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Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock

Gilson, Ronald J.; Schizer, David M.

The capital structures of venture capital-backed U.S. companies share a remarkable commonality: overwhelmingly, venture capitalists make their investments through convertible preferred stock. Not surprisingly, a large part of the academic literature on venture capital has sought to explain this peculiar pattern. Financial economists have developed models showing, for example, that convertible securities allocate control depending on the portfolio company's success, operate as a signal to overcome various kinds of information asymmetry, and align the incentives of entrepreneurs and venture capital investors. In this Article we extend this literature by examining the influence of a more mundane factor, tax law, on venture capital structure. A firm that issues convertible preferred stock to venture capitalists is able to offer more favorable tax treatment for incentive compensation paid to the entrepreneur and other portfolio company employees: Instead of being taxed currently at ordinary income rates, the entrepreneur and employees can defer tax until the incentive compensation is sold (or even longer), at which point a preferential tax rate is available.

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Title
Harvard Law Review
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2307/1342584

More About This Work

Academic Units
Law
Publisher
The Harvard Law Review Association
Published Here
June 1, 2016
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