Academic Commons


Countering Network Worms Through Automatic Patch Generation

Sidiroglou, Stelios; Keromytis, Angelos D.

The ability of worms to spread at rates that effectively preclude human-directed reaction has elevated them to a first-class security threat to distributed systems. We propose an architecture for automatically repairing software flaws that are exploited by zero-day worms.Our approach relies on source code transformations to quickly apply automatically-created (and tested) localized patches to vulnerable segments of the targeted application. To determine these susceptible portions, we use a sandboxed instance of the application as a "clean room" laboratory that runs in parallel with the production system and exploit the fact that a worm must reveal its infection vector to achieve its goal (i.e., further infection). We believe our approach to be the first end-point solution to the problem of malicious self-replicating code. The primary benefits of our approach are (a) its low impact on application performance, (b) its ability to respond to attacks without human intervention, and (c) its capacity to deal with zero-day worms (for which no known patches exist). Furthermore, our approach does not depend on a centralized update repository, which can be the target of a concerted attack similar to the Blaster worm. Finally, our approach can also be used to protect against lower intensity attacks, such as intrusion ("hack-in") attempts. To experimentally evaluate the efficacy of our approach, we use our prototype implementation to test a number of applications with known vulnerabilities. Our preliminary results indicate a success rate of 82\%, and a maximum repair time of 8.5 seconds.



More About This Work

Academic Units
Computer Science
Department of Computer Science, Columbia University
Columbia University Computer Science Technical Reports, CUCS-029-03
Published Here
April 26, 2011