The Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, once posited that war is “politics by other means.” In Clausewitz's traditional notion of war, political considerations must always lead military ones except in the case of a fight for survival. He also asserted that policy-making in wartime works best when military considerations are fully incorporated with the political, thereby producing a seamless policy.

In the years immediately following the Second World War, peace again prevailed. The architects of American foreign policy in the State Department therefore did not pay much heed to the military aspects of policy. Those tasked with evaluating the military aspects of policy, the Department of Defense planning staffs, largely deferred to their counterparts at the State Department. In the case of Franco’s Spain, much antipathy existed among the New Dealers of the State Department against his regime. Although they did not adopt an openly hostile stance, they pursued a policy of benign neglect toward Spain for a period of nearly five years. This policy ignored both important military and political aspects.

Historians such as Boris Liedtke assert that the military interests of the Department of Defense planners subordinated political considerations when the United States finally established relations with Franco’s Spain in the Pact of Madrid of 1953. This thesis will display that disequilibrium existed in American foreign policy toward Spain between 1945-1953 since the State Department ignored the Spanish question. The President then delegated negotiating authority to the Defense Department planners so that they could form a cohesive Spanish policy. The distinguishing factor of the Spanish negotiations was simply that they occurred under the aegis of military instead of civil authority. It will be shown that, in the case of Spain, military considerations did not supersede political ones, for they functioned in concert as Clausewitz originally put forward.
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Section I: Clausewitz in the Cold War

“...is whether in framing plans for a War the political point of view should give way to the purely military (if such a point were conceivable), that is to say, should disappear altogether, or subordinate itself to it, or whether the political is to remain the ruling point of view and the military to be considered subordinate to it.”
—Carl von Clausewitz

The New Principles of War

On his visit to Madrid a week after the signing of the Pact of Madrid that established the Spanish-American military alliance of September 1953, New York Times correspondent Cyrus Sulzberger commented on the “energetic, pushing, rather nice chap” who lead the American military mission there, Major General August Kissner of the United States Air Force. With his “typical Air Force mentality”, the General disregarded the moral issues behind the Spanish-American alliance. In this, he seemed to represent a new era of the Defense Department. After the civil authority neglected to form a cohesive foreign policy in respect to Spain, Congress and President Truman eventually designated Kissner’s military mission to negotiate bilateral relations with the government of Spain. Settling on the construction of four American military bases on Spanish soil, the Pact of Madrid allowed the United States to provide great sums of foreign aid to Spain under a military aegis. This amounted to the first time the Defense Department had exercised so much authority on the formation of American foreign policy. It left in its wake a troubled legacy as the Defense Department planning staffs took on a more permanent role in crafting foreign policy recommendations.

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3 Ibid, pp 897.
Despite its many peculiarities surrounding the involvement of the American military, the Spanish case did not constitute so radical a departure from the standard formation of foreign policy in wartime as its critics would believe. Several factors distinguished the Spanish Question from other Cold War cases. Generalissimo Franco rode into power on the coattails of Continental fascism during the bloody Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939. Battered and exhausted, Franco’s Spain did not join the Axis during the Second World War, though it maintained with the United States an official status of “non-belligerency”, and later in the war, of neutrality. By war’s end, Franco represented the vestige of a defeated ideology but somehow had managed to emerge on the other side of the war firmly in command of Spain. Ethically, Spain would make for an intolerable ally and should be excluded from such bodies as the United Nations. Yet as the need for foreign markets and the strategic contours of the Cold War determined, Spain could also serve a vital role in the community of Western nations. What to do with Spain remained an unresolved issue. The Spanish Question lingered in the public debate, as personal rivalries, petty grievances, and lack of bureaucratic coordination lent it an air of obscurity—as one Secretary of the Air Force called it “a separate stairway”.

Yet this was illusory in nature. As this thesis will analyze, any deviance from a standard wartime policy along the lines Clausewitz originally put forward in On War emanated from the failures of those agents involved rather than any from any structural shortcomings. In the formation of an American policy towards Spain, the “political” and the “military” functioned as complementary units of an overall objective.

By the time American planners began crafting a solution to the Spanish question in 1949, the Cold War was already underway. The return to traditional foreign policy formation in the years following the Second World War sometimes left important strategic concerns unheeded. In

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this light, the seminal lessons of war originally put forward by the 19th century theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, take on a modern relevance. In his estimation, policy worked best in wartime when the “political” led the “military”, or if the two complemented one another. This thesis intends to prove that, in a similar vein, the events leading to the signing of the Pact of Madrid in 1953 displayed that political and military considerations functioned in concert—without the predominance of one over the other.

The Military-Industrial Complex

Military aid during the decade of the 1950s exhibited the extent to which military considerations took root in Cold War America. When President Eisenhower addressed the nation a final time as President, he examined the extent of a new American phenomenon, the “military-industrial complex”. Its role, Eisenhower argued, safeguarded American strategic interests from Soviet subversion but conditioned a bellicose response from the people, “The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal government.” Safety came with a price, one that Eisenhower indentified as an increasing lack of civilian control over the military. A frequent outlet of defense production eventually presented itself as American foreign aid during the 1950s. Although the Marshall Plan fostered the development of a renewed community of interests in Europe, the Military Assistance Program and Mutual Security Program, to much less fanfare, extended foreign aid credits in the procurement of military equipment for America’s allies. By 1951, nearly seventy percent of all American foreign aid fell under the category of “Military Assistance”, rising from twenty-six

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6 Ibid
percent just one year earlier—an increase of $2 billion.\(^7\) The sums designated to military aid also increased. Over the decade of the 1950s, military assistance in its various forms comprised fifty-eight percent of all American foreign aid.\(^8\) Although all the foreign policy agencies of the government had a hand in forming policy recommendations, it was increasingly the task of the Department of Defense and its policy planning staffs to determine where military aid should go and in what quantities.

**Historiography**

The issue of American militarism—or the Military Industrial Complex—then took on a special significance in the academic community. Seeking to identify the first intrusions of this omnipresent and seemingly monolithic organization on American foreign policy, scholars looked to different points of origination from the early Cold War. The Spanish case seemed promising—for the military men of the Defense Department established relations with Spain in the Pact of Madrid of 1953, a nation that had been previously excluded from the global community of nations.

Theodore Lowi’s study *Bases in Spain* may be one of the first on the topic in 1963, yet it captured the bureaucratic motion that propelled the planning staffs of the Defense Department to the fore in constructing a Spanish policy.\(^9\) Lacking many of the benefits of declassified archives, Lowi remained somewhat uneasy about indicating who, in his estimation, won out: the political or the military. Although he briefly mentioned the matter, he refrained from examining it in full.

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Boris Liedtke asserted in his most recent study of 1998, *Embracing a Dictatorship*, that the “the US willingness to compromise” in granting Spanish demands late in the diplomatic process revealed the militaristic bent of the Defense Department generals in executing the Spanish policy.\textsuperscript{10} Military considerations, then, subordinated political ones. He stated this in no uncertain terms, “Military considerations had clearly overruled America’s democratic and liberal convictions.”\textsuperscript{11}

This interpretation, however, treats political considerations separately from military ones. In this new state of cold war, these interests could not be so easily divorced. Those who promoted defense interests did so with the understanding that it was an expedient and less apparent means of putting forward a cohesive Spanish policy—a policy that adequately examined political, ideological, and social considerations. Early ideas for Spanish integration, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff originally put forward, gave due consideration to political implications in a rather even-handed manner. These proposals met resistance from the State Department and President Truman—who interpreted political considerations through the narrow lens of ideology. This perspective omitted strategic, economic, and humanitarian concerns in the process. As a means of bringing about a swift resolution to the Spanish question, several Congressmen and thought-leaders re-inserted the language of defense back into the debate. After several legislative defeats, Truman acquiesced in the base agreements and placed blame upon the “military men” of the Pentagon.\textsuperscript{12} The decision in Washington to pursue the base agreements emerged as the compromise of a long and complicated political process. There were no clear winners, since the prestige of all suffered in the process.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, pp. 213.
\textsuperscript{12} Liedkte, pp. 91, 106.
Method

Historians have long attempted to insert, adapt, or read the seminal text of *On War* by Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian theorist of political realism, into the history of the Cold War. Azar Gat, correctly exposed modern American interpretations as creating an artificial “Marxist ‘Clausewitz connection’”\(^\text{13}\). Several inconsistencies emerge from the outset. Namely, the topos of war had seemingly changed. Nuclear weapons seemingly rendered conventional methods obsolete. Yet this change occurred in appearance only. This thesis does not seek to prove Clausewitz correct or to hold *On War* as a categorical standard. Rather, understanding how the “military” and “political” relate to one another in the construction of policy—the language of politics—provides a sound thematic basis for analyzing the Spanish question.

This thesis seeks to examine the Spanish question and the complex interactions of its many actors in order to display how the military and political were complimentary rather than competitive aspects of policy formulation. These were traits that Clausewitz first identified as national policy in planning for a war—a description that best captures how the Spanish-American base agreements emerged. To better understand the relation of the political to the military in the early years of the Cold War, this thesis recognizes four discreet periods.

The first—the policy vacuum of 1945-1949—emerged as the planning staffs of the Defense Department maintained little organization and thus could not form cohesive policy recommendations spanning the interests of all the military branches. Yet their early experience is telling. Not only did they take into account political, economic, and a host of other considerations into their policy goals, they deferred to the civil authority to make such judgments. Meanwhile, the majority of the State Department policy staff remained hostile to

Franco’s Spain influencing what can broadly be described as their political considerations. The subsequent prolonging of a definitive policy created a vacuum from 1945 to 1949 in which shortsighted political objectives took precedence over long-term political and strategic objectives.

The second period, the ascendance of the political “Junketeers” on Capitol Hill from 1949 to 1950, began as American political leaders recognized the need to establish diplomatic relations with Spain and the infeasibility of simply ignoring the problem. Senator McCarran, a vehemently pro-Catholic and anti-Communist Senator from Nevada and the former American ambassador to Spain, Carlton Hayes, appropriated the language of defense as an important component to their overall objective of Spanish inclusion. They formed what became known as the “Spanish Lobby” a group of political, business, and religious interests that actively promoted the cause of the Spain in Congress.

In the third period, the success of the efforts of the Spanish Lobby revealed the intransigence of President Truman and formerly of Secretary of State Acheson, sparking a radicalization of all parties involved followed by a headlong rush toward forming a Spanish policy. Although Acheson reversed his stance on the Spanish situation, President Truman held-up the legislative process that could have otherwise bestowed upon Spain greater allotments of economic aid. Despite the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and eventually the State Department itself that Franco was in Spain to stay, President Truman could not bring himself to tolerate him at any level. As a matter of priority, the immediate aid Congress allotted to Spain was for the construction of military bases that the Spaniards would then lease out to the Americans.

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14 Lowi, Bases in Spain. pp. 11.
15 Liedtke, Embracing a Dictatorship. pp. 59.
Finally, the fourth period saw the convergence of military and political interests into a single instrument of policy that the Department of Defense, through its arbitrators on the ground, ultimately crafted: The Spanish-American Pact of Madrid in 1953. From its earlier, more fragmented days, the Defense Department generals proved capable of executing the policy. They did so based upon the coordination of a number of ad hoc committees created for that purpose. This revealed how the earlier postponements had hindered the identification and implementation of valid political objectives. What emerged was nothing short of the full expression of national political interests over purely military ones.

**The Characters**

Between retirements, transfers, promotions, elections, and untimely deaths, the face of the diplomatic and defense establishments changed greatly from 1945 to 1954. In tracing the history of the relations between Spain and the United States in the eight years following the Second World War, some figures appear in multiple sections—George Marshall served as Chairman of Army, Secretary of State, and finally as Secretary of Defense during the period of study. Others, like Jaume Miravittles, appear only for an instance. Some of these figures acted as forces of stimulation to better adhere military to political considerations in foreign policy planning while the rest represented forces of restraint. Yet they all served important roles in defining the conditions under which Western defense planning was conceived in Spain.

In the years of the policy vacuum from 1945 to 1949, several inter-branch military committees emerged as the prime engines of coordination among the armed forces. By the conclusion of the Second World War, they answered to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of War/Navy. During the period of study, they gradually gained more autonomy, answering directly to the Secretary of Defense and his Secretariat. Originally intended to
facilitate coordination with the Allies in terms of educing strategic scenarios, the Joint War Plans Committee and its subordinate Joint Strategic Survey Committee grew to be comprised of influential “three flag” general staff officers by the end of the Second World War. After the establishment of the National Military Establishment in 1947—the predecessor of the modern Department of Defense—this committee evolved to become the Joint Strategic Plans Group. The JSPG among the rest of the planning committees imagined future combat scenarios and suggested the means the Defense Department should employ to meet potential threats. The Joint Intelligence Committee/Staff also was responsible for long-range scenarios. Other influential planning committees included the Joint Staff Planners and the Joint Logistics Committee. The Joint Staff Planners served as the most senior planners of their respective military branches. The Joint Logistics Committee examined the approximate needs of the military in both men and material to bring any proposed policies to fruition. Finally, the Joint Intelligence Committee compiled analyses of the current military knowledge for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Over the course of the period in study, the committees slightly changed names as the agency underwent a series of reorganizations.

At the same time, the Catalan Jaume Miravittles appeared at the Directorate of Spanish Information for the State Department with a scathing report against the voices in the National Military Establishment and elsewhere that contemplated some sort of military alliance with Franco’s Spain. This report circulated to the White House and to the National Military Establishment in 1948 to remind planners south of the Potomac to hold fast to the line of Spanish exclusion. Miravittles had good reason for his strong opinions. He was a progressive and sided

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on the political left in Spanish politics. More specifically, he was a Catalan nationalist and a member of a separatist political party known as the *Esquerra*.\textsuperscript{18} Along with his friend, the Catalan historian Companys, the two consistently wrote policies for the flagging republic out of Barcelona. Eventually, the Nationalist victory prompted the two to go into exile. While organizing exiled Catalans in Vichy France during the Second World War, German authorities caught-up with Companys. The Germans deported him to Spain, where he was swiftly tried and executed.\textsuperscript{19}

After James Forrestal began to falter as the Secretary of Defense, President Truman brought in Louis Johnson. His ongoing fight with Secretary of State Acheson over military preparedness revealed the extent to which personal rivalries hindered the needs of American foreign policy—forcing it through channels it may not have gone otherwise. Originally a New Dealer, Johnson left the War Department in 1940 after President Roosevelt asked Johnson to step down.\textsuperscript{20} Roosevelt thought it prudent to bring more Republicans into his administration on the brink of war. As a Washington outsider born in Western Virginia to a grocer, Louis Johnson possessed a populist connection to the people that few else in Washington could display. Roosevelt valued Johnson for his rough-and-tumble style and frequently promised Johnson the post of Secretary of War when it should become available.\textsuperscript{21} Johnson, a former heavyweight-boxing champion during his college days at the University of Virginia, spent three years fighting his way up the War Department to be its Assistant Secretary. Due to the political necessities at

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, pp. 117.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, pp. 101.
the time, Johnson had to go. In 1948, Johnson earned the recognition of President Truman, raising campaign funds and improving Truman’s political standing among veterans during a contentious primary battle. Upon his arrival at Defense, he promised to make changes—to lead from the top of the reporting structure. On the issue of Spanish integration, Johnson held a different view than the President though he deferred to the interests of the State Department regularly.

In the second section, several figures appear who attempted to insert Spain back into the foreign policy dialogue of the late 1940s. The most prominent of these were Carlton Hayes, the former United States Ambassador to Spain and Seth Low Professor of History at Columbia University, and Senator Patrick McCarran, one the great firebrands of the Senate in the 1940s and 1950s. A frequent target of those who supported the creation of a Spanish policy was Secretary of State Dean Acheson. His counterpart at the Department of Defense, Louis Johnson largely followed the political line of the Truman administration, but in the last instance, demurred concerning the administration’s lack of concern of military considerations in the formation of foreign policy in Spain. Some others made an appearance, but only briefly. A notable trait of these other fringe political figures who called for a pro-Spanish policy was that they ascribed to the platform of the so-called “Spanish Lobby”—group of businessmen, politicians, and Catholic clergy who desired the resumption of full diplomatic relations between Spain and the United States.

From a quiet, upstate New York town, Carlton Hayes came to Columbia College in 1900 and continued his graduate studies in history under the tutelage of Charles Beard, earning his

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22 McFarland, pp. 101.  
23 Ibid, pp. 135, pp. 137  
24 Lowi, pp. 2
Ph.D. in 1909 at the age of twenty-eight.\(^\text{25}\) Hayes served as the United States Ambassador to Spain starting in 1942 for the duration of the Second World War. During Congressional hearings for the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, references to “Columbia University’s history professor” Carlton Hayes appeared.\(^\text{26}\) Hayes was no stranger to the defense community. Between graduating from Columbia College in 1904 and rising to full professorship by 1919, Hayes served as an intelligence officer with the General Staff of the Army during the First World War.\(^\text{27}\) He converted to Roman Catholicism after his own graduate studies convinced him of the existence of universal historical truths—such as economic justifications for history, which his biographer described as “socialistic”.\(^\text{28}\) Yet over his academic career, his reviews were mixed with others questioning Hayes’ liberal credentials.\(^\text{29}\) President Roosevelt tapped Hayes to be the Ambassador to Spain in 1942 inviting criticism from the political left on account of Hayes’ overt position that the United States draw Spain away from the Axis by recognizing Franco’s regime.

Senator McCarran was raised in austerity. Born to Irish immigrant parents who raised livestock on the barren Nevada wastelands, McCarran’s Catholic faith held an especially central role in his personal development.\(^\text{30}\) Despite early political success in Nevada state politics, McCarran opted to abandon the livestock business and move out of the Reno area altogether to the mining towns that were springing up further to the south in places like Tonopah and Goldfield. There, he made a name for himself as a talented defense attorney who gained a


\(^{26}\) Congressional Record, 81\textsuperscript{st} Congress, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session, vol 96, no 5 May 10. pp. 3964.


\(^{28}\) Ibid.

\(^{29}\) Ibid.

reputation for his “emotional oratory” for the common man, the lowly “sinner”.  
McCarran possessed immense populist appeal. During the 1906-7 Goldfield strike, McCarran sided with the IWW and the miners—denouncing the current Nevada governor and thus limiting his immediate political in the process. Yet McCarran was also a politician of the times. Upon his election to the Senate in 1932, he attached himself to the tenets of the New Deal, ensuring that “contentment may come to the masses of the people and that the forgotten man shall be kept constantly in mind.”  
He later broke with the New Deal during the Truman era. During the early years of the Cold War, as his Senatorial power waned, he grew increasingly fraught at the thought of Communist subversives working in the federal government. Above all else, McCarran was a strong Catholic. He even called upon the Vatican during the Second World War in an attempt to secure the release of Joseph McDonald, the son of family friend who was stationed on Wake Island during the Japanese invasion of 1942 and subsequently taken prisoner.

At this point, Secretary Acheson did not support Spanish inclusion. Born as the son of a preacher and living in Middletown, Connecticut, Acheson grew-up in an upper middle class setting. He then was educated at the Groton School alongside future New Dealers whom we could count as his friends. Among these, Acheson developed a particularly strong friendship with W. Averell Harriman, the future shipping magnate, diplomat, and politician. After going on to Yale and Harvard Law School, Acheson distinguished himself as an international lawyer before clerking for Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in 1919.  

Although Acheson supported the Roosevelt Administration as Under Secretary of the Treasury in 1933, he fell out

31 Jerome Edwards, pp. 17, 8.  
33 Ibid, pp. 124  
with Roosevelt over his stance on the President’s currency inflation scheme and resigned.\(^{36}\) One of the original architects of America’s Cold War foreign policy, Acheson rejoined the Roosevelt Administration in the State Department during the Second World War and rose to be its Secretary under the Truman Administration in 1949. Early during his tenure at the State Department, his “Eurocentric” tendencies began to show forth.\(^{37}\) Over this and a variety of other issues, he would clash with the Secretary of Defense from 1949-1950, Louis Johnson.

In the third section, the Defense Department begins to take initiative in forming American foreign policy since several years of inaction exposed breadth of American political and military considerations by securing an allied Spain. At this point, most of American interests in Spain fell into the category of the strategic. As such, President Truman delegated policy-making authority to the Defense planners. President Truman pursued such a plan for efficiency and to assuage administration critics who thought Truman was bungling the Korean War effort. Secretary Acheson took on a more proactive role in forming a cohesive Spanish policy alongside the new Secretaries of Defense, George Marshall followed by Robert Lovett. As a disconnect appeared between the political and military authorities following the Korean crisis of June 1950, much criticism against the Truman administration surfaced. Moreover, most of this criticism was levied at Secretary Johnson at the Defense Department and at Secretary Acheson.

After Secretary Johnson left the Truman administration, Acheson alone suffered the brunt of attacks from administration critics on account his Eurocentrism that ignored other areas of the world. Among the critics, Senator McCarran was prominent. He even brought Acheson before his Senate Internal Security Subcommittee—originally designed to root out accused Communists

\(^{36}\) Beisner, pp. 13.
\(^{37}\) Ibid, pp. 512, 14.
from the federal government—on account of his perceived incompetence in late 1952.\textsuperscript{38} Although Acheson survived politically until the change of administrations in 1953, his previous reluctance to rearm West Germany, to integrate Spain, and to place more emphasis in Far Eastern affairs hampered any strong stances he might have maintained. For the rest of his tenure as Secretary of State, Acheson kept a low profile.

In the fourth section, Robert Lovett succeeded George Marshall as Secretary of Defense in 1951—a period during which the Defense Department pursued bilateral relations with Spain along the lines that Congress and the President had designated. After Louis Johnson left the Department of Defense, President Truman called George Marshall, the former Secretary of State and renowned General of the Army from the Second World War, out of retirement to serve as the agency’s Secretary.\textsuperscript{39} Although the National Security Act of 1947 prohibited anyone who received a military commission in the prior ten years from serving as Secretary of Defense, Congress exempted Marshall.\textsuperscript{40} During this period, the Korean War demanded much of Marshall’s policy initiative and he did not play a specific role in crafting a Spanish policy. Yet Secretary Marshall would retire from public life after a year as Defense Secretary.

Finally, Robert Lovett appeared as Secretary of Defense in 1951 until the end of the Truman administration. Lovett managed the Defense Department’s improved policy role by continuing the agency’s internal reorganizations that his predecessors began. Lovett was also a close friend of Averell Harriman dating back to their childhood, and more recently, as alumni of the Skull and Bones Society of Yale.\textsuperscript{41} Before completing his degree at Yale, Lovett served as a naval pilot in the First World War alongside the Yale Flying Unit, a group of ambitious

\textsuperscript{38} Beisner, pp. 52.
\textsuperscript{41} Isaacson, \textit{The Wise Men}. pp. 21.
undergraduates-turned-aviators. Lovett met General Marshall during the Second World War when Lovett was the Assistant Secretary of War for Air. In this role, he earned the esteem of Marshall. After the Second World War, Marshall called on Lovett from Brown Brothers Harriman to serve as his Under Secretary in 1949. Lovett was also on good terms with Acheson through their respective social circles.

Along with these figures others made important contributions though they did not necessarily give much regard to Franco or Spain in particular. Others in the military like General Omar Bradley, and a series of Joint Chiefs of Staff also played central roles in the Spanish negotiations, yet they responded to the policy imperatives of the civil authority. The integration of Spain was a complex situation, for it relied on many different agencies and a confluence of peculiar circumstances.

Section II: The Policy Vacuum

The Early Years

Between 1945 and 1949, military considerations did not dominate political ones. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and their subalterns eventually revealed their more circumspect conceptions of political interests in their future war scenarios. Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff displayed an unwillingness and inability to broach the Spanish question, thus limiting the scope of military interests—leaving the civil authority to determine the course of the Spanish policy. Three factors hindered the Defense Department’s potential in pursuing the Spanish question in conjunction with other federal agencies: initially, the fragmentary nature of military oversight precluded any

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43 Ibid. pp. 118.
44 Ibid, pp. 117.
agency-wide initiatives or agreement on policy; the war planners of the defense committees did not put much importance into placing American military resources in Spain; finally, the competition between the branches of the military again limited the scope of the agency’s authority. Although some at the State Department called for a new approach instead of the diplomatic non-recognition of Spain, a strong countercurrent emerged that identified political considerations solely upon an ideological basis. A period of indecision ensued producing a vacuum in policy. With this in mind, the sudden turn of Spanish-American relations in the early 1950s eventually put forward many of the policy ideas that first originated from the Defense planners.

“A Loose Confederation of Independent Fiefdoms”

The early components of the Defense Department exhibit a lack of coordination extending across all the branches on both the civil and military structures. Adam Yarmolinsky, who chronicled the rise of the Defense Department in such works as *The Military Establishment*, conceded that by the 1970s, the DoD had grown too big for its own good, “The flexibility needed to deal with new threats is compromised by the dead weight of established force structures.” Yet earlier in it history, the agency displayed a great amount of operational flexibility, “The military establishment as an organization is usually visualized as a monolith, but in reality it is more like a modern structure of prestressed concrete held together by the tensions of opposite forces.” This adaptability emerged from the early days of the National Military Establishment as petty rivalries merged with the ad hoc needs of the institution, “From 1947 to 1961, the Department of Defense was a loose confederation of independent fiefdoms, uneasily presided

over by the Secretary of Defense.” 47 “Fiefdoms” can rarely function in concert, and even more sparingly refrain from fighting amongst themselves. In this light, the reports of the Defense planners served as weak recommendations to the actual decision makers in the State Department.

Despite their efficient management of the American war machine during the Second World War, the Joint Chiefs lacked the organization during the immediate postwar years to gain appreciable influence in foreign policy formation. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War Secretaries were the architects of the military recommendations that informed policy decisions, their absence on account of administrative issues exposed a lack of attention of military considerations in policy formation. The military thus functioned as subsidiaries of the political.

With the development of a permanent military establishment in the postwar years, the need to establish bases abroad in the defeated axis nations now occupied an uncomfortable locus between the military and civilian authority. Chief of Staff of the Army, General George Marshall, called for clarification of the military’s future role, particularly about developing American bases abroad in JCS 1496 “United States Military Policy.” 48 In Marshall’s estimation, global military commitments were quickly becoming a matter of policy.

Then Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew swiftly responded through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. He indicated the need to comply with new, international framework, “It [JCS 1496] also ignores the need for making clear that our military policy must conform with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to employ force only under

Ostensibly, this directly ruled out Spain. If there were any ambiguity as to American intentions to Spain, the Tripartite Declaration of March 1946 between the United Kingdom, France, and the United States removed it:

“It is agreed that so long as General Franco continues in control of Spain the Spanish people cannot anticipate full and cordial association with those nations of the world which have, by common effort, brought defeat to German Nazism and Italian Fascism, which aided the present Spanish regime in its rise to power and after which the regime was patterned.”

The civil authority was firmly in control of the Spanish question. By December 1946, they had also voted on the UN Resolution to remove all ambassadors of member nations from Spain. Nonetheless, the State Department pledged to keep abreast of strategic developments. They committed to forwarding a cohesive policy that took into account military issues, “It is the view of the Department of State that the maximum degree of security can be obtained only if our foreign policy and our military policy are mutually helpful.” It was their hope going forward that both would be given due consideration since it appeared that a permanent and global military presence would have a great bearing on American foreign relations. As the National Military Establishment took shape, Spain attracted the interest of the policy planners of the defense community.

**Scenarios of War**

Although they lacked the organization to pursue their policy recommendations, the planning staffs of the early Defense Department did not ignore political considerations. The method by which they arrived at their recommendations involved the analysis of a great number
of factors—not all of which pertained directly to military action. These recommendations did not always favor Spanish inclusion, though they did call for a different approach to the Spanish question. They did this by writing recommendations based upon future conflicts with the Soviet Union. Under what circumstances would strategic interests lead the United States to ally itself with another nation? How would political considerations affect the willingness of the United States to make allegiances during peacetime? By 1949, the military planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed these questions and more. They had come to understand the political while their civilian counterparts did not understand the military.

The strategic importance of Spain first appeared to the National Military Establishment only as a stopgap against a potential Soviet invasion of Western Europe in its future war scenarios. These did not entail the commitment of the American defense establishment to Spain since they precluded American involvement in Iberia unless war broke out. After all, it was a general hope that the United Nations could offer some security against foreign intervention through small-scale and sustained action. The Joint War Plans Committee first compiled future war scenarios in April 1946. Its successor organization, the Joint Logistics Plans Committee, and its subsidiaries, the Joint Intelligence Committee and Joint Logistics Plans Group, followed suit. The future scenarios of the Joint Chiefs, PINCHER, DRUMBEAT, BROILER, and BUSHWACKER, all dealt with Spain at some level. Most were pessimistic about American prospects in Europe. Some of these reports dealt with the Spanish situation only in passing while others focused more specifically on Spain. The lack of intra-department consensus and the factionalism between the military branches detracted from the potential policy influence of these

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war scenarios. Yet their conception of Spain, in some cases, interpreted political considerations in a more nuanced manner than did their counterparts across the Potomac.

The Pyrenees initially appeared to the military planners as bridge-too-far, but as they recognized the sheer mass of the Soviet and Eastern bloc militaries that had not yet departed Eastern Europe, circumstance forced them to consider the possibility of further Soviet expansion. Comprised of former intelligence and logistics officers of the Joint Post War Committee who now had more time, the Joint Intelligence Staff and the Joint War Plans Committee set to work preparing for future conflicts. Early reports from late 1945 to March 1946 frankly admitted the unfavorable gap of conventional forces that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union—with nearly three hundred divisions a few hundred miles from the heart of Western Europe counting those of the Eastern bloc nations. In their calculus, the JWPC determined that, with the current Soviet presence in Europe, the Soviet military could conquer Europe as the opening phase of a larger operation to take the Middle East. They estimated that there would be a “stiff price” to pay once the Soviets reached the Pyrenees. As a line of defense against a Continental European invasion by the Soviets, the Pyrenees attracted some attention in defense circles as early as 1946.

From recognizing the vulnerabilities of the Western defense matrix, the Defense committees then anticipated their alternatives that, in most cases, did not involve direct commitments to Spain. The Joint War Plans Committee wrote the first strategic scenario reports for the Joint Planning Committee in the form of PINCHER—regarding the outbreak of war with

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54 Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, pp. 150.
56 Schnabel, pp. 71.
57 Ibid, pp. 71.
the Soviet Union within the next few years on April 27, 1946.\(^{58}\) This report served as the basis for other such global scenarios such as CALDRON, COCKSPUR, MOONRISE, and most importantly for Spain, DRUMBEAT, which was subtitled “The Soviet Threat Against the Iberian Peninsula and the Means Required to Meet It.”\(^{59}\) As policy planners, it was their responsibility to plan hypothetical responses, which required a greater understanding of the political. In the unlikely event that the likely Soviet enemy attacked various parts of the world, the military could provide at least theoretical responses.

PINCHER recognized that, if faced with a confrontation with the whole of the Soviet military, aid to the Spanish military may arrive too late and that the immediate construction of bases may not be necessary. Spain, though strategically valuable in the eyes of the JWPC, maintained an ambiguous role in the event of a Soviet-American war in 1947-1948. The primary objective, the eradication of the “Soviet will to resist” could only be brought about swiftly by the “collapse of her totalitarian government; destruction of her industry or the complete disruption of her communication system (LOC lines of communication).”\(^{60}\) With the implications of a strategic air campaign against Soviet communications and transportation systems, air bases would be desirable. In the likely event that the Soviets overran the Rhine along with American bases in Western Germany, Iberian bases seemed attractive, but potentially unnecessary. PINCHER also admitted that, if the Soviets invaded by 1949, they would overrun each Western European nation in a matter of weeks, “The Red Army should have little difficulty in completely

\(^{58}\) Schnabel, pp. 74.

\(^{59}\) Jill Edwards, pp. 220.

overrunning Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Austria, and France." In a matter of two months, the Soviet military could penetrate all the way to the Iberian Peninsula.

In this case, Spain could serve a vital role with the Pyrenees as a natural barrier, but not as much else. The Iberian Peninsula could be a foothold on the Continent to which the armies of the Western Europe retreat if the Soviet armies overpowered them, “it is probable that any remaining allied forces might be withdrawn either to Italy, the Iberian Peninsula to protect the western entrance to the Mediterranean.” Since Spain’s thirty highly anti-Communist military divisions could be counted upon to resist a Soviet “occupation”, the air forces of United States and Great Britain would then disrupt exposed Soviet supply lines. With this in mind, the Joint

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61 Joint War Plans Committee 423/3 “PINCHER”, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 27 April, 1946 RJCS Part II: The Soviet Union.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
War Plans Committee predicted that the Soviets would attempt to stab directly toward the Iberian Peninsula. Yet this did not entail a commitment to defend Spain, since the planners felt confident that American and British air power could halt the Soviet advance on the doorstep of the Pyrenees. Some doubts lingered as to what political course of action the Caudillo would pursue, “In any event, Spanish assistance outside her borders cannot be counted upon to influence military action.” Nonetheless, PINCHER provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff a strategic understanding of a future war with the Soviet Union that did not entail any specific American commitments to Spain.

Although the earlier reports of the planning staffs of the defense department examined Spanish potential through the one-dimensional prism of conventional military force, these studies enabled them to take into account domestic conditions in Spain. Admittedly, the earliest mention of Spain by the Joint Intelligence Staff simply examined the ability of Spain to militarily resist a Soviet invasion in their report titled “Invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by the USSR” of December 1946. Later known as the “‘A’ Team Report”, it also examined the existing military bases of Spain, “Available facilities are sufficient for use of the present Spanish Air Force and will probably be ample to accommodate any Air Force expansion which might occur in the next three years.” As a conclusion to PINCHER, it determined no pressing need to make inroads to Spain. Even at this early juncture, the Defense planners realized that they could accomplish their wartime objectives of using Spain’s five hundred thousand man army, the fourth largest in Europe at the time, without so much as Franco’s assent. Though they were severely

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64 Joint War Plans Committee 423/3 “PINCHER”, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 27 April, 1946 RJCS: Part II.: The Soviet Union.
underestimating the resolve of Franco, diplomatic concerns also began to appear from the perspective of the defense planners.

Their following report “Soviet Logistic Capabilities for Support of Iberian Campaign and Air Assault on Great Britain”, likewise did not propose American involvement in Spain for more pessimistic reasons. Considering the implications for the “western end of the Mediterranean”, the JIS doubted that the United States and Allies stood a chance at stopping the Soviets in Spain, “The size of the forces required to assist the Spanish to defend Spain may be prohibitive in view of other demands upon our available forces.”66 The United States could simply not furnish the troops to make the defense of Spain feasible. Any aid—economic or military—would be wasted.

The JWPC also revealed its ability to conduct an adequate and thorough economic, political, and military analysis of the Spanish question. In their subsequent report written in August 1947 titled “DRUMBEAT”, the Joint War Plans Committee marked a turning point in conceptions of Spain in the Defense community—they called for direct American economic assistance to the beleaguered Iberian nation. Despite their conclusion that the United States could afford to forgo an immediate resolution to the Spanish problem, the JWPC desired that resolution occur some time in the future. These military leaders never presumed to second-guess of the better judgment of their counterparts at the Department of State, and thus DRUMBEAT, “The Soviet Threat Against the Iberian Peninsula and the Means Required to Meet It” was consigned to the Defense Department’s growing shelf of future war scenarios.

The Joint War Plans Committee extended the premises of PINCHER to anticipate a Soviet invasion of Western Europe first—thus eliminating the militaries of almost every American ally in a single fell swoop. The Soviet military would then harass American interests

66 Joint Intelligence Staff. “Soviet Logistic Capabilities for Support of Iberian Campaign and Air Assault on Great Britain” March 5, 1947. RJCS: The Soviet Union; part II: 1946-1953
in other areas around the world. The JWPC assumed that Spain would “actively resist a Soviet invasion of the Iberian Peninsula.”\(^{67}\) Should the Soviet military chose to overrun Spain and Portugal, the JWPC reasoned that they could do it with 50 divisions and 1,000 aircraft in about two months—or “D+60” after crossing the Pyrenees.\(^{68}\)

Aside from the military recommendations their plan put forward, the JWPC also recognized the political intricacies of the Spanish problem. They understood, that barring the unlikely event of another civil war in Spain or international pressure to remove Franco from power, he would most likely remain the Caudillo:

“The Franco government has been supported by powerful groups—the Army, the Church, the large landholders and the conservative business and financial classes…Against these forces and particularly the Army and police, masses of the Spanish people, hating Falange rule but dreading another civil war, have had no weapons to enforce their will. A myriad of clandestine political and labor groups are active but unable to achieve cooperation among themselves or gain the essential support of the Army for political change.”\(^{69}\)

This was quite a detailed report for those who the State Department considered to be inept at understanding the political. The Monarchists and petty bourgeoisie remained divided—with the majority falling into Franco’s orbit. If Don Juan, the Bourbon regent in exile, returned to Spain, a Conservative constitutional monarchy could potentially supplant Franco’s regime, “If Don Juan were to return, the government would still be anti-Communist and political activity would be permitted [to] other groups.”\(^{70}\) The Joint Chiefs did not discount the return of a Socialist Spanish government—for it would not be pliable to Soviet political pressure. The chances of the latter case were slim since the Army and the Falange retained a monopoly on political power, and would most likely resist political change through force of arms. The Anarcho-Communist

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\(^{68}\) Ibid. The Soviet Union: part II: 1946-1953.

\(^{69}\) Ibid.

\(^{70}\) Ibid.
elements of the former trade unions would surely side with the Soviet bloc if another confrontation similar to the Spanish Civil War were to again occur.

Despite the current problems in Spain, the Joint War Plans Committee desired further action in Spain, in order to avoid direct American involvement—hence embracing a dictator. Rather, the JWPC through their political estimate of DRUMBEAT, sought to enable the Spaniards to defend themselves with minimal American involvement. Since Franco would be in Spain to stay, barring foreign interference in Spain’s internal affairs, the JWPC then considered what could best promote the Western defense, “Although very unlikely the next three years, continued poor living standards might in time result in a change to a government more sympathetic to the U.S.S.R.”\textsuperscript{71} An improved standard of living could improve not only the military situation in Spain, but the political one as well, “Communist infiltration is facilitated by poor economic conditions and conversely is inhibited by a good standard of living. Economic assistance might prevent significant pro-Communist sentiment in Spain and thus should strengthen the anti-Communist position.”\textsuperscript{72} The JWPC understood that other, perhaps more important political considerations were at stake in Spain and addressed them. Yet their choice was clear. Since political considerations at their extreme were not so different than political ones, the United States should resume economic relations with Spain, “The question of economic aid to Spain during peace is subject to many considerations; however, from the military point of view, improvement of Spain’s economic status is very desirable since it might remove the threat of a Soviet invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and thus safeguard the Straits of Gibraltar.”\textsuperscript{73} As Soviet influence grew, national security could rightly be called a political motivtion. The first

\textsuperscript{71} Joint War Plans Committee 432/7. “DRUMBEAT”. August 4, 1947. RJCS: The Soviet Union: part II.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
course of action DRUMBEAT advocated called for the United States to “furnish economic aid to Spain as soon as possible.”

It was at this point that the divide between military and political objectives seemed to dissolve. If the United States deferred its decision-making regarding Spain for fear of Soviet and Western European political repercussions, Stalin could continue to exploit the apparent discord among the Western Allies. Political opposition in Spain did exist; Franco permitted it to speak, but not act. One of the first American accounts of post-World War Spain put it succinctly, “Franco allows opposition mice to scurry until the squeaks become too loud. Then out flicks a paw and—silence.” Publishing anti-regime literature could still land one in prison. Yet, the opposition settled for this status quo if only to avoid repeating the Spanish Civil War. What opposition did exist in exile in France and the United Kingdom—the Monarchist and Socialist factions—remained divided over the issues of a monarchical restoration. The nominal Soviet patronage of the Socialists in exile also prevented an opposition alliance from forming, although this patronage had no “appreciable influence on its policies”. The only real purpose of this limited Soviet support, in the estimation of the JWPC, was to divide Franco’s foreign opposition, “Presumably this support is continued in part for propaganda purposes and in part in the hope of preventing a rapprochement of exiled republican and leftist groups with the monarchists.” The JWPC also analyzed Soviet intentions for not taking a more aggressive stance against Spain:

“Although the Soviet government has urged that drastic measures be taken by the United Nations to oust Franco and has been loud in its support for the return of the republic, it is not believed that the Soviets are too dissatisfied with the present situation. Not only is Franco a convenient target

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76 Ibid, pp. 192.
78 Ibid.
for their propaganda, but a peaceful change to a constitutional monarch, the only likely alternative to dictatorship, offers them little advantage.”

In their estimation, the JWPC recognized that the Spanish question could serve as a wedge issue among the nascent North Atlantic Treaty nations. The original purpose of the Tripartite Declaration was to bring about political improvements in Spain, among others, a “peaceful withdrawal of Franco, the abolition of the Falange, and the establishment of a caretaker government […], political amnesty, the return of exiled Spaniards, freedom of assembly and political association, and provision for free public elections”. Over the course of the previous year and a half, the civil authorities of the Tripartite Powers had not made any headway with their task. Perhaps economic incentives could lead to political improvements in Spain. Although no desirable course of action presented itself, at least economic aid could lead to the “only likely alternative to dictatorship.”

The estimates of the JWPC were hardly shortsighted. As military recommendations first, DRUMBEAT identified the strategic importance of Spanish inclusion from the outset. At a certain point, these recommendations held great political importance. Yet it was possible, from the perspective of the Joint Chiefs, that economic coincide with political improvement. They did not forsake the lot of those that dissented from Franco’s Nationalists; they were not imperceptive of the important political questions of the day. Yet from a balanced political and military perspective, no viable alterative to Franco presented itself.

Yet DRUMBEAT was a scenario that hinged upon a direct Soviet invasion of Spain—a proposition that the Joint Chiefs listed as unlikely. In the worst-case scenario, the Spaniards could hold out until “D+150”—or roughly five months after the Soviets began the invasion.

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80 The Times. March 5, 1946; pg. 4; Issue 50392; col F.
This would provide the United States and its allies enough time to mount a relief or retreat effort. With a 1-to-1 ratio of Spanish defenders to potential Soviet adversaries, the Spaniards stood a chance of holding the Soviet advance to the Pyrenees. The British and American Air Forces could then halt the Soviet advance by delivering crippling blows to its resupply network extending across France and West Germany.


DRUMBEAT was notable for several reasons. The JWPC put forward an accurate assessment of Spanish economic, political, and military considerations. It also displayed a keen perception of items not usually factored into political estimates such as topography, geology, hydrology, the state of public health, and agriculture. They mapped out every possible avenue of a potential Soviet invasion along with its different phases and analyzed what resources those
Soviet invaders would require while in Spain. The result was a sophisticated understanding of the Iberian Peninsula and its politics. The thoughtfulness and thoroughness of the war planners surpassed that of their counterparts at the Department of State.

“BROILER”, a subsequent report by the Joint War Plans Group, the successor organization of the JWPC, with the aid of the Joint Intelligence Committee revealed that the Soviet Union could not penetrate as far as the Iberian Peninsula on account of logistical problems, thus ruling out the need for Spanish cooperation in advance. The report forwarded two opposing views, View A, which ruled out a Soviet invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, and View B, which anticipated one. Unless the Soviet military somehow managed to quickly eviscerate Iberian resistance, the supply problems detailed in View A would hinder troop movements. On this basis, the JIC recommended that military aid be designated to Spain in the event of war, but not before, since it would take the Soviets “D+90” to reach the foot of the Pyrenees in Southern France. This automatically precluded providing long-term military assistance to Spain. Specifically, it was the Soviet Union’s lack of aviation gasoline, access to European railroads that the allies would have demolished by this time, and experienced aircrews of a “Long Range Air Force” that would do as much damage to the Soviet advance as Allied bombs.

The JIC determined in BROILER that Spain’s usefulness in the event of war was confined to its strategic location—not its military capabilities. For this, the JIC predicted that Franco would welcome Western militaries as to not fall beneath the Soviet axe himself. Again, it was preferable, but not necessary, that Spain’s military be reequipped so they could contribute to the defense of the Pyrenees. The Soviet military would most likely neutralize the nations of Western Europe, “It is concluded […] that against probable opposing forces the Soviets have the

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82 The Joint Intelligence Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “: Soviet Intentions and Capabilities – 1949, 1956/57” 18 December, 1947. RJCS: The Soviet Union: part II.
combat power to overrun key areas in Europe and Asia.”83 Yet the twenty-two military divisions of Spain comprising 521,000 soldiers would keep the Soviets occupied at the Pyrenees.84 This also amounted to one of the largest armies of Europe at the time. The Joint Chiefs understood the limitations of the Spaniards, “The Spanish Air Force could not make any substantial contribution to Western air effort […] The Spanish Navy reflects the economic and political conditions existing. It is hampered by lack of material and lags behind in technical improvements.”85 The Joint Chiefs concluded, “Spain’s contribution would be limited to providing bases for foreign strategic air units.”86 Although they did mention pursuing bases as a Spanish “contribution to the Western defense, there was not much mention of how or when the United States should pursue them.

The final report involving an invasion of Western Europe and the potential role of Spain concluded that there was no immediate need for the United States to embrace Spain economically or militarily. As the Cold War heated up in early 1948, the Joint Strategic Plans Group sought to consolidate the Western European war plan in their March 1948 scenario “Bushwacker”. This report largely repeated what the earlier reports put forward with the notable exception that, by 1952, the Soviet Union would have acquired nuclear weapons of some sort and would be at war with the United States, “The U.S.S.R. will not have atomic bombs but will probably have other atomic munitions in limited quantity.”87 For Spain, the JSPG assumed that it would pursue neutrality in the event of war unless the Soviets attacked it. Like the previous

83 The Joint Intelligence Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “: Soviet Intentions and Capabilities – 1949, 1956/57” 18 December, 1947. RJCS: The Soviet Union: part II.
84 Ibid
85 Ibid
86 Ibid
reports, a Soviet invasion of the Iberian Peninsula would allow for an Anglo-American counterattack.

Over the course of the war scenarios, the JWPC and the other Defense policy planners analyzed all aspects of the Spanish question—from the purely military to the purely political. They ultimately concluded that no immediate action in respect to Spain was necessary after considering other theoretical possibilities. They expected that, in the long-term, Spanish-American rapprochement might occur and that the United States would furnish Spain with economic aid. This would have potentially obviated the need for an outright political alliance between the two countries, while enabling Spain to better defend its north frontier in the event of a Soviet attack. Considering the political implications involved in terms of Soviet propaganda, an indirect relationship with Franco was the most desirable option yet. Although some in the State Department likewise examined the Spanish question from a similar perspective, early opinion on Spanish exclusion remained largely unchanged.

**Spanish Exclusion from a State Perspective**

As the Defense Planners weighed different options in addressing the Spanish question, there existed few such preoccupations at the State Department—to whom the Defense committees deferred at nearly every early juncture. After the Second World War, resuming military or political relations with Spain at any level was out of the question—and for good reason. But in the following years, the White House and to the State Department leadership exhibited intransigence at pursuing other policy alternatives short of complete Spanish isolation. As the political needs of the United States changed, the foreign-policy leadership did not.

In months immediately following the Second World War, the foreign policy establishment held to the line of Spanish exclusion from the community of nations. On the
grounds that Spain was not a “peace-loving state” as stipulated or membership into the United Nations by its Charter, other national delegations also agreed.\textsuperscript{88} At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew notified Secretary of State Byrnes that he intended to make public a letter critical of Franco from the recently deceased President Roosevelt without receiving previous instructions from Byrne to do so.\textsuperscript{89} Grew intended to flaunt America’s tough stance on Spain for the purposes of the Conference. These justifications also kept Spain from joining the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the predecessor of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.\textsuperscript{90} Following these early shows of American distaste of the Caudillo, the Tripartite Agreement of March 1946 between France, the United Kingdom, and the United States further reflected these sentiments. From the American perspective, the basis for early Spanish exclusion rested upon Grew’s conviction in the moment.

Spanish non-recognition remained the status quo policy for several years and the State Department regarded any changes to it as somehow contrary to political considerations—however narrowly the leadership defined them. Although it may be easy to dismiss criticism of the State Department position on Spain as simply cloaking the political in ideology, documentary evidence has not yet produced an alternative interpretation. Rather, it has reinforced the criticism that ideology bound the opinions of policy-makers. Instead of an economic basis or one that asserted an American understanding of its role within the Mediterranean region, these political considerations were purely ideological. This attitude persisted until early 1949 until


\textsuperscript{89} Jill Edwards, pp. 46.

Congressional pressure forced the President’s hand. By October 1948, in a report titled “Spain and a Third World War” sent to the President Truman, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, Jaume Miravitlles made the case against Spain via the State Department’s Directorate of Spanish Information. The report also served as a counterargument to several recent articles commenting on the senselessness of ignoring the military presence of Spain as a buffer to the Western European defense. Miravittles in “Spain and a Third World War” denounced the strategic and military importance of Spain based upon a deep resentment against Franco. As his experience during the Spanish Civil War rather justified, Franco, the Falange, and the Nationalists were odious to American notions of democracy. Yet strategic considerations remained, and Miravittles accordingly sought to discount these claims.

Even as Miravittles examined such factors as geography to undermine the strategic importance of Spain, he frequently reverted to ideological language—betraying his premises for writing the report. In the exigency of a Soviet invasion, Miravittles had to first address the notion of the Pyrenees as a last line of European defense, “Spain has been one of the most oft-invaded countries in history. The mountainous nature of the Spanish terrain does indeed constitute a difficulty from the opposite, that is, from the defensive point of view, as will be indicated below (there is no room for large air-bases etc.).”

From the times of the Celts and the Visigoths, military forces had been able to penetrate the Pyrenees, which rendered it an untenable position in the estimation of Miravittles.

Not far behind geographical factors were the ideological ones that overruled the other aspects of political considerations. In the report, Miravittles attacked the integrity of the Spanish military. In his opinion, Spain’s 24 military divisions including the Spanish Foreign Legion were

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91 Jaume Mirtavilles, “Spain and a Third World War,” Office of Spanish Information. RJCS: The Soviet Union: part II.
comprised of undesirables, “it is important to note that the latter includes some 12,000 to 14,000 German Nazis, Italian Fascists, Rumanians that fought with the Axis, Vichy French, etc.”

These estimates leaned on the side of speculation. As the former American Ambassador to Spain Carlton Hayes noted, Franco’s Spain also allowed for the repatriation of 1,200 Americans and a number he estimated at 30,000 “free” forces—soldiers of Nazi-conquered states such as France and Poland—all of whom passed through Spain. In full disclosure, Hayes also erred on the side of speculation—albeit on the other side. Spanish inclusion did not seem like a likely proposition with the sort of ideological baggage Miravittles described.

Beyond criticizing the Spanish government under the Caudillo, the Office of Spanish Information insisted that the United States adopt a passive approach in removing Franco from power. He first made the case for the continued exclusion of Spain from the global economy, “Franco hopes that if there is a change of administration after the elections in the United States, the American attitude toward his regime will soften. With this hope, he holds out despite the desperate economic situation of the country.” Furthermore, they believed a diplomatic waiting game with Spain could unsettle its leadership, “Franco has made it plain that while he remains in power, no evolution toward democracy can take place.”

Indirect and indeterminate, this plan maintained few actual benchmarks of amelioration. Miravittles made his case clear, “Franco must go.” By 1948, the current policy planning communities elected “not to scuttle the political considerations involved” in respect to its Spanish policy—as Miravittles defined them.

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92 Jaume Miravittles, “Spain and a Third World War,” Office of Spanish Information. RJCS: The Soviet Union: part II.
95 Ibid, pp. 8.
96 Ibid, pp. 8.
97 Ibid, pp. 7.
At this point of diplomatic relations with Spain in late 1948, the policy planners at the Department of State saw the situation in Spain as beyond repair, but did not advocate a proactive solution in its stead. In their estimation, further economic isolation—and its attendant problems of social unrest caused by famine—could ultimately topple Franco's regime sometime in the future. Of course, this posed a moral dilemma since removing a dictator could entail the planned starvation of a people. By 1949, this became a possibility as a rainfall forty percent below the annual average of an already arid climate destroyed the domestic food supply. Without the importation of food and the credit to obtain it, Spain faced a humanitarian crisis. With a firm hold on the military, the possibility of galvanizing Spanish popular sentiment against foreign subversion bent on subjugating Nationalist Spain, and with no internal opposition willing to oppose him, Franco held onto power in Spain indefinitely. Little international help was forthcoming and the cost of Spanish isolation fell squarely on the Spanish people. Hopes for the contrary amounted to wishful thinking as the Spanish people were slowly starved. This consequence ran counter to the political objectives of the Western Allies as they stated in the Tripartite Declaration. Humanitarian, economic, or social aspects did not fit into the purview of these political considerations. By January 1949, the human cost of the current policy proved great.

Political Errors and the Consolidation of the Fiefdoms

The appearance of multiple policies in the eyes of foreign governments could generate severe repercussions on American foreign policy—and thus the Defense planners sought to preserve the initiative of the civil authority in respect to Spain. To some extent, the apprehension

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of the diplomatic community in respect to the Spanish question was justified. During the escalation of the Cold War in 1948 and 1949, the battle for the hearts and minds began at the United Nations where the representatives of young nations gathered to ascertain what deals—if any—they could elicit from the superpowers. The perceived association of either the Soviet Union or the United States with fascism could be especially detrimental. When the Polish delegate to the United Nations, Katz-Suchy stated that a secret military agreement existed between Spain and the United States on May 6, 1949, the Department of Defense swiftly clarified its intentions, “Because of the political situation, no firm steps have been taken or are contemplated by the State Department in the near future in the direction of U.S. military cooperation with Spain. The existence of any such agreement as that alleged by the Polish delegate may be flatly denied.”

This memorandum of clarification circulated to all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the National Military Establishment and to their respective planning staffs. Promoting discord over the Spanish Question made it in the interest of the Soviet bloc not to resolve the issue too quickly. As long as the Western allies remained divided over strategic, political, and ideological concerns, Soviet delegates and allies could easy exploit their internal divisions at the United Nations.

The notion of placing American military bases on Spanish soil gained some traction in the Navy towards the end of 1948, yet it also exposed the lack of unity among the various branches of the military. After Louis Johnson assumed the post of Secretary of Defense in March 1949, he immediately set about proving himself by first reducing defense expenditures. Rumblings around Washington surfaced as to the future role of the Navy and the Marine

Secretary Johnson’s proposition of “Unified Command”—of separating military forces across the globe into separate operational zones accountable to a military leader regardless of service branch—divided the armed forces. He seemed to confirm the Navy’s suspicions when he cancelled the construction of what was to be America’s first super-carrier, the USS United States, on April 23—merely a month after assuming his new post—prompting the resignation of Secretary Sullivan of the Navy. Secretary Sullivan let his grievances be known, “The conviction that this result will result in a renewed effort to abolish the Marine Corps and to transfer all naval and marine aviation elsewhere adds to my anxiety.”

The Chief of Naval Operations Louis Denfield then reasserted the role of the Navy in the Mediterranean, especially along the extensive Spanish coastline. There was no denying the importance of the Air Force, which could deliver nuclear weapons to any target in the world in a matter of days. The Navy could not match this potential. As the British seemed increasingly incapable of managing the Mediterranean basin, the Navy brass hoped to base Admiral Sherman’s Mediterranean Fleet—later to become the U.S. Navy 6th Fleet—at the Seas’ most strategic points. In September 1949, Admiral Conolly of the Mediterranean Fleet visited Generalissimo Franco at his hometown, the port of El Ferrol, Galicia, with four Navy admirals in tow. Yet this only occurred as a response to the waning importance of the Navy in the eyes of Secretary of Defense Johnson. The Admirals billed their visits to Spain as “courtesy calls” to the

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100 McFarland, pp. 174.
101 Ibid, pp. 175.
103 “Forrest Sherman”. Naval Historical Center. (accessed, 2/4/10)
104 Lowi, pp. 10.
State Department and President Truman. This bid for attention did not constitute a serious plan on the part of the Navy for a long-term strategic commitment to the Iberian Peninsula.

Before the Korean War, ambivalence towards the official American line towards Spain was growing apparent—especially among the members of the State Department who dealt most closely with Spain. Paul Culbertson, the State Department chargé d’affaires in Madrid, warned of the spillover effect that “political breakdown or disintegration” could have on American hopes for the “economic [and] political rehabilitation [of] Europe.” George Kennan and Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett, favored a more sensible approach. Lovett purportedly urged the National Security Council to “quit kidding ourselves” and adopt a reasonable Spanish policy which the Director of Western European Affairs, Theodore Achilles, mentioned to Culbertson; the “Kick-Franco-out-now” mentality of the State Department had to end. Kennan, author of the Long Telegram and founder of State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, called for at least diplomatic recognition of Spain since the Caudillo was entrenched in Spain to stay. In a letter to Lovett, Kennan expressed his “serious doubts” of the official line of the State Department, which in his opinion, was based upon “ideological grounds”. Officially, these doubts comprised the substance of PPS/12:

“The Policy Planning Staff has studied the question of our relations with Spain, which are unsatisfactory not only from the political point of view but from the viewpoint of our military planners. On the one hand, we have hoped to bring about the replacement of the totalitarian regime of General Franco by withholding from his government the benefits of international and political relationships. On the other, we are confronted with the fact that General Franco remains firmly in power and that his regime has actually been strengthened by demonstrations of international hostility.”

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105 Lowi, pp. 10.
Rather than embracing Franco’s regime, Kennan desired that neutral relations exist between the two nations, “the time has come for a modification of our policy toward Spain with a view to early normalization of U.S. Spanish relations, both political and economic.”¹⁰⁹ The grievances of PPS/12 found their way into NSC 3, written in December 1947. The course of affairs in Spain could not be left to chance or inaction. Recent votes in the United Nations on Spanish membership also suggested that the international community was gradually preparing to include Spain, as the Brazilian delegation introduced a vote to the floor that would bring Spain back from diplomatic limbo.¹¹⁰ Yet resistance from the highest levels of the American government—reaching to Secretary of State Acheson and President Truman—stalled solutions to the Spanish problem.

With deferent military planners to a State Department unwilling to confront the political and economic realities of America’s new role in Europe, a sustained period of inaction persisted into the next decade. The military planning staffs made it clear in their early discussions of Spain that they regarded it as a component of the Western defense. The variance of what each report required of Spain certainly indicated at least that much. During this process, the Defense planners gained a valuable working knowledge of political concerns. Also during the course of their investigation, they recognized the urgency in securing the defense of Western Europe. Even then, they crafted circumspect war scenarios and left their plans to the prerogative of their peer institutions. In large part, the Miravittles estimation characterized sentiments of Spain in the foreign-policy establishment of the United States. Yet, by 1949, other nations had acted in their own self-interest by resuming unofficial trade with Spain. The United Kingdom bought Spanish

¹¹⁰ Liedtke, pp. 30.
fertilizers and the French sold aircraft engines to Spain. \textsuperscript{111} Franco acquired the means to “hold-out” despite the opinion of the Americans. If long-term economic and political considerations did not prevail, it was not for a lack of examination on the part of the Defense planners. At this point, ill-hatched political goals and their underlying ideological premises won out.


title={Section III: The “Junketeers” on the Hill}

By early 1949, the Defense community received support through an unlikely conduit—a group known in Washington as “The Spanish Lobby”. Counting Senators, businessmen, and other civil servants among its number, the Spanish Lobby made significant inroads in the Beltway. \textsuperscript{112} Congressmen from different parties and regions took up the cause of Spain. From the esoteric former United States Ambassador to Spain, Carlton Hayes, to the fervently anti-Communist Senator, Patrick McCarran, the Spanish Lobby appropriated the language of defense to make the case for Spain. Though most had their own reelections in mind, these “Junketeers”, as Lowi described them, represented a wide variety of interests. Hayes formed the arguments for Spanish integration and McCarran crafted the legislation. These two figures served as the prime movers of the Spanish question. The political leaders of the Spanish Lobby tailored their approach towards Spanish inclusion based upon a variety of humanitarian, economic, and political considerations. After meeting resistance from President Truman, the Junketeers on the Hill portrayed the issue of Spanish inclusion by a politically sensitive aspect—that of strategic defense—and if the State Department could not provide it—they would look to the military men

\textsuperscript{111} Liedtke, pp. 33, 36, 66.
\textsuperscript{112} Lowi, pp. 11
of the Pentagon. After the President and some in Congress rejected political arguments for
Spanish integration, strategic arguments became not only convenient, but also effective.

In the summer of 1949, lawmakers in Congress realized that, despite the success of the
European Recovery Program, American-aligned nations required more in the way of military aid
to promote their internal stability. Addressing American national security interests in the way of
economic stability were the Import-Export Bank, World Bank, and European Recovery Program.
The Spanish Lobby wasted no time in attaching Spain to the security interests of the United
States. Their interest in Spain emanated more from business interests and Catholic fealty than it
did from a genuine interest in foreign affairs. Yet, as early as 1945, one of the most prominent
academics of his generation was evaluating possible solutions to the Spanish question.

The “Cloak and Gown”

In the last months of his legation, Hayes appropriated the language of military and
economic security as a part of American national policy to make the case for Spain, thereby
providing the fundamental linkage between the defense of Spain and postwar American
ambitions that other members of the Spanish Lobby eventually seized upon. Senator McCarran
in particular saw these arguments as a way to address the policy vacuum with respect to Spain.
They provided the basis for his tactics in Congress of combining political and military interests
to further isolate his opponents, Secretary of State Acheson and President Truman.

As a Catholic convert and established historian, Hayes seemed to delight in taking a
revisionist path through his political and academic careers. From Hayes’ autobiography, he
described his homecoming back to upstate New York, “As an old returning native, I find my
position in the community somewhat anomalous. I am regarded as a bit ‘queer’, in part because
of my occupation as historian is unique and generally incomprehensible, in part because I am a
Catholic and an enrolled Democrat.”113 From his choice to attend Columbia College instead of nearby Cornell to his early adherence to the historical method of his mentor, Charles Beard, Hayes defined himself against what he perceived to be common. His interest in Spanish history proved no different. In May, 1942, when President Roosevelt required a political outsider to quickly earn the ear of Franco to keep him from joining the Axis during Operation Torch in North Africa, he turned to Hayes.

The very nature of Hayes’ mission to Spain underscored his early cognizance of the strategic issues behind the Spanish question. As even President Roosevelt prepared for Spain to align with the Axis after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, he nonetheless attached great importance in keeping neutral the nation that straddled the Straights of Gibraltar.114 As Franco attempted to exploit after the war, Spain remained non-belligerent and neutral during the Operation Torch of November, 1942. Hayes published his wartime reminiscences from his post as United States Ambassador to Spain in 1945. Toward the end of his recollections, Hayes launched into the case for Spain in his chapters titled “Spain’s Benevolent Neutrality” and “How I left Spain”. In a final meeting with the Foreign Minister, Jose Lequerica, Hayes remembered the Spaniard’s emphasis on strong Spanish-American relations, “On the other hand, he felt that if the United States…was to play its proper role in the postwar period, it should realistically utilize Spain as a special bulwark in Europe. He even hoped there might be special understandings between the United States and Spain—economic, political, and military.”115 More specifically, the United States ought to maintain a “good neighbor” policy with Spain, keeping open a “convenient European bridgehead for our armed forces” for future use “in case of emergency”.

115 Ibid, pp. 287.
“Spain is just such a nation; and especially friendly future relations with her should not undermine, but rather buttress, any policy or program of collective world security.”\textsuperscript{116} Already on his trip back from Spain, Hayes considered how he could convince others of Spain’s economic, political, and strategic importance.

It is important not to dismiss Hayes’ position on Spain as simply pro-Catholic since virtually alone in his support of Spain, receiving much criticism as a fallen liberal. Though his faith undoubtedly added to his fervor for his new cause, Hayes weighed political and strategic issues foremost. Throughout his ambassadorship, Hayes even received letters from family friends and acquaintances urging him to actively condemn Spain, “I urge you to stop apologizing for the fascist Franco regime. To repudiate it instead.”\textsuperscript{117} Hayes also kept watch on the Office of Strategic Services to ensure it would not actively seek the ouster of the Spanish Caudillo as one of his former history students, Donald Downes, conducted covert operations in Spain beginning in 1943.\textsuperscript{118}

Before Hayes left Madrid, he also took an active role in acquainting students, academics, and politicians with the importance of Spain beyond its strategic importance. Upon learning of the arrival of a young Spanish professor of legal theory, Ignacio de Lojendio, to the United States on a speaking tour endowed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Hayes promoted it to his academic colleagues as well as his friends in Washington to foster “mutual understanding between the United States and Spain.”\textsuperscript{119} For his part, de Lojendio conducted over forty lectures and was well-regarded. Before he returned to Spain, he likewise called for sensibility on the Spanish question,

\textsuperscript{116} Hayes, \textit{Wartime Mission to Spain}. pp. 310.
\textsuperscript{117} Letter from Flora Mock, April 19, 1944. Box 6. \textit{Carlton J.H. Hayes Papers}.
\textsuperscript{119} Letter from Hayes to Reverend Vincent Donovan, April 18, 1944. Box 6. \textit{Carlton J.H. Hayes Papers}.
“I tell you most sincerely that the better I get acquainted with the fantastic tide of literature on post-war planning, the more I feel alarmed at the shortsightedness of so many people who waste time either in rabid manifestations of revenge and hatred, or in a no less sterile display of pious phases which get nowhere.”

Since Hayes published his diaries in the same year he returned from overseas service and considering the extent of his pro-Spanish activities that far exceeded his role as Ambassador, it is clear that Hayes was apprehensive about Spain’s postwar prospects. He often turned Franco’s response to his global political predicament into a virtue—attempting to reconcile the participation of the German Condor legion in the Spanish Civil War with the withdrawal of the Spanish Blue Division from the Eastern Front in the Second World War—straining logic at best. While Franco never hindered the Allies, he certainly never helped them. Yet some of these arguments held their sway. As a nation that by 1949 had not yet embarked down the road to recovery, Spain was ripe for foreign investment if inducements for international trade could remove the restrictive trade barriers that Spain maintained as an autarkic nation. Now that Hayes had provided the basis, it was up to others to argue for Spanish integration in the halls of power.

**Containment, the Anti-Communists, and Congress**

There was probably no more influential figure in recombining military and political interests than Senator Patrick McCarran, the Nevada Democrat. It was Senator McCarran who originally argued Ambassador Hayes’ points on the floor of the Senate, not only inserting Hayes articles into the *Congressional Record*, but in some cases having them read aloud. Hayes’ *Wartime Mission to Spain* carried considerable weight since it offered a firsthand perspective of the situation in Spain from the top American diplomat in the country. Yet Senate opposition prevented Spain from receiving European Recovery Program funds in 1948. Led by “Big” Tom

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Connolly of Texas, the Senate voted to exclude Spain from receiving Marshall Plan aid after the House of Representatives voted to include Spain on the landmark legislation. Attempting to secure funds for Spain through the other methods—namely the Mutual Defense Assistance Act and later the Economic Cooperation Act. McCarran exhibited an unusual amount of political organization toward the Spanish Question and it is doubtful that without his constant pressure on the Truman administration, the base agreements could have occurred. After another failed attempt in Congress in 1949, he even flew to Madrid to discuss potential integration issues with Franco, inciting a rebuke from the President, Secretary Acheson, and Congressional opponents. Franco was one of McCarran’s “favorite foreign leaders.”

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123 Lowi, pp. 11.
Behind the polemics and invectives, McCarran raised the important issue of economic integration. If the European Recovery Program was designed to create a community of interests in Europe that a future way be avoided, why should Spain be excluded?

Since the conclusion of the Second World War, Senator McCarran channeled his populism from before the war and his patriotism during the war to unabashed anti-Communism after the war. Moreover, the sight of a Catholic Spain starving from years of economic autarky left McCarran eager to improve the lot of Catholic Spain. An early opportunity presented itself in the form of Spanish membership into the North Atlantic Treaty. McCarran still possessed the fiery rhetoric that had originally propelled him into politics:

“I need go no further than to quote the Secretary of State [Acheson] before the Appropriations Committee—‘Spain would be a most essential element in the North Atlantic Treaty’—essential from a military standpoint, essential from an economic standpoint, essential from a diplomatic standpoint, indeed, essential from every standpoint to the welfare and successful operation of the treaty, and, indeed to the welfare of the democratic, liberty-loving, God-fearing peoples of the world.”

It was McCarran’s intention that the United States Ambassador to the United Nations vote favorably to ending the ban on diplomatic relations with Spain as originally put forward in the United Nations Charter. The implications of McCarran’s invective resounded across the Senate—opposition to the inclusion of a Christian nation seeking America’s protective embrace amounted to subversion of American national interests. A year after McCarran delivered the previous statement he crafted the “Internal Security Act”. This Act of Congress proscribed from defense-industry jobs those who maintained an affiliation with a group that the federal government defined as ‘Communist’. Alongside Senator McCarthy, McCarran distinguished himself as one of America’s greatest red-hunters of the Cold War.

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125 *Congressional Record*, 1949. 81st Cong, 1st sess. Vol. 95, no. 5. pp. 5963.
Part of McCarran’s strategy was to discredit Secretary of State Acheson for his earlier intransigence on the Spanish Question. Despite his emotional and rhetorical appeals for Spanish inclusion into the defense network of the North Atlantic Treaty, McCarran also Senator McCarran continued his early invective into what eventually became a convenient target, “It has been extremely difficult for some of us to understand why that it was that our State Department seemed to be stymied in regard to diplomatic recognition of Spain…Mr. President, why is it that the State Department refuses to recognize Spain?”\textsuperscript{126} Senator McCarran dispensed with his appeals of pathos and instead made the case in the Senate on pragmatic grounds, “However, I believe that anyone who is a strategist will agree that there is nothing more essential to the military success of the North Atlantic Pact—if it means military success—than the Iberian Peninsula.”\textsuperscript{127} Much like the simple reduction the Defense planners, the most salient argument for Spanish integration revolved around the simple balance of conventional military forces between the Soviet bloc and the West.

Over the course of first the NATO and the European Cooperation Act debates, McCarran and the Spanish Lobby extracted various components of the Spanish question on the floor of the Senate to display how the current approach was not meeting political concerns. McCarran won some unlikely allies during this display of senatorial showmanship. Senator Brewster, a Republican from Maine and a staunch anti-Communist, echoed McCarran’s sentiment against the State Department:

“What of the operation of our Air Force? I wonder what the aviation directors of our military forces would say regarding this matter? I wonder if their voice has been heeded in connection with the attitude of the State Department upon this score—whether or not the Department has considered the significance of our attitude with respect to our future security in the

\textsuperscript{126} Congressional Record, 1949. 81\textsuperscript{st} Cong, 1\textsuperscript{st} sess. Vol. 95, no. 5.,pp. 5963.  
\textsuperscript{127} Congressional Record, 1949. 81\textsuperscript{st} Cong, 1\textsuperscript{st} sess. Vol. 95, no. 5. pp. 5965-7.
event of the development of the Moscow menace until it shall result actually in an attack and an aggression."^{128}

Defense interests for Brewster amounted to American air power. Other followers joined McCarran and Brewster on Spain. Senator Wherry (R-NE) and Senator Eastland (D-MS) concerned themselves with opportunities for cotton exports to Spain. Senator Eastland exposed the raw economic opportunity that existed, “Spain ranks third today among the nations of Europe in potential textile production […] Yet the employees of Spanish textile mills are able to work only one and a half days a week because of the scarcity of cotton.”^{129} Senator Chavez (D-NM) brought to light the great human cost of Spanish exclusion during a time of drought, “Let us go a little further. Is our general policy and the policy of the Marshall plan to do good to the world, to feed hungry people? Is that philosophy and that noble purpose to be set aside and the hungry children of Spain be allowed to die simply because we do not like Mr. Franco?”^{130} Rhetoric aside, the members of the Spanish Lobby began to expose the policy failings of the Truman Administration in respect to Spain. To make matters worse, Truman offered no substantive rebuttals, cornering him further into his original ideological redoubt for Spanish exclusion.

A year later in 1950, the Spanish Lobby attempted again to secure Spanish inclusion—this time issue through the Economic Cooperation Act. Using the arguments Hayes first put forward, Western defense grew to be an issue of utmost importance. For the members of the Spanish Lobby, foreign policymakers—such as the State Department—ignored military interests when crafting political decisions. The result was a North Atlantic alliance more militarily vulnerable than it had been at the end of the Second World War.

^{128} Congressional Record, 1949. 81st Cong, 1st sess. Vol. 95, no. 5. pp. 5971.
^{129} Congressional Record, 1949. 81st Cong, 1st sess. Vol. 96, no. 8, pp. 10073.
^{130} Congressional Record, 1949. 81st Cong, 1st sess. Vol. 96, no. 8, pp. 10072.
McCarran’s approach was simple: arrange for a constant stream of military representative from the mid-echelons to repeat to members of Congress how important a component Spain was to the Western Defense. He wasn’t shy about his tactics. In an article he wrote for the *Saturday Evening Post*, McCarran outlined the basic problem with the Spanish question as it had played out, “They (shirt-sleeve boys of the Pentagon) saw that the Iberian peninsula had great value to the West if it comes to war. But the military does not make decisions if political questions intrude.” 131 Unofficially, McCarran arranged for the “technical men”—the “lower echelon” planners to drift around Congress until, “Congress caught the cue.” 132

Another member of the Spanish Lobby, Representative Clement Zablocki attempted similar tactics in the House of Representatives. He brought the issue to the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, during the Mutual Defense Assistance Program hearings. “In the case of Spain wanting to come under the military assistance program—first of all, I am going to ask you, General, if you would care to comment on the value of Spain in our defense plan.” 133 Although Zablocki continued the line of questioning, and though General Vandenberg offered his comments on Spain off the record, Spanish integration now was an indirect or hypothetical factor, “In any case of emergency we would all be in it together and these people would contribute certain armed forces, bases and so forth…There are things that could be furnished in the way of bases and contributions of definite forces to the collective defense set-up.” 134 McCarran’s early efforts required sustained effort, but he was determined to

132 Ibid, pp. 25.
134 Ibid, pp. 39
restate the Spanish question as an urgent military and political matter that required Congressional action.

Although a partisan member of the Spanish Lobby, McCarran was frustrated by the lapses he perceived of the Mutual Defense Act. As a measure to address the shortcomings of the European Recovery Program, opponents in the State Department neglected military measures on account of Spain’s fascist leanings—that is to say, political considerations. In the process, the greater need of American national security was not being satisfied. McCarran finally got his way through the Economic Cooperation Act on April 27, 1950—securing a 50 million dollar loan for Spain. 135 Although this did not amount to a large sum, it demonstrated a change in sentiments toward Spain. By the time of the ECA vote in April 1950, McCarran was able to convince a third of the Senate that a new approach to the Spanish question was necessary. Within two months, the Korea War would convince another third and the Junketeers could pursue even more funding opportunities for Spain—in the amount of $62.5 million. Yet the ECA and other foreign aid organization answered in one form or another to the State Department. They still maintained initiative on the resolving the Spanish question.

Section III: Making up for Lost Time

The confrontation between Secretaries Acheson and Johnson marked a new period in the history of the Pact of Madrid, one in which the civil authority designated more policy-making prerogative to the planning staffs of the Defense Department. It also had an unintended consequence: the radicalization of the “Junketeers”. A number of other complications led to Johnson’s ouster, but a large share of the blame, perhaps most of it, resided with Secretary of

135 Lowi, pp. 13.
State Acheson. Although Acheson also came to accept the possibility of diplomatic relations with Spain in early 1950, their rivalry eventually revealed the ultimate source of Anti-Spanish sentiment: President Truman detested Franco’s regime. From a number of offhand remarks, it became clear that President Truman based his political assessments of Spain on a deep-seated distrust of Spanish backwardness. Once the circumstances of the Korean War overcame this obstacle, the continuation of the political considerations alongside military ones accelerated. Yet, it was precisely the inability of the State Department to heed its own advisers that exposed their subversion of the national political interest due to personal sentiments. This redirected the initiative on the Spanish question to an alternative avenue, that of military planning. Before it could get there, the Junketeers made one last push to consolidate their gains.

A year later in 1950, the issue reemerged in the Senate as hearings for Economic Cooperation Act. Using the arguments Hayes first put forward, Western defense grew to be an issue of utmost importance. For the members of the Spanish Lobby, foreign policymakers—such as the State Department—ignored military interests when crafting political decisions. The result was a North Atlantic alliance more militarily vulnerable than it had been at the end of the Second World War.

**Johnson’s Gamble**

By this time, Congressional leaders indicated the desirability of pursuing a better policy in respect to Spain—one that at least placed an Ambassador back in Spain. Johnson favored such an approach, but had earned himself the distrust of his admirals in the process. The resulting confrontation resulted in Truman sacking Johnson and Congress browbeating Acheson until he pursued a course in Spain more in line with American national interests.
After several contentious years on Capitol Hill, lawmakers finally placed a premium on shoring up the Western defensive network. Furthermore, certain members of Congress like Senator McCarran made the case that if the National Security bodies of the federal government did not function, the Defense Department should not be overlooked. In a memorandum to Secretary of State Acheson in April 1949, Secretary of Defense Johnson emphasized the need to at least give the military the option of military coordination with Spain should a national emergency develop, “One of the most important of these matters is the consummation of political relations and arrangements which will permit the United States military cooperation with that nation.”¹³⁶ Johnson was not without a premise, for Kennan influenced NSC/3 to a large extent on account of his frustrations with the apparent inertia of the State Department at pursuing any sort of proactive policy regarding Spain.

As far as tangible goals were concerned, then Secretary Johnson pushed for either bilateral relations between Spain and the United States or even full-acceptance into NATO. In a revision of his previous memorandum, Secretary Johnson through the Joint Plans Committee of the JCS added an additional clause on normalizing relations with Spain: “either bilaterally or acceptance of that nation as a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty or Western Union Treaty.”¹³⁷ To be clear, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee as a matter of policy desired the full support of its most powerful Western allies, France and the United Kingdom, “the United States will ascertain the position of the British and French delegations with respect to Spain but also that it will press for the acceptance by the United Kingdom and France of the objectives of United States policy.”¹³⁸ Bilateral military agreements of forces between the United States and

¹³⁶ Johnson Memorandum to Acheson, April 14, 1949. RCJS: part II, 1946-1953: Europe and NATO.
¹³⁸ Ibid
Spain required American allies to concede that the best guarantor against a Soviet invasion, the United States military, may retreat behind the Pyrenees in the event of war. This was an unacceptable proposition for NATO allies. From their perspective, they required military aid and any designated for elsewhere—much less Spain—would not go to reinforcing the front along the Iron Curtain that had recently descended across Europe. Politically speaking, this would produce a demoralizing effect in Western European capitals and could perhaps embolden Communist elements within those nations—which had been the intent of all the American foreign aid to avoid. These were the political considerations that required further articulation, which the State Department did not provide.

Just a month prior to the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, Secretary Johnson testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Senator Cain of Washington inquired as to Johnson’s views on Spain, “How serious is this Government in pursuit of the ambitions to protect the North Atlantic area?” The Secretary of Defense responded, “My job is to encourage these nations over there, help them all we can. So, I am trying to stay away from statements such as I might have to make that would cause trouble for some of our North Atlantic partners. It’s not just an American problem.” It was apparent that, until the end of his tenure as Secretary of Defense, Johnson favored Spanish inclusion.

**Acheson versus Johnson**

Despite the earlier victory of Johnson in instituting efficiency in the Department of Defense, the lack of coordination of military and political policy outside of Europe reflected poorly upon him. Secretary Acheson and President Truman attached “little strategic value” to the

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139 *Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 1950*, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 1950, pp. 46.
Korean Peninsula in early 1949.\textsuperscript{140} This prompted Johnson to specifically ignore drawing up a defensive plan of action in Korea.\textsuperscript{141} As the Korean Conflict increased in intensity, Johnson, President Truman’s ally in the reigning in of the Defense Department fiefdoms, called into question Acheson’s circumspection. That Communist forces secured victories in China and now threatened in Korea, undermining the whole notion of Containment. Meanwhile, the *White Paper on China* of Acheson was supposed to bring the deteriorating situation in the Far East to a stasis—an option that again appeared several years too late.\textsuperscript{142}

Personalities also interfered with policy. Johnson and Acheson clashed over Spanish question—further prolonging the Spanish question. In the wake of the North Korean invasion of South Korean, Johnson sought to obtain military rights with nations that remained undecided in the case the Korean War broadened. Taking issue with Johnson’s intent to establish “military accessibility and military cooperation with Spain”, Secretary Acheson indicated he would tolerate nothing of the sort, “The Department is fully aware of the desirability of developing relations with Spain which will permit closer military cooperation. In the Department’s opinion, however, the political considerations outlined above make the program suggested by the [JCS] politically impracticable at this time.”\textsuperscript{143} Acheson, presumably with the favor with President Truman, effectively sealed off any more analysis of the Spanish question within the executive authority until the end of the year, when international circumstances again thrust the Spanish question into broad view.

President Truman wanted to fire Johnson when the timing was right, but due to a lack of a private setting, Truman sat on the news for about a week until *The Washington Times Herald*

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\textsuperscript{140} McFarland, *Louis Johnson*. pp. 320.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid. pp. 320.
\textsuperscript{142} Biesner, *Acheson*. pp. 186.
\end{flushright}
somehow received word of it on September 8, 1950. It was Monday, September 11 that Truman managed to lay the news on Johnson. The pugilist left Truman’s office “dejected” and “beaten”. General George Marshall relieved Johnson as Secretary of Defense immediately afterward. Wary of the thankless job he was about to assume, Marshall stipulated to President Truman that we would stay on as Secretary of Defense for only a year having already designated his longtime subordinate, Robert Lovett, as his successor. As the course of the war improved, the highly esteemed Marshall was drawn into the conversation concerning General Douglas MacArthur’s insubordinate conduct in Korea. Although few would dare to levy much criticism at Marshall’s expense, Senator McCarthy dubbed the venerate general “a front man for traitors.” As the former Secretary of State who created the scheme for European postwar recovery that bears his name, Marshall respected the civil-military divide—to the extent that he never voted in his life.

Like most things during his Presidency, the buck of the Spanish question stopped at Truman. Despite the high-level political maneuvering of all involved, the nature of Truman’s opposition rested in that he did not trust a country without full religious freedom. By this point, the stringently ideological component of Truman’s defense fell away as favored granting foreign aid to Tito’s Yugoslavia and, by August 4, 1950, to China. Before the newly appointed American Ambassador Stanton Griffis left for Madrid in February 1951, Truman mentioned to

144 McFarland, Johnson pp. 343.
145 Ibid, pp. 343.
146 Borklund, Men of the Pentagon. pp. 89.
147 Ibid, pp. 89.
149 Borklund, Men of the Pentagon. pp, 112.
him, “I am a Baptist and I believe that in any country man should be permitted to worship his God in his own way. The situation in Spain is intolerable. Do you know that a Baptist who dies in Spain must even be buried in the middle of the night?”

Truman was a Grand Mason, the highest order of freemason, and Spain’s anti-Masonic laws that often entailed death for offenders deeply troubled him to the core. Truman also dragged his feet when it came to allocating the $62.5 million dollars Congress had allowed the President to spend on Spanish loans. The State Department made the ECA allotment so difficult to use that it was not reallocated until 1952—to the military planners. Without the support of even Acheson, Truman distanced himself the Congressional action on Spain and mischaracterized the nature of his own role, “I don’t like Franco and I never will, but I won’t let me personal feelings override the convictions of our military men.” By mid 1951, more than just the military men were convinced, in fact, it was Congress that convinced the military men to assume a greater role in solving the Spanish question.

The Radicalization of the Spanish Lobby

The sudden outbreak of war in Korea presented an opportunity for pro-Spanish elements in Congress to finally achieve the prerogative of the Defense planners in establishing relations with Spain for the purpose of channeling American funds to Spain. Although most of the Congressmen and Senators involved pursued the general policy of economic liberalization and expansion of markets, their brief taste of political success prompted a radicalization of the

151 Stanton Griffis. Lying in State. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1952), pp. 269
152 Jill Edwards, pp. 178
153 Lowi, pp. 18.
154 Griffis, pp. 300.
Spanish Lobby. They tacked hard to the right, making the political component more difficult to predict. In order to finally put forward a Spanish policy, the political price for compromise had increased.

Upon his return to the academic community from his hiatus as Ambassador to Spain, Hayes adopted a stridently political line—determined to secure Spanish integration. Congress had already proscribed Spain from the European Recovery Program. American allies had not yet decided to include Spain in NATO. The only existing avenue from which Spain could procure foreign credits was through President Truman’s discretionary Mutual Defense budget. Spain did obtain some funds for an Import-Export bank fertilizer project, but this did not amount to much.\(^{156}\) Hayes desired a steady stream of American assistance to Spain. To obtain this, he again articulated the academic and political case for Spain in his 1951 work, *The United States and Spain: an Interpretation*. This amounted to an academic and historical account for the improvement of relations between Spain and the United States.

Hayes expressed shared Spanish-American interests on a greater social level than just mutual security—he desired a greater community of shared political interests that extended across the Atlantic. In his justification of Spanish inclusion, Hayes saw Spain as integral member of what he termed “the whole Atlantic Community”—steeped in the values of Western Civilization.\(^{157}\) He favored a more pragmatic Spanish policy. Spain, to Hayes, was an essential component of the ‘Atlantic Community,’ “The freer it is, the more naturally does commercial intercourse draw together the whole Atlantic Community, and the more clearly does it indicate the interdependence of America and Europe.”\(^{158}\) *The United States and Spain* appeared as a general course of policy, combining the circumspection of a professional academic with the

\(^{156}\) Liedtke, pp. 83.

\(^{157}\) Hayes, *Spain and the United States*, pp. 175.

\(^{158}\) Ibid, pp. 12.
ideological bent of a Presidential appointee. Hayes concluded the book with a prescription uncommon of academic literature:

“What is desirable in relations between the United States and Spain should by now be clear. With Spain we should establish and maintain especially close and cordial relations. We should do so in our own interest, in that of the Atlantic Community, and in that of a decent, peaceable world order. And Spain, having like interests, can be counted upon to reciprocate.”

For Hayes, this could mark the beginning of a new world order buttressed by mutual understanding and cooperation between Spanish and English speaking peoples across the free world—if it could be called that.

Skeptical about the motivations and academic references of the intellectual left, Hayes weighed in on what he perceived to be the intellectual susceptibility of American civil servants to subversive ideologies, “Moreover, the Spanish Republicans supplied plenty of propaganda calculated to appeal to ‘liberals’ and ‘progressives’ abroad and particularly marketable in the United States during the period of our ‘New Deal’.” Continuing on the topic of the Communist propaganda of the Spanish Republicans, Hayes mentioned, “And it must be recognized that a number of journalists on our more staid and conservative newspapers, and I fear, some officials of our State Department, have taken their cue about Spain from the Nation or PM.” These publications, in Hayes’ opinion, printed tainted articles after “fellow travelers” from Spain gained a following among the New York literati. He derided the relative inexperience of then future of Secretary of State when negotiations with Spain over the bases began, “There was also a new, non-career Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, who was a close personal friend of Alger Hiss and had the reputation at the time of being especially conciliatory toward Russia

159 Hayes, Spain and the United States. pp. 175.
160 Ibid, pp. 142.
161 Ibid, pp. 145.
and hostile to ‘Franco Spain’.” Although Acheson had risen to become the full Secretary by then, Hayes still approached him with distrust.

After taking aim at those New Dealers left in high office that did not favor Spanish inclusion, Hayes discussed concrete steps the United States could take to consolidate Spain into the Western defense. Highly critical of the Senate’s exclusion of Spain from European Recovery Program funds after the House of Representatives Hayes reasoned that the United States had already aligned itself with Tito’s Yugoslavia, that nations like Iceland and Canada were included in NATO yet Spain could not even secure economic aid by 1949. He echoed his internationalist views in the name of Containment, “We should expand the North Atlantic Pact into a defensive alliance of the whole Atlantic Community including Spain and Latin America…What it [Spain] lacks is up-to-date military equipment, and a first counsel of wisdom would seem to be for us to help supply that lack. An investment by us in Spain would be surer to strengthen our defense than what we are contributing to certain other countries.”

Regardless of his political leanings, Hayes was influential in all the circles that mattered—diplomatic, academic, and retained some influence in the military as well. As a devoted member of the Spanish Lobby, it is apparent that many of the arguments that originated with Hayes appeared in Senator McCarran’s statements or anywhere else the Spanish Lobby found an audience. In this way, Hayes continued as their intellectual base through the negotiation of the base agreements.

The Retractions Begin

As the Spanish Lobby achieved a great score in respect to establishing some sort of greater relationship with Spain, they forced top lawmakers to withhold their opposition to the

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162 Hayes, Wartime Mission to Spain. pp. 156.
163 Ibid. pp. 89.
nascent Spanish policy. One of the strongest Spanish opponents in the Senate, “Big” Tom Connolly publically retracted his previous view.\textsuperscript{164} Citing the impracticality of ignoring Spain and thus ignoring the political, a new approach was required, “It is now clear that this action [the 1946 United Nations ban on Ambassadors] has not only failed in its intended purpose but has served to strengthen the position of the present regime.”\textsuperscript{165} Specifically, the negligence of the political was to blame, “In our view, the withdrawal of ambassadors from Spain as a means of political pressure was a mistaken departure from established principle.”\textsuperscript{166} This mistaken departure entailed a disregard for establishing diplomatic relations with Spain.

The leaders of the American foreign policy establishment were now conceding that their former political objectives revolved too closely around ideological considerations. On July 20\textsuperscript{th}, further down the National Mall, Secretary Acheson in the State Department conceded as much:

“first, there is no sign of an alternative…second, the internal position of the present regime is strong and enjoys the support of many who, although they might prefer another form of government or chief of state, fear that chaos and civil strife would follow a move to overthrow the government; third, Spain is a part of Western Europe which should not be permanently isolated from normal relations in that area.”\textsuperscript{167}

One of Acheson’s justifications for Spanish exclusion was the UN ban on ambassadors to Spain.

On November 4, 1950, over two-thirds of the General Assembly approved the rescinding of the ban.\textsuperscript{168} Thus, it was time for the United States to name an ambassador. At this point, Washington had already conveyed its distaste for the Spanish Caudillo after five years of benign neglect. Negotiations with those who permitted the Spanish exclusion in the first place would be highly problematic and as the Secretary of State knew well, would most likely be met with suspicion.

\textsuperscript{164} Caro. \textit{Master of the Senate}, pp. 64.  
\textsuperscript{165} Hayes, \textit{The United States and Spain}, pp. 166.  
\textsuperscript{166} As it appears in Hayes, \textit{Spain and Spain}, pp. 166-167.  
\textsuperscript{167} Dean Acheson. \textit{The Pattern of Responsibility}. McGeorge Bundy, editor. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1952), pp. 131  
\textsuperscript{168} Lowi, pp. 19.
The military aspect constituted only part of an overall policy. Not much of one existed prior to 1951. Although American civil servants at the highest levels now readily conceded that the United States adopt a realistic policy in respect to Spain, the question now was which agency should begin the negotiating? The State Department still maintained the initiative to begin a policy, but had discredited themselves by ignoring the Spanish question. During the previous year, the State Department and the Defense Department revised each other’s versions of NSC 72 ad nauseam. Beyond his initial dismissal of NSC 72, Secretary Acheson and President Truman stood alone against the political current until the United Nations removed its prohibition on placing ambassadors in Spain in November 1950. Not having a Spanish ambassador could lead to further political complications. Stanton Griffis, who had briefly served with the Office of Strategic Services in Spain during the Second World War, arrived in Madrid in February 1951 to assume his position as the United States Ambassador to Spain.

Section IV: The Pact of Madrid

In July 1951, Congress and the President had finally agreed over Spanish integration in NSC 72/6. The construction of bases, negotiated by the military planners of the Defense Department, solved both lingering problems. It would provide strategic security while not establishing a full political reconciliation with Franco’s Spain—thereby alienating America’s NATO allies. Yet friction persisted and had existed during the previous year. Although the President and the State Department no longer actively hindered the Spanish policy from going forward, they were only recently aroused from bureaucratic inertia, and thus desired more deliberation on the Spanish policy. By the time the Franco and Ambassador James Dunn signed
the Pact of Madrid in 1953, the United Nations had already signed an armistice ending the
Korean War. On account of the inefficacy at the State Department and the need to maintain some
political distance from Franco’s Spain, the National Security Council allowed the military
planners to negotiate the better part of the Spanish-American agreements—particularly their
economic aspect. It was at this point that the military planners undertook political aspects of the
Spanish policy that the State Department, for various reasons, could not.

NSC/72

Although the military planners worked in concert with representatives from the State
Department, years of slow-moving diplomacy exposed its organizational lapses. During the
previous year, the State and Defense Departments addressed the Spanish question in NSC 72. As
the Korean War raged in the summer of 1950 and McCarran’s amendment to the Omnibus
Appropriation for 1951-1952 passed, Louis Johnson put forward NSC 72 for the purpose of
entering into military alliance with Spain in June 1950. Secretary Acheson swiftly
countermanded it in NSC 72/1. With an ambassador now headed for Spain, it was now
impossible to delay the resolution of the Spanish question any further. Acheson indicated as
much in NSC 72/2 of January 1951, “Thus, if we do not soon determine to exploit Spain’s
strategic position and to develop its military potentialities, manpower, and resources, we may
well lose the opportunity.” The foreign policy agencies—under the moderating influence of
the National Security Council, which was designed in 1947 to coordinate American foreign
policy—came together for another attempt at the Spanish question.

Although the State Department began to address political and economic concerns with
the Spanish policy, the military planners had come to expect a continuance of the State

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Department’s rigidity. Until January 1951 they had good reason. In NSC 72/3 of late January, Secretary Marshall of the Defense Department proposed that the United States proceed with “a sense of urgency” to incorporate Spain. Ideally, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—founded in 1949 to ensure greater military cohesion among North Atlantic nations—would accept Spain and that the United States could provide Spain with aid through the Mutual Defense and European Recovery Programs. Yet Marshall understood this outcome was not probable. Marshall concurred with Acheson’s earlier political estimate for American’s European allies. A valid political concern, establishing a line of retreat behind the Pyrenees and providing military aid to Spain perhaps at the expense of other allied nations could damage the prestige of American-aligned governments. NSC 72/3 sought to clarify the preeminence of NATO in American strategy, “NAT countries have priority for our aid and for material under the NAT, MDAP, and ERP.” After overcoming political restraints, NSC 72/3 established the priorities of the new Spanish policy—priorities that would be accomplished with the “close coordination between officials of the Department of State and Defense.”

Delineating the roles of the Departments in forming the new Spanish policy was a difficult task. In similar negotiations with other European recipients of American economic aid, it was the European Cooperation Agency with much oversight from the State Department that stipulated the conditions under which the United States would deliver aid. Yet the State Department would now contend with the opposition of American allies if the United States pursued any Spanish aid scheme. It could not maintain a very active role in the Spanish negotiations. NSC 72/3 suggested that the Defense Department, through its Civil Aeronautics Administration, to begin transferring “as much as possible of the air navigational aids and other

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171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
electronic equipment”. From civilian aid, the Defense Department would then offer “consultation and technical advice concerning the improvement of Spanish ports, roads, railroads, telecommunications, and airfields.” The State Department, sensing its waning authority over the economic considerations of the Spanish policy, would later reinsert itself. For the time being, this separation of responsibilities served as the modus operandi of the American foreign policy establishment until June of 1951.

Despite this, the State Department still vied for greater responsibility in the negotiating process. In early February, just before Ambassador Griffis departed for Spain, Under Secretary of State James Webb placed a greater emphasis on the political regards involving NATO allies. He also called for more deliberation between the Department of State and the Department of Defense concerning the $62.6 million dollars of aid that Congress required President Truman to divulge to Spain—which, for one reason or another, remained unspent in the State Department’s hands.

As of April 1951, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff still looked to the State Department for all the requisite clearances in keeping with NSC 72/3. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee prepared to designate its Joint Military Survey Team to Spain, which would have no negotiating power outside of what had already been put forward in NSC 72/3. After this team compiled its findings about the military capacities and geography of Spain, they would have to wait for the approval of the Secretary of State before the negotiating aspect could begin. The Joint Chiefs further elucidated the point to Admiral Carney, the commander of what would become the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, “These initial

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174 Ibid
discussion should be held on a broad, general level, and should be of an exploratory nature with a view toward preparing for more technical discussions to follow. You are not authorized to make any commitments during these discussions.”\textsuperscript{177} In the meantime, they also established the International Security Affairs of the Defense Department to determine how it would go about dispensing future military aid.\textsuperscript{178} Since the military planners recognized that they knew very little about economic conditions in Spain, they decided to coordinate their activities with the State Department to the greatest extent possible.

On June 7, 1951, Secretary of State Acheson desired to slow down the pace of military and economic inquests of Spain and put forward NSC 72/5—again indicated his unwillingness to see a Spanish policy through. As the Navy prepared its first delegation under Chief of Naval Operations, Forrest Sherman, Secretary Acheson made his demands clear, “All action to develop Spain’s military potentialities should be tempered by political considerations.”\textsuperscript{179} At this point, Acheson had abandoned purely ideological reasons as a motivation for hindering the Spanish policy, but he only now took an active interest in the other political concerns of the Spanish question—a role that was his from the very beginning. Secretary Marshall then called together the National Security Council to confirm the previous delineation of responsibilities in NSC 72/6, which served as the definitive Spanish policy until the Pact of Madrid. In his estimation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should, with their Spanish counterparts, immediately begin military consultations, exchanges of information, and technical discussions.\textsuperscript{180} With that, Admiral Sherman left with his delegation for Spain on July 16. Two days later, Acheson announced the


\textsuperscript{178} Borklund, \textit{The Department of Defense.} pp. 86.

\textsuperscript{179} NSC 72/5. June 7, 1951. \textit{Documents of the NSC.} Fourth Supplement.

\textsuperscript{180} NSC 72/6. June 27, 1951. \textit{Documents of the NSC.} Fourth Supplement.
new policy to the press, taking lengths to distance himself from the military considerations and possible political consequences involved with preliminary military talks, “Military authorities are in general agreement that Spain is of strategic importance to the general defense of Western Europe.” Sherman’s mission to Spain, however, was short-lived. Apparently ill before he left, Sherman suffered a series of debilitating heart attacks and died in Naples on July 22. In his stead, the Defense Department designated first Joint Military Survey Team to evaluate the Spanish infrastructure.

**The Survey Teams**

From the locations of the bases to their subsidiary infrastructure, more than just military considerations factored into the decisions of the Defense planners on the ground in Spain. The State Department also hoped to lead various aspects of the Spanish policy, but was unable, leaving it to the military teams to place all aspects under a single policy. The first Temporary Economic Survey Group and the Joint Military Survey Team respectively, arrived in Spain for a brief assessment of locations suitable for potential joint Spanish-American military bases in 1951. Immediately following Sherman’s death, the Joint Military Survey Team under General Spry and the Temporary Economic Survey Team under University of Syracuse economist Sidney Sufrin left for Spain in August 1951. During the three months in which the survey teams were compiling military and economic data in Spain, Congress passed the Mutual Security Act. This act allowed Congress to continue the military component of the European Recovery Program after it expired under the newly established Mutual Security Agency. For Spain, this

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182 Liedtke, pp. 116.

meant $100 million dollars for fiscal year 1952-1953. As Sufrin’s Economic Survey Team encountered great difficulty in compiling accurate data due to Spanish interference, greater responsibility for economic estimates fell to the military planners. Although the two teams toured Spain for almost the same amount of time, they produced very different results.

Secretary Acheson hoped that the findings of the Temporary Economic Survey Team would serve as a justification for maintaining the role of the State Department in allotting economic aid to Spain. He hoped that Sufrin’s recommendations to his supervising agency the European Cooperation Agency would allow the State Department to determine how the $100 million of the MSA allotment. Sufrin made a series of blunders and more importantly, had great difficulty in removing himself from his Spanish hosts. He recognized several important flaws with the Spanish economy, such as the predominance of corporatist industry through the Instituto Nacional de Insdustria, which controlled all of Spain’s largest industries and was modeled after the fascist Italian IRI. He also took issue with Spain’s variable exchange rates on commodities, which he believed deterred from foreign investment. Above all, Sufrin desired more economic aid to Spanish agriculture and infrastructure in order to avoid inflation if the Spanish government began spending large sums of money on base construction. Yet, on account of a lack of access, Sufrin reverted to earlier State Department reports on Spain. Combined with some awkward diplomatic moments like when he accidentally hit the Spanish Duke of Alba, Sufrin’s report did not serve Acheson’s intended result when Sufrin returned in the autumn of

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185. Liedtke, 130.

Congress had allotted $100 Mutual Security Aid, which could not directly be spent on armaments. Since Sufrin and the State Department could not offer an accurate plan, the Mutual Security Agency would have to look elsewhere.

Liedtke mentioned that the State Department was concerned that the Defense Department would supplant the diplomatic role of the State Department in Spain, “the State Department ran the risk of being swept aside by military considerations during the negotiating process.”

Although Acheson’s State Department now desired to take an active role in constructing a Spanish policy, the “military men” had already studied the Spanish question in depth and been in communication with their Spanish counterparts since 1949. Robert Lovett, Acheson’s protégé and former Under Secretary of State for George Marshall, now lead the Defense Department.

Under his leadership, the military staffs of the Defense Department merged political and military considerations in such a way to maintain distance from Franco’s regime while channeling to it much needed aid.

The report compiled the ninety-man Joint Military Survey Team under General Spry guided both military and economic aid allotments for the State Department and the Defense Department. It would later serve as the document from which American negotiators in Spain referred in order to obtain anchorage rights, land claims, and other contractual obligations. Per his previous instructions, however, General Spry did not himself come to negotiate, but simply to “look around”. Expecting to strike a hard-bargain with the Americans, Franco encountered negotiators tougher than he expected. In the estimation of Benjamin Welles, one of the first

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189 Welles, pp. 289.
American historians to write on modern Spain under Franco, the JMST caught Franco off-guard, “The Spanish, traditional masters of bureaucracy, had finally met their match.”

When Spry’s team issued their findings in Washington during in December 1952, the extent of American economic and military requirements in Spain required the active participation of the State Department to develop a negotiating strategy. On the basis of their findings, the JMST determined that the Spanish authorities were willing to permit, and the Spanish infrastructure able to support, up to ten wings of fighters and bombers—a detail of around twenty thousand airmen. A force this large stationed abroad would require a host of support facilities, including supply depots, ammunition dumps, adequate roads, and sufficient means of refueling. As the Sufrin report indicated, an increase in short-term spending for the military projects would bring with it other economic considerations that the State Department would have to address.

In addition to the basics, the base construction would have a number of tangential effects. First, the Spanish central bank would have to establish complete currency convertibility from the peseta to the dollar. The servicemen would likely want off-base amenities. Franco did not want “little Americas” to spring up as they had in the Rhineland-Palatinate and elsewhere in the Federal German Republic where there were American military bases. Would rowdy airmen in Madrid, Cadiz, Sevilla, or Zaragoza be returned to military justice? Would this include criminal acts? The Spaniards would also have to take up their Catholic intolerance of other religious, as young couples would potentially desire to marry. In short, the scope of this proposed American military presence abroad required a sustained commitment from both Spain and the United States to cover issues beyond the purview of the military planners alone.

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190 Welles, pp. 289.
192 Höhn, Maria. GIs and Fräuleins. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), pp. 84.
The initial report of the Joint Military Survey Team examined the military aspects of the Spanish policy, but later in 1952, John Ohly of the Mutual Security Agency expanded the role of the Defense Department to include a great share of the economic side as well. He designated the lingering $100 million dollar from the Mutual Security appropriation for military use. With this added responsibility, the military planners, the Joint Logistics Plans Committee in early 1952 reported to the Joint Chiefs how various allotment of military aid could satisfy economic improvements in Spain. The Spanish rail system, in their estimation was decrepit, “the present Spanish rail net is inadequately maintained and cannot support the Spanish economy.”\(^{193}\) They decided to set aside, under the auspices of the United States Army, $15 million for their revitalization, “which should properly be a priority element of economic aid to Spain.”\(^{194}\) With some rebalancing of priorities, the JLPC arranged the railroad revitalization to cost $1.4 million dollars while the ECA would cover the rest. Yet, the defense planners waited to announce any larger initiatives until the State Department made their recommendations. They made this point clear,

“Our military requirements in Spain, and the related program of economic, military, and technical aid in support of those requirements which the State Department has been requested to coordinate and develop, are essential elements in our proposed negotiations with Spain, for which negotiations the State Department is also responsible.”\(^{195}\)

Ostensibly, it was the responsibility of the Temporary Economic Survey Team to analyze the state of Spanish infrastructure from which a greater aid plan could emerge. Without a sound basis, the European Cooperation Agency came to rely more on the recommendations of the military planners instead of those of the State Department.

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\(^{194}\) Ibid.

\(^{195}\) Ibid.
Before the new year, Secretary Lovett and the Joint Chiefs composed a new group of general staff officers to return to Spain, “To take advantage of contacts established by the JMST and in order to expedite the conclusion of the desired base rights agreement and a bilateral military aid agreement, a Joint U.S. Military Group should be established in Spain as a matter of priority.” This amounted to, in effect, a hybrid organization that answered to the United States Ambassador, but remained beyond his immediate jurisdiction indicating what lengths policy-makers were willing to go in order pursue national policy. Without much input from the State Department, the Joint Chiefs decided it would be best for the Joint United States Military Group: Spain under Major General August Kissner to report directly to Ambassador Griffis and his successor, the current United States Ambassador to Portugal, Lincoln MacVeagh. The sums involved were simply too great without adequate cooperation across the Departments: an estimated $330 million for the Air Force; $60 million for naval construction; and $15 million for the Army’s roads. By February 14, the Mutual Security Agency and the Joint Chiefs decided on funding scheme that allowed the Spaniards to fund sixty percent of development projects with the peseta while the ECA would cover the remaining forty percent by dollar expenditure.

As the list of projects continued to grow, the State Department offered little in the way of counsel, yet still desired to hold a leading role in the Spanish negotiations. Between the various federal subalterns like the European Cooperation Agency, Mutual Security Agency, and Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee, and the military planners, a detailed Spanish policy emerged. They had already arranged funding sources for “investment projects for economic development”, revitalization of the munitions industry, and “commodities provided to offset inflationary impact

of peseta investment”. They proceeded on a model they believed offered “commodities and technical assistance, and stimulation of economic developments which support Spain.” Yet Acheson took issue with the Joint United States Military Group—which the Joint Chiefs of Staff envisioned the negotiators of the Spanish policy, “The proposed terms of reference for the Joint U.S. Military Group exceed the limitations of the ‘initial discussions’ approved by the President…The program of U.S. facilities desired in Spain at this time should be reviewed to determine whether a program of lesser magnitude could be accepted.” At this late juncture, Acheson still resisted. Yet, the State Department did not furnish any further recommendations to the nascent JUSMG, which was scheduled to leave by March 25.

Although the negotiations were just beginning, it was clear that the military planners of the Defense Department came both put forward and enact the Spanish policy because their counterparts at the State Department were unable. A hybrid negotiating team comprised of military men—the Joint US Military Group—working under the American Ambassador with the aid of some smaller federal offices that managed foreign aid resolved the Spanish question. Liedtke pointed out some of Kissner’s error during the negotiating process—some of them costly. When Kissner indicated to his Spanish counterpart, General Vigón, that the United States may be willing to finance military upgrades, the Spaniards pushed for it. Since it was precisely this political concern that the American negotiators wanted to avoid. The military aid Spain would receive did not come from the same sources that guaranteed other Western European

199 Ibid, RJCS: part II: 1946-1953: Europe and NATO.
200 J.C.S. 1821/73. Joint Strategic Plans Committee in Collaboration with the Joint Logistics Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. March 1, 1952. RJCS: part II: 1946-1953: Europe and NATO.
201 Liedtke, pp. 152.
recipients “end-product” military items—such as advanced weapons systems. These nations feared their share of American military technology would decrease should Spain receive it. With NATO recovering from the shock of the Korean War, any other irregularities would strain the alliance if not break it outright. The talks stalled throughout 1953 and were nearing denouement. At last in early August, the American negotiators dangled $125 million of aid for the Spanish military instead of the previous $15 million, which Franco readily accepted. At this point in the process, these constituted political errors rather than an elevation of military interests over political ones. The political authority had left the Spanish policy to chance. Their subalterns and the Defense planners desired the opposite. The military planners had invested two years in forming a Spanish policy while the State Department, in large part, chided them from their self-imposed stint on the sidelines.

Section V: Epilogue

The headline of the conservative Spanish weekly ABC for the week of September 27, 1953 stated what every Spaniard, by this point, already knew—“to reinforce the preparation of the West in the safe-keeping of the Peace”—the resumption of close Spanish-American relations began. The afternoon before, the current United States Ambassador to Spain, James Dunn signed the finalized Pact of Madrid along with the Spanish Foreign Minister in Madrid. As the anonymous writers for ABC recognized, Spain finally could assume its place among the Western nations in the global struggle against Communism. Yet they could not disguise their most

202 Liedtke, pp. 152.
204 ABC, 27 September 1953, pp.1.
pressing interests even on the front page, “Spain will receive economic, technical, and military help.”

Spain’s darker days were over. To mark his influence during this important turn of events, Senator McCarran also made a headline in the same issue, “Mac Carran expresses his satisfaction and says that the signed accords ought to last many years.”

Earlier that summer, McCarran received the Grand Cross of the Order of Isabella la Catolica—one of Spain’s highest honors—in light of his contributions to Spanish-American relations. Yet the Spaniards were more concerned with the American trains, trucks, and their mechanics who would arrive in the coming year to serve as technical advisers.

Despite some of the logistical concerns on the part of the planners, they came to accept locations for a total of four large bases in Spain. These four bases lay along a diagonal nearly five hundred miles long running northeast from Cadiz on the Atlantic to Zaragoza in the Ebro River basin. To connect them all, the JUSMG recommended that an oil pipeline be constructed along the corridor of least distance. They ruled out other areas with as much strategic value, such as the Atlantic port of El Ferrol, for reasons that remain ambiguous from the documents. Yet all the bases were to be located next to important urban centers. Zaragoza was the fifth largest city in Spain and would be the home of the Sanjurjo-Valenzuela air complex. The site of the Torrejón base stood within the city limits of Spain’s capital and largest city, Madrid. The southern air base would be located at Morón, just thirty kilometers southeast of Spain’s third largest city, Sevilla. The Rota naval base, future anchorage for the nuclear submarines of the US 6th Fleet, would be located across the bay from Cádiz, one of Spain’s most important maritime centers and the same port from which Columbus set sail in 1492.

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205 ABC, 27 September 1953, pp.1.
206 Ibid. pp. 1
207 Lowi, pp. 29.
208 Whitaker, pp. 60.
During the years of the Spanish question, 1945-1953, the political, military, and economic needs of the United States changed greatly. As such, the nation required a foreign policy that reflected this. Yet the inability of the American diplomatic corps to execute this policy led to a strange scenario where military men became diplomats. As such, no predominance of one group of interests over another emerged. Rather, the hybrid civil-military negotiating teams represented the outward expression of the American policy on Spain.

From 1945 to 1949, the foreign policy establishment did not address the Spanish question as the future war scenarios of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed its strategic importance. Rather, a combination of personal disputes between the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State hindered any progress. Although the Secretary of State presented valid political concerns
regarding the reaction of America’s European allies to Spanish integration, but narrowly constructed ideological arguments usually ended further debate on the issue.

In Congress, the Spanish Lobby presented the Spanish question on its political, economic, and military merits. Carlton Hayes began the effort. Although they frequently experienced setbacks, their leader, Senator McCarran was able to win over a third of the senate to the Spanish cause before the outbreak of war in Korea. Immediately afterward, another third voted with the Spanish Lobby.

Through his Congressional maneuvering, McCarran forced President Truman to spend at least $63.5 million in Spanish aid. As the United States bestowed foreign aid to Tito’s Yugoslavia, a humanitarian crisis loomed in Spain, and Truman uttered disparaging remarks about Franco in the American press, even ideological justifications for Spanish exclusion rung hollow. Following further attempts of the Spanish Lobby and the recommendations of the most-trusted minds of the foreign policy establishment, President Truman finally acceded a military solution to the Spanish question. By doing this, Truman dodged criticisms from American allies while offering more security to Western Europe.

During a span of three years from 1949 to 1952, the various policy and military planning groups of the Department of Defense adapted to the changing course of the Cold War. After national political leaders agreed that military interests should play a greater role in national security policy, they rushed headlong into investing negotiating authority to the interdepartmental committees, a large component of which was comprised of planners from the Defense Department. This about-face was abrupt. Yet the Joint Strategic Plans Committee required a series of ad hoc Survey Groups and Economic teams to fully develop their policy on political terms. They would also periodically consult the State Department for expertise should
they find it in short supply. This did not result in military considerations supplanting political ones, for the Defense Department incorporated various new methods of constructing policy into its structure—thereby establishing a modus operandi for future endeavors.

It is a rather simple question: which should take precedence—military or political considerations? The answer Clausewitz provides is simple enough; political considerations must lead other concerns when crafting a military policy. Under different circumstances, the political and military may complement one another, but this takes coordination and discipline across a bureaucracy, “But if policy judges correctly of the march of military events, it is entirely its affair to determine what are the events and what direction of events most favourable to the ultimate and great end of the War.”\(^\text{209}\) This was the case in the events leading to the Pact of Madrid in 1953.

Perhaps the transition to peacetime bureaucracies—and the scaling back of the Defense Department—followed by its sudden resurgence during the Korean War revealed that the United States required a war-oriented diplomacy to meet the contours of the Cold War. The Spanish case reveals some important insights on these questions, but not completely. What is certain is that, in the Spanish negotiations, a full subordination of political to military requirements did not occur. Rather, the military and the political eventually converged. If critics assert that Clausewitz does not apply to the modern age, they need examine the integration of Spain as an example. This thesis examined what consequences administrative departures from established diplomatic principles may have on the ability of a nation to conduct its diplomacy and how the diplomatic needs of a nation will somehow be met. If the military aspect is ignored, it must eventually be addressed, and most likely on less than desirable terms.

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