in the studio, and every time he sees Tharp try "to move on too quickly, leaving a loose end or taking an easy solution," he shakes his head, and she goes back to the labor for hard-won perfection. Yet from all we now know about the way Balanchine worked, this was exactly what he never did. He was not a perfectionist in this way. He worked quickly, left lots of loose ends, and went back later, confident that he could tie them up. Tharp's Balanchine sounds like somebody else—Jerome Robbins, maybe, or Tharp's mother. But it doesn't matter whether Tharp got Balanchine right in her fantasy of him. What matters is that she gives us a real insight into her frame of mind.

Oversimplification of motives makes the book's ending unbelievable:

> Finally [in "The Men's Piece"] I can tell that my attempts to discover truth through objective distance have linked up with my gut, bringing my feelings into focus, allowing my own passion to flow into my classical forms. Letting the anger unify with the gratitude, I have made one dance, not two. I will continue to learn, but the apprenticeship is over. Finally I can feel I have caught up with myself.

Living people don't experience feelings in sentences that begin with "finally." Only characters in books—in mediocre books—experience feelings that way. Tharp tells us that she has reached a new, freeing psychic level, but her language is telling us that she is in chains.

Consider Avedon's thoroughly unspontaneous head shot of Tharp on the dust jacket, in an attitude that recalls publicity photos of Audrey Hepburn, and compare it with the passage in *Push Comes to Shove* in which Tharp describes what she claims to be the moment in her life of greatest vision and joy. "While working on 'The Fugue' I also made 'The One Hundreds,' a dance I simply and modestly designed to represent the entire universe," she begins:

> The idea came on a sunny spring afternoon. I was lying on a hill; bees buzzed about pockets of wildflowers; a single bird's call pierced every now and then through the general cacophony; the grass and nettles bristled up; the clouds moved swiftly. I saw this marvelous mix of smell, texture, movement, sound and touch—feeling my heart beating, and imagining I could feel my baby's heart beating too—all this dense completeness of God's creation reflected in one theatrical moment: One hundred people would fill a reasonably sized space with one hundred different and carefully crafted eleven-second phrases. In and out, on and off, in eleven seconds, simultaneously grand and humble. As I worked, choreographing these two pieces in a great rush, my life was more balanced than ever before—my happiness was complete. I had a marriage that worked, a child on the way and work I cared about deeply, which I developed with a community of loyal and talented friends. Nothing was missing. For me, life, love and work cycled back and forth in a healthy flow. For a few brief months, in the spring and summer of 1970, I truly had it all.

This is a heartbreaking paragraph. Its very lack of glamor compels belief. Still, to believe Tharp here is to disbelieve the way that she presents the inside of herself elsewhere. In this autobiography, as in her career, she tries to have it all: happiness, tragedy, ingenuous wonder, jaded wisdom, the farm, the city, the glamor that distances and the warmth that closes distances. The range of her ambition is admirable. Yet its embodiment has no integrity. The woman in the paragraph and the woman on the dust jacket remain divorced. Tharp the star and Tharp the human being also remain unintegrated. The writer turns out to be the star's worst enemy—moving too quickly, leaving loose ends and taking easy solutions to her goals. This book is one project in which Tharp really needed the man in the chair in the attic, and it is one project in which, somehow, she let him go.

MINDY ALOFF is a regular contributor to *The New Yorker*.

Rough Trade

BY JAGDISH BHAGWATI

Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries by Laura D'Andrea Tyson

(Institute for International Economics, 352 pp., $25 paper)

Laura Tyson, the chief of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers, is anything but uncontroversial. She is also immensely smart. Her economist critics err when they cite her lack of academic distinction relative to their own as evidence of folly in the president's choice.

And yet good policy judgment comes in two varieties. You recognize it in others when they reach conclusions identical to your own, or when they persuade you to change yours. It is not a quality that many economists have, but it is desirable, certainly, in the president's chief economist. Unfortunately, if Laura Tyson's new book on trade policy is any guide, there is cause for concern.

The book displays a certain political skill. Tyson hedges by describing herself as a "cautious activist," and by making accommodating noises to keep critics at bay. Still, for all her disarming and disclaiming, her economic views emerge all too clearly. Tyson would overturn the basic premises of our postwar trading policies. And her arguments fail to persuade.

Concentrating on "high-tech" industries, Tyson declares herself in favor of three kinds of government action to help these industries: first, selective subsidies; second, the use of "aggressive unilateralism" in the form of threats to close our markets and to pry open foreign markets that we unilaterally judge to be closed to us unfairly; and third, a resort to "managed trade," which economists define as the setting of restrictive quotas on imports and targets to expand exports, Tyson choosing the latter.

All of this she urges with "caution," and under "appropriate" conditions. But these policies would undermine, for a sizable and growing segment of world trade, the current international trading system. Under that system, the use of subsidies has been increasingly constrained. New trade obligations have been established through reciprocal concessions rather than through using intimidation to extract one-way concessions; and the trend is toward settling trade disputes in impartial multilateral tribunals. Moreover, managed or "results-oriented" trade, where bureaucrats fix quantities to be traded, has increasingly given way to "rules-based" trade, where the quantities traded reflect competition, just as in a game it is the rules that are fixed and not the final score.

Fearing Tyson's beliefs, which they have gleaned mostly from her reputation for being "against free trade" rather than from a close reading of her work, economists have reacted in two defensive ways. Herbert Stein, a former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, let his hopes triumph over his expectations, and in *The Wall Street Journal* he predicted that Tyson would return to the fold. Robert Barro of Harvard University, in the same newspaper, took an outlandish line: it did not matter who ran the Council of Economic Advisers, since it influenced nothing.

But such reassurances will not suffice. Tyson is a powerful figure now, and as her book makes clear, she has an agenda. Indeed, the most likely explanation for Tyson's appointment is the most obvious one: the president finds that her views broadly coincide with his own. (The president's unrehearsed statements on trade policy at his first press conference only confirmed this impression.) The importance of high-tech industries and the need to promote them in all necessary ways: these appear to be home truths that only impractical "theorists," who are out of touch with "reality," ignore. Few politicians remember, of course, that common sense is precisely the quality that makes people assert that the earth is flat, since that is how it appears to the naked eye.

The president can also be expected to be responsive to the high-tech executives who flocked around him during the campaign. And a president who won the campaign preaching an exaggerated message of economic decline will be vulnerable to economists who can equate high-tech special pleading with socially desirable policy. Tyson certainly plays that tune. The policy program of her book rests on the following logic. High-tech industries are more important than others; international trade and competition in them are skewed, because our trading rivals intervene more heavily than we do; when others intervene to help their high-tech industries, we must intervene, too; and the appropriate policies include subsidies, trade retaliation and managed trade.

Each of these assertions is unconvincing at best, flawed at worst. Consider, first, her infatuation with high-technology industry. Being high-tech is popularly thought to be synonymous with occupying the high ground; making semiconductor chips is better than making potato chips, as Clyde Prestowitz put it. Ross Perot loved Prestowitz's motto so much that he used it in the presidential debate. And Bill Clinton found Prestowitz's support so important that he cited it in the final debate as proof of his own Silicon Valley virtue. And yet, for all these endorsements, and Tyson's, the argument is shallow.

The definition of high-tech industry, for a start, is much too nebulous for purposes of policy. One favored criterion is above-average spending on research and development; but there are different ways of defining averages, and the period over which you calculate the average will yield different groups of high-tech industries. Also, if you think high-tech means using advanced technological know-how and highly skilled labor, then you may be in for some surprises. Michael Schrage has written in the *Los Angeles Times* about how potato chips are actually made by Pepsi Co.'s Frito-Lay subsidiary. It turns out that those guys are not slouches chewing tobacco on an assembly line that has seen no changes since Chaplin's days. Potato chips are made by pretty sophisticated technology these days.

Prestowitz has clearly bitten off more than he can munch; and so has Tyson. It is also not enough to say, as Tyson does, that R&D has beneficial spillovers for society at large, and that economists agree that those spillovers are often uncompensated. At best, that argues only for a general, rather than industry-specific, subsidy for research and development. Tyson is also guilty of concentrating only on R&D in manufactures as a source of uncompensated spillover effects. But don't doctors earn less than the happiness they provide simply by being accessible when you fall sick? Banks provide valuable infrastructure: Is this reflected in their profits? Are teachers' salaries a measure of their true worth? If I had to hazard an informed guess, I would say that services are at least as prone on the average as manufactures to yield uncompensated spillover effects, maybe more.

But Tyson wants to make a very specific case for singling out particular industries for support. She argues that certain high-tech industries have greater cachet in creating uncompensated externalities than do industries not on her list, and are therefore deserving of governmental support. But she does not bother to look at the evidence, sparse as it is, on where the uncompensated externalities are, and whether they correspond to her pecking order of favored industries. The economist Edward Mansfield did careful work on the returns from seventeen industrial innovations, and he found that the highest discrepancy between social and private returns from innovation was in "thread innovation" and then in "stain removers," neither of which would rank high on a high-tech list, or even appear on such a list at all. Besides, these discrepancies are so different across industries, and so difficult to predict, that selecting any one industry, or any one bunch of industries, for prior support is nothing more than an act of faith. The empirical basis for such a selection is shaky indeed.

Unless Tyson has a crystal ball and can plausibly foresee, which she cannot, which industries are most deserving of a subsidy, we must stick to tax breaks for all R&D. It is a policy about which we may agree, since all we can tell for sure is that R&D in general turns out to have a social rate of return that vastly exceeds its private rate of return. This may favor the "high-tech" industries on Tyson's list. But it may not, since "over the last decade, the ten ... industries classified as high-technology industries by the U.S. Department of Commerce funded nearly 60 percent of private industrial R&D in the United States." That more than 40 percent of American R&D is funded by non-high-tech industries suggests that the net effect of a general R&D subsidy may well be to pull resources to these industries rather than to Tyson's preferred ones. And this would likely be the better outcome.

Moreover, recent research by the economists David Dollar and Edward Wolff has shown that Japan's particular industries, including high-tech industries, "emphatically" contribute nothing to explaining why Japan's aggregate productivity has been catching up with ours. Although "much of the American obsession with Japan arises from that country's success in some highly visible [mostly high-tech] lines: automobiles, television, VCRs and computers," they conclude that "Japan caught up with the United States because its relative productivity increased in every industry." The same basic result holds for other OECD countries, and therefore "there is not some key industry or product line that has to be captured as the means to economic success."

I suspect that the preference for computer chips over potato chips is, in the end, also a form of quasi-Marxist technological determinism. Surely it is not what you produce that determines what you are; it is what you do with yourself. You could be producing semiconductor chips, fitting boards mindlessly, exporting them in order to import potato chips, eating them as you watch television and turning into a society of morons. Alternatively, you could be producing potato chips with advanced technology, exporting them to import semiconductor chips embedded in P.C.s that you use imaginatively to improve yourself, turning into a society of creative citizens. It is the "fundamentals," your education and your aspiration, that finally matter, not your work station and your industry.

Proceeding from the unproved premise that the high-tech industries must be preferred, Tyson argues that we are sitting by idly while others intervene sensibly to seduce high-tech to their shores. Why do we tie our hands while others fight? Partly because we refuse to admit that others do fight; and partly because we subscribe to the defunct doctrine of free trade, turning the other cheek.

Tyson's contention that others fight and we don't rests on case studies that are selective; they do not reflect an unbiased sample. Sure enough, Motorola pagers had a difficult time breaking into Japan, and the European airbus was subsidized with dogged determination. But you would not know from Tyson that the Japanese government's subsidies for private sector R&D, for example, are no more than $1 billion annually, running at about 3 percent of the $30 billion in R&D subsidies dispensed to private companies by our government. Indeed, as Gary Saxonhouse has noted, our government spends far more, in absolute and proportional terms, than Japan's on civilian R&D even when our defense-related expenditures are ignored.

The selectivity of Tyson's empirical research is also evident in her discussion of the complex issue of Japan's "closed" markets. Tyson cites only those who favor her own position, ignoring the work of Saxonhouse and Robert Stern, who have shown that Japan's average tariffs and nontariff barriers have fallen to negligible levels, perhaps even to levels lower than ours. Indeed, in manufactures, our extensive use of voluntary export restraints (for example, on Japanese autos) and our resort to antidumping actions, given Japan's virtual self-denial of these protectionist devices, put our manufacturing protection well ahead of theirs.

The debate has shifted, therefore, to "structural" barriers in Japan's market. To understand this issue, recall the Tarzan movies of your childhood. The jungle may be closed to you because the natives, led by the chief, are shooting poisoned arrows at you. But if they are not, and the jungle is open (and inviting because of the gold that it promises), the progress of the safari through the jungle is constrained by the tall grass and the thick vegetation. Then again, the path through the jungle is hazardous because of the dangers posed by traps, laid by natives to hunt animals but inadvertently dangerous to the safari as well. In short, openness and penetrability are different things.

The focus of the debate about Japan has now shifted from openness to penetrability, even though politicians and sloppy economists continue to talk of Japan's "closed" market. Is the penetrability of the Japanese market for manufactures unusually low? Attempts at proving that Japan is impenetrable are a growth industry in the high-tech economics sector, but it is the rare study that is not in dispute. The most cogent analyses have been directed at showing how Japan's *keiretsus* (or close-knit business groups) reduce imports from abroad by buying preferentially from their own domestic suppliers. But even these studies run into serious conceptual problems. *Keiretsus* are informal groupings, and hence hard to work into statistical analysis. They come in many different varieties. Moreover, vertical *keiretsus* (closely linked suppliers and users) are only an informal counterpart of vertically integrated companies, far more common here. Do we complain about IBM making its own semiconductor chips (and hence preventing Hitachi from selling them to IBM by "denying access"), or about General Motors, which produces more than 75 percent of its parts itself (while the share of the average in-house production of parts in Japanese auto plants is closer to 25 percent)? Indeed, some of the same factors that encourage close supplier relationships among firms there stimulate vertical integration here. Can the same thing be bad in Japan and good in America?

To be sure, those who find others to be competing unfairly rarely examine their own backyard. It is not just that similar roadblocks can obtain at both ends. Rather, what we consider to be perfectly reasonable, given our culture and our history, will often present obstacles to others who evolved differently. If the safari finds the jungle difficult to penetrate, the debut of the Earl of Greystoke in London and the entry of Crocodile Dundee into New York were no walkover, either. Think of how the older-generation Japanese must have struggled to get a toehold in our markets, which presented both perils and opportunities: the English language was an imposing barrier to entry, and residues of racism were widespread.

Tyson ignores all such complications of perspective, advocating that the United States respond head-to-head, matching each ploy with a ploy of our own. As the Clinton campaign promised in *Putting People First*, if they do not play by our rules, we will play by theirs. Tyson suggests that this "eye for an eye" response has been inhibited in the United States by the doctrine of unilateral free trade, now defunct because of a "new" theory of trade. She errs. We have never been unilateral free traders. The "old" theory of trade allows amply for shared embrace of free trade. The GATT, designed and supported by the most distinguished free traders of the postwar generation of international economists, is premised on the mutuality of trade obligations and concessions. The reasons for not going along with Tyson's prescriptions are far more complex and nuanced than mere reflexive commitment to unilateral free trade.

The lament that our markets are open when others are closed has its flip side in the current self-indulgent view that we have been altruists in our trade policy, giving concessions that are not matched by those we receive. This belief does not sit well with the facts. Unlike nineteenth-century Britain, with its passionate commitment to unilateral free trade, we have generally insisted on reciprocity of concessions. Even the Trade Act of 1934, which began trade liberalization after the disastrous Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, has the word "reciprocal" in its title. What we did in the postwar period was to provide leadership in creating and sustaining a GATT-based multilateral trading system, geared to opening markets through successive rounds of negotiations. But you can lead without being altruistic. In virtually all rounds (except the very earliest, when the others were prostrate after the war), we collected as much as we gave.

It is also incorrect to assert that free traders have generally been unilateralists because that is what the "old" trade theory of Adam Smith taught them. Yes, we do teach our students that if others harm themselves and us through trade barriers, that is no reason to compound the damage by erecting our own. As Joan Robinson used to say, if others throw rocks into their harbor, why throw rocks into your own? But then we also know that Adam Smith had clearly advanced the argument that there are times when we may usefully threaten to impose tariffs to get others to remove theirs. You may be able to throw rocks at others and thereby to force them to dredge up the ones they have thrown into their own harbor.

Cosmopolitan free traders also have argued for symmetry of free trade obligations. I might gain if you subsidize and cheapen the goods that I import; but your subsidy distorts the incentives shaping the allocation of activity among different nations. Cosmopolitan free traders prefer free trade for all to unilateral free trade by oneself, just as one may gain by receiving stolen property but object to doing so because of the effect that would have on the system at large. In fact, the GATT, overseeing world trade since 1947 and now 108 nations strong, embodies precisely these "systemic" views of free trade. In both trade obligations and concessions, the institution seeks symmetry and reciprocity.

Tyson, then, need not fear free traders. Few free traders are for unilateral disarmament. But they need fear her. For she goes well beyond the suspension of belief in unilateral free trade to embrace aggressive unilateralism against our rivals. She endorses our use of (even GATT-illegal) tariffs against countries whom we have unilaterally decided are "unfairly" competing with us; she wants to enforce corrective measures, including a commitment from them to import targeted quantities of specific items such as semiconductor chips. Thus she challenges (and, as the president's chief economist, endangers) multilateralism as the process for establishing and enforcing trade discipline. She is an enemy of rules-based trade.

The heavy hand of American industries is evident in Tyson's thinking, not least in her failure to consider that the interventions of foreign governments may have been foolish and our failure to match them may have been wise. The Concorde, a commercial disaster, gets only one mention in her book. She fails to probe thoroughly the story of High-Definition Television, told by Cynthia Beltz, in which the Japanese government was "pro-active" but backed the wrong (analog) horse, while we were passive and won by betting on the (digital) winner. Clearly this is the highest profile test case for those in favor of selective industrial policy. Its proponents clamored for intervention: influential business, labor and congressional leaders sent an open letter to President Bush and Congress, urging that the government support this crucial technology, warning that our trading rivals were already investing hundreds of millions of dollars in it.

On the European airbus and on Japanese semiconductors, there are many studies now suggesting that governmental support produced disadvantageous results. But Tyson either ignores them, or dismisses them summarily with agile footnotes. The grounds on which she rejects the well-known study by Richard Baldwin and Paul Krugman, which concluded that the Japanese policy on semiconductors had harmed the Japanese economy, are telling. Tyson argues that the Japanese government's first priority was to support and attract the semi-conductor industry, rather than to worry about the costs to consumer welfare, and that in any case, thanks to the spillover effects from producing one's own chips, the disadvantages of intervention were exaggerated.

But this will not do. Surely Tyson would not want to evaluate industrial policy in terms of industry-defined or government-defined objectives such as protecting production, rewarding friends and satisfying lobbies, without asking whether the policy was socially desirable or undesirable. And the broad appeal to spillovers, without any attempt at calculating whether they are large enough to offset Baldwin and Krugman's findings, is a trifle disappointing in a work that advocates a shift in our policies on the basis of economic analysis. Tyson's attitude plays into the hands of those who facetiously argue that spillovers and externalities are the last refuge of the scoundrel, and of others, more cynical, who maintain that they are the first.

But if Tyson, along with American industries, exaggerates the need to match what others do by mistaking their occasional folly for beneficial intervention, she is also overzealous in emphasizing the importance of taking the lead. In analyzing oligopolistic industries in which a few players compete, economists often analyze "first mover" advantages and the ability to make it difficult for latecomers to enter the market. Tyson fears, for the most part, that foreign actions (for example, subsidies) and inactions (for example, failure to break up *keiretsus*) will create irreversible first-mover advantages for foreign high-tech firms at the expense of American firms. If we wait to negotiate agreed rules, as at the GATT, on matters where we have concluded that others already may be seizing the opportunity to gain ground, then Tyson concludes all will be lost. Therefore we must act unilaterally and immediately.

Tyson panics too much. Has she not heard of the "latecomer's advantage"? Developing countries in the postwar period grew at unprecedented speed because they increased their investment rate, but also because they could profit by taking vast technological know-how off the shelf. Many firms leapfrog ahead of the first-movers. Recent theoretical work demonstrates the possible wisdom of "better late than early." Many real world stories, carefully recorded by the economist Michael Sherer, also document how United States firms have successfully fought back when others have moved ahead.

Tyson's policy prescriptions are nonetheless in tune with the petulance that attends the "diminished giant syndrome" as we face the competition from the Pacific: the suspicion that they are gaining thanks to unfair trade practices is hard to dispel, even to moderate. Her positions also dovetail nicely with the inclination to interventionism that attends declinism. The great economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron once observed that state interventionism increases the more you are behind. Declinism fits the pattern: the fear of falling behind strengthens the visible hand as much as the reality of being behind.

In a declinist ethos, moreover, corporate interests become important bedfellows of the proponents of the general interest. Though John Kenneth Galbraith exaggerated in saying that what was good for General Motors was (necessarily) bad for the United States, it is no exaggeration to note that much of the country is now in a mood to assert the opposite, that what is good for General Motors is (necessarily) good for the United States. Thus have panic and petulance, ideology and interests combined to make Tyson the woman for this season. A long, northern winter is on its way.

JAGDISH BHAGWATI is Arthur Lehman Professor of Economics at Columbia University and the Economic Policy Adviser to the Director General, GATT.

Connoisseur Abroad

BY E. V. THAW

Splendid Legacy: The Havemeyer Collection

(Metropolitan Museum of Art, catalog 432 pp., $65, $45 paper; exhibit open March 27-June 20, 1993)

The Metropolitan Museum is now a little like a mall filled with designer boutiques. Wings are variously named Lehman, Tisch, Wallace, Astor, Sackler, Kravis and so on. In the case of Lehman, the naming commemorates the bequest of a major collection, under the condition that the museum build and pay for a completely separate wing. The other names commemorate cash gifts or pledges toward the cost of bricks and mortar. But until just recently, when her vast collection went on display, you couldn't find Mrs. Henry O. Havemeyer's name emblazoned in big type anywhere.

When she died in 1929, Mrs. Havemeyer bequeathed a large and choice selection of her vast collection—oriental art, decorative arts, Old Master paintings and above all nineteenth-century French masterworks, including the world's largest and finest accumulation of paintings and sculptures by Degas. But her bequest was made in a rare spirit. It was her particularly enlightened and intelligent choice that her art possessions (the importance and the quality of which she understood as well as anyone) should fit in where they belonged in a large, encyclopedic museum. In a letter to her children asking their help in seeing her bequest properly carried out as a memorial to their father, she wrote:

> I have made very few stipulations in my will in regard to the placing or care of the collection because I believe there are those who are as intelligent and as interested as I in the care and conservation of a valuable gift.

What faith in the good offices of a museum! And what an absence of ego or any attempt at control beyond the grave. Lucky thing she did not live into the Hoving era at the Met, when Manet's "Boy with a Sword," a picture that she and her husband deeply regretted not having in their own collection, was slated for deaccessioning like so many others, and was only saved by a last minute barrage of publicity.

Yet the great Havemeyer exhibition now on view at the museum, with its fat catalog, vindicates her faith. The whole collection was exhibited briefly in 1930, in a temporary memorial show that had only a checklist for a catalog and virtually no illustrations or accompanying information. After that, the pictures, objects, porcelain, glass, prints, drawings and sculptures were integrated into their respective curatorial departments at the Met, never to be reassembled or published properly until now.

As a young, unmarried woman on her first trip to Paris in 1874, Louisine Elder met the American painter Mary Cassatt, who had arrived there about a year earlier. Their friendship grew, and shortly afterward, with Cassatt's advice and her own saved money, she bought a Degas ballet scene and a Monet, both considered then to be the cutting edge of modernity. (These were possibly the first paintings by each artist to reach America.) Later, having become a friend and a patron of Degas, she learned that her purchase had come at a moment of financial stress for the artist. In other contexts the story falsely turned into the myth that Degas, but for her timely purchase, was about to give up painting.

In 1883 Louisine married Henry O. Havemeyer, the scion of a family that had long been in the sugar business. He prospered mightily, creating the Sugar Trust, one of the great nineteenth-century business combines that so exercised our lawmakers and prosecutors around the turn of the century. Harry, as he was called, must have had an eye for art also, since he had begun to acquire Japanese textiles well before courting his wife. But together, as the fortune grew, they pursued their great collecting adventure in a remarkable, very American, yet curiously sophisticated way.

It was an age of Robber Barons and virtually no taxes and, thanks to a combination of cultural insecurity (vis-à-vis Europe) and arrogance, it was a great age of American art collecting. Bernard Berenson had not yet reached his zenith of influence, but rich Americans were nevertheless in pursuit of certified Old Masters. Mostly that meant, even then, Italian Renaissance paintings, English portraits and an occasional Rembrandt, for emotional depth. Those with a penchant for more recent art, but art also certified by the consensus of accepted good taste, bought the Barbizon painters: Millet, Diaz, T. Rousseau, Daubigny and of course Corot, the American all-time favorite (of whom it was later said that he painted 2,000 pictures of which 6,000 are in America alone).

Before and after his marriage, Henry Havemeyer showed an inclination to collect along this safe and accepted path. But with Louisine's ambition to be both more modern and more truly original, and with the arrival in New York of Durand-Ruel, the firm from Paris with its roster of Impressionists, a change began to take place. Their more daring approach to acquisition was further encouraged by the planning and building of a Fifth Avenue mansion, 1 East 66th Street, from 1888 to 1892. The somewhat prosaic French Renaissance exterior was designed by the architect Charles Haight, but the extravagant and Sheherezade-like interior was created by Louis Comfort Tiffany. It contained, as