From at-risk to disconnected: Federal youth policy from 1973-2008

Rachel Hare Bork

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ABSTRACT

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Rachel Hare Bork

Traditionally youth policy has been studied from a psycho-social perspective that treats the concept of youth as a natural developmental stage. This dissertation adopts a political perspective and analyzes how political actors shape the social construction of youth. It documents the extent to which five sub-issues of youth policy—education, criminal justice, public health, social services, and workforce development—were present on the congressional agenda from 1973-2008. This research question is addressed through an analysis of congressional hearing data from a researcher-designed database of all congressional hearings held on youth-related issues during this 35 year-period (n = 986). This descriptive analysis provides a longitudinal picture of what Congress chose to consider with regard to youth issues.

The dissertation then empirically probes possible explanations as to why the five sub-issues of youth policy were more or less prevalent on the congressional agenda. Drawing from existing literature, this research posits two competing theories that may explain congressional attention to youth issues over time. The external events hypothesis argues that youth issues are present on the agenda as a result of external events catalyzing an increase in attention to youth issues, whereas the internal actors hypothesis asserts that internal actors such as congressional leaders and interest groups are responsible for promoting youth issues. These competing explanations are then tested with a content analysis of the hearings, supplemented with data from a small number of elite interviews. Results suggest that both hypotheses are partially correct, but that the first theory better explains the peaks in the number of hearings, signifying the role external conditions played in motivating Congress to hold more youth hearings.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In the United States the transition from childhood to adulthood occurs legally at the age of 18, yet in reality it is social and economic life events, such as completion of formal schooling, entry into the labor force, marriage and parenthood, that determine adulthood in practice (Arnett, 2004; Furstenberg, 2006; Hogan & Astone, 1986). Although many individuals between 16 and 24 years old, navigate this process relatively smoothly; for others it is an unsettling time filled with hardship and strife that can lead to severe consequences later in life (Institute of Medicine & National Research Council, 2011). These struggling young people are often described as “at-risk,” “vulnerable,” “disconnected,” “out-of-school,” “disadvantaged,” and so forth (Fernandes, 2007).

There is no singular definition of this group. For instance, the 2003 White House Task Force for Disadvantaged Youth defined this population as “youth who, because of certain characteristics, circumstances, experiences or insufficiencies, encounter financial, legal, social, educational, emotional and/or health problems and may have significant difficulties growing into adults who are responsible citizens, productive workers, involved members of communities, and good parents” (Executive Office of the President, 2003). In other words, disadvantaged youth experience substantial barriers as they enter adulthood and teeter on the margins of the education, labor, and criminal justice spheres of society. Conversely, a 1992 Urban Institute Report described these young people as having “characteristics and experiences that put them at risk of developing problem behaviors and outcomes that have the potential to hurt their community, themselves or both” (Burt & Resnick, 1992, p. 13).

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) categorizes youth policy into five issue areas: workforce development and job training (including community service), education, juvenile
justice and delinquency prevention, social services, and public health (Fernandes, 2007). This categorization is based on a review of federally legislated programs and policies that have been created to help these young people better navigate the transition to adulthood (Scott, Deschenes, Hopkins, Newman, & McLaughlin, 2006). Because issues affecting young people between the ages of 16 to 24 can be characterized as both child and adult policy issues, these five issue areas are the major sub-issues that constitute youth policy. The presence of youth policy on the federal agenda is the focus of this research.

Traditionally youth policy has been studied from a psycho-social perspective that treats the concept of youth as a natural developmental stage. This dissertation, however, adopts a political perspective and analyzes how political actors shape the social construction of youth. Social construction is defined as “the underlying understanding of the social world that places meaning-making at the center” (Schneider & Sidney, 2009). It distinguishes socially meaningful target populations, that is, different types of people or groups that policy is attempting to change, through the attribution of values, symbols, and images. Consequently, through imposed eligibility criteria target populations become empirically verifiable and take on group identities (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).

This dissertation is also different from the majority of public policy scholarship because it examines agenda setting for a whole policy area that comprises many sub-issues rather than for a discrete issue. For instance, the majority of policy research focuses on one issue or a comparison among several issues, but it does not examine policy issues that have distinct sub-issues that operate independently of the issue as a whole (e.g., Kingdon (2003) compares health and transportation issues).
In particular, this research examines the role of Congress in creating the youth policy agenda. Weir, Orloff, and Skocopol (1988) explain why Congress is such an important actor in the creation of social policy: “Within the federal government, Congress, with its strong roots in state and local political establishments, has remained pivotal in national domestic policy making—even during periods of strong executive initiative such as the New Deal and the world wars and the Cold War” (p. 19).

In addition, this study examines the interest groups that testify on Capitol Hill on behalf of youth issues and the role they play in propagating the youth agenda in Congress. American government is premised on the fundamental belief that organized interests must be able to freely exist. While their scope and power have expanded over the generations, the purpose of interest groups, that is to represent their constituents before government, remains unchanged. To this effect, interest groups are a primary channel of access through which members voice their opinions to those who govern them. Organized interests struggle to frame political issues and engage in agenda building, thereby, making them central actors in modern American politics (Berry & Wilcox, 2009). Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993) explain the importance of interest groups this way: “Interest-group activity does not simply set segmental or particular interest against common interests. Instead, it helps overcome an impossible diversity and conflict of individual interests… [and interest groups] help greatly in structuring the conflicts” (p. 76).

Given the broad scope of issues that comprise youth policy and the mercurial definition of what constitutes the youth population over the years, studying youth policy is inherently messy, and not surprisingly, very little research exists on the political dimensions of this topic. This study, therefore, represents a beginning study of federal youth policy by exploring two research questions that examine the nature of congressional attention to youth policy from 1973
to 2008. In essence, this dissertation longitudinally examines the presence of youth policy issues on the congressional agenda and tests competing theories that may explain the historical patterns. The agenda can be defined as: “The demands that policy-makers chose to or feel compelled to act on, or at least, appear to be acting on, constitute the policy agenda” (Anderson, 2006, p. 87). Furthermore, Kingdon (2003) distinguishes between “the governmental agenda, the list of subjects that are getting attention, and the decision agenda, of the list of subjects within the governmental agenda that are up for an active decision” (p. 4). This dissertation is a study of the governmental agenda. The remainder of this chapter reviews the theoretical framework guiding the research and a detailed discussion of the research questions and hypotheses.

1.1: Theoretical framework

The political science literature is filled with existing research on the politics of policy problems and agenda setting, which is the framework from which this research is derived. This dissertation adds to the rich literature by examining how the complex policy problem of youth that comprises many sub-issues is addressed by the U.S. Congress. To that end, this research will provide insight into the ways changing the perception of public policy problems has contributed to larger structural change in American social policy

1.1A: Policy problems

Although the world is filled with many issues that deserve political attention, only a handful of issues or topics actually receive space on the governmental agenda. If all of society is in agreement as to how to deal with an issue then there is no need to have government spend its time and resources to address this issue. However, this phenomenon almost never occurs. Consequently, issues must be determined to be in need of government action, or in other words

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1 I deliberately selected this 35-year period because it is the most active period to date of domestic youth policy and encompasses many political and social changes in the United States. Chapter 4 provides further explanation as to the timeframe selection and research methodology.
be construed as a “policy problem.” Only once an issue is a policy problem can it be resolved by political actors (Anderson, 2006; Eyestone, 1978). In essence, a policy problem is the tactical way groups, individuals, and government agencies portray issues to promote their favored course of action (Stone, 2002). Stone (2002) explains:

Problems are defined in politics and political actors make use of several different methods, or languages, of problem definition. Each of these languages has room for moral conflict and is a vehicle for expressing moral values, but there is no universal technical language of problem definition that yields morally correct answers (p. 134). She also suggests that the way problems are defined and demonstrated in politics is strategic and deliberate. Representations of problems, she writes, are “constructed to win the most people to one’s side and the most leverage over one’s opponents” (Stone, 2002, p. 133). She constructs a typology of ways that language is used to portray policy problems. The two most relevant categories in her typology to the problem definition of youth issues are symbols and numbers. Symbols stand for something else, yet the meaning of the symbol depends on how people interpret it, use it, or respond to it.

At the core of defining policy problems is the use of language. Society exhibits strong political responses when issue positions are linked to cultural values through political myths and rituals (Cobb & Ross, 1997). In turn, it is language, symbols, and images that are used to create these political myths and rituals. Language plays the central role in how human beings understand “the issues, the leaders, the enemies, the categories, and the tests of rationality on which political support and opposition are based” (Edelman, 1994, p. 238). Edelman (1994) further explains that, “we do not experience political events or actions in any direct way, but always through the language used to describe them and so give them a particular meaning. Language, then, is political reality” (p. 238).
The language used to describe issues constantly evolves as issue advocates try to replace negative language with positive terminology. The target population that was once referred to as “crippled” became “handicapped,” which in turn became “disabled” (Ingram, Schneider, & deLeon, 2007). As the title of this study implies, the adjectives used to describe youth have undergone a similar evolution. Young people were often labeled as “at-risk,” a vague term that makes no reference to the type of hazard the person may be in jeopardy of encountering. Following the lead of the medical profession, the term “risk factor,” referring to the independent variables associated with a negative outcome entered the youth policy lexicon. Currently, “disconnected” is a common adjective used to describe disadvantaged young people. Those who use the label hope that through interventions and support, young people can become connected with society and its institutions, therefore subject to their positive influence.

Similarly, cultural and symbolic factors contribute to issues of resource distribution through invocation of issues such as “fairness” and “group identity” (Cobb & Ross, 1997). Ross (1997) asserts that culture is politically relevant when it: frames the context in which politics occurs; links individual and collective identities; defines the boundaries between groups and organizes actions within and between them; provides a framework for interpreting the actions and motives of others; or provides resources for political organization and mobilization. Often cultural images are utilized to present competing perspectives on important social issues, for example “healthy children” versus “illegitimate teen pregnancy” in the welfare reform debate (Cobb & Ross, 1997).

1.1B: Issue competition

Just as the shaping of policy problems is a political process so too is the way in which issues find themselves on the agenda. Kingdon (2003) explains: “Out of the set of all conceivable
subjects or problems to which officials could be paying attention, they do in fact seriously attend to some rather than others. So the agenda-setting process narrows this set of conceivable subjects to the set that actually becomes the focus of attention” (p. 3). As a result of the agenda setting process, only a small fraction of issues within the universe of policy problems actually receive governmental consideration. Schattschneider summarizes the competition for policy problems as: “some issues being organized into politics, while others are organized out” (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 71). He asserts that the public’s general apathy and inattention to politics allows elites to control government without constituency oversight.

Downs (1972) believes that issues rise and fall in importance due to electoral competition. Elections create a recurring incentive for the expansion of conflict. Strategically minded party leaders will try to raise new issues that cross party lines or trespass on the issues of the other party in order to expand their electoral coalition. They often accomplish this by altering the problem definition of their issue.

To explain the competition between policy issues, Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) assert that competition among problems arises both within each substantive area, and between areas. In other words, each issue area must have an internal debate to decide on which issue(s) to market and support in the public arena. Then all the issues chosen by the different policy arenas must compete with each other to reach agenda status. Problems that win this competition are then able to gain widespread attention and grow into “celebrities” which dominate arenas of public discourse.

1.1C: Agenda denial and non-decisions

Since issues have to win their place on the agenda, there is also the presence of agenda denial and non-decisions that both act to block issues from receiving governmental attention.
Agenda denial occurs when those who want to maintain the current state and oppose governmental action use their political resources to block issues from reaching the agenda. They do this by often denying that a problem exists (e.g., second-hand smoke from tobacco) or suggesting that it is private matter that is not appropriately handled by government (e.g., teaching evolution in school).

Similarly, nondecision-making is another use of power to prevent issues from reaching the formal agenda. Issues that do not reach the agenda as a result of this type of power are referred to as “non-issues.” Similarly, “non-decision making” is defined as the:

Means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process. (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970, p. 44)

As such, inaction by those less powerful should not be seen as their choice or attributed to apathy or ignorance; rather it should be viewed as the product of their purposeful exclusion through an exploitation of their feelings of fear, vulnerability, or induced hopelessness (Gaventa, 1980).

Bachrach and Baratz (1962) assert that research on the policy making process must include the acts of “non-decision makers” or people whose political power prevents certain issues from reaching the public arena. They argue that what does not get voiced and discussed in political discourse is more important that what does get discussed. The real exhibit of political power which they refer to as the “second face of power,” therefore, is the ability to keep issues off the agenda. Instead of just looking at the big decisions, they argue that it is more important to know who controls the routine political decisions.

Moreover, in studying the lack of political attention to air pollution, Crenson (1971) tackles the empirical problem of studying “non-issues” by analyzing the political explanations
for ignoring this significant phenomenon. He uses a two-dimensional view of power, similar to Bachrach and Baratz, to explain why Gary and East Chicago, Indiana, two neighboring cities with similar populations and equal levels of pollution, took very different paths in terms of combating air pollution. While East Chicago began to clean its air in 1949, it was not until 1962 that Gary followed suit. According to Crenson, U.S. Steel, which built Gary, not only prevented the issue from being raised, but when an anti-pollution ordinance was finally enacted, U.S. Steel influenced the content, albeit without actually entering the political arena. The remaining theories of the agenda setting process are discussed in the next section.

1.2: Research questions & hypotheses

This study empirically documents the extent to which youth policy, comprised of five main sub-issues, was present on the congressional agenda from 1973 to 2008. This research question is addressed through an analysis of congressional hearing data from a researcher-designed database of all congressional hearings held on youth-related issues during this period. Data from this database includes all laws, hearings, testimonies, and witnesses involved in youth policy on Capitol Hill. As a result, this descriptive analysis provides a longitudinal picture of what Congress chose to consider with regard to youth issues. The findings from this research question are then used to inform the remainder of the study which empirically probes possible explanations as to why the sub-issues that comprise youth policy were more or less prevalent on the congressional agenda over these 35 years. Drawing from existing literature, this dissertation posits two competing theories that may explain the change in attention Congress gave youth issues. The external events hypothesis argues that youth issues are present on the agenda as a result of external events catalyzing an increase in attention to youth issues, whereas the internal actors hypothesis asserts that political actors, such as congressional leaders and interest groups,
are responsible for promoting youth issues. These competing explanations are then empirically tested with a content analysis of the youth related hearings and supplemented with data from a small number of interviews with experts in federal youth policy. The two competing theories are presented below.

1.2A: Hypothesis I: External events

The first explanation argues that youth issues were present on the congressional agenda as a result of larger institutional and environmental factors enabling the promotion of youth issues on the national agenda. During this era in United States history, the country experienced external environmental shocks, such as inner city riots, the explosion of the crack-cocaine epidemic, and the release of major reports such as *A Nation at Risk* to name a few, that provided policy entrepreneurs with the opening to seek governmental change towards young people. Similarly, public education became an area of great concern as the Cold War and the 1957 launch of Sputnik fueled the race to have America produce a more educated workforce to compete with the Soviet Union (Kaestle & Lodewick, 2007). This hypothesis suggests that policy entrepreneurs responded to these external events and as a result Congress held hearings on youth issues in reaction to these changing environmental conditions.

There are many theories of the policy making process that highlight the role of policy entrepreneurs in the agenda setting process. Mintrom and Vergari (1996) define these actors as follows:

Policy entrepreneurs can be thought of as doing for the policymaking process what business entrepreneurs do for the marketplace. That is to say, policy entrepreneurs serve to bring new policy ideas into good currency. Like their business counterparts, they are identifiable primarily by the actions they take, rather than by the positions they hold. (pp. 422-423)
Although many of the theories of policymaking acknowledge that policy entrepreneurs often capitalize on external events to advance their agenda, the theories differ in the degree to which policy entrepreneurs actively manipulate external events for their own advantage.

According to Kingdon (2003), policy entrepreneurs are ready and waiting to seize their “policy window,” or the intersection of an advantageous political climate, a politically palatable problem and solution, and a lack of political opposition (often discusses as three separate streams). Each of these streams has structural elements that must all coincide and be exploited by a policy entrepreneur according to this policy formation framework. The problem stream includes the issues that require political attention, the policy stream is a conglomeration of ideas that compete to win prominence amongst policymakers, and the political stream includes the environmental situation, such as legislative turnover and national mood (Zahariadis, 2007). Only when these three streams come together to create a policy window are policy entrepreneurs able to capitalize on the moment to advance their policy agenda.

Moreover, Kingdon (2003) notes that social problems do not reach the agenda simply because they are important, and certain solutions are not preferred merely because they are germane. Rather, social problems are more likely to be included on the government’s decision agenda if they have certain features – such as dramatic symbolism or resonance with dominant social values. The solutions to those socially recognized problems often do not arise through careful review of alternative possibilities, but are often arrived at in idiosyncratic ways. Solutions may often exist prior to the problems they supposedly solve and are regularly coupled with barely relevant problems by entrepreneurs seeking opportunities to push pet solutions. As a

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2 This theory originally described by Kingdon (2003), is often referred to as the multiple streams or policy streams theory by Sabatier and other scholars (Sabatier, 1991; Zahariadis, 2007).
result, “Kingdon’s theory appears to make agenda setting a rather random or chancy process; much depends upon timing and luck” (Anderson, 2006, p. 90).

Furthermore, Kingdon’s theory gives equal weight to the three streams and does not give causal priority to any one of them. As a result the theory assumes that all three of the streams are necessary, but that independently each stream is not enough, thereby, making it easy to explain away examples that do not fit the theory. For instance, if an issue fails to reach the agenda despite the presence of a policy window, Kingdon would argue that entrepreneurs were missing or lacked the savvy to exploit the window of opportunity. Although Kingdon may be correct in his assessment of the policy process, there is also analytical value in more sharply distinguishing the two kinds of theoretical explanations. In essence, the external events hypothesis in this study poses changing environmental conditions as the catalytic element enabling more youth issues to receive congressional attention, with policy entrepreneurs seen as reactive.

1.2B: Hypothesis II: Internal actors

The second theory asserts that internal political actors, such as congressional leaders and interest groups were the primary actors responsible for facilitating the presence of youth issues on the congressional agenda. According to this perspective, congressional leaders, through strategically calling hearings and inviting witnesses, and youth interest groups, through strategically testifying at the same hearings publicized the importance of youth issues. In essence, congressional leaders and youth interest groups acted as policy entrepreneurs and redefined the social construction of youth and shopped around to find the most advantageous venue to advance their issue. This hypothesis places less emphasis on the changing environmental conditions; rather, it asserts that it was the internal actors themselves that
strategically pushed for more attention to youth issues. This hypothesis is based on the punctuated equilibrium theory and the advocacy coalition framework (ACF).

Punctuated equilibrium theory highlights the active role policy agents play in redefining policy issues and the institutional venues in which they are considered (True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 2007). The theory describes the policymaking process as the work of policy monopolies, which are in the business of developing and marketing how and what the public thinks of their issues (policy images). Policy monopolies lead to long periods of political stasis as the myriad of political issues facing society are handled by many different policy subsystems. These subsystems tend to be characterized by policy monopolies dominated by a core policy image connected to fundamental political values. In order to maintain their position of power, policy monopolies resist change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Meijerink, 2005; True, et al., 2007).

This stability is punctuated, however, when actors, often led by policy entrepreneurs, are successful in altering the image of their problem and the venue responsible for implementing solutions. The theory suggests that movement into a new policy venue attracts new supporters and that the rise of a new policy image, which is “shopped” in new venues, enables new actors to become involved. Once new participants become involved and feel they now have right to say something on the issue, a sharp change in policy direction can occur (Meijerink, 2005; True, et al., 2007). While in Hypothesis I policy entrepreneurs wait for their policy window to open as a result of external streams coming together (Kingdon, 2003), in Hypothesis II political actors, such as congressional leaders and interest groups, actively participate in the agenda-setting process and do not wait for the perfect storm of environmental conditions to come together giving them a political window (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF)\(^3\), which emphasizes the role of semi-autonomous policy communities or “policy subsystems” in the policymaking process, also guides Hypothesis II (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). These policy subsystems are comprised of various advocacy coalitions that are promoting different policy issues and proposals. Each advocacy coalition includes “actors from various public and private organizations who share a set of beliefs and who seek to realize their common goals over time” (Sabatier, 1986, p. 39). What distinguish the various advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem are the different belief systems about the nature of society, public problems, and the types of policy solutions that should be advanced to solve them. These beliefs can be either “deep core” referring to basic norms and shared values or “policy core” understandings that affect a particular policy subsystem, including “strategies for realizing core values within the subsystem” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007).

The advocacy coalition framework suggests that groups choose their allies based on perceived trustworthiness and core belief compatibility guided by bounded rationality (Jones, 2003; Leach & Sabatier, 2005; Simon, 1985). In response to the rational choice movement, which argues that individuals make decisions based on rational cost-benefit analyses, bounded rationality asserts that human rationality is limited (Jones, 2003; March & Olsen, 1989; Simon, 1983). Due to individuals’ imperfect ability to process and analyze information, human decisions are not made through modeling their utility; rather “[individuals] decide what their main priorities are (that may not be rational) and then attempt to fit their needs as well as they can” (Koelble, 1995, pp. 233-234). The assumptions of bounded rationality, therefore, guide the choices organizations make in terms of relationships with other groups.

\(^3\) While ACF provides an actor-centered perspective, in practice its proponents, often blur the distinction between actors and events by also discussing how external factors may play a critical role in the policy process. This is similar to how Kingdon blurs the three streams in his theory.
1.2C: Summary

The first explanation asserts that the presence of youth policy on the congressional agenda emerged in response to policy entrepreneurs capitalizing on larger environmental issues, whereas the second theory places the onus on the political actors as the drivers of the youth policy agenda. In sum, the first explanation asserts that the policy problem formed in reaction to policy entrepreneurs capitalizing on broader external shocks that open policy windows, while the second explanation presents the issue formation as a strategic attempt by congressional leaders and interest groups to publicize the importance of youth policy.

This dissertation includes several theories of the policy process and attempts to separate these theories into two opposing perspectives. In reality, however, these theories all borrow from each other and include similar elements such as policy windows, external shocks, and policy entrepreneurs. As a result, this study capitalizes on key elements of each theory in order to identify important distinctions in the policymaking process.

1.3: Limitations of study

The policy process can be conceptualized as a five stage model: problem identification and agenda setting, formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation (Anderson, 2006). This dissertation examines the first stage of the policy process model—problem definition and agenda setting. It does not examine what aspects of the youth policy agenda are adopted into legislation and implemented. Nor does it examine the change in appropriations for federally-funded youth programs. Future research would be needed to address these issues and are outside the scope of this research. Additional limitations of this study will be discussed in the data and methods chapter as well as in the final chapter.
1.4: The plan of the dissertation

The chapters that follow demonstrate the presence of youth policy issues on the congressional agenda and the reasons that account for the historical trends. Chapter 2 provides a more in-depth discussion of youth and the issues affecting young adults. In order to contextualize the period under examination in this research it also reviews federal policy towards young people prior to 1973, with an emphasis on how various levels of government have contended with youth issues. Examining congressional attention to youth policy from 1973 to 2008, Chapter 3 explains the data collection strategy and methodology for the study. Chapter 4 presents the main findings of the study and uses empirical evidence to test the hypotheses laid out in this chapter. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the implications of this research for American social policy and suggests how future research can further contribute to the larger subject of youth policy.
Chapter 2: Context

This chapter provides the context necessary to analyze of congressional attention to youth issues from 1973 to 2008. It begins by expanding the discussion of youth and the issues affecting young adults that were included in Chapter 1. It then reviews federal policy towards young people before 1973, with an emphasis on how prior to the 1970s youth policy was fragmented by issue (e.g., workforce development, education etc.) and by the age of the youth population. As this chapter will show, the United States of America has never had an overarching policy targeted towards young people. Instead, modern federal youth policy emerged in response to perceived deficiencies plaguing young adults, thereby leading to a national history of scattered social policy towards children and youth (Scott, et al., 2006). In particular, the history of federal youth policy shows how it was crafted in response to societal changes, such as increasing inner-city poverty and unemployment, as well as in reaction to poor educational outcomes that started to became apparent in the 1960s and 70s. Finally, this chapter argues that these same societal changes contributed to the rationale used by youth policy groups to work together. Whereas previously interest groups had predominantly worked independently, it was during this same period that they began strategically to form coalitions.

2.1: Definition of youth

“Youth is an elastic category: where it begins and ends is subject to interpretation and is sensitive to social and historical context” (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2005, p. 11). Psychologists
consider it to be a period when individuals explore and consolidate their identity (Erikson, 1968). As youth work to make sense of who they are as individuals and the society around them, they begin to develop their own ideology and viewpoint distinct from the choices their parents may have made. Steinberg and Lerner (2004) describe young people as the “generational cohort that must next be prepared to assume the quality of leadership of self, family, community, and society that will maintain and improve human life” (p. 52). Due to the general vagueness in definitions for this segment of the population, it is difficult to determine when individuals reach this middle stage and cease being children. Flanagan and Syversten (2005) explain: “In summary, youth is a social construction: its meaning varies according to the particular contexts in which people are making transitions from the dependencies of childhood to assume the responsibilities of adulthood” (p. 13).

The terms youth and adolescence are often used interchangeably. In 1904 psychologist G. Stanley Hall established the idea of adolescence, which he defined as the period of “storm and stress” between childhood and adulthood where youth are vulnerable to risky behavior, conflict with parents, and perversion (Hall, 1904). Over the years, theorists such as Piaget, Erikson and others, have built upon the work of Hall to further the conceptualization of the stages of adolescence. Table 2.1 presents an approximate chronology of the theories of adolescence developed since the early 20th century. These theories focus on many different aspects of adolescent development and attempt to explain why adolescent behavior is different from both
child and adult behavior. Today, adolescence is generally depicted as covering three stages of development: early adolescence (ages 10-14), middle adolescence (ages 15-19), and late adolescence (ages 20-24) (Spano, 2004). Each stage of adolescence is marked by specific characteristics of behavior both physically and cognitively (Spano, 2004). This study uses the term youth to refer to middle and late adolescence (ages 16 to 24). The last stage is also sometimes referred to as young adulthood.

Table 2.1: Theories of adolescence, presented in approximate chronological order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developmental Area</th>
<th>Theorist</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biological</td>
<td>G. Stanley Hall</td>
<td>Biology determines the period of physical and social development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>Sigmund Freud</td>
<td>Anxiety and sexual excitement characterize adolescence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychosocial</td>
<td>Erik Erikson</td>
<td>Identity development characterizes adolescence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive</td>
<td>Jean Piaget</td>
<td>Development of abstract thought, rather than concrete thought, characterizes period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological (interaction between individual and environment)</td>
<td>Urie Bronfenbrenner</td>
<td>Development determined by context (e.g., family, peers, schools etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Cognitive Learning</td>
<td>Albert Bandura</td>
<td>Adolescent development occurs through emulating adult behavior, and the relationship between social and environmental factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Margaret Mead</td>
<td>Development determined by culture.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These changing conceptions of adolescence are associated with changes in scientific research, but also with sociological developments that have fundamentally altered the nature of youth and adolescence. In the past, most of the major life events that had traditionally been considered the identifying markers of adulthood were attained by individuals in their late teens or
early 20s. This timeframe, however, is no longer the norm. Today’s youth are devoting more time to higher education, delaying entry into the labor force, and marrying and having children later in life (Arnett, 1998, 2000). Consequently, “entry into adulthood has become more ambiguous and generally occurs in a gradual, complex, and less uniform fashion [than in the past]” (Settersten Jr., Furstenberg Jr., & Rumbaut, 2005, p. 5). Furstenberg explains: “No longer does the end of adolescence signal the beginning of adulthood. Today, the twenties have become what the late teens were a half century ago—a time of transition” (Furstenberg, 2006, p. 303). In sum, young adulthood in 2012 is a much longer period compared to young adulthood in 1970.

Although considerable research has been done in the field of human development to reframe how adults think of adolescence, many still consider it to be a particularly difficult stage of life—one that individuals must endure to reach adulthood. Gary Walker, former President of Public/Private Ventures, explains it this way:

> Adults see adolescence as a confusing and trying time, full of new thinking, experimentation and hormonal change, ups and downs in mood—hard to characterize easily, hard to predict, hard to explain in terms of cause and effect…In the end, to them, adolescence is something to “get through”—so internally driven as to be impervious to outside influence. (Walker, 2000, p. 71)

Scholars and advocates of youth, however, disagree with the negative undertones that are associated with the word “adolescence.” Instead of thinking of adolescence as a period of “storm and stress,” youth activists perceive this developmental phase as a process by which caring adults can help facilitate the process of discovery and development which young people need to reach adulthood. In turn, supporters have argued for the use of the term youth development (often with the term positive preceding it) to describe the process of transition from childhood to adulthood. Karen Pittman, a champion of youth development, and her colleagues explain youth development as:
...the ongoing growth process in which all youth are engaged in attempting to (1) meet their basic personal and social needs to be safe, feel cared for, be valued, be useful, and be spiritually grounded, and (2) to build skills and competencies that allow them to function and contribute in their daily lives. (Pittman, O'Brien, & Kimball, 1993, p. 8)

Newman, Smith, and Murphy elaborate: “Youth development then is a combination of all of the people, places, supports, opportunities and services that most of us inherently understand that young people need to be happy, healthy, and successful” (Newman, Smith, & Murphy, 2000, p. 85). Or in the words of Hugh Price, former president of the National Urban League, youth development is "what parents do for their children...on a good day" (Center for Youth Development and Policy Research, n.d.).

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the transition to adulthood for many individuals occurs without too much hardship. Policymakers, practitioners, and researchers, however, often subdivide those who struggle during this period based on their risk factors and life experience. For example, these groups include, but are by no means limited to (Osgood, Foster, Flanagan, & Ruth, 2007; Wald & Martinez, 2003):

- Youth emancipating from foster care
- Runaway and homeless youth
- Youth involved in the juvenile justice system
- High school dropouts
- Young unmarried mothers
- Youth who are neither working nor in school

It is also important to note that these groups are not mutually exclusive; rather many young people fall into more than one of these categories. For example, many youth transitioning out of foster care at the age of 18 are more likely to become homeless since they are less economically secure than the general youth population and do not often have family support or resources at their disposal (Osgood, Foster, & Courtney, 2010).
The difficulties in operationalizing the term youth have led to significant variation in how programs and policies define youth for the purposes of service delivery and research (United States Government Accountability Office, February 2008; Wald & Martinez, 2003). As mentioned in Chapter 1, this study uses 16-24 to define youth because it contains young people who are legally considered both adults and children. This age range also captures young people who could be enrolled in either secondary or postsecondary education. It also includes public services that are dedicated to working with children (e.g. juvenile justice, foster care) and adults (e.g. community college, criminal court, workforce development programs). This definition, while not perfect, clearly delineates the youth population.

2.2: History of federal youth policy

It was not until the 1960s that policies explicitly targeted to youth reached the political agenda (Scott, et al., 2006). Previously the federal government had created policies and programs to meet the needs of women and children, but youth policy as we currently know it is an extension of policies created only in the last 50-60 years. The following sections briefly describe federal social policy with youth components leading up to the 1960s and the major initiatives targeted to youth that were created during the 1960s and 1970s.

2.2A: Early youth policy

Scholars have suggested that although the United States has not developed a modern welfare state along the lines of those created in Western Europe, the country first developed an approximation of federal social policy following the Civil War when the country provided benefits to veterans and their dependents (Skocpol, 1992). Although the federal government

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4 Although scholars of youth and youth policy may contest this definition, it is an attempt to meet Gerring’s (2001) seven criteria of conceptual adequacy: coherence, operationalization, validity, field utility, resonance, parsimony, and analytic utility.
created some social policies during the 19th century, it was not until the early 20th century that the federal government made a larger push into this policy area. For instance, in 1912 the Children’s Bureau in the U.S. Department of Labor was established to address the central child welfare issues of the time (i.e.: child labor and juvenile delinquency) and the Congress passed the Sheppard-Towner Act in 1921, the first social welfare legislation for children and mothers (Skocpol, 1996). This Act, however, was repealed after a few years.

The Children’s Bureau’s most important contribution to youth policy was through its implementation of the child health and welfare programs established by the Social Security Act (P.L. 74-231) of 1935. This included federal funding for states to create and enlarge public child welfare services in special needs areas of the country. In addition, the Aid to Dependent Children Program, now called the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, was established to provide financial resources to impoverished children.

In the early 20th century, juvenile justice courts were also established in almost all of the states. The foundation for the juvenile justice system rested in the doctrine of “parens patriae” which translates into “the state as parent.” “Parens patriae” was first established in the 15th century in reference to orphans, but beginning in the late 19th and early 20th centuries it was applied to poor children whose parents were still living (Schwartz, 2000). In essence it allowed the state to intervene and protect young people whose parents were deemed to not be providing adequate supervision or care (Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, n.d.). Although, the focus on the juvenile court during this period was on rehabilitating the offender, rather than punishment based on offense, the majority of youth who entered the juvenile justice system were “poor, ghetto-dwelling children of recent immigrants” (Schlossman & Wallach, 1978, p. 71). In reviewing court documents from select cities in the early 20th century, researchers found that:
In Milwaukee, for example, more than 90 percent of the children brought into the court were the offspring of European immigrants. Of these, three out of four were either German or Polish. In Chicago, San Francisco, and New Haven the ethnic background of delinquents was similar, although southeastern European countries were more frequently represented, reflecting the different patterns of immigrant settlement in these cities. (Schlossman & Wallach, 1978, p. 71)

In sum, early juvenile justice policy towards young people was based on the assumption that the state could meet the needs of young people from poor immigrant backgrounds better than their families.

Several years later, the federal government also addressed youth issues in response to the massive unemployment and social upheaval caused by the Great Depression through the 1935 creation of the National Youth Administration (NYA) as a youth counterpart to the Works Progress Administration\(^5\) (WPA). The NYA included three components to assist young people between the ages of 16 and 25. The first component provided funds for part-time employment of needy high school, college, and graduate students to help them complete school. This was referred to as the student aid program and later renamed the school work program. The second component, called the work projects program, allocated funds for part-time employment on work projects for unemployed out-of-school youth. Finally, the third component, the guidance and placement program, was offered to young people in both the student aid and work projects programs (Praeger, 1977).

By the 1940s, however, many of the institutions and programs created in the early 20\(^\text{th}\) century were abolished. Since the NYA was created by Executive Order it had no legislative recognition and was terminated in July 1943 (Praeger, 1977). Similarly, in 1949 the Children’s Bureau was moved from the U.S. Department of Labor to the Federal Security Agency and then in 1953 to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and child health policy issues were

\(^5\) The Works Progress Administration was one of the major initiatives of the New Deal designed to employ millions of unskilled workers in public works projects, such as construction of public roads and buildings.
transferred to the Public Health Service. This reorganization of the Children’s Bureau was due to the federal government’s widespread reorganization that prioritized agency function over the constituency served by the agency (Fernandes, 2007).

Furthermore, the federal programs of this era were primarily devoted to job creation and federal relief to alleviate the widespread poverty caused by the Great Depression. The educational initiatives that were included in federal policy during this era came principally from the need to tide people over and put them back to work; thus “when the need for work relief declined as the economy recovered with the onset of World War II, the rationale for these programs evaporated, and they were abolished by Congress” (Kantor & Lowe, 1995, p. 5). As a result, the federal government did not initiate any additional substantial youth policy until the Great Society programs of the 1960s.

2.2B: Youth policy of the 1960s and 1970s

Although the federal government previously established policies to assist children and youth in the early 20th century, there was not an expansion of policy towards this section of the population until the 1960s and 1970s. During this rapid expansion of social policy, the federal government targeted children, adults, and the elderly. This marked the beginning of widespread federal involvement in youth issues, as well as many other social issues that were once considered to be outside their jurisdiction (Cross, 2003; Kaestle & Lodewick, 2007). Peterson (1995) explains: “Only gradually did it become clear that state and local governments for all their ability to work with business leaders to enhance community prosperity, had difficulty meeting the needs of the poor and the needy” (p. 10).

The poverty referenced by Peterson became increasingly apparent during this period when the plight of the American city, (home of many struggling young adults) entered the public
consciousness. Researchers who study this period in American history have sought to explain the demographic and economic shifts of this period. They suggest that as white-flight from urban to suburban areas intensified, rust-belt cities became more demographically and economically homogenous—predominantly home to disadvantaged people of color, or what many call the “underclass” (Massey & Denton, 1993; Wilson, 1990). The loss of the urban tax base from white flight was compounded by the widespread loss of low-skilled jobs as companies fled to the south and finally overseas; as well as by massive private sector disinvestment in urban areas. There were even reports of property owners burning their property to receive insurance money, as that yielded more money than selling or renting urban property during the 1970s (Time, 1977). As a result, many cities in the Midwest and Northeast became areas of concentrated poverty.

Furthermore, during this period structural economic factors including technological advances, foreign trade, and immigration, started to influence employers’ demands for a more educated labor force (Katz & Autor, 1999). The decline of blue-collar jobs, especially in industrial sectors such as manufacturing that pay relatively high wages, and the increase of service-sector employment that requires more advanced skills, contributed to the decline in economic opportunities for low-income individuals, especially those without a high school diploma. In fact, research suggests that the earning power of dropouts has been in almost continuous decline over the past three decades. In 1971, male dropouts earned $35,087 (in 2002 dollars). In 2002 male dropout earnings fell 35 percent to $23,903 (Barton, 2005).

The federal government capitalized on the public momentum and the Democratic Party argued that the nation needed a comprehensive strategy to address social and urban problems. For instance, the National Commission on Urban Problems (1958), the National Commission on Civil Disorders (1967), the President’s Task Force on Suburban Problems (1967), and President
Nixon’s Commission on Population Growth and the American Future (1972) were all influential federal reports that examined the problems of racial segregation and discrimination, poverty, and inner-city decline (Judd & Swanstrom, 2008). In addition, in 1962 the Ford Foundation in conjunction with other funders launched Mobilization for Youth (MFY)—the first large-scale program created to control and ameliorate juvenile crime in cities. According to Passow (1977), “in this pre-war-on-poverty era, it was juvenile delinquency which provided access to program funding. MYF’s approach was a comprehensive one involving projects in the so-called worlds of legal services, neighborhood and community services, work, mental health, and education” (pp. 5-6).

Youth policy of the 1960s, however, really began with the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963, which allowed newly-sworn in President Johnson to capitalize on the civil rights legislation Kennedy had introduced to Congress a few months prior (now known as the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and create further legislation to address economic inequalities. In President Johnson’s first State of the Union address on January 10, 1964 he said: “This Administration here and now declares unconditional war on poverty in America, and I urge this Congress and all Americans to join me in that effort” (Judd & Swanstrom, 2008, pp. 160-161).

The social policy programs of the Great Society, however, stand in sharp contrast to the earlier New Deal federal programs. Kantor and Lowe (1995) explain that, “although the CCC [Civilian Conservation Corps], NYA [National Youth Administration], and WPA [Works Progress Administration] provided a variety of educational services to those most in need, concern about poverty, race, and the role of education in expanding economic opportunity for minorities and the poor did not dominate discussions about social policy in the New Deal, as it did in the Great Society and the War on Poverty that was part of it” (p. 5). Moreover, President
Johnson’s War on Poverty initiatives and subsequent social legislation established many programs targeted to the socio-economically disadvantaged, minority communities in response to the changing societal conditions previously discussed.

In terms of youth policy, this period established many programs in the areas of workforce development, education, juvenile justice, social services, and public health, which were often created independently of each other (Fernandes, 2007). Consequently, youth policy emerged as an uncoordinated effort designed more to solve specific problems rather than to meet the needs of young people holistically. The major legislation during this period, in chronological order, included:

- **The Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964 (P.L. 88-452)**, was the linchpin of the War on Poverty and created the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), which administered programs to encourage the well-being of youth and individuals with low socio-economic status. Programs included: Job Corps (to promote vocational and educational opportunities for older low-income youth), the Neighborhood Youth Corps (to provide work, training and education for economically disadvantaged youth aged 16 to 24), Upward Bound (to assist disadvantaged high school students attend college), Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) (the domestic counterpart to the Peace Corps) which sent volunteers into economically depressed American communities, and Head Start (a child development program for low-income children ages 3-5).

- **Higher Education Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-329)**, increased federal funding to postsecondary institutions and established financial aid in the form of scholarships and low-interest loans for students. It also created the Talent Search program to identify older, low-income youth with potential for postsecondary education. The Higher Education Act (HEA) was amended in 1968 (P.L. 90-575) to include two programs: Student Support Services to improve disadvantaged college students’ retention and graduation rates, and Upward Bound (transferred from the OEO to the Office of Education and later to the U.S. Department of Education).
- **Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 (P.L. 89-10),** the first major piece of federal education policy provided federal funding to low-income schools. The core idea of the ESEA was that most public schools were adequately educating American children, and the schools with poor outcomes were geographically concentrated in low-income neighborhood. The legislation did not interfere with local and state responsibility of school governance; rather it provided additional funds to low-income schools (McGuinn, 2006).

- **Youth Conservation Corps Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-378),** permanently established the Youth Conservation Pilot Program to employ youth between the ages of 15 and 19 of all backgrounds to perform work on federal lands, such as the National Wildlife Refuges, National Fish Hatcheries, research stations, and other facilities.

- **Comprehensive Employment and Training Activities Act (CETA) of 1973 (P.L. 93-203),** established federal funding for the Youth Employment and Training Program and the Summer Youth Employment Program, both of which financed employment training activities and on-the-job training for young people, including out-of-school youth.

- **Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) of 1974 (P.L. 93-415),** extended federal support to states and local governments for rehabilitative and preventative juvenile justice delinquency projects, as established under the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act (P.L. 90-445). Title III established the Runaway Youth Program to provide temporary shelter, counseling, and after-care services to runaway youth. Congress later amended (P.L. 95-115) Title III to also include homeless youth.

- **Education for All Handicapped Children (now known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act or IDEA) of 1975 (P.L. 94-142),** required all public schools accepting federal funds to provide equal access to education for children with all physical and mental disabilities, no matter how severe. Public schools were required to create an individual education plan (IEP) in the least restrictive environment for these students to ensure they received a fair public education.

As will be described in Chapter 4, these laws and associated programs continue to influence congressional youth policy since they have all been reauthorized several times since their
creation, thereby requiring Congress to devote its attention to the issues these laws attempt to address. In sum, modern youth policy is very much an artifact of laws and policy created during the Great Society and the subsequent domestic policy framework implemented in the 1960s and 1970s.

Besides legislative changes affecting youth policy in the 1960s and 1970s there was also important work done by the judicial branch of government which impacted youth. In the 1960s there was a pervasive view among youth stakeholders that young people transgressing the law were being inappropriately placed in the juvenile justice system instead of receiving the appropriate social services. It was also argued that young people in the juvenile system were not being treated fairly according to the law. As a result, the Supreme Court became involved in youth policy in its 1967 ruling *In re Gault*, which mandated that due process, under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, be applied to the juvenile court system (Dorsen & Rezneck, 1967). The ruling stated: “Under our constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court” (*In re Gault,* 1967).

As such, the ruling entitled juveniles to constitutional procedural protections similar to those of adults, such as adequate and timely notice of charges and hearings, the right to counsel at adjudication, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the protection against self-incrimination (Schwartz, 2000, p. 242). *In re Gault* laid the foundation for 1974’s Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, which emphasized that youth committing status offenses (behaviors considered offenses only if carried out by a juvenile, such as truancy and running away) were more in need of care and guidance than they were of punishment.

Furthermore, the executive branch became involved in youth policy in both 1960 and 1971 when the White House devoted its annual Conference on Children and Youth to efforts to
promote opportunities for youth. The 1960 conference focused on the role that community agencies can play to help parents address the concerns of youth, as well as how to improve social services to young adults. “The recommendations called for the federal government to establish a unit devoted to youth and to support public and private research regarding the issues facing this population, including their employment, education, military service, marriage, mobility, and community involvement” (Fernandes, 2007). This call for action has been repeated in various forms and continues today.

In addition, the 1971 conference recommended a suspension of the draft, less punitive measures for drug possession, and income guarantees for poor families—issues all relevant to that era in American history. Finally, in 1970 the Family and Youth Services Bureau (FYSB) in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services was created “to provide youth at risk of becoming involved in risky behavior with positive alternatives, ensuring their safety, and maximizing their potential to take advantage of available opportunities” (American Youth Policy Forum, 1999). These changes in federal policy set the backdrop for the modern youth policy agenda, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

2.3: Interest group research

The final important contextual consideration is the role of interest groups in American politics. Since the second hypothesis explaining congressional attention to youth asserts that interest groups working in coalitions facilitated the presence of youth issues on the congressional agenda, it is necessary to review the prior research on this topic. Just as youth policy was initiated on a large scale in the 1960s and 70s in response to societal changes, interest groups also began to emerge in larger numbers during this period and started to form coalitions.
2.3A: Types of interest groups

Interest groups have always played an important role in American politics (e.g. see Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America*), but in the 1960s and 1970s the nation experienced an explosion of organized groups forming and locating or relocating to Washington D.C. in order to lobby and attempt to influence the federal government. Berry and Wilcox (2009) present data showing a huge increase in the number of interest groups that established Washington, D.C. offices or moved their headquarters to become more involved in federal politics. “Before 1920, only one corporation had a permanent Washington office. In 1978, there were 175 corporations with D.C. offices; by 2004, the number had grown to more than 600” (p. 17). Other scholars suggest that the increase in the number of interest groups located in Washington D.C. during this period was closely related to the rise in the number of issues on the federal agenda, creating a unique political culture:

> With more public policies, more groups are being mobilized and there are more complex relationships among them. Since very few policies ever seem to drop off the public agenda as more are added, congestion among those interested in various issues grow, the chances for accidental collisions increase, and the interaction tends to take on a distinctive group-life of its own in the Washington community. (Heclo, 1978, p. 97)

Many of the new interest groups that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s were “public interest groups.” According to Berry (1977): “a public interest group is one that seeks a collective good, the achievement of which will not selectively and materially benefit the membership or activists of the organization”(p. 7). Scholars suggest that public interest groups play an important role in Washington politics due to the breadth and durability of their organizations, especially as some have developed into large organizations supported by huge membership and corresponding budgets (Berry & Wilcox, 2009). Examples of these organizations include the Environmental Defense Fund, the Children’s Defense Fund, the
Consumers Union and other often liberal groups, as well as professional organizations, such as the National Association of Social Workers which moved its headquarters from New York to Washington, D.C.

Although public interest groups grew in size and influence, business groups remain the most influential interest groups operating in Washington, D.C. Business always had a large stake in governmental lobbying, but their Washington presence increased in response to government regulation which they generally opposed. “In the 1970s, the business community devoted considerable attention to building its political muscle…the idea that government relations was critical came to permeate the corporate world, creating expectations that executives would contribute to company PACs [political action committees] and to politicians, that lobbying was a cost of doing business, and that coordinated efforts could pay off” (Berry & Wilcox, 2009, p. 30). Nevertheless, as business regulation declined under Republican control, the business community did not reduce their lobbying efforts making them major players in federal agenda setting and policy implementation (Berry & Wilcox, 2009).

Although not to the same extent as business groups, think tanks also play an important role in Washington politics. Rich (2004) defines these organizations as “independent, non-interest based, non-profit organizations that produce and principally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support and to influence the policymaking process” (p. 11). Weaver (1989) suggests that think tanks play four major roles in the policy process. First, they serve as sources for policy ideas and he cites the role of The American Enterprise Institute (AEI), The Hoover Institution, and The Brookings Institution as championing the deregulation of domestic transportation policy. Secondly, they act as evaluators of policy proposals and of existing government policies as he suggests that “much think tank research is concerned less with dissemination of new
overall approaches to public policy than with the advancing and evaluating specific policy proposals” (p. 568). Thirdly, they also serve as a reservoir of personnel who are government experts and a place of employment for the key members of political parties that are not in power. Finally, think tanks and their members are called on by the media to serve as “experts” and “political pundits” based on their perceived issue expertise.

Finally, nonprofit organizations play a passive role similar to interest groups. Although these groups usually act as diverse service providers rather than political actors, Berry suggests that they do “play political roles, albeit not as obviously or aggressively as other interest groups” (Berry, 2007, p. 235). Given the growth of the welfare state, the number of nonprofit organizations has dramatically increased. Since they have to register as 501(c)(3) organizations with the Internal Revenue Service, records indicate that in from the mid-1960s to 2003 the number of nonprofit organizations increased from 100,000 to 800,000 (Berry, 2007). In his survey of nonprofit organizations, Berry (2007) found that nonprofit leaders are uninformed of the laws that govern their group’s potential political activity and disinclined to engage in legal political activities.

2.3B: Coalition evidence

Early interest group literature suggested that interest groups would not work together and form coalitions (Olson, 1971; Salisbury, 1969; Truman, 1951). For instance Wilson (1973) wrote that, “autonomy gives to an association a stable claim to certain resources and thereby reduces uncertainty and lessens threats to survival” (p. 263). Similarly, Berry (1977) argued that it was in the best interest of an organized group to devote resources to efforts that enhanced its own reputation, rather than efforts that would make it appear less original. A study of agricultural interest groups argued that interest groups remain credible through creating narrow “issue
niches” (Browne, 1990). Group survival is dependent on self-proclaimed issue expertise. However, as a result of the explosion of interest groups and interest group coalitions in the 1970s, political scientists began to reconsider and examine interest group behavior more closely.

When diverse groups form an alliance they are in essence “expanding the scope of the conflict” (Schattschneider, 1960). In other words, conflict is the essence of politics. Therefore, individuals or groups that want to have their issue reach the public agenda must gain the attention and support of others to successfully reach their goal. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) build on this concept to argue that the increase in interest groups caused groups to secure the decreasing public resources brought on by the growing number of organized interests. Since the 1970s groups have created alliances to gain access to a wider range of decision makers and to aggregate their members in order to appear more powerful (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).

Hula (1999) expands these theories to argue that alliances offer groups a low-cost way of showing members or policymakers that they are active. His study of coalition formation among organized interests in Washington, D.C. suggests that different types of organized interests respond to different incentives to join coalitions. According to his research, groups that have policy-oriented goals join coalitions to reduce their resource expenditure, to shape the content of policy proposals, and to define the parameters of the issue debate. On the other hand, other types of groups join alliances to access the information available to coalition members. He explains that, “given the importance of timely information at all stages of the policy process, access to new sources of intelligence is a general requirement for group representatives” (Hula, 1999, p. 124).

Other studies assert the importance of the context in which organizations make decisions to form coalitions. Instead of taking it as a given that groups will act collectively, Hojnacki
(1997) conducted an empirical study to examine why and when organized interests join coalitions. She measures the probability of a group joining a coalition on five diverse issues. Using survey responses from a mailed questionnaire, she then modeled the probability of the interest group joining a coalition based on independent variables drawn from her survey. The study’s results suggest that the costs of joining an alliance outweigh membership benefits when a group’s interest in an issue is narrow and when potential allies signal that the organization will have little to contribute to a collective advocacy campaign. In contrast, the benefits outweigh the costs, when the coalition already has pivotal membership and when groups represent expressive interests or perceive a strong organized opposition. The validity of the study’s findings, however, is limited by its sampling-frame and low response rate.

2.4: Conclusion

Qualitative methodologists who practice historical research posit that time and sequence matter as a result of path dependence. Path dependence, sometimes called increasing returns, suggests that events occur due to a continuous feedback loop. “Initial moves in a particular direction encourage further movement along the same path. Over time, ‘the road not chosen’ becomes an increasingly distant, increasingly unreachable alternative” (Pierson, 2000, pp. 74-75). Consequently, this chapter provided a cursory review of the important historical events and societal changes predating 1973 to contextualize the empirical portion of this dissertation. In order to understand the evolution of federal youth policy from 1973 to 2008, it is essential to have a sense of what came before since earlier events are in part responsible for future outcomes.

In addition, this chapter provided important context as the types of interest groups operating in American politics and how those groups have changed over time. Furthermore, I included a brief literature review as to theories of why interest groups form coalitions. Since this
dissertation involves a critical exploration of the role of youth interest groups, it is necessary to contextualize the empirical findings presented in Chapter 4 in terms of the prior research. The next chapter reviews the data collection process and methodology, followed by the empirical findings showcasing congressional attention to youth issues from 1973 to 2008 presented in Chapter 4.
Chapter 3: Data and methods

The dissertation uses a historical methodological approach to analyze the presence of youth issues on the congressional agenda. It documents congressional attention to the five sub-issues that comprise youth policy and empirically tests two hypotheses that may account for the change over time in the presence of youth issues on the congressional agenda. The research design required substantial data collection because there is no preexisting research that empirically analyzes federal youth policy and the interest groups involved in youth issues. Since youth policy does not fall within the bounds of one particular policy area it is difficult to identify groups that have lobbied for youth issues. Coupled with the lack of prior information on youth policy and the youth advocacy coalition, the research design was constructed to broaden rather than limit the population.

Congressional hearings were chosen as the main source of data because they are the venue in which “lobbyists have their greatest influence” and present a snapshot of the important issues of the time (Cross, 2003). Congressional hearings are defined as a meeting or session of the Senate, House of Representatives, joint, or special committee of Congress. Hearings are usually open to the public and are held in order to obtain information and opinions on proposed legislation, conduct an investigation, or evaluate/oversee the activities of a government department or the implementation of a federal law. They may also be purely exploratory in nature intended to inform members of Congress about topics of current interest (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005).

In Congress there are many types of committees (e.g. ad hoc, conference, select, special, standing, joint, and so forth) that are used for a variety of purposes. Two defining characteristics distinguish the basic types of committees: legislative authority (the right to receive and report
measures) and permanency (existing from one Congress to the next) (Deering & Smith, 1997). All committees have the power to collect information, but some lack the formal authority to draft and report legislation to their chamber. The four joint committees (economic, taxation, library, and printing) whose membership comprises both Representatives and Senators, with the chairmanship rotating between members of both chambers, have permanent status yet lack legislative authority. Select committees are formed to: highlight important policy issues, to study or investigate pressing problems, to coordinate the development of policy that overlaps the jurisdictions of several standing committees, and/or sometimes as a reward from party leaders to members who have done them favors (Deering & Smith, 1997). This study includes an analysis of all types of committees.

Congressional committees have existed prior to the development of political parties, yet they are constantly being revised and reformed based on changes in partisanship and the policy agenda (Deering & Smith, 1997). In the past 60 years, these external pressures have led to numerous official and unofficial reviews by Congress of its institutional structures (Schneider, Campbell, Davis, & Palmer, 2003; Schneider, Davis, & Palmer, 2003). From the 1970s to the present, the congressional committee structure has oscillated from a decentralized to a centralized system (Deering & Smith, 1997). Furthermore, congressional committees often change names and are created and abolished over time. Given the constancy of congressional reform, it is essential to study federal youth policy with a longitudinal approach.

3.1: Prior research on the politics of Congress

Given that this dissertation examines the nature of congressional attention to youth policy, I examined the prior research on the politics of Congress to support the research design.

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For a review of the history of congressional reform see Deering & Smith, 1997; Schneider, Campbell, Davis, & Palmer, 2003; and Schneider, Davis, & Palmer, 2003.
for this study. The United States Congress is a dynamic institution as a result of the obvious fact that members come and go based on electoral preferences, but also due to Congress’ self-created institutional changes in regard to how it organizes itself and the legislative process.

3.1A: Committee theory: Information

Many scholars have studied congressional hearings in an effort to understand their role in the legislative process. Some scholars find that congressional hearings are a strategic venue used by congressional members to skew information and shape the policy conversation. For instance, hearings are often held because committee chairs want to promote their own agenda and they invite witnesses who can help facilitate this effort (Leyden, 1995; Talbert, Jones, & Baumgartner, 1995). In Huitt’s (1954) case study of the Senate’s Committee on Banking and Currency in spring 1946, he described the hearings over the question of extending price control as “a public platform for opposing groups with which the senators identified” (Huitt, 1954, p. 365). He continues, “A great deal of information was received from interested groups, which the senators accepted or rejected in accordance with their preconceived notions of the facts” (Huitt, 1954, p. 365). Furthermore, Oleszek (1989) suggests that members enter hearings not only with prepared questions for witnesses, but also with a list of expected answers that have been derived from extended work on the part of their staff with witnesses.

Other researchers, however, find that congressional hearings are used for more objective information gathering. DeGregorio (1992) finds that a committee chair convenes a hearing to gain insight and information about the consequences of various policy proposals, or simply to learn why a problem exists in the first place. In such instances the chair is more likely to instruct staffers to invite witnesses with diverse points of view. The minority party is given one day to hear testimony from witnesses of their choosing, but the majority party is afforded many days in
which to hear testimony from their selected witnesses. Although legislation that emerges from congressional hearings must be voted on by the House of Representatives and Senate and is subject to further negotiation and revision, the hearings are particularly important since it is at this stage that many members shape their opinions on issues through exposure to testimony and field visits in hearings (Cross, 2003).

Furthermore, elected officials seek out information in congressional hearings in order to protect their self-interest (i.e.: re-election and peer respect) (Fenno, 1973). “Generally speaking, legislators seek two types of information: political information that enlightens their understanding of the electoral consequences of their decisions, and policy information that enlightens their understanding of the consequences of policy change” (Leyden, 1995). Smith’s (1984) empirical study of the lobbying activities of the National Education Association found that members of Congress look to interest groups to help interpret the consequences of their decisions. According to Smith, "The aim is to show the position favored by the advocate is also one consistent with the goals of the members—either by shaping the members' personal understandings of the consequences or by providing members with acceptable explanations of their positions" (Smith, 1984, p. 47).

Diermeier and Feddersen (2000), however, take a different angle and argue that information obtained in hearings may not be informative to committees, but rather are more useful in providing crucial information to the floor. They find “that if hearings are informative and costly then committees both specialize and hold hearings for a wide range of prior beliefs about likely policy outcomes” (Diermeier & Feddersen, 2000, p. 59).
3.1B: Committee theory: Jurisdiction

In addition to examining the flow of information through congressional committees, other political scientists have studied the role of formal and informal jurisdiction in the politics of Congress. Jurisdiction refers to the issues each committee has the authority to review, or in other words its “turf.” King (1994) quotes a congressional staffer as saying, “Jurisdiction boils down to whether you’ll have a seat at the table when important decisions are being made. If you’re not at the table, you’re a nobody” (p. 48).

Another way to conceptualize jurisdiction is as a rational division of labor. On the one hand it may make sense to have zero overlap among committees in terms of their jurisdiction. That way, each committee can specialize and act as the “expert” on a given topic. On the other hand, there is the parallel problem of the continual arrival of new issues, such as those brought on by technological advances, demographic changes and so forth. The fundamental dilemma that this poses is that members of Congress are elected to represent the diverse issues affecting their constituencies and as such it is not in their best interest to specialize too narrowly. This conflict is at the heart of the issue of jurisdiction.

King (1994) distinguishes two types of jurisdiction: statutory and common law. Statutory jurisdiction refers to the legal jurisdiction recorded in the congressional rules. As such, most committees have between ten to 15 specific issues listed under the jurisdiction in the rules. Consequently, it is clear which issue goes to which committee for review. Common law jurisdiction, however, is a much more political process. King (1994) explains:

When jurisdictionally ambiguous bills are introduced, they still have to be referred to one committee (or sometimes several committees) within 24 hours...the House and Senate parliamentarians—unelected but powerful clerks—refer bills and resolve jurisdictional ambiguities. These referrals establish binding precedents for all future bills on the same subjects, thereby resolving jurisdictional ambiguities. (p. 49)
As a result, entrepreneurial committee chairs are active in guarding their legislative turf from rival committees and additionally work to expand their jurisdiction through claiming ownership of new issues as they arise. In essence jurisdiction is a political game because for every committee that wins jurisdiction over a new issue, there are many more committees that lose in the continual conflict over turf.

As the number of issues has risen over time, Congress has modified the jurisdictional structure. One solution has been to redefine existing issues more narrowly in order to prevent issues spilling over beyond the jurisdiction of a single committee. Consequently, committee jurisdictions have become increasingly specific and narrow based on the language of statutory authority, executive agency activities, or clauses of the tax code rather than jurisdiction based on common sense and broad policy terms. Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod (2000) give the example of health care policy in the 105th House of Representatives to illustrate this phenomenon:

The Commerce Committee is given authority over “health and health care facilities, except health care supported by payroll deductions” (Rule X-e-3), which goes to Ways and Means because of its traditional control over Social Security issues. This reaction to the jurisdiction problem leads to problems of coordination since policies created by a variety of different statutes may coexist in a single policy area. It helps explain some long-standing contradictions of government policy as well. (p. 327)

This lack of coordination in Congress has been particularly problematic for the advancement of the youth policy agenda, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.

To document the change in jurisdictional clarity in the post-war period, Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod (2000) analyzed a dataset of all congressional hearings held between 1947 and 1994. They calculated Herfindahl indexes, a measure used by economists to assess market concentration, but used more recently used by political scientists to assess jurisdictional concentration (Hardin, 1998; Lowery & Gray, 1998). Following their lead, I also make use of
Herfindahl indexes in this dissertation, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. In their study, Baumgartner et al. (2000) use Herfindahl scores to summarize the degree to which a single committee dominates (a high score) or shares authority with a large number of rivals (low score) and the extent to which each committee focuses its attention on a single issue (a high score) or spreads its attention across many topics (low score). Through their analysis, they find that committees in both chambers spread their attention more broadly than in the early post-war period illustrating a decline in jurisdictional clarity as a result of increasing issue complexity and the institutional resources available to study issues. Regardless of these issues, they also found that committees continue to specialize given these constraints. Given the battle of jurisdiction, the structure of congressional committees cannot be studied as a static institution, and as such this study uses a longitudinal approach of 35 years to understand how Congress has approached youth issues, rather than a cross-sectional approach which may be biased based on the politics of Congress at any particular point in time.

3.2: Data

To examine federal youth policy I created and analyzed a database of all congressional hearings on youth issues held from 1973 to 2008. In addition, I conducted a small number of interviews with members of the youth advocacy coalition to contextualize the findings from my content analysis of the congressional hearings. The following sections review the data collection process.

3.2A: Timeframe

I purposely selected the period from 1973-2008 since it is the most active period to date of domestic youth policy. This 35 year time period includes many political and social structural changes in the United States. For example during this timeframe the federal government
fluctuated in its methods of mandating and funding social policy, indicated by the allocation of
categorical grants, that specifically ask state and local governments to follow federal regulation
versus block grants, that provide significant leeway in state allocation of federal funds (Conlan,
1998; Peterson, 1995). Moreover, during this era interest groups grew in size and importance,
with some scholars arguing that interest groups surpassed political parties as society’s dominant
political institutions (Lowi, 1967, 1979). The flourishing public-interest movement in the 1970s
and the government’s commitment to a wider range of services and higher levels of spending
never before seen in the nation’s peacetime history are important hallmarks of this period
(Jillson, 1994).

Furthermore, I purposely selected the specific years 1973 and 2008 as the beginning and
end points of the study. The Vietnam War, characterized by the youth-led anti-war movement,
ended in 1973. I chose to begin the timeframe after the Vietnam War, as to not confuse factors
specific to the youth-led anti-war movement with more general institutional issues impacting the
formation of federal youth policy. The study concludes in 2008 with the election of President
Barack Obama which signified a substantial change in political regime.  

This time frame also satisfies the recommendation of many public policy scholars who
argue that a minimum of 20 years is necessary to study the politics of policymaking in order to
understand “the impact of a variety of socioeconomic conditions and to accumulate scientific
knowledge about a problem” (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Derthick & Quirk, 1985; Eisner,
1993; Sabatier, 2007). Given that so little is known about federal youth policy, this dissertation

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7 Although the 2010 election witnessed a subsequent political shift back to the right with Republicans winning
control of the House of Representatives, 2008 is still considered a watershed election with Democrats controlling
both the legislative and executive branches of government, which they had not done since the 103rd Congress (1993-1994).
uses a 35 year period to better understand the change over time rather than the minimum recommendation of 20 years.

3.2B: Data collection: Congressional hearings

All data collected were found through the ProQuest Congressional database. This database provides information about individual hearings which are generally grouped through a “legislative history.” Each legislative history provided by ProQuest includes an abstract of the public law, bibliographic citations, controlled vocabulary subject indexing, and a list of all hearings related to the bill. ProQuest also provides a unique Congressional Information Service (Wong, Shen, Anagnostopoulos, & Rutledge) Legislative History number. Each hearing in the ProQuest database includes important information, such as: the title of the hearing, date, committee, and the listing of each testimony, as well, as a unique CIS number that links with the CIS Legislative History number. Furthermore, for each testimony it also lists all the associated witnesses that participated at the hearing. The majority of hearings included in the database had several testimonies that each included many witnesses.

To facilitate data analysis, I created a database including all information relevant to the laws, hearings, testimonies, and witnesses. The database provides a rich dataset compiling information that is not currently available in any one source. The database includes a four-tiered structure to allow all the information to be included. The first level includes all information relevant to the legislative history: the name and public law number, CIS number, date, enacted bills and statutes, congressional session, and the summary of the legislation. The second level

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8 In January 2010, ProQuest acquired the database from LexisNexis and changed its name accordingly. The database can be found at: [http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp).
9 Testimony refers to a panel of witnesses that are grouped together to give information to the committee. A testimony can range from one or two witnesses to many witnesses.
10 The database was created with the help of Bob Scott head of the Columbia University Libraries Digital Humanities Center (formally called the Electronic Text Service).
provides the information related to the hearings itself: the title of the hearing, CIS number, the date(s) held, the name of the committee(s) and subcommittee(s) that convened it, the location(s) of the hearing, the law associated with the hearing, and a summary of the topic discussed. Next, the third-level of the database contains the testimony information: the name of the hearing and related law, the CIS number and testimony number, the date held, and the statement and discussion. Finally, the fourth-tier of the database includes information about all the witnesses testifying at a hearing: the first and last name of the witness, their title and institution, as well as any additional institutions they may be representing, and the hearing and law associated with the testimony.

Data collection began with a review of the Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) 2007 report *Vulnerable Youth: Background and Policies* (Fernandes, 2007). The CRS report includes 45 federal programs designed to serve or research vulnerable youth primarily between the ages of 10-24 (Fernandes, 2007). All authorizing legislation and subsequent reauthorizations found in the report were searched using the Legislative History function and all the relevant hearings were included in the database. The CRS report was a useful way to search the congressional hearings because of the inconsistent age parameters federal youth programs use for eligibility requirements discussed in Chapter 1. All of the reauthorizations after 1973 of the laws described in Chapter 2 were included in the initial search criteria.

While the CRS report identified 45 programs for vulnerable youth, other federal reports using broader definitions of youth have identified many more programs designed to serve disadvantaged youth. A 1996 General Accountability Office Report cataloged 131 programs targeting individuals aged five to 24 years old who, due to certain characteristics or experiences, were statistically more likely than other youth to encounter legal, social, financial, educational,
emotional, and health problems in the future (U.S. General Accounting Office, March 1996). Similarly, the 2002 White House Task Force for Disadvantaged Youth developed a Federal Youth Programs Survey that asked all the federal departments to identify and provide details regarding any programs they operated in FY 2002 that targeted disadvantaged youth between the ages of 5-17. The Task Force identified 335 federal programs that served or addressed disadvantaged youth in FY 2002 (Executive Office of the President, October 2003). Although these reports present a much larger body of federal programs, they do so through using a definition of youth that includes younger children. Since this dissertation uses ages 16-24 to define youth\textsuperscript{11}, the findings from the General Accountability Office Report and the White House Task Force for Disadvantaged Youth were inappropriate sources to guide the data collection since they define youth as beginning at age five. The CRS report is not perfect because it uses the age range of 10 to 24, but since that includes early adolescence, as described in Chapter 2, it provided the best available list of legislation in which to guide the data collection process.

However, the list of programs and accompanying public laws provided in the CRS report was not exhaustive, most notably excluding large block grants that states might use to serve young people. Due to the variability in the use of block grants for youth issues, however, they were not included in the analysis. Nevertheless, to reduce further selection bias, I also searched ProQuest Congressional for enacted laws that had not been funded and for hearings that ProQuest did not classify as belonging to a “legislative history.” All additional data were found through searching the ProQuest Congressional database using relevant search terms (see Table A2 in Appendix A). Examples of relevant legislative histories not included in the CRS report, but found through searching of the ProQuest database include, but are not restricted to: the Tom

\textsuperscript{11} See Chapters 1 and 2 for more information regarding the study’s definition of youth.
Osborne Federal Youth Coordination Act (P.L. 109-365), the YouthBuild Transfer Act (P.L. 109-281), and the Claude Pepper Young Americans Act (P.L. 101-501).

Selection criteria regarding the hearings and legislative histories were purposively broad. As long as one testimony in the hearing was youth related, the hearing was included in the database and analysis and similarly a legislative history was included as long as one hearing was deemed relevant. This allowed for the inclusion of all possible youth hearings and the organizations testifying. Consequently, the database includes an over-sampling of hearings and organizations, but given the lack of previous knowledge on youth policy, the research design was constructed to broaden rather than limit the population. In sum, the database includes 107 laws (see Table A1 in Appendix A), 986 hearings, 3,389 separate testimonies, and 11,751 witnesses. The data were collected primarily between January and July 2010.

3.2C: Data collection: Limitations of hearing data

In 2011, the hearings and legislative histories included in the database were checked with the hearing information provided by the Policy Agenda Project (n.d.) to ensure that no relevant data had been missed. Although every attempt was made to find the population of congressional hearings on youth-related topics, it is still possible that hearings were omitted due to human error and upload delays by ProQuest. According to the ProQuest website, data are added on a monthly basis to its online system, which may account for the limited number of hearings found in more recent years. Furthermore, ProQuest is continuing to upload hearings and legislative hearings from all years included in this study. For instance, in December 2011, hearings on youth unemployment were added from 1979. According to the online record provided by ProQuest, the 1979 hearings were only uploaded in November 2010, which was after the completion of the major data collection. Although every attempt has been made to ensure that all relevant hearings
are included, it is possible that some hearings and corresponding witness information are missing.

3.2D: Data collection: Elite interviews

To further understand federal youth policy during this timeframe, I also conducted a small number of interviews with youth policy elites \((n = 5)\). Elites refer to people in decision-making or leadership roles, or in other words, experts in the topic (Leech, 2002). Elite interviews are a useful technique because, “well-informed or influential people are unwilling to accept the assumptions with which the investigator starts; they insist on explaining to him [the investigator] how they see the situation, what the real problems are as they view the matter” (Dexter, 1970, pp. 6-7). Furthermore, elite interviews provide context and explanation that cannot be found through archival and internet research. Scholars have noted that the opaque nature of interest group behavior necessitates the use of primary accounts in interest group research (Cigler, 1991). For instance, while the process of government decision-making is available in the Congressional Record or the Federal Register, no such equivalent exists for interest group decisions (Hula, 1999).

Respondents were selected based on their knowledge of youth policy from 1973-2008, their activity in an advocacy organization, and their specific knowledge of particular policy areas that have produced coalition behavior. Participants varied in their area of expertise and involvement in federal youth policy. Of the five respondents, three were knowledgeable on all five sub-issues of youth policy, one was an education expert, and one was a workforce development/community service expert. Several respondents also had previous work experience on Capitol Hill and provided useful insider information into the workings of Congress and youth policy. Another respondent previously worked in the media covering youth issues and was able
to discuss the marketing of youth issues to the larger public. Four of the respondents were male and one was female. Although only five interviews were conducted, the combined expertise of the respondents provided essential information that helped to elucidate the congressional hearing data.

In order to maximize the information provided by the interviews, questions were semi-structured, that is, elites were asked mainly open-ended questions allowing respondents the opportunity to answer questions in some detail. Open-ended rather than close-ended questions were used since little is known about federal youth policy and the interviews primary purposes was to inform the history of the movement as well as the respondents’ actual views. Furthermore, open-ended questions maximize response validity and are generally preferred by elites (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). In addition, respondents were given preliminary findings from the congressional analysis prior to the interview and were probed as to why they thought certain patterns occurred in the data.

Interviews were audio-recorded and notes were generated for each respondent. The notes were reviewed and analyzed following to identify themes and explanations for congressional hearing data. Direct quotes presented in Chapter 5 were transcribed from the audio recordings based on the research notes.

3.3: Coding of congressional hearing data

After all hearings were entered into the database, I coded each CIS hearing. The coding scheme used elements from the Policy Agendas Project (n.d.) and a classification system I refined from the CRS report to identify the subject of the hearing. These topics include: education, workforce development, criminal justice, social services, and public health. I selected these five categories based on the above-mentioned CRS report (Fernandes, 2007). Table 3.1
provides examples of topics that fell into each category. The categories are mutually exclusive.

When a hearing contained information regarding more than one topic, it was coded for the predominant topic. Furthermore, I applied a series of coding rules in order to have consistency across the issue areas. For instance, topics on the issue of vocational education were coded as workforce development, whereas the topic of school lunch and nutrition education received the public health code.

Table 3.1: Codes applied to congressional hearings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Examples of topics included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workforce Development</td>
<td>Job training, vocation education, adult education, school-to-work, community service, service learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>K12 education, higher education, school dropout, child care, afterschool.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Justice</td>
<td>Illegal drugs and alcohol, sexual abuse, child pornography, child abuse, school violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Service</td>
<td>Foster care, welfare reform, homeless youth, adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>Pregnancy and abortions, nutrition, suicide, violence in the media, abstinence education.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, I coded each institution represented by a witness in the database as workforce, education, juvenile justice, social service, or public health—the same categories used to differentiate the different types of policy areas comprising youth policy. However, I enlarged the coding scheme to also include higher education, business, and other organizations (e.g. foundations, labor, multi-issue, and youth policy groups\(^\text{12}\)), as well as separate codes for governmental institutions. Since the witnesses included a mixture of government and non-governmental organizations, I applied two separate codes based on the organizational affiliation.

\(^{12}\) Youth were included in the “other” category because of the small sample size. Many witnesses representing youth were captured in broader categories and very few fell into the youth category and not any other larger group.
When necessary I referenced the websites of organizations to determine the appropriate code.

See Table 3.2 for a description of each code.
Table 3.2: Codes applied to witnesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Governmental Organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce &amp; Community Service</td>
<td>Includes community service and mentoring (e.g. Girl Scouts, Big Brothers, Big Sisters), vocational education, adult literacy, technical schools (e.g. trade school), YouthBuild, and Conservation Corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Includes general education, parent-teacher associations, child care, and child development organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Justice</td>
<td>Includes drug issues, sexual abuse, child pornography, school violence, child support, and organizations related to the legal system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Service</td>
<td>Includes foster care, welfare reform, homeless, runaway, and missing children, adoption, child abuse, and child welfare groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>Includes any groups focused on pregnancy (including abortions), abstinence education, nutrition and school lunch, suicide, and violence in the media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Includes any businesses, business roundtables, or business advocacy groups, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or a local affiliate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>Includes all colleges or universities, including community colleges, and any organization focused on financial aid for higher education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Includes general advocacy organizations (e.g. National Governors Association (NGA), The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), Children's Defense Fund (CDF)); philanthropic foundations; labor unions (e.g. AFL-CIO, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), and National Education Association(^{13}) (NEA)); religious organization (e.g. churches, YMCA, Catholic Charities); and any other groups that were not mentioned in the above categories (e.g. media groups, sports teams, Association of Junior Leagues, American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), National Retired Teachers Association, camp or sports related) and so forth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governmental Organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>Includes mayors, city councils, city bureaucrats, school boards(^{14}) and, public libraries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Government</td>
<td>Includes governors, state legislatures, state bureaucrats, and state boards (e.g. Board of Regents, State Boards of Higher Education, and so forth).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Includes members of Congress and their staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American Government</td>
<td>Includes representatives of Native American Tribes and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{13}\) All labor unions were grouped together and not coded based on the industry of the workers they represent.

\(^{14}\) School boards are coded as local government, whereas individual schools are coded as K12.
3.4: Methods

After the database was constructed and coded, I ran descriptive statistics of the content of the hearings and organizations testifying to examine patterns over time. I also explored the data based on the Chamber of the hearing (e.g. Senate, House of Representatives, or a Joint committee), by Presidential term, and by political party and conducted t-tests and chi-square analyses to examine group differences. To examine the extent to which the different interest groups were concentrated by committee, a proxy measure consistent with whether groups worked together or independently, I also calculated Herfindahl indexes. Herfindahl indices of concentration are calculated by summing the squared proportions of a categorical classification of a population and then multiplying it by 100 for ease of interpretation.

Following Hardin’s (1998) work on committee jurisdiction, other scholars have used the measure to assess jurisdictional concentration in Congress (Gray & Lowery, 1996; Poole & Rosenthal, 1997). For each type of non-governmental witness, I used a Herfindahl index to summarize the degree to which a type of witness dominated a committee (a high score) or worked with other types of groups (a low score)—what Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod (2000) refer to as the Index of Overlap. I calculated the Index of Overlap for each type of non-governmental witness during each congressional session from 1973 to 2008.

The method for calculating the Index of Overlap is easiest to understand by examining an example. In every congressional session, there are K committees designated to hold hearings and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Court</td>
<td>Includes judges, district attorneys, or court representative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K12 School</td>
<td>Includes public and private schools</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 Only 11 percent of the records in the K12 category are private schools. The majority of those are religious schools and schools for students with disabilities.
N witnesses that give testimony in front of the committees. To calculate the Index of Overlap I first determined the number of each type of witness category testifying in each committee per congressional session from the congressional hearing database I created for this study. For instance, Table 3.3 presents fictional data to elucidate the Herfindahl Index calculation. The table shows one individual from Witness category 1 testified in front of Committee A and five individuals from Witness category 2 also testified in front of Committee A during that same congressional session. Second, I calculated the proportion of each type of witness testifying per committee. I then squared each proportion before summing all the proportions to calculate the Index of Overlap. At this stage the Index which measures concentration at the interval level ranges from zero (illustrating a monopoly) to one (a completely non-concentrated situation).

Finally, I multiplied the Index of Overlap by 100 for ease of interpretation. This procedure was followed for each congressional session included in the analysis. Using the data in Table 3.3 as a guide, the calculation for the Index of Overlap for Witness category 1 is: \((1/10)^2 + (2/10)^2 + (3/10)^2 + (4/10)^2 = 0.30\). I then multiplied 0.30 times 100 to get 30 which is the number presented in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Herfindahl calculation example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Witness Category 1</th>
<th>Witness Category 2</th>
<th>...</th>
<th>Witness Category N</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Span</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committee A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee B</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee K</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Overlap</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After I calculated the Index of Overlap for each type of witness category in each congressional session, I combined all the data into a new table to examine the trends in the Index
of Overlap over time. I then took an average of each witness category’s Index of Overlap per congressional session. The averages of each non-governmental witness category were calculated to summarize the extent to which non-governmental actors of various types were concentrated in a committee each congressional session. Since the theoretical maximum for the sum of the Herfindahls is equal to the number of non-governmental witnesses, the average corresponds to dividing the sum of the Herfindahls by the number of witnesses. Each type of witness receives a score between zero and 100 for each congressional session to represent the degree to which that type of non-governmental witness is concentrated in a given committee. This information is presented in Table 4.8 in the next chapter.

Given that the scale is from 0 to 100, I selected 50 as the arbitrator of high or low levels of concentration since there is no information in the literature to suggest the implication of certain scores of an Index of Overlap and corresponding concentration. This method posits that if different types of groups are diffusely represented within committees than the evidence is consistent with the notion of collaboration. This assumption is also explored through the elite interviews to ensure that it accurately captures the reality of coalitional behavior. If many witness categories receive a low score (under 50) it will be an indication that they may be working together because they would be testifying in various committees on a diffuse range of topics. If witness categories, however, receive high scores (above 50) it will be a sign that they may be working independently because they are concentrated in a committee. Since the Herfindahl Index is a measure of concentration, it is being used in this analysis as a proxy measure for collaboration since concentration is consistent with the notion of collaboration,
3.5: Conclusion

To document and analyze the changing nature of federal youth policy from 1973 to 2008, this study required an extensive data collection process. Congressional hearings were the main source of data collected because they represent an objective moving picture of the important national issues of the time. Data collection included the creation of a database including 107 laws, 986 hearings, 3,389 separate testimonies, and 11,751 witnesses. Since I examined the topic over 35 years, moreover, the data provided a longitudinal perspective of the policy area. Furthermore, elite interviews were conducted to gain insight into the evolution of federal youth policy in a way that the congressional hearings could not. Combined, the study includes a rich and diverse set of data from which to make analytical claims as to why youth policy emerged on the federal agenda. The following chapter showcases the empirical findings.
Chapter 4: Findings

This chapter provides empirical evidence documenting the presence of youth policy, comprised of the five main sub-issues of criminal justice, education, public health, social service, and workforce, on the congressional agenda and the corresponding interest groups that participated in youth hearings from 1973 to 2008. Data are presented in section 4.1 that describe the change over time in the number and type of youth congressional hearings, as well as the committees that hold the hearings and the political party in control of the legislature. Section 4.2 then presents empirical data on the witnesses that testified at the hearings based on their organizational affiliation. In addition, information provided by the elite interviews is interspersed to explicate the findings.

Together these empirical data test the two hypotheses presented in Chapter 1. The first hypothesis, titled the external events hypothesis, suggests that the change in attention Congress gave youth issues was the result of policy entrepreneurs reacting to changing environmental conditions. The second hypothesis, entitled the internal actors hypothesis, suggests that internal political actors, such as congressional leaders and interest groups were the primary actors responsible for facilitating the presence of youth issues on the congressional agenda. This hypothesis places less emphasis on the changing environmental conditions; rather, it asserts that it was the internal actors themselves that strategically pushed for more attention to youth issues. Data to support the external events hypothesis would include examples of policy entrepreneurs acting upon external events that corresponded to an increase in hearings related to that topic. On the other hand, the internal actors hypothesis would be supported by evidence that interest groups representing the various subtopics of youth policy would testify together in front of congressional committees, even if the committee’s jurisdiction was not the interest group’s primary target. Analyses testing the hypotheses are presented in sections 4.3 and 4.4. In sum, this
chapter elucidates why the sub-issues that comprise youth policy were more or less prevalent on the congressional agenda over the 35 years included in this dissertation.

4.1: Hearings

To understand the history of youth issues on the congressional agenda, data are aggregated by congressional session to examine trends over time. The data are analyzed by the subject of the hearing by major topical area, the chamber and committee holding the hearing, and the political party in control of each chamber.

4.1A: Overall trends

Congress held 986 youth hearing from 1973 to 2008 characterized by considerable variation in the number of hearings held per congressional session as depicted in Table 4.1 and the bar graph in Graph 4.1. As the graph and table show, the data are characterized by various peaks and valleys and do not illustrate a clear relationship between the number and type of hearing and change over time. For instance, some years are marked by a large number of hearings (e.g. the 102\textsuperscript{nd} Congress from 1991-1992 held 97 hearings), whereas other sessions include very few hearings (e.g. the 107\textsuperscript{th} Congress from 2001-2002 only held 34 hearings). On average Congress held 55 hearings per session, with a median of 51 hearings per session.

To put youth hearings in perspective, I compared the total number of hearings held per session to the total number of congressional hearings during the same session identified from the Policy Agenda Project.\textsuperscript{16} My calculations show that the 986 youth hearings held in Congress during the study period represent 1.70 percent of the total 58,144 hearings held. This information

\textsuperscript{16} Data provided in the Policy Agenda Project (www.policyagendas.org) were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and were distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here.
is also presented in the line graph in Graph 4.1, which shows that youth hearings represent one to three percent of all congressional hearings each session (Author’s calculation). The data show that even in years with large numbers of youth hearings, these issues never have a prominent space on the congressional agenda. Furthermore, the pattern of the percentage of hearings closely mimics the pattern of the total number of hearings. The only exception is the increase in the percentage of total hearings in the last year of data (shown by the line graph), which is larger than the increase in the number of total hearings presented in the bar graph. This is most likely the result of incomplete data on the total number of congressional hearings, discussed in Chapter 3, due to a delay in the publication of all congressional hearings held during that session. The implications of this finding will be discussed in further detail in the final chapter of the dissertation.

4.1B: Content of hearings

An examination of the content of each hearing held clearly shows a hierarchical order in terms of the number of youth hearings held each session based on subtopic. Within this hierarchy, education is clearly the most popular sub-issue with almost one-third of the hearings included in the database focusing on education related topics ($n = 280$). Conversely, only 15 percent of the hearings covered workforce development issues ($n = 145$) and 16 percent were on social service issues ($n = 155$), which were the two smallest groups. The other issues each represented approximately 40 percent of the sample with criminal justice representing 24 percent ($n = 232$) and public health 18 percent ($n = 174$) of the hearings included in the database. This information is displayed in both Table and Graph 4.1, as well as in Table 4.2.

Examining the data longitudinally reveals that unequal attention was paid to the various youth sub-issues over time. For example, even though youth hearings are held most frequently
on education issues, the data also shows that during some sessions Congress did not actually devote much time to education issues. This is most pronounced in the 97th Congress when the number of education hearings was zero. In addition, although workforce is the least frequent sub-topic on the congressional youth agenda, in the early 1980s workforce development issues (e.g. the 97th Congress) were actually the most prominent of youth issues on the congressional agenda.

Table 4.1: Youth policy hearings by type and congressional session, 1973-2008 (n = 986)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Criminal Justice</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Public Health</th>
<th>Social Service</th>
<th>Workforce Dev.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973-1974</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1978</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1980</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1982</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1984</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1986</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1988</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1994</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>986</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given education’s independent rise on the federal agenda over this period (Cross, 2003; McGuinn, 2006), it is not surprising that education-related hearings represent the largest proportion of youth hearings. When asked why education received the most federal attention one of the policy elites interviewed commented: “K-12 education is the thousand pound gorilla and, out of necessity, that’s the place where we touch every child in this country.” Another
respondent confirmed the data showing youth workforce programs as receiving the lowest amount of federal attention.

Youth employment programs tend to get a fairly low amount of attention compared to other workforce issues… We came out of the last recession and found that while the upswing in the economy made every sector of America better off, it did nothing to bring the status of young people, especially young black males, back up and we’ve failed to have our policy set up so that we come out of economic downturns and have young people protected and supported.

All respondents interviewed agreed that of the five sub-issues comprising youth policy, education was the most prevalent and workforce development the least represented issue on the youth congressional agenda.

The data also suggest an inverse relationship between the number of social service hearings and the number of workforce hearings (See Graph 4.1). When there were more social service hearings, the data suggest that there tended to be less workforce hearings and vice versa. These types of hearings often addressed issues of poverty from different perspectives (i.e.: entitlements versus job preparation); therefore, it is not surprising that as one issue’s intensity increases the other declines. After the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, moreover, there is a general decline in the number of hearings focused on social service, workforce development, and public health issues. Conversely, there was an increase in the number of criminal justice hearings during this same period. These patterns may suggest the use of the second degree of power—the use of power to block issues from the agenda—by Congressional Republicans to prevent certain domestic social policy issues from the agenda. The implications of this finding are discussed later in this chapter.
4.1C: Chamber of hearings

In terms of the location of the youth-related hearings, 62 percent were held in the House of Representatives (\(n = 609\)), 38 percent were sponsored by the Senate (\(n = 372\)), and less than one percent of the hearings were held by the Joint Economic Committee (\(n = 5\)). Analyzing the subtopic of hearing by chamber illustrates a fairly similar breakdown of the overall sample, except that the House of Representatives held more education hearings and less criminal justice hearings compared to the Senate. Table 4.2 presents the number and type of hearing by chamber.

Table 4.2: Type and percent of youth hearing by chamber (\(n = 986\))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>House</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>Joint</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% in House</th>
<th>% in Senate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Justice</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23.53</td>
<td>20.20</td>
<td>29.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28.40</td>
<td>31.20</td>
<td>24.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17.65</td>
<td>16.58</td>
<td>19.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Service</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.72</td>
<td>16.09</td>
<td>15.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.71</td>
<td>15.93</td>
<td>11.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Percent of youth hearings based on political party in control of governmental branch\(^{17}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Hearing</th>
<th>House of Representatives*** ((n = 609))</th>
<th>Senate ((n = 372))</th>
<th>White House* ((n = 986))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democrat Control</td>
<td>Republican Control</td>
<td>Democrat Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Justice</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05
*** p < .001

Statistical analyses also suggest that the political party in control of the legislature and the executive branch is associated with the number and type of youth related hearings held in Congress, as presented in Table 4.3. In the House of Representatives, approximately 20 percent

\(^{17}\) Although the design was intended to collect the population of hearings, given the limitations discussed in Chapter 3, I conducted significance testing in case there remains missing data.
of Democrat controlled hearings focused on public health and workforce issues, compared to roughly 10 percent of Republican controlled hearings on the same topics (p < .001). Conversely, 30 percent of Republican controlled hearings were on criminal justice issues, compared to only 15 percent when the Democrats controlled the chamber (p < .001). These findings show that the political party controlling the House of Representatives is associated with the content of youth hearings held. There was, however, no statistically significant relationship between the party in control of the Senate and the type of hearings held. With the exception of hearings on education and workforce developmental issues, when Republicans control the White House, Congress held more hearings on criminal justice, public health, and social service issues (p < .05). (See Table B1 in Appendix B for a breakdown of the political party in control of the legislative and executive branches of government during each congressional session).

This finding highlights importance differences in the two chambers of the U.S. Congress. Since Senators serve longer terms they are theoretically less susceptible to changes in public opinion compared to Representatives who face reelection every two years. As a result of their constant need to win reelection, members of the House of Representatives may be more likely to adhere to “issue ownership,” meaning that certain political parties usually gravitate towards certain issues more than others (Petrocik, Benoit, & Hansen, 2003). Holian (2004) explains how traditionally, “Democrats own issues including social welfare (Social Security and Medicare), women’s issues, and issues related to groups in society (e.g., rich vs. poor). Republicans own such issues as those related to big government, civil and social order (crime- and traditional values-related issues), and national defense” (p. 97).

The variation in issue ownership found in this study therefore mimics the larger trends found in American politics, with House Republicans holding considerably more criminal justice
hearings compared to Democrats. Similarly, when the Democrats controlled the House of Representatives they held more hearings on traditionally liberal issues (e.g., public health, social services, and workforce) compared to Republicans. The issue of education, however, transcends the liberal/conservative dichotomy. Although, education was traditionally considered to be a liberal issue, over the course of the 20th century it evolved into a bipartisan issue exemplified by both Democrats and Republicans supporting No Child Left Behind in 2001 and subsequent policy convergence within education (Howell, Peterson, & West, 2011; McGuinn, 2006).

Across the hearings, the House Committee on Education and Labor (n = 344) and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) (n = 196) held the most hearings in each chamber. The Senate Committee on Judiciary (n = 71) and the House Committee on Ways and Means (n = 62) also held a considerable number of hearings. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 provide the number of hearings by type for each committee longitudinally, separated by chamber. As the tables show, with the exception of the major committees that hold hearing on youth issues, the remainder of the committees are rather erratic in the number of hearings they hold each session. In general while these committees hold one or two hearings every few sessions, they do not consistently hold hearings on youth issues.

Although committees in the House and Senate may have similar names, they do not always have similar jurisdiction. For instance in the Senate the HELP committee deals with health issues, but in the House it is not the Education and Labor Committee, which is generally seen as the counterpart to the HELP committee, but rather the Committee on Energy and Commerce that handles health issues. Similarly, school lunch falls under the purview of the House Education and Labor Committee, but the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. One former staffer of the House Education and Labor Committee suggested that
“depending on how you define youth, you enter government in different ways. It is such a large topic with so many different aspects and it is affected by congressional jurisdiction. There is not a unity to it and by its nature it is going to be difficult to deal with.” Consequently, there is a wide variety of committees listed in Table B2 (see Appendix B for more information) which presents the frequency and name of all the committees that held youth hearings from 1973 to 2008, categorized by the current name of each committee.  

Given the importance of the chairman of the committee, I also explored the relationship between the chairman and the number and type of hearings for the House Committee on Education and Labor and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions since both committees held the largest number of hearings in their respective chambers. Tables B3 and B4 in Appendix B provide a listing of the chairmen and their political affiliation of both committees from 1973 to 2008. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the committee chairman, like the CEO of a company, sets the tone for the committee and determines the number and content of hearings. T-tests analyzing the political party of the chairmen and the total number of hearing per congressional session and the number of hearings of each type did not have a statistically significant result. When Republicans controlled the HELP committee they held an average of ten hearings every congressional session and the Democrats held an average of 12 hearings every session when they controlled the Senate. The House Education and Labor Committee held an average of 19 hearings every session regardless of the chairman’s political party. Furthermore, data from these committees show that there were congressional sessions were only a few of the youth sub-issues were on the agenda. For example, neither committee held any education

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18 Since congressional committees frequently changed names over the period included in this study, I refer to the committees by their current name. See Appendix B for more information.
hearings in the 95th (1977-1978) and 97th (1981-1982) Congresses and the HELP committee also failed to hold education hearings in the 98th Congress (1983-1984). Nonetheless, there were 14 education hearings held between the two committees in the 96th Congress (1979-1980).

Disaggregated data for these committees are presented in Graphs B1 and B2 in Appendix B.
Table 4.4: House of Representatives hearings by committee, 1973-2008 (n = 609)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education &amp; Labor</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ways &amp; Means</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
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Table 4.5 Senate hearings by committee, 1973-2008 (n = 372)

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4.2: Witnesses

In addition to the content of the hearings, I also collected and categorized information about the witnesses who testified at the 986 congressional hearings included in the database. The data are disaggregated based on the types of organizations the witnesses represented, which were reviewed in Table 3.2 in the previous chapter. The presence of many non-governmental groups testifying before Congress is important since American government is premised on the fundamental belief that organized interests must be able to exist freely. Organized interest groups remain the primary channel of access through which citizens voice their opinions to elected officials. Furthermore, it is through organized interests that political issues are often formed and put on the political agenda (Berry & Wilcox, 2009).

Table 4.6: Subtotals and percentages of governmental and non-governmental witnesses by congressional session, 1973-2008 (n = 10,924).

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<th>NGO Subtotal</th>
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<th>% Gov.</th>
<th>% NGO</th>
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Note: Excludes the 827 individuals who testified, but did not represent an organized group.
From 1973 to 2008, 10,924 individuals representing organized groups testified at youth-related congressional hearings. Slightly less than 40 percent represented local, state, or federal government ($n = 4,065$) and over 60 percent of witnesses represented non-governmental groups ($n = 6,859$). Table 4.6 presents the total number and percentage of governmental and non-governmental witnesses per congressional session. In addition, Graph B3 in Appendix B displays the raw numbers in bar graph form. The evidence presented shows that the 60/40 ratio of non-governmental to government witnesses holds true in most congressional sessions included in the analysis. The 102nd Congress from 1991-1992 is a notable exception when there were many more non-governmental witnesses than in other years. This corresponds to the session with the highest number of hearings due to the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. Further investigation of the data shows that it is an increase in higher education representatives that is driving this increase in the 102nd Congress.

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19 This excludes the 827 witnesses representing themselves personally rather than a larger organization. Individuals were excluded from the analysis because the study is interested in the role of interest groups and governmental agents in the creation of youth policy. This methodological choice is explained in more detail in Chapter 3.
Table 4.7: Frequency and percent of governmental and non-governmental witnesses representing institutions testifying at youth-related congressional hearings, 1973-2008 (n = 10,924).

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<td>Business</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,924</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Excludes the 827 individuals who testified, but did not represent an organized group. Other Non-Governmental category includes: foundations, labor unions, religious organizations, multi-issue organizations (e.g.: National Governors Association and Brookings Institution), and youth organizations. Organizations that solely are identified as youth organizations, meaning they do not specialize in one of the five sub-issues, are included in this category due to its small sample size.

Table 4.7 presents the frequency of each type of witness and Graph 4.2 then illustrates the number of non-governmental witnesses by type during each congressional session. As the graph and table show, higher education representatives represented 22 percent of the overall witnesses. This category includes a mixture of higher education interest groups, college administrators, and professors who testified based on their subject area expertise. Since codes were applied to the institution testifying, professors who testified based on their expertise fell into the higher education category rather than the subject of their testimony. For instance, if a professor from Columbia University was testifying based on his expertise on welfare reform, his organization was coded as higher education rather than as social service.
The data also suggest that business involvement is uneven across the 35 years, punctuated by periods of growth and decline. For instance, from the 95th Congress (1977-1978) to the 99th Congress (1985-1986) business involvement generally increased. It then declines until the 101st Congress (1987-1988) and rises again through the early 1990s. Scholars and citizens alike realize that business plays a major role in all aspects of the policy process. It is documented that business is not only excellent at helping to shape policies that they find helpful to their needs, especially with concern to the tax code, but they are also in a unique position given their privileged communication with government officials that often advances the needs of business over the needs of other interest groups (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993). Furthermore, scholars suggest that business influence on policy is distinct since government relies on private enterprise to power the national economy. Although Vogel (1987) argues that while government must rely on business, business is also dependent on governmental decisions creating a more equal relationship.

The rate of business involvement in youth issues may be related to the prosperity of the American economy. When the labor market and the economy are booming, business leaders may be less concerned with youth policy issues because they lack the economic imperative to use their political power for youth issues. Conversely, when business conceives of a clear association between youth issues and their own prosperity they may be more inclined to utilize their political resources. Although their involvement is not consistent, one youth policy advocate interviewed suggested that business participation is very important to advancing youth issues on the agenda: “Business plays a role in getting attention. A lot of time there is a big spotlight on youth issues when corporate leaders speak up on youth issues, for instance the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on education issues, [although], the [U.S.] Chamber [of Commerce] tends to have an academics
only approach to youth issues.” This quote implies that the business community may share “policy core” beliefs, in the words of the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), but not “deep core” beliefs since they conceive of education as reading, writing, and arithmetic rather than a holistic approach to education and child development. Given the importance of the business lobby in Washington politics this may explain why the youth agenda on Capitol Hill has been inconsistent over the years.

As discussed in the earlier section, the data on the hearings showed that after the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, there was a general decline in the number of hearings focused on social service, workforce development, and public health issues and an increase in the number of criminal justice hearings during this same period. As a result, the type of witnesses testifying at congressional hearings also shifted. From 1994 through 2008 there was a general decrease in witnesses representing social service and workforce development organizations. The total number of non-governmental witnesses, however, also declined beginning in the 105th Congress from 1997-1998.

Generally speaking an increase in the number of witnesses corresponds with an increase in the number of hearings. The only notable exception here is in 1999-2000 when there was an increase in the number of hearings but not in the number of witnesses. Beginning in 1995-1996, there is a large decline in the overall number of witnesses testifying in youth related congressional hearings. In fact, in 2001-2002 there were only 157 witnesses listed, which was also the session with the smallest total number of hearing in the database. This may be the result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City. In fact, according to the Policy
Agendas Project the number of national security hearings increased considerably to the detriment of domestic social policy topics\textsuperscript{20}.

\textsuperscript{20} Author’s analysis based on the Trend Analysis tool available on the Policy Agenda Project website: http://www.policyagendas.org/page/trend-analysis
Graph 4.2: Non-Governmental Witnesses by Type, 1973-2008 (n = 6,859)
4.3: External events hypothesis

The external events hypothesis presented in Chapter 1 argues that the change in congressional attention to youth issues was the result of policy entrepreneurs reacting to institutional events allowing for issues to “burst” on the agenda—in other words how certain issues appear suddenly and without warning on the agenda. Institutional events and policy entrepreneurs can be internal or external to Congress. As discussed in Chapter 1, a policy entrepreneur can be thought of as a “champion” of an issue or the primary driver of an initiative. The data show these external events were often the establishments of specific institutional venues or groups rather than a single event such as the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

The follow section reviews the relationship between institutional factors and the change over time in youth hearings and presents evidence that supports this hypothesis. This section also argues that not all institutional events are associated with increased congressional attention to youth issues. The remainder of this section is organized by institutional event.

4.3A: Vice President Walter Mondale’s Task Force on Youth Employment, 1979

The early 1980s saw a rise in the number of workforce development hearings, with almost half \((n = 22)\) of the total hearings \((n = 48)\) held in the 97th Congress (1981-1982) dealing with workforce issues (see Table 4.1). This may be the result of Vice President Walter Mondale’s Task Force on Youth Employment, a nine month study beginning in 1979, charged to “study the causes of youth unemployment and…the roles of government, education, and community organizations in meeting this challenge” (American Enterprise Institute, 1980, p. 2). The three volume report of the Task Force, first released in May 1980 explains:

In order to address this challenge of youth unemployment, President Carter directed a full-scale review of Federal youth programs under the leadership of Vice President Walter F. Mondale. The aim was to develop youth policies for the 1980’s which make the
best use of scarce resources and institutional capacities in meeting this challenge. (The Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment, 1980, p. i)

It is not surprising that President Carter asked Vice President Mondale to take on this issue since interviewees suggested he was a champion of youth issues when he served as a Senator from Minnesota from 1964-1976. This attention to youth employment occurred during a period of “soaring inflation and interest rates, rising unemployment, and increasing public concern about energy prices, economic stability, and pressing foreign policy difficulties” (American Enterprise Institute, 1980, p. 2). These economic difficulties were exaggerated for youth of color who were concentrated in urban areas, spurring federal attention. The increase in the number of workforce hearings during this period corresponds to the reauthorization of the Vocational Education Act, which in turn was a response to these external economic conditions. Nevertheless youth workforce development hearings were never as prevalent on the congressional agenda after this period.

During this period, Rep. Carl Perkins (D-Kentucky, 7th district), Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee from 1967–1984, played a particularly active role and can be considered a policy entrepreneur who was reacting to the economic conditions of the time. Perkins was the first chairman to open committee meetings to the public, which allegedly was a successful tactic for ensuring enough members attended hearings and were on their “best behavior” (Reeves, 1993).

Carl D. Perkins, an active and permissive chairman, contributed substantially to the growth in hearings. In addition to scheduling regular hearings in Washington, the chairman frequently held hearings in his own and other members’ districts. He also allowed other members to hold as many hearings as they liked. (Reeves, 1993, p. 175)
Furthermore, Rep. Perkins was considered such a champion of youth workforce development issues that the 1963 Vocational Education Act was renamed in 1984 the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act.

4.3B: The creation of the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, 1983

In 1983, the U.S. House of Representatives created the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, conceived of and chaired by Rep. George Miller (D-California, 7th district). The creation of this committee was an important institutional change, albeit temporarily, in the way Congress handled youth issues. In his opening remarks, Rep. Miller explained the reasoning behind the creation of the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families:

First, we are impressed with the dramatic and permanent changes in the living situations of families and children: More children born into poverty, more raised in single-parent families, more destined to grow up in, and be shaped by environments vastly different than our own. Second, we are deeply concerned about what we see out there—the increased stress, the family violence, the abuse, the unacceptably high levels of infant mortality. Third, a committee like this can go after the best possible advice. I believe there is value in new knowledge itself and we must keep up with it. At times elected officials must step outside the pressures of our agenda and our ideologies to use Congress to gather information and test ideas without necessarily having a preconceived legislative purpose. Fourth, we know from experience that we have the potential for success. From WIC to foster care, to name a few, we know success can be reached by a Congress willing to combine pragmatism with compassion, workability with equity. (Miller, 1983, pp. 1-2)

The creation of the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, spearheaded by Rep. Miller, provided an important institutional venue for members to learn about youth issues that were previously dealt with by various other entities. Zigler and Muenchow (1984) wrote, “The creation of the Select Committee has made it possible to call together some of the most talented and experienced people concerned with children's issues. The witnesses come from all sectors—representatives from corporations, churches, service organizations, and nonprofit agencies, as well as social scientists and leaders” (p. 417). However, as mentioned in the
previous chapter, Select Committees are not authorized to draft and report legislation to their chamber; rather, they are often formed to: highlight important policy issues, to study or investigate pressing problems, to coordinate the development of policy that overlaps the jurisdictions of several standing committees, and/or sometimes as a reward from party leaders to members who have done them favors (Deering & Smith, 1997).

Representative Miller’s role in creating the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families illustrates the importance of a policy entrepreneur. According to one of the policy elites interviewed who was a former congressional staffer; Rep. Miller had been in office for six years and was not senior enough to take over a subcommittee in the Education and Labor Committee. Nonetheless he had a great interest in youth issues, which spurred the creation of the committee. The former staffer commented: “He wanted to look across committees to look at programs regardless of agency or regardless of congressional committee.” Rep. Miller was also able to push for the creation of the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families given the longstanding Democratic control of the House of Representatives, which generally supported the investigation of domestic social policy issues. Furthermore, the committee brought publicity to youth issues, commissioned studies, and made recommendations to standing committees to take action. As a result, Rep. Miller’s role as a policy entrepreneur is further evidence of the application of multiple streams theory (Kingdon, 2003) that asserts that policy entrepreneurs are able to capitalize on their policy window to push their policy preference forward, thereby supporting the external events hypothesis.

The Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families held 40 hearings from 1983 to 1992 on a variety of youth issues. The Committee took a special interest in public health issues, including holding a number of hearings on the effects of HIV and AIDS, eating disorders,
adolescent mental health, and adolescent risk-taking. Consequently, the Select Committee, chaired by Rep. Miller, was able to help reframe the problem definition of youth issues. In addition, when the committee was first formed it also held field hearings throughout the United States to examine the holistic “problems and needs of children, youth, and families” in specific geographic areas (i.e.: Northeast, Midwest, Southeast, Mountain West, and Southwest).

According to the elite interviews with those working in Congress during this period, these field visits occurred under the special direction of Rep. Miller who wanted to hold hearings outside of Washington, D.C. These hearings were unique (at that time and subsequently) because they focused on the broad issues affecting youth and families and not on discrete topics, such as only focusing on education or criminal justice.

Unfortunately from the standpoint of youth advocacy, the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families was disbanded in 1993, along with the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, the Select Committee on Hunger, and the Select Committee on Aging. In a scathing editorial, the Wall Street Journal wrote: “They [Select Committees] have become mini-fiefdoms for grandstanders such as Rep. Pat Schroeder of Colorado, who chairs Children, Youth and Families. They've spent millions, employ more than 90 staffers and do little but get in the way of other committees” (Wall Street Journal, 1993). Although the select committees did not have a formal role in adopting legislation, they were able to hold hearings that generated information and make recommendations. As such, critics claimed that the select committees were “intended to be temporary [and] interfere with standing committees covering similar issues, and are a waste of staff and money” (Cohen, 1993). Furthermore, Tony Blankley, the press secretary to Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia), the House minority whip at that time, was quoted
in Education Week as saying that the select committees have been "flagrantly used as an opportunity to do press releases" promoting their leaders (Cohen, 1993).

The demise of the select committees was foreshadowed in January 1993 when Democrats joined House Republicans in defeating, 237 to 180, a measure brought up separately to reauthorize the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control for two years. According to the Washington Post “Democratic leaders, surprised at the losing vote, ultimately decided that junking the select committees could serve as a symbol of congressional reform. The panels spent about $ 3.7 million a year, and their closing will save about $ 2.7 million for the remainder of the current budget year” (Cooper, 1993). At the announcement of the closing of the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colorado), head of the Committee and the only woman serving as chairwoman of a congressional committee at that time, called for a new and permanent Human Resources Committee. She was quoted as saying: "Of course, natural resources have theirs, but human resources don't...I guess we care more about owls than kids" (Cooper, 1993). Her call to action, however, was never realized and no committee to date has fully taken over the jurisdiction of the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families.

4.3C: Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 1992

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965 (P.L. 89-329) is the major law addressing postsecondary in the nation. It established: financial aid in the form of scholarships and low-interest loans for students, the Talent Search program to identify older, low-income youth with potential for postsecondary education, student support services to improve disadvantaged college students’ retention and graduation rates, and Upward Bound that provides high school students from low-income families academic and social support to increase
high school graduation and college access. The data suggest that whenever the Higher Education Act was reauthorized in 1976, 1980, 1986, 1992, 1998, and 2008, it corresponds to a spike in the number of education hearings. In fact, the largest surge in the number of youth hearings occurred in the 102nd Congress (1991-1992), primarily driven by an increase in education hearings due to the reauthorization of the HEA. Of the 97 youth hearings held in the 102nd Congress, half \((n = 48)\) were dedicated to education. Unlike the other policy areas, higher education represents a self-contained industry of diverse actors (e.g. private sector institutions, public sector institutions, for-profit institutions, students, parents, and so forth) and therefore is effective at mobilizing its various constituencies when needed (Weisbrod, Ballou, & Asch, 2008). Consequently, the regular reauthorizations of the Higher Education Act catalyzed increases in attention to youth issues.

Furthermore, Rep. William D. Ford (D-Michigan) chair of the House Education and Labor Committee from 1991 through 1994 and was previously chairman of the Subcommittee on Higher Education and Workforce Training, was a big proponent of holding congressional hearings and “liked to get into issues in great depth,” according to a former staffer. It was during his chairmanship that higher education hearings peaked as he reacted to the reauthorizations of the HEA with the convening of congressional hearings. Moreover, under Rep. Ford’s leadership there was also an increase in the number of hearings on criminal justice, social service and public health topics, although not to the same extent as the increase in education hearings.

4.3D: White House Task Force for Disadvantaged Youth, 2005

President George W. Bush’s 2003 convening of the White House Task Force for Disadvantaged Youth was a major turning point in youth policy since it assessed federal youth

\[\text{21 There is no spike in education hearings in 2008 most likely due to a lack of up-to-date data provided by ProQuest. See section on data limitations in Chapter 3.}\]
policy and developed recommendations to strengthen the federal response to the needs of youth. However, this event is minimally represented in the data. There is only one congressional hearing regarding the Task Force in 2005. Although, evidence in support of Hypothesis I requires an event to concur with an increase in congressional hearings, the Task Force is still worth mentioning as it was a turning point in federal attention to youth policy since it includes a policy entrepreneur, Rep Tom Osborne (R-Nebraska, 3rd district), working to advance youth issues on Capitol Hill in reaction to the growing concern about disconnected youth in the nation.

The Task Force found that, “federal youth policy, administered across 12 departments, lacks coordination and focus” (Executive Office of the President, October 2003). Acting on the findings of the Task Force, The Federal Youth Coordination Act (FYCA) was introduced in the 109th Congress to implement the report’s recommendations. The original legislation, H.R. 856, passed the House in November 2005 by an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 353 to 62, with 163 Republicans supporting it, and no Democrats opposing. The bill was introduced by Representatives Tom Osborne (R-Nebraska, 3rd district), Harold Ford Jr. (D-Tennessee, 9th district), Pete Hoekstra (R-Michigan, 2nd district) and Donald Payne (D-New Jersey, 10th district). The companion bill in the Senate, S. 409, was introduced by Senators Norm Coleman (R-Minnesota), Mike DeWine (R-Ohio), Lamar Alexander (R-Tennessee) and Debbie Stabenow (D-Michigan). After much negotiation, FYCA was modified slightly, renamed for Tom Osborne, its congressional champion, and attached as Title VIII of the Older Americans Act.

For example, in 2001 a group of foundations formed the Youth Transition Funders Group dedicated to improving the lives of disconnected youth. Furthermore, many scholars have produced studies calculating the estimated socio-economic effects of dropping out during this period (e.g., Adair, 2001; Harlow, 2003; Thorstensen, 2005, Alliance for Excellent Education, 2003, & Rouse, 2005).
reauthorization bill. It passed the House and the Senate with no opposition at the end of September, 2006. It was signed into law by the president on October 17, 2006.

The Tom Osborne Federal Youth Coordination Act (PL 109-365) established the Federal Youth Development Council. According to sec. 803 of the law ("Older Americans Act Amendments of 2006), the Council was to be made up of 11 federal department secretaries and heads of agencies, representatives from youth-serving nonprofits, foundations and faith-based organizations, and young people themselves. The Congress authorized $1 million for the Council, but due to the continuing resolution for FY 2007, which did not include new programs, the Federal Youth Development Council did not receive funding for FY 2007, and was not included in the FY 2008 budget request. In sum, although the federal government devoted attention to the issue of disconnected youth, they did not and still have not followed through with implementation.

The remaining institutional events explained in sections 4.3E and 4.3F did not result in more congressional attention to youth issues as reflected in the empirical data. Furthermore, the interviews did not reveal any particular policy entrepreneurs in the youth policy community or in Congress that were responsible for championing these issues on Capitol Hill.

4.3E: A Nation at Risk, 1983

Although the data suggest that some spikes in the number of hearings correspond to external events, there are other external events that do not correspond with an increase in hearings. In 1983 The National Commission on Excellence in Education published A Nation at Risk; the most influential and widely cited report on American education. The report argued that “the rising tide of mediocrity” in American education was a direct threat to the nation’s economic dominance and power. It contended that the change to a global knowledge economy
coupled with a decrease in educational attainment in the United States was a looming national crisis. The Commission asserted that although the quantity of U.S. high school graduates had increased over-time, the quality of the education had decreased. They argued that this was especially concerning due to the rise of international competition. The authors argued that previously the United States had secured its economic dominance through its manufacturing sectors, but with globalization and outsourcing, that was no longer the case.

The Commission based its findings on commissioned papers from the scholarly community, hearings from those involved in the education and business sector, and searches for examples of notable programs and promising approaches to specific problems in American education. Additionally, the Commission examined course taking patterns of high school students in 1964-1969 compared with course taking patterns of high school students in 1976-1981. Even though the Commission did not empirically test its conclusions, its findings had a major impact on education policy and to some extent still do. There are no hearings in the database, however, that specifically mention *A Nation at Risk*. Given the report’s influence though it may have spurred the general increase in education hearings beginning in the early 1980s (illustrated in Graph 4.1), but the congressional hearings collected in this study do not specifically mention the report as a causal factor.

4.3F: The Forgotten Half and Turning Points, 1988-1989

Furthermore, the literature suggests that the publication of two seminal reports produced by the philanthropic community that framed the challenges of youth policy, were important in moving the youth agenda forward (Pittman, Irby, & Ferber, 2000; Scott, et al., 2006); however, this is not reflected in the data. The William T. Grant Foundation’s Commission on Work, Family, and Citizenship issued the influential report *The Forgotten Half*, which drew attention to
the vulnerable population of non-college-bound young people and the lack of adequate social, economic, and vocational supports for those not in trouble, but not in college (The William T. Grant Foundation Commission on Work Family and Citizenship, 1988). In addition, The Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development published *Turning Points*, which identified the systems that serve young people (e.g.: schools, health care institutions, and community based organizations) (Task Force on Education of Young Adolescents, 1989). Both of these reports “captured public opinion and set the stage for a decade of work focused on building on youth potential” (Pittman, et al., 2000, p. 19). Although these received attention in the field, one elite respondent suggested that in general Congress is unresponsive to foundations unless they thought “they did something egregious” such as the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 in response to the close relationship between the Ford Foundation’s and Sen. Robert F. Kennedy’s (D-New York) staff in the 1960s.

4.3G: External events hypothesis conclusion

The data suggest that in many cases the external events hypothesis accurately captures the formation of youth policy on the congressional agenda. Several examples show the importance of policy entrepreneurs exploiting environment factors to increase the status of youth issues. It is possible, however, that the data are missing the role that other actors could have played to assist policy entrepreneurs in this situation. Although the roles of other potential actors were not identified in the elite interviews, the study is limited by the small number of respondents included in the analysis.

4.4: Internal actors hypothesis

The internal actors hypothesis asserts that interest groups representing the various sub-issues of youth policy decided to strategically work together, through testifying at the same
hearings, to publicize the importance of youth issues. To examine the degree to which different types of organizations testified together at the same hearing, a measure consistent with collaboration, I calculated and graphed the Index of Overlap derived from the Herfindahl index. The Index of Overlap summarizes the degree to which types of organizations appeared independently or part of a larger group of organizations as witnesses in each committee included in the sample. A high score indicates that the organizational type dominated a committee, meaning that other types of groups did not have a significant presence in that committee. Conversely, a low score suggests that the organizational type testified at committee hearings along with other types of groups illustrating that the committee heard testimony from diverse organizational groups rather than from one single type. This measure, however, is unable to distinguish if diverse issues groups were working in collaboration, only that they were present at committee hearings over a congressional session. Each type of witness received a score between zero and 100 for each congressional session to represent the degree to which that type of nongovernmental witness is concentrated in a given committee for each two-year period.

4.4A: Coalition activity

The findings presented in Table 4.8 and Graph 4.4 show that the majority of groups received a score below 50\textsuperscript{23} on the Index of Overlap indicating the diffuseness of the groups operating across the committees. In addition, I examined the data by quartile to see if that altered the main findings which found that the majority of organizations received scores in the second quartile from 26 to 51. Only public health interest groups and “other” institutions had an average score under 25, therefore suggesting that those types of organizations were most likely to be

\textsuperscript{23} Given that the scale is from 0 to 100, I examine the data two ways. First, I selected 50 as the arbitrator of high or low levels of concentration since there is no information in the literature to suggest the implication of certain scores of an Index of Overlap and corresponding concentration. Second, I examined the Index by quartile, 0-25, 26-50, 51-75, 76-100, to see if there was any variation among the concentration of groups by quartile.
present at congressional hearings with other types of groups when the data is aggregated to the committee level. Conversely, education and workforce development organizations were the most concentrated on the Index of Overlap meaning that they were most likely to be present at congressional hearings that only included other education witnesses and not at hearings with a variety of issue groups present.

An examination of the scores on the Index of Overlap over time reveals several congressional sessions where all organizations received a score below 50. For instance from 1987-1996 and again from 1999-2008, each organization received a low score. This may suggest that over time, youth interest groups have been more strategic in their activities on Capitol Hill. For instance, in 2001, a handful of youth interest groups organized The Campaign for Youth, to build consensus among organizations that focus on improving the chances for disconnected youth. A leader in that organization, who was interviewed for the study, suggested that basic premise of the Campaign for Youth is to bring together the various organizations working on behalf of young people that have no political voice to bring those issues to the forefront. To that end, they have sought out input from 1,000 organizations around the country that work with disconnected youth in an attempt to raise the awareness of youth issues during presidential elections, with varied success. During the 2004 election, the Campaign convened an event with the campaign chairs for President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry and young people to interact and voice their questions. Although they made a similar attempt during the 2008 election, they were “unable to gain interest from the campaigns in the way we were during the prior campaign.”

In general, the data suggest that diverse youth advocacy groups testified at the same hearings—a measure consistent with a coalitional strategy—to possibly work to advance the
youth agenda in Congress. During this period, it is possible that interest groups realized that the advancement of the youth policy agenda in Congress required a broad coalition able to work across committee jurisdiction. In other words, the Index of Overlap results suggest that diverse groups were by and large testifying at the same hearings, which is consistent with a theory that these groups were working together in Congress, during the 35 years identified in this study. The data, however, can only identify that diverse actors were present at the hearing and not that were in fact working collaboratively.

However, the data presented in Graph 4.3 does show a handful of spikes where the Index of Overlap is above 50 (indicating a concentration of groups in committees), but only two spikes involve more than one type of group concentrated during the same congressional session. The spikes of an individual group concentrated in a single committee tend to correspond with the reauthorization of a major piece of legislation related to the type of group. For instance, the spike in criminal justice groups in 1975-1976 corresponded to the reauthorization of the Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. Higher Education Act reauthorizations in 1985-86 and 1997-1998 also caused similar spikes in education and higher education groups. Consequently, types of organizations cluster in certain committees when legislation that directly affects their constituents is up for reauthorization. When this is not the case, non-governmental organizations concerned with youth issues tend to spread out across committees as shown by the Index of Overlap, which is consistent with a more collaborative strategy.

It was only in the 97th Congress (1981-1982) that business, education, and workforce groups each received a score over 50. During this period, all of these groups are concentrated in the House Education and Labor Committee regarding Perkins re-authorization. Since these three groups dominated the committee, it may suggest that education, workforce development, and
business organizations coordinated their efforts, which is consistent with a coalitional strategy. The date cannot determine, however, if these groups were testifying in support or against of each other. It also cannot distinguish if these groups were selected by the committee chairman to testify together of if they strategically choose to testify together in front of the committee. In addition, education and higher education groups also each received a score above 50 in the 98th Congress (1983-1984). Since these groups are closely related and represent educational opportunity from childhood through adulthood, what is now often referred to as the P16 pipeline of pre-Kindergarten through a BA or 16th grade, however, it is not surprising that the efforts of education and higher education organizations overlapped in the same committees.

Although the data can only suggest collaboration, several of the interview respondents did speak about the coalition strategy attempted by many of the youth policy advocacy organizations. One policy director for a youth organization explained: “Everyone’s policy shops are so small and we always try and build a coalition of organizations to work together.” He described how the youth field has many small advocacy organizations, but that none of them is large enough to independently influence policy. According to the respondent, the average environmental advocacy organization has 300,000 people on their mailing list and most youth policy groups only have an average of 5,000 people on their lists. He commented that, “until those numbers flip we cannot change policy to the same extent. Young people aren’t as compelling an issue to rally around compared to the environment.”

Interviewees also suggested that they mainly target the two main education committees in Congress, but based on the particular issue, they also seek out opportunities to testify at other committees. Organizations focused on national service and service learning, which I place under workforce development, commented that they also targeted transportation and natural resources
committees since those committees were often responsive to having young people involved in environmental projects that they authorized. Respondents from various organizations also spoke about supporting each other’s activity on Capitol Hill and testifying on myriad issues, not always directly related to their main organizational mission. For example, a representative of a workforce development organization commented that she testified several times to the judiciary committee in terms of her organization’s support of programs for youth involved in the justice system. Consequently, the elite interviews support the notion of collaboration as also suggested by the Herfindahl Index analysis.

4.4B: Internal actors hypothesis conclusion

The Herfindahl Index of Overlap identifies the level of concentration types of witness had by congressional committee. When there is a high concentration of a group in a committee it suggests that different types of groups are not present in the committee, which may suggest that other youth interest groups are not targeting that committee. On the other hand, it could indicate that collaboration may exist, but that the coalition decided to let one type of interest group focus on a particular committee. When there is a low concentration of many groups in a committee it may be an indication that different types of interest groups may be working in a coalition. This method, however, is unable to determine how and why distinct issues groups may be working together. It is also unable to analyze if groups found at the same committee are working in collaboration or are in competition with each other. It is possible that diverse interest groups found in the same committee could be an indication of competition and not collaboration. Rather, the Index of Overlap captures the presence of different groups testifying together by committee. The findings, however, are supported by the elite interviews which corroborated the hypothesis
of collaboration. Nonetheless, additional qualitative research would be needed to further unpack how groups came together and the commonality of their policy positions.
Graph 4.3: Witness Index of Overlap from 1973-2008 (n = 6,859)

- Education
- Workforce
- Social Services
- Criminal Justice
- Public Health
- Business
- Higher Education
- Other Organizations
Table 4.8: Index of Witness Overlap, All Hearings, 93rd to 110th Congress, 1973 to 2008

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<th>99-00</th>
<th>01-02</th>
<th>03-04</th>
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4.5: Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented the empirical evidence documenting congressional attention to youth issues in an introductory attempt to systematically and empirically study federal attention to youth issues from 1973 to 2008. The findings indicate that congressional attention to youth policy issues cannot be easily summarized. Congress has oscillated between devoting time and energy to the issues impacting young people, to a general hands-off attitude leaving much out of the political discourse. In some cases the external events hypothesis is validated, but not always. For instance, there was very little congressional activity related to youth after A Nation at Risk and in response to the 2003 White House Task Force on Disconnected Youth. In addition, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the documented interest group behavior is consistent with collaboration, the evidenced does not always support a relationship between group concentration in committees and a change in the number of youth related hearings held in Washington. A further analysis of how the findings relate to the two hypotheses and further implications and policy recommendations will be discussed in the final chapter of this study.
Chapter 5: Implications and conclusion

Traditionally youth policy has been studied from a psycho-social perspective that treats the concept of youth as a natural developmental stage or as a reaction to external factors. This dissertation, however, examined these issues from a political perspective and analyzed how political actors and public policy play a role in shaping the social construction of youth. In essence, political actors and policymakers make choices regarding the content and implementation of policy when they are confronted with an issue or problem. The choice of design elements in a given public policy, therefore, “reflects political and social values, historical precedent, national trends in ideas about ‘good’ policy, as well as a host of ‘local’ knowledge that leads to enormous variability in policy designs across time and space” (Schneider & Sidney, 2009, p. 105). Consequently, youth issues and youth policy cannot be fully understood without analyzing the political components of the policymaking process.

The concepts of “social construction” and “target populations” play an important role in the policymaking process. Social construction is defined as “the underlying understanding of the social world that places meaning-making at the center” and target populations refer to the different types of people or groups that policy is attempting to change (Schneider & Sidney, 2009). Social construction distinguishes socially meaningful target populations through the attribution of values, symbols, and images. Consequently, through imposed eligibility criteria target populations become empirically verifiable and take on group identities (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).

Once target groups are created and assume an identity, Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that they can be characterized as belonging to one of four major types of broad policy targets: advantaged (powerful groups with positive images), contenders (powerful groups with negative images), dependents (powerless groups with positive images), and deviants (powerless
groups with negative images). In terms of this typology, youth are often classified as “deviants” since they lack both social inclusion and political power. Young people are often characterized as a negative target population, rather than by the positive attributes they possess.

In breaking with the traditional body of research on youth policy, this dissertation, analyzed how political actors and the policy process play a role in shaping the social construction of young people and youth policy. In particular, this research examined the role of Congress in creating the youth policy agenda. Congress was chosen as the venue to study the youth policy agenda because public policymaking occurs most frequently, although not absolutely, on the federal level through the work of Congress (Weir, et al., 1988). Consequently the issues that Congress selects to study and analyze are those which become significant politically.

On the most basic level, in a functioning representative democracy, the subjects to which the legislative branch devotes agenda space, are ideally the topics that concern most Americans. In reality, however, not all issues that are important to citizens receive space on the congressional agenda, as there are simply more issues than there is agenda space. As a result, issues are constantly in competition with each other for political attention and this conflict produces winners and losers (Downs, 1972; Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). The individuals who control congressional committees, furthermore, have considerable power in determining which issues receive attention in Congress and which witnesses are called upon to inform the committee (DeGregorio, 1992; Leyden, 1995; Talbert, et al., 1995). In the modern political system, issues rise and fall on the political agenda in large part as a function of the lobbying efforts of constituents and interest groups (Smith, 1984).
5.1: The study

This dissertation was an initial study of federal youth policy from 1973 to 2008. For the purpose of this research, youth policy was represented by five main sub-issues: criminal justice, education, public health, social service, and workforce development. To date, no research exists on the creation or evolution of youth policy on the federal level. The limited empirical research on the politics of youth policy is comprised of a few publications from the same study on the politics of youth advocacy in the San Francisco, California Bay Area (Deschenes, McLaughlin, & Newman, 2008; McLaughlin, Scott, Deschenes, Hopkins, & Newman, 2009; Scott, et al., 2006). More research was, and still is, needed on this topic; therefore, this dissertation begins to fill the research gap.

Furthermore, this dissertation broadened the small body of research on youth policy by examining the politics on the federal level. Historically social and youth policy, targeted to the urban poor, were most often considered local-level issues. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, however, Congress expanded its jurisdiction and actively mandated large-scale social policy programs targeted to the urban poor and youth. As explained in Chapter 2, beginning in the 1960s the federal government expanded its reach into these issues and developed legislation authorizing the creation of and appropriations for youth-targeted programs. As a result this dissertation not only examined an issue currently underrepresented in the academic literature, but it also expanded the conceptualization of youth issues to include a study of the politics of youth policy in Congress.

This study, therefore, examined longitudinally the presence of youth policy issues on the congressional agenda and tested competing theories that explained the historical pattern derived from a unique database of all congressional hearings held on youth issues from 1973 to 2008.
The database I constructed included 107 laws, 986 hearings, 3,389 separate testimonies, and 11,751 witnesses. In addition, I conducted a small number of interviews \((n = 5)\) with members of the youth advocacy coalition to contextualize the results of the congressional hearings analysis. Congressional hearings were chosen as the main source of data because they are the venue in which “lobbyists have their greatest influence” and present a snapshot of the important issues of the time.

This dissertation put forth two possible hypotheses to explain the presence of youth issues in Congress over time. The external events hypothesis argued that changing environmental conditions were the catalytic element enabling more youth issues to receive congressional attention, with policy entrepreneurs reacting to these changes. The second theory, the internal actors hypothesis, asserted that internal political actors, such as congressional leaders and interest groups were the primary actors responsible for facilitating the presence of youth issues on the congressional agenda. In essence, congressional leaders and youth interest groups acted as policy entrepreneurs and redefined the social construction of youth and shopped around to find the most advantageous venue to advance their issue. This hypothesis places less emphasis on the changing environmental conditions; rather, it asserts that it was the internal actors themselves that strategically pushed for more attention to youth issues.

5.2: Findings

The findings, presented in the previous chapter, suggested the youth issues were more or less prevalent on the congressional agenda over these 35 years both as a reaction to policy to external broader institutional issues, and from the proactive process of interest groups working together to publicize the importance of youth policy. The peaks in the number of hearings from 1973 to 2008 signified the role external conditions played in motivating Congress to hold more
youth hearings, since there were several instances where institutional changes and external events helped motivate this increased activity. However this was not consistently the case as there were also times when significant and relevant external events did not correspond to an increase of congressional hearings.

Furthermore, the comparison of the total number of hearings held per session to the total number of congressional hearings included in the previous chapter showed that at most Congress devoted only a small amount of its time to youth issues. Even in years with large numbers of youth hearings, youth issues took up at most three percent of the total agenda. In sum, youth policy was clearly not considered as a significant public policy issue by the United States Congress.

In addition, the empirical evidence demonstrated that a variety of non-governmental interest groups were present at the same committees. This is consistent with the theory that interest groups formed a youth advocacy coalition to better achieve their policy agenda, thereby, supporting the internal actors hypothesis. It showed that interest groups acted strategically in their interactions with Congress to advance their cause and did not confine their activity only to reactions to external events. However, it is clear that the youth lobby had limited success in persuading Congress to hold more youth hearings to advance the prominence of youth issues on the national policy agenda.

These findings, therefore, suggest that the process of bringing youth issues to congressional attention is complex and messy. By and large the external events hypothesis most accurately explains the patterns of congressional attention, but it is not universally applicable. Although the evidence suggests that the internal actors hypothesis is also partially accurate, the lack of a relationship between the proxy measure suggesting that interest groups were working
together and an increase in congressional hearings shows that the youth coalition was successful in advancing youth policy on Capitol Hill only to a limited degree.

The analysis of congressional hearings also surfaced important distinctions, documented in the literature, between the political party controlling each chamber and the content of hearings held (Petrocik, 1996). The analysis suggests that when Republicans controlled the House of Representatives they held more hearings on traditional conservative issues and that when Democrats controlled the chamber that they held more hearings on traditional liberal issues. Education which was historically considered a liberal issue, however, was more prevalent in the House of Representative when Republicans controlled the chamber compared to Democrats. This illustrates the changing role of education as an important policy issue in national politics.

5.3: Implications

Although the empirical evidence suggests that a youth advocacy coalition exists, it is by-and-large a fragmented and loosely-connected coalition. In fact, every respondent interviewed for this study gave a different answer to my asking them to define the terms youth, adolescence, and youth development, thus illustrating the lack of unity among youth interest groups. One respondent, however, was adamant that the lack of consensus was not an issue. He explained: “It hasn’t hindered the movement of youth policy. The United Nations definition is 15 to 24. Let’s just leave it there!” The results of this dissertation, however, suggest otherwise.

Nevertheless, I argue that the lack of a cohesive problem definition and target population boundaries hinders the advancement of youth issues on the political agenda. How can youth policy win a bigger slice of the agenda pie, if the youth interest groups cannot decide on a consensual definition of their target population? For instance, the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes the youth target group has led to significant variation in how programs and
policies define youth for the purposes of service delivery and research (United States Government Accountability Office, February 2008; Wald & Martinez, 2003). In this age of limited resources that require programs to be accountable for public monies spent, the country needs a common definition of what constitutes a youth program and what does not. Otherwise, youth programs and policies can never be accurately studied and compared, thereby, hampering the evolution of youth issues on the political agenda.

If the youth lobby wants to achieve more for its constituents, it must formulate a clear definition of the actual group of people they are representing. With every interest group using a different definition of “youth” it is nearly impossible to enlarge the youth policy coalition and market the issue to legislators and the public at-large. If interest groups and constituents are going to be more successful in advocating for youth issues, they all need to come together and start speaking the same language, in order to spur political action (Edelman, 1994).

Language, however, is not static, but constantly evolves as issue advocates try to replace negative language with positive terminology. The target population that was once referred to as “crippled” became “handicapped,” which in turn became “disabled” (Ingram, et al., 2007). Although youth interest groups have worked to change the negative image of youth, they have not acted collectively and consistently. Unifying their language will also enable interest groups to better shape the social construction of youth. As the findings suggest, youth policy is generally equated with education policy. If youth policy advocates are to be more successful in placing all youth issues on the congressional agenda, they need to have a unified message that uses the same language.

Although youth policy began as a local issue, it is currently estimated that the federal government runs hundreds of programs to serve children and youth ages 0-24, spread across 12
departments and agencies (Campaign for a White House Office on Children and Youth, n.d.).

Even though the youth lobby has not been as successful as their members would like, the federal government nonetheless runs many programs targeted to young adults. Table 5.1 lists some of the reasons the federal government is involved in youth issues according to the 2003 Task Force on Disadvantaged Youth.

Table 5.1: Why the federal government gets involved in disadvantaged youth issues:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Examples</th>
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<tr>
<td>Seriousness of the problem</td>
<td>To provide federal intervention for large growing problems, that in the past have not been “properly” addressed</td>
<td>Programs for job training or welfare dependency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preferred strategy</td>
<td>To incentivize the use of particular strategies through allocating funds for that specific purpose</td>
<td>Family planning services, abstinence education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Specific services</td>
<td>Congress chooses to allocate funds for specific programs or services</td>
<td>Safe and drug-free schools, health care for mothers and children</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greater federal resources</td>
<td>To use federal dollars to supplement state and local initiatives</td>
<td>Title I education funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the common good</td>
<td>To use federal dollars for programs to that serve broader values and goals of the nation</td>
<td>Public education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal/constitutional</td>
<td>To protect the federal rights of youth and ensure equal protection of the law</td>
<td>Disabilities programs</td>
</tr>
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<td>Special programs</td>
<td>To offer help for a specific target population</td>
<td>Special education, minority programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical reasons</td>
<td>To use the authority of the federal government to address issues across state lines</td>
<td>Collaborative efforts between various levels of the government</td>
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<tr>
<td>National goals</td>
<td>To help meet federally-established goals</td>
<td>Public health and education goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic reasons</td>
<td>To enhance the economic competitiveness of the country</td>
<td>Economic development and job creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary service</td>
<td>To encourage voluntary, community service in local communities</td>
<td>AmeriCorps, VISTA</td>
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Although the federal government runs many youth programs, this does not mean that they implement these programs and policies in any coordinated or systematic fashion. This is evident by the growing body of research on youth policy that advocates for a holistic approach to serving
the needs of young people. This research, however, does not seem to be leading to real change. Although Congress passed the Federal Youth Coordination Act (FYCA), it only held one hearing on the topic. Not surprisingly, the FYCA was never implemented.

As such, the youth lobby also needs to do more to persuade legislators to read and react to the growing body of research and reports on the changing nature of adulthood and how that impacts the nation’s young people. Interest groups and researchers are creating these materials and espousing high value to their products, yet there is no evidence that Congress is receiving this information and/or translating these findings into congressional hearings and public policy changes. These research reports usually include compelling evidence as to why elected officials should care about young people, but it does no good if legislators do not assimilate or respond to these findings.

Given the importance of political party and the youth issues that receive attention in congressional hearings, the youth lobby should target their initiatives based on the political party in control. Although they do not want to prioritize one issue to the detriment of the others, it would be prudent for youth interest groups to take into account the issues that are traditionally important to the party in control of Congress. For example, when Republicans control Congress, especially the House of Representatives, it would be strategic to focus on juvenile justice and education issues, while when Democrats are in power to focus on public health, social service, and workforce development issues.

5.4: Limitations and future research

Given the lack of research on the politics of youth policy at the federal level, this study represents a first attempt to examine these issues. Future research is needed to explore this topic in more detail and to address some of its limitations. For instance, given the delay in the


publication of congressional hearings via the ProQuest website, the database used in this study is most likely incomplete. This is especially true for the later years included in this study since it is highly likely that ProQuest is not yet up-to-date for more recent years. This is evident by the lack of total hearings held in the 2007-2008 session irrespective of topic of hearing. In addition, future research should include a larger sample of elite interviews. This study was able only to include five elite interviews and a larger sample would be helpful to explore these issues in more detail.

As mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, the use of the Herfindahl Index of Overlap to measure interest group collaboration is another limitation of the study. This method posits that if different types of groups are diffusely represented within committees than the evidence is consistent with the notion of collaboration. This method, however, is unable to determine how and why distinct issues groups may be working together. It is also unable to analyze if groups found at the same committee are working in collaboration or are in competition with each other. It is possible that diverse interest groups found in the same committee could be an indication of competition and not collaboration. Rather, the Index of Overlap captures the presence of different groups testifying together by committee. Although the findings were supported by the elite interviews, additional qualitative research should be completed to further analyze how groups came together and the commonality of their policy positions.

Finally, more research is needed to examine the presence of youth issues on the congressional agenda and the actual implementation of youth policy. Researchers should examine the relationship between congressional attention and congressional appropriations to youth issues to more fully understand the federal role in youth policy. This would help elucidate the role policy entrepreneurs and interest groups play in crafting public policy.
References


In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (U.S. Supreme Court 1967).


Table A1: Legislative histories searched, listed in chronological order ($n = 107$)

**Juvenile Justice ($n = 19$)**
5. Missing Children Act, 1982  
15. Prosecutor Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 or PROTECT Act  
18. Protecting Our Children Comes First Act of 2007  
19. Providing Resources, Officers, and Technology To Eradicate Cyber Threats to Our Children Act of 2008 or PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008  

**Education ($n = 18$)**
1. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975  
7. School Dropout Prevention and Basic Skills Improvement Act of 1990  
8. School Dropout Demonstration Programs, 1990 – no hearings  
12. Improving America's Schools Act of 1994  
15. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
16. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004
17. Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Improvement Act of 2006

Workforce Development ($n = 13$)

1. Youth Conservation Corps Amendments of 1974
3. Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977
5. Youth Employment Demonstration Amendments of 1981
7. Job Training Partnership Act Amendments of 1986
8. Training Reform Amendments of 1992
10. School-to-Work Opportunities Act of 1994
12. YouthBuild Transfer Act, 2006

Public Health ($n = 25$)

1. Public Health Service Act, amendments, 1975
2. Public Health Service Act, amendments; Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Act, extension 1976
3. Health Services Programs, extension, 1977
4. Public Health Service Act, amendment, 1978
5. Mental Health Systems Act of 1980
6. Public Health Service Act Programs Extension, 1984
7. Miscellaneous Health Provisions, 1986
8. Indian Land Conveyances, Forest Management, Child Abuse Prevention, and Health Care Programs, 1990
9. ADAMHA Reorganization Act, 1992
10. Indian Health Amendments of 1992
12. Children's Health Act of 2000
14. Garrett Lee Smith Memorial Act, 2004
15. Welfare Reform Extension Act, Part VIII 2004
16. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Related Programs Continuation Act of 2004
17. Welfare Reform Extension Act of 2004

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24. It was also reauthorized in 1997, but not included because none of the associated hearings had an explicit youth focus.
18. Qualified Individual Program (QI), Transitional Medical Assistance (TMA), and Abstinence Programs Extension and Hurricane Katrina Unemployment Relief Act of 2005
20. Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005
21. Sober Truth on Preventing Underage Drinking Act or STOP Act, 2006
22. Abstinence Education and QI Programs Extension Act of 2007
23. Medicaid Transitional Assistance and Abstinence Education Programs Temporary Extension 2007
24. Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009
25. Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009 or PACT Act

Social Service (n = 32)

2. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
3. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978
5. Federal Supplemental Compensation Act of 1982, amendment
6. Amendment of Part A of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 1984
7. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984
10. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 1987
12. Domestic Volunteer Service Act Amendments of 1989
15. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
17. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
19. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
20. Missing, Exploited, and Runaway Children Protection Act, 1999
21. Foster Care Independence Act of 1999
24. Promoting Safe and Stable Families Amendments of 2001
27. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005
29. Older Americans Act Amendments of 2006
30. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008

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26 This includes the Tom Osborne Federal Youth Coordination Act (P.L. 109-365).
32. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009; Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing Act of 2009
Table A2: Search terms used for data collection, in alphabetical order

1. Administration for Children, Youth, and Families
2. Adult education
3. Antipoverty programs
4. Black students
5. Career education
6. Child welfare
7. Children
8. Compulsory education
9. Courts
10. Crime and criminals
11. Drugs and youth
13. Education
14. Elementary and secondary education
15. Federal aid to education
16. Federal aid to higher education
17. Federal aid to local governments, education
18. Federal aid to states, education
19. Federal aid to states, public welfare programs
20. Federal aid to vocational education
21. Foster home care
22. Higher education
23. High school
24. Homelessness
25. Juvenile Courts
26. Juvenile delinquency
27. Juvenile detention and correctional institutions
28. Law and Justice
29. Manpower training programs
30. National Advisory Committee on the Education of Handicapped Children and Youth
31. National Youth Administration
32. Neighborhood youth corps
33. New careers program
34. Office of Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development
35. Poverty
36. Presidential Commission on Child and Youth Deaths
37. President’s Council on Youth Opportunity
38. Prisons
39. Public services career program
40. Public service employment
41. Public welfare programs
42. Runaway and missing persons
43. Students
44. School dropouts
45. School lunch and breakfast programs
46. Upward Bound Programs
47. Vocational education
48. Vocational rehabilitation
49. White House Conference on Children, Youth, and Families
50. White Conference on Youth
51. Work incentive programs
52. Youth
53. Youth conservation corps
54. Youth employment
55. Youth Employment Advisory Committee
**Appendix B**

Table B1: Political party controlling Legislative and Executive branches of government, 93rd to 110th Congress, 1973 to 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Presidential Party</th>
<th>Senate Party</th>
<th>House of Representatives Party</th>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
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</table>

27 Characterized as Democratically controlled because more of the year was under Democratic control rather than Republican control after Sen. Jim Jeffords from Vermont switched political parties on May 24, 2001. Previously, the Senate was split evenly between the two parties and Republican Vice President Dick Cheney served as the deciding vote since he served as President of the Senate.
Table B2: Committees holding youth hearings from 1973 to 2008, \((n = 986)\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% of Chamber</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>House of Representatives</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Agriculture (1820-present)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Appropriations (1865-present)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Oversight &amp; Government Reform (2007-present)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>Includes hearings from Committee on Government Reform (1999-2007), Committee on District of Columbia (1808-1999), &amp; Committee on Post Office &amp; Civil Service (1946-1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Energy &amp; Commerce (1981-present)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>Includes hearings from Committee on Interstate &amp; Foreign Commerce (1891-1981) and Committee on Commerce (1819-1881).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, Select (1983-1993)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>Committee Disbanded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Financial Services (2001-present)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>New Name. Includes hearings from Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (1975-1995).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Judiciary (1813-present)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Crime, Select (1971-1973)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>Committee Disbanded.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, Select (1977-1993)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>Committee Disbanded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Population, Select (1977-1981)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>Committee Disbanded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Science, Space, and Technology (1977-1995; 2007-present)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>New Name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Small Business (1975-present)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>% of Chamber</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee on the Budget (1974-present)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee on Ways and Means (1802-present)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee on Natural Resources (1993-1995; 2007-present)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>New Name. Includes hearings from Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs (1951-1993) and Committee on Resources (1995-2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Economic Committee (1946-present)</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee on Appropriations (1867-present)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee on Banking, Housing, &amp; Urban Affairs (1970-present)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee on Finance (1816-present)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Judiciary (1816-present)</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee on the Budget (1974-present)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>New Name. Includes hearings from Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs (1948-1977).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Energy &amp; Natural Resources (1977-present)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>New Name. Includes hearings from Committee on Commerce (1961-1977).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Commerce, Science, Transportation (1977-present)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>New Name. Includes hearings from the Committee on Government Operations (1952-1977) &amp; Committee on Governmental Affairs (1977-2005).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee on Homeland Security &amp; Governmental Affairs (2005-present)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>New Name. Includes hearings from the Committee on Government Operations (1952-1977) &amp; Committee on Governmental Affairs (1977-2005).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee on Indian Affairs (1993-present)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>Includes hearings from the Select Committee on Indian Affairs (1977-1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>% of Chamber</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, &amp; Forestry (1997-present)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>New Name. Includes hearings from the Committee on Agriculture &amp; Forestry (1884-1977) &amp; the Select Committee on Nutrition &amp; Human Needs (1968-1977)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship (1981-present)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>From 1981-2001 it was called the Committee on Small Business.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>986</td>
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</table>
Table B3: Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, & Pension Youth Hearings by Congress and Type, 1973-2008 (n = 196)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Cong.</th>
<th>CJ</th>
<th>ED</th>
<th>PH</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>WD</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Political Party of Chairman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973-1974</td>
<td>93rd</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Harrison Williams Jr.</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>94th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Harrison Williams Jr.</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977-1978</td>
<td>95th</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Harrison Williams Jr.</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1980</td>
<td>96th</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Harrison Williams Jr.</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981-1982</td>
<td>97th</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Orrin Hatch</td>
<td>Republican</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983-1984</td>
<td>98th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Orrin Hatch</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1986</td>
<td>99th</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>Republican</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987-1988</td>
<td>100th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Edward Kennedy</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>101st</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Edward Kennedy</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>102nd</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>Democrat</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993-1994</td>
<td>103rd</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Edward Kennedy</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>104th</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Nancy Kassebaum</td>
<td>Republican</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>105th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>James Jeffords</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
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<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>106th</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>James Jeffords</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>107th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Edward Kennedy &amp; James Jeffords</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>108th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Judd Gregg</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>109th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Michael Enzi</td>
<td>Republican</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>110th</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Edward Kennedy</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Cong = Congressional session, CJ = criminal justice; ED = education; PH = public health; SS = social service, and WD = workforce development.
Table B4: House of Representatives Committee on Education & Labor Youth Hearings by Congress and Type, 1973-2008 (n = 344)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Cong.</th>
<th>CJ</th>
<th>ED</th>
<th>PH</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>WD</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Political Party of Chairman</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973-1974</td>
<td>93rd</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Carl Perkins</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>94th</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Carl Perkins</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1978</td>
<td>95th</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Carl Perkins</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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*Note.* Cong = Congressional session, CJ = criminal justice; ED = education; PH = public health; SS = social service, and WD = workforce development.
Table B5: Type of Witnesses Over time, All Hearings, 93rd to 110th Congress, 1973 to 2008 ($n = 10,924$)

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Note. Cong = Congressional session or member of Congress, Loc. Gov. = local government; State Gov. = state government; Fed. Gov. = federal government, Ind. Gov. = Native American tribe; Court = member of judicial system; K12 = public or private K12 school; PH = public health; SS = social service, WD = workforce development; CJ = criminal justice; ED = education; Higher ED = higher education; and Bus. = business.
Graph B1: Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
Youth Hearings, 1973-2008 (n = 196)
Graph B2: House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor
Youth Hearings by Type, 1973-2008 (n = 344)
Graph B3: Witnesses by Congress and Type, 1973-2008, \( (n = 10,924) \)

- **Governmental**
- **Non-Governmental**