The Certificate of Virginity: Honor, Marriage and Moroccan Female Immigration

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy under the Executive Committee of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

2011
ABSTRACT

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Although Moroccan female-initiated migration to Europe has captured the attention of scholars in various fields of study, the majority of these studies have focused on macro-level analysis of resettlement and integration patterns. These studies, however, have bypassed the subtle impact of the socio-cultural junction between Islamic ideals and Western values. The interchange of the socio-cultural values resulting from Moroccan female immigration to Spain have complicated the Moroccan system of honor and marriage, which has played a crucial part in defining gender roles, space, production and reproduction. Using participant observation, semi-structured interviews, oral histories, and focus groups, this study aims to examine the effects immigration to Spain have on honor and marriage for Moroccan immigrant women.
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I have encountered many people along this arduous yet rewarding path to whom I am greatly thankful. Some people I cannot thank by name due to confidentiality while others deserve to have their names carved in gold for their generosity, patience, and support throughout the years.

First and foremost, this dissertation would not be possible without the guidance and wisdom of Dr. Lambros Comitas, my advisor and sponsor. His kindness and understanding have helped me through all my multiple academic and personal crises. Because of him, I have learned to love and respect fieldwork and the discipline of anthropology. Anthropologists have been known to veer from the beaten path so to have someone direct and redirect you through the curves and detours of this field is invaluable. Lambros never gave up on me even when I wanted to give up on my dissertation. For all his support and encouragement, I owe Lambros my deepest gratitude and appreciation.

I would also like to thank Dr. Hope Jensen Leichter for inspiring and encouraging me to forge ahead in my academic career. She has given me the moral, academic, and financial support throughout my studies at Teachers College. She has served as my boss, my mentor, and role model from the beginning. Working with her at the Elbenwood Center for the Study of the Family as Educator has provided me with ample support and opportunities any graduate student could ever want.

I am also pleased to thank Dr. Laurel Kendall, another important mentor and role model with whom I have worked and confided. She has not only encouraged me but has also provided me with much needed assistance in bringing the dissertation together. Her enthusiasm and ingenious ideas have helped me throughout the writing process. Additionally, I will always look back at my internship at the American Museum of Natural History with fond memories because of Laurel.

I would like to thank Dr. David Gilmore for his guidance and expertise on the topic of
honor and on the Mediterranean area. He has taken his valuable time to answer my questions and concerns and has often surprised me with his quick responses and generous advice. I am extremely grateful to have him involved in the culmination of the dissertation.

This is also an opportunity to express my respect to Dr. George Bond, from whom I have learned a great deal about urban anthropology and immigration and for serving as the chair of my dissertation committee. I would also like to acknowledge Dr. William Heaney and Dr. Andy Hamid for their guidance and support during the early part of my doctoral studies.

Apart from the ivory towers of academia, I have also relied on many people in the field and in my personal life. I would like to thank Dr. Cynthia Plette (NIMAR and SSR) and Ms. Stephanie Bordat (Global Rights), who have provided me with much needed resources and information in Morocco. I also want to express my gratitude to staff at the Centro Hispano-Marroqui, particularly Maria and Carolina, for providing me with the resources to conduct my fieldwork in Spain. Most importantly, I could not have completed my study without the Moroccan women in Morocco and in Spain who have given me their time and trusted me with intimate information. They have not only welcomed me into their lives but have also provided me with their companionship during my pregnancy.

I am also pleased to have a number of friends who have made this achievement possible. First of all, I am thankful to Amy Tijong, Jennifer Franco, Geoffrey Walker, and Lisa Moore for their encouragement, support, and at times, a place to stay. I would also like to thank Ivan and Juana del Rio for their love and support throughout the years. I would have left Spain and my fieldwork a long time ago without their friendship.

Finally, I am most grateful for my immediate family, my parents and my siblings. I would like to especially thank sister, Ruby Stuart, for taking her valuable time and effort to edit the final draft of the dissertation. This book is dedicated to my parents, Kim Lan Le and Pierre The Pham, whose unconditional love and support have made all my achievement worthwhile. I can only hope to be as good at parenting as they have been with me.
This dissertation has benefitted from the generous funding of CIFAS (Comitas Institute for Anthropological Study) and the Elbenwood Center for the Study of the Family as Educator.
For My Parents
&
Daria
MAP OF MOROCCO
MOROCCO AND SPAIN
MAP OF SPAIN
INTRODUCTION

Abu Marwan let all make free
With his good ladies' chastity
That he might gratify his whim;
A buck was what attracted him.

I taxed him with indecency,
And rated him for cuckoldry;
These lines he quoted in reply
To prove him impudent and sly:

“I got, if I must answer true,
Exactly what I wanted to:
What makes the other fellows rue so,
I was the only one to do so!”

– Ibn Hazm, The Ring of the Dove, p. 245

Honor, once a concept that unified an entire area of study in the field of anthropology, is still considered a fundamental human condition. The dignity that we feel when honor has bestowed upon us by our social group separates us from lesser primates. Without honor, we go around with our heads bow in shame. Honor is the affirmation, an affirmation of status within our social group that gives us our sense of worth.

Nevertheless, some would argue that honor is no longer as vital in Western societies as in the past when the individual had no claim of his own and had to surrender to the group's needs. Honor ruled during the days when laws and rights were premature and clans, tribes and kin groups had to defend their property and worth by retaliating with vengeance. Modern Western societies, however, have created and enforced laws to protect individual members and their property. By submitting to formal rules and laws, individuals have abdicated their need to defend the infringement upon their group. Society now apprehends, judges, and punishes. In essence, the culture of law has replaced the culture of honor.¹

Honor, nonetheless, exists in places where laws are operative and effective. Although personal honor and dignity may have a place in Western societies, the social honor of the past

¹ Ibn Hazm (Abu Muhammed ’Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Sa'id ibn Hazm), born in 994 in Cordova, was a renowned Andalusian poet and philosopher.
² The 'culture of a honor' is a term used by social psychologist, Richard Nisbett (1996), in discussing the predilection for violent behaviors in the southern part of the United States.
still exists in places where group identity, traditional values, and little enforcement of the law, or the distrust in the law, are practiced. In Morocco, social honor, more specifically family honor, remains vital to the status and the reputation of kin groups. The men in Morocco guard and are granted honor, whereas women uphold the family honor by preserving their virginity and chastity. As family honor hangs on a balance with the reproductive value of its female members, the display of the woman's sexual preservation is publically presented during the wedding ceremony. Hence, Moroccan families take great care and vigilance upon its female members until the actual wedding day.

I happen to experience this process serendipitously while researching on a different topic. In the summer of 2006, a Moroccan informant and her husband invited me to spend their first return visit home to Morocco. In fact, many Moroccans in Europe consider spending their month-long summer vacation in their country of origin as a cyclical journey home, where visiting family and friends is obligatory and crucial in maintaining ties. The original trip with my Moroccan informants had started as a study of the process of Moroccan immigration and integration. My friend-informant, however, had other plans for me. While I was observing and recording their migratory process, my friend-informant was arranging my marriage to her younger brother.

We had originally planned to travel together by plane, but in the end, I travelled by bus with other Moroccan acquaintances. When I arrived at the bus station, my friend’s brother was waiting for me instead. She and her husband had taken a trip to the Atlas Mountains to visit her in-laws so I stayed at her house with her family for three days by myself. During those three days, her brother showed me around and bought me small gifts. Only when my informant returned did I realize her family’s attempt to make me a prospective bride for her brother.

For three weeks, I played the part of a prized bride. They valued me not just as a foreign visitor but also as a foreign bride who needed protection. They forbade me from leaving the house without a family escort. They bought me a blue jellabah, a long hooded overcoat, and
a veil to wear during our outings. The family took me to meet their aunts, uncles and cousins in Salé, Rabat, and Mohammedia, introducing me as a prospective part of their family. Her brother would often try to make short conversations and repeatedly asked me to bring him to either Spain or the United States. Towards the end of the three weeks, my friend-informant asked me directly for the favor of marrying her brother.

In order to reason with me, she appealed to my emotions. Marrying her brother would bring our friendship closer, forming a stronger alliance and would also rid him of the embarrassment of living in his parents’ living room and working in his father’s hair salon in Rabat. She had mentioned that her mother’s friends had been bringing their daughters to meet him, but he had not been pleased with the choices. He dreamt of seeking his fortune away from Morocco. He had even accumulated enough money for the bridewealth for a local girl but would rather use the money for a better marriage contract. She offered two thousand Euros for the bridewealth, the *sdaq*, to seal the marriage contract.

What my friend had offered me was a marriage alliance between friends, a practice not so uncommon in Moroccan society. For my friend and her family, the marriage proposal was based on trust, on the strengthening a bond between friends, and on helping a family member migrate abroad. They converted my friendship and my American citizenship into marriageable commodities. Since I was in the process of divorcing my husband at the time, I gently rejected the offer on the basis that I was still legally married and unavailable. Disappointed, my informant searched for other prospects for her brother.

A year later, I encountered her husband on the train in Madrid. His wife and I had lost contact due to my rejection of the marriage proposal. He approached me with questions about my living situation and my current marital status. I admitted that I was no longer married but still would not consider the marriage proposal. Surprised, he asked me, “How else would you do your study? The best way for you to understand us is to be a part of us. We are only trying to help your research!” He may have been right because the insider/outsider approach to an anthropological study may be the best method to understand another group. I, however, have
a Western idea about marriage that cannot be shaken so rather than marrying to study, I study marriage instead.

From my short-lived courtship in Morocco, I became interested in women's roles in the Moroccan marriage system. As an outsider, I played both an active and a passive part in the marriage arrangement. I began formulating questions concerning Moroccan women and their experience with the Moroccan marriage and family system. My main questions are the following:

1. What constraints do Moroccan women experience within the traditional system of marriage? 2. How has immigrating to Spain affected this system?

**Honor and Marriage**

While wearing a *jellabah* and veil during my courtship, I could not help but compare my previous visits to Morocco when I had dressed modestly without feeling controlled or possessed by others. As a prospective bride staying in the home of my future affines, I respected their wishes to guard me as one of their own. My behaviors would have had consequences for their honor, especially if a wedding had taken place. Whenever I asked to walk alone in the neighborhood, the family would object due to my safety and the reputation of the family if something had happened to me. Sometimes they explain that the “reputation” or the *'ird dialna* (our honor) in reference to my needing an escort, veiling, and dressing modestly. Hence, my pending marriage had linked me intricately into their honor system.

Honor and shame, just as kinship and marriage, had once held some reverence in anthropological studies. The notion of honor has undergone much scrutiny and criticisms, particularly as anthropologists had bolstered it as a pillar for Mediterranean studies. Kinship and marriage studies, on the other hand, have suffered a similar demise following David Schneider's (1984) critique. Nevertheless, these concepts have originated from an area that shares the same geographical and historical background and continue to have merits with the people who value them most (Stewart 1994).

In anthropological research, the honor and shame system have designated men as
having honor and women as experiencing shame. Women's behaviors either uphold or damage men's honor, but the shame women feel places them in the secondary position of the honor system. The honor system punishes women for its destruction but does not glorify them when they validate or elevate the honor of the men. The reason for women's secondary position is their exclusion from the public domain (Maher 1978, Stewart 1994). Still, the gender bias in the conceptualization of honor has ironically relegated women to a secondary position in research as well (Wikan 1984). Women, in their own realm, have their own values related to honor and/or shame, but previous research has analyzed the notion of honor within a male-dominated system. Shame, for some societies, tends to be more operative than honor, and women, in some societies, have the right to possess and obtain honor (Wikan 1984). The problem starts with the definition of honor, and whose definition of honor is being used and how.

Honor has a variety of meaning for different people. Anthropologists have long argued its conceptual reliability and its comparative usefulness. In searching for a comparative and reliable conceptualization of honor, Frank Stewart (1994) proposes different dimensions of honor. Vertical honor or competitive honor describes the use of the concept in the context of vertical or hierarchical relations to express a form of exclusivity “by those who have shown themselves to be superior as individuals (p. 60).” Horizontal honor, on the other hand, takes more of a personal nature. It has a zero-sum value. Personal honor may be lost if the person who holds it has breached certain rules or has failed to maintain certain standards or code. It may be personal, which follows a code, or even reflexive, which concerns the agent's reaction when another has encroached upon his standing in the group. Stewart, as with other anthropologists, believes that men have the possession of honor in many societies; whereas, women either are granted none or very little.

When projecting the family’s needs through the woman, researchers often used the concepts of honor in interpreting familial actions and reactions to women’s behaviors and status. Personal honor, which Stewart claims to be more commonly used, deals with the right
to respect, which follows Pitt-Rivers’ conceptualization of honor. Honor, in essence, has three facets: the feeling of honor, the manifestation of the feeling in conduct, and the evaluation of the conduct by others (Pitt-Rivers 1971). Pitt-Rivers (1977) notes that honor is “a sentiment, a manifestation of this sentiment in conduct, and the evaluation of this conduct in others (p.21).” In fact, "honor . . . derives from virtuous conduct and that honor which situates an individual socially and determines his right to precedence. (Pitt-Rivers 1966, p. 36).” Men and women, however, have different behavioral model in the honor system. Pitt-Rivers (1966) elaborates the differences between men and women:

"The honor of a man and of a woman therefore implies quite different modes of conduct. A woman is dishonored, loses her verguenza, with the tainting of her purity, but a man does not. While certain conduct is honorable for both sexes, honor and shame require conduct in other spheres, which is exclusively a virtue of one sex or the other. It obliges a man to defend his honor and that of his family, a woman to conserve her purity (p.42)."

Women often have overbearing fathers and brothers who scrutinize and control their actions in order to prevent women from dishonoring their families, making them passive in a system that critically depends on their behaviors. They are both subjects and objects in the honor system.

With their previous minimal involvement in the public domain, women did not partake in the glorification of honor, but that fact remains questionable as well (Shaefer Davis 1983, Wikan 1984). However, economic and social changes in Morocco have permitted more women to enter into the workforce. Immigration to Europe has further catapulted women into the international public domain, far from their familial binds. Given the physical and social distance from their families and from their natal societies, do Moroccan immigrant women continue valuing and behaving within the traditional system of honor? If so, how has honor affected their lives, particularly related to marriage and family? Do Moroccan women not have a sense of honor, as proposed by so many scholars?

**Terms of Honor**
In Arab societies, two kinds of honor exist: *sharaf* and *‘ird*. *Sharaf* refers to the honor of a social unit, a tribe or a family, which can change depending on the behavior of individual members. Individuals have to adhere to adequate moral conduct or the social status of the family or tribal unit decreases. However, the *sharaf* of the unit may strengthen by exemplary moral behavior such as hospitality, generosity, courage in battle, etc. *Sharaf* resembles the Western notion of “dignity” or “respect” rather than “chastity” or “purity,” which are more akin to the concept of *‘ird* (Feldner 2000).

*‘ird* ties women’s behavior to honor of the social unit. Unlike *sharaf*, *‘ird* can only decrease in value, in which the exemplary behavior cannot recuperate. As with *sharaf*, *‘ird* affects the individual woman and her entire social unit so that a woman would gravely damage her family’s status when her chastity is compromised or her reputation is stained. Moreover, *‘ird* trumps *sharaf*, elevating the woman’s chastity to immense stature. Behavior that violates family honor, however, varies among families and social groups. On the other hand, the constitution of damaging moral behavior is socially defined and morally punished.

Moroccan immigrant women awaiting marital prospects use a term more familiar to Moroccan Arabic of *nif* for ‘honor’ and in describing behaviors related to familial honor and saving face (Maher 1974). The term *‘honor*’, its Spanish equivalent of *ird* or *nif*, describes chastity and purity or the honor women feel in relation to the sexual use of their bodies. *Eshuma* refers to feelings of guilt for inappropriate behaviors. In fact, the dichotomical concepts of honor and shame, which have long been the bread and butter of anthropological studies of the Mediterranean, are intertwined or rather two sides of the same coin and not their opposites (Stewart 1994, Wikan 1984). Wikan (1984) argues that shame, a feeling, cannot be the opposite of honor, a value. Nevertheless, *eshuma* seems to be more commonly used nowadays by both Moroccan men and women when referring to the loss of honor of any kind, family or personal. When they mention *‘ird* or *sharaf*, they are referring to the grand

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3 The *Moudawana*, the Moroccan Family Code, uses the term *sharaf* in reference to family honor.
feeling of familial honor. However, the usage is particular and occasional.

Honor is the aspiration to status and the validation of status. Historically, honor has been closely connected to the Muslim institution of marriage. Many studies have indicated that women's honor correspond to men's lineage rights because the ultimate violation of honor or *nif* takes place if a woman, unmarried or married, gives birth to an illegitimate child. Yet since a man's honor requires legitimate male offspring to carry on his lineage (*nasab*), a wife's inability to produce an offspring provides a man with a reason for taking a second wife, especially since Islam sanctions polygamy. Hence, the status and behavior of women is central to the honor concept when referring to the institution of marriage and family.

Although honor killing is rarely reported in Morocco, physical abuse and forced marriage are common, and immigration to Europe does not lessen these customs. The single Moroccan women interviewed in this study are proud of their virginal state. They find that men are intrigued and attracted to their virginity, which they reported as an advantage in their relationships and in their future marriage negotiations. Overall, they do not wish to dishonor their families either in Morocco or in Spain. News travels fast if these women happen to talk to male strangers in the neighborhood.

Additionally, Moroccan women do not like having their pictures taken for fear of their publicizing their wares to the world, robbing their husbands and families of their possession. Associations in Spain tend to include photographs of their clients in the annual reports. The women who have had their photos publicized in these reports have met with severe reprimand from families and friends. The sentiment underlying these chastisements involves male jealous possession and domination of their women. For many Moroccan men, the women and their embodied honor are directly connected to their pride and dignity. Hence, women dancing in neighborhood parties, considered public events, may beckon criticisms and chastisement from their compatriots, particularly when men are present.

Although popular beliefs have indicated that modernization, globalization, and materialism have eroded the traditional notion of “honor” and “shame” of individuals and
groups, Moroccan immigrant women still use concepts in demarcating themselves from Europeans, particularly from Spanish women, who they claim are *eshuma* (shameful) or practice things they consider ‘*haram*’ (forbidden) for them as Muslim women (Evers Rosander 1991). Moreover, the problems concerning marriage and family for many Moroccan women deal with honor. Spain may have changed since Pitt-Rivers’ presented the honor and shame model as a Mediterranean trait, but how much can Spain change the Moroccan female immigrants may be studied through the changes in the system of marriage and family.

**Methodology**

This study draws on ethnographic data gathered between 2008 and 2010 spanning locations in two countries: Spain and Morocco. Madrid is the primary site of the research and the capital of Spain with approximately 737,818 registered Moroccans, of which 282,352 are women (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2009). The majority (75%) of employed Moroccan female immigrants work in domestic services and food service. The primary method used for data collection consisted of participant observations, questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, oral histories, and focus groups.  

**The Entry**

Finding an entry into any part of the Moroccan community in Madrid was challenging at first. I had originally came to Spain to study the Moroccan community but had found access to the ‘community’ difficult due to the scattered population of Moroccans in Madrid and Barcelona. Although I had visited and spoken to several people at different mosques in Madrid and Barcelona, the information given by the people, mostly men were varied and many times gender specific. Additionally, the wives often perceive following Moroccan men as an invitation for a tryst or a seduction. Locating Moroccan associations is also challenging, as Moroccan associations in Spain do not last long due to the lack of funding and conflict among members who are often from the same village or neighborhood.

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4 Refer to appendices F and G for the survey and focus groups questions.
After the first year of field research, I temporarily left the study but continued to live in Lavapies, a predominantly Moroccan neighborhood in Madrid. I befriended a handful of Moroccan women prior to volunteering at a community center to meet other Moroccan women. My Moroccan friends all had university degrees and had lived in Spain before the Madrid train bombing in 2005. The women, who I would later meet at the various centers, would be distinctly different in class and education level from my former Moroccans friends. Additionally, I was interested in the different groups and types of women, particularly since the Spanish newspapers had been reporting about people migrating via *pateras* (small) boats from the coast of Morocco to the coast of Spain.

More interestingly, newspapers, television, and personal reports indicated that more and more Moroccan women have started migrating alone. They have been arriving with work visas for strenuous agricultural work, particularly in the strawberry fields in Huelva, located in the southwest coastal area of Spain, or they would arrive on tourist visas to work in domestic services. Others arrived without documents by hiding in boats and ships with only a phone number of a contact person to locate once they have arrived in Spain. From these report, I became intrigued with this population, many of whom are illiterate and have never worked outside their homes before arriving to a foreign land.

Although Moroccan women can be easily spotted in the neighborhood wearing *jellabahs*, the traditional Moroccan hooded robe, and *hijabs* or veils, they do not usually approach people or welcome people approaching them. Befriending these women requires a medium or a socially adept informant. Thus, I decided to volunteer for the semi-public organization called *Centro Hispano Marroqui* as a child-minder and after school tutor for the children.

However, before volunteering, I had to attend a month training to become a volunteer as it was a protocol for many associations in Spain and did not start until February 2008. During my interview with the director, I explained my reason for volunteering at the *Centro* as a way to meet Moroccan women for my study. I introduced myself to the mothers as a
volunteer/researcher, and later to weekly women’s group as an anthropology student interested in studying Moroccans. They were wary at first and did not share as much information when they noticed my note taking. However, after several weeks, they started sharing more of their experiences and did not notice my scribbling while they converse about their problems and their interests.

At the beginning, the women who attended the support group did not bring their children so I participated in the Moroccan women’s group for many weeks before tending to the children. The women’s group varied from 5 to 30 women from various backgrounds but the majority was from Morocco. After six months of attending the weekly women’s group, I presented my idea of studying the women more intimately.

**Questionnaires and Interviews**

I devised a short survey focusing on the common themes discussed during the weekly women’s group such as discrimination, education, work, health, family and friendship. They welcomed the idea and completed the survey. I asked them to refer friends for the study, which attracted women from their social network that did not regularly attend the activities at the Centro. I soon noticed the network connection and had them talk about their relationships with each other. Eventually, I became friends with a handful of them and started coming to their houses regularly for meals and mid-afternoon tea.

From the Centro and other associations in a couple of small towns throughout the Madrid region, I conducted 72 surveys and chose 20 women for semi-structured interviews. The 72 Moroccan immigrant women range from lower class to upper-middle class with no education to having university degrees. The women identify themselves as Arabs although many have Berber background. Unless the women speak only Berber, they identify each other as Arabs, which have long been a controversial point in Moroccan identity politics as David Hart (1999:23) notes “scratch a Moroccan, find a Berber.”

We usually conducted the surveys at the Centro but when we ran out of time, we would relocate to a nearby café. I would ask to record the semi-structured interviews and was only
turned down four times. I took notes during the interviews in case I experienced problems with the recording.

Throughout the study, I added more questions to the survey in order to gather more information about trust and marriage. From twenty women I had conducted semi-structured interviews; I became well acquainted with four and collected oral histories from them as well as making genealogy charts of their families. During the weekend, I would help their children with their English homework while also observing parent-child interaction and conjugal roles and relationship. I also accompanied them to doctor’s visits, social security visits, to the Moroccan embassy, romantic dates, summer visits to Morocco and celebrations (Ramadan, birthday parties, etc.) in Spain. When the visits went into the late hours of the evening, I would end up sleeping at their homes and spending the following day with the family. Along these visits and trips, I kept records on the people the informants had relied on for information and resources, which helped to reveal part of their social networks.

Some women from the Centro would spend more time with each other than others, but they did not form an organized group. “In an organized group one needs to study every member to understand the group as a whole. Yet in a network one can get a general picture of the structure of the network from a small number of informants, but one cannot find out the exact content of the relationships and activities of all the members” (Bott 1957, p. 49). Hence, I focused more on their relationships with each other and mapping their social network.

Additionally, I travelled to Morocco various times with several informants to their city of origin. I met female friends and neighbors of their families in Larache and Tetuan and had informal interviews with as many people as possible. I was able to conduct twelve semi-structured interviews with female kin and neighbors to obtain information regarding current marriage trend and opinion in Morocco. From these informants, I conducted focus groups with a Spanish lawyer on the Moudawana\textsuperscript{5}.

\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Al Moudwana} or the Moudawana is the personal status code, also known as the family code, in Moroccan
Focus Groups and Aggregate Data

I have obtained demographic and aggregate data from the following sources: INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística), the Ayuntamiento de Madrid (Madrid City Hall), CAM (Comunidad Autónomo de Madrid), and TEIM (Taller de Estudios Internacionales Mediterraneos). From these sources, I have compiled information regarding the distribution of Moroccan women in Spain, the distribution of the Spanish foreign population, the distribution of Moroccans by age and sex, the distribution of Moroccans by places of origin, and the civil status of Moroccans by sex. The tables and charts related to this information are located in the appendices.

In addition to the interviews, I also observed the Moudawana workshops conducted by the Spanish lawyer from the Centro Hispano-Marroqui. I travelled with her to help organize the workshops and focus groups in Spain (Madrid and surrounding towns) and in Morocco (Larache and Fez). While she presented the revisions to the Moudawana, I recorded the exchanges and later debriefed the group on the points in the workshop. From the themes that had emerged from the focus group, I altered my interview questions to examine the common themes in more depth.

The questions for the focus groups examined the women’s ideas about marriage and their opinions about the revisions to the Moudawana. In addition to the qualitative information from the interviews, workshops and focus groups, I also looked at the marriage records, census tracts, and population demography pertaining to the Moroccan women in Madrid. However, the number of interviews and surveys of Moroccan women is too small to make generalization of their marriage patterns. By supporting the responses with quantitative data, I can provide more information regarding trends.

Data Analysis

law. It deals with issues related to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody. Based on the Maliki school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, the Moroccan government officially codified and standardized family and inheritance laws following its independence in 1956.
From the semi-structured interviews, I have compiled questions in excel files in order to organize and detect trends in the group. I charted genealogies while recording life histories to map kin relations, migration patterns (residency, year of migration, method of migration), and frequency of contact. I also obtained statistics from the INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística) on Moroccan and Spanish marriages. With the aggregate data, I compared my information and observations to further analyze the marriage practices of Moroccans in Spain. I also used sociograms to trace the network of kin and friends in Spain and Morocco. A partial network will have to suffice rather than a total network given the lack of time and resources.

Some informants know each other while others are merely acquaintances. I passed my information to informants to have their family members and friends contact me for interviews. The snowball method of obtaining interviews worked well in this study as it gives some indication of the density of the social network among the interviewees. It also provided a means to analyze their attitudes and opinion on various topics. Additionally, the workshops and focus groups have also helped in presenting ideas about marriage and family.

When analyzing the data, I ended up using the ego-network approach. The informant or ego is the ‘focal node’ in the network whereas her kin, friends, etc. are alters or the nodes to whom the ego is directly connected. I took information from individuals or ‘egos’ to extrapolate all her kin, friends, neighbors and acquaintance and their ties with each other. Such information is useful for understanding how networks affect individuals, giving a picture of the general texture, albeit incomplete, of the network as a whole.

In discussing the density of social network, I have borrowed much from Bott’s (1957) study to classify network density as close-knit, medium-knit, and loose-knit. Bott uses terms related to social network such as close-knit and loose-knit to describe the density of the social network, in which ‘close-knit’ describes “a network in which there are many relationships among the component units” and ‘loose-knit’ depicts “a network in which there

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6 I have placed the statistics related to Moroccan-Spanish marriages in Appendix E.
are few such relationships (p. 59).” Medium-knit network consists of some relationships among the individuals.

Moreover, I have expanded the Bott’s network analysis technique by identifying the immigrants’ relationship and contact with Moroccans as opposed to Spaniards or other nationalities. The reason for the separation falls under the assumption that the more contacts and frequency Moroccan women have with people other than their compatriots, the more their information and resources may vary, which may benefit them in locating job opportunities, housing, social services, etc. (Maya Jariego 2003). Having less intense contacts with compatriots may mean less social pressure to adhere to traditional values and customs while more contacts with compatriots may perpetuate values and behaviors from their country of origin.
Enveloping the western edge of the Mediterranean Sea, both Spain and Morocco hover over the water strip that separates Europe from Africa. The two countries, more like kissing cousins than neighbors, share a common past and an ongoing dependence on each other and their two main body of water: the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Regardless of their commonality, the relationship between Spain and Morocco has continuously been a contentious one, with one conquering the other at different historical period.

During the 1950s until the early 1980s, anthropologists studied villages and towns in both countries to advance the theoretical foundation for the Mediterranean area study. The concept of 'honor' served as a common denominator for the area that has other similarities such as their history, climate and geography. Following rampant criticisms, anthropologists nowadays rarely consider the relevance of grouping the countries that border the Mediterranean Sea under a unified rubric. Nevertheless, these neighboring countries have shared some common values although cultural amnesia seems to have affected Spain after becoming more affiliated with Europe.

The union with Europe has brought Spain modernization and rapid growth. So rapid was the growth that the Moroccan informants in this study have difficulty comprehending the behaviors of their Spanish sisters who they have felt more akin to than any other European counterparts. Many places in Spain remind immigrants of areas in their Moroccan hometown. However, the space available to these women differs significantly from their sending country to the receiving one. This chapter focuses on the variation of space and place and the factors
affecting them.

Unlike earlier studies of honor in the Mediterranean area, this study encompasses several locations in Spain and Morocco rather than focusing on one community. The study will mention community, but the 'community' in this study is not bounded physically but rather socially when generally referring to the large groupings of Moroccan immigrants. Although the informants from the study have come from various places, the study focuses more on the neighborhoods, towns, and cities where the majority of the informants live.

The majority of the women interviewed are currently living in the capital city of Madrid with a small number of interviewees living in the surrounding towns and villages of Guadarrama (in the Sierra Mountains), Alcalá de Henares, Alcorcón, Parla and Fuenlabrada and a couple of women living in Barcelona. The main setting for the study takes place in the infamous neighborhood of Lavapies, near the Atocha Train Station of Madrid, where the majority of the seventy-two Moroccan women surveyed for this study is currently living or are spending the majority of their time working, studying or visiting friends and relatives. The study then follows the migration pattern of this group of women from their towns or cities of origin to their current destination in Madrid.

**Morocco: the Jebala Region**

Morocco spans the Atlantic Ocean, the mountainous ranges, and the Sahara desert. Four rugged mountain chains dominate Morocco’s topography and divide the country into three geographic regions: the mountainous interior, including plateaus and fertile valleys; the Atlantic coastal lowlands; and the semi-arid and arid areas of eastern and southern Morocco where the mountains descend gradually into the Sahara Desert. During the colonial period, France and Spain divided Morocco into two parts: Spain dominating the north and France
taking the south. Remnants of European colonization still haunt, as well as illuminate, Morocco of its past struggle and glory.

The Jebala (Yebala) region, located in the northwestern part of Morocco, has had a long history of migration to Madrid. The current ecological (sporadic rainfalls), economic (insufficient government aid, low wages), and social problems (drugs, smuggling, prostitution) in the impoverished northern region have led to mass migration to southern Europe, particularly to Spain (Driessen 1998, McMurray 2001, Ramírez 1998). With the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta located within this region, legal and illegal border-crossing to Spain take place on a regular basis. The Jebala region, which encompasses the mountainous “Rif” and the coastal and interior plains, has been predominately populated by Berber-speaking Moroccans (Brown 1972, Eickelman 1981, Evers Rosander 1991, Gellner 1972, Ramírez 1998).

The two most popular sending communities from Jebala to Madrid are Tangier (estimated population 555,000), which consists of approximately 12.6% of the Moroccan population in Madrid, and Larache (estimated population 145,000), which is estimated to make up 15.4% of Moroccan migrants in Madrid. Both communities combine make up at least 28% of the documented Moroccans in Madrid; migrants from Casablanca constitute 25% of Moroccans in Madrid (Ramírez 2004). As with many migrant groups, the number of undocumented immigrants can be twice or three times the size of the official Census data.

**Larache**

Overlooking the Atlantic, Larache has been an important harbor town in the Jebala region from its origin. However, since independence, Larache has not only served as a harbor for the region but has also survived and thrived on migration abroad. Larache, and the rest of
the Jebala region, has been important for its commencement of female migration to Europe (Ramírez 1998). The first wave of female migration to Europe was in the early 1960s, soon after Morocco had become an independent country. Although exact figures are unknown, reports indicate that several thousands of Larachi women migrated to the surrounding areas of London for work in agriculture and in the service sector. The majority of Moroccans (55,000) in England live in London with origins from this first wave of female migration7 (Cherti 2008).

Male migration from Larache dominated the latter waves of migration to other parts of Europe in the 1970s to 1990s. However, the crisis in the European real estate and construction sector of the early 1990s and again from 2003 to today has brought about a reemergence of female migration from Larache and other parts of the northwest coastal region of Jebala, which includes Tangier, Tetuan, and Asilah, to places with continuing demand in the service sector such as Madrid.

At first, one can deduce the reasons for mass migration abroad. Larache is situated on the lower northwestern coast of the Jebala region with easy access to a main highway connecting Rabat, the capital, at 150 km south to Tangier at 80 km north, where the nearest airport and the ferry port are located. Hence, travelers have several options coming from Spain to Larache. Larache also has relics of past and present connections with Europe, detectable through its buildings, street names and its inhabitants.

Larache has had a long history of conquests and attempted conquest from various countries. It was first settled in the 7th century when a group of Moorish soldiers decided to

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7 The majority of Moroccan women who migrated to England came from the Jebala region, starting with the first cohort in the late 1960s and continuing throughout the 1970s. While other Western European countries demanded more traditionally male-oriented jobs such as building and construction and metal manufacturing, England had shortages in service jobs Moroccan women could obtain (Cherti 2008).
extend a camp near Lixus, an ancient Phoenician trade town, onto the south bank of the Loukkos River. In 1471, Portuguese settlers drove out the inhabitants of Larache, leaving the town vacant until the Mohamed Es Said Ech Sheik repopulated it and built a fortress above the Loukkos River, as a means of controlling access. The town began to grow in population and significance as the largest Moroccan port by the 15th century with unsuccessful attempts by the Portuguese, the Spaniards and the French to control it. Moulay en Nasser built the Kasbah in 1491, which later served as a stronghold for pirates intercepting European vessels. King Phillip III of Spain bought Larache in 1610 but used it mainly as a trading post. The Arabs retook the town in 1689 under Moulay Ismail with continuous attacks from various countries for its control. During the 18th and 19th century, Larache built wooden pirate ships for the cities of Rabat and Sale. Then in 1911 Spain colonized the northern part of Morocco, along with Larache, until Morocco’s independence in 1956.

Fragments of Spanish rule can still be found in various parts of town. The Spanish Consulate proudly waves its flag near the town square, Plaza Liberación, and Casa España remains a popular place for Spanish ex-patriots, tourists and Spanish-file Moroccans to have alcoholic beverages and Spanish tapas. Inside, Casa España is lined with wooden tables on the elevated floor and couches and coffee tables filled the lower floor. The walls are decorated with fishnets and photographs of the Spanish presence in Morocco. This society was established in the 1930s for Spanish expatriats to gather and chat. Now that only a few Spaniards are left in the town, more Moroccans frequent the place, but during the summer months, Spaniards vacationing in their newly constructed apartments would patron this place, reestablishing the venue as an expatriate paradise.

The Catholic cemetery, the resting place for many Spanish expatriats, overlooks the
town’s cliff that faces the Atlantic edge of Cadiz, as if the hope of returning to la patria España was a dream for many Spaniards who had settled in Larache during the colonization period or had escaped from Franco’s regime. Several small cafés serve the Spanish fried dough, *churros*, but without the chocolate, a Spanish obsession. While many restaurants have paella on their menu, hotels also retain the Spanish flavor with the neo-classic Hotel España and Hotel Malaga.

Nevertheless, Larache remains in destitute although the migrant women recounted a short-lived revival period in the 1990s until the town politicians wasted the king’s grant money on their own expenditures, leaving many projects unfinished. Unless you have a reason to stop in the town, Larache can easily be bypassed by tourists for its dirty-whitewashed buildings, crumbling pavements, multiple dirt roads, and disheveled town hall and government buildings. However, several European tourist buses would stop for a day as part of their planned trip prior to their final destinations elsewhere in Morocco.

Tourists often stop by to pay a quick visit to the old quarters and the Spanish town of the center. Nonetheless, tourism has not thrived much in Larache. The town museum has been closed for a couple of years due to disinterest and the lack of funds. The architectural mixture of Arabic, Spanish and Jewish history of the town can be spotted on buildings but are scarcely appreciated by non-historians due to their poor preservation and dearth of information. On the other hand, Larache boasts fine beaches, which tourists, summer residents from Europe, and visiting Moroccan immigrants can take a boat or ferry to a small island off the coast of the mainland. The town politicians are trying to renovate the town to attract more tourism with new apartment buildings and a golf course at the outskirt of town. However, the continuing delay to finish the development has cost the town a lot of money.
Spaniards looking for cheap investments and good summer housing have bought many luxury apartments in the new white building overlooking the coast near the main square. Although blue and white succor houses in the medina resembles the more popular town of Chaouen and Asilah, many Larachis considered the medina as the most impoverished part of Larache so return migrants and expatriates would purchase apartments away from the main square. Apartments in colorful new buildings of pink, blue or yellow were scattered around different parts of town but many of the closed blinds indicate a surge of seasonal occupancy from immigrants and foreign residents. Some immigrants purchased new houses for their families’ usage and would stay in these houses during the summer months. A common area to live was near the bus station, a fifteen-minutes walk from the main square.

The town resembles a neglected Andalusian dream in its nostalgic whitewashed buildings stained with dirt and soot. To distinguish the rows of white-cemented buildings, families with money or money from remittances would have newer wooden or metal entry doors. I stayed with an informant’s family who had a thick black steel door purchased with remittance money. From the outside, the houses appeared similar, but once inside, the distinctions were noticeable in the size, the number of rooms and the décor of the house.

Families receiving remittances usually have larger houses with newer furniture. Moroccans often take pride in their salons or living rooms, decorating them with majestic, sheer curtains and valances with tassels hanging from all corners. The divan-sofas are usually custom-made with matching textiles for the boxed cushions and throw pillows. The sizes and quantity of salons in the houses are important because they correspond to one's economic class. The hosts usually show their guests around the house, starting with the salons
Larache's Blue and White, Andalusian-style Buildings
Larache's Seaside

Larache's residents often linger or stroll along the seaside near the Spanish Consulate office.
A Typical Moroccan Salon

then to the bedrooms, if they have any. The smaller salon, the family room, is usually the
place for eating and watching television. Guests can sleep in the living area, if a bedroom was not available.

Wall decorations in the salons are chosen with great care. The majority of the houses I visited had framed Koranic artwork, which consisted of an important passage from the Koran with calligraphic writing. Although many Moroccan women cannot read or write Arabic well, they can read the passages framed on their walls. Clocks, ranging from plain to beautifully gilded ones, also hang from walls. Some families have large portraits of their children who had migrated abroad. Comments on the portraits often depend on their level of trust with the observer.

Despite the recent courting of tourism and foreign real estate investment, Larache’s economy mainly depends on fishing and local agriculture, manufacture and exports from its port. Fishermen take their boats along the coast and sell their catch in the local market or send them to nearby towns. Although small in size, Larache has ample street markets (suqs) in various parts of town, in the medina and multiple side streets, which have become problematic for traffic flows during the summertime. Small household items and various types of vegetables (khudra) can be found year round. The vegetables such as ripe tomatoes, eggplants, cilantro, onions, potatoes, squash, melons, apples, oranges, lemons, prickly pears, pears, figs, mint leaves, and spices of cumin, pepper, paprika, nutmeg, cinnamon and saffron can be found on large wooden tables managed by men and women. Veiled women carrying plastic shopping bags fill the streets, moving hastily when cars approach to pass through the narrow space not blocked by the stalls.

Besides the busy street market, the rest of the town remains quiet until around 4 PM when the cars coming from work would circulate the town square. Moroccan men can be
found in the café shop surrounding the square at all hours of the day, but they are more numerous around five and six in the afternoon. At around seven in the early evening, locals are walking along the seawall or gathering in the Place Liberacion. The winter months are not as boisterous as the summer months when the population doubles in size with immigrants cruising around in their cars through the Plaza, blasting Arabic music from their Bose speakers. Immigrants returning for summer vacation usually bring luxury cars, with license plates from Spain, France, United Kingdom, and Holland, marking their rise in economic class while wandering around the main square and its surrounding streets in search of old friends or to find new ones.

As the summer evening unfurl, people congregating in the square usually start dancing and swaying to the Arabic music. In the square, many veiled and some unveiled women, children, hoodlums, sellers, and homeless people also participate in a dance. Both entertainment and snacks are available in the town square. People sell all kinds of items at the square: popcorn, drinks, and candies. Child-sized cars and motorcycles are lined next to the large water fountain in the middle of the square to entice young passersby to beg their parents for a ride. Men sitting in the crowded café shops often talk and observe the actions of the square, dominated by women and children in the afternoon. Young girls, the majority veiled, can be found in pairs and in groups, strolling around the square and up and down the seawall while the boys would do the same but in the opposite direction. Quick glances and nervous laughter from both parties signal interest as each side scan the other for possible matches. The square and the seawall remain crowded until past eleven in the evening. The crowd eventually disappears shortly after midnight, leaving the town square quiet and vacant until the early morning.
The time spent strolling usually lasts much longer during the summer months than the non-summer months, but the locals often continue this custom as a break following afternoon tea. Although many have noted that Morocco has been changing rapidly for the past five years, they also comment that respectable young women should not go walking alone in the afternoon, even for a leisure stroll. At least one woman always accompanies me, even if the trip is a short trip to the market.

Women continue to behave modestly in public. Not everyone wears a veil, but the presence of veiled women still dominates the streets. Women still have to walk purposefully when they are alone. In fact, a woman walking alone at night beckons trouble and deserves whatever outcome she attracts (Conway-Long 2002, Mernissi 1987).

**Tetuan**

Another area favoring female migration to Spain is Tangier-Tetuan region, the origin of twenty-nine of the seventy-two women interviewed. Tetuan and Tangier have traditionally attracted women from the countryside to work in the textile factories surrounding these two cities. The Tangier-Tetuan region has approximately 2.5 million inhabitants (2005) and an area of 11,570 km².

Considered as a cosmopolitan port city, Tangier has a distinct history of its own. Tangier has been occupied by numerous countries and civilizations (the Romans, the Phoenicians, the Berbers, England, Portugal and Spain). Each civilization has left its mark on Tangier, making it one of the most eclectic places in Morocco. Its location in the Strait of Gibraltar continuously exposes the city to foreign and international influences.

Present-day Tangier is connected to the rest of Morocco by rail and new expressways, making Tangier the connecting point for many immigrants entering and leaving Morocco.
The economic base of the city is shipping, communications, tourism and small-scale industry (fishing and agriculture). Tangier has Morocco's largest black market, where smuggling people and goods between Spain and Morocco yields the highest profit. Tangier is situated on the Atlantic side of the Strait of Gibraltar, whereas Tetuan is located 15 km from the Mediterranean Sea, slightly more inland but only 40 km apart. In order to leave to or arrive from Spain, travelers have to either take the ferry from Tangier (40 km north) or they can fly into Tangier’s Ibn Batuta airport, located 15 km from the city’s center, and take a grand taxi or bus to this small town. Bus services to Tangier are frequent, and several companies offer bus (autocar) packages to main cities in Spain.

The city of Tetuan, on the other hand, was built near the Roman city of Tamuda which is situated five kilometers at the outskirts of present day Tetuan and flourished between the eleventh and fourteenth century. In the 1400, the Catholic Kings' army from Spain invaded and destroyed Tamuda, leaving it in ruins. Ironically, Moorish refugees led by Sidi Ali Al Mandari who emigrated from the Andalusian city of Granada to escape the persecution of the Inquisition rebuilt the town towards the end of the fifteenth century. The town prospered as an agricultural town, producing grains and vegetables for the surrounding area. In 1913 Spain made Tetuan the capital of its protectorate, housing and serving the Spanish military and civil servants (Pennell 2003). Following Morocco's independence, Tetuan returned to more agricultural and livestock activities.

Today Tetuan’s economic base consists of agricultural products such as grain, citrus fruits and vegetables, along with livestock and crafts, which are traded with other Mediterranean and North African countries, particularly Egypt. Industries in Tetuan has been expanding and attracting workers from all over Morocco producing cigarettes, soap, matches,
flour, textiles and building materials. Spanish and other European tourists can be easily spotted during the high summer seasons eating in Moroccan-Spanish restaurants. The recent boom in real estate development has attracted many return Moroccan immigrants, who have been investing in new apartments along the roadway, particularly since the old bus station had relocated from the medina to the main roadway, where it can be detected and admired in its new majestic white building.

Unlike Larache, Tetuan’s white buildings gleam from the roadway, and its bluish-green pillars welcome visitors along the road. The town maintains its radiance in the outer part of town, but the center or the medina remains disheveled. As with Larache, Tetuan has maintained some of its Spanish pride from its halcyon days as the protectorate’s capital. Walking along the torn up pavement of the main square, a visitor can detect the residual Spanish influence in the town’s cathedrals (in shapes of mosques), photos of children’s first communions advertised in photography shops, advertisement for paella, Spanish signs and books, Spanish music, Spanish-speaking people, Spanish archeology and ethnography museums, afternoon strolls or paseo from 6 until midnight, a few ‘Spanish’ bars, and a supermercado for the nostalgic Spanish tourists and expatriates.

The main gate of the Tetuan’s crowded medina bursts open daily with people selling vegetables and fruits of all kinds. The majority of the sellers are men but some veiled women can be spotted selling as well. Tetuan has an abundance of different types of fish, the shrimp, caracoles (snails), chicken, beef, and eggs being sold along with the fruits and vegetables.

The streets are full of people during the daytime. The majority of the women walking the streets are veiled and often walks in pairs or in groups. My informants often tell me that women rarely walk leisurely alone. However, I have noticed that younger girls can go
unveiled in their school uniforms, whereas adult women wear their veil and jellabah while shopping and roaming the town. The women interviewed note that the towns in northern Morocco are more traditional and conservative than the ones in the south. By “traditional and conservative” they mean that more women in the northern area don their veils at a much younger age and in greater numbers, and women tend to leave their jobs, if their husbands desire so, after they marry. Women tend to stay close to the private space of their homes while the men are in cafés or other public places.

The separation of private and public space is more prominent in Tetuan than in larger cosmopolitan cities such as Tangier and Rabat. Men fill the cafés in Tetuan, which is similar to the majority of the metropolises in Morocco. Women are frequently absent from cafés, particularly if they are not with their spouses or other family members. If they go to a café, they have a designated area to sit, usually on the upper floor. Many times during my stay in Morocco, the Moroccan women who accompany me would ask the waiter where they should sit. The usual response is “fuq” or “upstairs”. When I go alone or with a non-Moroccan to a café, we simply sit wherever we want.

According to the Moroccan male informants, the division of space is circular. The woman’s domain is her home, and she entertains her female friends in the afternoon in her house. Her husband is kicked out of the house following their afternoon nap (around 5 PM). From 5 until 8, women usually have their friends over to gossip. Husbands are not usually allowed in the house because the women will not be free to visit each other. Therefore, men are often relaxing in cafés for hours. Since men are usually not at home during the middle part of the day as they are either working or sitting in cafés, women tend to stay home cleaning and preparing meals. Moreover, the high unemployment rate makes hanging out on
Women spend most of their time at home and at social activities (*hammam*[^8], shopping, tea gathering) with other women if they are not with their families. Therefore, participating in the daily activities of a typical Moroccan woman would reveal her social network. The social network may include familial and non-familial interactions. Neighbors are important for Moroccan women because of the proximity and the daily interactions they have with them. While visiting various houses, I notice the difference between families with migrants and ones without. Neighbors often benefit vicariously from their immigrated neighbors, even though there are no clear blood relations between them.

**Moroccan Women in Spain**

Moroccan female migrants have concentrated in three areas in Spain: Malaga, Madrid and Barcelona. The female immigrants in Madrid have mostly settled in the central area of the city as opposed to Malaga and Barcelona where the women tend to live in the outskirts of town (Ramirez 1999). Madrid has been attracting more Moroccan female-initiated migration than migration through the family reunification program.

Madrid is capital city, which is also the site of the March 11th train bombing which killed over 200 people, and the main site for this study. It has historically been the center of international exchanges and serves as a cradle for migrants from more impoverished areas of Spain and for new immigrants. Madrid has been central to the Spanish rural to urban migration, rural to urban to international, and urban to urban (Kenny 1961, 1963, 1976). More importantly, Madrid has had the highest demand for labor in the domestic service sector than any other Spanish cities (Gregorio 1998, Herránz Gomez 1998, Oso Casas 2004, Ramirez 1998). Many of these Moroccan immigrant women, who had come from the Jebala

[^8]: Turkish baths, separated by sex, and a popular place for socializing, gossiping, and arranging marriages.
region (Larache, Tangier, and Tetuan), tend to have lower levels of education. They have either worked as live-in maids and nannies and have opted not to marry in order to financially help their family. The married women who migrated alone have used this strategy as a way to bring their families afterwards, leaving their husbands and children behind (Lora-Tamayo d’ Ocón 2000, Oso Casas 2004, Ramírez 1998, Veredas 2004). Some women eventually divorce their husbands and sponsor only their children to Spain. For many Moroccans, the area most widely known to attract Moroccans and other newly arrived immigrants have been the neighborhood of Lavapies due to its central location and low-price housing.

**Lavapies: A Neighborhood of Immigrants**

“Lavapies has over fifty nationalities from Morocco, China, Senegal, Romania, Bangladesh, Nigeria, etc. Although only 60% are the original Spanish owners, we have been living side-by-side for quite some time without any problems. The bombing of 11-M had brought negative attention to our neighborhood because several of the terrorists had resided here. As a matter of fact, 80% of the news about our neighborhood has been negative. Our neighborhood is not perfect, but we represent what Spain is or could be, which is [a neighborhood where] many nationalities co-existing peacefully.” –Manuel Osuna, Presidente de la Asociación de Vecinos La Corrala de Lavapiés, February 21, 2010

Lavapies starts at Plaza Tirso de Molina to the roundabout of Ronda de Embajadores. A typical street to walk through the neighborhood is Calle Jesus y Maria, which changes into Calle Lavapies after 6 blocks. The first few stores are usually wholesale clothing and jewelry stores owned by Chinese immigrants. After passing a row of teleboutiques and small wholesale shops fills the center plaza of the neighborhood. One notable teleboutique is

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9 11-M is short for the March 11, 2005 train bombing in Madrid, in which over 200 people died. Several Moroccans were accused and tried in connection with the incident.
named “Touba Khelcom” where Africans and Moroccans can use the phone or send money and telegrams back to their countries of origin. Calle Lavapies, which extends from Plaza Tirso de Molina to Ronda de Valencia, remains the main artery of the neighborhood.

Immigrants from Sub-Sahara Africa are noticeably present at all hours of the day on Calle Lavapies, as well as the Indians, Bengalis, and Pakistanis who own the telephone shops and Indian restaurants near the small park. As indicative of the needs of its population, Lavapies is filled with teleboutiques (places with cheap internet services and pay phones to make cheap long-distance calls) and money transfer services to call home or send remittances at cheaper rates. The neighborhood also has various convenient stores selling ethnic foods and halal meats in order to cater to its inhabitants.

Many immigrant men congregate at the squares (Plaza Lavapies, Tirso de Molina,) either waiting for work offers in the morning by construction companies or to merely socialize and exchange information. In the early afternoon, they gather to socialize and sometimes to sell pirated cds and dvds into the late evening. The sub-Saharan Africans would gather in the Plaza Tirso de Molina behind the metro stop and the bus stop. The East Indian men can be found sitting on the benches along with elderly Spanish men on Calle Lavapies. The more assertive Moroccan men and boys usually huddle at the corner of Calle Caravaca and Calle Lavapies, hissing “chocolate”\textsuperscript{10} to prospective clients walking down the streets.

Young Moroccan men in Lavapies are known for drug dealing and other dangerous pursuits. Recruitment to sell is easy. The Moroccan boy just has to ask around for a position, and the chief operator, usually a Moroccan man in his early 30s, will approve. The young dealers offer a nickel-size amount of hashish for ten Euros to passersby. A simple nod or a quick “sí” signifies an agreement with an immediate change of cash for the hash at close

\textsuperscript{10} “Chocolate” is slang for hash.
proximity, usually in a discrete corner or between the crevices of two parked trucks. Further inquiries about other stocks of drugs (cocaine, heroine, acid, etc.) may result in a phone call at the nearby teleboutique for a special delivery at a murkier location (behind a building, at the garage door entry, etc.).

Until a year ago, young Moroccan men held a strong presence in the center of the neighborhood. However, Spain’s economic crisis has become worse, more and more police officers appear in Plaza Lavapies with fewer and fewer Moroccan boys perching at the corner of streets. Moroccan boys occasionally plead with the police at the Plaza not to arrest them for they either have to attend the neighborhood mosque or need the money to send home to their sick parents. Nowadays, Moroccans caught dealing drugs are sent immediately to prison for the average sentence of three years incarceration prior to deportation. The ones caught without proper documentation are either sentenced to 45 days imprisonment before their deportation or they can be directly deported back to Morocco if cheap flights are available.

In 2009, police departments throughout Spain started implementing a quota and a reward system for capturing undocumented immigrants. Racial profiling has become common for dark skin males of Arabic or African descent (El Mundo 2009, Diario ABC 2009). Spain has an agreement with Morocco and some African countries to deport illegal residents. Other immigrants such as Bengalis, who resemble Moroccans, are caught, imprisoned but are released after their incarceration because Spain does not have a repatriation agreement with Bangladesh. Furthermore, the cost of the flights is too high for the Ministry of Interior to bother.

Calle Tribulete, which starts from Plaza Lavapies to Embajadores Park, is infamous for the teleboutique from which one of the March 11th leading conspirators had owned and
operated. Although the teleboutique is no longer there, Moroccan businesses still dominate this street. A popular Moroccan restaurant leads a long row of Moroccan grocery stores, butcher shops, clothing shops, gift shops, hair salons, cafés, and the Moroccan association Ibn Batuta. Veiled and unveiled Moroccan women, as well as Spaniards and other nationalities, share the small walkway that leads from the heart of Lavapies to the edge of the Embajadores neighborhood. Dareeja, the Moroccan dialect, can be heard everywhere in the neighborhood: between a young couple, two women, and Moroccan men chatting at street corners, having coffee outside, or tending the gift and clothing shops on Tribulete. Midway on Calle Tribulete is a Moroccan male-only barber shop “Tangier,” named after the port city 14 km south of Algeciras, Spain.

Police activities can be observed along Tribulete Street. They often stop Moroccan boys from hurting each other with knives and at times, arrest drunken men beating their wives or girlfriends in bright daylight, or simply monitor for illegal immigrants. Behind the market, on Calle Sombrelete, lies a large ‘corrales’ apartment building, which houses immigrant families and elderly Spaniards. A Moroccan butcher shop and a large artisan store managed by several Moroccan men are half a block before the corrales of Calle Sombrelete. What is special about this particular building is that it also houses a small Pakistani mosque, which welcomes all male Muslims in the neighborhood. The mosque, located on the first floor of the apartment building, measures approximately 40 square-meters covered with worn Indian rugs over white tiles. The daily call to prayers do not resonate through loud speakers as they do in Morocco, but Muslim men in the neighborhood are aware of the prayer time and arrive according. According to Manuel Osuna, the current president of La Asociación de Vecinos La Corrala de Lavapiés, concerns regarding the mosque are minimal: “The only
complaint we have of the mosque is that they would leave their shoes near the entryway. It bothers some neighbors here. We do not believe there are terrorist activities there.” (Osuna 2010).

Next to the mosque is Madrid Puerta Abierta, a non-profit Spanish association that provides social and educational services to immigrant families. A small group of Moroccan women from Tetuan who live near the mosque on Calle Meson de Paredes and Calle Amparo attend the Spanish language and social integration workshop conducted by Spanish social workers from Madrid Puerta Abierta while their husbands attend the afternoon mosque service. On Fridays these women go to the women’s support group at the Centro Hispano-Marroqui after attending the social integration workshop.

The Centro serves as a public civic center aim at integrating Moroccans and other immigrants in the center of the city to Spanish society. The Centro receives funding from both the Ayuntamiento de Madrid (the city of Madrid) and the Comunidad de Madrid (the province or region of Madrid) and is strategically located near the Atocha train station, the infamous site of the March 11th train bombing but within the vicinity of Lavapies. The Centro is currently managed and operated by La Rueca Asociacion, a non-governmental association originally established to help integrate the Gypsy population into society. La Rueca won a bid from the province in 2007 to establish a center for Moroccan integration as part of the government’s three-year Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration (MTAS 2007).

The Moroccan women usually take the path from the Embajadores Park on Calle Tribulete to Plaza Lavapies to the Centro three to four times a week for Spanish classes, cultural workshops and activities and support groups. They often arrive alone though at times
they would come in pairs or in small groups of three or four. Moroccan women over forty
years of age are often veiled when walking through Lavapies and even during the time spent
at the Centro. They see the Centro as a public space where strangers roam and Moroccan
female neighbors may talk about them.

The women often befriend each other by age cohort and/or by towns and
neighborhoods and sometimes include new members to their existing social networks.
Though groups are sometimes formed from activities in the Centro, many women have
known each other prior to coming to Madrid. Some were neighbors back in their hometown.
Others are relatives or friends of relatives. They often come to each other houses to have tea
and pastries, albeit not as often as they had done in Morocco. The leaders of the groups tend
to be the hostesses of tea parties in their cramped corralas apartment because hosting is
considered an honor and having guests bring them baraka (blessing).

The majority of the Moroccan women in Lavapies live in the typical corralas
apartments. These buildings are deteriorating due to age, ranging from 100 to 150 years, and
the local government has neglected to renovate them. Properties in Lavapies have
depreciated since the real estate market dove in 2008 and rent has been consistently lower
than other areas in the city. The owners no longer live in the neighborhood and have rented
their apartments to immigrants who in turn would rent their bed to other immigrants.
Immigrants have a reputation of keeping “the beds hot” (las camas calientes), beds which are
rented out in eight-hour periods/shifts and are constantly occupied throughout the day
(Veksler 2005).

Conditions are often poor with ceilings caving in, poor lighting, and small space. It is
not uncommon to find an entire family living in a 30 square-meters apartment (Veksler
Entering these old apartment buildings requires strength and ambidexterity. In order to open the door, one has to push in the heavy wooden door while manipulating the rusty lock. Once inside the dark corridor, nimble fingers are useful in locating the light switch between the row of mailboxes and splinters. Additionally, one has to maintain some vigilance with the falling planks and the dripping water from rows of hanging plants. The darkness of the corridor either continues up a decomposing flight of stairs or ends in the brightness of patio in the center, which connects up to four apartment buildings.

The well-maintained apartment buildings have clean patios with a couple of old tables and chairs, where neighbors can congregate, but the women have told me that their Spanish neighbors usually gather in the patio areas during the summer afternoons and weekends cheering and shouting at each other. Even so, many patio areas of these buildings are cluttered with piles of wooden planks, bags of sand or dry cement, and stacks of bricks. Although the local government implemented a citywide renovation project in the late 1990s, Lavapiés have been one of the very last neighborhoods to benefit from this venture. Very few buildings have elevators so immigrant women have to climb two to four flights of stairs with bags of groceries, small children and baby carriages. Nonetheless, the compacted and complicated building structures with its internal passageways and steep stairs resembles many neighborhoods in Morocco.

Some families are fortunate to find furnished apartments for rent as they can use the saved money for other necessities. However, the rent for furnished apartments is often higher and requires a larger security deposit. The less fortunate ones, on the hand, can find small, unfurnished apartments with no kitchen appliances. The rent may be slightly lower, between 300 and 450 Euros, but renters need time and money to make their apartments livable. When
they have the time and the means, Moroccan immigrants often bring back furniture and textiles from their summer vacations in Morocco.

The type of furniture and wares in the house indicate the length of time the immigrants have resided in Spain. Although some stores carry household items from Morocco, the high markup of the prices can deter Moroccans from buying the imports. Immigrants would rather wait until they return home to buy more economically. Additionally, families who stay longer in Spain can save enough money to obtain a Spanish driver’s license since driving schools are mandatory and expensive (at least 1,000 Euros). Immigrants may bring items to and from Morocco by bus, but since there is a weight limit, people tend to bring only the necessities.

Families residing less than ten years in Spain have few, if any, household items from Morocco. They have tagine dishes and the tea sets, reasonably priced and easily bought in Spain or easily carried from Morocco. However, other household items and furniture are either furnished by the apartment owner or are locally bought in Spain. As their time in Spain increases, their houses are filled with more items from Morocco, which not only bridge two cultures but also bring a sense of settlement.

Many apartments of long-term Moroccan immigrants residing in Spain have Moroccan style divans, which are long rectangular pieces of packed cotton or other material covered with heavy, colorful textiles with Arabian designs. Pillows of various shapes and sizes with matching textiles may be used for both decorating and for sleeping. Since many immigrants’ apartments in Lavapiés are small with one or two bedrooms, family members often use the salon sofa as their bed. Many Moroccan homes have large framed Koran writings and other Moroccan designs, elegant curtains and many silver plates, pots and jars.
for special occasions. The long-term residents have the means to bring typical Moroccan items to their Spanish homes. Their large television, although bought in Spain, may have Channel 2M from Morocco and other Arabic channels broadcasting in Classic Arabic in the background. They often watch Egyptian and Mexican soap operas as if they were still in Morocco. Satellite and cable television packages are expensive so immigrants need to have a sufficient income to pay for the service or they use their social network to locate someone to hack these services for them.

Neighbors, friends and family still visit for tea and cookies but not as frequently as in Morocco. Moroccan women, fortunate enough to sponsor family members to Spain, may have them living nearby. Female family members and friends often arrive at their house, many times without prior notice, to discuss the family situation in Spain and back in Morocco, the current economic situation, mutual friends and acquaintances, recipes, and job possibilities.

The husbands’ family, if they live in Spain, may reside in the same neighborhood but the proximity is farther than the women’s side of the family, either in another part of the city, in another part of the country, or in another European country. On the other hand, women who had migrated with their husbands or had followed their husbands via the family reunification program, tend to have more of their husbands’ families nearby rather than their own. Some Moroccan female migrants who migrated alone either live in government-subsidized flats, with their bosses’ families, or in flats owned by their bosses.

**Social Networks in Lavapies**

Social networks, however, serve many needs apart from basic resources and assistance. In Morocco, the women’s social network generally consists of kin, friends and
neighbors who not only provide help but also regulate behaviors, disseminate information and uphold tradition and custom. The strength of women’s kin and social network may decrease after marriage but women never completely sever their ties. As with migration, marriage also reconfigures women’s social network. On the other hand, social network may also dictate behaviors or it reconstructs notions of honor among the women. The more closed and tightly knitted the network of the women is with their compatriots are, the more social vigilance and pressure to conform to modest and honorable behaviors and at times, marriage choices.

Due to the constraints of traditional Moroccan marriages, Moroccan women often resort to their kin and social network to obtain resources, assistance and information. However, when a person, man or woman, migrates, his or her social network will undergo a drastic reconfiguration, either severing ties or adding new ones. For Moroccan female migrants who usually depend on kin and neighbors, migrating alone to a foreign country without knowing the people, the language, and the culture can be overwhelming if they do not find new people to rebuild their social network. Associations sometimes help with the process but research indicates that Moroccans and other immigrants first approach their fellow countrymen, then associations and afterwards to native inhabitants of the host country (Maya Jariego 2003, Maya Jariego et. al. 1999).

The Centro Hispano-Marroqui has a women’s group. The term ‘group’ used in the context does not imply an organized, self-perpetuating entity that recruits and reproduce members. The Centro uses the label 'el grupo de mujeres' (the women's group) merely as a title although the members have hoped that the group will blossom into something more than just weekly meetings. This women’s group consists of two different social networks of
women who may know each other but do not have contact outside the Centro’s activities.

Other Moroccan women associations such as AMAL (Asociacion de Mujeres Marroquies), AMAIA (Asociacion Mujeres Arabe para Igualdad y Apoyo), and ATIME (Asociacion de Trabajadores e Inmigrantes Marroquies en España) offer some assistance, but Moroccan women complain that these organizations focus more on their political agenda than on providing services for women. As a result, the Moroccan women who approach these centers continue to depend highly on their social networks of kin and friends than on these associations.

Teatime in Morocco serves as a designated time when female kin and friends gather at each other house for an afternoon snack to discuss and plan events. Moroccan women in Spain complain that they do not have the afternoon teatime like their mothers have had. Nevertheless, teatime remains important for Moroccan women to rekindle or establish social network ties. Although women take turn visiting each other, some women have more visits and guests, particularly the ones with more knowledge and contacts in their host country. These ‘cultural brokers’ would be frequently contacted to accompany the women to appointments in order to translate for them.

In fact, studies of relationship networks among immigrants have emphasized the necessity of social support networks in adapting to their receiving country (Maya Jariego 2003, Maya Jariego et. al. 1997). Time and family reunification have solidified former networks, making them more ‘closed’ than before. Immigrants residing less than ten years in their receiving country have different types of social networks, depending on their country of origin and marital status (Maya et. al. 1997). Moroccans, particularly women who had migrated alone, tend to have a minimal amount of network support (0-3 providers) when they
immigrate to a foreign country (Maya Jariego 2003). They would first seek assistance from their fellow compatriots before soliciting help from the Spanish natives. Yet in the case of the first cohort of Moroccan female migrants, they did not have a Moroccan community before the 1980s to seek assistance so they had to rebuild their own social network by first starting with initial contact person who had helped them migrate in Morocco.

**Conclusion**

Spain and Morocco may only be separated by 14 kilometers of water along the Strait of Gibraltar, but the difference in the places and the space for Moroccan women requires some cultural readjustments. If the immigrant women had settled in Andalusia, then the houses and surroundings would have looked similar. Still, my informants have noticed the differences in behaviors, mannerisms, and beliefs. The women in this study live mainly in the capital city of Madrid so their exposure to a big European city have taken more effort than living in a small southern Spanish town, which may have some similar characteristics to their towns and villages in Morocco.

Yet, the Moroccan immigrant women in this study have experienced more social space and freedom in movement in their host society than in their hometown. They do not have to worry about being on their brother's or their father's short leash. They can speak to whom they want whenever they want without the looming judgment of neighbors and the threat of abuse from their family members for acting loosely. They are free to walk alone without risking their reputation and their family honor.

On the other hand, more social space may also mean more difficulty in locating compatriots for information and assistance. As a result of immigration, the social networks that these immigrant women had depended on have either been greatly reduced or severed.
The expansion of social space allows Moroccan women to start a new life, learn new ideas and practices, and acquire new experiences and opportunities. The disadvantages of living abroad in Spain are the loneliness, the lack of family support, the frustration of learning a new language and cultural misunderstanding, and the need to find resources and information on their own.
Celebration at the Centro Hispano-Marroqui
TRADITIONAL MARRIAGES AND HONOR

"Marriage without good faith is like a tea-pot without a tray."
"When you marry, marry into a good family, the enemy will find nothing to say."—Moroccan proverbs, Westermarck (1931)

"For all those women, life was limited. It did not amount to much more than cooking, housework, waiting around, and once a week, a restful afternoon in the hamman. I was secretly pleased that I did not belong to that limited world."—Tahar Ben Jelloun, The Sand Child (1985)

The honor system, as noted by Jane Schneider (1971) and other social scientists, thrives when the reach of legal authority is weak or nonexistent. In fact, researchers claim that honor operates outside the path of the formal legal system (Nisbett and Cohen 1996, Black-Michaud 1975). Various societies, however, have etched honor into its legal texts, supporting the values held by its members (Stewart 1994). Morocco exemplifies this pattern of a society that has historically been hostile towards its mazhen, the central authority, yet with the gradual incorporation of the tribal sectors through concessions and negotiations, some balance has been achieved.

In less than fifty years, Morocco has transitioned from a country with perpetual tribal feuds to a European colony and finally to an independent country whose tribal contestation rests upon the tentative control of an autocratic monarchy (Pennell 2003, Waterbury 1970). Despite the changes to Moroccan society throughout the twentieth century, marriage and family remain the glue that keeps laws, ideals and institutions in balance. The Family Codes, the Moudawana, represents the ongoing tension and negotiation made among the different sectors of its society. Values related to tribal and lineage (nasab) solidarity such as honor (sharaf) have been incorporated into the legal imprints of the Moudawana.

Family Law and Documentation
Unlike many Western societies, the separation between religion and government or Church and State does not exist in Morocco. Although Spain identifies itself as a confessional state, the Catholic Church does not directly dictate and influence family law. Recently, gay marriages, abortion rights and common law marriages have met countless challenges from the Spanish Catholic Church with diminutive effect. Morocco, on the other hand, takes its guidance from Islamic law, the *Shari’a*\(^{11}\), which weaves religion into the moral and social fabric of Moroccan and other Muslim societies.

The *Shari’a* encompasses many aspects of private and public life. It directs codes not only in family and kin relations but also personal status and property rights. The *Shari’a* also dictates explicitly on kinship and family matters. Feminist scholars have indicated that the interpretations of the *Shari’a* by male authorities throughout the centuries have condoned the subjugation of women in order to preserve patrilineal privileges and solidarity (Ahmed 2002, Mernissi 1987, Wadud 2002). The degree of referencing depends on the predilection of the country’s legislative framers. Essentially, the degree of female subordination ranges among Muslim countries as each has the authority to compile its own set of laws with references to the *Shari’a* (Ahmed 2002, Charrad 2001).

Morocco has reinterpreted and revised its family laws several times since the inception in 1957 of the *Moudawana*. The changes the *Moudawana* have undergone reflect the changes in the country’s socio-political tensions (Charrad 2001). The *Moudawana* projects an ideal-type Moroccan family, headed by the father with the support of his agnates and male heirs (Bargach 2002). Family honor and lineage preservation serve as the foundation upon which the codes are based. In actuality, marriage and spousal duties are

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\(^{11}\) The *Shari’a*, a collection of religious Muslim laws of the 7th century, legitimizes the male-centered, societal structure, sanctioned by God, in which the father has authority over the son and other family members and the man over the woman.
dictated with lineage and honor in mind, which is clearly indicated in Article 51 of the 

*Moudawana*:

“[Marriage duties are] lawful cohabitation on the basis of good conjugal 
relations, justice, equality in case of polygamy, mutual fidelity, virtue, 
and the preservation of family honor and their children; cohabitation, 
mutual respect, affection, and the preservation of the family interests; 
good relations with each other's parents and close relatives, respecting, 
visiting and hosting them within accepted standards...”

Honor and family preservation remain crucial in the ideal marital relations, favoring the husband and his agnates. The previous versions of the *Moudawana* have allowed kin, particularly patrilineal kin, to control property, production, and reproduction of the family unit. Although recent changes to the *Moudawana* have decreased the agnates' legal domination in the familial realm, sociocultural dicta can perpetuate practices privileging patriarchy.

**Post-Colonial Challenges and the Moudawana**

Despite modeling its family code after the *Shari‘a* recommendations and Maliki sources, the Moudawana carries political remnants from the colonial period. Under the French Protectorate, Morocco's administrative and legal procedures needed to be unified, systematized, and controlled using the French version of legal documentation and codification (Bargach 2002). The French's obsession with legalization gave way to the Berber Dahir (decree) of 1930, which officialized and regulated the functioning of the course of justice in the Berber region (Brown 1972). The French used the decree as a divide and conquer tactic of pitting the Berbers against the Arabs. The strategy backfired by instigating nationalist feelings, which led to the independent movement.

Morocco’s independence in 1956 challenged a new nation wrangling with pre-
colonial tribal mayhem to rebuild itself. As a matter of fact, much of Moroccan history has been rife with tribal rivalry, which the French had known about and had tried to extract as a part of its divide and conquer strategy. Local leaders with tribal ties would rule the countryside while urbanites followed the makzhen (government). The two zones constantly battle for domination while the sultan, now king, manages the balance by distributing concessions.

The country had united under Mohammed V in its struggle for independence, and the king had to maintain the fragile political equilibrium while rebuilding the nation. However, as the monarchy found its strongest support among the rural tribes, the King would acquiesce to their demands by maintaining the post-colonial status quo. He retained the social, economic, and political arrangements that favored the survival of tribally organized social structure (Charrad 2001). Tribal arrangement meant marriage by alliance in order to maintain ties and promote asabiyya or the group solidarity that Ibn Khaldun (1989) proposes. Hence, the composition of family law would need to closely follow the Shari'a, which privileges kinship ties, particularly the patrilineal ones, at the cost of subordinating the women.

Although Mohammed V had informed the public of his intent on preserving the spirit of the Shari'a in the Moudawana, the nationalists tried to pressure the King to reconsider. The nationalists from the urban-based party, the Istiqlal, had contributed significantly to the independence of Morocco. However, they were not the only ones who helped drive the colonial forces out. The King recognized that his power rested upon maintaining a political stalemate between the urban and rural opposition. Since the nationalists wanted a constitutional monarchy with more power allocated to parliament, Mohammed V benefitted more by siding with rural leaders. The rural leaders, who had been ruling through tribal
connections, wanted to maintain local control. The King, on the other hand, had serious
reservations about relinquishing too much national control. In the end, the King collaborated
with the rural leaders for his own benefit (Charrad 2001).

Regardless of the political outcome, the nationalists had their own ideas on how to
frame the new family code. They proposed the ideas of Allal al-Fasi, the founder and leader
of the nationalist party, Istiqlal. Fasi published a book Al-Naqd Al-Dhati (Self-criticism) in
1952 arguing for equality between the sexes in the legal reformation of the nation (Charrad
2001). Fasi believes that the existence of what Geertz (1995) refers to as ‘primordial ties’ of
tribe and kin in Morocco has perpetuated the social strife that has plagued Morocco for
centuries. In order to move beyond this social disharmony; Morocco needs to reconfigure its
family unit. He also proposed to modernize Morocco with the conjugal family as the basic
unit rather than the extended kinship ties that have ordered Morocco.

Educated women, who had come from elite families, had more opportunities than
other women in the independence movement. Even though the educated women of elite
families continued serving their country as political leaders, social workers, and instructors,
they also faced other disappointment as women, particularly when the government passed the
Moudawana in 1958. Prior to the independence movement, Moroccan women had been
socially relegated to the private sphere, but the practice had been passed down by tradition
and custom (Maher 1978). The Moudawana, however, formalized this social practice in
1958. The Islamic revival following Morocco’s independence had prompted the Moroccan
government to model the Moudawana after strict patriarchal interpretation of the Shari’a,
deeming women as too immature to handle legal matters, including their own marriages
(Baker 1999, Mernissi 1987). According to feminist scholars, the interpretation of Islam
through male authoritarian structure has been the main reason for female repression in Muslim countries (Ahmed 1992, Mernissi 1987, Wadud 1999).

In the end, Fasi’s proposal fell on deaf ears along with the nationalist agenda of a constitutional monarchy (Pennell 2003). Furthermore, Morocco chose to garner its support behind the monarchy, albeit constitutional or absolute, and the monarchy preferred collaborating with the local tribal leaders. Fasi, the urban elite, and many women who had fought for the nationalist party had to contend with the political and social loss (Baker 1999, Charrad 2001).

By crafting the *Moudawana*, the king unified Moroccan personal status codes that had once separated the Arabs from the Berbers through the French implementation of the Berber Dahir. Addressing those charged with promulgating the Code of Personal Status in 1956, King Muhammad V stated that Morocco’s rich history meant that it did not need to have recourse to the legal codes of foreign powers (Pennell 2003). The decree had officially granted legitimacy to customary law and tribal councils in Berber regions as a colonial strategy of conquest by inciting factional feuds. The sovereign Morocco needed the *Moudawana* to join the various factions, and Mohammed V chose to uphold kinship ties and tribal solidarity in his version of unification (Charrad 2001).

Using the French system of codification, the King implemented the original *Moudawana* as a series of decrees between November 1957 and March 1958. The Moroccan Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice later supplemented it with legal acts and decisions. Mohammed V wanted to establish legal regulations that resembled a codification of Islamic law and preserved the prescriptions of Maliki law and the *Shari’a*.

**Reproduction and Property**
By basing the *Moudawana* on the conservative interpretation of the Islamic family law, Morocco adopted the vision of society inherent in traditional Islam. The Moroccan family code obligates a *wali*, a marriage tutor, who is usually a male family member, to represent the woman in contracting marriage. Having a marriage representative not only treat women as minors but also allow space for arranged alliances between kin groups through the exchange of women. Thus, paternal kinship ties would overshadow conjugal unit in all matrimonial matters (Charrad 2001).

Since the child inherits his or her patrilineal filiation, the *Moudawana* gives explicit guidelines in determining patrimony. “Filiation” has an anthropological definition, which is related to descent and complementary filiation and is comprised of matrilineal links (Fox 1967). The *Moudawana*, on the other hand, defines filiation as descent “by which a child becomes part of the *nasab* of his father” (Global Rights 2005). The term *nasab* refers to the agnatic lineage, the patrimony of paternal filiation, which needs the recognition and acknowledgement of the biological father (Al-Haj 1995). The inclusion of this definition of filiation highlights the extent to which Moroccan family law emphasizes patrilineal descent in its conception of the family (Charrad 2001). Hence, an unwed mother cannot give the child a last name without the consent of the child's father or her father's surname. Despite automatically having complimentary filiation with the child as a mother, the mother may not grant descent from her kin group without the child's maternal grandfather's permission. Women may possess the privilege of giving birth, a natural prerogative, but societal reproduction belongs to men. Patrimony is a male prerogative. Without a surname, the child does not legally exist in Morocco and cannot apply for government identification or for school (Bargach 2002).
Mother then is nature, and father is culture, which dominates in its determinining
descent and material inheritance. Feminist scholars posit that traditional interpretation of
Islam has an underlying fear of women. Islam perceives women as evil, sexually
promiscuous by nature, divisive and unpredictable (Charrad 2001, Mernissi 1987, Wadud
1999). Culture (male) has to dominate nature (female) in traditional Islamic law. Therefore,
guidelines to determine paternal filiation dominate Moroccan family law, which follows
closely to the Shari’a and Maliki law. The law, the public male-dominated realm in Islamic
tradition, controls the recruitment and inclusion of new members.

Men may know with whom they have had sexual relations, but they can never be sure
the unborn child is theirs. The general underlying suspicion of women and their sexual
prowess complicates the reproductive process, particularly since it involves property
inheritance. Despite attempting to control women's sexual activities under the system of
family honor, misogynist suspicion still looms in matrimony. One resolution to this dilemma
has been etched into a formulaic guidance for determining patrimony.

According to the Moudawana, a divorced or widowed woman has to observe a
waiting period or an ‘iddah before remarrying. A divorced woman has to wait three months,
whereas a widow waits for four months before another betrothal may occur. The reason for
instituting the ‘iddah is to allow for the possibility that the woman may be pregnant at the
time of the divorce or the death of her husband. This formula ensures the identity of the
father if the woman gives birth to a child within the designated time frame. If she turns out to
be pregnant, then her waiting period lasts until the birth of the child. Otherwise, she may
remarry after the end of three month or the four-month period. With these guidelines,
reproductive matter remains within agnatic control.
The need for men and their agnates to control the reproductive process has link to property division, which still favors the patriarchal structure. Inheritance laws privilege agnatic kin by granting more to male heirs than to female heirs. Male children receive twice the amount of their female counterparts. If the family has no direct male heir, then the inheritance may go to the nearest male descendant or the father can use the epiclerate system which designates inheritance to female heirs in the absence of a male heir (Goody 1983). The distribution of some property to females in Islamic law may explain the preference for patrilineal parallel cousin marriages in order to maintain property within the kin groups (Holy 1989).

The *Moudawana* requires a will to be ascertained by two notaries and sign by its author in order for it to be valid. Revealing the difficulty of the Moroccan administration in controlling the registration of civil matters, however, the same article of the code relaxes the conditions for the validity of a will. If, for acceptable reasons, the will cannot be established before two notaries, but only in the presence of witnesses, it is still valid. It can also be expressed verbally and does not necessarily have to exist in writing.

Furthermore, each spouse retains his or her separate property before marriage while marital or communal property, including children, belongs predominately to the husband and his kin. In fact, the husband retains absolute control of the fragile marital bond, which is tolerated in Islamic law (Charrad 2001). The original *Moudawana* allowed polygyny, repudiation, and unilateral divorce by husbands. Polygyny is still legal, albeit difficult to apply, in accordance with the *Shari’a*’s recommendations, because the man has to treat each wife equally. Nevertheless, wealthy and resourceful men have practice polygamy in Morocco for centuries (Mernissi 1987, 2003). Regarding repudiation under *Maliki* law, a man can use
the informal repudiate formula of stating three times, “I repudiate thee,” to terminate his marriage without legal recourse. On the other hand, a woman may divorce only under very strict guidelines of abandonment, infertility, and/or severe physical abuse. The husband, however, must appear to contest his divorce, whereas the presence of the wife is not necessary or judges to grant divorces (Mernissi 1987). Islam, in actuality, considers marriage a contract that legitimates sexual relations obliging a man to present a bridewealth for the woman’s reproductive and domestic services as well as for her virtue and fidelity (Charrad 2001, Mernissi 1987).

**The First Reform**

Contradictions, however, exist between the *Moudawana*, privileging patrilineal kinship ties while the Moroccan Constitution focuses on individual rights. Civil status, as embodied in the various Moroccan constitutions dating from 1962, is based on the principle of equality between men and women. The Moroccan Constitution states: “All Moroccans are equal before the law” (Article 5); men and women enjoy equally their political and civil rights (Article 8); the sexes are equal in the exercise of public employment and in the conditions required (Article 12).” These statements of equality for women challenge the *Moudawana*, which had constructed the female citizens as minors unable to enter into marriage contracts on their own and needing to be represented by a *wali* (a guardian in the form of a male family member) until their husbands take over.

In the past, Moroccan women had no say in the event the husband decided to marry additional wives. Lacking autonomy, a woman had little control over their own lives or those of their children should her husband divorced her. These inconsistencies led to periodic movements to bring the *Moudawana* into harmony with other laws. A 1972 royal commission
drafted some proposed changes, but a surge of conservative political and religious uproar halted this effort. In 1979, women associations and members of the Istiqlal political party submitted two drafts for changing the Moudawana, but the Ministry of Justice bypassed the Constitution by forwarding the drafts to the ulama (a group of religious scholars), and only a few of the original initiatives were passed. During that same year, a royal commission of three magistrates proposed many minor changes and some major changes to the Moudawana, but they also met intense religious opposition.

In the 1980s Morocco experienced another surge of economic and social upturn that would eventually prompt another reform. Even with a surge of Western aid and a lack of political opposition, the Moroccan government faced a series of droughts that would eventually bring havoc to the Moroccan economy. A riot broke out in Casablanca in 1981 after government raised the price of subsidized commodities due to the winter drought of 1980-1981. Poverty has overtaken Casablanca with 32% of adults unemployed (Pennell 2003). The Islamic movement rose to the occasion by providing aid to impoverished households in exchange for their participation.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union attempted to help Morocco out of its economic ailments. The European Union even reduced restrictions on trade between 1980 and 1983 in hopes of animating the Moroccan economy. The IMF also set guidelines to reduce budgetary deficits and redirect investments to export industries. As a result, Morocco reduced its deficit by the end of the 1980s with agriculture, fishing and tourism thriving. Additionally, remittances from immigrants helped to stabilize the northern Morocco. Nevertheless, unemployment and inflation increased as a result placing more pressure on the makzhen.
Furthermore, women had participated more outside their homes, some out of necessity while others out of interest. With the high rate of male emigration and divorce, Morocco had twenty per cent of its households headed by women by the early 1980s (Pennell 2003). Women had entered the workforce, making up 35% of the urban workforce by 1990 and a third of professional positions (judges, doctors, teachers and university lecturers). In 1984, Nawal al-Moutaouakkil, won the women’s 400 meters hurdles in the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, further challenging the traditional images of Moroccan women.

During the mid-1980s, another campaign to liberalize the Moudawana began amidst the severe financial crisis and structural adjustment. King Hassan finally succumbed to mass pressure and passed a series of economic reforms and human rights reforms in the midst of a parliamentary implementation of a new constitution. In 1992, Hassan II approved a new constitution granting more power to parliament and bestowing more respect for human rights. Moreover, Hassan began restructuring the economy with privatization of state enterprises and a liberalization of trade. The European also assisted in this endeavor by providing more aid after the Mediterranean conference in Barcelona in 1995 to forge better relations with the various States in the eastern and southern Mediterranean.

As Moroccan society opened up to more Western influences, women renewed their fight for equality, holding meetings and workshops, and sharing research on women’s rights according to the Koran. They even contributed greatly in the establishment of a human rights organization, Organisation Marocain des Droits de l’Homme in 1988, in October 1990, the Union de l’Actin Féminine (Union for Feminine Action). Founded by professional and middle-class women, the Union for Feminine Action launched a campaign to gather a million signatures on a petition to reform the Moudawana. The campaign encountered such bitter
conflict with conservative religious groups that in 1992, the king intervened.

On August 20, 1992, in a national broadcast, Hassan II arbitrated, stating that the Moudawana was his responsibility as Commander of the Faithful (Amir al-Muminin) and that only he had the authority to amend it. After meeting with the women to discuss the proposed reforms, Hassan II brought their suggestions before the Council of the Ulama\textsuperscript{12}, and in 1991, some reforms were passed, opening the door to change: a man now needed his wife’s permission to take other wives, a religious judge’s permission was required for the divorce; a mother who is more than eighteen years of age would receive custody of their children if their father died.

**The Second Reform**

External and internal pressures have lead to changes to the Moudawana in 2004. After the fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, Morocco faced pressure from the World Bank, feminist groups and human rights group, and Moroccan liberal-reformist parties to broaden women rights. Supporters of women’s equality argued that the participation of women was essential to any process of modernization and to democracy. There could be no true development without women because it was the women’s movement that had opened space for a civil, democratic society.

In March 1998, the various political groups joined together under the leadership of ‘Abderrahmane El Youssoufi, leader of Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), to call for a “Plan of Action for the Integration of Women.” Youssoufi and the socialists took control of government, albeit under the guidance of the monarchy to implement reform on women’s rights as part of Hassan’s gouvernement de alternance (Maddy-Weitzman 2005). The agenda consisted of protecting women from violence, raising levels of female literacy,

\textsuperscript{12} The official Council of Islamic scholars.
promoting women's and children's health, integrating women into the economic framework, strengthening women’s status in the legal, political, and public institutional spheres, eliminating obligated obedience for women, and allowing judges to decide on repudiation proceedings and to enforce restrictions on polygamy.

The response among religious circles regarding the proposed changes was strongly negative. The Islamic opposition led by ‘Abd al-Karim Khatib of the Parti du Justice et Développement, which had obtained 10 seats in 1997 and 44 seats in a 325-member parliament in 2002, openly attacked against changing the law. Due to the strong opposition from the Islamic groups, changes to the Moudawana stalled until the death of Hassan II.

Following the death of Hassan in 1999, his son Mohammed VI replaced his father as the king and leader of the Moroccan nation. Along with the throne, Mohammed VI had inherited the challenges and dilemmas of his country. Hassan II had numerous international and domestic political controversies that included human rights violations. Armed with French education in law, the new king prioritized human rights in his foremost order of business. In his first public statement to the nation, Mohammed VI declares:

“We strongly adhere to the system of constitutional monarchy, political pluralism, economic liberalism, regional and decentralized policy, the establishment of the state of rights and law, preserving human rights and individual and collective liberties, protecting security and stability for everyone” (BBC, July 31, 1999).

In this speech, the king clearly stated his intention to change Moroccan society.

In 2001 a number of women's groups formed a coalition called the "Spring of Equality" to protest the lack of progress in reforming the Personal Status Code. The lack of progress continued through the end of December 2002 when the chairman of the Moudawana Advisory Commission, Driss Dahak, announced that the Commission would not
be able to complete its work by the end of the year. The following year, the King replaced Dahak as chairman with Mohamed Boucetta, a former Foreign Minister to spearhead the proceedings. Although Mohammed had expressed sympathy towards women’s rights, his committee proposed two different sets of changes: one more limited and the other more expansive.

Nevertheless, on the international front, the European Union had been expanding rapidly and assisting poorer countries such as Spain, Morocco’s neighboring country, to prosper considerably. Mohammed wants to maintain good relations with the various countries as approximately 400,000 Moroccans are residing abroad in 2003 (US Department of State 2007). Additionally, sixty percent of Moroccan exports went to European markets, complicating relations even further between Morocco and Western nations (Pennell 2003). Overall, the King wants to present Morocco a modern and different from other Muslim country. This desire may have a played part in his initial proposal to make changes to the Moudawana (Maddy-Weitzman 2005).

When a terrorist bombing shocked Casablanca on May 16, 2003, killing 37 people, the King was forced to take action. The bombing had consequently influenced Mohammed’s determination to present a response to radical Islam, which he had not anticipated (Maddy-Weitzman 2005). The King decided to promote a more open interpretation of Islamic law using the revisions to the Moudawana as the platform. On October 10, 2003, Mohammed VI made a speech to Parliament presenting his plan to replace the Moudawana with a new modern Family Law that is “meant to free women from the injustices they endure, in addition to protecting children’s rights and safeguarding men’s dignity.” He ended all debates to the proposed changes with a reminder: “As the King of all Moroccans, I do not make legislation
for a given segment of the population of a specific party. Rather, I seek to reflect the general will of the Nation, which I consider to be my extended family” (Maddy-Weitzman 2005). The speech ended with the King ensuring the population that Morocco’s socio-cultural past would change, meaning measures would need to be taken in order to create the modern family court system.

The revisions to the 2004 *Moudawana* have brought more significant changes to Moroccan family law and women’s rights. The reforms raise the minimum marrying age from fifteen to eighteen, although family court judges may decide on exceptional cases. The reforms also establish the right to divorce by mutual consent. Under this new law, polygamy will be permitted only under highly restrictive conditions and the new Code also makes it more difficult for men to divorce their wives without their consent. Repudiation is also placed under strict judicial control. The responsibility of the family now lies with both spouses rather than blaming women for the family’s disintegration and allowing men to sole control of their wives and children. In actuality, the new reforms rescind the wife’s duty of obedience to her husband and eliminate the requirement of a marital tutor (*wali*) to marry. The new focus of Moroccan family law has moved away from extended patrilineal kinship ties to the nuclear family and individual rights.

The new reforms have brought mixed reception from the public. Conservative Islamists have accused the King of acquiescing to European and American pressure. Nadia Yassin, spokeswoman for Justice and Charity Islamist Movement (Al Adl Wa Al Ihssane), declared, “These reforms have been elaborated in response to the desires of foreigners and the feminist movement, but not to produce any real change in women's lives (Weingartner 2005).” Some Moroccans believe that “international organizations such as the world bank
have forced Morocco to introduce the changes in order to change the religion and culture. The conservative Islamists believe that the changes to the Moudawana directly attack and seek to change Islam (Weingartner 2005). They oppose the changes as defense against the penetration of Western hegemony.

On the other hand, the Minister of Justice Mohammed Bouzoubaa described the draft Code as a "crucial stage in the evolution Morocco is going through at the constitutional, democratic, and social and human rights level." In an interview published on January 17, 2004 by French magazine "Le Figaro Madame," Belqadi said, "since the beginning of his reign, HM King Mohammed VI voiced support for women's rights.” According to Belqadi, the King has been brave enough to launch a deep-rooted reform that has been controversial in many Muslim countries (Weingartner 2005). Women associations in Morocco generally delivered praises to the new reforms, yet they feared the complicated implementation may stir conflicts among Islamist militants (Weingartner 2005).

The new legislation, which is based on a reinterpretation of Islamic law, ensures equality of men and women before the law. Feminist Islamic scholars have investigated and debated gender rights, some of which have passed onto the legal reforms. Feminists have reinterpreted the origin of humankind, noting that Eve may have originated from Adam's rib, but Allah had made them equal in rights and responsibility over the fruits of the Earth. Due to these feminist reinterpretations, codes implying the inferiority of women in the previous versions of the Moudawana have changed to give women more rights in family law and to prioritize the conjugal unit over the lineage bonds. Beyond the written texts, however, traditions and inherited customs still regulate women’s status in Morocco. It is because of these traditions and inherited customs that have made the implementation of the reforms
complicated.

**The Moudawana in Morocco**

When laws are in conflict with normative traditions concerning family customs, women may find their lived experience not equating with their constitutional rights and civil status. Although the newly revised version of the *Moudawana* has endowed women with more rights, several factors prevent them from benefitting from these rights. In many cases, *de jure* laws do not correspond with *de facto* practices since social customs dictate social behaviors.

Firstly, Moroccan lawyers and judges still practice according to the old social customs and traditional perception, which inhibit the implementation of the *Moudawana* (Global Rights 2009). In order to implement the new changes to the *Moudawana*, judges and lawyers need to be trained. Their lack of familiarity with reforms may be one reason for the delay. Even with Ministry of Justice launching training programs for family court judges, the training may not suffice due to the uncertainty of the judiciary commitment to administering the reforms (Global Rights 2009). In fact, judges still fail to adhere to the modest reforms of 1993. Nevertheless, the revised text does allow judges to use religious principles in deciding on situations not included in the text, which give judges the prerogative to interpret as they see fit. Moreover, judges now have the role of overseeing the process of compulsory reconciliation in divorce cases. Given that traditional interpretation of Islamic law often prioritize patrilineal kinship ties over individual interests; judges who do not support the new reforms would favor patrilineal concerns (Global Rights 2009).

Secondly, the judiciary structure also hinders the progress of family law reforms. The implementation of the revised *Moudawana* stipulates the formation of family courts,
separating them from ordinary courts. The government plans to establish one family court per province, equating to seventy, which may not be sufficient considering 44% of the population still live in rural areas (Global Rights 2009). Moreover, removing family law cases from general courts may lower the standard of justice for family cases, degrading women and children involved even further.

Thirdly, the relegating of *adouls*, religious notary publics, to court clerks has complicated the applications of reforms. The *adouls* had authority to draft marriage contracts and to officiate them. The reforms would transfer their former role to the new marriage courts, which had prompted a protest at the Ministry of Justice. Nevertheless, the *adouls* may retain their influence over marriage since access to them are easier for the population and many Moroccans still consider them legal experts rather than the judges (Global Rights 2009).

Finally, disseminating the reforms and courting public acceptance remain a challenge. Women still do not recognize nor even when explained their new rights in the *Moudawana*, do women acknowledge their rights. Morocco still has a high illiteracy rate with official estimate at 42 percent of urban women and 82 percent of rural women making them vulnerable to familial pressure and also susceptible to extremist Islamic beliefs widely spread at grassroots level (Global Rights 2009). The Ministry of Justice, the national media, and civil society organizations have begun campaigning to counteract such misinformation but their effectiveness has yet to be measured.

**Traditional Marriage Patterns**

Before the inception and the implementation of a unified body of marriage laws, Moroccans have practiced a pattern of marriage that would ensure the stability and the
perpetuation of the lineage (nasab), along with preserving the honor of the family and its members. For generations, traditional Moroccan weddings have followed the pattern of arranged marriages with neighbors, friends or family members. Arranged marriages are marriages which are negotiated primarily by the parents of the couple, rather than the couple themselves. Based on economic and social necessity, the families of the future groom and bride set the terms of the marriage. The couple may directly or indirectly give their consent to their families. The question of whether the bride and groom are in love is not a priority; what is important is that the marriage is stable with staying power.\textsuperscript{13}

Although individuals give their consent to these arranged marriages, the degree to which “consent” is operative mainly depends on the individual’s gender and their economic dependence on their families. Generally, Moroccan men had more consensual power over the marriage arrangement than women. Although their parents might have talked informally about arranging marriages for their children, families would consult with male children prior to any formal talks with the prospective brides’ families (Maher 1974). On the other hand, traditionally Moroccan brides would know their prospective grooms on the day of the engagement or had met them briefly prior to their engagement.

Feminist writers argue that Islam views women as a danger to the social order due to their sexually promiscuous and potential rupture of kinship ties uniting the men (Ahmed 1992, Mernissi 1987). In fact, the concept of ayla (family) refers to the patrilineal kinship group, not the conjugal unit (Charrad 2001). The traditional Islamic perspective sees women as competing with their affines for their husbands’ loyalty and resources. Hence, women can cause zina (chaos) in the social order without strict patriarchal control (Mernissi 1987).

\textsuperscript{13} Article 51 of the Moudawana dictates the spousal rights and duties as a “cohabitation, mutual respect, affection, and the preservation of family interests...”
Division occurs by privileging the conjugal unit over the unity of the agnatic group, causing tension, which may endanger the social order. Another type of arrangement, albeit more beneficial to the kin group, result from forming alliances with outside group in the exchange of women. According to the traditional form, women serve as means, not act as agents in marital arrangements. In order to maintain kin group solidarity (*asabiyya*), agnatic ties must persist without the threat from the female element of the conjugal units (Charrad 2001, Conway-Long 2002). Keeping women confined to the domestic sphere would ensure their chastity and obedience, qualities that would enhance the family's honor and raise the exchange value of its women. Women, therefore, should not be endowed with too much power for they will disrupt the solidarity of the patrilineal network.

**Endogamy and Honor**

Honor continues to be imperative in the cohesion of familial relations so much so that it is imprinted in the *Moudawana*. The *Moudawana* provides guidance to an ideal type of marriage based on stability and family honor, defining it as a “lawful cohabitation on the basis of good conjugal relations, justice, equality in case of polygamy, mutual fidelity, virtue, and the preservation of family honor (*sharaf*) and their children...” (Article 51). Hence, parents and kin members take great precaution in arranging marriages to ensure that the family honor and conjugal unit stay intact.

Traditionally, Moroccan marriages are contracted to solidify alliances among tribal groups, lineages, and families (Hart 1972, 1993, 2000; Westermarck 1921, Davis and Shaefer 1995). These alliances provided land and property, resources, loyalty, and social networks for families as well as relieving them of the economic burden of maintaining their daughters. In fact, some anthropologists have deemed patrilateral parallel cousin marriages as
a common Middle Eastern characteristic (Barth 1954, Khuri 1970, Holy 1989, Murphy and Kasdan 1959). Elite families in Fez, Meknes, and Tetuan have also been known to practice patrilateral parallel cousin marriages in order to maintain property and status within their families (Maher 1974).

According to Murphy and Kasdan (1959), the preferential parallel cousin marriage may lead to social fission but "feud and fission are not at all dysfunctional factors but are necessary to the persistence and viability of Bedouin society (19)." Geertz (1995) observes Morocco’s “cultural center of gravity” lies “in the mobile, aggressive, now federated, now fragmented tribes (9).” It is in these decentralized and fragmented groupings that the honor system thrived as a unifying force (Schneider 1971). Preferential parallel cousin marriages in Morocco may have served a vital function in sustaining its tribal ties in the Morocco's past, but Morocco has changed much since Geertz's research. The increasing urbanization in Morocco has weakened local tribal ties. Morocco now has 56% of its inhabitants living in urban areas with a 1.8% annual rate of urbanization (US Department of State 2011).

According to anthropologist Ladislav Holy (1989), patrilineal parallel cousin marriage is not an independent phenomenon but rather an expression of a prevalent Middle Eastern preference for agnatic solidarity. According to Holy, parallel cousin marriages not only maintain the property within the family but keep the "symbolic capital” of which men are responsible for the conduct of women in their family. Keeping their control of women’s behavior preserve the family honor or the 'ird, the part of the familial honor most affected by women's behaviors. Cousin marriages allow kin groups to have more control to prevent dishonorable outcomes. Holy (1989) also claims other reasons for parallel cousin marriages such as better relations with the in-laws for the husband and for the parents of both sides, a
reduction in bride price, and for accessing the labor of their daughter's children. Moreover, endogamous marriages merge kin and social networks, ensuring their resilience and longevity.\footnote{According to Article 39 of the Moudawana and confirmed by informant interviews, Moroccans may not marry two sisters simultaneously, to a paternal and maternal aunt or uncle, a person who had shared the same wet nurse, and a non-Muslim man (for a woman) and a non-Muslim woman who is not of Christian or Jewish faith.}

Patrilateral parallel cousin marriages have the advantage of militating against the fragmentation of property by keeping the estate of a kin group intact. Since Islamic inheritance laws allow women to inherit, marriages between first parallel paternal cousins resolve the risk of agnatic property being divided. The preference for kin endogamy has served as a major device against partition of property in the Middle East. In a society where the size and strength of the lineage matter for economic and political power, giving a woman in marriage to her paternal cousin is advantageous for the kin group. Given the principle of patrilineality, the lineage of the woman's father will retain the woman's children and thus increase its size.

Until the changes to the 2004 revisions of the \textit{Moudawana}, the Moroccan family codes, women needed a \textit{wali}\footnote{The term 'wali' is a legal term. Many Moroccan immigrant women appear confused when asked about their \textit{walis}. However, they knew that they needed a male representative during the legalization of their marriage.} (a marriage tutor) to represent them in the marrying process. The \textit{walis} had to be male family members, usually their fathers, brothers or sons, in order to negotiate and legitimize the marriage contract on the brides’ behalf. According to the \textit{Moudawana}, the \textit{wali} or the tutor is first her father, then her mother, and then a close male agnate.\footnote{Article 236 of the Moudawana stipulates that the father is the tutor of his children. Article 238 grants the mother permission to act as the children's tutor in the event of the father's non-presence (death, absence, or incapacity). Article 244 allows the court to appoint a well-qualified agnate in place of the missing parents.} Traditional Moroccan society treats women as children, incapable of making their own decisions (Mernissi 1987). Hence, ‘consent’ in arranged marriages privileged Moroccan
men as grooms while the male bridal representatives would decide on behalf of the brides.

In the former version of the Moudawana, the level of education, however, did not render the woman capable of contracting her own marriage without a legal representative or a wali.\textsuperscript{17} Traditionally, the walis are usually male family members who hold authority in the women’s livelihood, giving them the power to negotiate the bride price (sdaq) and the legal authority to confirm and sign the marriage contracts (Mernissi 1987, Ramirez 1999). As a result, marriage negotiations and legalization were conducted in the politico-jural sphere, a space dictated and controlled predominantly by men.

Brides in many traditional Moroccan weddings, especially in the first marriages, would marry in their early teens, around between twelve and fifteen years of age, and most likely virginal. Marrying women off young would prevent behaviors that could dishonor the family because Moroccan society perceived women as insatiable sexual beings that needed marriage to tame them (Evers Rosander 1991, Mernissi 1987, Maher 1974). In Morocco, the urban Arabs, however, would adhere to the valued notion of honor and chastity more strictly than the rural Berbers who would allow their women more sexual freedom (Westermarck 1921, Venema and Bakker 2004). Nevertheless, Arab and Berber parents would marry off their daughters before eighteen years of age, the age of consent designated by Western ideals.

Given that the literacy rate for Moroccan women between 15-24 years of age did not surpass 50\% until 2000, the majority of women would not have known the contents of their marriage contract unless someone had informed them (UNESCO 2003). Moroccan parents would prioritize education for boys over girls since men often take the responsibility to provide for the family. Since parents needed girls, especially the older ones, at home to help

\textsuperscript{17} In the 2004 revised Moudawana, a Moroccan marriage does not require a wali or marriage tutor, but if certain cases, a marriage tutor is still deemed necessary (Article 20, 21, 22).
with the housework and the care of younger siblings, the eldest girls often have little or no education (Maher 1974). As a result, Moroccan parents chose the marriage partners for their daughters with much care, often resorting to sons of families who they knew well such as family members, close or distant, neighbors or friends. Bourdieu refers to these people as 'practical kin.' Despite the fact that patrilateral parallel cousin marriages have persisted as the social ideal for many Moroccans, Moroccans more often marry their children to practical kin rather than the true father's brother's daughter (FBD) marriage (de Haas 2006, Hart 1972, Maher 1974).

Moroccan families often marry their girls young in order to lift the economic weight of providing for them and to prevent possible illicit behaviors that may damage the honor of the family. Wafa, a 28-year-old divorced mother who had emigrated from Casablanca to Spain in 2007, recounts her early marriage:

“I never went to school. I had to stay at home and take care of my younger siblings and help my mother with the housework. My parents started forbidding me to leave the house when I turned ten or eleven. At thirteen my mother told me I was getting married to mother’s cousin who I had never met. I did not want to marry because I still wanted to play. One day my mother took me to look for kaftans and the next day I had my henna party and then my wedding. After six years of physical abuse, my husband finally left me for another woman. I was glad because I had my son and my freedom. I went back to my parents’ house and made plans to come to Spain with a girlfriend of mine.”

Although forced marriages exist, especially with endogamous marriage arrangements, Moroccan parents do consult their children regarding the marriage arrangements to children of friends or acquaintances. The young man, however, would have more freedom in rejecting the arrangement than the young woman, who being economically dependent on her parents would be at their whim. She should consider herself fortunate if they had even informed her
of engagement at all.

Nevertheless, the more common form of traditional Moroccan marriages would take the form of marriage by consent even though many couples were not well acquainted prior to their engagement. Traditional Moroccan society, particularly in towns and cities, had socially demarcated the public and private spheres, which made casual meeting and dating difficult if not scandalous. Young women roaming the streets alone may earn the reputation of “going around with men”, which not only endanger the honor of the family but may result in being offered a lower bride price (Maher 1974, Mernissi 1987).

In fact, dating terms do not technically exist. Women and men have friends but in relation to the same sex. Women have female friends or sadika/sahiba, and men have male friends, sadik/saheb. A clear separation exists between the opposite sexes until the wedding party (‘urs). Having a formal girlfriend (jatiba) or a boyfriend (jatib) only takes place during the day(s) of the wedding ceremony when family and friends gather to honor and to acknowledge the couple's union.

Despite the social division between the public and private sphere, women had played an active role in marriage arrangements in Arabic society (Abu-Lughod 1993, Baker 1999, Maher 1974). Mothers typically searched and arranged marriages for their children. Mothers would often sight and assess young women in the hammans or the public baths, casual afternoon visits for tea, in the marketplace, in various parties and celebrations where the women would often separate from the men (Maher 1974, Mernissi 1987). Due to the influx of migration from villages to towns, many marriages often required families being acquainted with one another or through the help of an intermediary, often an older, respectable woman who could move around in both male and female space without earning a
bad reputation.

The female intermediaries would report back to the young men about their prospective brides and their families. If the man found the information about the girl and her family agreeable, he would go with his father and/or his uncle to meet with her parents at her house. The couple would then meet and talk briefly to see if they find each other agreeable. Sometimes the couple would meet in the girl’s home a couple more times before consenting to matrimony. However, too much familiarity before marriage would be shameful (Mernissi 1987). Additionally, the groom’s family would spend time assessing the prospective bride and the family’s nif (face) and their ‘ird (honor) and the bride’s family would also need to evaluate the groom’s intention. Hence, families would often dissuade their daughters’ from accepting offers from soldiers and police officers because information about them was often scarce and their intention might not be honorable. More importantly, their daughters would often move far from their kin group following the termination of the soldiers’ assignment or tour, which would place them at the mercy of their affines, particularly with the domestically powerful mother-in-law (Maher 1974). Naima, who migrated to Madrid from Tetuan in 1996, recounts her marriage process:

“My ex-husband was a police officer and had noticed me when we had an emergency at my family’s hotel one night. I was alone with my younger siblings and was upstairs when a fight broke out. I had to call the police. My brother was at a cafe with friends and my mother was sleeping downstairs in the grand salon. I called for help from my window and the police came in. One policeman asked for my name so I told him my name is Naima. He was friendly, but I did not think anything of it when they apprehended the men and left.

The next day he returned and asked my brother Mohammed who was working at the desk. He asked to speak to a girl name Naima. He told him that there was no girl by that name, and the girl who was there had left to her town far away. ‘She was a guest,’ he told him. My brother was very angry with me and told me not to talk to anyone. He was very
protective of me and would not let me out the house. He told me, ‘If I see you talking to a man, I am going to kill him, and if you continue talking to more, I will kill you, too.’ I was scared of him so I obeyed.

I was walking down the street to my aunt’s house one day and ran into the officer again. He told me what had happened when he spoke to my brother, and I begged him not to talk to my brother, which he did not know was my brother until I told him. He told me that he wanted to marry me and wanted to know where I lived. I gave him the address of a girl I knew, also named Naima, and told him where it was. The following day, he and his father came to the girl’s house to ask for her hand and when he realized that the girl was not me, he left running.

He saw me again in the street several weeks later and called me a liar. Then he told me he wanted to marry me and wanted to know exactly where I lived. I told him that I was too young. I was thirteen at the time and still a child. He told me that he did not care and wanted to make me his wife. I did not want to marry him. Then he told me that he was not stationed in Tetuan and needed to know what my answer was because he had to leave soon. He told me that he had to move around because he worked for the King Hassan. He was one of his guards. Then I thought, I could marry this man and escape from my brother and from my family. I could be free from my imprisonment. Then I gave him my address.

When he arrived to my house, my parents were shocked. My brother was suspicious and turned him away, telling him that he was a police officer and could just have an engagement, meet up with me, rape me and then left me damaged and dishonor our family. The family was not going to have that and did not want him to marry me. He was disappointed so he left. Nevertheless, he was determined so he kept coming by the hotel daily, leaving his gun, his papers, others things to earn my family’s trust. He was quite clever. Then once they warmed up to him, he came by with his father to ask for my hand.

My mother told him that I was still a child and could not do anything for me. I did not even know how to fry an egg, let alone take care of him. We had servants to do those things. He promised to cook for me and take care of me. My mother still disagreed and called me down from my room. She told him that she could not make me do anything I did not want to do but I was a still child and would not want to marry such an old man anyway. He was 26 at that time. So she called me down and I came down. She asked me if I wanted to get married and I said ‘yes.’ She was shocked. They were all shocked. They kept asking me over and over again, and I told them I wanted to get married. My mother told me to think carefully. I told her that I had and wanted to
marry him. So we were married in this grand place and my [bride] price was high. I wanted a lot of gold bracelets and four kaftans. I wanted one from Al Hoceima where my grandparents were from because they were from the Rif we had a special outfit for weddings. We had a grand wedding. Mine lasted seven days! People say they had weddings lasting seven or ten days, but they really only had three. My youngest sister was still a baby when I got married so I was carrying her during my reception. I was happy to be rid of my family’s control over me.”

The marriage process accentuates the need to protect family honor. A suitor who originates from outside the village or town and has a position of authority could abuse the girl, ridding her of her prized virginity and stripping the family of respect and value. The role of the brother, especially if he is older, is to ensure that the 'ird of the family through the behavior of his sisters. Since a family cannot recuperate damaged 'ird, firm restrictions and intense pressure on unmarried women may cause some, if not many, to rashly agree to a marriage arrangement in order to escape from their natal binds. For many Moroccan women, marriage signifies not only an increase in status but also freedom from her family’s control (Evers Rosander 1991, Maher 1974, Ramirez 2003). According to Moroccan women who I had interviewed, the desire to escape the family, specifically the older brother’s vigilance and control, is still quite common reason to marry.

Nevertheless, Islam obligates consent in the nuptial process. Until recently, unmarried women depend solely on their families for subsistence, making them susceptible to familial pressure. 'Consent' to marriage is relative in this context for women in this familial environment do not have many opportunities to choose from, particularly when the family arranges to marry them to other family members. To decline an offer of marriage from a kin would disgrace the family, causing friction and jeopardizing the asabiyya of the kin group.

Nowadays young Moroccans have more freedom in meeting their prospective life
partners at school, at the workplace or at more casual settings (Davis and Schaefer Davis 1995). Anthropologists Douglas Davis and Susan Schaefer Davis (1995) measured the marriage trend in a semirural town in Morocco and found that 64% of girls and 55% of Moroccan boys still prefer arranged marriages with their parents choosing their mates for them. Few Moroccans marry exclusively for love, and the common pattern of marriage continue in the line of family arrangement, followed by a forced marriage if a girl is impregnated (Davis and Schaefer Davis 1995). Hence, the family’s approval of the match is still vital, particularly for young women who continue to depend on their kin group for sustenance and for social survival.

The traditional hold of the family on young women in Morocco can still be observed in towns and villages today in which fathers and brothers continue watching over their daughters’ and sisters’ behaviors, at times with overbearing suppression and aggression. During my visits to Moroccan towns in 2009 with high rates of female-initiated migration (Larache, Tetuan, Tangier, Fez and Casablanca), stories of family violence related to dating are told by the victims or by friends of these victims. The three Moroccan girls in the case below are close friends forming a tight social network, which included their family members. They share the ownership of a neighborhood hair salon, which they had bought with remittances from their siblings in Spain. The neighborhood women would patron the salon and gossip.

*Shaima and her best friend, Fatiha, co-own a hair salon in their neighborhood. Although they live twenty minutes walking from one of Moroccan largest cities, they describe their neighborhood as typically Moroccan. They have never worn a veil although both girls are of marrying age. They keep their salon door closed and its windows covered with drapes to provide privacy for their female clients. Although they describe themselves as modern, educated businesswomen, they would rather be married and stay at home taking*
care of their children. Shaima would like to marry her current boyfriend, but her family has forbidden her to see him. Her brother had broken her arm the last time he caught her speaking to her boyfriend, a rumored drug dealer in the neighborhood and had threatened to burn down the salon if she continues seeing him. Shaima had to sneak text messages to her boyfriend while hoping her brother would change his mind about him. Her father had left the family many years ago so her brother had taken his place as the authoritative figure. She swore she would only leave her current boyfriend if she could find another one who could take her to Spain.

Fatiha, on the other hand, had just ended her engagement when she discovered her fiancé with another woman. The other girl had confronted Fatiha with the affair one month before her wedding and likewise, Fatiha confronted her fiancé who did not deny this affair. He explained that he had needs that she could not fulfill because she wanted to keep her family honor and a high bride price. He essentially blamed her for his shortcomings and wanted her to give in to his desires so he would not have to resort to someone else. Fatiha could not fulfill his request knowing that her brothers would kill her if they discovered that she had dishonored the family. Although distraught, Fatiha immediately broke off the engagement out of respect for herself and her family.

Iman, Fatiha’s former best friend and co-owner, wanted to spend time with her boyfriend who her family had disapproved because he came from a poor family and was unemployed. Iman continued to see him behind her family’s back. When her parents went to Rabat to visit her grandparents, she had a meeting with her boyfriend. Her older brother saw them together and became angry. Iman was desperate and took a bottle of pills, which nearly killed her. After she had awaken from her coma, her brother threatened to kill her himself if he were to see her with her boyfriend again.

The case of Shaima, Fatiha, and Iman shows a continuing need for Moroccan families to maintain their family honor through the behaviors of these young women. The women may have earned some economic means from their hair salon, but the vigilance and threat from their brothers have limited their activities. Additionally, the freedom to marry whomever they wish still depend on their families’ approval. Consequences for disobedience may be strictly and at times violently enforced if women go astray. As indicated in the cases
above, honor and chastity are still intricately tied to the young women’s behaviors leading up to the wedding day. The young women in the above case also express the ideals of the traditional Moroccan marriage, which consist of the husband providing for his wife while she stays at home caring for their children and their home (Evers Rosander 1991, Maher 1974). Marriage is seen as an escape from the family’s control, as indicated by the above cases of both Naima and Shaima, and a way to provide comfort and some form of luxury.

**The Wedding Ritual**

According to Islamic law, neither a religious nor civil wedding ceremony is required for the validity of the marriage contract. Islamic law makes marriage essentially a private agreement between two families. The original texts do not require the registration of marriage either with civil or religious authorities who would then have the responsibility to record it with the civil registry. The offer and the acceptance, in the presence of two witnesses, constitute the marriage contract. Once verbal consent has been expressed, the marriage is concluded. In fact, the State did not originally sanction marriage. Since there was no state administrative apparatus when Islamic law was devised, marriage began as purely a social and familial matter (Charrad 2001). Throughout the centuries, Islamic practices have been co-opted by governments attempting to regulate and publicize what was once a private matter (Ahmed 1992, Charrad 2001).

As marriage traditionally unites two kin groups in Morocco, the ceremony serves a highly public verification and without it, the marriage has no validity in the community’s eye. Customs dictate wedding rituals and ceremony. Traditional Moroccan weddings require much care and attention too many elaborate details since the event represents the social and economic fusion of two families (Combs-Schilling 1989, Dessing 2001, Evers Rosander
Depending on the area and the budget, the wedding process can take up to seven days with many pre-wedding ceremonies taking place before the actual wedding. Usually the entire affair is expensive for the groom’s family, starting with the dower to be spent on jewelry and dresses for the bride as well as household items and furniture for the couple. If the groom’s parents are very wealthy, they may purchase items for the house separately from the dower. On any occasion, special or mundane, the groom gives the bride golden jewelry and presents of textiles, clothing, perfume and food. The courtship period can last from six months to two years, depending on the economic means and logistics of the wedding plans (Dessing 2001, Evers Rosander 1991).

The engagement or *khitba* usually takes place prior to and is distinguishable from the conclusion of the marriage ceremony. It is recommendable by Muslim law to have an engagement ceremony, although the acceptance does not oblige the contraction of marriage validity (Dessing 2001). However, there are two conditions: there must not be any permanent or temporary impediments to a marriage between parties and there must not be a pending proposal from another suitor.

Once the two parties reach an agreement about the marriage arrangement after more or less informal talks, there usually follows an official proposal of marriage at the bride’s home. The day, called *nhar el kmel*, is usually celebrated with an evening meal, called *el mlak*, in which members of the bride and groom’s family participate (Evers Rosander 1991, Westermarck 1921). It makes the intention public and also allows the parents to get acquainted with one another, especially with couples that have met before without the parents’ knowledge. The proposal may take place in front of many members of the family (*makhtub* or *lamlek*).
According to strict Muslim custom, only when the marriage proposal is accepted that the groom-to-be is allowed to see certain body parts of the bride-to-be. Moroccans follow the Maliki school of Islam, which believes that the suitor or the yahtub (one who proposes) can see only the face and hands of the bride but not her feet at this point of the engagement process (Dessing 2001). Sometimes at the conclusion of the marriage before the imam is when the couple can talk to each other. According to Malikite practice, a third person should chaperone the engaged couple wherever they meet until the wedding party. A hadith is often recited during the engagement ceremony regarding the strict prohibition of the couple contacting prior to the marriage ceremony, “when a man and woman who are not married to each other isolate themselves, the devil will be their partner” (Dessing 2001). Family members of the bride’s family often watch the couple to prevent behaviors that may damage their honor. Many women in the women’s group recount their sisters or cousins accompanying them on dates until the wedding ceremony. Additionally, more modest behavior is expected of the bride-to-be during the period before the wedding such as confining herself more at home and wearing more traditional clothing (Evers Rosander 1991).

A material settlement is made on the bride by the husband or her parents to pay for furnishing for their new home and for the bride’s wedding necessities. The bride price is often a symbolic amount indicating the value of the bride and her family as assessed by the groom’s family. Nevertheless, some families demand actual payment, particularly if the bride’s family still harbors suspicion against the groom and/or his family (Dessing 2001, Evers-Rosander 1991, Maher 1974). In Naima’s case, half of the bridewealth (sdaq) was demanded prior to the wedding ceremony due to the looming suspicion about the
policeman’s intention for their young daughter. The other half of the bridewealth must be paid upon divorce. However, the wife could forfeit the second payment should the judge find her behavior the precipitating factor for the divorce. The current rate of bride wealth ranges between 5000 to 20000 dirham (500 to 2000 USD), excluding pre-wedding gifts for the bride.

Once a date is set for the wedding, the real preparations begin. Five days before the matrimonial event, necessities such as a mattress and blanket are taken to the bridal chamber. There the bride is given a bath in *hammam*, which is a sort of milk bath that is meant to purify the bride. The bride enters a transitional period in which rituals of purification are necessary to rid her of dangerous elements (Evers Rosander 1991, Maher 1974, Westermarck 1921). Her *negaffa* (female attendants) will usually supervise the event. The *negaffa*, who are usually older married woman, female friends and relatives, would assist in preparing the bride. In the past, the *negaffa* were often black female slaves or servants of the family (Maher 1974, Westermarck 1921). After dressing her in an elaborately decorated wedding *kaftan* (usually white) they proceed to decorate her with heavy jewelry and darken her eyes with kohl which looks a bit like thick dark eyeliner.

The group then proceeds to have a *lila d’el henna* ceremony in which the hands and feet of the bride and her party are painted with henna. During the ceremony, the *negaffa* will usually take this opportunity to discuss the 'secrets' of marriage with the young virgin. In some ceremonies the bride will then be placed behind a curtain to symbolize her change of lifestyle. In more remote areas, this ceremony would only take place the day before the wedding (Evers-Rosander 1991, Maher 1974). The bride's designs are always the most intricate and the various floral and geometric designs are meant to ward off evil spirits or
jnun, bring good luck and increase fertility. The groom's name is often hidden in the henna designs. One of my informants, Khadija, who is a shurfa, a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed from lineage of Moulay Idriss, the founder of Fez, recounts her mother’s role in Larache:

“When my parents moved to Fez, my father changed a letter in his last name so people would not recognize who we were because of my grandfather’s problems with his lineage in Fez. People found out somehow and brides started coming to my house to get henna painted on by my mother because she is also a shurfa and would bring more baraka. She still does till this day. Every summer when weddings usually take place she paints henna for Moroccan brides from Larache and from Europe.”

Henna brings baraka or blessing and prevents the evil spirits from overtaking her (Combs-Schilling 199, Maher 1974, Westermarck 1921). A bride is not expected to do any housework until her henna has faded. Otherwise, she may attract bad luck should she damage the design (Evers Rosander 1991).

Once all bridal preparation is complete, food is then prepared in excess to cater for unexpected guests and the festivities begin. Although caterers instead of family members more often than not provide the food, the family continues to prepare a small portion of it (Dessing 2001). During the ceremony, someone is employed to paint the hands of guests with henna. Men and woman still celebrate these festivities at separate locations. After the henna celebration the ritual of transporting the bride to her new home would take place.

Transporting the bride to the groom’s house signifies not only her status change but also her kin affiliation. Brides are not supposed to look too happy during the wedding because she is leaving her agnatic kin behind. In some villages, the transportation of the bride to the groom’s house in a cage is still practiced although it may be perceived as backwards (Evers Rosander 1991). Brides nowadays are usually transported in cars to the grooms’ house.
for the ceremony. Immigrating to Europe for some migrant brides may entail taking the bus or the plane fully painted in henna to meet their bridegrooms at the station or airport. The ritual may take a transnational turn due to work and/or visa restriction.

During the wedding, the opening *sura*\(^{18}\) of the Koran or the *Al-Fâtiha* is recited on this occasion and the two parties present each other with gifts. However, this is traditional as Moroccan law does not obligate this action. What is common is that the couple’s parents calling for God’s help in a general way saying “Let us hope that God will make them happy” (Dessing 2001). Moroccan couples may exchange milk and dates, signifying fertility, as a welcoming ritual before exchanging rings (Maher 1974, Westermarck 1921).

The wedding reception can be celebrated with the sexes separated or together. If celebrated separately, the groom at some point in the evening would leave his party and make his way towards the bridal party accompanied by a group of friends who sing, beat drums and dance (Westermarck 1921, Evers Rosander 1991). Music at these occasions can be traditional Berber, Andalusian, Arabian, or they can be popular modern tunes played on traditional instruments (Combs-Schilling 1989, Dessing 2001). The parties would then be joined and the celebration would continue. The bride would be lifted up on a circular cushion or table and the groom on the shoulders of his friends.

At the latter part of the wedding party, the couple would go to a private room to consummate their marriage. After the consummation, the bridal party would examine their sheets or the bridal panties for signs of blood to confirm the bride's virginity. In traditional Moroccan weddings, ritual of bloodletting during the consummation act is deemed necessary (Combs-Schilling 1989). However, the bride does not necessary have to be a virgin in some

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\(^{18}\) A *sura* is a chapter in the Koran. *Al-Fâtiha* is the ‘opening’ or the introductory passage to the Koran which is classified and revealed in Mecca.
areas of Morocco, but the mark of blood on the designated medium needs to be displayed by the groom or a member of his family to certify his ownership over his wife's body (Westermarck 1921).

After the inspection, the stained bridal panties or *sirwal* is displayed in the reception for all the guests to bear witness to the consummated act. Some families have taken the extra step to pin the certificate of virginity onto the material evidence to further validate their honor. Some immigrant women remember their mothers and grandmothers dancing with the stained bloomers to express their pride. Other exhibitions of the stained bloomers are more subdued either quickly presenting it to guests or passing them around on a silver plate (Maher 1974). Some ceremonies had the couple taking a journey to their new home and the bride would circle her home three times before becoming the keeper of her new hearth (Dessing 2001, Westermarck 1921). The bride has now progressed to her new social age of womanhood as someone’s wife (Evers Rosander 1991).

**The Production and Reproduction of Married Life**

Transitioning to a married life for Moroccan women can be difficult given the reduction in contact with their former kin and social networks. Prior to married life, a woman’s social network is vital to her survival in traditional Moroccan society, especially for women who do not work outside their homes. Women depended on kinship-based networks for mutual help and resources since their presence in the market economy have not been as easily accepted as men. Although current Moroccan society has been more accepting of working women, women’s social networks continue to be important in times of need. Moreover, they may have built a new social network during their marriage but their commitment will always remain with their kin group (Maher 1974, Fortes 1959). As a result,
women tend to marry nearby to be close to their family and social network due to the frequency of divorce and abandonment (Evers Rosander 1991, Maher 1974, Ramirez 1996).

The bridewealth gives rights of ‘bride-removal’ to the husband, which the husband will try to integrate his wife into his own kin network. Continuous contact with the wife’s own kin and social network may prevent her from accepting the norms of her affinal group and also give her the venue to leave the marriage if she feels overwhelmed (Evers Rosander 1991, Maher 1974). Hence, both husband and wife prefer to start having children immediately following the wedding to avoid preventable conflicts. Without a child, the wife remains an outsider among her affines and would be restricted from participating in various ceremonies (Evers Rosander 1991).

Maternity gives a woman more prestige within her husband’s family and allows her to participate in gift-giving parties to enhance her social network. Wives attending these parties represent their husbands and their in-laws by demonstrating the economic means and social status of their affines through the gift exchange. Moreover, the gift exchange and its reciprocity build relationship and expand a married woman’s social network. One important party is the seba or the naming party seven days after the birth of a child in which usually only married mothers attend, bringing gifts of good tidings (Evers Rosander 1991). Married women depend on the social gatherings to build new ties and solidify existing ones in order to help them obtain resources for events and crises, particularly since there may be obstacles in relying on their kin network.

Moroccan men often try to prevent women from having too much contact with their kin network because the wives’ networks may provide a venue for them to leave the marriage should conflicts arise. Evans-Pritchard (1964) observes that “the real danger to the union
husband and wife is not the hostility of the wife’s family, but the intimacy which frequent contact and kinship ties might bring about (p. 185).” In fact, Moroccan women often solicit assistance from their kin network to transport goods back without their husbands realizing it (Evers Rosander 1991). Therefore, seclusion is the most common and effective form of severing contact with the wife's kin group. Moreover, the act of secluding one’s wife also indicates a sign of wealth and civility, particularly for Berbers who associate bridewealth and seclusion as being more Arab (Maher 1974). Having one’s wife walking the marketplace or working would be considered shameful because it shows one’s inability to not only control her but to provide for her. Men who were unable to control and provide for their women were not seen as full men in the eyes of Moroccan society (Evers Rosander 1991, Mernissi 1987).

For economic survival, Moroccan women would sew, embroider, or make goods to sell in the market. Women in towns, however, face much more restrictions as their behavior is more closely tied to their husbands’ honor. Secluded women in towns would earn the high status of being well-kept and protected, elevating morally above their poorer counterparts (Evers Rosander 1991, Maher 1974). On the contrary, small villages and hamlets may practice some form of excluding women from public activities but not as extreme as their urban sisters since female labor was necessary for farming, fetching water, tending animals, embroidering, tailoring and making daily visits to the suq, or the market. In the Atlas zone and in some urban areas, prostitution was and still is a socially accepted form of economic survival, particularly for divorced and widowed women (Maher 1974, Venema and Bakker 2004). Ideally, however, Moroccan men would relegate their women to the private domestic sphere with the permission of movement resting upon the will of their husbands or other male authorities.
The *Moudawana* confirmed the status and role of Moroccan women in society as wives and mothers who are constantly at the deference of the male authority in their homes. The husbands are expected to provide for and sustain their wives and children, yet they may repudiate, divorce or take on other wives if they wish (Mernissi 1987, Ramirez 1996). The women are constantly worried about the possibility of losing their husbands; therefore, they maintain contact with their kin network to provide a safety net in case of divorce (Evers Rosander 1991, Maher 1974). Moreover, according to the *Moudawana*, a woman has the right to visit her parents and her husband must not prevent her from doing so (Global Rights 2005).

With many Moroccans migrating to different parts of Europe, Moroccan women and children would fill European airplanes destined for Morocco throughout the year. Moroccan immigrant husbands still observe their wives' right to visit their families even if it means allowing transnational visits. Once in Morocco, parents and brothers would accompany the returned female migrants and their children back home. Not to have a relative waiting for them at the airport is considered a disgrace for the woman.

**After Marriage: Divorce and Widowhood**

Traditional Moroccan marriages could be quite unstable, particularly under the previous version of the *Moudawana* which gave men more liberty in divorcing their wives unilaterally or simply repudiating them (Global Rights 2005, Mernissi 1987). Moroccan women would often have their first marriage before the age of fifteen and divorced several years later. Families, particularly rural families, would stress the importance of marriage as it brought women a higher status and alleviated the worry of losing the families’ honor. Moreover, women with bad reputation could improve their statuses simply by marrying
(Venema and Bakker 2004). In fact, first marriages were viewed as rites of passages in rural and semi-rural areas given the high frequency of divorce (Evers Rosander 1991, Maher 1974). On the contrary, town marriages were meant to last forever and divorce was shameful for women (Maher 1974).

In Morocco, the differential treatment by gender is demonstrated through the divorce process. Before the 2004 changes to the Moudawana, a husband can simply repudiate his wife three times to finalize the separation (Global Rights 2005). Men can request a divorce, and judges simply register the request and grant them the divorce without any stipulation (Mernissi 1987). On the other hand, the judges decide on divorce cases initiated by women. Women can initiate the divorce for mistreatment and abuse, but she must provide clear evidence. Even when she provides evidence, she needs male witnesses to validate the evidence (Maher 1974, Mernissi 1987). After providing evidence and witnesses, judges normally do not favor the woman if the husband refuses to divorce her (Mernissi 1986). Women, as implied in previous Moudawana Codes, did not have full citizenship rights compare to their male counterparts. They were at the mercy of their husband or of the court, where judges were often men. Even with the changes to the Moudawana, some remnants of this practice still persist (Global Rights 2005).

Reasons for divorce in traditional marriages vary. The most common reason for divorce is infertility because the main purpose of marriage is procreation (Mernissi 1987). Having children would bind a woman emotionally to her husband and his agnates as well as confirm her contribution to their lineage. Hence, it is crucial for women to bear children soon after marrying in order to prevent their husbands from threatening to divorce them. Nevertheless, bearing children does not necessarily ensure stabilization in a marriage.
Poverty and economic factors greatly affect divorce rates, depending on gender and location. In the agricultural areas of the High Atlas zone, women tend to divorce as frequently as men (more than 50% of marriages would end in divorce) since women often marry very young and divorce during the early years of marriage (Maher 1974). A woman’s value in agricultural areas continues after childbearing years since she can still work in the field. On the other hand, an urban husband would often initiate divorce when his wife reached middle age since her faded beauty no longer served as a status symbol and her childbearing years were over. Moroccan men, according to Maher (1974), would always have wives and frequently remarry in order to have a woman care for him and his children so that he could freely participate in the public sphere. Additionally, women who divorced after menopause do not usually remarry due to weariness of caring for yet another husband when her children have already grown. Younger divorcées, who are still in their childbearing years, often remarry in order to have another man provide for them and their children (Fisher 1995, Maher 1974)

Also, the number of children plays a deciding factor in a woman’s economic and emotional dependence on the marriage. Being the main breadwinner in traditional marriages, Moroccan men can earn his own living and not be as dependent on his wife as she is with him. Moroccan men tend to divorce when the number of children increase and find their wives care-worn and competition from their older sons frustrating in limiting their movement and activities in the public sphere (Maher 1974). Many Moroccan men would frequent bars as they grow older. They can be found drinking and gambling in the evening and welcoming the service of prostitutes and flirty divorcées. Moroccan women in urban areas, often secluded or semi-secluded, would tolerate the infidelities due to their economic dependence
on their husbands. Women in villages and hamlets, however, tend to have a lower threshold for marital problems. Their lower resilience mainly comes due to the availability and proximity of their kin and social networks (Maher 1974). However, should their husbands leave them for another woman, the majority of Moroccan women would have no option but to return to their families’ homes.

Moroccan women with young children often return to their families following the aftermath of a failed marriage or widowhood. In fact, the mother-daughter bond in Moroccan families is considered the strongest tie, which neither marriage nor divorce can sever (Evers Rosander 1991). In the majority of this study’s surveys, Moroccan women place their trust with their mothers and sisters rather than their male members. One reason may be the conflicting roles fathers and brothers play as protectors and controllers. More importantly, the male authority still has more weight in a Moroccan court of law so he can contract marriages on behalf of his female family members. On the other hand, mothers and sisters provide support and function as confidants. Therefore, young women tend to return to their mothers if they are divorced or widowed, and older women often go live with their daughters.

What women take from the divorce is indicative of the type of divorce administered by the court. Women who bring back the jewelry (ed dhab), clothes, and furniture bought with their bridewealth, gifts from the husband (el hediyat), the sdaq\(^{19}\) from the second part of the bridewealth paid upon divorce and monetary support for her children and alimony meant that her husband had divorced her without faulting her. However, many Moroccan men are unemployed and cannot provide support so many women are often left with items from their original bridewealth and part of the sdaq (Evers-Rosander 1991, Maher 1974). If the woman initiates the divorce, she forfeits her right to the remainder of the bride wealth. Sdaq is

\(^{19}\) Articles 26-34 of the Moudawana refer particularly to the sdaq or the bridewealth and its conditions.
sometimes paid in full to pay for a car or house, which is usually under the husband’s name. In case of divorce, all these property would remain with him, especially if the couple has not included a prenuptial agreement indicating their separate property (Global Rights 2005). Also, a woman initiating divorce has to return all the presents she had received from the husband as well as the amount of money in the *sdaq*. She may only keep the ones she had bought with her bridewealth. As a result, women would leave the house with her belongings while the man stays with the furniture.

Furthermore, the divorced woman has to contend with the custody of her children, which generally belongs to the father. However, most Moroccan men would rather have small children go with their mothers than to take full responsibility of them (Evers Rosander 1991, Maher 1974). According to Muslim law, children are considered to be part of their father’s kinship groups. Nevertheless, the *Maliki* School of law in North Africa emphasizes the mother’s right and recognizes the need of small children to be with their mothers. Sons may stay with their mothers until puberty (set at 15 years old), but daughters may stay with their mothers until they are married. Still the court decides if the mother is fit or appropriate for the education of children because of bad manners, immorality or other reasons. If not, an older female family member, preferably the mother’s mother, will be given the guardianship of the children. More importantly, the divorcing wife may even lose the children to her ex-husband and his new wife if they court deem her as too impoverished and inappropriate or immoral to care for her children. Stories of stepmothers in Morocco have been infamously horrendous since the new wives tend to favor their own children and would often abuse their stepchildren, treating them as slaves (Evers Rosander 1991).

Knowing the binds of Moroccan family law, many women try to negotiate with their
husbands before going to court. Naima, married to a police officer, finally decided to leave him after his drinking and gambling had led to a series of absences and tremendous losses of money.

“**My separation to divorce took over 6 years. He kept calling and asking me to come home. I told him that I had to work to take care of the children. I kept asking him for a divorce and he would refuse. He told me that he would not give it to me and allow me to marry someone else. He had married me when I was still a child so I was supposed to be just for him. I kept asking and finally after two years of not returning to Morocco for the summer, he agreed. I came back that summer and begged him to sign the paperwork. I could not ask for my own divorce because it would be too complicated and I could lose my children. I asked him to sign and he told me that he would not give me a dime. I told him the only condition I asked is for him to give me my children. I did not want his money or child support. I just wanted my children. He could have his house and all, but I wanted my children. Then he agreed to those terms. All the while he would not sign unless I gave up the conditions. I just wanted freedom from him. I told him that for now I wanted a divorce, but I do not know what will happen in the future between us. I just wanted my freedom. He finally agreed and signed.**”

Some women would leave for Spain and other European countries to escape their abusive husbands. They complicate their divorce as they have to contend with the *Moudawana* and Moroccan court while residing in Spain. As with other countries, a divorced spouse would need the permission of the former spouse to take the children abroad to live. The consent of the ex-husband is necessary in Morocco since the children belong to the paternal kin group. Even if the husband dies, the wife has to carefully plan the removal of her children from his agnates. Paternal grandparents may gain full custody of their deceased son's children if they take their daughter-in-law to court.

Moroccan men often marry later than women because they would need to accumulate some money for the bridewealth and other gifts. For some Moroccan women who had married very young, their marriages end in their husbands’ deaths rather than divorcing. It is
not uncommon to find traditional conjugal couples with ten, twenty or even forty years
difference in age due to the high frequency of multiple marriages (Maher 1974).

Widows, on the other hand, garner more support and respect than divorced women,
particularly when they are older. Losing a husband through natural causes or accidents
invoke more sympathy than losing a husband through abandonment or rejection. Moroccan
widows often return to their kin groups if they have the luck of their support. The unfortunate
ones who are both widowed and orphaned have to resort to their social network of friends
and neighbors for assistance. The death of a husband leaves all the responsibility to his wife
in caring for his children and his household. Without work experience and minimal
knowledge of the world, a young widow had to seek resources from her network of friends
and neighbors. In fact, a young widow still faces social pressure to remarry due to the
economic burden placed upon her family and the possibility of misbehaving that may shame
the family.

Returning to their kin groups after a failed marriage or the death of a spouse is not a
viable option, particularly when they have a large number of children. In 1970, the total
births per woman in Morocco were 6.97 and 3.7 in 1997 (UNESCO 2003). With a large
number of children, the burden for other family members to help these women would have
been too heavy even for a wealthy family like Naima’s. Therefore, migration abroad to
Europe where the demand for unskilled female labor was high became the most attractive
option for these women. Besides being dependent upon family members, the other options
were to remarry or in severely impoverished cases, to prostitution. Even with no knowledge
of the country or its language, divorced, widowed and single women would migrate to
Europe as an alternative to the traditional marriage pattern.
Conclusion

Marriage for Moroccans, particularly for women, serves many purposes. Many young women find marriage as an escape from the stronghold of family members protecting their honor. Moroccan girls often dream of marrying a Moroccan man who will provide for them so they would only need to care for their children and their homes. Marriage also elevates the status of a woman within her social network and community even if she has had a checkered past. Moreover, Islam does not value nor recognize celibacy as an option for either sex. Hence, marriage is crucial in fulfilling one’s duty as a Moroccan woman and as a Muslim.

Nevertheless, traditional Moroccan marriages have its drawbacks, particularly for women who are uneducated and do not work outside their homes. Moroccan women in rural and semi-rural areas often need to work in the fields, embroider, sew or do what they can economically to help their household. Urban women in traditional marriages are secluded or limited in their movement by their families and husbands. Although modern urban Moroccan marriages may permit women to work outside their homes she will usually succumb to his demands and stay at home if a husband objects to his wife working.

When the marriage fails or if the husband dies, a Moroccan husband would often leave his wife with little resources and many children. Although husbands are required to pay child support and alimony, many Moroccan men are unemployed and cannot afford to make payments. Therefore, women often return to their families for support until their next marriage. However, the economic burden for families with divorced or widowed daughters can be overwhelming, especially if the daughters have children. Jobs are scarce in Morocco so an attractive option for many women who have been through the traditional marriage ordeal or who want to delay or forgo the traditional Moroccan marriage is to migrate to
Europe.
Wedding Preparations
MIGRATORY HONOR AND PRODUCTION

“He looks at the Spanish coastline, closer with every breath. The waves are inky black, except for hints of foam here and there, glistening white under the moon, like tombstones in a dark cemetery...Tarifa. The mainland point of the Moorish invasion in 711...Tariq Ibn Ziyad had led a powerful Moor army across the Straits...Little did they know that we'd be back...Only instead of a fleet, here we are in an inflatable boat—not just Moors, but a motley mix of people from the ex-colonies, without guns or armor, without a charismatic leader”--Laila Lalami, *Hope and Other Dangerous Pursuits*

**Honor and the Mediterranean**

The proliferation of the usage of the concepts of “honor” and “shame” in the anthropological study of the Mediterranean Society started 1959 in Burg Wartenstein, the European Headquarters of the Wenner-Gren Foundation with Julian A. Pitt-Rivers and John Peristiany. Essays were then published in 1965, along with two other publications on this topic, ending with the 1995 version on “honor and grace.” Anthropologists used the “honor and shame” concepts in their studies of the Mediterranean area, which also demarcated the countries within the region for area studies.

In discussing Mediterranean studies as a distinct region of study, many anthropologists who have supported this idea would refer to Braudel’s (1972) work on *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (Boissevain 1975, Gilmore 1990, Herzfeld 1987, Pina-Cabral 1989). As a ecological region, the Mediterranean environment can be distinguished not just sharing a common sea to facilitate communication, but also similar climate which produces common crops (i.e. olives). Researchers also observes the area's similar modes of production, which are reflected in their social organization and their conflicts with neighboring groups. In the juxtaposition of the plains, mountains, hills, and valleys, an anthropologist can find communities of peasants, tribesmen, and/or pastoralists residing adjacent to agrotowns or other remnants of the latifundium. Spain rests in the heart of this region linking Europe with the northern tip of Africa, the region once jointly referred to as Al-Andalus.
Writing during the late fourteenth century, Ibn Khaldun (1989) describes the social organization of the inhabitants of Al-Andalus\textsuperscript{20} and the surrounding Mediterranean area. He posits that both the Bedouins and sedentary people are 'natural groups' and coexist with each other. The Bedouins are nomads, perennially migrating through the desert in search of resources. The Bedouins would wander through the desert with their camels, feeding on shrubs and drinking from salty desert water. Their necessities were minimal but their loyalty to each other and to the group would promote a sense of solidarity that not only helps them survive but also to conquer weaker communities. They do not submit to laws from a governed body but rely on their sense of solidarity, justice and fortitude. Moreover, they constantly migrate from one area to the next in search of food and resources so physical and social ties with other groups appear fragile, if not contentious. According to Ibn Khaldun, the Bedouins have great courage and would not hesitate to defend a member of their group, particularly when humiliation is involved:

“One feels shame when one's relatives are treated unjustly or attacked, and one wishes to intervene between them and whatever peril or destruction threatens them. This is a natural urge in man, for as long as there have been human beings. (p.98)”

Frank Stewart (1994), who studied the Bedouins of the Sinai Peninsula, notes that modern-day Bedouins uses honor (\textit{'ird}) in every major legal respect. Whether or not honor still relates to solidarity and group identity is unclear in Stewart's study. However, one can deduce that honor still relates to the group and to the individual's position in the group. They

\textsuperscript{20} Al-Andalus was the Arabic name given to a nation in the parts of the Iberian Peninsula, most of Spain, and part of Maghreb, which were governed by the Moors (Muslims), at various times in the period between 711 and 1492.
categorized offenses concerning honor into various types with each tribe appointing a
total of men as judges. Until recent times, Bedouin society existed without central
authority, in which civic and legal matters were handled within the groups.

According to Ibn Khaldun, the Bedouins have long existed before the sedentary
people, who he describes as the Berbers and non-Bedouins. They include people who depend
on agriculture and animal husbandry, in which the best means of survival in this manner of
living is to be stationary. These people would eventually establish communities, villages and
towns.

Another category of people Ibn Khaldun mentions is the pastoralists who make their
living from animals such as sheep and cattle. They would move from one land to the next in
search of pasture and water for their animals. Yet, these people do not venture too deeply into
the desert because there are no pastures and little water for their animals to survive on. He
includes the Berbers, the Turks and the Slavs in this group. Morocco has long been inhabited
by the Berbers who lived as both farmers and shepherds in the steep mountainous ranges of
the country. The Bedouin, on the other hand, would practice wandering existence in the
Moroccan desert. Except for the groups of settled farmers, Morocco has been a country with
constant internal migration of nomadic groups.

Theorizing about group adaptation and cohesion, Jane Schneider (1971) proposes that
the notion of honor is inherent in pastoralism and agriculturalism. She includes the
pastoralists and agriculturalists mentioned by Ibn Khaldun but neglects to mention the
Bedouins. The fact that Schneider has disregarded the Bedouin in this area lays suspect to the
existence of the unity of Mediterranean that seems culturally and geographically subjective
(Stewart 1994). Nevertheless, the premise behind her argument for the unity of the
Mediterranean lies in the honor notion, given the geographical and climatic unity and the lack of geo-political centrality in the region.

According to Schneider (1971), pastoralist and agricultural societies have co-existed and competed with each other for the scarce resources that have plagued the Mediterranean region. The Mediterranean area has a limited amount of good farming soil as most of its more fertile soil has been eroding due to climatic, geographical, and human factors (de Franchis 2003). The access to scarce resources predicates the atomistic familialism, in which the economic autonomy of the nuclear family is more adaptive for their survival. Schneider argues that pastoral societies focus more on dyadic relationships, making them fragmented. Agriculturalists, who tend to be more organized, have problems in the Mediterranean due to the dearth of fertile land and water, as well as the ongoing competition with the pastoralists regarding these limited resources.

These nomadic groups often carry their property at the risk of having it stolen, and with the pastoralists, families often lose their sheep and goats to others if they do not keep a careful watch on them. Due to the lack of resources and insufficient law enforcement in these Mediterranean societies, inspiring fear forms a better strategy than promoting friendship. Stealing animals and property is held as a survival strategy and as a means of accumulating wealth. Groups have to quickly respond to the infringement through revenge or force compensation. If not, their weakened reputation makes them vulnerable for further infractions.

Group solidarity, theorized by Ibn Khaldun, pertains to more than simply lineage organization. The lineage organization needs other elements to hold it together, which according Ibn Khaldun comes from *asabiyya* or 'group feeling.' Schneider, however, specifies
this 'group feeling' originates from their system of honor. According to Schneider, the usefulness of the honor system in both pastoral and agricultural societies resolves the intense socio-economic needs and loose political organization of the Mediterranean area. As a result of the scarcity and competition among these atomistic families, different groups would use their women as commodities in offsetting the trade between families.

Additionally, Schneider posits that the focus of women as a source of family honor masks the inherent competitiveness between father and son for resources. Women would serve as not just prized commodities but also as scapegoats for the faltering of family honor. Controlling them provide men with the power and the glory to maintain their familial status within a given a community. The chastity of their women provides a trade value that would guarantee their procreative purity. Moreover, the women's purity and chastity confirm the strength of the male members in the family. On the other hand, their uncontrollable behaviors would ruin the family's reputation and symbolically castrate the male members.

Although Schneider may have a very interesting argument regarding the origin and the rationale for the honor system in the Mediterranean, she may have gone too far using the honor system to demarcate the Mediterranean area, a notion that has been criticized by many (Davis 1987, Goddard 1994, Herzfeld 1987, Stewart 1994, Pina-Cabral 1989). Furthermore, Schneider and other anthropologists, places women as a subordinate element in the honor system. Although subordinate, women's actions may dismantle the honor system, but if they behave properly, they do not partake in the glory the honor system can bestow.

21 In People of the Mediterranean, John Davis (1977) criticizes the anthropological endeavors in Mediterranean studies for its parochialism (lack of comparative framework), lack of adequate historical data and analysis, and the reification of the notion of honor and shame. According to Davis, the anthropologists trained or have used the model from Pitt-Rivers’ People of the Sierra, have merely replicated the homogenous, small community studies that appear enclosed and static, which Goddard (1994), Herzfeld (1980), Stewart (1994), and Pina-Cabral (1989) also argued as a limiting element in Mediterranean studies. The lack of history and comparison from these community studies does not provide adequate information to argue for the unity of the Mediterranean area as a conceptual unit of analysis.
upon them. It reduces women to commodities in the economic and political exchanges of a marriage negotiation (Maher 1974, Schneider 1971). Honor is a male prerogative. Hence, women earn no honor but bear the emblem of shame should they jeopardize the family's fragile unifying element.

Anthropologists working in Morocco agree with Schneider's assessment and further posit that women's exclusion from the public domain, the place where honor is earned and negotiated, is the reason for their exclusion from the honor system (Bowen 1998, Schaefer Davis 1978, Dwyer 1978, Maher 1978, Ramirez 1999, Rosen 1978). However, no society lives in isolation, and thus, change is imminent. Changes to the *Moudawana* have granted women more rights. Additionally, the expansion of education, the job market, and opportunities abroad has brought more and more Moroccan women into the public domain. With these changes, particularly with immigration, the honor system need to be revisited to examine whether or not changes have allowed women some participation within a traditional system that was reserved predominantly for men.

**Moroccan Migration**

The immigration flows, especially with the recent feminine flow of immigrants from the North African region, to the southern European countries have presented an opportunity to revisit the concept of “honor” in examining the behaviors and perceptions of Moroccan female immigrants in the European setting. Straddled between two different cultural systems, Moroccan immigrant women have to act within the constraints of two areas of the Mediterranean: one in Europe and the other in North Africa.

With its proximity to Europe, many Moroccans have resorted to migration for better social and economic opportunities. Despite economic factors being the primary motive for
many Moroccan immigrants, other motives have influenced people to uproot themselves from family and friends to start their life anew in a foreign land. Following its independence, Morocco has predominantly sent single men from the northern region of Morocco to Europe and elsewhere in search of economic prospects. As sovereign Morocco encounters more economic and political instability, both men and women from all parts of Morocco have taken great risks in migrating abroad.

Nevertheless, macro-level factors play a crucial role in affecting migratory trends. Due to Europe's labor demand in the building and construction sector, single males have dominated Moroccan migration, like many other migratory countries. Since the 1970s, the restrictive immigration policies have brought in more women through the family reunification and family formation in various parts of Europe. Additionally, Moroccans continue to migrate to other European countries such as Spain and Italy where migration policies remain lenient until the recent global economic crisis. As the economic opportunities decrease in many male-dominated jobs, the trend for female-initiated migration has been rising with high demands in the service and agricultural sectors. The late 1980s witnessed a rise in female-initiated immigration, and each year, more and more Moroccan women take the initiative to improve their situation by migrating abroad (Ramirez 2004).

Despite its patriarchal leanings, Morocco highly depends on remittances from abroad and has done little to curb emigration of both men and women. In fact, remittances from abroad have helped the Moroccan economy annually from 23 million USD in 1970 to 5.6 billion USD in 2006 (de Haas 2006). Hence, the contradiction inherent in Moroccan female-initiated emigration and Morocco’s patriarchal society manifests itself on the intermediate or meso-level as well as the individual level, while the macro-level permits widespread
migration for both sexes.

Moroccans have started migrating extensively to Europe since the colonial period. The French recruited Moroccans to fight in various parts of the French colonial empire, as well as during the two World Wars (Chattou 1998). These Moroccan soldiers would return to Morocco at the end of their tours but the prospects of living abroad would continue to loom in their mind. Additionally, the Moroccan elites had long sent their children abroad to study at some of Europe’s most prestigious universities, which ironically, had also trained many of the leaders of Morocco’s independence movement.

Following its independence in 1956, Morocco experienced growing pains, leading to decades of political and economic instability and massive emigration in search of better opportunities. Moroccan emigration started in the northern region, being the most impoverished and neglected area following independence (Refass 2004, Seddon 1974). In fact, the northern region of Morocco has developed much slower than other regions due to the scarcity of government investment, the extreme inequality and pervasive population displacement.

The severe conditions in the northern region of Morocco could be traced back to the colonial period under Spanish rule. Unlike the French, the Spaniards dismantled the tribal organization in the northern region. In order to exploit the land and its subjects, the Spanish colonists had to remove control from local leaders, who were often tribal leaders. The Spaniards subjugated sections of the Moroccan population by relegating them as laborers in mines, factories and the protectorate administration (Seddon 1974). The Berbers in the Rif area had a semi-sedentary existence prior to colonization, in which alliances formed through marriages had pacified tribal rivalries (Pennell 2003, Westermarck 1921). By appropriating
land for colonial use and intensive farming, the Spanish colonists displaced farmers and
induced them to seek work as wage earners or low-level administrators in nearby towns
(Seddon 1974). Seddon (1974) noted that the Spaniards had plans to exploit all forms of
resources: land, humans, and minerals. When the Spaniards arrived, they built villages to first
serve as military camps and strongholds and later as established commercial centers and
market places to centralize activities, monitored by local inhabitants working for privately
owned Spanish companies. As a result, the large number of Moroccans migrating from rural
villages to urban towns loosened the strength of tribal ties and kin networks, which had made
management of the population highly difficult following independence.

Yet despite the drastic changes in social structure implemented during colonization,
the newly independent Moroccan government did little to change this conspicuous pattern of
social inequalities (Charrad 2001, Seddon 1974). Big landowners who had worked with the
colonists would utilize their resources to acquire positions of power in the post-colonial
administration, further exploiting the structural inequalities (Berriane 2004, Eickleman
1985). In fact, Mohammed V depended on the loyalty of big landowners and local leaders to
offset challenges from the nationalists who wanted a strong parliament rather than an
absolute monarchy. Therefore, it was to the King’s advantage that the landowners revived
tribal ties, in order to remain powerful with local leaders remaining loyal to the King

Nevertheless, Morocco needed a plan to boost the staggering economy damaged by
colonial penetration. In the 1960, Morocco became a net importer of cereals so that the
economy depended on external markets for imports and exports. From 1954 to 1962, the
Moroccan government implemented plans to industrialize and modernize Morocco in order
to promote rapid growth and lift it from the prolong stagnation. The King extended the infrastructure in the countryside by building roads, providing electricity and telecommunication. Unfortunately, these public projects did not offer much employment for the rural population (Pennell 2003). The plans called for further investment in mass production and tourism but neglected the agricultural regions in the north, which became further distressed by droughts.

Cyclical drought periods in Morocco have historically devastated agricultural production, affecting exports and domestic livelihood. Since 1896, Morocco has had twelve major very dry periods, categorized as moderate to strong intensities. Since the 1970s, Morocco has experienced the most severe droughts between 1980-81 to 1985-86, 1991-92 to 1994-95 and 2000-2001 to 2002-2003 and 2006-2007. Agriculture had occupied more than 40% of the labor force that produced no less than 15 percent of the GDP (Refass 2004). The reliant on agriculture meant Morocco would continue to be at the mercy of unreliable rainfall. The unstable weather conditions brought about numerous socio-economic crises, accompanied by the nullification of even more economic plans. As a result, the main drought periods, having a cycle of approximately 11 years, have brought massive internal and international migration since the 1960s (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004).

Due to the governmental skewed investment in industrial production and tourism along with the destructive dry spells, many Moroccans left their villages in search of urban jobs. In fact, the main motive for migrating throughout the latter half of the twentieth century has been for economical reasons (Refass 2004). Urbanization, which started during the colonial period, has thrived concomitantly with the government’s modernization plan. In the 1900s, 450,000 Moroccans resided in cities, whereas today, more than 17 million Moroccans
or 56% of the Moroccan population currently dwell in urban areas (Refass 2004). However, landless and jobless workers who had migrated into urban areas had fewer opportunities than they had anticipated, culminating in intense frustration and grave disappointment.

Furthermore, exponential population growth had presented Morocco with more mouths to feed with fewer resources to feed them. Since the 1960s, the Moroccan demographics have change dramatically, complicating the socio-economic situation even more. From 1900 to 1914, Morocco’s population grew only 0.66%, but from 1971-1981, the population exploded, growing 2.6% annually until 1994 when the rate decreased to 1.54% annual growth. Morocco started with 4.5 million inhabitants at the beginning of the century and ended with nearly 29 million inhabitants by the end of 2000 (Refass 2004). Improvements in health services and sanitation had reduced infant mortality from 20% in 1970 to 6.1% by 2000 and had increased life expectancy from 48 years in 1972 to 69.5 years in 1999. Thus, the combination of high population growth, droughts, and economic stagnation resulted in socio-political conflict, which makes migration a vital valve in releasing the demographic tension.

During 1960s, political unrest seemed eminent at the lowest level. The working population began showing its discontent with the perpetuation and systematic promotion of social, economic, and political inequality. Between 1965 and 1971, shantytowns grew around most Moroccan cities, where people barely survived. Casablanca grew from 96,500 inhabitants in 1960 to 1.5 million by 1971, making it the third largest city in Africa. Poverty and socio-political instability ravaged the newly independent nation throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Moroccans first blamed the makhzen (government) for their troubles then accused the local notables and rich peasants of unabashed exploitation (Seddon 1974).
Accompanied by periods of drought and rising unemployment, sovereign Morocco was in trouble. Hassan II, who had succeeded to the throne after his father’s death in 1961, dissolved Parliament in 1965 in order to take full control of the situation. The government subsidized staple foods to avoid starvation while receiving generous aid from the United States to keep the restless population in check (Pennell 2003). Concomitantly, economic stagnation prolonged over several years with unemployment rising rapidly. The turmoil continued with two failed coup d’etat attempts in 1971 and 1972 as repressive measures did not little to harness the turmoil.

Despite major economic reforms, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) data indicated that Morocco recorded growth in its gross domestic product (GDP) of only 3.5 percent per year after the 1960s until the 1990s (Berraine 2004). In the end, the growth rate was insufficient to curb unemployment and poverty. Something had to be done in order to quell the tension of the growing population as well as the rise in external debts, a weak infrastructure, and high unemployment (Berriane 2004). With Europe experiencing tremendous growth and seeking cheap foreign labor, the Moroccan government saw the opportunity for external migration in order to decrease the internal pressure. After many talks and negotiations, Morocco signed agreements with several countries to send its citizens abroad on temporary work contracts.

In fact, contracts to work abroad were bountiful and visas were often issued on the same day. Migrants, mainly single men, left in droves for France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany to work in the building and construction sector (Berriane 2004, de Haas 2006, Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004). Many originated from the northern Rif region and spoke Berber. Although a cohort of Moroccan women from the northern Jebala region (Larache, Tetuan,
Tangier) went to England to work in the catering and health service sector, they remained invisible in Moroccan’s migration history (Cherti 2009, Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004).

**Guest Workers and Settlement**

After World War II, Western European countries experienced an economic boom that attracted many immigrant workers from southern countries, which during that time were at the economic fringe. Spain, currently a country of immigrants, had at one time sent its citizens to work in other parts of Europe. Following World War II, Western European governments had a drastic increase in demand but a shortage in labor. Since recruiting foreign labor would be less costly than hiring native workers, governments took measures in attracting immigrants.

Western governments signed temporary ‘guest worker’ agreements with economically struggling countries to relieve them of labor overflow and to supply European countries with much needed human capital. Guest worker agreements between Morocco and Western European countries began in the early 1960s. Morocco signed an agreement with Germany and France in 1963, Belgium in 1964, and the Netherlands in 1969. The guest worker agreements launched the pervasive immigration of Moroccans to Europe and the Middle East for several generations to come (de Haas 2006). Although the preferred destination site for many Moroccan migrants had been France due to the language and colonial ties, Moroccan female-initiated migration had commenced in other parts of Europe, starting first in England and later directed to Spain where the demand in the service sector would privilege female immigration.

In the past, Moroccan immigrants had a trend of return migration in which migrants would work, send remittances, save money to buy a house and retire in Morocco (de Haas
Due to the economic market crash and the 1970s Oil Crisis, the migration pattern changed in reaction to the political and economic context of the receiving countries. The Oil Crisis radically brought about economic stagnation and restructuring which led to rising unemployment and a lowering of demand for unskilled workers in many Western European countries. Countries such as England, the Netherlands, and France became more selective, restricting immigration to semi-professionals in the 1980s and highly skilled professions from the 1990s.

However, the increasingly restrictive immigration policies by European governments made Moroccan migrants more intent on staying than continuing the pattern of circular migration. Moreover, the Oil Crisis had worsened the economic and political situation in Morocco, forcing the King to take more repressive measures, especially after two *coup d'état*. When European governments implemented the family reunification program in the late 1970s, Moroccan immigrants opted to bring over their family members rather than return to their country.

As fears grew over the immigration halt, foreign workers sought permanent residence. Between 1973 and 1975, Western European governments instituted an "immigration stop," introducing restrictive measures to deter immigration and to put an end to recruiting foreign labor. The immigration halt, however, had unforeseen consequences. In spite of the dwindling of entries of foreign workers, the migration dynamic nevertheless continued. Migrants residing in Europe would continue to sponsor their extended family's immigration, sparking a different type of immigration, which comprises of the migration of women and children to Europe via the family reunification program. Ironically, the restriction in immigration led to a proliferation in the immigrant population as immigrants rapidly
brought over their families, fearful that the doors to Europe would close forever.

The end of the 1980s largely completed the family reunification limitation set by many European governments. The temporary ‘guest workers’ became permanent residents and eventually voting citizens. The economic crisis in the 1990s placed further restrictions leaving Moroccans to migrate mainly through marrying a partner from Western European countries. Currently, this pattern has become the most viable option for migrating to these countries (de Haas 2006).

As these countries are EU members, they also subordinate national law to European Union directives and to the decisions of the European Court. For example, in recent years, both Denmark and the Netherlands have passed laws limiting family reunification. In both cases, marriage immigration dropped significantly from about 60 to 38 percent in four years (2001-05) for Denmark, and from 56 to 27 percent for Dutch Turks and 57 to 23 percent for Dutch Moroccans over a five year period beginning in 2001 (de Haas 2006). However, in July 2008, the European Court prohibited member states from denying residence permits to non-EU spouses of EU citizens or residents. This ruling has caused a political crisis in Denmark, but the government sees no alternative but to obey. The law requires that all EU member countries attempting to curb marriage integration. Apart from the marriage solution, another option for Moroccans in the 1990s was to migrate to more newly admitted EU countries such as Spain where immigration restrictions were less restrictive.

**Women and Production**

Up to the 1990s, the majority of migrants were men, leaving behind a large population of women, who had to subsist without fathers, brothers, husbands, sons and prospective grooms. Before the implementation of the family reunification programs in
European countries, the impact of male emigration to Europe had dire effects on Moroccan women and children, especially given the fact that Moroccan women had traditionally depended on men for their livelihood. The family reunification program had allowed women and children the opportunity to reunite with male immigrants, saving many broken families from severe poverty (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004).

Poverty remains the most dreadful consequence for women and children left behind. In fact, poverty has risen since the 1990s from 13.1 per cent to 19 percent. The Moroccan government declared more than 2.7 million women poor in 1998-1999, with women under 25 at 48.2% (59.1% in rural areas), women between 25 and 44 at 33.8% (24.1% in rural areas) and women over 45 at 13.0% (16.8% in rural areas). Moreover, households headed by single women represent 30.3 % in rural areas and 14.4% in urban areas (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004).

Since wives, children, sisters, and parents of male migrants in Europe depend on remittances for their livelihood, their impoverished situation only worsen when migrants cannot find jobs or have low-paying jobs. Remittances from Europe usually help to provide food, shelter and education for remaining family members. Hence, when migrants face economic problems in their host country, the non-migrants left behind would suffer severely (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004). Additionally, rural women and children often suffer more than their urban counterparts due to the fact that rural women have fewer savings (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004). The discriminatory inheritance law, which states that male heirs receive twice as much as female heirs, often leaves women with less land and less resources. In actuality, the majority of Moroccan women are considered illiterate (89.9% of women in rural areas and 58.2% in urban areas) according to 1999 official statistics (Ramirez 2004). Illiterate and impoverished, these women often face difficulty obtaining credit and loans from banks due to
their lack of guarantees or collateral, further exacerbating their impoverished situation (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004).

Moreover, as a consequence of the massive male migration that began in the mid-1960s, generations of Moroccan female were left behind with less marital prospects (Mahler 1974, Mernissi 1986). Since Moroccan females often marry around the ages of 12-17 in 1960s-1970s, the shortage of men due to migration would leave poor rural families with daughters to feed and to care for a longer duration than anticipated (Ramirez 1995, 1996). In 2000, the average age of first marriages for women in the city was 28.5 years of age and 25.4 years of age in the rural areas. In 1970, 20.4% had never married by the age of 25. Not being married by 25 was considered unfortunate for young Moroccan women. Yet in 2000, 69% of women had not been married by the time they reached 25 (Ramirez 2004). The large percentage of single women combine with an unstable European job market may have compelled families to allow their daughters to migrate in search of viable opportunities.

Due to the global economic crisis that had hampered economic opportunities for migrants, many rural families have opted to send their daughters to urban areas to live and to work. Furthermore, families with many single, older daughters or no male heirs would have to resort to the migration of daughters rather than sons. During the 1970s, flows of female internal migration from rural to urban areas in Morocco started from the northern part where European factories were located, attracting cheap, unskilled labor (Lahlou 2004, Maher 1974, Ramirez 1998). Given the social and religious constraints, female internal migration would take several forms, which usually involved the informal economy and low wages, if any. Urban women with some education would work as civil servants in low-level positions, leaving housework to young girls from rural areas with little education to come and work as
“petite bonnes” or child laborers (Mernissi 1987). Wealthier family members would adopt poorer family members, usually girls, to help them with domestic chores. The informal ‘adoption’ or Kafala enables kin members to exchange services for shelter, food, education and protection (Bargach 2002).

Other migration patterns, particularly to Tangier and Tetuan, have seen an increased in the number of single, underage women as well as divorced women from rural areas to work in textile factories. Urban women's production has moved from their homes to the factories. Unfortunately, working in factories comes with a social cost. Moroccan women working in factories are viewed to have a tendency towards prostitution (Mernissi 1987, Ramírez 1998). In fact, factory workers often dress as modestly as possible when commuting to work (Cairoli 1998). From the factories in Tangier and Tetuan, many would eventually leave to work in Spain, which only worsened the perception of female migrants. Many Moroccans view female migrants as a shameful ordeal for the family (Ramirez 1996). Thus, families often have to negotiate economic necessity with honor preservation.

Before the 1990s, many Moroccan families consider female migration as “haram,” or forbidden because a woman was abandoning her natural place in the home to be involved in dubious activities, particularly since she would work in the presence of men who were not family members (Mernissi 1987, Ramirez 1998). The possible loss of control and family honor is deeply linked to female migration, both internal and abroad. Poverty meshed with rapid urbanization, industrialization, and male emigration has loosened the protective hold on many women. Nowadays, Moroccan patriarchal society has accepted the idea of a working woman as long as she does not clash with society’s gender role assignment (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004). In fact, part of the proliferation of veiling in Morocco originates with working
women needing to maintain modesty in the public space of work and education, previously
dominated by men.

With the economic squeeze in the domestic and international labor market, Moroccan
families have to adjust to women working outside their homes where the demands from the
service and agricultural sectors are more favorable for women (Oso Casas 2004). Women
working outside the home could garner a sense of self-reliance in managing their own
finances and making decisions regarding the household. Furthermore, male migrants often
leave women in charge of running the household in Morocco, which sometimes cause marital
conflict when absences are long (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004). When the economic crisis in the
building and construction sector in Europe has brought widespread unemployment for male
migrants, women continue to be courted in the service sector. Hence, women have comprised
a large percentage of the irregular migration to Europe because of gender-based job demand
abroad and sexual discrimination at home, which have made it more difficult to gain
respectable status in their country of origin (Anderson and Rogaly 2005).

**Women and Education**

Even if Moroccan women have more access to higher education, they normally take
low-level administrative positions such as secretarial jobs (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004). In order
to improve their marketability, Moroccan women need to study abroad. In fact, one category
of Morocco female migrants, who have experienced this discrimination in their country of
origin and have been understudied, is students.

Morocco has been sending students abroad since the colonial times. Prior to
independence, Moroccan students would continue their education overseas in hopes of
improving their job prospects at home or elsewhere. Following independence, more and more
women have been entering universities even though jobs remain scarce after graduation and opportunities have been more favorable for their male counterparts (Baker 1999).

During the colonial period, the independence movement had given women the chance to participate in traditionally male spaces. Free schools established by the urban nationalists as part of the independence movement allowed families with economic means to send their daughters to formal schooling. These girls later contributed to the independence movement as teachers and writers (Baker 1999). By the late sixties and early seventies, a significant number of women had entered the university; many of them were part of the cohort who had started their education prior to independence (Baker 1999).

Despite having the opportunity to advance to higher education, Moroccan college women often felt disappointed and frustrated with the limited social and economic opportunities available to them as women. Their disappointment stemmed from the restrictions of rights implemented through the 1957-8 Moudawana and the limited number of jobs commensurable to their education. As a result, many joined forces with the Marxist student movement in protesting against social inequalities (Baker 1999). The students’ uprisings led to severe repression by Hassan II, who had the students imprisoned, killed or exiled. The repression and instability of Hassan’s government precipitated many students to study abroad in European countries such as France, England and Spain in hopes of encountering a better future (Cherti 2008).

**Spain and Immigration**

The immigration policies in Spain since 1985 have shaped the flows of immigrants. Until the 1970s, Spain has been a relatively closed society with a long history of out-migration rather than in-migration. Spanish men migrated to other European countries and to
Latin America to work in factories, agriculture, and construction; whereas, Spanish women would work in service areas as *au pairs*, housekeepers, cooks, cleaners, etc. While Spaniards emigrated far and wide, the Spanish dictator, Franco, presented measures to rigorously discourage immigration (Carr 2000). Following Franco’s death in 1975, Spain has been opening its doors to foreign influences and receiving foreign workers.

From the 1970s until the late 1980s, immigration had been largely male due to the demand in the construction sector. Spain began courting cheap immigrant labor, from former Spanish colonies in Latin America and the Philippines, and from Morocco, to offset the low birth rate and to subsidize the cost of one of the most rapid economic development in Europe (Arango 2000, Barbulo 2004). Spain’s treatment of these new immigrants has varied with Moroccans having the least amount of privileges and the most discriminated as *los moros* (Huntoon 1998).

While eager to recruit new population, Spain joined the European Union in 1986 and has to continuously contend with EU policies and regulations regarding immigration (Magone 2004). The passing of the Public General Act 7/1985 was the first step in a legislation that favored a broad regulatory process under the protection of the Public General Act created in 1991. The Schengen Treaty (1990), which Spain agreed to in order to join the EU and the Maastricht Treaty (1991) changed Spain’s reception of Moroccan migrants. Three days after the bi-lateral agreement with Morocco had expired, Spain signed the Schengen Treaty, which requires visa documentation imperative for entrance, (Cornelius 2004). The Maastricht Treaty has also obligated Spain to tighten its border control and decrease its immigration quota for many North Africans. For Africans, permanent residency in Spain increased to 5

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22 *Los moros*, a pejorative term, used by Spaniards to demean people from North Africa as the cunning Muslims who had once conquered Iberian peninsula.
years with elaborate requirements of proof of income and stability. Naturalization increased to 10 years for immigrants from Africa, whereas many immigrants from Latin American countries only needed two years of residency. Although Spain’s bilateral agreement with Morocco since 1992 had eased conditions for legal residency for some, the majority of Moroccans, many undocumented, would manipulate the bureaucratic quagmire for entry (Huntoon 1998, Sorensen 2004).

During the early 1990s, Spain had an economic recession that largely affected its building and construction industry. The decrease in the labor demand of construction led to a decrease in male immigrants. However, the increase in the Spanish female workforce since the late 1980s created a demand for domestic services, leading a shift in migration type from predominantly male migration to increasingly female migration from Morocco (Herranz Gómez 1998, Oso Casas 2004, Ramírez 1998, Solé 1994). Morocco, which had traditionally sent its sons abroad, would send its daughters instead.

Due to the legal and social changes enforced by the new democratic Spain, Spanish women who have had accessed to education have been entering the workforce in flux. Companies would hire women in low to mid-level positions as they are cheaper than their male counterparts. The housework and care left by Spanish women have been replaced by foreign women, which have also changed the idea of the traditional Spanish family, especially in large cities like Madrid (Solé 1994). Unlike other European countries, domestic service is recognized as an occupation, making it easier for domestic workers in Spain to obtain permits (King and Zontini 2000, Kofman 2003). In fact, domestic service has constituted 63% of immigrant women in 2005 (Herranz Gómez 1998).

Given the demand in the domestic service sector, Moroccan women would often
arrive with a tourist visa and easily find jobs working as live-in workers or contracted helpers. They would rely on their social network to locate a patron who would be willing to offer them a contract. Many Moroccans often have a contact person from their country of origin who knows someone in the host country who is looking for domestic help (Ramirez 1998). They would pay their bosses the required amount (usually 2,000 Euros) to secure a contract, pay the social security expenses, and apply for residency without encountering many difficulties.

Another strategy is to work for a few years to save enough money to pay the boss and apply for “arraigo” or “taking roots” residency. An arraigo applicant has to demonstrate that he or she has been living in Spain for at least three years and to show proof that he or she has been economically and socially responsible. However, the arraigo strategy may leave women in a precariously illegal situation plagued with all kinds of abuse (Anderson 2000, Anderson and Rogaly 2005, Mate and Schepers 2000, Schweken 2005).

Although Moroccan women have been migrating to Spain since the 1980s, the Spanish government did not acknowledge the large cohort of women migrant until the first regulatory process in 1991 (Ramirez 1998). Additionally, the restrictive policies and job opportunities for immigrant women elsewhere in Europe had Moroccan women gravitating to Spain in search of work and other opportunities. Spain’s proximity to Morocco as well as its colonial ties made migrating a viable option for many Moroccan women who had eschewed migrating to other parts of Europe due to the distance, the cultural differences, and the language barrier.

Due to the changes to Spanish immigration law in 1991, the continuing demand for female labor, and changes in Moroccan society, there has been more female migration (Actis 1995, Domingo Peréz 1996, Solidaridad Internacional 2009). In 1991, the Madrid census
indicated that 4,843 Moroccan females were legalized and 2,697 more had applied for legalization, making Madrid the highest concentration of female Moroccan immigrants at 38.6% with Barcelona at 18.2% and Malaga at 13.7% (Instituto Nacional Estadística 2008). Through political agreements with various countries, Spain increased its quota to 20,600 positions in 1993 with 72% for domestic services, 20% for other services, 2% for agriculture, and 0% for construction, indicating its preference for traditionally female-dominated jobs over the males. Spain approved 5,220 of the 6000 applicants for residency in 1993 with 4,346 for domestic services (83% of all applicants), in which Moroccan women consisted of 11% of the approved applicants (Gozálvez Pérez 1998b, TEIM 1998). In 2003, Moroccan women made up 35.7% (20,023) of the legal Moroccan population of 56,137 in the Comunidad de Madrid, continuing its trend as having the highest percentage of Moroccan female population in Spain (Lora-Tamayo d’Ocón 2005). As of July 2009, 42.3% or 11,305 of the documented Moroccan population in the city of Madrid were women (Ayuntamiento de Madrid 2009).

Additionally, the Spanish government has also implemented programs to attract more Moroccan migrants. On July 25, 2001 Spain signed a Manual Labor Agreement (Acuerdo de Mano de Obra) with Morocco and set up a National Agency of Employment Promotion (Agencia Nacional de Promocion Del Empleo), or ANAPEC. Spanish companies would establish agencies in various Moroccan cities to recruit workers in the service and agricultural industry. VIPS, the popular restaurant chain, had agreed to recruit, train and contract 2,000 Moroccan men and women from 2007 to 2011.

Furthermore, agricultural companies working with ANAPEC would recruit Moroccan women on seasonal contracts to work in the strawberry and vegetable farms. The agencies have been reportedly highly selective of its workers, choosing mainly unattractive divorced
women with young children so that their need to return to Morocco is high and their ability to contract marriage is low (Moreno 2009). The typical profile of workers consists of women between 25 and 45 with children and some agricultural experience. Additionally, the company would reject overweight women, women over 50, pregnant women, and well-groomed or pretty women. Nevertheless, recruitment agencies would attract over ten thousands of women each year, 22,000 women in the year 2008 alone, due to their limited opportunities or unfortunate circumstances (Moreno 2009).

The programs to recruit Moroccan labor came from the European Union’s demands to limit the flow of illegal immigration by controlling the flow of legal immigrants. The need to establish a ‘fortress Europe’ prompted the Spanish government to pass a series of contingencies from 2002 to 2005 to regulate the circulation of the immigrant workforce. The most notable contingency dealt with the hiring procedure of foreigners, which required a provisional authorization status in lieu of the signed contract and visa. Nevertheless, Spain broke the European record of massive regularization, as they have taken place in 1985, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005, the year of the March 11th train bombing in Madrid. During the normalization process in 2005, 82.7 percent of applications submitted were women and 22.3 percent of those applications were for domestic services.

However, since the global economic recession, Spain has implemented more control of its borders and enforcing its immigration laws. Undocumented Moroccans are prime targets due to Morocco’s repatriation agreement with Spain and the availability of cheap airline fares to Tangier and Casablanca. As with previous generations of Moroccans who needed to remain in Europe, family reunification and family formation are the more viable options in times of immigration crisis. Many Moroccans, both men and women, would try
different means to arrive and remain in Europe.

**Morocco-Spain Relations**

Unlike other European countries, Islam has had a long and fundamental presence in Spain originating in 711 AD with the first Islamic conquest of the Umayyad Empire. During the Almoravid and the Almohad Empires (1030-1147 and 1121-1269), Islamic Spain was united with Morocco and other parts of Maghreb. In fact, the great Tunisian historian Ibn Khaldun descended from a prominent Al-Andalus family who left Al-Andalus in the thirteenth century when Seville fell to the Christians. Ibn Khaldun’s magnum opus, the *Muqaddimah*, uses accounts from his political experience as a statesman during the tumultuous period of tribal rule in the area. The tumultuous tribal period eventually led to Catholic Kings’ conquest of Spain in 1492 (Pennell 2003).

From the sixteenth to the twentieth century of European colonization, Catholic Spain, along with Portugal, France, and England, continuously battled with Morocco for control of its coastal region and ports. European powers had divided Morocco between French and Spanish rule until 1956. Then in 1975 the Spanish government withdrew from the Sahara after the death of Franco, leaving Morocco and Mauritania to stake their claims. Periodic activities from the POLISARIO, the free Saharan independence group, would often bring international tension between the two countries. The most recent incident was in 2009 when Aminatou Haidar, a member of the POLISARIO, a Western Saharan independence activist group went on a hunger strike at Lanzarote airport in Canary Islands, in order to drag both Spain and Morocco into an international predicament regarding their political history over the Sahara. The matter ended when Morocco reversed its expulsion order against her.

Spain still looms in Morocco’s proximity. The Spanish government has yet to
relinquish the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which it had acquired from Morocco in the 1861 treaty of Madrid. In 2002, when a group of Moroccan soldiers landed on Leila Island, a tiny uninhabited islet near Ceuta, to monitor illegal immigration and terrorism, the Spanish government deemed the act as an invasion and reinforced its territorial claims on its enclaves (Pennell 2003). Continuous illegal entries by Moroccans and other Sub-Saharan Africans have led to periodic police brutality by both the Spanish and the Moroccan national police corps.

Other tensions with Spain involve various economic and political disputes. When Morocco closed its waters to European fishing boats in 1999 following a fallout on negotiations over a new fishing agreement with the European Union, Spanish fisherman had to bear the brunt of the maritime closure. By October 2001, the strain between the two countries led Morocco to terminate diplomatic relations with Spain until February 2002. Nevertheless, Spain remains Morocco’s second most important commercial partner after France.

The problem with immigration further compounds diplomatic relations between Spain and Morocco. By July 2001 at least a quarter of a million Moroccans were working in Spain legally, but many more Moroccans had tried to cross the Strait of Gibraltar to come into Europe. Being pressured by the European Union to control its borders, Spain enlisted Morocco for assistance in halting illegal immigration. The Spanish government complained about Morocco’s slow response to the illegal immigration problem, which propelled part of the Spanish media to launch a racist campaign against illegal immigration. The repatriation of Moroccan immigrants had led to further tension with reports of racism and abuse by Spanish police officers flooding the media in both countries. The ongoing tensions have
perpetuated the love-hate relationship between the Morocco and Spain with immigrants being caught in the middle of the periodic crossfires.

**Settlement and Citizenship**

The reception from the host-country means variation in citizenship status, access to resources and identity. Hence, immigrants may be thought of as being in what Victor Turner refers to as a “liminal” state, where they are betwixt and between rootedness and uprootedness. Refugees and immigrants have historically existed in a liminal state as they are at the mercy of the receiving nations, the international community, and conditions of the sending nations. Legal residence and ultimately citizenship, if ever, would eliminate the legal liminality.

Spanish citizenship is the goal of many of the interviewed women whether or not they would like to stay permanently, particularly after retirement. Given the frequent changes to Spanish immigration laws, Moroccan women prefer to resolve as much of their liminal status as possible. However, given the Spain’s history with Morocco, Moroccans tend to experience more difficulty in obtaining citizenship in Spain than other immigrant groups.

Verena Stolcke (1995) discusses the complexity of citizenship within the European countries. According to Stolcke, immigrants are seen as a threat to cultural integrity of the country and then to the idea of “Europeaness.” Concepts, such as “rootedness” and “belonging,” are used to indicate this exclusionary idea that in order to protect a country’s identity, the immigrants should go back to where they originally came from (Stolcke 1995). Origin then becomes a source of contention as to the notion of “citizenship” and what it entails as each country, e.g. France, England and Spain, differ in their determination. Is citizenship determined by blood or by residence? As with Ong’s (1998) study of Flexible
Citizenship, citizenship is not the same across countries or within a continent, even if the continent strives to become an entity.

According to current Spanish law, the qualifications for citizenship vary by countries. Former Spanish colonies such as Ecuador, Peru, and the Philippines have an agreement with Spain to allow migrants from these countries two years residence before applying for naturalization. Morocco, although a former Spanish protectorate, does not qualify for the special treatment. Moroccan immigrants must reside at least ten years in Spain prior to applying for citizenship unless the immigrant has proof of direct Spanish descendent from at least one parent or grandparent. The argument for the discrepancies among the countries is that immigrants from former Spanish colonies speak Spanish and have similar customs. At times another argument for the preferential treatment is the reparation of the historical harm and suffering placed upon the ancestors of these immigrants, which may be contrived as a post-colonial guilt trip in excusing the differential incorporation of various immigrant groups.

Moreover, immigrant children born on Spanish soil are not automatically Spanish citizens unless their parents have legal residency of at least one year. Even after fulfilling the prerequisites, the parents cannot apply for a Spanish passport and naturalization papers for the child until a year after the time of birth. Most importantly, the child’s status is closely linked to parental residency status, not the reverse. Parents residing illegally cannot use the child’s status to stay in the country. Hence, citizenship in Spain is by “blood” rather than by “residence,” and Moroccan immigrants are aware that having Spanish citizenship is imperative for the future of their children, even if they are planning to retire in Morocco.

Conclusion

Migration has been a way of life in Morocco since the beginning of its history.
Berbers, Bedouins, and pastoralists have moved from one area to the next searching for food and resources to feed their families. Centuries later, Moroccans continue to migrate in search of better resources and opportunities for their families.

Although Moroccan men tend to migrate before bringing over their families, more and more women are initiating their migratory process mainly due to the change in labor demands of the receiving countries. Traditionally relegated in the domestic domain of production, Moroccan women have to learn how to navigate through the social and economic system of a new country without the assistance of their kin and social network. The complicated relationship between Spain and Morocco does not make the migratory process easier; neither does the difference in their cultural and social practices.

Spain provides Moroccan women with more opportunities and freedom. Without the family vigilance, immigrant women have to negotiate and choose actions that may perpetuate or neglect their traditional values and customs. For many Moroccan women, the maintenance of their reproductive purity prior to marriage is directly related to the honor of their family. Their duty to remain chaste and modest has functioned as their moral compass. Actions that may destroy this compass can lead to dire consequences.
Tangier Port and Daily Ferries
ARRANGEMENTS AND CHOICES

“A friend should not be covetous, and a neighbor should not let his neighbor starve.”—Moroccan proverb, Westermarck (1931)

“The question is, what are you ready to do to overcome poverty?” Tahar Ben Jelloun (2009)

“Family reunification is a necessary way of making family life possible. It helps to create sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third country nationals in the Member State, which also serves to promote economic and social cohesion, a fundamental Community objective stated in the Treaty”, The Council of European Union, Council Directive 2003/86/EC, September 22, 2003

As with any group of immigrants, the situation prior to migration from the sending countries is crucial in observing and analyzing the settlement process. For Moroccan women immigrants, their prior conditions and to a varying extent, their current conditions are intricately intertwined with marriage customs and laws (Bargach 2002, Global Rights 2005). Marriage for Moroccan women has been one of the most, if not the most, important priority in their lives (Evers Rosander 1991, Maher 1974, Mernissi 1987). Until ten years ago, the majority of Moroccan women were illiterate and dependent on their immediate families for survival. Marriage enables them to not only leave familial binds but also to increase their social status.

In Morocco, women have learned to amass support and obtain resources from their kin and social network. Since the majority of Moroccan women is still illiterate and has not had much formal education, their socialization comes predominantly from their families, friends, and neighbors. For many women, their educational milieu has consisted mainly of women. Their fathers and brothers may restrict their behaviors, but they learn, question, debate, and confirm their beliefs to their female cohort. Furthermore, these beliefs have affected their decision to marry and to whom in Morocco.
However, immigrating to Spain has provided many Moroccan women with more opportunities and freedom than if they had stayed in Morocco. Included in this broadening of experiences is the opportunity to choose whom to marry and when to marry. The distance from the binds and vigilance of kin and other relations also allows Moroccan women the space to act in accordance to their needs and desires. Whether or not their needs and desires run counter to preserving family honor depends on various factors.

**Transnational Arrangements**

With the increase in female-initiated immigration, more and more women have found the traditional marriage arrangements taking a more transnational form. The common pattern of marriage for Moroccan immigrants has consisted of Moroccan males either returning to Morocco to marry and import their brides to Europe or they would bring their wives and children after securing their residency and sponsorship under the family reunification program. Nowadays, the pattern has reversed somewhat. Moroccan female immigrants are attracting male grooms from their country of origin and taking responsibility for sponsoring their future husbands. Social scientists have referred to this immigration act of importing a spouse from the country of origin as 'transnational endogamy.'

The trend of ‘transnational endogamy’ concerns lawmakers in the receiving countries because it signifies that the immigrant or the descendant of the immigrant has not and will not integrate into the host society. Social scientists, particularly sociologists, have long used intermarrying to measure the degree of assimilation for immigrant groups (Gordon 1964, Kulczycki and Lobo 2002, Leiberson and Waters 1988, Leivens 1998, 1999; Merton 1941, Zhou 1989). Marrying a native implies assimilation simply because couples will eventually adopt their spouses' cultural practices and ideas. Immigrants marrying other immigrants or
importing spouses from abroad will not fully incorporate and identify with their host society if their spouses are from elsewhere.

Moreover, criticisms of arranged marriages of immigrant groups usually involve the practice of cousin marriages, which appears to be on the rise in the Moroccan and Turkish immigrant communities in Europe (Ben-David 2009, Corijin and Lodewijckx 2009, de Haas 2006, Gonzalez Ferrer 2005, Hart 2007, Lievens 1998, 1999, Reiner 2001, Schoenmaeckers et al. 1999). Western societies currently perceive the cousin marriage pattern as problematic although this was not always the case. During the 1800s, cousin marriages among the aristocracy and elite class filled the registry. In fact, both the illustrious evolutionist Charles Darwin and Lewis Henry Morgan, the lawyer-turned-anthropologist, married their maternal cross cousin.

Western religion and scientific postulates, however, won in the end. In the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church started forbidding certain types of marriages in order to seize property from domestic groups. According to Jack Goody (1983), behind the Catholic's laws forbidding of close kin marriage, polygyny, and divorce lay the Church's economic need to obtain property for its institutional expansion. The reasons for the prohibition are: the risk of hereditary diseases and the commitment of sin in interacting with a close kin. In time, other Western societies follow suit. In fact, only certain states in the USA allow cousin marriages, proclaiming Mendelian inheritance as the prime reason. Nowadays, Westerners associate cousin marriages, at least publicly, with poor, uneducated, backwards people in countryside and with similarly type of people from developing countries.

Nevertheless, European nations have been trying to control the flow of immigration through every means possible since the mid-1970s, and cousin marriages have given
European countries ammunition in blocking more immigration. Transnational endogamy and cousin marriages are just recent tribulations of degrading the non-European immigrant communities. With thousands of immigrants now seeking entry through family unification or family formation with relatives and friends, many countries have attempted to impede the process by passing immigration marriage laws. England had a campaign, focusing on the Indian and Muslim population, to prohibit forced marriages. The Netherlands passed a law forbidding the import of a cousin-spouse for Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. Spain has not passed any law prohibiting cousin marriages but marriages based on obtaining legal residency status are illegal.

In Morocco, arranged marriage has been the norm, and arrangements between families or friends have existed to ensure longevity of the marriage based on economic and social needs. Morocco, as with many Middle Eastern countries, has had a preference for patrilateral parallel cousin marriages (Holy 1989, Maher 1974, Westermarck 1921). However, true patrilateral parallel cousin marriages of father's brother’s daughter (FBD) have only been observed in the south-central region of Morocco at less than 20% of all marriage types (Hart 2000). The Moroccan women in this study who have married someone in their family have consisted of cousins from both their maternal and paternal sides.

Moroccans who marry endogamously often use the term 'cousin' but unless the interviewer specifically asks for the degree of closeness, a 'cousin' could be consanguineous or fictive. They may even be neighbors or children of close family friends, of which Bourdieu (1977) refers to as 'practical kin.' Researchers studying this reported trend from Census Data and questionnaires do not specifically ask for genealogical information. During fieldwork, several informants have referred to me as ‘family’ due to our ongoing contact and
personal relationship; hence, their children will be referring to my children as ‘khal’ (male) or ‘khala’ (female), meaning cousins. All the terms that apply to maternal relatives are variations on another root word ‘khal’ or mother's sibling. Paternal relatives would command more respect, particularly the father’s brother, referred to as ‘amm’ since he occupies a pivotal structural position in a system of unilineal descent (Charrad 2001). Deferential behavior toward one's paternal uncle is socially prescribed and calling someone who is not a blood relative “amm” (paternal uncle) is a sign of respectful affection. Therefore, the ibn (walid) or son and a bent or daughter of an amm may be related or unrelated ‘cousins.’

Social Network

Moroccan women who have consistent contacts with their fellow compatriots and kin in Spain tend to adhere to the preservation of honor and follow the customary practice of arranged marriages. The arrangement may take the traditional form of family members meeting to discuss the match, and the couple would later meet to agree on the nuptial. The arrangement may also take the form of a female friend proposing a marriage match of one of her close relatives to a female friend. As indicated in the introduction, I have had first-hand experience with this form. Since the arrangement of marriage is within a group that shares the honor value system, the woman's behavior and composure need to comply with the expectations of this group.

The expectations consist of maintaining a virginal status and behaving and dressing modestly. Since many Moroccan immigrant women may be working during the time of the marriage negotiations, their future husbands and affines may demand an end to working outside the home once the marriage has commenced. Some immigrant women agree to these conditions while others refuse, leading to the termination of the engagement.
Although arranged marriages have persisted in the transnational context for Moroccan women in Spain, the strength of the social network tend to affect their marriage decision. Some studies indicate that cousin marriages are increasing in Moroccan immigrant communities, but the term ‘cousin’ needs to be explored more to confirm this trend. Additionally, Moroccans who have settled in Belgium and the Netherlands are from the Rif region, which are reportedly more traditional in their customs (Ben-Davis 2009). The majority of the female immigrants are from the Jebala region and their customs and cultures are different from the Rif region (Ramirez 1998, 2004). Hence, research on Moroccan immigration also needs to account for areas of origin for customs and behaviors differ from region to region.

**Transnational Alliance and Debt**

Marriage arranged exogamously of one kin group to another on behalf of women can take either a form of alliance-building or for debt repayment. According to Levi-Strauss (1963), kin groups exchange women for some "prestation" which could either be other women or labor and material goods. Marriage is a form of gift exchange, one that exchanges women (Mauss 1990). Leach (1951) agrees but adds that prestation could also take the form of intangible assets like "prestige" or "status" that might belong to either the wife-givers or the wife-takers. The ‘prestige’ or ‘status’ in the case of Moroccan migrant women may refer to their European residency, which would enhance the attractiveness of these women exponentially given the current economic conditions in Morocco and the difficult entry into ‘fortress’ Europe.

Gayle Rubin (1975) posits that women as exchange objects rarely profit from these exchanges whether in the form of a marriage or the aftermath of a battle, particularly as they
are presented in Levi-Strauss’ notion of the communication of women and Mauss’ gift exchange (Mauss 1990). The Maussian gift exchange describes women as the gift that can never realize her benefit from either the bridewealth given to her family, the dowry given to the bridegroom’s family, or as a trophy or compensation taken to battle. If the arranged marriage results in a balance of power between the conjugal pair, the woman may stake her claim. On the other hand, if the arranged marriage results in the male domination of the household, the woman loses considerably.

Yet arranged marriages still exist in Morocco and the pressure to succumb to this pattern continues for Moroccan migrant women in Spain. Female immigrants command a high bridewealth in Morocco and relatives and friends are eager to arrange marriage matches (Van Amersfoort and Penninx 1994). Some studies claim that the second generation of Moroccan women import their spouses because they benefit from the freedom bestowed upon them in Europe and being able to marry someone from their common background without having to deal with the patrilocal complications (Lievens 1999, Ben-David 2009). Nevertheless, the second generation of Moroccan women do not necessarily need to import spouses to enjoy freedom from their in-laws. Hence, marrying a Moroccan immigrant from another European city may also give them the same freedom. Nevertheless, familial obligations and pressure tied to a transnational social network still affect second generation Moroccan women in some European cities.

The Centro constantly encounters cases of forced marriages of Moroccan female students who have to marry their male ‘cousins’ in order to settle debts their families have accumulated. Forced marriages, however, differs from arranged marriage. In forced marriages, at least one individual in the nuptial couple has not given his or her consent to the
marriage; whereas, arranged marriages indicate both people have consented to the planned marriage. European newspapers and NGOs have noted the common practice of forced marriages in Moroccan immigrant families, in which the head migrants are clearly the fathers who had sponsored their wives and children to Spain. Caught in a socio-cultural quagmire, many young Moroccan girls would eventually succumb to their parents' wishes. Dependent on their family for economic survival, the young girls could not press charges against their parents and risk familial ostracization.

Moroccan women migrating to Spain without family may still depend on their kin network for other means. In fact, obtaining legal residency in Spain may be both a blessing and a curse for the woman. Without legal residency, a Moroccan woman does not have the ‘prestige’ to attract many marriage proposals due to her suspicious activities away from home. If she has suitors, she is unable to return to Morocco for her wedding. Once she obtains residency, her status increases dramatically, drawing families, friends and neighbors to solicit a possible opportunity to migrate to Europe through a marriage arrangement.

Moroccan migrant women usually encounter pending marriage arrangement after obtaining legal residency in Spain. Since Moroccan immigrants in Europe tend to spend their month-long vacation in Morocco, family and friends often flock to visit and frequently arrange marriage possibilities for single migrants. The majority of Moroccan female immigrants start working as domestic servants, usually as live-in housekeepers. Hence, their interactions with other Moroccans and Spaniards are limited to their work environment. Despite being far from Morocco, they still maintain contact with their social network back home. They constantly communicate with family members in Morocco, calling at least twice a week and sending monthly remittances. Although they work and reside in Spain, they
preserve strong social and emotional ties to the social network in their country of origin.

Case: Khadija

Khadija, a plump 48 year old woman, massages her swollen hands to relieve the pain. “I have worked since I was seven years old,” she remarks, partially excusing herself from paying full attention to the anthropologist. Many women refer to Khadija as the ‘mother’ of Lavapies because she had migrated in 1981, before the majority of the women, and had helped her husband’s family, her family, and her neighbors in Larache to migrate to Madrid. “My family was very poor after my father left our village to go to Larache. His brother had sold most of the land from his inheritance and left nothing for his younger siblings. My father was the youngest so he had to leave with his wife to start a new life in the town. I was second of six surviving children so I had to help my mother as much as I could. My elder sister Fatima carried the burden of the housework. My parents did not have much money so we could not go to school. My younger sister, the third one, went to school. I was sent to Tangier to live with a wealthy neighbor who needed help and companion for their daughter.

I went to Tangier to ease my parents’ burden when I was seven. I lived with them until I was twelve. I came back to Larache until I was fifteen and left for Tangier again to work in the home of the French Consulate in Tangier. I worked in his home until he returned to his country. When I returned home, a neighbor had recommended me to work at the Italian embassy, but I would have to go to Madrid because the family was relocating in a few months. My father thought I should take the opportunity so I accepted the job despite my mother’s reservation of leaving Morocco.

Before I left for Madrid, I had a marriage proposal from the brother of a friend. My husband’s mother had also come to my parents to arrange my marriage, but they had told them that I had already been promised to someone else. I had several other proposals before I migrated. My husband, who lived on the same block, was the most persistent. I had already left for Madrid for several months before returning to Morocco. My mother needed to see me to make sure I was all right so I returned the second I had the chance. I returned to find that my fiancé had impregnated another woman so I had to terminate our engagement.

When I broke the engagement with my fiancé, his husband's mother knew about it first and went straightaway to my parents to reinitiate the proposal. Back then, a girl with a broken engagement would attract all sorts of talk. My parents accepted the neighbor’s proposal, and I had a meeting with my husband, but we did not marry until I had my residency.

I worked and lived with the Italian family for six months until they left for
Russia. I did not want to move so far away so they referred me to a Spanish doctor who had just recently divorced from his wife and had to care for his two children. I stayed with his family for another year before coming back to Morocco to visit. The Italian embassy had taken care of my paperwork so I did not worry.

I return to Morocco and had my wedding. We had the reception at the largest hall in Larache, in Plaza España. Before returning to Madrid, I had promised to help my husband’s brother migrate. My husband had to stay to help his family’s fishing business so his brother left first. The doctor had introduced me to a close friend of his who had a large restaurant in Leganes so I was able to obtain a contract for my brother-in-law to work there. Three years later I brought my husband over to work for the same restaurant. A friend of the owner needed someone to take care of her elderly mother so I had my sister-in-law come to live with them. My sister-in-law then brought her mother and her husband who later in turn brought over his family. I also helped bring my childhood friends to Madrid. Whenever someone asked the owner for help, I would suggest a friend or relative. I found work contracts for my three sisters; the eldest came first and worked at the same restaurant as the rest of us and then the two younger ones in the 1990s. I suppose that is why I know so many people here.”

Khadija has a close-knit network that spans transnationally with her tight social network in her country of origin place pressure on her to accept the arranged marriage. Apart from her new social network in Spain, many members of her social network in Morocco know each other, exerting social pressure on her to conform. Bott (1957) posits that close-knit networks consist of:

“…the networks of the component families are so closely connected and the relationships within the local group are so clearly marked off from external relationships that the local population can properly call an organized group. Families are encapsulated within this group. Their activities are known to all and they cannot escape from the formal sanctions of gossip and public opinion. The group to which they belong governs their external affairs. (p.99)”

The investment in courting and marrying an immigrant woman would yield handsome returns for the husband and his family since the immigrant woman may have an established
network of Spanish bosses who need workers from Morocco. Immigrant women can sponsor spouses and kin members to Europe under the family reunification program. By developing strong relationships with Spanish bosses and patrons, Moroccan female immigrants can find employment contracts for agnates, affines, and friends. Khadija brought over the majority of her social network from Morocco with the exception of her parents and two married sisters. Moroccan women who have assisted many kin members and 'practical kin' (friends and neighbors) to immigrate to Spain often reweave close-knit networks of compatriots. Some take the role of 'cultural brokers', from whom female compatriots would approach for help in settling into their host society.

Newly arrived immigrants, particularly Moroccan immigrants, tend to seek help from their fellow countrymen prior to soliciting help from other nationalities or from the native population (Tonon and Maya Jariego 2006). The newly arrived immigrant usually receives material support from the previous cohort of immigrants while obtaining emotional support from their own cohort who may be experiencing the similar predicaments. Support network, as indicated in the case of Khadija, grows gradually through time depending on the time of reference, the degree of family regrouping, the migrating cohort, and the size of immigrant communities of compatriots (Garcia et al. 2005).

The immigrant cultural broker often receives many visitors for casual visits, particularly for afternoon tea. Their networks mainly consist of their fellow compatriots, but they also have an expanded, almost a separate network of Spaniards and other immigrant nationals to provide them with information and resources. Despite having a network of diverse members, Moroccan cultural brokers see more of their compatriots for a variety of activities, partly due to their dependence on their old ties. Cultural brokers such as Khadija
may appear ‘encapsulated’ by their imported social network. The people who these cultural brokers had helped immigrate to Spain would bring their relatives and friends who in turn would bring their social network. In time, a single Moroccan immigrant woman may find herself married with children and surrounded by many compatriots from her hometown in Morocco. The reconstruction of a tight social network, however, has its cost.

A close-knit network brings both cost and benefits. Having kin nearby provide social and economic support, heightening traditional customs and gender roles (Bott 1957). Moreover, by recreating the network of compatriots, transnational gossip may transpire as members in Spain can easily pass information to family and friends back home. The intensity of the gossip tends to revert to traditional values and customs from the sending country.

Moroccan women soon discover that the social constraints they have left behind in Morocco would revive itself in Spain. Moroccan women often complain about relationships with their female compatriots as risky because they would 'talk' and cause problems. They scrutinize each other for dishonorable behavior. The women treat the dishonorable women cordially in public spaces such as in the women's group at the Centro or at the neighborhood Ramadan celebration, but beyond these public activities, they gossip about their compatriots' dishonorable behavior with men, drugs, their manner of dress, etc. As a result, they re-certify the criteria of honorable behavior, and their validation of the 'honorable' women against the ‘dishonorable’ ones may be observed by noting who they invite to their ceremonies.

Marriage not only offers Moroccan women an improvement in social status in their country of origin but also in their imported community of compatriots. By reestablishing a close-knit network of compatriots, the women also import the custom of valuing honor and marriage. Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton (1994) posits as part of a ‘deterritorialized
nation-states, immigrants may migrate but “still not live outside the state wherever its people go, their state goes too (p. 269).” Hence, immigrants carry their customs and traditions with them no matter the destination. Moroccan women often succumb to the pressure of her social network in continuing their old customs and traditions. Immigrants may carry some practices from their country of origin, but the manifestation of the traditions needs the encouragement and the affirmation of others.

**Level of Education**

Along with the frequent contacts with their compatriots in their social network, the women's level of education also influences their adherence to the traditional honor and marriage system. The women in this study who marry through arranged marriages all have low-levels of education and a close-knit network of kin in Spain. The woman’s dependency on her kin, whether economic, social or emotional, results in her acquiescence to the marriage arrangement. On the other hand, class does not play an important factor in determining whether or not the women would succumb to the pressure of marrying her parents’ choice for a spouse (Davis and Shaefer Davis 1995).

As a matter of fact, one’s position in the family highly determines the likelihood of marriage by arrangement. Several immigrant women in the study have sisters who did have arranged marriages. I have analyzed their genealogical charts and have found that their positions in the family, being first or second born, and their low level of education often determine their matrimonial predicament (see genograms).

The birth order of women in Morocco also greatly determines their access to education. First and second-born girls in Moroccan families tend to have less formal education than their younger siblings. The trend may be changing within the past ten years
due to the Moroccan government's plan to eradicate illiteracy, but all the women in this study are over 20 years of age and have not benefitted from this new campaign to improve the overall literacy level. Despite the Moroccan government's efforts, literacy rate among women has only reached 39.6% of the population in 2004 census, whereas 65.7% of Moroccan men are literate (US Department of State 2007).

Older girls who have to care for their younger siblings and help with the housework are especially susceptible to having a limited level of formal education, if any at all. When these girls migrate to Spain, they tend to have more difficulty integrating into Spanish society than their fellow compatriots with a higher level of formal schooling. Without a strong foundation of formal schooling, many Moroccan women find it challenging to learn how to read and write in Spanish. In the end, they maintain closer ties to their immigrant community, which perpetuate the imported customs and values from Morocco, one of which is the honor and marriage system.
Khadija’s Education and Occupation
Genogram
The Education and Occupation Genogram

Suad and Samira

Yasmin

[Genogram diagram showing relationships and occupations of family members]
Additionally, having a lower level of education makes the woman susceptible to the influences of kin and friends. Families may have a social and economic need to marry the uneducated woman when she barely reaches adulthood in order to prevent dishonorable acts from taking place. Moreover, lower-class families who cannot afford to send their older daughters to school may need to marry the girls for economic reasons. Khadija, as indicated in the previous case and the genealogical chart, is the second-born child in her lower-class family. Her eldest sister, who is also illiterate, has a marriage arranged for her as well.

**Class and Choice**

Moroccan women from middle-class and above have more economic and educational opportunities than their lower-class counterparts. Even from the colonial period when women's access to education was expanded, the majority of the first cohort of female students who attended the Free schools established by the Moroccan independent movement came from upper-class families (Baker 1999). With the current low literacy rate among Moroccan women, the gap in education still maintains a class distinction.

Education provides Moroccan women with the ability to read and learn about other ideas and possibilities. Moroccan women with higher levels of education have more exposure to these possibilities. Formal schooling also provides social possibilities that may lead to different dating and marriage patterns. Attending school and working outside the home gives women opportunities to meet and interact with men not related to their kin and natal social network. In Morocco, the choices that have come with the expansion of education have changed the traditional pattern, albeit with limitations.

Contrary to arranged marriages, the operative word for “choice” in marriages provides individuals with options outside of what their parents or others have determined for
them. In Moroccan arranged marriages, individuals can accept or deny the suitors chosen by their parents. In fact, Islam obligates consent in marriages. By finding their own prospective spouses, Moroccans would reverse the traditional marriage form by taking the initiative of choosing. However, parental consent still rules in the end so Moroccans continue to operate within familial constraints. Westerners, on the other hand, have more freedom in choosing and deciding on their future mates. Families may object, but many Westerners would forge ahead with their matrimony despite objections. They are the agents of their lives and take actions to fulfill their needs and desires.

Philosophers, anthropologists, and other social scientists have grappled with the individuals' interaction in society by discussing the decisions and actions they would take, given the constraints of their social structure. All humans are agents, and all live in a social setting with particular norms and/or laws that the individuals have to follow. Given these constraints, individuals make decisions and act accordingly in order to live in society. However, social theorists have different explanations on how individuals go about deciding and acting in their world.

Structuralists and functionalists propose that the perceived agency of individuals can mostly be explained by the operation of the overall structure of their society. Social forces determine actions so free will does not exist. Conversely, social phenomenologists and other theorists privileging the individual stress the capacity of individual "agents" to construct and reconstruct their worlds. Social structure, in this respect, is illusory, acting as the mind-forged manacles of individuals. Rather than focusing on agency or structure in the ontological debate, some theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu (1977) and Anthony Giddens (1979) attempt to reconcile structure and agency by seeing them as complementary forces. The pre-existing
social structure, consisting of norms and law, influences human behavior because the agent has been socialized with them and has internalized relationships and expectations corresponding to their roles and relationships (Bourdieu 1977). However, social rules and structure are not fixed and external because individuals can sustain or modify them through human actions (Giddens 1979). Hence, the individual is constantly "externalizing the internal" and "internalizing the external" (Bourdieu 1977).

Moroccan women, both migrants and non-migrants, make choices in relation to themselves, their families, and their social milieu. Given the constraints of the Moroccan honor and marriage system, Moroccan women choose to veil, to maintain their virginity, and to marry. Behaving outside the norm has consequences from being the center of the community gossip, damaging the family honor, to being ostracized. The punishments for abnormal behaviors serve as deterrents for future action.

As indicated in previous chapters, the traditional Moroccan marriage system has constraints within the need to form alliances and to protect family honor. The honor and marriage system targets women as the problematic factor in its stability. By controlling women, family honor is preserved and alliances can be more easily formed. Left to their own devices, women would disrupt this system, causing disgrace by their indiscreet sexual behaviors. Hence, the migration of women distances them from familial vigilance and from their responsibilities and traditional values.

Furthermore, international migration would distance women physically and culturally from their families and their society. International migration places women in a different social structure with distinct constraints and opportunities. Living in Europe would expose both men and women to different marriage patterns and marriage choices. However, men
may marry non-Muslim women because their children inherit Islam patrilineally. Women need to marry Muslim men for the transference of affiliated faith.

Nevertheless, customs and traditions are not stagnant and fixed. Economic necessity, migration, satellite television, and other forms of cultural exchanges may alter traditional forms. Marriage and family, as a system of reproduction and socialization, are also susceptible to change.

**The New Matchmaker**

Although the traditional system of arranged marriages still occurs in Morocco, young Moroccans have started choosing their own spouses rather than having their parents choose their spouses for them. However, arranged marriage and even forced marriages are still common for Moroccan women immigrants who live under the pressure of their natal family (Pajares and Chaib 1999). Moroccan women with more freedom in choosing their partners have started marrying non-Moroccan and non-Muslim European men.

Mate preference differs among Moroccan women. Factors affecting mate preference and selection depend mainly on the women's level of education. In general, women from the first generation of Moroccan immigrants with little or no formal education prefer marrying Moroccan men over non-Moroccans. Muslim men from other countries are their second option. Still, the longer the woman remains in Spain, the more open she becomes to the possibility of marrying a non-Moroccan and non-Muslim. As a matter of fact, Moroccan women with higher level of education are more open to the possibility of marrying non-Moroccans and non-Muslims. The women with at least a secondary level of education in this study prefer Spanish or other European men to Moroccan men. They claim that race and religion are not important in their decision, but love, compatibility, and commitment are the
more important criteria.

Although many Moroccan women who marry non-Moroccans met their spouses after immigrating, more and more Moroccan women have been using internet dating in Morocco to find their mates from abroad. Internet dating has grown in popularity globally within the past decade. Morocco is not immune to this trend; in fact, it increases annually in usage among the young, educated generation. In 2000, Morocco had only 100,000 users or 0.3% of its population, but grew to 10,442,500 internet users as of December 2009, constituting 33.4% of its population and a 10,342.5% increase between 2000-2010 (ITU 2010). Many women in this study could barely read or write let alone send an email, but the ones who have some computer literacy would use chat rooms and internet dating to find prospective mates. Some women may also ask their more computer literate friends to help them find a virtual dating connection. People can easily maintain relationships with family and friends as well as contract marriages by virtue of telecommunication devices (Constable 2003).

Both Moroccan men and women can be found on various internet websites in Arabic, French, Spanish and English. Some sites require a fee while others are free with a membership. Internet dating has made it possible for people to use a virtual intermediary to either match them with someone or they can choose for themselves by reading and responding to the personal advertisement. At some point, the foreign suitor has to come to Morocco to meet his mate in person. The relationship either ends or continues and perhaps leads to marriage.

Concerns about marrying a foreigner have caught international attention but in different aspects. For Western receiving countries of immigration, transnational exogamy, as opposed to endogamy, raises flags of suspicion regarding the intent of the foreign or ‘third
world’ nationals, a current term used to describe people from developing countries, in marrying ‘first world’ nationals. The punishment for entering into a marriage of convenience, however, differs by country.

The United States Consulate General in Casablanca has a precautionary notice on its website for United States citizens visiting Morocco with the intent of marrying Moroccan citizens who they have met on an internet dating website.

“Many Americans befriend Moroccans through Internet dating and social networking sites and these relationships often to lead marriage, or engagement. While many of the marriages between Americans and Moroccans are successful, the U.S. Consulate General in Casablanca warns against marriage fraud. It is not uncommon for foreign nationals to enter into marriages with Americans solely for immigration purposes. Relationships developed via correspondence, particularly those begun on the Internet, are especially susceptible to manipulation. Often, the marriages end in divorce in the United States when the foreign national acquires legal permanent residence (“green card”) or U.S. citizenship. In some cases, the new American or permanent resident then remarries a wife he divorced before, around the same time as entering into a relationship with a sponsoring American citizen.”—US Consulate General, Casablanca, Morocco

The warning particularly indicates the behavior of some Moroccan men using the pronoun ‘he’ and ‘wife’, appearing to exclude Moroccan women from practicing this type of marriage pattern. Moreover, the note assumes a naïveté in American ideals of love and marriage against the crafty Moroccan strategy of immigration via marriage. Nevertheless, the consequence comes with a hefty price tag. In the United States, severe penalties for marriage fraud consist of up to 5 years in federal a prison, a $250,000 fine, and deportation.

On the other hand, the Commission of the European Union provides a more gender-neutral account of a marriage of convenience in its directives. According to the European Union, Council Resolution 97/C 382/01 of 4 December 1997:

“A ‘marriage of convenience’ means a marriage concluded between a national of
a Member State or a third-country national legally resident in a Member State and a third-country national with the sole aim of circumventing the rules on entry and residence of third-country nationals and obtaining for the third-country national a residence permit or authority to reside in a Member State.”

Spain has seen a proliferation in heterogamy between immigrants and Spanish citizens and has tightened its control of *el matrimonio blanco* (fake marriages). In 2006, the Spanish civil registry recorded 209,843 of marriages with the number of mixed marriages increasing dramatically. The *Instituto Nacional de Estadística* (National Institute of Statistics) has found the number of mixed unions in Spain has tripled since 1994 (9,198) to 2004 (30,930).

Although not all the marriages may be considered marriages of convenience, the Spanish authorities have heightened their suspicion of the trend (Maldonado 2009).

Western liberal democratic States such as the United States, Spain and other European countries, control the marriage institution by conferring marital status to unions that uphold its ideals (Hegel 1952, Metz 2007). In current Western societies, marriage “involves material and expressive goods, influences behavior and belief, and is quintessentially familial and political and personal and communal” (Metz 2007: 6). Hegel (1952) posits that although some governments have less religious influence than others, the marriage institution carries a moral value that liberal states hold in granting marital status. Marriage, according to Hegel, is a transformative process starting with two distinct individuals, who by agreeing to marry become a unit or a couple, deeply intertwined with each other and with the community. In essence, the state establishes marriage to not only control the reproduction of individuals but also to uphold the moral value of obligation and commitment of two individuals to each other and to the community at large. Therefore, a marriage based on love celebrates the liberal, democratic ideal. On the other hand, a marriage of convenience would debase this ideal due
to its temporal nature and lack of commitment to family formation.

**Mixed Marriages**

Marriages based on love or on convenience are difficult to detect in aggregate data. Even so, aggregate data can present general group trends. The number of Moroccan immigrant women who marry Spanish nationals has also increased dramatically. From 1996 to 2008, the number of marriages between Moroccan female nationals and Spanish male nationals has grown three times from 371 to 1012 (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística* 2009). As a matter of fact, the trend for Moroccan women mirrors the national trend of mixed marriages between foreign nationals and Spanish nationals.

Although Spanish nationals also include Moroccans with Spanish nationality as well, the process of obtaining Spanish nationality takes at least 10 years. Moroccans need to reside legally in Spain for 10 years before applying for Spanish nationality and another three years to obtain an approval and the passport. The trend may indicate a mixture of both a transnational exogamy or marrying outside of one’s nationality (heterogamy) or transnational endogamy or marrying within one’s nationality (homogamy). None of the women in this study is married to a Moroccan with Spanish nationality. The seven women in the study with mixed marriages are married to Spaniards and have acquired their Spanish nationality through their marriages.

The proliferation of religiously exogamous marriages between Moroccan women and European men has invited scornful criticisms from the Moroccan media. Unlike Judaism, Islamic faith is inherited patrilineally rather than matrilineally. Men may marry infidels, whereas women have to marry a Muslim since children acquire Islam through the father’s bloodline (Abd Al-Ati 1995, Coleman, 1994).
In a TV show in June 2008, Sheikh Mohammed al-Tawil, an imam in Fez, Morocco, publicly criticized the trend of Moroccan women, many of them immigrants in Europe, returning to Morocco with their European groom for a summer wedding. The Moroccan report indicates that almost 6,000 Moroccan women registered their marriages to foreigners, mainly Europeans, in 2007 while Moroccan men only registered 4,320 marriages to foreigners. The imam blamed the 2004 changes to the *Moudawana* for allowing women more freedom to choose their own partners, which had resulted in the marrying of infidels.

"This kind of marriage, between Moroccan women and European men, is forbidden by the Koran (the Muslim holy book) and the Sunna (the way or deeds of the Prophet Mohammed). A Muslim woman may not marry a non-believer while a Muslim man may marry Christian and Jewish women. [They can marry European men who had converted to Islam]. Islam only required two witnesses for someone to be able to convert and such a marriage is valid. If a European then decides to abandon Islam, Mohammed's words apply to him: those who renounce their own religion must be killed, as they are an apostate.” -- Sheikh Mohammed al-Tawil, TV interview with the Arabic satellite TV network al-Arabiya.

The imam’s harsh commentary originates from the changes in the *Moudawana* that has given women more freedom in determining their own marriage and divorce. Moroccan women no longer require a male family member, a marriage tutor or *wali*, to represent them in contracting their marriages. The imam equates the freedom to represent themselves as the cause for the surge in taking infidels as husbands.

According to the Islamic law, the *umma*, the community of believers, consists primarily of men with women posing as second citizens (Ahmed 1992, Mernissi 1987). A Moroccan woman marrying a non-believer risks her children not becoming Muslims. Through the father, Muslim identity is ascribed. Through the mother, it ends with her if her husband-father is a non-believer. The children can always convert later but the inheritance of
faith through patrilineal blood remains crucial in the patriarchal society of Morocco.

Nonetheless, the imam from the report does not separate the types of marriages that may flourish in transnational arrangements. He assumes that marriages, whether by arrangement or not, jeopardize the continuity of Islamic transference.

As indicated in the statistics, marriages between Moroccan females and Spanish nationals have risen within the last ten years. The trend may have grown due to the restrictions in European immigration laws. However, these haram or forbidden marriages may or may not be fake marriages. The commitment in some of these marriages may expire once Spanish nationality is acquired or it may last a lifetime. The benefits and consequences of choosing to marry a foreigner for papeles, or legal residency, may balance out so that making a decision to marry for convenience is not as simple as it seems.

**Case: Karima**

*When I met Karima in 2008, she had just left the strawberry fields of Huelva to live in Madrid with her aunt and cousins. She had just turned thirty and left her twin boys in Morocco. Karima obtained work in the Huelva strawberry fields from an agency in Morocco. She was selected because she was a divorced woman with two small children, which ensured her quick return to Morocco once the season ended. To Karima’s surprise, the owner of the farm did not want to trouble himself with the protocol of returning hundreds of women to Morocco so he sent back only the ones who had no family in Spain or who did not want to stay. Karima had a maternal aunt in Madrid so she opted to stay in order to work and support her children. The children’s father had left her for a younger woman and had refused to pay support. Karima had return to her parents’ house but could not support the family without money. She decided to migrate and left her children with her mother.*

*Karima would like to remarry but many Moroccan men had dismissed the idea of having to care for her two children from a previous marriage. Moreover, Karima’s ex-husband was a police officer; making it more difficult for men in her town to know her. Moreover, she could not find work in Morocco so immigrating to Europe was the best solution for her family. She heard about the strawberry job through a cousin who had applied the year before and was rejected because she was single and too*
She stayed in Huelva for three months until the season was over. Karima spoke to her family once a week, usually on Sundays, to check on her children. She would send 200 Euro each month to help her family care for her children. When Karima had to return to Morocco, the owner allowed her to call her family in Madrid to see if she could go there instead. She took the bus to Madrid and stayed with her maternal aunt and her family.

Karima found the scarcity of jobs in Madrid stressful but was able to find a job through her aunt’s friend in a restaurant. However, she soon encountered problems with her aunt’s family because she could not give them the monthly amount for the household bills. She claimed, “They knew I had been working on the farm and wanted some money. I gave them some but they wanted more. I told them that I had to send the money home, but they explained that I was living there, eating their food, and using their water and electricity so I had to help pay. They also did not like that I had a new boyfriend. They told me I could not see him anymore but when I refused, they called me a prostitute and kicked me out of the house for shaming them. I did not know what to do. I called my Moroccan girlfriend but she was not available. I had to find some place to go so there was a Spanish man in the neighborhood who offered me his place if I clean for him. I accepted. I lived there for a week and had to leave. He wanted to sleep with me.” Fortunately, she contacted her Moroccan girlfriend who gave her a place to stay until she found a job as a live-in through the Centro Hispano-Marroqui.

She occasionally comes to the Centro for cultural activities and Spanish classes. Karima befriended Samira and Laila at Centro and learned from Laila that she had married an older Spanish man for residency. In fact, she had submitted her application for citizenship. Karima expressed her dismay with the tightening of immigration laws and worried she may be deported due to her illegal status. She needed to stay and work to support her family. Laila showed her the internet website where she had met her current husband and noted that she only needed to stay married until her citizenship’s approval. Karima had never used a computer so Laila volunteered to help her with the chat room.

A year later, Karima brought her gay Spanish male friend, Enrique, to meet us at the Centro. She announced she was getting married to him soon for papers. He had agreed with the plan since he needed a wife to appease his parents, and she needed her residency to stay and work in Spain. She had met Enrique through his aunt, the elderly woman whom she was taking care of. Karima had agreed to pay him 1,000 Euros for the marriage.
Abuse or the threat of abuse in domestic service, as indicated in Karima's case, is not uncommon in Spain (Ramirez 1999). Some Moroccan women encounter similar predicaments while working as a live-in housekeeper. Physical, verbal and sexual abuses by bosses often go unreported due to the illegal status of these women. Having their family dependent on them, these women cannot risk deportation if they go to local authorities with their problems. Caught in a precarious situation, Moroccan women abused by their bosses would keep their problems hidden from others until their legal situation is resolved (Ramirez 1999).

Nevertheless, Moroccan migrant women continue to try to find a solution to legalize their status, which includes marrying a non-Muslim for residency. Moroccan women would prioritize staying in Spain to support their family over the Islamic restriction of marrying outside one’s faith. By supporting their family through marriage, the women can retain some respect and status as married women as well as fulfilling their duty as good daughters.

The women in this study separate marriage into two categories: real and false. A real marriage is based on a life-time commitment to raise a family and to serve God (if the woman is religious). A false marriage is a temporary civil union for a practical purpose in order to help one’s family. False marriages or marriages of convenience include marriages for residency.

Moroccan women who enter into false marriages do not usually trust Spanish people with this knowledge. Moroccans in their social network may be aware of the relationship, but only very close and trustworthy Spanish friends are privileged with this information. In fact, Laila, the woman who introduced Karima to internet dating, has told her Moroccan friends and relatives of her pragmatic marriage to an older Spanish man but none of her Spanish
friends or the workers at the Centro has any knowledge of that information. The lawyer of the Centro discovered Laila’s marital situation when her Moroccan boss revealed the information accidentally during a business lunch. Laila happens to be currently in love with a Moroccan man in Barcelona but has to remain married for another year until her naturalization process is complete.

As individualistic as the marriage of convenience may appear, the women in this study believe that marriages of convenience are sacrifices for their kin group. They believe that love marriages may bring them more happiness, at least at the beginning for the relationship, than arranged marriages with someone who they hardly know. They describe happiness in arranged marriages as being ‘lucky.’ However, contracting a marriage for legal and economic reasons is morally acceptable for the woman is sacrificing her happiness for her family. She can always divorce when the contract is fulfilled and marry someone else to start a family. Being properly married is a sense of duty to their family with which many Moroccan women have been socialized (Davis and Shaefer Davis 1995).

Love Marriages

In Europe, Moroccan female immigrants may have more freedom in choosing their spouse. The initial process of mate selection may be different. However, spousal selection still requires approval, either from the family and/or from the state. Marriages outside the norm of approval risk encountering severe consequences: ostracization or deportation. Pure freedom to choose and act as one desire has shown to be more complicated than many immigrant women had anticipated. While the State regulates marriage, the family still has some control over the individual migrant.

The modern Western metanarrative dictates that individuals should initiate the search
for his or her spouse because the individual must take responsibility for his or her needs, desire, and goals. In modern Euro-American marriages, love is a moral foundation individuals need in order to form a lifelong commitment (Constable 2003, Giddens 1992, Schneider 1965). Although studies have indicated that feelings of love do not endure for long, marriages based on love remain the current Western ideal (Coontz 2003, Shumway 2003). If individuals choose to marry each other for pragmatic reasons (economic, political, social), the present Euro-American predilection would judge these marriages as cold, calculating and profane. Marriage, as a sacred institution, requires deep sentiments and a strong attachment.

Romantic love is believed to have originated from the Medieval period when aristocratic men and women exchange gestures and expressions of strong emotion for each other. During the period of the Crusades, however, many upper-class marriages were arranged based on property and alliance so romantic love would exist outside of marriage. In fact, courtly love usually involved idealization and were generally not sexual in nature (Ackerman 1994). Some theorists believed that the popularity of romantic love grew along with the development of the novel (Giddens 1992). According to anthropologist William Jankowiak (1995), aristocratic women during the eleventh- and twelfth-century fostered a gradual development of a “language of gentility and social distinction” based on the experience of courtly love. Hence forth, the formal ideology of romantic love created social boundaries between the cultural elite and the peasantry.

The distinction of a love marriage as sacred and a pragmatic marriage as profane separates ‘us’ from the ‘other’. We still use love marriages to distinguish ourselves as ‘modernized’ and ‘advanced’ in comparison with the ‘traditional’ and ‘backward’ practices of
the pragmatic, arranged marriages in developing countries. Love marriages allow individuals to realize their profound desire to form a strong emotional attachment to another person. Arranged marriages rob individuals of their initiatives and of realizing their true desires, which are our deep sentimental attachment to one another, not an attachment dictated by external forces or a temporary agreement to bond with one another for sensible motives. Western ideals consider individuals marrying for practical reasons as superficial and selfish, debasing one of the most sacred institutions of human reproduction.

Although love relationships have penetrated Moroccan society, Moroccan women tend to be more practical in their choice of spouses than their male counterpart (Davis and Schaefer Davis 1995). A Moroccan woman marrying for love, however, can face severe consequences if her family does not approve of her partner selection. Moroccan women tend to develop a sense of social responsibility (‘aql), particularly to their family at a young age (Davis and Schaefer Davis 1989). These women continue to have strong attachment to their kin group, particularly their maternal kin group. If she chooses to marry someone her parents have rejected, she risks severing ties with her family. In Morocco, she would not have a safety net to return to if the marriage dissolves. Yet in Spain, she may simply cut contact and lose an essential emotional and social part of her social network but still be able to survive economically. If she is economically dependent on her family, she has to find other forms of support to help her. However, she may have more social opportunities to establish friendship with Spaniards and other foreigners who would support her decision.

In this section, I examine a case of two sisters who both at one point decided to marry for love. In examining a family case, I can bracket their social and economic background. One major difference between the two sisters is their level of education. Each decision has
different consequences so the factors of the decisions and their consequences will be explored. I spoke to the informants’ family, which includes their mother, aunts, uncles, siblings, and neighbors in Madrid and Tetuan to obtain more information.

**Case: Samira and Suad**

Samira, 29 years old, and Suad, 31 years old, are sisters but have different directions in life. They came from a family of six sisters and one brother. Suad is the eldest then Samira. Suad studied up to her second year in high school while Samira dropped out after three days at primary school. They described their family as middle class from the city of Tetuan. Suad migrated to Spain with her aunt in 1994 to work in Spain due to her parents’ impending separation. She knew things would turn difficult financially should their parents’ divorce.

Suad and her aunt found jobs through a family friend in Madrid as live-in housekeepers for a rich Spanish family in Madrid. Suad knew a little Spanish before but had to learn very fast on the job. She took care of the couple’s two young children while her aunt tended to the housework. After nearly a year with the family, her aunt returned to Morocco, leaving Suad with the family. Soon afterwards, Suad discovered that the husband took a special interest in her. When he raped her, she could not tell anyone. The rape occurred several more times until finally in 1995, she heard news from her aunt that her mother had migrated to Madrid.

She left her job to join her mother, Naima. Her mother found work as a live-in housemaid in Madrid and Suad stayed a year with her before going to Tenerife to work in a hotel where her friend also worked. While working at the hotel, she developed a friendship with the Spanish owner’s son. The friendship blossomed into love, which led to their marriage three years later. Although her family suggested that her husband convert to Islam, he never did. Her mother, her aunts and uncles attended her wedding in Tenerife. Suad and her husband recently bought a beautiful, modern apartment in the new part of Tetuan for her mother and siblings to use during their summer vacation.

In 1999, Suad’s mother’s application from the family reunification program was approved so her six younger siblings came to Spain. Samira, the second eldest, could not read or write. Although the family had money in Tetuan, Samira stayed at home to help with the housework rather than attend school. Therefore, Samira learned Spanish more slowly than her younger siblings. However, Samira
found work through her mother’s friend’s restaurant. Her mother had befriended a Syrian doctor when she first arrived to Madrid. He helped her find an apartment and a job for her and for Samira. Although her mother worked well at the restaurant, Samira had difficulty with a Spanish waitress. Her arguments with the girl resulted in her dismissal. The doctor-friend found another job as part-time housekeeper, but she only lasted for three months before the owner dismissed her. Although Samira could not hold a job, she could easily find another one with the help of her mother’s friend and her aunt.

During their summer vacation in Morocco in 2003 Samira’s mother arranged for her marriage to a distant cousin. He was the son of her paternal grandfather’s brother’s son. He had indicated to his family that he wanted to marry her to come to Spain. Samira had just turned twenty-two years old and according to her family, she needed to be married. She had a meeting with her cousin and agreed to marry him. By the time she returned to Madrid, she had her marriage certificate.

When the husband finally arrived in Madrid, he only lived with Samira for one month before disappearing with 5,000 Euros of her mother’s money. In 2008, Samira fell in love with a Muslim man from Bangladesh and wanted to marry him. Her mother grew concern over Samira’s relationship with her Bengali boyfriend as she started not coming home for several days and occasionally had bruises on her body. Her mother called her brothers and sisters over from Morocco to speak with Samira in Madrid. They demanded to know if she was still a virgin since she never had a wedding ceremony to publicize her marriage. She insisted that she was still a virgin despite having a new boyfriend and disappearing for days at a time. They wanted proof in the form of a certificate so Samira agreed to show them proof. They then met with the Bengali boyfriend to know his intention with Samira since he was evidently residing in Spain illegally. The boyfriend declared his love for Samira and his intention of wanting to marry her. He even gave Samira’s uncle 2,000 Euros to hire a divorce lawyer for her.

The divorce took longer than expected with Samira’s in-laws demanding a khol from her for breaking the contract.23 Her husband is illegally residing in Spain because she did not follow through with her promise. Samira refused to pay. The bureaucratic hurdles were also complicated and time-consuming. Her Bengali boyfriend

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23 Samira wanted to file for a divorce on the grounds of abandonment, which is under Article 104 of the Moudawana that gives the wife the right to petition for a divorce if the husband is absent from the conjugal home for more than one year. Her affines, however, demands compensation for a divorce (khol) from the woman in exchange for her freedom under Articles 115-120.
became wary and threatened to leave her. Desperate, Samira started spending more time with her boyfriend even vacationing with him in Murcia. Her mother was livid and demanded she break the relationship. Samira refused. She started fighting with her mother incessantly over the boyfriend. When her mother lost one of her three jobs and had difficulty paying her bills, she told Samira to go to work and help out or leave the house with her boyfriend. Samira left with her boyfriend. One month later, the boyfriend left Samira to marry a Spanish girl for his residency. Samira asked her mother if she could return, but her mother refused. Samira went to her social worker at the Centro who linked her into the housing system. Samira is currently living in a shelter for women and periodically visits her siblings when her mother is away.

Arranged contract marriages also illuminate the tensions and contradictions within neoliberal transformations where the "individual" and the "family" (along with the "company" and the "nation") compete to be the basic units of society (Song 2009). Spain’s neoliberal capitalist economy privileges the individual as the basic unit of society, whereas the Moroccan tribal model of alliance favors the family and kin groups as the more important unit. The restructuring of Morocco’s economy has allowed it to experiment along the neoliberal lines in order to integrate itself into the global capitalist economy. Nonetheless, kin ties still govern marriage practices, albeit permitting more individual initiative in marriage formation.

Immigration produces its own contradictions, not the least of which results in tensions between the older collectivity of the family in its country of origin and the newer ideal of democracy and capitalism, embodied in the Post-Franco era of Spain. While the former is in danger of collapse during the resettlement process, the latter is necessary for integration and advancement fueled by individual energy, enterprise and desires. As a result, the ‘individual’ and the ‘family’ would compete for being the fundamental the unit in the Moroccan immigrant community in Spain.
The case of two sisters shows the limitation of marriage choice for a particular Moroccan family having to straddle between two societies. Both women in the presented case immigrated during the 1990s when Spain had a high demand in the service sector, particularly the domestic service sector (Ramirez 2004). However, Suad, the elder sister, stayed long enough in her jobs to save enough money to relocate to Tenerife, giving her more freedom by loosening her dependency on her kin group. Samira, on the other hand, has very little formal education (less than a year) and continues to depend on her family for social and economic support. Her dependency ties her to her family's influences and wishes. Her single mother cannot afford to support her any longer. Besides, Samira is at an age when marriage is necessary to prevent her from behaviors that may damage the family honor.

As these cases indicate, immigration with family members permits continuity with their kin social network, particularly with their most intimate kin (their mother, their aunts and uncles and their siblings). The closeness of the kin network may help in accumulating and distributing resources, but it may also hinder social behaviors and movements. Moroccan families perpetuate the honor system by preserving their economic and social resources. Thus, a Moroccan female migrant's closeness and dependency on her kin network would make her susceptible to an arranged marriage.

Although Spain offers women more educational and economic opportunities, immigrant women still need to take advantage of these opportunities. Only by separating physically, economically and socially from their natal groups will Moroccan immigrant women have more agency in the realm of marriage and family. Additionally, an immigrant woman's command of the Spanish language, which often correlates with her pre-migratory educational training and language skills, may also allow her to venture far from her kin
network (Oso Casas 2004, Sole 1994). Loosening the binds of close networks by distancing from the contacts and meeting other people, Spaniards or other non-Moroccans, would provide these women with a wider range of information and opportunities. Hence, they would be exposed to foreign influences and exogamous marital prospects.

Moroccan women with little or no formal education may find themselves at the mercy of the employers in Spain and their families at home. Abuse of workers is not uncommon. Many women have reported working long hours for little pay in order to earn the trust of their employers for sponsoring their residency papers or for assisting them in bringing their family members to Spain. The fortunate ones would develop trusting patron-client relationships, yet the majority of the women would feel disappointed and cheated of their labor and loyalty in hopes of accumulating social capital.

A Moroccan woman with limited knowledge of Spanish usually limits her interaction and forming friendships with Spaniards and other nationalities. She often continues to depend on her family and her social network of compatriots and resorts to traditional values and customs. Europe has provided immigrant women with an important mechanism for leverage: social assistance and shelters. Wayward women in Morocco may resort to a street life if their families decide to abandon them. In Spain and other European countries, the State and religious institutions (the Church) may substitute for kin assistance. Rejected by their families, women like Samira can turn to the State for government assistance. Although government assistance may not be as personal and durable as kin relations, women resorting to social welfare can use it as leverage against their families' demands.

The Second Generation

Studies of second and third generation Moroccans in Europe have indicated a rise in
the ‘transnational endogamy’ trend of importing spouses from their country of origin rather than intermarrying with the native population (Corijin and Lodewijckx 2009, de Haas 2006, Lievens 1999, Reiner 2001, Schoenmaeckers et al. 1999). The second generation of children from the first cohort of Moroccan female-migration in Spain has just reached marrying age. Hence, macro-level research on this population does not exist. Nonetheless, several informants in this study have children of marrying age who were either born in Spain or had arrived before the age of five, which I would define as the second generation.

The women with close-knit networks of Moroccans have encountered a pattern of marriage proposals similar to the traditional Moroccan marriages. Female friends and relatives would suggest an informal meeting to introduce their children to each other. Daughters of female migrants notice the pressure placed upon them after reaching the marriageable age from their parents’ friends arriving for lunch or dinner with their grown sons, as well as neighbors and relatives approaching them during their summer visits with their sons. Raida, Khadija’s eighteen-year-old daughter complains:

“I cannot go anywhere in my neighborhood without people talking. Sometimes when I am walking with my Spanish friends along the street, and my mother calls me to come home because so and so has told her that I should not be alone with a group of boys. My mother knows everyone so I have to behave. They have told me not to do anything that can harm my family's honor. Girls with bad reputations cannot get married, but I do not want to be limited. My mother's friends have been coming by with their sons to ask for my hand. It started when I turned seventeen. It has been nonstop. I get proposals here and in Morocco. My excuse is my studies. They have all told my mother they can wait. I want to marry who I want to marry whether he is Moroccan, Muslim, non-Muslim, Chinese, Spanish or whatever.”

Khadija’s daughter, who also lives within her mother’s close-knit network, experiences the effects of the tightness of the network. Although she identifies herself as both Spanish and Moroccan, the close observation, gossip and social pressure from her mother’s network
restrict her movements and her behaviors in the neighborhood. Raida feels trapped and does not understand how her female cousins who live in Alcalá de Henares have exogamous marriages to non-Muslims.

Raida’s aunt and Khadija’s eldest sister, Farida, migrated to Spain in 1988 with Khadija’s help through securing a work contract at a restaurant owned by Khadija’s boss. Farida brought her two young daughters with her, ages two and three at that time, to live in Madrid. Several years later, they moved to Alcalá de Henares, a small town north of Madrid, where her husband had found a job. Farida’s social network was entwined with Khadija’s network for several years until she moved away from Madrid. Raida mainly resumes contact with her sisters and a few friends. Her daughters grew up in the small town, establishing more friendships with Spaniards than Moroccans. In the end, they met and married their Cuban and Spanish husbands through their network of non-Moroccans friends.

Despite Raida’s feelings about her quandary in her mother’s close-knit network, Khadija has her view on arranged marriages she claims to have learned from her own experience and from observing other forms of marriages in Spain:

“I would not want my daughters to experience what I have to deal with in my marriage. I barely knew him before agreeing to marry him. Look what has become of my situation. I have not spoken to him since my father’s funeral when I discovered he had added his name to my house in Larache and removed my parents’ names. The house is our inheritance, and he is stealing it from us because he can read, and I cannot. That is the cost of being dumb. We did not have much of a choice back then. I never had an education so I want to make sure my daughters have theirs before marrying.

My friends and relatives have been coming by asking for Raida’s hand. They want to join our family, but I told them that Raida has to study, and she needs to find someone on her own. They insist. They persist. I told them ‘you know what I have been through with my marriage, why would you want my children to experience the same?’ They agree yet they still come by. Old habits never die.”
The influence of living in Spain and having Spaniards within her social network provides Khadija with a different perspective and opportunities for her daughters. Her daughter Raida may feel that her family controls and watches over her more than a typical Spanish adolescent would experience. Khadija clearly does not want her daughters to suffer a poor marriage match as hers. Her economic quarrel with her husband relates directly to her bridewealth and her inheritance.

Khadija does not want to arrange a marriage for her daughters. Khadija’s 13 and 18-year-old daughters have expressed their desire to choose whom and when they want to marry. Raida has no preference for race or religion. In fact, Raida and her group of Moroccan friends, who are all second-generation Spanish-Moroccans, have expressed their aversion to Moroccan men. They describe them as “machistas y malcriados” (sexist and spoiled). Moreover, they believe their parents will accept whomever they choose to marry and are not concerned about their parents’ opinion regarding their future mates.

According to the Shari’a and the Moudawana, a daughter inherits half the property of a son. Since Khadija has no brothers, she and her five sisters inherited all her father’s property. She and her sisters inherited as epiclerates, residual heirs in the absence of brothers (Goody 2004). Khadija sold her portion of her inheritance, her wedding jewelry, and items from her bridewealth to buy a house in Larache for her parents to live. As she is illiterate, she entrusted her husband with the transaction on behalf of her family. Her husband bought the house under their names and left her parents out of the title. She discovered her husband’s embezzlement at her father’s funeral but could not demand a divorce with the property predicament.

In fact, Khadija’s husband has bypassed the Islamic law for separate property of
spouses by manipulating Khadija into trusting him with the property title to include him in the ownership of her family’s property. Islamic law prescribes separation of ownership in marriage. It does not offer joint ownership as an option for a married couple. The husband's patrimony and the wife's property remain separate throughout the duration of the marriage. The wife has no legal responsibility to provide for the household. Her property is only hers, and the law entitles her to manage it as she pleases, except for a small restriction included in the Maliki rite. She may freely give her property away to a member of her family, in which case the husband has no right to intervene. If, however, she tries to give more than one-third of her assets to someone other than a family member, the husband has the right to stop her and an established donation will be voided. Otherwise, the woman has authority over the management and use of her wealth.

**Conclusion**

Although many Moroccan immigrant women such as Khadija may have arrived in Spain alone, their ties to the kin and social network can still be quite strong, making them susceptible to values and customs that may complicate their lives in Spain. Since Moroccan women with legal status in Spain tend to attract marriage proposals for immigration purposes, immigrant women have doubled their commodified value as a wife and as a sponsor. Their reproductive value combines with their productive value as a lottery ticket to a more productive life in Spain.

As with any arranged marriage, the compatibility and happiness of the couple depend on luck. The natal family needs to marry the single woman even if she lives on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar. Agreeing to the arrangement makes it easier on the family. However, marital problems cannot easily be resolved, especially within a close kin and social
network.

The rebuilding or the importing of a close-knit social network may replicate the pattern of mutual help, resource exchange, and values from the country of origin. However, the close network may also produce social pressure and constraint (i.e. gossip) to restrict behavior for both first and second generations immigrants. The loosening of the social network may provide other perspectives and resources. Moreover, the break from the former social network allows immigrant women to exercise the opportunities that Spain has offered. Women who choose their marriage partners tend to have a higher-level of education than the ones who follow the traditional marriage pattern of arrangements. When choosing, more and more Moroccan women choose marrying Europeans over Moroccan men who they consider as sexist and domineering. Regardless of which marriage pattern Moroccan immigrant women choose to follow, each type has its own consequences.
A Reenactment of a Traditional Moroccan Wedding in Madrid
THE CERTIFICATE OF VIRGINITY: HONOR AND SHAME REDUX

“A man’s honor lies between the legs of women.” --an Arabic proverb.

As we were waiting for the doctor in the white washed halls of the emergency room at the Doce de Octubre Hospital in Madrid, Samira told me she had obtained a ‘certificate of virginity’ from her last visit to the gynecologist. I had heard from her social worker, her lawyer and her mentor that Samira had requested a certificate of virginity during a visit to the gynecologist who had surgically removed benign tumors from Samira's uterus. Samira had not mentioned the certificate of virginity to me until now.

Samira had been complaining of recurring abdominal pain after her operation to rid her of tumors last year. The doctor believed Samira may have also suffered from severe endometriosis since her x-rays did not show any tumor regrowth. He explained to her that he had to operate again, this time through the vaginal opening to reach the uterus. She told the doctor that she could not allow him to touch her vagina for she needed to keep her virginity for marriage. The operation would be invasive and would tear her hymen. The doctor was puzzled for her records indicated that she was already married. She assured him that the marriage was arranged to help a family member so she never lost her virginity.

Samira refused to have the operation but kept returning to the doctor month after month complaining of pain. After nearly a year, Samira agreed to the operation on the condition that the doctor confirmed her status of virginity prior to the operation. Although he had initially disagreed to provide a certificate of virginity, Samira’s persistency proved successful and a document was typed, signed and sealed.

She showed me a document stating her status of virginity by a Dr. Reyes prior to the operation. The doctor had signed the document dated for March 6, 2007 and placed the clinic seal at the top of the page. The document did not indicate a test of virginity, only a verbal claim of the patient’s status of purity. “I do not want to dishonor my family and feel ashamed
so I have to keep my virginity safe,” she declared. Samira took the document from my hands and placed it in her backpack along with other documents. Although illiterate, Samira had learned the importance of certificates and documents in supporting her claim, carrying all her documents in a black backpack, which her more educated younger sister had given her as a birthday present.

The Social Construction of Virginity

The social construction of virginity has long taken part throughout history and in many parts of the world. Defining what constitutes a ‘virgin’ differs among cultures and practices. Western medicine has only deemed an intact hymen as proof of virginity although a torn hymen does not necessarily entail a loss of virginity either. In fact, Saint Augustine separates virginity into two categories: physical and spiritual. In this case, a woman raped by a man still maintains her virginity since she has not enjoyed the pleasure of male penetration.

In secular Western societies, the importance of maintaining a woman’s virginity or to demonstrate her attempt at preserving her virginity appears antiquated if not inane. Virgins no longer can see and command white unicorns. Vestal virgins no longer cultivate fire to ensure the longevity of an empire. Yet, religion still reifies female virginity. For many Christians, virginity embodies high morality, a state closer to the Divine. Many Muslim men relish the idea of having seventy-two virgins in the heavenly afterlife. The problem exists for women when their virginity affects others and hence, is controlled by others.

Proof of virginity is morally and socially important in Muslim societies like Morocco because it intricately weaves into their system of honor and marriage. As more and more female migrants from Muslim countries continue to settle in European societies, situations similar to the opening scene have occurred more often. While some European countries have been contending with the veil dilemma in public places and the proliferation of hymen reconstruction surgeries, certificates of virginity may start to grow in popularity among Moroccan female immigrants who live in countries that value documents and seals as proof and truth. Purity may still be symbolically tied to family honor just as veiling may symbolize
female submission and gender inequality.

Moroccan female immigrants have to manage the cultural values they hold as important against the reality and practicality of living in a place with contradicting values and beliefs. The goal for many Moroccan Muslim women is to marry and have children with their husbands as breadwinners. Yet, as immigrant women working and living in a society currently obsessed with promoting gender equality, the goal may deviate from traditional values and patterns. To be married may remain a priority but to whom, how, and why one marries may vary depending on one’s needs or the family’s needs.

As mentioned in previous chapters, the strength of kin and social network can transcend international borders if the woman still depends heavily on family members. Virginity remains important if the woman decides to have an Islamic marriage. The sexual freedom granted in Europe comes with a price, prompting a proliferation of reconstruction surgeries to maintain family honor. On the other hand, the loosening of network ties allows women more freedom to choose their desired partner, yet freedom requires sufficient resources and without it, an immigrant woman has to fend for herself.

The complication in the opening vignette of Samira’s situation is her desire to be rid of her pain from the tumors. Since her marriage was a marriage of convenience, she theoretically remains a virgin. In fact, her maternal uncle had asked me once during our summer visit to Morocco if Samira had converted to “a mra (a woman) yet”. The operation would have robbed her of the most important commodity she possessed for remarriage: her purity. In this respect, the Moroccan marriage system commodifies virginity, pressing women to either preserve it or reconstruct it.

The vignette veers away from the traditional Moroccan marriage process written by anthropologists, historians and reporters. Return migrant women often resort to having their fathers or brothers represent them at the signing of the marriage contract in Morocco and have the contract translated into Spanish in order to register and apply for the family reunification program in Spain. Some migrant women, like Samira, would marry a family
member to sponsor them to come to Europe. Often these women would not have the official wedding ceremony that publicizes their social and sexual union to their community, validating their status change and activities.

Contrary to the customary elaborate weddings in Morocco, contracting marriage in Islam is a simple process. The couple only needs two Muslim witnesses to attest to their union in front of an adoulo̲l, a religious agent certified by the government to officiate marriages.\(^{24}\) The wedding ceremony, however, takes on a much more elaborate style in order to publicize and legitimize the nuptial union. The celebration is the social act; without it, women would not be certifiably married. In the case of Samira, she had cut her wedding short by not returning to Morocco before commemorating her wedding, the \textit{walîma al-`urs}. Without the \textit{walîma al-`urs}, the kin groups and neighbors had not confirmed the union. \textit{Walîma} is a meal organized on the wedding day. \textit{Urs}, defined as ‘wedding’, relates particularly to the marriage contract. Without the social confirmation of the union, women like Samira can and need to claim virgin status in order to protect the honor of both their agnates and affines until their \textit{walîma al-`urs}.

In addition to the woman’s virginity, a Moroccan woman’s European residency further commodifies her. She converts into a gift presented in the alliance (\textit{liff}) of marriage. Moroccan immigrant women from Holland are often referred to as ‘gold-edged papers’, whereas the ones from Spain are simply called ‘visa’ (Wikan 2000). Thus, the value of immigrant women appreciates in accordance to their social wares: residency status, virginity, and reputation.

For many anthropologists, the gift of women is closely tied to the kin groups (Levi-Strauss 1963, Mauss 1990). Families form alliances by exchanging their women, making them a form of property. In order to gauge the value of the female-cum-property, the reproductive quality of women needs to be assessed. The purity of the female sexual system

\(^{24}\) Article 49 and 65 indicate the need for presence and signatures of two adouls during the marriage formalization.
would ensure any offspring from her womb comes only from her husband. Keeping daughters chaste would secure their exchange value and validate the family's reputation of producing honest goods. The underlying assumption of having a virgin bride would translate into having a loyal, modest wife. Consequently, the raping of women threatens the morality of their kin group, damaging their value as gifts (Rubin 1975). Damaged women are haunted and unpredictable. If their families cannot control them, their husbands and affines will not be able to either.

Moroccans traditionally manifests the value of virgins through the bridewealth. In Morocco, virgins traditionally command a higher bridewealth value than divorced or widowed women (Maher 1974, Evers Rosander 1991, Westermarck 1921). The bridewealth locks the productive and reproductive services of the woman to her husband and his agnates. The higher bridewealth of virgins not only commends the effort of the bride's family but also provides the woman with more means to secure her role as a wife and later as a mother. Thus, a marriage of convenience, as indicated in Samira's case, prolongs the bride's virginal status and enables her to transfer this status to the next marriage. Any breach upon this status endangers the transference. A verification of a nonsexual breach may ensure the woman's reproductive value and her family's honor.

**The Verification of Virginity**

Determining what constitutes a virgin in Western medicine would mean the existence of an intact hymen. To obtain proof of a healthy hymen requires a medical examination by a physician, who then documents the finding. However, a damaged hymen or a lack of one does not mean the woman has had sexual intercourse. Accidents, physical exertion, and other factors may render the loss of the medical proof of virginity.

The traditional Mediterranean practice of a bloodstained piece of cloth or clothing to verify virginity also has its flaws. Not all women bleed from their first bout of intercourse. Hymens vary in shape, size, texture and durability, making them unreliable in determining virginal status (Blank 2007). Nevertheless, a woman's virginity has a commodifying value for
her Moroccan family as it embodies community respect and honor, patriarchal protection and control, and purity. Given the complex embodiment of virginity for many Moroccan families, maintaining this status until the marriage act is imperative. The physical distancing of unmarried daughters from the natal families due to internal and international migration complicates the traditional hold fathers and brothers may have on their women's behaviors and ultimately, to family honor.

Despite the freedom Moroccan women may have through migrating away from their natal binds, returning to Morocco to marry and/or marrying a Moroccan man can revive the virgin dilemma. Moroccans who return to Morocco to marry have to meet certain requirements from the government. The list of documents for a foreigner wishing to marry a Moroccan national is exhaustive. For a foreign man, he needs to provide a Consul certified copy of passport with the most recent entry visa, a proof of income, the original birth certificate, an attestation de travail (proof of a job), a work contract, a police record less than 90 days old, a police record from the Ministry of Foreigners in Rabat, a proof of residence, a rental contract signed and notarized, a medical certificate by local Morocco doctor, an affidavit of eligibility to marry, an affidavit of nationality, and a certificate of conversion to Islam (only if the foreigner is male). Additionally, all documents need to be signed, stamped, and paid. Moroccan women have to provide a medical certificate proving virginity, a sworn affidavit of consent and eligibility to marry by two adult male family members, an identity card, and a police check and validation by the local police. However, the Moroccan woman usually has to provide these documents whether she marries a foreign national or not. The groom and his family may waiver the certificate of virginity but this prerogative lies within his family’s power.

In addition to being a socially desired prerequisite for marriage, virginity also has

25 The requirements follow under the guidance of Article 65 and 67 of the Moudawana, requiring a medical certificate from both parties. The content and procedures, however, are defined by the Ministers of Justice and Health, which may stipulate an examination of virginity on the part of the woman.
legal support in the *Moudawana*. Although no where in the *Moudawana* requires that a proof of virginity should be met before marriage, the marriage is considered 'defective' and the contract may be annulled if either party believes that they have been deceived by fraud\(^26\). Moreover, the groom may not insist on the consummation of the marriage before paying the bride her share of the *sdaq* or the bridewealth\(^27\). If the marriage is consummated before receiving the money from the *sdaq*, the bride can no longer claim it. The bride's family may take the groom to court, but it would be his word against hers, and the word of a man tends to outweigh those of a woman unless her family has extensive and important connections in the government.

Hence, the cultural value of virginity has merged with the Occidental value in documentation as the verification of truth. Married Moroccan women can still recall the simple virginity tests of bleeding on the bedsheets or the bridal panties as proof. The custom of displaying bloodstained panties in a tray is quite common. In fact, some families have been known to pin the virginity certificate officially issued by a doctor to the garment. For others, a certificate of virginity from a medical doctor is enough to justify one's purity, particularly immigrant couples who wish to spend their wedding nights privately rather than publicly. Nevertheless, certificates and documentation have served as proof for European immigrants who may not have the time nor the social capital to gather the necessary male witnesses to prove a fact. Bureaucracy has provided Morocco efficiency and links to its Western partners.

**European Bureaucracy and Documentation**

Bureaucracy has reified documents, signatures, stamps and seals in certifying the

\(^26\) Article 63 notes that “either spouse who was placed under duress or deceived by fraud with the intent to induce him or her to agree to the marriage, or by facts expressly stipulated as a condition in the contract, can petition for the annulment of the marriage before or after the consummation within a period not to exceed two months from the date when the duress was lifted, or when she or he discovered the fraud. She or he has the right to demand compensation.”

\(^27\) Article 27 of the Moudawana deals with the *sdaq*, stipulating that an amount needs to be specified upon the conclusion of the marriage contract. If the two parties cannot agree on the amount, the court will intervene to determine the amount given the 'social' background of both the husband and wife.
proof of an act or a marital or sexual status. Morocco had undergone a bureaucratic overhaul during the colonial period. The French, more so than the Spaniards, revamped Morocco with decrees and documentation as part of the modernization project (Paul 1977). Medical practitioners, as an integral part of the public health institution, have assisted in the growth of bureaucratic operations and legitimacy in Morocco.

European medical doctors have penetrated into the Moroccan health system since the pre-colonial period. These doctors would then serve as diplomats, missionaries, spies, agents and propagandists of colonial rule (Paul 1977). In fact, Morocco’s health care system still models itself after the French colonial system. The infiltration of certificates and record-keeping persists and proliferates as the country and its citizens interact with Western ideas and practices.

Although many Moroccan women may be illiterate, they recognize the importance of documentation and certificates. Documentation belongs to the public space, the world of men, in which many Moroccan women have had no knowledge of until they migrate. Moroccan women are aware of the documented words of Allah in the Koran, but since many women in Morocco are illiterate, they either briefly glance at the Koran or listen to orations. Their experience with documents intensifies with the migratory process. They need documentation to leave Morocco and to enter Spain.

In order to live in Spain, numerous documents are needed. If they are illegal, they are called “sin papeles” or “undocumented.” Once they have obtained their legal status, returning to Morocco requires more documents. If and when they are married in Morocco, they have a document to support their union. Marriages are documented and translated from one language to another in order to be validated between countries. They would bring back the marriage documents and would have to apply for family reunification, which means more documents are needed. In the process of dissolving the marriage, they need to present the paper trail leading up to the divorce.

By combining the value of virginity for their pending marriages and the importance
of documentation in the immigration process, Moroccan women would have the authoritative public figures (doctors, social workers, judges, etc.) to certify their virginity in a written form as proof of her purity. In the past, Moroccan courts used to require four male witnesses to validate a truth, but Western shortcuts have provided Moroccan women with more venues to bend the truth, making verification more difficult than before. Samira’s insistence on the doctor’s documented witness of her virginity before the operation means that she has some awareness of the importance of documentation and a chance to regain her status for a possible remarriage with some value and honor intact. Nowadays, in the immigrants’ world, where Occidental ideas collide with traditional values, documents have credibility, even in the virginity department.

**The European Controversy**

Muslim immigrant women encounter different cultural praxes regarding sex and family life in Europe. Although some Moroccan women do have premarital sex, the consequences for their actions during the wedding night differ depending on the area of Morocco (Westermarck 1921). The wedding tends to have a performing quality, in which virginity needs to be demonstrated but may not be necessarily factual (Combs-Schilling 1989). However, with the resurgence of fundamentalist Islamic practices in many parts of the world, including Morocco, being an *adre* (a virgin) on the wedding night in order to uphold the family’s honor has brought many Muslim women to clinics for certificates of virginity or for hymen reconstruction surgery (Crumbley 2008, USA Today 2006).

The ‘artificial’ virginity is not a new practice in Morocco. In the past, brides have spilled vials of animal blood on sheets and panties to replace their virginal stains (Combs-Schilling 1989, Westermarck 1921, Mernissi 1987). The modern version of artificial virginity, hymenoplasty, reminds women of the religious and social limitations of their behavior when returning to Morocco. The need to maintain the appearance of virginity for nuptial purposes after enjoying the sexual permissiveness of the European milieu may reach a climatic compromise although drastic at times. Nevertheless, doctors and authority figures
in some receiving countries would sympathize with the women’s plight and collaborate with their need to maintain a façade of purity. Other countries, however, view the proliferation of virginity validation and reconstruction as another representation of Islamic sexist oppression and backwardness.

In 2002 the Partido Popular, the more conservative of the two main Spanish political parties, proposed a law in the parliament of the Andalucia provincial government in reaction to a growing number of requests for certificates of virginity within that region. The majority of the requests had come from Moroccan female immigrants who have been residing in Spain and wanted to return to Morocco to marry (Bosch 2002). The certification law stipulates that the virginity certificates invade the patients’ privacy, which infringes upon the Spanish constitution. Both the Office of Medical College of Malaga and the Office of Medical College of Barcelona approved the initiative, and their commission of ethics has been implementing reports regarding the certificates of virginity in Spain.

Despite the official reports and protocols of handling the requests for virginity test and approval, European doctors continue to debate whether or not to issue these tests. European doctors who had seen the results of honor killing in their hospitals do not hesitate to sign certificates of virginity when requested (Sage 2007). A report shows that hundreds of certificates of virginity are delivered annually in Belgium to Muslim immigrant families (Amy 2008). Some Spanish doctors, as Samira’s case indicated, continue to administer the certificate of virginity in respecting their patients’ religious and cultural values. Others, however, find the practice unethical, disrespectful, and ‘unfitting’ (no cabida) towards women in Spain (Bosch 2002). Moreover, they will not administer the certificates unless the court obligates them.

Although some medical practitioners refuse to corroborate with the Moroccan immigrant communities, hymenoplasty has proliferated in various parts of Europe. Parisian doctors have reported reconstructing seven to eight hymens a month. The price for the 20 to 30 minute operation averages around $500 (Crumbley 2008). Although the medical
community in Germany may consider hymenoplasty a taboo topic, German doctors have widely catered to the Muslim population need to adhere to traditional customs of honor and female purity. One German doctor advertises his hymenoplasty service on the internet at $1,250. Although hymenoplasty has proliferated in other European countries with a longer history of Moroccan immigration, hymen reconstructive surgery has not been widely reported as problematic within the Moroccan immigrant community in Spain. Hymenoplasty appears to be utilized more by Spanish gypsies, but that is not to say that Moroccans do not patronize these clinics nor do they return to Morocco for their surgeries. Shaima, a Moroccan student studying at a Madrid university confesses:

“My Moroccan friends and I talk about the double standards all the time, and they are studying in France. We know that we need to stay virgins until the wedding night, but we see the Moroccan boys having all the sexual liberties without any repercussion. According to the Koran, they are supposed to stay chaste, too, but no one is punishing them for their actions. We want to have fun, too. Europe is fun so we want to enjoy ourselves. We know there’s a price, but we also know there are clinics in Casablanca to fix it.”

Although operations related to correct consequences of sexual behaviors (hymenoplasty, abortion, etc.) are illegal in Morocco, many Moroccan women have some familiarity with doctors and clinics willing to preserve their families’ honor with surgery and money. With hymenoplasty costing between 500 and 1,000 dírham (DH) in Morocco and the average annual expenditure of a family of farmers is 65 DH, this economic value indicates which social classes participate in the virgin restoration (Mernissi 2003). However, the price for hymenoplasty in 1968 was 2,000 DH due to the supply of doctors performing the operation relative to its demand. Hence, Moroccan women like Shaima who would consider hymenoplasty have traditionally come from an upper-middle to upper class background. In fact, Moroccan women who study abroad almost exclusively come from the upper-class Moroccan families with money and connections (Mernissi 2003).

The prevalence of hymenoplasty and its social dilemmas are depicted in a Italian-
Moroccan film inspired by true events of Moroccans living in Italy. In a film “Women’s Hearts” (*Corazones de Mujer*, 2008), a Moroccan-born Italian woman, Zina[^28], returns to Casablanca for hymenoplasty after her parents had arranged for her marriage to a Moroccan man in Italy. Her parents have no idea of her sexual experiences in Italy or her plan to visit Morocco to have her hymen repaired. Rather than telling her family, she decides to have the surgery to save them from being dishonored in their Moroccan immigrant community.

Zina and her Moroccan transvestite dressmaker, Shakira, travel to Morocco in search of a clinic in his hometown. She advertises the trip to her parents as a shopping tour for her wedding gowns. The pair faces homophobic and violent events in Morocco, eventually resulting in Zina's revelation about her situation. After embarking on a heartfelt journey to Morocco with her gay companion, the young woman confesses to her mother about her non-virginal status. The story ends with her mother's acceptance of the situation and promises to cancel the wedding. The woman and her companion return to Italy without her having to undergo hymenoplasty.

Women, like Zina, who have had pre-marital sex, may have their marriages annulled by the grooms’ families. When such events occur, the women not only dishonor their family but also stigmatize other family members, especially the unwed female members. The unmarried females of the family also run the risk of becoming undesirable as prospective brides. If one girl in the family is not a virgin that stigma transfers to her sisters and close female cousins. Although virginity vicariously affects female marriageability, it directly affects family honor.

Virginity has a direct link to the honor system. For a group wanting to exchange its women, the wife-givers, in forming alliances, the purity of a woman represents the care, the value, and the trustworthiness of the group from which she originates. It may also ensure that the offspring from the untainted woman clearly belong to the receiving group, the wife-takers.

[^28]: The term 'zina' means 'disorder' and 'chaos' and is usually associated with the sexual prowess and wildness of women that would lead to the demise of the social order (Merniss 1987).
(Holy 1989). The solidifying of alliances in an environment in which the government cannot be trusted is imperative for survival.

Moreover, honor solidifies cohesiveness within the group (Schneider 1971). The protection and vigilance of the group's women serve as a mechanism to ensure the perpetuation of the honor system. As a matter of fact, honor serves many purposes for the group:

“Honor as ideology helps shore up the identity of a group (a family or a lineage) and commit to it the loyalties of otherwise doubtful members. Honor defines the group’s social boundaries, contributing to its defense against the claims of equivalent competing groups. Honor is also important as a substitute for physical violence in the defense of economic interests. The head of a family challenges the rest of the world with the idea of his family's honor.” (Schneider 1971, p. 17)

Virginity, as indicated in its need for verification and certification, is a product of a social act. When linked to honor and marriage, the virginity of a woman no longer belongs solely to her. The protection of her body as a commodity becomes the responsibility of the group, particularly the head of the family and other male members assigned to protect her. Her virginity is a crucial unifying element in maintaining the cohesiveness of group. Since the premature loss of virginity affects the entire group's reputation, a responsible woman guards her chastity or hides any evidence of its damage.

**Spain and Shame**

Living and working in Spain may present Moroccan women with new cultural ideals and behaviors in public spaces that have been forbidden or restricted in their country of origin. A common and comical vignette is told by Spanish social workers about a group of Moroccan men and veiled Moroccan women who inconspicuously arrived by small boat (pateras) off the coast of the Spanish city Cadiz only to encounter a nudist camp. Although the men were both shocked and a bit excited, the women were shocked, ashamed and anxious about how they should behave in the near future. On the contrary, marriage patterns in Spain have changed not too long ago.
What Moroccan women experience with honor currently was what Spanish women had lived with throughout the Franco era. Spanish women had not always had the freedom of expression. Women’s rights in Spain only started garnering support following the death of Franco. Not more than thirty-five years ago did Spanish customs and laws dictate women’s behaviors and confined many women to the private spaces of their homes. Under Franco, domestic violence was not even considered a crime, and divorce was illegal in Spain until 1981. Moroccan women often complain about Spanish women having completely forgotten that their mothers and grandmothers wore headscarves and submitted to their husbands’ commands. In fact, the Moroccan women’s opinion about Spanish women mirrors some ethnographies portraying Spanish women as objects or commodities from which Spanish men extract their prestige and status (Collier 1997, Gilmore 1987, Pitt-Rivers 1971).

Pitt-Rivers’ (1971) well-known community study of Alcala de la Sierra in the 1950s depicted women as commodity in the community’s system of ‘honor and shame.’ Women were an integral part of the community and serve as objects of gauging the families’ status. Hence, family members, neighbors, and other community members would monitor, gossip, and reprimand women for improper behaviors. Women experience “shame” with their sexual discretion, which in essence dishonor their family, specially the men in their family. To Pitt-Rivers’ credit, when he wrote the essay on “Honor and Shame” for the 1966 publication, he fleshed out the notion of “honor and shame” in relation to class and his depiction of Spanish women follows along the same line. Women experience “shame” with their sexual discretion, which in essence dishonor their family, specially the men in their family.

Pitt-Rivers’ notes that upper class women can escape this rigid imposition as they have resources and mobility that plebians and middle-class women do not. In addition, upper class women do not disrupt the social order because being that they are outside the social order (as señoritas) they do not affect it. Their shame, sexual, and gender deviations (dominating over men) are not as scrutinized as the middle-class women whose husbands are jealous and controlling of their movements and activities. The middle-class Spanish women
have to deal with the rigidity of “honor and shame” contingency the most. They do not work and do not hold their husbands’ purse so they do not have power at home, either. Their boredom, according to Pitt-Rivers, is prevalent.

The plebian woman, who has to work, and is scrutinized for her activities has some independence when she leaves her parents’ house, but she goes immediately to her husband’s house where the husband controls her public movements. She controls the private sphere as she controls the family purse. Pitt-Rivers notes that her command of her husband and others can only be taken so far. The extreme would be the witch, who rides on the broom (phallic symbol) and breaks havoc and fear to the community.

The image of the witch remains prevalent in stories told by Moroccan women. Moroccan men fear old women who no longer crave sex but still crave power and control. The power of destruction through old women's gossip and hidden black magic or trickery is notorious in proverbs and tales.

On the other hand, migration has a tendency to change the perception of women’s status and roles, even before the death of Francisco Franco, Spain’s last dictator. In fact, movement and mobility affect the power of the Spanish woman in some ethnographical literature. Pitt-Rivers fieldwork was conducted in the 1950s, when the migration out of Spain had just started again. Additionally, Pitt-Rivers' study has been criticized for its microcosmic approach (Giordano 2011).

In another study, William Douglass (1975) conducted research in a rural area of Spain in the 1960s, when emigration was common and necessary for many families. In his ethnography of a Basque village, Douglas shows the public/private sphere of the women differently with the notion of “honor and shame” seems absent in the village called Echar. He posits that movement and mobility affect the power position of Spanish women, in which their status and positions prior to and after marriage are not major concern regarding the honor of their families. He described the migrant women as seductresses, capable of taking care of themselves and are attracted to urban migration. Their ‘sentiment’ for home seems
minimal and their desire for adventure and opportunities appear insatiable. Since the farmstead has declined due to the lack of political investment into tourism and industrialization, the girls in Echar have to migrate to France or other cities in Spain to work.

The changes in Spanish women in relation to gender depiction can also be observed through Jane Collier’s (1997) work where she did a restudy of Los Olivios from twenty years before. This work was conducted in the early 1980s where gender studies obtained acceptance and notoriety in anthropology and other fields of study. Collier compared women from twenty years before with their daughters and noticed that they are not as encaged as they used to be; the engagement period is much less; the husbands are helping out more, and they do not have to wear and bear the heavy symbol of mourning in manner of dressing and in socializing.

Times have changed in Spain with the notion of honor and shame reduced to sayings of ‘sin verguenza’ and ‘maleducado’ (Gilmore 1987). A Spanish woman can freely smoke, drink, have quick affairs, and cohabit with her partner without the past harsh repercussions. Spain has joined Europe, not just economically but also culturally, in attempting to become more advanced and modern.

In 1995, the Federation attended the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing and agreed to work on adopting the conference platform in Spain to promote the women’s rights, to eliminate poverty of female-headed households, to eliminate unequal access to education and employment, and to end domestic violence. Following the Beijing Conference, the Spanish feminist group, Federacion de Mujeres Progresistas (FMP) took an active part in supporting and assisting in the integration of female immigrants. The 1992 immigration laws had regularized thousands of immigrants, a large number of these immigrants were women with little or no previous education so in 1996, the FMP developed and implemented a program called El Programa Alfabetización de Mujeres Adultas, for which they received a recognition award from the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). Evidently some Mediterranean characteristics still persist, but the former ways of dealing with women have died with
Morocco ambivalently tries to progress in the same direction, but religion and tradition have erected obstacles. Trapped in between the desire for rights and adhering to cultural norms, Moroccan immigrant women make choices that may enhance or break transnational relational ties, especially when their behaviors endanger their families’ honor. Moroccan women complain about the sexual exploitation of European women on television, in films, and also on the streets. Spanish and other European women's tendency to go topless at poolside and at the beach provoke feelings of pity from Moroccan women who believe European women need to attract men by exposing their bodies. During a panel discussion of Ramadan, Moroccan men complain about the difficulty in observing Ramadan in Spain due to the Spanish women's provocative manner of dressing. Moroccan women worry their husbands may stray and their daughters may imitate the sexualized behaviors of Western women.

Virginity remains imperative in perpetuating the traditional honor and marriage system, imported by Moroccan immigrants. Moroccan women constantly affirm their pre-marital virgin status with each other, partly to evaluate each other as well as to elevate themselves. The women at the Centro enjoy talking about their deflowering experience and would repeat the same stories again and again to their compatriots. They would beam with pride recounting how their relatives would pass around their blood-stained underwear or white sheets during their weddings as the confirmation of an intact family honor. Additionally, the younger, single Moroccan women of the group often ask each other about their status of virginity. The answers are always overwhelmingly affirmative despite the contrary.

**Conclusion**

Living in Spain may provide Moroccan women with more opportunities and freedom in their movements and behaviors, but the consequences of too much sexual freedom may cause some women to find external solutions to maintain the honor of their family.
Certificates of virginity offer women a documented proof of their pure state, whether or not the medical examination can technically confirm purity remains controversial. However, in the current world of bureaucracy, a certified document can supply the necessary validation of the woman's chastity amidst the temptation to behave more European.

Although disguising or reinventing virginity has existed prior to certificates and surgery, women now have more knowledge and means to manipulate their situation. Women who can afford surgery can reconstruct their hymen without anyone knowing. The result of the certification or the operation may bring immense joy to their kin group. Both the woman's family and her future affines appreciate the control a single immigrant woman may have despite the underlying assumption that women cannot control their sexual urges.

The popularity of these modern devices, however, only supports the notion that the reproductive state of a Moroccan woman still does not belong solely to her. She continues to entrap herself in the traditional honor system, hoping to marry without dishonoring her family in the process. For some Moroccan women, the possibility to behave differently has its limits. The respect for family honor remains strong. If she does not behave, severe consequences, such as honor killing, is not unheard of.

Moroccan women have to disguise in front of family members, their compatriots, and sometimes themselves. The only women who cannot disguise their past are unwed mothers. The proof of their downfall can never be erased. As an eyesore in Morocco, an unwed mother and her bastard child have forfeited their rights as social beings. Immigration to Spain, however, has offered them a second chance.
Siham came to Spain in 1995 at 23 years of age on a tourist visa. Siham had decided to terminate her law studies at the university when she realized that the prospect of her finding a job in Morocco would cost her family not only money but also social capital. Besides, she enjoyed her vacation in Spain so much so that she decided to stay and work as a live-in nanny for a Spanish family recommended by her childhood Moroccan friend living in Valencia. After working for several months with the family, she was able to obtain a work contract, which led to an approval for a work permit. During her second year in Spain, she had befriended and fell in love with a man from Madrid, who she had met through some Spanish friends. When her boyfriend broke off the relationship, Siham was distraught. He later returned and resumed an open relationship with her, in which she found complicated because she wanted a more serious commitment. Siham decided to stop taking her birth control pills and became pregnant. When she informed him of her pregnancy, he became upset and denied fathering the child. Feeling distraught and desperate, Siham fled to her family in Morocco.

Her father had retired after working as a middle-level state administrator for years. They live in a beautiful mansion near the beach in Sidi Kacem. When she announced her pregnancy, her mother fainted and her father nearly had a heart attack. She wanted to keep the baby with the hope that her boyfriend may change his mind and ask her to marry him. She gave birth to a boy in Morocco and stayed with him for several months before returning to Spain due to the embarrassment her pregnancy had brought upon her family. She had also
been in Morocco for nearly a year, which is the maximum amount of time legal residents are permitted outside of Spain. When she returned to Spain, she could not locate her former boyfriend in Madrid. He had moved and had disconnected his phone. Now having to send money home to her parents to care for her son, Siham went looking for another job. She was able to find another live-in position through a Colombian friend.

Siham returns every summer and every Ramadan to visit her parents. She would limit her contact with friends and relatives during her return home and often spend her time sunbathing on the beach alone. When her son turned six, she applied for his visa to Spain through the family reunification program. She left her live-in position and found a job waitressing in order to care for her son. Luckily, Siham lives next to an Indian woman whose son attends the same school as hers. The woman takes her children and Siham's son to and from school so Siham can go to work. Because of her father's previous government position, he is able to secure a tourist visa for her mother to periodically come to Spain to help her care for her child.

Siham does not participate in the activities sponsored by the Moroccan immigrant community in Madrid. Despite living ten minutes from the grand mosque of Madrid, she has never visited a mosque in Spain. Siham knows she has damaged her family's honor and often expresses remorse over her actions. However, she insists she has created her own honor by migrating to Spain, providing for her son, and sending monthly remittances home to help with her father's medical bills.

Nevertheless, Siham remains separated from the Moroccan community in Madrid. She claims she only has one Moroccan friend who lives in Valencia. Her other friends come from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Argentina, the United States, England, and Spain.
Siham's case is not uncommon with the increase in female-initiated immigration to Europe. Unwed mothers and other single women have braved the lonely trip to the other side of Mediterranean where families and friends are scarce and the cultural divide is wide. Many single Moroccan mothers, such as Siham, have emigrated from Morocco with the idea of Europe being a place where women can live and work without the looming judgment of social morals. Nevertheless, being completely free from judgment may not be possible since immigrants carry their values and customs with them. Therefore, unwed mothers would have to adjust to a life in Spain differently than their compatriots.

**Dishonor and Its Repercussions**

Women like Siham who have dishonored their families in Morocco are at their families' mercy. Unfortunately, families will go through extreme lengths to protect its honor. They can marry her off or even excommunicate her to another city or village or disown her all together. Siham's immigration to Spain provides her family with some space to hide her dishonorable act. One means of covering the shameful repercussions is the adoption of the child by relatives and friends, oftentimes through secret adoptions (Bargach 2002). However, many unwed mothers and their children may find themselves abandoned by their families and living in the streets. In fact, it is not uncommon for Moroccan police to find abandoned babies in street corners (BBC News, 2000, Masid 2000).

Unwed mothers are still considered social pariahs in Morocco. For an unwed Moroccan mother, leaving Morocco is the best option if she wants to work and care for her child. As outcasts, not only are unwed mothers socially excluded, they are also economically
excluded from finding jobs (Al-Aly 2002). Employers are often reluctant to hire unwed mothers because of the dishonorable image they convey, which would drive away their business. In an attempt to preserve their positive image, members of society distance themselves from unwed mothers. As a result, many unmarried mothers are impoverished and constantly live on the fringes of Moroccan society.

Morocco has recently been under fire in 2006 for its treatment of unmarried women and children:

“...virginity is highly valued by society – a woman who has lost her virginity before marriage is considered to have brought dishonor on her family and may not be able to marry. Unmarried mothers and their children, who usually come from disadvantaged backgrounds, are often subjected to inhuman treatment by society, and the mothers may be threatened with imprisonment for having sex outside marriage. The loss of virginity and/or pregnancy outside of marriage, combined with societal mores, lead many young women to commit suicide, abandon their children, or engage in prostitution. While several associations work to care for these women, their resources are inadequate to meet the women’s needs due to the high number of cases. The government seems to have adopted a policy of ignoring the problem, yielding to pressure from extremist religious groups (Freedom House 2006, p. 178).

Moroccan society considers unwed mothers and their illegitimate children as “children of sin” (Bargach 2002). The fortunate ones still have their family’s support, but the rest is at the mercy of non-governmental organizations and secret adoptions. Although the majority of unmarried mothers (60%) in Morocco live in urban areas and forty-five percent are illiterate, there is still a dearth of support for these women apart from their families (Gagnon 2009). In the last decade, Moroccan police would frequently arrest and imprison unwed mothers in hospitals, sometimes right after giving birth. Aicha Ech-Chenna, the director of SOLFEM (L'association Solidarité Feminine), a women association in
Casablanca committed to assisting and supporting unwed mothers and their children observes:

“In Morocco, until this day, in 2006, in the third millennium, the worst that can happen to a young woman is to have a child outside of marriage. She is automatically excluded, be that she is rich or poor.” (Oxfam 2007)

No matter what class or education level an unwed mother has, her reputation in Morocco resembles one worst than that of a prostitute rejected by the community for dishonoring her family by her sinful act and exhibiting evidence of it. Men pay prostitutes for sex, but as long as the prostitutes hide evidence of this act, they do not suffer the fate of unwed mothers. In fact, the Moroccan government considers having a child out of wedlock a crime with a fine of 2000 dirham (200 Euros) and with the possibility of incarceration from three months to five years, depending on previous offenses.

Some of these women resort to prostitution as a means of survival. In fact, the Moroccan government does not distinguish between 'prostitution' and 'illicit sex'. Prostitution as an economic exchange of sexual favors carries the same weight as a woman who has had non-marital sex. The confusion between prostitution and non-marital sex is deliberately maintained. The Moroccan Penal Code views all “illegal sexual intercourse as an act of prostitution.” Article 490 of the Penal Code provides for a prison sentence of one month to a year for “anyone of the opposite sex who has sexual intercourse outside of marriage.”

In the past, Morocco would only punish the woman for the disgraceful act and refuse full rights and privileges to her bastard child.29 The Moroccan government would enforce laws protecting crimes of 'honor' by imprisoning unwed mothers as 'prostitutes' along with a

29 Article 146 of the Moudawana stipulates that “filiation to the mother produces the same effects regardless of whether the children are the result of a legitimate or illegitimate relationship.” Maternal filiation is a biological fact.
fine. Nowadays, both the man and woman involved in the premarital procreation face charges and imprisonment. Nonetheless, the man can deny the charge and is not obligated to go through DNA testing. Moreover, if a woman secures police report against her perpetrator, there is no guarantee she has access to an independent judiciary. It was reported in 2007 that the judges in practice did not always base rulings on new laws and instead referred to outdated laws in their decisions (Solidarite Feminine 2007). In fact, unwed mothers can still be hunted down and killed by their families without any repercussions to their perpetrators (Solidarite Feminine 2007). The woman, unable to deny her child, bears the brunt of humiliation. In order to revoke the charges, the shameful couple would have to marry.

Furthermore, paternal filiation is extremely important in patriarchal society such as Morocco. Moroccan women, however, lack authority to give their newborns their surname. During birth registration, civil servants often refuse to register a child if a father’s name is not given, albeit factual or fictitious (Bargach 2002). Moroccan women have to ask permission from their fathers or the infants’ fathers to socially inherit their last name, the symbolic identity of patrilineal descent. Without a last name, however, their children would not socially and politically exist in Morocco. They cannot obtain government identification and attend school.

**Honor Killing and Immigration**

Besides expelling the fallen woman from the family through exile or a forced marriage, some families would resort to honor killing. Human rights group and journalists have reported the existence of honor killing in Morocco despite the local and national government's failure to report them as such (LeBlanc 2004, Sadr 2003, and Neuwirth 2004).

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30 Article 161 of the Moudawana states that only the father can grant paternity. The mother cannot give the child her paternal surname without the permission of her father. Filiation with the father needs to be legitimate and has to meet conditions of marriage, acknowledgement, or 'sex by error.' The 'sex by error' is a judicial matter and is determined by the court.
Reports indicate that Morocco sanctions honor killing in cases of adultery and of premarital pregnancy (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2004, Sadr 2003, Neuwirth 2004). What some of these reports are referring to is the Penal Code related to honor killing in adulterous cases. Laws related to honor in Morocco appear in the Civil Codes rather than the Moudawana, the Moroccan Family Codes. Despite the stereotype of honor killings affecting only women, Morocco indicates that honor killing can affect both genders.

Moroccan law also stipulates that honor killing from adulterous acts have legal justification for both males and females. Prior to 2007, only men have justification for killing his wife and her lover. Nowadays, men are just as vulnerable to honor killings as women because the Moroccan government provides sanctions for both sexes to kill for the sake of honor. Moreover, the changes to the Moudawana may have some impact on civil laws related to marriage and family. Women now have more rights in Morocco, which includes the right to kill for the honor of their marriage.

Hence, rather than criminalizing honor killing and obviating the notion of honor, Morocco simply expanded the system by implementing laws that maintain the system of honor. In this respect, Morocco mixes Westernized ideas of women's rights while upholding traditional values of family and honor. However, women, as producers and reproducers, have more value within the current Moroccan framework as long as they do not infringe upon the institution of marriage and family. Since many police officers would rather ignore intense family matters than interfere with them, many cases of honor killings go unreported (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2004).

Living in Europe does not necessarily reduce Moroccan families' needs to guard their honor. On the contrary, Moroccans who have continuous contact with their compatriots in
their host country often feel pressured to continue with customs and traditions imported from their country of origin. The perpetuation of tradition and customs are allowed as long as they do not conflict with European laws. For example, Moroccan men who have strong conflicts with their wives can simply return them to their natal families and leave. Repudiation and divorce may follow with this act, but the abandonment of wives in Morocco is not uncommon. However, when Moroccan immigrant men abandon their immigrant wives on trips back to Morocco by taking their passports, they have violated European law, prompting countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium to take actions regarding the rights of immigrant wives (Wikan 2001).

Nevertheless, family honor remains crucial in facing their community of compatriots as well as relatives and friends back home. Unni Wikan (2000) refers to a case of Nadia, a Moroccan girl with Dutch citizenship, who accused her parents of kidnapping her, forcing her to marry, and threatening to kill her for dishonoring the family. According to the parents' testimonies, Nadia had displayed actions that would have dishonored her family so her parents took her to Morocco to reform her. Nadia publicized her situation to the Dutch press, involving Dutch diplomacy to remove her from her paternal grandfather's home in Morocco. The public removal of Nadia from her grandfather's village further embarrassed her kin group, bringing more dishonor to the family. Since honor is public, any display of disgrace and shame will destroy the group's reputation (Wikan 2001). In the end, Nadia recanted her story in order to reduce the damages brought upon the family honor.

The social aspect of honor is imperative for Moroccans who still value this concept. How the significant people in the community perceives the person makes upholding one's honor so vital. The person may have his or her own personal honor, but the affirmation of the
community solidifies the sense of honor (Brandes 1987, Gilmore 1987, Peristiany 1966, Pitt-Rivers 1966, Schneider 1971, Stewart 1994). In the cases of abandonment and honor killing, social honor trumps personal honor and familial ties. A daughter may be blood, but if she ruins the social honor, the family, usually the male members, need to remedy the situation by eliminating her socially and/or physically. This idea has baffled European authorities that deal with immigrant groups still adamant about preserving their family honor at all cost (Wikan 2001).

Nadia, as with other cases of Moroccan girls living in Europe with their families, represents the import of honor in Moroccan immigrant communities. Honor killings have captured the European media regarding the disjuncture of imported traditions with integrative efforts. European countries have witnessed honor killings from other Muslim groups\(^{31}\) with honor killings in the Moroccan communities in Europe slowly unfolding in the media limelight.

In 2009 France, the European country with the largest Moroccan population, four brothers, originally from Morocco, kidnapped another young Moroccan from the parking lot of his work place for having an intimate relationship with their sister, which, they believed, harmed their family’s reputation. A police helicopter followed their car to the Spanish border where officials found an axe and a chopping block in the car’s trunk. The brothers were taking the boyfriend, whom they had beaten, back to Morocco by ferry to resolve the situation. French authorities also arrested two other sisters and sentenced them to prison terms for threatening their “dishonored” sister with death and other forms of violence. The

\(^{31}\) Pakistanis have captured more media attention in England for arranged marriages as well as honor killings. Regarding Northern Europe, Unni Wikan (2003) writes about honor killings in the Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Norway, referring mainly to Turkish and Iraqi Kurds. Killed by family members in order to regain their honor, these young women symbolize the conflictual problems between generations of youngsters who have integrated more into European society than their parents and relatives.
connection between Morocco and Europe remains intricately linked in settling cultural conflicts among its members, and matters dealing with honor still hold vital importance.

Other European countries with a large number of Moroccan immigrants also witnessed honor-related cases in 2009. In Portugalete, a small town in Basque country, Spain, a forty-three-year-old Moroccan stabbed his twenty-year-old daughter twenty times after discovering a photo of her with a non-Muslim boy, who he presumed was her boyfriend. Witnesses to the case, consisting of the victim’s brothers and sisters and neighbors, indicated that there had been a cultural clash between traditional customs and a European lifestyle. The father has discovered a dishonorable act that needed to be remedied by eliminating the source of the problem, the source being his daughter. In a Moroccan court of law, he probably would have found sympathy, but Spanish authorities had charged him with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon.

Taking the life of a daughter who has dishonored a Moroccan family has been publicized more and more through the European media. On June 14, 2010, a Moroccan man faced charges of killing his eighteen-year-old daughter in Pordenone, Italy in 2009 as well. The Moroccan father had allegedly become enraged after discovering his daughter was having an affair with a thirty-two-year-old Italian man. He followed the couple, which had made plans to live together, and slashed his daughter’s throat, while injuring the boyfriend who was trying to stop him. Although gruesome and violent, this particular Italian case is not the first of its kind to be reported in Italy. Italy has witnessed several similar 'honor' killings within its Muslim communities, and advocates have insisted that the Italian government take action in preventing future occurrences. In fact, the European media has labeled the Italian, the Spanish and the French incidents, as 'honor' killings.
The cases captured by the media in different European countries highlight the ones that have reported extreme violence and deaths related to the infringement of honor. Many cases go undetected by newspapers and media for Moroccan family members and the victims tend not to publicize family strafes. In Spain, social service centers such as the Centro Hispano-Marroqui and Moroccan women associations have witnessed ample examples related to honor infringements. Moroccan girls attending schools in Spain may find themselves in various situations that may endanger their family honor.

According to social workers at several Spanish associations, cases of Moroccan fathers removing their teenage daughters from school in order to marry are common yet go unreported. Even if the girls report their predicaments to their Spanish social workers, they tend to recant their stories and refuse to charge their parents with abuse and forced marriages. Many Moroccan women who live with their families in Spain still have to follow customary guidelines to preserve the family honor. However, Spain and other European countries offer women more opportunities to interact with the opposite sex than in Morocco. Sometimes unwanted pregnancies may result from these interactions as they have been occurring clandestinely in Morocco.

Unwed pregnant Moroccan girls in Spain can opt for abortion or live in a residential facility arranged by their social worker or health care worker. Some girls are brave enough to report their pregnancy to their parents only to have them ostracized from their homes. Moroccan parents sometimes welcome their pregnant daughters back home under the condition that they marry the perpetrator, which is a common practice in their country of origin.

The Moroccan immigrant community and the families' social networks back home
still hold much weight in assessing their honor. The constant public scrutiny of honor by ones' significant others perpetuates this system of ranking and rating, based on the actions of its members (P. Schneider 1969). Moroccan immigrant women, on the other hand, tend to have fewer restrictions in their receiving country than their sending country. Their negotiation of the honor system sans the male vigilance can take a different direction.

Images of Shame

The sense of honor, especially related to the Mediterranean, has centered on the control of resources and property (Schneider 1971). Women, as an extension of these limited resources, also needed controlling. Controlling the productive and reproductive abilities of women keeps society organized and balanced. Nevertheless, Morocco is not exceptional in its social exclusion of women. Unwed mothers and their bastard children have faced social stigma throughout history and in many societies. Honor killings are not particular to Morocco. Pakistan, China, and Iraq all have cases of honor killings related to dishonorable acts of women. In fact, the legitimacy of Jesus Christ through an 'immaculate' conception supports the point that women have historically needed husbands in order to bear socially acceptable children. Only an act of God may excuse the woman of any wrongdoing to her family.

In Spain, unwed mothers had faced harsh conditions during the Franco era, and in some remote Spanish villages, unwed mothers are still socially criminalized (Kelley 1991). It was not until the rise of women's rights following Spain's democratic overhaul that unwed mothers have gain more acceptance. However, in Morocco unwed mothers and their illegitimate children still carry little to no value. The irreparable evidence of damaged virginity is resulted in a child, a mark that cannot be repaired by pouring chicken blood on
the white sheets or reconstructing a hymen. The economic cost of raising a child rests on the mother, who in Morocco would continue to depend on her family since she would be socially and economically excluded from society. Europe, particularly Spain, offers unwed mothers economic and social opportunities that have been limited to their kind in their home county. Nevertheless, unwed mothers still face social restrictions within their immigrant community.

Moroccan films also recycle the humilitating imagery of unwed mothers as prostitutes. I went to one of these films at Casa Arabe in Madrid with a group of twenty Moroccan immigrant women from the Centro Hispano-Marroqui. The film is called “Ali Zaoua, the Prince of Casablanca,” directed by Nabil Ayouch (2000), a Moroccan filmmaker. Ali Zaoua depicts the life of street children in Casablanca with the main character name Ali and his three friends who had just left a street gang. Ali leads the boys away from the gang because he wants something better for himself and for them. Ali wants to become a sailor - when he was living with his mother, a prostitute, he used to listen to a fairy tale about the sailor who discovered the miracle island with two suns. Soon after they leave, the gang ambushes them and Ali is killed. The three remaining boys take his body to the port to be buried as a ‘prince’. The burial becomes complicated, which leads the boys through a journey of discovery.

Part of the journey consists of discovering Ali’s life before becoming a street urchin. They find Ali’s unwed mother, who works as a prostitute. They discover that she has provided Ali with a lovely room in her apartment with all the comfort a child needs. The room is hidden behind curtains and a door to separate it from her bedroom where she entertains her clients. Once she’s aware of Ali’s death, his mother goes insane and wanders the street searching for his body. The boys return to fetch her for Ali’s royal burial is eventually set up by a sailor who has befriended Ali prior to his untimely death.
During the debriefing of the film, the Moroccan women complained about the overall idea and sentiment behind the film. They thought the film had portrayed the worst part of Morocco and felt embarrassed to watch that film with Spanish people in the audience. They agreed that unwed mothers were sinners and continued to act in immoral ways such as the film had shown. One woman confessed she had adopted a girl eighteen years ago in Morocco because the child's unwed mother could not return to her family unless she gave away the child. Her adopted daughter has regular contact with her biological mother, which the woman did not understand and referred to her as a ‘qaiba’ or prostitute. The women claimed it may be acceptable to have a child out of wedlock in Spain, but unwed mothers are a disgrace to Moroccan society. They believed that unwed mothers deserve the harsh treatment and criminalization because they took a conscious risk, which constitute both a moral and a legal crime.

Given the reception of the film, unwed mothers may find much difficulty in participating in the Moroccan community in Spain as well as Morocco. Their contact with their compatriots may be minimal or restricted due the perpetual moral stain their status holds. In actuality, their social network looks distinct from the other types of Moroccan female immigrants. Besides their immediate family, they tend to only have a couple Moroccan friends who they maintain regular contact.

While conducting research on Moroccan women, I had the opportunity to visit villages surrounding Madrid with large Moroccan communities. One village in the mountainous region of the Sierra has a Moroccan women's group that meet every Friday for learning Spanish and for socializing. When discussing honor in the family, the women recalled a case of a Moroccan girl who had come to live with her uncle's family and ended up
getting pregnant. The women noted that the uncle took a variety of measures to hide the girl from the community, but people could still see her cleaning the garden or going grocery shopping. The girl moved to female neighbor house and was never seen again. The women had no idea what had happened to the girl and did not want to pressure the uncle's wife into revealing any details since they had tried to hide the pregnancy. The women believed the girl had been sent to Madrid or another city so she would not continue to dishonor the family. The Spanish social worker of the group later confirmed the story and added that she went to visit the girl one day and could not find her anywhere in the village. The family had told her about the girl and wanted her help, but they did not inform her or sought her help in relocating the girl.

The unwed mothers interviewed for this study choose to have their small circle of friends and remain separated from the Moroccan community. They are not usually invited to the celebrations their female compatriots throw for their friends and families. Unwed mothers are absent from birthing parties, circumcisions, birthday parties and weddings. I babysat Siham's son once for a wedding she attended outside of Madrid, which she claimed she was not often invited to any Moroccan weddings or celebrations since the birth of her son. She chose not to take him with her for her friend did not know that she had a son.

With its large population and space, Moroccan women living in Spanish cities have more freedom and opportunities to move and to remove themselves from the vigilance of their Moroccan compatriots. Although they now live in a society that no longer criminalize and stigmatize unwed mothers, Moroccan women have to completely or almost completely distance themselves from the Moroccan community in order to escape the imported devaluing of unwed motherhood. In fact, the majority of unwed mothers in the study often
befriend Spaniards and other nationalities that they find more supportive and understanding than their compatriots.

**Rebuilding Lives and Honor**

Having the resources and assistance remain important for unwed mothers to survive in Morocco as well as Spain. In Spain, however, female immigrants with children are limited as domestic workers due to their working hours. Siham had to return to Spain to earn money, but she could only maintain her live-in position by leaving her child with her parents in Morocco. When she was ready to bring him to Madrid, she had to change to a waitressing job in order to have time for her son. Yet without the help of her neighbor and her mother, Siham would have found it even more difficult to work full-time. Single Moroccan mothers with fewer resources may not be able to balance work and family as well as Siham had done. Siham has a higher level of education than many Moroccan women. Although class and level of education cannot help unwed mothers escape the social stigma in their country, having some education and social capital can help unwed mothers adapt to a life in Spain much easier than their more impoverished and less educated counterparts. The following cases demonstrate the differences in their adaptation.

**Case: Soraya**

“I came to study at Complutense at the end of 1989 for my doctorate but without a scholarship. I paid my way through the university... I finished my coursework but then I got a job and then I had two kids and just lost interest. My Moroccan friends had the same problem. We all came together, the three of us [girls] from Fez. One left for France after she met and married a French student. The other one met and married a Swede at the university. She is now in Sweden. I stayed here and had my children...

I met the father of my children through my friends but we never married. I never thought about it. The Moroccan lady yesterday called them “children of sin” --products of sin, and she just reminded me of...
these narrow-minded women in Morocco. The Moroccan women here do not know about my personal life. I teach them Spanish and that is all they know about me. I do not have much contact with the Moroccan community besides my job. I teach those Spanish and social skills but that is all.

The children’s father is from the Cameroon. So the kids are mixed. I met him through friends from Guinea Equatorial. I knew them because one went to Complutense so I met her there then I met her other friends. Then I lived with one of them and her cousin and he would come and visit them from time to time. That’s how we started. We have been separated since my youngest was 6 months. My sons are now 11 and 9.

When I introduced my mother to my ex-boyfriend, she was delighted. She’s always been an open person so she had no problems with our relationship; it was only when I got pregnant that she began to worry. Not so much because of him but because of my situation and that we were not married and what would happen. She’s always been open but that part made her worried about me and about my responsibility for having a child without being married. But fine, she has no problem with my situation. She has always supported me. When we separated, I was left with a huge responsibility. There were many things I had never expected. Things that had never crossed my mind about what had happened and how I let it happened. And with two kids, it’s a tremendous weight on me, but actually, she had helped me a lot. Now she lives with me and returns to Morocco during the summertime.”

Case: Faten

“I am from Casablanca. I have an aunt, who brought me here when I was twelve. I begged my father to let her bring me because I wanted to go to Europe. I wanted to study and work. He wanted me to marry a good man in Morocco and have a nice family, but I did not want to get married yet. He did not want to let me go, even if it was with his sister. She promised him she would look after me so he finally let me go.

My aunt told the government that I was her daughter and had a visa for me to come with her. I came and lived with her for two years, but they were the worst years I ever had. She brought me over to take care of the house for her and would not let me leave the house. I did not go to school because she said there was a problem with my papers so I had to stay at home. I was angry so I caused problems for her and her family. I would not do what she told me so she would beat me and cursed at me. I was so depressed. I would run away but I did not know Spanish at that time so I did not stay out long. I did not have friends; I had no one.
When I was living in the streets, I had some Moroccan friends. I met Spanish people through them and Latin Americans, too. I would go with them, staying in one place or another. Then I met Ali, the father of my daughter. My friend introduced me to him, and I liked him. He sold drugs and did a lot of drugs; that was how I got started in drugs. We were always on the streets, selling and smoking. Then I got pregnant but I could not stop. We were worried so I went to a clinic and told the doctor. The doctor sent me to a rehabilitation center in Barcelona. We met people from everyone in that Center. There were people from France, England, Germany, Russia, Romania, America, Peru, everywhere. They moved us because there was no medical care there for children so we were moved to Valencia. I gave birth to her in Valencia, in a drug center. We stayed there until they move us to another center, which was when he left. He was only with us for less than a year after she was born. Once they moved us to another center, he went out and did not come back. Until this day, I do not know where he is. So they moved us to Valencia and then to Madrid. My daughter has been living in drug centers all her life and she has been educated there. They took my daughter away from me last year because they claimed I had neglected her, which was not true. I was at a Madonna concert and had left her with my neighbor at the residential place. She reported me to the social worker; I am sure of it. You cannot trust anyone these days. Now I can only see my daughter on Sundays with a social worker.

Working single mothers, in any country, need assistance in caring for the children. For some Moroccan women, the importing of their biological mothers has been the solution for childcare assistance. However, obtaining a tourist visa requires connection and money, resources that many Moroccan families do not have. The ones who do not have family ties and social capital are at the mercy of the Spanish associations and the government.

Despite their education background and class, unwed mothers would socially perish in Morocco, whereas they can socially thrive in Spain. However, unwed Moroccan immigrant mothers vary in their levels of education and resources, which make a difference in Spain. Siham and Soraya have a higher level of education in Morocco and have come from wealthier Moroccan families. Although they may have extreme difficulties living in Morocco, they can rely on the kin network and its resources to establish a transnational link
of family assistance. Their families can easily obtain periodic tourist visas that families without means cannot. In Morocco, money and contacts can supply many things except the social acceptance for unwed mothers.

However, unwed mothers and families in general, are not completely free from the State’s reach. Unwed mothers may live socially better in Spain, but if they cannot care for their children the way the Spanish society deems as appropriate, then government officials may remove the child from the mother. The more secularist government of Spain may not criminalize unwed mothers for having children. However, it criminalizes them for not providing proper care. Moroccan mothers with some education can find jobs in the service sector or in administrative work. They can maneuver their way through the system. Women with little or no education continue to suffer economically in their host country, particularly in obtaining work in domestic services, the predominant means of work for many uneducated Moroccan women. Finding work in domestic services requires contacts that many unwed mothers do not initially have. However, with time and perseverance, many unwed mothers befriend Spaniards and other immigrants to help them obtain a job that can sustain both mother and child. Unfortunately, unwed mothers are also limited by the hours they can work if they do not have anyone to help them care for their children. Therefore, they cannot take live-in domestic positions that may include for room and boarding.

Faten comes from an extremely impoverished family in Morocco and has barely attended enough formal schooling to learn how to read in Arabic. She has limited her contact with her kinsmen in Spain after her pregnancy. She has mainly relied on non-Moroccan friends and Spanish associations to replace her absent kin network. The dependence on the Spanish social service system does entail behavioral guidelines that Faten chooses not to
follow. When Faten demonstrated her negligence of her child, the State quickly placed the child in foster care and limited Faten's contact with her. Without any familial support and economic means, Faten and her child are at the mercy of the Spanish State.

Unwed Moroccan mothers have to persevere in Spain because returning to Morocco may not be a feasible option. Faten has expressed her desire to return to her parents' house with her child, but her family will only welcome her temporarily. An interview with Faten’s mother in Morocco confirms Faten’s fear that she remains an outcast in her own home:

“...the only door we have is the broken entry door. We do not have money to fix it. My husband has been sick for several months and we have asked Faten for money, but she doesn’t have any. I finally found a job cleaning a clinic for ten hours a week just to buy medicine for my husband. His sister broke his heart for what she did. Faten broke his heart for having a child without marrying. We have lost our honor. We hear she is using drugs, is that true? We also hear that she drinks, is that true? Her cousin tells us such horrible stories, but we do not want to believe it. We would like to see her and the baby, but she cannot come back. She can visit but she has a baby and no husband. She has made her life in Spain.”—Fatima, Faten’s mother, December 30, 2009

Unwed Moroccan mothers in Spain cannot return to Morocco for their social stigma still lingers there. Spain, especially Spanish urban areas, has provided the opportunity to escape social humiliation for the unwed mothers and their illegitimate children, but the escape is not permanent. Sooner or later, these women have to return to Morocco to visit their families or they may accidentally have an encounter with their compatriots or kinsmen in Spain. Whether or not they maintain their personal honor is their prerogative, but they have damaged their social honor among Moroccans.

Once honor (‘ird) has been tainted, recovering it is nearly impossible. Women may marry and earn legitimacy, but without marriage, the child has no other recourse except maybe adoption. However, legal adoption in Islam does not exist. The Kafala
system, which assumes an informal, though socially recognized form of adoption in Morocco, allows more economically and socially privileged relatives or 'practical kin' to rear impoverished members of their kin group. Sometimes the adoption may entail some servitude on the part of the adoptees, in exchange for room and board as well as education and training. The *Kafala* children, however, cannot inherit from their adopted parents. Furthermore, European governments do not recognize the legitimacy of these adoptees in the family reunification program. Hence, poor and/or illegitimate children continue to live on the fringe of both frontiers.

In certain small villages of Spain, unwed mothers may still conjure images of female moral inferiority. Nonetheless, they can still participate socially and economically in society (Kelley 1991). In fact, unwed mothers constitute 148,945 of births (30%) of 492,527 births to all mothers in Spain in 2007 (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística* 2007). On the other hand, Moroccan statistics of unwed mothers do not exist or are extremely inaccurate for it illustrates a moral problem that the country cannot acknowledge or does not want to acknowledge. Moroccan society still does not allow for this category of women to integrate. Some Moroccans view attempts at integrating unwed mothers as supporting immoral behaviors and the perpetuation of illicit sex.

**Conclusion**

With the changes in the Moudawana and the increase in rights for Moroccan women, Morocco continues to ostracize women who stray from the institution of marriage and family. Women who have children out of wedlock not only strip their families of honor but also go against the inheritance law of Islam and of Moroccan society. Illegitimate children do not
have inheritance claim, starting with the father's surname to his property. Marrying the perpetrator of the act may cancel out the dishonor bestowed upon the woman's family, but the affines may make her married life as miserable as possible in order to avenge the semi-forced union.

Immigration has provided unwed mothers opportunities to start anew, but they still have to revisit their actions during their visits home. They may have achieved a personal honor in their receiving society for being able to take care of themselves, their children, and their kin back home, but the family honor has been tarnished and cannot be recovered. Moreover, unwed mothers maintain a social distance from their compatriots in the receiving country. They limit their interactions within the Moroccan immigrant community and advise their children to do the same.

The term “children of sin” can still be heard during discussions related to unwed mothers and the danger of single Moroccan female immigrants in Spain. The act of marrying may diminish some of the stigma attached to an unwed mother, but to remain single with illegitimate children makes women uncomfortable. Moroccan female immigrants who have husbands or who had husbands cannot comprehend the idea of unwed mothers. The Moroccan government does not acknowledge them; Islam does not recognize them so Moroccan society follow suit. The import of these beliefs carries weight within the Moroccan community and within the various Moroccan women groups as well.

Unwed Moroccan mothers in Spain find more comfort and companionship with non-Moroccans, particularly with Spanish women. They claim they get a sense of honor and respect in Spain for their hard work and believe that Spaniards are more open and accepting of their situation than their compatriots. They depend on their friends, their social workers,
and their immediate family members for support and resources. Extended family support appears non-existent for unwed mothers. They have long severed the extended social network as a result of their pregnancy and cannot return to the way things were. The damaged honor is permanent.
According to the selected quotes and provides, Islam and Moroccans do not favor divorce (talaq) and singlehood. Singlehood in many societies violates the social norm of marriage and family. In fact, having a partner supposedly makes one complete or as indicated in the Moroccan proverb, marrying makes one morally sound. Although different societies have varying ways of perceiving the advantages and the disadvantages of love and marriage, not marrying for men and women in Morocco remains inconceivable. Some Moroccans never marry, but destiny determines singlehood, not agency.

The Western metanarrative allows for choices in marriage. One can stay single, cohabit, marry, separate, or divorce without embodying evil, yet love and marriage are still considered the ideal. Plato proposes the idea of love and marriage as a worthy goal: “For love is the desire of the whole, and the pursuit of the whole is called love. There was a time when the two sexes were only one, but now God has halved them.” The quote comes from Plato’s Symposium, the widely acknowledged text about the Occidental constitution of ‘true’ love. In the story, God divides the original union of man and woman having four arms and four legs. The division benefits God in that it increases the number of worshippers. The
bisected units would spend their entire lives searching for the original missing halves in order to make them whole again. Theoretically, the incompatibility of couples occurs when the halves attach themselves to the wrong members and feel dissatisfied and deficient. Hence when speaking about one’s true love, Westerners often use metaphors of half units. English speakers use the concept of a ‘soul mate’ while Spaniards refer to their partners as ‘media naranja’ (half orange).

Love does not necessarily culminate in a legal union. As the previous chapter indicates, the Euro-America union requires love and commitment. In fact, Spaniards no longer view singlehood with such negativity (de Miguel 2004). The median marrying age for Spaniards has increased in recent decades as droves of women enter universities and the work force and more and more people are prolonging their stay in the natal household (de Miguel 2004). Moreover, cohabitating couples now have similar rights as married couples, either heterosexual or homosexual ever since the Spanish government has broadened the category of civil status by granting individuals more choices with their marital or non-marital state.

Moroccan immigrant women, however, have to negotiate between the values of their country of origin and the values of their host society. With the changes in the Moudawana and the rise of women's education level and access to the workplace, Morocco has changed to improve women's rights. For many immigrant women, the changes in Morocco have not occurred fast enough for them to improve their lives. As a matter of fact, many groups and factions have been protesting the changes while Moroccan courts continue to resort to traditional interpretation and practices (Global Rights 2005).

Despite the ongoing contention with women's rights in Morocco, single Moroccan
women who have immigrated in the 1980s and early 1990s have returned to Morocco to marry and have imported their spouses. Khadija, the case from the previous chapter, presents some of the dilemmas that Moroccan immigrant women have faced. Moroccan women now play the role of spouse-importer and family-supporter. A role that is atypical of Moroccan immigration in the past. As with any marriage, problems arise during the course of cohabiting and raising children. Divorce, traditionally a male prerogative in Morocco, has become more and more common for women to initiate, albeit with great difficulties. Apart from the legal and bureaucratic aspects of divorce, Moroccan women also have to face criticisms and the risk of damaging their family honor and respect among their kin and social network.

**Divorce and Social Network**

During the real estate recession, many Moroccan women continue working while their many husbands stay home, unwilling to contribute to the domestic management (Ramírez 1998, 2004). The economic kaput of the building and construction sector in the European countries exacerbate the domestic tension with financial and social preoccupation. While women continue to be courted in the service and agricultural sectors, Moroccan men find themselves in untraditional roles both in many European countries, particularly Spain (Ramírez 1998, Oso Casas 2004). Some Moroccan women who imported their spouse from Morocco find the strain of the lop-sided domestic responsibilities, the male chauvinistic attitude, the financial worries, and in some cases, the domestic violence too much to bear.

Acculturation may affect their social network and their decision to leave their husbands. Acculturation occurs when one group establishes continuous contact with another and incorporates the beliefs and practices of the other. The more contact with members of the outside group, the more likely the exchange and the adoption of the new ideas and praxes. In
expanding this concept, we can assume that the frequency of contacts with Spaniards indicates a higher tendency for acculturation. Therefore, by analyzing the intensity of contacts the Moroccan women have with their fellow countrymen and with Spaniards and other nationalities, we can observe the changes in their behaviors and their marriage choices.

Moroccan women who stay and those who leave have different social network density in Spain. Women with close-knit networks chose to stay in their marriage despite the stress, dissatisfaction and abuse. Moroccan women who leave their marriages, particularly the ones who import their spouses, have looser networks. Take two cases of women who have resided and worked in Spain for over fifteen years.

We are familiar with Khadija’s case, her social network density, and her discontent with her marriage. She gives reasons for staying in her marriage: her daughters, which she may lose if she divorces; her house title bears her husband’s name; her eldest sister, who works for a restaurant currently own by her husband’s brother; the loss of respect and honor from her neighbors and friends in Madrid and Larache. Khadija has complex economic ties to her husband and his network that prevent her from leaving. In addition to his owning part of the house in Larache, his brother is currently her eldest sister’s boss. Moreover, she risks losing her daughters if she files for a divorce since she has no strong basis, according to a Moroccan court, to divorce her husband.

The constraints from her social network may prevent her from divorcing since she can lose her marital status, a mark of honor for Moroccan women, and her moral base of sacrificing for her family. Khadija confesses, “I often wish he would just leave me for another woman so I can receive the rest of my sdaq and keep my dignity. People will blame me if I leave but will feel bad for me if he leaves.” Despite her frustration with her husband,
she prefers to keep her achieved status of being married in order to avoid the loss of face. If her husband leaves her, which is a traditional pattern of marriage dissolution in Morocco, she will achieve a secondary gain of pity from her affiliates.

The status of being a 'divorced' woman is lower than being a 'widow.' I met a woman in Morocco who everyone, including herself, identified her as a widow. After spending some time talking to her, she revealed that she had been twice divorced. Her first husband died of cancer after two years of marriage. The loss of her first husband was beyond her control. The termination of her second and third marriage, however, lay in her hands. This 'widow' divorced her second and third husband, making her appear selfish and dishonorable to her former affines. In fact, she had to move to another town with her children in order to escape from being criticized and scrutinized by the villagers. Only a few people in the town she currently resides in know her true life history.

Indeed, the perception of the group towards the individual remains important, particularly when the individual desires the honor and respect from the group members. Immigrant women like Khadija not only imported her spouse, but she also sponsored her family members and helped friends and neighbors migrate to Spain. Some immigrant women import their husbands without importing their affines and other members of their social network. Due to distance and time, the strong hold of the social network will lose its grip and what is once considered ‘intimate’ kin will turn to ‘familiar’ kin. Bott (1957) describes intimate kin as relatives who ego visits frequently (or whenever possible), maintains constant contact and provides mutual aid when necessary. ‘Familiar’ kin, on the other hand, are relatives who ego knows information about them, visits them periodically, but does not have the same amount of frequency and intensity in their relationship as with an intimate kin
When studying the qualitative relationship with the women’s kin network, the ‘intimate’ and ‘familiar’ kin members are difficult to separate due to the transnational aspect of their relationship. Nevertheless, for many immigrants, the relocation to Spain does not necessarily reduce intimacy among kin if annual visits to Morocco, weekly contact, and monthly remittances are routinely practiced, particularly within the first five years of migration. The importation of kin will significantly ensure the intimacy between ego and her network. Nevertheless, distance and time will corrode network ties, leaving the immigrant woman to depend on local ties.

**Case II: Rachida**

*Rachida, who always wears a pink veil, immigrated to Madrid in 1991 when she turned eighteen on a domestic service contract. She is the oldest of seven children from a very poor family in Al-Hoceima. She attended less than a year of school before her parents withdrew her to help with the housework. She had acquired the contract from a neighbor whose boss in Spain was looking for a live-in housekeeper. Rachida took a coach bus from Tangier to Madrid and lived there for three years before returning home. For the first three years, she kept contact with her family three times a week and sent monthly remittances.*

*When she returned several summers later, her parents had made arrangements for her to marry her father’s father’s brother’s son who she had never met before. After a long discussion with her parents, her father revealed a debt he had incurred with the family in which marrying her off would eliminate. She met her distant cousin and found him agreeable. They married that summer and three years later, she brought him to Spain live with her. She quit working as a live-in and found a job at Spanish restaurant. She persuaded her new boss to also hire her husband. They worked side by side for a short time.*

*After a while, her husband would come in late for work after stopping at bars to drink. Eventually he was fired and would spend his days drinking at home. She would often return home to a messy house even after repeatedly cajoling him to clean. His drinking worsened as well as his temper. The beatings started about a year after the firing. It continued for years. Sometimes she would arrive bruised to work,*
worrying her Spanish boss and workmates.

\[ \text{Rachida has no relatives in Spain and only three Moroccan friends who she has stopped contacting due to the work schedule and the chronic beatings. Her Spanish workmates finally convinced her to see a social worker, to whom she ultimately disclosed her domestic problems. She eventually reported the abuse to the police who arrested her husband a couple of time.} \]

\[ \text{“He was very tyrannical and would not allow me to leave the house. I would go to work and come home and he would hit me. I wanted to learn how to read. He would hit me. I wanted to go to the market and would hit me. It was horrible. I was a prisoner until I finally divorced him. Now everything is much better by myself. I go to work; I come to class. I have my job and my health so I am fine.”} \]

\[ \text{After going back and forth for ten years, she called her family and had her brother started the process of filing for a divorce in Morocco. Her brother always accompanied her when she visited her lawyer or appeared in court. Although her parents supported her decision, some relatives refused to acknowledge her and even sent threats to her home in Morocco. The process took a long time because her husband had initially refused to divorce her. He also stalked her during the process, making the experience even more painful. She had to report him to the police on several occasions for threatening her. However, in 2003, she obtained her divorce decree after she paid her husband 500 Euro, a khol’, to grant her the divorce. She also forfeited her sdaq.} \]

Moroccan women working in Spain, and to some extent in Morocco, have challenged the ideal traditional household where the men would spend the majority of their time outside, working and frequenting cafes and bars, while women labor incessantly inside the home. Female initiated-migration to Spain has induced more and more women to work outside, sometimes alongside their husbands. Unfortunately, rather than balancing the domestic division of labor with their husbands, many migrant women find themselves having to work hard both outside and inside the home. Their exposure to other forms of conjugal role organization (sharing or complementary) at work and on television adds more fuel to their frustration. Khadija constantly lament to her friends and to the anthropologist:
“I never would have thought that living in Spain and being married would bring me such hardship. At least in Morocco, men would feel ashamed to have their wives work outside. It means they cannot provide for them and are not real men. Here, the Moroccan men want you to work outside for them, cook and clean for them, and to obey them unconditionally. If I would have known this, I would not have returned to Morocco to marry and then bring my husband here.”

Unlike women with a close-knit network and financial ties to their husbands such as Khadija, women like Rachida would initially maintain close contact with her social network in Morocco but had little contact with people outside her job. However, having children does not dissuade other Moroccan women to seek a divorce. The majority of the divorced women in this study have children.

Furthermore, seeking a transnational divorce between Morocco and Spain is ripe with complications. Migrant women have to depend extensively on their social networks in both countries to pass the bureaucratic hurdles of both countries. Bureaucratic hurdles have made it even more difficult for women to obtain a divorce. The majority of Moroccan women, who are illiterate (60%), find it nearly impossible to divorce their husbands without paying a monetary amount. Immigrant women need to collect multiple documents from both countries in order to build sufficient evidence for their cases. When they return to Morocco, some women have to revert to the traditional practice of having their fathers, brothers, or uncles accompany them and speak on their behalf in requesting for documents or actions taken by government officials. In Spain, Moroccan women may elect to have other women accompany them, particularly the ones who cannot read or speak Spanish well. The ones who have more skills or confidence would go to their appointments alone.

Moroccan women immigrants can also use the social and political advantages of the receiving country in order to bypass the legal and social constraints in obtaining a divorce.
Some Moroccan women, such as Rachida, would press charges or initiate the divorce process in Spain to pressure their husbands into agreeing to a divorce in Morocco. With criminal charges in Spain, Moroccan husbands may relinquish their rights over their wives in order to relieve them of complications in their host country. Regardless of divorcing in Spain or in Morocco, Moroccan women still need to have separate means of income in order to pay for the lawyers, the court fees, the trip and possible pay of severance or *khol*.\(^{32}\)

Transnational divorces are lengthy and complicated. Due to time and distance, some women would resort to paying her husband for a divorce. Moroccan women, who work and have access to funds, can provide a monetary payoff for their freedom. Working Moroccan women in Spain (and Morocco) have their earnings to buy their independence if necessary. Moroccan migrant women, such as Khadija and Samira, have less means and more constraints than working women such as Rachida. Moreover, having a close-knit network of Moroccans may provide resources but also prevent women from divorcing by placing social pressure to maintain their honor and their highly-prized marital status.

Studies have proposed that divorce rates correlate with economic autonomy (Fisher 1995, Shumway 2003). Societies, particularly capitalist societies, where spouses tend to more economically independent, divorce rates are high. Societies where spouses are dependent upon each other economically with shared resources (i.e. networks), divorce rates are lower (Fisher 1995). On the other hand, Morocco’s past divorce rates had been quite high (up to 50% in certain areas) due to the repudiation rights of men and without the economic autonomy of women. The significant drop in divorce rate occurred the years after the 2004 *Moudawana* revisions (Global Rights 2005).

\(^{32}\) A *khol*, according to the Moudawana, is a divorce of mutual consent, in which the woman may obtain a divorce from her husband by paying him an agreed amount to terminate the marriage. Articles 115-120 dictates the conditions and actions needed to divorce using the *khol*. 
Nonetheless, in order to bypass the process, female immigrants need money and some knowledge of both systems in order to maneuver and manipulate them to achieve what they want. Illiterate immigrant women with little to no familial connections in Spain often depend on the knowledge of friends and acquaintances, and more importantly, the knowledge of Spanish lawyers from the Centro. The public social service sector in Spain and in other European countries has become a major part of social network for Moroccan women. In a sense, these associations may act as the replacement for lost familial resources, a pattern that is increasingly common for single Moroccan female immigrants.

The rebuilding or the importing of a close-knit social network may replicate the pattern of mutual help, resource exchange, and values from the country of origin. On the other hand, the close network may also produce social pressure and constraints (i.e. honor, relationships, education) to restrict behavior for both the first and second generation immigrants. The loosening of the social network may provide other perspectives and resources but the consequence of following these new perspectives, such as seeking a divorce, may be detrimental.

**Post-divorce Opportunities**

Divorced women, who have had experience in the sexual and marital realm, have more freedom in movement than Moroccan maidens (Evers Rosander 1991, Mernissi 1987, Ramirez 1998). Many Moroccans often suspect divorced women of prowling for another husband in order to help support her children and to unburden her family (Evers Rosander 1991, Maher 1974). Being unattached to a man provokes gossip even if the woman has severed the relationship. The common Moroccan perception of women of reproductive age is uncontrollable and dangerous to society because it is unnatural for women to be unattached
to a man. The merged categories of divorce and single indicate the ultimate anomaly, a
sexually experienced woman without the binds of marriage. Moreover, her value in the
marriage market is much less than women who have never been married (Evers Rosander
1991, Maher 1974). In some cases, divorced women generally command half the amount of
virgin maidens in bridewealth (Westermarck 1921, Maher 1978).

Divorced Moroccan women immigrate to Spain not just for economic reason but also
for the freedom of movement and of partaking social and economic opportunities without
being judged. Some divorced women want to remarry Spanish nationals in order to secure
the economic and social opportunities for their families back home. For other divorced
women, remaining single is a viable option in Spain since the social pressure of the social
network in Morocco can be severed or distanced until the summer visit. Additionally,
unmarried women can work in Spain without having to worry about endangering their
families’ honor since migrating has already marked them as debauched.

Nevertheless, divorced women who maintain close ties with her kin network in
Morocco and Spain would experience restrictions in their behavior. At some point, distancing
away from their Moroccan compatriots and moving towards more Occidental influence from
Spaniards or other foreigners would loosen the traditional social pressure to remarry.

Case Safa

“I married at twenty-four and divorced at twenty-eight because my
husband decided to take a mistress. Even with my university education
and my father’s connections, my jerk husband made off with everything.
I had everything I wanted except the fidelity I needed. I went back home
but could not find anything. My sister suggested Spain so I left to visit
her in Madrid. I taught French classes for four years, and now I have a
good job with a multi-national company. My family and friends back
home do not understand why I have not remarried. I am approaching
thirty-three yet I do not want to renarry. I am very happy now and want
to be independent.”
Some Moroccan friends here do not understand either so I do not talk to them anymore. The ones who understand are married to Spaniards. My Spanish friends understand me so I spend more time with them. I do not need to be reminded of why I left Morocco in the first place. Here I can smoke, drink, date, and work without being judged.

There was a sense of liberty and freedom that I felt in being in Spain that I did not feel in Morocco. There are a lot of silly things that I just do not agree with in Morocco. For example, I smoke and my family smokes. I would smoke in my house but not in the streets simply because it was seen as bad behavior. The men could smoke but we could not. I would feel frustrated and upset inside because of silly things like this. Yes, still, I cannot go back there now and smoke in the streets without people giving me dirty looks or saying something rude to me. When I came here and was able to smoke in the streets with no problems, I thought how wonderful it was. I could light my cigarette where I’d want and thought how great this was.

And going out at night, too because I could not. Although I had no problems with my family, I could not go out at night because outside in the street is the world of men. And if you leave by yourself, you are proposing something that you are exposing yourself. And if you encountered danger then it would have been your fault because you asked for it and you were looking for it. The blame was always on the woman. The blame was always yours. I would always be angry about that. I wondered why I could not go out in the evening, even if it was just for a walk around the neighborhood just because I wanted to and felt like it and did not need to explain it to no one. I could not do it just because it was not acceptable and if you did it there could be problems. If you got in trouble then it would be your fault because you provoked it being a woman walking outside by yourself. Or they would just say terrible things to you if you were walking out in the streets by yourself. In some places they still do it, in others like Rabat or Casablanca then it would not be a problem. In Fes this still happens, at certain time of night, you just cannot be out in the street by yourself if you do not want to be attacked physically or verbally. You cannot just walk out to go to a discotech or a bar or just to walk around the corner. You just cannot without provoking some sort of reaction.

They will call you a ‘qaiba’, a prostitute, or something derogatory like that. They assume that you are looking for something so they will give it to you. For that, I hate it there. I am a person too and have rights too. I am not bothering anyone and not saying anything to anyone. Because I do not have to worry about those things here, I prefer it here more. Here I can do whatever I want. Nobody says anything bad to me or look at
me badly.”

Case: Naima

“I do not know if I want to get married again. When I left my children behind in Morocco, they would cry and call me to tell me people were calling me a whore for going to Spain. They had a difficult time when I left because of all the talk about my leaving them behind for Spanish men. I had to bring them over so they could escape all that cruelty.

My Syrian doctor-friend wanted to marry me but I turned him down. I did not want to iron and take care of another man again. Unless the man is super, super rich, it’s not worth it for me. I had to take care of my children and that was hard work. I do not want to have to take care of another man again. I am happy being alone but sometimes I get lonely.

Another man wanted to marry me. He came from a family of famous Spanish singers. Then he criticized my daughters for taking advantage of me. I could not live with someone like that. They are my children and I raise them how I want to raise them. I did not want someone to interfere so I turned him down too. I have suffered for my children and have not regretted it so I do not want a man to tell me what I am doing is wrong. I have their father putting the entire burden on me, and I do not want that again.

I get the men to help but to be in love, I do not think I have ever felt so much in love or to love someone so much that I would lose control. No thank you. I rather be by myself and take care of my own children. If the man gets in the way, I will leave him. My children come first.”

In Spain, divorced women have the choice to remarry or stay single. Economic and social opportunities in Spain have allowed divorced women such as Safa and Naima to forgo marriage if they choose without worrying about social and economic repercussions. In fact, women’s rights have flourished in the midst of democratic ideals, capitalism, and the rise of consumerism (Coontz 2003). Spain has exemplified this hypothesis in its recent support of women’s rights following the death of Franco.

It was not until 1974 when the transition period began with Franco’s ailing health that the feminist movement in Spain launched into the socio-political space. Under the direction
of the dictator, Francisco Franco, the Spanish regime launched a program of economic liberalization in 1959 in establishing more relations with the European Economic Community. However, the regime continued to repress individual rights such as stifling expression and criminalizing adultery, abortion, divorce and other behaviors that violated Catholic morality. It was not until rumors of Franco’s demise in 1974 that Spanish women organized and demanded for equality and rights leading to the creation of subsections and government departments that are geared towards women. Women associations, union leaders, and other stakeholders rewrote the Constitution in 1978 giving universal rights to both men and women and prohibiting discrimination based on birth, sex, race, religion, opinion, and other social and personal situation.


In 1987, women’s associations throughout Spain consolidated into the Federation of Progressive Women (La Federación de Mujeres Progresistas or FMP) to work together in advancing women’s rights. They put forth the Plan for the Equality of Women and Men (Plan para la Igualdad de Mujeres Hombres) and a novel program called El Programa Kanguras, to provide childcare services for working women through a network of
individuals, groups and associations. Through this program, married, divorced, and unwed mothers can assist each other in the distribution of childcare, allowing them to work and have a family.

Given the changes in family law and social action, ideology eventually changed, promoting the social acceptance of gender equality. The current administration has also established a Ministry of Equality, headed by a woman, one of the many female Spanish ministers in the Zapatero administration. The pendulum has shifted for women in Spain’s post-Franco, democratic era of being part of geopolitical entity. With the economic opportunities, as well as the influence of the current Spanish gender ideal, Moroccan immigrant women who have more contact with Spaniards than their compatriots are likely affected by this ideal.

**Singlehood**

Singlehood in Christianity is not a new phenomenon. Christianity has long given high status to its righteous and pious singles that adhere to the form of love known as *agape*, the ancient Greek term for the love of God. Priests and nuns remain single and celibate in their devotion to God while earning social and moral reverence. Not only do priests and nuns serve God, but they also protect the poor. Additionally, the expansion of the priests and nun orders in Europe had contributed to the changes to the family and moral laws of the Catholic Church as a means of seizing properties from domestic groups (Goody 1983). Islam has no corresponding roles for these exalted singles.

Christianity also provides a revered role for mothers even if the mother happens to be impregnated by a supernatural being. In fact, creation myths of the Immaculate Conception fill various Western canons. The Greeks and Roman gods have numerous encounters with
humans resulting in illegitimate, albeit divine, pregnancies. The Roman Catholics venerate the Virgin Mary, the mother of the Christ child, who eventually marries a man who is not the biological father of her child. The Christ child, considered a bastard in Islamic standard, becomes the Son of God, the highest status of all human standards. Catholic Spain has over seven major and thousands of minor shrines of the Virgin Mary to pay homage to the honored Mother of God.

Yet unlike Christianity, Islam has no equivalent positions for the priests and nuns or a veneration of illegitimate children. Islam has stricter rules for marriage and legitimacy, subjecting unmarried Muslims to low status and a role void. According to the Koran, Allah stipulates the predilection for marriage:

"And marry off the single among you and the righteous ones among your male and female slaves. If they are poor, Allah will enrich them from His bounties and Allah is expansive, knowing." (Koran 24:32)

A good Muslim should marry and reproduce in order to regenerate the umma, the community of believers. A good Muslim belongs to a family and has the responsibility to expand his family in honor of God. Therefore, a bachelor has little value. A spinster has even less since she burdens the family socially and economically (Evers Rosander 1991, Maher 1974, Mernissi 1987).

Traditional Islamic interpretation does not allow for the variation of the non-marital status that Christianity has permitted. Mohammed’s older first wife, Khadija, was a prosperous businesswoman and older than the Prophet. As the story goes, she proposes marriage to the Prophet, before his revelations. She also supports his spiritual journey and conversion and later becomes his first Muslim convert. It was not until recently, however, with the feminist interpretation of Islam has Khadija’s contribution to the Prophet

In the past, Moroccan women can easily return to being single. Prior to the 2004 changes to the Moudawana, men can arbitrarily repudiate or divorce their wives without much legal intervention. Moreover, since brides tend to be much younger than their husbands, many women are widowed after bearing a multitude of children. Hence, Moroccan women constantly live in a precarious state. They have worked all their lives to maintain their purity and chastity for their family honor in order to marry properly. Once married, fate may strike at any point in time to return them to a state of singlehood, dependency and misfortune. In fact, single women who never marry exist but society usually looks upon them with much pity.

Nowadays, the category of single Moroccan women consists of women who have never married, widows, divorced, and women who cohabit with their partners. Cohabitation is not allowed in Morocco although the new reforms of the Moudawana recognize the existence of this form. Still, the new law obligates cohabitating couples to marry within the five years after the implementation of the reforms. If not, the couple would be not only living in sin but also committing a legal offense to the State (Global Rights 2009). In Morocco, single women follow a general pattern of living arrangement. Women who never marry live with their parents until their parents die then continue living with their siblings. Widows, on the other hand, may either return to their parents’ home or live with their grown children (Evers Rosander 1991). Divorced women often return home to their parents with or without children, eagerly awaiting possibilities of remarrying (Evers Rosander 1991, Maher 1974).

Regardless of the varying types of single women, Moroccan society defines women in relation to men. Women, in fact, achieve a higher status simply by marrying (Evers Rosander
An unmarried woman is called a *bent*, which means ‘girl’, whereas a married woman is referred to as *mra*, a word referring to both wife and woman. Although the current Moroccan government has granted more opportunities and rights to Moroccan women, women are still expected to acquiesce to men. For example, current Moroccan family law does not obligate a woman to ask her husband for permission to leave the country. Nevertheless, many Moroccans still practice this custom, whether out of ignorance or out of male chauvinism. The French-Moroccan novelist and poet Tahar Ben Jelloun declares, “The power of the word in Morocco belonged to men and to the authorities. No one asked the point of view of poor people or women” (The Guardian Interview, May 2006).

Given the social context of single women in Morocco, immigrant women may have other reasons besides economic that have motivated them to leave their social networks and establish a new life in a foreign country. For the past two decades, more and more single Moroccan women have immigrated to the point that Spanish urban centers have seen a balance in the sex ratio of Moroccan immigrants (Ramirez 2005). The Mhani Belrhrib El Hamdouni, Moroccan director of Casa Arabe, a state-sponsored Arabic cultural center in Madrid, notes that:

“The divorced women, the separated women are leaving on their own. We have to change our way of thinking to understand their situation of poverty, of challenges from their original situation in Morocco. Each day it is being seen as less horrible but it still exists: the horrible way we view divorced women. Other type of female migration is a single mother. There are single mothers who leave to find work here. So we have to consider the discrimination they had faced in their country of origin. They were not able to get the access and proper resources for their children but that is another subject. Another type of female migration is a woman who has limited access or freedom. Many women came because they wanted to continue studying or to develop new skills for themselves. They wanted to learn, to work, and to grow as much as they could. Europe has transformed into an open door for these women.”
Even with Morocco’s implementation of the revisions to *Moudawana* by providing resources and opportunities for women, the transformation is not fast enough for some Moroccan women. Cultural change, particularly with a religious base, takes much longer. The women in the study who support the changes to the *Moudawana* believe changes to Moroccan social perception may take at least a generation. Many women cannot wait for the cultural domination of the upcoming generation on their lives. Moreover, their families’ subsistence depends on the current moment. Since Europe currently provides the opportunities, the rights, and the freedom, immigration enables them to change their lives as well as support their families.

**Escaping and Trafficking**

Young single women who never marry are on the social fringes and are perceived as sex bombs waiting to explode and destroy their family honor (Mernissi 1987). Single women often attract gossip as well as direct questioning and commenting about their personality, their sexual prowess, and their life circumstance. For her family, a single woman remains an economic and social burden, particularly if she does not work. If she does work, she is expected to help her family and guard her virginity until she finds a spouse. Although Moroccan newspapers have publicized a group of economically independent single women living alone in Moroccan cities, these professional women often come from the upper-class echelon of Moroccan society, who tends to behave differently than the general population (Baker 1999). Lower class women working in factories behave more modestly and continue to live with their families until marriage (Cairoli 1998). As noted in the previous chapter, they carefully adjust their manner of dress and public behavior in order to evade gossip and preserve their honor.
Above all, single women are expected to marry, especially when a good marital prospect presents itself. In Morocco and elsewhere, marriage has its benefits and disadvantages. Marriage for Moroccan women may earn them a higher social status, security and freedom from the familial vigilance and binds. But marrying a person they dislike in order to appease their parents may bring more disadvantages than benefits. Take this common scenario. The prospective groom may be a family member, a neighbor, or a family friend, and the alliance between the families would guarantee either continuity or reciprocity of some kind. The woman wants to reject the offer but cannot due to her family’s coaxing or pressuring because they have given their word to the groom’s family. The bride feels obligated, not wanting to humiliate her family. However, she also does not want to spend her life in servitude and unhappiness either.

If the above scenario had occurred thirty years ago, the Moroccan woman would have conceded to her parents’ wishes. Many women nowadays still acquiesce to their parents’ desires. Nevertheless, there are those whose unbearable dismay of marrying has triggered the need to emigrate. Yet, not everyone can emigrate. Emigration takes more than desperation and determination. Emigration takes economic and social capital.

In some cases, women can negotiate with their families to allow them to emigrate rather than marry. However, a woman marrying someone close to the family has more difficulty trusting members of her kin and social network to assist her in emigrating. She may depend on female friends to help locate someone outside the family for information and opportunities to leave. Additionally, she will always need money to pay the trafficker as well as money to survive on before she can secure employment at her destination. She will also need to know someone in the receiving country to help her find housing and/or employment.
Case: Kenza

Kenza is 36 years old and had come from Hijbka, a town near Casablanca. Her parents have thirteen children, and she is the eldest girl. Kenza never had the opportunity to study. Her family is very poor so she has been working since the age of five to help them. She worked in domestic services until the age of fifteen when her boss found her a job in a textile factory, which manufactured designer clothes. After working for nearly seventeen years, her parents arranged a marriage with a distant cousin. He and his father had come to ask for her hand, and she had agreed in order to please her parents.

Following the engagement, Kenza spoke with workmates about wanting to go to Europe so one of them introduced her to a broker who promised to take her for 3,000 Euro. Kenza was making a decent salary but knew that she would have to stop working after marrying a man who she did not like. Her wedding was already being prepared and the bridewealth was determined for 30,000 dirham (3,000 Euros). She sold all her belongings and used her savings to pay the agent to take her to Europe. The man took her to Ceuta and left her there. She complained, but he told her that Ceuta was Spain since Spain was part of Europe, he had kept his end of the bargain. Although she had no money, she could not return to face her parents and her impending marriage. She was helping her family but had used all the money to escape from her marriage.

Kenza slept on the streets and ate out of trashcans for seven months in Ceuta. She emphasized how she slept with a large rock between her legs so the street boys would not attempt to rape her. She insisted on maintaining her family honor despite her hardship.

She heard about people hiding in trash boats to Spain so she took one that brought her to Cadiz. In Cadiz she had to rely on a Spanish stranger’s help to call a friend of her brother’s in Almeria. The family came and brought her to stay with them for a couple of months in Almeria where she found a job cleaning houses. She had wanted to go to Italy so she saved up enough money for a bus ticket to Italy where her cousins live. However, when she arrived in Madrid to change buses, she called her brother to inform him of her plan. He discouraged her from going to Italy because she would not be able to enter with her illegal status.

“I sat at the bus station waiting and thinking. There was a Moroccan lady who was sitting next to me. She asked if I was from Morocco. I told her my story and my current predicament. She thought it was an amazing journey and asked if I wanted to come live with her and help out with her house. She has two children and has been very busy with
her own work. I agreed and went to live with her. Her husband is Spanish, and he has a lot of money. She does not have many Moroccan friends so I keep her company. We both help each other. I help her out with her children and she helps me with my things. I clean and cook for them and she gives me 100 Euro a month. I live with them and eat with them. I have no problems with that arrangement. She even helped me find a job with my Spanish boss. He helped me obtain my residency. I feel I owe him everything.”

Case: Yasmin

“That was 8 years ago when I decided to leave, and my family agreed to send me to Spain. I was 12 at the time and my father had arranged for me to marry a boy who was the brother of my cousin’s husband. I met him once and did not think anything of it, but in my village, girls marry young. Since I am the oldest, they had to marry me quickly. But something happened a couple of months before I had to make a decision.

My cousin was at home cooking and her husband came home angry that lunch was not ready. She had been spending time with me in the morning so she did not have lunch ready when he arrived. He beat her so badly that she could not get out of bed the next day. The abuse has been continuous since they got married but never to the point that she could not get out of bed the next day. She was twelve when she got married. I became scared. I was about to marry his brother. If this boy was like this, his brother could not be too different.

Then one day during the summer, one of the villagers came back from Madrid on vacation. She was asking around for a girl to help her with her children in Spain. I heard about this and inquired about it through my cousin. The lady came to my father’s house and took a look at me. She thought I looked responsible enough. My father asked me if I wanted to go to Spain to work rather than stay and get married. I told him that I would rather work although it meant that I was going to leave my family. I did not want to end up like my cousin so I took a chance and look where it got me.”

Moroccans are quite aware of the trafficking industry in Casablanca, and in some cases, people seek traffickers to bring them to Europe. The cost, however, may be much steeper than the monetary value that was originally paid to the traffickers. The recent
restrictions on legal, long-term immigration and the difficulties in obtaining short-term visas to highly industrialized countries in Europe have contributed to the proliferation of illegal immigration. With Spain and other European countries closing its borders while facing economic problems, visa approval to leave Morocco have been increasingly more difficult each year. As the demand for visas rises, organized networks of brokers have also flourished to assist prospective migrants reach their desired destinations legally or illegally (Long 2004). With the spread of these clandestine activities, unknowing immigrants are often exposed to dangerous situations across the borders involving threats, violence, forced prostitution, and debt bondage.

Although Yasmin was also trafficked into Spain to leave a forthcoming marriage, her case differs from Kenza. Yasmin negotiated with her family to emigrate rather than marry, and her family thought her migration might benefit her and the family more than marrying a possible abuser. Because her neighbor’s need for a domestic worker, Yasmin had the opportunity to reject a marriage proposal to come to Spain. In the past, Moroccan women have depended on their social network for information and resources. Nowadays, their network provides them with choices: emigrate or marry.

With the passing of the family reunification program in 1999, Moroccan immigrants can bring family members to Spain. Some Moroccans use this opportunity to bring poor family members and non-family members to help them with domestic tasks. Moroccans tend to bring other Moroccans into their homes rather than hire Spaniards or other immigrants. Moreover, young girls are preferred in domestic services, and people from Casablanca and Rabat tend to practice the trend of bringing young girls with them to Spain to work in their homes. The trend may have its roots from the 1980s and 1990s when urban Moroccan
women with some education would work as civil servants in low-level positions, leaving housework to girls from rural areas to come and work as “petite bonnes” or child laborers (Mernissi 1987).

Cases similar to Yasmin are common, particularly in Casablanca and Marrakech, which according to the US Department of Labor, are central areas for human trafficking to Europe. The Moroccan Statistics Directorate have recorded that 11.1 percent of children ages 7 to 14 years worked in 2000, and the majority of the children worked in either the agricultural sector or informally in the textile, carpet and other manufacturing factories (US Department of State 2007). In urban areas, girls can be found working as domestic servants, often in situations of unregulated “adoptive servitude.” There are an estimated 36,000 child maids in Morocco, close to 23,000 of whom are in Casablanca, and 59 percent of whom are under age 15 (US State Dept. of Trafficking Persons Report 2009). In these situations, girls from rural areas are trafficked, “sold” by their parents, and “adopted” by wealthy urban families to work in their homes. The Moroccan government has been trying to eradicate child labor within its borders. However, the smuggling of people, particularly children, to Europe has been overlooked.

Nevertheless, the pattern of “adoption” of girls into immigrant families also can constitute as human trafficking. Although some cases do not involve sexual exploitation, many cases of child trafficking abroad involved prostitution. The term ‘trafficking’ has been frequently used to describe undocumented migrants who have been smuggled or kidnapped across international borders (Demleitner 2001). Additionally, Human rights groups specifies trafficking to

“Consist of all acts involved in: within or across borders; whether for financial or other gain or not; and in which material deception, coercion, force, direct or
indirect threats, abuse of authority, fraud, or fraudulent non-disclosure is used; for the purpose of placing a person forcibly, against her/his will or without her/his consent; sweatshop labor, domestic servitude or other abusive forms of labor or family relationships, whether for pay or not (Stewart 1998:16).”

As with many human trafficking cases, the victims are confined to their “owner’s” home and when they are children with no knowledge of their host country’s language, the situation may be graver and more complicated. The resolution of Yasmin’s case illustrates typical problems faced by trafficked victims:

Yasmin, who was twelve years old when her neighbor brought her to Spain to work in her house, had suffered three years of slavery and abuse until she met two ladies in the park. Since Yasmin was illegal in Spain and could not communicate in Spanish, she could not report the abuse to the police. After hearing her story, the Moroccan woman and her Colombian friend took Yasmin to the police to report the abuse. Yasmin went to live with the Moroccan woman for several weeks before her original boss found her and demanded compensation for bringing her to Spain. Yasmin refused to cooperate and remained in the Moroccan woman’s home until protective services found her a placement in a residential center. She lived in the children residence home until she was 18 and was transferred to an adult resident place where she had lived until three weeks ago when her social worker, who is also her boss, let her rent a room in her family’s flat and has applied for her legal residency.

It is not uncommon for Moroccans to bring poorer relatives and neighbors to Spain in order to work as domestic servants. Moroccans have practiced this custom at least since the beginning of post-colonial era when massive urban migration brought poor rural Moroccans alongside richer relatives and neighbors (Maher 1974). The practice continues but with a transnational flare. Moroccan immigrants may bring young kin members or neighbors disguised as their biological children. Another common arrangement is for Moroccans to recruit in newly arrived Moroccan women to live with and work for them, and in return, they would help them obtain their residency.

Reliance on the social network for resources is common for Moroccan women,
particularly the ones who do not work outside their homes. Female migrants who migrated alone depend on acquaintances, primarily Moroccans, for assistance. The initiation into Spanish society obligates some to seek help from their fellow countrymen (Heering et.al, 2004). Once they acquire a better command of Spanish, they tend to go to social workers and associations for resources. With little or no familial social network, female migrants often contact associations for social services related to housing, food, employment, money, legal advice, education, and socialization. Hence, the migrants view Spanish classes and cultural activities as opportunities to exchange and obtain information.

Until they are able to bring their family members over, including their husbands, Moroccan women tend to have strong bonds with the associations’ staff members. Some have close relationships with their bosses in a patron-client type of relationship, in which their bosses provide the resources and contacts. The immigrants serve them by fulfilling their every need. Some bosses are wealthy Spaniards who have a network of friends and acquaintances needing domestic workers, which results in providing more contacts for the Moroccans to bring more kin and friends.

The patron-client relationship is a mutually obligatory arrangement between an individual who has authority, social status, wealth, or other personal resource (the patron) and another person who benefits from his or her support or influence (the client). When the patron-client relationship is formed within the domestic service sector, the boss is the patron and the Moroccan immigrant is the client. In Yasmin’s case, her current boss is Spanish and gives her vital resources (housing, work permission and residency, job). As a result, the domestic service sector can easily be an informal arrangement for immigrants without legal documents. Hence, the process of obtaining legal documents from an existing boss may
perpetuate the patron-client relationship, making the immigrant woman feel even more indebted to her boss.

**Conclusion**

Even though Morocco has made some progress in providing opportunities for women, Morocco still lags far behind Spain and other European countries in closing the gender gap. The discrepancy between the two countries can be easily observed and experienced by single immigrant women, particularly the ones who have encountered degrading situations in Morocco. Nevertheless, maintaining contact with many compatriots in Spain may replicate similar social situations from their country of origin. Hence, the density and content of the social network still plays a crucial element in determining the women’s decisions and actions. Moreover, not marrying in Morocco is not only a social anomaly but also a moral, religious one. Families continue to encourage and sometimes force divorced women and widows to remarry in order to relieve them of the social and economic burden of supporting them. A single woman’s family may pressure her so strongly that the only escape is to migrate to Spain. Spain and Europe provide Moroccan women with the economic and social opportunity to live differently than they would have had if they had stayed in Morocco.

Moroccan society intricately fuses religion and government in ways that Spain and other Western European countries no longer have. Many single Moroccan women have emigrated from Morocco with the idea of Europe being a place where women can live and work without the looming judgment of social morals. Nevertheless, being completely free from judgment may not be possible since immigrants tend to carry their values and customs with them. Some single women have to evade extensive contact with their compatriots in order to renew their lives in their adopted country.
The Women's Group at the Centro Hispano-Marroqui
VEILING

“O you Children of Adam! We have bestowed on you raiment to cover your shame as well as to be an adornment to you. But the raiment of righteousness, that is the best. Such are among the Signs of Allah, that they may receive admonition.” (Koran 7:26)

In Western societies, veiling holds specific meaning in certain context. Catholic nuns wear veils as a symbol of consecration or a sign of consecrated virginity. Western white weddings usually consist of brides donning white veils to symbolize their virginal status and as a gesture of modesty. Veiling in Islam, however, has controversial origins and existence in modern times.

In the Koran, the prophet Mohammed gives passing mention of the veil or the hijab regarding the necessity for the separation of space between men and women. Part of the Koranic verse, quoted by many scholars as well as a couple of my Moroccan informants, dictates Muslim women's need to cover themselves:

“And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their husband's fathers, their sons, their husbands' sons, their brothers or their brothers' sons, or their sisters' sons, or their women, or the slaves whom their right hands possess, or male servants free of physical needs, or small children who have no sense of the shame of sex; and that they should not strike their feet in order to draw attention to their hidden ornaments. And O ye Believers! Turn ye all together towards Allah, that ye may attain Bliss.” --Koran (24:31)

Despite this verse and others briefly mentioning bodily covering in the Koran, the Prophet Mohammed only had his wives covered from the public while female servants and slaves remained uncovered (Ahmed 1992, Mernissi 1987, Wadud 1999). This tradition continued in Morocco up to the colonial period when black servants and Berber women had more freedom in their behavior and manner of dressing while the secluded Arab women donned
headscarves in public ceremonies (Westermarck 1921). Sources, in fact, indicate that veiling has origins in Persian and Byzantine societies and was later adopted by Arabia’s nomadic tribes to enforce a strict code of female modesty (Bloom and Blair 2002, Eposito 2005).

Veiling has not always attracted such popularity in Muslim societies although nowadays the veil has become a symbolic representation of Islam. In 1899, Qasim Amin, one of the founders of the Egyptian nationalist movement, called for the banning of the veil in his book *Tahir al Mara’a (The Liberation of Women)*. Debates in various Islamic communities followed Amin’s book, along with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk banning the veil in order to create the secular nation-state of Turkey in 1923. Moreover, veiling or the covering of one’s head was a common practice for Christians throughout the Middle Ages. Up until the mid-1970s, Spanish women frequently wore headscarves for various occasions: daily activities, religious ceremonies, celebrations, etc.

The interpretations of covering women’s bodies in demonstrating modest behaviors and in effect, preserving the individual's and her family’s honor differ in meaning depending on the social customs of the country. Veiling ranges from simply covering the head with a scarf (*hijab*) and wearing long sleeves shirt to cover the arms and a long tail shirt to cover the buttock. Long pants or skirts are worn to cover the legs as well. The covering of the entire body and face (*burka*) are more common as in Iran and Saudi Arabia than in Morocco. In some Arab societies, facial features such as the mouth are considered sensuous and need to be covered. Hair may be sensuous, but can be partly covered or completely covered. Hence, veiling for a Moroccan woman means the full covering of her head with no sign of hair showing while it is acceptable for a Bengali Muslim woman to cover her head loosely with wisps of hair showing in the front.

Regardless of its adorning etiquette, unpacking the meaning of veiling for Moroccan women may help in capturing the effects migration has had on their lives. These women have moved from a society that values and supports the preservation of family honor and female modesty to one that currently encourages female empowerment in the public sphere.
Although the demarcation of gendered public and private domains still exists in Morocco, the boundaries may not be as rigid as have been in the past. However, the uses of veiling for Moroccan women in two different cultural milieus can demonstrate the difference in the configuration and the contents of the public and private domains of the sending and the receiving societies.

**The Public and Private Domain**

Meyer Fortes (1959) notes that societies, in the most basic conceptualization, consist of two complementary levels of organization and action: their public and private domains. The public domain consists of the political, the judicial, the economic and the religious domains; whereas the private domain is ascribed to the family. Fortes posits that within the social structure, the familial unit “is fitted into the external systems of political, juridical, economic and religious institutions and arrangements (1972, p. 6).” The two domains, particularly the familial and the politico-jural domains, are constantly reciprocating and complementing one another (Fortes 1972). In Arab countries, such as Morocco, the political, the judicial, and the religious are more noticeably and elaborately linked than in Western societies (Bargach 2002, Charrad 1992, Salih 2001).

The division of space between the sexes in Morocco corresponds to the private domain of home and family and the public domain of the streets, the market, the government, the workplace, etc. (Bargach 2002, Freeman 2005, Geertz 1979, Maher 1974, Ramírez 1998, Evers Rosander 1991). Men belong to the public domain, the Islamic community of believers or the umma, whereas women are confined to the private space of home and family or familial surroundings. Women entering into the public domain have to take measures, such as veiling or covering themselves entirely and being accompanied by relatives, preferably by male relatives, to avoid dishonorable confrontation with male strangers (Evers Rosander 1991, Freeman 2005). The term aryana means “nude” and is associated with women who are trespassing in male space, the public domain, and is stirring up zina or disorder (Conway-Long 2002, El Guidi 1999, Mernissi 1987). If she is unveiled, then she is exhibiting herself in
order to provoke men to react aggressively.

In Morocco, space is gendered with men occupying the public space and women occupying the private space. Moroccan women traveling outside the home without male family members are trespassing in male space (El Guidi 1999, Mernissi 1987). If a woman goes to see a public official by herself in Morocco, particularly in small towns and villages, the official may not take her seriously or even attend to her at all. Moreover, the official’s superior may not reprimand the official for the poor service if the woman's male family member is not present. Thus, many female immigrants would renegotiate their space when returning to Morocco in order to respect social custom and not to waste their month-long summer vacation battling the male-female space dilemma.

In Morocco and other Muslim societies, segregation of the sexes is legitimized by *hadith*[^33], referencing the *shari’a*, from which Moroccan family law and culture have taken its guidance, although *de jure* and *de facto* practices tend to conflict. Morocco has followed a pattern of contradiction regarding women, from having tradition and norms that dictate the ideal type of female as chaste, faithful, submissive and nurturing to sanctioning circumstances that allow some flexibility. Max Gluckman (1968) posits that flexibility and inconsistency in norms make them more rather than less useful socially because they can be adapted to suit immediate circumstances. Circumstances such as economic hardship and political conflict and struggle have permitted Moroccan women to stray from the norms without experiencing scathing criticisms.

As a country having continuous encounters with European countries, Morocco has permitted some leniency in allowing women to occupy the public space. Alison Baker (1999) conducted a series of oral histories of Moroccan women who took part in the independence movement and revealed the range of contribution they had taken to free their country from colonial rule. During the colonial period when King Mohammed V expanded women education, middle and upper-class women became educated and joined the nationalist movement.

[^33]: Hadiths are regarded as narrations on the *Sunnah* or lived examples of the Prophet.
movement to educate and mobilize other women into the independence movement. Women who did not have the opportunity to attend schools contributed to the movement by cooking, housing, and caring for the soldiers, storing documents, sending messages, and transporting arms and weapons. These women used the stereotypical image of the submissive and ignorant Moroccan woman fully covered in their *burkas* to pass by the unsuspecting colonial guards in their various missions. Following Morocco’s independence, these women claimed to be fighting for their country in their own way would like to be honored as independence fighters. However, once Morocco obtained its independence, these women returned to their roles as wives and mothers with many feeling disappointed with the imposition of traditional values set by their husbands and by their society (Baker 1999).

When writing about 'honor' being in the male public domain, the criteria for 'honor' entails bravery and defense of one's status and territory. The female Moroccan freedom fighters embody these criteria, yet they cannot partake in the glory and reward associated with this 'honor.' Just because Moroccan society chose not to honor the female freedom fighters as such did not mean that these women did not operate within an honor system of the independence movement or within their groups. These women wore their veils strategically to bypass the colonial guards. Veiling in this period would not necessarily cover a submissive, modest woman but a woman determined to fight for her country.

The internal and international migration of women also exemplifies the flexing of norms although certain practices, such as veiling, have proliferated in order to balance the gender struggle within the public domain. The female presence in public spaces due to Westernized economic and political infiltration has socially castrated the male-centered arena in Morocco. In order to regain control, families and communities have to foster behaviors to protect male honor. Yet in contrast to the common belief that Moroccan men force their women to veil in order to protect, control, and enclose them from the eyes of other men in the public space, the pressure to veil come from the community, particularly through the women. The women may have internalized the value of honor and modesty from their male-
dominated society, but the external pressure of other women validates the act of veiling.

**Social Distance**

Veiling as a means of socially distancing oneself from others tangentially relates to Fortes' separation of spaces. However, the theory of social distance and veiling, as Robert Murphy (1964) has proposed, deals more with relations, albeit dyadic, triadic or in groups, and the variation in the covering of one's face and body in relation to the actors. In Murphy's case of the Muslim Tuareg in southern Algeria and the northern parts of Mali and Niger, it is the men who practice veiling rather than the women. Tuareg women, on the contrary, only veil in special occasions and appear to have more freedom in public movement and expression than their Muslim sisters in other societies.

Unlike the veiling practice of Moroccan women, the Tuareg men wear their veils continuously whether at home, travelling, work or at festivities. Moroccan women tend to veil in public places and at home when male strangers visit. Nonetheless, Moroccan women also don their veils in the presence of other women, particularly women who they do not know or do not trust. At the Centro's festivities and group meetings, the women always come fully dressed in their jellabahs and headscarves without ever removing their veils. Occasionally one or two lower their veils if the meeting has taken too long, but the rest remain poised and covered. My visits with my informants support this practice as the women would wear their veils at the beginning months of my visit until they become more comfortable with me. Now when I come to their house for tea, they no longer excuse themselves to don their veils.

Murphy (1964) observes the subtle differences in the position of the Tuareg's veiling, which relate to status hierarchy and social relations. The full covering of the Tuareg men, saved their eyes, endow them with the means to hide parts of themselves physically, socially, and psychologically from their companions. They are most strict with their veils, elevating it tightly above their nostrils, in the presence of their in-laws and socially higher-standing individuals to demonstrate respect, avoidance, and to hide shame.
As with the social distancing used by the Tuareg’s veiling, Moroccan women in Spain also expand their veiling practices to not only show their reverence to Islamic practice and modesty but also to negate particular social interaction, to attract respect, and to preserve their personal sense of honor. The women may not conceal their mouths, the primary communication zone, to decrease their vulnerability as with Tuareg and burka-wearing Muslim women, but they do distance themselves through word choices and by fabricating or withholding information from their companions, a practice commonly misinterpreted by their Spanish social workers and lawyers as 'lying'.

The appearance of Moroccan women and their divulgence of information can be detrimental to them socially if they are not careful. They may reside in Spain, but their social network still extends back to their country of origin, especially if they interact with their compatriots. The *eshuma* (shame) they try to avoid through veiling and proper behaviors can easily be conjured and manipulated, placing their family and personal honor in jeopardy.

**Gossip and Honor**

Proper behaviors, usually referring to Moroccan women more so than Moroccan men, are controlled through gossiping. Many Moroccan women commented on how they distrust other Moroccans mainly due to the gossiping among the women. Studies of Moroccan women have supported this pattern of behavior in the past, which has continued to current times (Conway-Long 2002, Evers Rosander 1991).

Moroccan immigrant women still trust family members more than non-family members, including their husbands. When asked in the survey with whom do women place their trust, thirty percent of the Moroccan migrant women (22 out of 72) stated their husbands. Fifty women stated their blood relatives, identified as mothers, fathers, siblings, close cousins, and children. Only a few (eight out of 72) women reported non-family members as their confidants. For many women, gossip prevents them from forming strong bonds with non-family members in Spain. They mistrust their compatriots, particularly their female compatriots, who they believe only want to cause problems for their entertainment
and personal sense of importance among their friends.

Anthropologists have studied and found that gossip plays a significant part of people's lives, although the analysis of gossip differs among different schools of thought. Gossip may determine who is included and is excluded from the social group and can dictate proper behaviors, which has social consequences for women in Morocco (Gluckman 1963). Gossip may also serve individual interests in manipulating cultural rules to advance over their rivals in relation to status, power, friendship, resources, etc. (Paine 1967). By gossiping, individuals continuously debate and negotiate the cultural rules and social behaviors of which they and others need to adhere (Haviland 1977, Heilman 1978). Gossiping guides the behaviors of group members and helps in preserving honor as well as administering scornful criticisms of shame.

In this study, gossip also bridges Moroccans with their family members abroad, and for many women who remain in Morocco, talking about migrants affect their ideas about womanhood and opportunities available to their gender. News and rumors may be heard during social visits (tea gatherings, marketplace) and at the hammam, the Turkish bathhouse, as I have observed in my fieldwork and in previous studies (Maher 1974, Mernissi 1987, Evers Rosander 1991). Moroccan women have a fear of having a bad reputation because they are usually blamed for marriage failures either as the wife, the mother, or the mother-in-law. At first glance, the fear of gossip may just be social paranoia, but it can also lead to a legal dissolution of a marriage if the woman is not careful. In fact, Moroccan law allows witnesses to attest to a woman's character when her husband doubts the paternity of his wife's or another woman's child.

Furthermore, gossip about families with migrants living abroad can lead to other complications and at times dictate immigrants’ decision-making. Just because an immigrant is absent from the neighborhood year round does not mean that he or she is excluded from being the topic of the social chatter. Immigrants are often aware of the impact gossip has on them and often cite by both Moroccan men and women as the main reason for not returning
to Morocco. They believe returning to Morocco permanently before retirement means that they have failed in Europe, which would be a disgrace for their families. The following excerpts are conversations in a Larache neighborhood hair salon, during tea gatherings and at the hammam:

“We become the neighborhood’s bank, or worse, an association [NGO] because people would ask for money and never return it. Just because they know that we have families abroad, they think we have money lying around. We have to be extra careful with whom we speak to and where we go.” – Nezia, 19-years-old with three brothers and a sister in Madrid

“I do not like people asking me questions because I know they will start talking and then rumors would start. I did not like it that they ask you [the anthropologist] where you’re from the other day in the hammam. You saw how hesitant I was to answer the lady. She will go and tell her friends and family and the next thing you know everyone will come and ask for favors. They would want this and that from Europe or money even. My mother lent her friend 1000 dirham three years ago, and they are no longer friends because the woman refuses to pay her back. She even claims my mother is greedy for wanting her money back, which is not true. You lose a lot of friends this way.” — Nadia, has two sisters working in Madrid

“We have to be careful how we behave if we want to marry into a respectable family. His parents may not allow him to marry us if too many people talk about our reputation and question our virginity. You see how these women are pointing at that girl, they’re talking about her, either good or bad but usually bad.” — Ghizlan, 18-years-old with a brother in Madrid

“The women would come to the salon and also ask about my sister Salima and how she’s doing and what she’s doing. They’re curious about her life in Spain, but I have to be careful what I say because they will report it to their family and then she will have a bad reputation. It is already bad enough that she is in Spain and not married. They also ask about her in order to find out something bad, I suppose. Sometimes they ask about my brothers because some people know that they’re in jail. I do not know how but they know and they talk. My mother knows about them, but she doesn’t know that they’re coming back soon and can never return to Spain. She’s going to die when she finds out. People will
talk and say that they’ve failed in Spain and what shame it will be for our family. I am worried about what people will say.”—Nezia

“I ask about her sister Salima because I want to go to Europe and want to know what life is about over there. I am studying English right now because I want to go to north. I hear the situation in Spain is not good so I want to go elsewhere. Salima left a long time ago. She is always happy each time we see her in the summer. I would like to go to France or even to Spain in order to have the opportunity to work and have some freedom. My parents want me to marry soon, but not me, I want to have other experience first.”—Miriam, 18 years old, university student

Apart from watching news on television, many Moroccans learn about life in Spain and other parts of Europe from first-hand reports and gossip about immigrants living abroad. The cars, the manner of dressing, and other material items only confirm what Moroccans have heard from others. The current economic crisis sweeping Europe has brought back many Moroccans, mostly single men. The fortunate ones receive unemployment while ‘visiting’ and driving their families around in their luxurious Mercedes or BMW. The less fortunate ones return, often from deportation, with their tail between their legs.

In 2004, the Spanish government signed an agreement with Morocco allowing them to repatriate delinquents back to their country of origin permanently after serving their prison terms. ‘Delinquents’ in Spain has expanded to mean anyone who had broken the Spanish law, ranging from drug dealing to being undocumented. Many Moroccan towns and villages of migrants have seen more and more of its native sons returning and strolling its streets and plazas.

**Veiling in Morocco**

Although veiling may appear to be on a rise for some Muslim immigrant groups, the increasing trend in veiling is actually in the country of origin. The practice and the initiation of veiling vary from country to country and among the women. Muslim women in other countries such as Turkey would start veiling upon entering adolescence (Delaney 1987). Moroccan women note the social influence in their wanting and needing to veil. Overall, the
covering of sexualized parts of the body from the flowing feminine tresses to the round buttocks and soft arms reveal act of modesty rather than oppression. Certainly some families do force their daughters and wives to veil against their will, but the Moroccan immigrant women in Spain have indicated that veiling is voluntary. The following is an excerpt from a group discussion regarding veiling:

*Anthropologist:* Have you ever worn a veil?
*Fatima (21 years old):* Yes but many years ago when I lived in Morocco. Eight years ago. I do not wear it when I live here [Spain].
*Anthro:* Why the change?
*Fatima:* I feel more comfortable without my veil here. I can fit in more.
*Anthro:* Does your mother or father want you to wear the veil?
*Fatima:* Not really. They do not obligate it. We wore it in Morocco but I do not feel like wearing it here.
*Anthro:* Do you wear it when you go back to Morocco?
*Fatima:* No, I do not wear it over there when I come back for vacation either.
*Anthro:* What about you Noura? Before you got married?
*Noura (22 years old):* I wear it here and back then, even before I got married.
*Anthro:* And your family? Your mother and sisters?
*Noura:* My mother wears it but my younger sister doesn’t.
*Anthro:* Is that a problem for your family that your sister doesn’t wear it?
*Noura:* No, it’s up to her. I wear it because I want to because I am married, but I wore it before, too.
*Laila (22 years old):* To get married?
*Noura:* (laughing) Maybe. My friends thought so.
*Laila:* Here, young people do not wear it so much but when you’re older, you wear it for respect.
*Noura:* I have always worn it.
*Anthro:* Do people look at you strangely here in Madrid?
*Noura:* No, they look but I do not think it’s anything. I do not find it uncomfortable.
*Anthro:* Where do you go in Madrid?
*Noura:* Lavapies, Embajadores.
*Anthro:* You do not work?
*Noura:* No, but I walk around the neighborhood.
*Anthro:* What about you Faten?
*Faten (49 years old):* I have always worn it since I was young. I have three sisters but my younger sisters do not wear them. It’s not a problem for me or my family. They do what they want and wearing a veil is not as important.
Anthro: But in Morocco, they do not wear a veil?
Faten: No, she goes outside without one.
Anthro: Where did you all live in Morocco?
Faten, Noura, Laila: Tetuan.
Fatima: Casablanca, a village near Casablanca.
Suza: Tetuan.
Faten: My family is big, too but we do not all wear veils. I did not wear one until a couple years ago as I got older and wanted to be respected and honored by people around me, especially after my haj.
Anthro: You’re a haaja?
Faten: Yes, for several years now so I wear my veil as part of age and respect. I did not bother with it when I was young but now I like wearing it.
Veronica (Spanish social worker): I find women put on makeup and hairstyles underneath their veils.
Faten: Yes, we take it off in the company of women. We put it on in the streets and in front of men we do not know.
Anthro: Do they have to be family?
Faten: No, just strangers or acquaintances. My neighbor came yesterday to borrow sugar so I gave him sugar without putting on my veil. He’s Spanish, but I know him so I do not bother with the veil. My daughter doesn’t want to wear theirs until they get married. We never force them, but they decide on their own when they want to wear them.
Anthro: What about you Suza?
Suza (52 years old): I have always worn my veil, even when I was young. My parents wanted us to wear it, but when the parents are not around, we take them off. I have always worn mine so it’s not too bad for me.
Anthro: You have children?
Suza: Yes, I have four daughters but we do not obligate them. They wear them if they want, and they do not. Well, none of them are married either so maybe it will change once they’re married.
Faten: We wear it later in life to be close to God because we’re near dying. (Laughing)
Suza: Closer than before. (Chuckles)

Donna Bowen (1998) argues that the popularity of wearing the hijab in Morocco has been increasing due to the rise in women in the urban workforce, which constitutes nearly a third of all non-agricultural workers from 1995-2002. Urban working women have long been reputed with having loose morals (Bowen 1998, Mernissi 1987, Ramírez 1998). The recent trend of veiling in Morocco not only is due to the rise with Islamic identification but also due to the increase in female labor force. Many Moroccan women believe that veiling will soften
the traditional allegation that women who work outside the homes will succumb to morally
loose behaviors (Maddy-Weitzman 2005).

During one of my weekly stay at an informant's house, I observed a father-daughter
interaction that supports the need for veiling as a means to control loose behaviors. The
daughter, who was seven at the time, had been learning how to dance from watching her
mother and aunts. One day the child started dancing spontaneously in front of her father who
was home from his lunch break. He immediately slapped her and told her never to dance in
front of him or other men in that manner again. He threatened to make her wear a veil the
next time this happened. Crying incessantly, she ran to her mother in protest, who
complained to the father about submitting to the oppressive practices of their country of
origin. The mother later repented and agreed with him that their daughter should not display
and move her body as the Spanish women. She promised to speak to her daughter about the
proper space and audience to dance with or she will have to start veiling at an early age. They
both later explained to me that the possible *eshuma* brought by the provocative dance could
damage their family honor from Madrid to Morocco.

Until the 1980s, it was not socially acceptable for Moroccan women to work outside
their homes (Ramirez 1998). Working as a family helper is common, in which in exchange
for working, women would have a place to live and food but no pay (Bargach 2002, Maher
1974, Mernissi 1987). In the traditional arrangement of being a family helper, the family can
still monitor a woman's behavior and guard their honor. Yet Moroccan women have worked
outside the domestic space since the colonial period, albeit with much denigration. Women in
urban areas worked in French factories because the French colonists could pay women much
less than men (Penell 2003).

In fact, working women challenge the honor of the family and the stability of
of labor in the family corresponds with aspects of honors, in which the frailty of women is
the inevitable correlation to this conceptualization. He notes that “an honorable woman, born
with the proper sentiment of shame strives to avoid the human contacts which might expose her to dishonor; she cannot be expected to succeed in this ambition, unsupported by male authority (1966: 46)." If she is working outside the home to support the family, the honor of the family is at risk because the male members cannot protect her and the family honor against too many outside factors. Hence, her status is constantly challenged in the public spaces where men have traditionally dominated but are now displaced, particularly in the labor market.

“I worked in a textile factory for seventeen years before leaving Spain. People talk about women in factories because they think we go with men. I never did anything to dishonor my family and will never do anything to dishonor them. I work for them and will suffer for them. If I never marry, then I will die a virgin.”--Kenza, 36 years old, domestic worker in Madrid

Laetitia Cairoli (1998) observes that female factory workers in Casablanca recreate and behave accordingly to the traditional Moroccan patriarch family despite working outside their homes. The female workers would informally agree to working conditions that resemble a typical Moroccan household, in which the male directors control the factory and the female workers submissively respond and support their decisions. The female workers work in a separate area inside the factory, wearing pajamas, jeans and other form of comfortable clothes. Once they leave the work area, they would put on their jellabahs, the Moroccan hooded robes, and headscarves to enter the outside world where non-familial men roam. Moreover, the female factory workers would defer to their parental decision in their marriage arrangement and view their working in the factory as temporary until marriage. After marrying, these women would defer to their husbands’ decision about their working outside the home. The study finds the female factory workers’ behaviors as perpetuating the ideals of the traditional Moroccan household (Cairoli 1998).

Community members and public authorities still control the separation of male/female space and social decorum in many areas of Morocco (Conway-Long 2002).
Women are yet not free to walk just anywhere in public, and, even in the acceptable places, they can encounter harassment during the day and are hardly seen at night. A woman alone at night is assumed to be a prostitute. A woman walking with a man at night can be stopped by the police and order to produce a marriage certificate; failing that, they can be arrested and, if unmarried, can be forced to marry under the assumption that carnal acts have taken place.

“Once I took a short trip with my cousins from Oujda, and we got stopped by the police. They demanded to see our identifications because they thought we were going somewhere to do something bad. We told them we were cousins, but they did not believe us. I was with two male cousins and a female cousin. Our parents had to come and get us or we would have spent time in jail.” --Mahwa, 18-year-old, Spanish-Moroccan, high school student

“I am married with a son, but I still have to be careful. I wear my veil so I do not attract attention, not just from men but from the women in the neighborhood. If they say something and it gets back to my husband, I will be in trouble with my husband and his family. I would never want that!” --Amina, 22 years old, married, housewife in Larache

“We wear our veils here. It’s our choice, but it helps to keep the talk low. It’s fine not wearing veil but you never know what people will say. They pay more attention to you if you do not wear one. I wear mine because it’s more comfortable for me to walk around.” —Suad, 20 years old, single, unemployed in Larache

“Suad wears a veil because everyone knows that she goes out with men. They say for money. Sometimes the veiled girls are the bad ones.” —Nezia, 19 years old, single, hair salon owner in Larache

Moreover, veiling for Moroccan women signifies a social age and status. One can find veiled and unveiled women within a single family, yet the pressure to veil more often comes from outside the family rather than inside. In Morocco, married women tend to veil more than Moroccan women in Spain.

“I wear a veil sometimes when I go to Morocco. I do not wear one here
[Madrid] and see no reason to, but in Tetuan, more and more girls are wearing them. Now that I want to get a divorce, I wear it more when I go home so people will not disrespect me or talk about me.” --Samira, 30 years old, domestic worker in Madrid

“I have never worn a veil. Not here, not in Morocco either. I have a child and no husband so why should I pretend. I do not live there. My sister is divorced and does not wear one, not in Madrid. My youngest sister and my mother wear them. My sister wants to get married so I tease her about wearing a veil to catch a husband.” -- Sara, 34 years old, unwed mother, waitress in Madrid

Married women in Morocco wear veils as a sign of respectability and modesty for their status and position. Single women in small towns and villages would wear their veils, hoping to manifest their modest nature to prospective husbands. Young single women in large cities in Casablanca and Rabat with at least a tertiary level of education will less likely wear veils than their less educated counterparts. Divorced women often feel the need to veil in order to assuage suspicion and gossip of indecent behaviors. An interview with Fatima (2005), a recently divorced attaché for the United States Embassy supports this point:

“In the 1960s and 1970s, the trend was to go unveiled because we were fighting for our rights. Now I see the girls at the university wearing them to attract husbands, and girls working in urban areas wearing them so people won’t talk. I started veiling after I divorced my husband. I do not want people to talk about my divorce and about my working for the Embassy or that I work outside my home. But I know people still talk because I am a divorced woman. I am no longer at the same level as a married woman. You see many women veiling in the cities so people do not say things about our moral behaviors. The Moudawana may have changed, but people’s ideas are slow to change.”

The Veiled Dilemma

The veil continues to be a source of contention for many European courts as social and religious customs of Muslim minority groups continue to coexist alongside European way of life. However, jurisdiction differs depending on the countries’ constitutions and what
is inherently defined as public and private spheres. The first known *hijab* case brought upon the European Union was in 1989 in Creil, a suburb of Paris, where three high school girls wore Islamic headscarves to class. The girls were expelled, but after the incident, the spread of veiling proliferated in France so much so that fifteen years later, the French government banned the *hijab* as a religious display and obstruction within the secular arena of public schools (Bowen 2004). In Britain, the court upheld the right of a British principal to dismiss an assistant teacher who refused to remove her full-face veil (*niqab*) while teaching. The British decision mirrored the French argument of wearing a private profession of faith in a public sphere. Tony Blair even noted that the veil is a “mark of separation,” which for European integration, it is considered a civic offense.

The differing treatment of the veil controversy may originate from the social ideals inherent in each country. Kastroyano (2004) discusses the differential incorporation of Islam in France and Germany. According to Kastroyano, the difference between French and German secularism deals with the notion of “society,” in which the relation to public space and civil society determine how religion gets incorporated. She refers to the French *laicite*, which was established after a century of the struggle between Church and State, most notably with the 1905 French law, which states that the Republic will not recognize, fund or subsidize any religion. *Laicite* connotes the absence of religious involvement in governmental affairs and vice versa. It allows for the participation of individuals in politics as citizens, free from community, religious, and ethnic ties and equal before the law (Kastroyano 2004). Hence, the veiling controversy in France as public display of religious markers goes against *laicite* for bringing a private belief and practice into the public sphere.

The Germans, on the other hand, take their cues from the Enlightenment era, which was not against religion. Nationality is the primary source for ethnicity. Thus, immigrant identities as minorities in Europe appear to be placed with their nation of origin. Kastroyano notes the conflict for North Africans as their nationality and religion have been officially linked. Hence, the incorporation of these “new immigrants” depends on the societal
implication that can hinder religious and cultural practices.

Unlike France, Spain is a “confessional” country, a State that officially practices a particular religion. In this case, the religion of choice is Catholicism. In its constitution, Spain professes to grant the same rights to all its citizens and to some extent, its non-citizens. Moreover, Spain allows freedom of religion or minority religions.

Spain has a more complicated relationship with the Islamic religion than their European counterparts. Until the sixteenth century, the majority of Spain was under Islamic rule. Like France, Spain also has had its anti-clerical movement in the early twentieth century. However, the bouts of civil wars culminated in a dictatorship that privileged Catholicism and its various trajectories. Islam, the religion of many Moroccans, has had multiple legislative encounters with the Spanish State, which may still have some Catholic remnants from the Crusades and the recent dictatorship. The Madrid train bombing on March 11, 2005, has revived post Crusade sentiments from conservative Catholics against the jihad message from the Islamic perpetrators, some of whom are Moroccans. More importantly, the bombing has triggered a series of attempts to control some Islamic practices (McLean 2004). The most notable and widely publicized concerns the donning of headscarves in public spaces.

Spain's ambivalence towards Islam can be observed in its treatment of the veiling practice. Cases of veiling in public schools differ, depending on the Spanish region. In two separate cases in El Escorial, a town 45 kilometers (28 miles) northwest of Madrid, involving the rights of two Moroccan girls to wear veils in public schools, the schools and families of both girls reached an agreement to allow the girls to wear their religious garments prior to entering and after leaving school. Once inside, the girls have to remove their veils and wear their required school uniforms. On the other hand, Moroccan female students in Melilla, the Spanish enclave in Morocco, where Moroccans constitute over fifty percent its population, are permitted to wear their hijab to class (Montilla 2004). Although all students in Spain have the right to religious freedom (article 2.1 of the law LO 7/1980, 5 of July), the right to
religious convictions (article 2.2 of the law LO 10/2002, 23 of December), and the right to freedom of expression (article 16.1 of RD 732/1995, 5 of May), the common complaint from public officials, including the minister of Education and the minister of Work at the time (2002), against veiling was that it symbolized gender discrimination, a “unacceptable custom…comparable to female circumcision” (Diario ABC, Febrero 17, 2002: 39).

Spain has also shown inconsistency in legal ruling on veiling in public. The Spanish legal system takes cases individually depending on whether or not the religious practices affect the work environment. In 1997, the court ruled in favor of a Moroccan female employee who demanded to special working hours and conditions related to her Islamic practices (Montilla 2004). The most recent case related to a veiling incident that took place on October 29, 2009 when a Moroccan-born Spanish lawyer was expelled from a national court room for wearing a veil (Dominguez 2009). Zoubida Barik Edidi has pressed charges against Judge Javier Gómez Bermúdez for discrimination as there is no law prohibiting lawyers from wearing a veil in a Spanish courtroom although Judge Gómez declared that it was his prerogative to make rules for his own court proceedings. Nevertheless, the Spanish court has recently ruled against the banning of the burka in public places, stating the freedom of religious expression as the reason.

Despite some favorable ruling for Muslim women to practice their beliefs, many Moroccan women feel discriminated in Spain for their religion. By veiling, Moroccan women distinguish themselves from the Spaniards and other nationalities, yet they do not understand the series of antagonistic remarks from some Spaniards equating their veiling as the embodiment of Islamic oppression. Moroccan women believe they have a connection with Spanish women and their cultural history. They remember seeing past photos of Spanish women wearing headscarves and had lived under strict familial control during the Franco era.

For the Moroccans, Spanish women have been suffering from cultural amnesia since Spain entered into the European Union. The women note the cultural gulf between the two countries that had only decades ago practiced similar notion of modesty and chastity. The
cultural gulf can convert to a racial gulf:

“I was waiting at the doctor’s office the other day when a Spanish lady asked me what my vagina looked like. I told her that mine had sharp teeth and she believed me. These people think we are animals.”--Naima, veiled, married, domestic worker, 48 years old

“Spanish women forget their mothers and grandmothers wore the scarves on their heads. We can see no difference with what they did and what we are doing now. They see us as different, as different people.”--Fatna, veiled, housewife, 46 years old.

Moroccan women have noticed that the Spanish behaviors and manner of dressing that the old Spain, the pre-EU and Franco Spain, was more akin to their cultural beliefs and practices. The old honor system of Spain, made famous by Pitt-Rivers, seem to have faded with the onset of Europeanization. The Spaniards’ predilection for separating themselves from others, particularly Moroccans, who some still use the derogatory term 'los Moros' to refer to this group, can be heard in normal family conversations, friendly chit-chat, and in the some cases, outright racist comments towards Moroccans. The term 'los Moros' comes from the Moorish conquest and rule of the Iberian Peninsula prior to the fifteenth century. The term the “Moors” is loaded with negative images of lazy, manipulative, free-loading, and backward people from Africa. The extreme racist associations with Moroccans have animalistic characteristics and behaviors.

The September 11th attack may have separated the Arab world from Westerners, but the March 11th train bombing, coupled with mass migration and the economic crisis, have further separated Spaniards from their Mediterranean cousins, who share some historical background, similar landscape and climate, and the same sea. Moroccan women have noticed that by veiling, they set themselves apart from the Spaniards, exposing them to racist remarks. Nevertheless, women such as Naima and Fatna find comfort in their identification with Islam and with the respect and honor that veiling has earned them in the Moroccan community.
Veiling in Spain

Living in Spain does not mean that the social ties are completely broken. The migration to Spain forced Moroccan women into the public domain without the protection of fathers and brothers. The public space, clearly dominated by men in Morocco, is opened to both sexes. Newly arrived Moroccan women often have to negotiate between the social dictum of modesty in manners of dressing and behavior with European secular preference and prejudice against Islam, which they view as an oppressive religion with veiling as its representation.

Crossing the border to Spain would require interacting with custom officials, the representatives of both politico-jural domains, who many Moroccan women would not have to encounter if they had never left their country. Their movements were restricted within the familial social network, even in public places (Freeman 2005). Moroccan women immigrating alone have to interact with public figures and other non-kin males in both Morocco and Spain, which would have been haram for them since they were not traveling under the protection of their family members.

The migration to Spain introduces new possibilities for Moroccan women having to resettled in a society that is currently focused on gender equality. Following his reelection in March 2008, Spanish President Zapatero created a new position of Minister of Equality, occupied by a 31-year-old woman who is responsible for implementing equality laws that strengthen women’s rights in Spain. The Spanish politico-jural or the public domain is changing in an attempt to better incorporate gender roles in society, which is a sharp contrast to traditional Moroccan society. According to the World Economic Forum Gender Gap Report of 2008\textsuperscript{34}, Spain is ranked 17th and Morocco is ranked 125th out of 130 countries. In the latest report of 2010, Spain now ranks 11th while Morocco has slipped to 127th out of 130 countries. In

\textsuperscript{34} Reports started in 2006 by the World Economic forum to measure and compare the magnitude and scope of gender-based disparities among countries and regions. The report measures gender gaps in economic, political, education, and health and rank countries according to the overall disparities.
134 countries (Hausman et.al 2010).

The interaction of the Moroccan female individual in Spanish society may take a variety of forms. The most common path of interaction for the single female migrant would entail working for a Spanish family or a Spanish establishment. Depending on the locale and the nature of the business, Moroccan women may continue their veiling practice or start veiling in their Spanish job posts.

Severed from their social networks, many Moroccan women depend on the services provided by Spanish associations. Contrary to Morocco, Spanish civil society has proliferated following the democratic transition (Perez-Diaz 1993). Although deemed as non-governmental associations, the Spanish government is involved in virtually all Spanish associations. Hence, the integration program promoted by the State reaches individual immigrants through these Spanish organizations. The most crucial program implemented to assist in the integration of Moroccan immigrant women concerns language proficiency and literacy.

In fact, the cultural interplay and negotiation can be observed in Spanish language classes. Moroccan immigrant women would attend the Spanish language courses; many of them often consist of both men and women. At first, Moroccan women would attend the classes regardless of the sex composition. Once they feel more comfortable and have gained the trust of the association staff, they usually insist on separating the class by gender. They often claim that their family's honor is at stake.

The Spanish staff, consisting of mainly women, often expresses confusion and complains of the backward and oppressive mentality of these Moroccan immigrants. Nevertheless, the staff eventually acquiesces to the women's request, knowing that if they disregard their wishes, the women may discontinue their education. The staff rationalizes the move as progressive integration of the Moroccan women rather than forcing the idea of gender emancipation too quickly. Even though some immigrant women continue with the mixed, co-ed classes, the majority of the women attend the gendered Spanish classes. The
ones who do not mind the mixed classes have less contact with the ones who preferred the segregated groups although they claim time and work as excuses for attending the mixed sessions.

Moroccan women attending activities and services at these Spanish associations come veiled and unveiled. Moroccan women in Spain tend to veil with age and marital status. Veiling more often take place during their middle age, around their mid-40s, whether or not they are married or have children. Immigrant women use veiling to indicate a social age of modesty and respect. They demand honor, or the right to be respected, from other Moroccans. Even older Moroccan women who do not normally veil in Morocco often feel pressured to veil in Spain among their female compatriots.

On the other hand, young Moroccan women in Spain associate veiling with religion and age. Many young Moroccan women without legal paperwork often stop veiling in Spain for fear of deportation. The ones with legal residency concur with the older Moroccan women. A few young married women veil as a sign of modesty and religious piety, but most young married women indicate that veiling is for older women. A group discussion at the Centro among three friends indicates the difference in opinion about veiling.

“I have nothing to hide. I am married and have a child. My honor is my own. Veiling is for older women. When I turn forty-something, I may wear one. The older women want to be respected so they wear them. I have do not need for that kind of respect.” --Saida, 23 years old, housewife in Madrid

“I am twenty-four; and I wear my veil because I am Muslim. I want to cover myself. She [Saida] thinks differently and that is okay. I still respect her [laughing].” --Kamilia, 24 years old, housewife in Madrid

“I do not veil either and I am twenty-two. No one in my family wears a veil except for my grandmother, but she is old and lives in Morocco. I know it says to veil in the Koran, but I choose not to veil. Sometimes I veil in Morocco so the boys do not bother me in the streets. I agree with Saida. Veiling is for older women.” --Jasmin, 22 years old, caseworker in Madrid

Young Moroccan women in Madrid claim they feel no pressure to veil from their
families or from their community. Although they limit their interactions with men in order to avoid gossip, they have more freedom of movement in Spain than in Morocco so veiling is unnecessary to protect them from the public domain. Furthermore, veiling may cause more problems. Veiling makes them more susceptible to racial profiling by the police and attracts suspicious looks from Spaniards, particular after the Madrid train bombing.

**Conclusion**

When occupying the public realms, the morality and chastity of a woman is usually protected by the family to preserve its honor. In Morocco and other Muslim countries, women can protect themselves by having a male relative accompany her and by veiling. In Spain, Moroccan women have to fend for themselves. The protection of the family no longer holds the same weight as it has in Morocco. However, some immigrant women still behavior as if their family honor is at stake. Although veiling discourages community gossip, not many young Moroccans in Spain don veils. Furthermore, young Moroccan women who often return or intend on returning to live in Morocco would dress less provocatively than the ones who plan on permanently settling in Spain.

The internalization of the value of honor along with pressure from the Moroccan community perpetuates traditional behaviors such as veiling. Moroccan women who have more Moroccan friends and relatives in Spain often resort to behaviors similar to the ones in Morocco. Regardless of their duration in Spain, Moroccan immigrant women who have sponsored friends and family members to Spain or who have them living nearby usually begin veiling and behaving more modestly in their 40s. The ones have not had the opportunity to have their family and friends nearby tend to have more freedom in movement and behavior. The segregated Spanish class is full of women who know each other or are related to each other. The majority of them wear their headscarves to classes and meetings even without the presence of men. The ones who remain in the mixed sex classes and activities have a few or no relatives residing in Spain.
Gossiping at the Centro Hispano-Marroqui
Young Girls Relaxing on a Moroccan Beach
CONCLUSION

“Once there was a Bedouin people, caravaneers and poets, a people coarse and proud who lived on dates and camel's milk. Mired in error, they invented their own gods. For fear of dishonor and shame, some cast off their female offspring, marrying them off when they are still mere children or burying them alive. Eternal damnation awaited these men. Islam condemned them.” --Tahar Ben Jelloun, *The Sacred Night*

Although perceived as a dead horse in anthropological studies of the Mediterranean, the system of honor still has relevance in the lives of Moroccan immigrant women in Spain. As with many immigrants, Moroccan women carry their values, customs and behaviors to their receiving societies. Additionally, Moroccan women still maintain contact with their families and social network at home as well as establishing new contacts in their host country. Living in a different social milieu may affect the Moroccan traditional system of honor and marriage, but how and why these values and customs would depend on various factors: the composition of their social network, their economic dependency on their family, and their situation prior to arriving to Spain.

Hardly taking center stage in Morocco, women bracket their lives in terms of marriage and family. They learn their duties and obligations as daughters early in life. Some have the chance at education while many more barely know how to write their names. They learn cooking, cleaning, and child minding by the time they reach puberty. They watch as their brothers go from playful to vigilant, protecting what they believe is their family's honor. The familial vigilance would continue until the day the bridegroom appears. Their virginity is then tested, certified, and celebrated. They move from their natal homes to a place near their affines. The birth of their first child solidifies the marriage and amplifies their domestic roles. A daughter would relieve them of some household tasks, and a son would ensure a respectable position with the affines. They would direct their son to watch and guide his sister's chastity. When the time comes to marry off their children, they would solicit friends and neighbors for good matches. Their children's marriage would strengthen old ties. For
their sake, they hope to stay married long enough to raise their children to adulthood. If the marriage is cut short too soon, they will return to their natal home and wait for another marital prospect or look for work. If they cannot find work in Morocco, they will immigrate to Spain where people need domestic assistance.

Their lives in Spain have many contradictions. They acquaint themselves with Spain, its culture, its laws and its people. They learn Spanish and find resources from compatriots and from Spanish government through organizations and associations. Their veiling does not seem to matter unless they are around their compatriots and are at a certain age. They demand more respect from their others as they freely move about in streets, sit in cafes, and go shopping. Their production has more value both domestically and publically, and they send the fruits of their labor to their families back home. At some point, they obtain their residency.

They would then return to Morocco to visit, only to feel the former pressure to marry. The ones who have never married would need to have their virginity confirmed before and maybe during the wedding ceremony. If they have lost their virginity, they would need to reconstruct it or they will damage their family's honor. Their parents may have already chosen spouses from their kin group, neighbors, or friends. They may refuse, but consent is circumscribed by feelings of obligation, duty and honor.

They sponsor their spouses to Spain. Some live happily; others have problems. Domestic violence is common. They solicit help from the Spanish associations, but divorcing would require a return to Morocco and face their families and the court. The changes to the Moudawana have provided them with more rights, but the court system still lag due to customary practices and old values. The divorce proceedings linger for years in Morocco. They return to Spain, and some would resort to divorcing under Spanish law to pressure their husbands to grant them the divorce in Morocco. Others just pay their husbands to divorce them. They then stay in Spain, not wanting to revert to the traditional pattern of serial marriages. At the age of forty or so, they feel the need to veil and to garner honor from their
community of compatriots. Spain has offered them another path to take and many have taken it.

Moroccan female immigration to Spain has challenged the view that honor predominantly belongs to men. Rather than granting women a passive role in the traditional system of honor, Moroccan immigrant women believe they have earned the honor or the respect from immigrating, working, veiling and marrying strategically to not only sustain their family's honor but also elevate their own. Women still maintain the traditional notion of chastity as it relates to their marital prospects, but the act of veiling and of maintaining their marriages directly affect the honor these women want to attract from their community of compatriots and to a certain extent, from non-compatriots.

However, not all immigrant women act in accordance with traditional norms and values. Women adhering to the notion of honor and the traditional pattern of marriage tend to have closer ties to their families and kin network in Morocco and to their compatriots in Spain than the ones who have reduced or severed ties to their networks of kin and compatriots. In rebuilding and importing their social networks, Moroccan women also import and revive old customs and values, albeit with some differences.

In Morocco women may have started working more, but they continue to succumb to the honor system linking their chastity and modesty to the men in their lives. In fact, veiling in Morocco relates to the protection of family honor and respecting male space, whereas veiling in Spain has more reference to Islam and to the need for the honor and respect of other Moroccan women. Moroccan immigrant women, who have had to forgo family and home in order to work in a foreign land have adopted honor, which belongs mainly to Moroccan men. Since their productive value is no longer relegated to the domestic sphere, their involvement in the public domain of another country allows them to identify with the traditionally male privilege of honor. The protection of the 'ird is no longer just for their family but also for themselves and their status among their fellow compatriots.

From a Western perspective, veiled Moroccan immigrants are continuing to act within
the imported social constraints of their native country. The Western public often misinterprets veiling, the embodiment of honor, as a gesture of male domination without considering the meaning and the action of the women donning the symbolic garment. Moroccan immigrant women, therefore, are in a double bind. They do not receive the respect they deserve from the male-dominated Moroccan society nor from the European authorities believing in their need to save these women from male oppression. By denying Moroccan women the right to practice their beliefs by veiling, the European governments are ironically suppressing these women's freedom of expression.

Nevertheless, the immigrant women's need to adhere to the traditional system of honor and marriage has presented their receiving country with cultural dilemmas, manifested through the laws and actions of various authority figures. Spain, a recently democratic country, has been changing its previous practice of gender oppression. Receiving requests for certificates of virginity and the proliferation of veiling by Moroccan women have attracted controversy regarding Islamic ideals and practices. These practices, however, mask the complicated ideas about honor and marriage these women have to negotiate in different aspects of their lives. Contrary to the past, Moroccan women are taking an active part in both the domestic and public domains, producing goods and providing services for their families and societies. Their involvement in Morocco may require veiling as a negotiable medium to co-inhabit the traditionally male-dominated public realm, but their veiling in Spain embodies other factors.

The notion of honor imported from Morocco is reinvented through having a close-knit social network of female compatriots and kin members to support and acknowledge their traditional behaviors. Moving and dressing freely as Spanish and other European women would entail having looser social network consisting of fewer compatriots and more non-compatriots. This reconfiguration of their social network would allow more ideas and opportunities to act differently from the binds of the traditional system of honor and marriage.
Moroccan immigrant women generally have more freedom, especially if they have some knowledge of Spanish. Additionally, the precarious economic situation in Spain robs men of the luxury to seclude their wives when they can more easily find a job in the service sector than the men can in the construction. Moreover, the laws in Spain also protect women more. Moroccan women suffering from domestic violence can report and remove their husbands from their homes. If they wish to escape from their husbands and agnates, Spanish social services and law enforcement will assist them.

Breaking from transnational social ties requires a conscious rupture. Even though the norm in many Western societies still consists of being married with children, not marrying in Morocco is not only a social anomaly but also a moral, religious one. A single woman’s family may pressure her so strongly that the only escape is to migrate to Spain. Spain and Europe provide Moroccan women with the economic and social opportunity to live differently than they would if they had stayed in Morocco.

In Europe, Moroccan female immigrants may have more freedom in choosing their spouse or choosing not to marry. However, spousal selection still requires approval, either from the family and/or from the state. Marriages outside the norm of approval risk severe consequences: ostracization or deportation. Pure freedom to choose and act as one desire has shown to be more complicated than the immigrant women had anticipated. While the state regulates marriage, the family still has some control over the individual migrant for the strength of kin and social network can transcend international borders.

Furthermore, the sexual freedom in Europe has its consequences. Virginity remains important if the woman decides to have an Islamic marriage. Premarital sex comes with a price that has prompted a proliferation of reconstruction surgeries to maintain family honor. Even in Europe, freedom requires sufficient economic and social capital. An immigrant woman behaving without limits would need enough resources to pay for her virginal reconstruction or to sever some contacts without feeling too alienated.

Moroccan society intricately fuses religion and government in ways that Spain
and other Western European countries no longer have. Since Islam does not value nor recognize celibacy as an option for either sex, marriage is crucial in fulfilling one’s duty as a Moroccan woman and as a Muslim. Many single Moroccan women have emigrated from Morocco with the idea of Europe being a place where women can live and work without the looming judgment of social morals.

Being completely free from judgment may not be possible since immigrants carry their values and customs with them. Some single women have to evade extensive contact with the compatriots in order to renew their lives in their adopted country. Yet the social pressure, as indicated in the workshops and focus groups, transcend international borders. Many women still have families in Morocco and make periodic visits. The burgeoning of the Moroccan community in Spain has brought immigrants more opportunities to establish contacts, links, and relationships to their country of origin. Thus, changing countries does not free women completely from the demands of the norms and laws. What changing countries provide are economic and social opportunities to reform the imported norms or to evade them and their bearers.

Out of all the categories of Moroccan immigrant women, unwed mothers have benefitted the most from their immigration to Spain. As social pariahs in their home country, unwed mothers and their illegitimate offsprings are excluded from nearly all the social and economic opportunities. Illegitimate children represent the rotten fruits of damaged honor. The refusal to accept unwed mothers and their children in Morocco as well as in the Moroccan immigrant community indicate the profound hold that women's reproductive capabilities have on Moroccan society.

The extreme manifestation of disapproval of the breach of honor is killing the source of the damage. Honor killing may go unreported in Morocco, but Europe cannot turn a blind eye to such actions. The individual, either male or female, has more rights in Europe and other Western countries than in places where family and kin groups are entitled to defend their honor and position in society. In Morocco, group rights trump individual rights,
particularly when the individual is a woman.

Moroccan immigrant women have known and experienced their country's limitations and have enjoyed the space Spain has provided for them. However, their time in Spain has become more challenging economically and socially with the onset of the economic crisis two years ago. Many women have found their working hours cut or have been completely dismissed from their jobs. The current Spanish unemployment rate in 2011 is twenty percent. Spanish families have decreased their spending on luxury items such as domestic services, especially if the wife or the husband becomes unemployed. Additionally, the competition for jobs in all sectors has increased, making it more difficult for Moroccan women to compete with native Spaniards for the same position. Furthermore, immigrants from the newly admitted countries to the European Union have also brought more competition since they demand little pay for more work.

Moroccan women who have resided in Spain for more than thirteen years should have obtained their Spanish nationality already. The ones who have just reached the ten year residency criteria or naturalization have been facing obstacles and jumping through multiple hurdles to acquire their Spanish citizenship. The economic crisis has brought about more restrictive measures in granting citizenship to immigrants, particularly to Moroccans.

Some immigrants have chosen to return to Morocco. In fact, some women in this study have been contemplating about returning. They know the difficulties they may face in Morocco and have been desperately searching for ways to avoid having to return. The unwed mothers in this study never want to return to Morocco. They have considered leaving their children with their families in Morocco so they can work more hours or move more easily to a different area to find more work. Living in Morocco, however, is not a viable option for unwed mothers.

On the other hand, married Moroccan women have no reservation about returning home if the situation in Spain worsens. The only regret they have is leaving the good public health care system for one that does not exist or only exists for the wealthy in Morocco.
Nevertheless, married women still have their status and can resettle in their original communities without any looming judgment from their kin group and their neighbors. According to the traditional value system, married Moroccan women have preserved their honor so their transitioning home would not be as morally challenging as the other categories of Moroccan female immigrants.

For the rest of the immigrant women who have adopted the European or Spanish lifestyle and/or some of the Western values, Morocco serves as a prison. Summer visits are short and temporary. However, going from one place of freedom and opportunities back to a place of restrictions and limitations is not a feasible possibility for many Moroccan women. In the words of the Moroccan writer, Tahar Ben Jelloun (1985):

“...in our house women are inferior to men it's not because God wishes it or because the prophets decided it thus, but because the women accept this fate. So submit and live in silence!” (p.46)

Moroccan immigrant women have a choice as to where they want to live. They can either weather the storm in Spain or they can return to Morocco, where they know what will be in store for them after a long sojourn away from home.
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Freedom House

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Weingartner, Laura A.  

Westermarck, Edward  


Wikan, Unni  


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APPENDICES
# APPENDIX A

## FOREIGN POPULATION IN MADRID

### 2009-2010

## DISTRIBUTION OF MOROCCANS IN SPAIN

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<tr>
<th>Countries of Origin</th>
<th>Number of People</th>
<th>% of Foreign Population</th>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>China</td>
<td>156607</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
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Data obtained from INE (Instituto Nacional Estadística 2010).
APPENDIX B
DISTRIBUTION OF MOROCCANS IN MADRID
BY AGE AND SEX (2009)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>0-4 years</td>
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<td>4890</td>
<td>48.09</td>
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<td>5-9 years</td>
<td>5476</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>2902</td>
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<td>2574</td>
<td>47.01</td>
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<td>10-14 years</td>
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<td>4.69</td>
<td>2256</td>
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<td>2049</td>
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<td>15-19 years</td>
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<td>55.86</td>
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<td>2126</td>
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<td>71.88</td>
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<td>14.06</td>
<td>7656</td>
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<td>5249</td>
<td>40.68</td>
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<td>30-34 years</td>
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<td>4908</td>
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<td>3968</td>
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<td>57.54</td>
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<td>2248</td>
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<td>50-54 years</td>
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<td>1453</td>
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<td>55-59 years</td>
<td>1746</td>
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<td>60-64 years</td>
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<td>65-69 years</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>0.64</td>
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<td>315</td>
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<td>70-74 years</td>
<td>450</td>
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<td>45.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>75-79 years</td>
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<td>41.3</td>
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<td>80-84 years</td>
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<td>55</td>
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<td>85 and over</td>
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Data obtained from CAM (2010).
### APPENDIX C

Moroccan Provinces of Origin By Birth and Residence
Of Moroccan Immigrants in Spain
1992-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Origin (Birth and Residence)</th>
<th>Birth Male</th>
<th>Birth Female</th>
<th>Residence Male</th>
<th>Residence Female</th>
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<td>Casablanca</td>
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<td>Tangier</td>
<td>9.25</td>
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<td>Tetuan</td>
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<td>8.15</td>
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<td>Larache</td>
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<td>Bent Mellal</td>
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<td>9.87</td>
<td>4.49</td>
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<td>Taurit</td>
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<td>Uxda</td>
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<td>Yerada</td>
<td>4.16</td>
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<td>Al Hoceima</td>
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<td>Nador</td>
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### Civil Status of Moroccan Immigrants in Spain
1992-2000

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<td>Single</td>
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37 Data obtained from TEIM (2004)
38 Data obtained from TEIM (2004)
APPENDIX D

The Distribution of Moroccan Women in Spain (Percentages)

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<th>Regions</th>
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<td>Castilla -La Mancha</td>
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<td>Galicia</td>
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<td>Basque Country</td>
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<td>La Rioja</td>
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<td>Beleares</td>
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<td>Navarra</td>
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<td>Valencia (Community)</td>
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<td>Murcia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantabria</td>
<td>12.2</td>
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APPENDIX E

Moroccan Women Marriages to Spanish Nationals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>416</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>521</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>484</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
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<td>2004</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX F

LA ENCUESTA
(The Survey)

Por favor, marca su respuesta adecuada con x o √.

Edad: 15-17____ 18-21____ 22-25____ 26-30____ 30-35____ 36-40____ 41-45____ 46-50____
51-55____ 56-60____ 61-75____ 76-80____ 80+_____

Hombre: _____ Mujer: _____

Ciudad de origen:

Tanger___Tetuan___Rabat___Fez___Nador___Casablanca___Larache___Marrakech___

Ouijda___Berkan___Larache___Kenitra___Salé___Al Hoceima___Otra

Estado civil: Soltera_____Casada______Divorciada________Viuda________

Si tiene o tenia marido, de donde es su marido? ____________________________________________

Cuanto tiempo llevan casados? ______________

Cuantos hijos tiene? _______________ Donde estan?

________________________________________________________________________________

Años de estudiar en Marruecos?

<1 año_____ 2-5 años____ 6-8 años____ 8-12 años____ 12+ años____

Cuando lleguo a España? _____________ Donde? __________ Como?

________________________________________________________________________________

Con quien vino a España?

________________________________________________________________________________

Que es el motivo principal para venir a España?

________________________________________________________________________________

Tiene familia aqui? ______________ Quien y donde vive(n)?

________________________________________________________________________________
13) Con quien vive en España?


14) Tienen familia en Marruecos? Quien y donde vive?


15) Que hacia en Marruecos (antes de inmigrar)?


16) Con quien tiene confianza? Por que?


17) Ha trabajado en España? Sí No

Que tipo de trabajo?
Cuidar de niños
Limpieza
Construcción
Restaurante
Turismo
Fábrica
Vender
Otro

18) Puede leer ___ o escribir ___ en español? Sí No Poco

19) Puede leer ___ o escribir ___ en árabe? Sí No Poco

20) Que tipo de problemas ha encontrado en España?
Discriminación por su idioma Sí No
Discriminación por su religión Sí No
Discriminación por su raza Sí No
Encontrar trabajo Sí No
Problemas con su salud Sí No
Problemas con su familia Sí No
Problemas con su vivienda Sí No
Problemas con sus hijos Sí No
Problemas con su educación Sí No
Problemas con su matrimonio o pareja Sí No
Problemas con violencia Sí No
Problemas con documentos ______ Sí ______ No ______
Problemas con la policía ______ Sí ______ No ______
Problemas para volver a Marruecos ______ Sí ______ No ______

21) Ha enviado dinero a Marruecos? ______ Sí ______ No ______

Cuantas veces? 1_______ 2-4_______ 5-7_______ 8-10_______ 10+_______

Cuantos (total)?_______________ Euro

22) Quien le ha ayudado para conseguir cosas (información, documentos, etc.) ?
   Su familia ______
   Amigos ______ Conocidos ______ Asociaciones ______ Desconocidos ______

23) Tiene amigos españoles? ______ Sí ______ No ______
   Cuantos? 1_______ 2-5_______ 5-10_______ 10-15_______ 15+_______

Describe sus relaciones:__________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________

24) Cómo ha encontrado este sitio?
   Su familia _____ Sus amigos Marruecos _____ Sus amigos Españoles ______
   Conocidos ____ Otra Asociación ______ La mezquita _____ Anuncios _____

25) Que tipo de ayuda quiere conseguir en este sitio?
   Clases de español ______
   Clases de árabe ______
   Buscar trabajo ______
   Buscar vivienda ______
   Avisos legales ______
   Cursos culturales ______
   Actividades culturales ______
   Apoyo (grupo de mujeres, asociación, etc.) ______

26) Lleva panuelo?___________ en Marruecos?_______________
Por que?____________________________________________________________________

27) Quiere ir a Mecca? ______________ Por que?
__________________________________________________________________________

28) Quiere quedarse en España? _______ o vuelve a Marruecos? ______ por que?
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
29) Prefiere su vida aquí o en Marruecos? ____________________ Por qué?
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

Si quiere que nosotras le contactemos para una entrevista, escribir su nombre y número de móvil: __________________________#_____________________

Las entrevista dura más tiempo (entre 45 minutos a una hora). Muchas gracias por su participación.
APPENDIX G

FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS

1. ¿Estas casada? (Are you married?)
2. ¿Cómo conociste a tu marido? (How did you meet/know your husband?)
3. ¿Qué le pareció a tu familia tu novio? (What did you family think of your fiance?)
4. ¿Cuánto duró el noviazgo antes de la boda? (How long was your courtship?)
5. ¿Cómo fue tu boda? (How was the wedding?)
6. ¿Como fue tu dote? (How was the process of obtaining the bridewealth?)
7. ¿Con que edad te casaste? (How old were you when you married?)
8. ¿Por qué te casaste? (Why did you marry?)
9. ¿Qué tal tú matrimonio? (How is/was your marriage?)
10. ¿Qué derechos tiene tu marido sobre ti? Es diferente en España? (What rights does your husband have over you? Is it different in Spain?)
11. ¿Qué ocurre con las mujeres abandonadas? (What happens with abandoned women?)
12. ¿Ha hecho algo para avergonzar a tu family? Que? Que ha pasado? (Have you done anything to shame your family? What? What has happened?)
13. ¿Qué piensas de que en España la gente piense que los marroquíes tiene muchas esposas? ¿Porque piensan eso? (What do you think about Spanish people thinking that Moroccans have many wives? Why do you think they believe this way?)
14. ¿En qué situaciones una mujer marroquí puede divorciarse? (On what occasion can women divorce?)
15. ¿Qué necesitas hacer para divorciarte? (What do you need to do to get a divorce?)
16. ¿Qué ocurre cuando ya estas divorciada?(What happens after getting divorced?)
17. ¿Qué pensarías si tu hija pretende casarse con un chico no musulmán? (What would you do if your daughter tried to marry a non-Muslim person?)
18. ¿Y si el que te lo plantea es tu hijo? (And if your son did the same?)
19. ¿Qué opinas de las madres solteras? (What opinion do you have of unwed mothers?)
20. ¿Qué opinion de los cambios de la mudawana? (What opinion do you have of the changes to the Moudawana?)