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少数规则:国家所有权和外国直接投资风险消减策略

James, Barclay E.; Vaaler, Paul M.

企业研究人员、高管以及监管部门可能认为企业中的国家所有权引起了私人投资的风险。毕竟,私人投资是追求利润而政府是谋求福利的。都给予它们股权只会混淆投资项目的目标,使投资项目经理的工作复杂化并且使投资项目失败的总体风险增加。但是,这些假设都不符合已在几十个国家的数百个投资项目中得到证实的一个著名的风险观测指标:我们发现,在初始投资方面容易受到东道国政府重新谈判的国家,东道国所进行的非控股的但仍然实力雄厚的股权投资这一“少数规则”能够起到消减风险的作用。

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More About This Work

Academic Units
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment
Publisher
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment
Series
Columbia FDI Perspectives, 111
Published Here
March 5, 2014

Notes

An English version of this paper is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.7916/D8930R6N.

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