The victory of Democrat Grover Cleveland over Republican James G. Blaine in the presidential election of 1884 is one of those events in U.S. history that once commanded broad attention but that has long since ceased to stir the blood. This was an epoch, after all, about which historians customarily play up the radical transformations being wrought by big business and downplay the influence of presidential administrations on public policy. In the conventional narrative—familiar to contemporaries, and updated a half century later for a generation of New Dealers by the journalist-turned-popular historian Matthew Josephson—greedy "robber barons" called the shots, while unscrupulous "politicos" did their bidding. This big-business-centric narrative has proved remarkably durable and helps explain why generations of historians have—misleadingly, in my view—borrowed a phrase from Mark Twain and called the period between the end of Congressional Reconstruction in 1877 and the emergence of the Progressive movement around 1900 the Gilded Age.

To the extent that the 1884 election lives on in the collective imagination, it is largely on account of a single incident that occurred in a Republican rally in New York City during the final, hectic week of the campaign. Exasperated by Blaine's Democratic opponents, an obscure pro-Blaine Presbyterian minister castigated the Democrats as the party of "rum, Romanism, and rebellion." Not until the following Sunday would Blaine issue a public statement disavowing the minister's derogatory characterization of the Catholic Church. By this time, the phrase had gone viral, galvanizing. If informed insiders can
be believed, thousands of Irish Catholics to switch their votes from Blaine to Cleveland. Cleveland's margin of victory over Blaine in New York State was razor-thin, a mere 1,047 votes out of 1.2 million ballots cast. Even so, the margin was large enough to give Cleveland the state's thirty-six electoral votes and, with them, the election. Historians have long challenged the causal relationship between the minister's remark and the election outcome. Yet, in the annals of electoral lore, it lives on as one the most disastrous gaffes in the history of American politics.

The significance of the 1884 election is not to be found in its denouement. Rather, it lies in the emergence of a small but determined voting bloc during the election campaign and in the role of this bloc following Cleveland's victory on the promulgation of public policy. At the core of this bloc of voters were antimonopolist merchants troubled by the conduct of giant corporations and anti-Blaine Republicans outraged at the moral failings of the Republican candidate. While this voting bloc existed in several northern and midwestern states, it was particularly influential in New York, the country's media capital, the home of the largest port, and its most important financial center. The legacy of this voting bloc extended well beyond the 1880s. By forging an alliance with journalists emboldened by novel forms of visual storytelling, it helped lay the groundwork for the early twentieth-century Progressive movement and the mid-twentieth-century administrative state.

Of the various issues to agitate the electorate in 1884, few proved more enduring than the public outcry over railroad and telegraph "monopolies." The rapid expansion since the 1850s of a nationwide transportation and communications network was one of the defining features of the age. Slowly yet decisively, the state-chartered corporation was supplanting the common-law proprietorship as the nation's dominant economic institution. While the emergence of giant corporations had a seeming inexorability, corporate expansion did not go unopposed. For a small yet articulate group of self-styled antimonopolists, the business practices of William H. Vanderbilt's New York Central and Hudson River Railroad and Jay Gould's Western Union, the nation's largest telegraph network provider, posed a fundamental threat not only to commerce but also to the Republic.

Antimonopolists objected less to the scale on which railroads and telegraphs operated than to their autonomy. Unconstrained by the regulatory mechanism of the market—a mechanism that, as all merchants knew, continued to regulate commerce on the high seas—these corporations had acquired the economic power to set prices for the conveyance of people, goods, and information at high speeds throughout the vast American interior.

Railroads and telegraph lines crossed state boundaries, making federal legislation a logical remedy. In the case of the telegraph, none was forthcoming. Though Congress repeatedly debated federal telegraph legislation during Cleveland's first administration, with the exception of an 1888 law outlawing the ownership of telegraph lines by land grant railroads (the Anderson Act), none of this legislation found its way into law. In the case of the railroad, antimonopoly lawmakers were more successful. By the time Cleveland took office in 1885, Massachusetts and New York had already established state railroad commissions: Massachusetts in 1869, New York in 1882. Emulating their example, lawmakers in 1887 established the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate the nation's railroad network. The ICC was not the first federal regulatory agency, having been preceded by the Post Office Department and the Patent Office. Yet it was the first federal agency to oversee an economic sector in which the corporation had supplanted the proprietorship as the dominant mode of economic coordination.

Presidential elections in the late nineteenth century are best understood not as single events, as it has become customary to characterize them today, but rather as an aggregation of individual state elections, each with its own peculiarities. The outcome, of course, was national—one candidate won the majority of the electoral votes, and with it the presidency. The process, however, was federal. A typical late nineteenth-century presidential election revolved around a distinctive array of often idiosyncratic issues that had their own state-specific dynamic.

The great prize for party leaders was not the popular vote in the nation, but the popular vote in each individual state. Under the federal Constitution, the winning candidate needed a majority of the votes in the Electoral College, in which every state was allocated a vote total that was equal to the number of its U.S. senators and representatives. In accordance with a long-standing convention known as the "unit rule," the electoral votes of each state were awarded in a bloc to whichever candidate won a plurality of the state's popular vote. Whoever won the largest number of electoral votes—which was usually, though not invariably, the candidate who also won the popular vote—won the election.

As so often occurred in late nineteenth-century presidential campaigns, the 1884 election hinged on voting results in four states: Indiana, Connecticut,
New Jersey, and New York. The reason was simple. In each of these states, the electorate was more or less evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans, making it conceivable that, in a close election, the standard-bearer for either party might prevail. In a country that was as large and diverse as the United States, it might seem bizarre for a presidential election to be decided by such a relatively small number of voters. Yet that was how things worked in practice. Of these four states, none had more electoral votes than New York. In fact, New York, with thirty-six, had the largest number of electoral votes of any state in the country.

The outsized significance of New York in electoral politics was a by-product of the political compromises that an earlier generation of lawmakers had made to reunite the country following the Civil War. Terrified by the threat that ex-slaves posed to the political order, Democratic Party leaders had worked doggedly in the years since emancipation to deny them, and increasingly many poor whites, their constitutionally mandated voting rights. This strategy had an unmistakably partisan rationale. The vast majority of ex-slaves were Republican, and in several of the eleven southern states that had seceded during the Civil War, the Republican Party depended on African American votes to win elections. It took hard work to make the South "solid": persuasion, intimidation, violence, and even outright murder were among the tools that Democratic Party leaders deployed. Nothing any Republican ward heeler did to suppress the turnout in Democratic-leaning districts in the burgeoning industrial cities of the North was remotely comparable to the systematic disenfranchisement of hundreds of thousands of African Americans in the former Confederacy.

In short, the electoral map was biased in favor of the Democrats, and with each passing year it became increasingly clear that there was precious little that ex-slaves, Republican Party leaders, or, for that matter, high-minded ex-abolitionist civil rights activists could do about it. It was, thus, no accident that all of the four swing states were located in the North. Party competition was the most intense in that part of the country in which the Democratic Party had the least control over the levers of power. Had the Democrats not systematically blocked southern blacks from participating in electoral politics, New York's electoral votes would not have loomed so large. Blaine would have won several southern states and, with them, the election. Yet the Democrats had rigged the system, making New York's electoral votes far more consequential than they would have been had the South been in play.

No seasoned political insider seriously doubted that once the final election returns had been tallied New York's bloc of electoral votes would be awarded to either Cleveland or Blaine, and not to a third-party independent candidate. Yet it was far from obvious who would win over the large cohort of independent voters who held the balance of power. "For more than twelve years," declared one political insider in July 1884 in seconding Cleveland's presidential nomination, the most critical voting bloc in the state of New York was the "large unattached vote"—one hundred thousand strong--"which belongs to neither political organization," and which was far less inclined to vote for the candidate, or the party, than for the positions on issues the candidate had pledged to uphold.

The existence of such a large bloc of independent voters thrust into prominence two third-party candidates: John St. John and Benjamin F. Butler. St. John carried the standard for the Prohibition Party, Butler for the Greenback Party and the Anti-Monopoly Party.

St. John and Butler appealed to different segments of the electorate. St. John ran well among evangelicals in New York's upstate "burned-over district," a voting bloc that, had St. John stood down, would almost certainly have gone heavily for Blaine. Many evangelicals yearned for a total ban on the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages and felt betrayed when Republican Party leaders refused to incorporate into their platform a strongly worded prohibition plank introduced by Frances Willard's Woman's Christian Temperance Union. St. John shared the evangelicals' indignation and entered the race to protest the Republican Party's moral equivocation.

Butler, in contrast, could be expected to siphon votes away from Cleveland, given his popularity among urban workmen, a constituency that typically voted Democratic, especially in New York City and Brooklyn. Party leaders understood all of this perfectly well and responded accordingly. Republican operatives covertly funded Butler's campaign, while St. John's campaign received financial support from the Democrats.

Butler's candidacy posed a particular challenge for Democrats, since he ran as a "fusion" candidate who had obtained the endorsement of two very different political blocs: the Greenback Party, an organization that drew the bulk of its support from midwestern farmers and laborers, and the Anti-Monopoly Party, an organization with close ties to influential New York City merchants.

The Anti-Monopoly Party had its beginnings in the rising protest of East Coast merchants against the business practices of railroad and telegraph
corporations. One turning point occurred in January 1881, when the country's business elite was stunned by the unexpected takeover of Western Union by the notorious Wall Street trader Jay Gould. Gould's gambit crystallized the uneasiness that New York City's business elite felt toward financial practices associated with the emerging corporate order. Now that Gould controlled the nation's most important high-speed communications network, critics feared that he had it within his power to manipulate the prices not only of agricultural staples—and, conceivably, even the price of gold—but also of corporate securities.

Gould's takeover of Western Union led directly to the establishment of the New York City-based National Anti-Monopoly League, an organization that would quickly establish itself as a force in electoral politics. The league drew its primary support from merchants, wholesalers, shippers, and the lawyers who represented their interests. Its rationale, as founder Francis B. Thurber explained, was not to destroy the emerging corporate order, but rather to render it accountable to law: "Mr. Chairman and fellow-citizens, the Anti-Monopoly League stands simply upon the principles embodied in the Constitution of the United States, and as interpreted by the highest legal authority in the United States—the Supreme Court. If this is radical, we are radical; if this is the action of demagogues and Communists, we are demagogues and Communists, not otherwise." So fervent was Thurber in his denunciation of the railroad firms that one critic sardonically called him the "bottom, top, rind, and the core" of the antimonopoly movement in New York.

The legislative agenda that Thurber championed was broad and wide-ranging. Prominent among its goals was a ban on the informal agreements, known as pools, that railroad managers negotiated with each other to stabilize the flow of the goods they transported. Thurber also sought a restriction on the issuance of corporate securities in amounts that exceeded the actual value of a corporation's assets, a practice known as stock watering, and the elimination of rate schedules that discriminated against shippers who wanted to transport a relatively small quantity of goods over a relatively short distance, as distinct from shippers who transported in bulk and over long hauls. Finally, Thurber hoped to persuade the New York legislature to establish a permanent railroad commission, with rate-setting powers, that could authoritatively determine the actual cost of transporting a given item a given distance in a given period of time, making it possible to base railroad rate making on the actual cost of delivery rather than on whatever rates the railroad could obtain from the shipper, a practice that Thurber regarded as extortionate, and which he derisively termed "what the traffic will bear."11

Thurber's antimonopolism was grounded in his business experience. A highly successful wholesale grocer, Thurber was the coproprietor of Thurber, Whyland & Company, a sprawling commercial empire whose opulent six-story showroom in lower Manhattan was reputed to boast the "largest, choicest, and most comprehensive stock of food products in America." (The building still stands today; it now houses luxury apartments.) Thurber was one of the country's leading specialists in the global supply chains upon which his business depended, and filled his Manhattan showroom with exotic foodstuffs imported from East Asia and Europe as well as canned goods manufactured in his own Moorestown, New Jersey, factory.15 To build a market for his wares among the retailers who were his primary customers, he capitalized on recent technical advances in multicolor printing to issue thousands of splashy, full-color chromolithographic trade cards, an innovation that historians of advertising regard as an important juncture in the transformation of advertising from a verbal to a visual medium.

Hostility toward railroad and telegraph corporations was widespread in the 1880s, and not only in New York City. Upstate merchants, too, deplored the conduct of railroad and telegraph corporations and cried out for relief. The meteoric rise of Grover Cleveland from Buffalo mayor in 1881 to U.S. president in 1884 built on this popular groundswell. The most critical event in Cleveland's rise was his victory as New York governor in 1882, one that antimonopolists attributed to his endorsement by merchants disgusted with what they derided as the procorporate tilt in state government. Cleveland's immediate predecessor as governor, Alonzo Cornell, had been dropped from the ticket by Republican Party leaders for several reasons, including Cornell's refusal to veto legislation establishing a permanent railroad commission, a reform for which Thurber had diligently lobbied since 1879, and which would be duly established in 1882.14

Cleveland's tenure as New York governor divided the antimonopolists. Some admired his judiciousness in adjudicating the rival claims of corporations and their critics. Others—including Thurber—criticized Cleveland's appointees for the railroad commission and expressed outrage at his veto of a bill that would have capped at five cents the fare that a Gould-owned elevated streetcar line could charge off-peak-time commuters.22 That Gould had bribed lawmakers to overturn the will of the people as it had been expressed through
their legislators seemed to Thurber self-evident. Other prominent public fig-
ures concurred. Had it been permissible under U.S. law to issue a bill of at-
tainder to bring Gould to justice without the necessity for a jury trial—or so
declared the then little-known state assemblyman Theodore Roosevelt, in ex-
plaining why he too endorsed the rate cap—Roosevelt would do so gladly,
for Gould headed up the “wealthy criminal class” that, through bribery, phys-
ical intimidation, and worse, was insidiously corrupting the political insti-
tutions that lay at the foundation of the Republic. A jury trial would only
magnify Gould’s perfidy: if legal proceedings were convened, Gould would
almost certainly buy off the jurors. 26
To the consternation of his critics, Roosevelt soon changed his mind.
Cleveland’s veto had been entirely proper, he now concluded; since Gould’s
franchise had been granted by a state legislature, the legislature had a legal
obligation to uphold it.
Roosevelt was hardly alone. Among the antimonopolists to back Cleve-
land’s veto of the five-cent bill was the prominent New York City lawyer
Simon Sterne. Sterne, a Democrat, wrote widely on public policy topics and
was the author of a respected history of the U.S. Constitution first published
in 1882. Sterne’s antimonopoly bona fides were unassailable. He had played a
prominent role in the political crusade that had brought down the notorious
Tammany boss William Tweed and had testified in support of the establish-
ment of the New York railroad commission. Yet Sterne was a lawyer by train-
ing and shared his profession’s veneration for legal propriety. Gould’s overhead
railroad operated in accordance with a legal charter, and the legislature lacked
the authority to alter its terms.
Cleveland’s nomination for president in 1884 did nothing to heal the rift
in the antimonopolists’ ranks. Moderate antimonopolists sided with Sterne
and endorsed Cleveland as the antimonopoly candidate. Uncompromising
antimonopolists like Thurber refused. Troubled by the appointments Cleve-
land had made as governor to the state’s newly established railroad com-
mission, and outraged by Cleveland’s five-cent veto, he cast his lot with Butler.
Thurber’s public endorsement of Butler underscored his dissatisfaction
with Cleveland’s tenure as governor. Everything in Cleveland’s administra-
tion, in Thurber’s view, revealed that his sympathies were “with corpora-
tions, and not with the people”. “If the people want to be ruled by the wealthy crim-
inal classes, and if they desire to see the National Government prostituted
by the lusts of greedy and unscrupulous monopolists, let them vote for Gov.
Cleveland. If they want honest government and the abolition of monopoly
they will poll a heavy and independent vote, and leave Mr. Cleveland out in
the cold.” Only Butler, in Thurber’s view, had the fortitude to challenge the
powers that be: “The rights of labor and the opposition to the monopolies that
are gaining ground day by day will be the rallying cries of the coming cam-
paign, and the leading parties will learn when it is too late that the people
are tired of machine misgovernment. There will be a conference of Anti-
Monopolists later this month.” 27
Thurber freely conceded that he had voted the Republican ticket in the
past and that his business partner and brother, H. K. Thurber, backed Blaine
in 1884. But he would not. Unlike Butler, and in flagrant defiance of what
Thurber regarded as the country’s democratic heritage, each of the major party
candidates preferred to “associate with” and “serve the interests” of the “rich
and powerful few rather than the many who are poor and weak.” It was an
open secret, in Thurber’s view, that corporations had come to wield enormous
influence over many state governments and had proved equally successful in
gaining a foothold in Congress: “The condition of things is truly alarming,
for unless it be changed quickly and thoroughly, free institutions are doomed
to be subverted by an oligarchy resting upon a basis of money and of corpo-
rate power.” 28
Sterne was more measured. Neither Blaine nor Butler, in his view, deserved
the antimonopolists’ vote, since neither candidate had ever “done anything”
to “entitle him to the confidence of those who desire to see the growing mo-
opolies curbed.” A vote against Cleveland was a vote for Blaine, and Blaine’s
election would be a disaster for the antimonopolists: “[Blaine] dares not, if
he now would, offend the monopoly powers, who hold the secrets and con-
trolled his actions in the past.” 29
In the end, Butler’s campaign failed to live up to Thurber’s expectations
or Sterne’s fears. Despite a great deal of media hype, Butler polled far fewer
votes than expected; in fact, in New York he did considerably worse than
the Prohibition candidate, St. John. No one could deny that the working-
man had grievances, explained one Brooklyn journalist in urging his read-
ership not to bolt for Butler. Yet the electoral math was undeniable: any
vote for Butler was a vote for Blaine. And the proposition that the workers’
wrongs could be righted by putting Blaine in the White House, where he
would be surrounded by a “crew of monopolists, corruptionists, tax eaters,”
and “openly confessed robbers” who had profited from high tariffs, which the
journalist termed “surplus taxes,” was “too manifestly absurd” to be made to
“intelligent citizens.” 30
While Butler failed, the antimonopolists succeeded. By publicizing the challenge posed by the emerging corporate order, they popularized a morally charged reformist idiom that would shape American electoral politics for the next fifty years. "Like light, or air, or water," Thurber explained in a magazine article published in 1875—articulating a theme he would return to in the run-up to the election of 1884—steam and electricity were "God's gifts to the human race" and "should be possessed and enjoyed by everyone." To Thurber's chagrin, in 1884, as in 1875, their benefits continued to be monopolized by the few.

For the antimonopolists the crux of the problem lay in the failure of the country's lawmakers to establish the necessary regulatory mechanisms to constrain corporate power. The critical dividing line was not rich versus poor; rather, it was proprietary capitalism versus corporate capitalism. Thurber's own business career was a case in point. The political economy in which Thurber had built his business was dominated not by corporations such as the New York Central Railroad and Western Union, but rather by proprietorships such as Thurber, Whyland & Company. Thurber had built his fortune as a proprietary capitalist, in markets defined by competition, rather than as a corporate capitalist, in markets structured by administrative coordination. A proprietor might well become wealthy—for Thurber had nothing against wealth. This was to be applauded, since he had earned his "accumulations" under the "regulations of the laws of competition," which he could not fix by charging an arbitrary price. Corporations, in contrast, set their own prices, unconstrained by the discipline of the market. Even more disturbingly, they had no soul. And for Thurber, this was the nub of the matter. The fathers of the American Republic had abolished primogeniture in order to secure the country from the "evils" of the accumulation of "vast individual wealth" from "generation to generation." Corporations had discovered in their state-granted perpetual charters the "elixir of life": "A corporation can neither be hung nor sent to the penitentiary; that is to say, there is an entire absence of individual responsibility." 23

The New York antimonopolists took it for granted that the recent rise of railroad and telegraph corporations owed more to bribery and corruption than to technological imperatives and market incentives. Many journalists concurred. The exposure of secret dealings made for a good story, and few disclosures could top the revelation that a politician had lavished special privileges on a corporation in return for inside information, money, or some other valuable gift. No other issue—not the tariff, civil service reform, Civil War pensions, or the disenfranchisement of the ex-slaves—offered up as much dramatic potential. The principal fault line was not the people versus business, as a later generation of progressives would contend. Rather, it was business versus monopoly, a very different polarity. "Monopoly is not business," explained an editorialist in a New York City periodical shortly before the election, in a particularly pithy distillation of the conventional wisdom. On the contrary, monopoly "kills business":

The business of the country will probably have a good deal to say on election day. It is not the [money] princes who are to do the voting, but their somewhat disloyal subjects. It is not the monopolists, but the small dealers, the middle men, the men who used to make fair profits through the then established principle that opposition is the life of trade. Too much of the wealth of this country is in the hands of a score of men and too little in the hands of the people. That is the business issue that is to be settled now. 24

The likelihood that a public figure would find himself implicated in a corporate corruption scandal was, all things being equal, roughly proportional to the length of time he had held public office. And here Cleveland had the advantage over Blaine. Cleveland's public career in 1884 was still pretty much an open book. Though Cleveland had served one term as a sheriff in 1871, he had held his first major public office—as the mayor of Buffalo—a mere three years before he won the Democratic Party's presidential nomination. Blaine, in contrast, had served in Congress from 1863 until 1881, including a six-year stint as House Speaker during the Grant administration. By 1884 Blaine had generated a long paper trail that could easily be used against him. Particularly damning was a cache of personal letters that Blaine had written to an Arkansas railroad contractor during the former's tenure as Speaker. These letters documented the brazenness with which Blaine bartered political influence for personal financial gain, a character trait that would haunt him throughout the campaign.

Had this cache of letters never existed, it would not have been surprising had some journalist found occasion to invent them. After all, they fit perfectly with what had become by 1884 a widely agreed upon narrative about Blaine. Notwithstanding his formidable intelligence, charisma, and ambition, the ex-congressman turned presidential contender had personally profited during his tenure in Congress from the back-room deals he had struck with railroad
lyzes New York's election returns using modern statistical techniques, then it would seem plain that this interpretation is mistaken. Blaine, as it happens, Republican presidential candidate, James Garfield, had in 1880. In fact, Blaine Republicans did much to give the Cleveland-Blaine campaign its melodic tone, while mugwump journalists churned out reams of anti-Blaine editorials and a gallery of visually arresting cartoons.

The anti-Blaine Republicans would come to be known as mugwumps, an epithet popularized by a pro-Butler New York City journalist who did not intend it as a compliment. Before 1884, to call someone a mugwump was to identify him as a holier-than-thou old-stock Massachusetts blue blood—a self-regarding group whom Butler had long despised, and who more than returned the favor. Whatever its origin, the mugwump label quickly became a badge of pride as well as a factor in the campaign. The often fervid oratory of anti-Blaine Republicans did much to give the Cleveland-Blaine campaign its melodramatic tone, while mugwump journalists churned out reams of anti-Blaine editorials and a gallery of visually arresting cartoons.

Historians long credited the mugwumps' bolt with Blaine's defeat, a conclusion that echoed, and was largely based on, the mugwumps' own assessment. Cleveland won the pivotal state of New York by a whisker, and notwithstanding. Cleveland, meanwhile, polled more poorly than one would have expected of a Democratic candidate, given the composition of the electorate; indeed, he even failed to carry his hometown of Buffalo.25

If the mugwumps could not be credited with Blaine's defeat, then who could? If any single individual tipped the scales, it was almost certainly the Prohibition Party candidate, John St. John. Had Republican Party leaders prevailed upon St. John to take himself out of the running in New York, Blaine would have obtained many if not most of St. John's twenty-five thousand votes—far more than Blaine needed to win the state and the election.26

While the mugwumps failed to swing the election, they shaped its tone. Here, as in so many chapters in American electoral politics, the press took the lead. Well-educated, well-bred, and well-mannered, anti-Blaine Republican journalists penned countless editorials deploring Blaine's venality and extolling Cleveland's probity. For them, the election became, as it were, a morality play in which good and evil battled for the soul of America. In so doing, the mugwumps most emphatically did not strip American electoral politics of its raucous emotionality, as twentieth-century historians unfamiliar with the narrative conventions of the 1884 presidential campaign have mistakenly contended.27 On the contrary, the mugwumps invested it with a burning sense of moral passion.

To render antimonopoly compelling for the masses, journalists devised a novel storytelling genre that combined words and pictures in a straightforward dramatic narrative. In so doing, they prefigured the eventual transformation of the presidential campaign from a face-to-face ritual that mobilized thousands of partisans in spectacular torchlight parades to a mass-mediated spectacle in which a sedentary, though not necessarily passive, citizenry consumed the news in the relative privacy of their homes.

The journalistic innovations of the 1884 campaign figured prominently in its final hectic week. At the behest of party leaders, Blaine agreed to attend a fund-raising dinner on the last Wednesday before the election at Delmonico's, a swanky New York City restaurant. It was a high-risk gambit. In an age in which it was unusual for presidential candidates to openly campaign, it was even more unusual for them to appear at public events intended to fill the party's coffers. But Republican Party leaders were short of funds, and the gregarious Blaine obliged.

Most campaign funding in this period came not from corporations, but rather from wealthy individuals, and, most important of all—at least for the party in power—from the assessments that party leaders made from the salaries of government officials. To mount a credible election campaign in New
York City in the 1880s cost at least $100,000, a prodigious sum. Election Day expenses alone ran, at a minimum, to between $12,000 and $60,000, the cost of printing the ballots that party leaders distributed to their supporters so that they could register their preference at the polls. Government-printed ballots remained in the future: every ballot in 1884 had to be paid for by one of the parties with candidates in the field. This total did not include the cost of vote buying, a ubiquitous practice for both the major political parties, or the staffing of polling places, a task that also fell primarily to the parties, having yet to be absorbed by the state.

The guest list for Blaine's Delmonico's dinner read like a who's who of New York City's movers and shakers. Prominent among them was Jay Gould, a circumstance that seemed highly consequential to several of the journalists who reported on the event. Never before, or so one journalist claimed, had the city's most notorious financial buccaneer fraternized so brazenly with a presidential candidate; in fact, the journalist added, it was hard to recall more than two or three previous occasions during which Gould had dined in public.

The Delmonico's dinner received wide coverage in the press, almost all of it hostile. The fact that Gould would join Blaine for a fund- raiser less than one week before the voters went to the polls prompted anti-Blaine journalists to openly warn that the financier was brazenly undertaking to buy the election. Journalists remembered a similar banquet held a few years earlier at which Republican president Chester A. Arthur had reminded his audience about how, during the final frantic days of the 1880 presidential campaign, Blaine had toasted the "corruptionists" after the fact; the upcoming dinner would be the last-minute infusion in Indiana of cash, or what Arthur euphemistically called "soap," that clinched the state and the nation for the Republicans. Arthur had toasted the "corruptionists" after the fact; the upcoming dinner would allow business moguls intent on "defrauding the nation" by stealing the election. Five "money kings," including Gould, were alleged to have contributed $100,000 apiece to Blaine's campaign. While it is unlikely that sums even remotely this large ever found their way to Republican Party coffers, the specter of electoral corruption remained. Gould's speculative coups were legendary and had furnished the theme for countless newspaper stories as well as a spate of cartoons, while his uncanny ability to predict the future movement of a particular stock had impressed his fellow traders with a combination of admiration, envy, and horror. How could it be, one reporter asked rhetorically, that so many respectable merchants permitted themselves to be seen in the company of such a moral reprobate? Why Gould had agreed to
dine in public with Blaine seemed obvious. He stood to reap a rich financial reward from Blaine's election. Yet why so many honest businessmen had agreed to "join hands" with Gould by following his example was one of the "mysteries of the age." 28

The single most effective piece of journalism to come out of the Delmonico's dinner was a rudimentary black-and-white cartoon drawn by Walt McDougall and engraved by Valerian Gribayedoff that ran on page one of the pro-Cleveland New York World on the day after the event (see Figure 3). Entitled "The Royal Feast of Belshazzar Blaine and the Money Kings," the cartoon features Blaine and Gould at the head of a table of bigwigs, including at least one businessman—William H. Vanderbilt—who had not actually been present at the dinner. The confusion over the guest list may stem from the circumstances of the cartoon's composition. McDougall was reputed to have unsuccessfully pitched a similar idea earlier that summer to the editors of the mugwump humor magazine Puck. Following the Delmonico's dinner, he and Gribayedoff may simply have dusted off his mockup, updated it, and readied it for the next day's edition.

The Belshazzar's feast conceit was hardly new. The "royal feast" to which it referred was an allusion to a legendary banquet in the biblical Book of Daniel in which the soon-to-be-deposed Babylonian tyrant Belshazzar is horrified to watch as a prophecy announcing his imminent doom suddenly materializes in plain view in his banquet hall. Yet McDougall and Gribayedoff gave it a distinctive twist. As it happens, a considerably more polished anti-Blaine cartoon by the renowned cartoonist Joseph Keppler on a similar theme had run several months earlier in Puck (see Figure 4). In Keppler's cartoon—entitled, appropriately enough, "The Writing on the Wall"—Blaine-the-King covered behind a copy of the pro-Blaine New York Daily Tribune so that he might shield his eyes from the prophetic writing on the wall: "Republican Revolt." In the World cartoon, in contrast, Blaine is confronted not by his Republican detractors, but rather by a humble workingman and his wife and child, who silently implore the monopolists to explain why they have been denied a place at the table.

"The Royal Feast of Belshazzar Blaine and the Money Kings" and "Writing on the Wall" were but two of the many hard-hitting anti-Blaine cartoons to be featured in the 1884 campaign. While these cartoons differed in many particulars, they had two things in common. Most obviously, they underscored Blaine's lack of moral fitness for the presidency, often, as in the World cartoon, by emphasizing his subservience to "money kings" like Gould. Harper's
Markets, Morality, and the Media 91

Figure 4. "The Writing on the Wall," Puck 15 (June 18, 1885): 199. This artful color lithograph by the celebrated political cartoonist Joseph Keppler dramatized the "revolt" within the Republican Party provoked by Blaine's nomination. Try as he might, Blaine and his running mate found it impossible to paper over this rift by hiding behind the favorable coverage in the New York Daily Tribune, a newspaper that remained loyal to the Republican Party. Like "The Royal Feast of Belshazzar Blaine," it was based on a biblical story. Keppler assumed that his readership would make the connection and recall that the writing on the wall—"Republican Revolt"—was a harbinger of doom.

Weekly cartoonist Thomas Nast proved particularly effective at exploring this dimension of Blaine's candidacy. In one cartoon, for example, Nast depicted Blaine as a gifted magician who relied on sleight of hand to fool the voters into regarding him as morally fit; in another Blaine became a medieval knight chasing after the "public purse" in the "railroad ring." A second theme that these cartoons had in common was their marked pro-proprietary, anticorporate bias. Corporate kingpins like Vanderbilt and Gould were proprietary capitalists gone to seed. At their most harmless, they clogged the channels of commerce; at their worst, they were actively conspiring to destroy the Republic.

By far the most artful and elaborate of the anti-Blaine political cartoons ran in Puck, a weekly mass circulation humor magazine that featured three
full-page multicolor chromolithographs in every issue. While Puck cartoonists caricatured Blaine in various unflattering ways, the conceit that made the greatest hit with audiences was the transmogrification of the candidate into the tattooed man, a sideshow attraction at a “dime museum” whom the promoter had put on display to satisfy the curiosity of spectators eager to learn about his sordid past.

The tattooed man had by 1884 become a familiar figure in popular culture. The original was a sideshow attraction whose body a savage oriental tribe had covered from head to foot with images of birds, fishes, and snakes. Like the body of the man in the sideshow attraction, Blaine’s had been festooned with tattoos; unlike the tattooed man, however—at least, if one believed the showman’s hype—Blaine’s tattoos were self-inflicted and consisted of a catalogue of his dubious financial dealings.

Political cartoons, yet almost never do they recognize them for what they were: a highly effective and largely novel medium for mobilizing public sentiment and articulating shared values. The political cartoon antedated 1884. Yet rarely before had it polarizing—and, indeed, “cartoon-like”—archetypes: the “robber baron,” the “politico.” These archetypes would live on long after the issues that agitated contemporaries in 1884 had been forgotten. Indeed, to a remarkable degree they would remain staples of journalistic discourse about government-business relations for the next fifty years, and have been by no means entirely supplanted as a journalistic convention even today.

The influence of the political cartoon on the 1884 presidential campaign can partly be explained by recent technical advances in high-speed printing. The mechanical reproduction of woodcuts was, of course, old hat. Prior to the 1880s, however, their preparation ordinarily took at least two full days, making it hard for cartoonists to respond to rapidly unfolding events. “The Royal Feast of Belshazzar Blaine and the Money Kings,” in contrast, was ready for the press in a mere two hours and would hit the newsstands the following day. Technical advances hastened the demand for new images, further increasing their proliferation. In 1880 only a handful of newspapers featured political cartoons with any regularity; a decade later, or so Gribayedoff would boast in a retrospective essay on the rise of “pictorial journalism,” the total had increased to over five thousand. Gribayedoff exaggerated. Not until the opening decades of the twentieth century would the political cartoon become a ubiquitous feature of the popular press. Even so, he was on the mark in underscoring the rapidly growing presence of the political cartoon in newspapers large and small, and not merely in trailblazers like the New York World.

Chromolithography was an even more fundamental technical advance. The mass publication of multicolor images was in 1884 less than a decade old, and the 1884 presidential election was the first in which two rival New York City-based humor magazines, Puck and Judge, ran dueling cartoons to boost rival candidates.

The highly conspicuous role that the political cartoon would play in the 1884 presidential campaign is a pointed rejoinder to the oft-voiced contention that the mugwumps had a principled aversion to spectacle. Puck was a mugwump periodical; too was Harper’s Weekly. Instead of taking the passion out of electoral politics, the mugwumps injected into the presidential campaign an insistent moralism, rooted in the worldview of proprietary capitalism, which translated often recondite issues into visually compelling imagery that fascinated contemporaries and remains today an enduring legacy of an often forgotten election.

* * *

The 1884 presidential election had enduring consequences not only for American journalism, but also for the American state. With Cleveland’s victory, the Republican Party lost control of the administrative apparatus of the federal government for the first time since 1861, a significant shift that, paradoxically—since parties in power are ordinarily loath to give up the patronage that is at their disposal—accelerated the emergence of a permanent, nonpartisan civil service in several federal agencies, including the Treasury Department and the Post Office Department. Now that the Democrats were in power, they too had an incentive to ensure that their supporters would not be dismissed from office should the Republicans defeat them the next time around. For if there was one structural constant in U.S. national politics, it was the inevitability of the next presidential election and the challenge that an electoral defeat would pose for party leaders intent on retaining control of the levers of power. By expanding the number of federal officeholders covered by the Pendleton Act (1883) and, even more importantly, by championing the virtues of frugal, honest, and impartial public service, Cleveland helped lay the foundation not only for the ICC, established during his presidency, but also for the emergence in later decades of the administrative apparatus of the modern regulatory state.
"Liberty, Equality, Honesty!" trumpeted the headline for a page one cartoon by Walt McDougall that the World ran immediately following Cleveland's victory in 1884 (see Figure 5). McDougall, of course, was hardly impartial. Yet by depicting Cleveland as a morally upstanding statesman who had slain the "monopoly" serpent, he cast the spotlight on a dimension of the president's victory that was evident to contemporaries, yet that would be later forgotten. In the popular imagination, Blaine had much closer ties than Cleveland to the emerging corporate order, making Cleveland's victory a defeat not only for a political party, but also for the developmental vision that the Republican Party embraced. To make sure that no one missed the point, McDougall took pains, in the caption accompanying his cartoon, to spell out the moral: "The Government Again Belongs to the People and Not to Corrupt Monopolists." 39

For most Americans in 1884, the corporation remained an exotic bit of flotsam in a sea of proprietorships. It was, thus, perhaps not surprising that the antimonopoly critique spearheaded by Thurber and Sterne would shape the legislative agenda of the Democratic Party's congressional leadership during the first Cleveland administration. The reason was simple. New York remained a swing state in the 1888 presidential election, elevating the importance of voting blocs that were not firmly committed to a particular political party. Democratic Party leaders well understood the extent to which their party's future remained beholden to highly motivated, if numerically small, voting blocs such as the New York antimonopolists, and proceeded accordingly. Thurber and Sterne each received an invitation to testify before Congress on the merits of commission regulation, and their voices were heard. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 led to the establishment of the ICC, a federal agency with a broad mandate to ensure that railroad corporations did not abuse their power over rate setting. The ICC is sometimes assumed to have been a new departure. In fact, it built on several decades' experience at the state level and was directly modeled on the New York railroad commission for which Thurber and Sterne had lobbied since 1879, and which the New York legislature had enacted in 1882.

The solicitude of Democratic Party leaders for a permanent railroad commission represented a major compromise within the party's ranks. The Democratic congressional delegation in the 1880s included a large and vocal bloc of southerners who opposed the establishment of a permanent railroad commission as a dangerous augmentation in the administrative capacity of the federal government. As an alternative, they endorsed a detailed, rigid, and

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Figure 5. "Liberty, Equality, Honesty!" New York World, November 8, 1884. Cleveland's victory in the election of 1884 was hailed in the Democratic press as a triumph of moral probity and equal rights over moral turpitude and special privilege. In this front-page New York World cartoon, Cleveland has just slain the "monopoly" serpent, saving the Republic from the corrupt alliance between business and government that antimonopolists deplored. Blaine's defeat was a setback for the Republicans' developmental agenda, which disparaged antimonopoly and idealized the emerging corporate order.
highly punitive railroad law championed by Texas Democrat John H. Reagan that mandated heavy criminal and civil penalties for the violation of its provisions and left its adjudication to the state courts. In the end, however, the New Yorkers prevailed and Reagan lost.

Mindful of the imperatives of electoral politics, Democratic Party leaders subordinated a proposal that had broad support among the party’s own congressional delegation to a minority proposal championed by the New York antimonopolists. The only significant concession that party leaders made to Reagan concerned the ban on pooling—and even here, it was the exception that proved the rule. On this issue, the New York antimonopolists were divided: Sterne favored pooling; Thurber did not.

Reagan’s defeat is sometimes lamented by political scientists sympathetic to the anticommission, small-government antimonopolism that Democratic Party leaders rejected. Yet it is worth recalling that Reagan’s proposal presupposed the same states’ rights orthodoxy that had hastened the disenfranchisement of thousands of African Americans and that would remain an impediment to social justice until it would be finally be overturned by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Reagan’s favored regulatory mechanism—the state courts—was, after all, the same institution that had proved so effective in maintaining the racial status quo. For southern antimonopolists, any augmentation in the administrative capacity of the federal government raised the terrifying prospect that future lawmakers might threaten the Democratic Party’s one-party monopoly in the South.

Blaine’s defeat in 1884 was in no sense a rejection of the emerging corporate order. Yet it does raise questions about the commonplace characterization of the post–Civil War decades as a so-called Gilded Age. The “Gilded Age” catchphrase assumes that the period was unusually sordid, selfish, and corrupt. Yet was it? The phrase itself would not become widely used until after World War I, long after the period had ended. By that time, the antimonopoly political economy of Thurber and Sterne had been supplanted by the progressive political economy of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. In the antimonopoly political economy, personal morality remained a core value. In the progressive political economy, in contrast, personal morality had given way to the moral claims of technological imperatives and economic growth. Might then it not be time to relegate the Gilded Age label to the historiographical scrap heap and to acknowledge the extent to which the 1880s were, in ways that have too often been underappreciated, an age of reform?
30. Two recent accounts of the 1860 campaign are Egerton, Year of Meteors, and Michael S. Green, Lincoln and the Election of 1860 (DeKalb: Southern Illinois University Press, 2011).
33. Campaign Plain Dealer and Popular Sovereignty Advocate, October 17, 1860.
34. Quoted in Egerton, Year of Meteors, 187. See also Robert McKnight, Mission of Republicans: Sectionalism of Modern Democratic Party; Speech of Robert McKnight of Pennsylvania, Delivered in the House of Representatives, April 24, 1860 (New York: Republican National Committee, 1860).
35. This point is made in correspondence between Manton Marble and his friend, the lieutenant governor of Rhode Island, Samuel G. Arnold. See, for example, Arnold to Marble, March 20, 1861, Marble Papers, and Library of Congress.
45. The call for the Republican Party convention in 1860 had gone out not just to "pure" Republicans, as the radicals had wanted, but also to "members of the People's Party of Pennsylvania and of the Opposition Party of New Jersey, and all others who are willing to co-operate." Proceedings of the Republican National Convention, Held at Chicago, May 16, 17 and 18, 1860 (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons and Co., 1860), 1.
52. The partisan allegiance of workers in the late nineteenth-century industrial city should not be taken for granted. It would be a mistake, for example, to assume that all things being equal, workers could be expected to vote the Democratic ticket. Like businessmen, workers had a vested interest in high tariffs, a winning issue for Republicans. In addition, many were Irish Catholics, which, or so party leaders assumed, might predispose them to vote for Baine. Though Baine was a Protestant, his mother was a devout Irish Catholic, a fact widely reported in the immigrant press.


26. Pocock, "Wet or Dry?", 174–90.


29. "The Press on the Dinner," *New York Herald*, November 1, 1884, 4. "This is the first time in the history of any party," opined one journalist, "that Jay Gould has openly lent his influence for a particular candidate, and it is only the second or third time that he has ventured to appear at a public banquet."


5. Anglophobia in Nineteenth-Century Elections, Politics, and Diplomacy


21. The classic example here is John Quincy Adams’s oration on the Fourth of July, 1821. See *Niles’ Weekly Register*, July 21, 1821.


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