Regulatory Harmonisation:
The Singapore Issues

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Introduction

The inclusion of a domestic regulatory agenda in WTO negotiations represents a departure from the traditional ‘market access’ focus of the GATT rounds. The national regulations embodied in the ‘Singapore issues’ have become more prominent as the liberalisation of traditional trade protection instruments has highlighted the trade impact of remaining differences in national regulatory regimes.

Efforts to harmonise national regulation have commenced in competition law, FDI policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation. It has been argued that these issues are not priorities for low-income countries and should not form part of a so-called ‘development round’. In particular, there is significant opposition from developing countries. In the space of a month from early June 2003, 77 developing countries, including over half the WTO membership, made public statements urging that new negotiations should not be launched as part of the Doha Round.¹

Several developing countries see the Singapore issues as incursions into their national sovereignty that are not justified by the benefits they bring. Multilateral regulatory disciplines hold the spectre of preventing individual governments from pursuing development policies based on their own national priorities and problems.

In addition there are concerns that the initiatives based on the Singapore issues may impose a large burden on the administrative capacity of developing countries. There are significant costs associated with both the creation and enforcement of new regimes in competition policy, investment regulations, and trade and customs procedures. Moreover the required institutional capacity and human expertise may not be available in developing countries. In OECD countries these critical inputs developed gradually over a long period of time. These considerations suggest that the payoff to requiring WTO members to rapidly implement the Singapore proposals may not be large relative to its costs. Moreover it suggests that any reform will require significant technical assistance from developed countries.

Finally there is broad concern that the Doha agenda may be overloaded. The Doha Round has an ambitious work program involving multilateral negotiations on many issues. The inclusion of complex and controversial issues may slow progress on more fruitful initiatives.

As the debate on the Singapore issues evolved, two other issues became more apparent. The first is that many of the Singapore issues involved a detailed knowledge of complex public policy issues that went well beyond the competence of trade ministers to negotiate. The outcomes, accordingly, might not be good even for the developed countries. There was a resonance with what had happened in the intellectual property negotiations (TRIPS) in the Uruguay Round, where both the Council of Economic Advisers and the Office of Science and Technology Policy raised serious concerns, to which the U.S. Trade Representatives paid little attention in the negotiations. The issues that were being debated under “Competition” did not attempt to unify treatment of predatory pricing between domestic and foreign firms, a natural part of any attempt at developing a uniform competition code. The United States put on the agenda in the discussion of Investment highly controversial issues involving capital market liberalization, which almost contemporaneously, the IMF had revisited.

This brings us to the second concern: some of the proposals would have actually been adverse to the development of the developing countries. They went against the entire spirit of the Development Round. Such was the case, for instance, with proposals for full capital market liberalization.

In the context of these concerns, we consider four criteria for prioritizing an issue in the current round of negotiations.

- Is WTO justified by returns to international collective action that are higher than returns to unilateral action, i.e., are there spillovers or externalities which justify multilateralism?

- Are the benefits of the initiative large relative to other proposals? Are the benefits shared between developing and developed countries?

- Are the costs of implementation small relative to the benefits of the initiative?

- To what extent do multilateral commitments impede national development strategies?

Using these criteria, this note analyses the merits of including the Singapore issues in the Doha Development Round. The merits are certainly not uniform across the four issues or even across the different initiatives within each issue.

Significantly more work needs to be done to quantify the potential benefits and costs flowing from the Singapore issues. Indeed the paucity of authoritative studies in this area is in itself a reason to advocate caution. Therefore the conclusions of this note are preliminary.
Nonetheless the empirical survey below suggests that the current focus of the WTO's regulatory harmonisation agenda is misdirected in some areas.

- In the competition and investment arenas, the WTO should move away from imposing uniformity on manifestly different countries and focus its attention on areas where externalities generate returns to multilateralism.

In investment policy, reducing the ‘race to the bottom’ incentive war would be a useful initiative.

Similarly, competition policy initiatives should include anti-trust action against cartels which raise prices for developing countries, and a mechanism for analysing the global effects of merger decisions in developed countries.

- In government procurement and trade facilitation, progress should be made through national efforts aided by technical assistance, rather than through imposing additional obligations in the WTO.

21 Investment

At the Singapore WTO Ministerial meeting in 1996, members agreed to form a working group to study the relationship between trade and investment. Since then, some developed countries have attempted to move towards a negotiated investment agreement within the WTO.

The proponents of such an agreement seek internationally binding rules that would minimise the conditions and regulations on foreign investors entering or operating in host countries and to grant them national treatment. This would involve the removal of performance requirements and the adoption of a range of investor rights.

However most developing countries were reluctant to agree to this because several believed that an investment regime was inappropriate within a trade organisation. Others had concerns about the loss of autonomy over investment policy and the consequent limitations on industrial policy options. Also there were broadly expressed concerns that an investment agreement would divert time and human resources from other vital work in the WTO.
2.1.1.1 Potential benefits and costs from an investment agreement

The fundamental premise of the argument in favor of a multilateral investment agreement is that it will increase investment flows to developing countries. An agreement which improves investor protections may stimulate domestic investment and alleviate the concerns of foreign investors.

However there are several reasons to be cautious about the responsiveness of investment to new multilateral protections. First, the current absence of multilateral investment disciplines and the failure of previous attempts to establish them (such as the OECD’s ill-fated Multilateral Agreement on Investment, MAI) has not deterred foreign investment. Foreign direct investment has grown rapidly over the last decade, outpacing both trade and output growth.

Additionally, the absence of a multilateral agreement has not prevented substantial unilateral liberalisation of investment regimes. UNCTAD reports that between 1991 and 2001, a total of 1,393 changes were made to national investment regulations. More than 90 per cent of these were liberalising changes. Figure 1 shows that in 2001, over 200 regulatory changes were made in 71 countries, only 6 per cent of which were restrictive changes. In this environment there does not seem to be a compelling rationale to force national governments to adopt a uniform multilateral agreement. Idiosyncratic national regimes are sensitive to national development propierties and can be tailored to existing institutional arrangements to minimise implementation costs.

Figure 1. Liberalisation of investment regimes

A final reason for caution comes from the historical experience of investment treaties in generating increased investment flows. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) surged in the 1990s to more than 2,000 in 2001. There has been significant activity between developing countries, which accounted for 42 per cent of new BITs in 2001 (UNCTAD 2002). BITs proscribe a range of investment protections that often go further than many of the realistic proposals before the WTO. Yet there is not much evidence that the signing of bilateral investment treaties increases the flow of investment. UNCTAD’s (1998) study found no relationship between the level of FDI and the number of BITs signed by host countries. A more comprehensive study by Hallward-Driemeier (2002) looked at the bilateral flows of OECD countries to 31 developing countries over 20 years. After accounting for trends, they found little evidence that BITs increased investment to developing countries. More research needs to be done on the effects of investment treaties on investment volume, but the existing evidence suggests that the benefits of additional treaties may be small.

The most serious concern, nationalization of foreign investments, has already been addressed at both the national and international level, though national and multilateral agencies (MIGA, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Association, is part of the World Bank Group) providing guarantees against such confiscations of property.

Figure 2. Bilateral investment treaties

Growth of BITs in developing countries
(number of treaties in decade)

The difficulty is that in providing further protections, even bilateral agreements negotiated by trade ministers often go too far, in retrospect intruding on national sovereignty in unacceptable ways. The problem is that it often takes years before the full import is discovered, and revising the treaty is difficult and tendentious. The infamous Chapter 11 of NAFTA provides a compelling case in point, where foreign investors were given more rights than domestics (e.g. for compensation for changes in market values as a result of even fully justified regulations, in what are called regulatory takings). This is arguably having an adverse effect in the development of important regulations in areas like the environment and consumer protection. Even judicial protections, such as punitive damages, have come under question.

The attempt to impose restrictions on capital market liberalization illustrates the dangers of these non-trade related investment agreements. (Trade related capital flows are already covered within current IMF agreements.) There is compelling evidence that full liberalization has little effect on economic growth, but exposes countries to increased instability, a fact recognized even by the IMF in its recent Board paper.2

For these reasons, the current direction of WTO negotiations on investment disciplines seems to offer few advantages to developing countries. An international agreement on investment rules of the type currently being proposed is ultimately designed to maximise foreign investors rights whilst minimising the authority of governments in developing countries. Instead the WTO should focus on improving the investment environment in ways which strengthens the bargaining position of governments vis-à-vis foreign investors rather than weakening it.

### 2.21.2 Priorities

One area in which there is clear cause for multilateral action is the reduction of ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ investment incentive competition for foreign investment. Since the mid-1980s, the efforts of national and sub-national levels of government to attract direct investment to their jurisdictions have increased considerably (Charlton 2003).

Political pressure on governments to be seen as ‘job winners’ push policy makers to play a race-to-the-bottom game. Oxfam (2000) estimates that developing countries lose $35 billion per year due to a competitive

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2 See also the forthcoming IPD volume on Capital Market Liberalization and Macroeconomic Stability (Oxford University Press)
pressure to reduce corporate tax rates combined with the transfer of profits out of developing countries to low-tax environments.

The potential negative consequences of investment competition are particularly acute in developing nations. The risk of “overbidding” is exacerbated by institutional weaknesses, poor cost-benefit analysis and in some cases, corruption. Moreover, the potential consequences of excessively generous incentives might be increased in those developing nations whose fiscal positions are already weak.

Agreements to limit the size of incentives seem to be the most obvious approach to pursue within a multilateral framework. The European Union provides a good example of the kind of approach to policy coordination that might benefit developing countries. The EU has been operating state aid guidelines now for several decades. Although grants to foreign direct investment are not explicitly targeted by Commission policy, in practice they are one of the main forms of state aid regulated by it. The EU takes the general view that state aid is incompatible with the common market. The definition of state aid clearly encompasses traditional instruments of investment attraction. Indeed the European Commission classifies state aid as including i) grants to firms; ii) loans and guarantees; iii) tax exemptions; and iv) infrastructure projects benefiting identifiable end-users. The European Commission claims some success in reducing subsidies in the EU. There is evidence that the Commission has used its guidelines to effectively restrict incentives in some areas. For example, before the introduction of guidelines for the support of SMEs, it was not rare to find state-aid grants of as much as 20 per cent of an investment project. Under the new framework, the fixed maximums are 7.5 per cent (medium-sized enterprises) and 15 per cent (small enterprises).³

### 32 Competition policy

Strong competition policy backed by clearly enforced laws is beneficial to developing countries and should be encouraged in international forums. There is a clear worry that the benefits of a liberal trade regime would be undermined by domestic or international monopolies and cartels. Liberalization might largely simply transfer rents that had been accruing

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³ An example from the Czech Republic provides an illustration of how the Commission uses its power in practice. The Czech Republic planned to offer subsidies to the Volkswagen unit Skoda for an engine plant at Mlada Boleslav. After a year of negotiations with the EU, the government agreed to slash tax breaks and grants that it was offering to Skoda from $120 million to $22 million.
to the government to private sector monopolies, and not lead to lower consumer prices. However competition policy disciplines as envisaged by the proponents of a WTO agreement may impinge on the ability of each country to choose a competition policy model which is suitable for its own development priorities, and the proposals under discussion do not address the most important concerns of developing countries. For example, the EU proposal to ensure competition in local markets for foreign firms, would affect the needed flexibility for the country to have its own idiosyncratic competition policy regime.

What is required is a paradigm to view competition from a development perspective. What is needed is to ensure that developing country producers receive even handed treatment with domestic producers (which they currently do not), and to ensure that developing country consumers can be protected from non-competitive actions by global anti-trust action, including anti-trust actions centered in the developed countries. National competition law and policy should complement other national development objectives (such as industrial development). Moreover it should not hinder government efforts to minimise adjustment costs resulting from structural change generated by WTO driven liberalisation in other areas. Some sensitive industrial sectors may require protection from advanced foreign firms for the time it takes to create local capacity. Moreover, it needs to be recognized that the legal frameworks that have been developed in the advanced industrial countries to promote competition are costly to administer. Early on, there was an awareness of the risk of politicization of competition policy, providing one of the rationale for private enforcement actions. There is some reason to believe that those fears have been justified, and when incorporated within trade regime, there is often more a concern for the promotion of the interests of the country’s corporations, than on the well-being of consumers. Thus, a failure of a country’s firms to do well in a market will be blamed on anti-competitive actions; but the attempt by a foreign government to protect its citizens from anti-competitive practices of one’s own company will be viewed with suspicions. But because of their costs, private enforcement actions are often not feasible for those harmed in developing countries.

For these reasons, some of the conventional models of competition which operate in developed countries may not be appropriate for a developing country. In the discussion below, we identify some policies that might redress the imbalance.

3.4.2.1 Potential gains and costs

The theoretical benefits from the maintenance of competition are clear. Indeed, the benefits that are associated with free markets are only
enjoyed if those markets are competitive. As we suggested before, trade liberalization and privatization will only deliver on their promised benefits in a competitive environment. But imperfections in competition are pervasive, especially in developing countries whether markets are often small. There is an abiding concern that a large multinational can use its economic power to become dominant in certain markets in developing countries—these companies often have sales that exceed the GDP of the economy.

While the case for strong competition policy is clear, there is regrettably only a small amount of evidence on the welfare effects of competition policy agreements. Kee and Hoekman (2002) investigate the impact of competition law on estimated industry mark-ups over cost. They use time series panel data from 28 industries in 42 countries. They conclude that antitrust legislation has no individual impact on the size of mark-ups. It does indirectly affect prices by reducing the marginal effect of imports. By contrast they conclude that imports and lower entry barriers are associated with a larger payoff, a result supported by several studies (Djankov et. al, 2002; Hoekman, Kee and Olarreaga, 2001; Vandenbussche, 2000).

By contrast, Clarke and Evenett (2003) show that in Latin America, Asia and Western Europe, jurisdictions that did not enforce their cartel laws suffered greater overcharges than those nations that actively enforced their cartel laws.

New competition regimes are associated with large implementation costs. Competition law is technical and requires institutional skills and resources that are in short supply in many developing countries. In addition competition law enforcement is expensive. OECD and national sources indicate that the annual budget of the antitrust office in OECD countries is in the $15-50 million plus range. For developing countries with enforcement agencies the budgets are lower but still significant (Hoekman and Mavroidis 2002).

### 3.22.2 Priorities

Discussions under “competition” center around two issues: preventing monopolization and anti-competitive practices; and preventing governments from acting in ways which give an “unfair” competitive advantage to their firms, either by imposing requirements on foreign firms or by subsidizing their own firms.

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4 For example, the costs of antitrust offices are large in Mexico ($14m), Poland ($4.1m), Argentina (1.4m), Hungary ($2m).
Under the first rubric, preventing monopolarization and anti-competitive practices, there are two important reforms. The first is the adoption of a single standard for predatory anti-competitive behaviour between domestic and foreign firms. There is a large literature on the cost of dumping laws, and on their inequities.

Another priority should be to protect purchasers in developing countries from paying excessively high prices as a result of monopolies and especially international cartels. National competition policy may ignore collusion by domestic firms to raise prices in export markets. Alternatively, developing countries without the resources to effectively enforce competition policy on international firms may suffer from international cartels. There is a small amount of (mainly informal) evidence on the effects of international cartels on developing countries. Levenstein, Oswald and Suslow (2002) analyse 16 goods whose supply was found to be internationally cartelised by American or European firms. They found that in 1997 developing countries’ purchased $36.4bn of goods from a set of 10 industries that had seen a price fixing conspiracy in the 1990s. This amounts to 2.9 per cent of developing countries total imports which may have been subject to collusive price fixing by firms from developed countries. It has been estimated that cartels in developed countries have cost consumers in developing countries up to $7bn in the 1990s. Some of the worst offending cartels have been found in the international maritime transport industry. Such cartels are often approved by national competition authorities but have been found to lead to higher prices for consumers. Fink et al. (2001) estimates that collusive practices in the maritime transport industry have cost consumers in the US alone up to $2.1bn. If developing countries were to save the same proportion of their shipping costs the savings would be $2.3bn.

Figure 3. Imports affected by cartels

Total imports of 12 products where cartels have been proved to exist.

In the mid-1990s, as moved from Communism to a market economy, one of the few goods that it could easily sell internationally was aluminium, but its attempts to enter Western markets were hampered as American aluminium companies put pressure on the United States to create an international aluminium cartel that would strictly limit the extent to which they could enter Western markets and which would thereby maintain international prices at high levels. This is a case in which both Russia and consumers around the world were injured. But those affected had no recourse to anti-trust laws, especially since governments were involved in the very creation of the cartel.

This suggests there might be potential gains from multilateral action to ban export cartels. One option would be to allow governments of detrimentally affected countries to use the court system of OECD countries to prosecute offending firms. Further, adversely affected parties (including governments acting on behalf of citizens) should be allowed to be a plaintiff in civil actions in the courts of the advanced industrial countries, and there should be a provision for class action suits, with flexible standards for class certification, which would in particular encourage purchasers of products in foreign countries to be able to join in with other purchasers in the advanced industrial countries. Given the limited resources of developing countries and the high costs of suits, assistance from OECD countries would be desirable. Hoekman and Mavroidis (2002) suggest the creation of a 'special prosecutor' within the WTO with authority to bring cases in the relevant jurisdiction on behalf of developing country consumers.

Merger policy is another area in which national competition policies may have international spillover effects. The concern is that nationalistic approval criteria may allow mergers between domestic firms even when the global welfare effect is negative, so long as the welfare benefits within the country are positive. If these firms have a larger combined market share in some smaller foreign markets than they do in the domestic market, a merger may be domestically acceptable but globally undesirable.

Both from the perspective of developed and less developed countries, we worry about attempts to harmonize national competition policies, for in
doing so, there is a real risk that the “least common denominator” will be accepted, that is, one which will provide the least protection for consumers. Even a movement towards a common framework, a common framework which inevitably would be close to a “least common denominator,” would risk not recognizing the differential circumstances of the developing countries and encouraging governments to move towards this low standard. This is especially the case because corporate interests tend to be far better represented in trade negotiations than consumer interests.

It would be better to use the discussion of Competition issues within the WTO to encourage countries to develop high competition standards, and to recognize some of the ways that countries may legitimately do so. For instance, the United States has, on several occasions, recognized that concerns about competition “trump” intellectual property; standard intellectual property protections, which give temporary monopoly power, have been circumscribed, when they lead to excessive monopolization of particular markets. This is a principle which should more universally be recognized; it should be made explicitly clear that such actions are not a violation of TRIPs. As a second example, per se rules may be easier and less costly to enforce than “rule of reason” judgments, requiring the careful balancing of costs and benefits of certain potentially anti-competitive practices. Strong “per se” rules (such as limiting the size of the country’s market that any firm may have) should be allowed, even if they have the effect of limiting entry by international firms (for whom, say, entry into a market would only be worthwhile if they had a dominant position.)

On the second rubric, actions taken to give a competitive advantage to one’s own firms (or competitive disadvantage to foreign firms), the development concerns should be given priority, and actions which have arguably a development objective should be allowed, at least on a medium term basis, even if they put foreign firms at a disadvantage. Inevitably, firms from developing and developed countries are in different circumstances; each has some advantages over the others. Firms from advanced industrial countries often have access to lower cost of capital and to government financed research, especially by-products of the huge expenditures on defense. Local firms may have more local knowledge, and that may give them a competitive advantage. Inevitably, there will be some ambiguity in what is meant by “levelling the playing field.” But approaching the issue from the development perspective provides some guidance into what kinds of policies should be allowed by developing countries. Developing countries should be allowed to provide capital to domestic firms at “reasonable terms,” which may be significantly below the very high interest rates that are imposed on them as a condition of IMF loans, or which they feel they have to pay to prevent a currency crisis. Imposing “community reinvestment act” lending requirements on banks, to lend a certain fraction of their money
to particular groups, e.g. underserved minorities, or small or medium size domestic enterprises, is a legitimate restriction. Giving preferences to small and medium sized enterprises for government contracts (see below) should also be legitimate, even if in doing so, multinational firms are in effect discriminated against. At the same time, the standards for judging whether the provision of infrastructure which, in the first instance, may be directed at a particular enterprise, is a subsidy or not should be looked at from different perspectives for a developing country than for a developed country. While advanced industrial countries have long been critical of local content requirements, such requirements may in fact facilitate developmental objectives.

## 4.3 Government Procurement

Government purchases of goods and services are a significant fraction of world GDP. Recent analysis by the OECD indicates that total central government expenditures of OECD countries was almost $2 trillion in 1998. In developing countries this figure was $0.3 trillion – equal to six times the total annual multilateral and bilateral aid currently given to developing countries (Evenett 2003).

In an attempt to harness this part of the international economy, several WTO members signed the ‘plurilateral’ (only binding to those members that choose to sign) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) at the Uruguay Round in 1994. One of the GPA’s primary long-term objectives is to ensure that government decisions to purchase goods and services do not depend on the location of production or the affiliation of the supplier.

Many developed countries, principally the US and the EU would like to see the GPA develop into a multilateral agreement which in the first stage draws all members into an agreement on transparency; and in the second stage extends the scope to due process and national treatment for foreign firms.

### 4.13.1 Potential benefits and costs

Estimates of the value of a broad multilateral procurement agreement (encompassing both transparency and non-discrimination) depend on the

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6 This figure excludes military expenditure and the payment of state employees.
size of the government procurement market, the size of preference margins extended to domestic suppliers, and the general equilibrium gains and losses derived from the elimination of these preferences.

As described above, government procurement accounts for an average of about 10-15 per cent of GDP for developed countries and as much as 20 per cent of GDP for developing countries. National domestic preference margins are estimated by analysing either national policies or the price wedges that explain government purchasing choices. Francois, Palmeter and Nelson (1997) estimate the margin of preference for OECD countries to be in the 13-50 per cent range.

However the proportion of government purchases whose price is inflated by preferential treatment may not be large. In a procurement auction, preferences only raise prices when domestic bidders are not the lowest but are within the preference margin, or when the domestic bidders are the lowest but there is only one of them (in which case the domestic bidder raises its sell price to the lowest foreign price plus the preference margin). However in other circumstances a preferential procurement policy may actually reduce procurement costs. McAfee and McMillan (1989) show that preferential policies can cause foreign suppliers to reduce their sell price so as to bid under the domestic firms receiving preferences.

Government procurement policies have important economic and social roles in developing countries which would be curtailed if governments were mandated to observe national treatment principles. The level of expenditure, and the attempt to direct the expenditure to locally produced materials, is a major macroeconomic instrument, especially during recessionary periods, to counter economic downturn (Kohr 2003). If the foreign share increases, there would be a leakage in government attempts to boost the economy through increased spending during a downturn.

Additionally procurement policies might be used to boost domestic industries or encourage development in specific sectors of national interest. Social objectives could also be advanced by preferences for specific groups or communities, especially those that are under-represented in economic standing.

In the context of the important government objectives achieved by procurement policy and the lack of any externalities to justify international action, it seems important that developing countries retain their autonomy over this area of policy.

Moreover, it will be difficult to implement any procurement policy in a way which would widely be acceptable. A large fraction of American expenditures are for defense, and it will almost surely claim a defense exception. Much of government procurement
54. Trade facilitation

Trade facilitation initiatives hold out the promise of increasing trade and efficiency by reducing onerous trade-related costs. Such costs include: regulatory compliance costs; charges for trade-related services; procedural delays; lack of predictability; and lost business opportunities (Lucenti 2003).

The benefits of improving trade facilitation include: increasing trade in goods and services; promoting competition which can spur productivity gains as well as lower prices; enhancing efficiency in both the state sector and the private sector; improving the business environment and so encouraging foreign direct investment ("FDI"); and increasing participation of small- and medium-sized enterprises ("SMEs") in international trade.

The empirical evidence below suggests that many of these benefits may be economically significant but are associated with large implementation costs. Rather than imposing new obligations within the WTO, progress on trade facilitation should be achieved through national efforts aided by technical assistance.

5.14.1 Potential benefits and costs

Few studies have been done that explicitly examine the potential gains from trade facilitation. There are dramatic anecdotal stories: Costa Rica’s commitment to trade facilitation was arguably critical in its getting the large Intel plant. Modern manufacturing has increasingly relied on just-in-time inventory methods, and these cannot operate if there are costly delays at borders.
Moreover the studies presented below differ in terms of the scope of trade facilitation considered and the breadth of countries and commodities analysed. This makes their results difficult to compare meaningfully. However the results below do highlight the magnitude of potential gains from trade facilitation.

Ernst and Whinney (1987) surveyed EC business costs for the European Commission. The customs compliance costs associated with intra EC trade were estimated to be 1.5 per cent of the total value of trade between member countries.

The US National Committee on International Documentation (US NCITD) analysed the benefits of trade facilitation in a 1971 study, subsequently updated in the 1990s by Raven (1996). These studies found that the costs of documentation and compliance with export and import regulations (at both ends of the transaction) represented more than 7.5 per cent of the total value of US shipments.

A study by the Swedish Trade Procedures Council (SWEPRO) in 1995 used data from companies and government sources to estimate the cost of compliance with Swedish trade procedures. It concluded that these costs could be as much as 4 per cent of the value of imports and exports.

More recently, a study by Wilson et al. (2003) used a computable general equilibrium framework to estimate gains from trade facilitation. They estimated the effect of bringing the below average APEC members halfway to the APEC average in four key areas of trade facilitation (administrative transparency, e-commerce, logistics, standards harmonisation). They estimate this type of facilitation would increase APEC trade by $280bn.

A similar study by Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2003) compares the relative benefits from trade facilitation with those from traditional market access initiatives. They estimate that a reduction of all tariffs to zero from an APEC average of 6.5 per cent would create a gain of $27.8bn. By comparison they find that the improvement in trade facilitation necessary to achieve the same gains is small. Relatively minor improvements in port efficiency, customs procedures and e-business usage deliver similar sized gains.

The brief survey above suggests that there is a wide span of estimations regarding the costs of trade procedures, ranging from 1.5-7.5 per cent of the value of trade flows.

The implementation costs associated with realizing gains from trade facilitation are also significant. Administrative changes are associated with obvious costs to both governments (the creation of new systems and enforcement of new regulations) and business (compliance). For
developing countries, a large part of the costs to government should be borne by technical assistance from developing countries.

The costs of trade facilitation depend on the type of reform proposed. For example, the World Bank assisted Tunisia in its program of streamlining and modernising its customs procedures. The total value of World Bank loans to Tunisia for this purpose was $35m in 1999. Similarly the World Bank lent $38m to Poland for upgrading physical and managerial infrastructure of its port facilities.\(^\text{9}\) In some cases, streamlining procedures will both facilitate trade and save the government money.

Developing countries should put forward the view that improvements in trade facilitation should be made through national efforts aided by technical assistance, rather than through imposing additional obligations in the WTO. If the consideration of the problems in these areas results in some solutions, these should, at best, be adopted only as guiding principles or as flexible best-endeavour provisions, not enforceable through the dispute settlement process (Das 2002).

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