Official Historiography, Political Legitimacy, Historical Methodology, and Royal and Imperial Authority in Spain under Phillip II, 1580-99

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ABSTRACT

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Between 1580 and 1599, Spain was the subject of a barrage of foreign polemical attacks, a reaction to Spain’s European hegemony under Philip II. These attacks used historical arguments to directly challenge Spain’s political legitimacy and power, its reputation, and its political standing within Europe by criticizing Spain’s dynastic arguments for empire, and denigrated Spanish imperialism and the nature of Spanish rule, threatening constitutional structures by claiming that Philip ruled as a tyrant. In response to these attacks, a coterie of scholars and powerful political advisors, seeking to solidify claims to certain territories and to justify imperial actions, developed innovative historical writing practices that were effective ideological tools for creating support for new political ideas. To convincingly defend Spanish imperialism and restore Spanish reputación, official history needed to concern itself with questions of statecraft, and to do so within the framework of humanist notions of “good” history. Specifically, the new type of historical writing used humanist and antiquarian methodologies, especially an emphasis on source-based documentation of arguments and claims, and combined these with reason of state politics to respond to European challenges to Spanish imperial authority and Spanish actions in Portugal and France by ensuring that only a very specific image of the king was conveyed, and very specific sources were utilized and revealed. In doing so, official historians, most notably Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Esteban de Garibay, and Gregorio López de Madera, and advisors, like Juan de Idiáquez and
Cristóbal de Moura, turned to the writing of history not as a means to reform the state, but instead as a potent means to bolster and defend the existing state’s identity and advance its purpose.

This dissertation uses court correspondence, the treatises on the artes historicae written by the court historians, and the innovative official histories they produced to show how the tensions between ideology and methodology played out in this new form of official history, and how theory and practice came together in the service of power. Through its use of multiple sources of data, this study shows that it was due to the polemical context, not despite it, that a new and more powerful history emerged, which included new practices and cultivated a more critical sensibility. Official history came to play a role in giving conceptual identity and political legitimacy to Spain’s imperial ambitions in a new reason of state context. Thus, notions of rule (Spanish Christian reason of state) and provisions of proof became the two pivots upon which Spanish imperial ambitions were justified, and larger debates about how to legitimize formal rights and privileges found a concrete form of expression in official history.
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Note on Documentation

Citations in this work have been provided in standard Chicago Manual of Style format. While it has not been possible to include all of the texts in the original language, since many of the primary sources for this subject are either unfamiliar or unpublished, some of the most significant phrases are included in their original language in the footnotes; these are included in their original form, and have not been modernized.

All translations are mine, unless otherwise noted. All Spanish spelling is from the original, unaltered (not modernized), unless indicated. Spanish passages in the footnotes appear as they do in the originals, (except the $u$ and $v$ have been altered to agree with modern usage). The same is true of book titles and treaty names (the capitalization of these has not been modernized).

A note on the terms used:

I have drawn a distinction between the Crown and the person of Philip II and frequently refer to the Crown in the collective, different but not separate from the person of the King. Moreover, while aware of the antecedent problem, it is useful to think of the Crown as both the King and his advisors therefore making the Crown plural.
Abbreviations

Archives and Libraries

AHN      Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid
AGI      Archivo General de las Indias, Seville
AGS      Archivo General de Simancas. Estado.
BNM      Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid. Manuscript Section.
BFZ      Archivo y Biblioteca de Francisco Zabálburu, Madrid
IVDJ     Instituto Valencia de Don Juan, Madrid
RAH      Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid
RB       Real Biblioteca del Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial
PR       Biblioteca del Palacio Real, Madrid
In considering the history of this study of historical writing under Philip II, I must acknowledge that my interest in this subject began before I set out to write this dissertation. It derives in part from my interest in Renaissance studies, image creation, self-fashioning, and emerging political theories, and the new ways devised by those in power to present themselves to a growing reading public. I first became preoccupied with the history of historiography and its relationship to the nature of ideology in my historiography class co-directed by Nicolas Dirks and Martha Howell. There I came to see the ways in which history has been written and conceived over the centuries and the tools, intentions and ideologies that drive the profession. My interest in this topic, however, primarily derived from my interest in Spain and the ways it experienced a similar period of historiographic vibrancy in the early modern period. I came to the growing belief in the need to subject Spanish historical thought to the critical re-examination completed by scholars for Spain’s European contemporaries.

I was fortunate enough to find an extensive source base upon which to base my investigation. Indeed, the beginnings of my understanding of the change in historiography which occurred in late-sixteenth-century Spain was first revealed to me when I encountered a set of letters between official historian Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas and Philip’s Secretary of Portugal, Cristóbal de Moura. This led to a further amassing of over 200 letters held in various
libraries and archives throughout Spain. This, however, like the project that will be described, was a collective effort. For assistance in developing the research base on which this study is built, I am deeply indebted to the librarians and archivists who led me in the necessary directions and the gracious support of those who helped me gain access into the Archives of the Condes de Orgáz. Special thanks must go to archivists, Teresa Mezquita Mesa, Cristina Guillén Bermejo, and José Rucio Zamorano.

My most substantial debts, however, are personal. First, in point of time was my undergraduate encounter with the “sense of history” in Professor William Acres’s seminar on early modern historiography, which enticed more than one unsuspecting student into this field. This course led to my acquaintance with Professor Peter Burke, and his course at Cambridge. I am in debt to my Professors at Columbia, especially professors Martha Howell, Nicolas Dirks and David Armitage, who taught me to see the value of a critical understanding of history. Also I am indebted to those Professors who have helped me in my research: Peter Burke, Fernando Bouza, Anthony Grafton, Anthony Pagden, Ottavio di Camillo, José Rabasa, and Daniel Woolf, now chancellor of Queen’s University and with whom I will be pursuing my Social Science Research Council of Canada PostDoc. I am only sorry that I was unable to include all of their advice, and that I have not been able to rely more heavily on their authority.

Some of the most obvious deficiencies in this study I prefer to think are inseparable from the questions which provoked it in the first place. In particular, I have not been able to examine as thoroughly as I should have any single author or theme, as the subject of any one of the principal chapters deserves, I think, an entire book. At the same time I have been compelled to
venture into a number of technical fields where I claim no special competence – particularly the
history of classical scholarship and philology, genealogy, philosophy, and the law. It is my hope,
however, that the scope of the inquiry is appropriate to the questions posed, and it is my belief
that whatever value this dissertation may possess is largely the result of trying to bring together
such a diverse compendium of questions, sources, topics and approaches, and placing them
within a much larger political and intellectual context.

Some of the material upon which this dissertation is based and in particular parts of the
overview of scholarship that appear in the Introduction was published in The Oxford History of
Historical Writing, Volume 3 (Oxford University Press, 2012). Parts of this dissertation were
presented at the Renaissance Society of America, the Canadian Society for Renaissance Studies,
and at the Newberry Library.

This project has benefited from the generosity of a number of individuals and institutions.
I am grateful to the Department of History and the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at
Columbia University for the training, fellowships and opportunities granted to me over the
course of my graduate education. In particular, I feel fortunate to have participated in Columbia
College’s Contemporary Civilizations program. The combination of teaching and discussions
among faculty that took place there changed my work in more ways than I can explain.

I must also express my gratitude to several institutions and foundations. Research for
much of this dissertation was supported by a grant from the Program for Cultural Cooperation
between the Spanish Ministry of Culture and United States Universities, as well as the Social
Science Research Council of Canada. These made possible my research in Spain and extensive research in the many libraries and archives on both sides of the Atlantic. Also I extend my thanks to Columbia for providing me with summer travel grants, and the funding provided by the Newberry Library in collaboration with the Fulbright Foundation.

A number of individuals have read all or part of this dissertation in different stages over the years. Professor Howell and Professor Adam Kosto, who directed this dissertation offered crucial insights in direction and definition and made invaluable suggestions throughout. I also must thank the other members of my Dissertation Committee, including Pamela Smith, Patricia Grieve and Matthew Jones, whose comments at the defense helped me confirm the importance of my research, and provided numerous suggestions and comments that I hope to include in future publication. I must extend additional thanks, and am particularly indebted to Professor Adam Kosto, who took me under his wing and helped bring this project to completion, and especially for his critical readership, encouragement and ongoing support. His extremely knowledgeable and aphoristic suggestions and corrections proved invaluable.

Most essential of all has been the support of my friends and family. Although some very unexpected obstacles could have derailed the completion of this project, they have all been by my side providing continuous support and encouragement. Most essential has been the support of my father, and my Jon. For many kindness and provocations I must also thank my dear friend Professor Kelly de Luca. They are the ones who have really kept things in perspective, offering key encouragement at critical moments. I could not have completed this project without their
support. This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Dr. Joan Fitzgerald, whose wisdom and counsel I will carry with me always.

Needless to say, the errors and omissions are all my own.

K. v O-S. New York / London, Ontario Canada, July 2013
Introduction

Official history writing in late-sixteenth-century Spain experienced a major change in its conception and utilization for the purposes of reason of state and statecraft. Between 1580 and 1598, in the midst of dynastic, political, and imperial upheavals, Philip II’s advisors and historians produced an innovative type of official history that ultimately placed humanist methodology in the service of political necessity. This study illuminates the links that bound this new historical writing to the state and the emerging historical methods to the political purposes of the monarchy and empire. Consequently, issues of historical legitimacy and governance pervaded historical writing. Specifically, the new type of historical writing used humanist and antiquarian methodologies, especially an emphasis on source-based documentation of arguments and claims, to respond to European challenges to Spanish imperial authority and Spanish actions regarding Portugal and France. This study argues that Spain, seeking to solidify claims to certain territories and to justify imperial actions, used innovative historical writing practices as ideological tools for creating support for new political ideas.

By bringing together humanist rhetoric and antiquarian strands of scholarship to meet emerging demands for documented forms of legitimacy, Spain’s official historians made history an effective tool of state that defended the legitimacy of the Spanish Empire and promoted the Spanish ideology of Christian reason of state through verifiable history. To create such histories, official historians navigated the complex world of late-sixteenth-century Spain, defending the actions of the king and Spanish imperialism in a manner that supported the king’s vision of his rule, while at the same time adhering to the demands of humanist scholarship, growing demands
for proof and authentication, and the need to respond to foreign polemical attacks in ways that would not be taken as mere laudation. Working within specific political and professional constraints, Spanish official historians drew from, adapted, and brought together extant and burgeoning developments in humanist scholarship to create this new, or as Philip’s Secretary of War and State Juan de Idiáquez termed it, “better history” (mejor historia) for the king, which combined reason of state with humanist scholarship for state purposes and legitimacy.¹

This “better” history was originally proposed by Philip’s advisors as a political strategy to defend the Spanish Crown and Spanish European imperialism against polemical attacks and the anti-Spanish propaganda that came to be known as the Black Legend. Between 1580 and 1592, Spain was the subject of an increased number of foreign polemical attacks, a reaction to Spain’s European hegemony under Philip II.² Two historiographical attacks in particular, which targeted Spanish interests in Portugal and France, Girolamo Conestaggio’s Historia dell’unione del regno di Portogallo alla Corona di Castiglia (Genoa, 1585) and Louis Turquet de Mayerne’s Histoire générale d’Espagne (Lyon, 1587), were regarded as threats sufficient to warrant official Spanish responses. These two works criticized Spain’s dynastic arguments for empire and referred to Spanish imperialism as “bad rule,” portraying Philip II as a tyrant and damaging his image as a Christian king. Conestaggio and Mayerne directly challenged Spain’s political legitimacy and power, its reputation (reputación³), and its political standing within Europe by attacking the nature of Spanish imperialism and rule.

¹ Juan de Idiáquez to Philip II, BFZ, Altamira, Consulta dated January 28, 1585, legajo 123/17 (Carpeta 194, fol. 163).
³ Henceforth, I will use the Spanish word for reputation, reputación, because it has connotations of honor, fame, and prestige. As a consequence, the Spanish term reputación (similar to the Italian term virtù) has a more defined and
These foreign polemical attacks, coupled with growing internal criticism of Spanish imperial pursuits, prompted the Spanish Crown, by which is meant the king and his advisors, to commission responses to these works, which for the purposes of this study will be called “counter-histories.” As published responses to specific challenges, these counter-histories differed in content and methodology from previous official histories. They defended Spanish actions by revealing the causes and intentions behind Philip’s imperial actions, presenting a vision of Spanish rule under Philip as the epitome of the Christian state, and demonstrating that his rule was grounded in precedent and proof. Moreover, they claimed to have adhered to a more stringent methodology than their Spanish predecessors or the foreign polemical attacks. In fact, the counter-histories directly claimed that they provided a more critical and impartial account of events, and to support this claim method and scholarship were presented as integral to these works. Significantly, the counter-histories did provide more substantiation for their claims than any prior history had done; they referred to their sources directly in the texts and defended political claims through more stringent forms of humanist authentication and “proof.” Indeed, in their defense of Spanish imperialism and the nature of Philip’s rule, these counter-histories created a new form of history writing that incorporated emerging political imperatives with growing antiquarianism.

This study is the first to examine directly the counter-histories and the political and intellectual impetus behind them. It looks at the roles of Philip II and his advisors in their creation, and the political ideals that motivated these counter histories. It also examines the

significant meaning than the English word reputation. For a more thorough discussion of this term in the context of late-sixteenth-century Spanish historical writing, see Chapter One below.

4 I have drawn a distinction between the Crown and the person of Philip II. The term Crown is utilized as a collective term that includes the king and his advisors, and therefore is different but not separate from the person of the King.
treatises on the *artes historicae* written by Philip’s official historians, including those who wrote the counter histories, to examine the influence of theoretical developments in the field of history on the creation of these historical narratives and polemical works. It will explain the intimate and intertwined relationship between political necessity and the increased demands of humanist scholarship and how the official historians sought to reconcile these tensions. An understanding of the complex nature of such developments is only possible because of a unique and rich set of primary sources. These sources reveal the profound changes in history writing in late sixteenth century Spain, especially in the relationship between political necessity and historiographical developments, and how these works were positioned relative to humanist theory.

The men who figure most prominently in this study are Philip II’s (r. 1556-1599) two leading advisors, Cristóbal de Moura (1538-1613) and Juan de Idiáquez (1540-1613), the king himself, and the seven historians who held the title of “official historian” under Philip II: Juan Páez de Castro (1512- c.1580), Ambrosio de Morales (1513-1591), Sebastián Fox Morcillo (1526-1560), Esteban de Garibay (1533-1600), Pedro de Navarra (1545?-1595), Antonio Herrera y Tordesillas (1549-1626), and Gregorio López de Madera (1562-1649). Significantly,

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Idiáquez and Moura were accountable directly to the king, formulating policy and general strategy for Philip.\textsuperscript{10} The seven historians all enjoyed official appointments at court; of these, Castro, Garibay, Morales, and Herrera held the title of \textit{cronista del rey}.\textsuperscript{11} As a group, these official historians were antiquarians, historians, lawyers, diplomats, and even influential ecclesiastics.\textsuperscript{12} The most prolific, Herrera, was a key player in the development of the new type of history that emerged and how it was used to defend Spanish imperial pursuits, as the Crown repeatedly turned to him to write works concerning Portugal and France. All of these historians, however, shared a common purpose in the histories and a common approach in their treatises.

The Sources

This study investigates three groups of Spanish sources: court correspondence, treatises by Spanish official historians, and the historical narratives written by the official historians commissioned specifically to respond to foreign polemical attacks. Only by looking at the political intentions of the Crown, the methodological considerations of the official historians, and the officially commissioned counter-histories themselves, can one demonstrate how the tensions between ideology and methodology played out, and how theory and practice came together in the service of power. This study traces how official historians maneuvered within a complex political and intellectual climate to move both historical methods and historical writing to a new level, while simultaneously meeting urgent political demands.


\textsuperscript{11} It should be noted that no sustained study, nor full scale biography, exists on Páez de Castro, Garibay, Navarra, or López de Madera. Furthermore, while individual biographies pay attention to some official historians, they do little to further our understanding of the political intentions of their works, or how their works were used as mechanisms of state in the late-sixteenth century.

\textsuperscript{12} For example, Morales was a well-known antiquarian, Herrera had served as political advisor to Vespiano Gonzaga, and Navarra was Bishop of Commenges.
The first set of sources is the correspondence that emerged around the foreign polemical attacks against Spanish imperial pursuits in Europe. The works of Conestaggio and Mayernne, in particular, produced a voluminous correspondence in the Spanish court, especially among Philip II, his advisors Idiáquez and Moura, and the official historians Páez de Castro, Morales, Garibay, and Herrera. This collection of over two hundred letters, written from the 1580s until the end of Philip’s reign in 1598 and now held in various libraries and archives throughout Spain, all relate directly to the writing of official history. The letters reveal both the political climate in which the counter-histories were written and the development of the historiographical strategies for the new type of history. This correspondence situates the counter-histories within the larger political program of Philip II in the last decades of his reign.

The second set of sources is comprised of eleven of the treatises on historical writing written between 1560 and 1598 by the official historians in Philip’s court; significantly, all seven of them wrote at least one such treatise. Even before they were commissioned to write specific counter-histories, these historians were aware of the complex interactions between their role as writers for the Crown and their role as humanist historians and they sought to avoid accusations.
of being simply court sycophants, or men who were, as a foreign contemporary called them, "paid to lie." These treatises fit within a marked and decided turn in the artes historicae that started around 1560. As a group, Philip’s official historians promoted a reshuffling of historiographical priorities away from rhetoric and towards making official history more scholarly. Examining this group of treatises shows that advances in the artes historicae in Spain emerged directly from the court and were created specifically by officially appointed historians, who were positioning their treatises and themselves to meet both the demands of humanist scholarship and political necessity.

The letters and treatises are crucial to understanding the third group of sources investigated: the official counter-histories, written by Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Esteban de Garibay and Gregorio López de Madera, that were commissioned directly by the Crown to respond to foreign polemical attacks against Spanish interests in France and Portugal. Although

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15 BNM, Ms/ 13229, fol. 203 r.-v.
16 For this shift in artes historicae in the latter part of the sixteenth century, see the work of Renaud Malavialle, “L’essor de la pensée historique au siècle d’or. De Juan Luis Vives à Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas” (PhD diss., University of Provence, 2008).
17 Most of the treatises of official historians remain unstudied. Of the treatises investigated in this study, only those of Sebastián Fox Morcillo, Ambrosio de Morales, and Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas have received any significant scholarly attention. See especially the works of Cortijo Ocaña and Sánchez Madrid cited above, and Renaud Malavialle, “Temps récit et vérité historique chez Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas,” Cahiers de Narratologie [Online] 15 (2008): http://narratologie.revues.org/698.
18 Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Cinco libros de la historia de Portugal y la conquista de las isles de los Azores (1591); Esteban de Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealógicas de los Católicos Reyes de las Españas y de los Cristianísimos de Francia (1596, manuscript 1593); Gregorio López Madera, Excelencias de la Monarquía y Reyno de España (1593); and Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Historia de los sucesos de Francia desde el año 1585 que comenzó la liga Católica hasta fin del año 1594 (1598). There is no study on either of Herrera’s works on Portugal and France (Historia de Portugal or Historia de los sucesos en Francia). No study exists on Garibay’s Ilustraciones Genealógicas. The few studies that exist on Madera’s Excelencias de la Monarquía have not placed it within the French-Spanish context out of which it emerged and was specifically commissioned to respond to. It should be noted that there has been considerable confusion as to the original year of publication for Madera’s Excelencias de la Monarquía, in great part because the work saw multiple editions. Some scholars, including Benito Sánchez Alonso and Richard Kagan, have mistakenly claimed that the book was originally published in 1625, and discuss it as part of the history writing being produced under Philip IV. This work, however, was first published in 1593, and was directly commissioned by Philip II to respond to the attacks being made against Spanish imperial claims in
Portugal and France were two distinct imperial contexts, requiring slightly different types of responses, all of the counter-histories fulfilled the political needs of the Spanish Crown as set out in the correspondence, using the humanist methodologies defined in the treatises.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, the counter-histories are excellent case studies for the examination of how the political needs of the Crown and the scholarly ambitions of the official historians were reconciled in practice.\textsuperscript{20} Crucially, the humanist techniques used in their official histories were more than just demonstrations of their erudition and scholarly abilities. They used humanist methodologies not only to provide legitimacy to their work, but strategically to justify political action and assert political legitimacy.

Only by combining these three groups of sources can we contextualize our understanding of late-sixteenth-century Spain’s “better history.” The combination of sources allows us to appreciate how official historians balanced the complex relationship between humanist history and history that served political ends. As we shall see, while the Crown emphasized content, the historians emphasized practice—a crucial bifurcation that was not a dichotomy. Significantly,

\textsuperscript{19} It should be noted that scholars of early modern history writing had long found it difficult to connect developments in humanist methodology to the actual writing of history, mainly because they followed the assumption that, throughout Europe, those who wrote \textit{artes historicae} rarely wrote narratives. Anthony Grafton, however, has gone a long way in demonstrating that there were notable exceptions, including Francesco Patrizi, François Baudouin, and Jean Bodin. Anthony Grafton, \textit{What was History? The Art of History in Early Modern Europe} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). It remains highly significant, however, that every single official historian in Philip’s court wrote a treatise on the \textit{artes historicae}, while also writing official history for the Crown.

\textsuperscript{20} Karl Kohut has made an immediate call to understand the relationship between theory and practice in Spain, especially after 1580, when he claims that, for the first time, those who wrote history and theory merge: “hasta los años setenta del siglo XVI, los teóricos no escriben crónicas y, por otra parte, los cronistas no escriben tratados teóricos . . . estudio es necesario de la convergencia entre teoría y praxis en tres autores que son, a la vez, cronistas y tratadistas de teoría historiográfica: Ambrosio de Morales, Antonio de Herrera y Luis Cabrera de Córdoba.” Karl Kohut, “Las Crónicas de Indias y la teoría historiográfica: desde los comienzos hasta los mediados del siglo XVI,” in \textit{Talleres de la memoria - Reivindicaciones y autoridad en la historiografía india de los siglos XVI y XVII}, ed. Robert Folger and Wulf Oesterreicher (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005), 157. It was not only these three historians who wrote both theoretical tracts and historical narratives; the process began much earlier than the 1580s, and every official historian in Philip’s court that this study investigates wrote treatises as well as historical works.
these ideas emerged from similar polemical necessities. The Crown needed “better history” to justify and legitimize Philip’s actions; official historians needed to write political history in ways that accorded with humanist notions of impartiality and truth—the precepts for writing what Páez de Castro called “good history” (buena historia). How the Crown and official historians sought to articulate and reconcile these needs is the focus of this study.

The intellectual creativity and elasticity of the Spanish political advisors and official historians were the product of a particular political and intellectual environment. Three related aspects of this environment are important for understanding the complexities, significance, and innovations of the late-sixteenth-century counter-histories: Spanish developments in historical writing prior to and surrounding late-sixteenth-century developments, including prior developments in the writing of official history and artem historicae and a growing Spanish antiquarianism; the political context surrounding the rise of reason of state ideology in Spain and its relationship to Spanish imperialism; and, finally, the rise of humanism in Europe and its implications for politics and historical methodologies.

Historiography and Antiquarianism in Philippine Spain

To appreciate late-sixteenth-century official historical writing in Spain fully, one must consider the longstanding relationship between history and politics in Spain. Philip’s historians could draw on a rich legacy of history writing at the service of the Crown, dating to the Middle Ages. Beatrice Leroy demonstrates that it was during the Middle Ages that the history of the

22 See Robert B. Tate, Ensayos sobre la historiografía peninsular del siglo XV (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1970); Peter J. Linehan, History and the Historians of Medieval Spain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Alan D.
nation came to be attached to that of the prince and to Spanish conceptions of royalty, majesty, and the idea of ideal government. In this way, Leroy argues, historians presented history as exempla, and their histories were a way to teach those in government about power and its exigencies. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Spanish historians looked to particular events, peoples, or traditions to provide examples of both good and bad government, and that would represent their visions of the past.

From the fifteenth century onwards, history originating in the court was primarily a means of defending the monarch and providing an official account of events. For this purpose, starting around 1400, the Spanish royal court set about institutionalizing the office of the chronicler, hoping to invest his work with an aura of trustworthiness (auctoritas) that other, non-official histories lacked. The official royal chroniclers were to craft texts that served as a kind of apologia favorable to the interests and image of the monarch, supporting the politics, and

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25 Significantly, in Spain, the institutionalization of the relationship between government and history was established much earlier in the fifteenth century than elsewhere, starting with the creation of the office of “royal historian” (cronistas del rey). Juan II offered his Latin secretary, Juan de Mena (1405-1454), an extra salary (or ración) in exchange for an “official” [or “sanctioned”] history of his reign, when confronted with the prospect that history might do something other than offer a laudatory portrait of his achievements, and in 1445, Mena became the first to be called by the official title of “royal historian.” See José Luis Bermejo Cabrero, “Orígenes del oficio de cronista real,” *Hispania*, 40 (1980): 395–409. This cemented the relationship between history and politics quite early in Spain. Moreover, the Catholic Monarchs would further entrench official history in Spain when they endowed the office of royal chronicler with new prestige by granting its incumbent a regular and lucrative yearly salary. For the relationship between power and historical writing prior to the sixteenth century in the rest of Europe see: Gabrielle M. Speigel, “Political Utility in Medieval Historiography,” *History and Theory* 14/3 (Oct. 1975): 314–325; Bernard Guenée, *Histoire et culture historique dans l’occident medieval* (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1980), 364–5; Bernard Guenée, *Politique et histoire au Moyen Age* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1981); Ernst Breisach, *Classical Rhetoric & Mediaeval Historiography* (Kalamazoo, MI: Mediaeval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University, 1985); Chantall Grell, Werner Parvicini, and Jürgen Voss eds., *Les princes et l’histoire du XIVe au XVIIIe siècles* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1998). See also Eduard Fueter, *Geschichte der neueren historiographie* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1911), 28–42.
conserving the memory of the monarch’s many great deeds. History was to support government objectives by compiling and recording the materials necessary to preserve and solidify claims to privilege, clarifying boundaries, and defining precedence. The role of historians at court increasingly came to be to define the rights of princes, whether to defend the rights of the monarch against those of the Church, their neighbors, or the ambitions of other noble families. Moreover, as Jeremy Lawrence observes, chroniclers became the official custodians and arbiters of memory, preventing vital information from falling into the abyss of “the forgotten” (*el olvido*).\(^{26}\)

According to Robert B. Tate, by the time of the “Catholic Monarchs,” Ferdinand and Isabel (r. 1474-1516), history had become a means to solidify internal bonds and to promote international standing.\(^{27}\) Under their patronage, Spanish historians constructed a version of the past in which the antiquity of the Spanish dynasty was emphasized, Spanish grandeur legitimized, and the special position that Spain held in the world justified.\(^{28}\) The primary feature of Spanish chronicles under the Catholic Monarchs was the preeminence of the Spanish kings, who, reign after reign, distinguished themselves from other European monarchs in their devotion to religion and military prowess, a legacy that culminated in the position of power that Spain found itself in by the beginning of the sixteenth century, having discovered the New World, expelled the Jews and Moors from the Spanish Peninsula, and established an empire.\(^{29}\)

Historians did not merely accommodate the past to the needs of the present; rather, the past

\(^{26}\) Lawrence, “Memory and Invention,” 91.


provided a framework within which to understand the present. Such vernacular chronicles became an expression of royalist ideology that exploited a rich legacy of European myths and classical history to promote and legitimize current objectives.³⁰

The national consolidation established by the Catholic Monarchs with the unification of Aragon and Castile provided Spanish historians with a master narrative. We see quite early on in Spain the re-invention of an eleventh-century genre, the writing of a monumental General History of Spain (Crónica General), which placed the monarchy at the center of Spanish history and made it the reason for Spain’s illustrious historic legacy and its providential destiny.³¹ Moreover, since royal family history and Spanish history were inseparable, by accounting for the sources of the “force” and “grandeur” of Spain, general histories also came to represent a sort of political testament for the Catholic Monarchs and their heirs. Such General Histories set the pattern for the dominant type of historical writing on the Iberian peninsula for nearly two centuries.³² Ricardo García Cárcel argues that these works played into a growing sense of a Spanish national consciousness.³³ Regardless of whether one sees such works as expressions of an early national identity, such general histories were, by the beginning of the sixteenth century, used to rally support and engender feelings of loyalty centered around the monarchy. Late-sixteenth-century Spanish advisors and Spanish official historians definitely drew upon these precedents and potentials.

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From an early stage of this historiographical development, humanist and patriotic impulses were closely knit. Starting in the mid-fifteenth century, closer contact with the Italian courts revealed that Italian humanists not only saw themselves as the sole inheritors of the glory of Rome, but generally regarded Spaniards as the barbaric and culturally backward descendants of the marauding Visigoths. Faced with Italian accusations of Spanish barbarity and immaturity, such as those that colored the works of the historian Guicciardini, the Crown understood that building international esteem and reputación must be an important part of its European political strategy. As Tate observes, official historians became cultural accomplices to the expansionist ambitions of the Catholic Monarchs, especially as they began to wield influence in Europe. For Tate, this promoted humanist-inspired historical writing in Spain, in which Spain’s past and present glories were directly envisioned and mediated through the vestiges of antiquity. Such connections were easy to establish, as Hispania had included some of the most Romanized provinces of the Republic and Empire. Spanish historians used the same evidence as their Italian counterparts to achieve the same end—a glorious past rooted in Greece and Rome that enhanced Spanish prestige in contemporary Europe. The Catholic Monarchs were careful to demand that their official historians were humanists, and high standards and humanist erudition were specifically mandated as requirements for those who held the lucrative position of official historian. Indeed, in 1497, the task of the royal historian was described as, “to write, declare,

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35 For example, Antonio de Nebrija, Muestra de la historia de los antigüedades de España (1499). Tate, “Mythology in Spanish Historiography,” 10–16.
copy and collect all of the information pertinent to the [chronicle of the reign] . . . to emulate the style of Livy and other ancient historians, and . . . embellish their chronicles with the judgments based on philosophy and sound doctrine.”  

Significantly, the imperial assertions of Spain’s power meant that the dignity of intellectual work in the vernacular rather than Latin was established very early on, doing away with the distinction between scholars and writers, although many authors continued to write in Latin in order to put forward their humanistic convictions and abilities.

The close relationship between historical writing and politics in Spain was also conditioned by the restrictive environment placed upon intellectual production, which also began under the Catholic Monarchs. Under Ferdinand and Isabel, all published work needed to be approved by the Crown. This limitation upon the circulation and publication of books meant that the most widely read histories were those endorsed by the court. Additionally, official historians were designated official censors of “all works of history,” whether published abroad or produced internally.  

Tate, Richard Kagan, and Fernando Bouza see such Spanish control over cultural production as unique in Europe at the time.  

Fear of the rise of Protestant ideas in Europe, and the need to control information about and access to the New World led to a greater effort to

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38 Translation mine, as cited in Bermejo Cabrero, “Orígenes del oficio de cronista real,” 408.
secure doctrinal and political orthodoxy. As both Jeremy Lawrence and Antonio Domínguez Ortiz demonstrate, official historians were clearly aware of royal censorship, and understood the need to moderate critiques of various aspects of the monarchs’ reign, such as the cruelty of the Inquisition, or the violence of battle and war. It is with such precedents and controls in mind that the late-sixteenth-century Spanish Crown came to appreciate the possible political fruits of a new historiographic enterprise.

In addition to these historical precedents, the unification of the peninsula and discovery of the New World created new political motivations to extend the function of official history from praising the institution of the Monarchy and the person of the monarch to exalting and supporting the Spanish imperial agenda. Official history came to provide the legitimization for Spain’s quest to expand its territories and the justification of its position of power. Scholars have long recognized that New World histories posed particular problems for historical writing as they had to deal with completely new materials and a disorienting strangeness of lands and peoples, which led not only to problems of description and understanding, but meant that much of the precedent of classical theory, evidence, and knowledge was insufficient and did not apply. From the outset, Spanish official historians tasked with writing about New World developments were given access to documents, told to base their accounts on reliable sources,

45 Tate, Ensayos sobre la historiografía peninsular del siglo XV, 253.
and were aided by secretaries and scribes who had themselves been tasked with recording every aspect of the conquest. Although they did not write distinct treatises on the *artes historicae*, the historians Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo and Bartolomé de las Casas, aware of the need for new techniques and new rhetorical strategies, discussed in the prologues to their narrative histories issues of authority, authenticity, and credibility; they specifically focused on the use and authentication of eyewitness accounts. Ultimately, they sought to find a way to lay claim to a privileged form of interpretation that they called “truth.”

As the century progressed, histories of the New World took on more administrative and legalistic/notarial tones, and focused on the specific dates of events, lists of those present at events, and upon the recording of laws, ordinances, and titles and prerogatives that had been granted. As Eva Stoll demonstrates, the use of the arid notarial/chancellery style, especially in many non-official works, afforded New World histories a certain marker of credibility. This

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increased use of documents in historical narratives and legalistic tone played an increasingly important role in contests over rights and power.

Given their methodological and formal innovations, it is unfortunate that the sixteenth-century Spanish histories of the New World are studied separately from the histories of the Iberian Peninsula. Many of the developments in New World writings, including their use of the notarial style, their considerations of the reliability of eyewitneses, and their use of documents within their texts and the legal authority such documents provided (even in actual negotiations), are a crucial backdrop to the official histories that developed in the final decades of the sixteenth century. They were particularly relevant to the way documents were used in official histories as a way to legitimize petitions and claims to authority. Furthermore, the official historians adopted many of the practices of New World historians to assert their own authority and probity.

Charles V (r. 1519-1556), Philip II’s father and Holy Roman Emperor, furthered both the political uses of history and its relationship to humanism.51 He continued the project of the Crónica General, commissioning Lucio Marineo Sículo to write a history of Spain from antiquity to the eleventh century. In his De Rebus hispaniae memorabilibus (1533), Siculo consulted books and documents, and sought to come to a better understanding of events in the past by turning to geography, archeology, and numismatics.52 In addition, as Baltassar Cuart Moner observes, the histories written in Charles’ reign, drawing upon the Medieval convention

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of sacerdotal kingship, emphasized how the monarch embodied the characteristics of all of the members of his divinely-chosen and divinely-supported dynasty of kings. Alongside such developments, historical writing under Charles aimed to immortalize the monarch by presenting Charles as a good ruler because he epitomized his ancestors and the ancients; they focused on the ancient precedent of Rome and promoted Charles as its imperial heir. By placing the monarch in the pantheon of his ancestors, histories also provided Charles V with a continuous narrative by which his power was legitimized and which justified Spain’s universal imperial ambitions.

Unlike their Medieval antecedents, these new imperial histories used documents and letters to increase their credibility. Official historians like Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and Fray Antonio de Guevarra studded their work with long extracts from primary sources. By mid-century, therefore, Spanish official historians used excerpts from documents in their texts, visited archives, requested eyewitness accounts, and occasionally noted contemporary bibliographic sources. In fact, official histories began to use a significant number of original documents, although the inclusion of sources was rather sporadic. Like most Renaissance historians, official

historians under Charles followed the precepts of rhetoric and carefully transmuted most raw documents into smooth artistic prose.

Charles’s reign also saw the development of another variety of historical writing that specifically depicted the Emperor’s chivalric and heroic actions and deeds; these works tended to resemble the Medieval panegyric more than humanist forms of narrative. For example, Pedro de Mexia’s *Historia del Emperador Carlos V* (1548) outlined the Emperor’s illustrious genealogy and emphasized Charles’s most noteworthy accomplishments, envisioning Charles as a Burgundian monarch who rose to glory through chivalrous prowess, wartime valor, and service to the Catholic cause. It emphasized the sacred character of the monarchy and argued that Charles’s actions had been divinely sanctioned and supported. This work was written in order to create a desire for emulation, especially among the young prince Philip and Spanish courtiers, but was also supposed to characterize Charles as the apogee of the Catholic Monarchy, whose task it was to bring Catholicism to an empire; it depicted Charles as almost superhuman, and his monarchy as limitless. Thus, while Mexía’s veneration of the monarch significantly damaged the objectivity of his work, it was a powerful vehicle for expressing royalist ideology.

Official histories under Charles were understood to possess a specific political, pragmatic, and pedagogical purpose within the court. According to both Tate and Baltasar Cuart Moner, Charles’s reign was characterized by a dramatic increase in the use of history as an educational tool, and history as *magistra vitae*. Histories were seen as moralizing and

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pedagogical works and all of Charles’s official historians used humanist strategies of historical comparison to provide moral guidance for public action in present circumstances. Ronald Truman, in his book on Spanish mirrors-of-princes, discusses these Spanish expressions of historiographical humanism, and how the use of historical exempla to discuss politics and the art of ruling became even more prevalent under Philip II, and how, like the majority of European humanist work at the time, the material was organized in terms of commonplaces. As a result, as Alfredo Alvar Ezquerra claims, Spanish historians increasingly came to address directly the problems of truth, the utility of history, its pedagogical function, and its political fundament.

Therefore, as Cuart Moner states, by the time Philip came to power in 1556, some very clear humanist methodological precepts had been adopted by all of the official historians in Spain. These included a Ciceronian definition of history based on the models of Livy and Sallust, history as magistra vitae, which meant that it had both a political and ethical dimension. In addition, through the careful selection and exposition of examples, history was supposed to not only enhance the reader’s morality, but provide modes of conduct for the collective as well as the prince. In essence, modes of conduct were to be derived from history, although in the

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58 Ronald W. Truman, Spanish Treatises on Government, Society and Religion in the Time of Philip II: The ‘de regimine principum’ and Associated Traditions (Leiden: Brill, 1999). Significantly, scholars agree that the notion that historical exempla be used for political education, and the creation of early modern handbooks on political methodology, primarily concerned with the arrangement of historical data for didactic purposes, appears in Spain much earlier than elsewhere, and was clearly evident in Fadique Furió Ceriol, El consejo y consejeros del príncipe (Amberes, 1559). María Ángeles Galino Carrillo, Los tratados sobre educación de príncipes (Siglos XVI y XVII) (Madrid: CSIC, 1948), 2–35.

Aristotelian sense, rather than the Machiavellian one. Indeed, the pattern of analogical thinking that was a fundamental element in historical thinking across Europe was prevalent in Spain. History, therefore, through its provision of exempla, came to be regarded as the primary means to teach, inform, and discuss the art of rule, and a vehicle through which to discuss politics.

While these developments in historical writing and its relationship to politics are well understood for the reign of the Catholic Monarchs and Charles V, less is known about how Philip II (r. 1556-1598) utilized history for his own political objectives. Most scholars state that the forms established by previous Spanish monarchs simply continued under Philip. This research gap may in fact be a reflection of the young king’s own attitudes; as Richard L. Kagan demonstrates, when Philip II took the throne, he openly objected to his own history being written, perceiving it as a vanity. Instead, he promoted other forms of official history, in

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61 Fernández-Santamaria, *The State, War and Peace. Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance*, 240–48. This started to have more practical applications around 1560, when Spanish historians like Juan Páez de Castro turned to Cicero, seeing history not merely as, “the light of truth” but the “mistress of life,” and even, beyond Cicero, “a principal counselor of state,” that was to be directed towards princes and their education. See “Memorial del Dr. Juan Páez de Castro, dado al rey Philipppe II al principio de su reinado,” *Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos* 9 (1883): 165–170.
62 For a long time, the writing of history in Philippine Spain was understood mainly through the summaries included in general overviews of early modern Spanish historical writing, monographs on individual Spanish historians or their individual works, or studies that concentrated on the Crónica General project. The standard works remain Benito Sánchez Alonso, *Historia de la historiografía Española*, Vol. II, *De Ocampo a Solís* (1543-1684) (Madrid: CSIC, 1941-1950), 109–174; Rafael Ballester y Castell, *Las fuentes narrativas de la historia de España durante la edad moderna* (1474-1808) (Valladolid: Talleres gráficos de la Sociedad general de publicaciones, 1927), 56–78; George Cirot, *Etudes sur l'historiographie espagnole. Marian historien* (Bordeaux: Feret & fils, 1905). In fact, there is an almost a forty year gap between such scholarship and more modern assessments of Spanish historical writing in the late-sixteenth century, undoubtedly the result of the restrictions placed upon scholarship (and especially access to the archives by foreign scholars) during the Franco regime. More recent scholarship discussed below has begun to fill this void by looking to developments in Spanish “General Histories,” trying to relate them to scholarship of the past twenty years that deals with the rise of the nation and national identity (like that of Cárcel and Wulff), and on growing Spanish antiquarianism, (like those of Sánchez Madrid, Van Liere, and Olds), as well as expanding our understanding of the artes historicae (like that of Malavialle).
particular the *Crónica General* project. However, Philip’s attitude towards the writing of the history of his own reign changed dramatically around 1580, although Kagan acknowledges that “it is difficult to pinpoint the precise moment, let alone the precise cause of this turnabout.”

According to Kagan, Spain witnessed an increased prescription of history for polemical purposes beginning around 1580, marking a decided “political turn” in Spanish official history “expressly designed to defend not only [Philip’s] policies, but also his reputación as a historical actor.”

While Kagan notices this shift, it is not the focus of his study, and unfortunately Kagan does not delve into individual works, nor their contents or methodological framework. It is not coincidental that the counter-histories that this study focuses upon were written after 1580, when Philip’s attitude changes, and when this “political turn” is seen to have occurred.

This study, through its rich untapped source base, will build upon Kagan’s observations to demonstrate specifically why this “political turn” in Spanish official history occurred and why the writing of official history in late Philippine Spain changed so dramatically. It will demonstrate that the foreign polemical attacks on the nature of Spanish rule and Spanish imperialism directly produced a specific Spanish response in the form of emergent and innovative historical writing. Most significantly, this study will reveal that this “political turn” in official history was intimately tied to a burgeoning culture of reason of state, and the re-definition occurring in Spanish imperial identity.


64 For example, Ambrosio de Morales, *La Crónica general de España* (1574-86) and Esteban de Garibay, *Compendio historial de las chronicas y universal historia de todos los reynos de España* (1571). See Ricardo García Cárcel, ed., *La Construcción de las Historias de España* (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2004), Ch. 4 and 5.

65 Kagan attributes this change in attitude to a combination of Philip’s advanced age, his increasingly precarious health, and the direct and sustained attack from various enemies both foreign and domestic. Richard L. Kagan, “‘Official History’ at the Court of Philip II of Spain,” in *Princes and Princely Culture, 1450-1650*, ed. Martin Gosman, Alasdair MacDonald, and Arjo Vanderjagt (Boston: Brill, 2005), 268.

Kagan notes that, “the king’s historians were to be historians wholly dedicated to the cause of the monarchy and the glory of the Spanish nation.” Yet, as this study will show, while this is true, and official historians remained faithful to the Crown in their work, they were also very aware of the need to remain faithful to their humanist ideals and values, thus indicating that the motivations, goals, and loyalties of Philip’s official historians were very complex. Moreover, and crucially, it was the precise manner in which the official historians applied their extensive knowledge of historical practice that transformed their work into the powerful tool of state it became.

Artes Historicae, ca. 1495 - ca. 1550

According to Karl Kohut, early sixteenth-century Spanish artes historicae focused on the relationship of history to rhetoric, emphasized style, and sought to identify historical patterns; it reflected the traditional humanist understanding of the methods and purposes of history. These issues of style and presentation and how to record events first appeared as reflections in the prefaces to early-sixteenth-century histories, such as those of Antonio de Nebrija or Lorenzo Galíndez de Caravajal. Nebrija, a renowned philologist and commentator on texts, was the first to claim explicitly that for history to be accepted as truthful, the historian needed to judge his sources carefully. Galíndez de Caravajal provided one of the earliest expressions of the difficulties relating to the dual role of the official historian as both provider of truth and servant of the Crown, producing the first extensive commentary on the problems and aims of official

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70 Codoñer, “Tres cronistas reales: Alfonso de Palencia, Antonio de Nebrija y Lucio Marineo Siculo,” 120.
historians, in the preface to his Memorial o registro breve de los Reyes Católicos (1523).\(^7^1\) In the first decades of the sixteenth century, these passing reflections developed into full-scale treatises about the philosophy and idea of the craft of history. Most of these texts followed the classical example of Aristotle’s Ars rhetorica,\(^7^2\) and were didactic treatises on the reading and writing of history analogous to the artes poetica and rhetorica.\(^7^3\) In his De tradendi disciplinis (1531), Juan Luis Vives propagated the idea so dear to Italian humanists, of rhetorical eloquence as essential to creating prose able to “live on and move the will of others.”\(^7^4\) However, Vives also argued that historians were drawn to rhetorical excess, excessive credulity, intentional lying, and too much zeal for their country and religion.\(^7^5\) He offered a program for writing a history of nature and the arts, as well as for states, and for forms of learning and scholars; in doing so he connected the artes historicae to a wide range of contemporary projects including the examination of the relationship between truth and fiction, fact and fallacy.\(^7^6\) Vives included in

\(^{7^1}\) Lorenzo Galindez de Caravajal, Memorial o registro breve de los Reyes Católicos (1523), ed. Juan Carretero Zamora (Segovia: Patronato del Alcázar, 1992), 2.

\(^{7^2}\) See Malavialle, “L’essor de la pensée historique au siècle d’or” and Kohut, “Die spanische poetic zwischen Rhetorik und Historiographie,” 75–93. Precedents for such works abounded in antiquity, such as Lucian’s ‘How to Write History,’ and in the Middle Ages, Isidore of Seville’s chapter on the utility of history and on the first historians; but in general this genre was the creation of Italian humanists. The “praise of history” became an immensely popular topic in Renaissance literature and appeared in a number of guises from dialogues to lectures, pedagogical works, and prefaces. It also began to take the form of treatises, such as Lorenzo Valla’s The Writing of History, the works of Polydore Vergil, and the writings of Juan Luis Vives discussed above. For a general discussion of such Renaissance works see Donald Kelley, “François Baudouin and his Conception of History,” Journal of the History of Ideas XXV(1964), 35–37. See also Peter Burke, The Sociology of Knowledge: From Gutenberg to Diderot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 83–87.


\(^{7^5}\) Karl Kohut, La ficción de la crónica y la verdad de la épica: Hispanoamérica, siglos XVI – XVII (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2003), Introduction.

\(^{7^6}\) Vives outlined that in the narration of events and actions, since they were more intended for understanding or moral education, the historian had to have a more ample notion of truth, which allowed one to add to works senetencias and adages intended to teach or entertain. Accordingly, what was required was a certain rhetorical
his treatise ideas on how to compose history, what subjects to include, how to map out stages of
development and decline, how to recount an event, or narrate simultaneous events without
confusing the reader, and how to create precepts or “rules for learning” and especially those for
useful ends.77 “Method” in terms of his ars historica, therefore, implied a historical pattern and a
pedagogical scheme.78

Renaud Malavialle, who provides the first sustained study of the writing of artes
historicae in Spain between 1530 and 1590, reveals that, starting around 1560, Spanish artes
historicae began to focus less on the rhetorical purposes of history and more on the importance
of analyzing and utilizing historical sources.79 While Malavialle does not link the distinct nature
of these treatises to shifting political needs, he does demonstrate that starting around 1560, the
artes historicae in Spain began to reflect specifically on the use of sources, and how to judge the
work of ancient predecessors.80 Sabine MacCormack links the more discriminating use of
historical evidence in the second half of the sixteenth century to the growing belief that political
change arises not from individual actions but from the interplay of forces beyond the individual’s

77 Kohut, “Die spanische poetic zwischen Rhetorik und Historiographie,” 75–93. For a comprehensive study of
notions of Renaissance language, rhetoric, and historical thought see Nancy Struever, The Language of History in
l’enseignement de la rhétorique au XVIIe siècle,” XVIIe siècle 80-81 (1968), 19–43; Hannah Gray, “Renaissance
Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence,” Journal of the History of Ideas 24 (1963), 497–514; and Grafton, What was
History, 21–29.

78 Santiago Montero Díaz, “La doctrina de la Historia en los tratadistas españoles del Siglo de Oro,” Hispania
(Revista Española de Historia) 1 (1940-41): 3–39. For a general description of sixteenth-century discussions on
method, see Julian Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Sixteenth-Century Revolution in the Methodology of Law and
History (New York; Columbia University Press, 1963), Chs. 7–9.

79 Renaud Malavialle, “L’essor de la pensée historique au siècle d’or,” 258–276. See also Malavialle, “Temps, récit
et vérité historique chez Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas.”

MacCormack argues that shifts in historical methods went hand in hand with shifts in the nature of events and processes that attracted the interest of the historian in the first place, and because in the late-sixteenth century historians sought to provide political truth through *exempla*, they became more attentive to the need to provide accurate historical information. Similarly, Malavialle sees the more concerted interest in source evaluation in the second half of the sixteenth century as consistent with the changing landscape of political ideas that MacCormack observes. The treatises written by the Spanish official historians at this time, all gave priority to the problem of historical truth, began to regard the question of style and elegance as secondary, and set out to transform the rudimentary text-processing systems of the rhetorical tradition into a more distinctive method on ways to accumulate, categorize and evaluate sources. This study will demonstrate that all of the treatises on the *artes historicae* by Philip’s official historians fall into this new category of *artes historicae*, focusing on source use and evaluation.

Although all of the treatises written on the *artes historicae* by Philip’s official historians focused specifically on writing history for the Crown, they all recognized the need to be

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82 Malaviallle is not the first, however, to point to this change in the *artes historicae*. See Rafael Altamira, “Antonio de Herrera, su Concepto de la Historia y su Metodología,” *Armas y Letras* (Nuevo León) V/8 (Aug. 31, 1948), 349–356; and Antonio Cortijo Ocaña, *Teoría de la historia en el siglo XVI en Sebastián Fox Morcillo*, “Introducción.”
impartial and dispassionate, and the need to utilize humanist methodologies to further this cause, which prompted further theoretical and methodological refinements in source use and evaluation. Indeed, this study will conclude that it is precisely because of their political role that Spanish official historians were forced to think about method in more critical terms. The treatises of Philip’s official historians combined the observations made by their predecessors with new insights into how to write humanist history with polemical consequences. Philip’s official historians turned their focus directly upon humanist scholarly methodologies, bringing together a wide variety of requisites, tools, and techniques, including those of antiquarians, and thus enlarged the scope of the artes historicae.

Antiquarianism, Archives and Authentication

Recent scholarship by Katherine Van Liere, Sebastián Sánchez Madrid, and Lucia Binotti demonstrates that by the 1560’s advances in the ancillary disciplines, especially the critical philology developed by Italian humanists, helped to create new criteria for accuracy in the assessment of historical documents.84 Using legal, grammatical, rhetorical, geographical, and chronological arguments, Spanish humanists began to critically assess the authenticity of their sources and demonstrated that many documents were forgeries.85 Significantly, Sánchez Madrid


85 A crucial qualification should be made, however. Pervasive as the influence of classical humanism was, and despite humanist philology’s enduring contributions to historical studies, we should not overlook the subtle but substantial effects of medieval scholarship, including the various medieval legal traditions that gave vital ideas and techniques to historical scholarship, which not only persisted into the sixteenth century, but enjoyed a kind of
demonstrates that these antiquarian developments were directly appropriated by official historians like Ambrosio de Morales, who enhanced the scope of Spanish official historical writing by demonstrating an awareness of, and the importance attached to, primary sources. By incorporating such techniques into his historical narratives, and in particular his general history, La coronica general de España (1574), Morales established in Spain the notion of narrative history as the presentation of documentable facts. For Sánchez Madrid, by incorporating the results of antiquarian research into his work, Morales provided “new opportunities for empirical verification within historical narratives, reinforcing the idea that the study of the past could be a science of verifiable truth.”86 Crucially, the Spanish Crown would ask Morales for advice on how the official counter-histories should be written, indicating that Morales’s knowledge of and adherence to a particular historical methodology would be brought directly to bear upon the way the Crown conceived of the late-sixteenth-century official historiographical project (or counter-history project), the opportunities that this could provide, and how such techniques could be used for greater political effect. This study will explain the role that learned proto-bureaucrats like Morales played in late-sixteenth-century developments in official historical writing, and how the Crown turned to them, seeking to use their learned antiquarian skills, tools, and techniques for the purposes of state.

In addition, Katherine Van Liere demonstrates that scholars like Morales embodied many of the tensions that emerged in the sixteenth century between the critical tendencies of the humanist movement and the confessional demands of the Catholic tradition, demonstrating how

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although Spanish historians drew deeply from humanist critical traditions, they also exemplified a passionate pride in the Spanish monarchical tradition and local religious tradition, and so sought to find ways to use humanist tools to support the Catholic cause. As we shall see, late-sixteenth-century official historians similarly grappled with how to utilize humanist scholarly rigor to support and legitimize the claims of the Crown, utilizing their critical learning for the purposes of political apologetics.

Significantly, the Spanish Crown was directly involved in growing antiquarianism, and Richard Kagan notes that Philip II personally tasked historians to record officially the “antiquities of Spain,” sending them on missions “to collect old [medieval] and ancient manuscripts, and all documents pertinent to the realm,” as well as ancient and medieval relics, and transportable remnants of the past, including coins and inscriptions, and to bring them to the new Escorial Library. The royal library at the Escorial became a treasury of books and artefacts that inherently expressed Philip’s majesty, by sheer virtue of the high quality of its original copies and artefacts. Indeed, the Spanish Crown saw historical documentation as a crucial

87 I thank Professor Van Liere, who was gracious enough to send me the transcript of a talk she gave on this topic at the Society for Spanish and Portuguese Studies. A synopsis of her talk, Katherine van Liere, “Criticism and credulity in the historical thought of Ambrosio de Morales,” The Society for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies Bulletin (2005), is available at: http://www.sonoma.edu/users/h/halavais/ssphs/html/old/issue1/index.htm.

88 For example, Ambrosio de Morales, “Viaje de Ambrosio de Morales por orden del rey D. Phelipe II. a los reynos de Leon, y Galicia, y principado de Asturias. Para reconocer las reliquias de santos, sepulcros reales, y libros manuscritos de las cathedrales, y monasterios. Dale á luz con notas, con la vida del autor, y con su retrato,” (1582), BNM Mss/9934. This work would be published in slightly modified and expanded form as Ambrosio de Morales, Viaje santo . . . por orden del rey Phelipe II a los reynos de Leon, Galicia y Principado de Asturias (Madrid, 1585).

89 José Luis Rodríguez de Diego, “La formación del Archivo de Simancas en el siglo XVI. Función y orden interno,” in El libro antiguo español, IV. Coleccionismo y bibliotecas (siglos XV-XVII), ed. María Luisa López-Vidriero, Pedro M. Cátedra and María Isabel Hernández González (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1998), 519–57. The building of the Spanish archives remains a relatively neglected field of study in the history of written culture in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain. Without a doubt the strengthening of the archives serving the Crown and other jurisdictions warrants the greatest attention. Moreover, such antiquarian efforts also formed an organic part of the massive early modern effort to capture and use the whole world of particulars. See Gianna
weapon that could be used to assert religious or political legitimacy and supplement claims, and, as elsewhere in Europe, the archives had become central nodes in the sixteenth century’s international web of information-gathering institutions. Fernando Bouza even comments upon how the most notable members of Philip’s court were known to sift through the archives, as if they were “veritable political gold mines” with which to make claims and assert authority and find proof of rights and obligations.

Archives and libraries were designed to preserve the “official” record of the king’s reign and all other official matters. According to José Luis Rodríguez de Diego, Philip extended the contents of the Royal Archives from guarding the “rights and privileges of the monarchy,” to include those of “all of [the king’s] vassals and subjects.” Moreover, not only did Philip seek to give additional definition to the contents of the archive, but he sought to create “order,” commissioning a central catalogue for the library collections of both the Escorial and Uclés, created by none other than Páez de Castro and Morales. Most importantly, while restricted

91 Grafton, What was History?, 125.
94 Official historians Juan Páez de Castro and Ambrosio de Morales were not only commissioned to gather materials for the archives, but even wrote tracts about creating archives and what was to be contained therein. Significantly, Morales was the first to create a central catalog for the Library collections of both the Escorial and the Library at Uclés, thus initiating data-organization innovations years before other countries made the first catalogs of their own holdings. Ambrosio de Morales, “Apuntes sobre el Archivo de Uclés,” (ca. 1579) BNM Ms/12876 and Ambrosio de
access had been imposed upon these collections, and access was only granted by royal approval, as Rodríguez de Diego observes, access to the most recent documentation placed within the archive was made available only to specifically sanctioned official historians and the king’s closest advisors.95 The patrimonial collections and restrictive nature of the archive are illustrative of the importance and the potential political uses that the information contained in the archive possessed for those in power, and especially in the mind of the king. Only those to whom the king granted access could make document-based claims, or more importantly, provide the judicial exigency of written proof.

We see under Philip, therefore, not only an increase in the volume of accumulated documents, but an incessant turning to these documents, which also engendered further accumulation and organizational measures. Indeed, this careful preservation and classification of treaties, letters, and dispatches in archives were dictated more by the emergence of legitimizing arguments anchored in political-historical fact than by mere legal codes. Owing to the thoroughness of the bureaucratic system and the increasing importance of writing and archival papers, every imperial action was indelibly stamped in the record held in the archives, to be used for future reference or to assert claims.96 Significantly, when it came to European international relations the archive had also become the primary repository of “diplomatic successes” and “military triumphs,” making the archive the primary repository of that which not only exalted the

Morales, Parecer sobre la librería de El Escorial (ca. 1566), BNM Ms/5732. See also Juan Páez de Castro, “Memorial dado al Rey Felipe II, sobre fundar una librería por Don Juan Páez de Castro” (1568) [Presentación de D. Blas Antonio Nassarre, 1784] BNM VE/1242/8 and 9/241507.
95 José Luis Rodríguez de Diego, “Archivos del Poder, archivos de la Administración, archivos de la Historia (s.XVI-XVII),” in Historia de los Archivos y de la Archivística en España, (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1998), 29–42.
96 Moreover, for González Echevarría the vastness and sheer size of the archive, and the continuous stream of information that came through its doors, was a simulacrum of the order of the empire; an order that was “a simulacrum of the authority invested in the figure of the king.” Gonzáles Echeverría, Myth and Archive: A Theory of Latin American Narrative, 18.
monarchy and the perpetuation of its memory, but of the documents that were to be utilized in imperial contests.\textsuperscript{97} Such developments are vital to keep in mind for, as we shall see, the archive will play a crucial role in late-sixteenth-century developments in official historical writing, becoming the key source from which official historians were required to obtain their information to write their historical narratives for the Crown, providing the “proof” necessary to make claims in counter-histories. Moreover, the restrictive nature and purpose of the archive obviously conditioned the historiographic enterprise, while also allowing official historians to make certain claims to truth.

Alongside such antiquarian developments in Spain, one also sees an increase in the creation of forgeries, most notably a number of artifacts found in Granada, commonly referred to as the \textit{Plomos}.\textsuperscript{98} The \textit{Plomos} had attained great popularity and had become highly significant, as they allowed for a recasting of Moorish Granada’s past in a Christian mold.\textsuperscript{99} Significantly, the creators of the \textit{Plomos} had constructed their texts with a profound understanding of what “true” (in the Renaissance sense) really looked like; they employed recognizable principles of historical criticism such as a distinction between primary and secondary sources and a sensitivity to

\textsuperscript{98} In 1588, treasure hunters in Granada discovered a series of forged documents and saints’ relics, collectively referred to as the \textit{Plomos} (lead books) of Granada. These included an apparently ancient parchment written in Castilian, Arabic, and Latin, discovered in the rubble of Granada’s old minaret, a number of relics including a piece of the Virgin’s handkerchief and a bone of the protomartyr Saint Steven, and twenty-two thin lead disks engraved in Arabic. Most of the texts were attributed to St. Cecilio, the legendary first Bishop of Granada, and one of the Seven Apostolic Men who were believed to have been St. James’s (Santiago’s) disciples and the first bishops and evangelizers on the Iberian Peninsula. Katie Harris, “Forging History: The \textit{Plomos} of the Sacromonte of Granada in Francisco Bermúdez de Pedraza’s \textit{Historia Eclesiástica},” \textit{The Sixteenth Century Journal} XXX/4 (1999), 945–966; Antonio Bonet Correa, “Entre la superchería y la fe: El Sacromonte de Granada,” \textit{Historia} 16 (1981): 43–54; Benjamin Alan Ehlers, “Juan Bautista Pérez and the \textit{Plomos de Granada}: Spanish Humanism in the late-Sixteenth Century,” \textit{Al-Qantara: Revista de estudios árabes} XXIV/2 (2003). For other forgeries emerging throughout Europe see, Anthony Grafton, \textit{Forgers and Critics: Creativity and Duplicity in Western Scholarship} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 43–48 and Lisa Jardine, \textit{Erasmus, Man of Letters: The Construction of Charisma in Print} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
\textsuperscript{99} Katie Harris, \textit{From Muslim to Christian Granada: Inventing a City’s Past in Early Modern Spain} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2007).
historical distance and anachronism. As a result of the proliferation and popularity of these forgeries, Spanish learned readers and scholars became increasingly sensitive to errors of fact, chronology and detail, historical and linguistic anachronisms, and a host of other textual problems. Such developments undoubtedly created an environment in which readers began to view such allegedly primary sources and the histories which used them rather skeptically, re-enforcing official historians desire to demonstrate their own thorough and meticulous scholarship. The Plomos controversy and resulting skepticism renders the innovative methods of contemporary antiquarians upon which the official historians drew all the more significant. When making their claims for the Crown, the historians acknowledged the need to protect and validate certain claims in order to safeguard political objectives and protect the res publica. This need to produce works that advanced the Crown’s agenda to a skeptical audience led official historians to new kinds of critical thought and new ways to demonstrate and provide “proof” of their claims.

These historiographical developments meant that official historians in late-sixteenth-century Spain were working in an intellectual environment full of novel restrictions and possibilities. When new political needs arose, particularly the need to confront foreign polemical attacks, these foundations provided the Spanish Crown and Spanish official historians with the means to make history a more effective tool of state.

Politics in Philippine Spain, ca. 1560-1598

Changes in late-sixteenth-century Spanish official history must be seen in direct relation to Spain’s increased need to defend and define itself in a Europe that was increasingly hostile to Spanish imperial designs and its European hegemony and also in light of growing internal criticism. Philip’s advisors directly referred to these issues in their discussions of why reason of state should be used to frame the Crown’s vision of Philip’s rule, and how they wanted Spanish politics to be presented in the counter-histories. The administration of justice and the defense of the faith became the two pivots of the “New Monarchy” (Nueva Monarchía) and their antiquity and continuity formed the basis of their political legitimacy and religious unity.

Understanding this vision of the monarch as the center of Spanish identity and purpose, as well as the ideals that this purpose embodied and their historical foundations is vital since, as we shall see, these ideas and notions were directly included in the way Spanish counter-histories were conceptualized.

In late-sixteenth-century Europe, contention was rife over what determined kingship, sovereignty, and legitimacy, and the relationship of these concepts to territorial conquest, power, and control. Indeed, a larger political debate was going on across Europe, centered on questions about the reasons behind, and the nature of rule. Consequently, many foreigners began to provide

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extensive critiques of the Spanish Monarchy and its objectives. Arguments opposing Spanish imperialism within Europe rested on claims that the Spanish king was a “bad ruler,” Spaniards were cruel “oppressors,” the Spanish Inquisition was diabolical, Spain wished to achieve universal hegemony, and Philip II was a deeply flawed human being. Reaction to such characterizations intensified the Spanish courts’ interest in questions regarding the nature of rule, Spain’s providential destiny, and how to maintain a vast empire, while keeping both those abroad and those at home contented. Anthony Pagden demonstrates how dynastic claims began to look insufficient as a mode of political leverage and imperial legitimacy, when they were unsupported by a larger conception of the destiny of the state. The Spanish Crown struggled to express its imperial identity in more humanist terms focused on the nature of Spanish rule and the benefits derived from association, rather than simply in dynastic terms, or through Providentialist reasoning. Furthermore, the last years of Philip’s reign also saw a burgeoning social and economic crisis because of the continued demands of the Crown upon its Castilian subjects for financial support in its imperialist efforts combined with population growth and inflation. Internal criticisms of Philip’s rule also emerged because of the bloodshed, violence, and destruction that resulted from the Morisco Revolt (1568-1570), which was well remembered

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in Granada and became emblematic of attitudes towards Philip.108 Scholars of early modern Spanish intellectual history have identified this changing political climate in the last years of Philip’s reign, demonstrating that a re-definition was occurring in terms of both imperial and monarchical identity and how both were tied to the rise of the state and reason of state ideology.109 Indeed, as José A. Fernández-Santamaría has noted, a “new political culture” came about during the final two decades of Philip’s reign.110 It is within this political atmosphere that the primary element of humanist politics—reason of state—emerged in Spain.111

“Reason of state” was a sixteenth-century Italian coinage that had quickly established itself across Europe in the councils of princes; it referred to the practical ways in which princes conducted their business and the reasons that guided them when doing so.112 Reason of state also centered around the idea that the well-being and stability of the state were paramount, and all of the government's actions should be directed to this end. Among those who brought such issues to

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light was Machiavelli, who in *Il Principe* (1532) had pointed out the central problem with the concept: that it was extremely difficult to separate reason of state from pure self-interest, and questionable actions that promote the health of the state from those that promote the personal ambitions of the ruler. Moreover, divorced from traditional Western concepts of Christian morality, reason of state became an end unto itself, carrying its own independent standard of behavior. This led to a debate across Europe about the relationship among politics, morality, and religion, and the intentions of rulers when making political decisions.

Many Catholic theorists, aware of the needs of the state, sought to reconcile religious orthodoxy and reason of state needs. Giovanni Botero’s *Ragion di Stato* (1589) was particularly influential in Spain, as it endeavored to reconcile Machiavelli’s notion of power politics with the principles of Christianity.¹¹³ In fact, Philip II himself commissioned the first translation of Botero’s work to appear in another European vernacular; it was translated into Spanish in 1591 by none other than official historian Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, who, significantly, was also a key participant in the counter-history project.¹¹⁴ Fernández-Santamaría, Joan-Pau Rubiés, and Xavier Gil, have expanded our understanding of the theory and practice of Spanish reason of

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¹¹⁴ For a further discussion of Herrera’s translation of Botero’s work see Chapter One and Three below.
state (razón de estado).\textsuperscript{115} They demonstrate that the Spanish court was acutely aware of the transformation of European political discourse in the wake of the reception of Machiavelli’s \textit{Il Principe}, and responded by integrating topics and terminologies familiar from juridical and theological texts and debates into discourses on political prudence, seeking to create a Christian reason of state.\textsuperscript{116} Indeed, in treatises on the art of government, like those of the Jesuits Pedro de Ribadeneira and Juan de Mariana, Spanish theorists set out to provide a doctrine of statecraft just as practicable, though morally less offensive, than the one found in Machiavelli’s \textit{Il Principe}.\textsuperscript{117}

In particular, Spanish political theorists accepted the basic premise that in order to maintain power a ruler had to protect and expand his territorial possessions, and focused on how a prince could do this in a Christian fashion. Essentially, Spanish political theorists sought to make Christian ethics and the exigencies of \textit{Realpolitik} compatible.

As Harald Braun demonstrates, Spanish political theorists and theologians, like Mariana, bridged discursive boundaries to contextualize Spanish politics within this new landscape; theories of Spanish reason of state fused scholastic and humanist concepts and methodologies into a hybrid language about reason of state that integrated Aristotelian-Thomist and Augustinian-Catholic discourses, as well as stoic and skeptic elements together into a decidedly


\textsuperscript{116} It has long been argued that it is rather impossible to separate religion from politics in Spain, and that moreover, without the religious context—the confrontation with the Muslim and Jewish heritage, the missionary task in the New World, and the defense of Catholicism against the Protestant heresy—Spanish politics make little sense. While this is undoubtedly the case, and such issues frame Spanish understandings, the focus of this study is upon the specific relationship between religion and politics in a reason of state context—which, as we shall see, focused more upon Spain’s role as defender of the Catholic faith within Europe, and Philip’s actions as those of a prudent pious prince, and how these were utilized as a prime justification for Philip’s European imperial politics, and therefore, does not focus upon Providentialist notions of politics.

\textsuperscript{117} Pedro de Ribadeneira, \textit{Tratado de la religión y virtudes que debe tener el príncipe cristiano, para governar y conserver sus estados, contra lo que Nicolás Machiavelo y los políticos deste tiempo enseñan} (Antwerp, 1597); Juan de Mariana, \textit{De rege et regis institutione libri III} (Toledo, 1599).
practical evaluation of politics. Indeed, scholars see the late-sixteenth century as a watershed period in Spanish political history, manifest in the new political language and political discourse that melded European humanism with systematic ways of thinking and the semantic tools and strategies of scholastic political thought, and which found its most potent manifestation in a reason of state framework as a new way of speaking about ethics and politics. Significantly, it is this political language of Spanish reason of state, with its amalgam of ideas, concepts, and tactics, and its hybrid scholastic-humanist discourse, that will also be exhibited in, and provide the basis for, the justification of Philip’s politics and Spanish imperialism in the counter-histories.

One must always keep in mind, however, that regardless of attempts to reconcile practical politics with ethics, reason of state in Spain was still a synonym for the pursuit of power, wealth, and glory regardless of Christian ethics. Therefore, the divide between Christian morals and pragmatic political ends meant that reason of state did not eliminate, and even contributed to, a deep-rooted sense of moral and epistemological confusion and disillusionment (desengaño), and even to accusations of deceit. This led theorists to try to find ways to assure readers that there were clearly identifiable ways in which a Christian prince could and ought to act and these could be shown to be truthful. Spanish theorists created manuals of Christian statecraft in the

118 Harald E. Braun, “Baroque Constitution and Hybrid Political Language: The Case of Juan de Mariana (1535-1624) and Juan Márquez (1565-1621),” Revista Canadiense de Estudios Hispánicos 33.1 (Fall, 2008): 79–104; Harald Braun, Juan de Mariana and Early Modern Spanish Political Thought (London: Ashgate, 2007).
119 Braun, “Baroque Constitution and Hybrid Political Language,” 80.
122 Shifra Armon, “Gracián Dantisco and the Culture of Secrecy in Hapsburg Spain,” Ingenium 5 (June, 2011): 55–75. See also Jon Snyder, Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).
mirrors of princes tradition, and discussed the science of governing in ways that provided a buttress and even a justification for political actions. Inspired by contemporary interest in issues of political morality and the relationship of Christianity to politics, the Spanish court turned its eyes increasingly to historical information, and so works of historical scholarship began to concentrate on political ethics and the practical governance of a state, rather than on issues of law and sovereignty. These histories were designed explicitly to teach prudence through human example rather than precepts, and they sought to reveal and teach the causes behind certain actions of the prince. Understanding the way rule was presented and justified is also crucial to understanding how such ideas were presented in the counter-histories.

It should not be seen as a coincidence that the new type of history emerged at the same time as this re-definition of authority occurred in Spain. The need to respond to foreign polemical attacks (and especially accusations of tyranny) aligned official history directly with this re-definition of authority and the need to present Philip, and Spanish imperial politics, in terms of a Christian reason of state ideology. Interestingly, the role of historical narratives and of official history, in this re-definition of authority, or in terms of reason of state politics occurring in the last decades of Philip’s reign, has not been the focus of scholarship. This study will expand our knowledge of the relationship between historical writing and the rise of reason of state politics.


Humanism and the Use of History in Sixteenth-Century Europe

The Spanish Crown’s promotion of an officially sanctioned historical tradition occurred against the backdrop of Renaissance humanism, which called for a repudiation of the scholastic method and for a return to original sources.126 As Anthony Grafton illustrates, the concept of historical proof, who had the authority to provide it, and how it should be presented, were questions that occupied major scholars and philosophers in all fields from the sixteenth century onwards.127 Inevitably the use of historical claims, and particularly the use of historical documents to prove the validity and worthiness of claims in political and legal matters, had an impact on the way that the Spanish Crown wished the counter-histories to be written, especially as they were responses to challenges to imperial authority and the legitimacy of Spanish imperial claims, and therefore would need to present their legitimizing arguments and substantiation in similar ways.


Increasingly too, historians were using their histories to reflect on the proper form of government and the fate of states, mainly by drawing comparisons with the past. Drawing from Cicero, Polybius, and Tacitus, early modern historians invoked the benefits of history for its provision of truth and practical utility and to provide moral and political precepts. Inspired by Tacitus, such “politic” works primarily sought to find parallels and prudential maxims and provide useful moral and political lessons centered on the personalities of rulers and counselors and on the processes of decision making. Scholars have demonstrated how this had an impact.


on notions of the practice of rule, and how the rudder of the state—the *gubernaculum*—was seen to reside no longer solely in the hands of God, but in the hands of the historically conscious prince.\(^{131}\) Monarchs, therefore, turned to historical knowledge to govern the state effectively, reading humanist history to apply past wisdom to current politics and seeing history as a vehicle to discuss political ideas.\(^{132}\) John G. A. Pocock claims that late-sixteenth and seventeenth-century political thought was argued by means of historical scholarship.\(^{133}\) Consequently, historical information not only provided fuel for concrete action, but legitimacy and justification for actions.

Across Europe, historical studies in the form of legal antiquarianism began to be used to consolidate political legitimacy.\(^{134}\) As Julian Franklin, John H. M. Salmon, and Donald Kelley


\(^{132}\) Indeed, across Europe, kings, princes and counsellors read history to understand past states and constitutions, and sought to apply the lessons of history to their own day. Grafton, *What was History?*, 195–98. How Philip used such historical information to govern has not been the focus of studies. Significantly, the counter-histories provide evidence of Philip’s decision making, especially the work of Herrera discussed in Chapter 3 below, which demonstrates how Philip effectively governed his state by using historical knowledge, and especially by following the ancient privileges and precedents of the areas over which he ruled.

\(^{133}\) See, Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law*, 2–27. Drawing inspiration from the ideas of Pocock, both Anthony Pagden and José Fernández-Santamaría believe that this was also the case in Spain.

have noted, legal antiquarianism was both an archaeological and a documentary science based on authentic proofs. \(^{135}\) Documents were assembled in support of rights to wield power, levy taxes, grant lands, raise armies, wage war, form alliances, and stake territorial claims. Genealogy was used to solidify claims to privileges, clarify boundaries, and define precedence. \(^{136}\) Such historical precedent formed part of the language of humanist political debate and provided legitimacy for political actions, with history slowly becoming an authoritative mode of proof and a basis of political power. \(^{137}\) As Pocock puts it, the basis of political authority in early modern Europe shifted from the “laws of nature” to “appeals to the past.” \(^{138}\) Indeed, finding historical precedent was one of the main functions of history, which many sixteenth-century scholars considered an auxiliary field of study rather than an autonomous discipline; they considered the use of primary documents to be less a method of history, than “a method of law.” \(^{139}\) In fact, by the end of the sixteenth-century, the need for historical proofs produced a trained corps of historical scholars, who in turn, as Anthony Grafton and Peter Miller demonstrate, formed a learned proto-bureaucracy at the heart of the state, utilizing their antiquarian skills for political purposes. \(^{140}\)

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135 Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Sixteenth Century Revolution in the Methodology of Law and History; and Kelley, The Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship, esp. chs. 8-9. See also Salmon, Renaissance and Revolt, 119–35.


140 For the most detailed history of antiquarianism and state building, see Miller, Peiresc’s Europe, 76–103; and Grafton, The Footnote, 148–89. See also Barbara J. Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
In France and the Low Countries, however, documents and historical precedent came to be used not only to assert prerogatives, but also to challenge power and royal authority. Throughout Europe, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were a time of collision between the authority of kings and local or national privileges, liberties, and constitutions. Across Europe a more intensive use of historical and antiquarian thinking emerged in an attempt to settle fundamental political questions. Consequently, both scholars and politicians turned to archives and “authentic records.” Searches into the past in countries like France, the Netherlands, Italy, and England were motivated primarily by the need to reform the state, in other words, to nullify old laws, supplement claims, or restrict the power of princes. Thus, history and historically based claims became a primary means through which to criticize, and even dismantle, power. As Barbara Sher Tinsley observes, history became a means to undermine the foundations of political stability, by providing the necessary justifications to rally support around an opposing cause. In this climate, the writing of history was no innocent activity. Such uses of history sent shock waves throughout Europe, making rulers and those in positions of power aware of the potentials that history and historically based claims could have upon the foundations and exercise of power. It is significant, therefore, that attacks on Philip and Spanish authority in

143 Grafton, *What was History?*, 76.
Portugal and France made by Conestaggio and Mayernne came in the form of historical assertions.

When it came to international matters, the legalistic outlook involving precedent and ‘proof’ that dominated the sixteenth century also allowed for historical knowledge of the origins of claims or conflicts to contribute to the resolution of differences among states. Historical precedent remained the first line of defense in matters of territorial disputes well into the seventeenth century.\(^{146}\) It is important to note that in the sixteenth century, as in the medieval world, there was no concept of ‘natural’ borders. A state was defined by such territories as a ruling house could acquire, or make good its claim to, and a complex patchwork of competing historic claims became the inevitable backcloth to any new negotiation or conflict.\(^ {147}\) Finding and providing the primary documents necessary to provide ‘proof’ of historical claims was an essential part of sixteenth-century imperial discourse about the legitimacy and implications of claims to lands.\(^ {148}\) As a result, Europe had become immersed in a practical and polemical need for titles and precedents to sanction policies and political claims. Sovereigns across Europe employed official researchers and historiographers to comb ancient texts and chronicles to provide such precedents.\(^ {149}\) Increasingly, therefore, whether in a court of law or in negotiations among states, dynasties and their diplomats presented elaborate cases to foreign courts, asserting

their claims by providing substantial evidence, including the historical information necessary to assert dynastic and genealogical precedence. Such developments further entrenched the use of documents as key to political activity and power across Europe. Inevitably the use of primary documents and historical claims in imperial matters to prove the validity and the worthiness of one’s claims to lands would have an impact on the way that the Spanish Crown wished the counter-histories to be written, especially as they were to be responses to challenges to Spanish imperial claims.

The Reformation and Counter-Reformation also powerfully shaped the conception of history, its uses, and the important role of historical documents in polemical contests and to prove claims. Scholars even claim that it was the Reformation that crystallized the use of documentary proof for legitimacy and the need to create “verifiable” history, as each side of the religious divide began to provide its own source-based evidence to assert claims, spurring a movement across Europe that was about authenticating rather than homogenizing. Such polemical tomes showed the utility of history and inspired religious historiographical revisionism, forcing church historians to publish the original documents from which they drew a

revised view of the development of the Church.\textsuperscript{151} As the works of Arthur G. Dickens and Simon Ditchfield demonstrate, both Protestant and Catholic historians endeavored to write detached histories of the church and its practices based solely on sources, and strove to establish methods by which to find demonstrable proof of their claims, applying techniques of historical criticism to “corrupted” traditions.\textsuperscript{152} Indeed, historical methodology and criticism became one of the sharpest weapons in these struggles. These revisions of ecclesiastical history, liturgical texts, and saints’ lives were just as central to the Counter-Reformation as were the reforms of the Council of Trent (1545-63), and integral to larger projects of Catholic reform.

Undoubtedly, the combination of both the philological and legal tools developed by humanists, and the competition for better and more verifiable legal and historical information provoked by the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation affected how the Spanish Crown responded to polemical attacks. The Crown realized that history and historical precedents were increasingly authoritative modes of discourse and a basis for political power. Moreover, the rise of historically based claims in polemical contests meant that the Spanish Crown came to fear the power of critical history, and recognized the need to take the power of historically based arguments seriously.


Thus, intellectual historians have laid the groundwork for the ways in which historical documents and a historical consciousness became keys to power and political activity in early modern Europe. Although scholars have noted a tradition of historical verification which formed part of cultural practice in everyday life of the educated, they have paid less attention to the role of historical narratives and official history in these processes, or how documents and the critical use of sources were manifested in historical narratives and official historiography specifically for political purposes. Furthermore, despite increased attention to the use of documentary evidence to settle political and dynastic claims, few studies have examined the role historical narratives played in imperial disputes, especially in late-sixteenth-century Europe.

This study will demonstrate how official historical narratives were used within international conflicts to cement and advance imperial claims within Europe, becoming vital sources of legitimacy in themselves. Moreover, this study will expand upon how the new techniques, attitudes, and facilities for research developed by humanists, philologists, and legal antiquarians, were utilized specifically in the construction of historical narratives for political purposes. Specifically, this study places late-sixteenth-century counter-histories within the

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153 Indeed, because it tends not to focus on historical narratives, scholarship has largely dismissed the role of official history in these sixteenth-century developments. For the role of official history in the fifteenth century in Europe see in particular Ernst Breisach, Classical Rhetoric & Medieval Historiography (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University, 1985). For the seventeenth century see Michel Tyvaert, “L’image du Roi: Légimité et moralité royales dans les histories de France au XVIIe siècle,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 21 (1974), 521–547; Louis Marin, Portrait of the King, trans. Martha M. Houle (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988); Barret-Kreigel, Les Historiens et la monarchie; and Chantal Grell, L’histoire entre érudition et philosophie. Étude sur la connaissance historique à l’âge des lumières (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993). Many scholars, including Chantall Grell who focus specifically on the works of official historians in the French court, continue to perpetuate the idea that official historians were generally “not interested in meticulous study or a critical appraisal of facts,” but were solely concerned with supplying the Monarchy with a glorified history. Chantal Grell, dir., Les historiographes en Europe de la fin du Moyen Age à la Révolution (Paris: PUPS, 2006), 14.

154 There has long been an acknowledgement of the need to look at early modern historical narratives in relation to rising humanist methodologies. For example, Geoffrey Elton criticized Ferguson’s Clio Unbound, for failing to look at Tudor historical writing, and rather solely focusing on the ancillary disciplines when making his claims about the
framework established by scholars such as Grafton and Miller, who demonstrate how official
texts can be studied in the context of mainstream intellectual, cultural, and political history, and
how scholars working for a polemical cause were also active in developing and utilizing the
critical humanism so reflective of the age. By closely examining the changes that came about in
late-sixteenth-century Spanish official history writing, this study significantly advances our
understanding of the many ways in which official history and historical narratives became a
crucial site for ideological and methodological innovation.

A Better History ca. 1580-1599

Under the combined intellectual forces of the Renaissance and the Reformation, an
emphasis on documentation and verification in political contests blossomed in late-sixteenth-
century Europe, increasing the demand for tangible and credible proof in polemical contexts. In
late-sixteenth-century Spain in particular, antiquarian tools were used in innovative ways to
make claims to authority and authenticity. This was an environment increasingly concerned with
notions of rule and of discussions of politics framed within historically based arguments, in
which definitions of rule were used as assertions of authority and legitimacy, but at the same
time, it was also an environment that began to question the actions of rulers, skeptical of their

modernity (or lack thereof) of Tudor historical thought. See Geoffrey R. Elton’s review of Ferguson, in History and Theory 20 (1981): 98–99. Yet demonstrating such connections between antiquarianism and narrative history in the
sixteenth century had long proved elusive for many modern scholars, primarily due to the fact that it was widely
held that the two never met. In fact, scholars had long argued that there was a clear distinction between the
philologists or those who researched and the rhetoricians or those who wrote narrative histories. For the classic
expression of the separation of antiquarianism and narrative history, see the seminal essay of Arnaldo Momigliano,
1–39. See also Ranum, Artisans of Glory, 56. Furthermore, Daniel Woolf observes: “Politic history did not research,
but drew merely from its reading of earlier historians.” Daniel Woolf, The Idea of History, 22. More recent
scholarship by Anthony Grafton and Peter Miller among others, has revealed, however, that many antiquarians also
wrote narrative histories and utilized their antiquarians skills for various purposes. See Grafton, What was History?
and Miller, Peiresc’s Europe. Also, for a recent consideration of the long-term impact of Momigliano’s studies on
the formation of modern academic disciplines see Peter N. Miller, Momigliano and Antiquarianism: Foundations of
the Modern Cultural Sciences (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).
ability to maintain their ethical convictions, and that increasingly saw politics as a world of dissimulation, if not outright deception.

It was in this political, intellectual, and cultural environment that Spanish advisors and official historians conceived and wrote the late-sixteenth-century counter-histories. Working within well-defined restrictions, including a court structure, strict censorships, and closed archives, and in a polemical political and intellectual environment, Phillip’s advisors and official historians created innovative histories that forged a vision of Philip and Spain based on the emerging Spanish reason of state, while positioning their work within the scholarly humanist tradition.

This study will demonstrate that in seeking to confront challenges to Spanish authority the Spanish Crown drew upon a traditional and humanist understanding of history that regarded history as a key source of political exempla, and thus as a primary vehicle to teach and inform. However, it also drew from a growing antiquarian movement in Spain that stressed the importance of evidence, credible authorities, and the search for “truth.” It must be emphasized that while history had for some time been regarded as part of the political agenda of the Spanish Crown, it was not until the foreign polemical attacks in the last decades of Philip II’s reign that historical writing would develop into a much more potent weapon. History was used as an instrument of power and was, at the Crown’s insistence, based upon sophisticated humanist methodologies that made history a means to disseminate an ideology of rule, providing and responding to new demands for proof, clearly distinguishing late-sixteenth-century official works from their predecessors. Indeed, as we shall see, by reacting and trying to find new ways to
counteract criticism, the Crown posed new questions about the utility of history for statecraft and empire, thus shaping the “political turn” in late-sixteenth-century official history.

Under increased foreign polemic pressures, as well as growing internal criticism, the Spanish Crown realized that they would need to create a new type of history, utilizing humanist tools and ideals to new political advantage and to suit new demands. Spanish advisors and Spanish official historians came to understand that they could not seek to defend Spain’s imperial ambitions through *encomia*, nor by making allusions to myth or Roman precedents. As Idiáquez wrote to Philip II, the Crown needed “better history” (*mejor historia*) to respond to attacks, first of all to justify Spanish imperial pursuits, especially in light of new understandings of politics and the need to present the nature of rule. This official history was intended to explain the nature of Philip’s rule and the practical workings of politics, especially by looking at the causes and motivations behind political actions. In doing so, these histories would present Philip’s Christian reason of state.

This study examines how a coterie of scholars and powerful political advisors turned to the writing of history not as a means to reform the state, but instead as a potent means to bolster and defend the existing state’s identity and advance its purpose. The Crown understood that they would need to utilize a new type of history. These counter-histories were perhaps influenced by New World histories that had already created an environment in which judicial rhetoric had become a means of providing legitimation through narrative histories, and in which petitioners had used legal documents in their narratives to assert claims to privileges. Moreover, the Spanish Crown understood that the new demands for proof and for greater historical precision
necessitated the use of all available historiographic tools, including primary source investigation, antiquarian techniques, verifiable documentation, and source referencing. Ultimately, therefore, the need to respond to polemical attacks and defend Spanish intentions meant that the Spanish official historiographic project would bring together Spanish reason of state with humanist scholarship and its attendant critical techniques to create a new and “better” history.

The counter-histories in particular redefined imperial authority in relation to the understanding of reason of state politics that emerged in Spain in the last decades of Philip’s reign. This study demonstrates how official history came to play a role in giving conceptual identity and political legitimacy to Spain’s imperial ambitions in a new reason of state context. It demonstrates how notions of rule (Spanish Christian reason of state) and provisions of proof became the two pivots upon which Spanish imperial ambitions were justified, and how Spanish government (or good Christian government) and its perpetuation became the new imperial goal. Furthermore, the writing of history tied to reason of state and contemporary political theory encouraged the development and use of critical humanist techniques, making works of official history into exemplars of exceptional scholarly inquiry.

To achieve these aims the Spanish Crown drew upon a readily available trained corps of historical scholars, a learned proto-bureaucracy at the heart of the state, who could utilize their skills and antiquarian knowledge and techniques to the advantages of the state. In turn, official historians sought to find new ways to support the monarch and, faced with political demands for both ideological purity and proof, they developed in their treatises on the *artes hisitoricae* a
robust set of theoretical reflections on how to write “the truth.” Significantly, official historians recognized the value of humanist scholarship, and of the need to be seen as impartial scholars.

Although Spanish official historians may well have been ideologues, the counter-histories demonstrate that they were also sophisticated, thorough, and meticulous scholars, working with the methodologies they had developed in their *artes historicae*, bringing together theory and practice. While the controls and restrictions that official historians worked under guaranteed that the resulting counter-histories would favor both the king and his policies, and while official historians willingly presented the expedient vision of Philip and Spanish politics, their counter-histories made their case in a way that demonstrated their considerable abilities as humanist scholars. Official historians appealed to readers by positioning themselves as impartial scholars, and purveyors of demonstrable proof, using the recognizable assets of humanist methodological and antiquarian tools so vital to their enterprise. Thus, the official historians produced the best possible works of scholarship for the time, *despite* their need to bolster their claims for the Crown, because this requirement engendered political and methodological creativity, bringing together available political ideas, and humanist tools and techniques in new ways for greater political and scholarly effect.

As we shall see, for both Philip’s advisors and official historians, official history proved the legitimacy of Philip’s imperial policies, but did so by providing the proof necessary to assert claims and reveal the inner workings and intentions of Philip’s rule to elucidate a Spanish reason of state. Indeed, they would seek to combine available developments and techniques, to create an apparently evidential history. As with the official history before it, counter-history was also
designed to court public opinion, rally support for a particular program and set of beliefs, in a manner that was decisive, implicit, directed, and intentional. Official historians brought together humanist developments for reason of state needs, and utilized the language of reason of state and the principles of political prudence to justify Spanish imperial actions. This study will demonstrate how the counter-histories were much more than just polemical texts put to use in imperial battles. They were just as central to the definitions of monarchical and imperial authority as were political treatises. They demonstrated the new means through which power and authority were legitimized and how humanist methodologies became integral to larger projects of political legitimacy.

This study, therefore, has a dual focus. It examines both political and historiographical ideas, how they were combined, and how they found their full expression in historical narratives and official works. Indeed, the unique source base that this study utilizes provides a privileged way to trace the interactions between humanist ideals and historical methodology with political necessity. For while it is in the counter-histories themselves that all of these developments are manifested, they cannot be fully understood without the frank discussions of their political impetus found in the letters of the Spanish advisors or the methodological foundations developed in the treatises. Carefully examining the demands of the Crown in relation to what the historians wrote is crucial because although methodological and humanist concerns guided their work, their primary concern was political. This study, therefore, begins by looking at polemical attacks and how the Crown sought to respond to them, then moves on to the methodological concerns of official historians, and finally to the counter-histories written in response to those attacks.
Chapter One, *Defending the King; Defending Spain*, outlines the motivations and intentions of the Spanish Crown in commissioning counter-histories to refute foreign negative histories of Spain and Philip’s actions. It begins by examining how foreign polemical attacks undermined Spain’s imperial power and the “public good” by promulgating a negative picture of Spanish rule and threatening constitutional structures by claiming that Philip ruled as a tyrant. In order to defend Spanish imperialism and restore Spanish reputación, the Crown understood that official history would have to concern itself with questions of statecraft. In a series of letters, Spanish advisors, Philip II, and Spanish official historians discussed the appropriate response to these attacks, which would be a specific project of state, carefully controlled and supervised, and monitored even by the king himself. This chapter notes how two fundamental changes were required of the new official history. First, it was required that each counter-history defend Philip’s rule by presenting the reasons and intentions behind his actions, and specifically demonstrating how his rule conformed to a Christian Spanish reason of state, thus reconfiguring official history to include political thought and ideology. Second, document use, according to humanist techniques including a critical appreciation of texts, became a requirement of the official project. Advisors wanted official history to adopt a legalistic approach to documents as a means of asserting, defending, and legitimizing Spanish imperial ambitions. Advisors outlined what type of evidence was to be used, what sorts of claims were to be supported by documents, and specified where these documents were to be found. This set in motion the bringing together of reason of state and humanist methodologies in official history for the purposes of state, creating prescriptions for a new type of official history. To accomplish this official project, however, the Crown understood that they required the most skilled and politically astute
historians with a deep knowledge of both Philip’s Christian reason of state and the new humanist tools. Thus, they also outlined specifically who they thought best suited to the task, understanding that official historians would need to combine antiquarian and political knowledge to effectively support the Crown’s political objectives.

Chapter Two, *The Practice of “Good History,“* uses the official historians’ own treatises on the *artes historicae* to examine their thinking about writing history for the Crown. The demands placed upon Spanish official historians highlighted the need to clarify the rules and protocols that added credibility and political legitimacy to their work. This prompted the official historians to consider the proper methods to meet political needs while maintaining the humanist foundations of thorough scholarly inquiry and rigorous critical research. Bringing together available humanist tools and techniques as well as extant theoretical considerations, official historians in their treatises sought to define historical practice and tackle the tensions between humanist critical constraints upon history, and writing history for the Crown. Official historians attempted, therefore, to “protect history from charlatanry,” safeguard their official role, and position themselves as impartial and dispassionate, laying out a “method for writing [official] history” (*método de historiar*), and seeking to create a way to provide political “truth” in humanist terms. The treatises emphasized humanist methodologies, accuracy of sources, rules of evidence, stringent source selection, the use of eyewitnesses, and the qualifications of the historian, even stressing a rigorous deontology, and brought to their treatises the contributions made to historical scholarship by the ancillary disciplines, primarily antiquarianism and philology. For Philip’s official historians, method meant assembling the widest range of material, corroborating sources, remedying omissions, establishing relationships of dependence, and
overriding prejudice. Yet they also understood that writing for the Crown required a more precise and carefully constructed evidentiary standard, to ensure that the necessary political message be conveyed. This required them to construct a method that utilized a combination of the historian’s own morals and notions of decorum and restraint (even dissimulation) when evaluating and utilizing primary sources and testimony, based less in hermeneutical rigidity than on political necessity. Thus, the treatises demonstrate that official historians believed they could establish “truth” when writing for the Crown, but also that the notion of “truth” itself was conditioned by political and ideological prescriptions.

Chapter Three, The Rule of a “Prudent King,” provides a case-study of the counter-history written by official Spanish historian Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, in response to the foreign polemical attack against the Portuguese succession written by Girolamo Conestaggio. Herrera’s Cinco libros de la historia de Portugal y la conquista de las isles de los Azores (1591) would not only provide an official history of the annexation of Portugal, but also sought to provide legitimacy for Spanish imperial claims by establishing both Philip’s dynastic entitlement and the very character and nature of Philip’s rule. Herrera used his history, therefore, to articulate the Christian reason of state politics that epitomized the way the Crown envisioned Philip’s rule, making his work a political testament to Philip as the perfect “Prudent King” (Rey Prudente). Moreover, Herrera demonstrated how he had based his claims on archival research, stressing his critical assessment of sources and thus bolstering the political effectiveness of his work. Indeed, Herrera illuminated the politics of the Crown in a way that accorded with new reason of state needs that the Crown envisioned, yet also made apparent the techniques and methods necessary for such work to be regarded as serious humanist scholarship. This chapter first looks at how
Herrera laid out his arguments, then to how he sought to use proof to solidify his claims, revealing how Herrera’s *Historia de Portugal* sought to respond to foreign polemical attacks effectively.

Chapter Four, *Antiquity, Continuity and Stability*, deals with the official counter-histories written about the French succession and Spanish imperial justifications for involvement in French affairs. As Spaniards sought to assert their claim to the French throne in response to the threat of a French Protestant heir, negative histories appeared, especially that of Louis Turquet Mayernne. The Spanish Crown responded by commissioning three histories to solidify claims and refute the negative portrayals. These works were Esteban de Garibay’s *Illustraciones Genealogicas de los Catholicos Reyes de las Españas y de los Christianissimos de Francia* (1596, manuscript 1593), Gregorio López Madera’s *Excelencias de la Monarquia y Reyno de España* (1593), and Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas’s *Historia de los sucesos de Francia desde el año 1585 que comenzó la liga Católica hasta fin del año 1594* (1598). These counter-histories sought to prove that its antiquity, purity of lineage, longstanding defense of the Catholic cause, and its historical legacy of “good rule” made the Spanish Monarchy the most worthy claimant to France. Indeed, official historians used traditional justifications from history and combined them with notions of the Spanish character to legitimize new moral principles for royal actions. Yet it is the means through which they presented such ideas that is of critical importance. Whether in the form of an elaborate genealogy, a historical narrative of sweeping scope, or an account of military actions, these counter-histories used humanist methodologies as tools to make claims, establish and verify legitimacy, and reveal the political ideals of the Crown. In this way, Garibay, Madera, and Herrera produced a means to verify the kind of Spanish rule they wished to
represent, both past and present. By envisioning Spain, its monarchy, and its historical legacy in
grander terms, based on notions of antiquity, continuity, longevity, and defense of the faith,
Spain’s own “appeals to the past” in its new official history rallied support for the Spanish
imperial cause, for the monarch, and for the Spanish manner of rule.

As this study demonstrates, looking at developments in late-sixteenth-century Spanish
official history is vital for a deeper appreciation of Spanish political society, as well as the
relationship between culture and power, and the relationship between intellectual creativity and
power. For it is in the historiographical developments and innovations of the last decades of
Philip’s reign that we can gain a greater understanding of Spanish reason of state, notions
concerning the nature of rule and governance, Spanish imperialism, and a changing definition of
the purpose and reason of the Spanish empire. This study will conclude with a brief exploration
of how historiographical developments give us insight into late-sixteenth-century notions of
power, authority, and rule. Significantly, it will conclude that official history matters not only as
a mechanism of state, but as a vital tool of legitimacy; most importantly, it will demonstrate the
vital role that the writing of history and the historian’s craft played in these political
developments. Indeed, the conclusion will draw together the observations made in individual
chapters to detail how in late-sixteenth-century Spain, official history, antiquarian tools, and
rhetorical needs were combined and utilized for political purposes. These developments shaped
humanist scholarship and critical inquiry, as the official historians mobilized humanist tactics to
legitimize political action and statecraft. The counter-history project legitimized Spanish actions,
especially through provisions of “proof” and demonstrations of good rule, and therefore helped
to establish Spain’s imperial authority. Moreover, official historians, while adhering to the
demands of the Crown, also moved historical scholarship forward, not only by combining multiple tools and techniques in their works, but through their presentations of their scholarly inquiry directly within their official works. Indeed, in Spain, a transformation in official history in content and form occurred, promoting greater ideological and methodological creativity and utilization, and transforming history into a powerful tool of state.
On January 28, 1585, Philip II’s Secretary of War and State, Juan de Idiáquez (1540-1613) wrote a letter to his king arguing for the urgent need for “better [official] history” to refute “the [emerging] calumnies and falsities propagated by foreign histories hostile not only to Spain, but to the monarchy itself.”¹ The Spanish Crown was particularly alarmed by the criticisms in these foreign histories of the Spanish king’s character and the nature of his actions; they branded Philip as a “bad ruler” and even a tyrant. Through these attacks, Philip and his advisors came to see the need to support a new program for official history that would refute foreign claims and present a “better” account of the king, his rule, and the Spanish imperial agenda. Specifically, the Spanish Crown came to realize that dynastic association no longer sufficed as the justification for Spanish European imperialism; such claims had to be combined with notions about the purpose and nature of Spanish rule, and the benefits that could be derived from this rule. Furthermore, these claims had to be supported with documentary “proof.”

The correspondence discussing the foreign histories demonstrates how, in developing a strategy to respond to attacks, Spanish advisors and official historians created prescriptions for what they would term “better history”—a more effective and powerful type of history that could respond to attacks, publicize the politics of the king, and legitimize Spanish imperialism. Thus, the Crown’s response to external attacks was a crucible in which Spanish official historians transformed the interpretative framework of late sixteenth-century history, bringing together

¹ Idiáquez to Philip, 1/28/1585, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 123/17, carpeta 194, fol. 163.
reason of state with humanist methodologies and practices for political purposes. Ultimately, by trying to find new ways to counteract criticism, the Crown challenged scholars to reshape the utility of history for statecraft and empire.

Although the “better histories” discussed in Idiáquez’s letter were commissioned in direct response to the works of Gerolamo Conestaggio and Louis Turquet de Mayernne, these were only two of a growing number of attacks on Philip that were part of a wider historical discourse about the nature of rule and notions of tyranny. In fact, the letters of the Spanish advisors reveal that Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s histories were seen as directly connected to other attacks on Spanish imperial power originating in the Low Countries. These polemical attacks were not simply offering alternative interpretations of Spanish history; Conestaggio, Mayernne and many others depicted Philip and Spain in a way that directly challenged contemporary strategies for shaping the royal image, and especially the image of the Christian prince. They depicted Philip as a cruel liar, a king who did not abide by the law or uphold privileges—as a tyrant. For Spanish advisors, therefore, the danger was not the superficial expression of disrespect for the king, but rather a threat to the political, legal, and moral legitimacy of his rule, and of Spanish imperial claims. Ultimately, these attacks alarmed the Spanish advisors for two fundamental reasons: they questioned the constitutional structure of state power and they threatened Philip’s political reputation (reputación), both necessary components of imperial power.
Idiáquez warned Philip that foreign works like Conestaggio’s, “are dangerous to Your authority, this transmission of untruthful [ideas] to the provinces and foreign nations.”\(^2\) Indeed, by characterizing Philip’s actions as tyrannical, these “untruthful” foreign histories undermined the king’s authority, especially in foreign lands. By stating that Philip ruled tyrannically, broke with the law, and ruled in his own interest, histories critical of the king and Spanish rule threatened the very basis of Spanish political power by challenging Philip’s adherence to his contractual responsibilities, thus putting into question the nature of Spanish monarchical rule. Moreover, historical criticism not only threatened to denigrate Philip’s character and the legitimacy of his claims, but also raised concerns, as Cristóbal de Moura warned, that “every [foreign subject] will become an enemy of the state. For these works will have taught them that.”\(^3\)

The accusations of tyranny embedded in the histories critical of the king had a direct impact on the way the Crown would envision a new official history; they sought to restore Spanish and Philip’s reputación by promoting a discussion of Philip’s rule within a “Christian reason of state” framework.\(^4\) The Spanish advisors envisioned “new” histories which would categorically demonstrate that Philip possessed none of the attributes of a tyrannous leader, and moreover, that Philip’s interests in Portugal and France were based on dynastic pre-eminence and notions of rightful and just conquest.

\(^2\) Emphasis mine. “era dano a Su autoridad trasladarle mentirosamente[sic] a las provincias y naciones estrañas.” Idiáquez to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 5. Also see Idiáquez to Philip on how such slanders had affected political activity in Flanders, BNM Ms/ 9375.
\(^3\) Moura to Idiáquez, BNM, Ms/ 6178, fol. 48.
When developing their ideas on how Philip’s rule should be presented in the counter-histories, his advisors drew upon scholastic, classical, and contemporary concepts and terminologies. Yet it should be noted that their ideas, as presented through their letters, were neither systematic, nor always presented in the detailed manner of a scholastic theologian or expert Roman lawyer. Instead there was a great flexibility in the ideas they presented, with flourishes of humanist rhetoric presented alongside principles drawn from scholastic juridical discourses. In fact, this unscholarly mixture is key to understanding how these men, who were close to the King and dealt with him on a daily basis, envisioned rule and power, and their concern with questions of perception. Significantly, their desire to utilize official history as the method to project the “true” image of Philip was unanimous. Indeed, the correspondence of the advisors illustrates the multi-layered, theoretical and practical twists of contemporary political thought, and the methods of its dissemination.

This chapter examines the correspondence of the Spanish Court as it related to the hostile foreign histories and the development of a “new” history that would respond to these attacks and further establish the basis for Phillip’s and Spanish imperial authority. The chapter begins with an examination of the correspondence discussing the foreign historiographical attacks and why the Spanish Crown needed to respond to them. The second half of the chapter examines the Crown’s formulation of a response to foreign polemical attacks, and how they envisioned this “better history.” It will demonstrate how the Crown incorporated the new and emerging culture of reason of state politics into official history by envisioning history as a way to illustrate the political ideals that legitimated Philip’s rule and Spanish imperial ambitions. Yet the need to convince readers to their cause also caused Spanish advisors to advocate for another vital change
in official history: Spanish advisors made documentary proof an intrinsic and essential component of official history and a key mechanism for it legitimization. To this end, the Crown also sought to institutionalize the training and methodologies of official historians to ensure unimpeachable scholarship; they proscribed the use of archives and the direct participation of the king, and defined the appropriate and necessary qualifications of those scholars chosen to produce counter-histories.

“Calumnies and Falsities”: Dangerous Foreign Histories

By the mid-1580s, Spanish imperial ambition was the subject of a growing culture of criticism within Europe and Spain, and polemical attacks were increasingly directed at Philip and Spanish rule. These attacks frequently took the shape of historical arguments and historically based claims. Indeed, by the late sixteenth century Europeans had begun to use the power of historical discourse in polemical contests. Making historical claims had become the best way to assert claims to “truth,” and thus establish legitimacy and precedence, especially across the learned courts of Europe. What especially alarmed the Spanish advisors about the wave of criticism in the mid-1580’s was their direct attacks on the Spanish king; by criticizing Philip and his motivations, these attacks amounted to direct challenges to Spanish authority. The historically based attacks on Spanish imperial pursuits in Portugal and France by, respectively, Gerolamo Conestaggio and Louis Turquet de Mayerne, posed particular challenges to Spanish power and authority and these documents eventually spurred the Crown to respond to these histories.
Idiáquez was not the only leading official and political advisor in Philip II’s court to voice concern about these two works. Cristóbal de Moura (1538-1613), Philip’s Secretary to Portugal and a member of Philip’s royal camera (privy council) and of his Council of State, also perceived these critical narratives as a threat and warned the king of the harm they posed to Spanish imperial power. In fact, Moura clearly articulated Spanish concerns about these works in his ‘Request that history be written to respond to foreign accounts,’ writing to Philip: “Foreign writers, who are neither constrained nor experts, and who write without the fundament of truth, relying solely on the complaints and false rumors of the vulgo that your fame has brought from one reign to another, have judged [Your Majesty’s] actions not as your piety and zeal deserve . . . and they will not stop the damage.”5 For both Idiáquez and Moura, Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s works warranted particular attention because they made a direct attack on the king and Spanish power. Idiáquez immediately warned Philip that Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s works mimicked Dutch libels, in that they too contained “gossip [that will be used by] rivals of His Majesty and our nation”6 and thus had the potential to undermine Spanish authority, as they promoted “supposed injustices, avarices and cruelties.”7

5 “Autores fuera de [el Reyno] desobligados y desaficionados y sin fundamento de verdad, sino de las quejas del pueblo y rumores falsos del vulgo que la fama lleva de unos reinos a otros . . . juzgan los acciones de S fasta Majestad no como merece su piedad y santo celo, . . . y no pararán el daño.” ‘Request that a history be written to counter foreign accounts.’ Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 1.
6 Idiáquez, BNM Ms/ 20526, fol. 12. In this letter Idiáquez, although he makes direct reference to Mayernne, only refers to “that Italian work.” Therefore, his comment might not be a reference to Conestaggio, but could be a reference to the work of either the Venetian historians, Giovanni Battista Adriani and Pietro Giustiniani, who had also published histories inimical to the Monarchy’s interests, and whose works circulated widely in places hostile to Spanish imperial power, or to the work of Girolamo Benzoni, whose ‘History of the New World’ impugned Spanish political activities in Mexico and the Caribbean. I believe, however, that he is referring to the work of Conestaggio, which is the primary target of his other letters.
7 “de injusticias, avaricias y crueldades que gustarán mucho de saber los extranjeros, herejes y enemigos de esta Monarquía.” Moura to Juan de Silva, Count of Portalegre, 1/5/15[8]4?, BNM Ms/ 981, fol. 23.
The Dutch libel to which Idiáquez referred was the 1581 publication of *The Apology*, attributed to William of Orange, which was a product of the ongoing Dutch Revolt (1559-1609) against Spanish rule. Although a grave exaggeration and distortion of historical reality, *The Apology* garnered a huge readership and was very successful in spreading a negative image of Spaniards in the Netherlands (an image which much later came to be referred to as the Spanish “Black Legend”). More importantly, although it was not the first attack against Spanish power to come out of the Netherlands, *The Apology* significantly changed the nature of anti-Spanish polemics. Anti-Spanish works prior to the 1580s, especially those from the Low Countries, had abstained from directly attacking the Royal Person. *The Apology*, however, gave a new twist to

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8 Although attributed to William of Orange, *The Apology* was in fact written by French protestant Marnix de Sainte Aldegonde. The original text was produced in French as “Apologie de Guillaume IX Prince d'Orange contre la proscription de Philippe II, roi d’Espagne, présenté aux Etats Généraux des Pays-Mays, le 13 Décembre 1580.” This original version can be found in Jean Dumont ed., *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens* (Amsterdam: P. Brunel, 1726-1731), 4: 384–406.

9 Sverker Arnoldsson, *La Leyenda Negra. Estudios sobre sus orígenes* (Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1960), 8–10, and 68–70. The term “Black Legend” was coined in the early nineteenth century by Julián Juderías in his *La Leyenda Negra: Estudios acerca del concepto de España en el extranjero* (Barcelona: Araluce, 1914), and was quickly appropriated by English scholars to describe the manner in which Spain was described and understood in the early modern period by foreigners.

the “Black Legend” by focusing on the qualities and actions of the king and highlighting his alleged personal vices.

*The Apology* accused Philip II of numerous political failings, blaming him personally for bringing the Inquisition to the Low Countries, violating the corporate privileges and the special laws the country exercised over its members, applying the same inhumane cruelty to its citizens as that seen in the New World, and of personal sins, such as bigamy, adultery, and the siring of numerous illegitimate children; it argued that Philip had essentially subjected the Flemish to an absolute and tyrannical rule. It even compared Philip to the emperor Tiberius, the archetypal tyrannical ruler accused of killing members of his own family for political gain. Crucially, *The Apology* argued that because Philip had shown himself a tyrant, he had broken the conditions of his rule, and therefore had forfeited his sovereignty, thus both allowing and obliging the rebels to exercise their right to resist tyranny and to pursue the means necessary to restore and secure their rights, privileges, and liberties. Such personal accusations against Philip himself were used to justify the Dutch Rebellion, and in 1581 they were the basis for the denial by the rebels of Philip’s sovereignty. William himself effectively used these accusations to convince the kings

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11 Such characterizations of Philip remained in the popular imagination as well as in scholarship up until the early twentieth century, mainly due to foreign scholars like Leopold von Ranke who used these foreign polemics as sources for their own characterizations of Philip. Attacks against Philip would lessen over the years, but the characterization of him as “dogmatic, a fanatic, and excessively prideful” was extended to the entire Spanish spirit, and accusations of decadence were blamed for the eventual demise, in economic, political, and intellectual terms, of the Spanish Empire. It was not until the 1980s that substantial scholarship arose to refute these accusations, and provide a much more balanced understanding of Spanish actions and Philip in the sixteenth century.

of Europe of the illegitimacy of Philip’s actions in the Low Countries, which helped to legitimize the Dutch Revolt internationally.

Worse, from the Spanish Crown’s point of view, *The Apology* had served as a catalyst, inspiring dozens of other libels and polemics, each designed to defame Philip and Spaniards in general, and place Spanish imperial rule into question. Indeed, after 1581, spurred on by this Netherlandish anti-Hispanic propaganda, as well as by the fears, jealousies, and animosities of Spain’s European rivals, a deluge of caricatures, drawings, pictures, songs, and treatises appeared across Europe, especially in England, France, and Germany, which presented Spaniards as the worst of oppressors. This created a whole generation of readers who began to view the Spanish Monarchy and its imperial ambitions from the perspective of its archenemies, the pamphleteers of the Dutch Revolt and their disciples, and those who had every incentive to paint the bleakest picture possible of Spanish “tyranny.”

At the same time as this anti-Spanish propaganda was flourishing, a number of historiographic works appeared in Europe, especially in France, which were increasingly concerned with issues of power, kingship, and corruption. These works included that of François

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13 Once such polemical work, which came to be known as the *AntiEspañol*, anonymously published in 1590 in both French and English, repeated many of the *Apology*’s accusations, and even accused Philip of personally murdering his son Don Carlos. The English edition of the *AntiEspañol* appears as: *The Coppie of the Anti-Spaniard, made at Paris by a Frenchman, a Catholique* (London, 1590). Another example is the work of Antonio Pérez, once Philip’s favorite, who published similar accusations in his 1592, *Relaciónes*, also known as “The Sins of History,” which appeared in French and English, and which presented Philip as not only a tyrant, but as being responsible for the death of his advisor Juan de Escobedo. Antonio Pérez, *Relaciones o Pecados de historia, “Figure of the Spaniarde”* (London, 1594).

14 For comments on the pernicious effect that the *The Apology* had in the Low Countries and throughout Europe see Idíáquez to Bernardino de Escalante, and Escalante’s response, BNM, Ms/ 20526, fols. 12-18. For additional comments made by Idíáquez relating to the problems caused in the Low Countries by the slanders initiated by *The Apology*: BNM, Ms/ 9375, fols. 48-50. See also the comments made by Pedro Enríquez de Acevedo, Count of Fuentes, and Governor and *Capitán General* of Milan and Flanders, BNM, Ms/ 8695.
Hotman, whose celebrated 1573 *Francogallia* used history to demonstrate the ancient constitutional basis upon which the assembly of the realm could judge and depose a tyrannical king,\(^{15}\) as well as the 1579 work of Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, which outlined the historical legitimization upon which a people could take rightful action against a tyrannical king, especially if he did not abide by notions of “proper rule.”\(^{16}\) These works revived classical characterizations of tyranny and the Aristotelian definition of tyranny as a corrupt form of monarchy in which the ruler acted despotically and preferred his own profit and pleasure to the common good.\(^{17}\) The various works clearly indicated the increased interest across Europe in evaluating the nature of rule and the pre-requisites of power.

Thus, across Europe monarchs were increasingly criticized for their ambition, greed and thirst for power.\(^{18}\) Yet by grounding their arguments on real or presumed historical precedents in law and institutions, these polemists sought to incite general discontent towards what was presented as the unjust actions of monarchs and to further argue for the right, even the duty of subjects to resist tyrants.\(^{19}\) Thus across Europe there was discussion about the right to judge and potentially depose legitimate princes, especially if they fell into tyranny, and a project to provide lawful means to challenge royal authority.\(^{20}\) Thus, by the mid-sixteenth century, works like

\(^{15}\) While Hotman cited several Frankish depositions as precedent, his principal tyrant was a more modern king, Louis XI (*r.* 1461–1483), who had allegedly subverted the constitution. Further, Hotman’s preface listed the tyrants of classical antiquity, suggesting the direct relevance of ancient tyranny to his own times. François Hotman, *Francogallia* (Geneva, 1573).


\(^{17}\) Aristotle, *Politics*, 5:10.

\(^{18}\) For Spain, see Juan de Mariana, *La dignidad real y la educación del rey (De rege et regis institutione)*[1598], ed. Luis Sánchez Agesta (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitutionales, 1981), 21. [Herein after referred to as *De Rege*]. See also Harald Braun, *Juan de Mariana and Early Modern Spanish Political Thought* (London: Ashgate, 2007), 44.


Hotman’s, Duplessis-Mornay’s, and *The Apology*, had demonstrated to the Crown that historically based criticism could have real political consequences.

The specific polemic attacks upon Philip and Spanish actions being made by Conestaggio and Mayernne so alarmed the king’s advisors because couched as these polemics were in the context of widespread criticism of princes, they specifically used the language of tyranny and thus readily found fertile anti-Spanish ground. Furthermore, the works of Conestaggio and Mayernne directly challenged the legitimacy of Spanish actions and imperial intentions in Portugal and France, respectively, at a time when appropriating the Portuguese empire and attempting to intervene in the French succession by placing a Catholic Spaniard on the French throne were key to securing Catholic hegemony in Europe.21 A complex web of historical justifications supported such Spanish imperial ambitions in Portugal and France, ranging from simple dynastic succession to more complicated notions of precedent based on antiquity, religion, and dynastic prestige.22 Conestaggio and Mayernne not only challenged the very legitimacy of Spanish imperial claims, they wrote their own versions of history that

Significantly, recent scholarship even suggests that Spaniards endorsed the notion of tyrannicide, especially if a ruler attacked either the basic liberties or goods of his subjects or did not protect the “true religion,” ideas expressed in Juan de Mariana’s widely popular *De rege et regis institutione* (1599), which applauded the Spanish imperial mission for it represented the exercise of political and military skills in the interest of Catholic Christianity. See Braun, *Juan de Mariana and Early Modern Spanish Political Thought*. See José A. Fernández-Santamaría, *Reason of State and Statecraft in Spanish Political Thought, 1595-1640* (New York: University Press of America, 1983), 96-101. For contemporary doctrines circulating about the lawful deposition of a Pope, unanimously endorsed by scholastic thinkers, see Brian Tierney, *Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 61–67, and Appendix I.


challenged the historical rationales that formed the basis of Philip’s actions in Portugal and his intentions in France. Therefore, although in their correspondence the advisors focused on responding to Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s histories, this is perhaps part of a reaction to broader and wider accusations about the nature of Spanish rule and general challenges to Spanish imperialism, and not just those of the Italian and Frenchman, although it is highly significant that it was to these two works that specific responses were constructed (undoubtedly because of more immediate imperial imperatives, and necessities.) In fact, perhaps preserving Portugal and France from the fate that had been suffered in the Netherlands is one of the principle motivations for these counter-histories.

The Genoese Gerolamo Conestaggio’s *Istoria dell’vnione del regno di Portogallo alla corona di Castiglia* [History of the union of the kingdom of Portugal to the Crown of Castile] (1585), was a polemic of the events surrounding the Spanish annexation of Portugal in 1580. Conestaggio not only provided an alternate genealogical precedent that supported other contenders to the Portuguese throne, thus challenging Spanish claims of dynastic supremacy, he provided an argument for Phillip’s unfitness to rule by negatively characterizing the Spanish Crown’s actions leading up to and during the annexation, and during the first four years of Spanish rule. Indeed, Conestaggio provided much more than a simple recounting of events. He suggested that the annexation had been brought about through a series of adroit political maneuverings entailing the use of bribery, intimidation, and brute force—a kind of *Realpolitik* worthy of Machiavelli, and that Philip, moved solely by personal gain and interest, had followed

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23 Gerolamo Conestaggio, *Istoria dell’vnione del regno di Portogallo alla corona di Castiglia del sig. Jeronimo de Franchi Conestaggio gentilhuomo genouese* (Genoa: Appresso Girolamo Bartoli, 1585). For a more detailed discussion of Conestaggio’s work, and the specific Spanish counter-history written as a response by Spanish official historian Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, see Ch. 3 below.
with no concern for the benefit of his Portuguese subjects. Such characterizations further allowed Conestaggio to demonize Philip as a tyrannical ruler to the Portuguese, providing additional justification for Philip’s unworthiness for the Portuguese throne.

The political, economic, and strategic importance attached to aspects of Spanish imperial policy made Conestaggio’s history a matter of significant and immediate concern. Indeed, as Geoffrey Parker observes, the need to maintain both his inherited and acquired dominions became part of Philip’s “Grand Strategy” and a defining characteristic of Philip’s government.24 Moreover, as scholarship by both Parker and Fernando Bouza has demonstrated, a common belief among Philip’s counselors was that the union with Portugal made Philip the most powerful king in the world.25 Conestaggio’s work, therefore, was seen as potentially undermining the perception of power that the union created across Europe. Similarly, Conestaggio’s work was initially published in Genoa, and Spain’s domination of northern Italy remained at all times a matter of high priority to Spanish imperial policy.26 Thus, the Crown became particularly concerned about areas out of its immediate purview where rumors could easily circulate and fester. Idiáquez, in particular, worried that Conestaggio’s work might affect Spain’s Italian interests, especially since it added to ideas already circulating in Italy, which had originated

24 For Geoffrey Parker this “Grand Strategy” or imperial idea is identified as “messianic imperialism,” that is, “the efforts of leaders to link their own causes to God’s purposes and their belief that God would perform miracles to help achieve their goals.” Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II, 2. See also Geoffrey Parker, The World is Not Enough: The Imperial Vision of Philip II of Spain (Waco, Tex.: Markham Press Fund, 2001); and Alain Milhou, “1492-1598: Un climat favorable au messianisme ibérique,” in Millénarismes et messianismes dans le monde ibérique et latino-américain, ed. Jean Franco and Francis Utéza (Montpellerier: Université Paul Valéry, 2000), 13–33.


26 Very little has been written about Spanish foreign policy under Philip II, with only the work of Miguel Angel Ochoa Brun’s Historia de la diplomacia española, 6 Vols. (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1999), providing any kind of in-depth overview. See also, Angelantonio Spagnoletti, Principi italiani e Spagna nell’età barocca (Milan: B. Mondadori, 1996); Garret Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (London: Penguin, 1955); and for the Habsburg era and the influence of Bernardino de Mendoza see De Lamar Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism: Bernardino de Mendoza and the French Catholic League (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1964).
during the reign of Philip’s father Charles V, that Spanish rule had brought “ruin and an injurious infirmity” to Italy. 

It should be noted as well that, on a practical level, Spain relied overwhelmingly on foreign money, troops, and ships to sustain its empire, and thus maintaining a positive image abroad was crucial. 

Avowed Protestant Louis Turquet Mayernne’s *Histoire générale d'Espagne* [A general history of Spain] (1587) attempted to challenge Spanish imperial claims to the French throne after Henry III’s death. Spanish claims to France lay in Spain’s historic role as the defender of the Catholic faith, the longstanding dynastic ties between the two kingdoms, and the longevity, antiquity, and grandeur of the Spanish Monarchy, which was proof of Spain’s favored providential role and proved that the Spaniards were the most worthy claimants to the French throne. Mayernne, however, asserted that Spain had no such historical justifications for its French claims, questioned Spanish dynastic preeminence, and challenged the historical legacy of past Spanish monarchs. Beginning in antiquity, Mayernne’s narrative portrayed a legacy of Spanish monarchs who repeatedly betrayed the privileges of their nobles and who only feigned support for their religious cause. Thus, Mayernne’s response to Spanish ambitions in France was

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30 As will be discussed further in Ch. 4 below, Mayernne also averred that the designated Spanish heir, Philip’s daughter, despite being a Valois, as a woman could not inherit because of the French Salic Law.
a criticism of all of Spain’s past, of the Spanish character, and of its legacy of “bad rulers.”

Mayernne deliberately brought his historical narrative up to 1582, which allowed him to provide a historical account of Philip’s rule, which he characterized as that of a murderous and tyrannical king. Mayernne even went so far as to accuse Philip of poisoning his third wife, Isabel of Valois, and assassinating his son Don Carlos. His portrait of Philip was of a religious fanatic, hypocrite, cheat, and enemy of Europe who ruled only in his own self-interest.

The fact that both Conestaggio and Mayernne challenged not only traditional historical claims such as genealogical precedent, but also directly challenged the nature of Spanish rule in their historical studies is significant. Mayernne, in particular, knew that his appeal to a historical legacy of unjust rule was integral to the charges he was making against Philip, as he hoped to convince his readers that Philip would only continue this Spanish legacy. Spanish dynastic primacy had long been used as the main justification for Spanish legitimacy in its imperial claims within Europe, so the histories’ challenge to the dynastic legitimacy of Spanish claims was important. However, Conestaggio and Mayernne also used their histories as a way to criticize Spanish actions both past and present, and to directly criticize Philip’s rule in order to de-legitimize Spanish authority.

So it is no wonder that Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s works caused such alarm and were equated with The Apology. An environment had been created within Europe where such accusations of tyranny, alongside the rhetorical force of history and historically based arguments, provided a powerful challenge to authority. The fact that both Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s works were made in the form of historical assertions is highly significant, as by the mid-sixteenth
century historical claims had been established as the most effective means to gain support for political actions. Indeed, as Pedro de Cabrera, Count of Chinchón, in direct reference to Conestagggio’s and Mayernne’s works, replied in a letter to Moura: “we cannot let these [foreign polemics] have [the effect] that we see in the [Low Countries] . . . and the pain and suffering [that malicious rumors] have caused to the utility and well-being of the entire kingdom.”

Moura also immediately compared Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s works to *The Apology*, and warned that they were bound to be just as popular, and thus have the same pernicious effect, since “foreigners, . . . heretics and enemies of this Monarchy, love to know about supposed Spanish injustices, avarices and cruelties.” Indeed, across Europe the promotion of supposed Spanish “avarices” and “cruelties,” and in particular accusations of Spanish tyranny, had become potent weapons that Spain’s enemies used to serve their own ideological and political causes.

More importantly, the advisors’ concerns had already been actualized, since Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s works had appealed to the popular imagination abroad: as one English reader described Conestaggio’s work, “it told of the tragedy of a King [Sebastian], and his people, and that is why it is so popular, . . . [for it tells the history of the] downfall of Portugal at the loss of their valorous King, and their taking over by the greedy Spaniards and the tyrannous Philip.”

It was not only the international reaction that concerned the Spanish advisors; they also feared the effects of these histories on growing local discontent, which had also begun to focus on the king and Spanish imperialism. By the 1580’s, Castile’s economy had slumped and poverty

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31 “. . . el dolor . . . que ha causado a la utilidad y bienestar de todo el reino . . . esos rumores maliciosos.” Chinchón to Moura, BNM Ms/ 18633, fol. 64.
32 “de injusticias, avaricias y crueldades que gustarán mucho de saber los extranjeros, herejes y enemigos de esta Monarquía.” Moura to Juan de Silva, 1/5/15[8]4?, BNM Ms/ 981, fol. 23. See similar concerns by de Silva to Moura, BNM, Ms/ 12856, fol. 8.
33 Papers of E. Blount, dated 1598, British Library, 593.e.7. Blount would go on to translate Conestaggio’s work into English in 1601.
had increased. The resulting discontent was directed at Philip, who was seen as personally responsible for the kingdom’s multiple problems, both at home and abroad. 34 Especially in Granada, in the wake of the Morisco Revolt of the 1560s, Philip’s rule increasingly came to be equated with a brutal Inquisition and oppressive taxation. Explanations of divine displeasure, especially over Philip’s continual quest to expand his empire, were used to explain the tragedy of the Armada in 1588, and Spaniards directly chastised Philip for the defeat of the mightiest fleet that Europe had ever seen. In fact, Philip’s reputation would reach its nadir in Spain in the years following the defeat of the Armada in 1588 and Drake’s raids on Galicia and Portugal. Critics exploited these events, characterizing Philip as a ruler too physically weak to look after the welfare of his subjects, let alone defend them against attack. 35 By 1589, a prominent Jesuit and political theorist, Pedro de Ribadeneira, expressed alarm that many of the king’s vassals were “embittered, discontented and upset with His Majesty.” 36 In addition, there had been internal opposition to Philip’s annexation of Portugal, as well as his interests in France. Many Spaniards believed that adding Portugal would only divert Philip’s interest away from more pressing matters at home, while intervening in French affairs and the French Wars of Religion, would only deplete Spanish coffers. 37 Such Spanish apprehensions about imperial actions in both

34 These problems included a corrupted Church, a brutal Inquisition, oppressive taxation, a lack of justice for the poor, and weak defenses. All of these were seen as caused by Philip’s faulty external policies and his own personal faults. See Richard L. Kagan, Lucretia’s Dreams. Politics and Prophecy in Sixteenth-Century Spain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

35 For a comprehensive discussion of the criticisms that emerged of Philip II during the 1580s and 1590s in Spain, see Kagan, Lucretia’s Dreams; Charles Jago, “Crisis sociales y oposición política: Cortes y Monarquía durante el reinado de Felipe II,” in Las Cortes de Castilla y León en la Edad Moderna (Valladolid: Cortes de Castilla y León, 1989), 315–340; and Fernando Bouza, “Servidumbres de la Soberana Grandeza. Criticar al Rey en la corte de Felipe II,” in Imágenes Históricas de Felipe II, ed. Alvar Ezquerra, 141–179. For a theoretical understanding of how the Spanish nobility found expression in criticizing the Monarchy see: Peter Burke, “La historia social del lenguaje,” in Hablar y callar. Funciones sociales del lenguaje a través de la historia (Barcelona: Gedia, 1996), esp. 11–49.

36 “amargos, disgustados y alterados contra su majestad.” Ribadeneira to Gaspar de Quiroga, 2/16/1589, as cited in Henry Kamen, Philip II of Spain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 159.

Portugal and France are of particular interest, therefore, in light of Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s attacks, as there was already discontent and waning support for both of these enterprises at home. In this context of rising foreign and domestic criticism of Philip, Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s works played upon growing domestic discontent with the growing costs of Spanish imperialism, as well as European animosity towards Spain’s ambitions to continental hegemony.

Clearly, Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s works were regarded by the Crown not only as works of history, but also as political works produced by men with political intentions. Idiáquez characterized them as “popular imaginations, of historians and políticos.” Moura frankly called such foreign texts “dangerous” (peligrosos) and directly damaging to the Monarch’s reputation (reputación). Moura and Idiáquez immediately began corresponding with other advisors in Philip’s court about what was to be done about these “dangerous” foreign texts. It is in this correspondence that more serious questions as to the nature of attacks were discussed, as well as broader concerns about the perception of Philip and his rule abroad, and what this meant for imperial power and authority. For Spanish advisors, Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s specific criticisms of Philip posed a direct threat to imperial authority.

What Spanish advisors feared most about Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s works—what would provide the primary catalyst for a formal Spanish response—was the way in which they

38 “imaginaciones del vulgo, de historiadores y de políticos.” ‘Orden para escribir la Historia’ (1587), BFZ (Juan López de Velasco, Colección Zabálburu) 1032, fol. 89.
39 ‘Request that a history be written to counter foreign accounts.’ Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 2. Moura, in particular, was very familiar with these “dangerous” texts, and was known to have spent much time collecting the “satires [critiques] that came out against actions of the royal government and great ministers” (“sátiras que salían contra acción o gobierno real i ministros grandes”). Información en discurso histórico dictada por el zelo del bien público en lo más sustancial de una Monarchía decorada por un pequeño mas fidelíssimo vassallo a su Rey. Original de Manuel de Faria y Sousa. Año MDCXXXIV [1634], RAH Ms/ 9/5117, fol. 72v.
directly assaulted Philip’s character and actions, in effect, the nature of his rule. This was particularly important, since it was this aspect of both *The Apology* and subsequent Netherlandish-inspired works that had been used to subvert Spanish authority across Europe. In fact, almost identical notions of Spanish tyranny and the nature of Spanish rule as seen in *The Apology* informed Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s rhetorical strategy. They characterized Philip’s rule as defined by egotism, interest, and inconstancy, with no apparent limits to royal power, and an unwillingness to adhere to hereditary laws or primogeniture. They presented a history of capricious or arbitrary use of power and the neglect of laws and privileges. Indeed, histories critical of the king, like *The Apology* and those of Conestaggio and Mayernne, essentially amounted to direct accusations of tyranny.

Since the fifteenth century, the king had represented the head and soul of the body politic and the relationship between the king and the people throughout the Iberian Peninsula had become something of a contractual arrangement, with the king having the responsibility, as the nominal head, to provide justice, promote religion, and defend the integrity of the realm. Such notions extended to the Spanish European empire (an empire largely bound together by dynastic right), which was an association of multiple kingdoms in which each state functioned separately but under the aegis of a single Crown. As John Elliot has argued, we should consider the Spanish empire a “composite state,” that is an amalgam of separate polities each with its own laws, institutions, and traditions that owed allegiance to a single ruler. The various realms associated

with the early modern Spanish empire retained their independence in government, laws, coinage, and armed forces, had their own independent parliaments (Cortes), and were joined only by obedience to a common sovereign. Thus, in Philip’s “composite state” the Spanish Empire was increasingly envisioned through the person of the king, the only unifying factor in an empire of associated kingdoms. The king was not only the core of imperial identity, he was also the fount of order, stability, and law for the empire. He had an obligation, however, to uphold his responsibilities and fulfill his contractual responsibilities in each of his different kingdoms.

As Elliot points out, the degree to which the king provided this cohesion increasingly came to determine whether he was considered a “good king.” This made the ad hominem criticisms of Conestaggio and Mayernne particularly worrisome, since by characterizing Philip’s rule as one of self-interest, they showed that the king was not fulfilling his contractual responsibilities to his subjects. Certainly, presenting the nature of Philip’s actions and rule as not being in his subjects’ best interests, as unlawful, and as not upholding local privileges threatened the very basis of Spanish political power. This explains why Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s political accusations were seen by Spanish advisors as possessing real political consequences, for there was an understanding, as Ribadeneira expressed, that the mere belief in the preponderance of a ruler’s vices, such as “greed for the property of his subjects, violation of ancient rights, and disregard for the nobles and men of merit,” could lead the prince to “lose his state.”

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42 John H. Elliot, El Conde Duque de Olivares y la herencia de Felipe II (Valladolid: Cátedra Felipe II, 1977), 65.

43 Ibid., 65–66.

44 Pedro de Ribadeneira, “Tratado de la religión y virtudes que debe tener el príncipe cristiano para gobernar y conservar sus estados, contra lo que Nicolás Maquiavelo y los políticos deste tiempo enseñan” (1595), in Obras Escogidas del Padre Pedro de Rivadeneira (Madrid: M. Rivadeneyra, Impresor-Editor, 1868), 565–690. Political theorist Pedro de Aguire similarly expounded that even the slightest hint that a ruler governed tyrannically
advisors were aware that a prince risked losing his power if his subjects perceived him as having declined into notorious tyranny of the most excessive kind, as Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s work depicted. Regardless of whether they were mere accusations and exaggerations, they posed problems and could precipitate action if subjects, rightly or wrongly, after reading these works, felt oppressed. As the Jesuit political theorist Juan de Mariana put it, “by its nature, nothing influences more in governing and public life than the judgment and opinion of men,” of the king, and that negative ideas should not be allowed to circulate for, “whether they be true or false, even including malicious rumors,” they must be controlled for “the well-being of the entire realm will be jeopardized if such malicious sentiments are allowed to be expressed.” 45 Therefore, it did not matter if accusations were true or false, since it was the mere accusation that held force, as it could sway opinion against the king. The king needed to be seen to be working for his subjects, and upholding his obligations, especially in foreign kingdoms.

Philip’s advisors remarked specifically upon the prejudicial impact that Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s ideas had upon Spain’s reputation. Here the reputación of the “Spanish nation” and that of the monarchy were one and the same, and as Idiáquez had put it, Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s works were “harmful to our Monarchy and our nation.” 46 Here we come to

45 “por naturaleza influye más en el gobierno y en la vida pública el juicio y la opinión de los hombres que la realidad efectiva de las cosas.” Mariana, De rege, ed. Agesta, 44 and 65. Similarly, a contemporary Spanish translation of Lipsius by Bernardino de Mendoza, who had been Philip’s ambassador to England and France and was a close confidant of the King, also stressed: “Kings must do everything to ensure” that “a base and vile opinion of the King and his state,” must not be “imprinted upon the minds of his subjects, nor on foreigners” (“la opinión vil y baxa del Rey y su estado, . . . imprimida ansi en los súbitos como en los estrangeros”). Los seys libros de las políticas o doctrina civil de Justo Lipsio que sirven para el gobierno del Reyno o Principado. (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1599), 31–32.

46 He added that immediate action was necessary since “these false histories take away the King’s and Spain’s reputación” (“la falsa historia quita el honor . . . y reputación del Rey y de nuestra nación”). Idiáquez to Morales, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVI. This provides a clear example of how history was intrinsically bound up in the King’s person, and even regarded as an extension of the imaginary body of the
understand how this Spanish reputación was a legalistic quasi-mystical concept of reputation that encompassed both an idea of international standing and prowess and a national spirit.\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, Spain was a society built upon honor and fama (fame or glory), and therefore the consequence of insult and injury was so much greater.\textsuperscript{48} Any loss of reputación abroad was seen as a besmirching of “Spanish honor.” Possessing fama meant having a good reputación; moreover, fama was the reputation derived from great achievements, and therefore meant lasting reputación.\textsuperscript{49} Fama, therefore, was also one of the building blocks of a strong state and essential for those in power, and therefore directly tied to reputación. Indeed, such concerns demonstrate how Spain’s international standing and preeminence led directly to questions of reputación and

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\textsuperscript{47} Moura voiced a significant concern that such attacks had affected not only Spanish prestige, but Spain’s international standing, and even Spanish power itself: “because of these works . . . the precedence which amongst all the Kingdoms is due to Spain, is under question” (" La precedencia que entre todos los Reynos se le debe [a España] anda en opiniones"). Moura to Philip, 10/13/1584, BNM Ms/ 981, fol. 72.

\textsuperscript{48} Moura warned that through polemical attacks, “Foreigners in many things [and] on every occasion, desire to take away our honor, which to the excellency of this Kingdom and Monarchy is due”) (“Los estranjeros en muchas cosas [ y ] en todas ocasiones nos quieren quitar la honra que a la excelencia de este Reyno y Monarquía se debe”). Moura to Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 8. Similar comments are made by Diego Hurtado de Mendoza in ‘Senor don Juan de Austria quejoso del Rey’, RB II/2807, fol. 178 v.

\textsuperscript{49} Bernardino de Mendoza had also reminded Philip that the Flemish scholar Justus Lipsius had noted that a prince needed to be “watchful of his fame,” because, “whether it be warranted, [his fame] should be great, and more so because, once the prince has been criticized it will follow him and color any of his subsequent actions, whether they be good or bad” (“qual la aurá merecido la ha de tener grande y más porque el Príncipe una vez aborrecido está muy apretado y cargado de sus acciones ora sean buenas, ora malas”). Mendoza to Philip, 12/22/1587, AHN, Inquisición, legajo 4513–2, fol. 85 v.
its utility. *Reputación* was understood as the support of the people, and constituted the cardinal
element in the king’s power, which in turn augmented his *reputación*.\textsuperscript{50}

Thus, when Moura warned Philip that his “*reputación* is being destroyed,”\textsuperscript{51} this was
understood to have significant repercussions, as losing any *reputación* was seen as perilous.

Political theorist Giovanni Botero had stipulated that without the support of his people a prince
could not rule for any length of time; this support consisted in the people’s love for the king and
his *reputación* among them, and were “foundations of every government of a state.”\textsuperscript{52} According
to Robert Bireley, in this way Botero had introduced “a non-juridical form of popular consent
into government initiated by the Scholastics.”\textsuperscript{53} Similar notions were also circulating in
contemporary Spanish political thought, and best expressed by Baltasar Zúñiga, who noted that
“in my opinion, a monarchy which has lost its *reputación*, even if it has not lost its state, will be
a sky without light, a sun without rays, [a body] without a soul[spirit], a cadaver.”\textsuperscript{54} As Mariana
put it, “the power of the prince is weak once reverence has departed from the minds of his
subjects.”\textsuperscript{55} It was understood, therefore, that if Philip lost the support of the people, or if he lost
the confidence of his people, he became powerless. Such notions clearly applied to the Crown’s
understanding of critical histories, as Moura and Idiáquez worried about issues of perception and
support and the impact it was seen as having on politics and power. Thus, Spanish advisors
understood that Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s histories posed a threat to the state by

\textsuperscript{50} See Robert Bireley, *The Counter-Reformation Prince, Anti-Machiavellianism or Catholic Statecraft in Early

\textsuperscript{51} Moura to Philip, 10/13/1584, BNM Ms/ 981, fol. 73.

\textsuperscript{52} As cited in Bireley, *The Counter-Reformation Prince*, 54.


\textsuperscript{54} “una monarquía en mi sentir cuando ha perdido la reputación, aunque no haya perdido el estado, será un cielo sin

\textsuperscript{55} Mariana, *De Rege*, ed. Agesta, 65. See also Braun, *Juan de Mariana and Early Modern Spanish Political
Thought*, 89; and Jeremy Robbins, *Arts of Perception: The Epistemological Mentality of the Spanish Baroque, 1580-
challenging Philip’s reputación. Idiáquez and Moura similarly understood that maintaining reputación was necessary, if the king sought to inspire veneration in his subjects and respect in neighboring states.

Thus, in this Spanish context, issues of reputación appear to have taken on more urgent tones, and were directly related to the maintenance of power. Indeed, when it came to international matters, Spanish advisors had no doubt about the importance of reputación as both an object and an instrument of policy. They understood that reputación was even more important than arms or other levers of power. Moreover, Idiáquez and Moura were aware that in the conduct of foreign policy Spaniards had to be concerned with questions of prestige and status. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Idiáquez saw the need to respond to attacks for, “if the King does not demonstrate his [anger and sorrow] over this matter of precedence, no reputación will remain for us to lose.” Indeed, it is interesting that for Idiáquez and Moura their immediate discussions around how to respond to foreign criticism and assert Spanish authority did not concern an amplification of law or the judicial powers of the Spanish Crown, but rather in how to ensure the king’s reputación.

In their letters to each other, the Spanish advisors were clearly aware that authority and power were based on perception and they understood that they needed to take into account, as Mariana pointed out, as much opinion as the effective reality of things. Opinions of the king’s actions, his image, and hence the reputación of the monarch, had become more than an ideal; it

57 Idiáquez to Philip, 4/30/1586, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 11.
was understood as a state of being essential to sustain. Moreover, with clear external criticism and growing internal unrest, foreign histories critical of the king not only threatened political authority, but also produced wider societal implications. In fact, Philip’s advisors believed that the circulation of these critical histories threatened the very “faith” that people had in authority itself. Moura even compared Conestaggio’s work to the damage caused by “false currency.” It became evident, therefore, that both Mayernne’s and Conestaggio’s work needed to be banned. For official historian Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, using the same analogy as Moura for the need to ban “false currency,” the banning of Conestaggio’s work in Spain was justified: “that is why, conforming to laws and rights, with [good] reason one punishes those who produce false monies for the damage it causes to the public’s faith in commerce and contracts, so too it is even more justifiable [to ban] those [foreign historians like Conestaggio] who write untruthfully, prejudicing not only the truth, but what is certain.” Significantly, the term “certain” (cierto) was also equated with the term “indubitable,” which was understood as that which was not to be doubted or called into question.

58 For Moura, therefore, foreign historical narratives needed to be suppressed, for they threatened “the good opinion of Your Majesty” (“no hay que dar ocasión a que la mentira prevalezca en peligro de la buena opinión de su Majestad”). Moura, San Lorenzo, 12/11/1596, BNM Ms/ 6178, fol. 56. As an Italian emissary wrote to a member of the Spanish court, it had become paramount to conserve the royal image and its reputación, “without which,” he warned, “a prince cannot be.” Carlo Pallavicino to Carlos Manuel de Saboya, Madrid, 6/18/1586, AST(Archivo di Stato Turin), Lettere Ministri. Carteggio diplomatico. Spagna, mazzo 3. I owe this reference to Anthony Pagden.

59 Moura, San Lorenzo, 12/11/1596, BNM Ms/ 6178, fol. 56. That was why Moura wrote to Philip, “writing your history . . . [will] guard and prosper and augment the state, the life and health of the person of Your Excellency, and of [your imperial holdings].” Moura continued: “Nothing will assure as much your name than if [this history] is set forth, it will be conserved for a great time, and will assure that [things] will live for all posterity” (“escribiendo esta historia . . . guarde y prospere con augmento . . el estado . . [y] la vida y salud de la persona de V. Excelencia, y de Lisboa. Ninguna asegura tanto su nombre como si quedase puesto, y se conservaría gran tiempo y aseguraría que viviría también para siempre”). Moura to Philip, BNM, Ms/13229, fol. 203.

60 “Y por esto, si conforme a las leyes y derechos son con razón castigados los que fabrican falsa moneda por el daño que hacen a la fee publica en los comercios y contratos, quanto mas justamente lo deven de ser los que escriben falsamente perjudicando tanto a la verdad y experiencia cierta de las cosas.”Antonio de Hererra y Tordesillas, Cinco libros de la historia de Portugal y la conquista de las islas de los Azores (Madrid, 1589), 1.

61 In sixteenth-century Spain, “cierto” is defined as: “Conocido como verdadero, seguro, indubitable.” Sebastián de Covarrubias, El Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española (Madrid, L. Sánchez, 1611), 124.
The Spanish Crown, therefore, quickly banned both Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s works. After the arrival of Conestaggio’s work at court in Madrid, the book was immediately suppressed and placed on both the Castilian and Portuguese Indices, and all found copies of the work were seized. Mayernne’s work met a similar fate. Significantly, Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s works were the first historical narratives written by foreigners to be placed on the Index of Prohibited Books. The banning of these secular foreign histories provides further evidence of the political objectives of the Index. Clearly the list included works that went beyond heretical ideas, to include those strictly of political interest, and expressly those coming from abroad. For the Crown, the censoring of works that did not support the ideals of the state was a means not only to control foreign ideas, but to ensure internal cohesion. The notion that those who control the means of persuasion also control the means of power was, as Anthony Pagden points out, a humanistic commonplace.

Such actions were supported by a long tradition in Spain of controlling historical works that were inimical to the Monarch’s interest. Beginning under Ferdinand and Isabela (r. 1474-1520), the censoring of history had become key to the project to centralize and strengthen the Spanish Monarchy, and the banning of local or “private histories” has been seen by scholars as a way that the Catholic Monarchs tried not only to centralize power, but to center Spanish identity

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62 Idiáquez to Philip, 11/29/1582, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 121/40, fol. 63.
63 Jesús Martínez de Bujanda, *Índices de libros prohibidos del siglo XVI* (Sherbrooke: Centre d’études de la Renaissance, Université de Sherbrooke, 2002), 522. On the Index see Virgilio Pinto Crespo, *Inquisición y control ideológico en la España del siglo XVI* (Madrid: Fundación Caja de Madrid, 1983), 200–259. Neither Conestaggio nor Mayernne’s attacks were intended for a Spanish audience, but rather for a wider European readership. Copies did flow, however, across the Spanish border, thus requiring that they be placed on the Index.
64 It should be noted that although considerable attention has been paid to the general suppression of ideas and ideological control in Spain in the second half of the sixteenth century, no author has focused on the specific control of foreign historical writing under Philip II.

Following in this tradition, as Richard Kagan notes, Philip and his advisors also took issue with, and repeatedly sought to suppress, histories that put purely local or regional interests ahead of those of the monarchy.\footnote{Richard L. Kagan, “Clio and the Crown: Writing History in Habsburg Spain,” in Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World. Essays in Honor of John H. Elliott, ed. Richard L. Kagan and Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 73–99. In particular, Castilians, whose court was at the centre of Spanish power, were critical of the way Aragonese scholars wrote histories that gave undue precedence to Aragon in Spain’s past. Consequently, the Crown began to suppress the circulation of such “regional” Aragonese histories. Benito Sánchez Alonso, Historia de la historiografía española. Vol. 2, Ensayo de un examen de conjunto, De Ocampo a Solís (1543-1648) (Madrid: J. Sánchez de Ocaña, 1944), 42–49.} Concurrently, a larger effort was occurring to suppress ideas that did not paint the king in a favorable light, and a variety of both blasphemous and heretical propositions as well as seditious statements injurious to the honor and reputación of the king were regulated and suppressed by the Holy Office of the Spanish Inquisition in Madrid.\footnote{Kagan, Lucretia’s Dreams, 1.} In 1582, additional restrictions were also placed upon histories of the New World that might invoke criticism, histories that might prove to be “inconvenient” (incómodo) for the state, or those which, even if true, “did not serve Your Majesty.”\footnote{AGI, Consulta 9/28/1582, Indiferente General 426, libro 26, legajo 740.} These were not made public and declared “disloyal or suspect” (desleales o sospechosos), as they could potentially affect “the future loyalty of subjects.”\footnote{AGI, Consulta 9/28/1582, Indiferente General 426, libro 26, legajo 740.}

Idiáquez and Moura realized that such historical censorship now needed to be directed towards hostile foreign historical writing in order to protect Philip II’s domestic and international

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70 AGI, Consulta 9/28/1582, Indiferente General 426, libro 26, legajo 740.
\end{footnotesize}
political position. For Idiáquez and Moura the construction of the royal image through the use of historical narrative was regarded as not only having particular implications for Spain’s foreign dealings, but was also regarded as possessing consequences for domestic conceptions of royal power. Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s works appeared precisely at the time when the Crown began to face internal criticism focused on the king. Indeed, Idiáquez and Moura specifically voiced a concern that uncontested malicious rumors might allow Philip’s enemies abroad to find and exploit a “fifth column” of discontented subjects in the peninsula. Idiáquez and Moura understood therefore that access to Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s ideas needed to be controlled, especially within Spain. As Moura put it, in order to secure the well-being of the state, immediate action would be necessary to ensure that Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s “lies not prevail,” nor endanger stability, especially at home.  

Both Idiáquez and Moura believed that the banning of foreign works, however, was not enough, and the only way to counter Conestaggio’s and Mayernne’s works conclusively was to commission “official history,” for as Idiáquez wrote, “not having an authentic history [. . .] to prove that what they write is false . . . [these works] are received or perpetuated as truth without offense and go against the service of God and your Majesty.” Such sentiments not only testify to the power that history was seen to possess as a means of disseminating “truth,” but also to explain why explicit counter-histories were considered necessary. The Crown clearly had come to see the need to defend history and the image of the king and of the realm, as an integral part of

71 Moura, San Lorenzo, 12/11/1596, BNM Ms/ 6178, fol. 57. This provides further evidence for the ideas of Fernand Braudel who recognized that Spaniards implicitly accepted the notion that there was a relationship between foreign wars and civil wars (and foreign and domestic issues and conflicts) in the sixteenth century. See Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe* (Paris: A. Colin, 1966), 2: 170.

72 “no habiendo historia auténtica en contrario que lo contradiga . . . [no hay prueba aunque sea falso y no verdadero] . . . es recibido o perpetuado por verdad sin ofensa [de ella?] y de servicio de Dios y Su Majestad.” Idiáquez to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, undated, legajo 160/54. Moura repeats this phrase almost verbatim in his ’Request.’ See also Idiáquez to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, 1/28/1585, legajo 123/17.
statecraft, and “official history” as a vital tool. Indeed, with questions of political authority being
discussed throughout Europe in the medium of history, Spanish advisors knew that suppressing
challenging documents was not enough. They would need to produce their own historical writing
to consolidate their political legitimacy.

It is no coincidence that the demand for a new kind of history occurred simultaneously
with the rise of censorship. Spanish advisors recognized how influential the new history, which
portrayed a specific image of the king and of Spanish imperial legitimacy, would become in the
vacuum created by active censorship of competing claims. Thus the Crown attempted to
monopolize historical discourse in order to transform it into an instrument of power.

Creating a “Better History”

As the transformation of officially sanctioned Spanish history was spurred by the
necessity to respond to foreign polemical attacks, it is not surprising that the process would lead
to the political implications of historical scholarship becoming articulated and institutionalized.
Among Idiáquez’s papers is a document entitled, ‘Orden para escribir la historia’ [Order to
write history] (1587). Significantly, this previously unstudied document reveals that the King’s
advisors envisioned counter-histories as more than mere expressions of official policy; by
prescribing clear objectives and requirements for the official refutation project, Philip’s advisors
wished to change the direction of official history in two vital ways. First, Philip’s royal advisors
understood that responses needed to be more than just encomium; they needed to explain the

73 This document appears in a collection of letters by various members of the Spanish Court, including Idiáquez and
Moura. Although it has no attribution, this document is clearly in Idiáquez’s handwriting. ‘Orden para escribir la
Historia’ (1587), BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, folio 89.
workings of the royal court and the actions of the king. Furthermore, to bolster the effectiveness of these historical writings, and in order to ensure that Spanish responses not be found to be mere laudations, they also demanded a second change: that historical narratives buttress and solidify their claims through source-based proof.

Unlike its historiographic predecessors in Spain, the “new history” was inspired by the contemporary political ideology of reason of state. Spanish advisors understood that educated readers familiar with the emerging ideas of reason of state would look for the causes behind events as a way to decipher, understand, and support political actions. Spanish advisors understood that recounting causes and intentions was the best way to present the political ideals that guided Spanish actions to both foreign and domestic audiences. In this way they could demonstrate how Philip’s actions were guided by the ideals of a Christian reason of state, regardless of outcomes. Indeed, by focusing on the causes, motivations, and intentions behind Philip’s actions, Spanish advisors hoped that their counter-histories would essentially become a means to demonstrate not only a certain philosophy of rule and certain Spanish political ideas, but also a way to demonstrate Spanish reason of state politics and a certain Spanish ideal.

Furthermore, Spanish advisors realized that the counter-histories needed to demonstrate additional forms of legitimacy for Spain’s imperialist policies. In a growing culture of authentication, advisors understood that they would need to respond to these new demands for proof, especially when making imperialist claims. Indeed, to ensure and restore reputación, merely outlining politics was not enough; the politics needed to be authenticated and “proof” provided. Spanish advisors understood, therefore, that attacks needed to be countered not only
with carefully constructed depictions of Philip’s Christian reason of state rule, substantiated with causes and intentions, but also with documents, thus transforming Spanish official history to meet both new political needs and new legitimizing elements.

As two of the most influential and powerful advisors to the king, Idiáquez and Moura were in the position to envision exactly how history and the official history project could be used not only as a means to enhance reputación, but as a tool of state and statecraft. Idiáquez and Moura were not only intimately involved in political affairs, but were directly responsible to the Crown, formulating policy and general strategy for the king, a service upon which Philip depended. Cristóbal Moura served as one of Philip’s key secretaries, most notably as Secretary of Portugal and a member of the Grande Junta, while Juan de Idiáquez, a career diplomat who had served in Italy, was Philip’s Secretary of War and State. Furthermore, Idiáquez and Moura both held seats on Philip’s Junta de Noche, the advisory body to the king, where Idiáquez dealt with foreign policy and Moura with finance and Portuguese affairs. This placed Moura and Idiáquez at the center of discussions on imperial policy and positioned them perfectly to influence directly the objectives of historiographical policy under Philip. To this end, however, Idiáquez and Moura sought the advice of historians in constructing their new vision for official history, and in particular the official historian Ambrosio de Morales (1513-1591).75

74 Further the Consejo de Estado (Council of State), on which Moura held a definitive role, dealt specifically with foreign policy. John Lynch, Spain 1516-1598. From Nation State to World Empire (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 278–280. See also Henry Kamen, Spain 1469-1714: A Society in Conflict (London: Longman, 1991), 128. For contemporary thoughts on Moura, his influence on policy, and his relationship to Philip II see, Francisco de Gurrea y Aragón, Duque de Villahermosa, Tratado practicable de las enseñanza de un buen Príncipe y avisos para su gobierno y la razón y causa de estado que a sí y a sus reynos conviene, distribuydo por las hedades del hombre. ADA, Biblioteca, Ms/ 57–58, esp. fol. 103v.

75 Idiáquez and Moura also called upon another official historian, Esteban de Garibay (also a close confidant of Morales), on how best to proceed in writing a concurrent project, a history of Philip’s life, a biography of sorts, that the two advisors envisioned could also be used for political purposes. For the discussion between Idiáquez, Moura, and Garibay on these matters see, “Memorias de Garibay,” in Memorial histórico español, ed. Pedro de Gayangos
In letters to Idiaquez and Moura, Morales made it clear that contemporary history in Spain was inadequate to combat attacks, and he re-enforced many of the advisors’ concerns and perceptions of what contemporary official history offered.76 First, Morales noted that the efforts of Spanish official historians had not concentrated on writing history of more current events. Morales was not wrong, for up to this point, the historiographic project and policy under Philip had focused on constructing a grand historical narrative of Spain’s past, of recording Spain’s antiquities, and on accumulating the documents pertinent to the reign.77 Historical scholarship under Philip had yet to begin the process of recording the monarch’s own deeds and achievements. This probably was the result, as Richard Kagan has observed, of Philip’s reluctance to commission accounts of his own reign, supposed due to modesty and his perception of such history as a vanity.78 Morales echoed Moura’s fears when he suggested that this lack of an official history of contemporary Spanish actions had clearly left the door open for criticism of both the king and Spanish actions. With mounting external criticism of more recent actions, therefore, political necessity highlighted the need to write about issues of the present.79 Further, whether it was in the comments of advisors, the Cortes, or historians, the paucity of information

76 Morales Letters, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII.
77 Sánchez Alonso, Historia de la Historiografía española, 2: 20–49. See also the Introduction above.
78 Kagan adds that Philip’s father had “set his own record straight,” only at the very end of his reign. Richard L. Kagan, “Felipe II, la Historia, y los Cronistas del Rey,” in Philippus II Rex (Madrid, Lunwerg Editores, 1999), 87–118.
79 As seen in the Introduction above, the Catholic Monarchs and Charles V had taken advantage of “present history,” to promote different political objectives, but Philip had put a stop to such history, focusing rather on his antiquarian pursuits, and the writing of the Crónica project. For prior examples of how official history had dealt with writing “present history,” see Hernando de Pulgar’s Crónica de los Reyes Católicos (1502), and the works of Pedro Mexía, Antonio de Guevarra, and Juan Gines de Sepúlveda, who were commissioned by Charles to write about his life and reign. See Kira von Ostenfeld-Suske, “Writing Official History in Spain, History and Politics ca.1474-1600,” in The Oxford History of Historical Writing, ed. Jose Rabasa, Daniel Woolf, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3: 86–125.
about Spanish actions in Portugal and France made the need to provide that information so much more important. Indeed, because of this lack of knowledge, histories which attacked a regime were all the more relevant and threatening, especially in a Europe increasingly starved for “accurate” information. Thus, Morales pointed out to both Idiáquez and Moura the need for “current history” (historia de nuestros tiempos) and a “true and accurate account of recent actions.”80 As Morales wrote to Idiáquez, “one will find [in current history] all the examples that one’s desire can find, especially those of our Catholic religion . . . and all the other virtues and excellencies that illuminate and unite with exemplary doctrine all men, like things of the illustrious art of military discipline and of great deeds, challenges, efforts and true animos[spirit/intentions] and negotiations of great and mature government, and all else that one might desire.”81 Therefore, the “histories” of present and current political actions had potentially powerful implications for legitimacy, especially if they revealed “true intentions,” and therefore provided their own form of exempla through which to teach about government action.82

Morales also brought another problem to the attention of Idiáquez and Moura. It was not only the lack of more recent history that posed a problem for the Crown, but also the way in which official history had portrayed Spanish monarchs that needed some modification.83 The problem that the Crown faced was that older, mainly mediaeval structures of chronicle history

80 The phrase “current history” or “history of our times” (historia de nuestros tiempos) appears in BFZ, Altamira, 1/30/1592, carpeta 169, fol. 54. See also, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 159/107.
81 “En historia presente se hallarán todos los ejemplos que desear se pueden, así principalmente de nuestra católica religión y de cosas de grande santidad y de letras universals[ic] y de todas las demás virtudes y excelencias que ilustran y ensalzan con doctrina ejemplar a las gentes, como de cosas de la ínclita arte de la disciplina militar y de grandes hazañas, ardides, esfuerzos y ánimos verdaderamente enardecidos y negocios de grande y maduro gobierno y de todo lo demás que desear se puede.” Morales to Idiáquez, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII.
82 For Moura, “providing [these histories] is not only important to good government and commerce of the people, who without it would live in shadows and perpetual ignorance, [but are] the only witness of times.” ‘Request that a history be written to counter foreign accounts.’ Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 3.
83 Morales, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII.
did not work in the late-sixteenth-century context. Official history writing had long been at the service of the monarchy as an effective means to assert and define Spanish authority both within Spain and abroad. Even before Philip, history had been used to legitimize imperial claims.\(^8^4\) In these prior works, however, justifications for actions had been based on ancient myths or Roman precedents, or how actions mimicked those of the past by comparing monarchs to their ancient ancestors, or by extolling chivalric prowess and military exploits.\(^8^5\) In fact, it should be noted that it might not have been Philip’s desire to avoid being seen as vain which prompted his reluctance to have a history written of his reign, but rather his concern over the negative reception that many of the histories of his father had received for being too excessively laudatory. Clearly, Idiáquez and Moura understood that to combat external historical criticism effectively they would need to find an alternative to the traditional historiographical representations of kingship to justify the actions of Spain and its king.

Interestingly, the court correspondence shows that Philip did not initially recognize the necessity of an official response. In a series of letters, Idiáquez and Moura, clearly aware of Philip’s hesitations, sought to promote “current history,” and especially a history that would look directly at Philip’s own actions and intentions. As Idiáquez wrote to Philip, “men can allow themselves to be convinced much more by things of the present, than by those of the past.”\(^8^6\) “Current history,” therefore, was presented not as a vanity, but a necessity. There was an additional immediacy and urgency for writing “current history,” however, especially since as

\(^8^4\) See Introduction above.
\(^8^5\) Prior histories under Charles had focused on the actions of the Monarch, but had done so by comparing his actions to classical or mediaeval models (his heroic virtue, honor, valor, and courage, thus his chivalric qualities, along with his humanist education, and patronage, thus also his epitomizing of the qualities of the ideal Renaissance prince), a blending of two conceits that greatly suited his royal imagery. For a further discussion of all of these precedents please see the Introduction above.
\(^8^6\) Idiáquez to Philip, BNM, ‘Documentos históricos manuscritos del reinado de Felipe II,’ Ms/ 1968, fol. 17v.
Moura warned Philip, “the memory of those who lived through it is coming to an end” and “so if we do not write authentic history to counter [these attacks] . . . the only accounts available [will be those of foreigners], whether they be true or not.”\(^{87}\) Thus, an “authentic” and “true” account of events needed to rely on those who had actually witnessed events first hand, as they were regarded as the only ones who could attest to the “true” nature of the events. In this way official history was not only to be used as a “vault of memory,” to be used for the benefit of government, but the need to commit this memory to paper was considered necessary to guarantee the continued availability of such historical “truth.”

Moura also expressly laid out to Philip II why such an official response to negative foreign histories was needed in his ‘\textit{Request that history be written to respond to foreign accounts}.’\(^{88}\) Moura argued that the general lack of Spanish official histories to counter the “jealousies and animosities of foreigners,” meant that negative histories, if left unchallenged, would color the understanding of the kingdom and the actions of the king.\(^{89}\) Therefore, as Moura asserted there was a pressing need to write an official account of contemporary events to “set the record straight,”\(^{90}\) for he claimed:

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\(^{87}\) “no habiendo historia auténtica en contrario que lo contradiga y acabada la memoria de los que viven, quedaráse lo que escribieren falso o verdadero, recibido o perpetuado por verdad sin ofensa de ella y de servicio de Dios y Su Majestad.” ‘\textit{Request that a history be written to counter foreign accounts}.’ Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/18768, fol. 1.

\(^{88}\) ‘\textit{Request that a history be written to counter foreign accounts}.’ Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/18768, fols. 1–12.

\(^{89}\) This does not mean that political tracts coming out of the Spanish court had not used historical reasoning and justifications to provide the foundations for Spanish imperial interest in Portugal and France. These tracts would prove to be vital sources of information from which counter-historians would draw heavily when writing their responses. See Chapters 3 and 4 below.

\(^{90}\) Moura uses the terms: “poner en claro,”[make clear] “hacer manifesto”[make manifest] “poner bien”[put right] “dar order de las cosas”[give order to things], “para clarificar las cosas . . . porque no tienen la información correcta” [to clarify things . . . because they do not have the correct information]. ‘\textit{Request that a history be written to counter foreign accounts},’ Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/18768, fol. 8.
The things which have occurred in the time of Your Majesty in both number and greatness are the most talked about in the world, and so most worthy of history [in order] to clarify and testify to their glory, and thus make manifest, because if [an account of Your actions is] left to the temerarious judgment of the vulgo, always inclined to judge the worst, they will not appear as they are, and many will be badly judged, even though the intentions of Your Majesty in all of them has been before God what needed to be done, and what we know to be true.91

Not only were Spanish actions and those of the king worthy of an official account, but Moura realized that if they did not write such an account someone else would, and they could not control these other accounts, nor ensure that they demonstrated Philip’s “true” intentions. Moura claimed that the lack of an official account of events from which to draw, would leave Spanish and foreign readers benighted: “Since there is no history [of these events] there is nowhere for people to gain reason or light of things, and so they will judge the actions of your Majesty [not as is deserved], . . . and this damage will not stop until a history is written on the peripheries as it should be for the Kingdom.”92 Writing counter-history, therefore, was not only necessary for posterity, but to teach contemporary readers about the “true” workings of government, and thus the “true” nature of Philip’s actions.

91 “Las cosas sucedidas en tiempo de Su Majestad en número y grandeza son de las más señaladas que ha habido en el mundo y más dignas de historia que las califique y declare porque si se dejan al juicio temerario del vulgo inclinado siempre a juzgar lo peor, no han de parecer lo que son y muchas de ellas serán mal juzgadas aunque la intención de Su Majestad en todas haya sido delante de Dios la que debe y se sabe.” Request that a history be written to counter foreign accounts, Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 6.

92 “No pudiendo tener sin la historia razón ni luz de las cosas, juzgará las de Su Majestad no como merece su piedad y santo cello, sino conforme a su dolor y sentimiento, y no parará el daño en esto sino que se escribiéndose su historia por los rincones come ya se debe escribir en el Reyno.” Request that a history be written to counter foreign accounts, Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 3. This notion of posterity was important, for, not only was that contained in histories held as sacrosanct, but it would have a lasting impression on future generations, and would become part of a Monarch’s legacy. That was why early in his career, Philip’s advisor Antonio Perez warned Philip that “Princes should fear historians more than ugly women fear painters” (“Los principes deben temer a los historiadores más que las mujeres feas a los pintores”). Cited in Fernando Bouza, Imagen y propaganda: capítulos de historia cultural del reinado de Felipe II (Madrid: Ediciones Akal, 1998), 51.
Moura was not alone in impressing upon the king the need for an official historiographical response to foreign polemical attacks. The Spanish Cortes also urged upon Philip the need for an “official record” of events and claimed that not having accounts with which to counter attacks would be detrimental to Spain’s standing within Europe and thus, there was a particular need to create an “official history” to be exported abroad for foreign courts.93 Further, one finds in court letters, in the writings of foreign diplomatic envoys, and in the prologues of many official histories how dangerous it was that there were no “official” histories to respond to foreign polemical attacks.94 Thus, there was a general understanding of the importance of an official response through official history and the political functions it served.

From the outset Spanish advisors acknowledged that for the Spanish response to have the full and necessary political effect, it would need to be translated to reach beyond a Spanish-speaking audience.95 There was a general European understanding, as Botero had stipulated, that official history not only had to be finely written in order to fulfill its persuasive function, but it needed to spread knowledge of a monarch’s accomplishments “all over the world.”96 For Idiáquez, there was only one way to accomplish this: “if these works are written only in Spanish, ___________

93 Requests by the Cortes for the Crown to promote the writing of “official history” emerged specifically in the years between 1580 to 1598. I have been able to find 15 such requests to the King from the Cortes of Castile appearing in their records. See especially, Cortes de los antiguos reinos de Castilla y León, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Imprenta de la real casa, 1882), 4: 382.
94 For example see Bernardino de Mendoza to Philip, BNM Ms/ 1241, fol. 75 and the comments found in BNM Ms/ 13229, fol. 203 r.-v. Two other mentions of the need to publish history as a means to counteract negative accounts appear in an unsigned letter to Philip, Madrid, 5/3/1585; ADA, Caja 111–46; and Philip to Busto de Villeagas, Aranjuez, 4/16/1585, BNM Ms/ 18633–64. See also, Páez de Castro, ‘Memorial al Rey,’ BNM V/234, about the need to promote works which defended reputación.
95 Significantly, Conestaggio’s work alone had seen translations into German and French, and two more editions in Italian. Conestaggio’s work would see three published versions in Italian, in 1585, 1589, and 1592 (with three more before 1642), a 1589 German edition, and a 1596 publication in French (with five more by 1695). Two versions appeared in Latin, in 1602 and 1603 respectively, and it was translated into English by Christopher Marlow, and prestigiously inserted into Elizabethan literature as, The Historie of the Uniting of the Kingdom of Portugal to the Crown of Castile (London, 1600). Marlow’s translation would be reprinted five times between 1600 and 1616 in England. This demonstrates the importance this work was seen as having to foreign courts.
a knowledge of these Kingdoms which is so warranted, will not be communicable to foreigners, and they will not be able to benefit from it . . . and without a translation in Latin, the truth will be in danger . . . it is more convenient [therefore] that besides the first which is to be ordered in Spanish, another be done in Latin.”97 He continued, “these works need to be translated [so that foreign readers], see the good ventures of Your Majesty, his justice and equity in all things,” and thus provided a direct means of legitimizing political objectives and actions abroad.98 Such political sentiments and intentions were institutionalized in 1587 when Philip created the new post of “official chronicler in Latin” (*cronista en latín*) and appointed well-known humanist Calvete de Estella with the specific mandate to “translate [official] histories for export and distribution abroad.”99

Ultimately, however, to deal with growing internal unrest and domestic opposition to Spanish imperial ambitions, Spanish responses were to be written “first in Spanish,” with the express intention of promoting feelings of solidarity between the people and their king, by as Idiáquez put it, “praising the excellence of Spain and its Monarchy.”100 Thus the counter-histories were first a tool of internal defense, for as Moura believed, it was through these histories that Spaniards would, “affix themselves to their land, and know of its greatness [great

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97 “Si se escriba en castellano solamente como se debe al conocimiento de estos reynos, no será tan comunicable los extranjeros, y no la gozarán . . . sin una traducción en latín se pondrá en peligro la verdad, . . . convendrá que demás de la primera que se ordenare en castellano, se haga otra en latín.” The passage continues by stating that Spaniards themselves would need to produce these translations, and do so with the greatest style, so that “nadie se pueda atrever a traducirla mejor” (“nadie se pueda atrever a traducirla mejor”). Idiáquez to Philip, BNM Ms/ 1968, fol. 17v.
98 “es necesario que la trujsessen[sic] porque como tengo dicho, vean las buenas venturas de Su Majestad, su justicia, su equidad en todo.” Idiáquez to Philip, BNM Ms/ 1968, fol. 17v.
100 Idiáquez to Philip, BNM Ms/ 1968, fol. 17v. See also Moura, BFZ, Altamira, Mss/ 468. Significantly, in Spain national imagery already existed centered around the king. Further, Philip was already the center for both a national and imperial identification.
doings]” and, thus, “defend what is theirs against many foreigners.”\textsuperscript{101} Indeed, reputación abroad also depended upon the reputación and support that a Monarch enjoyed at home, for a crucial measure of a prince’s weight in international affairs was the support, or lack of it, from his own subjects.\textsuperscript{102} Thus, it was of utmost importance to produce historical narratives which would garner Spanish support for Philip’s imperial actions, and so it became necessary that they first be published in Spanish.

Having clearly recognized the nature of the threat and established the legitimacy and necessity of the historical project, and having identified the two audiences that must be addressed, Idiáquez and Moura then set out to specify the objectives of the Spanish response. As a political tool of state, the counter-histories needed to be carefully constructed works that outlined the specific ideals and motivations behind Spanish imperial actions, especially if they were to counter-act accusations of tyranny. Indeed the need for a specific response led official historians to enter into lengthy discussion about how the counter-history project could be a way to explain Philip’s reason of state politics and restore reputación. Accordingly, Idiáquez and Moura specifically outlined their program for the project.

Step 1: Demonstrating the Motivations of the Prudent King

Spanish advisors did not want to demonstrate that Philip was ruling well because he mimicked his ancestors, or that he was a chivalrous and valiant knight, or a perfect renaissance prince known for patronage and love of the arts and literature, or a Christian emperor favored by

\textsuperscript{101} Emphasis mine. “se aficionen a su tierra y sepan sus grandezas y puedan defender sus cosas contra muchos extranjeros.” Moura, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 5.
\textsuperscript{102} Bireley, \textit{The Counter-Reformation Prince}, 55.
God, as had been the representations of Charles, Philip’s father in histories. Although their fierce patriotism directed at the king and Spain permeated their considerations, Moura’s and Idiáquez’s choice of terminology and the issues raised in their letters show that they wished to express their views of Philip’s rule through a specific debate. First, they sought to find a way to establish Spanish political authority through historical narratives more in line with the new understanding of political ideology that focused on motivations and intentions, in addition to means and outcomes. Second, by emphasizing Philip’s morality they wanted to demonstrate how Philip was a ruler who abided by the laws, as although the authority of the king was tied to the law, whether or not the king actually supported the rule of law was entirely dependent on his will and moral integrity.

Beginning around the 1580s, and linked to the rise of the political ideology of “reason of state,” the understanding and evaluating of politics began to involve primarily judging actions and intentions, or as Anthony Pagden termed it, “the assessment of the likely behavior of agents (kings and princes), according to assumptions about the nature of their interests.” This had a profound impact on the way that European society began to envision rule, as it sharpened the perception of contemporaries about what kind of politics was necessary in the modern world. Undoubtedly, Spanish reason of state needs would have to combine these new notions of governance with official history.

103 For a further discussion of all of these precedents please see the Introduction above.
104 Xavier Gil Pujol, “Las fuerzas del rey. La generación que leyó a Botero,” in Le Forze del principe. Recursos, instrumentos y límites en la práctica del poder soberano en los territorios de la monarquía hispánica, ed. Mario Rizzo and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 2005), 975.
The way the Crown began to envision its “better history” was strongly influenced by the political ideas of “reason of state” as interpreted by Giovanni Botero, whose ideas had gained great popularity in the Spanish Court, and whose *Ragion di Stato [Reason of State]* (1589) Philip had personally ordered immediately translated into Spanish by official historian Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas. Botero’s ideas held particular appeal in Spain since he was specifically interested in the welfare of the Spanish Empire and saw the political principles of reason of state as exemplified not in the parochial politics of Italy, but in the Catholic imperialism of the Habsburgs. This was specifically a reason of state in which Christianity played a key role in molding a practicable and appealing ethic for the early modern statesman. Botero’s “reason of state” became a term of art in the Spanish court, used to legitimate political proceedings.

Botero’s ideas particularly appealed to Idiáquez and Moura in this context for two reasons: his reason of state tried to not only reconcile the ideas of Machiavelli with Tridentine orthodoxy, in the hopes of creating what we now term a ‘Christian reason of state,’ but his work was also a study of how one was to fortify and strengthen the state, which was of particular interest to Spanish advisors. For Botero, reason of state was concerned with how princes kept and preserved their political power, or with the “preservation of [states] and empires,” and thus he sought to provide “knowledge of the means suitable and necessary to create, preserve and

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106 Philip personally requested that Herrera translate Botero’s work the very same year it was published in Italy. Herrera’s translation was printed as Juan Botero, *Diez libros de la razón de Estado; con tres libros De las cosas de la grandeza, y magnificencia de las ciudades* (Madrid, 1591). A manuscript copy of Herrera’s translation, as well as copies of the original in Italian, circulated widely within the Spanish Court starting in 1589. It is significant that it was Herrera who translated Botero’s work, for, as we shall see, Herrera was a key figure in the Spanish response to foreign attacks. Indeed, Herrera’s personal familiarity with these reason of state ideas is crucial; see Chapter Three below.

expand a rule so established.” He also sought to provide advice for how to keep dominions “under control, when they have expanded, supporting them in such a way, that they do not diminish, and they do not decline.” For Botero, such political possibilities resided in how a ruler, as the head of the political body, ruled and applied “reason” to the problems of government.

Accordingly, Botero’s work offered advice concerning a variety of economic and military matters in addition to providing detailed suggestions as to how princes could protect and even enhance their reputation and grandeur by using all the necessary instruments of state. History formed an integral part of this program and was one of the many tools that could be used to ensure the loyalty of one’s vassals by extolling the king’s great deeds and accomplishments. Idiáquez and Moura were clearly influenced by these ideas when they too began to see history, and especially counter-history, as a way to “secure the existence and well-being of the community.” Indeed, the need to defend the king and his reputación meant that reason of state came to be embedded into the very purpose of official history.

For Moura and Idiáquez, making official history a means of revealing Spanish intentions and interests, therefore, was crucial in this context. Spanish advisors knew that fears of Spanish European hegemony had led foreigners, as well as Philip’s subjects abroad, to judge and depict Philip’s actions negatively. As Moura wrote to Philip, foreign histories “judge intentions, not as

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112 Moura, BNM Ms/ 18768. That same year (1595), Spanish political theorist Pedro Barbosa Homen had similarly defined ‘reason of state’ as the “total sum of the ways which enable the monarch to secure the existence and well-being of the republic.” Cited in Fernández-Santamaría, *Razón de estado y política en el pensamiento español*, 125.
your Majesty deserves, but rather as others want or can describe.”¹¹³ For Moura, such characterizations prevailed, however, primarily because foreigners did not understand the intentions behind Spanish actions. Idiáquez agreed, adding that foreign works, which he described as of a “common brutishness” (vulgo bestial), could not “know the causes and motivations that the prince has to do what he does,” and, because of that, “they judge the king harshly.”¹¹⁴ The foreign polemical attacks focused on the negative consequences or hardships that might have resulted from Spanish actions and used it as evidence of “bad ruling.”¹¹⁵ As Philip himself commented, foreigners did not know the causes that moved him to action abroad:

“They do not look at the justification, necessity and convenience which one has taken in the execution of the dealings of the realm . . . they speak about them with great liberty, but with no consideration as to what is just . . . leading and encouraging one to believe the opposite of the path [that] was actually taken.”¹¹⁶ Thus, a Spanish response needed to show that, regardless of the outcome of events, the motivations behind actions had always been for the right purposes, and had always been derived from “just,” and beneficial intentions.

¹¹³ “escriben y juzgan la intención no como [Su Majestad] merece, sino como ellos quisieren o pudieren.” Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 2.
¹¹⁴ “por no saber las causas y motivos que tiene el príncipe para hacer lo que hace.” Idiáquez to Madera, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 159/107. For Idiáquez, Conestaggio’s work in particular reflected a view from the margins which faithfully reflected the popular horizon of opinions about current events. Idiáquez had a distinctly low opinion of the vulgo, which he did not see as a definite and well-organized body politic. Rather, he entertained the notion that once provoked into rebellion “the multitude is like a torrent that destroys everything in its path.” What mattered for Idiáquez, therefore, was “how important it was that the spirit of the people be pacified.” Idiáquez to Madera, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 159/107.
¹¹⁵ Many subjects in imperial domains had in fact fallen upon hard times, and Moura claimed that many faulted the King, especially when they could not find the immediate cause for their problems they “blame[d] those who rule them” since it gave people the immediate satisfaction of identifying the reason (the person) responsible for their discontent (“porque los sucesos han sido varios y los tiempos estériles y estrechos han entrístecido muchos . . . y apretado los ánimos del pueblo que como en los trabajos no sabe si no volvearse a culpar los que le rigen”). ‘Request that a history be written to counter foreign accounts,’ Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 12.
¹¹⁶ “No mirando a la justificación, necesidad, y conveniencia con que se va procediendo en la ejecución de lo que se ha tratado con este reyño, han hablado de ello con libertad y sin consideración de lo que fuera justo, dando a entender y procurando persuadir lo contrario del camino que se lleva.” Philip to Busto de Villegas, Governor of Toledo, BNM Ms/ 18633–64.
For Moura and Idiáquez, the only “just” or right reasons behind political actions were those which accorded with the Christian principles of reason of state, or what they believed to be “true” politics. Philip’s advisors, therefore, wanted official history to create an image of the king tied to Spanish notions of “good rule” and Christian reason of state politics. The fact that the king’s advisors expounded Philip’s religion and morality as part of the king’s operable civic ideology is hardly surprising. The extent to which they appeared to refrain from, and exclude genuinely theological considerations, however, is worth mentioning. Moreover, Divine providence was noticeably absent in their considerations. Instead, Spanish advisors wanted official history to present a view of secular political ethics, presenting religion and Philip’s morality (piety and religious orthodoxy) as vital to the survival of the commonwealth. Spanish advisors wanted to emphasize that Philip’s religion, like his other virtues, was exercised according to the rational maxims of political prudence, especially since its maintenance benefited the state and commonwealth. As Idiáquez advised Philip, in this way the counter-histories would “serve Your Majesty in all his realms, and especially those of Spain, [by showing] the moderation, justice and imperial clemency of your spirit . . . [and] so that they may see the good ventures of Your Majesty, his justice and equity in everything [all things].”117 As Herrera wrote to the king, “by demonstrating your most prudent judgment, [counter-history] will be of great benefit to Your Majesty . . . [especially] by considering well the heroic customs and actions of Your Majesty and the very Catholic and prudent ways in which [You] have governed your Kingdoms and states in peace and in war.”118 This was a view of Philip that accommodated and

117 Emphasis mine. “para servir a Su Majestad en que todos sus reynos y especialmente estos de España vean la moderación, justicia e imperial clemencia de su ánimo . . . para que vean las buenas venturas de Su Majestad, su justicia, su equidad en todo.” Idiáquez, RB II/1451, fol. 19
118 “mostrado V. Magestad en ello, como en todo lo demás su prudentíssimo joyzio, pues para V. M será este libro de mucho fruto . . . porque la cosa que [illustra] es, con auer muy bien considerado las heroicas costumbres y
assimilated an acceptable view of his rule, combining Christianity and ethics with practical politics and adherence to the law; it was consistent with the humanist rationale of civic religion, specifically, that religion and orthodoxy were to be maintained and toleration refused on the grounds of necessity.

The Spanish reason of state, as envisioned by Phillip’s advisors endeavoured to reconcile notions of practical politics and political necessity with the fundamental precepts of the Christian religion, especially charity, virtue, temperance, and prudence. For Spaniards, the “reasons” for political action corresponded loosely with the “laws” of conventional ethics and politics—natural law, civil law, law of war, and law of nations. This was particularly true for actions which “looked to the public welfare” and sought the “good of the republic,” or of the prince representing the public. Here, public welfare was to always be placed above personal advantage, and pursued diligently as the highest good. According to this line of thought, a powerful prince like Philip could be politically minded and still be a Christian prince, especially if he was motivated not by self-interest, but by the good of the commonwealth over which he ruled. Specifically influenced by Botero, Spanish reason of state was also particularly interested in how princes could increase their power and enhance reputación without recourse to some of the amoral subterfuge advocated by Machiavelli; it proposed a Christian program for the development and preservation of the state. Spanish reason of state not only saw Christianity and political achievement as compatible, but, more importantly, believed that the combination

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acciones de V.M. . . . las formas tan catolicas y prudentes con q ha gouernado sus Reynos y Estados, en paz, y en guerra.” Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, ‘Dedication to Philip,’ in his Historia de Portugal, 3.


120 Intense debate emerged in Europe about the relationship between politics, morality, and religion, and issues of political morality and the relationship of morality and politics was a feature of the era. See Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince, 20–51.
enhanced the chance of political success. Those who sought to define a Christian reason of state in Spain focused on the practice of statecraft, an emphasis that grew out of their concern to meet Machiavelli on his own terms. Thus, government and politics were to be based on showing the character of men, inspired by the knowledge of their passions and interests, motivations and causes. Idiáquez and Moura began to see official history as a means to show this pragmatic and practical nature of Philip’s rule, which was conducted for the benefit of its subjects. They saw the counter-histories project as a means of demonstrating how such rationalizations took shape. Yet while the need for a response to foreign histories would politicize the pursuit of reputación, it did not remove it from moral considerations. Indeed, the political ideals of a Spanish Christian reason of state guided the way that Idiáquez and Moura wanted Philip’s rule represented in official history as a tool to further political understanding.

For Moura and Idiáquez, in this political context with its emphasis on causes and motivations, official counter-histories would need to pay particular attention to the union of politics and history by not just describing events, but illustrating what moved Philip to action and the basis of his intentions. That explained why Idiáquez was convinced that in any official response, “simple narration of the events is not enough.” Indeed, Spanish advisors outlined that the official historian’s task in a counter-history was to be the establishment of causal relationships. For while Morales had written to Idiáquez that any response would need to “bring

122 See specifically Pedro de Ribadeneira, Tratado de la religión y virtudes que debe tener el príncipe cristiano para gobernar y conservar sus estados, contra lo que Nicolas Maquiavelo y los políticos deste tiempo enseñan (Madrid, 1595).
123 As Idiáquez emphasized, “these Works will demonstrate to the world the rational underscoring of his Majesty’s actions and so respond to the calumnies and false imputations which foreigners have fabricated” (“mostrar al mundo . . . las razones . . . y la justificación de las acciones de S.M. y satisfazer a las calumnias y falsos ymputaciones q ellos han fabricado”). Idiáquez, RB Ms. II/1451, fol. 19.
124 Idiáquez to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 5.
to light successes in a way that reveals [discovers] their causes,” Idiáquez had come to understand that simply relating successes was not a productive way to explain and justify political causes.¹²⁵ For Idiáquez, it was necessary that readers “must know the causes before their effects, for without this, the opposite will happen, because rarely from outcomes, does one know the knowledge of causes.”¹²⁶ Indeed, Idiáquez understood that since the counter-histories were to justify actions and the imperial enterprise, they would need to demonstrate cause before effect, as this would be the only way to reveal the “true nature” of Philip’s politics, and how he had been moved by the “right” and “just” reasons, regardless of outcomes. Moreover, for Idiáquez, the primary reason that people would read these counter-histories would be to “come to know the causes” (saber las causas) that had moved Philip to act on these imperial matters.¹²⁷ Idiáquez specifically outlined that any counter-history, therefore, would have to “explain the causes which moved [the King] to act, later what means were taken to achieve the end desired. It is here where the historian is obliged to treat [where actions succeeded], and where not, and for what reasons, and must write on how [the Spanish] went about their task, which should be a great part of the history . . . and finally they must write on the effect that was had.”¹²⁸

Thus, under these polemical circumstances, the historiographical project became oriented not only toward revitalizing and strengthening the king’s image, but it endeavored to do so in

¹²⁵ “revelar sucesos de manera que descubre sus causas.” Morales to Idiáquez, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII. More in line with contemporary European ‘politic history,’ Ambrosio de Morales had also called for official historians to be versed in “moral philosophy, so that they may recount the particular case, and make it a general rule, which can always be held as law” (“la filosofia moral, para saber discurrir, sobre el caso particular, y tratar dél[sic] haciendo regla general, que siempre tenga como por ley”). Ambrosio de Morales, ‘Apuntes sobre el Archivo de Uclés,’ Introductory notes, BNM Ms/12876.
¹²⁶ Idiáquez to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 7.
¹²⁷ ‘Orden para escribir la Historia’ BFZ, Altamira, 1032, folio 89.
¹²⁸ “explicar las causas que en el consejo movieron a que comenzasen, después qué medios se tomaron para conseguir el fin que deseaban, donde el historiador es obligado a tratar en qué se acertó, y qué no, y por que razón, y escribir cómo se pusieron a la obra, que es grande parte de la historia . . . y al fin el efecto que hizieron.” Idiáquez to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 74.
line with the new understanding of political activity as intentions, causes, and means; an understanding that judged political actions based upon intentions and means. Spanish advisors insisted that cause and effect, rather than type or analogy, become the new analytical axis of official history. Significantly, Idiáquez requested that counter-histories de-emphasize direct divine intervention and focus more on the actions of men. While this emphasis on human rather than divine causes was in line with Renaissance humanism, it must be emphasized that there existed a very sophisticated Christian moral theology regarding Philip’s actions. While the counter-histories were to focus on human actions, they were always to be done within the context of Christian reason of state. It was Philip’s purpose to serve God, which ultimately meant that Spanish imperial actions implemented God’s will. The delineation of causes helped provide a more effective picture of the king, and looking to the intentions and motivations behind actions was the best way to demonstrate Philip’s Christian reason of state. In a reply to Moura, an anonymous writer even added that the most important thing that counter-histories were to convey was, “the coherence of cause and effect, counsels and successes, action and action,” for “knowledge of this” would allow the reader to make “true use of these works.”

This emphasis on explaining actions and focusing on causes also possessed additional significance. Moura and Idiáquez not only wanted to demonstrate the application of Christian reason of state principles to the problems of government, but wanted to make sure that the counter-histories included criteria whereby “the means to certain political ends deemed advisable for the preservation of the commonwealth could be judged.”

129 ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ, (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, folio 89.
130 This appears in the correspondence of Diego Queipo de Sotomayor, on matters pertaining to Portugal, yet it is not in his hand. Anonymous to Moura, BNM Ms/ 1753, fols. 17-19.
that by requiring that the Spanish response look to “causes and intentions,” official works could be used to attest to good kingship, and thus would further legitimize Philip’s taking of the Portuguese throne and his intentions in France. By looking at causes first, the reader would be able to understand the complexity behind Philip’s actions, and therefore would be more able, as Moura put it, to “judge the resulting actions.” This was particularly important, since Idiáquez and Moura became particularly concerned that many of the king’s actions had not always produced the results that the king intended, but if their intentions were presented as having been for the right purposes, those actions could still be justified. Indeed, readers would “judge” actions not on the basis of their effects or results, but on the righteousness of the intention. Since political understanding depended upon qualifying the actions of rulers, the counter-histories would confer political legitimacy by identifying the causes and intentions of Philip’s historical actions, for the reader to see and judge.

This should not be taken as a call for an open judgment on the part of the reader, or a call for an autonomy borne from any real desire to empower an audience. Rather, what Moura meant was that, if provided with the intentions behind Philip’s actions, readers would complete the meaning of the text offered by recognizing the intentions being described as those which accorded with notions of good Christian rule, and “just” and right purposes for action. Such an understanding of how readers were to “judge” actions, or rather complete the text, can only be understood in relation to the culture of scholasticism and the culture of literary auctoritates that

132 Emphasis mine. The full passage reads: “put the cause first so that [the reader] may judge the resulting action.” Moura, BNM Ms/ 6178, fol. 48.
133 Moura, BNM Ms/ 6178, fol. 48.
permeated sixteenth-century Spain. Indeed, one should not dissociate the idea that the reader could “judge” these texts from the notion that in the sixteenth century an author was not always valued because of his texts’ innovativeness, but rather, because of its skillful redeployment of already well-known and well-established ideas and thematic material. For as Idiáquez wrote, “in this way [readers] will see what has always been known and understood to be true.” Indeed, readers would be quick to pick up on references to contemporary understandings of notions of good rule.

Idiáquez made manifest, however, that, in order truly to explain the causes or intentions behind the king’s actions, Philip himself was to be actively involved in the writing of history. Here again we see the direct influence of Botero, especially upon the thoughts of Idiáquez. Botero had recommended that, since only “the prince alone has full knowledge of the reasons and circumstance of his undertakings and their outcome,” the prince needed to be involved in the writing of history. Indeed, for Spanish advisors, while other historians sought to infer qualities of mind or behavior from their effects, Spanish official historians could and were to turn directly to the source. This would prove crucial as it would allow the counter-histories to provide direct evidence that Philip had used “the certain and desired reasoning to achieve a certain desired outcome,” as Ribadeneira had put it, regardless of whether that outcome was achieved, and thus reveal that his intentions and all of his actions had corresponded to the precepts of Christian reason of state. Clearly inspired by such ideas, Idiáquez understood that it was only with the

135 ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, folio 89.
137 Ribadeneira, “Tratado de la religión y virtudes que debe tener el príncipe cristiano para gobernar . . .”, in Obras Escogidas, 565.
involvement of the monarch that the history written would correspond with the monarch’s own understanding of truth and his true motivations, and therefore was the only way to ensure that the king’s own understanding of his politics was conveyed and made patent. By stressing the participation of the king in this process, however, Moura and Idiáquez not only wanted to ensure that what was being presented corresponded with the king’s own sense of his image, they also wanted the history to be “correct,” and to arrive at the truth through the participation of the “eyewitness” to the king’s motivations—the king himself. Significantly, by requiring such participation Idiáquez was, in effect, requesting that the king personally participate in an elaboration and evaluation of his own actions and his rule, largely by providing the intentions and reasoning behind his actions.138

Philip himself admitted that his “true” intentions and the nature of his rule were not properly understood, and therefore, needed to be communicated. As Philip himself wrote of foreign critical histories: “They do not see my intentions in these matters, which have always been based in careful consideration.”139 In fact, Philip had come to understand the need for an official or “truthful” history of his reign, requiring him to set aside any remaining reservations, and commission works of “current history” to refute foreign polemical attacks. Philip understood the necessity to maintain his reputación and the vital role this played in maintaining his power. Philip also acknowledged that his rule was being criticized, and sought means to combat such attacks, or in his own words the “disrepute” (desreputación) that had been brought to

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138 Perhaps this might also have been a way of keeping the monarch in check, since by making him profess the motivations behind his actions, it would remind the King how he had to ensure that he rule based on those principles.
139 See Philip to Villegas, BNM Ms/ 18633–64. On Philip’s reaction to foreign misperceptions of his rule see, BNM Ms/ 1045, and Ms/ 2062. See also, Baltasar de Porreño, Dichos y hechos de el señor Rey Don Phelipe Segundo, el Prudente (Madrid, 1748), 141.
considerations of his rule, both within and outside his realms.\textsuperscript{140} Spanish advisors, therefore, sought to reverse the controversy. Where foreigners did not know the king’s intentions, the counter-histories would make them clear, as they had direct access to the “true” intentions of the king. It is hard to imagine that Philip, who has been characterized by some scholars as a “meddlesome manager,”\textsuperscript{141} would not have wanted to be involved in the official historiographical project, although Idiáquez’s request that the king be involved might have been an additional way to garner the king’s endorsement for the counter-history project. Moura, however, in order to secure the king’s support, reminded Philip that “reputación was being destroyed,” aware that the monarch’s own reputación also included the chivalrous idea of honor that would suffer irrefutable dishonor if Philip did not come to its defense, or if he buckled in the face of foreign threats. He added, “[t]he prince who does not allow such truth to be written through history, does a great disservice not only to himself, but to God.”\textsuperscript{142} Moura, therefore, also appealed to Philip’s piety, and the need to make known the king’s Christian politics, and what was being done to further the Catholic cause. The personal involvement of Philip in the actual writing of the counter-histories remains unclear; what is known is that Moura and Idiáquez convinced Philip of the immediate need to commission historical texts directly challenging foreign polemics. The counter-histories written by Esteban de Garibay, Gregorio López de Madera and Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, that will be the focus of later Chapters, received

\textsuperscript{140} Philip in 1586, in one of his letters to his daughter Catalina Micaela, wrote of the dangers of falling into despreputación (disrepute), and the threats that this posed to the realm. Cartas de Felipe II a sus hijas, ed. Fernando Bouza (Madrid, Akal, 1998), carta LIV. Actual letter at San Lorenzo del Escorial, 8/27/1586.

\textsuperscript{141} Andrew Pettegree, Europe in the Sixteenth Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 126. See also Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II, throughout. Fernando Bouza sees Philip’s active involvement in every aspect of the planning, building, and decoration of the Escorial as a key example of the king’s desire to take part actively in every aspect of his self-glorification. Bouza, Imagen y propaganda, esp. 20–25.

\textsuperscript{142} Moura, BNM Ms/ 1643 fol. 538.
the royal seal, and each stated that they were written “at the express mandate of the King,” and correspondence reveals that Herrera and Garibay both consulted directly with Philip.  

Thus, only Philip could provide official history with authority. As official historian Esteban de Garibay insisted, consulting the king was crucial as he was the best guarantor of truth, but moreover, he provided the last crucial step in the writing of “good history.” Garibay reiterated that, 

having all the material brought together so that one can see and judge it all, and after one has selected what things are to be published and worthy of history, which, when writing history is the most difficult as this is where one is most likely to either get it right or err . . . [the historian] must bring any doubts to the King’s attention, and give him notice of all that you write, for it is certain that his judgment will be the best, and history will gain great credit and authority if you do so . . because just as the life of Caesar, which he himself wrote, has gained such respect among the Latins, . . . when it comes to truth, one can assume that such a grave person would not have allowed anything to come to light that was not true in this work, and that no one could have given greater reason or causes, motives, and effects of the things he undertook than him, [and it is this] which gives the most excellence to his history . . .

Idiáquez and Moura not only emphasized that the response was to focus upon describing the causes and intentions behind rule, they specifically outlined what aspects of Philip’s rule

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143 See BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468; Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Preface; Gregorio López Madera, Excelencias de la Monarquía y Reyno de España (Valladolid, 1594), Title page; Esteban de Garibay, Illustraciones Genealogicas de los Catholicos Reyes de las Españas y de los Christianissimos de Francia (Madrid, 1596), front matter unpaginated. Further, Philip held a private copy of all three counter-histories in his private library at the Escorial.

144 “Y estando la material junta y apuntada para poderse ver y juzgar, y hacer elección de las cosas que se deben[tragic] publicar y fueren dignas de historia, que en el escribirla es lo más dificultoso y en que más se puede acertar o errar . . . y consultando las dudosas con Su Majestad, y dándole noticia de todas, porque sin duda, será su parecer el mejor, y la historia ganará mucho crédito y autoridad en ello, como la que César hizo de sí mismo, que por esto es la más aprobada de las Latinas y con razón, porque en lo que toca a verdad, no se puede presumir de persona tan grave que se sufiere en ella cosa que no fuese y en el dar las causas y motivos de los efectos que es la mayor excelencia de la historia, ninguno la pudo hacer como él, por ser el autor y escritor de ellos, que por todo salió su historia en estilo y en los demás tan acabada.” Esteban de Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” (1593) BNM Ms/ 1750, fols. 469–480.
needed to be emphasized in order to demonstrate that he fulfilled the necessary attributes of a “good ruler,” and how these needed to be represented in the counter-histories. Providing the causes and intentions behind Philip’s actions and looking at specific aspects of his rule was an acceptable way of revealing the *arcana imperii* to readers, while avoiding making it subject to indiscriminate criticism.

This did not mean, as we shall see below, that the response would not also need traditional historical justifications for imperial action, like genealogy or claims to dynastic supremacy, as these were vital to establishing legitimacy for imperial claims and the right and just assumption of territory; however, the primary and new concern of Moura and Idiáquez was how the response would provide a specific image of Philip and his politics based on other vital sources of legitimacy. Since foreign works characterized Philip’s politics as motivated solely by Machiavellian interest and greed, official history would need to take on new meaning as a way to show that actions taken abroad, or future intentions, were based in causes and intentions that were grounded in prudent decisions, whose primary concern was the benefit of subjects, the protection of the Catholic faith, and both the protection and adherence to precedent and privileges, thus, strictly adhering to the political principles of “good rule.” In this way the counter-histories would demonstrate how Philip was a ruler who combined moral goodness with political skill, and thus the perfect prudent, virtuous, and civic-minded prince.

This reflected a basic principle of Renaissance humanism from Petrarch onwards about the relationship among the prince, the people, and the law, and how the prince had to embrace the authority of laws, and avoid licentiousness and wickedness, since princes who exhibited
vices rather than virtues would find their subjects faithfully imitating their conduct, and thus, conspiracy and rebellion were the inevitable outcome.\textsuperscript{145} As Juan de Mariana had put it, the prince who undermines the legitimacy of his rule by public displays of “wicked deceit, violence and adultery,” is like “the armed madman hell-bent on destroying himself as well as others.”\textsuperscript{146} Thus, the need to promulgate Philip’s lawful conduct was vital as it was a necessary element in establishing and maintaining the authority of the prince.

Although there was no explicit declaration that Philip was bound by the laws, the notion that Philip was bound to the law and had a moral duty and obligation to abide by the law was part of scholastic political language, drawn from canon and Roman law.\textsuperscript{147} Indeed, a prince who was seen as undermining the rule of law was seen as invariably contributing to the undermining of public confidence in his ability and legitimacy and thus destroying the foundation of his power. Moreover, in all of the criticism about rulers across Europe the dichotomy was clear: a king who did not rule according to the compact he had with his people ruled as a tyrant. Advisors wanted to ensure, therefore, that Philip was seen as not ignoring the distinct political traditions and mentality of the many and distinct peoples over which he ruled. As Moura stated, the counter-histories would demonstrate how Philip was a king who “respected the laws and rights of each kingdom and province.”\textsuperscript{148} Spanish advisors, therefore, were adamant that the counter-histories demonstrate how Philip was intent on preserving the rule of law and thus distinguished himself from arbitrary rulers and tyrannical regimes. Moreover, official history would have to

\textsuperscript{145} Pagden, \textit{Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination}, 22.
\textsuperscript{146} Mariana, \textit{De Rege}, ed. Agesta, 107. See also Braun, \textit{Juan de Mariana and Early Modern Spanish Political Thought}, 81.
\textsuperscript{148} Herrera recounting what Moura had told him, BNM Ms/3011, fol. 5v. See also Moura, BNM Ms/ 1930.
show that Philip’s respect for the laws was a manifestation of his virtue. Perhaps, indirectly, advisors also wanted to show that Philip had learned from the errors in the Netherlands and how attempts to impose Spanish laws and customs on the Dutch had caused problems. Indeed, from the Low Countries and the situation there, Philip and his advisors had learned a very valuable lesson: they needed to permit the citizens of the United Provinces to enjoy their long held and respected privileges and laws. Thus, while the king still believed in his absolute legitimacy to his dominions, he had learned from the Dutch Revolt that he needed to be seen as a king who abided by and maintained privileges and laws.

Idiáquez and Moura also made it clear that since the primary purpose of the state and hence, Philip’s rule, was to protect, conserve, maintain, and preserve stability, Philip needed to be presented as the force against faction and war, one who followed a philosophy of civic prudence and the common good by always adhering to law, privilege, and religious ideals. In his discussion of the response to Conestaggio’s work, Moura explicitly stated that in the matter of Portugal, it would have to be demonstrated how Philip “immediately began to rule Portugal with justice and divine zeal [conviction],” and so ruled according to justice and piety.\textsuperscript{149} This perfectly corresponded with contemporary notions of Spanish imperialism, which Anthony Pagden observes was a combination of dynastic interest and ethical and political convictions and obligations that arose in defense of empire and Spain, and that came to be identified almost entirely with the common good.\textsuperscript{150} Idiáquez and Moura saw official history, therefore, as a primary mechanism for demonstrating and promoting how Philip’s rule abided by such principles.

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\item[149] “Felipe comenzo a regir Portugal con juicio y divino cello [sic].” Moura, BNM, Ms/ 1930, fol. 33.
\item[150] Pagden, \textit{Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination}, esp. Ch. 2.
\end{footnotes}
Specifically, Idiáquez and Moura argued that counter-histories would need to demonstrate Philip’s prudence, especially since polemical attacks presented Philip as persistently violating the rules of political prudence. The term itself was a Ciceronian translation of Aristotle’s *phronesis* or practical wisdom. Prudence had always stood for the ability to manage affairs that demanded more than mere mastery of theoretical principles. Spanish theorists, however, had sought to combine such notions with a definition of prudence as a Christian virtue concerned only with what was truly good and how to attain it. Though a virtue of the intellect rather than a moral virtue in the strict sense, it was reason that ensured that the will and passions were directed towards what was “good” (or morally right).\(^{151}\) In their letters, therefore, Spanish advisors sought to cast Philip exclusively in terms of the language of political prudence.\(^{152}\) In fact, Idiáquez and Moura wanted to demonstrate how Philip’s political thinking was infused with pragmatism. The desire was to demonstrate that Philip’s actions were in no way capricious or based on self-interest, but rather utilized all the resources of his personal piety and his prudence. The political ideals of Spanish reason of state stressed that while Philip acted politically, he did not rule according to vices, or immorally.\(^{153}\)

Prudence was a particularly important virtue in light of attacks and accusations of tyranny, as it would demonstrate Philip’s restraint, not least because a ruler regarded as abusing his legitimate power could expect to be challenged if he were not working within existing

\(^{151}\) Such an emphasis on Philip’s morality remained in the fold of Aristotelian epistemology or a Thomist-Aristotelian framework. Braun, *Juan de Mariana and Early Modern Spanish Political Thought*, 92.

\(^{152}\) It is worth noting, however, that despite the importance Spanish advisors attributed to prudence, in the sense of practical reasoning that allows for shrewd and balanced assessment of humans affairs, the actual term “prudente” is not as prominent in the letters, as it was in political treatises of the period. Indeed, their terminological vagueness allowed them to avoid tackling the fact that the term *prudente* continued to evoked connotations of duplicity or moral flexibility, as the term was commonly used by those speaking of reason of state in more Machiavellian terms, and was only beginning to be defined in more Christian terms by Jesuit theorists like Ribadeneira and Mariana.

\(^{153}\) Ribadeneira, “Tratado de la religión y virtudes que debe tener el príncipe cristiano,” in *Obras Escogidas*, 565.
constitutional frameworks. Interestingly, such constitutionalist ideas were also nourished by Spanish scholasticism. This of course reflects contemporary perceptions of constitutional procedure concerning the exercise of control and power and especially those expressed by the Cortes of Aragon. Yet discussion on the limits of royal power, which was more scholastic in its roots and terminology, was presented by Spanish advisors as a discourse on reason of state. Indeed, while they wanted to characterize Philip as a powerful and worthy ruler, they also wanted to ensure that the counter-histories showed Philip as a king who knew he was limited by his values, the law, and his responsibility to his subjects. The vision of a king in the counter-histories was one who held absolute power, but this power was limited by the law, tradition, privilege, and precedent. Philip’s good government resided in his understanding and maintenance of this precarious equilibrium.

Associating virtue with kingship was not a new strategy; however, explaining and promulgating virtuous conduct in terms of Realpolitik was. In traditional histories, European kings were associated with certain virtues and attributes, revealing an almost immutable structure of moral-political principles developed over generations of European monarchs. Indeed

154 Subjects generally perceived monarchical government as legitimate only if its government conducted itself “within the bounds of modestia and mediocritas,” as Mariana put it. For Idiáquez and Moura, Philip embodied the kind of self-restraint in the exercise of royal prerogatives that people commonly associated with legitimate rule. Mariana, De Rege, ed. Agesta, 100. See also Ricardo García Cárcel ed., Historia de España, Siglos XVI y XVII. La España de los Asturias. (Madrid: Cátedra, 2003), 115.


156 Robert B. Tate, “Mythology in Spanish Historiography in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,” Hispanic Review 22/1 (Jan., 1954): 1–16. Within the tradition of historical panegyric, history had long been a way of representing, in abbreviated form, all of the king’s virtues. This was accomplished by blending two essentially different conceits: a religious vision of kingship as divinely ordained, and a concept of kingship as emblematic of classical virtues. The first echoed the medieval convention of sacerdotal kingship, which emphasized the ways in which the monarch reflected the characteristics of all members of a divinely chosen and supported dynasty of kings;
dynastic history had become a series of almost identical portraits, all representing former rulers in the same way. Sebastián Fox Morcillo, in his *De Historiae Institutione Dialogus* (1557), had written: “History is nothing more than the evident and lucid demonstration of virtues and vices . . . it is truthful narration, clear and with a distinct order of past and present things, to imprint its memory on the minds of men . . . and what is consecrated to the memory of history is made eternal.”¹⁵⁷ It was for this reason that Moura was specifically concerned with how Conestaggio had depicted Philip: “The virtues of the King are justice, religion, prudence and great power, and invidiously Conestaggio claims that [H]e was not just but rather cruel, rigorous, [and] inexorable, . . . and when others called [H]im constant, [Conestaggio] paints him as insensible [impervious to pleas for mercy].”¹⁵⁸ Thus, by characterizing Philip as a tyrannical ruler, Conestaggio and Mayernne challenged the nature of Philip’s rule by challenging his virtues and principles. In doing so, Moura warned, these works would “mar the actions of the King.”¹⁵⁹

By demonstrating the king’s motivations and his actions, counter-histories could be utilized to both teach and demonstrate political comportment. This approach was proposed by Morales who, in a letter to Moura, while parroting the specific phraseology of Dionysius of Halicarnassus that history was “philosophy teaching by examples,” and impressing upon the advisor the classical view of history as a bountiful lake of instructive cases, also emphasized a

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¹⁵⁷ Sebastián Fox Morcillo, *De Historiae Institutione Dialogus* (1557), 24. Almost the same exact phrasing appears in Juan Costa, *De conscribenda rerum historia libri duo* (1568).
¹⁵⁸ “Son virtudes del Rey justicia, religión, prudencia, gran poder, y Conestaggio invidiosamente nos dize que no fue justo, sino cruel, riguroso, inexorable, . . . y cuando los otros lo llaman constante, el le pinta insensible.” Moura to Idiáquez, BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) Ms/ 6178, fol. 57. See also Moura, BNM Ms/1930.
¹⁵⁹ Moura to Idiáquez, BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) Ms/ 6178, fol. 57. Moura also commented to Philip that foreign works: “defame Your actions and Your words”) (“trataban de deslucir Sus acciones y Sus dichos” ). Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 12.
new critically important qualification—that firsthand experience always trumped mere intellectual knowledge of the past.\textsuperscript{160} Writing to Idiáquez, Morales further confirmed that, “Where [prior works] only treat things speculatively, through precepts, advice and rules, [in the account of Philip’s actions presented in counter-histories] we will see them put into practice and with their vivid colors revealed.”\textsuperscript{161} Counter-histories would thus adopt ‘politic’ history’s emphasis on practical guidance, but would use Philip as the \textit{exemplar}, and would do so by looking to causes, motivations, and actions. In so doing, they would make historical reading useful in new ways, in particular by demonstrating how Philip practiced a Christian reason of state. For as Moura wrote to Philip, only a recollection of Philip’s actions would demonstrate the “truth” and provide an example to be followed, “for it is Your [the King’s] image and motivations which will teach so clearly . . . and especially [Philip’s] Christian patience and politics,” for these attributes provided testimony of the “truth” and therefore their demonstration would “not be taken as affection, adulation or artifice.”\textsuperscript{162}

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\textsuperscript{160} Morales, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII. Similarly, Fox Morcillo wrote: “Only Philosophy and History provided ultimate \textit{verità},” and the only means by which they differed was in terms of form. Fox Morcillo, \textit{De historiae Institutione Dialogus} (1557), BNM R/17640.
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\textsuperscript{161} “Los que en ellos se trate especulativamente, los preceptos, avisos, y las reglas de la vida real, aquí se [verán] puestos en práctica y con sus vivos colores esmaltados.” Morales to Idiáquez, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII. Moura and Idiáquez agreed that they did not wish for counter-histories to manifest Philip’s virtues through maxims, comparisons, or aphorisms, but by looking at, and explaining, the causes behind actions. As Moura put it, history was not to be a simple narration of \textit{res gestae}, “of prowess (proezas), (ánimos), wars, divisions or changing alliances of the protagonists of History,” but rather it was to “reveal the causes behind such actions” (“reveler las causas . . . y los varios y notables avisos, ejemplos y sucesos, mañas, ardides, y cautelas en materias de estado, de guerra y de gobierno”). Moura to Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 8. This does not mean, however, that beneath these features of Philip, the attuned reader did not also perceive the features of great leaders of antiquity.
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\textsuperscript{162} “porque su imagen y su motivación lo pueden enseñar muy claramente.” The letter continues with: “estos atributos, muy devidos a la persona real de Su Magd . . . [representan] testigos indubitables de la verdad . . . muy agena de toda afición, adulación, y artificio.” Moura, RB II/2807, fol. 178v. Indeed, power was legitimized by a monarch being emblematic of those virtues that constituted good Monarchy. José A. Fernández-Santamaría, \textit{Natural Law, Constitutionalism, Reason of State and War: Counter-Reformation Spanish Political Thought} (New York: P. Lang, 2005), 2: 157.
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Idiáquez and Moura clearly desired that the image of Philip’s politics presented in the counter-histories would contrast starkly with Machiavellian notions of politics. For a Christian reason of state, the laws of ethics and politics were those that “looked to the public welfare” and sought the “good of the republic.”  

Spanish understanding of reason of state, while concerned with the conservation and augmentation of states, did not subordinate moral considerations to public utility. Instead, Spanish advisors sought to implement strategies and tactics that would support and promote the image of Philip as the ideal Christian prince. Furthermore, unlike the foreign attacks, which tended to focus on the personal foibles of the king, responses were to concentrate on “kingly” virtues, such as adherence to precedent and privilege, and respect for tradition and custom, and in doing so were to direct attention toward the nature of the royal office. Moura required counter-histories to focus specifically upon examples of Philip’s “justice, clemency, virtue, and humility,” values that had long been used to legitimize kingship. Thus, Idiáquez and Moura wanted counter-histories to demonstrate the legitimacy of Philip’s rule by showing that he satisfied the definition of good [Christian] kingship, and thus the worthiness of his imperial actions and intentions, not only because he acted for the greater glory of God, but also because he followed Christian principles. By demonstrating his virtues, counter-history would clarify and legitimize the nature of his rule, and justify his actions. Virtues

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165 It should be noted that, unlike polemical attacks, Spanish official historians, unable to deal more overtly with the human frailties of the King, would in their counter-histories deal mainly with his political body, with his authority and power, or the actions he took and the ideological motivations behind them.
166 Moura to Philip, RB II/1451, fol. 4.
167 Páez de Castro had already emphasized in 1556 that it was necessary to show through history how: “Good Princes hold an office on earth granted to them by God, according to reason, and that God gives them certain benefits necessary for the good governance of the world. Which is not to say that everything they do is by permission of God, but rather with His express will” (“Y cierto, como los buenos Principes tengan oficio de Dios en la tierra parece conforme á razón, que Dios les dé entre otras gracias tambien esta como necesarias al gobierno del mundo. Lo qual no es de creer que solamente se hace con permision de Dios, sino con expresa voluntad suya”). Páez de Castro, ‘De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia,’ BNM V/234.
not only possessed an exemplary function, but carried a higher purpose, to demonstrate that
Spanish kings had always acted according to Christian precepts. As Moura explained, “that is
why for both reason and justice one must write these histories . . . as it is for the glory of God
that men and Kings do good works, and it is the honor and obligation of men to provide an
account of these acts following the example of God, and [in doing so] not only will they give
justifications to actions, but will teach others.”

Idiáquez and Moura agreed that the best way to demonstrate the nature of Philip’s rule
was through actual accounts of the king’s actions. Indeed, revealing virtues through actions
would make the advisors’ desired vision of Philip both more comprehensible and more appealing
to readers. Virtue was a measure of both legitimacy and political aptitude in a prince. In fact,
Morales argued that Philip’s actions were better than any ancient exempla, as they demonstrated
how he truly ruled. Demonstrating actual actions had an additional benefit: ideology articulated
in concrete reality was effective. Moreover, showing actions and intentions was part of
demonstrating a Spanish political ideology, for as Moura explained, only through such
“examples [of actions] can these customs be seen with greater distinction.” Actions, therefore,
facilitated the ability to demonstrate the intentions and causes behind actions, or Philip’s and
Spanish political ideals. More importantly, through an account of actions, intentions could be
verified, as actions themselves were verifiable. Idiáquez and Moura came to understand that a

168 “por esto debe en razón y justicia mandar escribir estas historias, pues es gloria de Dios que se sepa que los
hombres y más, los Reyes obran bien por su respecto y es honra y obligación de los hombres dar buena cuenta de si
y de sus hechos a ejemplo de Dios . . . que con serlo darán a los suyos [sic] [que con serlo la ha querido dar de los
suyos] . . . para justificación de sus obras y enseñamiento de los hombres.” Moura, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz
(Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVI. See a similar phrasing in Moura’s ‘Request that a history be written to counter
foreign accounts.’ Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 4.
169 “Necesitan dar ejemplos, para que las costumbres se viesen mejor con distinción.” Herrera recounting what
Moura had told him, BNM Ms/ 3011, folio 5v.
Spanish response would have to provide “verifiable examples” (ejemplos verificados), as Idiáquez called them, of Spanish actions.  

As Idiáquez pointed out, a history of the king’s actions was like a “picture of the king, which speaks.” Further, as Morales told Idiáquez, “the King’s actual actions will provide the best testimony [witness] and portrait . . . because actions are the sons of understanding, and those which allow us to see into the true nature of man.” That advisors compared official history to royal portraiture is not surprising, but is significant in this context. Clearly Idiáquez and Moura wanted to utilize the sophisticated language of politics, moral philosophy and iconography that suffused Renaissance history and visual representation, by painting “a picture that speaks” of the king’s intentions, actions and rule for new political purposes. As Fernando Bouza observes, both iconographic and textual resources were mobilized equally for the construction and diffusion of the figure of the king in the age of Philip. An Italian contemporary courtier expounded upon

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170 “use ejemplos verificados.” ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
171 “la historia . . . es pintura que habla.” Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468. The comparison between history and portraiture, and the role of history as a projector of the royal image first appeared in the preface of Bernardo Pérez’s history of the actions of Charles V in Italy: “history is a picture which speaks” (“la historia es pintura que habla”). Historia de las cosas que han pasado en Italia desde el año MDXXI de nuestra redemptión hasta el año XXX (1536). See also, Alfred Morel-Fatio, L’historiographie de Charles V (Paris: H. Champion, 1913), 159–162 ; Richard L. Kagan, “Los cronistas del emperador,” in Carlos Imperator (Madrid: Lunwer Edidores, 1999), 12–40; and John Slater, “History as Ekphrastic Genre in Early Modern Spain,” Modern Language Notes [MLN] 122/ 2 (2007): 217–232. Maintaining the King’s image had implications for power. As Louis Marin contends, a monarch “was made, ennobled, and immortalized through the artistry of what and whoever represented him in language and image,” and “The king is only truly king, that is, monarch, in images. They are his real presence.” Furthermore, belief in this image was crucial, for if it was not then, effectively the monarch could lose his power: “A belief in the effectiveness and operativeness of his iconic sign [image] is obligatory, or else the monarch is emptied of all his substance through lack of transubstantiation, and only simulacrum is left; . . . his signs[image] are the royal reality, the being and substance of the prince . . .” Louis Marin, Portrait of the King, trans. Martha M. Houle (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 8.
172 “las propias obras son mejores testigos y retrato, . . . . .porque las obras son hijos del entendimiento, el cual nos dá el ser principal de los hombres.” Morales to Idiáquez, Archivo de los Condes de Orgá (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII.
173 Fernando Bouza, Communication, Knowledge and Power in Early Modern Spain, trans. Michael Agnew and Sonia López (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), i. Indeed, a strong foundation was established across Europe to read history with a metaphorical and analogical disposition. See Daniel Woolf, “From Hystories to
the wonderment of beholding the royal portrait of Philip in Naples, and how it made the king capable of being “present in all of his realms at the same time, causing joy,” and winning “the love and respect of his subjects.”174 History similarly made a powerful impression on the mind of readers, just as painting did for viewers; both “gave presence to the absent being or thing.”175 For Idiáquez and Moura, therefore, the counter-histories would present a picture of the king, and, in this way, writing would imitate image, making Philip recognizable and present, and would similarly garner love, respect, and support. However, the written word would prove much more effective than portraiture, as it could provide more complete and much more precise knowledge to a wider audience. Indeed, in this context, Spanish advisors saw history as the most persuasive means available, especially because of history’s perceived capacity to teach politics and convey “truth.” That was clearly why Moura stated, “history is testimony and prize of your [Philip’s] worthy acts, [and is why it is right to record these acts and write them in historical narratives for all to read] for the authority of history has always been held as venerable and sacrosanct.”176

More importantly, history was the perfect vehicle for advancing political ideas. As Idiáquez wrote: “History confirms doctrine . . . [and] is of the greatest force to avail us of what is just and right, and because of this, one can say that History is sufficient tribunal by itself.”177 Spanish advisors clearly understood how effective historical scholarship had become as the best means to convince and persuade. Indeed, as Moura wrote to the king, “[b]y looking at our actions abroad,

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174 “A un tiempo presente en todo sus estados, causando alegria . . . amor e respeto.” BNM Ms/ 12851, fol. 127.
175 Bouza, Communication, Knowledge and Power in Early Modern Spain, 7.
176 Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/768, fol. 438. Further, as historian Juan Costa put it, “because of the debility of our memory, which vacillates and slips up, she [history] confirms it and what is consecrated to the memory of history is made eternal,” thus placing Philip’s acts within the framework of history made them irrefutable, and everlasting. De conscribenda rerum historia libri duo (Madrid, 1568), 188.
177 Idiáquez to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 74.
they will see the true effect that we have had, and thus will cease the false rumors, against Your Majesty and our nation.”

Yet the exceptional circumstances created by foreign historiographic attacks and the political volatility they potentially posed, led to additional measures to bring Spanish political “truth” to light, prompting Spanish advisors to advance the second fundamental change in official history: that official history provide primary source evidence to support Spanish claims.

Step 2: The Power of Documents

Previous official histories that were too laudatory of kings and princes had created an environment where many readers had become skeptical of the information contained in official histories. Idiáquez and Moura understood that if counter-histories were to provide the “truth,” and thus provide “legitimate history,” they would have to be based on original documents. With the growing tendency of courts across Europe to turn to documents to originate and supplement claims, and with antiquarian tools and techniques being used to support both political and religious action, it is no surprise that the Spanish advisors decided that official historians should adopt analogous materials and methods when writing official history. Indeed, Spanish advisors turned to provisions of “proof” because that was what their society now demanded. The use of documents in official history would likely have appealed to Philip, a monarch characterized by scholars such as Geoffrey Parker as having a bureaucratic character and a “love

178 “para que con tratar de las cosas de fuera mejor se encubriere el afecto de las nuestras y se quitase materia de murmurar a los émulos de su majestad y de nuestra nación.” Moura, RB II/2807, fol. 178v.
179 See the Introduction above.
of papers.” It is significant, however, that Idiáquez and Moura required that official historians specifically utilize and incorporate humanist and antiquarian tools when crafting the official historiographical project. The foreign polemics had provoked a kind of disturbance/controversy that needed to be rationalized, and thus the turn to humanist methodologies can also be seen as an attempt to use humanist and antiquarian methodologies to promote order, coherence, and a political rationality in these polemical circumstances, while at the same time responding to new demands for “proof.”

For Idiáquez and Moura, the new requirements for “good-history” stemmed from two developments: the rise of source-based forms of legitimacy in both religious and political confrontations across Europe and the humanist advancements in historical methodology and antiquarianism. By the sixteenth century, questions of historical truth had become intimately linked to the use of primary sources and documents. Inspired by jurists, sixteenth-century historians across Europe had adopted the conception of documentary evidence not merely as illustrative or exemplary, but as a process that provided precedent and proof, and thus by extension, established legitimacy for political action and statecraft. It was the Reformation,

181 ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
182 See the Introduction above.
184 As seen in the Introduction, across Europe, historical studies in the form of legal antiquarianism had become the most potent way to consolidate political legitimacy, and many sixteenth-century scholars considered the use of primary documents to be less a method of history than a “method of law.” See especially, Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Sixteenth Century Revolution in the Methodology of Law and History, Ch. 2. For the use of documents in making claims to political legitimacy in France see, Davis Bitton, “History and Politics: the Controversy over the Sale of
however, which crystallized the use of such documentary proof for legitimacy, and the need to create “verifiable” history, as each side of the religious divide began to provide its own source-based evidence to assert claims. Similarly, political documents had become the instruments with which the Spanish Crown made claims to power and authority, and were the basis for the juridical discourse of a system of agreements made to confront both present and future situations. Spanish advisors, therefore, understood how historical proof and document-based forms of legitimacy had become the most effective way to influence and persuade readers to their cause. Indeed, throughout Europe there was an acute awareness of the importance of evidence, and increasing demands for different kinds of evidentiary proof. Artifacts and historical referents were regarded as equally impartial, and therefore were constantly used when defending all sorts of claims.

The use of documents had particular implications for imperial politics. Sixteenth-century Europeans did not adhere to the notion of “natural” borders. Territories to which a ruling house...
could establish good title defined a state, and a complex patchwork of competing historical claims formed the inevitable backdrop to any new negotiation or conflict over a new territory.  

To this effect, Europe had become immersed in a practical and polemical need for titles and precedents to sanction policies and political claims. Dynasties and their diplomats who presented their cases in territorial negotiations had begun to use such historical evidence and precedent to assure the success of dynastic claims, whether in a court of law or in negotiations among states. Sovereigns across Europe employed official researchers and historiographers to sift through ancient texts and chronicles to provide such precedents for them.

Such developments had further entrenched the use of documents as key to political activity and power in Spain and in the Empire. Thus, as political advisors, Idiáquez and Moura knew that the use of, and need for documents to solidify and justify Spain’s actions took on greater significance in the context of European imperial ambitions. Indeed, when it came to territorial negotiations, Spanish advisors were well aware of the need for titles and precedents to sanction policies and political claims. In this context, documents and proof would have to take center stage, especially in works which were to defend Spanish imperialism and make international claims to power and authority, just as they did in diplomatic negotiations. Moura, in particular, knew of the importance that documents had played in the contest over Portugal, as he had personally travelled to the archive in Lisbon to amass documents pertinent to the succession, and had brought them to Madrid. It had clearly come to Idiáquez’s and Moura’s attention that claims to imperial authority could not be based solely on rule but had to be supported by

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190 Moura, Lisbon, 9/21/1578 and 10/19/1578, BNM Ms/ 1930, fol. 100 and 134r.
documents. Idiáquez, therefore specifically laid out in his ‘Orden para escribir historia,’ that primary documents were to be the “chief means of intelligence for official historians.”191 For, as Idiáquez believed, “these [counter-] histories should be from prudent reflections and documents, or they will be without dignity or force.”192

For Moura and Idiáquez foreign polemical attacks were simple, unsubstantiated accusations of tyranny, incest, and murder; they were mere “calumnies” (calumnias), false and malicious misrepresentations of Philip’s actions, calculated to injure his reputación with no basis in fact.193 Idiáquez even characterized these foreign works as not only “untrue,” but “self-seeking lies,” and Conestaggio’s work in particular as “a work of deceptions, malicious gossips and flatteries, insinuated willfully with mellifluous insolence.”194 Most importantly, Conestaggio’s account of events was considered “false,” not only because his work was “loaded with exaggerations and untruths,” but because his claims were unfounded, as they were “not [supported] by documents.”195 Idiáquez and Moura firmly believed that official histories, grounded in original documents, would be understood as far more authoritative than those which did not use such documents. As Idiáquez noted, “Conestagio will repeat in various strategic places [throughout his text] the reasons for why [the Portuguese] complain about the King, his

191 ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
192 Idiáquez to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 159, fol. 108.
193 A “culture of fact” had developed in Spain in the twelfth century, and has been traced to the gradual spread of judicial procedures based on Roman law, which in Spain was codified in the great legal compendiums compiled under Alfonso X. These procedures privileged proofs based on “facts,” preferably in the form of written documents, or facts derived from the oral testimony of a reliable individual, especially an eyewitness to a particular occurrence. Once assembled these facts served as the basis of legal judgment. These developments too were transposed into history, where this “culture of fact” privileged the writing of contemporary, or at least nearly contemporary history, since ordinarily it was recent events that could be verified on the basis of facts derived either from eyewitness testimony – ideally that of the historian himself- or written documents. See Isabel Alfonso Antón, “Judicial Rhetoric and Political Legitimation in Medieval León-Castile,” in Building Legitimacy: Political Discourse and Forms of Legitimacy in Medieval Europe, edited by Alfonso Antón, Hugh N. Kennedy and Julip Escalar (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 51-87.
194 Idiáquez to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 159, fol. 107.
195 Idiáquez to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 159, fol. 108.
ministers, and the Spanish nation, but he does so without reason nor defense, [nor does he even try] to give proof to support his false charges leveled against the King.”196 The lack of substantiation or use of primary source proof was a major criticism that Spanish advisors advanced against foreign accounts, and why they were considered, quite simply, “bad history.”197

Idiáquez and Moura saw it as important to inveigh against the methods and tools used by foreigners like Conestaggio and the disrepute into which they had dragged the “fair name of history.”198 By defending the “honor of history,” the Spanish advisors were simply advancing an argument for ethical and well-based history in general. As they were not source-based or verifiable history and not based on first-hand evidence, the histories of Spanish deeds written by foreigners were “delusion of fantasy, and fable” or “more appropriately, what one can call lies.”199

Yet despite their lack of evidence, historical works like the _Apology_, or those of Conestaggio and Mayernne, had been markedly effective in garnering a wide and receptive audience, as they often interspersed dubious accusations with actual events and verifiable dates, which may partially have accounted for their success. Therefore, in their quest to write, as Moura put it, “better history than those provided by foreigners,” Spanish advisors understood that

196 “repitiendo en diversos puestos elegidos las causas con que se quejaban del Rey, de sus ministros, de la nación Española, pero los dexa sin respuesta en oración i defensa dellos . . . donde tuviera claridad la verdad . . . [ni da prueba] para apoyo de sus falso cargos contra el Rey.” Idiáquez to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 74.
197 Juan López de Velasco to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 160, fol. 54.
198 Moura to Idiáquez, BNM Ms/ 6178, fol. 57.
199 “mas propriamente se puede llamar mentira.” Moura to Idiáquez, BNM Ms/ 6178, fol. 58.
official history would need to provide factual data that went far beyond mere dates and places.200

Clearly, Philip’s advisors had become convinced that well-researched, well-crafted, and reputable official history would convince readers of the unassailable veracity of their cause. Idiáquez and Moura understood that to separate official history from both its predecessors, as well as the work of foreign contemporaries would require new, or “better” forms of authority. The Spanish Crown did not simply want to respond to these attacks, but to counter them with “better history.”

Since Spain’s ambitions in both France and Portugal were related to matters of dynastic succession and the right to rule, Moura explained that, a primary task of the counter-histories would be to use the documents which would “provide proof of Spain’s precedence through genealogy and ancient rights and privileges.”201 Genealogy was a vital component of history and a source of vital political information, especially for imperial expansion and dynastic claims. Significantly, genealogy had, since the Middle Ages, been concerned with providing evidence to vindicate the right to enjoy particular liberties and status, and either consciously or indirectly was intended as a defense against the encroachments of some other authority. Furthermore, when linked to history, it provided all of the required information necessary to ensure government stability and order by providing notice of privileges and rights. As official historian Juan Páez de Castro put it, such genealogical history provided monarchs with, “lineages, descendants of all the royal houses, the common rights of each Kingdom of Spain, the rights and justice to be upheld during conquests, the order of the nobility, and the privileges and charges to be upheld in all your

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200 Emphasis mine. Moura to Idiáquez, BNM Ms/ 6178, fol. 48.
201 “usar los papeles garantizadores de los privilegios . . .” Moura, BNM Ms/ 1930, fol. 134. Elsewhere he also writes how counter-history was to show clear dynastic precedent as set out “in old documents” (“en los documentos antiguos”). Moura to Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 8.
Royal genealogy had long provided monarchs with a narrative by which their power was legitimised, while dynastic history had recorded the antiquity of lineages, marriage alliances, the right to possession of lands and titles, and, as Morales impressed upon Idiáquez, “the origins of peoples, kingdoms and lands, and the fundament of laws.” Genealogy, therefore, remained fundamental in matters of dynastic disputes. Indeed, throughout the sixteenth century, and well into the seventeenth century, when making dynastic and imperial claims, the question of genealogy permeated every court in Europe and became the purview of heralds, antiquarians, and official historians, who were actively commissioned to ensure that royal genealogy was well-researched and constantly updated. It was clear that the Spanish “just claims,” especially in Portugal, were claims to property under clear laws of dynastic succession, and that the counter-history would need to establish the Spanish right to succession, providing a primary form of legitimacy for their actions in both Portugal and France, by proving the just assumption of territory. Thus a primary task of the counter-histories would be “to provide proof of Spain’s claims through the documentation of genealogy and ancient rights and privileges,” and further to use these documents to lay out the “rights of the King,” in these matters “as set out in old [the oldest] documents.”

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202 “linajes, y descendencias de las casas principales casi de todo el mundo, los derecho común de cada Reino de España, derechos para tratar la justicia de las conquistas . . . la orden que tienen de nobleza . . . y de las privaciones de cargos y estados.” Páez de Castro, BNM, Ms/23083 fol. 4. See also, Páez de Castro, “Usos de la Historia,” BNM, Ms/Q–18.

203 Morales to Idiáquez, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII.


206 “usar los papeles garantizadores de los privilegios . . . para revelar . . . los derechos del rey.” Moura, BNM Ms/18768. Elsewhere he also writes how counter-history was to show clear dynastic precedent as set out “in old documents” (“en los documentos antiguos”). Moura to Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/468, fol. 8.
While Spanish advisors understood the need to use traditional claims to genealogical precedent, they also insisted that a new rigor, precision, and an emphasis on substantiation needed to be applied to the presentation of these genealogical claims. This did not mean that prior genealogies written for the Crown had not been thoroughly researched, but a new crucial requirement was imposed on those who were to provide this genealogy for the Crown: the research had to be made evident so that these accounts would be taken as definitive and true.207

The contested succession to the Portuguese throne and the placing of a Spanish heir on the French throne made providing the exact sources for Spanish dynastic legitimacy vital. According to Idiáquez, the counter-histories were to demonstrate before anything else, “[the King’s] Cesarea progeny by both paternal and maternal lines,. . . taking its origin from that which is most suited to the situation, for the greater ornament and authority of the work.”208 Such comments clearly demonstrate that dynastic claims no longer sufficed as an effective source of imperial legitimacy if not supported by clear documentation of ancient titles and bloodline ties. Yet, more importantly, Idiáquez and Moura wanted to ensure that Spanish claims were uncontestable, and so, inspired by more general developments in legal and antiquarian humanism that had already emphasized the need for source-based forms of legitimacy, they sought “document-based” accounts to legitimize the actions of both Spain and its king.

207 It should be noted that the emphasis that Moura and Idiáquez placed upon the need to provide proof specifically of genealogical claims might also be a reaction to the tremendous number of genealogical forgeries that were appearing throughout Spain, especially because of limpieza de sangre (purity of blood) statutes, and the increased need to “prove” that one was descended from “pure” Christian blood in order to attain high office. Henry Kamen, Phoenix and the Flame: Catalonia and the Counter Reformation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 19.
208 “Luego ante todas cosas se debe mostrar a su Cesarea yugal progenie por ambas lines paterna y materna, con toda la luz conveniente para este lugar, tornando su origen de donde mas convenga , para mayor ornato y autoridad de la obra.” ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
Idiáquez clearly outlined that the counter-histories needed to bolster genealogical claims with not only the clear use, but also the clear exposition of documents, to prove their case. This was undoubtedly also the result of the influence of Morales, who had suggested to Idiáquez that the counter-histories provide lists of the documents that had been used to support their claims at the end of their texts. With a reading audience increasingly influenced by historical evidence, Morales told Moura that whoever was to write counter-history would have to “look for, copy, and bundle every source he could find on Spanish claims” including those which related to “precedence over Habsburgs, and regalian rights over ecclesiastical holdings” and present them at the end of their narratives “for the reader to see,” echoing the techniques of legal humanists.

Indeed, influenced by Morales, Idiáquez and Moura emphasized that any vital source found or used as a source of legitimacy needed to be directly acknowledged. As Moura stated, the counter-histories would need to “bring to light . . . the papers which guarantee the privileges of the sacred imperial title.” Therefore, even in such polemical circumstances, an understanding had arisen that the writing of history was not all about homogenization, but also about authentication, and Spanish advisors clearly sought to utilize historical methodologies and antiquarian tools within the construction of official history to bolster its claims to authority. By listing the precise documents they had used to support their claims in their narratives, even for their more traditional genealogical claims, Idiáquez and Moura believed that official history would come to be regarded in much the same way as the work of objective jurists.

209 Morales, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII. Morales himself, around the same time, in his De las Dignidades (ca. 1581), his account of royal and nobles titles and privileges, had provided documentary evidence for the “liberties” which gave definition to the Monarchy, and had included a list of some of the legal documents he had used to support his claims at the end of his text, as well as provided a similar list of the sources he had used for his survey of “titles of honor” for the Spanish nobility. See, Morales De las dignidades, BFZ, (Colocición Zabál buru) Ms/1956.

210 Morales to Moura, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII.

211 Emphasis mine. “revelar los papeles garantizadores de los privilegios de la sacra cesarea majestad.” Moura, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 11.
Significantly, Moura emphasized that these works would explicitly “lay out the treatises, letters, articles, charters, ordinances, provisions of armies, businesses of commerce, [and] other passages of state, appertaining to our History,” upon which Spanish claims were made.\textsuperscript{212}

Idiáquez and Moura wanted official works to be presented almost like notarial records, drawing upon the juridical character of these sources, and counting on the apparent objectivity of the notarial style. In this way Idiáquez and Moura wished for official history to become irrefutable. It should be noted here that New World chronicles had already included legal documents within their texts to assert authority.\textsuperscript{213} Similarly, Spanish advisors sought to fuse legal and antiquarian precision in the use and citation of evidence within official history, thereby making history comparable to law in utility and status, especially in these imperial contests. Idiáquez and Moura envisioned counter-historians as using a quasi-legal historical method to find the sources necessary to assert their claims by searching through all and any available documents, similar to what jurists were doing in political contests; they also required official historians to incorporate references to these documents directly into their narratives in order to identify the documents which provided legitimacy for political action and statecraft.

Therefore, influenced by the legal/notarial rhetoric prevalent at the time, as well as the ample evidence of the usefulness of legal documents in legal disputes and claims, Spanish advisors would make the demonstrable use of documentary sources a requirement of official history. Such demands, however, also demonstrate the flexibility and lasting legacy of scholastic methods of inquiry and proof, and how they were combined with new humanist scholarly demands and pragmatic humanist inquiry. The advisors’ emphasis on the demonstrable use of

\textsuperscript{212} Moura to Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 8.
\textsuperscript{213} See Introduction above.
documents indicated that they wanted demonstrations of proof to be clearly apparent, so as to almost overwhelm the narrative. Idiáquez made it very clear that any Spanish counter-histories would have to “be derived from originals . . . the first and the most substantial [of which] are papers from the Council of War and State, because these contain the purity of truth in all events, especially the most worthy of perpetual memory, of the causes that moved the King and his advisors to act.” Furthermore, Idiáquez emphasized historians were to use documents to reveal how precedent “instructed [the King’s] actions.” In this way counter-histories would fulfill the crucial task of transmitting to those who had not been present, not only actions, but also, and most importantly, a “true” understanding of the reasoning behind historical events, and how the king came to his decisions. Spanish advisors understood that documents and their insertion as provisions of proof, would provide evidence of how Philip ruled as a Christian prince and followed a defined reason of state ideology and specific political ideals because he adhered to laws, privileges, and precedents as provided in documents. Thus, Idiáquez and Moura required that counter-histories demonstrate the historical research and specifically the documents that supported their claims, essentially requiring an integration of non-narrative legal antiquarian research into official history.

These requirements were undoubtedly drawn from humanist scholarship, which was based on the assumption that the claim of an argument to absolute or varying degrees of relative truth depended on the nature of the proof provided, and documents invariably provided clear

214 Idiáquez, RB II/ 1451, fol. 19. It is worth noting that Idiáquez was chair of the Council of State. Moreover, as Moura clearly stated, it was only “through the ordination of history,” that one could show “the causes that moved the King and his advisors, to consider actions, even war, to pursue it, and to finish it.” Moura to Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 8.
215 “de usar ejemplos verificados . . [y] como de ellas instruyo Sus acciones.” ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
sources of ‘proof,’ if not the best form of proof.\textsuperscript{216} The collection of historical documents and their inclusion in narratives would provide legitimacy and justification to Spanish political actions and would persuade and convince readers of the validity of Spanish imperial claims. Moreover, as Moura wrote, “when they read this and see the basis for Spanish actions, they will realize the falsities perpetuated by foreigners and will see the truth.”\textsuperscript{217} Thus, documents were to be used to explain the reasoning behind Spanish politics, making causes and motivations verifiable, and transforming them into “truth.” Thus history became a way to reveal the “verifiable workings” of Philippine politics and Spanish imperialism and to transform Spanish actions and intentions into historical facts. Significantly, the advisors specified that the counter-histories were also to demonstrate “the laws that constitute the necessary means for the good administration of the republic,” undoubtedly with the intention of demonstrating how Philip was specifically abiding by them.\textsuperscript{218} The counter-histories would not only detail laws, but how Philip used these laws effectively, thus melding the strict terms of scholastic juridical-constitutional discourse and rationality with the humanist language of political prudence.\textsuperscript{219}

These techniques would have great practical utility, for Idiáquez and Moura understood that the sources “brought to light” would be taken as evidence of the historical accuracy of the counter-histories. Idiáquez even argued that bringing such sources to light would halt the dissemination of negative ideas about Spain and Spaniards, as these works would be “based in

\textsuperscript{217} Moura to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 134/1. Who the “they” refers to in this comment is unclear, although it appears to mean simply any reader of these counter-histories. We do know that these works were intended for both a domestic and foreign audience and undoubtedly included members of both the Spanish and foreign royal courts.
\textsuperscript{218} Moura to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 134/1.
\textsuperscript{219} Harald Braun sees such melding as representative of Spanish Baroque thought where “juridical principles were removed from their generic semantic and epistemological contexts in order to function as principles of practical reasoning.” Braun, \textit{Juan de Mariana and Early Modern Spanish Political Thought}, 84.
the truth of documents” and thus “better respond to the histories that secretaries of foreign kingdoms and provinces of apostates have written.” As Moura commented, “if foreign works had investigated the records, they would have realized the truth, . . . the reality of things.” Foreign works lacked the credibility and truth that only careful research and examination of documents could provide; thus, because of their use of sources, in the official Spanish response “the clarity of truth will triumph over these false charges leveled at the king.” Indeed, following Morales’s lead, Spanish advisors realized that the use of historical documents more than ever translated into political power and legitimacy especially among learned scholars and diplomats in foreign courts, and Spanish nobles who demanded proof. Moreover, while historical documents had long affirmed royal rights and title, thus establishing power over a territory by providing the legitimacy for that power, documents had also become a way to differentiate between the “truth” and a “lie.” Thus, Idiáquez directly echoed Morales’s sentiments, confirming that to justify Spanish claims to political “truth” a list of vital documents needed to be placed at the end of all official counter-histories.

In order to assure the unassailability of source-based claims, Idiáquez and Moura further argued that the mere use and demonstration of these documents were not enough. They also wanted the Spanish response to accord with new developments in historical methodology, which required a thorough and critical assessment of documents to ensure their validity. By doing so, Idiáquez and Moura hoped to ensure that official historians produced the “best [kind of]
history.” 224 Spanish advisors wanted official histories not only to include the concerns of political theorists of the time, but also the values of humanist scholarship. In this, Idiáquez and Moura drew upon recent developments in historical methodology that had already reached Spain and were being further developed by Spanish scholars and official historians. By deploying legal, grammatical, rhetorical, geographical and chronological arguments, Spanish scholars had weeded out forgeries and extricated myths and false traditions. 225 Indeed, it was believed that critical methodology, and especially tools like philology, allowed the “truth” to become evident and an “authentic” history to be written. 226 As seen in the Introduction, the Spanish Crown had begun to take an interest in how these methods could be used to settle political and religious disputes. Interest in new critical methodologies and new standards of historical accuracy intensified under the influence of official historian Ambrosio de Morales. 227 Morales’s philological and antiquarian investigations of Roman Iberia and medieval Castile had applied a greater critical consciousness to his research than had his predecessors, and by incorporating the results of antiquarian research into his work, such philology and numismatics had provided new opportunities for empirical verification in narratives, reinforcing the notion that the study of the past could provide verifiable truth. 228

224 “la mejor historia.” ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
227 Philip was particularly interested in how Morales had developed methods for the proper handling of medieval charters and Islamic sources, having collected a vast number of Eastern manuscripts, which the king believed to be useful ammunition for the ideological wars in the Mediterranean. See both Ambrosio de Morales, “Viage de Ambrosio de Morales por orden del rey D. Phelipe II. a los reynos de Leon, y Galicia, y principado de Asturias. Para reconocer las reliquias de santos, sepulcros reales, y libros manuscritos de las cathedrales, y monasterios. Dale á luz con notas, con la vida del autor, y con su retrato” (1582), BNM Ms/ 9934; and “Viage de Ambrosio de Morales por orden del rey D. Phelipe II. a los reynos de León, y Galicia, y principado de Asturias,” (1595), BNM GM/5941. Ambrosio de Morales had also broadened the scope of source use by using philological, ethnographic and topographical evidence for his claims.
228 Sánchez Madrid, Arqueología y Humanismo, 38.
Crucially, Morales brought such developments in critical historical research to the direct attention of both Idiáquez and Moura. In fact, Morales encouraged Idiáquez and Moura to promote the methods and practices of antiquarian historical philology. In numerous letters, Morales reminded Moura that when writing official history the historian would have to “open his eyes, when studying the papers given to him,” “submit all one’s materials to deep examination,” and judge each document he came across for its authenticity.229 Only in this way would historians be able to write the history “necessary to respond to [foreign] lies,” as only the “most truthful documents” would solidify claims.230 Clearly, Morales believed that humanist methodology and antiquarianism could be tailored for state purposes and understood the need to find the “most truthful” documents for the Crown’s interests.

Morales’ suggestions were heeded and Idiáquez and Moura articulated precisely how this critical methodology was to be allied with the political needs of the Monarchy. First, Idiáquez and Moura instructed official historians to follow proper methods by verifying the claims found in documents through careful source analysis. Indeed, although advisors undoubtedly wanted to bolster the claims of the Crown using documents, they also wanted to make sure that the documents used for this purpose were well analysed, so that their use could not be criticized. Perhaps too, the controversies surrounding the emergence in Spain of false claims and relics, such as the Plomos, led the advisors to demand greater precision and authentication of claims. As Idiáquez wrote in the ‘Orden para escribir historia,’ historians would have to “check source against source,” “dissect questionable passages” in documents, and “not include that which could

229 “abra el ojo, en el estudiar los papeles que le direron” and “someterlos a un examen profundo.” Morales to Moura, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII.
230 “solo los documentos auténticos.” Morales to Moura, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII.
Thus, Idiáquez and Moura repeatedly urged official historians to further their goals by using accepted humanist standards to judge and evaluate their sources. Indeed, the methods developed by Spanish humanists like Morales for critically evaluating sources and seeking authenticity were seen by Idiáquez and Moura as tools to bolster the authority of official works and further help the state in advancing Spanish claims. Second, official historians were tasked by Idiáquez with pointing out the methodological deficiencies in foreign historical accounts, “drawing and revealing from them the immoderate, and demonstrating their imperfection, and bringing to light their defects.”

This was seen as a means to further Spanish claims by demonstrating that not only had foreign accounts not used the appropriate documentary proof, but that they were not written according to contemporary standards.

Idiáquez and Moura even requested, in order to demonstrate that foreigners like Conestaggio had “not got the story right” and had in fact made “false claims and used false sources,” that the writers of the counter-histories would search archives to see whether there was any truth to foreign claims and to assess the “accuracy of foreign claims.”

This also corresponded with contemporary practices, for as Sebastián Sánchez Madrid claims, by 1580, Spanish official historians understood the need to and had used libraries, archives and primary sources actively in order to verify historical claims, especially those of a political or religious nature.

Idiáquez and Moura, therefore, sought to capitalize on humanist methodologies to further the political project, and use their rivals’ failure to adhere to these standards as further proof that their claims

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231 ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
232 “tirándole lo inmoderado e limándole lo imperfecto e acrescentándole en lo defectuoso.” Idiáquez to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 74. These sentiments almost echo verbatim the advice that Morales had given Idiáquez when he discussed what counter-histories were to do, and contain. Morales to Idiáquez, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáiz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII.
233 ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
234 Moura, Lisbon, 21/9/1587, BNM Ms/768, fol. 438. It should be noted that neither Conestaggio nor Mayernne made any claims to source use, although each, at least once in his text, claimed that documents existed that could prove their claims.
235 Sánchez Madrid, Arqueología y Humanismo, 250–258.
could not possibly be taken as ‘truth.’ Therefore, aware of the burgeoning antiquarian
demonstration and provision of proof and the implications of the increased critical assessment of
legal and historical documents, they sought to combine these elements in the construction of the
official response, to serve as a tool to provide ‘proof’ of politics.

To ensure that only the “proper documents” would be used by counter-historians in their
efforts, Idiáquez and Moura also sought to direct where such documents were to be found.
Indeed, Spanish advisors demanded that official historians turn not only to manuscript texts,
official records, and ancient chronicles, but specifically to “authentic writings and papers held in
the archives,” thus emphasizing the value of archives as a source of historical knowledge.236 The
counter-histories would need to provide an authoritative history of events that incorporated
“papers that are now in the archives,” and thus those that would accord with the “truth.”237

When it came to the requirement that the official response use the resources of the
archives, Spanish advisors were conditioned by the ideas and efforts of official historian Juan
Páez de Castro (ca. 1512-1580). Páez de Castro had led both Philip and his advisors to see how
vital the archive had become as a repository of documents from which to write histories that
“serve the realm.”238 Páez de Castro directly influenced the King, Idiáquez and Moura to see the
primary purpose of “official history” as providing a “true” account of events based on
“trustworthy and reliable sources,” specifically, the primary source evidence found in the

236 “escrituras y papeles auténticos en los archivos.” ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru)
1032, fol. 89.
237 ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
238 Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia (1562), BNM Ms/ 23083/4, fol. 12v.
archive, which was to be used to serve “both the history of Spain and the Monarchy.”

As Páez de Castro wrote to Philip: “Because historians do not have the fundament and [insight] needed to gain from past acts the truth or proper memory of things . . . it is of great importance and utility that all papers and writings be collected and placed in the archives . . . especially all those since the time of the Catholic Monarchs . . . [it is] only through the use of these documents when writing history that the record will be set straight.” Páez de Castro, therefore, had set the stage for archival sources, as requisites for a “true” version of events. In the years immediately prior to his death, Páez de Castro corresponded with Idiáquez, Moura and the King about the need to amass documents, reorganize the various archives across Spain, and ensure that these documents be readily available to historians who wrote “official history.” Páez de Castro not only emphasized that the historian was to search the archives, but also how the new archives and libraries being created by Philip were to be created specifically for the “benefit of future historians.”

By requiring that official historians use the archive as their primary source, the Spanish advisors also sought to control what information was to be used in the counter-histories. The archive was the vital repository of documents of state, already accumulated in support of specific causes and to legitimize imperial claims, and therefore held the documents needed to justify Spanish claims in Portugal and France. The archive held the documents which granted rights of

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239 Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia (1562), BNM Ms/ 23083/4, fol.15r. Similarly, Páez also influenced Philip II to task Ambrosio de Morales to “find, protect, and organize important documents concerning royal rights and finances.” BNM, Ms/ 13121.

240 Páez de Castro, AGS Estado, 892/68.

241 Paez de Castro, BNM Ms/ 5785. A few of Páez de Castro’s letters have been printed, although these do not include the letters utilized here: Gregorio de Andrés, “31 Cartas inéditas de Juan Páez de Castro, cronista de Carlos V y Felipe II,” Boletín de la Real Academia de Historia 168 (1971): 516–571. See also Fernando Checa Cremades, Felipe II: Mécenas de Artes (Madrid: Nerea, 1993), 368–387.

242 This is most likely a reference to the new archives and libraries being created at the Escorial and in Barcelona. Páez de Castro, BNM Ms/ 6426.
kings and subjects, successes and privileges, or all of that which supplemented, established, and legitimized claims to authority and privilege. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Idiáquez and Moura would require that the historians turn to the archive, for it was in the archive that the historian could find the concrete arguments to justify Spanish foreign policy and elucidate a policy of Christian political expediency. The legal and state documents contained in the archive were a repository of the very sources of precedent needed to make imperial claims. This is what Páez de Castro alluded to when he wrote to Philip that the archive was a tool for the king to turn to for “reviewing past events, for the elucidation of future difficulties.”  

Idiáquez and Moura clearly understood the utility of such repositories for the official historiographical project and saw searching through archival evidence as a primary means of attaining justification and proof for claims and understood how archival documentation provided “legal authority” when making claims. 

In this context, Idiáquez and Moura, drawing from Páez de Castro, sought to transform the foundations provided by the legal authority of archival sources into a discursive locus from which to write and supplement official history.

Idiáquez emphasized specifically that the manuscripts and papers held in the archives were part of the “arms and instruments” to be used in the “struggles for the defense” of the

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243 Páez de Castro, Memorial dado al Rey Felipe II, sobre fundar una librería por Don Juan Páez de Castro (1558), BNM VE/1242/8. See also Páez de Castro’s codified lists of books held in various libraries: BNM/ 5734.

244 Similar developments were occurring in the New World, where, as Rolena Adorno has demonstrated, the use of archival documentation in colonial disputes had provided “legal authority” when making claims, according to both colonial magistrates and claimants. See Rolena Adorno, “History, law and the eyewitness: Protocols of authority in Bernal Díaz del Castillo’s Historia verdadera de la conquista de la Nueva España,” in The Project of Prose in Early Modern Europe and the New World, ed. Elizabeth Fowler and Roland Green (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 154–75, on 160; and Rolena Adorno, “Textos imborrables: posiciones simultaneas y sucesivas del sujeto colonial,” Revista de Crítica Latino Americana 4 (1995): 33–49.
Crown’s objectives. Indeed, any defense of Philip’s actions needed to be based not only on precedents, but also on the royal edicts and titles preserved in the archives. Idiáquez even insisted that historians would have to check all political “claims” against the information in the archive, as he believed that “truth” could only be found in archival papers. As Moura stated, the official response was to refute foreign works of “pure conjecture” by completing “the archival research necessary to extract the whole truth.” Moura even listed the kind of documents he wanted the historian to use, the precise questions he wanted answered by these documents, and the places where the historian should look for specific documents. Moura, therefore, wished for official historians to use research tools in a directed way, as opposed to letting the documents speak for themselves, which can be seen as his attempt to impose a method of historical inquiry for serving an ideological necessity. This further established the idea of “truth” as being based in archival research and papers, as well as the notion that that which could not be based on, nor found in, the archives, could be placed in doubt.

Crucially, the most important information contained in the archive concerned the documents composed by the king himself, as well as copies of formal speeches he had delivered, which, Moura asserted, were “to be used as a demonstration of the king’s intentions.” Indeed, the archive was the primary repository through which to establish “the causes that moved the king” to take action. In this way each counter-history would fulfill the crucial task of

245 Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 159, fol. 107. The official mandate for the ‘Chronicler of the Indies’ as set out in 1591 would also require that, beside direct testimony, the official historian was only to use archival evidence when composing his work: AGI, Indiferente General 745, n. 228.
246 Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 159, fol. 107.
247 Moura to Philip, BNM, Ms/ 18768, fol. 6.
248 Herrera on his conversations with Moura, BNM Ms/ 3011, fols. 153–155.
249 Moura to Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 8.
transmitting “true” understandings through primary sources about the reasoning behind historical events. Indeed, such archival sources not only gave official works authority, they were also claims to “legitimate knowledge” that gave the authors the ability to write “true and legitimate history” (verdadera y legítima historia). 251 Unlike foreign works, official works would not be grounded in hearsay or secondhand information, but rather in “state papers” (papeles de los consejos de estado y guerra), and documents, as well as in the king’s own papers, all of which would serve to guarantee the “truthfulness” of the accounts.252

One must always be cognizant that the documents contained in the archives had already been selected and approved by the Crown and access to the archive was strictly restricted and regulated.253 Therefore, by requiring that the archive be the primary source of information for the counter-history project, advisors essentially established that the claims that would be made based on these sources were based on pre-approved materials of state—materials which specifically supported the king’s objectives. Any account based on those sources, therefore, would necessarily accord with an official account of events. The archive, therefore, became the place where the perspective of the government, the task of the historian, and the specific record of an event came together. Moreover, the archive became a necessary condition to the writing of official history. The archive was not a repository of all information, just the information deemed necessary by the state for its functioning, a repository of the principal sources of official

251 ‘Request that a history be written to counter foreign accounts.’ Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 2.
252 ‘Request that a history be written to counter foreign accounts.’ Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 4.
253 On the restricted nature of access to the archives see María Dolores Mateu Ibars, “Cartas de Carlos I y Felipe II a Juan y Antonio Viladamor, archiveros de la Corona, coetáneos de Zurita (1534–1556–1560),” in Jerónimo Zurita. Su época y su escuela (Zaragoza: Instituto Fernando el Católico, 1983), 413–423. See also, José Luis Rodríguez de Diego, Instrucción para el gobierno del Archivo de Simancas (1588) (Madrid: CSIC, 1989), 32.
memory, and therefore largely did not include that which had already been censored or that which did not accord with the principal arguments of the Crown.

Idiáquez and Moura understood that if the archive was the “source of truth,” historians were going to need institutional support in their efforts to arrive at this truth. Not only would the writers of counter histories need access to the archive, the Crown would have to facilitate additional mechanisms to aid them in their research. Thus, Moura ordered the head archivist in Lisbon to “give [the historian] all the papers that you have under your charge on [the matter of Portugal], and bring those that are important to [his attention].”²⁵⁴ Official historians were also required to carry out their own document searches in the archives in order to be assured that the Spanish documentation of claims was superior to all others. That Idiáquez and Moura requested that official historians find these documents not only indicates that they felt it was necessary to know all of the possible documentary bases for imperial claims, they also wanted to be aware of any other “verifiable” claim that could be made. Moura even asked Morales to make a list of where the most important documents relating to issues concerning Portugal and France might be found and to make that list available to those official historians who would write the official Spanish response, so that the historians could not only travel to the named archives and see these documents firsthand, but also request that “copies and originals” be sent to Madrid “for their review.”²⁵⁵ Undoubtedly, the need to have such “authorities” at hand, and conveniently classified, would mean that much of the relevant paperwork and materials would be removed

²⁵⁴ “den al historiador los papaeles [sic] que pidiere y hubiere menester, y se saquen los que fueren importantes.” Moura, BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) Ms/ 1930, fol. 33. Evidence does suggest that the head archivist, Antonio de Castilho did give all documentation pertinent to the matter to Herrera. See Ch. 3 below.
²⁵⁵ Moura to Morales, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 954. Morales did provide a list to both Herrera and Garibay, two of the counter-historians, of all of the sources available on these matters. Herrera, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 153v.
from their original location and sent to Madrid, indicating the Spanish Crown’s broader desire to accumulate and control information pertaining to matters of imperial importance.

This deep concern with the use of archives and documents makes it clear that the advisors did not want historians to lie. Rather, they wanted historians to provide only the needed justifications for imperial claims, and those which existed in the archives and in state papers. Significantly, Idiáquez and Moura emphasized that counter-histories were never to reveal things that might prejudice claims, meaning that official histories were to provide only the strongest justifications they could find for official claims, and none for arguments being made by opponents. It should be noted that among Catholic political theorists like Ribadeneira, while lying was condemned as inherently sinful and evil, the different strategies of deception technically known as “simulation,” (simulatio) and “dissimulation” (dissimulatio) were acknowledged as both acceptable and sometimes even necessary. Catholic political writers, drawing from Thomistic ideas, identified and conceded that dissimulation (claiming that something does not exist when it in fact does) was necessary. As Ribadeneira put it, “it is in fact not a lie to hide something by silence, and to conceal the secrets (arcane) of councils and actions.”

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257 Dissimulation was not new to the Renaissance; the challenge of establishing boundaries between non-disclosure and outright lying had challenged theologians for centuries. Thomas Aquinas, for example, rejected outright falsehoods and discriminated among differing classes of false speech. Yet he was willing to forgive three types of lying: lies such as boasting that merely exceeded the truth, lying by omission of the truth, and lies committed in the service of greater good. Only malicious lies, or lies intended to injure others, were unpardonable. Aquinas’ distinctions would continue to inform subsequent formulations of normative ethics, contributing to the creation of a culture of self-consciousness in the Renaissance that Jon Snyder had called a “culture of secrecy.” Jon Snyder, Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe (Berkley: University of California Press, 2009), 6.

258 Ribadeneira, Tratado de la religion y virtudes que deve tener el príncipe christiano (1595), 235.
advantage (which he calls *commoditas*), or out of “goodness of the prince’s purpose and the pressing nature of the circumstances, as well as to ensure that the prince not be misunderstood,” then such dissimulation was not lying, and therefore was justified. Furthermore, Ribadeneira even suggested that there was “no moral wrong in secrecy or concealment of intent when dealing with enemies who are owed no openness.”

Obviously, Spanish advisors felt the same and were influenced by such principles. They understood the need to protect the king and the empire from damage and potential destruction. Although they demonstrated a willingness to be more generous in terms of discussing Philip’s *Realpolitik*, they also needed to ensure that what was presented was regarded in the best light. For Idiáquez and Moura, the counter-histories needed to reveal the beneficial workings of politics, to “ensure that the king was not misunderstood,” and his actions legitimised, but they also needed to ensure that nothing come to light that might in any way threaten the monarchy. Such dissimulation was seen as an indispensible tool of statecraft.

Secrecy was an important part of early modern political culture. Spanish advisors knew the basic rules of dissimulation and its role in politics, conversation, and courtly manners and Spanish advisors worked in an arena which taught the efficacy of concealment in

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260 Höpfl, *Jesuit Political Thought*, 153. Höpfl suggests that for many Jesuit thinkers “dissimulation” was rather the practice of *ignoring* certain things deemed non-beneficial or too controversial to be made public (see pages 133–34).
261 Moura to Idiáquez, BFZ (Colección Zabálburu) Ms/ 6178, fol. 57.
262 Snyder, *Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe*, 6.
263 Indeed, it should come as no surprise that alongside a more open discussion of politics, also came a debate on dissimulation (and the need to hide certain aspects of political decision making). Studies have begun to emerge which identify how secrecy became a factor in negotiating Spanish matters of state. Shifra Armon, “Gracián Dantisco and the Culture of Secrecy in Hapsburg Spain,” *Ingenium* 5 (Jun., 2011): 55–75.
courtly sociability. Indeed, Shifra Armon argues that selective concealment was vital to ensuring and optimizing good relations within the high-pressure nexus of the imperial court. As Jon Snyder suggests, secrecy was ingrained through the casuist pedagogy of the Jesuits and the international culture of neo-Stoicism, which taught the rules of prudence and self-control. Indeed advisors and official historians alike were aware that certain things needed to be avoided in discussions. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that similar notions would come to be applied to the construction of counter-histories, and undoubtedly Idiáquez and Moura approached the task of trying to envision a way to present Philip’s rule through official history with caution. The need for secrecy here was less of an ethical question than one of the necessities of state. Indeed, advisors called upon prudence and reason of state, mandating that counter-historians would need to justify expedient action in the name of the “greater good” and “the public good” (el bien público) and keep those things hidden “which might cause more harm than good.” Thus concealment was pardonable and any omissions justified, if done for the “greater good.”

Advisors also needed to ensure that counter-histories did not exaggerate excessively for the purpose of pleasing the king. The “plague” of exaggeration, as one mid-sixteenth-century commentator had described the histories of Philip’s father, Charles V, had damaged the credibility of official works, to the point where “people no longer believe anything such liars say

264 Armon, “Gracián Dantisco and the Culture of Secrecy in Hapsburg Spain,” 55.
265 Armon, “Gracián Dantisco and the Culture of Secrecy in Hapsburg Spain,” 56.
266 Snyder, Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe, 6.
267 “por no hacer más daño que provecho.” Moura to Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 9. In another missive Moura writes: “knowledge of such occurrences, will benefit the public weal [and the republic]” (“sera para el bien público . . . el gran provecho que la república recibirá con ella.” Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 1045, fol. 160.
unless they bring a witness to confirm the veracity of their story. “This was why proof became so important. Although dissimulation might be used, the provision of proof meant that a fair rhetorical contest was provided. Idiáquez and Moura sought to answer the call for proof and appeals for transparency in the workings of government, while at the same time making concessions to dissimulation. A balance between these needs was necessary to ensure that the counter-histories were effective in achieving the Crown’s objectives.

This tight monitoring and control of the official historiographic project meant that the particular character of the men who were to write the counter-histories needed to be specified; Moura and Idiáquez made explicit that those chosen to write counter-histories needed to be “carefully chosen officers of the state.” Idiáquez and Moura acknowledged that they needed men, “of great and excellent character, of the very highest reputation for prudence,” which ensured discretion when applying a Thomistic-Ribadeneiran model of writing “in the service of the greater good” – as this caveat permitted official historians to elaborate slightly, emphasize or omit, in order to support the king. Moreover, Idiáquez’s and Moura’s emphasis on documentation and verification and the need to ensure that Spanish responses be based on verifiable documentation meant that the counter-historians also had to possess substantial historiographical skills. The new official history required learned historical research to support its objectives, especially since they envisioned ‘counter-histories’ as providing the documentary proof of legitimacy necessary to settle any dispute, but the counter-historians also needed the

269 Idiáquez to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468. See similar comments by Idiáquez in his ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89; and Moura BNM Ms/ 1045, fol. 106. That those chosen to write counter-histories were to be specifically chosen men was consistent with the ideas of the time that discussion of the arcana imperii was reserved only to kings and their most trusted advisors. Antonio Feros, *El Duque de Lerma. Realeza y privanza en la España de Felipe III* (Madrid: Akal, 2002), 15.
political skills to know which documents to select, “which to use and which not to bring to light, and to identify the papers of Your Majesty in order to choose those which are most appropriate.”

The Crown would need scholars, therefore, who had the critical reading skills to recognize those historical documents that possessed political ramifications, and those which best historically bolstered the legitimacy of the king’s claims, but also those which needed to remain hidden, so as not to reveal “too much” or potentially prejudice the King and the Spanish imperialist cause. In addition, the counter-historians would need to look to the motivations and actions of the king. Idiáquez and Moura, therefore, specifically characterized the kinds of men necessary for the counter-history project as men who were of high moral character, were erudite scholars, and who also understood political theory and practice and the objectives of the Crown.

High standards and humanist erudition had, since the late fifteenth-century, been mandated as requirements for those who held the lucrative position of official historian. In the context of the specific demands of the counter-history project, however, Idiáquez and Moura

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270 It continues, “reconocer papeles de Su Majestad para escoger los que fuesen más a propósito.” ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
271 ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
272 In 1497, the task of the royal historian was outlined as: “to write, declare, copy and collect all of the information pertinent to the [chronicle of the reign] . . . to emulate the style of Livy and other ancient historians, and . . . embellish their chronicles with the judgments based on philosophy and sound doctrine.” Translation mine, as cited in José Luis Bermejo Cabrero, “Orígenes del oficio de cronista real,” Hispania 40 (1980), 408. Since the Catholic Monarchs, therefore, official historians were essentially to be humanists familiar with the ancients, and able to write in glowing Ciceronian Latin and judge actions based upon an understanding of political philosophy by including political aphorisms into their texts. Moreover as royal historian Fernán Pérez de Guzmán wrote to King Ferdinand already in 1450, the official historian needed to be “discreet and knowledgeable” and have “good judgment” and was to be a man who was capable of “carefully discerning matters.” Indeed, the Crown had long understood that those responsible for writing official history needed to be men of superior intellect and restraint. See Béatrice Leroy, L’historien et son roi: essai sur les chroniques castillanes, XIVe-XVe siècles (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2013), 2. Moreover, as Charles’s official historian Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo had put it, only a royal chronicler, that is, paid out of the royal purse, could be trusted to write about royalty “with the truth and purity that is required.” Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, Libro de la cámara real del príncipe don Juan [1567] (Madrid, 1870), 174.
required that those chosen to write the official response possess an additional set of specific skills to ensure its effectiveness. First, the ‘Orden para escribir historia,’ specified that the men chosen would have to be versed in law, because legal sources reflected the very substance of human history, offered means of judging evidence and behavior, and suggested general patterns of historical interpretation. Moreover, like jurists, historians would have to evaluate testimony, investigate political and social causes and effects, judge human motivation, attend to chronological order, take into account various geographical and anthropological facts, and enquire into mythology and the problem of origins, and therefore had to be legal humanists.

Second, the ‘Orden para escribir historia,’ specified that counter-historians would also have to possess the skills required for the critical assessment of documents. Idiáquez had made it very clear that those chosen to craft the official response would have to combine their official skills with more recent humanist developments in their dealings with documents. Therefore, because of the types of sources that official historians would have to deal with, and especially “old documents” and archival sources, meant that those chosen for the task would need a method for “correct” understanding brought about by the ancillary disciplines, in particular legal studies and philology. Official historians, therefore, were to be antiquarians. These two requirements were essential since Spanish advisors wanted to combine humanist developments in antiquarianism and scholastic legal attitudes and use such techniques in the construction of responses to ensure greater political effectiveness.

Third, the ‘Orden para escribir historia’ required that they needed to be knowledgeable in “Letters and Philosophy, as well as *humanidad* [humanity-the behavior of men], so that they
may lay out and qualify those happenings in a way that will demonstrate what they actually were." Thus, the counter-historians had to respond to foreign polemical attacks not only as officials of the state, but as men capable of explaining the practical workings of the state. Indeed, that historians also be philosophers was not a new concept in Spain, as official historian Sebastián Fox Morcillo had long believed that in order to complete their work properly historians had to “recognize that their ability to write, their diligence in describing events and successes, their knowledge of places, times and of human life, or even the customs or likings of each people, their advice, exhortations, discipline and order of their topics, none of this could exist without a great knowledge, and a perfect understanding of philosophy.”

Fourth, counter-historians also had to have practical political experience and knowledge, which Idiáquez and Moura saw as vital to the nature of the official historiographic project. Moura even specified that they needed to be particularly knowledgeable in the “affairs of state” (las cosas del estado). This further solidified the notion that those who were to be chosen to write the Spanish response be “of the state” for only such officials had access to the inner workings of politics. As the ‘Orden para escribir historia’ specified, those chosen to write a response are “to be of the state . . . so that they may know from their roots the principles[the reasons for why actions were undertaken] and progresses of things . . . as well as the laws and

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273 “y letrados y repúblicos por las leyes . . . sabios en letras de Filosofía y humanidad para disponer y calificar los hechos de manera que enseñen y parezcan lo que son.” ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 92.
274 “reconoced[sic] que su agudeza en el decir, su diligencia en anotar las causas de las cosas y los sucesos, su conocimiento de lugares, tiempos y de la vida humana o las costumbres y pareceres de cada pueblo, sus consejos, exhortaciones, su disciplina, orden y distinción de los temas, nada de esto podría existir sin una gran sabiduría y un perfecto conocimiento de filosofía.” Sebastián Fox Morcillo, Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia [Translated by Ambrosio de Morales] (Madrid, 1560), 81.
275 ‘Request that a history be written to counter foreign accounts.’ Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 12.
276 Idiáquez even called for them to be soldados (soldiers), “so that they would be able to consider and refer to the trances [trenches] of war” (‘deben ser soldados para ponderar y referir los trances de la guerra”). ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
order of government.”277 The official historian, therefore, had to be a man with some experience of the behavior of men in real life, and his practical knowledge of politics became one of his indispensable qualifications.278

Idiáquez and Moura, therefore, did not seek out removed humanists, but rather men of state, who could combine their active participation in affairs of state with their knowledge of law, letters, philosophy, and politics to evaluate the causes and intentions behind Philip’s rule.279 Idiáquez and Moura made active participation in politics, or at least direct acquaintance with political dealings a prerequisite for writing “better history.”280 Spanish advisors agreed that only those with knowledge of political affairs could judge political actions “correctly.” The advisors wanted to make sure that not only would counter-historians understand politics, they would also understand the needs of the Crown and present exactly the political evaluation that was

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277 “debiendo ser del estado para saber de raíz los principios y progresos de las cosas . . . y las leyes y orden del gobierno.” ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
278 The Crown was not alone in enforcing the need for active participation of historians in the affairs of state. Increasingly too, official historians had come to recognize the importance of the historians’ involvement in political affairs. As Fox Morcillo put it, cloistered, sequestered, or closet penmen, “are keen in style, but poor in judgment, and partial in feeling;” instead the historian had to be a “faithful witness as to the real passage of business. It is for ministers and great officers to judge these things . . . those who have handled them in government, and been acquainted with the difficulties and mysteries of state business.” Fox Morcillo, Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia [trans. Morales], 81. Similarly, in 1574 Páez de Castro openly questioned how an erudite man could capture the essence of political debate, had he never attended or participated in matters of state, and how a man who had never been in battle be able to write of military exploits. Páez de Castro, BNM Ms/ 6426. Perhaps Herrera stated it best, however, when he wrote that historians who dealt with contemporary subjects needed practical political and administrative experience, arguing that “if those who write histories were experienced in governing the world, as opposed to having only attended lectures in schools and studying bundled up in rooms and isolated cells, there would not be so many errors.” Herrera, 11/7/1583, IVDJ, Envio 21 n.735.
279 Indeed, because of the increased use of history as a provider of political exempla, increasingly across Europe, historians were sought out not only for their humanist erudition, but for their practical political knowledge, so that their knowledge could be used specifically to help counsel the King. Moreover, Jean Bodin stressed that those lacking experience in politics and war were limited in their ability to write history. Jean Bodin, Method for the Easy Comprehension of History, trans. Beatrice Reynolds (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 43.
280 Indeed, in their letters, the topos about active participation in politics by writers of history in the Spanish court is a constant, as it was believed that only through access to, and observing situations where the gravest concerns of state were deliberated, that they could write a “true” account of political affairs and thus, “good history.”
needed. As we shall see, this will particularly the case for counter-historian Herrera y Tordesillas who had recently translated Botero’s treatise on reason of state. Thus, Idiáquez and Moura envisioned official historians as both scholarly civil servants and practical humanists, putting their knowledge of philosophy, politics, history, and humanist and antiquarian tools to use for political purposes.

Idiáquez set out a detailed series of “necessary qualifications” in his ‘Orden para escribir historia’ for the men chosen to write counter-histories, “so that their work gain the proper authority and respect.” As his model of the ideal historian, Idiáquez used recently deceased official historian Páez de Castro and stated that the Crown would have to find men who, like Páez de Castro, were “distinguished in letters and in all learned things of our time” and who possessed “the prudence, experience, and knowledge” required of a “good historian” (buen cronista). Moura even emphasized that, “no one except for Spanish historians shall write these histories,” a sentiment echoed by Idiáquez in a letter to Philip. The “good historian” therefore, was politically experienced, learned, and Spanish.

281 Idiáquez, 10/12/1592, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 121/40.
282 ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
283 It should be noted that relying on the intelligence of the individual historian as a requirement or condition of “good” or authoritative history also allowed for any flaws or faults in a work to be excused and, or, attributed to a “lack on intelligence” on the part of the author. For example, Herrera excused himself for any faults that might have occurred in his work on that very basis: “And whatever faults that might arise that Your Majesty may excuse [them] on my short ingenuity” (“no culpa las faltas de mi corto ingenio”). Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Dedicatoria.
284 “como doctor Joan[sic] Páez de Castro, uno de los ynsignes hombres en todo genero de letras y lenguas y en todas facultades que hay agora . . . tuvo la bondad, prudencia, y experiencia que se requiere de un buen cronista [de un buen historiador].” RB II/2321 fol. 44. See more of Moura’s comments on Páez: RB II/2321, fol. 89. See other official comments on the impact of Páez on the writing of history at court, and his contributions to humanist scholarship in a letter of Francisco de Mendoza y Bobadilla to Cardinal Mendoza at the RAH, Colección Salazar y Castro, A-112, fol. 250r-v.
285 Emphasis mine. Moura, RB II/ 2807, fol. 178v. See also Idiáquez to Philip, 8/ 23/1587, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 121/40.
There was further reason, however, why Idiáquez and Moura needed to emphasize that counter-histories could only be written by men with a specific skill set. Not everyone at the Spanish Court agreed that a response would be to the Crown’s advantage, as some members of the Cortes feared that works not written with the “required modesty” might be “more prejudicial than advantageous.” Idiáquez emphasized that the qualifications that they demanded of those who would be chosen to write the Spanish response would ensure that they possessed the qualifications necessary for the “good historian,” and that these “carefully chosen men” would guarantee that it would be worth the effort to commission such works. Moreover, Morales argued that while political and legal arguments for imperialist action were persuasive, foreign histories which were critical of the king and Spanish rule needed to be responded to in kind, and, therefore, as he explained to Idiáquez, it was “the historian and not the lawyer who must explain the causes of the King’s just claims. A summary, but well-distilled and studied narrative of the reasons of the [Spanish Crown], written in [carefully] chosen terms and reduced to the expression of true meaning, will enable the least knowledgeable persons to understand what the cleverest have difficulty unraveling in great volumes.” Unlike foreign histories, like those of Conestaggio and Mayernne, which Idiáquez claimed were produced by men who were “ignorant of learning, crude in style, low in judgment, lacking in memory, quick in believing, slow in understanding, obscure of life, and strangers to virtue and grace,” those Spanish “official historians” chosen for the counter-history project would be “learned” (doctus), and as Moura indicated, would be those who “understood the necessity of history for [the workings of]...
politics.” Since official historians were to “judge and qualify” political actions, Idiáquez understood that they needed to have “the mildness [of judgment], prudence and experience required” to write official works for the Crown. In this context, official historians would not only need to be learned and judicious, but could be trusted to elucidate what was needed. Idiáquez and Moura understood, therefore, that they needed both learned men and those committed to the king and the Spanish imperial cause and to furthering political objectives, aware of the calculated effect their writing would have. Idiáquez, therefore, assured those who had questioned the benefits of producing counter-histories that the official historian’s primary concern would be to write works which upheld, and would be, “beneficial to the state,” as official historians were regarded as guardians of the “common good” (res publica).

Idiáquez and Moura understood that this project would need to be closely monitored by the Crown to ensure that the proper messages were conveyed and that, as Moura put it, “the right version of events appear.” It is significant that in this context the historiographic project was more explicitly conceived of as a project of the state, to be conducted by state officials, and expressly under the “order of government” (orden del gobierno). Moura made this explicit when he commented that the official project would need careful supervision, “because of the inconvenience that might result if things are brought to light which oppose the point of view of

290 Moura, RB II/2309, fol. 133 and RB II/2321, fol. 86.
291 ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, folio 89.
292 Idiáquez, RB II/1451, fol. 19. Juan Páez de Castro had specifically laid out the great benefits that official historians had brought the Crown, and how they were guardians of the res publica in his “De las cosas necesarias para escribir Historia” (1560), BNM Ms/ 6425. Indeed for advisors and official historians the “purpose of history is the public good,” where “public” was defined in the Aristotelian sense as the business of government, or what Spaniards by the late-sixteenth-century were beginning to equate with the "estado" or state.
293 Emphasis mine. Moura, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 3. The need to select carefully both the historians needed to write the official response, and the need to monitor their work and progress, appears in numerous discussions among Idiáquez, Moura and Morales. See BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, and Moura, BNM Ms/ 1930, fol. 33, and Ms 1643, fol. 538.
294 ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
the state.”295 To ensure the achievement of the appropriate ends, official history itself was to become a matter of state. As Idiáquez wrote: “These works will be supervised by the Monarch himself, so that the proper ends might be obtained.”296 This was not only a new, but an important development. That any counter-history written needed to be not only supported, but supervised, by the king himself signals the true importance of these works to the machinery of governance.

The Writing of History as a Political Act

From the reign of the Catholic Monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabel, official history in Spain had served to establish the status and reputation of Spain and the monarchy abroad; royal reputación was maintained largely through historical representation and it was understood that “history both clarifies and glorifies [the King’s] reputación and renown.”297 Such reputación rested on the force, grandeur, and prestige of the Spanish monarchy, and its achievements, longevity, continuity, and devotion to the Catholic cause.298 Indeed, as Robert B. Tate has

295 “por el inconveniente que puede tener que salgan a la luz cosas que se opongan al punto de Estado.” Moura, BNM Ms/ 1045, fol. 29.
296 Idiáquez, BNM Ms/ 8741, fol. 51. When speaking of the appointment of the official historian, Pedro de Navarra even advised that the King himself needed to search out and appoint these men because “in these works rests the reputación of princes and nations” (“Las historias están por cuenta y cargo de los principes. El que desea acertar en la elección de persona tan importante, con cuidado la mande buscar en sus reinos, y si no se hallare, en los extraños[sic] se busque. Van en esto la reputación de los príncipes y de la nación de quien se ha de escribir, y más si es natural de ella”). Qual debe ser el cronista del princepe (Tolosa, 1569), Prologo.
297 Lorenzo Galíndez de Caravajal, “Generaciones y semblanzas é obras de . . . don Enrique el Tercero é don Juan el Segundo” (1517), RB Ms Z.III.2. Accordingly, the Catholic Monarchs were advised to pay particular attention to the ways in which their history was written, as was their grandson, and Philip II’s father, Charles V. Páez de Castro had also impressed upon Philip II that history was essential for government, and an essential component of the “fame” and “reputation” of a prince and thus Philip had to be particularly concerned with how his image was presented. Páez de Castro, “Memorial del Dr. Juan Páez de Castro, dado al rey Philippe II al principio de su reinado (1562),” BNM V/234. See also Páez de Castro to Jeronimo de Zurita, 6/12/1556, RAH, Colección Salazar y Castro, A-112, fol. 331.
observed, by extolling the achievements of Spain’s royal ancestors, history had served as justification for the special position that Spain held in the world.299

By the end of the sixteenth century, these ideas were being challenged across Europe by the spread of Renaissance ideas about the importance of earthly or temporal achievement; when translated into the world of dynastic politics, these ideas made reputation a key political resource, something that no ruler could do without. However, the basis for achieving a good reputation was changing.300 Robert Bireley has observed that sentiments about the merit of rulers—their benevolence, fame, and authority—were regarded as essential to the well-being of the state.301 Indeed, the political and institutional development of the monarchies, their territorial extension and financial difficulties, growing colonial rivalries, the wars of religion, and concerns for peace, coupled with the Counter-Reformation response to the ideas of Machiavelli, all revolved around a central preoccupation with defining and defending the resources of the state. Clearly in this context, reputación was regarded as one of the resources of the state, and therefore the Spanish Crown could not afford to lose it. In this environment, polemical histories attacking Spain and the Monarchy had stimulated more than idle controversy—they were a serious threat to imperial authority.

299 Tate, “Mythology in Spanish Historiography in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,” 12–16. Moreover, since the fifteenth century royal family history and Spanish history had become inseparable by reason of the synthesis of lineage and royal titles. Thus, by demeaning the sources of the “force” and “grandeur” of Spain by demeaning the legacy of its past monarchs, Mayenne’s history also challenged Philip’s political testament. Sánchez Alonso, Historia de la historiografía española, 2: 120–128.
300 “Of these political virtues the first is authority, or fame, and reputation, the second is the love of the citizens, and the third is wealth, arms, men, fortresses and cities.” Adam Contzen’s 1609 remarks quoted in Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 144–145. Concerns with secular reputation were not seen as inconsistent with the conventional royal representation of Christian piety, nor as antithetical to dynastic claims of inherited superhuman qualities. Orest Ranum, Artisans of Glory: Writers and Historical Thought in Seventeenth Century France (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 151.
301 See Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince, 136–143.
The sheer number of references to the polemical attacks made by foreigners in the letters of Spanish advisors is evidence of both the proliferation of negative images of Spain, their king and Spanish imperialism, and of the growing Spanish concern over what they believed were erroneous interpretations of the king’s actions and intentions. Their letters highlight some of the predicaments faced by rulers of early modern composite monarchies; in particular, the advisors were aware of the need to please subjects, both domestic and foreign, but especially those distant from the king. Philip had to maintain a monarchy and empire made up of very different people, each with their own history, traditions, and laws. He could only hope to ensure his diverse subjects’ loyalties and passions if he could maintain a positive image of himself and his rule. The letters also reveal the advisors’ desire to project politics outwardly and find a way to do so in Spanish terms. In fact, the nature of the attacks and the need to defend Spanish imperialism forced Spanish advisors to consider how to present larger questions of rule, and specifically how to express these ideas in historical writing.

Moura and Idiáquez summarized this new dual function of official history in the petitions they made directly to Philip to promote this new kind of official history, insisting that this new and “better” form of history would be “both for your royal service and for the truth of recent happenings and events.” Such official history would “bring to light the intentions that Your Majesty has had in these matters,” and since it would be “carefully written history based on truthful reports derived from papers and with the attention it deserves,” they concluded “[we] know that Your Majesty will be well-served if it is so written.”

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302 Idiáquez to Philip, 1/30/1592, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 160/54.
303 Full passage reads: “both for your royal service and for the truth of recent happenings and events, carefully written history based on truthful reports derived from papers and with the attention it deserves . . . bringing to light
discussions about politics brought about by Botero (among others), and increased demands for
proof and authentication as well as reason, research, and critical thinking grounded both in
scholasticism and humanism, Spanish advisors sought to combine these various elements to
convince the educated elite of the legitimacy of Spanish imperialism. Indeed, advocacy of
research and other humanist tools was not only a good strategy, Moura and Idiáquez also
believed that these were the necessary and most effective tools in these efforts. Polemical works
which attacked Spain and the Monarchy had stimulated more than idle controversy—they had
created the kind of environment in which advisors came to understand the need to combine the
weapons of rhetoric and antiquarian erudition. It was only through this strategy that the advisors
could ensure that official historians would produce “better history” (*mejor historia*) and thus
effectively combat foreign polemical attacks.

For Spanish advisors, polemical attacks were outright lies and manipulation which
presented Philip as a tyrant and usurper of power. Idiáquez and Moura proclaimed that such
representations could not have been farther from the “truth.” For Spanish advisors, Conestaggio
or Mayernne had not bothered to investigate events completely or diligently, and their evidence
was vague and overtly credulous. They had neglected important details, making omissions which
reflected a lack of rigor. Moreover, Idiáquez and Moura regarded these laxities as deliberate,
since without details as to their sources of evidence, their claims could be neither corroborated
nor challenged. Similarly, longstanding legal norms in Spain stipulated that evidence was
required to substantiate any claim, and this was especially the case in matters of legal and
political importance. The fact that they provided no evidentiary proof alone made Spanish

the intention that Your Majesty has had in these matters, and knowing that Your Majesty will be well-served if it is
so written.” Idiáquez to Philip, 1/30/1592, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 160/ 54.

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advisors regard Conestaggio’s or Mayernne’s works as careless. Therefore, Idiáquez and Moura came to believe that as they detailed Philip’s true motivations, backed up by documents and proof, the counter-histories would not only be scholarly, but would demonstrate the reality, the “truth” of Spanish politics. Acquainted with developing needs for proof and authenticity emerging across Europe, advisors wanted the response to be thorough and diligent, believing that Spanish official histories, by revealing sources, and following a proper historical methodology would provide “the best history” (la mejor historia), in the eyes of contemporary readers. 304

The letters from the 1580s until the end of Philip’s reign in 1598 demonstrate how, in developing a strategy to respond to attacks, Spanish advisors and official historians created prescriptions for a “better history” that could respond to foreign attacks, publicize the politics of the king, and legitimize Spanish imperialism. To create this new history, Spanish advisors and official historians turned to burgeoning ideas about politics and reason of state, antiquarianism, authentication and proof. The letters provide insight into these historiographical developments, as they provide evidence of assertions made by identifiable actors in identifiable circumstances for identifiable reasons to demonstrate the strategies for an official historiographical project. With both the person and the policies of the king coming under direct attack, the Crown found new ways to solidify power through history. Idiáquez and Moura understood that the response would not only need to defend Philip and his actions, but provide an authoritative account of Spanish imperial actions, and place these within the context of Spanish history. Thus, they would also need to document Spain’s and Philip’s deeds in both an imperial and national context.

304 Moura to Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 8.
Advisors also wanted to create a powerful persuasive tool to convince readers of the legitimacy of Spanish action and garner support for the Spanish cause. They knew that given the nature of their intended audience, substantiating political claims with documents was crucial. Seeking the most powerful means of persuasion the Spanish advisors became aware of the power of history, the rhetorical force of historical argumentation, and the power of documents and antiquarian methodologies. Recognizing the intellectual standards of the particular audience they wished to address, the counter-histories were meant to persuade rather than enlighten, and so the advisors turned to learned bureaucrats, capitalizing on their antiquarian skills to communicate political ideas convincingly. Spanish advisors and official historians sought to combine developments in their own unique ways to create official histories that would bring together growing demands for proof and proof-based forms of authority with an elaboration and justification of rule and imperial politics, commanding antiquarian skills for polemical purposes. Indeed, the reason of state aims of Spanish advisors required the development of loyal and compliant subjects primed to support the empire and enhance the majesty of the royal office. Spanish advisors, therefore, sought to create the means necessary to sway readers to the Crown’s interests.

The letters examined in this Chapter outline the ‘new’ history and the political ideas they promulgated. In the correspondence among Philip’s advisors, official historians, and the king, we see the new language of reason of state being used to defend a rule and mission criticized in foreign histories. While Spanish advisors worked in a court notorious for suffocating the critical comments of advisors, their letters provide an invaluable window into their thoughts, underscoring the political circumstances surrounding the need to respond to polemical attacks.
Idiáquez and Moura wanted the Spanish response to emphasize the specific nature of Spanish reason of state, reinforcing what they regarded as the ethical and legal norms of their society. In this way, Spanish advisors looked to official history as a means of justifying, legitimizing, and bolstering the current state of affairs. Spanish advisors saw counter-history, as a way to promote Philip’s political virtues and ideals and demonstrate the role of the monarchy in the order, structure, and betterment of society.

Spanish advisors attempted not only to reply to the cultural and ideological attacks of their opponents, but also to forge a more specific and institutionalized instrument with which to promote Spanish ideals. Official history was envisioned as a collaborative project, involving historians, translators, archivists, and the king, which also fostered the institutional mechanisms necessary to ensure the project’s success. Spanish advisors grasped the dynamics of molding perceptions about the king and Spanish rule and sought to institute historiographical policies that culminated not only in answering polemics written against the king and Spain, but also in explaining as effectively as possible the nature of the king’s rule and Spanish imperial policies, and their historical foundations.

The ideas and intentions that emerged from the need to respond to foreign accounts reveal how the ideology behind Spanish rule became clearly aligned with Christian reason of state. This provides further insight into how Spanish advisors saw the nature of rule, the place of the royal office, and its position in an imperial context. Indeed the purpose of the counter-history project emerged from, and was part of, larger political ideas of the time intended to clarify ideology. The way the Spanish response was conceived tells us how history was to depict the
foundations of Spanish politics in its several fundamental senses: politics as right of rule (sovereignty), politics as public policy and decision making (governance), and politics as boundaries of legitimacy and jurisdiction (authority). It also provides a deeper understanding of how history could serve politics by furthering social alignment and the creation of bonds of fidelity. For Idiáquez and Moura the counter-histories would provide moral legitimacy by demonstrating Philip’s virtues and confer political legitimacy by identifying the causes and intentions of Philip’s historical actions as well as the verifiable precedent found in historical documents that supported their claims, and legal authority by establishing Spanish dynastic claims. History became comparable to law in utility and status in justifying and legitimizing actions. The Spanish advisors wished for counter-history to present Philip and Spain as making vital contributions to rule and to Spain’s historical legacy. Thus Idiáquez and Moura saw history as a way to present what they believed to be the politics necessary for the time—a Spanish Christian reason of state which could be brought to all of Spain’s imperial holdings.

Thus, in late-sixteenth-century Spain, official history and reason of state politics became inexorably linked. Strategies, however, were to be conducted in accord with Spanish principles of royal politics and so it became necessary to recognize the exigencies of reason of state in Spanish terms. History was not merely a means of understanding how to rule; it offered direct access to power. Spanish advisors decided that the primary purpose of history would be to present a vision of Spanish rule that could be used to teach politics and proper modes of ruling to contemporaries as well as future generations. Spanish advisors brought further originality to the didactic function of history by asserting that any account of the king’s deeds needed to be based on the “proof” found in original documents, and especially those of “state papers” held in the
archives, because only these contained the “purity of truth.” While the text, by revealing the political ideals behind the king’s action would persuade readers of the legitimacy of the Spanish cause, the historian’s diligence, research and ‘proof” would prove their points and Spanish claims.

Spanish advisors tasked official history, therefore, with melding a search for definitive, authoritative, and source-based history, with more of a Tacitean politic history that looked to causes and sought to explain events. Idiáquez and Moura understood that bringing together political and source-based claims was key to making history a viable tool of legitimacy, and that using a quasi-legal historical method would make official history scholarly and authoritative. Spanish advisors sought to make official history contingent on source-based forms of legitimacy. Idiáquez and Moura wanted historians to use documents as direct justification and proof. Such source-based history was envisioned as vital to how Spanish official history would make claims to the conclusiveness of their findings and critical assessment of sources became relevant for statecraft serving official historians and the political effectiveness of their work.

In this context, the way Idiáquez and Moura envisioned Spanish official history provides a new way of understanding how the establishment of claims and ideologies occurred through the use of the historical methods of verifiable source-based history. While the motivations and ideology of the Spanish Crown guided the historiographic process, Idiáquez and Moura appropriated humanist methods for political ends, wielding historical facts to support Spanish political philosophy. The demand for critical archival research and the incorporation of antiquarian research into narrative histories could not have taken place, however, without the
fundamental contributions made to historiography by Philip’s leading official historians with whom Idiáquez and Moura collaborated, Páez de Castro and Morales. The methodologies that humanism and antiquarianism provided became mechanisms to provide “proof,” providing the means through which the Crown could substantiate its assertions and advance its agenda. Indeed, advisors sought to align their needs with the conceptual devices of humanists, and the increased demands for scholarship and proof in order to bolster political claims, emphasizing the use of proof and documents to substantiate rhetorical aims. In this way humanist methodologies became an instrument of statecraft to defend and legitimize Spanish actions and intentions. The emphasis upon proof and legitimacy demonstrates that the intended audience for the counter-histories was the select circle of the Spanish and foreign courts, who lived in a world immersed in documents and documentary claims and who understood the importance of such “proof” in diplomatic contestations.

Focusing on why and how the Spanish Crown responded to foreign polemical attacks through conceiving of the necessities of “better history” reveals more than the reasons behind the “political turn” in official history in late-sixteenth-century Spain; it indicates how notions about power, image creation, and new means for legitimacy were conceived in early modern Spain, and helps illuminate the principles and the mechanics of late-sixteenth-century Spanish statecraft and empire. Indeed, the Crown’s reaction to foreign polemical attacks reflected the level of anxiety produced by historically-based criticism of matters of state and defined the political role that history would come to play in statecraft during the latter part of the reign of Philip II. Idiáquez and Moura came to believe that if history could be a political repository for government negotiations, then it could also be a polemical arm in conjectural circumstances, and ultimately,
if document use could be utilized successfully to challenge authority, then document use could also be used successfully to challenge criticism. Thus, Idiáquez and Moura would turn to an already existing milieu ripe with documentary use to envision a source-based history that would further the Spanish imperial cause.

Idiáquez and Moura made it very clear that official counter-historians needed a humanist engagement with the intellectual requirements of history, as well as an appreciation of the necessities of court. For Spanish advisors, active participation in and understanding of the affairs of state gave writers of history the necessary critical perspective to write counter-histories. For Idiáquez and Moura, only kings and their immediate counselors knew the reasons behind political actions and understood the affairs of state and the true motivations behind royal actions and could recount them appropriately. Thus only an official historian could write “better history.” Further, as will be demonstrated, the men who would write the official counter-histories were politically active, trained jurists and scholars, with long-standing family ties to the Crown, and whose loyalties were unquestioned. All of these official historians had lived and served Philip II and Spain abroad, were familiar with foreign affairs and foreign opinions of Spain, and had even carried out delicate diplomatic missions. Their knowledge of political affairs of state became a powerful critical comment upon the merit of their historical thought.

Significantly, it was because of this active participation in the affairs at court that writers of official history in late-sixteenth-century Spain began to question their ability to write impartial history, consistent with the humanist requirements of “good history” writing. For these men, establishing political legitimacy through history writing rested in writing an account that would
be taken as truth, although they increasingly saw the tensions implicit in the requirement that they write history that was also “beneficial to the state.” Official historians, therefore, wrote extensive commentaries on the purposes of writing official history. Indeed, a burgeoning historical methodology appeared in the theoretical tracts written by official historians. They too wanted to write “better history” and sought to develop means that would ensure their work would gain authority and respect, and not be seen as mere rhetoric. In doing so, they produced thoughtful considerations as to how the historian’s craft could be used to further political purposes. As we shall see, the restrictive environment engendered by the express purposes and practices of the counter-histories would have a complex but stimulating effect upon historical thought. Indeed, these conditions stimulated the development of a critical approach to writing history with clear ideological intentions, and promoted intellectual creativity in the considerations of how to write history that was persuasive and convincing. Official historians were sensitive to the importance of grounding their claims in a recognizable tradition, aware of the need to create works that were truthful, impartial, and scholarly. Moreover, official historians understood that defending the king and promoting a Spanish reason of state ideology would require special considerations, based on political necessity and the need to maintain and promote political stability, rather than strict hermeneutical rigidity. It is to these theoretical reflections that we will now turn, to see how historians themselves, and not just Spanish advisors, made fundamental contributions to the way historical writing would be utilized for reason of state purposes in the latter part of the sixteenth century in Spain.
Chapter 2
The Practice of “Good History”

According to Cicero, the first law of history is to tell the truth.¹ Yet in their treatises, Philip’s official historians clearly acknowledged that there was more than one way to define truth. They did not see a contradiction in providing truth and defending the reputación of the king or upholding and defending the Spanish cause. However, in their attempts to separate themselves from their sycophantic predecessors, and in response to mounting criticism of their impartiality and political aims, these humanist scholars came to explicitly define what constituted political truth, a notion based on the common good, and to refine their historical methodology and the means through which they presented historical “truth.” The result was a method that forced historians to think critically not only about their sources, but also about their own situation and the political necessities and demands of their work. Indeed, the intellectual challenges posed by trying to reconcile humanist thinking concerning the writing of history and the search for truth with political imperatives, led Philip’s historians to envision history in a new way—as a comprehensive form of inquiry that ranged across space and time, and as a critical discipline based on the distinctions between primary and secondary sources.

Crucially, every official historian under Philip wrote a theoretical tract, eleven in all, on how to write history, emphasizing their preoccupation with this issue. These treatises fit within a new group of artes historicae identified by scholars that began to emerge around 1560, which increasingly focused on source use. Scholars have identified how the primary aim of humanist

¹ Cicero, De Oratore, 2.62.
historical writing was to write “accurate and impartial accounts” of events, prompting historians to develop the critical faculties necessary to weigh the relative validity of sources. Moreover, by the end of the sixteenth century, notions of “perfect history” came to equate historical veracity with thoroughness, rigor in research, and even with documentary proof. Although questions of historical accuracy and verification became the common link among humanists across Europe, only a handful of historians apart from the Spaniards wrote treatises that developed methods of source evaluation. It is significant, therefore, that within their treatises on the artes historicae, official historians sought to link their impartiality directly to methods of source evaluation and use.

In fact, unlike the reflections of their predecessors, these treatises were practical, not theoretical. What they proposed was more of a plan, a project, rather than ideas or philosophical reflections. They recognized the political needs and necessities of official history writing, and the development of their methods over four decades resulted from the increased proscription and demands placed upon history by the Crown. These works not only considered sources, but how to use them to political effect. Indeed, these works changed the artes historicae from mere

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reflections, or discussions of source use, into something much more complex. Spanish official historians not only considered how to write history, but explicitly considered the relationship that adherence to methods had upon the political purpose of their work.

As we shall see, in their treatises, official historians adumbrated and formulated a method for writing official history, seeking to re-define traditional boundaries, and position history not as a branch of rhetoric, but as an impartial display of broader notions of political truth. Indeed, they sought to create a set of canons for effective writing of history for polemical purposes. As humanists and officials, they sought to reconcile their loyalty to humanist historiography and its quest for impartial truth while ensuring that their work met political needs. Significantly, they brought to their treatises the techniques of antiquarians and legalists—especially in their development of techniques for how to judge and use sources. The fact that they sought to incorporate these techniques into their treatises on the _artes historicae_ is significant.

All of the treatises began not only with declarations that official history needed to provide truth, but also with an understanding of how Philip’s official historians needed to work differently from his father’s historians. The “plague” of exaggeration in the official histories of Philip’s father had damaged their credibility, so that people no longer believed the work of official historians. Philip’s official historians used the _topoi_ of criticizing deceitful and sycophantic courtiers, but they directed these notions directly at their predecessors and the problems that such laudation had caused, seeking to distance themselves from such techniques, but also framing their treatises through the need to remedy those problems. Even the Crown was aware of the problems that excessive praise of the king brought, and secretary of War and State,
Juan de Idiáquez stressed the need for “official history” to be “impartial” and possess “neutrality” so that official works would garner the necessary authority and respect. He further stressed that they needed to be written “with prudence, without hatred, avarice or adulation.”

Re-establishing the credibility of official historians was a vital step in the Crown’s political objectives. As official historian Ambrosio de Morales wrote to Idiáquez, re-establishing their integrity was essential, for the reputación of history itself and the purpose that it served was at stake: “if [official] history loses the reputation of truth, it loses its purpose.” For Spanish official historians, their predecessors, by being too laudatory, had favored rhetoric at the expense of the central historical principle of historical accuracy, and had reduced their work to pedantry. They knew, therefore, that their own work needed to present itself as “learned and judicious.” While they still wanted their works to be rhetorically effective, they understood the need to present their work as “truthful.” They understood that they could not be guided by their partiality, and that while they needed to support the Crown, they needed to do so in a way that was guided by their scholarly integrity and methodological rigor and not their desire for favor.

This chapter, therefore, looks directly at Spanish “official historical method,” or the practical schematics and guides that official historians created in their treatises. It looks at how

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6 “con prudencia, sin odio, ni avaricia, ni adulación.” Idiáquez to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 159, fol. 107.
7 The entire passage reads, “Todo estos provechos nos trae la historia: la cual si pierde la reputación de verdad pierde la vida, pierde el ser.” Morales to Idiáquez, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII.
8 Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, “Discurso y tratado que el medio de la historia es suficiente para adquirir la prudencia” BNM Ms/ 3011, fols. 158r–165r.
9 This should not be confused with the general understanding of the “methods of history” in early modern Europe, which were commonly understood to be the construction of a political philosophy and the reading and organization of history for didactic reasons.
official historians sought to define and create rules for writing “good history” (buena historia).¹⁰ Ultimately, this chapter hopes to show that these discussions had more to do with the mapping out of discursive strategies than with the establishment of modern standards of historical truth. Their treatises sought to advance the practice of writing official history, by bringing together diverse tools and techniques, seeking to create methodologies and mechanisms that would provide foundations for how to go about conducting sound historical research, even while writing for the Crown.

This chapter will demonstrate how the political demands placed upon Spanish official historians affected the way they envisioned historical methodologies and the historian’s craft and how these could be used for purposes of state. By focusing on the treatises written by official historians under Philip between 1560 and 1598, a greater understanding can be gained about the general principles of the writing of history that developed in Spain and their direct relationship to politics. Indeed, these treatises warrant further investigation not only because they were written by official historians writing for the king, but especially because they explicitly reflect upon the political uses of history, and how these uses affect history’s methodological underpinnings and presentation. The treatises provide an extensive exploration of questions of impartiality, and a set of rules for writing dispassionate history that considered the character of the historian, source credibility, the use of eyewitnesses, the reconciliation of testimony, and the contribution made to historical scholarship by ancillary disciplines, primarily antiquarianism and philology.

¹⁰ Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia . . . y como se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fols. 141r–156r.
The Treatises

Every one of Philip’s official historians wrote a treatise. This chapter will focus predominantly on the following six: Juan Páez de Castro’s (ca. 1512-1580) *Método para escribir la historia* [Method for writing history] (1562);\(^{11}\) the Spanish translation of Sebastián Fox Morcillo’s (1526-1560) *Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia* [Concept of History or Dialogue on the Teaching of History] (1560);\(^{12}\) Pedro de Navarra’s (1545?-1595) “*Dialogos qual debe ser el chronista del principe,*” [“Dialogue on what the official chronicler of the King must do”] (1567);\(^{13}\) Ambrosio de Morales’s (1513-1591) “*Apuntes sobre la historia*” [“On history”] (1585);\(^{14}\) Esteban de Garibay’s (1533-1600) “*De la utilidad de la historia,*” [“On the utility of

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\(^{11}\) Juan Páez de Castro, *Método para escribir la historia* (1562), BNM Ms/ 5578; an additional manuscript copy is held at the RB (Escorial), III/ 23 fols. 1–42r. We will also consider his “De las cosas necesarias para escribir Historia” [On the necessary things to write history] (1560), BNM Ms/ 6426; as well as “‘Que es historia,’ dado al rey Philippe II al principio de su reinado” [“What is History”] (1555), PR (Madrid), XVI-2016(10); “Memorial dado al Rey Felipe II, sobre fundar una librería por Don Juan Páez de Castro” [“How to create a library, given to Philip II] (1568), BNM VE/1242/8; and his earliest “Notas y adiciones a la dedicatoria de una historia anónima del Emperador Carlos V” [Notes and additions on an anonymous history written of the Emperor Charles] (1550), BNM Ms/ 23083/4, in which he comments extensively on the problems with and criticisms of contemporary histories, especially those of Philip’s father, Charles.

\(^{12}\) Sebastián Fox Morcillo, *De historiae institutione dialogus* (1557), translated by Ambrosio de Morales as *Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia* (Madrid, 1560). The copy used is held at RB V/125–8. It should be noted that Fox Morcillo would never hold his appointment as official historian, as he died while *en route* to Spain to take up the charge of tutor to the young prince Don Juan, and as *cronista del rey* (chronicler to the King). Moura, as well as Philip, wrote of how his death was most unfortunate since Fox Morcillo was seen as the front runner for the position of lead official chronicler. Moura extensively commented on how his methodological insights had positioned him perfectly to write “official history.” Further, this treatise would be translated by official historian Ambrosio de Morales who would also extol its contents. Thus, this treatise is considered, not only because it was written with the official historian’s role in mind, but more importantly because his work was widely read by both leading officials in Philip’s court and the official historians who were to follow. As such, this treatise needs to be regarded in relation to the treatises of official historians that would follow, as it deals directly with the issue of writing history for the Spanish Crown and its relationship to methodology.

\(^{13}\) Pedro de Navarra, *Diálogos. Qual debe ser el cronista del principe. Materia de pocos aún tocado . . . Dictados por el Illustriissimo y Reverendíssimo Señor don Pedro de Navarra, Obispo de Comenge* (Zaragoza, 1567), 118 folios. The copy used is held at BNM R/15/644. A section of this work had already appeared as “Dialogos qual debe ser el chronista del principe,” in *Diálogos de la eternidad del anima* (Tolosa, 1565). The copy used is held at BNM R/8451(3). This latter work would appear also under the title *Diálogos muy subtiles y notables* (Tolosa, 1569).

\(^{14}\) Ambrosio de Morales, “Apuntes sobre la historia” (1585), PR (Madrid) II/ 2245. Also considered are his *Discurso general de antigüedades* [General Discourse on Antiquities] (1582), BNM Ms/ 9934, a second manuscript copy with marginalia by Garibay, BNM Ms/ 13121; *Viaje de Ambrosio de Morales por orden del rey D. Phelipe II. a los reynos de León, y Galicia, y principado de Asturias* [The travels of Ambrosio de Morales by order of the King . . . ]
history”] (1593);\textsuperscript{15} and Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas’s (1549-1626) “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia, que cosa es y de cuantas maneras [hay], del oficio del historiador y como se ha de inquirir la Fe y Verdad de la Historia y como se ha de escribir” [“Discourse on the benefits of history, what it is and the various forms it takes, on the office of the historian, and how one should obtain Faith and Truth from History, and how it should be written”](ca. 1598).\textsuperscript{16}

It should be noted that most of the treatises remained in manuscript form and were never published, although they circulated widely among the official historians. Indeed, not only did these historians read each other's work, they commented upon and acknowledged their fellow official historians’ treatises directly within their own manuscripts.\textsuperscript{17} Fernando Bouza claims that

\textsuperscript{15} Esteban de Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia” (1593), BNM Ms/ 1750, fols. 469–480. We will also consider his “Traca y orden para la historia del rey católico señor Phelipe el Segundo y apuntamientos de materias por sus años” [Tract for the writing of history of Philip II . . .] (1593), BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 159, fol. 107-112. It should be noted that Richard L. Kagan contends that this work can be attributed to either Esteban de Garibay or Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas. (Richard L. Kagan, El Rey Recatado: Felipe II, la historia y los cronistas del rey (Valladolid: Colección “Síntesis,” 2004), 77–103.). In my judgment, its style, phraseology, and cadence are much more in line with the writing style of Garibay than Herrera. We will also consider the additional comments by Garibay on historical writing, and his role as royal chronicler, which appear in Esteban de Garibay, “Memorias de Garibay” in Memorial Histórico Español, ed. Pascual de Gayangos, Vol. 7 (Madrid: Imprenta de José Rodríguez, 1854).

\textsuperscript{16} Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia, que cosa es y de cuantas maneras, del oficio del historiador y como se ha de inquirir la Fe y Verdad de la Historia y como se ha de escribir” (ca. 1585-1591), BNM Ms/ 3011, fols. 141r–156r. We will also consider his “Las grandes utilidades de la historia” [On the great utilities of history] (1598), BNM HA/8741; “Varias Epistolas y Discursos y Tractados de Antonio de Herrera” [The Various Epistles, Discourses and Treatises of Antonio de Herrera], BNM Ms/ 1750, fols. 538–49; “Discurso sobre que Tacito excede a todos los historiadores antiguos y el fruto que se saca de sus escritos” [Discourse on why Tacitus is superior to other historians, and the fruits of his writings], BNM Ms/ 3011, fols. 49v–61r; “Discurso y tratado que el medio de la historia es suficiente para adquirir la prudencia” [How history is the sufficient means to acquire prudence] (ca. 1598), BNM Ms/ 3011, fols. 158r–165r; “Discursos y Tratado de la Historia e Historiadores Españoles” [Discourse and Treatise on Spanish History and Spanish Historians], BNM Ms/ 1.035, fols. 105–111. Both of these last two “Discursos” discuss the writing of history, history as a means of attaining prudence, the use of Tacitus and Tacitus as the ideal historian, the admonishment of false myths (like Viterbo’s), and how to come to the truth. Moreover, Herrera’s ‘Discurso y Tratado de la Historia e Historiadores Españoles’ discusses the writing of history in Spain (the first historiography of sorts), and provides a catalogue of all Spanish historians since antiquity. Some of these treatises, as well as some latter additions appear in, Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas’s, Discursos morales, políticos e históricos [On Moral, Political and Historical Matters](Madrid,1608).

\textsuperscript{17} Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas and Esteban de Garibay specifically relied upon and referenced the ideas of Juan Páez de Castro, Sebastián Fox Morcillo, Pedro de Navarra and Ambrosio de Morales. In fact, Páez de Castro even sent Herrera a copy of his Método para escribir la historia (1562), accompanied by a letter which outlined how he and Ambrosio de Morales had long been reflecting upon the theoretical foundations necessary for “good history

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many early modern texts remained as manuscripts because “it preserved the secrecy and flexibility of texts not meant to fall into the hands of the public.”18 Moreover, as Bouza clarifies, manuscript composition constituted “the essential instrument for the intellectual technique of the commonplace which, in literate settings, governed both reading and writing . . . where scholars accumulated vital information ascertained from printed books about certain themes and topics, creating a library of extracts, examples and references available for the composition of new discourses.”19 Perhaps this explains why many of these treatises remained in manuscript, to be used by other official historians, providing them with a series of topics, concerns and methods that they could build upon, clarify, perfect, and attempt to solve. In this way too, these treatises can be seen as part of the genre of instructions, reminders and advice that aristocrats composed for their heirs telling them what and what not to do, so key to life at court.20

Moreover, perhaps they remained in manuscript form because they were texts that were meant to be continuously re-written, built upon, and refined, especially given the changing circumstances at court. As Bouza has demonstrated, the manuscript copy in the sixteenth century proved especially appropriate both for its comparative solemnity and privacy, and for its writing.” BNM Ms/ 13229, fol. 203r. In addition, Ambrosio de Morales sent Herrera a copy of his ‘Apuntes sobre la historia,’ accompanied by a letter stating that he had spoken with Páez de Castro, and that both had agreed that Herrera could benefit from reading this work. Morales also sent Herrera a copy of his Spanish translation of Fox Morcillo’s De historiae institutione dialogus [Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia (1560).] See also the letters between Morales and Garibay which discuss the role of the historian as a profession, and writing history with the use of documents, BNM Ms/ 13229, fols. 191–198; and the letter between Herrera and Navarra on the role of the official historian, and how to write history based in “truth,” BNM Ms/ 5732, fol. 49. It should also be noted that Páez de Castro, Morales, Garibay, and Herrera also referred to the comments on history made by Juan Luis Vives and his book on the intellectual disciplines, De disciplinis libri (1531).

19 Bouza, Communication, Knowledge and Power in Early Modern Spain, xiii.
20 On these aristocratic advice books see Fernando Bouza, Palabra e imagen en la Corte: Cultura oral y visual de la nobleza en el Siglo de Oro (Madrid: Abada Editores, 2003).
structural flexibility, permitting easy incorporation of modifications.\(^{21}\) As Bouza observes, reading led to writing, in the form of marginal commentary, glosses, and responses. Notes in the margins, as Herrera’s in Garibay’s texts, augmented Garibay’s text.\(^{22}\) We need to look at these treatises, therefore, as essentially the work of co-authors who shared ideas, read one another’s work, corresponded about history’s purpose, proper form and methods, and even argued about how to confront the vast array of historical information now available to them.\(^{23}\) Such connections are vital, as they demonstrate how official historians saw their task (including its theoretical and methodological foundations) as a unified, collective, and even collaborative effort.

Furthermore, it is by looking at the treatises as a group that we see a broader and wider goal and intention. Most importantly, we see a true commonality of purpose in these treatises, not only in the problems they sought to address, but in their approaches to resolving these issues. Therefore, we must begin in the 1560s with the works of Páez de Castro, Fox Morcillo, and Navarra, for these were the first historians to tackle the tensions inherent in writing history for Philip and the Crown, and the purposes to which methodology could be put. Indeed, it was Fox Morcillo and Navarra’s treatises that have been recognized by Renaud Malavialle as works which marked a decided turn in the *artes historicae* in Spain that focused less on questions of

\(^{21}\) Bouza, *Communication, Knowledge and Power in Early Modern Spain*, 52.

\(^{22}\) See Herrera’s marginalia in Garibay’s ‘De la utilidad de la historia’ (1593), BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 479, discussed further in footnote 78, below.

\(^{23}\) Significantly, Cristóbal Suárez de Figeroa not only lists these historians, but specifically calls them “los escritores que trabajaron grandemente por ilustrar el método de la Historia,” *Plaza universal de todas las ciencias y artes* (Madrid, 1615), 170. Fray Jerónimo de San José provides further evidence of the connections between these theorists and how they drew upon each others’ ideas. In his 1651 *Genio de la Historia*, he wrote of the influence that these historians had upon one another, and how specifically the work of official historians Navarra and Garibay had influenced his own work when considering “how to write [his] history” (*como escribir historia*): “Pedro de Navarra, obispo de Comenge en ocho diálogos en lengua española discurre con gravedad y erudición sobre los requisitos de la Historia y el Historiador . . . igual todo lo escrito sobre lo necesario para escribir historia por Esteban de Garibay.” Fray Jerónimo de San José, *Genio de la Historia* (Zaragoza, 1651), 4.
style and more on source use, a group in which he also included Herrera. Yet, as we shall see not only Fox Morcillo and Navarra, but also the treatise of Páez de Castro, all established the foundations upon which the treatises of Morales, Garibay, and Herrera built. The concerns of all of these official historians were not just with a refinement in a critical use of sources. By looking specifically at treatises of official historians, we can see that they all considered the relationship that adherence to methods had upon the political purpose of their work. Indeed, they wrote their treatises with the express purpose of considering how their methodologies could help serve their works and thus serve the state, as they understood the effect that such adherence to rigorous historical methodologies would have upon the official histories they would write for the Crown. As we shall see, the ideas developed by official historians sharpened in the final decades of the sixteenth-century, and especially after 1580, when the polemical demands placed upon Philip’s official historians intensified.

Crucially, all of these tracts demonstrate a clear self-awareness on the part of their authors both of their roles as “official historians,” and of the express political purposes of their work. They were to write historical narratives that supported Spain and the Monarchy and all realized the difficulties this kind of history writing involved. Whether they directed their treatises at the post of “official historian” itself, or at “writing history for the King” more generally, their theoretical reflections revolve around the challenges inherent in writing history for a political purpose and with political implications. More importantly, all of the treatises tried to reconcile

24 Renaud Malavialle demonstrates that the genre of the *artes historicae* in Spain grew from ancient and fourteenth-century thought, took a clear shape in the first half of the sixteenth century, and assumed a more canonical form starting around 1560. It is in these more canonical treatises that one sees the increased concentration on issues of source use and evaluation. Renaud Malavialle, “L’essor de la pensée historique au siècle d’or. De Juan Luis Vives à Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas” (PhD diss., University of Provence, 2008). All of the treatises of Philip official historians fit within this later category of *artes historicae*. 181
their political objectives with their humanist intentions by creating methodological constraints that would ensure impartiality and “truth.” Indeed, the similarities in their methodological convictions are unmistakable, and in their fidelity to a particular method in their official task these theoretical reflections share an underlying unity. Official historians believed that, in light of the strictures of “humanist” historiography and its drive towards impartiality, working for the Crown meant that they would need to justify their work and their role. To do so they had to make explicit the principles that underlay their historical works.

Truth, Impartiality, and the Reputación of Official History

In their treatises, Philip’s official historians made major statements about historia and made full use of the classical doctrine on the subject, seeing history as magistra vitae, and regarding history as a literary genre (genus scribendi) whose formal vehicle was narrative (narratio) and whose function was both didactic and patriotic. Our concern, however, is not with these official historians’ articulation of the classical topoi on history. Rather, our interest is with their reflections on the practicalities of history writing, its necessary requirements, and how these could serve political ends. Indeed, while official historians would refer to standard classical aphorisms on history, and even cite each other’s opinions about them, they were more concerned with their craft and sought to construct prescriptions for writing official history.

Páez de Castro, Fox Morcillo, Navarra, Morales, Garibay, and Herrera all began their treatises by emphasizing that, specifically because of the nature of their task, the guiding principle for the official historian was to ensure that their work always strive to provide “truth.” From the time of Cicero and Quintilian, history had made claims to truth. According to Cicero,
the “first law of history” (*prima lex historiae*) was to tell the truth and the whole truth.\(^{25}\) Moreover, Cicero saw history itself as “light of truth (*lux veritus*), life of memory, mistress of life, and the messenger of antiquity.”\(^{26}\) Accordingly, historical examples moved the reader to action more effectively than fiction or philosophy because they were *true*. For ancient historians, however, history, like poetry, also aimed at beauty, or pleasure (*voluptas*), and goodness, or utility (*utilitas*).\(^{27}\) While the implications of Cicero’s *lux veritus* contended with the belief in history as *magistra vitae*, it seldom occurred to classical authors that an accurate representation of past reality was difficult to attain, particularly if the main purpose of the historian was to teach moral lessons. When humanists in the sixteenth century revived the discussion of the relationship between history and truth, they inevitably inherited the tensions between history’s utilitarian and critical elements, and between pragmatic education and undirected erudition. Most historians, however, sided with the ancients in seeing no contradiction in their task, since truth in Renaissance history was exemplary, offering paradigms of moral and political behavior.

Humanist notions of truth were predicated on the Ciceronian notion of truth as based in direct observation and analysis, which required the historian to avoid falsehood, tell the whole truth, and try to avoid prejudice.\(^{28}\) Humanists turned, therefore, to Polybius, who had established criteria of historical evidence known as *normae Polybianae*, requiring eyewitness testimony and impartial interpretation, and Tacitus, who had defined true history as written with “neither anger

\(^{25}\) Cicero, *De Oratore*, 2.62.

\(^{26}\) Cicero, *De Oratore*, 2.9.36.


\(^{28}\) Nelson, *Fact or Fiction*, Ch. 1–3.
Thus, impartiality for humanists was a matter of honesty versus dishonesty, a devotion to truth as opposed to an intent to deceive; it was not to be driven by emotions, and was achieved through research and attention to sources. For Philip’s official historians’ notions of truth and impartiality were informed by these humanist understandings, and it is within the context of humanists’ high standards and expectations for historical narratives, and the quest for narrative truth, that official historians began to grapple with the challenge of writing history for the Crown.

Therefore, the essential purpose of official history in sixteenth-century Spain was to write “truthful history”; truthful in the humanist sense that it was based on reliable sources, preferably direct testimonies, but also accommodating the old Ciceronian doctrine of history. Citing Cicero, Páez de Castro began his treatise with the statement that “truth must be the historian's principal goal.” Moreover, as Fox Morcillo put it, official historians understood that the “soul of history is truth.” However, late sixteenth-century official historians did not subscribe to the notion that truthful history was incompatible with their “service to the king” (al servicio del rey) and the state.

31 The office of royal historiographer itself, as well as those of Chronicler of Castile, Aragon, and Valencia, was established “to make the truth known” (el dar a conocer verdaderas historias). *Cortes de los antiguos reinos de Castilla y León*, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: M. Rivadeneyra, 1882), 7: 382.
33 “el anima de la historia, es la verdad.” Fox Morcillo, *Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia* [trans. Morales, 1560], 8. Garibay even wrote, “my job is to tell the truth.” BNM Ms/ 5732, fol. 49.
34 Navarra, *Qual debe ser el cronista del principe* (1567), 1.
These declarations of truth, however, must be understood within an increasingly critical atmosphere towards the writing of official history and its ability to provide impartial truth. In fact, challenges to the historians’ ability to provide truth, whether they were officials or not, were evident throughout Europe by the mid-sixteenth century, and the historian’s task itself had come to be seen as inherently biased. As an anonymous sixteenth-century Spanish observer wrote, “Whenever a kingdom is divided into factions, [historians] tend to follow one party, and others another, and each one describes happenings with certain colors that favor the side they are inclined to, or fear the most, or that which will gain them the greatest interest or applause.”

Works of history, therefore, increasingly came to be seen as works of artifice, in which the historian simply organized facts in a way that best suited his interest or concerns. Critics also attributed this trend to the fact that, because history increasingly was intended for political or moral education, historians increasingly added weight to their narratives, and did so through the inclusion of aphoristic exempla to offer a range of political and moral advice, even inventing speeches (mimicking many ancient historians), to provide evidence of the thinking and motivations underscoring the actions of their histories’ principal characters. The result was a certain kind of rhetorical history (historia colorata), following the models of Sallust, Livy, and Thucidides, that made history a form of rhetoric.

In this context, the works of official historians were inevitably and increasingly criticized. This was particularly the case for official historians in Spain, whose very role was directly denounced for its lack of impartiality and who were increasingly characterized as time-serving

35 “siempre que el Reyno se divide en parcialidades los escritores suelen seguir unos un partido y otros otro y cada cual describe los sucesos con aquellos colores que más ha menester la parte a que se inclina, o que más teme, o de que espera mayor interés o aplauso.” BFZ, Varios históricos curiosos, 73–247, fols. 149 r.–165 v. Reparo 2.
sycophants of the court. As Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal put it, “[t]he defect one finds in the chronicles commissioned by kings and princes . . . is that they are written both to please and praise them . . . [thus, historians] write more than what they are mandated to, or write what they think will please, at the expense of the truth.”  

Thus flattery and pusillanimity were seen by contemporary observers as inevitable vices of both the official historian’s own particularities as well as of his official role.

Such criticisms saw a heightened intensity around 1560 when an onslaught of complaints emerged across Spain about the problems that official historians had caused, especially in their representation of Charles V. Charles’ official historians Pedro Mexía (who had revived the medieval panegyric to the king), and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (who portrayed Charles as the ultimate Renaissance prince), were particularly chastised for their lack of impartiality. In direct reference to their work, Cardinal Francisco Mendoza y Bobadilla even wrote that despite these works’ great popularity, “we see among these historians, that everything is done for flattery, and their own self-interest and reward, and they only write that which benefits their patron, and they do not care about the damage that they cause by hiding the truth . . . all I can say is that it is because of these men, that many foreign nations give little credit to our nobility and [to

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38 “el defecto que tienen es porque lo que las cronistas escriven, es por mandado de los reyes e príncipes. Por los complacer e lisonjear o por temor de los enojar escriven más lo que les mandan, o lo que creen que les agradará, que la verdad del fecho como pasó.” BFZ, Varios históricos curiosos, 73–247, fol. 149.

39 See the discussions and criticisms of Charles’ historiographers’ works, and in particular the works of Mexía and Sepúlveda in the records of the Spanish Cortes. Cortes de los antiguos reinos de Castilla y León, 4: 382. See also Páez de Castro, “Notas y adiciones,” BNM Ms/ 23083/4. It should be noted that the works of official historians under Charles were based in research, and their authors had collated various published versions of events and even questioned their validity, had sought dates, places, names to corroborate events, had offered their own eyewitness accounts, as well as those of others, and had even incorporated excerpts from other sources. These works, and especially the ways in which they were written and how they presented Charles, however, led many to regard them as excessively laudatory, and mere encomium.
Spain]." Therefore, an understanding had emerged of the inherent incompatibility in the criteria for truth when dealing with political histories, and of the damage such excessive flattery had for political standing. Such complaints would continue throughout the 1560s and 1570s and comments that official historians were prone to lie or exaggerate abounded. Foreigners had also sought to discredit directly the work of Spanish official historians. Girolamo Conestaggio even called Spanish official historians men who were “paid to lie” (condotto mentire), while others simply characterised them as writers who “simply write false accounts that merely favor the King.”

The most pointed accusation against official history, however, came from a Spaniard, Antonio Pérez, once Philip’s favorite but who, by 1580, had been ousted from court and had found refuge in France. Pérez, in The Sins of History, openly accused Spanish official historians of gloss and obsessive repetition, and of displaying a “morbid fascination” with the deeds of their kings. He also wrote that Spanish official works were filled with “various venoms, and contradictions reduced to distillations . . . bringing out the most insignificant essence, trying to find the antidote to human cases . . . for the teaching and instruction of man.” Such writing was seen by Pérez as possessing significant implications for power: “I have wanted to tell of these particularities [in official history] because [as a result] . . . men lose part of the love and

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40 “entre los cronistas (como en otras facultades) todo es lisonja o halago por sus intereses, y en materia de linajes no escriben sino aquello que les dicen los interesados, y no es poco daño querer oscurecer la verdad […] sólo diré que de estos desórdenes resulta que las naciones extranjeras dan tan poco crédito a la nobleza de España.” Francisco de Mendoza y Bobadilla, El tizón de la nobleza de España (1560), ed. Armando Mauricio Olmedo (Mexico: Frente de Afirmación Hispánica, 1999), Prologue.

41 Girolamo Conestaggio, Historia dell’unione del regno di Portogallo alla Corona di Castiglia (Genoa, 1585), Prologue, “Al lettore.” See also, BFZ, Varios históricos curiosos, 73–247, fol. 151.

42 “Que yo aseguro de lo que se de algunos historiadores, que tal montón de menudencias, le estimaran, le entendieran y como venenos varios y contrarios reduzidos a destilación, sacaran la quinta esencia y el antidoto contra los casos humanos que es la noticia de ellos, para el enseñamiento y escarmiento de los hombres, y el fin principal de las Historias.” Antonio Pérez, Pecados de Historia, o Relaciones, asy lammadas por sus Auctores los Peregrinos (León [Actually printed in London by Richard Field], 1594), 52–53.
confidence that they have in princes, . . . [especially since the way that monarchs are depicted in these works] is too great, and approximates idolatry . . . Such excess love and respect comes to be damaging to the very King and for his vassals.”43 A general understanding had emerged, therefore, evident in the words of both Bobadilla and Pérez, that even though sensational writing might have been popular, it was ultimately prejudicial. Adulation did not serve the prince well, whereas truth did.

It was these critical appraisals of official history that by 1560, and especially after 1580, both forced and inspired official historians to conduct a critical evaluation of their trade and to search for solutions to their perceived faults and biases. For whereas their predecessors had identified the problems inherent in the task of the official historian in the Prologues to their historical narratives, Philip’s official historians made such concerns central to their treatises on the artes historicae, and sought to confront these issues head on, framing their theoretical considerations in relation to such concerns.44

43 “he querido contar estas particularidades porque de más de ser verdaderíssimas . . . pierdan los hombres la parte del amor, y confianza, que tienen a los principes . . . la parte digo, la demasiada, y la que acerca idolatría, que la debida a ellos . . . Porque el demasiado amor, y respecto viene . . . el continuo daño del mismo Príncipe y de los mismos vasallos.” Pérez, Pecados de Historia, 53.

44 The earliest expressions of the dual role of the official historian as both provider of truth and servant of the Crown first appeared at the beginning of the sixteenth century in the Prologue to Lorenzo Galindo’s de Carvajal’s Memorial o registro breve de los Reyes Católicos (1523) [ed. Juan Carretero Zamora (Segovia: Patronato del Alcázar, 1992)]. Galindo (1472-1532), who was official historian to the Catholic Monarchs, provided the first extensive commentary on the problems and aims of official historians. He believed the royal chronicler should only “witness or scribe, and not judge or gloss the deeds, but only record them as they occurred.”(2) Despite this avowed impartiality, however, he impressed upon Ferdinand the need to commission histories to enhance the King’s reputation abroad, and warned him of the dangers of unflattering accounts. Galindo believed that the only guarantee of historical accuracy was for chronicles to be written by scholars attached to the court, but he emphasized precision and a conscious attempt to avoid prejudice and eulogy as prerequisites for the official task. Galindo, therefore, identified many of the problems the treatises in this Chapter identified, but he did not try to offer a solution as to how the official historian was to master this dual role.
In their treatises, Philip’s official historians acknowledged the increasing criticism of their profession and the poor quality and excessive flattery in the works of their predecessors. They made it clear that they agreed with much of the criticism leveled at their predecessors, and how overly encomiastic accounts and rhetorical excess posed problems for the integrity, credibility and authenticity of official works. They sought to address the conflicts between excessive rhetoric and historical truth, and the unconditional preference for the latter shown by their predecessors. In fact, Philip’s official historians specifically framed their treatises in relation to the debate between rhetoric and truth. They understood that “truth” was a prerequisite for history to be both beneficial and useful, and that a history full of flattery, or excessive praise which bordered on fiction, was next to useless. As official historians they emphasized that, unlike their predecessors, theirs was not a desire to fabricate or merely present a flattering account of events, but to present “the truth of events.”

45 In fact official historian Esteban de Garibay went so far as to state that, “flattery in a writer, is like the sin of idolatry.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” (1593) BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 471.
46 In particular, Fox Morcillo, a great admirer of Greco-Roman culture and an authority on Plato, heavily criticized his contemporaries, the Spanish histories being produced, and the obsessive desire found in contemporary work to mimic the ancients. He made manifest that his treatise sought to remedy directly such works by providing a treatise on how to write history “properly.” Fox Morcillo argued against the ideas of Dionysus of Halicarnassus, who believed that only agreeable things be included in history, and criticized Herodotus for including too many fables, and Livy for his excessive love of Rome. He believed that history had to contain the good and the bad. Despite his occasional rebuke of the ancients, Fox Morcillo was still a traditional humanist, writing his tract in Latin, and using rhetorical flourishes to prove his points. Among all of these official historians, however, a clear understanding had emerged that “the historian’s desire to provide sound philosophy and doctrine should never make him supersede truth.” Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia, . . . y como se ha de escribir”, BNM, Ms/ 3011, fol. 5. As Garibay put it, “the job of the perfect historian is to fight against oblivion, drawing from history all that is worthy of memory, making it an exemplar full of truth and doctrine; here the historian must turn to the eyes of Argos, and recognize with unfailing vigilance his most subtle task to provide truth and philosophy, without exceeding one for the other, nor augmenting, or adding more than what is necessary” (“el oficio del perfecto cronista es luchar contra el olvido, sacándole de las manos todo lo digno de memoria, haciendo dello un ejemplar lleno de verdad y de doctrina: aqui son menester los ojos de Argos, y reconocer con infatigable vigilancia esta parte sutilísima, por estar compuesta de verdad y filosofía, sin que la una haya de exceder a la otra, ni mostrar más [de lo necesario]”).
47 Páez de Castro, De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia, BNM Ms/ 6425. Significantly, both Páez de Castro and Navarra accused their predecessors like Mexía and Antonio de Guevarra of “luxuria” and “excessive wording” (“loçania de palabras”) and excessive “affectación.”
Yet these historians clearly acknowledged the difficulties their official role posed to their efforts. Indeed, it should be noted that the official historian’s task was specifically described in terms of glorification, spreading fame and enhancing reputación, and the task of the official historians was, “to record, elevate and adorn the memory of the innumerable deeds, antiquities and things worthy to be remembered.”48 In all of these treatises a clear understanding emerged, therefore, that the injunction to glorify and exalt needed to be set against the impartiality necessary for any true account. Yet theirs were not mere calls for impartiality with no further criteria for determining or controlling bias; not only did they identify the problems of bias and flattery, they sought to provide the necessary requirements and procedures that needed to be adhered to in order to avoid them.

Thus, aware of the political demands of their task, Philip’s official historians promoted a reshuffling of historiographical priorities, in an attempt to make official history appear more scholarly. Moreover, this targeted effort was precipitated by the desire to articulate how the artes historicae and historical practices could serve politics. As a result, the treatises of official historians stand out for the liberties they took bringing together well-established and diverse tools and conceptual devices in order to serve their overall political agenda, creating a distinct form of artes historicae.

Official historians immediately recognized that the worst impediment to obtaining truth and to be seen as obtaining truth was the quandary of interest; they considered bias as the most

48 Cortes de los antiguos reinos de Castilla y León, 7: 255.
prevailing and serious of historiographical sins. Thus, while humanist historians throughout Europe called for impartiality and warned against bias, Spain’s official historians began to discuss how to reconcile their need for impartiality and neutrality with their service to the Crown. Official historians understood that establishing their role as providers of truth would be hard won, and thus the repeated advice that official historians adhere to truth began to take a more critical turn. As theorists of history, they presented themselves not only as servants of the king but also as servants of truth. Indeed, official historians clearly understood the complex and somewhat paradoxical nature of their responsibilities, while still entertaining the notion of truth as their operative entity. Therefore, it would be in the second half of the sixteenth century, because of mounting criticism of their task, that official historians began to discuss openly the question of bias and how to avoid it. To restore the “reputation of official history,” they had to show that official history was for the public good, that official historians were impartial, and that it was possible to write unbiased contemporary history. Furthermore, they had to establish the ethical and technical superiority of the official historians. As Páez de Castro put it, his treatise

49 Official historians in Spain had long been aware of the problem of bias and excessive artifice when writing history, and a concern with the problems of the historian’s bias first appeared in the work of official historian Perez de Guzmán (1376–1458). Guzmán launched an empirical attack, and saw bias as the primary obstacle to obtaining “truth” when writing history. In the Prologue to his Generaciones y semblanzas [ca.1450] (a kind of advice book) Guzmán worried openly about the pernicious influence of chroniclers who wrote in the service of one faction or another: “Often it happens that the chronicles and histories that tell of powerful kings, notable princes, and great cities are regarded with suspicion and doubt. Little faith is put into their veracity for [various] reasons. [The] first, because of some of those who undertake the writing and commentary of ancient matters are shameless men who would rather relate what is bizarre and extraordinary than what is true and exact, in the belief that their story will be regarded as inconsequential if they do not tell of things that are bigger than life, even if those things are more worthy of awe than of credulity.” Fernán Pérez de Guzmán, Generaciones y Semblanzas (ca. 1450), ed. J. Domínguez Bordona (Madrid: Ediciones de “La Lectura,” 1924), 12. In fact it was Pérez de Guzmán, a Spaniard, who was one of the first Europeans to express doubts about the validity of historical knowledge. [It should be noted that Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim’s attack on history in his De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium (1531), has long been regarded as the first formal indictment against the ability of the historian to provide “truth.” Guzmán’s work, however, clearly preceded Agrippa’s.] Thus, there was a long tradition in Spain of discussing notions of bias, and its impact on truth, and whether history and truth were compatible. Spanish historian Juan Luis Vives (1493-1540) also excoriated medieval hagiography as the product of bias rather than truth. Moreover, starting in the late-fifteenth century, and continuing in the first half of the sixteenth century, royal chroniclers in Spain, most notably Antonio de Nebrija, openly discussed whether there was any such thing as “truth” in history. Kohut, “Die spanische Poetik zwischen Rhetorik und Historiographie,” 75–93.
discussed “the importance of history, [and] of the good historian, of the parts that legitimate and perfect history should have, and how to write it.”50

It should be noted that the need to defend their task and the work they produced led Philip’s official historians to present the prologues to their treatises on history under the strange title of *diuinatio*. The *diuinatio* was the name given to a kind of professional gathering in which jurists came to decide upon who, from a group of competitors, was the best suited to serve the state as a judge, and during which each candidate presented his own self-defense.51 By beginning their treatises in this way, official historians sought to present themselves as one of these competitors, not only defending their task to write “history for the Crown,” but trying to show why they were best suited for the task and to lay out the specifics for how they were to perform their duty in order to ensure that official history provided the “best kind” of history. They saw their treatises as self-defenses, which needed to explain not only how to write history properly, but also clarify the motives, intentionality, and the reason why official history was necessary.

In their treatises, all sought to justify their official function by beginning with the general *topos* that all well-administered states had writers appointed to record the events that had taken place within the realm, and of the importance of history for the functioning of state. As Páez de Castro put it, “How else could one know the identity of the ancestors of the most notable individuals in the state and upon what rights they established their prerogatives,” for “it is in history that Kings find support for their endeavors, . . . and good actions are provided for those

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50 “la importancia de la historia, la del buen historiador, las partes que ha de tener, las de legítima y perfecta historia y como se hará tal.” Páez de Castro, *De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia*, BNM Ms/ 6425.
who want to imitate them.” Indeed, all began their tracts with an exploration of the purposes that history fulfilled and provided commentary on the pragmatic utility that history provided the present. All regarded history as a requisite instrument of education since as Morcillo put it, “history is a better teacher than philosophy,” for it provided examples of action.

Yet while in their definitions of history official historians differed little from the typical artes historicae on the utility of history, they added an emphasis upon the value of placing the writer of history at the service of the state. As Garibay wrote,

> If life and reason permitted a man to live many centuries and to travel through many provinces, considering all that is in them, and in what their strength and power consists, and what had been accomplished well or badly in the affairs, negotiations, deeds, and counsel of each prince or citizen, who would not consider him to be a great advisor? Who would not take his advice, determinations, and answers as if an oracle? What nature denies mankind, history grants him, because those who know history appear to have lived through many centuries, seen all the regions, found themselves in all the public councils and present at all events, noting and judging them carefully.

Thus, official history was necessary, for it was to history that the monarch as well as readers would turn for an accurate and truthful representation of the past, and as a guide for

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52 Páez de Castro, De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia, BNM Ms/ 6425.
53 “la historia enseña mejor que la filosofía.” Fox Morcillo, Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia [trans. Morales, 1560], 25. As Páez de Castro put it, “History is of great price and value, for it is, by testimony of many, teacher of human life, witness of past things, conserver of memory, messenger of virtue, and truthfully gives cause for pleasure and honest utility to princes and nobles” (“Así que cosa es de gran precio y valor la Historia de las cosas pasadas, la cual, como sea, por testimonio de muchos, maestra de vida humana, testigo de los tiempos pasados, conservadora de la memoria, mensajera de la virtud, por cierto da mucha cabra de deleite y de honesta utilidad a los príncipes y señores”). Páez de Castro, De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia, BNM Ms/ 6425.
54 “Si la brevedad de la vida y la misma razón permitiera que un hombre viviera muchos siglos y anduviese muchas provincias y considerase lo que ay en todas y en qué consiste la fuerza y poder y lo que se avía seguido en bien o en mal de cada cosa, caso o negocio de cada príncipe o particular en hecho y consejo, ¿quién no diría ser gran consejero? ¿Quién su parecer no tendría por oráculo en las determinaciones y respuestas consultado? Lo que niega la naturaleza, da la historia, pues los que la saben parece que han vivido muchos siglos, visto todas las regiones, hallándose en todos los públicos consejos y presentes a todo lo acaecido, notándolo y juzgándolo con cuidado.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fols. 472–473. Similar statements will be made later by Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, De historia: Para entenderla y escribirla (Madrid, 1609), 40–41.
understanding and action. This not only gave official historians great influence, but represented
the role that history was to play for the purposes of political determinations in the sixteenth
century. Official historians, therefore, presented their task not only as an honor, but as a duty and
service in the Ciceronian sense, as well as a necessity, for as Navarra emphasized, “Tell me in
the name of human justice and faith, what better service can I do for my country [than to write
history]?”.  

Official historians recognized that their official task required that they produce history
that was not only “true” but had public utility. Páez de Castro gives us the best of all purchases
on the subject when he claimed that while official history was to stand for truth, the practical and
ethical value of historical truth, what he called the “utility of history,” was a past both “true and
usable.”  

Crucially, as official historians they would need to “focus only on the affairs of action
that most concern the government” and “deliver an account of the course of affairs, insomuch as
is fit for public understanding.” Indeed, specifically when it came to writing their narratives,
official historians stressed that the historian would have to ensure that he did not bring to light
any “state secrets.” In all of their treatises, therefore, emerged a concern with resolving the
question of how to reveal the “effective truth of things” without revealing “too much.” For
official historians, there was a careful balance between providing “truth” and not going too far,
between revealing too much and modifying one’s account to the point of fabrication. Páez tied

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55 “Dime, en el nombre de la justicia humana y de la fe ¿qué mejor servicio puedo hacer en este momento por mi
patria?” Navarra, Qual debe ser el cronista del príncipe (1567), 1.
56 Páez de Castro, De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia, BNM Ms/ 6425.
57 Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la Historia . . .,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fols. 141r–156r.
59 Herrera specified that this was why foreign works could not be trusted, as they revealed “too much” “give too
much license,” (“porque hallo que casi a todo lo escrito no se podia dar fe, por la demasiada licencia que han
tomado” ). He added that foreign works “approach libel in their excessive freedom, not to say audacity. They bring
into the open the secrets of princes . . . and everything that ought to be clothed in darkness [which should remain
this need to dissimulate directly to the need to develop more rigorous methodologies—they
needed laws or conditions to follow so that “[writers] may direct their activities to the common
good and not foment troubles to the disadvantages of the state.”

As Jon Snyder shows, there was a rich philosophical framework to deal with these
ethical, behavioural philosophies in the work of ancient thinkers like Aristotle, Pyrrhon, Cicero,
and Tacitus. Moreover, Christian fathers and theologians such as Augustine had looked to
balance parrhesia, the need to speak what is on one’s mind, with dissimulation, the need for the
Church to maintain secrecy and silence in certain matters, while early humanists had struggled
with the ethical dilemma of prudential dissimulation and Christianity. In Spain, as seen in
Chapter One, Jesuit political theorists like Juan de Mariana and Pedro de Ribadeniera recognized
the importance of political prudence and sought to reconcile political dissimulation with
Christian civic virtue.

For these Church scholars, the writing of history to support confessional causes was
regarded as both a moral obligation, as well as a calling, creating works redolent of a sense of
duty. Moreover, the theories of history being developed by the Jesuits of the Society of Jesus

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hidden], like the necessary [mysteries] in the functioning of any government . . . this category includes Machiavelli .
. . and then there are those libels that claim to tell the public of the King’s thoughts and ideas with no basis in truth,
but rather what they have taken from hearsay, and gossip.” Herrera, Discurso sobre los provechos de la Historia,
BNM Ms/ 1035, fol. 5. See also the comments made by Juan de Idiáquez regarding the quality of the work of
foreign historians, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 123, fol. 17.

60 Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578.
61 Jon Snyder, Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe (Berkley: University of California
62 Harro Höpfl, Jesuit Political Thought. The Society of Jesus and the State, c. 1540-1630 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 133–134.
63 See Donald R. Kelley, “History as a Calling: The Case of La Popelinière,” in Renaissance Studies in Honor of
Hans Baron, ed. Anthony Molho and John A. Tedeschi (Florence: Verso, 1971), 773–889; and Brendan Dooley,
“Veritas Filia Temporis: Experience and Belief in Early Modern Culture,” Journal of the History of Ideas 60/3
emphasized that “historical research should serve the greater Glory of God, and the Church.”

Indeed, as scholarship on Church developments demonstrates, excessively rigorous historical and philological approaches to revising the past as well as religious rites and the liturgy as demanded by the Council of Trent were moderated by taking into account theological considerations. As Simon Ditchfield recounts, religious scholars acknowledged the “drastic consequences” that obliterating certain relics, martyrs, and liturgical rites, or certain beliefs would have. Thus, they too created a number of guidelines for revisions that would respect scripture and tradition, while also fulfilling the more stringent criteria of early modern erudition.

In this sense, like the guidelines established for such orthodox revisions by their religious counterparts, official historians also sought to create guidelines for how to write a history that supported the Crown, while seeking to meet humanist demands. They too sought to prescribe scholarly methodologies and stringent criteria (but also latitude) upon their work, because they too feared the “drastic consequences” that might occur if people lost their faith in the monarchy and the king. They too sensed the danger implicit in bringing certain things to light or revealing anything which might lead people to “lose faith” in those in power. Indeed, just as Church scholars realized that miraculous matters required a special sort of consideration, motivated more by a pious and generous spirit than by hermeneutical rigidity, so too did official historians understand that political histories that defended Philip and the Spanish cause would need to be motivated by loyalty and the need to ensure the “common good.”

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Thus, the notions that political matters needed to be handled somewhat more cautiously, and that the principles of historical criticism could be utilized and modified accordingly, grew out of a Spanish and European environment which recognized a need to preserve a “truth” that might not always conform to the most absolute forms of critical historical inquiry. Indeed, because of the opacity of high politics in the world of court, and the official role they played, Philip’s historians realized that such dissimulation was a necessity. It should come as no surprise that books on the efficacy and art of concealment in the arena of courtly sociability such as Lucas Gracián Dantisco’s epistolary courtesy treatise, *El galateo español* (ca. 1582) were also emerging at the same time in Spain.66 It is highly significant, however, that official historians grappled explicitly in their treatises with the virtues of silence and secrecy and those of honest and scholarly inquiry.67 That they frame their treatises on the *artes historicae* using the language of dissimulation is crucial. Significantly, unlike political theorists, or even Spanish advisors, official historians sought to come to a more prudential way to define dissimulation and how one could control and temper dissimulation through an adherence to method and ethics. As Morales put it, “A prudent writer will know how to write history without separating himself from the truth and also without causing unnecessary scandal or rumor.”68

Prudence on behalf of the historian in the context of sixteenth-century historical polemic is most understandable: Philip’s *reputación* was at stake, and damaging facts could not come to

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67 For example, Fox Morcillo stressed that the official historian needed to be careful, “what things are to be suppressed, what lightly touched upon, and what treated at large: how credit may be won, and suspicion avoided, what is to be observed in the order of times, and description of places and other such circumstances of weight, [and] what liberty a writer may use when telling of events, framing causes, counsels, and outcomes of things done.” Fox Morcillo, *Diálogo de la enseñanza de la Historia* [trans. Morales, 1560], 18.
68 Morales, “Apuntes sobre la historia” RB II/ 2245. See also Morales, AGI, Indiferente General, leg. 752.
light. Official historians knew that there was a delicate balance between the demands of humanist history and the needs of the king or state. For Páez de Castro, “Writing history is like walking on embers hidden under white ash, which [appears harmless] but deceives us.”70 If it was too flattering it would be taken as mere idolatry, and thus would not be taken seriously; if it was not flattering enough it might be seen as an insult; if it contained too many truths, it could pose a threat. Indeed, their very investigation of truth was influenced by the interests of the state from the very start. Official historians, however, sought to address the delicate balance between political flattery or excessive condemnation and historical truth.

Official historians, like political theorists of the time, believed that the image of the king that they were creating was “like a painting.”71 Just as a painter might exceed the limits of truth, as long as he remained within those of verisimilitude, so might the historian develop an account of Philip’s and Spanish actions. Indeed, here they adapted the ideas of one of their predecessors, famed humanist Antonio de Nebrija (1441-1522), who while writing of the obligation of the official historian to garner truth and how the historian was never to lie, had written that like a painter, the historian could “maquillar” (to “make-up,” literally to “alter something to improve

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69 Official historians understood that in their hands lay the legacy of the monarch and the Spanish Monarchy. Thus, when speaking of the election of the official historian, Navarra stressed that the prince himself needed to search out and appoint these men because “in these works rests the reputation of princes and nations” (“Las historias están por cuenta y cargo de los príncipes. El que desea acertar en la elección de persona tan importante, con cuidado la mande buscar en sus reinos, y si no se hallare, en los extraños [sic] se busque. Van en esto la reputación de los príncipes y de la nación de quien se ha de escribir, y más si es natural de ella”). Navarra, *Qual debe ser el cronista del príncipe* (1567), Prologo. Fox Morcillo, too, stressed that it had long been specifically up to historians to “guard through their post, the authority, industry and liberality of princes” (“cuidar con el beneficio, la autoridad, la industria y liberalidad de los príncipes”). Fox Morcillo, *Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia* [trans. Morales, 1560], 62. Herrera added, “Historians are like counselors . . . Good Counselors serve to conserve Kingdoms and Kings” (“los que escriben historia son como consejeros . . . Buenos Consejeros sirven para la conservación [sic] de Reynos y Reyes”). Herrera, “Discurso y tratado que el medio de la historia es suficiente para adquirir la prudencia,” BNM Ms/3011, fols. 158r–159r.


71 “La historia es pintura que habla.” Bernardo Pérez, *Historia de las cosas que han pasado en Italia desde el año MDXXI de nuestra redemptión hasta el año XXX* (Madrid, 1536), 2.
its appearance”) the truth, shading or softening certain events, actions, and behavior, while bolstering others.\textsuperscript{72} While appearances were crucial, however, they were not to take the place of reality, virtue, or power. In this context, concealing or enhancing certain things should not be seen as hypocrisy, but rather a healthy “respect for virtue,” as it was a “good example” to “conceal” some of the vices or wrongdoings that a king might possess or enhance those virtues which demonstrated his defense of a cause.\textsuperscript{73} However, if history was to ensure reputación, official historians understood that it had to be based in truth and reality; appearance was never enough.

For while official historians were to provide an interpreted and polished truth, they were not to lie. Political theorist Justus Lipsius (1547-1606), who was also Philip’s official historian in the Netherlands, suggested that one might find it necessary when writing on political matters to suppress outright certain information that was “not in the ruler’s best interest.”\textsuperscript{74} Inspired directly by Lipsius, to whom he refers, Herrera sought to apply such principles to the writing of history: “there are things that history, as it should, can and must be silent about. History is a suitable means for discrediting and undoing false rumors by manifesting the truth, while also leaving


\textsuperscript{73} Höpfl, Jesuit Political Thought, 155.

\textsuperscript{74} Herrera referring to Lipsius. Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la Historia . . . y como se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 143. Maria M. Portuondo, looking at Spanish New World cartography, demonstrates how the Crown did not want certain cartographic and geographic information to be revealed, and based on Lipsian notions of “light deceit” sought to control the production and dissemination of maps in Spain and the New World. Secret Science: Spanish Cosmography and the New World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 200. It should be noted, that although Lipsius was appointed to the charge of official historian for Philip, it appears that he never wrote any histories.
unwritten others that might not be advisable to be known.”

This did not mean that one was not to tell the whole story. It was only “state secrets,” or as Garibay put it in almost direct Lipsian terms, “omitting those things which did not detract from the truth, but which could sully [the Monarch’s] reputación,” which were to be avoided.

Indeed, official historians understood that they were protecting the reputación of the King, not just advancing it, and they were advancing statecraft, which also enlisted the notion of protection. That which might jeopardize the workings of state was to be excluded from history, but not that which hid truth. Official historians acknowledged that if they strayed from the truth, it could have grave consequences, for as they understood it, deceit (deceptio) was “an artful design departing from the way of virtue and the laws for the good of the king or the kingdom,” and thus “of a vigorous and perfect malice.”

Indeed, under this regime of “truth,” outright lies or overt elaboration posed a direct threat to the public good. Official historians knew that if official history was false or mere laudation the public faith in what official histories provided would be irrevocably compromised. Moreover, it is fundamental to our understanding of the motivation of official historians that they did not want to impugn, under any circumstance, not only the king, but their own honor, even perhaps their own reputación by writing lies.

Thus, official historians understood that absolute “historical truth” as we understand it might have to be subordinated to the state in order to secure foreign and domestic peace and
stability. Truth was not an end in itself, but rather the essential means by which to attain the ultimate goal of the work, which was to serve the common good. By combining their need to defend the King and the public good they defined what constituted “political truth”—or that which benefitted the ruler and the public good. Thus, official historians’ notions of truth reflected the political crucible within which the historiographical enterprise itself was conceived by Spanish official historians.

Given these complexities, it is not surprising that Philip’s historians also argued that history for the public good could only be written by “virtuous” men. While prior observations by historians had noted that the historian had to be a morally upright man, these treatises specifically discussed how this morality would guide their method. It would not only help in their source selection, but would also balance the need for dissimulation by ensuring that while they would not include anything that was damaging, they would also not lie, or be too flattering.

There were other reasons for the treatises to explain the character of the official historian. They needed to address the accusation that they were merely men who were “paid to lie.” Indeed, the office of official historian brought with it great benefits: a regular and lucrative

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78 The following handwritten short poem appeared in the margin of Garibay’s ‘De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 479, and is almost certainly in the hand of Herrera:

Where there is no truth, there is no reason;
where there is no reason, there is no counsel;
where there is no counsel, there is no justice;
where there is no justice, there is no King.

Donde no ay verdad, no ay razón;
donde no hay razón, no ay consejo;
donde no hay consejo, no ay justicia;
donde no hay justicia, no ay rey.

It is surely not a coincidence that this marginal note appeared precisely besides Garibay’s discussion of truth, and how the historian must provide the truth that supports the “public good” and that demonstrates the “good intentions of the King.” Essentially Herrera created an equation: Reason=Conseil=Justice=King (and this equation could be immediately reversed). This reveals that Herrera equated justice with the monarch, and that the king provided justice through reason, and therefore providing that “truth” through official history was justified and legitimized.
salary, lodging, publication subsidies, privileged access to important state papers, and a modicum of prestige. In their treatises they justified the idea that they received a salary from a patron with the fact that the ancients, like Aristotle, Quintilian, Athenodorus, Virgil, Horace, and Plutarch had similarly received patronage.\textsuperscript{79} Official historians vehemently argued that these ancients had been able to write “good history,” and write “truth” for their masters, even though they, too, had been handsomely rewarded for their efforts.\textsuperscript{80} The office of the official historian should be seen as no different; official historians were equally as capable of writing “good history” for the Crown.

Furthermore, all of the treatises stressed that comfortable financial autonomy was not only acceptable, it was crucial. The position of official historian afforded them more flexibility and freedom than the freelance historian, making them more capable of assessing and accessing “truth,” as they could fulfill their duties without constantly having to concern themselves with garnering favor or patronage.\textsuperscript{81} Garibay was even critical of the historian who was not an official historian, as he “always yearns to be, so he does everything to garner favor, which is detrimental

\textsuperscript{79} For example, “Los Cretenses dieron una cantidad de oro por las obras de Homero. Nicomedes Rey de Chipre dio a Isocrates por el libro que le dedico 120 ducados. Los Romanos levantaron una estatua a Josefo por la historia que hizo de Captivitate judaica. Y nuestro Rey Alonso el octavo hizo a Don Rodrigo Ximenez de Rada, primado de las Españas y Arzobispo de Toledo.” Herrera, “Discurso sobre que Tácito excede a todos los historiadores antiguos, y el fruto que se saca de sus escritos,” BNM, Ms/ 3011, fol. 44.

\textsuperscript{80} For example, “the ancients . . . por rústicos que eran y mal polidos[sic] en la doctrina y arte . . . entendieron que el fundamento principal de la historia era no atreverse á decir cosa falsa y osar decir todo lo que fuese verdad, y no escribir cosa por hacer placer á unos, o pesar á otros, sino mostrar siempre el ánimo libre, y sereno de toda pasión, quiero á escribir lo que pasa”). Páez de Castro, \textit{De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia}, BNM Ms/ 6425.

\textsuperscript{81} Since the time of the Catholic Monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella, royal historians were to respond to independent scholars who wrote “without any feeling, with bad intentions, and simply to criticize,” as royal chronicler Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo wrote to Isabella. For Oviedo, only a royal chronicler, such as himself, paid out of the “royal purse,” could be trusted to write about royalty “with the truth and clarity that it requires.” Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, \textit{Libro de la Camera real del príncipe don Juan} [1548] (Madrid: Sociedad de bibliófilos Españoles, 1870), Carta Dedicatoria.
to his work,” and which would inevitably lead him to write “bad history.”

For official historians, having a cause or purpose was not seen as damaging to the historian’s work; in fact, the official historian’s task was contrasted sharply to the work of those who had no official endorsement, affiliation or purpose, or “those who write voluntarily, for pleasure, or merely out of inclination.” Navarra even suggested that works that lacked political “loyalty” should be seen as the most suspect; for Navarra one needed to be loyal to some power or cause, as this prevented the historian from writing solely out of self-interest, “to gain prize or favour,” or for “some other ulterior motives.” Thus, official historians stressed that, because they had an official appointment, they lacked the ulterior motives of money and greed that might move other historians. For Navarra the “freedom to write what one wants” was a necessity since it “will allow the historian to write the truth.” This was crucial, for the historian’s independence of

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82 “Pretende y espera de algún príncipe o república, y armado con todas las cautelas de la ambición, tiende todas las redes de la lisonja, no procurando otra cosa en lo que escribe sino el gusto de la persona a quien adula. Los sucesos y acaecimientos de sus cosas los representa gloriosísimos; encarece sus hazañas, encubre sus defectos, engrandece su memoria, y para que parezca mas divino, deprime y abate la de cuantos concurrieron en su tiempo dignos de mención.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 479. Such sentiments echo the ideas of another contemporary historian and theorist Melchor Cano, “Verum ipsum in scribentis sinceritate candoreque relucet, et mendacium contra autoris quidam angor et calliditas patefacit.” Melchor Cano, De locis theologicis libri duodecim, (Salamanca, 1563), 17.

83 Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 478. Most Spaniards also agreed that a person without some kind of obligation only served their own interests. As Cristóbal de Moura had put it, historians who were “non-obligated and non-afficionados” could not be trusted. (“Autores fuera del el [el Reyno] desobligados y desaficionados y sin fundamento de verdad, sino de las quejas del pueblo y rumores falsos del vulgo que la fama lleva de unos reinos a otros . . . y por su propio ambición . . . juzgan los acciones de Su Majestad no como merece su piedad y santo celo, . . . y no pararán el daño.”) ‘Request that a history be written to counter foreign accounts,’ Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 3.

84 Navarra, Qual debe ser el cronista del príncipe (1567), 11. Similarly, Pedro de Ribadeneira wrote in 1573 “the truth [in history] is always obscured by those who write either out of ignorance or as a result of their own particular aims and desires.” Pedro de Ribadeneira, Vida de San Francisco de Borja (Madrid: Por la viuda de Alonso Gómez, 1573), 2: Ch. 18, fol. 109v.

85 While official historians depended on the monarch for their salary and the influence, status, and the public visibility that constituted reputación, Garibay stressed that although they were to write for the Crown, they should not feel entirely financially dependent upon it, and should feel financially free to write the truth. This is perhaps why Garibay preferred that official historians be of noble lineage, as it afforded additional financial security and flexibility. Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 469.

86 “pues la libertad y verdad que (como queda dicho) son el alma de la historia . . . son necesario para escribir la verdad.” Navarra, Qual debe ser el cronista del príncipe (1567), 1. Similarly, Herrera stressed, “The just historian conceals nothing out of fear, nor speaks anything out of favor . . . the [official] historian must have a free spirit . . . as history should not be written out of fear or the hope of great rewards, or because of hatred toward something, . . .
judgment and absence of relative “pressure” (presión) were seen as the highest priority.87

Official historians stressed, therefore, the need for independence as a pre-requisite for their task, and that official historians were to feel “free” so that they could write what they believed and write about the truth of events “without fear of reprisal.”88 Official historians presented their official role and its implied loyalty to the Crown, therefore, not as compromising their freedom of expression, nor a repudiation of the fundamental tenets of impartial history as demanded by humanists, but instead as providing them with the ability to write truth more “freely.”

Yet it was less the need to present truthful political exempla from the past than the need to write about current affairs which came to form the basis of their discussions of the relationship between history’s utility and its need to be truthful. Indeed, all of their treatises directly acknowledged that the most pressing obstacle they faced was the fact that, because of political necessity, they needed to address the problems associated with writing current history. For much rather history should be written for liberty and truth, which, as is well known, are the soul of history; truth should be the [historians’] primary goal” (“Y sobre todo tenga el animo libre: este tal hará bien el oficio de historiador . . . , lo cual no podrá hacer si teme, o tiene esperanza de premio, o tiene odio contra alguno”). Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia . . . y como se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 156r. Rosa Arciniega claimed that Herrera was one of the first Spanish historians to make claims to the “independence of the historian.” Rosa Arciniega, “La libertad del historiador,” Cuadernos del Congreso por la libertad de la cultura 16 (1956): 74–80. These treatises reveal, however, that this is a much more widespread and significant pronouncement being made by all of the official historians.

87 As Navarra noted, “Many write to praise the prince, doing so more for the prize that they will receive than for their good name in the republic. The good and true [historian], as I have said, must be, in my humble opinion, neutral, authentic, and so free and [lord unto himself] that he may purely and sincerely want to write the truth, without fear, hatred, love, passion, interest or obligation; . . . [he must be] a foreigner to any type of flattery if he wants his work to be taken as grave and truthful, because truth and authority do not come from an adulator [a sycophant]”) (“Otros escriben por adular al príncipe, esperando más premio de hazienda que de buen nombre en la república. El buen y verdadero cronista, como he dicho, ha de ser, a mi pobre juicio, neutral, auténtico, y tan libre y señor de sí que pura y sinceramente ose escribir verdad, sin temor, amor, pasión, interresse[sic] ni obligación . . . ha de ser ajeno a toda adulación si quiere ser tenido por grave y verdadero, porque la verdad y autoridad no se dejan poseer de hombre adulator”). Navarra, “De cuál debe ser el cronista del príncipe,” in Diálogos muy subtiles y notables (1565), 52. Similarly, Garibay wrote: “Although historians do not have [ample means] (as Seneca said), they are obliged with all solvency, diligence, and possible means, to inquire upon these acts, guarding themselves at all times from three enemies which tend to perturb and impede the process, which are: love, hate and interest” (“De lo cual, aunque los historiadores no tienen dadas fianças (como dize Séneca), son obligados con toda solvencia, diligencias humanas y vias posibles a inquirirlas, guardándose de tres enemigos que suelen perturbar e impedir esto, que son: amor, odio o interés”). BNM Ms/ 15.644, fol. 19.

88 Navarra, Qual debe ser el cronista del príncipe (1567), 5.
of the sixteenth century, many of Europe’s most prominent political writers warned about the dangers involved in writing “politic history,” which they characterized as that of living personages, of events still underway, and of recent happenings (even by comparing them with the actions of the past). Of these, notably Jean Bodin, in his *Methodus ad facillem historiarum cognitionem* (1566), advised historians to avoid contemporary subjects on the grounds that it was impossible to write about the living in a dispassionate, disinterested, and thus, truthful way.\(^8^9\)

Most humanists sided with Bodin in urging historians to focus on earlier times. Indeed, across Europe, questions of truth had led to a move away from writing contemporary history, for it did not allow for the same objectivity that could be attained when studying remote times.\(^9^0\)

For official historians in Spain, however, the polemical demands placed upon official history in the latter part of the sixteenth century forced them to address this very issue—how to write contemporary history. Official historians immediately acknowledged that this meant that theirs was not an ideal situation for arriving at the truth. Widespread discussion emerged in their treatises of their awareness of the dangers involved in writing the history of current events and Páez de Castro focused his entire treatise upon the need to write a contemporary history of Philip’s reign, acknowledging that while history was usually not written until after the death of the king whose reign was under consideration “so that the historian may write without fear,” exceptional political circumstances had meant that official historians needed to focus their


\(^{90}\) Ianziti, “Humanism’s New Science,” 86.
energies upon how to write about the “history of these times,” despite the fact that this “cause[d] great problems” for the historian.91

They openly acknowledged that this task was “the most difficult” both in scope and in trying to find the “truth” of events. Garibay encapsulated this notion best: “Having to write the true history of [present] doings and memorable events for the eternal memory of man is in my opinion a work of great danger, no less than the task of gaining knowledge of said events and finishing one’s work, [as is] the difficulty in trying to find the pure truth of things and how they actually happened.”92 The difficulty of their task, therefore, became an argument for the prestige of their function, and it ennobled their task, especially since their work was to provide the “true” workings of government to be used for the purposes of state.

Official historians immediately realized that the dilemma they faced was twofold: to grasp the pattern of history in the making without the benefit of hindsight, and to tread a path through the ideological minefield of current affairs. Garibay even began his treatise by addressing the need to write present history and the problems this posed: “After having dealt for a long time with recounting the ancient history of Spain which pleased me very much, I now find

91 Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578. Fox Morcillo agreed, arguing that impartiality when writing royal history could only be guaranteed by not writing about the King while he was still living: “it is preferable that history not be published on a king or prince while they are still living, so that the historian be free to write the truth without fear” (“que la historia no sea publicada viviendo el rey o príncipe en cuyo tiempo y señorío se horden, por que el historiador sea libre para escribir la verdad sin temor”). Fox Morcillo, Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia [trans. Morales, 1560], 36.
92 “Aver de escribir con verdad historias, hazañas, y cosas memorables para eterna memoria de los hombres es (a mi parecer) un trabajo y peligro no menor que emprenderlas y acabarlas, así por el trabajo de ordenarlas y escribirlas como en la dificultad que hay en hallar la pura verdad de las cosas de como en efecto pasaron.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 471.
myself obligated to write about [current] events which make my pen shake.”93 It should come as no surprise that Garibay’s pen shook when considering writing about the present, for he admitted that it was well known that because he, like his contemporaries, had lived through these current events, they held opinions and sentiments about them.94 Navarra best expressed the problems that contemporary history brought when he discussed the incompatibility of writing truthful, impartial, dispassionate, and disinterested history about living subjects, elaborating, “when writing on things of one’s own time, one encounters danger and difficulty, as a result of the [emotions] that exist because of love towards one’s own, and the hatred towards one’s enemies, from which perturbations arise which tend to blind, or prevent one from seeing what is honest, and from maintaining even-handedness . . . and thus impede a just account.”95 Even Navarra,

93 “Después de haber narrado ya hace tiempo la época antigua del pueblo hispánico con mucho gusto, desde hace poco tiempo, me veo obligado, a relatar los acontecimientos antes los que mi pluma tiembla.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 478.

94 Garibay included in his treatise a lengthy defense of the value of contemporary history and emphasized that the official historian should not be dissuaded from writing it, as it was of equal value to that of the more remote past: “In present history one will find all the examples that one’s desire can find, especially those of our Catholic religion and of the sacred things, and of universal letters, and all the other virtues and excellencies that illuminate and unite with exemplary doctrine all men, like the illustrious art of military discipline, and of the great deeds, challenges, efforts and true animos[spirit/intentions] and negotiations of great and mature government, and all else that one might desire” (“Historia presente se hallarán todos los ejemplos que desear se pueden, así principalmente de nuestra católica religión y de cosas de grande santidad y de letras universals[sic] y de todas las demás virtudes y excelencias que ilustran y ensalzan con doctrina ejemplar a las gentes, como de cosas de la ínclita arte de la disciplina militar y de grandes hazañas, arides, esfuerzos y ánimos verdaderamente enardecidos y negocios de grande y maduro gobierno y de todo lo demás que desear se puede”). Garibay, “Traza y orden para la historia del rey católico señor Phelipe el Segundo y apuntamientos de materias por sus años,” BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 159, fol. 107–112. Thus, contemporary history was presented on equal terms with the past and was deemed a necessity because of the invaluable examples it provided regarding current government, religion and morality.

95 Navarra, “De cuál debe ser el cronista del príncipe,” in Diálogos muy subtiles y notables (1565), 51. Navarra preferred that if historians had a choice, they were to focus on earlier times. Yet if he had to write about contemporary events, Navarra stressed that the historian needed to write, “without passion, fondness or obligation. Without passion: that he not be an enemy of the prince of whom he writes. Without fondness: that he also not be too much a friend. Without obligation: that he not be a native of where he writes” (“Entendiendo que sea sin pasión, afición y obligación. Sin pasión: que no sea enemigo del príncipe de quien escribe. Sin afición: que tampoco sea demasiado amigo. Sin obligación: que no sea natural”). Navarra, BNM Ms/ 15.644, fol. 5. See also, Navarra, “De cuál debe ser el cronista del príncipe,” in Diálogos muy subtiles y notables (1565), 59–60. To avoid bias, it was commonly believed that, ideally, historians could not write about their own country. This was much easier, however, for non-official historians, for as Pedro de Rhua wrote in 1569, “The first and principal thing that is required of history is that it is necessary that the historian be a good man, who loves the truth, and who writes it freely, without love, fear, hatred, avarice, ambition, misericordia, or shame . . . ultimately he must be a guest without nation, king, or law” (“[es necesario que el historiador] . . . que sea hombre bueno, que ame verdad, y la diga libremente, sin amor, temor, odio, avaricia, ambicición, misericordia, verguenza . . . en fin ha de ser huésped sin patria, sin rey, sin
however, like his fellow official historians, consciously acknowledged that they would need to break with the belief that, because of the lack of perspective and the risk this posed to compromising historical truth, they could not write about the history of the present. As Herrera emphasized, addressing the present had become necessary, “for the protection of [His] Majesty,” which he believed outweighed the methodological problems of writing history about the present without the benefits of greater distance, as well as Philip’s concern about the appearance of vanity.  

Indeed, it was precisely because their histories were not to be written out of “vanity, but necessity” that official historians were required to re-evaluate how they were to write “current history” (historia de nuestros tiempos) for the Crown, for as Herrera cautioned, “I would not dare write current history if it was not for the needs of [His] Majesty.”

Therefore, while Páez de Castro, Navarra, Garibay, and Herrera noted that the historian of contemporary events may not have enough detachment or hindsight to write “the most perfect history,” they justified their contemporary projects because of the political necessity they fulfilled in “telling the truth about Spanish actions,” mainly because subsequent generations would lack sufficient information to provide a worthy account. Herrera insisted, “the means that exist to write a good history and write of events with the truth and authority that [the King’s] deeds and greatness require, must be done with the most convenient haste . . . so that the truth not be obscured . . . such a work will benefit if one begins right now, because time is brief, and the materials long . . . further haste is required so that papers do not get lost and the people that

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96 Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia . . . y como se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 141r.
97 Ibid. The phrase “historia de nuestros tiempos,” was used expressly in the commissioning of Spanish counter-histories. ‘Orden para escribir la Historia’ (1587), BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
98 Páez de Castro’s wrote specifically to Moura on the necessities of “truthful” history of the present. Páez de Castro to Moura, RAH, Salazar y Castro, Ms/ A 112, fol. 331.
might be able to give account of things do not pass [die],” and, moreover, that it was necessary to
do so before any more “rumors and delirious ravings are published.”99 Such sentiments indicated
a certain pragmatism as well, since it was necessary to write history while one still possessed
proof, not hearsay. The danger of political immediacy, therefore, was balanced by a potent claim
to veracity.

Official historians acknowledged, however, that they had to get the present “right,” just
as they did the past, and that they were entrusted with the search for “truth” on the same terms.
This, of course, led official historians to understand that their task was more difficult than that of
more removed humanists. Páez de Castro even outlined the basic contradiction of trying to
achieve both impartiality and full knowledge when writing contemporary history. For Páez de
Castro, if the historian remained outside the matrix of events, he might be more impartial but
lacked complete information. If, however, he was on the inside, he might have access to full
information, but being party to events created a potential for bias.100 Navarra sought to resolve
this issue by arguing that historians were of two sorts: either public or private men. Private men
watched great events from the outside, and reported only the hearsay “one picks up from the

99 Emphasis mine. “y así, el medio que hay para hacer una buena historia y escribir la de los hechos con la verdad y
autoridad que a Sus obras y grandeza se debe y con la prisa conveniente . . . para que no se oscurezca la verdad . . .
habiéndose de escribir convendría que se comenzase luego porque el tiempo es breve y la materia larga y porque no
se pierdan los papeles y se acaban las personas que pueden dar noticia de las cosas . . . antes de llegar a publicar mas
rumores y desvarios.” Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia . . . y como se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/
3011, fol. 154r. Herrera repeats these sentiments verbatim in his Historia de Portugal, Introduction to ‘Libro
Primero,’ 1. Páez de Castro had written something quite similar, when addressing the need to write about current
history: “Habiéndose de escribir convendría que se comenzase luego porque esperándola se pasará el tiempo y se
acabarán las personas y memorias y acabada esta edad no se podrá después volver a ello con fundamento de verdad
y así se olvidará y si esto no se hace, se puede estar cierto que no uno, sino muchos [lo van a] escribir y juzgar la
intención no como ella merece sino como ellos quisieren o pudieren.” Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la
historia, BNM Ms/ 5578. See similar sentiments in Garibay, “Traca y orden para la historia del rey católico señor
Phelipe el Segundo,” BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 159, fol. 107–112.
100 Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578.
streets.”¹⁰¹ Public men, by contrast, wrote from the inside, and since they had been present at events, or personally knew those involved, they could more accurately report the facts. Thus, any bias that might arise because of their involvement was trumped by the fact that one could never deny that those who had witnessed events first hand were better sources of knowledge than any hearsay.

Thus the treatises turned one of the main criticisms against their impartiality—their direct involvement with the Spanish court—into an argument for the truthfulness of their histories. They realized that the position they occupied did not allow for the Renaissance vision of history as an independent intellectual discipline, or the Renaissance idea of the historian as a removed scholar and humanist intellectual able to contemplate, separate, and distance himself from the daily affairs of state and court, or retreat to a quiet place which would offer the opportunity and time to think, craft independent judgments, and write.¹⁰² Instead, they argued that a historian was required to engage with and evaluate politics and political actions, while striving for “a neutrality and impartiality, not required of others.”¹⁰³ Official historians came to understand that to mediate the complex relationship that existed between “truthful history” and one that served political ends required “neutrality.” Beginning with Páez de Castro, therefore, their treatises increasingly sought not only to demonstrate how far removed they were from their predecessors, but stressed the need for “neutrality” if their histories were to garner authority and respect, and especially if their work was to be “above all a guarantor of probity.”¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ Navarra, Qual debe ser el cronista del príncipe (1567), 40–47.
¹⁰³ Herrera to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 78.
¹⁰⁴ Páez de Castro, De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia, BNM Ms/ 6425. See Navarra, Diálogos muy sutiles y notables, 29.
Official historians acknowledged that the balancing act involving “neutrality,” “truth” and political necessity was delicate. Thus, one of the primary guarantees of veracity became the various skills of the historian, including his technical capabilities. Indeed, the qualifications of the historians themselves were seen as integral to providing legitimacy to the historical project. To restore the reputation and status of official history, official historians sought both to specify and to raise the standards not only of intelligence and education, but more specifically the morality and critical skills required for the official historian to accomplish his task. As Navarra put it, the official historian needed to possess, above all others, “dignity, independence and decorum” (dignidad, independencia y decoro) if his work was to garner “authority and respect” (autoridad y respecto).  

It is a commonplace to assert that the dignity and self-awareness of men of letters increased during the Renaissance. Thus, it should come as no surprise that in their treatises, Spanish official historians all betrayed this increased self-awareness, revealing a great sense of pride in being men of letters and of the prestige that they believed accrued from erudition and scholarship. Yet within the politically charged context of the late-sixteenth century in Spain, and the increased need for impartiality, they understood that erudition might not always be enough. In fact their predecessors were erudite humanists, but this had not prevented them from writing works which overly praised their king. For Philip’s official historians, the only solution to the problems they faced would be to combine the historian’s erudition and abilities with his

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105 Navarra, “Dialogos qual debe ser el chronista del principe,” in Dialogos de la eternidad del anima (1565), 59–60.
106 Sixteenth-century biographies, autobiographies, portraits, and collective biographies of authors testify to a sharper identity among men of letters than had been known in the Middle Ages. Research on this growing self-conscious identity among Renaissance erudits in Europe has been primarily conducted by Anthony Grafton and Nancy Siraisi. Anthony Grafton, Defenders of the Text: The Traditions of Scholarship in an Age of Science, 1450-1800 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); and Gianna Pomata and Nancy Siraisi, eds., Historia: Empiricism and Erudition in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005).
morality. As seen in the previous Chapter, the Crown had emphasized the political skills requisite to write official history and stressed the need for the official historian to possess a knowledge of politics and be involved in the political affairs at court. 107 Official historians emphasized, however, that although historians were to have knowledge of, and be active in the affairs of state, the skills that they needed to exercise when writing official history were both moral and technical, as these were necessary for the historian to evaluate political action properly.

Their treatises emphasized that the ethical character of the historian was the determining factor in his ability to judge both political actions, as well as his sources, and that it was key to helping the historian determine what he should, and should not include in history. Indeed, only specific men with specific skills and qualities would ensure a thorough evaluation of events and the correct use of information. As Páez de Castro outlined, “only specifically chosen noble men, who are [both] erudite, prudent, philosophers, perspicacious, [as well as] spiritual and dedicated to divine knowledge like learned priests, . . . only such men who possess such virtues are capable of presenting the truth of events, without being taken away by prejudices or partisanship.”108 Navarra further clarified these requirements, dedicating an entire chapter of his treatise to the specific attributes and skills required of the “official historian.”109 Navarra began his discussion with the official histories that had been written about Charles and how they had been regarded by foreigners as excessively adulatory. For Navarra, since history was the “narration of truth by

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107 ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.
108 “varones escogidos, doctos, prudentes, filósofos, perspicacísimos, . . . y espirituales, dedicados al culto divino como sabios sacerdotes . . . por que con solo tener estos virtudes puede el hombre escribir la verdad sin perjuicios ni partidarismos.” Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578.
learned men.”110 Responsibility lay not only in providing truth, but upon the competence of the person who provided it. Thus he placed enormous emphasis upon the qualifications of the historian as a means of mediating partiality, or excessive adulation. For Navarra, “bad historians” were not “men of learning, but rather [men who] write with a crudeness of style, and lack good judgment, for they lack memory, and are quick in believing all that which they read and hear, . . . they are [also] slow in their understanding, and do not know much about men . . . finally, they are strangers to virtue and grace.”111 In this, Navarra succinctly characterized the ways in which Spanish official historians would come to understand the complex relationship between their own qualifications and abilities, and how they could be used to buttress the authority of their texts. For official historians, the type of history produced was entirely dependent on the type of person who wrote it.112 Indeed, an “ethical” character became a requisite to developing the skills necessary to be a “good historian” (buen historiador). Thus, Navarra agreed with Páez de Castro that whoever was to take up the task of writing official history, had to possess both the erudition and acumen for the task, but also the moral qualities to ensure the quality of the work.

For Navarra the moral fabric of the official historian was dependent on “having authority” which for Navarra meant being, “pure of blood, pure in life, and of good name and fame.”113 The official historian, therefore, could not be of “mixed blood” nor have a tarnished

110 “narración de verdades por hombres sabios.” Navarra, “De cuál debe ser el cronista del príncipe,” in Diálogos muy subtiles y notables (1565), 41.
111 Navarra, “De cuál debe ser el cronista del príncipe,” in Diálogos muy subtiles y notables (1565), 38.
112 Páez de Castro made this reference directly: “it is very hard to write history, and it is therefore rare to find good history. First of all because of the need for skill and style and practice; second because of the need for diligence and effort in chasing down the smallest points; third, because of the necessity for judgment.” So “good history” required skill, style, practice, as well as diligence and judgment, a combination of which, Páez de Castro claimed, was very difficult to find in most historians. Páez de Castro, “De las cosas necesarias para escribir Historia,” BNM Ms/ 6425.
113 “Ha de poseer autoridad [que es] ser claro en sangre, claro en vida, y en buen nombre y fama.” Navarra, “De cuál debe ser el cronista del príncipe,” in Diálogos muy subtiles y notables (1565), 162. See also, Navarra, BNM Ms/ 15.644, fols. 2–19 (esp. fol. 5). Navarra, in particular, was quick to address all the problems that the post of official
reputation, as these might bring his loyalty as well as his morality into question.\textsuperscript{114} Navarra also wanted the official historian to be a noble, since the nobility of his blood provided the historian with additional virtues. Despite this, Navarra conceded that, “true nobility proceeds from virtue,” and that a “good and long experience would even allow a plebian” to write good history.\textsuperscript{115} Thus a historian’s virtue could also stem from his abilities and experiences, as this provided him with a “good reputation” and thus made him a man able to judge things appropriately, as he had no need to seek out honor or fame. Most importantly, however, Navarra, like all of his fellow official historians, agreed that, above all else, the “good historian” (buen historiador) was to be “a good Christian,” who “lives a good life.”\textsuperscript{116} This was essential for, as Navarra pointed out, “histories are things that need to last well beyond the lives of the Kings which they serve” which explained why the official historian needed to be a man “fearful of God,” because he dealt with very important and immediate things, and only a man of “Christian virtue,” would “maintain the purity and value of truth.”\textsuperscript{117} Therefore, the truth that was to be presented in history became not only the objective quality of the events being narrated, but also a subjective virtue of the historian. Indeed, in all of their theoretical reflections on the “writing of history,” there was an underlying emphasis that official historians were to be, above all else, “good Christians” and

\textsuperscript{114} In sixteenth-century Spain, having “mixed blood” (meaning not having a “pure” Christian lineage) was equated with religious and racial corruption, and a sign of immorality. See, Joseph Pérez and Janet Lloyd, The Spanish Inquisition: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), Ch. 2.

\textsuperscript{115} If two candidates presented themselves, however, and if their experiences were the same, Navarra still preferred the nobleman for the task: “Mi opinión es que siendo iguales en las otras calidades, debe ser preferido el noble para este oficio por las razones que tengo dichas, aunque no niego que la verdadera nobleza procede de la virtud, y tan buena y larga experiencia podría dar de sí un plebeyo, que mereciese ser preferido a los nobles, en el cual caso ya este tal será más que noble: y juntamente con esto tendiendo las otras partes que tengo referidas, podría ser admitido.” Navarra, “De cuál debe ser el cronista del príncipe,” in Diálogos muy subtiles y notables (1565), 163.

\textsuperscript{116} Navarra, BNM, Ms/ 15.644, fol. 8.

\textsuperscript{117} Navarra, “De cuál debe ser el cronista del príncipe,” in Diálogos muy subtiles y notables (1565), 59–60.
men of morality and “virtue,” as this gave them, “determination, strength of mind, and rectitude [honesty]” (*determinación, entereza y rectitud*). 118

This rigorous deontology of the writer of history would ensure “truth.” In fact, for Herrera, even if the conditions of historical practice had been observed by the historian it was above all the historian’s partiality which determined whether or not he provided “truth,” for no matter how thorough his research or critical of his sources, his partiality could damage the work. As a result, the credibility and morality of the historian was, for Herrera, the “deciding factor” (‘*causa efficiente*”) of his ability to achieve impartiality and thus present “truth.” 119 The treatises of Philip’s official historians, therefore, are marked by a perceptible shift from ideas of impartiality as a self-evident textual property in narrative to more of a focus on the figure of the historian as a guarantor of truth. The qualities of the historian conditioned the truth he could provide; thus, this *ethic of the historian* came to form a signal component of their doctrine of history.

Despite this new emphasis on the character and ethics of the historian, all of the treatises agreed that for official history to arrive at the neutrality needed for “truth,” the historian also had to adhere to the correct tone and style when writing history. For Fox Morcillo, truth would always be corrupted by “excess credulity, writing with too much intention, excessive or wrongly

118 Fox Morcillo, *Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia* [trans. Morales, 1560], 32.
119 Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia . . . y como se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 141r–143r. A notable precursor to this notion is Bartolomé de Las Casas, who in the prologue of one of his histories had criticized the work of prior New World historians for not telling the truth about the atrocities perpetrated upon the Indians; he placed particular emphasis on the morality of the historian, seeing only moral men as capable of writing the truth. Karl Kohut, *Narración y reflexión: las crónicas de Indias y la teoría historiográfica* (Mexico: El Colegio de México, 2007), 16.
placed love of one’s country, and religion.”  

Official historians stressed, therefore, that passion had to be consciously avoided, as such affections would greatly undermine their work; “if [the historian] shows such passion, or is too harsh in [his] judgments,” then his work would, “not serve the purpose of history . . . [but rather will be seen as] an infamous libel or childlike foolishness.” Passion was antagonistic to the search for truth, but also to the purposes of state. As Navarra put it, “passion impedes upright judgment and prevents one from revealing what is honest.” This did not mean, however, that official historians could not have an allegiance to a particular cause; “passion” referred to any feeling that was essentially undisciplined and which subordinated all other matters to the satisfaction of that passion. For official historians, uncontrolled emotions could curtail their enterprise, regardless of how much they claimed impartiality. Removing emotion from their enterprise, however, would prove difficult, as historians were well aware that all men were moved to write according to their own interest or inclination. As Páez de Castro put it, “there are very few [historians], and not one

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121 “mostrar siempre el ánimo libre, y sereno de toda pasión, quanto á escribir lo que pasa . . . no hacerlo[el pasión] el propósito de la historia . . . porque si la historia es escrito [asi] . . . seria libelo infamatorio ó cosas de niñerías.” Páez de Castro, De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia, BNM Ms/ 6425. Herrera echoed these same sentiments: “one must deliver the course of events, and of our affairs, without passion, or partiality.” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 5.

122 “Se requiere que los sucesos se quenten[sic] sinceramente con verdad sin que nada tenga fundamento vano, porque la verdad es fundamento de prudencia y de sapiencia.” Herrera, Discurso sobre los provechos de la Historia, BNM Ms/ 1035, fol. 118.

123 “impedir el juicio recto y no ver lo que conviene y lo que es honesto.” Navarra, Diálogos muy subtiles y notables (1565), 41. As Garibay wrote of foreign historians, “a hatred towards their enemies . . . blinds them, making them unable to provide proper judgment, and prevents them from seeing what is convenient, or what is honest . . . even despite all of their attempts to ensure equality and neutrality” (“el odio de los enemigos, de quien nacen las perturbaciones, son ciegas y se fingen para impedir el juicio recto y no ver lo que conviene y lo que es honesto, por más que guarden igualdad y neutralidad”). Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 473.
without his own personal faults, who can claim with certainty to not be an aficionado or
impassioned when he writes.”

Official historians’ treatises stressed that official works were no longer to be given
pardonable license of excessive patriotism or feudal loyalty. Indeed, the official historian’s
patriotism needed to be controlled, since all love, hatred, and interest needed to be avoided—
mainly because these would damage their work. Garibay ruminated on this very topic: “To tell
the truth, which I have always prized and procured (by the grace of God) to do, [I realize] that
great is the love I have for my nation, and I have a strange affliction to augment its grandeur, but
not in a way that engenders hatred in other nations, or blinded by passion to make me unable to
see, or causes me to add or omit things from my work [things which I would never forgive
another historian for doing]. . . I am human, and I can—by ignorance—fool myself; but God help
me that it not be from love or hate.”

Thus, beneath the surface of the reassuring
commonplaces about historical discourse as a treasure trove of experience, brimming with true
stories of important deeds by great men, one can begin to detect in the treatises written by
official historians after 1560 an anxiety concerning even the basic assumptions of the discipline.
The characterization of the model historian as having to grapple with his own passion and love

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124 “hay muy pocos [historiadores] o ninguno en quien no falte lo mas de todo esto sin las faltas propias de cada uno
que le acierta a no ser aficionado o apasionado en el escribir de que pocos se escapan es descuidado o temerario a la
verdad y maldiciente, impertinente, menudo y desautorizado.” Páez de Castro, “‘Que es historia,’ dado al rey
Phelippe II al principio de su reinado” (1555), PR (Madrid), XVI–2016(10). Official historians understood, as we
still do today, that the emotion of the narrator and what he narrates are very difficult to separate: “No se puede negar
que aunque un historiador cuente verdad, como hombre se apasiona.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM
Ms/ 1750, fol. 475.

125 “Por decir verdad, cosa de que yo siempre me he preciado y procurado (por la bondad de Dios), grande es el
amor que yo tengo a mi nación, y deseo con extraña afición el aumento y grandeza della, mas no de tal manera que
engendre en mi pecho odio contra las otras naciones, para que cegado con la pasión no vea, calle, o disimule, añada
o omita a ninguna de las otras lo que haría en la mia. Soy hombre, y como tal puedo – por ignorancia – engañarme;
pero no quiera Dios que sea por ninguna de los dichos amor y odio.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM
Ms/ 1750, fol. 472. It should be noted that no historian of the time was free from a nationalist bias, and even Bodin,
who was quick to criticize historians because of their race, class, and political affiliations, touted the achievements
of the French whom he believed represented the Aristotelian mean.
for his *patria* was one way in which such uncertainties were expressed by even the most enthusiastic defenders of official history, and should be seen as one of the clearest signs of the significant changes which occurred in the ways of conceptualizing the practice of official history in late-sixteenth-century Spain.

While such calls for neutrality and impartiality, in terms of avoiding one’s own patriotism, were by no means a definition of historicism in disguise, the fact that official historians acknowledged in their treatises the tendency of writers of the time to favor national inclinations provided them with a more critical perspective of their own scholarship. All agreed that “passion, envy, and interest” would cause them to “trample justice,” while at the same time understanding that they were human, and that personal, patriotic, and even scholarly considerations often clouded their judgment. It was crucial for official historians not to pretend to be able to circumvent such obstacles entirely. Instead, by being aware of them they hoped for more success in restraining them. Garibay even sought to bring into focus how “truth” in history was a relative matter, and that different nations would necessarily entertain different interpretations of the causes of war, rebellion and other important events. Garibay, when writing to Herrera even stressed,

> It’s far too hard for any human being to rid himself entirely of passions, although he must always keep the truth in his sights. Take the history of Charles V and Francis I – any Frenchman or German will tell it differently. And the one will never persuade the other of what he himself thinks is true, and would guarantee at any price. The same is true for the

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126 Navarra, “De cuál debe ser el cronista del príncipe,” in *Diálogos muy subtiles y notables* (1565), 52.
rest – especially when you are concerned with providing counsels, or with the rights of provinces, the causes of wars, the private lives of princes, or, above all, the problem of religion. Truth lies at the bottom of the well; we drink water from the surface in its place, relying on the testimony of others to scoop it up.128

Such patriotic sensibilities underlay the complexity and difficulty of the problem of impartiality. Indeed, official historians realized that many of their contemporaries were not convinced that one could be fair-minded when writing for a particular cause or “party.”129 As a result, official historians came to understand that if they were to write the “truth” without “deceit or pretence, silencing enthusiasm and partiality, or one not inspired by hate, ambition or avarice, or one moved by bribery or adulation,” the methods through which they wrote their histories would have to guide their projects.130 Indeed, it had become evident to official historians that they needed to establish conditions through which to avoid bias and thus ensure neutrality and impartiality. As Antonio de Herrera replied to Garibay, “What does it serve to write with malice, or twist the meaning of things, or to persuade the opinions of those who do not know . . . Consider well the diligence of [any] History, confer it with other works . . . and understand that virtue and vice consist in things, and do not spring from the author, if he does his job well, and follows the rules of history.”131

129 See the letter of non-official historian Rodrigo de Huerta y Cavasellas to Herrera regarding the nationalist inclination of contemporary historians. Huerta to Herrera, 11/22/1599, Archivo de los Condes de Orgaz (Avila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVI.
130 Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 470. Similarly Fox Morcillo wrote, “porque si se ha de narrar la verdad sin engaño ni pretexto, no callara ante entusiasmo o parcialidad, nada dirá inspirado por el odio, nada escribirá por ambición o avaricia, por soborno o adulación.” Fox Morcillo, Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia [trans. Morales, 1560], 34.
131 Emphasis mine. “pero de qué sirve el hablar con malicia, ni retorcer el sentido de las cosas, ni concitar el animo de los que menos saben mostrándoles en los que se ha faltado: consideren bien la diligencia de esta Histora, conferen[si]c con otras y no aprobar en otros lo que reprueban de mi, entiendan , que la virtud, y el vicio consisten en las cosas, y que no se mudan con el autor . . . si hace su trabajo [bien] y si guardan las reglas de la historia.” Herrera to Garibay, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 56.
Indeed, after considering the role and obligations of the official historian, Páez de Castro, Fox Morcillo, Navarra, Morales, Garibay, and Herrera all concluded that historical impartiality could only be achieved by setting forth conditions and “rules” (reglas) for practice. As Páez de Castro put it, these “rules” were the methods that provided, “the means by which to write good history, [and how to write] a history of our times and [Our] Majesty, with the truth and authority that such acts and greatness require, and with the required speed necessary for material of such great breadth and importance.”

Thus, official historians sought to create the means through which they could establish their sincerity, credibility and authority as providers of truth. Their treatises, therefore, turned directly to determining criteria that they believed were essential to the practice of “impartial,” and “truthful” history for the Crown. By establishing their own set of “laws,” or criteria, official historians sought to ensure that any official history they would write would be able to obtain its true and complete humanist objectives without compromising its political applicability and purpose. These criteria would also mediate future criticism and attack by allowing them to position themselves as dispassionate, by “guarding [keeping to] the rules of history.”

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132 Emphasis mine. “el medio para hacer una buena historia y escribir la [de nuestros tiempos y de nuestra Majestad], con la verdad y autoridad que a sus obras y grandeza se debe y con prisa conveniente a material tan larga [y] importante.” Páez de Castro, De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia, BNM Ms/ 6425. See also Páez de Castro, BNM Ms/ 5734. Fox Morcillo, in reference to Charles’ royal historian Pedro Mexia, who he considered a “bad historian” wrote: “I do not know how to judge what is worse in this author, his ambition, or his complete disregard for keeping to the rules of history” (“No sabría juzgar cual es más en este autor, el ambición o el descuido en guardar las reglas de la Historia”). Fox Morcillo, Diálogo de la enseñanza de la Historia [trans. Morales, 1560] 19.

133 “guardar las reglas de la historia.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 469.
The Rules of History

Official historians’ explorations into the importance of history and how it was to be written had one fundamental goal in mind; to find means to convince readers that official history provided truth. They understood that the reader would judge whether or not the official historian had achieved his goal. Thus, Herrera emphasized that the historian, “by presenting an unfeigned disposition to the truth, and an inclination to give fair and just representation of men and things, will prepare the reader to have a good opinion of the integrity and impartiality of [our work as historians].”\textsuperscript{134} Official historians came to realize that it was not just the facts of their histories that would be evaluated, but that the quality of their work also possessed meaning, merit, and worth. In their treatises, therefore, official historians sought to provide mechanisms that official historians could employ to persuade the reader to “trust” or “have faith” in the histories they would produce for the Crown, and the “truth” that they presented. Their treatises all stressed that the search for truth could only be guaranteed if historians followed the foundations they laid out in their treatises, as it was the only way to guarantee that they would not be taken by “love, hatred or passion.” Moreover, such procedures were necessary, for as Herrera put it, without an “honest pursuit of truth” even “Authority, Reason and Example” might be misinterpreted.\textsuperscript{135}

These rules included prescriptions in three areas: the historian needed to possess appropriate erudition and character; the historian needed to adhere to a certain style when writing his history; and the historian needed to adhere to a specific methodology, which included the careful selection and organization of facts and events, an expansion of the types of sources that

\textsuperscript{134} Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia . . . y como se ha de escribir” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 141r.
\textsuperscript{135} Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia . . . y como se ha de escribir” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 142r.
he used, and a careful critical evaluation of sources. Thus, the official historian regarded “method” (método de historiar\textsuperscript{136}) as a set of protocols for establishing impartiality and his claims to truth. While each historian in his treatise might have varied slightly within these precise requirements, and we will see a further refinement in the tools emphasized in the latter treatises of Morales, Garibay, and Herrera, in all of these treatises these sets of rules are a constant, and define the way they envisioned a method for properly writing official history. Moreover, all of these rules were specifically discussed in terms of their relation to, and purpose for, writing works for the state. Official historians, therefore, sought to unite technical refinement with their commitment to political polemics. Indeed, official historians sought to create a better way to present political history and the monarchy and that was why they joined their methodology to their intent, rather than separating them.

Morality and Technical Skills

The morality of the historian became all the more important, as official historians acknowledged that the nature of their work forced them to make judgements about politics. Unlike other narratives embellished with words of moral wisdom, official histories were to provide analytical narratives on statecraft, which involved both evaluation and judgment. Navarra even emphasized the inescapability of judgment in official historical writing, identifying its inherently controversial nature: “There is no other task, which creates so many enemies, especially when they think that things are being presented not as they should, not to mention that

\textsuperscript{136} The term used by Spanish official historians, and in particular Páez de Castro, Garibay, and Herrera, was método defined as “a way for how to proceed.” Covarrubias, Tesoro de la Lengua Castellana o Española (1611) (1979 ed.), 272.
all men want to be Judges.”

Judgment, however, could not be avoided, as it was a necessary requirement of their task. Thus, reflecting the standpoint of the ancients, Páez de Castro justified the official historian’s “historical judgment whereby the historian, having narrated the events, brings to it his opinion,” as the integrating element of the historian’s task, especially since “some people say that this inculcates a prejudice in the mind of the reader. That is by no means true, for anyone who reads a history makes his own tacit judgments . . . [and] any trifling inconvenience that might occur is amply compensated for by the very considerable gain that will be had from that judgment.” Indeed, “historical judgment” came to play a great role in their theory of history, and was seen as a necessary requisite of historical presentation rather than the object of fundamental inquiry. Judgement, then, became aligned with their humanist notions.

Since official Spanish historians sought to allow for judgment, they required that historians be versed in certain disciples that would allow them to assess things correctly.

While the historians’ morality would guide their work, their treatises still specified that “higher intellectual knowledge,” was required to write “good history.” As Fox Morcillo had put it, “Being a man of intellect is necessary . . . as nothing can be known without great

137 “No hay obra en que mas enemigos se tomen cuando les parece que su negocio no era como debe, dexando aparte, que todos quieren ser Jueces.” Navarra, “De cuál debe ser el cronista del príncipe,” in Diálogos muy subtiles y notables (1565), 59–60.

138 Navarra, “De cuál debe ser el cronista del príncipe,” in Diálogos muy subtiles y notables (1565), 13. This belongs to a wider sixteenth-century debate about the meaning and direction of history itself. This was the moment when most historians saw themselves as either “simple historians” as Michel de Montaigne (1533-1593) had called them, who only wrote in a straightforward annals manner, devoid of interpretation, or those which were called “outstanding historians,” those who had the “capacity to choose what is worth knowing and then interpret it, and present it.” See Grafton, What was History?, 51–53.

139 Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578.

140 Garibay stressed, “Before we judge, we must learn the truth . . . through careful study . . . [and] only when one knows these things can one make their judgment . . . if you do not [do this] you may think you have found what you like, but not what is really there . . . [as this is only] an image conceived ahead of time in our minds . . . and not history.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 479.

141 Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578.
knowledge and study.”¹⁴² Fox Morcillo, an expert in Platonic thought, even believed that in order to write history for the king, one needed to be a “philosopher.”¹⁴³ Fox Morcillo was not alone in specifying the type of erudition official historians were to possess. Páez de Castro stressed how official historians were to be versed in both “moral and natural Philosophy, Law, Mathematics, Genealogy¹⁴⁴ and have knowledge of the ancients, especially Aristotle and Cicero.”¹⁴⁵ In this system of knowledge, it was Philosophy, however, that held the preeminent place, for as Herrera put it, “There is no other place where Philosophy is more needed [than in history], so that [the historian] may discuss the particular case, and try to make from it a general rule, which can always be held as law.”¹⁴⁶ Further, because of the great influence that history had upon the very foundations of stability in society—Law and Philosophy—the value of History and its contents was elevated enormously, and thus necessitated that history be written by “only the most learned men.”¹⁴⁷

¹⁴² Fox Morcillo, *Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia* [trans. Morales, 1560], 22. Herrera too stressed that “many men who pretend to be learned without having studied, do not realize that nothing can be known without Mastery and Doctrine” (“muchos que pretenden ser doctos sin estudio, no conocen que nada se puede saber sin Maestro ni Doctrina”). Herrera, “Discurso y tratado que el medio de la historia es suficiente para adquirir la prudencia” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 164r.

¹⁴³ Fox Morcillo, *Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia* [trans. Morales, 1560], 39. Fox Morcillo also wrote *De regni regisque institutione* (1556), which discussed the philosophy of kingship, and advised that any good prince should surround himself with knowledgeable humanists, and especially historians, so that the monarch could draw from their knowledge of politics and philosophy in times of political necessity.

¹⁴⁴ Information concerning the births, marriages, and deaths of princes, and proclamations were not only necessary information for contests over accession, but for ascertaining the date of many documents, and thus provided dating formulae for documents, crucial to writing well-researched and accurate history.

¹⁴⁵ Páez de Castro delineated a complex program of required instrumental knowledge that the historian had to possess: “El historiador debe conocer la filosofia moral, y natural, matemáticas, Genealogia, Derecho, . . .” Páez de Castro, “De las cosas necesarias para escribir Historia,” BNM Ms/ 6425. Pedro de Navarra repeated these same requirements when he requested that all historians have humanist training, also recommending that they be very familiar with Aristotle and Cicero. Navarra, “De cuál debe ser el cronista del príncipe,” in *Diálogos muy subtiles y notables* (1565), 12.

¹⁴⁶ “No hay donde más necesaria sea la Filosofia moral [que en la historia], para saber discurrir, sobre el caso particular, y tratar del haciendo regla general, que siempre se tenga como ley. . . Lo qual hace Thucyidges, entre los griegos, y Cornelio Tácito entre los latinos, y Pedro de Navarra, entre los vulgares.” [Herrera directly refers to fellow official historian Navarra’s preparation and style as *exemplars*]. Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia . . . y de como se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 144r.

¹⁴⁷ Herrera, “Las grandes utilidades de la historia,” BNM HA/874. Indeed, for Spanish historians, history shared with philosophy a concern for understanding the effects of forces in the earthly sphere, and sought to elucidate the human causes of events. As such, history was an essential handmaid to philosophy, showing what could be done by
Coupled with the call for increased erudition and philosophical acumen, there was also a demand that the official historian possess more technical skills. For example, Fox Morcillo emphasized that official historians needed to be “grammarians, and that their principal faculty be etymology, and the origins of words.”148 Páez de Castro expanded these qualifications to a knowledge of “languages, legal studies, and knowledge of the natural sciences”149 Morales stressed that philological skills could be used to supplement the historian’s knowledge of “Poetry, Geography, Medicine, and Law, from which one learns the good administration of the republic, as well as religion, human and intellectual values, and political and military history, as well as demography . . . [and] antiquities.”150 For Morales, such a broad preparation was instrumental to creating the “good historian,” as it helped the historian avoid humiliating errors of chronology, location and interpretation, and allowed him to look at the historical act from its multiple and changing perspectives through political, military and scientific history. Such knowledge would also allow the official historian to set events into their appropriate political and legal contexts, which was crucial to understanding their bearing on the evolution of the state, politics, and law. Indeed, only such “learned men . . . [with these skills] could dispel and qualify happenings in a way that would [both] teach and demonstrate what they actually were.”151

what had been done in the past, and teaching, in Spanish theologian Melchior Cano’s words, what “makes life happy and eternal.” Melchior Cano, De humanae historiae auctoritate, in Locorum theologicorum libri duodecim (Salamanca, 1563), 87.

148 “gramáticos, para la parte más principal de su facultad, que es la etimología y origen de los vocabulos[sic].” Fox Morcillo, Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia [trans. Morales, 1560], 31.

149 Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578.

150 “Poesía, la Geografía, la Medicina, y el Derecho . . . de donde pende la buena administración de la república.” Further, he stressed the need for a knowledge of geography and chronology, and saw both as vital and necessary, claiming that without details as to place and time historical works would be “like a dead body” (“como cuerpo muerto”). Morales, “Apuntes sobre la historia,” RB II/2245. Fox Morcillo also called upon the need for knowledge of medicine, law, religion, and language. Fox Morcillo, Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia [trans. Morales, 1560], 3.

151 “para disponer y calificar los hechos de manera que enseñen y parezcan lo que son.” Herrera, “Las grandes utilidades de la historia,” BNM HA/874. Spanish advisors had also stressed that specific skills, and in particular political knowledge and participation were necessary for the historian to properly “qualify things” (“calificar las cosas”), ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) 1032, fol. 89.

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Thus, official historians came to require antiquarian skills for the writing of official history. In doing so, official historians defined the characteristics necessary for the “good historian” to be that of a virtuous and learned man, whose moral, intellectual and technical expertise helped temper his passions and loyalty to the Crown. Perhaps Garibay expressed it best: “Three things are required to complete the character of the historian—authority, skill and integrity. Without authority, the work is void, without skill it is hollow and rash; and without integrity, it is unjust.” In this, the historian and history were inexorably connected. Bias could be warded off by the virtues of integrity and skill; superior technique led to impartiality, and great skill to virtue—and morality bolstered and conditioned great skill.

Style

Having justified their authority, set out requirements for a certain morality and integrity, and defined a set of erudite and technical skills, official historians would then lay out in their treatises the rules for how their work was to be written, placing emphasis on the appropriate style that historians were to use in order for their work to garner respect for its integrity and impartiality. They understood that how they wrote history would have an impact on the reception of their work and they understood the need to balance rhetoric with erudition.

Humanists across Europe were deeply concerned with issues of style in historical study, in part because of the connection they perceived between narrative and the social and pedagogical functions of history. An emphasis on style had also distinguished humanist

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152 Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/1750, fol. 469. For Navarra, the authority of the historian rested in a combination of “his virtue, knowledge, and the dignity [of his] office” (“la autoridad del historiador descansa en su virtud, sabiduría y dignidad de oficio”). Navarra, “De cuál debe ser el cronista del príncipe,” in Diálogos muy subites y notables (1565), 63.
historiography from the arid style of medieval chronicles, making it more appealing to a growing
reading public. Thus, questions as to the ways history was to be written in terms of rhetoric,
style, and language were commonplace in the sixteenth century and central to conversations
about history’s proper form and function to persuade and teach. \(^{153}\) As a result, emphasis on style
became a characteristic of humanist historiography, which declared eloquence a means to
achieve the greatest didactic value. \(^{154}\) For practicing historians, a general understanding even
existed that writing “readable history” (historia que se puede leer) allowed for a greater diffusion
of one’s work, especially beyond Spain’s borders, while also ensuring greater longevity for a
work. \(^{155}\)

Spanish advisors specifically mandated that the new “better” history was to “above all
else, have a fluid and agreeable style,” a maxim which reminds us of the Ciceronian call that
history be written by orators. \(^{156}\) Indeed, eloquence was seen as exerting political power,
conveying ideas better and more convincingly, increasing a work’s appeal, but also ensuring its
persuasive function. Style, therefore, was seen as important in history because of its subject
matter and pedagogical function; Páez de Castro stressed, “good form honors and guards the


\(^{154}\) Donald R. Kelley, *Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship: Language, Law, and History in the French
Renaissance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 240. See also Donald R. Kelley, “Humanism and
History,” in *Renaissance Humanism. Foundations, Forms and Legacy*, ed. Albert Rabil (Philadelphia: University of

\(^{155}\) Alvar Ezquerra, “La historia, los historiadores y el rey en la España del humanismo,” 218–237.

\(^{156}\) “un estilo agradable.” See Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 12. Idiáquez had even stressed that official
histories had to be “eloquent,” as this would have an impact on the political events they were to relate, especially
since: “few events which are written about poorly, appear done well” (“y sobre todo eloquentes, porque pocas cosas
mal dichas parecen bien hechas”). ‘Orden para escribir la Historia,’ BFZ (Colección Zabalburu) 1032, fol. 89. Such
an understanding was based upon ancient commonplaces, for while Cicero had taught that to tell the truth was the
foundation of history, its complete structure depended as much on the language of presentation as on its the material
material.”

Official historians, therefore, understood contemporary concerns with the outward appearance of history, and there was a general understanding that central to the historian’s task was imparting stylistic coherence and rhetorical polish to heterogeneous and disparate materials. However, they were also aware that as both officials and humanists they needed to display more than rhetorical virtuosity, especially if they were to persuade readers in polemical contests.

In their treatises, Philip’s official historians were quick to distinguish themselves from their contemporaries and predecessors, and argued that the function of imparting good style had often predominated over the recovery of truth or documentation and even the greater certainty of past events. In fact, they argued that the contemporary emphasis on style as the most important element defining history writing had superseded the search for truth. Official historians, therefore, identified the need to eschew rhetoric and flourish, although they recognized that they would still need to ensure that their works were at the very least “readable” and that there be, as the Crown requested, a basic pursuit of an “agreeable style.”

While Páez de Castro, Navarra, and Garibay saw classical histories as good models, they emphasized that they were not the ultimate goal. Rather, the official historian was to improve upon the ancients by developing a more “just style,” suitable to their subject matter. Official

157 “porque la buena forma onra e guanneçe la material.” Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578.


159 “un estilo justo.” Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578. He also called for a more “suitable style” (“estilo conveniente”), Páez de Castro, De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia, BNM Ms/ 6425. It should be noted that Morales stood apart from other official historians in that he still emphasized the need for rhetorical polish. Morales even believed that the historian was to surpass the ancients by providing a more “beautiful” style. Morales distinguished two principal reasons for writing history; first “to give greater certainty to
historians, therefore, set out to establish the correct style with which to write official history, seeing it as a paramount concern. Official historians sought to outline a necessary style of writing that relied less on rhetorical flourish and more on presenting things “as they really are.”

For Páez de Castro, this meant a style that was paradoxically, unselfconsciously cultivated and unpretentiously affected:

The style of history [according to those who know what is necessary], should not be thin, nor weak of reasons, nor so laudatory that it sounds like a trumpet blast, as they said of the verses of Homer, but rather widespread and substantial [full of examples], with a natural style, as if it were spoken . . . [yet] many who try to do this, find it difficult for reason of their attentiveness or artifice, trying rather to imitate other authors . . . Instead one must write without harshness, and be soft, because [if what one is to write is to be] beneficial, the gentleness with which one treats the subject must enlighten and [persuade the reader], just as a cool breeze which travels over flowers, enlivens the heart, and wakes the senses without any bother or artifice, but rather naturally, purely and clearly.

Thus, the official historian was to write in a style which would persuade and teach the reader, not through rhetorical flourish, but through a clear, natural, and unadorned style. Official history things” (dar mayor certidumbre en las cosas), and second so that “while in relating the truth of events we cannot supersede that told by the ancients, we must at least tell of these events more beautifully, recounting them with greater appeal and sweetness, which can only be done through a good style” (“ya que en la verdad de la historia no pueda sobrepujar a los pasados, vencerlos ha a lo menos en dezir mas hermosamente las cosas, dandoles mayor gusto y dulçura, con la que les puede poner el buen estilo”). Introduction to the first volume of his La coronica general de España, que continuaua Ambrosio de Morales, natural de Cordoua, Cronista del Rey Catholico nuestro señor don Philipe Segundo deste nombre (Alcalá, 1574).

160 “como verdaderamente son.” Páez de Castro, De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia, BNM, Ms/ 6425.

161 “El estilo de la historia [según dicen los que de esto saben es necesario], que no sea estrecho, ni corto de razones, ni menos tan entonado que se puede leer á son de trompeta, como decian de los versos de Homero, sino extendido y abundante, con un descuido natural que pareza que estaba dicho, y quien probare á escribir de aquella manera halle tanta dificultad por causa del cuidado y artificio, cubierto con imitación de autores, que sudando y trabajando vea que no puede hallar vado, como dicen del rio Eurotas, que sin hacer ruido lleva mucha agua, y por muy clara y limpiña que corre no se entiende bien su honenda. Junto con esto ha de ser tan sin aspereza, y suave, que con ser lo que se escrebe provechoso, la gentileza con que se trata deleite y afficione; como quando un aire fresco deseado en el estilo ha pasado por florestas de buenas yerbas y flores que alegra al corazón y recrea todos los sentidos sin molestia ninguna, ni artificio procurado, sino con su natural puro y limpio.” Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578.

162 Similarly, for Herrera, the “proper” account of events needed to “be handed down to posterity . . . without improper ornament,” so that the “truth may shine of its own beauty.” Herrera noted that whether or not the historian possessed eloquence of expression was not important; rather, he had to ensure that at least he “narrate in plain prose,
was not to entertain, but to teach and inform throughout the entire narrative, slowly building to show the reader the whole picture. Indeed, history was not only to have some kind of basic stylistic aesthetic, but also a compositional aesthetic, which Páez de Castro valued perhaps even more than style, for as he put it, in order for history to have the best effect, “the composition must be harmonious and unified.”

For Garibay history was superior to rhetoric, which he did not regard as particularly devoted to “truth,” and to poetry, which offered “too much pleasure with little utility.” Whatever was to be its actual record of achievements, history’s object was “the attainment of true knowledge by the faithful exposition of things,” unlike the rhetorician who spread his stylistic wings without regard to whether the stories he told were credible. For Garibay, the “true” historian created his account by following the sources he thought to be most accurate: “Of those who compose history there are two sorts, those who try and write the truth based on ancient sources . . . [and] diligently examine everything, so that they provide the most accurate account . . . and others that take little interest in the truth, and choose to write what will excite the readers, and aim rather to marvel, and thus are more concerned with high style (alto estilo) and adornment.” The good historian’s style, therefore, was to be centrally concerned not with rhetorical flourish but rather with the critical and intelligent weighing of evidence. The historian

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so as to reveal the truth.” Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia . . . y de como se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 148r.
163 “la composición ha de ser armoniosa y unitaria.” Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578. Similarly, Fox Morcillo wrote, “The historian must ‘create a coherence by following a style and order’ (‘según un estilo y orden, que hagan un cuerpo unido[sic]’).” Fox Morcillo, Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia [trans. Morales, 1560], 2.
164 Ibid., fol. 1750, fol. 470.
165 Ibid., fols. 470–471.
166 Ibid., fols. 478–480. It should be noted that the move away from more rhetorical strategies in historical writing was also beginning to occur throughout Europe, albeit slightly later than seen in Spain, as such concerns emerged elsewhere starting in the first decade of the seventeenth century. See Grafton, What was History?, esp. 7–9.
was to examine his sources, take from them only what was demonstrably credible, and then reproduce it in clear prose. Ultimately style was to be subjugated to content, in order to avoid disguising the “truth.” Indeed, in their treatises, official historians carefully sought to link their reliance on documents to an explicit rejection of the literary cosmetics of rhetoric, which, as Herrera put it, merely allowed the historian to “write beautifully, so as to easily deceive.” Instead, they had come to understand that writing in a style guided by careful research and source use would be more likely to assure the reader that what official history provided was “truth.”

Garibay also stressed that it was not eloquence, but rather the proper use of words and terms that was more important when writing official history, and, therefore, that an increased specificity in language was necessary. Herrera agreed and emphasized that the careful use of words needed to be both a guiding principle and made obvious to the reader: “if every word is carefully selected then [the historian] will pay more attention to how [ideas are presented] rather than just to entertain, and one must always measure their use of words in a way so that [the reader] can see the diligence and care with which one has written.” Thus, Herrera, too, associated the truthfulness of narrative history with the literalness of the grammatical method used by historians, and celebrated both as foundational to creating “faith in history.” The inference is that Herrera conceived of history in the most fundamental sense not as a literary genre, but as an independent mode of thought. He stressed that although the style required to write official history “might at times be arid, it will not in any way deceive . . . [in fact] one must

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167 Herrera, “Las grandes utilidades de la historia,” BNM HA/8741, fol. 3.
169 “Siempre . . . que se juzgue de la disposición y lenguaje pesando las cosas y las palabras de manera que de la misma historia se entienda la diligencia y cuidado con que se hubiere escrito[sic].” Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia . . . y de como se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 143r.
be cautious of those works which are beautifully written, for perhaps they try to hide things."\textsuperscript{170}

Herrera even went so far as to argue that even if official histories ended up being “poorly written, it is better than if they had not been written at all, as there needs to be an account of events.”\textsuperscript{171}

In even more opposition to the Ciceronian school of historical rhetoric, Herrera insisted that when it came to discussing political matters, eloquence constituted a direct obstacle to truth. In these ideas, Herrera was inspired by another ancient, Tacitus. Herrera praised the Roman historian's writing style as a rigorous alternative to Cicero: “It is true that on account of his unpolished manner of speaking Tacitus usually is repudiated by those who prefer the lighter trifles of grammarians . . . and who reject the more serious accounts of those who have spent the whole of their lives in public affairs . . . yet [the style of Tacitus] is wonderfully keen and full of prudence,” as it provided clear “exempla with the brevity and lucidity required to show succinctly what one is to do, and how to follow their example.”\textsuperscript{172} Significantly, Herrera sought to bring such conciseness and clarity not just to the provision of exempla, but to all historical writing, and especially the writing of historical narratives and stressed in his treatise that official history was to be written with, “brevity, in the most naked words possible, [as it needs] to tell the

\textsuperscript{170} Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia . . . y de como se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 147.
\textsuperscript{171} He added, “por la calamidad de nuestros tiempos se contiene diversos hechos de Guerra de los cuales se sacará tanto fruto para el gobierno de las cosas humanas, que aunque mal escritos, no deberían dejar de ser leídos.” Herrera, “Las grandes utilidades de la historia,” BNM HA/8741, fol. 3. Similar sentiments are expressed in Herrera to Baltassar de Zuñiga, BNM Ms/ 5781, fol. 130.
\textsuperscript{172} Herrera, “Discurso sobre que Tacito excede a todos los historiadores antiguos,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fols. 49v–61r. For Herrera such a style even helped in the attainment of prudence for “if we want prudence, then we must not digress outside of our purpose, as one does not need to add flourish in order to demonstrate the true intentions of [people].” Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia . . . y come se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 156r.
truth in its entirety and simply, without any deceit, or adornment, [for only in this way will it not be taken] by rhetoric or vanities, which other works of our time tend to rely on.”

While Herrera’s complete denial of stylistic elegance stood at the extreme end of the spectrum, in all of their treatises, Philip’s official historians stressed that because of the nature of their task, eloquence and style had taken on new meaning and needed to be conditioned because of the subject matter that their histories needed to cover, especially since they would have to, as Herrera put it, “properly reflect the conditions, inclinations, and passions that had moved the King to act.” Herrera here undoubtedly drew from Páez de Castro who had stressed that a proper style was needed both to control the historian’s own tendency towards partiality as well as to allow for the historian to explain properly the king’s “passions, inclinations and spirit.”

That explained why the focus of official historians needed to be less on style and more on how they could present an account that acceded with the political “truth” required and one which was neither too laudatory, nor too arid. While official historians still argued that official history needed to be agreeable in style, it was not to be fiction in any way, including rhetorical excess, and moreover, it was to be based in careful and meticulous research and use of sources. Style

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173 “brevemente, y en las mas desnudas palabras que pude, contar la verdad entera y sencilla, sin que en ella aya engaño, ni cosa que la adorne, para que mejor parezca sin emboluer[sic] en ella las retoricas y vanidades, que por otros libros deste nuestro tiempo se ponen.” Herrera, “Discurso sobre que Tacito excede a todos los historiadores antiguos,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 49v.


175 “There is no other place where a just style is more necessary, to praise and uncover good acts . . . or to diminish and color bad acts so that they are not repeated, because from history comes the most potent examples for how to conduct one’s affairs. Thus a just style is necessary to portray not only factions and dispositions, but also the conditions, inclinations and passions, as well as the most convenient reasoning, for why people do certain things” (“Es necesario también la eloquencia . . . y un estilo más justo . . . para pintar no sólo las facciones y disposición del cuerpo, sino también las condiciones, inclinaciones, y pasiones del ánimo, y para dar los razonamientos convenientes á quien los hace”). Páez de Castro, De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia, BNM Ms/ 6425. See similar sentiments in Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578.
needed to be subordinated to content.\footnote{176}{"truth is more important than eloquence." Herrera, “Las grandes utilidades de la historia,” BNM HA/8741, fol. 8. This does not mean that tracts that focused on the importance of rhetoric, the debate on poetry vs. history, or the notion that history should only include the beautiful and the good in order to provide the best \textit{exempla}, did not still circulate in Spain. See in particular Juan Costa (d.1597), \textit{De conscribenda rerum historia libri duo} (Zaragoza, 1591). See Sánchez Alonso, \textit{Historia de la historiografía Española}, 2: 11–13. Among Philip’s official historians, however, there seems to be a consensus that emphasis should be placed on content rather than style.} The “best style” was that which showed the least hint of “partial reflection,” and thus one which did not prejudice truth, since revealing truth was still to be their primary goal.\footnote{177}{“a writer of histories must not discover his inclination to the prejudice of truth, and one must always strive to write in a style which shows no inclination . . . knowing that just as the best oil is adjusted to that which hath no taste at all, the historian is preferred whose style hath the least tang of partial reflection.” Herrera, “Discurso y tratado que el medio de la historia es suficiente para adquirir la prudencia,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fols. 158r–159r.} Thus, while official historians stressed the importance of providing truth, they added a refinement by suggesting that the manner in which this truth was to be “delivered” was crucial to the achievement of its desired effect. A new “just style” (\textit{estilo justo}) and not simply eloquence, therefore, was necessary for, as Páez de Castro explained, it “helped discretion (\textit{decoro}).”\footnote{178}{“guardar aquella discreción, que suelen llamar decoro.” Páez de Castro, \textit{Método para escribir la historia}, BNM Ms/ 5578.}

It became immediately evident to official historians that the ability to write in this required style was dependent upon the historian and his capabilities. To write in such a style required a certain amount of intellect and restraint, which directly acknowledged the necessary qualifications and qualities that the official historian was to possess that they had already laid out. Official historians argued that, just as courtiers depended on comportment, so too would they need to show restraint in their writing and observe the rules of moderation, sobriety, and discretion. Fo\textsuperscript{x} Morcillo clarified that, in order for official history to be “written well and correctly,” and for the official historian to create “good history . . . the historian must be discreet, intelligent [and] wise, and this he will demonstrate through his use of a proper style.”\footnote{179}{Fox Morcillo, \textit{Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia} [trans. Morales, 1560], 15–18. Similarly, Páez de Castro wrote: “There is no other work than in official history where one needs complete discretion, especially when}
not just about writing in a way that was not too flattering, too feigning, or too laudatory—it was also how to write in a way that was more scholarly, and one which appeared to be led less by political demands than by the “truth” as revealed through research and in documents.

To achieve this “just style,” official historians turned their energies to an adherence to method, suggesting that they regarded their erudition and careful study, rather than eloquence, as better criteria for veracity. Thus, after addressing the moral and intellectual qualities of the historian and the correct style of presentation, questions of historical method became the central focus of discussion in the treatises of Spanish official historians and would occupy the remainder of their tracts. In their treatises, official historians turned their energies towards creating a specific methodology to come to the truth, based upon what to recount, what sources to use, and how to use them. Indeed, official historians believed that they could only attain the required truth by adhering to method. Páez de Castro would provide the first treatise which specifically considered how to write official history in light of increased criticism, and was the first to emphasize method as an solution to the dilemmas the official historian faced.180
Methods

Significantly, their treatises focused on the need to concentrate on more objective documentary evidence in an effort to substitute proof for rhetoric and stressed the need to provide the mechanisms through which to evaluate those sources as vital to the historiographic enterprise and as a further means to obtain a degree of impartiality. In this way the treatises of Philip’s official historians fall within a turn in the artes historicae in Spain identified by Malavialle that looked to sources and source use. The treatises of official historians, however, began to distinguish themselves within this turn by not only calling directly upon source use as a means for them to solidify historical claims, but how they sought to create prescriptions for source evaluation in order to help them deal directly with the problems inherent in their task and their particular biases. These requirements and elaborations upon the precise methodology the official historian needed to follow must be seen as a direct and significant by-product of the historical debate emerging around the incompatibility of truth and political history, as well as of criticisms of their craft. Indeed, it was this environment which forced official historians to establish and specify further principles of organization, interpretation, and criticism.

The question of the organization of official history shaded imperceptibly into that of its purpose and utility. Official historians carefully considered, therefore, the problems involved in selecting and presenting their materials, or as Páez de Castro put it, “what to cover and what can be left in the shadows without prejudicing the truth.”¹⁸¹ Páez de Castro laid out what the historian was to recognize as historical, “everything great, useful, pleasant or exemplary,” and not, “vulgar or common things that are not convenient to the dignity of History, nor worthy of

¹⁸¹ Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578.
Indeed, shallow accounts of events or vain digressions were not required in their narratives, but rather in-depth critical explanations of what happened and why. Fox Morcillo agreed that “it must be understood that in the narration of the principal points and deeds, one must leave out trivial matters and digressions, for they serve no other purpose than to extend the work into ten books, when one ample and extensive book should suffice.” What was to be included in history ranged from the underlying causes of actions to more minute facts, including names, places, and dates. Official historians emphasized, however, the meticulous care that needed to be taken to relate precisely the circumstances of time and place. They also stressed the exquisite care that the historian needed to take when tackling questions of plausibility. For this, the official historian would depend upon the correct selection of facts, as well as the rigorous exclusion of falsity. Garibay summarized it best: official historians had to start at the outset of

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182 “todo lo grande, útil, grato y ejemplar [. . .] y no las cosas vulgares y menudas, que ni convienen a la dignidad de la Historia, ni son dignas de ser leídas.” Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578. Fox Morcillo further tasked the historian to avoid “excessive artifice and avoid vulgarity” (“ampulosidad y evitar la vulgaridad”). Fox Morcillo, Diálogo de la enseñanza de la Historia [trans. Morales, 1560], 4. This tendency to exclude ignoble events from history was presented as a means not to clutter the narrative. In fact, the notion that only noble or memorable events should dominate historical narratives pervaded historical writing throughout Europe well into the eighteenth century.

183 “Resumirá, pues, la narración a los principales puntos y hechos, donde ay bien en qué entender, dexando menudencias y digresiones escusadas que no sirven más que de estender a diez libros lo que comprendier a uno bastante y dilatadamente.” Fox Morcillo, Diálogo de la enseñanza de la Historia [trans. Morales, 1560] 8. Herrera even added that “there was more power in truth, than in vain digressions,” and the historian had to prune away “mundane details, and impertinent digressions, not to mention unworthy flights of fancy.” Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia . . . y de como se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 143r.

184 Páez de Castro was very specific as to what one was to add, “including dates, places, people and explaining the causes that moved them” adding that the historian had to “explain the causes of things, and what means were taken, of triumphs and errors, and what effect these had” (“explique las causas de los hechos, los medios que se pusieron, dónde se acertó, y dónde se erró, y que efecto tuvieron”). Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578. Just before his death Páez de Castro would write to Moura that the most important thing that official histories were to convey was “the coherence of cause and effect, counsels and successes,” and the motives for action as only these would allow for “true political judgment on behalf of the reader.” Páez de Castro to Moura [1580], BNM Ms/ 23083. Moreover, as Herrera stressed, “History must teach the virtues and vices . . . these virtues and vices must be fully explained together with the causes that led a person to them, and the occasion which provided their motive; likewise their consequences.” Herrera, “Discurso y tratado que el medio de la historia es suficiente para adquirir la prudencia,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 164r. Therefore historians had to present both the causality and the motivations behind acts.

185 Fox Morcillo, Diálogo de la enseñanza de la Historia [trans. Morales, 1560], 39.
events, and then “only include big events, and not digressions, [and] only truth, not falsities.”

Thus, the official historian would reflect with great care upon the content of his history, avoiding as much as possible any distortion of the past, and once again turning to their methodology to guide them in their efforts.

For Páez de Castro and Fox Morcillo, what was necessary, especially in the writing of official history, was to “summarily recognize all the papers relative to an event, making memory of those that are useful for history . . . but not to use them to reveal secrets . . . and so that they not be published.” While the historian was not to write about anything that might reveal the confidential workings of state and perhaps even risk censorship, Páez de Castro emphasized, “In the writing of history do not hide anything, and if you can, make it your primary purpose to show the documents you use, and their place [with all ease and promptness], so that one might go and check the originals, when necessary.” Although the official historian might not reveal the whole truth, there was not to be any outward manipulation of facts, nor was there to be any deception in writing history. Official historians stressed that they were never to substitute fiction

186 Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 469.
187 “reconocer sumariamente todos los papeles del servicio y tiempo [de los eventos] haciendo memoria de los que fueren útiles para la historia con deleite de los secretos para no publicarse.” Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la Historia, BNM Ms/ 5578. For Fox Morcillo, “having the material before your eyes, you will see what should be chosen, and what left out, what to tell and what to silence, to create the truth” (“teniendo la material delante de los ojos, verá lo que della para esto ha de elegir o dejar, qué decir, que callar, para formar la verdad, materia de su historia, juntando las cosas para saber empezar, proseguir y acabar; con tal conveniencia de las partes entre sí, según el estilo y orden, que hagan un cuerpo gallardo y hermoso”). Fox Morcillo, Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia [trans. Morales, 1560], 25. Garibay further elaborated that “the historian must be diligent in knowing how to examine the truth, like a clear mirror (reflecting only those things which are revealed in front of them), and presenting them as represented” (“[es necesario que el historiador] sea diligente en saber examinar la verdad: semejante a un espejo claro: que cuales formas y objetos rescribe: tales los represente”). Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 470. Official historians sought to justify their selectivity by constantly reminding their colleagues that even the most scholarly and high-minded historians “hand-selected” their evidence so as to achieve a particular reading of a given event, personage, or action. For official historians, as long as they always kept the goal of providing the required “truth” foremost in their minds, it did not matter if they were selective in their evidence.
188 “Hay de escribir historia de manera que no se esconda nada de cuanto pudiere ser a propósito que dando los papeles concertados en forma y con facilidad y presteza, se pueden ver originales cuando sea menester.” Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la Historia, BNM Ms/ 5578.
for fact, especially since their role was to defend the king’s honor and assure a distinguished past for Spain. In this they would be guided by their use of documents. As Garibay noted, by looking at documents, and following a rigorous appraisal of facts, they would ensure that official history provided only “the necessary version, and correct judgment of history.”

Páez de Castro, Fox Morcillo, Navarra, Morales, Garibay, and Herrera all state in almost identical terms that one could not just simply write “inconsiderately according to truth” (*inconsideradamente según la verdad*), but that rather other considerations, such as reputación, the common good, or the interests of the state, always needed to be taken into consideration.

Their search for “truth” needed to correspond with those interests. Official historians therefore, approached their work with a highly legalistic view of the tasks of government, and were strongly conscious of the need to exalt and uphold the king’s authority, if only to maintain and ensure the common good. Indeed, if the ultimate goal of official history was for it to be fit for “public understanding” and be for the the “common benefit” (*provecho común*), nothing could be brought to light that might put either in jeopardy. The official historian, therefore, needed to

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189 Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 474.
190 Ibid., fol. 475. As Páez de Castro wrote about the Portuguese, “The [P]ortuguese have written much things which provide truth, but which in themselves have been prejudicial . . . if we fall into the same trap as they have, by writing, or allowing to publish that which insults us, or contrary to that which we are trying to prove . . . it can only cause great difficulties” (“Los portugueses han impreso cosas verídicas, pero perjudiciales a sí mismos . . . si nos dejásemos engañar y cayésemos en los yerros en que ellos han caído, con escribir y dejar imprimir cosas que proiulgan[sic] a nos mismos, y contrarias a lo que pretendemos probar . . . solo puede causar daño”). Páez de Castro, *Método para escribir la Historia*, BNM Ms/ 5578.
191 As Garibay put it, “so as to not offend the honor of people who this could touch if you discover something which is not widely known . . . the first condition of good history is that it not defame, save for those that the law [justice] would punish with public penance, thinking of the common good before the particular’s harm. [Further] there are things that history, providing what it does, should and must hush [quiet/silence]” (“por no recelar la honra de personas a quien podría tocar descubriendo lo que no se sabe, la primera condición de la buena historia es que no infame sino a los que la justicia podría castigar con pena pública anteponiendo el provecho común al daño particular que en estos la infamia de la historia como el castigo de la Historia Sagrada se hace en las cosas públicas y notorias que en las secretas y ocultas . . . y en efecto hay cosas que la historia, haciendo lo que debe, puede y debe callar”). Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 476.
think of a greater collective interest at the service of the early modern state when considering what to include in history.

Therefore, when determining what they were to include in history, Páez de Castro, Navarra, Fox Morcillo, Garibay, and Herrera directly compared their methods to those used by lawyers when creating legal briefs in support of a client. Lawyers sought to offer a truthful explanation of events bearing upon an alleged violation of law, often through the selective reading of evidence that minimized the importance of some facts while highlighting others.\(^{192}\) This involved the careful use of rhetorical *inuentio*, or “the choice and elaboration of material, true or plausible, to make the case convincing.”\(^{193}\) Like lawyers who were accustomed to impugning both the quality and relevance of the evidence brought forward by their opponents and insisting that their particular reading of the evidence was that which best aligned with the truth, official historians believed that they too worked in similar ways, carefully selecting “facts” and arranging the evidence so as to construct narratives that readers would find convincing and truthful. As Páez de Castro put it, “To convince the judge [of what decision to make], the lawyer must cite historical examples [precedent] to support his case . . . [so too] must the historian.”\(^{194}\) Whereas in a court of law, a judge served as the ultimate arbiter of the truth, when it came to history, it was readers who determined which among competing narratives best accorded with the truth. Readers, however, unlike judges who had some standards for determining truth, were much more diverse, as were their criteria with which to judge history. Thus, the task of convincing readers that their narrative provided truth also meant that their “case” (or their claims


\(^{194}\) Páez de Castro, *Método para escribir la historia*, BNM Ms/ 5578.
to historical “truth”) needed to be carefully presented. In fact, since official history was to reveal the workings of state, Herrera stressed that a more careful consideration, exposition and selection of events “than those provided by any lawyer” were required.\textsuperscript{195}

Collecting and Evaluating Sources

These demands for even more than “legitimate proof” led official historians to seek out systems for establishing the reliability of their sources, aware that the readers’ incredulity placed new demands upon history and evidence.\textsuperscript{196} Although they had argued they were by office and character, in a position to write “accurate” history, they were clearly aware that, in a society where tradition and precedent were vital for justification, finding the exact documents that proved their “truth,” as well as authenticating these archival sources would be necessary. In fact, they had come to understand that in order to bolster their own credibility they needed to place additional demands upon their evidence. As Garibay wrote, “History used to be believed and taken as testimony and public faith by itself . . . yet the temerity of these times and the ignorance [of many foreign writers] has made it so that history is no longer accepted without legitimate proof (\textit{legitima prueba}), and even then, sometimes that is not enough.”\textsuperscript{197} Moreover, they also knew that when writing works of political importance, especially in light of their predecessors, they would need to use their sources as witnesses to confirm the veracity of their histories. In their treatises, therefore, official historians clearly advocated the need to use humanist

\textsuperscript{195} “más que el jurista.” Herrera, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 100.

\textsuperscript{196} That they stressed the need for research and proof should not be seen as a surprise. If evidentiary proof was intended to elucidate, correct, amplify, and serve as a defense of both official history itself and the claims it made, it was incumbent upon the official historian to prepare adequately researched and documented histories to support their claims, a view expressly made by Herrera. Herrera, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 100.

\textsuperscript{197} “Solia la Historia en otros tiempos ser creyda, y era testimoño y fe publica, desobligada de mas prueva que su dicho . . . La temeridad de estos tiempos y su ignorancia ha estragado tanto las historias que ya no se admiten sin legitima prueba, y aun muchas veces no basta.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 469.
methodologies when writing carefully researched and source-based history, and emphasized the need for accuracy of sources, calling upon rules of evidence in their use of documents. Indeed, their treatises focused not only upon the need to use sources, but on how to judge and evaluate those sources, and advocated means to collect, classify and evaluate (collectio, ordo et judicium) sources based upon their content and credibility.\textsuperscript{198}

Their skillful redeployment of well-known and well-established techniques make these texts valuable, but it was the bringing together of historical techniques for the evaluation of documentary evidence with antiquarian and philological materials and methods that distinguished these treatises as something new in the \textit{artes historicae}. In fact, official historians hoped that an emphasis upon antiquarian techniques when evaluating their sources would help them achieve not only a certain impartiality, but a certain degree of respect. This approach mimicked the broader humanist desire to collect as much information available on a topic and harvest every conceivable detail from a wide range of sources.\textsuperscript{199} Indeed, in such efforts official historians were part of a much wider intellectual community, an informal Republic of Letters which extended beyond the court of Madrid to encompass other erudite men in Spain and

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\textsuperscript{198} Fox Morcillo, \textit{De historiae institutione dialogus}, 57–68.
\textsuperscript{199} All agreed that to derive the “truth” would require extensive research and careful study. Páez de Castro noted that, “writing history is not an easy or lightweight task as people think . . . it requires work, thought and consideration” (“escribir historia no es cosa tan fácil y ligera como la gente piensa”). For the official historian, the amount of work required to write history for the Crown was consonant with the substance of what history provided, for as Páez de Castro elaborated, “Things that have small beginnings, can be done with little work, [but] last a short time, and are easily lost. History [however] as something so necessary to life, for which it has been called light of truth, messenger of antiquity, witness to the times, and life of memory, needs great fundament, and must be laboriously done, in order that it be well registered . . . Because if we truly consider the past, according to what is left, there is no memory more durable than history” (“Las cosas que tienen pequeños principios, y se hacen con poco trabajo, de su natural duran poco, y se pierden facilmente. La historia como cosa tan necesaria á la vida, por lo qual fué llamada luz de la verdad, mensajera de la antigüedad, testigo de los tiempos, y vida de la memoria, tuvo necesidad de grandes fundamentos, para ir bien labrada y quedar por registro viejo, como suelen decir, de tantos negocios. Por que si bien consideramos el tiempo pasado, conforme al qual será lo que resta, ninguna memoria hallaremos más durable que la historia”). Páez de Castro, \textit{De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia}, BNM Ms/6425.
Portugal who shared an interest in collecting, documenting, and reviving remnants of the past. Morales, in particular, enjoyed a marked prestige for such efforts, and was a widely known member of this Spanish learned community. Moreover, as seen in the previous Chapter, Páez de Castro, Morales, Herrera and Garibay were considered integral parts of the royal court’s intellectual circle. All of Philip’s official historians shared an interest in collecting, documenting and reviving remnants of the past with other like-minded men including Ribadeneira and Mariana, who did so for political reasons, and local hagiographers, who did so more for regional interests.

For Páez de Castro, any evaluation of how to write history needed to include a thorough consideration of all types of sources. The question of historical veracity was linked not only to the kind of sources used, but also to the methods by which they were used. For Páez de Castro this meant that historians had to use primary source materials in official works, expand the types of sources they used, and strictly adhere to a certain method when utilizing these sources:

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How to write history should not be a thing of invention, or just of talent or wit, but rather of work and labor; to bring together the things that one must write about, it is necessary to search for them. Taking notes from the works of ancient and diligent people; reading the memorials on public monuments, and writings on tombstones, the memories of public events; going through and unraveling ancient notarial registers where one finds the actions of the State, the testaments of Kings and great men, and many other things which make up History; scour the libraries of colleges, monasteries and abbeys; read the archives of many cities so as to know their privileges and donations, their resources and their public goods, and their laws, jurisdictions and ordinances; to inquire upon lineages, decendancies and [titles], and to know the common rights of each Kingdom in Spain, and the order of the nobility.”

For Páez de Castro, methodology began with “legwork,” as history could draw from an unprecedented diversity of sources; history writing was a huge project which required a complex apparatus, an ample and ambitious heuristic base, and a rigorous historical method. Indeed an understanding of history came only after laborious experience, for in historical terms, history was not a manifestation of reason, but the accumulation of many human actions. For Páez de

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202 “Como escribir historia, no sea cosa de invención, ni de solo ingenio, sino también de trabajo y fatiga, para juntar las cosas que se han de escribir es necesario buscarlas. Ir tomando relaciones de personas antiguas y diligentes, leer las memorias de las piedras públicas y letreros de sepulturas, desenvolver registros antiguos de notarías donde se hallen pleitos de Estado, testamentos de Reyes y grandes hombres y otras muchas cosas que hacen á la Historia, revolver librerías de colegios y monasterios y abadías, ver los archivos de muchas ciudades para saber sus privilegios y dotaciones y bienes de propios, y sus fueros y ordenanzas; inquirir los linajes que hay en cada una, y saber sus descendencias, y blasones; saber el derecho común de cada Reyno en España, y la orden que tienen de nobleza.” Páez de Castro, De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia, BNM Ms/ 6425. See also Páez de Castro, “‘Que es historia,’ dado al rey Phelippe II al principio de su reinado,” PR XIV–2016(10).

203 Páez de Castro even tasked historians to buy as many ancient and modern histories as they could find, and especially foreign ones “for every other country in Europe has written on Spain,” especially during the time of Philip II. Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578. Garibay also stressed the need for the official historian to acquaint himself with foreign works, and “that with the assistance of the Inquisitor General, histories written by secretaries of the kingdoms and provinces of the apostates be brought here and read.” He stressed in particular the need for historians to read the works of Dutch rebels, “because enemies inside one’s house are far worse than those outside it.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fols. 479–480. As Chapter One explained, what these foreign histories contained were not only matters of state but heresy themselves, and the “truth” that foreign authored histories provided had become a threat. Thus, by knowing the “truth” provided by avowed enemies of the monarchy, official historians would acquaint themselves with all of the historical arguments being made, and be able to “fix their mistakes” and misinterpretations by providing well-researched and thorough accounts of the Spanish “official truth” of events.
Castro, understanding human nature and political events was only accessible through concrete investigation of specific texts, documents, and artifacts.

Páez de Castro was not alone in this almost excessive preoccupation with the search and exhumation of historic writings and multiple primary sources for historical ends. Garibay wrote, “While some sources in archives can provide rich and ample matter for history, so do other types of testimonies on many points that now escape us. I must rebuke those who do not look in this direction when they are seeking evidence for their histories . . . why confine myself to books and manuscripts. . . [when] everywhere around us are buildings and monuments, paintings, inscriptions carved on stone slabs, and coins, which together provide us with historical examples of every kind.”

Herrera, however, was more dubious of such sweeping forms of research and stated that such sources were useful only within narrow limits: “antiquities or remnants can be used by the industrious person but only with an exact and scrupulous diligence and observation . . . as names, monuments, private records, fragments of tombstones, and the like, have also been subject to manipulation and forgery.” Regardless, all of the official historians believed that truth was derived from systematic research and presentation of sources, and they were committed to the idea that seeking out any and all sources of information was the way to get at the truth of the past. Indeed, official historians understood the need to draw from an unprecedented range of evidence, including non-literary evidence such as archeological remains, when making claims and providing legitimacy for the Crown.

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204 Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 175.
205 Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la Historia . . . y como se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fols. 144r–145r. Such sentiments must also be placed within the context of rising forgeries emerging within Spain in the last decades of Philip’s reign, most notably the Plomos discussed in the Introduction, above. The controversy and resulting skepticism concerning the Plomos renders all the more significant the emphasis that official historians placed upon thorough and meticulous scholarship and the need to use only “true” sources when writing official history.
Páez de Castro warned, however, that because motive and causation were so important to political histories, it would be very easy to take liberties with facts. Thus, official historians would need clear guidelines for what types of sources they should use and how they were to use them. An understanding emerged that in order to ensure that fact and reason prevail, and to guarantee impartiality, official historians would have to augment the critical tools available. Because they sought to separate themselves from their own partiality, as well as distinguish themselves from “bad historians,” and since they needed to look at intentionality, they stressed that “good historians” would need to do the following. First they would have to base their accounts on sound historical research and investigation, not only using and looking at multiple sources, but expanding upon commonly used sources to draw upon non-written remains of the past and focusing more heavily upon eyewitness testimony. They believed that this would allow them to come to a greater understanding of the difference between the historic act and its correct representation through sources. Second, they would need to evaluate those sources and use them correctly. This would require guidelines for how to evaluate sources critically.

The expanded scope of the materials of history and the quest for “truth” that history demanded, thus clearly necessitated that official historians, if they desired to write “true” history, abandon their “desks” (escritorios), “go straight to the scene” (recorrer los escenarios) and scour the archives for sources.206 As Herrera put it, they needed to do “the archival work necessary to reveal the whole [all of the] truth, which is the soul of history.”207 Páez de Castro, Morales,

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207 Herrera, BNM, Ms/ 5781, fol. 130. Morales’ two brief pamphlets about the creation of the archive in Ucles (BNM Ms/ 12876) and *Parecer sobre la libreria de El Escorial* (Madrid,1566), elaborated on the purposes to which archival information could be put—insisting that it was mainly for the purpose of “writing history for the benefit of Spain.” Páez de Castro also wrote a brief tract on the importance of the archive for the writing of official history: “Memorial dado al rey Felipe sobre fundar una biblioteca,” BNM VE/ 124218.
Garibay, and Herrera even stressed the need for the official historian to become a pilgrim historian, retracing ancient sites like antiquarian chorographers and to visit personally the archives of numerous cities, including those outside of Spain. This also conformed to the Ciceronian precept of the necessity of knowing directly the place in which events occurred.\textsuperscript{208} Indeed, official historians stressed that it had become necessary to see topographically, as much as it was to know classical and contemporary sources, and that official historians would have to bring their own experience to bear when verifying their sources. Moreover, official historians realized that their accounts would be seen as more credible if they had visited the archives where documents were held and seen their sources first hand, as opposed to copies.\textsuperscript{209} In this way, official historians presented the historians’ role not as \textit{otium} (an act of repose or quiet contemplation), but as action. For these historians, it was not sufficient to just state that one’s sources “exist in Simancas” (\textit{existen en Simancas}), or solely to name an archive, but rather, that the official historian “see the document himself,” for if one had not seen the documents personally, then one could not properly comment on them, nor on their authenticity.\textsuperscript{210}

While narrative credibility has always been a concern in historiography, given official history’s particular claim to truth the question of how to gauge the textual reliability of their sources began to gain new relevance and urgency. Consequently, establishing the reliability and accuracy of sources became a crucial step in the methodology official historians sought to establish in order to make their works politically effective. For Páez de Castro, official historians

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\item[209] Debate did emerge, however, between Garibay and Herrera as to how to accumulate information from the archives. For Garibay it was enough to have archivists read the documents and send only those they thought most pertinent to the matter under review, whereas Herrera argued that only the historian himself could judge which documents were of the greatest value and thus he categorically required that the historian go and review them \textit{in situ}. On these discussions see Herrera, BNM Ms/ 3011, fols. 169–173.
\item[210] Herrera, “Las grandes utilidades de la historia,” BNM HA/ 8741.
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were to concern themselves constantly with critical thinking and the intelligent weighing of evidence and he set out criteria for how to distinguish between reliable and unreliable sources.

The first criteria set out by Páez de Castro was that official historians were only to use “true and approved authors,” and “only use that which has the stamp of antiquity, the approbation of Testimony, or the allowance of authority.”\(^{211}\) Even those sources, however, were to be analyzed to distinguish between the facts and things added for substance, or pleasure and the historian had to be vigilant to determine the “good faith” of the author and the authenticity of the text, “for falsifications and interpolations ever threatened the unwary historian.”\(^{212}\) Moreover, official historians were to be wary of relying too closely on any one source. Rather than just asserting criteria based on the “veracity” or authoritativeness of the author, Páez de Castro, however, also proposed two more reliable criteria of source evaluation based on proximity to the event in question and agreement with other testimonies. When it came to written sources, one always had to seek the oldest work, or an account written as close to the event as possible, since “the latest and more recent account of events, is usually the least reliable.”\(^{213}\) Moreover, the official historian needed to “submit all one’s materials to deep examination,” “dissect questionable passages in older texts,” and “compare variants”; thus, sources needed to be verified using the critical technique of corroboration with other documents.\(^{214}\) Further, when it came to more recent events, using a source written as close to the event as possible allowed the

\(^{211}\) Páez de Castro, *Método para escribir la historia*, BNM Ms/ 5578.

\(^{212}\) Ibid. Similarly, Fox Morcillo wrote: “Se debe creer se ha escrito la verdad con toda decencia, mas por mayor claridad advierto que todo en historia . . . sea tomado de muchos y verdaderos autores aprobados, que en ella se declaran donde convenía así en lo tocante a la verdad de la historia y cosas que se le han aplicado para sustancia y gusto de ella.” Fox Morcillo, *Diálogo de la enseñanza de la Historia* [trans. Morales, 1560], 22.


historian, even if he had not witnessed events himself, to write “good history.” As a fourth and final criterion, when official historians were forced to use second hand sources, they had to ensure that they only used those based on first-hand accounts, or on significant research. Páez de Castro established, therefore, that for the official historian, *method* implied assembling the widest possible range of material, evaluating the worthiness of each source based on an established set of criteria, checking one narrative source against another, remedying omissions, establishing relationships of dependence, corroborating accounts, and revealing (or at least being aware of) how overriding prejudice could and did obfuscate historical accuracy.

Subsequent treatises by Navarra, Morales, Garibay, and Herrera would develop Páez de Castro’s ideas, and whereas Páez de Castro set out broad definitions and criteria, subsequent treatises sought to lay out more specifics. All adamantly stressed the need to evaluate one’s sources and emphasized that although a document or artifact was found in an archive, appeared in a chronicle, or was seen in one’s travels, it was not to be immediately taken as legitimate. Their treatises were very specific: official historians would need to evaluate every kind of source they encountered. Even the *auctoritas* of past authors, including famed chronicles, was no longer absolute, especially if one could not verify the source of information. They did not restrict themselves, therefore, by an undue reverence for anything classical and were willing to sit in judgment on every kind of source.215 That explained their emphasis upon the requirements of education and intellect they had laid out as necessary components of the historian’s ability to evaluate his sources and stressed that “only intelligent men” would look at sources with the necessary reverence but also skepticism and could systematically seek, process, and assess the

information they collected. Following Páez de Castro’s example, all stressed the need for “great diligence in collecting the most certain versions and accounts that one could find of what happened,” and sought to clarify further the criteria of accuracy for the assessment of historical documents. Antonio de Herrera expanded upon these methodological requirements when he wrote, “In order to have a true understanding and a consideration of the verisimilitude of events that the historian is to recount, it is necessary to review many ancient books, and only those things which are confirmed by the authority of great men, are to be taken as true,” and that crucially, the historian had to leave “aside many things referred to by other authors, but unable to be verified in authentic sources.”

In their discussion of sources, the official historians also highlighted their unique access to documents and correspondence held in the royal and state archives, to court documents and rare bibliographical sources, to people at court who understood political events, and to eyewitnesses to political events, which non-official historians could not. They took such privileges seriously and sought to use such sources rigorously and carefully, especially since they were the only ones able to determine the “truth” these sources contained. They were aware that both the volume and exhaustiveness of the examples that they could provide through such sources were potent proofs of credibility. As Herrera put it, “the most informed author, who uses the most sources, and who has the most access to the best documents at his disposition, who is

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216 Fox Morcillo, *Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia* [trans. Morales, 1560], 38.
217 “gran diligencia en recoger las mas ciertas relaciones que se hallan[sic] de lo sucedido.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 56.
218 “Para tener un conocimiento cierto y consideración verosímil de los hechos . . . es necesario revisar muchos libros de los antiguos . . . [y] después de ser confirmadas por la autoridad de varones doctísimos, se tomaron por verdaderas . . . [y] dejando aparte muchas cosas que los referidos autores han dicho por no poderse verificar con escrituras auténticas.” Herrera, *Discurso sobre los provechos de la Historia*, BNM Ms/ 1035, fol. 14.
the most consistent and coherent in his writing . . . will provide the best compilation of events and actions.”

We see in their treatises, however, an increased specificity in terms of what types of sources were to be used by official historians. The best guarantee against any distortion was an adherence to “original sources” (papeles auténticos). For Páez de Castro, Fox Morcillo, Navarra, Garibay, and Herrera this meant archival rather than literary sources. More specifically, this meant “papers of state,” as they dealt directly with political dealings, or arcana imperii - the workings of state. Páez de Castro even expanded upon what he had written in his treatise in a letter to fellow historian Antonio de Zurita, insisting,

I have talked with his Majesty, as well as his ministers . . . His Majesty understands that [official] history should not be based on letters from soldiers, nor from what is talked about in town squares, but solely upon the basis of approved and authenticated sources . . . to write history with the necessary weight and authority, requires the necessary sources . . . especially when looking at the reasons [his Majesty] had for going to war. . . Philip’s ministers assure me that they will help [official historians] obtain papers belonging to His Majesty, and grant [them] permission to visit the archives at Simancas. I have requested personally permission to

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219 “el autor más informado, que más fuentes había utilizado, que más y mejor documentación había tenido a su disposición, que había sido más consecuente, y coherente al escribir . . . [tendrá] el mejor compilación de los hechos.” Herrera, “Las grandes utilidades de la historia,” BNM HA/ 8741, fol. 7.
220 Páez de Castro, De las cosas necesarias para escribir historia, BNM Ms/ 6425.
221 Such documents were those that also embodied the public memory of the Monarchy. As Páez de Castro wrote, “everything would be uncertain if our ancestors had not left us the memory of genealogies, testaments, contracts, judgments, laws, statutes, and other human actions . . . that we find in these papers of state (papeles de estado).” Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578.
the archives, and have told Philip’s ministers that such access is important for many reasons, among them the need for His Majesty’s chroniclers\textsuperscript{222} to consult the relevant papers . . . It is necessary to have such material at hand . . . if not, any history that will be written shall only be a thing of invention. [The official historian] must be permitted to consult documents and established authors, in order to give substance to the body of the history [he writes]. It is only by using the papers of the Council of State and other vital documents, that the historian will be able to write history with both body and soul.\textsuperscript{223}

For official historians, using “documents of state” gave history substance and depth.

Moreover, they believed that their scope of research would also allow them as official historians to distinguish themselves from their predecessors not only because of their in-depth research, but because their method provided them with the means to create works which were so thorough and convincing that there could be no disagreement about their facts or their claims, nor would there be any need to elaborate with rhetorical flourish. Because of the political implications of creating “verifiable” source-based history, Páez de Castro emphasized that official historians when conducting their research were required to take notes, name their sources and the archives they had used, as such practices were essential to the works that historians would create: “list the title or subject of the document, and the document’s location . . . so that you have this information . . . so that your work carry the authority of these real documents.”\textsuperscript{224} He added too that this would

\textsuperscript{222} It should be noted that the use of the term chronicler or chronicle here is typical of the time in Spain, where we see the interchangeability of the term chronicle with history (historia), and chronicler and historian. For Spanish historians, both terms, especially by the late-sixteenth century, implied authorship by someone who possessed the tools and learning needed to inquire into a subject and then place it within a universal context.

\textsuperscript{223} Páez de Castro to Zurita [Official Chronicler of Aragon (cronista de Aragon)], 1/30/1569, BNM Ms /23083, fol. 71. Such ideas underscored Páez de Castro’s and other official historians’ understanding of history as a humanist endeavor, and one that approximated what François Baudoin and other sixteenth-century writers defined as “historia integra” or “perfect history.” For Badouin perfect history also had to be truthful history to the extent that it was factually verifiable and rested on a solid documentary base as opposed to street gossip or “reports from those who had their own personal motivations when writing about their actions.” Perfection for Badouin and his contemporaries, however, was achieved when historians included in their narratives exempla designed to offer their readers sound moral advice. See, Huppert, \textit{The Idea of Perfect History}.

\textsuperscript{224} Emphasis mine. Páez de Castro, \textit{Método para escribir la historia}, BNM Ms/ 5578.
also play into their doctrine of style which needed to be an “oblique style with verifiable examples.”

The need to address contemporary history meant, however, that accounts of those who had been present at events were not always to be found in the archives. Indeed, the nature of writing histories of political significance and political histories of more recent events demanded that they rely more heavily on eyewitness testimony. While the position of most historians and antiquarians remained heavily in favor of written authority, official historians soon realized that because they were writing about contemporary events, they could not do so without eyewitnesses. Indeed, contemporary events necessitated current sources and thus firsthand information.

Spain had a long history of using eyewitness accounts and discussion of their use had appeared in the prologues of many histories, especially those about the New World, like that of Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo. Philip’s historians, however, incorporated these discussions on how to evaluate eyewitness testimony directly within their treatises. They understood that while eyewitness testimony was vital in order to write an accurate account of current events, it was also vital for them to demonstrate their ability to evaluate these types of sources. They acknowledged, however, that many events that had recently occurred had yet to be committed to paper and

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225 “un estilo oblique con ejemplos verificados.” Páez de Castro, Método para escribir la historia, BNM Ms/ 5578.
226 One should not minimize the influence of medieval historiographical practices upon the use of eyewitness testimony in Spain. As Beryl Smalley notes, Spanish historians had long followed Isidore’s injunction to rely on eyewitness accounts as the most truthful material of history. See Beryl Smalley, Historians in the Middle Ages (New York: Scribner, 1974), 22–25. Oral sources and eyewitness accounts did, however, fall out of favor in the late Middle Ages in Spain. It was only with official historiographer to the Catholic Monarchs, Fernán Pérez de Guzmán, that we see a revival in the use of oral sources. Guzmán emphasized in his prologue to his Generaciones y Semblancas (1495), the need for the historian to be either present at notable events, or to rely on trustworthy witnesses.
227 See the Introduction, above.
especially many conjectural matters and diplomatic dealings, which were not always recorded.  

This meant, therefore, that it had become even more imperative for the historian to search out eyewitnesses. Furthermore, as Morales pointed out, the historian could not actually see everything occurring at court, despite his political knowledge and involvement. Thus, the “eye-witness” (testigos de vista) accounts of “trustworthy men” and making use of, “things which were made notable and public to all” broadened the scope of acceptable reliable evidence.

Furthermore, all of the official historians agreed, therefore, that when dealing with current history, eyewitness testimony accorded history a degree of credibility that other kinds of evidence could not. In fact, they understood that one way to lend credibility to their work and to refute questions regarding the historian’s personal authority and bias was to look to and include eyewitness testimony. Indeed, to write “true and legitimate history” official historians would have to combine written accounts with eyewitness testimony, and integrate both of these strains of evidence with information derived from a vast range of other primary sources and documents. Such historiographic techniques, which sought to incorporate the accounts of eyewitnesses and factual data from documents, indicate the similarity of developments occurring between historiography and jurisprudence.

228 Navarra to Moura, BNM Ms/ 2936, fol. 1 Navarra was not wrong, as Juan de Velásquez had told Philip that diplomatic dealings were too important and critical and should not be written down, but dealt with only through one-on-one talks. “Aquellas eran pláticas de mucha importancia para tratarlas por papeles.” Velásquez to Philip, 5/5/1592, RB Ms/ 342/5.

229 “cosas que a todos fueron notorias e públicas,” Morales, “Apuntes sobre la historia,” RB II/ 2245.

230 Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 106. Undoubtedly, this placed additional emphasis upon why official historians needed to be members of the court and participants and witnesses to political action, or, at the very least, have access to eyewitnesses and the testimony they produced.

231 Similarly, when considering New World chronicles, Rolena Adorno contends that the use of reliable eyewitness testimony demonstrates the influence of “the developing juridical tradition in the Indies.” Rolena Adorno, The Polemics of Possession in Spanish American Narrative (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 218.
Therefore, official historians sought to establish means through which they were to judge the reliability and veracity of oral testimony and eyewitness accounts, and sought to do so with the same rigor that they had established to evaluate written documents. Indeed, in all of these treatises, official historians sought to develop a distinct methodology for how eyewitness sources were to be selected and evaluated. All began with the premise that the best eyewitness account was that of the historian himself, and thus, as Fox Morcillo stressed, it would be best if “the historian be present at the main and most notable events, both those of war and peace.”

Increasingly for official historians, truth was ultimately guaranteed by autopsy and personal acquaintance with the facts, especially when it came to writing about political matters. Herrera’s definition of history even hinged upon the implicit notion that an account based upon personal experience offered more direct access to unmediated reality. Herrera claimed that there was a long historical tradition in Spain of the official historian using his own eyewitness testimony and observations as “proof” when writing accounts of current events and referenced the historical precedent set by López de Ayala (1332-1407) who, Herrera claimed, had grounded his claims to “truth” (verdad) on his own direct acquaintance with the facts when writing his chronicle of the reign of Enrique III (1350-1406). For Herrera, Ayala had provided “true information” (vera información) by recounting what he had seen “with his own eyes.”

For Garibay, however, it was the historians of the New World such as Fernández de Oviedo, who wrote about what he had encountered and witnessed firsthand on Hispaniola, that provided the most potent example of the importance and reliability of the historian’s own eyewitness testimony.

232 “y que él sea presente a los principales y notables actos de guerra y de paz.” Fox Morcillo, Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia [trans. Morales, 1560], 27.
233 Herrera, “Las grandes utilidades de la historia,” BNM HA/8741, fol. 6.
234 Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 470. This referred to Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo’s, Historia general y natural de las Indias (1562). In the Prologue to his history of the New World, Oviedo explained the need to accumulate and evaluate the accounts of eyewitnesses, and how historians should only use their own personal experiences and knowledge and testimony which accorded more with their own knowledge, and
Since it was impossible for the historian to be present at all events, however, official historians laid special stress upon the public memory of other living witnesses. As Fox Morcillo put it, “[the historian] must be discreet and receive only information of events from men worthy of trust, who were present at the events in question.” In this way, official historians sought to transform the commonplace judgment that only those who had participated directly could write “good histories” of current events. When it came to selecting eyewitness accounts Páez de Castro, quoting Polybius, stated, “I prefer those witnesses who describe what they have taken part in, while those who give hearsay evidence are only indirect witnesses, which are always rejected by jurists.” Indeed, testimonies of firsthand witnesses became vital sources of “truthful” information, and carried enormous weight. Moreover, it was also believed that those who had been present at events also provided the best written accounts. Thus, when choosing older sources to use, official historians insisted that it was preferable to use those of men who had personally witnessed events.

should only accept testimony based upon the morality and social standing of the eyewitness. Moreover, he also outlined that the more witnesses one could find to an event the more truthful one was to take that event to be. Historians of the New World had greatly contributed to the growing acceptability and use of oral sources among Spanish historians, as they had exposed the limits of book learning and classical knowledge, and the value of experience. Oviedo’s first-hand experience of the New World provided his work with an authority unavailable to those who never set foot in the New World but claimed to provide authoritative accounts based solely on the accumulation of sources. See Kathleen A. Myers, “History, Truth and Dialogue: Fernández de Oviedo’s Historia general y natural de las Indias (Bk XXXIII, Ch LIV),” Hispania 73/3 (1990): 616–25.

235 The whole passage reads, “A mi ver, para las historias se fazer bien e derechamente es necesario . . . que el historiador sea discreto y sabio . . . y que él sea presente a los principales y notables actos de guerra y de paz, y porque siendo imposible ser él en todos los hechos, a lo menos que él fuese así discreto que non recibiese información sinon de personas dignas de fe y que ovisen sido presentes.” Fox Morcillo, *Dialogo de la enseñanza de la Historia* [trans. Morales, 1560], 41. These comments closely resemble those of Fernán Pérez de Guzmán who, in the prologue to his *Generaciones y Semblanzas* (1450), stressed not only that the historian should be present at events, but that he only accept accounts from those “worthy of faith” who were also present. See Béatrice Leroy, *L’historien et son roi: essai sur les chroniques castillanes, XIVe-XVe siècles* (Madrid, Casa de Velásquez, 2013), 2.

236 Páez de Castro, *Método para escribir la historia*, BNM Ms/ 5578. Navarra also drew attention to the fact that some ancient historians had already raised the problem of trying to determine which eyewitness sources to believe and cautioned that, “it is an ancient rule that one should believe witnesses, not witnessing” (“testibus, non testimonis ”). Navarra, “Dialogos qual debe ser el chronista del princepe,” in *Dialogos de la eternidad del anima* (1565), 22.
Official historians were clearly aware of the problems that one had to deal with when trying to verify personal testimonies and knew that eyewitness testimony was understandably affected by personal circumstances and beliefs, and prone to exaggeration. Indeed, not every eyewitness account was to be taken as immediately credible. In fact, they stressed that even personal experience was to be doubted in its historical fundament. In this, Navarra compared the task of the official historian to that of a judge: “the wise judge always looks for reliable witnesses,” someone whose “status and integrity” endowed what he said with authority. Thus, just as with their conditions for judging documents, the first test which determined the acceptance or rejection of a fact recorded orally favored “learned” testimony as opposed to “vulgar” error. All agreed that only “the most worthy men” were to be given credence, and that it was only men who met those standards who deserved “trust.” The eyewitnesses most worthy of trust were “grave men” (*hombres graves*), or those whom official historians defined as “the most meritorious people” in Spanish society such as members of the *Cortes*, prelates, heads of ecclesiastical orders and universities, and the Ministers of the Holy Office of the Inquisition.

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237 For example, while Garibay suggested that “eyewitness accounts” could offer a substantial correction “to those written later,” the historian needed to keep in mind that eyewitnesses often lied or exaggerated. Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia” (1593), BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 479.


239 For Morales, the notion of who was a credible authority was expanded to include the testimony of first-hand witnesses, but also to include the oral traditions voiced by local people to ‘antiquaries,’ as well as the views of “noble men.” Morales, “Discurso general de antigüedades,” BNM Ms/ 9934, fol. 18.

240 Navarra, “Dialogos qual debe ser el chronista del principe,” in *Dialogos de la eternidad del anima* (Tolosa, 1565), 25. Páez de Castro and Morales also corresponded about what made a “worthy man,” and which eyewitness testimony to trust. BNM Ms/ 13229, fol. 198.

241 Herrera, “Discurso y tratado que el medio de la historia es suficiente para adquirir la prudencia,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fols. 163r–164r. Morales emphasized that such principles had guided his choice of sources when writing his *Coronica*. When introducing the chronicle sources he most valued and used to compose his history of medieval Spain, Morales put great emphasis on the fact that their authors were “grave men” such as bishops, “Lucas, Bishop of Tuy and Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada, Archbishop of Toledo, for the 13th century; the bishops of Astorga and Oviedo for the 11th; and the Bishop of Salamanca for the 10th [although the “Chronicle of Alfonso III is no longer attributed to him].” For Morales, the episcopal dignity gave these authors greater credibility. Morales, “Apuntes sobre la historia,” RB II/ 2245.

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Thus formal status in society provided a sort of formal criteria for credibility. Those that met such standards deserved “trust,” for in a society so dependent on honor and reputación, one’s status and the need to maintain and uphold it, made those with status less likely to lie, as that might lead them to lose their credibility and standing within the court. Moreover, they would provide “accurate” information that defended the king, giving historians what was needed within the polemical context. Indeed, when it came to political matters, the best eyewitnesses were, as Herrera stressed, “people of state, who both through official missives, correspondence, or by being witnesses to the events themselves, provided indubitable notice [information].”

Such appeals to acknowledged prestige and distinction are in themselves revealing manifestations of a particular conception of politics and truth, but more importantly, indicate that an emphasis upon an eyewitness’s “prestige” and distinction was a means of determining his honesty.

Official historians were aware, however, that the persons most likely to possess the most accurate information about political events were the ministers who were privy to the secret counsels of a prince, and that the ministers who received such counsels were precisely those most likely to transmit them in a modified form. Given the pressure of reputación, both on the side of the prince and on that of the minister, manipulation of the truth was deemed almost inevitable. Moreover, even if there were no outright manipulation, the official historian understood that the documentary or verbal accounts of a particular event were subject to an endless process of substitutions and omissions caused by the defective or selective memories of those involved. Thus, Herrera clearly stated that it would be necessary to judge every eyewitness account that one came across independently, to see whether it was more “true” than others by

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comparing it to other court documents. He also insisted that the official historian had to be very thorough in ensuring the honesty of even the most noble eyewitness: “Finally, although not insignificantly, to garner much of what is required [to write] history, it is necessary to search it out, and use the testimony of men worthy of great credit, who had been present at the events [to be recounted]. It [is also] necessary to consult not a few common men, but rather many noble ones, whose versions of the same events are to be diligently compared to ensure that only things that are [corroborated] by many, and which are closest to the truth, [are used].”

A solution could be found, therefore, in both the quality and the quantity of eyewitness accounts, and so eyewitness testimony had to be verified using the critical technique of corroboration. Further, the rules for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable testimonies were based not only on the criteria of the veracity or “authoritativeness” of the witness, but on the much more reliable criteria of proximity to the event in question, actual presence at events, and agreement with other testimonies. In this way eyewitness sources came to be seen as objective as ancient sources, as they could be evaluated using the same tools. All of this had political implications, for only once one had established whether an account could be relied upon, could it then be used as a “prudent source of knowledge” about political, military, and diplomatic affairs.

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243 Herrera, “Discurso y tratado que el medio de la historia es suficiente para adquirir la prudencia,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 164r. See also, Herrera to Avallaneda, 11/22/1599. Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Fondo Castrillo, Caja XVI.
244 “Finalmente, lo que no es poco, para escribir historia, mucho de lo que atañía a historia es necesario buscarlo por aquí y por allí y a partir de hombres dignos de todo crédito que habían estado presentes en los hechos. Y entretanto es necesario consultar no a unos pocos hombres vulgares sino a muchos nobles, cuyo relatos sobre los mismos hechos es preciso comparar con diligencia para tomar por ciertos sólo aquellas cosas en las que muchos han conocido y parecían más cercanas a la verdad.” Herrera, “Discurso y tratado que el medio de la historia es suficiente para adquirir la prudencia,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fols. 164r–165r.
Under the influence of Morales, the official historians also began to consider antiquarian material more seriously as a source of historical information. In his antiquarian studies Morales had developed techniques for evaluating the legitimacy of non-written remnants of the past, and he encouraged Garibay and Herrera to apply these methods to their evaluation of sources to be used when writing historical narratives for the Crown and in the presentation of documentable, verifiable ‘facts.’ Morales wrote extensively to both Herrera and Garibay, calling for new levels of precision in their research and for greater details in their reporting. Morales also sent them both copies of his ‘Discurso general de antigüedades,’ [A general discourse on antiquities], a systematic exposition of the proper methods (including philology, numismatics and etymology) for interpreting ancient historical sources, encouraging them to use it as a model to follow in their study of the documents that were to be used in political works. In this brief tract, Morales invoked Aristotle’s Ethics and Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations as his guides and noted their common belief that in moral matters, probability was more accessible than absolute truth. Applying this to history, Morales suggested that the best a historian could promise his readers was “good conjectures” (buenas conjeturas) based on “good probability” (buen
As he wrote, “In [some] subjects one cannot go any further than demonstrating that something is verisimilar and probable, since none of the reasons that can be offered can do more than provide some good probability.” Morales’s cautious observation about the impossibility of absolute certainty was tempered, however, with his belief that the historian could come as close as possible to “truth” by carefully weighing evidence of a source’s authenticity, such as comparing archaeological evidence against classical literary sources.

As his primary example, Morales depicted how he had personally evaluated every religious relic he had come across during travels for its “testimony” (testimonio), or the evidence of its authenticity, and that he did so in order to ensure that Philip not be duped into promoting any false relics or even buying one for his chapel at the Escorial. For Morales, such questions of authenticity were very much questions of historical judgment. When evaluating relics, he claimed that the historian might find that they possessed “no more testimony than tradition” or that “its testimony [was] no more than that of ancient tradition.” In other words, all there was for many relics was an oral tradition. He warned, however, that such testimony was not to be

250 Morales, “Discurso general de antigüedades,” BNM Ms/ 9934, fol. 31. For how he practically implemented such ideas when recording the antiquities he found, see his “Viaje de Ambrosio de Morales por orden del rey D. Phelipe II. a los reynos de León, y Galicia, y principado de Asturias” (1595), BNM GM/ 5941. Further, Morales did indeed bring the interest of the antiquarian and passion for exact information about material objects and inscriptions, and rigid concepts of truth, to the writing of his historical narratives, especially his Crónica general de España, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1570-1592).

251 “Porque en esta material no se puede llegar á mas de mostrar algo que sea verisímil y probable, pues ninguna de las razones que pueden en esto traerse no puede más de hacer que alguna buena probabilidad.” Morales, “Discurso general de antigüedades,” BNM Ms/ 9934, fol. 34.

252 In his “Discurso general de antigüedades” Morales outlined the principal sources of “antiquities” that historians were to turn to aid them in their efforts, divided into thirteen overlapping categories, including archaeological, textual, and oral sources. He included aids on how to find “signs and traces of antiquity,” such as coins, statues, and inscriptions, and how ancient geographers could be used to correlate ancient and modern places according to latitude and longitude. Among textual authorities Morales included Church councils and the lives and legends of saints, and deemed the “authority of credible people” to be useful. In contrast, Morales deemed that popular opinion (común opinión) was valuable only if it accorded with “reason,” or else it proved useless.

253 Morales “Discurso general de antigüedades,” BNM Ms/ 9934, fol. 2.

254 “no tienen más testimonio que tradición,” and “el testimonio no es más que tradición antigua.” Morales “Discurso general de antigüedades,” BNM Ms/ 9934, fol. 5.
taken as absolute, and that the authenticity of a particular relic could be placed in doubt if the
popular beliefs handed down from generation to generation which supported a relic’s
authenticity were not also supported by physical or documentary evidence. He stressed,
therefore, the need to apply knowledge of material history (and especially knowledge of coins
and inscriptions) to substantiate claims to the validity of certain relics.255 Morales also gave
weight to other considerations when reviewing a relic’s authenticity. For Morales, if people of
“authority” and “good faith” believed in its authenticity, then that provided the relic with
additional merit. As Morales put it, “if it has long been held as a precious relic, and if on the
insistence of Kings, and of peoples, it has it been recorded,” then it could be taken as credible.256
This does not mean, however, that Morales’s sense of Catholic piety prevented him from being a
thoroughgoing humanist skeptic. Instead, Morales sought to combine his admiration for the
supposed skeptical posture of Cicero and Aristotle that he posited with the idea that when it came
to the question of relics, probability was more accessible than absolute truth. In the subsequent
letters Morales wrote to both Garibay and Herrera, he stressed that such ideas could, and needed
to be applied to the evaluation of all sorts of sources and evidence and especially when trying to
come to a “true” understanding of political events and actions.257

255 Morales, for example, found it “quite foolish” (cosa de disparate) that the nuns of the Monastery of San Payo
claimed to have the stone on which James the Apostle was beheaded, especially since a simple reading of its
inscription made it very clear that it was only a burial monument, no more than three centuries old. Ambrosio de
Morales “Discurso general de antigüedades,” BNM Ms/ 9934, fol. 6. As Katherine Van Liere points out, Morales
was committed to an underlying storyline about the emergence of a Christian Spain that was essentially sacred in
many respects. In dealing with this sacred history, however, Morales did not abandon the notion that historians can
extract no more than “good probability” (buena probabilidad) from their sources. Katherine Van Liere, “The
Moorslayer and the Missionary: James the Apostle in Spanish Historiography from Isidore of Seville to Ambrosio
de Morales,” Viator 37 (2006): 519–543. In this instance, the same notions would be transplanted to the writing of
history for the polemical purposes of the Crown.
256 “se ve como era tenida … por preciosa Reliquia, y muy cierta, pues con instancia de Reyes y del pueblo se
recobraba.” Morales, “Discurso general de antigüedades,” BNM Ms/ 9934, fol. 5.
257 Significantly, we will see in the treatises of Garibay and Herrera, directly influenced by the ideas of Morales,
how the credibility of an oral source came to be connected to probability in much the same way as occurred with
written and non-written sources. One was only to accept eyewitness testimony which was both “most likely,” and
“subject to proof.”
Garibay, inspired by a growing antiquarian spirit, also seems to have adopted many of Morales’s methods, setting out in his own treatise the appropriate techniques to determine the authenticity of documents and how to separate them from “interpretations and artifice.”

He stressed that if the documents being used were not collected by the historian himself, then the only ones that could be trusted were those evaluated “by grave men.” He stressed how zealous historians were to be in their labors, always using “diligence” and always submitting all one’s materials to “thorough examination especially if one is to determine whether they are true or not.”

For Garibay, the historian could “only accept those sources that all concur,” and “must constantly seek to determine and resolve if [what one writes about] is verifiable or not.” This testified to the fact that Garibay understood that in order to write “official history,” a more rigorous, almost scientific, method needed to be undertaken.

Where Morales had the most profound effect on Garibay’s thoughts, however, was in comparing sources for their authenticity. Garibay claimed that, if after finding the oldest and best sources, one was to find among them two contradictory accounts, then the historian was only to give credit to the source which “accords more with reason,” or the one which was more

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259 “muy graves personas.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 477. Further, Garibay also sought to ensure that when looking at eyewitness accounts specific details be amassed, including names, dates, and places, and the precise people involved (“que rey, y en que lugar y fecha, y ante que secretario otorgó la facultad real para su vinculo”). In this way he believed that he could come to a firsthand understanding of events based on the compilation of information from documents, information solicited in writing from others, and direct eyewitness testimony. Garibay, AHN, Osuna, legato 455–1, expedientes 1-110.
262 As Herrera wrote, “the independence, dignity and liberty of expression of the historian are necessary conditions for this science” (“La independencia, la dignidad, y libertad de expresión del historiador son inapelables condiciones para esta ciencia”). Herrera, “El historiador y la prudencia,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 146r.
This notion of probability appears most strongly at the end of Garibay’s work where he wrote, “People will believe that which they think is most plausible (verisímil), and so I take it as very dangerous to affirm anything as absolute truth, . . . the only thing [one might] state with certainty are those things which are obviously notorious fictions [a direct reference to the work of Annius of Viterbo].” For Garibay, as it was for Morales, probability was easier to attain than absolute truth, although greater certainty could be achieved when determining lies.

Moreover, Garibay posited, if the only discrepancies between two sources were merely inconsequential details (menudencias), they were not really sufficient to invalidate the essential truth of either, and the same applied between the testimony of two eyewitness, or two documents as historical witnesses. Indeed, it was more important that events, and especially those which dealt with the king and Spanish actions, be presented properly, and with the necessary decorum, than to dismiss valid documents and testimony which varied only in insignificant details that did not detract from the fundamental message for the public good.

Morales’s thoughts also had a profound effect on Herrera, who applied Morales’s antiquarian ideas to his criteria for how to distinguish between false and truthful sources. While all of the official historians relayed the need for the expurgation of undocumented traditions and

263 The whole passage reads, “Queda sólo un cabo para satisfacer a los que han leído otros libros que tratan de algunos cosas que van en este, y las hallan allí muy diferentes de lo que nosotros decimos, y es [que] en relaciones [tan] diferentes, ¿a quién se debe dar crédito? Y a esto digo que . . . en las antigüedades del mundo, más crédito se ha de dar a las gentes donde se siguieron los acaecimientos, que a los extraños, y entre los extraños, más a los vecinos que a los de lejos [. . .] Y si caso es que dos particulares escritores son iguales, en ser de una tierra y de un tiempo, y no discordan de lo que está contenido en los anales públicos, razón es de creer al que dice cosas más allegadas a razón.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 478. This internal criticism amounted to accepting as a probability that which appeared most reasonable.

264 “Más como cada cual puede creer en estas cosas lo que más verisímil le pareciere, yo tengo por cosa muy peligrosa afirmar ninguna por más verdadera dejando aparte las que son notorias ficiones . . . [como] las de Viterbus[sic].” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 479.
forgeries, Herrera wrote extensively about how to identify false chronicles. Herrera focused on a well-known target—the falsities perpetuated by Annius of Viterbo, using him as a cautionary example so that others would “not fall prey to the same tricks.” Annius of Viterbo (Giovanni Nanni, 1432-1502), writing under the name of Berossus, a real Chaldean historian of the third century BCE whose works had not survived, invented a royal genealogy “proving” that the Catholic Monarchs were directly descended from Tubal, the grandson of Noah, and the legendary first ruler of Spain. Herrera stressed that while Viterbo’s “gravity of style and eloquence was excellent, [these] should not have misled historians to believe automatically that all he wrote was truth.” Rather, Herrera believed that others had been naïve to believe Viterbo especially since “Viterbo made grave errors in chronology . . . on which all certainty in history relies.” Herrera even demonstrated how Viterbo had been faulty in his facts, citing the wrong number of kings and the wrong length of reigns, cases which should have given the reader great pause as to Viterbo’s reliability. For Herrera, Viterbo’s gravest errors, however, were his excessive confidence and his tendency to underestimate his fellow man, something which

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265 “De lo que escribió Juan Annio de Viterbo con el nombre Beroso, . . . después de mucho estudio he hallado en graves autores . . . el engaño que de él han recibido hombres muy señalados, . . . lo hago conocer . . . por que si fuere posible no incurran otros en los mismos yerros.” Herrera, “Discursos y Tratado de la Historia e Historiadores Españoles,” BNM Ms/ 1.035, fols. 115v–116v.

266 Viterbo’s list of mythical Spanish Monarchs appeared in his Commentaria super opera auctorum diversorum de antiquitatibus loquentium (1498). This list immediately garnered acclaim for it provided Spanish historians with the means to lay claim to a consecrated origin and descent. Herrera demonstrated that although Viterbo had provided a powerful and persuasive argument, and one which lent claims of great political power, it was so obviously a forgery that it needed to be rejected, for if not, it could negatively impact those who used it (as well as the political claims being made with it).

267 He extended such notions to an evaluation of all sources, “Porque son excelentes en el estilo, elocuencia, gravedad . . . no deben ser tomado[sic] como la verdad.” Herrera, “Discursos y Tratado de la Historia e Historiadores Españoles,” BNM Ms/ 1.035, fol. 117v.

268 “Hizo muy grandes yerros en la cronología . . . de la cual depende la certidumbre de la historia.” Herrera, “Discursos y Tratado de la Historia e Historiadores Españoles,” BNM Ms/ 1.035, fol. 115v. See also Herrera, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 185.

269 For example, “El verdadero Beroso escribió su historia hasta Ciro, el que vivió más de 600 años después de la guerra de Troya y este Beroso de Juan Annio reduce las cosas hechas por los Asirios y Caldeos solamente hasta el principio del reino troyano que viene ser hasta el 18 Rey de los Asirios, que fue contemporáneo de Danao, primero rey de Troya.” Herrera, “Discursos y Tratado de la Historia e Historiadores Españoles,” BNM Ms/ 1.035, fol. 115v. See also Herrera, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 106.
Herrera stressed that no official historian could do. Yet Herrera admitted that Viterbo had been mischievous and had made it hard to “let his treachery be known, and so many fell for his claims, including Jean Dideron, Nauclero [Johannes Nauclerus], and Valerio Anselmo.”270 For Herrera, it was the historians’ technical abilities which would help them ultimately identify works like Viterbo’s as forgeries. The “good historian,” one who evaluated his sources appropriately, would immediately recognize that Viterbo’s work was a forgery, as any cautious and observant historian would automatically realize that Viterbo’s style of writing, its eloquence, its gravity, and its attention to minute detail, was not that seen in the works of the time period from which it claimed to be derived. Thus, Herrera severely criticized many of his contemporaries who had been persuaded by, and utilized, Viterbo, and condemned them for not having immediately noticed falsity and for not “constantly observing . . . its grammar, its phraseology, and its cadence.”271 In other words, he criticized them for not utilizing antiquarian tools and techniques to verify sources.

Herrera sought to unmask Viterbo’s faulty yet persuasive method. He noted Viterbo’s indiscriminate use of documents both real and false, even his complete fabrication of documents to suit his needs, and how, because of his competence and ability as an erudite scholar, his ability to extrapolate “convincing” data from other works and present them as “truth.”272 By revealing

270 “sin echar de ver el engaño, cayeron en él y estos fueron Jean Driedón, Nauclero, Valerio Anselmo.” Herrera, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 105.
271 “la gramática, los frasis, y modos de hablar.” Herrera, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 106.
272 Herrera stated that he had relied upon and extended the copious scholarship of other historians who had already acknowledged Viterbo’s falsities, and specifically referenced the precise chapters in their works which dealt with such issues: “mucho son los autores que han apartado esta verdad y la han sacado a luz, y en particular Fray Melchor Cano en el libro 11 de sus lugares comunes teológicos, el Volterrano en el libro 14 de su Antropología, Juan de Bergara en sus ocho questiones, Luis Vives en el libro 5 del modo de enseñar las disciplinas.” Herrera, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 105–106. These are references to Melchor Cano’s, De locis theologica libri duodecim, in Opera, BNM, 3/17210; the Tratado de ocho questiones del templo propuestas por el Ilmo. Señor Duque Infantado, respondidas por el doctor Veraga, Canónigo de Toledo (Toledo, 1552); and Juan Luis Vives, De disciplinis libri (1531).
Viterbo’s mistakes, Herrera directly sought to provide mechanisms through which his fellow official historians could find an imposter. By using Viterbo as a case study, Herrera, like Morales, sought to provide approaches which could be made more general and which could be applied to all of the sources that the historian was to evaluate. Indeed, Herrera was providing the mechanisms by which to judge works, showing the methods and procedures he himself had followed and the tools like philology that he had used. Herrera’s criticism of Viterbo exhibited the whole array of humanist weapons—polemic and personal vituperation, as well as criticism stemming from grammar, logic, geography, chronology, history, and law. Most importantly in this exercise, Herrera also sought to use Viterbo as the model for what the official historian “must never do”: “Viterbo hid sources,” “invented sources,” and often used “clear and well-known lies.”273 Instead, the official historian was to concern himself with properly using records, and that the careful research, contemplation and review of sources were to be the primary concerns of the historian, as style, as Viterbo’s work had demonstrated, merely “easily dissuaded.”274 Thus, Herrera’s example of Viterbo also reiterated, in a more concrete way, how when writing history, substance mattered more than style and that research, investigation, and the correct use of sources needed to trump the historian’s desire for popularity. For Herrera, the “just and good historian” avoided distorting evidence, only supporting his statements by “good authorities,” and refrained from displaying too much “love” or elaborating their work with rhetorical excess.275

The clear articulations in the treatises of the need for the official historian to use the tools of philology when evaluating sources are significant. Philology was the most effective tool of

273 “mentira clara y conocida.” Herrera, BNM Ms/3011, fol. 106.
274 Ibid.
275 Herrera, BNM Ms/3011, fol. 107.
early modern historical method, although throughout Europe many early modern historians were slow to discover the potentials of philology; it was rather lawyers, antiquarians, and biblical scholars who utilized philology’s possibilities as the most sensitive indicators of historical change. Donald Kelly argues specifically that this was the case in France.\(^{276}\) Therefore, while in much of their antiquarian discussion and in their interests and abilities official historians were rather typical of an antiquarian age in which historical scholarship no longer simply meant revisiting ancient classics like their predecessors, but also necessitated philological and archeological skills, it is significant that they brought these concerns directly to their treatises on writing history. Morales, in particular, had already specifically broadened the methodological insights of those readers in the Spanish court, especially Philip II, Idiáquez, and Moura, by establishing numismatic and epigraphic evidence as comparable, and even superior to, narrative and documentary sources.\(^{277}\)

Morales, Garibay, and Herrera all considered the importance of focusing on language as a potent indicator of historical change and thus a tool that could be used to verify the authenticity of sources. To these ends official historians sought to emphasize their mastery of these humanist tools as a way to offer a solution, albeit ultimately only a partial solution, to their dilemma of writing political works with the requisite impartiality by combining narrative with the sorts of analytical history practiced by antiquarians, philologists and jurists.

One more development distinguishes the treatises of Morales, Herrera, and Garibay from those of Páez de Castro, Fox Morcillo, and Navarra. While for all of these official historians the

\(^{276}\) Kelley, *Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship*, esp. 53, and Ch.3.

\(^{277}\) See Chapter One, above.
exposition of the truth resulted from systematic research and the number of sources used, for the three later historians, it also came to be directly associated with the presentation of sources. Morales, Herrera, and Garibay argued that the official historian was always to reveal the sources that formed the basis for his claims. In this way these three official historians sought to build upon the methodological foundations established to create an even more powerful tool for practice. It should come as no surprise that their treatises emerged after 1580, when intensified demands were being placed upon official history by the Crown. Once again, they compared their task to that of the lawyer who presented his case. Herrera in particular stressed that documents not only provided proof, but should be studied and utilized like quasi-legal evidence to be included in historical narratives; he stressed that the weight of documents was, “far superior to any eloquence.”278 In their treatises Morales, Garibay, and Herrera placed an enormous emphasis not only upon document use, but also on the need for historians to reproduce these documents or include them in texts and cite precisely their location. These official historians stressed that if official history was to be accurate and verifiable history, it would need to provide a documentary guide to the historiographical controversies that official works examined. Their treatises, building upon Páez de Castro’s methodological suggestions for practice, spoke of the need to directly specify primary archival sources within their historiographical works, and to differentiate specifically whether one used those of the Camera Real (state papers) or Reales archivos (Royal archives).279 Such an emphasis upon the need for official historians to provide specificity in their use of primary documents and their location became not only a mark of their treatises, but of late Philippine historiography itself, as Morales, Garibay and Herrera would

279 “si hanse seguido en la historia los papeles de la Cámara Real, y Reales archivos . . .los más importantes son los libros, registros, y relaciones y otros papeles del real y Supremo Consejo de las Indias.” Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 479.
expand upon these requirements in the historical narratives they would write for the Crown. In their treatise, however, these official historians sought to establish a way for official history to claim absolute truth, establishing that the “purity of truth” (*pureza de verdad*) was to be found through the *demonstrable* use of research in archival papers. This explains why they emphasized the need for careful source evaluation, as they were aware that openly presenting their sources might allow the opportunity for further questioning and refutations of their claims, since once sources were revealed, “alternate interpretations” could emerge; that explicates why they needed to be thorough, and their assessments critical, so that their claims could not be challenged.

Aware of the increased scrutiny of their work, and the claims these made for the Crown, official historians understood that every source they found and used needed careful analysis. Thus, it was not just an emphasis on sources that was seen as a necessity, but the establishment of clear principles of source criticism and interpretation. Indeed, in their treatises, Spanish official historians took a very utilitarian attitude towards historical evidence and, in order to make optimum use of it, devised a set of rules for historical judgment, authentication, credibility and proof.

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280 As we shall see in subsequent chapters, official historians would fill their histories with direct passages from their sources, state where they had received their information, name archives, and even supply marginal references and provide lists of their sources. Most importantly, their sources came to take a central role in their official histories. At its most basic, it was assumed that archival documents, especially when dealing with matters of state, were so truthful that they were beyond question, and the historian who used them was deemed a “good historian.” Herrera, when writing to Idiáquez, claimed that archival research helped the historian, “to bring clean the whole truth, soul of history” (“sacar en limpio la verdad, alma de la historia”). BNM Ms/ 5781, fol.130.

281 Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la Historia . . . y como se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 144r.
Political Methods

By bringing together an emphasis on the value of archival knowledge with an assessment of the relative merit of authorities, and by developing the means to determine the authenticity of documents, evaluate eyewitness testimony and corroborate their claims, and by illustrating the application of antiquarian methods, Spanish official historians brought together rules and skills from various humanist disciplines in a new way and for political purposes. Significantly, these official historians emphasized that such superior techniques led to impartiality. As a partial solution to the conflicts that arose in terms of maintaining their impartiality, official historians sought to lay out and master critical methods for their historical writing, and believed that by combining official history with the sorts of analytical history and ways of judging evidence practiced by jurists and antiquarians, they could avoid accusations of bias. They sought to establish means to provide their readers not only with the most useful information, but ultimately with the necessary “truth.” In this way, in their treatises, official historians sought to create a politically useful method of documentary and eyewitness assessment and evaluation, which allowed them to present “truth,” albeit a truth with a particular political value.

Being thorough in the methods used to authenticate their sources had political implications. Indeed, adherence to this methodology was constantly presented in their treatises as necessary to the official historiographic project. Herrera specifically stressed his desire to

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283 As Herrera put it, “Understand that one cannot deliver something as Truth without good authority. It is only by delivering the Truth as revealed through the careful study of documents [as well as the accounts of those eyewitnesses to events] and the authority that these provide, that the [reader] shall witness that the historian is neither biased by Love or Hatred, nor swayed by Partiality or corrupt Affections.” Herrera, “Las grandes utilidades de la historia,” BNM HA/8741, fol. 27.
“certify things” personally so as to “serve the King,”284 while Esteban de Garibay repeated similar comments when it came to gaining personal acquaintance with the facts: “So that our lord is served . . . and this can only be made manifest with the use of documents garnered with great diligence, and that is why [one must] see [and review] these documents, so that one might satisfy any inquiries on these issues, and although one might be certain of issues, one must always desire to certify them first.”285

It would be Ambrosio de Morales, however, who would best clarify how critical techniques had become the historian’s most powerful weapon when making claims and asserting political legitimacy. Indeed, Morales’s thoughts on this matter would greatly influence the thoughts of both Garibay and Herrera and the treatises of these official historians demonstrate a more marked concern with the relationship between antiquarian techniques and their political utility. As part of a community of learned men, united by an enthusiasm for ancient texts and artifacts, official historians engaged in historical, philological, and proto-archeological debate and collaboration. They stressed the need to hunt for sources, compare and contrast accounts, and demonstrated a sophisticated understanding and sensitivity to anachronism, inconsistencies and errors. Their treatises, however, demonstrate more than mere antiquarian interests; rather their treatises sought to provide guidelines for how to use these tools to prove their points and arrive at truth, and to do so specifically for political effect.

284 Herrera, “Las grandes utilidades de la historia,” BNM HA/8741, fol. 2.
285 Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, in Varios attached. Although, it should be noted that, when choosing sources, official historians acknowledged that they were to always favor a local over a foreign source, and they all agreed that they could never use a source which disagreed with the “public record” (los anales públicos). Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 480.
A Better History

Throughout their treatises, these historians reflected upon their duty as both historians and royal officials. Their treatises reveal how the allegiance of official historians lay with both a particular set of scholarly values, and a particular political doctrine, and that the two could be reconciled. For official historians, theory or “how to write history” was intimately tied to the political function of history. Spanish official historians clearly understood the political implications of the official histories they would write, and therefore understood the need to abide by a critical historical method, especially through their use and critical evaluation of sources, because they understood that their works would not only be subject to universal inspection, but also legitimize the intentions and actions of the monarchy. In this way, Spanish official historians sought to come to grips with the two major demands placed upon history—to provide truth and write “good history,” and to provide political utility. Their attempt to reconcile these conflicting obligations by creating a method for practice is one of their major accomplishments.

Significantly, these late-sixteenth-century Spanish official historians framed their attempts to create a “better” history in terms of the nature of the truth represented, the qualities and perceptive abilities of the narrator, and the credibility of the narrative both in relation to the evidence and to the manner in which it was written. Moreover, these historians sought directly to engage in their political task, armed not with abstract ideals or rhetorical strategies, but rather with a clear sense of who they were, and what their public duty was, and how to perform said duty to the best of their abilities. Official historians presented their frustrations surrounding these issues not as the ruminations of removed humanists, but rather as the practical concerns of men
whose own political role they could not ignore. Official historians, therefore, created rules for practice in order best to arrive at the “truth.” In this way they sought to accord new importance to official history in that it offered a “better” means to provide “truth” and therefore, to enhance power.

In their treatises, Philip’s official historians introduced many new prescriptions for official history, one of the most original being the restoration of the reputation and status of official history by raising the standards of ethics, intelligence, and critical skill required in the official historian. Navarra stated it best, in order to ensure neutrality the historian had to be both “dispassionate and authorized.”

Here we see the interesting paradox of the official historian posited as a sign of both the reliability and impartiality of the narrative. Indeed, it was to be a combination of the historian’s moral and technical virtues which would allow him to write “good history” for the Crown. Furthermore, “good history” for official historians not only required skill in inquiry and integrity in selection, but also a more “just style” in writing history which accorded with their subject matter.

Official historians advanced criteria they believed were essential to the theory and practice of writing “truthful” history. They did not see their official role as compromising the historian’s freedom of expression or the fundamental tenets of “perfect history” espoused by Bodin and La Popelinière and other early modern commentators of the artes historicae. Rather,

286 “Historia es una narración llana y verdadera de sucesos y cosas verdaderas escritas por persona sabia, desapasionada y autorizada en orden al público, y particular gobierno de la vida. Contiene esta definición los cuatro géneros de causas: la formal, que es ser narración llana y sencilla; la material, que es de ser de cosas y sucesos verdaderos; la eficiente, que es ser escrito por personal desapasionada y autorizada, y final, que es ordenarse al público y particular gobierno de la vida.” Navarra, “De cuál debe ser el cronista del príncipe,” in Diálogos muy subtiles y notables (1565), 47.
they regarded their role as official historians and as public men as granting them the ultimate freedom of expression, and their methodology as guaranteeing the truth of their cause. For official historians, “legitimate history” was based both in documents and the “honor and integrity of the historian.” Indeed, they wanted their trade to be conditioned by their character and requisite morality and ethics, as well as their constant vigilance in ensuring that nothing which might prejudice the workings of state come to light. This epistemic shift focused primarily on the ethos of the historian, both as a thorough, precise and conscientious practitioner, but also a representative of the republic, affirming the project of historiographic alliance between the historian and the monarchy.

This preoccupation to “above all else” maintain and write for the “public good” and their construction of a methodology in order to write such official history provided a complete and self-conscious rationale for writing official history that was at once compatible with the principles of humanist methodology and with the aim of protecting the Crown. The intellectual outlook and habits of expression fostered by their loyalty to the Crown and the Spanish cause permeated their humanist ideals. As men educated in the humanist fashion to believe that it was their civic duty to serve the common weal, official historians saw the writing of official history as a political act, and their principal obligation as serving as the “spokesman of the state” (la boca de la republica). Indeed, their considerations about the role and obligations of the official historian and his activities indicate their almost religious belief in the notion that the historical truth they provided contributed and maintained political stability. Thus, by implication,

288 Juan de la Puente, the Castilian royal chronicler, claimed that this “had been the role of the [official] historian, under Philip [II], as it is for his son, our King.” Juan de la Puente, Tomo primero de la conveniencia de las dos Monarquías Catolicas, la de la iglesia romana y la del Imperio Español, y defensa de la precedencia de los Reyes Católicos de España a todos los reyes del Mundo (Madrid, 1612), 2.
one could “deliver truth,” but still be partisan. In all of these treatises a distinction emerged between partiality and partisanship. For official historians partisanship meant the assertion that one could be fair-minded and abide by the rules of evidence even if one wrote history for a particular “party.” Ultimately, by defending the public good above all others, even partisan argument could be seen as essential to defining the importance and purpose of historiography, as official historians defined it, and not a methodological flaw. Official historians acknowledged, however, that they had certain sympathies and allegiances which could not be ignored, but which always needed to be conditioned to show neither too much love nor hate, and that was why it became so important for them to outline a method for practice to help them avoid and condition such sympathies.

While the writing of history in the service of power created tensions between the historians’ official obligations and their desire to remain faithful to their craft, it also created opportunities for the use of the requirements of, and conditions for, their craft, and how these could be used to bolster notions of power, authenticity and “truth.” Their desire to be seen as “good historians” and not sycophants sharpened their methodology and humanist historical method and thus helped them move the theory behind official history writing on to a new stage.289 In their stress on the ways history was to be useful for both the prince and government, they purposefully transformed historical methodology itself into an instrument of state with powerful long-term results. Ultimately, it was a humanist understanding of history and the historical profession which allowed official historians to develop methodologies that would serve

289 Indeed, it was notions about, and criticisms of, official history that helped contribute to the establishment of history as a field of activity governed by autonomous rules; it was also through these discussions that impartiality and neutrality at the service of the Crown came to be considered in terms of the historian, his style of writing, his method, his sources, and his regard for truth.
the power structures of late sixteenth-century Spain, indicating how history and power were legitimized by similar forces. The methodological constraints developed by official historians were intended to buttress the authority of the historical narratives they were to write. Notions of history and truth informed each other and both were connected to the interests of the state in a way that shaped the ideals of historical scholarship.

Yet after 1580, we also see that the tensions in writing history for official historians propelled the art of writing official history in even more critical directions. Official historians like Páez de Castro, Fox Morcillo, and Navarra laid the theoretical foundations for official history as a source of fact-based history based on the patient accumulation of evidence, careful consideration of the relative weight and reliability of sources surrounding a particular event, and a self-conscious commitment to create a disinterested narrative that appeared to be both balanced and fair. Morales, Garibay, and Herrera, however, added more stringent critical methods, and especially those of antiquarians to their treatises, and in doing so created a process through which to create their “historical truth.” Indeed, this provided a stepping stone towards the creation of a truly accurate, critically assessed, source-based history. By incorporating the methods of antiquarians and legal humanists into their treatises, they brought new exigencies to historical methodology in Spain. They drew from the ancillary disciplines to create a more stringent method of historical practice for the express purpose of writing official history. Indeed, official historians brought such tools and techniques to their treatises, because they sought to consider ways in which to make official history more effective, and especially more effective for political purposes.
Conclusion

It is not surprising that under the increasing conscription of history for the polemical aims of power and politics, the need for official historians to define the relationship between ideology and methodology would crystallize as never before. Spanish official historians’ ideological loyalty came to form a part of their definition of morality and their theoretical ideas about how to compose history were directly related to their notions regarding the utility of history. Because of history’s pragmatic function and their emphasis on utility, the official historians clearly articulated that as historians, they were to be both practical humanists and scholarly civil servants.

The criteria that guided the writing of official history reveal the political necessities behind the creation of their methodology. In the distinction between truth and error lay matters of political importance. Competing claims to “truth” were understood as competing claims to power and could potentially undermine political authority. Thus, the need to provide an official Spanish “truth” became paramount. “Truth” was a political instrument and the purpose of history was to place things within a very particular perspective which favored the king, his acts, and the Spanish past. Historical truth was another form of legitimization, appealing to reason of state needs. Such thoughts created the shift in their treatises on historical method and their emphasis upon more stringent rules and regulations, as official historians sought to set out the conditions necessary to establish their own historical credibility.

Paradoxically, their political aims meant that the Spanish official historians sought to make historical research and practice capable of attaining a sufficient degree of certitude for the
discipline to be classed among the sciences rather than among the arts of rhetoric, where Aristotle had put it. Indeed, all their treatises regarded history as more of a science for truth rather than an art of rhetoric, and a discipline which placed humanist knowledge and techniques to state use, seeking to unite scholarly erudition with rhetoric. In doing so they also argued for a “new” history, which lay outside the traditional boundaries of the rhetorical tradition. Their treatises, therefore, demonstrated a vigorous spirit of reflection, debate, and experimentation that sought to delineate methods and narrative techniques appropriate to the writing of history for the Crown. This was mainly the result of their desire to reconcile the need to write works for the king and Crown and the increasing politicization of their royal office, with the scholarly demands of humanist historiography. Official historians would try to negotiate this conflict and come to ways in which they could deploy their critical learning and new methodologies to the purposes of political apologetics. Their treatises reveal how they considered the nature of their task and the value of the history they wrote for political reasons, seeking to reconcile these two apparently contradictory objectives to create “better history” for the Crown.

Underlying all of their treatises was the desire to re-assert the authority of the official historian as provider of “truth.” Most importantly, by emphasizing how their predecessors had not written history properly, they presented their conviction that the histories that they would write by following their new methods would be a better type of history. Indeed a passion for rational “proof,” rather than dubious laudation was what inspired official historians when they sought to address the two inherent problems of the task: to uphold scholarship and to defend the political cause. While truth still animated their histories, they understood that the knowledge that characterized their works was even more vital as it helped in the workings of the state and the
maintenance of the public good. They recognized both the significance of their task, and how political necessity would shape their judgments of historical authenticity.

Thus, while the humanist historiographical model in the sixteenth century prescribed eloquence and elevated tone, proper form and elegant style, impartiality and the search for narrative “truth,” Spanish official historians focused more upon the construction of a historical method. Their discussions surrounding history not only entailed an answer to the question, “What is history?” but more importantly, the necessary “conditions” that historians needed to satisfy in order to ensure that their official history became a means of disseminating “truth” and not just adulation of the Crown which they supported. In their treatises, official historians were concerned with the concrete problems of historical scholarship and in creating a method not for reading history, as seen elsewhere in Europe, but for practice, and in particular creating the means to achieve a certain measure of impartiality when writing history, and especially when writing history of political importance. Thus, their treatises focused predominantly on historical method and an expansion of the techniques and critical methods that the official historian was to use.

While the tools they developed needed to be followed in order to ensure that they achieved the required impartiality necessary for any historical study, these constraints would need to be adhered to in order to achieve historical “truth.” It is in their treatises, therefore, that the nature of “truth” itself came to be debated and official historians considered how history and its relationship to politics played a role in determining “truth.” For the official historian, to arrive at the “truth” would require a combination of their professional requirements, their dispositions,
and their methodological framework. Moreover, the truth that history was to reveal was subject to a number of conditions: Truth was to be subject to “decorum and morality” and limited by political utility. Decorum, in this context, was a technical and conceptual crossroads—the place where the protocols of rhetoric now met new demands for prudence.

As we shall see in the following Chapters, the political needs for the “new history” outlined by the Crown in Chapter One and the need to respond through counter-histories to foreign polemical attacks, gave official historians the opportunity to put the “rules” they developed in their treatises into practice. Indeed, it is clearly significant that these treatises were written by the same men who would write the historical narratives required by the Crown. Consequently, official historians were well prepared to write the “better history” that defended Philip and supported the Crown’s objectives in a way that met the new demands for proof and documents. Whether official historians really did create the “good history” as they envisioned in their treatises, can be seen in the official projects they wrote for the Crown, as well as the political effectiveness of these work. As the next two Chapters demonstrate, in practice official historians would assert their dual role as humanists and officials, and would reconcile political necessity and humanist methodology by deploying the methods they developed in their treatises to serve their political objectives. These counter-histories tried to set new standards for impartiality based not only in more common ideas of critically researched work, but by reinforcing the intentions of the writer through style, documentation, and the use of antiquarian skills to evaluate and present sources. The official historians provided the thoroughly researched, critiqued and eloquent “truth” following the best humanist practices to justify, legitimize, and

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290 Navarra, *Qual debe ser el cronista del principe* (1567), 59–60.
advance Spanish dynastic and political action, and supplement Spanish claims to imperial status and authority.
Chapter 3
The Rule of a “Prudent King”: Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas’s *Historia de Portugal*

In 1589 Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas (1549-1626) published *Cinco libros de la historia de Portugal y la conquista de las islas de los Azores* [hereafter referred to as *Historia de Portugal*],¹ his officially commissioned response to Girolamo Conestaggio’s 1585 *Historia dell’unione del regno di Portogallo alla Corona di Castiglia*.² Conestaggio’s³ scathing history challenged the Spanish succession to the Portuguese Crown and criticized the nature and intentions of Spanish rule in Portugal. Herrera was tasked with writing a counter-history that justified the Portuguese succession, defended Spanish actions, and legitimized Spanish rule. Herrera’s document-based account was meant to put to rest any claims made by other aspirants to the throne and to demonstrate that Philip began his rule in Portugal, “on the very basis from which prudence derives,” which was careful consideration of what was best for his new subjects.⁴ However, Herrera’s work was much more than a response to Conestaggio’s polemic; it skillfully used developments in humanist writing and antiquarianism to maintain and strengthen both the claims of the state and the expansion of empire. Herrera not only explained the rational underpinnings of Spanish policy, he provided extensive documentary proof, and thus made his work superior to the accounts of foreigners, which were mere “slanders and lies,” as they lacked

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¹ Antonio de Hererra y Tordesillas, *Cinco libros de la historia de Portugal y la conquista de las islas de los Azores* [Five books on the history of Portugal and the conquest of the islands of the Azores] (Madrid, 1589, 2nd ed. 1591), BNM R/15560. Hereinafter referred to as *Historia de Portugal*.
² Girolamo Conestaggio, *Historia dell’unione del regno di Portogallo alla Corona di Castiglia* [History of the union of the kingdom of Portugal to that of Castile] (Genoa, 1585).
⁴ Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Introduction.
the credibility that only research and documents could provide. Moreover, Herrera’s documentation and argumentation were not glosses on Spanish actions but, rather, a detailed explication of the legitimacy of the succession, and a document-based account of a rule defined by adherence to precedent, privilege and custom.

The immediate and practical purpose of Herrera’s work was clear. Herrera provided the first comprehensive and documented account of Spanish actions in Portugal that justified the Spanish succession and provided concrete proof that Philip abided by Portuguese laws and customs. Herrera knew, however, that his Historia de Portugal was part of a greater project to defend Philip and Spanish imperialist actions through historical writing. As the Crown desired, Herrera conceived of history as an instrument of statecraft and a rhetorical weapon to be used to defend what he called the “public good,” or the reputación of the Monarchy and Spanish imperialism. Herrera saw history as part of the arsenal of weapons that the Monarchy was to deploy against its enemies to defend the legitimacy of Philip’s claims. For these purposes, Herrera understood that the Crown needed a new kind of history, and he used his own understanding of ideology and methodology to build upon the special requirements already laid out by the Crown to produce a “better history.”

As the Crown had demanded, Herrera added to the conventional and traditional justifications of dynastic expansion, the concept of “good kingship,” based on the ruler’s maintenance of order, stability, and justice. He defined the relevant criteria of good kingly behavior—political actions, adherence to precedent and privilege, and respect for Portuguese traditions and customs—and demonstrated how Philip represented the good, “responsible

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5 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 2.
monarch.” Crucially, Herrera reconciled his political project with the humanist demands of his discipline by adhering to what he considered to be a rigorous investigation and presentation of sources and events. Herrera’s deep-rooted commitment to write edifying history, based on a truthful representation of historical reality, served as a catalyst for his emphasis on methodology and his desire to arrive at the “truth” in the most impartial way. In this way, just as in his *artes historicae*, by constantly making reference to how he had sifted through and assessed his evidence, Herrera explicitly found a way to indicate within his text how he was adhering to “proper [historical] methods.” Thus, Herrera not only revealed himself as having adopted one of the primary aims of humanist history—the desire to create an accurate and objective account of events—but directly sought to provide examples within his historical narrative explaining how he had sought to achieve these ends and how he had done so by adhering to strict methodology and criteria.

Indeed, *Historia de Portugal* illustrates the Spanish Crown’s explicit belief that the validity of a historical narrative resided in the qualities and abilities of the historian himself—his experiences, his knowledge, and his skills. The Spanish Crown needed men like Herrera, with historiographical and political experience, to respond to Conestaggio’s polemical attack with critical, well-researched, and archivally based forms of legitimization, and to explain Philip’s rule through the language of Spanish reason of state. Ultimately, Herrera’s work became a powerful political tool that legitimized the actions of the king and Spanish imperialism.

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6 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Prologue.
Herrera the Diplomat

Born in Cuellar (Segovia) in 1549, Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas came from a family known for its loyalty to the Crown—his grandfather, Rodrigo de Tordesillas had died at the hands of the Communeros during their revolt against Charles V in 1520. Antonio, having demonstrated an aptitude for languages at a very early age, was sent to receive a typical humanist education, studying law and philosophy in both Spain and Italy. It was while he was studying in Italy in early 1570 that he became the secretary of Vespasiano Gonzaga Colonna, the Duke of Sabioneta and brother to the Duke of Mantua. Gonzaga was not only a skilled diplomat, he was a writer, military engineer, and patron of the arts whose political and intellectual ideas, and especially his understanding of civic humanism, undoubtedly affected the young Herrera.
Moreover, Gonzaga was absolutely loyal to the Habsburg Empire, and in particular the Spanish Crown, and would become one of Philip’s most faithful advisors and a leading intermediary and advocate for Spanish affairs in Italy.¹¹

Under Gonzaga, Herrera came to learn the world of sixteenth-century diplomacy at its center and became thoroughly familiar with Spanish policy in Italy. For over ten years, Herrera would follow Gonzaga on his diplomatic missions, alternating his time between Italy and Spain, gaining expertise in matters of state.¹² During this time, Herrera served as a political advisor and was entrusted with recording diplomatic negotiations and providing precedents for Gonzaga’s undertakings.¹³ By 1579, Gonzaga, then Viceroy of Valencia, expanded Herrera’s duties to include negotiations in matters of coastal defense and royal policy involving the moriscos; he also had him lead delicate negotiations with the jurtas (city councillors) over questions of fraud and government reform.¹⁴

During his time spent under Gonzaga, Herrera’s administrative work in matters of both governance and war aroused his interest in history and historical writing and especially the history of more current events. By 1585, the year he joined the court in Madrid, Herrera had already translated from Italian into Spanish a history of the wars between the Persians and the Turks which, perhaps anticipating a new post, he had dedicated to both the Spanish Crown and to

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¹³ Moreover, because of Herrera’s loyalty and political finesse, Gonzaga sent him on a secret mission to France with the task of carrying important and “vital” information to Madrid where Herrera was to have personally met with Philip II on Gonzaga’s behalf. Herrera, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 148. See also BL, Additional Ms/ 28.880, fol. 236.
¹⁴ Herrera, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 153v.
Secretary of War and State, Juan de Idiáquez. Herrera had also already sought to find ways to legitimate the actions of the Spanish Crown through history. He had written a history that examined the events in both England and Scotland leading up to the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots, which justified Philip’s decision to intervene in Scottish internal affairs on the basis of Spain’s historical legacy as defender of the faith. Herrera, therefore, had already begun to work propagandistically for the Spanish cause through historical writing even before he came to work directly at the Spanish court, undoubtedly influenced by Gonzaga’s loyalty and devotion to Philip and Spanish imperialism.

Unlike other politically motivated historians, Herrera employed historical research and multiple sources when constructing his historical works and realized the importance of primary sources in his efforts to create the most thorough, well researched, and comprehensive account of events. Herrera first evidenced such erudition in his *La Crónica de los Turcos* [The Chronicle of the Turks], the first manuscript of which appeared in 1576 and which he had dedicated to Gonzaga; it was based on a diverse collection of Venetian, Genoese, Sicilian, and French sources on the Turks. Significantly, Gonzaga’s court turned to Herrera, the historian, rather than polemical tracts, to provide them with much needed accurate information about the Turks and their Empire. Because it was a rigorously researched account, his work became a key source of vital information for the Habsburg courts and their supporters about Turkish Islam and the

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15 Herrera’s manuscript translation (BNM Ms/ 3624, Ms/3606 and Ms/7074) of Giovanni Tomasso Minadoi, *Historia della Guerra fra Turchi, et Persiana* (Roma, 1585), was later published as *Historia de la guerra entre Turcos y Persas [1576-1585]*, (Madrid, 1586). The version with Herrera’s dedication to Idiáquez is held at BNM R/23810.

16 This work circulated in manuscript form (BNM Ms/2347), until it was published as Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Historia de lo sucedido en Escocia e Inglaterra en quarenta y quarto años que vivió María Estuardo, reyna de Escocia* (Madrid, 1589). This work was also written specifically to refute the works of Scottish “Presbyterian” historian, George Buchanan, including his *Rerum Scotiarum Historia* (1582).
workings of the Sultan’s court.¹⁷ Such a penchant for thorough historical investigations bolstered Herrera’s reputation as a historian who could provide vital information in a climate desperate for accurate knowledge of foreign regimes.

By 1585 Gonzaga had become quite ill and sought to find a new position at the Spanish court for his loyal servant; he brought Herrera to Madrid, where he formally introduced him to the King.¹⁸ Gonzaga boasted of Herrera’s diplomatic finesse, his knowledge of both Spanish and Italian politics, his abilities as a trusted secretary and his continuous and uncompromised loyalty to both him and the Habsburg cause.¹⁹ In 1589, Philip II put Herrera to work on translating Giovanni Botero’s *Ragion di Stato* [Reason of State] (1589), not only providing the first translation of this text into another European vernacular, but putting Herrera in the position to be intimately involved in the transmission of political ideas in Spain.²⁰ It is noteworthy that Herrera would be simultaneously writing his history of the events that transpired in Portugal while translating Botero’s reason of state ideas, as well as writing his own observations about emerging

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¹⁷ Later scholars mistakenly attributed this work to various other authors, but recently Fernando Fernández Lanza has definitively proven that the work is indeed that of Herrera. See Fernando Fernández Lanza, “La crónica de los Turcos de Antonio de Herrera y Tordesilas,” at www.archivodelafrontera.com/CLASICOS-003-cronica1.htm (as of July 1st, 2013).


¹⁹ Herrera, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 153v.

²⁰ Philip requested that Herrera translate Botero’s work in 1589, the same year it was published in Italy, RB Ms/ II/1451, fol. 19. Herrera would deliver his first manuscript translation of this text to the King in October of 1590, BNM Ms/ R/8766. Evidence that Herrera’s manuscript version circulated heavily between 1590 and 1592 appears in letters referring to the work; BNM, Ms/22660. That this manuscript translation exists is of utmost importance, as it certifies that Herrera was concurrently working on *Historia de Portugal* while translating Botero’s text. Herrera’s translation would not be published until 1591, appearing as Juan Botero, *Diez Libros de la razón de Estado; con tres libros De las causas de la grandeza, y magnificencia de las ciudades de Juan Botero, traduzido de Italiano en Castellano, por Antonio de Herrera* (Madrid, 1591), BNM R/1148. It contains a ‘Dedicatoria de Antonio de Herrera al Rey Felipe II,’ dated April 12, 1591. Most scholars, however, refer to a later 1593 publication: Juan Botero, *Diez libros de la razón de Estado; con tres libros: De las cosas de la grandeza, y magnificencia de las ciudades* (Madrid, 1593). Robert Bireley is the only scholar to identify the earlier 1591 translation. See Robert Bireley, *The Counter-Reformation Prince: Anti-Machiavellianism or Catholic Statecraft in Early Modern Europe* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 45 and 50.
ideas about Spanish Christian reason of state. Such ideas, therefore, were foremost in his mind and undoubtedly had an impact on how he would position Spanish rule in regard to Portugal.

In his writings, Herrera had also considered specifically how history could be used as a political tool. For Herrera, history was to, “publicize the good deeds of the king and his vassals,” in ways that offered “apologies [formal justifications] and defenses as opposed to simple narrations of events.” Herrera’s own thoughts on the interrelation between history and politics had almost certainly been enhanced by his engagement with Botero and Italian political theory. Herrera even wrote a brief “Discurso y tratado sobre la material de Estado” [“Discourse and treatise on the materials of state”], in which he saw history as one of the most vital tools to help the monarch “secure and maintain power.” Significantly, Herrera’s thoughts on these issues circulated at court, and Herrera even wrote to fellow historian Juan Antonio de Zamacoa of the necessity and “great utilities of history,” and, citing Cicero, explained that history was the best “instrument” to “conserve and perpetuate the King’s praiseworthy and loyal deeds . . . for example and doctrine for centuries to come.”23 He even elaborated in true Tacitist fashion that, “history was necessary for good public governance,” for it helped serve, direct, and provide doctrine for “good government [to be used by] the next generations.” Herrera understood that history served a clear didactic function. His ideas on these issues had clearly been made manifest at the Spanish court.25 Herrera, therefore, was a significant actor in a burgeoning world of political theory, commented upon contemporary political affairs, and furthermore, understood

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21 Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia, BNM Ms/ 1035.
22 Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, “Discurso y tratado sobre la material de Estado,” BNM Ms/ 3011 fols. 49-156. See also BNM Ms/ 1035 and Ms/ 6437.
23 “conservar y perpetuar sus loables hechos . . . para ejemplo y doctrina de los siglos venideros.” Herrera in Papeles Tocantes a Felipe II, BNM, Ms/ 1750, fols. 469–480 (formerly fols. 538–49).
24 doctrina para el buen gobierno de las próximas generaciones.” BNM Ms/ 1750, fol. 479.
25 Letter of Herrera to Bernardino de Avallaneda, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz, Ávila, Castrillo, leg. XVI. See also BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fols. 54–57.
that history was not only useful for understanding the workings of politics, but could be used as a political tool. From the outset, therefore, Herrera was concerned with how to create legitimizing principles through history.

Herrera’s more practical political experience would also contribute to his writing of a counter history. Because of Herrera’s ties to Italy, he had already mastered ways to forge stronger ties between members of different Spanish Kingdoms. He had also helped assert Spanish claims in diplomatic missions and had provided historical precedents for Gonzaga’s undertakings. These experiences were particularly relevant, for as the first historian to be commissioned by the Crown to create an official response to foreign criticism through the writing of “new” history, Herrera was in a unique position to conceive of innovative ways in which this history could be made effective. He used his own political considerations, his previous experience in defending Spanish interests, and his growing understanding of the power of historical methodologies, documents, and diplomatic legal antiquarianism to help him accomplish his task in the most effective way.

One final factor made Herrera the ideal man to take up the task of confronting Conestaggio’s account and convinced Spanish advisors of Herrera’s ability to write the type of politic history that the Crown needed. Idiáquez remarked upon how Herrera was particularly “knowledgeable in the issues” surrounding the Portuguese dynastic dispute, as he had just written ‘Genealogía verdadera de los reyes de Portugal’ (1586) [‘The true genealogy of the

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26 Idiáquez to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 121/40.
kings of Portugal’]. Herrera, therefore, was well-versed in proper Portuguese genealogical precedent, which Idiáquez saw as fundamental in effectively settling the question of Philip’s dynastic primacy. For the Spanish Crown, therefore, Herrera was the ideal candidate to write the response to Conestaggio’s attack, for not only was he a “learned and judicious man, capable of explaining [politics]” but “doctus in [the] historical matters,” surrounding the Portuguese succession.28

It came as no surprise, therefore, that in 1586, when discussion arose surrounding who might take up the challenge of writing responses to the polemical attacks coming from abroad, that Herrera’s name appeared on a list of historians that Idiáquez had created of who he thought most capable of writing the required counter-histories for the Crown.29 Philip, too, immediately recognized Herrera’s aptitude for historical writing and regarded Herrera as vital to the official historiographic enterprise.30 The King specifically commented upon the benefits that his new addition had brought to the royal court in a letter to his official historian Ambrosio de Morales, even mentioning how Herrera might be someone they might look to for help with the writing of a

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27 Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, ‘Genealogía verdadera de los reyes de Portugal’ BNM Ms/ 2/28382. Herrera’s ‘Genealogía verdadera’ had been a response and commentary on Duarte Nuñes de Leão, Censure in libellum De regnum Portogaliae origine (Lisbon, 1585), a work which questioned the origin and pedigree of the Portuguese monarchy. Leão’s work did not challenge Spanish claims to the Portuguese Crown, and in fact, he disavowed any claims that Antonio, Prior of Crato had to the Portuguese throne; he did, however, challenge many of the traditional views as to the origins of the Portuguese Monarchy. Herrera’s ‘Genealogía verdadera’ would remain in manuscript form, until it appeared at the front of a second edition of Leão’s work, re-printed in Lisbon at Philip III’s behest as, Primeira parte das chronicas dos reis de Portugal, reformadas per mandado del rei Philippine (Lisbon, 1600).

28 “docto en asuntos históricos.” Idiáquez, BNM Ms/ 8741, fol. 51. This is almost the exact compliment that both Idiáquez and Moura had made of official historian Juan Páez de Castro, whom both considered the model historian and whom they wished all official historians, and especially those who were to write any counter-histories, to mimic. See Chapter One above.

29 Idiáquez to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 5.

30 Notice of Herrera’s historical works began to appear in Spanish court correspondence in early 1583: BNM Ms/ 34567. On the popularity of Historia de lo sucedido en Escocia, see BNM Ms/ 18633, fol. 64.
new ‘History of the New World.’\textsuperscript{31} Morales also wrote to both the King and Idiáquez commenting on Herrera’s potential as an “official historian,” and specifically argued that Herrera should be considered for the counter-history project.\textsuperscript{32} For Morales, Herrera’s particular skills and long experience in political affairs made him a perfect candidate for writing counter-history for the Crown. Morales recognized Herrera’s abilities as an interlocutor and stressed that Herrera was a, “very knowledgeable man, who knew much of the things of the world,” and moreover, whose moral rectitude was well known and that he was “a man who spoke the truth.”\textsuperscript{33} Most importantly, Morales also stressed that Herrera’s years spent under Gonzaga dealing with political affairs and his previous administrative, scribal and political experience, had made him “interested in things of [the management of] State, guiding his purpose to make matters understandable to ordinary people.”\textsuperscript{34} Idiáquez was quite taken by these claims, for he understood that the Crown needed men who understood politics and political dealings within the new framework of Spanish reason of state and its objectives and who were capable of explaining them to a wider readership.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{31} Philip to Morales, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVIII. On this issue, the following was also stated at the time: “Quo diem suum oveunte Philippus II, Rex Catholicus commendatum sibi in supremis tabulis Atonium conscribendis americanorum rerum commentariis paefecit.”\textit{Antonio, Biblioteca Hispana Nova}, 1: 128.
\textsuperscript{32} Morales to Idiáquez, BNM Ms/12876, fol. 17.
\textsuperscript{33} Morales to Idiáquez, BNM Ms/12876, fol. 17. An anonymous letter also exists which mentions how Herrera’s abilities made him the perfect man to write a response to Conestaggio’s work, as he was considered a “man of truth”: Torre de Tombo, Chancillería de Felipe I. 1238, fol. 12.
\textsuperscript{34} Morales to Idiáquez, BNM Ms/ 12876, fol. 13.
\textsuperscript{35} Soon after receiving this letter from Morales, Idiáquez approached Herrera to begin work on a monumental project designed to defend the Crown: a “general history of the world” from 1559, the year when Philip established peace with France and began his reign in Spain, to the then present. Idiáquez impressed upon Herrera that such a history was necessary because Venetian historians like Paolo Giovio, Pietro Giustiniana, and Giovanni Batista Adriani had written histories that were against “the interests of our nation” (“no servían a los intereses de la nación [española]”) by vilifying Spanish actions abroad, and so a “world” history from a Spanish perspective was necessary. (Herrera mentions this meeting in Herrera to Bernardino de Avallaneda, Madrid, 11/22/1589, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVI.) This was a reference to Paolo Giovio’s, \textit{Delle istorie del suo tempo} (Venice 1556); Pietro Giustiniana’s, \textit{Rerum ventarum ab urbe condita} (Venice 1560); and Giovanni Batista Adriani’s, \textit{Istoria de suoi tempi} (Venice, 1583). Govio’s work, in particular, worried the Crown, for it claimed to write universal contemporary history based on public documents, private letters, and information procured by interview. (On Govio see Eric Cochrane, \textit{Historians and Historiography in the Italian Renaissance}}
Herrera, therefore, was selected to write the Crown’s response and Idiáquez sent him an urgent letter requesting that he suspend all his other activities in order to deal with, as Idiáquez put it, a “much more pressing” matter: the need to respond to Conestaggio’s scurrilous *Historia dell’unione*. In this letter, Herrera was specifically tasked by Idiáquez to study carefully Conestaggio’s text, look at its arguments, and focus on the specific ways in which it portrayed the King and Spanish actions. It would not be until a year later, however, in 1587, undoubtedly precipitated by the growing popularity of Conestaggio’s work across Europe, that Herrera was officially commissioned to write a response to Conestaggio’s work, a task that took him almost two years to complete.

Conestaggio the Apostate

Conestaggio’s *Historia dell’unione* provided an account of Portuguese social, military, and political history from the period of “the youthful training of King Sebastian” in 1577,
through what Conestaggio called the “loss of Portuguese independence” in 1580 and the
beginnings of Spanish rule, to 1585. Conestaggio chose this characterization and time period
deliberately, since, by recounting the events from 1577 to 1585 was he able to not only discuss
the question of dynastic succession and whether the Spaniards were the rightful heirs to the
Portuguese throne after Sebastian’s death, but it also provided him with a way of recounting the
events leading up to the annexation and also how Spaniards and Philip established their rule in
Portugal.

Although a rather typical polemical attack for the time, Conestaggio’s work had caused
great alarm in the Spanish court, as it was among a group of works from abroad that threatened
Spanish reputación and undermined Spanish power by painting a negative picture of Spanish
rule and its imperialist intentions within Europe.39 There were additional reasons, however, why
Conestaggio’s work was taken to be particularly threatening to Spanish power and why a specific
response to this work was needed. Conestaggio’s work advanced two main arguments. First, his
work was intended primarily to demonstrate the questionable nature of Philip’s dynastic claim to
Portugal, as Conestaggio claimed that there were other, more direct, successors to the Portuguese
throne than Philip. Second, Conestaggio’s work openly criticized the nature of Spanish rule in
Portugal and claimed that when Philip took the throne, he did not respect privilege or precedent,
nor the long-established and guarded liberties, laws, concordats, and rights of the Portuguese,
and, therefore, brought to Portugal a form of tyranny. Through his two-pronged argument,
Conestaggio claimed not only that Philip and Spaniards had taken the Portuguese throne

39 For a further discussion of the nature of such attacks and why they caused such concern to the Spanish Crown, see
Chapter One above.
unlawfully by usurping dynastic precedent, but that they ruled the Portuguese not as good and lawful rulers, but as “oppressors.”

The first challenge that Conestaggio’s work posed was that it questioned the legitimacy of Philip’s dynastic primacy to Portugal. The Spanish Crown had no doubt of Philip’s legitimate right to the Portuguese succession. Yet the fact that Conestaggio questioned Philip’s primacy remained a concern, especially since other claimants to the Portuguese throne continued to assert their own claims, even after Philip had annexed Portugal in 1580. Discussions about who was the rightful claimant to the Portuguese throne and other pertinent questions regarding the Portuguese dynastic succession were longstanding and had arisen immediately after the untimely death of the Portuguese king, Sebastian. When Philip asserted his claim in 1580 and annexed Portugal, supporters of the remaining aspirants to the throne accused the Spaniards of usurping dynastic rights, and wrongfully using dynastic genealogy as proof of their claims. Moreover, the Spanish annexation of Portugal had provoked the ire of many Spanish detractors, mainly in England and the Low Countries, who also averred that Philip’s claim to the throne was not the most worthy and that other pretenders had similar, if not more valid, claims to Portugal and its empire.

In the late summer of 1578, a childless King Sebastian (1554-1578), Philip’s nephew through the marriage of his sister Juana to prince Joao (Juan), died during an ill-conceived attempt to carry out a crusade in Africa. Cardinal Henry (r. 1578-80), Sebastian’s great uncle, and last living son of Sebastian’s grandfather King Don Manuel, was proclaimed the next king,

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but as he was already sixty-six and vowed to celibacy, the question as to who would succeed him remained unresolved. Philip possessed the strongest dynastic claim to the Portuguese throne, and at Henry’s death in 1580 the Spanish king quickly dispatched an army to Portugal to secure what jurists had told him was rightfully his. Other claimants to the Portuguese throne included Sebastian’s cousin Catherine, the duchess of Braganza, and his nephew, Rainunccio Farnese. Another contender was Antonio, prior of Crato, a bastard nephew of Cardinal Henry, who had sought the aid of both the French and the English to take the Portuguese throne.

Drawing upon the same arguments as these Spanish opponents, Conestaggio set the stage for the illegitimacy of Philip’s succession by claiming that other pretenders, especially Catherine, had stronger dynastic claims to the Portuguese throne, and while he did not entirely dismiss Philip’s claim, he ranked it well below those of others. For Conestaggio, Philip’s claim to preeminence to the throne through his mother was essentially a “false dynastic claim,” since Catherine of Breganza, and even Rainunccio Farnese, had stronger claims to the throne, as they were derived through Don Manuel’s male heirs. For Conestaggio, according to feudal custom, it was the children of male heirs that always held preeminence. Conestaggio stressed that Catherine of Breganza had the strongest claim to the throne, and therefore, Spain’s incursion into Portugal was to be regarded as an act of “conquest” rather than accession. Furthermore,

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43 Conestaggio even provided his own genealogical schematic at the end of his work to explain how other claims were much more direct and justified than Philip’s. Only the original manuscript and the first version published in Genoa have this genealogical schematic, which is omitted in subsequent publications and in translations. The version that Herrera was responding to did have this chart.
44 “If men will not believe that Catherine’s prerogative by her father be of more virtue and efficacious than Philip’s own right, and that the imperfection derived from his mother [doth] more prejudice the king, than that of the Duchess which remains in her own person, how can I help it?” Conestaggio, The Historie of the Uniting of the Kingdom of Portugal to the Crown of Castile (London, 1600), Preface.
45 It should be noted that modern scholarship reveals that despite foreign criticisms and despite Spanish military actions, the terms on which Portugal accepted Philip make it plain that there was no “conquest,” and that there was
Conestaggio claimed that precedents derived from an ancient Portuguese privilege given to the people by past Portuguese kings, established that if two claimants to the throne had legally rightful cases, the Portuguese had the “right to choose” their successor.\textsuperscript{46} Therefore, Conestaggio asserted that by taking the throne Philip had failed to uphold Portuguese processes and privileges.

The second major problem that Conestaggio’s work posed for the Spanish Crown was the way he characterized Philip and Spanish rule. Conestaggio directly attacked the nature of Spanish rule in Portugal by insisting that Philip failed to fulfill his royal obligations, usurped time honored tradition, disregarded the needs as well as the basic rights and privileges of the Portuguese people, and dedicated himself to the “things of the king’s own whim and fancy.”\textsuperscript{47}

Moreover, Conestaggio characterized Spanish control of Portugal as one based solely on self-interest, and especially ambition and greed.\textsuperscript{48} Because of this, Spanish rule of Portugal was one of “excesses,” and one which only sought to “drain and gouge Portugal of the riches of its empire.”\textsuperscript{49} Thus, for Conestaggio the Spanish annexation of Portugal had been motivated solely by Philip’s imperial and economic desires. That explained why, Conestaggio claimed, Philip never any truth to the dynastic usurpation envisioned by Spanish detractors and endorsed by other Portuguese pretenders. See especially, Ronald Cueto, “1580 and All That ... : Philip II and the Politics of the Portuguese Succession,” \textit{Portuguese Studies} 8 (1992): 150–169; Geoffrey Parker, “David or Goliath? Philip II and His World in the 1580s,” in Richard L. Kagan and Geoffrey Parker, eds., \textit{Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World: Essays in Honour of John H. Elliott} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 245–266. See also Fernando Bouza, \textit{Portugal no tempo dos Filipes: Polifítica, cultura, representações (1580–1668)} (Lisbon: Edições Cosmos, 2000), Ch 1; Jean-Frédéric Schaub, \textit{Portugal na monarquia hispânica, 1580–1640} (Lisbon: Libros Horizonte, 2001), Ch. 1; Juan Gil, “Balance de la Unión Ibérica: Éxitos y Fracasos,” in \textit{A União ibérica e o mundo atlântico}, ed. Maria da Graça M. Ventura (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 1997), 367–383.

\textsuperscript{46} Conestaggio claimed that he had been told that the documents that attested to this “right” of the Portuguese people to “elect” their next King existed, although he did not claim to have seen the documents himself. Conestaggio, \textit{Historia dell’unione}, Preface.

\textsuperscript{47} Conestaggio, \textit{Historia dell’unione}, 21.

\textsuperscript{48} Conestaggio, \textit{Historia dell’unione}, 1–2.

\textsuperscript{49} Conestaggio claimed that “the union with Portugal” occurred solely because of “Philip’s complete desire [his self-interest], for the many riches which could be continuously taken from the East and West Indies,” and because of this Portugal was “pursued at all cost . . . and aided by force.” Conestaggio, \textit{Historia dell’unione}, 2.
had used brute military force as well as all the coercive machinery of state to ensure that his enterprise in Portugal succeeded. Conestaggio contended that such actions demonstrated a kind of realpolitik worthy of Machiavelli. Indeed, Conestaggio characterized Philip as duplicitous and devious, emphasizing how he had established his power in Portugal through misinformation, violence, intimidation, bribery, propaganda, and other dubious methods, making parts of his text read like a litany of the abuses of power of a capricious king. Not only did Conestaggio characterize Philip’s and Spanish intentions and ambitions as strictly utilitarian and for personal gain, but he argued in truly Machiavellian terms that Spanish actions “put the glory and maintenance of the monarchy not in being loved, but by being feared by their peoples.” As “proof,” Conestaggio provided numerous instances of Spanish cruelty. For example, when recounting the Spanish taking of the Azores he wrote: “they entered the Azores with so much determination to repress the last resistance [in the Terceres Islands], that they united under a cruelty worse than that of the Turks, which resulted in a grave public affront, which the Spanish nation could not easily erase.” Thus, Conestaggio characterized Spaniards and Philip as “foreign invaders” who failed to uphold Portuguese rights and privileges.

Conestaggio’s work, therefore, was not just a historical account of the events leading up to and during the annexation of Portugal, but rather an indictment of Spanish imperial rule in Portugal. Indeed, Conestaggio dramatically framed his work as one whose purpose was “to report the fall,” of the Portuguese state. Significantly, Conestaggio sought to demonstrate the

50 Conestaggio, Historia dell’unione, 159.
51 Conestaggio, Historia dell’unione, 153. Conestaggio even melodramatically elaborated upon this event: “the killing of French prisoners” on the island by the Spanish, who were “taken from a holy place [the French had supposedly sought shelter in a Church], was such a terrible act, that it so horrified the good Pope Gregory . . . that he could not contain his tears.” Conestaggio, Historia dell’unione, 156.
52 Conestaggio, Historia dell’unione, 159.
53 Conestaggio, Historia dell’unione, Prologue.
problems brought by Spanish rule, by noting Philip’s personal deficiencies, concentrating on the
King’s personal mistakes, wrongdoings, and failures. Conestaggio included numerous inglorious
details, such as Philip’s fondness for dark-haired women, his elaborate and decadent eating
habits, his deplorable hygiene, and his supposedly numerous illegitimate children. He extended
such characterizations to the nobles who had travelled to Portugal with Philip, concentrating on
their “whims and fancies,” such as their tendency to violence, or their immoral behavior, and
included incidents such as that of a Spanish official cheating a Portuguese merchant out of his
money.54 These sordid details were provided by Conestaggio as “proof” of the political and
moral contours of Philip’s and Spanish rule. For Conestaggio, demonstrating such personal
foibles was essential, because he claimed that Philip’s morally deficient was reflected in the
Spanish state, and thus Spanish imperial rule would inevitably lead to Portugal’s ruin.

Indeed, Conestaggio skillfully showed that the “conquest” of Portugal was an evil
travesty that unmasked the “unrelenting appetite” of the king and “unleashed upon the
Portuguese court and people his vices and greed.”55 Conestaggio claimed that since the Spanish
occupation, Portugal had become a place wracked by “civil madness,” as the ambitions of the
king had “infected” the Portuguese people.56 Conestaggio presented the decay of Portugal,
therefore, as imminent—and it was Philip’s degenerate vices that would ultimately ruin Portugal.
These personal attacks on Philip allowed Conestaggio to move from the personal sphere to the
political. Conestaggio developed a double vortex of private and public decadence by juxtaposing
Philip’s depravity, the weaknesses of the royal head, with the corresponding disease in the body
politic. Conestaggio’s view of the state and the qualities of the king were one and the same, as he

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sought to demonstrate “vices which are common to states, and to men’s private humors . . . [and that these] march always united to the state and the qualities of the person.” Further, it was not only Philip, but the men, the grandes, whom the King had appointed to crucial posts in Portugal who were also “unrelenting egoists” and whose “Vanity, Greed and Idleness[Sloth]”—mortal sins—would ensure that Spanish depravity would destroy Portugal, especially since, as Conestaggio claimed, such Spanish “delights and idleness are capital enemies to any state,” and in this way Conestaggio also attacked the Spanish character.

While Conestaggio drew on contemporary models of political polemics to make his conventional charges against Philip as a “bad ruler,” his attack on Philip’s dynastic supremacy and his more scathing personal characterization of Spanish and Philip’s actions and intentions concerning Portugal caused enormous concern among Spanish advisors. In light of new understandings of power and politics based in the nature of rule, attacks on Philip’s personal character and rule had taken on new meaning, especially since Portugal and Spain were unified only by a common king. Moreover, there was a concern that the spread of such ideas might foment discontent and perhaps even rebellion in Portugal. Both Idiáquez, Philip’s Secretary of War and State, and Cristóbal de Moura, whom Philip had recently appointed as Secretary to

57 Conestaggio, Historia dell’unione, 21.
58 Conestaggio characterized these Spanish nobles as “jealous, circumspect, ambitious, temporizers, careful to their own cares, and careless of others . . . being qualities that accompany all of [Philip’s] favorites.” Conestaggio, Historia dell’unione, 8.
59 Conestaggio, Historia dell’unione, 9. Moreover, ambition and greed were the worst insults that could be levied against a ruler. (John G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1: 90.) As Herrera put it, “the worst of the insults against the King [that Conestaggio levels], is that your Majesty had the fault of ambition” (“y procura que de los insultos contra el Rey tenga su Majestad la culpa ambicioso”). Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Carta Dedicatoria.
60 Accusations of greed, in particular, both offended and worried Spanish advisors, as diplomatic correspondence from a Spanish emissary in Portugal had revealed that similar rumors had begun to circulate in the Portuguese court, which claimed that Spain had taken over Portugal only for its overseas empire. Gómez Dávila to Conde de Benavente, San Lorenzo, 7/25/1590, AHN, Frías, Caja 25–44.
61 For a further discussion of these issues see the Introduction and Chapter One above.
Portugal, agreed that an immediate response to this work was necessary. Moura immediately impressed upon the King the need for a full-fledged history documenting the “legitimacy of his [Portuguese] succession.”\textsuperscript{62} The Spanish Crown, therefore, in hopes of dispelling such foreign “calumnies” and ultimately creating new forms of political legitimacy to solidify their claims to Portugal, commissioned its own historical narrative of the events leading up to and during the Spanish annexation of Portugal.

Despite their concern for its influence, the Spanish advisors clearly regarded Conestaggio’s dynastic claims and his characterizations of Philip and Spanish rule in Portugal as mere lies and slanders.\textsuperscript{63} More importantly, Moura regarded Conestaggio’s work as “not real history,” because he had not based his work on sound and thorough research, nor did he provide documentary evidence to support his claims.\textsuperscript{64} Indeed, the major criticism leveled at Conestaggio’s work by the Crown was that it was “a composition of lies,” which failed to verify or substantiate any of his claims; the observant reader could easily see that his work was simply “unfounded” and thus “false” because it lacked “proof.”\textsuperscript{65} As Moura had commented, “if Conestaggio had investigated the records, he would have realized the truth . . . the reality.”\textsuperscript{66} In addition, they argued that Conestaggio’s work was vulnerable to attack, because he did not understand the nature of Spanish politics, or the causes that had driven Spaniards to take the actions they did, as he was a man with “no experience in the understanding of political affairs.”

\textsuperscript{62} Moura to Philip, BFZ (Colección Zabál buru) Ms/ 1045, fol. 438. See also Moura’s 1589 letters to Philip on Conestaggio’s work, and its increased popularity, BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 148, fols. 16 and 21.
\textsuperscript{63} Spanish diplomats at the Portuguese court claimed that Conestaggio had simply “invented” his account as well as his sources of information, and thus was mere fabrication, and that moreover, his work was easily discredited since they could verify that it clearly contained “a thousand mistakes.” BNM Ms/ 18768.
\textsuperscript{64} “No es historia.” For Spanish official historian Ambrosio de Morales, Conestaggio’s lack of “proof” made his work anti-historical, and thus not a “true history.” Moura to Morales and Morales’ response, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVII.
\textsuperscript{65} “composición de mentiras,” “falso,” “no tiene prueba.” Idiáquez to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 74.
\textsuperscript{66} Moura to Herrera, BNM Ms/ 954, fol. 1.
and furthermore he was “not a learned man, . . . [nor] a trained historian.” Thus, the Spanish Crown believed that it would be easy to rebut his claims with a counter-history that would “respond to the calumnies and false imputations being made against [Philip]” by providing a “better history.” The Spanish counter-response was to be based in documents and it would demonstrate the true nature of Philippine rule by examining historical causes; moreover, it would be written by someone knowledgeable in politics and the affairs of state.

Thus, Herrera’s counter-history was never meant to be a simple account of the events leading up to, during, and immediately following the Spanish annexation of Portugal. Before proceeding with his narrative history of the Portuguese annexation and Spanish actions in Portugal between 1579 and 1589, Herrera began his work with a genealogy and a short account of the lives of past Portuguese Kings up to the reign of Sebastian. He followed this with an ‘Introduction’ that looked at the years preceding the annexation, starting in 1577 to provide a detailed explanation of how and why Philip had decided to claim his Portuguese inheritance. Herrera stressed that in order to understand the “causes and motives” (causas y motivos) behind Spanish actions, one needed to consider the events leading up to the annexation, and that it was only by “going back to the beginnings of actions” that he was able to demonstrate why Philip had sought to assert his claim to the Portuguese throne and thus conclusively demonstrate that Philip’s intentions in Portugal had never been about greed or gain.

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67 Idiáquez to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 74.
68 As Moura put it, because of their use of sources and their emphasis on causes, in the official Spanish response “the clarity of truth [is sure to prevail] against these false charges leveled at the King.” (“la claridad de la verdad . . . vencerá[sic] los falso cargos contra el Rey.”) Moura to Philip, RB II/ 34-6.
69 “las causas que movieron al Rey y a sus consejeros.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Prologue. “de donde comenzó,” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction. For Herrera, the reasons which moved kings to action were “the soul of kingdoms and provinces,” and thus, were vital to demonstrating the nature of Spanish rule (“el alma de los reinos y provincias” . . . significa prudencia política . . . consiste en lo que se propone, en lo que se aconseja y en lo que se determina para fundar un Estado, para aumentarle y para conservarle.”) BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 50–56v.
Bringing to light Philip’s intentions and how they had guided his actions became especially important since, as Herrera affirmed, Conestaggio had “prolifically dismiss[ed] the causes that moved the King to action” and when addressing “the actions of Spaniards, he never looks directly at their justifications [reasons for actions].” For Herrera, Conestaggio had facilely accused Philip of taking an interest in Portugal on a whim or through greed. It was Herrera’s task, therefore, “[to reveal] what moved the King, so that we may reveal the errors of those who have written about the successes [in Portugal] without the true light and information that they should have had.” Significantly, Herrera stressed that it was impossible for Conestaggio to determine the true motivations and causes that moved Philip to act the way he had, since Conestaggio did not have access to the court documents and Spanish histories that made such causes and precedents for action known, and moreover, Conestaggio had not had access to the first-hand political knowledge that Herrera enjoyed. Conestaggio did not know the “laws, institutions, and precedents behind Spanish actions” and as such did not understand the “true” nature of Philip’s decision, which explained why he simply characterized the King’s annexation of Portugal as self-interested and ruthless. Herrera explained to the reader that this was undoubtedly why Conestaggio had deprecated Philip’s actions. Herrera made manifest that it was both his own unique skill set, and especially his political knowledge and access to

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70 “discurre prolijamente sobre las causas que movieron al Rey” and “de las acciones de los Españoles jamás examina la justificación derechamente.” Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Introduction and 66. Interestingly, Herrera reversed the terms of the controversy by laying the burden of proof at Conestaggio’s door, and in doing so stressed that it was Conestaggio who had to produce concrete evidence of bad Spanish behavior if his account was to be credited.
71 In a letter written a few years after the publication of *Historia de Portugal*, Herrera reflected on what had motivated the Crown and the King to commission this work: “Y esto fue lo que movió al Rey nuestro señor, porque puedan ser conocidos los errores de los que han escrito los sucesos [en Portugal] sin la verdadera luz é información que debían tener.” AGS, Contaduría de Mercedes, legajo 149, fol. 4. See also, AGS, Estado, legajo 409, fol. 249.
72 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Introduction.
73 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Introduction. Conestaggio was either unfamiliar, or purposefully ignored, many of the legal bases of Spanish actions.
information that allowed him to reveal the “true causes and intentions” of Philip’s and Spanish actions and to present to the reader the inner workings of politics.

The purpose of Herrera’s history, however, was not only to refute Conestagggio’s claims but to outline the general causes that had moved Philip and Spaniards to ensure Philip’s Portuguese inheritance. For Herrera, Philip’s motivations for actions in Portugal were dynastic rights, religion, securing the common good, and ensuring peace, order, continuity and, hence, stability in his imperial domains. In all these actions, Philip was guided to make decisions based on Portuguese customs and laws and abided by his contractual responsibilities and his prudential politics. Ultimately, therefore, this “new” history not only provided the necessary arguments to assert and convince readers of the just and rightful annexation of Portugal, it simultaneously demonstrated Philip’s Christian reason of state politics and provided the documentation that supported its claims. Herrera, therefore, sought to write a political history of Spanish actions in Portugal. This is significant since, in contrast to Conestagggio’s consideration of the King’s personal attributes and characteristics, which he used to vilify the King and his regime, Herrera focused instead on Philip’s political personality - the king in his “dignitas.” Herrera presented Philip as a monarch “tireless in his dispatch of government business,” concerning himself solely with government and not his personal needs or wants.

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74 Which was to “ensure [his] just inheritance,” “ensure the conservation of the monarchy,” and “[maintain the] true dynastic bloodline.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction.
75 “su continuo e incansable trabajo en el despacho de los negocios” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction, and repeated on 251.
Philip the Prudent King

Herrera set out to protect the royal prestige by adhering to what the Crown had requested: to reveal the nature of Spanish Kingship through his explanation of the causes that moved Philip to annex Portugal. Herrera understood the political implications that revealing these intentions possessed, for as he wrote in his own “Discurso y tratado sobre la material de Estado” [Discourse and treatise on the materials of state], explaining the causes and intentions behind political action would always help the monarch “secure and maintain power,” especially if they demonstrated how the king was moved to action “by religion and prudence.”76

Herrera was also aware that it was not only important that he had the knowledge necessary to “find the causality and motivations of events,” he had to be perceived as a man with the knowledge of “moral and natural philosophy, Genealogy, Law, . . .” that allowed him to “pursue the historic action as it progresses and see it in its multiple aspects: historical, political, military and scientific . . .”77 In his Prologue, Herrera made clear to the reader that his ability to reveal a “truthful account of events,” depended specifically upon his education, intellect and political acumen.78 Herrera asserted that the combination of his humanist training and political knowledge allowed him to understand the “true causes and intentions” behind political actions that foreigners like Conestaggio were unable to grasp. He characterized Conestaggio as a man

76 “las formas tan católicas y prudentes con q ha gobernado sus Reynos y Estados.” Herrera, “Discurso y tratado sobre la material de Estado,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 49v–61r.
77 “Porque el historiador ha de buscar la causalidad y motivaciones de los hechos . . . el historiador debe conocer la filosofía moral y natural, Genealogía, Derecho, ect. . . . una preparación compleja, que le permite perseguir el hecho histórico en sus cambiantes y múltiples aspectos [como] historia, politica, militar y científica.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Al lector. Herrera had made similar comments as to the necessary education and political and historiographical knowledge required of the “good historian” in his treatise ‘On the benefits of history’: Discursos sobre los provechos de la historia, BNM Ms/ 1035.
78 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Prologue.
who “lacked intellectual training” and thus was not a trained humanist scholar, but rather solely “an agent of Stéfano Lercaro in Lisbon, whose patron’s commercial interests forced him into commenting on politics, of which he had no knowledge.” Further, Herrera explicitly stated that since Conestaggio had “no knowledge of politics, . . . he could not understand [its] difficulties or subtleties.”

Herrera emphasized that, while the populace in its innocence always believed that it was the same thing ‘To be both a good man and a good king,’ those knowledgeable in political ideas understood that this issue was more complicated. Indeed, Herrera underscored that those who were not versed in politics, like Conestaggio, were unable to understand that sometimes, because of the complexities of politics, intentions and outcomes could differ. Herrera saw it as his task to illuminate the true political motivations and ideals behind Spanish actions and so reveal the intricacies of rule. Herrera stressed that as Gonzaga’s secretary he had been involved in various affairs of state and had acquired considerable expertise in matters pertaining to governance and administration and that such unique qualifications ensured that his work provided a thoughtful and careful evaluation. Furthermore, since he understood the inner workings of politics, he could use his history “to explain them.”

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79 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Prologue. Herrera was not the only historian making accusations concerning Conestaggio’s lack of intellectual training. Fellow historian Fernando Góis Loureiro also claimed that Conestaggio was “not a historian” but rather, a “liar,” who “willfully set out to discredit the justifications of Spanish claims,” and as “intrusive and incompetent . . . a simple salesman.” Fernando Góis Loureiro, *Jornada del Rey dom Sebastião à África* (Lisbon, 1595), 12 and 24.

80 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Al lector. Similarly, Sebastián de Cormellas commented that Conestaggio’s work “contained many lies . . . as it did not understand the workings of [Spanish] politics.” Sebastián de Cormellas, *Historia de la union del reyno de Portugal a la corona de Castilla* (Barcelona, 1610), 5.

81 “poner en claro,” “dar claridad,” “hacer manifesto,” “poner en orden” “explicar las causas . . . porque no tiene la [información] correcta.” Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, ‘Al lector’ and Preface. See also Herrera to Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 75.
As Herrera explained in his Introduction, the primary purpose of his work was to demonstrate how Philip acted “prudently” (*con prudencia*), by providing an account of how the King based his decisions only in “mature and knowledgeable advice and deliberations in all things, founded in great causes and reasons, according to the needs of the time, . . . [and] especially in the matter of Portugal.”82 This explained why it was so necessary to look at Philip’s actions from cause to effect, for Herrera stressed that this was the only way to reveal fully Philip’s prudential politics.83 For Herrera, prudence was part of knowledge: the ability to choose what was best from a variety of options and act upon it, thus revealing the pragmatic nature of rule.84 Indeed, prudence meant the correct application of custom and tradition to political practice. Therefore, just as the Crown had requested that Herrera focus on and demonstrate the causes that moved the King (or the virtues that moved him) to action in Portugal, for Herrera, the most important political principle to elucidate was Philip’s prudence, since his prudence in the workings of government was what made Philip a monarch who superseded all others.

Herrera was not alone in stressing the value of prudence above all other political virtues. The term had become an important part of the vocabulary of the “new” humanists of the 1580s, like Justus Lipsius and emerging Italian and Spanish Tacitists.85 Herrera, like Lipsius, had even identified reason of state with “the means of increasing and preserving the realm through

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82 “sus maduros y sabios consejos y deliberaciones para todo ello, fundado en grandes causas y razones, según el estado de los tiempos.” Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Introduction.
83 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Introduction.
84 For Herrera, the basic principle of reason of state was “political prudence . . . [which] consists in what is proposed, in what is advised [counseled], and in what is determined to be the fundament of a State, [in order] to augment and conserve it” (“razón de estado . . . significa prudencia política . . . consiste en lo que se propone, en lo que se aconseja y en lo que se determina para fundar un Estado, para aumentarle y para conservarle”). BNM Ms/3011, fols. 50–56v.
prudence.”

For both Herrera and later sixteenth-century Spanish political theorists, prudence was the cardinal virtue of the ruler and politician as it combined morality with political skill, as in the Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions. Herrera, therefore, positioned his *Historia de Portugal* as a means to show how Philip had used the utmost political prudence in coming to his decisions regarding Portugal. It was not greed or selfish desire, but rather “the needs of the time,” that moved Philip to action in Portugal, because he always did what was “best for [his] realm[s], and God,” which were the “true and right reasons” for action.

Philip’s prudence, therefore, was key to demonstrating the Crown’s strategies of Christian reason of state. Indeed, it becomes remarkably and immediately evident that one cannot consider the *Historia de Portugal* without reflecting upon how Herrera personally envisioned the politics of Christian reason of state, for it is against the backdrop of his political considerations...
understanding that one understands why he emphasized certain aspects and not others of Philip’s intentions and rule in Portugal.90 In this, Herrera was profoundly influenced not only by the ideas of Giovanni Botero, but by another Italian political theorist, Girolamo Franchetta.91 Franchetta had also worked under the Gonzagas in Urbino and was a strong proponent of that court’s emphasis on the *moral* qualities of Spanish rule in Italy.92 Herrera borrowed directly from Franchetta his thoughts on how reason of state was of two types: “One, the true [reason of state], . . . which I call civil prudence, is separated neither from moral virtue or religion, and therefore is true reason and rule of government. The other is counterfeit, as it is concerned only with the advantage of him who uses it, with no consideration for God or duty.”93 By identifying Spanish reason of state in Portugal with “civil prudence,” Herrera took from Franchetta the assimilation of the writing on politics of the new humanists (who advocated more of a Tacitean approach to politics) and melded it with the traditional accounts of princely politics found in all humanist writings, derived from both Aristotelian and Roman traditions, with their clear moral restrictions on what the prince was entitled to do. Although Herrera took a Tacitean approach to writing history, which aimed to reveal the causes behind political action, he differed from Tacitists elsewhere, who believed that Ciceronian “prudence” with its clear moral constraints was inadequate as a way of understanding the reality of imperial politics.94 Herrera, rather, would reconcile imperial politics with his version of “true” reason of state, which was obliged to follow orthodox Christian principles. In fact, Herrera sought to demonstrate in *Historia de Portugal*

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90 Herrera, “Discurso y tratado sobre la material de Estado,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 49v–61r.
how only Spanish hegemony could secure the moral integrity of the entire Iberian peninsula and preserve Portugal’s true liberty.

For Herrera, the protection of Portuguese Catholicism was the primary principle that had guided Philip’s approach to his Luisitanian inheritance. Herrera made clear that it had been paramount for the Spanish Crown to ensure that Catholicism prevail in Portugal and its empire, especially against the attempts of the Protestant-supported Antonio of Crato. Herrera was especially critical about the fact that Conestaggio had failed to recognize these religious motivations, “Conestaggio always sees any Spanish resolution as erred . . . [and is] always passing judgment, . . . [but] he never accords the political with the sacred.” In fact, Conestaggio had gone so far as to claim that Philip’s insistence on the justice of his right to the Crown of Portugal was “not to assure his conscience, as he says, but rather to find some way of doing what he wishes with an appearance of religion.”

Demonstrating that Philip’s defense of the faith in Portugal was not one of Machiavellian appearance, but was sincere, was of utmost importance to Philip and his advisors, especially in a political system in which politics and religion were inextricably interwoven. For Herrera, as for most of his contemporaries, religion constituted an essential bond between the king and his subjects. Moreover, the ravages of conflict in France, Germany, and England added force and

95 “para mantener la paz, justicia y religión que hay en las demás provincias fuera della [the colonies] . . . contra las acciones de Antonio.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction.
96 “siempre pasando juicio . . . i siempre da por errada la resolución de España . . . nunca concuerda lo político con lo sagrado.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction.
97 Emphasis mine. Conestaggio, Historia dell’unione. 78.
98 Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince, 88. Fernando Bouza, “La cosmovisión del Siglo de Oro: Ideas y supersticiones,” in La vida cotidiana en la España de Velázquez, ed. José N. Alcalá-Zamora (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1989): 217–34. That is why Herrera not only emphasized Philip’s support of the Catholic cause, but also his personal convictions, and how he “began his rule in Portugal with justice and divine zeal” - for the prince’s morals,
urgency to Herrera’s desire to make the reader aware of just how vital the maintenance of Catholicism and the need to “ensure religious stability and orthodoxy” in Portugal was for Philip. Herrera, therefore, also stressed the practical benefits that securing Catholicism in Portugal and its empire had ensured for both Spain and the Catholic cause: “With making this union between Castile and Portugal, all of the church and all of [C]hristianity has gained one of the greatest benefices and commodities that can be offered, for it has created the most effective means to confront and abate the forces of insolence and the tyranny of the Turk, who is the constant enemy of all named Christians.” Herrera, therefore, presented Portugal and Castile as protagonists in the same struggle in the defense of the faith rather than antagonists. Both Crowns were presented as agents of Providence, and Providence had chosen Philip through inheritance to defend the Catholic Church in Portugal. Herrera presented the crisis that arose in Portugal as a result of the defeat and death of Sebastian in Africa, the sudden death of Henry, and Philip ascending the Portuguese throne as the hand of God at work. To paraphrase Herrera: “Divine Providence would not have allowed Sebastian to die, without great cause.” He later added, “we must give thanks to God [that we have been unified with Portugal], for it is to him that all things are done and asserted in the service of your Majesty.”

and in particular his piety, were also critical to his authority (“Felipe comenzó a regir Portugal con juicio y divino cello”). Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 19. For the relationship between piety and authority, see Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince, 84.

99 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction.

100 “con hacerse esta unión [entre Portugal y Castilla] se hace a la iglesia y a toda cristiandad en general uno de los mayores beneficios y comodidades que se puede jamás ofrecer, pues será medio eficacísimo para enfrenar y abatir las fuerzas, insolencia y tiranía del Turco, perpetuo enemigo del nombre cristiano.” It continues “Que habiendo conservado su pureza por la misericordia de Dios, la religión Católica romana en estos y esos reinos sin haber hallado entrada de herejías y falsas doctrinas que el demonio ha introducido en otras provincias de la cristiandad, importa sumamente que tenga esta de España la virtud unida para resistir y ofender a los herejes y rebeldes de nuestra madre la sancta madre iglesia apostólica romana, cuya protección y amparo habemos de anteponer siempre a todos otros respectos temporales y fines humanos.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction.

101 “porque tan extraño acaecimiento en Alcazarquibir, como por esta tierra ha venido, no lo permitió la Divina Providencia sin gran causa.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction.

102 “a Dios sean dadas las gracias, que a el solo se deben de todo lo que se hace y acierta en el servicio de V.M.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 359.
It should be noted, however, that Providentialism was less prominent in Herrera’s work than that of his predecessors. Although the Catholic cause ultimately guided Spanish and Philip’s actions, Herrera’s focus (as the Crown had requested) was on pragmatic politics. For Herrera, *Historia de Portugal* was to reveal the relationship between politics and ethics in a Christian state. Furthermore, while Philip had to abide by the law of God in all his actions, he also had to abide by natural law and especially the fundamental laws of the kingdom. Indeed, as with almost all of his contemporaries, Herrera was convinced of the primacy of justice, and the monarch was responsible before God for the dispensation of justice. This was a political virtue, rather than a personal one. Ultimately, Herrera needed to show that, despite Conestaggio’s characterizations, Philip saw himself as utterly devoted to his Portuguese subjects, for whom he felt responsible directly to God.

Thus, after establishing Philip’s dynastic right to the Portuguese throne, and proving that he was motivated by a true desire to defend the Catholic faith, Herrera set out to demonstrate further that Philip had annexed Portugal to ensure Portuguese stability, order, peace, and well-being by maintaining justice and “just rule” in Portugal, through his political prudence. For Herrera, at the most pragmatic level Philip’s “civil prudence” constituted actions taken out of the King’s respect for his subjects’ interests and beliefs. Unlike Conestaggio, who sought to portray a Spanish reason of state that “took nothing into account but interest” and which sought to defraud people, Herrera wanted to present Philip as a prudent king who, “always looked to the customs and laws of the country [Portugal], wanting to ensure the happiness of his subjects.”¹⁰³ As testament to this, Herrera wrote that Philip immediately instructed his viceroy in Portugal that “his principal object . . . must be to work for the community, which was his charge, so that it live

¹⁰³ Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Introduction.
and rest in full security, justice, peace and quiet.” This directly meant the maintenance of custom and law, to ensure order and stability in Portugal.

This policy in Portugal was in fact recognition of the fact that any alteration of laws would disrupt the existing normative order, as events in the Netherlands had shown. Therefore, Herrera wanted to demonstrate that Philip and Spaniards had followed Portuguese customs in order to promote peace, order, stability, and orthodoxy in Portugal, and that Philip had abided by Portuguese laws and upheld customs and privileges, thus fulfilling his contractual responsibilities as defined by classic legalistic authority. Indeed, implicit in Herrera’s statements was the notion that defending and adhering to Portuguese laws, privileges, and prerogatives, was part of Philip’s reason of state politics.

Indeed, Herrera’s aim was also to demonstrate wider reason of state politics noting that Philip’s ultimate goal was “preservation.” For the sixteenth-century European, “protection” and “preservation” were synonymous and meant security from civil unrest and disruption, and thus the maintenance of norms and customs and the general well-being of the population. In the typology of sixteenth-century political thinking, this concern for and understanding of the need for “preservation” directly belonged to the political domain of “prudence.” One could always take a state by force, but to “preserve” it was quite different. In fact, preservation

105 “to preserve,” “to protect” and “ensure Portuguese security” (also cited as the “security of the patria”). Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction, 8 and 21. Herrera repeated such sentiments on pages: 43, 45, 52, 55, 58, 71, 87, 112, and 158. Furthermore, by ensuring that Portugal was safe from foreign incursions and degradation, Spaniards had also ensured that Portugal would be ruled wisely.
required precedent, which depended on notions of good rule and kingship, and as Herrera put it, “preservation was part of prudence and wisdom, virtues superior to force.” Therefore, by making preservation one of Philip’s primary goals, Herrera sought to demonstrate how the King understood and used his political virtue of prudence. Herrera outlined that the statesman acquired prudence through three species of knowledge: past, present and future. For Herrera, Philip had demonstrated his ultimate political prudence (mostro su prudencia) when considering what courses of action to take in Portugal through a combination of his own experience, his “fruit of the years,” and his “knowledge of history.” In particular, Herrera sought to emphasize how Philip had used his knowledge of Portuguese particulars, and especially Portuguese history, to ensure that he ruled Portugal to maintain Portuguese stability, order, and ensure the “common good” and “civil happiness.” Herrera sought to demonstrate how history had provided Philip with the resources necessary to rule well. For Herrera, “just as prudence is the beginning of all sound action, so can it be said that history is almost the very principle or beginning from which

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107 Herrera’s ‘Introduction’ to his translation of Botero, Razón de estado (1591), 9.
108 For Herrera, prudence was the knowledge of earthly affairs (past and present) used to bring about “political good,” or at least a level of effectiveness in politics. Prudence, for Herrera, was the knowledge, “called política, civil faculty, or universal science” needed to rule. Herrera, BNM Ms/3011, fol. 52r–52v.
109 Herrera, BNM Ms/3011, fol. 151r.
110 To gain his practical wisdom on Portuguese affairs and to gain the knowledge which “moved him to action,” Herrera outlined that Philip had sought to gain, and had a “knowledge of [Portuguese] particulars” and a “knowledge of [Portuguese] history.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction. Significantly, in practice Philip had also realized that he needed knowledge of past Portuguese actions, commenting that, “Without [knowledge of past dealings, i.e. history], there is no notice that is useful for the good direction of present things.” (“Sin ella no ay noticia que convenía para la buena dirección de las (cosas) presentes.”) Philip to Jeronimo Zurita in 1579, as cited in Louis P. Gachard, Correspondance de Philipe II sur les affaires des Pays-Bas (Brussels: Gand, 1848), 1: 14.
111 For instance, Herrera argued that when it came to imperial matters, Philip had learned his continued “love of his vassals, his maintenance of peace, his conservation of the State (la conservación del Estado), and its security,” and most importantly “never forgetting the privileges, exemptions and prerogatives of his subjects,” from his father Charles. For Herrera this was a means by which to demonstrate how Philip not only followed the good actions and advice of past Spanish Monarchs, but it was “proof” that Philip was utilizing history appropriately—learning and adhering to the rules of “good rule.” Further, by demonstrating that Philip followed the past and took advice from it, Herrera provided substantiation to his claim that Philip’s rule of Portugal was based on “the very principle from which prudence derives.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction. Charles’ influence on Philip’s decision making and manner of rule appears again on page 269. Herrera’s description of how Philip had followed his father’s example also served another purpose; Conestaggio had made some brief, yet particularly scathing, comments about Charles V and his prior interactions with Portuguese nobles, and so Herrera’s depiction of Charles served as a way to counter Conestaggio’s critical characterization of Charles and the Spanish Monarchy in general.
all prudence derives.”¹¹² Philip’s prudence, therefore, comprised Philip’s morals as well as his political attributes and his use of history to seek how best to rule his Portuguese subjects. In this, Herrera demonstrated the importance of knowledge of history and historical precedents as vital to the practice of “good” government.¹¹³

In his Introduction, Herrera explained how Philip had drawn specifically from the precedents of the Portuguese past to guide his actions and help him to rule his new subjects. For example, when considering what actions to take in the Canary Islands, Herrera explained how, only after considering “many and weighty occurrences,” and only after “much deliberation and studying of past precedents,”¹¹⁴ and in particular the actions of past Portuguese Kings Alfonso V and his son João, Philip had come to understand the need for swift military force in order to quell the resistance of Spanish opponents in the Canaries,¹¹⁵ as precedent had shown that it was the only solution to restore “order” and “peace” on the islands.¹¹⁶ Thus, Herrera presented Philip as a

¹¹² Herrera, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 152v. Herrera had written in true humanist fashion that history was “the memory of the past . . . and for that reason it is called the teacher of life. We seek in it precepts to live by; to rule ourselves, households, cities and kingdoms . . . History is a self-sufficient court which . . . leads to civil happiness.” That was why for Herrera a knowledge of history was essential for any ruler. Herrera, ‘Como la historia es suficiente para adquirir la prudencia,’ BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 156r.

¹¹³ Herrera elaborated upon these ideas in his ‘Discourse on the materials of state’ where he discussed the relationship between reason of state, prudence, and history. Herrera, “Discurso y tratado sobre la material de Estado,” BNM Ms/ 3011 fols. 49–61.

¹¹⁴ Demonstrating Philip’s careful consideration in all matters was crucial since, as evidence of Philip’s bad rule, Conestaggio had claimed that Philip was “slow to judgment” (muy tardo en resolver), which he claimed had caused great problems in governance and had impaired the workings of government, as it led Philip to “disregard the immediate needs of his subjects.” (Conestaggio, Historia dell’unione, 42.) Herrera would counter that allegation by claiming that any tardiness in Philip’s decision making was a consequence of the King’s “maximum prudencia en la justicia,” (“máxima prudencia en la justicia.”) as he never hastily moved to action, but rather, always “carefully considered the proper course,” and always had his subjects’ best interests in mind. Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction.

¹¹⁵ The only full-fledged resistance to the Spanish succession to Portugal occurred in the Azores, where Spanish troops had to take San Miguel in 1582, and Terceira in 1583: Geoffrey Parker, “Hacia el primer imperio en que no se ponía el sol: Felipe II y el Tratado de Tordesillas,” in El tratado de Tordesillas y su época (Valladolid: Quinto Centenario del Tratado de Tordesillas, 1995), 3: 1417–1431.

¹¹⁶ Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction. Herrera’s narrative account of these events appears on pages 127–134. It should be noted that, for Herrera, force was used only because of the need to defend religion, justice, and dynastic rights. Herrera emphasized that Philip waited “industriously” [meaning considering all his options]
prime example of what Quentin Skinner has demonstrated: that political authority in late
sixteenth-century Europe rested not only in “appeals to the past,” but also with the cultural
practices of a “historically conscious prince.” In this way, Herrera stressed, “Philip
demonstrated that counsel, reason and prudence, could dominate experience and bad fortune,”
and that through “opportunity and industry” Philip was able to “reach the desired end even in the
most difficult and desperate of circumstances.” Ultimately, however, such historical precedent
was used to justify the use of force.

True political prudence, however, required the ruler to understand the relationships
between cause and effect in order to compare circumstances throughout time. Herrera wished to
demonstrate how Philip had taken into account “everything which has happened in the past and
compare[d] it with the present,” and when the conditions for action were equal, “kn[ew] in which
part these past actions correspond[ed], and where they differ[ed].” Knowing that not all things
were equal, Philip had weighed cause and effect. For Herrera, therefore, Philip’s political
prudence was *ars practica* in the completely Aristotelian sense—the particular capacity to utilize

(\textit{industriosamente}) a month and a half before taking arms in the Canaries, and that he did so only for “justice and
obligation” (\textit{justicia y obligación}) and so that those who supported the other pretenders, “would not impede upon
public tranquility” (\textit{no impidiesen la tranquilidad publica}). In fact, after Cardinal Henry’s death, unrest, turmoil and
even violence had began to spread in Portugal as various court factions, and supporters of Antonio, Prior of Crato,
tried to take control. Thus, Herrera sought to demonstrate how the primary cause explaining why Philip and
Spaniards took such swift (even violent) action (whether on the Peninsula, or in the Canaries) was to “stop the wars
and disturbances in the Kingdom” (\textit{parar las guerras e inquietudes del Reyno}), and thus restore tranquility and

\textit{\begin{scriptsize}$^{117}$\end{scriptsize} Quentin Skinner, \textit{The Foundations of Modern Political Thought} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 1: 208.}

\textit{\begin{scriptsize}$^{118}$\end{scriptsize} “alcanzar el fin propuesto en lo más dificultoso y desesperado.” Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal}, 127. Moreover, to
justify Spanish military action in the Canaries further, Herrera used and cited the \textit{Proposición sobre Portugal y los
derechos de los reyes castellanos sobre la conquista de las Canarias} (1434) by Alonso de Cartagena (1384-1456),
which had claimed and defended the right of Juan II of Castile over that of Enrique of Portugal to the islands when
they were originally discovered, and that Juan’s claim to the islands was greater than that of the Portuguese, thus
alluding to Philip’s actions as those of a rightful ruler, who had long had the right to possess these lands, but had not.

\textit{\begin{scriptsize}$^{119}$\end{scriptsize} “todo lo sucedido en los tiempos pasados y comparándolo con lo presente”, and when the same “conociendo en
qué parte corresponde a sus obras, y en qué son diferentes de ello.” Herrera, \textit{Como la historia es suficiente para
adquirir la prudencia}, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 156r.}
the awareness of various facts and knowledge for the purposes of practical political activity. Herrera sought to make such reasoning evident to the reader of his *Historia de Portugal*. Herrera demonstrated how Philip had come to his decisions with regards to Portugal by following “the natural light of reason,” and a set of “rules of politics” in harmony with faith, and how Philip regarded the reasonableness of an action as based upon its utility for good. Indeed, Herrera sought to reveal the pragmatic nature of Philip’s statecraft and how Philip demonstrated a style of prudent politics and actions in the pursuit of true Christian reason of state objectives.

Herrera, therefore, used his *Historia de Portugal* as a means to employ his own knowledge of politics and philosophy to demonstrate Philip’s Christian reason of state politics, especially as revealed through Philip’s intentions and motivations. By clarifying the ideology behind Philip’s rule in Portugal, Herrera sought to teach the reader how Philip’s intentions and rule were those of a Christian prince, who fulfilled true reason of state objectives in the service of the common good. In this way Herrera emphasized the justice of Philip’s rule in Portugal, ultimately asserting his legitimacy.

**Herrera the Humanist Scholar**

The Crown wanted the Spanish response not only to elucidate Philip’s politics, but to provide “proof” through documentation of Spanish rights and the bases for their claims. Herrera was perfectly poised to take on this challenge, having written his own theoretical reflections on how the historian needed to evaluate sources carefully, and how writing history for the Crown...
required that the historian adhere to the strictest methodologies.\textsuperscript{121} Although he had written well-researched works in the past, the new demands placed upon his counter history meant Herrera had to make his research a primary element of his work, thus combining the Crown’s demands with his own reflections.

While it was easy to laud the King’s intentions, it was another matter to provide “proof” of these motivations and of the benefits of Philip’s rule in Portugal.\textsuperscript{122} Herrera had to convince the reader that he was not a mere apologist. While the first aim of his rhetorical strategy to legitimize the claims of the Crown was to dispel completely any image that foreigners, and especially Conestaggio, might have created of Philip as a tyrant, Herrera knew that in order to do so effectively he would have to put to use not only his vast knowledge of political theory, but also his historical methodology to shape a narrative that provided legitimacy for Philip and Spain in new and innovative ways. Herrera understood that it was his methodological innovations and his use of humanist tools that would allow him to provide the “better history” (mejor historia) that the Crown demanded. Herrera, therefore, sought to demonstrate conclusively that what he presented should be taken as “truth” and not laudation, by seeking to establish his impartiality, and by emphasizing the methodologies he had followed. Herrera made the reader fully aware that, “the means exist to make a good history and to write about actions with the truth and

\textsuperscript{121} See Chapter Two above.

\textsuperscript{122} For as he wrote of “false histories,” like Conestaggio’s: “[F]or just as the man who walks down the wrong road becomes very frustrated, since he arrives at a different place than intended, so too is the great damage caused to those who read false histories, because they conceive of different opinions than those which are truly beneficial for the good rule of this century . . . that is why . . . history must provide the truth” (“como queda muy frustrado del pensamiento que lleva el que caminando por camino errado va a parar a lugar diferente del que quería, así reciben daño notable los que leen historias falsas, porque conciben diferentes opiniones de los que conviene para el regimiento de las cosas del siglo . . . así no puede aver cosa para el buen gobierno de la vida humana de más provecho, que la noticia de las historias, y ninguna mas prejudicial que no ser puntualmente escritas . . . y por eso . . . la historia debe [proveer] la verdad”). Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal}, Introduction to ‘Libro Primero,’ 3.
authority that [the King’s] deeds and greatness require,” but that such a history required the “greatest diligence . . . so that the truth not be obscured.”

Herrera was clearly conscious of the political necessities that his work needed to fulfill in terms of national vindication. Herrera knew that the Crown had turned to him, as a historian, to justify the legitimacy of Spanish claims. Herrera clearly understood that he would have to defend Philip’s interests using historical writing and strengthen the Crown’s political legitimacy by providing a more “truthful” explanation than Conestaggio’s. Critically, he was also aware of his audience’s awareness of his aims and their skepticism about his methods. In his Preface, he openly informed the reader that he had undertaken this work to respond to the “dangerous false histories” of the same events, and to “re-write the history of these events,” so as to defend the legitimacy of Philip’s claims to Portugal, and provide a “true account of the Portuguese” annexation. Yet he followed this statement by stressing his impartiality: “My unfeigned disposition to the truth, and my inclination to give fair and just representation of men and things, will prepare the reader, I hope, to have a good opinion of my integrity and of the impartiality of my writing.” He continued: “All that I have written has nothing to do with affection, adulation, or artifice; it is hoped that the manner in which this work is presented will render manifest to the readers the integrity of the author . . . and thus this work hopes to render irrefutable witness to

123 “[el historiador debe seguir], el medio que hay para hacer una buena historia y escribir la de los hechos con la verdad y autoridad que a sus [del Rey] obras y grandeza se debe . . . y con gran diligencia para que no se obscurece la verdad.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction to ‘Libro Primero,’ 1.
124 In a letter to Philip II, Herrera acknowledged the challenges that writing his contemporary history of Portugal posed, yet stressed that he never would have dared to write this account of “current events” if it had not been absolutely necessary, and that the need to “protect Your Majesty and Spain” outweighed the methodological problems of writing history about the present without the benefits of greater distance and objectivity, as well as the King’s concern about the appearance of vanity: “no tuviera yo atrevimiento . . . si no fuera con propósito de ponerlos debajo del amparo de V.M . . . este historia no [se escribe] por vanidad, sino por necesidad.” Herrera to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 159/107.
125 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Preface.
Thus, in these sequential sentences, Herrera epitomized his two-pronged goal, to write a work for the Crown, yet to provide truth as a “good historian.” Herrera stressed that a critical use of sources, as well as use of new humanist tools and methodologies, had allowed for him to write his work in a dispassionate way, which allowed him to provide “truth.”

Herrera knew that he needed to demonstrate to the reader how, in writing Historia de Portugal, he had adhered to the highest standards of historical accuracy and brought the methods of the humanist historian to his narrative. Moreover, he knew that the way he was to write his history proved vital to the way his work would be received and utilized, even writing in his Preface: “There is nothing more prejudicial than when history is not written with great care, diligence and certainty . . . for nothing benefits more the good government of human life than history written in proper form.” Herrera understood how the perception of his use of “proper” historical methodology also served to bolster the political effectiveness of his work, and the reason of state objectives it served to promote. Herrera, therefore, clearly understood the connections between his methodologies and his work’s potential use and political implications.

Herrera immediately made explicit how his methodological ideas informed the writing of his work, and specifically began his Prologue to his Historia de Portugal with the statement:

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126 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Preface.
127 Similarly, Herrera wrote to Philip, “on my behalf, I can promise, that in my fidelity, diligence, work, good will and in all the necessary things of [a good historian] I will not falter, in serving as a loyal vassal of Your Majesty” (“de mi parte puedo prometer que no faltará en mi fidelidad, diligencia, trabajo, buena voluntad y todas las otras partes necesarias [del buen historiador], para servir como fiel vasallo a V.M.”). Herrera to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 159/107.
128 “No hay cosa más prejudicial que [la historia] no sea puntualmente escrita . . . y con cuidado . . . y decir la verdad . . por que no puede haber cosa para el buen gobierno de la vida humana de más provecho que la noticia de las historias . . . escrito en buena forma.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 3.
In the undertaking of this work, I have assumed unto myself the freedom of the Just Historian, concealing nothing out of fear, nor speaking anything for Favor, and delivering nothing for a Truth without good authority. It is by delivering the Truth [and the bases for my claims, by revealing the documents I have used], that the [reader] shall witness that I am neither biased by Love or Hatred, nor swayed by Partiality or corrupt Affections . . . [but] rather have kept myself to the rules of the Good Historian . . . I have not written this work out of prize or obligation, but rather of my sole and free will . . . for liberty and truth [as is well known] are the soul of history, and will thus be my primary goal in this account.\textsuperscript{129}

Such statements become even more important when placed in relation to the treatises that Herrera had written on the \textit{artes historicae} discussed in Chapter Two. Indeed, Herrera had already reflected upon the importance of the historian’s impartiality and how the historian needed to be guided by his humanist principles rather than his desire to please and adulate the king when writing work of political importance, and that the historian’s use of primary sources, and research helped ensure that he would be guided by his critical methodologies, and not just his required political task.\textsuperscript{130} As seen in his treatises on the \textit{artes historicae}, for Herrera, impartiality meant the assertion that one could be fair minded and abide by the rules of evidence even if one wrote history for a particular party. In his counter-history, Herrera sought specifically to emphasize his lack of passion and reward, since Conestaggio had accused Spanish official historians of being men “full of passion . . . corrupt and paid to lie.”\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{129} Emphasis mine. “no lo escribió como premio de obligación, sino mi sola y libre voluntad . . . pues la libertad y verdad que (como queda dicho) son el alma de la historia, serán mi principal fin en este cuento.” Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal}, Introduction to ‘Libro Primero’, 1.

\textsuperscript{130} It should not be seen as mere coincidence, or empty rhetoric, that Herrera used almost identical phrasing in the Prologue to \textit{Historia de Portugal}, as he had used in his treatises on the \textit{artes historicae}. Although he did not explicitly mention his treatises, he made explicit that he followed a rigorous methodology. Moreover, statements of following a scholarly method (common in the Prefaces of many contemporary historical narratives) here were not hollow. Herrera, throughout his narrative, demonstrated how he had followed such methods, and moreover, had in fact, done the required research, visited the archives firsthand and provided an accurate citing of sources.

\textsuperscript{131} Conestaggio had written, “I am enemy to the corrupt writing of [official] Historiographers, who are driven by passion . . . corrupt and paid to lie.” Conestaggio, \textit{Historia dell’unione}, ‘Dedicatio.’
For Herrera, the reader would be the ultimate judge of his work and whether he had been successful in writing an impartial and true account: “I will satisfy every point I think necessary . . . and will make my suppositions of a firm ground, so that the truth and diligence of this history be known . . . [in this way] the reader will judge the truth of [this] history and the neutrality of the writer.” Therefore, while Herrera knew that positioning himself as impartial and dispassionate would make his readers more likely to take his work as truth, he knew that mere claims to impartiality were not enough, especially among more critical learned readers at court. It would be his work’s diligence and the evidence he presented that would prove its worth.

Herrera’s demonstrations of his humanist methodologies also served another purpose—they allowed Herrera to separate himself from other works, especially that of Conestaggio. Herrera directly compared his work to those of foreigners who, he stressed, could not be trusted for, “in almost everything they write, one cannot place faith, due to the excessive license that has been used.” For Herrera, it was foreigners’ “passion, envy, and avarice [greed]” that had caused them to “trample justice.” Foreign historians were not men of virtue but rather men

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132 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Prologue. Similarly, Herrera wrote:“Consider well the diligence of [this] History, confer it with other works . . . and understand that virtue and vice consist in things, and do not spring from the author . . . if he does his job well” (“consideren bien la diligencia de esta Historia, confíenla con otras y no aprobando en otros lo que repueban de mi, entiendan, que la virtud, y el vicio consisten en las cosas, y que no se mudan con el autor . . . si hace su trabajo bien”). Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction. Herrera also wrote, “It shall suffice that every man of a free judgment discern my competence, and how through my diligence I have sought to provide the truth and protect Spaniards from the malice and ignorance of our adversaries.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Prologue. Such repeated claims attest to rising tensions among official historians, aware of increased criticism of their work, and of the need to distinguish their work clearly from those of mere laudation.

133 “porque hallo que casi a todo lo escrito no se podía dar fe, por la demasiada licencia con que hasta entonces se había hecho.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction to ‘Libro Primero,’ 2.

134 “Tan atropellada la justicia
Por los historiadores extranjeros,
Por pasión, por envidia, y por codicia.” Herrera on Conestaggio, Historia de Portugal, unnumbered page before Introduction. Herrera pointed out that Conestaggio’s passion made him “not a true historian” since he “mixed mocking words with vile spirit . . . qualities foreign to a loyal historian” (“mesclando palabras de amarga burla con espiritu mordaz ajeno del fiel historiador”). Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Prologue. Herrera saw himself as a loyal historian, careful to abide by the rules for
“with little shame” as they preferred to “relate things which amuse, rather than that which is true
and certain.” Herrera, therefore, separated himself from such works by emphasizing his
rectitude, his adherence to sources, but also his chosen style and use of words, affirming in his
Prologue: “[M]y principal intention has been brevity, in the most naked words possible, to tell
the truth in its entirety and simply, without any deceit, or adornment, [I have not been taken] by
rhetoric or vanities, which other works of our time tend to rely on.” For Herrera, his work
differed from foreign works in that he offered only carefully written, unadorned truth. Furthermore, Herrera also maintained that his history, based on “the truth of documents,”
effectively responded to Conestaggio’s work and those of other “apostates and sectarians,”
whose works were based on hearsay and rumors, and therefore were no more than “slanders and
lies.” Thus, Herrera sought to use his claims to source use to combat Conestaggio’s claims and
prove the weakness of Conestaggio’s account. As we will see, however, Herrera sought to
distinguish his work by constantly emphasizing his own careful investigation of documents, his
travels to the archives, and how the documents he used specifically proved his claims. Indeed,
for Herrera, Conestaggio was “wrongfully” using history, by not following the “proper method”
writing “good history,” while remaining steadfast in his allegiance to Spain, its sovereign, and the Spanish cause.
The two aims were compatible, as long as one adhered to the sources, and sought to provide “truth.”
Herrera commented that Conestaggio was like other amateur historians: “porque algunos que se entremeten a
escribir e notar las historias y las antigüedades son hombres de poca vergüenza, e más les place relatar cosas
extrañas e maravillosas que verdaderas e ciertas.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Prologue.
Herrera added that he had also sought to “narrate in plain prose, so as to reveal the truth.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction. This is similar to what Herrera would write in his, “Las grandes utilidades de la historia,” (1598) BNM HA/8741.
Herrera, Historia de Portugal, ‘Dedicatorial Rey.’ That Herrera was considered to have adopted such a style is
demonstrated in a commendatory letter which characterized Herrera’s work as one of “sutil ingenio con prudencia
unido . . . espíritu divino, lengua pura . . . estilo no aprendido, admirable invención y compostura, junto con afable
gravedad.” In Herrera, Historia de Portugal, unnumbered page before Introduction.
Herrera added that such works were only “rants,” and not real history as they were not only
unverifiable, but because they were moved by “hate and envy.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Prologue.
of verifying one’s claims through sources, and since “History” was to provide “truth,” and “truth” only came from documents, Conestaggio merely provided a convoluted version of events, thus defying the very purpose of history.\textsuperscript{139} Herrera remarked that he had provided a history in “proper form” and through his research he had been able to “extract the whole truth, which is the soul of history.”\textsuperscript{140}

As discussed in Chapter Two, official historians understood that if they were to make claims to impartiality and “truth,” especially when writing works of political importance, they would have to show the “logical steps taken to come to the truth.”\textsuperscript{141} Therefore, Herrera knew that in order to solidify his claims, he would need to use and display a more vigorous approach to his source use when writing \textit{Historia de Portugal}. Thus, Herrera made certain that at every opportunity he provided within his historical narrative his sources of information and the methods he had used to verify their credibility before he used them as “truth.” Indeed, Herrera’s primary goal was to produce a source-based account that would justify Philip’s dynastic supremacy and properly document and substantiate the causes behind the events leading up to the annexation and the first few years of Spanish rule in Portugal.\textsuperscript{142} For Herrera, only source-

\textsuperscript{139} Herrera spent a good part of his Prologue condemning Conestaggio’s historical methodology and his lack of “proof,” and questioning the caliber of his scholarship, not merely his conclusions. Thus one can also view Herrera’s work as a historical critique, a growing historical genre in Spain and Italy, which criticized the work of other historians for their lack of research, their claims, and the “authorities” they used. See Benito Sánchez Alonso, \textit{Historia de la Historiografía Española} (Madrid: J. Sánchez de Ocaña, 1944), 2: 236–237. Spanish attacks against Conestaggio’s work, and the “untruths” he provided because he had not properly researched his account, persisted well into the seventeenth century, the most notable coming from Jerónimo de Mendoça in 1607, Miguel Leitão de Andrade in 1629, and Don Fransisco Manuel de Melo, ca. 1645, and probably the result of the continuing translations and publications of Conestaggio’s work across Europe.

\textsuperscript{140} “buscar en los documentos . . . [y así] sacar en limpio la verdad, alma de la historia,” BNM Ms/ 5781, fol. 130.

\textsuperscript{141} Herrera, “Discurso sobre los provechos de la historia, que cosa es y de cuantas maneras, del oficio del historiador y como se ha de inquirir la Fe y Verdad de la Historia y como se ha de escribir,” BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 141r–156r.

\textsuperscript{142} Herrera had explicitly been requested not only to write an account of what “moved the King” to action, but to write an account of events “based and founded on original documents,” and especially those of “state papers” (\textit{los consejos de estado y guerra}), because only these contained the “purity of truth.” Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal},
based “legitimate history” could provide the “proof” necessary to justify and legitimize Spanish actions. Accessing, possessing, and providing such proof and documentation became vital, therefore, since Herrera told Idiáquez, “the most informed author, who uses the most sources, who gives the most and best documentation that he has at his disposal, and who is most consequent and coherent when writing, [will provide] the best compilation of events . . . for the greater glory of the Crown.” Herrera was clearly aware that like Spanish legalists he would have to use documents and archival sources to bolster his claims. Indeed, Herrera was adamant that his work offered “better history” precisely because of its use and demonstration of sources.

As a historian, Herrera clearly envisioned the writing of history as one of critical research and appraisal, applying his theories of source use directly to his research. Crucially, when writing Historia de Portugal, not only had Herrera’s research efforts been exhaustive, but so was his concern to find the most meritorious and most authoritative sources available. Herrera stressed that his methodologies had directly helped him in these efforts: “In order to gain a true and certain knowledge of events, it was necessary to review many [texts], and then confirm what I had garnered with the authority of only the most trustworthy and knowledgeable men, and only

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Prologue. Further, Idiáquez had requested that Herrera specifically find and utilize sources to “prove Spanish claims.” See Idiáquez to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 160, fol. 54.

143 For Herrera, well-researched history founded in real and true documents provided a “purer truth” (or the “purity of truth”) since only document-based truth was the fundamental principle of “prudence and knowledge” and thus, the essential and indispensable ingredient for “legitimate history” (“los documentos contienen la pureza de la verdad” and “la verdad es el principio de prudencia y de sapiencia y el ingrediente imprescindible para la legitima historia”). Herrera, Discursos sobre los provechos de la historia, BNM Ms/ 1035.

144 “el autor más informado, que más fuentes había utilizado, que más y mejor documentación había tenido a su disposición, que había sido más consecuente, y coherente al escribir . . . [tendrá] mejor compilación de los hechos . . . para la mayor gloria de la Corona.” Herrera to Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 75. Herrera would repeat these sentiments verbatim in his own treatises on history: “Las grandes utilidades de la historia” (1598), BNM HA/8741.

145 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 3. Herrera believed that only the “Truth that documents provide” offered an unmediated truth for his work, and the Crown. Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Prologue.

146 Herrera, Discursos sobre los provechos de la historia, BNM Ms/ 1035.
then was what I found taken as truth.” Indeed, Herrera sought to make his methodologies patent. Throughout, he stressed how he had “judged each of these documents as to their authenticity” and did not include things that “could not be verified” and had “used only great diligence in collecting the most certain accounts that can be found of what happened.” Even when using secondary evidence, he always made the reader aware of how he had only used “the most knowledgeable accounts,” and only those which were well-researched. Just as Herrera had stressed in his treatise on history, in *Historia de Portugal* he actually provided the “truth” through its “accurate assessment of history,” which for Herrera meant not only citing the documents upon which he had based his claims, but also demonstrating his critical appraisal of his sources. In this way, *Historia de Portugal* differed from his prior works, and allowed Herrera to ultimately and convincingly provide the “new” history that the Crown had so clearly and exhaustively demanded, presenting his rhetorical claims through his antiquarian research.

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147 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Prologue.
148 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Prologue and throughout. Thus, no manuscript source was held as sacrosanct. In fact, one can see how Herrera exercised an intelligent criticism of even his most authoritative sources and even distrusted some sources: “I have [left] aside that which other authors have said, but which could not be verified through authentic documents” (“dejando aparte muchas cosas que los referidos autores han dicho por no poderse verificar con escrituras auténticas”); moreover, he did not use those which could not be corroborated: “I have only used accounts if more than two people correspond.” Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, in the Introduction to ‘Libro Primero,’ 2.
149 “Puse en todo gran diligencia en recoger las mas ciertas relaciones que se hallaron de lo sucedido.” Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Introduction. See also pages, 5, 23, 71 and 104.
150 A particularly apt example is Herrera’s use of the work of Fray Hierónymo Romano, whose own *Historia de Portugal* (1575), announced in its preface that Romano had himself “travelled the country from archive to archive, from that of the Torre de Tombo to that of the Casa de Braganza, and Monasteries throughout, and the archives of the Churches of Santiago, Salamanca and Braga,” gathering the data necessary to write his account (BNM, Ms/ 13229, fol. 218 r. and fol. 181 r.). Further, Herrera’s claim that Romano had reviewed the same sources that he himself had gone to Portugal to see, and that both of them had come to similar conclusions, provided secondary verification for Herrera’s findings. See Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 5, 7, 64 and 188.
151 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Introduction. See also Herrera, “Historia como método para adquirir la prudencia,” BNM, Ms/ 3011.
The “New” History of Portugal

Proving Spanish Dynastic Claims

Herrera understood that he needed to use his text to legitimize Spanish dynastic claims, especially in light of Conestaggio’s claims that Philip was not the most direct heir to the Portuguese throne. Herrera knew that dynastic origins served as the first ground of political legitimacy and was the basis for Spanish power in Portugal, and thus while he believed that “the greatness of [Philip’s] blood sufficed” to prove Philip’s legitimacy, he still understood that he could not afford to ignore the attacks that Conestaggio had made on the primacy and purity of Spanish succession to the Portuguese throne.152 The Spanish Crown specifically requested that Herrera definitively lay this issue to rest, categorically proving the preeminence of Spanish claims over others, thus ensuring Spanish legitimacy to Portugal.153 Spanish contemporaries were well aware that throughout Europe dynastic succession was based on historical claims and effective genealogies.154 Clearly, establishing Spanish supremacy in the dynastic contest also possessed wider political significance, as it would help Herrera further justify Spanish actions. Establishing the primacy of Philip’s claims and discrediting the claims of any other pretender were particularly important since Herrera stressed that Philip’s dynastic rights provided him with the “executive arms of reason and justice against tyrants, and usurpers of what is not theirs.”155 Conclusively verifying this right, therefore, also provided definitive “proof” to justify any use of force which had been used by Spaniards in the defense of their rightful claim. That was why,

152 “bastará la grandeza de su sangre.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 8.
153 Idiáquez to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 74.
155 “armas ejecutoras de la razón y justicia contra los tiranos, usurpadores de lo ajeno” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 8. In particular, Herrera, was referring to the military action that had been taken by the Spaniards against the supporters of Antonio of Crato.
when it came to the question of succession, Herrera emphasized that he had studied Conestaggio’s claims closely, since “to know the enemy is to triumph over them” (or, “to know is to conquer”).

Herrera knew that if he was going to make claims to genealogical precedent he would have to demonstrate to the reader his thorough and intimate knowledge on the subject. Herrera, therefore, wrote not only of his previous experience in evaluating Portuguese dynastic genealogy, but how in order to find the proof necessary to make his claims he had done additional and extensive research. He also emphasized how he had immediately sought the aid of Moura to help him obtain all of the necessary documents relating to the succession. The Spanish Crown was well aware that adversaries of royal claims hoped that by digging into the masses of hitherto ignored evidence on ancient genealogies and dynastic claims they could undermine the royal position. That explains why, beginning in 1578, the Spanish Crown had begun to amass any and all documents they could find relating to issues of succession and the ties between the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns. In the light of the Crown’s increased understanding of the importance of documentation and proof in

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156 “conocer el enemigo es vencerle.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 2.
157 Herrera stressed his adherence to a strict methodology, stating how he had looked to “ancient” texts in order to confirm his genealogical claims, and how he had sought to confirm these “through the authority of the most learned men” (“Para tener un conocimiento cierto y consideración verosímil de los hechos que yo iba a narrar, fue necesario revisar muchos libros de los antiguos, a fin de que las cosas que yo había escrito, confirmadas por la autoridad de varones doctísimos, se tomaron por verdaderas”). Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 7.
158 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 1.
159 BNM Ms/ 1930, fol. 100v. Philip even signed a royal order in early 1578 that all documents from the various archives around Spain as well as those from the Torre de Tombo, the main Portuguese archive in Lisbon, that related to the Portuguese succession (Sucesión de Portugal) were to be copied (ad verbum) and brought to the Royal court at Madrid. This specifically included all information pertaining to the Princess Doña Juana (Philip’s mother and Portuguese Infanta) and all the Portuguese Kingdoms, including the New World. BFZ, Varios históricos curiosos, Ms/ 73-246, fol. 199r.-v. See also BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 219/142. Herrera even made reference in his Preface to the “great fury” with which the King had demanded documents from Portugal, and especially the copies of “capitulations” (capitulaciones) in the years leading up to, and immediately after 1580, that had been sent to Madrid. Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Preface. Herrera claimed to have relied heavily on these capitulaciones.
the matter of the Portuguese succession, Philip also ordered Moura, recently appointed his Secretary to Portugal, to win to the Spanish cause the archivist of the Torre de Tombo (the main Portuguese archive in Lisbon), Antonio de Castiho.\textsuperscript{160} Thus, when Herrera approached Moura, the advisor helped make the information necessary for Herrera to assert his claims readily available. Herrera, therefore, had at his disposal a mountain of official documents on which to base his claims. These official documents pertaining to the succession were not only overwhelming in number, but closely guarded by the state, and only officials had access to them. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter One a source-based history could not have been constructed outside of the confines of the court, nor without an official appointment which granted access to state papers and official permission to use the archives. For Herrera, since official historians were given access to these documents, it was not only their right but their responsibility to use them, and moreover, to make the reader aware of such sources. Herrera understood that it was only by using such archival sources that he would be able to make claims to “legitimate knowledge” and thus provide his work with an authority that others could not claim.\textsuperscript{161}

The Crown, however, was fully aware that additional documents existed, and so both Moura and Idiáquez also instructed Herrera to go to Portugal specifically to visit the archive in Lisbon and use what he found in the Portuguese archives to prove Spanish claims.\textsuperscript{162} Significantly, for the Crown, Herrera was to embark upon a larger fact-finding mission that went beyond the scope of his narrative \textit{per se}, for as Moura instructed Herrera, “[b]e diligent in

\textsuperscript{160} Philip to Moura, 13/9/1578, BNM Ms/ 1930, fol. 72 v. See also Moura’s replies from Lisbon 21/9/1578 and 19/10/1578, BNM Ms/ 1930, fol. 100 and 134r. In fact, it was through his \textit{Embaxaidas de Portugal} (Embassies to Portugal) that Moura first met with Castilho and obtained the information needed to make Spanish claims. Gómez Dávila to Moura, 1/12/1586. BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 194, fol. 163. On how Moura was informed of additional sources that were found in Portugal as late as 1598, and on their potential use (as well as on an attempt to date previously found documents), see Juan de Silva to Moura, Lisbon, 21/2/1598, BNM Ms/ 6198, fol. 45r–46v.

\textsuperscript{161} Herrera, \textit{Discursos sobre los provechos de la historia}, BNM Ms/ 1035.

\textsuperscript{162} Idiáquez to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 74.
finding papers and materials that are [in Lisbon] on this matter, and amass them, and have them in good order, and maintain a copy of the originals, and bring a copy of the originals to Madrid if possible.’”

Further, Moura requested that for whatever Herrera found, he needed to take detailed notes: “declaring when it was written, … and where it appears [where it can be found] in the Archive.” These notarial instructions undoubtedly affected how Herrera would present these sources in Historia de Portugal. Indeed, such instructions demonstrate not only the importance such documents were seen to possess for Herrera’s project, but also for the Crown’s cause and the need to “bring these sources to light” and provide document-based substantiation for claims. This also demonstrated the clear awareness of the details required so that arguments being made could be substantiated and verified, if needed. For this, Moura also acknowledged the institutional support that Herrera would need and requested that Castilho personally help Herrera find all “necessary documents” and to bring to Herrera’s attention any others which might be of importance, so that Herrera could present “the whole truth.”

This was an acknowledgement of the important role that the archivist himself began to play, not only as a collector and organizer of documents and as “protector of documents,” but also in helping officials of the Crown find and interpret archival sources. Moreover, this indicated the collaborative nature of the historiographic project involving advisors, historians and archivists.

163 “Hazer diligencia en buscar los papeles y cartas que ay sobre esto y juntarlo todo y tenerlo a buen recaudo, y mantener una copia de los originales, y traer copia auténticas a Madrid si es posible.” Moura to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 82. A note made by a later hand makes reference to AGI, Indiferente General 738/82, which is a document containing a list of documents found at the Torre de Tombo, including a list of documents used by Herrera.

164 “declarando en ella de que tiempo es, lo que en el huviere escrito, y como queda puesto en el Archivo.” Moura to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468.

165 “den al historiador los papaeles [sic] que pidiere y huviere menester, y se saquen los que fueren importantes.” Moura to Castilho, Torre de Tombo, Ms/ 45–342. Herrera wrote to Moura about what he had found in Lisbon, and his dealings with Castilho. Herrera to Moura BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 78.

166 Herrera to Castilho, Torre de Tombo, Ms/ 45–401.
who helped in accumulating the papers necessary to write the official response which would become a powerful political tool.

Within *Historia de Portugal*, Herrera noted that since he sought to sanction Philip’s annexation of Portugal by proving Philip’s dynastic supremacy to the Portuguese throne, he had travelled even more extensively, since the majority of Portuguese medieval feudal contracts and genealogies remained housed in various archives throughout Spain and Portugal. Herrera specifically identified the archives and papers he had utilized, writing in his Prologue: “I have followed in this history, the papers of the Camera Real, and the Royal Archives, [as well as] the books, registers, and relaciones and other papers of the Royal and Supreme Council [held at the Archive of Simancas].” Herrera also wrote of his fact-finding trip to the Torre de Tombo in Lisbon, “to review the documents held there,” his numerous personal trips to various smaller Portuguese archives in Tuy, Coimbra, Évora, Viana, Batalha, and Belém, and his use of the personal papers of Portuguese secretary, and later archivist, Diego de Ayala. In fact, Herrera had not simply looked at the copies of documents that had reached Madrid, but made explicit how he had sought out and had “looked at originals” in Portugal and reviewed them first-hand to ensure that nothing had been omitted or misinterpreted. Such curiosity and eagerness to travel not only demonstrated his desire for rigor, but had the additional benefit of permitting Herrera to

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167 “He seguido en esta historia los papeles de la Cámara Real, y Reales archivos, los libros, registros y relaciones y otros papeles del Real Consejo.” Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Prologue. As outlined by the Crown, Herrera’s official history “must include papers that are under the care of [the King’s] ministers.” Moura to Herrera BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 82.
169 Herrera to Moura about his visits to these smaller archives and repositories: BNM, Ms/ 13229, esp. fol. 218r and 181r. In these letters, he also mentions his numerous visits to the main Portuguese archive in Lisbon (“el archivo del Reino de Portugal que se guarda en el Castillo de la ciudad de Lisboa en la torre de Tombo”) to talk with Ayala. BNM Ms/ 13229, fol. 203r.
170 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Prologue, and throughout. Similarly, in his own treatises Herrera had stressed that the historian had not only to “search out his sources,” but see these primary sources for himself. Herrera, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 153v. For Herrera’s comments on the need for historians to see documents first-hand and not copies see Chapter Two above.
prove *in situ* the exact location of where treaties had been signed, people buried, and where historical events had taken place.\(^{171}\) Moreover, by referencing the archives he had visited directly within his text, he demonstrated that he had followed a rigorous methodology, searching out documents and pursuing his substantiation for claims in the manner of legal antiquarians.

Herrera further emphasized to the reader not only how his travels to amass his information had been extensive, but also the exhaustiveness of his research, claiming as he did to have “seen all the material available” and “read all the pertinent documents” relating to the succession.\(^{172}\) Herrera even claimed to have meticulously read the entire dossier presented to the Spanish *Consejo de Estado* (Council of State) and all the multiple *juntas* brought together to discuss the materials of the succession of Portugal. Such claims were not hollow; Herrera was, in fact, familiar with these court documents and all the different political allegations and juridical claims and opinions upon which Philip’s candidacy was based.\(^{173}\)

Herrera presented all of the political reasons for the succession given by Philip’s advisors between 1578 and 1580,\(^{174}\) and verified his claims using the two primary political tracts which had provided the dynastic and legal basis for Spanish claims: the *Resolución que dio la Facultad de Theología de la Universidad de Alcalá, acerca de la prosecución del derecho que su Majestad del Rey Don Phelipe nuestro señor tiene a los Reynos de la Corona de Portugal* (ca.

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\(^{171}\) Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Prologue. That Herrera actually visited the sites he commented on, and reviewed documents in Lisbon and across Portugal is also referenced in a letter that Herrera wrote to Bernardino de Avallaneda, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVI.

\(^{172}\) Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 10.

\(^{173}\) For the legal and political arguments used by the Crown in the matter of Portugal: Hierónimo Çurita *El derecho que tiene su Majestad a la sucesión del Rey de Portugal*, (1578), AGS *Estado*, legajo 418, fol. 33. See also AGS, Estado, legajo 400, fols. 168–173; Luis de Molina, *Iuris Allegatio pro Rege Catholico Phillippo ad successionem Regnorum Portugaliae* (1579), AGS, Estado, 8769; and BNM Ms/ 21698-21.

1578) [Resolution given by the Faculty of Theology of the University of Alcalá on the rights that His Majesty Philip II our lord has to the Kingdoms of the Crown of Portugal] and the,

Advertimiento de la intención y iustas causas con que la Majestad del Rey Cathólico se mueue a tomar la posesión de los Reynos de Portugal por su propia auctoridad sin aguardar más tiempo (1580) [Advertisement of the intention and just causes with which his Majesty the Catholic King was moved to take possession of the Kingdoms of Portugal through his own authority and without haste]. Furthermore, not only did Herrera directly identify these tracts, he used many of the genealogical and political justifications presented in these works, inserting lengthy passages verbatim from these political tracts into his text.175 Readers familiar with the issue would recognize the texts Herrera used as those that were in fact used by political advisors when making their cases at home, and in foreign courts. Herrera then expanded on these documents, by showing the validity of their claims, and how the claims they made were in fact “true.”

Herrera also drew heavily from state papers circulating at court of another historian, Pedro de Salazar y Mendoza (1549-1629), whom Philip II had ordered to research and justify the rights of Spanish Kings to all of the countries they possessed. Mendoza’s research provided the historical and juridical justifications necessary to demonstrate how each domain had come under Spanish control.176 Mendoza had done extensive investigations on matters pertaining to Portugal, and not only did Herrera use Mendoza’s research and findings as further proof of Philip’s dynastic claims, he acknowledged that Mendoza’s work had led him to many new sources.177 It

175 See Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 9–10, 17, and 18–19; (Resolución), RAH 9/3723, num. 71; (Advertimiento), RAH 9/3723, num. 69.
176 Mendoza’s work would not be published until the eighteenth century, appearing as Pedro de Salazar y Mendoza, Monarquía de España (Madrid: J. Ibarra, 1770-7). Herrera’s reference to this work, therefore, is either to a manuscript version of this text, or an earlier published version.
177 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 9. Herrera also drew from Mendoza’s unpublished and undated genealogical work, “Origen de las Dignidades Seglares de Castilla y León: con relación sumaria de los Reyes de estos Reynos,” which
Herrera asserted that he was only finally able to verify his conclusions and consolidate his dynastic arguments and provide authoritative “proof” for his claims after careful examination of “old documents” (papeles antiguos) that were “circulating at court regarding the succession” and which provided additional verification of genealogical links and dynastic precedent. Specifically, this included a medieval genealogical schematic he “found kept, thanks to the public care of our mayors, in the archive of this Kingdom [Portugal], a royal lineage and genealogy, describing up to the time of the serene King Don Juan of Portugal [(1455-1495)], in a dutiful order of succession, and represented in the form of a tree.” For Herrera, this medieval schematic provided both the “allowance of authority” and “stamp of antiquity” to demonstrate conclusively that dynastic genealogical precedent had been followed in Portugal. Most importantly, it proved that according to Portuguese precedent the Portuguese Crown rightfully went, and repeatedly had gone, to the oldest male descendant of the last

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178 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 13. See, in particular, notes in Herrera’s hand in AGI, Indiferente General, 738/83.
179 It should be noted that Herrera’s use of the terms “old” and “ancient” were also used as code words which, throughout Europe, denoted value and legitimacy, like “noble,” or “true,” and were used in reference to a more recent as well as a remote past. See Daniel R. Woolf, “In Praise of Older Things: Notions of Age and Antiquity in Early Modern England,” in Historians and Ideologues, ed. Anthony Grafton and John H. M. Salmon (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2001), 123–153.
180 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 3.
181 “Tras haber encontrado custodiadas, gracias al cuidado público de nuestros mayors[sic], en el archivo de este reino una estirpe y genealogía regias descritas hasta los tiempos de el serenísimo Rey Don Juan, en un cumplido orden de sucesión, y representadas a la manera de un árbol.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 11–12.
Portuguese king to have children, who in this instance was Don Manuel, making his eldest male heir, Philip. It would be this document, therefore, that helped Herrera reaffirm the Spanish claim that Philip was the most direct bloodline heir to the Portuguese Crown. Moreover, Herrera sought to demonstrate how the Portuguese Crown had used this very document and its genealogical tree at the death of Don Juan, who had died without leaving an heir, and that because they had relied on this document, Don Juan was succeeded by his cousin, Don Manuel, the eldest living male heir of Alonso V, Don Juan’s father, through a female line. Thus, Herrera also used this document as a pivotal piece of “proof” in the succession of Portuguese King Don Manuel, of whom Philip was the eldest living male heir, which allowed him to present Philip and his rule as the continuation of the Manuelian plan. Lastly, Herrera used this ancient genealogical tree to demonstrate the historical links between the Spanish and Portuguese thrones through successive marriages starting in the eleventh century, concluding that because of this both Crowns were “of the same stock, and language.”

Herrera also used this “ancient genealogy” for another more ideological reason. He would emphasize a prophetic tradition about the recovery of Portugal and the re-integration of ancient Hispania. Indeed for Herrera, it was the memory of Roman Hispania and the

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182 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 13–17.
183 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 13–17. Herrera even added to his genealogical discussion how Philip himself, in 1543, had married the Portuguese Infanta Maria, who “much to the King’s sadness and anguish” died two years later giving birth to Don Carlos. Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 17.
184 Harkening upon the revival of an ancient and mythic Hispania was by no means a novel idea in early modern Iberia. As John Elliott has pointed out, although the Spanish monarchy from the time of Ferdinand and Isabella was a composite monarchy ruling over many different kingdoms and political entities, it often “sought to revive shadowy memories of a Roman or Visigothic Hispania in order to suggest a wider potential focus of loyalty in the form of a historically revived “Spain”.” And while this proved difficult, since local Castilian, Aragonese, or Catalanian allegiances and loyalty were often primary, “in certain contexts, . . . the advantages of political union could be considered, at least by influential groups in society, as outweighing the drawbacks,” and thus, it was “possible for a strong loyalty to the wider community of “Spain” to exist.” For Elliott, Portugal was such a context, where the monarch and his new subjects generally succeeded in achieving the ‘Union in Name’ that was “so elusive in Iberia itself.” John H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” Past and Present 137 (Nov., 1992): 57–58.
aspirations for a revived Iberian unity that had nourished the matrimonial alliances of the Portuguese, Aragonese, and Castilian ruling houses seen in this genealogy and which, he asserted, had made the eventual re-unification of the three Crowns almost an inevitability.\(^{185}\) Indeed, Herrera used this ‘ancient document’ to provide proof for his ideological justification for the union of Spain and Portugal under Philip II: restoring ancient *Hispania*. In doing so, Herrera carefully added to the more traditional dynastic historical justification of lineage that of antiquity, providing additional historical legitimacy to Philip’s claim to Portugal.

Herrera made one final argument to assert Spain’s dynastic claims. He again used primary sources to emphasize that it had been through “the generosity and benevolence of the Castilian King Alonso” that Portugal was granted “as a gift” to Don Enrique for his services against the Moors in the eleventh century and so it was right that it had returned to Spanish hands (“*se volvió . . . a la corona real de Castilla de la cual salió*”).\(^{186}\) Indeed, it was during his archival research in Madrid and Lisbon that Herrera came across “[medieval] chronicles” which he claimed conclusively verified that in fact Alonso had granted Portugal to Don Enrique.\(^{187}\) While it should be noted that Herrera had made a similar claim in the genealogy he had written of the Portuguese Monarchy, his ‘Genealogía verdadera de los reyes de Portugal’ (1586),\(^{188}\) in *Historia de Portugal* he stressed that through additional and extensive research, he had been able to find new evidence that supplemented his prior claims and testified that Portugal was initially

\(^{185}\) Herrera knew that such ideological ideas added to Spanish dynastic precedence. Furthermore, Herrera stressed that the restoration of ancient *Hispania* could only have been accomplished by Spain, since “there is no other Crown more, illustrious, ancient, and worthy in all the world” (“*no hay otra Corona tan ilustre, antiguo y claro en el mundo*”). Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Introducción, and repeated on page15.

\(^{186}\) Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 18–23.


\(^{188}\) Herrera, ‘Genealogía verdadera de los reyes de Portugal,’ BNM Ms/ 2/28382.
created as a feudal vassalage of Castile, directly referencing these texts. For Herrera, such proof served to provide additional support for his claim that the taking of the throne by Philip was in reality the final re-integration of Hispania, bringing Portugal back under the Castilian Crown, “of which it once belonged.”

Through such arguments, Herrera openly and concretely re-enforced the claims of the Spanish Crown: that the acquisition of Portugal was an essentially legal and dynastic event, occurring within a complex juridical framework of historical rights and inherited obligations. By combining “state papers” with genealogical records, and evidence from “ancient documents” he sought to provide multiple forms of evidence to assert Philip’s dynastic supremacy. Yet Herrera provided the ultimate justification for the Spanish annexation of Portugal by incontrovertibly establishing and proving Philip’s dynastic precedence and legitimacy through revealing the actual documents that verified his claims. Such tactics not only allowed Herrera to discredit Conestaggio’s claims of the precedence of other pretenders, but also to demonstrate his impartiality, positioning himself in a dispassionate way through his adherence to humanist and antiquarian methods.

Herrera continuously emphasized his use of documentary evidence in support of his claims. Throughout his narrative, he referenced the sources he had used to make his claims, and even directly cited the names of the authors who provided the information he used, occasionally

189 Among the medieval chronicles he cites, Herrera specifically refers to the twelfth century Chronica Alfonsi Imperatoris [The Chronicle of Alfonso the Emperor], which did in fact support this claim.
190 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 23.
191 For more on this, see Elliott, “The Spanish Monarchy,” 49.
citing “each book, and page number;” thus making his evidence verifiable and more reliable.\textsuperscript{192} Herrera even identified the archives where specific sources were located. In this way, his text carried the authority of these “real” documents. Herrera also sought to demonstrate how he was not only responding to Conestaggio’s accusations, but providing a \textit{better} history, not only by using documents, but by making them part of his work. For Herrera demonstrating his use of a proper historical method required that his conclusions be verifiable. Therefore, as a final demonstration of his historical rigor, Herrera insisted that not only had he been “complete and fair” in his account, but sought to bolster his claims by stating that he was open to people reviewing his claims by examining the documents he had used. Thus he requested in his ‘Dedication to the King’ that the sources he used be made public so that everyone could refer to them and see that he had used them appropriately.\textsuperscript{193} Moreover, when it came to his genealogical claims and the documents he used, he specifically wrote to Moura requesting that, “using public monies, we transform [these documents] into an elegantly written [genealogical] history . . . so that [the truth they contain] may be brought to light.”\textsuperscript{194}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{192} “[e utilizando] solo crónicas impresas, o donaciones reales sacadas del Archivo de Lisboa, y aun apuntando el libro y las hojas dél.” Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal}, Prologue.

\textsuperscript{193} Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal}, Carta Dedicatoria. Herrera also clearly understood the need for a Latin translation of his counter-history, and the wider propagandistic function it fulfilled, especially abroad in foreign courts when he wrote: “Our deeds [in Portugal] have not received the light of history, and those deeds which have been recorded have either been ignored or since everything written [about these events has been] in the vernacular it has yet to reach other peoples” (“nuestros hechos, no han recibido luz alguna de la historia, o si alguna han recibido, los demás la han ignorado, porque todo lo escrito en lengua vernácula no ha podido aún llegar al resto de los pueblos”). Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal}, Al Lector. On knowledge of Spanish and Spanish works in foreign courts, and on readership of Spanish works, especially in the English court see Warren Boutcher, “Vernacular Humanism in the Sixteenth Century,” in \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism}, ed. Jill Kraye, 6th edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 189–202.

\textsuperscript{194} “procuramos, [de acuerdo con la autoridad y el consejo de el ilustrísimo señor don Cristóbal de Moura,] que, también con dinero público, se transformasen en una historia con un estilo más elegante . . . para que pudieran salir a la luz.” BFZ, \textit{Varios históricos curiosos}, 73-247, fols. 149 r.–165 v. Perhaps what Herrera had in mind was a substantiated genealogy, like that produced by Esteban de Garibay and discussed in Chapter Four below.
\end{footnotesize}
Herrera’s use of sources not only became integral to the new type of history he was producing to verify and provide substantiation for Spanish claims, it also provided him with the means to demonstrate the flaws in Conestaggio’s genealogical claims as it offered an opportunity for Herrera to demonstrate to the reader not only his own critical appraisal of sources, but Conestaggio’s methodological deficiencies. Herrera asserted that although history and historical writing had long played a vital role in proving and providing royal genealogies, it was well known at the time that “one sees the greatest instances of forgeries in genealogies . . . especially the false lineages of royal houses.”

Herrera stressed that Conestaggio’s work was one such instance of a “fabricated truth,” since the genealogy he provided was “faulty” and could “not be trusted” and that Conestaggio was like other sycophantic amateur historians who, “try to legitimize successions . . . because of their own interest or for flattery.” Herrera insisted that it was the kind of sources that Conestaggio had used, however, that had led him to such “false” conclusions. Herrera emphasized that Conestaggio had purportedly used “the personal documents of men,” which Herrera saw as the worst sources of information for genealogies because in such documents, “one thing or another is falsified by those . . . who want to adulate.” Herrera was adamant that he had refrained from using such sources, as well as other kinds of evidence that were questionable: “nor have I used tombstones since many of them are

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195 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 9. Herrera’s views on forgeries and “false” genealogies and how they sought to “deceive” also appear in, “Advertencia a los lectores,” BNM Ms/ 3056. Similar ideas concerning the frequency of forgeries, especially in royal donations, appear in Sobre los que se han de prender en Castilla cómplices de Diego Carrillo que lo está en Valencia por hauer falsificado la firma real de Vuestra Magestad (1592), Archivo de la Corona de Aragón (Barcelona), Consejo de Aragón, Legajo 194, fol. 332. I thank Javier Docampo, archivist at the BNM, for bringing this reference to my attention.

196 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 9.

197 “atienden los escritores por la mayor parte a legitimar la sucesión del que reyna o por interés o por lisonja.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 5. That was why, Herrera claimed, Conestaggio had stressed that Catherine’s husband also held a substantial claim to the throne, and one that even trumped Philip’s.

198 “documentos personales . . . porque una y otra cosa se falsifica por aquéllos a quien toca o por quien los quiere adular.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 8.

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falsified.”¹⁹⁹ Instead, Herrera had used “only printed chronicles, or royal donations taken from the Archive of Lisbon,” or “old documents” to verify his claims.²⁰⁰ Herrera openly criticized Conestaggio’s work, therefore, for its poor historical methodology and its improper and inadequate use of sources, understanding that this served a controlled historiographic purpose, for not only did it weaken Conestaggio’s claims, but it also helped Herrera bolster his own work and his claims for the Crown, and the sources of authority he had used to verify his claims. Moreover, many of Herrera’s criticisms of Conestaggio were valid. Indeed, Portuguese feudal law did require that the eldest male heir of the last living king was to inherit the Portuguese throne, thus confirming Philip’s preeminence. Furthermore, a look at Conestaggio’s work reveals that he provided an unsubstantiated account, and his genealogical assertions were mostly speculative, especially his assertion that Rainuncio Farnese held a stronger claim to the throne than Philip.²⁰¹

Disproving the ‘Right to Elect’

Herrera also sought to demonstrate his adherence to a rigorous historical methodology by describing directly within his text how he had used various techniques to verify his claims. The prime example is Herrera’s use of his antiquarian methods in his assessment of whether the Portuguese people had the “right to choose” their next king, as Conestaggio claimed. Instead of avoiding this contentious issue, Herrera sought to answer conclusively whether an ancient right

¹⁹⁹ “ni menos letreros de sepultura que muchas están falsificados.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 8–9.
²⁰⁰ Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 9–10.
²⁰¹ In fact, Philip had the strongest dynastic claim to the Portuguese throne through his mother Isabel, who was the eldest daughter of the late Portuguese King, Don Manuel, which made him the eldest of Don Manuel’s living male heirs, which according to Portuguese law made him the preeminent heir.
of election actually existed. Herrera explicitly laid out how he had sought additional
documentation from Moura, Castilho, and from the king’s personal archives on this issue.
Moura had relayed to Herrera that after asking Castilho, “what acts (autos) the [Portuguese] people had done to acquire the right of this immemorial possession that they pretended,”
Castilho responded that those who supported the “right to elect the King” (el pueblo elegir Rey) claimed this right based on three precedents. They claimed that the Portuguese people had
elected the first king of Portugal, Don Alfonso Enrique, and had also elected Alfonso III, and Don Juan. Herrera emphasized that he sought to come to a more definitive answer on this issue of the “election” as opposed to the “speculations made by others.” Herrera knew, however, that because of the implications of these alleged precedents, categorically disproving their credibility would require substantial investigation. Therefore, Herrera expressly wrote how he had gone to see the documents that claimed these precedents firsthand and how he had judged each document he encountered on the matter independently according to its textual authenticity and attention to detail, but also its age and reliability, seeking to reveal whether the documents

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202 Unlike Conestaggio who “in his narration of what occurred, he composes it in his own fashion, silencing what he does not like either entirely or in part” (“en la narración de lo sucedido compone a su modo callando lo que no gusta decir enteramente o en parte”). Herrera made clear that his work did not shy away from things that were contentious, claiming: “what for others may be the subject of contention, shall only strengthen our cause.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, in the Introduction to ‘Libro Primero.’

203 Spaniards had demonstrated a concern with this issue, as Philip was made aware that Sebastian’s successor, Cardinal Henry (Enrique I), had ordered the royal archivist to find the documents that proved whether or not “a people could choose a King” (el pueblo elegir Rey), according to Portuguese custom. Philip to Moura, 9/13/1578, BNM Ms/ 1930, fol. 72v. As a result, Moura personally spoke in 1578 with Castilho about whether there was any validity to the claim that “the people can choose the King, as they have done so other times” (“si el pueblo puede elegir como ha hecho otras veces”). Moura to Philip, 9/21/1578, BNM, Ms/ 1930, fol. 101r–v.

204 Moura to Herrera, 13/5/1589, BNM Ms/1780, fol. 68. Moura had told the King the same thing a few years earlier: Moura to Philip, 10/19/1578, BNM Ms/ 1930, fol. 134r. Idiáquez also makes mention of these claims: Lisbon, 9/21/1578, BNM Ms/1930, fol. 100v. The documents relating to the right to election can be found in Torre de Tombo, Chancillería de Felipe I. Livro I de privilegios, folio 37/r. This folio also makes reference to how Philip requested that these documents be brought to Madrid.

205 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, in the Introduction to ‘Libro Primero,’ and 8. Herrera would write multiple letters to Moura and Idiáquez requesting more documents, and claiming that the documents he had been given on this issue were “insufficient” and “inconclusive.” Herrera to Moura, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/468, fol. 78. There is also a reference that Herrera personally consulted with Philip about obtaining more documentation on this issue in Morel Fatio, “El cronista Antonio de Herrera y el Archiduque Alberto,” 55–7.
upon which such claims were based were “worthy of credit.”

Herrera made clear that while some documents attested to the “right to elect,” a simple examination of these documents revealed that they were recent and that none pre-dated the reign of Sebastian. More importantly, Herrera had found earlier documents which demonstrated that these “elections” were merely symbolic; all three kings (Enrique, Alfonso III, and Don Juan) had held the pre-eminent right to the Portuguese throne regardless, and thus their supposed “elections” had merely been a symbolic confirmation of their right to the throne. Herrera also stressed that he had confirmed their dynastic pre-eminence through genealogical records. Thus, although Herrera acknowledged that a symbolic election existed, he provided proof through the “oldest documents”, as well as his additional analysis of genealogical records, that it was merely a process by which kings were confirmed and thus a mere formality, just as Philip had been “elected” by the Portuguese Cortes when he took the throne.

Herrera sought to demonstrate further to the reader how he had turned to antiquarian tools such as philology, to confirm a document’s age and authority, and how he had drawn from his expert knowledge of language to determine the precise meaning of an “ancient” document’s words in a specific context. Indeed, in one of the most powerful of the handful of examples of his use of philology in Historia de Portugal, Herrera sought to clarify the terminology used in the “right to elect.” Significantly, Herrera asserted that there had been confusion regarding the issue

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206 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, in the Introduction to ‘Libro Primero.’
207 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 8.
208 So convinced was Herrera on this issue, that after completing his investigations in the archives in Lisbon he wrote to Philip that every piece of extant archival evidence that he came across only further confirmed “the right of your Majesty and lessen any claim that the people might have the ability to elect.” Herrera to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 80. Spanish advisors had also claimed in 1578, that all evidence pointed to the fact that there was no actual “right to elect.” See Fernando Bouza, Portugal en la Monarquía Hispánica (1580-1640). Felipe II, las cortes de Tomar y la génesis del Portugal Católico, 2 vol. (Madrid: Editorial de la Universidad Complutense, 1987), 1: Ch. 1.
of “election” because of a misunderstanding of the use of the term “selectus” in some documents. Herrera emphasized that if people had only done some research and turned to tools like philology, they immediately would have seen the weakness of certain claims, since in the past the Latin term “selectus” had not meant “election” but rather a vote of “approval,” and that if they had simply done some further genealogical research it would have been immediately evident that they had not “chosen” their kings, but rather “accepted” them as rightful heirs.209 Herrera’s skillful and wide-ranging use of philology to assert his claims was another way to discredit those historians, like Conestaggio, who failed to use these tools when looking at older documents. By conclusively demonstrating the symbolic nature of the “election,” Herrera further weakened any claims made either by Conestaggio, or actual pretenders like Antonio of Crato about the “right to election.”210 By using tools like philology, Herrera had demonstrated that the texts upon which other claimants relied were not only not “worthy of credit,” because they were new, but moreover, the terms in other more ancient documents had been subject to misinterpretation, and, therefore, could not be used to establish incontrovertibly claims to the legitimacy of an election based on them. Herrera, therefore, lent his legal, antiquarian and historical skills to the support of the monarch and did so in a new and innovative way by incorporating such techniques into the historical narrative he wrote for the Crown, lending additional dimensions to the new history.

209 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 8–12.

210 In a letter to Philip, Moura had even claimed that he was told (by an unidentified person) that these claims had been based on fraudulent papers, perpetuated by Antonio’s supporters, and inserted into the archive without the librarian’s knowledge. Moura to Philip, BNM Ms/ 1930, fol. 100.
Herrera acknowledged, however, that when it came to characterizing Philip’s rule and current events one would have to turn to eyewitnesses, since “proof” of Philip’s “prudent” actions was not to be found in ancient texts. Herrera’s approach to source evaluation, therefore, also extended to his use of eyewitness testimony and he applied the same rigor to determine their authenticity. Herrera had come to understand that if he were to clarify the nature of Spanish rule in Portugal, he would have to turn to the accounts of those who had witnessed events first hand. Moreover, Herrera understood that “proof” of recent actions in Portugal and evidence of the nature of Philip’s “good rule,” could not always be found in official records. The evidence provided by those who had personally witnessed Philip’s actions was vital in order to garner an accurate account of the way Philip had come to his decisions, and how he had conducted himself with his new Portuguese subjects. Therefore, to supplement his archival research and his use of official documents, Herrera also sought out and used the accounts of eyewitnesses, as a final form of “proof” to establish his claims and provide verifiable evidence that Philip ruled for the benefit of his Portuguese subjects: “I [became] informed by many people of state . . . who had direct and true knowledge . . . and by those present at events, [who provided] indubitable notice.”211 In these efforts, Herrera would also rely heavily on institutional support. Moura had already acknowledged that when writing about more recent events, the official historian would have to use the insights of those who had been present, as they were the only ones who could verify “that things happened as they really did,” asserting that the veracity of those who had

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211 “yo me informe de personas de estado, los cuales por letras misivas dello tenían verdadera relación y por testigos de vista, indubitada noticia.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Prologue.
actually witnessed events trumped all others. To this effect, Moura had gathered every account he could from those nobles who had accompanied and served Philip in Portugal and gave them to Herrera to use as sources and evidence. These also included the written accounts of soldiers who had personally accompanied Philip to Portugal and witnessed Spanish actions. Of these, Herrera specifically noted that he had relied heavily on the accounts of Antonio de Escobar and Francisco Díaz de Vargas, whose accounts Herrera claimed to have received personally from Moura.

Herrera understood that eyewitness testimony accorded current history a degree of credibility that other kinds of evidence did not, although he immediately acknowledged the problems with using eyewitness testimony. While eyewitnesses provided the “approbation of testimony,” Herrera informed the reader how he had soon realized that many eyewitness accounts differed in their assessment of events. To remedy this problem, Herrera wrote that he had actively engaged with his notions of historical methodology when considering which eyewitness sources to use: “Although not an easy thing, to write this history, I had to do much research, and turn to many men worthy of credit who were present at events. I did not turn to a few common men, but found it necessary rather to consult many noble men, whose accounts I

212 Moura to Herrera, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 12.
213 Moura was also to have asked many of the nobles who had been present at events to speak with Herrera to provide the historian with an account of what they had witnessed. See, for example, Moura to Bernabe Bustos, BNM Ms/ 18768, fol. 5.
214 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, references Escobar on pages 6, 72, 82, 112. Antonio de Escobar, Recopilación de la jornada que Felipe II hizo en la conquista de Portugal [Summary of the Journey Philip took during the conquest of Portugal]. Escobar was a Spanish soldier who had taken part in the annexation of Portugal. His work was a detailed account of Spanish activities, especially all armed activities and operations, leading up to Philip’s arrival in Lisbon. See Benito Sánchez Alonso, Fuentes de la Historia de España (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1944), Fuente 6767.
215 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, references Vargas on pages 53 and 67. Díaz de Vargas, Discurso y Sumario de la Guerra de Portugal y sucesos della [Account and Summary on the War of Portugal and its successes]. Vargas had been a soldier who was part of the expeditionary fleet into Portugal. Like Escobar’s his account was also a detailed military account of armed activities. See Sánchez Alonso, Fuentes de la Historia de España, Fuente 6751.
216 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 6 and 53.
diligently compared, and I took as certain only those things which many of them had experienced and agreed on, and, of those, only that which appeared closest to the truth.”

Therefore, while Herrera still preferred written sources, he acknowledged that eyewitness accounts were equally capable of providing sound information, as long as they too were carefully evaluated.

When evaluating and utilizing eyewitness testimony Herrera used the techniques he had reflected upon in his treatises, and in fact many of his theoretical ideas found direct expression in *Historia de Portugal*. For example, in order to get the most accurate account of events, Herrera sought the earliest *testimonia* of events he could find, as he believed that those accounts offered greater accuracy for they had not been corrupted “by time, or lack of memory.” Herrera indicated the veracity of two such accounts: the contemporary account of Don Manuel De Menezes, Duke of Vila Real (Portugal), and the information contained in the letters of the Marquis of Santa Cruz, one of the Spanish ambassadors in Portugal and a man known for his “trustworthiness.” Not only did Herrera confirm that both were the accounts of eyewitnesses and that he had verified through court documents that both had personally been present and witnessed events, but he stressed that they were also the first to provide written accounts of what they witnessed. More importantly, their works independently supported one another, thus

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217 “Finalmente, lo que no es poco, para escribir historia, mucho de lo que atañía a esta historia fue necesario buscarlo por aquí y por allí y a partir de hombres dignos de todo crédito que habían estado presentes en los hechos que yo iba a narrar. Y entretanto fue necesario consultar no a unos pocos hombres vulgares sino a muchos nobles, cuyo relatos sobre los mismos hechos fue preciso comparar con diligencia para tomar por ciertos sólo aquellas cosas en las que muchos habían conocido y parecían más cercanas a la verdad.” Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Prologue.

218 Herrera repeats almost verbatim these procedures, when describing how to conduct one’s research in one of his treatises on the *artes historicæ*, discussed in Chapter Two above.

219 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 7. Herrera directly references these accounts on pages 14, 55, 39, 41, 43 and 91. The Marquis of Santa Cruz’s account was given to Herrera by Moura. Moura to Herrera, BNM Ms/ 18768.

220 Herrera’s review of court documents containing lists of those present at events also served another purpose. Herrera sought to prove that the accounts on which Conestaggio based his version of the events were not those of people who had witnessed events firsthand, and thus were unreliable as historical evidence. Herrera assured the reader that his review of court records of attendance at events proved that many of the people that Conestaggio...
confirming their version of the events and establishing their reliability.\textsuperscript{221} Thus, Herrera systematically cross-examined and authenticated the testimony of these witnesses. Moreover, since the Duke’s account corroborated that of the Marquis, Herrera stated that he could trust Menezès’s account to provide him with additional details not found anywhere else. Herrera made clear to the reader, therefore, how he had specifically followed a certain procedure when finding his eyewitnesses and considering which ones to use and how to assess their veracity. Herrera revealed, therefore, that “proper” historical method included not only reading and being critical of as many documents pertaining to the issue as available, but also trying to find the most credible sources, including those of eyewitnesses, accepting only those accounts from “the most trustworthy” men and using only accounts that he could confirm with others.\textsuperscript{222} In this way he united his theoretical reflections in the actual writing of history, and presented these methodologies to the reader to demonstrate his scholarly motivations.

Proving Philip’s Adherence to Portuguese Law and Custom

Herrera’s use of his historical method had its most profound effect, however, when it came to demonstrating and “proving” the nature of Philip’s rule. Herrera had been specifically requested by Idiáquez to “expose and obliterate the false impressions made on the understanding [of actions in Portugal], by the malignity of foreign writers,” a direct reference to Conestaggio.\textsuperscript{223} The only way to expose and negate said claims would be to \textit{prove} that they were wrong. In order to provide the necessary account of events required by the Crown, and in order

\textsuperscript{221} Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal}, 14 and 43.
\textsuperscript{222} Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal}, Prologue.
\textsuperscript{223} Idiáquez to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 74.
to show that Spaniards were not self-serving opportunists in their dealings with Portugal, Herrera would need to provide specific examples of Spanish actions, understanding that only verifiable examples would provide the tools to bolster the political effectiveness of his work. Indeed, it was not enough to explain the causes that moved Philip to action, as he had done in his Introduction; Herrera would have to substantiate these claims by providing verifiable examples of how these causes had moved the King and thus demonstrate Spanish politics and the nature of Philip’s rule at work. Philip’s “good rule” had to be verified.

Herrera set out to demonstrate how Philip’s actions as a monarch followed from “the laws” (las leyes) above his personal “will” (alverido) and conclusively proved how Philip’s rule of Portugal and all of his actions were directed towards maintaining order, stability, and justice in Portugal.224 Herrera understood that he needed to show how Philip had respected the customs and, above all, the laws of his new Portuguese subjects, especially since such respect for local custom was part of Philip’s political prudence, and an essential element of Philip’s reputación. Order and stability were ensured by Philip and his advisors seeking to maintain the commonweal (i.e., the public good – el bien común), which meant adhering to Portuguese norms. Conestaggio had claimed that Portuguese rights and ancient privileges were not being respected. Such accusations could not be taken lightly, especially since elites across Europe feared monarchies limiting their privileges and status. Herrera understood that the “policing of customs” had become a predominant political issue throughout Europe, and even wrote, “there is no nation so barbarous that it does not want to know about the times of its [past], especially those countries

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224 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 21 and 251.
which discuss so much the policing [maintenance] of customs, like those of Europe.”

Herrera, therefore, sought to demonstrate “[Philip’s and the Spaniards’] proven history of accepting of the privileges, exemptions and prerogatives of these lands.” Indeed, Herrera was aware that both Spaniards and Portuguese alike had a profound respect for corporate structures and for traditional rights, privileges, and customs; thus demonstrating that Portuguese elites continued to enjoy existing privileges under Spanish rule was paramount.

To prove that this was the case, Herrera turned to “state papers” [or “documents of state” (papeles de estado)], especially those of “the [C]ouncils of [S]tate and War” (los consejos de estado y Guerra), to support his claims, because these documents contained the “the purity of truth” (pureza de verdad), as they provided detailed accounts of diplomatic dealings, and treaties, which Herrera used as sources of evidence for political actions. For Herrera, only the “truth” provided through sound research into these official records and the accounts of eyewitnesses would provide evidence of the basis of Philip’s prudence and knowledge, and how he had abided by Portuguese ancient rights, “upholding justice, and always abiding by [Portuguese] privilege and precedent.”

This was crucial since Conestaggio had provided no verification or substantiation for his claims, which was taken as testament to his inability to provide an accurate account of events. Herrera made this clear to the reader arguing that Conestaggio “never considers or verifies, [regardless of] whether he is just or [merely] condemns, and when it comes


226 Emphasis mine. Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 150.

227 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 4.

228 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 250.
to Spanish actions, he never directly examines his justifications, whether in archives, or through people who personally witnessed events.”

Herrera assured the reader that demonstrating how tradition and custom were maintained in Portugal was “one of the reasons why I have written this work.” In his ‘Dedication to the King,’ Herrera emphasized that making manifest how privileges and customs were being maintained and a Lusitanian particularism assured in Portugal were especially important since the supposed changing of custom and enhancement of Spanish prerogatives through the imposition of certain Spanish norms and ideals had created great hatred and mistrust in the Netherlands. That Herrera mentioned the Netherlands brings into focus how Herrera also saw his Historia de Portugal as an opportunity to demonstrate how Philip had done everything to remedy those mistakes, especially by showing how Philip upheld Portuguese laws, and how he sought to be a more Lusitanian king. Thus, Herrera quoted directly from Philip’s Royal Pragmatic, promulgated in Lisbon on November 15, 1581, in which Philip “confirmed [all of] their rights and privileges” to his new Portuguese subjects, using it as proof of “His Catholic Majesty’s clemency and liberality” and how he sought to begin his rule in Portugal with “justice and prudence.”

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229 "sin considerar o verificar si es justo o reprobado." Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 66. Elsewhere he writes: “no da defensa [de sus argumentos], especialmente donde tuviera claridad la verdad . . . no busca por los archivos . . . y no da prueba . . . pero la verdad tan oscurecida dara luz . . . contra los falso cargos contra el Rey.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Prologue. He also wrote, “[Conestaggio] no ha visto los documentos que dan prueba de los derechos del rey.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 223.

230 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Carta Dedicatoria.

231 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Carta Dedicatoria. See also Herrera to Philip II, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 80v. According to Anthony Pagden, Spaniards had learned from the Netherlands that “ruling with severity and ceremony and not considering the customs of the country could only ever lead to civil war.” Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the World. Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 57.

232 “muestra de la clemencia y liberalidad del Rey.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 296.
Herrera knew, however, that it was not enough simply to claim that Philip upheld Portuguese laws; he would have to provide a definitive account of Spanish political actions in Portugal to prove that law and privilege were upheld. As proof of Philip’s desire to respect Portuguese norms, Herrera recounted how Philip had sent emissaries to compile a formal record of all privileges held throughout Portugal and ordered that a copy of the list of these privileges be held at all times by all Spanish diplomats and envoys to Portugal, a clear indication for Herrera that Philip understood the importance of upholding these privileges.²³³ It was only in “ancient documents” that one was to find the laws and rights that had been granted and thus needed to be maintained.²³⁴ Herrera stressed, therefore, that Philip had personally sought out all “seals, donations, [prerogatives, titles,] privileges, and agreements and all other writings and decrees found on matters pertaining to this Kingdom,” so that he could familiarize himself with them, and that the King and his advisors had read these original documents “in Portuguese” so that there was no confusion as to what they pertained.²³⁵ Herrera further used this as evidence to demonstrate how Philip had sought to acquire an understanding of the nature of the Portuguese and the specifics of this particular state. This was particularly important, since knowing which laws were to be respected in Portugal required knowledge and in particular, knowledge of their past, and especially Portuguese customs.

For Herrera, the key document which attested to Portuguese rights was *Los Artículos de Lisboa de 1499* [The Articles of Lisbon of 1499] (hereinafter referenced as the *Artículos*), as it

²³³ Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 201.
²³⁴ Herrera himself also sought to define what true Portuguese privileges were, becoming so thoroughly familiar with the customs, rights, and privileges of Portugal and the Canary Islands, that he wrote a short tract on the matter: Herrera, ‘Los privilegios . . . del reyno de Portugal’ BNM, Ms/ 6437, also referenced in Ms./ 3011 fol. 49–156.
was vital to Herrera’s provisions of Portuguese laws and therefore vital in helping him prove his case of Philip’s “good rule.” The *Artículos* were the guarantees that the Don Manuel (1469-1521) had granted, laying out Portuguese privileges and customs, and specifically delineating the “ancient” (*antiguos*) privileges to be followed for all “inheritors and successors who inherit all [of Portugal’s] kingdoms.”

The *Artículos* had played a major role in the formulation and codification of Portuguese political rights and duties and almost served as a form of an “implicit constitution” for the Portuguese people. In combination with other written and unwritten customs and rules, they restricted the power of the prince, codified participatory claims, guaranteed civic rights, and in so doing, secured the rule of law in Portugal. The *Artículos*, therefore, were the fundamental laws of the country, which no king was allowed to violate or change; they were restraints on the king and they contained the conditions on which the Portuguese *Cortes* accepted the king on behalf of its people. Herrera, therefore, made explicit that Philip had sworn an oath in front of the Portuguese *Cortes* to abide by the *Artículos*, clearly wanting to emphasize that Philip acknowledged that it was Portuguese consent that vested him with authority. Herrera understood, however, that in light of Conestaggio’s accusations, it had become crucial to demonstrate that Philip abided by this, “certain contract with this Kingdom, and in particular with this city [Lisbon], about its privileges and exemptions, that Don Manuel had agreed to give

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236 The *Artículos de Lisboa de 1499* are also referred to by scholars as the *Capítulos del Rey Don Manuel*.  
237 “herederos y sucesores que heredaren estos Reynos todos juntamente,” Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 200.  
239 Moura had also promised the Portuguese *Cortes* in 1579, that Philip would abide by its “laws.” On how this document was used by Moura when discussing matters pertaining to the question of the Portuguese succession, see Moura to Philip II, Lisbon, 9/21/1579, BNM Ms/ 1930, fol. 101 r.–v; Moura to Philip, 10/29/1578, BNM Ms/ 1930, fol. 126r; and RAH, 9/592, fol. 4r. See also Cueto, “1580 and All That . . .,” 150–169.
the [Portuguese] people,” and thus demonstrate how Philip was ruling according to Portuguese customs, privileges, and laws as laid out in this document. In doing so, Herrera would conclusively prove that Philip had not dismissed, deviated, reformed, nor changed Portuguese rights and customs, as Conestaggio claimed.

Not content with using a copy provided to him by Moura, Herrera tasked himself with finding the original copy of this document held in the Lisbon archive. Significantly, it was on one of his many journeys that Herrera came across one of the oldest known copies of this document, the alleged original. Finding the earliest version of this document would have great political significance, since over the years certain additions and subtractions had been made. For Herrera it was vital to demonstrate that Philip was abiding by the “original contract” made by Don Manuel. As with his contemporaries, Herrera held fast to the belief that the older a text was the more authority it held, especially in the battle to seize the past as an ideological weapon. Herrera, therefore, also sent a personal copy of what he had found to Philip. This was vital, for although Philip had plenty of copies of this work, these could be seen as worthless without their original. Herrera asserted that not only did this “earliest” version of the Artículos provide the proper precedent to be followed in Portugal, and thus substantiated Philip’s actions, but that having a physical copy of this “original” document was necessary since it would be of utmost “importance for the future.”

240 “el cierto contrato con este Reyno y en particular con esta ciudad sobre sus privilegios y exenciones que el rey Don Manuel cedió a sus súbitos . . . el pueblo,” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 256.
241 Herrera, using his antiquarian skills, based this claim on the age of the physical document itself. Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 35.
242 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 20–21.
244 Herrera to King, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 123.
245 “estos papeles serán de importancia para adelante.” Herrera to King, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 123. The copy Herrera sent to Philip is, BNM Ms/ 13229.
Herrera would accurately cite from this earliest version of *Artículos* twenty-six times in his text to demonstrate how Philip followed its precedent. Indeed, Herrera did not just reference this vital document, but utilizing the tools of legal antiquarianism, made it an integral part of his text. That Herrera felt the need to cite and refer repeatedly to the *Artículos* might reflect the observations of Robert Bireley, who notes how, just as in political tracts which called on histories of the late Roman Empire and the early Middle Ages or on the historical books of the Bible to provide examples of actions for analysis, the multiplication of examples, a typical form of Baroque argument, was intended to overwhelm the reader and so compel his assent.\(^{246}\) Indeed, we must not lose sight of the rhetorical force of the illustrative example when considering why Herrera provided so many examples of Philip abiding by the *Artículos* and how and why he utilized this document so heavily.

To demonstrate how Philip acknowledged the need to abide by these *Artículos*, Herrera first provided a detailed account of how, in April of 1581, when Philip met with the Portuguese *Cortes* at Tomar to be recognized as King, he “swore to uphold” the *Artículos*, and to observe all of the laws of the realm.\(^{247}\) Herrera then pointed out how from that day forward Philip mandated that his ambassadors to Lisbon, as well as any emissary into Portuguese territories, carry a copy of the *Artículos*, and he required that they be followed “in all official dealings, and at all times.”\(^{248}\) With this, Herrera presented Philip as a monarch who bound himself by oath to govern the state in accordance with the fundamental laws of the country, and thus the public good. This clearly showed how Philip had chosen to take over his new inheritance on terms similar to those


\(^{247}\) According to the *Artículos*, every Portuguese King had to take a solemn oath to uphold the *Artículos* on the occasion of his accession (which Philip did indeed do in 1581).

\(^{248}\) Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 256. That Philip did indeed require that the *Artículos* be carried by his emissaries is confirmed in letters of Spanish ambassadors: AGS, Estado, legajo 409, fol. 162.
on which his Portuguese predecessors had in earlier generations taken over their newly inherited
kingdoms and provinces.  For Herrera, this also provided a powerful demonstration of Philip’s
reliance on the privileges as laid out in historical documents, as well as the practice of
government that such documents taught him, and how he utilized these learned tools to govern
effectively.

Herrera spent three pages outlining what Manuel had provided to his Portuguese subjects
in this document and then proceeded to prove that each right and privilege it delineated was
being maintained.  For example, the Artículos not only required the maintenance of all
tribunals, ranks and positions (dignidades), and offices (oficios) that existed in Portugal, but as
part of Portuguese privilege, required that all important Portuguese posts be held only by
Portuguese men and that whoever ruled Portugal was to take counsel from them.  Conestaggio
claimed that, contrary to Portuguese precedent and ancient custom, instead of promoting only
Portuguese nobles to Portuguese offices, Philip had promoted to high office, in both the church
and in the state, only “self-seeking Spaniards.”Conestaggio stressed, therefore, that Philip was
an unlawful ruler, not only because he usurped dynastic privilege, but also because he was
submitting the Portuguese to what could only be considered an absolute and tyrannical rule by
violating special Portuguese laws of jurisdiction and privileges, such as the feudal rights of the
nobility and Portuguese aristocracy, by not granting them the most important posts in the

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249 It should be noted that not everyone in Spain approved of this approach of guaranteeing Portugal’s distinctive
rights and forms of government. Cardinal Granvelle had wanted Philip to exploit the opportunity provided by the
annexation to reorganize Portugal’s system of government, as there were concerns that Portugal was a country
where royal authority was severely curbed by well-entrenched constitutional liberties. See Elliott, “The Spanish
Monarchy,” 51.

250 Herrera also demonstrated that the Artículos were not the only Portuguese laws that Philip upheld. Herrera,
Historia de Portugal, 256–259.

251 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 256. Number 5 of the Artículos was that “all the mechanism[s] upon which
Portuguese government and Empire relied would continue to be held in Portuguese hands.”

252 Conestaggio, Historia dell’unione, 88.
Portuguese court. Herrera sought to demonstrate clearly that this was not the case and that Philip abided by the Artículos—that “Portuguese alone held office in the realm and in their empire,” and that Philip constantly sought their advice on all matters pertaining to Portugal and its foreign possessions.²⁵³ Herrera recounted how “because the King was so concerned with the good ruling and conservation and good [public welfare] of these Kingdoms . . . in all things were commended only officials who were [natural Portuguese subjects],” how they performed “the most important duties [of the realm] . . . as they know of the customs of these lands,”²⁵⁴ and furthermore, that Philip was a king who was always “very inclined to follow the opinions of his Portuguese counselors.”²⁵⁵ As further evidence, Herrera listed the names of all of the Portuguese nobles whom Philip had placed in the most prominent political positions, and provided examples of how he had used their local knowledge to determine Portuguese policy. For Herrera, this provided ample evidence to confirm that Philip and his advisors had taken into account the peculiar nature of the Portuguese court and its politics, another requirement of the Artículos, by seeking the help of very well connected Portuguese nobles. In particular, Herrera wrote of Don Jorge de Ataíde, “an authentic [P]ortuguese” (un autentico portugués) whom Philip retained as conselheiro, capelão-mor and esmoler, and whom the King nominated as Inquisitor General and Abbot of Alcobaça, and wrote at length of the advice Philip took from Bartolomeu dos Mártires, Archbishop of Braga, whom the King made “Primate of all Spains.”²⁵⁶ Herrera also stressed that when Philip returned to Spain, he asked Ataide to accompany him to the court of Madrid and the Escorial so that the King could continue to seek his direct advice on Portuguese matters, which

²⁵³ Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 258; see also 320–356.
²⁵⁴ Emphasis mine. “porque se preocupo tanto por el buen regimiento y conservación y bien de estos Reynos . . . en todas cosas fueran comendadas a los oficiales naturales dellos y por ellos hechas . . . quien saben las costumbres de la tierra.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 199.
²⁵⁵ “inclinado a seguir las opiniones de sus consejeros Portugueses.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 198. Similar statements are made at 260 and 271.
²⁵⁶ Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 320–26.
Ataíde did for a period of three years. Another one of Herrera’s examples presented Philip availing himself of the services of the Dominican Provincial of Portugal, Fray Antonio de Sousa, to help strengthen Philip’s position outside of Lisbon with more localized noble factions, since Sousa was a man who “understood well [Portuguese] dealings” and had the “moderation and temperance needed in order to resolve this issue.” Such examples not only disproved Conestaggio’s claims, but also served to demonstrate Philip’s “continual care of distributive justice,” through the example of the King’s listening to his new subjects’ counsel and “granting posts only to the most meritorious people he can find.” As further testament to the high regard in which Philip held Portuguese nobles and the respect he had for their advice, Herrera also pointed out that two of Philip’s most trusted advisors at the royal court in Madrid, Ruy Gómez de Silva and Cristóbal de Moura, were, in fact, Portuguese by birth. All of these examples served as evidence of Philip’s following of Portuguese procedures, his adherence to Portuguese privileges, but also such examples provided further evidence to combat Conestaggio and to demonstrate how Philip was a “prudent king.”

Herrera also did everything to ensure that the reader knew that Philip not only sought Portuguese advice, but had listened to his new subjects at every opportunity: “[He listened] to their counsel, from the most grave issues of state to the most minor issues of governance.”

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257 “Fray Bernardo de Ataide . . . whose advice on Portuguese matters was greatly appreciated by Philip II,” and who, “His Catholic Majesty willingly received in audience at the Court of Madrid,” was of great help since he was so “knowledgeable and wise in the things of the [Portuguese] realm,” and “having so many friends in his debt” (tan cuerdo y tan aficionado . . . tiendo tantos amigos y deudos”), the King took “great advantage of his assistance” (“tomo gran provecho de su asistencia ahí”). Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 54.
258 “entienda bien estos negocios” and, “advertido de la templanza y moderación con que se[sic] de proceder en este punto.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 54.
259 “su cuidado perpetuo en la justicia distributiva . . . escuchar a sus consejos . . . y proveer . . . desde el supremo del estado hasta la menor audiencia y gobernación, de personas las mas bien meritas que se pueden hallar.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 250.
260 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 54.
This was in line with Herrera’s desire to demonstrate Philip’s prudential politics, since it was understood among political theorists that dialogue between a king and his subjects was the first requisite for the successful pursuit of the common good. For Herrera, such actions were customary of Philip’s rule, since Philip had “readily taken to the advice provided to him by his father [Charles V] . . . who told him to listen to his advisors,” and thus, when it came to matters in Portugal, Philip constantly turned to those “knowledgeable in Portuguese matters . . . and its past.” Herrera was bent on demonstrating how Philip understood how listening to his subjects was essential to exercising good rule. Herrera, in fact, cites at least twenty instances when Philip met with the Portuguese Cortes and Portuguese nobles to hear Portuguese cases, listening to his subjects and discussing issues with them. Herrera even provided dates and places of these meetings and who attended. Herrera also provided numerous instances where Philip had asked for Portuguese advice in order to make sure that his actions were in accordance with what the Portuguese Cortes and Portuguese nobles wanted. Significantly, Herrera directly drew from the aforementioned eyewitness accounts of Ayala, Philip’s secretary, and cross checked the events, the advice sought, and those in attendance, with the accounts of Menezes and that of

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261 On the importance of dialogue between a King and his people see Bireley, *The Counter-Reformation Prince*, 128.

262 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 269, 270–71, 273. In fact, Charles, in his *Instructions to his son* (1556), had told Philip that “the King can govern well . . . only through good ministers. If you cut yourself off from the advice of your best ministers, and disregard it and run matters alone, you will appear a very foolhardy king, and enemy of the well-being of your subjects.” As cited in Henry Kamen, *Spain 1469–1714: A Society in Conflict* (London: Longman, 1991), 144.

263 Herrera wrote of multiple instances of Philip’s “exemplary temperance, and royal meekness, gracefully granting audiences to his subjects as well as foreigners.” Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 54–59. This was also another way to combat Conestaggio who, in order to demonstrate Philip’s bad rule, had claimed that unlike previous Portuguese rulers, Philip had denied any kind of mediation, even that of the Pope, and that he was, in fact, an absentee king who relied solely on written dispatches rather than attendance at the Cortes, which had caused great problems: “his abandoning of the court . . . [is] the cause of bad government.” For Conestaggio this was both a reflection of Philip’s physical retreat from the world, and a symbol of his negligence and political apathy towards the Portuguese: “the King, whom few have the chance to see, does not attend to the petitions of his subjects as is deserved . . . against his royal obligation which is to hear and dispatch everyone great and small.” Conestaggio, *Historia dell’unione*, 43 and 47. Such accusations echoed ideas that appeared in various ‘Black Legend’ stories about Spain, which characterized Philip not only as greedy, but also negligent and apathetic, which impeded the workings of politics.
another Portuguese noble, Don Diego de Castro.\textsuperscript{264} Such examples possessed additional political implications for, as Robert Bireley reveals, many sixteenth-century political commentators thought that the greatest threat to the common good came from the failure of dialogue between the prince and his subjects when it came to matters of privileges, and laws.\textsuperscript{265} In providing these examples, therefore, Herrera also addressed one of the significant political issues of the day: the ruler’s conduct toward his own subjects. Herrera portrayed Philip as a ruler who listened to his subjects, and therefore valued and was preoccupied with the opinions and concerns of his people, and thus with the interactions necessary for the creation of a vigorous state.

Herrera would also use the \textit{Artículos} to great effect in other ways. The \textit{Artículos} as set out by Don Manuel had not only delineated the laws and privileges that a king had to follow, but also required that any new Portuguese ruler fulfill them in a certain “manner and mode” (\textit{manera y modo}).\textsuperscript{266} Indeed, the main thrust of the \textit{Artículos} was the maintenance of a certain particularism or Lusitanianism that was to be followed by whoever was to sit on the Portuguese throne.\textsuperscript{267} Herrera, therefore, went to great lengths to demonstrate how the union of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns through the body of the king (\textit{la persona real}) had not meant “the disappearance of the particularities of Lusitanian politics” (\textit{no significara la desaparición de la eminenté diferencia política lusitana}).\textsuperscript{268} To provide evidence of this, Herrera sought to present Philip’s rule of Portugal as following the \textit{modo} and \textit{manera}, or the same \textit{habitus} of past Portuguese monarchs. At the outset of \textit{Historia de Portugal} and even before he began to write of the actions taken by Philip and Spaniards and their intentions with respect to Portugal, Herrera

\textsuperscript{264} See, in particular, Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal}, 7, 18, 26, 51, 78.
\textsuperscript{265} Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal}, 54; Bireley, \textit{The Counter-Reformation Prince}, 128.
\textsuperscript{266} Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal}, Prologue, repeated at 200.
\textsuperscript{267} Bouza, \textit{Portugal en la Monarquía Hispánica}, 1: 101–110.
\textsuperscript{268} Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal}, Prologue.
had spent twenty pages recounting brief histories of past Portuguese rulers up to Sebastian, delving into their actions, and thus setting the stage for Philip as their next ruler. Herrera, in traditional historiographic form, would later refer to these accounts when recounting Philip’s actions in Portugal, showing how Philip followed their exempla. Significantly, Herrera emphasized similarities between Philip and Don Manuel, who had written the Artículos and thus was a king particularly concerned with questions of privilege and maintaining peace and order in his kingdom. In addition, Herrera also presented Philip as behaving more in accord with Portuguese values than the recently deceased Sebastian. In fact, Herrera purposefully portrayed Philip as unlike Sebastian, whom Conestaggio had lauded as a heroic warrior. For Herrera, Sebastian had acquired his “warrior spirit” and set off to wars in North Africa because of the undue influence of his advisors, who had been “more concerned with wars and novelties than with the political education of the prince.” Herrera used the events of the few years of Sebastian’s reign to provide a factual base for averring that the Portuguese king had been valorous, but careless, and that he was politically naive. Herrera presented Sebastian as having gone about his actions “without measuring (or checking them) with reason . . . he took his Kingdom away from the peace and serenity that it enjoyed, and went about afflicted by constant thought of war . . . without considering the damage that could result.” Thus, Herrera noted that at Sebastian’s death, Portugal had needed a more realistic new ruler, one concerned with

269 The differences that Herrera laid out between Sebastian and Philip also reflected two contemporary debates: the wider sixteenth-century polemic of arms versus letters (or whether a king should be defined as a military leader or through courtly sobriety), and the wider debate going on in politics about what political aptitudes could be acquired though study and counsel and what was due simply to innate talent (or whether governing was a skill that could be learned or not, and consequently how the prince was to govern and from whom or through what means he should acquire knowledge and seek advice).

270 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 28.

271 “guerras y novedades . . . sin medirlos con la razón . . . apartaba su Reyno del sosiego y paz que gozaba, andaba afligido de pensamientos de Guerra . . . sin considerar el daño que podían resultar.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 28.
Portugal’s stability, and that Portugal found such a ruler in Philip. Indeed, Herrera added to this more traditional rhetoric of exemplarity a discussion and demonstration of Philip’s reason of state politics. Herrera claimed that, unlike Sebastian, Philip always demonstrated his “constancy,” his “careful deliberations in all matters,” his concern for “peace and quietude,” and “his constant concern for his subjects” and well-being of his dominions, and how these were the things required of the Portuguese ruler in the Artículos. Thus, Herrera presented Philip’s Portugal as the restoration of the Manuelian plan.

To demonstrate further that Philip sought to maintain a certain Lusitanian nature in his rule in Portugal and ruled according to their “best interests,” Herrera also sought to emphasize Philip’s willingness to accommodate himself to Portuguese ways and how Philip sought to take on “a Portuguese nature” (naturaleza de Portugués). Herrera emphasized how Philip prided himself in having readily taken to the Portuguese, claiming that the King had “learned and tried to speak their language, and even went to live in Lisbon.” Further, Herrera characterized Philip as a monarch who possessed a deep sensitivity to the particular feelings of his new subjects, and that this became a characteristic of the rule of this “prudent king.” As an example, Herrera recounted how Philip, who had been dressed in mourning for over two years after the death of his wife, the Portuguese Infanta Isabel, capitulated and wore a brocaded vestment when...
he was crowned Portuguese king, even though it was “much against his will” (muy contra su voluntad) and “much to his dislike,” but that he had done so because he knew that “it was the custom of his Portuguese subjects . . . whom he wished to please.”277 This example of his willingness even to take on the necessary regalia to please his new subjects, even though he was not happy about it, was for Herrera a strong confirmation of how Philip tried to accommodate himself to Portuguese ways. As further evidence of Philip’s “love for his [Portuguese subjects],” Herrera recounted that when Philip had to return to Castile in 1583 after living in Portugal for two and a half years, he did his best to meet Portuguese sensibilities, which insisted that the Portuguese viceroy be either Portuguese or a member of the royal family, by leaving as his viceroy his favorite nephew Archduke Alberto, “whom he trusted more than anyone.”278 Herrera emphasized that although it caused the monarch “great sorrow” to part from this trusted confidant, he saw him as the only and best candidate to take care of his new subjects in his absence. Philip chose Alberto for his “virtues and great prudence” (virtudes y mucha prudencia) and his “great knowledge and affection for Portuguese ways,” and also because Alberto kept him “constantly updated” about all things pertaining to Portugal.279

To demonstrate that Philip did not see Portugal as inferior to his other domains, but as equal to Spain, Herrera stressed that Philip saw Portugal as a hereditary dominion and thus a direct extension of his patrimony. Therefore, since “the status of the realm was acquired by

277 It continues, “el rey entró vestido con sotana y gramalla de brocado carmesí con larga falda . . . Empuñado el cetro y con la corona parecía el Rey David, rojo, hermoso a la vista, y venerable en la majestad que representaba.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 32. Herrera’s account of this royal entry was copied verbatim by Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, Historia de Felipe II, rey de España (Madrid, 1611), 2: 633–634.
278 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 280.
279 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 280.
heredity,” Philip saw it as of equal status to his other Crowns. Demonstrating this was crucial, for in the polemical discussions that arose immediately before Philip’s coronation, the Portuguese had insisted that, upon the union, Portugal was to be seen as equal to Spain. Conestaggio had claimed that Philip saw Portugal as inferior to his Spanish domains and was merely using Portugal for monetary gain. Herrera, therefore, would use ample examples to demonstrate how Philip “car[ed] for Portugal, as he did Spain.” Herrera’s strongest evidence of this was Philip’s request that the royal coat of arms include Portugal alongside the Crowns of Aragon and Castile; as further proof, he recounted how Philip had the following inscription engraved on the wall of the Portuguese Cortes at Tomas: “Hic tibi requies Hispaniae certae laborum. Hic surgunt dextris vtraque regna suas.” Herrera also provided examples of how the Portuguese themselves felt “equal,” citing as proof numerous instances of how happy the Portuguese were under Spanish rule, and the “universal contentment” that followed the arrival of Philip in Lisbon. Finally, as evidence of the great love that Philip had for all of his Iberian holdings, how he viewed the equality of the two Crowns, and how the union had an ideological meaning for both Spaniards and the Portuguese, Herrera stressed that as a symbol of peninsular unity and ancient Hispania restored, from late 1580 onward, Philip began to call himself “King of Spain” (Rey de España).

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280 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 292. For the political discussion surrounding the “equality” of the two realms see Moura to Philip, 1/6/1580, AGS, Estado, legajo, 414, fol. 137; and ‘Auto do juramento do Principe Dom Philipe nosso Senhor’ [1584], BNM R/7698.


282 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 250.

283 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 295.

284 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 294.

285 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 295. That Portuguese nobles supported Spanish rule is evidenced in a 1580 letter of a correspondent of the Fuggers, who noted that the opinion among the Portuguese upper class was quite favorable to Philip’s cause; “all the best people here are in favor of Spain.” AGS, Estado, 8769.

286 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 296. España was the term used to describe the entire Iberian Peninsula, including Portugal. It is noteworthy, therefore, that Philip began to use this title formally only after 1581. See Kamen, *Spain 1469-1714*, 127.
Most importantly, Herrera stressed how Philip “promised to conserve the autonomy of Portugal and its empire,” and emphasized that “the treatment of equality was obtained between the two Crowns, and the empires of the two kingdoms, and in their political dignity.” For Herrera, the clearest evidence of this was that Philip had maintained separate charters for Portugal. Indeed, Herrera stressed that Philip had not regarded the Portuguese Cortes’s request that Spain maintain separate charters for Portugal as unusual since Spain had a long history of abiding by separate charters; Herrera directly compared Portugal to Aragon, where separate charters had always been maintained. By comparing what had occurred in Portugal and how it had been incorporated into the Spanish Crown with the way Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile had merged their respective realms, Herrera wanted to demonstrate how Portugal had retained its “independence,” and that the only entity it shared with the rest of the peninsula was a common sovereign. All of these examples served Herrera’s fundamental purpose to reveal that “although the two kingdoms are divided and distinct, this does not mean that they cannot depend upon one monarch and head,” which he believed was integral to explaining and demonstrating the true nature of Spanish imperial politics.

There is ample evidence to suggest that the Spaniards did indeed maintain Portuguese customs and abided by Portuguese privileges. Geoffrey Parker confirms that Philip was known for keeping protocol in Portuguese matters and ensuring that separate charters were always maintained in Portugal, so that their day-to-day matters remained unchanged. Herrera further

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287 “prometió conservar la autonomía de Portugal y de su imperio.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 295.
288 “trato de igualdad que se consiguió a las dos Coronas y a los imperios de los dos reinos, y de su dignidad política.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 295.
289 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 192–99.
290 “porque los dos reinos estén divididos y sean distintos no significa que no pueden depender de una monarquía y cabeza.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Prologue.
demonstrated that Philip was abiding by the specifics of the *Artículos*. In effect, Herrera sought to demonstrate that Portugal retained all its liberties and was wholly autonomous. Indeed, such examples were used not only to demonstrate how Philip not only sought to “esteem his domains equally,” but that he had maintained Portugal’s distinctive identity by ensuring that Portuguese laws, customs and privileges were preserved. Moreover, while Herrera’s demonstration of Philip’s love of his vassals humanized the king, it did so in a way that did not diminish his majesty or royal power. Instead, Herrera sought to demonstrate that Philip’s art of governance was one of justice, attenuated by temperance and concern.

Herrera’s use of the *Artículos* as a historical document provides a prime example of how Herrera used primary sources and documents to assert his claims and justify Philip’s actions and how he sought to provide a verifiable means of demonstrating the nature of Philip’s rule. In fact, Herrera sought to demonstrate that Philip understood that the love of his new vassals depended on the maintenance of justice and prosperity and on stability secured and that there was no better way to demonstrate this than to show how Philip abided by the rules laid out by their former king Don Manuel, as certified through their documents and further verified through eyewitness accounts. By demonstrating how he followed the *Artículos*, Herrera conclusively demonstrated Philip’s “administration of justice,” his “clemency,” his “useful negotiation of benefits” (*útil negociación de beneficios*), and that it was his concern for these issues that had moved Philip to act as he did in Portuguese affairs. This also proved how Philip had “shown his continual and indefatigable dedication to the dispatch of the affairs of state” and “his perpetual attention to distributive justice, and to the affairs of his councils, from the supreme Council of State, to the lowliest court or governorship, [and] from the most worthy individual to the concerns of the
people (del pueblo).”\textsuperscript{292} This conclusively demonstrated that Philip’s primary concerns were with matters of state and the daily workings of politics, as well as with public sentiment and the concerns and opinions of his Portuguese subjects, and not his personal needs or wants. Moreover, these were the same principles upon which he had been moved to annex Portugal initially. As Herrera himself wrote in his treatise on reason of state: “No state can hope to survive under an unjust ruler,” the best possible source of justice was to be found in a ruler who was “servant of his people” and who “upheld the laws [that were] useful to the community.”\textsuperscript{293} Thus, Herrera sought to portray how Philip’s actions and intentions, by following the Artículos, in \textit{Historia de Portugal}, met those exact constitutional terms.

Herrera also took the opportunity to demonstrate that Philip’s equal regard for Portugal was evident in the practical way he had conducted his rule in Portugal. For example, Herrera recounted how immediately following his accession to the throne, Philip passed numerous decrees regarding matters of the economy, making Portugal equal to its Spanish counterparts. Herrera recorded how just twelve days after Philip was recognized as legitimate heir, and even before having secured the kingdom itself, Philip issued an edict (also known as \textit{The Decree of 1580}) that abolished the \textit{puertos secos}, the sixty or so custom posts in Castile that since 1559 had collected a 10 per cent duty on all goods crossing the Portuguese-Spanish frontier. Herrera used such actions as clear evidence of Philip’s care and concern for his Portuguese vassals and his desire to eliminate the “boundaries” between the two realms.\textsuperscript{294} Herrera used this particular example as a springboard to digress briefly from his narrative account in order to challenge

\textsuperscript{292} Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal}, 299.
\textsuperscript{293} Herrera, “Discurso y tratado sobre la material de Estado,” BNM Ms/ 1035, fol. 49v–61r.
\textsuperscript{294} Herrera, \textit{Historia de Portugal}, 232. For a full discussion of how the abolition of this tax affected the economy at the time see Henri Lapèyre, \textit{El comercio exterior de Castilla a través de las aduanas de Felipe II} (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 1981), part I.
Conestaggio’s version of the events occurring during the first year after the succession. Conestaggio claimed that when Spaniards took control of Portugal, trade had all but ceased, stunting Portuguese economic growth. Herrera claimed that his review of “documents of state” revealed just the opposite: Philip’s decrees had decreased the barriers between the two countries, the Portuguese had “benefitted greatly from a new flow of Spanish goods,” and Spaniards had also benefitted from a new influx of goods from “Portugal and its empire.”

As further evidence of Philip’s interest in bolstering and facilitating the Portuguese economy, Herrera went on to stress Philip’s commissioning of various “public works,” *(obras publicas)* emphasizing his support for Giovanni Batista Antonelli’s project to make the Tajo river navigable from Toledo to Lisbon and how this building program had been a great source of employment. For Herrera, Philip’s support for such projects throughout Portugal was evidence of his “greatness of spirit and his desire for the good of his subjects.” Where Conestaggio stressed Philip’s complete disregard for Portugal’s welfare, Herrera provided examples of actions that were clear indications and concrete evidence of Philip’s efforts to be a good king, in that he fostered projects necessary for the well-being of the population, promoting the “public good” *(el bien publico)*. Moreover, such actions were “indubitable witnesses to the truth” and therefore Herrera believed that he was not manifesting any “affection, adulation or artifice” when recounting such actions, but rather was simply presenting an unembellished recitation of facts.

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296 “grandeza de animo y deseo del bien de sus súbitos.” Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, 256.
A “Better” History

The same year that Historia de Portugal appeared Herrera had written, in true Boterian fashion, that “the worth of a state” resided in the virtues of its king, of which the most crucial was the king’s “love of [his] citizens.”²⁹⁸ Herrera’s political understanding made him keenly aware that demonstrating such love was crucial for explaining the nature of Philip’s rule to a skeptical audience, as well as a primary guarantor of political stability in Portugal. Thus, at almost every available instance in Historia de Portugal, Herrera sought to define Philip as a monarch who attended to the needs of his subjects, and whose actions were aimed at obtaining the “love of the people,” and thus their loyalty and trust, and how “these attributes, very deserved of your Royal Person, . . . represent unquestionable witnesses of the truth.”²⁹⁹ Herrera sought to bolster these claims through his use of eyewitness accounts, to confirm not only that Philip did indeed rule well, but to testify to the king’s “actions of love.”³⁰⁰ Herrera sought to demonstrate, therefore, that it was the virtue of Philip’s rule (the royal virtue) that formed the fundament of political order. For Herrera, a virtuous, prudent king, who acted for the benefit of his subjects, produced a virtuous kingdom and prudent rule for Portugal. It was the manner in which Herrera presented Philip’s rule that re-enforced the king’s authority in Portugal, justified his rule, and provided a moral legitimacy to both Philip’s actions and Spanish imperialism. Indeed, Herrera presented Philip as possessing the political virtues and characteristics necessary as the “best” claimant to the Portuguese throne, which served as further proof for how necessary it was that any further contest for the throne cease.

²⁹⁸ Herrera, BNM Ms/ 1035, fol. 38 and fol. 73v. See also Herrera’s translation of Botero, Razón de Estado (1591), 41.
²⁹⁹ Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Dedication to the King.
³⁰⁰ Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 196, 201, 211, 256–59, and 270.
For Herrera, Philip’s acknowledgment of the particular sentiments, needs, and requirements made by the Portuguese was a reflection of the characteristics of the “prudent king” (el rey prudente). Herrera’s insistence on stressing the importance and the role of Philip’s cultural understanding, knowledge, and love as expressed in his exercise of power indicates the main thrust of Herrera’s political thinking. Herrera envisioned his Historia de Portugal as a way to explain Philip’s pragmatic politics and a way to present a rule that was not divorced from Christian morality. As Richard Tuck points out, such ideas belonged to the recognizable late-Renaissance tradition of political thought of the doctrine of Christian reason of state. More importantly, they fell directly in line with the political ideas of Spanish advisors seen in Chapter One, and the way they wanted Philip to be presented. Herrera revealed, therefore, his deeper knowledge of, and engagement with, the political ideas of the time and sought to make his history a vehicle for demonstrating the practical manifestation of those ideas.

This counter history marks a decisive shift in the conception and writing of history. Herrera’s understanding of Christian reason of state politics framed his response in a way that allowed the political ideologies of reason of state to be articulated through his “learned” scholarship. In proving that Philip only sought orthodoxy, order, stability, continuity, and Portugal’s well-being, Historia de Portugal ultimately provided the Spanish Crown with the means through which to assert political legitimacy for Spanish political actions, and provided the ultimate justification for Philip’s succession and reign in Portugal. This demonstrates how questions as to the nature of rule were foremost in discussions of how to make legitimizing claims through history. Clearly in line with what the Crown had demanded, Herrera’s history became a means to express the nature of Spanish rule, in Spanish terms. As Herrera made clear:

301 Tuck, Philosophy of Government, Ch. 3.
"I [have delivered] the Succession, and course of our Affairs, insomuch as is fit for the public understanding,"\(^{302}\) by revealing and providing the necessary vision of the king, but also providing the documents and proof to support claims. For Herrera, his demonstration of an adherence to “proper” historical methodology and antiquarian techniques and precision had helped him bolster his claims to political legitimization, ensured that his work would not fall prey to shallow criticism or attack, and helped to convince his reader of his thoroughness and impartiality. This work, therefore, clearly demonstrated how history was to be conceived and utilized for reason of state and statecraft.

It is evident that Herrera not only sought to meet the demands of the Crown when writing *Historia de Portugal*, but to do so with the rigor and precision of the “good historian” outlined and espoused in his own and in the treatises of Philip’s other official historians. Herrera directly strove to provide demonstrable proof of his claims, applying techniques of historical criticism to demonstrate his scholarly motivations and impartiality. His was a work of diligence and thoroughness and his concern was not with rhetorical flourish but content. In this way, Herrera strove to demonstrate an impartiality and neutrality not found in prior works. *Historia de Portugal* is a prime example, therefore, of how official historians sought to combine their theoretical reflections with the actual practice of history. It is clear from *Historia de Portugal*, that for Herrera, historical method was about substantiating claims, providing documentary proof, and reviewing and utilizing sources in a critical manner. By doing so he demonstrated how he had tried to make his work less passionate and adulatory. While Herrera provided a laudatory portrait of Philip’s actions in Portugal, he did not lie, although he certainly avoided anything that might have sullied the king’s *reputación* and although he provided the necessary

\(^{302}\) Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, Introduction.
image that the Crown had demanded, it was always bolstered by sound proof and documentation. Herrera, in fact, abided by what he had proclaimed at the beginning of his work: “Here nothing is said without the proof of printed chronicles, or royal papers taken from the archives of Lisbon, and I have provided the books and pages within.”³⁰³

Moreover, Herrera explained and demonstrated to readers the methodologies that had been followed in order to ensure that his work provided what was required of “true” history. Herrera’s adherence to methods added to the legitimizing principles that he sought to provide in his work and ultimately to the claims he made for the Crown. In fact, it was the way he went about presenting and proving this Christian reason of state ideology through his “methods of practice” within his historical narrative that ultimately made Historia de Portugal so powerful. Herrera presented his historical narrative of Spanish actions in Portugal, therefore, as the work of a superior sort of historian, an archival researcher, whose probity was guaranteed by his critical appraisal of sources, his use of eyewitness accounts and the veracity of his sources. Herrera supported the Crown, but he did so in the best manner available, using sources, and demonstrating the bases of his claims, using legal antiquarian techniques directly within his narrative, and presenting his methodologies as integral to his claims. In fact, he knew how to support the Crown and its claims, and did so in a most persuasive manner, corroborating claims, and positioning himself as impartial and dispassionate.

³⁰³ “Aquí no se dice cosa sin prueba de crónicas impresas, o cartas reales sacadas del Archivo de Lisboa, y aun apuntando el libro y las hojas dél.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Prologue.
History and Statecraft

In his counter history, Herrera presented the Spanish king as the ideal ruler, guided by his need to fulfill his obligations as the rightful dynastic claimant to the Portuguese throne, to help secure Catholicism on the Peninsula and through his prudent rule to protect and defend Portuguese privileges and rights and thus ensure the well-being of his Portuguese subjects. Herrera presented Philip as a king who understood that stability, order, and the happiness of his vassals were necessary components for the maintenance of Spain’s European imperial possessions. Herrera demonstrated how Philip sought to ensure a peaceful unification of the two realms by abiding by their laws, respecting their customs of governance, and even by learning their language and living in Portugal for a time. In this way, Historia de Portugal revealed how, in true Christian reason of state fashion, Philip was a king who understood how “the conservation of the state consists in maintenance of the peace of its subjects.” Significantly, by making justice and peace the primary aims of Philip’s government in Portugal, Herrera presented Philip as a prince whose respect for the laws of the realm made his rule of Portugal not only effective, but legitimate. Moreover, since the conservation and augmentation of the state needed to be seen as benefitting both the prince and his subjects, Herrera would demonstrate the special mechanisms of power, such as the following of precedent and the upholding of justice, that Philip had implemented to ensure and preserve his new “inheritance” and ensure the happiness and loyalty of his new subjects.

304 The general character of early modern Europe, with its profound respect for corporate structures and for traditional rights, privileges, and customs, made demonstrating Philip’s adherence to such privileges vital, as it demonstrated how Portuguese elites had continued enjoyment of their existing privileges. See Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” 48–71.

305 Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Introduction to Libro Primero. Herrera repeats what Botero had stated almost verbatim “la conservazione di un stato consiste nella quiete e pace de sudditi.” Botero, Ragion di Stato, 54.
Consequently, Spanish imperial actions could be presented as having been motivated by and conducted through prudence and abiding by principles of good rule and thus by a virtuous and law-abiding monarchy. Therefore, Spanish actions in Portugal were legitimate because they were supported by true political power in the service of the common good. Historia de Portugal sought to present the great benefits that Philip as king, as well as the Spanish empire, brought to Portugal—thus making Historia de Portugal a tool to further statecraft and imperial and reason of state objectives. Indeed, Herrera saw his work as one which showed not just how Philip ruled, but how this rule benefitted the state. Herrera presented Philip as a monarch who represented continuity as opposed to dramatic change and strove to convince readers of the current and potential benefits derived from participation in a wider imperial association, which upheld the Catholic cause and restored ancient Hispania. Historia de Portugal, therefore, was not a work of Spanish “might” but a work which promoted the stability and communal betterment that Philip had brought to Portugal.

Herrera understood the role of his history as both a tool to promote the fame and reputación of the prince, but also of great pragmatic and didactic use, especially when Herrera asserted in his Prologue that his work would show “the general utility that all Portugal gained by recognizing Philip.”307 By demonstrating that Philip was ruling for the benefit of his new

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307 “la utilidad general que todo Portugal consiguió al reconocer a Felipe.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, 7.
Portuguese subjects—by maintaining peace, order and stability—Herrera demonstrated the cornerstones of Spanish imperial policy. Moreover, this was not just about explaining a Spanish philosophy of rule, but rather concretely demonstrating said philosophy through verifiable examples. Herrera illuminated how order and stability were maintained by allowing Portuguese nobles and elites to have continued enjoyment of their existing privileges and liberties, to maintain their distinctive identity and statutes, and to continue to enjoy local self-government. Significantly, in this way, Herrera’s work provides the modern reader with evidence of how newly gained political authority was conceived, consolidated, maintained, and legitimized in early modern Spain.

*Historia de Portugal* sought to reveal the intimate link which united the early modern state to a mode of rule and to a collective project aimed at the conservation of the state and ultimately the empire. Herrera’s work was not only a historical monograph about how he and the Spanish Crown wished to portray Philippine politics, but also provided the theoretical groundwork of how a king was to rule. By portraying Philip as a prime exemplar of a “good king,” Herrera essentially recounted how early modern Spaniards conceived of how a king should act if a monarch were to secure a new realm. Substituting the “mirror of princes” genre, *Historia de Portugal* sought to demonstrate and teach the virtues deemed necessary for good governance and thus can also be seen as part of the debate about how to rule properly.

Herrera made his history a forum in which he could discuss the nature of rule in concrete ways and not through precepts. This was the true intention of the new historiographic project laid out by the Crown, for Herrera’s work not only sought to set the record straight on the history of
Portugal and the succession, but allowed him to depict an entire political ideology of good rule and Spaniards and Philip as its prime exemplars, through causes and intentions, and demonstrations of virtuous, prudent actions. Precisely because of his more pragmatic concerns, Herrera was able to address himself to aspects of political thought neglected by formal philosophy by making history a means to reveal and provide evidence of the practical workings of politics. Herrera did not look at an abstract idea of monarchy, or of rule, but specifically demonstrated how Philip’s intentions, as well as his rule, were specifically directed at keeping order and stability in Portugal. Herrera considered and explained the practical measures that Philip had taken to ensure dynastic continuity, protect orthodoxy, preserve laws and privileges, protect Portugal, ensure custom, continuity and balance, and even facilitate commerce, ultimately legitimizing Spanish rule.

While previous studies have looked at the ideologies of rule and empire found in political tracts and diplomatic correspondence, none have looked at how, embedded within official history, such a Spanish ideology of rule was made verifiable and palpable to a reader through examples and “proof” and moreover, became a means through which to provide additional political justification and legitimization. This explains why this work is so important, for not only were such ideas expressed through a historical narrative, but they provided the Crown with another means to express Christian reason of state politics outside of regular political tracts. By understanding and showing how practical politics could be explained, Herrera effectively combined the tools of humanist historiography, antiquarianism, and reason of state politics. Thus, we must regard Herrera’s work as both political and historical. Indeed, Herrera’s response was as much about kingship and the moral and political bases of Spanish reason of state, as about
the intricacies of a particular question of succession. In particular, Herrera regarded his source-based account as a way to further this political project and justify politics and political actions. Herrera’s work, therefore, is a testament to the power that history provided in documenting historical actions and giving them the weight of precedent and making them verifiable. Indeed, perhaps the greatest importance of Herrera’s work lies in how he presented his ideas, which demonstrates how the history he provided was new.

From the Crown’s perspective, Herrera’s work was seen as having helped to solidify Spanish power and further establish Spanish authority in Portugal. Marquis Orazio Scotto wrote to Philip II: “[this history] corroborates the truth . . . and is meticulous and praiseworthy . . . and even in this state [Naples] the fame of Your Majesty has been extended.”308 Moura was also impressed and furthered such praise, writing, “this [history] demonstrates not solely the history of what has happened in Portugal, but demonstrates good governance of individuals, cities and entire kingdoms.”309 Thus, Herrera’s account of the way the Spanish had conducted their affairs in Portugal had fulfilled its mandate and was seen as key to maintaining Philip’s and Spain’s reputación and pre-eminence in Europe. The greatness of Philip’s rule was presented as a direct reflection of the greatness of the Spanish state and the benefits that both brought to all their dominions.310 In fact, the Crown directly regarded Historia de Portugal as having helped both Spanish and Portuguese readers attain knowledge of the events that had transpired. Idiáquez

308 “Istoria spagnuola corrobori la uerità . . . et anco in questi Regni s’estenda la fama delle gloriose attioni di S.A.” Facsimilie copy at the BNM R/6540. Original in the Archivos Farnesianos (Naples), Spagna, fascio 17, num 30, fol. 494. Further, Miguel de Ondarca, secretary of the Royal Camera (escribano de camera de su Majestad) stated that the book had been presented to the king’s Royal Camera, as well as seen personally by Philip II and his most important advisors, and that it had received “great acclaim.” Herrera, Historia de Portugal, Carta Dedicatoria.
309 Moura, BNM Ms/ 18768.
310 As Idiáquez wrote to Philip: “Not only do the Portuguese now know their history, the nature of their past, and what is good for it, but [can now] see the benefits brought by Philip to his Lusitanian inheritance.” BFZ, Altamira, 6/6/1592, legajo 121/40.
proclaimed that Herrera deserved great acclaim having “brought to Spain and Portugal
knowledge . . . and to his patria felicity.” Historia de Portugal exemplified the glories of the
present, by demonstrating the nature of Spanish rule, and presented a picture of Philip and
Spanish actions that conformed to all of the principal interests of the Spanish Crown, which was
seen as vital to Spanish power and the preservation of the state and empire, and thus, a vital tool
of legitimacy.

By emphasizing certain aspects of Philip’s rule so heavily, however, Herrera had added
his own scholarly perspective to the Crown’s demands. Herrera’s understanding of politics, in
particular his understanding of the requisites of political prudence, and his repeated emphasis and
search for Philip’s “prudence,” would inevitably have the effect of preselecting the theme (topoi)
for the narrative. This led him to draw selectively from the available examples and evidence of
Philip’s actions, but it would serve his historiographic purpose well. Herrera illuminated Philip’s
and Spanish characteristics in a way that conflated them into a whole political philosophy, which
for Herrera was one of prudent rule. By providing numerous examples of Philip’s prudence and
consideration in his rule, Historia de Portugal became a sort of philosophical testament to
Philip’s rule with documentation and proof. In fact, it was this very work and Herrera’s emphasis
on Philip’s political prudence which is believed to have initiated the epithet of Philip as the
“Prudent King” in Spain. Indeed, that Philip II became eponymous with the “Prudent King”
meant that this work had a significant impact in establishing the image of Philip as ruling

311 “que menos no merece el que ha traído A Spana[sic] Delfos, y a su patria Dela.”Idiáquez to Philip, BFZ,
Altamira, 6/6/ 1592, legajo 121/40.
312 Richard Kagan, El Rey Recatado: Felipe II, y las Cronistas del Rey (Valladolid: Colección “Síntesis” XII,
Universidad de Valladolid, 2004), 18.
according to a Christian reason of state, founded in historical referents and depicted as a paradigm of exemplary government and a symbol of good governance and just rule.

Furthermore, *Historia de Portugal* was not just about accumulating documents pertinent to the succession, or praising the deeds of Philip and Spaniards; it contained source-based justifications and legitimizations of the actions of the Spanish Crown. Indeed, Herrera demonstrated how Philip adhered to “ancient” privileges and precedents as set out in documents. In this way, Herrera’s extensive archival research and use of sources to verify his claims allowed him to make claims to a more detailed and substantiated account and thus a “true” account of events. Herrera demonstrated that Spanish actions were based on precedents, which he verified through archival and historical documents, and that Philip had used examples derived from history to guide his political decisions. *Historia de Portugal* thus reveals how historical methodology became a tool of statecraft in defense of the King’s interest. Indeed, Herrera lent his rhetorical and antiquarian skills to the service of politics and Spanish imperialism. Herrera’s archivally based history “offered nothing less than the unadorned truth about Spain and its intentions.”

Indeed, Herrera’s counter-history provides a masterly example of how early modern humanist historical scholarship and antiquarianism could be used as effective tools of the state.

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313 Herrera, *Historia de Portugal*, ‘Dedicatoria al Rey.’ Idiáquez also called Herrera’s work the “simple truth.” Idiáquez to Philip, 6/6/1592, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 121/40.
Chapter 4
Antiquity, Continuity, and Stability: Justifying Spanish Intentions in France

The threat of a Protestant ascending to the French throne spurred Philip II and the Spanish Crown to intervene actively in French affairs and to attempt to place a Spanish heir on the French throne. Once again, history was used to justify Spanish political aims, but the strategies were very different than those used in the Portuguese case. The Spanish Crown commissioned three official histories to advance Spanish claims: a genealogy of the Spanish and French Crowns by Esteban de Garibay, a general history of Spain by Gregorio López de Madera, and a history of Spanish involvement in the French Wars of Religion by Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas. Although very different in form and style, all three harnessed history to legitimize and justify Spanish imperialism in the matter of the French succession. More specifically, all three presented a synthesis and embodiment of Philip’s and the Spanish Monarchy’s combined religious and political aims, using traditional historiographic forms, but shaped by a new Spanish ideology of rule and with a new emphasis upon different forms of “proof”. While their forms were familiar, their aims expanded the traditional role of historiography.

Spanish dynastic claims to the French throne possessed some validity, as Philip’s daughter, Isabela of Valois, was a direct bloodline heir to the French Crown. Spaniards also claimed the French throne based on their historic role within Europe as defenders of the Catholic faith; they argued that their ability to bring stability and continuity to France through their dynastic lineage, orthodoxy, and legacy of good rule and service to the common good made them
the most worthy of all of the European Crowns to protect France from heretics and civil unrest. As Spanish interest and intervention grew in French affairs, however, negative foreign accounts, particularly a scurrilous history of Spain and its past by Louis Turquet de Mayernne, emerged that criticized Spanish intervention in French affairs and Spanish imperial intentions by providing a negative picture of Spain’s past and its historic legacy of bad rule. These polemical works undermined Spain’s international status, credibility, and reputación, and thus Spain’s status as “worthy” in the French contest. An examination of the official responses to these attacks, particularly the historical justifications for Spanish claims to intervention in France that these works provided, will show how officially commissioned historians legitimized Spanish incursions into France, defended Spanish intentions and actions, and provided new forms of authority through history. It also brings into focus the historical methodologies Spanish official historians used to achieve these aims. This chapter demonstrates the different strategies used by different historians, and in doing so helps further our understanding of how historical contestation fit within larger debates and ideas about formal legal rights and privileges.

By focusing on the main arguments of these works, this chapter explains the significant changes taking place in Spanish official history at the end of the sixteenth century and, in particular, those that fostered a particular ideology. Furthermore, it shows how, by adhering to a specific methodology, these histories furthered the interests of the state. While all three works took radically different shape, all three conformed to the demands of the Crown. All provided new legitimizing principles for Spanish claims, and all three adhered to the methodological principles of “good history” writing. These works demonstrate the multiple historiographical justifications that provided the basis for Spanish claims to France and how historiography served
the totality of the intentions of the Crown in this matter. These works also, individually and in combination, served both external and internal purposes. These works were intended not only to help rally Spanish support for the Spanish cause in France, but also fostered a Spanish sense of identity and pride based in the illustrious heritage of the Spanish people and its monarchy and in Spain’s historic role as defender of the Catholic faith.

Spain and the French Succession

The growth of Huguenotism in France and the French Wars of Religion that had begun in 1562 impelled Spaniards to become increasingly active in French affairs.¹ There is no doubt that Philip viewed himself as essentially a defender of the Roman Catholic Church against the aggression of the perceived heretics, an aggression that now seemed to have become mainly military and that consequently had to be met with military force, and that the primacy of the need

to maintain religious orthodoxy in Europe led the Spanish “Catholic Monarchy” to involve itself in the French Catholic cause. However, Spanish interest and involvement in France went beyond the need to defeat heresy and defend Catholic orthodoxy, as intervention had a significant and immediate political importance; as Antonio Pérez had already advised Philip, “The heart of the Spanish Empire is France.” France was not only the most populous country in Europe, it held a central geographic position and a Protestant king would threaten the conglomerate of dispersed territories of the Spanish European Empire.

The issue was complicated by the fact that France’s Henry III (1551-1589) had no heir and Henry of Navarre, who aspired to the French throne, was a Protestant. Since Henry of Navarre was a Huguenot, his accession would produce a Protestant France willing to continue to help the Calvinist Dutch rebels, and this posed serious imperial concerns for Spain. Philip simply could not afford a government hostile to Spain in France, especially if he wished to maintain his political hegemony in continental Europe, as well as his quest to end the threat posed by both the Ottomans and Protestants to Catholic Europe. To this end, he was supported by Catholic solidarity, and by those who opposed the heresy of both Huguenotism and Henry of Navarre. Indeed, most French Catholics turned to Spain, the “Most Catholic” of European nations, to stake a claim to the French throne through Philip’s daughter, Isabela of Valois. Philip and the

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Spanish Crown agreed that if they could put Isabela on the French throne, they could secure Catholicism. Moreover, the Infanta Isabela Clara Eugenia, as the eldest child of Philip’s marriage with Isabel of Valois, was the grand-daughter of Henry II and Catherine de Médicis, and therefore the legitimate bloodline heir to the French throne. Thus political calculations, religious commitment, and patrimonial interests all united under a strong confidence in God’s support, solidified Spanish resolve and provided the primary political and legal foundations for Spanish intents in France.

As Navarre’s succession started to look more likely (he became heir presumptive in 1584), Philip decided he needed to intervene directly. Philip formed an alliance with Henry III, committing troops and money to the cause with the express aim of preventing Henry of Navarre from taking the throne of France. Spanish involvement in French affairs intensified when, in 1588, Henry, duke of Guise and the leader of the Catholic League, was assassinated by Henry of Navarre’s agents, and Philip found himself as the coalition’s new leader. In actuality, despite the fact that Henry of Navarre had claimed the throne, between 1590 and 1593 circumstances seemed to favor Philip and the Spanish cause in France. Parma was in Paris, and the East and Brittany were occupied by the Spanish. Henry of Navarre's tenacity and tactics, however, eventually won him the strategically important city of Rouen, and Parma died from wounds suffered defending Amiens. The issue was further complicated when Henry of Navarre (now Henry IV) converted to Catholicism in 1593, and the Spanish lost many of their Catholic supporters, as much of French Catholic opinion swung in favor of a French rather than a Spanish king. Moreover, Pope Clement VIII refused to make Philip “protector of the Catholics of

France,” supposedly fearing increased Spanish power, not to mention his own papal claims to the French throne.⁵

Even with Henry’s conversion, however, the Spanish Catholic Monarchy did not abandon the cause, as the religious conflict continued in France. The transcendence of a common Catholic culture, and the need to re-establish civil harmony and moral order all carried significant weight as arguments for Spanish involvement in France.⁶ Further, many French Catholics continued to support Spanish involvement, as many Catholics viewed Henry’s conversion as insincere, and more importantly, they believed that Henry was still under the control of Protestant politiques. Aware of Spain’s continued intentions, and to fend off those who opposed him within France, Henry IV declared open war on Spain and Philip in 1595 and brought both England and the Dutch into alliance with him in 1596.⁷ This initiated a bloody conflict that lasted from 1595 until mid-1598, when, urged by Clement VIII, a peace treaty was signed.⁸ The war declared by Henry IV was seen by Spaniards as a direct challenge and threat against Spain, and action was needed to defend their own honor, if not solely that of the Church. Thus, despite Henry’s conversion, war between 1595 and 1598 sustained the pressure, both within and outside of Spain, to have Isabela take the French throne and have Spain restore France to the “true faith.”

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⁵ Indeed, beginning in 1585, both Sixtus V and later Clement VIII, began to distance themselves from Spanish pretensions by exercising their own rights as legitimate monarchs to the French throne through such works as Giovanni Battista De Luca’s Monarchia ecclesiae (De Regalia in Ecclesiis vacantibus Regni Franciae) and Tommasso Bozio’s De ecclesiae Monachia etiam intemporabilis.


It was precisely in the period from 1589 to 1598 that an official Spanish position regarding these issues was needed, to gain support for their cause and to substantiate legitimacy through the successive stages of conflict. Because of the changing politics regarding these matters, Spanish reasoning for intervening in French affairs was by no means static. The political evolution that was taking place, the relationships between the Houses of Bourbon and Lorraine, Henry’s conversion, and changes in papal diplomacy, as well as the Catholic League’s increased financial dependency upon Philip, made it necessary for the Spanish Crown to find justifications that complemented their political program dynastically and that also took into account the centrality of the alliance with the League and the positioning of Philip as its defender. Moreover, not everyone in Spain supported Spanish intentions in France. The Cortes of Castile expressed strong opposition to the idea from 1592 through 1598, since for them, dedicating resources to a foreign war was like “throwing money into the ocean.”9 The Cortes stressed that, instead of outwardly helping their Catholic brethren, it was much more intelligent and efficient to put into effect more indirect media of intervention. Philip claimed, however, that nothing was more practical and moral than to defend the Catholic faith and thus that his actions accorded with the fundamental principles of Christian reason of state.10

Spanish political advisors and theorists, therefore, began preparing various formal treatises justifying Spanish action in France starting in 1586. Indeed, Spain believed that it could make a good claim to France based upon numerous dynastic, politico-religious, and historical

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9 Cortes de los antiguos reinos de Castilla y León, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Imprenta de la real casa, 1882), 4: 382.
rights. Its primary claim was that a Spanish monarch would help ensure and maintain Catholicism in France. This was bolstered by the fact that Isabela was a rightful claimant to the French throne. In their efforts the Spanish were aided by French Catholics, who, starting with the Estates General in Blois of 1576/77, sought to establish as a fundamental law of the kingdom the requirement that the monarch be Catholic. Many French jurists, however, asserted that the Salic Law, which excluded women and their children from the royal succession, and which they claimed dated back to the practices of the early Franks, was also a fundamental law of the kingdom, thereby denying Isabela the throne, regardless of her Catholicism. As a result, a significant effort was made in the Estates General by French Catholics, known as the Sixteen of Paris, to challenge the supremacy of the Salic Law; they argued that the religion of the monarch was more important, and thus they supported the claims of the Catholic Spanish Infanta.

In 1589, however, when Henry III was assassinated, more immediate action was needed, and Philip ordered the duke of Parma to Paris to ensure that Henry of Navarre could not take the throne, and turned to his political advisors to advance Spanish political claims. “The affairs of France,” Philip wrote to Farnese in 1589, “are at this moment the principal thing.” As a result, starting in 1589, various Spanish political tracts were written, the primary purpose of which was to neutralize the French Salic Law. These included Francisco Álvarez de Ribera’s Información sobre el derecho de la Infanta doña Isabel al Reyno de Francia (1589) [Information on the right that the Infanta Isabel has to the Kingdom of France], Pedro Barbosa’s Parecer sobre los

13 AGS Estado, K–1594, n° 7.
14 AGS Estado, K–1594, n° 9 and 10.
Papeles y fundamentos del derecho de la infanta Doña Isabel a la corona de Francia (1590)

[Papers regarding and the grounds for the right of the Infanta Isabel to the Crown of France],

and Pedro Rodrigo de Zapata’s Tratado de los derechos de la infanta Isabel al trono de Francia (1590) [Treatise on the rights of the Infanta Isabel to the French throne].

By positing three arguments for female succession—common law, custom, and the questionability of the Salic Law—such works clearly led the way for Philip to assert that his daughter Isabela, the last remaining descendant of the Valois line, was “legal heir to the House of Valois” and thus should inherit the French throne.

In addition to refuting the Salic Law, Spanish political theorists made five further arguments for the precedence of Spanish claims to the French throne: “a greater nobility of lineage, a more ancient history, a greater dignity in action, a greater commitment to honor privileges,” and a “continuous commitment to the Catholic cause.”

To supplement these claims, they maintained that Spain’s Catholic Monarchy was not only older than France’s Rey Très Christienne, but also superior in terms of its nobility, power, and purity of religion. Therefore, a historical understanding of the foundations and bases of power had become central to Spanish claims to political legitimacy in this conflict, and the question of precedence surrounding who was to replace Henry III were discussed not only in more practical political terms, but also in terms of magnificence and antiquity. Knowing the way these arguments were discussed is crucial, since, as we shall see, the official histories commissioned all sought to prove

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15 AGS Estado, K–1594, n° 29 and 30.
16 AGS Estado, K–1595, n.° 1.
18 “la primera nobleza de linaje, la segunda antiguedad de tiempo, la tercera alteza de dignidad, la quarta memoria de beneficios.” Agustin de Cravaliz, Sumario de diversas historias para probar que el Rey de España ha de preceder al Rey de Francia, BNM Ms/887, fols. 301–328; and Discurso sobre las precedencias de España y Francia, BNM Ms/1022, fols. 2–44. Indeed a huge basis of legitimization was formed for why a Spaniard could, and should, take the French throne: see Íñurritegui Rodríguez, “«El intento . . . », “331–348.
the dynastic, legal, and political rights and privileges outlined in the political treatises and to provide proof and historical substantiation to these claims.

Aware of Spanish intentions and the historical foundations upon which their claims were made, Protestant sympathizers began their own denial of Isabela’s legitimacy and Spanish claims to France based upon the same underlying premises. A huge body of literature emerged, which negatively characterized Spaniards and which even claimed that the Spaniards only had an interest in France in order to destroy it, and make the French their “slaves.” Indeed, the Spanish candidacy worried many French, for not only was it contrary to the French Salic Law, but many French outwardly protested the idea that they allow themselves to be ruled by a Spaniard. This climate of uncertainty provoked Louis Turquet de Mayernne to write *Histoire générale de l’Espagne* (1587) [A General History of Spain], which not only directly attacked female royal succession, but which negatively characterized Spain’s past and its historical legacy, and presented Spanish and Philip’s rule as tyrannical, and that Spaniards could not be trusted.

Mayernne’s *Histoire générale d'Espagne* was that of a Huguenot staunchly opposed to Philip’s intervention in the French Wars of Religion. Mayernne stated that Spain had no real justification for her claims to the French throne, even if there was a threat that their new king might be a Protestant, since the Spaniards could only claim the French throne through marriage.

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19 The most well-known of these was Alexandre de Pont Aymery, *Discours d’ Estat, ou la nécessaire et les moyens de faire la Guerre en l’Espagne mesme . . .* (Paris, 1595), 2.
Mayernne, following the Salic Law, also denied any form of female inheritance. Further, when it came to Spanish rule, Mayernne catalogued a long Spanish history of ambivalent rulers, uninterested in their subjects or their needs, and provided a narrative of Spanish vices, stretching through the history of Spain’s kings. Mayernne claimed that Philip was the latest in a line of “bloodthirsty monarchs” guilty of “unspeakable crimes.”\(^{21}\) Further, beginning with the Roman invasion of the Iberian peninsula, Mayernne told a history of Spain wracked by war and civil unrest, constant invasion, waning Christianity, forced obedience, immoral and deceitful politics, and a lust for conquest.\(^{22}\) Thus, using both past and present actions, Mayernne sought to plant seeds of distrust in his readers against Spanish intentions in France.

Mayernne’s obvious sympathies and polemical arguments gave *Histoire générale d'Espagne* great popularity.\(^{23}\) Mayernne began his account of Philip’s rule with the death of Philip’s son Don Carlos. Mayernne claimed that the Holy Office had deemed Carlos a heretic, and obliged Philip to make a very difficult decision: be a father and offer his son a royal pardon for his crimes, or be a king, and impose appropriate royal justice. Philip, according to Mayernne, “rejecting his own humanity,” opted to be king and sentenced his own son to death.\(^{24}\) This apocryphal story was intended to demonstrate the harsh and unyielding nature of Philip’s rule and how such decision-making would be brought to Spanish dealings in France. With such episodes, Mayernne also introduced into the foreign historiography of Philip characteristics and circumstances that would appear later in tragedies, repeated as late as the nineteenth century in


\(^{22}\) For example, Mayernne cited the example of King Henry of Castile, who “forced obedience” in all places he ruled, and claimed that the Spanish had longed ruled and expanded their territory through “conspiracy,” and “reproachful things.” Mayernne further characterized Spanish rulers as “severe men . . . full of revenge,” and as such, had a long history of not ruling in the interest of their subjects. Mayernne, *Histoire générale d'Espagne*, 200 and 203.

\(^{23}\) See opinions on the popularity of this work in Chapter One above.

\(^{24}\) Mayernne, *Histoire générale d'Espagne*, 1289.
Verdi’s opera Don Carlos. Indeed, Mayernne painted a vivid picture of Philip as a man who was “suspicious, mistrustful, cruel . . . jealous, doubting, closed, dissimulating, ambitious, and having a pride greater than the normal condition of man,” and claimed that his “reign [was] barren of any actions done in Spain, and few abroad.”

Mayernne even suggested that Spain’s dynastic claims to France were merely a cover for Philip’s grander design to “conquer” France and subject its inhabitants to the most abject slavery, akin to Spanish tyranny in the Americas. Mayernne deliberately introduced the twin themes of “conquest” and “enslavement” in order to tap into the rich vein of anti-Spanish rhetoric already circulating in France. Mayernne presented a catalogue of Spanish horrors, from massacring the indigenous peoples of the New World to the brutal despoliation of Dutch towns and the “Spanish fury” that had taken over the Low Countries. Further, Mayernne also stressed that the Spanish repeatedly acted outside the bounds of “good behavior” and international law and thus were not entitled to allegiance. Mayernne claimed that Spanish victims of conquest were denied any kind of property rights or personal liberty, religious or otherwise. He concluded that if the Spanish were allowed to take the French Crown, then all French rights and privileges would be lost, as proven by past Spanish actions in its imperial holdings. For Mayernne, Spaniards could not be trusted to uphold French sovereignty. Indeed, for Mayernne, his catalogue of abuses was proof that the Spanish aspired to be universal monarchs or “lords of all the world.”

Mayernne presented Spanish imperialism, therefore, as the same both in and outside Europe, and presented both as forms of “conquest.” Moreover, for Mayernne, history had provided presumptive

25 Mayernne also wrote of Philip: “il fil mouris sa femme; il tua son enfant . . . Il pille Portugal, injuste triomphant.” Indeed, Mayernne had added that Philip had also been responsible for the death of his wife Isabel, the French princess. Mayernne, *Histoire générale d’Espagne*, 1289–90.
26 Mayernne, *Histoire générale d’Espagne*, 1301 and 1227, respectively.
evidence of the Spanish desire to subvert freedom, and he even called for a greater anti-Spanish alliance to thwart Spanish intentions not only in France but in the rest of the world.

Mayernne’s characterizations of Philip’s politics as the “finest politics of deceit,” was entirely contrary to the image of Philip as a Christian prince. He also questioned the legacy of past Spanish Monarchs and their upholding of the law and privileges. Mayernne’s attack struck a blow to Spain’s claim to be the most Catholic of Catholic Monarchies, and thus the upholder of justice and the ‘true’ faith. A more formal response to Mayernne’s work, therefore, was demanded by the Spanish Crown. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter One, Mayernne’s work warranted an official response, as it directly challenged the very historical claims that laid the foundation for Spanish imperialism and threatened Spanish reputación.

It was within this international and domestic context that the Spanish Crown turned to official historians to provide ammunition for continued support of the Spanish cause in France. The Spanish Crown understood that it needed to justify and provide legitimacy for its French claims, respond to changing political imperatives and necessities, and respond to works like Mayernne’s that criticized the nature of Spanish imperialism and its historical legacy and achievements. The Spanish Crown had come to understand that the entire political project for France needed to be substantiated through history. Spaniards knew, however, that they would have to justify their intentions thoroughly, especially when it came to asserting international standing and precedence, and justify claims to rights, privileges and preeminence. Thus while the dynastic-religious character of the whole affair needed to take center stage, the Crown understood that appeals to history, and especially establishing historical superiority in various

28 “política más fina del simular y disimular.” Juan de Silva to Moura, BNM Ms/ 12856 (H.57–R.58).
forms, would also justify intervention in the matter of the French succession. These political ideas and necessities, therefore, would take particular shape when expressed in the writing of official historiography.

The Spanish Crown identified three issues that needed to be addressed with regards to Spain’s role in France. First, it had to establish the legitimacy of Isabela Clara Eugenia and her rightful claim to the French throne. Second, it needed to respond to the challenges to Spanish reputación and its historical legacy being leveled by Mayernne and others. Third, it needed to justify Spanish involvement in French affairs and demonstrate the nature of Spanish intentions and actions. Three works were officially commissioned to deal with these issues. The first was Esteban de Garibay’s, *Ilustraciones Genealógicas de los Católicos Reyes de las Españas y de los Christianissimos de Francia* (1596) [The Illustrious Genealogy of the Catholic Kings of Spain and the Most Christian Kings of France], commissioned to cement Spanish dynastic claims through a meticulous genealogical study of both the Spanish and French royal houses.29 The second, *Excelencias de la Monarquía y Reyno de España* (1594) [The Excellencies of the Monarchy and Kingdom of Spain], was a vast general history of Spain by Gregorio López de Madera, commissioned directly to respond to the French anti-Spanish polemic of Louis Turquet de Mayernne by providing legitimacy for Spanish actions based in its illustrious past.30 The third,
Historia de los sucesos de Francia desde el año 1585 que comenzó la liga Católica hasta fin del año 1594 (1598) [History of the outcomes in France begun by the Catholic League from 1585 to 1594] by Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, was to provide an account of Spanish and French actions during the Wars of Religion, which covered the nine-year period leading up to Henry IV’s conversion, and was to provide justification for Spain’s actions.31

Through a combination of genealogy, general history, and a historical account of contemporary actions, these three works commissioned by the Crown sought to prove the superiority of Spain’s dynastic claims, assert Spain’s illustrious past and the precedence of its monarchy, and emphasize its constant support of the Catholic faith. The search for historical precedent to justify contemporary policy, therefore, led deep into the national past—not so much in terms of the “ancient constitutionalism” that we see elsewhere, but rather in creating and solidifying Spain’s reputation, status, and magnificence. Moreover, all three works were necessary elements in the demonstration and legitimization of the need for Spanish aid to Catholic brethren in France to restore Catholicism, and the worthiness of a Spanish successor to the French throne.

These works, therefore, sought not only to justify Spanish actions, but were also intended to garner support for Spanish interests in their ensuing war with France. Significantly too, as they looked into the origins of the country and its monarchy, Spanish official historians sought to find

Millán (Madrid: Editorial Parteluz, S.L., 1998), 149–169. It is crucial that this work be placed back within the Franco-Spanish conflict as clearly defined by its commission, and the work’s Dedication and Introduction.

31 Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Historia de los sucesos de Francia desde el año 1585 que comenzó la liga Católica hasta fin del año 1594 (Madrid, 1598).
elements that defined their identity and purpose in the present. Indeed, the expansive nature of the types of history commissioned must be seen as an attempt to bring the entirety of Spanish history into review and, more importantly, as a means to reveal the nature of Spanish Monarchy itself. For in all these works, the central focus was the Spanish Monarchy, its ties to religion, its manner of rule, and by extension the rule of their current king, Philip. Further, all three sought to demonstrate how monarchical actions were based on a set of principles that defined Spain and its identity.

These histories can also be seen as part of what José A. Fernández-Santamaría calls the “new politics” that made the king the most substantial component of the kingdom’s identity. The king was the Spanish Monarchy and was Spain, and so the destiny of the monarchy and that of the kingdom were one and the same, uniting the king and his people in a common purpose. This common purpose resided in many factors that were combined and utilized in different ways to suit different political objectives. Significantly, the administration of justice and the defense of the faith became the two pivots of the “New Monarchy” (Nueva Monarchía) and their antiquity and continuity formed the basis of political legitimacy and religious unity. Understanding this way of envisioning the monarch as the center of Spanish identity and purpose, as well as the ideals that this purpose embodied and their historical foundations is vital since, as we shall see,

32 Across Europe scholars focused their attention upon “national antiquities,” and searched for origins, in order to construct a national identity and establish or restore unity, especially from polemical and mainly religious divides. Chantal Grell, ed., Les historiographes en Europe de la fin du Moyen Âge à la Révolution (Paris: PUPS, 2006), 140.
these ideas and notions were directly included in the way Spanish counter-histories were conceptualized.

Esteban de Garibay and the Dynastic Issue

While a political literature had emerged that supported Spanish dynastic claims, a definitive genealogy that linked the two Royal houses of France and Spain was still needed. Such grandiose genealogies were a traditional historiographic genre and genealogy was not seen as separate from other forms of historical writing.\textsuperscript{35} Indeed, from the outset, Spanish history had been family history. Through oral transmission and verse, on stone, parchment, or paper, medieval aristocratic and royal families had taken care to remember the names, marriage alliances, lands and great deeds of their ancestors. The Spanish Monarchy was no exception, and as their control extended over more lords and lands, and especially with the consolidation of the reigns of Castile and Aragon, their family history became Spanish history. Such family history was defined by genealogy, for without it, there could be no lineage. Both genealogy and history were memorials and witnesses, a form of engendering, transmitting patrilineally the actions and events that defined a man, family, or state. Dynastic history itself also established a royal lineage through the recording of the marriage alliances and the right to possession of lands and titles.\textsuperscript{36}

Further, many "general histories of Spain" provided genealogical charts at either the beginnings or ends of the work. Such schematics traced not only heirs, but many linked royal lines to greater


Dynastic ties, and traced the rights, titles, and legitimacy of the monarchy. Indeed, genealogy and history were intimately linked and were of equal status.

Thus, as tensions mounted, the Crown turned to official historian Esteban de Garibay y Zamalloa (1533-1599)\(^{37}\) to write an authoritative genealogy that the Crown could use to establish incontrovertibly Spanish dynastic claims in France. Between January and September of 1593, Garibay was approached by Juan de Idiáquez, Cristobal de Moura and even the King himself, requesting that the historian write a book on the royal lineage of both Spain and France.\(^{38}\) Such a genealogy was regarded by the Crown as vital to the political project of asserting disputed dynastic claims to France and supporting Isabela as a direct heir. Indeed, Garibay was specifically requested to link Spanish genealogy directly to the genealogy of the French kings.

Garibay was an obvious choice for this task as he was an accomplished genealogist, having already written on the succession of the kings of Portugal from king Don Alfonso Henriquez (1109-1185) onwards, even providing genealogical trees.\(^{39}\) More importantly, this

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\(^{38}\) Garibay was first approached on the 19th of January by Idiáquez, and then on the 20th of September of 1593 by Moura. AGS, Estado, K–1535, n.° 39. For mention of how Idiáquez personally requested that Garibay create this work, see “Memorias de Garibay” in Memorial Histórico Español: Colección de Documentos, Opúsculos y Antigüedades que publica la Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Imprenta de José Rodríguez, 1854), 7: 587–597, at 592. Also on the commissioning of this work by the Crown see RAH, folio Colección Garibay, appearing in the last volume (tomo), bound in leather but unpaginated, in the folio named, ‘De las obras, no impresas de Esteban de Garibay, cronista de los Catholicos Reyes de las Españas, y del Nuevo Mundo, Don Philipes Segundo y tercero.’

\(^{39}\) Garibay, BNM Ms/ 11001. For Garibay’s own views of this work, see “Memorias de Garibay,” 587–97. Garibay also created a ‘Genealogy of the English Royal House,’ BNM, “Papeles Varios”, Ms/ 9984.
prior work was seen as such a vital tool that even Philip himself had asked Moura (then Minister to Portugal) to use it in his early diplomatic journeys [1575-1579] to Portugal to ensure the Spanish inheritance.\textsuperscript{40} Significantly, Philip himself called Garibay “intelligent, capable, careful and meticulous.”\textsuperscript{41} Further, Moura had also already commissioned Garibay to write a work outlining royal rights and privileges in Iberia, dating back to king Don Pelayo (c. 685-737).\textsuperscript{42} Garibay, therefore, was the perfect man for this job, as his prior work had proven to be politically useful for the Crown in substantiating claims to authority and asserting the precedence of the Spanish Monarchy in dynastic disputes. Garibay was also an ideal candidate, as his feelings on the issue of France had been made quite clear: he sympathized with the Catholic League and he sided with many in the Sorbonne faction of the Faculty of Theology in Paris.\textsuperscript{43} Writing to one of its faculty members, Garibay outlined extensively the need for Philip to intervene in French affairs and the tragedy of the assassination of Henry III in 1589, seeing France as divided between Catholics and “those heretics who give [Henry IV] obedience.”\textsuperscript{44} Indeed, as Garibay wrote to Moura in relation to being commissioned to write this genealogy, “the present state of Christianity is in notable danger if heresy, already so widespread, also prevails in France, which will undoubtedly occur in that Kingdom with the ascendance of a Heretic King.”\textsuperscript{45} Thus the

\textsuperscript{40} BNM Ms/ 1930, 9/13/1578, fol. 72 v (see also 10/9/1578, BNM Ms/ 1930, fol. 134r.).
\textsuperscript{41} “inteligente, hábil, cuidadoso.” Philip to Moura, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468, fol. 65.
\textsuperscript{42} Esteban de Garibay, \textit{Letreros e insignias reales de todos los serenísimos reyes de Obiedo, Leon y Castilla} (Madrid, 1593). This work focused on the origins, titles and privileges of the Spanish nobility and the Crown.
\textsuperscript{43} On Garibay’s ideas on Spanish rights in France, see \textit{Papeles Varios}, BNM Ms/ 18227.
\textsuperscript{44} “Por su muerte habiéndose acabado totalmente en Francia la sucesión masculina de la casa y familia real de Valois, pretendió reinar en ella Enrique de Borbón, duque de Vendome y señor de Bearne, intitulado por los franceses rey de Navarra, como descendiente varón de la casa real por la sangre de Borbón. Por lo cual todos los herejes de Francia le dieron la obediencia y se la dan hoy día, llamándole Enrique Cuarto, pero no los católicos, en especial la católica ciudad de Paris y su Santa Universidad protectora de la religión cristiana, y las ciudades de Tolosa, León, Orleans, Rean y otras muchas, que hacen la mayor parte del reino.” Garibay, 9/13/1591, in ‘Apuntes biográficos de diversas personas,’ BNM Ms/ 14030/306/450.
\textsuperscript{45} “el presente estado de la Christianidad y el notable peligro que se corre que acabe de estragarse en esta parte de Europa si la heregia que está tan extendida en todas las partes setentrionales acaba de prevalecer en Francia, como parece sucederá si en aquel reyno sucediere Rey Hereje.” Garibay to Moura, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468.
“legitimizing” Garibay, the man determined to justify the rights of the Spanish king to the French throne, was already evident by the time he was officially commissioned to write this work.

Garibay was also an ideal candidate, for as an antiquarian and scholar of Semitic and classical languages, he was regarded as an almost obsessive advocate of detailed scholarly inquiry into evidence. Garibay was a Hellenist and Latinist, known for his extensive studies of the classics, and as a humanist antiquarian who passed much of his time carrying out research on the ways of the ancients: “from childhood, he has been inclined to histories, and having read the Romans, Greek, and those of other nations, he has spent over twenty years on writing that of Spain, and the last six years, travelling through the archives reading and copying ancient writings as materials for his General History that Your Majesty has so often sought.” This was a reference to Garibay’s Compendio historial de España (Amberes, 1571) [A Short History of Spain] in which he had “published of the greatness of Spain, spoke of the great doings and achievements of its holy Kings, and the great reasons for the titles they have been awarded . . . as well as the beginnings of religion.” In fact, despite the diversity and volume of his other work, Esteban de Garibay is known almost solely today for his Compendio historial, his contribution to the General Histories of Spain (Crónica General) written under the command of the Crown, which provided Spain with a national narrative, from its ancient origins to its present, that rivaled works appearing in France and Italy. This work is important in this context, as Garibay would

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46 López de Calatayud to Sarmiento de Acuña, RB II/2151 (doc. 89). For a list of Garibay’s unprinted works see BNM Ms/ 11001.
47 “desde su niñez fue inclinado á historias y que habiendo leído las romanas, griegas y de otras naciones, ha ocupado 20 años en las de España, y los seis últimos en andar por Archivos leyendo y copiando escrituras antiguas para materiales de la Historia general que con el favor de V. Magestad pretende proseguir.” Salazar de Mendoça to Sarmiento de Acuña, RB II/2164 (doc. 209).
48 “publicó de sus grandezas, donde escribió las vidas y hazañas de sus santos Reyes con la razón y título que tienen en la Historia que publicó de los principios de la religión.” In ‘Apuntes biográficos de diversas personas,’ BNM Ms/ 14030/306/450.
draw from and reference heavily this prior work when composing his *Ilustraciones Genealógicas*, especially as it had included a genealogical history of the Spanish Monarchy up to Ferdinand, and had highlighted the pre-eminence of the Spanish kings who, reign after reign, distinguished themselves from other European Monarchs. Moreover, by extolling the achievements of Spain’s royal ancestors, Garibay’s *Compendio historial* had already served as a justification for the special position that Spain held in the world by the late sixteenth century. More importantly, Garibay had presented himself as an obsessive proponent of scholarly inquiry into Spain’s past.49

**Significantly,** as discussed in Chapter Two, Garibay had also written extensively on the proper historiographic methods that needed to be followed when writing works of political importance in order for them to obtain the necessary “authority and respect” from readers: they required extensive research, primary source use, and scouring of the archives.50 He also believed that antiquarian tools and techniques were to be brought directly to considerations for writing and constructing official history. Crucially, for Moura and Idiáquez, it was a combination of Garibay’s loyalty, erudition, and stringent views on methodology that made him a man capable of “writing history in proper form.”51

In pre-modern Europe, royal families were constantly preoccupied with providing heirs to their possessions, and fearful to the consequences if conception failed. In particular, as Paula

49 Garibay was also a great friend of Christopher Plantin, whom he visited many times in Antwerp, learning of the power of typography and the printed word from this great publisher. See Leon Voet, “Felipe II, Guillermo de Orange y el tipógrafo Christopher Plantino,” in *Imágenes Históricas de Felipe II*, ed. Alfredo Alvar Ezquerra (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Cervantinos, 2000), 43–58.


51 BNM Ms/14030/306/450.
Sutter Fichter has shown, the princely families of the Holy Roman Empire worried continually not only about the earliest stages of their family trees, but about the present and future ones as well.52 Thus, when Garibay practiced and preached the vital importance of the “genealogical part of history,” he was expressing a vision of history shaped by his time and place, as well as Spanish political necessities. In his world of well-ordered states, charters rested on birth, orders emanated from the top, and birth order determined the destiny of individuals and states. To that extent, genealogy itself became a critical method, a key to debunking false myths, and revealing many truths—or at least a means to provide a rigorous display of how Providence had blessed or withheld favors of inheritance, and how great monarchies, and their states had been built, survived, thrived, and expanded. Unlike us, Garibay’s contemporaries were not genealogical innocents, and they appreciated his enterprise. They understood such genealogical statements and what these meant to assertions of power and prestige, especially within international contexts.

The use of genealogical “proofs” to answer questions of origins and antiquity possessed a particular valence in early modern Spain due to the culture’s conception of “purity of blood” (*limpieza de sangre*), (that is, no descent from Jews or Moors).53 Concerns with *limpieza de sangre* also had specific ramifications upon the use of documentation. Indeed as *limpieza de sangre* was a prerequisite for the highest secular and ecclesiastical offices in early modern Spain, a juridical procedure with sophisticated rules of evidence to “prove” one’s ancestry evolved, and

53 The importance of genealogical and other origins is immediately evident in *limpieza de sangre* statutes. See Albert A. Sicroff, *Los estatutos de limpieza de sangre: controversias entre los siglos XV y XVII. La otra historia de España* (Madrid: Taurus, 1985). For a further discussion on notions of the importance of “origins” in late sixteenth-century Spain, see A. Katie Harris, *From Muslim to Christian Granada: Inventing a City's Past in Early Modern Spain* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007).
additional concerns and needs to verify one’s genealogy created an additional culture of “proof.” Indeed, the need to provide proofs of *limpieza* brought about the creation of many very elaborate and well described, and supposedly researched genealogical backgrounds so they could “pass” tests of *limpieza de sangre*. This led many *conversos* to commission such genealogies, the vast majority of which were false and based on forged documents. Indeed, the need to establish the noble lineages of many courtiers, as well as the need to prove purity of Christian blood, sparked an onslaught of fantastic genealogies of noble houses and lineages. Such developments had created an environment in which personal identity was based increasingly upon the provision of proof. Thus Garibay’s genealogy was to be written for an audience that was both convinced of the value of genealogical claims, and acutely aware of the unreliability and even spurious nature of many genealogies.

Garibay’s royal genealogy of the Spanish and French houses appeared in 1596 as *Ilustraciones Genealógicas de los Católicos Reyes de las España y de los Christianíssimos de Francia, y de los Emperadores de Constantinopla, hasta el Católico Rey nuestro Señor Don Philipe el II y sus serenisísimos hijos*. However, it had already circulated in manuscript form a few years previously; mention of this work appears as early as 1594. Undoubtedly, mounting

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55 It should be stressed that no scholarly study exists on Garibay’s *Ilustraciones genealógicas*. The full title of this work appears as: *Ilustraciones genealógicas de los Católicos Reyes de las Españas y de los Christianíssimos de Francia y de los Emperadores de Constantinopla hasta el Católico Rey nuestro Señor Don Philipe el II y sus serenisísimos hijos. Las mesma hasta sus Altezas de muchos sanctos confessores de la Iglesia Católica Romana, sus gloriosos progenitores, como lo mostrara la pagina siguiente. Para el muy alto y muy poderso Principe de las Españas, y del Nuevo Mundo, Don Philip, Nuestro Católico Señor. Compuestas por Estaban de Garibay, Chronista del Católico Rey y con su real privilegio impresas* (Madrid, 1596).
56 Original Manuscript appears at the BFZ, Altamira, carpeta 160, fol. 54. A second manuscript is held at the BNM Ms/ 11001.
tensions as active war broke out between France and Spain and a desire for a wider readership than just political advisors at court prompted its publication in 1596.

The underlying political purpose of this work was to present Philip as the legitimate descendant of both Charlemagne and the first Christian emperor, Constantine the Great, thus linking both Philip and Isabela to France, but also allowing them to lay direct claim to being the ‘Most Christian Kings.’ More immediately, it was intended to provide the historical ammunition necessary to justify Philip’s intervention in France’s Wars of Religion and its continuing efforts to depose Henry IV, in defense of Spain’s dynastic precedence. Therefore, it provided the foundational dynastic justifications for the works that were to follow by both Madera and Herrera.

Garibay stressed that, in his efforts, he was following Polybius, who supposedly claimed that, while some readers like pragmatic history, “others enjoy more reviewing genealogy.”

Garibay, therefore, saw genealogy as a profound form of historical thought, one that offered vital information for rulers, institutions, and political claims. For Garibay, the utility of his work was quite distinct. *Ilustraciones Genealógicas* was not meant as pragmatic instruction of the sort Tacitus and others had praised, but as another apparently distinct realm of historical work. “Genealogy,” he wrote, “illuminates all the other parts of history, and without it, they bear basically no fruit at all.” After all, he pointed out “anyone can see that history chiefly deals with the persons who did things, and that they must be separated out into families.” Like states, families had set periods of existence, during which they rose to great positions of power and

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presided over numerous territories. “Knowledge of this” wrote Garibay, is “pleasant,” but more essentially, “important for kings and others who steer the ship of state, and [thus is] very useful for everyone. For if we consider the matter rightly, the ornament of nobility itself rests on this, as if on a foundation. For if we are to believe Aristotle, it is the antiquity and integrity of the breed, or its rank, [which is] attained by the services of its ancestors to the state.”60 Thus “history,” accordingly for Garibay, was also to be found when presented in long genealogical tables that laid out “the history of rulers,” which provided the positions of power that had been gained from services rendered, and evidence of “services to the state” which legitimized monarchical power. Moreover, the longevity of such services proved their worthiness. Indeed, for Garibay, genealogy formed the core of history, and he stressed that any student of history had to master the generations of great and royal families, especially if he was to understand, justify, and legitimize current actions in imperial matters, thereby displaying his diplomatic antiquarian concerns. Thus, genealogy became a critical method, a key to “truth”—or at least a rigorous introduction to the complex ways in which Providence had blessed monarchies and their states with healthy heirs, and how they, in turn, survived or failed, and upon which claims to precedence legitimacy and authority through rights and privileges could be made.

It is with such considerations in mind that we must position our assessment of Garibay’s Ilustraciones Genealógicas. Garibay’s work, however, differed substantially from what came before it, as his work provided a substantiated genealogy through the multiple and layered connections he sought to establish, and his extensive use and referencing of the sources he had used to establish these claims and thus, provided a “true” genealogical history of the two Crowns. This had political importance, for as Garibay wrote in his Preface: “Thanks to this

60 Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealóigicas, Prólogo al lector.
history [Garibay specifically calls his genealogy a “history”] we are now able to know the antiquity of lineages, the possession and rights to things, and the origins of peoples, their kingdoms and their lands.”61 Indeed, Garibay’s work would solidify Spain’s claims to privilege, status, influence, and precedence, and defended Spain’s dynastic claims to, and ties with, France.

To accomplish his task, Garibay was given a huge number of sources from which to draw and write his work.62 Garibay made mention of how Philip had given him two French works on French genealogy and an unnamed work by Bernardino de Mendoza, Philip’s ambassador to France, on which to base his genealogy.63 Significantly, Garibay was specifically given a work drawn together by Juan de Idiáquez himself called the Memoria sobre Sucesión (1589) [A Record on Succession], which provided a condensed version of the political arguments provided for Isabela’s superiority in the dynastic contest and the arguments made against Salic Law in the works of Ribera, Barbosa, and Zapata, mentioned above. The intention of Idiáquez’s work, as he wrote to Garibay, was not only to show the legitimacy of female succession in France, but also the “just and reasoned right to the French throne,” based in the antiquity, nobility, and support of the Catholic cause by the Spanish Monarchy, and thus the political bases for dynastic legitimacy.64 That Garibay was given this text by Idiáquez, and mentions it in his Prologue, is testament to the political nature of his work. His work must be seen as something more than a

61 Emphasis mine. “Gracias a esta historia se pueden conocer las antigüedades de los linajes, la posesión y derecho de las cosas, y los orígenes de las gentes, reinos y pueblos.” Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealógicas, Preface.
62 Garibay wrote to the Infanta Isabel requesting that she send him documents pertinent to matter of the French succession for his review: “Para que nuestro señor (el rey) será servido . . . y porque pueda manifestar esto, con documentos de mayor diligencia, suplico a (V.S. llma – vuestra señora) me haga las mismas, con mandar satisfacer a los puntos que pido, en el memorial que será con esta, y puesto el caso que no dudo en todos, deseo mucho certificarme de ellos mejor.” BNM Ms/ 1750, fols. 469–480 (in Varios attached).
63 In addition, Philip personally requested that Bernardino de Mendoza provide Garibay with additional French works on genealogy. AGS, Estado, K–1448.
64 “justo y razonado derecho, al trono Frances.” AGS, Estado, K–1594, n° 14 and 22.
mere genealogy, but rather a “new” history, in line with the politic history of the counter-history project.

To the basic genealogical claims being made by the Crown, Garibay, however, added his own extensive research and investigations. In 350 pages, Garibay provided a work that included 130 schematics in the form of elaborate genealogical trees, along with brief descriptions, and the sources from which each tree was derived. Garibay presented his trees in full-page plates, sometimes in extra-long formats, with some requiring that they be unfolded multiple times by the reader. A full-page plate was devoted to each line and even to individual kings. These elaborate trees provided an ideal medium to display the “greatness” of these lines, and included ornamentation, elaborate trunks of trees, and naturalistic details. Further, depictions of the different kinds of Crowns and heraldic and royal shields also provided an additional impressive array of “historical” material linking reign to reign.

Garibay’s genealogical trees covered,

From the end of the Goths, until the complete restoration of the ancient union, through Philip our lord, divided in 11 lines, up to his serene highnesses his children . . . Of the three lineages of the Royal monarchy of the most Christian Kings of France, until your Highnesses . . . But also of the lives of the Catholic confessors which united the two realms; Saint Arnulf . . .; Saint Begga, Duchess of Brabant and mother and founder of the Beguines in Flanders; Saint Charlemagne, Emperor and King of France; Saint William, Count of Pontoise, who became a hermit and founded the Order of Saint Augustine; Saint Louis, King of France . . .; Saint Isabel queen of Portugal and Infanta of Aragon; Saint Malcolm and Saint Margaret his wife, Kings of Scotland; as well as the days on which to celebrate their holy feast, will be presented in the last tree of this book.65

65 “. . . Sant Arnulpho, Señor de Mofellana, y después de viudo, Obispo de Metz de Lorena; Sancta Begha, intitulada Duquesa de Brabant, madre y origen de las religiosas, llamadas Beginas por ella en los estados de
Thus, Garibay not only linked the two royal houses, but also linked them through their joined ties to Catholicism and Christianity. Garibay knew that one of the principal components of Spanish identity that appealed to French Catholics was the strong ties of Spain and its monarchy to Catholicism and the Catholic Church. Garibay, therefore, also provided a “genealogy” of the early bishops and saints of Spain, starting from the formative centuries of Spanish Christendom. Further, for Garibay, the Catholic Church and its patronage had also united and “civilized” the two Crowns and their communities and had helped ensure that justice and protection of privileges were exercised by both Crowns.

Garibay wanted to show the greatness of the parentage of the Spanish Monarchy, as he knew that such a genealogical history represented a sort of political testament for Philip and his heirs, especially Isabela. Moreover, for the Spanish Monarchy itself, Garibay stated that he sought to provide a genealogy that accounted for the 300 years after the end of the Goths.66 More importantly, he sought to link the Spanish and French Crowns conclusively by bringing to light “the many lines which have been ignored, or lost to time.”67 Garibay, therefore, presented a “community of relatives” (comunidad de parientes) between the two houses, creating a model for a community based in a common parentage. This, of course, had an ultimate purpose: “Now, while in sect and law, customs and regions, there is difference and distance between us, we are

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66 In a single chart Garibay provided the successive lines of Catholic Kings beginning after the decline and end of the Goth kings and starting with Fauila, Duke of Cantabria and son of Don Pelayo, the first King of Asturias whose reign began in 716 and ended in 735. He then listed the successive Kings and Dukes of the Lines of Cantabria, Oviedo, Leon and Castile, up until Philip II and his progeny.

67 Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealógicas, 2.
all of one blood and substance, all extracted from the House of Troy. Garibay’s aim, therefore, was to show a superiority of lineage of the two Crowns. Links to Roman emperors, to Charlemagne, to classical origins and kinship to “the Ancients” were commonplace claims with which Renaissance humanists elevated their own society. Garibay was no different, but here he created such links through blood descent. Moreover, the underlying conviction for Garibay was that a political entity with shared origins would be expressed properly when it returned to its original unity. Indeed, the empire of Charlemagne provided an imposing proof of how much glory could be drawn from unity. Garibay thus offered a bright promise of France’s rebirth in glory if it united with Spain, as its real political situation would again be in harmony with its origins. Furthermore, Garibay not only demonstrated these common origins, but how the two houses had been forever intricately intertwined through successive marriages.

Garibay, therefore, provided an evidence-based genealogy that demonstrated the connections between the two houses, linking them on various levels, and through multiple and successive lines. Garibay provided over thirty genealogical lines to demonstrate how he believed that the Spanish Crown could directly claim a connection to the French Crown through four direct lines, including the noble lines of the “holy confessors of the Catholic Church,” which “had brought forth the saints, like Charlemagne as well as the founder of the Beguines, and the founder of the hermits.” When linking Spain to the kings of France, Garibay also provided genealogical charts for six separate lines of the kings of France: “Including those for all fifteen

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68 Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealógicas, 2.
69 José Antonio Maravall, Antiguos y modernos: La idea de progreso en el desarrollo inicial de una sociedad (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1966), 502–503. Moreover, such claims to origins, and especially the claim to the legacy of the Roman Empire, not only glorified, but had been used to legitimate Spanish conquest and expansion, especially in the New World.
male descendants of Hugh Capet,” linking each not only to Philip, but directly to Isabel of Valois, the third wife of Philip, and mother of the current Isabela, therefore, linking the princess through both her mother and her father to prove her precedence.\(^71\) Thus, when it came to the French royal house, he wrote:

I have provided, in the form of a tree, a genealogical line of all of the Kings of France, progenitors of our Lady the Infanta Doña Isabela, from King Louis Capet, who began the third masculine line of his royal house . . . so that Your Majesty may see how, through her, on the part of her mother, Queen Isabel, our Lady of good memory . . . is progenitor of the royal house of France and the [united kinship] of its royal Crown, and now that the royal blood of the House of Valois is finished, how she [Isabela] is the greatest of that Kingdom. I also demonstrated the first time that the French used the Salic Law, and all the other four times that they used it, showing that it has only been five.\(^72\) I [have] also demonstrated your Majesty’s line and right to the Duchy of Brittany, by your great-grandmother Madame Claudia, proprietary Duchess of Brittany and Queen of France, the first wife of King Francis the First, your great-grandfather.\(^73\)

Garibay, therefore, not only cemented the dynastic ties between the two Crowns, and Isabela’s right to the French Crown, he also sought to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the French Salic Law as a fundamental law of the French kingdom, thus dispelling any notion that Isabela could not ascend the French throne. In the tree for the Royal French line, a caption in a circle appears above Philippe V’s (r.1316-1322) name, which reads: “First inventor of Salic Law, 1315”

\(^71\) Genealogical tree number 63 provides a five page tree (folding out), all in a straight line, of the direct descendants of the King of France, Hugh Capet (ca. 987). Garibay presented thirty direct descendants from Capet to Henry III. Isabel of Valois (Philip’s third wife and mother of his daughter Isabela), was presented as the thirtieth descendant, immediately after Henry III. Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealógicas, 159.

\(^72\) “compuse en forma de árbol una línea de todos los Reyes de Francia progenitores de la señora Infanta Doña Isabel desde el Rey Hugo Capeto, en quien comenzó la tercero línea masculina de su corona real . . . para que Su Alteza viese por su línea de la parte de la Reyna su madre Dona Isabel nuestra Señora de buena memoria . . . mostrando por él como era primogénita de la casa real de Francia y la deuda mas conjunta de su corona real, y que acabada la sangre real masculina de Valoes [Valois], era ella la mayor della en aquel reyno. Señaléle tambien el tiempo que la primera vez usaron los franceses de su ley Sálica y todas las otras cuatro veces que la repitieron, mostrando como por todas han sido cinco. Apuntélé tambien su línea y derecho del ducado de Bretaña, y por su visabuela madama Claudia duquesa propietaria de Bretaña y Reyna de Francia, muger primera del Rey Francisco el primero su visabuelo.” Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealógicas, 10.
(Primer inventor de la ley Salica, 1315), and above Philippe VI (r. 1328-1350), the thirteenth king of France after Capet, Garibay writes, “the third author of Salic Law, 1328” (autor tercero de la ley salica, 1328). By indicating through these captions that the Salic law was first utilized in 1315, and thus, that it had not originated with the Franks as French jurists had claimed, and that it had only been invoked four more times after that in French history, Garibay explained that it should not be deemed, nor had it become a fundamental law of the kingdom. Moreover, by providing the proponents of and actual dates for when the Salic Law had been “invented” and invoked, he sought to demonstrate how it was only an occasionally used rule and, thus, was not customary.

Garibay explicitly told the reader how he had gone about making his claims of lineage, and how he had traced descent. For example, to tie the Portuguese Crown to Spain, he wrote that “they were united through Charlemagne,” following the line of the Lorraine’s (Lorena), and described it as follows:

For this, I took as its origins, the glorious Emperor Charlemagne, King of France, Germany and Italy, and under him the counts of Flanders, and from them the Lords and counts of Guises and Bologna in Picardy, and from them the Dukes of Lorraine, by the male line, and from them to Don Henrique, Count of Portugal, and father to Don Afonso Henriques, the first King of Portugal, all proven by great authorities. . . It was necessary to demonstrate in this brief account, how Don Henrique was [great-great-great nephew] to Godfrey of Bouillon, the first Western King of the Holy City of Jerusalem . . . Thus I have created in the same tract, another brief discourse on all of the Western Kings of that most Holy City [Jerusalem], and all of its successors, demonstrating the reason why the Kings of Naples have called themselves Kings of that city.

74 Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealógicas, 159
75 “Para esto tomé yo en él su origen del glorioso Emperador Sancto Carlos Magno Rey de Francia y de Alemania é Italia, y del baxé á los condes de Flandes, y dellos á los señores y condes de Guines y Bolonia en Picardia, y dellos á los duques de Lorena por linea masculina, y dellos á Don Henrique conde de Portugal padre de Don Alonso Henriquez primer Rey de Portugal, probándolo por autores graves . . . Fué necesario mostrar en este breve discurso
Garibay’s work, therefore, had larger ideological aspirations. Not only did he explain how he used Charlemagne to link the Crowns of Portugal, France, and Germany to Spain, he also linked both the Houses of Spain and France to the kings of Jerusalem.

Demonstrating his methodology had a second purpose. Under the political circumstances in which Spain found itself, emphasizing a dynastic history that sought to supplement its claims on various levels and through numerous lines allowed Garibay to provide multiple statements of preeminence that could be made over other families, lands, and nations, through both dynastic and imperial heritage. Garibay envisioned genealogy as a buttress for the historical legitimacy of the Spanish empire, as well as any future advancements. He also set out, like a good critical humanist, to completely discredit some of the multiple fantastic lineages that his predecessors had created for the various European noble houses. Garibay did not go back to a mythical past, as did genealogies before him. Instead he went back directly to traceable ancestors like Hugh Capet, Charlemagne, and Godfrey of Bouillon. “Vanity” he pointed out, had “always fostered genealogical invention.”

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to be sure, everyone in a position of political or cultural power knew of the power of family histories. But Garibay’s defense of genealogy as the foremost form of historical knowledge had additional significance. Indeed wider developments in historical practice had shaped much of Garibay’s views. Fantastic genealogies que el dicho conde Don Henrique fué sobrino[sic] de Godofre de Bullon, rey primero occidental de la sancta ciudad de Hierusalen, hijo de su hermano menor Guillelmo duque de Lorena, y por esto ordené en el mismo tratado otro breve discurso de todos los reyes occidentales de aquella sancta ciudad sucesores suyos, mostrando la razón por que despues los reyes de Nápoles se han intitulado reyes della.” Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealógicas , 9. Garibay also linked the Kings of Spain and France to the Kings/Emperors of Constantinople through six successive lines, all tying and linking Philip and his progeny (and thus Isabela and Spain) to the Greeks and the ‘Orient.’

76 Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealógicas, 2.
blossomed across mid-sixteenth-century Spain and Europe as never before, and influential scholars competed to draw them up. Annius of Viterbo was only the first among a long list of scholars who lent their talents to devise long fake genealogical tables that traced the people of Europe back to noble ancestors, boldly inventing where the blank spots appeared on the record.77

Moreover, as Roberto Bizzocchi points out, genealogical fantasies flourished in the courts of the Holy Roman Empire.78 Garibay, however, specifically did not go back to fable: he did not want to be seen as a credulous laughing stock in an age of criticism. Instead, he set out as a good critical humanist, to shred some of the fantastic lineages that other more sycophantic scholars had spun for their noble patrons. Garibay was careful to point out that he had to not allowed his art to be distorted by such pressures. Instead, following Ambrosio Morales, Garibay set out to examine modern ways of studying the past, when records were lost, or things had been omitted.79 Morales had been disappointed with the lack of records on Spain’s most remote antiquity, and claimed that one could only begin to write history when one possessed evidence, and where he could not find evidence in Roman records, he had looked instead to material evidence.80

Similarly, Garibay would use heraldic devices and shields to fill in genealogical gaps. Indeed, the reason for why Garibay did not go back to any mythical descendants was made clear in his treatises, seen in Chapter Two, where he had written that he believed that due to the lack of textual and material evidence, one could only write a complete genealogy, or even Spanish history, starting with the Romans and not before.81 Garibay dismissed more remote antiquity as a useful field of historical study as it lacked tangible evidence.

77 Anthony Grafton, What was History? The Art of History in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 149.
80 Ambrosio de Morales, “Apuntes sobre la historia” (1585), PR (Madrid) II/ 2245.
81 Esteban de Garibay, “De la utilidad de la historia” BNM Ms/ 1750, fols. 469–480.
Garibay, therefore, stressed in his Introduction that to come to the truth had not been easy, and how he had found it necessary “to examine and compare ancient and modern histories that dealt with these issues which are diverse, and differ on certain things, . . . this caused me great confusion, [and I found it necessary to look at] many ancient historic sources and even modern ones who have not yet seen the illustrious artifice of impression [so manuscripts].” 82

Immediately after this statement, Garibay listed the main sources, which included twenty-three contemporary and late medieval authors, as well as the unpublished “ancient” records that he had used to come to his primary conclusions.83 Most importantly, he substantiated every one of his

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82 “Fue necesario bien examinar y cotejar las historias antiguas y modernas que desto tratan que son diversas y en algunas cosas diferentes, que me ponían en confusión . . . [y] muchos históricos antiguos, y modernos que aún no eran llegados al ilustrísimo artificio de la impresión.” Garibay, *Ilustraciones Genealógicas*, 2.

83 While providing references to their works throughout, Garibay even directly provides an additional list of the authors of his primary published sources, even mentioning what he had used them for:

“Juan Bono Sicilian ([which I used for] his account of the House of Austria)
Gerardo de Roo (for the House of Austria)
Juan Cuspiniano (for the House of Austria)
Hieronimo Geuulier (for the Houses of Hungary and Bohemia)
Pedro Marenio, the Apostolic notary (for the lines between Charlemagne and Charles V, and of Don Fernando, Emperor of the Romans)
Roberto Gaguino (for the French line),
Paulo Emilio Veronense [Paul Emile] (for the French line)
Juan Tilio, Papirio Mason, and Matheo Zampino (for the origins and progeny of the lines of Hugh Capet)
Clemente Baudin (for the French line)
Francisco de Belleforest (for his universal genealogy and geography of the world)
Philippe Comines (for the French line) It should be noted that Madera also used Pedro de Agullon’s translation of Philippe Comines’s work: Pedro de Aguilon, *Historia del Duque Carlos de Borgoña, bisabuelo del Emperador Carlos Quinto* (Pamplona, 1586).]
Guillermo and Claudio Paradin
Iacobo Meyero (for his account of the Counts of Flanders)
Cornelio Martin Zelandes (for the sucessions of the Counts of Flanders and Holland)
Philiberto Pingonio (for his tree of the Houses of Saxony and Savoy)
Juan Nauclero
Eginharto
Antonio Bonfino (for his history of England)
Polidor Virgilio (for his history of England)
Pedro Mexia, Juan Cristobal Calvete de Estrella, and Don Rodrigo Zapata (for the Spanish lines).”

Garibay, *Ilustraciones Genealógicas*, 14–15. This referred to among others: Gerard de Roo, *Annales rerum belli domique ab Austriaciis Habsburgicae gentis principibus, à Rudolpho primo, usque ad Carolum V. gestarum* (1589); Johannes Cuspinianus, *Austria . . . cum omnibus eiusdem marchionibus, ducibus, archiducibus, ac rebus praecellere ad haec usque temporae ab iidem gestis ...* (1554); Pietro Marenio, *Compendio della stirpe di Carlo Magno et Carlo V., imperatori ; nel quale si comprende la variatione di fortuna ; li mutamenti ne i regni ; & altri grandissimi accidenti che nel mondo sono occorsi ; da Noe insino à l’età nostra...* (1545); Robert Gaguin, *Compendium de origine et gestis Francorum* (1497); Paolo Emili, *De Rebus Gestis Francorvm*, 10 Vols. (1500-1547); Jean Du Tillet,
genealogical trees by providing the sources he had used. Garibay’s critical remarks about his procedures for sifting through evidence were not mere pedantry. He saw his work as more than bulwark against the fantasies of scholars seeking favor or of deluded heralds. He claimed that the ways in which he had conducted his scholarship made it a vital center for history. Garibay’s zeal matters here. He saw genealogy as a profound form of historical thought, one that in itself offered vital charters for rulers and institutions.

Garibay acknowledged that many records of Spain’s ancient past had been lost to time and decay, yet he stressed that “the historian must not allow his art to be distorted by such pressures . . . so as to create records, and lineages where there are none.” Instead, to help him resolve such problems, Garibay emphasized that he had examined ancient precedents for modern ways of studying the past. For Garibay, the ancients had sought to examine records personally and he attempted to follow their lead by immersing himself in the study of genealogy, and requesting access to the archives to review royal genealogical charts. Moreover, Garibay drew upon his own methodological understanding, as well as those methodological precedents set out by other Spanish historians discussed in Chapter Two, as he attempted his critical sorting of

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84 Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealógicas, 2.
ancient and modern family trees. Garibay even cited numismatic evidence for his “correct spelling” of various names of Visigothic kings.  

Garibay’s discussion of his attention to methodology when composing his *Ilustraciones Genealógicas* was not a mere pronouncement. Throughout the document, Garibay concentrated on giving evidence or “proof” (*pruebas*) to support his genealogies and stressed that, despite the fact that his descriptions of his schematics were brief and succinct, “they were produced in a substantial way.”86 In his preface he stressed the variety of historical evidence, including manuscripts, documents, and chronicles that he had used, and even included his use of material evidence such as marble inscriptions and coins.87 Garibay even wrote about the efforts he had undertaken to complete his work: how he had travelled to France and Flanders, and throughout Spain to see genealogical records first hand. More importantly, alongside his schematics and appended to each genealogical chart, Garibay provided the precise sources he had used to obtain his genealogical records.88 Thus he clearly provided substantiated genealogies, which

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85 For example, Garibay used as sources portraits and diagrams of successions, and martyrologies and indices of Saints. Garibay further commented upon how he had also used a work on heraldry by Pedro Mexía, BNM Ms/ 7864, fol. 3.

86 “siempre de manera suscinto y sustancial para tanta brevedad.” Garibay, *Ilustraciones Genealógicas*, 2. Garibay had written extensively on the methodology to be followed when specifically composing genealogies. For instance when describing how he had gone about writing on the lineage of the House of Mendoza, one of the most noble families in Spain, he wrote about the questions he had followed and how he had began his investigations, and emphasized how these were methods that could be followed by others: “Qué rey, y en qué lugar y fecha, y ante qué secretario otorgó al facultad real para su vínculo a Pedro González de Mendoza; lugar, día y año y escribano ante los que se constituyó el vínculo; y ante los que ha ido creciendo los vínculos: estas preguntas le servirán para ir a la documentación original notarial . . . Qué promogénto de esa casa se dio el primer título de conde de Saldaña y en qué día, año y ante qué secretario . . . lugar, día y año de nacimiento.” RB, Folio Garibay, Osuna, 1976, 42–I. This document is indexed separately, within Garibay’s file. Garibay had also written a tract on the proper way to construct genealogies using his own family as example. See “Memorias de Garibay” in *Memorial Histórico Español*, 7: 579–626.


88 For example, for chart 130, he specified that he had used: “Francisco Rofiers (or Rosiers), from his *History of the House of Lorraine*, Nicolao Clemente Treleo and his epigrams of the same House, Juan Nauclero and his *Chronica*, Juan Leslao and his history of Scotland, Polidor Virgilio and his history of England, Claudio Paradin and his *Genealogies*, Juan Molano Louaniense and his additions to the Holy Martyrology of both 1568 and 1573 . . . and the *Indiculo* of the Saints of Belgio (which are the states of Flanders).” Garibay, *Ilustraciones Genealógicas*, 270.
demonstrated that they were based in both ancient and contemporary, as well as foreign and domestic, sources. Garibay did not shy away from his use of contemporary sources and directly mentioned those he drew from, including the work of his fellow official historians, including Lucio Marineo Sículo, Morales, Florián de Ocampo, and other contemporary historians, like Antón Bueter. Garibay even provided a three page, single-spaced, small font list at the end of his work of all of the sources he had considered when composing *Ilustraciones Genealógicas*, including foreign authors. In addition, for every chart, Garibay acknowledged those friends and fellow scholars who had sent him materials, “originals” as he called them, which had provided him with additional details. Such acknowledgements demonstrate more than just courtesy; they also reaffirmed that his work represented more than an individual achievement, thus providing additional authority to his work, as it was bolstered by all those scholars who had aided him in his enterprise. In particular, Garibay included how he had drawn from the work of Dr. Antonio Gomez, a professor at Salamanca, whose antiquarian investigations and extensive research for his “genealogy of the House of Austria,” had established, as did Garibay, that Philip’s ancestors included Constantine the Great as well as several members of Rome’s Colonna family. On this very matter, Garibay added how he had personally been given by Philip the *Annales* of Gerardo De Roo, on the House of Austria and Germany [the *Annales rerum ab austriacis principibus*](#)
gestarum, a Rudolpho I ad Carolum V, Gerardo de Roo auctore (Eniponti, 1592), and cited this work on several occasions within his text. Garibay, however, was quite critical of Roo’s work, and even wrote to Philip on the misgivings he had with some of Roo’s findings. Garibay challenged Roo’s work’s veracity, or at least its integrity, by pointing out some fundamental genealogical and chronological errors.

Such reference to source evaluation and critical appraisal of claims was typical of Garibay’s scholarship and the fact that he carried over such investigations to his genealogy and that he made explicit mention of his critical studies, both in the work’s introduction, as well as in the numerous letters he sent to members at court who were to read this work, elaborates upon the importance that such methodological thoroughness provided for the validity of his work and the legitimacy of its claims. Moreover, Garibay wrote to Moura “of the great diligence I have taken in making such a wide variety of findings, as is customary when dealing with these kinds of materials.” In this he meant the procedures being used by antiquarians, philologists and heralds, thus bringing their “customary” techniques directly to his work.

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91 Garibay, *Ilustraciones Genealógicas*, 293. Indeed, Garibay insisted on citing an author every time he used it. For example, Claudio Paradin and his *Genealogia*, Juan Tillet and his writings on the royal House of France, Ponto Heutero, and Thomas Cormero Alenconio are all cited on pages 250, 252, 254, 256, 302, among others.

92 Garibay pointed to how within Roo’s work there were slight differences which had greatly confused him, and that he brought these directly to Philip’s attention stating: “I looked at these Annals, and particularly at the point that [His Majesty] showed to me about [the genealogy of] his great-grandfather the Emperor Maximillian, Archduke of Austria . . . eight days later, I [attempted to see] His Majesty in Madrid, telling him what I had found on these matters. I found that many of the Habsburg court, progenitors of the House of Austria, defer from the most accepted position . . . especially that of the great [genealogical] tree that [His Majesty] holds in the Great Library of San Lorenzo [Escorial], and I laid out on paper both opinions, and left it for [the King], so that he could review them carefully.” (Vi los dichos Annales y particularmente un punto que me señalo en ellos en la vida de su bisabuelo el Emperador Maximilliano archiduque de Austria . . . [ocho días después] se los torné á Su Majestad en Madrid, haziéndole relacion dellos y particularmente de un punto. Y porque en los condes de Habsburg, progenitores de los duques de Austria, diferia en mucho de la opinión mas recibida, en especial del árbol que dellos tiene Su Majestad en la gran libreria se Sanct Lorenço el Real, puse en un papel ambas opiniones y se las dexé para que las viese de espacio.) Garibay, “Memorias de Garibay,” in *Memorial Histórico Español*, 7: 593.

So adamant was Garibay that he had been thorough in his investigations and that he had ensured his impartiality when writing about such illustrious things, that in his Preface he stated that he also intended to publish a second part to his work, in which he would include a further list of his sources, and which would include reproductions of the inscriptions he had used. In fact, even a simple perusal of these sources demonstrates that Garibay did indeed use them. These texts and materials, of course, were selective, and strongly supported his genealogical links, but he brought so many together, that this alone makes his work significant. Moreover, as demonstrated by his comments about Roo, Garibay even pointed out where his views differed from some of these sources. Garibay stressed that he had written his work with higher principles in mind: “As a loyal son of the Holy Apostolic Church, I confirm that this work is written with due reverence and humility.” This reaffirmed that he had been faithful both to his own beliefs and his religiously minded humanist discipline, but also to the ideals of the Crown, and especially to the political and religious significance of the genealogies that he composed.

The true value of Garibay’s work, therefore, lay in how his work conformed to both the needs and demands of the Crown, and Garibay’s own understanding of antiquarian and humanist method and purpose. The book bore Garibay’s erudite mark and used detailed documentary evidence, clear textual references, and citations of books and manuscripts in defense of his genealogical claims. Indeed, Garibay went to great lengths to show his use of primary documents

94 I have not been able to find any evidence of such a text, or whether he did produce this intended work. However, he might have found such a work redundant, especially after all of the detail and references he had already provided within, and at the end of, his Ilustraciones Genealógicas.

95 “con debida reuerencia y humildad.” Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealógicas, 2. Similarly, in a letter to Philip, Garibay wrote that he had sent the king a copy of his Ilustraciones Genealógicas, so that the King himself could judge whether he had included any “unworthy” things, and whether he had written his work with the required modesty: “Que Su Majestad la pueda ver y juzgar para que no se ponga en ella nada que no debe publicarse ni cosa que no sea muy digna de su grandeza y gravedad.” Garibay, “Memorias de Garibay,” in Memorial Histórico Español, 7: 231.
and verified sources, systematically practicing what his treatise, discussed in Chapter Two, had outlined. He had harnessed the changes in official history demanded by both the Crown and his fellow humanist official historians and brought these to the service of this particular question of succession and directly to the historiographical enterprise of genealogy.

Indeed, his critical remarks about the procedures for sifting through evidence, the methodologies he had taken and his obsessive citations must be seen in light of the task he had in front of him. Garibay saw his work as more than a bulwark against many of the fantasies presented previously by other scholars. He saw his work as a vital center of history. To bolster his ideas, therefore, Garibay presented alongside his genealogical charts detailed commentaries, or brief histories, providing a way to give his readers additional insight into the characteristics of the great men and women who had made history. Indeed, his comments presented before each genealogies, as well as his introductory pages, also represented an additional way to give readers insights into the characters of the great men and women who, by his account, made history happen, as well as what they had contributed through their “services to the state.” For example, in the pages before the tree of Philip’s direct line, Garibay included a brief synopsis of the king’s life, and mentioned the death of his father, his four marriages, and the heirs that resulted. Yet included alongside details of dates and places where events took place was mention of Philip’s upholding of the Catholic cause, a constant concern for justice, and his continuous demonstration of virtue. As Garibay wrote: “These heroic virtues are resplendent in the King, most notably in the course of his religious life, always affixed and close to the Royal heart, . . . such a great, grave and good example, for the edification of all princes of the World, his contemporaries and
for future rulers, as well as for the Christian people whom God has entrusted him with.”

Indeed, within his ‘Dedication to the King,’ Garibay stressed that his genealogy not only provided dynastic substantiation to Spain and its monarchy’s greatness, but also demonstrated, “the virtues [that] have always persisted in Your royal heart.” In this way, Garibay’s work also produced a dual effect. Not only could it be used to counteract such works as Mayernne’s, which claimed that the legacy of the Spanish Monarchy was not one devoted to God or its cause and thus not one devoted to the “common good,” but it could also be used to re-affirm Philip’s, and the Spanish Monarchy’s, role as “defender[s] of Catholicism” (*Defensor Fidei*). Therefore, by considering the two primary objectives of this work, to create verifiable and substantiated links for the two royal Houses (defined by methodological rigor and substantiation), proving Spanish titles and rights, and to demonstrate the piety and virtues which had constantly underpinned Spanish rule, and continued to define Philip’s Christian reason of state purposes in France, we come to understand the greater political implications of Garibay’s work and how he sought to bolster Spanish claims through genealogy.

For the Spanish Crown, however, it was the scholarship and erudition that Garibay had used when writing his work that made the claims that it provided so politically useful. In the printed edition of *Ilustraciones Genealógicas* the frontispiece included a portrait of Garibay with the Latin inscription *IN LABORE QUIES* [REST IN LABOR], undoubtedly a reference to the constant and never-ending diligence and scholarly activity the historian had undertaken to write this work for the Crown and the contemplative fulfillment he had received from doing so.

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96 “estats heroycas virtudes han resplandecido en el, notablemente en todo el curso de su religiosissima vida, estando siempre muy fixas y constants en su Real corazón, en mayor descargo de su Real ministerio, tan grande y grave, y buen exemplo y edificacion de todos los Principes del mundo sus contemporaneous y futures y del pueblo Cristiano que por Dios le esta encomendada.” Garibay, *Ilustraciones Genealógicas*, 9.

Indeed, Garibay had provided the substantiated and verifiable history that the Crown had envisioned and which was so necessary to supplement its claims. Moreover, as was customary, before the royal seal of approval be given for a book’s publication, the Royal Council (Consejo Real) had asked three of the greatest scholars and ecclesiastic antiquarians of the day to review Garibay’s Ilustraciones Genealógicas, to judge whether it merited publication. These included the Jesuit and noted jurist, Juan De Mariana; Doctor Luis de Castilla, who was archdeacon and canonigo of Cuêca and visitador to the State of Milan; and Doctor Benito Arias Montano, abbot of Santiago and ‘capellan of the Catholic King.’ Significantly, the entirety of their assessments as to the work’s historical accuracy and content were included at the beginning of the work as testament to its quality, something not normally seen at the beginning of genealogies. Moreover, although praising the learning and intelligence of official historians was customary of the time, it is highly significant that in these approbations it was the quality of Garibay’s scholarship that was lauded most vigorously. Indeed, so taken were these men with the value and merit of this work, all three men unquestionably agreed on the work’s erudition.98 Mariana wrote:

> I have seen under order of the Royal Council the Ilustraciones Genealógicas of Esteban de Garibay, Chronicler of our King, and I judge that it should be printed, for I have seen nothing in it which is against the Faith, nor against our good customs, or that which might cause a scandal in government. Moreover, the author should be lauded and remunerated for his efforts, and great diligence, carefulness, and provision of truth that he has provided in all of this work, and for the

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98 Doctor Luis de Castilla wrote that he approved the work, as it not only brought to light, through great diligence “many forgotten antiquities” (“las antiguedades muy olvidadas”), but that it was a work “of much doctrine and erudition” (“de mucho doctrina y erudicion”) and remarked upon, “the great diligence and zeal of its author” (“la mucha diligencia y zelo de su autor”). Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealógicas, 3.
tremendous amount of effort it has taken him, and the many works that he has scoured, to trace the antiquity of things which have been forgotten, and the great zeal with which he has demonstrated to the service of Your Majesty, and to the common good, and because I find it to be so, I sign my name in Toledo, on the twenty seventh of March of the year 1595.99

Montano wrote that there was a great need for what Garibay revealed, and that it should be brought to light with much haste, as it provided vital information “of our Kingdoms and seigniories of the greatest and important part of all of Christianity,” and that “many Imperial and Royal Crowns are interested in this work, as well as archduchies, duchies, condals, marchionals, and other great states.”100 What impressed Montano the most about the work was its diligence, and its use of new source-based forms of authority as a way to supplement political claims.

Evidence suggests that the King himself realized the political power and potential of this work, since, after being presented a copy of this work in late June of 1594, Philip II requested that Garibay deliver a copy to Isabela (the Infanta) and Prince Philip, and that a copy also be provided to Moura.101 Philip II also requested that a copy be sent to Cardinal Alberto, archduke of Austria, the king’s cousin; it arrived only 18 days after it was first delivered to the Spanish king. Isabela was also taken by this work and she also requested that a copy be sent to her sister,

99 “He visto por orden del Consejo Real las Ilustraciones Genealogicas . . de Esteban de Garibay, Cronista del Rey nuestro Señor, y juzgo que se deuen imprimir, por quanto no he visto en ella cosa alguna que sea contra la Fé, ni contra las buenas costumbres ni que pueda causar algun escandalo en el gobierno, antes el autor merece ser loado y remunerado, por la mucha diligencia, cuydado y verdad, de lo que ha usado en toda esta obra y el mucho trabajo y costa que en ella ha empleado, los muchos libros que ha rebuelto, para rastrear la antiquedad de cosas tan oluidadas, el mucho zelo que muestra al servicio de su Majestad, y al bien public: y porque lo siendo asi, di esta firmada de mi noombre en Toldeo, a veinte y siete de Março de 1595 anos.” Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealógicas, 3–4.

100 “de muchos Reynos y senorios de la mayor y major parte de toda Christianidad . . . eran interessados en ella muchas coronas Imperiales y Reales y tambien archducales ducales, comitales, marchionales y de otros grandes Estados.” Montano also wrote that one should laud this work because of its great work, diligence and for its uncovering of many forgotten things (“considerando su largo trabajo, y las cosas de su composition de muchos años como era necesario para inquirir y descubrissiye cosas tan olvidadas y remotas de la memoria de las gentes de nuestro siglo”). Garibay, Ilustraciones Genealógicas, 4.

101 Garibay, “Memorias de Garibay,” in Memorial Histórico Español, 7: 596. In addition, Garibay was to have met personally with Philip to discuss this genealogy and the legitimacy of the king’s right to the French throne. See Moya, Garibay historiador vasco, 173–174.
also daughter of Isabel of Valois, the Infanta Doña Catalina in Savoy. Garibay personally presented this copy to the Infanta Isabela in the presence of the King. Philip II and the Infanta clearly were not only impressed by this work, but realized its potential as a political tool to legitimize their intentions in France; the speed with which it had reached Austria further attests to the immediacy of its dissemination and how the Crown understood its usefulness as a means to bolster the Spanish effort to gain the French throne.\textsuperscript{102}

Garibay formulated his genealogy to provide the methodological substantiation necessary to “prove” dynastic (and religious) ties between the two Crowns, as well as his greater ideological claims to the nature and purpose of the Spanish Monarchy and its rule. This was precisely the sort of historical scholarship that the Spanish Crown needed to fend off foreign attacks, and defend their imperial claims. By settling the question of dynastic links, the validity of female succession by questioning the absoluteness of the Salic Law, the joint ties of the two Crowns to Catholicism, and the nobility and antiquity of the Spanish dynasty and its continued service to the Catholic cause, Garibay provided the Spanish Crown with a definitive account that they, and other Europeans monarchs, could use to defend Spanish intentions in France. Furthermore, by demonstrating how the two Crowns had always been united not only in blood, but also in a Catholic faith, Garibay presented the Catholicism of the French Monarchy as almost a fundamental law of the French kingdom.

\textsuperscript{102} For how Garibay’s work was seen by his contemporaries as serving to bolster the hereditary rights of Philip’s descendants to the French throne see, Julio Caro Baroja, \textit{Los vascos y la historia a traves de Garibay} (San Sebastian: Editorial Txertoa, 1972), 67, 86, 85, and 99.
On the frontispiece above Garibay’s portrait was written: “Portrait of the author whose zeal for the common good led him to finish this work.” Ultimately, therefore, it was the public good that most benefitted from his work and it was Garibay’s concern for and devotion to the public good which had led him to compose it. Garibay wanted to augment the intentions of the king and the Spanish Crown by providing a work which demonstrated how Spanish interests in France were to “ensure the true dynastic bloodline,” but also “to do everything possible with respect to the glory and service of God our Lord, the exaltation of the Roman Catholic Faith, and for the universal benefit of Christianity.” Therefore, Spanish actions in France were necessary for the common good, by ensuring the French Monarchy’s and France’s continued Catholicism. Moreover, the long “proven” history of Spanish kings and their “service to the state” and the Church made them the most worthy to take the French throne, and it ensured Spanish success, and thus, bolstered their cause.

**Gregorio López Madera and Establishing Spanish Precedence**

Despite Garibay’s historiographical accomplishments, the contest for France still raged and the Crown still needed to demonstrate why it was the most worthy of all of the European Crowns to take up this cause. In an effort to promote the greatness of the Spanish Monarchy and present a more laudatory portrait of Spain’s past than that provided by Spanish opponents and especially the work of Mayernne, Moura approached Gregorio López de Madera in 1589, requesting that he write a work that “demonstrate Spain’s illustrious history” and counter the

103 “Retrato del autor que con zelo del bien público acabo esta obra,” Garibay, *Ilustraciones Genealógicas*, Frontispiece.
attacks made by Mayernne, as this was particularly important “for the matters of France.”

While the exact date of this meeting is unknown, it is probably no coincidence that it occurred the same year as Henry III’s death, when Philip began to openly assert Spanish pre-eminence and insist that the French throne go to Isabela Clara Eugenia. What is certain is that the first manuscript of this work appeared in 1592 and that Madera received the royal seal of approval to publish his work in 1593; the work was first published in 1594, with a second edition in 1597, just as open war began with France, appearing as *Excelencias de la Monarquía y Reyno de España*.

Gregorio López de Madera (1562-1649), like Garibay, was another ideal man to take up the Crown’s cause through historical writing. A native of Madrid and the son of a famous military officer and physician to the royal court, Madera had decided at an early age to serve the Crown through the study of law and letters, studying both canon and civil law at the

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105 For mention of this meeting, see ‘Papeles Curiosos’ BNM Ms/ 13205 (h.130–140).
106 I use throughout the 1594 edition, the copy of which is found at the BNM 3/13703. Copies of its 1597 edition, printed in Valladolid by Diego Fernández de Cordoua, can be found both at the Real Biblioteca, V/1588, and the BNM R/17062. A copy of the 1594 publication is also found at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal), FOL–H–1394. It is worth noting that the Bibliothèque Nationale holds five copies of this work, ranging in dates from its 1594 publication to its 1625 edition, holding even more copies than the BNM. Further investigation as to when these works came to be included in the Bibliothèque Nationale collections and by whom would be valuable in furthering our understanding of the impact Madera’s works might have had in France itself. In Spain, Madera’s *Excelencias* would see, according to José Antonio Maravall, nine editions (including additional ones in 1601, 1620, and 1627, none of which I can find). It is unfortunate that no scholarly study exists on Madera’s *Excelencias*, in relation to the Spanish-French contest, nor Philippine historiography. The only scholarly overview of the *Excelencias*, is the ‘Introduction’ to an edition of the *Excelencias* by Bermejo Cabrero: Gregorio López Madera, *Excelencias de la monarquia y reino de España*, ed. José L. Bermejo Cabrero (Madrid: Centre de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1999), “Estudio preliminar,” ix–ixi. Considerable study has been done, however, on a chapter that Madera added to his later editions, “On the origins of the Spanish language – How Spanish came before Latin.” by linguists and philologists, who emphasize Madera’s views on the primordiality of the Castilian language. See especially Lucia Binotti, *La teoría del “castellano primitivo”: Nacionalismo y reflexión lingüística en el renacimiento español* (Munster: Nodus Publikationen, 1995).
107 There is still much to be known about Madera’s life and works. A brief biography and overview of his works is provided by José Antonio Martínez Torrez, and Enrique García Ballesteros, “Gregorio López Madera (1562-1649): Un jurista al servicio de la Corona,” *Torre de los Lujanes* 37 (Oct. 1998):163–178. Some debate has also occurred as to Madera’s date of birth, but Ballesteros and Torrez have clearly identified his year of birth as 1562, in Madrid. See Ballesteros and Torrez, “Una Historiografía en tiempos de Felipe II,” 152. Gregorio López de Madera is
Universities of Salamanca and Alcalá de Henares, and eventually becoming a royal litigator. In a
missive sent to Philip, Madera was described as “a well-learned man” (buen letrado) and “a
virtuous man” (hombre virtuoso). An accomplished jurist, Madera became well known for
Animadversionum iuris civilis, liber singularis (1586), a work that discussed the differences
between natural law and civil law, examined the rights of kings and subjects, and explored what
constituted just war. Further, Madera served as one of Philip’s “bureaucrats” (burócratas), as
judge of the House of Trade (Casa de Contratación) of Seville and later as Crown Attorney to
the Chancery of Granada. According to Idiáquez, it was through the various duties Madera
had performed, that he had developed the “experience” (experiencia) that the king demanded of
his burócratas, making him an ideal candidate to write the much-needed counter-history to
Mayernne’s Histoire Générale. Madera emphasized that his “enterprise” (empresa) in writing
this work was not “foreign” (ajena) to his condition of being a lawyer, since he was also trying
to establish, “the act[s] which provided the right” (el hecho para acomodarle el derecho) for the
Spanish to intervene in French affairs. Indeed, Madera directly brought his technical-juridical
style to his general history.

referred to by his Spanish contemporaries, like Ximénez Patón and Don Francisco de Quevedo, variously as
‘Madera’ and ‘López Madera.’
108 BR, Cartas Inéditas, 1268/45. For more official comments on Madera’s erudite “virtues” see AGI, Indiferente
General, leg. 741, ramo 4, n° 108, consulta dated September 10, 1586.
Further, Madera also wrote (ca. 1588-1589), Discurso sobre la justificación de los censos; and later, El principio de
jurar los Príncipes de España (Madrid, 1608). On this last work, see, Salustiano de Dios, “La doctrina sobre el
110 Among his many charges, Madera held both government and legal positions, including acting as a judge with
prosecutorial powers for Madrid. Eventually Madera gained a seat on the Council of Castile, becoming Counsellor
of Castilla (Consejero de Castilla), a position of great power. In addition, he attained one of the most prominent
positions at the Royal Court becoming a member of the Council of Castile, and Judge of the Royal House and Court
(although he went in and out of royal favor during the reign of Philip III, especially under Lerma, and, occasionally,
Olivares). On Madera and his role in the Council of Castile, see Janine Fayard, Les membres du Conseil de Castille
à l’époque moderne (1621-1746) (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1979). On Madera’s service to the Crown see, Ballesteros
111 Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468. One could argue that just like Herrera, Madera needs to be seen for the
entirety of his work, which ranged from law, to history, to religion, and that together they truly reflect the political
and ideological ideals of Philip’s reign.
Madera had also earned a reputation for his displays of erudition and, as Moura stated, he was a “lawyer who knew history, the parent of all sciences.” More importantly, Madera’s intellectual projects directly agreed with the ideals and efforts of the Crown. Significantly, Madera’s previous work had not only dealt with the intricacies of constitutions and laws, ancient privileges, the powers and role of the monarchy, he had also helped verify antiquities—all necessary elements in establishing historical legitimacy to actions and claims.

Madera's antiquarianism had already been triggered by his zeal to establish the authenticity of supposedly prophetic writings and saintly relics that had been recently uncovered in Granada, the famed Plomos of Sacromonte. His writings on these artifacts included his Reliquias y Prophecia que se auia hallado el año pasado en 1588 (1589) [On the Relics and Prophecy found last year in 1588], and his Discurso sobre las láminas, reliquias, y libros que se han descubierto en la ciudad de Granada este año de 1595 (1595) [On the Engravings, Relics and Books found in Granada this year of 1595]. In these works, Madera used his antiquarian knowledge to establish the primacy of Spanish Catholicism by showing that Granada was the site of the earliest Christian community in Europe. In fact, Madera wrote more on the writings and relics of San Cecilio, San Hiscio, and San Jesifón and about the authenticity of findings relating

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112 Moura, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468.
113 On the discovery of these relics, and on Madera’s, as well as Ambrosio de Morales’s accounts and assessments of them see A. Katie Harris, “Forging Identity: The Plomos of the Sacromonte and the Creation of Civic Identity in Early Modern Granada” (PhD diss., Department of History, Johns Hopkins University, 2000). See also, Thomas D. Kendrick, St. James in Spain (London: Methuen, 1960); and Julio Caro Baroja, Las falsificaciones de la Historia (en relación con las de España) (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1992), 49–150. It should be noted that, like Madera, the Papal Council too found the relics to be genuine; they would not be condemned as heretical forgeries until almost one hundred years later in 1682.
114 Madera also wrote two slightly later works which reiterated his prior thoughts on the relics, and their authenticity: Discursos de la certidumbre de las reliquias descubiertas en Granada en el año 1588 hasta el de 1598 (Granada, 1601), and Historia y discurso de la certidumbre de las Reliquias, Láminas y Prophecia descubiertas en el Monte Sacro y iglesia de Granada desde el año 1588 hasta 1598 (Granada, 1602). These two works were combined and translated into English appearing as, An account of the manuscripts and reliques found in the mountains of Granada from 1588 till 1598 (c. 1603?), later re-printed in Miscellaneous Tracts by Michael Geddes (London, 1702-1706).
to them, than any other Spanish writer. Madera had been quite critical of these findings, and although he accepted many of them, he did not accept all of them. In fact, his assessments of these matters was so thorough, they would be directly referred to by Herrera in his own treatises, as models of thorough antiquarian inquiry.

In the Introduction to *Excelencias*, and undoubtedly inspired by his legal training, Madera explicitly laid out the multiple purposes for his work. First, he sought to “set the record straight” in terms of Spain’s precedence especially since, “the precedence that all other [k]ingdoms owe Spain is in question.” Second, he saw it as necessary to write his work so that “others pay to Spain the debt which they owe both its sons and citizens.” The first was a reference to the fact that Spain held the utmost precedence in the territorial contest for France and for providing a legitimate heir to the French throne, while the second was an obvious reference to the aid (both financial and military) that Spain had given France in the Wars of Religion in helping them to defend the Catholic cause. Indeed, Madera stressed the long and continuous role that Spain had played in “defense of the faith,” for which he believed all other European countries needed to be grateful. Finally, the last reason for writing his work was that Madera sought to exalt Spain, which he thought was maligned by foreigners. Madera even proclaimed in his Introduction that

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115 See Ballesteros and Torres, “Una Historiografía,”151.
116 Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Primera parte de las varias epístolas, discursos y tractados de Antonio de Herrera a diuersos claros varones:* las cuales contienen muchas materias útiles para el gouierno político y militar; . . . y 23 discursos sobre: los derechos y costumbres de las Islas Canarias, sobre la defensa y seguridad de los reinos, sobre materia de estado, Tácito historiador, la virtud heróica, no provocar guerras, la feliz monarquia castellana, algunas virtudes de la vida civil, sobre personajes inventados por Viterbo, sobre el reino de los godos y coronación de los reyes de Castilla y León y sucesión, la cultura no es incompatible con la defensa militar, las ideas de los reyes a veces producen efectos contrarios, la Historia, el historiador y la prudencia, sobre qué es majestad, decoro y reputación, sobre la fe y la palabra, y un resumen de lo sucedido en el descubrimiento de las reliquias del Sacromonte de Granada conforme a lo que escribió Gregorio López de Madera. BNM Ms/6437.
118 “Que otros paguen a España esta deuda en que tan obligados están sus hijos y naturales.” Madera, *Excelencias*, Introduction.
not only did his work directly counter Mayernne’s, but that his work clarified those of “Jean Bodin, Stephan Forcatulo . . ., Charles Dumoulin . . . and Barthélemy Chasseneux,” whose accounts and views on Spanish history had not always been favorable. As Madera put it, these “foreigners have in many things, and on every occasion tried to take away our honor that to the Excellency of this Kingdom is due.” Therefore, Madera made quite clear in his Prologue that the purpose of his work in the French contest was to juxtapose the many falsehoods perpetrated by the French and Mayernne with the fundamental God-given justice of the Spanish cause, “to demonstrate to the world the Justifications that his [M]ajesty has for action, and to satisfy the calumnies and false imputations that the French have fabricated.” Madera, therefore, clearly understood that his work served a direct political purpose as a tool against Mayernne, but also was a means to legitimize and justify Spanish actions with regards to France.

Madera was aware that, if he could assert historical priority, then he could also establish political priority. He therefore sought to establish and prove the antiquity, purity of lineage, and historical continuity of the Spanish Monarchy throughout time, its nobility, its historical legacy of “good rule,” its Catholicism, and its continuous defense of the faith since the earliest Apostles. Significantly, these not only made the Spanish Monarchy the most worthy of all the European monarchs to lay claim to France, but were attributes that extended to the entire Spanish nation and its people. By recounting not only the history of the monarchy, but of Spanish religion, language, law, institutions, and churches, as well as many other aspects of Spanish culture,

120 “Los estranjeros en muchas cosas [ y] en todas ocasiones nos quieren quitar la honra que a la excelencia de este Reyno y Monarquia se debe.” Madera, Excelencias, Introduction.
121 “mostrar al mundo la justificacion del as acciones de S.M. y satisfazer a las calumnias y falsos ymputaciones q los franceces han fabricado.” Madera, Excelencias, Introduction.
Madera sought to provide evidence of all of the “privileges,” “liberties,” and accomplishments that gave definition to the monarchy. Madera, therefore, presented both the excellence of the Spanish Monarchy and of Spain as a function of its antiquity, unequalled by any other, except the Jewish nation. As a lawyer, however, Madera valued not only the antiquity but the continuous existence of the monarchy. Madera believed that legitimacy, like history itself, was a living thing, and remarked to Philip in his “Dedication to the King,” that his purpose was “to not attribute any new authority which is integrally the same as those exercised by [Your] predecessors, but to maintain and prove that it has existed at all times.”

For Madera, as we saw for Garibay, origins were vital, and constituted moments that continued to shape the essential nature of the Spanish Monarchy, illuminating its purpose. This nature would be carried into whatever actions the Spanish Monarchy would undertake, and would be taken into France to restore it to its purity and essence as a Catholic country. Establishing such origins, therefore, was a potential source of power available to the Spanish Monarchy, its institutions and its people, empowering them to take an active role in France. Origins provided a principle of coherence not only to restore a lost union between the Spanish and French Monarchy, as Garibay had shown, but a unity and coherence in faith. Moreover, Spain’s preservation of origins through the centuries was testament to the nobility of Spanish rule, and the way Spain had striven for the survival and continuity of Christianity in its purest form. Indeed, Madera created a vision of Spanish history that emphasized the formative role of the monarchy in the creation of a unitary—and Catholic—Spanish state. Thus, who better to restore Catholicism to France than the oldest continuing progenitors of the religion? Madera’s multiple “witnesses” to Spain’s antiquity, both in lineage and Christianity, affirmed the glory and

122 Madera, Excelencias, Dedicatoria al Rey.
restoration of the ancient Christian republic in its modern reincarnation and demonstrated a
Spain ready to help the French return to their purer form and help transform France’s history into
one of faith triumphant.123 Indeed, Madera wished to present Spaniards as not only loyal servants
of the Church and the primary military protectors of Christendom, but who recognized their role
in the larger Christian republic.

Indeed, the value of antiquity as a sign of legitimacy, and as a means to vest authority,
was prevalent throughout Europe, and the saying, “the old is always the best, and the best is the
oldest,” appeared in political and legal tracts across Europe.124 In the early modern period most
people held the assumption that the authority or legitimacy of a belief, practice, or institution,
increased in direct proportion to its longevity and antiquity.125 In this context, Madera’s
statement that, “foreigners claim we have no history,”126 and his intention to fill the supposed
“lacuna” (laguna) in Spanish historical writing that foreigners claimed existed had political
rather than historical connotations. These comments were not only a reference to the fact that
foreigners, especially Italians, saw Spaniards as uncivilized, descendants of barbarians, who
lacked a glorious historic past like Italy, but also referred to others, like the French, who claimed
that the Spaniards had no interest in writing about their past, and moreover, lacked the abilities to
produce any significant scholarship. Significantly, Mayernne claimed that, “the antiquities of the

123 In doing so, Madera provided his work with its own philosophy of history when it came to explaining the causes
of the greatness of Spain: “In the acquisition and conservation of all dominions, three things tend to concur: “God,
Prudence and Occasion, which all together are called Destiny . . These three causes have only been seen in the
Spanish Monarchy” (“En la adquisición y conservación de todo dominio suelen concurrir tres causas: Dios,
Prudencia y Occasion, que todas en conjunto son llamadas Destino . . Estas tres causas unánimemente concurrieron
en la Monarquía española”). Madera, Excelencias, Prólogo al lector.
124 Florimond de Raemond, from his History of Heresy (ca. 1570) as cited in Barbara Sher Tinsley, History and
125 See Daniel R. Woolf, “In Praise of Older Things: Notions of Age and Antiquity in Early Modern England,” in
Historians and Ideologues: Essays in Honor of Donald R. Kelley, eds. Anthony T. Grafton and John H. M. Salmon
126 “los extrangeros dicen que no tenemos historia.” Madera, Excelencias, Introduction.
Spanish nation are obscure and uncertain, and many writers thereof ignorant or negligent,” and that this had led many to believe that, “Spain had nothing notable in its antiquity.” This, of course, was a grave exaggeration, as there had been numerous works on Spain’s antiquity including those of Antonio de Nebrija and Lucio Marineo Sículo and the more recent work of Ambrosio de Morales, which were not only erudite and scholarly works, but which were known to have circulated across Europe. Madera understood, however, that because of this foreign misperception there was an immediate need to write a “newer” version of Spain’s past and a need for a complete history of Spain, to establish its legitimacy and prestige.

In their attempt to bolster an imperial vision of Spain, official historians had already begun to write a “history of Spain” which attested to its providential place in the sixteenth-century European power structure. These histories, which included Garibay’s Compendio, had lauded the achievements of Spain’s ancestors that served as proof positive of why they merited the privileged position they had in the world. In doing so, Spanish historians had not only glorified Spain’s past monarchs, but had created a more unified vision of Spain’s past, centered around the Spanish Monarchy and its achievements. Madera drew from, and built upon, these works, but he understood that his work served a larger historiographic purpose, for he emphasized that “we Spanish have failed [in the writing of history], for although we have accomplished feats worthy of the Greeks and Macedonians, crossing great seas, discovering

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127 Mayernne, Histoire générale d’Espagne, 5.
129 See the Introduction, above.
lands and continents, subjugating many countries, and acquiring a new world, we have failed to record these deeds in a worthy way.”\textsuperscript{131} Thus, while his work must be seen as part of these general histories, in this context we see how Madera’s work not only defended Spanish intentions, but also demonstrates an additional ideological purpose: to create an account more “worthy” of the importance and greatness of the Spanish Monarchy and their actions, than those of the historians who preceded him, and written in a more “worthy” way.

For Madera, what previous histories had failed to do, and what he saw as the primary responsibility of the historian, was to know the “character, nature, knowledge, customs, and ways of life of the entire republic, so that we [Spanish historians] unlike blind foreigners, [can provide] when necessary, a description of things in order to clarify history.”\textsuperscript{132} Madera believed that revealing the Spanish character as reflected in its historical origins and actions served an immediate political purpose. Indeed, for Madera “narrations of past events [are] useful for political deliberations,” a statement quite similar to Justus Lipsius’s phrase on the importance of history.\textsuperscript{133} Madera, therefore, explained the underlying intentions for his history, repeating Idiáquez’s intentions for counter-histories almost verbatim: “[M]y intention has been to serve Your Majesty, so that others may see the moderation and justice and imperial clemency of Your actions, and so that they can see the good ventures of Your Majesty and his justice and equity in

\textsuperscript{131} Emphasis mine. He continued, “España pues con haber tenido tantos de los primeros que con su sangre y muertes la han subido al colmo de poder y grandeça en la que vemos, no hay[sic] buena cuenta . . . han estado en falta los escritores de las hazañas, de las de sus reyes y capitanes.” Madera, \textit{Excelencias}, Introduction.

\textsuperscript{132} “su carácter, naturaleza, conocimientos, costumbres, y el modo de ser de la república entera, para que no parezcamos ciegos extranjeros cuando haya necesidad de hacer una descripción de estas cosas para clarificar la historia.” Madera, \textit{Excelencias}, Prologue.

\textsuperscript{133} Madera, \textit{Excelencias}, Prologue. Similarly, Justus Lipsius (1547-1606), had recommended that princes, like Philip, take advice from the past “as it is useful for political deliberations.” (Lipsius, \textit{Sixe Books of Politickes} (1589), I.19.) Madera’s work, however, was not a book of maxims, but rather looked at the totality of Spanish history and how this past could provide information vital for the current working of politics.
all he undertakes.” Madera sought to demonstrate such an understanding of the nature of Philip’s rule, and how it derived from the Spanish past. This was also crucial since Mayernne’s criticism of Spain’s past and the rule of previous Spanish monarchs implicitly undermined the legitimacy of Philip actions and intentions and by extension the power of the state, clearly undermining Spanish claims of superiority in the French contest.

Madera, therefore, aimed to demonstrate Spanish virtues and character through a history of Spain and its monarchy, and of Philip as the inheritor of this legacy. Madera’s history, therefore, was not a mere history of Spain. Its aim was “To show that the Spanish Monarchy is the most ancient in all of Europe, that no other can claim equal majesty, that Rome itself was less ancient, and that before and after it [Rome], at the same time its precursor and inheritor, Spain raised itself above all other nations, without possible competitor, as a queen, august in age and power.” Across Europe, in political and diplomatic contests, making claims to antiquity was a means to assert one monarchy’s precedence over another. Ultimately, based in notions of law, antiquity, and precedence, Madera sought to show the superiority of the Spanish Monarchy against all others and thereby cement Spanish pre-eminence.

To show the “excellencies” of the Spanish Monarchy above all the others of Europe, Madera provided a history of Spain from its origins to the present. Madera began his work with a brief discussion of the Aristotelian notion of how political organization was innate to man

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134 “mi intención ha sido servir a Su Majestad . . . que vean la moderación, justicia e imperial clemencia de Su ánimo. . . para que vean las buenas venturas de Su Majestad, su justicia, su equidad en todo.” Madera, Excelencias, Preface.
135 “demostrar que la Monarquía Española era la más antigua de Europa, que ninguna podría pretender una igual majestad, que Roma misma era menos antigua y que antes y después de ella, a la vez precursora y heredera, España se alzaba en medio de las naciones, sin posible competición, como una reina, augusta por la edad y la potencia.” Madera, Excelencias, 12.
(human beings) and that it was thanks to this that man had been able to escape external threats. This led him quickly to his more direct predilection: to establish who was the first king in the World, choosing Noah, who led his people against the tyrannous Nimrod. Beginning with such ancient foundations was central to Madera’s greater argument, which was to trace the population of Spain back to ancient Tubal,¹³⁶ who was the grandson of Noah. Tubal who had come to the peninsula after the confusion at the Tower of Babel, became Spain’s “first king,” and brought with him, according to Madera, the Castilían language.¹³⁷ For Madera, Spain’s antiquity and purity of monarchy, as well as its laws, language, monotheism, and immemorial nobility, all stemmed from their primogenitor Tubal and his clan.¹³⁸ Moreover, from his grandfather, Tubal had brought to Spain, and taught his people, the “law of nature” (ley de la naturaleza), and “order for good living” (orden de bien vivir), or good government, and thus, was Spain’s first “civilizing hero” (héroe civilizador).¹³⁹ Crucially, for Madera, Tubal established the role of the monarchy as “protector,” in charge of maintaining peace, stability and authority, whose role was to conserve the good of his people and whose obligation was to protect, an obligation that was extended to the protection of religion. Madera then traced this lineage to Ibero, the son of Tubal, and his clan, the Iberians.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ Since the Middle Ages, Christian historians had typically begun their prologues with the peopling of the world by the descendants of Noah. See Bernard Guenée, *Histoire et culture historique dans l’occident médiéval* (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1980), 19.
¹⁴⁰ To make these connections, Madera explicitly stated that he had drawn from biblical sources, especially Genesis, and the details provided by the works of early medieval historians like Rodrigo Jimenez de Rada, “who took his account from Flavio Josefo, San Jeronimo, and San Isidoro de Seville.” Madera, *Excelencias*, 25. Indeed, Madera’s Tubalism was part of a longer Christian tradition, Hispanicized by Isidore of Seville, and then taken up by
Tracing the Spanish Monarchy to Tubal was clearly defined by political-ideological necessity, as Madera wished to instill within readers the antiquity and authority of the Spanish cause and purpose. Moreover, with such origins, Madera, in effect, sought to show the genesis of great power and responsibility. For Madera, historical practice and scholarship were less concerned with change than with discovering the “eternal,” and unchanging “essence” of things. This also conformed to Madera’s legal understandings. Therefore, to his emphasis on the Spanish Monarchy’s lineage, antiquity, continuity, and grandeur, Madera added a narrative of the monarchy’s continuous virtue, justice of administration, defense of religion, and love for the Church and the upholding of its cause. These had not only an exemplary function, but also provided proof of legitimacy and became aspects of historical knowledge that Madera employed in the enhancement of Spanish claims. Such a noble ancient lineage made the Spanish people worthy of greatness and honor; tying the Spanish Monarchy to Tubal provided it with the greatest antiquity and the most noble of lineages of all the European royal houses. Further, according to this genealogy, Madera claimed that Spain was 3592 years old in 1592, approximately 1200 years older than Rome itself. Indeed, by providing this lineage for Spanish kings as descendants of Tubal, Madera was able to show his “first consideration, [which is] to assert that in Spain, or that place that is still known as Castile, there were Kings before the first destruction of Troy.”

Madera’s purpose in creating a unified identity for Spain and its people through his appeals to history was especially evident in his investigation of the antiquity, continuity, and

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Rodriguez de Rada, and even Alfonso X. Annius of Viterbo would also help exacerbate the spread of Tubalism in the fifteenth and sixteenth-centuries with his “false” chronicles.  
141 “la primera consideración es de acatar que en España y aún de aquella parte que se llama castilla hubo reyes ante de la primera destrucción de Troya.” Madera, Excelencias, 2.
purity of Spanish culture as revealed in its language. Madera demonstrated not only the *antiquity* of the “Kingdom of Spain,” but the antiquity of the Spanish language itself, claiming that Castilian was created by God at Babel and brought to the Iberian Peninsula by Noah’s descendant, Tubal, after the Flood, long before the Romans arrived, which allowed him to claim that Castilian could not have derived from Latin, as foreign scholars claimed, but rather, “our Castilian is the true language of our ancestors.” ¹⁴² Madera asserted, therefore, that from the time of the post-diluvian repopulation, the Spaniards had “never lost their language” despite centuries of subjugation to Roman, and later Visigothic and Islamic conquest. ¹⁴³ For Madera, not Latin origins, but rather divine creation at Babel dignified the Castilian language and thus spoke in favor of Spain. Moreover, for Madera, the great similarity with which all parts of Spain spoke Castilian was a testament to its antiquity and longevity. ¹⁴⁴ Once again, this essentialist stress on origins and authenticity was a piece of his larger ideological defense. For Madera, the Spanish language had its own timeless and inimitable substance. For example, in Madera’s words, the style of the first-century poet Martial showed him to be a “true Spaniard,” whose prose revealed “a genius (*ingenio*) that is very particular (*propio*) to Spain and its natural poetry.” ¹⁴⁵

According to Zachary Sayre Schiffman, Renaissance historical practice and scholarship was less concerned with evolution than with discovering such “eternal” and “unchanging essences,” of things, and claims that it is this form of teleological historical consciousness that

¹⁴² Madera, *Excelencias*, 100–106. Madera was not alone in stressing the primordialism of Castilian. See Binotti, *La teoría del "castellano primitivo": Nacionalismo y reflexión lingüística en el renacimiento español*.
underlay sixteenth century legal humanism. For Madera, establishing such connections, and especially revealing a Monarchy of such noble and great lineage and heritage, indicated that it was unlikely that Philip and his inheritors would fail to realize this potential. In this way, Madera deliberately intertwined his examination of the origins of the Spanish government with Philip as its heir. Indeed, the Spanish Monarchy was to be seen as directly emanating from and sharing the same principles as its origins. For Madera, the living presence of Tubal, who had brought and upheld the law, order, and monotheistic religion to Spain, still existed within the Spanish Monarchy and defined it. Madera makes it clear that he expected his readers to share his assumptions about the continuing vitality of these origins. Madera’s demonstration of the greatness of the Spanish Monarchy must always be seen in light, therefore, of how Madera wished to present Philip and his descendants, especially since the corpus of kingship was transferred to them. For Madera, Philip and his offspring embodied the ideals and virtues of their ancestors, and anything that had happened in the past continued to affect their present identity. In fact, in the subtitles provided underneath each one of his chapter titles, we see how in each “excellence” that Madera tried to prove, he directly sought to link it to Philip and his manner of rule, as he was the living embodiment of this legacy:

Madera argued that it was because of these origins that, throughout its long history, the Spanish Monarchy was the only institution that had been able to fulfill the requirements for his definition of what constituted “True Monarchy” (*Verdadera Monarchia*), which for Madera was a sovereign power that recognized no superior and a continuous monarchy marked by outstanding excellence.\(^{148}\) For Madera, according to this definition, the king of Spain, therefore, was the only legitimate ruler according to his sovereignty and the antiquity, nobility and

\(^{148}\) Having established the Monarchy’s antiquity, Madera also sought to demonstrate its continuity, despite moments of invasion. Using as his sources the *Historia Gothorum* of Isidore of Seville and the *Historica gothica* of Rodríguez Jiménez de Rada, Madera looked at the population that had existed in Spain before the arrival of the Visigoths, to emphasize that the illustriousness of this lineage had not dissipated because it had come under the Carthaginians and Romans: “que no disminuye nada el autoridad[sic] de nuestra España auer estado por este tiempo subjeta, por que estas son las vezes del mundo, y las mudanças que han siempre tenido los grandes Reynos, los cuales segun se dice en el Ecclesiastico, se passan por varias causas de vnas gentes en otras, y en ser subjeta a los Romanos tuuo por compañeras, las mas florecientes prouincias del mundo, quanto mas que uuo grande differencia, en el modo de venir a ser subjeta, por que estaua, no como otro Reynos debaxo de vn gouiero, con vn Rey, o Capitan general, que la defendiese, sino repartida, como deziamos en pequeños gouiernos y señorios . . . que pudo ser vencida, y aunque en estos tiempos estuviesse sepultado en ella el nombre, y gouiero Real (como en las demas prouincias Occidentales) fue para resucitar con mayor potencia, en la cayda del Imperio Romano.” Madera, *Excelencias*, 24.
continuity of his title. Moreover, for Madera, “one must call by its excellence a true Monarchy, [only] the one which is the most powerful kingdom, and that which possesses the most provinces, and has the most subjects.” Thus, for Madera the king of Spain was the “only” (único), legitimate and “true” (verdadera) monarch, as his monarchy was the only one with an authentic “empire of its own . . . which no other Western Kingdom has been except Rome,” but Philip was to be considered “the greatest and most powerful Prince in the whole world, [as he possessed] more territories and kingdoms, than any other past Monarch.”

In his history, Madera also emphasized the enormity of Spain’s possessions and the expansiveness of the Spanish Empire, pointing out the impeccable way in which it had been incorporated, as being mostly through succession and without the need or use of indiscriminate force, which Madera claimed was characteristic of successions in other countries. Moreover, Madera presented the virtue of Spanish strength and power as measured by the extension and size of the territories it possessed and especially those it had gained through “just titles” (justos títulos), such as Portugal and Navarre, or through what Madera described as “just war” (guerra justa), as in America. Further, Madera stressed that the most notable conquest had been that of

149 “el derecho y verdadero señorío” of Spain, “siempre estuvo y se continuó en los Reyes de León y Castilla.” Madera, Excelencias, 22–23. By claiming an unbroken sovereign and legitimate rule over Spain by the Spanish Monarchy, Madera argued that the Moors could never really be said to have ruled Spain. Madera reasoned that since they occupied a foreign territory by force, they did not actually “possess” it. (Madera, Excelencias, 139). Although temporarily vanished, the kings of Spain never lost their “natural,” legitimate possession of Iberian territory. (Madera, Excelencias, 140). Moreover, although accidental features of reconquest may have divided the territory into different titles, Madera held that “the kingdom of Spain is truly one” because of its natural integrity. Madera, Excelencias, 142.

150 “llamase por excelencia Monarquia, el Reyno mas poderoso, y que mas Reynos y Prouincias tuiesse sujetas.” Madera, Excelencias, 10.

151 “el mayor y mas poderoso Príncipe del mundo . . poseyendo mas tierras, y reynos que ninguno de los Monarchas pasados,” and “imperio respecto de sí misma, que no lo ha sido Reyno alguno de los Occidentales, sino respecto de Roma.” Madera, Excelencias, 16 and 22 respectively.

152 Furthermore, in order to establish Spain’s superior dignity, he specifically compared it to England, stressing Castile’s greater size (“es tan grande como serian tres ynglaterras”), geographical centrality (“fablando propriamente ynglaterra esta fuera del mundo”), and diversity (“ynglaterra no son tantas naçiones, ni ay tamaña ni tan fermosa diferençia de pueblos”) throughout time. Madera, Excelencias, 129.
the New World, a historic moment when Spanish designs reached fruition. Such accomplishments provided proof of why Spain merited its special position as the “only true” monarchy; Madera concluded that because of this pre-eminence and “being well-proved its prerogative,” Spain was the only kingdom that warranted the title of “Monarchy” and thus was the only one “to which all owe superiority and vassalage.” Furthermore, throughout its history, Spain had also demonstrated something not seen in the rest of Europe—Spanish self-sufficiency—having never had the need to require external help. Auto-sufficiency was an Aristotelian concept. Thus, in Aristotelian terms, this Spanish auto-sufficiency was for Madera, a mark of a civilized and well ruled community, demonstrated one of the necessary conditions of a good state. As a result, Spain had everything that man could desire for one’s country and one’s ruler, “we find in Spain the greatest excellence . . . all the things necessary of a perfect and magnificent Monarchy.”

To prove further the excellence of the Spanish Monarchy, Madera focused a few of his chapters on dynastic questions and successions. For Madera, the excellence of the monarchy was represented through its continuity of succession from father to son, a succession that was never interrupted from Don Pelayo to Philip II, thus providing Philip’s descendants with “thirty-four

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153 “considerando la dificultad della, el peligro de la nauegación, la imposibilidad, que tan de antiguo estaua assentada en los animos de los hombres, se vera, que solo para los de los Españoles, para los pechos y valor de aquellos Catholicos Reyes, podía estar reseruada tan grande hazaña.” Madera, Excelencias, 227.

154 “quedado bien prouada su Prerrogativa,” “superioridad y vasallaje.” Madera, Excelencias, 23. Similar sentiments are expressed in his Prologue.

155 Xavier Gil Pujol, “Las fuerzas del rey. La generación que leyó a Botero,” in Le Forze del príncipe. Recursos, instrumentos y limites en la práctica del poder soberano en los territorios de la monarquía hispánica, ed. Mario Rizzo and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 2005), 983.

156 See Pedro Simon, Los ocho libros de república (Zaragoza, 1584), Bk. II, Ch. I and Bk. IV, Ch. IX.

157 “Contiene [la monarquía Española] en sí sola todo lo que pueden desear los hombres para su necesidad, provecho o gusto, y aún para hartar su ambición y deseo . . . Hallaremos en España esta grande excelencia, que no sólo es suficientísima para sí misma en todas las cosas necesarias a una perfecta y magnífica Monarchía, [pero] que alcanza la comunicación y trato de las demás por su abundancia.” Madera, Excelencias, 224.
sequential grandfathers” (*tryenta y quarto Aguelos*). This was not a banal argument, as such claims would be used repeatedly throughout the seventeenth century to make claims to precedence; for as Pedro Salazar de Mendoza stated “never has a Spaniard kissed the hand of a King whose father had not kissed that of his father, something not seen anywhere else.”

For Madera, this dynastic principle was fundamental: “All past monarchies began in violence and force of arms, and only that of Spain has had just beginnings great part of it coming together by succession.” Such continuity and purity in succession provided the Spanish Monarchy with juridical powers as the long history of the Spanish Monarchy, its illustrious genealogy, and its unbroken line, all provided substantiation to Spanish superiority and claims to power. Madera’s work, therefore, complemented that of Garibay. Indeed, for Madera, as it had been for Garibay, lineal descent was central to the claim of imperial status. Moreover, just as Garibay had done, a collective past was envisioned as a kind of genealogical filiation. Madera defined the notion of Spanish identity as a lineage by tying together the diversity and copiousness of the Spanish kingdoms’ prehistory by binding the state to its monarchy through a single line of common descent, as well as celebrating the nobility.

Within his discussions on dynastic succession, Madera found the perfect opportunity to introduce his discussion on the origins of Spanish nobility and chivalry. Indeed Madera was interested in establishing “when nobility was introduced into the world,” linking this directly to

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159 “nunca el español besó mano de Rey a cuyo padre no se la huviése besado, cosa particular y nunca vista.” Pedro Salazar de Mendoza, *Monarchia de España* (ca. 1622), BNM Ms/ 12982.
161 Indeed, the effort to construct a continuous historical narrative depended in many ways on the dynastic/genealogical/legal fictions which tied the monarchy to an ancient past through the notion of successive dynasties, and the “memory of great deeds, accomplishments, and wars.” Madera, *Excelencias*, 152.
the “nobility and antiquity of the Spanish Monarchy.” For Madera, it was of utmost importance to show “the original nobility” and their “persistence.” Nobility was transmitted via blood to the original noble houses which comprised Spain from its origins. For Madera, however, there were two fundamental types of nobility, one that included men of high birth, and the other that included those who had ennobled themselves through their actions. For Madera, virtue could triumph over noble blood and genuine nobility depended on virtue. Here, Madera sought to combine a traditional definition of nobility that appealed to the attributes of illustrious bloodline and antiquity with one that focused more on subjective, inner qualities of goodness and virtue, which allowed him to anchor his concept of “nobility” to the whole community.

Madera demonstrated that, more than any other nation, Spain’s history was defined by the illustrious actions of the Spanish nobility, but also by men who had ennobled themselves through their noteworthy deeds. Thus, alongside the doings of monarchs, Madera included those of Spanish noblemen, saints and bishops, to show the totality of Spanish “excellencies,” and which he claimed also provided greater justification for its worthiness as the “greatest of all Monarchies.” Madera extolled the excellent nature of Spaniards and addressed “those most significant qualities that have always given Spaniards the advantage for the glory of their nation and kingdom,” which he claimed were: “The judiciousness and gravity of the Spanish . . . their courtesy and warm welcome to strangers . . . their constancy and forbearance . . . Spanish loyalty . . . piousness and staunch faith . . . humility and moderation.” Moreover, Madera presented

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163. “la nobleza originaria” and “la perduración de la nobleza” Madera, Excelencias, 204.
164. It was believed at the time that each people had a fairly stable national character or “genius.” Scholars, accordingly, used contemporary evidence to confirm and elucidate the genius of a given people, both in the present as well as in the past. Fernández-Santamaría, Natural Law, Constitutionalism, Reason of State, 2: 157
165. Madera, Excelencias, 151–152.
the virtue of Spanish strength and power as measured by the number of valiant men that the “nation” (nación) had.\textsuperscript{166}

It was also within his discussion of dynastic succession that Madera addressed the major issue brought about by French detractors of Spanish claims, as well as one specifically stressed by Mayerne: the validity and legitimacy of female rule. Three reasons had been given by French lawyers, and repeated by Mayerne, as to why France did not allow for female succession: common law, custom, and the Salic Law. Madera, drawing upon his own familiarity with legal techniques confronted all three in his history. Madera had already addressed the question of common law in his account of Roman Spain and its laws when he wrote, “according to Roman Laws, which are called common law, it is held that women must be admitted,” to positions of power, and that it was rather just a preference for males, especially in terms of equality in rights, that had caused the majority of rulers to be male.\textsuperscript{167}

When speaking of the greatness of Queen Isabella of Castile’s (1451-1504) rule, Madera was able to confront the issue of the Salic Law more directly. Madera recounted how, when Isabella had ascended to the throne, there had been those who at first questioned the abilities of a female ruler, and who had sought to draw upon the Salic Law to prevent her from taking power. Madera demonstrated, however, that these men realized that they could not use the Salic Law in

\textsuperscript{166} To support his claims of Spanish valor and might, Madera used indirect evidence. Madera showed that for all their disagreements about whether Spain was worthy of its grandeur, even foreign historians conceded that Spain had indeed controlled the Mediterranean and did not argue about Spain’s maritime superiority. Their works were thus to be counted as indirect proofs: “even if [Spain's adversaries] did not wish to concede what these authors affirmed, because they gave no evidence, [they] still must accept them as testimonies of what was affirmed in their own time.” Thus, even those who in the past had objected to Spain's rule, Madera concluded, provided testimonies (or multiple witnessing) of the fact that she “ruled the seas,” and he expressed his “thankfulness” for them as evidence. Madera, \textit{Excelencias}, 154.

\textsuperscript{167} “por las leyes romanas que se llaman derecho común, es cierto que las mujeres han de ser admitidas,” Madera, \textit{Excelencias}, 86.
their efforts for, “after much study, it was confirmed with all certainty, that in our Kingdom, as
in many other of the most notable Kingdoms, and especially the Kingdom of France, that there
has never been, nor is there, any Salic Law which excludes women from succession to the
Crown; [and that] it is the malicious trickery of the very first who claimed that this was law, and
made a manifest error by those who followed them, that people believe that it should be
followed.”168 Madera, therefore, also sought to correct a historiographic error and clarified that
the only place where such a law did exist was in Germany: “this law speaks of the succession of
Salic land in Germany, and not in any other Kingdom,” and even there this law applied only to
“private goods and lands.”169 Indeed, Madera rightly observed that the Salic Law was merely a
private law from an early Franco-Germanic code and did not prohibit women from monarchical
rule. More importantly, he showed that there was no true precedent for the use of the Salic Law
in the French contest. Madera then briefly diverged from Spanish history to mention how France
too had seen illustrious Queens (something which Garibay had also shown in his genealogy),
briefly presenting their abilities as regents, consorts, and de facto rulers, including those of
Freadegund, Clotilda, Jeanne, Blanche of Castile, and Isabelle of Bavaria, thus providing
historical proof of women active in politics in France and further demonstrating how this was not
out of the ordinary and could even be seen as customary, thus confronting the last obstacle
against female rule. Yet the issue of the uncertainty of female rule remained, and so Madera
emphasized that Spanish female rulers, like Queen Isabella, had ruled and defended their empire,

168 “después de mucho estudio es confirmado con conclusión cierta y averiguada . . que en nuestro reyno, como en
muchos de los mas notables reynos, y en especial el reyno de francia no ha havido ni hai[sic] ley sálica que excluye
da las mujeres de la sucesión de [la] aquella corona; que fue engaño malicioso de los primeros que afirmaron que la
havia y yerro manifesto de los que despues los han seguido.” Madera, Excelencias, 176. Modern scholars agree with
Madera, that Salic law was an invention of legalists during the Hundred Years War. See Sarah Hanley, “Identity
Politics and Rulership in France: Female Political Place and the Fraudulent Salic Law in Christine de Pizan and Jean
de Montreuil,” in Changing Identities in Early Modern France, ed. Michael Wolfe (Durham, NC.: Duke University
Press, 1997), 78–94.
169 “que esta ley habla de la sucesión de la tierra sálica, de Alemania, y no de otro reyno,” and “pertenecce solo a los
bienes y haziendas particulares.” Madera, Excelencias, 177.
“with political astuteness,” “spiritual conviction,” and even “military might.”\footnote{Madera, Excelencias, 178–9.} Indeed, Madera described at length Isabella’s’ “good government of Castile,” and emphasized the prominent role she played in the Reconquest, portraying her as the driving force behind the reconstitution of Catholicism in Granada, stressing her founding of monasteries, convents, and hospitals, and demonstrating the prominent role she played in establishing the Inquisition and expelling the Jews from Spain.\footnote{He added: “Nunca nuestra España en todas las cosas tuvo más alto grado de perfección, su crecimiento, aumento y estado florido, que en aquellos tiempos en que a sus Reyes Católicos les resplandecieron todos los dictados de honra y gloria que se deben a la verdadera remuneración de la virtud, los cuales, correspondiendo entonces a la multitud de sus notables hechos, pusieron a la monarquía en la cumbre de su perfección. Y . . . levantaron a España en el más alto estado de felicidad y de grandeza que jamás hasta allí tuvo.” Madera, Excelencias, 180.}

Thus, Madera portrayed female rule as going hand in hand with “good government” and reconstituting, strengthening and defending the faith, an obvious allusion to what Philip’s daughter Isabella, her namesake, would bring about in France. Madera, therefore, not only drew upon the political arguments being made by Spanish political and legal theorists against the Salic Law, but provided his own “proof” against it, and supplemented his claims with additional evidence of examples of good, long and successful female rule. Furthermore, within Madera’s lengthy discussion on female rule, he continuously emphasized the role of women in dynastic lines and successions, positing that the female line was just as worthy as that of any male for succession. Indeed, the successory instability that France faced with the potential of a Protestant king was another reason Madera praised female succession as that which best ensured the “the natural rights of man” (el derecho natural de las gentes), as Isabela Clara Eugenia was the daughter of Isabel of Valois, a pure and true Catholic, and therefore her assuming the French throne would return the stability, stasis and continuity long enjoyed by France through both the

\footnote{Madera, Excelencias, 178–9.}

\footnote{He added: “Nunca nuestra España en todas las cosas tuvo más alto grado de perfección, su crecimiento, aumento y estado florido, que en aquellos tiempos en que a sus Reyes Católicos les resplandecieron todos los dictados de honra y gloria que se deben a la verdadera remuneración de la virtud, los cuales, correspondiendo entonces a la multitud de sus notables hechos, pusieron a la monarquía en la cumbre de su perfección. Y . . . levantaron a España en el más alto estado de felicidad y de grandeza que jamás hasta allí tuvo.” Madera, Excelencias, 180.}
Valois line and their Catholic religion, thereby restoring orthodoxy and the “true” religion, as well as peace, order and “freedom [from heresy]” to an embattled France.

It was important that Madera stressed Isabela Clara Eugenia’s Catholicism, indeed a significant portion of his work was entirely devoted to the question of religion and its relationship to the monarchy. Claims to noble ancestors who distinguished themselves not only by their deeds, but also by their devotion and dedication to a religious cause were another means to glorify Spain and Spaniards, and establish their preeminence in the French contest. Since Spaniards had never given up this pure religion, they were the most worthy to see its continuation in France. Further, Madera stressed that it had been its ties to Catholicism that had created a territorial unity that superseded the diversity of the various kingdoms, counties, and principalities that existed in Spain throughout the Middle Ages. Similarly, this unity in faith was also what united the Spaniards to the French, and especially French Catholics, regardless of their political independence. Madera presented, therefore, a Spanish community in which orthodox dogma and devotion had become part of their sense of self and purpose. Indeed, from the outset Madera’s concern was to depict ancient Spain as a Christian republic and to show from the earliest of times Spanish commitment to Catholicism: how the martyrs had established the bulwark of the faith and in so doing provided one of the main connections between ancient times and modern goals.

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172 Madera, Excelencias, 197.
For Madera, Spain’s Catholicism was the oldest and the purest. He set out to demonstrate how Spaniards were among the first generation of Christians, having received the message directly from the Apostles, or their direct disciples, and that they were the very first in Europe to demonstrate outwardly an adoration of the cross. Madera presented both the Spanish Church and its Spanish followers, therefore, as direct heirs of the primitive Church and thus, natural leaders of the Christian community. Like Garibay, he also provided a “genealogy” (a sequential list) of the early bishops and saints of Spain, beginning with the formative centuries of Spanish Christendom. Madera also recounted in glowing terms the lives and works of these early bishops, presenting them as benevolent prelates, active in reforms, church councils, and the fight against heresy, spiritual guides to Spain’s Christian republic, and symbols of the moral state of the whole community. The history of ancient and medieval Spain was presented, therefore, as that of a Christian civitas, where local saints and martyrs represented the virtues of constancy, strength, and valor in defense of the faith and where monasteries and institutions provided relief for the poor and exhibited Christian charity. For Madera, the combined work of bishops and kings made Spain’s governments, both civil and ecclesiastical, models for the rest of Europe.

173 For his sources on the primitive monotheism of the Iberian pre-Christians brought to Iberia by Tubal, Madera detailed how he had drawn upon Strabo and his Geographica and stressed that Strabo confirmed the existence of a monotheistic cult on the peninsula. He also drew from the work of Josephus Flavius, Seneca, and Pompius Mela to confirm this pre-Christian monotheism, and provided secondary evidence by using more contemporary sources including Alfonso X’s Crónica General, the accounts of chroniclers García López de Roncesvalles and Carlos, Prince of Viana, and the works of Lope García de Salazar, Florián de Ocampo, and even Garibay’s Compendio, all of which he references.


175 Madera stressed how members of Spanish Church Councils also concerned themselves with ensuring “good government”: “a los de mas Reyes de su tiempo, y quan bien ayan proueydo a sus subditos en esta principal parte del buen gouierno que consiste en las leyes, lo muestran bien los Sanctos Concilios Toledanos, desde el Tercero hasta el Decimoseptimo juntados todos a su instancia, en los quales despues de los negocios de la Religion, y Fe Catholica, se ordenauan siempre todas las cosas tocantes al gouierno de sus estados, queriendo aquellos Reyes como tan Catholicos, y Religiosos que de allí saliesse proueydo y decretado lo necesario a su Republica.” Madera, Excelencias, 50.
Key to Madera’s arguments was his demonstration of how Christianity had been preserved in Spain in its purest form, despite and throughout, the centuries of Islam. For Madera, rather than destroying or replacing this true Christian identity, the centuries of Muslim rule had merely repressed it. For Madera, the number of Spanish Christian martyrs during the Muslim “occupation” was testament to Spain’s constancy in the faith. Indeed, referring to Spanish martyrs served to demonstrate the greater Spanish purpose by providing evidence of the Spanish mission to Christianize and protect the faith, especially in the face of opposition, persecution and violence. Thus, the relics of these Spanish martyrs were additional physical evidence of Spain’s deep Christian roots and the survival of Spain’s original Christian character, even despite centuries of Muslim rule. Madera emphasized that the relics of Spain’s Christian past, whether they were ancient manuscripts, printed texts, or artifacts, helped establish a direct link with Spain’s past and with the primitive faith of its first Christians, utilizing relics and remains as additional actors within his human history. Crucially, as noted above, the authentication of relics was one of Madera’s specialties. True to his Catholic beliefs and inclinations, Madera would use the vast numbers of reliquaries in Spain as “proof” that Spain had been blessed by favors which he saw as a sign of God's will, but more importantly, had been preserved and protected through these artifacts.

Madera’s use of relics as evidence, however, also served his greater political purpose in trying to show the benefits that could be brought to French Catholics through association.

176 For Madera, Christianity had been maintained throughout the Moorish invasion because, “the love and affection that everyone has for their religion, and the greater strength and mass of the common people (el vulgo) is enough to preserve [one’s religion] against the will of their superiors (mayores).” Madera, Excelencias, 173. Further, Madera also asserted that Asturias had never known Arab domination and thus was a place where Spanish Christianity was preserved in its original, pure form.
Madera clearly reflected the ideals of the Council of Trent that had legitimized relics and their use as part of Counter-Reformation identity.178 Moreover, the sixteenth century’s emphasis on relics was tied not only to a growing European-wide interest in history and archeology, but, more importantly, formed part of the broader context of a Catholic response to the Protestant destruction of the Catholic past, and was thus directly related to the question of France and the widespread destruction of relics by Huguenots. Significantly, Madera described the “destruction” of Spanish Catholicism by the Moors in terms reminiscent of the “destruction” of Catholicism going on in France, and made mention that it was well known that in the city of Tours, Huguenot insurgents had burned the bones of saints. Madera’s emphasis upon Spain’s relics can be seen, therefore, as an attempt to create a unifying element in a community of Catholics. As Alain Joblin points out, the use of relics above all “freed and fueled a genuine spirit of anti-Protestant reconquest in France . . . the repossession by Catholics of a space formerly under Huguenot control was almost always marked by a procession and exhibition of relics.”179 Thus, in a narrative steeped in the climate of struggle for the defense of the Catholic faith, Madera drew eloquent parallels between the muslim occupation of the Iberian peninsula and Reformed iconoclasm. Also, undoubtedly in an effort to strengthen Spanish support for the French cause, Madera mentioned the centuries-old kinship between the Churches in Toledo and Tours, and how, during the Muslim invasion, the canon of the Toledan church had sought refuge in Tours. Mention of this ancient solidarity was meant to draw support from Spaniards for its historical ally in the face of the Protestant scourge.

179 Cited in Lazure, “Possessing the Sacred,” 69.
The key element in demonstrating Spain’s inherent Catholicism was Spain’s historical legacy of defending the faith and its “war against the infidel,” as Madera called it, as these had profound implications upon Spanish identity. For Madera, the Christian Reconquest, especially that of Granada, allowed Spain to “return triumphant to the grace of her king, to the arms of the Catholic Church her mother, to her original state, and re-elevated [her]to greater faith and more heroic virtues.” 180 Indeed, Madera presented the reconquista as a formative period in the creation of a certain Spanish political character. The ideal constitution of Spain’s political entity was recapitulated when Spain regained its original geography, and once again all of the Peninsula was restored to Christian rule under the Catholic Monarchs, creating a unified Catholic Spanish state. By invoking the memory of the good Christian kings of the past who had devoted their lives to defending the faith, Madera also demonstrated Spain’s long history of loyalty to the Christian Church, and how the Catholic Monarchs were part of a long and successive line of rulers who had dedicated themselves to this cause, “to serve God, uphold the inquisition, suppress heresy, dispense justice, and hold the balance between their advisors.” 181 For Madera, the Spanish Monarchy’s “true marks of nobility [were] displayed through their aligning with the foundations, advancement and conservation of the true faith,” and was “testimony of Spain’s continuous Christian kingship.” 182 Madera, for example, noted how Charles V, the emperor and “God’s lieutenant” had consumed his life in defense of the Catholic faith, waging war on the Turks in Tunis and Austria, and seeking at all points to repress the Lutheran heresy. 183 This

180 Madera, Excelencias, 153. For Madera, since Spain had been engaged in a “Holy War” (guerra divinal) against the Moor during the Reconquista, it had rendered greater services to God and to the Church than any other “nation.” For how the struggle with the Muslim and the Turk played into the Spanish struggle for national identity see, Patricia E. Grieve, The Eve of Spain: Myths of Origins in the History of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Conflict (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
181 Madera, Excelencias, 201.
182 Madera, Excelencias, 155.
183 Such examples were also a way to address specific accusations against past Spanish Monarchs that had been leveled by Mayermne. Mayermne had provided a secular interpretation of events under Charles V and suggested that
demonstrated a political prudence whose first principle was a logical obligation to theological considerations. Philip’s intentions to protect the Catholic faith and intervene in French affairs, therefore, signified a fidelity to the same commitment and obligation of conscience that successive Spanish monarchs, like his father, had felt directly towards God. For Madera the symbiosis between politics and religion had grounded the power of the Spanish kings, and it indicated how Spaniards identified with their monarchy. For Madera, religion was part of the sovereignty of the state; he argued for a definition of sovereignty resembling Bodin’s, while extending this definition to include Spain’s empire: “For Religion and the Empire cannot be parted.”

Madera presented the preservation of the Catholic religion as the prime, if not sole, legitimization for the Spanish state and its empire, which made Spain the “most Catholic state” (*el estado más Católico*) within Europe. Furthermore, the historic role that Spain had occupied “in defending the Catholic church against the danger of the Turks, Moors, and heretics” made Philip and Isabela the “true heirs” as “defender of the faith,” as had long been the role of all Spanish monarchs. Indeed, only Spaniards with their illustrious past, their great acts, and their virtue, were significantly worthy enough to be considered “the most Catholic,” and thus Philip was the “true king of the Catholics” (*verdadero rey de los Católicos*) and the only true champion of its cause. Spain’s Catholicism and its historic support and defense of the faith, therefore, were justification alone for Spaniards to be the sole and legitimate entity to intervene in France.

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Charles V had only political reasons for combating the Protestants and that it had not been his religious convictions which had moved him to action. Mayernne, *Histoire générale d’Espagne*, 1189.


“en defender a la iglesia católica contra el peligro de los turcos, moros y herejes.” Madera, *Excelencias*, 158. Madera also stressed that God had acknowledged such service and that “divine support for Philip’s actions has been demonstrated through the increase in his holdings, through his longevity, through the greatness of his decendence, and in their defence of the faith” (“la confirmación divina de la rectitud de las acciones de Felipe se muestra a través del incremento de sus dominios, de la longevidad, de la descendencia, y de la defensa de la fe.”) Madera, *Excelencias*, Prólogo al lector.
fact, for Madera, writing in his ‘Prologue to the Reader,’ it was “the obligation of the patr"a, and to the land that we have become.” to defend Catholicism and intervene in France.\footnote{Emphasis mine. “la obligaci\'on de la patria y de la tierra que alcanzamos ser.” Madera, Excelencias, Pr\’ologo al Lector.}

Throughout his work, Madera positioned the Spanish Monarchy as the basis of public good in all its aspect—political, moral, and religious. This was a common good that was not only for the Spanish people, but was extended to include the entire Christian [Catholic] community. Madera emphasized the role of Spanish monarchs as patrons of peace among Christians and how these pacifying and unifying virtues had been present in all Spanish monarchs, but especially Philip and his offspring—an obvious allusion to how these would be brought to France to help quell disorder and disruption and restore order. In this way, all those who opposed Spanish policies were defined as enemies of the common good and of Christianity. Time and time again, Madera demonstrated how different episodes had called for the necessity of the monarchy’s protection, and how in each case the Spanish Monarchy had always been the people’s and Christianity’s champion.

Madera believed that demonstrating a tradition of good rule, an upholding of the “common good,” a commitment to the law, and a continued commitment to the defence of the faith, and therefore, a continued pattern of rule, was essential to solidify claims and convince readers that such rule would be brought to France. Moreover, the political and religious achievements of Philip’s ancestors was proof positive of how they had ruled well and explained why Spain merited the privileged position it held by the end of the sixteenth century. The notion that the Spanish Monarchy’s purpose was to maintain the social status quo was a reflection of the
Spanish political philosophy espoused by the Crown, and especially the ideas of a Christian reason of state that stressed that the primary goal of the monarch was the common good and maintaining stability, security, and order, and that the ultimate guarantee of all of this was religion. Madera, therefore, appropriated the entire spiritual legacy of the Habsburgs as a cornerstone for the Spanish Monarchy’s authority and capitalized on past Spanish monarchs’ actions in defense of the faith to strengthen the current monarchy’s cause. Indeed, Madera sought to define the past actions of Spanish Monarchs as rulers who had governed successfully according to Christian principles, who had lived as good Christians, and hence morally, and who had succeeded in this worlds, including in politics. In this way he combined his more traditional presentation of Spanish politics with those of Christian reason of state.

Throughout Excelencias, Madera displayed himself as a iurisconsulto, an antiquarian jurist. Madera had already distinguished himself as a consummate scholar in his treatment of both Roman and medieval legal history, as well as the documents pertaining to privileges and rights of towns and nobles, and his previous antiquarian investigations into the authenticity of relics and manuscripts had left him well versed in the ancillary disciplines that helped historical research and criticism, including philology and numismatics. It is evident that he directly brought these concerns with historical evidence to his Excelencias. Indeed, Madera sought to turn the historical evidence he used into almost legal evidence that could be used to support his claims, and his search for “proof” (pruebas) when finding the “acts which provided the right” to France put him in line with his other works that sought to establish the validity and antiquity of laws,

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and thus a means to assert claims to rights and privileges.\textsuperscript{188} Throughout *Excelencias* Madera made numerous references to the multiplicity of sources he had used in finding “proof” for his claims, and for each claim he made, he provided various sources of evidence. First, he claimed proof on the basis of “memory;” second, upon known authorities. In fact, Madera followed a flexible evidential system, whether using memory, other written sources and documents, or non-written remnants of the past like relics as proof for his claims. Madera made clear, however, that he had researched each source he used, as well as the claims it made, in order to ensure its authenticity. Furthermore, when amassing his sources, Madera had written to Idiáquez, requesting that for each source that was sent to him, that the royal advisor provide details as to where the source came from, as well as other details to aid in its verification.\textsuperscript{189} Madera also created lists of his principal sources, together with references to particular scholars who had sent him material, as well as the large number of sources that he personally uncovered.\textsuperscript{190}

In his Prologue, Madera stressed that he had “thoroughly” assessed each chronicle, manuscript and documents he used to write this history to ensure its veracity, and that he had even been critical of the *auctoritas* of ancient sources. Furthermore, he stressed his efforts in trying to find the most authentic account, and acknowledged the contradictions in various accounts and how he came to his conclusions. There is even a brief mention in his text of how he examined public records, royal and imperial documents, and private papers.\textsuperscript{191} While Madera

\textsuperscript{189} Madera to Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, legajo 160/54.
\textsuperscript{190} BFZ, Altamira, legajo 160/54.
\textsuperscript{191} Madera also included at the end of *Excelencias* lists of kings and successions for the lines of Navarre, Oviedo, León, Castile, and Aragon, a list of saints and bishops, and lists of roman emperors, Muslim kings, and Spanish rulers under the Goths. Significantly, in each list Madera provided the precise page(s) within the text where each figure was discussed (so an Index of sorts), for easy reference.
handled primary sources with aplomb, for the most part in his *Excelencias*, he relied on secondary sources, both the histories written by his contemporaries and early Spanish chroniclers. Yet, whenever he could, Madera supplemented the claims he took from other secondary works by adding his own additional evidence, including statutes, laws, and privileges of the realm, which he had come across in his own studies to further attest to and support his claims. For example, when it came to trying to demonstrate both the primordiality of Castilian and how he had sought to fill in the gaps for Spain’s most ancient history, Madera stressed that many past historians had relied on accounts by the Greeks and Romans, who had unfortunately erred: “We now realize that neither the Greeks nor Romans (*Latinos*) were able with any veracity to write about the first populations of Spain, especially since they could not read the writings of the Monarchies which came before them, and which time has brought to light with the use of languages [philology] and the benefit of print.”\(^{192}\) He therefore turned to the auxiliary disciplines in helping him to fill some of these gaps.

Madera also provided numerous chapter indices. This allowed the reader interested in, for example, the origins of secular authority to browse the index and be able to quickly go to that chapter for further information. Also his index on “notable” or main issues was organized alphabetically, which allowed the reader to approach issues of interest throughout the text. This was not only a demonstration of his legal antiquarianism; his indices were a means to further support the suggestion that certainty could be found in the text. Moreover, together with the main

\(^{192}\)“De todo esso sacamos que no los griegos, ni los latinos pudieron con verdad escribir las primeras poblaciones de España, porque no pudieron ellos leer las escrituras de las Monarchías que fueran antes dellos, que agora el tiempo ha sacado a la luz con el uso de las lenguas y beneficio de imprimir.” Madera, *Excelencias*, 74. Madera also writes in his “Prólogo al lector” to be leery of the Roman writers since “Fueron los romanos tan amigos de su patria.” This did not mean, however, that Spain had not greatly benefited from their Roman past whose: “por este cello del bien y aumento de su pueblo, moralmente merecieron el grande Imperio de que alcanzaron.” Madera, *Excelencias*, 80.
text, the indices validated Madera’s claim that his account provided a complete source of all knowledge of the affairs of state.

Significantly, when supplementing his claims based on “authorities,” he used the language of the law, and frequently used the term “allegatione in iure,” a term that indicated both a plea made before a jury and the action of quoting legal authorities. Indeed, he tried to prove from this juridical standpoint his entire series of excellencies. For Madera, however, his “proof” resided in providing continuity not change. Indeed, Madera’s appreciation of evidence was based more on series and patterns, and he did not see isolated resemblances as constituting evidence.

For Madera, the “honor” owed to the Spanish kingdom was based in ancient origins, a royal founder, a pure monarchy, an inherent and pure Christianity, constant habitation, and an original and continuous language. For Madera stasis, not change, was natural: “Each thing tries to conserve the characteristics of its kind,” and “according to the laws of nature, change in things cannot be presumed.”193 Indeed for Madera, stasis meant superiority and nobility, and he saw substance, nobility, and value as tied to the oldest, original forms. For although he recognized change over time in some circumstances, for most he espoused a classical view of “corruption”: that any change from an original perfection could only lead to decay.194 Hence his indignant rejection of the claims that there was a break in monarchical continuity or Christianity during the Muslim invasion, or that Castilian derived from Latin. Instead, Madera insisted that the monarchy, its religion, as even its language were primordial and eternal. For Madera, even Spain’s people were aboriginal, being “Spaniards” from their first appearance after the Flood. In

193 Madera, Excelencias, 68 and 100, respectively.
excluding the possibility of corruption, however, he also largely excluded the possibility of development over time: “Monarchy, Religion and language are the same as our ancestors.”\textsuperscript{195}

For Madera, the ancient past was not a foreign country; rather, it was an uncannily familiar one, and where things were done in exactly the same way in the present as they had been in the past. The Spanish essence—its monarchy, its religion, its convictions, its purpose—was not actually past. This essence was present all around Madera and could only be seen more clearly through the prism of Spain’s glorious past.\textsuperscript{196} For Madera the fact that this essence remained and could be seen all around him had political implications; it was testament to the worthiness of the Spanish people and the Spanish Monarchy.

For Madera, antiquity was, in and of itself, “venerable” and constituted “the highest excellence.”\textsuperscript{197} In this, Madera followed Pliny, who had stressed that, for cities and provinces antiquity was “sacred,” and that antiquity brought venerability to cities, as well as to their customs and beliefs. Madera, however, extended such notions beyond communal boundaries and classical beliefs by stressing that such notions could be extended to “our nation” (\textit{nuestra nación}).\textsuperscript{198} In fact, Madera expanded upon why antiquity itself was valuable to the nation: “The ancient has great kinship with the good, and having [antiquity] is a clear indication of it being good. If the republic of Venice had not been just, it would not have lasted so long. And if the Spaniards had not been so loyal and their monarchs so Catholic, the reign would not have

\textsuperscript{195} Madera, \textit{Excelencias}, 108.
\textsuperscript{197} Madera, \textit{Excelencias}, 2.
\textsuperscript{198} Madera, \textit{Excelencias}, 44.
remained in one family for more than 900 years . . . What we find in this lineage is one of the most honorable things we could ask for our nation, which is the antiquity of its Monarchy.”

Madera, however, sought to bring such legal and political understandings to his arguments for the superiority of the Spanish Monarchy in his historical narrative. Furthermore, as Madera’s statements elucidate, what was important to the theory of primordial Spain, its monarchy, and its culture, was not historicity in the sense of change, development, evolution, or contingency. Rather, what Madera valued in Spain’s monarchy, society and language was its antiquity, continuity, and constancy which made them timeless and unique.

Madera’s antiquarianism must be understood, therefore, within a much larger context, and as a single aspect of a much wider set of mental assumptions held in one form or another by most men and women from the fifteenth through the eighteenth century. That age and continuity provided legitimacy became a common theme across Europe in the late sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth centuries, especially in the political and religious worlds. Indeed, in the period between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, continuity, longevity and age

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199 Madera, Excelencias, 75.
200 Some scholars have evaluated such notions rather negatively. Indeed, Leonard Krieger has observed that in the early modern period a historicist interest in documentable origins conflicted with a historiography which focused on tradition. “Tradition,” Krieger claims, was predicated on continuity and constancy, and thus “erased the distinction between past and present and along with it the temporal dimension essential to history.” Leonard Krieger, “Germany,” in National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe, ed. Orest Ranum, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 67–97, at 73. John G. A. Pocock agreed, writing: “The mere affirmation of continuity can produce only traditionalism; historical explanation can arise only where there is some awareness of discontinuity.” John G. A. Pocock, “The Origins of the Study of the Past: A Comparative Approach,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 4/2 (1962): 209–246, at 223. Madera’s purpose, however, was an ideological one, and his approach to history was one with specific intentions and motivations.
provided valid claims of legitimacy and were considered proof of rightness. Thus, the need for Madera to prove such antiquity and longevity became vital to his claims of Spanish political legitimacy in France.

By linking the far reaches of Spain’s antiquity to the modern era, Madera, however, provided the connections essential not only for Spain’s political agenda in France, but also for political stability at home. Purity, unity, antiquity, and continuity were, for Madera, national virtues especially in the way he sought to connect them through historical examples. Indeed, the patriotic thrust of Madera’s argument should not be underestimated, for as Justino de Chaves commented after reading this work: “I confess that since I saw the work of Doctor Madera, it pleased me so much that I have not been able to give it up, and it could well be that at work here is the pious affection that I owe my country, because I look with enthusiasm on all things that speak in its favor, [but I think that my interest in this book stems rather from the fact that] it demonstrates the truth of our [Spain’s] ancestry and of our nation.” Indeed, as Idiáquez stated of Madera’s work: “His history is light and honor of Spain, in contraposition to foreign countries.”

Madera saw the legitimacy of Philip’s reign and his actions as proceeding from the superiority of the Spanish Monarchy, a superiority derived from its historical continuity both in lineage and action. Madera’s history, therefore, was more than a way of representing the

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203 It continues: “Doctor Gregorio López Madera, of His Majesty's Council, and Alcalde [judge with prosecutorial powers] of the royal house and court, mature and universal genius of all forms of letters, on whose writings on the history of Spain . . . he has shown me the truth of the ancestry of our nation, and I can say with Horatio that God has corrected my sense.” Chaves to Sarmiento de Acuña, RB II/2118, doc. 43.
204 “Su historia es luz y honor de España, en contraposición de las naciones extranjeras.” Idiáquez, BNM Ms/ 9375.
idealized image of the Spanish Monarchy; it also represented the idealized vision of the nation as its kings were the symbolic fictive body of the kingdom.205 Such opinions reflected the new vision of politics dominant in Spain by the late-sixteenth century. Here, the destiny of the monarchy and that of the king, and thus that of Spain, were one and the same. Indeed, the excellencies and virtues of the monarchy [the “New Monarchy” (Nueva Monarchia)] were also those of the king and the nation.206 Thus, Madera provided a history that showed how the stability and permanence of Spain and its empire rested “upon religion, the impartial administration of justice, and prudent government,” and thus was tied to a Christian reason of state.207 Thus in his ‘Dedication to Philip II,’ Madera suggested that the king needed to understand the past of Spanish civilization and the “excellencies” of the Spanish Monarchy in order to “understand himself” (following the Delphic command of Sapere Aude), and thereby emphasizing the extent to which the king embodied the collective dignity, past and present, of the country he ruled.208 In this way his work also performed the function of a political treatises written by a jurist. Implicitly, this presented the king as the sum of the accumulated and inherited cultural experience of the Spanish past. For Madera, man was a historical creature, and this understanding of the indelibly historical nature of man and the king furnishes perhaps the most fundamental motive for both the study of history, but also for the writing of his work. Moreover, through reading this history, Philip could confirm and justify his own decisions, and especially those concerning France.

205 As Madera wrote to Idiáquez of Philip II, “the History of the Realm runs through His veins.” Madera to Idiáquez, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/468. Intrinsically, history was bound up in the King’s person, even regarded as an extension of the imaginary body of the King. See Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also, Louis Marin, Portrait of the King, trans. Martha M. Houle (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 10–15.
207 Madera, Excelencias, 244.
208 Madera, Excelencias, Dedicatoria al Rey.
Madera’s *Excellencias* was not only marked by his technical-juridical style, but also reflected the spiritual and political needs of the monarchy. Madera provided an “official” history to defend Philip’s intentions in France through a glorious history of Spain, and in this way his work was more in line with the rhetorical humanism so prevalent across Europe. Yet his demonstration of Spanish precedence as based in antiquity, purity, continuity, and his use of this illustrious history as testament, demonstrated how he brought his legal, political, even antiquarian concerns to his work. Indeed, Madera, in particular, expertly combined the old and the new assumptions and methodologies of history to new political effect. In fact, the manner in which Madera turned a scholastic juridical framework into a language of exhortative rhetoric is one of the most original aspects of the work. Moreover, Madera’s work was an assemblage of concrete evidence of Spanish greatness, whether such evidence be relics, or the Spanish language.

According to Madera, Spain was worthy of intervention in France because it was older, more noble, had a purer and continuous dynastic line and a purer form of Christianity than any other nation and it was Catholic earlier than even France. Significantly, Spain’s superior Catholicism over that of France, and the absolute religious purity of its monarchy would be a powerful argument for the worthiness of a Spanish heir, especially over a converted Henry. For Madera, however, it was the Spanish Monarchy’s antiquity and grandeur that made it outshine every other monarchy, including that of France. Further, it had a lengthy history of resistance against the heretic: it had resisted the Romans, the Carthaginians, and the Moors, always maintaining its true essence, while also providing its own cultural and political contributions, such as giving the greatest number of (foreign) emperors to Rome. Whether he was looking at
the Spanish Monarchy, or the doings of illustrious men, for Madera, it was Spanish superiority, grandeur and prestige in various forms, its “excellencies,” especially as based in their antiquity, purity and continuity, that proved Spanish prowess and worth, as it provide them with authority and preeminence, and thus justified Spanish precedence and superiority among its European counterparts and legitimized Spanish claims to the French throne. Moreover, here we also clearly see how history, just as Spanish advisors had demanded, was to be a unifying mechanism between the sovereign and his people.

Antonio de Herrera on Spain and France

The last of the works commissioned to address questions relating to France was an account of Spanish involvement in the French Wars of Religion, *Historia de los sucesos de Francia desde el año de 1585, que comenzó la liga Católica, hasta el fin del año de 1594* (1598) by Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas.209 While Garibay’s work had substantiated and verified Spain’s dynastic claims and Madera’s work proved the worthiness of the Spanish Crown to intercede in French affairs, there was still a need to discount negative views of Spanish involvement in the French Wars of Religion. Both Garibay and Madera had written their works in a political climate in which the possibility of the Infanta Isabela ascending to the French throne still had the support of French Catholics. Henry of Navarre (now Henry IV), however, had converted to Catholicism in 1593, which meant that if the worthiness of Isabela over Henry was to continue to be debated, further justifications needed to be promoted. More importantly, armed conflict had erupted between Henry IV and the Spanish (1595-1598) and so continued, and

209 An earlier manuscript version appears at the BNM Ms/ 6747. Just as for Garibay’s *Geneologia*, no study exists of Herrera’s, *Historia de los sucesos de Francia.*
especially financial, support for the Spanish cause in France needed to be bolstered. As a result, Philip and the Crown understood the need to clarify the motivations behind Spain’s initial involvement in the Wars of Religion.

The Spanish Crown, therefore, commissioned Herrera to write a history explaining how Spain had involved itself in the French conflict. Indeed, there was a need to assure Spaniards that these justifications remained and continued to guide their actions, and so the king personally approached Herrera in 1596, requesting that he write a “full-fledged history of the French Wars of Religion.”²¹⁰ Herrera reiterated in his ‘Introduction’ the imperative of his work, and that his history of France was completed on the direct orders of the king: “He ordered me to write the true history of actions in France.”²¹¹ Further, as Moura wrote to Herrera, there was an additional immediacy, as there was great need to be leery “of [Henry’s] conversion back to Catholicism, as this should only be seen as an action done for political gain, and not out of faith,” and therefore Spanish pressure to remove him from the throne could not be lifted.²¹² Indeed, many French Catholics also viewed Henry’s conversion as insincere, compelling the Spanish Crown to hold to the possibility that Isabella would persevere in the French contest.

Undoubtedly, Herrera’s prior history legitimizing Spanish actions in Portugal, discussed in Chapter Three, directly contributed to the commissioning of Historia de los sucesos de Francia. The Crown knew that Herrera could and would harness the new history discussed in

²¹⁰ An account of this meeting appears in Herrera to Avalleneda, 9/28/1596, Archivo de los Condes de Orgáz (Ávila), Secc. Castrillo, legajo XVI.
²¹² Moura to Herrera, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468.
Chapter One to the service of this particular question of France, just as he had done for Portugal. Moreover, it should be noted that Herrera had already addressed the affairs of France in 1586, when he translated from French a tract written by English Catholics to their French counterparts, *Advertencias que los católicos de Inglaterra escribieron a los católicos de Francia tocantes a las presentes revoluciones, y cerco de Paris* (1589) [A Warning Written by English Catholics to French Catholics on their present turmoil and the siege of Paris], which warned the French of the dangers that would result if they lost their religion and came to be ruled by a Protestant monarch.\(^\text{213}\) Indeed, in this work, Herrera demonstrated prescience, writing directly in his prologue that his translation was intended as a means to inform Spanish readers that Catholicism in France was at risk unless Philip intervened militarily to prevent the accession to the throne of Protestant Henry of Navarre. Significantly, Philip ordered that this work be re-published in 1592, in obvious response to the escalation of this issue and Philip’s expressed desire to intervene in the French succession.\(^\text{214}\) In the new 1592 edition, Herrera added a section on the horrors that had befallen English Catholics by the cruelty of ministers installed by the heretic Elizabeth in 1592. Herrera insisted that a Protestant France would bring the same fate to French Catholics, and therefore that any intervention by Philip in France was necessary to protect religion, and that those who sought to make it about other issues were mere “*politiques*” (*políticos*).\(^\text{215}\) Herrera, therefore, not only possessed an ample base from which to draw when beginning to compose his

\(^{213}\) Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Advertencias que los católicos de Inglaterra escribieron a los católicos de Francia tocantes a las presentes revoluciones, y cerco de Paris* (1589), RAH (Sello y Ex-libris de la Biblioteca E. F. San Román), 2/1063. This was a translation of the, *Advertissement des Catholiques anglois aux François Catholiques, du danger où ils son de perdre leur Religion; et d’ experimenter, comme en Angleterre, la cruauté des Ministres s’ils reçoivent à la couronne un Roy qui soit Heretique de Loys Dorleans* (1586).

\(^{214}\) The second edition was published with a slightly longer and more pointed title: Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Advertencias de los Católicos Ingleses a los Católicos Franceses, acerca del peligro de los ministros herejes si admiten a la Corona a un Rey Erético* (Zaragoza, 1592). This second edition included various addenda with translations of letters written by English Catholics dating from 1586 until 1592.

Historia de los sucesos de Francia, but had made his thoughts well-known on these issues, as well as his support for the Catholic cause.

Published in 1598, Herrera’s Historia de los sucesos de Francia provided an extended defense of Philip’s right to intervene in France’s civil wars, or as a contemporary document described, it was a work “that proves that Your Majesty was moved to help the [French] Catholics in order to protect the faith.”216 Indeed, Herrera (like Garibay and Madera) adopted an openly pro-Catholic position to justify Philip’s decision to intervene in France’s internal affairs. Herrera sought to discredit any rumors that claimed that “the King has covered his more political intentions under the mantle of religion . . . and that he is not interested in peace with France, but rather yearns with the desire to wage war.”217 Consequently, Herrera made his work a way to present Philip as “the first prince of Christendom,” by offering an extended defense of Philip’s right to intervene in the conflict by directly claiming that, although he had done so “reluctantly” (as no Christian prince wants to go to war), Philip II saw intervention as a necessity, led by “his sincere and zealous desire to protect the Catholic religion.”218 Herrera, however, added to this justification an additional element, that it was Philip’s desire to help maintain the “public good” in France that had moved him to intervene in French affairs.219 It was this combination of a defense of the faith and of the public good that provided the key element in helping Herrera

216 Emphasis mine. The full passage is in English, and reads: “Herrera is known to have just finished writing about the French civil war from 1585 to 1594 that proves that your Majesty assisted the Catholics only in order to protect the faith.” AGI Indiferente General, legajo 743, fol. 209, (consulta of 2/12/1598).
217 “Otros dicen que el rey con el manto de la religión, cubre outras políticas intenciones . . . es lejos de pensar en conseguir la paz de Francia, [porque] ardia en deseos de hacerle la guerra.” Herrera, Historia de los sucesos en Francia, Introduction.
218 Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, prologue.
219 Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, prologue. He repeats this dual justification on the concluding page of his work (353).
solidify Spanish claims in France, through a demonstration of Philip’s Christian reason of state intentions.

Although Herrera’s *Historia de los sucesos de Francia* covered Spanish involvement in the religious wars in France from 1585 to 1594, it should be noted that in his Introduction, Herrera drew upon Spain’s illustrious history. In terms very similar to those of Madera, Herrera presented “Spain [as] the most ancient [oldest] in history, population, [C]hristianity and many other things above other Kingdoms.” Herrera also stressed that, most importantly, when looking at the Spanish past it was “the services rendered by the Crown of Spain to the Holy Roman Apostolic See” and how it was a combination of all of these elements that gave Spaniards “the greatest merit and worth” in any imperial claim. Lastly, Herrera stressed that Isabela’s dynastic claims had been well established, and her support by French Catholics in the Estates General well known. Thus, Herrera’s focus was to be upon the activities of Spaniards in the Wars of Religion and upon the military actions taken in defense of the faith by the Spaniards and the French who supported them. For Herrera, despite the other justifications given for Spanish supremacy and superiority in the dynastic contest, the conflict with France was above all an ideological war. In this way, Herrera’s work directly aligned with the directives of the Crown. The contest against heresy was an imperative that the Spanish Crown and Philip’s key ministers, including Moura and Idiáquez, saw as not only ethically necessary but in line with the reason of state politics of the Spanish king; moreover, it was strategically important, especially regarding

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220 “Que España es más Antigua en situación, población, cristianidad y otras cosas que otros Reynos.” Herrera, *Historia de los sucesos de Francia*, prologue.

221 “los servicios hechos por la corona de España a la Santa Sede Apostólica Romana.” Herrera’s *Historia de los sucesos de Francia*, prologue.

222 “el derecho bien fundado por sangre y sucesión legítima de la Infanta Isabela y su reconocimento [by the Estates General] con toda brevedad como Reyna propietaria.” Herrera’s *Historia de los sucesos de Francia*, Introduction.
Henry IV, a once openly Protestant adversary and one whose aggressive character had showed itself time and time again.

To provide the fullest picture of Spanish intervention in France, Herrera sought to show the totality of military affairs. Indeed, perhaps some of the most evocative prose in the entire work appears in Herrera’s section summary on “the kind of materials” he included in his discussion of military affairs: “[I will provide a history of] the fortuitous events, the adverse ones, the vicissitudes and inconstancies of human affairs, the clash of arms. [On] the rivalries among generous souls, who put honor before their lives . . . [on] the truces and the cease fires, their conditions, and the men that made them. [And on] the return to war . . .”

Thus, Herrera included the realities of war, defeats as well as victories. Perhaps this more realistic appraisal of war was necessary, especially since Herrera sought to influence his reader to continue to support the French cause in an atmosphere where Spaniards had grown weary of the conflict, having realized how devastating financially, and in terms of casualties, it had been. Indeed, many Spaniards had begun to lose some of their faith in supporting this divine mission, or as Madera had put it, in Philip’s “God-given right” to fight heresy. Herrera presented military actions, therefore, as a collective effort and emphasized that, “This work will ensure that our Spanish wars and campaigns are recorded in writing, which will not only benefit your Majesty, but will let all know of the commanders and soldiers who have distinguished themselves by their actions . . . so that the deeds of our countrymen are celebrated” and thus was intended not only to honor and celebrate Philip’s decision to intervene, but the individual Spaniards who participated.

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223 Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, Introduction.
224 Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, Introduction.
Herrera began his discussion of the conflict with the causes behind Spanish intervention. Herrera recounted how there had been a great need for Philip’s troops to intervene actively in the conflicts in France when word of the troubles and miseries that French Catholics were facing came to Philip’s attention in 1585. Herrera relayed how Philip was greatly alarmed when he read the account of Mateo de Aguirre, who had seen firsthand the aggression of the Protestants, and how the king was so moved by this account that he immediately sent troops to aid the French.\textsuperscript{225} Herrera was clear, however, that Philip had greatly deliberated upon these matters, as he knew of the perils that could come with military action and emphasized how Philip had consulted with Pope Clement on what to do.\textsuperscript{226}

For his evidence, Herrera stated that he had used court “manuscripts and state papers” as clear “demonstrations” of government action, which provided him with “proof” of the intentions of Philip and the Crown in the struggles for the “defense of the Faith,” and thus verified the Crown’s “true” reasons for action.\textsuperscript{227} In this, Herrera presented the desire to intervene in French affairs as a collective effort and emphasized the great many archbishops, bishops, presidents, and members of the royal councils, viceroyes, ambassadors, and deputies of the Cortes who in these sources had demonstrated their “great willingness” to support the king in these efforts, and especially providing the king with the money necessary “for the many extraordinary expenditures in defense of the Holy faith.”\textsuperscript{228} Moreover, Herrera stressed how he had found ample evidence of how French Catholics had turned to Spain and Philip for aid. Missives by

\textsuperscript{225} Herrera, \textit{Historia de los sucesos de Francia}, 4. Aguirre’s account would only be published in French, appearing as Mateo de Aguirre, \textit{Declaration au Roi D’Espagne sur les troubles, miseres & calamitès que affligent la Chretienté & notamment le Roiaume de France} (1591).

\textsuperscript{226} Herrera wrote how Philip had sent an emissary to Pope Clement with letters asking his advice on what to do with regards to France, and that he had read many of these letters first-hand. Herrera, \textit{Historia de los sucesos de Francia}, 23. One such letter is: Philip to Clement, 1/2/1592, AGS, Estado, legajo 960.

\textsuperscript{227} Herrera, \textit{Historia de los sucesos de Francia}, Introduction and 23.

\textsuperscript{228} Herrera, \textit{Historia de los sucesos de Francia}, 56. Similar comments are made on pp. 87, 90, 128, and 254.
French Catholics to the king relayed how they had seen it as a sacrilege that a heretic like Henry of Navarre, who had been excommunicated by the pope, should accede to the French throne. Herrera further emphasized the various legal actions the French had taken to prevent Henry’s accession, even including how in early 1584 French Catholics had attempted to overturn the Salic Law of succession in order to maintain the Catholic purity of the monarchy.²²⁹ Herrera, therefore, presented French Catholic nobles as Spain’s “greatest allies” (aliados), who acknowledged and accepted “the beneficial conditions” (las ventajosas condiciones) that “the Catholic King [Philip]” (el rey católico) offered to France by securing the Catholic religion, but also recognized how Philip and Isabela offered France “security and reputation” (seguridad y reputación).²³⁰

Herrera further emphasized that Spain’s role as defender of the faith was well-known across Europe, and that the French were not the first to turn to the Spanish and Philip for help in protecting the faith. English Catholics, unhappy with the confessional politics of Elizabeth, the Irish, who were under the same regime and who saw the development of English plantations, and the Scottish, who had wanted the restoration of Mary (Stuart), had also “cast their eyes and petitions to the King of Spain.”²³¹ This image of Spain as the “protector of Catholics” and leader of (Catholic) Christianity was indeed diffused throughout Europe, and the development of a

²²⁹ Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, 6.
²³⁰ Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, 6. On this, Herrera relied heavily on the work of Louis Dorléans (1542–1629), who had provided him with clear evidence of how the French had sought alliance with Spaniards, and how many Frenchmen supported Spain’s intentions. Loys[sic] Dorléans, Le banquet et apresdinee du conte d’Arete ou il se traiyte de la dissimulation du Roy de Navarre & des moeurs de ses partisans . . Reveu, corrigé et augmenté par l’Auteur (Arras, 1594), Preface. Dorléans wrote of the necessities of a Catholic King (“avoir un Roy Catholique, instrument de Dieu pour réparer toutes misères” p. 4), and approved of Spanish intervention as long as it was only guided by a love of the Church, and the desire to see the Crown of France go to a Catholic. Indeed, his work was primarily written to justify the possible election of a Spanish Catholic King in France, and to demonstrate how the Spaniards were not the natural enemies of the French, but that this was the role of the English.
²³¹ “dirigieron sus mirada y sus peticiones al rey de España.” Herrera, Historia de los sucesos en Francia, 27.
European-wide Catholic sentiment had been derived from the understanding of the necessity of an alliance with the king of Spain as the only option possible to save the “ancient” Catholic religion (la antigua religion). It was this pro-Catholic sympathy, along with the hereditary rights of his daughter, his obligation to defend and protect his French Catholic brethren, faith that God would help them in “restoring Catholicism,” and the need to defend the French “public good” (el bien publico), that Herrera presented as corroborating elements for Philip’s intervention in France.

Throughout his account, Herrera stressed that it was not only the actions and ingenuity of men, but also the hand of God that had aided the Catholics in this enterprise. For example, in his account of the battle of Calais, he wrote that Catholic victory was sent to them from “God, after the flagellation of so many disappointing wars.”²³² Thus, although Herrera stressed the practical nature of battles, the valorous actions of French Catholic nobles, the ingenuity of Spanish military maneuvers, the bravery of Spanish soldiers, and the decisions made by men that helped battles to be won, he never lost sight of the role of Providence in these victories.²³³ In this way, Herrera sought to move and inspire his readers by reminding them of Spain’s higher purpose in defense of the faith, seeking to garner support for the Spanish cause.

Herrera’s focus, however, was upon military actions, and his accounts of battles allowed him to recount moments of great triumph and great pathos for the Catholic cause, like his

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²³² “enviada por Dios después del flagelo de tantas guerras desoladoras.” Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, 12.
²³³ For example, the Spanish victory at Amiens after a successive series of defeats was presented as a potent example of the renewed military power and force of the Spanish King and his army and of his never-ending resources, but also as “the miracle that God was seeking for his people in their moment of worst affliction” (“milagro por el que Dios socorrió a su pueblo en los momentos de mayor afflicción”). Herrera’s Historia de los sucesos de Francia, 19.
account of the defeat of the German Protestant rebels by the duke of Guise. Crucially, Herrera also provided details of military action in order to dispel foreign rumors of how Spanish soldiers had supposedly acted in battle and its aftermath. Herrera stressed that Spaniards were being described “in the most perverse and sacrilegious way, akin to the worst heretics.” While Herrera did not elaborate as to the specifics of these accusations, many French had indeed complained that Spanish soldiers had destroyed property and pillaged the land. In response, Herrera used the eyewitness testimony of both French and Spanish soldiers and nobles who had been present at the events in question to present the “truth of events,” most notably drawing from, citing and referencing the accounts of Antoine de Laval and Antonio Trillo de Guadalajara. Additionally, Herrera stressed, “I informed myself in various languages, and directly from people of state, and men of great merit . . . from parts of Italy and France who through letters, or eyewitnesses provide a true account, [and] indubitable notice [of what occurred].” Thus, he brought to his work the requirements for the “new” history to provide “proof.”

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234 “de forma tan perversa o sacrílega como los peores de los herejes” Herrera’s Historia de los sucesos en Francia, Introduction.
236 This was a reference to the virulent anti-Protestant history by French Catholic Antoine de Laval, L’historical des rois non-catholiques sur un roi antichristianne et la resistance continuelle des catholiques (1592), and Antonio Trillo de Guadalajara’s Historia de la rebelión y guerras de Flandes (1592), which also discussed the conflict in France. For Herrera, the authority of these works derived from the fact Laval and Guadalajara had been direct witnesses to deeds and happenings. Similarly, Herrera drew from the eyewitness account of Pedro Cornejo, Compendio y breve relación de la Liga y Confederación de Francia (1591), which covered the events from 1585 to 1591, and which was considered the authoritative work on the subject until Herrera’s came along. Herrera also relied on Bernardino de Mendoza’s Comentarios de don Bernardino de Mendoza de lo sucedido en las guerras de los Payses Baxos, y Francia (1592). Significantly, Mendoza had provided an eyewitness account of many of disputes presented before the French Estates General in favour of Isabela Clara Eugenia and for the dismissal of Salic law.
237 “yo me informé de lengua en lengua y de mano en mano de personas de estado y de gran guisa . . . de Italia y Francia, los cuales por letras misivas dello tenían verdadera relación y por testigos de vista, indubitada noticia.” Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, Introduction.
Significantly, while Herrera wished to provide a more positive account of the activities of Spanish soldiers, he did not shy away from all reproach. He admitted that eyewitness accounts attested to how Spanish soldiers had increasingly lost respect for local custom and the institutions that they were supposedly defending, and that this had increased anti-Spanish sentiment, thereby presenting a more realistic appraisal of the actions resulting during war. Herrera stressed, however, that this was the result of gangs of “lowly” soldiers who had set out on their own. He made clear, that the moment that Philip was made aware of such actions, not only was the king “gravely saddened to hear of such acts,” but the king immediately sent Juan Fernández de Velasco to impose restrictions upon soldiers, restore order, and ensure that all institutions and laws were upheld.

For Herrera, Philip’s swift action and attention to this matter was a clear indication of how the Crown’s intentions in all things was not only to maintain orthodoxy, but also uphold French institutions and administration in order to maintain stability, order, custom, continuity, and the common good. Therefore, when it came to taking over the cities of Doullens and Calais, Herrera stressed how in both instances, Philip had guaranteed and confirmed in writing that the privileges of these towns were to be preserved in full. In this way, Herrera presented both Spaniards and Philip as liberators of these cities, both from heretics and heresy and from disruption and disorder. As further “proof” (prueba) of Philip’s and Spanish desire to maintain the common good, Herrera described how in each city that they took they immediately “expelled all [simonites], installed a college of Jesuits, respected the privileges of convents and the cities, including those granted by Henry IV, compensated those if there was a need to repair the city’s

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238 For how Spaniards sought the practical application of such ideas, see José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, *Felipe II y Cambrai: El Consenso del Pueblo. La soberanía entre la teoría y la práctica política (Cambrai, 1595-1677)* (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 1999).
infrastructure, guaranteed all payments of salaries to soldiers, suppressed all [new] taxes that had been established, and abolished all [new] superfluous offices that had been created [not by taking away authority, but by correcting abuses], respected all municipal justice, designated all offices to Frenchmen, respected the civil populace, and accepted the municipal body as valid political interlocutor.” In this, Herrera clearly demonstrated, Philip’s upholding of constitutional structures, and thereby, the “multiple things that the King has procured to do for the common good,” and melding constitutional ideas with Philip’s Christian reason of state politics.

In addition to his chapters relaying military actions, Herrera also provided accounts of political actions, including various attempts made by Spaniards to garner support from the French Estates. Herrera discussed at length the allocutions made by Juan Bautista Tassis and Iñigo de Mendoza in front of the Estates General in May of 1593, and that of the duke of Feria a few weeks later, to gain support for their cause, discredit and remove the Salic Law, and affirm the need to defend Catholicism. Thus, Herrera supplemented his military account of events with political acts, a clear reflection of Herrera’s wider reason of state objectives.

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239 “la expulsión de todos los simoniacos, instalar un colegio de jesuitas, respecto a los privilegios de los conventos y a los privilegios de la villa (incluso los acordados por Enrique IV), compensaciones en caso de construirse una ciudadela, garantía de pago de la guarnición profesional por el rey, supresión de todos los impuestos nuevos establecidos en los últimos veinte años y del los oficios superfluos creados en los últimos treinta años, respecto a la justicia municipal, designación para los oficios a naturales de Francia, respecto a la población civil, y aceptación del cuerpo político municipal como interlocutor válido.” Herrera, *Historia de los sucesos de Francia*, 27. For these claims, Herrera stressed that he had drawn such statements from “papers of state” (*papeles de estado*) held in the Archive of Simancas. Indeed, various diplomatic papers in Simancas describe Spanish actions in France in similar terms: see AGS (Estado) 1596, n° 52; AGS (Estado) 1598, n° 31 and 34; AGS (Estado) 611, n° 29; see also, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 218, fols. 78 and 80.

240 “de las diversas cosas que proveyó el Rey para el buen gobierno.” Herrera, *Historia de los sucesos de Francia*, 28.

241 Herrera, *Historia de los sucesos de Francia*, 247. Herrera similarly referenced how he took his account of these proceedings from papers held at the archive of Simancas. An account of these events does appear in AGS (Estado) K–1585, n° 47.
By focusing on matters of both governance and war, Herrera kept to the tenets of humanist historiography. Herrera, however, expanded upon the traditional topics discussed in humanist historiography, just as had Garibay and Madera, by including matters of faith, and combining the question of religion with that of the state. Herrera wished to show how “reason” was not the only factor in the life of Spanish politics and “reason of state.” Faith played a fundamental role, and “reason,” or the criterion for judging the rectitude of the means directed towards certain ends, was in turn subject to the scrutiny of a higher court. For Herrera, religion and its so-called daughter, ethics, enabled the monarchy to make certain that *recta ratio* was applied in the process of selecting the means for action in France and especially if those means included war. Herrera stressed, therefore, how only “just and the strongest reasons,” had motivated Philip to take military action, and that the most “just” (righteous) reason was “the defense of the faith.”

In early modern Europe, neither Catholics or Protestants conceived of religious unity and governmental stability as separate political objectives. Herrera’s stress upon the Catholicism of the Spaniards was undoubtedly a strategy to appeal to French Catholics who regarded Catholicism as a vital part of French identity and Protestantism as even more “foreign” than Spanish involvement in French affairs. Moreover, religious uniformity was not a secular or lay issue, but derived its authority from Scripture. The Spanish Crown and Herrera as its mouthpiece

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242 “solo justas y potentísimas razones.” Herrera, *Historia de los sucesos de Francia*, 257. This insistence on the moral duty of kingship to serve the “common good” and justice and on the subservience of the prince to eternal, natural and divine law was commonplace in theories of monarchy in Spain and Europe.


knew and capitalized on this relationship between faith and government, just as such notions had also guided the works of both Garibay and Madera. Herrera did not differentiate between strictly political issues and those that were dependent of the necessities of the Church. Indeed, when it came to France, Herrera expressly sought to show the “concerns and cares of the King in both spiritual and temporal governance.”\(^{245}\) Herrera, therefore, provided both temporal as well as spiritual reasons for the accession of a Spanish monarch to the French throne, presenting both as crucial not only for France, but for Spain, its monarchy, and the Catholic faith itself.

Herrera, therefore, further elaborated upon the Catholic imperatives that had moved Philip when it came to France. The first was that the very existence of a “catholic Christian republic” (\textit{republica cristiana católica}) was threatened and needed to be defended. The second was that the crux of Philippine politics was dependent on the “maintenance and defense of the faith” (\textit{sustentación y defensa de la fe}). Third, that taking up this mission meant that Philip found himself as head and leader of all the Catholic monarchs of Europe who recognized his role and the necessity of his undertaking: “Only to him has God given this commission and authority to sustain and defend the Catholic religion and Roman Church, not only in lands where princes are Catholics, but also where they might not be but have Catholic vassals whom, after God, look to the King of Spain in the hopes of having him help free them from the strife in which they live.”\(^{246}\) Spanish intentions in France, therefore, was not only for the benefit of the “Holy Roman

\(^{245}\) “del cuidado del Rey en lo spiritual y temporal del gobierno.” Herrera, \textit{Historia de los sucesos de Francia}, Introduction.
\(^{246}\) “De manera que a el solo principalmente . . . le ha dado Dios la comisión y autoridad para sustentar y defender la religión católica e iglesia romana, no solamente donde los principes son católicos, o donde no lo son y hay parte de católicos vasallos, los cuales después de Dios tienen puestos los ojos en el rey de España, y con las esperanzas que dél tienen, se animan a pasar la estrechura en que viven.” Herrera, \textit{Historia de los sucesos de Francia}, Introduction, and repeated on 254.
Catholic faith,” but as Herrera emphasized, for “the universal benefices of Christianity.”

In this way this work was also a product of the present conditions in Europe. Underpinning its view of Spanish activities in France is the persistent claim in Historia de los sucesos de Francia that the only hope for the future security of both Christianity and the only political system in which there was hope for a society that was both godly and politically-minded, that is orderly, rational and prudent, was the Spanish Monarchy and Empire. Ultimately, Spanish involvement in France was, as Herrera put it, “not about aggrandizing or increasing the Monarchy of Spain [which many fear], but rather to put in France a Catholic Monarch, for the good of that Kingdom, and all of Christianity.”

For Herrera, by supporting these goals, Philip was not only being a good king, but the “perfect prince” (príncipe perfecto), the archetypal Christian ruler, whose political conduct embodied true reason of state. As Herrera stressed, by “placing within that Kingdom a Catholic [Monarch], not only will France be recuperated [restored], but hopes will be ignited that once again in Germany one might see the return of Catholicism through the serene House of Austria . . . and that together with Spain, having in its hands France, they will restore law upon all others.”

For Herrera, this was Spain’s reason for being—to conserve the true faith—and by

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247 “para la gloria y servicio de Dios nuestro señor y de la exaltación de su sancta Fee Cathólica Romana y del universal beneficio de la Christiandad.” Herrera, Historia de los sucesos, at front unpagedinated. Herrera also presented Philip as “la columna de la iglesia . . . obligado a no perder la ocasión que Dios le ofrece.” Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, 211.

248 “no se trate[sic] de engrandecer la Monarchia de España, que es lo que les hace andar recelosos, sino de poner en Francia un Rey Catholic[o]sic] parábibien de aquel Reyno y de toda Christianidad.” Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, 254.

249 “poniendo en aquel Reyno Rey Catholic, no sólo se recuperará Francia, empero ha de aguardarse que volverá a cobrarse en Alemania la Religión Cathólica por la serenísima Casa de Austria . . . que junto con España teniendo a su mano Francia, pondrá ley a todo lo demás, para lo cual havemos de juzgar que lo ha ordenado Dios con grande providencia que suceda en tantos Reynos y Señorios.” Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, Introduction. Thus, Herrera sought to stress Philip’s “singular and admirable constancy in the conservation, defense, and augmentation of the Holy Catholic Faith . . . [and] his admirable determination to expurgate errors of faith from
doing so it would be a triumph for the king, as well as a decisive moment for the Reformation
problem in the rest of Europe. Herrera’s work had a larger didactic purpose and wider political
implications, for as Herrera wrote in his Introduction, by recounting Philip’s intentions and
actions in France, “other parts of Europe who are confronting similar problems in questions of
religion, may take great utility . . . and they may too, through his example and dialogue, . . .
conserve their state by living and dying in the Catholic faith” and bring this “doctrine and
example to their lands, so that they might bring greater benefit than they would otherwise.”\(^{250}\)
Herrera, therefore, also transformed his history into a call for a Christian reason of state to be
adopted by all monarchs, specifically advocated against the Machiavellianism that divorced rule
from religion and morality.

For Herrera, there was one basic political truth: the state cannot survive without religion,
and that religion was to be Catholic. This part of Herrera’s argument allowed him to position
foreign criticism, and especially the work of Mayernne, as the work of “heretics,” whose self-
interest in promoting Henry IV was not only against the interest of the French Monarchy and the
true religion, but also against the best interests of France. Herrera presented Philip as the only
agent through which the hand of God could be guided in helping to stave off “the [Protestant]
wolves” and their aggression, restore civil happiness, and finally “end the conspiracy that since

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\(^{250}\) “a esta razón que estando en estos Estados las cosas de la religión en su ser, dellos mana[sic] grande utilidad,
para que en todas otras partes de Europea los que están en buen punto se conserven, y los otros sean alumbrados y
reducidos así por la frecuencia de todas naciones que aquí concurren, que se pueden corregir con el ejemplo y
conversación que aquí hallaren, y vivir y morir aquí en la fe católica, o llevar la doctrina y ejemplo se aquí a sus
tierras, donde pueden hacer más provecho que yendo de otra manera.” Herrera, \textit{Historia de los sucesos de Francia},
Prólogo al lector.
the days of Judas Escariot” had sought “to destroy the Church.” Indeed, it was not dynastic, but larger confessional and ideological reasons, or true Christian reason of state reasons, that ultimately legitimized Spanish intentions and actions in France. Moreover, since Herrera stressed that Catholicism was fundamental to the French people and their monarch, the “religious communion” between the people and the king needed to be restored as it was the foundation of the French people, and the country. The rule of a relapsed heretic like Henry of Navarre, who sought only conflict with Spain, was seen as prejudicial not only to the “public good, [and to a good Christian society, but to] all of Christianity.” France had become a “country where Faith and knowledge are threatened.” Moreover, Herrera presented confessional intentions as directly tied to the consent of the law. There could be no peace, therefore, if not brought about by the “justice” of religion. Thus, by making Philip’s defense of France’s “public good” (bien publico) and “civil order” (orden civil) a prime motivator for Spanish incursions into France’s internal affairs, Herrera combined Spanish religious reason of state with a civil reason of state.

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251 “la communio religiosa funda el pueblo . . . [y asi con las acciones del rey] el mecanismo de Dios sera guiado . . . [y] protegido de los lobos, . . . que desde Judas Iscariote intentaba destruir . . [a la] Santa Iglesia.” Herrera, *Historia de los sucesos*, 189. This is also why Herrera emphasized Philip’s “catholic arms [Catholic military and the actions they took as], totally distinct from any form of tyranny” (“catholicas armas, muy agenas de toda tyrania”). Herrera, *Historia de los sucesos de Francia*, 189.


253 Herrera’s exposition of the consequences of Huguenot control was that France had become: “tierra de tantas herejías y maldades sin justicia,” noting that wherever Calvinists reigned “a todos aquellos reynos tienen puestos en perdicion, así en lo spiritual como en lo temporal, por falta de justicia.” Herrera, *Historia de los sucesos de Francia*, Prólogo al lector. Spanish control was presented as: “como la única forma de salvar el catolicismo en la villa y de restaurar el buen gobierno que respetara[sic] los privilegios de la ciudad y las prerrogativas de los católicos.” Herrera, *Historia de los sucesos de Francia*, 128.

254 Herrera, *Historia de los sucesos de Francia*, 353. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Herrera had written a *Discurso* on reason of state. Herrera’s fivefold division of reason of state included: civil reason of state, religious reason of state, reason of war, reason of economy, and reason of justice. *Discurso y Tratado sobre la material de estado, BNM Ms/ 3011, fol. 51v.*
Herrera juxtaposed Philip’s rule against Henry’s. Indeed, just as in the additions to his translation of the polemical tract mentioned above, Herrera presented Henry’s conversion as insincere, or as a “simulated conversion” (simulada conversion), and how it was “political and private interests which led [Henry] to make profession of his Catholicism, and thus those who follow [him] have armed themselves against all law and reason.”256 Thus, Herrera described all those who supported Henry (whether before or after his conversion) as “políticos” who attempted to emancipate the state from the moral bonds of religion: “They create religion out of the state, rather than make the state out of religion” and “who use the mask and sweet name of reason of state because they know that the prince always aims at preserving and enlarging the republic,” but who are, in reality “impious and seek to set reason of state apart from the law of God, as if the Christian religion and the state were mutually exclusive, or as if there were better reason to preserve the state than the one the Lord of all states has given us.” Herrera added that these “políticos,” were “men [who] do not want a King, but rather a civil faith, which they call [Religion].”257 Further, these “políticos, were disciples of Machiavelli, men without God nor faith, and who do not believe in any religion other than that which seems best suited to preserve their station.”258 Herrera stressed that only with “the love and fear of God” could a prince find the means necessary “to rule well,” and find “true reason of state.”259 Herrera, therefore, using the language of Spanish reason of state that he was so familiar with, openly questioned whether Henry IV could possibly be able to restore the public good, or even rule the state, if he had

256 “Eran motivos políticos e intereses privados . . . haciendo profesión de catolicismo, . . . los que siguien [Henry] han armado sus brazos contra todo derecho y razón.” Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, 128.
257 “ellos no quieren un Rey sino una fe civil, la cual ellos llaman, por excelencia fe.” Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, Introduction.
258 “hombres políticos, discípulos de Mach[í]avelo, hombres sin Dios y sin fe, y que no tienen ni creen en otra religión sino la que les paresce que les está bien para conservación de su estado.” Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, Introduction.
259 Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, 192.
rejected the true religion, and then out of political convenience, and thus not out of love nor fear, had converted back.

Herrera’s work also possessed its own more immediate reason of state objectives—to motivate, draw support, conserve, and convince Spaniards to rally to the Spanish cause. In the ‘Introduction’ to the second half of the work, Herrera directly explained that his work sought “to show the honor of our actions, and its purpose . . . to condemn the traitors, and to move the heart . . . [and] even if battles have been lost . . . to not lament, but rather to admire their sacrifice,” and finally “so that others may wish to participate in the honor that those [who have fought] have won, and from which God and man will always benefit.”

Herrera, therefore, made a direct call to continued arms: “the blood which has fallen calls out to all of the Nobility, the chiefs and captains, of all Catholic soldiers. Fight soldiers of God, defeat the hydra of heresy, exterminate impiety, defend the Religion, destroy rebellion, and take forth the name of the Crucifix. What does it serve to weep [or, why should we lament out losses], when it is time to fight.”

Indeed, Herrera characterized Spanish actions in the ensuing war with Henry IV as a direct “defensive act, necessary to end the rebellion against God, and the Church that this King is perpetuating along with his allies and associates.” Herrera knew, in true Boterian fashion, that in order to engender loyalty to the Spanish cause among Spanish readers and continued support among Spanish nobles and soldiers, it was necessary to impress upon them the justice of the Spanish
cause, and to demonstrate that the “defense of religion,” both for the maintenance of the French state, but also for Spanish honor, “was just,” and that it “was necessary to place themselves at the mercy of God.”²⁶³ Herrera, therefore, based his call to arms and continued support for the Spanish cause on the same two main issues that had motivated Philip to intervene in French affairs: to defend Catholicism and protect the French public good, and that these were the honor and obligation of all Spaniards, not only of Philip as monarch.

Here we see how unity in the Catholic cause and particularly Spain’s role as defender of the faith, was presented as a source of Spanish political strength, from the perspective of both providentialists and intrinsic pragmatism. Yet coupled with a defence of the “public good,” Herrera also stressed to Spanish readers that Spain and the Spanish Monarchy also bore a political obligation to ensure peace, order, and security, and that this was the basis of Spanish imperialist ambitions. Herrera’s work, therefore, also became a means to show how in all of their actions, Philip and Spaniards were also following a historical legacy of defending the faith, and thus the “public good,” as part of Spanish obligation and character, thus extending Philip’s reason of state politics to become an imperative for all Spaniards. Indeed, by demonstrating that Spaniards’ primary concern was the preservation of the French public good through religion, Herrera also demonstrated the bases of the political ideology for which the Spaniards were willing to fight.

Undoubtedly for these reasons, Historia de los sucesos de Francia was very well received both in Spain and in Europe’s Catholic courts, even reaching Naples, where marquis Orazio Scotto wrote to Philip of Herrera, “he has corroborated the truth [and what we in Italy and

²⁶³ Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, 201.
the Latinate understand about what has and is going on in France], . . . and it has been well-received in France, where this work is most necessary, . . . although it has greatly upset the King [Henry IV].”264 Moreover, as Moura emphasized, “it gives proof of the actions done for God and the public good.”265 In this way Historia de los sucesos de Francia directly complemented the works of Madera and Garibay, who also had “given proof” in various forms of Spanish “rights to intervene in France.”266

By 1599, however, changing political circumstances would have an effect on Historia de los sucesos de Francia’s circulation. Indeed, only five months after Herrera published his work, the Treaty of Vervins (1598), which established peace between Spain and France, was signed, and although Historia de los sucesos de Francia circulated freely for almost a year, at some point in 1599, so as not to further enrage Henry IV and to help relations between Spain and France improve, Herrera’s work was temporarily denied export, and its circulation within Spain was also temporarily restricted.267 Rodrigo Vazquez de Arce, the president of the Council of Castile, wrote to Don Martin de Idiáquez, the new Secretary to Philip III in 1599, that the work overall “was good in all that it relates” (está bien en todo que en el se dize), and so there was no need to take away its license for printing, but since peace had been made with France there were a few instances where Herrera had used certain “untidy words” (palabras descompuestas) that did not “sound good” (no suenan bien) when referring to how Henry had “parted from the

264 “et particularmente delle ultime di Francia . . . sui Istoria corrobori la uerità delle italiane et latine, . . . risultato infelicità di quel Rey il fine.” Archivos Farnesianos de Nápoles, Spagna, fascio 17, num 30, fol. 494 and fol. 496. I use the facsimile copy held at the BNM R/564.
265 “es prueba de los acciones hechos por dios y por el bien publico.” Moura about Herrera’s work to Philip II, in ‘Documentos históricos manuscritos del reinado de Felipe II,” BNM Ms/ 18768.
266 Emphasis mine. “Garibay da prueba.” Moura to Idiáquez, in ‘Documentos históricos manuscritos del reinado de Felipe II,” BNM Ms/ 18768. Also, “[Madera] da prueba de los derechos del Rey en Francia” Idiáquez to Philip, BFZ, Altamira, Ms/ 468.
Catholic faith” (en quanto á estar apartado de la fe catolica), and how since the French king had “publicly returned to the faith” (se ha reducido á ella en lo publico) and reconciled with the Catholic cause and Spain, it was necessary to “take them out where one finds them in the already published works, and in any future publications.” With such minor changes, Arce believed that the book could once again freely circulate both in Spain and abroad.

Herrera did not believe that any such changes were required, however, and defended the “truth” that his work provided. Herrera even wrote to archduke Albert and his wife Doña Isabel, pleading for them to help him keep his work in circulation in its original form. In this letter, Herrera argued that although political considerations had changed and peace between the two nations restored, there was nothing in his work that he believed offended the French or Henry: “There is nothing in it which is against required modesty” and that not only had he been fair and thorough in his research of what had happened, but his work was corroborated through court documents, and eyewitness testimony. Following his Ciceronian ideals, Herrera even stressed, “In this, as in all of my work, I have taken the greatest care to provide truth, which is the first law of history.” Moreover, he emphasized that, since he had written his history in “proper form,” nothing that it contained, regardless of changing circumstances, could be taken as “untrue” or written “without reason.” Herrera, therefore, further pleaded with archduke Albert to use his

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268 “que se quiten de donde las ay en la ympression que está hecha y en las que de aqui adelante se hizieren, y con esto podra correr el libro.” Vázquez Arce to [Martin] Idiáquez, 5/8/1599, BNM R/11889.

269 “Carta del Cronista Antonio de Herrera al Archiduque Alberto” (Letter dated the 20th of April, 1600) (Transcribed and commentary by Morel-Fatio), appended to Morel-Fatio, “El cronista Antonio de Herrera,” 55–57. Morel-Fatio does not provide reference to where this letter is held, so the original has not been read. I rely solely on his transcription of this letter.

270 My translation from the Spanish as cited in Morel-Fatio, “El cronista Antonio de Herrera,” 57. Similarly in his Prologue, Herrera had written: “En todo el discurso se tuvo en gran cuenta la verdad que es la primera ley de la historia. Los tiempos van averiguados con mucho cuidado y puntualidad.” Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, Prologue.
influence to lift the embargo, claiming that it was “the King himself [Philip II] who had ordered that I write on the successes in France from the year 1585 until 1594 . . . to let it be known that he did not take his actions to oppress nor divide that state, as his enemies led many to believe, but rather did so because of the zeal of religion, and his desire for the good of the French people . . . and that the King himself, having already seen the peace with France, continued to [endorse] my book and did not stop the publication of 600 copies.” Herrera continued that, “there was still much to be known about this issue, as much had been written, before and after the peace, by those seeking to offend his Majesty [Philip II] and the name of Spain. I ask Your Highness to look at the book, for he shall find in it nothing which is contrary to what is known, [and will see that] what is narrated is mostly about what happened amongst the French themselves, and so they cannot be offended by it, nor have they been offended, as it is what they know to be true.” He expressly wrote that the purpose for writing history, as well as his role as a “good historian” (buen historiador), obliged him to “not hide the truth, nor tell falsities[lies]” (ni ocultar verdad, ni decir falsedad). This demonstrates how Herrera, the historian, always sought to maintain his historiographical criteria, even in the face of criticism. Indeed, for Herrera, when it came to Henry, these were not his elaborations, but rather a view fully substantiated by contemporary sources and opinions. Lastly, Herrera argued that, since his work provided a “definitive account of the wars and the intentions of the Spanish,” it needed to be widely read, and even reiterated his Christian reason of state goals, “so that Spain may know of its purpose,” and so “that other nations may know how to rule.”

273 Herrera, AGI, Patronato, 18.
274 Morel-Fatio, “El cronista Antonio de Herrera,” 57. Ultimately, we do not know how successful his petition was, or how many of the original 600 copies were amended. I can find no censored copies, and uncensored copies of this text do appear in libraries in France, Italy, and even Germany.
his work not only because he had written his history with the necessary humanist diligence but stressed that it provided the “truth,” and for that reason it could not, nor should it offend. As a result, Herrera concluded that he did not need to revise his account, since, “the truth says so” (*la verdad dice así*), and that the sources and eyewitness testimony he had used testified to his assessment.275

Herrera’s auto-defense brought together a personal reaffirmation of his work with a professional reaffirmation of the historian and the character he was to possess, which demonstrated not only an elevated idea of the historian and his purpose, but evidence of history’s perceived scientific nature. This still meant, however, that Herrera’s presentation of the truth did not supersede the needs of the “public good,” nor the necessities of the Spanish Crown. Indeed, for Herrera, some “untidy words” were not sufficient to change his larger objectives, which were to show the nature of Philip and the Spanish character and the true motivations for why they had intervened in French affairs. Moreover, for Herrera, keeping his original representation of Henry demonstrated his adherence to the truth. Indeed, Herrera sought to vindicate himself through his claims to autonomous judgment and impartiality and argued that it was his sources that had provided him with the first grounds of “truth” above any other consideration. In addition, and perhaps what is more revealing, is Herrera’s claim that he would not change his account, since including this information did “not damage the state.” 276 For Herrera, the “untidy words” in his history did not threaten stability, nor question the authority of the state, nor diminish Philip’s intentions in intervening in French affairs; instead, his history provided a “truth” that needed to be disseminated and protected.

The statements issued by Herrera in his defense, bring into focus how, when it came to defending his work and the integrity of his claims and investigations, he stood his ground and followed the mandates of both his profession, but also of his office, even against very powerful members of the court. Perhaps that is why a Council of Castile member described Herrera as follows: “he is an equal judge, and is moderate [in his appraisals], and is not subject to the nobility, nor the will of anyone else, and he does not [write to] please.” More importantly, in the archduke’s reply to Herrera, he agreed that it was not beneficial to change “accurate history” for the “personal” benefit of Henry, and that if this were done Herrera’s history would be no better than “those foreign histories who paint their own version of events.” Clearly the archduke sided with Herrera, agreeing that other more significant political considerations were at stake, and that Herrera’s history contained more vital political information that needed to be disseminated. Herrera and others members at court, therefore, believed that the interest of the state superseded any concern that Henry might be offended. Indeed, Herrera’s loyalty was only to the “truth” and to the Spanish Crown, not to Henry, and thus, the “truth” that Herrera provided, since it did not contradict the interests of the state, needed to appear in “public history” (*historia pública*). Moreover, his reference to Henry’s questionable piety, was “proof” of

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279 The same could be said for the reverse. If Herrera believed that such “untidy words” jeopardized the workings of the state, he would have had them removed, as evidenced in how he eliminated the question of characterizing those who revolted against Pizarro as “rebels” in his history of the New World. See Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Historia general de los hechos de los castellanos* (Madrid, 1609), 4: 24. As Herrera wrote to Philip II, there was a question as to how the participants in the revolt should be represented: “once one has come to a thorough, just and completely truthful understanding of what has happened, one must then consider whether Your Majesty will be served, and whether it is convenient for the loyalty that one requires in the future … and whether it is better to leave in the public history approved by your Majesty, that which declares them as disloyal or suspect” (“cuando se puede averiguar lo susodicho y sea justo y todo sea verdad, parece que se debe mirar si será servido Vuestra Alteza y convendría para la fidelidad que se debe esperar en lo porvenir . . . dejar en historia pública y aprobada por Vuestra Alteza, declaradas por desleales o sospechosos”). Herrera to Philip II, RB II/1497. Here Herrera clearly brought to light how the interest of the state superseded any public need to know the “truth.”
Herrera’s faithful adherence to the sources, and which the archduke regarded as testament to the “impartiality” of his work.  

Conclusion: “For the Public Benefit of My Patria and Nation”

The conversion of Henry IV marked the beginning of the end of Spanish intervention in France, as it resolved the major concern of French Catholics—that the religion of their monarch was fundamental to French law and identity. Armed conflict, however, had continued the need to defend Spanish intentions, requiring a re-affirmation that Spain had not only the better claim to the French throne, but was most likely to restore peace and stability to a nation whose current rulers now only sought conflict for political reasons. The signing of the Peace of Vervins in 1598, however, was a tacit acknowledgement by Philip that Henry was indeed a “Catholic king.” Indeed, Spaniards could no longer maintain that Henry’s conversion had been a fraud since, with the signing of the Treaty, they acknowledged him as a Catholic king. Moreover, the peace treaty softened Spanish-French relations and thus the intentions of the Spanish Crown and consequently diminished Spanish imperial interests in France. This, however, did not mean that Garibay’s, Herrera’s, or Madera’s works lost all utility for the Crown. As we have seen, these works had larger intentions and purposes than just the issue of the French contest.

All three works offered strong evidence-based support for the different political reasons given by Spanish political theorists for Spanish initiatives in France. The first defended the right

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280 AGI, Patronato, 18.
281 Significantly, and directly influenced by Spanish tactics, the Catholicism of Henry IV would become part of his image, power, and supreme authority, and opened a new period in French history where a conception of Monarchy was developed based on notions of “Royal Catholicism.” See Jean-Frédéric Schaub, La France Espagnole. Les racines historiques de l’absolutisme français (Paris: Seuil, 2003).
of the Infanta, the second established the superiority of Spain’s historical antiquity, purity and continuity, and thus its precedence, and the third demonstrated Philip and Spain’s role as Defenders of the Faith and protectors of the “public good,” and hence stability. These claims of Christian antiquity and constancy possessed a special urgency, especially in the decades following the Council of Trent (1545-63) and the upheavals and instability brought about by the rupture with apostolic authority brought about by Protestant challenges. Indeed, the historical arguments and foundations that these works provided stressed that the Spanish Monarchy and Spanish involvement were the means through which to maintain stability, continuity, and “the ancient religion” in France, and thus ensure the common good. Moreover, all three works rallied Spanish support around the Monarchy, its cause, and a larger Spanish purpose. In this, despite their differences, they conformed to the broader demands placed upon official historiography by the Spanish Crown, not only to “set the record straight” by providing a definitive account, but to make history a means to explain the ideology behind Spanish politics and rule, especially by propagating the causes that motivated and justified Spanish actions. These works demonstrate not only how historical culture legitimized the actions of the state, but also how politics was authenticated in relation to the past. Indeed, Spain’s past provided substance and validation for government action. Here history must be seen as an instrument of a broader rhetoric of power, as a tool in helping shape a political enterprise, serving to establish Philip as the epitome of Catholicism and the Catholic king, and thus his authority, as well as that of his inheritors. In doing so, these works helped to project a coherent image of the king, his monarchy, his rule, and particularly his intentions in France, to contemporaries and for posterity. Moreover, in this context, legal right and privileges took shape in historical contestations and came to be founded in notions of age, continuity, purity, stability, uniformity, and consensus.
These works therefore, also demonstrate how history not only legitimized the Spanish Monarchy and its actions in France, it also served as a tool in the formation of a collective Spanish identity, based on the legacy of its monarchs and is past, and the upholding of a common set of ideals. All three works expressed the dynastic and moral attitudes that governed the traditional Spanish vision of Spain’s place in the world. It was not Spanish self-interest, but a solemn duty to defend dynastic rights, uphold the Catholic cause, and to do what was best for Christianity, and thus for liberty and justice, and to ensure the “public good” abroad that propelled Spanish imperialism. It is within these official histories that the relationship among Spanish imperial pretentions, Catholicism, and the republican perception of community/stability came together. In this way they presented the humanist ethics of Spanish rule, revealing a long history of moral actions for a greater good, combining moral authority and political legitimacy in true Spanish reason of state fashion. Spanish monarchs were presented as munificent rulers, bound to the defense of the faith, and Spanish rule was characterized by humanist notions such as public welfare and utility. By looking at the three works commissioned to defend the question of France, combined we begin to see the various justifications provided for the idea of “imperial Spain” and how it combined dynastic, legal, political, sociological and psychological categories, as well as various forms of historical materials and knowledge and various different forms of historical appeals. In this way the Spanish response combined reason of state objectives with ideas and methods drawn more from scholasticism and its emphasis on theology and law. Furthermore, these histories revealed the nature and the reason behind Philip’s decisions, thus justifying his actions, but also tying his purpose and that of the Spanish people together—binding the ties between the king and his kingdom. These works demonstrate how history could mobilize around the monarchy and Spain, the ensemble of available forces for the universal
Hispanic mission, or transimperial Catholicism, expanding these to include broader notions of rule and the foundations and purpose behind Spanish reason of state politics.

The continuity with an ancient Christian past alluded to in all three of these works was a fundamental element in creating the notion of a larger Christian community. All three works fashioned a collective identity with France, not only through clear dynastic ties, but through a common Catholic past. Garibay used history to attempt to create a feeling of unity between the two Crowns, based both in dynastic and religious ties. Madera used history to postulate a sense of Spanish divine purpose and a unity with France in faith. For this, he singled out two elements in Spain’s past—faith and the struggle against heresy—something that now France faced, and Spain would help them overcome. Herrera similarly drew upon a common Christian bond, but also the ideas of the religion of the monarch as fundamental, as well as a common desire to maintain peace, stability and the common good, which united both the Spanish and French [which for Herrera meant Catholic] people. All three works, therefore, fashioned a language and discourse which could be shared by all Catholics, and one most amenable to fashioning a common and unifying identity between the French and Spanish. Indeed, all three works recognized that it was not just the need for continuity, but consent that vested authority. Moreover, while foreigners, like Mayernne, criticized Spanish rule as motivated strictly by greed and exploitation, Spaniards presented a history that demonstrated the Spanish effort to “conserve, defend, and augment peace and the Catholic faith,” and thus, that the purpose of Spain and Spanish imperialism was to “protect the faith, [and] further the common good,” and that knowledge of such history, “reveal[ed] the rules of prudence which, after God, founds,

augments, governs and conserves states.”283 Indeed, these official histories became the mechanism to explain such ideas about Spanish rule in Spain and to a wider European readership, providing a vehicle for a dynasty whose Catholic conception of its monarchy and its Christian reason of state politics in the world was paramount.

Such works emerged in a Post-Tridentine world, where theologians and political theorists chose to highlight the political dangers of heresy, emphasizing that religion was the “civic bond” par excellence, and would remain strong only if Catholic orthodoxy persisted.284 It was argued at that time that any toleration of heresy was tantamount to the destruction of the commonwealth. Elaborating on the humanist civic function of religion, Garibay, Madera, and Herrera repeatedly urged readers to recognize that religion provided “the foundations which sustain sociability and union among men . . . [and] with their king.”285 These three official historians were well aware that religion was by far the best tool to gain the “goodwill of the multitude” and arouse their zeal for the king’s cause.286 Moreover, they knew that when it came to the matter of France, the defense of the faith was the only “true and just reason” (verdadera y justa razon) that justified Spanish intervention, as was the necessity to intervene in the religious conflict seeping through contemporary Europe, evidenced in the maelstrom of destruction that was left in its wake. Herrera’s readers in particular, were warned not to misjudge the destructive force of heresy and the potentials it had to sweep across the Spanish boarder. Indeed, neither the natural boundary of the Pyrenees, nor the Holy Inquisition were to be seen as absolute bulwarks against the

283 “la conservación, defensa, y aumento de la paz y la fe Católica . . . y el bien publico . . . esta historia . . . [da] las reglas de prudencia con que, después de Dios, se fundan, acrecientan, gobiernan y conservan los estados.” Idiáquez to Philip, BNM Ms/ 18768.
285 Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, 253.
286 Madera, Excelencias, 183.
possibility of such religious conflicts entering Spain—thus Spain and Philip were also left with no choice but to safeguard their religious and political unity.

Combining religion and history, however, also brought about an identification with the Spanish character and a coherent social fabric, and all three works hoped to unite Spaniards behind the cause of the Crown. In all three works, it was also made evident that the monarchy “serve[d] the state” and that it was its mission to fulfill that purpose. It is here where we see how these works served a larger purpose: they created a means to establish and assert rights and precedence founded in the antiquity, longevity, and purpose of the Spanish Monarchy and the Spanish people. In this way they hoped to foster a broader shared consciousness, based in shared ideals between the monarchy and its people. Moreover, these works legitimized a new nucleus of identity, based in the historic creation of a shared experience and conscience. Indeed, in this context, history operated as a political instrument, forging a community’s sense of the past by several means, including a myth of origin and descent, a shared history and shared purpose, and a specific political culture. This unified vision was predicated on Spain’s providential role as preserver of the faith, the common good of Christendom, and upon the service and reputation of its rulers and the primacy of the monarchy. Indeed, Madera, Garibay, and Herrera’s very purpose was not only to show the superiority of Spaniards and the Spanish Monarchy, but to produce an account of Spanish actions to which a broader Spanish population outside of Castile could also begin to find a locus of identity to rally behind, be edified, and perhaps even feel more unified with their Monarchy by reading of it.287

287 See Manuel de la Fuente Merás, “La ‘España Imperial’ y los distintos modos de pensar su identidad,” El Catoblepas 38 (April, 2005): 12–39. We can see in these works, therefore, “the formation of the nation in the Renaissance revolution in historical perception that takes place in the sixteenth century,” as Erich Auerbach put it. Auerbach continues, “The various European peoples came to regard themselves as national entities and hence grew
Madera, in particular, sought to develop a broader consciousness that encompassed territory, language, culture, community, and sovereignty and found unity in a shared religious community and established these as political resources for the early modern Spanish state.

Madera directly boasted that his account of the antiquity, nobility, and legacy of the Spanish Monarchy served to honor the glory of the Spanish nation: “Since my intention has been to defend through all means the excellencies of our Spain, it would not have been good to leave this [the origins of our Monarchy] undefended. In every way [this work] satisfies my desire for the honor of the nation that has always been so dear to me.” It is perhaps too speculative to claim that Spain was a “nation” in this period in the sixteenth century, or that national consciousness was a mass phenomenon. Rather, it can be argued that the construct of nation as a natural and venerable political community was not only becoming available, but was being used as a strategic tool in public debates in early modern Spain and directly being used by official historians in the writing of official history. It should be noted, however, that while Madera’s work presented a unified Spain, in actuality, Spain was by no means unified, and was still an

conscious of their distinctive characteristics . . . This did not happen all at once, but in the sixteenth century it progresses by leaps and bounds, adding enormously both to the breadth of perspective and to the number of individuals acquiring it.” Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 321. Spanish historian José Antonio Maravall has long argued that since many historians of the early modern period lack knowledge of events in parts of Europe such as Spain they have tended to miss the early appearance of proto-nationalist sentiment. José Antonio Maravall, Estado moderno y mentalidad social (siglos XV a XVII) (Madrid: Escalpe, 1972), 1: 472 and 494–495; and his, Antiguos y modernos: Visión de la historia e idea de progreso hasta El Renacimiento (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1986).

288 Madera, Excellencias, 181–182. Similarly Garibay emphasized that he wrote his work for “the public benefit of my patria and nation” (“para publicó provecho de mi patria y nación”).Garibay, Ilustraciones, Prologue. It should be noted that Garibay was a loyal Basque, and had done much to assert Basque identity in his prior work; therefore, his use of the term “nation” in this context undoubtedly refers to a larger Spain, and not just Castile. While Herrera emphasized that defending the faith in the cause for France was “the obligation of all Spaniards” as it was a reflection of Spain’s “profound religiosity, justice, temperance, and love of peace . . . [which they] wish to see in all nations” (“la obligación de todos los españoles . . . y de la profunda religiosidad, incomparable juicio, templanza de animo y amor por la paz . . . [y] el deseo de verlo[sic] en todas las naciones”). Herrera, Historia de los sucesos de Francia, 358. The formula “our Spain” has been viewed by historian Pierre Vilar as a diagnostic of national sentiment. See Ian A. A. Thompson, “Castile, Spain and the Monarchy: The Political Community from Patria Natural to Patria National,” in Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World: Essays in Honour of John H. Elliott, eds. Richard L. Kagan and Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 125–159, at 159.
association of Kingdoms. Yet official historians and their officially commissioned work sough to appeal to the honor of “our nation” and the national “genius” of “our culture” and “our religion” in an attempt to justify imperial activity, and garner support, especially internally in the Spanish courts. Indeed, a prime motivator of Madera’s work was the notion that all Spaniards “attach themselves to their land, and know of its greatness, and so that they can defend it against [what is said by] foreigners.”\textsuperscript{289} In its celebration not just of heroic kings but of language, culture, and people within the \textit{madre patria}, the sovereign territory and cultural homeland, Madera’s work was at the very least “proto-nationalist.”\textsuperscript{290}

Thus, the writing of official history in Spain played a role in the development of both the state and empire, and became a mechanism to express both ideas of community and imperial purpose.\textsuperscript{291} This demonstrates both the ties between the state and imperialism and how both relied on similar foundations and ideals. Indeed, the counter-histories of the last decades of the sixteenth century represented a transitional period that forged an identity for both the monarchy and for the Spanish state out of polemical circumstances, and which established a Spanish

\textsuperscript{289} “se aficionen a su tierra y sepan sus grandezas y puedan defender sus cosas contra muchos extranjeros.” Madera, \textit{Excellencias}, Introduction.

\textsuperscript{290} Madera's active defense of the Spanish nation in his \textit{Excellencies} belonged to the tradition of the \textit{laudes Hispaniae} (praises of Spain), dating from the work of Orosius in the fifth century and Isidore of Seville in the seventh. Although highly patriotic the earlier historiographic tradition, however, was a paean to the land, not to a people and political community identified with that land. By the time Madera took up this apologist form, however, the tradition had added an emphasis on the qualities of “the people” (“el pueblo,” or “la gente”), which Clifford Davis claims slowly evolved into a national consciousness and consolidated into a “Spanish nationalism avant la lettre.” See Gifford Davis, “The Development of a National Theme in Medieval Castilian Literature” \textit{Hispanic Review} 3/2 (1935): 149–161, at 150. See also Helmut Koenigsberger, “Spain,” in \textit{National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early-Modern Europe}, ed. Orest Ranum (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 144–172.

\textsuperscript{291} Tamar Herzog demonstrates not only that conceptions of ‘Spanishness’ begin to emerge at the very end of the sixteenth century, but that when discussing early modern ‘proto-nationalism’ one cannot ignore empire. Tamar Herzog, \textit{Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 54–63.
purpose around a national base that could be used for both peninsular as well as universal purposes.

Madera, in particular, sought to reconcile seemingly discontented nationalist and internationalist elements for the purposes of the monarchy’s imperial project. In all three works, however, we see how both an imperial and a national identity were constructed based on the same principles and ideals, and having similar historical foundations, and both were utilized in the service of the state. Like the Crown that had commissioned these works, Garibay, Madera and Herrera implicitly accepted the notion that there was a relationship between foreign and internal ideas. They knew that if Spanish imperialism lay in establishing its rights abroad, it had to do so with Spanish support, and through Spanish understandings. Indeed, here we see how notions of a larger consciousness of purpose and national honor was used as a political cudgel in an international political controversy, and how Spanish imperial cultural policy was presented as unselfconscious religious and political pragmatism rather than Hispanicization. Moreover, here we also see reflected a self-conscious state policy that stressed a unity of “peoples” built on a foundation of blood ties, religious unity, and a desire to maintain the “common good.”

Finally, while political and religious necessity prevailed, Garibay, Madera, and Herrera’s histories conformed to the highest contemporary standards of research, which bolstered their authenticity. While official historians understood the need to re-establish Spain’s precedence among nations, and the need to defend Spain’s imperialist cause, they did not see these goals as incompatible with their ability to provide a “true” version of events; in fact, they recognized that humanist historical methods would “prove” and justify their claims. Whether through
antiquarianism, humanist rhetoric, or an explanation of reason of state politics, these historians ultimately understood that the weight of history was not enough if they did not provide “proof” of their claims, or evidence that Philip and Spanish rule adhered to the principles of “good rule.” Not only did all three of these counter-histories describe Philip and the Spanish Monarchy as champions of the Christian cause, constantly preoccupied with the common good, they sought to provide evidence that such claims were based in the information found in primary sources. Garibay, in particular, produced a thoroughly researched work, which upheld standards of critical inquiry and which sought to present the “truth” for the Spanish Crown through a demonstration of its sources, and by providing multiple forms of authority. In this way his history sought to directly carry the authority of “real” documents and sources. Herrera also defended his claims through his admonishments of his strict adherence to his methodological ideals. All three sought to present Spanish ideology through substantiated history, and by claims backed by “proof,” or through “better history” in “the best form.”

The stress upon their methods, and adherence to “proof” was a means of demonstrating that they were “true” to sources and truth. As seen in the Introduction, since the time of the Catholic Monarchs history has been a tool used to bolster the monarchy, legitimize international standing, and as a means to promote legitimacy and Spanish standing among other European monarchs. However, in the past such assertions had been made mainly through mythologizing and laudation; in the “new history,” verifiable examples, substantiated assertions, and the establishment of various levels and rights and justifications were the stamps of authenticity.
Philip’s official historians believed that they had conducted their task in the best manner possible. Herrera, in particular, rigorously defended his claims when criticism challenged the “impartiality” and “meticulousness,” of his clear defense of the Spanish cause. Indeed, while official historians toed the party line, supporting the king and his policies, they did so in a way that emphasized their rigor, thoroughness, and erudition. It should be noted, any contemporary negative comments written about the counter-histories, seem to have been provoked less by the perceived quality of their scholarship, which even among detractors seemed to be unquestioned, but by their local or factional interests, as we see with Herrera and his characterization of Henry.

These historians understood that, in order to avoid the accusation that Spanish imperial claims derived only from self-interest, power, or unprincipled pragmatism, their appeal to dynastic superiority, precedent, to antiquity, continuity, stability, or an adherence to law and continual defense of the faith, needed to be lodged in “proof.” All three historians stressed how they had come to their conclusions and how they evaluated their sources and claims, and how they had pledged a strict adherence to sources and to thoroughness, especially since they were trying to legitimize political actions, the authority of the king, dynastic claims, and the greater Spanish imperial cause. That they produced works that adhered to the Crown’s demands should come as no surprise; all three men had been characterized by their fidelity to the Crown and Philip. The multiple techniques and methods they brought to their histories, however, are what makes these works significant. Just as the military feats of ancestors had rewarded them with lands, titles, or jurisdictions, Spanish official historians sought to establish authority and precedence in new ways, allowing them to make claims to international claims to privilege and authority, and to explain why the Spanish Monarchy was the most worthy of the French throne.
Indeed, whether through “proof” of dynastic ties, or of the antiquity and continuity of the Spanish Monarchy and their dedication to Catholicism as well as good rule, or evidence of upholding of laws and privileges and the continual defense of the faith, they found means to legitimize Spanish power and prowess and demonstrate the greatness of the Spanish Monarchy, and justify Spanish intentions in France through history.
Conclusion

When Idiáquez wrote a letter to Philip II on January 28, 1585, explaining the need for an official Spanish response to the threats posed by foreign historiographical attacks, he may not have foreseen what the combination of political ideology and historiographical method would produce when filtered through the humanist approaches of the Spanish official historians. What he did know was that Philip’s reputación and power needed to be defended, particularly with regards to Spain’s actions in Portugal and France. However, Idiáquez and Moura had the insight to see that they could use humanist tools and the Christian ideology of reason of state to turn the debate to the Spanish Crown’s advantage. Together with the court’s official historians, they created a “new” or “better” history that made history into a potent form of legitimization for Spanish imperial pursuits and power. Strikingly, the Spanish Crown’s use of history to defend, legitimize, and strengthen its interests, resulted in fundamental contributions to the growing trends in the use of antiquarian knowledge and the need for verification.

As comments by contemporary Spanish readers and especially prominent members of the Spanish court noted in this study have revealed, the efforts of Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Esteban de Garibay, and Gregorio López de Madera were successful. Their counter-histories not only provided a defensive vanguard to protect the integrity of Spanish imperial actions when its legitimacy was being attacked, they upheld and even advanced the standards for historical evidence. Under the increased pressure to write extremely polemical histories, the relationship between methodology and ideology in history writing was crystallized as never before and both became key tools of legitimacy. This explains how a humanist understanding of history was used
to create incontrovertible, political history, and how Spanish imperial claims were cemented though historical proof, documentation, and verification, thus demonstrating conclusively that the Crown viewed this history as a powerful vehicle to transform power into authority.

The examination of the motivations (correspondence), methods (treatises), and products (counter-histories) of Philip’s official historians helps to explain how, in the late sixteenth century, history became comparable to law in its utility and status in international debates; it justified and legitimized Spanish imperial claims and demonstrated the benefits of Philip’s rule, particularly in Portugal and France. Official history came to serve as an instrument of government and imperial policy, documenting and legitimizing policies of expansion, dynastic and imperial titles, and claims to territories. Indeed, the counter-history projects initiated by Idiáquez and Moura were motivated by implicit territorial and political considerations and they presented their cases in ways that substantiated claims to legitimacy. The Crown’s official historians provided the proof necessary to demonstrate Spanish rightful, just conquest and assumption of territory, not only due to its dynastic supremacy and political pre-eminence, but because of its Christian actions, its adherence to law, precedent, privilege, and its defense of religion.

As demonstrated in Chapter One, the Spanish Crown’s conscious historiographical agenda is recorded in the correspondence among Philip’s advisors, official historians, and the King himself. The correspondence reveals how the Spanish Crown, recognizing the need to respond to foreign attacks in a more robust and rigorous fashion, turned to history and official historians, rather than to philosophy, theology, or political pamphlets, to defend Philip’s
reputación and Spanish imperialism. The letters clearly indicate the Crown’s awareness of a growing lack of confidence in Spain’s European imperial ambitions and the threats to Spain’s preeminent position as the dominant power in Europe. In this context, defending the king meant more than just writing favorable histories; it meant embedding within these histories the moral philosophy and political ideals of the monarchy and of a Spanish reason of state. Thus, the counter-histories were explicitly commissioned to enhance and preserve Philip’s reputación by emphasizing the nature of his rule and by demonstrating that Philip and the Spanish monarchy were the epitome of a Christian reason of state.

Through this court correspondence, we see how the Spanish Crown envisioned the official histories as both histories and political tracts. Significantly, the Crown understood that to achieve its political purpose, official history needed to not only record actions, but also to present the underlying causes and intentions that lay behind Spain’s affairs of state. The new official histories would need to redefine notions of authority by illustrating the interrelationship of politics and character rather than focus solely on the working out of Providence. Indeed, this correspondence presents Philip as a rational, hands-on ruler who understood the futility of outright polemics and, with advisors Juan de Idiáquez and Cristobal de Moura, entertained a degree of respect for readers. The advisors discussed in their letters the methods as well as the purposes of the official historiographic project because they understood that if this project were to succeed, it needed to be reasonable, well-researched, and institutionally supported.

Recognizing that only an accurate, critically assessed, source-based history would strengthen and solidify Spanish imperial claims, Philip’s advisors turned directly to official
historians like Ambrosio de Morales and Juan Páez de Castro and even to archivists to develop this new history; indeed, even the conceptualization of this project depended upon an extensive collaboration among politicians and humanists. The historians understood the need to explain politics and the workings of the Spanish state to an increasingly skeptical audience at court and the need to make these explanations verifiable and substantiated and thus incontestable. The Crown and its official historians saw the counter-history project as both a better, more rigorous form of history and as an effective mechanism of state; the new history would not only provide proof through its use of documents and papers of state, it would also explain the causes behind actions and thus the “true” intentions behind Philip’s politics. Furthermore, the Spanish Crown understood that the means through which to achieve the goal of their “better history” was through a verifiable form of historical writing, conducted by “good historians,” not mere apologists. For advisors, this meant that official historians had to be loyal to the Crown and its agenda, yet be men capable of presenting the “truth” of Philip’s politics in humanist terms to an audience clamoring for more revealing and reasonable representations of rule, demonstrations of proof, and humanist rigor.

As examined in Chapter Two, in their methodological treatises on the *artes historicae*, the attempts of Philip’s official historians to align rigorous humanist methodologies with their political objectives led them to consider a wide range of methodological questions and suggestions: questions about the purpose of history, source criticism, about the problems inherent in defining rhetoric as the central discipline of historical writing, and about the relationship of technical knowledge to historical texts. Ultimately, to ensure that the works they produced for the Crown would be above reproach, they applied the critical techniques of humanist source
evaluation to a wide range of sources including eyewitness accounts and combined these
techniques with an increased awareness of the need for impartiality and dispassionate inquiry, an
emphasis upon the qualifications and ethical character of the historian, and the incorporation of
the sources and methods of antiquarians and philologists and their notions of authenticity and
provenance. These artes historicae demonstrate the degree of intellectual and discursive
flexibility and creative engagement with humanist theories that official historians employed to
reconcile and justify their task as both officials and scholars. The innovations in the artes
historicae of Philip’s official historians lies not only in the specific resources and methodologies
they brought together, but also in how they specifically sought to align and reconcile these
humanist methodologies with political objectives. Indeed, the official historians sought to find
ways to present not only truth, but political truth, and to do so while acknowledging both the
needs of humanist scholarship and the constraints and limitations of their office.

Thus, while the Crown saw history as a means to further its own purposes, the official
historians sought to move the discipline of history writing to a new level to meet these political
demands. Indeed, political demands actually led them to sharpen their methodologies and to
create new ways to position their scholarship and claims. Despite their differences, in their
treatises, the official historians Juan Páez de Castro, Sebastián Fox Morcillo, Pedro de Navarra,
Ambrosio de Morales, Esteban de Garibay, and Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas agreed on a
number of essentials issues in historical writing such as the need for neutrality when dealing with
contemporary history, a certain understanding of ethics and morality, the need to identify and
maintain a defined way of writing history, and the use of sources including eyewitness accounts
and non-written remnants of the past. They accepted the proposition that historical writing was a
partisan activity, but they also emphasized the need for an increasingly stringent and critical methodology. Ultimately, they directly evoked the authority of sources in dealing with the question of partisanship and believed that the authority of documents and their provisions of "proof" would solidify their claims and assert their impartiality and merits as "good historians."

Through their treatises, we see the cultivation of a new critical sensibility at the service of the Crown. By seeking to develop a specific "method" and "practice" for history writing, Spanish official historians produced a distinctive way to make history a mechanism to solidify authority. In this way, the influence of politics and political necessity on historical writing actually encouraged humanist development. Their treatises reconciled the tensions between the new humanist critical approach and its emphasis on erudition and impartiality, with the increasing conscription of history for the polemical purposes of power and politics. In fact, it was the combination of the need to defend official history and monarchical ideology that became the impetus to propel the historiographical methods of official historians in more stringent, even critical directions, and which brought theory and practice together for the benefit of the Crown.

Chapters Three and Four analyze how these methodological and political tensions were expressed in the counter-histories written by Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Esteban de Garibay, and Gregorio López de Madera. These counter-histories demonstrate how the particular polemics of sixteenth-century European hegemony and contemporary debates about notions of rule and government and the purposes of rule and empire were argued within narrative histories and were cast in historiographic forms. Indeed, official history became a new form of political expression and, as seen in both Chapters 3 and 4, the counter-histories immediately garnered
recognition as the chief sources and record for Spanish claims and actions in both Portugal and France by both Spanish readers and foreigners, especially in Spanish-dominated Italy. Significantly, these counter-histories are replete with references to documents, sources, proof, and justifications and a rigorous appraisal of sources. In each of the counter-histories, the writers elaborated on the vast critical examination they had undertaken to come to their conclusions and they not only cited their sources, they provide a critical discussion of the sources directly within the historical texts. In this way, they brought to bear upon their subject all of the apparatus of humanism, applied to the widest possible range of sources, and they used their deep knowledge of ancillary disciplines to present their works as accurate and “true” accounts.

Garibay, Herrera, and Madera used their scholarly authority to define “good and prudent rule,” and to show that the antiquity, purity, and nobility of Spain and its monarchy, as well as its dedication to the Catholic cause, justified Spanish imperialism, and provided authority to claims for rights and privileges. They further demonstrated that while the Spanish Empire was defined and justified in terms of dynastic succession, it could also be defined and justified in terms of rule and religion. In particular, they sought to demonstrate that Philip’s and Spanish rule provided order by adhering to and maintaining law, through the administration of justice, and by following precedent and privileges. Moreover, they sought to establish the Spanish imperium as a provider of peace, stability, orthodoxy, and hence continuity.

Demonstrating the Monarchy’s ability to ensure orthodoxy and maintaining custom, continuity, and balance not only provided political legitimacy for Spanish actions in Portugal and France, it justified broader imperialist actions and Spanish intentions to achieve European
hegemony. In the counter-histories we see the persistent claim that the only hope for the future security of Christianity and a society that was both godly and politically-minded lay in the Spanish Monarchy and the Spanish Empire. Indeed, Spanish official historians put into motion an ideology of the Crown that ultimately became an effective arm of state and defined Spanish imperialism for the century to come: a renewed vision of the monarchy (the *Nueva Monarchia*) and its imperial ideal, whose actions were based on specific moral-political principles and founded upon historical precedent. Spaniards were clearly concerned with the *legalities of* Spanish imperialism and not just appropriation, especially within Europe, and the new official history served as a repository for the legitimizing claims of the Spanish Empire.

Because the counter-histories dealt with matters of imperial importance, they had to not only present these historical claims, but also the primary documents/sources that supported the claims, as both played an essential function in imperial discourse about the legitimacy and implications to claims to lands. In this way, the counter-histories, although written to defend Spanish imperial actions in Portugal and France, were also intended to be regarded as parallel texts to political events, replete with explanations and citations that could be directly used in ongoing political debates. Indeed, the counter-histories were not meant to be merely adjuncts to the specific political events that they recounted; they were to form a dialogue with broader political discussions. In the counter-histories scholastic and humanist traditions com mingled, adapted, and complemented political needs and necessities.

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The legacy of late-sixteenth-century Spanish official history revolves around the fact that the Spanish Crown understood the benefits of historical writing for the state, and how the tools of antiquarian scholarship could be effectively used to bolster and support the state’s ideology. This was a new understanding of history, shaped in the court and produced for the court both in Spain and abroad. The Crown not only identified history as a new way to solidify claims using available humanist tools, they also envisioned history as a way to discuss political ideals and thus provide a new form of political legitimacy. The Crown envisioned power as articulated through historical discourse and recognized that the content of ideologies of power could be defended through historical means. History provided the theoretical basis of political knowledge and official historians provided the methodological means to assert the significance of that knowledge and its implications for power by providing it with legitimacy. Official history became the logos of the monarchy and the vehicle to distribute the discourse on power, as well as becoming the veridical voice of official thought. Counter-histories, then, became part of the way authority was displayed and verified, and negotiated and constructed in early modern Spain.

Although the official historians proclaimed that the “the spirit of history is truth,” they were quite conscious of their role, as “artisans of glory,” as Orest Ranum characterized late-sixteenth-century French official historians. Yet Spanish official historians did not present the king’s rule as the epitome of Christian reason of state because they were seeking favor or appointment. Historians in the service of the Crown found nothing wrong in arguing that Philip ruled according to Christian reason of state ideals, especially since they understood that Spanish rule was being challenged by other modes of rule. For the official historians, the counter-histories played a role in propagating both Philip’s political agenda and the historic role of the
Spanish Monarchy in the order, structure, and betterment of society. Thus, while there was no overt fraud or deception here, official historians used humanist techniques to ensure that the image presented of Philip and Spain accorded with the Crown’s objectives. Indeed, official historians wanted to ensure the “correct” reading of politics and of the causes behind political actions, to present the necessary image of the monarch and Spanish imperial intentions, and to put any criticism of these actions or intentions to rest. Each official historian, therefore, composed his counter-history according to these needs, maneuvering among them. Within these tight restrictions, each historian brought his own individual style, inclinations, and expertise to his work. Thus, although Herrera, Garibay, and Madera differed with regard to the semantic and rhetorical strategies they employed and the specific needs that their counter-histories met, they nonetheless shared a remarkable degree of uniformity in the way they presented the question of Philip’s reason of state politics to a political elite that was finding it difficult to reconcile the increased financial burdens of empire with the need to support Spanish imperial objectives. They combined tangible evidence with a mastery of humanist techniques and rhetoric to create a more accessible and ideologically unified demonstration of Spanish reason of state.

In this way official historians became political writers, not because of their involvement and experience in affairs of state, although this was an essential aspect of their qualifications, or because they wrote to support contemporary events, but rather because they sought to reveal the “true” underlying causes and reasons behind Philip’s actions and Spanish politics and because they sought to create a theoretical link between the writing of history and its political purpose. The counter-histories thus combined scholastic constitutionalism with Thomistic-Aristotelian definitions of the body politic and aligned these with classical and humanist approaches to rule,
and presented this approach within the new terminology of Spanish reason of state. Furthermore, official historians sought to meet the increased demands for scholarship by providing proof to bolster political claims, melding legal scholastic and humanist techniques of authentication.

The ways in which official historians accomplished the twin objectives of fulfilling a royal mandate and satisfying the demands of their discipline emphasize the complexities and sophistication of late-sixteenth-century official historical writing. Official historians approached their work with a highly legalistic view of the tasks of government and were highly conscious of the need to uphold the king’s authority. Yet when it came to writing the counter-histories that the Crown needed, they revealed the “truth” of events through careful research and meticulous scholarly labor, demonstrating their role as humanists. Official historians employed the topoi of scholarly inquiry and constructed their texts with a profound understanding of what “truth,” in the Renaissance sense, really looked like. They drew from early modern ideas of what constituted authentic historical evidence and “proof,” then utilized their evidence in ways that gave their texts verisimilitude. Moreover, they used real sources, and real documents to make their case, which they carefully researched and analyzed, and although their work was clearly based on a very selective use of sources that supported the needs of the Spanish Crown, the sources they used were not fabrications.

The counter-histories, therefore, were not constructed ex nihilo; their attributions and contents were based on actual sources, documents, papers of state, and eyewitness accounts. They were not presented as encomia, but rather as substantiated assertions, based on a critical appraisal of sources. Indeed, Spanish official historians placed a special emphasis upon proof,
scholarship, and impartiality to compensate for what they perceived as the deficiencies of their predecessors, and to present their work as truthful. Decidedly, in their counter-histories, the official historians demonstrated laborious research and the use of an unprecedented range and quality of evidence, accompanied by a sensitivity to the distinction between primary and secondary sources; they also used a strict adherence to method to demonstrate their impartiality. Moreover, they presented their work as having employed a rigorous criticism of sources and sought to demonstrate the methodologies that led to their conclusions. As these case studies reveal, by making these official histories look and feel even more like “perfect history,” at least as it was increasingly accepted in early modern Europe, they transformed official histories into truth, as it was recognized by the learned audience of the late-sixteenth century.

Furthermore, the official historians themselves developed what could be called a “rhetoric of impartiality” through which to frame their methodologies when writing history for the Crown. At the beginning of their counter-histories, official historians emphasized their impartiality by arguing that they did not base their accounts solely on auctoritas or the works of their predecessors, but rather on archival material and primary source research. These declarations of impartiality helped bridge the divide between the political message being conveyed and acceptance by the reader. For the particularly skeptical reader or critic, it was hoped that the admonitions by official historians of dispassionate inquiry would serve as a palliative, making readers more receptive to their claims, and if this did not work, their demonstrations of proof and their provision of the sources they used were sure to accomplish their purpose. Indeed, the official historians’ emphasis upon their impartiality and dispassionate inquiry and their emphasis on source use were intended to manifest the absence of any sort of
personal interest in the service of the king and the imperial cause and that they were not sycophants providing empty rhetoric.

To bolster their arguments further, the official historians exploited their privileged prerogatives, most noticeably in their constant referral to archival and state documents to which only they had access, aware that this made them the only ones capable of an authoritative and truthful history. Furthermore, to supplement their archival data, official historians used confirmable historical details such as dates and places and eyewitness accounts to events, and tangible sources like relics and coins. They also aimed at enhancing the impact of their texts by including lists of sources and even indices, which were crucial to their core objective of enhancing the persuasive hybridity of their texts. Thus, they blended and alternated scholastic and humanist styles, genres, and methods of inquiry, in order to garner the greatest effect, and applied antiquarian-like erudition to intensely political works. Indeed, they used evidence in a masterly way to shape and enhance their rhetorical aims.

These entwined modes of historical methodologies indicate the non-linear ways in which these counter-histories were designed to be read and understood and the multiple forms of legitimacy they sought to provide. What official historians produced was a novel fusion of humanist, legal, and antiquarian tools and techniques. Out of coordinates drawn from both the humanistic and the legal traditions, the counter-histories became a place where multiple methods and practices met, where antiquarianism intersected with political necessity, and where these colluded with legal forms of authority and political ideology, all phrased in a language of impartiality and dispassionate inquiry.
The official historians’ use of documents and antiquarian knowledge in their counter-histories can be compared to what Arthur de Boislisle termed *erudition d’état*, or the methods and practices of antiquarian historical philology tailored to state administration, which appeared throughout Europe by the seventeenth century.¹ Indeed, Spanish official historians were learned bureaucrats who used their antiquarian skills for the purposes of state and who wrote historiographical works using these skills for greater political effect. The counter-histories created a solid base of erudition with which to prop up political claims. They met the challenge of foreign histories critical of the king by presenting extensively researched and documented historical polemic and thus must be placed not only within the specific imperial contexts out of which these works emerged, but also within a broader Spanish and European context in which historical contestations and historical information were utilized according to new and stricter standards of scholarship and proof, and played a growing part in new juridical approaches to power and authority. This was a historiographical project which conformed to the norms of its epoch, utilizing and synthesizing the tools available to new political effect.

To achieve these political aims, the historians understood that the style with which they presented political ideas needed to be that of impartiality and meticulous scholarship, with provisions of “proof,” for if not, their works risked being simply dismissed by readers and thus they would not fulfill their political purpose. Perhaps that is why in their treatises, as well as in their counter-histories, it appears almost an obsession among official historians to convince readers that what they relayed in official history was “true.” They did so through their constant claims to impartiality, through the rigor of their research, through their scouring of the archives,

their drawing from multiple sources, their corroboration of sources, and their excessive provision of documentary proof. They sought to demonstrate that official history was bound to the same rigor and scholarship demanded of other scholars and sought to reveal that official history could directly appropriate the methods and practices of antiquarian scholarship. To that extent, they sought to use their theories to conquer the contemporary world of historical practice. Moreover, their claims to source use were not mere professions; official historians did not simply list sources, they actually looked at the sources they claimed to have used, cited from them correctly, actually visited archives and saw documents firsthand, and sought out eyewitness testimony to corroborate accounts. Such methodologies allowed official historians to make their claims with confidence.

Although clearly not the first Spanish official historians to cite their sources or eyewitnesses, the novelty of the counter-histories lies in their emphasis on how their impartiality and dispassionate inquiry guided their work and their demonstrations of just that through the excessive provision of proof. In this way, they sought to make political ideals verifiable, and in many respects the veracity of the cited documents and sources was less important that the rhetorical force they provided; the same could be said for the rhetorical force of the writers’ claims to impartiality. In this way, they created a new type of history that, while positioning the writers as meticulous scholars, used archival sources, antiquarian evidence, and humanist methodology to political effect. As a result, it is almost impossible to separate the actual counter-histories from the theoretical reflections in the historians’ treatises about the perfect and correct methods for writing works for the Crown. If they succumbed to dissimulation (hiding certain aspects of the truth), they also possessed a strong sense that their pursuit and presentation of
specific knowledge were both necessary and worthwhile in order preserve the public good (*el bien público*). In this way official historians aligned their historical methods with the contents, perspectives, and necessities of contemporary political thought.

A crucial aspect of the historians’ claim to verifiable truth was their access to the restricted official archive. Both advisors and official historians emphasized that “truth” was to be found in this archive and arguments not founded upon such archival sources were susceptible to doubt. Indeed a qualitative leap had been made: the *auctoritas* of prior as well as other contemporary historians was diminished if their works did not cite their sources of information and especially if they did not use archival sources and documents of state. It was precisely this new emphasis upon the use of archival sources that allowed official historians to justify creating histories that followed those sources and thus histories which specifically supported the Crown. In this way too, counter-histories became part of the much larger effort to master and use the massive amounts of information contained in the Spanish archives.

The counter-histories were innovative in other ways. They brought multiple resources and techniques together, sought to find ways to reconcile the demands of the Crown with the needs for humanist rigor, and produced meticulously researched works that provided multiple forms of “proof,” all the while avoiding the strict censorship laws and maneuvering within the intellectual limitations and boundaries of working for the Crown in late-sixteenth-century Spain. These innovations, along with the ways in which politic issues were presented and legitimized demonstrate how Spanish advisors and official historians responded to the complex reality of late-sixteenth-century Spain and how the need to defend Spanish imperialism and the king...
through counter-histories exemplified the discursive capacities of late-sixteenth-century official history. The official historians had the willingness and capacity to merge and thus transform competing and opposing discursive systems, in order to meet specific needs and for pragmatically defined outcomes; their use of all available tools and techniques demonstrates the flexibility and pragmatism of the advisors and official historians.

This study has demonstrated that during the last decades of Philip II’s reign, Spanish official history was transformed into a new and vital tool of statecraft. The Crown and Spanish official historians did not look to history as a way to reform the state, as we see elsewhere among jurists such as Jean Bodin or François Hotman, but rather as a means of legitimizing and bolstering the current state of affairs. Significantly, this coterie of scholars and powerful advisors understood the advantages of the new humanist methods and constructed their own adaptations for political purposes, fashioning a new official history that was defensive, but also delineated a Spanish political philosophy of Christian reason of state. In this way, official history became a potent means to bolster and defend the existing state’s identity and advance its purpose. Indeed, by emphasizing and utilizing humanist techniques official historians were able to negotiate and ultimately present to a wider audience the difficult questions of contemporary politics. With the very identity of the king and the purpose of the monarchy and Spanish imperialism at stake, readers were anxious for the “proof” necessary to demonstrate that Spanish actions were lawful, justified, motivated by the right intentions, and undertaken in the interest of the common good. The counter-histories allowed domestic readers to reconcile their wish to support Spanish objectives with their concerns over the increased financial and human toll of imperial action.
Specifically, as Philip’s rule and Spanish imperialism were increasingly criticized by foreigners, the Spanish Crown and official historians moved to justify the king’s imperial action in Portugal and France. Official historians found legitimacy in Spain’s past and in Philip’s Christian reason of state politics. The ‘new’ Spanish official history that resulted was causal and analytical, narrative and ‘politic,’ antiquarian, rhetorical, and humanist; it joined theory to practice and ideology to proof. The epistemological and methodological innovations that were strategically employed by the official historians rendered history not only more ideological, but more scholarly. Thus the defense of monarchical and imperial legitimacy found its greatest expression not in philosophical tracts, but in historical writing.
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