THE RIGHT TO NO LONGER BE A REFUGEE
The Legal Empowerment of Syrian Refugees in Jordan

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

May 2016
ABSTRACT

The Right to No Longer Be a Refugee: The Legal Empowerment of Syrian Refugees in Jordan
Rachel Mayer

The now-protracted Syrian refugee crisis has become the largest global refugee crisis since World War II. Although often discussed in terms of the European migration crisis, this crisis has had a far greater impact on the neighboring host countries, which have been overwhelmed by massive influxes of Syrian refugees since the onset of the crisis in Syria. Moreover, these generous host countries have not received nearly enough support from the international community to cope with the crisis. Consequently, these countries have placed more and more restrictions on Syrian refugees. Syrian refugees in Jordan are marginalized and are not afforded basic rights like the right to work. As humanitarian aid has been consistently underfunded, and Syrian refugees’ savings have dried up, many Syrian refugees are no longer able to cope.

Herein I examine the case of the Syrian refugees in Jordan. I focus on legal status of Syrian refugees in Jordan through a human rights lens, bearing in mind the economics and security perspectives. I use the noted observations and interviews with Jordanian nationals, Syrian refugees, and staff from various UN agencies, IGOs and INGOs, and local NGOs obtained during my fieldwork in Jordan in March 2016 in addition to archival material, reports, and other publically available secondary sources. I conclude that Jordan is obligated to ensure the protection of these Syrian refugees’ human rights (including both civil and political and social, economic, and cultural rights) regardless of how the refugee influx has impacted its economy, infrastructure, and national security. Furthermore, it is in Jordan’s economic and national security interests to integrate the Syrian refugees not just economically but legally by providing them with a pathway to citizenship.
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## ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND TERMINOLOGY

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<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>The Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France-Presse</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHSI</td>
<td>Al Husseini Social Institute (Jordan)</td>
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<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
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<td>AJ</td>
<td>Al Jazeera</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJE</td>
<td>Al Jazeera English</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
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<td>ARC</td>
<td>American Refugee Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARDD-Legal Aid</td>
<td>Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development—Legal Aid (Jordan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Cash Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</td>
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<td>CBP</td>
<td>Community-Based Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERD</td>
<td>The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Child Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>The Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>CRI</td>
<td>Core Relief Items</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSR51</td>
<td>The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Da’esh / ISIS / ISIL</td>
<td><em>El Dowla El Islamiyya fi ‘Iraq wa El Sham</em> (The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria / The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>The Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>Environmental Impact Assessment</td>
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<td>ESSR</td>
<td>Emergency Services and Social Resilience</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FSA</td>
<td>Free Syria Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoJ</td>
<td>Government of Jordan</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCSP</td>
<td>Host Community Support Platform</td>
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<td>HRCU</td>
<td>Humanitarian Relief Coordination Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<td>ICESCR</td>
<td>The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICMC</td>
<td>The International Catholic Migration Commission (Jordan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>The International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRMW</td>
<td>The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>The International Federation of the Red Cross</td>
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IGOs
Intergovernmental Organizations
IHL
International Humanitarian Law
IHRL
International Human Rights Law
ILO
The International Labor Organization
IMC
The International Medical Corps
IMCC
Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee
IMF
International Monetary Fund
INGOs
International Nongovernmental Organizations
IOM
The International Organization for Migration
IRAP
The International Refugee Assistance Project (formerly The Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project)
IRC
The International Rescue Committee
IRD
International Relief and Development
IRW
Islamic Relief Worldwide
JAF
The Jordanian Armed Forces
JAH
Jordan Affordable Housing Project
JESSRP
Jordan Emergency Services and Social Resilience Program
JHCO
Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization
JOHUD
The Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development
JRF
The Jordan River Foundation
JRP or JRPSC
Jordan Response Platform to the Syria Crisis
JRS
Jesuit Refugee Service
LED
Local Economic Development
M&E
Monitoring and Evaluation
MC
Mercy Corps
MHPSS
Mental health and psychosocial support
MOE
Ministry of Education
MOH
Ministry of Health
MOI
Ministry of Interior
MOL
Ministry of Labor
MOMA
Ministry of Municipal Affairs
MOPWH
Ministry of Public Works and Housing
MoSD
Ministry of Social Development
MOT
Ministry of Transport
MSF
Médecins Sans Frontières, or Doctors Without Borders
Mukhaberat
Arabic term for secret police/intelligence agents/police informants
MWI
Ministry of Water and Irrigation
NAR
Needs Assessment Review
NCD
Non-Communicable Disease
NDF
The National Defence Forces (Syria)
NFE
Non-Formal Education
NGO
Nongovernmental Organization
NHF
Noor Al Hussein Foundation (Jordan)
NPS
National Poverty Strategy
Rachel Mayer

NRC The Norwegian Refugee Council
NRP National Resilience Plan
NYLC National Youth Leadership Council
NYT New York Times
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OIC The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
PFLP The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO The Palestinian Liberation Organization
PRRO Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PSS Psychosocial Support Services
PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
RRP Regional Response Plan
R2P / RtoP The Responsibility to Protect
R2S / RtoS Responsibility to Solve
SAF The Syrian Armed Forces
SDF The Syrian Democratic Forces
SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SILF The Syrian Islamic Liberation Front
SNC The Syrian National Council
SOHR The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
SRAD The Syrian Refugees Affairs Directorate
SRCC The Syrian Revolutionary Command Council
SRCD The Syrian Refugee Camp Directorate
SRF The Syria Revolutionaries Front / Syrian Rebel Front
SWM Solid Waste Management
TB Tuberculosis

*The Berm* The north-eastern border between Jordan and Syria where between 30,000 and 40,000 Syrian asylum-seekers are currently stranded

UASC Unaccompanied and Separated Children
UNDP The United Nations Development Program
UNFPA The United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF The United Nations Children’s Fund
UNGA The United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSC The United Nations Security Council
USCIS United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
VAF The Vulnerability Assessment Framework
WAJ Water Authority of Jordan
WANA West Asia - North Africa Institute
WASH Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene

*Wasta* Arabic term for a connection, “an in”, or someone that can make things go your way because of their position
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>The World Food Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>WG</td>
<td>Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>The World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>The World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVI</td>
<td>World Vision International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3RP</td>
<td>Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dhulum / Zulum</strong></td>
<td>Arabic term that roughly translates to injustice but is more specific than the English translation. It means injustice often in terms of resource distribution or fairness. For example, if a lower-middle class family receives humanitarian food vouchers or food stamps but a poor family is denied the same food vouchers or stamps, this is considered <em>dhulum / zulum</em></td>
</tr>
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</table>
MAPS AND FIGURES

Map 1

Map 2

Map 3

The number of people stranded at the border area between Syria and Jordan has continued to rise. According to the Jordanian Border Guard Forces, more than 37,000 persons are around the crossing points of Rumtan and Hesn, on the eastern border, compared to the 17,000 recorded in late January. The number of admissions to Jordanian territory is tightly controlled and remains low compared to the continuous new arrivals at the border area from within Syria.

Humanitarian assistance is organized from the Jordanian border. However, there are mounting concerns about aid not reaching those most in need, particularly at Rumtan where the majority of stranded concentrate. Asylum seekers increasingly resort cases of theft, violence, and abstention at the hands of local groups from within Syria. Disorder and riots have become more frequent reflecting the stress and the inappropiate conditions under which people have been living in the remote desert area for several months now.

In addition, death cases continue being recorded regularly. The number of maternal and neonatal deaths is of utmost concern. UNHCR and partners are stepping up advocacy with Jordanian authorities to evacuate pregnant women, particularly those in the late stages of pregnancy. On a priority basis, UNHCR, financed by ECHO, is covering the cost of medical referrals to ensure that there are no financial impediments to the evacuation of those most in need. DG ECHO is supporting different partners working at the border area.
Figure 1

This figure includes 2.1 million Syrians registered by UNHCR in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, 1.9 million Syrians registered by the Government of Turkey, as well as more than 28,000 Syrian refugees registered in North Africa.

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Figure 2

This figure includes the total persons of concern in Jordan according to UNHCR.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all the people that have helped me along the way to completing this thesis for my M.A. in Human Rights Studies. First and foremost I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis advisor, Professor Rashid Khalidi, for his continuous support, advice, and assistance throughout this process. I would also like to thank him for entrusting me to do my own research and providing me with both the freedom and the support to conduct independent field research in Jordan in March 2016 for this thesis. Also, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Institute for the Study of Human Rights for supporting my research and funding my fieldwork. I would also like to express a special thanks to Kristina Eberbach for advising me throughout the process and helping me narrow my thesis topic. I would also like to thank several other professors who have given me advice over the past two years that has helped me complete this thesis. This includes Professors Dipali Mukhopadhyay, Michael Doyle, J. Paul Martin, Zachariah Mampilly, and Tsveta Petrova.

In addition, I cannot forget to thank all the people who helped me while I was in Jordan. First I must thank the Syrian people I met in Jordan, whose openness, hospitality, compassion, humor, kindness, and willingness to meet me and to share their stories and perspectives despite the trauma that they have experienced and the hardships that they currently face in Jordan continues to inspire me to do as much as I can to raise awareness of their plight and help them overcome the current challenges they face in Jordan so that they might have a brighter future for themselves and for their children. I must also thank several people who helped me while I was in Jordan, including Ahmad Mousa and Farrah Bdour at the Columbia University Middle East Research Center, Musa Hattar at Agence France-Presse, Adam Coogle at Human Rights Watch,
Hala Shamlawi at the International Committee of the Red Cross, Kelly Kirk at ARDD-Legal Aid, Eva Kaplan at UNICEF, and Mohammad Al-Tarawneh at Blue Umbrella Organization. I would also like to thank Mahmoud Sadaqa and Ihab Muhtaseb, who helped me arrange interviews, a driver, and access to Syrians and Jordanians in Amman and Al Mafraq. I also have to thank my friends Zenobia Azeem, Eduardo Alvarez Gutiérrez, Jesse Marks, and Madison Marks who helped me while I was in Jordan.

Finally, I must also thank my family and friends who have supported me throughout the process. I could not have completed this thesis without the support of my parents, my sisters Elana Mayer and Aimee Mayer-Salins, my brother-in-law Mickey Salins, my grandmother Bea Mayer, and my friends Sydney Gilbert, Margaret Fletcher, Rachel Keegan, Claire Warner, Tricia Taormina, Tim Wyman-McCarthy, Kathryn Herrera, Mi-Mi Saunders, Mette Frederiksen, Sila Sonmez, Harshini Reddy, Russell Pildes, Mouhanad Al-Rifai, and Valentina Frolova.
INTRODUCTION

It is now time to recognize that the international community has a Responsibility to Solve these long-term refugee situations and to commit to new strategies for doing so.\(^7\)

-- T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Stephen Poellot, April 2014

Roots of the Crisis in Syria, the Current Crisis, and the Resulting Syrian Refugee Crisis

The crisis in Syria is highly complex, multifaceted, and protracted. It is now a situation in which multiple wars have been happening at the same time between region and international proxies, local power brokers, the Assad regime, and international or transnational terrorist organizations. This complexity has only increased over time, and as the crisis became protracted, the number of parties to the conflict multiplied several times over. Currently, there are hundreds of parties involved in the crisis, ranging from global superpowers (Russia and the United States) to tiny and transient local militias but importantly including regional powers (Iran, Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar) as well as the FSA, Jabhat Al Nusra, Da’esh, the Kurds, and the Assad regime.

One can say it all began with the Syrian Revolution in March 2011, or with the Assad regime’s violent crackdown on the uprisings. But the roots of this crisis go far deeper than that. First and foremost, it is important to understand the emergence of the modern Syrian state in order to understand the current crisis and particularly the rise of Da’esh. Syria was part of the Ottoman Empire prior to World War I, as was Iraq, and prior to the Mandate period during the interwar years, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, and Jordan were all parts of “Greater Syria.”\(^8\)


was not until after World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire that the borders we see today in the Middle East, or West Asia, emerged. Importantly, the secret Sykes-Picot agreement ensured that the French would control what is now Syria and Lebanon while the British would control what is now Iraq, Jordan, Israel, and Palestine. These borders were imposed on the inhabitants of what was the Ottoman Empire from the outside by rival European imperial powers competing for territorial control in West Asia (also known as the Middle East) and North Africa. This fact has increased Da’esh’s popularity precisely because Da’esh refuses to recognize these borders, which after a century have been established and recognized in a juridical sense by the international community.

Next, let us take a moment to look back at Hafez Al-Assad’s regime briefly in order to understand how this crisis unfolded following the spring 2011 uprisings. Hafez Al-Assad ruled over Syria for thirty years through an authoritarian regime of “spectacles” replete with “iconography and slogans” used in a cult-like fashion to achieve “domination” through “compliance rather than legitimacy.” Lisa Wedeen explains that under Hafez Al-Assad’s rule, people were “not required to believe the cult’s fictions, and they [did] not, but they [were] required to act as if they did.” However, under the surface, there was resistance despite this, perhaps best exemplified by the growth of opposition in Hama and Hafez Al-Assad’s violent suppression of such opposition by perpetrating the 1982 Hama Massacre and crushing any hopes of opposition there. Yet cults are fragile and are often highly dependent on a single leader, and with the end of the Cold War, increased globalization, and the succession of Bashar Al-Assad, this cult was not to last.

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9 Ibid.
10 Hafez Al-Assad was Bashar Al-Assad’s father.
12 Ibid. p. 30.
In 2000, there was a short “period of intense political ferment” following Hafez Al-Assad’s death after thirty years of rule and the accession of his son Bashar Al-Assad to the presidency rather than his older brother Basil Al-Assad, who had died in a car crash in 1994.\textsuperscript{13} There “was much optimism about a young president with exposure to western education who, in his inaugural speech, emphasized his determination to modernize Syria.”\textsuperscript{14} When this short spring “turned into the Damascus Winter,” some political asylum seekers began to leave Syria even as “aftershocks of mobilization,” such as the “Damascus Declaration Movement of 2005,” continued.\textsuperscript{15} Bashar Al-Assad’s had planned to “modernize authoritarianism” in Syria, but his project failed. According to Hinnebusch, he “inherited an authoritarian state with built-in vulnerabilities which he set about ‘upgrading’: he went relatively far towards restructuring the regime’s social base but failed to undertake a corresponding political adaptation,” and, from Hinnebusch’s perspective, the “most dangerous juncture for an authoritarian regime is when it seeks to ‘reform’, particularly when the path of reform combines neo-liberalism and crony capitalism.”\textsuperscript{16} Then a “terrible drought” from 2007-2010 “led to agricultural decline” and a housing crisis further exacerbated the situation.\textsuperscript{17} It only took the spark in Tunisia in the spring 2011 for revolution to come to Syria.

The Syrian Revolution began with protests in March 2011 in the city of Daraa following the uprisings and revolutions of the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Though these protests began peacefully, Bashar Al-Assad chose to crackdown on the protests and attempt to violently suppress them as his father had done in Hama in 1982, committing crimes against...

\textsuperscript{15} Gelvin, \textit{The Modern Middle East}. p. 330-331.
\textsuperscript{16} Hinnebusch, “Syria.” p. 95, 112
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. p. 102.
humanity in the process.\textsuperscript{18} The peaceful uprising quickly turned sour as the combination of Assad’s violent crackdown and major regime defections and the formation of the FSA forced what started as a peaceful revolution to morph into a civil war. Violence worsened, the regime began to commit systematic war crimes and crimes against humanity, and eventually opposition groups followed suit, as such crimes became the norm.\textsuperscript{19} The opposition began to splinter several times over, and foreign fighters from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah, and Russia intervened to support Assad as foreign fighters and mercenaries also came to join various other factions including Jabhat Al Nusra, Da’esh, and the Kurdish groups, among others. Things have been further complicated by a regional proxy war in Syria between Iran and Saudi Arabia (and the rest of the GCC) as well as an international proxy war between Russia and the United States in Syria as Russia formally intervened and the International Coalition comprised of many states both from the region and from outside the region intervened with the stated goal of defeating and destroying Da’esh in Iraq and Syria.\textsuperscript{20}

The result of all this has been massive destruction of almost the whole of Syria, the splintering of the Syrian state and the Iraqi state into several de facto states at the present moment, the growth of Da’esh and an increase in Da’esh and Al Qaeda terrorist attacks


worldwide, and the largest refugee and IDP crisis since World War II. Whether or not the recent hopes of a truce and potentially a ceasefire and eventual peace agreement actually materialize or if Syria once again descends into all-out war, the refugee crisis remains, and realistically most of the refugees will not be able to return to Syria in the near future or in the distant future, whether or not they wish to do so.

The Failure of the International Community

The plight of Syrian refugees has become a hot media topic of late. This global crisis has become one of the greatest challenges to the human rights regime and one of the greatest crises that this generation faces. This concerns not just traditional international refugee law and refugee protection but also civil and political rights; sovereignty and identity politics; and economic, social, and cultural rights. Yet in the international media the Syrian refugee crisis has mostly been discussed in terms of the more recent mass migration to Europe, which is perhaps the greatest European migration crisis since the aftermath of World War II, rather than what is proportionally and absolutely the even more massive migration from Syria to neighboring host countries of Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. But in spite of the great media focus on Europe in the past year, these neighboring host countries have been overwhelmed by massive influxes of Syrian refugees since the onset of the crisis in Syria following the uprisings that began in March 2011. What is more, these generous host countries, whose economies, institutions, and political structures are weaker than those of their European and North American counterparts, have not received nearly enough support from the international community to cope with such large influxes of refugees. Consequently, these neighboring host countries have placed more and more restrictions on Syrian refugees.Borders have closed, refugees have been refused
asylum, refugees already inside the country are not legally permitted to work and have no civil rights inside the country, and the list goes on. The mere fact that it took a mass migration to Europe for the world to wake up to the desperate situation in Syria and the resulting Syrian refugee crisis sadly demonstrates the extent to which the international community had failed to adequately respond to both the crisis inside Syria and the resulting refugee crisis.

One Jordanian that I interviewed in Amman named Youssef* explained that the Syrian refugee crisis “is a wrong on top of a wrong.” Youssef* criticized the international community and particularly wealthy powerful nations such as the United States and Russia that have intervened in Syria, exacerbated the crisis inside Syria rather than resolving it and consequently exacerbated the Syrian refugee crisis as well, and then have demanded that the neighboring countries to take in the refugees while they sit comfortably at a distance and are not forced to take in Syrian refugees. He argued that the international community has failed Syria and the Syrian refugees primarily by not solving the crisis inside Syria and that this should be prioritized over any discussion of what to do with the Syrian refugees residing in Jordan. However, Youssef* stressed that he does not blame the Syrian refugees themselves and stressed that we must treat them like human beings and ensure their rights and dignity while they are here in Jordan instead of treating them like victims or weak people that cannot help themselves in a paternalistic manner.

As international support has diminished and the little savings Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) have has dwindled, the war in Syria continues to trudge onward into its sixth year. The situations in which Syrian refugees and IDPs find themselves have become

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21 Jordanian 2, interview by Rachel Mayer, Voice Recorder (MP3), March 10, 2016, 2.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
unsustainable. The world has finally awoken to a protracted refugee crisis that began soon after the Syrian uprisings began in March 2011. Yet less than 1% of the world’s refugees are resettled in a third country. As a result, many refugees, including not just Syrian refugees but also Iraqi, Sudanese, Afghani, Libyan, and other refugees, have been willing to risk their lives to cross the Mediterranean and be smuggled across borders into Europe in hopes of reaching wealthy and more welcoming EU states because many of them see it as their only chance to survive and lead a dignified life.

While the best situation for both the Syrian refugees and host countries would be if the war in Syria ended and the refugees could safely return home, the prospects for such an outcome in the near future remain dim, even if the recent discussions of a truce hold. A second ideal solution would be true global responsibility sharing. This would include both full financial and logistical support for UNHCR and other agencies and organizations providing for the refugees as well as increased resettlement on a global scale distributed in a just manner based on economic calculations, population, population density, and sociopolitical capacity to integrate the refugees. However, achieving true global responsibility sharing for the Syrian refugee crisis (and for that matter all refugee crises) is similarly unlikely to happen in the near future, even with increased awareness of the crisis and increased empathy toward Syrian refugees. If anything, trends in Europe and the U.S. are shifting towards increased xenophobia and fear mongering rather than towards increased openness and understanding of our common humanity. One need only listen to the Republican presidential candidates in the United States or examine the recent agreement between the European Union and Turkey over the migration crisis to see the increasing xenophobia and aversion to increased resettlement in most countries in the world today. But perhaps even worse, one need only look at wealthy, powerful nations that refuse to take in any
Syrian refugees, including Russia, China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, to see that it is highly unlikely that resettlement can become a sufficient solution for the Syrian refugees at least in the near future. With this unfortunate reality in mind, it is essential to examine other possible solutions given the climate of protracted conflict in Syria and paralysis in the international community.

The Case of Jordan

Herein I focus exclusively on the case of Jordan. Jordan, like Turkey and Lebanon, has generously accepted a very large influx of Syrian refugees. The Kingdom is currently hosting approximately 636,040 of the 4,812,993 total persons of concern, which includes both Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR and those that are not registered but are nonetheless counted among those Syrian individuals in need of humanitarian assistance outside of Syria. Considering that Jordan’s population is approximately 8,117,564, Syrian refugees now comprise roughly 7.8% of the population. In contrast, the United States has only taken in approximately 1,854 Syrian refugees, which constitute about 0.000574% of the U.S. population, which was estimated at 323,227,742 as of March 25, 2016, and plans to accept 10,000 Syrian refugees

total,\textsuperscript{29} which will add up to about 0.00003094\% of the total population. Germany has taken in about 1,000,000 Syrian refugees,\textsuperscript{30} which adds up to about 1.239403\% of the German population, which stands at about 80,683,980.\textsuperscript{31} Other wealthy and powerful states such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, China, Japan, Russia, and Iran have yet not pledged to take in any Syrian refugees.

Jordan has proven very generous by accepting so many Syrian refugees since the onset of the current crisis. Furthermore, its generosity is heightened by the fact that Jordan has previously hosted large waves of refugees from Iraq, Syria, and Palestine before the current crisis. Furthermore, it is important to note that the situation for Syrian refugees in Jordan overall is probably better than the situation for Syrian refugees in several other host states. For example, in Lebanon, approximately one fourth of the population is now Syrian refugees, and abject poverty, sectarian violence, the presence of Hezbollah, and the precarious security situation has made life for Syrian refugees more difficult than it is for those living in Jordan.\textsuperscript{32} As another example, the


situation in Turkey has proven difficult for Syrian refugees, despite the presence of most of the Syrian political organizations and opposition groups there, as a result of the language barrier and the unstable security situation as a result of Da‘esh, the flow of foreign fighters through southern Turkey, the civil violence in Kurdish areas and terrorism committed by Kurdish militant groups, and the tension between Turkey and Russia.\textsuperscript{33} Yet the fact that life is somewhat better for Syrian refugees in Jordan than it is in Lebanon and Turkey does not mean that the situation in Jordan is perfect and without its own array of issues that require further scrutiny, assessment, and adjustment.

Even though Jordan has absorbed multiple waves of refugees in the past, the situation has become anything but hopeful for Syrian refugees. Unable to work and lacking even the most basic rights stipulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Optional Protocol, Syrian refugees have been forced to live off of their savings and the little humanitarian aid they are able to acquire. Rather than increasing rights and privileges for Syrian refugees over time, integrating them into the economy, and providing a pathway towards citizenship, Jordan has chosen the opposite path by banning them from employment and not guaranteeing them the same rights and

protections afforded to Jordanian citizens. At first, this was understood among the Syrian refugees as a temporary inconvenience, but as time has gone on and the war in Syria continues to rage, this way of living is no longer sustainable, even for the more well off refugees. Many have chosen to go back to Syria despite the risks because they would rather have their dignity than face the temporary permanence of refugeeedom, marginalization, and poverty in Jordan. Others have chosen to try to reach Europe in hopes of finding a better, more dignified life.

**Research Objective**

Herein I will examine the case of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Instead of focusing exclusively on the economic impacts of the influx of the Syrian refugees or the humanitarian provisions for them, I focus more on legal status and civil and political rights. I will also use noted observations and interviews with Jordanian nationals, Syrian refugees, and staff from various UN agencies, IGOs and INGOs, and local NGOs obtains during the course of my fieldwork in Jordan. The questions I seek to answer in this study are as follows: If the large influx of Syrian refugees are unwilling and/or unable to return to Syria and are not resettled elsewhere, and will thus reside in Jordan for years to come, will Jordan be obligated to provide a pathway to citizenship and meaningful political participation for Syrian refugees? Taking into consideration its legal obligations and moral imperatives as well as its domestic and regional security concerns, should the Jordanian government provide a pathway to citizenship and meaningful political participation for Syrian refugees? How does Jordan perceive its responsibility to the Syrian refugees it is currently hosting? Finally, why is full integration a better solution than partial integration, protracted responsibility sharing or simply relying on repatriation and resettlement?
Research Methodology

The Syrian refugee crisis, like the war in Syria, is very current, dynamic, protracted, multifaceted, and constantly changing. As a result, research on the subject has proven difficult, as the situation on the ground is in near constant flux, and consequent conclusions today may prove almost irrelevant tomorrow. With this understanding in mind, it is no wonder that the vast majority of the sources on the Syrian refugee crisis come from news media, human rights reports, UN reports (including UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, UNOHCA, OHCHR, and the UN Security Council), INGO reports, local NGO reports, released or leaked intelligence reports, and academic work published by universities, journals, and think tanks.

To answer the questions I posed above, I employ a mixed method with a mainly qualitative approach. I employ data from a range of primary and secondary sources as well as emerging academic literature. The primary sources consist of observations and interviews gathered during the course of my field research in Amman, Jordan and Al Mafraq, Jordan from March 3, 2016 to March 22, 2016. For this fieldwork, I interviewed Jordanian nationals (including both East Bankers and Palestinians that have Jordanian citizenship), Syrian refugees, and staff from various UN agencies, INGOs and IGOs, and local NGOs and took ample notes on my observations while working in Amman and in Al Mafraq.

The secondary sources include a range of reports, qualitative and quantitative data, news articles, and academic works as well as key covenants, conventions, treaties, agreements, and domestic laws pertinent to international refugee law, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and domestic Jordanian laws pertaining to immigration, asylum, labor, and citizenship.
Research Significance

This thesis is significant and relevant not just because the plight of Syrian refugees is making headlines these days, but also because the crisis has become protracted, and we can no longer look at it strictly from a humanitarian lens. It is useful to examine this issue from a human rights lens, as opposed to just a humanitarian lens, a security lens, or a development lens, for several reasons. Perhaps most importantly, this lens allows us to see this crisis from the perspective of the Syrian refugees themselves and to focus on their rights to live in dignity and have agency rather than just survive as “guests” in host countries fully dependent on insufficient and dwindling humanitarian assistance. This is also a security issue, as those lacking legitimate fora to influence politics and change their realities often mobilize politically outside the realms of the state structure and may turn to violent means of political participation to achieve their goals. Thus, the fulfillment of Syrian refugees’ human rights, including civil and political rights, is not just a moral imperative, but it is also in Jordan’s long-term national security interest and in the international community’s security interest.
CHAPTER 1: THE STATUS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN JORDAN

To deny any person their human rights is to challenge their very humanity. To impose on them a wretched life of hunger and deprivation is to dehumanize them.34

--Nelson Mandela, June 1990

Poverty is the absence of all human rights. The frustrations, hostility and anger generated by abject poverty cannot sustain peace in any society. For building stable peace we must find ways to provide opportunities for people to live decent lives.35

-- Muhammad Yunus, 2006 Nobel Peace Prize Awardee, December 10, 2006

The situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan is dire. Syrian refugees initially were welcomed generously as brothers, but now that the refugee crisis has become protracted, much has changed, and some of that welcome has worn off.36 Most of the Syrian refugees no longer can live off of their savings and face poverty and uncertainty.37 Humanitarian aid has been woefully insufficient since the onset of the crisis, and humanitarian organizations have had to operate on approximately 50% of their budgets throughout much of the crisis.38 In addition, Syrian refugees

37 Ibid.
are not permitted to work in Jordan and are marginalized economically, socially, and politically. The status quo has undoubtedly become unsustainable.

**Jordan’s Generosity**

Jordan has demonstrated “extraordinary generosity in hosting refugees” even as its “communities are under considerable strain as basic services are overstretched.” The Kingdom is hosting an incredibly high number of Syrian refugees—approximately 636,040 of the 4,812,993 UNHCR’s total persons of concern, which includes both Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR and those that are not registered but are nonetheless counted among those Syrian individuals in need of humanitarian assistance outside of Syria.

One Jordanian small business owner I interviewed in Al Mafraq named Abdullah* told me that the Syrians in Jordan are “our guests and our brothers” and are welcome here in Jordan. He said that “we welcome them and must help them” especially since their situation is generally worse than that of Jordanians, even with the unemployment among Jordanians and the fact that

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the influx of Syrian refugees has exacerbated Jordan’s economic problems, because they are not allowed to work, are often denied the aid they are promised, and are completely dependent on humanitarian organizations and charities that oftentimes are corrupt and nepotistic in their dealings with them.\footnote{Ibid.} Abdullah* employs a Syrian refugee in his store named Firas* (who I also interviewed) who has been denied aid several times. However, Abdullah* concluded that the situation cannot really improve until the crisis in Syria is resolved so that the Syrian refugees can finally return home in peace.\footnote{Ibid.}

The international community must not forget that Jordan, in addition to Lebanon and Turkey, is “providing a global public good to the international community by hosting an incredibly high number of Syrian refugees” at great domestic cost and with insufficient support from the international community.\footnote{Ibid.} According to Khetam Malkawi’s article in The Jordan Times, “Economists and UN officials feel that the international community is taking Jordan's generosity for granted and not supporting the Kingdom enough in sharing the unprecedented burden of hosting thousands of Syrian refugees.”\footnote{Belhaj, “Generosity Has Limits.”} According to a statement by the UNHCR representative to Jordan Andrew Harper in quoted in this article, “one of the reasons that have driven refugees to go to Europe is the insufficient support provided by the international community to Jordan and the World Food Programme (WFP) in particular to mitigate the impact of the crisis.”\footnote{Khetam Malkawi, “World Should Not Take Jordan’s Generosity for Granted — Officials, Relief Workers,” Jordan Times, November 15, 2015, sec. Local, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/world-should-not-take-jordan%E2%80%99s-generosity-granted-%E2%80%94-officials-relief-workers.} Jordan’s generosity must be appreciated and the international community must take on its share of
responsibility in helping Jordan to cope with the crisis. The international community “must step up its efforts.”

However, lack of sufficient funding for humanitarian and development assistance and economic weaknesses do not negate the responsibility of every state to ensure human rights protections for those residing within its borders. Furthermore, Jordan’s generosity for taking in more refugees does not override its responsibility to uphold international human rights law and international refugee law and to ensure that Syrian refugees have the same legal protections to ensure that their human rights and domestic civil rights are upheld as those afforded to Jordanian nationals.

The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Jordan

Let us more closely examine the legal status of refugees in Jordan. Although Jordan has not signed and ratified the Refugee Convention, it does have a long history of hosting refugees, including most notably Palestinian refugees as well as more recently Iraqi refugees. Although Jordan is not party to the Refugee Convention, “article 21 of the Jordanian Constitution prohibits extradition of ‘political refugees.’” In addition, “Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs requires that those entering the country as political asylum seekers present themselves to a police station within forty-eight hours of their arrival.”

Nevertheless, “Article 31 of this Law grants the Minister of the Interior the authority to determine on a case-by-case

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48 “3RP 2016-2017.”
51 Ibid.
basis whether persons that entered illegally will be deported” even though “it does not identify conditions under which individuals will be eligible for asylum” and it “also does not impose any sanctions against asylum seekers who entered the country illegally.” Furthermore, “Refugees do not automatically acquire rights to residency, employment, public education, or health care,” and all foreigners, including refugees, are not able to “live in the country without acquiring a residency permit,” and “such permits in most cases are valid for one year only.” In practice, residency status has “generally been granted only to Palestinians except under special circumstances,” and “this exception has not been implemented for Syrian refugees” to date.

The legal situation is even more stringent than this with respect to employment. “The 1954 Constitution spells out most clearly that the right to work in Jordan is reserved exclusively for Jordanian citizens.” According to the 1973 Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs Law, Jordanian nationals and companies are “not to employ foreigners without a valid residence permit.” But “this law allows for exemptions in connection with humanitarian needs or political asylum.”

The Ministry of Labor “publishes a list of professions and industries in which only Jordanian citizens are allowed to work,” including “medical, engineering, administrative, accounting and clerical professions; telephone and warehouse employment; sales; education; hairdressing; decorating; fuel sales; electrical and mechanical occupations; guards; drivers; and construction workers.” “Labour Law No. 8 of 1996 defines the rights, protections and responsibilities for all

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
workers and employers, except for those in the domestic and agricultural sectors (who are covered under separate laws).”  

However, this law “does not contain any references to ‘refugees’ or ‘asylum seekers’.”  

Finally, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between UNHCR and the Jordanian government signed in 1998 stipulated that, “asylum seekers can remain in Jordan for six months after recognition, during which time the UNHCR has to find a resettlement country for them.”

However, this grim legal picture does not fully paint the picture of refugee status in Jordan. As it turns out, the laws toward refugees are discriminatory and depend on the country from which the refugee fled (and in the case of Palestinians, where in Palestine they are from and when they fled) as well as when he or she fled. For example, “article 2 of the country’s nationality law, Law No. 6 of 1954” is case in point here—it “grants Jordanian nationality to all Palestinians that lived in Jordan between December 20, 1949, and February 16, 1954” but has not been applied to Palestinian refugees from Gaza nor to Iraqi or Syrian refugees. This is because Jordan controlled the West Bank from 1948 to 1967, and it did not relinquish its territorial claims to the West Bank until 1988 following the First Palestinian Intifada in 1987.

“To the extent that the United States can be considered a nation of immigrants, Jordan is a nation of refugees.” Yet instead of being gradually integrated into Jordanian society, most refugees “are still considered refugees even decades after entering the country and are often

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60 Ibid.
63 Christophersen, “Jordan.”
denied rights enjoyed by the rest of the population.”64 For a nation of refugees, “Jordan’s overall record on refugees is nonetheless a very mixed one.”65 It has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, but it has “generally offered generous humanitarian hospitality and temporary protection to its refugees.”66 Nevertheless, “while Palestinian refugees residing in Jordan between December 20, 1949, and February 16, 1954, were granted Jordanian citizenship, those arriving since then have suffered from temporary and limited rights.”67

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The Socioeconomic Realities for Both Syrian Refugees and Jordanian Nationals

The socioeconomic realities for both Syrian refugees living in Jordan and many Jordanian nationals are difficult and have worsened in recent years. For most Syrian refugees in Jordan, the socioeconomic situation is very hard. As the crisis in Syria enters its sixth year now, the Syrian refugees in Jordan can no longer rely on their savings, which have since dried up. Furthermore, since humanitarian aid has consistently been underfunded and Syrian refugees are not legally permitted to work in Jordan, their socioeconomic situation has become impossibly grim and unsustainable. Many have turned to desperate measures and “negative coping strategies” such as “reduction in food consumption, withdrawing children from school and taking on informal, exploitative or dangerous employment.”68 For many Syrian refugees living in Jordan, the socioeconomic challenges have become so great that they have chosen to risk even more dangerous choices such as returning to Syria despite the very real dangers or attempting to make it to Europe through smuggling routes or crossing the Mediterranean Sea.

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64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Washington et al., “VAF Baseline Survey.”
It must be acknowledged that many Jordanians have also been impacted by the crisis, as the large influx of Syrian refugees in Jordan over such a short period of time has significantly impacted the economy, the state infrastructure, and the sociopolitical situation as Jordan struggles to hold on to its distinct national identity. Although it is impossible to determine the full economic impact, both negative and positive, the “Jordanian Economic and Social Council has stated that the cost to Jordan per Syrian refugee is over US$3,500 per year and the direct cost is currently at US$1.2 billion and is expected to rise to $4.2 billion by 2016.”69 In addition, as Jordan is “facing a severe water crisis and needing to recruit more armed forces, but lacking adequate funds, the country has formulated a National Resilience Plan in an effort to protect Jordanian infrastructure.”70

But in spite of the negative rhetoric and widespread assumptions that the Syrian refugees are a burden on the Jordanian economy, there actually have been a number of very positive impacts as a direct result of their presence in Jordan. One major positive impact has been economic growth and expansion as a result of both rapid population increase and increased development assistance. When the population in a country increases, consumption increases, demand increases, there is resulting job growth and labor markets expand, and prices increase, benefitting business owners, manufacturers, and other producers. A Jordanian I interviewed named Youssef*, who is a student at the University of Jordan and works at a café part-time explained that this is already happening in Jordan, and the economy and labor markets have already expanded and continuing to grow because of the Syrian refugee influx and the increased development funds coming into Jordan.71 This has already started to occur in Jordan and is easily

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69 Al-Kilani, “A Duty and a Burden on Jordan.”
70 Ibid.
71 J 2, 2.
observable in the rapid development happening in Amman as well as the growth in the city of Al Mafraq, which only had a few stores before 2011 and now has many new businesses as the economy has multiplied in size. In addition to this, consumers in Jordan have benefitted from the presence of Syrian refugees because Syrians are willing to take jobs that Jordanians do not want and work longer hours for lower wages and less benefits, thus reducing the prices and improving the services available to Jordanians in markets such as construction and food service. A Jordanian woman I interviewed named Randa*, who is a corporate lawyer from West Amman, explained that before the Syrians came, restaurants and cafes used to be full of Egyptian migrant workers, but now Syrians have taken many of those jobs instead of the Egyptian foreign workers. She said that in her opinion, the Syrians have generally been better workers anyway, working longer hours, providing better service and better quality food, and charging less than the Egyptians did before them, which benefits Jordanian consumers. Furthermore, increased development assistance has benefitted not only Syrians but also Jordanians, since, according to the individuals I talked to from UNICEF, ARDD-Legal Aid, and Blue Umbrella Organization, development projects are generally required to benefit both Syrians and Jordanians in order to receive government approval, funding, and support, and most projects allocate 30-50% of their budget exclusively to benefit Jordanians in host communities.

However, there have also been some negative effects on Jordan’s economy and on Jordanian nationals as a result of the Syrian refugee influx. Economic development is often uneven, and Jordanians do face several challenges as a result. Another Jordanian I interviewed in the city of Al Mafraq named Mahmud* explained that prices have increased, especially housing prices, and wages have decreased, labor standards have worsened, and many employers employ Syrians illegally instead of Jordanians because they can pay them a lot less and do not have to give them
benefits or labor protections. From his perspective, Syrians have received aid and assistance from many humanitarian organizations and charities, but Jordanians have not received anything, even though they are also struggling and the Syrian refugee influx has made their situation worse. Mahmud* argued that the situation in Al Mafraq is improving though because “Syrians are leaving” and are either returning to Syria, going to Europe, or going elsewhere. Mahmud* did not acknowledge the economic growth and development that has occurred in Al Mafraq since 2011 and argued that the situation will get better when the Syrians leave and either go back to Syria or go elsewhere. Although this perspective is rather narrow-minded and based more on his own experience and emotional reaction rather than on the data and the facts, this perspective is representative of a large number of Jordanians, especially “East Banker” Jordanians in poverty pockets such as much of the city of Al Mafraq, who have felt overwhelmed by the Syrian refugee influx, especially since there are currently more Syrians than Jordanians in Al Mafraq. Nevertheless, there is some truth to some of his statements. For example, wages have decreased because Syrians are working illegally for much lower wages. Also, housing prices have increased because of the increase in demand due to the Syrian refugee influx.

Nevertheless, many of the economic woes in Jordan, especially in poverty pockets, are not a direct result of the Syrian refugee influx. It is important to acknowledge that Jordan’s economy was not very strong at the onset of the refugee crisis. “Jordan has a world of problems, all visible in its expanding capital, Amman: too many unemployed young people, rising food and energy prices, political upheaval across the region and a war in Syria that has landed the country with
more than 600,000 refugees.” The Syrian refugee influx may not be the key causal factor for most of the economic problems that Jordan currently faces.

In many ways, the large influx of refugees has exacerbated some of Jordan’s economic woes and other problems. Given their dire circumstances, many Syrians are willing to work for “half the subsistence wage a Jordanian would expect” and “live two or three families to a flat built for one.” This naturally has the potential to drive down wages, cause a housing crisis, overwhelm the sewage and transit systems, and drain the already scarce water resources. The international community has provided some financial and other assistance, but Jordan needs more support to cope with the crisis.

Svein Erik Stave and Solveig Hillesund of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and Fafo produced an important 153 page report on the subject of the economic impact of Syrian refugees in Jordan this year entitled “Implications of the influx of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labour market: findings from the governorates of Amman, Irbid and Mafraq.” This large influx of Syrian refugees has had a significant impact on the Jordanian labor market. Some important demographic findings from this study are that most of the Syrian refugees in Jordan are from rural areas of Syria, and overall, their education levels are much lower than that of Jordanians. The labor market among Syrian refugees is also highly gendered, with only 7% of Syrian women participating in the Jordanian economy and 88% of those women outside of the camps unemployed. The first key finding was that about 30% of those that were working in the industrial or agricultural sectors prior to 2011 are no longer working in those industries and the

73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Stave and Hillesund, Implications of the influx of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labour market [Arabic version].
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid. p. 10.
number of Jordanian males working in construction has decreased as the number of Syrian refugees working in construction as increased significantly as has the number of Syrian refugees working in retail and sales, thus indicating that Syrian refugees are crowding the Jordanian labor market. The second key finding was that, as Syrian refugees are not legally allowed to work, only 10% acquired official work permits, and the rest of those working are working in the black market outside of the scope of Jordanian labor law and the protections it provides to those working in the country legally. Nevertheless, Syrian refugees are willing to accept jobs and wages that Jordanians are not willing to accept.

The ILO/Fafo report presents four effects of this refugee influx on Jordan’s labor market: (1) the loss of an opportunity to grow Jordanian employment in emerging low-skilled jobs, (2) increased competition for existing jobs, (3) future threats of overcrowding in the labor market, and (4) the general deterioration in working conditions is leading to more shortcomings/deficiencies in decent work in Jordan. Based on these results, the report presents the following prescriptions: (1) tackle and formalize the informal economy and reduce informal employment, (2) encourage the private sector to employ Syrian refugees in the sectors that permit the recruitment of migrant workers, (3) develop realistic scenarios for the development of the Jordanian labor market as a basis for any strategy in the labor market, (4) maximize the possibilities for short-term employment in the economy of aid and coordinating arrangements between the international community and the Jordanian government, (5) improve the link with the National Employment Strategy, and (6) promote school enrollment among Syrian children.

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78 Ibid.
79 Ibid. p. 11.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid. p. 11-12.
Alexandra Francis argues that the “Syrian refugee crisis has exacerbated endemic political, economic, and resource challenges in Jordan.” As the war in Syria has continued and has entered a protracted state, “Jordan has limited its humanitarian response” rather than increasing it. Francis lists four main challenges to addressing the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan:

1. The massive size of the Syrian refugee influx (620,000 Syrians registered with UNHCR) and the fact that 84% of Syrian refugees do not live in refugee camps.

2. The increased stress on “economic and resource infrastructure in Jordan, which was already suffering from structural issues before the refugee crisis.”

3. “The Jordanian public consistently overstates the negative impacts of the Syrian refugee influx, while the positive impacts receive far less attention, highlighting the politicized nature of the refugee crisis in Jordan. Public sentiment toward Syrian refugees has a deleterious effect on the government’s ability to respond productively to the refugee influx.”

4. “Confronted with persistently underfunded humanitarian appeals, Jordan has lost confidence in international donor support. Without additional aid and a sustainable response to the refugee crisis, Jordan will continue to restrict the protection space for Syrians. Doing so will increase the long-term risks of instability in Jordan and the region.”

Yet in spite of the apparent “burdens” that the Syrian refugee population has placed on Jordan, these same Syrian refugees can and are already contributing to the economy and to

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83 Francis, “Jordan’s Refugee Crisis.”
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
Jordan’s development. In a report released by Chatham House, Doris Carrion explains that the Syrian refugee crisis has caused an 8% increase in the Jordanian population, a presence which “has raised fears over competition for resources and opportunities.”\(^8\) Nevertheless, Jordanian communities “have partly benefited from the presence of refugees and the international aid that has come with them,” even though the most negative impacts of the Syrian refugee crisis have “hit the most vulnerable people in their country hardest.”\(^9\)

Jordan also views the refugees as a social and political burden that threatens its national identity. It is important to note that many Jordanians consider this issue to be the major problem. “More than 40% of Jordan's current population originates from other countries, including two million Palestinians, up to 1.3 million Syrians and 29,000 Iraqis.”\(^9\) For economic, supposedly demographic, and resulting security reasons, “to protect its national identity in these circumstances,” and given “the complicated situation in the region generally,” Jordan “has not become a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention.”\(^9\) Instead, “Jordan's law on refugees is defined by a 1998 Memorandum of Understanding with UNHCR, amended in April 2014,” which “includes the Convention's definition of 'refugee' and accepts the principle of non-refoulement and third country resettlement for refugees” but “does not allow for local integration as a solution.”\(^9\)

These trends are easy to observe in how humanitarian agencies and organizations, NGOs, development organizations, and charities in Jordan strategize and design programs and projects. During his fieldwork in the summer of 2014 in Jordan, Davidson found an array of “short-term

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\(^9\) Ibid.
aid projects designed by the NGOs to meet the various needs of the refugees” but “no plans to approach the issue Syrians’ need with any long-term solutions.” Consequently, “the Syrian refugees in Jordan, like refugees elsewhere are stuck in cycles of temporary permanence.” Similarly, during the course of my own fieldwork in March 2016 I found that most UN agencies, INGOs, and local NGOs still approached the Syrian refugee issue in a short-term manner with the understanding that the Syrian refugees were not going to be in Jordan forever and that they were not going to be integrated locally in Jordan. These organizations included the ICRC, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, and Amal ou Salam, among others. Notable exceptions that actually had long-term strategies, programs, and projects included JOHUD, ARDD-Legal Aid, and Blue Umbrella Organization.

**Human Rights Violations, Loss of Dignity, and an Unsustainable Status Quo**

No one can say that the human rights situation in Jordan is anywhere near as bad as is the situation inside Syria, and on a scale, the human rights situation in Jordan is very good compared to that of Syria. Nevertheless, Syrian refugees in Jordan are facing human rights violations and suffer from an unsustainable status quo and a growing loss of dignity and hope. Some of these are clear legal violations, such as deportations in violation of the principles of non-refoulement enumerated in both international refugee law and domestic Jordanian law. Many of the Syrian refugees I interviewed in both Amman and Al Mafraq were terrified of deportation and felt that there was a high likelihood that they could be deported if caught working, committing a

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95 Ibid.
misdemeanor, or being at the wrong place and the wrong time.\textsuperscript{96} Other less tangible violations that many of the Syrian refugees I interviewed in Amman and Al Mafraq brought up were social and economic rights violations such as denial of the right to work and denial of access to adequate healthcare and education.\textsuperscript{97} Other human rights violations that I observed and that several Syrian refugees I interviewed told me about included restrictions on the freedom of movement and intense monitoring by the mukhaberat.

Consider the story of one Syrian refugee family I met in Al Mafraq. I first met Adnan* very briefly on the street and briefly interviewed him before he introduced me to his sister Reem*. They were originally from Homs, but after their city was bombed again and again, so much so that the city became unrecognizable amid the widespread destruction, they were forced to flee, first internally as IDPs for awhile, and eventually as refugees, crossing the border, entering Za’atari refugee camp and registering with UNHCR. When Adnan* and Reem* first fled to Jordan, Adnan* was able to work because he had had a work permit in Jordan before the crisis in Syria began. It was for this reason that Reem* came to join him in Jordan in the first place, joining him in Amman after a short period in Za’atari. However, as time went by, Adnan’s* permit and Syrian documents expired, and he could no longer work legally in Jordan. For this reason, Reem* made the incredibly difficult decision that her three boys had to remain together in Lebanon without her. They lost her husband in Syria and since his disappearance have come to the conclusion that he was killed. Reem* has only her brother Adnan* and her grandmother with her in Jordan. Caught working illegally, Adnan* was forcibly send to Azraq after being

\textsuperscript{96} Syrian Refugee 1, interview by Rachel Mayer, Voice Recorder (MP3), March 11, 2016, 1; Syrian Refugee 6, interview by Rachel Mayer, Voice Recorder (MP3), March 18, 2016, 6; Syrian Refugee 8, interview by Rachel Mayer, Voice Recorder (MP3), March 18, 2016, 8.

detained without food for two days and being dumped at the camp in the middle of the night. He was forced to pay 5,000 JD as bail. Azraq camp was horrible. Reem* described the camp to me as a prison that is very difficult to get in and out of and that receives much less international attention and far less goods and services than Za’atari camp. Reem* and Adnan* came to Al Mafraq after escaping Azraq “illegally” because Amman was far too expensive and more importantly because the only chance they had for Adnan* to regain his right to work in Jordan was by retrieving his documents from Syria. When I spoke to both of them in mid-March 2016, Adnan* had not yet attempted to cross the border yet. Reem* explained that they had no refrigerator and no washing machine because they could not afford it. She said that she and her brother had begun to sell everything, including all of their modest furniture except two beds and a few other things in order to survive.

Reem* explained to me that the reason for their terrible socioeconomic was threefold—one, the terrible protracted crisis in Syria; two, their legal status in Jordan, which afforded them “no rights” and no dignity in Jordan; and three, the insufficiency and corruption in the humanitarian sector, which had denied her aid and did not help her whatsoever. Reem* explained that she and her brother were denied aid from UNHCR and from other humanitarian organizations because they are not categorized as “most vulnerable.” This is because her brother is a single male, and, on paper, UNHCR considers her a single woman because her children are in Lebanon alone without her, and her husband disappeared in Syria and is likely dead. To make matters worse, Jordan does not permit Syrian refugees to return if they leave Jordan. This means that Reem* has not seen her children in about four years, and she has no way of doing so because Lebanon will not accept her, Syrian refugees have been detained at the airport in Turkey, or at least that is what she was told, and there is no way for her children to come to Jordan.
Reem* also complained of widespread corruption in the humanitarian sector and among translators and fixers working with Syrian refugees in Jordan. She said that aid was often unjustly distributed, with some that were doing ok receiving humanitarian assistance while others who desperately needed it being denied such assistance. She said that what was even worse was that sometimes non-Arabic speakers would come to talk to Syrians with translators that were completely unprofessional. She explained that the Iraqi translators were honest and professional, but many of the Jordanian translators intentionally omitted things that were said, added their own personal commentary, or simply made the situation sound a lot better than it was to maintain Jordan’s good image internationally. Reem told me that Jordanians did not mind that the international community saw how difficult the socioeconomic situation was for Syrian refugees in Jordan, but they did not want them to see it as a result of the legal status given to Syrian refugees in Jordan.

In addition, Reem* told me that the mukhaberat in Al Mafraq seemed to be overly concerned with any interactions Syrians had with Christians, regardless of the reasons for such interactions. She said she understands proselytizing is illegal in Jordan, but back in her neighborhood in Homs, she, a Sunni Muslim, lived in the same neighborhood as Christians, Murshidis, Druze, and others. Before the crisis began, they had lived in peace. She said that what they had was beyond coexistence—they had shared each other’s lives, holidays, and celebrations. It is for that reason especially that she could not understand why the Jordanians seemed to be so concerned with people of different religions talking to one another. She said that her beliefs were personal and they had no right to restrict her from talking to Christians or others solely based on religion or the fear that she might convert. She told me that after talking to individuals from Christian humanitarian organizations before, the mukhaberat came to her house and told her not to speak...
to them again. This even happened with a friend of hers. She said that people had resorted to wearing hijab to come see her to avoid suspicion and the unwelcome involvement of the mukhaberat. To her, it seemed that some Jordanians were more concerned about Christians proselytizing than about Syrians surviving.

Reem* and Adnan**’s socioeconomic situation in Jordan in addition to their trauma and family separation have become so difficult that they have given up hope. Reem* told me that there are no solutions, no matter how hard I try. She said that a solution may help some people, but it cannot solve everything—there is no silver bullet. Defeated and hopeless, she exclaimed that she has only two choices: return to Syria in peace, or return to Syria and die.

Consider another story from a different family I met in Al Ma’raf. Though not as terrible as Reem* and Adnan**’s socioeconomic situation, the situations of most other Syrian refugees I interviewed are far from easy. Another Homsi98 family I interviewed while in Al Ma’raf similarly faced a difficult and unsustainable socioeconomic situation. At minimum, this family is all together in Jordan, with no one left in Syria or separated and living elsewhere as a refugee far from their family. I met Kamal*, his wife Nour*, several of their small children, all of whom were under age five or six, and Kamal’s* brother Nizar*. Their situation was a little better, since they received some humanitarian aid from UNICEF for the children and a small amount from UNHCR and CARE since they are categorized as a family rather than a single individual. Nevertheless, life is not easy, as they are not able to work. Kamal* was a construction worker back in Syria and was able to provide for his family, but now he can hardly make ends meet. Nizar* is in a similar situation, and he too has children to support. To make matters worse, Kamal* explained to me that prices—especially housing prices—have been continuously

98 Homsi is an Arabic term used to describe someone from Homs.
increasing. Kamal* said he feels that there is a preference for migrant foreign workers from Asia over Syrians, and he does not understand why. He explained that there is discrimination and prejudice against Syrians and that Jordanians (at least in Al Mafraq) do not care about the Syrians’ plight even though most Syrians [in Al Mafraq] suffer greatly. He said that the situation was further exacerbated by the fact that they had to deal with corruption and nepotism in UNHCR and most aid agencies and zulum in aid distribution, access (or lack thereof) to services like medical care, and access to resources. Kamal* and Nizar* differed in how they felt about the overall situation and their future, however. Although Nour* seemed hesitant, Kamal* explained that he had tried for resettlement and had talked to UNHCR and a Canadian official, but he had not heard back in months and did not know his status or how likely it was that his family might actually be able to resettle elsewhere. Kamal* and Nizar* both explained to me that everyone is homesick, but there is no home to go back to. He said that Homs is completely destroyed, Syria is broken, and there is nothing for them there. Nizar* told me that many Syrian s are turning to drugs and alcohol if they can get their hands on them to escape and forget about how miserable their situation has become. Kamal* said that life had become unbearable and impossible in Jordan, and unless there are major changes, then there is nothing for him in Jordan either.

The status quo in Jordan has become unsustainable, unjust, and unacceptable for both Syrian refugees and Jordanian nationals. The next chapter further examines the dangers of maintaining the status quo and the necessity of finding solutions and changing policies in order to mitigate the major challenges that both Syrian refugees and Jordanians are currently facing.
CHAPTER 2: RISKS OF MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO

What happens to a dream deferred?

    Does it dry up
    Like a raisin in the sun?
    Or fester like a sore—
    And then run?
    Does it stink like rotten meat?
    Or crust and sugar over—
    Like a syrupy sweet?

    Maybe it just sags
    Like a heavy load.

    Or does it explode?

-- Langston Hughes, “Harlem” from Collected Poems

The policies of non-integration for Syrian refugees in Jordan have become unsustainable for both Syrian refugees and Jordanians. If no major changes are made, there could be serious consequences. The risks of not changing these policies to cope with the present realities regarding the Syrian refugees in Jordan could involve not just negative impacts for the Syrian refugees residing in Jordan, but also negative impacts on Jordan’s economy and infrastructure as well as domestic, regional, and global security. In this chapter, the potential impacts of both the large Syrian refugee influx and the Jordanian policies of non-integration and protracted humanitarian assistance are further examined in terms of (1) the Syrian refugees themselves, (2) Jordan’s economy and infrastructure, and (3) the possible security implications of maintaining the status quo.

Impacts on the Syrian Refugees

The continuation of the status quo with respect to the legal status and socioeconomic conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan will no doubt have the most significant consequences on the Syrian refugees themselves. As the war continues to rage in Syria, preventing Syrian refugees from safely returning home, and as the attitudes toward refugees in the West harden, their situation in Jordan will continue to deteriorate if they are not integrated into the Jordanian economy and permitted to fully integrate into Jordanian society by becoming Jordanian citizens. Broadly speaking, these impacts can be categorized into three main categories: economic impacts, psychological and health-related impacts, and social and political impacts.

Economic Impacts

Both the policy of non-integration and the serious shortfalls in funding for humanitarian and development assistance have resulted in serious economic consequences for Syrian refugees in Jordan. Both Syrian refugees living in the official refugee camps (Za’atari and Azraq) and Syrian refugees living outside of the camps amongst Jordanians in areas such as Amman, Mafraq, and Zarqa face serious economic challenges as a result of the crisis itself, the international community’s insufficient response to the crisis, and Jordan’s thus far short-sighted policies regarding the Syrian refugee crisis. These challenges include problems such as unemployment, lack of access to livelihoods, deepening poverty, and, and increased vulnerability.

The Government of Jordan (GoJ), humanitarian organizations, and charities as well as Jordan’s neighbors and “community groups” have “contributed generously” and exerted much effort “to maintain the wellbeing and dignity of the refugees,” and “to support the most
vulnerable Syrian refugee households.” But humanitarian aid and sympathy are not enough. As “needs increase and community coping mechanisms and safety nets” have been nearly exhausted, “vulnerabilities” are becoming “exacerbated” and “community tensions” are rising. Syrian refugees need real, durable solutions, not charity and pity.

About 85% of the Syrian refugees in Jordan have “settled out of camps, principally in Amman, Mafraq, Irbid, and Zarqa,” yet a large proportion of them “are classified as ‘extremely vulnerable’.” Although “refugee registration gives access to humanitarian assistance and some public services, the Syrian refugees have no legal entitlement to work” without a work permit. As a result, “it is the informal sector which provides the opportunities for income generation but wages are inevitably very low and working conditions are exploitative.” But “income-generating activities are scarce and for most of them the income-expenditure gap is substantial and increasing.” According to a “recent food security monitoring exercise,” as much as “three-quarters of refugee households relied on food vouchers as their main source of income, while in host communities 20 per cent of female-headed households scored ‘poor’ or ‘borderline’ in a food consumption assessment, compared with 12 per cent in male-headed households.” UNHCR estimates that about “86 per cent of urban refugees live below the Jordanian poverty

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102 “JORDAN RESPONSE PLAN for the Syrian Crisis.”
103 Huffer and Sheth, “When Empathy Isn’t Nearly Enough”; Balsari et al., “Syrian Refugee Crisis.”
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid. p. 16.
line of 68 JOD (approx. US$95) per capita per month.”¹⁰⁹ Consequently, “[livelihood] sustainability, cost of living and rent levels, alongside food insecurity and increasing indebtedness, are major concerns for the refugees as well as for their hosts.”¹¹⁰

As this crisis has become protracted, many if not most of the Syrian refugees in Jordan “have now been cut off from their homes and livelihoods for years, and face increasing vulnerability as whatever savings or assets they possessed have been depleted or sold.”¹¹¹ This “sale of personal assets” has become “extensive.”¹¹² The problem is, “this not only increases their current impoverishment but depletes the resources that the refugees might have available when and if they return to Syria to rebuild their lives and livelihoods.”¹¹³ Furthermore, unemployment and increasing impoverishment “has disproportionately affected women and youth.”¹¹⁴ There has been a “rising incidence of child labour” as well as child marriage, causing a “loss of education that will affect their life chances both in exile and when they return to Syria.”¹¹⁵ This has put in motion a cycle of poverty. “The costs and impacts of displacement on their livelihoods are severe and their marginalisation from the mainstream response programme is particularly worrying.”¹¹⁶ If Jordan’s policies do not change, the Syrian refugees will keep falling deeper and deeper into poverty.

*Psychological and Health-Related Impacts*

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¹¹¹ “JORDAN RESPONSE PLAN for the Syrian Crisis.”


¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.
Syrian refugees in Jordan have also experiences major psychological and health-related issues as a result of the crisis in Syria and their situation in Jordan. The psychological and health-related issues that many refugees have or are currently experiencing are the result of a combination of factors both prior to and after their flight to Jordan from Syria. Some are physical, and others psychological. Some are short-term, and others long-term or chronic. Some simply concern access to healthcare, and others are in part a result of other challenges that the Syrian refugees residing in Jordan face.

Many of the primary health issues for Syrian refugees are psychological. These issues include trauma and depression, among other issues. As refugees, many suffer from trauma and PTSD as a result of the violence they witnessed and suffered back home in Syria. In addition, many women and children (and men in some cases) have suffered from sexually and gender-based violence (SGBV), which has been used as a weapon of war in Syria, during their flight as refugees, and/or during their time as refugees in Jordan. Furthermore, the stress of refugee status in Jordan and the consequent feelings of isolation, marginalization, and lack of belonging; the relative deprivation and frustration that refugees experience because of their legal status and socioeconomic situation; the feelings of being stuck in limbo because of the protracted nature of

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the crisis; the feelings of loss of dignity and self worth; and the hopelessness all contribute to further trauma, stress, anxiety, and depression. This is not helped by the fact that issues of mental illness, trauma, and especially SGBV are still stigmatized and considered taboo in Syrian [and Jordanian] society.\textsuperscript{120}

Another issue is disease.\textsuperscript{121} Due to the chaos and crumbling healthcare system back in Syria as a result of war, many preventable and treatable diseases began to surface, including polio, measles, and tuberculosis (TB).\textsuperscript{122} In addition, due to the overcrowding in the Syrian refugee camps in Jordan (specifically Za’atari and Azraq camps) as well as the poor socioeconomic conditions of the vast majority of Syrian refugees,\textsuperscript{123} who live in urban areas,\textsuperscript{124} the spread of viruses, bacterial infections, and diseases is a public health concern as well.

However, even more troubling than these contagious diseases is the issue of non-communicable diseases (NCDs). These include diseases such as “hypertension, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, chronic respiratory diseases, and arthritis.” This “high prevalence of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) poses a challenge to in terms of provision of appropriate secondary and tertiary services, continuity of care, access to medications, and costs.”\textsuperscript{125} This, in turn, feeds into the next key issue for Syrian refugees—access to adequate healthcare.

Finally, access to adequate healthcare is a serious challenge for Syrian refugees in Jordan.\textsuperscript{126} Several Syrian refugees that I interviewed complained of lack of access to adequate healthcare

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{123} “Jordan’s Za’atari Refugee Camp Turns Three, Challenges for the Future of Thousands Living There.”
\item\textsuperscript{124} “JORDAN RESPONSE PLAN for the Syrian Crisis,” p. 9
\item\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.; Abisaab et al., “Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Urgent Issues and Recommendations.”
\end{itemize}
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because of insufficient funds and poor-quality care. For example, Bilqis*, an elderly Syria woman from Homs who I interviewed in Amman, has serious heart problems but cannot afford her medications nor the nutritional supplements she needs. Nesrin*, a Syrian refugee from Daraa that I met in Amman, is a mother of two children with serious developmental disabilities and major heart conditions that require surgery. She cannot afford the treatments, and the operation her son needs is out of the question because it is so expensive. Another Syrian refugee I met named Yasser* and his wife Nadia* from the ancient Roman city of Al-Nakheel similarly faced medical challenges. Yasser has a serious disease that causes him to lose his limbs, and he no longer has arms or legs. Yet he also cannot access the necessary treatment and medical care because he cannot afford it. Nizar*, a father and husband I met in Al Mafraq who is originally from Homs, complained that Jordanian healthcare is very expensive and poor quality. He said that he had rushed his pregnant wife (she was pregnant when they fled Syria) to the hospital in the middle of the night, since she was in labor. He said that when they arrived, all the nurses and staff were dancing, listening to music, taking their time, and ignoring the patients. It took them hours and hours to get the care she needed. Nizar* explained to me that this never would have happened in Syria. First of all, healthcare was free back in Syria, and secondly, staff would never be able to get away with overtly ignoring the patients in need of care like what he experienced when his wife was in labor. These problems in the healthcare system are the result of several factors, including the sheer magnitude of the refugee crisis, persistent underfunding for humanitarian assistance, and the strain that the Syrian refugee influx has put on the Jordanian healthcare system.

_Social and Political Impacts_
There have also been serious social and political consequences from the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan and Jordan’s policies toward the Syrian refugees entering the country or already within its borders. These consequences are to a large extent cyclically linked with the socioeconomic conditions and legal status of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Some examples of negative impacts have been social exclusion, increased tension between Syrian refugees and Jordanian nationals, and increased child marriage among Syrian refugees.\textsuperscript{127} The continuation of that status quo could bring engender other dangerous outcomes for the Syrian refugees, including increased domestic and communal violence; an increase in crime, gangs, sexual and other types of harassment; involvement in the black market and consequent increased risk of labor and other abused; and increased risk of civil strife between Syrian refugees and Jordanian nationals.\textsuperscript{128}

Finally, the unsustainable status quo has already forced many Syrian refugees to leave Jordan indirectly if not directly in some cases. Some Syrian refugees have been deported back to Syria, perhaps in violation of the fundamental principle of \textit{non-refoulement} “for violating laws, such as working illegally,” or “for posing security problems, usually as a result of political actions, regardless of specific affiliation.”\textsuperscript{129} Others have made their own decision to return to Syria despite dangerous conditions to participate in the violence or to somehow earn a living.\textsuperscript{130} Others have attempted to migrate elsewhere. Starting a little over a year and a half ago, the world witnessed a massive increase in “illegal” and dangerous migration to Europe by boat and smuggling routes. If the status quo does not improve, this trend will likely continue.

\textsuperscript{127} “JORDAN RESPONSE PLAN for the Syrian Crisis.” p. 21
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid. p. 68.
Impacts on the Jordanian Economy and Infrastructure

That the large influx of Syrian refugees has impacted the Jordan’s economy and infrastructure is incontrovertible. It has affected the labor markets, the housing markets, the roads and transportation system, the sanitation and sewage systems, the already scarce water supply, the healthcare system, the education system, the government’s budget and finances, and the overall economy in Jordan. Nevertheless, “Jordan has absorbed refugee flows for well over a century.”131

The UN, various IGNOs and faith-based NGOs, and the international community have been assisting the Government of Jordan (GoJ) in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis. However, “the nature of the crisis has evolved significantly,” since the onset of the crisis, “even as the scope and cost of the operation has continued to expand.”132 The situation morphed from a short-term humanitarian operation limited to small refugee camps into a nation-wide crisis. “Refugees began leaving the camps and settling in some of the poorest municipalities of the northern governorates,” which in turn began “placing an unmanageable burden on basic services and infrastructure, markets and local communities’ resources.”133 At the start of the crisis, Jordanians approached the Syrian refugees with generosity and compassion. But as the situation has become protracted and the refugee influx has had an increasing impact on the economy, infrastructure, services, and resources, this welcome has worn off to many Jordanians. This has become “a protracted systemic crisis in which some of the poorest most vulnerable Jordanians are sharing their scarce local resources, services and infrastructure with a growing population of refugees

132 “JORDAN RESPONSE PLAN for the Syrian Crisis.” p. 16
133 Ibid.
living among them, and increasingly competing for employment, shelter, schooling, water and other basic necessities.”

Jordan’s finances have been seriously affected as well. “Providing for their [the Syrian refugees’] needs has impacted heavily on Jordan’s public finances, increasing government expenditure on subsidies, public services, and security, while further compounding the negative economic consequences of regional instability.” As the crisis is becoming more and more protracted, the impacts on Jordan’s public finances are becoming more and more substantial. “In some municipalities refugees outnumber residents, and the impact on inflation, employment, and access to public services and community resources has fuelled local tensions and threatened to spark wider social unrest.” These trends will likely continue if there are no changes in policy and aid provision.

There have also been significant impacts on Jordan’s fiscal position and its international trade. “Hosting over 1.4 million Syrians has also heavily impacted Jordan’s fiscal position, exacerbating pressure on public finances, increasing government expenditure on subsidies for bread, water, electricity, and gas, and further inflating the budget deficit.” Since the UN agencies, INGOs, and local NGOs have faced persistent underfunding throughout the crisis, limiting their abilities to provide adequate humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees, Jordan’s economic responsibilities and expenditures have increased tremendously. In addition, the “fiscal impact has been compounded by interruptions to the flow of relatively cheap gas from Egypt, leaving the country with no alternative to expensive oil imports, at an annual cost of

\[134\] "JORDAN RESPONSE PLAN for the Syrian Crisis." p. 16
\[135\] Ibid.
\[136\] Ibid.
\[137\] Ibid. p. 16.
approximately US$2 billion.”

This high cost naturally limits the amount of public funds that can go toward other important areas such as infrastructure and public services. On top of this, international trade “has been severely disrupted by the loss of the country’s main trans-regional trade route through Syria, impeding Jordan’s access to major export markets in Europe.” In addition, “trade with Iraq - which previously accounted for 20 per cent of total exports (i.e. US$1.25 billion in 2013) has fallen by almost 90 per cent since armed groups seized the main Iraqi border crossing in June 2014, leading to an additional revenue loss of over US$1.4 million per day.”

The ongoing war in Syria and the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan have seriously affected Jordan’s finances, international trade, and overall economy.

Nevertheless, while it is true that the “Syrian refugee influx has compounded existing problems associated with large numbers of migrant workers in Jordan,” as well as Jordan’s fiscal concerns, these challenges have been exacerbated by the fact that Syrian refugees are not permitted to work legally. There already are “large numbers of irregular migrant workers who are subject to discrimination and abuse,” and these numbers have increased as Syrian refugees have started to work illegally, creating a more permissible climate for labor abuses and exploitation and eliminating the incentive “to improve the wages and quality of work” throughout the labor market but especially in low-skilled jobs. This in turn has been driving down wages and standards throughout the labor market for both migrant workers (and Syrian refugees) and Jordanian nationals. Furthermore, since Syrian refugees are not permitted to work legally, they are more dependent on both government services and international humanitarian assistance, which weighs down on Jordan’s finances as well as donor contributions from the

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138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid. p. 16.
141 Ibid. p. 24.
142 Ibid.
international community. If Syrian refugees are not permitted to work legally, these negative economic trends and consequent social tensions will continue to increase, negatively impacting both Syrian refugees and Jordanian nationals.

The Syrian refugee crisis has impacted not only the Jordanian economy, but also every aspect of the Jordanian infrastructure and government services. This includes a range of areas, including the education system, the healthcare system, local governance and municipal services, the energy sector, the environment, the justice system, shelter, transportation, and WASH. Concerns for the education system include “overcrowding in high population density areas, shortages of qualified teachers, and concerns about declining quality.”143 In addition, the “health sector urgently requires the continuation of humanitarian assistance to cope with the immediate health needs of refugees, while simultaneously strengthening systems to maintain and restore quality and extend coping capacity for future inflows.”144 In addition, the “influx of Syrian refugees has exacerbated municipalities’ already limited capacities to meet local needs and address social cohesion within communities,” and this “situation is exacerbated by their severe financial distress overall.”145

In terms of energy, the gas crisis “has been compounded by the increased demand from Syrian refugees, with total residential energy consumption rising from 4926 GWh in 2009 to 6265 GWh in 2013.146 In order to “offset increased demand and reduce pressure on the power grid,” Jordan must urgently address “energy efficiency and renewable energy supply measures in addition to improvements in capacity.”147

As for the environment, “short-term responses to the refugee crisis and resilience-building measures such as new construction risk deleterious consequences for the environment,”

143 “JORDAN RESPONSE PLAN for the Syrian Crisis.” p. 19
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid. p. 20.
146 Ibid. p. 19.
147 Ibid.
especially in “already resource-scarce and environmentally fragile country like Jordan.”\(^{148}\)

“Technical assistance and support” will thus prove necessary “to ensure that environmental impact assessments (EIA) are undertaken to incorporate the appropriate mitigation measures within the design of projects, preventing damage to the environment while addressing risks to social cohesion and well-being.”\(^{149}\)

The refugee crisis has also affected the justice system. “Competition for access to public services and scarce resources has fuelled tensions and social conflict, which can be considered as one of the key reasons for a marked increase in juvenile delinquency and crime rates.”\(^{150}\) The caseload has increased by “50 per cent in Amman, 77 per cent in Irbid, and 84 per cent in Mafraq during the period 2011-2014” according to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ).\(^{151}\) This has seriously impacted “the technical and operational capacity of the judicial system.”\(^{152}\)

Housing has also been affected. “The increased demand has led to increased rental prices, sub-division of existing units, and conversion of outbuildings into rental accommodation.”\(^{153}\) Areas with the highest influx of refugees have been most severely impacted, with “rental prices inflated by 100 per cent to 200 per cent compared to pre-crisis value prices thereby causing an increase in sub-standard solutions and growth of informal settings.”\(^{154}\) Since most refugees live in host communities, “competition for affordable housing has become a leading source of community tension.”\(^{155}\)

\(^{148}\) Ibid.
\(^{149}\) Ibid.
\(^{150}\) Ibid. p. 20.
\(^{151}\) Ibid.
\(^{152}\) Ibid.
\(^{153}\) Ibid.
\(^{154}\) Ibid.
\(^{155}\) Ibid.
“The influx of refugees has also heavily impacted Jordan’s transport infrastructure, particularly in areas with high concentrations of refugees.”156 This is due to both the provision of humanitarian assistance and the increase in population and new unplanned settlements. “Servicing refugees’ needs has increased the pressure on transport networks, multiplying the volume of heavy-loaded cargo, water supply, and sludge disposal trucks, while further contributing to the rapid degradation of the roads.”157 There is also a need for new road and better transit in areas “where unplanned settlements have sprung up throughout municipalities in the north as a result of refugee arrivals.”158

Finally, the “water infrastructure is in need of urgent rehabilitation to increase water quality and accessibility.”159 Due to increasing demand, the frequency of water delivery has become insufficient and is worsening, and as a result, “households have to supplement their supply by purchasing water.”160 The sanitation and sewage systems have also been impacted. “The influx of Syrian refugees has also increased pressure on already limited sewage and communal waste systems, which only cover 62 per cent of the Jordanian population.”161 Plus, the refugee camps must not be forgotten: “water and sanitation will continue to be needed throughout 2015 in refugee camps.”162

Given the increasingly protracted nature of this crisis, “there is a growing acknowledgment that current life-saving humanitarian funding and programming are neither sustainable nor sufficient, and should be complemented by a more development-oriented approach to build

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156 Ibid. p. 21.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid. p. 21.
national resilience and sustain the level and quality of services provided.” However, if the status quo continues, Jordan will likely see the negative impacts on its economy and infrastructure worsen far more than they would if there was a policy shift towards development and integration.

Some organizations and agencies are starting to shift from a strictly humanitarian approach to a more development-focused approach. For example, UNICEF is starting to shift its focus towards development and improving “social cohesion” between Syrian refugees and Jordanian nationals and is working to integrate their programs into the broader development agenda for Jordan. UNICEF operates based on a model that incorporates both development and humanitarian assistance by incorporating its programs into four cyclical phases—development, crisis, recovery, and development. A staff member that I interviewed at UNICEF argued that the Syrian refugee influx in Jordan is not necessarily a burden economically, as there is some economic growth and increased development funding, and there is a new initiative to set up special economic zones wherein Syrian refugees will be able to work. However, she maintained that this crisis has placed a huge burden on the schools, transit, and infrastructure and that Jordan cannot and should not be expected to shoulder this responsibility on its own.

Some other organizations, including some local organizations, recognize the risks of maintaining the status quo of non-integration and marginalization of Syrian refugees for both Syrian refugees and Jordanians and are actively working to change the trajectory of these trends through integrated development for both Syrians and Jordanians. For example, a very new local Jordanian NGO called Blue Umbrella aims to “Build civil society of underdevelopment areas affected by the impact of asylum through capacity building and development for local nonprofits

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and build networks of peers and promote resource sharing to drive effectively all civil society components in order to maximize their positive change in the community, in turn generating more resources for local nonprofits.”

The organization intends to target local nonprofit organizations, youth activists, and community leaders among both Jordanian and Syrian communities in order to empower marginalized and hard-hit communities, increase local capacity among current and future community leaders, and promote harmony, unity, and prosperity for everyone living in Jordan. Although this organization was just established this year, it is the first local organization I found while in Jordan that both recognizes the dangers of maintaining the status quo and is actively attempting to address these issues through long-term strategies rather than through protracted humanitarian assistance, increased resettlement, and encouraging the repatriation of Syrian refugees in Jordan to Syria.

Security Concerns

Refugee influxes do not only impact the economies of host countries; they also present potential security concerns for host countries. There is a large body of literature in political science, comparative politics, conflict studies, political psychology, urban studies, geography, and security studies concerning radicalization, political violence and militarization among refugees. One of the most basic arguments is based on Ted Gurr’s classic frustration-aggression theory: perceived relative deprivation yields frustration, which can shift to aggression and violence given the right preconditions and a spark. In the context of refugee crises, this

165 “Blue Umbrella Organization”; Al Tarawneh, J 3.
argument can be applied as follows: if refugees perceive relative deprivation as compared to the host community in the host country in the form of economic disparities, disparities in the provision of rights, discrimination, or other such disparities, then, given the right circumstances and a spark, they may turn to aggression and violence (individually or collectively).

Bueno de Mesquita et al. add an important analysis to this discussion in *The Logic of Political Survival*. They argue that political leaders do whatever is necessary to stay in power by relying on and catering to the “winning coalition”, or the group of people that supports them and keeps them in power.\(^{167}\) This is true in all political regimes, no matter if they are democratic, semi-democratic, or non-democratic.\(^{168}\) Since the Syrian refugees in Jordan are denied the same rights as Jordanian nationals and, most importantly in this case, are denied civil and political right, they cannot be part of the Jordanian government’s “winning coalition” needed to maintain political power. Thus, in order to have any chance of influencing politics, the Syrian refugees will have to force their way into that “winning coalition.” If Syrian refugees continue to face marginalization and are denied their human rights, including their civil and political rights, they may turn to violence to force their way into the “winning coalition” and gain a political voice.

Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch contend that “the presence of refugees and displaced populations can also increase the risk of subsequent conflict in host and origin countries” because refugees can “expand rebel social networks” and, “although the vast majority of refugees never directly engage in violence, refugee flows may facilitate the transnational spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies conductive to conflict.”\(^{169}\) The spillover of refugees

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168 Ibid.
can, based on their study, correlate with conflict spillover.\textsuperscript{170} Refugee flows in this sense can be fundamentally destabilizing to host countries, not just economically as the literature on economic “burdens” or impacts might suggest, but also politically and in terms of domestic and regional security.

Yet it is important to recognize that, one, as Salehyan and Gleditsch stated, most refugees never participate in violence, and two, not all refugee populations collectively employ violence. Some refugee groups militarize, and some do not, despite the prevalent fear that militarization is not only possible, but perhaps inevitable. In his study of militarization or lack thereof among Palestinian and Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Lebson argues that “four conditions are necessary and sufficient to lead to refugee militarization in a particular host country at a particular time: a collective project to redeem the homeland from a clear enemy, socioeconomic marginalization from the host state, militancy entrepreneurs and political opportunity.”\textsuperscript{171} He summarizes his results as follows:

\textit{From 2010 to 2011 I conducted 174 interviews of Palestinian and Iraqi households and local experts in Jordan. The results of these interviews reveal that from 1948 to 1963 there was a collective project among Palestinians in Jordan, but most refugees were waiting for powerful states to redeem the homeland on their behalf. From 1964 to 1970 all four conditions were met. From 1971 to 2011 militarization has not occurred mainly due to lack of political opportunity. This suggests that Palestinians would likely militarize again if political opportunity arose. Among ordinary Iraqis, however, there is little collective project, despite

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid. p. 360.
the presence of militancy entrepreneurs, so it is unlikely that they would militarize even if given the opportunity.\textsuperscript{172}

The question is, does the group Syrian refugees in Jordan fit Lebson’s four conditions? It could be argued that Syrian refugees do in fact fit the first of Lebson’s conditions. There are “clear enemies” for Syrian refugees back home—the Assad regime and Da’esh—and in addition, there has been a “collective project to redeem the homeland” from these enemies in the form of the revolution against the Assad regime (despite the factionalism, militarization, weakness, and polarization that have developed since 2011). As for the second condition, Syrian refugees are certainly facing “socioeconomic marginalization” in Jordan, given that they are not even legally permitted to work in Jordan. Militancy entrepreneurs have already been seen in various capacities among the Syrian refugees in Jordan, as the Free Syria Army has had significant support from refugees and FSA fighters have crossed back and forth over the Syrian borders into Jordan and elsewhere for medical treatment.\textsuperscript{173} The last one of Lebson’s conditions is “political opportunity.” This part is hard to measure, but the meaning is clear. The first three conditions are preconditions for violence, or fuel if you will. The fourth condition is the spark. Given the right circumstances, violence can flare up if the other three conditions are met, according to Lebson’s argument. If marginalization continues for the Syrian refugees in Jordan and there is some spark or trigger, then, based on Lebson’s argument, there is a real risk that the Syrian refugees may turn to violence.

In another piece, Lebson develops “a comprehensive theory of refugee militarization that emphasizes the importance of endogenous factors, including political and economic motivations,

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.

in the context of broader structural factors, including political opportunities and resource mobilization, mediated by the presence of militancy entrepreneurs” to “helps integrate the motivation of refugees, and the discursive framing used by militancy entrepreneurs to mobilize them, with capacity for militant activity.”

Importantly, Lebson lists “improving living conditions, employment opportunities and legal rights of refugees in the host state to meet the terms of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, regardless of whether the host state is a signatory” and facilitating “economic integration in the host state” among his policy prescriptions to reduce the likelihood of militarization among refugee groups.

Building on this “refugee warriors” literature, Leenders finds that there is “a serious divergence between theorizing on refugee warriors and the important case of Iraq's war refugees.” Importantly, Leenders questions the salience of this “refugee literature” and “argues that the generalized application of the refugee warrior label and the overstated prominence given to it by some scholars and by practitioners within the international refugee regime need to be critically examined.” These assumptions and the application of “the refugee warrior label” have already had major consequences. “In reference to Iraqi refugees' abandonment in terms of protection and given strenuous efforts to contain them to the region, it is suggested that the label appears to have gained currency with the effect of helping to impose an ‘in-region solution’ for refugees and drastically curbing refugees' access to direct asylum procedures in North America and Western Europe.”

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175 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
The relatively small number of Syrian refugees that have been resettled or that have been granted asylum in the U.S. and much of the E.U. perhaps suggests that policymakers in the West may be basing their refugee policies largely on the “overstated prominence” and “generalized application” of the refugee warrior literature with respect to Syrian refugees. But, given the case of Iraqi refugees, these policies should likewise be critically assessed.

In sum, the risks posed by non-integration of refugees are significant. It is true that refugee studies and policies toward Syrian refugees not just in Jordan but also in states throughout the world are already becoming highly securitized. Yet the policies of encampment, non-integration, and isolation, which are often put in place for security reasons, often have the opposite effect, increasing rather than decreasing security risks. In spite of the seeming dangers of integration, non-integration may pose a similar if not greater risk to Jordan, its neighbors, and the international community.

The Jordanian government, mukhaberat, and military are certainly aware of these potential threats, as evidenced by the significant military presence in northern Jordan near the Syrian border and the seeming ubiquity of the mukhaberat, not just in Amman, but also in Al Mafraq, Irbid, and other places throughout the country. However, the current securitization of the Syrian refugee issue, the heavy monitoring of Syrian refugees, and the sheer size and reach of the security sector is increasing the levels of frustration and deprivation among Syrian refugees and is not addressing root causes despite ensuring day-to-day security for Jordanians and tourists and preventing immediate terrorist threats from materializing. In the city of Al Mafraq, I observed more military vehicles full of soldiers than I did civilian vehicles on the streets. The very air and vibe in Al Mafraq felt tense and highly militarized and securitized. People in Al Mafraq were afraid to speak openly, and every conversation I had in public lasted less than ten minutes.
Almost all of the Syrian refugees I interviewed, whether in Al Mafraq or in Amman, mentioned being monitored by the *mukhaberat*, facing restrictions on their freedom of movement not just across international borders—Syrian refugees that leave Jordan will lose their status and will not be able to return—but also in Jordan itself as well as their deep fear of deportation should they be caught working illegally, commit a minor misdemeanor, or even just be caught at the wrong place at the wrong time. Many of the Syrian refugees that I interviewed explained that many Syrian refugees are not permitted to leave the refugee camps legally, especially Azraq camp, and furthermore that those caught working illegally will first be forcibly sent to Azraq camp and fined 5,000 JD then deported back to Syria if caught again or deported back to Syria right away depending on the case.

But what struck me as even more worrisome was the security sector’s seeming obsession with preventing Christian proselytization. Proselytization is illegal in Jordan (preaching Islam is legal, but preaching other religions is illegal), and it is also illegal for Muslims to convert to Christianity or another religion in Jordan. A minister I met in Amman explained to me that his church is heavily monitored and that Christian charity groups working with Syrian refugees are especially monitored because, whether or not they are missionary groups, the *mukhaberat* assume they are missionaries. Furthermore, one of the Syrian refugees I interviewed in Al Mafraq named Reem* explained to me that the *mukhaberat* monitor who comes to talk with them, and if they are Christian groups, even Christian humanitarian organizations and charities like WVI, Caritas, or JRS, or even if they are just friends, they are told not to speak with those organizations or individuals again.

While these approaches do have short-term benefits for Jordan by preventing terrorists attacks from materializing and by preventing the spread of Christianity, which seems to be
seriously over-prioritized in Jordan to the point where it has become more important than the basic dignity and livelihoods of the Syrian refugees, these approaches may do more harm than good in the long term for Jordan as well as in the immediate sense for the Syrian refugees living in Jordan. With continuing and increasing frustration, anger, and hopelessness among Syrian refugees as well as an increased sense of repression, it is clear that the risks posed by the non-integration, marginalization, and isolation of the Syrian refugees are significant and must be seriously examined.
CHAPTER 3: INTEGRATION AND A PATHWAY TO CITIZENSHIP

I urge you to celebrate the extraordinary courage and contributions of refugees, past and present.  

-- United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, June 20, 2002

Sahar* fled Homs a little over three years ago and came to Jordan via Iraq through the long desert route. Her husband passed away and she has seven children. Back in Syria, she had run a clothing business out of her home, but in Jordan, Syrians cannot work legally. She spent a short time in Za’atari but now lives in Amman. Sahar* complained that when she first arrived in Za’atari, UNHCR treated them terrible, “like slaves,” and in an inhumane manner by forcing them to be out in the hot sun or out in the snow freezing. UNHCR denied her refugee status three times because her husband was a soldier, even though she is completely anti-war and does not support any militant or terrorist group. She left Za’atari as soon as she could. However, she explained that over time, things have gotten better for her because she now has a proper ID card and legal status in Jordan. Nevertheless, her greatest fear, needless to say, is deportation back to Syria.

The most important thing to Sahar* was that she and her children escaped imminent death in Syria. However, she worries about how the current situation is affecting her children and about their futures. Currently, four of her seven children are not in school. One of them is working illegally in construction (floors and tiles). She is terrified that he will either be forcibly sent to Azraq Camp or deported back to Syria if caught. With the effects of the trauma from the horrors back in Syria on top of the difficult situation in Jordan half of her kids out of school, one

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180 SR 1.
181 Ibid., 1.
182 Ibid.
working illegally, no father around, and no immediate hopes of legal employment or social integration, Sahar* fears for her children and what such deprivation and desperation could engender in the future.

In addition to this, Sahar* told me how grateful she was that Jordan was safe and stable and that she could lead a somewhat normal life here. She said that she is terrified of being sent back to Syria and that there is nothing for her and no future for her children there. However, she does want to stay in Jordan for perhaps permanently. Sahar* stressed that she is happy here in Jordan and is thankful for Jordan’s generosity in opening its doors to so many Syrians, but all she wants is to be treated with dignity and afforded the same civil rights and human rights as Jordanian citizens.

The Need for Integration and a Pathway to Citizenship

Given the protracted nature of the war in Syria and the Syrian refugee crisis as well as the situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan and the sheer size of the population, the option of integration and the provision of a pathway to citizenship for Syrian refugees in Jordan should be seriously considered and prioritized. The present situation for Syrian refugees in Jordan has become unsustainable, and inaction or continuation of the status quo of non-integration could lead to serious consequences not only for the Syrian refugees themselves, but also for Jordanians. Integration and a pathway to citizenship would not only improve the situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan, especially with respect to their human rights, but it would also help mitigate some of the negative consequences that the Syrian refugee crisis has had on Jordan and slow or even reverse the negative economic, social, and political trends in Jordan. Assuming that one, the war

183 Ibid.
in Syria will continue and that the Syrian refugees will not be able to return home, and two, that refugee resettlement continues to account for a only a tiny percentage of the refugee population, then integration, a path to citizenship, and the provision of equal rights is the best solution for Syrian refugees living in Jordan who would otherwise be left in legal limbo and denied their human rights.

**Moral Reasons**

The influential theoretical literature continues to be relevant to refugee studies today as well as to the current Syrian refugee crisis. Hannah Arendt’s famous work on rights and statelessness in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, particularly “Chapter Nine: The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man,” continues to be studied as the preeminent philosophical foundation of refugee studies and refugee law. In her discussion of the massive displacement of peoples in the aftermath World War I, Arendt deftly illustrates the core of the problem that refugees continue to face today:

> Civil wars which ushered in and spread over the twenty years of uneasy peace were not only bloodier and more cruel than all their predecessors; they were followed by migrations of groups who, unlike their happier predecessors in the religious wars, were welcomed nowhere and could be assimilated nowhere. Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth.\(^{185}\)

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\(^{185}\) Ibid. p. 267.
The human rights regime, based on Arendt’s analysis, was based on the nation-state system and the ability of individuals to claim rights from the state in which they held citizenship. Without citizenship, individuals would be “deprived of their human rights” because they would have no access to a state from which to claim rights. Arendt further illustrates further consequences of statelessness in the world of nation-states:

*Much worse than what statelessness did to the time-honored and necessary distinctions between nationals and foreigners, and to the sovereign right of states in matters of nationality and expulsion, was the damage suffered by the very structure of legal national institutions when a growing number of residents had to live outside the jurisdiction of these laws and without being protected by any other. The stateless person, without right to residence and without the right to work, had of course constantly to transgress the law. He was liable to jail sentences without ever committing a crime. More than that, the entire hierarchy of values which pertain in civilized countries was reversed in his case. Since he was the anomaly for whom the general law did not provide, it was better for him to become an anomaly for which it did provide, that of the criminal…As a criminal even a stateless person will not be treated worse than another criminal, that is, he will be treated like everybody else. Only as an offender against the law can he gain protection from it...The same man who was in jail yesterday because of his mere presence in this world, who had no rights whatever and lived under threat of deportation, or who was dispatched without sentence and without trial to some kind of internment because he had tried to work and make a living, may become almost a full-fledged citizen because of a little theft…He is no longer the scum of the*
This inversed system of legal incentives for the stateless proved detrimental to both the stateless individuals residing in a given state and for the state itself. Those whose mere existence was considered illegal often were only able to gain the rights of citizens after committing a criminal offense. Finally, she concludes by explaining the danger of such a paradox:

*The paradox involved in the loss of human rights is that such loss coincides with the instant when a person becomes a human being in general-without a profession, without a citizenship, without an opinion, without a deed by which to identify and specify himself-and different in general, representing nothing but his own absolutely unique individuality which, deprived of expression within and action upon a common world, loses all significance.*

In a world in which human rights have become more and more accepted as the basis upon which states in the international system should be built and the legal body to which we should all be bound, the trends of displacement, forced migration, and statelessness continue to rise. The result is a continuous paradox.

**Legal Reasons**

Fortunately, there has been significant progress since Arendt wrote *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. The most essential of these changes have been the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Optional Protocol. Although not afforded the full set of rights afforded to citizens, the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Optional Protocol do stipulate the provision of limited rights to refugees, including lawful residence and the key

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186 Ibid. p. 286.
187 Ibid. p. 302.
principle of non-refoulement, as well as other important rights such as property rights, rights of association, access to courts, wage-earning employment and self-employment, housing, public education, and freedom of movement.\textsuperscript{188}

There has also been significant progress in terms of human rights in general that can and should apply to all individuals, including to refugees. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in addition to a number of other international human rights treaties (of which there are a total of 18).

Nevertheless, not all states have signed and ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Optional Protocol. Importantly, Jordan, like many other Arab states, has not ratified the Refugee Convention or its Optional Protocol.\textsuperscript{189} However, there have been developments in the Arab World with respect to refugees, embodied in two important documents that have been adopted: “(1) the Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Arab World, which was adopted in November 1992; and (2) the Arab Convention on Regulating the Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries, adopted by the League of Arab States in 1994.”\textsuperscript{190}

But this is just the surface of international refugee law and refugee studies. There has been a great deal of scholarship on interpreting international refugee law, assessing its effectiveness, critiquing the narrow definition of “refugee” provided in the Refugee Convention, and suggesting additions or alternatives to the current interpretations of international refugee law.


\textsuperscript{190} Ibid.
A key development was of course Goodwin-Gill's famous work was published in 1996.”\(^{191}\) However, Piotrowicz is correct in saying that much “has happened since the 2\(^{nd}\) edition of Goodwin-Gill's famous work was published in 1996”\(^{192}\) in terms of both developments in international refugee law and the ever-changing realities on the ground.\(^{193}\) In terms of refugee law, some key developments include the fact that “subsidiary, or complementary, protection is now well established in many countries as a way of granting international protection to those who do not qualify for refugee status (or perhaps to avoid granting refugee status).”\(^{194}\) Additionally, there are now “Guidelines on Internally Displaced Persons.”\(^{195}\) What is more, “UNHCR has started to take more of an interest in the plight of stateless people.”\(^{196}\) But developments in refugee law to cope with changing realities have also occurred alongside new and challenges for refugees, forced migrants, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and host countries. Interestingly, the new cover for the 2007 edition\(^{197}\) includes “a photograph of the massed tents of a refugee camp,” which at first glance may seem insignificant, but in fact is highly significant.\(^{198}\) In fact, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam are “making a point here, that while for many western countries the refugee issue involves argument and debate over who is a refugee, what is a particular social group, or who is entitled to complementary protection, the reality of refugees for many other countries, especially in Africa and Asia, is how to cope with tens of


\(^{192}\) Ibid.


\(^{194}\) Ibid.

\(^{195}\) Ibid.

\(^{196}\) Ibid.


\(^{198}\) Piotrowicz, “The Refugee in International Law.”
thousands of people fleeing armed conflicts and various natural calamities.” The cover reflects this changing global reality.

“It is commonplace to state that refugee law faces a severe crisis.” This is in part because refugee law has not fully adapted to the fast-moving changes in the realities facing refugees, forced migrants, IDPs, and host states. But there is also increasing discontent with refugee law and the benefits it brings to host states and particularly states in which individuals seek asylum status. “Increasingly, refugee status is seen merely as an alternative path to immigration.” Like the immigration debate in the U.S. and in other countries, the issue of asylum has also become highly politicized and “ideologically charged.” In fact, despite the sound arguments and clear evidence that immigration can be beneficial, and particularly economically beneficial, for the host country, xenophobia and resentment towards immigrants and refugees has increased in many places. Yet “anti-immigration propaganda does not seem to be based on sound economic argument, but on a mysterious pursuit of national homogeneity,” an identity which in reality is nearly impossible to define in a homogenous manner in any case. There is thus “inherent tension between immigration control and refugee law,” which although highly relevant today is certainly not new but rather “can be traced back to the origins of refugee law in the 20th century.” But what make this issue different today are the consequences for refugees in the face of increased immigration controls. Nathwani quotes John Stoessinger here, who argues that, “What distinguishes the refugee of the twentieth century is the immense difficulty, and often the impossibility of finding a new home”—a difficulty which Nathwani terms “restrictive

199 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid. p. 2.
immigration policy.” Consequently, many states have overt strategies to limit “the scope of the refugee concept”, the definition of a refugee, and the application of international refugee law when it comes into conflict with its domestic immigration law.

Despite the apparent goals of the Refugee Convention and its Optional Protocol and the human rights stipulated in the Refugee Convention and its Optional Protocol (as well as in the 18 human rights treaties), there is decreasing respect for the human rights of refugees.

In an era where States are increasingly challenging the logic of simply assimilating refugees to their own citizens, questions are now being raised about whether refugees should be allowed to enjoy freedom of movement, to work, to access public welfare programs, or to be reunited with family members. Doubts have been expressed about the propriety of exempting refugees from visa and other immigration rules, and whether there is a duty to admit refugees at all.

Hathaway worries that “international refugee law is profoundly misunderstood” and “that erroneous and competing claims by governments and the refugee advocacy community about the structure and purpose of refugee law threaten its continuing ability to play a truly unique human rights role at a time when no meaningful alternative is in sight.” This is especially evident for Hathaway in a number of host countries in the developing world where refugees live in a precarious limbo:

In particular, governments of the developed world are now appropriating the language of burden-sharing in order to further an only mildly attenuated global apartheid regime under

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205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
which most refugees not only remain in the less developed world, but remain there under conditions which are generally rights-abusive and often literally life-threatening. These states have distorted the true object and purpose of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’), erroneously suggesting that it sets only protection obligations of ‘last resort’ — that is, that refugees may be routinely sent away to any other state that will admit them without risk of return to their country of origin.\textsuperscript{209}

Moreover, "these same governments have sought to justify their harsh—and often illegal—treatment of refugees arriving at their territory on the grounds that such harshness is the necessary means to a more rational protection end."\textsuperscript{210} This of course “is largely a distortion of international refugee law.”\textsuperscript{211}

Hathaway recognizes that there is "no doubt that the burdens and responsibilities of offering protection to refugees are today unfairly apportioned,” as "more than 90 per cent of refugees remain in the less developed world, and some states are “hosting more than one refugee for every 100 citizens.”\textsuperscript{212} In addition, these same states have host such vast numbers of refugees with far fewer resources and significantly smaller budgets.\textsuperscript{213} “Furthermore, not even that tiny budget is guaranteed, but has to be garnered each year from voluntary contributions to the UNHCR of a small number of wealthier countries — there is no formula-based funding arrangement."\textsuperscript{214} Thus, "it should come as no surprise that the living conditions of refugees in less developed host countries are often dire" under such circumstances.\textsuperscript{215} Hathaway concludes by arguing that “the official rhetoric surrounding refugee law reform is largely unhelpful” but that refugee law is still

\textsuperscript{209} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid. p. 90.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid. p. 92.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid. p. 93.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid.
relevant because it "is clearly attentive to state interests" but also "is anchored in a recognition that most refugees today do not enjoy the rights which refugee law formally guarantees them — either because they have no access to a safe state, or the safe state to which they are able to travel is either not really safe or forces them to languish without hope of regaining any meaningful measure of autonomy in their lives."\textsuperscript{216}

Unlike international human rights law and humanitarian law, refugee law has not developed much over time to fit changing circumstances despite the increasing need for legal development.\textsuperscript{217} This fact leads to an important question: “why has greater regard for human rights failed to be accompanied by a corresponding respect for refugee rights?”\textsuperscript{218} The answer is in part the reality that refugee influxes come with costs to the host states, and those states have become “disinclined to embark upon the development and codification of new rules which can only mean taking on and carrying out even more exacting obligations than those that already exist.”\textsuperscript{219} Consequently, “the international community has developed a hybrid regime,” known as the refugee protection regime, “which is applied on an ad hoc basis for as long as a given crisis endures.”\textsuperscript{220}

Using the Iraqi refugee crisis as an important case study, Alborzi establishes that “there exist serous lacunae in the international mechanism of refugee protection and that, in the absence of a modern contractual basis for an enhanced level of protection, the international community has tried innovative ways and means to bridge the gaps, although not always very successfully.”\textsuperscript{221}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[216]{Ibid. p. 95-103.}
\footnotetext[218]{Ibid. p. 2.}
\footnotetext[219]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[220]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[221]{Ibid. p. 311.}
\end{footnotes}
Alborzi furthermore argues that, “the conventional definition of refugees as reflected in hard-law instruments is not up-to-date and relevant” and “is therefore no longer applicable to the needs of our time.”\textsuperscript{222} \textit{Non-refoulement} is a key principle established by the Refugee Convention, however, “it is the same principle which has also turned out to be the main obstacle to a modern contractual definition of refugees, as states show greater resistance to any broadening of its initial scope.”\textsuperscript{223} To Alborzi, refugee law has lost much of its relevance and must be reformed to fit today’s realities.

However, in spite of the ongoing debates among legal scholars regarding the Refugee Convention and Protocol, progressively changing legal interpretations of these documents, and the necessity of reforming international refugee law, there are still clear legal reasons supporting integration and a pathway to citizenship for refugees. Regardless of the shortcomings in international refugee law, the Refugee Convention (and Protocol) do stipulate several human rights principles (in addition to those principles stipulated in the various human rights treaties) to which state signatories must adhere and strive towards, including non-discrimination (Article 3), right of association (Article 15), access to courts (Article 16), wage-earning employment (Article 17), self-employment (Article 18), housing (Article 21), public education (Article 22), labour legislation and social security (Article 24), freedom of movement (Article 26), identity papers (Article 27), travel documents (Article 28), \textit{non-refoulement} (Article 33), and naturalization (Article 34).\textsuperscript{224}

Thus the goals of the Refugee Convention and Protocol are to ensure the protection of refugees’ human rights and to promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees if and when it is

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{222} Ibid. p. 312.
\item \textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
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safe to do so, the integration of refugees into the host country / country of first asylum, and/or the integration of refugees into a third country to which they are resettled. Moreover, as one of the most signed onto and ratified treaties, the Refugee Convention and Protocol are now considered part of customary international law. With this in mind, all states, whether or not they have signed and ratified the Refugee Convention and Protocol, are expected to abide by its laws and principles.

**Economic Reasons**

The literature focused on the economic side of refugee studies tends to focus on either the “burden” or impact of hosting refugees or the need to shift from a humanitarian assistance framework to a development framework. The potential economic impacts of hosting refugees must be studied critically not just from the perspective of a “burden” on the host country, but also from the potential assets refugees may present to the host country and to the region as a whole.

There is a growing realization that the humanitarian framework is insufficient and unsustainable for protracted refugee crises. Hosting refugees in the traditional humanitarian sense—non-integration, refugee camps, and protracted humanitarian assistance—is very expensive, highly reliant on donor states, and economically inefficient. Furthermore, since refugees in these situations are often entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance due to legal restrictions against employment and equal access to public education and healthcare in host countries—most major host countries are not signatories to the Refugee Convention and

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225 I use the word “burden” in quotations here intentionally, as the burden is often a buzzword employed by conservative political pundits to generate fear domestically. The actual impact of hosting refugees on a host country aside, it is important to point out the highly politicized connotation of the word “burden” and the importance of utilizing more neutral terms such as “responsibility” and “impact” instead. With this in mind, much of the literature focused on the “burden” of hosting refugees is not academic but rather comes from media outlets.
Protocol—they place a high cost on the domestic and global economies without being able to contribute to the economy in which they live. In this traditional understanding, refugees do in fact represent a burden on the domestic and global economies as well as the domestic infrastructure, education system, and healthcare system. However, this traditional humanitarian understanding of refugees does not take into consideration the potential assets that refugees may bring to a host country’s economy. It views refugees as objects that simply drain resources rather than as human beings with potential, creativity, skills, and a drive for success that can prove immensely beneficial to the host country. Thus, there are clear economic reasons to promote the integration, or at least the economic integration, of refugees residing in a host country for a protracted period of time.

Several scholars of refugee studies and practitioners argue that humanitarian assistance must shift over time into development. As a refugee crisis becomes protracted, humanitarian assistance becomes unsustainable. This shift in essence requires that the refugees be integrated at least economically into the host country as humanitarian assistance is phased out, and is replaced by increased development assistance. This development assistance is then allocated not just to the refugees, but also for the communities in which there are refugees and other marginalized groups in order to promote development on a communal and national scale.

One of the reasons why there needs to be a shift to development is donor fatigue: “While emergencies may attract a significant amount of funding in assistance to the displaced, long-standing situations are perceived to have neither the urgency nor likelihood of resolution that draw heightened donor interest.”226 This shift requires a paradigm shift among donors and

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practitioners as well as host countries. “Aleinikoff argues for long-term development solutions and a new narrative in addressing protracted displacement, one that emphasizes refugees' potential to contribute to host and origin communities through their own human capital, transnational connections, and dedicated international assistance.”

Yet this is still politically unpopular in host countries. “While the development potential of granting refugees the right to work in their host country has been demonstrated, many host governments are still reluctant to do so, and taking such solutions to scale will require the buy-in of both donor and host governments as well as development agencies.” Humanitarian assistance must thus be phased out over time in a protracted refugee crisis as development assistance is phased in to assist both the refugee community and the host community.

Arguing that the current humanitarian model has become unsustainable, some propose shifting to development and involving the private sector in coping with the refugee crisis. “At the World Economic Forum in 2015, the High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres stated that the "international humanitarian community no longer has the capacity to respond," and called for a re-imagining of the humanitarian aid model, in which the business sector can play a constructive part.” Yet this approach may prove challenging despite the good intentions behind it:

*The challenge for humanitarian and development actors is to stabilise the precarious economic situation, forge a transition from assistance to development, promote economic development strategies which support host and refugee communities equitably, and reduce the potential for negative economic impacts to exacerbate domestic and regional tensions. At*

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227 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
the same time there is the imperative to ensure and enhance a 'protective environment' for the refugees.\textsuperscript{230}

Protection of refugee rights is essential, but so is the shift to development and “the involvement and inclusion of host communities in services and infrastructure provision for refugees.”\textsuperscript{231}

Omar Dahi takes this argument one step further in his application of the need for development spending to the Syrian refugee crisis and its impact on Lebanon and Jordan: “The most effective way to tackle the Syrian refugee crisis is for neighbouring states to assume a leading role in development spending, infrastructure upgrading and job creation, particularly in the most underdeveloped regions of those countries.”\textsuperscript{232} Even though their “line of thinking is erroneous, even from a self-interested perspective,” Jordan and Lebanon are both “loath to embark on major development spending,” fearing that “substantial investment in refugees will provide incentives for further inflows - or integration of existing refugees.”\textsuperscript{233} Dahi explains that, “Shifting to development means investment in upgrading the water, electricity and health infrastructure as well as launching projects (perhaps with mixed public and private sector involvement) that can generate jobs and alleviate poverty.” He concludes by arguing that:

\textit{Development initiatives administered by the state such as infrastructural investment in services, health care, education and job creation, and targeting host communities as well as refugees, have the benefit of strengthening state capacity and relieving tensions at the same time as addressing refugees' needs. Though large-scale initiatives carry certain risks, so does inaction, particularly as both refugee and host communities become increasingly restless.}\textsuperscript{234}

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\textsuperscript{230} Zetter and Ruaudel, “Development and Protection Challenges of the Syrian Refugee Crisis.”
\textsuperscript{231} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{232} Dahi, “The Refugee Crisis in Lebanon and Jordan.”
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
This last sentence is important. States often think that inaction is a better choice than action because it will maintain the status quo. But in refugee crises, the status quo is not as constant as it may seem and inaction may only increase the current trends. In the case of the Syrian refugee crisis, Syrian refugees are residing in Jordan, and they will continue to impact Jordanian society and the Jordanian economy whether the Jordanian government chooses to invest in development, chooses another path, or chooses inaction.

Thus, as Carrion argues,

*Should Syrians be given more opportunities to earn a living legally, both Syrians and the Jordanian economy would benefit. Such a move would draw opposition, but the benefits would outweigh these costs. In order to minimize the negative political effect, a more open livelihoods policy should be accompanied by a significant increase in international development support for host communities.*

However, as Reed explains, “Jordan's original tribal inhabitants have alternatively chafed at and welcomed the Palestinians, Iraqis and others, but they acknowledge that the refugees built modern Amman too.”

Perhaps the Syrian refugees could build and develop Za’atari, Mafraq, Irbid, and other areas with large numbers of Syrian refugees into thriving local economies as the Palestinians built and developed Amman. “Even the Syrians, for all the friction they are creating, are contributing to Jordan more than they cost in the goods and services they demand and new jobs they create, observers such as the contrarian economist Yusuf Mansur have argued.”

Although Syrian refugees are putting strains on the Jordanian economy now, it is possible that, if

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236 Reed, “Syrian Refugees Test the Resources of Jordan’s Capital.”
237 Ibid.
permitted to work legally and mesh with Jordanians in a national economic development strategy, they could become assets to the Jordanian economy in the future.

Yet shifting to development, in and of itself, will not suffice. There certainly are good reasons to promote economic integration and a shift from protracted humanitarian assistance to development. “Should Syrians be given more opportunities to earn a living legally,” Carrion argues, “both Syrians and the Jordanian economy would benefit,” and “the benefits would outweigh these costs” even if this drew domestic opposition. These costs must also be taken into consideration. Thus, in order “to minimize the negative political effect, a more open livelihoods policy should be accompanied by a significant increase in international development support for host communities.”

However, real economic integration is most successful when coupled with social, political, and legal integration. It is not enough to legally permit refugees to participate in the economy; there remain immense social and political barriers to equal employment opportunity and advancement based on merit, especially when refugees lack civil and political rights in addition to economic rights such as the right to work. Thus, if refugees are provided with a pathway to citizenship in addition to the right to work and the protection of their basic human rights, then the shift from humanitarian assistance to development will be more successful. Full integration will allow for the growth of the national economy as a whole, the growth of the middle class, and the reduction of poverty and economic marginalization, especially among Syrian refugees and major host communities in Jordan.

Security Reasons

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239 Ibid.
Security arguments are often made to trump policies that promote human rights. In this way, the human rights (both civil and political rights and economic and social rights) of migrants in general (including refugees) are often compromised in the name of security. This usually begins with a binary of categorization of “us” and “them,” propagated by nativists and popularized by fear. The migrant, or in this case refugee population is placed outside of the nativist in-group and becomes “them” in this scenario. It is from here that political pundits and nativists begin to make sweeping statements about why “they” pose a threat to “us.”

Yet despite the growing fear of refugees and securitization of the Syrian refugee crisis both in Jordan and worldwide, there are important security arguments for promoting integration and a pathway to citizenship for Syrian refugees in Jordan. In fact, Syrian refugees and Jordanians alike, as well as others in the region and throughout the globe, will likely be safer and better off if the Syrian refugees are integrated economically and socially and have the option to become Jordanian citizens.

The maintenance of the status quo of non-integration for Syrian refugees in Jordan poses some serious security risks. Furthermore, these risks are even higher if this also entails increased encampment, isolation, and marginalization from Jordanian society. There is a great deal of literature in political science and refugee studies on the dangers of encampment and collective isolation of refugee populations. Sarah Lischer employs the cases such as the Rwandan refugees in the Great Lakes region, Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and Bosnian Muslim refugees in the Balkans, among other cases, to highlight the risks of refugee militarization, particularly in isolated camps in border areas—hence the title of her book Dangerous Sanctuaries.\(^{240}\) From

Lischer’s perspective, “refugee crises [can] function as a strategy of war,” especially in the cases of “exiled rebel groups,” wherein “a refugee population provides international legitimacy, a shield against attack, a pool of recruits, and valuable sources for food and medicine” and “refugee camps [in essence] function as rear bases for rebels who attack across the border.”

This problem can be mitigated through the discouragement of encampment and isolation and the promotion of integration, citizenship, and politics by peaceful rather than violent means.

But regardless of whether or not encampment continues, non-integration has already produced widespread feelings of relative deprivation, and if these trends continue, this growing frustration could produce aggression and violence given the right circumstances. This violence could take many forms, some of which have already begun to rise in Jordan. On a more individual level, instances of sexual harassment and SGBV, domestic violence, petty theft, and crime have been increasing among Syrian refugees in Jordan. However, there is a potential that this could morph into more serious and organized types of violence, including but not limited to gang violence, terrorism (domestic, international, and/or transnational), riots and uprisings (against the Jordanian state, the GoJ, and/or the Hashemite monarchy), and militarization and political violence (inside Jordan, in Syria and/or Iraq, and/or in other places throughout the region and the world).

All of this in turn may lead to the escalation of tensions between Syrian refugees and Jordanian nationals and an increased potential of internal strife and even civil war in Jordan.

Thus, policies of non-integration pose a severe long-term risk to Jordan’s national security, regional security in the Middle East, and possibly even global security.

Nevertheless, promoting integration, a pathway to citizenship, and naturalization for Syrian refugees in Jordan also poses some security risks. One serious risk is backlash and the potential for violence and civil strife. Some Jordanians, and particularly those living in poorer areas such as Mafraq and Zarqa that have witnessed massive influxes of Syrian refugees, may respond in a reactive manner if Syrian refugees are permitted to work, integrated into the economy, and put on a path to citizenship. They may see this as both a threat to their jobs and livelihoods and a challenge to their Jordanian national identity and respond violently. This in turn could lead to frustration on the part of Syrians, especially if they face discrimination despite equality before the law (this has been a problem for Palestinians in Jordan), and perhaps violence in response.

Some other risks posed by integration concern the political arena and the future of Jordanian politics. One of these risks is the potential for more popular protests and even revolution for democracy and/or regime change. It is important to note that most of the Syrian refugees in Jordan are from Daraa, where the Syrian Revolution began in 2011. Although Jordanians have already protested in small numbers for similar reasons, Syrians could potentially increase the numbers and strength of such a movement. It is possible that their demands for democracy and an end to corruption and cronyism in Syria might transfer over to protests against the GoJ and the Hashemite Monarchy, but there is no guarantee one way or the other. Moreover, it is certainly possible that the Syrian refugees may avoid violent means to achieve their political objectives, given the failures they have seen in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. But no one can really predict for certain how the Syrian refugees might choose to affect change in Jordan if they even choose to act collectively.
Another risk of full integration is that the Syrian refugees will likely shift the political discourse and policy priorities in Jordan. This is a major concern, particularly for Jordanians that are invested in the political status quo. If the Syrian refugees become citizens and are able to vote and participate in Jordanian politics (though this is limited since Jordan is a constitutional monarchy, not a representative democracy), they may change the political discourse and policy priorities, potentially in a way that Jordanians (both East Bankers and those of Palestinian descent) may not like. For example, they may shift the priorities from Palestine to Syria, especially in the short term. This may anger some Palestinians, particularly those still living in camps and receiving aid from UNRWA. Given the large number of Syrian refugees in Jordan vis-à-vis Jordanian citizens at the present moment, the Syrian refugees will no doubt have significant influence in the political arena if they become citizens and are permitted to participate in the political system.

Yet in spite of the potential risks of integrating Syrian refugees in Jordan and providing a pathway to citizenship, the risks posed by non-integration, marginalization, isolation, and encampment are significantly greater. Furthermore, the risks posed by integration cannot be fully eliminated by non-integration policies. For example, tensions between Syrian refugees and Jordanians are already rising, and the potential for civil strife and political violence is increasing, not decreasing, as a result of the current approached to the Syrian refugee crisis. As another example, the possibility that Syrian refugees will collectivize, mobilize, militarize, and/or rise up against the state, the GoJ, or the Hashemite monarchy already exists; this problem will not just go away on its own or by isolating the Syrian refugees and continually repressing such movements. In the long term, this will continuously pose a threat, especially if the Syrian refugee population remains in Jordan and the policies of non-integration do not change. From a national
security and a global security point of view, Jordan should seriously consider not just economic integration and development, but also social integration and a pathway to citizenship for Syrian refugees. In the long run, full integration is in Jordan’s national security interest and in the international community’s global security interest.

A Global Responsibility to Solve

Important new literature is emerging on the need for global responsibility sharing and the “responsibility to solve” refugee crises, including but not limited to the Syrian refugee crisis. This change in rhetoric and approach is evident particularly among practitioners and at the UN. In a statement accompanying the release of UNHCR’s annual report, High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres said, “For an age of unprecedented mass displacement, we need an unprecedented humanitarian response and a renewed global commitment to tolerance and protection for people fleeing conflict and persecution.” Amnesty International went further in its criticism of the global response to the refugee crisis and the lack of global responsibility sharing, accusing “governments and smugglers alike of pursuing ‘selfish political interests

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244 Aleinikoff and Poellot, “The Responsibility to Solve.”

245 Sengupta, “60 Million People Fleeing Chaotic Lands, U.N. Says.”
instead of showing basic human compassion.” Secretary General of Amnesty International Salil Shetty further stated that,

*The refugee crisis is one of the defining challenges of the 21st century, but the response of the international community has been a shameful failure. We need a radical overhaul of policy and practice to create a coherent and comprehensive global strategy.*

In a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace paper on the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan, Alexandra Francis presents four “key takeaways for Jordan and the international community”: (1) “Prioritize the integration of development and humanitarian aid;” (2) “Maintain protection space for Syrian refugees;” (3) “Formalize access to livelihoods;” and (4) “Empower local governance actors.” She argues that Jordan “will depend on increased international support” in order “to confront its national challenges and continue to provide a safe haven for Syrian refugees.”

Aleinikoff and Poellot take this one step further, arguing that there must be not just international “burden” sharing (or responsibility sharing), but also the international community has a “responsibility to solve” protracted refugee situations. They begin by explaining that, “more than half of the world's nearly twelve million refugees are in protracted refugee situations and the vast majority are not on the road to a durable solution.” Taking this reality into consideration, Aleinikoff and Poellot argue that the international community has a responsibility to solve these protracted refugee situations because of (1) “the human harms imposed on those left in the limbo of refugee status for an extended period of time,” (2) “the centrality of solutions

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247 Ibid.”
248 Francis, “Jordan’s Refugee Crisis.”
249 Ibid.
250 Aleinikoff and Poellot, “The Responsibility to Solve.”
251 Ibid. p. 195.
and the necessity of burden-sharing” that “underlie the international refugee regime,” and (3) “specific commitments of members of the UN General Assembly and signatories to the Refugee Convention to cooperate with UNHCR in seeking solutions.” 252 Protracted humanitarian assistance is not a solution, according to Aleinikoff and Poellot. “The responsibility of the international community to refugees is not simply to support camps or other arrangements that provide assistance to refugees; it is to end the condition of being a refugee.” 253

Bidinger et al., Crisp and Arif each argue in favor of global responsibility to protect Syrian refugees. 254 Arif makes this point quite plainly:

In this refugee crisis, the world community should not be escaped themselves from carrying out their minimum responsibility towards the refugees. One fact is very simple: millions of Syrians now need prompt and effective global assistance. 255

Crisp puts the issue into perspective, explaining that,

Confronted with this scenario, many analysts have reached some very gloomy conclusions about the Syrian refugee situation. According to an independent review recently published by UNHCR, “after three years of humanitarian response to the refugee crisis, the situation has reached a critical phase. Refugee vulnerability is increasing. Humanitarian assistance is not sustainable at the current level. There are serious and growing protection concerns.” 256

He concludes by explaining that refugee protection in countries already hosting refugees will worsen without real global responsibility sharing: “Unless the Syrian refugee emergency is

252 Ibid.
253 Ibid. p. 195-196.
254 Bidinger et al., Protecting Syrian Refugees; Crisp, “Syria’s Refugees”; Arif, “GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY to Protect Syrian Refugees.”
255 Arif, “GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY to Protect Syrian Refugees.”
256 “The Global Refugee Crisis.”
treated as a truly global responsibility, we cannot expect hard-pressed countries in the region to maintain the generosity they have demonstrated since the crisis erupted.”

The report by Boston University law students Bidinger et al. entitled *Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility Sharing* closely examines the Syrian refugee crisis from both a legal and a policy perspective and presents a series of recommendations for each country hosting a large population of Syrian refugees as well as for the international community:

*This report makes an urgent call for a global Comprehensive Plan of Action (“CPA”) that builds on UNHCR’s recommendation that “the international community...show solidarity with countries hosting Syrian refugees in the region by offering resettlement opportunities, humanitarian admission places, and family reunification or other forms of admission for Syrian refugees.” The recommendations in this report differ somewhat from the humanitarian admissions proposal advanced by UNHCR, which asks countries to “admit up to 30,000 Syrian refugees on resettlement, humanitarian admission, or other programmes by the end of 2014, with a focus on protecting the most vulnerable.” Currently, with three million refugees from Syria outside their home territory, resettlement can only be a partial solution—restricted as it is to only the most exceptional opportunities for the most vulnerable individuals. Countries outside the current host region must begin considering much more open policies to allow at least partial integration of Syrians into their states, both to alleviate the burden on current host countries, and to prevent the inevitable unfolding of an even greater humanitarian and security crisis than is already occurring.*

257 Crisp, “Syria’s Refugees.”
This report recommends not just increased financial support and resettlement of Syrian refugees—it also recommends improving local integration policies in host countries.\textsuperscript{259} The combination of all these policies would constitute true global responsibility sharing and would result in the best solutions for Syrian refugees, host countries, and the international community.

From this same set of literature, there is a growing realization that the status quo is insufficient. As Huffer and Sheth eloquently articulate, “The recent call for empathy-based policies toward refugees substitutes a mercurial, apolitical emotion for a substantive analysis and solution to the current crisis.”\textsuperscript{260} Empathy and a leaning toward human rights is simply not enough. Furthermore, they challenge us to recognize that Arendt’s conclusion that the nation-state is the only real entity from which individuals can claim their human rights and with that work to end statelessness and reintegrate forced migrants and refugees into the nation-state system:

\begin{quote}
Those of us who belong to nations do bear a responsibility to those who do not. Precisely because our human rights are secured through our belonging to a nation-state, our responsibility to the stateless stems from that fact. It is up to us as peoples who belong to nations to push our governments to step up and fulfill their obligations to the stateless not through an abstract humanitarian appeal but through the legal and political apparatus of our nations. There is no time to wait for the perfect wave of emotion to spring us to action.\textsuperscript{261}
\end{quote}

This is a global responsibility, not just for NGOs, the UN, and nation-states, but also for citizens of the world’s nation states to push their governments to take on their fair share of responsibility.

\textsuperscript{259} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{260} Huffer and Sheth, “When Empathy Isn’t Nearly Enough.”
\textsuperscript{261} Ibid.
Why Integration and a Pathway to Citizenship Should Be Prioritized

There are a number of other proposals for how to approach the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan that stop short of considering integration and a pathway to citizenship. One proposal is based on the common assertion that this crisis is not just Jordan’s responsibility but rather is a global issue that requires global responsibility. Building on this perspective, some argue that Jordan can and should instead depend on global responsibility sharing, increased and sustained support from the international community, protracted humanitarian assistance, and increased resettlement. This would be based to a large extent on the model of protracted responsibility sharing in Kenya, wherein the international community has continued to fund and support humanitarian assistance and refugee camps for Somali and other refugees, who are not permitted by the Kenyan government to integrate and naturalize, for more than two decades. But there are several major problems with this option. One, protracted humanitarianism is very expensive and fiscally unsustainable and subject to donor fatigue. Another problem is that this does not address the security concerns about hosting large populations of refugees—if anything, protracted encampment and denial of social, economic, civil, and political rights as well as personal and collective agency can exacerbate security concerns and increase the likelihood of refugee militarization and use of political violence. This increased security risk as a result of

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protracted encampment, relative deprivation, isolation, denial of human rights, and refusal to consider integration is perhaps best exemplified by the militarization of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Furthermore, the desire to encourage global responsibility and increased resettlement is not an excuse for neglecting refugees’ human rights and basic dignity.

Another common argument is that Jordan cannot afford to integrate Syrian refugees socially and politically because they would become a significant minority that could upset the East Banker support base of the Hashemite monarchy. There is some truth to this argument; the East Banker base of the Hashemite monarchy has already become a minority, albeit a large one, and if the current trends continue, its size in proportion to the total population will continue to shrink. It is already estimated that more than 50% of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin,263 so a large influx of Syrian refugees would certainly turn the East Banker population into a smaller minority than the significant minority it is estimated to be without considering the Syrian population. Nevertheless, even if Jordan maintains its policies of non-integration, this would not make this demographic challenge suddenly disappear—the Syrian refugees are still residing in Jordan and can still influence politics in spite of their political and economic disenfranchisement, especially if they mobilize collectively.

The Jordanian government’s choice to depend on protracted international humanitarian aid and increased resettlement while barring Syrian refugees from both civil and political as well as economic and social rights has not produced true global responsibility sharing, despite its intentions to encourage this, nor has it promoted conflict resolution back in Syria. Sadly, the

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people most impacted by this policy have been the Syrian refugees in Jordan, who are living in limbo, waiting for the Jordanian government and the international community to gather the political will to adequately respond to the Syrian refugee crisis and the protracted war in Syria. It is indisputable that Jordan needs much more support and increased development assistance to handle the strains of hosting such a large population of Syrian refugees. However, this need for additional assistance does not negate the rights to which Syrian refugees are entitled nor the moral imperative to solve the crisis.

Given the protracted nature of the crisis in Syria and the Syrian refugee crisis, as well as the ways in which the international community has responded, Jordan should prioritize full integration and a pathway to citizenship for the Syrian refugees residing within its borders. Regardless of how Jordan chooses to respond to this crisis, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees will not be resettlement, and that, given the protracted nature of the war in Syria, they cannot safely return home. Protracted responsibility sharing and humanitarian assistance may seem appealing at first, but ultimately it is expensive and unsustainable for the international community, it has the potential to threaten national security, and, perhaps most importantly, it denies Syrian refugees the fulfillment of their basic human rights to live in dignity and with the agency to determine their own fate. As the protracted nature of the cases of refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma, Kenya (over 20 years) as well as the case of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (since 1948), this is not a solution. As Aleinikoff and Poellot compellingly articulate, there is a “responsibility to solve” protracted refugee crises.264 The Syrian refugee crisis and the situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan are no exception.

264 Aleinikoff and Poellot, “The Responsibility to Solve.”
CONCLUSION

We have the means and the capacity to deal with our problems, if only we can find the political will.

-- Kofi Annan, 2015

The Syrian refugee crisis is a highly complex issue resulting from an even more complex and protracted crisis inside Syria. No one proposed solution can truly be a silver bullet that can fix everything. Even if the war in Syria were to end tomorrow, many Syrian refugees cannot return and many no longer wish to return either way. And even if countries around the world actually took on more responsibility and pledged to take in more Syrian refugees and to fully fund the humanitarian and development sectors working with Syrian refugee populations, this still will not account for the overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees residing in neighboring host countries who cannot return to Syria and will not be resettled elsewhere. Even the proposed solution in this thesis of local integration and a pathway to citizenship for Syrian refugees in Jordan will not fully solve the issue for the Syrian refugees in Jordan, as many do just want to return home, some want to be resettled elsewhere, some just want to be reunified with family members wherever they are, some are still waiting it out to see what their best options will be, and some have already given up entirely on any hope of a solution.

Nevertheless, should Jordan be more open to integration and a pathway to citizenship for Syrian refugees, this option will surely ameliorate some of the challenges that the Syrian refugees in Jordan currently face as well as some of the resulting challenges that Jordanian nationals and organizations working with Syrian refugees or both Syrians and Jordanians currently face. Overall, this policy option is in Jordan’s long-term interests and it will certainly improve the situation of the Syrian refugees in Jordan and Jordanian nationals who have been negatively impacted by the impacts of Syrians working illegally and under the table in informal markets.

However, for this to succeed, there are several hurdles that must be overcome. The first major hurdle is social and political, or perhaps even cultural. The concept of citizenship is understood differently throughout the world. In United States, concept of citizenship is based on a *jus solis* system, wherein anyone born in the U.S. is automatically a U.S. citizen. Furthermore, there is a long history of naturalization and pathways to citizenship in the U.S. Specifically for refugees and asylum seekers, once an individual refugee is resettled to the U.S. or an asylum seeker in the U.S. attains asylum status, he or she is automatically placed on a pathway to citizenship and can apply for citizenship after five years, assuming that he or she has adhered to the law and has done nothing to jeopardize their immigration status. In Jordan on the other hand, citizenship is based on a *jus sanguinis* system wherein a person is a Jordanian citizen if he or she is born to a Jordanian father. There is no real concept of a pathway to citizenship in Jordan, with the notable exception of the forced naturalization of Palestinians after Jordan annexed the West Bank following the 1948 war against Israel. Many Jordanians, especially in areas like Al Mafraq that have been almost entirely “East Banker” Jordanian (with few Palestinians), deeply oppose any idea to integrate the Syrian refugees and fear that they might stay forever like the Palestinian
refugees who were almost fully integrated and were given Jordanian citizenship. This same sector of Jordanian society still has not come to terms with the fact that Palestinians, or rather Jordanians of Palestinian origin, are Jordanian citizens. To an outsider, this may appear to be just nativist discrimination. However, this identity issue is further complicated by the fact that this “East Banker” population is the core and base of the Hashemite monarchy that ensures its continued legitimacy. Most public sector positions, whether in the government, the military, the mukhaberat, or other areas are occupied by “East Banker” Jordanians, many of whom still maintain this nativist mentality and narrow understanding of what it means to be a Jordanian citizen. Thus, to overcome this major sociopolitical obstacle, there must be a culture shift in Jordan away from such nativist and narrow understanding of what it means to be Jordanian. This is certainly the biggest obstacle and could prevent a solution like the one proposed in this research from ever materializing in Jordan. This would constitute a drastic and perhaps radical shift from the sociopolitical status quo. Further research will be required to determine how major this obstacle is and if and how it can be overcome.

The second key obstacle is more tangible and far easier to overcome—increased and sustained international development support in order to ensure more even development and social cohesion within and between Jordanian communities. This international assistance will have to include both traditional development aid and increased foreign direct investment as well as smarter sustainable development programs aimed at addressing the major resource and environmental issues that Jordan faces such as water shortages, energy shortages when pipelines and sources are disrupted due to conflict and instability in neighboring or nearby states, and agricultural and food shortages resulting from the small amount of arable land in Jordan and the
insufficient water supply. Further research will need to be done to find both short-term and long-term solutions to this sustainable development challenges in Jordan.

It is undeniable that the challenges to achieving policies aimed at local integration and a pathway to citizenship for Syrian refugees in Jordan are great. But from a human rights perspective as well as from an economic perspective and a security perspective, this option should not only be considered but should be highly prioritized. The social and political barriers will be difficult to overcome, and Jordan will need increased and sustained support from the international community for this proposal to have any chance at success. However, for the sake of the Syrian refugees in Jordan that fled the horrors in Syria only to find themselves in the temporary permanence of poverty, marginalization, isolation, lack of dignity, and hopelessness in Jordan, it is our duty to ensure that they can enjoy the same human rights to which all people are entitled without discrimination.
NOTES

All the names used in this thesis are pseudonyms and are marked with an (*).

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Rachel Maver 96


