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Market Arbitrage, Social Choice and the Core

Chichilnisky, Graciela

This paper establishes a clear connection between equilibrium theory, game theory and social choice theory by showing that, for a well defined social choice problem, a condition which is necessary and sufficient to solve this problem-limited arbitrage-is the same as the condition which is necessary and sufficient to establish the existence of a equilibrium and the core. The connection is strengthened by establishing that a market allocation, which is in the core, can always be realized as a social allocation, i.e. an allocation which is optimal according to an ordering chosen by a social choice rule. Limited arbitrage characterizes those economies without Condorcet triples, and those for which Arrow's paradox can be resolved on choices of large utility values.

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Academic Units
Economics
Publisher
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Series
Department of Economics Discussion Papers, 9596-30
Published Here
March 3, 2011

Notes

July 1996

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