Resurrecting Nagasaki: Reconstruction, the Urakami Catholics, and Atomic Memory, 1945-1970

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ABSTRACT
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This dissertation traces the reconstruction of Nagasaki City after the atomic bombing of August 9, 1945 by concentrating on politics and religion. It follows the various people and groups who contributed to the city's rise from the ashes and shaped its image in Japan and the world. In contrast to Hiroshima, Nagasaki did not make its atomic tragedy the dominant theme of its postwar image, and instead strove to rebuild the city in the light of its past as a center of international trade and culture. The most influential group advocating the focus on "international culture" during the early postwar period was the Roman Catholic community of the northern Urakami Valley, which was ground zero. Although Hiroshima became synonymous with the atomic bomb in national and international discourse, Nagasaki followed its own path, one that illuminates the relationship between mass destruction, city history, religion, and historical remembrance. It is a story that sheds a different light on the atomic bombings and their aftermath, not only in comparison with Hiroshima but with other cities destroyed by area bombing and the course of their subsequent reconstruction.
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For My Parents
A city brings together in the same space different ages, offering to our gaze a sedimented history of tastes and cultural forms. The city gives itself as both to be seen and to be read.¹

Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting.

**Valley of Ashes and Visions: An Introduction**

When mass destruction levels a city, surviving city officials and residents turn to familiar referents—memory, religion, or history—to guide the reconstruction process. They seek to restore the recent past but also to build a vision of a renewed destiny. Reconstruction becomes an exigent and existential venture encompassing the past, present, and future. Standing in the ashes, people gaze backward in time to revive what was lost and look forward to give meaning to the tragedy and clear a path to renewal. After the atomic bombing of Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, the history of the city constituted the bedrock on which officials and citizens planned to build the city's future. Their visions of reconstruction sometimes conflicted, as did their perceptions of the significance of the destruction, even as shared experiences and disparate views combined to set Nagasaki on a different path than its atomic counterpart, Hiroshima. Out of the discordant visions of the first three decades after the bomb emerged the diverse narratives, or memories, of post-atomic Nagasaki.

When the city set out to rebuild, it first sought to articulate the significance of the bombing. The symbolism of the event depended on who was speaking, producing a variety of interpretations that at once overlapped and opposed one another. For Allied occupation forces, Nagasaki city officials, the Catholic community, and even Emperor

Hirohito, the bomb brought the end of the war, or as a common saying put it, the bomb was a "harbinger of peace." Nagasaki was the second and last atomic bombing in the war, the logic went, so city officials rallied residents with the saying, "Peace starts from Nagasaki," attempting to set the city's catastrophe in the broader context of the end of the war, surrender, and the new postwar beginning. City politicians and the emperor alike encouraged Nagasaki residents in the early years of reconstruction to "turn tragedy into happiness" by rebuilding their "international cultural city."

Because the Urakami Cathedral had stood at the epicenter of the bombing, the official approach enhanced the position of the Catholics who viewed its destruction as a kind of martyrdom. In November 1945, the leader of the Catholic parishioners, Nagai Takashi, declared the tragedy an act of Providence, claiming that God chose Urakami—ground zero and home of generations of Catholics—as a sacrificial lamb on His altar to expiate the sins of humankind for the sake of ending the war. For Nagai, the bomb became a "harbinger of peace" with the martyrdom of the Catholics, "the only worthy sacrifice." Nagai was already a leader in the Catholic community before the bombing, but after it he became a local prophet to whom Catholic survivors looked for spiritual leadership. During the occupation, Nagai was the public voice of Nagasaki's atomic experience and a key figure in the city's physical, social, and spiritual reconstruction. Through his nationally best-selling books, which expounded his interpretation of the bombing, he shaped the discourse on the Nagasaki bombing, which linked it to Urakami and Christianity in popular memory for decades to come.

For most hibakusha (atomic-bombing survivors) who were neither Catholic nor members of the city council, the bomb meant personal trauma and human loss. The
bomb brought not peace, but destruction, the death of loved ones, and physical and mental scars, as well as lifelong, debilitating illness caused by exposure to radiation. These survivors constituted by far the largest group in post-atomic Nagasaki. I refer to them here as "hibakusha," even though the term technically includes all those who survived the bombing and radiation, including most city officials and Urakami Catholics. In the 1950s, the term "hibakusha" in Nagasaki came to signify the groups of survivors active on behalf of bomb victims or in the peace movement, as well as the voiceless survivors for whom they spoke. In my analysis, the main historical actors were the city officials and politicians, the Catholics, and the hibakusha, so defined.

Municipal policies of reconstruction, which made a priority of reviving Nagasaki's past over addressing the plight of the survivors, tended to ignore the hibakusha until they rose up in the peace movement in the mid-1950s. A literary movement by Nagasaki hibakusha to write and publish poetry, prose, and testimony relating to their experience of the bomb gained traction at around the same time. Many hibakusha worked against the voices of city politicians and the Catholics to bring attention to the needs of survivors, forming activist groups whose central mission to relate the horror of the atomic bomb and promote peace was joined in the 1970s with increasing efforts to gain adequate national compensation and relief. In short, the reconstruction process produced obstructions, or walls of silence, to the voices of the Nagasaki residents who were hibakusha, which they then challenged through peace activism.

Many groups worked for the reconstruction of Nagasaki, but few shared exactly the same vision. Differing views of politics, religion, history, and memory informed the
kinetic enterprise of reconstruction, and the groups who held these views constituted what must be called a social cartography of reconstruction.

Mayors, councilmen, and other municipal officials recalled the Nagasaki of days of old, when the city had boasted economic ties to China and the Netherlands for more than three hundred years. From the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, when Japan was closed off from relations with Europe, Nagasaki remained the sole window to the West, both in trade and intellectual exchange. The bomb did not erase this historical legacy, which prompted officials to call for the reconstruction of Nagasaki as an "international cultural city," an approach that became official in 1949 when the Nagasaki International Cultural City Construction Law passed unanimously in the National Diet in Tokyo. By comparison, the Hiroshima Peace Commemoration City Construction Law, which was passed by the same Diet, solidified Hiroshima's past, present, and future as an atomic-bombed city. Nagasaki officials created their own memorials, museums, and committees to commemorate the tragedy, but the removal of symbolic physical remains of the atomic bombing against vocal opposition of the hibakusha demonstrated their unwillingness to compromise their central vision of building an "international cultural city." Unlike Hiroshima, addressing the human destruction brought by the bomb was never a top priority for politicians in Nagasaki.

The hibakusha, for their part, wanted the city to emphasize the atomic-bombing experience in the reconstruction process, just as Hiroshima City was doing. In the first decade after the bomb, however, the survivors had almost no political voice, which meant no influence in the plans for reconstruction. Only in the mid-1950s did they successfully assert their demands for municipal and national assistance in paying medical treatment
and living costs. Gaining momentum through the 1950s and early 1960s, the *hibakusha* eventually became the most vocal presence in post-atomic Nagasaki. At this time, *hibakusha* from both Nagasaki and Hiroshima found strength in a unified front against government neglect of the survivors, which for them presented the last, unfinished work of reconstruction. They berated the national government for its neglect of their needs and insufficient care. And their criticism continued even after a national relief law finally passed in 1957 because of its inadequacies and its refusal to recognize large numbers of *hibakusha*. Indeed, only 1,436 *hibakusha* were "legally recognized" (*ninteit*) and received some form of relief in the first year of the law, although 200,984 people had applied.\(^2\)

The determination of the *hibakusha* to redress these injustices never flagged, even after political infighting broke the unity between and within the two cities in the late 1960s.

The Catholic community supported discussions of restoring the "international" nature of the city, not only for the purposes of promoting trade, culture, and tourism, but also because it suited their identity as part of an international community of Catholics. The presence of American occupation forces, many of whom were Christian, helped to empower the Catholics. For Nagasaki Catholics, reconstruction became a vision of the complete renewal of the Urakami Valley, even if that meant demolishing the ruins of their cathedral, which by the late 1940s had become the symbol of Nagasaki's destruction, often compared to the ruin of Hiroshima's Atomic Dome. Catholics advocated removal of all atomic-bombing relics in Urakami that reminded them of the tragedy and threatened their total recovery. They promoted remembrance of the bomb

but also encouraged moving past it, an approach shared by city officials intent on promoting the international culture of the city.

If visions of reconstruction took many forms, they all shared the same vocabulary. Many words emerged for "reconstruction." The conventional word "saiken" was used in postwar discourse, but not nearly as often as the word "fukkô," meaning "revival." "Saiken," literally reconstruction, usually referred to physical rebuilding, while "fukkô" implied a general revival of physical, social, and psychological well-being. Residents all agreed on the first stage of fukkô as rebuilding the destroyed physical landscape of Nagasaki, but after that the definition fragmented. At times, fukkô meant the building of houses and repair of roads; at other times, it meant the revival of the spirit of the citizens, which in large part relied on the success of physical construction. At times, fukkô meant restoring international trade; removing the ruins of the cathedral to restore Urakami and the Catholic community; overcoming psychological trauma; and winning national compensation and medical relief. Other words, such as fukkatsu (rebirth), kaifuku (recovery), and even fukko, which more directly implied the restoration of the past, appeared in the vernacular of reconstruction.

Still other words pointed to the tension among competing visions. The term "sacrifice" (gisei) served the purposes of all parties to refer to those who died in the war and the atomic bombings. The word also informed political and religious rhetoric. Politicians directed the citizenry as to what they must do to overcome the hardships of the postwar years and tirelessly make sacrifices to revive the nation. Catholics, of course, used the word with the connotation that identified the destruction of their community
with the death of Christ. The hibakusha used the word primarily about those who died in the bombing, but also in reference to their own individual trauma and collective plight.

"Pray" (inoru) was a ubiquitous word in postwar Japan, often in the phrase "pray for peace," but it had an additional connotation in Nagasaki because of the city's historical relationship with Christianity. Nagasaki and the surrounding area has been the center of Christianity in Japan from the time Jesuit missionaries first arrived in the middle of the sixteenth century. In the late-1940s and 1950s, both Nagasaki and Hiroshima "prayed" for peace and reconstruction, as even a cursory glance at local newspapers reveals. After Nagai Takashi became known as the voice of Nagasaki in 1948, "inoru" gradually came to imply a passivity that was linked to its Catholic history, a popular view best captured in the mid-1950s saying, "Hiroshima Rages, Nagasaki Prays" (Ikari no Hiroshima, Inori no Nagasaki). The phrase suggested that Nagasaki's peace activism lagged behind that of Hiroshima, in that Nagasaki continued to passively pray about its atomic experience rather than exerting active efforts to commemorate it and work for world peace. In short, some thought that Nagasaki peace activism had not evolved with the times, remaining stuck in the late 1940s when incantations of "praying for peace" were a common tactic of the emerging peace movement.

From the 1940s to the 1980s, the word "memory" did not appear much in Nagasaki, or at least it was not identified as public memory (kioku), a term that only became prominent in the 1990s. Instead, a number of "memories," or narratives, developed in and about Nagasaki, which were informed and shaped by the events discussed here, revealing, it seems, at least three versions of memory. When those who

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3 Literally, "Hiroshima of Rage, Nagasaki of Prayer."
envisioned the revival of Nagasaki related their interpretation of the bombing to their view of reconstruction, they fashioned narratives of the atomic experience that have left clear traces even today. First, for municipal officials, "memory" meant city history, something to be revived and evoked, not created or affected by the atomic bomb. The bomb was part of the narrative, but not its central motif. Second, Catholics took a complex and at times contradictory approach to remembering the bomb. The martyrdom, as they saw it, continued the history of Christian martyrdom in Nagasaki, which had preceded the bomb by hundreds of years. Although they thought that the tragedy should not be forgotten, the physical traces that connected them to "a tragic past," as the Nagasaki bishop put it, also prevented the full recovery of Urakami. This view encouraged, as it were, both remembering and forgetting in a single breath.

Third, the hibakusha saw atomic memory, however painful, as something to be protected from threats coming from many directions. The national government, by not accepting responsibility for the livelihood of the hibakusha, did not acknowledge their experience, which for them was tantamount to neglecting the memory of their trauma. The municipal government removed symbolic relics of the bombs, supplanting them with "empty symbols" (kyozó) that failed to convey the reality of the bombing and cost vast amounts of money, while the hibakusha suffered without relief. The Urakami Catholics, especially Nagai Takashi, presented an interpretation of the bomb that took root during the occupation and dominated the discourse of the bomb for decades, overshadowing the efforts of Nagasaki hibakusha in the peace movement and inhibiting the recognition of their experience. Perhaps the greatest threat to Nagasaki hibakusha memory, though, came from Hiroshima.
"Hiroshima" has monopolized the popular history and memory of the bombings since the earliest years. The emphasis of Nagasaki city officials on restoring the international history of the city diluted the focus on the bomb for the first decade, while Hiroshima made the bomb the center of its postwar identity. The prominence of Nagai Takashi and Urakami in the representations of the Nagasaki experience drew attention away from the fact that most hibakusha, like their Hiroshima counterparts, "raged" against the inhumanity of the bomb and the postwar threat of nuclear weapons.

Numbers also played a role. Estimates of the population in the two cities on the day of the bombing have fluctuated, but it is generally agreed that there were around 350,000 people in Hiroshima and 270,000 in Nagasaki. The number of affected persons rose in the following weeks as tens of thousands of people entered the highly radioactive areas to help in the relief efforts. Nagasaki is a smaller city surrounded by mountains, which buffered the destruction of the bomb when it exploded in the northern valley, preventing much of the destructive power from reaching the central part of the city. As a result, the human damage was greater in Hiroshima, with about 120,000 dead by the end of 1945 and Nagasaki with 74,000. In 1950, a national census based on data from the U.S.-led Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) counted 158,597 hibakusha in Hiroshima and 124,901 in Nagasaki. In the same year, the death toll had risen to 200,000 and 140,000, respectively. The larger population of hibakusha in Hiroshima, who also

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5 Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, p. 359.

6 Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, p. 369.
did not encounter the obstructions to memory that Nagasaki *hibakusha* did, depicted their experience as a complement to the image of a "Peace Commemoration City," that is, an atomic-bombed city. In short, the collective voice of Hiroshima *hibakusha* was much larger than Nagasaki's.

The *hibakusha* of Hiroshima had a larger presence in the peace movement and produced more atomic-bomb literature. The Nagasaki *hibakusha* 's "lag" behind Hiroshima, as commentators often phrased it from the 1940s through the 1970s (and into the present), can be attributed in large part to the challenges they fought to overcome from the 1950s. These included municipal reconstruction policies that had de-emphasized the atomic experience as well as the dominance of Nagai Takashi in the city's atomic literature and discourse. The Nagasaki survivors found themselves in a constant competition with Hiroshima in the popular media and also in the scholarship on the bombs. Only one chapter of ten in John Treat's seminal work on atomic-bomb literature deals with Nagasaki, for the fact is that the Nagasaki *hibakusha* simply wrote less about their experience than their counterparts in Hiroshima.\(^7\) Realizing this, though perhaps too late, Nagasaki survivors began a literary movement in the mid-1950s, which increased in effort and production from the late 1960s.

In popular memory, Nagasaki was thus an international cultural city first and only then an atomic-bombed city. This approach, which endures in Nagasaki today, allowed Hiroshima to become *the* atomic-bombed city. Officials in Hiroshima emphasized the experience of the atomic bombing, in part to avoid reference to the city's past as a major command center for the Imperial Army. And while officials in Nagasaki, too, promoted

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\(^7\) John Whittier Treat, *Writing Ground Zero: Japanese Literature and the Atomic Bomb* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Chapter Eleven is not included in my count because it is an epilogue.
the memory of the bombing, they did so to a lesser degree than in Hiroshima, instead choosing to balance the bombing with the revival of the city's history as an international port, which itself was related to the city's history of Christianity. In light of Nagasaki's "delayed" peace activism in comparison to Hiroshima's, some critics have referred to Nagasaki as an "inferior atomic-bombed city" (rettó hibaku toshi). Nagasaki scholar Takahashi Shinji agrees that the city's experience has been neglected in popular history and memory, but he blames the narrow-mindedness of "the world" for being unable to see past "Euro-shima" simply because it was the first atomic bombing.

Of course, Nagasaki officials, city planners, and the hibakusha never intended to forget the bombing. Indeed, they considered it an important responsibility to convey their experience to the world to ensure that such a catastrophe never happened again. But still, as Treat says, Hiroshima became the "metonymy" of nuclear destruction in popular memory, while Nagasaki became an afterthought. The plea of "No More Hiroshimas!" can still be heard today, but the "No More Nagasakis!" of the 1940s and 1950s have been muffled by the decades of Hiroshima dominance. Historians, politicians, activist groups, and popular media have favored Hiroshima for more than six decades. It is surely time to write Nagasaki back into the history of the atomic bombings and their aftermath.

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10 Treat notes in Writing Ground Zero, p. 301, that "the place name 'Hiroshima' is now the metonymy of all 'Hiroshimas' past and future." "There exists in the historiography of the nuclear age a hierarchy—Hiroshima and then, only sometimes, Nagasaki."
The Urakami Valley, ground zero of the bombing, is the primary setting for my inquiry. Urakami Valley had been the home of Nagasaki Catholics for more than four centuries. After Christianity was outlawed in the early 1600s, the religion went underground and survived in communities of "hidden Christians" (kakure Kirishitan) until modern Japan allowed freedom of religion in the latter part of the nineteenth century. After Japan signed a treaty of commerce and friendship with France in October 1858, Nagasaki City was opened as a port of trade with the West in 1859: to England and Russia on July 1, the United States on July 4, and France on August 15. The Dutch had been there since the sixteenth century, conducting trade from a small man-made island in Nagasaki Bay called Dejima.

In September 1859, Father Prudent S. Girard, a French Roman Catholic missionary who had been standing by in the Ryukyus (present-day Okinawa), arrived in Edo (present-day Tokyo) to lead the Japan mission for the Vatican. He immediately built a church in Yokohama, a treaty port like Nagasaki, and called Fathers Louis Furet and Bernard Petitjean, who had also been waiting in Okinawa. Furet was close friends with Leon Dury, the French diplomat and first representative to Nagasaki, who was a doctor and a fervent Catholic. After Nagasaki opened to the West, a residential area for


foreigners was established in the Ôura District near the bay, and there the missionaries set up shop.\textsuperscript{14}

Intent on finding the descendants of the seventeenth-century Kirishitan, Furet joined Dury in Nagasaki on January 22, 1863 after Dury promised to sponsor his stay.\textsuperscript{15} Furet leased land on a hill in Ôura and began to build a cathedral to meet the religious needs of the Western residents, as permitted by the 1858 treaty.\textsuperscript{16} No doubt, though, that Furet also sought to reestablish Christianity in Nagasaki and prepare for a possible reunion with Japanese Kirishitan. Petitjean joined Furet in August 1864, and took on the responsibility of building the church when Furet left for Paris in October.\textsuperscript{17}

The Ôura Cathedral was completed on December 29, 1864.\textsuperscript{18} Following the wishes of Furet, it was named the "Cathedral of the Twenty-Six Holy Martyrs," in commemoration of the Nagasaki martyrs crucified in 1597 at the start of the Christian persecution.\textsuperscript{19} Petitjean, too, hoped that the cathedral would draw the Kirishitan descendants out of hiding. In case the large cross on top of the steeple failed to convey the message, Petitjean arranged to have characters 天主堂 (tenshudō), meaning "cathedral," "church," or "temple of the Lord," inscribed in large letters above the door, so as to communicate to the Kirishitan the return of the Catholic missionaries banished

\textsuperscript{14} Kataoka Yakichi, Nagasaki no Kirishitan (Nagasaki: Seibo no kishi sha, 1989), p. 92.

\textsuperscript{15} Nagasaki-shi shi, vol. 4, pp. 593-4.

\textsuperscript{16} Kataoka, Nagasaki no Kirishitan, p. 92.

\textsuperscript{17} Drummond, A History of Christianity in Japan, p. 303; Urakawa, Urakami Kirishitan shi, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{18} Kataoka, Nagasaki no Kirishitan, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{19} Nijûroku sei junkyôsha dô: Urakawa, Urakami Kirishitan shi, p. 49.
by the shoguns centuries earlier. Father Girard had done the same with his church in Yokohama. The Ôura Cathedral faced the center of Nagasaki with its shiny gold-colored cross atop the steeple. City residents found the building an interesting spectacle, referring to it simply as the French Temple (Furansuji). "French Temple viewing" (Furansuji kenbutsu) became a popular pastime, but among those who came to view the grand church, none had yet confessed to being Christian.

At midday on Friday, March 17, 1865, the Ôura Cathedral received a group of around fifteen visitors. As Petitjean opened the doors, he thought some local farmers were bold sightseers to have come to the steps of the cathedral for their "Furansuji kenbutsu." But these were no ordinary farmers. As Petitjean walked back inside the cathedral, the group followed him in, and still unsure of their intentions he prepared to preach to them about Christianity. Then one of them, a lady of forty or fifty years old, walked up to Petitjean, put her hand over her heart, and spoke. "We who are here have the same heart as you Fathers." "Really?" replied Petitjean. "Where are you from?" She answered, "We are all from Urakami. Almost everyone in Urakami has the same heart as we do." Then she asked, "Santa Maria no gozô wa doko?" ("Where is the statue of the Blessed Virgin Mary?"). Petitjean exclaimed, "Santa Maria!" Having heard them speak

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20 See photograph of Ôura Cathedral in Nagasaki-shi shi, opposite to page 592.
22 Urakawa, Urakami Kirishitan shi, p. 49.
23 "French Temple viewing": Kataoka, Nagasaki no Kirishitan, pp. 93-5.
24 Kataoka, Nagasaki no Kirishitan, p. 97. On the numbers and origins of the members of the group, see Urakawa, Urakami Kirishitan shi, p. 63, ftnt. 2.
the holy name, he no longer doubted the identity of the farmers: they were indeed the descendants of the *Kirishitan*. When news of the encounter reached Rome, Pope Pius IX reportedly wept tears of joy.

The joy, however, was short lived. Christianity was still banned in 1860s Japan, as it had been for more than two hundred years, and Japan's new treaties with the Western nations had only granted religious freedom to Westerners residing in the treaty ports. Petitjean and Joseph Laucaigne—whom the Urakami Catholics referred to as "Big Bishop" and "Little Bishop," respectively—drew the attention of the Japanese authorities because of their contact with residents in the Urakami Valley. Although the missionaries practiced their work as discreetly as possible for the sake of the safety of the *Kirishitan*, the local authorities quickly caught on and took measures to deal with the potential revival of Christianity in their region.

The Nagasaki *bugyō* (local shogunal authority) declared "France Temple viewing" illegal for all residents in the city and surrounding areas, but the Urakami Catholics ignored the warning and continued to visit the missionaries at the cathedral. In April 1869, the Nagasaki government ordered the Urakami residents to pay homage at their

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26 This version of the encounter is from the letter Father Petitjean wrote the following day (March 18, 1865) to Father Girard in Yokohama. The letter is reproduced in Japanese translation in: Urakawa, *Urakami Kirishitan shi*, pp. 50-52. *The Kirishitan* invited Petitjean and the other Fathers to their celebration of the birth of Jesus (*Zeusu*), who they reaffirmed to the Fathers died on the cross (*kurusu*) to save our souls (*anima*). Many other words used in Catholicism, such as *orasho* (prayer), had also been preserved in the communities of Hidden *Kirishitan*, and are still used by Japanese Catholics today.


28 The words used by the Urakami Catholics were, "*futoka episukoposu-sama*" and "*komaka episukoposu-sama*." The word "episcopus" is latin for bishop: Kataoka, *Nagasaki no Kirishitan*, p. 93.

local Shinto shrine, *Kôtai jingû*. While many did so, and some even apostatized, most of the thousands of Catholics in Urakami ignored the order. City officials then decided on a more drastic measure to deal with the defiant Catholics. On October 30, the government ordered seven hundred suspected Christians residing in Urakami to "appear at the Tachiyama Public Office at 6:00 the following morning." Later, the *Shin'entai*, Nagasaki's paramilitary police force, gathered the remaining thousands of believers and escorted them to boats that had been prepared to "entrust" (*funtaku*) the *Kirishitan* to other domains. Within a few days, all ships had set sail, leaving the French missionaries with little recourse. Some *Kirishitan* had been exiled starting in 1868, but 1869 marked the beginning of a mass purge of Catholics from Urakami, as they were physically forced out of their homes into exile.

In the five years from the beginning of the Meiji era in 1868, the Nagasaki government "entrusted" 3,530 Urakami residents to other domains. The largest groups of *Kirishitan* were banished to Kagoshima City (Satsuma), Nagoya City (Owari), and Kanazawa City (Kaga), but the majority were spread over nineteen other domains,

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30 The *Kôtai jingû* was renamed the *Sannô jinja* after the Meiji split of Shinto and Buddhism. It was 800m from the epicenter of the atomic bombing in 1945, and is now a popular tourist attraction because of its peculiar resilience to the bomb: the blast of the bomb destroyed the shrine, but left a single pillar of the *tori'i* (shrine gate) standing.

31 *Nagasaki-shi shi*, vol. 4, p. 622.

32 Urakawa, *Urakami Kirishitan shi*, p. 278.

33 *Nagasaki-shi shi*, vol. 4, p. 623.

34 See Urakawa, *Urakami Kirishitan shi*, p. 289. Urakawa writes that on the day the last ship departed Nagasaki harbor full of the *Kirishitan*, a line of Buddhist monks from a temple near Óura Cathedral watched it leave and rejoiced that "The enemies of Buddhism have been extirpated!" (*Butteki ga horobi useta yo*).
including in the villages of Hizen (Nagasaki). Of the 3,530 Catholics, 655 died in exile, 109 in Kanazawa alone. Urakami became a ghost town with 684 houses uninhabited.

The exile of the Catholics ended in March 1873. The French missionaries, including Laucaigne (Petitjean had been recalled to the Vatican), had appealed on behalf of their Urakami parishioners, and several foreign diplomats, including Dury, had expressed official outrage at the religious intolerance demonstrated by the exile of the Kirishitan. Some Japanese intellectuals, too, such as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Nakamura Masanao (who later converted to Christianity) argued that there was no reason to prohibit Christianity and that freedom should be accorded to believers in the faith. On returning home to Urakami in 1873, the Catholics found that the sign-boards displaying anti-Christian laws had been removed and the prohibition on visiting Ôura Cathedral had been lifted, allowing them at last to practice their faith unmolested.

If Petitjean's encounter with the fifteen Catholic farmers in 1865 signaled the "discovery" of the Kirishitan, the liberation of their faith in 1873 after centuries of

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35 Hizen domain (home to Nagasaki) is included in this number, where 127 Catholics were banished to Ômura City. Incidentally, Hiroshima City 177 received Urakami Catholics, of whom 40 died during exile.

36 Nagasaki-shi shi, vol. 4, pp. 643-645. There is a disagreement in numbers of exiled Christians among sources, but I have relied on the official numbers of Nagasaki City Office presented in the volume cited. Van Hecken uses the figure 3404, but provides no citation. Joseph Jennex, A History of the Catholic Church in Japan: From its Beginnings to the Early Meiji Period (1549-1873) (The Committee of the Apostolate, 1959), p. 224, puts the figure at 4,100. Urakawa, Urakami Kirishitan shi, pp. 290-291, shows a number of 2,810 and lists only 19 domains, which is from a report written by the Nagasaki Prefectural Office shortly after the banishment.

37 Nagasaki-shi shi, vol. 4, p. 623. For a detailed account of the exile of the Urakami Catholics, see Urakawa, Urakami Kirishitan shi, especially chapter 21, "Urakami Kirishitan no sô razai" (The total banishment of Urakami Kirishitan), pp. 278-06.


39 Nagasaki-shi shi, vol. 4, p. 632. The sign-boards (kôsatsu) that informed the public of the anti-Christian laws were removed in February 1873: Urakawa, Urakami Kirishitan shi, p. 396.
persecution marked the revival of Catholicism in Japan. Although legal religious freedom was not promulgated until the constitution of 1889, lifting of the ban in 1873 catalyzed a new growth of the church in the Nagasaki area, most especially in Urakami. Urakami Catholics grew in size and influence, until by the time of the atomic bombing there were approximately 10,000 parishioners and the Urakami Cathedral, completed in 1925, was the largest cathedral in East Asia. The mutual distrust between residents of Urakami in the northern part of the city and the rest of Nagasaki in the south did not fade in the decades after the exile ended, continuing even after Urakami became part of Nagasaki proper in 1920. The Catholic terms for the two areas, "City of Maria" and "City of Eros," respectively, conveyed the Catholic side of mutual antipathy that continued well into the postwar era.

The Catholics had a strong voice during the first decade and a half after the atomic bombing. The Urakami Valley was the center of the worst destruction and required the most physical reconstruction. The Catholics and even some non-Christian residents argued that the bombing was primarily an Urakami catastrophe and only secondly a Nagasaki one. More specifically, some claimed that the "atomic bomb fell on Urakami, not Nagasaki." This idea was perpetuated in early newspaper reports that focused on the destroyed Urakami Cathedral and the fact that more than eighty-percent of the Catholic community had been killed. Some people in southern Nagasaki had even

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41 Funakoe Kôichi discusses the Christianization of the atomic bombing in relation to this phrase in, "Jû roku seiki made sakanobotte genbaku o kangaeru," in Takahashi and Funakoe, eds., Nagasaki kara heiwa gaku suru!, pp. 29-36. The exact phrase as it appears in Funakoe, p. 30, is the "atomic bomb fell on Urakami." My addition of "not Nagasaki" is based on conversations with Nagasaki-based scholars over the years, including Abe Shinji, who said the phrase as I have written it.
claimed that the bomb was divine punishment for the non-Shinto residents of Urakami.\footnote{Takahashi, Nagasaki ni atte tetsugaku suru (1994), p. 201.} Furthermore, from 1945 until 1958, when the cathedral ruins were replaced with a brand new church, the demolished Urakami Cathedral served as the popular symbol of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. Photographs of the cathedral ruins often accompanied articles about the bombing in local and national media, linking the atomic catastrophe to Urakami and Christianity.

The first months of newspaper coverage of the bombing played a major role in localizing the bomb's tragedy to Urakami. On September 15, 1945, two reporters for the *Yomiuri hôchi shinbun* called for the preservation of the ruins of the cathedral as a symbol of the atomic catastrophe. They speculated that the Catholic "sacrifice" was perhaps thirty-percent of the total number of casualties.\footnote{The version of the article that is referenced here is from the *Nagasaki shinbun*, 15 September 1945. At the time, the *Nagasaki shinbun* ran stories in cooperation with the *Asahi shinbun*, *Mainichi shinbun*, and the *Yomiuri hôchi*.} Another mid-September 1945 article in the *Nagasaki shinbun* argued that while the "dark silence of the pain of war devastation and the sadness of defeat continues," residents should find comfort in the fact that "Nagasaki escaped total destruction" because the bomb had exploded in Urakami; the article neglected to mention that Urakami lay smoldering in a flattened landscape of rubble and ash.\footnote{*Nagasaki shinbun*, 16 September 1945.}

The bombing was also presented as a Christian tragedy. Nagai Takashi reinforced the notion in his popular books, which suited the rest of the city early on, especially city and prefectural officials, because the bombing appeared as the Catholics' problem, not theirs. The prefectural governor announced in August 1947 that the "land of Nagasaki is
a land of Christian martyrdom," and because of that, the reconstruction of the city as a "cultural city" was "all the more significant." Later, in 1949, Mayor Ôhashi Hiroshi introduced a publication of twenty-one testimonial accounts of the bomb by framing the destruction in terms of "peace" and a "revelation of heaven." Other officials promoted the singularity of Urakami, perhaps most notably Motoshima Hitoshi, who was mayor of Nagasaki from 1979 to 1995, as well as an avid scholar, peace activist, and fervent Catholic. While few agreed that the atomic bombing was not a citywide problem, the "Urakami singularity argument" continues to exist in the present.

These claims notwithstanding, the atomic bomb in fact devastated the entire city of Nagasaki and its people and the postwar recovery shaped the city's history in subsequent decades. The story of the reconstruction of Nagasaki shows the relationship between mass destruction, politics, and religion that so often exists in societies recovering from traumatic events. In this sense, the case of Nagasaki is not unique. But the various groups who resurrected Nagasaki—occupation forces, city officials, Catholics, and hibakusha—worked from a historical context and generated atomic memories that were indeed unique to Nagasaki.

45 Nagasaki minyû, 9 August 1947.
46 Nagasaki bunka renmei hen, Nagasaki: ni jû ni nin no genbaku taiken kiroku (Tokyo: Jiji tsûshin sha, 1949).
47 See, for example, Motoshima Hitoshi, "Urakami no kirishitan no junnan: kinkyôrei, yonban kuzure, genbaku," in Seibo no kishi, October 2000.
The moral shock of the atomic bombs had been a profound one, and for a while the cunning side of the human animal was overpowered by its sincere realisation of the vital necessity for reconstruction.


Chapter One

In the "Valley of Death":
The Destruction of Nagasaki and the First Years of Occupation

During the Allied occupation of Japan (1945-1952), the presence of American soldiers was part of the daily life of Nagasaki residents. During the first months of cohabitation they learned that the former enemy who had destroyed their city with an atomic bomb would be, for better or worse, a lasting and vital force in the reconstruction process. Indeed, both Nagasaki residents and American occupying forces discovered in each other a common humanity that had been nearly erased by the ravages of war and the waves of propaganda. Amid the atomic ruins, Nagasaki locals and American soldiers established a foundation that helped to bring about a successful reconstruction of the city.

Yet in the wake of the bombing, a disconnect existed between the American occupiers and Nagasaki residents that was never entirely overcome. For the American occupiers the war had lasted for three years and eight months and they arrived in Japan "brimming with pride and self-righteous confidence."¹ For them, the bomb had ended the war and saved American lives that would have been lost in an invasion of Japan.² American soldiers in Nagasaki were well aware of the special nature of the city that they


occupied, expressing pride in U.S. scientific superiority which had created the bomb and ended the war. The cavalier attitude of the American soldiers in Nagasaki toward everything "atomic" could not have been more different than the views of the locals who had lost their families and who lived with the traumatic aftereffects of the bomb, struggling to overcome the exhaustion and despair of the fifteen-year war that had destroyed the country.³

Even so, the reconstruction and revival of Nagasaki began with the presence and the work of the occupation forces. The American soldiers witnessed firsthand how the bomb had turned Urakami into the "Valley of Death," as they referred to it. The first year of occupation in particular created the foundation on which Nagasaki officials and residents rebuilt the city, with cultural exchanges making the biggest impact. The cultural rapprochement between the United States and Japan fit into the cultural orientation of Nagasaki as an international cultural city and left the greatest legacy of the occupation. Even though the occupation was rife with tension and misunderstanding, residents have looked back upon the period as a positive one compared to what had preceded it—years of war and the destruction of Japanese cities by conventional and atomic bombs.

³ The term "exhaustion and despair" is John Dower's. For more on this, see Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, esp. chp. 3, "Kyodatsu: Exhaustion and Despair."
I. Destruction

The Trinity and the Bombing

In the middle of the night on August 8, 1945, a mass was held on Tinian Island at the chapel of the 509th Bomber Group, which had been charged with the special mission of dropping atomic bombs on Japan. The Roman Catholic father, Chaplain Downey, sent the flight crews on their dangerous mission with a solemn prayer, asking God to fly with them and "Lead them on your wings." At 2:56 a.m., Major Charles Sweeney piloted the B-29 super-fortress Bock's Car from Tinian Island and headed to Japan with his crew and the "five tons of destruction" contained in the second atomic bomb, named Fat Man. Great Artiste and Victor 90, both observation planes, followed closely behind. Special Bombing Mission No. 16 was underway with a trinity of planes.

Wartime propaganda depicted Japanese as a subhuman and bestial people who adhered obsessively to their Shinto cult and worshipped their emperor as a god. Such dehumanization, as one historian writes, "facilitated the decisions to make civilian populations the targets of concentrated attack, whether by conventional or nuclear weapons." As the B-29s flew over Japan in the final months of the war, the pilots and bombardiers carried out their missions with a psychological distancing of the people on

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the ground, just as they did against Germany, where personal responsibility for the lives of the enemy during the war was further diluted because the air crews saw themselves as cogs in a political machine.\(^7\)

As the American pilots flew over the primary target in Kokura City on August 9, 1945, heavy enemy flack exploded around them and clouds obstructed the view of the drop zone for the bombardiers. The safety of the planes and their mission could not be guaranteed in such conditions. After several unsuccessful passes over Kokura, Sweeney and Fred Ashworth, who was in charge of the bomb, decided to try instead for their secondary target, Nagasaki.\(^8\) Ironically, the three planes that had been blessed by a Roman Catholic chaplain now flew toward the most Catholic city in Japan.

Nagasaki was never a favored target, meaning industrial factories and residential areas were far apart. Additionally, mountains surrounded the city, a factor which could prevent the atomic bomb from achieving its full destructive potential. The presence of an Allied POW camp, too, lowered Nagasaki’s place on the target list. The headquarters of the U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces on Guam reported to the War Department on July 31 that there existed an "Allied prisoner of war camp one mile north of center of city of Nagasaki." They inquired, "Does this influence the choice of this target for initial Centerboard operation?" The War Department replied, "Targets previously assigned for Centerboard remain unchanged."\(^9\) Earlier, a Mission Planning Summary by the 509th

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acknowledged that "Nagasaki was the poorest of the layouts [among potential targets for the atomic bomb], and it had a prisoner of war camp nearby; so, it was made tertiary." In addition, the primary target, Kokura, also "had a prisoner of war camp." This portion of the Summary, section number 3 on page 41, was singled out for deletion in the final draft with a handwritten note: "Sensitive to mothers whose sons were P/O's [POWs] + [and] never returned."  

The target map for Nagasaki marked the coordinates for the aiming point in the city as 114061. The Mitsubishi Shipbuilding factories lay on the west of the bay, and many munitions and steel factories were in the northern part of the city. But 114061 marked the center of the city, east of Nagasaki Harbor, as the intended ground zero, which was a residential area tightly packed with city hall, prefectural hall, and some Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines.

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11 This number, 114061, indicated the Mean Point of Impact (MPI). By this time, the Twentieth Air Force, of which the 509th was a part, no longer made a clear distinction between MPI and Aiming Point (AP). It was referred to as both in the reports. See Okuzumi Yoshishige, Kudô Yôzô, Katsura Tetsuo, trans. and eds. Beigun shiryô: genbaku tôka hôkoku sho — panpukin to Hiroshima, Nagasaki [Tactical Mission Report (Mission No. Special/Flown 20 July - 14 August. 1945/Copy No. 12) Head Quarters Twentieth Air Force Apo 234] (Tokyo: Tôhô Shuppan, 1993), p. 213 and p. 47.

12 Okuzumi et al, trans. and eds. Beigun shiryô: genbaku tôka hôkoku sho, p. 47. Also see: Mission Planning Summary, Report Number 9, 509th Composite Group, Box 6, Entry I, Groves Papers, Record Group 200, National Archives (as quoted in Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, p. 534): "The aiming point was placed east of Nagasaki Harbor in the commercial district of the city." Also see Takahashi Shinji, Zoku—Nagasaki ni atte tetsugaku suru: genbakushi kara heiwa sekinin e (Tokyo: Hokuju Shuppan, 2004), pp. 154-155. Because of the location of the B-29s and strong winds, the atomic bomb drifted far north of its target and landed in Urakami. The atomic bomb falling far off target was only one of many things that went wrong on the second atomic bombing mission: see Chinnock, NAGASAKI: The Forgotten Bomb for more examples.

The fact that the actual (but missed) target was the main residential area of the city was discovered and published by Japanese scholars Okuzumi Yoshishige and Kanako Riki in 1993, when they realized that the code "114061" on the target map indicated the point in Nagasaki where the Nakashima River and the Tokiwa Bridge made a natural X in the middle of the city (the bridge is still there today). Takahashi (2004, p. 155) argues that because this area was residential and the U.S. explicitly targeted non-combatants for the
This was not the first visit of American bombers to Nagasaki. Bombing raids on April 26, July 29 and 31, and August 1, 1945 forced the city to strengthen air defenses.\textsuperscript{13} On August 1, seventy-four American planes bombed the city in several waves of raids with conventional bombs. For about an hour and twenty minutes beginning at 11:20 a.m., the planes flew over the city from the east and southeast and flew to the west and northwest, attacking in eleven waves of P-51s, B-25s, and B-24s. The Nagasaki newspaper reported the bombing as the first attack on the "strategically important" part of the city, but the damage was relatively slight because most of the bombs had fallen in the ocean or in the surrounding mountains.\textsuperscript{14} During this raid, a plane dropped a 500-kg bomb directly on an air-raid shelter at POW Camp No. 14, which was clearly marked with a red cross. The Allied POWs who were there expressed shock that the plane flew directly toward the red cross, close enough that they could see the pilot. One Japanese soldier and three Allied POWs died in the attack.\textsuperscript{15}

On August 9, the pilots of Special Bombing Mission No. 16 made several passes over Nagasaki looking for a clear shot at 114061, but clouds obstructed about seventy percent of what they could see below.\textsuperscript{16} Due to the special nature of the bomb and the


\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Nagasaki shinbun}, 2 August 1945.

\textsuperscript{15}Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, p. 479.

\textsuperscript{16}Okuzumi et al, trans. and eds., \textit{Beigun shiryô: genbaku tôka hôkokusho}, p. 47.
mission, Sweeney and Ashworth had been ordered to drop their cargo visually—a radar-based drop was not permitted.\textsuperscript{17} The pilots were given another special order: "Under no circumstances will your aircraft fly in or near the smoke from the explosion. It will undoubtedly be radioactive and highly dangerous."\textsuperscript{18} Target 114061 remained hidden beneath the clouds. Then a slight gap appeared and revealed several factories of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, so the bombardiers released the bomb over the steel and weapons factories that stood along the Urakami River.\textsuperscript{19} Two days after the bombing, President Harry Truman declared, "When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast."\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{Below Fat Man}

As Bock's Car flew toward Nagasaki on the hot, humid, and party cloudy Thursday morning in August, the nearly 270,000 Nagasaki residents were well into their day.\textsuperscript{21} Air-raid sirens sounded all morning, but the alarms had become a routine daily experience, so people quickly returned to their activities when the alarms were lifted.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{17} Chinnock, \textit{NAGASAKI: The Forgotten Bomb}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{18} Quoted in Chinnock, \textit{NAGASAKI: The Forgotten Bomb}, p. 168.

\textsuperscript{19} Okuzumi et al, trans. and eds., \textit{Beigun shiryô: genbaku tôka hôkokusho}, p. 47. Clouds parting over Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, for example, see: Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{20} As quoted in Alperovitz, \textit{The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb}, p. 563. Truman was replying to a "telegram from Samuel McCrea Cavert, general secretary of the Federal Council of Churches" that expressed the disturbance of "Many Christians...over use of atomic bombs against Japanese cities."

\textsuperscript{21} For calculation of Nagasaki population at time of atomic bombing, see: Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, pp. 353-354. Okuzumi et al, trans. and eds., \textit{Beigun shiryô: genbaku tôka hôkokusho}, p. 212, give the population number of 253,000.

\textsuperscript{22} Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, pp. 26-27.
On August 4 the *Nagasaki shinbun* had declared: "Do not be afraid of enemy planes; they are flies. Carpet bombings are becoming an everyday occurrence." On the morning of August 9, while some Catholics attended mass in the Urakami Cathedral, others were fishing or farming, and Catholic students from the all-girl Junshin School were at work in the Mitsubishi factories.

On the morning of August 8, Doctor Paulo Nagai Takashi said goodbye to his wife Midori as he headed to work at the Nagasaki University Medical School. As a radiologist he used X-rays to diagnose a variety of illnesses, but he had contracted leukemia from overexposure to radiation from his work. That night, despite his illness, he stayed at the hospital to keep watch for air raids and check preparations in case of an attack. At around 11:00 the next morning, Nagai was sitting at his desk in his office on the second floor of the medical school sorting X-ray film as the crew of Bock's Car opened the belly doors of the B-29 and released Fat Man. The plutonium bomb fell through the air toward the Urakami District and its historic cathedral, whose red bricks had mesmerized Nagai when he first came to Nagasaki from Matsue in Shimane Prefecture.

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23 *Nagasaki shinbun*, 4 August 1945.

24 For more on students working in the factories, see: *Junjogakutôtai junnan no kiroku* (Nagasaki: Junshin joshi gakuen, 1961).

25 All biographical information on Nagai Takashi, unless otherwise noted, is taken from Kataoka Yakichi, *Nagai Takashi no shôgai* (Tokyo: San Paulo, 1961).


Atomic Destruction

Nagasaki lay in ruins. The single pika-don (flash-boom) of Fat Man converted the bustling historic port city into a pile of ash, rubble, and corpses. The blast leveled all buildings made of lighter materials like wood, and left few others standing. The intense heat vaporized some residents, charred others black as coal, and left still more with severe burns. The radiation killed then and continued later to kill numerous others. Of the approximately 51,000 buildings in Nagasaki before the bombing, 36.1% were completely destroyed or damaged. By comparison, the number in Hiroshima was 91.9%, even though the plutonium bomb in Nagasaki had more destructive power.\textsuperscript{28} Because the bomb exploded in the narrow valley of Urakami, about 3 km north of the city center, much of the power of the plutonium bomb, including the blast and heat rays, was buffered by the surrounding mountains.\textsuperscript{29} Mt. Konpira protected most of the southern and southeastern part of the city—the intended target (114061)—from the worst part of the explosion, heat, and radiation blast. But mountains could not save the rest of the city from radioactive fallout.\textsuperscript{30}

The destruction extended south about 4 km, but broken windows were reported as far away as 19 km. Wholesale destruction by the bomb reached up to 2.5 km from the hypocenter, 0.5 km farther than the reach of the Hiroshima bomb.\textsuperscript{31} Shortly after the blast in Nagasaki, various locations throughout the city spontaneously combusted, ignited by the intense heat rays, and conflagrations quickly spread across the landscape, raging

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{28} Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, p. 57.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, p. 62.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, p. 78.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, p. 62.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
through the streets and into the buildings still standing. At around noon, fires ignited in areas several kilometers from ground zero and spread over what remained of the city.\textsuperscript{32} At 2.4 km away, Nagasaki train station was rocked by the initial blast and subsequently burned in the fires. Many government buildings within 4 km of the blast in the southern part of the city, while ravaged, remained structurally intact. The solid stone structures of City Hall and the Prefecture Office stood standing, but fires destroyed their interiors. The conflagration flattened all the buildings surrounding the Prefecture Office, but the fires stopped short of the southernmost part of the city.\textsuperscript{33}

Urakami Valley was virtually erased, save for the skeletons of larger buildings such as the Nagasaki Medical University Hospital, which stood 750 meters from the hypocenter. The reinforced steel frames of the Mitsubishi factories were not completely flattened, but they looked as though permanently struck by a windstorm. The Urakami Cathedral was a strong and massive brick structure, with a seating capacity of 6,000, but it was 500 meters northeast of the hypocenter, too close to survive the blast, whose force crumbled it like a sand castle.

The exact number of people in Nagasaki at the time of the bombing is unknown, because some residents had moved, evacuated, or been mobilized to work in industrial factories, and military troop movements around the city were not recorded.\textsuperscript{34} Tens of thousands of people died in a matter of seconds, others more slowly. By the end of 1945, approximately 74,000 people had died in the explosion and fires, or from the immediate

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{32} Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, p. 66.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Nagasaki shiyakusho sōmubu chōsa tōkeika, \textit{Nagasaki-shi sei roku jū go nen shi} (Nagasaki: Nagasaki shiyakusho sōmubu chōsa tōkeika, 1959), v. 3, p. 482.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
release of gamma radiation and the radioactive fallout, another 75,000 were injured. An estimated sixty to eighty Allied POWs, including American soldiers, died in the bombing, and around 200 others were injured.\(^{35}\) Since 1943, Allied POWs had been sent to Fukuoka POW Camp No. 14—a prison in Nagasaki 1.65 km away from the hypocenter, which was completely destroyed.\(^{36}\) Various factors, such as radiation, made it difficult for scientists to calculate precise numbers of atomic-bombing dead and wounded in both Nagasaki and Hiroshima, which led to varying estimates.\(^{37}\) In addition, as a seminal study by a joint Nagasaki-Hiroshima committee points out, the destruction was such that public agencies responsible for surveys were demolished; and there was no one and no way to check individually the thousands who were burned to death instantly or buried under the ruins, or who plunged into rivers and were carried away to death. Many more thousands who got as far as evacuation centers, and even received some treatment, later died; and records for estimating their numbers are insufficient. Later estimates also vary because different premises and source materials were used.\(^{38}\)

**Radiation**

The greatest after-effect of the atomic bomb, indeed that which distinguished it from conventional bombs used during the war, was radiation. On August 23 (one month before occupation censorship began) the *Mainichi shinbun* related the theory that the bombed areas of Nagasaki and Hiroshima would remain biologically sterile for at least seventy years. The *Asahi shinbun* and the *Yomiuri hōchi shinbun* ran the same story the

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\(^{35}\) Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, p. 479.

\(^{36}\) Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, pp. 478-479.

\(^{37}\) Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, p. 359.

\(^{38}\) Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, p. 363.
next day. The Manhattan Project scientists knew of the radioactive element of the bomb, and Japanese scientists suspected it. But no one knew exactly what would happen from radiation; everything was speculation. Even some American Marines stationed in Nagasaki did not understand why their hair was falling out or why they had bloody diarrhea. For weeks and months, tens of thousands of people, including U.S. military personnel, moved around the irradiated part of Nagasaki, mostly unaware of the danger.

The radioactivity had several stages. Initial radiation that reached the ground included a blast of gamma rays and neutrons, which had grave effects on the human body. Then, in a process called induced radioactivity, neutrons were absorbed by components of the ground and man-made structures, converting their elements into radioisotopes and causing them to emit residual radioactivity. Induced radioactivity was confirmed in Nagasaki on August 13, four days after the bombing, and scientists have estimated that the atomic bombs in both cities created around 200 types of isotopes. Residue from the bomb, known as "ashes of death" and which included radioisotopes, became a component of the fallout and harmed anyone exposed to it. The black rain that fell from the mushroom cloud in Nagasaki about twenty minutes after the explosion contained massive amounts of radioactive matter, which rained over the aid workers, local survivors, and other "early entrants" into the city who were searching for family

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39 Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, p. 615.

40 Number of isotopes produced by the bombs: Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, p. 78.

41 Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, esp. pp. 67-79. For statistics on radiation-induced cancers and other illnesses related to the atomics bombs, see esp. Part II, pp. 105-332.
members or who engaged in such tasks as corpse disposal. The radioactive fallout in this way created countless "secondary A-bomb victims."\(^{42}\)

The radiation in Nagasaki was greater than in Hiroshima. Scientists have measured the maximum value of overall exposure dose from fallout, strongest at around 15 cm above ground, to range from 4 to 40 rads (radiation absorbed dose) in Hiroshima and from 48 to 149 rads in the Nishiyama District of Nagasaki. The black rain in Nagasaki transported radioactive fallout over Mount Konpira to the Nishiyama reservoir east of the hypocenter, which was one of four main water supplies of the city even after the bombing. In early October 1945, the Japan-United States Joint Commission measured the gamma-ray dose at one meter above ground about 3 km to the west of ground zero in Hiroshima (where black rain had carried much of the fallout) to be 0.045 milliroentgen per hour, and in Nishiyama, Nagasaki the number was 1 milliroentgen per hour, or more than twenty-two times the dose in Hiroshima.\(^{43}\) Unfissioned plutonium-239, which has a half-life of 24,000 years and is highly radioactive, was detected in Nishiyama in 1969 and has been persistent in the soil in the form of plutonium-oxide.\(^{44}\) People who seemed unharmed after the blast, or who entered the blast radius after the bombing, also became sick with radiation poisoning and died in days, weeks, months, or years after the bomb.

\(^{42}\) Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, pp. 357-359. Later, when *Hibakusha* Relief Laws were written, this became a category of people who were considered "survivors" of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki (and Hiroshima).

\(^{43}\) Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, pp. 78-79.

Relief Activities

Before the bombing, the municipal government had established twenty-two relief stations throughout Nagasaki to respond to aerial bombings, located in buildings which included primary schools, Nagasaki University Hospital, and the hospital of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Over three hundred people had been organized for these stations, but the destructive power of the bomb deeply compromised relief plans. The hospitals were largely destroyed and most of the medical staff were killed in the explosion and subsequent fires. The few doctors and nurses who survived converted school buildings or built makeshift relief stations to treat the wounded. Immediately after the bombing, aid teams from naval hospitals and police first-aid teams from all over Kyushu flooded into Nagasaki to help.

The reinforced-steel and concrete buildings of Nagasaki University Hospital, where Dr. Nagai Takashi had been working in his office, were reduced to their frames in the blast. Flying glass severed Nagai's right temporal artery, but together with his surviving colleagues he managed to regroup their twelve-member relief team, the Eleventh Medical Relief Corp and from August 12 they set up a first-aid station in Mitsuyama, a small, mountainous area north of Urakami with an old spring that was thought to have the power to heal burns. Nagai treated patients as best he could, but it was difficult because he had to put pressure on his own bleeding wound. He and his colleagues worked day and night treating "atomic-bomb patients" (genbaku kanja), Nagai

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46 Kyushu is the name of the island on which Nagasaki City is located, and it is one of the four major islands of Japan.

keeping a detailed medical journal of the patients' conditions. As a doctor and physicist he felt compelled to record the effects of the new bomb on humans because he knew it was an atomic bomb and that the tragedy represented a major advance in physics, as well as a new threat to humanity. He later published the writing as *Nagasaki no kane* (The Bell of Nagasaki, 1949).\(^\text{48}\)

Leaflets dropped by an American B-29 after the bombing informed residents that the bomb was atomic. On August 10, Nagai walked with some colleagues among the ruins of the hospital to look for survivors and to examine the damage. A nurse ran up and handed him a piece of paper with singed edges, one of many that American planes had dropped on the night of the ninth. Nagai took it in his hand and noticed that it was a message from the American bombers warning Japan to surrender or face further atomic destruction.\(^\text{49}\) The message devastated Nagai. As a physicist he knew that with the evidence of the bomb all around him as he stood in the rubble and ashes of his beloved Urakami Valley that Japan no longer had a prayer at winning the war. The leaflet read:

**TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE**

"America asks that you take immediate heed of what we say on this leaflet.

"We are in possession of the most destructive explosive ever devised by man. A single one of our newly developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent in explosive power to what 2000 of our giant B-29's can carry on a single mission. This awful fact is one for you to ponder and we solemnly assure you it is grimly accurate.


"We have just begun to use this weapon against your homeland. If you still have any doubt, make inquiry as to what happened to Hiroshima when just one atomic bomb fell on that city.

"Before using this bomb to destroy every resource of the military by which they are prolonging this useless war, we ask that you now petition the Emperor to end the war. Our President has outlined for you the thirteen consequences of an honorable surrender: We urge that you accept these consequences and begin the work of building a new, better, and peace-loving Japan.

"You should take steps now to cease military resistance. Otherwise, we shall resolutely employ this bomb and all our other superior weapons to promptly and forcefully end the war."

EVACUTE YOUR CITIES

The leaflets dropped on Nagasaki were part of the psychological warfare operation carried out by the B-29s. Personnel of the United States Office of War Information (OWI) on Saipan translated the messages into Japanese and the planes would drop the leaflets on selected cities that were scheduled to be bombed, usually twenty-four hours prior to the attack. However, they were dropped on Nagasaki many hours after the atomic bombing, perhaps because the city had not been the primary target on August 9.

50 The English version of the pamphlet as transcribed here is the original pre-translation version as it appears in facsimile in *Tactical Mission Report (Mission No. Special / Flown 20 July - 14 Aug. 1945 / Copy No. 12)* Head Quarters Twentieth Air Force Apo 234, as translated by Okuzumi et al as *Beigun shiryô, Genbaku tôka hōkokusho—panpukan to Hiroshima-Nagasaki*: see page 93. There were different versions of the leaflet, but the one transcribed here was the one that Nagai Takashi saw, and I have included an image of the actual leaflet, now preserved at the Nagasaki City Nagai Takashi Memorial Museum, Nagasaki.


After a few days at the Mitsuyama Relief Station, Nagai was finally able to return home. He had said goodbye to his wife on the morning of the bombing, but when he arrived three days after the bomb he found nothing. This he had expected. A pile of
ashes and debris where he had last seen his wife was the only thing to welcome him home. Where the kitchen had been, he discovered a black clump. In the ashes he found Midori's rosary melted and lying near her charred bones. He solemnly picked up her bones, which were still warm from the fires that had consumed her, and put them in a burned metal bucket, carrying her pressed to his chest as he took her elsewhere for a proper Catholic burial. But as he walked in silence, Midori's bones rubbed against the inside of the bucket, making a noise that sounded to Nagai like Midori saying, "I'm sorry, I'm sorry." In the smoldering remains of his home, in addition to the melted rosary, Nagai salvaged another cherished relic that symbolized his dedication: The Order of the Golden Kite (kinshi kunshô, kite: the bird), which he had received for his military service in China.\

*Ashes to Trenches, Huts to Homes*

As Nagasaki survivors emerged from the rubble, clearing debris and corpses took months, and for a long time residents lived in destitution in trenches and improvised huts. Air-raid trenches provided a place to sleep and after most of the fires had faded days later, residents began constructing makeshift homes in the trenches out of surrounding debris, such as burned wood and broken tiles. Police forces began removing corpses a few days after the bomb, but until then the trenches were filled with the "corpses of people who had escaped to the air-raid shelters." A survivor who lived in a trench for a

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54 See *Nagasaki nichinichi*, 9 August 1947.
week said years later how "even now I cannot forget the putrid smell of the corpses in the trenches."\textsuperscript{55} The trench-huts (dugout-houses or gōsha) lasted for about a month.

The trench-huts days were the first of what Nagai Takashi called the four stages of house reconstruction in the "atomic wasteland" (genshino) of Urakami. He also called the trench days the stage of the refugees. The second was the stage of the makeshift huts (kasha/kariyado); the third, provisional construction (kari kenchiku); and the fourth, proper construction (hon kenchiku). The makeshift huts, built as communal spaces approximately six meters square from burned poles and sheet iron, lasted for a few months until winter forced the residents to build stabler and warmer structures, the provisional construction. The houses, as Nagai wrote in 1949,

had a rough coat of plaster, and there were no ceilings—only a roof of straw. They were like modest houses in the countryside. They had tatami matting on the floor and shutters to keep out the rain. They were places where one could live in comfort. People began to move into these houses. They began to get married; and weddings were celebrated at the rate of more than ten a week. This phase could also be called the stage of rehabilitation.

At the time Nagai wrote his description of the four stages of reconstruction of houses in 1949, the fourth stage of proper construction, or "luxury" had yet to come.\textsuperscript{56}

Recovery was gradual, yet steady. Electric light was restored two days after the bombing in central Nagasaki, but did not reach Urakami until October 20. Of course, there was no electricity in the trench-huts, and an "eerie darkness" blanketed the bombed-

\textsuperscript{55} Nagasaki genbaku sensai shi, v. 1, p. 649.

\textsuperscript{56} The translation of Nagai is from William Johnston, trans., Nagai Takashi, The Bells of Nagasaki (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1984), p. 113. Johnston incorrectly translates "ni tsubo" as "three meters square." For "six meters squared" huts, see Nagai, Nagasaki no Kane, p. 182. The term Nagai uses is "ni tsubo naigai," or, "approximately two-tsubo." One tsubo is an area measurement equal to about 3.306m-squared. Two tsubo would be about 6.612m-squared. Nagai's own hut, Nyokodô, was approximately one-tsubo.
In the "Valley of Death"

out area, which was dimly lit with torches. Combined with the makeshift huts and provisional structures, Nagai thought that Urakami probably looked to passersby like a hopeless pile of roof-tiles and ash, and the revival of it doubtful (obotsukanai). "It may not be visible to the eye," he declared in 1949, "but the atomic wasteland is being restored little by little." But early on, something invisible to the naked eye proved a major obstacle to reconstruction in the bombed-out area: fear.

The fear that the bombed-out area of Nagasaki was poisoned with radiation and would not be habitable for seventy years haunted the residents of Urakami for months. Rumors spread in the press and among scientists and townspeople. In September 1945, a letter from prefectural officials addressed to Nagasaki neighborhood association heads stated, "All living things have been annihilated by the atomic bomb that was dropped on Urakami District. Because vegetation will not grow in the Urakami area for the next seventy years, there is a danger to the lives of the residents. It is recommended that residents seek out appropriate land and relocate." Officials echoed the belief of many scientists that the radiation from the atomic bomb had sterilized the area surrounding ground zero, making it uninhabitable.

The "seventy-year sterility theory" (nanajūnen fumō setsu), as it came to be known in Japan, stemmed from a statement made by Columbia University professor Harold Jacobson, a Manhattan Project scientist. He declared, "In the atomic-bombed-out area of Japan, there is a risk of dying for anyone who enters the area over the next

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57 Nagasaki genbaku sensai shi, v.1, p. 651.

58 Nagai, Nagasaki no kane, pp. 183-184.

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seventy years."\textsuperscript{60} The Urakami Valley was not just sterile; it was toxic. On September 9, 1945, the \textit{Asahi shinbun} ran an article in part to allay the fear of Nagasaki's infection from the atomic bomb's radiation, and pointed out, simply, that plants had rebounded in the bombed area.\textsuperscript{61}

The radiation in the Urakami Valley may have presented a danger for residents, but they did not let the rumors keep them from staying or impede their reconstruction of the area, perhaps because most of them had nowhere else to go. Nagai Takashi took it upon himself to quell the fear of radiation. As a resident of Urakami, a neighborhood association head, and a role model of the valley's Catholic community, Nagai attempted to prove the "seventy-year sterility theory" false. After making observations similar to the \textit{Asahi shinbun} article that plant and animal life had once again begun to thrive in the bombed-out area, Nagai built a one-room shack near the hypocenter and lived in it with his two children, Makoto (9) and Kayano (4), from October 1945. In January 1946, they moved into a makeshift hut near the same area, and later in 1948, some Catholic community members built him a provisional structure (\textit{kari kenchiku}) on the same spot.\textsuperscript{62} Nagai's decision to live in the bombed-out area was intended to inspire hope in his fellow residents that their land had not been converted into an eternal landscape of death, and that they could indeed rebuild their city and community.

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Nagasaki genbaku sensai shi}, v. 1, pp. 655-656. The U.S. War Department of course denied the claims published by Jacobson. For a short but good discussion of this and related issues, see, for example, William Wallis, "The Atomic Bomb," in \textit{Fourth International} (6:9), September, 1945, pp. 277-278.

\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Nagasaki genbaku sensai shi}, v. 1, pp. 655-656. An August 10, 1945 article in the Australian newspaper \textit{The Argus} mentioned that "published reports" had quoted Jacobson's claim that the bombed-out area would cause death for seventy years.

Over the next several years, the government housing authority (jūtaku eidan) and numerous individuals and volunteers built simple dwellings (kan'i jūtaku)—provisional structures—throughout Nagasaki and laid a solid foundation upon which the city created a long-term reconstruction plan. During that time, the city had guests. Allied troops arrived in Nagasaki in the latter part of September 1945—when Nagasaki residents were making the transition from dugout-shacks to makeshift-huts—to occupy the city and oversee the initial stages of reconstruction. The presence of the American occupying forces aided in physical reconstruction and in the rehabilitation of relations between former enemies.

II. Occupation

Rapprochement between Nagasaki residents and American soldiers was key to the reconstruction in the early months after the war. American occupiers sought to build relations with the Japanese locals through goodwill events that encouraged peaceful and educational interactions, even as American pride in atomic science commemorated the bomb. The soldiers named many buildings and areas throughout the city with the prefix "atomic," a word that became part of the lexicon of the Nagasaki occupation. City residents, in contrast, were surrounded on a daily basis by reminders of the bomb, which included the American soldiers with whom they now shared the city. Many Japanese embraced the opportunity for peace and worked to overcome the exhaustion and despair of war, seeing the occupation as a time of relative repose compared to the destructive war that had preceded it. But they also had ambivalent feelings about the American

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63 Nagasaki genbaku sensai shi, v. 1, pp. 663-664.
occupiers. After surrender, fear and anxiety about the occupation abounded in Japan, but as the soldiers flooded into the country in numbers beginning in mid-September, the demonic image of the Americans in popular media was soon replaced by warmer impressions. Similarly, the early months of the occupation in Nagasaki saw a transformation of Japanese perceptions of Americans.

**September 11, 1945: First Impressions and Changed Perceptions**

September 11 was a momentous day in Nagasaki. On that day, just thirty-three days after the atomic bomb decimated the city, three American ships docked in the city harbor. The Navy hospital ship Haven headed the mission to rescue and aid Allied POWs, and by September 23, around 10,000 POWs from all over Kyushu had been processed and boarded on the ships for evacuation. Nagasaki residents viewed the foreign ships with some anxiety. As the local newspaper reported on September 14, "Nagasaki townspeople temporarily stared wide-eyed (me o mihatta (驚)) as they saw for the first time Allied ships flying the Stars and Stripes on their masts. But, there was not even the slightest bit of the chaos or disturbance that had been expected." In an oddly calm scene, the article continued, locals slowly backed away when they noticed American soldiers making an odd gesture to them with hand motions (the soldiers were waving hello). The newspaper was quick to state that its visitors came in peace. The colonel in charge of the POW mission reassured the reporter, via his proxy Major Arthur,

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64 The first American into Nagasaki actually arrived on September 6, five days before these ships. George Weller (1907-2002) was a wartime correspondent for the U.S. military, clandestinely making his way to Nagasaki to get a glimpse of the atomic wasteland. His notes were censored and never published during his lifetime. They were published belatedly as George Weller, *First into Nagasaki: The Censored Eyewitness Dispatches on Post-Atomic Japan and Its Prisoners of War* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006).

"There is absolutely no need for the Japanese people to fear us. We ask you to continue your ordinary daily lives with a calm attitude." The reporter added that the colonel "wished for the once great country of Japan to again recover that greatness." In the beginning, restoration was key.

But anxiety persisted at the thought of a massive presence of American soldiers in Nagasaki. On September 14th, nine days before the arrival of American occupation troops in Nagasaki Bay, the city government laid out ground rules for safety in the newspaper for its residents to keep in mind. The heading gave the gist of the rules:

"Refraining from Allied Occupation Forces in Nagasaki—Women, stay on your guard! Men, also stay indoors on the day [of their arrival]." The message included fifteen "general instructions," as well as ten warnings especially for women and children. Number nine warned, "When alone, avoid direct contact with the foreign soldiers. If the other party approaches you and speaks, do not panic, do not smile, especially women and children, and do not answer them in clumsy English." Number fourteen advised: "There will be planes dropping rations and other things on the foreigner barracks (formerly the POW camp), so if anything should fall on private houses, definitely turn it in to the police. Absolutely refrain from humiliating yourself by being scorned and having your home searched by the Allied soldiers just because you took some trifling thing." Women,

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66 *Nagasaki shinbun*, 14 September 1945. On September 25, George Weller wrote that the Haven "bore homeward the last load of liberated POWs from Japan": Weller, *First into Nagasaki*, p. 144.

67 Immediately after the atomic-bombing, the newspaper acted as the main form of communication because all other forms had been destroyed in the bombing. The government relied heavily on the local newspaper, the *Nagasaki shinbun*, much as it had throughout the war, as a vehicle to communicate essential information to its citizens. The atomic bombing had wiped out virtually all other lines of communication, and the central disseminator of information became the newspaper. Even though the central office of the Nagasaki Shinbun Company had been destroyed in the bombing, reporting never ceased and after the bombing the paper was printed outside the city.
"especially self-aware Japanese women, should not let down their guard." "Do not go outside in your underwear" (no. 2). "Give up being naked or half-naked while indoors and, of course, outdoors" (no. 4). And, "Women, do not pay attention if you are approached with 'Hello' or 'Hey,' or in broken Japanese."

The city government hoped for as smooth of an occupation as possible by avoiding contact with the American soldiers because they did not expect the Americans to be compassionate.

When approximately twenty ships arrived at Nagasaki harbor at noon on September 23 and occupation forces stepped off the boats, a sigh of relief passed among local residents. It appeared that the Americans were not demons or beasts after all. *Nagasaki shinbun* ran the headline on the 24th, "Harmlessly and Cheerfully, [The Allies'] First Step after Landing in Nagasaki." The paper wrote how the "faces of the occupation soldiers who came ashore were cheerful, with a harmless expression, smiling as they pointed at the [Japanese] reporters and discussed something. There was no dismay and no countenance of concern and anxiety of the residents of Dejima District [where the ships were docked] or other residents on the roadside." The arrival of the American occupation forces that day was a "natural" and "peaceful first step ashore under the autumn sky."

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68 *Nagasaki shinbun*, 14 September 1945. Another notable warning, Number 8, stated, "Absolutely refrain from words such as 'captive' (*furyo*) in reference to the captives (*furyora*) who have been released." This would have been especially important during the first weeks when the American ships were still aiding Allied POWs.

69 *Nagasaki shinbun*, 24 September 1945. One article mistakenly put "two ships" as the number of vessels in which the soldiers arrived on the 23rd.
Despite the optimism of the newspaper, it could not have been critical of the arrival of the Americans to Nagasaki in any case. From September 18, Allied occupation officials implemented the Press Code, which outlined the limitations of news coverage such that "There shall be no false or destructive criticism of the Allied Powers" (point no. 3); "There shall be no destructive criticism of the Allied Forces of Occupation and nothing which might invite mistrust or resentment of these troops" (no. 4); "There shall be no mention or discussion of Allied troops movements unless such movements have
been officially released" (no. 5). The Press Code initiated a system of unofficial censorship, which was conducted through what one historian calls a "phantom bureaucracy" until September 1949, but it continued in various forms until the end of the occupation, especially in regard to the atomic bombings. Censorship prevented most open discussion of the bombings by journalists, scholars, and city officials, not to mention the hibakusha, but American troops stationed in Japan were fair material for editorials, as long as they painted the occupiers in a positive light.

As the young soldiers disembarked in Nagasaki on September 23, they were led by a small brass marching band as they made their way to the American Occupation Office a few blocks away from the Ōura docks, near the Ōura Cathedral, which had survived the bombing. One soldier, a young lieutenant who had studied Japanese since high school, turned to a reporter and said in fluent Japanese with a smile, "Sensô ni wa biiru to gasorin ga hitsuyô desu yo" (Beer and gasoline are necessary for war). Later that day, curious about the destructive power of the atomic bomb and the damage it inflicted on Nagasaki, some military staff drove around the city ruins in trucks. From September 11th to the 24th, 18,611 U.S. Marines arrived in Nagasaki. Almost immediately, residents grew accustomed to American jeeps in their city and settled into their daily lives with their new co-residents.
In a scene that was common in Japan and occupied Germany, many soldiers lifted
the spirits of children with candy and conversation, and in Nagasaki, some spent time
with local children to study Japanese. Children made the greatest effort to help the
American soldiers learn the language. The soldiers often sat among groups of children,
armed only with "phrase books" provided by the military and, later, the local newspaper's
conversational column, as well as a desire to learn Japanese. After their "lessons" in
Japanese, soldiers would be barraged by a bunch of kids yelling, "tomodachi!" (friend).
Other children who were too shy to participate in the group Japanese lessons, the soldier
easily won over with sticks of gum or chocolate. These encounters perhaps left a
greater impression on the American Marines than the Japanese.

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74 For an example, see: Nagasaki shinbun, 4 October 1945.

75 See: Pfc. Leo L. Wright and Pfc. Herman E. Erke, eds., "Pictorial Arrowhead: Occupation of Japan by
Second Marine Division," (Headquarters, Second Pioneer Battalion, Pictorial Arrowhead, Second Marine
Division, "C" Company, 1st Platoon, Team 7, Nagasaki, Kyushu, Japan, 1946). This was a photo booklet
issued to the Second Marine Division to commemorate their occupation of Nagasaki.
The American soldiers' interest in learning Japanese and their attempt to interact with the locals attracted the attention and encouragement of many townspeople. Soldiers appeared all over the city saying, "ohayō" ("good morning"), and carrying Japanese conversation dictionaries when they went shopping or out for a stroll. The Nagasaki shinbun quickly picked up on the phenomenon and provided a special service to encourage the soldier who wanted to learn Japanese, as well as the Nagasaki resident who wanted to speak English. From October 15, 1945, the newspaper began printing the "ENGLISH CONVERSATION COLUMN イングリッジ コンバション コラム." In order to facilitate Japanese (and English) learning as much as possible, the column appeared, respectively, in English, katakana English, rōmaji Japanese (Roman-alphabetized

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76 Nagasaki shinbun, 4 October 1945.
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Japanese), and Japanese script. The topic of the first lesson, for example, was "Asking the way" ("Michi wo tanunete" [sic]), which included fourteen useful phrases, such as:

Excuse me, can you tell me how I go to Nagasaki Station? (イクスキューズ ミーシャン ユー テル ミー ハウ アイ ゴー ツ ナガサキ ステーション) Sumimasen ga, Nagasaki eki niwa do ittara yoroshu gozai masu ka. (済みませんが 長崎駅には どう行ったら 宜しゅう こざいますか).

Topics ranged from everyday greetings to shopping and bartering, and other types of encounters that were possible between American soldiers and locals.

The editors of the Nagasaki shinbun knew that communication was the key to mutual understanding. They claimed that "Japan-U.S. goodwill starts first from words," the English column they created encouraging harmonious interaction with the foreign occupiers: "Let's be friendly with the occupation soldiers." Their message was well received—by American soldiers. On October 16, the day after the column's debut, American soldiers flooded the newspaper company with requests for more, leading the editors to conclude that the soldiers' desire for Japanese study was "marvelous." The English conversation column was an immediate hit. Within days, American soldiers could be spotted in groups reading the newspaper and practicing the phrases, the paper declaring with emphasis, "Kaiwa ran dai ninki" (conversation column immensely popular). The soldiers suggested that the column be made easier to understand for local

77 Nagasaki shinbun, 15 October 1945. All sic. That is, all katakana spelling, word spacing ("niwa"; "gozai masu"), and translation as it appears here is from original article, including the hiragana "ko" in Japanese "gozaimasu." This first Japanese-English lesson concluded, naturally, with arguably one of the most useful phrases one can learn: "Thank you very much. (サンク ユー ベリ マツ チ) Arigato. (ありがとう)." My number count of fourteen phrases includes the topic title: "Asking the way. (アスキング ザ ウエイ) Michi wo tanunete (道を尋ねて)." The mis-Romanized "tanunete" is the original.

78 "Shinchûgun shôheisan naka yoku shimaseu."

79 The "emphasis" I refer to is a series of double dots (dakuten) on each character, which is common in newspapers and other writings in Japanese.
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Japanese. "We understand this well, but isn't it difficult for Japanese people? […] Please look into how you could make [the English column] easy for Japanese people to understand, too." The paper responded the next day by including explanations of English terms for the locals.

The English column in the Nagasaki shinbun facilitated communication to a limited extent, but it never served the official purposes of either the U.S. military or the local government. The occupation authorities in Nagasaki hired many local residents to fill various positions, such as doctors and harbor engineers, but there was a mandatory prerequisite of English language skills. Many Japanese who could speak English had hidden their skill during the war for fear of persecution or ostracism, but now they were being called upon to act as liaisons to facilitate occupation and reconstruction, and many responded to the call.

In the first months of the occupation, perceptions of the former enemy had changed. The encouragement of interaction with the occupiers contrasted starkly with the fears of mid-September 1945, when the locals were advised to stay indoors, "avoid speaking broken English," not to mention the wartime propaganda that had depicted them as beasts. Considering the devastated state of Japan, and especially the destitution of Nagasaki, the practically overnight transformation of the perceptions of American soldiers is remarkable.

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80 Nagasaki shinbun, 17 October 1945.
82 See, for example, Nagasaki nichinichi, 3 February 1947.
Fear and misunderstandings persisted nonetheless. Nagasaki townspeople and the American occupation forces found a rhythm in their daily routines over the first year, but the reality of having once been enemies had not disappeared. City officials warned locals via the newspapers to behave in the manner of an occupied country and avoid transgressing dangerous lines. During the first year, occasional thefts of Allied supplies, such as clothes and cigarettes, prompted occupation officials to begin body searches of pedestrians and searches of the homes of suspects by Military Police, because mere possession of Allied goods was illegal. By August 1948, the frequency of thefts had risen to the point that American officials warned, via the newspapers, "If [we] discover [someone] stealing [they] will be shot to death at once" (Nusumidashi o hakken sureba tadachi ni shasatsu suru).83

The Work of the Occupation

Approximately 430,000 soldiers from the Sixth and Eighth U.S. Armies arrived in 1945 to occupy Japan, supported by contingents of U.S. Marines and Allied troops from Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.84 The task of the occupation forces was to ensure Japanese compliance with the terms of surrender and supervise local implementation of occupation policy. The occupation of Nagasaki was initially delegated to the Second Marine Division, 5th Amphibious Corps of the Sixth U.S. Army, which boasted a force of 21,469, including Army and Navy personnel, mostly living in barracks

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83 Nagasaki shibun, 4 August 1946. I have yet to find evidence of anyone being shot.

within the city. As the occupation of Japan transitioned to the control of the Eighth Army, the forces of the Sixth Army were relieved of duty and sent home, with the last of the Second Division Marines leaving Nagasaki in July 1946. The Marines had been deactivating forces in numbers each month after it became clear that large troop numbers were unnecessary to carry out the goals of the occupation. General MacArthur decreased U.S. Army numbers to 200,000 in 1946, 120,000 in 1947, and 102,000 in 1948, until the Cold War brought a renewed urgency for a large U.S. military presence in East Asia from 1949.

The first task of the occupation forces in 1945 was to demilitarize Japan, or as the Marines in Nagasaki called it, "constructive destruction." The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), the American-led military government in charge of the occupation, ordered the Japanese government to collect, record, and destroy weapons and war vehicles, including large stashes that had been hidden in caves and elsewhere in preparation for the Allied invasion. In late September, Regimental Combat Team-2 (RCT-2) and RCT-6 (around 8,000 soldiers) patrolled the city and its surroundings for Japanese military supplies and to ensure that demolitions were happening according to surrender terms. Marine demolition teams found a variety of weapons and vehicles,

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87 Takemae, Inside GHQ, p. 126.


89 Takemae, Inside GHQ, p. 108.

such as midget tanks, DUKWs (amphibious trucks), "baka bombs" ("idiot" bomb, small kamikaze plane piloted by a single person), five-man submarines, large-caliber defense guns burrowed into hillsides, and bomb-proof birds nests. Smaller weapons and munitions were collected, inventoried, and given the "deep six" off the coast of Nagasaki.

Other tasks of the occupation forces undertaken during the first months in Nagasaki focused on reconstruction, primarily for the purposes of troop activities, but to the benefit of the residents as well. The Marine Engineer Group, aided by the 43d Naval Construction Battalion (NCB), repaired and maintained roads; rehabilitated Dejima Wharf and the ship landing areas of the harbor; fixed petroleum tanks; cleaned up an athletic field near ground zero and built new ones to the west of the harbor where


Mitsubishi factories were located; constructed a radio station at Ômura; and built an airstrip in the Urakami Valley. The 1298th Engineer Combat Battalion of the Army repaired and maintained all major roads and bridges throughout the city and was tasked with building the Urakami airstrip less than 1000 feet from ground zero. "Atomic Field," as the small airport was called, took twelve days to build with the labor assistance of 350 Japanese workers and opened on October 11. 93 Most projects undertaken by the engineer groups employed at least 150 Japanese laborers per day. 94 The Marine Observation Squadron-2 (VMO-2), flying mostly out of Isahaya Airfield about ten miles outside of Nagasaki, conducted reconnaissance and other flights, including spraying DDT to prevent diseases, such as typhus, among the Allied troops and the Japanese. 95 When the Eighth Army assumed exclusive responsibility of the occupation from 1946 and the U.S. Marines had left Nagasaki after the tasks of demilitarization and initial reconstruction were completed, the primary duties of the occupation forces were surveillance, policing, and reporting to SCAP on the status of occupation policies at the local level. 96

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93 The English term "Atomic Field" inspired Urakami residents to call the flattened landscape of the valley by the same name: see Kataoka, Nagai Takashi no shōgai, p. 205. Nagai Takashi decided to translate the term literally as "genshino," which for residents meant the entire bombed-out area of Urakami (p. 206). It is this word, genshino, which is translated back into English today as "atomic wasteland."


96 Takemae, Inside GHQ, p. 117.
The Disconnect in Well-Intentioned Public Relations

Angelo Bertelli won the Heisman Trophy in 1943 playing for Notre Dame, but on New Year's Day, 1946 he found himself quarterbacking in the "Atom Bowl," a football game between soldiers from the Second Marine Division that they played on Atomic Athletic Field No. 2 in Nagasaki. Bertelli headed the roster for the Nagasaki Bears, and the Isahaya Tigers featured "Bullet" Bill Osmanski, an NFL fullback who played for the Chicago Bears. In fact, both teams' rosters were packed with seasoned football players. The game grew out of an order from Major General LeRoy P. Hunt to boost morale among the troops who were longing for home during the holidays, and Colonel Gerald
Sanders, the division's recreation officer, organized the game with the help of Bertelli. The debris on Atomic Athletic Field No. 2 had been removed prior to the game, but broken glass from the atomic blast remained scattered on the field, so the organizers decided against a tackling game and made a rule of two-hand touch below the waist. A pep-band aided the necessary fighting spirit. Despite Bertelli's valiant efforts, the Nagasaki Bears blew a 13-0 halftime lead, losing to Osmanski and the Isahaya Tigers, 14-13. Nagasaki citizens looked on curiously from a distance.\(^97\) And while the American soldiers enjoyed their athletic pastime, occupation officials prohibited the Japanese from engaging in their athletic martial arts, namely *kendô* and *jûdô*.\(^98\)

The Marines made themselves at home in Nagasaki. During their stay, they organized numerous events in order to brighten the general mood in the post-atomic landscape, as well as to encourage harmony between the troops and the locals. Public relations events were one of the ways both the U.S. occupiers and Nagasaki city officials and residents mended wounds and repaired the demonized wartime perceptions of one another.

Colonel Gerald Sanders organized a special program for Christmas 1945, several days prior to the Atom Bowl. The program featured a Japanese children's choir from the Christian all-girls school *Kassui* singing carols in English for their American guests. Some battle-hardened soldiers remained wary of an event with so many locals in attendance, but as Sanders later recounted, even the weathered veteran soldiers "sat there


\(^{98}\) *Nagasaki shinbun*, 6 October 1945.
and they cried and they just really found that all Japanese weren't bad that night." In the end, "People felt good and walked out, talking, arms around each other."\(^9^9\)

One American advocated the power of square dancing to promote democracy. By autumn 1946, SCAP officials in Nagasaki had well-established policies of fraternization that built human ties between U.S. soldiers and locals, and they were willing to try anything as long as it supported democratization. In this spirit, Winfield P. Niblo arrived in September as Chief Education Officer of the Nagasaki Military Government Team and introduced square dancing as a form of interaction between Americans and Japanese. Although many Japanese were not accustomed to dancing with a partner, the dance became immensely popular practically overnight. According to a December 1946 report by the American military government in Nagasaki, American culture had come to the rescue: "The degree of appreciation and enjoyment which the Nagasakians apparently derive from this activity leads to the conclusion that they have been starving for this type of inexpensive, wholesome, community recreation so much needed to enrich the cultural life of the average Japanese community." By summer of 1947, approximately 30-50,000 residents of Nagasaki Prefecture square danced. Eventually, the dance spread over much of Japan thanks to a textbook on square dancing prepared by Niblo at the request of the Japanese Ministry of Education, in which he wrote, "Dancing people are happy people, and America is happy that this bit of American culture can bring a portion of happiness to Japan." SCAP officials viewed the quick spread of the American pastime as Japanese willingness to embrace American culture and a representation of the potential for

\(^9^9\) Lukacs, "Nagasaki, 1946." Lukacs's article does not identify the children's choir as being from the Kassui School for girls. This is from "Pictorial Arrowhead," photo of Christmas concert with girl students from Kassui School: "Christmas carols sung in English by girls from the Methodist Kassui School."
democracy to take hold in Japan.\textsuperscript{100} Square dancing is still popular in Nagasaki Prefecture today.

As Americans extended a hand, Nagasaki townspeople made peace offerings of their own. In October 1945, officials from Nagasaki City, the Nagasaki Prefectural Association of Commerce, Industry, and Economics (\textit{Nagasaki-ken shōkō keizai kai}), and the Nagasaki Prefectural Society for the Rectification of Goods (\textit{Nagasaki-ken busshi kōsei kyōkai}) called upon all Nagasaki citizens to donate Japanese "souvenirs" to be gathered and given collectively to the occupation forces as a "bouquet of peace." This was just one of many souvenir drives in the city. Even though people were destitute and had little to donate as "souvenirs," they gave. But city officials were not picky either. They reassured citizens that almost anything could pass as a Japanese souvenir: clothing, lacquer ware, dolls, footwear, embroidery, glassware, tea sets, postcards with pictures of Nagasaki, or anything else that would serve as a memento. The point was the gesture. Nagasaki residents benefited, too, as city officials offered a "fair price" for each item.\textsuperscript{101} Mementos for the American soldiers of their time in the city represented one method that Nagasaki city officials devised to promote peace and reconciliation.

But amid the gift giving and the square dancing, Nagasaki residents did not feel elated. American insensitivity to the bereaved residents, for example, was shocking. Shortly after arriving in Nagasaki, the American troops began clearing debris and building roads for official purposes. A young student who had survived the bomb, Uchida Tsukasa, witnessed the work:

\textsuperscript{100} Lane R. Earns, "'Dancing People are Happy People': Square Dancing and Democracy in Occupied Japan," in \textit{Crossroads} (No. 2, 1994).

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Nagasaki shinbun}, 7 October 1945.
The Americans brought bulldozers to clear up the Urakami area which had been hit by the atomic bomb. There were still many dead under the rubbish. Despite that the Americans drove their bulldozers very fast, treating the bones of the dead just the same as sand or soil. They carried the soil to lower places and used it to broaden roads there. A person who tried to take a picture of what they were doing was approached by the military police. The MP pointed his gun and threatened to confiscate any picture taken.

Uchida noted, "Because of the Press Code there was no possibility for us to write about such incidents. Newspapermen did not tell about them and they did not appear even in the readers' columns."\(^{102}\)

In April of 1946, officials from the city and the Allied occupation collaborated in a public relations event that they hoped would "brighten" the city.\(^{103}\) Three major newspaper companies—\textit{Nagasaki shinbunsha}, \textit{Nishi Nippon shinbunsha}, and the \textit{Mainichi shinbunsha}—sponsored and worked closely with municipal officials and American Military Headquarters in Nagasaki to organize the first ever "Miss Nagasaki" pageant. Pageants, like square dancing, were a quintessential piece of American culture, and promised to liven the mood of the city while spreading democratic ideas.

A classified ad in the \textit{Mainichi shinbun} on April 17 called to Nagasaki women between the ages of seventeen and twenty-five to participate in this rare opportunity to demonstrate Nagasaki's budding recovery. Winners would receive a prize. The pageant took place over three days from April 29 at the Nagasaki Dance Hall.\(^{104}\) At the finale on May 1, a panel of U.S. Marine judges unanimously decided the winner, Yamamura Yôko,

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\(^{103}\) Personal correspondence, Takahara Itaru to Chad Diehl, 7 February 2010.

\(^{104}\) \textit{Mainichi shinbun}, 17 April 1946. Nagasaki Dance Hall is located in the southeastern part of the city, downtown, several kilometers from ground zero.
In the "Valley of Death"
as well as the runners up, Kozaka Fumiko, Shimonaga Yoshiko, and Yoshida Nobuko. Yamamura Yôko may have been the first ever "Miss Nagasaki," but to the Marines she was "Miss Atom Bomb." For the occupiers, the contest was never the "Miss Nagasaki" pageant, but rather a beauty contest to find the most beautiful woman in a city destroyed by an atomic bomb. Since occupation soldiers considered everything in Nagasaki "atomic," they crowned the winner in this way, seemingly oblivious to the link between female beauty and the horror of the atomic bomb.

The media companies that had organized the event were unaware of the Marines' designation of "Miss Atom Bomb," because for them it was always the "Miss Nagasaki" pageant. They saw it as a way for the city to demonstrate that the spirits of the residents had not been broken. Takahara Itaru, the Mainichi shinbun photographer who covered the pageant, had fond memories of the event, largely because the woman he had asked to enter, Yamamura, took first place, but also because the Marine photographer's flash camera impressed him. Despite his intimate knowledge of the event, Takahara "had absolutely no clue" (mattaku shirimasen deshita) that the Americans called the pageant "Miss Atom Bomb." The contest was never advertised or discussed in terms

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105 Occupation document with photo and comments by public relations office, 1 May 1946: courtesy of Takahara Itaru. Comments by Melvin C. Dodson.

106 Historian John W. Dower argues that "responses to the victors," such as the pageant, "seemed exceptionally naive, accommodating, or superficial." "Even in nuclear-bombed Nagasaki, residents welcomed the first Americans with gifts [...] and shortly afterward joined local U.S. military personnel in sponsoring a 'Miss Atomic Bomb' [sic] beauty contest": Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 241. Many gestures may have been intended by Japanese to curry favor with the occupiers, but in this case Dower's argument is misinformed. Also, Dower does not include the date of the pageant, and claims that the "Miss Ginza" pageant on January 15, 1947 was the "first Western-style beauty contest to be held" (p. 151). If the "Miss Nagasaki" pageant can be considered an official "Western-style beauty contest," then it might very well have been the first.


108 Personal correspondence, Takahara Itaru to Chad Diehl, 10 February 2010.
of the atomic bombing. When Takahara was interviewed in 2005 for a Japanese newspaper article about the pageant, he found out for the first time that Yamamura had actually been crowned "Miss Atom Bomb" and not "Miss Nagasaki." Even fifty-nine years later, he was shocked. To link the destruction of the atomic bomb to human beauty, and to label a local woman with a connotation of pride in the destruction, appeared insensitive within the context of the first year of recovery. But Takahara's and other residents' view of the American soldiers as beneficent occasionally blinded them to the fact that it was a military occupation. The designation in Japanese as "Miss Nagasaki" suggested that Nagasaki wanted to make the occupiers feel at home by proposing a western-style beauty contest. In fact the event seemed to entertain the Americans more than it did the locals.

109 Personal correspondence, Takahara Itaru to Chad Diehl, 7 February 2010. Takahara Itaru has many fond memories of the occupation in Nagasaki. He is most grateful, he says, that the soldiers were American and not Russian. As a photographer for the Mainichi shinbun, he was attached to the Nagasaki Headquarters of the Allied Occupation. He remembers how American officials often gave him whiskey and Lucky Strike cigarettes, but since he didn't smoke at the time, he gave the Lucky Strikes to his superior at the news bureau. Today he smokes, and a Lucky Strike was his first cigarette.
The ABCC

During the occupation, Nagasaki residents came to know two kinds of American occupiers: soldiers of the occupation forces and the personnel of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC), the agency charged with collecting data about the atomic bombing. The ABCC began in 1947 after a survey team of American scientists who visited in December the previous year recommended that the commission undertake research on the effects of the bomb, especially radiation, related to "cancer, leukemia, shortening of life, loss of vigor, growth and developmental disorders, sterility, genetic alteration, visual alteration, abnormal pigmentation, epilation, and epidemiological
changes." The ABCC conducted its first research in Hiroshima in April 1947, studying the hematology of survivors. In January 1948 the commission continued with additional funding and research personnel from the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare. The permanent ABCC building was completed in Hiroshima in November 1950. In Nagasaki, the commission began its research in July 1948 at the city health center and by July 1950 it had its own facilities. The ABCC continued research in Hiroshima and Nagasaki until 1975, when the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF) succeeded it.  

Cooperation with the ABCC was mandatory for those who were selected through a survey, and the experience left an unfavorable impression on many survivors who felt that they were treated as curiosities in a laboratory. City officials on order from Tokyo encouraged the cooperation of the *hibakusha* "for the good of society." As historian Takemae Eiji puts it: "Informed consent was not on the agenda, and neither the authorities nor the subjects were told the purpose of the experiments."  

The work of the ABCC was initially impeded by its secrecy during the occupation, the constant turnover of American scientists, and the attitude of Hiroshima and Nagasaki residents who did not trust the commission. The ABCC never provided medical treatment to *hibakusha* but only tested them, which undercut the image of the Americans as beneficent occupiers and underscored the insensitivity of the occupation and the Japanese

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110 Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, p. 511.


government toward survivors. There was no established medical system for hibakusha until 1957.\footnote{Takemae, Inside GHQ, pp. 430-431.}

III. Radiation and Christianity in the Urakami Valley

George Weller, a respected press correspondent for the U.S. military during the Pacific War, was the first American into Nagasaki.\footnote{Of course, there had been American POWs in Nagasaki before the atomic bombing, who witnessed the bomb's destructive force or were killed by it. By "first" into Nagasaki, I mean (as does the title of the collection of Weller's dispatches) the first post-surrender entrant. Weller himself writes that he entered Nagasaki "as the first free westerner to do so after the end of the war" (p. 3).} He arrived on September 6, walked out of the Nagasaki train station, and looked in disbelief at the destructive force of the atom: "Walk in Nagasaki's streets and you walk in ruins."\footnote{Weller, First into Nagasaki, p. 25.} As he walked the flattened city over the next several days, Weller observed and described the destruction in his dispatches (which did not survive the military censors but are now a valuable source). On September 8, he travelled north from the Nagasaki Station area toward ground zero, and described what he saw.

It is about two miles from the scene of the bomb's 1,500 foot high explosion, where the harbor has narrowed to the 250 foot wide Urakame [sic] River, that the atomic bomb's force begins to be discernible. This area is north of downtown Nagasaki, whose buildings suffered some freakish destruction but are generally still around.

The railroad station—destroyed except for the platforms, yet already operating normally—is a sort of gate to the destroyed part of the Urakame valley.\footnote{Weller, First into Nagasaki, pp. 29-30. Weller was surprisingly accurate in describing the height of the explosion at 1,500 feet.}
Walking in Urakami Valley, Weller explored the devastated scene of ground zero accompanied by Japanese authorities. "The Japanese have heard the legend from American radio that the ground preserves deadly irradiation. But hours of walking amid ruins where the odor of decaying flesh is still strong produces in this writer nausea, but no signs of burns or debilitation." Deeper in the valley, he explored several "ruins which one would gladly have spared," as his guides pointed out to him "that the home area flattened by the American bomb was traditionally the place of Catholic and Christian Japanese." Weller concluded, however, that the destruction of the Mitsubishi factories along the river outweighed any necessity to preserve the valley of the Catholics.117

During the occupation, the Christians in Urakami fascinated the American soldiers. The physical characteristics of ground zero—its mysterious radioactivity and its destroyed cathedral—reminded the Japanese and Americans alike of how little they knew about the historic bombing.

Misery and Company

The Urakami Valley remained a landscape of radioactive rubble for months after the arrival of the occupation forces, or as Marine Corporal David C. Milam later described it, the "entire area reeked of decaying human flesh buried under tons of debris."118 John D. Bankston of the Second Division Marines explained decades later why they called Urakami the Valley of Death: "As sad and grievously oppressive as it


118 David C. Milam, The Last Bomb: A Marine Remembers Nagasaki (Austin: Eakin Press, 2001), p. 35. "Valley of Death" was the name given to Urakami Valley by the Second Marine Division. See, "Pictorial Arrowhead," photo of Urakami Valley taken from the north and labeled "VALLEY OF DEATH."
In the "Valley of Death"

was to the eye and mind, the valley was appropriately named because it was profoundly clear that no one or any living thing escaped this sea of destruction in any form less than invisible micro bits."\textsuperscript{119} No photos or souvenir hunting was allowed under penalty of court-martial, although some Marines clandestinely did both. Bankston recalled, "Japanese swords and rifles made great souvenirs for the American troops."\textsuperscript{120} As much as possible, though, occupation headquarters in Nagasaki kept the area near ground zero off limits until it had been cleaned up, which took several months. Milam recalled, the "stench of the dead was so overwhelming that you could never become accustomed to it. It even lingered in our clothes. Under the ruins of rubble and waste were body parts and burned flesh, the smell of which subsided only after the winter months offered Mother Nature's cleansing touch."\textsuperscript{121} After they cleared off the corpses and the rubble, the Marines built a rifle range, a supply dump, and a football field on which they played the bowl game on New Year's Day, 1946.\textsuperscript{122}

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\textsuperscript{119} Bankston, \textit{Invisible Enemies}, p. 63. Chapter twelve is entitled, "Valley of Death."

\textsuperscript{120} Bankston, \textit{Invisible Enemies}, p. 59.

\textsuperscript{121} Milam, \textit{The Last Bomb}, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{122} See, "Pictorial Arrowhead," various pages.
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Physical destruction was not the only characteristic of the Valley of Death. Ground zero and surrounding areas were still radioactive when the first Marines arrived, some servicemen becoming secondary *hibakusha* when they contracted radiation poisoning from working in the rubble. Corporal Milam recalled,

At first no one seemed to suffer from radiation poisoning. Since nothing was provided to protect us from contaminated air or soil, we assumed that we were not in danger. The first bizarre sign of illness that surfaced was sudden hair loss among the men. It came out in clumps. Then the divisional dentist began to see teeth that came loose without apparent cause. Next came severe headaches. Finally, several men died of leukemia. A friend of mine, Pfc. Morrow, suddenly started getting tired a lot. By the time he finally reported in to sick bay [*sic*], he was so sick that he died within a few short weeks. Cancer of the blood was something that most of us had never heard of. […] I felt at the time that Lady
Luck had spared me, but years later, after medical tests, I discovered that the radiation had made me sterile.\textsuperscript{123}

John Bankston remembered in 2003, "We were never informed of the dangers of being exposed to ionizing radiation fallout, or ingestion of contaminated water in either beer or food." This was especially concerning, considering that the "outside water in the ground holding ponds was highly contaminated with fallout from the Bomb."\textsuperscript{124} Upon returning home to the United States, Bankston suffered constant illnesses that he thinks were due to his exposure to radiation in Nagasaki. He also lost two sons due to health conditions that in his mind resulted from his own genes having been ionized.\textsuperscript{125} Soldiers like Bankston were exposed to lethal amounts of radiation because occupation officials, if they even knew themselves, did not warn their men of the dangers lurking in the Valley of Death.

The atomic bomb did not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or national origin. Japanese citizens, Korean and Chinese laborers, Allied POWs, and American occupation troops all experienced the silent but deadly radiation. The "Atomic Soldiers"—as the American personnel poisoned by radioactive fallout from U.S. military atomic and nuclear weapons came to call themselves—understood better than other occupying troops in Japan that victory in the Second World War came at a price.

\textsuperscript{123} Milam, \textit{The Last Bomb}, p. 23. Milam mentions that, "An organization called the National Association of Atomic Veterans was later to fight the U.S. government for years to help men who suffered from the effects of radiation poisoning" (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{124} Bankston, \textit{Invisible Enemies}, p. 61. American soldiers became fond of Japanese beer while in Nagasaki. Bankston remembers, "Japanese beer tasted different from ours, but it did not take long to acquire a taste for it. Marines passed up the opportunity to drink American beer on base because they had developed a taste for the local brew and enjoyed it even more in the company of the pretty Japanese girls."

In the "Valley of Death"

"...in the heart of Nagasaki's christian [sic] settlement"

The largest community of Roman Catholics in Japan lived in the Valley of Death. Their cathedral, once the largest in East Asia, was destroyed and most of the community died instantly. Those who survived were a source of curiosity for the occupiers and they also provided a sense of familiarity for the Christian Americans who found themselves living in a foreign country, many for the first time. Some Nagasaki residents were quick to point out to their occupiers that Christians lived in their city, and newspapers took an interest in the interaction between the American and Japanese Christians.

In October, 1945, a reporter for the Nagasaki shinbun approached a Marine chaplain from Philadelphia who was admiring the Ōura Cathedral near the occupation Headquarters, and asked him a few questions. "As a Catholic clergyman (seishokusha)," the reporter asked, "is it all the more deeply emotional for you that you have come to occupy Nagasaki, the singular Catholic holy land [in Japan], and not any other city in Japan?" The chaplain replied affirmatively and added that the resilience of the Catholics has inspired his own faith. "Yes," he explained to the reporter, "back home in America, I have heard the name of Japan's holy land of Nagasaki many times. [...] And now that I have come face to face with the city of Nagasaki and the vestiges of its transformation [as a result of the atomic bomb], it impels my human soul along the endless lonely journey (ryoshū)." The reporter eagerly continued: "Having come to Nagasaki and made contact with Nagasaki Catholics and the 'religion' (shûkyō no mono (物)) of Nagasaki townspeople, what are your thoughts?" "I think they [Catholics] are extremely pious and deeply devout," answered the chaplain. He continued, "It is true that every virtuous action of a person adds to and propels the foundation of religion (shûkyō no mono). That
is why I am able to have a moral and bright hope for the future of the people of Japan, and why I can extend a blessing to them."  

The reporter finally got to the heart of the matter, making it relevant to the present. "Do you think that there can be a 'Japan-U.S. goodwill' friendship based on the shared faith of Catholic believers among the American occupation forces and the local Nagasaki Catholic believers? Have you decided on any concrete policies in that regard?"

The chaplain replied that there surely would be an "arrival" of "a divine peace (kamiteki heiwa) that only those who have been tied together through the same faith possess." The reporter asked, bravely, "And what about how your country used the atomic bomb that obliterated (hōmurisatta) the cathedral of Urakami and many Catholic believers?" "As a clergyman," the chaplain said, "I cannot say anything about that question at the present. […] In a way, America is awakening in Japan its self-awareness as religious kin."

Furthermore, "you all should build the future of Japan and Nagasaki with deep love and understanding."  

Common faith inspired goodwill activities between the Christians of Nagasaki and the Americans. On Sunday, October 28, they gathered at the Kassui girls school for the first meeting between the two groups as a gesture of "cordiality that fosters (tsūzuru) peace and goodwill" between Japan and the United States. Religious leaders from both groups discussed the past and future of Christianity in Nagasaki, and as the meeting progressed, they "tore down the fence between nations (minzoku)." National interests

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126 Nagasaki shinbun, 8 October 1945. The article prints "Nagasaki" in katakana occasionally when the chaplain speaks, but only that word. It appears in kanji when the reporter is speaking.

127 Nagasaki shinbun, 8 October 1945.
"melted away in the promise of Japan-U.S. goodwill, as sunlight filled the harmonious atmosphere of the room."\textsuperscript{128}

Many Americans visited the Ōura Cathedral, which had been built by French missionaries in the mid 1800s. On October 5, 1945, an American lieutenant and sergeant asked Father Hatanaka why the Angelus Bell of the cathedral was not ringing, because it was "unbearably lonesome to be unable to hear the sound of the bell at a time when Nagasaki [was] setting out anew." The father explained that the clapper was broken and materials to repair it were hard to come by. The two soldiers offered to fix it and did so on the following day, boasting of their work, we "wonder how long the sound of the bell will ring. We have done a truly good thing."\textsuperscript{129}

The survival of the Nagasaki Christians symbolized for some Americans the resilience of faith. The popular military magazine *Pacific Stars and Stripes* featured a story in early 1946 about the local Catholics, entitled, "Christianity Survives Persecution, A-Bomb At Nagasaki." The correspondent, Clement S. McSwanson, wrote,

There rises out of the debris of this flattened city the atom-butchered bulk of the Urakami Catholic church. Clinging firmly to a knoll overlooking Nagasaki, the shattered red brick stumps of what were once church steeples stab the bleak skyline as a grim reminder to visitors of the inferno loosed by this city's doom bomb. In the miles of rubble that surround the church 80 per cent of Urakami's 10,000 Christians perished.

And yet amidst this scene of terror and death there is no spirit of resignation or defeat among the local clergy. Piles of tile roofing and other building material glisten in the sunlight. Like the sparrows that flit cheerfully about the mutilated place of worship, the Christians of Urakami are rebuilding. Father Francisco Nakada estimates it will take twenty years to reconstruct the

\textsuperscript{128} *Nagasaki shinbun*, 30 October 1945.

\textsuperscript{129} *Nagasaki shinbun*, 7 October 1945.
once magnificent and imposing landmark. But the Christians of Nagasaki are a stubborn and exceedingly devout lot as history as shown.\textsuperscript{130}

The article stated that the "atomic bomb fell in the heart of Nagasaki's christian [sic] settlement." It added, after mentioning the centuries of religious persecution endured by Nagasaki Catholics, that the atomic bomb "came as another blow to a long persecuted church." But the Catholics of Nagasaki are resilient, and "show little sign of being squelched even by an atom bomb."\textsuperscript{131} The writer, presumably a Christian himself, boasted of the invincibility of Christianity in the face of atomic destruction and admired the determination of the local parishioners to rebuild their church in the Valley of Death.

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Despite the complications and contradictions of reconciliation in the wake of the atomic bomb, the work of the American forces in Nagasaki and the everyday interaction between occupier and occupied created the basis for successful reconstruction. John D. Bankston looked back on his time in the city, recalling that the "Japanese looked at us with suspicious eyes for some time, and at the same time we were curious and very cautious with them. Both sides showed skepticism as we were greeting each other in a conservative manner." But things quickly changed. "After a short period of time all this changed and we became friendlier to one another. The people of Nagasaki began to realize why we were there and they started to show trust in our daily presence with them. Each passing day it was easy to tell that both parties were becoming more comfortable

\textsuperscript{130} Clement S. McSwanson, "Christianity Survives Persecution, A-Bomb At Nagasaki," in Pacific Stars and Stripes, 31 March 1946, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{131} McSwanson, "Christianity Survives Persecution, A-Bomb At Nagasaki," p. 4, photo caption. The author includes discussion of seventeen non-Japanese Franciscans helping to rebuild the community.
with one another.\textsuperscript{132} The American occupiers perhaps found the reconciliation more profound than did their Japanese counterparts, who were likely more preoccupied with overcoming the destruction of war and the difficulties of reconstruction. The rapprochement was due in large part to the cultural exchanges, which did much to liven the first six and a half years of reconstruction, when the military occupation was an abiding reality for residents. After the foundation for reconstruction had been built, the political quest to establish the city's place in the new national order saw the city transformed from an atomic wasteland into an "international cultural city."

\textsuperscript{132} Bankston, \textit{Invisible Enemies}, p. 59.
Chapter Two

Envisioning Nagasaki: From Atomic Wasteland to International Cultural City, 1945-1950

Colonel Victor E. Delnore, a Lebanese-American who was Commander of the Allied forces in Nagasaki during the occupation, greeted the residents of the prefecture on January 1, 1947 with a hopeful wish for reconstruction. "New Year's Day," he declared, "is a time when we should have a mental housecleaning and remove cobwebs from our minds and dedicate ourselves to worthwhile [...] achievements for the coming year. We should now firmly resolve that the end of the ensuing year shall find [you] much improved as individuals, as families, as communities and as a nation." Nagasaki, he added, "because of its illustrious history and because it has been Japan's gateway to the rest of the Orient [should] take the lead in building a finer and better Japan." Although he had arrived in Nagasaki only three months earlier, Commander Delnore's greeting captured the mood of the city and the direction it had taken since shortly after the bombing.

In the first five years after the war, Nagasaki officials and public figures worked to revive the conceptual landscape of Nagasaki, even as they wrestled with the difficulties

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1 This is from the English version of the address that appeared with the Japanese version in the Nagasaki nichinichi, 1 January 1947. For a good biographical essay on Victor Delnore and his time in Nagasaki, see Lane R. Earns, "Victor's Justice: Victor Delnore and the U.S. Occupation of Nagasaki," in Crossroads (No. 3, 1995). Delnore took command of Nagasaki on September 23, 1946, exactly one year after the first wave of troops arrived to occupy the city. It was around the same time that Winfield P. Niblo, Chief Education Officer of the Nagasaki Military Government Team, came to Nagasaki and introduced American square dancing to promote reconciliation and democratization.
of navigating the initial stages of physical reconstruction. They sought to link the city's international past to its atomic present instead of defining its place in history solely in terms of the bombing. Even before the Americans arrived, the officials had hoped to restore the "old Nagasaki" (mukashi no Nagasaki) that had existed before the bombing. For a city that was once known as the "Kyoto of Kyushu," and even the "Naples of Japan," it was natural to wish to rebuild the city in those terms rather than associate it with an atomic wasteland.\(^2\) From the first years of restoration planning, the memory of the atomic bombing figured relatively little in the discourse of reconstruction. The early municipal plans suited the Catholic community, because they, like the city planners, did not want the tragedy of the atomic bomb to dominate the image of the city, especially Urakami, and they saw themselves as part of an international community based on Catholicism. By the end of the 1940s, at least on the official level, Nagasaki once again boasted of itself as a city of international culture.

I. Restoring the Past in the Wake of Disaster

Thinking of "Old Nagasaki"

In the early months after the war, Nagasaki and Hiroshima were among all the other cities razed by Allied bombs. Little was known about Nagasaki and Hiroshima except that they were destroyed by a "new type" of bomb that was atomic, the significance of which only gradually came to be understood. In Nagasaki, as in other bombed out cities, the initial reaction was to rebuild what had been destroyed.

\(^2\) "Kyoto of Kyushu," "Naples of Japan": Saitô Tetsurô, "Dai Tôa no kyôyô moji toshite no Nihonji," in Nagasaki dansô (October 1942) 30, p. 84. Also see Lane R. Earns, "Italian Influence in the 'Naples of Japan,' 1859-1941," in Crossroads (No. 6, 1998).
Before the arrival of American occupation troops, when Nagasaki residents still lived in trench-huts, ideas about reconstructing the city were already caroming among officials and intellectuals. On August 28, only nineteen days after the bombing, members of the Nagasaki Prefectural Association of Commerce, Industry, and Economy (Shōkō keizai kai) met with the mayor of Nagasaki, Okada Jukichi, to discuss plans to "revive the Great Nagasaki City of yesteryear bathed in its brilliant light (kyakkō)." Two days later, the group submitted its official recommendation, the "Great Nagasaki Revival Plan" (Dai Nagasaki-shi fukkō keikaku), which outlined the path the city should take in its reconstruction. Nagasaki, the economists declared, should draw on its history and become an international center of trade and tourism. It should "be the gateway of western Japan" and serve as the base of trade with China and Taiwan, in the end becoming a "free trade port." In addition, historic areas of Nagasaki should be "beautified" to develop the city as a sightseeing center.³

The ideas in the petition gained immediate traction. Economist Itō Hisa'aki pointed out in mid-September that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, especially its shipbuilding factories, had dominated industrial Nagasaki (before and) during the war, but the conglomerate "suffered a fatal blow" with defeat. Therefore, he argued, the city "has no choice but to continue its economic existence as a traditional port of trade." Nagasaki, he added, should also take the opportunity to rebuild in such a way as to attract tourists. Once the rubble had been cleared, and the "scattered dung of horses and cows" removed from the streets in the manner of a "civilized country" (bunmeikoku), then the city could erect "modern hotels and recreational facilities," as well as "wide streets,

³ Nagasaki shinbun, 1 September 1945.
greenbelts, and flower gardens." Then, the "sightseeing city of Nagasaki" would surely attract "high-class people of culture" to its various historical sites and museums that celebrated the city's rich past as an international port city.⁴

"Nagasaki culture," it was noted, had not been destroyed in the bombing. Itô admitted that the ruins of "the exotic Cathedral" on a hill in Urakami aroused sentimental thoughts in everyone who looked upon it, and it would indeed become "a historical memento of Japanese Christians," but he declared that the tragic scene should not dishearten the city. The destruction of Nagasaki's Christian community and its Cathedral by the atomic bomb dropped by "Christian America," Itô pointed out, was a "regrettable event for cultural Nagasaki," but "historical traditions cannot be destroyed by mere violence."⁵ Itô concluded, "In this aerial bombing, the cultural Nagasaki of history sustained no fatal wound," and "the modern cultural city of Nagasaki" should continue to have deep contact with the "new China."⁶ Itô's message was clear: Nagasaki could overcome its tragic fate and rise from the ashes by embracing and reconstructing its past as an international trading port.

Mayor Okada agreed. The reconstruction of Nagasaki would require exorbitant amounts of money—over the next ten years, the mayor predicted that recovery (fukkyû) costs might exceed 100,000,000 yen—and the national government could not be counted on to supply the money. Nagasaki was not the only city in Japan that lay in ruins, and the

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⁴ Itô Hisa'aki, "Nagasaki saiken no kôsô," in Nagasaki shinbun, 14 September 1945.

⁵ The parishioner leader of the Urakami Catholics, Nagai Takashi, echoed this sentiment by declaring that even though the community was decimated and their beloved cathedral lay in ruins, the atomic bomb did not destroy their faith.

⁶ Itô, "Nagasaki saiken no kôsô." Itô writes tenshudô (Cathedral) with an unconventional character (kanji) for shu. Instead of 主, he uses 守.
national government needed to spread its resources over the entire country. In Nagasaki, the mayor pointed out, reconstruction funds could also not count on the industrial profits of Mitsubishi and other destroyed companies. The "decrease" (gen) in numbers of residents in Nagasaki due to the atomic bombing made taxes an unreliable source of funds. Nagasaki's only recourse, the mayor thought, resided in the city's future as a hub of trade, which he hoped would soon resume with China, and as a city of tourism.7

A City of Trade, Tourism, and Culture

Less than a month later, the City Planning Division of the Prefectural Public Works Department released an official plan for the city. Considering the wishes of the "people of old Nagasaki" as well as the "people of new Nagasaki," the city planners proposed the reconstruction of "Great Nagasaki" as a "city of free trade" and a "city of tourism" (kankō). An elaborate system of trains and trolleys would cover the city, so that residents would not have to walk more than two- or three-hundred meters to ride public transportation. Streets would be wider than before and public parks would abound.8

Private sector organizations also had a hand in conceptualizing—and realizing—the direction of Nagasaki's future as a city of trade and tourism. The young businessmen of the Nagasaki Prefectural Association of Commerce, Industry, and Economy, who had initially submitted the dual-themed reconstruction proposal to the government, formed the "Nagasaki Revival Company" (Nagasaki fukkō kaisha) and immediately joined

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7 Nagasaki shinbun, 16 September 1945. The term used to mean "recovery," fukkyû, implies "a return to the old state of things," and city planners used the same kyû character in the term, "old Nagasaki." "Kyû" here represents the Nagasaki of past, and so "fukkyû" as used by the mayor implied a return to the Nagasaki of days past.

8 Nagasaki shinbun, 7 October 1945.
governmental efforts to reconstruct "Great Nagasaki." Even though torrential rains impeded construction through September, the "first stage of construction" was completed by October, which brought residents out of the dugout air-raid trenches into makeshift huts. As one commentator put it, "a breath of new life flows strongly in Nagasaki City."9

Reconstruction projects also sought to create an atmosphere of "modern culture" in the city. In 1946, the Nagasaki Cultural Association (Nagasaki bunka konwa kai) emerged to propose a name for the reconstruction of the city, and the intellectual elite who made up the group organized an informal meeting in August to discuss with planning officials the merits of their suggestion to envision Nagasaki as a "Cultural City." Several city-planners attended the "Cultural City Construction Colloquium" (Bunka toshi kensetsu kondankai), including the head of the Prefectural City Planning Division as well as the chief of the City Facilities Department, Naruse Kaoru, who later became head of the City Construction Office. The group discussed concrete ways to construct modernized streets, shopping areas, improved harbors, an airport, parks, sports grounds, and other facilities to enliven the city, or as one member called them, "good policies for prosperity." They discussed creating a "Nagasaki City of tourism" by building hotels and such, and also the possibility of setting aside two or three areas for the construction of pleasure quarters (or, red-light districts: kanrakugai).10 The rhetoric of "cultural city"—and indeed "cultural-" everything—was standard postwar language, but in Nagasaki the word held a specific significance that drew on the city's history. Making Nagasaki a city of "culture" relied on its past, but as city-planners quickly realized, reconstruction in the

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9 Nagasaki shinbun, 7 October 1945. The article points out that the name of the NGO is a "tentative name" (kashô). Also, see Nagai Takashi, Nagasaki no kane, p. 181, among others.

10 Nagasaki shinbun, 13 August 1946.
wake of war and the atomic bombs also required the promotion of another ubiquitous postwar term: peace. Public discourse focused on the peace that many Americans and Japanese argued the bombing had brought about. Thus those who survived the devastation of Nagasaki endured the first years of defeat and occupation by viewing the atomic tragedy through a discourse of peace.

The discourse of peace was ubiquitous in Japan. Prime Minister Higashikuni Naruhiko declared in September 1945 the general hope of Japan to "construct a nation of peace not inferior to the United States" (Beikoku ni otoranai heiwa kokka kensetsu). "We will build a completely new, peaceful Japan," he said, "and it will become a cultural nation (bunkakoku) of high morality." 11 John Dower writes that the "two most familiar slogans of the early postwar period—'Construct a Nation of Peace' (Heiwa Kokka Kensetsu) and 'Construct a Nation of Culture' (Bunka Kokka Kensetsu)—resurrected two key themes of wartime propaganda, construction and culture, and turned them into rallying cries for the creation of a nation resting on democratic, antimilitaristic principles." In the immediate postwar, "Catchphrases were like valises," Dower notes, "waiting to be emptied of their old contents and filled with something new." 12 The word "peace" found its way into every corner of society and culture, from festivals to

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11 Nagasaki shinbun, 18 September 1945. Prince Higashikuni, who was a member of the imperial family, expressed the hope that Japan and the United States could work together for peace, but made a special request of the victors: "American citizens, won't you please forget about Pearl Harbor? Let us Japanese also forget the ravages (sangai) of the atomic bomb. Then let us set out as a completely new, peaceful nation. America won. Japan lost. The war is over. Together, we will sweep away hatred. This is the position of my cabinet from the beginning." As Higashikuni’s statement reveals, it appears that Americans were not the only ones who saw the atomic bombings as retribution for Pearl Harbor. Higashikuni resigned a month later in October after he disagreed with SCAP’s decision to repeal the 1925 Peace Preservation Law (chian iji hô), which had essentially served the purpose of quashing political dissent against the Japanese government for two decades. The word "peace" of the law, chian, actually means "public order." See John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), p. 81.

12 Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp. 176-177. All Romanization is sic.
reconstruction laws to the "Peace Constitution" of 1946, written by the Americans. The constitution's Article 9 forever renounced war, underlining Japan's resolve to maintain peace. The ideas of peace and culture became intertwined as the country sought to rebuild as a demilitarized and democratic nation.

While Higashikuni did not last long as prime minister, the concept of building a nation of "peace" quickly took root and persisted. The first year of reconstruction in Nagasaki represented the city's "first step toward the historic construction of peace." "Among the ruins of atomic-town Nagasaki (genshi no machi Nagasaki)," the Nagasaki shinbun reported on August 4, 1946, "a town of modest houses has emerged," and the "city-plan of Nagasaki City, which was established in the 'atomic town' of ruins and dust, embodies a beautiful dream aimed at the reconstruction of a port city of bright and virtuous peace." Nagasaki was "making a comeback" as it slowly rebuilt its prestige as an international port, "conveying its spirit of new life" as far as "the mountains that surround the port."13 One year after the atomic bombing, city planners and townspeople did not dwell on the event. To be sure, it was lamented and remembered, but not to the point of impeding the "beautiful dream" of reviving the old Nagasaki that had welcomed foreign ships and served as gateway to the wider world. For years afterward, the "atomic citizens" (atomu shimin) of Nagasaki City worked to fulfill their hope of reconstructing the city as a center of trade and tourism.14

Even so, officials and townspeople understood the importance of preserving the ruins as reminders of the horrors of war. Indeed, this would be key to fulfilling the

13 Nagasaki shinbun, 4 August 1946.

mission of building a nation of peace. At a city council meeting on October 6, 1945, councilman Kunitomo, who had lost his wife in the atomic bombing, declared that rallying cries for the revival of the city were not enough. As an atomic-bombed city, Nagasaki had a responsibility to do more. He argued that the city should retain the ruins of the atomic bomb that "snatched away the existence of tens of thousands of our countrymen." By preserving the physical traces of the bombing, he claimed, "we must provide to the world research material (kenkyû shiryô) on the menacing atomic bomb of science that laid the foundation for world peace." "We have a human obligation," Kunitomo continued, "to fully record the aftermath of the destruction, and preserve all important research material, such as factory ruins, scorched trees, and the crumbled Urakami Cathedral." These ruins, he believed, would long interest historians, much like the ruins of Pompeii. Kunitomo asserted that it was "the duty of a cultured nation" to conduct the necessary preservation work.\(^{15}\)

The preservation of ruins presented an additional advantage in Kunitomo's mind. He pointed out that a western scholar claimed that even though Japan was a "civilized nation," it was not a "cultured nation." For Kunitomo, post-atomic reconstruction was Nagasaki's chance to help the country rise in the eyes of the world through the "sacrifice" of his wife and tens of thousands of others. Preservation of the ruins would demonstrate to the world that Nagasaki and the Japanese people truly regretted their part in the war, and that the "noble sacrifice of tens of thousands of Nagasaki City residents has rid the world of war forever."\(^{16}\)

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\(^{15}\) *Nagasaki shinbun*, 8 October 1945. Kunitomo declared that the "atomic bomb of Nagasaki City put an end to the Greater East Asian War" (*dai tôa sensô ni shûshifu o utta Nagasaki-shi no genshi bakudan*).

\(^{16}\) *Nagasaki shinbun*, 8 October 1945.
The preservation of the ruins also promised to contribute to Nagasaki as a city of culture and tourism. The pinnacle of modern, scientific culture had devastated the city, leaving ruins, such as the Urakami Cathedral, to stand as reminders both of modernity and of the folly of war. Man had conquered the power of nature by splitting the atom, and Nagasaki testified to that tragic human achievement even as the Roman Catholic cathedral was evidence of historic and international "Nagasaki culture." The path of the city looked bright as it overcame its atomic devastation to rebuild its past but now as a modern city in control of its future.17

II. Becoming a Symbol of International Trade and Peace

...at the Mercy of the Government

In August 1946, months after Japan had begun laying out national city-reconstruction plans, delegates from Nagasaki and Hiroshima traveled to Tokyo to discuss their cities' plans with officials from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Nagasaki officials acknowledged that the benefits of international trade and tourism had yet to produce revenues to support the reconstruction efforts, so they were caught in a kind of chicken-and-egg dilemma. The national government, as Mayor Okada had pointed out, could not be counted on for reconstruction funds in 1945, but by fall 1946, Nagasaki had no choice but to ask for help. The August 1946 meeting in Tokyo, as deputy mayor Kan'no reported upon his return to Nagasaki, had gone "smoothly." The delegates from the atomic-bombed cities and ministry officials had agreed that Japan should promote the

17 The hill of the Twenty-Six Martyrs of Nagasaki was also considered an ideal tourist spot in accordance with the reconstruction plan to rebuild Nagasaki as a city of trade and tourism: Nishi Nippon, 8 August 1948.
reconstruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima over the other war-damaged cities of Japan.\(^{18}\) Here was official recognition that the two cities were indeed different from the other bombed-out cities of Japan.

The national government had developed a plan already in November 1945 to aid in the reconstruction of 115 war-torn cities, including Nagasaki and Hiroshima.\(^{19}\) City governments all over Japan were struggling to fund their projects, but city officials from Nagasaki and Hiroshima thought that the "special" nature of their destruction entitled them to national funds. Throughout 1946, officials from both cities, inspired and supported by local public opinion, worked together to request "special funds" from the national treasury for their cities, which they argued required more aid than the "general war-damaged city."\(^{20}\) The August meeting in Tokyo took into consideration the fact that the two cities were destroyed by atomic bombs, which national officials agreed made them different and declared that the reconstruction of the two cities was also "special" (**tokubetsu**).\(^{21}\) At a plenary meeting of parliament on August 23, 1946, Nagasaki representative Honda Eisaku and Hiroshima representative Kuroda Yoshi submitted an official petition. Parliament adopted the proposal without delay, and upon negotiating a "concrete figure" from the Treasury Office, Nagasaki prepared to "launch full-blown city reconstruction."\(^{22}\)

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\(^{18}\) *Nagasaki shinbun*, 4 August 1946. Deputy mayor Kan'no also petitioned Tokyo, based on the "special circumstances of Nagasaki City," to build a marine meteorological observatory.

\(^{19}\) This was the "**sensai fukkô keikaku kihon hôshin**": see Nagasaki shiyakusho, ed., *Nagasaki genbaku sensai shi* (Nagasaki: Nagasaki kokusai bunka kaikan, 1977), v. 1, p. 665.

\(^{20}\) *Nagasaki shinbun*, 24 August 1946.

\(^{21}\) See *Nagasaki shinbun*, 4 August 1946.

\(^{22}\) *Nagasaki shinbun*, 24 August 1946.
But the special funding Nagasaki received also left the city at the mercy of the national government. A year later in August 1947, Nagasaki and Hiroshima no longer seemed to be working together but rather taking different paths. Hiroshima held a massive commemoration ceremony for the second anniversary of the atomic bombing on August 6, for which it received a special message from General MacArthur. This was the first "peace festival" held in Hiroshima and it attracted more than 10,000 people. Nagasaki officials, for their part, organized a city-sponsored week-long "Foreign Trade Revival Festival" (bōeki fukkō sai) rather than a commemoration of their atomic bombing on August 9.23 The Nagasaki minyū newspaper company, after receiving letters from Nagasaki residents expressing "jealousy" over the situation in Hiroshima, decided to investigate. City officials seemed to have been so consumed by their goal to make Nagasaki a city of trade and tourism that they neglected to commemorate the atomic bombing, a point made on August 8 by a reporter named Sakamoto in an interview with Nagasaki Mayor Ôhashi. The mayor, failing to see it as a major problem or setback, placed the blame on the national government.24

"Hiroshima is holding a massive peace festival," Sakamoto stated, "and [residents here] feel lonely (sabishii) since Nagasaki is not. We have received many letters expressing their envy of Hiroshima, which received a message from General MacArthur."

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23 *"Bōeki" can be literally translated as "trade," but in the case of Nagasaki it implies "foreign trade." I have translated "fukkō" here as "revival," whereas elsewhere I translate it as "reconstruction."

24 Nagasaki minyū, 9 August 1947. The "Foreign Trade Revival Festival" was sponsored by: Nagasaki Nichininchi shinbunsha (newspaper company), Nagasaki City [Government], Nagasaki Assembly of Commerce and Industry (Nagasaki shōkō kaigisho), Nagasaki Prefectural Trade Association (Nagasaki-ken bōeki kai), and the Association for the Promotion of Foreign Trade at Nagasaki Harbor (Nagasaki-kō bōeki shinkō kai).
Mayor Ôhashi responded, "We thought a good deal about holding an August ninth commemoration, but we were unable to hold any memorial service (ireisai) or commemoration (tsuitôkai) that would be sponsored by the city, prefecture, or public group."

"What do you mean public groups couldn't sponsor it?" inquired Sakamoto. Ôhashi explained, "We received a notice from the government." "What do you mean 'from the government'?' asked an unsatisfied Sakamoto. Ôhashi answered vaguely, "I forget if it was from the Ministry of Home Affairs or the Ministry of Health and Welfare, but it came from one of the ministries in charge." So the city decided instead "to hold an event with a special purpose. Of course, if the war-damage federations, religious groups, or youth groups hold [commemorative events], we will not hinder them."25

The mayor held firm: "Hiroshima is holding a special peace festival. Here we will be holding a peace trade festival (heiwa bôeki sai) from the ninth through the fifteenth. On the fifteenth we plan to pray for peace by sounding sirens and praying for the eternal repose (meifuku) of those who died in the war."26

Sakamoto persevered: "But the atomic bomb fell on August ninth. For the people of the world to understand, it's meaningless if it doesn't take place on the ninth."27 In reply to Sakamoto's query about a message from General MacArthur, the mayor replied that a letter had been sent via a prefectural representative. But Hiroshima had sent a personal delegate directly to Tokyo, countered Sakamoto, and considering that the

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25 The Urakami Catholic community held a large commemorative mass on August 9, 1947.

26 Notice that it is "those who died in the war" (sensaisha), not specifically those who died in the atomic bombing. "Sensaisha" can also be translated as "war victims."

27 Notice that Sakamoto said the atomic bomb "fell" (ochita); it was not "dropped."
representative had not yet answered by today, which was August 8, "there's no way it will make it in time, is there?"\textsuperscript{28}

Many in Nagasaki (and Hiroshima) could not understand the official decision not to commemorate the bombing in 1947. Perhaps there existed no "notice" from the government at all in regard to such a commemoration. It hardly seems likely that Hiroshima could hold a massive peace event and Nagasaki could not. It is more probable that Nagasaki officials had their sights set on emphasizing their city as a center of trade and tourism. Now that they were receiving extra funds from the national government, to divert from the course of reconstruction would make little political sense, and further, it would not distinguish the city from Hiroshima. In the eyes of many, including the American occupiers (as seen in Commander Delnore's 1947 New Years' address), Nagasaki was a historic gateway between Japan and the rest of East Asia and the West—it was not simply an atomic-bombed city. So Nagasaki officials had the encouragement of the occupiers in stressing the importance to restore the city to its place in history.

Organizers of the Foreign Trade Revival Festival in August 1947 intended it to "celebrate the shining rebirth (kadode) of the promotion of foreign trade and the reconstruction of the economy" of the city.\textsuperscript{29} But Nagasaki residents made their voices heard, insisting that the city not allow the atomic bombing to be forgotten as they moved forward with reconstruction. Acknowledging the tragedy of the atomic bombing, Prefectural Governor Sugiyama pleaded to residents to embrace hope because "the day of the reconstruction of trade is approaching. I believe that the tradition and prosperity of

\textsuperscript{28} The exchange appears in \textit{Nagasaki minyû}, 9 August 1947.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Nagasaki nichinichi}, 8 August 1947.
the international port of Nagasaki will stand upon the hard experience [of the atomic bombing], shine with the ideals and morality of mankind, and build upon mutual reliance and cooperation.\textsuperscript{30} Mayor Ôhashi took a stance similar to the view of the United States in saying that the Nagasaki bombing ended the war and "saved countless lives" that might have been lost in the continuation of the war, and he called on Nagasaki residents to "turn misfortune into happiness" by reconstructing Nagasaki as a "cultural city." The prefectural governor Sugiyama agreed, noting that the "cultural city" approach was significant considering the history of Christian martyrdom in Nagasaki.\textsuperscript{31} The destiny of Nagasaki was portrayed not as a reminder of "misfortune" but rather as a beacon of hope for "the ideals and morality of mankind" based on prosperous international trade.

Not surprisingly, American officials supported this approach to Nagasaki reconstruction. Although Nagasaki did not receive a message from General MacArthur in August 1947, it did receive one from Commander Victor E. Delnore, who praised Nagasaki for its ability to connect to the West.\textsuperscript{32} Nagasaki residents "have grasped the significance of western countries in the past, and they should restore this distinctive characteristic of old. I am overcome with gratitude," he continued, that the residents of Nagasaki are exerting "astonishing efforts" to this end. "The exotic atmosphere and beauty of Nagasaki City have long been greatly extolled by western poets and authors. More than any other city in Japan, [Nagasaki] embodies the honor, charm, and beauty of

\textsuperscript{30} The newspaper article from which I took this quote actually has a kanji missing, [blank]ryoku, which I have interpreted from the context to mean kyôryoku, "cooperation."

\textsuperscript{31} Nagasaki minyû, 9 August 1947.

\textsuperscript{32} MacArthur did send a message to Nagasaki the following year for the 1948 commemoration ceremonies. See Nagasaki nichinichi, 9 August 1948. I have relied on the Japanese version of Delnore's address. Many other prominent officials sent messages in 1948 as well, including Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru.
your country." Delnore concluded by assuring Nagasaki residents that American occupation troops would do all in their power to support reconstruction efforts.  

One year later in August 1948, the memory of the atomic bombing in Nagasaki had a very different tone. The third-year anniversary saw the first of what would become the standard commemoration, with citywide public ceremonies and pledges to "never repeat the tragedy of Atomic Nagasaki (atomu-Nagasaki)" blended with the official insistence on building a "city of trade and tourism." Commander Delnore attended the city-sponsored commemoration ceremony, called a "Culture Festival" (bunka sai). The event was also named the "Reconstruction Festival" (fukkô sai), and what would later become "Peace Park" was called "Atom Park." Delnore echoed (via first lieutenant Callaghan) Mayor Ôhashi's declaration of Nagasaki's mission to convert the city's tragedy into something meaningful to the world. Ôhashi stated: "The sacrifice we paid was enormous, but the result has been even grander. Nagasaki is not just a city of Japan (Nagasaki wa Nihon no ittoshi de wa nai)." In order to "repay the noble sacrifice, [we] commit ourselves to the realization of the cultural Nagasaki that the world expects, to conquer all obstacles and to exert great effort and diligence." A reading of a message from General MacArthur, which the newspapers boasted was personalized for Nagasaki, followed Mayor Ôhashi's speech. MacArthur kept it short: "Along with the Nagasaki mayor, I extend heartfelt greetings to all city residents." He concluded that he was

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33 See Nagasaki minyû, 9 August 1947, and Nagasaki nichinichi, 9 August 1947. The two newspapers have slightly different Japanese translations of the address, and I have used the former here.

34 Nagasaki nichinichi, 10 August 1948.

35 Nagasaki nichinichi, 9 August 1948.
pleased to see that residents had produced "exceedingly excellent results in the reconstruction of Nagasaki City."\footnote{Nagasaki nichinichi, 10 August 1948. I have relied on the Japanese newspaper version of MacArthur's address here as well.}

At the 1948 ceremony, in addition to the usual rhetoric of "Cultural Nagasaki," "peace" was the catchword. The first ever "Peace Declaration" \((heiwa sengen)\), which would become a staple of the anniversary ceremony of Nagasaki (as in Hiroshima), elucidated the city's approach to commemoration. The Nagasaki City Council vice-chairman read the declaration.

As the reference point \((kiten)\) of the atomic bomb in this century, our land \((chi)\) of Nagasaki is the soil \((tochi)\) that put an end to the world war, and the unprecedented destruction \((sensai sanka)\) became the turning point that brought about the bright hope for peace. In that sense, in its global status Nagasaki is the most deeply impressive land, and we believe without a doubt that through the exclamation of "Never repeat Atomic Nagasaki!" we will establish everlasting world peace. At this ceremony of the Culture Festival we strongly profess No More Nagasakis and declare our pledge to explicate this widely to the world.\footnote{Nagasaki nichinichi, 10 August 1948. From 1949, the mayor read the annual Peace Declaration, although there was no Declaration in 1950. Nagasaki City's webpage contains a version of the 1948 Peace Declaration that contains disparities with the 1948 newspaper version, but I have relied on the 1948 newspaper for my translation here. See, http://www1.city.nagasaki.nagasaki.jp/peace/japanese/appeal/history/1948.html (Accessed August 4, 2010). One example: the 1948 version that appears in the newspaper has in the first sentence \(seiki\) (century) but the present version online has \(sekai\) (world). The newspaper version also omits a vital character, indicated in brackets, in the sentence, \" Atomu Nagasaki o futatabi kurikaesu [na]\" ("Never repeat Atomic Nagasaki!").}

"Peace Starts from Nagasaki" and "No More Nagasakis" became the phrases that defined Nagasaki's perception of itself and its role in establishing everlasting peace by virtue of its "world status." The 1948 Nagasaki peace declaration made no mention of Hiroshima. By this time, the two cities had settled into their individual paths of reconstruction, each professing the greater significance of their city's atomic destruction and peace work.
Officials in each city considered their own tragedy as the "cornerstone" of world peace, but the term held different meaning for each. Hiroshima officials viewed their city as different from and, in terms of the emergence of the nuclear age, more significant than Nagasaki, because it was the first city in history to experience the destruction of an atomic bomb. John Whittier Treat, like many others, noted that Nagasaki was considered a "redundant act within the logic of the Second World War," done out of curiosity "for power's sake." In other words, Nagasaki was simply a second "Hiroshima." Nagasaki officials, however, considered their atomic bombing as more significant precisely because it was the second and last atomic bombing, which meant that their atomic tragedy had ended the war. But the approach of Nagasaki officials and city-planners to rebuild the city as a center of international trade, tourism, and culture made them appear less eager than Hiroshima to stress the horror of an atomic bomb and the necessity to work for world peace. The late 1940s witnessed a political struggle between the two cities over their rightful places in the popular symbolism of the atomic bombings.

**The Fight for "Peace" and the Special-City Reconstruction Laws**

The word "peace" pervaded Nagasaki (and national) discourse from late-1945, but from 1948, it became ubiquitous. By 1948, the idea of Nagasaki culture effectively blended the two images of the city as a promoter of peace and an international city. In 1949, after years of cultivating the image of Nagasaki as a center of trade and culture, and recognizing Hiroshima's competitive spirit to be the atomic-bombed city, Nagasaki officials sought to emphasize their atomic bombing as an equally important part of the

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reconstruction plan and increased concrete efforts to that end. As in Hiroshima, Nagasaki actively promoted peace through the preservation of ruins, reconstruction projects and policies that included the term "peace," and the organization of annual ceremonies. Each city implored people to remember the tragedy. Nagasaki worked for "everlasting world peace" and "No More Nagasakis" while Hiroshima called for "No More Hiroshimas," each city concerned primarily with its own reconstruction.

In late April 1949, delegates from Hiroshima, including the mayor, traveled to Tokyo for the May 10 National Diet Meeting to propose the ratification of the "Hiroshima Peace Commemoration City Construction Law" (Hiroshima heiwa kinen toshi kensetsu hō). The law reflected the direction Hiroshima had been taking since its atomic bombing, as well as the image that officials wanted to project into the future—as the first atomic-bombed city, Hiroshima must stand as the preeminent symbol of the horror of war and the importance of peace. Officials in Nagasaki received no notification from Hiroshima of its plan to propose the legislation to the Diet, catching them off guard and unprepared. Nagasaki officials felt betrayed because they claimed there had existed a promise between the cities to work in harmony to protect the special character of the two atomic-bombed cities among the rest of the bombed-out cities of Japan. That it had come to Hiroshima's need for individual recognition ahead of Nagasaki as a special atomic-bombed city, Nagasaki officials thought, was "regrettable."39

Mayor Ôhashi and a few other officials from Nagasaki rushed to Tokyo in time for the National Diet meeting, working through the night to cobble together a proposal for their own city-reconstruction legislation. The Nagasaki representative in the Diet,

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39 For comments of Nagasaki officials made at an ad hoc City Council meeting on May 9, 1949, see Nagasaki nichinichi, 10 May 1949.
Kadoya Seiichi, attributed his city's "slow start" (tachiokureta) to the self-serving attitude of Hiroshima, considering that Nagasaki officials had to "stop an already departed train, jump on with a lot of luggage, and stand shoulder-to-shoulder to ride together" with Hiroshima.\(^{40}\) City council members who stayed behind in Nagasaki organized an ad hoc meeting on the night of May 9, the day before the Diet meeting. Some members thought that Nagasaki, too, should be a "peace city." Indeed, Hiroshima did not hold a monopoly on the word, but the designation of Nagasaki as a "cultural city" had already gained traction.\(^{41}\) Either way, Hiroshima was not willing to share its unique designation as the city of peace.

At an earlier meeting of the Liberal People's Party (Minjitô), Hiroshima supporters objected to the inclusion of "peace" in Nagasaki's official title. The word "peace" defined the reconstruction of Hiroshima because the city could not draw on its past and revive its history as a major military headquarters for the Imperial Army. One Hiroshima representative at the Minjitô meeting pleaded that only Hiroshima's law be passed because its purpose, he explained, was to rid the city of its military traces, that is of former "land for military use." Nagasaki had none to speak of, he pointed out, saying, "I ask that you approve only Hiroshima's law." Nagasaki's representatives did not attend that meeting, but later they joined Hiroshima representatives for another meeting with the Minjitô, where it became clear after intense debate characterized by "heroic hometown love" (hisô naru kyôdôai) that Hiroshima's law could not pass the Diet without a similar

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\(^{40}\) See Kadoya Seiichi's preface to Teramitsu Tadashi, Chûkai: Nagasaki kokusai bunka toshi kensetsu hô (Sasebo: Sasebo jiji shinbunsha, 1949), pp. 9-10.

\(^{41}\) Nagasaki nichinichi, 10 May 1949.
law for Nagasaki. Only the content of the law needed to be decided, including a designation for the city to define its path of reconstruction.\textsuperscript{42}

On May 3, representatives from Nagasaki and Hiroshima held a joint meeting to discuss the Nagasaki law, attended by Mayor Ôhashi. The meeting "saw the confrontation of fiery opinions" from both sides, but in the end it only "strengthened the attitude of Hiroshima," which claimed that there could be only one peace city. The Hiroshima side argued, as Nagasaki representative Tsubouchi explained in the \textit{Nagasaki minyû} on May 11, that the existence of two peace cities in Japan would "undoubtedly blur the focal point" and dilute the essence of a "peace city" altogether. Whether the concern over a blurred "focal point" refers to "peace" or "Hiroshima" was not clear. But Hiroshima's unwillingness to share the designation of a "peace city" determined the fate of the two cities. It was decided at a following board meeting of the \textit{Minjitô} that Nagasaki would instead become a "city of culture." Indeed, as Tsubouchi titled his op-ed piece in the \textit{Nagasaki minyû}, Nagasaki had lost to Hiroshima.\textsuperscript{43}

On May 10, the National Diet unanimously passed the "Hiroshima Peace Commemoration City Construction Law" and the "Nagasaki International Cultural City Construction Law" (\textit{Nagasaki kokusai bunka toshi kensetsu hô}). Hiroshima, as planned, became \textit{the} "peace city" of Japan, while Nagasaki joined a clique of "international cultural cities" that included Kyoto, Nara, Beppu, Itô and others. Despite the ubiquity of "culture" and "peace" in postwar Japan, the former dominated in the titles of city

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Nagasaki minyû}, 17 May 1949.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Nagasaki minyû}, 17 May 1949. Tsubouchi's op-ed article, "Nagasaki lost to Hiroshima" (\textit{Nagasaki wa Hiroshima ni maketa}), outlines the behind-the-scenes politics that resulted in the two cities' laws. He wrote it on May 11, the day after the laws were passed in the Diet.
reconstruction laws. Nagasaki hoped to emphasize its history of "international culture" that had defined it for centuries, but also the contemporary international culture that included peace activism. Beppu put emphasis on its "international tourism and hot spring culture," using the term "international" quite loosely, but Kyoto came close to resembling Nagasaki with its "Kyoto International Cultural Tourism City Construction Law" (Kyôto kokusai bunka kankô toshi kensetsu hô). Nara's law was nearly identical to Kyoto's. Like Nagasaki's law, each city aimed at the "achievement of the ideal of everlasting world peace," a phrase that appeared, identically, in the opening clause of the laws. Among the bombed-out cities in Japan, Hiroshima managed to preserve its image as the sole "peace city."

The first clause of Nagasaki's legislation declared: "This law, designing the advance of international culture, and in order to achieve the ideal of everlasting peace, aims to construct Nagasaki City as a city of international culture." Clause Four entitled Nagasaki to receive additional aid from the government for its "international culture" projects. Although a last-minute ordeal, Nagasaki had, at least on the official level, revived its image of an international historical past and its present status as a symbol of culture.

The inability of Nagasaki officials to secure a reconstruction law with the word "peace" in the title demonstrated both the city's approach to reconstruction since 1945

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44 On the reconstruction laws of Kyoto and Nara, see: Shintoshi (1950, 4:10), pp. 5-6. Yokohama and Kobe were each designated as an "International Port City" (kokusai kôto): pp. 6-7. On the reconstruction laws of Beppu, Itô, and Tokyo (shuto), see Shintoshi (1950, 4:6), pp. 7-11. It would make an interesting study to see whether the focal point of the word "culture" became blurred as a result of the numerous "cultural cities" in postwar Japan.

45 Teramitsu, Nagasaki kokusai bunka toshi kensetsu hô, p. 13.

46 Teramitsu, Nagasaki kokusai bunka toshi kensetsu hô, p. 24.
and its political weakness in comparison to Hiroshima. Many in Nagasaki could not understand why "peace" did not appear in the title. Tsubouchi argued that there were many issues upon which Nagasaki needed to "greatly reflect" in the future, but the main reason that Nagasaki had lost to Hiroshima was that it had not kept up with Hiroshima's peace activism, which had been strong for over three and a half years. The "loss" of the word "peace" should serve as Nagasaki's wake-up call, he argued, but the "International Cultural City Law" was by no means a loss. Rather, Tsubouchi declared, "I truly pray from the heart that with this law Nagasaki emerges internationally as a cultural bridge across the world and sustains lasting development." Overall, city officials and residents were hopeful about their newly defined mission. For Nagasaki in 1949, international culture meant celebrating a vibrant past while embracing a responsibility to work for everlasting peace, even without an official designation as a "peace city."

In his address to the National Diet, Nagasaki representative Wakamatsu Torao declared that the formation of Nagasaki in the reconstruction law made the city the "central city of international peace," an idea inherent not only in the city's designation as a "city of international culture," but also in its motto, "Peace Starts from Nagasaki." The Emperor declared in May 1949 that Nagasaki must "turn the sacrifice of the atomic bombing into the foundation of peace." Being labeled an "international cultural city" instead of a "peace city" allowed Nagasaki to move forward from its tragedy by embracing its history even as it represented the "foundation of peace" in the present. By

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47 Nagasaki minyū, 17 May 1949. I have translated "aran" (verb aru) as "sustain."

48 Teramitsu, Nagasaki kokusai bunka toshi kensetsu hô, p. 5. Wakamatsu translates the motto, "Heiwa wa Nagasaki yori," as, "Peace from Nagasaki."

1949, Nagasaki was recovering from atomic destruction as its International Cultural City Construction Law reflected its approach to mark the atomic bombing as one important event on the historical timeline of the city.

The 1949 law promoted the themes of reconstruction that had been present in Nagasaki since 1945: trade, tourism, and culture. The city had served as an international port since the late 1500s, and for centuries it was the center of relations with the West and an importer of Western cultures, including Christianity. In the postwar era, the city saw itself as a lasting symbol of modern, international peace. Despite the loss to Hiroshima of the word "peace," local newspapers referred to the city as "Peace and Culture City Nagasaki" (bunka heiwa toshi Nagasaki), or simply as "Peace City Nagasaki" (heiwa toshi Nagasaki), both of which were interchangeable with "International Cultural City."50

III. Nagasaki, the International Cultural City

Initial Confusion

The official designation as an "International Cultural City" left some Nagasaki residents scratching their heads. Some scholars could not comprehend what made the city more special than other bombed-out cities in Japan, or what exactly was meant by "international culture," and indeed many residents had a hard time grasping the meaning. Some city officials only slowly discovered what "international culture" meant. Kino Fumio, Chief Secretariat of Nagasaki City Council, looked up "international culture" in the encyclopedia but found nothing. He decided to "study" a bit more about what the term meant, so that he could educate his fellow residents who saw the term as an empty

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50 See, for example, Nagasaki nichinichi, 11 May 1949; and ibid., 12 May 1949.
Envisioning Nagasaki

In the context of the postwar world, he wrote in 1950, "international culture" meant "freedom and peace," which the 1949 law envisioned with its opening clause that declared the promise to realize "everlasting world peace." The people of Nagasaki would cultivate a city of international culture by resurrecting their past and commemorating the atomic bombing.

Naruse Kaoru, head of the Nagasaki City Construction Office, argued that everyone in Japan was struggling with postwar life and he could "not easily forgive the fact that only Nagasaki would become a good child (yoi ko)" through implementation of the special-city reconstruction law. Naruse held the responsibility of implementing projects that focused on concrete activities, such as removing debris, designating land for specific use, and modernizing city streets. It seemed odd to him that Nagasaki had been singled out for "special reconstruction." Writing in 1950, he declared, "I still cannot even comprehend what the devil is meant by the First International Cultural City." "It is a big mistake," he wrote, to think that the city could reconstruct simply because it benefited from a construction law from the national government. In order to be successful and receive support, the revival (fukkō) of Nagasaki had to serve the greater purpose of the reconstruction (saiken) of Japan as a whole. But Naruse realized that the revival of the city outweighed the need to debate what seemed to him to be political nonsense surrounding the official designation of the city. International Cultural City did not mean "National Treasure City," he declared, and in some cases Nagasaki would have to


53 Jpns: "Dai ichi kokusai bunka toshi to wa ittai donna mono de aru ka sae mada tsukamenai."
prioritize "developmental destruction" over preservation of the past in order to remodel itself as an international city that capitalized on Nagasaki's traditional culture.\(^{54}\)

**Blind Embrace**

In May 1949, two weeks after the law had passed in the Diet, Emperor Hirohito traveled to Nagasaki to survey the destruction and view the progress of reconstruction, and, as local newspapers noted, even viewed the quality of the fish at the market. Nagasaki residents were ecstatic. One newspaper headline read, "Banzai Cheers of Peace Now Arise in the Atomic Land (genshi no chi)," describing the atmosphere of the emperor's visit, during which he charged the citizens of the city with the task of becoming the foundation of peace in the world.\(^{55}\) The banzai cheer, which once expressed patriotism and solidarity with the military goals of the nation in the name of the emperor, now hailed peace at his encouragement. "I am sure it is painful, but I want you to endeavor," Hirohito said. "I am praying," he added, "that a happy and peaceful life comes to you all (minna no ue ni kuru koto)." He was "deeply touched" by the progress of reconstruction, especially the ability of Nagasaki to revive its past as an "international cultural city" and find meaning as a "symbolic city of peace and culture."

In his parting words to the people of Nagasaki, Hirohito declared the significance of postwar Nagasaki:

> Citizens. I am glad that today I was able to experience the revival (fukkō) of Nagasaki City and be exposed to the energetic appearance of the residents. I am overcome by sympathy for the sacrifice suffered by Nagasaki residents, but with

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\(^{54}\) Naruse Kaoru, "Nagasaki kokusai bunka toshi kensetsu no kōsō," in Nagasaki bunka (1950: No. 4), p. 10. "Ikasu" as used here can also mean "revive."

\(^{55}\) Nagasaki nichinichi, 28 May 1949.
[the sacrifice] as the cornerstone for the construction of a peaceful Japan, we must work for world peace and culture.\textsuperscript{56}

The emperor thus appropriated the sacrifice of Nagasaki as the sacrifice of the nation that "we" (wareware) must use as a foundation for peace.

Opposition to the International Cultural City Law never gained any real momentum, and the debate subsided as the people of Nagasaki welcomed the special-city reconstruction law. A public vote was held on July 7, 1949, and an historic 73.5% of eligible voters showed up to the polls, voting unanimously in favor of the law. Of the 81,637 people to cast votes, 79,220 (98.6%) chose to adopt the law, while only 1,136 (1.4%) voted against it.\textsuperscript{57} The law took effect on August 9, 1949, on the fourth anniversary of the bombing, and commemorations were accompanied by celebrations that lasted for three days in honor of the city's progress toward revival. "Today is the birthday of New Nagasaki," declared a headline in the \textit{Nagasaki nichinichi}. General MacArthur and Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru sent messages to Mayor Ôhashi and the citizens of Nagasaki to congratulate them on the official new path of reconstruction as a center of "international culture."\textsuperscript{58}

The international culture of Nagasaki, or its "aroma" (nioi), as city planner Shimauchi Hachirô called it, was easily identifiable by its landmarks.\textsuperscript{59} Shimauchi

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Nagasaki minyû}, 28 May 1949.

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Nagasaki genbaku sensai shi}, v. 1, p. 667. By comparison, residents of Tokyo voted on the "Capitol Construction Law" (shuto kensetsu hô) as follows: out of 1,840,312 ballots cast, 1,025,790 (55.7%) voted in favor and 676,550 (36.8%) voted against, with 137,972 (7.5%) invalid votes (mukô tôhyô): \textit{ibid.}, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Nagasaki nichinichi}, 9 August 1949.

\textsuperscript{59} The word "nioi" usually carries a negative connotation and is generally translated as "smell," but in the context of the article by Shimauchi Hachirô, the word suggests a positive nuance, so I have translated it here as "aroma."
boasted of the historic sites that defined Nagasaki in a 1951 article for Shintoshi (New Cities), a Tokyo-based journal dedicated to issues of city reconstruction in postwar Japan. Shimauchi included Nagasaki’s "national treasures," such as the Ôura Cathedral and two Buddhist temples. The Dutch compound Dejima topped the list of historical landmarks, followed by the Chinese compound, the hill of the Twenty-Six Christian Martyrs of 1597, and the former residence of British merchant Thomas Glover. Glover's mansion held special significance, Shimauchi wrote, because its beautiful garden inspired the opera Madame Butterfly, which made Nagasaki a place of world-renowned international culture.\(^60\)

The city was indeed rich in history, and Shimauchi called upon the residents to make the most of it in light of the new reconstruction law. He pointed out how Nagasaki had two pre-eminent instances of "international culture"—300 years of foreign trade and the atomic bombing—and he suggested that residents dedicate themselves together with city officials to make the most of that history for the most advantageous development possible.\(^61\)

Residents boasted of the city's new title by naming events and buildings "International Culture-" or "Peace-," and they embraced the task given to them by the law to resurrect the past and cultivate peace activism. As an editorial in the Nishi Nippon newspaper declared in late August 1949, the basic principle of the law was to make "Nagasaki City a model city of everlasting world peace replete with happiness and peace," and its construction would be realized through real activities that promoted


peace.\(^{62}\) This would not be accomplished by the "simple promotion of local culture" or "exclusively through the institution (shisetsu) of city planning." The city reconstruction plan, the editorial argued, envisioned at least three things.\(^{63}\)

One, as the unique national cultural city of Japan, [Nagasaki] will have facilities (shisetsu) that directly promote peace ([i.e.] facilities for atomic-bombing commemoration, facilities able to carry out assemblies of international peace and culture). Two, [the city] will have educational facilities of higher learning that contribute to the promotion of peace and the advancement of culture. Three, with the general city population in mind, [the city] will equip facilities of a modern city of the highest standard permitted by present-day objective terms and conditions.\(^{64}\)

According to commentators, Nagasaki had to look beyond its local, Japanese culture and promote a so-called world culture that blended "culture" and "peace." In 1951, city officials added provisions to the reconstruction legislation to construct appropriate facilities in accordance with the law, which began to shape the architectural landscape of the city. The International Cultural Hall—which later became the Atomic Bombing Museum—Peace Park, Peace Hall, and other facilities (all located in Urakami Valley) breathed new life into the former atomic wasteland.\(^{65}\) City ambassadors emerged to spread Nagasaki's image in Japan and abroad. In 1949, perhaps inspired by the "Miss Nagasaki" contest three years earlier, the city held a beauty pageant to find an appropriate female ambassador for the city. Kadoki Hisako became the first "Miss International" (Misu kokusai), and, as the Yûkan Nagasaki

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\(^{62}\) That is, "heiwa yokkyû he no jissen undô."

\(^{63}\) "Envisioned": shidôteki kôsô.

\(^{64}\) *Nishi Nippon*, 21 August 1949. There was a similar article in the *Nagasaki nichinichi* (22 August 1949) that contemplated the course of action to take to build Nagasaki as an "international cultural city" and "model world city." One of the main goals, it argued, should be to "first promote (shinkô) education" in order to "advance the level of the residents (shimin)."

\(^{65}\) *Nagasaki genbaku sensai shi*, v. 1, p. 666.
newspaper put it, she was the embodiment of "a beautiful icon of Nagasaki."\textsuperscript{66} In November, Miss International joined "Miss Hiroshima" (not "Miss Peace") in a joint commemoration event organized by youth groups from the two cities, held near the Atomic Dome in Hiroshima—the city's enduring site of memory of the bombing.\textsuperscript{67}

\textit{The Christian Factor}

Miss International was one of two ambassadors of the new, international Nagasaki who gained visibility in popular media. The other was Nagai Takashi, the Catholic doctor who had survived but lost his wife in the atomic bombing, and who led his Catholic community out of the ashes of the Valley of Death.\textsuperscript{68} Nagai had risen to fame long before Kadoki Hisako became Miss International for the role he played in the reconstruction of Nagasaki. Many considered Nagai to have advanced the city's postwar culture with his books, a role model in the name of the International Cultural City Law.\textsuperscript{69} His Roman Catholic faith was a major component of the city's historic "international culture" and the Urakami Catholics fully supported that designation of their city. The promotion of international culture, as they saw it, represented the joining of past and present, namely their history of martyrdom—exemplified in the annual international commemoration of the Twenty-Six Martyrs of 1597—and the emergence of the age of religious tolerance in postwar Japan.

\textsuperscript{66}“A beautiful icon of Nagasaki”: Yûkan Nagasaki, 26 February 1950.

\textsuperscript{67}For more on this event, see: Nagasaki taimuzu (The Nagasaki Times), 22 November 1949; Yûkan Nagasaki, 25 November 1949.

\textsuperscript{68}For an article discussing Kadoki Hisako and Nagai Takashi as the two representatives of Nagasaki, see Nagasaki nichinichi, 26 February 1950.

\textsuperscript{69}See, for example, Kino Fumio, "Kokusai bunka no yokogao," in Nagasaki bunka (1950: No. 3).
For national officials, too, Christianity was a major characteristic of Nagasaki's international culture which benefited reconstruction. At a press conference on June 25, 1949, Chief Cabinet Secretary Masuda Kaneshichi announced a victory for Nagasaki and Hiroshima: the United States had agreed to contribute all of the resources (issaï no shizai) necessary for the reconstruction of the two cities. This was indeed reason to be pleased, he stated, because "all we have to produce is the labor force (rôdôryoku)." The contribution of the United States, however, was not without condition. A large amount of the money received was tagged for erecting Christian buildings or to otherwise improve the cultural sphere of Nagasaki (and Hiroshima), such as the construction of churches and schools. The United States "installed" (dônyû) approximately $50,000,000 in "private capital" to support the special laws of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, including a fund of $12,000,000 for the construction of Christian universities. This proves, Secretary Masuda declared, that "the noble blood spilled in the atomic lands by our fellow countrymen, our brothers, fathers, children, and wives, and their great sacrifice, was not at all pointless. Especially now, we have repaid [that sacrifice]." Masuda continued by referring specifically to Nagasaki, saying, "The shining dawn (shokô) toward the construction of a cultural city is on the horizon (mieta). Our delight that resounds in the atomic wasteland of southernmost Japan, and the zeal of 200,000 residents for the construction of a cultural city, must step in unison in one great march toward world peace."70 "Yes, 'Peace From Nagasaki,'" echoed the Nagasaki nichinichi after quoting Masuda.71 Money from the United States aided the realization of a cultural city by

70 “Step in unison”: ashinami ga sokkuri sono mama.

71 Nagasaki nichinichi, 26 June 1949.
contributing to the international aspect of Nagasaki's reconstruction, even if the generosity was partially motivated by the American hope for the resurrection and cultivation of Christianity in the city and Japan.

Nagai Takashi, who became representative of the Urakami Catholics soon after the war, was key to promoting the reconstruction of Nagasaki as a venture of international culture. Since 1948 he had been publishing books about the atomic bombing and the responsibility to work for world peace. Kino Fumio declared in 1950 that Nagai was a perfect exemplar for an international cultural city. Thanks to Nagai's books, Kino said, "the cultural nature of Nagasaki is being conveyed forcefully and widely." Kino further declared that when others finally emerge in Nagasaki who rank with Nagai and "bathe in the true limelight of the world in science and art, or intellectually and politically," only then can Nagasaki be said to have achieved the "prestige (menboku) of an international cultural city."72 Members of the National Diet evoked Nagai's name during the May 1949 meetings when they passed the special-city reconstruction laws of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Other legislators agreed that Nagai was exemplary because of his contributions to the reconstruction of Nagasaki.73

For Nagai and the Urakami Catholics, the Nagasaki International Cultural City Law represented more than a "Peace Commemoration City Law" ever could. The law revived, through its approach to historical remembrance, Nagasaki's long history with the Christian West, which included the Urakami Catholics' history of oppression and martyrdom, but it also gave the city the opportunity to be a "harbinger of peace," as


73 See, for example: Kadoya, preface to Teramitsu, Nagasaki kokusai bunka toshi kensetsu hô, esp. p. 7.
Nagai put it. The defeat of Japan in the war brought unprecedented religious freedom, and aid from the United States promised to aid the revival of Christianity in the city and Japan. The Catholics saw the International Cultural City Law as a call to resurrect and promote Catholicism in Nagasaki, which their leaders, especially Nagai, enthusiastically strived to do.

Soon after the law emerged, Nagai began sketching with excitement the possible emblems he envisioned being used to represent the city in English translation. Every sketch included the word "peace": the phrase "Mother of Peace Nagasaki" encircles a drawing of Mother Mary (halo included); "Message of Peace Nagasaki" flies in the air with a dove carrying an olive branch in its mouth; "Bell of Peace Nagasaki" appears on a bell that includes a protruding crucifix on its surface; "Harbinger of Peace Nagasaki" surrounds a mushroom cloud; "Pray for Peace Nagasaki" shares a shining light with a praying female Christian, presumably Mother Mary.74

The Catholics considered their religion essential to the successful construction of an international cultural city. Nagai wrote that Nagasaki lacked the materials necessary to build "a city of beautiful buildings" on par with cities that boasted international cultures, such as Buenos Aires, and that no matter how hard the residents worked to erect such buildings, Nagasaki would rank low in the world and could not be called an international cultural city. Instead, Nagai argued, "Nagasaki must aim to become a great

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74 All original sketches appear in "Scrapbook: Kokusai bunka toshi," Archival Materials Room, Nagasaki City Nagai Takashi Memorial Museum (NTMM), Nagasaki. Nagai also considered possible English translations of the city's title: The International Culture City; The International Cultural City; The Open City of Culture; The Open Cultural City; and A City of International Culture.
city of spiritual culture (seishin bunka)," of which Catholicism had been a vital component for centuries.75

The Catholics used an international religious celebration to demonstrate that their community enjoyed strong ties to the West. The festival of the four-hundredth anniversary of the arrival of St. Francis Xavier to Japan, which took place on May 29 and 30, just weeks after the International Cultural City Construction Law was announced, involved more than 300,000 people, including numerous missionaries and representatives from the Vatican, who brought with them the holy relic of Xavier's arm.76 The timing of the event was key to displaying the Urakami Catholics' support of the city's plan to emphasize its international character in its postwar image.

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Initially, it seemed that the passage of the International Cultural City Construction Law benefited Nagasaki more than the Peace Commemoration City Construction Law did for Hiroshima. Prior to these special-city reconstruction laws, among forty-one cities slated to receive national reconstruction funds, Hiroshima placed sixth on the list, but Nagasaki trailed far behind at thirty-first. The laws launched both cities to the top of the list for funds.77 In the beginning, the respective images of the city that developed out of the laws worked to the advantage of Nagasaki as a site of tourism.

Despite its focus on "international culture," or perhaps because of it, by 1950 Nagasaki had become a hotspot for atomic-bombing tourism. What appealed to visitors


76 Nagasaki nichinichi, 30 May 1949.

77 Nagasaki minyû, 12 May 1949.
was the combination—or juxtaposition—of natural beauty (of the bay and surrounding mountains), historical sites (such as Glover Park, Dejima, and Chinatown, all of which survived the bombing), and traces of the atomic bombing (such as the Urakami Cathedral ruins). The reconstruction laws allowed each city to build a museum according to their appellations: Nagasaki International Cultural Hall and Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, both completed in 1955, which also became popular tourist destinations. In the first year of operation, Nagasaki's museum drew in 220,671 visitors to Hiroshima's 115,369. The activities of the two museums were similar, but Nagasaki's greater attraction could perhaps be attributed to—in addition to the city's juxtaposition of histories—its museum's goal to "promote international culture and contribute to the establishment of lasting peace." Hiroshima's museum, by contrast, focused exclusively on the "victim's sufferings as well as their struggle for peace." By 1969, the average number of annual tourists to Nagasaki reached 2,500,000.

By the start of the 1950s, Nagasaki had already made tremendous strides in recovery. The city population rose to 241,818 by 1950, surpassing its 1935 number by more than 15,000 and approaching the 1945 pre-bombing number of about 270,000. As newly elected Mayor Tagawa Tsutomu proudly put it in a national journal, the city was building according to its relationship with Western culture, enhancing its history through

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80 Mainichi shinbun, 1 August 1969.

maintenance of historical sites. A series of photos of these sites displayed the proud scenery of the city, including the "Glover mansion of Madame Butterfly," the Ôura Cathedral where French missionary Petitjean had "discovered" the hidden Christians, and the shipbuilding facilities in the bay, for which the city had been famous since the latter part of the nineteenth century.82

By the mid-1950s, the Nagasaki Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Corporation had once again risen as a world-renowned shipbuilder. The company built a variety of ships, including cargo vessels, oil tankers, and passenger ships, but during the war, it also built all kinds of war vessels, including the famous Musashi Battleship, completed in 1942. The plant carried its wartime profile into the postwar, building its first battleship, the Harukaze, for the Japanese Self Defense Forces in 1956, followed by many more, including the Amatsukaze (1965), the Haruna (1973), and the Hatakaze (1986). Royal figures toured the shipbuilding facilities during their visits to Nagasaki, including Emperor Hirohito in 1949 and 1969, and King Baudouin of Belgium in 1964.83

Nagasaki's shipbuilding facilities were, from the start, a presence that promised to aid in the recovery of the city's economy by serving as one manifestation of the international cultural city, another being the Urakami Catholic community. An August 1947 news film by Nihon nyūsu emphasized both the shipbuilding and Catholic characteristics of the city. The news report, "Nagasaki monogatari" (Nagasaki Story), was short (less than one minute) and to the point, suggesting that the recovery of both


symbols after the atomic bombing demonstrated the recovery of the city as a whole. The latter part of the film, accompanied by triumphant music, stressed the importance of Nagasaki Bay to international trade and shipbuilding, displaying scenes of the harbor and workers building massive ships. The first part of the film projected a much narrower focus. It featured, with a soundtrack of pipe organs as if in a church, the leader of the Urakami Catholics, Nagai Takashi, commending him for his research on the effects of radiation on the human body. Less than a year later, Nagai stormed the literary world with his books about the atomic bombing, transforming practically overnight from the representative of Urakami to that of Nagasaki.
The sable presbyters approach
The avenue of penitence;
The young are red and pustular
Clutching piaclative pence.

Under the penitential gates
Sustained by staring Seraphim
Where the souls of the devout
Burn invisible and dim.¹

T.S. Eliot, "Mr. Eliot's Sunday Morning Service" (1918).

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**Chapter Three**

**The "saint" of Urakami:**

*Nagai Takashi and the Formation of Atomic Memory, 1945-1951*

A confluence of circumstances in the early postwar years allowed Nagai Takashi to rise as the representative of Nagasaki. Nagai benefited from the occupation being primarily an American venture as Christianity increased in importance, strengthening his position as a Catholic and giving visibility to his religious rhetoric. The focus on reconstruction throughout his books, which encouraged community revival, religious themes such as forgiveness of one's enemies, and the recovery of a historic Nagasaki in which Catholicism played a part, served the purposes of local and national politicians, as well as the American occupation, not to mention the Nagasaki Catholic community. Nagai's ruminations on the relationship between God, destruction, and revival, also advanced the image of the Church in Japan. Nagai exerted efforts in support of recovery through literary and monetary means, drawing national and international attention to the history of Nagasaki, especially its Christians, its plight among the other war-torn cities in

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Japan, and its desire to fully recover from the tragedy and become a voice of peace. Nagai's point of view as a witness of the bombing, combined with the postwar benefits of his religious position, propelled him to the top of the literary world when the nation thirsted for information regarding the atomic bomb.

I. Providential Tragedy: The Atomic Bombing as the Work of God

Nagai Takashi was not born in Nagasaki. Nor was he originally Catholic. He was born in 1908 in Matsue City, Shimane Prefecture, where his ancestors had lived for generations in the region of Izumo, or as Kataoka Yakichi once wrote, "the land of the foundation myths of Japan." Izumo is home to one of the most historically and spiritually important Shinto shrines in Japan, the Izumo Taisha, and Nagai's father Noboru was a devout worshipper at the shrine. Growing up in Izumo and in a strictly Shinto household gave Nagai a solid patriotic foundation, which underlay his encouragement of his Catholic fellows in Nagasaki to embrace the cause of the nation in the war.

Nagai left his hometown at the age of twenty to attend medical school at Nagasaki University, located in Urakami. On a hill near the medical school stood the grand Urakami Cathedral, which mesmerized Nagai with its red bricks and the sound of its Angelus Bells. When offered a room for rent, he moved to the second floor of the house of the Moriyama family, which stood directly in front of the cathedral. The Moriyamas


were direct descendants of the hidden Christians (kakure Kirishitan), Japanese Christians who took their faith underground after enduring persecution from the early 1600s and practiced their faith in secrecy for almost 250 years. The Moriyama family had been the chôgata ("keeper of the calendar"), the most important task of Catholic leaders during the centuries underground. The chôgata bore the responsibility of informing the parishioners of religious dates, such as the Assumption of the Virgin Mary on August 15, and passing on the essence of Catholicism from generation to generation.

While living with the Moriyama family, Nagai learned the history of the Urakami Catholics and was drawn to the religion. When he was drafted into the military as a medic in 1931 after the Manchurian Incident, the young daughter of the Moriyama household, Maria Midori, sent Nagai a book entitled Kôkyô yôri (Catholic catechism) in a care package. Nagai received Midori's gift under the watchful eye of his commanding sergeant, who was immediately suspicious of the book and sent it to be examined for subversive ideas. Three days later the sergeant returned the catechism to Nagai, saying, "This is a Christian book, so there are many areas in it that make no sense, but because it does not seem particularly socialist, I guess you can hang on to it. However, if you have time to read stuff like this book of a Western God, read the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers (Gunjin chokuyu)." Nagai had already memorized the Gunjin chokuyu, so he decided to devote his time to studying the Catholic catechism.5

It was on the battlefield in China studying the principles of Christianity that Nagai began to understand the essence of Catholicism and decided to embrace the Christian

5 See Nagai Takashi, Horobinu mono o (Nagasaki: Nagasaki nichinichi shinbunsha, 1948), pp. 91-93. Page 92 of the original is mistakenly printed as 29.
God. Upon his return to Nagasaki he converted to Catholicism.\(^6\) On June 12, 1934, Nagai was baptized a Roman Catholic and received the name "Paulo."\(^7\) Two months later in August, Paulo Takashi married Maria Midori, and he became a member of one of the most important Catholic families in Nagasaki.\(^8\)

**Shintoism, Catholicism, Nationalism**

On August 29, 1937, Lieutenant Paulo Nagai Takashi sent a letter to his fellow Catholics in Nagasaki. Nagai had been drafted into the military again after Japan entered all-out war with China in July, and he was serving as a medical officer in the Imperial Army fighting near the Great Wall. The letter was published in the September 15 issue of the *Katorikukyô hô* (Catholicism Bulletin), a Nagasaki bimonthly publication that kept the parish informed on religious matters and national news, as well as international Catholic affairs. In the letter, Lieutenant Nagai informed his community that the battles in China were gruesome and "the corpses of Chinese soldiers" lay everywhere. He noted, however, that the "Chinese soldiers are much braver than expected. They are actually excellent soldiers." They "use sophisticated Czechoslovakian-made weapons, and they are quite skilled at mortaring." Nonetheless, he continued, "Tomorrow we are finally going over the Great Wall and advancing the attack. I'm glad."

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\(^6\) See Nagai, *Horobinu mono o*, p. 93.


\(^8\) Kataoka, *Nagai Takashi no shōgai*, p. 360.
Nagai's letter went on to address the serious matter of the safety of Nagasaki, considering the reality of the horrors of war he had already witnessed in China.

I've mentioned the bombing of Tianjin [in previous letters], but the aerial bombing of that city was actually quite tragic. You had to see it to believe it. I did not take pleasure in Tianjin's condition, but looking back, my heart shivered (samukunatta) when I thought what if Nagasaki were bombed...

I want Nagasaki to more seriously build its air defenses. There is nothing more pitiful than a city with no air-defense facilities.

First, you must actively build (ken'no) patriotic airplanes to secure Japan's command of the air. Then comes building air-defense facilities.

Everyday, planes come and the sounds of the Great Wall being bombed ring on. We all raise our hands and shout, "banzai!" It feels great. I wish I had a plane.

His letter was not meant to be a warning to his Nagasaki Catholic community of their fate in 1945, but to encourage them to mobilize for the war effort, build airplanes, and defend the homeland. Although Nagai was a fervent Catholic, patriotism for his Shinto homeland pervaded his letters from the battlefront. Nagai's patriotism was not atypical of Japanese Christians, his letters from the battlefront echoing the calls of Catholic leaders in Nagasaki to be patriotic.

In Nanjing in December 1937, after the Japanese Imperial Army had occupied and devastated the city from the 13th, Nagai wrote another letter to his Catholic community back in Nagasaki. Although Nagai acknowledged years later that he "saw all kinds of crimes being calmly performed on the battlefield" in China, the mood of his letter was cheery. "I respect fully wish you all a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year."

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9 Jpns: "Minakerya hanashi ni naranu."
10 Katorikukyō hô, 15 September 1937.
11 Witnessed "crimes" in China: Nagai Takashi, "Shi ni chokumen shite" in Shinchô, Special Edition (Bessatsu), January 15, 1951, p. 20. In the postwar, Nagai did not often discuss his military service in China. The article cited here was written less than four months before his death, when, as the title points out, he was "facing death."
Year from the battlefield," he wrote. "We have greeted this year along with grave current events, but especially this year Japan will soar. This is the perfect opportunity for Japanese Christians to display that essence. As I pray for the activities of everyone on the home front, I, too, will render the duty of a warrior of Japan, and repay the kindness of the emperor."\(^\text{12}\)

Nagai's experiences in China shaped his views of death. He witnessed bloody battles and treated countless wounded soldiers, Japanese and Chinese alike; faced with the daily reality of war and death, Nagai turned to the Bible for guidance. He always carried with him a 1910 copy of Emil Raguet's translation of the New Testament (he thought the newer translations had too many errors) and he repeatedly read a particular passage for comfort: "We all face death for the Lord, and through it we are akin to the sacrificial lamb."\(^\text{13}\) Nagai wrote years later that during his time in China he realized that "death is never coincidence. It is according to the Providence of God (Tenshu)."\(^\text{14}\) Nagai later evoked this view of death to give meaning to the destruction of Nagasaki by the atomic bomb and help his community understand the religious meaning of their loss.

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\(^\text{12}\) *Katorikukyô hô*, 15 January 1938. In the letter, Nagai makes no mention of the manner in which Nanjing fell to the Japanese military.

\(^\text{13}\) This is from the Bible, Romans 8:36. In Japanese, the verse as it appears in Nagai, *Horobinu mono o* (p. 189) is, "Warera hinemosu shu no tame ni shi no kiken ni ai, höraru beki hitsuijii no gotoku seraruru nari." I have translated the Japanese verse into English instead of relying on conventional English translations of Romans 8:36.

\(^\text{14}\) Nagai, *Horobinu mono o*, "Providance": p. 188; Raguet, "sacrificial lamb" (*höraru beki kohitsuji*): pp. 189-190. Father Emil Raguet was once the rector of the Urakami Parish (*Urakami kyōkai no shunin shisai*): p. 189.
**Patriotism beyond Destruction**

After Nagai returned from China in 1940, he settled back into a routine at home. He had returned to Nagasaki on March 5 as a decorated soldier, having received the Order of the Rising Sun for his bravery in China, and he continued to wear his military uniform to work at the hospital to show his patriotism and promote military training (gunji kyôren) among his community.\(^{15}\) He continued his work as a radiologist at Nagasaki University Medical School. Because of wartime scarcity, X-ray film was in short supply and he could no longer take "indirect photographs" of patients, but he could also not stop his work. Nagai continued working with X-rays, exposing his body to dangerous amounts of radiation. In May 1945, he began feeling ill.\(^{16}\) And in June, Nagai was given three years to live. Nagai's colleagues estimated that he had contracted leukemia as early as 1940, since he had been living with the pain for five years.\(^{17}\) Nonetheless, Nagai continued to teach at the university and treat patients, allowing himself no time to rest.

In July 1945, the military ordered Catholic leaders to report to army headquarters in Nagasaki for a meeting to address their loyalty to the nation. Military officials had long suspected Japanese Christians of being fifth columnists, but they grew more concerned once American planes began bombing the main islands in late 1944. At the

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\(^{15}\) See: Kataoka, *Nagai Takashi no shôgai*, p. 360; *Nagai Takashi zenshû*, v. 3, p. 772; Glynn, *A Song for Nagasaki*, p. 82. See also Takahashi, *Nagasaki ni atte tetsugaku suru* (1994), p. 211. Takahashi argues that Nagai, having seen the destruction wrought by Japanese forces in China, became militaristic (gunkokushugi) and his behavior back home in Nagasaki reflected the change. Takahashi discusses an instance where Nagai thought a certain young woman was "slacking" (tarundeiru) and threw her into ice water to teach her a lesson. However, Takahashi does not provide a reference.

\(^{16}\) *Nagasaki shinbun*, 11 February 1946.

\(^{17}\) Kataoka, *Nagai Takashi no shôgai*, p. 82.
meeting in July 1945, officials berated the Catholics and demanded they report to police headquarters immediately if they discovered any Americans landing.\(^{18}\)

Nagai Takashi and the Urakami Catholics never had the opportunity to warn of the arrival of the Americans on August 9, 1945. The atomic bomb decimated the only place in Nagasaki that the Japanese military suspected would be sympathetic to the Americans. The evening of the bombing, when Nagai and his medical staff were treating the waves of wounded that flooded their relief station, Nagai took the bandage from his own bleeding forehead and used it to draw a red circle in the middle of a large white cloth, planting the flag of the rising sun with a bamboo pole on the hilltop above the university which overlooked the flattened and burning landscape of Urakami.\(^{19}\)

**Providence**

The northern, Christian district of Urakami had long contrasted with the southern part of Nagasaki with its mostly Buddhist and Shinto population.\(^{20}\) The disparity was

\(^{18}\) Discussed in Glynn, *A Song for Nagasaki*, p. 92. The suspicions of military officials were not unfounded. There were instances of downed American pilots being aided by sympathetic Japanese civilians and Christian missionaries. The July meeting with the Nagasaki Catholics followed a nationwide alert for American spies because in the last year of the war the United States seemed to be uncannily adept at anticipating Japanese military strategy. In one instance, an American spy named Frank Schuler parachuted into Japan in July 1944, during a bombing mission of the B-29s, and was aided by missionaries in the Tokyo area, with whom he had worked in 1941 when he was an aide at the United States Embassy. On the same night, five OSS agents parachuted out of the same plane at different places, hoping to encounter Japanese willing to help in their reconnaissance activities. The missionaries acted as Schuler's field agents, observing Japanese warships in Yokohama harbor and aircraft at bases, which he relayed to MacArthur twice a week via a suitcase transmitter. The Japanese military quickly caught on and searched for the spies. The five OSS agents were captured one by one, sent to Sugamo Prison, interrogated, and executed by hanging in November 1944. The *Kenpeitai* (secret police) caught up with Schuler in 1945, but he survived the war: see Paul Manning, *Hirohito: The War Years* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1986), pp. 47-50.


\(^{20}\) Indeed, Christians lived throughout the city, and the Ôura Cathedral, built by French missionaries in the 1860s, is located in the far southern part of the city. The Ôura Cathedral survived the atomic bombing
The "saint" of Urakami

such that Nagai referred to Urakami and "Old Nagasaki" as the "City of Maria" and the "City of Eros," respectively. Both Nagasakis were cities of love, Nagai declared, but the "city of the god Eros" was filled with earthly love in contrast to the supernatural love of the "city of Holy Maria." The disdain between the two parts of the city was mutual and did not disappear with the bomb. Instead, the bombing reaffirmed for some residents that the gods disliked the Urakami Catholics because they refused to worship at shrines. In the weeks and months after the bombing, some declared that the atomic bomb that fell directly on Urakami exemplified divine punishment because the Catholics had not made sufficient pilgrimage to Suwa Jinja, the main Shinto shrine in Nagasaki. Nagai Takashi, in response to this claim, declared that it was not divine punishment, but, rather, the love of God that directed the bomb to Urakami. In what would become one of the major motifs of his postwar writings, Nagai claimed that God loved the Catholics of Urakami and so chose them as sacrificial lambs to end the war. Nagai, drawing inspiration from Mark 8:34 in the Bible, thought that because He loves them, the Urakami Catholics had to walk in the footsteps of Jesus Christ, becoming martyrs for a greater cause. Nagai used religious explanations for the atomic destruction of Urakami to console the community and help them attempt to work through the trauma.

The devastated Catholics looked to Nagai for comfort when the death of loved ones challenged their faith in God. A friend of Nagai, Yamada Ichitarō, returned home to Nagasaki to find his wife and five children killed in the atomic bombing, and he believed


21 Nagai, Horobinu mono o, p. 97.

what people were saying—that the bombing was divine punishment. Yamada agonized that "Everyone I meet says so: the atomic bomb was the wrath of God (tenbatsu); those who were killed were sinners (warumono); those who survived received a special grace from God. So, does that mean that my wife and children were sinners!?" Yamada was torn because he could not believe that God, to whom he had dedicated his life, had killed his wife and five children for being sinners, especially considering that it was he who had been a soldier in the Imperial Army. Nagai reassured Yamada that such thinking misunderstood the workings of God. "That the atomic bomb fell on Urakami was great Divine Providence. It was the grace of God," Nagai declared to his troubled friend. And instead of lamenting the destruction and losing faith, Nagai argued, "Urakami must offer thanks unto God" for having been chosen as a sacrifice to end the war. The survivors, he claimed, had failed the "entrance exam" into heaven and had to remain on earth to continue their "studies" through suffering. Yamada understood and, feeling reassured of God's love, left Nagai's hut, saying, "I am a sinner (tsumibito), so more than anything I look forward to the opportunity to suffer and pay for my sins (baishô)."

As the parishioner representative, Nagai presented the eulogy at the funeral mass for atomic bombing victims on November 23, 1945. In it he blended religious and historical interpretations of the tragedy to proclaim the exceptional character of the Urakami Catholics in the eyes of God. To evoke the words of the poet Rainer Maria Rilke, the "eulogy entrusted [him] with a mission" to "gently remove the appearance of

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24 The English term "parishioner representative" (shinto daihyô) is from: "Chronology of the Life and Work of Nagai Takashi," in pamphlet, "The Life of Dr. Nagai Takashi" (Nagasaki: Nagasaki City Nagai Takashi Memorial Museum, no date). Nagai writes "shinja daihyô" at the end of the eulogy manuscript, which means the same thing.
injustice about their death—which at times slightly hinders their souls from proceeding onward."\(^{25}\)

On a hill overlooking the devastated landscape of Urakami in front of thousands of Christians gathered near the cathedral ruins, Nagai spoke words of comfort, reassuring them of the exceptional love of God for Nagasaki Catholics, and linking the atomic tragedy with the history of Christian martyrdom in the city. The eulogy was the first instance in which Nagai spoke publicly of the atomic bombing as a providential tragedy, a view that shaped the image of Urakami and the bomb for many years. Nishida Hideo, who attended the funeral, remembers that when Nagai read the eulogy "in a loud voice," everyone wept.\(^{26}\)

**Eulogy for the Joint Funeral for Atomic-Bomb Deceased**\(^{27}\)

On August 9, Showa 20 [1945] at 10:30 a.m., a meeting of the top administrators of the war took place at the Imperial Headquarters to decide whether to resist [the Allies] or end the war. Not only the fate of Japan, but the fate of the world rested on the outcome. When the world was standing at the crossroads of fate—either bring a new peace to the world, or plunge humanity (jinrui) deeper into a wretched war (senran)—that is, at 11:02 a.m., a single atomic bomb exploded in the heart of our Urakami, and in an instant it summoned eight-thousand believers to the hands of the Lord God (Tenshu). At once, raging flames ignited and burned, and the Holy Land of the East (Tôyô) turned to ruins of ash.

In the middle of the night that day, Urakami Cathedral spontaneously combusted and went up in flames. At the exact same time in the Imperial Headquarters, the Emperor graciously suppressed the stubborn resistance doctrine


\(^{26}\) NBC Nagasaki hôsô, prod., "Kami to genbaku: Urakami katorikku hibakusha no 55 nen" (Aired on 30 May 2000).

\(^{27}\) The manuscript includes hand-written edits that Nagai made before he read it at the funeral, so I have translated it as he would have read it, and I do not include the text that has been crossed out. The revisions, at any rate, were minor.
(kōsenron) of the military (gunbu) and pronounced the Imperial Decision to end the war for world peace.²⁸

The imperial rescript was issued on August 15 and greeted the morning of worldwide peace, but this day actually corresponded to the great holiday of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary. Japan is a country that was offered to Mother Mary. And I recall again how our cathedral of Urakami was especially offered to Mother Mary.

Were these mysterious coincidences (itchi) really mere chance (gūzen)? Or, were they the embodiment of the exquisite providence of the Lord? If one considers the fact that the atomic bomb, which had aimed for the vicinity of the prefectural office in the heart of Nagasaki City, drifted to the north because of the weather and fell in Urakami right in front of the cathedral, along with the fact that this atomic bomb was the last act of war and fighting did not happen anywhere on earth, one will realize that there exists a deep connection between the destruction of Urakami and the end of the war. In other words, the church of Urakami was placed on the altar of sacrifice as atonement for the sin of humankind (jinrui) that was the world war. It was chosen as a pure lamb, slaughtered, and burned. We believe this.

Humankind, which inherited the sin of Adam and Eve having stolen the fruit of the tree of knowledge and the blood of Cain who beat his brother to death, are the same children of the Lord even as they disobeyed the commandment of love (ai no okite) and hated and killed each other: this was the great world war. In order to end the fifteen-year war that began with the Manchurian Incident in Showa 6 [1931] and welcome peace again, humankind of the world had to not only deeply repent those sins, but also offer an appropriate sacrifice to the Lord as an apology. Until this happened, there were many opportunities to end the war, and there were many cities that were annihilated by bombing raids, but they were not suitable for the sacrifice, so the Lord did not yet forgive [humankind]. However, I humbly observe (haisatsu) that there is no mistake that when we raised and offered the church of Urakami, for the first time the Lord deemed this as good and forgave, listening to the apology of humankind, and suddenly He conferred (tareru) a divine revelation upon the Emperor and allowed him to pronounce the Imperial Decision to end the war. To put it another way, precisely because Urakami was sacrificed, the war ended. I believe that according to this sacrifice, billions of people were saved from the calamity of war.²⁹

Our Urakami church had no religious freedom in Japan (wagakuni) but was not destroyed by the persecution of Toyotomi and Tokugawa, nor did it lose to the tyrannical rule of the military government and nation since Meiji. [The church] persisted for four hundred years, shedding the blood of numerous martyrs as it protected the righteous faith. Sincerely, was not [the Urakami church] in particular chosen from among the world as a flock of pure lambs that should be offered on the altar of the Lord? Alas, the great holocaust (hansai) that was made

²⁸ Jpns: "Shûsen no seidan o kudashi tamôta no de gozaimasu."

²⁹ Billions of people: "jûsû oku no jinrui."
in the presence of this cathedral on August ninth and duly ended the darkness of the great world war and shined the light of peace! Even in the nadir of sadness, we reverently viewed this as something beautiful, something pure, and something sacred.

Father Nishida, Father Tamaya, the nuns of Junshin and Jôsei [schools for girls], the elderly, teachers, the women of the Association of the Cross, relatives, friends, family—whomever [we] remember, they were all good people. ……… Furthermore, because you all (anata kata: the departed) had finished confession or had completed absolution (kyûmei) for the Fukure manjû holiday, you eight thousand were given a ride together on the cloud to heaven.

[We] must say that all of you who left this world without knowing defeat in war were blessed (kôfuku). Compared to you who are being embraced by the hands of the Lord as pure lambs, how pitiful and wretched are we who survived. Japan lost. Urakami is in complete ruins. As far as one can see is all ashes and tiles. No houses to live in. No clothes to wear. The potato fields, too, are desolate and there is no one to till them. We, the bereaved few, who lost you important workers, stand aimlessly in the fire ruins, look up at the encroaching winter sky (yukizora), and devote prayers.

Why did we not die together with you on that day at that time? Why must we survive like this as the wretched and defeated ones (haizensha)?

It is now that I am fully shown the depth of my sins. Since we had not yet fulfilled atonement, we were left behind. It was because the impurity of [our] sins is too great that [we] were not placed on the altar. There is no mistake that the road that we must walk after this as a defeated nation will be miserable and replete with hardships. Also, the reparations imposed on us by the Potsdam Declaration are an extraordinarily large and heavy burden. Is not the road of hardship that we must travel bearing the heavy burden the road of the hope that we can atone for our sins?

Blessed are those who mourn: for they shall be comforted.

We trust in these holy words, and as we look forward to (yoki) the rapture of being admitted to heaven, we honestly and without false pretense intend to proceed along the road of hardship. Our lord Jesus Christ, who shouldered the cross up the hill of Calvary, will certainly grant us courage when we carry upon our shoulders the heavy burden of reparations, being ridiculed, mocked, whipped, soaked in sweat, covered in blood, hungry, and thirsty.

Please, as the one who grants special courage upon us the weak, according to the mercy (otoritsugi) of Mother Mary, we beseech Thee, oh Lord.

Today, at the sponsorship of the Nagasaki diocese (kyôku), a joint funeral for all of you [the departed] was administered in the ruins of this Urakami

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30 The Fukure manjû holiday means the day of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary, because on that day the Catholics make a special kind of steamed bun called fukure manjû.

31 Nagai's audience would have immediately recognized this as Mathew 5:4. Jpns: "Saiwai naru kana naku hito: karera wa nagusameraru bekereba nari."
Cathedral, and a choir mass by Bishop Urakawa from Sendai and a ceremony of absolution (shatôshiki) were conducted. Urakami-born bishops, priests, and nuns came home from all over Japan, and they are earnestly devoting heartfelt prayers together with the two-thousand bereaved displaying eight-thousand crosses. According to the compassion of the Lord, according to the piety of this mass—be purified by the fire of purgatory and quickly ascend to heaven.

Alas, let us always praise the work of the omniscient and omnipotent Lord! Let us give thanks for the church of Urakami having been chosen out of the entire world to be offered in the holocaust. Let us give thanks that according to the sacrifice of the church of Urakami, peace was restored to the world and freedom of religion was bestowed on Japan.

I pray that the souls of the departed, through the compassion of the Lord, may rest in peace.

Amen.

Representative of the Urakami Parish of the Roman Catholic Church
Paulo Nagai Takashi
Respectfully (kin'etsu)

The eulogy gave meaning to the destruction by seeing it as a providential tragedy: it exemplified atonement for the sin of world war. The sin, however, was not the Catholics', or even Japan's, but rather humanity's; that is, responsibility for the war belonged to all of humankind equally, including the victorious Allies. Since Japan had initiated the "fifteen-year war" with the Manchurian Incident, the war had to end in Japan, but the numerous cities that the Allies firebombed in the last year of the war were "not suitable for the sacrifice." Only Urakami possessed the qualifications to become a sacrificial lamb. Nagai created a theodicy for his community by claiming that God worked through them in order to expiate the sins of humankind. Nagai hoped that the

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32 Urakawa temporarily served as bishop of Nagasaki in 1937, and was bishop of the Sendai Diocese from 1941-1954.

33 Nagai Takashi, Genshi bakudan shisha gôdô sô chôji, manuscript, delivered on 23 November 1945.

34 As Max Weber noted, one "can explain suffering and injustice by referring to individual sin committed in a former life (the migration of souls), to the guilt of ancestors [...] or—the most principled—to the wickedness of all creatures per se." The pain and suffering of an individual or group, then, represents a martyr complex characterized by the "missionary prophecy" in which "the devout have not experienced themselves as vessels of the divine but rather as instruments of a god": H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 275, 285.
belief in the exceptional love of God for his community would comfort the few who had
not been summoned to His side and that they would take comfort in knowing that their
loved ones who died were not punished, as some Nagasaki residents had claimed, but
rather chosen by God because of their purity and righteousness. The atomic bombing of
Nagasaki was not divine punishment. It had "ended the darkness of the great world war
and shined the light of peace."

The bereaved took the message to heart. "We were persuaded" (nattoku) by Nagai's interpretation of the bomb, Nishida says, "even the people who had thought it
was divine punishment." Nagaoka Some, too, remembers Nagai as having inspired the
Catholic community. "He was such a good person," she says, "that some people thought
God had delivered him to us (unde kureta)."35

**The Popular Beatification of a Moribund Nagai**

In the months surrounding the November eulogy, Nagai became the voice of the
Urakami community, many people around Nagasaki venerating him as a paragon
Catholic and Japanese citizen. In October, two months after the bombing, Nagai moved
back into Urakami from the relief station in Mitsuyama in defiance of the "seventy-year
sterility theory" and built a small three-meter-squared shack to live with his two children.
In January 1946, Nagai and his children moved to a more stable makeshift hut, and in
March 1948 they moved into a better hut built and donated by many in the Catholic
community, where he and his children lived until his death in 1951. Nagai named the
humble hermitage, "Nyokodô," which he derived from the words of Jesus, "Love thy

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35 NBC Nagasaki hōsō, prod., "Kami to genbaku: Urakami katorikku hibakusha no 55 nen."
neighbor as thyself." Nyokodô, the "smallest house in the prefecture," as Nagai claimed, represented for him the unrelenting faith of the Urakami believers, including those killed in the bombing. The hut served as the headquarters of Nagai's reconstruction activities, through which he continued to spread his interpretation of the bombing of Nagasaki.

From early 1946, newspapers in Nagasaki and from around Japan began to take notice of Nagai as a Christian doctor in bombed-out Urakami and as a spiritual leader of the survivors. Reporters came to Nyokodô and turned to Nagai to speak for the residents of the atomic-devastated valley. In February, a reporter from the Nagasaki shinbun interviewed Nagai, who took the opportunity to reiterate some of the ideas that he had advanced in his November eulogy. The article began by describing Nagai's leukemia and how he had contracted it, going on to explain how it improved after the atomic bombing, when his white-blood cell temporarily decreased from 200,000 to 100,000. Even so, little changed for Nagai, the reporter pointed out, as a healthy person's count is around seven or eight thousand, and "according to common medical knowledge today," Nagai's sickness was still serious and he had "less than three years to live." Despite his severe leukemia, Nagai performed his duties as a doctor, and, considering that his terminal condition resulted from work as a radiologist, the reporter concluded, Nagai had made an enormous "noble scientific sacrifice." The Ministry of Education's promotion of Nagai to

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36 In Japanese, the phrase is, "Onore no gotoku hito o ai seyo," or the simplified four-character equivalent, "Nyoko aijin." "Nyoko" is the abbreviated form of "onore no gotoku," or "as thyself," and "dô" means "temple" or "church."

37 Nagai Takashi, Hana saku oka (Hill of Blossoming Flowers), in Nagai Takashi zenshû, v. 1, p. 201.
full professor in 1946 was the first of many awards that, the reporter declared, recognized his dedication as a doctor and his ability to inspire strength in his fellow citizens.\textsuperscript{38}

The reporter went on to extol Nagai: "As an ardent Christian, he makes a point to participate in Church functions no matter how busy he may be with work (tabō), and he stands in a position of leadership" in his community, always showing love and affection as he guides them through destitute and painful times. When the atomic bomb exploded, he suffered a severe injury, the reporter explained, but he treated numerous patients with one hand pressing a cloth to his wound to keep the fresh blood out of his face. Nagai "performs abilities (hataraki) that a normal person could not possibly do, as if he is doing the work of God (Kamiwaza no gotoku)." The reporter's somewhat sycophantic descriptions preceded a short auto-biographical account by Nagai.

I was born in Izumo, and from a young age I was raised with a Shinto education. However, as I grew up, I harbored doubts about the spiritual life [according to Shinto], and after enduring much suffering, I finally entered Catholicism. Then, aspiring to the land of the Twenty-Six Martyrs, I came to Nagasaki.\textsuperscript{39} It is surprising that Nagasaki people are indifferent even as they possess this world-famous and noble treasure. In Rome, as a certainty on the day of martyrdom, February 5, four hundred million believers suspend all other activities to simultaneously hold a memorial (matsuri).\textsuperscript{40} I see the true spirit of Catholicism in this fresh-blooded history. I think there is nothing nobler than the souls of people who, because of their faith, suffered persecution that defies description, and praised the holy name of the Lord (Kami no mina) as they separated from the bonds of the flesh and ascended to heaven. The damage of the atomic bomb is the tragedy of the century. Eight thousand believers died because of it. However, those people are blessed. Bearing the greatest gift of the Temple of Heaven (jōdo

\textsuperscript{38} Nagasaki shinbun, 11 February 1946.

\textsuperscript{39} Nagai embellished his own story a bit here. He came to Nagasaki for medical school, which is located in Urakami near the Cathedral, and he aspired to Catholicism only after arriving in Nagasaki.

\textsuperscript{40} The memorial that Nagai refers to is for the "Twenty-Six Martyrs of Nagasaki." On February 5, 1597, twenty-six Christians, including Jesuits, Franciscans, and Japanese converts, were crucified on a hill overlooking Nagasaki Bay. Pope Urbanus VIII proclaimed them as martyrs on July 10, 1627: see Richard H. Drummond, \textit{A History of Christianity in Japan} (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1971), p. 86.
no tenshudō), they were chosen as atonement for sin to bring about peace for humankind, and they ascended to the foot of God. I was unable to be included in this selection because my sins run deep. It is unfortunate, but until the Lord summons me, I must fulfill my duty.

The reporter concluded: "A man of passion. A man of love. An object of reverence by his colleagues and acquaintances. And just the fact that he is a rising professor of much promise, the thought that [his success] will be short-lived is unbearable, and the Doctor will be missed." 41

As the article affirmed Nagai's status as a notable figure in Nagasaki, it also echoed the discourse of post-atomic Urakami that Nagai had initiated with his eulogy, giving visibility to his interpretation of the bombing. The Ministry of Education's elevation of Nagai to full professor suggests that officials saw the promise of Nagai's strength and fortitude to inspire Nagasaki residents to endure the "road of hardship." By February 1946, the image of Nagai and Urakami in postwar popular media was established. Local and national reporters depicted Nagai as pious and undeterred by the atomic bomb, almost superhumanly so, and as someone for all Japanese to emulate as they attempted to overcome defeat and destruction. The fame enjoyed by Nagai from early 1946 led to the next chapter of his life as the voice of Nagasaki that transcended local and national borders.

Nagai's November 1945 eulogy attracted national and international attention after the first part of it was translated and published in 1947 in the American magazine, "The Field Affair," along with one of his poems. The translated portion of the eulogy included Nagai's declaration that the atomic bombing of Urakami exemplified atonement for the

41 Nagasaki shinbun, 11 February 1946. The article claimed that Nagai was building a "barrack" hut, but he had just moved out of that makeshift hut into a provisional house weeks earlier.
war and that the Catholics were the sacrificial lambs that expiated the sin of humankind. An American named Ruth Giblin wrote Nagai from Concord, Massachusetts in March after reading the article to express solidarity and sympathy as a fellow Christian, and she offered to help the Urakami community in any way she could. Nagai requested of Giblin only a holy cloth for the church altar, which she enclosed with a letter two months later, along with some soap. The altar cloth and the soap, however, never made it to Nagai, who thought that both had probably been confiscated upon entry to Japan, which caused him to "feel sad."

The *Nagasaki nichinichi* newspaper declared in 1947 on the second anniversary of the bombing that Nagai's "religious love that transcends national borders" had allowed the knowledge of the tragedy of the bomb to reach international audiences, as evidenced by the letter from an American admirer. His writings on the medical effects of the atomic bomb, on which he had been writing and presenting since as early as 1946, using himself as a research specimen, would soon be translated into English, the newspaper asserted. Nagai's achievements by 1947 had positioned him to become the "vanguard of international goodwill," not to mention a key to Japan-U.S. relations. The newspaper commented that "Nagai of Nagasaki" had become "Nagai of Japan" and now, at last, he was the "Nagai of the world."

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42 *Nagasaki nichinichi*, 9 August 1947.
II. Nagasaki Literature and Postwar Society

In the last three years of his life, from 1948 to 1951, Nagai Takashi wrote more than ten books on the atomic bombing, Christianity, and the dawn of the nuclear age, donating his royalties to reconstruction projects in Urakami and other parts of Nagasaki. The books brought him considerable domestic and international renown, which he used to advance the image of Nagasaki and improve the position of Catholics in Japan. Despite Nagai's controversial interpretation of the bombing, religious leaders such as Pope Pius XII, and others in the international Christian community, applauded the "saint of Urakami" for his literary, spiritual, and financial contributions to the postwar revival of the city.

As the only atomic-bomb author to appear in major circulation and be read widely, Nagai symbolized the prosperity of Nagasaki as an "international cultural city." No such representative emerged as equally influential in Hiroshima. In total, Nagai published nine books and numerous medical reports, poems, paintings, and editorials in newspapers and journals. Two additional manuscripts of his were published posthumously as books.\textsuperscript{43} Reviewers praised his books for describing the nuclear age and educating the populace on the truths about radiation and the peaceful uses of atomic energy.\textsuperscript{44} "Dr. Nagai is quite famous" for his dedication to "atomic science" (genshigaku), wrote Ono Tomoaki, and the way in which he connected the narrative of

\textsuperscript{43} For a list of Nagai's publications, see Nagai Takashi zenshû, pp. 785-789.

the atomic destruction of Urakami to the region's history of Christianity and his own faith demonstrated how Nagai "conquered atomic power with faith."\(^{45}\)

**Horror and Sentimentality: The Success of Leaving These Children Behind**

A month after collapsing in front of Urakami Station in July 1946 from complications of his leukemia, Nagai Takashi produced his first book manuscript. Less than a year had passed since the atomic bombing, and with the experience fresh in his mind, Nagai wrote candidly about the physical destruction, his medical relief team and their futile efforts to treat irradiated patients, the physics of the atomic bomb, and the impact of the bomb on his community. He also included his November 1945 eulogy address as representative of his community's interpretation of the bombing. The manuscript, entitled, *Genshi jidai no kaimaku: igakusha no taiken shita genshi bakudan* (Raising the Curtain on the Atomic Age: The Atomic Bomb as Experienced by a Physician), promised to inform readers outside Nagasaki (and Hiroshima) of the effects of the atomic bomb. Nagai hoped to publish the manuscript as soon as possible, and because he did not criticize the United States for dropping the bomb, he did not expect any problems in passing censorship. He was wrong.

The institution of American censorship was not fully understood by authors in mid-1946, even if some knew enough to self-censor. From early in the occupation, Nagasaki newspapers reminded citizens: "Remember without exception to submit publication materials for censorship."\(^{46}\) Authors did not always know what might be


\(^{46}\) "*Shuppanbutsu wa kanarazu ken'etsu o*": Nagasaki shimbun, 28 February 1946.
considered unpalatable to the occupiers, and Nagai submitted *Genshi jidai no kaimaku*, in manuscript form, to officials for approval in early 1947. After a lengthy review process that involved several departments of SCAP, the censorship bureau "suspended" the decision on Nagai's manuscript for six months.

While waiting for the decision, Nagai continued to write from the perspective of a *hibakusha*, doctor and physicist, Catholic, and father. Those books easily passed censorship and were published in 1948, soon topping the best-sellers charts. *Kono ko o nokoshite* (Leaving These Children Behind), *Itoshigo yo* (My Beloved Children), *Rozario no kusari* (Rosary Chain), and his autobiography *Horobinu mono o* (Grant Me Something Eternal) established Nagai as the first author to emerge prolifically and successfully from the atomic-bombed cities. One bookstore in Tokyo advertised Nagai's autobiography as the "bible of the modern era" (*gendai no seisho*).\(^{47}\) *Kono ko o nokoshite* alone sold 220,000 copies in the first year of publication.\(^{48}\) Not bad for "a frail little Japanese doctor who awaits death in a tiny hut on a Nagasaki hill," who also happened to be "Japan's most popular author-doctor," as Nagai was described in a June 1949 article in the Associated Press.\(^{49}\)

In the first years after the war, other *hibakusha* were not as successful as Nagai in speaking about the atomic bombings. Hiroshima *hibakusha* Kurihara Sadako explained, "we could never have written about our experiences of the atomic bomb during the

\(^{47}\) Advertisement poster of Hasumi Shoten in Kanda, Tokyo for *Horobinu mono o* (1948): in *Kôkoku* folder, NTMM.


\(^{49}\) In *Pasadena Star - News*, "Doomed by Bombing: Leading Japanese Author Calmly Awaiting Death" (June 5, 1949). Article written in Tokyo by AP staff, June 4, 1949.
Occupation. It would have been impossible because of the censorship. [...] We were not
allowed to write about the atomic bomb during the Occupation. We were not even
allowed to say that we were not allowed to write about the atomic bomb.50 During the
1947 mayoral election in Hiroshima, one candidate got cut off halfway through his
speech because he mentioned the atomic bombing.51

Yet in 1948, Kono ko o nokoshite was a huge success. Written from the
viewpoint of a father contemplating what will become of his two children, Makoto and
Kayano, when he dies of leukemia, the book makes several references to the atomic
bombing of Nagasaki. At one point, Nagai recounts the treatment he applied to the
wounds of a little boy with whom he discussed the hundreds of dead schoolgirls whose
corpses lined the riverbed. But the way in which Nagai wrote this account made it
acceptable to the occupation authorities. It began with Christian sentiment:

The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away. Let us always praise the name of
the Lord!

[...] That night, I medically treated Kozasa-kun and the others, but according
to their story, it appears that in the dead of night on a riverbank two hundred
meters east from the [Jôsei] all-girls school, a Latin hymn sung by several people
could be heard joining then ceasing, joining then ceasing. When the night expired
and we looked, the nuns were clumped into a group and had become cold.⋯⋯⋯ Could it have been these nuns who were singing last night's hymns? Or, couldn't it have been a flock of Angels, come to welcome the souls, who were singing?⋯⋯⋯ Looking at the pure faces of the dead that were lined in a row made you think that way.

Those of us left living who saw the dead thought that the atomic bomb was not
divine punishment at all, but that it was no different from the expression of some
profound plan of Divine Providence.——That same day I too had become a weak,
penniless person and had embraced two small children in the fire ruins. I don't
know what it was, but I believed and didn't doubt that this was the expression of
Love's Providence.


I have endured three years since that day, but the fact that my faith that day was correct will gradually come to be proven. Because of the atomic bomb, the obstruction that was blocking my righteous path was removed, and I became able to taste true happiness. "Death" that will come to me soon is also the greatest gift of love that I confront, I who am God's and who increases in His infinite love.\[52\]

The chapter in which this excerpt appears, entitled "Providence," revealed a transformation in Nagai's views since 1945. No longer was Nagai professing the idea of the providential tragedy as his own, but rather as "ours"—"Those of us left living," we, consider the atomic bombing an "expression of Divine Providence." As parishioner representative since 1945, Nagai spoke for the entire Urakami community, but after the publication of *Kono ko o nokoshite* in 1948, he began to represent the "we" of Nagasaki. In addition, the Christian words Nagai used to express the bombing of Nagasaki in the book outweighed the potential of the book to arouse anti-American sentiments. After all, in the eyes of the censors, "they" of Urakami were uncritical of the atomic bombing and even grateful. The book thus posed no threat to the image of the Allies.

*Kono ko o nokoshite* brought Nagai's Catholic ideas to a wide segment of the population. The writer Inoue Hisashi wrote that when he lived in an orphanage in Sendai in the north of Japan as a child after the war, he received a piece of chocolate whenever he brought home a book written by Nagai Takashi because of the Catholic message in his books.\[53\] *Kono ko o nokoshite*, especially, was popular in orphanages, because in it Nagai expresses the unconditional love of a father in the valuable advice he gives to his soon-to-be orphaned children.


An advertisement in the *Nagasaki shinbun* declared that "the saint of Urakami, Dr. Nagai," had produced in *Kono ko o nokoshite" a memoir of passionate paternal love, written from his sickbed for his beloved children. It is also a book of love bequeathed on behalf of the mothers and fathers of the world." The ad insisted, "Tears! Tears! [Your] tears will soak this emotional book." Another ad said that *Kono ko o nokoshite* was the representative work of Nagai, which "extracted the sorrowful tears of the nation (zenkokumin no netsurui)." Nagai's voice represented the anxiety of his generation, who contemplated the future of their children in a war-ravaged society which had witnessed the violent emergence of the atomic age.

Scholars praised Nagai's capacity to represent various voices and draw attention to social problems. In a 1949 essay, one scholar admired Nagai's ability to blend science and faith, because, quoting Nagai, "Righteous faith is necessary for a scientist. [...] We scientists conducting experiments in the laboratory, and monks praying in the friary (shūin) are one and the same (onaji na no da). Experiments are prayers." The scholar went on to point out that Nagai also illuminated broader social issues in the book. Reflecting on the fate of his own children after his death, Nagai drew attention to society for its failure to properly address the problem of orphans in postwar Japan. When Nagai discussed the dire state of orphanages in a story of an orphan who drowned while attempting to escape from an institution, the scholar felt "sharp regret (hansei) boil to the surface, as if I had committed some kind of great crime. Ahh, if only the many

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54 *Nagasaki shinbun*, 25 June 1948. From 1948, Nagai was known widely as the "saint of Urakami" (*Urakami no seija*; "seijin" was also used). The newspaper cited here is the first public expression of Nagai as the "saint of Urakami," as far as I have seen. Most likely, there is an earlier instance, but I have yet to find it. An ad for the same book in the May 22, 1949 issue of the *Mainichi shinbun*, referred to Nagai as an "apostle of Urakami" (*Urakami no shito*).

55 Advertisement clipping, in *Kōkoku* folder, NTMM.
bourgeoisie of the world, the directors of social service institutions, and related
government authorities—no, the entire nation of Japan—understood orphans even just
half as well as Dr. Nagai does, then might we have been able to prevent an extremely
large number of tragedies and crimes" against the orphans of Japan?56

Nagai’s discussion of orphanages reached the ears of policy makers in the
National Diet. At a meeting of the House of Representatives on March 31, 1949,
representative Fukuda Masako pointed out the destitute conditions of orphanages and
argued for the revision of the Juvenile Social Welfare Law (Jidô fukushi hô) and the
improvement of facilities throughout the country. The words of Nagai in Kono ko o
nokoshite emphasized for Fukuda the fact that the current facilities did not allow for the
proper nurturing and psychological cultivation of children.57

At one point, Nagai became the most-read author in Japan. In early September
1949, the Mainichi shinbun newspaper company conducted a national survey of readers.
The Third National Public Opinion Poll of Publications posed the question: "Among the
books you read in the past year, are there any that you consider good books (ryôsho)?"
The previous year, Dazai Osamu's Shayô (The Setting Sun) and Ningen shikkaku (No
Longer Human) had dominated the Mainichi’s charts, but the 1949 results revealed a
change. Three books by Nagai Takashi appeared in the rankings: Kono ko o nokoshite
stood at number one, surpassing the number-two book by thirty-percent of the votes; his
Nagasaki no kane (The Bell of Nagasaki) won out over Yoshikawa Eiji’s popular
historical novel Miyamoto Musashi for fourth place; and his Rozario no kusari was

56 T S, "'Kono ko o nokoshite' dokugo kan (sono nî)," in Koe, no. 862 (July 1949), pp. 40-41. This article
was part two of two. Part one has "T K" listed as the author.

57 Notes of the National Diet of Japan, Shûgiin, Kôsei i'in kai, March 31, 1949, No. 3, p. 8.
sixteenth. Nagai's books placed far ahead of the Japanese translation of John Hersey's *Hiroshima*, which was nineteenth, and that only in the votes of men. Nagai's books equally dominated sales in bookstores across Japan.\(^{58}\)

The success of *Kono ko o nokoshite* caught the attention of foreign publishers. Representatives from Editorial Marfil in Spain asked Nagai for permission to publish a Spanish version because "We think that publication of this book in Spain would be very interesting for the large mass of the Catholic people of our country."\(^{59}\) Roman Catholics around the world admired Nagai for his ability to see the love of God where others saw only death and despair. Pope Pius XII sent Nagai a wooden rosary in May 1950. Nagai used his international fame to improve the conditions of Nagasaki as best he could, contributing to the spiritual revitalization of his Catholic community and to the social and physical reconstruction of the city.

**Literature and the Recovery of Nagasaki**

On May 27, 1949, just two days before the St. Francis Xavier festival, Emperor Hirohito paid a visit to the sickbed of Nagai Takashi, who had moved to an office in the Nagasaki Medical School to allow for more space during the visit. A few months earlier, Nagai had presented the emperor with a copy of *Nagasaki no kane* through his publisher

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\(^{58}\) Results published in *Mainichi shinbun*, 26 October 1949. The poll also surveyed bookstores: "Name the book that had the best standing at your store in the past year." *Kono ko o nokoshite* secured the number-one spot with a forty-three percent margin of votes over the number-two book, *Kyōsan shugi hihan no jōshiki* (Common knowledge of the criticism of communism). Clearly, the publishing year of 1948-1949 was defined by Nagai's *Kono ko o nokoshite*. Strangely, Nagai did not appear in the top ten of the "favorite author" category. Number one in that category was Yoshikawa Eiji. According to a *Yomiuri shinbun* company poll, *Kono ko o nokoshite* was the number-one book in 1948 as well: see T K, "'Kono ko o nokoshite' dokugo kan (sono ichi)" in *Koe*, no. 861 (June 1949), p. 34.

\(^{59}\) El Secretario of Editorial Marfil, S.A. to Nagai Takashi, February 9, 1950. Correspondence file 2, NTMM.
Shikiba Ryūsaburō. Hirohito asked, gently, "How is your illness?" "I am fine," replied Nagai ("Genki de orimasu"). "I hope for your quick recovery," added Hirohito. As the emperor spoke, Nagai brought his hands together silently, and replied, "My hands still move. I will continue to write as long as my strength allows." Hirohito, smiling, told Nagai, "I saw your novel (shōsetsu)." The emperor then turned to Dr. Kageura, the chief physician caring for Nagai, and said, "Please take care [of the patient]." The Nagasaki minyū newspaper wrote that the "kindness" of the "human and scientist emperor echoed strongly in the heart of the bedridden Dr. Nagai." Before leaving, Hirohito encouraged Nagai's children, Makoto and Kayano, "Please study hard and become fine people."

Nagai was excited to receive a visit from the emperor. Years earlier, he and so many others had fought in China in his name, and as Nagai saw it, the sacrifice of Nagasaki had convinced Hirohito to end the war. Nagai was overwhelmed with gratitude and humility, wishing that the encounter had occurred under better circumstances.

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60 Nagai gifted a copy each to the emperor and the crown prince. The Imperial Palace acknowledged receipt of the two copies of Nagasaki no kane on February 10, 1949 in a document sent to Nagai's publisher, Shikiba Ryūsaburō. See document of receipt in Correspondence file 1, NTMM.

61 Nagasaki minyū, 28 May 1949. Notice that Hirohito did not say he "read" it. He also called the book a "shōsetsu" (novel), which implies fiction.


63 Notice that the newspaper reporter wrote, "human emperor." Hirohito was an amateur biologist, hence, "scientist emperor." Nagai felt a deep connection to Hirohito because they were both scientists. For reference to Hirohito's interests in science, see Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: HarperCollins, 2000; Perennial, 2001), esp. pp. 60-62.

64 Nagasaki minyū, 28 May 1949.

65 Nagai, Itoshigo yo, p. 313. Wished that the visit could have been under better circumstances: "mottai nai shidai de atta."
Nonetheless, May 27, 1949 was a special day for Nagai, and he composed several poems as mementos of the imperial visit.\textsuperscript{66}

The meeting between the emperor and Nagai exemplified the delicate juxtaposition between the wartime empire and the defeated nation. The emperor seemed to understand the significance of Nagai and his books. As one historian writes, the "emperor skillfully tapped" into the "Nagai Boom" that swept the nation in the late 1940s and early 1950s.\textsuperscript{67} Hirohito, the icon of Japanese imperialism, and Nagai, the "saint of Urakami," came together for a photo opportunity that embodied the hope of a postwar transition. With the issue of the war responsibility of the nation (and of the emperor) left unaddressed, the two men seamlessly combined the wartime and postwar legacies of Japan.

The Nagai boom extended beyond the borders of Japan. By the time \emph{Nagasaki no kane} was published in 1949, Nagai Takashi was already famous. His bestsellers had made him an international figure as a voice of Japanese who repented for the sins of war and struggled to rebuild their nation in the hope of world peace. For Christians, Nagai's ability to find God in the destruction commanded admiration and attracted notable visitors, such as sixty-nine year-old Helen Keller, who made a pilgrimage to his bedside on October 18, 1948.\textsuperscript{68} Letters from publishers, editors, and admirers abroad poured in. His fame was such that some letters arrived at his small hut in Urakami without a correct address, as long as the sender had managed to include Nagai's name in some form. One

\textsuperscript{66} Nagasaki minyû, 28 May 1949. Nagai Takashi was a prolific poet and painter, in addition to book author, scientist, and theological philosopher.

\textsuperscript{67} Bix, \emph{Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan}, p. 637.

\textsuperscript{68} Recorded, among other places, in Nagai, \emph{Itoshigo yo}, pp. 279-288.
letter was addressed simply to "Dr. Paul Nagai, Nagasaki, Japan," but no matter the language or the address, the letters seemed to arrive safely.\(^{69}\) The correspondence Nagai received from America, Italy, Spain, Mexico, Brazil, and other countries, praised him for his books, his courage in the face of leukemia, and his ability to relate the devastation of the atomic bombing in the language of his faith.

Japanese actors, artists, and novelists also expressed their admiration for Nagai in personal letters.\(^ {70}\) Actor Chiaki Minoru, who starred in several Kurosawa Akira films, including *Rashômon* and *Seven Samurai*, and who played Nagai in a 1949 play version of *Nagasaki no kane*, wrote to Nagai on March 14, 1949 after visiting him in Nagasaki.\(^ {71}\)

"As a public figure, Nagai-sensei is now everyone's sensei," declared Chiaki. "You are everyone's Nagai-sensei, [including] ordinary people and the many admiring readers (aidokusha) from the time [you published] *Rozario no kusari*.\(^ {72}\) Nagai represented the exemplary "sensei" and a role model for the nation.

\(^{69}\) One letter had an address in Italian: "Ilustre Signor, Prof. TAKASHI NAGAI, Professore della Facolta di Medicina, Università di, NAGASAKI (Giappone)." For both letters, see Correspondence File 2, Archival Materials Room, Nagasaki City Nagai Takashi Memorial Museum, Nagasaki. Another letter was addressed to "Dr. Nagi" in "Nagisaki": W.H. Deal to Professor T. Nagi [sic], August 23, 1947, *Shohyô* folder, NTMM. Incidentally, Nagai's actual mailing address was: Nagasaki-shi, Ueno-machi, 373.

\(^{70}\) Among them were Anzai Keimei, Hino Ashihei, Suzuki Shintarô, and many others. See: Correspondence file 1, NTMM.

\(^{71}\) The play was performed by the Bara za (Rose [theater] group) at the Mitsukoshi Theater (gekijô) in Tokyo in March 1945: see Tokyo Times, 3 March and 19 March 1949. The group performed it in Nagasaki as well on March 6 and 7, 1949: see *Nagasaki minyû*, 2 May 1949. The play version was arranged by Sasaki Takamaru, Chiaki Minoru's father-in-law. Sasaki Takamaru and Chiaki Minoru starred together in the 1956 Inagaki Hiroshi film, "*Kettô Ganryûjima,*" about Miyamoto Musashi. Sasaki Takamaru also starred in the 1953 film "*Senkan Yamato,*" (Battleship Yamato). Sasaki's grandson, Chiaki's son, is the actor Sasaki Katsuhiko (b. 1944).

The director Ôniwa Hideo made a film version of *Nagasaki no kane* in 1949 and it, too, became a hit. The film was produced by Shochiku Co., Ltd. (*Shôchiku*). See *Eiga "Nagasaki no kane" shashin shû [Movie, "The Bell of Nagasaki" photo album] folder*, NTMM.

\(^{72}\) Chiaki Minoru to Nagai Takashi, March 14, 1949: Correspondence file 1, NTMM.
Foreign publishers sought to tap into the Nagai boom. In 1949, Duell, Sloan and Pearce of New York approached Kodansha publishers in Tokyo about the possibility of translating *Kono ko o nokoshite*. For the American press, the book had value for American readers because of its "Catholic aspects (nioi)" and scientific approach to writing about the bomb, both of which the publisher hoped to intensify in the translation. But the deal never came to fruition. Instead, Duell, Sloan and Pearce became interested in an account of eight Nagasaki survivors written by Nagai for an American audience, which Kodansha sent them in November 1949. Charles A. Pearce replied in February the following year that the manuscript, "*Genshiun Senjo Shinri* (Atomic Battlefield Psychology) [sic] ... has been carefully examined and read by several reliable advisers. As a result, I am happy to report that we wish to proceed with the translation and publication of this manuscript by Dr. Nagai." The press had already secured the necessary translators, "a professor at Columbia University and one of his colleagues," after having promised to pay them "a substantial royalty on the first 10,000 copies." Ichiro Shirato and Herbert B. L. Silverman translated the book as *We of Nagasaki: The Story of Survivors in an Atomic Wasteland*, which was released in early 1951.

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73 Amino Isao to Nagai Takashi Sensei, September 7, 1949: Correspondence file 2, NTMM. Amino Isao wrote on behalf of the Shuppan Kyoku (Publishing Bureau) of DaiNippon Yubenkai Kodansha in Tokyo. The letter to Nagai outlined three issues that Duell, Sloane [sic] & Pearce inquired regarding *Kono ko o nokoshite*: 1) the possibility of obtaining translation rights; 2) the existence of anybody in Japan suitable to translate the book for them; and 3) permission to "intensify" the Catholic aspects of the book (*Katorikku no nioi o yori koku sakaritai*), as well as the "feelings" of "Nagai the scientist" regarding the atomic bomb. Ray Falk, a reporter for the North American Newspaper Alliance dispatched to Japan, approached Kodansha for Duell, Sloan and Pearce and acted as liaison.

74 Charles A. Pearce to Shinnosuke Owari [sic], February 24, 1950: Correspondence file 2, NTMM. *Genshiun senjo shinri* more literally means, "battlefield psychology beneath the atomic mushroom cloud."
Duell, Sloan and Pearce hoped that Nagai's reportorial account of the experience of the Nagasaki survivors—tentatively titled *The Fate of Man at Nagasaki*—would outdo the success of John Hersey's *Hiroshima*. In a fall 1950 press release, the publishers declared that thanks to the "acuteness and reportorial detail" with which Nagai told the story of the survivors, the "narratives probably surpass any existing reports, not excluding the Hersey account of Hiroshima." The release pointed out the contribution of the Nagasaki survivor accounts: "Cumulatively, they lead to a moving statement of Nagai's major theme, that the dangerous spiritual degeneration which an atomic war must inevitably beget is being lost sight of in the concern with material loss, physical death, and suffering."75 Charles Pearce wrote in his letter, "We believe that this book of his is one of the most sincere, impressive and thought-provoking message [sic] that could be presented to the world today."76 Nagai dreamed that his works would garner American sympathy for Nagasaki, just as Hersey's had done for Hiroshima, but the timing of the English translation in the United States indicated a concern with science and faith in the Cold War era, when atomic fear pervaded society.

The significance of *We of Nagasaki* as envisioned by Nagai and the American publishers was not lost upon its readers. Ruth E. Giblin, who had visited Nagasaki and met Catholic Fathers Nakashima and Nagata, wrote to Nagai after reading *We of Nagasaki*: "I hope all readers cannot fail to see that those of Nagasaki have carried the cross and suffered the crucifixion for all the rest of us weak ones." Giblin agreed that Nagasaki was the sacrificial lamb on God's altar that ended the war. But the greatest

75 "Fall 1950: Books: Duell Sloan & Pearce": Correspondence file 2, NTMM. Spacing is *sic*: "death, and suffering."

76 Charles A. Pearce to Shinnosuke Owari [sic], February 24, 1950: Correspondence file 2, NTMM.
impact of Nagai's book, for her, forced recognition of "[o]ur American responsibility for it all," which, she added, "weighs me down. But now we, on our side, are in fear of the bomb being used on us, but most are in great ignorance and have no idea what it could be like." Nagai's book promised to educate Americans on these matters, she thought.\textsuperscript{77}

Other letters to Nagai noted the importance of the book in teaching the world of the destructive power of the atomic bomb. Mary Rutherford wrote, "I hope many people throughout the world read [your book] and become more aware of the far reaching horror and destruction caused by such a weapon."\textsuperscript{78}

Sister Mary Ambrose, B.V.M., of Mundelein College in Chicago reviewed the book for a journal and expressed her admiration for it in a letter to Nagai.

I am very sorry that you are ill for your cross of suffering is heavy indeed. When I knew that the bomb had struck Urakami where Christian families, who have so loyally preserved and suffered for their faith since the days of St. Francis Xavier lived, I recognized again the mission of those whom God calls to share the sufferings of Christ, His Only Son. In His eternal designs, He knows those loyal enough to give everything - hence His Cross of suffering pain and death. He knows, too, the answers to our Why's and Wherefore's; ours is the task to trust with unfaltering faith even when those we love have gone the ways of Gethsemani and Calvary with Him. \textit{We of Nagasaki} are doing that - and your reward will be exceedingly great.\textsuperscript{79}

That Nagai found God in the atomic destruction did not surprise Ambrose. Rather, as a fellow Christian, it assured her that Nagai understood the workings of God. God requires the faithful to "share the sufferings of Christ, His Only Son," so the residents of Urakami were a natural sacrifice. Ambrose based her views on Catholic theology that sees

\textsuperscript{77} Ruth Giblin to Dr. Nagai, January 28, 1951, \textit{Shohyô} folder, NTMM.

\textsuperscript{78} Mary Rutherford to Dr. Nagai, February 13, 1951, \textit{Shohyô} folder, NTMM.

\textsuperscript{79} Sister Mary Ambrose, B.V.M. to Doctor Takashi Nagai, January 25, 1951, \textit{Shohyô} folder, NTMM. Underlines are \textit{sic}. "B.V.M." stands for "Blessed Virgin Mary" and means the Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, a charitable organization established in the U.S. in the 1800s.
suffering as the manifestation of God's love for the ardently faithful, "those loyal enough to give everything." Other American publishers were interested in books by Nagai, including *Nagasaki no kane*, but *We of Nagasaki* was the only one published during his lifetime.80

**Royalties, Taxes, and Contributions to Reconstruction**

Nagai Takashi's first major publication in the postwar had nothing to do with the atomic bombing but everything to do with his religion.81 The book, a 1947 co-translation of the Scottish author Bruce Marshall's Catholic novel and international best-seller, *The World, the Flesh, and Father Smith*, earned Nagai around 40,000 yen in royalties, of which he donated 38,000 to the funds to rebuild Nagasaki's famous St. Francis Xavier Hospital, three schools, and the Urakami Cathedral. Among the contributions was a 10,000-yen organ for the cathedral. The 2,000 yen that remained went to feed his family.82 Nagai hoped that the book would help propagate "the fact that Christianity

80 *Nagasaki no kane* was not published in English translation until 1984 as *The Bells of Nagasaki*. Today, *The Bells of Nagasaki* and *We of Nagasaki* are the only two books by Nagai available in English.

81 From August 1946, Nagai published short writings of his own as series in newspapers and journals. He also gave several lectures and presentations on conditions in post-atomic Nagasaki from the latter part of 1946. The early writings were: "Kagakusha no shinkô - gakutô ni okuru" (The Faith of a Scientist - A Gift to Students) in *Katorikku shinbun* (Catholic Newspaper), 18 August to 2 September 1946; "Genshino rokuon" (A [Sound-] Recording of the Atomic Wasteland) in *Seibo no kishi* (Knights of the Blessed Mother [Mary]), January 1947; "Shi no shinri tankyû" (Investigation into the Truth of Death) in *Dokusho tenbô* (Reading Outlook), April 1947; and "Kuro yuri" (Black Lily) in *Nagasaki bungaku* (Nagasaki Literature), September 1947. The 1947 co-translation of Bruce Marshall's book discussed below, however, was the first publication to produce substantial royalties for Nagai.

forms the foundation of democracy."\textsuperscript{83} The immediate benefit of the book was not ideological, but material. The donation of his royalties for reconstruction efforts set a precedent for Nagai when his own books began selling in the late 1940s. His best-sellers produced substantial profits for him and his publishing companies, but rather than keep the wealth for himself, he gave most of it to the city.

During the 1948-9 fiscal year, Nagai Takashi's books earned 2,176,333 yen in royalties.\textsuperscript{84} By mid-1949, \textit{Kono ko o nokoshite} had sold 220,000 copies, and the rest of his books followed closely behind, producing a sudden and enormous gain in wealth for Nagai.\textsuperscript{85} The royalties catapulted Nagai to the eighth-highest income earner in Nagasaki City, yet he remained in his Nyokodô hut and continued his daily life in poverty. Nagai cherished the humble life, but more importantly he never viewed his books and their royalties as his alone—they always belonged in some way to Nagasaki. Indeed, he wrote "for the sake of Nagasaki," for its culture and history, and so that atomic-bombing "literature by Nagasaki writers will not lose out to Hiroshima."\textsuperscript{86} The majority of his after-tax income went directly to city reconstruction projects.

Taxes presented a challenge to Nagai's charity. Out of the 2,176,333 yen from 1948-9, he paid nearly 90\% in commercial, national, and city taxes, leaving him with

\textsuperscript{83} See "\textit{Inzei o byōin saiken ni: Nagai hakase shōsetsu o kyōdō honyaku}": newspaper clipping, undated, in \textit{Kiji kirinuki} folder, NTMM.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Asahi shinbun}, 14 June 1949.

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Mainichi shinbun}, 10 June 1949.

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Mainichi shinbun}, 29 March 1949.
The "saint" of Urakami

around 20,000 yen to donate to the city.\footnote{Asahi shinbun, 14 June 1949.} The year before was not much better: Nagai paid around 400,000 yen in taxes on a royalty income of about 800,000 yen.\footnote{Mainichi shinbun, 10 June 1949.} While the city taxes that Nagai paid probably went in some way to reconstruction efforts, the fate of his national and commercial taxes was less clear. But Nagai never had a problem with paying taxes. "I want to pay all taxes," he said, "because the payment of tax is a shared responsibility for the reconstruction of Japan."\footnote{Kataoka Yakichi, "Nagai hakase to chosaku" in Nagasaki nichinichi shinbun, 15 May 1951. The tax burden, however, was so great that Nagai eventually "had to write in order to pay taxes." Or, as Nagai put it somewhat bitterly (kushô), "It's as if my legs are stuck in a bog." The article is reproduced in Kataoka Chizuko and Rumiko, Hibakuchi Nagasaki no saiken, pp. 83-86.} When Nagasaki residents and journalists expressed their surprise and confusion at the government exacting exorbitant amounts of tax from Nagai, he told his close friend Kataoka Yakichi, "Taxes are the oil for the reconstruction of Japan. I am working for reconstruction and there is no way I would not pay taxes. I gathered my income documents and filed a tax return without a mistake of even a single \textit{sen}.\footnote{A \textit{sen} was the smallest unit of monetary measurement at the time. The saying is akin to, "not a single cent."} I will pay my taxes in full." Nagai did, however, sometimes disagree with the way the government used his and other citizens' taxes. "When I hear of [our] hard-earned taxes being misappropriated (\textit{tsumamigui}) or being wasted on banquet expenses, my desire to pay taxes weakens." As he wryly said to Kataoka, at first "I wrote to eat. I then had to pay taxes because I wrote. Now, I must write only to pay taxes."\footnote{Kataoka, Nagai Takashi no shôgai, pp. 218-219.} "It's as if my legs are stuck in a bog."\footnote{Kataoka, "Nagai hakase to chosaku," in Nagasaki nichinichi shinbun, 15 May 1951.} Even so, he
encouraged all residents to be sure to pay taxes in support of the International Cultural City Construction Law that was set to make Nagasaki "a beautiful town" and a city of culture.\textsuperscript{93}

Nagai declared in May 1949 that he wished to donate all of his royalties to the Nagasaki International Cultural City Construction Fund for projects such as building a medical treatment facility for \textit{hibakusha}, an orphanage, a museum, or a "Peace Cultural Hall," as long as it improved the infrastructure of the city. In this way, he believed that donating to the larger city fund would allow for the revitalization of the Urakami community. But tax law threatened to bleed dry his hopes.\textsuperscript{94} Large monetary donations were subject to additional taxation, and Nagai's donations were indeed massive. Newspapers noted that his recently published books, \textit{Horobinu mono o, Seimei no kawa}, and \textit{Hana saku oka} (Hill of Blossoming Flowers) promised to bring in around 5,000,000 yen in royalties, but income tax would claim around 80\%. Of the remaining 1,000,000 yen, Nagai hoped to put away 100,000 yen for his family after he died and donate 900,000 yen to the main city reconstruction fund, but after a hefty "donation tax" the amount the city received would be reduced to around 400,000 yen.\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{93} Nagai, \textit{Nagasaki no hana}, in\textit{ Nagai Takashi zenshu}, v. 2, p. 422.

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Asahi shinbun}, 26 May 1949.

\textsuperscript{95} "\textit{Zei de ikinayamu: Nagai hakase no inzei kifu}" [Deadlocked over taxes: the royalty donations of Dr. Nagai], undated newspaper clipping, \textit{Kankei kiji folder 5}, NTMM. "\textit{Zóyózei}" can also be translated as "capital transfer tax." As the head of the Inheritance Tax Department of the National Tax Agency (\textit{kokuzeichō sózokuzei kachō}) pointed out, the donation would not be taxed if it was simply to Nagasaki Prefecture or the city, but only in the case that the companies (contractors) performing the various projects of the "cultural city construction" were "incorporated foundations" (\textit{zaidan hôjin}), which most likely would be true in many cases.

This particular case of taxation, when Nagai paid 4,000,000-plus yen in taxes on 5,000,000 yen in royalties, led to a discussion among policy makers in the National Diet about the need to revise tax law: see, Notes of the National Diet of Japan, \textit{Sangī’in, Ōkura i’inkai}, June 9, 1949, p. 14.
When the heavy tax system compromised Nagai’s efforts to donate, he abandoned the large, single donation and continued to donate to smaller projects that were not subject to as much taxation. Whatever money remained after taxes, Nagai gave most of it to the Urakami community or Nagasaki City. He knew that his children Makoto and Kayano would benefit from improved infrastructure in Nagasaki instead of individual family wealth. Nagai explained to Kataoka Yakichi, who had asked him why he did not save any money for his children, "We must raise the general level of the area. If everyone improves then my children will also improve. The revitalization (fukkô) of Urakami and the reconstruction (saiken) of Nagasaki are our serious responsibilities."96 For Nagai, writing books not only helped the reconstruction of the city, but it laid the foundation for the future of his children and the other children of Nagasaki.

Nagai’s charitable spirit produced tangible results not only for the Catholic parish but for the benefit of all of Nagasaki. Nagai intended "Our Bookcase" (Uchira no honbako), a library aimed at educating the children of Nagasaki, and the "Monument for Those Children" (meaning those killed in the bombing), to advance social education in the city and improve the commemorative landscape of the atomic-devastated area.97 Nagai’s support also made possible the planting of one thousand cherry trees in Urakami, which were meant to rejuvenate the area in time for the third Christmas after the bombing.98 Initially called the "Thousand Urakami sakura (cherry trees)," the hill of cherry blossoms later came to be known also as the "Nagai sakura."99

96 Kataoka, Nagai Takashi no shôgai, p. 217.
97 Kataoka, "Nagai hakase to chosaku" in Nagasaki nichinichi shinbun, 15 May 1951.
98 Nishi Nippon shinbun, 26 December 1948.
99 See, for example, Nagasaki nichinichi, 26 March 1950.
The Politics of Local and National Recognition

In November 1948, the Kyûshû taimuzu (The Kyushu Times) conferred on Nagai the "Kyushu Times Culture Award"—an award in recognition of contributions to the cultural reconstruction of Japan (Nihon bunka saiken)—for his dedicated research on atomic sickness (genshi byô) in which he used himself as a subject. On December 3, 1949, Nagasaki City Council voted unanimously to name Nagai an "Honorary Citizen" (meiyo shimin) for his efforts to realize the vision of "Nagasaki International Cultural City" through his books and "spreading the spirit of love to the world." Among other things, the title of honorary citizen entitled Nagai to a municipally sponsored funeral. The list of awards was long. But one award in particular sparked a debate over the qualifications of Nagai and his contributions to the nation, revealing a tension between democracy and communism, as well as the presence of an anti-Catholic undercurrent in postwar society.

In mid-1949, the National Diet formed the Special Investigation Committee of the House of Representatives (Shûgi'in kôsa tokubetsu i'inkai) to search out and nominate persons for the first award for "persons whose deeds have contributed to the reconstruction of the nation" (Kokka saiken no kôrôsha). The committee chose two men. The first nominee was Yukawa Hideki, who had won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1949, the first Japanese to receive the honor. The other nominee was Nagai Takashi. The Nagai

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100 See Kyûshû taimuzu, 15 November 1948.
101 Asahi shinbun, 4 December 1949.
102 Mainichi shinbun, 4 December 1949.
boom had reached most of Japan and parts of the world, and the members of the National Diet were no exception. But not all Diet members shared the reverence for Nagai. The Communist Party and the Socialist Party objected to Nagai’s nomination on the grounds that he had no qualifications or "academic achievements" (kôseki), especially when compared to Yukawa.103

A Diet meeting was convened on September 12, 1949 to present the findings of the special committee and to discuss the concerns of the dissenters. First, the two dissenting parties argued that if the Diet sought to commend a Japanese scientist for his work, someone with a higher level of achievement (gyôseki no suijun) would be more appropriate, such as the bacteriologist Nakamura Keizô for his research on leprosy, or the pathologist Oka Harumichi for his work on tuberculosis. Second, one of Nagai’s books, namely Rozario no kusari, showed him to be no "humanist" at all, because he revealed his feudal mindset in the way he treated his wife like a slave (reizokuteki). Third, "This same doctor had supported the Pacific War until the very last moment.” Last, they pointed out that Nagai’s books having become best-sellers did not necessarily mean that he contributed to the reconstruction of the nation.104

Nonetheless, the special committee concluded that the "famous achievements" (gyôseki) of Nagai from his various books such as Kono ko o nokoshite and Nagasaki no kane, "have contributed (kiyo) to culture and science, and contribute (kôken) substantially to the reconstruction of Japan."105 The Diet members decided not to award Nagai on the

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104 Mainichi shinbun, 13 September 1949. The vote was held the day before on September 12.
105 The committee's report was titled, "Nagai hakase hyôshô ni kan suru ken kiso chôsa." The version quoted here is from, Kamiyama Shigeo, "Kami no mono wa kami no te ni" in Nihon hyôron, November 1949. For excerpts, see also Mainichi shinbun, 13 September 1949.
grounds of "academic achievements," which the Communists had contested, but rather for his contributions to social reconstruction.

In the end, the Communists stood as the only dissenting party among the members of the special committee.\textsuperscript{106} Kamiyama Shigeo, leader of the Communist Party, wrote the dissenting opinion and summarized in detail the viewpoint of the opposition in an article, entitled, "Leave Matters of God in the Hands of God" (\textit{Kami no mono wa kami no te ni}).\textsuperscript{107} In the article, he concluded that the issue was a political problem, not a cultural or religious one, even as he employed culture and religion in his own analysis. He criticized the nomination of Nagai on five grounds. First, Nagai failed as a scientist. Kamiyama pointed out that his work did not compare to the significant contributions of Nakamura Kenzô, Oka Harumichi, and the biophysicist Tasaki Ichiji. In the field of physics, especially, Nagai could never compare to the "giant" Yukawa Hideki, who was "always devoted to the development of science, from the prewar through the war, and intellectuals the world over also recognize him as a scholar who is the pride of the Japanese nation (\textit{Nihon minzoku})." Even the special investigation committee, Kamiyama pointed out, had no choice but to admit that Nagai as a scientist cast a relatively "small shadow."\textsuperscript{108}

Second, Kamiyama argued that because the publishing world created best-sellers, Nagai's books having become best-sellers did not necessarily reflect the true interests of

\textsuperscript{106} Kamiyama, "\textit{Kami no mono wa kami no te ni}," p. 77.

\textsuperscript{107} Although Kamiyama Shigeo wrote the article on September 20, the version I use here is from the November 1949 issue of \textit{Nihon hyōron}. At the end of the article, however, Kamiyama has included the date September 20, 1949.

\textsuperscript{108} Kamiyama, "\textit{Kami no mono wa kami no te ni}," p. 73. Page numbers hereafter cited in the text. Most of the article originally appeared in the Communist journal \textit{Akahata} in September 1949. The Communists' critiques of Nagai appeared in many newspapers and journals: see, for example, \textit{Mainichi shinbun}, 13 September 1949.
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The best-seller rankings in newspapers, he argued, were flawed: "We must point out the extremely unscientific nature (hikagakusei) of the polling method" that was used, for example, by the Yomiuri shinbun. The newspaper poll, he said, provided no scientific basis for the special investigation committee to solidly conclude that Nagai's books were indeed best-sellers that made a major "contribution" to society. Giving the example of Yoshikawa Eiji's best-seller Shinran, "which contains extremely feudalistic and out-of-date subjects," Kamiyama argued that it is "completely simplistic (keisotsu) to see books as influencing the minds of people in society just because they appear on the best-seller list, or because they were advertised on the radio or in newspapers as having done so. This may be forgivable for a journalist, but we must emphasize that it should not be a stance taken by the National Diet." The fact that Nagai's books appeared on the best-seller lists simply meant that they had "sold well," and it did not mean they contained anything truly scientific or that they had contributed to public morals and human spirit (sedōjinshin).

Third, Kamiyama thought that Nagai was wrong in his understanding of war, and his religious interpretations of it damaged the peace movement more than they advanced it. No doubt Nagai contributed "not a few things related to 'peace'," Kamiyama conceded, but "we also know that Mr. Nagai's peace ideology (heiwa shisō)—if there is such a thing—is far removed from the ideology for real peace." Kamiyama never explained what constituted "real peace ideology" in his or the communists' eyes, but he knew that Nagai did not embody it because he "does not know, nor makes any attempt to know, the reactionary () and aggressive nature of the Pacific War." Nagai had always been a strong patriot and believed in the immortality of the land of the gods, Kamiyama
pointed out. As a result, Nagai mistakenly interpreted the defeat of Japan as a regrettable event, "lamenting that the 'Yamato race (minzoku) had been thrust into the lowest hell (naraku)" by the defeat, and that "he envies the people who found happiness by 'leaving the world without knowing defeat.' He cries that 'We who survived are miserable.'" Kamiyama believed that even Nagai could not ignore the fact that "defeat taught us so much more than war ever did." Even though Nagai "weeps to himself as a survivor in the defeated country of Japan, 'What pleasure is there in having lost the war?" Kamiyama knew that "Mr. Nagai" was undoubtedly "grateful for the return of peace and for the freedom of religion" that stemmed from the defeat.

Religion, however, represented for Kamiyama the biggest weakness of Nagai's "peace ideology" because it contributed nothing tangible to the promotion of peace. "Prayers" and "hope" are not only powerless, he claimed, but they become "instruments that dull the battle for peace." This was no coincidence, Kamiyama thought. In Japan, among Christian activists in the anti-war movement who had tried to make a difference, from the time of the Russo-Japanese War through the Pacific War, and even in the postwar international movement, everyone had been a Protestant. The Catholics, Kamiyama argued, had largely been absent, and the behavior of Nagai exemplified that of an "old-fashioned Catholic."

The eulogy of November 23, 1945 represented the perfect example for Kamiyama of how Nagai's Catholic ideas "anesthetize the anger of the Japanese people against the true war criminals," and it demonstrates how little Nagai understood "the nature of war."

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109 Here, Kamiyama references Nagai's November 23, 1945 eulogy, which he also singled out for criticism.

110 Kamiyama did not refer to Nagai as "Doctor" (hakase).
The eulogy, Kamiyama declared, did not constitute a commemoration of those sacrificed in the war, but rather exemplified the forced resignation of the will of the people because everything—including national defeat and the atomic bombing of Urakami—was due to Providence. That may be fine for someone like Mr. Nagai who lived his life according to a deep faith in Catholicism, but "when such a thing is spread as propaganda to the masses, we must think about it." Nagai's promotion of the omnipotence of God in world affairs produced a dangerous mindset, Kamiyama argued. If Nagai was correct to assert that God punishes the unjust with defeat and bestows His blessing on the victorious, and if "There is no possibility of victory in a war that is not just before God," then the "victories of the aggressive, imperialistic wars—the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the First World War—become rationalized in the name of God."

Kamiyama considered this mode of thinking as lacking knowledge of the nature of war by ignoring the facts of history, which would prove useful for contemporary war provocateurs, such as the reemerging fascists. If World War Three were to erupt today, Kamiyama asserted, "it would not begin or end according to 'God's Providence.'" Prayers will not stop it. "War does not fall from heaven. [...] It is an invariable product of society," and it would be through the collective action of myriads of people who have realized this that we will defend against the coming of a third world war. In order to truly contribute to the fight for peace, Kamiyama thought that Nagai needed to elaborate on and explain to the masses several of the points that appear in his books, such as how the use of atomic weapons is contradictory to humanity, that the atomic weapons currently in existence should be destroyed, and how the peaceful use of atomic energy could greatly
contribute to world society and human history. However, "hopes and prayers will not protect peace" (74-75).

Fourth, Kamiyama attacked Nagai's character, claiming that he was a selfish person, not a paragon of humanism, and deserved no national honor. This was a response to Nagai's criticism of and opposition to communism in a 1949 article in the *Tokyo shinbun*, which Kamiyama thought demonstrated that Nagai's "opinions are extremely narrow." Nagai had never hidden his dislike of communism; he had written during the war of the danger of communism consuming China and eventually Japan.¹¹¹ The *Tokyo shinbun* article signified for Kamiyama and his communist colleagues the fact that "Mr. Nagai is completely ignorant about the labor movement" and they could not help but "smile wryly" as they read it. For them, Nagai was in no position to criticize the communists because he continued social practices that were outdated relics from the days of "feudal" Japan. Kamiyama turned to one of Nagai's own books, *Rozario no kusari*, to support his argument, because in it, he claimed, Nagai treats his wife inhumanely.¹¹² In the book, Nagai wrote that his wife Midori, who had perished in the atomic bombing and whose ashes he found with a melted rosary, was a "simple woman" and that the main reason for marrying her was to have children. However, "with a farmer's daughter, who did not have the education that I had, clinging to me would only hinder success in life. Is that kind of person worthy of being the woman (ojôsan) of a university professor?" Kamiyama saw Nagai's opinion of Midori as a lack of respect for her, and because Nagai

¹¹¹ Open criticism and dislike of communism by Nagai was not atypical of Catholics. Even a cursory look at the Nagasaki-based *Katorikkukyô hō* (also, *Katorikukyô hō*) reveals countless articles on the dangers of communism, from as early as the 1920s, if not earlier.

¹¹² This particular criticism of Nagai was not new, and Kamiyama referenced a June 12, 1949 article in *Shûkan asahi* by Uramatsu Samitarô, and quoted it at length.
viewed her as inferior and as a subservient person who was meant to care for the household, Kamiyama accused Nagai of perpetuating feudalism. In short, Kamiyama explained, because of Nagai's "feudal," "inhumane," and "narrow-minded" qualities, he and the Communists could not concur with the findings of the special committee that declared Nagai an "incarnation of humanism" (75-77).

The final point that Kamiyama made put the "saint of Urakami" at the center of the struggle between communism and capitalism for the "peace, freedom, and independence" of Japan. Kamiyama accused the capitalists of using the "saint of Urakami" as a political tool to appease the working class, and it was therefore capitalism that had corrupted the Diet. The Democratic Party, which Kamiyama accused of having used the Nagai debate to attack the Communists, was the biggest culprit with its "misgovernment" of the Diet, which pushed forward a course of reconstruction that benefited the capitalists. In this respect, the Democrats had the most to gain from the Nagai award. "They say that through this 'saint' they give consolation and strength to the 'workers' and the 'weak,' and they 'arouse the will to reconstruct.'" Kamiyama insisted that the Democrats were simply working to "preserve their own system of rule." What they were actually doing was "crushing the industry of the nation, creating widespread unemployment, tormenting the peasants, causing the mountains and rivers and seas of our beloved ancestral land to fall into ruin, and giving only pain and suffering to the 'workers' and the 'weak.'" In Kamiyama's mind, the capitalists were "non-Japanese" (hi-Nichi) and would destroy the nation in their greedy quest for money and power.

Kamiyama denied the accusation by the Democrats that the opposition to Nagai stemmed from a hatred of Catholicism, which grew out of a centuries-long battle between
Catholicism and communism that began "hundreds of years before Kamiyama's fatherland, the Soviet Union, gained political power." The policy of the Communists in bringing "peace, freedom, and independence" to the people of Japan promised the best future for the country, Kamiyama declared, as his party would "strive to create a comprehensive democratic national front by transcending ideology (shisō), faith, gender, and nationality." The Democrats failed to recognize, Kamiyama went on to say, that "religion is a personal affair" and should not influence national issues. In conclusion, he pleaded, society must leave Nagai and his Catholic community to live according to their religion and not embroil them in the things of society that do not concern them: "Let God govern the matters of God." Religion and politics needed to be separated. Kamiyama believed that Nagai Takashi himself could not disagree with the political critique put forward by the Communist Party in light of the political motivations of the Diet in bestowing Nagai with the national award (77-79).

Kamiyama was right. Nagai felt that the Diet had made a mistake by choosing him because he thought they had overlooked more qualified candidates. Shortly after the nomination, he wrote, "It is a national disgrace that the National Diet would award someone like me, who is a failure at life and a citizen of a defeated nation. There are so many worldly persons (sekaiteki jinbutsu) who have truly worked for the reconstruction of the nation, and [the Diet] would do better to award those people." Nagai added, for good measure, "I agree with Representative Kamiyama's dissenting opinion." Nagai's humility had no effect on the special committee and they moved forward with their

\[\text{In Katorikku shinbun, October 9, 1949. Nagai opposed the nomination on similar grounds in other newspapers as well: see, for example, Nagasaki nichinichi, 14 September 1949.}\]
"investigation," which consisted of interviewing people close to Nagai, as well as scientists and other academics, to officially vet Nagai for the award.

Other critics of the saint of Urakami emerged outside the political realm and included normal citizens and scholars, who did not agree that Nagai was the best choice for their country's honor. Konno Setsuzo, a "company employee" in Tokyo, echoed some of the general points of opposition, stating, "I do not think Dr. Nagai is the most eligible for the honor." It must be recognized that "Japan still is in the process of reconstruction; it has not yet been 'reconstructed.' Accordingly, no [single] person can be credited with contribution to its rehabilitation." In addition, "There are many scientists much superior to Dr. Nagai." Nagai's books, Konno concluded, are indeed "replete with his humanitarian sentiments but that is all. He has done no positive service for moral rehabilitation of the Japanese people. What made his books the best-sellers of the year are nothing but the beautiful style, the peculiar circumstances in which he has been placed and the publicity whipped up by publishers."114

Opposition to Nagai's nomination was out-voiced by popular opinion that agreed with the Diet that Nagai had made substantial contributions to the reconstruction of the nation. Some artists showed their support of Nagai by satirizing the opposition of the Communist Party. In the September 15, 1949 Tôkyô taimuzu, cartoonist Shimokawa Ôten depicted the "achievements of Dr. Nagai" as a giant "stake driven into the heart of the reconstruction of Japan," with a Diet member presenting the award to the stake, which extended up to the clouds. On the other side of the stake stands a blindfolded

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114 Konno Setsuzo, "LETTERS TO THE EDITOR: In the Japanese Press—(To the Mainichi)" [in English], undated, unmarked, in Kankei kiji folder, NTMM.
"Materialist [Diet] Representative" who "can't see" the massive contributions of Nagai in front of him.\footnote{Shimokawa Ōten, "Ore ni wa mienai," in Tôkyô taimuzu, 15 September 1949. Clipping from Kankei kiji folder, NTMM.}

In December 1949, the Diet voted unanimously to bestow the award on Nagai, and on June 1, 1950 he received the Prime Minister Award and the Imperial Silver Cups.\footnote{Various sources: for example, Takahashi, Nagasaki ni atte tetsugaku suru (1994), 225; Mashima Kazuhiro, dir., "Nagasaki no kane: tsukurareta besuto seraa" (NBC Nagasaki Hôseiisaku, 2000). The award certificate and silver cups are preserved and on display at the Nagasaki City Nagai Takashi Memorial Museum, Nagasaki.} The debate and resulting decision represented more than a disagreement over the qualifications of Nagai for the national recognition. It reflected a general stance against communism and a political loss for the Japanese Communist Party. The 1949 award from the national government was also an attempt to appropriate Nagai's persona to depict Japan as a nation victimized by the atomic bombings. Instead of a former aggressor in East Asia, Japan could be linked to the image of a "saint" helping people in the atomic ruins.

Other Voices from Nagasaki and Hiroshima

_Hibakusha_ authors in Nagasaki and Hiroshima attempted to publish narrative and poetic accounts of their atomic-bombing experiences, but their readership remained limited during the occupation, if they were able to avoid censorship at all. No atomic-bombing author published as much or became as widely read as Nagai Takashi. The other Nagasaki and Hiroshima survivors who did write presented a narrative of the bombings that contrasted with Nagai's Catholic interpretation.
Some occupation officials were sympathetic to the hibakusha and thought that eyewitness accounts of the bomb were important testimonies about the dawn of the atomic age. When Ishida Masako, a teenage survivor in Nagasaki, sought to publish her account, Masako taorezu (Masako Shall Not Fall) in March 1947, American officials supported her. Captain Irvin W. Rogers recommended to the CCD in Fukuoka that Ishida's book and her father's book-length account be published without censorship. Lieutenant Colonel Victor E. Delnore, Commander of the occupied forces in Nagasaki, attached a note to the letter saying that the two books were valuable in conveying the truth of atomic experience: "They show the reactions of the members of one small family in the holocaust; they show the heartbreak and the pain." Furthermore, Delnore pointed out, "For us to properly realize the significance of the atomic bomb, to experience vicariously the feelings that so many thousands of Japanese people experienced is desirable in these propitious times." After initial rejection, Captain Rogers sent another, more direct letter and included with it the signatures of Nagasaki residents who petitioned for the book's publication. The book was suppressed, "at least for the time being," but was finally published on April 26, 1949, about three months after Nagai Takashi's Nagasaki no kane.\footnote{Braw, Suppressed, pp. 92-93; 169n12.} Masako's book, however, never attained the popularity of Nagai's book.

Other than Ishida Masako, few others published in Nagasaki until the mid-1950s, but in Hiroshima, occupation censorship notwithstanding, many hibakusha wrote about their trauma, which, if it appeared in smaller publications, generally went unnoticed. Hara Tamiki's famous story Natsu no hana (Summer Flowers, 1947) appeared in an
obscur[e] journal, which escaped the eyes of the censors and as a result, as John Treat notes, "fell, so to speak, between the cracks." 118 Hiroshima writers produced relatively abundantly, and in 1949 several received national recognition in a special issue of the journal Shûkan asahi dedicated to "No More Hiroshimas." Among the books mentioned were Hara Tamiki's Natsu no hana, Ôta Yôko's 1948 Shikabane no machi (City of Corpses), Ogura Toyofumi's Zetsugo no kiroku (Letters from the End of the World), Koromogawa Maiko's Hiroshima, Tamai Reiko's Watashi wa Hiroshima ni ita (I was in Hiroshima), and Agawa Hiroyuki's 1947 Hachigatsu muika (August Sixth). 119

The occupation period Hiroshima writers differed from Nagai Takashi in at least two respects. First, their writing conveyed the horrifying realities of atomic destruction, instead of religious interpretations that seemed to undermine the significance of the tragedy. Second, the hibakusha writers did not reach as broad of an audience. In addition to basic censorship, dissemination of Hiroshima literature was limited because the genre of atomic-bomb literature (genbaku bungaku) was not welcomed into the Japanese literary tradition. Well into the 1950s, as Treat notes, "atomic-bomb literature was generally regarded as a local literature restricted to the provinces, a minor literature concerned with a minor theme." 120 Many publishers thought that books and other writings by hibakusha would not be popular and chose not to publish them. Even the magazine Hiroshima bungaku (Hiroshima Literature) ignored hibakusha writings. The hibakusha claimed that their writings formed a new genre, but literary circles disagreed,

118 Treat, Writing Ground Zero, p. 90.
120 Treat, Writing Ground Zero, p. 95.
including the *Hiroshima bungaku kai* (Hiroshima Literature Society). Kurihara Sadako and other survivors found it irritating that such pretentious groups determined the fate of writings on the atomic bombings. In 1953, Ôta Yôko spoke out against what she called the "*bundan,*" which were exclusive, bourgeois groups consisting of writers, critics, and editors, who had historically determined what constituted "*bungaku*" (literature), and who denied Ôta and other *hibakusha* a position in the literary world as authors of a new genre. Debates on the atomic bombings as a subject of literature waged for several decades after the bombs.\(^{121}\) Perhaps what made Nagai's books successful, at least in part, was that he never identified his writings as a new genre or purported them to be so; he intended them to serve as a record of the bombing of Nagasaki in order to convey the experience of the city and the significance as he saw it, often employing literary conventions to these ends, as did most *hibakusha* authors.

### III. The Bell of Nagasaki and Occupation Censorship

Occupation period discourse regarding the atomic bombs focused on atomic energy and only incidentally on the significance of the atomic bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. In the post-occupation period, the national government and peace movements evoked the experience of the atomic bombs to portray Japan as a nation of victims of the war rather than its aggressors.\(^{122}\) The transition from aggressor to victim began during the occupation period, with the publication of the books of Nagai Takashi playing a part. An examination of one of his books shows one of the ways that atomic

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\(^{121}\) Treat, *Writing Ground Zero*, pp. 92-107.

victimization came to dominate the postwar story. The first manuscript that Nagai completed after his collapse from leukemia in 1946, *Genshi jidai no kaimaku*, received SCAP permission to be printed in 1949 under the title, *Nagasaki no kane* (The Bell of Nagasaki), but only after Nagai had agreed to include an American-prepared appendix. By October, the book had become the fourth most-read bestseller in Japan, behind the number-one *Kono ko o nokoshite*, also by Nagai.\(^\text{123}\)

After detailed review processes, American censors cleared all of Nagai's books for publication, which contained graphic accounts of the bombing as well as descriptions of the bomb and atomic energy from a physicist's perspective. In the case of *Nagasaki no kane*, SCAP even supplied substantial amounts of paper when paper was still scarce in Japan, because Nagai had agreed to the appendix, which detailed the atrocities committed by the Japanese military in the Philippines. For the American occupiers, Nagai's books did not threaten the social order, but offered a medium through which the ideas inherent in the goals of SCAP, both official and unofficial, could reach Japanese citizens: Nagai perpetuated strong Christian morals; he did not criticize the use of the atomic bomb by the United States; he professed anti-communist ideas; and despite having witnessed the terrifying power of atomic science, he praised the future of atomic energy and related it to world peace.

Before the 1949 National Diet award put Nagai in the national political spotlight, *Nagasaki no kane* had become embroiled in the political space dominated by an occupation that was intolerant of graphic and critical publications on the atomic bombings. Nagai and his books influenced and reflected the course of events that created

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\(^{123}\) *Mainichi shinbun*, 26 October 1949.
a democratic Japan struggling to come to terms with its role in the war. *Nagasaki no kane* served as a bridge between the early-postwar repentance and the post-occupation silence about aggression that came to define a nation of atomic-bomb victims.

**A Manuscript of Political Convenience**

Occupation authorities understood that information regarding the atomic bombings could not be contained indefinitely, and the books of Nagai gave them a way to slowly lift the ban. *Nagasaki no kane* detailed day-by-day the experience of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Nagai's medical musings, and his Christian rhetoric, including his November 1945 eulogy. Even though Nagai made slight revisions to the eulogy for publication, it stayed true to his main point: that the atomic bombing exemplified God's Providence. Before the eulogy in the book, Nagai depicts the encounter with his friend Yamada Ichitarô to whom he declared, "That the atomic bomb fell on Urakami is great Divine Providence. It is God's grace. Urakami should offer gratitude unto God." Similar to his 1948 best-seller *Kono ko o nokoshite*, *Nagasaki no kane* portrayed the atomic bombing of Nagasaki as the result of the grace of God. In the revised version of the eulogy, Nagai offered the same explanation for why the survivors of Nagasaki's bombing had to suffer as they did: they were sinners.

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126 See, also, Nagai, *Itoshigo yo*, p. 303, where Nagai discusses the atomic bombing as due to the grace of God.

127 John Treat notes that Nagai asserted "that it was the blameless innocent who were killed outright by the bomb and called to heaven, whereas those who had transgressed in life—he includes himself among their number—were merely injured in order to remain in the post-atomic purgatory of an irradiated Nagasaki": Treat, *Writing Ground Zero*, p. 314.
Nagai's formulation of the atomic bombing as a providential tragedy in *Nagasaki no kane* caught the eyes of SCAP censors soon after the publisher Tokyo Times Co. submitted the manuscript for censorship on March 24, 1947.\(^{128}\) Seven days later, the Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) expressed "no objection to the publication of the physical and chemical information disclosed in this document."\(^{129}\) The Public Health and Welfare Section (PHW) concurred, stating on April 10, "PHW has no objection" to the "physical effects on humans of the atomic bomb explosion at Nagasaki," because the descriptions put forth by Nagai in the manuscript "are of common knowledge and have been repeatedly publicised in newspapers and other stories."\(^{130}\) The publisher Shikiba Shunzô remembers that when he submitted the manuscript earlier under its original title, *Genshi jidai no kaimaku*, it had elicited an abrupt "No, of course we can't publish this!" kind of reaction from the censors because of the book's references to "hell," "eruption of innards," "stomach ripping open and exposing intestines," and "eyeballs flying out."\(^{131}\) But this time, the manuscript, with its new title, translated as *The Bell Tolls for Nagasaki* in SCAP documents, seemed to be moving along quite smoothly.\(^{132}\)

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129 Check Sheet, ESS to PH&W, "Transmittal of manuscript from CCD for recommendation; subj: Bell Tolls for Nagasaki by Dr. Takashi Nagai," 31 March, 1947, folder 200.11 Book Censorship 1947, box 8655, SCAP.

130 PHW to ESS, "Manuscript, subj: Bell Tolls for Nagasaki," 10 April, 1947, folder 200.11 Book Censorship 1947, box 8655, SCAP.

131 Mashima, dir., "*Nagasaki no kane: tsukurareta besuto seraa.*"

132 For new title, see PPB Rounting [sic] Slip, RRZ, 24 March, 1947, folder 200.11 Book Censorship 1947, box 8655, SCAP. Monica Braw, *Suppressed*, incorrectly copies the original English title as *The Bells Toll for Nagasaki*. For the name of the submitting publisher, see also CCD (Civil Censorship Detachment) to Civil Intelligence Section, 29 April, 1947, folder 200.11 Book Censorship, box 8655, SCAP. For a succinct and detailed account of the journey of *Nagasaki no kane* through the censorship bureaucracy of SCAP, see Braw, *Suppressed*, pp. 94-99.
As early as April 29, 1947, SCAP censor Richard (Dick) Kunzman recommended that *Nagasaki no kane* pass censorship and be published in its entirety, noting in his report two significant passages that demonstrated why the manuscript was eligible. The first was a lesson by Nagai about the Bible to two of his former students who had fought in the war, where Nagai advised them to throw away silly ideas of revenge and of "rising again like Germany did with our swords in our hands." Kunzman pointed out that Nagai explained, in "the Scriptures one reads the words of God, 'Vengeance is mine, I will repay.' God punishes those who are unjust in His eyes, without regard to gains and losses in battles fought on earth. The question of revenge lies beyond us." Nagai encouraged his readers to embrace defeat without feelings of vengeance, and instead exert themselves to maintain peace. He offered, through his manuscript, a potential tool for precluding ultranationalist ideas of revolt against the occupiers, but more importantly, Nagai promoted anti-war sentiment.

The second passage that Kunzman singled out also rang a familiar Christian tone. He reported that the "author includes an oration read at the funeral service for those who died by the bomb: '....It is God who gives, and God who takes. Praised be his name. And let us offer thanks to Him that Urakami was chosen for the sacrifice. Let us be thankful that through this sacrifice peace was restored to the world, and freedom of belief given to Japan.' (Urakami is a section of Nagasaki)." Nagai was "thankful" for the atomic bomb ending the war through the martyrdom of his community, and in doing so he removed the United States from discussion of the morality of the atomic bombings. Kunzman

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133 CCD (Civil Censorship Detachment) to Civil Intelligence Section, 29 April, 1947, folder 200.11 Book Censorship 1947, box 8655, SCAP. The section pointed out by Kunzman appears in *Nagasaki no kane*, pp. 167-9.
concluded in regard to the censorship of *Nagasaki no kane*: "Recommend book be passed in entirety."\(^{134}\)

Another censor, John (Jack) Costello of the CI&E, vehemently objected. Costello could not understand how *Nagasaki no kane* had been recommended for publication, and he was perplexed by the incompetency of the censorship apparatus. "I could not believe this document had been given deliberate censorship examination after I read only a few pages," wrote an incredulous Costello. "It is clear to anyone who reads it that some part must be deleted, if the book were allowed to pass at all." Furthermore, Costello added,

I asked Dick [Kunzman], who recommended that it be passed in its entirety, if he had read it. He had "skimmed through" the first part, he said, and read the last part, described in his memo, thoroughly [sic]. I asked if anyone in PPB I had read the entire book. He didn't know, but "thought that Mr. Takata (head of Book Department) read it." [...] In other words, no one in PPB I read it before bucking it to me. I can understand that it is quite a chore, because I had to read it. Careful censorship, of course, is not spectacular, but it is certainly a sine qua non. This is not the first instance, or only instance, of tedious, time-consuming routine being avoided by PPB I.\(^{135}\)

The same day, May 5, 1947, Costello sent a memo directly to Kunzman, chastising him for what he saw as laziness, and he advised Dick to do his job: "It is impossible to censor material without reading it or a completely satisfactory brief."\(^{136}\)

Costello pushed hard to stop the book's approval. In his May 5 report, after acknowledging that the ESS, PHW, and Kunzman all recommend the book for publication in full, Costello stated, "I recommend the book be suppressed, on grounds

\(^{134}\) CCD to Civil Intelligence Section, 29 April, 1947, folder 200.11 Book Censorship 1947, box 8655, SCAP.

\(^{135}\) CCD to CCO, 5 May, 1947, folder 200.11 Book Censorship 1947, box 8655, SCAP.

\(^{136}\) CCD to RK, 5 May, 1947, folder 200.11 Book Censorship 1947, box 8655, SCAP. Kunzman retired soon after, and some attributed the "famous May 5 1947 blast from Costello" to "the principal immediate causes for Kunzman's decision to resign": Unnamed document, TJH to RMS (initials), handwritten date of 10 February, 1949.
that it would invite resentment against U.S. If desired, will prepare IOM for forwarding to CIS or G-2 for action." His main reason for recommending suppression was that the book "describes at length the scenes of horror, and the great death toll, as well as the destruction of irreplacable [sic] medical personnel and equipment, by the atom bomb, and the painful injuries inflicted on the victims." On May 15, Costello sent the inter-office memorandum to General Willoughby, the head of G-2, the Intelligence division. He relayed his concerns as outlined in the May 5 memo, but went on to point out a significant absence in Nagai's book: "No mention is made of destruction of military objectives." General Willoughby concurred with Costello, "because [the book] described the horrors and the great death toll and thus was likely to disturb public tranquility and create ill will toward the United States."

However, the book was not suppressed. Instead, G-2 decided to suspend publication for six months, which changed the nature of censorship on the bombs. A memo dated May 16, 1947 ended the controversy over the fate of Nagai's book, at least for the time being:

A manuscript of a book entitled "The Bell Tolls for Nagasaki" was referred in the following order to: MTT, RRZ, RHK, RRZ, Masuda, ESS Tech Intel, PHW, ESS, Hank Masuda, RRZ, RHK, JJC, Col Putnam, JJC, Col Myrick of CIS, Col Blake of CIS, Gen Willoughby, Col Bratton, Col Putnam, JJC, RHK, RRZ and now you [probably RMS, meaning Captain Shaw]. There were various recommendations made in connection with it, including "Pass in Entirety", "Pass With Deletions", "Suppress". [sic] The last comment, and the significant one for your reference in future censorship action, was made by Col Putnam who stated:

137 PPB, CCD to CCO, 5 May, 1947, folder 200.11 Book Censorship 1947, box 8655, SCAP.

138 IOM, CCD to CIS, G-2, 15 May 1947, folder 200.11 Book Censorship 1947, box 8655, SCAP.

139 In Braw, Suppressed, p. 95.

140 Handwritten note by Colonel Putnam (WBP) on: IOM, CCD to CIS, G-2, 15 May 1947, folder 200.11 Book Censorship 1947, box 8655, SCAP.
"Costello: Book is not suppressed, only suspended for 6 mo. as will all articles or books of this nature. We propose to allow publication at a future date. WBP"\textsuperscript{141}

And so \textit{Nagasaki no kane} was granted permission to be published, albeit "at a future date" and under to-be-determined conditions. When Colonel Putnam had ordered that the publication not be suppressed, but rather suspended, Costello thought that was "pretty slick, 'cause we never did that before."\textsuperscript{142}

When the six months had passed, a representative from the Nagasaki district censorship bureau visited Nagai in January 1948 to confirm his illness.\textsuperscript{143} Nagai's publishers had pleaded to SCAP censors from early on for a quick and positive response to the matter of publication because "the author (Nagai) desired to see his book published prior to his death." Indeed, as the censors understood, Nagai "was near death (acute leukemia) in Jan 48."\textsuperscript{144} According to the representative's report, Nagai explained that he wrote \textit{Nagasaki no kane} in response to Hiroshima having garnered so much attention and sympathy from American readers, while Nagasaki was largely ignored. Nagai claimed that the bombing of his city was vastly more significant than Hiroshima, and he hoped that American readers would acknowledge that fact.\textsuperscript{145} The story of the atomic bombing

\textsuperscript{141} Press and Publications Sub-Section, Routing Slip, 16 May, 1947, folder 200.11 Book Censorship 1947, box 8655, SCAP. "RMS" meant Captain Shaw. Colonel Putnam's note to Costello was originally scribbled at the bottom of Costello's IOM from the previous day.

\textsuperscript{142} NBC Nagasaki hôsô, prod., "\textit{Kami to genbaku: Urakami katorikku hibakusha no 55 nen}"; the statement by Costello is at 18:22.

\textsuperscript{143} From early on, censors doubted the genuineness of Nagai's illness and one noted, "I wish we could check": see, Braw, \textit{Suppressed}, p. 95.

\textsuperscript{144} TJH to RMS, "On Book 'NAGASAKI NO KANE' By NAGAI TAKASHI," 3 June, 1948, SCAP; document courtesy of Takahashi Shinji.

of Hiroshima had captivated the sympathy of American readers as early as 1946 when John Hersey published his account of six survivors in the *New Yorker* as *Hiroshima*.¹⁴⁶ Costello, in his May 5, 1947 detachment concerning *The Bell Tolls for Nagasaki*, saw the similarity of the book with *Hiroshima*, noting that Nagai's book was "an eye-witness account of bombing of Nagasaki, resembling Hersey's article in New Yorker."¹⁴⁷

Yoshida Ken'ichi, scholar of English literature and son of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, translated *Nagasaki no kane* into English at the request of Shikiba Ryūsaburō at Hibiya Shuppan, and published an abridged version in *Japan Review* on April 17, 1949 (Vol. 12, No. 16).¹⁴⁸ Earlier, SCAP censors, who were already familiar with Yoshida, noticed with some irritation his involvement with the book: "YOSHIDA Kenichi [sic] is in the act here too, just as in the Battleship of Yamato deal," of which Yoshida was the "ringleader."¹⁴⁹ Despite opposition from SCAP, Shikiba intended to publish the entire translation in America, because, he argued, even though Hersey's *Hiroshima* was the first

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¹⁴⁶ Even though Hersey's account contained graphic scenes of the bombing, the CCD could not censor the publication of a translation of *Hiroshima* in Japan, because it lay outside of the jurisdiction of SCAP. See Braw, *Suppressed*, 105.

¹⁴⁷ PPB, CCD to CCO, 5 May, 1947, folder 200.11 Book Censorship 1947, box 8655, SCAP. The part, "resembling Hersey's article in New Yorker," was crossed out by hand and not included in Costello's IOM to G-2 on May 15, but otherwise the IOM is nearly identical to the detachment. Costello's detachment appears to have been edited, most likely by Colonel W. B. Putnam, who attached a handwritten note addressed to Costello, saying, "Jack, write an IOM from Bratton to Gen. W., including the remarks in the attached notes, recommending suppression. Don't send any inclosures or the book, just the IOM." That Colonel Putnam suggested not to include a copy of the book could be for one of two (if not more) reasons: he did not want to bog down General Willoughby with unnecessary details and papers; or, since he concurred with Costello, he may have wanted to avoid any ambiguity about the content of the book that may have resulted from Willoughby's own reading of it, i.e. the heavily Christian message or the exemption of U.S. responsibility for dropping the atomic bomb inherent in Nagai's interpretation of the bombing as being the work of God.

¹⁴⁸ AGH to RMS, 26 April, 1949, SCAP; document courtesy of Takahashi Shinji. For the Shikiba request, see Shikiba Ryūsaburō, preface to Nagai, *Nagasaki no kane* (1949), p. 2.

¹⁴⁹ CCD, RMS to TJH, 10 February, 1949, SCAP; document courtesy of Takahashi Shinji. The documents here refer to the book alternatively as "Bell of Nagasaki," "The Bell of Nagasaki," and "The Bells of Nagasaki."
book and an immensely valuable piece of literature on the atomic bombings, Nagasaki no kane was the first account written from the point of view of a Japanese person.\textsuperscript{150} But a complete translation would have to wait because Nagai wanted to first publish the book for Japanese readers, who were his primary audience.

The publisher Showa Shobo resubmitted the publication request to SCAP regarding Nagasaki no kane in January 1948.\textsuperscript{151} In March, after the book had been sitting for nearly a year without an official decision on publication, General Willoughby required that action be taken, and censors began reexamining the book.\textsuperscript{152} Willoughby decided to allow publication by Hibiya Shuppan on the condition that the author include the appendix about Japanese atrocities in Manila. At first, Nagai's publishers refused because, they claimed, "the purposes of the publications are entirely different." The publishers in charge of Nagai's manuscript, Shikiba Ryūsaburō and his younger brother Shunzō, even pointed out how with "great meekness the author admits the justification for dropping of the atomic bomb" in the book. But Willoughby demanded that the "other side of the story" be given "or the book would be suppressed in the future as well."\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{150} Shikiba, preface to Nagai, Nagasaki no kane (1949), pp. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{151} See TJH to RMS, "On Book 'NAGASAKI NO KANE' By NAGAI TAKASHI," 3 June, 1948, SCAP; document courtesy of Takahashi Shinji. The memo notes that "SHOWA SHOBO was a member of JFPA, considered by censorship as 'centrist' or 'slightly right of center'; a small establishment; and on post-censorship at the time of final submission (Jan 48)."

\textsuperscript{152} Braw, Suppressed, p. 98. Braw notes that General Willoughby in the beginning "ordered the book held for six months" and promised the publisher, Hibiya shuppan, an answer at the end of that time: Suppressed, 95. The manuscript had passed through the hands of two other publishers before reaching Hibiya shuppan: Tokyo Times Co. and Showa shobō. The person in charge of Nagai's manuscript at Hibiya shuppan, Shikiba Shunzō, thought it strange that SCAP did not outright suppress Nagasaki no kane because of its graphic descriptions of the destruction and human suffering, but instead merely suspended its publication: see Mashima, dir., "Nagasaki no kane: tsukurareta besuto seraar.

Nagai and the Shikiba brothers were put on the censorship watch list.\textsuperscript{154} They eventually acquiesced to the demands of SCAP, and the appendix, "\textit{Manira no higeki}" (Tragedy of Manila), accompanied the publication of \textit{Nagasaki no kane} in January 1949.\textsuperscript{155}

The publication of \textit{Nagasaki no kane} was a milestone for the spread of information about the atomic bombings. But it was also a rarity. Christian rhetoric, the link between God's grace and Nagasaki's atomic destruction, and Shikiba's plea that Nagai considered the dropping of the atomic bombs a justified act, made Nagai and his work attractive to SCAP. As the Civil Intelligence Section pointed out, "The book is well-written and will undoubtedly sell well. [...] Recommend we do not suppress it."\textsuperscript{156}

In an unprecedented action, SCAP set aside enough paper for the Japanese publishers to print 30,000 copies of the book.\textsuperscript{157} In February 1949, less than a month after its debut, the initial 30,000 copies of \textit{Nagasaki no kane} sold out, and five months later in July the

\textsuperscript{154} Indeed, letters sent to and from Nagai Takashi in Nagasaki were subject to censorship. Correspondence that was censored is preserved in the archives of the Nagasaki City Nagai Takashi Memorial Museum. The letters have stamps showing that they have been "Released by Censorship - Ken'etsu sumi." To avoid such censorship, some delivered their letters to Nagai by entrusting them to visitors who could hand them directly to him. For example, actor Chiaki Minoru entrusted a letter to Shikiba Ryûsaburô for delivery to Nagai. The actor's previous letter, however, passed through the eyes of the censors before arriving at Nagai's address.

\textsuperscript{155} SCAP censorship documents translate "\textit{Manira no higeki}" alternately as "Tragedy of Manila" and "Tragedy in Manila." In the English translation of the preface, the documents have "rape of Manila."

\textsuperscript{156} Theater Intelligence to Colonel Bratton, 12 January, 1948, folder 000.73 Censorship News Articles in Japanese Press, box 8519, SCAP, as reprinted in Braw, \textit{Suppressed}, on p. 100. Emphasis in original.

\textsuperscript{157} Takahashi Shinji, \textit{Zoku – Nagasaki ni atte tetsugaku suru} (Tokyo: Hokuju Shuppan, 2004), p. 103; Mashima, dir., "\textit{Nagasaki no kane: tsukurareta besuto seraa.}" In Mashima's film, Nagai's publisher Shikiba Shunzô explains that his publishing company, Hibiya, had never before received paper from GHQ/SCAP to print books, especially of \textit{Nagasaki no kane}'s nature, but did occasionally receive paper to print pamphlets. A CCD dated February 10, 1949, however, lists the paper used for the 30,000 books as "Unrationed paper (senka)": PPB, CCD, Book Department, 10 February, 1949, SCAP; document courtesy of Takahashi Shinji.
number had reached 110,000. In March, it was the number-six best-selling book in Japan behind Yoshikawa Eiji's popular historical novel *Miyamoto Musashi.*

**The Significance of the Manila Appendix**

The Manila appendix served three purposes for SCAP. The coupling of an account of a Japanese atrocity with the story of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki demonstrated that retribution had been rightly meted out to Japan for its war crimes. The atomic bombing(s) exemplified Japan's redemption for its past aggression. And, lastly, the U.S. military framed the "Manila Tragedy" in the context of imperial Japan's attack on the United States, which was only stopped by the atomic destruction of Nagasaki.

The release of *Nagasaki no kane* differed from Nagai's previous books in that the inclusion of the appendix presented the Nagasaki bombing in the context of retribution, as a justified attack. American officials feared that the atomic bombings must appear to others as an atrocity. Indeed, several intellectuals all over the world shared the

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159 At this time, Nagai's *Kono ko o nokoshite* already sat comfortably at number one. See list in *Jiji tsūshin*, 9 April 1949, no. 1023, *Furoku* (appendix), p. 1.


161 Dower, *War Without Mercy*, pp. 37-38. John Dower points out that "in the single sweeping dissenting opinion at the Tokyo tribunal, Justice Radhabinod Pal of India dismissed the charge that Japan's leaders had engaged in a conspiracy to commit atrocities, and went so far as to suggest that a stronger case might be made against the victors themselves. The clearest example of direct orders to commit 'indiscriminate murder' in the war in Asia, Pal argued in his lengthy dissent, may well have been 'the decision coming from the allied powers to use the atom bomb.'"
sentiment that the atomic bombings were crimes against humanity, but U.S. officials defended the bombings and combated the notion that they may have been a war crime.\textsuperscript{162}

The purpose of the Manila appendix, as Willoughby saw it, was to show the "other side of the story," or, in other words, the reason for using the atomic bombs against Japan. Willoughby argued that the appendix would clearly demonstrate that "we used the bomb to terminate a war \textit{which we did not start}," so "[i]f and when American military acts were described (as the bombing), then Jap military acts \textit{that were provocation or motive will have to be shown}" (emphasis in original).\textsuperscript{163} The Americans viewed the atomic bombings as an appropriate response to Japanese aggression during the war, and the Manila appendix gave them an opportunity to justify the bombings as retribution.\textsuperscript{164} Nagai Takashi had already argued in many of his books that the sacrifice of Nagasaki represented atonement for the sin of war. If the "saint of Urakami" agreed to the appendix, then Japanese readers, too, might begin to view the atomic bombings as just punishment for the sins of their nation during the war. Or so the American occupiers may have hoped.

The first page of the Manila appendix prepared by the Military Intelligence Division of SCAP contained a memo from Elbert D. Thomas, Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Military Affairs, to Senator Carl Hayden. The memo, dated June 16, 1945, nearly two months before the atomic bombing, summarized the significance of the account of Manila in the eyes of the United States military: "Since the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{162} Yoneyama, \textit{Hiroshima Traces}, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{163} As quoted in Braw, \textit{Suppressed}, p. 99: General Willoughby to Staff re Censorship of Book on Bombing of Nagasaki, March 31, 1948, folder 000.73 Censorship of News Articles in Japanese Press 1948, box 8519, SCAP.

\textsuperscript{164} Dower, \textit{Embracing Defeat}, p. 415.
\end{footnotesize}
Japanese atrocities in Manila were committed on territory under our flag, and against persons who are our nationals, it is felt that our official condemnation of Japanese atrocities can be effected only through the most formal kind of censure." Thomas wrote that because the account derived from military documents, it provides "the solemn pledge of the national honor in attestation of the truth of these reports." The Japanese attack on Manila equated an attack on American soil, which called for retaliation. The date of the memo suggests that the military had wanted to publish the information about Manila for years. Nagai's detailed account of the atomic bombings gave them the opportunity to present to the Japanese people their own military's atrocities committed against "American nationals."  

In the preface to *Nagasaki no kane*, Shikiba Ryûsaburô pleaded for Japanese readers to reflect upon the role of Japan in the war.

As we lower our heads to the tragedy of Nagasaki, we must also deeply reflect on the Manila Incident (*jihen*). Mr. Nagai's record will be looked upon by the people of the world as the first account of the atomic bombing experience in the world, and will definitely leave its mark on the world. That is why we Japanese, along with [*Nagasaki no kane*], must read the Manila Incident with solemn feelings.

Interestingly, the appendix did not appear in a Japanese version of the book published in the United States by Saikensha in Denver, Colorado in March 1949.

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165 "Manira no higeki," appendix to *Nagasaki no kane* (Tokyo: Hibiya, 1949), p. 193. The appendix is entitled in English, "Japanese Atrocities in Manilla [sic]," and in Japanese, "Manira no higeki" (literally, The Tragedy of Manila). The letter discussed here was, oddly, reprinted in English with no Japanese translation. Also, the Manila appendix contains seven photographs of the atrocity, all depicting human suffering and death; the account of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki contains only four photographs, including one that simply shows a large could of smoke with no destruction at all.

166 Of course, by asserting that the people of the Philippines are "our nationals," Thomas is reasserting—unconsciously perhaps—the colonial legacy of the Western nations over Southeast Asia.

The Manila appendix served as a literary tribunal for Japanese war crimes that to some extent exempted the Japanese people from war responsibility and blamed the wartime military government for misleading the nation. The preface declared, "The primary responsibility for the crimes lies with the Japanese Supreme Command and the Japanese Government which re-presented [sic] the Emperor. Moreover, the Japanese people cannot escape the responsibility for the terrible crimes. The Japanese are, morally speaking, accomplices and are, therefore, guilty." Hiroshima and Nagasaki, therefore, were punishments that fit the crime.

By forcing the inclusion of the Manila appendix, SCAP unintentionally reaffirmed what it had wanted to prevent all along: that the atomic bombing of Nagasaki was an act of inhumanity visited upon a civilian population. SCAP intended to illustrate the reasons for the use of the bombs, but the appendix of one tragedy to the book about another appeared as a tacit admission that the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, too, was an inhumane act. Yet, allowing Nagasaki no kane to be published by itself seemed a greater threat to the occupation, because it had the potential to "disturb public tranquility and create ill will toward the United States."

**Japan's Redemption as a Hibaku-Nation**

The American focus on Manila was not unrelated to the wartime dehumanization of the Japanese people. The June 16, 1945 memo to Senator Hayden that prefaced the

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168 This translation is from RMS to TJH, 10 February, 1949, SCAP; document courtesy of Takahashi Shinji.

169 Several historians have noted this. See, for example, Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 415; or, Lifton, *Death in Life*, p. 329.
Manila appendix reflected the desire to inform people about the Japanese military's savagery in Manila. Frank Capra's 1945 film for the U.S. military, *Know Your Enemy: Japan*, served the same purpose. Capra includes the Manila tragedy as testimony to the barbarity of the Japanese enemy, depicting images of the dead juxtaposed with sarcastic narration explaining that this exemplified Japan's assertions to "peace," "co-prosperity," and "enlightenment." While the Manila appendix evoked the stereotype of the wartime Japanese enemy as savage and subhuman in order to justify the dropping of the bombs, it did not reflect occupation attitudes to the Japanese people.

In this case, however, the concern of American officials was not what impact the depiction of the wartime Japanese people might have, but rather how the actions of the United States during the war appeared to the Japanese public. Shortly after *Nagasaki no kane* was published in January, SCAP prepared a summary report on the book and the Manila appendix, which shows its top-down process from G-2 against the dissent of the censors. Captain Shaw (RMS) wrote in February 1949 that the "joint Nagasaki-Manila" publication represented the American bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima as atrocities. "Coupling of these accounts in publication," he noted in the report, "is direct demonstration of what the Japanese mean when they claim that Nagasaki-Hiroshima was just as bad as, if not worse than, the Japanese atrocities in Manila & Nanking, and that our action cancels out their guilt." SCAP officials realized, albeit too late, that the

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170 Frank Capra, dir., *Know Your Enemy: Japan,* 1945.

171 CCD, RMS to TJH, 10 February, 1949, SCAP; document courtesy of Takahashi Shinji. RMS argues that, a "typically Japanese opinion is expressed in the sentence in top preface [by Shikiba], page 2, underlined in blue." The underlined sentence in the document reads, in English, "We must reflect seriously upon the Manila events just as we are impressed by the tragedy in Nagasaki." RMS bases his worries on this sentence, which clearly suggests the equation of Manila with Nagasaki. However, the original context and wording of the Japanese sentence actually encourages Japanese readers to reflect on Manila before they pass judgment on the U.S. for bombing Nagasaki. The preface does not equate the two tragedies per se, at
Manila appendix equated the two American atomic bombings to two of the most infamous Japanese war crimes. The coupling of Nagasaki and Manila in fact canceled out the guilt for atrocities that Japanese readers were supposed to have felt by intensifying the sense of victimization by the atomic bomb.

The sentimental prose of Nagai Takashi's books helped Japan appear as a repentant nation opposed to the inhumanity of war. As Nagai explained the death of their mother to his children in *Itoshigo yo*, the atomic bomb "is a clump of atoms. Atoms did not come to Urakami to kill your mother. What killed your mother—that loving mother—was war."\(^{172}\) The two tragedies presented in *Nagasaki no kane*—Manila and Nagasaki—underlined the transformation from victimizer into victim: the Japanese were punished for their atrocities by becoming victims of atomic war. John Dower notes that in postwar Japan, "war itself became the greatest 'victimizer,' while the Japanese—personified by the saintly father/doctor/scientist [Nagai Takashi] dying in a nuclear-bombed city—emerged as the most exemplary victims of modern war."\(^{173}\) Anti-war sentiment was profoundly important in postwar Japan, and Nagai exemplified the conversion of Japan into a victim-nation during the occupation.\(^{174}\) In anti-nuclear discourse, Japan bears the title "yuitsu no hibakukoku" (the only country to have suffered

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\(^{174}\) As historian James J. Orr points out, "war victim consciousness was promoted by Allied psychological warfare agents and Occupation authorities to encourage alienation from the wartime state and its military." He continues that the "vision of the Japanese as innocent war victims reached its purest expression in the public dialogue over nuclear weapons": Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, p. 7.
the atomic bomb), a term whose etymology is the same as the word for atomic-bombing victims, _hibakusha_.

Nagai's anti-war message appealed to a wide audience, even if it was often worded in Christian language. The sacrifice of Urakami, "the only holy place in all of Japan," was necessary to bring about world peace, Nagai argued, and therefore Nagasaki (and Japan) had the responsibility to preserve that peace. As he wrote of Nagasaki's place in post-atomic Japan, Nagai promoted the phrase "Peace starts from Nagasaki" (_Heiwa wa Nagasaki yori_) in his books, spreading an anti-war message to a nation-wide audience at a time when Japan was setting out to create a peaceful nation, perhaps best exemplified in Article 9 of the country's Constitution (1947) which committed Japan to pacifism.

The 1949 publication of _Nagasaki no kane_ with the Manila appendix confirmed the status of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as victims of war, and the people of Japan as citizens of a _hibaku_-nation. The suffering of a few hundred thousand became the suffering of millions. The removal of the Manila appendix from the printings of _Nagasaki no kane_ after the occupation ended in 1952 underlined the move from victimizer to victim. After the removal of the appendix, an August 6, 1952 Asahi Graph poll showed that, "that which shocked the citizens of Japan in the seventh year after the war was the victimization of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, not the Japanese military's invasion and victimization of Asia and the Pacific." By the end of

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175 Orr, _The Victim as Hero_, p. 36: Orr writes that "Japan's unique experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki gave the Japanese an exclusive and seductive claim to leadership of the world antinuclear weapon movement."

the occupation, the narrative of the war was centrally defined in terms of the experience of the atomic bombings.\textsuperscript{177}

\textit{Manila as a Christian Tragedy}

The content of \textit{Nagasaki no kane}, which included discussion of the history of oppression, persecution, and martyrdom of Nagasaki Christians, provided a good foil for the story of Manila. The residents of Manila were not just "our nationals" in the colonial sense. They were Christian. The Japanese slaughter of Christian nationals of the United States, as some American officials saw it, constituted an attack on the Christian religion, a theme which became a tool of propaganda. The narrator of Capra's \textit{Know Your Enemy: Japan} argues that "Shinto seems to be a nice, quaint religion for a nice, quaint people," but it's doctrine "is now evil," and the Pacific War is a fight to save "Christian humanity."\textsuperscript{178} This statement echoed utterances in the West, such as the claim by British Lord Halifax that the war equated a "struggle to save Christian civilization."\textsuperscript{179} Reminiscent of such remarks, the Manila appendix echoed the view of the war as a religious crusade.

The preface to the appendix discussed the oppression of Christians and Christianity in Japan as a precedent for the actions of the Japanese military in the Philippines:

\textsuperscript{177} See, for example, John W. Dower, "The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory" in Michael J. Hogan, ed., \textit{Hiroshima in History and Memory} (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 116-142, where Dower shows how the victimization of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have become icons of Japan's wartime experience as a nation.

\textsuperscript{178} Frank Capra, dir., \textit{Know Your Enemy: Japan} (1945).

\textsuperscript{179} See John Dower, \textit{War Without Mercy}, p. 163.
The Japanese sought to wipe clean every last drop of the stench of Christianity in the Philippines. [...] Churches, schools, and the property of [Christian] groups were indiscriminately destroyed. The result of the Japanese attempt to extirpate (nekosogi jokyo) the vigor of Christianity in the Philippines surpasses the pain endured by Christians in Nagasaki and Shimabara four hundred years ago.\textsuperscript{180}

The English translation of the "Preface to Tragedy of Manila" in SCAP documents differed slightly from the original, but stressed how "One of the incomprehensible things about Japanese policy was that the Japanese wanted to eliminate all that was under Christian influence. Pastors, missionaries, nurses and orphans in monasteries were all murdered. Not only the Catholics, but anyone who has connections with Christianity, whether he was Catholic or Protestant, all had to suffer."\textsuperscript{181} The SCAP translator had replaced a sentence about the beheading of eleven Baptist missionaries with mention of Protestants, who did not appear in the original Japanese version of the text.\textsuperscript{182} The translator added that in the account of Manila, "Several examples of atrocities against Christians are given," including the "Murder of children in Catholic schools."\textsuperscript{183} The preface concluded that "America and the entire world had no other choice but to drop the atomic bomb" to end these indiscriminate acts of atrocity, and in doing so "saved the countless souls of Japan and other countries."\textsuperscript{184}

\textsuperscript{180} "Manira no higeki" in Nagasaki no kane (1949), pp. 194-196. Also see Mashima, director, Tsukurareta besuto seraa.

\textsuperscript{181} CCD, RMS to TJH, 10 February, 1949, SCAP; document courtesy of Takahashi Shinji.

\textsuperscript{182} "Manira no higeki" in Nagasaki no kane (1949), p. 195.

\textsuperscript{183} CCD, RMS to TJH, 10 February, 1949, SCAP; document courtesy of Takahashi Shinji.

\textsuperscript{184} "Manira no higeki" in Nagasaki no kane (1949), p. 196. Also see Mashima, dir. "Nagasaki no kane: tsukurareta besuto seraa."
"The "saint of Urakami" and the "Pitiable Red Ants" of Communism"

Nagai Takashi openly opposed communism. In his letters written from the front in China, he warned of the danger of communism consuming East Asia, and he continued his criticism in his best-selling books. When the occupation lifted the ban on criticizing the Soviet Union after the "reverse course" in policy that sought to dampen the communist political voice in Japan in the context of the Cold War, books such as Nagai's suited the goals of the occupation.

Nagai envisioned the Cold War as a struggle between Christianity and communism.\(^{185}\) Nagai had been openly expressing anti-communist feelings since the 1930s, and in *Kono ko o nokoshite*, he made his case against communism by comparing "America and Western Europe where Christianity prospers" to the "wretched condition of the masses in Eastern Europe where Christianity is persecuted." He described how "when citizens become poor, anti-Christian communism becomes prosperous. For communism to flourish, it becomes necessary for [the communists] to make their citizens poor." To preclude communism taking root in Japan, Nagai advised his readers, "it is necessary that we, through the neighborly love of Christianity, give food, clothing, housing, new jobs, and preach the word of God to those poor people who will be pulled away by the evil hand of communism."\(^{186}\) Published in 1948, as the cold war intensified, his best-selling book conveyed anti-communist rhetoric to hundreds of thousands of readers.

\(^{185}\) Takahashi also argues this: *Nagasaki ni atte tetsugaku suru* (1994), p. 217.

Nagai condemned communism in another work, *Heiwa tô* (Peace Tower, 1949), arguing that "the red leaders of materialism tame the masses to live only on bread; in other words, they train them to be domestic livestock that are the property of the nation."\(^{187}\) In his 1948 bestseller *Rozario no kusari*, Nagai illustrated how to be charitable in order to keep one's neighbors from falling into the hands of the communists and becoming "the property of the nation," by observing red ants near a jar of sugar. Nagai had taken out the sugar to sweeten some coffee that he received from Captain W.F. Deal of the U.S. Liberty Ship S.S. George L. Farley docked in Nagasaki.\(^ {188}\) The "pitiable red ants," Nagai wrote, approached the jar while periodically stopping to do "what appears to be praying." They then arrived at the sugar at which they look with sorrowful eyes. They did not look for an opening in the jar in order to steal the sugar, but simply looked up at the jar in awe of the beauty of the sugar, like monks (*shûshî*) singing hymns. Nagai, feeling pity for the red ants, gave them a pinch of sugar from the jar and exclaimed, "oh, the surprise and gratitude of the red ants!"\(^ {189}\) The anti-communist message in Nagai's books, whether direct or through metaphor, was clear: if we help and love our communist neighbors, they will see the error of their ways, become enlightened, and turn to Christianity.\(^ {190}\)

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\(^{188}\) For correspondence between Deal and Nagai, see: W.F. Deal to Professor T.Nagi [sic], August 23, 1947, in Shôhyô folder, NTMM.

\(^{189}\) Nagai, *Rozario no kusari*, pp. 182-4. In *Itoshigo yo*, Nagai uses the color white to refer to an ally and red to refer to an enemy (p. 271). Catholic distaste for communism was nothing new. The Nagasaki Catholic publication *Katorikkukyô hô* made its disdain for communism quite clear for decades, from the 1930s into the 1950s.

\(^{190}\) Nagai, *Itoshigo yo*, 209. The Christian teaching to "love thy neighbor as thyself" was a major motif in Nagai's works and teachings.
Writer Inoue Hisashi charged that Nagai's anti-communist approach to the atomic experience—in addition to his Christian rhetoric—led to his becoming a minion (chôji) of SCAP. The works of Nagai met the demands of "this internationally vigorous culture" (i.e. anti-communism) and proved their usefulness for U.S. purposes after the reverse course in occupation policy. "After all, books have a reason why they sell," Inoue noted, "and then they sell for that reason."  

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### The Death of a saint

Paulo Nagai Takashi died on May 1, 1951 from leukemia at forty-three years of age, leaving behind his son Makoto (16) and daughter Kayano (9). Nagai donated his body to science to advance research on radiation-related illness. An autopsy revealed that his organs were badly affected, with his spleen thirty-five times larger than normal and his liver five-times larger. Despite the severity of his leukemia, Nagai had lived three years longer than expected.

On May 3, the Urakami Catholics held a funeral mass for him, and on May 14, as a privilege of the first Honorary Citizen of Nagasaki City, awarded in 1949, he received a second, city-sponsored funeral, which attracted a crowd of around 20,000 people. Among the attendees was Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, who gave the funeral oration. Nagai's "achievements are truly remarkable with many implications for morality and faith," declared Yoshida. "Today, at the Nagasaki City Public Funeral Service, I extol the

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191 Inoue, Besuto sera, p. 63.

192 Nagai Takashi zenshû, p. 777.

193 Nagai Takashi zenshû, p. 777. Nagai was buried next to his wife Midori.
virtues of [his] life and reverently present this memorial address." Mayor Tagawa Tsutomu spoke as well, recounting Nagai's many contributions to science on the effects of radiation on the human body and his many books that garnered him and the city so much international attention. A representative from the Vatican attended the funeral and read a message from Pope Pius XII, who had sent Nagai a rosary together with a portrait containing a handwritten note in August 1950, and in December had bestowed on Nagai an "exceptional blessing." "I extend my deepest sympathies to the bereaved family of Dr. Nagai," the Pope stated. "Dr. Nagai, who had a deep understanding of Catholic doctrine and who transcended (yoku shinogareta) poor health, resides now in heaven as a grand protector of your nation." In the first year and a half after Nagai's death, six books were published: two that he had written, one that he had edited, and three about him by other authors.

In subsequent decades, Nagai's works and persona continued to be the voice of Nagasaki's experience of the bombing, fostering a popular image of the city as having responded to the destruction by "praying" for peace but performing little real action in the anti-nuclear and anti-war movements compared to Hiroshima. This view presented a challenge to survivors who disputed the interpretation of the atomic tragedy as providential and were able only in the 1960s to shake Nagai's hold on the popular memory of the bombing.

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195 Nagai Takashi zenshû, p. 777.
The moment of lieux de mémoire occurs at the same time that an immense and intimate fund of memory disappears, surviving only as a reconstituted object beneath the gaze of critical history.

Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire."\(^1\)

Chapter Four

Ruins of Memory: The Urakami Cathedral and Symbolism, 1937-1959

On March 18, 1915, a centuries-long era of persecution came to a symbolic end for the Catholics of Urakami. On a small hill in the northern valley, Bishop Johanne Claudio Combaz performed a consecration ceremony for the nearly complete Urakami Cathedral with approximately ten thousand Catholics in attendance. Local clergy, lay believers, and French missionaries witnessed the blessing and celebrated the holy structure, which symbolized the fruit of their struggle for religious freedom.\(^2\) Construction of the cathedral, which began in 1895, would not be completed until 1925 with the erection of the bell towers, and full religious freedom would not be gained until 1945, but March of 1915 held special significance. It marked the fiftieth anniversary of the "discovery" of the Urakami Catholics by French missionary Bernard Petitjean on March 17, 1865.\(^3\) The additional significance of the consecration ceremony also rested on the fact that the cathedral was funded and built by Nagasaki Catholics, who just

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\(^1\) Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire," in *Representations*, No. 26, Special Issue: Memory and Counter-Memory (Spring 1989), pp. 11-12.


decades earlier had suffered persecution at the hands of their Buddhist and Shinto neighbors.

Urakami held significance for Catholics worldwide as the historic center of Christianity in Japan. The descendants of the hidden Christians (kakure Kirishitan) in Urakami had survived centuries of religious persecution, and it was the center of the revival of the Catholic Church from the 1870s to the mid-twentieth century. A stone monument built in front of the Urakami Cathedral in November 1922 commemorated fifty years since the reawakening of Christianity in Japan. In 1873, Nagasaki Catholics were freed from their six-year exile and when they returned to Urakami, the local government granted them unofficial religious freedom, meaning that they tolerated Christianity despite it still being illegal. The Catholics thought that there was no better place in all of Japan to have constructed the cathedral. As the birthplace of Christianity in Japan, some considered Urakami as akin to Jerusalem and Bethlehem. In the same month and year as the building of the monument, Catholics elsewhere joined in celebrating the holy land of Urakami, as Pope Pius XI demonstrated by donating a 160-pound stone lantern for use on the altar of the cathedral. The cathedral was the largest in East Asia until the atomic bomb exploded in the air directly above it in 1945, reducing it to rubble.

The Urakami Cathedral represented more than the labor of the Catholics. It also stood as a symbol of the international nature of Nagasaki culture, especially when the ringing of its massive bells echoed throughout the city. Residents of Nagasaki, mostly

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4 Nagasaki-shi shi, vol. 4, p. 642.

5 The stone lantern was 120 kin, or 158.7 lbs, when 1 kin = 600g: Nagasaki-shi shi, vol. 4, p. 634.
non-Christians, found aesthetic value in the cathedral. Novelist and Nagasaki native Kamohara Haruo, a disciple of Akutagawa Ryūnosuke, wrote in 1931 of the wondrous sites of his hometown, including among them the "red-bricked Urakami Cathedral, which greets us not with its religiousness but with its beauty." Writing six years after the bell towers were completed, Kamohara described a typical stroll through Urakami Valley as he listened to the sound of the Angelus Bells from the Urakami Cathedral. He wrote that when the sound hits your ears, you should hurry and look closely to observe the "unusual custom" (ifû) of the Christians, who were "mostly peasants," gradually stopping their work in the fields to quietly bring their hands together. The bells could be heard throughout much of the city and the cathedral represented the exoticism that Nagasaki cultivated as part of its unusual international history. Nagasaki Catholics viewed the cathedral and their community as part of an international culture centered on Christianity, although during the war they considered loyalty to the Japanese emperor as important as their service to God. The struggle between the seemingly conflicting ideologies of national loyalty and religious faith defined local and national discussions of the role of Christians in the Japanese empire in the 1930s and during the war.

During the war, the cathedral served as the center of Nagasaki Catholic patriotic activities, such as prayer vigils for the success of the Imperial Army abroad. After the atomic bomb destroyed it in August 1945, the rubble became the symbol of the decimation of the Catholic community, whose few survivors hoped to rebuild the cathedral. To non-Christian city residents, the ruins of the cathedral stood as a reminder of the tragedy of the atomic bombing and a symbol of the city's role in showing the folly

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of war and promoting "everlasting world peace." From the late 1940s through the 1950s, the cathedral ruins were Nagasaki's equivalent to Hiroshima's Atomic Dome (also known as the Peace Dome). Whenever Nagasaki appeared in the media, an image of the cathedral ruins generally accompanied the article, as did the ruins of the Atomic Dome in the case of Hiroshima.

During the 1950s, Urakami became a site of controversy over history and memory, religion and politics, and atomic symbolism. Immediately after the bombing, Catholics wanted to remove the ruins of the cathedral to build a new cathedral that would symbolize rebirth and provide a center of prayer. City Council members and the majority of residents, who were not Christian, wanted to preserve the ruins as a symbol of the tragedy of war and as a reminder of the importance of peace, which was a component of postwar Nagasaki's self-image as both an "international cultural city" and an atomic-bombed city. The ensuing debate loomed large in Nagasaki throughout the 1950s. The city council (via the mayor) allowed the removal of the ruins to enhance the layout of Nagasaki as a modern, international city, which, the mayor emphasized, required a tidy and well-organized landscape of architecture.

I. Christianity and Patriotism in Urakami

Establishing Loyalty while Preserving Faith

Construction of the Urakami Cathedral over thirty years from 1895 to 1925 created the cornerstone of the Nagasaki Catholic community. As one commentator put it in 1937, the cathedral embodied the "pride" of the Urakami Catholic faith and symbolized their perseverance in the arduous journey to religious freedom. It represented
their "Foundation Stone of Faith."  The perseverance of the Nagasaki Catholics through persecution from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, coupled with the arrival of French missionaries in the 1860s, had cemented Nagasaki as the center of the Catholic community in modern Japan. By the time the bell towers were in place in 1925, Urakami already boasted the largest parish in Japan, and in 1927, of the 1,206,000 residents of Nagasaki Prefecture, 53,643 were Catholic. The same year, the Propaganda in Rome, the policy arm of the Vatican concerning missionaries, appointed Januarius Hayasaka Kyūnosuke as the first Japanese bishop of the Nagasaki diocese.

For decades prior to the war, the question of Christian loyalty as subjects of the emperor remained unresolved. After all, Christians prayed to and worshiped first God and Jesus, and only then the Japanese emperor. After Shinto became central to imperial ideology in the 1890s, Christian schools were required by the state to conform to the national standard of Shinto teachings and allegiance to the emperor. Most Christian schools adapted to these requirements and continued to operate with relative freedom. But as Japan became increasingly militarist in the 1930s, the importance of Christian conformity as imperial subjects increased in ideological importance. Showing reverence at a Shinto shrine, for example, presented a dilemma for Japanese Christians: paying homage at shrines clashed with the principles of their religion, but refusal risked retaliation by the state.

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7 See *Katorikukyô hô*, 8 August, 1937: "Kirishitan shiseki meguri."
The Vatican handled the dilemma of the Japanese Catholics in unprecedented fashion. On May 26, 1936, the Sacred Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith in Rome (the Propaganda) sent an Instruction to the Catholics of Japan permitting them to attend patriotic ceremonies, marriages, and funerals at Shinto shrines.\textsuperscript{11} With the Instruction, the Vatican did not imply a change in religious practice, but rather seemed to have accepted the assertion of the Japanese government that State Shinto was not a religion.\textsuperscript{12} The Instruction allowed Japanese believers to participate in Shinto rites that demonstrated their nationalism and exposed them to the ideology of the state without compromising their faith. They could be loyal Japanese subjects \textit{and} good Catholics adherents.

Alexis Chambon, the Roman Catholic Archbishop in Tokyo, instructed the Japanese Catholics on July 17, 1937 after the start of Japan's war with China: "If you are not a loyal subject, then you cannot be a good Catholic."\textsuperscript{13} Japanese Christians had been struggling for decades for social acceptance in Japan, because of doubts about Christians' loyalty to the state.\textsuperscript{14} The archbishop's admonition coincided with—and indeed was a direct response to—an initiative by the Japanese government to ensure the state was safe

\textsuperscript{11} Van Hecken, \textit{The Catholic Church in Japan Since 1859}, p. 121. The Instruction was sent to the Catholic leaders in Japan, who at the time were foreign missionaries. They then instructed the Japanese clergy, who in turn instructed their parishioners.


\textsuperscript{13} Editorial, \textit{Katorikukyô hō}, 1 August 1937. Chambon became archbishop of Tokyo in 1928, when Januarius Hayasaka Kyûnosuke became bishop of Nagasaki. Peter Doi Tatsuo replaced Chambon as archbishop in 1940. While Tokyo being the capital of Japan made it the center of officialdom for the Roman Catholic Church, the "most beautiful flower of the Church in Japan" was always Nagasaki. See Van Hecken, \textit{The Catholic Church in Japan Since 1859}, pp. 74-75.

\textsuperscript{14} Ion, "The Cross under an Imperial Sun," p. 69.
from internal ideological threats, such as Christianity, as it embarked on a war with China. Chambon's statement was an attempt to confirm that Japanese nationalism and Catholicism were compatible, encouraging Japanese Catholics to embrace the opportunity to prove themselves as good subjects.

Christian publications in Japan, including newspapers and bulletins, relayed Church doctrine and instructions as well as state ideology. Beginning in 1931, locally based Catholic weekly and monthly publications were discontinued and merged into the *Nihon Katorikku shinbun* in order to centralize and unify the Church message and promote wider, uniform distribution. The Nagasaki-based *Katorikukyô hô* (Catholicism Bulletin), however, remained independent because local Catholic leaders argued that Nagasaki Christians were accustomed to the language of their publication. Bishop Januarius Hayasaka Kyûnosuke and Michael Urakawa Wasaburô began publishing the paper in November 1928, and continued it bi-monthly until, as the later editors stated, it "encountered the misfortune of the government regulation on publications" and was forced to stop printing in October 1940 in order for Japan to "conserve resources." The paper was written with *furigana* (phonetic markings) to help the lay reader with potentially difficult Chinese characters, since many Catholics were farmers or fishers. When the national government sought to instruct their Christian

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16 Editorial, *Katorikukyô hô*, 15 April 1948. The extra "k" in "Katorikku" is not a typo. The postwar version of the bulletin changed the transliteration of the word "Catholic" in *katakana* from "Katoriku" to "Katorikku." Therefore the name of the publication until its termination in 1940 was the former, and from 1948 it was the latter.

17 As Drummond points out, in contrast to the Protestants, the Catholics in Kyushu were mostly of the lower classes: Drummond, *A History of Christianity in Japan*, p. 317.
subjects on an issue, they addressed local Christian leaders, who would then forward the messages in their publications. In this way, the newspapers, including the national *Nihon Katorikku shinbun*, supported the war effort.\(^{18}\)

After the start of full-blown war with China in July 1937, the Japanese government took advantage of the extensive Christian publication network. The state increased efforts to secure the place of civil obligation in the minds of its Christian subjects and on July 12, 1937, five days after the start of hostilities in China, the undersecretary (*jikan*) of the Ministry of Education issued a decree to the Nagasaki Christians, addressing it to the "Head of the Nagasaki Diocese of Roman Catholics." The bishop in Nagasaki published the decree immediately in the *Katorikukyô hô*. The Nagasaki diocese (*kyôku*) included Catholics throughout the prefecture, around thirty towns or villages, which in 1937 included 56,343 adherents. Urakami had the largest single group in the diocese, with 8,409.\(^{19}\) The Ministry official explained that the decree was intended for Christian leaders to "properly" educate their followers on the current situation in China, and expressed the hope that along with preserving their duty as subjects, they awaken the vigor of cooperative harmony and be filled with national spirit.\(^{20}\)

Japanese Christian leaders embraced the opportunity to demonstrate loyalty to their nation and instructed their fellow believers to do the same. Michael Urakawa Wasaburô served as bishop of the Nagasaki diocese for a short time in 1937 while the

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\(^{18}\) See, for example, NBC Nagasaki hôsô, prod., *"Kami to genbaku: Urakami Katorikku hibakusha no 55 nen"* (Aired on 30 May 2000).

\(^{19}\) Numbers: *Katorikukyô hô*, 15 October 1937.

\(^{20}\) *Katorikukyô hô*, 1 August 1937.
Vatican ruminated a replacement for Januarius Hayasaka Kyûnosuke, who had fallen ill.21 As incumbent bishop, Urakawa, who was an accomplished historian of Christianity in Japan, served as editor-in-chief and publisher of the *Katorikukyô hô*. He printed the government declaration on the North China "incident" in July, which included the brief address by the Ministry official to Nagasaki Christian leaders. On August 1, the headline of the *Katorikukyô hô* read, "Fulfill the Christian Duty to Protect the Nation."22 Urakawa explained that in accordance with the decree of the government, and "in view of the gravity of the current emergency of our ancestral land, all believers should deepen their knowledge of the situation, intensify their sense of duty as citizens, and fulfill their duty to protect the nation. [We] must pray for the security of the state (kokka) and dedicate the sincerity of Christianity (*Hôkyô no jitsu*) to these ends."23

Inspired by the July decree, Urakawa took the opportunity as bishop of the Nagasaki diocese to instill a sense of patriotism in his fellow Catholics. In a short "Admonishment" (yukoku) published on August 15 but delivered in July, Urakawa advised, "We Catholics must contribute, not only physically and materially, but especially in spiritual aspects (*seishinteki hômen*). [...] Let us pray for the struggle of the Imperial Army, for the prosperity of the state, and for a decisive [and swift] victory in the war (*ketteiteki senshô*)." In conclusion, he added, "In order for our prayers to be heard, we must aim to first purify our hearts, rectify our actions, be diligent in family business at

21 *Katorikukyô hô*, 1 October 1937.

22 “Gokoku Hôkyô no honbun o mattô seyo”: the word "Hôkyô" literally means, "to dedicate religion," but here refers to Japanese Christianity, specifically that of the early-modern, or Tokugawa, period.

23 *Katorikukyô hô*, 1 August 1937. See above note for explanation of "Hôkyô."
home, and fulfill our duties in society. We must wield unyielding courage and strive to especially perform our duty as subjects."

In September 1937 the Vatican appointed Paul Yamaguchi Aijirō as Bishop of the Nagasaki Diocese. Yamaguchi also administered the Kagoshima Diocese, so the territory under his direction covered much of Kyushu. Michael Urakawa encouraged the Nagasaki Catholics to welcome with "prayers of sincere gratitude" the native Catholic who hailed from the "heart of the Nagasaki Diocese, Urakami." On November 7, a seating ceremony took place at the Urakami Cathedral in celebration of Nagasaki's new bishop, who was the second native bishop ever appointed in Japan, and foreign Catholic leaders such as Archbishop Chambon came to the city for the event. Bishop Yamaguchi quickly established himself as the leader of the Catholic community in Nagasaki and continued the line of promoting the role of religion in the war effort, encouraging his parishioners to continue contributing both prayers and money. By October 10, 1937, even before the arrival of Yamaguchi, the Nagasaki Diocese of Roman Catholics had already raised 749 yen and 6 sen for the "defense of the nation." The parish of Urakami raised the largest individual amount, 70 yen and 50 sen. The diocese

24 *Katorikukyô hô*, 15 August 1937.
25 *Katorikukyô hô*, 1 October, 1937.
26 *Katorikukyô hô*, 1 October, 1937.
27 A schedule and explanation of the ceremony appears in *Katorikukyô hô*, 1 November 1937.
28 *Katorikukyô hô*, 15 October 1937.
entrusted the money later that month to the Prefectural Shrines and Temples Division of Military Affairs (Ken shaji heiji ka).29

Bishop Yamaguchi took over as publisher of the Katorikukyô hô and made sure that it fostered loyalty of the Nagasaki Catholics to the state. The New Years issue on January 1, 1938 printed the date not as "1938 in the year of our Lord" (A.D.), but rather "2598 in the year of our Emperor" (kōki). Yamaguchi took the opportunity as the leader of the Nagasaki Catholic community and as editor-in-chief of its major publication to use his annual New Year's greetings to remind the readers of Japan's purpose abroad. In his first address as bishop on January 1, 1938, he set the tone of his mission and responsibility as a religious leader of Nagasaki to promote the dual spiritual mission of Japanese Christianity—i.e. faith in Catholicism and dedication to empire.

"Among the clouds of war," Yamaguchi began, "we welcome the New Year of Showa Thirteen" (1938). He went on to glorify the "loyal and brave soldiers (shôshi) of our Imperial Army" who stand on the warfront in China and gaze out over the eastern sky (tôten) as they "chant banzai for the emperor, bless the country of our ancestors, and burn with bravery as they again press forward." Bishop Yamaguchi called for his fellow Catholics to be grateful for the tranquility and happiness of their daily lives at home, to stiffen the defenses on the homefront, to "fulfill the duty of a subject," and to act as a "proper Catholic in a time of crisis." "Because our parishioners carry on the traditional faith of some three hundred years, it must be that our spirit of faith (shinkô seishin) and our daily life have been cultivated in harmony." "The righteous life of the present world," Yamaguchi continued, "represents the duty to serve divine will." "Heaven

29 Katorikukyô hô, 1 November 1937. This issue lists the slightly different sum (sôkei) of 730 yen and 36 sen.
requires violence," he explained, and one "cannot obtain the crown of eternal happiness without passing through narrow paths and roads of thorns." He called upon Nagasaki Catholics to "also heed the holy teaching that a faith not performed is a dead faith, and we must live our daily lives with a vigorous faith that pervades all our existence (seimei)." "We cannot," he asserted, "be believers in name but not in reality (yûmei mujitsu)." Since the "China incident," Yamaguchi continued, "the sincerity of the Catholics has been increasingly recognized in the world" because of their service and dedication to Japan. The millions of Catholics in the world have come to recognize the "righteous stance of our country." Indeed, Yamaguchi proclaimed that Japan was engaged in a crusade in China, a "holy war against communism" (bôkyô no seisên) guided by the "righteousness of the Imperial Army."  

**The War at Home**

As Japanese Christians continued the dual effort to prove their loyalty as subjects and gain religious freedom at home, many also fought in the Imperial Army abroad. Nagasaki Catholics from various parishes, including Urakami, served in the military and died in the name of their emperor. Urakami Catholic Tagawa Matajûrô "died an honorable death in war" on March 19, 1938 "while flourishing on the battle lines in central China." Before marching off to war, he was "a diligent exemplary youth who worked at the Nagasaki Mitsubishi Electric Works, and he was extremely filial." Obituaries of those who died in the name of the emperor often appeared in the

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31 *Katorikukyô hō*, 1 April 1938.
Katorikukyō hô and other local papers with leaders like Bishop Yamaguchi evoking them as objects of reverence.

Each Catholic soldier who "achieved an admirable (appare) death in war," Yamaguchi explained, exemplified both a "blossom of the Yamato spirit" and a "confessor of the faith" (shinkō no shōseija). It was the duty of Catholics at home in Nagasaki to emulate their brethren abroad and "together with Japanese spirit demonstrate the faithful spirit of sacrifice (shinkōteki giseishin) that shines with eternal hope." Bishop Yamaguchi explained that by embracing their nationality (kokuminsei), Nagasaki Catholics on the homefront also had the opportunity to become "blossoms of the Yamato spirit" and "confessors of the faith."

At Urakami Cathedral services were held for the war dead, as well as prayer vigils for military success in the war. On April 25, 1938, a memorial service for the war dead was held in conjunction with a grand festival (taisai) at Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine on the same day. The Katorikukyō hô noted that, "All Catholics attended the service, prayed for the tranquility of the departed souls, and expressed gratitude for their loyalty." Following the service, they "hoisted the national flag" in front of the cathedral, where the rising-sun flag flew throughout the war. A month later, on Sunday May 29, forty minutes of a ten o'clock mass in Urakami were broadcast on national radio. The mass opened with hymns

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32 Front page, Katorikukyō hô, 1 January 1938.

33 Katorikukyō hô, 1 May 1938. The rising-sun flag flew in the Urakami District throughout the war, and patriotic Catholics hoisted the flag even amid the ruins immediately following the atomic bombing in 1945. For an example, see Josef Schilliger, *The Saint of the Atom Bomb*, trans. by David Heimann (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1955), p. 92. As Schilliger writes, Nagai Takashi "spread a white cloth over the ground" and "drew a red circle over the center with his bloodsoaked [sic] bandage, fastened it to a bamboo stick, and planted it in the field." Schilliger continues, "High from the hilltop, over the smouldering [sic] university and the dying city, the flag of Japan with its rising sun waved in the evening breeze." See also, NBC Nagasaki hôsô, prod., "Kami to genbaku: Urakami katorikku hibakusha no 55 nen."
sung by students of the Urakami Theological Seminary, followed by a sermon by Father Matsuoka and a recitation of the Apostles' Creed. Ten o'clock radio on a Sunday was usually reserved for Buddhist religious services, but according to the Katorikukyô hô, the Catholic broadcast was well received.34

Even though Japanese Christians made every effort to prove their loyalty to the country and embrace state ideology, the national government remained wary. The Ministry of Education implemented a comprehensive approach to controlling religious groups in the Religious Organizations Law (Shûkyô dantai hôan) of 1939, which made the Ministry of Education the overseer of all religious bodies, not just Christian ones.35 The Minister of Education argued that the spiritual strength to live and die that was given to us through religion was "most necessary on the Japanese homefront in this time of emergency, especially since the incident [i.e. war] has already entered a new level of construction for the long run (chôki kensetsu)." The detailed forty-clause law intended to cultivate the activities of religious groups on the homefront and build a spiritual bulwark against enemies, foreign and domestic. The Minister wrote of the law, "As we newly open a road to the protection (hogo), advancement (jochô), and social relief (kyûzai) of religions that walk along with the state, it is also important to strictly control actions that disturb public peace and injure public welfare."36 Imaizumi Genkichi, a prominent lawyer in Tokyo, was one of many Christians who condemned the authoritarianism

34 Katorikukyô hô, 1 June 1938. The term used here to mean Buddhist religious services is 勤行 which is generally read gongyô, but the Catholic paper uses the reading kinkô, which is probably a mistake.
(kantoku shugi) of the House of Peers and demanded the law be repealed. However, the resistance of religious groups to the law never succeeded in annulling it, and it remained in effect until it was abolished by SCAP in October 1945.

The Religious Organizations Law imposed unprecedented regulations on all religious groups, but the Minister of Education was displeased with the failure of some Christian leaders to conform to certain aspects of the new law. He proposed to force the Japanese Catholic clergy to cut all ties to the Vatican and the Pope, which the Minister hoped would settle the ideological competition and leave the minds of the believers devoted to the emperor and the Japanese state. Prominent Japanese Catholics, including an admiral in the Imperial Navy, approached the Ministry on behalf of their religious community to convince the government to abandon its proposal and leave the Catholics what little religious freedom remained to them. Admiral Stephen Yamamoto Shinjirō and Bishop Taguchi Yoshigorō declared that given a choice they would rather die as martyrs to protect the integrity of their religion, which the proposal threatened by cutting off Japanese Catholics from the Holy See (the Vatican). The Minister did not pursue the matter further, and the Japanese Catholic Church was officially recognized on May 3, 1941 by its new name, Nihon Tenshu kōkyō kyōdan (Association of the Roman Catholic Church in Japan). In 1940, the official number of adherents in Japan was 119,224, of whom nearly half resided in Nagasaki Prefecture.

37 Imaizumi Genkichi, Shûkyô dantai hōan to Kirisuto Kyôkai (Tokyo: Nihon Kirisuto Kyôkai, tai shûkyô dantai hōan tokubetsu i'inkai, 1939), p. 1. The text was published on March 26, three days after the promulgation of the Religious Organizations Law.


The Religious Organizations Law caused a change in the leadership of Catholicism in Japan. Foreign Catholic officials, who had defined the Church in Japan since the sixteenth century, left Japan and turned over their positions to Japanese clergy. In late 1940, the clergy submitted their resignation to the Vatican and the Japanese clergy took complete control of the Church in Japan and its colonies, including Korea and Taiwan. In Japan, officials such as Bishop Yamaguchi continued the course of promoting patriotism as the duty of a good Catholic during Japan's "holy war" in Asia.

In 1941, when Japan embarked on a war with the United States, Japanese Christians continued to contribute to the war effort spiritually and physically. Nagasaki Christians who did not fight overseas worked in factories at home. All continued to pray for the prosperity of their nation, and some continued to proselytize both for their religion and the state in the empire. After the Religious Organizations Law, the government left Japanese Catholics and other Christians relatively undisturbed, and the effective blending of faith and patriotism that defined contemporary religious ideology in Japan allowed Christianity to survive the war. This is not to say that the Christians were not harassed by non-Christian subjects, but the patriotic fervor of the Christians dispelled much of the

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41 Van Hecken, *The Catholic Church in Japan Since 1859*, p. 93. For more on Japanese Christian missionary work in Japanese-controlled territories, such as Taiwan, Korea, China, and Manchuria, see for example Ion, "The Cross under an Imperial Sun," pp. 77-82. Also see various articles in the Nagasaki Katorikukyō hō, which until its termination in 1940 included numerous articles on the missionary work abroad by Japanese Catholics, especially those hailing from Nagasaki, such as Kataoka Yakichi, a personal friend of Nagai Takashi.


suspicions that they were agents of the West. In 1944, the Association of the Roman Catholic Church in Japan joined the Japan Wartime Patriotic Religions Association, which coordinated and encouraged patriotic efforts with Shinto and Buddhist organizations. Christians continued throughout the war the "practice of bowing toward the imperial palace and praying for the soldiers who had died and for those fighting at the front." Until Japan's surrender in 1945, Urakami Catholics praised the war in East Asia in religious tones, similar to Nagai Takashi in his letters from the front in 1937, when he wrote that he was slaying the "Devil" in China in the name of God and the emperor. The destruction of the Urakami Cathedral by the atomic bomb broke the ideological bond between Christianity and wartime patriotism.

II. The Christian Factor in Postwar Japan

Destruction and Liberation

The atomic bombing of August 9, 1945 shattered the Urakami Catholic community, killing over eighty-percent of the parishioners and leaving the "wretched few who survived" to question the existence of God in light of their cruel fate. Nagai Takashi

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44 Walter W. Van Kirk rightly points out how the Christian community in wartime Japan was "always subject to criticism by the strutting militarists and the loud-mouthed patrioteers, [and] was doubly suspect during the war. Christians, it was charged, were spies of the United States and her allies. [...] The hostility of the warmakers was buttressed by the ill will of Shintoists and Buddhists who saw in the situation an opportunity to rid Japan of an alien faith. In Nagoya we were told that temple priests had plastered the doors of churches with the slogan, 'Now is the time to get rid of Christianity'": Walter W. Van Kirk, "Japan's Christians Stood Firm!" in The Christian Century, December 19, 1945, p. 1409.

45 SCAP, Religions in Japan, p. 111. The document refers to the Association of the Roman Catholic Church in Japan simply as the "Roman Catholic Church" and points out that the Protestant equivalent, the Church of Christ in Japan, joined the Japan Wartime Patriotic Religions Association at the same time.

46 See, for example, Katorikkukyō hō, 15 November 1937.
led them out of the ashes of the Valley of Death, helped to restore their faith in God and man, and encouraged them to find spiritual meaning in the destruction and use the memory of their loved ones to work for the physical and spiritual revitalization of Urakami. Recovery was not immediate, of course, but the Catholics had their faith and also a newfound spiritual freedom.

The American victory empowered the Christian communities in Japan. The atomic bombs had destroyed the Nagasaki Catholic community, but Japan's defeat brought the demise of Shinto as a state religion and liberated Christians and other religious groups from the control of the state. Within months of the end of the war, Japan underwent a "spiritual disarmament" under MacArthur's leadership. On October 15, 1945, the Japanese government released the last person who had been imprisoned for religious reasons, and on November 4, the 1939 Religious Organizations Law was abolished, making all religious groups independent. On December 15, MacArthur issued a directive abolishing Shinto as the official religion of the state. On January 1, 1946, the occupation saw to it that the emperor proclaimed his humanity and stated that it was a "false conception that the Emperor is divine." Christians in Japan now had the

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50 As quoted in Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 314. For more on the humanization of the emperor, see esp. pp. 308-318. Dower (p. 316) notes how the New Year's Day proclamation was not broadcast but "appeared in the press accompanied by a commentary by Prime Minister Shidehara. While the text was intelligible to educated readers, the final version had typically been worked over by a scholar of classical language and was couched in the stiff and formal prose reserved for imperial pronouncements. The prime minister's gloss, on the other hand, was in the vernacular and, following the usual practice, was regarded as the official interpretation of the emperor's words."
freedom to practice their religion without fear of retaliation from the government or the need to juggle faith, patriotism, and imperial ideology.\textsuperscript{51}

The international culture of Christianity, moreover, provided Japanese believers a common ground with the United States. In Nagasaki, Christianity was one of the most important elements of the city in its efforts to become an "international cultural city" because it promoted relations with the United States and other Western countries. During the occupation, the Nagasaki Christians, and especially the Catholics, settled in to their religious freedom even as they attempted to understand the events that had destroyed the city.

No one singled out Japanese Christians for their willing contribution to the war effort, any more than all the other Japanese who did the same. Christian institutions in the United States, while acknowledging their participation in the war, considered Japanese Christians victims who had survived State Shinto and imperial ideology. "Japan's Christians Stood Firm!" declared the title of an article in \textit{The Christian Century} in December 1945.\textsuperscript{52} Yet physical evidence to the contrary was impossible to ignore. The cathedral, where they had prayed for success of the "holy war," lay in ruins as a result of that war, not that anyone wanted to dwell on that fact.

At a February 19, 1946 press conference, a spokesman for MacArthur declared that the Supreme Command understood the participation of the Buddhist church during

\textsuperscript{51} Van Hecken writes: "Thanks to this new liberty it was possible to observe effectively, up to a certain degree, a turn in favor of Catholicism." Van Hecken then presents the example of a daughter of a Zen bonze who after hearing the emperor's proclamation became disappointed because if the emperor was not God, she asked, then "who was God?" Shortly after, she and her father, "a fervent Buddhist of the Zen-sect, discovered the truths of Catholicism": \textit{The Catholic Church in Japan since 1859}, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{52} Van Kirk, "Japan's Christians Stood Firm!," p. 1410. See, also, Van Hecken, \textit{The Catholic Church in Japan since 1859}, p. 95.
the war, but that it would not be charging it with war crimes. To pursue religious organizations, the spokesman stated, would render the entire Japanese population culpable for war crimes. The Supreme Command "recognizes," he noted, that the government oppressed religious groups and individuals during the war and that their participation was "unavoidable." A Nagasaki shinbun reporter noted that this was a moment when the "scope of war responsibility" was still being assessed, but he was confident enough of his interpretation of SCAP's approach to declare in a headline, "No 'Crimes' for Religion" (Shûkyô ni 'hanzai' nashi).53

Nor did Nagai Takashi's books make mention of Christian participation in the war, or of the vigils at the Cathedral and the dual faith in Catholicism and empire. Nagai avoided any indictment of the leaders of the community, including himself, for supporting Japan's war of aggression. His books focused instead on the religious exceptionalism of Urakami, the dawn of the nuclear age and its repercussions for humanity, and the role of Nagasaki and its Christians in working for peace. Peace has always been at the heart of their Christian faith, but in concrete terms, for Nagai and other Urakami Catholics, a vital component of working for peace in postwar Japan meant removing the ruins to build a new cathedral to symbolize rebirth and to renew their dedication to world peace. For the Catholics of Nagasaki, the ruins of the cathedral represented a memory that had to be erased in order to move on from the past and find their place in postwar society.

The rest of Nagasaki saw the ruins of the Urakami Cathedral differently: as the symbol of the atomic tragedy of the city. The fact that Urakami was ground zero did not

53 Nagasaki shinbun, 20 February 1946.
induce sympathy for the Catholics among most city residents. Rather, they saw the cathedral as the only major landmark severely damaged in the atomic blast yet remaining intact enough to be easily identifiable. It was a reminder of the folly of war and the importance of peace. The fact that it was a church that had served as the center of the Catholic community for decades seemed of little concern outside Urakami. Indeed, the Catholics' biggest supporters came from outside Japan, from Christian groups in the West.

**The "Candles of God" in Japan and the U.S. Hope for a Christian Revival**

The liberation of the Church in Japan gave hope to Christian groups in the United States "that the future of Christianity in Japan is full of promise," as Walter W. Van Kirk put it in February 1946. "The clock of destiny has struck for the Christian movement in Japan." It was feared, he pointed out, "that the fury with which the war had been waged, the demolition and the incendiary bombing, and the dropping of atomic explosives upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, had done irreparable damage to the Christian movement in Japan and extinguished there the candles of God that had been lighted by the missionaries of other years." But, he said, "These fears have proved to be without foundation. We of the West were of little faith. We forgot, if we ever knew, that Christianity thrives upon persecution and waxes strong under adversity. So it was with the early Christians. So it has been with the Christians of Japan." The resilient

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Christians of Nagasaki whose numbers had been decimated by the atomic bomb but had survived as a group testified to the truth of Van Kirk's statement.

Christian groups grasped the opportunity to revitalize the Church and evangelize in Japan. In 1948 alone, ten religious institutions in Europe and the United States sent missionaries, and nearly twenty additional mission societies arrived over the decade from Australia, Italy, the United States, and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{56} The missionaries had long waited for this moment. "There is a spiritual uneasiness in Japan," a Catholic missionary commented in 1948, "and for the first time, maybe since St. Francis Xavier [mid-sixteenth century], the door is open to the Gospel."\textsuperscript{57}

Facilitated by occupation authorities, Christian groups wasted no time in seeking to fill the so-called spiritual vacuum left by the abrogation of State Shinto. Leaders of groups in the United States called for support. "Our Christian brethren in Japan are already laying the groundwork for a new advance," Van Kirk encouraged. "They are pleading for Bibles and hymnals for use in their prospective evangelistic endeavors."\textsuperscript{58}

American Christians were quick to respond. In December 1945, the Foreign Missions Conference of North America (FMCNA), at the behest of Dr. Luman J. Shafer who had recently traveled to Japan with Van Kirk and served as chair of the Japan committee of the FMCNA, requested the American Bible Society to "send at the earliest possible moment 100,000 New Testaments in English, which have been specifically requested by Japanese Christians." The Society had already prepared "for immediate shipment to

\textsuperscript{56} Van Hecken, \textit{The Catholic Church in Japan since 1859}, p. 99-100.

\textsuperscript{57} See Van Hecken, \textit{The Catholic Church in Japan since 1859}, p. 98.

Japan 45,000 New Testaments and Gospel portions in the Japanese language," and an "additional 65,000 New Testaments with Psalms" were "being printed in anticipation of further needs."^59

Japanese Christians could not have asked for more avid supporters than the United States Christian groups and military occupation authorities. The American government assembled private capital totaling $12,000,000 for the construction of Christian schools in Nagasaki and Hiroshima.^60 This monetary support of the reconstruction of Nagasaki grew largely out of the hope that Christianity would flourish. While there was never any official plan to Christianize Japan, Christianity was viewed as a means to fill what officials saw as a spiritual vacuum. To this end, SCAP carefully tracked and whenever possible supported the activities of the various Christian communities and visiting missionaries during the occupation. In December 1945, Van Kirk, Shafer, Dr. Douglas Horton, and Bishop James C. Baker traveled to Japan for "three weeks and two days" as a Christian deputation, which was endorsed by the FMCNA and the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. Shortly after the trip, Van Kirk wrote that the "President approved our going, as did the state department and General MacArthur. [...] We traveled to and from Japan in planes of the Army Transport Command. [...] To be sure, we were the recipients of many favors at the hands of our military authorities. For these courtesies we are extremely grateful."^61

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^60 Nagasaki nichinichi, 26 June 1949.

Early in 1946, the occupation noted the resilience of the Catholics at ground zero of the Nagasaki bombing. A translation of an article from the April 29 Nagasaki shinbun appeared in the Social Series section of the May 6, 1946 Press Translations for SCAP. Sandwiched between an article concerning the hoarding of rice and wheat by Japanese citizens and another about the reconstruction of schools in Shizuoka, the Nagasaki article discussed the revival of Catholicism in Nagasaki after centuries of oppression and persecution. The perseverance of Catholicism in a mostly Shinto and Buddhist nation had caught the eye of occupation translators in an article about Nagasaki that made no reference to the atomic bombing nine months earlier. "T. Ogawa" translated the article "Catholicism in NAGASAKI," with a summary that highlighted the words of Bishop Yamaguchi Aijirô. "In regard to the idea of the reconstruction of Christianity, Bishop YAMAGUCHI, the Director of the NAGASAKI Catholic Vestry" writes,

Spring has come to the Catholic churches, which have been the object of oppression by the authorities for a long time. The destruction of URAGAMI [sic] village by the air-raids has certainly had a bad effect on the future of Christianity. But on the other hand, the ardent faith of the congregation [is] beyond comparison with that of Buddhists or Shinto believers. The Catholic churches in NAGASAKI have a traditional firmness. The rehabilitation of the NAGASAKI Catholic Churches which has already begun, was initiated substantially at [sic] instigation of the congregation.

The church authorities are planning to establish the JAPAN Catholic Church Rehabilitation Commission in JAPAN as well as in the UNITED STATES after negotiating with the TOKYO Catholic General Affairs Board. The commission will take charge of the rehabilitation of Christianity which is now in an exhausted condition throughout the country. In addition, the NAGASAKI vestry authorities are planning to organize a society of converts, and to call on the intellectual classes to establish a Catholic library to publicize the real character of the Catholic church. It is true that Christianity in JAPAN has been rowing with the current of the times and receiving immense aid from the Occupation Forces since the termination of the war. Nevertheless, we hope that the development of Christianity will be more substantial and more deeply-
rooted. We have often received contributions from the congregations and the Occupation Forces to the rehabilitation fund of the church. We are planning, however, to use this money more as a fund for the propagation of the faith [emphasis mine].

The American soldiers who occupied Nagasaki had taken an interest in the Catholic community since they arrived in late 1945, but officials in occupation headquarters in Tokyo and General MacArthur himself also hoped for the growth of the church in Japan. MacArthur wanted to Christianize Japan because he thought that Japan could only become truly democratic if it cultivated a "spiritual core." Christianity was "the antidote to Communism." In early 1947, MacArthur encouraged American Christian groups and the Vatican to send missionaries to propagate the faith, and he believed that if "no religion or belief was oppressed, the Occupation had every right to propagate Christianity."

Newspapers in Nagasaki took note of MacArthur's Christian faith and hope for the success of the religion in Japan. On June 25, 1949, the Nagasaki nichinichi reprinted in Japanese translation a June 23 article by the Associated Press that discussed MacArthur's hopes for Christianity in Japan: "Christianize Japan: General MacArthur, too, Explains the Spiritual Vacuum of the Japanese People." The article included MacArthur's explanation of "urgent matters" (kyûmu) for church groups in the United

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63 For a good discussion of General MacArthur's role in trying to fill the "spiritual vacuum" in Japan with Christianity, see Wittner, "MacArthur and the Missionaries," pp. 77-98.

64 Moore and Robinson, Partners for Democracy, p. 35.


States that "If one thousand missionaries come to Japan, Japan can be Christianized." And in a letter to a prominent member of the southern California Christian community, MacArthur expressed his belief that defeat enlightened the Japanese people to the "superficiality of their myths and legends (shisetsu). The state of the spiritual vacuum of the Japanese that resulted because of this represents the ideal context (bunri) for activities to evangelize (dendô) Christianity." Convincing the missionaries to try to fill Japan's "spiritual vacuum" was the easy part. But MacArthur could never persuade Washington to make Christianization official policy of the occupation. He succeeded in expanding Christian influence during the occupation, but as historian Lawrence S. Wittner notes, "'influence' is quite a different thing from conversion." As before, the duty of conversion fell to the missionaries.

Christianity in Japan benefited from "the policy of the occupation to facilitate the entry of missionaries into Japan." As a SCAP document stated in 1948, missionaries were "the first class of foreign personnel not attached to the occupation to be permitted entry. Their entry has preceded that of businessmen by almost a year and a half." In 1951, SCAP officials noted how "2,500 Christian missionaries have taken upon themselves the task of making Christ known to the people of Japan."

The initial stance of the occupation government was articulated in Operation Directive Number 91, which showed "no partiality to Christian missionaries." As Ralph J. D. Braibanti saw it in 1947, the directive amounted to a "discriminatory" policy that

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69 SCAP, Religions in Japan, p. 142.
70 Quoted in Wittner, "MacArthur and the Missionaries," p. 82.
"deprived [the missionaries] of certain privileges which were, indirectly, extended even
to Japanese nationals," such as food rations and other commodities. SCAP quickly
changed its policy in regard to missionaries, and the Eighth Army Operational Directive
Number 17 of February 19, 1947 rescinded the previous directive. The title of the new
directive, "Extension of Aid to Missionaries," as Braibanti noted, "was somewhat more
friendly." Paragraph three made it clear that "It is the policy of this theater to increase
greatly the Christian influence and every effort will be made to absorb missionaries as
rapidly as the churches can send them to this area." This did not mean that the
occupation authorities would make resources available to the missionaries without
condition, but that the "use of army supplies and facilities on a reimbursement basis in
cases of emergency and to prevent undue hardship" facilitated the coming of the
missionaries to Japan, even if it "effected no real alliance between the army and the
Christian church."71 It was up to the missionaries to keep the fire of Christian faith
burning in Japan.

The "candles of God" burned brightest in Nagasaki. The Christians there claimed
a long history of martyrdom, and the atomic destruction reassured them of their special
place in God's heart. Encouraged by postwar religious freedom and the spiritual and
material support of the international Christian community, the Urakami Catholics strove
to revive their community. The revival depended in no small part on raising Urakami

71 Ralph J. D. Braibanti, "Religious Freedom in Japan," in The Christian Century, July 9, 1947, p. 852. Braibanti went on to note, "Undoubtedly an alliance between Christianity and the occupation forces in Japan would make for conversion of Japanese in great numbers. Such a policy would not be incompatible with the Roman tradition in Christianity. In the final analysis our policy in Japan will serve to strengthen the Christian ideal as that ideal has been interpreted by liberal Protestantism since the days of the 'irrepressible' Roger Williams in this country."
Cathedral from its atomic ruin and building a new church to breathe life into the community.

III. Resurrecting the Cathedral

One month after the atomic bombing, the ruins of the Urakami Cathedral had already become the symbol of Nagasaki's atomic bombing. On September 6 and 7, 1945, before the arrival of U.S. troops, two reporters for the Yomiuri hôchi shinbun walked through ground zero to survey the damage. As they endured the stench of rotting bodies (shishū) mixed with "pungent gas," the remains of the giant cathedral on the hill caught their eye amid the flattened wasteland. The horror of the bomb hit the reporters hard as they stood in the gruesome remains of what was once a vibrant community, where they estimated at least one-third of the presumed 30,000 dead from the bombing were Catholic. As they walked among the rubble of the cathedral, they were told of the two priests and forty parishioners who had died in the blast and whose bodies still remained buried under the bricks. For the reporters, the tragedy of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki was exemplified by the destruction of Urakami, where "10,000 Christians (seikyōto) had been sacrificed" and the historic cathedral that had represented the international nature of the city now lay silent in a pile of rubble and corpses. The reporters called for the cathedral's "preservation as a memento (kinenbutsu)." The few surviving Catholics did not agree.

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72 Nagano Hideki thinks that the reporters, Miyamoto and Oshikawa, were probably from Tokyo or Osaka: Nagano Hideki, "Genbaku wa 'Kami no setsuri' ka: Nagai Takashi no zenkei to kōkei" in Josetsu XIX (Fukuoka: Kashoin, August 9, 1999), p. 43.

73 The version of the article that is referenced here is from the Nagasaki shinbun, 15 September 1945. At the time, the Nagasaki shinbun ran stories in cooperation with the Asahi shinbun, Mainichi shinbun, and the Yomiuri hôchi.
The Grassroots of Urakami

Nagasaki Catholics felt that a successful and effective reconstruction of Urakami would demonstrate to the world the wonder of their faith. "Today it is said that the culture of Christianity in particular," wrote Nagai Takashi in early 1949, "will be most useful (yaku ni tatsu) in rebuilding a new Japan. I think the rise of Urakami will surely become a reference" for the power of Christianity in overcoming adversity to successfully reconstruct in a "wasteland" (areno) while maintaining a "quiet brightness."74

From the beginning, Nagasaki Catholics considered the reconstruction of the Urakami Cathedral synonymous with the revival of their community. There could be no recovery, no healing, until the cathedral had been reconstructed on the same spot where their ancestors had labored for more than thirty years to build the original church. In the months following the bombing, approximately one thousand Urakami Catholics, still living in the dugout trenches, gathered for mass every Sunday in the "field of burned ruins" near the crumbled cathedral. The ruined icon of their community represented the tragedy that befell Urakami, but the piles of red bricks around which they held mass reminded the Catholics that they had lost their house of worship.75

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74 Nagai Takashi, *Hana saku oka* (Hill of Blossoming Flowers), prologue, in *Nagai Takashi zenshū*, v. 1, p. 141. Nagai finished writing *Hana saku oka* in March, 1949 and the book was published on June 20, 1949 by Hibiya shuppan, the same publisher as *Nagasaki no kan*e. Similar to *Rozario no kusari*, *Hana saku oka* traces the condition of Urakami through the early reconstruction process from wasteland (areno) to a "hill of blossoming flowers."

75 *Nagasaki shinbun*, 8 October 1945.
In early October 1945, Sadata Hiroshi, an Urakami Catholic clergyman, declared the hope that the Urakami Cathedral would be reconstructed as soon as possible in order to initiate a "speedy revival" (kyûsoku na fukkô). The greatest desire of the Catholics, he noted, was to "spread the teaching of 'love'," which defines "our dogma," to the souls of people in order to "breathe a strong breath" into the reconstruction effort. A church would be central to realizing this aim. The voices of the thousand Catholics praying amid the atomic ruins, as a reporter for the Nagasaki shinbun put it, expressed their ardent desire (netsugan): "Even a provisional church is fine, so as soon as possible [let there be] a place of worship (midô) on the grounds of Urakami."76

Catholic leaders understood that the reconstruction of a cathedral similar to the original was "more difficult than one could dream" (yume yori kon'nan), so they resolved to build a temporary wooden church.77 By November 1945, construction of the provisional church next to the cathedral ruins was under way, as various groups in Nagasaki, including occupation forces, contributed materials and labor to the effort.78 The small, wooden, provisional church, completed in December 1946 on an "elevated area of the burned ruins" was the first public building erected after the bombing and a promise of the reemergence of Catholics from the destruction.79

76 Nagasaki shinbun, 8 October 1945.


78 The wooden church was completed in 1946. For details of the provisional church (kari seidô), including its construction, see, for example: Kataoka, Nagai Takashi no shôgai, pp. 202-203. Father Nakada led groups into the mountains to collect lumber for the new church (p. 202). Allied occupation forces contributed materials (shizai): Nagasaki shinbun, 15 November 1945.

"The cathedral was demolished," wrote Nagai Takashi in 1949, "but that does not injure the omnipotence of God even a little, because it was a building. It was a collection of stones and bricks built by the hands of humans. That it would crumble when receiving the pressure of a blast is a phenomenon that rightly abides with physics." The bomb may have returned the cathedral to its original state of "stones and bricks," but the Catholic faith remained intact, if not stronger than before the tragedy.

In his 1949 book Hana saku oka (Hill of Blossoming Flowers), Nagai wrote that the reconstruction of the cathedral was essential to revive the "society of love" of ten thousand Catholics that had existed before the atomic bomb and had centered on the "largest cathedral in Asia." The destruction of the cathedral by the atomic "pika-don" and the "departure" of 8,000 believers from this world forced the villagers left behind to "think deeply about the Providence" of the tragedy, and now they "thank God who swells with love, praise [Him], quietly and brightly continue prayers and sacrifice day and night, and strive to build a village of blossoming flowers of love." The mission of the reconstruction was to spread Christian love.

Nagai elaborated on the need to remove the ruins, explaining, "Every time we see [the ruined Cathedral] (konna mono), not only do our hearts ache, but we also do not want to show the children who will be born in the future traces of the crimes (tsumi no ato) of our generation that erred and committed a war that burned even the house of God. Rather, we want to build a peaceful and beautiful church, and make this place a hill of

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80 Nagai, Hana saku oka, in Nagai Takashi zenshū, v. 1, p. 190.

81 Nagai, Hana saku oka, prologue, in Nagai Takashi zenshū, v. 1, p. 143.
blossoming flowers to point the hearts of the children freely to heaven." To this end, Nagai donated money for a public children's library and a thousand cherry trees to be planted near the cathedral and elementary schools in Urakami.

Leaders such as Nagai promoted education about the folly of war and the importance of peace, but they also advocated the erasure of any physical evidence that could tie themselves and their community to the war. The "crimes of our generation" meant those of all humanity, not just the Urakami believers. Future generations should not have to suffer for the crimes of the past generation, or so Nagai seemed to be arguing. Not only would the preservation of the cathedral ruins impede a revival of the community that survived the atomic bombing, but it also threatened the spiritual freedom of future generations.

A modest movement emerged in the late 1940s to raise money for the removal of the ruins and the construction of a new cathedral. Nagai and other Catholic leaders, such as Bishop Yamaguchi and Urakami Vicar Francis-Xavier Nakada, put together booklets appealing for the reconstruction of the cathedral. A 1949 photo-booklet entitled, *Urakami Tenshudō: The Church of Urakami, Nagasaki, Japan*, included sixteen pages of photos with short captions in both Japanese and English, telling the story of the Urakami Cathedral. Nagai described how just as Nagasaki's mushroom cloud represented a "beacon of peace" that ended the war (p. 2), so too did the cathedral that "bursted [sic] into flames" (p. 3). The booklet concluded with several photographs of the landscape of Urakami in 1949 that shows "no vestige of ruins." Nagai boasted, "Many houses are already rebuilt, fields have been cleanly tilled, every human figure on the road is moving

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82 As quoted in Kataoka, *Nagai Takashi no shōgai*, p. 199.
actively. If you look [at] this bright view, you shall feel the Will which comes from the Love of Lord [sic]" (p. 15). Vicar Nakada noted in a separate English booklet the "generous effort in manual labor and use of their own money" of the "few faithfuls [sic] who survived - some 2000, with the benediction of the Lord," built a "temporary chapel in six months," which was blessed by American Bishop O'Hara in June 1946. Still, he continued, "there will be no rest in this parish till the Catholic parishioners by their own efforts and the assistance of every sympathiser have erected a new and larger Church over the ruins of the old one. God be blessed."

By 1949, Urakami had made strides in recovery. The only thing left was the removal of the two remaining walls of the cathedral and the construction of a new one. Meanwhile, the skeletal remains and the provisional church next to it served as the center of Catholic worship. Celebrations of religious holidays, funerals, prayer vigils, and mass were held as regularly as could be managed in the first decade after the bombing. In 1950, weddings averaged twenty-five per month, sometimes with two or three ceremonies per day.

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83 Nagai Takashi, ed., Urakami tenshudô: The Church of Urakami, Nagasaki, Japan (Nagasaki: Urakami tenshudô, 1949), page numbers cited in text. The booklet was printed in Tokyo. The "[at]" that I include in the quote was actually penned in with pink ink, probably by Nagai. The version I possess has been heavily copy-edited in pink pen.

84 Fr. Francis-Xavier Nakada, undated, untitled document, in Shiryô folder, NTMM. The page includes before and after photographs of the Urakami Cathedral.

85 Kataoka, Nagai Takashi no shôgai, p. 203.
Bride on wedding day, 1958. Courtesy of Takahara Itaru.
Preserve or Remove: The City Debate, 1953-1958

In the 1950s, Nagasaki residents had a choice: preserve the ruins of the Urakami Cathedral as a symbol of the atomic experience, the folly of war, and the city's role in the peace movement; or, remove the ruins, put the tragedy behind them, and move forward as they emerge from the ashes reborn and renewed. After the piles of bricks were cleared in 1948, two walls remained that had resisted the blast: the corner wall of the southwest belfry and most of the southern wall. The Catholics wanted the walls removed and a new cathedral constructed in the same spot, but their view ran counter to the goals of the Nagasaki City officials and residents who sought to preserve the ruins as a commemoration of the bombing. The resulting debate between the Urakami Catholics and the non-Christian residents, including the City Council, defined the climate regarding

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the reconstruction of Urakami through the late 1950s. Discussions about the fate of the ruins, including in newspapers and journals, was often phrased as "preserve or remove?" (hozon ka tekkyo ka).

In 1949, the Nagasaki City Council inaugurated the Committee for the Preservation of Atomic Bombing Materials (Genbaku shiryô hozon i'in kai) and charged it with the task of designating and maintaining physical traces of the atomic bombing, including melted bottles, flash-burned wood, and the two cathedral walls. During its twenty-seven general meetings held between 1949 and 1958, the committee voted nine times in favor of preserving the Urakami Cathedral ruins, which reflected the general point of view in the city. Indeed, one reporter noted, the committee represented "the voice of the residents." Every year, the committee submitted a report to the mayor recommending that "the ruins should be preserved." In the years since the bombing, the ruins had become a major tourist destination—a "sightseeing relic of Atomic Nagasaki" (atomu Nagasaki kankô ibutsu)—which visitors looked at to discover the horrific power of the atomic bomb. The primary goal of the City Council and the committee in preserving physical traces of the bomb's destruction was to convey Nagasaki's atomic experience to visitors and to educate posterity. From the early 1950s, the Nagasaki City Tourism Association (Nagasaki-shi kankô kyôkai) and the Nagasaki City Cultural


88 Takase, Nagasaki: kieta mô hitotsu no "Genbaku Dômu", p. 115. See also for discussion of the committee's submissions to the mayor: Nagasaki City Council Meeting Notes, 17-18 February 1958, "Kyû Urakami tenshudô no genbaku shiryô hozon ni kan suru ketsugian" (Resolution Regarding the Preservation of the Old Urakami Cathedral as Atomic-Bombing Record): preserved at the Nagasaki shigikai jimukyoku, gijika, Nagasaki.

89 For "sightseeing relic of Atomic Nagasaki," see: Katorikkukyô hô, 1 September 1951.
Association formed a movement to ensure the preservation of the ruins as a memorial (*kinenbutsu*) to the atomic bombing and as "significant evidence (*shiryô*) that speaks of the tragedy of war."\(^90\) The City Council and the other groups had the full support of the non-Catholic *hibakusha*, who wanted neither the memory of their tragedy diluted nor the voice of their peace movement silenced.

In 1951, the Catholics explained their side of the issue in the parish bi-monthly bulletin. Removal of the ruins was necessary, it was argued, because the remaining walls of the old Urakami Cathedral were a "significant obstacle" to building a new cathedral on the same spot. Furthermore, "rather than leave behind a relic (*ibutsu*) of war," it would be more appropriate to remove the ruins and cultivate the "hill of blossoming peaceful flowers" in order to "plant hearts of peace."\(^91\) Construction of a new cathedral was also a physical necessity. In the years since the bombing, the numbers of parishioners increased to such a degree that the makeshift wooden church built in 1946 could not serve the needs of the growing community. In late 1948, the community in Urakami had grown to 4,319 adherents, including 285 newly baptized Catholics in the same year.\(^92\)

Catholic leaders recognized the "high honor" of Urakami's popular image as an "atomic-bombing tourism site," but they also felt that the impediments represented by the ruins of the cathedral could not be left unaddressed. It would be an unconscionable act against the "guardian of Urakami, the Immaculate Mother Mary, and to our ancestors in

\(^90\) *Katorikkukyô hô*, 1 September 1951.

\(^91\) *Katorikkukyô hô*, 1 September 1951.

\(^92\) *Katorikkukyô hô*, 15 December 1948. The number of Catholics in the Nagasaki diocese at this time was 60,624: *ibid*. By 1952, the Nagasaki diocese had risen to 69,740. It is interesting to note that in the 1950s, clergymen of the Nagasaki diocese were still actively engaged in work to "enlighten" (*kyôka*) the "hiding Christians" (*senpuku Kirishitan*), which meant convincing them to come out of "hiding" and embrace the Nagasaki Catholic community: see *Katorikkukyô hô*, 1 August 1953.
heaven" if a new cathedral were not built. In February 1953, community leaders resolved to make an effort to realize the reconstruction of the cathedral on the same spot as the old one.\(^93\) In July of the following year, the Catholics formed the Association for the Reconstruction of Urakami Cathedral (Urakami Tenshudô saiken i'in kai) to raise money for the project. In May 1955, Bishop Yamaguchi left for a ten-month trip to the United States to seek funding for the project, visiting St. Paul, Chicago, New York, Washington D.C., New Orleans, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Honolulu.\(^94\) Upon his return in 1956, Catholic leaders submitted a request to the city to remove the ruins of the cathedral.

Over the years, the Catholic rationale for removal and reconstruction evolved to include other justifications. Bishop Yamaguchi told a journalist in early 1958 that remains of the atomic bombing do not represent peace, but rather "are too inextricable from the memory of a tragic past." (Yamaguchi did not elaborate on what he meant by "tragic past," whether he meant the atomic bombing generally or the community's patriotic fervor in a war that decimated them). Furthermore, he explained, the mission of the Catholics was the "salvation of souls" (ikita tamashii o suku'u) and a new cathedral was absolutely necessary to this end. An Urakami parishioner told the same journalist that it was "bothersome" (komaru) that the ruined cathedral was considered a sightseeing destination. "Many people point their cameras at believers who are holding mass" and take their photograph, "snap snap" (pachi pachi). Day after day, "busloads of tourists pulled up to the chapel and the adjoining ruins, and near the devout prayers being offered

\(^{93}\) Katorikkukyô hô, 1 April 1953.

\(^{94}\) Katorikkukyô hô, 1 March 1956. Yamaguchi left on May 5, 1955 and returned on February 9, 1956. During his time in the United States, the Villanova University School of Law, a Catholic school founded in 1953, bestowed on Yamaguchi an honorary law degree.
they made sounds (abekku no kyōsei) as if looking in a zoo."\(^{95}\) Moreover, since the Catholics wanted to build a new church with their own labor and money "on our own land," "it doesn't make any sense when people shout, 'Come now, leave the ruins! They're a symbol of peace.'" The Catholics viewed Urakami as a "holy land" that was rich in Catholic history and martyrdom, and they never seriously considered the option to build a new cathedral in a different spot.\(^{96}\)

The head of the Nagasaki City Tourism Office pointed out the loss of revenue for the city that would result from removing the cathedral walls. "The ruins of the cathedral are the most important tourism resource of atomic-bombed-city Nagasaki," he declared. "Removing them will be a fatal minus of financial resources for the city." The Catholics were appalled at the city's insistence on "using the sacred cathedral as a tool for tourism." Kataoka Yakichi responded to the city official that, "[We] want to rebuild (saiken) as quickly as possible with the strength of Catholic believers. To ignore this wish of ours and insist on using (tsukaō to suru) the present state [of the cathedral] as a billboard for tourism is religious sacrilege (shūkyō no bôtoku)."\(^{97}\)

Realizing the need to respect the religious concerns of the Catholics, the Committee for the Preservation of Atomic Bombing Materials proposed several compromises. One, reinforce the ruins so that they would not pose a physical threat as time went on; two, build a new cathedral out of the bricks and two walls of the ruins; three, build a new cathedral next to the present ruins; and four, build a new cathedral in

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\(^{95}\) Original phrase in Japanese for "...as if peeking in a zoo": "Maru de dōbutsuen de mo nozoku yó na abekku no kyōsei mo nagareta."


an entirely new location. Urakami representative Father Nakashima Banri responded to the committee that, one, the present site was entirely too small, so it is impossible to leave the ruins as they were; two, the ruins were "weathering" and would present a danger in the future; and three, refining the tragic appearance of the cathedral, from a religious standpoint, was not acceptable (omoshirokunai). In short, the Catholics would not budge.

Some City Council members and hibakusha also refused to budge as they fought to protect the so-called "scar of the devil" (akuma no tsumeato). At City Council meetings throughout the 1950s, officials were unanimously in favor of preserving the ruins, but the persistence of the Catholics challenged their resolve. On January 21, 1958, at a meeting of the Committee for the Preservation of Atomic Bombing Materials over the fate of the two church walls, Father Nakashima declared, matter-of-factly, that the Catholics would begin removal of the ruins in February and construct a new cathedral on the same site.

The City Council responded by holding an emergency meeting on February 17 to produce a resolution of the city's official approach to the issue. Iwaguchi Natsuo, a former reporter for the Nagasaki nichinichi shinbun and, at thirty, the youngest member of the City Council, stood out in the meeting. In a last effort to preserve the ruins, Iwaguchi pleaded to the mayor and the rest of the council that the ruins held value in conveying the experience of a generation and educating others about the history of the

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99 The debate over the fate of the ruins was sometimes phrased in religious terms by both sides. The ruins were also referred to as the "Crucifix of the Twentieth Century" (Nijû seiki no jûjika): see, Opinion-Editorial, "Kieru tsume ato."

city, not to mention standing as a relic of the bombing to warn future generations of the dangers of war and atomic weapons. He pointed out that only the residents of Nagasaki and Hiroshima knew the realities of the atomic bomb, something that not even President Truman or the politicians who waged the war or anyone else in the world could ever know. He said that the two cities were the only ones in the world where boys and girls walked around with keloid scars. Furthermore, Iwaguchi argued, it was the right, and indeed the duty, of the citizens of Nagasaki and Hiroshima to prevent future atomic tragedies (hisan) and cry out (sakebu) for peace. He asked for the opinion of Mayor Tagawa and for an explanation of the political negotiations (seiji kōshō), as well as the process of negotiation (sesshō) with the Catholics, that "invited the most regrettable result," namely the removal of the ruins.¹⁰¹

Tagawa disagreed with Iwaguchi on three grounds. "It is true that [the ruins] serve as a resource of tourism for Nagasaki City today," but it was not easily discernable "whether or not [the ruins] are essential to protect peace." In regard to the debate over the role of the ruined cathedral as "an adequate resource (shiryō) to relate the tragedy (hisan) of the atomic bomb," Tagawa declared, "I will speak frankly. As a resource to convey the tragedy of the atomic bomb, it is not appropriate. In my view, there is no need to maintain [the ruined cathedral] to protect peace." Furthermore, Tagawa continued, "I whole-heartedly (zenpuku) support the hope that the Urakami Cathedral will be quickly restored (fukkō) to its former appearance and reconstructed as a future anchor for the

¹⁰¹ Nagasaki City Council Meeting Notes, 17-18 February 1958, "Kyū Urakami Tenshudō no genbaku shiryō hozon ni kan suru ketsugian." Iwaguchi said the city names, Nagasaki and Hiroshima, in that order.
hearts of the believers. I pray that such a church be built as soon as possible." Tagawa was not Catholic.

The meeting had officially begun at 11:04 a.m., but after the statements by and brief discussion between Iwaguchi and Tagawa, the council broke for lunch at 11:33 a.m. When it resumed at 2:40 p.m., only twenty of the original forty-one attending councilmen returned, leaving the matter unresolved. Iwaguchi was furious and demanded that the absence of his twenty-one colleagues go on record. The few remaining councilmen, among whom not everyone felt as passionately as Iwaguchi about preserving the ruins, agreed to leave the final decision to the City Council Chairman, Wakiyama Hiroshi, who had not shown up to the meeting at all.

Shortly after the February meeting, Iwaguchi formed the group Satsuki kai, which nicknamed themselves the "Justice League" (Seigiha) and declared their role as "proprietors of 'passion'." The League promoted the same arguments to preserve the ruins that Iwaguchi had put forth in the February meeting, but their efforts were to no avail. In a final meeting on the matter of the ruins in mid-March, the City Council voted to leave the final decision in the hands of Mayor Tagawa.

The Justice League joined with the hibakusha group Nagasaki genbaku seinen otome no kai (Nagasaki Atomic Bombing Association of Young Men and Women) and

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102 "Anchor...": "Shinja no shōrai no kokoro no yoridokoro."

103 Nagasaki City Council Meeting Notes, 17-18 February 1958.


105 Opinion-Editorial, "Kieru tsume ato," p. 31. For a more detailed account of the days between the February meeting and the final decision to allow the removal of the ruins, see Takase, Nagasaki: kaeta mó hitotsu no "Genbaku Dōmu", esp. pp. 148-152. Takase discusses Mayor Tagawa's and Wakiyama Hiroshi's visits to Bishop Yamaguchi.
submitted a petition to Mayor Tagawa with 10,000 signatures in support of their cause. The groups realized, however, that mere signatures would change little and that more concrete action had to be taken. The hibakusha group became the "earnest voice of city residents," joining with another survivor group headed by Fukahori Katsuichi (himself a Catholic), and together submitted three concrete proposals to the City Council to prevent the removal of the ruins.\(^{106}\) They proposed, one, to hold surveys all over the country and publish the results in the media to develop the issue as one of "national public opinion." Two, to invite the National Commission for Protection of Cultural Properties (Bunkazai hogo i'inkai) to Nagasaki and "request its opinion."\(^{107}\) And, three, to provide financial backing to gain control of the reconstruction project. At one point, Iwaguchi even suggested petitioning the Pope, but he realized that he could not compete with the influence of Bishop Yamaguchi. All proposals came too late as the City Council had already ceded the final decision to Mayor Tagawa.\(^{108}\) Unlike Councilman Iwaguchi, many of the other members of the City Council were apathetic, and the movement of the residents came too late to inspire any action in the council.\(^{109}\)

The mayor decided to allow the Catholics to remove the ruins and build a new cathedral. In the end, a single column from the old cathedral was placed in Peace Park near ground zero to continue as a memorial to the tragedy of the atomic bombing, but for Iwaguchi and the hibakusha, it stood as a memento of the loss of the city's main symbol

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\(^{106}\) The group headed by Fukahori was the Nagasaki-ken dōin gakuto giseisha no kai (Nagasaki Prefectural Association of [Atomic-Bombing] Victims Who were Mobilized Students [during the war]).

\(^{107}\) The Bunkazai hogo i'inkai had already made Ōura Cathedral in southern Nagasaki City a national treasure in March 1953.


of the atomic tragedy. The column, measuring ten meters by three meters, cost the city 1,000,000 yen to move.\footnote{Nagasaki City Council Meeting Notes, 21 April 1958.}
The Lost Symbol of Nagasaki: Religion, Memory, and Politics

Mayor Tagawa's decision left many Nagasaki residents furious and some people around the country confused. One resident attributed the loss of the ruins to the apathetic and uncaring attitude of the City Council and general public in Nagasaki. Survivor groups in Hiroshima and Tokyo, such as the Gensuikyō and the Fujin dantai, struggled to comprehend Nagasaki's self-destruction of their "peace symbol." Another city resident wrote, from April 14, 1958 the "heartless echoes of hammers" could be heard tearing down the ruined walls of the Urakami Cathedral. Nagasaki non-Catholic hibakusha considered the loss of the symbol as a product of "religious egoism," because

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111 The loss of the ruins that marked Nagasaki's image as an "atomic-bombed city" (genbaku toshi) and a peace activist city still sparks anger and regret in Nagasaki today.


113 The Catholics actually began tearing down the ruin walls on March 14. See, among others, Takase, Nagasaki: kieta mō hitotsu no "Genbaku Dōmu", p. 266.
the Catholics wanted to forget their own suffering at the expense of the memory of other survivors. *Hibakusha* blamed city officials, too, because their approach to commemorating the bomb seemed incongruous with their stated mission as an atomic-bombed city to stay active in the peace movement. Survivor and activist Watanabe Chieko asked why the city had spent 30,000,000 yen on a "Peace Statue" in 1955 but refused to leave the ruins of the cathedral at no cost. She declared that leaving at least the "burned Maria statue" would "have given us courage," but more importantly the ruins "were no longer just the possession of the [Catholics]." For her and the other *hibakusha*, the cathedral ruins stood as a symbol of the tragedy, which they would never forget and did not want to be forgotten by others.114

The Catholics, on the other hand, were delighted. The clergy boasted to the community that the new cathedral would be same design as the old one, but bigger, and instead of bricks it would be built of reinforced concrete. The cost of the initial construction stage would be 50,000,000 yen, but, whereas the first cathedral had taken thirty years to build, planners estimated less than one year for the new one.115 The new Urakami Cathedral was completed by October 1959.116 While the Catholics gained a new place of worship that symbolized the recovery of their community, Nagasaki had lost its most recognizable symbol as an atomic-bombed city.


The gain for the Catholics proved to be a loss for the peace activists of Nagasaki. For thirteen years the ruins of the Urakami Cathedral had stood as the city's symbol of the experience of the atomic bomb, usually linked to the Atomic Dome in Hiroshima. In the mid-1960s, hibakusha and city officials in Hiroshima began a movement to ensure the preservation of the dome. They reached out to the nation for donations, hoping to raise 100,000,000 yen, but the overwhelming response they received brought in 409,000,000 yen, enough to maintain the dome for at least several decades. Approximately 3,500 letters of support poured in to the city from all over Japan along with donations.

The failure of Nagasaki residents to protect their atomic symbol harmed the city's national image. By the 1950s Hiroshima had become the center of the peace movement in Japan, fulfilling its mission as put forth in the reconstruction laws of 1949 to become the "peace commemoration city." Nagasaki, in contrast, had been growing farther away from its identity as an atomic-bombed city in its mission to rebuild as an "international cultural city" and as a city where the Catholic community had considerable influence. Some commentators acknowledged—and many Nagasaki residents agreed—that without the cathedral ruins, the city was left with only "empty symbols" (kyozô), such as the 1955 Peace Statue. The popular statement that emerged in the 1950s describing the presence of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the peace movement—"Hiroshima Rages, Nagasaki Prays"—captured the moment when the Catholic influence on the cityscape of Nagasaki was arguably at its strongest.

117 See, for example, Kamata Sadao, "Nagasaki no ikari to inori: hankaku shôgen 36 nen no kiseki kara" in Nihon no genbaku bungaku (Horupu shuppan, 1983), v. 15, pp. 415-416.


119 See, for example, Nishi Nippon, 8 August 2002.
The politics of religion and war memory shaped the interests of Nagasaki and its developing image as an atomic-bombed city in the 1950s. The desires of the Catholics outweighed the need to preserve the symbolic relic of the bombing, and the appeals of Iwaguchi and his Justice League, the hibakusha organizations, and city residents fell on deaf ears. On returning from a visit to the United States in 1956, Mayor Tagawa changed his stance regarding the fate of the ruins, which had been one of preservation, and began to favor the point of view of the Catholics. Nagasaki residents were baffled, and rumors surfaced that the mayor had been bribed during his visit to the United States. His visit to St. Paul especially "stinks," the rumor went, as if he had promised something to officials there. Other rumors posed the possibility that half of the reconstruction fund had come from overseas and therefore the Christians had stronger influence over the situation.\(^\text{120}\)

At the very least, however, it was clear that influential Christian groups and politicians with whom Mayor Tagawa met during his trip to the United States had indeed changed his mind. Perhaps they had managed to persuade Tagawa that the preservation of an atomic relic that symbolized the perfidy committed by the United States against Japan's Christian center would complicate the cultivation of relations between Nagasaki—not to mention Japan—and the United States.\(^\text{121}\)

The characterization of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki as retribution for Japanese military acts during the war, especially for the attack on Pearl Harbor, surfaced again when the city officials of St. Paul considered Nagasaki as a sister city. St. Paul

\(^{120}\) For these and other rumors, see Opinion-Editorial, "Kieru tsume ato," p. 27.

\(^{121}\) Takase Tsuyoshi considers Tagawa's visit to St. Paul, Minnesota particularly telling of the desires of politicians from both cities to forget the violence of the war for the sake of improved political relations. The proposal of St. Paul officials to become Nagasaki's sister-city, Takase claims, was tantamount to a request to Nagasaki residents to "forget the event of the past that is the atomic bombing" because "we are no longer concerned with Pearl Harbor": Takase, *Nagasaki: kieta mō hitotsu no "Genbaku Dōmu"*, p. 126.
officials had drafted an agreement between the two cities to be signed by Mayor Tagawa on his scheduled (but postponed) trip to the city on December 7, 1955, the fourteenth anniversary of Pearl Harbor, and tenth year since the atomic bombings.\textsuperscript{122} Even though Mayor Tagawa did not make his visit to the United States until August 1956, the purpose of his trip was to improve relations between Nagasaki and the United States, and the Pearl Harbor connection could perhaps be seen as a gesture of reconciliation on the part of St. Paul officials.

During his political tour of the United States from August 23, the layout and infrastructure of American cities impressed Mayor Tagawa and his delegation, informing their vision of Nagasaki's future as a modern, international city. On their return to Nagasaki in September 1956, Tagawa addressed the City Council, presenting his impressions and reflections from meetings and tours with mayors and other city officials in St. Paul, Chicago, New York, Washington D.C., New Orleans, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Honolulu. Tagawa was impressed most with the warm perceptions of and trust in Japanese people that Americans had in the mid-1950s, which he attributed to the cultural interaction with "approximately 2,000,000 occupation forces" until 1952. The Americans who had resided in Japan, Tagawa claimed, returned to the United States and told other Americans how the Japanese were an "extremely good" and "extremely kind" people and that Japan was "an extremely beautiful place." Having realized this during his trip, Tagawa said, "I was delighted as I returned to Japan."\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{122} Takase contends that the choice of the anniversary of Pearl Harbor as the date of ratification for the sister-city treaty with Nagasaki suggested that St. Paul officials saw the atomic bombing as punishment for the Hawaii attack: Takase, \textit{Nagasaki: kieta mō hitotsu no "Genbaku Dōmu"}, pp. 124-125.

\textsuperscript{123} Nagasaki City Council Meeting Notes, 28 September 1956.
Most of the cities that he and his colleagues visited, Tagawa thought, were well organized and maintained. In Chicago "we learned much about the infrastructure of large cities," parts of which could become a "reference" for Nagasaki. In New Orleans, the "second largest trade port in America" which was on the verge of surpassing New York, they received a tour of the harbor from the mayor, who also gave them "detailed materials" regarding the infrastructure of the port. The mayor of San Francisco presented Tagawa with a key to the city. Two cities that did not particularly impress Tagawa were New York and Los Angeles. New York's streets were narrower than even Tokyo's and, "indeed, it is a congested city." Tagawa declared that "it is perhaps the most inconvenient city," and city officials failed to impress him with their explanations of building construction. The biggest issue for Los Angeles was its smog and pollution, which made the city "extremely unpleasant."124

It was Tagawa's and the Nagasaki deputation's first stop in St. Paul for six days that left the greatest impression regarding American cities and the potential for Nagasaki to become an equally beautiful city. St. Paul, Tagawa told the council members, was "one of the top ten most cultural and prettiest cities in America." He continued that it would not be an exaggeration to say that the fact that Nagasaki and St. Paul made the first ever sister-city relationship between Japan and the United States meant that they were representative cities of their countries, noting that other cities were following Nagasaki and St. Paul's lead by creating sister-city alliances as well. Tagawa was "honored" to present such a positive report regarding Nagasaki's sister city.125

124 Nagasaki City Council Meeting Notes, 28 September 1956.
125 Nagasaki City Council Meeting Notes, 28 September 1956.
The cities that Tagawa and the Nagasaki group had visited (minus New York and Los Angeles) gave them the feeling that American cities were well organized and "pretty." They were not, however, "beautiful," Tagawa claimed. Even so, the visit presented Nagasaki city officials with a direction of city construction for which to aim. Tagawa explained to the council that there were areas of Nagasaki that could not even be called "pretty," let alone "beautiful," and the desire to make the city "beautiful" should drive construction and tourism projects.¹²⁶

Mayor Tagawa's visit to the United States, especially to St. Paul, convinced him that Nagasaki had much work ahead of it in order to become a modern city on par with cities in the United States. The Urakami Cathedral was perhaps an impediment to the construction of modern, international Nagasaki in the 1950s. Bishop Yamaguchi had visited each of the eight cities—in the exact same order—and met with the same officials there more than a year before Tagawa. The primary purpose of Yamaguchi's trip was to raise funds for the reconstruction of the cathedral, which, plausibly, came up in discussion between American officials and Mayor Tagawa during his visit. From the standpoint of constructing Nagasaki as a modern, "beautiful" city as Tagawa came to hope after his visit, the preservation of the cathedral ruins perhaps stood as an obstacle to such a plan. Specifically, Tagawa may have thought that city funds could be put to better use in achieving the construction of a "beautiful" Nagasaki, rather than wasted on maintaining a destroyed cathedral, which he claimed had no role in "protecting peace."

He explained to Iwaguchi Natsuo during their debate in 1958, "I have no intention (kangae) to throw large amounts of city funds into preserving (nokosu)" the cathedral

¹²⁶ Nagasaki City Council Meeting Notes, 28 September 1956.
Thus the cathedral ruins, Tagawa thought, presented the final obstacle to the revival of Urakami and the construction of Nagasaki as a modern city.

On May 25, 1959, midway through the construction of the new Urakami Cathedral, the Vatican raised the status of Nagasaki from diocese to archdiocese. The post-atomic revival of the Catholic community of Nagasaki that had begun with the leadership of Nagai Takashi began to see real results as a "hill of blossoming flowers" in a dramatically altered landscape. By the end of the 1950s, the Catholics had rebuilt the devastated landscape of Urakami, increased their numbers, built a children's library and other educational facilities, planted a hill of cherry trees, and received recognition from the Vatican. Most important, they had fought against formidable political forces to win the right to rebuild the spiritual center of their community. Many accused the Catholics of wanting to forget the atomic bombing, but community leaders such as Nagai Takashi never encouraged such forgetting. Removal of the ruins and the construction of a new cathedral represented an attempt at healing and moving on, and it exemplified the revival of the Urakami community. Forgetting the experience of wartime, however, was a different matter. During the war, the Catholics dedicated themselves to the war effort as much as their neighbors, but in the postwar years they took advantage of the view of the international Christian community that the Japanese Christians had been victims of the state. With the removal of the cathedral ruins in 1958, the last remaining physical trace of Urakami's "tragic past," as Bishop Yamaguchi had called it, vanished.

\[127\] Nagasaki City Council Meeting Notes, 17-18 February 1958.

\[128\] Van Hecken, *The Catholic Church in Japan Since 1859*, p. 106. Yamaguchi Aijirô became Archbishop of the Nagasaki Diocese. To this day, the only other archdiocese in Japan is Tokyo.
Within the span of approximately forty years from 1915 to the 1950s, the Urakami Cathedral symbolized the resilience of the Catholics during centuries of persecution, the international nature of Nagasaki, the marriage of faith and patriotism during the Second World War, the destruction of the Catholic community by the atomic bomb, and a symbol of peace that illuminated the folly of war and the mission for peace. The new Urakami Cathedral which replaced the ruins in 1958 symbolized the revival of the Catholics, but the commemorative landscape of Nagasaki had lost its primary site of atomic memory.
Living witnesses still exist. The people who felt heat rays that left keloid scars on their skin, who barely escaped alive crawling from among collapsed buildings, who concealed their breath and hid deep inside the dugout shelters—they are still surviving. The people who hatched maggots in their wounds, the people whose hair fell out and could not stop bleeding from their gums, the people who struggled to escape from the abyss of death—they greet today, the twenty-fifth year, still living.


**Chapter Five**

*Living within the Walls of Silence: The Hibakusha Struggle for Survival, 1945-1970s*

In 1970, the *Nagasaki genbaku hibaku kyôshi no kai* (Nagasaki Association of Atomic Bombing Educators) published a collection of essays that addressed the state of Nagasaki's image as an atomic-bombed city in Japan. Written by *hibakusha*, the book, *Chinmoku no kabe o yabutte* (Breaking Down the Walls of Silence) analyzed the historical situation and discussed the representative figures who contributed to the formation of Nagasaki's post-atomic image of passivity and prayer rather than activism and memory. No longer could the *hibakusha* scholars, poets, and activists let the significance of their city's atomic bombing be ignored in national memory and effaced by that of Hiroshima. The time had come to break down the walls of silence and educate the nation about the "living witnesses," who, like their Hiroshima counterparts, had experienced atomic destruction and strove to preserve their memory through peace activism and testimonial literature.

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In the decades after the bomb, Hiroshima became the center of peace and anti-nuclear movements. Nagai Takashi's books, which presented the only narrative of the Nagasaki bomb to be widely read outside of the city in the early postwar years, not to mention the debate over the cathedral ruins in the 1950s, overshadowed the experiences of non-Christian survivors. To be sure, in the first two and a half decades after the bomb and before the survivors "broke down the walls of silence," some hibakusha spoke openly about their experience of the atomic bombing and others related their stories in collections of testimonies, poetry, art, or participation in the peace movements. But few had openly or effectively challenged the popular image of the city as "lagging" behind Hiroshima, hence the saying in the 1950s of "Hiroshima Rages, Nagasaki Prays." In other words, the Nagasaki hibakusha's production of atomic-bomb literature (genbaku bungaku) and participation in the peace movement did not compare to that of Hiroshima.

Even though Nagasaki hibakusha may have initially seemed unproductive compared to their Hiroshima counterparts, they were never passive about their atomic bombing experience. They understood better than any politician or critic of their presumed passivity that "we must never forget" the weapon that blackened human beings "like grilled fish." The hibakusha felt the responsibility to educate others about the tragedy in order to ensure that it never happened again.\(^2\) Despite the municipal policies of reconstruction undertaken in the two atomic-bombed cities, the hibakusha of Nagasaki performed the same activism as their colleagues in Hiroshima. In the first three decades after the bomb, the Nagasaki hibakusha "struggled to escape from the abyss of death" and embrace their role as "living witnesses."

\(^2\) Chinmoku no kabe o yabutte, p. 1.
From 1945 until approximately 1970, Nagasaki hibakusha worked to share their experiences and interpretations of the bombing. Some found catharsis in testimony, literature, and peace activism. Others hoped that by speaking of the horrors of an atomic bomb, people throughout the world would acknowledge the ever-growing threat of nuclear war and work to avoid it during the Cold War. Still others felt compelled to relate the grotesque reality of the bomb, which appeared to be lost in the lofty religious interpretation of Nagai Takashi and the desire of the Catholics to erase the relics of destruction to make Urakami "a hill of blossoming flowers." Survivors also fought for medical relief for health problems related to wounds or exposure to radiation. The 1950s and 1960s witnessed movements of hibakusha in Nagasaki that strove for a place in the landscape of popular memory. They undertook active memory work, such as the systematic collection of survivor testimonies and participation in the international peace movement, challenging the image of the city as somehow inferior to Hiroshima.

I. The Walls of Silence

In the first two and a half decades after the bombing, at least three social and political obstacles impeded the attempts of Nagasaki hibakusha to give voice to their experience. Memory studies scholars have argued that trauma requires the passing of time, a "period of latency," to be properly addressed. In the case of Nagasaki survivors, the period of latency was in part imposed from the outside, by occupation censorship, social discrimination, municipal policies of reconstruction, the Christian image of ground

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3 Historian Dominick LaCapra writes: The "traumatic event is repressed or denied [by survivors] and registers only belatedly (nachträglich) after the passage of a period of latency": Dominick LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 9.
zero, and the persistent Hiroshima-centrism of memory of the atomic bombs. The latter three obstructions to hibakusha activism that existed in Nagasaki were never present in Hiroshima.

Even after a partial lifting of censorship in late 1949 when the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) was dissolved, media representations of the bomb continued to be suppressed. On June 9, 1950, the communist newspaper Akahata (Red Flag) released a special on the Hiroshima bomb, entitled, Heiwa sensen (Peace Front), which included six photographs. To coincide with distribution of the paper, Akahata members coordinated a photo exhibit in Hiroshima, called, "The Brutality of the Atomic Bomb" (Genbaku no sanjô). American occupation officials quickly suppressed the Hiroshima publication and targeted Akahata to be shut down. Of course, the communist position of the paper explained this reaction, which was different than the treatment of Nagai Takashi's books. On June 7, General MacArthur had already ordered the purge of the editorial board of Akahata; on June 26 the publication was ordered to halt activities for one month for printing unfavorable articles on the American situation in Korea; and on July 18 it was terminated.

Immediately after the occupation ended in April 1952, hibakusha and journalists were free to write on the bombings, and many journals and other print media soon

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6 Takemae, Inside GHQ, p. 482. SCAP censorship was not always thorough and seemed sporadic at times. For example, the August 7, 1949 Shûkan asahi special on Hiroshima published three articles on the bomb that included a photo of a "shadow of death" on a concrete slab where a person was vaporized by the atomic bomb.
published special issues on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 6, *Asahi gurafu* published a special, titled, "The First Presentation of the Damage of the Atomic Bombs" (*Genbaku higai no sho kōkai*), and on November 15, the journal *Kaizō* dedicated an issue to "This Calamity of the Atomic Bombs" (*Kono genbaku ka*). Both publications included grotesque photos of human casualties of the bomb, which signaled the demolition of the first wall of silence for both cities. However, the end of the occupation did not mean the end of silence for all survivors, and the effect of the forced silence during the years of censorship took years to wear off entirely.

**Social Discrimination and Self-Imposed Silence**

Survivors in both cities endured social discrimination that convinced many of them that silence was better than unwanted attention. The atomic bomb created a stigma that plagued survivors and affected their livelihood for decades. The *hibakusha* had difficulty getting work if they did not conceal the fact, if possible, that they had experienced the bomb, and at work, discrimination continued. A 1975 survey conducted by the Ministry of Health and Welfare found that two percent of respondents reported "adverse discrimination" in the workplace. Even some second-generation *hibakusha* were refused work.

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7 The special edition includes the translation of a speech by Albert Einstein.

8 Social discrimination has lasted in certain forms to the present day.


10 See, for example, *Mainichi shinbun*, 1 August 1970.
The stigma of the bomb also affected social interactions. Although hibakusha frequently married other hibakusha, many others had difficulty finding marriage partners for reasons of health or the fear that the effects of radiation would be passed on to their children.\(^{11}\) One hibakusha woman from Urakami with keloid scarring covering her entire body was lucky enough to find a partner, also a hibakusha, and they were married in 1947. The following year she gave birth to a boy, but nine days later his nose began bleeding and he died. Her mother-in-law asked her to give her son a divorce, because she "didn't want a daughter-in-law who breeds abnormal babies."\(^{12}\) Birth defects were common among babies born of hibakusha. Some common birth defects and other complications that resulted from radiation, whether the mother was exposed with child in utero or the baby was conceived later by one or both parents who were hibakusha, were premature birth, stillbirth, artificial abortion, early death (within the first year), microcephaly (small head), and growth and mental retardation, including autosomal trisomy 21 (down syndrome).\(^{13}\)

Many survivors, including those who moved to other parts of Japan, concealed the fact that they were hibakusha, or even related to one, to avoid discrimination. "I don't want my name to be public (seken ni shiraretakunai)," said both Ms. "U" and Ms. "A" to a reporter for the Mainichi shinbun in 1970 for a story about hibakusha discrimination. "I don't know what kind of discrimination will strike again. I don't want to cause trouble

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\(^{12}\) Mainichi shinbun, 1 August 1970.

for my family and relatives who are healthy."\textsuperscript{14} The \textit{hibakusha} struggled to live with social discrimination as well as health complications due to the bomb, such as keloid scarring and cancers, including leukemia. The psychological hardships of survival in this context produced among the \textit{hibakusha} what they called "keloid of the heart" and "leukemia of the spirit."\textsuperscript{15}

Daily life was difficult under the eyes of neighbors who worried about contracting radiation sickness from the survivors or who otherwise doubted the ability of the \textit{hibakusha} to function as members of society. In Nagasaki, Yamaguchi Senji, whose face was badly burned from the intense heat of the bomb which caused keloid scarring, recalled in 1985 the difficulty of living as a \textit{hibakusha}, especially in the early postwar years. He returned home to the Gotô Islands near Nagasaki in 1946, with his "face resembling that of a demon," after seven months of treatment for his burns. Going to the public bath in the evening was the hardest (\textit{tsurai}) thing for him to do. He dreaded it.\textsuperscript{16} "Not only would everyone stare at me, but I felt in their eyes the fear that they might catch the atomic-bombing illness (\textit{genbaku shō})," Yamaguchi recalled. To avoid this situation as much as possible, he went to the bath "around ten o'clock in the evening, right before the bathwater is thrown out, and bathed while enduring the looks of others." Two months later Yamaguchi returned to Nagasaki to finish high school. On graduating in 1951, he had difficulty finding a job because the thick scar tissue that covered much of his body had handicapped his movement, so he went home to Gotô. The pain of living

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Mainichi shinbun}, 1 August 1970.

\textsuperscript{15} Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, pp. 13-14.

\textsuperscript{16} Jpns: "Ki no omoi koto deshita."
overwhelmed him, so, determined to die, he returned to Nagasaki in 1952. He slit both wrists with a razor, but, he recalled, "fortunately or unfortunately" he survived.\textsuperscript{17} Numbers of \textit{hibakusha} in both Nagasaki and Hiroshima committed suicide because the trauma was too great. Hiroshima survivor and accomplished writer Hara Tamiki killed himself in 1951 by lying down on train tracks in Tokyo, a suicide some considered a delayed death related to the bombing.\textsuperscript{18}

The experience of Yamaguchi Senji enduring the suspicious eyes of society was typical for many survivors in both cities, especially those with physical traces of the bomb on their bodies, such as keloid scarring. This discouraged many from drawing further attention to themselves by recounting their experience of the atomic bomb through public testimony and talks or otherwise speaking of their survival. \textit{Hibakusha} who had no trace of the bomb on their bodies were disinclined to admit that they were exposed to the bomb, for fear of stigma and to avoid reliving the trauma. Nagasaki survivor Gotô Minako explained the difficulty of writing: "For me writing means reopening the 'grave' I have tried to cover for good. To reach into what lies at the base of consciousness, to retrieve it and turn it into words, is painfully difficult to endure. Writing becomes distasteful, and I find myself wishing to begin living with these memories of the past interred." Nonetheless, \textit{hibakusha} writers, poets, and activists, as


Gotô put it, were "urged to go on by another voice" and relate their experiences to others.¹⁹

Ikeda Sanae was twelve at the time of the bomb and did not talk about it for years, only overcoming the trauma to speak for the cause of peace activism. In 1981, more than a decade after Kamata and others had "broken down the walls of silence," Ikeda recalled:

In the first week [following the atomic bombing] my youngest brother died. My mom and dad were busy looking after my other brothers and sisters and could not leave, so I wrapped my little brother in straw matting and cremated him. The setting sun shined brightly and my tears were dyed crimson by the fire that burned my little brother.

My little brother was born on December 8, Shôwa 16 [1941], on the evening of the attack on Pearl Harbor. And he died on August 16, Shôwa 20 [1945], the day after the conclusion of the war. He lived in nothing but days of war. He didn't know even a single day of peace. That little brother of mine died. At twelve years old I had to cremate my little brother. This is the tragedy of the atomic bomb.²⁰

When Ikeda shared his testimony in a lecture at Nagasaki University in 2004, he became choked with tears when he described, in graphic detail, cremating his little brother and hearing his joints "pop" from the heat of the flames. For him, the tragedy of the atomic bombings was not found in the atomic demolition of two cities, Japan's defeat, or the death and destruction that surrounded him. Rather, the bomb represented his personal tragedy of having to cremate his younger brother, who himself had not known a single day of peace.²¹ Ikeda relived this trauma each time he shared his testimony, but the imperative to tell others of the tragedy of the atomic bomb impelled him to overcome the

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inner wall of silence and endure the pain. In this way, survivors found some meaning in their suffering through peace activism in Nagasaki as in Hiroshima.

**Hiroshima in Popular Memory**

In the late 1940s, Hiroshima surpassed Nagasaki in the popular memory of the atomic bombings, and, despite the best efforts of activist groups in both cities to work together, emerged as the leader of peace activities in Japan. After Hiroshima was designated the Peace Commemoration City in May 1949, the nation looked to it as the atomic-bombed city representative. By August 1949, Hiroshima often appeared in national publications about the bombings without any mention of Nagasaki. The journal *Shûkan asahi* published a special on August 7, entitled, "Nô moa Hiroshimazu" (No More Hiroshimas), which highlighted the city's "prayers for peace" (*heiwa e no inori*), before "praying" for peace became associated with passivity. Written primarily by editorial staff in Tokyo (one article was by a contributor in Hiroshima), the publication detailed the aftermath of the bombing and the works of *hibakusha* authors such as Hara Tamiki and Ôda Yôko. It also included "reflections on the 'ethics' of the atomic bomb" and placed Hiroshima in the context of the world peace movement.22 Not only was Nagasaki mentioned only once in passing, a separate issue for the city was never published.

By the early 1950s, Nagasaki's peace activism became a point of concern for activists in Hiroshima. In May 1950, the *Hiroshima-shi seinen rengô kai* (Hiroshima City Youth Association) visited Nagasaki for a conference with youth groups which had visited Hiroshima for a similar event in 1949 along with Miss International. After the

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22 *Shûkan asahi*, 7 August 1949.
conference, which spanned several days, Iwada Yukio, president of the Hiroshima youth group, noted how his "brothers and sisters" of the Nagasaki groups had improved over the past year and exhibited the passion of youth, but they still needed work. Before he returned to Hiroshima, Iwada gave three points of advice as "words of parting." One, Nagasaki youth needed to become more politically aware and involved. Two, they needed to strengthen the organization of their groups, which would give them more validity. And, three, they needed to "intimately connect to society" so that they do not become estranged from it, implying that they were in danger of falling into isolation (yûri). In short, they needed to establish themselves as a politically savvy group that demonstrated to people outside of Nagasaki, without any misunderstanding or doubt, "what it was they were doing." Having a clear and meaningful purpose, Iwada argued, constituted "the essence of we youth groups."23

More than the condition of the youth groups in Nagasaki, Iwada thought that the reconstruction of Nagasaki in general "lagged a step" behind that of Hiroshima. Speaking as the "representative of Hiroshima," he was "surprised at the filthy streets and that there were houses built in the middle of traffic routes (kôtsûro)." He said that if Nagasaki were ever to become an "international cultural city," then it needed to reevaluate its city construction plans to address such destitute conditions.24

The images of the two atomic-bombed cities were taking shape. Hiroshima was the voice of peace, while Nagasaki, working to become an "international cultural city," did not prioritize it atomic-bombing memory, evidenced by its constant "lagging" behind

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23 Yûkan Nagasaki, 13 May 1950.

24 Newspaper clipping, undated, Kokusai bunka toshi folder, Archival Materials Room, Nagasaki City Nagai Takashi Memorial Museum, Nagasaki (NTMM).
Hiroshima in reconstruction and peace activism. While "Nagasaki" dominated the literary world during the occupation through the best-selling books of Nagai Takashi, "Hiroshima" took lead of the peace movement. After the occupation ended, however, what had been a relatively minor atomic-bomb literature movement in Hiroshima surpassed Nagasaki in number of hibakusha authors and volumes of published accounts and poetry.

In the post-occupation period, criticism of Nagasaki's failure to keep up with Hiroshima continued for decades, with complaints voiced within Nagasaki as well. The Nagasaki shinbun ran an editorial in August 1970, claiming that the "rage" (ikari) of Nagasaki was "tepid" (usui). It was of "general opinion" (ôkata no itchi shita iken) that "Nagasaki lags behind Hiroshima on all fronts." A major contributing factor, the editorial asserted, was that many hibakusha were Catholics who clung to the idea of Urakami-as-sacrifice, such as Fukahori Kunio, a butcher and Catholic, who claimed to the paper, "Our brothers and sisters of Urakami were sacrificed for Nagasaki residents." Furthermore, Catholic community leaders encouraged their parishioners to see forgiveness, not rage, as the road to peace. The editorial went on to point out that Hiroshima boasted its Atomic Dome, which was preserved as a "witness to the atomic bomb" thanks to a national fundraising movement that garnered 409,000,000 yen, but Nagasaki had no such "witness."25 And while Hiroshima had approximately one hundred memorials scattered around the city, Nagasaki had only a "quiet" few that did not stand out. In short, critics within Nagasaki attempted to draw attention to the city's lack of

25 The article says "40,000,000 yen," but I have used the figure "409,000,000 yen" from Odagiri Hideo, "'Kaku no jidai' to kono kirokushû sei," in Ienaga Saburô, Odagiri Hideo, Kuroyoshi Kazuo, Nihon no genbaku kiroku (Tokyo: Nihon tosho sentâ, 1991), v. 20, p. 264.
"rage" compared to Hiroshima. The criticism from within and outside Nagasaki served as one source of inspiration for the hibakusha to begin "breaking down the walls of silence."

The Wall of the saint of Urakami

The dominance of Nagai Takashi as representative of the bombing during and after the occupation presented one of the greatest walls for the Nagasaki hibakusha. As survivor and peace activist Kamata Sadao pointed out, the "Catholic myth of Urakami" permeated Nagasaki memory for decades because the books of Nagai Takashi were the only widely-available source about the bombs during the occupation. Several scholars have pointed out the disparity in occupation-period literature stemming from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From 1946, Hiroshima hibakusha authors and poets, such as Kurihara Sadako, Hara Tamiki, Ôta Yôko, and Tôge Sankichi, struggled to produce literature that conveyed the horror and inhumanity of the atomic bomb, while Nagai Takashi was writing and publishing his books with relative freedom, reaching a national audience. Tanaka Toshihiro rightly argues that the disparate themes of occupation-period atomic-bomb literature in the two cities, especially Nagai's "deification" (shinkakuka) of the bombing, created, in part, the postwar image of a passive, "praying Nagasaki."

26 Nagasaki shinbun, 3 August 1970.


Kamata stressed how Nagai's books developed an image of Nagasaki through Nagai's religious interpretations of the tragedy that expressed gratitude for the bomb instead of horror at its destruction. The books, especially *Nagasaki no kane*, he argued, promoted the "uniquely Catholic, or Nagai-like (*Nagaiteki*), reception of the atomic bomb as aesthetic martyrdom," exemplified best in the inclusion of his November 1945 eulogy at the mass funeral for the atomic bombing dead. Kamata noted how the atomic bombing appeared as a natural disaster, because Nagai wrote that the bomb "fell" (*rakka*) on Nagasaki, it was not "dropped" (*tôka*).29 Nagai's argument that the destruction of Urakami exemplified God's love for the Catholics was a "masochistic logic" that was not representative of the *hibakusha*. Nonetheless, Kamata claimed, it produced best-selling books under the occupation, which prevented the development of alternatives in logic, sentiment, and literature about the bombing of Nagasaki.30

The issue in the decades following the war was not so much a struggle between Catholic versus non-Catholic survivor memory, but rather the persistence of Nagai as a voice for all Nagasaki survivors and the passive image of the city that his influence had helped create. Some Catholics disagreed with those who thought that God had sent Nagai to them, pointing out that the Christianization of the image of the city in the first five years after the bomb had forced the non-Catholic *hibakusha* into silence. Akizuki Tatsuichirô, a *hibakusha*, Catholic, and once a colleague of Nagai, believed that three factors fostered the silence: one, Nagai's books; two, the Nagasaki residents' joyful welcome of the emperor in 1949; and, three, the Catholic festivities in 1949 to celebrate

29 Kamata, "*Nagasaki no ikari to inori*," pp. 411-416.

30 Kamata Sadao, "*Genbaku taiken no keishô to kokumin kyôiku e no tenbô: Nagasaki no kussetsu shita taiken no naka kara*," in *Chinmoku no kabe o yabutte* (1970), 192-193.
the 400th anniversary of the arrival of Francis Xavier in Japan. The warm reception of the emperor in May 1949, Akizuki thought, represented Nagasaki's contribution to the "construction of a country (kokka) of peace and culture" through the misfortune of its atomic bomb. The emperor had called on the people of Nagasaki to turn misfortune into happiness in order to achieve a successful revival of the city. The seemingly uncritical nature of how Nagasaki accepted the emperor's call to "construct a country of peace and culture" led to the phrase "Nagasaki Prays" in contrast to "Hiroshima Rages," because Nagasaki residents exchanged their "rage" against the brutality and oppression of the war for prayers for peace and culture at the urging of the emperor, in whose name the war had been waged. After the 1949 Xavier festival, Akizuki lamented, no one in Nagasaki except the Communist Party said anything negative about the atomic bombing, because to do so implied anti-American and revolutionary elements. Akizuki pointed out, "Religious leaders, too, fell silent and offered up nothing but prayers."31 The silence of Nagasaki residents left their post-atomic image firmly in the hands of Nagai Takashi.

Akizuki, despite being an Urakami Catholic, did not agree with Nagai that the atomic bombing exemplified Providence, nor did he attend the mass funeral in November 1945.

I don't think it unfortunate that I did not go to the memorial service for the dead where thousands of Urakami Christian believers gathered. I didn't even want to hear the memorial address that was to be read in front of thousands of people. I cannot go along with Nagai-sensei's way of thinking that "Because the Lord loves the people of Urakami he dropped the atomic bomb on Urakami. Because the people of Urakami are loved most by God, they must suffer time and time again."

31 Kamata, "Nagasaki no ikari to inori," p. 415.
Furthermore, Akizuki explained, Nagai's way of thinking about the bomb was "too horrible" to go along with. Yet despite views like those of Akizuki and other Christians, not to mention the opposition of hibakusha to the passive image of the city, the Christian link to the bombing persisted.

The removal of the ruins of the Urakami Cathedral in 1958 solidified the dominance of Urakami in the popular memory of Nagasaki. The Catholics' desire to "quickly forget the wounds of the atomic bomb," Kamata thought, was shortsighted and erased a symbol that had stood equal to Hiroshima's Atomic Dome. The single column of the ruins preserved near ground zero was to serve that purpose, but "its image as a symbol of the Nagasaki atomic bombing is weak." It was the duty of hibakusha, Kamata claimed, to challenge the dominance of Urakami in representation of Nagasaki's experience. From the late 1960s, Nagasaki hibakusha activists, such as Kamata Sadao and Yamada Kan, among many others, attempted to challenge the Urakami grip on the representation of the city's experience through concrete attempts to correct the image of their city. In the face of the long Christian history of the city and interpretation of the bomb, they "could no longer keep silent" and watch their trauma continue to be "concealed" (inpei) and "forgotten" (bôkyaku).

Hibakusha did not challenge the dominance of Nagai Takashi in Nagasaki literature until 1956, when Fukuda Sumako published a collection of poetry and essays, titled, Hitorigoto (Soliloquy), marking Nagasaki hibakusha's arrival on the stage of

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33 Kamata, "Nagasaki no ikari to inori," pp. 415-416.

34 Kamata, "Nagasaki no ikari to inori," p. 409.
atomic-bomb literature. In subsequent decades, they published numerous poetry collections, testimonial accounts, and novels, yet two walls persisted, preventing any significant change in the popular image of the city: the legacy of Nagai as the voice of Nagasaki and Hiroshima as the atomic-bombed city.

II. Overcoming the "Dark Era": Peace Activism and the Fight for Medical Benefits

In Nagasaki, 1945 to 1957 has become known as the "dark era of the hibakusha," when no national system of recognition, compensation, and medical benefits existed for them. During this time, survivors formed groups that put forth two primary purposes: one, to promote peace through activism that sought to educate posterity about the atomic bombing of the city and to ensure that such a bombing never happened again; and, two, to fight for the implementation of a national system of relief that recognized the suffering of hibakusha and provided them with medical care. Thus the peace movement and the fight for relief—medical as well as psychological—were intertwined.

"Abandonment"

Shortly after the war, survivors of the Allied aerial bombings, including the atomic bombings, were confronted with a difficult situation: relief from the Wartime Casualties Care Law (WCCL), implemented in 1942, lasted for only two months, expired in October 1945, and left them without a national system of care. The WCCL provided

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35 Yamada Hirotami, "Nagasaki no hibakusha," in Takahashi and Funakoe, eds., Nagasaki kara heiwagaku suru!, p. 52. The term "hibakusha no kurai jiki" (the dark era of the hibakusha) is from a 1996 publication, entitled, Nagasaki genbaku hibaku go jü nen shi, published by the Nagasaki-shi genbaku hibaku taisaku ka.

no special exception for residents of the atomic-bombed cities, meaning that the relief stations operating under the purview of the local and national government had to close. The relief center in Mitsuyama that Nagai Takashi had overseen shut down as well, the wounded having to seek medical care elsewhere at their own expense.\textsuperscript{37}

The cities did their best to make up for the closures. Officials in Hiroshima designated a number of school buildings as "hospitals" for the treatment of \textit{hibakusha} under provisions set forth in the National Medical Care Law of 1942. Nagasaki Medical University, whose main buildings were largely destroyed in the bombing, designated two satellite facilities to care for \textit{hibakusha}, one initially located at Ômura Naval Hospital then moved to Kawatana Naval Hospital in Isahaya, and the other at the Shinkôzen Elementary School. After the start of the Allied occupation, the U.S. military provided medical supplies, including medicines not common in Japan, such as penicillin and sulfaguanidine. Some of the medicines provided by the United States effectively treated subacute infections related to bombing injuries, which were difficult to treat because of the biological complications induced by radiation poisoning. In December 1945, the occupation official in charge of overseeing medical activities in Nagasaki, Captain Hohne, converted a former army hospital into "Blair Hospital," stocked it with medical supplies, and donated it to the residents of Nagasaki. The facility became a charity hospital and was later renamed the Nagasaki Citizens Hospital.\textsuperscript{38}

The government closure of the relief stations in October 1945 despite the severity of the atomic bombings and the medical needs of the wounded represented for some

\textsuperscript{37} Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, pp. 535-536.

\textsuperscript{38} Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, pp. 535-536.
hibakusha the start of the Japanese government's apathy for and abandonment of atomic-bombing survivors. In essence, the closures "shut out the hibakusha" and ushered in the "dark era." Scholar and hibakusha Yamada Hirotami says that the Japanese government may indeed have been too overwhelmed with the "chaos of the postwar" (sengo no konran) to consider the welfare of hibakusha, but he thinks that it was only part of the reason. He claims that the Japanese government "ingratiated (geigô) with the occupation forces, who strove to conceal the destruction of the atomic bombings, especially the radiation damage." Yamada points to a September 1945 statement by General Thomas F. Farrell at a press conference at the Tokyo Imperial Hotel as the origin of the official stance of the occupation regarding the damaging effects of radiation in Hiroshima in Nagasaki, a stance to which Japanese government officials catered. Farrell, who was a key member of the Manhattan Project, declared after visiting the two cities that no one there suffered from radiation poisoning and that residual radiation was not harmful human health. In response, Yamada argues, the Japanese government "deliberately abandoned relief for the atomic-bombing victims (higaisha)." Whether or not the abandonment of the hibakusha was deliberate, it was undeniable. As a result, survivors organized and fended for themselves in the early years after the bombings, engaging in relief efforts to help one another.

39 Yamada, "Nagasaki no hibakusha," p. 53. For more on General Farrell, see Takemae, Inside GHQ, p. 428. General Farrell's statement was largely a response to an article by an Australian journalist named Wilfred Burchett, who had claimed that people were dying in Hiroshima from a "mysterious illness" brought on by radiation: Takemae, Inside GHQ, p. 389.

40 Ishikawa and Swain, trans., Hiroshima and Nagasaki, p. 564.
Rise of the Activist Groups

The first group to form in Nagasaki after the bomb did not call themselves hibakusha and they did not take up peace activism, but rather revival activism. Eight survivors, including Sugimoto Kameyoshi and Takigawa Masaru, organized a group in December 1945 called the Nagasaki sensaisha renmei (Nagasaki Federation of War Victims), which distributed material relief to residents and raised funds to build houses for the "war victims." The organizers and many of the group members later became leaders of the peace movement, which burgeoned across Japan in the 1950s.\(^{41}\)

A United States nuclear weapons test on Bikini Atoll in March 1954 ignited the peace and anti-nuclear weapons movement in Japan. Radioactive fallout from the test fell for six hours on the Japanese fishing boat Lucky Dragon No. 5, located about 100 miles east of the explosion, and the twenty-three crewmembers contracted radiation poisoning before their return to Japan two weeks later. In September 1954, one crewman died. The fact that the "ashes of death" rained on Japanese citizens for a third time enraged the general public and inspired action in many parts of society outside of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, including a women's reading group in the Suginami Ward of Tokyo. The group initiated a petition against atomic and hydrogen bombs in May 1954, becoming known as the "Suginami Appeal," and by mid-1955 the National Council for an Antinuclear Signature Campaign (formed in August 1954) had collected 32,000,000 signatures in Japan. The 660,000,000 signatures of the worldwide "Vienna Appeal"

\(^{41}\) Yamada, "Nagasaki no hibakusha," pp. 54-55.
against the use of atomic weapons in early 1955 bolstered the position of the Japan petition.\footnote{Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, pp. 575-577.}

The first ever World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs was held in Hiroshima on August 6, 1955. A group of women *hibakusha* in Nagasaki created the *Nagasaki genbaku otome no kai* (Nagasaki Atomic Bombing Young Women's Association) and dispatched two representatives, Watanabe Chieko and Yamaguchi Misako, to the conference.\footnote{Yamada, "*Nagasaki no hibakusha,*" p. 55.} Yamaguchi Misako and Hiroshima survivor Takahashi Akihiro spoke about their atomic-bombing experiences, which some commentators noted "deeply moved" the approximately 30,000 people in attendance in Peace Memorial Park, who for the first time felt the "painful responsibility of living in the nuclear age." After the conference, a nationwide citizen group against nuclear weapons was formed as the *Gensuibaku kinshi Nihon kyôgikai*, or the *Nihon gensuikyô* (Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs).\footnote{Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, pp. 577-578.} For the first time since the bombings, national attention was being paid to the *hibakusha*.

Months later, on October 1, 1955, Yamaguchi Senji and other *hibakusha* who had been calling themselves the *Nagasaki genbaku seinen kai* (Nagasaki Atomic Bombing Young Men's Association), hung a signboard with their name in front of the *manjû* (steamed bun) store where Yamaguchi was living, establishing their headquarters and their determination to become a recognized and influential group in the peace movement. On May 3, 1956, Yamaguchi's group joined, or as Watanabe Chieko put it, "married," the
Nagasaki genbaku otome no kai, creating the Nagasaki genbaku seinen otome no kai (Nagasaki Atomic Bombing Association of Young Men and Women). Watanabe recalled how everyone was "bright and happy" about the marriage and hoped that with the efforts of the group, "the darkness, distortion (hinekure), nihility (kyomu), and hopelessness [of surviving the bombing] would completely disappear."\(^{45}\)

In August 1956, Nagasaki hosted the Second World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. For this occasion, Nagasaki hibakusha, including Yamaguchi Senji, Takigawa Minoru, Kino Fumio, Sugimoto Kameyoshi, and other members of the Nagasaki sensaisha renmei, formed the Nagasaki genbaku hisaisha kyōgikai, or Nagasaki hisaikyō (Nagasaki Council of Atomic Bombing Victims), with Sugimoto becoming the group's first president. The Nagasaki hisaikyō unified the city's hibakusha groups, declaring its stance against nuclear weapons and its goal to receive compensation from the national government for survivors, positions that were shared by all hibakusha groups. On August 10, eight hundred hibakusha representatives from all over Japan formed a national hibakusha organization, the Nihon gensuibaku higaisha dantai kyōgikai (Japan Confederation of Atomic-Bomb and Hydrogen-Bomb Sufferers Organizations), or Nihon hidankyō for short.\(^{46}\) During the Nagasaki conference, the Nihon hidankyō, too, declared its "appeal to the world" against nuclear weapons and its mission to gain compensation from "the state" (kokka).\(^{47}\)

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\(^{45}\) Yamada, "Nagasaki no hibakusha," p. 55.


Peace Activism as Life Mission

Peace activism gave meaning to the survivors' suffering. As Yamada Hirotami notes, "the creation of the Nagasaki hisaikyō was the first step by the hibakusha in overcoming the 'era of darkness.'" Indeed, every activist group—and there were many—that put forth the mission to work for peace, seek government compensation, and relate the experience of the bombing through testimony provided a sense of "life mission" (shimei) for survivors struggling to overcome trauma. Yamaguchi Senji, who just years earlier had attempted suicide, became a leader of the Nagasaki peace movement for six decades, and many other survivors found catharsis and relief from their psychological and physical pain.

Taniguchi Sumiteru was sixteen at the time of the bombing.\(^{48}\) Delivering telegrams on his bike when the bomb exploded over Nagasaki, his entire back, left arm, upper left leg, and face were scorched so severely that he had to lie on his stomach in a hospital for one year and nine months, during which time he stopped breathing twice. Taniguchi developed bedsores as well, which permanently damaged his chest. "How many times did I cry out, 'Kill me!'?" Taniguchi wondered in 1970 when he recalled the "pain and hopelessness." "So many times did I think about wanting to die."\(^{49}\) Even after leaving the hospital in March 1949, the pain and hopelessness continued, despite miraculous strides toward physical recovery. Taniguchi could not sleep a full, painless night (and still has not managed to), because of the stiff keloid scarring that covered most of his torso, impairing his movement—his left elbow's range of motion was less than 100


An additional source of anxiety was that he would be unable to continue working as a postman or be effective at any job because of the physical limits of his body. Taniguchi's anxiety was justified. After returning to postal delivery in April 1950, he found it difficult to work so he received surgery on his elbow, but it did not improve much. Life was unbearable until he encountered the peace movement.

When Yamaguchi Misako and Takahashi Akihiro shared their testimonies at the 1955 world conference in Hiroshima, they inspired many hibakusha to get involved in peace activism. Taniguchi recalled that when the two stood one at a time on the stage in front of tens of thousands of people, he realized for the first time that he was not alone and that there was a battle (tatakai) being waged by the hibakusha who felt that "enough was enough" (mô iya da). Inspired to take action, "I chose the path to become a witness (shônin) for peace. I already had partly given up on life, so I was determined (negatta) to dedicate my new life to the 'battle with the atomic bomb' (genbaku to no tatakai)."

For the 1956 Nagasaki conference, he led a group of hibakusha in publishing a collection of survivor testimonies, titled, "Enough is Enough: Living Witnesses of the Atomic Bomb" (Mô iya da: genbaku no ikite iru shônintachi). Taniguchi eventually became president of the Nagasaki genbaku seinen otome no kai.

Taniguchi (and his wounds) became an icon of the Nagasaki peace movement. In 1970, Kamata Sadao was editing a collection of Nagasaki hibakusha testimonies, entitled,

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51 Taniguchi, "Ni jû go nen me no kaisô to shôgen," p. 9.

52 Taniguchi, "Ni jû go nen me no kaisô to shôgen," p. 9.

Nagasaki no shôgen: 1970 (Testimonies of Nagasaki), to be published in August, when two films were broadcast on national television that the United States had confiscated twenty-five years earlier, one black-and-white and one color. Kamata noticed in the color film a young man lying on his stomach with his back reddened from severe burning by the bomb, and he realized that it was Taniguchi. The film produced an outpouring of support for the hibakusha. Within days of the national broadcast on June 29, Taniguchi received thousands of letters of encouragement from viewers all over the country, as well as requests to publish his story. The Asahi shinbun sent Taniguchi a color photo of the scene of his suffering, which he brought to Kamata, deciding together to put it on the cover of Nagasaki no shôgen. The publication included more than eighty testimonial accounts and primary documents, becoming a "central reference" in the Nagasaki testimony and peace movement.

Taniguchi, in his contribution to Nagasaki no shôgen: 1970, wrote that he did not want his suffering to become a spectacle, but the importance of the peace movement outweighed his potential embarrassment. He emphasized that the cover photo of his wounds represented the pain of all hibakusha and showed the reality of the bomb. Speaking directly to the reader, he pleaded, "Those of you who have looked at my image, try not to look away. I want you to look once more, carefully. I miraculously survived, but still our entire bodies bear the cursed scars of the atomic bomb. I want to believe in the intensity (kibishisa) and the warmth of your eyes that stare upon us."

54 Kamata, "Nagasaki no ikari to inori," p. 410.
55 Asahi shinbun, 3 July 1970.
57 Taniguchi, "Ni jû go nen me no kaisô to shôgen," p. 8.
"Nagasaki testimony' movement" began in earnest in 1968, but the 1970 publication represented the renewed determination of Taniguchi, Kamata, and other hibakusha activists to give meaning to their suffering, not to mention their refusal to let the memory of their tragedy be forgotten, no matter how painful it was to recall. Taniguchi printed the color photo of his wounds on his business card (he carries the same one today), not in order to garner sympathy, but in the hope of relating the horror of the atomic bomb to everyone he met.

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58 Kamata, "Nagasaki no ikari to inori," p. 409.
The postwar living standards of *hibakusha* began to brighten from the early-1950s, when local governments acknowledged their needs. In May 1953, a group led by Mayor Tagawa Tsutomu and which included representatives from Nagasaki University, prefectural and municipal offices, medical associations, and social groups, formed the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Casualty Council (a similar council had been created earlier in Hiroshima) and launched a system of free medical examinations for *hibakusha*. The
council also conducted surveys of hibakusha and undertook research of atomic-bombing related illnesses. Yet the livelihood of hibakusha was slow to improve. Relief developed through the survivors' own efforts and the support of other members of the peace movement in Japan.

After the Lucky Dragon No. 5 incident in 1954, citizen groups and the Casualty Councils in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, backed by the mayors, city councilmen, and National Diet members from each city, petitioned Tokyo for "payment by the national government of all medical costs of the A-bomb victims." The petition, an initiative of the Nagasaki Casualty Council, stated that the number of hibakusha in Hiroshima and Nagasaki that required medical care was 6,000 and 3,000, respectively, but the activists also demanded special provisions to aid their livelihood. For the first time, the Ministry of Health and Welfare acknowledged that it was necessary, "as demonstrated by the Bikini incident, for the state to make all haste in providing compensation to the victims of atomic bombings." The government responded to the demands of the petition by distributing 3,522,000 yen to medical institutions in the two cities, with 2,349,000 yen going to Hiroshima and 1,173,000 yen to Nagasaki. The cities, however, required

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60 Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, p. 552.

61 As translated by and quoted in Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, p. 543.


63 As translated by and quoted in Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, p. 552.
325,800,000 yen to cover medical costs of *hibakusha*, such as surgery and living subsidies.\(^{64}\)

Although the government allocated funds to Hiroshima and Nagasaki again in 1955 (8,303,100 yen and 4,138,900, respectively) and 1956 (16,750,000; 8,932,000), its official position regarding the promulgation of a special law that would recognize *hibakusha* as different from other aerial bombing and war survivors remained the same.\(^{65}\) Officials considered it unnecessary to create a special relief law for the survivors of the atomic bombings because, they believed, it would cause a kind of survivor envy among other Japanese citizens who had lived through the war. That is, the government wanted to avoid categorizing "victims" of war or making judgments, for example, about the differences between firebombing and atomic-bombing survivors. If the *hibakusha* "were accorded special treatment," they thought, "then all casualties and their survivors must be given compensation." Such thinking characterized the response of the government to the *hibakusha*’s demands from the 1950s through the 1970s.\(^{66}\)

While the national government ignored the requests of the *hibakusha*, activist groups in Nagasaki became openly critical of municipal approaches to commemoration of the bombing, which seemed, despite the city's best efforts, to make the health and wellbeing of survivors its last priority. When the world conference was underway in Hiroshima in summer 1955, officials in Nagasaki installed the enormous "peace statue" in Peace Park, costing the city 30,000,000 yen, more than seven times the amount of

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\(^{64}\) Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, p. 543.

\(^{65}\) Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, p. 543.

\(^{66}\) Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, pp. 556-557.
money received by the city from the national government for medical treatment of hibakusha the same year.\textsuperscript{67} The hibakusha were livid, failing to see how it connected to the bomb at all.\textsuperscript{68} The sculptor, Kitamura Seibô, intended his work to represent Nagasaki's atomic destruction as well as its rebirth as a city of international culture.\textsuperscript{69} But many residents did not see the relation of the statue to either theme. The statue, which is of a large, shirtless "Olympic" man, "a human who transcends all mankind," points his right hand to the sky, representing the atomic tragedy, while his other arm extends straight out to the left, guiding humanity toward peace. His facial expression is supposed to convey "a prayer for the eternal happiness of those who died."\textsuperscript{70} Kitamura's "peace statue," not the cenotaph at ground zero, became the center of the annual municipal commemoration ceremonies.\textsuperscript{71}

Some hibakusha saw the statue not only as a confusing symbol of their trauma, but also as a waste of municipal funds. In 1955, hibakusha poet Fukuda Sumako wrote an open letter to the city in the form of a poem published in the \textit{Asahi shinbun}. She wrote:

\begin{quote}
I have become disgusted with it all.
The giant peace statue towers over the atomic wasteland.
That's fine. That's fine, but
with that money, I wonder if something else couldn't have been done.
"We cannot eat a stone statue; it will not alleviate our hunger."
Please don't call us selfish.
These are the honest feelings (itsuwaranu shinkyô) of the victims
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{67} Kamata, "Nagasaki no ikari to inori," p. 413.

\textsuperscript{68} Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, p. 605.


\textsuperscript{70} Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, p. 605.

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Nagasaki-shi sei roku jû go nen shi}, vol. 3, p. 1151.
who have barely lived the ten years after the bomb.

Sigh. I have no energy this year.
Peace! Peace! I'm so tired of hearing [that word].
No matter how much one shouts or cries out, there is a powerlessness, as if it disappears into the deep sky.
I am completely tired of the unseen anxiety (shôsô) for whatever the reply.
Look. The atomic cannon (genshihô) has arrived.72

Fukuda expressed the frustration and displeasure of the Nagasaki hibakusha, who felt that municipal funds were being wasted on meaningless projects and empty symbols of "peace," instead of supporting their medical treatments and improving their living standards. "The more everyone gets excited (sawagu) [over the statue]," she lamented, "the emptier my heart is."73

The statue reflected the city's approach to commemoration, which rarely took into consideration the voice of the hibakusha, as exemplified in the 1958 debate over the ruins of the Urakami Cathedral. Again in 1997, the hibakusha opposed the efforts of city architects who commissioned a bronze sculpture from Kitamura's protégé, Tominaga Naoki, that was supposed to replace the cenotaph column at ground zero. Tominaga created another "colossal statue" that failed to represent the horror of the bomb; his, which stands nine meters tall, is of a mother wearing a flowing dress adorned with golden roses and holding a baby. In response to hibakusha outcry against the statue, which culminated in a "human chain" of residents around the ground zero cenotaph on August

72 Kamata, "Nagasaki no ikari to inori," pp. 413-414.

73 Chinmoku no kabe o yabutte, pp. 17-18.
9, 1997, the city abandoned plans to replace the cenotaph, but placed the statue just meters away, where it stands today.\textsuperscript{74}

Despite municipal policies of commemoration that seemingly ignored the plight of \textit{hibakusha}, the local government did more than Tokyo in working to relieve the suffering. The Nagasaki Casualty Council built a therapeutic facility in 1965 at the natural hot springs in nearby Obama City, and installed other clinics and medical facilities throughout Nagasaki City in the late 1960s and 1970s. The facilities provided examinations, treatment, and aid for daily life, including counseling services.\textsuperscript{75} Still, the relief efforts of the city and prefecture were limited without national funds.

At the Nagasaki world conference in August 1956, the \textit{Nagasaki hisaikyō} and the \textit{Nihon hidankyō} agreed that the national government had a responsibility to improve the conditions of survivors.\textsuperscript{76} On August 9, the Socialist Part of Japan (JSP) took the first step in Tokyo to improve the situation of \textit{hibakusha} by announcing that it would support a bill in the next National Diet meeting that demarcated 230,000,000 yen in support.\textsuperscript{77} Encouraged by the action of the JSP, the \textit{Nihon hidankyō} submitted a request on behalf of all \textit{hibakusha} to the Diet and to each political party, stating that the \textit{hibakusha} "were the sacrifices of a war executed under the responsibility of the nation (\textit{kuni})," and therefore financial support of their "medical treatment and livelihood [should] be carried out under the responsibility of the nation." The Ministry of Health and Welfare drafted a law in response, requesting 267,493,000 yen from the Ministry of Finance. On March 31, 1957, 

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Nishi Nippon}, 9 August 2002.

\textsuperscript{75} Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, p. 560.

\textsuperscript{76} Yamada, "\textit{Nagasaki no hibakusha}," p. 58.

\textsuperscript{77} Ishikawa and Swain, trans., \textit{Hiroshima and Nagasaki}, p. 544.
the Diet passed the *Genshi bakudan hibakusha no iryō nado ni kan suru hōritsu* (Law Related to the Medical Treatment and Other Needs of *Hibakusha*; *Hibakusha* Relief Law), which included a final fund of 174,589,000 for *hibakusha* relief.\(^78\)

Passage of the law was groundbreaking for at least three reasons. One, it recognized the survivors of the atomic bombings as a distinct, legal category of war survivor. The law also allowed that the term *hibakusha* could be applied to anyone exposed to the radiation from the bomb, not just those exposed directly to the blast. Two, *genbaku shō* (atomic-bombing illness) was recognized as a unique sickness resulting from the bomb. Combined with recognition of *hibakusha* as a special category of survivor, this implied the national government's acknowledgement that radiation from the bombs was indeed a factor in the suffering of the survivors. Three, the number of *hibakusha* who applied for national aid in response to the law, 200,984, revealed that the need for aid was myriad times more pressing than previously thought.\(^79\)

In regards to how the national law affected the lives of the *hibakusha*, though, it did not correspond sufficiently to what the activists had been pursuing; it was seen as "woefully inadequate" and a "far cry" (*hodo tōkatta*) from the needs of the *hibakusha*.\(^80\)

The law did not mean recognition for all. Out of the 200,984 *hibakusha* who applied for relief, only 1,436—less than one-percent—were "legally recognized" (*nintei*) as atomic-bombing survivors and eligible for aid. Furthermore, it did not address support for the families of those who died in the bombing, or who later died from injuries or radiation

\(^78\) Naono, "*Tsugunai naki kuni no hibakusha taisaku,*" p. 65.

\(^79\) See, for example, Yamada, "*Nagasaki no hibakusha,*" pp. 58-59.

\(^80\) Ishikawa and Swain, trans., *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*, p. 559; Yamada, "*Nagasaki no hibakusha,*" p. 58.
sickness. The law had turned the petition of the *Nihon hidankyō* on its head: it made the treatment of survivors the responsibility of the national government, but only survivors who were recognized by the government as *hibakusha* were eligible to receive aid. The rest were left without recourse. As Ôda Takashi put it, "those of us who are not recognized patients do not receive any kind of benefits (onkei)." Additionally, some *hibakusha*, fearing social discrimination, did not apply for relief in order to avoid drawing attention to themselves. In response to the inadequacy of the national relief law, prefectural and municipal governments in Hiroshima and Nagasaki supplemented relief efforts with their own funds and activities, mentioned above.

The "dark era" was the first of three major periods of *hibakusha* activism for relief. The second began in 1956 with the *Nihon hidankyō* petition to the national government and ended in 1965 after activist groups split apart because of political partisanship between 1959 and 1964. Though the activists achieved some success in improving *hibakusha* relief in 1964, the political infighting and split stalled the groups' overall activism in the latter part of the second period. The third (and current) period began in 1966 with a renewed effort by the *Nihon hidankyō* to bring national attention to the hardships of the *hibakusha*. The group published a pamphlet, entitled, "*Genbaku higai no tokushitsu to 'Hibakusha engo hô' no yôkyû*" (Characteristics of Damage by the Atomic Bombs and Demands for the "Hibakusha Relief Law"), which stressed the "realities" of the atomic bombings and the suffering of the survivors. It asserted that

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83 See, for an example, *Nagasaki shinbun*, 1 August 1970.
adequate government relief in all aspects of the hibakusha's lives was a goal that would not be compromised. The "Crane Pamphlet," as it came to be known for the image of a paper crane on the cover, marked the "development of an epoch-making movement" (kakkiteki na undō no tenkai) from the spring of 1967.84

In 1973, the Nihon hidankyō released a revised "Crane Pamphlet" that set forth three demands to the national government regarding the past (compensation), present (relief), and future (peace pledge). The first demand, however, was addressed in part to the United States, requiring that it admit to concealing and "monopolizing" information about the damage of the atomic bombings during the occupation, and for it to assume responsibility for starting the nuclear arms race. In addition, the Japanese government had to accept responsibility for aggression during the Second World War and for neglecting the hibakusha after the war. The hibakusha sought compensation for damages suffered. The second demand called for comprehensive relief for hibakusha to overcome health, living, and spiritual burdens. The third demand charged the national government to establish a commitment to the hibakusha and to the people of Japan that it would work to prevent another atomic bombing—that is, a commitment to peace and anti-nuclear activism. The Nihon hidankyō campaigned in 1973 to encourage national political parties to push their interests through the National Diet in the form of a bill. Supportive parties introduced a joint bill accordingly, but it was ultimately defeated.85 The response of the national government to the needs of the hibakusha has remained "woefully inadequate."

84 Ishikawa and Swain, trans., Hiroshima and Nagasaki, pp. 564-569; Hiroshima-shi, Nagasaki-shi, genbaku higai shi henshū i'inkai hen, Hiroshima, Nagasaki no genbaku saigai (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1979), p. 455. This second reference is the original Japanese version of Ishikawa and Swain, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I cite it here because I have translated some terms differently than Ishikawa and Swain.

85 Hiroshima, Nagasaki no genbaku saigai, pp. 455-456; Ishikawa and Swain, trans., Hiroshima and Nagasaki, p. 568.
The efforts of hibakusha and citizen movements from the 1950s brought recognition, partial relief, and a sense of life mission to many survivors. Nagasaki hibakusha were just as active as their colleagues in Hiroshima, and through their own efforts they brought an end to the "dark era." The hibakusha struggle to receive adequate compensation and relief from the national government had only just begun. It continues today.

III. Breaking down the Walls of Silence through Literature

The late-1960s and early-1970s saw a renewed effort by Nagasaki hibakusha to overcome the walls of silence, inspired by strides made in the national peace movement. Taniguchi Sumiteru, Kamata Sadao, and others, compiled and published testimonies that conveyed the horror of the atomic bomb and appealed for peace, while other hibakusha turned to prose and poetry as vehicles of representation. Hibakusha writers and editors strove to change the image of the city in order to advance its position and that of the survivors in popular memory, which, despite the city's record of peace activism, remained associated with its postwar Christian image.

Testimony and Poetry

The Nagasaki atomic-bomb literature movement began slowly, but gained momentum in the late 1960s. In 1952, the Nagasaki shinbun company coordinated efforts with the prefectural and municipal governments to reach out to the city's hibakusha in order to collect and publish their testimonies of the bombing. The response was surprising. In just nine days, more than 300 hibakusha submitted "My Account of
the Atomic Bombing," when only 170 were collected in Hiroshima two years earlier. The editorial staff in Nagasaki were overwhelmed, resolving in the end to publish only six of the accounts.86

Four years later, in 1956, Taniguchi Sumiteru spearheaded a testimonial movement with the *Nagasaki genbaku seinen otome no kai*, leading to the publication mentioned above, "Enough is Enough: Living Witnesses of the Atomic Bombing." Taniguchi, Kamata, and other *hibakusha* activists renewed the testimony movement in 1968 with the publication of the first issue of *Nagasaki no shôgen*. Their efforts intensified again two years later in response to what they saw as a revival of ultranationalism, evidenced by the government's declaration of a "National Day" during the Osaka World Fair in 1970, which included singing of the "national foundation myths" and a musical performance by a Self-Defense Forces band. The celebrations of "National Day" represented for Kamata and others the government's militaristic recidivism, which had seemingly forgotten the realities of the victims of war, especially the *hibakusha*. The second edition of *Nagasaki no shôgen*, as the editors saw it, "returned a blow" to the "amnesia" and the "base ultra-nationalist thought" of the national government.87

The *hibakusha* activists realized that the nation needed to be "educated" on the history and memory of the atomic bombings, a realization which resulted in the book, *Breaking Down the Walls of Silence*, written by the Nagasaki Association of Atomic Bombing Educators. Also in 1970, Taniguchi and the *hibakusha* published the second edition of "Enough is Enough," which included the testimony of twenty-five *hibakusha* to

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86 Kamata, "Genbaku taiken no keishô to kokumin kyôiku e no tenbô," p. 192.

commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the bombing. While many survivors pressed on with the testimonial movement, others turned to different literary mediums.

Many survivors relied on poetic composition instead of testimony and prose to articulate their experience, creating a canon of hibakusha verse, which John Treat thinks may have "exceeded [prose accounts] in sheer volume." Treat conjectures that "no other single specific theme in Japanese poetry accounts for so many examples in such a short span of time." In Nagasaki, which has historically boasted a rich tradition of poetry, the amount of poetry, and of literature in general, was not equal to that of Hiroshima. One writer, Hayashida Yasumasa, has attributed the smaller volume of survivor poetry to the "popularity of traditional shorter poetic forms" in Nagasaki, such as tanka and haiku. The smaller canon of poetry can be attributed, in part, to Nagasaki's "late start"—that is, while Hiroshima survivors began publishing minor volumes of poetry as early as 1946 despite occupation censorship, Nagasaki survivors did not begin to do so until 1954. In fact, ever since the emergence of hibakusha literature, scholars have been quick to point out the dominance of Hiroshima writers in the canon. Nonetheless, the atomic bomb as the main subject of poetry prevailed in both Nagasaki and Hiroshima, but some poets questioned the subject's ability to inspire well-written verse.

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The *hibakusha* and poet Yamada Kan spoke of how the atomic bombing ruptured the Nagasaki poetic tradition. "The poverty of poetic expression," he noted, "makes one wonder what has happened." He lamented, the "subject of poetry has become greater than tragedy; the immense ruins that repudiate the traditional rhythmic forms of waka and haiku, and the anxiety over death caused by the lingering effects of atomic-bomb disease, mean that the spirit of poetry is extinguished with only powerlessness left to it."92 The atomic bomb had shattered the spirit of traditional poetry, replacing the poetic vocabulary with death and destruction, which caused the "poverty" of expression that defined the atomic-bomb literature of the city.

The bomb's destruction challenged the *hibakusha* writers' ability to voice the unvoiceable in articulating their experience. *Hibakusha* poet Tanaka Kishirô declared:

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However one tries to speak
However one tries to write
Of human atrocity
All tongues and pens are to no avail.
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As Treat points out, the "irony here of course is that Tanaka is trying."93 Nonetheless, the poet's point is well received: human atrocity reveals the inability of human language to convey the inhumanity, tragedy, and trauma. But to not at least try to speak and write of atrocity presents a greater threat to the preservation of humanity and to the psychological preservation of the survivor. Their trauma and the anxiety over death that haunted Yamada and the *hibakusha* writers inspired them to write against Yamada's assertion that there existed a "poverty" of expression, in order to bear witness to the atomic tragedy and to attempt to reclaim the landscape of memory in Nagasaki.

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92 As quoted in Treat, *Writing Ground Zero*, p. 58. Treat does not italicize "waka" or "haiku."

93 Treat, *Writing Ground Zero*, p. 159. Tanaka Kishirô's poem, as quoted here, appears on the same page.
Breaking down the wall of the "uninvited representative," Nagai Takashi

The most vocal critic of Nagai Takashi was the hibakusha poet Yamada Kan. Yamada experienced the atomic bombing at 2.7 km from ground zero at fifteen years old, along with his younger sister. Yamada began writing poetry in 1948, and he published his first collection of poems in March 1954, two months after his sister committed suicide to escape the psychological hardships of being a hibakusha. Yamada published the collection of poetry, *Inochi no hi* (Fire of Life), because he wanted to commemorate her death, but more than that, it was for himself: it was his atonement for not fulfilling his duty as an elder brother to protect her, but also a way for him to deal with survivor guilt.

Before the 1970s, few hibakusha publicly criticized Nagai Takashi. Yamada Kan recalled in 1999 that nobody in Nagasaki ever addressed the "Nagai Takashi problem," because, "Once you touch that, you're on your own." Yamada claimed that even in 1999, Nagai was "untouchable," and peace research institutes and other scholarly institutes avoided the topic altogether, although Yamada never understood the reason for the taboo. In 1972, Yamada wrote a criticism of Nagai in the national journal *Ushio*, in which he called Nagai the "uninvited representative" of Nagasaki hibakusha, and pointed out that his interpretation of the bomb seethed with "self-righteous Catholic egoism."

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94 "Kioku no koshitsu: Yamada Kan shi ni kiku," editors' interview with Yamada Kan, in *Josetsu XIX* (Fukuoka: Kashoin, August 9, 1999), pp. 66-67; entire interview, pp. 51-70. The interview was conducted at Yamada's home by five scholars for the purpose of the publication. For a detailed discussion of Yamada's view of Nagai and his influence, see esp. pp. 66-68. Yamada mentions a 1955 essay, a rare instance of a scholar addressing the "Nagai problem": Kashiwazaki Saburō, "Chabangeki no keifu: Nagai Takashi no imi suru mono." Kashiwazaki's article can also be found partly quoted in *Nagasaki-shi sei roku jū go nen shi*, vol. 3, p. 703.

The same journal also included an article written by Taniguchi Sumiteru. Shortly after Yamada's article was published, he received a phone call from an influential Catholic scholar in Nagasaki, Kataoka Yakichi, who was also a Catholic priest, had been Nagai's close friend, and was the author of the official biography of Nagai (*Nagai Takashi no shōgai* (The Life of Nagai Takashi, 1961)). Kataoka apparently berated Yamada for the sacrilege of criticizing the "saint of Urakami."96

But Yamada was not attacking Nagai as a person but as the representative of Nagasaki atomic-bombing literature. As Yamada wrote to author Yasuda Mitsuru, "I am not aware if there is anyone who dislikes [Nagai]. To express my conviction and as part of my literary theory, I published criticism of Nagai Takashi, but there is no one continuing it." Yamada was not interested in the "extraliterary" (*bungakugai*) persona of Nagai, but rather in how his literature affected other *hibakusha* from Nagasaki and muffled the impact of their literary voice in comparison to that of Hiroshima. Yamada said, "I'm not saying he's bad," only that his literature needed to be interrogated from a literary perspective. He intended to point out how Nagai's books were simply not good literature and were not representative of Nagasaki writers. Yet, after the 1972 *Ushio* article, no one in Nagasaki would work with Yamada, not even authors in the broader literary world. Yamada had simply argued that Nagai "was obviously embroiled in the policies of the American occupation," but, he said, "once you point out that fact" within Nagasaki, "everyone hates you."97

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For years, Yamada had made it a point of his "literary theory" to look at atomic-bomb literature as literature, not as something easily accepted because it addressed the bomb. Yamada felt especially strong about poetry, as he was a poet himself. Nagasaki hibakusha, he argued, needed to transcend the arbitrary genre of "atomic-bomb poetry" (genbaku shi) to write poetry that could be called literature. Simply writing a poem about the atomic bombing and calling it literature did not make it so. In 1970 he observed that around ten poets resided in Nagasaki, but in comparison to Hiroshima which had placed the atomic bomb at the center of its broader literature movement, they tended to write poetry only for poetry's sake (geijutsu shijō shugi teki). For Yamada, poetry when composed with sincerity possessed the power of both representation and testimony.

Throughout his life as a survivor of the bomb, Yamada made it his mission to battle the domination of Nagai in Nagasaki literature, and his weapon of choice was poetry. Avoiding lofty religious imagery or claims of beauty in death, Yamada depicted the grotesque realities of atomic destruction. He replaced Nagai's sacrificial lamb with ravens perching on the corpses in the atomic-bombed landscape. As Yamada walked with his younger sister through the Urakami Valley the day after the bomb, he noticed some wooden poles on top of a pile of corpses; nearby, a soldier had died with his head in a tub of water and his boots off. All of a sudden, a raven flew down to the corpses and perched calmly on one of the poles. Yamada saw many ravens sitting on the corpses, poking at the bodies with their beaks—a scene that burned itself into his memory.


99 Mainichi shinbun, 1 August 1969.

In March 1972, he evoked the raven he had seen with his sister in "The Dead Raven" (*Shinda karasu*):

[...] One raven walks along with its head hanging.

Indeed, [the bombing] must have been around here.
It’s a wasteland of corpses.
Burned pieces of wood had blown over the browned roof tiles.
Corpses you can see. Corpses you can't see.
Raise their hands. Tear their stomachs.
Raise their scorched heads. Spread their crotches.
Everything lies in the abyss (*soko*) of darkness. Smoke flows.

One raven.
Perches atop the head of a corpse.
It (*soitsu*) [the corpse] never moves.
We cried out loud and moved along.\(^{101}\)
The raven looks from above,
walking along slowly with its head hanging.\(^{102}\)

Yamada saw no salvation in the destruction. The motionless and charred corpses remained frozen in grotesque poses as ravens perched upon their lifeless bodies that were powerless to shoo away the birds. The scene represented for Yamada the helplessness of human beings in the face of the destruction of the atomic bomb and its aftereffects, where the raven embodied the death that awaited even the so-called survivors.

Yamada considered his poetry a representative voice of the *hibakusha*, commenting in 1999 on the presence of ravens in his work: "I depicted the anxiety over the occurrence of blood cancer under the pretense (*katak*su) of the raven swooping down."\(^{103}\) For Yamada and many Nagasaki *hibakusha*, the representative image of the atomic bombing was no sacrificial lamb but death, human destruction, and the persistent

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\(^{101}\) The change in tense is in the original: *shita*.

\(^{102}\) This is only half of the poem: see Ienaga Saburō et al, *Nihon no genbaku kiroku*, v. 20, p. 178.

\(^{103}\) "*Kioku no koshitsu: Yamada Kan shi ni kiku*," editors' interview with Yamada, in *Josetsu XIX*, p. 63.
anxiety of dying. His poetry presented a challenge to Nagai as the voice of Nagasaki, drawing attention to and contextualizing the issue of Nagasaki hibakusha memory and representation, but the resistance he encountered was indicative of the persistence of Nagai in the atomic memory of the city. Today, Nagai's memory is still venerated, his city-sponsored museum attracts numbers of tourists, and his books occupy a special shelf in local bookstores. The Nagai wall remains standing.

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From early in the reconstruction process, some critics accused Nagasaki city and the hibakusha of "lagging" behind Hiroshima "on all fronts," yet for more than two decades Nagasaki prevailed as the atomic-bombing tourist site. Between 1955 and 1978, the Nagasaki kokusai bunka kaikan (Nagasaki International Cultural Hall, later the Atomic Bombing Museum) saw more visitors annually (except for three years) than its Hiroshima counterpart, the Hiroshima heiwa kinen kan (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum). Nagasaki had 20,356,222 visitors to Hiroshima's 17,957,399. Still, the Nagasaki hibakusha saw themselves as working against the forces of popular memory that threatened to eliminate their voice, continuing that struggle today because the present demands they do so. The persistent danger posed by nuclear technology, whether it be the threat of nuclear weapons or the hazards of nuclear power plants, urges on the hibakusha who are still alive to testify as "living witnesses" of that danger.

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104 Ishikawa and Swain, trans., Hiroshima and Nagasaki, p. 605.
So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.


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Valley of Memories: An Epilogue

In 1997, former Nagasaki mayor Motoshima Hitoshi published an article in response to Hiroshima City's successful bid to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) the previous year to have the Atomic Dome designated a World Heritage Site. The title—"Hiroshima, be not proud!"—set the tone of the article, which Motoshima intended to bring attention to what he saw as Hiroshima's perpetuation of Japan's sense of victimhood and inability to confront its wartime aggression. He did not pull any punches. Hiroshima's campaign on behalf of the dome was shameful, he said, especially since the two countries that dissented in the vote, the United States and China, had been the primary enemies of Japan in the Second World War. Their non-support "piled on the shame" (*haji no uwanuri*). If there had been any "reflection on the great war" by Hiroshima officials, Motoshima thought, they certainly would not have focused so much on their own victimization by pressing to have the dome made a world heritage site.

Motoshima thought that Hiroshima's memory of the war—or rather, its amnesia—reflected the general attitude of Japanese society. As an imperial military command center for decades, "Hiroshima was a victimizer in war," only later becoming a victim. In order to move forward from the nation's wartime past, Motoshima challenged Hiroshima (and Japan) to confront that past through reflection and to practice self-restraint, rather than display self-indulgence. "What we must do now," he asserted, "is to apologize to the peoples of China, Asia, and the Pacific nations. Beg from the heart for forgiveness. For
the sake of the past and the future of Japan." The present was crucial. He recommended that Japan "apologize for Pearl Harbor, and that Hiroshima and Nagasaki forgive the atomic bombings. Rage and hatred are not good for individuals, nor for the state (kokka)." He pleaded that Japan adopt the "mindset of forgiving that which is unforgiveable." Accordingly, "Hiroshima and Nagasaki should stand as the vanguard of the 'world of reconciliation' (wakai no sekai). The twenty-first century must be a 'world of reconciliation.'" 1 As the only Nagasaki voice among ten Hiroshima scholars writing in that 1997 issue of the Peace Education Journal, Motoshima had turned the criticism of passive Nagasaki on its head, pointing to Hiroshima's self-indulgence in its post-atomic demeanor. 2 Hiroshima had a history problem, he suggested, unlike Nagasaki which had looked beyond the atomic bombings toward a longer history as the basis for its reconstruction.

Motoshima's way of thinking was not uncommon in Nagasaki. Oka Masaharu was an ordained minister, three-term city councilman, and peace activist who worked to gain the Korean hibakusha of Nagasaki recognition and compensation from the government. After his death in 1994, supporters built the Nagasaki heiwa shiryōkan (Nagasaki Peace Museum) entirely through citizen donations to continue Oka's activism. 3 The first floor of the museum presents the forced labor of Koreans in wartime Japan, and the second floor displays Japanese military atrocities in Asia, focusing on events such as

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2 Kamata Sadao, who at the time was the head of the Nagasaki heiwa kenkyūjo (Nagasaki Peace Research Institute), also contributed a short analysis (less than one page) of a survey: p. 41.

3 The museum is located directly behind NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), the government television station, near Nagasaki Train Station, and does not receive business donations or government funding of any kind. It became a non-profit organization in 2003, and it is operated entirely by volunteers. For more on the museum, see Takahashi Shinji and Funakoe Kōichi, eds., Nagasaki kara heiwagaku suru! (Kyoto: Hōritsu bunka sha, 2009), p. 121.
the Nanjing Massacre and the sexual enslavement of the "comfort women." Like Motoshima, Oka viewed (and the private museum displayed) the atomic bombings as a result of Japan's war of aggression, quite different from the way the publicly funded museums presented the bombing. Since the mid-1990s, however, even the city museum Nagasaki genbaku shiryōkan (Nagasaki Atomic Bombing Museum) has begun to provide visitors with an enlarged context of the war. At the insistence of local scholars, the museum installed a permanent exhibition on the non-Japanese hibakusha, including Korean and Chinese forced laborers as well as Allied POWs. Several Nagasaki-based scholars, including some hibakusha, have now made a point of placing the atomic bombings in the larger context of the war.4

Some Nagasaki intellectuals have proposed to confront the past by accepting Japan's war responsibility. During his career as a politician, Motoshima made a name for himself through his outspokenness on such issues, most famously when he demanded in late 1988, as Hirohito lay on his deathbed, that the emperor accept responsibility for the war. Motoshima was one of the first to do so publicly. During a city council meeting on December 7 of that year, Motoshima responded to a question from a Communist Party member, "I think that the emperor bears responsibility for the war." After the meeting, he elaborated to reporters that "it is clear from historical records that if the emperor, in response to the reports of his senior statesmen, had resolved to end the war earlier, there would have been no Battle of Okinawa, no nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I myself belonged to the education unit in the western division of the army, and I instructed the troops to die for the emperor. I have friends who died shouting 'banzai' to the

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4 For a recent example, see esp. Takahashi and Funakoe, eds., Nagasaki kara heiwagaku suru!
emperor. I am a Christian, and I had difficult moments as a child when I was pressed to answer the question, 'Who do you think is greater, the emperor or Christ?' He did not think that the emperor was a god, though he could not admit it during his childhood because of the social discrimination against Christians. In response to the statement about the emperor's war responsibility, Motoshima received more than 7,000 letters from around the country, some in support (many from hibakusha), but also some that derided him as an "idiot" (baka) or told him to "die!". Conservatives demanded that Motoshima retract his statement, but he never backed down. A member of the fanatic right shot Motoshima in front of Nagasaki City Hall on January 18, 1990, an attack he survived.

Although he is not a hibakusha, Motoshima in many ways exemplifies Nagasaki atomic memory—or rather its convergence of visions, to which he gave voice. Motoshima is a descendant of the hidden Christians (kakure Kirishitan), a fervent Catholic, and an admirer of Nagai Takashi. He wrote about the bomb, often sympathizing with the Urakami community and commenting on Nagai, whose work he placed in the context of Catholic dogma and the history of Urakami as a site of martyrdom. Although he linked the bombing to the regional history of Christian martyrdom, his insistence on confronting the past for the purpose of the present reflected the city's emphasis on its long history of contact with international (Western) culture. For Motoshima and others, postwar Germany served as a model for accepting war

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6 Field, *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor*, p. 247.

7 Nagasaki City Hall compiled a collection of these letters and published them as *Nagasaki shichô e no 7,300 tsû no tegami* (Komichi shobô, 1989).

8 See, for example, *Mainichi shinbun* and *Nagasaki shinbun*, 19 January 1990.
responsibility and working toward reconciliation. His time as mayor bolstered his role in the Nagasaki peace movement. While in office he was a strong supporter of the hibakusha, and he championed Nagasaki's "international cultural" approach to atomic memory in contrast to the self-centered approach of Hiroshima. His memories of fighting in China during the Asia-Pacific War impelled him to call attention to the aporia of memory, including the black hole surrounding the atomic bombings which had resulted from popular remembrance of the bombs but not of the war of aggression preceding them. In this way, the visions of post-atomic Nagasaki that had emerged from diverse sources—Allied occupation forces, city officials, Catholics, and hibakusha—coalesced under Motoshima, revealing their postwar traces reaching across the decades.

The tension among competing visions may have made Motoshima's public utterances more controversial. His view of the atomic bombings as an "unavoidable" end to Japan's war of aggression was sometimes misunderstood as a moral justification of the bombings, or even senility, especially when he played so prominent a role in Nagasaki's peace movement during his time in office. A comment he made much later in 2007, that the atomic bombings "couldn't be helped," drew criticism from all sides, including in Nagasaki. His comment echoed a statement made by Kyûma Fumio months earlier that the bombs "couldn't be helped" because they were necessary to end the war. Kyûma was a member of the Nagasaki Prefectural Assembly in the 1970s, later becoming a National Diet representative and Defense Minister in the conservative Koizumi administration, but national backlash against the comment led to his "resignation" in summer 2007. "It couldn't be helped" is different from "it was morally justified," but there are many who

\[9\] See, for example, Motoshima, Hiroshima yo, ogoru nakare, p. 9.
will not accept any historical justification for the atomic bombings. In Nagasaki, Hiroshima, and indeed much of Japan, the inhumanity of the atomic bombings, which the hibakusha have striven to convey for nearly seven decades, remains inviolable common sense. Motoshima never set out to denigrate the work of the hibakusha, only to promote peace and reconciliation through mutual forgiveness. For him, as for others, Nagasaki's reconstruction as an "international cultural city" implied a move toward forgiveness.

The character of post-atomic Hiroshima with which Motoshima took issue in the mid-1990s had taken shape decades earlier, as did that of Nagasaki. An article in Time magazine captured the mood in 1962: "Hiroshima today is grimly obsessed by that long-ago mushroom cloud; Nagasaki lives resolutely in the present. [...] Hiroshima has made an industry of its fate." In contrast, "Nagasaki is a monument to forgiveness." Former chairman of Nagasaki City Council, Wakiyama Hiroshi, who had overseen the council debates over the Urakami Cathedral ruins in 1958, told the Time correspondent, "We don't want to go around bragging about being victims of the atomic bomb. It is not compatible with the character of Nagasaki." Whether or not Wakiyama was qualified to speak for all of Nagasaki, his statement revealed that the city's self-images from the early postwar era persisted, just as Motoshima's views showed three decades later. The fact that Hiroshima and Nagasaki developed in such disparate ways after the bombing should not be surprising—the main historical similarity between the cities is the atomic bombing. It is perhaps more surprising that Hiroshima has "made an industry" out of its trauma. It should be said, however, that Nagasaki has also made an industry of its history.

Today Nagasaki is a vibrant city that both champions its international past and commemorates its atomic tragedy. With a population of more than 440,000, the city thrives with a tourism industry that displays both characteristics of the city—just as the early city planners had envisioned—attracting 6,108,300 visitors in 2010, which was 500,000 more than the previous year. The spike in 2010 may have been partly due to a popular television drama about Sakamoto Ryôma, who had aided in the "opening" of Japan to the West in the nineteenth century through his relationship with Thomas Glover, a British merchant and arms dealer who lived in Nagasaki. Glover Mansion, still a popular tourist destination, had 1,015,415 visitors in 2010, a fifteen-percent increase from the previous year's number of 882,810. The former site of the Dutch encampment on Dejima attracted 404,078 visitors in 2010, the city having restored its buildings it a few years ago. Atomic-bomb tourism is also going strong: the Atomic Bombing Museum (Genbaku shiryôkan) saw 693,391 visitors in 2010, about the same as in 2009.\textsuperscript{11} In January 2011, 28,871 people visited the museum. Many of the tourist sites in Nagasaki related to both its international history and the atomic bombing do not require entrance fees but see equal numbers of visitors, among them Chinatown, numbers of Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines, Nagasaki Peace Hall, and the Nagasaki National Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims (Kokuritsu Nagasaki genbaku shibotsusha tsuitô heiwa kinen kan).\textsuperscript{12}

The construction of the Nagasaki National Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims and its counterpart in Hiroshima shows that the government approach to


\textsuperscript{12}This is the official name in English.
the *hibakusha* has not changed. The two museums, completed in 2003, were built as a result of article 41 of the *Hibakusha* Relief Law of 1994 which provides for construction of "facilities for the sake of commemorating everlasting peace," the Nagasaki museum costing 4,400,000,000 yen ($40,000,000) in national funds.\(^\text{13}\) The museum spaces are largely underground, with the atmosphere of a mausoleum. In them are preserved testimonial accounts of the bomb, including videos, as well as the books that record the names of all the people who have died to date as a result of the atomic bombing. Today, the shelves in a massive glass pillar in the Nagasaki museum house 153 books containing the names of 152,276 persons.\(^\text{14}\) New names are added at each annual commemoration ceremony on August 9 for those who died during the previous year. All the names included in the books have not necessarily been legally recognized as *hibakusha* by the government, but at least they have achieved a kind of acknowledgement that they were unable to win when they were alive. For, despite the grandiose new museum, built with national funds, the *hibakusha* continue to fight for recognition, compensation, and relief in the face of municipal and national "peace projects" that have persistently ignored their plight. In the *hibakusha*’s fight against nuclear weapons, though, they found an unlikely ally in President Barack Obama, whose speech in Prague in April 2009 calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons provided them a renewed sense of hope that their fight is not in vain.


If tourism boosts Nagasaki's economy, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI) fuels much of the rest of it. Rebuilt after its destruction in the bombing, the Nagasaki shipyard was building ships again by 1947 and still manufactures a variety of sea vessels. Other Mitsubishi factories in Nagasaki produce weapons, such as the MK41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) (licensed through Lockheed Martin) and the Type 97 Torpedo, developed by Japan.\textsuperscript{15} MHI has become the Japanese equivalent of the Lockheed Martin Corporation, and it also maintains license agreements with the American manufacturer.\textsuperscript{16} The production of weapons at the Nagasaki Mitsubishi plants is one manifestation, if somewhat contradictory, of the city's post-atomic reconstruction. Nagasaki was the original site of Mitsubishi Shipbuilding in the latter part of the nineteenth century, playing a major role in the economic history of the city through the end of the Asia-Pacific war. The city's vision to recreate the "international cultural city" included the restoration of Mitsubishi as a central industry. That Mitsubishi produces materials for war suggests the selective memories in this city dedicated to peace and international exchange. Postwar Mitsubishi built its first battleship in 1956 in Nagasaki Bay, proving that even the "international cultural city" could not entirely escape its wartime past.

Nonetheless, Nagasaki continues its role as a center of peace activism. The city holds annual commemoration ceremonies of the bombing on August 9 at Peace Park, in front of the "Olympian" statue, drawing thousands of participants, although the crowds are always smaller than those at Hiroshima's annual commemoration. The city sends its mayor and several hibakusha to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty meetings that take


place at the United Nations. At Nagasaki University, students can major in "Peace Studies," which for years has been the self-classification of the work that many scholars undertake in the city and around Japan.

Municipal rivalries with Hiroshima have recently been renewed. In summer 2010, Nagasaki announced plans to build a research center, similar to the Hiroshima Peace Institute at Hiroshima City University, which would invite scholars from around the world to study in Nagasaki and address a wide range of issues relevant to the "construction of peace," including the abolition of nuclear weapons. The tentative name of the institute, the Nagasaki University Research Center for the Construction of Peace (Nagasaki daigaku heiwa kôchiku kenkyû sentâ), echoes the familiar tone of the rhetoric of the immediate postwar period pledging to "construct" peace. Yet its formation and many other activities and projects related to the city's atomic history demonstrates Nagasaki's unending competition with Hiroshima over its stature as an atomic-bombed city and clarion voice in the peace movement.17

Reconstruction after disaster almost always links a city's past with visions of its future. The past presented Nagasaki city planners and citizens with historical templates they immediately grasped, not least because memories of a storied past shone bright in the catastrophic days of 1945. The visions of revival of Nagasaki that so many groups articulated in the early decades after the bombing generated atomic memories that remind us how the past lives on in the present, sometimes in trickling streams, often in grand rivers that carry us forward into the future.

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