Academic Commons

Articles

Probable Plaintext Cryptanalysis of the IP Security Protocols

Bellovin, Steven Michael

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is in the process of adopting standards for IP-layer encryption and authentication (IPSEC). We describe how "probable plaintext" can be used to aid in cryptanalytic attacks, and analyze the protocol to show how much probable plaintext is available. We also show how traffic analysis is a powerful aid to the cryptanalyst. We conclude by outlining some likely changes to the underlying protocols that may strengthen them against these attacks.

Subjects

Files

More About This Work

Academic Units
Computer Science
Published Here
June 28, 2010

Notes

1997 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security: proceedings, February 10-11, 1997, San Diego, California (Los Alamitos, Calif.: IEEE Computer Society Press, 1997), pp. 52-59.

Academic Commons provides global access to research and scholarship produced at Columbia University, Barnard College, Teachers College, Union Theological Seminary and Jewish Theological Seminary. Academic Commons is managed by the Columbia University Libraries.