Citizen-Subjectivity, Experiential Evaluation, and Activist Strategies: Explaining Algerian Violence and Polish Peace under Authoritarian Rule

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ABSTRACT

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This project explains Polish non-violence and Algerian violence under martial law following peaceful protests against comparable material deprivation and authoritarian political exclusion. From narratives of state formation, institutional performance, and social movement evolution in postwar Poland and postcolonial Algeria a conditional model derives violent and non-violent opposition strategies from divergent practical citizenship regimes in formally similar autocratic systems. It argues that distinct regimes of citizen-subjectivity under authoritarian governance foster divergent practices of resistance and evaluations of states before and during emergency conditions that reduce activists to biological life, tempting violence. Where citizenship regimes differentiate social resources (means of protest) from state resources (means or sovereignty), affording regime opponents actual or immanent systemic subjectivity, social agitation remains non-violent despite objectively comprehensive political and social dispossession; in contrast, by subordinating social to state resources, undifferentiated citizenship regimes under martial law wholly eliminate systemic subjectivity, provoking violence. Neither the formal political regime-type nor the immediate experience of social suffering or political abjection distinguishes violent from non-violent responses to despotism; rather, violent versus non-violent protest strategies express discrepant evaluations of regime coercion, reflecting the elimination versus endurance of the citizenship regime that formed the iterated systemic subjectivity of regime opponents.
Poland’s worker-based citizenship regime endured fiscal crisis and martial law because it provided differentiated social resources: regime opponents had means independent of state solvency to compel policy concessions by withdrawing labor power from industries pivotal to ruling-elite incumbency. But Algeria’s client-based citizenship – based on undifferentiated resources – tied activists’ systemic means of compulsion to state largesse. Differentiated citizenship regimes endure state crises because citizens retain the social resources, however suspended, of systemic-subjectivity that ground their evaluations of state actions, minimizing incentives to violent pressure on ruling classes. Undifferentiated citizenship regimes perish under state bankruptcy or force, eradicating social resources and channeling the recuperation of subjectivity to anti-systemic acts. In short, Polish workers could strike and threaten the state under martial law; Algerian clients were effectively expelled from political status. In forming opposition strategies, citizens judge state policies or legitimacy, but also their status as systemic subjects. Evaluations of systemic subjectivity reflect experiences in using social resources, not merely immediate material or political conditions. The research design does not test a general theoretical model linking citizenship-subjectivity regimes to experiential evaluations of objective dehumanization, but its conceptual and causal variable analyses may complement other studies of state institutions and social agitations by promoting subject formation over abstract human universals as the key mechanism in reliable social explanation.
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PREFACE

Starting with empirical observations of protest movements in Poland and Algeria under authoritarian rule, this thesis addresses a puzzle of persistent concern to academic, intellectual, and practical political thought: how to explain violent and non-violent social action. The project has many moving parts, which this preface summarizes as simply as possible to make the text accessible despite some technical discussions.

The question I pose concerns varied protest strategies under authoritarian governance. It is now clear that whatever their common formal properties – such as the absence of civic rights and political freedoms or prevalence of central bureaucracies and command economies – the authoritarian “regime type” has varied as much as the democratic in social organization. It is also now widely appreciated that authoritarian efforts to incorporate citizens while gaining their loyalty or securing their acquiescence has inspired diverse citizen responses in autocratic states: from support to passivity to resistance. Building on this growing sense of the diversity internal to authoritarian governance, my essay examines the trajectories of revolt against Polish and Algerian despotism. In particular, it inquires into the discrepant strategic choices of Polish and Algerian dissidents after ruling elites crushed their non-violent, intra-systemic protests by imposing draconian emergency conditions (1981 and 1992, respectively). My puzzle is this: Why did Polish activists remain non-violent while Algerian activists turned to armed conflict despite experiencing similar state brutality, political exclusion, and social suffering.

I propose that the different regimes through which the Polish and Algerian authoritarian states centralized their populations and politicized their citizens distinguished these outcomes. Specifically, I ascribe the quintessentially contrasting results of martial law to Poland’s worker-
based citizenship formation and Algeria’s client- and, briefly, voter-based citizenship. Because Polish workers retained their capacity to compel state concessions by striking even under state fiscal crisis and military rule, they had an incentive to remain committed to their non-violent or “self-limiting” revolution. In contrast, Algerian clients and then voters lost all systemic capacity to influence ruling elites, since state bankruptcy and coercion in effect de-naturalized activists, reducing them to internal political refugees. Polish workers retained power against the state because ruling classes needed their labor power to run the industrial economy; Algerian clients-turned-voters lost all citizen-efficacy because the state did not depend on their contribution.

I extrapolate from these empirical findings an explanatory, and exploratory, model of violent and non-violent social agitation based on conceptual claims about citizenship and subjectivity and about regime differentiation. I claim that citizenship regimes foster particular subjects, thus subjectivities, as one basis of state-citizen systems. Roughly I equate citizenship regimes, the objective structure of meaningful membership, with systemic subjectivity, the formative experience of this structured membership. That is, I link them but they are distinct objective and subjective features of state-citizen interaction. Polish citizens, for instance, became systemic subjects as workers, in a worker-citizenship regime, or one could say, but for stylistic reasons rarely will, through worker-citizen subjectivization. Algerian citizens became systemic subjects as clients and, in a fleeting reform, as voters. All this means that Polish and Algerian authoritarian rulers cultivated discrete systemic subjectivities, that is, specific sub-types of political agency, through effective and practical citizenship regimes; in turn, those regimes are defined by political means or social resources afforded citizens to confront and
communicate with the state. Systemic subjectivities are orientations to the state, ways-of-being-in-the-political-world, cultivated by the social resources of citizenship regimes.

I claim, too, that differentiated and undifferentiated citizenship regimes have distinct effects on systemic subjectivity and thus on whether dissidents continue to experience effective citizenship under the state of exception. Differentiation refers, then, to the separation as opposed to conflation of state and social resources. A differentiated citizenship regime provides social resources that remain intact during state fiscal crisis. For instance, the Polish state relied on citizens’ labor to fund state functions. That gave the workers social resources that remained powerful even when the state experienced fiscal crisis. Citizens’ labor power constituted a differentiated worker-citizenship regime, which therefore remained the basis of systemic subjectivity under Polish martial law. Algerians became subjects through an undifferentiated patron-client citizenship regime; parasitic on state revenue, its social resources vanished under fiscal retrenchment and military coercion.

The endurance of worker-citizenship, or systemic subjectivity, yielded intra-systemic non-violence in Poland while the evaporation of client- and then voter-citizenship fostered anti-systemic violence in Algeria. This project argues that to endow citizens with reliable social resources to affect elite political decisions is to form a citizenship regime – in effect, a systemic political means or site to act as a willful subject. To redress one’s grievances successfully in a citizenship regime is to have systemic subjectivity: the experience of a means or a site within a polity where one’s willful action can accomplish one’s social objectives. Where activists retain their social resources and thus possess systemic subjectivity, they remain non-violent. This is
the structural or objective element of my model, which I will elaborate briefly before discussing the hermeneutic or subjective element.

Two premises underpin this hypothesis – first, a distinction between formal-institutional and informal-citizenship regimes; second, an insistence that citizenship regimes satisfy a human desire for subjectivity “in the first instance,” deprivation of which increases their likelihood of violence as the remaining means of subjective assertion. First, then, formal-institutional and informal-citizenship regimes both matter, but the latter constitute the dominant practical mode of communicative and coercive interaction between state and non-state members of a polity. Citizenship regimes set effective means or reliable if tacit rules for ordinary people to appeal to officials or press rulers to address grievances. They thus provide regular channels of state-society reciprocity or antagonism. To illustrate, elections in a formally democratic regime may be discredited while grassroots and shop floor mobilizations effect desired policy changes. In such a scenario the citizenship regime operates through popular activism rather than electoral rituals. Citizenship regimes create mutual linkages between states and citizens that centralize political activity but can also distribute or decentralize material benefits. The means possessed by non-state actors to compel state concessions – such as campaigning, bargaining, protesting, or striking – are their actual social resources, the tools or weapons discussed above that citizens deploy to express grievances or resist the state; they are the political heuristics of effective citizenship or systemic subjectivity. In sum, then, the social resources established by citizenship regimes produce discrete political or systemic subjectivities. Citizens become subjects when social resources, the effective means of regular state-citizen interaction, shape their responses to public misfortunes, i.e., when they act on their citizenship regimes to achieve systemic
subjectivity. The second premise, then, is that humans pursue systemic subjectivity first via the formal and informal state-citizen resources that constitute the citizenship regime; and, second, via means, often violent, outside state-supported formal institutions and informal norms. So, systemic subjectivity is an ontological desire for political will that always seeks its fulfillment.

In the hermeneutic or subjective part of the model, I propose that perceptions, based on historical, experiential evaluations, are central to the political operations of citizenship regimes, social resources, and systemic subjectivities. This is pivotal in explaining why equally repressive autocratic state violence in Poland and Algeria sustained non-violence in Poland but triggered social violence in Algeria. I link the distinct phenomena of Polish and Algerian militancy under objectively similar political exclusion and social suffering to their polar experiential evaluations of their citizenship regimes’ ongoing relevance under martial law. Even though the strike option, the social resource that constituted Poland’s citizenship regime, was objectively suspended under the state of emergency, experience had taught Poles that their systemic subjectivity was in abeyance rather than destroyed. In contrast, Algerian citizens knew that they had no actual or potential social resources when the state could not finance the patron-client citizenship regime or countenance an Islamist electoral triumph. In short, activists respond to state violence and dispossession historically, experientially, asking whether the social resources or citizenship regime that gave them political strength in the past had been suspended or annihilated. I infer that state opponents who perceive their citizenship regime to be potentially revived, as in Poland, will be more inclined to non-violent or intra-systemic activism; dissidents who cannot discern recoverable social resources, as in Algeria, will be more disposed to violent, anti-systemic actions.
The two elements of the explanatory model presented here are “structural-objective” and “hermeneutic-subjective” because the endurance of the citizenship regime, notably in the case of Poland’s non-violent Solidarity movement, is divided. On one hand, the social resources appear to be present, inasmuch as the factories, trains, shipyards, and mines still exist and the state still needs their productivity and revenues; on the other hand, the citizen-regime is under attack and inoperable. The social resources of worker-citizenship are subjectively inspiring but objectively useless, and activists respond to this ambivalence in making strategic decisions. In contrast, the eradication of the Algerian client- and (briefly) voter-citizenship was undivided. Objectively and subjectively, activist and disengaged Algerian citizens were politically negated. My argument therefore is that an explanation of sustained collective violence will often require both structural-objective-institutional and hermeneutic-subjective-ethnographic components.

To review the argument combining both components: states create citizenship regimes by providing significant social resources that generate legible, reliable, and practical channels of communication and coercion between ruling elites and ordinary citizens. Citizenship regimes vary in response to state insolvency or repression; those based on social resources autonomous from fiscal crisis or martial law are differentiated and endure in hard times. The endurance of a differentiated citizenship regime is objectively and subjectively visible under state coercion, so it is perceptible even when paralyzed by state agencies. Activists who discern the endurance of systemic subjectivity in their recoverable, if suspended, social resources are less likely to resort to violent or other anti-systemic protest strategies. Extrapolating from the Polish and Algerian cases, the choice to engage in violent or non-violent strategies depends on whether subjects
judge that there is a likelihood of restoring previously effective citizenship regimes and thus reviving systemic subjectivity.

Assuming a naïve account of subjectivity\(^1\), citizenship regimes may be said to situate self-transparent agents and their desires in either horizontal or vertical social ties, segmented or seamless political spaces, and differentiated or undifferentiated systems of effective membership. If the core argument of the thesis links the citizenship regime before and during martial law to discrete strategic outcomes, it could seem otiose to raise questions of history, evaluation, memory, and especially subjectivity at all. But I insist on including the latter categories, and in claiming that there was equivalent suffering and dispossession in Poland and Algeria at the outset of martial law. It seems to me that the coincidence of different citizenship regimes but identical experiences of immediate systemic objectification is a fruitful paradox for understanding political violence. I try to resolve this paradox by showing that the citizenship-regime forms subjects whose evaluations of present circumstances include previous iterations of state-society contestation. An exclusively structural account of Polish and Algerian incentives must, in other words, be supplemented by an account of experiential evaluations partially shaped by subjects’ historical relationship to the state. My argument thus incorporates memories of past experiences that influence current evaluations. I hold that there is something excessively conventional in an even heuristic acceptance of the enlightenment subject as the analysand of social explanation. I use the case narratives and outcomes to analyze this problem of subject-formation in social science, namely, the difficulty of braiding objective and subjective features of political violence in reliable social research.
The trajectory of the dissertation reflects the path of explanation I followed, from the empirical observations and analytical puzzles about disparate activist strategies under similar political regimes to enduring debates about the appropriate social ontology of political science. In other words, the chapters of the project report the question-answer-question dialectic of the inquiry, where resolutions to puzzles generated subsequent puzzles and potential resolutions that raised analytical concerns and challenged seemingly settled findings or propositions. This work, in short, follows the path of explanation: deriving violence or non-violence from varying structural features of authoritarian regimes yields insights into divergent actor-evaluations of comparably brutal martial law, which in turn refines the objectification/re-subjectivization thesis, provoking finally a reconsideration of how the field envisions subjectivity between rational-calculation and situated motivation. Most simply, I argue that violence evinces a mobilized subjectivity rather than a morbid subject whose will-to-freedom rises up to reclaim human dignity, as in the regnant Fanonian paradigm. The objective of the project is to situate and join debates about subjectivity and social knowledge. As my histories raised conceptual and methodological issues, they demanded conceptual and philosophical reflections on violence, causality, objectivity, and subjectivity. Taken together, then, the chapters report the dialectic between empirical center and theoretical periphery, inevitably co-constituted.
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Finally, anything of value I commit to the page is dedicated to my daughter Remy.
Whenever we seemed
To have found the answer to a question
One of us untied the string of the old rolled-up
Chinese scroll on the wall, so that it fell down and
Revealed to us the man on the bench who
Doubted so much.

I, he said to us,
Am the doubter. I am doubtful whether
The work was well done that devoured your days.
Whether what you said would still have value for anyone if it
Were less well said.

Whether you said it well but perhaps
Were not convinced of the truth of what you said.
Whether it is not ambiguous; each possible misunderstanding
Is your responsibility. Or it can be unambiguous
And take the contradictions out of things; is it too unambiguous?
If so, what you say is useless. Your thing has no life in it.
Are you truly in the stream of happening? Do you accept
All that develops? Are you developing? Who are you? To whom
Do you speak? Who finds what you say useful? And, by the way:
Is it sobering? Can it be read in the morning?
Is it also linked to what is already there? Are the sentences that were
Spoken before you made use of, or at least refuted? Is everything verifiable?
By experience? By which one? But above all
Always above all else: how does one act
If one believes what you say? Above all: how does one act?

Reflectively, curiously, we studied the doubting
Blue man on the scroll, looked at each other and
Made a fresh start.

Bertolt Brecht¹
NOTE ON STYLE

How astonishing it is that language can almost mean, and frightening that it does not quite. Love, we say, God, we say, Rome and Michiko, we write, and the words get it wrong. 

Jack Gilbert

Robert Merton mocked the “squirrel-like collector of innumerable good things to learn.” While preparing a genealogy of the “dwarf-on-the-shoulders-of-giants aphorism” he had stumbled onto an absurdity:

I had been industriously collecting, like a squirrel in your[3] own backyard but without his[4] presumably assured knowledge of why he is doing what he is doing, every little nut of an allusion to the epigram and providently storing it away. Like that furry rodent, I didn’t always remember where I had put the things...Everybody knows, of course, that the aphorism goes back to Didacus Stella (in Luc. 10, tom. 2) and may have originated there – who can say?

What if documents, data, sources, and ideas point not to conclusive provenances or apodictic truths but only to one another? Do we invent whatever knowledge transcends the “horrible mélange” of history? Are our texts mere fabrications, our reasoning adornments, our research ornaments dangling from willful perspectives? To adduce Merton’s wicked irony, Who can say what everybody knows?

Hardly a shrugging relativist, Merton assiduously tracked the gnomic adage we owe our mentors. But the damage was done – another archivist stricken by the “roundabout route to Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations.” Evidence and intellect converge in this dilemma. Adding is expected to subtract: more data, documents, arguments, and tested hypotheses should mean less supposition, estimation, intuition, and mystification. But then ethnography produces and

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releases new details, stories, significations, and perspectives. To embrace the proliferation endemic to a truth procedure of open investigation is to risk adding without subtracting.

I am grateful to many giants. Even they are grateful. “Derrida once said he writes only because he reads, and he reads only because there are these authors to read time and again. He ‘owes’ them something or, perhaps, everything, if only because he could not write without them: their writing exists as the precondition of his own; their writing constitutes the means through which his own writing voice is animated and secured.” Derrida imbricates the means-ends and subjects-objects of ethnographic inscription to explore how textual “preconditions” configure the worldly effects, constraints, and exclusions of writing. He sees texts as braids of creative motions, discursive traces, interstitial disruptions, and supplementary significations, as a tormented unraveling.

My project comprises empirical, conceptual, argumentative, and speculative inquiries laden with anxieties about the boundaries of disciplinary validation, analytical digression, and nomadic citation. I want this work to straddle and cross lines, often denied in the profession, among demonstration, doubt, and discovery. The artifices by which we define puzzles and find solutions can, I suspect, identify or test hypotheses about social action; but the status of our exclusions remains little discussed. As with Merton’s recursive citations, discovery lies on both sides of demonstration, goaded or guided by doubts about ideal-types, initial conditions, and all that is held constant. But the counter-peril to over-simplifications is infinite regression. Desire, taste, or bias decides the terminus, the same choice-mechanism at play when we “[write] through and not just...about” a text, conceding our “inability to quote without also creating.”

This image of writing alchemizes words and things, which co-inscribe, lest reflection
devolve into detached abstraction. The symbiosis of narrative and situated realities conveys specificity, multiplicity, and perhaps universality. As W. G. Sebald remarked, about his memoir:

[O]ne thing takes you to another, and you make something out of these haphazardly assembled materials. And, as they have been assembled in this random fashion, you have to strain your imagination in order to create a connection between the two things. If you look for things that are like the things you have looked for before, then, obviously, they’ll connect up. But they’ll only connect up in an obvious sort of way, which actually isn’t, in terms of writing something new, productive. So you have to take heterogeneous materials in order to get your mind to do something it hasn’t done before.

Is there some other way to think, speak, or write – some other path from origin to originality? Is there another way to assert veracity in guarded language games? The synthetic, overflowing style of my inquiry evinces a dialectical fidelity to empirical accounts of coercion and resistance, objects and subjects, pasts and presents, and experiences and calculations. Fealty to concrete events disciplines the “heterogeneous materials” that allow the “mind to do something it hasn’t done before.” As Vargas Llosa says, “This process is literally a cannibalization: these materials are fully digested by the new reality, transformed into a distinct and integral substance.”

Situations and texts govern the purposeful creativity of social argumentation, conditioning and challenging, if not impeaching, reliable social knowledge. Back once more to Merton – Who can say what everybody should know?

My desire is to communicate a thesis about how social resources form citizen-subjects through historical-material experiences that, under duress, structure the evaluations of regimes that shape protest strategies. It is a simple humanist idea – people decide what they want and how to act based on who they are; who they are is a matter of history, culture, or experience. But it entails a daunting research apparatus and I walk a line between excessive and inadequate philosophical and ethnographic documentation. Here the unbearably already-late David Foster
Wallace haunts me. Manic citations, recondite diction, rationalist “anity,” and melancholic
cynicism protected his steeply humanist realism; he once said along these lines:

There’s a way, it seems, that reality’s fractured right now, at least the reality that I live in. And
the difficulty about writing about that reality is that text is very linear and it’s very unified,
and...I, anyway, am constantly on the lookout for ways to fracture the text that aren’t totally
disorienting – I mean, you can take the lines and jumble them up and that’s nicely fractured, but
nobody’s gonna read it.  

Social science registers a worry that linear and unified analyses may reduce empirical realities
by bracketing the origins, affect, and rationality of violence that complicate political action. We
may need “different modes of discourse, a different writing” to envisage this plurality, as our
language itself must convey, contain, and reflect the dense objects it explores.

Violence and non-violence make demands on our language to encompass them, to
indulge ruminations equal to the unspeakable kernels of killing, dying, or living. But does
adequate language guarantee that “nobody’s gonna read it,” as Wallace suggests? I am told to
limit my citations, so my argument surfaces and stays afloat. But my sources reflect obligations
beneath the desire for novel insight. Citations are shoulders I stand on and signs of gratitude for
them. Then again, I do not want my account of violence to suffocate under its effort at clarity.
So, if you begin to drown in Milton’s “paroxysm of citations,” forego the notes for the ideas
they have inspired, shaped, or contested – and return to the main text’s dry land.
INTRODUCTION

Violence Between Freedom and Will

In a constellation that poses the threat of total annihilation through war against the hope for emancipation of all mankind through revolution – leading one people after the other in swift succession “to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them” – no cause is left but the most ancient of all, the one, in fact, that from the beginning of our history has determined the very existence of politics, the cause of freedom versus tyranny.

Hannah Arendt

If “the cause of freedom versus tyranny [is] the most ancient of all,” violence and peace are arguably the central categories in assessing freedom and tyranny in political-philosophy and social science alike. We often conceive freedom as the presence of systemic peace and tyranny as the presence of systemic violence. If violence and peace index these two essential political conditions, freedom and tyranny, it seems reasonable that they have also come to be seen as related to them in consistent ways. Tyranny and violence are accordingly thought of as a natural fit, as are freedom and peace. Moreover, these pairings are not formed by elective affinity, as in Weber’s capitalism-Calvinism nexus; that is, tyranny-and-violence or freedom-and-peace do not just happen to click together as compatible but autonomous phenomena. Rather, they are seen as co-constituted – co-extensive in reciprocal causal logics. The phrases peaceful freedom and violent tyranny therefore sound pleonastic, as our normative and scientific political conventions causally identify freedom with peace, tyranny with violence – as foundations of our thought.

This conceptual map provides a basis for a philosophically inclined comparative politics of peaceful and violent social phenomena by raising persistent dilemmas of social explanation.
One dilemma concerns reliable knowledge about agents who, as objects or subjects of political regimes, interpret their own conditions, experiences, and actions in particular ways. I will posit this dilemma – generally: that between universal-objective and particular-subjective aspects of social analysis – as soluble but still vexing. These aspects of explanation are coeval; I separate them heuristically to convey the dialogue between social actions and theories that emerged in my research and writing.

Exploring why Algerian but not Polish activists resisted brutal states of emergency violently, I discerned that historical and subjective evaluations of material-political suffering bore greater explanatory weight than immediate and objective conditions. Specifically, despite similar systemic deprivation, I detected that Poles constituted as worker-citizens retained their historically effective social resource – the strike – to compel policy concessions and bind state to subject; but Algerians constituted as client-citizens lost their social resource – shifted loyalty – and capacity to compel ruling elites without violently alienating state and citizen-subject. This disparity generated two symbiotic arguments. First, I argue that the social resource, withdrawn labor, that formed worker-citizenship endured state fiscal and political crises, sustaining Poles’ experience of systemic subjectivity and minimizing incentives to violence; in contrast, the social resource, removed fealty, that structured client-citizenship perished, eradicating Algerians’ systemic subjectivity. In addition to structurally linking citizenship regimes to protest strategies, I argue, second, that the social resources of citizenship regimes reiterate practices of effective systemic membership that form subjects who evaluate their present conditions historically and experientially. Reacting to similar initial assaults under martial law Polish and Algerian citizen-
subjects acted on distinct historical experiences, yielding divergent readings of state coercion and evaluations of agitation strategies, depending on the potential recovery of social resources.

I will explore in this work, then, two kinds of claim, concerning objective and subjective conditions of violent or non-violent strategies. First is an inference from objective conditions: under martial law Poles remained non-violent as their labor resource afforded them immanent power within the regime whereas Algerians turned to violence because their loyalty resource gave them power only outside the regime. Second is an inference about subjective conditions: Poles experienced and intuited immanent potency, despite objective dispossession, *subjectively* as worker-citizens who had repeatedly used strikes to reverse state decisions. Even as the ruling class banned strikes, labor power remained visible, virtual, immanent – a potent weapon in the experiential subjectivity of Polish dissidents, rendering the state a deluded colossus. In contrast, Algerians experienced systemic suffocation under state absolutism, unmediated by dormant or suspended social resources, as client-citizens and voter-citizens rendered abject by the state consolidation of material and social sovereignty, obliterating actual and virtual citizenship alike. When Algerian rulers canceled the experiment with elections, refusing Islamists a hard-earned electoral victory, Algerians were systemically expelled, denied effective membership conferred by reliable social resources, securing state prerogative and casting citizens as political objects.

The first argument about divergent objective conditions – that the observable retention or eradication of the resources that constitute citizen-subjects produces non-violent or violent protest – stands alone as a structural or institutional cause-and-effect. A spare version of this argument says: if the tools of social protest available *before* martial law are removed (and not replaced), violence will be more likely. Or, more tersely: effective social resources discourage
violence. In a sense this is the primary, core claim of my project. But this argument entails that habituated social resources were, indeed, differently effective under Polish and Algerian martial law, translating directly into divergent protest formations. The similarity of state violence in the two cases means, though, that the structural disparity in antecedent systemic subjectivity does not explain the discrete outcomes. The second claim thus explains the first by showing how the citizenship regimes continued to shape outcomes when, in the volatile early period of martial law, neither provided Poles nor Algerians with systemic subjectivity. The second argument thus addresses the discrepancy arising from the first, between objective conditions and subjective evaluations of social suffering and political exclusion, given martial law appears in both Poland and Algeria to have eliminated all previously salient opposition strategies. This second claim emphasizes experiential evaluation or historical interpretation of state coercion with respect to its effects on systemic subjectivity, not only on grievances. So, emphasis on historical patterns of systemic subjectivity provides the dynamics of the structural model: how materially credible and institutionally legible, but immediately ineffective, social resources may still seem present if inoperable to Polish activists, dissuading them from violent resistance. A streamlined structural account of exclusion-versus-inclusion needs a supporting account of the subjective evaluations of enduring-versus-eliminated social resources that determine the political content of objective suffering or disenfranchisement.

These objective conditions and subjective evaluations are co-extensive variables in the theoretical model (see §1.b), so I confront structural-without-subjective explanations of violent or non-violent social agitation strategies, while questioning the common inference that the causal component of experiential or subjective evaluation precludes comparative explanatory
inferences. I should clarify here that while I extrapolate theoretical insights from my account of Polish non-violence and Algerian violence, I apply the theory and explanation narrowly to these cases, and offer them as only potentially applicable to other social situations and movements. In summarizing the findings in broader terms, I do not propose a universal theory of systemic subjectivity, citizenship structures, or social action, but one that makes sense of the choices of Poland’s Solidarity and Algeria’s Islamists, if not social agitations elsewhere. Invoking Arendt’s concepts of tyranny and freedom through immediate and experiential aspects of social action in reading my case studies, I affirm but refine the polarity of dehumanized and subjective states in social explanation; propose that in their evolving strategies dissidents act on historically formulated evaluations of present citizenship status, or social resources; and connect violent and non-violent protest decisions to patterns of citizen-subjectivity and experiential evaluation that invite causal explanation. These are the explanatory and theoretical hypotheses elaborated and, I hope, justified in this project, which I will now introduce in analytical detail, sketching the premises questioned and advanced in the following chapters to transcend the dilemmas of explaining self-sacrificial violence.

The identities freedom-peace and tyranny-violence adduced above offer a promising framework for comparative research. Inasmuch as they conceptually and causally bind tyranny to violence and freedom to peace, these two dyads furthermore form our concept of human being itself, as Arendt suggests. Freedom and peace become the necessary, defining conditions for realizing human potential, which tyranny and violence absolutely prevent. One concrete derivative of these pretty abstract equations is the premise that peaceful freedom and violent tyranny create feedback loops between regimes and societies. The characteristics of tyrannical
and free systems diffuse to their inhabitants who absorb, embody, and replicate their regimes’ coercive or liberal tendencies. On this view regimes and citizens grow into each other over time as mirror images, echoed in adages about states and societies deserving each other. Tyrannical regimes and their citizens are thus warlike, free regimes and citizens peaceful. Ultimately, each description morphs into its own explanation. Both images envisage humanity as structured, contextually and mimetically, on dichotomous axes of tyranny/freedom and peace/violence. For a social science that needs a causal mechanism but admits the locality of choice or value as consequential in producing violence, the key provision here is a human ontology – a universal property that encompasses all social activities under foundational concepts and distinctions that can support explanatory schemas. That implied human ontology is the desire for freedom and the practical result is imitative adaptation in compulsory political systems or social contexts.⁷

One codicil that reiterates this logic in the absence of state-society mimesis posits that if regime and citizen do not become fused, one or both have retained an identity external to their relationship. Mismatches between state and society thus must testify to outside influence, such as some previous cultural commitment or foreign ideology that has corrupted the presumptive identification of regime and citizen.⁸ This interpretation surfaces in both analytical and political practice. Analysts conflate social actors and institutional configurations, at least in much social movement theory, much the way states and citizens accuse each other of infidelity when failing to align. In each case the belief persists that regime and citizen ought to be co-constituted. The expectation from our conceptual map is that freedom and peace constitute each other, as do tyranny and violence. In more prosaic terms, we expect the pairings inclusion-peace, exclusion-violence. As basic ensemble variables, freedom-peace and tyranny-violence are responsible for
the presumption of “authoritarian persistence and stability”\textsuperscript{9} from Latin American bureaucratic authoritarianism to West Asian\textsuperscript{10} distributive police states – until they crumble or reform under cross-ideological or multi-class oppositions. This perception of authoritarianism as stable-until-unstable exposes fault lines in the analyzed and experienced dictatorial edifice; but it sustains the either/or framing of violent tyranny and peaceful freedom as our archetypal political forms.

This discussion leads to the predicate that grievances are an expression of \textit{human being}. A regime indexed tyrannical-violent is said to violate the conditions of human flourishing, to be \textit{inhumane}; a regime indexed free-peaceful fulfills those criteria and is \textit{humane}. Turning to the \textit{inhumane} authoritarian states of exception in my cases, Poland and Algeria, we may infer that Solidarity and Islamist activists resisted a similar condition: \textit{dehumanization}. If so, invoking our conceptual map, we would say that in autocratic Poland and Algeria \textit{humanity rose up against inhumanity}, albeit in distinct expressions of recuperated humanity. By extension, tyranny is a necropolis in which survivors – sustained by values, ideals, or hopes from \textit{beyond} their regime or society – emerge, coalesce, and revolt in defense of their humanity.\textsuperscript{11} The uprising proves the failure of thanatopolitical despotism to eradicate life.\textsuperscript{12} This city of the dead coming to life articulates the \textit{dehumanization} thesis, which recommends a compelling if problematic causal mechanism\textsuperscript{13} behind social violence and peace. My project affirms the logic of this thesis, centrally the salience of dehumanization in producing violence. But I will explain the discrete outcomes by retreating from immediate to historical experiences and evaluations of inhumane conditions, re-inscribing social agents as subjects, not objects, of coercive regimes. To support these ideas, it helps to take up the analytical leverage gained from revising the dehumanization thesis, still the governing premise in leading explanations of violence.
Dehumanization refers to political disenfranchisement, material dispossessions, or social expulsion that erodes collective or individual abilities to achieve consciously defined objectives willfully and reliably in a compulsory social system. It denotes diminished agency or subjectivity, conceived apart from liberal notions of freedom predicated on a universal potential for rational-detachment. In sophisticated dehumanization theses, agency or subjectivity – the latter is a quasi-technical term in my project – comprise two components of a successful and reliable exertion of will to realize self-articulated demands: material provisions that permit physical endurance and political resources that guarantee efficacious expression of grievances. Denial of these biological and expressive needs dehumanizes people. The causal argument built up from these concepts is that sustained social violence is a double movement of repression and revolt, of suffocation and gasping for air.\(^{14}\) It occurs when people have been dehumanized by a system that must therefore be broken to reverse this process and re-humanize their lives. Put another way, people resort to violence when reduced from acting subjects to acted-upon objects, when as humans-into-things they cannot improve their welfare using only the means established and accredited in hegemonic political arrangements.\(^{15}\)

Frantz Fanon gives us a lucid, stirring vision of the dehumanization thesis in his dramatic deathbed recitation, *The Wretched of the Earth*:

\begin{quote}
A world compartmentalized, Manichean and petrified, a world of statues: the statue of the general who led the conquest, the statue of the engineer who built the bridge. A world cocksure of itself, crushing with its stoniness the backbones of those scarred by the whip. That is the colonial world. The colonial subject is a man penned in; apartheid is but one method of compartmentalizing the colonial world. The first thing the colonial subject learns is to remain in his place and not overstep his limits...The dreams of the colonial subject are muscular dreams, dreams of action, dreams of aggressive vitality. I dream I am jumping, swimming, running, and climbing. I dream I burst out laughing, I am leaping across a river and chased by a pack of cars that never catches up with me. During the colonization the colonized subject frees himself night after night between nine in the evening and six in the morning.\(^{16}\)
\end{quote}
This passage bristles with poetic images of eruptive resistance to strangulation. It describes a violently enforced, class-defined institutional racism – *apartheid* is a term too kind, he stresses, for France’s Algerian colony – whose inhumanity typified the indifference and prerogative of one people to another.\(^{17}\) When Algerian demands for civic, racial, and economic equality after WWII had yielded only more brutal expressions of these inequities, the colonized attacked. Fanon’s rendering contains a social-psychological *explanation* of the refusal of dehumanization. Cobbling together observations from his clinical and anti-imperial activities, Fanon claims that inhumane circumstances cause their victims *neuroses when internalized* and *violence when externalized*. Echoing his earlier analysis of racism in *Black Skins, White Masks*, written before the revolution, he provides a sort of hydraulic theory of personhood. A social system, he says, can compress but not extinguish our identity and will, our capacity to realize our personal and social desires.\(^{18}\) If social arrangements stop us from being who we are, who-we-are will take refuge in our unconscious – sustaining itself in muscular dreams of running, jumping, climbing, outpacing *colons’* cars – until survival forces who-we-are out of hiding to fight back. Militancy marks the symptomatic shift from internalized to externalized effects of dehumanization, that is, a *qualitative* change in the symptom itself. At some pressure point, re-humanization occurs *through* the transformation from internal dream to external war – a “new man” arises.\(^{19}\)

The analysis here concerns Fanon’s contribution to a human ontology that, I have been proposing, grounds our general model of social and political violence in the desire for freedom from dehumanization. So it seems worthwhile to round out his account of dehumanization. In simple terms, Fanon reports that dehumanization first represses and then radicalizes its victims.
The repression phase manifests symptoms on the couch – anxiety, frustration, fury, or more broadly estrangement, dislocation, and melancholia. The radicalization phase manifests on the battlefield – certainty, satisfaction, discipline, but also integrity, wholeness, mourning. So Fanon portrays two phases of dehumanization, each with a distinct person. Re-humanization converts the subordinated, neurotic object into the radicalized, willful subject. I will ask what explains this abrupt, disjunctive reversal in which repression\(^20\) becomes rebellion, object subject; or rather, I will need to scrutinize Fanon’s implicit explanation that the gradual suffocation of identity and subjectivity reach a tipping point on the line between subject and object where the subject recoils from reification.

To critique this account, I have to pause over some details. Fanon perceives a qualitative asymmetry in the two symptoms of inhumanity. He thinks it is not the case that repression and rebellion are similar but sequential effects of dehumanization, since it is not the same person whose fantasies become realities of power and prowess. Fanon rejects the scenario where the dreamer-turned-fighter is one continuous agent stretching from repression to revolution. This seamless progression is just the image Fanon dismisses on the imperishable premise that it is through our actions that we become subjects – in essence, that we as beings\(^21\) do not exist before we as doings.\(^22\) Fanon implies here that revolutionary liberation is not the result of reflective decisions by objects (things do not make decisions) or subjects (agents do not decide their agency\(^23\)). His revolutionary psychoanalysis sees Algerian de/re-humanization, rather, as an instinctive, physical rejection by the human will of an animal, objectified existence deprived of will. Fanon thinks that, on the verge of extinction, subjectivity protects itself and that this is a universal mechanism of human life.\(^{24}\)
Fanon offers an explanation: compression is not only the context of escape but its cause. *Dehumanization causes re-humanization.* “Decolonization...transforms the spectator crushed to a non-essential state into a privileged actor,” he says. “It infuses a new rhythm specific to a new generation of men, with a new language and a new humanity...The ‘thing’ colonized becomes a man through the very process of liberation.” Czesław Miłosz echoes Fanon’s reverie when he rejoices at “the moment when [Polish] society learned to consider itself as a subject, rather than as an object manipulated by those who govern.” Here Fanon adds to the human ontology delineated above in two ways. First, his dehumanization thesis extends our inherited conceptual landscape to tyranny-violence-object versus freedom-peace-subject. In the process of re-humanization violence and liberation are symbiotic but this is a median stage on the way to post-colonial freedom. Second, more significantly, he insists that people respond to tyranny and freedom not as violent or peaceful mimes but as willful (not “intentional” or “free”) subjects. For Fanon, people do not reproduce hegemonic social orders as if distillate mimetic instances of them; they follow their irrefragable drive to reclaim their humanity. In conceiving a primal desire for liberation from tyranny, Fanon explains revolutionary violence as part of his proof that subjectivity arises from the elemental, universal need to be human. 

Fanon’s dehumanization thesis is a good place to begin discussing explanations of social violence/non-violence, less for the specific theses about racism, empire, and revolution than for the crystalline, if all-too-casual, conceptual architecture. My sense is that the research on social violence and collective action has rejected or complicated Fanon’s argument while retaining its structure and principles. The literature invokes resource mobilization, repertoires, framing, and political access as variables that intervene between grievance and deprivation, as institutions or
practices that mediate political reactions to inhumane conditions. There is no direct causal connection between dehumanization and violence or recuperation of subjectivity, pace Fanon’s thesis, as these variables are defined, animated, ameliorated, and resisted in myriad ways. My project explores how institutional histories differentiate subjective evaluations of objective dehumanization, so it follows this corrective agenda. For that reason I want to ask if we have refined and qualified the dehumanization thesis but accepted its logic and whether that logic is itself valid. So my project makes several linked arguments.

First, retaining the scaffolding of the dehumanization thesis likely reveals a significant, valuable truth about social explanation: it requires a human ontology of the kind under severe and crippling attack for decades within and beyond “the field.” The content of this scaffolding is equally revealing. Fanon depicts a confrontation between internal and external conditions; his idea is that this “inessential thing” – the colonized object – results when subjective identity and will are snuffed out by material and social deprivation. But this relationship between subjective and objective conditions opens up a gap, as activists like Gandhi insisted and social movement theorists have affirmed. My internal-subjective wellbeing and external-objective wellbeing do not make direct and causal contact, short of outright eradication of my person; they reach each other only through highly particular interpretive and normative prisms. But for a crucial reason this is not Fanon’s perspective, which is that violence is a purely physical phenomenon in cause and effect. Physical deprivation suffocates the inextricable human need for willful subjectivity, which is also physical. It is easy to surmise that Fanon feels we be reduced to mere physicality only when we are objectified, but this is what he rejects in explaining the liberating violence of the “new man.” We are always physically willful, that is, so dehumanization does not reduce
one to but denies one’s physical state. Repression and violence are intensities at the vanishing point between subject and object, between internal and external energies. The point of this is Fanon’s candor about what social scientists believe but do not say: that reliable explanation of social violence entails a *human ontology rooted in our physical needs for subjective integrity*.31

The second linked argument my project addresses is that this tension in social scientific practice – crudely, between difference and explanation – should be disinterred and analyzed explicitly, even at the risk of social explanation itself. Writing *within* and not *about* a method, Fanon was insouciant about the philosophical precision and methodological status of his many theses. This lack of self-conscious hesitation permitted him to foreground the claims to physical human ontology that social science needs but rarely speaks. This eerie silence raises two more items in the series. Third, dehumanization remains the muted substrate in explanations of social violence *because of, not despite*, its political rarity and social extremity. To locate a necessary universal basis for comparative political analysis, so the logic goes, we should build up from *physical duress* to more mentally mediated offenses to, say, cultural dignity. This order of things mirrors the effort to define a “minimal” conception of human rights32 or human security33 for intuitive reasons. It seems reasonable to think that if there is a general human characteristic, a universal baseline *useful for causal explanation*, it must be our repulsion over physical brutality; we *absolutely ban* torture, rape, and genocide in our political imagination, but not profound threats to traditional or personal integrity. Putting it the other way around, if denied dignity as a variable can support a causal explanation of violence, it would seem to entail that *physical* degradation is causal as it denies dignity. Following from this, the fourth view I hold is that the dehumanization thesis, based on a physical human ontology, is necessary
but insufficient as a credible explanation of violence and non-violence, at least in the cases I have discussed (§3, §4, §5). It seems to me that Fanon’s explicit, and our leading theories’ implicit, reliance on the dehumanization nexus needs to be illuminated specifically to shift the site of human ontology from physicality to subjectivity.

There are evident flaws in the dehumanization thesis that recommend its logical edifice be relocated to a new terrain—specifically, that its universal or ontological category be moved from general human needs and desires (physical and cultural) to processes of subject formation. To put this provocatively, a critique of the dehumanization thesis forces us either to develop subjectivity rather than injury as our explanatory variable or to surrender the explanation of violence altogether. The reason for these stark alternatives is likely obvious. If dehumanization refers to severe wounds to body or dignity, it fails as a causal variable because even as physical injury inhumanity varies hermeneutically across settings. But if the concept dehumanization is recalibrated to accommodate diverse interpretations of inhumanity for greater social accuracy and explanatory force, it leads to Babel—to particular reactions to specific experiences of multifarious deprivations. As a universal, dehumanization cannot explain; as an explanation, it cannot be universal. If some social ontology is needed for causal explanation—for a social science\(^{34}\)—of political violence, and if dehumanization is the strongest candidate we have, then we must examine alternatives between heaven and Babel. Critiquing the dehumanization thesis clears a path to other options and, I speculate, promotes processes of subject-formation as the optimal mechanism for explaining violence.

Three objections to the repression\(\Rightarrow\)revolution thesis arise on analytical and empirical grounds, which I will discuss succinctly. The main analytical vulnerability concerns the volatile
line between subject and object under dehumanizing conditions. Fanon’s model has obvious contradictions, but I would prefer to examine the most generous reading of his text, and of the thesis in general. The glaring weakness in “On Violence” is that Fanon does not explain how a “thing” or “beast” reclaims its own, presumably lost, subjective will. If imperialism renders the colonized subject an object, presumably its subjectivity is destroyed, leaving it inert, an object acted upon but not acting in any subjective sense. Fanon seems to say that objects bereft of will can miraculously will their own will back into being, which seems to be a theological recourse external to his method and model. But I will raise a more probing issue by dismissing that one to emphasize an intuitive sense of Fanon’s idea. He evidently means that dehumanization is approached but not achieved, that people are never dehumanized in the revolutionary process. Note that dehumanization can refer to either process or outcome, which is more significant than it may appear. The thesis turns on the difference between “I am being dehumanized” and “I am dehumanized.” Fanon thinks people revolt when almost, not fully, dehumanized. That makes more logical sense but exacerbates the analytical impasse. If revolt signals impending rather than achieved dehumanization (assuming Fanon thinks rebels react to dehumanization, not merely to suffering or sadness), then rebellious subjects must link immediate to imminent conditions. Resistance expresses, in his view, an interpretation of ominous dehumanization, but such an interpretation would surely depend on myriad non-universal social or cultural factors. In sum, the dehumanization thesis must refer to: a subject protecting itself, not an object transcending itself; an approach to “thingness”; and a situated interpretation of the future, not a universal condition of the present reduction of subject to object. The dehumanization thesis
must explain how objectified humans will their own subjectivity or how particular perceptions of inhumanity can be generalized in line with the idea of physical and moral dehumanization.

Because the subject⇒object⇒subject sequence is logically excluded, we are left with a relatively flimsy dehumanization thesis: that people revolt when they suffer. This version of the thesis depends on interpretations of suffering, for instance, its meaning, progression, prospects, causes, and solutions. Once we resituate dehumanization from objective injury to subjective evaluation (§1.b.3.b), we surmise that dehumanization per se cannot provide the ontology that social explanation requires. We ascend to this general claim from extreme cases of starvation and indignity. It is difficult to see hunger strikers, torture victims, prisoners of conscience, casualties of war, or self-immolators as, in any axiomatic or objective sense, less or more free or humanized on a spectrum of suffering. We detect in such cases an “exogenous bias” in the dehumanization thesis that emphasizes conditions over perceptions of deprivation but even in situations of horrid injury we should “give an enhanced role to people’s critical appraisals of their own experiences and choices as important determinants of new and different choices.”

This gap, filled by value-plural appraisals, between objects and subjects of suffering may account for a vexing truth about brutality: it may mobilize or silence, as in the Warsaw uprising or in post-genocide Guatemala. There are two inversions in this second objection that impair the dehumanization thesis. Re-humanization can occur through willful submission to inhumane or even fatal treatment. Conversely, recalling that the thesis is about the near extermination of subjects, we see that dehumanization destroys people as often as it inspires them to resist. This reality does not refute the dehumanization thesis but it cautions us against trivializing brutality and domination or celebrating it as a new beginning.
The third objection, pertinent to the first two, derives from my comparative reading of modern Polish and Algerian political history. As I have mentioned, Polish and Algerian activists suffered similarly before and during martial law but responded differently to dehumanization. I will examine below broader commonalities that make this comparison instructive (§3.b), as well as various cultural, economic, and political differences that may have shaped these discrepant outcomes. (§3.c). In this way, I hope to make room for an argument about systemic subjectivity, social resources, and experiential evaluation (§1.b) that retains in refined form the strengths of the dehumanization thesis while suturing its failings. The strengths, to repeat, are its views that social explanation requires a human ontology; social violence reflects the reduction of willful subjects into objects; and social action involves historically defined subjectivities. The weakness is the paradoxical nexus of object and subject that throws us back into relativistic judgments of suffering that betray the substrates humanity/inhumanity. My project expects to sustain these strengths and compensate the weaknesses by claiming that political evaluations that motivate opposition strategies can be explained as the bi-products of citizenship regimes that structure citizens as subjects by endowing them with distinct social recourses. The differential effects of fiscal crisis and martial law on these social resources, and thus on what I call citizen-subjectivity, determines whether activists experience systemic life or death – whether crisis and coercion sustain or eradicate their subjectivity, reducing them to objects. I claim, then, that the resort to violence expresses the interruption of systemic subjectivity; that the end of citizen-subjectivity reflects a judgment by citizens based on their experience using state-provided social resources; and that the interplay of citizenship regimes and experiential evaluations explains violence. In a simpler language, even if people rise up for the same reasons, how they rise up depends less on
what they want from a system than who they are in that system; and less on deprived subjects than on disruptive subjectivities.

I especially hope, but am not certain, that my analysis usefully address the conundrums of explaining violence. I conclude this work with a lengthy defense, extrapolated from my case studies, of subject formation as the apt mechanism in a reliable social explanation of collective violence. I take seriously the dilemma that has inspired the conceptual map of freedom/tyranny and its conjugate dehumanization idea. That is, we seek causal accounts of phenomena such as violence that we know must come from specific, local, or even personal emotions, values, and provocations. Our practical or intuitive awareness abhors the universal theory and mechanism needed to explain collective violence. More specifically, we realize humanization differs across societies and polities, so we rightly suppose that dehumanization differs accordingly. Pleased with this, the relativist will hasten to insist that we are never directly offended qua humans, but rather that our desires or grievances are offended and these hardly belong to all of humanity.

Disputing the relativist view, Wieviorka nonetheless describes, justly,

\[\text{a great tension that is itself never anything more than one of the modalities of the great divide between universalism and relativism that characterizes our modern era. The more we take the view that violence is what we perceive to be violence thanks to [various] mediations, the more we have to accept that our perception is subject to temporal and spatial variations, and that it varies from individual to individual, from group to group, and from period to period. We must, that is, take into account both individual subjectivity and national particularities. We therefore tend to take a relativist view.}\]

That “our perception is subject to temporal and spatial variations” underlying social violence seems to militate against causal explanations grounded in generalizations about human life. In this respect it is curious and revealing that we still invoke violated human features or demands as the provenance of violence. But statements that do convey universal human traits – “we all
want to be treated like humans,” “we are all hungry,” “we all demand dignity” – do not tell us what people will do if they don’t get what they want; do not tell us the content of these formal desires; i.e., do not give us a mechanism.\textsuperscript{41} Referring to what distinct people see as a fully human life, dehumanization cannot be conceived in the image of a universal injury to pride or taste or body. Polish and Algerian reactions to the state of emergency affirm, for instance, that cruelty, exclusion and poverty do not explain the resort to violence or success of non-violence. The explanation seems to lie in the structure of distinct experiences of social and political life.

Violence may be the ideal test case for causal social explanation since it evokes feelings, sensations, memories, references, attachments, symbols narratives, sensibilities, and values that are full-blooded anthropological qualities. Such motivations specify in particular places and peoples so-called universal human demands; the dignity we all seek will not be a single set of meanings, practices, and affects, all of which are surely the beating heart of social sacrifice, struggle, and risk. Violence raises, then, notoriously acute, albeit productive, tensions between particularity and universality, or, if one likes, between ethnography and explanation. I should hope that we are now a sufficient distance from the static conceptual map of freedom-peace-subjectivity and tyranny-violence-objectification to locate our social ontology elsewhere. But where and how do we get there? I conclude this introduction by inverting the paradox alleged to hamper social explanations of violence that recognizes human plurality. I want to suggest, against a prevalent view, that the further we move back in time from the moment of violence, tracking outcome to cause, the closer we get to its explanation.

One approach to explaining violence anxiously views the causal backtrack from violence to grievance to conditions to values as a plunge into anthropological objections to universality.
That is, the further one gets from the moment of violence, the further one gets into particular cultural attributes and therefore the further from explanation. Put another way, the track from outcome to antecedent is the trajectory from causal explanation to anthropological description. This bias, stemming from ethnographic anxieties, toward the moment of violence as the site of the universal encourages theories that focus on the immediate conditions of violence. In turn, taking the cause of violence as concurrent with the violence itself, researchers look for common elements across scenes of violence, bracketing historical or cultural preconditions that might immure them in idiosyncratic commitments that vitiate explanation. Violent incidents naturally tend to concern resentment about material, political, or spiritual deprivation, so it only follows that those deprivations cause the violence. This method concludes, for instance, that indignity causes violence since at every violent occasion people felt their dignity violated. Where social movement research advances causal connections between violence and immediate exclusion from the regime, the same assumptions and conflations occur. If we were to venture more deeply into indignity or exclusion hypotheses, notably by asking how different people conceive of dignity or exclusion, the explanations would collapse because desires for dignity or inclusion are hollow universals, not causal mechanisms. But anxiety about cultural specificity or historical experience need not confine social explanations to cobbling together elements from immediate conditions into a universal desire for dignity whose violation triggers resistance.

Causal explanations of violence nonetheless tend to focus on the moment of violence, then, sensing tension between particular conditions and general theories. They are not alone in this anxiety, though it is usually submitted as evidence against social explanation or human
ontology. Weber, whose belief in objective social science did not extend to causal explanations, thus remarked:

[A]s soon as we attempt to reflect [on how] life confronts us in immediate concrete situations, it presents an infinite multiplicity of successively and [coextensively] emerging and disappearing events, both “within” and “outside” ourselves. The absolute infinity of this multiplicity is seen to remain undiminished even when our attention is focused on a single “object,” for instance a concrete act of exchange, as soon as we seriously attempt an exhaustive description of all the individual components of this “individual phenomenon,” to say nothing of explaining it causally.  

As often, Weber echoes Nietzsche: “[T]he entire history of a ‘thing,’ an organ, a practice can be a continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and arrangements, whose causes need not be connected even among themselves – on the contrary, in some cases only accidentally follow and replace one another...Only that which has no history is definable.” The shared image is not a static mosaic of infinitely multiple values, but a dynamic wave of proliferating forces and energies forever growing, contracting, modifying, and improvising in its own singular entelechy.

All this is a conundrum for an explanatory account: the more rigorously we explore the discrete causal or constitutive elements of violence/peace to explain divergent outcomes, the further we get from a general explanation. The closer we get to causes, the further we get from causal theories. If we value reliable social science, we must ask how to combine ethnographic particularity and explanatory universality in the causal analysis of violence/non-violence. My research design, case studies, and empirical findings reverse the worry about losing explanatory traction as we traverse back from the event of violence into discrete conditions, experiences, and subjects. Adopting a revised dehumanization concept, I propose that the further we trace back from the common conditions of social violence (political and material lack), the closer we get to an explanation of violence. To move back through the causal pathway to the origins of
violence looks like this: outcomes ⇒ evaluations ⇒ experiences ⇒ \{citizenship ⇒ resources\}.

Reversing the causal flow into its temporal sequence, here is a simplified version of my thesis:

\[\{\text{citizenship regime ⇒ social resources}\} ⇒ \text{experiences} ⇒ \text{evaluations} ⇒ \text{outcomes}\]

"citizen-subjectivity" w/ regime of regime V/non-V

I will elaborate the puzzle, concepts, and model in the theoretical chapter (§1.a, §1.b.2, §1.b.3) but here I merely want to suggest that to move back from violence/non-violence to the formation of subjects within regimes constituted by social resources – that is, to the design of citizenship regimes – is to move from evacuated universal humans to robust situated subjects as the kernel of our socio-political ontology. The insight that our subjectivities rise up against their foreclosure suggests that past experiences define evaluations of even the most coercive state actions. We see that these evaluations are carried not only by memories of wrangling with the state, but by the fate of the social resources used against the state; whether effective or immanent in the period of martial law, their potential recuperation as weapons to compel state concessions, to reinvigorate the citizen-subjectivity, is paramount. Finally, we perceive that as experiential evaluations of martial law – based on the persistence or elimination of the social resources of effective citizenship – produce violence/non-violence, the citizen-subject emerges as an ideal-material agent. If evaluations of objective dehumanization are subjective (based on past experiences deploying resources), then these subjective evaluations of dehumanization are also objective (based on the present credibility of those social resources). I will urge that this amalgam embodies the process of subject formation, the tendency among humans to orient themselves as willful agents of intensifying historical events.
The primary goal of this project is empirical: to explain why similar conditions produced violent upheaval in Algeria but peaceful transition in Poland. My hope is to persuade readers that citizenship regimes based on distinctive social resources were the institutional source of violence in Algeria and non-violence in Poland. If I interpret the histories acceptably, my project could contribute to our sense of how specific institutional forms and ideational dynamics interacted in forging opposition strategies under authoritarian regimes, and perhaps beyond. I suspect other regime-types would register similar patterns; among democracies we might test for links between effective citizenship and social violence, for instance, by comparing peak-level bargaining or party-electoral procedures in providing systemic subjectivity. More ambitiously, I suspect Algerians’ experience of systemic reification and expulsion under martial law, of being the object of unmediated authoritarian force, are replicated in otherwise contrasting contexts evidently proliferating in the current period: rather than imposed by the autarkic command economies of centralized states, this experience of subordination to uncontained social power may dominate the inhabitants of neo-liberal markets or collapsed states. In other words, if systemic subjectivity is at the root of consequential differences in protest movements in authoritarian Poland and Algeria a generation ago, it may be a helpful model or idea to apply to conflicts outside that regime-type, such as the war on terror, populated by combatants drawn from the most dehumanizing but “free” conditions of the free market and failed state.
CHAPTER ONE

Citizen-Subjectivity, experiential evaluation, and violence/non-violence

Where wind carries the smell of the crematorium
And a bell in the village tolls the Angelus¹,
The Spirit of History is out walking.
He whistles, he likes these countries washed
By a deluge, deprived of shape and now ready.
A worm-fence, a homespun skirt is pleasant to him,
The same in Poland, in India, Arabia.

*Czesław Miłosz²

§1.a  Puzzle: Algerian violence/Polish non-violence under martial law

Political and economic deprivation under authoritarian socialist rule inspired Polish and Algerian activists in to demand greater welfare and rights. State reforms intended to divide or distract dissidents only unified and concentrated them in a Polish labor union and an Algerian political party. Confronting peaceful, disciplined mass oppositions under state fiscal crises, both regimes imposed martial law. Poland then transitioned peacefully to democracy (1981-1989)³ but Algeria collapsed in vicious factional violence (1992-1997).⁴ Why did sustained and radical collective opposition movements under equally corrupt and coercive dictatorships remain non-violent in Poland but turn violent in Algeria, killing tens of thousands?

Vexed by this disparity during Algeria’s brutal and escalating conflict, one scholar wrote:

The seizure of power by General Jaruzelski in 1981 may be seen as the first step in the transition to democracy, a decade...in which the armed forces and the police were pitted against Solidarity and large segments of Polish society were ‘mobilized’, and civil society began to create political space for itself. Could the aborted elections in Algeria and the seizure of power by the military and technocrats signal the beginning of a similar transition? I believe that the answer is no, because the FIS, aside from its popularity, in no way resembles Solidarity.⁵
This answer raises the question driving my project: especially given similar legacies of religious-nationalist militancy against states denounced as unjust, why didn’t the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) resemble Solidarity (Solidarność)? Waterbury credits Poland’s expansive civil society with the country’s democratic transition; but why didn’t FIS’s “popularity” represent “civil society” or generate “political space”? He seems to blame Algeria’s Islamist agitators rather than ruling elites for the country’s failure to replicate Central Europe’s glasnost. The implication is that Algeria lacked the activists it deserved. But should a state’s opponents be analytically separated from the institutions and ruling elites that shaped them, to the extent that they become an explanation but not explained? Polish Solidarity continued to oppose the state under martial law with “self-limiting” non-violence but Algerian Islamists turned to unlimited violence. Given evidently similar conditions and initial commitments to non-violent means, what explains this divergence in dissident strategies: religious values, informal practices, state structures, imperial contexts, economic resources, or some combination of these?

That similar social grievances and state reprisals under a single regime-type yielded a liberal-democratic polity in Poland but a blood-brimmed necropolis in Algeria implies that the Polish and Algerian states of exception declared war on different kinds of subjects. I will argue that these responses to martial law reflect discrete citizenship regimes organized by Polish and Algerian ruling elites. The social resources afforded to Poles incorporated as workers and to Algerians integrated first as clients and then briefly as voters cultivated distinct citizen-subjects. In short, the endurance of Polish worker-citizen-subjectivity and evaporation of Algerian client- and voter-citizen-subjectivity meant that Poles retained the experience of effective citizenship
but Algerians experienced political eradication or expulsion under fiscal crisis and martial law. It is the enduring versus eliminated citizen-subjectivities – sustained through social resources that allow non-state agitators to compel state concessions – that forges incentives to intra-systemic versus anti-systemic resistance strategies. I will supplement this overarching argument with the claim that this distinction between sustained Polish and eliminated Algerian citizen-subjectivity reflects activists’ subjective assessments of the potential utility of temporarily suspended social resources, based on the objective persistence of historically effective and credibly recuperated tools to compel state concessions. Violence and non-violence express activists’ experiential-systemic evaluations of state coercion, derived from distinct historical state-citizen interactions rather than from similar immediate social suffering and political exclusion under martial law.

I should establish the salience of this thesis before detailing it in the following sections. Academic research is emerging from a period after 1989 that produced abundant theories that derived specific social outcomes (e.g., violence) from abstract, totalizing concepts like culture, dignity, democracy, or globalization. Scholars and practitioners now realize that such broad phenomena cannot explain discrepant outcomes such as violence/non-violence or elucidate concepts like agency and grievance. In response, works on institutions, subjectivity, values, and violence have turned from global theories to local explanatory logics to illuminate political processes beneath and within formal regime-types. Recent research complicates received impressions of homogeneous totalitarian policy-making and citizen subordination as against the putatively greater complexity of democratic governance. Amid research on intra-authoritarian institutional variation, Algerian violence and Polish non-violence reveal an overlooked axis of iterated ruler-dissident strategic interaction. Complicating these academic refinements, post-
authoritarian empirical political discrepancies have grown only more striking over time. Post-communist Central Europe has developed advanced capitalist-democratic systems with vibrant civil societies while the Middle East and North Africa remain autocratic, besieged by violent rebellions, or mired in fragile and halting transitions.\textsuperscript{10}

My study examines events that occurred decades ago under authoritarian regimes that have either passed away or reformed, but the divergent long-term outcomes matter beyond the non-violent and violent short-term. Algeria’s social-political violence has retained the illiberal corporatist political economy\textsuperscript{11} under a regime that holds referendums, stages uncompetitive elections, and grants amnesties while battling dwindling bands of Islamist militants. The Algerian state remains a distributive apparatus thriving on crony capitalism and trabendist networks run by bosses who control oil-economy derivative markets like import-export trades. Wary of uprisings since the consuming violence ceased in 1999, the Algerian state has gestured toward curtailing military perquisites and influence while tactically allying with the US against AQIM, the local *al-Qa’ida* affiliate. Algeria’s regime has remained structurally continuous since 1965.\textsuperscript{12} In contrast, Poland abandoned communist dictatorship in round table talks immediately succeeded by Solidarity’s permitted electoral victory. Poland has developed a bustling liberal democratic political economy, peacefully if heatedly debating issues like social inequity and the place of Catholic values in the public sphere.

Following brutal state violence against non-violent citizen mobilizations under different citizenship regimes, these disparate long-term trajectories put Algeria and Poland on opposite ends of a poignant peace-violence spectrum. Algeria has long offered eager recipients\textsuperscript{13} images, icons\textsuperscript{14}, and victims of the “supposed ubiquity of [its] violence”\textsuperscript{15}; but the state-Islamist war of
the 1990s justified Algeria’s descent into a global symbol of savagery. The apparent struggle of the secular state against Muslim militancy inspired even rigorous analysts to depict Algeria as an instance of the “theocratic impasse”\(^{16}\) between secular conservative reactionaries in power and Islamist reactionaries seeking power. Against these fatalistic tendencies, Poland’s secular, cosmopolitan civic order\(^{17}\), the legatee of celebrated shipyard strikes and charismatic modern liberators, has offered a breath of fresh air that keeps returning us to the same question:

Where is the Muslim Solidarnosc?...The ideal of pro-democracy activism arising spontaneously from the shipyards of Gdansk stands for the hope that in every society, no matter how totalitarian or repressive, there are freedom-loving people who see clearly that democracy is the solution to what ails their country. Yet such popular democracy movements are hard to come by in the contemporary Muslim world.\(^{18}\)

The “Arab uprisings” of 2011 may seem to have answered or overridden this question but wrestling with it, at least for the period in question, may prove valuable in how we interpret the revolts. The similarities and differences in the two cases justify this speculation by exposing contrasting dynamics within the authoritarian regime-type. In my explanation, the independent variable (citizenship regimes that deploy social resources to generate systemic-subjectivity) and dependent variable (Algerian violence and Polish non-violence) are connected through a critical exploration of similarities and differences that deepen and defend the puzzle’s significance and the causal importance of citizen-subjectivity in violent outcomes. A robust literature correlating participatory inclusion and decreased political violence within Arab-Muslim countries confirms my framework,\(^{19}\) but to complement the democratic-inclusive pacification thesis, I utilize cross-regional research to reveal how social resources of systemic subjectivity operate within a single regime-type – such as horizontal labor sites or vertical client networks.
An ancillary benefit of this approach is to clarify alternative or interstitial modes of
state-citizen cooperation common to authoritarian-command and liberal democratic forms. As
a prescriptive aside, transitional modes of citizen-subjectivity could break the democratic-
theocratic impasse in countries like Algeria. Indeed, recent MENA mobilizations and uprisings
have explored this possibility by working through labor, feminist, and student organizations to
create experiences of effective citizenship under, and maybe out of, authoritarian rule. The
benefits of effective citizenship in meliorating social tension may apply also to neo-liberal
political-economic arrangements, such as in contemporary Poland, in which citizens may
experience a different form of abandonment or objectification amid arbitrary market and police
forces beyond their control. In short, citizenship regimes and social resources may be variables
whose operations on systemic subjectivity under authoritarian variation might inform our
testing about multiple historical situations that have fostered social violence.

In the rest of this section, I briefly sketch the similar conditions that I detail later (§3.b)
and that permit this comparison to generate a worthy puzzle and theoretical model. A research
design to pursue this puzzle and test this explanation must “control for” other differences in the
two cases. Poland and Algeria differed in several ways often invoked to explain Poland’s peace
and Algeria’s violence. Algeria had fought a war to end its colonial subordination to France, but
Poland toiled under the yoke of the Soviet empire whose potential intervention may have
intimidated Solidarity into sustained peaceful commitments. Or perhaps Algerian Muslims and
Polish Catholics adhered to distinct sanctions concerning violence. Alternatively, the countries’
different sources of wealth nurtured distinct political economies that may have effected the
contrasting social movements. Algeria, rich in oil and natural gas, industrialized through capital-
intensive and labor-minimizing mono-cultural exports but Poland industrialized through a labor-intensive production regime. I will assess these alternative explanations below (§3.c) but now will summarize similarities in my two cases to reinforce the value of the explanandum.

Many similarities in the Polish and Algerian political economies, state institutions, and social values lead me to consider the causal effects of worker- and client-citizenship regimes on protest formation, while enriching the puzzle. Algeria and Poland had been colonized for over a century and then decimated during religious-nationalist independence struggles. Both countries rapidly industrialized via command-economic planning, including public outlays to incorporate an urbanizing citizenry, while growing dependent on foreign commercial banks and Soviet aid. Algeria and Poland developed bureaucratic police states, indenturing citizens to single-party recruitment for political, professional, or social advancement. Discrete reversals of socialist planning were made in land reform, pricing, import-export conditions, and so on in response to government crises and activist critics. In addition, the states permitted a small percentage of entrepreneurial activity in the overall socialist economy, leading to comparable reliance on the informal economy. In each case, as opposition mounted with new discipline and organization, ruling elites adjusted their citizenship regime in order to divide dissident opponents, attempting conservative mini-regime-changes roughly four years before brutal martial law was imposed.

In addition to developmental similarities, Poland and Algeria had analogous religion-state relations. Polish Catholic and Algerian Muslim institutions predated the modern state and retained either an effective veto power or restraining effect over secular sovereign prerogative. Algerian and Polish rulers negotiated and compromised with religious constituents throughout authoritarian rule and popular agitations. They also tried to “co-opt religion” by creating official
religious authorities to approve priests or imams and sanction sermons, often in state-funded religious centers and places of worship. But Polish and Algerian religious organizations retained the autonomy and popular support to mediate between secular state programs and religious citizen demands. In a sense, churches and mosques buttressed the state by competing with it for popular allegiance while soothing regime-citizen conflicts. By providing social services and refuge for faithful and secular non-state actors, churches and mosques cushioned the blows of failed government policies. Church and mosque thus bridged religion and state while insulating adherents from the regime. Finally, Polish and Algerian religionists had equally strong ties, if not divided loyalties, to religious influences outside their countries. Polish and Algerian dictators contended and bargained with large, powerful, and relatively autonomous religious institutions and movements over the terms of popular sentiment and commitment.

Poles and Algerians also had comparable ethical conceptions grounded in community obligation, private property, autonomous faith-based institutions, and distributive justice. With comparable struggles with imperial occupation and coercive centralization, Polish and Algerian activists and ordinary citizens were nationalistic, jealous of self-determination. Conservative and rural in background, they desired “traditional” education and family planning. Polish and Algerian moral revulsion at elitism, corruption, and income disparities evinced a spiritual, principled contempt for material opportunism and political obscenity that fueled growing antagonism toward ruling elites. Churches and mosques exercised ideological and cultural authority in each country to the extent that Polish communists and Algerian socialists had to demonstrate public support for the church and mosques. Polish and Algerian religious landowners’ defeated land collectivization that threatened religious endowments and urban
Catholic and Muslim activists compelled the states to expand church and mosque construction. Churches and mosques offered education, social support, spiritual counsel, and community relationships to poor adherents, constituting a virtual parallel welfare state. At the same time, Poles and Algerians pressed for access to the commons, believing that the public sphere must accommodate normative values. In Poland and Algeria, similar traditions were inseparable from public policy deliberations. Political venality, military violence, police brutality, and economic suffering prompted institutional and personal religious resistance by Poles and Algerians. Finally, despite eventual Polish non-violence and Algerian violence, Poland’s pre-martial law instability was systemically more revolutionary than Algeria’s. While denying its radical ends, Solidarity’s demands in 1980 for autonomous unions would have effectively dismantled the structure of communist rule; Algerian Islamists wanted less to change the regime than to usurp it. Minimally, the Polish uprising was as stringent and militant as Algeria’s, so a distinction in systemic threat does not explain the outcomes.

Deepening the puzzle further, peaceful Algerian and Polish dissidents suffered similar state coercion. The states had wagered that Polish unions and Algerian parties would stabilize ruling class domination by dividing the oppositions and isolating extremists, but when Solidarity and FIS dissidents further undermined, rather than bolstering, their discredited governments, increasingly invasive, efficient Polish and Algerian forces arrested, tortured, killed, and interned thousands political opponents. Polish and Algerian activists invoked centuries of colonization or partition, uprisings for national emancipation, assaults by “secular” European governments, and atrocities against their populations. Martial law compounded popular contempt for the avarice, inequality, and aggression of military-backed state socialism-cum-capitalism. Moreover,
Polish and Algerian agitators had struggled peacefully and violently for freedom or recognition for generations. Roman Catholic and Sunni Islamic doctrines or cultural mores do not explain Polish non-violence or Algerian violence, evidently; both peoples have been renowned for their traditions of militant resistance. Similarly, state retaliation at home or from abroad had not prevented radical or violent protests in the past.

Before martial law, Poles and Algerians had militated for similar conceptions of physical, juridical, and subjective security and confronted comparable attempts to deny them. The Polish peace and Algerian violence after martial law remain perplexing. As Poland’s pacific revolution still lifts the spirit, Algeria’s bloodbath still shocks the conscience: villages slaughtered, women raped, children bayoneted. Out of relatively similar social, economic, and political conditions and popular criteria of welfare and piety, Poland’s non-violent activists and Algeria’s militarist factions adopted binary modes of anti-authoritarian agitation. The variable analyses and case studies below examine these divergent campaigns for reforms, concluding that contrasting structures of effective citizenship separated Poland’s peace from Algeria’s war.

§1.b Explanation: Citizen-subjectivity ⇝ evaluation ⇝ violence/non-violence

The rest of this chapter explains Polish non-violence and Algerian violence in response to authoritarianism and martial law. First, I will summarize the claims in prose and in a narrative chart. Second, I will present the explanation’s concepts and causal pathway. Third, I will specify, given these concepts, how Poland and Algeria diverged in the causal pathway. Fourth, I will characterize this project’s constraints and ambitions with stipulations about the text. This is a relatively short and lightly documented chapter because it focuses on my argument. The broad
significance and problematic of the project are addressed in the introduction, while critical reviews of the literature emerge in discussions of the variables (chapters two and three) and historical narratives (chapters four and five).

§1.b.1 Summary of claims

My explanation for the distinct responses of Polish and Algerian activists to martial law presents a causal sequence from *citizenship regime*, or *citizen-subjectivity*, grounded in *social resources* (Ind V) through *experiential evaluation* (Int V) to *opposition strategies* (DV). These variables substantiate two propositions about political action and social agitation: citizenship regimes constitute systemic subjectivities (universal) and citizens desire systemic subjectivity (mechanism\(^{24}\)). Adding values to the variables, the argument is that Poland’s worker-citizenship regime constituted Polish subjects as potential strikers in labor-intensive production sites, a differentiated social resource that endured fiscal crisis and martial law, thus sustaining citizens’ systemic subjectivity and incentives for non-violence; but Algeria’s client-citizenship regime, in contrast, constituted Algerian subjects as clients in patronage networks, an undifferentiated social resource that evaporated under fiscal crisis and martial law, forcing Algerians to reclaim their subjectivity against state institutions. Confronting equally harsh material deprivation and state coercion, Poles retained the strike-based citizen-subjectivity that had long enabled them to compel state compromises, but Algerians’ client-citizenship dissolved, expelling them as meaningful or willful members of their polity. In sum, fiscal crisis and martial law eliminated the citizenship regime and systemic subjectivity of Algerians but sustained that of Poles, providing motives in Algeria but not in Poland to oppose state prerogative through violence.
Here is the simplified graph of my explanation, introduced in the preface and elaborated in the following section of this chapter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Interv var I</th>
<th>Interv var II</th>
<th>Dep var.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>citizenship regime ↦ social resources ↦ experiences ↦ evaluations ↦ outcomes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“citizen-subjectivity” with regime of regime V/non-V</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the cases I have studied, state formation includes provision of social resources that connect ruling classes to citizens in practical channels of communication and coercion that often parallel “formal” regime-type institutions. Reiterated use of these social resources to express demands or compel state concessions creates a regime of effective citizenship, a reliable mode of state-society interaction: claim making, problem solving, manipulative extraction. Formal citizenship has two main components, in most cases: the juridical order (symbolized by the passport) and official means of recruitment (typically political parties). Effective or practical citizenship, at the heart of this work, is not formal in a juridical or official sense, but it is also more than informal; effective or practical citizenship indicates a recognized, repetitive, and dominant pattern of exchanging or distributing social power that becomes the primary system that active individual or collective citizens deploy to pursue or achieve their goals. Because this quasi-formal system creates incentives that fundamentally orient non-state actors, situating their agency in the state through the use of specific social resources, I call this whole complex the citizenship regime, the reiterated and predictable but unofficial patterns of state-nonstate exchange that situate citizens as subjects in a political system, i.e., form systemic subjectivity. When formal citizens interact practically and repeatedly with states through a principle mechanism or process that enables their systemic will, they act as citizen-subjects. For this reason, citizen-subjectivity is an ensemble of resources and experiences – the subject-forming experience of using resources.
I will take in turn three key concepts: systemic subjectivity; subjects and subjectivities as social agents; variation in citizenship-regime components. First, sustained collective action by citizens to influence state policies can occur within (intra-) or against (anti-) the routinized, predictable, and non-injurious *political system*, including formal and informal state-citizen interactions. When citizens act within the legible, regular, effective political arrangements that constitute the process of state-formation, they enjoy systemic subjectivity – that is, they become subjects, citizens who can pursue their wants or needs effectively within the recognized political system. Again, the political system, or citizenship regime, constitutes citizens-as-subjects by providing them social resources that situates or orients their effective agency in state operations, that is, by centralizing or politicizing citizen-subjects through actionable political and social incentives. Citizens lack systemic subjectivity if they cannot pursue or achieve their ends through resources linking their willful actions to state policies, i.e., if they do not inhabit a citizenship regime that affords them the regular capacity to compel policy concessions. The authoritarian Polish regime devised a worker-based citizenship regime by concentrating and politicizing Poles in labor-intensive production facilities, such as factories, shipyards, mines, and railways. Polish worker-citizen-subjects enjoyed the state-provided social resources of the strike; labor-activism thus became the core of the Polish citizenship regime or systemic subjectivity. Poles repeatedly went on strike to protest price increases successfully as worker-citizens; they were meaningful, effective citizen-subjects if they used the strike resource. Hence, to act as willful subjects within the political system of effective citizenship they had to use the strike as a social resource; in this sense, the strike constituted effective Polish citizens. Systemic or citizen-subjects are effects of dominant political arrangements. This
does not mean a political system determines the citizens’ subjective lives – their emotional, material, aesthetic, or political makeup. It means only that a political system defines the modes of action to which it will respond. If Polish citizens wished to protest price hikes, they did so as systemic or citizen-subjects – meaning, as workers. Politically or systemically relevant Polish agents were *subjects qua workers*. But Algerians who protested as clients of entrepreneurial patrons or supporters of bureaucratic officials were systemic *subjects qua clients*. A duality appears between desires for particular items to satisfy tastes, and desires for systemic subjectivity to satisfy one’s will.²⁶

Second, we must make two distinctions of consistent relevance to social movement and protest strategies. First, we should distinguish between securing particular material items we desire and securing a desirable environment in which to state and resolve grievances. Second, we have to differentiate between securing material items or opportune environments as *things we want* from seeking a world that protects or cultivates *who we are*. If the social resource of elections has constituted me in a voter-citizenship regime that gives me systemic subjectivity as a voter, and wish to guarantee my daughter an inhabitable planet, I will act as a voter-citizen to help elect an environmentalist. If my candidate loses, the political effect on me will differ from a second scenario in which the state rescinds my right to vote or annuls the election of my candidate. If my candidate loses the election I remain a voter-citizen, a subject in a system; if I lose my right to vote I lose my status as a voter-citizen and become an object of a system that has expelled me. On this principle, I am usually able to distinguish between securing the objects I want and securing the systemic subjectivity that constitutes my meaningful membership, not to mention the promise of successfully guaranteeing my daughter a healthy future.
A difficult distinction emerges here between a subject who acts and a subjectivity that acts. We posit subjects as autonomous persons who define their desires and pursue them with a plan. In this image, subjects enjoy some capacity to detach from their desires and plans, if only tactically, to pursue others they choose. We typically revise this image when threats to the subjects become more grave; perhaps, in the example above, as I shift from losing the election to losing the right to vote, I am less capable of detaching myself from my stated desires – this is because if I lose my systemic subjectivity, I lose my meaningful personhood, rather than losing a desired object. We might say that systemic subjectivity is the necessary condition for securing other desires. As I turn from securing my desired objects to securing my systemic subjectivity, I experience a change in the nature of my security. I am now protecting myself as a subject – or, more accurately, my subjectivity is defending itself. It is crucial to erect the image of subjectivity itself acting, not only subjects acting, at the point of violence/non-violence. Denial of effective systemic willing is the circumstance where subjectivity will rear up to defend its existence, even risking the subject – thus, self-risking violence reclaims subjectivity against or outside a system.

Third, social resources that form citizenship regimes vary in their internal systemic logics and thus in the citizen-subjectivities they forge. Different citizenship regimes cultivate different political subjects with qualitative and consequential distinctions. The Polish and Algerian cases have prompted me to emphasize three variations in citizenship regimes and so the experiences of citizen-subjects. Citizenship regimes vary in social ties, political space, and regime status, variations that affect how activists cooperate, congregate, and evaluate under systemic duress. Polish worker-citizens were constituted as cooperative (horizontal labor), segmented (factory space), and differentiated (enduring) subjects; Algerians were formed as competitive (vertical
clients), seamless (public space), undifferentiated (eradicated) subjects-into-objects. I expatiate on these categories below; here, I will address differentiated and undifferentiated regimes, the central explanatory property in the independent variable of my explanation. Differentiated\(^2\) citizenship regimes do not depend on the state’s fiscal solvency and will still provide activists (the credible promise of) social resources and systemic subjectivity even under fiscal crisis or martial law. Undifferentiated citizenship regimes are parasitic on the state’s economic health and cease to provide activists social resources in hard times. Differentiated citizenship regimes endure and undifferentiated regimes expire under state crisis, retaining or eradicating systemic subjectivity and supporting/discrediting non-violence, respectively. The other intra-citizenship-regime variations determine the social ties and spatial relations of sustained collective action, and distinguish the constituencies, associations, loyalties, and expectations of Polish Solidarity and Algerian Islamists, but the endurance of social resources decides the status of systemic subjectivity and hence the probability of intra-systemic versus anti-systemic means to compel policy changes or even state reforms, all other things equal.

The final piece of the explanation expands on the concept of experience in evaluations given the correct observation that martial law eradicated both Poles’ and Algerians’ immediate subjectivity. Objectively the conditions in Poland and Algeria were similar – activists arrested, tortured, and detained indefinitely; continuation of the material deprivation that had sparked the initial uprisings; and both citizenship regimes rendered ineffective and explicitly targeted for destruction. My analytical response to this commonality is to propose that similar material and political conditions do not overwhelm distinct historical and experiential interpretations of
those conditions by citizens, and that in these “readings” of regime actions, citizens are shaped by past interactions with the state through the social resources of the citizenship regime.

First, activists responding to state coercion ask if they retain the social resources that rendered them systemic subjects. They ask why they are suffering, if the regime is just, what allies they should seek, of course, but they also ask if they still exist as citizens with a relationship to the state, as subjects who can effectively connect their willful actions to improvements in their condition by engaging the social system. Their subjectivity itself poses this question and then reacts to the situated response. Second, evaluations of subjectivity are experiential, historical, systemic – not restricted to immediate institutional opportunity or social misery. I call this the subjective interpretation of objective conditions, or experiential evaluation, an objective/subjective gap opens by the perceived availability of enduring social resources when they are held in abeyance but credibly potent. Citizens who ask if they are still subjects, in-forming their response to state coercion, answer by assessing whether their social resources still exist, either actually or immanently. Polish and Algerian dissidents were crippled, embittered, and paralyzed by the declarations of martial law, before diverging into non-violent and violent reactions. But when Poles searched their desolate political landscape in 1981 they felt they might reanimate a suspended but enduring social resource that in the past had been and in the future could be wielded against the state. Where Poles could “read” martial law as a desperate last gasp effort to suppress mass social agitation, Algerians could draw inspiration from no systemic social resources or experiences that suggested a potential to affect much less threaten ruling elites. Activist evaluations of objective social and political-economic conditions are referenda on systemic-subjectivity and refer to reiterated mobilizations of social resources.
Subjective evaluations are objective, however, referring to the material persistence of powerful elements of the citizenship regime, however apparently dismantled or weakened by the state.

Having summarized the conceptual and causal architecture of my explanation, I will now offer the declension of subjectivity deployed in my argument. People ask or embody two modal questions about their demands and citizenship status:

- Do we get what we want: what are our demands?
- Can we affect what we get: are we citizen-subjects?

Citizen-subjects inquire about their social resources, not only about satisfied tastes or desires; they ask multiple questions when evaluating their subjective status, i.e., when asking whether they still have social resources under this political-economic state? Inter alia, they ask:

- Are the social resources that made us who we are extant?
- Are the social resources that made us who we are operable?
- Are the social resources that made us who we are immanent?
- Have we been eliminated as subjects? Does our subjectivity endure?

People do not, then, ask only if they are getting their “material” desires met, nor whether ruling elites or formal institutions are just, but whether they have the elements of their subjectivity – however actionable in the moment. Again, we can also say that it is not only subjects who ask but also subjectivities that react when confronting compressed social or material conditions.

Experiential evaluation is a judgment by citizens of their effective or meaningful citizen-subjective status. This evaluation redounds to operable or immanent social resources. Thus, it is a historical or pedagogical reading of circumstances. Thus, experiential evaluation ramifies into two relations between objective and subjective variables:
Divided. Subjective evaluation of objective conditions; citizens assess immediate circumstances as historical systemic subjects embodied in the citizenship regime’s social resources.

- Objective, immediate suffering underdetermine evaluations.

Unified. Subjective evaluation of objective conditions; citizens explore potential (immanent) re-mobilization of suspended but materially enduring social resources, not free-floating, ideational artifact “life of its own”

- Objective, immanent resources determine evaluations

§1.b.2 Conceptual model

In this section I explicate the conceptual grid of the variables in the explanation, mapped here over the temporal-causal pathway:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Crisis (similar)</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>labor-citizen</td>
<td>worker</td>
<td>strike</td>
<td>resources intact</td>
<td>non-violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>social</td>
<td>cooperative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>spatial</td>
<td>segmented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>regime</td>
<td>differentiated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>client-citizen</td>
<td>client</td>
<td>switch</td>
<td>resources gone</td>
<td>violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>social</td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>spatial</td>
<td>unified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>regime</td>
<td>undifferentiated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The independent variable in my explanation is the citizenship regime formed by social resources; the intervening variable is experiential evaluation; and the dependent variable is violence/non-violence. I elaborate and defend a conventional concept of the dependent
variable in the next chapter (§2.b). I will take the independent and intervening variables in turn.30

Citizen-subjectivity: citizenship regime and social resources

One pivotal feature of any state with even minimal infrastructural or disciplinary power is the provision of citizen-held social resources, the dominant institutional means of compulsion and communication between government and non-state agents. It may seem paradoxical that a state would deliberately offer citizens means to oppose the state, but the means are reciprocal: as the Polish and Algerian cases show, the absence of quasi-formal links between state and citizen can be destabilizing, of not perilous, to the regime (C). Paradoxically, the optimal path to securing incumbency may be to ensure that citizens enjoy systemic subjectivity, that they have reliably effective social resources to compel reforms or concessions from the state and do not experience systemic expulsion.

Social resources are the tools that can be used as leverage against the state, something that can be withdrawn or withheld. In Poland the social resource was labor power, and in Algeria the power of loyalty or support. Poles could and did withdraw their labor power from the state, a direct threat to the regime, to reverse unfavorable policy decisions. Repeatedly the workers mobilized this weapon by striking or carrying out work stoppages; in 1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980 these tactics changed policies and removed high-level ruling personnel. In Algeria, citizens had weaker tools to compel ruling party elites, though if they concentrated their forces, they could create bargaining conditions on a discretionary and temporary basis, as Muslims did in trading land reform and the 1984 Family Code for Islamist assimilation to the regime. Social
resources are, then, incentive systems that create regular patterns of state-society interaction that develop a level of mutual “infrastructural power” between ruling elites and civil society or individual citizens. The continual and cumulative use of social resources between the state and citizens generates a practical regime of effective citizenship generally beneath or beside formal elements of the political regime.

Examining common-pool resources, Ostrom remarks, “To understand the processes of organizing and governing CPRs,

It is essential to distinguish between the resource system and the flow of resource units produced by the system, while still recognizing the dependence of the one on the other. Resource systems are best thought of as stock variables that are capable, under favorable conditions, of producing a maximum quantity of a flow variable without harming the stock or the resource system itself...Resource units are what individuals appropriate or use from resource systems. Resource units are typified by the tons of fish harvested from a fishing ground...The distinction between the resource as a stock and the harvest of use units as a flow is especially useful in connection with renewable resources, where it is possible to define a replenishment rate. As long as the average rate of withdrawal does not exceed the average rate of replenishment, a renewable resource is sustained over time...I call the process of withdrawing resource units from a resource system “appropriation.” Those who withdraw such units are called “appropriators”...The term I use to refer to those who arrange for the provision of a CPR is “providers.”

In these terms, social resources are the resource units that activist appropriators extract from the resource systems or citizenship regimes designed by Polish and Algerian providers. If the flow between state and citizen of the social resource is steady and replenished the regime will consolidate eventually as a resource system. My stress is on how that system will re-define its participants in the practices of that system. The discrepant ways that social resources structure citizen-subjects helps us “escape from the pluralist-corporatist dichotomy [by showing] that these categories suggest less variety in politics than citizens experience.”
In this project, then, the concept citizenship regime is caught up with the processes of state formation and ruling class consolidation. In both Poland and Algeria, and this may typify late developers, the citizenship regime became a negotiating tool that afforded providers and appropriators leeway to improvise policy through informal channels without accountability. Given the postwar conditions of Polish and Algerian citizenship formation, Tilly’s comment on revolutionary dynamics is apposite: “effects of large-scale change on conflict run through the structure of power, especially by shaping the organizational means and resources available to different contenders for power.” I interpret “organizational means and resources” as a subtle distinction between elements of an organization, as means and resources differ. The latter are, it would seem, malleable tools for adjusting policies and policymakers, inviting us to conceive of citizenship in practical terms, as the dominant mode of interaction between regime and citizen, however informal or improvised. As Thompson says, citizenship should be “defined not only by the political language of constitutions,” but also by “all of the points at which people come into contact with the state inevitably shape their citizenship. Citizens’ rights (or lack thereof) are established in the daily practices of government, when a tax collector appears at the door, when a police officer stops a car, or when a public works engineer designs a new street or water system. For a large number of citizens, contact with the state comes mainly through its social policies. Their relative status as citizens is defined when a school admits their children (or does not), when a government clinic vaccinates a child (or does not) against a disease, or when the state intervenes to stop employer abuses (or does not). In addition to defining citizenship as the multiple practical interactions of individuals and groups with the state in a given polity, I would stress that however improvised or pragmatic the interactions, states integrate citizens by structuring them as subjects, orienting them toward certain tools, spaces, discourses, associates, activities, affects, references, memories, and so on, rather than others. This idea of the citizenship regime as both structural and improvised tries
to bridge aleatory “social constructionism” and path-dependent institutionalism. In recent years structural and institutional arguments have fallen on hard times. Tilly and his co-authors endorse a “dynamic mobilization model” that recasts opportunity, mobilization, framing, and repertoires as elastic, agential, creative, and subjective processes; protest, they say, is “socially constructed” and not strategically given by contextual incentives. Likewise, Schwedler argues that the Yemeni and Jordanian states had little institutional capacity to manipulate opponents’ ideological demands. Motyl claims that because structures “promote only tendencies” they “have a probabilistic effect on concrete outcomes but not a determinative one.” These are instructive reminders to include decision, reflection, affectivity, and commitment in explaining movement outcomes or social action more broadly.

Still, the use of citizenship structures to consolidate state power by incorporating non-state actors through “productive power,” as Foucault called it, can complicate the polarity of structure/agency or causality/contingency found in some studies. The citizenship regimes I have described in Poland and Algeria channeled citizens into specific speech or action, in the absence of other alternatives, but this does not imply the absence of willful activity – indeed, I would argue, to the contrary, that citizenship regimes constitute subjects by building their allegiance through their agentive participation. It is not a contradiction to claim that subjectivity must be founded on a ban, a decision, a rule, or a prohibition – some limitation that enables axes of restrictive-productive power. In the first instance subjects belong, for example, to a class, culture, ideology, religion, ethnicity, and spatial-temporal order that motivates their action and situates their subjectivity. In a passage critical to my formulation, Burawoy introduces his idea of a “regime of production,” partly derived from research in Central Europe:
Because these apparatuses of production vary independently of production, and because production in turn varies independently of class structure, there is no one-to-one relationship between class position and class formation. In other words, the link between class in itself and class for itself depends on the lived experience in production, that is, on the organization of work and its regulation, that is, on what I call the *regime of production*. The link between class in itself and class for itself depends on the character of the regime of production. Under advanced capitalism, hegemonic regimes engender consent to capitalism by constituting workers as individuals and by coordinating their interests with those of managers and owners. This organization of consent takes place independently of the identities and consciousness forged outside work... [T]he production regimes of state socialism engender *dissent*. Like the consent organized under capitalism, dissent toward state socialism is not simply a mental orientation but is embedded in distinctive and compulsory rituals of everyday life. Moreover, under certain conditions, dissent leads workers to struggle for the transformation of state socialism toward a democratic socialism. This *negative* class consciousness produced by the state socialist regime of production provides the raw material for a *positive* class consciousness, a vision of an alternative order which can only be forged in class *mobilization*.44

This passage brings together several themes I have been emphasizing in this discussion. First, subjects form in contexts, sites, projects, and regimes that shape but do not “determine” them, creating citizens whose agency is heightened within the centralized system of incorporation. Second, even as regimes constitute their constituents “by coordinating their interest with those of managers and owners,” they do not foreclose alternative sources of consciousness but divide them from those that forge subjects as meaningful members of a system or regime. But, third, through granular mechanisms and macro-sociological dynamics, a regime that produced, in this specific case, socialist subjects in Central Europe mobilized “compulsory rituals of everyday life” that eventually led to a “positive class consciousness” culminating in Solidarity.

Shifting from a descriptive to an explanatory account, I focus on variations in citizenship regimes, which manifest diachronically or synchronically. It is key to reiterate that a citizenship regime is the *predominant*, not necessarily only, mode of state-society interaction outside of recruitment agencies. Indeed, a positive correlation could be hypothesized between an increase
in the number or efficacy of state-society resources and a decrease in social violence. Northern European social democracies constructed overlapping citizenship regimes operating through capital-state-labor bargaining and electoral processes with relatively low levels of individual or collective violence. Similarly, citizenship regimes can layer their modes of state integration and delineation to limit or calibrate the efficacy of citizen access to ruling elites, as Mamdani shows regarding decentralized despotism. It is beyond the purview of my study to explore this fully, but late-developers appear to form citizen regimes predominantly by incorporating voters, clients, or workers. The salience of this variation for explanatory analysis is its disparate effects on constituted subjects. Here, for Poland and Algeria, these effects are sociality, spatiality, and longevity of systemic subjectivity. I will specify these effects for my two cases in the following section, but here will lay out general dynamics that may apply elsewhere as well. The point to emphasize is that the form of citizen-subjectivity will determine how social actors “read” the actions of the coercive state as an impact on their systemic existence. My claim is that all three effects matter in defining opposition strategies because they form opposition subjectivities – but the central variation is the endurance of the regime, derived from its differentiation.

The first variation in citizenship regime is its social force – the qualities or patterns or identities encouraged among non-state actors and potential agitators. Specific to my cases, the distinction is between horizontal or cooperative social ties and vertical and competitive ties, with potential influence on how the social movement comes to define “the we” of the mass mobilization as a collectively reclaimed subjectivity. The second variation is its spatial effect – what physical places are available to citizens to gather for discussions, protests, negotiations, and sustained mutual visibility and audibility. In my cases this category divides into segmented
and seamless social spaces, which either permit or preclude incremental or gradual modes of self-assertion and mutual state-society recognition. The third variation within citizen regimes is whether their social resources endure state insolvency and the state of exception – what sense of continued systemic subjectivity is materially credible in citizens’ evaluations of state action. Again, I propose this as the pivotal explanatory variation in the independent variable: whether the social resources that establish the citizenship regime endure or evaporate, thus retaining or eliminating agitators’ systemic subjectivity, determines the non-violent and violent responses to state coercion, notably in the defining early weeks and months of martial law.

The intervening variable, experiential evaluation, addresses how activists see or “read” the actions of states on their effective citizenship. As I mentioned above, this category adds a “materialist” component to the idea of framing, but also an “idealist” or ideational component to the idea of opportunity structure. Moreover, I would urge that the salience of experiential or historical or subjective evaluation does not collapse into “mere” ethnographic or ideographic narratives, as opposed to reliable social explanation. Rather, the hope is to demonstrate that as we track the outcomes to their institutional-material and experiential-ideational sources in the iterated practices of the citizenship regime, we approach rather than abandon discretionary and explanatory variables. At the risk of repetition, then, experiential evaluation suggests that as social actors responding to or generating policy changes, we begin not only with desires and expectations and tastes and preferences, but also with subjectivities that are the sine qua non of the very relevance of advocating for these various demands or expressing our grievances. In the evolution of dissident strategies under martial law or other forms of coercion this category is critical because activists’ primary motivation or orientation concerns the protection of their
very existence. In the moment of existential threats, dissidents evaluate state actions as effects on their systemic subjectivity – that is, they evaluate the citizenship regime. I have claimed that the *endurance or eradication* of effective citizenship is the explanatory variable behind violence and non-violence, but also recognized that this endurance or eradication of citizenship regimes is, by necessity, a matter of perception, a judgment or evaluation that does not simply express or translate objective conditions. So I wish to address briefly the viability of this intervening variable in claiming particularly that Polish activists perceived themselves as effective citizens as the state arrested their leaders and appeared to eradicate the systemic relevance of Solidarity.

One of the problems in deploying evaluation as a mediating or intervening variable with a defining effect on the outcomes is that it falls under the rubric of consciousness or meaning, often seen as problematic in social explanation and reliable political knowledge. My approach begins with a distinction that deliberately challenges my argument. I do *not* want to claim only that when subjects in Poland and Algeria took a hard look at their immediate situation Poles still felt like members of a citizenship regime and Algerians did not. In that case, the problem of evaluation would dissolve under proper anthropological techniques; we could just ask Poles and Algerians whether they experienced martial law as radically dehumanizing. I do say that the sense of expulsion differed between Solidarity members and Islamists, but also I want to attribute this difference to the subjectivities of workers and clients. As workers, Poles were objectively still members of worker-citizenship, even if they did not subjectively experience this efficacy at a given moment. People experience at a deeper level of identity and activity the endurance or eradication of their systemic subjectivity; it is not a cognitive operation or explicit
discussion one has with oneself. This idea makes evaluation harder to deploy than “thinking” or “reflexivity” because it links the experiential aspect to subjectivity.

An analogy for subjectivity’s operating at the level of experience may help. It is akin to being kidnapped or detained in a war-torn country and “knowing” that one’s passport provides immanent protection, one’s nationality grants immunity, although in the moment one cannot establish this. I had this experience while detained in Egypt, Algeria, Uganda, and Turkey. I had no objective way to know that I was safe but I believed I was and acted on that belief given my subjective experience of my citizenship regime of national membership and global prerogative. It is also possible that I was wrong, that my subjective evaluation was irrelevant to my objective condition and just some projection into the present of past experience. Experiential evaluations of the endurance of citizenship regimes operate this way, as a sort of pivot between historical knowledge and current uncertainty. First, the regime structures me as a subject who evaluates my present conditions given my recent experiences of systemic subjectivity. Second, evaluation must be based on the continuous visibility, the material signs, of social resources that defined those past experiences, even as they remain inoperable or repressed. That is, the passport must be in my pocket and my consulate functioning in the capital, just as the factories and the state’s vulnerability to withdrawn labor power must persist in order to sustain the confidence that immediate conditions have not reduced workers from subjects to objects of the social system.

Nonetheless, evaluation is especially hard to include in an explanation because it holds this connotation of awareness, consciousness, meaning, and experience that may not be visible. Turner provides helpful commentary here:
There is, of course, no way we can know, except perhaps through an empathetic leap, how [social] symbols are appreciated within the conscious life of another individual. We can learn how an individual uses the symbols in his portrayal of reality. This distinction is important. We can know, in other words, the rhetoric of symbols, but we cannot know, except hypothetically, how symbols are experienced.\(^46\)

This suggests that we cannot directly access the experiences, but can read the evaluations that include them in rhetorical fields or symbolic schemata. Note the “common scientific dilemma [that] when some of an explanation’s premises are unobservable, it is impossible to provide \textit{direct} evidence that \textit{all} of them are suitable representations of the situation about which the explanation is directed.”\(^47\) In this sense, I treat experiential evaluation roughly as Fields treats ideology, as an objective discursive manifestation of material inequality and dispossession:

Such is the weight of things that \textit{must be true ideologically} that no amount of experimental observation can disprove them...Ideology is best understood as the descriptive vocabulary of day-to-day existence, through which people make rough sense of the social reality that they live and create every day. It is the language of consciousness that suits the particular way in which people deal with their fellows. It is the interpretation in thought of the social relations through which they constantly create and recreate their collective being, in all the varied forms their collective being may assume: family, clan, tribe, nation, class, party, business enterprise, church, army, club...As such, \textit{ideologies are not delusions but real, as real as the social relations for which they stand}...Ideologies do not need to be plausible, let alone persuasive, to outsiders. They do their job when they help insiders make sense of the things they do and see – ritually, repetitively – on a daily basis.\(^48\)

Fields emphasizes a key aspect of my project and this variable, that people cannot leap away from their activities and identities in their ideas: “Ideology is a distillate of experience.”\(^49\)

Does this observation evade by re-describing the problem of measurement; what does it mean to treat evaluation as ideology in Fields’s sense? I suspect we can work from the co-extension of subjective experience and objective conditions to justify interpreting evaluation as a form of structural expression. To be more precise, we can test for the reflection of objectively available social resources in subjective responses to social duress. This may allow social explanation to
include objective and subjective characteristics of self-sacrifice or self-endangerment without compromising causal analyses. “Although the manufacture of things is also the manufacture of relations,” as Burawoy says, “it is also the manufacture of the experience of those relations.”

Minimally it would seem that continuous patterns in thinking, acting, and perceiving avail us of some capacity to incorporate experience and subjectivity into social explanation.

§1.b.3 Causal model

In this section I track the variables of my explanation through the causal pathway and describe the salient effects in Poland and Algeria of variations in the citizenship-regimes on systemic subjectivity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Evaluation I</th>
<th>Subjectivity</th>
<th>Resources/</th>
<th>Evaluation II</th>
<th>Subjectivity</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Similar</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Evaluation I</td>
<td>Subjectivity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resources/</td>
<td>Evaluation II</td>
<td>Subjectivity</td>
<td>Decision</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cases

Poland
- **strike**
- worker ✓
- worker ✓
- extant
- immanent
- Peace

Algeria (-1989)
- **switch patron**
- client ✓
- client ×
- eliminated
- Violence

Algeria (1989-)
- **vote**
- voter ✓
- voter ×
- eliminated

It remains to draw the variables conceptualized in the previous section into the causal-temporal pathway of my explanation. I have already given my explanation in a few forms to get clear about its fundamental mechanism and variables, so I will not repeat or belabor the overall argument for the centrality of citizenship regimes and social resources in the puzzling outcomes in Poland and Algeria. Here I wish only to specify the discrete effects of worker-citizenship and
client-citizenship as they shape these outcomes by constructing different subjectivities. I depict the three variations in citizenship regimes that I have conceptualized, culminating in the one I identify as the causal variable in violent or non-violent strategies. I should emphasize that these are all potentially primary explanatory variables, so it is of some consequence to include in this section discretionary assessments as to causal effect on the outcomes.

§1.b.3.a Social resources and citizen-subjects

The citizenship regimes of authoritarian Poland and Algeria differed in social structures, what might be called their sociological subjectivity. Worker-citizenship fostered horizontal and cooperative social ties by creating a mass working class based in complementary factories, shipyards, and civic infrastructure. This countrywide working class experienced state policies in similar ways and as an increasingly conscious singular class, especially under the pressure of repeated state efforts to manipulate commodity prices and effective wages to avoid economic restructuring. Signs of this social reciprocity recur throughout the history of modern Polish class activism, notably in the immediate responsiveness across areas and regions of state investment and social production of workers connected not personally but in producing worker-citizens. Under tyrannical prerogative and martial law, Poles mobilized as worker-citizens collectivized as a self-conscious, mutually identified class horizontally linked by a unified subjective experience.

Algeria’s client-citizenship created vertical and competitive social ties, linking individuals or groups to the state via exclusionary channels, encouraging social antagonism. In the absence of a large-scale working class, achieved through capital-intensive monoculture extraction and oil-receipt distribution, Algerians were integrated into the state through discretionary rewards offered by official, ministerial, or crony-capitalist state-embedded entrepreneurs. The Algerians
became discrepantly situated and striated state clients, whom the military government briefly re-inscribed as voters in doomed elections. Under duress, the Islamists were able to coordinate a temporary umbrella opposition organization. This horizontal versus vertical direction of social resources was a significant distinction throughout the histories and seems to explain modes of activist social ties but not the strategies they adopted.

The regimes differed as well in spatial subjectivity. Worker-citizens were constituted in production sites that gathered laborers in permanent places that enabled and represented their shared experience. There is a strong confluence in the actions and spaces of worker-citizenship that emerged in using their social resource, strikes. Factories and shipyards provided endemic places of protest, such that just by not appearing there one expressed a political stance. The widespread feeling about the factories, especially in accounts of clashes between workers and various state security personnel, is that they belong legitimately to class members, almost as an element of the social contract that founds the citizenship regime. At the first sign of agitation, the factories themselves became not only secure fortresses for workers, but also weapons. During a strike, factories inverted radically, from places at the bottom end of a hierarchy from the state’s party-union officials to regional and factory level management to places the state has to infiltrate, creating an instant sense of illegitimate political-normative violation. In the Gdansk negotiations of 1980 this spatialized politics is clear, but ran in two directions, perfectly exemplifying citizenship regime dialectics. Factories were the provenance and site of opposition politics but also a physical place state representatives had to visit and be received. Workers had increasingly formed mini-states that would have been impossible without this established and sanctioned and indispensable spatial resource.
But Algerians lacked any sanctioned or informal space that could be a secure material or symbolic site of identification or resistance. Algerians existed in seamless public spaces in which opposition activities instantly challenged the state’s authority over the public sphere. Whereas the segmented social spaces of Poland’s population centers allowed workers to gather and even protest without a direct symbolic confrontation with the state, Algerians lacked any similarly consecrated space of visibility in which to create ambiguous signs of intra-systemic mobilization. Algerian client-citizens could not protest, as in 1988, without communicating a zero-sum contest over the meaning and possession of public areas. As a result, the mosque and other religious sites became this political space. Even as this location favored Islamist activists, it retained a sense of challenging or usurping state sovereignty, as the FLN and constitution claimed Islamic credentials. Here a parallel in Polish and Algerian state ideologies brings out this contrast more sharply. Just as the Polish communists claimed to represent the working class in official unions, the Algerian socialists claimed to represent Muslim values in official mosques. But this is also an asymmetry; Polish production sites were the center of the informal regime of worker-integration, whereas Algerian mosques represented the lack of effective citizenship, a kind of fallback position that merely relocated state-citizen disputes over political space. This distinction between Polish and Algerian political spaces is, again, an example, mechanism, and artifact of worker- versus client-citizenship regime, but not the causal variation of the outcomes.

Finally, worker- and citizen-subjectivity differ in regime status, meaning the endurance or eradication of citizen-subjectivity under fiscal crisis or martial law. Because workers and work were critical to the survival of the Polish regime, the working class had correspondingly greater
power in forcing state responsiveness to popular grievances than Algerians whose client status depended on top-down material distribution. Because of its dependence on labor, the Polish state created a differentiated citizenship regime, meaning that the social resources of worker-citizens were independent of the state’s financial status and even coercive exertions. Algeria’s client-citizenship regime was undifferentiated – the fate of the state’s coffers directly decided that of ordinary and activist Algerians’ meaningful political existence. It is pivotal that both citizenship regimes rooted the destinies of their oppositions in the state, creating reciprocal identifications that bound even the radical opposition strategies to previous state decisions.

§1.b.3.b Experiential evaluation

This central variation becomes clearer still if the causal pathway is elaborated. As one can see in the basic chart above, the emergence of Solidarity and FIS/GIA occurred through two stages, which is typical of widespread mobilizations to demand changes to existing citizenship regimes. First, each state experienced crippling fiscal crises that compelled ruling elites to retrench and dissidents to protest. Here citizens made a first evaluation of how the state responded to their grievances. This first evaluation concerns both the restoration of desired material goods and the legitimacy of the governors. In this first evaluation, dissidents criticize, first, policies as undesirable and, second, policy-makers as unsustainable or corrupt; it is a moment of public moralization and consolidation of dissent. A second evaluation occurs in the wake of the state’s declaration of martial law. In this evaluation dissidents ask whether they remain willful subjects or, better still, they respond as citizen-subjectivities to the state’s attack. This marks the trajectory from citizens’ evaluating provisions and ruling elites in light of popular, itemized, material and ethical desires to evaluating their own subjective existences.
based on a reading of enduring or eradicated social resources. In this moment of the second evaluation, Poles and Algerians read their social resources accurately and objectively, given the material continuity of their means of effective citizenship for decades.

Trouillot gets at this concept of experiential evaluation incisively:

Workers work much more often than they strike, but the capacity to strike is never fully removed from the condition of workers. In other words, peoples are not always subjects constantly confronting history as some academics would wish, but the capacity upon which they act to become subjects is always part of their condition. This subjective capacity ensures confusion because it makes human beings doubly historical or, more properly, fully historical. It engages them simultaneously in the socio-historical process and in narrative constructions about that process.\textsuperscript{52}

This second evaluation of systemic subjectivity, entailing “perceived opportunity”\textsuperscript{53}, differed in Poland from Algeria because the strike option – the social resource that established effective citizenship for workers for thirty years – endured fiscal crisis. Even as Poles resolved that they were suffering both material deprivation and corrupt rule in the first evaluation, in their second evaluation of their social resources they remained strong. The “capacity to strike [was] never fully removed,” as Trouillot says, and thus the fundamental sense of workers and others in the KOR or the Church in and surrounding their movement as willful subjects remained and encouraged the sense that the state, and not they, was imperiled. Martial law looked entirely different to Algerian dissidents – the final blow to their meaningful, relevant place in the polity and the final consolidation of unmediated state power. Their temporary experience of differentiated voter-citizenship, now revoked after an effortful and successful campaign, returned them to the undifferentiated social resources of the client. Martial law expelled Algerians altogether from meaningful political membership – cast them out as systemic objects that could assert political subjectivity only in violent actions to obstruct state sovereignty.
§1.b.3.c Logic and evidence

The model’s logic applies citizens’ observed need to experience subjective willfulness in improving their lives by satisfying desires and resolving grievances. Existing political movements or social agitations demand effective regime responses to protest actions, mainly in the form of systemic subjectivity. If they are refused a citizen-regime that affords non-state activists social resources, they will re-direct their demand for subjectivity outside the given political system. In short, the fundamental ontology of this project maintains that a will-to-subjectivity drives social agitators first to act intra-systemically, but if need be anti-systemically, to impose constraints on state opponents. At least among highly motivated political dissidents, subjectivity will out, as it were, one way or another, to compel state concessions or to disrupt sovereign operations.

This logic connects the structural classifications above of citizenship regimes to practical strategic outcomes – to why Poland’s worker-citizenship and Algeria’s client- and subsequently voter-citizenship explain non-violent and violent strategies under cruel state retrenchment and repression. The materially viable anticipation of the resuscitated social resources of a worker-citizen-regime avoided incentives to anti-systemic violence among Solidarity activists while the comprehensive destruction of all semblances of once and future systemic subjectivity confined Algerian-activist disruptions of the state to anti-systemic (or non-systemic) resistance. To state the hypothesis of the model as modestly as it is intended, as long as an opposition is motivated to assert its subjectivity, as most sustained collective protest actions are, the likelihood of intra-systemic strategies like non-violence increases in direct relation to the provision of immanently or immediately effective social resources. Two analytical challenges to this explanatory model
have surfaced, one about the relative statuses of subjective and objective aspects of the theory and the other concerning evidence and inference.

The claim that experiential evaluations of subjective standing explain why equally harsh state violence produced distinct strategic responses seems empirically justified and analytically necessary. Poles made ambivalent but consistent statements to the effect that martial law had shown the success and promise of Solidarity even as it appeared decimated and dormant. Such declarations, often penned in jail, found eventual confirmation in resurgent strikes to impede state planning and compel concessions throughout the 1980s. In contrast, the parallel efforts of non-violent Algerians activists to negotiate with the state and of violent dissidents to destroy it constituted a sort of test, begun in 1992, of the generals’ relative responses to anti-systemic and intra-systemic approaches, confirming the effective systemic expulsion of state opponents. Thus, empirically despite similar social suffering and political exclusion, the credible restoration of the Polish worker-citizenship regime sustained incentives to non-violent opposition but the explicit repudiation of non-state agency in created incentives to anti-systemic re-subjectivization among Algerian agitators. To put it another way, Polish dissidents had sufficient incentives to wait-and-see if their labor power might be re-weaponized after the early frenzy of the state of exception, while Algerians learned with increasing clarity that state repression would intensify directly in correspondence with continue protest actions. Indeed, against several doubtful alternative hypotheses (§3.c), it seems that distinct subjective evaluations of similar objective conditions were, at the very least, critical contributors to activists’ decisions under martial law.
Analytically, the relative status of objective and subjective inputs to opposition tactics or strategies can be complicated and enriched with a simplified chart derived from the one above. The theoretical argument can be charted as a temporal flow to raise one of the analytical issues that intrigues me and motivates this project:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-marital law (T)</th>
<th>Martial law (T')</th>
<th>Evaluations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland:</td>
<td>worker-citizens</td>
<td>suffering/exclusion</td>
<td>immanent resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria:</td>
<td>client/voter-citizens</td>
<td>suffering/exclusion</td>
<td>eradicated resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The claim that experiential evaluations of the potential to recuperate previous citizen-regime-based social resources when they are visible but incapacitated entails that political activists at time $T'$ are still defined by their experiences at time $T$, to the extent that the latter override the former. That is, Poles suffering and excluded under martial law at time $T'$ were so profoundly shaped by their pre-martial subjective experiences at time $T$ that their evaluations of the state of emergency seem to prefer past to present conditions. Put another way, in rather stark terms analytically, there would appear to be simply no rational reason for a Pole at time $T'$ to believe in the relevance of his experience in the previous time $T$ as against his objective assessment of his actual condition at time $T'$. This is why I have preferred the “thick” concept of subjectivity as the agent of social agitation rather than the “thin” concept of the “rational actor”.

But this then raises the grave challenge to my evidentiary inferences in seeming to read back from the effects to the causes. The objection here could be that I appear to be translating agents’ decisions into causes, that is, asserting that what they decided to do is what they were caused to decide by available resources. A harsh way to phrase this is that I seem to be telling stories about non-violent Poles calculating that they might still have options based on past experiences and violent Algerians calculating otherwise, and for some reason abruptly calling
this a causal explanation. Have I not assumed Poles must have sensed intra-systemic potential precisely because they sustained non-violence? In short, how do the concepts and research design permit confirmation/falsification, minimally for a test of the link between non-violence and the perception of immanent social resources? While I am not confident that I can dismiss this objection persuasively, my replies are several. First, this is a dilemma for all “functionalist” explanations, however irksome especially to social movements’ theorists deriving aggression from the absence of structural opportunities. It is possible, if not a wholly satisfactory retort, that we must consider this problem of falsificationism a standing impasse for explanations of protest strategies. Another way of saying this is that until we have demonstrable proof that a theory of social violence that can be dispositionally falsifiable is available, this critique loses some credibility for the simple reason that it may be demanding what cannot be provided. Second, while it may seem evasive, I have tried to combine a critical review of the literature to establish more or less likely contributors to the non-violence and violence in Poland and Algeria, rather than the final causal provenance of all opposition strategies. This is why I have “over-structured” the research design and model, not as a gesture of positivist piety but to examine rather than presume the limitations and possibilities of such explanations. As I noted in the introduction, only a rigorous act of faith can expose its insubstantiality; that is, only by trying to “explain” violence carefully can we open up the broader possibility that it cannot be done satisfactorily. On this argument, it may simply be one answer to that question to examine such a work only to accuse it of this very failure. Apart from these perhaps programmatic rejoinders, third, I do feel anxious that I may appear to be saying that how dissidents acted is how they had to act, since this would be circular to a fault. I do not wish to read back from how Poles and
Algerians reacted to martial law to impose their perceptions, yet I understand how my argument might appear to do just that. I have tried to avoid this problem by assessing the literature, providing lengthy narratives that expose the organizing power of citizenship regimes, and reporting actors’ impressions from the period. I have done this exactly because of the drawbacks of presuming that what activists used in their struggles speaks directly to what was available for use. First, as I will try to show in the next chapter (§2.d, §2.e), there is rarely if ever a direct correspondence between what we believe is available and what is “objectively” available. Second, often our actions are geared to create new social recourses, rather than simply generated by already-existing resources. These are the objections that spurred me to imagine teasing out an explanation of political violence by conceiving of activists, initially in direct response to them in the Middle East, as conducting what might be called structured experiments in subjectivity. By seeing activists in the throes of their own practical testing and falsifying hypotheses, we may infer a synthesis between social movement and explanation in promoting practical over positivist causality.

§1.c Stipulations

One burden of my project is to assess the causal weight of variables in explaining the outcomes in the two cases. To clarify the concepts and theories of violence in the dependent variable and theoretical model, chapter two discusses the relevance in my historical narratives of a conventional definition of violence. Analyses of the concepts, subjects, objects, and evaluations of violence supplement the project’s designation of violence and non-violence as the differential outcomes in Poland and Algeria. To examine or test potential independent variables, chapter two analyses alternative social models often adduced to explain social peace
of violence, either in Poland and Algeria or in general. Potential explanatory factors outside my model of citizen-subjectivity are influential and plausible and thus merit separate, detailed consideration. Divergent citizenship structures are not the only differences in authoritarian regimes that might explain various dissident responses to martial law; so it is pivotal to address significant differences that parallel, and could effect, Polish peace and Algerian violence. These alternative variables include: production-accumulation-developmental “deepening” shaped by contrasting access to state-monopoly oil-revenues; ethical commitments rooted in Catholic and Muslim values; state sovereignty given distinct imperial legacies, especially disproportionate Soviet intimidation; and tactical parameters enforced by cosmopolitan sensibilities or liberal-democratic civil commitments. Such economic, religious, political, and ideological variables, often invoked to explain social protest decisions, are compelling and discussed at some length.

To isolate and compare these candidate tributaries to Poland’s “self-limiting revolution” and Algeria’s “civil war,” the chapter on other variables and accounts first presents similarities in the two cases. Indicating commonalities does more than simply remove items from the causal pathway; it also informs our sense of those removed items. Knowing authoritarianism proves a poor predictor of the Polish/Algerian trajectories encourages us not to trivialize the regime-type but to revisit and refine our perception of its internal configurations. In this vein, a stand-alone assessment of convergent and divergent variables provides space for the historical-analytical texture my project supports. First, by comparing diverse factors, including similarities that manifestly do not explain disparate outcomes, we can abrade the hard edge of variable-analytical model building. Rather than rule out “religious ethics” as causally irrelevant because Polish-Catholics and Algerian-Muslims have been equally militant in past uprisings, we welcome
thinking about immanent Catholic and Muslim convictions that may vary over time in discrete contexts such as the Cold War. Similarly, if we impeach the reasonably appealing postulate that external domination pacified Poles but not Algerians, this difference in context may contribute to, for instance, theories of imperial versus hegemonic coercion and resistance.

*Second*, delineating similar and different variables in comparative ethnography can raise questions, propose hypotheses, counter received wisdom, or animate counterfactuals in ways single-case or regional studies cannot. Poland scholars debate whether workers or intellectuals predominated in defining Solidarity, a controversy absent from Algeria studies. Algeria scholars instead debate the causal force of oil versus Islam in discouraging a moderate civil society. But comparative variable analysis may propose background conditions for these distinct debates to arise and dominate Polish and Algerian academic discourses that would not otherwise arise. A political economist or social historian working on Algeria might ask his Polish counterpart how the strike option shaped dissident reformist gradualism; but Poland scholars stress ideational contests among workers, academics, professionals, and religionists to explain Solidarity’s non-violence, often without considering that the material position of strikers might frame the ideal potential of cross-class solidarity. Inversely, Algeria specialists rarely ponder the absence of labor-intensive production or forward and backward economic linkages in explaining Islamist violence. Chapter two seeks, then, to yield the theoretical model inferred from the case studies by arguing that similarities in modern Polish and Algerian politics inflect dissident movements and warrant the puzzle; and that notable differences between Polish and Algerian religiosity, economic resources, and sovereignty do not explain the Solidarity and Islamist uprisings.
A second burden of my project concerns method. As these remarks on variable analysis intimate, and as chapter two clarifies, the findings of a small-N, process-traced, Mill’s-method comparative study are limited in scope and certainty. More suggestive than conclusive or more probing than probative, this research design proffers only tentative causal inferences, even as it meticulously “controls for variables” or identifies initial and ceteris paribus conditions. No two-N comparison can produce a dispositive or general theory of institutional structure and protest decisions. Indeed, my agenda is not to conjure up a universal theory of collective protest or strategic choice but to provide a persuasive qualitative account of dissidence under Polish and Algerian authoritarianism. Rigorous arguments, logical interpretations, and empirical evidence are paramount, to be sure; even relatively “humanist” social science must meet standards of reliable knowledge. But my goal is to discern and explicate, in a qualitative research design, the intricate, incremental processes of protest rationales, including non-quantifiable, intercalated effects of immanent social resources on dissident decisions.

With this qualitative caution, I have examined historical, sociological, political-scientific, anthropological, and literary sources, as well as memoirs, interviews, and eyewitness accounts. In addition, I have incorporated, albeit minimally, interviews that inspired my project, with this apologia. Between 1986 and 1992 I did fieldwork, often residential, in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Yemen, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Turkey, Syria, France, England, Austria, and Poland. I conducted formal interviews with militant, peaceful, secular, and religious Muslims in Arabic, French, English, and even Spanish; but spoke with far fewer Poles and with them in English. I expect the much more available translations of Polish memoirs, letters, and interviews compensate for this imbalance. Also in the interest of
suasion, the project is structured to avoid a typical pitfall of qualitative research: evading criteria of falsification by conflating evidence and advocacy. While natural scientific procedures are not apposite here, obviating “hard” positivist claims, I believe my analytical slalom from model to variables to narratives offers reasonable grounds for assent or refutation.

But rather than just minimizing the drawbacks of this approach, I would like to affirm its benefits. Narrative analyses of the subjectivities and evaluations that determine the strategies of social agitations\(^54\) can select out likely explanatory factors in causal pathways while texturing the cases’ common variables, as I have discussed. But, in addition, tracing social movement and state agencies, resources, perceptions, and interactions can detect subtle processes of political subject-formation that may supplement larger-N research projects. My approach does not contest quantitative or statistical studies of collective action outcomes, then, but provides parallel accounts of the “mediating political and ideological apparatuses of production”\(^55\) that correlative discoveries or relatively abstract variable coding may overlook. For example, Poland’s Solidarity and Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front may both be considered social movements that burst on the national political scene abruptly after achieving cross-class, multi-sector alliances; articulating cohesive, popular, radical positions; and forming organized, deliberative, and tenacious organizations. Roughly four years separated the absence and then dominance of Solidarity (1976-1980) and FIS (1988-1992) as they arose under the ambivalently repressive and reforming apparatuses of authoritarian rule. Only in the mid-1970s did Polish activists overcome “social division...among dissidents; [until then], there was little contact between dissidents...from various social classes, for instance, between the intelligentsia and the workers and the peasants.”\(^56\) Similarly, FIS thrived on “the ability of its leaders to draw several
trends of thought and activism together under [the] single, mobilizing, populist umbrella...of a new vision of Islamist social and political morality.” Assuming the necessity of comparative explanation, one could code these as similarities or as differences, among which the centrality of religious activism, institutional space, and role of the intellectuals are but a few. Qualitative and quantitative approaches optimally could complement each other here, perhaps teasing out macro patterns in a large number of cases and then providing micro-foundations of patterns in comparative studies of sub-set cases. Reconciling contrasting methods is not, of course, a way to insulate either from criteria of falsification. A statistical result showing that labor- and client-citizenship regimes do not correlate with peaceful and violent tactical choices would trouble my qualitative research findings and force a re-examination of variables.

Having introduced the project’s analytical architecture, notably its methodological and conceptual commitments, I should say that its unfolding reflects both its ambition and modesty. Chapters three, four, and five are meant to work as the empirical core of the project in concert or conversation with the analyses of dehumanization, subjectivity, violence, citizenship in the introduction, and chapters one and two. That is, the empirical puzzle and explanatory model – bolstered by conceptual analyses – are the center in this thesis. As to its ambition or success, I hope the arguments are persuasive or at least provocative in linking opposition strategies to citizen-subjectivity and deriving lessons from this derivation about the dilemmas and promise of social explanation. I hope to have clarified the puzzle if I have not solved it, as it can be as good to sharpen a problem as to eliminate it.
CHAPTER TWO

Questions of Violence

[Placing] “adaptation” in the foreground...one mistakes the essence of life, its will to power; overlooks the essential pre-eminence of the spontaneous, attacking, infringing, reinterpreting, reordering, and formative forces, upon whose effect the “adaptation” first follows; [and] denies the lordly role of the highest functionaries in the organism itself, in which the will of life appears active and form-giving.

Friedrich Nietzsche

§2.a  Producing violence

This chapter supplements the puzzle and model of this project by analyzing its principal concept and dependent variable: violence. After developing the concept(s) of violence (§2.b) broached in the introduction, this chapter will address three analytical-empirical referents of social violence: its subjects, objects, and evaluations. For simplicity, violence will refer to the dependent variable violence/non-violence. Each concept advances our awareness of the elements and dynamics of violence vis-à-vis the puzzle. The insights and oversights of these concepts cumulatively build the conceptual apparatus of my arguments. In other words, my explanation reflects a progression in which each concept – subject, object, and evaluation – resolves an analytical problem only to raise another to be resolved. This progression from subject to object to evaluation is heuristic, not theoretic; it is a lexical ordering of insights arranged in the logical steps that have informed my thinking, not a statement about how subjects, objects, and evaluations interact as a rule. Finally, while sequentially doubting regnant convictions or impressions about social violence as unpersuasive or infeasible, these concepts
do not replace one another but converge, revised or refined, in my explanation of violence/non-violence.

*Subjects of violence* (§2.c) stresses that decisions to use physical force are contextual, rational, and affective – at the risk of stressing immediate over historical conditions of subject-formation. *Objects of violence* (§2.d), too, expediently emphasizes present suffering as a trigger to violence but helpfully parses biological and social extinction, a dichotomy that clarifies the gap between subjective evaluations and objective conditions. The risks here are in prioritizing extreme situations of biological life and organic theories of unreflective violence. *Evaluations of violence* (§2.e), in contrast, inserts historical, experiential, and cognitive mediations of biological and social, or objective and subjective, “dehumanization” processes. Strategic decisions about perceived injustice express the cumulative perceptions of reflective subjects constituted by past events. This view underwrites my view that violence expresses citizen-subjectivity, how subjects evaluate the actual or potential political salience of their social resources given their historical experience. Here the risk is in privileging ideational frames by excluding the material bases of actor assessments – in short, over-correcting by moving from objective to exclusively subjective interpretations. *Subjects, objects, and evaluations* of violence braid together the crucibles of systemic subjectivity, comprising experiential evaluations of material social resources.

These three concepts, then, present the elements of situated political agents prominent in my case studies – reflective-affective persons who evaluate objective dehumanization as experientially constituted citizens whose systemic efficacy is defined by the enduring (including immanent) public power of historically deployed social resources. The analyses in the following sections provide a conceptual vocabulary for my research finding that tactical choices of peace
or violence express subjects’ historical appraisals of their extant social resources – i.e., of their status as materially significant, effective citizens. More forcibly stated, dissent expresses more than ideological rejections of offensive circumstances or calculating assessments of “outside” events from “inside” subjects’ personal sensibility, private perception, or collective ethics. They express the material, ideational, historical substance of subjectivity itself, in ways susceptible to conditional explanation. Paths to peace or violence reflect not detached voices of subjects but attached valences of subjectivities – not only what people want from a system, but who they are through that system. As violence is often conceived and explained as an attack on a system from without, not emergent from within, I will explore the concept of violence first and then its formative elements: subjects, objects, and evaluation.

§2.b Concepts of Violence

My thesis seeks to explain the emergence of violent and non-violent activist responses to authoritarian coercion. Some qualifications about this dependent variable might be helpful at this point. As I mentioned earlier, this work is not focused on questions of political ethics and social theory, but does closely consider certain philosophical features of empirical comparative explanation. To assay analytical rigor in tracing how citizenship regimes shape the evaluations that forge opposition strategies, I focus on those variables while recognizing their complexities. This need entails replying to conceptual or explanatory objections from outside the parameters of the project. One tactical reply is to create a research design that brackets difficulties that cannot be managed without undue digression. For example, to concentrate my work on certain
institutional dynamics, I study cases of conventionally conceived violence and peace to bracket endless disputes about violence *per se*. Still, it is apposite to address concepts of violence/non-violence that complement and inform my explanatory model. Remarks in this section are meant to bridge my review of the dehumanization thesis (§I) and the elaboration of its salience in my project in this chapter (§2.c, §2.d, §2.e) by sharpening the concepts in the puzzle and theory.

Violence is a tenuous concept and outcome because its very presence and absence are contested conceptually; violence presents *measurement and existential problems*. Relative to war, inflation, migration, or climate change, violence creates especially intractable conceptual tensions due to its ontological status. All concepts are problematic, so I do not wish to press its distinct features beyond proposing that violence is one of those unusual concepts that cannot even heuristically hold in abeyance its ontological status because it is defined in and through that status. Before we can value or measure violence, we must posit a tendentious *analytical concept* of it. There is a related, perhaps unique, paradox – the concept of violence *necessarily* contains a cause-and-effect relationship that *conflicts* cause and effect in describing violence but must *separate cause and effect* in explaining it. The descriptive conflation and explanatory separation of violence threatens to undermine the very idea of a concept of violence. Because my project explores phenomena coded violent/non-violent, it engage this paradox, which bears on critiques of conventional definitions and explanations of violence, power, and subjectivity.

Consider the conventional concept of violence: intended physical harm due to a clash of discrete entities. If we *define* violence as “*X injures Y,*” we posit a cause-effect relationship as our *concept* of violence; *X causes injury to Y*. The embedded causal claim may seem confusing as to whether “*X injures Y*” is a *concept* (violence is the name for “*X injures Y*”), an *observation*
("X injures Y" happened), or a theory (in general "X injures Y"). With no general causal claim relating X and Y, we may assume "X injures Y" is a concept that does not smuggle in a theory. As the most straightforward, intuitive definition of violence, "X injures Y" offers a good baseline for grasping the concept. Without getting too bogged down we may begin by assigning the location and mechanism of the violence in "X injures Y." It seems obvious that the action that resulted in injury is the violence, rather than the injury. We would certainly not conceptualize violence as any injury to Y, but rather as one resulting from a certain kind of action. That would imply at least a priority placed on the action itself, indifferent to the injury, viz. any action “that would inflict physical pain or injury on others, if they happen to be in the path of the action in question.” This caveat registers unless we wish to exclude from violence coercive threats or potentially harmful actions that cause no physical injury. This is not a trivial ethical exercise in weighing intended versus actual consequences – “was it violent when the bomb I angrily threw at my parents' farm landed harmlessly in a field?” – but a consequential analytical matter. Alain Badiou’s denial that worker strikes in Poland were non-violent, as they were coercive or could have harmed bystanders, would force me to recalibrate my concept of violence. In short, it is plausible to conceive violence as a form of minatory action independent of its injurious results, and it is because “violence” is so elastic and polysemous a term that I will retain its component of injury in order to delineate heuristically the outcomes to be explained.

The problem arises when we equate violence with bloodshed or invoke the peace of the graveyard. Totalitarian confinement may appear to meet the criteria for peace implied in the “X injures Y” concept of violence, for any period of time in which no one is overtly being injured. But it feels more than a little odd to consider totalitarian internment peaceful or an absence of
violence just because it has established routine behaviors among the prisoners. Or, returning to my cases, it seems wrong to decide that martial law was less violent in Poland than in Algeria just because fewer physical injuries resulted, in part since the resistance remained non-violent. By the same token, however, it would also be odd not to distinguish the violence between two internment camps if only one tortured its inmates. Along lines of devil’s advocacy, why not intuit that martial law in Poland was less violent if it produced fewer physical injuries? My reply would be that martial law was equally violent physically or objectively in Poland and Algeria but not cognitively or subjectively. Polish and Algerian victims experienced martial law as distinctly endowed institutional citizen-subjects for whom the interpretive impact of equal state coercion diverged. But this specific reply raises a second difficulty with the standard concept of violence, “X injures Y.” The first was that physical injury is not, counter-intuitively, a required element of a strong concept of violence, although certain actions are. But now it seems that instead of actions, it is evaluations of actions that determine their violence. It seems that under scrutiny the conceptual site of violence moves from injury to action to interpretation. But this does not mean that the revised concept of violence becomes more subjective and less objective, or more ethnographic and less structural; it implies that those binaries may be confusing distractions.  

Taken together, these difficulties with the “X injures Y” formulation raise the ontological paradox I referred to above, one at the heart of my project: that injury is not a component of an effective general concept of violence. Narrowly put, the ontological paradox in conceptualizing violence is that it cannot be defined in itself, but only through other concepts surrounding its intuitive elements. Situated evaluation, rather than physical harm nor scary behavior, defines violence. This translates to the paradox of totalitarianism and genocide, forms of pure violence
whose telos is pacification. More broadly put, this paradox – that the more rigorously violence is conceptualized the less it can itself be identified – resonates with criticisms developed within counter-Enlightenment skepticism of the increasing tendency of modern institutions to produce subjects, overriding dualistic assessments of power, agency, consciousness, and violence. Those views oppose the concept of violence I adopt in thinking through the violent and non-violent ramifications of martial law in Poland and Algeria, so it makes sense to start with that concept.

This conventional or even orthodox concept is roughly that offered by Charles Tilly:

Collective violence...refers to episodic social interaction that (a) immediately inflicts physical damage on persons and/or objects (‘damage’ includes forcible seizure over restraint or resistance) and (b) results at least in part from coordination among persons who perform the damaging acts. At one edge such a definition excludes specifically individual, private, impulsive, and/or accidental damage to persons or objects. At the other it excludes long-term, incremental damage such as communication of infectious disease, cumulative wear and tear, exposure to toxic substances, and death hastened by neglect or social pressure. With some adjustment, this is a strong conventional definition since it invokes the intuitive and traditional notion of sovereign power – the exertion of physical force by one self-identical individual or collective agent against another. In essence, Tilly uses the “X injures or damages Y” definition that, I think, cannot be a general concept of violence but suits research projects like mine. This qualification yields my first apologia for adopting a conventional concept of violence; under dictatorial Weberian statism, coercive power was the relatively abundant mode of force projection in response to widespread and sustained social agitation. But these regimes differed in designing parallel modes of contact with citizens; they structured subjects’ evaluations of state violence on distinct social and institutional foundations. This variation implies that social explanation shapes our concept of violence by clarifying that the presence of violence depends on contextual evaluations. The objective reality of state coercion (detention, torture, street
clashes) will underdetermine *subjective evaluations* of violence if complementary institutions of effective citizenship provide multiple expectations. Identical state coercion may vary receptions of violence given distinct support systems, exit options, durations of physical force, and so on.

Tilly’s concept of collective violence also helps me distinguish the effects of martial law in Poland and Algeria while providing lucid terms for further clarifications. The designation of Polish dissent as “non-violent” seems to depend on whether activist workers damaged persons and property or social welfare. In 1956 and 1970 but not 1980 Polish protests made “episodic social interaction[s] that immediately inflict[ed] physical damage on persons and/or objects,” principally attacks on state offices. By this subtler instrument, Poles appear *decreasingly* violent over time, because they gradually ceased causing damage and risking injury. By a more abstract definition of violence as, e.g., actions that threaten public wellbeing by hindering production or incurring state coercion, Polish protesters could be considered consistently violent. Conversely, if we conceive violence as deliberate injury to persons, then Poles were consistently *non-violent*, as agitators did not directly target individuals in 1956, 1970, or 1980. Adopting the conventional concept of violence, intentional property damage or personal injury, I can narrow the outcome while also accessing compelling transformations on the path to the “self-limiting” Solidarity campaign of 1980-. Since it is key to my argument that iterated deployments of social resources establish effective citizenship regimes, so is the gradual desire and capacity to refuse to damage or injure. Over a generation of lived experience using the social resources of worker-citizenship, Polish dissidents grew increasingly habituated to their efficacy in pressing the regime for policy and personnel changes. As a result, they increased their *non-violence* even as the regime grew more violent. Along these lines, Algeria between independence and martial
law suffered less overall, and surely less cyclical, state-citizen violence than Poland because client-citizenship in vertically integrated distributive networks has lower startup costs and acculturation periods than worker-citizenship in horizontally integrated productive networks.

A concept of violence stressing injury or damage could, analogically, obscure distinctions indispensable to the study of social agitation, such as the differences between violence and militancy and between pacifism and non-violence. Unlike violence and pacifism, militancy and non-violence refer to deliberate, disciplined strategies that articulate the means and ends of a declared political project. It is more an addendum than a corrective to Tilly’s definition, but militant or violent agents can injure state agents or damage their holdings identically but as distinct subjects in disparate political campaigns. Scholars and activists such as Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. connote the terms militancy and non-violence in contrast to the general terms violence and peace to suggest the conscious disruption of reigning political arrangements (militancy) and the sustained, sacrificial commitment to a disruptive social cause that eschews physical or material destruction (non-violence). In this lexicon, Solidarity was non-violent and militant and not merely peaceful; pre-1970 Polish activists, disorganized and impulsive, were peaceful and non-militant even though they attacked buildings and damage occurred. Likewise, within Algeria, we might distinguish between the militant, peaceful FIS and the violent but non-militant GIA. The specific designations are not of concern except in illustrating how sub-dividing intuitive notions or conventional concepts of violence and peace helps differentiate categories of action relative to “physical injury or damage.” Careful disaggregation of necessarily heuristic conceptual types can contribute such nuance to our explanatory inferences.
Finally, violence thought of as “episodic social interaction” does not imply the absence of quotidian, pervasive, or continual structural or disciplinary violence. Restricted to punctuated disruptions, this concept of violence could reiterate the counter-intuitive idea that violence is unusual or unnatural, while peace is natural, or a naturally desired condition – as in Rousseau’s remark that “it is less the force of arms than the moderation of hearts that renders men independent and free.”¹² But Tilly’s concept specifying “collective action” should not be taken to mean that violence alone merits explanation; non-violent social movements are as significant and curious as violent actions in response to perceived injustice. This aside is to affirm that “too often the non-violence of social movements is treated as simply rational, or an expression of some popular will, rather than a reasoned and reflexive recognition of a movement’s relation to power.”¹³ With these caveats in mind, the conventional idea of violence not only applies to but also illuminates my cases.

A second, related reason for applying this definition to my project is that the Polish and Algerian oppositions demonstrate that coercive or invasive states can fail to “subjectivize” their populations into seamlessly identifying with overarching state ideologies and discourses. This in itself means that comparing authoritarian citizenship regimes, however antiquarian they seem in our rear-view mirrors, may inform our models of modernity, violence, and social action more broadly. Societies have long defined themselves as overcoming physical violence or, more precisely, expelling conflict by establishing consensual values and institutions over a delimited population. In our refined or complicated concept of violence, where “Y feels injured by X,” we expect any social system “Y” to experience as injurious all activities outside but infringing its parameters. Under this logic, social systems tend toward broad rubrics of violence comprising
not only explicitly anti-systemic but also non-systemic actions that may threaten shared norms. Social systems therefore tend toward expansive, quasi-paranoid regulations, perceiving injuries or threats as residues of violence conduced by a failure of the system to expel. Social systems correct this failure by further expanding and enforcing norms. Believing that this logic inheres in society or “civilization”\textsuperscript{14}, many critics and agitators view social systems as endemically violent because they perpetually expel resistance. In this perspective, peace is the surface effect of the social system’s resistance to resistance, its “lesser”\textsuperscript{15} violence against violence.\textsuperscript{16}

One implication of this logic is that violence is inevitable in any social system inhabited by willful citizen-subjects who by definition are under-determined by their social system. There is, in this sense, an ineluctable contradiction between society and subjectivity, a view identified with anarchism but arguably immanent in a wider range of political theories. In a discussion of the concept of violence in social explanation the society-subjectivity tension redounds to an ordinary-language distinction between “being” and “acting” violent. A person who is violent differs from one who acts violent in much the same way that a social system or political regime either is or acts violent. An agent who acts violent is, strictu sensu, the opposite of an agent who is violent. In order to act violent, I cannot be violent, just as I cannot act happy and be happy at once. This matters because acting, not being, grounds reliable social explanation, yielding a paradox: in order to be explained political “actors” must be able to make decisions instead of only adhering to “systems.”\textsuperscript{17} An account of systemically adherent behavior describes rather than explains, collapsing cause and effect. In studying violence, this entails a caesura between system and subject, between social regulation and citizen response. To explain violence seems to require explaining a non-determined choice by someone acting, but not being, violent.\textsuperscript{18}
encounter an analytical challenge in reconciling two claims. *Social systems generate resistance only if citizens are willful subjects; but as willful subjects their resistance cannot be directly derived from or causally conflated with their social system.*

There are two paradigmatic replies to the paradox of system and subject, the liberal and anti-liberal frameworks. In general, liberal theory sees agents as *acting*, anti-liberal theory sees them as *being*. So as not to stray too far from the matter of empirical violence, I will pursue this distinction briefly. Liberal theory presupposes, at some level, an under-determined subjectivity conceived as an autonomous will, desire, or idea that cannot be eradicated short of biological death. In this view, one’s *actions reflect decisions* in finite or constraining environments that do not explain those decisions. The impediment for social explanation in a liberal position on subjectivity is *contingency*, the problem of *indeterminacy*. In contrast, the skeptics I adduced earlier hold that modern social systems are historically distinctive in their capacity to structure our subjectivity, to produce or “subjectivize” people through various internalized languages and identities without which they would be devoid of meaning or drive. Indeed, for these skeptics, liberalism itself is the best example of this process, as it instills a naturalized belief about human agency as self-determined and self-willed choice, perfectly delighting the bourgeois master. The skeptics believe modernity replaces sovereign violence with subjective normalization, a subject-making-system that has gone by many names: the civilizing process; ideological hegemony; biopolitical governmentality; symbolic order; society of control; disciplinary docility; or social performativity. In a passage worth quoting in full, Norbert Elias provided an adequate summary of this outlook, characterizing civilization as the
whole reorganization of human relationships [that] went hand in hand with corresponding changes in men’s manners, in their personality structure, the provisional result of which is our form of “civilized” conduct and sentiment. The connection between these specific changes in the structure of human relations and the corresponding changes in the structure of personality... in [the] human mentality, in the patterning of the malleable psychological apparatus, which can be observed over and again in human history from the earliest times to the present... As more and more people must attune their conduct to that of others, the web of actions must be organized more and more strictly and accurately, if each individual action is to fulfill its social function. The individual is compelled to regulate his conduct in an increasingly differentiated, more even, and more stable manner. That this involves not only a conscious regulation has been established. Precisely this [characterizes] the psychological changes in the course of civilization: the more complex and stable control of conduct is increasingly instilled in the individual from his earliest years as an automatism, a self-compulsion that he cannot resist even if consciously wishes to. The web of actions grows so complex and extensive, the effort required to behave “correctly within it becomes so great, that besides the individual’s conscious self-control and automatic, blindly functioning apparatus of self-control is firmly established... When a monopoly of force is formed, pacified social spaces are created which are normally free from acts of violence. The pressures acting on individual people within them are of a different kind [from the pressures] previously. Forms of non-physical violence that always existed, but hitherto had been mingled or fused with physical force, are now separated from the latter; they persist in changed form internally within the more pacified societies.  

The impediment for social explanation in a post-dualistic concept of subjectivity is particularity, the problem of non-generalizability. These systems of subjectivization radically differ.

These debates help frame Polish and Algerian authoritarian “high modernist”21 state-formations, whose reliance on sovereign power seems to reflect an inability to subjectivize their citizens. An incisive application of the system/subject tension to effective political institutions is in the work of Michel Foucault, a theorist affected by the Islamist and Polish uprisings, whose account of sovereign power coincides with Michael Mann’s of despotic power. Sovereign or despotic power denotes the use of physical force to secure the stability of king and kingdom alike against the minatory whims of rogues such as regicides and pirates. Sovereign or despotic power entails corrective and preservative physical force, violence that erupts briefly to defend social power or reclaim political order by eradicating enemies and punishing infractions. There is an affinity between Tilly’s idea of collective violence and sovereign or despotic power, in
which a subject (prince, state, general, officer, parent) exercises coercive force over persons (peasant, citizen, enemy, criminal, child), rendering them objects of violence. An affiliation also appears between sovereign power and liberal commitments that emerged to oppose it – a shared or reciprocal prioritization of unfettered social agency. That aside, for Foucault sovereign violence negates, represses, punishes; for these reasons Mann sees despotic power as limited, reactive, and ineffective in securing state power.22

Foucault studies decentralized discourses and Mann centralized state apparatuses, but they concur that power gradually stabilizes via interventionist, productive23, non-sovereign means. Foucault calls these means disciplinary power, roughly Mann’s infrastructural power. These phrases name processes that produce social subjectivities through interactions in previously antinomian sites of sovereign power, such as manager and worker or state and civil society. The invention of psychoanalysis, a system of self-examination and sexual normalization thus invents a discourse of therapy that produces and disciplines the figures of therapist and patient in renovated sites of the religious confessional. In sovereign or despotic power, the king or priest would issue orders or extend “pastoral care” in a hierarchic, top-down fashion; in disciplinary power the rules, terms, codes, and symbols to which the subjects must respond are those that they participate in generating.24 Likewise, Mann says that the state-society interactions form a dialectical process in which ruling elites and non-state agents unwittingly exchange knowledge and resources, eventually coming to join rather than oppose each other in a cooperative civil-societal infrastructure. Foucault and Mann insist that sovereign or despotic power may enforce disciplinary or infrastructural power through coercion25, but this furthers the systemic pacification that erodes sovereign-subject polarity.26 Foucault’s “docile bodies”
and Mann’s dialectical state-society coordination overwhelm sovereign-despotic state/society antinomies. Ron thus warns against Whiggish celebrations of the ascendance of disciplinary/infrastructural power over the antithetical identities and practices in which civil societies might oppose states, in both modern political thought and revolt: “despotism is explicit, dramatic, and awful but is often irregular and fleeting. Infrastructural power is less blatant, by contrast, but often penetrates social life to a much greater extent.”

This divagation into theories of power highlights a striking and counterintuitive aspect of Polish and Algerian state formations. Although they consolidated centralized state institutions in education, media, intelligence, security, a political party, routinized citizenship practices, and social welfare provision, neither state supplemented the sovereign or despotic power it used to dominate citizens with disciplinary or infrastructural capacity to persuade, influence, or “know” them. Despite state propaganda and incorporation of citizens in muscular party organizations, Polish and Algerian ruling elites failed to define or constitute citizens as compliant secular socialist subjects. Polish and Algerian elites and officials failed to discipline docile bodies and inculcate ideological minds. This confirms the common impression that authoritarian states are inept at penetrating society – either to determine or ascertain citizens’ subjective experiences. But this state-citizen or system-subject fissure also suggests that while the regimes did not determine citizens’ perceptions, interpretations, or desires – as objects or subjects – their efforts to do so through carefully designed citizenship structures nonetheless generated distinct subjectivities among Poles and Algerians. Furthermore, the combined effects of authoritarian state-citizen proximity (surveillance and coercion) and citizen-subjective distance (practical and analytical disjuncture) generated a growing gap between state ambitions and capacities.
Neither Polish nor Algerian rulers formed co-constitutive identities or allegiances with citizens, but they failed differently, attaching citizens’ systemic subjectivity to distinct state-provided social resources. Authoritarian state structures differed, at least in these cases, not in inculcating internalized senses of loyalty to states, but in affixing an iterated experience of subjectivity within the state system. The disciplinary, infrastructural, pedagogical, or ideological apparatus that Foucault, Mann, Scott, and others describe were evidently absent or ineffective in Poland and Algeria, where citizen and state did not form together a disciplinary subject or dialectical state-in-civil-society. Disciplinary and dialectical state-citizen mechanisms seemed though, present in grounding citizen-subjectivity in state institutions with or without state-citizen identification or legitimacy. Political orders and citizen-subjects created a disjunctive regime whose disciplinary apparatus constituted citizen-subjectivity via social resources bereft of loyalty, identity, or reciprocity. Ultimately, the practical construction and normative rule of these regimes has an ambiguous relationship to the concepts of violence and power discussed so far. Leading up to the mass protests and uprisings, the Polish and Algerian regimes deployed a sovereign and disciplinary power that neither dominated nor defined their populations with lasting effect, and yet seems to have structured them as citizens and subjects.

This authoritarian tendency – in which sovereign power and citizenship regime seem to outstrip state disciplinary or infrastructural power – returns us to concepts and explanations of violence. In these bureaucratic police states, effective sovereignty and ineffective disciplinary power operated without their intended or theorized effects, integrating citizens through state-provided social resources adequately to shape their dissident subjectivity but not to secure their fealty. This structure of citizen-subjectivity, in other words, determined the form dissent
would take, not whether it would take form. This political paradox, the authoritarian regime’s capacity to structure citizen-subjectivity but not citizen-fidelity, complicates the conventional concept of violence and the criticisms of it alike. The compromised prerogative of even “strong” states to structure inhabitants to their own benefit – or to integrate citizens without providing them resources to oppose those states – appears to qualify the views of power and violence I have addressed. Polish and Algerian state performances only partially support post-structural assertions that modernizing social systems produce citizen identities, assimilating subjects to a monistic regime and a smooth space of political consensus.  

Both states did design citizenship regimes that created exclusive means for interacting meaningfully with the state, generating a dominant systemic subjectivity. But these citizenship regimes enabled resistance to state directives and authority, proving not merely that rulers failed to dictate the fate of their systems, but also that citizens as subjects retained sufficient autonomy of judgment in those systems to define and harness them to their own interests. This ambivalent success and failure of the regimes to constitute their inhabitants for their own ends in institutions of their own design impugns, for similar reasons, the conventional concept of violence and, therefore, the conceptual map of tyranny as either hostile to its citizens or creating them in their image. The mixed dynamics in these regimes’ capacities to subjectivize citizens in either dualistic or monistic systems makes it difficult to designate either regime or uprising as unambiguously peaceful or violent. If violence entails a radical challenge to the norms of a regime, then citizen-subjects who oppose regimes that partially constituted them cannot be construed as simply peaceful or violent. This complexity explains why Solidarity’s
non-violent clash with the Polish regime may be “reminiscent of a civil war” while Algeria’s terrible state-Islamist violence may not.

My purpose in analyzing the conceptual map of peaceful freedom and violent tyranny, concepts of violence, and debates about power is not to indulge in semantics but to defend a qualified concept of violence associated with physical and dangerous militancy that need not imply subjective sources of resistance wholly external to state institutions. Only with such qualifications does it work, at least in my case studies, to re-identify violence in conventional terms with physical injury and material damage. In this respect, I wish to conclude this section with a word about explanatory accounts of violence, at the risk of an abrupt lateral move. One policy recommendation stemming from my explanation might be that if ruling elites wish to prevent violent opposition movements, they may want to provide effective social resources to regime opponents – that is, by affording citizens institutional means to lodge meaningful challenges to state prerogative. While I do not aim for policy relevance, the concepts and arguments in my explanation could be invoked to diminish violence by guaranteeing effective citizen regimes. Nonetheless, I am cautious about such mechanistic reasoning about violence.

In the mid-1990s Islamists attacked Algerian villages, slaughtering, raping, burning, and mutilating non-combatants en masse, while the state arrested, killed, and tortured thousands of civilians. These atrocities followed the declaration of martial law, yet a state of emergency alone does not seem sufficient to prompt such violence. It seems martial law is itself mediated by social resources that define the political meaning and experience of dehumanization for besieged citizen-subjects. But even if true, does this really explain such monstrous acts? I am raising an old problem but not casually. Such violence, both intimate and extimate, seems to be
unthinkable, which suggests it may be inexplicable in a sense, somehow always exceeding the language and modalities of causal inscription. Perhaps the gap between states and subjects that I have attributed to despotic citizenship applies to the effects of dehumanization. There may be a remainder in translating inhumane conditions into physical resistance – some excess beyond the mirror image, where violence *transcends* the logics of regime and social explanation alike.

This would make sense if re-humanization were true resistance, that is, an instance of self-authorship that must exceed rather than replicate-by-negation the conditions that inspired it. If violence is a generative surplus of the uncontainable subject, to explain atrocities like those in Algeria would require some explanation of that excess itself, arguably a sort of arrogant or delusional claim of authority over the core nature of humanity. There is a danger lurking in this ambition that inhibits a project like mine. If we presume an explanation of horrific violence is awaiting our most sensitive instruments, we may by fiat exclude intangible or excessive human mechanisms, inadvertently trivializing its mystery and thus its horror. In his story, “My Cousin, Dikran, the Orator,” William Saroyan describes a cousin’s speech as “flawless: dramatic, well-uttered, intelligent, and terribly convincing – the conclusion being that the World War had not been fought in vain, that Democracy *had* saved the world.” In turn, his grandfather intones:

I listened to your speech. I understand you spoke of a war in which several million men were killed. I understand you *proved* the war was not fought in vain. I must tell you that I am rather pleased. A statement as large and as beautiful as that deserves to come only from the lips of a boy of eleven – from one who believes what he is saying. From a grown man, I must tell you, the horror of that remark would be just a little too much for me to endure. Continue your investigation of the world from books, and I am sure, if you are diligent and your eyes hold out, that by the time you are sixty-seven you will know the awful foolishness of that remark – so innocently uttered by yourself tonight, in such a pure flow of soprano English. In a way I am as proud of you as of any other member of this tribe. You may all go away now. I want to sleep. I am not eleven years old. I am sixty-seven.
Primo Levi identifies this potential ethical trivialization with both justification and explanation: “one cannot, what is more one must not, understand [because] one cannot reduce the human spirit to the genes, which is why one should not do it...We cannot understand it, but we can and must understand from where it springs...If understanding is impossible, knowing is imperative, because what happened could happen again.”

To “understand” violence itself, as opposed to its “sources,” offends because it evinces the kind of mastery over humanity he associates with violence itself. Even more compellingly, he cautions against naturalizing or normalizing violence in some de-mystifying causal or taxonomic understanding. We should not come to terms with unspeakable human cruelty, lest we overlook or will away its irreducible or unknowable kernel. In the spirit of Levi’s distinction between violence and its sources, between its understanding and explanation, I would emphasize that this division encourages us to seek those sources with redoubled rigor while conceding that we may no sooner explain than define violence.

§2.c  Subjects of Violence

In his curiously ignored novel, In Dubious Battle, Steinbeck stages a burst of violence at a strike scene. Strikers gather to face down “scabs” arriving at a railway station. The police stand by, armed but timorous. Strike leaders London, Mac, and Jim, hoping to guide the protest between steadfastness and belligerence, glimpse the trigger-tapping snipers above in nearby apartments. Scabs appear and strikers stiffen, the police “nervously trying to watch both sides at once.” Shots ring out and Joy, a frail but brave worker, jolts from a bullet and falls, blood running down his chin. Joy bleeds to death between the two sides, scabs and strikers, a “claw[ing and] squirming figure in the dirt...The quietness [falls] on the men like a wave of sound.” Absurdly accusing the strikers of killing Joy, the sheriff demands his body. London
refuses, the sheriff again insists, and London, his “eyes glow[ing] redly,” speaks the limit of tolerable offense – the line of violence. It is a literary scene worth reconstructing at length:

“All right, then. We’ll march in. Keep your guys in hand. Keep ‘em quiet and on the side of the road.” He grinned coldly. “If any of ‘em wants to pick up a few rocks and shove ‘em in their pockets, I can’t see no harm in that.” The men laughed appreciatively …

Burke said, “I’m for startin’ a mix soon’s the scabs get off the train. Scare hell out of ‘em.”

“Better talk first,” Mac said. “I seen half a trainload of scabs go over to the strike if they was talked to first. You jump on ‘em and you’ll scare some, and make some mad.” …

Singing broke out, the tuneless, uneven singing of untrained men…They had hardly started when ten motorcycle policemen rode up and spaced themselves along the line of the march…

“They got a reception committee for us. Ain’t that kind of ‘em?” The men about him tittered. Mac continued, “They say ‘you got a right to strike, but you can’t picket,’ an’ they know a strike won’t work without picketin’.” There was no laughter this time. The men growled, but there was little anger in the tone. Mac glanced nervously at Jim. “I don’t like it,” he said softly. “This bunch of bums isn’t keyed up. I hope to Christ something happens to make ‘em mad before long. This’s going to fizzle out if something don’t happen.” …

Dakin and London walked up and down the dense front, giving instructions. The men must not start any trouble with the cops if they could help it… “They figure they can scare us off. Jesus, I wish the train’d come. Waiting raises hell with guys like ours. They get scared when they have to wait around.” …

Across the street stood a line of dilapidated stores and restaurants with furnished rooms in their upper storeys. Mac glanced over his shoulder. The windows of the rooms were full of men’s heads looking out. Mac said, “I don’t like the looks of those guys.” “Why not?” Jim asked. “I don’t know. There ought to be some women there. There aren’t any women at all.” …

In the doorway of one of the boxcars a commotion started, a kind of a boiling of the men. A man squirmed through the seated scabs and dropped to the ground. Mac shouted in Jim’s ear, “My God! It’s Joy!” The misshapen, gnome-like figure faced the doorway. The arms waved jerkily. Still the screen screeched. The men in the doorway dropped to the ground and stood in front of the frantic, jerking Joy. He turned and waved his arms toward the strikers. His beaten face was contorted. Five or six of them fell in behind him, and the whole group moved toward the line of strikers. The guards turned sideways, nervously trying to watch both sides at once …

And then – above the steam – three sharp, cracking sounds. Mac looked back at the stores. Heads and rifles were withdrawn quickly from the room windows and the windows dropped. Joy had stopped, his eyes wide. His mouth flew open and a jet of blood rolled down his chin, and down his shirt. His eyes ranged wildly over the crowd of men. He fell on his face and clawed outward with his fingers. The guards stared unbelievingly at the squirming figure on the ground. Suddenly the steam stopped; and the quietness fell on the men like a wave of sound. The line of strikers stood still, with strange, dreaming faces. Joy lifted himself up with his arms, like a lizard, and then dropped again. A little thick river of blood ran down on the crushed rock of the roadbed.
A strange, heavy movement started among the men. London moved forward woodenly, and the men moved forward. They were stiff. The guards aimed with their guns, but the line moved on, unheeding, unseeing...

The guards were frightened, riots they could stop, fighting they could stop; but this slow, silent movement of men with the wide eyes of sleepwalkers terrified them...London lifted the little man in his arms. Joy looked very small against London’s big chest. A path opened for them easily this time. London marched along, and the men arranged themselves into a crude column, and followed...

“I want that body,” the sheriff said. “No, you can’t have it.” “You men shot a strike-breaker. We’ll bring the charge. I want that body for the coroner.” London’s eyes glowed redly. He said simply, “Mister, you know the guys that killed this little man. You know who did it. You got laws and you don’t keep ‘em.” The mob was silent, listening. “I tell you, I want that body.” London said plaintively, “Can’t you see, mister? If you guys don’t get the hell out of here, you’re goin’ get killed. Can’t you see that, mister? Don’t you know when you can’t go no further?”

Steinbeck presents a regime of state, capital, and labor (workers and replacements), all intensified by the “cracking sounds” of rogue elements. Workers and scabs, police and snipers: the inside/outside of labor and law under capital and state – all clumsily monitored by “guards” glancing back and forth, staring “unbelievingly,” aimlessly pointing guns. When Joy is gunned down, tittering-then-boiling strikers become a “slow, silent movement of men with the wide eyes of sleepwalkers.” It is an unfolding from work to strike, speech to march, protest to blood-flow, tittering and boiling to silence – a series of shifts from inside to outside the confines of a network. Workers speaking, speakers striking, strikers marching, marchers dying, mourners teetering on violence represent an upward movement across places and actions, a trajectory of refusals that break out of each sub-unit of the regime. So the shifts (work to talk, talk to strike, strike to march, etc.) form a sequence of escalating failures to resolve and recognize demands.

The movement of grievance from speech to march evinces a qualitative change, from material to social demand. This escalation of inside-to-outside violations is qualitative, in both Steinbeck and much social science and ethics, because we attribute distinct experiences to the levels of
action. Specifically, workers whose speech, strikes, and finally marches are ignored experience greater qualitative injustice at each stage; the moral content of their grievances is amplified.

Such serialized insults form our common definition of dehumanization – the systematic denial of persons’ capacity to connect their activity to desired improvements in their wellbeing. I intimated this sequential aspect to dehumanization in these terms in the introduction but it is crucial to foreground now the sense of movement across experiences of deprivation, expulsion, and injustice, as Steinbeck illustrates. Empirical studies of violence reveal a pivot point where the composition of an opposition alters, when subjects begin to question not the justification of policies only but of policymakers. At least in some cases, the quality of agitation changes when the legitimacy rather than actions of authority figures comes under scrutiny. Here moralization is a useful concept, one apposite in the Polish and Algerian cases. For good reason we expect that, under normal circumstances, my experience protesting jaywalking ordnances or the Iraq war will differ from my protesting against the right of the local council or the President to draft and implement these policies. I may be more emotional about the war than about jaywalking, and I may think a war has graver moral implications than where we cross the street, but in neither case would I say the policymaker is corrupt. I may claim these policymakers are making immoral policies, but it is a separate matter – a distinct experience – to claim that their making those policies is immoral. The progression from intra-systemic to anti-systemic agitation is the moment of moralization, of conceiving social arrangements themselves to be compromised.

Note, in this light, the timing and substance of the two key events in Steinbeck’s scene. First, Joy’s murder converts a fragmented, confused, anxious protest into a willful movement – strikers forged into an “unseeing,” converging, and potentially dangerous machine. I presume
the moral impulse has been aggravated, and the response is incredulity and stunned silence. It makes sense that the strikers remain “stiff” and “wooden,” a “heavy movement” right after this murder. The air fills with uncertainty and, pace the guards’ heads’ swiveling frantically, is still. After all the anxiety about the men getting antsy or bored or aggressive with “the waiting,” now that the rulers’ violence has killed one of them, they become one. What will they do? “The first blood, the blood of the first victim once spilled, infects the entire community, pulling it down into reciprocal violence,” as Esposito says. But it is the sheriff’s demand for the body that moralizes opposition. London stares at him and says, “You got laws and you don’t keep ‘em.” Note that London says, “you got laws,” not we, and that this reproach indicates that it is not law but the sheriff who is impugned. The law will become a credible resource to use against the sheriff; the sheriff’s lawlessness will not discredit the law. Moral outrage at dehumanization suffuses London’s bewildered warning to the sheriff: “Don’t you know when you can’t go no further?” This moment marks the acceleration and intensification usually associated with the violence London now threatens: “you’re goin’ get killed.”

In a study of lawlessness in Colombia, Taussig says such scenes recall Nietzsche’s sense “that criminals become hardened by observing that they and the police use the same methods, except with the police, the methods are worse because the police excuse their actions in the name of justice.” He quotes Nietzsche: “Spying, duping, bribing, setting traps…intricate and wily skills of the policeman and the prosecutor, as well as the most thorough robbery, violence, slander, imprisonment, torture, and murder, carried out without even having emotion as an excuse.” This explains why the murder of Joy is not yet the moment of moralization, at least in London’s words and the strikers’ actions. Instead, it will be the response of the sheriff, as the
representative of the law, to *decide* the moment and tenor of moralization. London even pleads with him not, in Taussig’s phrase, to excuse their actions in the name of justice – he begs him to avert violence by protecting the credibility of law, and thus the meaning of justice itself. What is crucial in this scene for our understanding of violence is Steinbeck’s portrayal of moralization as a ladder-climb in a trajectory toward anti-systemic violence. Each rung concentrates the forces of emotion and reason, physicality and reflection, hope and anxiety, even as we see the clear direction of these combinations. Steinbeck shows us the subjectivity of violence in this scene. His strikers, workers who turn to the law under duress and cruelty, are the subjects of a liberal democratic regime that provided thin legal protections against capitalist suzerainty especially among agricultural workers. In their posture, energy, and speech, they express not only what is happening to them or what they want but also who they are as the subjects of a regime. Steinbeck may, in this respect, overstate the extent to which immediate decisions rather than historically informed evaluations provoke violence, but I suspect this was not the first time London cried out, “Don’t you *know* when you can’t go no further?” – but the last.

§2.d  *Objects of Violence*

In his novelization of “real events” in Moroccan prisons, Tahar Ben Jelloun records a statement about human dignity that strikes the core of objectification:

Faith is not fear, I told myself. Suicide is not a solution. An ordeal is a challenge. Resistance is a duty, not an obligation. Keeping one’s dignity is an absolute necessity. That’s it: dignity is what I – what we – have left. Each of us does what he can to preserve his dignity. That is my mission. To remain on my feet, be a man, never a wretch, a dishrag, a mistake. I would never condemn those who cannot bear what is inflicted on them, who end by breaking under torture and letting themselves die. I have learned never to judge people. What right would I have to do that? I am only a man, like all others, with the will not to give in. That’s all. A will that is firm, ruthless, and uncompromising.
This passage conveys the extreme conditions of suffering and objectification, torture and confinement; the individuality of “a will that is firm”; and the aperture between living and breaking- unto-death. If citizens act as subjects of regimes, who are apt to resist violently when trapped, how do we address mixed accounts like Ben Jelloun’s of maximal objectification? How do we broach the distinct subject/object-positions that haunt Jean Améry’s recollections of his internment and survival?:

The so-called Mussulman, as the camp language termed the prisoner who was giving up and was given up by his comrades, no longer had room in his consciousness for the contrasts good or bad, noble or base, intellectual or unintellectual. He was a staggering corpse, a bundle of physical functions in its last convulsions. As hard as it may be for us to do so, we must exclude him from our considerations. I can proceed only from my own situation, the situation of an inmate who went hungry, but did not starve to death, who was beaten, but not totally destroyed, who had wounds, but not deadly ones, who thus objectively still possessed that substratum on which, in principle, the human spirit can stand and exist.42

An explanation that connects denied systemic subjectivity to violence has to confront empirically reached theories about the objects of violence before proceeding. Hence this will be the most detailed conceptual discussion. Simply posed, this section asks if dehumanization can suffocate re-subjectivization, and with it the repression-resistance hypothesis,43 by pure force; or if, at worst, it “divides” people “into a body and an interrupted whisper. Into body and poetry.”44 After all, it seems intuitively and empirically true that even if repression in general produces resistance, forming an upward line on a graph plotting coercion against retaliation, at some point an added unit of state repression will subtract, not add, a unit of social resistance. At some point, presumably specified by cultural and other contextual factors, resistance is defeated at least momentarily.45 This might imply an objective “dehumanization point” fruitful for causal models, perhaps obviating the interpretive resort to citizenship regimes or systemic
subjectivities evidently implied by discrete outcomes of martial law. Although it makes sense to think dehumanization as a kind of suffering unmediated by experiential evaluation, however, even brutal conditions of reification vary in how social actors conceive and react to them.\textsuperscript{46}

For this discussion it may help to work from the opposite condition, “freedom,” through diverse treatments of humiliation and dignity toward thoughts on subjectivity and confinement. For clarity, I should repeat that this section is intended to sharpen the concept of inhumanity or dehumanization by probing how the differences between social and biological life/death might inform distinctions between subjective and objective conditions. The studies of incarceration, brutality, and isolation adduced here reinforce the heterogeneity of responses to the reduction of the human from social life to social death to biological death.\textsuperscript{47} This multiplicity may speak to the indestructible nature of the human will short of biological eradication, even as individual wills vary. However inspiring or persuasive it may be to maintain that human vitality, spirit, or will \textit{always} escapes capture and domination, that something in us \textit{always} escapes or resists\textsuperscript{48}, I set aside philosophical ruminations. They are central to my argument but stand as summaries or conclusions of the works I foreground. The human will does not express its multiple energies in any one way, and this seems to support the view that even the most menacing circumstances occasion the expression of historical experiences and mobilization of discrete subjectivities.

To address a condition of \textit{inhumanity}, then, we may begin with efforts to elaborate the conditions of \textit{humanization}, often described as the criteria of \textit{freedom} and dignity. For instance, consider Ignatieff’s reflections on freedom with respect to choice, happiness, and rightness:

How can we create a world in which most people will not only be free to choose but will know how to choose? Freedom and happiness can accompany each other only when individuals know
that they have used their freedom rightly...But then what is left of freedom if choice is invariably guided by the collective wisdom of the brothers, the citizens, the comrades?49

Here freedom is conditioned on the capacity for competent choice in the absence of constraints to their formulation and implementation, including the “collective wisdom” of fellow citizen-subjects. Similarly, Kuran writes:

Experimental social psychology...suggests that social pressures, though very powerful, are not necessarily decisive. As individuals, we are evidently prepared to endure some social conflict to say or do what we really want. Our choices must be satisfying a need other than social approval and respect. This other need...is for individuality, autonomy, dignity, and integrity. I [propose] that we value the freedom to choose; that we derive self-esteem from resisting social pressures and establishing ourselves as people to be reckoned with; and that we find satisfaction in speaking our minds, opening up our hearts, acting ourselves. In short, I am suggesting that there is an ever-present voice in each of us that says, “To thine own self be true.”50

Such passages equate freedom, choice, individualism, happiness, and self-esteem, and notably “self” as conditions of possibility of a full human life. Ignatieff’s and Kuran’s statements seem consonant with Todorov’s view of “dignity [as] the first ordinary virtue, [which] simply means the capacity of the individual to remain a subject with a will; that fact, by itself, is enough to ensure membership in the human race.”51 Concerned with conceptual and analytical problems, I will bracket sub-debates – such as this fusion of “individual” and “human race” – as features of a general constellation. What matters instead is to derive the antinomian concepts to present an image of objectification that might support a causal dehumanization thesis. More simply, to get at the criteria of a hypothetically dehumanized condition, it may help or even be necessary to work our way from discourses of dignified freedom to those of suffocating inhumanity.

If choices made by a self provide dignity at the core of a free human life, the self without choice presumably is not free and suffers indignity. The identities and effects of indignity would seem to depend on its content; whether the absence of freedom causes agents to experience
degrading humiliation and whether that experience, in turn, provokes reactions.\textsuperscript{52} Note here a danger of treating as synonymous two absences: of freedom and of dignity. Dignity is one of those slippery terms in the political-philosophical lexicon that refers to \textit{subjective experiences} and \textit{objective conditions} without recognizing this as a foundational conundrum. We consider torture a universal offense against human dignity while failing to delimit our equally strong intuition that one key aspect of dignity is never surrendering our capacity to define it.\textsuperscript{53} Two issues overlap here: (1) the gap between freedom and dignity, assuming dignity means freedom to define one’s dignity; (2) the gap between objective and subjective states of (in/non-)dignity in practice and principle, assuming conditions under-determine experience. Often these gaps are thought to hedge against a universal or causal link, as I have noted, between repression and resistance except under unambiguous dehumanization. The premise is that dehumanization is a causal mechanism as it alone closes these gaps; abjection conflates indignity and unfreedom by reducing subjective to objective conditions, i.e., objectively eliminating the dignity of human freedom. If true, we should expect to find uniform reactions to systemic objectification under the most severe biological or social near-death experiences.

For analytical and deductive reasons the repression-resistance or dehumanization thesis has not fulfilled the promise of a causal theory of social violence. In part, as I have labored to show, it appears that along the precipice of even biological death, humans continue to respond to their historical experiences in responding to suffering. This logic applies all the more wholly to social death, of course. But, as stressed in the introduction, the \textit{repression\textsuperscript{\rightarrow}resistance} thesis is also paradoxical since the “objective conditions” for causal explanation entail that systemic subjectivity has been removed, perhaps triggering an automatic “animal” upheaval. Without
further elaboration the besieged and dying beast’s uprising cannot reclaim subjectivity; it is the
instinctive reaction of the animal or thing already in the condition of animality or thing-ness. Radical humiliation, by contrast, implies that subjective dignity, if degraded, is residual, extant: not absent. We would likely suspect that subjective humiliation and objective dehumanization would, on these grounds, provoke distinct resistances to systemic violence or exclusion. So, if Margalit is correct that humiliation is “an insult to human dignity” that marks an indecent society (or sub-system, like a prison), then humiliating indignity may be said to lie between the poles of subjective dignity and objective non-dignity – the site of an approaching reification but an intact historical reflexivity that retains the tensions between freedom/dignity and objective/
subjective explanation. That this humiliation may be an indispensable condition of our willful subjectivity merely adds another “paradox” to the beleaguered dehumanization thesis.

As we have encountered similar difficulties conceptualizing violence in terms of injury to
dignity or body, we must carefully invoke the idea, seemingly opposite to dignified freedom, of coercive constraint. The question is not, again, whether we can define these terms in general, but whether we can generate concepts helpful to the study of violence. With this in mind, it may be optimal to adopt this method of concept formation in reverse, permitting the paradigm instance of coercive constraint, posited in ordinary language, to lead us to our understanding of the objects of violence. Rather than formulate abstract concepts of freedom and dignity as the basis of assessing (de)humanization, given the vulnerabilities we have found in those concepts, perhaps we can pursue “absolute” or “objective” violation/violence against human subjectivity from empirical studies. For example, a selection of testimonials and research findings suggests that hegemony channels social or personal dignity via incomplete objectification by conscripting
subjective wills into disciplinary processes. It seems the highest form of systemic assimilation mobilizes rather than eradicates subjective wills, sustaining a liminal, remaining agency to enlist it in social stabilization. The parallel with the above depiction of biopower is intentional; there, too, reification forces people to become subjects of their own objectification (or objects of their own subjective repression). In this light I wish to cobble together eyewitness accounts that together form this image and idea of objects of violence as partial, fragmented, socially sutured. To lend focus to the procedure I will work my way from resistance to subordination to absolute domination, a sort of analytical tour of the horizon and problem of radical objectification.

The quintessential assault on personal integrity is torture and on social integrity solitary confinement. In passing, there may be an asymmetry between these two, e.g., if all affronts are personal but only some are social, but this seems peripheral to my goal. The contradictory pulls in C. L. R. James’s account of slavery in Saint Domingue are a helpful place to begin to decipher dehumanization. Describing French exploitation and sovereignty as suffocating, he writes:

Suicide was a common habit, and such was [the slaves’] disregard for life that they often killed themselves, not for personal reasons, but in order to spite their owners. Life was hard and death, they believed, meant not only release but a return to Africa. Those who wished to believe and to convince the world that the slaves were half-human brutes, fit for nothing else but slavery, could find ample evidence for their faith, and nothing so much as in this homicidal mania of the slaves.

There is will, pride, and strategy in these suicides, in this “[choice] between life and death [as] the last chance to hold onto one’s dignity.” James emphasizes the indignation of the indigenous and transplanted slaves. One way they expressed their outrage was by laughing at imperial hypocrisies such as altruistic domination and coercive universalism. The point of this observation is not that the colonized or enslaved see through their masters – though refusing to
be re-formed as subjects is critical – but that their \textit{social} bonds decided the character of their subordination, or one might say mediated the effects of its personal violations.$^{65}$

Koestler’s testimony about pure solitude is a pertinent contrast in this respect:

I was in a Spanish prison before [being interned in a French concentration camp for four months], in a death cell where I didn’t know when my turn to be shot was coming. Afterwards the French camp was easy to bear. It taught me among other things the relativity of freedom. Solitary confinement is rock bottom, it’s absolute unfreedom.$^{66}$

Evidently one can be tormented to the point of reacting as the tormenter desires – that is, as the object of the torturer$^{67}$ – by radical isolation from one’s accustomed sensory universe and alienation from one’s orienting “moral world.”$^{68}$ Conditions of personal and social de-centering can apparently \textit{either} destroy subjectivity \textit{or} refine its weapons, i.e., produce variegated results in formally dehumanizing circumstances. As we have seen, Fanon believes rebellious people reclaim an endangered subjectivity through a sobering revolutionary business.$^{69}$ Penned in, the subject may instead resort to less militant forms of invention, such as subterfuge; as Dalrymple reports: “Although I worked in a prison for 14 years, I never came to understand the language that prisoners used as they shouted to one another across landing and between buildings. It was their means of resisting domination.”$^{70}$ Failing this, under extreme carceral compression, subjectivity may turn in on itself, reaffirming itself as still a will. Rhodes notes that prisoners approaching total, objective absence of agency will construe their conditions as chosen – an assertion of personal control.$^{71}$

The difference in these outcomes seems to depend on the extent of personal and social attacks on the subject. Instead of resisting via revolutionary upheaval, new language games, or auto-re-inscription, abject or abandoned persons, Staub says, may convert stress or trauma into
choleric resentment or disaffection. Likewise, the subject does not always find a way to rebel or even act out. As an ex-prisoner of Guantánamo said, “I cannot describe in just a few lines the suffering and the torture; but the worst aspect of being at the camp was the despair, the feeling that whatever you say, it will never make a difference.” This testimonial is a clue to the central paradox of the attack on the subject: the implication of that subjectivity in its own suffering. When Benchellali remarks, “whatever you say, it will never make a difference,” he is venturing onto this terrain in which the subject can be made object only by being forced to act against, even to kill, itself – not its corporeal carrier but its will. In his analysis of violence, Geuss draws attention to this ideational determination of confinement, the work of subjectivity:

Although “to coerce” means “to leave with no alternative but X,” what counts as having “no alternative” is highly context dependent. “No alternative” usually means “no reasonable alternative,” for example the choice between wage-labor and starvation. Short of such dire circumstances, in which death is one of two “alternatives,” “what will count as “reasonable” depends very much on circumstances, and in particular on people’s beliefs and preferences.

The optimal mode of subordinating an agent appears indirectly in this passage, where a captive is given a part in shaping or performing captivity. It is roughly the difference between punishing a child and asking him to decide her punishment. Subjectivity’s assault on itself, its coercive turning of the will against itself, is a source of violence against oneself (e.g., suicide or self-hatred) or against others (homicide or revolt). The dominant experience of a subject’s will’s participation in its own annihilation is shame. Summarizing decades of research in settings of humiliating social-carceral confinement, Gilligan reports, “it is not poverty, racism, sexism, or age-discrimination, as such, that actually causes violence...

It is, rather, that each correlates with violence because each increases the statistical probability that individuals exposed to those social forces will be subjected to intolerable and potentially
self-destroying intensities of shame, from which they do not perceive themselves as having any means of rescuing themselves except by violence – preferably toward others, as in homicide, but also toward themselves, as in suicide, when homicide is not perceived as being possible, or likely to succeed in reducing the shame to tolerable levels.76

This insight has driven the CIA’s postwar research on torture: that the most powerful means to compliant objectification is to reduce the will or eviscerate subjectivity by forcing it to destroy itself. According to McCoy, the breakthrough in torture techniques among researchers since the 1950s has been to remove the subject-object relationship that prompts an immediate contest between victims and torturers and even bolsters their resolve, sense of injustice, and so on. Instead, the key to interrogation became the extraction of the enemy object and creation of a subject-object opposition within the inmate, crucially without opportunities for sublimation:

[The CIA’s psychological paradigm fused two new methods, “sensory disorientation” and “self-inflicted pain,” whose combination causes victims to feel responsible for their suffering and thus capitulate more readily to their torturers...Through relentless probing into the essential nature of the human organism to identify its physiological and psychological vulnerabilities, the CIA’s “sensory deprivation” has evolved into a total assault on all senses and sensibilities – auditory, visual, tactile, temporal, temperature, survival, sexual, and cultural...The fusion of these two techniques creates a synergy of physical and psychological trauma whose sum is a hammer-blown to the fundamentals of personal identity.77

To compel subjectivity to target or eradicate itself entails absolute and unmediated sovereignty over a subject. This control, apotheosized in the concentration camp, has generated a literature on biological and social death that concerns the death-in-life agent (an exemplary candidate for Fanon’s dehumanization thesis).

Analyzing the concentration camp, Giorgio Agamben seizes on “the threshold between the human and the inhuman.”78 The camp is the singular spectral site of this continuum from living to non-living, proximate in its morphology and “mechanisms of power”79 – its processes, objects, and effects – to the torture chamber. Technologies of torture – absolute enclosure,
vulnerability, and degradation – govern many sites of domination: colonial conquest, apartheid, partition, slavery, occupation, and martial law. These political orders and processes are often condemned for separating human from inhuman, but only “the camp” is consistently viewed as a torture room writ large. Torture is the governing technology in organizing and manipulating this “threshold between the human and inhuman.” This discussion pertains directly to Poland and Algeria, of course, because martial law in both countries exhibited the double logic of the state of exception. In that logic individual and collective – the political body and body politic – are attacked at once, reducing citizens and citizenry to objects of sovereign prerogative.

The human↔inhuman spectrum specifies the social content of the biological form alive/dead. Between creation and cessation of life, that is, lies a shorter continuum from human to inhuman that differentiates life from human, death from inhuman. Imagine a spectrum from biological to social life and social to biological death:

\[ \text{biological life} \leftrightarrow \text{human-life} \leftrightarrow \text{human-death} \leftrightarrow \text{biological death} \]

The objective of this schema is to show that human life and death lie between biological life and death lie. We are born and we die biologically before and after we are socially born and die; our biological birth/death contain our human birth/death. At some vanishing point, Agamben says, the human qua social self goes away and leaves a still-living body, but not a person. Here an apparent asymmetry may bear on our thinking about subjects and objects of violence. It seems, intuitively, that human life is more animated than biological life, but relatively counter-intuitive to view human death as more murdered than biological death. Ordinary language carries the asymmetry; a living person becomes more enlivened but a dead person does not become more deadened. Life as the start and death as the end are not perfect antinomies in our vernacular
sensibilities and social connotations. We add liveliness to life (becoming excited, energized) but not deathliness to death (beginning to decompose). Moreover, we say that between birth and death we live, we do not say we die. This is the orientation of subjectivity, which speaks its will in the asymmetry of life and death.81

Agamben calls camp inhabitants “moving skeletons,” “walking corpses,” and “faceless presences” who “inhabit ‘the limit between life and death.’”82 He adduces Sofsky’s description of “the ones who lie stretched out, unable to move, but still breathing slightly”83 to show “a point at which human beings, while apparently remaining human beings, cease to be human... But what does it mean for a human to become non-human? Is there a humanity of human beings that can be distinguished and separated from human beings’ biological humanity?”

Agamben separates life/death from human/non-human here. Mobilizing Bettelheim’s memoirs, he places the instant of transformation between human and non-human within the movement or on the spectrum from life to death – between life and death. Somewhere between living and dying, or after life and before death, prisoners become non-human.84 For Agamben “alive” and “dead” are mechanically separable, but “human” and “inhuman” are “indistinguishable.”85

This moment of non-humanity between human life and biological death is, I suspect, the invisible and unsayable moment of objectification. We cannot know the instant of suffocation, the final elimination of subjectivity, even as we ground empirical and normative projects in this moment as the obverse of freedom. Asserted instants of dehumanization86 proliferate among für sich and an sich, action and activity, choosing and picking, drive and demand, agent and structure, intention and interpellation, revolution and institution. Agamben complicates these polarities by designating “the camp [as] the new biopolitical nomos of the planet” in which
prisoners are spatially “captured outside” sovereign order and temporally “inscribed” between
*birth* (nudity) and *state* (nationality). Agamben’s monistic abstraction of modernity posits a
camp that overpowers, reduces, and eliminates human life. He is, then, one of the skeptics I
adduced in discussing the concept of violence who claims subjectivity is decided in advance by
social systems. As this does not apply to the cases of Poland and Algeria, a depiction of either
society as inherently a necropolis blurs the distinction between martial law and “normal” life
under and after authoritarian rule. Agamben has been too roundly attacked for his apparent
conflation of all modernity and the camp, but here that criticism applies.

This moment of non-humanity comes with many losses; responsibility, self, meaning,
ethics, love, guilt, desire, and other aspects of ordinary life are said to fall away, skin flaking off
a desiccated being to reveal “the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human.” In her
harrowing and surreal account of Aztec ritual murders, Clendinnen reports “a strange docility in
the behavior of the non-warrior victims of the mass killings which suggests the depths of their
social and psychological dislocation.” These automatons resemble the subjects-into-objects of
torture chambers and indefinite detention centers: “The prisoner is de-subjectified – in every
sense of the word ‘subject’ – political, psychological, and philosophical. She is denied agency,
stripped of her individuality, subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment, and quite literally
objectified.” Arendt’s effort to name those humans “forced out of all political communities,”
equally palpable, replays lengthy quotation:

[A] man who is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other
people to treat him as a fellow man...Regardless of treatment, independent of liberties or
oppression, justice or injustice, they have lost all those parts of the world and all those aspects
of human existence which are the result of our common labor, the outcome of the human
artifice. If the tragedy of savage tribes is that they inhabit an unchanged nature which they
cannot master, yet upon whose abundance or frugality they depend for their livelihood, that they live and die without leaving any trace, without having contributed anything to a common world, then these rightless people are indeed thrown back into a peculiar state of nature...[T]hey appear as the first signs of a possible regression from civilization...Those who have lost all distinctive political qualities and have become human beings and nothing else...become some specimen of an animal species, called man.\textsuperscript{93}

One aspect of this mere human is the evacuation of outrage that a victim might hold against a perpetrator, a moral blankness easily mistaken for a robust ethical theory of fatalism or cynicism. Marcus contrasts reactions to the Black Plague, with its self-flagellating theodicy, to the Irish potato famine, “the first disaster of its kind in history which was widely responded to, and continues to be thought of, as a moral outrage.”\textsuperscript{94} By 1845, an exculpatory theodicy or “religious argument” would “serve a classic ideological function...to screen other interests and motives,” viz. British exploitation. As Marcus notes, “death itself is relative and historical,” however “absolute...as a fact.”\textsuperscript{95} But “ideological” or “justificatory” supports for modern mass atrocity are rooted in deeper paradigmatic or epistemic conditions of possibility. Describing “total domination,” Arendt conveys similar means of the carceral state: “The camps are meant not only to exterminate people and degrade human beings, but also to serve the ghastly experiment of eliminating, under scientifically controlled conditions, spontaneity itself as an expression of human behavior and of transforming the human personality into a mere thing.”\textsuperscript{96}

Arendt depicts totalitarianism as an objectification process, the reduction of subjective to biological life, or even to death, accomplished with the strangulating combination of coercive force and diminution of persons’ sense of self. Having made some sense of a real condition of objectification, noting that even extreme conditions of captivity, brutality, and destitution do not \textit{dictate} the subjectivity of its victims, perhaps we can reverse course, with Arendt’s own refusal of totalitarian enclosure. Following Arendt back out of the concentration camp will do
two things for my broader argument. First, her melancholic and optimistic views of a valuable life defiantly derived from her relentless account of the camp, map over Polish and Algerian responses to authoritarianism. Second, her normative commentary on modern power and the subject of the camp help me reinforce the significance of objectification in my account broadly.

In tracing the concentration camp to bourgeois-imperial expansion and the Minorities Treaties, Arendt detects a core struggle over the public sphere between national(ist) and legal orientations. Her accounts of these alternatives inflect by extending my characterizations of the similarities of Polish to Algerian activism to the mobilizations per se. First, then, Arendt held conflicted views of national identity. It troubles her that between the world wars international politics were “organized” around nationalist states. Her concern is “the transformation of the state from an instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation,” in which “the nation has conquered the state” and “national interest had priority over the law.” However, Arendt also recognizes that national identification may be needed for the linguistic competence to support public rationality, and could be supported as an “ethical substance” of a people as long as it did not cross the line into reactionary and chauvinistic nationalism. Especially given her attraction to Burke, Arendt’s distinction between a worthy national public and a detestable nationalist sentiment records a tension that troubled Polish and Algerian activists in a similar way. Poles and Algerians opposed allegedly secular-socialist regimes with national and religious discourses by which they protected, sustained, or re-constituted their subjectivity. It is easily overlooked, given working class and religious codings of Polish and Algerian dissent but those manifest expressions of identity were mobilized and couched in national themes that greatly assisted the affective pull of anti-authoritarian commitments. The view of the nation Arendt endorsed as
necessary for social cohesion, rights, and law to survive against totalitarian logics figured in the Polish and Algerian efforts to reclaim their citizenship against tyrannical states.\textsuperscript{98}

National or cultural identity provided a public language necessary to the rule of law, an argument Arendt illustrates by comparing universal assimilation under Roman law to particular, discretionary exclusions typical of European imperial juridical forms. In a little noted paradox of her work, Arendt advocates universal lawfulness but acknowledges that law must work through particular languages or local ethics. Intuiting the “predicament” of moral diversity following the demise of divine or natural law, Arendt condemns particular \textit{and} universal ethical systems alike for irrationally fusing the notions of “good” and “right.” She describes as fascist

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a conception of the law that identifies what is right with the notion of what is good for – for the individual, or the family, or the people, or the largest number – becomes inevitable once the \textit{absolute} and \textit{transcendent measurements of religion or the law of nature} have lost their authority. [T]his predicament is by no means solved if the unit to which the "good for" applies is as large as mankind itself. For it is quite conceivable, and even within the realm of practical political possibilities, that one fine day a highly organized and mechanized humanity will conclude quite democratically – namely by majority decision – that for humanity as a whole it would be better to liquidate certain parts thereof...\textsuperscript{99}

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Arendt’s conception of law addresses the absolute sovereignty asserted in Poland and Algeria under emergency conditions. Her account of the ethical corruption of modernity maps closely over the dissident discourses of Solidarity and FIS. She identifies the lost world of universalism, of the “transcendental” compass of \textit{religious} or \textit{natural law}. This insight seems poignant given the religious inspiration Poles and Algerians took, often in the language of rights and fundamental social obligations, against modern states whose patterns Arendt assails. Her nostalgic passages on the homeless, the stateless, the refugee, and the internee as the site of
“unenforceable” human rights recalls the appeals among citizens in Algeria and Poland for redress against social abjection, against being “captured outside” the autocratic state.  

Specifically, what is lost or abandoned in modernity, Arendt says, is the universal sense of human being envisioned in Christian or natural law addresses-to-all, the absolute hospitality offered to outcasts. Maria Langthaler, a German who rescued Russian camp escapees in 1945, articulated this universalism: “The Lord God is for the whole world, not only for Germans. It is a community and there one must help. I did not ask them to which party they belong, I asked nothing at all; that made no difference to me. Only because they were human beings.” Only with a completely organized humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion from humanity altogether,” Arendt laments. Anticipating Agamben’s “bare life” and Rubinstein’s “superfluous populations,” she remarks:

Before this, what we must call a “human right” today would have been thought of as a general characteristic of the human condition which no tyrant could take away. Its loss entails the loss of the relevance of speech…and all human relationship, the loss, in other words, of some of the most essential characteristics of human life… [I]t is possible to say that even slaves still belonged to some sort of human community; their labor was needed, used, and exploited, and this kept them within the pale of humanity. To be a slave was, after all, to have a distinctive character, a place in society – more than the abstract nakedness of being human and nothing but human.

Arendt’s sensitivity about “being human and nothing but human” is not an abstract philosophy, but the real politics Algerians and Poles faced as their efforts to assert their rights to citizenship against discredited dictatorships. During martial law’s humiliating concentration camps, torture, threatened expulsion, Algerians and Poles neared the reified state Fanon described, the line Agamben conjures between biological and social life, and Arendt’s “nothing but human.” As this reflection on objectifying domination shows, and Polish and Algerian responses confirm, even
the reduction of the subject to a thing-acted-upon is mediated through the subjectivity of the
victims, at least up to the final extermination of biological life.

§2.e Evaluations of Violence

In Cabrini Green, a public project in Chicago, poor white and black kids used to face off
in the “glass wars” game,
slinging panes of glass across the street, like skipping stones across the water; when you cut
someone on the other side, you scored a point. For children the glass wars more provided the
pleasure of physical violence than expressed racial hate...The thrill of the glass wars was the
blood. Players scored few points directly, since it was easy to peer outside and see the glass
coming. The game became dangerous when errant panes shattered against the back walls of the
rooms; players got shards of glass stuck in their ankles or hands.

Once, however, a young black girl nearly died of a cut to her neck. Her teammates got
her to a hospital by flagging down a passing bus; the hospital called not the parents but the
police, the police again called the school rather than the parents, the school called out a platoon
of social workers, who descended on the community. The parents thus learned about the
incident only after it was over, managed by professionals...Evidently our white neighbors were
angry at the authorities for interfering; the black parents were more angry at their own children
for attracting the attention of the authorities. The difference makes sense. Down South, an
incident like this could have sparked off attacks on black adults; the demons of racism could be
roused no matter who was the victim. For the Chicago whites, the problem was that the
authorities had usurped the parental role.104

Under identical objective conditions of material deprivation and political powerlessness these
two racialized collective subjects reacted to the same disturbance in morally, analytically, and
behaviorally disparate ways.105 For these sub-populations the social and political mapping of
parents, kids, each other, and authorities (police, school, social work) holds different meanings
carried over and reinforced106 from contrary experiences.107 As obvious as this, it stands as a
historical and subjective rebuttal to the “synchronic gaze” of a structural or institutional
rationality that “bracket[s] the question of the processes that produced [this difference] in
order to work out its internal [textual] logic.”108 The “materiality and meaning of cities,
urbanism, and space,” in Katzenelson’s phrase, differentiates responses to authority in places like Cabrini Green and speaks lifelong constructions of social subjectivity and signification.

This section is meant to add one last element to the concept of violence, its experiential evaluation by the wounded. Sennett’s story about the past’s imprint on the meaning of a police presence for white and black parents shows that historical conditions trump current conditions in politically relevant responses to threat or injury. Clearly we are shaped by our pasts, although it is another claim to say that the past overwhelms the present. This latter claim is often made under duress where sunnier times are recalled as a resource in struggle or survival. “There’s been the growth of a strong sense of historical consciousness recently,” Ringelblum observed. “We tie in fact after fact from our daily experience with the events of history.” Sometimes awareness of history, of events passing, is as much a source of strength as specific memories; as Das says, “I have tried to conceptualize the violence that occurs within the weave of life as lived in the kinship universe as having a sense of the past continuous, while the sudden and traumatic violence that was part of the Partition seems to have been frozen.” In this section I will endorse and qualify this idea that historical experience influences our responses to events. This is a pivotal element in my argument because I claim that opposition movements respond to immediate suffering by evaluating their status as citizens and subjects based on their long-term, previous experiences interacting with the regime. I qualify this insight by claiming that experiential evaluations are not free-floating idealist constructs but reflect the ongoing material circumstances and resources of those past interactions. That these statements are truisms suits my larger argument that what is obvious intuitively has been bracketed in explanations of social violence because they imperil causal arguments based on a flawed idea of human universals.
Václav Havel called hope an “orientation of the heart [that] transcends the world that is immediately experienced, and is anchored somewhere beyond its horizons.”¹¹⁴ This enigmatic statement can be troubling if not debilitating to social explanation, invoking transcendence and resources from beyond the immediate horizon that force us to acknowledge, especially in cases of self-risking activism, that hope itself must be anything but immediately justified. In analyzing race and ideology in the United States, Fields does not discuss hope directly but is concerned to refute the view that ideologies can have such autonomous power. With particular relevance to experiential evaluation, she proclaims what ideology “is not”:

It is not a material entity, a thing of any sort, that you can hand down like an old garment, pass on like a germ, spread like a rumor, or impose like a code of dress or etiquette. Nor is it a collection of disassociated beliefs – “attitudes” is the favored jargon among American social scientists and the historians they have mesmerized – that you can extract from their context and measure by current or retrospective survey research...Nor is it a Frankenstein monster that takes on a life of its own...¹¹⁵

Fields insists that the ideology of racism exists only as long as it reflects the true practice of racism. In short, a society that ceases to exploit people on a racist basis will cease to have any use for the absurd idea of “race,” which will dissolve; in reverse, the presence of racism proves the prevalence of racial exploitation, domination, and injustice. Fields holds, then, that ideas of any social consequence, such as racist ideology, reflect a material baseline in political economy.

This conventional Marxist definition of ideology informs my project for the principle it upholds – the embodied imbrication of material and ideal conditions of social life. When the Solidarity and FIS movements emerged, I argue, they reacted as citizen-subjects to the status of their social resources. Poles retained the strike option, if in a suspended form, but Algerians lost their meaningful political membership altogether. I have attributed the situation where activists interpret similar regime behavior and social suffering in polar ways – Solidarity sees the Polish
communists’ last gasp but Islamists perceived the Algerian pouvoir’s crushing victory – to subjective evaluations of objective conditions, conceptually clarifying this point in the previous section. When martial law prevented Poles and Algerians alike from using the resources that had formed their subjectivity as citizens, it was objectively true that neither Poles nor Algerians had effective tools for membership in the society – they were both objectively dehumanized. But Poles and the Polish political economy did not lose the systemic promise of necessary labor power, so their social resource was in abeyance, immanent in the overall social structure and in their physical, embodied lives as workers. These are the points I would stress in saying more about ideology: that citizen-subjectivity and experiential evaluation – like ideology in the sense Fields intends – are objective and subjective, material and ideal, as well as mental and physical. This is not a recent insight, but an element of Marx’s sociology affirmed in my research. This is, finally, pertinent to the outcome as subjective evaluations and objective conditions converge in the dependent variable violence/non-violence.

The concept “ideology,” manifestly related to my preferred concept of “evaluation,” has long been associated with a simplistic sense of truth/falsity and “flawed” understanding.116 “Ideology consists,” Žižek says, “in the very fact that the people ‘do not know what they are really doing,’ that they have a false representation of the social reality to which they belong (the distortion produced, of course, by the same reality).”117 This conventional case of ideology appears in Marx’s depiction of liberal “false consciousness”; we think ourselves free when we vote in elections that capitalist rationality establishes to eliminate our freedom. That is, we think we are free voters choosing candidates, but we are really doing capitalist atomism and oligarchic rule; we think we are simply in love or getting married, but we are really doing
patriarchal conservatism; we think we’re fighting a “war on terror,” but we are really doing the military-industrial complex. In all such accounts we don’t know what we are really doing; we are misled, confused, and bewildered – misrecognizing our world and necessarily ourselves. If asked what we are doing, we would get it wrong – our knowledge of our activity would be incorrect. Any revolutionary project of human emancipation from this social falsity requires a total critique of the ideology that systemically converts capitalism into democracy, patriarchy into romance, the military-industrial complex into the “war on terror.” If ideology falsifies the reality of the social world to enslave us in illusion, distraction, and artifice, then freedom can be realized only by casting truth, clarity, or reality against ideology.

The sources of illusion and misrecognition morphed across Marx’s writings on ideology. If Marx had an “early” style or sensibility, it is a romantic strain in depicting imaginative re-humanization. In “On the Jewish Question” Marx claims that the human need for free, creative, and social existence drives alienated, exploited people to project their quashed capacities into expressive fantasies. Religion, democracy, liberalism, and human rights express in “inverted” or “mediated” ways repressed human capacities – “the [self-]recognition of man in a roundabout way, through an intermediary.” Humans translate their besieged potency into fantasies of an all-powerful deity, their desire for community into democratic faith, and their exploited labor-power into images of capitalism expelled from the collective self, viz. the public realm. Such inversions mean that people invent narratives, symbols, or spaces above and beyond their material conditions as they reclaim, indirectly, their human essence. In addition, in a rarely grasped aspect of Marx’s analysis, these fantasies do not merely invert the world or produce palliative images of, but they also explicitly express the true desires people have for the world
they live in. For instance, religious belief does not merely project humanity as divinity in a soothing theodicy of salvation, but it also contains a direct rejection of religion itself. Although religious people do not realize it, by demanding the separation of church and state, that church be privatized, they are actually declaring that they want theology purged from public life, from themselves, the public. Likewise, the superficial commitment to liberal individualism is a coded message that denounces bourgeois ethics by banishing them from the communal order.

Ideology’s falsity and truth here lie in human invention – it is a fictive but real expression of human suffering. In early Marxian schemes, antipodean class versus human desires generate an ideological consciousness whose falsity is a psychic simulacrum and social displacement that exceeds, transcends, or negates material conditions and resources. Experience of the factory floor does not directly create the false beliefs (religion, democracy, rights) that express true if suffocated human attributes; rather, the inextinguishable human character adds to the material reality a re-humanizing assertion of psychological autonomy and social irreducibility: imagined deities who will rescue us in the anti-capitalist afterlife. This version of ideology – where reified humans superimpose on their physical, embodied lives compensatory fantasies rooted in their own denied subjectivity – combines the social truth (of exploitation) and falsity (religion/rights). The cause of ideology is class domination and exploitation; its source is psychological redress exceeding the immediate experience of material conditions. In this way, ideologies of religion, democracy, liberalism, and rights are quasi-autonomous inventions of the mind re-configuring the world against its material determination.

In Marx’s early writing on ideology, then, we find “a theory of historically specific social mediation allow[ing] for an analysis of both economic and philosophical thought as expressions
of a historical/material reality they don’t fully apprehend.” To believe in religion or God, one refuses the material reality of the cash nexus in one’s mind, hopes, and becoming but in a way that is also a re-materialization of one’s own experience, re-oriented by the discipline and release of faith. In this ideology, the falsity refracts, performs, and generates a series of discrete truths: bourgeois truths of wage labor, repressed truths of human capacity, and emergent truths of revolution. The falsity-truth dialectic here originates in the mental-spiritual work of the aggrieved as innate, involuntary abreaction. The key point here is that the falsity, seen in the fetishes of God, voting, or rights-discourse, does not directly translate but rather indirectly transcends material existence; that is, the beliefs deeply held by the objectified and exploited inhabitants of feudal or bourgeois orders cannot be inferred or deduced from their experience; they invent narratives, images, and happy endings as an act of reclaiming by expressing their humanity; and they do this not as objects or subjects in the ordinary senses of these terms, but as liminal object-subjects whose human “essence” expresses itself in images that mediate and meliorate suffering and alienation.

“Later” Marx offers another version of ideology that re-locates the falsity of ideology in doing rather than knowing (fantasizing). Marx re-situates the fetish and its origin in an account of false consciousness radiating directly from the production-consumption process. He sees the fetish as the commodity-form consolidated when we value the products of labor instead of production or labor as such. In passages on “contemplative materialism” and “fetishism of commodities and the secret thereof” Marx answers materialist objections that psychological projections are process of false rather than material consciousness. In Capital, Marx derives ideology instead from the social relations of production and valuation, where labor’s products
form materially as commodities. His equation [M]oney-[C]ommodity-[M]oney summarizes how capitalism gets people to attribute human value to exchanged commodities and currencies, while failing to perceive the productive process behind these – specifically the human misery, inequity, and alienation in the “hidden abode of production.” The central point is that in “commodity fetishism” false beliefs or perceptions directly reflect the partial and fragmentary vantage afforded by our social and productive location in the mode of production. We add nothing to our physical, material, and psychic experience in generating the commodity fetish. If the commodity is the new god, unlike the imaginary divine presence this one is real.

Here the ideological falsity represents “not knowing” one’s world, a lack imposed by social and economic constraints and reflected in the commodity fetish. If religious fabrications compensating for suffering are forged in the realm of knowing as a revolt against doing, the commodity-fetish translates material into mental life, a knowing forged by doing. Thus, Marx shifts the source and content of “false consciousness” from what we do mentally (imagine) to what we do physically (produce): from minds to bodies, from ideal to material. Our activities directly construct our mental life, including the Symbolic Order that shapes and reflects us. So Marx re-grounds the falsity of our consciousness in material conditions that directly forge our perception of social and personal life. Marx himself may be partly responsible for confusions on this point, however, as he says early in *Capital* that

> the existence of the things *qua* commodities and the value-relation between the products of labor which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the material relations arising from them. There it is a definite social relationship between men that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order to find an analogy, then, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world.
Marx is obtuse or abstract here, since “social” bases of ideology and false consciousness cover both “early” relatively idealist and “late” relatively materialist accounts. It may also be objected that “early” Marx corrected Feuerbach by re-grounding his claim that “God is alienated man” in material rather than ideal structures. Still, the difference between the gods of religion and democracy and the god of the commodity mark an analytical split that looks roughly like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suffering</th>
<th>Mystified</th>
<th>Fetish</th>
<th>Optic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology I</td>
<td>Alienation</td>
<td>Humanity</td>
<td>Religion/God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology II</td>
<td>Exploitation</td>
<td>Product</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
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<td>Lack/Subtraction</td>
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In early Marx capitalism seems to conclude the process of dehumanization, defined as a lost capacity to see oneself in the world substantively, either in one’s creativity or society. If feudalism afforded an artisanal subjectivity, however obsolescent, in craft-making or mutual obligation, capitalism finally suffocates this human experience, or species life. In both cases of ideological falsity – divinity, commodity – “to denounce fetishism is to find behind an imaginary formation a structurally symbolic relation,” but those structures, symbols, and relations transform with the deepening of capitalism, especially the diffusion of commodity-form, -valuation, and -fetishism. This shows Marx’s “materialist” consistency, as his account of ideology reflects capitalism’s improving ability to re-structure human valuation and subjectivity by preventing emancipatory images. From the 1840s to the 1870s, Marx reports a systemically conservative human-as-commodity replacing an immanently revolutionary human-as-God, the “similar” fetish marking a world-historical upheaval where indirect re-humanization through the God-image is suffocated by a completed de-humanization in the commodity-image.
As Žižek stresses, Marx’s insight was not merely that we prize commodities and profits over humans and values, or that capitalist instrumentality or competition are so all-consuming that we come to identify commodities as human value. As liberal humanists criticize capitalism in just these terms, Marx pointedly critiqued these “highly conscious” critics of this capitalist fetishism. Rejecting the artifice of commodity fetishism, the sophisticated thinker of social totality strives to see it clearly, fully, contextually, to correct false perception. He argues that commodities are fetishes that obscure the real world – the “real” relationships of workers to products, exploitation to bargains, or corporate investments to drone-warfare. Thus, he will insist that commodity fetishism is itself the locus of falsity, illusion, ideology, or spectacle. But, Marx insists, precisely this view is false, because in capitalism commodity-relations are the real social formation, and thus to perceive the world in commodity-fetishist terms reflects the truth. In turn, to pretend otherwise is false. Depicting the commodity-fetish as false consciousness or illusion, the critic would wrongly claim that true consciousness and presumably truth per se are available in rigorous knowledge of the total social system that “sees through” the fetish.

So the conscious subject is wrong; he sees the world ideologically and falsely in thinking that knowing the totality of doing can break the grip of artifice and deception by removing the blinders of commodity-centricity. The elitist totalizing theorist restores the primacy of knowing over doing, which is now false, in a doomed, socially abstract effort at revitalizing awareness as the path to emancipation. The knowing humanist says, “Capitalism has falsified human life into market rationality,” “financial flows are fictional, unlike real people and economic suffering,” etc. In a typical inversion, Marx sees this “true consciousness” as another false consciousness. It is false to think, in a capitalist society, that truth can be abstracted from the commodity form.
In this sense, commodity fetishism is the true consciousness of capital. To pretend otherwise is the real ideological falsification. As Žižek puts it:

> [T]he highest form of ideology does not reside in getting caught in ideological spectrality, forgetting about its foundation in real people and their relations, but precisely in overlooking this Real of spectrality and in pretending directly to address "real people with their real worries." Visitors to the London Stock Exchange get a free leaflet that explains that the stock market is not about mysterious fluctuations but about real people and their products. This really is ideology at its purest.\(^\text{128}\)

Hence, people’s highly developed consciousness about what they know and do leads them to misdiagnose the provenance of false social perceptions; they locate miscomprehension of the world in mental instead of physical activity – in knowing, not doing. Precisely by extrapolating philosophical themes or political meanings from activity, doing, physicality, and sensuousness, he says, conscious ideology-critics methodically misconstrue the social world. The unmediated experiences and mechanisms of capitalist exploitation and statist coercion are the real world: social truth that speaks concretely and directly.

One product of bourgeois-statist experience is the fragmentary view each member gains of the productive-extractive-distributive process. Subjects inhabit the mechanisms and forces of a social system and form directly, but partially, as a reflection of the social truth of that system. What would it mean to say that the inhabitants of a system have a false view of its workings, or a true view? In Marx’s sense, abstractions of lived habitations themselves form an idealism of self-designated conscious humanists who desire the truth/falsity of the world to be located in the luxurious life of the mind rather than in the material life of the body. Yet from the early account of ideology, we retain the sense that the dual corporeality (body politic/body personal) of material-social optics does not disable or exhaust imaginative or theoretical transcendence. I
am raising an analytical dilemma for the account of fetishism; it must specify how or if a system of social-subjective enclosure produces creative perception or willful action that is irreducible to material circulation. If commodity fetishism describes capital’s totalization of social life and de-totalization of social optics – its coeval invention of radical social holism and fragmentation – we need to know the source of our awareness of this bifurcated absolute social formation. It is not obvious how the ability to perceive commodity fetishism itself does not redound to credit the humanist account of cognitive autonomy or liberal theories of the subject. In other words, if commodity fetishism fosters awareness of its operations, then either awareness of commodity fetishism is a purely material product or some non-material interpretive intervention occurs to achieve this awareness. Marx’s view could be that fetishism and theoretical awareness of it are material expressions of social or productive relationships. If this were true, this theoretical awareness would still appear to be a non-necessary element within capitalist reproduction, not an inherent product for, or of, that system. In short, the theory of commodity fetishism – which for Marx and Žižek is itself a commodity – is not initially produced for profit, but is generated as a creative intervention that is then captured and commodified. This reclaims Marx’s early view that under capitalist exploitation and alienation people retain a capacity to invent and express genuinely anti-capitalist convictions, desires, and insights. A liberating awareness of fetishism, in this view, acts like religious or “political emancipation” – as yet another sigh of the oppressed generating images of escape and recuperation.

Marx’s and Žižek’s accounts of the fetish illuminate Sennett’s portrayal of the glass wars game in Cabrini Green, where the police triggered such distinct evaluations by the objects and subjects of America’s racial history. It is facile to say of such situations that we are never all
object or subject – never wholly self-legislating or systemically inscribed. For Marx and Sennett, this object-subject admixture is precisely what needs to be substantiated and theorized in social explanations. When white and black parents reacted to invasive law enforcement as protection and threat, respectively, their subjective response was a willful reaction to their objective pasts in a racial landscape. Similarly, when the commodity fetishism that replaces religious or political fantasies is destabilized by material threats to commodified social relations, worker-citizenship will reflect the instability of dehumanized labor in novel systemic subjectivities. Hence subject formation combines acted-upon and acting-on, objects and subjects of institutional contexts. Between under- and over-determined social evaluations and actions, people act as systemic subjects not by exiting their situation but deploying and adapting its resources for the variations they have developed on its overarching values.

The structures that subjectivize people can be as intensive or extensive as language and consciousness, so that in extreme cases of indoctrination subject and object collapse into each other. When citizenship regimes ground our systemic subjectivity in social resources, they forge objective settings that generate our orientations, expectations, inclinations, or interpretations but do not wholly dictate how we will think, feel, or act. Objective social systems and subjective responses are parametric in this sense: if I think, feel, or act purely as a subjective will “of my own” or as a seamlessly objective component “of a system,” I am not a systemic subject, vis. an effective, meaningful member of a human polity. To be a systemic subject entails the use of socially relevant resources to achieve objectives that are rendered coherent in the discursive environment. Contextual coherence implies that subjectivity is best not defined as a-contextual or suprastructural but as improvisational within and through significant social relationships.
The divide between justice and law exemplifies how the subjective emerges objectively. If I wish to morally challenge a legal apparatus or decision, short of revolution I will refer to a principle of justice I have derived at some subjective remove from the juridical order. But to be effective, my moral appeal “outside the law” must conform to extra- or non-legal values upheld by my fellow denizens. I cannot successfully advocate just any moral principles; and if I adduce moral views not already held by my compatriots, I risk being considered irrational or idiotic for good reasons. So as long as I opt for voice over exit my subjectivity operates within social confines beyond my control; my willful subjectivity is objectively constituted in a system. In my explanation of persistent Polish non-violence and sudden Algerian violence under martial law, the citizenship regime structures subjectivity in this way. Workers and clients interact with the state through the meanings and mechanisms of politicized labor or patronage; to act in some other system than this citizenship regime would decrease their systemic subjectivity. This is an enduring paradox of subjectivity in Marx and much post-structural theory cited above, notably Foucault’s disciplinary power: subjectivity must be enabled by objective social systems to which it can then respond within its parameters.

Sennett’s tale of the glass wars game emphasizes three observations found in Marx’s comments on commodity fetishism and Fanon’s dehumanization thesis that underscore my argument. First, evaluations are experiential – the continuity of past events as they mediate present circumstances. Second, experiential evaluations are collective; they represent historical and objective patterns of social subject-formation. Third, experiential evaluations and subject-formation produce social systems (regimes, norms, institutions) animated by gaps between the objective and subjective, physical and cognitive, and material-ideal components of subjectivity.
Confronting state coercion and expulsion, Polish Solidarity and Algerian Islamists responded, we might say, to the experiential evaluations of their subjectivities, threatened with extinction and measuring their historical resources for survival.

In the event, Algerians and Poles enacted two Marxist forms of experiential evaluation – religious and class-consciousness. In his essays on ideology, this contrast maps over two related progressions: labor’s advance from religious to class subjectivity and theory’s advance from idealist to materialist understanding. The violent parochialism of Algerian Islamists and non-violent universalism of Polish workers parallels these two progressions as the endurance of Poles’ effective citizenship and social resources enabled non-violent commitments by securing worker-citizen-subjectivity. If the inference is that Polish non-violence is morally or humanely superior to Algerian violence and that this advance mirrors Marx’s preference for realism over fantasy and class over religion, it could mean that the capacity to mobilize an address-to-all rather than an address-to-some is predicated on the practical co-existence of objective and subjective social evaluation.
CHAPTER THREE

Cases and Explanations

L. Hughes: A critical work has a very deep background; it does not come in a moment. I am perfectly willing to come back and give it to you later, if you are tired.

R. Cohn: No, we will sit here as long as you want to go on. But you are missing the point completely. What we want to determine is whether or not you meant those words when you said them.

Hughes: Sir, whether or not I meant them depends on what they came from and out of.

US Senate Testimony

Humans have constantly shifting and deeply contradictory attitudes and desires, which we can render seemingly constant and consistent only at very high price, a price few moderns are willing to pay. The realization of this is perhaps the most important thing that divides us, but it divides us forever, from a world in which Kantian philosophy could be taken seriously. We can’t generalize all our maxims successfully, and we don’t have to. I can easily disapprove of and oppose a proposal to introduce gladiatorial games in the twenty-first century and yet remain neutral or even positive about them in Rome. My relation to Rome is not practical.

Raymond Geuss

§3.a Principles of Comparison

This chapter introduces the cases with critical analyses of similarities that draw Poland and Algeria into fruitful comparison and differences that may explain their divergent paths. I have presented the puzzle and listed the commonalities that enrich it above (§1.a). Because the outcomes I examine diverge this chapter’s primary concern is to address differences between Poland and Algeria that could impeach my explanation (§1.b). In these prefatory comments, I will briefly qualify my research and writing decisions.

This chapter assumes that social scientific methods can offer criteria for asserting and falsifying explanations. As research designs test the limits and promise of their methods, this
assumption is posited so as to address, not suppress, debates about reliable social knowledge. I adopt Mill’s comparative method – matching different antecedent and consequent variables⁴ – cautiously, knowing it has been criticized for its static, non-causal configurations and inferences. Similarly, I process trace institutional and activist trajectories to supplement the comparative format, knowing the problems of imposing initial conditions and isolated variable analysis on historical narratives. Waldner, for example, insists that comparative process tracing alone does not provide causal mechanisms: “for proponents of process tracing,

the distinction between a causal pathway and a causal mechanism imposes an obligation to not claim too much. Identifying causal pathways in a critical ingredient of science. But the identification of mechanisms has been celebrated as going one step further, as adding deep explanatory knowledge...Those who identify processes but not mechanisms should take great pains to demarcate properly their explanatory accomplishments.⁵

Responding to this insight, I state, trace, and test the mechanism of citizen-subjectivity as the motor of the causal pathway from state and subject formation to social agitation, without any pretense that an ideographic, small-N study will produce “deep explanatory knowledge.”⁶

My hope is that this chapter and the case studies provide a credible resolution to the puzzle posed in the introduction and perhaps join ongoing discussions in the sub-field about political knowledge and social explanation. This chapter thus replaces the standard literature review that takes a separate chapter to review alternative explanations of the dependent variable. Instead, I derive a review of literatures from the case studies and research design, to isolate variables that might explain the eventual Algeria violence and Polish non-violence. A literature review drawn from the cases rather than variables serves my explanation of specific outcomes and avoids digressing into arguments about violence, institutions, and resources in general or in other situations. My project is not designed to propose or test a grand theory;
rather the opposite, I wish to see if a narrow puzzle and solution might facilitate exploration of micro-political dynamics. If my study were to contribute to a grand theory, happily, it would come from specific findings of a small study that confines explanation to a different grandeur – that of subject formation. In this spirit I do not address insightful thematic readings of these outcomes, such as “third wave” democratization, the “rise of civil society,” or the diffusion of grassroots democracy.

I will turn to my modified literature review after some smaller notes about this study. First, to find the impetus to violent and non-violent strategies, I study divergent outcomes from similar conditions. Radically distinct responses in Poland and Algeria to fiscal crisis and martial law generate a puzzle that has survived the finest intra-regional research on state formation and social movements and on political sociology and social action. I do not in this sense see my argument as correcting or contesting others but assimilating or responding to them, often within their agendas or premises. The findings from my cases that framing is both material and ideal, for instance, or that historical evaluations more than immediate conditions of suffering define protest decisions are intended as interlocutions with other works on ideational forces or political opportunity structures. So I relegate academic commentaries to endnotes, where parallels and distinctions are drawn. My explanation may recall Huntington’s linking effective party centralization to stable social integration in Political Order in Changing Societies, but it slows the analysis to stop and counter his analysis or differentiate it from mine.

Second, I limit my case selection to already-existing widespread movements to bracket the potential problem for my hypothesis of successful dehumanization of a population, i.e., the absence of effective citizenship. Restricting my puzzle, research design, and explanation to the
evolution rather than emergence of social activism allows me to ask how citizen-subjectivities structure strategies; how systems without citizen-subjectivity operate is a related but arguably distinct question (§2.d). But if my model addresses the effects of meaningful membership in decision-making, for that very reason it is troubling to exclude cases where state brutality has actually reified subjects, eliminating their will, citizenship, and subjectivity without rebellion.

This puzzle, the vanishing point between subject and object (say, between Saddam’s Iraq and Algeria), as I have argued, cannot be solved without a robust theory of human consciousness. This constraint leaves me to glean from case studies of effective citizenship regimes how they vary in structure and outcome.

Third, I confine my study to manageable parameters. Soon after the fall of the Soviet empire, Adam Przeworski, an analyst of Poland and social science methods, wrote:

> [S]ocial science is not very good at sorting out underlying causes and precipitating conditions; witness the fifty years of controversy over the fall of Weimar. For the response to the question “Why did communism collapse?” is not the same as to ‘Why did it collapse in the autumn of 1989?’ It is easier to explain why communism had to fall than why it did.

His criteria for “sorting out underlying causes and precipitating conditions” are stringent. He thinks a strong explanation would have to show not only why an empire had to fall but also why it did fall – and by why he means when. My research design prepares an examination of institutional effects on protest outcomes in a definite temporal and spatial frame. The cases focus on the time period in relatively autarkic Poland (§4) and Algeria (§5) from state formation to activist responses to martial law. This frame lets me compare the variables I have advanced in my explanation [citizen-subjectivity (IV) and violence/non-violence (DV)] by contrasting
causal properties between Poland and Algeria while also tracking ambient factors within each country that may have affected the outcomes or debates in the specialized literatures.

Finally, in keeping with my wish to study particular institutions of subjectivity, adopting a refined conventional concept of violence (§1.b), I recognize certain shared features of Polish and Algerian political domination and resistance without addressing them – prominently the exercise and effect of disciplinary, ideological, and bio-political power. Authoritarian rule in Poland and Algeria, as in all modern states, governed with combined tools that cannot be ignored in portraying the mechanisms of social power and action. Exclusions like this occur as I wish to analyze only similarities that merit drawing Poland and Algeria into a comparison and only differences that may explain discretionary outcomes. Examining the shared and distinct features of Polish and Algerian authoritarian political arrangements sifts out all but citizenship regimes and social resources as the sources of dissident choices and yields case studies focused on systemic subjectivity.

Having said that, I do not casually or grudgingly analyze alternative variables or theories, but consider them as grave challenges to my account. None of this is to insinuate that analytical rigor will prove religious values or Soviet intimidation did not decide the outcomes. I suspect, instead, that scrutiny may deepen confusion about the cause of violence. Perhaps this is why Przeworski says, comfortingly, that “social science is not very good at sorting out underlying causes and precipitating conditions.” As I implied earlier, we should welcome the possibility that social science cannot explain violence as a contribution to our knowledge but only as a last resort. As Geuss advises,
If [some] notion...does not make any sense...then one should simply let it go, even if one does not immediately see what exact effect that will have on one’s mode of living and thinking. To demand that thinking, whatever the circumstances, _always_ be ‘affirmative’ is itself a form of repression that we should resist, and also a form of folly.18

§3.b  _Poland and Algeria: Similarities_  

This section on the similarities between Poland and Algeria is divided into political and discursive histories, admittedly clumsy rubrics. The political history will follow the chronological order, roughly, from state building through the declaration of martial law – that is, tracking the variables until the explanatory difference in the cases produced the divergent outcomes. The discursive history is topical, not chronological, and compares a range of ideological and cultural aspects of Polish and Algerian life. This section encapsulates political and discursive features of the countries in a suggestive rather than conclusive manner, given the depth of each topic. This section seeks, then, to provoke interest in Poland and Algeria; to promote them as productively compared; and to offer reasons why these factors, as more similar than different, are excluded from the causal pathway. This last purpose especially Justifies a lengthy consideration of Polish and Algerian similarities. Several shared political or discursive elements are counter-intuitive and must be _argued into similarity_. In other words, while the next section denies that proposed differences explain the outcomes, this section denies that certain variables are different at all. If my discussion is wrong about a difference, it immediately weakens my explanation; in contrast, if my discussion is wrong about a similarity, this does _not_ hurt my explanation unless the causal
weight of the variable is shown in a separate argument. This possibility means this section matters as much as the one after and is not merely a tour d’horizon.

§3.b.1 Political history

Polish and Algerian state formation succeeded the imperial invasion, occupation, partition and finally military decimation of their societies. Poland (1795-1918) and Algeria (1783-1962) had similarly long periods of external domination, marked by foreign penetration and domestic resistance. Poland, Algeria. While Russia, Austria, and Prussia trisected Poland France assimilated and settled Algeria, whose family lineages (zawaya) and brotherhoods (turuq) achieved unprecedented unity under expansive, exploitative colonial rule. The images of occupied, reconfigured Algeria and Poland contrast. Once fragmented, Algeria was integrated; once integrated, Poland was disintegrated. The inference might be that independent Algeria inherited an experience of centralized states and cohesive opponents, cultivated under French control, that Poland lacked. But the French colonization of Algeria proved as decentralizing and fragmenting as Poland’s partition. The relatively secluded, city-state political economies that grew up under French supervision, populated by intermediate-class immigrants from Corsica, Italy, and Spain defined urban centers like Bône, creating internal division and colonization as divided and disconnected as the Polish population during the partition and German occupation of WWII. Poland and Algeria militantly resisted foreign control on national and religious lines, repeatedly taking up arms while cultivating a constitutive demand for independence.

After a brief moment of hope for autonomy and national recognition in the interwar period, WWII and anti-colonial revolution decimated Poland and Algeria politically, socially, and
economically. Poland and Algeria together came to symbolize the worst of fascistic and imperial savagery, which had massacred Poles and Algerians and razed their societies with the mixture of ferocity and indifference notorious in racist total war. Their infrastructures destroyed, populations gutted, and economic wealth pillaged, Poland and Algeria founded postwar states in the literal rubble of war and poverty of dependency. These struggles also inherited vibrant agitations among Poles and Algerians seeking to define the new states and their obligations to citizens, a mobilization of energy, parties, and programs that recalls an overflowing account of Haiti’s “postoccupation period” (1934-): “a bewildering welter of evanescent mini-movements, groupuscules, political parties, and publications mutating almost too rapidly for the eye to follow.” Both states, under the distinct hegemonies of, respectively, the Soviet Union and France, confronted the dilemmas typical of late developers: highly motivated citizens’ making diverse if not incompatible demands on impoverished and conflicted ruling elites for favorable policies and state institutions. As a result, Poland’s communist party and Algeria’s army and FLN struggled for several years under provisional state structures to articulate membership criteria for citizens and the organization of the regime. Marx described this chaotic dynamic effectively:

Like the government, everything that was instigated, attempted, or enunciated during this period proclaimed itself to be provisional. Nothing and nobody ventured to lay claim to the right of existence and of real action...Every party construed it in its own sense. Having been won by the proletariat by force of arms, the proletariat impressed its stamp on it and proclaimed it to be a social republic. There was thus indicated the general content of the modern revolution, which stood in most singular contradiction to everything that, with the material at hand, with the degree of education attained by the masses, under the given circumstances and relationships, could be immediately realized in practice...In no period therefore do we find a more confused mixture of high-flown phrases and actual uncertainties and clumsiness, of more enthusiastic striving for innovation and more deeply rooted domination of the old routine, of more apparent harmony of the whole society and more profound estrangement of its elements.
Marx evokes the “confused mixture of high-flown phrases and actual uncertainties and clumsiness” of the state building process in both countries, notably naming the people’s parties and public programs of a “social republic.” One central difference between Poland and Algeria, one central to Marx’s passage and my explanation, is the presence of the proletariat. Poland, in the nineteenth-century, had a class-conscious proletariat, absent in Algeria, competing for state largesse with a powerful agricultural base, present in Algeria. State centralization and ruling elite consolidation were achieved in both countries through public provision; citizen integration in political parties and ancillary informal mechanisms such as work sites and patronage networks; and physical coercion. But Motyl distinguishes conditions in Central-Eastern Europe from those of Algeria, although “challenges facing...the successor states [are] unprecedented:

Never before have postcolonial elites had to sweep away the wreckage of totalitarianism and build everything from scratch. Native elites have been untrained, unskilled, and unprepared for the tasks of governing countries in all postcolonial settings, but only the post-Soviet elites must also overcome a seventy-year totalitarian legacy that did not just distort, in classical and colonial fashion, the polities, societies, economies, and cultures inherited from pre-Soviet times but actually destroyed them. Indian elites inherited British institutions; Algerian elites could draw on an intact society; even black South Africans are in a comparatively better position, since existing white institutions can be opened to them.25

It is difficult to compare the disembowelment of different societies in such times, surely, and the pressures they impose in survivors. Not only had partition impeded autonomous Polish institutional development, which now the Soviets would as well, but also the Nazi occupation was designed to obliterate the country. During the Wehrmacht’s invasion of Poland, the head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office) and second to Himmler in the Schutzstaffel, Reinhard Heydrich, ordered the Einsatzgruppen to murder all Polish communist party members, “the nonparty intelligentsia..., scholars, teachers, writers and journalists,
priests, public officials, upwardly mobile peasants, and the most prominent industrialists and bankers...[as well as] relatives and friends...\textsuperscript{26} Not only were elites directly targeted but for the entire population the “aim of the Nazi regime was not to assimilate but decimate the non-German population in the areas to be colonized in order to clear space and seize resources for Germans.”\textsuperscript{27} Within weeks the Germans burned 531 towns and villages, committed 714 mass executions, killing 16,376 persons – most Polish Christians and many children.\textsuperscript{28} The earlier Polish military repulsion of the Soviets in 1920 foretold the horrors to succeed these atrocities under Stalin\textsuperscript{29}: “most... commanders, Russian or Polish, who played a role in 1920...were caught up in the machinery of terror”\textsuperscript{30} and brutality of Russification\textsuperscript{31} on the eve of quasi-autonomy.\textsuperscript{32}

If Poland’s suffering and victimization were distinctively comprehensive and unrelieved, in political terms the effect of Algeria’s colonization and revolution were comparable, from the “dismemberment of the great tribes” of Algeria by the French in the nineteenth-century to the rise of anti-imperial “Jacobin Islam.”\textsuperscript{33} Indeed, much as in Poland, the newly independent state in Algeria inherited a long history of systematic efforts to dismantle the indigenous institutions and inhabitants with incessant waves of immigration, land appropriation, and political changes enforce by incarceration and massacres. As Ruedy says,

Settler colonialism in 124 years effectively destroyed in Algeria the primary elements of the traditional elite. Most were undone by the corrosive effects of years of military conflict, by systematic and state-engineered dispossession by colon and their landed wealth, or by the legislative and judicial procedures specifically aimed at substituting the colonial state as the mediator of interpersonal and intergroup relations.\textsuperscript{34}

Finally, Poles and Algerians were assailed and cleansed at the height of political consciousness and activism, both sides preparing the ground for state formation. The expulsion of returning Poles and remaining Jews after the war, a year after the Warsaw uprising, loosely parallels the
French assault on Algerians beginning in the same year after Algerians in Constantine and Sétif murdered *colon*. It was the survivors of comprehensive dispossession and destruction, forming coalitions of inexperienced rulers, bureaucrats, generals, and party organizers, who designed regimes in Poland and Algeria that could integrate diverse and passionate interests.\(^\text{35}\)

Poles and Algerians referred to these regimes simply as the *power or powers*. Algerians call their state *le pouvoir*; Poles call it *władze*, “literally ‘powers.’ The word is untranslatable, since its meaning is embedded in the entire system of political relations under which Poland has been ruled since 1948.”\(^\text{36}\) Although I will argue that the *citizenship regime*, a practical mode of politicizing and incorporating non-state agents into the centralizing state, differed in Poland and Algeria, the two states developed common governance apparatuses. In “overcoming the problem of securing accountability of rationalized administrative roles to political leaders,” each state combined what Silberman calls “informal social networks [with] systematic eligibility characteristics” and “formal organization of leadership, principally through political parties.”\(^\text{37}\)

Informal networks run on “private criteria for exclusion” in which “accountability is secured through shared social status and experience of political and administrative leaders”; in formal systems, such as political parties, the “criteria for eligibility are public and well defined.” Setting aside distinct formal regime-types in his study and mine, which lends terms like *public* different meanings, this duality illuminates a difference-within-a-similarity in Poland and Algeria. Each state relied on informal and formal mechanisms to secure its infrastructural capacity to monitor citizens and claim central authority. The Polish communist party (PZPR) and Algerian socialist party (FLN) were formal systems of social location, promotion, and surveillance that paralleled informal channels of personal prestige and influence, both mediated by the military.
Single-party military rule appear to be similar formal components of Polish and Algerian authoritarianism, but this commonality requires qualification. Specialists on Poland and Algeria note that granular study of these “public” mechanisms of recruitment and coercion reveal that Poland’s party and Algeria’s military were the decisive political instruments of public policy and ruling class incumbency. Roberts, for instance, states that “the Party of the FLN never ruled Algeria,” a military government since 1962, but merely enforced and justified its decisions. In contrast, Michnik always insisted, the military never dictated to the communist party in Poland, although, Davies says, “the triumph of the one-party system was never perfectly complete.”

To sort out these descriptions, we may distinguish between policymaking and governance patterns while qualifying the sense of “formality” in both cases. First, in Poland and Algeria ruling elites dictated as crony capitalists and political entrepreneurs, using party and military apparatuses to enforce their decisions, so it can be misleading to reduce policy adoption or implementation to these institutions themselves. If the party or the military consistently operated to promote its own interests, however, this might signal a party-state versus a military state, with potential impact on my outcomes – we might expect citizens of party-run state to be less militarized than citizens of an army-state. But scrutiny suggests that in both cases the party was a personnel-management system while the military used its coercive power to secure its business interests. These priorities and hierarchies appeared especially in the lead-up to and declaration of martial law. It is worth noting that the PZPR was inherently illegitimate, as Stalin conceded, and that the use of the military particularly against workers, even to restore “order,” instantly called into question the “worker state’s” credibility. In contrast, because its leaders had fought France, the FLN was seen, evidently, as a revolutionary, indigenous, and
legitimate party. But it is hard to see how the greater legitimacy of the army or party in Algeria relative to Poland would explain the outcomes in question, especially since the army discredited itself with the 1992 putsch.

One possible explanation is that military or revolutionary leaders are more disciplinary, rigid, or unimaginative in dealing with opposition movements, hammers seeing all protests as nails. It must be said in this respect that the Algerian regime from 1962 until the present has been relatively consistent, whereas the Polish regime began as a far more totalitarian structure than the FLN-ALN sought or achieved and then “de-Stalinized” after Khrushchev’s 1953 speech. As Ekiert describes it, “The Stalinist period in Poland ends for all practical purposes in 1956:

The controlled de-Stalinization crisis reconstituted Poland’s political elite and led to limited concessions to various social groups and organizations. Repressive political practices were abandoned or altered, despite the preservation of social and economic legacies of the Stalinist transformation and the institutional structures of the party-state. Although the post-1956 regime gradually retreated from its promises of political liberalization and economic reforms, Poland never came close to a reestablishment of Stalinist-type political control.42

As we shall see in more detail, like Poland Algerian rulers grasped the need for support among the citizenry and bargained and negotiated its way to practical legitimacy. But here we have to remember that authoritarian rule achieves greater power by engaging the subjects rather than objects of the state (§2.d). “Authoritarian legitimacy” in each case achieved with the absence of totalitarian enclosure what Andrei Plesu calls the “imperfection of evil:

Communist dictatorships, especially, distinguish themselves by the surprising interstices in which rules are suspended. The law can suddenly become lax for no apparent reason....[T]he infringement of the totalitarian norm plays an important part in the configuration of intellectual life under dictatorship... [Arbitrariness seems only to weaken the functional network of power. But] it consolidates it, adding a confusing coefficient of unpredictability.”43
To summarize where we are in depicting similarities: Poland and Algeria developed centralized formal and informal mechanisms of power operated through the military-party nexus to resolve problems of unstable incumbency and intra-elite conflict by integrating citizens into negotiated and partially legitimate regimes after crippling foreign assaults on their countries. As I have also implied, Poland gradually added politicized labor-intensive production sites to its system of citizen assimilation, and this state-worker nexus without substantive counterpart in Algeria’s exclusive reliance on informal networks will become the key instrument of the state.

Late-developing states’ capacity to construct a regime and to forge citizens into discrete subjects, as these distinct supplemental practices of citizen assimilation entail, implies Poland and Algeria exemplify the “over-institutionalization” thesis posited by Kesselman:

The cause of political disorder in modern politics is the obverse of the cause of political disorder in developing polities. By contrast to transitional regimes, in modern polities disorder does not derive from the inability of political institutions to contain participation. Rather, it frequently comes from their past success in accommodating challenges, demands, and rising participation – for this very past success may hinder current adaptation.44

Polish and Algerian state formation gained by “accommodating challenges, demands, and rising participation” that indeed came to restrict ruling elites’ room for maneuver.45 Algeria and Poland were both over-institutionalized states, according to this formulation; despite achieving bureaucratic competence after a generation, the regimes were over-extended in commitments to citizens, notably vis-à-vis distributive obligations, and largely incapable of policy adjustments that would guarantee incumbency and avoid social agitation.46 Both countries consolidated, in addition, “asymmetrical institutionalization,” “whereby the political system is strong out of all proportion to other social systems, even though the latter may be even more highly valued.”47 This thesis that the developmental state paralyzes itself, “hindering [subsequent] adaptation”
by institutionally accommodating “rising participation,” is consistent with Waldner’s description of “precocious Keynesianism.” Fitting this model neatly, Poland and Algeria overcame intra-elite conflict by giving side-payments to “constituent clients,” securing incumbency by allying a sub-section of the ruling class with a sub-section of the ruled or “popular class.” As a result, however, ruling elites consolidated a state and regime conditioned on cross-class obligations that bind the state to its contract with a now dependent constituency.

These models of over-institutionalized a precious Keynesian state incorporation differ or complement each other in deriving subsequent hindrances to policy latitude from the means of initial state consolidation. Both focus on state commitments to social actors; Waldner focuses on collective action dilemmas, while Kesselman emphasizes bureaucratic path dependence. In cases of similar social outlays and integration into state agencies or policy-making processes, an intervening variable is required to explain the rise and variation in widespread social agitation. For instance, Habermas’s discussion of the “overburdened” state, with its family resemblance to Kesselman’s over-institutionalized state, is descriptive but not explanatory:

The explanation [of crisis] begins with an “inflation of expectations and claims, heightened by competing political parties, the mass media, and pluralist interests. The pressure of popular expectations “explodes” in a drastic expansion of the volume of state activity. As a result, the steering instruments of state administration are overburdened. This overburdening leads to a loss of legitimacy, especially when the scope of state activity is restricted by parliamentary power blocs and when citizens blame the government for tangible economic losses. This is all the more when the loyalty of the population depends on material compensation.

His account of “legitimation crisis” is a valid general portrayal but “no satisfactory explanation is given...for the dynamics of change” and no variation in this “explosion” acknowledged or thus addressed. That burdened monopolistic bureaucracies and paralyzed welfare state in countries
like Poland and Algeria produced such distinct social movements suggests that an intervening variable is needed for a “satisfactory explanation” of how these crucial state dynamics evolve.\(^5^3\)

The earliest significant indication of the constraints on state prerogative in structuring the political economy of Poland and Algeria is their similar failure to collectivize agricultural production. Algerian *autogestion* in the late 1960s and Polish collectivization in the 1950s were reversed within a few years. Well into their import substituting industrialization, urbanization, and modernization programs, Poland and Algeria had retained largely agricultural populations. Stalin’s 1944 land reform had destroyed the extant Polish aristocracy and gentry, distributing all private holdings over 50 hectares to poor peasants.\(^5^4\) From this starting-point, collectivization threatened a reversal for rural workers; thus, “the political authority...had to retrench and compromise...in the area of agriculture when the regime had to withdraw in 1956 from its...collectivization because the Polish peasant was unwilling to give up the gains he had personally derived from the land reform.”\(^5^5\) Sweeping privatizations of rural Poland sacrificed a core tenet of socialist *praxis*, creating a demonstration-effect for the efficacy of social protest. In this light, the magnitude of the state’s capitulation matters greatly. After “the number of collective farms fell from 10,150 on 30 September to 1,534 on 31 December 1956...price subsidies and guaranteed grain quotas remained until 1989.”\(^5^6\) Hardly a simple material buy-off, this de-collectivization established a permanent class of powerful rural smallholders; holding over three-quarters of arable land in a country where thirty per cent of the labor force was agricultural, this “big chunk of the population wanted a change of regime, convinced, wrongly, that capitalism would ensure the permanence of their claim to property.”\(^5^7\) The regime
institutionalized an enemy to overcome intra-elite conflict and prevent an opposition alliance among “intellectuals, students, radical party activists, and workers.”

In contrast, Algerian agriculture was a class hierarchy. In 1962 25,000 families held estates of 100 hectares on half the arable land; “100,000 middle peasant households farmed holdings of from 10 to 50 hectares; [and s]ome 450,000 families farmed holdings smaller than 10 hectares and of these, about 120,000 owned less than 1 hectare.” The state’s “socialist turn” carried the “agrarian revolution,” affecting “one-fourth of the agricultural land and about 120,000 beneficiaries, who were organized into cooperatives of various types” under bureaucratic federal management. Algerian collectivization thus ramified into landowner opposition and “support from those...from poorer and peasant backgrounds.” This disparity between the residual and effective landed elites of the Algerian countryside and the egalitarian and powerful landed workers of Poland might seem critical for subsequent protest events and regime instability. Algerian elites but Polish peasants, along with the Catholic Church, opposed rural socialism, after all, suggesting a reactionary non-state power source in Algeria absent in Poland. But the contrast should not be schematized for ready inferences vis-à-vis revolutions from above and below. In each country landed classes prevailed in a socially conservative agenda, preventing or reversing state-driven collectivization by effecting rural incorporation. Moreover, in both cases rural privatization and incorporation were defined by state control over “all aspects of the production process, [including] all sources of supply of fertilizers and fodder, all banks, and all distribution and sales networks.” Differentiated by wealth, Polish and Algerian landowners acceded in their bargained pacification, leading to a marginal or delayed participation in the collective protests eventuating in the cities. In the de-legitimation
of the state in hard times, renounced rural-incorporation may target the party structure in a manner irreducible to simplified class-revolutionary statics.

Failed or “corrected” efforts in socialist economies to collectivize agriculture in state-directed cooperatives attest to the political importance of incorporating rural populations. Socialist cooperatives constituted a coercion-and-surveillance strategy organized as a form of industrialized “kinship economy” combining material and social reciprocity of agricultural societies with modern production. Indeed, rural incorporation may have been a sine-qua-non of institutional consolidation that allowed broad political support for further development to occur at all. As one study of state-building and rural politics puts it,

In virtually every case of rural incorporation regime founders use the political leverage generated by rural support to establish corporatist controls over urban labor movements which are attached to regime-supporting political parties, creating...an ‘integrative party system’ that can contain social conflict...If and when extra-coalitional opponents of these political-economic arrangements emerge, they will have great difficulty soliciting mass support and they will thus be more easily isolated and defeated without regime change.

Algerian and Polish state formation adhered to this pattern, first attempting strong agricultural centralization, then pacifying rural constituents through bargains, concessions, and incentives – in both cases incorporation strategies aimed at stable coalition-formation. Given the dominion of the party systems in communist and postcolonial socialist states, one might credit the party with whatever durability centralization achieved, including peasant integration managed by the communist party. Following Collier and Collier we could, on this logic, describe Poland and Algeria as in effect “labor” and “radical” parties, and perhaps derive the outcomes from the endurance of these “party” systems. This presence of urban or rural labor as a social formation with political relevance and identity is central to my project, as is its absence, so this
framework is tempting. That is, one could either credit the official party with any successful incorporation or call the any form of integration in effect a party. We could then try to define failed and successful party incorporation to see if it maps over protest strategies. The problem with this strategy, it seems, is that the measure of party efficacy becomes protest itself, which means party activity becomes a descriptor or falls out of the explanation of social agitation. We find this circularity in Huntington’s claim: “In modernizing society ‘building the state’ means in part the creation of an effective bureaucracy, but, more important, the establishment of an effective party system capable of structuring the participation of new groups in politics.”

In other words, it is difficult to know whether rural incorporation in Poland and Algeria strengthened or weakened the political parties or, in that regard, whether this shared failure-turned-success (failed collectivization-turned-incorporation) affected protest outcomes. It is feasible that the process held an inverse predictive value: the higher the party efficacy or rural incorporation, the lower the regime durability. Here the comparative incorporations noted by Huntington but theorized by Waldner enter the causal story. In his model deriving economic and political outcomes from intra- or cross-class coalitions, Waldner holds that the effect of discrete incorporation patterns on the politicized class structure is paramount – specifically, the “reduction in influence or even elimination of major portions of the former political elite.”

Polish and Algerian elites incorporated rural classes without directly or immediately costing former political elites power. Different rural class structures inherited by the postwar regimes tempt greater distinctions. In this sense, similarities in Polish and Algerian rural-incorporation show early signs of state vulnerability to cooperative citizens rather than clear gains for party or ruling class strength. With at best indirect effects on the stated outcome of this project, it
seems both states purchased stability at high short- and long-term costs. Rural resistance to state encroachment derived in part from efforts to protect religious endowments derived from property holdings, yielding similar patterns of anti-authoritarian and sometimes anti-secular feelings among prominent religious leaders.

Rural incorporation did not enable agricultural workers or owners to dictate terms to the states, which repressed prices to subsidize industrialization. In conjunction with rural integration, Poland and Algeria based their distinct import-substituting industrialization plans on urban-biased and foreign-indebted state investment, planning, subsidies, and welfare payouts. On the debt ledger, Frieden reports that Poland and Algeria were among the world’s top commercial-rate borrowers from the 1960s on:

In the 1960s governments in such widely varied countries as Algeria, Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea – in partnership with and financed by the international banks in a pattern of foreign indirect investment – began the systematic construction of integrated domestic economic structures. These nationalistic state-capitalist regimes have joined with the internationalist finance-capitalists of the Euromarkets: the banks provide the capital, the state provides the muscle and brains to force-march the countries involved into the industrialized world. 71

Note that Algeria was a member of this prestigious club of debtors, because its “petro-state” revenues afforded it an excellent credit rating; in contrast, Poland was credible for its labor-intensive and -repressive industries. Ironically, one reason these ideologically communist or socialist states borrowed from high-interest private banks was their refusal to become indentured to state-capitalism. Richards and Waterbury summarize the economic portfolio and dilemmas of the Algerian economy:

The key weaknesses of the Boumediène strategy were excess capacity, overcentralization, unemployment, massive rural-to-urban migration, and serious neglect of agriculture. These problems elicited halfhearted reform measures that helped delegitimize the government as it
imposed hardships, but failed to deliver a restructured economy. The situation in the early 1980s was increasingly difficult. Labor productivity had actually declined in both the hydrocarbon and the nonoil public-industrial sector...These problems can be traced to the...concentration on heavy industry and to management problems of state-owned enterprises. The economic argument for developing heavy industry was based on linkage effects: These industries were to provide the basic materials for others that would supply the population with its needs. It is true that basic metals and energy industries have high forward linkages, but they are also very capital-intensive and create relatively few jobs. Worse, in Algeria they were run as monopolies, giving enterprise managers little reason to be efficient.\textsuperscript{72}

Similarly, by 1981, the year the state imposed martial law, Poland’s “foreign debt had escalated to $27B with the industrialized West: $2billion more than the Bank of England’s total reserves...The implacable force of compound interest has raised debt-service above the level of Polish falling exports...as Western creditors dictated more draconian preconditions for the rescheduling of the debt.”\textsuperscript{73} “It was certainly an unfortunate coincidence [for Gierek’s economic restructuring of the early 1970s] that foreign indebtedness was reaching high levels but before investment paid off in terms of productivity and greater exports the Polish economy was affected by the international inflation and recession that followed the first energy crisis.”\textsuperscript{74}

In addition to the doctrinaire insistence on extreme centralization, excessive investment in heavy industry, and concomitant neglect of agriculture and consumer goods, Gierek’s policy of rapid industrialization – financed by Western banks and paid for by increasing exports of coal, copper, and other products – resulted in staggering debts, the decline of industries lacking in support infrastructures and unable to produce enough exports for a dwindling foreign market, and thus in the virtual paralysis of the country’s economy.\textsuperscript{75}

Poland and Algeria had, then, similar economic dilemmas: over-centralization, indebtedness, decreasing productivity, and refusal to restructure the economy. Because in both cases, state legitimacy rested on economic success, given the discursive focus on distribution and equality, economic failures set the citizens against the state \textit{politically}. After years of collective sacrifice over price increases, shortages, and black market activities, the illusory pay-offs promised from
these state policies were inflammatory, even without visibly growing income disparities. Note, among these similarities, one key distinction between Algeria’s capital-intensive and Poland’s labor-intensive production, fostering weak and strong working classes, respectively.

Leading up to the uprisings followed by martial law, Poland and Algeria suffered severe fiscal crises that forced them to adopt austerity measures that discredited their rule and caused mass suffering. Both states had steep debt service payments on commercial loans taken in an effort at stimulus-led rather than development or reform-led growth. Both economies suffered from incoherent domestic policy and global oil-price shocks, although causal inferences linking these shocks to social movements are contested. How oil rents affect regime construction is a significant difference that I address below, but the shared experience with oil-price shocks is relevant here mainly in similarly spurring protests. Algeria’s political economy depended on oil-rent distribution, and the 1984- oil-price drop impoverished Algerians who took to the streets in 1988. Poland suffered its oil crisis in reverse, in an earlier period, during the rise in prices during OPEC’s manipulation of the oil trade, 1973-4. The higher prices hit the Gierek regime when it was implementing reforms requiring reserves imperiled by even small shifts in oil prices. As I have implied, these fiscal crises rendered both states functionally insolvent, trapping them with massive foreign debt, threatening the informal “contract” based on side payment distributions, and derailing development schemes. Again, these startling similarities do not obviously map over the outcomes in question. In the causal model I have presented, it is worth stressing, fiscal crisis constitutes the first stage of protest that sets the stage for assessing state responses to collective grievance and mass mobilization in a second potentially moralistic evaluation.
These fiscal crises sparked spontaneous and diffuse demonstrations that contributed to gradually converging and unified opposition movements. Algeria’s 1988 riots began as spontaneous protests against inflation, unemployment, poverty, and reduced subsidies; led to criticisms of government corruption and growing disparities of income; and with the brutal state reprisals finally promoted relatively organized Islamist groups to form an opposition coalition powerful and secular enough to attract many non-Islamists. The ascendance of the Islamists was organizational, institutional, and economic as much as ideational. The Islamists neither led nor appropriated the 1988 riots, but rather coordinated and steered them, and gradually gathered a diverse constituency of investors. The emerging anti-FLN campaign did not in the first instance reflect an Islamist agenda but a broadly shared set of political and social criticisms. Indeed, popular sentiment was as much directing the Islamist agenda from below. As Roberts says, “it is not the case that popular feeling in Algeria over the Gulf crisis [1990] was whipped up by the Islamists. Rather, this feeling was a largely spontaneous reaction to the development of the crisis itself, and obliged the Islamists to modify their positions very considerably in order to stay in touch with their popular constituency.”76 Having conferred with Islamist leaders, and after the army “crushed the [1988] uprising,”77 Algerian President Chadli Benjadid announced “necessary reforms in the political field.” After a tainted referendum on his presidency to protect his position, he promised changes including a new constitution allowing independent political associations; modifications in the FLN, comprising a putative de-militarization; participation by autonomous parties in upcoming competitive local and national elections; and new rights to strike.78
Poland witnessed a cycle from the 1950s until the 1980s of chimerical state investment plans, abrupt economic retrenchment with price hikes and subsidy retractions, worker protests, regime capitulation, reversals of austerity measures, and removal of state leaders. The pattern reinforced the power of workers to menace ruling elites over discrete policy decisions but not to effect a structural change in the communist command economy, with its selective market innovations over time at the firm and intermediate management level. This was similar to the “socialist” state capitalists of Algeria – party rulers and military entrepreneurs who profited from state-contracted investments. As in Algeria, Polish dissidents gradually shifted, in the mid-1970s, toward political demands for self-determination. In Poland this meant the decision to develop grassroots and organized civil society, focused on independent trade unions, and to reject “positivism” and “revisionism,” the terms in Polish political discourse for intra-systemic, top-down reformism. In August 1980 the Solidarity movement compelled the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) to sign the Gdansk Agreement with Solidarity, permitting independent unionism. Rank-and-file workers, allied with professionals, writers, and the Church, were now working throughout Poland to form an independent inter-factory trade union movement. The towering figure of Solidarity leader Wałęsa should not eclipse the populist egalitarianism of the citizens and workers who, in fact, lifted him up; “workers worshipped Wałęsa, they cheered him, chanted his name, brought him little presents, reached out to touch him as he passed. And yet, on the other hand this worship was entirely provisional. They were well aware that Wałęsa was fallible and vain, and when he put a foot wrong they would noisily oppose him.”

Scholars debate whether Solidarity was “anti-systemic” locally but systemic or liberal democratic globally, in political and social ideology. In the parameters of this study, however,
focused on intra-state protest movements, Poland’s opposition was as radically anti-systemic as Algeria’s. As Malia puts it, “Though in the first instance a union, Solidarity was also the eternal return, but in non-violent form, of the classic Polish insurrectionary struggle for independence and democracy, or for the ‘self-governing republic’ as the union’s program put it in clear reference to the historic Polish Commonwealth.”

Indeed, the impression, perhaps drawn from Solidarity’s non-violence itself, should not stand that Poles were inherently non-violent or that non-violence was a form of risk-avoidance. As Kubik says, the period 1970-1980 instilled a “new tradition of Polish workers’ martyrdom, developed predominantly in the Gdańsk observances of the anniversaries of the December 1970 massacre.” Not merely symbolic recognition of the fallen, these were preparations for dangerous actions. In Lipski’s words:

This was a struggle with totalitarianism in its Bolshevik version, for which any individual life counted for nothing and could be sacrificed at any time to the Moloch of a so-called socialism, to the interests of the ruling class, party, or clique. KOR had no choice but to be different; here one could offer a sacrifice only of oneself, when one believed that it was necessary and right, but never of anyone else, although this was never discussed in KOR and any discussion would have been considered inappropriate.

Although in contemporary parlance Islamist *jihadis* are uniquely tempted by violent martyrdom, Wolicki gives a similar picture of the overall *capacity* in the Polish tradition of self-sacrifice:

In this philosophy of history, Poles occupy a special place. Out of all the peoples of Europe they have most strongly maintained their faith in God in its traditional sense and responded with the greatest intensity to this philosophical revival after Vatican II. The Polish faith is both the most parochial and the most universalistic, the most naive and the most enlightened, the most private and the most public, and it is oriented toward the salvation of both the individual and the world at large. This does not mean, of course, that this has been accomplished without conflict or effort, or that it will survive without the individual involvement of the faithful and their church in the earthly affair – *including martyrdom*, if need be.
Taken together, Poland’s Solidarity and Algeria’s FIS were comparably self-sacrificial, grassroots activists motivated by similar moral demands for institutional reform not only to improve their standard of living but also to expand the space of self-assertion and recognition in their polities.

As I said in presenting the puzzle, both regimes reacted by attempting to divide growing dissident movements by passing unprecedented neo-corporatist reforms with varying impact on real-world state operations. In Algeria, ruling elites responded to the 1988 protests, after killing perhaps 500 peaceful protesters, with a national referendum and legalization of political parties on the eve of promised elections that ran from local to national between 1990 and 1991. The Polish state, responding to a blossoming coalition of workers and intellectuals in the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR) energized by the 1976 worker uprisings and state repression, attempted to fragment various productive sectors and regional factory systems with discretionary financial incentives. According to Staniszkis and Shapiro, in this period Poland was turning to a new corporatism roughly between 1976 and 1980. A crucial similarity here is the effort of the authoritarian state to retain power against rapidly concentrating citizen organizations through reforms intended to divide them by changing their long-standing means of effective citizenship. Trying to buy time while developing a systemic response, both regimes risked more concerted and resourceful opposition responses. This suggests that the rise of motivated and organized dissent movements, concurrent with fiscal crises, concerned and hemmed in both states.

After decades of intra-systemic bargaining, years of economic hardship for citizens, and months of unprecedented dissidentious discipline and unity, Polish and Algerian dissidents and states were modifying their strategies and agendas. Ruling classes initiated systemic reforms,
expanding the public sphere with grave institutional innovations and systemic dangers. As the states’ tactics emboldened rather than fragmented regime opponents, providing them new social resources, ruling elites abruptly reversed course, abrogating reforms and exceeding the harshest previous responses to civil unrest or opposition demands. In Algeria the National Liberation Army (ALN) removed Chadli, dismissed the election results, and declared a state of emergency. In Poland the military (PPA) abruptly removed CP head Kania in the fall of 1981 and declared martial law on 13 December, rounding up Solidarity and KOR activists *en masse*. Both states deposited citizens in concentration camps and beat or tortured them. That is, in Poland the PZPR and in Algeria the FLN, ruling parties that had claimed civilian leadership, abdicated to explicit military rule; the PPR and ALN were *officially* running Poland and Algeria.

Military leadership lost prestige established in past defiance against external forces in liberation struggles. Here one distinction without a difference under martial law is that Algerian rule was consolidated and “legitimized” from the start by revolutionary militants from the war with France, whereas the Polish civilian-military ethos separated the PZPR from the PPR. In this view, the ALN’s usurpation (12 Jan 1992) *extended* military rule in Algeria while the PPA’s *coup* (13 Dec 1981) *established* military rule in Poland. Algeria’s military had always directed politics, but the Polish army had studiously avoided giving the impression that it made policy decisions. *Before* the two coups, then, the ALN was discredited but the PPA “was one of the most highly respected and trusted institutions in Polish society[,] creating a myth of its own fairness and impartiality...[with no] fear that the actions of particular officers would ever be judged or criticized publicly.” This evident difference might imply a greater likelihood of anti-military hostility or violence in Algeria than in Poland. But this distinction is overdrawn. Martial
law broke the military’s exceptional status at the height of radicalizing demands for state reforms. The repression tipped the balance between this myth of the upright military and its real practices, already tilting since the army used its “regulars” to suppress the 1970 worker revolts and given the growing popular resentment that “the army [had] intervened repeatedly to strengthen and consolidate communist power in Poland, and was on several occasions deployed directly against the population.” With the decline of positivism military support of the PZPR was reevaluated much as the FLN’s revolutionary credentials were downgraded in Algeria.

The elite officer corps in each country dismissed the head of state, halted liberalization, incarcerated opponents, and immured their power in unaccountable ruling cliques – the Haut Comité d’État (HCE) in Algeria and the Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Norodowego (WRON) in Poland. Intense infighting ensued among ruling elites over the composition of the new ruling clique and extent of unconstitutional emergency conditions, including mass purges, torture, special courts, and internment camps. According to the literatures, both states tried to deflect criticism of the “rational” and “honorable” military by deploying paramilitary forces or militias for domestic coercion, a technique underwritten by the “legendary” patriotic sacrifices of the FLN and Polish Home Army. The mirage and unmasking of the military’s higher national calling and instrumental rationality did not surprise especially younger citizens without memory of the Algerian or Polish wars of independence. Polish and Algerian dissidents no longer believed that “[b]y separating the problems of foreign or civil war from those of the army as a social class...the latter could be confined to acting in a purely instrumental capacity.” Martial law exposed, in Poland and Algeria, the military and state alike as enemies serving a ruling class.

§3.b.2 Discursive history
One could imagine attributing the divergent outcomes in Poland and Algeria to their evidently distinct democratic traditions, especially because Poland’s *liberum veto* power in the parliament (*Sejm*) famously granted mid-level Polish landowning citizens leverage over the king before the American, French, and Haitian revolutions. In contrast, the Algerian political, social, and economic order in the same period was organized around a network of self-contained, self-governing religious brotherhoods (*turq*) led by charismatic Muslim leaders. Before comparing these normative situations, we need to consider the logic in a “democratic peace” argument applied to these two cases and outcomes.

Democracy has been linked to peacefulness in a number of ways, generally institutional, ideological, and cultural. That is, broadly, the idea is that one can track tendencies toward non-violence or peace back to democratic institutions, beliefs, or values. It will always be difficult to establish *entailed* relationships between substantively distinct concepts like democracy and peace, or strategies and institutions. But the intuitions are that democratic institutions create binding structures of procedural mediation⁹³; that democratic ideology commits people to those institutions⁹⁴, even if their procedural coherence appears to outstrip their substantive rationality; and that democratic values instill in people convictions about the power of speech and cooperation in problem solving. These views surface in debates about whether “democracy needs democrats,” that is, whether an *ethos* of egalitarian justice or horizontal obligation must support formal institutions of equal citizenship rights manifest in elections. Notably, since the period of authoritarian and martial rule, Poles and Algerians have expressed their indifference to formal democratic procedures, perhaps because they disappoint this common ethos.⁹⁵
I will treat the proposed argument as a conjoined claim that an internalized experience of democratic practices and commitments underlies the different outcomes in Poland and Algeria. That is, I will consider whether a democratic normative subject was more dominant in Poland than in Algeria, on the hypothesis that this normativity has pacific influences, whether because democracy stabilizes value pluralism, institutionalizes uncertainty, mediates disputes, creates bargaining incentives, encourages coalitional compromises, or inculcates resignation. I will ignore for now the reduction of Algerian history to putatively anti-liberal Islamic dogma, as I consider religious divergence below (§3.c).96 It must be said here, though it applies throughout this chapter, that comparing concepts as historical objects or political identities across different times, places, peoples, and cultures is a problematic endeavor, which explains my cautious tone in making these comparisons.

In Algeria, the turuq were communities often called brotherhoods or hostleries run by a Muslim clan or family lineage. The five turuq were interlinked social and power centers rooted in the broad west African trade routes and operating with significant remoteness from Algiers, dominated by the Ottomans until the French invasion of 1830. Known as centers of resistance to Turkish and then French rule, the brotherhoods were strong political and cultural institutions that organized and funded libraries, schools, welfare, visitors’ quarters, and other typical duties of a state. The turuq were regulatory, distributive, educational, and ministerial associations that coordinated efforts with traders, Muslim Pilgrims, other turuq. These brotherhoods managed inheritance, property, endowments, and governance through formal legal mechanisms97 and the informal but highly regular tradition of consultation (shura).98 The shura gathers members of a social order (tariqa) for discussion of public matters, seeking consensus (ijma’) by exposing
leaders to popular views in shared deliberation and interpretation (*ijtihad*) of Islamic principles, practically applied. This practice of representative collective life establishes an elite-popular reciprocity and publicity whose negotiations and agitations potentially destabilize Islamic law (*shari’a*), and clearly mediated Sunni legislation as well as fostering anti-Ottoman and -French rebellions. 99 Most important, the *turq* embedded in Algerian political thought the belief in *shura* as the source of collective decision-making based on popular accountability – a concept explicitly invoked, as well, in 1980s Algerian protests.

The Polish *liberum veto* allowed “a single individual to destroy the parliamentary [Sejm] session,” itself a constraint on royal prerogative. Poland’s participatory decentralization was a more formalized and individual institution than that of the contemporaneous communal Islamic *shura*. But both systems operated on similarly influential and normative principles of inclusive decentralization. This is not to say that the systems were always effective or successful; indeed, each was accused of weakening central rule and institutional coherence and inviting conquest. Poland’s “veto” system was, if anything, less stable or consistent than Algeria’s *shura* system among the *turq*:

[The] *szlachta* [nobility] of the wider ‘communitas nobilium’ voiced their hopes and fears at the local assemblies, *sejmiki*…During the fifteenth century, the practice grew for the holding of larger regional assemblies, a development which nurtured the emergence of representatives or ‘envoys’…[and] their own separate chamber at the *Sejm*…The *Sejm* was never able to disencumber itself of its original character as an outgrowth of the faction-ridden royal council, mistrusted by the *szlachta* at large…The *szlachta*’s attitude to the veto was ambivalent. It was the ‘palladium of liberty,’ yet individuals who wielded it were widely condemned. In the eighteenth century it was as common to talk proceedings out as to disrupt the *Sejm* outright.100

Given the imperial histories of Poland, partitioned from 1795 to 1918, and Algeria, conquered and colonized from 1830 to 1962 (after Ottoman suzerainty), neither Poles101 nor
Algerians had much opportunity to express their deepest cultural ethics or political beliefs. A potential but minor comparison could be made for the interwar period, where Poland was independent for a generation and Algerian activists generated anti-colonial publications and political parties of several stripes. Given the persistent pressures of, respectively, the Russians and French, these short-lived experiments with self-rule or civil society were at best limited expressions of the democratic or civic normative outlooks of Poles or Algerians. In that light, it is hard to generalize, for instance, from the reactionary turn of Józef Piłsudski’s second Republic from 1926 till 1935 or Ahmed Ben Bella’s purges after 1962, much less to compare them, as expressions of Polish and Algerian values in response to independence. Still, at any opportunity, Poles and Algerians immediately organized peaceful organizations, interest groups, authors’ circles, political parties, and other civil society associations. If autocratic states consolidated power in Poland and Algeria against such proclivities, thwarting a deep-seated “democratic ethos” underscoring them, they seemed historically to have comprised egalitarian and activist in orientation. Even in these general terms, it is difficult to interpret the fates of Solidarity and the FIS/GIA as expressing subterranean differences in the commitments to rule by the people.

No credible juridical apparatus existed in Poland nor Algeria during the period under study, which can be seen best in its constitutional and representative conceits. Each country revised its nominal constitution in response to popular opposition, though in circumscribed and symbolic fashion. Poland’s 1975 Constitutional emendation giving the PZPR the “leading political role in society” “consolidated a wide opposition movement ranging from the Catholic intelligentsia to the former communist revisionists.” Algeria’s similarly statist 1976 “National
Charter” issued a new Constitution to “provide for state control over the economy,” including private enterprise and property “if it contribute[d] to the development of the country and [was] socially useful.”\textsuperscript{107} Constitutional artifice in both countries reflected the absence of the rule of law and human rights. In Poland “[v]agueness, unclear wording, loopholes, and the bending of rules depending on the need of the moment all contribute to an arbitrary interpretation of legal acts.”\textsuperscript{108} Likewise, during the period under review, “The precondition for securing human rights in Algeria [was] the establishment of law-bound government in general. This problem [was] complicated by the fact that at no point since 1962 have Algeria’s successive written constitutions corresponded to its real, unwritten constitution.”\textsuperscript{109} In both Poland and Algeria no reliable legal or constitutional architecture existed as a social resource for ordinary much less activist citizens.

Mamdani has suggested that “[e]ven the most radical political action, such as action that accompanies the rise of insurgent identities, has to take as it starting point identities enforced by law, even if to break out of a legal straightjacket. That is why, whether officially enforced or insurgent, political identities need to be understood in relation to the process of state formation.”\textsuperscript{110} Thus the absence of meaningful legal or rights-affording systems in these countries does not suggest the irrelevance of the juridical but, one might say, the relevance of that absence in the relationship between state formation and opposition movements. In Poland and Algeria, the appeal to worker or Islamist identity – in both cases progressing gradually from insider-reformist to outsider-rebellion in response to state intransigence – is notably an appeal not to rights or law, but to oneself as a kind of citizen, in a sense a right to be oneself. Surely, in both cases demands were made for human rights or legal protections, but these were means to
an end outside of juridical minimalism or negative liberties. Poles and Algerians, when they said anything about law or rights, referred to formal protections of the subjectivities they had long cultivated outside juridical-legal discourse and, in Mamdani’s terms, in response to its vacuous role in the states’ structuring of citizenship. Finally, where law constituted, in a longer historical frame, a general attitude toward the juridical, Poles and Algerians conceived legality as a mode of *separating* centralized state from citizens and subjects. Ottoman and French legal systems existed parallel to indigenous Algerian-Muslim traditions, inculcating an understanding that an overall juridical system comprises multiple sub-systems in order to distinguish, not integrate, the state and society. Likewise, according to Bernhard,

In East Central Europe civil society was able to carve out limited areas of autonomy from the ruling dynastic states. However, the monarchies were also able to maintain a great deal of autonomy from civil society. Critically, parliaments were constrained with respect to the monarchy, and governments were not fully responsible to the parliament...The pattern of political development in this region can be summed up under the rubric of *Rechtstaat* – a state of law. Boundaries between state and civil society were regulated by law. Exercise of political power was codified in a well-defined system of law but at the same time fell short of fully developed parliamentary democracy.\(^{111}\)

In addition to comparing Polish and Algerian legal conceptions, perhaps we might ask if they differed in their fidelity to “civil society,” “cosmopolitanism,” “tolerance,” “recognition,” or even democratic values, and, if so, how this difference might explain their divergent opposition strategies under martial law. I have already derived from the Polish *liberum veto* and Algerian *shura* systems a general criticism of the view that Poles and Algerians have historically opposed conceptions of “rule by the people.”\(^{112}\) But here the argument would be that disparities in deep values concerning, for instance, the sanctity of human life might have subcutaneous and path-dependent effects on attitudes to violence.\(^{113}\) The *intractability* of social conflict or the non-
negotiability of ethical demands could be rooted in profoundly resonant identities, such as the imperial struggles of “Islam and the West,” heightened by relatively recent efforts to assimilate these loyalties under artificially neutral bureaucratic institutions. For a simple and concrete example, Algeria and the MENA generally have been seen as external to “western” political phenomena, while Poland is seamlessly included in the central events of cosmopolitan western political and cultural developments. The Solidarity movement becomes a central instance in the story of post-1968 western trends toward non-violence, then, which would be unthinkable for a movement in a MENA country. My interest here is not in Orientalist discourses, but rather in a possible argument that Poles did not resort to violence, in contrast to Algerians, because they had a more civil or cosmopolitan cognitive paradigm. My approach to this issue is somewhat idiosyncratic, perhaps counter-intuitive, and informal. I will compare what might be considered expressions of this variable, let us call it cosmopolitan civility, such as treatment of minorities. If we find that Poles are more inclusive, pacific, or accepting toward the weaker in the midst, one can imagine divining in this distinction the roots of a great proneness for non-violent activism.

Polish and Algerian attitudes and treatment toward their Jewish minorities have come under great scrutiny in recent years, notably around Polish complicity with the Nazi occupation and around Algerian culpability for the departure of Jews after independence from France. For both countries, the conditions of Jewish political standing provide a long history, going back to the early medieval period with the declaration of autonomous Jewish rights in the Statute of Kalisz in Poland (1264) and, much more recently, the Decrét Crémieux extending citizenship rights to Jews French Algeria (1870). Without romanticizing the previously harmonious situation of Central European or North African Jews, we can say that Polish-Jewish and Algerian-Jewish
relations were not merely a story of symbiosis between small Jewish communities and Catholic or Muslim majorities eroding and degenerating into riots, battles, massacres, expulsions, and finally Nazi genocide, Algerian pogroms, and Vichy denationalization. The crimes included: in Algeria, a massacre (Algiers, 1805) and physical attacks (Algiers, 1896-7, by colons; Constantine, 1934, 1962), and expatriation (Statut des juifs, 1940); in Poland, massacres (Jedwabne, 1941; Kielce, 1946), and attacks (Posnan, Warsaw, &c., 1968). Such atrocities are notoriously hard to interpret at their expression of profound cultural commitments or racist attitudes, as they are hateful but potentially exceptions to quotidian cooperation or friendship to the vast majority of Polish and Algerian (and French) bystanders. In addition, again because of the imperial legacies (broadly construed) it is hard to identify the indigenous nature of anti-Semitism in Poland and Algeria. On the problem of the provenance of anti-Jewish sentiment, Arendt writes:

When one realizes that both Polish and Romanian anti-Semitism import their arguments from Germany, that even France, in a country where there are neither Jews nor a Jewish question, is battling the troops of the Spanish Republic while mouthing anti-Semitic slogans, and that we are now encountering German influence in Palestine, not to mention the countries of North Africa, then perhaps it becomes clear that in the interest of so-called world Jewry we cannot afford such slogans of “return” without endangering the Jews of every nation, including Palestine.116

Thus, for Arendt, perhaps in a Euro-centric moment, anti-Semitism seems essentially a European, more specifically a German phenomenon. A survey of Jewish treatment and standing in Algeria and Poland demonstrates its autochthony, ambiguity, and complexity and cast doubt on anti-Semitism as a distinguishing factor linked to Algerian violence or Polish non-violence. Under Ottoman rule,

Jewish and Christian communities had a special position, because they paid the poll tax and had their own legal systems of personal law, and...the governments had to be assured of their
loyalty. In the capital and in the provinces, the government recognized a spiritual head of each community as having a certain legal jurisdiction...In this way, the non-Muslims were integrated into the body politic. They did not fully belong to it, but an individual might rise to a position of power or influence,” especially as “money-lenders or bankers to the central government or provincial governors, and as managers of tax farms.”

Jewish traders privileged for their expertise thrived, but also suffered resentful reprisals. In late 18th-century Algeria, the local dey, permitting the Jewish Bushnaq and Bakri families to export wheat, threatened Ottoman rulers and Algerian growers alike. In 1805, after the wealthy and connected Nephtali Bushnaq was murdered and his Turkish killer lauded by Algerian religious leaders, “Turks and non-Turks went on a rampage, killed about 200 Jews, and looted Jewish property.” But such horrors were rare; indeed, “when the French landed in the bay of Sidi-Ferruch, the Jews of Algeria were already organized into a ‘nation’” that thrived.

Inspired by Jewish neutrality toward Muslim anti-imperialism and eager to assimilate Algerians, France first insinuated itself into Jewish life, then insinuated Jews into French life. In 1845 France created consistoires run by French-trained “civilizing” rabbis, in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. In 1865 France offered citizenship to Muslims and Jews who renounced their personal status laws, i.e., their religion – an offer 288 of 35,000 Jews and even fewer Muslims accepted. France then issued the Decrét Crémieux (24 Oct 1870), naturalizing all Jewish Algerians. Subsequent anti-Jewish attacks – peaking during the Dreyfus affair – were by colons, not Muslims who shared Jews’ reluctance to assimilate. Paradoxically, the admixture of colon domination and anti-Semitism in Algeria, like that of the Nazis in Poland, was so intense as to obscure or prevent clear sense of Algerian anti-Semitism. Arendt may be excessively exculpating of Algerians but she, again, attributes local attitudes to invasion: “[a]fter 1934, Nazi propaganda also made itself strongly felt in all North African countries...
Cries of “Vive Hitler” were common in Algerian movies, and considerable propaganda was circulated among the natives. There is no doubt that these activities were supported by the French colonials, who admired Hitler’s racial policy and who were only too glad to see the violent feelings of the economically depressed and politically underprivileged population directed against Jews rather than themselves...[I]n 1935, [Maurice] Violette [former Algerian governor] flatly told the Senate: “If there is anti-Semitism in Algeria,...Europeans...fan it.”

Even the Muslim-Jewish violence in Constantine (Aug 1934) is prohibitive, escalating like a barroom brawl when a Jewish soldier assailed Muslims at a mosque, Muslims stoned his house in the Jewish Quarter, and counter-attacks spiraled for weeks until four Muslims and 23 Jews were killed. Such events seem exceptional to intra-religious comity, most notably during WWII when Jews and Muslims were in peril. In Oct 1940 Vichy abrogated Crémieux with the Statut des juifs, disappointing Algerian colons who sought harsher anti-Jewish laws. Algerian Vichyists exceeded the Statut’s provisions, excluding Jews from primary and secondary schools; the official 14% quota had already sent home 18,500 Jewish pupils. Among them, Jacques Derrida reports that in Algeria, “I was a member of what was called the native Jews, who during those times experienced more support from the Algerians than from what were known as the Algerian French.” This is hardly surprising, given “the Vichy government’s revocation of the Crémieux decree, which left Derrida, along with all the other Algerian Jews, stateless.”

But Muslim-Jewish relations were not defined by hostility or passivity. Muslim leaders abjured anti-Jewish aggression, declaring in solidarity (Nov 1942): “By putting down the Jew one only brings even closer together the Muslim. It was thought that at the abrogation of the Crémieux decree the Muslims would rejoice; but [we] can see the dubious worth of a citizenship that the granting authority can take away after 70 years’ enjoyment.” Ferhat Abbas sneered at colon and French Vichy, “Your racism goes in every direction, today against the Jews,
and always against the Arabs.” Algeria was the “setting for one of [WWII’s] most remarkable episodes of solidarity with Jews,” where imams instructed Muslims not to capitalize on Jewish dispossession. According to Satloff:

Not a single Arab in Algiers stepped forward to accept Vichy’s offer [to seize Jewish holdings]. One Friday in 1941, religious leaders throughout the city gave sermons warning all good Muslims to refuse all French offers to serve as conservators of Jewish property. They even forbade Muslims from purchasing auctioned Jewish goods at below-market prices...[d]espite the economic difficulties faced by Arabs during the war.127

Yet around independence nationalists attacked Jewish symbols and celebrities, murdering the Constantinois Jewish community spokesman and maalouf singer Raymond Leyris and spurring a mass exodus of Jews from Algeria.128 Anxious Jewish belonging between colon and Muslim, always corrosive, had collapsed in Muslim-Jewish polarity and aggressive, if conflicted, anti-Semitism.129 It was not the Nazis or WWII but revolutionary independence that dispossessed Algeria’s Jews. Even then, Jewish communal property “largely remained under the control of the Federation of Jewish committees in Algeria,” soon “the only country in the world besides Israel to recognize and enforce Jewish religious holidays officially.”130

This pattern took extreme form, to say the least, for Polish Jews, similarly distinctive in cultural terms even as modern “urbanization and concomitant overcrowding” threatened some of their traditions and laws.131 “In 1939 [Hitler] told the Polish ambassador Jozef Lipski he hoped to settle the Jewish question by mutual agreement with Poland, Hungary, and Romania. He was thinking of shipping the Jews to a colony. Lipski replied that if Hitler could find a solution to the problem the Poles would build a monument in his honor.”132 Hardly an isolated
incident, Polish Jew-haters in some quarters publicly celebrated the advent of Nazism before Algerian Muslims rallied to protect Jews from it.\textsuperscript{133}

My mother was brought up by a woman – her mother, my grandmother – who was the only surviving member of her family. When Grandma was nineteen and Grandpa was seventeen years old, they had run away from Łódź, also in mid-Poland, to Germany to marry, against the wishes of their families which belonged to different communities, Orthodox and Hasidic. After their marriage, they followed Grandpa’s family and emigrated to London. Between August 1939 when she and my grandfather last holidayed, as they did annually, in Łódź, and 1949, when Cousin Gutta came and told my grandparents that she, a remote cousin, was the only one left, fifty members of Grandma’s family were killed – the children bayonetted first in front of their parents. Nowadays my mother denies this; she denies that it happened and she denies that her mother suffered from it, so deep is her own unresolved suffering. This denial and unexamined suffering are two of the main reasons for her all-jovial unhappiness – the unhappiness of one who refuses to dwell in hell, and who lives, therefore, in the most static despair.\textsuperscript{134}

One problem here is assessing the level and nature of local attitudes toward minorities under conditions of external occupation and violence. How does one assign a weighting system to selective, anecdotal evidence of collaboration with Nazis against the many instances, only some recorded, of Poles rescuing Jews?\textsuperscript{135} As one SS officer said, “You Poles are a strange people. Nowhere in the world is there another nation which has so many heroes and so many denouncers.”\textsuperscript{136} Rescuers were not only privately squirreling away Jews at great risk to themselves and their families (§I.d), but highly driven and organized. In September 1942, the Directorate of Civil Resistance, announcing the genocide in a proclamation published in the underground presses and broadcast abroad, protested “in the name of the entire Polish nation against the atrocities perpetrated on the Jews. All Polish political and civic groups join in this protest.”\textsuperscript{137}

From 4 Dec 1942 the Council of Assistance to the Jews channeled help to the Jewish ghettos and “broadened and improved existing forms of assistance to Jews living in hiding
outside the ghettos by providing them with living quarters, documents, food, medical care, and financial help, and by facilitating communication between members of the same families living in different localities.” The renowned Żegota assistance council began its work in the Warsaw Ghetto but soon “sent its representatives from Warsaw to Lwów and Kraków to transmit directives and to organize regional councils.” The council worked with the special Jewish Bureau of the Home Army, set up in winter of 1941-2, which coordinated activities not only with the intelligentsia and cultural elites but also “with the workers’ functionaries organized in the ‘Bund.” “In no other German-occupied country was there an organization like ZEGOTA... though the terror directed against the Aryan populations of these countries was nowhere near as extreme as in Poland.”

Before the German invasion, however, the Polish government’s ethno-nationalization measures “amounted to economic strangulation of broad sections of the Jewish population,” “exacerbated by other measures, such as the restriction of Jewish students in universities (the infamous ‘numerus clausus’), random violence on streets and [at] schools, and open adulation of Nazi anti-Jewish measure across the border. The powerful Catholic Church failed to take a stand against the official anti-Semitic policies of the ruling class (some even condoned it, accusing the Jews, as in Cardinal Hlond’s 1936 pastoral letter, of [corrupting] the youth.” On 6 June 1934 the *Endeks* of the anti-Semitic National Democratic party carried out anti-Jewish “pogroms throughout Poland.” The Jewish labor movement faced intimidation, and everyday Jew-hatred was rife, such as being called “dirty Jew” in Łódz and outbursts like the pogroms in the year before the Nazi invasion that ended only when “Jews resisted...They put up a fight.” After, “the German population of Łódz...sympathized with the Nazis, and along with many of
the Poles, helped the Nazis pick out the Jews." Reflecting on the issue of rescuing Jews, Eva Hoffman, whose parents were hidden and saved,

It is unclear why the rescuers were so often condemned by their countrymen, whether it was out of pure anti-Semitism, or political considerations..., or fear that they would reveal others’ nefarious acts, or the common man’s dislike of excessive magnanimity...But often the rescuers themselves didn’t want to talk about what they had done, and the people whom they had saved did not maintain contact. Why this is so is puzzling.

On the other hand, there was significant native resistance. A tiny fraction of the Polish population joined in rescue or protection efforts against the Nazi and Polish atrocities, but participants included Jews, Catholics, and Protestants. On 17 March 1936 Polish Jews, Liberals, and workers staged a strike with a mass demonstration against Polish anti-Semitism. The “moderately religious” were the most anti-Semitic; Catholics were relatively liberal and open to “outgroups.” Some “rescuers...were persecuted, even killed by the native population after the war because they had hidden Jews during the Nazi occupation of Poland. Helping Jews to survive was not only dangerous, it was not popular.” Amazingly, anti-Semites risked their own lives to save Jews. Marek Dunski saved 500 Jews even though he detested them for dividing the nation by “illegally placing Jewish children in orphanages and convents.” Likewise, National Democratic party member Hela Horska saved fourteen Jews and helped scores more; survivor David Rodman testifies: “Once she and I were watching from the window [as] the Nazis were executing Jews. Before I realized what had happened she [had] fainted. She used to come home and cry for the Jews. She used to run around incessantly trying to place Jewish children, she even forgot to eat she was so absorbed in helping.” The 28,000 Jews in hiding suggest
that, across social positions, more Poles helped Jews or silently observed that help than joined the Nazi slaughter.\textsuperscript{149}

Current discursive anti-Semitism is difficult to ascertain in the Algerian case. The Jews have left Algeria and are not a focus of domestic politics or rhetoric there. As for foreign political rhetoric, anti-Semitism \textit{per se} is difficult to measure. “Jew” (\textit{yuhud}) is a floating signifier in Islamist and Arab nationalist jargon used in the main to mean “Israeli.”\textsuperscript{150} Evidence of anti-Jewish hatred among Algerians, such as desecrations in France, is scant. Comparatively, “the rise of xenophobic nationalism [and] the reemergence of anti-Semitism, without Jews” has prevailed in Poland\textsuperscript{151} to a greater extent than in Algeria, where anti-Zionism seems the greater collective motivation.\textsuperscript{152} Outrage over post-communist anti-Semitism in any guise burst forth in Bronislaw Geremek’s strident remark: “I am a child of the Warsaw Ghetto. My family perished in the Ghetto. I am the Foreign Minister of the democratically chosen government of the now-free Poland. That speaks for itself.”\textsuperscript{153} As a social trend in Poland, anti-Semitism has historically been \textit{racist}, a Jew-antipathy heightened by nationalist responses to economic or democratic competition since 1989.\textsuperscript{154} But there are also mundane political sources. Accusation of collaboration – echoed in Poland’s post-communist “lustration” policy – have been coded in anti-Semitic terms.\textsuperscript{155} As in the Soviet Union, several leading Politburo members of the Polish Communist Party, including the domestic police director, were Jewish, and this brought out the Jew-haters, typically. Polish assistance with Israel’s Eichmann investigation shows the power of external influences such as the Arab-Israeli war. With Soviet support Poland cooperated with Israeli researchers during the Eichmann trial. The intentions were impure; concerns with potential efforts to implicate Poland and the Soviets were recast to put “the Eichmann trial in
the context of anti-fascism.”\textsuperscript{156} In 1968, “Zionism” and Judaism were conflated in a conspiracy-laden mindset abstracted from direct Israel-Poland relations. Poland’s “right-wing nationalist government.”\textsuperscript{157} Hard as it is to measure or code small or individual episodes of anti-Jewish hostility, as an indicator of \textit{cosmopolitan} values potentially constraining intolerance or violence, broad-based, collective anti-Semitism does not weight in Poland’s favor.\textsuperscript{158}

Turning to another slightly askew indicator of potentially pacifying cosmopolitan values, I will address Poles’ and Algerians’ relationship to France. France is, in part, a synecdoche for Europe but it also has specific and revealing meanings in the political life of Poland and Algeria. The propinquity of Poles to France on a personal or political level reflects, one might argue, an intimate association with Europe relative to Algeria’s estimate alienation.\textsuperscript{159} That is, Poland and Algeria may be seen as the inside/outside of the European fold, with potential implications for the modes of “civilized” political comportment. Recent signs of these relationships abound. For instance, during the Solidarity strike in August 1980, French unionists arrived in Poland to show their support.\textsuperscript{160} Nothing like this is imaginable in Algeria in favor of even the most moderate Islamist anti-authoritarian movement. More recently, while the Algerian state adopted much of the French governance system by necessity, Poland looks to France as its model, for example rejecting judicial review based on French jurisprudence; indeed, “[T]he reliance of the reborn Polish state on the French Third Republic’s theory of parliamentary supremacy precluded...the concept of the judiciary’s right to review the constitutionality of parliamentary statutes.”\textsuperscript{161}

These disparate relationships to the revolutionary core of the European enlightenment are inscribed principally in the contrasting connections to French imperialism. To put it crudely, Algeria was its victim, Poland its ally. In the nineteenth century Algerians battled France in
imperial warfare while Poles courted them as workers, intellectuals, or parvenus. Algerian leaders pushed for anti-French mobilization while Polish elites became glib French-inflected cosmopolitans – reminiscent of the cavalier Russian intelligentsia in Dostoyevsky’s bilingual The Gambler, not of Algeria’s parochial, peasant, Muslim mujahedeen. In part this draw to France was an ideological commitment to revolution, paradoxically among disfranchised nobility:

The Polish nobles were feudal landowners...[y]et their fight against the Russian tsar led them into conflict with the whole counter-revolutionary structure imposed on Europe after 1814 and again after 1848, and to find common purpose with revolutionaries and democrats across Europe. For the British Chartist, the French republicans, and the German communists, the Polish struggle was their struggle – and exiled Poles from noble families were to be found fighting in Italy, Southern German, Hungary, and Paris.162

It is not surprising, then, that as Abd el-Qadir’s fought for Algeria’s freedom against French imperialists, the “best Polish writers in the nineteenth century lived in Paris. The idea was that as an outsider you could speak more freely and you could even have a better view of the situation at home.”163 Within France, “Polish Catholic immigrants eager to blend in and become assimilated, while preserving only a memory of traditions whose observance was limited to the private sphere” – in contrast with the long-insulated “French Islam.”164 Thus, by the mid-19th-century France was the center of Polish political exile and cultural life:

The Polish Emigration in France was undoubtedly the senior émigré community in the nineteenth century. Until the installation of Polish miners in the Pas de Calais in 1919-1920, it was largely political in character. The Hotel Lambert, the Bibliothèque Polonaise, the Société Littéraire were institutions of major importance. With Adam Mickiewicz at the Collège de France, and with Słowacki, Niemcewicz, and Czartoryski strolling down the boulevards, for thirty or forty years after the November Rising [1830] Paris was a more significant center of Polish culture than Warsaw or Cracow.165
But long before this, and before the French landed at Sidi Ferruch, Stanislaw Augustas, had “modeled himself on...the pragmatic and legendarily popular...Henry IV” and, during the French revolution, “was being referred to, even by radicals, as ‘the heart and body of the nation.’” Replacing the “old noble Commonwealth” with a “new nation,” he conferred the new constitution (3 May 1791) “to universal chants of ‘The King with the Nation, the Nation with the King’” As part of this legacy, “[w]e also find the original image of nineteenth-century nationalism in France, seen by many east of the Rhine as both the home of political philosophy and a model national state.”

The impression French modernity and nationalism made on its colonized differed across and within imperial conquests. But the impression bequeathed by nineteenth-century history is of Algerian resistance to cosmopolitan, universalist France and Polish identification with it. Perhaps one major exception proves the rule: initial Polish support for and subsequent betrayal of France in the Haitian uprising during the Revolution. Here “the defection of Polish and German troops, who were quick to take the side of the Haitian insurgents, show that a union that strengthens is not just one that is made up of people of the same color.” Overall, however, into the twentieth-century, Poles identified with French ideologies, institutions, and values, whereas Algerians had far more ambivalent, suspicious, and critical views toward them. Polish activists spent formative years in France as an exilic community whose progressive hosts supported them against injustice at home (partition, Nazism, Stalinism); at the same time, Algerians visited France as poor workers or political exiles, anxious colonial subalterns haunting the metropole. The contrary images, impressions, and experiences of France are extreme.
In her excruciating memoir, Anita Lobel recalls that when the Germans first rolled into Krakov, and her nanny muttered, “Niemcy, Niemcy” (“Germans, Germans”), she heard Poles yelling out, “No, No! They are French. Surely they must be French.”  

At about the same time, to avoid military service, Michel Warschawski’s grandfather left his shtetl in Lodz, eventually ending up in Strasbourg, a “border town,” “in fact a ghetto, without walls and without police, but a ghetto nonetheless.”  

Under the Concordat “that Alsatian peculiarity that makes religion a component element of the Republic,...the Jewish community of Strasbourg was powerful, organized, and above all visible,” a town of inter- and “intra-community barriers...between Alsatian Jews and Ost-Juden,” both separated from Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist. Later, “in the 1950s and 1960s, Muslims did not exist, or rather, were simply not acknowledged. Of course, the expulsion of the Jews from Strasbourg (at the beginning of WWII), no matter what their origin, and the terrible fate they...shared, opened up the postwar relations between these communities; but only to a certain point: the boundaries did not disappear, nor did the natives’ feelings of superiority.” Warschawski records his alienation in this milieu, which shaped his response to other immigrant communities in France:

I relived this estrangement within the Jewish community with the mass immigration of Jews from North Africa; first from Morocco after the Agadir earthquake [1960], then from Algeria on the eve of that country’s independence. Confronted with the new arrivals, the Jews of Polish origin behaved like the natives. They looked at the latter with that same surprise and condescension that they themselves had been the targets of some decades earlier...I at once felt closer to these young people coming from Agadir or Oran than to the children of the bourgeois families of the Avenue des Vosges...My new schoolmates suddenly changed our environment. The heavy and gray atmosphere of the Akiba School had been lifted and a new warmth had gradually seeped into the classroom. The pied noir accent, the style of dress and haircut contributed to the new atmosphere, as well as a certain light-heartedness vis-à-vis life and its constraints that we were not familiar with. It was not easy for them, having lost forever the world they had grown up in to come live in a country where everything was different. From sunny and Mediterranean Algeria to imperial and very continental Strasbourg, the change was radical.
Presumably such experiences would confirm for Poles the value of secular revolutionary egalitarianism but for Algerians its imperial hypocrisy – lessons recalled, fittingly, when the French supported the cancellation of elections and declaration of martial law in the early 1990s. It might be argued that Algerian contempt and Polish fondness for enlightenment dispositions created a background condition for their respective religious-absolutist and liberal-reformist political theories in later years? In addition, the perception that Algerian immigrants were dispossessed, economic exiles while Poles were privileged, political exiles, might further divide the reception of French idealism. If Algerians encountered French military commanders, factory employers, or colonial officials, Poles hob-knobbed with intellectuals, activists, or bureaucrats; Algerian returnees likely evinced populist (anti-secular) communalism while Poles would return home with reformist, deliberative, or technocratic commitments. Finally, civil societal anti-authoritarian discourse in Poland seems contrary to authoritarian anti-civil societal discourse in Algeria. Such intuitions align the French empire with Algerian anti-rationalist religiosity and French hospitality to Poles; it does not cite Poles’ elitism – absent from Solidarity – but their egalitarianism, intellectualism, cosmopolitanism, and secularism.

This tempting hypothesis of contrasting deep structures of Algerian and Polish political thinking is inadequate. The backgrounds, motivations, and experiences of Algerian and Polish émigrés bore more similarities than differences by the time of the period under review. By WWI, Polish and Algerian peasants had immigrated as economic refugees to France from rural areas of endemic and exacerbating poverty. Algerian workers began immigrating to France in large numbers beginning around the turn of the 20th century: “By the start of [WWI], about 10,000
Algerians had already found jobs in France..., pioneers in a movement that would become enormous as the century went on, with...demographic, economic, cultural, and political consequences.” Also by then, and increasingly in the inter-war years, Polish and Algerian elites had marinated in French intellectual and political life.

Those consequences would meet up with the indigenization of French ideas in Algeria a generation after the 1871 defeat of anti-imperial resistance. By the 1890s most Algerians succumbed to colonial integration, notably through French education and military service. But Algerian educated elites quickly agitated for emancipation in several forms. The so-called Young Algerians, the initial Algerian modernist “évolués,” held French-informed debates in political-cultural clubs throughout the major cities; if against their influence and France arose the Islamist “vieux turbans,” even many of them “had extensive exposure to French education and were perfectly bilingual.” As Algerian nationalist tendencies erupted in political excitation in the 1930s in both France and Algeria, “the influence of French ideas, particularly the liberal and liberating ideologies of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution [influenced] enormously the way Algerian elites shaped the movement toward national liberation.” By the start of WWII, then, the vast differences between Polish and Algerian profiles vis-à-vis France had narrowed in two senses. First, economic and political emigrants were similar sociologically by class, occupation, and expression. Second, politicized Polish and Algerian exile communities shared political objectives and interpretations: opposing colonial coercion and partition with a conviction – and militarism by the mid-1940s – nurtured by French national ideology itself. In Davies’ wording:
The political complexion of the wartime Polish Government was limited only by its commitments to the principle of independence, to the war against Poland’s invaders..., and to the territorial integrity of the republic. Anyone who accepted these principles — ...the overwhelming majority of Poles at home and abroad — was free to participate in its numerous organs and agencies.”

That description captures the Algerian movement as well. Wartime experience furthers this comparison. Algerian and Polish liberation movements sealed French alliances against Germany. The Polish government’s “Polish Army in France” and “in the Levant” joined forces under direct French command in 1940. Poles and Algerians might have fought side-by-side. One might add, in light of Algerians’ renowned martial spirit, that Poles “organized the largest independent resistance movement in occupied Europe...which planned to fight the Germans and then confront the Soviets with a restored Polish state.” For their part, in Algeria “the Arab leadership was initially optimistic that the defeat of Hitler would usher in long-awaited reforms, and when they issued a manifesto February 10th 1943, in the wake of the Allied landings in North Africa, they took great care to emphasize their loyalty to the ideals of 1789 and their affection for the ‘culture of France and the West that they had received and cherished.’” French capitulation and Vichy collaboration were as devastating to Poles’ anti-imperial dreams as the massacre of Algerians at Sétif (1945) were to Algerians’. Nevertheless, the French political, cultural, or critical tradition would have had a similar impact on post-war Polish and Algerian nationalism and socialism – while Catholics and Muslims alike might have taken exception to its secularism. This parallel extends to the “conviction...[of] the Algerian [revolution]...that, even in dealing with so rational and civilized a people as the French, liberation was made possible only by resorting to the gun and the knife.” Nothing contra French praxis or ideals precludes revolutionary mobilization; and the religious violence that
erupted in 1992 surely projected the *betrayal* of the French revolutionary tradition embodied in the corrupt, “pseudo-secular” Algerian police state.\textsuperscript{186}

Patriarchal attitudes could provide an interesting variable in the two results for similar reasons – perhaps sexist repression of women is a good barometer for a level of hostility more generally. Here one would again have to be rather textured and careful, but in the end it is not evident that Poland is more progressive than Algeria on the matter of women’s freedoms with respect to the puzzle, or in general. Algeria is renowned for women’s participation in the war against France, portrayed in *Battle of Algiers* and elsewhere as a central tenet of revolutionary consciousness.\textsuperscript{187} What is less known is that the consolidation of an independent Algerian state reverted to highly gendered public-private designations, essentially sequestering women in the domestic sphere. Essentially absent from public policy debates, women became, over time, a bargaining chip between secular rulers and Islamist opponents, resulting in the notorious 1984 Family Code, which essentially traded Islamist cooperation with the regime for national policies relegating women to the home as what feminists called right-less servants of man and family.\textsuperscript{188}

If Polish women’s rights exceed that of Algerian women, it is not without similar strains and ongoing policy debates about gender. Penn laments that even at the height of protests and oppositional success, resistance to the Polish regime was cast in patriarchal terms as a “male revolution, thus institutionalizing at the very moment that a democracy was born, women’s invisibility in the Solidarity movement.”\textsuperscript{189} Like the Algerian women in the French Revolution, according to Penn, women were active, affective tokens in the gendered conflict with the state. Polish women in or around Solidarity were surely more equal than their Algerian counterparts under Islamist militarism, something that strongly intersected with class and ethnic divisions.\textsuperscript{190}
but women did support the violence in many cases and provide its backbone, although the coercion in recruiting assistants in post-1992 Algeria precludes imputing positive support for the GIA to women. In the cases of abortion law\textsuperscript{191} and labor regulations\textsuperscript{192} the same could be said, where shared patterns of male- and family-centered concerns are not identical but similar.

Such attitudes about women and polices on gender may bring us to the similarities in religiosity – as distinct from the \textit{differences} in religion which I address below. Algeria and Poland are among the “many societies [in which] religious groups enjoy a unique institutional legitimacy that translates into a number of distinct advantages when it comes to contentious politics,” such as “exemptions from taxation or conscription” and a distinct spatial or “temporal pattern of growth and decline from that of secular movements.”\textsuperscript{193} The political sanctity of religious practices and sites derives from their \textit{empirical} presence as the material expression of their religious, spiritual, and “ontological” power, all threatening to state sovereignty.\textsuperscript{194} Even the most brutal ruling classes hesitate to invade mosques, churches, and temples because of the primal force of their social and symbolic place in citizens’ lives. Religious centers tend for this reason to be relatively inviolable even under secular authoritarian rule, or if compromised to have won concessions or adopted a mediating or mollifying role between state and citizen. In Poland and Algeria, as in many other places, most people are committed religious believers with memories of political, social, national, and economic campaigns urged forward in their name by theistic convictions buttressed by communal obligations. Where drawn to religions’ mystical properties, people rarely adhere to the rituals, practices, and networks of religious belief without a strong subjective social content.\textsuperscript{195} But as Durkheim noted in defining religion,
all kinds of religions with mystified and self-sacrificial adherents fill “churches”\textsuperscript{196}: nationalism, capitalism, liberalism, secularism, scientism, statism, rationalism, and “high modernism”\textsuperscript{197}

Polish Catholics from the 1970s and Algerian Muslims from the 1980s exemplify the “de-privatization of religion” among activists confronting unresponsive, ineffective, or inhumane bureaucratic, market, and repressive state apparatuses.\textsuperscript{198} Polish and Algerian citizens were given church and mosque “organizational opportunity,” a key protest resource.\textsuperscript{199} In each case this “autonomous space” for religious collective identity antedated, was challenged by, and resisted state prerogative. “The Roman Catholic Church has always been part of the world of Polish politics,” as Davis says, “whether it likes it or not. Not only in its corporate existence as a wealthy, ancient, and respected institution, but also through the actions and attitudes of its priests and people, it has exerted a powerful influence on all political developments.”\textsuperscript{200} Polish communism – which Stalin compared to saddling a cow – gave up secularizing Poland by 1956. During the early years of communist consolidation, the editors of “\textit{Tygodnik Powszechny [The Universal Weekly]}, a high-level Catholic cultural magazine with a pronounced anti-totalitarian political orientation...refused, unlike those of all the other Polish magazines, to publish an idolatrous obituary of Joseph Stalin.”\textsuperscript{201} Still, the Church accommodated the state, mediating and stabilizing the regime more than opposing it, until 1976 when KOR, official Catholicism, and workers were pushing for a unified “civil society.”\textsuperscript{202}

In Algeria, the socio-political structure of sub-coastal Muslim brotherhoods bolstered an established religious civil society. These brotherhoods, as I discussed, were organized around charismatic “saints” whose hostelries ran learning centers, distribution networks, and ethical communities that contested coercive state centralization over the centuries.\textsuperscript{203} Two doubtful
inferences prevail concerning the continuity of Islamist activism into modern state formation in Algeria. First is the idea that Islamist movements or anti-state resistance reiterates the mystical anti-legalism or instinctive localism of traditional agricultural Muslim communities; that is, that Islamist activism against the Ottoman, French, or Algerian state-builders reflects an urban(e)-rural *theological* divide.\(^{204}\) The second error is to think that recent Islamist politics in Algeria or the MENA generally rejects the nation-state, either as a western or Christian foreign imposition, such that acceptance of anything less than an Islamist state – or Caliphate, perhaps – is a form of colonial or post-colonial capitulation.\(^{205}\) In Algeria, as in Poland, the long history of religious organization and self-defense survived state attempts to appropriate legitimizing symbols, institutions, and ideologies for despotic purposes, but in neither country is church or mosque doctrinally opposed to secular structures or beholden to outside sources of religious sanction. It is doubtful as well, given the earlier remarks on Polish martyrdom and the outcome in Algeria, that Catholic or Muslim precepts decided the social outcomes of modern Polish and Algerian authoritarian public policy. It is worth noting the common elements of church and mosque in the two countries: strong traditional base in rural areas and urban centers, a mediating role between the state and citizens, powerful external backers and influences, and legacies of religious resistance and nationalist uprisings.

The political involvement of religious organizations in Algeria and Poland gained from the homogeneity of their populations. Algeria is 95-99% Muslim, Arab and Berber; Poland is 95-99% Catholic (Roman). This was due largely to the expulsions or departures of Jews in and after WWII and decolonization. For instance, “the return in early 1946 of nearly 150,000 exiled Jews from Siberia and other parts of the Soviet Union generated a deep antagonism toward them,
bloodily expressed in Kielce in July 1946...[T]he exodus of Jewish survivors capped off [an] astonishing process of ethnic homogenization.”

This homogeneity, if anything, weighs against the view that religious or ethnic values dictate political, material, economic, ethical, or symbolic divisions. Religious or national consensus is generally an invention of narratives cooked up by political entrepreneurs attempting to form rather than mobilize an existing unanimity against actually diverse religious interpretations or ethnic demands. More simply, intra-Muslim and intra-Catholic contention recommends caution about inferences from this increased postwar homogeneity. The violence of recent Algerian politics and the history of Berber-Arab or intra-zawaya tensions may make this a more obvious point in that case than in the Polish case with its images of mass, uniform “adherence to the faith of the bulk of the Polish population.” Six million Poles greeting the Pope in June 1979 contrast with Algeria’s divisions impressively.

Such memories are crucial to the account of Solidarity, as the church-labor relationship deepened, but it is not only the apparent uniformity of such gatherings that strike one; their peaceful forbearance, politeness, humility, and devotion are maybe more significant.

Such an image of reverent but explicitly political gathering of Catholic workers lacks any correlate in our images of Islam, who are seen praying as a mass but nothing else. I am, again, not pursuing Orientalist tropes, but querying the efficacy of conceivably proposed explanatory variables. Here, the point is to compare similarities, either by equating them in the two cases or, perhaps, showing unexpected differences that might logically predict different outcomes. In this case, we have reasons, perhaps overwhelmed by events, to expect an even more violent Polish response to state corruption and coercion. After all, Polak-Katolik identity combined with a skilled, determined, and inspired work force constituted a literal army of labor, reserve and
employed. That is to say, the similarities in religious devotion, organization, and homogeneity in Poland and Algeria don’t solve my puzzle but raise another – why didn’t Poles take up arms? In this regard, concerning the resort to religious values in explaining protest objectives and tactics, Michnik’s remarks on the Polish state’s propaganda efforts are eye-opening:

party commentators [used] the specter of Iranian theocracy to frighten the Poles, [claiming] the entire Solidarity movement [was] simply an East European version of Iran’s conservative-religious revolution against modernity. They portray[ed] Solidarity supporters as “narrow-minded traditionalists feeding on a fanatical spiritual mishmash that combines a perverted version of Catholicism with chauvinistic forms of the romantic tradition.” The unions’ supporters [were] said to foster the belief that “the nation’s martyrdom will be rewarded by benevolent supernatural powers” and “the miraculous intervention of mystical forces.” They engage[d] in “the magical rituals of burning candles, erecting crosses, and undertaking pilgrimages to fight off evil forces.” They generate[d] “collective irrationality, steadfast in their belief that an act of faith can reverse relations of power, laws of economics, and all the rules governing political life.” Solidarity supporters [were] the latter-day offspring of the Counter-Reformation’s triumph over the Renaissance. In August 1980, just as in centuries past, the Catholic Counter-Reformation transformed the thinking, Renaissance brain of the Pole into a “Stone Age head, moved only by greed and superstition, closed to the world of progress.” It has made the Pole a fanatical believer in Polish messianism, an exterminator of heresy, a nationalist megalomaniac “enclosed in self-congratulatory bigotry as though in a coffin.210

§3.c Poland and Algeria: Differences

This section will compare the three leading alternative explanatory variables, gleaned from the separate literatures on Poland and Algeria, or on Central Europe and MENA. They are religious values (the Catholic versus Muslim values), economic resources (oil wealth versus labor-intensive production), and sovereignty (post-imperial versus ongoing imperial structure, i.e., the threat of Soviet intervention). Each is presented and analyzed as a feasible variable, to reflect my consideration of them as I researched on the cases. I try not to disprove them but to assess them as less convincing than might seem to a thoughtful or informed reader.
§3.c.1 Religious values

One objection to this comparison has been that diverse religious communities cannot be compared, especially across religious traditions. Here the specific presumption is that Islam has a greater tendency than Catholicism to legitimize political violence against secular, western, or national states.\textsuperscript{211} If this is so, Islam itself might explain Algerian militancy and Catholicism could explain Polish non-violence under their common (secular) suffering and deprivation. Difficulties immediately present themselves here. As I have tarried for some time with religion in Poland and Algeria, this will be an analytical complement to the previous section, noting that the point is to examine plausible causes of violence in religious valuation, including how it might mediate or decrease temptations to violence. The first response to this proposed variable is to cite specialized studies that reject isomorphic connections – diachronic and synchronic – between Islam vis-à-vis democracy\textsuperscript{212}, gender\textsuperscript{213}, tolerance\textsuperscript{214}, state sovereignty\textsuperscript{215}, secularization\textsuperscript{216}, legal or philosophical rationality\textsuperscript{217}, capitalism\textsuperscript{218}, cross-cultural coexistence\textsuperscript{219}, and authority.\textsuperscript{220} The lack of empirical correlation between Islam and violence is unsurprising.\textsuperscript{221}

But it might also be helpful or interesting to address the logics usually adduced in linking religion, or Islam anyway, to violence. It is common to derive given instances of “religious-nationalist” violence directly from their shared environment without testing whether that environment generally produces violence.\textsuperscript{222} They tend to identify (1) multiple instances of F (fundamentalism) and (2) one shared environment – usually M (modernity) – in which the many instances of F (F, F’, F”, etc) occur. They deduce that, if M is always present where F is, M must cause F. In turn, all F is said to reject all M, given specific anti-M beliefs. Finally, F is said to be a unitary trend. This method thus starts with violent religious expressions and seeks a context
that is universal, and intuitive, enough to encompass all of them. “Religious fundamentalist militants exist in Oklahoma, Egypt, India, Japan, Brazil, and Israel. They must be (1) akin and (2) reacting to the same thing, something that exists in all those places (such as secularism, the State, or globalization, i.e., M\textsuperscript{223}). Because they are religious, their religion must reject M.” Asking the militants themselves will confirm this thesis.\textsuperscript{224} So “the point of religious terrorism is to purify the world of these corrupting influences...[Standard] grievances often mask a deeper kind of angst and a deeper kind of fear. Fear of a godless universe, of chaos, of loose rules, and of loneliness.”\textsuperscript{225} Tests for this series of associations – by asking if M and F even correlate – are rarely undertaken.\textsuperscript{226}

A second error is to confuse “Islamism” and “Islam,” thus ignoring intra-Islamic variation amidst M.\textsuperscript{227} Researchers link jihadism not to globalization or similar general categories of M but to political exclusion.\textsuperscript{228} Even where inclusion does not alter opponents’ desires it affixes their behavior to corporatist and participatory incentives.\textsuperscript{229} Islam lacks “a politics”\textsuperscript{230} to explain specific socio-political strategies.\textsuperscript{231} As Bourdieu says, reflecting on his fieldwork in Algeria and articulating what I am conceiving as subjectivity:

it is the atmosphere of Islam which permeates all of life, not only religious or intellectual life, but private, social and professional life. However, to consider Islam the determining or predominant cause of all cultural phenomena would be no less fallacious than to consider religion as being merely a reflection of the economic and social structures. Indeed Islam, considered as a religious message, is not connected with any particular economic or social system; and justification could very well be found for radically different political orders or economic systems in the name of the same religious doctrine.\textsuperscript{232}

Thus it is important to clarify that colonization did not “produce 132 years of conflict with the local population.”\textsuperscript{233} Rather, perceptions, objectives, tactics, and strategies of Algerian Muslims
varied widely with changes in the imperial citizenship regime, as in the postcolonial regime; and in these varied conditions, Algerians moved along a dense theological and political spectrum from personal-pietistic to communitarian to militarist Muslim identities, not to be conflated.

A similar periodization and typology of Polish resistance to external occupation suggests a commonality between the cases that demotes the religious divergence as an explanation:

The experience of Central Europe suggests that there are four stages in the ongoing development of civil society; defensive, in which private individuals and independent groups actively or passively defend their autonomy vis-à-vis the party-state; emergent, in which independent social groups or movements seek limited goals in a widened public sphere which is sanctioned or conceded by the reforming party-state; mobilizational, undermine the legitimacy of the party-state by offering alternative forms of governance to a politicized society; and institutional, in which publicly supported leaders enact laws guaranteeing autonomy of social action, leading to a contractual relationship between state and society regulated eventually by free elections.²³⁴

Indeed, Catholicism does seem a poor predictor of social dissimulation or political non-violence, as French²³⁵, Irish²³⁶, and other histories make clear.²³⁷ As for the Polish case, Davies says:

During the century of statelessness and beyond, every single Polish generation has produced men careless of their own survival, who have risen with desperate courage against their tormentors. The Warsaw uprising of August 1944 was but the last performance of a drama which was also enacted in 1733, 1768, 1794, 1830, 1846, 1848, 1863, 1905, and 1920. On each occasion, if asked what they were fighting for, their reply might well have been the same: for ‘a few ideas…which is nothing new’.²³⁸

Under occupation and partition, four “courses of action [or traditions] were open” to the vast majority of Poles who could not “aspire to cultivate their native political traditions without serious fears of harassment and violence…: Loyalism, Resistance, Conciliation, and Emigration.” Resistance here refers to the

iron-hard devotees of Insurrection…prepared to use all possible means, including violence and military force, to further the national cause…The devotees of Insurrection, the most
consequential branch of Resistance, whose tradition stretched in unbroken line from Kościuszko to Piłsudski, dedicated their lives to fight for the Polish cause at all costs. Over the generations, they produced a crowded gallery of adventurers, folk heroes, and martyrs.\textsuperscript{239}

As in Algeria, these four categories could contest or co-exist with one another, their “political attitudes dominated not so much by social philosophies or sectional interests...but rather by people’s varying reactions to oppression.”\textsuperscript{240} This schema extends “exit, voice, and loyalty,” parsing two kinds of voice found in Algeria as well.\textsuperscript{241} Resistance and conciliation are opposed sub-categories of voice in these cases.

Indeed, in Algeria and Poland the “few ideas” protesters were fighting for – varying over time – do not map over fundamental \textit{religious} commitments or identities with explanatory purchase.\textsuperscript{242} This observation extends to the perception that failure of “all the other isms” made Islamism uniquely popular or persuasive as an assessment of “the Arab state” or “Muslim politics,” aided by the sanctity of the mosque as a “uniquely inviolable political space.” The idea is that secular ideologies – liberalism, socialism, nationalism, communism, and capitalism – all failed and were replaced with indigenous Islamic political principles (which in turn would have to uniquely endorse violence). Even if this depiction were accurate\textsuperscript{243}, Muslim values do not historically seem to distinguish practical Algerian-Muslim beliefs from those of Polish Catholics with causal bearing on my puzzle. A key feature of KOR/Solidarity was its own \textit{version} of these pragmatic-communal values – not its lack of those values.\textsuperscript{244} A \textit{similar} exhaustion or corruption of “western ideologies” had occurred in Poland, but with a different interpretation:

The encounter with Poland corrodes most political assumptions, not because this is an exotic nation but because it presents a view of the squalid under-side of big concepts – the side which rests on top of human beings. Bismarck, with his grand design for European peace, becomes the man who had thousands of Polish small boys caned for speaking their own language; Churchill
and Stalin lost dignity in the hour of victory in wrangles over Polish rivers and villages they could not spell. Capitalism meant that the nation’s factories were owned by Germans and Frenchmen. Socialism, which in theory comes so much closer to the Polish sense of community and equality, has become a term so defiled by public squalor, private privilege and hypocrisy about the Soviet Union that it has become for the moment unrecognizable.245

The politics of the Polish Catholic and Algerian Muslim uprisings are divergent strategic effects, then, of a shared criticism of principled ideologies under authoritarian brutality and corruption.

§3.c.2 Economic resources

If positing religious values as causes of opposition strategies reclaims a crude Hegelian idealism, resource-determinism recalls an equally simplistic Marxian materialism. Explanations of Muslim or Arab political trends have divided into these two poles until relatively recently in the literature. The field has been known to derive institutional patterns from material oil rents or from idealist Islamic doctrines. In MENA studies political economy and hermeneutic research converged, however, when neither materialist stress on physical resources nor idealist stress on cultural values alone could explain forms and trajectories of political agitation.246 Algeria has been subsumed under the materialist model – rentier- or petro-statism – and idealist Islam-centrism, which might suggest that interactions between oil-wealth and Islamist activism merit closer scrutiny.247 Similarly, Polish Catholicism and labor may be brought into a combined materialist and idealist account of citizenship regimes and social movement outcomes. To give further impetus to this synthesis, this section will discuss economic resources as a contributing explanatory variable in the causal pathway of Polish and Algerian protest patterns. It will focus on the oil-state hypothesis as the most likely materialist distinction between the two cases.

The predominant materialist claim is that a natural resource that can be exported as a monoculture with minimal labor inputs allows the state to accrue rents that can be exchanged
for support through distributive side-payment networks. Two institutional effects are said to come from oil-revenues: states can avoid labor and other kinds of opposition movements and citizens can be dissuaded from material grievances that spark reform demands. In recent years fine-tuning the oil-wealth argument has re-affirmed an inverse relationship between oil-rents and civil society, a link dismissed by historical institutionalists and political economists in its initial iterations. Oil-revenues may correlate with the absence of specific forms of democracy or civil society, but they do not directly vary with the outcomes of the puzzle posed here. Thus, oil-states with citizenship regimes distinct from Algeria’s experience government crackdowns without violent or dogmatic dissident reactions; for instance, Venezuela’s “explosive ‘Caracazo’” of February 1989, which engulfed nearly every city, punctuated the collapse of the populist system of reconciliation,” yielding “a chaotic, fluid political interlude...in which various sectors put forth incomplete projects to restore faith in the developmental potential of democracy.”

The presence of capital-intensive oil extraction, revenues, and rent-distribution (or presence of capital-intensive labor extraction, equally) does not, therefore, explain divergent institutional or movement outcomes, as we see in Algeria, Venezuela, Texas, and Norway. But oil wealth does provide ruling classes an incentive to form undifferentiated citizenship regimes that eradicate citizen-subjectivity under fiscal crisis and martial law. This outcome is facilitated by state-owned mineral-wealth but the latter is an intervening variable in protest outcomes.

Oil-rent states are said to have a “fundamental economic policy pattern: maximizing the external extraction of rents for subsequent domestic distribution through public spending according to a political logic.” Note that while this argument is “materialist” or “economistic” it formulates oil-wealth-effects “according to a political logic,” which may mean intervening in
already-existing political endowments and calculations or generating new ones. Similarly, “the rentier-state thesis [or allocation state thesis] argues that states deriving most of their revenue from external sources, not from domestic resource mobilization, are characterized by a high degree of state autonomy and authoritarian governments, bureaucracies that are oriented toward distribution and not [tax] extraction, and an emphasis on consumption, not development.”

States rich from capital-intensive monocultural extraction, refining, and revenue-collection can distribute wealth, thus avoiding demands for democratic or collective representation by taxed or working citizens. Capital-intensive production entrenches dual anti-democratic tendencies by obviating demands for inclusion from individual taxpayers and collective wage earners. It may also be argued that oil-wealth re-shapes rather than merely supports given policy priorities, notably by persuading ruling classes that the objective of oil-rent-distribution will be to prevent dissident movements or even quietist political associations.

Labor-intensive Poland, by contrast, was “highly industrialized, because industrialization was the preeminent goal of the communist planners. In fact, Poland was over-industrialized when compared with other countries at a comparable level of economic development, since the non-industrial sectors, particularly services, were starved for resources.” Poland’s state sought to legitimate PZPR rule via production and growth, an objective that always reflected wariness of the working class. Algeria’s state sought to avoid issues of legitimacy altogether by distributing rents in an mineral-export-based political economy. It may be argued that these fundamental policy orientations responded to available resources as incentive structures.

Viewed instead from the perspective of ordinary citizens, the oil-state is said to prevent democratizing effects of institutional and economic growth, especially those identified with
stratified class-formation. In one version of the theory, rentier-states simply preclude classes from forming in the first place, permitting cohesive ruling elites to avoid the collective action dilemmas of constituency clientelism. That is, oil-wealth may afford states greater latitude in satisfying citizens’ demands, earning their fealty, or perhaps influencing their identity. This logic implies that oil-revenues legitimize or stabilize central rule by meeting citizens’ material needs, incidentally rendering the regime-designation “authoritarian” otiose. This materialist view, confining citizens’ political claims to the provision of goods, presumes individual preferences trump collective action. The theory that patterns of material acquisition determine political demands and formations suggests that oil-states prevent social agitation in good times because flush oil states use state spending to cultivate dependent, asocial, and egoistic characteristics that forestall civil society, associational life, or political-bureaucratic modernization. In hard times, however, violence recapitulates this lack of state-society coordination, communication, and civility. The oil-state perpetuates, in this view, a political practice of vertical integration with enduring effects on the potential for reformist-gradualist mobilization.

Oil-wealth or mineral-rent is an ambivalent factor in analyzing these movement results because the dominant incentives and patterns among states flush with distributive resources do map over my argument. Vertical, clientelist integration via undifferentiated social resources, minimal civil society, and restricted political space correlates with state access to abundant oil-revenues. I do not therefore deny any impact of oil-rents on the distinct protest outcomes in Algeria and Poland; but I characterize them as indirect and conditional. Indeed, as Heydemann correctly notes,

in an explanation of how the Syrian, Iraqi, Egyptian, and to some extent Algerian regimes are able to sustain authoritarian strategies of governance that operate in part through the pervasive
militarization of everyday life, the fiscal autonomy of state elites stands out as a critical factor. Indeed, the presence of such external resources, and the interest of Middle Eastern states in securing them, can be seen as necessary conditions for the production of the highly militaristic and authoritarian systems of rule found in the dominant single-party regimes of the Middle East.\textsuperscript{258}

The institutional impact of state-accrued oil-revenues must be qualified rather than dismissed, as Chaudhry says: “oil exporters[’]...pursuit of different sectoral and industrial strategies belies the uniform outcomes posited by the ‘Dutch Disease’ framework. In the realm of policy, oil exporters have pursued very different strategies: Iraq, Malaysia, Iran, and especially Algeria, for example, countered the pressures against investment in tradables by initiating industrialization programs.”\textsuperscript{259} In addition to variation, the patterns can invert expectations; as her studies of Saudi Arabia and Yemen show, state-owned rents can decrease government capacity to shape social demands, identity, and actions relative to states whose people subsist on remittances.\textsuperscript{260}

It must be added that the causal factor in mineral-rich state distribution strategies is soft budget constraints, which characterized both the Polish and Algerian political economy, further diminishing the effect of the latter’s status as a mid-range “hydrocarbon society.”\textsuperscript{261}

Patron-client bargains, side-payments, and other informal instruments of securing state centrality exist in most states. But in client-citizenship such informal networks form an exclusive regime rather than a supplement to a differentiated or formal social resource. Yet it is neither logically nor empirically obvious that access to oil (or any other monopoly-controlled export commodity) “naturally”\textsuperscript{262} directs states toward patronage or crowds out alternative citizenship regimes. Domestic, international, and cultural forces, again, mediate the effect of oil-wealth on regime- or protest-type. Indeed, as a windfall to the state, rents seem more instrumental than determinant in consolidating state institutions. Finally, most important, if oil-rent distribution
inhibits the development of formal institutions or differentiated social resources and citizenship regimes, it does so indirectly – not as a by-product of the inherent features of mineral wealth but as the deliberate use of mineral wealth in the construction of specific non-state subjects. Oil-revenues increase the chances of ruling through undifferentiated informal mechanisms but the latter remains the direct explanatory variable, not least given that the former is not the only impetus to creating parasitic social resources. It was, evidently, ruling Algerian elites and not their oil and gas holdings that decided on a citizenship regime that denied dissidents enduring social resources, eventually yielding social agitation and violent militancy.

§3.c.3 Sovereignty

If religious (“idealistic”) or economic (“materialist”) differences inadequately account for Polish and Algerian opposition strategies, perhaps the difference in external pressure is decisive. It is reasonable to suspect that the credible Soviet threat to intervene inhibited violence in Poland, while the absence of an outside enforcer might permit or even encourage violence in Algeria.\textsuperscript{263} Polish protesters lived \textit{under}, but Algerians \textit{after}, imperial domination. This differential is so stark that its causal power in Polish non-violence is regularly seen as self-evident. But critical examination strongly qualifies or undermines this alternative argument.

One enduring shared sensitivity among Polish ruling elites, working classes, intellectuals, and the Church concerns Russian or Soviet intervention. If one anxiety has unified these groups it is Russia’s imperial designs on Poland since the 17\textsuperscript{th}-century, when Russian serfs were fleeing to Polish territories.\textsuperscript{264} For at least four hundred years, arguably until 1989, Russia or the Soviet Union partitioned, invaded, attacked, massacred, kidnapped, executed, imprisoned, colonized, sacrificed, or threatened Poles continually. It is also arguable that this minatory posture grew
only more determined and systematic over time, culminating in the Eastern “bloc.” There is evidence from the period of Solidarity that this threat was real and inhibiting. Former East German General Secretary Erich Honecker claimed that, “even in Poland, General Jaruzelski declared martial law in order to prevent [the Soviet] intervention,”\(^{265}\) threatened in a private ultimatum.\(^{266}\) Adam Michnik has said, from the side of the activists:

> Along with the shock caused by the unexpectedness of the coup, and the Polish belief that the spilling of blood is a barrier that must not be crossed, one more factor was decisive: Russia’s shadow. The possibility of Soviet intervention was often discussed. The Kremlin’s intentions, confirmed daily by statements in the press, were clear. Solidarity was not popular in the Kremlin. The discussions in Poland were about the direction of the policies of the Soviet Union – of its entanglement in the Afghan conflict\(^{[267]}\), its domestic problems, and of the complex international situation. Our conclusions were unclear. Some of us quietly hope that it would be possible to elaborate a model for Polish-Soviet relations in which there would be room for Polish autonomy. We also believed that the Soviet leaders would use armed intervention as a last resort, in response to civil war or a seizure of power. We thought the authorities were using the Soviet bogey only too willingly, in order to achieve the psychological effects of an intervention without an actual intervention...The specter of Russian invasion – in the event of Jaruzelski’s failure – was crucial in determining the attitude of the Polish people. I believe that this fact is yet another demonstration of the amount of common sense and rational thought in this romantic nation. Poles can do more than fight – they can think.\(^{268}\)

One minor background commonality in this political comparison is that the Soviet Union supported both Polish and Algerian regimes. The asymmetries in these relationships are obvious, given the centrality of Poland to the Eastern Block relative to Algeria’s peripheral status in Soviet Middle East foreign policy. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union’s provision of credits, arms, training, and aid to Algeria made the latter a key beneficiary of the Cold War contest in the Middle East for nearly thirty years.\(^{269}\) This does not make Algeria, counterfactually, as likely as Poland to have had its domestic political fights interrupted by the USSR. At the same time, the USSR’s heavy investment in the Algerian state implies dependence on Soviet subsidies and defense. This diminishes the *absolute* contrast between the subordinate powers vis-à-vis the
USSR, even without considering potential sources of external imposition on Algerian dissidents by French or American seeking to undermine Islamist rule. Indeed, Algerians had arguably as much to fear from eternal superpower opposition as Polish agitators had in 1980.

Without doubt Poland was a pillar of the Soviet empire – a front-line buffer state in its conflict\(^\text{270}\) with NATO, and even a “western”-inflected barometer of broad Soviet consolidation. As well, there is no doubt that the Soviet suppression of popular uprisings in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) preoccupied Polish activists during the 1970s and into the “self-limiting revolution” of 1980-89. Less clear, however, is the extent to which the USSR’s minatory posturing determined the progression of Polish non-violence at this time, especially given that the strikes \textit{per se} were radical and defied Soviet intervention. Ancillary factors like the Helsinki accords and US-USSR tension over Afghanistan made it implausible in 1980 that the Soviets would invade Poland to suppress the uprising; opposition figures argued this at the time. If this were \textit{false}, the mass protests should have drawn the Soviets in but they did not. Finally, potential counter-violence is, historically, a poor predictor for initial violence.\(^\text{271}\) These are all arguments that need to be considered in more detail to assess this alternative explanation.

Surely, as Kundera wrote at the time, “In Central Europe...everyone has always been particularly sensitive to the dangers of Russian might.”\(^\text{272}\) Solidarity activists wondered if Soviet elites – trapped in Afghanistan and courting or appeasing US president since the mid-1970s – might hesitate to invade.\(^\text{273}\) But domestic events provide better grounds for rethinking the effects of Soviet imperial policy on Polish social movements. Here I should stress that the revolt of Polish civil society is easily misunderstood as “reformist” \textit{because} it lacked violence. The Polish opposition’s demands constituted an anti-systemic and revolutionary rebellion; \textit{whatever}
effective means they chose, Solidarity was a threat to communist rule in Poland and in the USSR potentially – not only or principally violent means. Violence was only the crudest threat that provoked the Soviets, yet they held back in 1956, 1970, 1976, and in 1980 during massive public Polish fomentations. Poles’ resistance equally to foreign and domestic tyranny, Davies insists, sequentially overcame such divisions. Thus, “internal squabbles plaguing the new government [in the 1920s] were put aside as the whole nation rallied to Marshall Pilsudski’s summons for volunteers. Many thousands joined up for crash military training, while noncombatants carried the call to town and countryside through meetings, posters, and pamphlets.”

No less than the Nazi invasion sparked a “great national mobilization” in Poland, the first popular movement “in Europe to take up arms against the Nazis.” In the most stirring invocation of Polish national resistance, Todorov writes movingly of the Warsaw uprising of 1944:

I realized I was actually reading a reflection on heroism. Certainly the rebels were heroes, but, more than that, the hold that heroic values had on their spirit seemed to have played a decisive role in the outbreak of the revolt and in its progress. This heroic spirit had acted as a kind of drug; it kept the fighters in a state of exaltation that helped them withstand even the most difficult ordeal...[For] Chief of Operations for the Polish Home Army...Colonel Okulicki[,] General and Comander in Chief Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski[,] and Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff Tadeusz Pelczynski...what ought to be far outweighed...attention to what was...When someone told Colonel Antoni Monter, the Home Army region commander for Warsaw, that a certain neighborhood had fallen into German hands, he shot back, ‘I do not accept this information.’ That attitude is typical of the hero: he may know that his ideal is unrealizable (in this case, both Poland’s position on the map and the Red Army’s military potential made Soviet occupation a foregone conclusion), but because he desires it above all else, he pursues it with all his might...This, it seems, was the Polish military tradition. Steiner cites a prewar general who explains to his subordinates that material shortages can always be compensated for by and effort of will, by the soldiers’ capacity for self-sacrifice. ‘Let there be an inverse relation between your munitions and Polish blood,’ he admonishes them. ‘Anytime you lack some of the former, make up for it with some of the latter’...To claim that one’s ideal is ‘the nation’ is not enough, however, for the nation can be many things: a group of human beings – my family and my friends or my compatriots, for instance – or a certain number of places and houses and roads. These interpretations Okulicki rejects: the uprising, he argues, must no be postponed ‘under the pretext of saving a few lives or a few houses.’ It is a question of saving not the people of Warsaw but the idea of Warsaw, not individual Poles or Polish territory but an abstraction called Poland...And so it was not the Polish people who had to be saved but, rather, certain qualities of
their: their will to freedom, their desire for independence, their national pride... But even Poland the abstraction is not always enough; Poland must itself be offered up to an even more distant ideal – that of the West, which, in its turn, comes to stand for civilization, or even “humanity”... The insurrection becomes a sacrificial act in the name of a series of increasingly remote and always impersonal beneficiaries or audiences – Warsaw, Poland, the West, the world. Lives are sacrificed not for other human beings but for ideas... The rebels understood themselves to be writing, as the time-honored formula has it, ‘one of the most glorious pages in the history of Poland.’

We should not minimize the danger to, or of, Polish dissidents on the grounds that their non-violence was factually unthreatening to the USSR’s stated interests, did not raise the odds of interference, or increase the USSR’s own domestic concerns. Nor may we cite what we now know of the Soviet reluctance to aggress against the 1956 Poznań demonstrations at a more vulnerable period in communist party consolidation; nor Brezhnev’s subtle request to the Polish leadership to negotiate their way out of the crisis in 1970. Despite rumbling his troops around the Polish border in 1956, Khrushchev admitted subsequently that “as we began to analyze the problem in more detail and calculate which Polish regiments we could count on to obey [us], the situation began to look somewhat bleak. Of course, our own armed strength far exceeded that of Poland, but we didn’t want to resort to our own troops.” Surely, Poles could not have known of the Soviets’ specific hesitations since 1956 to intervene in Poland, but they could have inferred or intuited from twenty-five years of diverse activism without Soviet attack, and from changes in the geopolitical situation making such an attack less likely, that Solidarity would be permitted to proceed without violence; and that violence would have been countered by the Polish state directly, should it occur.

Fear of Soviet reprisal might have inhibited the massive public strikes and protests by openly identified people that did occur; or, conversely, it might have incited the clandestine violence, destruction, or terrorism that did not occur. “Hypothetical Soviet tanks were to figure
through the crisis [of 1980] as a political weapon to soften up the strikers. But the Gdansk workers, while showing exemplary restraint, were not to be frightened into surrender”279, Singer says. As my model anticipates, when the 1980 uprising eventually lost systemic efficacy, “supporters of Solidarity, particularly younger ones, [grew] increasingly impatient with our policy of nonviolence. Some began to insist that we had to prepare for war. Had nonviolent struggle against the Communists ever succeeded? they asked.”280 It was thus the intransigent pressure of Communist social and police structures that nearly engendered activist violence.281 Moreover, the specific Soviet threat seemed to prove marginal relative to the domestic menace: “Even though the Brezhnev Doctrine was dead and the Soviet Union no longer a threat, few things had changed in the People’s Republic of Poland” by the mid-1980s.282 This reference to past Polish-state behavior offers a final cautionary note against the counter-proposition that potential oppression deterred protester violence. Finally, inchoate indications of Russian cultural nationalism in this period presaged, along with the rest, a relative insularity that further lessened foreigners’ sense of expansionist reaction.283

It is noteworthy that this alternative hypothesis about the Soviets’ tamping down Polish actions defies the oft-heard claim that violence, or fear of it, causes violence; here the idea is that (potential) violence discourages counter-violence. Given this exceptional view, and many examples of oppression exacerbating violence, one either suspects it is an ad hoc description of Polish civic vigilance or a theory of the Polish exception that needs to be elaborated. But Polish communists ruthlessly assailed protesters for many years without deterring disturbances that included episodic destruction. After the 1976 torching of the PZPR Radom headquarters, “the police and security forces began a campaign of reprisals, including beating, arresting, firing on,
and imprisoning...thousands of workers.”284 Far worse, during the 1956 Poznań demonstrations, the 1968 student movement, and the 1970 coastal strikes, the state massacred, arrested, or tried hundreds of activists without halting subsequent demonstrations. Indeed, as repertoires of mass non-state collective action deepened, professionalized, and proliferated, “the use of violent repression...never ceased...– the protests broken up with tremendous brutality” by the Polish security forces.285 Reformist gradualism in the 1980-1989 Polish democratic transition may have eclipsed the often-fatal activities against atrocious state coercion. But this recovered pre-history reinforces that Polish activists were not intimidated easily even by fatal communist reprisals.

Given that Polish uprisings endured decades of relentless state violence, it seems threats of despotic repression do not explain why Polish freedom-seekers never turned to sustained violent revolt. With the compulsion of anger, memory and promise of state brutality, and temptations of clandestine terrorism, some urgent, internal force constrained Polish militants. It is surely hard to prove the combined Polish-Soviet communist forces were not decisive. But the evidence and arguments adduced question the “Soviet factor” as the explanation for Polish civic non-violence, particularly by the period in question.286 As one activist-intellectual wrote at the time, “it would be erroneous to see the choice of non-violent strategies as simply caused by the possibility of a Soviet military invasion, even if everybody was aware of it.”287 As another scholar says, “The new civil society also ignored the alleged threat of intervention, as well as Cassandran predictions of new partitions of Poland. In fact, it ignored the totalitarian political system and exploded into a massive social movement.”288 From the other side of the border, “Moscow tolerated these changes as long as the regime preserved communist party rule and
maintained its commitments to the Warsaw Pact." It seems, then, an exaggeration to refer to Poland during Solidarity's time as "a society...incapable of a revolutionary thrust, its hands tied by the Soviet threat."
CHAPTER FOUR

Polish worker-citizens and non-violence

The System – compounded by the Poles’ skepticism about all systems – produces a nation of ironists and gamblers...Disbelief in all symptoms of official life is, of course, so taken for granted that nobody needs to talk about it very much. Politics, like religion, is a game, except almost no one – no one we know, anyway – seems to believe in it. Poles don’t need demystifying philosophies to doubt all sources of power and authority. Nose-thumbing the system is a national pastime, and every second street-corner exchange is a deconstruction.

_Eva Hoffman_1

‘That long-dreaded fulfillment has freed us from the self-reassuring lies, illusions, subterfuges; the opaque has become transparent.’ Familiar forms of collective life collapsed overnight. The debates over ideologies and political doctrines came down to a display of unthinkable brute force. At last, modern man was able to behold his total, unashamed nakedness.

_Jaroslaw Anders_2

Faith in one’s ability to exert influence on the fate of society is an absolute prerequisite for political activity...[Even when] faith was based on delusions civic activity and open demonstrations of opposition were its real and positive results.

_Adam Michnik_3

Do not fear those who kill the body, for they can do nothing more!

_Father Jerzy Popieluszko_4

Are not these informed, nonbureaucratic, dynamic, and open communities that comprise the “parallel polis” a kind of rudimentary prefiguration, a symbolic model of those more meaningful “post-democratic” political structures that might become the foundations of a better society?

_Václav Havel_5

Polish spiritual life is characterized by a certain inborn Hegelianism, that is, it often seems to confirm Hegel’s intentions, as if in a given historical moment there always existed a certain uniform and ordinary state of the world, encompassing both plants and economics, morality and philosophy. Hegel’s Totalität cuts us in two like a ubiquitous razor, it intrudes into our most private thoughts, like secret police, except more effectively because not only does it sniff and examine, but, first, it creates and inspires what we are.

_Adam Zagajewski_6

In Poland, amid a time of surprising, inspiring new freedom for the country, I was invited by chance to think of myself as more historically determined than I had before. Striving to think of that as a writer’s problem, a formal problem, I felt a renewed sympathy for every sullen student doodling on the overflowing margins of some grubby notebook, a name or face.

_Robert Pinsky_7
§4.a  Summary

The goal of this chapter is to test the explanation of Polish non-violence presented in the introduction against a brief historical narrative of state formation and opposition strategies in postwar Poland. My hope is to provide an adequate empirical account of dissident activities in Poland to evaluate my theoretical model deriving sustained non-violence under martial law from Poland’s worker-citizenship regime – that is, from the predominant mode of state-citizen interaction that situated effective Polish citizenship in labor-intensive production systems that, enduring fiscal crisis and the state of emergency, protected Poles’ systemic subjectivity. I will first trace the dialectics of state policies and dissident responses under Polish communist rule, and then recapitulate the theoretical model in light of the key historical events. I will combine, then, the theoretical and empirical accounts to explore the plausibility of my explanation. In a concluding section I will address some limitations or extensions of my causal inferences.

The historical narrative portrays events culminating in the phenomenon of Solidarity in communist Poland. The account is oriented toward the puzzle of sustained non-violent dissent under communist dictatorship and state coercion. It is worth noting that this puzzle itself must be defended, since the commitment to non-violence of the “self-limiting revolution” led by the working-class is considered settled law in the specialized scholarship on Polish activism. I am, in a sense, re-opening the case by asking a question consensually seen as answered. The retention of Polish non-violence is widely viewed as the inherent result of Polish beliefs or values; the particular convictions contentiously attributed to Poles’ non-violence include priority of civility, fear of Soviet invasion, repression-fatigue, and democratic traditions. Whatever reason is given, the consensus is that the non-violent response to state brutality, ordered by ruling classes seen
as corrupt and illegitimate, is unsurprising. My narrative selects on this puzzle rather than on a theory, and engages a diverse literature that does not find my dependent variable problematic. More explicitly put, I have not composed the historical account to support my theory or model but to represent the scholarship well enough to interrogate them.

The sources and meanings of Solidarity are contested but specialists agree on its non-violence; institutional gradualism; popular support; intellectual, professional, and Church ties; and diffuse social organization and mobilization. There seems to be a consensus that Solidarity reflected the parallel rise of grassroots associational autonomy and demise of state authority, as dissident and ordinary Poles rejected “positivist” or top-down revisionism, embracing self-organization to demand autonomous unions. Clashing with the state in 1956, 1970, and 1976, protesting workers had regularly reversed public policies and removed top-echelon ruling elites, while discerning that systemic reforms were unlikely and progress in securing social welfare depended on worker self-legislation. On the other hand, scholars dispute the social provenance of the Solidarity movement, and more broadly of the growing discipline, vision, and coherence of Polish labor. It remains heatedly contested whether the union coalesced and evolved as an increasingly sophisticated collective actor within the internal logic of worker initiatives or, in contrast, as a result of necessary intellectual intervention and guidance. Some academics and participants trace Solidarity’s refined commitments and tactics to the 1970 strike and state repression; others cite the 1968 student revolts and founding of a professional and intellectual committee to represent and advocate for workers’ rights after the 1976 riots.

These distinct views texture an overarching agreement, though, that labor actions such as protests, strikes, or unionization drives formed the gravitational epicenter of Polish dissent
since the consolidation of “post-Stalinist” communism in 1956. It seems uncontested that, over the next generation, workers, intellectuals, professionals, and the clergy gradually converged around, through, and behind the Solidarity union. Researchers and activists concur that labor agitation organized civilian opposition to Communist authoritarianism in Poland, but arguably this agreement has naturalized the consequential non-violent strategies incrementally adopted and sustained by workers and their religious, intellectual, professional, and critical backers. We still lack, arguably, a clear sense of how the convergence of diverse anti-communist tendencies around Solidarity, how labor’s learning process, indeed how workers’ location in Polish society shaped leading Polish dissidents’ commitment to non-violence under martial law. I hope that the next two sections may contribute helpful theoretical observations to this remaining puzzle.

§4.b  

Historical narrative

It is typical to ground Poland’s modern political economy in the tenth-century baptism of King Mieszko I, which consecrated the Catholic nation-state of Poland⁸, and its Liberum Veto that gave every noble in parliament (Sejm) veto-power over royal decrees.⁹ These events symbolize the continuity of Polish commitments to the Catholic faith, national identity, and decentralized authority. As Davies says, “The beginning of Poland’s recorded history [was] the baptism of King Mieszko I in the Latin rite in 966” and its height was the great Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that, by the 16th century, had
devolved a unique political system. Supreme power lay with parliamentary gatherings of the nobility, who sought perfect liberty for themselves, and perfect equality among themselves. Such was their respect for the rights of the individual noble, that in time the extraordinary institution of Liberum Veto gave every single member of parliament (sejm) the right to veto any bill.¹⁰
Poland’s partition by Russia, Prussia, and Austria (1795-1918) seized upon this decentralized governance system, often blamed for Poland’s vulnerability to encroachment and conquest, while deepening Polish-Catholic national identity and resistance. The partition furthered these legacies: antipathy especially to Russian domination, acculturation to the sacrificial symbolism of militant agitation, and perpetual difficulties assimilating rural and urban citizens to a central state authority. One recalls here Napoleon’s apocryphal comment to Balashof: “What do I care for your allies? I too have allies – these Poles...; they fight like lions.” External domination by local or more distant outsiders spurred Polish-Catholic nationalism, with historical and social variations, to be sure:

During the 150 years of national and political subjugation, the church fostered allegiance in the faithful to the collective bodies of nation and Church rather than to religion alone as a road to redemption. Thus the loyal Catholic Pole did not...feel compelled to internalize principles of piety...His Catholicism, as the Church, was perceived in broad social, political, and symbolic terms...As such it became generally conservative, traditionalist, and highly politicized.

Partition created a “‘culture of dissent’ that would be revived under the communist regime,” with the Church acting as “guardian and preserver of all that was Polish...: the culture, history, language, and traditions.” Thus the great Polish romantics, with “their heroes and heroines larger than life” and “cult of Freedom,” “added a specifically Polish note of Catholic piety.” Occupied Poles demonstrated hair-trigger rebelliousness, rising up against the Czar in 1863, for instance, without the slightest chance of success. Hardly pacifist or especially patient in their jealous autonomy, Poles resisted conquest as martyred Catholic nationalists:

During the century of statelessness and beyond, every single Polish generation has produced men careless of their own survival, who have risen with desperate courage against their tormentors. The Warsaw uprising of August 1944 was but the last performance of a drama which was also enacted in 1733, 1768, 1794, 1830, 1846, 1848, 1863, 1905, and 1920. On each
occasion, if asked what they were fighting for, their reply might well have been the same: for “a few ideas...which is nothing new.”

Anticipating Solidarity’s steadfast non-violence, it must be emphasized that these uprisings do not represent merely angry outbursts, but a fundamental commitment to principles of identity and loyalty and autonomy to nation and religion that called for militant action – that embedded in the Polish political community a belief in physical self-protection, principally against Russian suzerainty and any form of central rule that rendered itself illegitimate by dividing Poles or undermining their principal social institutions. Polish Catholics learned that “rigid conservatism” better secured survival than “supple reformism” and that “it did not need temporal power to support and sustain it,...that it could even remain aloof from the secular rulers [if] it remained institutionally strong and in touch with the nation’s feelings.”

Poles finally enjoyed a measure of independence in the interwar period, when Catholic “moral prestige,” social associations, educational programs, union activity, and political debate flourished under Polish self-rule. The Church and state, finally freed of imperials ukase, agreed on the Concordat of 1925, trading Vatican recognition and government consideration in Episcopal designations for Church privileges. Whether the Church and the intelligentsia – from experimental artists to socialist activists and nationalists – found common ground, especially under Pilsudski’s creeping dictatorship, remains debated. While intellectuals were “put off by the Church’s traditionalism, exclusivism, and...intense anti-Semitic prejudice,” “the Church’s concern for easing social tensions helped to weaken the anticlericalism that had been widespread among the left-wing and liberal intelligentsia...and promoted the emergence of a new open-minded Catholic intelligentsia.” Meanwhile Polish nationalists and communists
were contesting the institutions and obligations of autonomous statehood in light of incessant German and Soviet designs on Polish sovereignty. General Hans von Seeckt, for instance, dreading a two-front war after Versailles, “reached the firm conclusion that the greatest threat came from the vengeful French – made all the worse by the French support of Poland. ‘The existence of Poland is intolerable and incompatible with Germany’s vital interests.’”

The expulsion of the Soviets in their short war of 1920 did not secure Poland’s autonomy but Poles momentarily asserted their sovereignty against an emerging great power.

Poland’s fleeting sovereignty ended with the Nazi invasion that targeted intellectuals, slaughtered a third of the clergy, and, aided by postwar anti-Jewish attacks, destroyed minority communities, leaving Poland entirely Catholic, as detailed in chapter three. Describing Poland’s losses and misery during and after WWII – six million (one-fifth of the population) killed, with the young, resistant, and gifted pointedly targeted – as both materially but also psychologically exceptional, Davies laments that “Poles, whose death-toll was the greatest of all, had to mourn without comfort or consolation.” Where Americans, British, Germans, Japanese, or Russians could claim some victory (gaining freedom by defeating an internal or external foe), Poland had gained least and suffered most – a people uniquely unable, perhaps, to move from melancholia to mourning.”

Because of their decimation, Poles were especially vulnerable after the war, as well, to the whims of outsiders, notably the imperial domination of the Soviet Union.

Yet from 1944 to 1956 the Church and communist party-state emerging under Soviet suzerainty jostled for power in a complex negotiation. One timeline of the oscillation between repression and accommodation in Church-Party relations lists “polemical discussion (1944-1948); mute coexistence (1949-1956); spontaneous mass dialogue (1956-1958); and
constructive dialogue (1959-). Communists hoped to co-opt Catholics with selective privileges since Catholics held the key to state legitimacy. The early balance of interests revealed the chasm between communism and Catholicism, which Stalin himself conceded with his comment about saddling a cow. Their tensions erupted in 1949 when the Church excommunicated Party members and the communist state nationalized Church land, confiscated the Church’s welfare agency, censored Catholic publications, eliminated religious teachings in school, and pulled chaplains from prisons, hospitals, and army units. A more brutal repression occurred during and after the war between Stalinist communism and Polish communist and socialist groups.

The imposition of Soviet communism exacerbated long-standing clashes between Polish and external polities both ideologically and institutionally. Kennedy shows that the alienation of Poles from socialism was an impressive achievement, given the growing multiplicity of socialist parties and minor union actions during the partition. “The central point is not this diversity, but that socialism was one of the major themes in Polish social and political life in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth. National independence for Poland was equally important, however, if not more so.” This confirms Ash’s summary of three patterns in Polish history: “The Poles are an old European people with an unquenchable thirst for freedom; freedom in Polish means, in the first place, national independence; the Polish national identity is historically defined in opposition to Russia.”

Initially, Polish socialists “gave equal place to national independence and social reform” under the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), although it was only WWI that reunited factions divided over the question of militant unionism. Especially in the interwar period Polish party activism was immensely dense, but generally, as Kennedy says, they staged an argument over the
relative merits of national and international (socialist or communist) agendas. The Polish Socialist Party PPS (1892-1948) was a nationalist, communitarian party with deep roots relative to the Polish Workers Party, KPRP (1918-1925), which was so “internationalist” that it refused to recognize sovereign Poland until 1923, and the Polish Communist Party, KPP (1925-1938). Stalin dissolved the KPP, it seems, because its popularity included grassroots nationalists. Its leading figure, Władysław Gomułka, reorganized the Polish communist party 1942 as the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR), which still emphasized a patriotic call for independence. Meanwhile, the Polish Home Army AK (1942-1945) was defending the fatherland from invasion, incurring the wrath of not only the National Socialists in Germany but also the totalitarian communists in the Soviet Union. Most authors depict this period as the death knell for any reconciliation between Soviet international communism and Polish national socialist traditions.

Between 1945-1948, “the Polish Communists and their Soviet sponsors were able to crush, disperse, or incorporate all non-communist political forces in the country,” producing the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR).32 But this only created a dilemma for the USSR between imposing communism and achieving legitimate rule in Poland. Lepak describes the ill prospects of Polish communism:

First, the party had always been widely identified by Poles as a non-Polish, antipatriotic, and Russian-inspired political force. Second, the party, in attempting to alter this popular perception of its character by developing a more national ideological orientation, ran directly into conflict with Stalin, the Comintern, and the CPSU. Thus, the party found itself in the fateful dilemma of being caught between the national political interests of the Polish people and the international political interests of the Soviet Communists. Third, as a result of this dilemma, and Stalin’s dim view of the KPP, the united party was subjected to factional struggle in and beyond the late 1940s owing to the Kremlin’s implantation and manipulation of loyal “Muscovite” Polish Communists. Thus the party was not only at very difficult odds with Polish Society, but was also divided against itself as a result of Stalin’s suspicions of chronic “nationalist deviation” among the comrades in Warsaw.33
Kennedy argues that the installation of communist rule perpetuated opposition by traditional nationalist and Catholic religious interests. This division, furthered by communist duplicity and betrayal against indigenous communist, nationalist, and religious tendencies, would prove incurable. Davies portrays the imposition of Stalinist institutions as enduring all the way through the Solidarity period: “the adoption of Marxism-Leninism as the sole ideology; the establishment of an extravagantly large conscript army; the Command Economy based on central planning; the mania for heavy industry; the Constitution of 1952; and, above all, the monopoly power of the Polish United Workers Party…Communist Poland…is essentially a Stalinist creation,” notable for its “gigantic construction projects” and “absolute priority given to heavy industry – especially coal, iron, and steel, and to the arms industry.”

Noting that poor people or revolutionary movements often founded authoritarian states for instrumental, indigenous, and temporary reasons, Davies remarks that in Poland, no…domestic rationale pertained. Poland, if left to itself at the end of the Second World War, might have produced its own form of democracy, as in 1921, or possibly its own variety of dictatorship, as in 1926. Given their established traditions and allegiances, the Poles could not conceivably have spawned a communist regime of their own accord. There were hardly enough native communists to run a factory, let alone a country of some thirty million people. In the economic sphere, Poland had everything to gain by association with the advanced economies of Western Europe and North America, but little from dependence on the backward and war-torn economy of the USSR. What actually happened in 1944-1948 was that the Soviet Union forcibly imposed a Soviet-style communist system on Poland, regardless of the people’s wishes or the country’s independent interests.

In short, the imposition of communist rule on Poland itself expressed its incompatibility with Polish commitments, history, and wishes. This chasm was exhibited in the results of a national education project launched in 1962, which seems to have highlighted more than overcome the alienation of Poles from communism. Fiszman says that the socialist-statist pedagogical project
was greatly troubled because many of its students were recent migrants from the lost eastern agricultural areas to recently reclaimed western industrial centers like Gdańsk. Overall, the hopeless objective was to reform Poles’ ideational orientation to socialism and secularism:

Fulfillment of such demands, however, is not without its problems. The schools are supposed to turn out citizens capable of being active and “cooperative” members of the new technological-industrial and Socialist community. Obstacles are encountered: an entrenched traditional culture perpetuated by the family, Church, and other established formal and informal; educational traditions of a classical and humanistic character and elitist in nature; a scarcity of personnel equipped to meet the new system’s technological goals and its ideological objectives; and a host of vested interests – functional, economic, and ideological – that may oppose the realization of the larger goals related to education.

Poland’s “centrally planned bureaucracy,” in the “new class analysis” proposed by Kuron and Modzelewski in their seminal essay in 1965, formed the production regime at the national level that integrated Polish workers into the state without formally empowering them:

The CPB is identified as the new “ruling class” by virtue of its monopoly control of the means of production. Since the workers must sell their labor to those who dispose of the means of production, the working class remains exploited, being deprived “not only of the means of power and control, but even of self-defense.” Because of its control over surplus products, the CPB can support an extensive coercive apparatus that checks any challenges to the established political and economic relationships.

The central levers of the command economy in Poland were monopoly ownership of the means of production, centralized organization and management of the economy’s “socialized sector”;
On 25 Feb 1956, Khrushchev delivered his “secret speech” against Stalinism. In Poland, Edward Ochab succeeded the Soviet’s client, Boleslaw Bierut, only to be succeeded by Gomułka who was “rehabilitated” as head of the PZPR after the Stalinist state attacked Poznań rioters.

The Stalinist period ended for all practical purposes in 1956. The controlled de-Stalinization crisis reconstituted Poland’s political elite and led to limited concessions to various social groups and organizations. Repressive political practices were abandoned or altered despite the preservation of social and economic legacies of the Stalinist transformation and the institutional structures of the party-state. Although the post-1956 regime gradually retreated from its promise of political liberalization and economic reforms, Poland never came close to a reestablishment of Stalinist-type political control.40

The political economy of Poland from this point forward was consolidated around the PZPR, the official (state) trade unions, and the military, supported by a security apparatus, whose degree of subordination to the party would be “directly related to the strength and cohesion of the party itself.”41 The communist state was organized as a two-tiered “dual subordination” system, with “office holders within the communist state system...accountable to a formal superior for the specific performance of his duties and to a party body or official for the general success and tenor of his performance.”42 Lewis stresses that the systematic coherence of the state’s party-management command structure obscured “ambiguity [that] can also be a source of political strength and a force working to sustain the authority of the party rather than to undermine it.” The putative ideological purity of the nomenklatura and bureaucratic rationality of the Communist state could eclipse the sociological composition of the ruling class. Podgorecki portrays the PZPR as filled with “the so-called half-intelligentsia,” those outside the “threelfold classification” of elite Polish society: the white collar “real intelligentsia,” the second-generation of the weak middle stratum (bourgeoisie), and the nobility and Church.43 The post-Stalinist
personnel and state may be understood as a highly friable apparatus populated by third-rate managers and survivors of Nazi cleansing that deliberately targeted the best and brightest.

This is the political party and bureaucracy that greeted Gomułka, known for nationalist as well as socialist leanings, after the 23 June 1956 riots at the Poznań Steel Works locomotive plant prompted his instauration. The restoration and elevation to head of state of a pro-independence leader was one political effect of “the first major outburst of worker discontent against the Communist authorities” in Poznań “when 80 percent of the workforce of the huge Cegielski factory, the largest in the region and then known as the Stalin works, walked off their jobs and marched into the streets on the morning of June 28, 1956...because of a dispute over wages...The rage of the workers, however, stemmed from their feelings of powerlessness.”

Worker protests were triggered by and advanced the de-Stalinization process, reversing several unpopular socialist policies toward workers, the Church, and peasants. Reforms in the Soviet and Polish parties resulted in returned Church political and financial rights, released religious detainees, and cessation of agricultural collectivization efforts and return of peasants land holdings (§3.b.1). The workers’ revolt compelled “changes in party leadership, institutional adjustments, and important concessions to the Catholic Church.” The PZPR exchanged “acquiescence from the Church hierarchy [for] concessions” such as re-privatized landholdings that funded religious endowments. Polish Catholics celebrated their newfound freedoms by founding “clubs of intelligence,” running for office, and forming an independent group called Znak, a collection of Catholic and secular intellectuals and artists that augured the future alignment of Catholics and activist intellectuals. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, released from jail, emblemized the perceived thaw in communist tyranny. “More socialist than
communist,” Gomułka was partial to the Church’s “liberation theological” impulses and allied in effect with the Cardinal.48

This was the first occasion that taught workers they could collectively protest and strike to express their grievances and satisfy their demands against the communist state. In the event, workers in June agreed to send Warsaw five demands, including a 20 percent wage increase. An 18 June demonstration turned violent when they stormed the city jail to release prisoners, the radio station, and the District office of Security. “The demonstrations escalated into large antigovernment riots in Poznań and in other Polish cities”; although maybe “100 people died in the crackdown…workers’ councils mushroomed around the country, independently of the party and trade unions, thus signaling the need for political reforms to accompany the administrative changes.”49 This would become the template for the next twenty years; together workers acted in concentric rings emanating out from an initial work site or action to protest PZPR’s policies, tactically withholding their labor power from the overall production system and storming or burning official buildings in aggressive acts that appear never to have targeted government officials. Thus, 1956 was a combined event of Stalinist descent, Gomułka’s ascent, and the message that worker resistance to government actions would be rewarded and would reward others, including non-worker citizens.

It was also a signal moment in postwar Polish political history, then, when discrete groups or interests gained collectively from worker militancy. In addition, this period created a general sense of disparate groups allied by a common opponent, the imposed communist regime. Potentially competing workers, peasants, and Catholic and secular intellectuals had in this time their first glimpse of a civil unity. Finally, in this period, the fundamental commitments
of Catholic religiosity in Poland were manifest, and this would prove a driving force in the working class movement through the Solidarity era. A resident philosophy professor, Michel Foucault, observed, “Marxism was an object of disgust, an irrelevant theory which they had to study as a French schoolboy might have to study the catechism. Catholicism, on the other hand, represented a form of passive resistance.”\(^{50}\) Despite his impression that most people “went to mass only to show their opposition to the regime”\(^ {51}\), Catholic commitments were profound and ineradicable, most evidently in the popularity of the annual tour of the Black Madonna (1957-1966), “seen by virtually all Polish Catholics,” which “strengthened social integration on local and national levels and rejuvenated the religiosity of the Poles…[T]his spectacular ceremony…defined the cultural frame of the conflict between the Church and the state for decades to come.”\(^ {52}\) Kubic stresses that after 1956 the Catholic Church took pains to “present itself as a champion of human rights, freedom, and genuine civil society,”\(^ {53}\) further testing the state’s tolerance of non-state organizations and commitments.

The “de-Stalinization,” “de-totalization,” or “de-Communization” of Poland appeared to offer citizens a return to native social traditions, political rights, and pragmatic religiosity over foreign-imposed ideology.\(^ {54}\) The thaw would not last long, but Poznań set a precedent that would: “The Polish crisis in 1980-81 was the culmination...of political crises that occurred periodically after 1956 and led to unexpected popular protests and abrupt leadership changes (since 1956 virtually all top Polish leaders had been deposed as a result of unrest) as well as to further erosion of the Stalinist party-state.”\(^ {55}\) In this period, according to Davies, “the Polish People’s Republic had ceased to be a puppet state, and became a client state [and,] too old a campaigner to think that the Polish people really loved their communists,...Gomułka was
empowered to make a series of strategic concessions to popular demands and to permit three specific features of the Polish order – an independent Catholic Church, a free peasantry, and a curious brand of bogus political pluralism.”

The communist party had conceived economic growth as the vehicle to political legitimacy and state-administered industrial organization and labor productivity as the motor of economic growth. That Polish ruling classes conflated growth, legitimacy, and stability would mean that they relied repeatedly on price adjustments and increased demands on workers to increase production rates. As we shall see, this often meant the state’s short-term, concrete social costs imposed on labor were long-term gambles for workers and the regime alike. The development strategy of the communist system initiated in the mid-1950s was to integrate large-scale, labor-intensive production sites through management of regional sectors overseen by party leaders. In the short-run this plan – akin to contemporaneous post-colonial efforts to politicize state-managed development schemes but by avoiding labor concentrations – brought workers, management, official unions, and the PZPR into a coherent politics of production, in Burawoy’s phrase. Seemingly efficient, productive, and cohesive, the assimilated material and organizational features of early state-socialist Poland seemed to produce a year of hope. We had seen, not the potential (for this was soon crushed) but the living, indomitable agents of that potential at work within those societies [of Eastern Europe]. Behind the posters, novels, and films [we saw] workers who were absentees, pilferers, time-servers, as well as workers who were learning to defend themselves, organize, and take common cause with intellectuals.

None of this came without long-term insecurity or immediate cost, generally benefiting state centralization. For instance, while the party halted rural collectivization, “the carrot [was]
matched with stick, and the state made it very difficult for private farmers to obtain the three essentials for small scale farming – agricultural credits, tractors and other machinery, and fertilizers.” The PZPR carefully oriented concessions to increasing state monopolization of political and economic resources, initiating a continual dynamic in which state centralization interacted with social decentralization spurred by working-class mobilization. For instance, the immediate post-1956 years relaxed constraints on artists and writers that reduced tensions between state and creative citizens. Artistic activism strengthened in aesthetic and political terms, in this period, presenting the typical dilemma among ruling classes between permissive and restrictive policies. In this time, Poggioli could describe Poland as

the only country beyond the curtain where residues of aesthetic protest are still displayed..., precisely because that “people’s democracy,” more than any other, has been constrained to accept compromises with the national and religious spirit. If avant-garde art is not yet totally dead in Poland, this is solely because their culture...is affected by that pluralism which distinguishes the modern culture of the bourgeois world – a pluralism that suffices to make the new order less totalitarian and monolithic.

The radiating changes “of leadership and policy result[ing] from labor protests” gave impetus to Polish artists and writers, even as the cultural breather was slowly suffocated again into the 1960s. “If the Polish October opened the way for intellectual reservations about the foundations of the system, even among those convinced of the value of socialist ideals, then those doubts spread through the younger generation and the intelligentsia in 1968. From that time on intellectuals no longer supported the Soviet model of socialism.”

Between 1956 and 1964, the relative easing of state surveillance inspired a politicization of intellectual activity, resulting in gradual tensions over freedom of expression and censorship. The Club the Crooked Circle, “an enclave of intellectual freedom,” thrived until 1962, while a
welter of publications, discussions, and letter-writing campaigns were beginning to confront the state’s invasive regulations of quotidian life, especially critical discourse. The seminal document from this period is an open letter to the PZPR by Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, a student and professor at Warsaw University, who critiqued the state on Marxist grounds, claiming that a revolutionary situation inhered in the chasm between the working class and “central political bureaucracy.” Each was sentenced to three years in jail and dismissed as members of the party. Such harassment included intimidating trials of writers and artists accused of betraying “the Polish people.” Agitation against these tactics was peaking in 1968 when Kazimierz Dejmek directed the Warsaw National Theater’s performance of “Forefather’s Eve,” a play by Poland’s national literary icon, Adam Mickiewicz. Although selected to satisfy the party’s call for a dramatic commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, the play contained sentences such as, “The only things Moscow sends us are jackasses, idiots, and spies,” and so was abruptly canceled. State security forces then assailed protesters on university campuses with shocking aggression. Karpinski chronicles the ongoing crackdown and proliferating trials for treason. Cries of “Poland awaits its own Dubcek” were heard in the streets, but this was also an organized movement, led mainly by the Union of Polish Writers (ZLP) who issued formal demands “to return to tolerance and creative freedom,” permit artistic and intellectual expression, and desist from state incursions into the universities.

The state launched in response an anti-Semitic campaign against the movement, but its long-run effect appears to have been to further discredit the regime – if not out of widespread concern for students or professors, then for the show of state arrogance and use of force on peaceful activists. Perhaps as a consequence of natural literary affinity, after 1968 protests and
repression, the Catholic Church publicly supported the opposition by publishing their articles in the Catholic presses and “demanding...on behalf of the episcopate...the release of arrested students, and an end to ‘drastic’ methods of investigation and punishment, and...truthful reporting.” In contrast, in 1968 the workers did not support the students, despite gestures of alliance from young intellectuals and teachers, but it is unclear that this was due to anti-Semitic tactics. It is important in the broad dialogue of intellectuals and workers – who would reconcile in 1976 with the founding of KOR – that they were mutually indifferent if not hostile from 1968 until the worker uprising in 1970. In retrospect from the mid-1970s, the state’s effort to draw workers into a racist campaign against the universities seems a critical juncture. First, the state signaled its incipient plan to subdivide and fragment diverse constituencies of the population. In other words, the PZPR expressed a relatively novel intention to manipulate or direct sections of the population instead of merely punishing transgressions. This seems to mean that the state grasped that its survival depended on moving from despotic to infrastructural power (§2.b) and on fostering competitive and vertical state-society ties to compete with the growing horizontal and cooperative ties already evinced in 1956. Second, the strain between workers and students in 1968-1970 attests to how radically Polish dissidents evolved in a short time. The excesses of this period – state coercion, intra-dissident hostility – seem, indeed, to mark a breaking point in postwar Poland after which social agitators turned away from the state and to one another.

Political attacks on intellectual production and aesthetic expression were followed by an incremental move to liberalize the political economy in a command framework. After “the Fifth Congress in 1968...resolved to...break out of the Stalinist model of extensive industrialization to intensive utilization of labor materials and capital,” Gomułka implemented “three drastic
means” to “solve the economic problem” of low growth, excessive demand, and rising prices and to “shift from quantity to quality in Polish industry.” In short, the state’s preoccupation with growth and efficiency as vehicles to stabilize prices and meet rising demand promised harder work but only predicted lower prices. Indeed, despite formal remarks about inflationary pressure, price hikes in 1970 triggered massive labor protests and state reprisals that changed the political economy and reconfigured social agitation for the next decade. The general result of the price hikes, strikes, and repression was a demonstration effect of labor’s defense of the Polish population in opposing the state at the risk and cost of their lives. In addition, massacres of workers unified in spirit intellectuals, religionists, and professionals who realized that they, too, could be victimized by absolute rule. For instance, violence inaugurated a tense decade of Church-state disputes, not least as workers in Poland are devoted Catholics. As usual, the PZPR shuffled state figures, replacing Gomulka with Edward Gierek, an act of penance not reform, but one that briefly registered with workers who considered the new party leader one of them. He had appeared personally in Gdańsk during the fighting, breaking communist form evidently by speaking directly to strikers about their demands. Again, the workers learned from their use of labor power to compel ruling elites to respond – not only in symbolically significant gestures such as switching party leaders to take responsibility for terrible actions, but also by retracting offensive policies such as price increases. More precisely, during the 1970 strikes and violence – again, the workers attacked and burned government offices and a prison – workers developed tactics, discourses, and objectives that suggested a new understanding of labor activism.

In his broadside against “elite” or “Leninist” analyses centered on the pedagogy of intellectuals, Laba argues that an explicitly political consciousness emerged in the 1970 worker
mobilizations and the unprecedented state repression, resulting in dozens of massacred Polish laborers, in which “the workers created their own meaning and salience, at a time when the state’s authority had weakened.” From a “structural crisis [of rigidified Leninist states entangled with oversized and outdated working classes],” two political arguments emerge:

The first is that the main characteristics of Solidarity, its master frames, were created autonomously by Polish workers six years before the creation of KOR [Workers’ Defense Committee] and ten years before the rise of Solidarity. The sit-down strike and the inter-factory strike committee are the organizational breakthroughs. The programmatic [innovation was] the demand for free trade unions, independent of the party. These findings push the direct origins of Solidarity in its programmatic and organizational dimensions back six years earlier than is generally thought. They also change the dynamic agent from the intellectuals to the workers [who sought] to build a democratic project as an answer to the contradictions, crises, and pathologies inherent in Leninist states.69

Crucially, Laba declares that “the available interview data and primary source materials [from 1970] illustrate quite clearly a process in which Polish industrial workers substituted assertion for subordination,...transforming themselves from the objects to the subjects of politics.”70 The old approach of the state to its denizens – in the words of poet Antoni Slominski: "stuffing their mouths with sausage so they'll shut up”71 – could no longer render working-class uprisings as episodic replies to particular and readily withdrawn policies. In 1970, working-class mobilization emerged in inchoate form as a movement for labor but also for all Poles. For this reason, Gierek personally announced the social power of labor in addressing the workers, asking for their help, proposing “a new explicit social pact between the workers and the socialist system,” and offering “an open recognition of their power of veto.”72

At the same time, however, Gierek was preparing his long-range plan for the economy. In Ascherson’s account, the early 1970s exemplified the state-society dialectic in Poland:
The sequence varies little in its broad outline. It begins with the arrival of a shining new government, promising radical economic changes and liberal political reforms. Gradually this ruling group is affected by political decay until it degenerates into the same sort of stifling autocracy which it replaced, a clique out of touch with the needs and wishes of the Polish people. Correspondingly, the management of the economy – at the outset dedicated to raising living standards and filling the shops – drifts off course into grandiose and irrelevant investment projects. The burden returns with increasing weight to the shoulders of the most vulnerable section of the society, the industrial working class. Economic discontent finally touches off a working-class revolt. The leads more or less directly to the fall of the political leadership and its replacement by a new team – in its turn flourishing promises of reform and responsiveness to public opinion. A cycle has ended. The next begins as this new leading clique, after only a few months in which the newspapers are free and sausage is plentiful, is slowly drawn into the same process of degeneration.73

Anticipating that growth would “normalize” the state’s relationships to workers, the Church, intellectuals, and professionals whose desires for deeper reforms were converging, Gierek conceived of an economic model comprising increased investment, enabled by massive foreign borrowing, that would stabilize prices, increase real income, develop Poland’s infrastructure, and improve overall welfare. However radical these proposals may have seemed in official or ideological communist dogma, not least the proposed indebtedness to capitalist lenders, the plan again expressed the state’s refusal to restructure the economy. Gierek’s investments did succeed for several years, notably in increasing Poles’ standard of living and macro-economic annual growth rates. But in the long-term, roughly from 1971 to 1975, expensively leveraged state spending on domestic production ignored the looming fiscal impasse and contradictions straining relations among the PZPR, management, and labor under increasingly complex industrial structures and management practices. This growing industrial concentration in postwar Poland intensified social divisions in the workplace and gave rise to political conflicts that could not be accommodated through the existing institutional arrangements. By the 1970s communication broke down among management, the party, and the work force because the structures of these institutions no longer corresponded. Most critical was the breakdown in the representation of working class interests in the governance of enterprises, for labor institutions remained localized while the structure of management became ever more centralized. The
party’s remedy for these ills was to reassert the role of party organizations, but not of labor institutions, vis-à-vis management. [W]orkers became more alienated from management and the party, and sought alternate, informal means of representing their interests.  

Bielasiak adds that tracing increasing labor autonomy and disaffection to industrial organization shows that “it is precisely because the party leadership resisted decentralization and worker participation that it experimented with various forms of enterprise organization” that worsened widespread regime legitimacy. Discrete incentives to each group supplemented aggregate material progress. For instance, the state restored to the Church properties in the “recovered areas” that the communists had held since 1950. In other words, the communist party in this period intended to overcome growing disparities between particular labor needs and centralized party and management organizations by discretionary side-payments. To put it another way, after the 1970 state-worker conflict and coeval specialization of production, labor was becoming more horizontally linked to other work centers than to state managers and party directors. Polish social arrangements and orientations in general seemed to be dissociating from the centralized, hierarchal state and party institutions and cultivating self-organization. 

The emergence of an incipient civil society co-extended with the abandonment of so-called revisionism, the belief in reform programs issued by the state apparatus by more liberal-minded party members. This decision to turn inward to achieve individual and collective self-legislation and -discipline is a rarely appreciated aspect of many 20th-century movements, and a strong feature of Islamist, Catholic, and other religious trends emphasizing personal piety and inter-subjective responsibilities beneath the operations of the state. An overarching turn from state- to society-centered social mobilization among Polish activists is contested but within a broad agreement that since 1970 pragmatic self-organization had gradually transcended faith in
communist state agencies: “disputation about politics within the democratic opposition needed to be set aside because specific individuals and their families needed help.”77 This was the founding principle of the Workers’ Defense Committee, founded in 1976 by Kuron, Jan Lipski, Adam Michnik and others, after the Ursus and Radom resistance to price hikes triggered state violence and detentions:

Kuron’s theory of organizing was simple: “Musimy się coś dziać.” People have to see that “something is happening.” For a movement to succeed, people must be in motion. Collecting funds, visiting workers’ families, attending trials, puts them in motion together. Such self-organization is both a means to a specific purpose and an ultimate goal.”78

Michnik’s concurrent essay, “A New Evolutionism” (1976), registered the disillusionment of intellectuals, workers, and Catholics alike with intra-systemic reformism and more generally ideological abstraction associated with communist pronouncements about sacrifice and class unity. With the exhaustion of revisionist Marxist humanism following the state’s attack against student activists in 1968, Michnik eulogized the “neopositivist” Catholic cooptation strategy.79 The shared optimism of revisionists and neopositivists that “change would come from above” via “positive evolution of the party, to be caused by the rational policies of wise leaders, not by incessant public pressure,”80 was dead. While intellectuals and workers were allying through labor activism and state reprisals, the Catholic Church retained its mediating role, albeit with excessive fealty, in the opinion of KOR members. Here Znak-Catholic support for the repression of the Radom strikes redoubled the dedication of Michnik and his colleagues to labor:

“New Evolutionism” is based on faith in the power of the working class, which, with a steady and unyielding stand, has on several occasions forced the government to make spectacular concessions. It is difficult to foresee developments in the working class, but there is no question that the power elite fears this social group most. Pressure from the working classes is a necessary condition for the evolution of public life toward democracy.81
This was a radical development in Polish politics – for the confluence of intellectuals and workers as an instance of the growing horizontality of non-state actors, and for its egalitarian, if lexically ordered, division of labor. As the “social group...that the power elite fears,” that has “on several occasions forced the government to make spectacular concessions,” workers would be the driving force of social change and political dissidence for a *general* mobilization of critical and activist citizens. This coalition of between labor and KOR was not merely “pragmatic” in the sense of lacking principled commitments or reducing its efforts to material subsistence, but in the principled goal of combining distinct modes of valuation and social situation toward a single goal under a complementary leadership. That political objective drove KOR’s practical example in protecting workers, as humble servants of the key activist class whose actions demonstrated moral commitment to the universal Polish subject. Indeed, KOR’s ethos,

defined for the most part by implication and example, stressed matter-of-factness and scrupulous honesty, nonviolence and forbearance, plus reluctance to sit in judgment. Much of this echoed the basic Christian tenet of charity, and KOR’s members, largely unbelievers, soon found themselves pursuing their goals in harmony with Catholic colleagues.  

Meanwhile, real wages were plummeting, prices were rising, and external debt skyrocketing. As if trying to prove how detached they were, the PZPR revised the constitution at this time, binding Poland more closely to the USSR and provoking the “letter of 59” writers and scholars, including Adam Zagajewski who was then fired, interrogated, and monitored when he joined the opposition.

As organized, independent, and renowned intellectuals converged in opposition to the state, in explicit alliance with workers from whom they had been estranged as recently as 1970,
the Church readily tilted its tactical balance between its communist counterparts and Catholic constituencies. When the episcopate accused the PZPR of violating Church education rights and property in 1976, the state aggressively plundered its funding sources and proposed a loyalty oath. The state’s Religious Affairs Director, Kazimierz Kąkol, proclaimed, “While allowing the Church to function, we will never go back on our principles...We will never permit the religious upbringing of children. If we cannot destroy the Church, we shall at least stop it from causing harm.” This hostility would not define Church-PZPR relations, but it demonstrated to many the combined alienation and arrogance of ruling elites at this juncture. Mieczysław Rakowski, the “voice of Gierek,” tried to correct this impression with an overture to the Church to reaffirm its status as mediator to other Polish advocacy groups, notably workers: “If the leaders of the Catholic Church in Poland will continue...a policy of cooperation as opposed to confrontation, and if they will take an active part in building our socialist fatherland, then the Marxists will certainly be ready to help settle problems which still exist today.” The “established pattern” of “the Church’s behavior” was thus restored while proving the state’s concern to bridge citizen and state at the cost of concessions to the Episcopate. Crucially, the Church, intellectuals, and workers were allied across distinct institutional and ideological interests and religious identities. Workers backed by the Church and armed with the strike and labor power, posed a double threat to the state coming to represent and focus Polish subjectivity beyond the factory floor.

Cardinal Wyszyński publicly denounced in 1977 the “daily humiliations” of those lining up to get “essential needs of the people” by apparatchiks still obsessed with “top performance of production.” This was a public signal of commitment beyond the coffers and pedagogical prerogative of the Church over its flock – the Cardinal was, like workers protesting price hikes,
speaking to and of all. The Workers’ Defense Committee, similarly, gathered “socialists and liberals, Catholics, Jews, and nonbelievers” to defend “a simple and profound belief in human freedom.”

Two dynamics were at work in this phase. First, a popular consensus on Polish dignity, rights, and material equality united the Church, intellectuals, professionals, and workers economically and ideologically. Second, in defiance, the state continued its tactic, since 1970, “to jump start the economy by upgrading the technology of Polish industry, borrowing about $20b from western governments and banks [by 1977]. The idea was simple, though wrong:

Poland did not need to change the economic system, but just to use better machinery. Remarkably,...the huge amount of foreign borrowing produced almost no increase in Poland’s exports to Western markets. As a result, the loans could not be repaid. Poland became one of the first countries in the world to fall into debt crisis after a round of heavy borrowing in the 1970s. By the late 1970s, Poland’s access to new loans had dried up, and Poland was struggling to make debt-service repayments. The shift from capital inflows to capital outflows created a dramatic squeeze on the economy.”

As an odd emblem of the state’s notorious distance from Polish citizens and subjects, in 1978 the PZPR allowed the publication of Ryszard Kapuściński The Emperor, about the Ethiopian dictator Haile Selassie, convinced that its “study of a failing reactionary” autocrat benefited the communist state by comparison. This was the kind of gesture intended to offset increasingly vocal and audacious criticisms, exemplified by the KOR’s “appeal to society” the same year, an open letter implicating government corruption and cupidity for social poverty and suffering, in short, voicing their material grievances as the effects of “moral” and “political” criminality and irresponsibility. Criticizing state performances in housing, health care, employment, consumer provisions, and work conditions, the KOR declared, “It is impossible to purchase any items in the stores without standing in lines, an enormous waste of time, or engaging in bribery or
nepotism.” In addition, the appeal cited “increased exploitation of the workers” and “growing social inequality” in contrasting the “extremely difficult living conditions” for most, to “a small number of families who have no financial worries whatsoever [given] the extensive system of privileges for groups associated with the authorities: privileged supplies, special health services, allocation of housing and building lots, foreign currency, and special recreational areas.” In an especially pointed ideological attack, the KOR accused the state of proto-bourgeois policies:

The fact that miners were deprived of free days to compensate them for free Saturday, that work is required on Sundays, and that a single day’s absence even for the most valid of reasons (such as a death in the family or illness) leads to a loss of approximately 20 percent of monthly salary – all this can be compared only to early capitalist exploitation.” Costs exceed values of state agricultural firms, which are less efficient than the family farms they target for destruction, though 250,000 farmers had “refused to pay retirement dues.

In addition, the statement announced, and linked, political and cultural criticisms of the political elites and system. It denounced “beatings” and “murders of [detainees] with full impunity” as exemplifying the state’s systemic disregard for “even the appearance of legality,” including: ignored complaints, fabricated cases, deaths of witnesses in prison, and more generally the communist party’s usurpation of all walks of life, from scientific research to “literature, theater, and film – those branches of culture dominated by language” and “especially vulnerable to the arbitrary throttling of the freedom of thought and to the annihilation of creative activities.”

This comprehensive dissent – listing multiple violations throughout public and private life – extended even beyond KOR and labor, suggesting a diffuse critical discourse at this time. Thus the new Experience and Future group, composed of “party members, Catholics, and non-aligned intellectuals,” formed “to discuss the deeply-felt crisis in Polish social life.” In 1980, they produced a “radical” report echoing worker and intellectual grievances that anticipated
Solidarity’s criticisms and reflected widespread grievances reported in rigorous opinion surveys of Polish citizens. The proliferation of strident anti-PZPR sentiment paralleled Gierek’s recovery scheme’s demise: “the abuse of political power, the resulting consciousness of a split between state and society, and the rejection of social inequality. [A] national crisis [was] repeatedly defined primarily as a social and political one, and only secondarily as economic in nature.”

This emphasis on explicitly political and social grievances, rather than the economic stimulus-response politics of protesting to prevent lost income and material welfare following price hikes, exemplified the direction of Polish activism in the late years of Gierek’s government: a diverse coalition of activists deeply committed to redressing economic inequality and material suffering by addressing their sources in political institutions and social organization.

Staniszkis has identified the state’s response to its economic, political, and social crises as neo-corporatist, as mentioned above (§3.b.1): “a new form of interest representation [that] evolved...in the mid-seventies” to divide Polish citizens into separate interest groups. The state opened “informal” channels, for instance, to individual workers to apply for discretionary state outlays. In theory, “worker pressure could...be...leveraged to help extract additional resources from hierarchical superiors unresponsive to more orthodox methods,” creating political and financial incentives for state and labor alike. But these programs were obviously devised to prevent the systemic reforms demanded by a growing dissident movement by preoccupying workers with industry- or plant-specific concerns. Hence, with the growth of material incentives, workers’ earnings became more dependent on management discretion and performance. Differences over pay and the distribution of bonuses emerged as the most common causes of contention.”

Polish ruling elites tried to placate highly attuned, critical, and
mobilized agitators with public and private schemes that recalled some “late version of a neo-colonial state linked to a large-scale economy, the main centers of which were elsewhere.”  

Or, as Bauman puts it, “The whole failed political strategy of Gierek’s regime was founded in legitimizing the socialist order as one aiding and abetting personal gain and self-interest and pandering to ever growing consumer desires [and] dismantling the vestiges of the welfare state cultivated under Gomułka.”  

The failed neo-corporatist strategy perversely echoes capitalism’s fragmentation of labor’s collective identity and action. That is, as Burawoy says,

> Class consciousness leads to class mobilization only under certain conditions – namely, the development of collective interests and collective capacities to pursue those interests. So the possibilities of collective mobilization are undermined by channels for individual mobility and the absence of autonomous institutions operating in a relatively open civil society.

Imitating its capitalist counterparts, the Polish state adopted corporatist tactics “to undermine collective mobilization by creating channels for individual mobility and weaken autonomous institutions,” but here in a potentially opening Polish communist society. Polish was an instance of a tendency in this period and region to adopt “a corporatist political structure [that] enables the state to advance domestic tranquility, at least in the short run, by negotiating among self-seeking groups that are odds with one another and co-opting them into collaborative policy arrangements.”  

But it seems the Polish state was attempting to create and then co-opt “self-seeking groups” after citizen-subjects had created themselves as a unifying self-seeking group.

The contradictions of communist party-management centralization, Gierek’s incapacity to invest his way out of them, and the braided opposition of workers, professionals, the Church, and intellectuals set the stage for the Solidarity movement. As Colas observes, “the advent of Solidarnosc marked the exhaustion of attempts to revise Marxism: civil society seemed to be
reborn, thus manifesting its ability to survive, its unquenchable vitality, in a country still ruled...by the communist party." The core of this perhaps world-historical social movement, Solidarity, was the adherence to the Polish population as a whole, led by workers uniquely possessed of a credible tool against the state. As Michnik writes, “the

effective rebellion against communism in Poland was a rebellion of the masses. As long as the communists were confronted by elite groups, they could ignore their voices. As long as they were concerned with democratic, legal procedures, the communists did not take them into account. The communists only began to take the opposition seriously once the crowd sided with it. They had to talk to the crowd. This situation led us to believe that we were effective in a crowd, or rather that we were effective when we spoke the language of the crowd...Populism in Poland was the language of the workers’ rebellion against the totalitarian state.”

One sign of this mass base was persistent skepticism about elite appropriation inside and outside the movement. Indeed, Touraine reports a pervasive egalitarianism in the ranks: “at the base, protest and questioning [were] more direct, since at the top the need to negotiate an awareness of external threats leads to greater caution.” Polish working class attitudes also evinced, to be sure, anti-intellectual tendencies directed at official and Solidarity elites alike. But Solidarity never considered allying with sympathetic intra-PZPR bureaucrats – themselves an index of how far labor disaffection and the movement’s suasion had advanced – instead of periodically hostile workers or religionists “because of Solidarity’s ‘fundamentalist’ hostility to the party.” But grassroots agitation did not overcome social and political despair. As Zbigniew Bujak writes, Havel’s essay “The Power of the Powerless”

...reached us at the Ursus factory in 1979 at a point when we felt we were at the end of the road. Inspired by KOR, we had been speaking on the shop floor, talking to people, participating in public meetings, trying to speak the truth about the factory, the country, and politics. There came a moment when people thought we were crazy. Why were we doing this? Why were we taking such risks? Not seeing any immediate and tangible results, we began to doubt the purposefulness of what we were doing. Shouldn’t we be coming up with another method, other
ways? Then came the essay by Havel. Reading it gave us the theoretical underpinnings for our activity. It maintained our spirits; we did not give up and a year later – in August 1980 – it became clear that the party apparatus and the factory management were afraid of us. We mattered. And the rank and file saw us as leaders of the movement.108

The Feb 1980 party congress led by First Secretary Stanislaw Kania exposed intra-elite conflict among the CP, with criticism emerging from within of party corruption.109 Perceptive PZPR elites were aware of defections in their own lower ranks as well as swelling opposition among the newly powerful Polish population. For instance, boosted by the 1979 visit of Pope John Paul II, former Cardinal Karol Wojtyła of Krakow, the Church had “virtually unlimited socio-cultural power” by 1980, with twenty-seven diocese; 7,556 parishes; 15,444 priests; forty-two monastic institutes of 4,207 priests and 1,477 brothers.110 By the standard of continual rule and popular legitimacy, a visitor might have guessed the Church was the Polish state but had been usurped by a band of corrupt thugs, the widespread sense of the state when Solidarity formed in the wake of labor actions in the summer of 1980.111

From mainly July on, repeated work stoppages sprang up in a disconnected fashion, with characteristic case-by-case government responses. In the predictable pattern, wage increases ended the Ursus stoppage, followed by walkouts in plants in Warsaw; in every case “strikers won a bigger pay packet. Indeed, on July 11th, managers of important enterprises were flown to Warsaw and told by Central Committee to buy ‘social peace,’ cheaply if possible, but really at any price.”112 In July work protest actions were on site rather than crossing the factory gates, with the exception of Lublin, where “most strike committees...had similar demands” that would prove paradigmatic: (1) higher wages; (2) family allowances on a par with the army and security police; (3) abolition of ‘commercial shops’ [used by the state to raise prices]; (4) fair allocation of housing; and (5) full guarantees for the strikers.113 In this milieu Solidarity emerged in
Gdańsk, to centralize the demand for an inter-factory strike committee that could speak generally for labor’s concerns. Solidarity emerged in August 1980 as a state within a state, with a massive infrastructure, countrywide worker support, and a compelling strike that would forcefully re-structure the politics labor-state relations. In addition, workers in Solidarity solidified their alliances with intellectuals and the Church.

On 14 August 1980, led by fired electrician Lech Wałęsa and supporters of the dismissed and humiliated welder and crane operator Anna Walentynowicz, the Gdańsk shipyard workers went out on strike. As Starski says, the detailed symbolism of this worker mobilization is crucial. For instance, Walentynowicz had become “an enemy [of the state] explicitly because she defended others and could organize her colleagues. For the authorities always tried to isolate those who could become leaders. After the strikes of 1976, a sufficient reason to receive a dismissal was that one had authority among one’s peers in the shipyards.”

For his part, Wałęsa, long active in coastal labor organizing, including a role on the 1970 strike committee, had been a victim of the state’s abuse in an incident of emblematic significance to many Poles – he had been arrested while walking his baby in a carriage which the security personnel then abandoned, unattended, in front of his house. As for Solidarity’s key ally, Cardinal Wyszynski “sent the young priest [Father Popieluszko] to celebrate mass for the strikers. His knees were quaking, it was said, as he passed through the gate, beyond which milled several thousand workers. This was the first time the priest had held mass in a factory, the first time during a strike.”

Popieluszko spoke from Wyszynski’s “prison notes...the most succinct diagnosis of totalitarianism I know: a system supported by the Big Lie, whose purpose is not simply to demoralize and liquidate opposition, but also to convince that opposition that
the treatment accorded it is just and normal.” Solidarity’s “rebellion of the masses,” he declared, represented a “populist...egalitarianism...that was rational within the confines of an irrational system because it was the only way to deprive the political system of legitimacy.”

Against this “irrational” treatment, only intensifying since 1976, ten million workers joined Solidarity – galvanized by Church and KOR support, urban and rural work-sites, and past successes in changing state policies and politicians. But “this time, unlike 1970 or 1976, the strikers did not pour out into the streets or attack local Party headquarters; they occupied factories and formed strike committee.” Solidarity’s non-violent, ideological pragmatism, its eminent “rationality,” is easily mistaken for moderation but this may ignore how militant their non-violence was. Solidarity was, indeed,

a total social movement aiming to change all aspects of public life...But it never sought to seize power: it concerned itself with institutional reforms, trying to install competent and hard-working managers in industry and wanting to see the freedom of the press respected and censorship abolished...a popular movement which behaved like a legislative assembly infinitely anxious to respect legal procedures.

On 14 Aug workers printed posters stating, and leaflets disseminating, their demands, “the first link between 1976 and the 1980 unrest which was spreading” in response to incremental price increases. They demanded reinstatement of dismissed workers, uniform increase of 2000 zlotys for everyone, family allowances on par with the militia, higher pensions, fair reporting in mass media controlled by the government, elimination of so-called commercial pricing, and for the construction of a monument to the fallen of the 1970 massacre. On 16 Aug, when shipyard management offered the workers a raise, the
strike committee agreed and Wałęsa announced that the strike had ended. Thousands of jubilant workers headed for the gates and home. [Alina] Pieńkowska was enraged, realizing that as a result of the agreement tens of thousands of strikers at plants throughout the region were being left in the lurch. She found the voice and courage to attack Mr. Wałęsa: ‘You betrayed them...Now the authorities will crush us like bedbugs.’\textsuperscript{120}

Pieńkowska’s father, a worker, had witnessed the massacre of strikers in 1970. Her activism represented that political event; as she put it, “Here in the shipyard I stopped being afraid, stopped running away, and became a real person,” she said.

Such events indicate the significant legacy of previous worker encounter with the state, but also the direction of its decision-making from the rank-and-file up to the Solidarity elites. Once “state negotiators and Wałęsa seemed satisfied, “the proposed agreement was then democratically rejected by the rank and file in the name of solidarity. The Lenin Shipyards were not going to give up the struggle and let other, weaker plants down...Wałęsa...bowed at once to the will of the majority.”\textsuperscript{121} Such reiterated decision-making practices and opinion gathering routinized Solidarity’s practical conception of the entire Polish working class, notably the need to accommodate specific factories’ demands as well as develop a general program. Within the month of August, in other words, Solidarity was improvising a strike-based political and social regime that organized a constituency of millions through a centralized but egalitarian system by presenting universal demands tailored to diverse needs. Solidarity’s “self-limiting revolution”\textsuperscript{122}, meanwhile, received public religious support. On 22 August, the Church issued a communiqué, stating, “The general council of the Episcopate expresses its esteem both for the workers on strike and their committees, and for the authorities for having prevented disturbances of public order.”\textsuperscript{123} On 24 August, in a television address, Gierek “announced a major reshuffling of the leadership, acknowledged past mistakes, and promised new economic reforms. [Because the
workers] had a memory, they were not too impressed.” Although the changes were “substantial,” removing one-third of the Politburo, including Premier Babiuch with his ministers, state trade union head Jan Szydlak, and propaganda minister Jerzy Lukasiewicz, they recalled nothing more than changes at the top after the 1970s repression and hardly augured innovative reforms.¹²⁴

Thus, Solidarity pointedly broke with the historical pattern, retaining the strike, holding the movement fast to non-violence, gathering together intellectual and professional support, and welcoming the clergy to the factory to perform mass. In addition, then, to these tactical innovations – refusing temporary repeals of offensive policies and disciplining workers not to attack government offices – Solidarity also appropriated the work site itself as a political space that acted as an official statehouse of the people. PZPR representatives, Catholic priests, and workers could visit the Solidarity movement to negotiate, lead services, or press demands. This new discipline permitted solidarity to secure the 31 August Gdańsk Agreement, wresting from the state the central working-class demand: autonomous inter-factory committees. It is worth quoting key provisions of the agreement and bolding its key passages to convey a sense of its revolutionary and symptomatic contents:

On Point 1, which reads: “To accept trade unions as free and independent of the party, as laid down in Convention no. 87 of the ILO and ratified by Poland, which refers to the matter of trade union rights,” the following decision has been reached:

(1) The activity of the trade unions of People’s Poland has not lived up to the hopes and aspirations of the workers. We thus consider that it will be beneficial to create new union organizations, which will run themselves, and which will be authentic expression of the working class. Workers will continue to have the right to join the old trade unions and we are looking at the possibility of the two unions structures cooperating.

(2) The MKS declares that it will respect the principles laid down in the Polish Constitution while creating the new independent and self-governing unions. These new unions are intended to defend the social and material interests of the workers, and not to play the role of
a political party. They will be established on the basis of the socialization of the means of production and of the socialist system that exists in Poland today. They will recognize the leading role of the PZPR in the state, and will not oppose the existing system of international alliances. Their aim is to ensure for the workers the necessary means for the determination, expression, and defense of their interests. The government commission will guarantee full respect for the independence and self-governing character of the new unions in their organizational structure and their functioning at all levels. The government will ensure that the new unions have every possibility of carrying out their function of defending the interests of the workers and of seeking the satisfaction of their material, social, and cultural needs. Equally it will guarantee that the new unions are not the objects of any discrimination.

(3) The creation of the free and self-governing trade unions is in line with Convention 87 of the ILO relating to trade union rights and Convention 97 relating to the rights of free association and collective negotiation. The coming into being of more than one trade union organization requires changes in the law. The government, therefore, will make the necessary legal changes as regards trade unions, workers’ councils, and the labor code.

(4) The strike committees must be able to turn themselves into institutions representing the workers at the level of the enterprise, whether in the fashion of workers’ councils or as preparatory committees of the new trade unions. As a preparatory committee the MKS is free to adopt the form of a trade union, or of an association of the coastal region...

(5) The new trade unions should be able to participate in decisions affecting the conditions of the workers in such matters as the division of the national assets between consumption and accumulation, the division of the social consumption fund (health, education, culture), the wages policy, in particular with regard to an automatic increase of wages in line with inflation, the economic plan, the direction of investment and prices policy. The government undertakes to ensure the conditions necessary for the carrying out of these functions.

(6) The enterprise committee will set up a research center whose aim will be to engage in an objective analysis of the situation of the workers and employees, and will attempt to determine the correct ways in which their interests can be represented...The new unions should have their own publications.

(7) The government will enforce respect for Article 1, paragraph 1 of the trade union law of 1949, which guarantees the workers the right to freely come together to form trade unions. The new trade union will not join the Central Council of Trade Unions (CRZZ). It is agreed that the new trade union law will respect these principles. The participation of members of the MKS and of the preparatory committees for the new trade unions in the elaboration of the new legislation is also guaranteed.125

The Gdańsk Agreement legalized independent trade unions, rendering the movement nationally and officially legitimate; “when Solidarity called a warning strike, the strike call was followed in the remotest corners of the country: in the tiny station buffet and the village pub as in Ursus or Huta Warszawa.”126 Poles taunted the state with “an endless parade of political meetings, mass rallies, and private discussion[s about] anti-Semitism in Poland, the theory and
practice of union democracy, or the proper income of steelworkers as a percentage of gross national product.” In addition, Solidarity received declarations of support from human rights groups, student, and rural workers. For the first time since the founding of the communist party in Poland, the ruling class had formally agreed to share policy-making with another group, and this group, Solidarity, had organized millions of workers capable of withdrawing their labor from the state, paralyzing the state now with only greater efficacy. It can be argued, to be sure, that the articles of the agreement are a last-ditch neo-corporatist ploy to sequester workers in their own sectoral jurisdiction, leaving the rest of “civil society” to their own or the state’s rule.

But several trends symptomatic of the alienation of the regime from “civil society” cast doubt on the practicality of this interpretation. First, the regime was “out of touch” enough to believe it could still control workers with minor adjustments after years of abusing dissenters. Second, as in 1956, 1970, and 1976, ruling elites were willing to make concessions but now they appeared only to prove the opposition’s systemic criticisms by re-enacting the contradictions of the state socialist political economy. Material concession displayed the perverse incentive of, in effect, paying the opposition to protest while showing that the dissidents had sufficient coercive force to exact further compromises; thus the state ended up paying them to continue striking. In addition, the regime’s concessions exhibited “neglect of the national economy,” which helped workers to stand above the state as concerned not only for personal, industry-level, or regional welfare but also for the wellbeing of Poland. This contrast between the workers and “worker state” in their national concerns resuscitated or resonated with long-standing Polish national sentiment by showing that the regime’s material concerns were selfish to the point of
sacrificing Polish wellbeing for personal wealth. Because the palliative economic offers were in themselves irrational and unsustainable, as Starski says,

it was blatantly obvious that the ruling class wanted to do anything, including ruining the country, in order to regain its monopoly of political power – the economy, rationality, and standards of living of the population were just tokens in their power game. This was a lesson that striking workers took very seriously. They were not out to wreck the country’s economy to get a few pennies more. They were out to have their say in preventing chaos in the country introduced by the very same ruling class that now so lightly disposed of the national budget.\textsuperscript{130}

With its extensive record since the installation of Gomułka of substituting superficial, reactive compromises for systemic reforms, the party’s and management’s offers and promises drew open laughter but also anger for several reasons that resounded with one key energizing offense: corruption. By 1980 it was clear, at least to workers, that Polish elites were selfish, deceitful, manipulative, incompetent, traitorous, and with all this enriching themselves. The ruling class would not, that is, betray only the workers, but Poland itself; indeed, these two became one in August 1980. The ruling elites were now trapped within the strict parameters of retaining incumbency, achieving social order, and securing their benefits – all by yielding to Solidarity, a social movement that could \textit{paralyze the economy}, with gains that would mollify rather than irritate them. Even a competent government would struggle with these imperatives and the Polish regime was evidently not this, or perhaps they were hemmed in by 1980; to stay in power seemed to entail, by definition, defying a dissident movement that seemed with each passing day to be taking over regions of the country and representing the spirit of the nation. In response to this bind, party leaders tried to smother the sound of their decisions in gradualism, a kind of government subterfuge, while still trying to divide their opponents. For example, party elites tried to raise food prices “surreptitiously” by introducing them in different gradations and
varying them by region and protest response. “The stratagem might have worked,” Singer says, “if the Polish labor movement had not gained experience and forged links in the preceding period. In practice, the clever tactics had an effect opposite to that intended: they acted as an inducement to strike,” not least since “the Warsaw wit, with their knack for paraphrasing slogans, put it in a nutshell: ‘Those who do not strike, do not eat meat.’”

Third, the uprising instantly proved deeply grassroots, religious, unified, massive, and immovable in its commitments, but also spontaneous and cohesive enough to respond organically and rapidly to daily evolving changes by increasing its organizational focus and strength continually. That is to say, the roots of the grass were driving the movement, as the underground movement surfaced while creating its unbroken ranks – the rank-and-file led the movement from the bottom up. The “horizontality” and depth of the uprising was so deep and pervasive that not only were its leaders workers, often unemployed, but they were lifted up and held aloft by their colleagues when their energies flagged, the regime compromises tempted them, or intra-industry disputes loomed. Throughout August workers from all over Poland pushed Solidarity forward by defying state instructions, adhering to movement decisions, arriving en masse in Gdańsk to represent increasing numbers and deepening networks of strike committees, and encouraging Wałęsa to radicalize their demands. But it is also crucial that Solidarity reflected and received the active, passionate devotion of non-workers throughout Poland. The strike itself coordinated workers and their families in a concerted system for delivering meals and other provisions. But even more dramatically, perhaps, the mobilization of workers country-wide created in sentiment one larger family of activists, such that “delegates from other parts of Poland to the shipyards were stopped
everywhere by...strangers [who offered] money, food, and words of support,” gestures that “had an immense influence on the coastal workers.” Even the negotiations conducted by appointed union representatives were guided by the immediate responses, cheering or booing, of workers listening in real time to the discussions and proposals.

*Fourth*, from the start the strike revised an established and acknowledged space of labor productivity, a literal and physical place of working class aggregation, consolidation, discussion, consciousness, and finally activism. That is, the strikers activated their available, recognized, gated communal site as an inviolable aspect of its social arsenal. The mobilization of workers in a workspace had in this sense a deep integrity, a holism in which subject and space arose as one, while also re-constituting a known entity – the work force. The regime and priests came to this place as an indispensable symbol of respect for labor. Thus, the political space of the work site, constituted by the new discipline of radical non-violence, forges the necessary apparatus of sustained mass opposition. For all the specifics of the positions, statements, and conditions, Michnik reminds us of the ontological status of Solidarity, above all:

Solidarity was a mass movement of millions of people with an inchoate political consciousness. They wanted to live better, to have less poverty, less fear, and more rights, but none of this added up to a political program. Solidarity has an ethos. Its program was, don’t give in to the Commies, learn how to cultivate those areas of freedom that have opened up. Social issues were formulated largely [as] demands for improvements in living and working conditions.

Although, or because, it had no clear *program*, it had a specific constituency: “Solidarity was a confederation against evil. Solidarity brought together three great political cultures: Catholic nationalism, working-class populism – in other words socioeconomic demands, including the demand for human dignity – and, third, the democratic culture of the
intelligentsia, so deeply rooted in Poland." At the same time, it was concretely limiting the monopolies of the party and management over the fate of workers and citizens. The former gained leverage against the state to demand improved health and safety standards, while the latter turned to Solidarity to state grievances about their welfare and rights. “Before the party was not everything,” MacShane writes, “but it [had been] the final arbiter. Now that too [had] changed. Regional officials [were] obliged to negotiate with Solidarity on a wide range of issues. In many regions bus routes and schedules [were] reorganized at Solidarity’s request. In Silesia an important aluminum smelter was closed down because of [its] disastrous effect...on the local environment.” Solidarity was a state within a state but not isolated – on behalf of a coherent constituency it could successfully press claims against the PZPR.

The effects of Solidarity’s consolidation lasted for sixteen months, throughout 1981. The effects were grave, including increased political freedoms, social welfare, and ongoing PZPR-Solidarity negotiations. Criticism became open and grew radical; for instance, in an academic conference in Poznań (July 1981) that “would have been impossible a year earlier,” historian Klech Trzeciakowski “won the biggest round of applause when he proposed that what is usually referred to as ‘the events of 1956’ be termed a workers’ ‘uprising,’” a word that “has an almost sacred connotation [of] armed attempts to regain Poland’s independence.” Party-elite tensions grew through the summer, until Kania’s near ouster at the June Eleventh Plenum and at the Extraordinary Party Congress in July, where the “most democratic of congresses produced...a non-descript central committee...dominated by discredited apparatchiki.” For its part, Solidarity was showing signs of ideological disarray, a result of its contentious constituency and, some argued, increasingly bureaucratic and hierarchical organization. In September and
October 1981 Wałęsa had to placate General Jaruzelski and vice-premier Mieczysław Rakowski, as military and party rulers grew more concerned about the radical potential of Solidarity’s less conciliatory members.

An effort to overcome internal strife and disputation may have persuaded ruling elites of exactly this radicalization, producing what many in the state and the union alike considered a brazen statement of purpose or “program,” which seemed abruptly to stake out non-negotiable demands and principles in a way that contravened Solidarity’s usual mode of operation. Like statements quoted above, Solidarity’s program combined material and moral, economic and political charges. In a sort of preface, it declared:

What all of us had in mind were not only living conditions, although we lived poorly, worked hard and very frequently in vain; history has taught us that there is no bread without freedom. What we had in mind were not only bread, butter, and sausage, but also justice, democracy, truth, legality, human dignity, freedom of convictions, and repair of the republic. All elementary values had to be mistreated to believe that anything could improve without their rebirth. The economic protest had also to be a social protest, and the social protest had to be simultaneously a moral protest.

Subtly distinguishing the roles of Solidarity and the Church, the document invokes “the heritage of independent actions carried out by the workers, intelligentsia, and youth” in 1956, 1970, and 1976; “the 1968 students’ rebellion,” and “the efforts...of the church to preserve the values and the heritage of all struggles for human dignity in our country.” The declaration of principles, as usual, cites the past as prologue and as pedigree driving the unification of Polish subjectivity: “Our union rose from those struggles and will remain loyal to them. We are an organization combining the features of a trade union and a great social movement...

Owing to the formation of the powerful trade union organization, Polish society has ceased to be divided, disorganized, and lost; while uniting under the slogan of solidarity, it has reconverted its strength and hopes. Conditions have been provided for an authentic national
rebirth…Solidarity unites many social trends and associates people adhering to various ideologies, with various political and religious convictions, irrespective of their nationality. We have united in protest against injustice, the abuses of power, and against the monopolized right to determine and express the aspirations of the entire nation.

At once referencing recent tribulations and potential trials, the program addresses “society,” arrogating this right against the state: “There is the danger that fatigue and disappointment will eventually turn into a blind destructive force or submerge us in helplessness. As a society, we must not lose hope that it is possible to overcome the crisis…We are fully aware that Polish society expects us to serve in such a way as to enable people to live in peace. The nation would not forgive anyone for treason against the ideals that brought Solidarity into existence. The nation would not forgive anyone’s acts, even motivated by the best of reasons, if they result in bloodshed and in the destruction of our spiritual and material achievements.” Two days later, on 18 October 1981, General Jaruzelski took over as First Secretary of the PZPR.

But on 28 Nov 1981, the “Central Committee of the PZPR passed a resolution proclaiming the need to equip the government with emergency powers to counteract the threat to ‘the socialist state and public order and security.’” On 3 December, the presidium of Solidarity’s National Commission, meeting in Radom, announced a one-day strike should the Sejm grant the state emergency powers, and a general strike if the state implemented them. The government’s chief negotiator, Rakowski, later said the PZPR decided on martial law “after the meeting that Solidarity had in Radom on December 3. The one where they said, behind closed doors, that they should openly ask for power…Radom simply scared us…They had gone completely crazy. On November 28, when Jaruzelski tried to pass an Emergency Powers act to stop the strikes and asked Solidarity leaders to restrain themselves, the answer was a huge fat
laugh. They said, ‘If the government makes a special law against strikes, there will be a general strike.’ On 11 December, Solidarity’s National Commission met in the Gdańsk Shipyard “to decide how the union should respond to the government’s apparent determination to provoke an all-out confrontation.” Jaruzelski gave a radio broadcast declaring Poland “on the edge of an abyss” and a “national catastrophe,” and announced a Military Council of National Salvation to enforce the “suspension” of Solidarity, a ban on further strikes, impose curfews, and exercise the state’s new rights to detain anyone on “justified suspicions” that they endangered public wellbeing.

It is crucial to stress the suffocating brutality of martial law and the communist effort to resist Solidarity, especially given my argument that non-violence persisted because experiential evaluations of worker-citizenship sustained a subjective analysis of enduring social resources despite objective political and social dispossession. Paczkowski describes two rapid stages of the imposition of martial law in December 1981, bookended by long-term trends begun in the 1970s toward more invasive security practices. The first stage carried out

a large-scale police and military operation that had been prepared with astonishing precision. More than 70,000 soldiers and 30,000 police, armed with 1,750 tanks, 1,900 personnel carriers, and 9,000 trucks and cars, along with several helicopter squadrons and transport aircraft...Forces were concentrated in the main cities and industrial centers. Their task was to break the strikes and to paralyze the normal life of the country in a way that would cow the population and preclude any response by Solidarity. Telephone lines were cut (resulting in numerous deaths, as people were unable to phone for ambulances), and the borders and gasoline stations were closed. A strict curfew and comprehensive censorship were enforced.

“After ten days,” Paczkowski writes, “the strikes and the demonstrations came to an end, proving the effectiveness of the plan. Fourteen were killed, and several hundred were arrested. About 4,000 strikers were arrested, and the first trials, which began at Christmas, resulted in
prison sentences of three to five years (with some as long as ten years). All the accused were judged in special military courts, which were responsible for halting and punishing ‘any infraction of martial law.’” The comprehensive assault on Solidarity – as we will see in the next chapter, comparable to the attack against the Islamists in Algeria – directly targeted Solidarity for destruction, manifestly communicating its intent, in word and deed, to eliminate worker-citizenship and hence systemic subjectivity by outright coercion and juridical procedures.

“The second stage of the repression consisted of the internment of all opposition and Solidarity militants,” launched the night of 12-13 December. “In a few days, by means of a simple administrative decision,” Paczkowski says, “more than 5,000 people were locked up in forty-nine isolation centers located outside the main cities. The primary objectives were to paralyze the union and to replace the leaders with SB[145]collaborators.” Mass internment over the next year “was relatively easy to apply, since it dispensed with the need for magistrates or trials,” permitting the state to corral activists into huge holding pens. It may have been easier for Jaruzelski than managing hardliners who sought demonstrative death sentences for Solidarity agitators and supporters. “Rather than crush social resistance by Stalinist methods, [the relative moderates in his camp] decided to ‘reduce tensions,’” Paczkowski writes. “Despite this policy,” he emphasizes, lest one confuse this directive with a soft version of martial law,

the authorities forcefully suppressed Solidarity’s demonstrations on 1 and 3 May 1982 (marking the anniversary of the 1791 constitution and hence a traditional festival) and on 31 August 1982 (the anniversary of the Gdansk agreement of 1980). Thousands of people were arrested, hundreds were brought to trial, and six people were killed. In these public trials, some of the leaders of the Solidarity underground were sentenced to up to five years’ imprisonment. After the internment centers were closed in December 1982 and martial law was officially lifted on 22 July 1983,…as many as 1,000 political prisoners [remained] incarcerated for underground union activity [and] printing, the dissemination of forbidden literature and books, or…just for taking up a collection for prisoners. The authorities also dismissed many people from their jobs.
There remains debate about why the state declared martial law. As I have suggested, one view is that the movements was becoming “unruly,” “radical,” or some combination of the two. Another view is that it was simply too active as a brimming, roiling state-within-a-state, with seemingly unlimited latitude. Only nine months earlier, for instance, “in March 1981 [there had been] an endless parade of political meetings, mass rallies, and private discussion groups, dealing with issues as diverse as...anti-Semitism in Poland, the theory and practice of union democracy, or the proper income of steelworkers as a percentage of gross national product.”

At the same time, there are indications the state may have been planning to implement a state of emergency throughout 1981. As Bujak recalled in an underground 1982 interview, “as early as the end of 1980...wives of Security officers [were] coming to regional headquarters and crying on my shoulder, saying, ‘They’re preparing camps for forty or fifty thousand people, the authorities are prepared to shoot, you have to do something.’” Along this line, Bauman says that despite the proximate causes – Solidarity’s increasing strength and audacity – the coup continued an older trend toward reaffirming state political centralization: “Jaruzelski’s regime can be seen as a culmination of a long and (with qualifications) continuous process of shifting the values of nationhood and statehood into the centre of a ‘fundamental principles’ cluster and of a correlated process of displacement of the Marxist class-focused Weltanschauung.”

In the meantime, as the state arrested and interned activists throughout the country, as the “security officers’ wives” foretold, and as Solidarity was driven underground and eventually delegalized (Oct 1982), a double-assault had stricken both sides of the citizenship regime. Not only Solidarity was decimated under martial law; so were its counterparts in the political regime. In effect, pure force extirpated the structure of effective citizenship between state and civilian. As
Hughes describes, “Among all the disintegrating elements of state and party, the army alone remained intact, and under a chief who combined machine-like efficiency with devotion to his concept of the public good.”

Before discussing the effects of this repressive matrix on Solidarity and the power of the strike, it is worth pausing to emphasize a few points about the union’s agenda. This discussion often takes place as recognition of Solidarity’s establishment of “civil society” for the first time in Poland, roughly the irremovable experience of associational modes of self-legislation apart from state domination and party prerogative. These principles of grassroots innovation and autonomous subjectivity enabled Solidarity to form its umbrella organization among multiple worker and non-worker constituents. As Wolicki describes it, “the kinship, if one can call it that, between the strategies underlying the social activism of the church, of Solidarity, and of the political opposition that took part in the union, irrespective of communal worldviews and morals, stemmed from sharing one fundamental characteristic: an unwillingness to take political power.”

Ost similarly depicts the “essence of the alternative politics espoused by KOR and Solidarity” as based on the belief that “politics is, and should be an active and widely accessible process where people jointly shape the world they live in. It is about communication and representation, about empowering citizens and building up independent civil society and not about state power and domination over others.” He adds:

In 1980-1981, the word that appeared in all discussions of the world Solidarity wanted to create was podmiotowosc. Awkwardly translated as ‘subjectivity,’ the word refers to the creative, active process whereby people become the ‘subjects’ of history rather than its passive ‘objects.’ People must no longer be cogs in some machine, ordered around by an omniscient party..., but must take an active, creative role in shaping the world around them, thereby shaping themselves in the process.
Against Ost’s view that Solidarity represented Polish re-subjectivization, Przeworski says the movement is best appreciated as a classic, if narrow, labor movement:\[152\]:

The Polish summer of 1980 should be viewed as a classic struggle for workers for the right to organize unions independent of their employers. Neither the specifically communist features of the Polish regime nor the amplitude of workers’ demands detract from the usefulness of this analogy. In spite of the existence of official unions, Polish workers did not have the right to organize and the Gdańsk strike was for this right. And, as in the west, the struggle for the right to organize had to lead to a general impetus toward democratization. Independent unions cannot exist if there is not general freedom to associate, if censorship is so pervasive that members cannot communicate with each other through mass media, if the political system does not contain institutions where the workers’ claims could be presented to the society and through which workers’ demands could be satisfied without reverting each time to the ultimate weapon, the strike. Independent unions can exist only in a democratic political system. The struggle of workers for the right to organize always generates an impetus toward democratization of the political system and hence poses the problem of political power...[T]he strike against a party that claimed to represent them turned out to be just a strike like other strikes against the power of capital and the state.\[153\]

But if we see in the overlap of labor activism, civil society, and the demand for a “democratic political system" the work of worker-citizenship, we need not choose between seeing Solidarity as either a civil-societal movement using the strike tool or a labor union whose intrinsic logic demands civil society. Touraine identifies in this respect Solidarity’s broad social program and identity, constituting a diffuse, deliberative strategy comprising “three levels of action – trade-union, democratic, and national.”\[154\] Similarly, Keenoy sees Solidarity as the “leading edge of a political revolution and institutional expression of a mass social movement [that] called itself a trade union.”\[155\] Motyl summarizes Solidarity’s innovations powerfully: “[t]otalitarianism...had so lost the capacity to control life effectively that a fair amount of private enterprise could exist in both, and the Catholic Church and Solidarity were able to form the basis of a genuine civil society in Poland.”\[156\] Yet the authoritarian state had not lost its coercive capacities, even if
Solidarity had usurped all other sovereign-state capacities, formed immovable union autonomy, or secured the practices and convictions of civil society and associational cooperation.

Martial law had justifications audible in discourse and visible in policy. First, Jaruzelski claimed to have defended Poland and, by extension, Solidarity from Soviet invasion. The conceit was that martial law under a relatively benign Polish General would show some deference to recent historical events, whereas the USSR would not. Solidarity had to be saved from itself, in other words, lest its ambition, indiscipline, and internal struggles tempt obliteration by imperial decree. Michnik agreed that the coup had “defended Poland against both intervention and a conservative putsch from inside the party,” not out of “high-minded patriotism but to defend their own positions and power.”157 Second, the defense of the ruling class appeared in this period to entail reforms in economic management, particularly selective decentralization from “central planners [to] workers councils [in] small and medium scale enterprises.”158 Although the state restored large-enterprise work councils to government ministries, workers gained some strength at the firm level. Bauman notes this reform implied a precise formula: political centralization as the condition of possibility for economic-productive devolution to workers and firms. The 1982 economic reforms allowed enterprise council members, elected by workers, to select directors, vote on corporate strategy, and participate in decisions about firm expenditures. Martial law oversaw a growth in the private sector, boosting employment from 271,000 (5.2%) in 1980 to 717,000 (14.7%) by 1989, accompanied by inflation, public sector job losses, higher crime rates, increased public debt, and a “decline in fear of the security apparatus and a general loosening of social strictures [as well as greater press freedom.”159
Proto-liberal reform from above did not, however, please dissidents. The ban on strikes yielded massive demonstrations throughout the martial law period, notably on 1 May in 1982; 1 and 3 May 1983; and 31 August 1982 and 1984 to mark the anniversary of the Gdańsk Accord.

A moment in Church-state relations is revealing, as well. Relatively protected, although critical of the state and defending the rights of workers, the Church continued to cooperate with the ruling party. On 8 Nov 1982 Jaruzelski and the Vatican announced another Papal visit, although this may have been a “tactical concession...to torpedo the strikes and demonstrations ordered by the Solidarity leaders.” If “decisively defeated” on this occasion, Solidarity remained in opposition: calling protests, holding demonstrations, scheduling strikes, and forcing the state to respond. Having negotiated a strike in February 1981, the Church characteristically described itself as the voice of reason that could adjudicate between labor and the state, but was not simply collaborating. With subtle tactics, the Church-labor connection remained central “in the defense of society’s subjectivity...”

It is the mainstay of all forms of public life (even for nonbelievers), both in direct contacts among people and organizationally. What is more, the experience of Solidarity has proved the church’s new ability to participate in the formation of a mass labor movement [and activities of] the most creative groups of the intelligentsia.

Having seized evidently absolute power, the state thus felt ongoing labor-defined pressure to make institutional reforms, for instance to its dubious legal apparatus:

In 1982, as a concession to Poland’s growing democratic movement, the Polish 1952 Constitution was amended to establish the Constitutional Tribunal, a quasi-judicial body similar to existing European constitutional courts, albeit with several important differences. While ostensibly created to control the constitutionality of state action, the Tribunal’s legislative underpinnings, passed only in 1985, limited the jurisdiction and operation of the Tribunal, creating only the illusion of constitutional legality and failing to substantially modify the totalitarian political framework. These limitations...ensured that the Tribunal would improve the
internal efficiency of the communist system, and not challenge its most fundamental assumptions.¹⁶³

None of this is to suggest that Polish dissidents were optimistic or assured under martial law. In his panegyric to non-violence, Kurlansky exaggerates in saying that all dissenting Polish “factions were committed to the principles of non-violence, consciously embracing Gandhi’s belief in the power of nonviolent non-co-operation and never doubting that it would work for them.”¹⁶⁴ If workers and other dissidents remained hopeful or faithful in emergency conditions, they did so against their doubt. As Weschler reports: “In December 1981, East Central Europe was still in the thrall of Brezhnev’s neo-Stalinism – perhaps more desolately so than at any time in the previous decade. Berlin 1953, Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, and now Poland 1980-81 – yet again, a tentative hope-swelling opening had suddenly been closed down with a vengeance.”¹⁶⁵ The Polish opposition was not celebrating in this time; they despaired, and some debated violence.¹⁶⁶ In 1983 Beylin remarked bitterly, “our revolution – which was self-limiting not only with regard to action but also to political thought – did not reshape the sphere of culture to include political activities.”¹⁶⁷ He claims that because Solidarity, now underground, had become desultory, some dissidents had begun to promote a “dangerous type of thinking” advocating an imitative, non-state “totalitarian” organization that could infiltrate the state.¹⁶⁸ He charged that the “language of universal community, still employed today, has provided the mass power and motivation for resistance but has made it impossible to differentiate those to whom it is addressed – namely, society.”

Yet even radical agitators did not take up arms. Asked about alternative tactics to non-violence, underground Solidarity members replied that it was unnecessary in order to achieve
their long-term objectives. In 1982, Własysław Frasyniuk replied that immediately following the state’s declaration of “war,” “there appeared...a paper published by a group calling itself the First Battalion of the Home Army...Other fanatics tried to get pyrotechnicians, chemists, and God knows who else involved in the Regional Committee. We soon dissuaded them:

Interestingly enough, it was mostly workers who initiated this kind of activity. There was one group of about eighty people, all of them from the same factory. I wrote them an open letter explaining our approach and they dissolved the group themselves. Ideas of this kind border on provocation; that’s why we always react strongly to any attempt at terrorism...

Also in hiding, Bogdan Lis replied to the same question concerning violence in 1984:

Terrorism would mean the end of Solidarity. If the Communists began to line people up against the wall, the most determined part of society would be in favor of fighting back as hard as possible. But our job is to prevent the underground from deviating into terrorism. Foreigners familiar with Polish history are sometimes surprised that, given our tradition of uprisings and our love of armed struggle (even when it’s doomed to failure), so far not one shot has been fired on our side in this “war” with the junta...Terrorism is a last resort for which we have no need at the moment. But if all other forms of resistance fail, if the poverty and repression get worse, then... Today the lads who want a fight shave the heads of collaborators or throw smoke bombs into their apartments; tomorrow they may decide to thrown grenades. But then we’ll already have an uprising on our hands.

That a Solidarity activist two years underground during martial law claimed that violence is “a last resort for which we have no need at the moment” suggests a hidden source of forbearance and political confidence. It is this source that inspired the incarcerated Michnik, in 1982, to characterize the state as “a colossus with legs of steel and hands of clay...communism with its teeth knocked out.” Along similar lines, Szlajfer could, also in the first year of the state of exception, shrug:

[W]hat this “restoration” should be remains unclear both to the public and to the coup plotters. Yet we should not overestimate the significance of this fact. The present state of uncertainty is
but transitional, but not in the sense that we should expect society to resist immediately and vehemently. To expect this would be excessive optimism. All the same, one can argue that what this restoration will be does not depend on the dictatorship alone, for the junta does not [have] total control either over the economy (foreign trade and agriculture in particular) or over the majority of Solidarity’s social base. The junta’s present control of the working class is nothing but police control.172

In 1986, a month after being released from jail, Michnik, asked if “oppositional activities in Poland have substantially diminished,” replied, “Can you show me just one other Communist country where the very existence of five hundred clandestine publications is even imaginable? Even if we accept...a certain reduction in these activities because of fatigue and so on, the opposition remains the only force that can negotiate with the government.”173 But were there grounds for such claims? Indeed, throughout martial law the state was never free from Solidarity – strikes, demonstrations, commemorations, the underground, and ongoing support among intellectuals, the Church, professionals, and even the youth. But, more simply, the state could ban strikes, ineffectually, but the PZPR could hardly ban work, workers, or their potential to stop working. So labor’s pressure on the state persisted. In 1988, again, “the party was faced by the most serious conflicts since 1980...In the absence of any prospect of a successful breakthrough, discontent was expressed in strikes that became increasingly politicized.”174

After generations of compelling state reforms by withholding its contribution to state revenues, it seems apposite that “social pressure (strikes) and the opposition’s refusal to accept [selective cooptation] led to the Roundtable Talks. At that moment, the first structural breaches in the authoritarian system appeared.”175 In May 1988 strikes erupted in Gdańsk and the Nowa Huta Lenin steel mill near Krakow, followed by “a wave of strikes in a great number of factories”176 in September. But as Osiatynski notes, these strikers were too young to have
worked in 1980-1981, and probably had no special loyalty to Solidarity itself. Over the duration of communist rule, the continuity seems to belong not to Solidarity as much as to the strike. To quote another prison letter of Michnik:

Let us repeat: Solidarity never demanded the removal of the communists from power or control by the union of the ship of state, [although] the ruling apparatchiks interpreted Solidarity’s declarations this way. They perceived in the union a grassroots movement for expelling party committees from the factories; they were haunted by the specter of elections to the people’s councils; they had nightmares about the national referendum on the form of self-government...In the course of events, however, it became obvious that the authorities perceived the union’s willingness to compromise as weakness. All concessions had to be extracted by strikes or threats of strikes.¹⁷⁷

§4.c Theory and evidence

Responding to the puzzling divergence of opposition responses to martial law in Poland and Algeria, I hypothesized in the preface that institutions of effective citizenship determine the incentives for non-violent and violent strategies, respectively. I argued that every state provides a predominant mode of state-citizen interaction, referred to as the citizenship regime and built upon reliable means of communication and compulsion called social resources. Operating often beneath the mechanisms of the formal regime-type, social resources and citizenship regimes constitute systemic subjects – they situate effective agency in the representative and repressive channels that define the regime. Finally, in forming citizenship regimes, social resources vary in the social relations, political spaces, and regime status they generate. For example, citizens who confront the state principally as workers politicized in labor-intensive production facilities tend to have horizontal and cooperative relationships; compartmentalized physical spaces of mutual recognition; and differentiated, thus enduring, means of challenging ruling classes. In contrast, citizens integrated into the state as clients tied to patrons have vertical and competitive social
ties; seamless and unprotected political spaces; and undifferentiated, thus perishable, means of opposing insolvent, coercive states.

My explanation for Solidarity’s non-violence under fiscal crisis and martial law seized on this last variable – differentiation or autonomy of the social resource from state policies – to argue that the endurance of the strike option to compel state reforms sustained systemic Polish subjectivity and obviated anti-systemic violence. The history above of Polish social movements and labor activism, culminating in the unionization of Solidarity, supports the hypothesis that worker-citizenship rooted in the social resource of labor power and strikes encouraged the non-violent response to martial law. This section will analyze the plausibility of this explanation by working the model back through the historical narrative, or revisit the history more explicitly in terms of the model. I will ask if Solidarity’s ascendance corroborates, qualifies, or challenges my account of the variables in the causal pathway from citizenship regime to opposition strategies. A good test of my model adduces evidence from different stages in the actions and discourses of Polish dissidents, focused on the pivotal moments of state-citizen dialectics in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980, and 1981, before and during martial law. In addition to interrogating my specific explanation of non-violence, this assessment will inform my supplemental theoretical questions about subjects and objects of violence and experiential or immediate evaluations. I will take these propositions in ascending order of theoretical abstraction.

Beginning with the effects of the citizenship regime on subject-formation that I consider secondary explanatory variations, Solidarity emerged as a horizontal, cooperative mass social movement operating in the demarcated political space of the factory. Taking these in turn, we have seen many signs of the gravitational pull of other movements, identities, or organizations
to Solidarity, establishing, I think, that worker-citizenship fostered a horizontal and cooperative social subjectivity among and beyond workers themselves. Most obviously, workers responded together across sectors, regions, skills, professions, and intra-working-class disparities despite the state’s repeated attempts to divide them along just these lines with policies exploiting potential structural tensions or rivalries. In 1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980 workers reacted as one to the government’s manipulations, recalcitrance, or brutality. Although Poland’s communist command economy could be described as an organic machine or homeostatic system, it was composed of discrete sub-systems that could be expected to compete for scarce material resources, real or artificially imposed under soft-budget constraints. As we have seen, especially in the second half of the 1970s, the new corporatist state strategy adopted to protect Gierek’s indebted development scheme, made just this concerted effort to break the workforce into interest group constituencies. Its failure reflected the horizontal, cooperative, egalitarian, and normative social commitments that bound workers tightly in solidarity strikes, allied walkouts, immediate cross-factory mobilizations, emotional and practical expressions of sympathy for working-class strangers, and resolute demands for memorials to fallen comrades.

The Polish working class also enjoyed a unique capacity to represent all Poles, notably in opposing the state’s relentless effort to raise food prices, lower real wages, and remove other subsidies. Precisely because Solidarity was a working class uprising to discredit the “worker’s state and party,” it is easy to overlook the extension beyond the working class of its actions, grievances, and decisions. In my argument, it is crucial evidence of the predominant mode of integration and effective citizenship to see which movement becomes the magnet to the metal shards of other movements. That Solidarity became the expression of multiple activist trends in
Poland identifying over time through trial-and-error the optimal route for their claim making demonstrates the efficacy of worker-citizenship for all Poles. In other words, Poland’s narrative instantiates a key variation across citizenship regimes, the capacity of systemic subjectivity to include people outside its specific constituency (here, workers) without demanding as the cost of inclusion sacrifice of outsiders’ initial claims, identities, or desires. As I have discussed, in the contrast-case of Algeria, Islamists attracted and galvanized instrumental support against the state among non-Islamists, but at the cost of their secular commitments due to the vertical and competitive design of client-citizenship. In Poland, Solidarity, the fulcrum of political dissent beyond workers, gathered into its unionization drive other non-state groups who stood to gain from its victory: the Church, intellectuals including students, professionals, and individuals.

Put another way, in fighting the corruption or stagnation manifest in economic poverty, the campaign of labor, particularly besieged among Poles, constituted an address-to-and-by-all: when workers took to the streets, went out on strike, held a stoppage, or enumerated their demands, they expressed grievances shared beyond their ranks. Changes achieved by workers improved the welfare and prospects of professionals, intellectuals, and Catholic clergy, as the governing demands of these other citizens would not redound to workers. The fundamental grievances and demands of these groups were relatively discrete or specific, although this distinction must be made cautiously. Intellectual, religious, or professional demands for free expression, devotional privileges, or public investment could be said to benefit all Poles. But there are two caveats to this apparent symmetry. This reciprocity relied on the dispensation of these discrete claims – for instance, what play was being restored or publication revived – because the state responded on a selective, case-by-case basis to secular and religious claims.
for state protection. This discrepancy in the capacity of different sub-populations to defend one another’s interests partly explains the alienation or hostility between workers and students in 1968 and 1970, but also why it was resolved in favor of intellectual support of the working class movement and not vice-versa – to the point where KOR dissolved once Solidarity formed a successful union in the fall of 1980. Despite the state’s discretionary wage adjustments to derail labor unity or discredit organized workers, protests and strikes yielded increased real income and removed governing personnel, necessarily benefitting all Poles in contrast to comparable, group-specific dissident accomplishments. This asymmetry becomes clearer if we stay focused on the means that define citizenship regimes, adhering to the model. The question is not whether non-workers’ demands could help workers as unionization benefits non-workers; under any regime ends often overlap different group interests, starting with the desire not to be arrested arbitrarily. The citizenship regime, though, concerns means and the subjectivities formed in their rehearsed deployment. Worker-citizenship formed a horizontal, cooperative Polish subject transcending the largest social movement in modern history – ten million members of the Solidarity union – to integrate the citizenry as a whole against the state, with the power to overwhelm crass appeals to anti-Semitism and to attract PZPR defectors.

The second variation in citizenship regimes is the creation and effect of political space, “constructed spatial worlds, which are necessarily distinctive as to time and location, [where agents] experience, interpret, and fight about the social order.” The worker-citizenship regime in Poland constructed massive labor-intensive production sites for the most part in and around rapidly populated city centers. I have suggested in the model that this collectivization and conversion of Polish citizens into workers, in addition to affording them a powerful weapon
derived from their indispensable contribution to state revenues and social stability, also turned what was initially a sort of cage into a defensive fortress. Here I would draw out of the historical narrative a trajectory parallel to the experiential pedagogy of social ties. There, various strands of Polish dissident life converged on a sophisticated method and perspicuous message over time; here that process had its counterpart in the gradual appropriation of the factory as the effective property of the working class. In the state-worker dialectic the factory came to be ever more the spatial expression of the workers’ increasing discipline and self-rule as they honed the use of their work-based social resources. The production site became one of those resources, as workers physically relocated from the street to the factory. In 1956 and 1970, we saw, the workers voiced their grievances by leaving the factories for the streets, as if deferring to an inculcated sense of moving from a private or specific to a public or general space. In the midst of the 1970 uprising, Laba suggests, an innovative working-class consciousness developed that revalued this polarity by converting the factory into a public space, a staging ground ideal for asserting workers’ rights to organize inter-factory unions. It seems, then, that the workers’ appropriation of this delineated, visible, unmovable, and indispensable physical space assisted in the subject formation of worker-citizens.

The labor-intensive production site is one locus in the Marxian image of a movement toward workers’ “consciousness” of themselves as historical subjects and not objects. The core mechanism here seems to be physical, discursive, and visible space as the necessary condition of class identity “for” rather than “in” itself. The concentration and proximity of potentially divided or competitive workers in a physical location allows them to invert any mutual hostility, enforced by capitalist incentives, into co-operation and reciprocal identification. The physical
place of work is also a pedagogical site that teaches each worker her relationship to others in an overall mode of production and its social relations. The massive, diverse, and diffuse work sites in Poland confirm an aspect of this depiction, though not by associating class “consciousness” with a veridical grasp of “true” social reality. Rather, against mapping class over a specific, totalizing, or abstract form of self-awareness, Polish workers appear in this study as “formed groups, sharing dispositions. Such cognitive constructs map the terrain of lived experience and define the boundaries between the probable and improbable.”¹⁸¹ It seems the evolving claim to speak from, gather in, and take over, i.e., effectively own the factories evinces Katzenelson’s focus on dispositions formed in specific situations and lived experiences where calculations of political probability included, in this case, spaces of dissident worker organization. By the time of the Gdańsk negotiations in 1980, we find workers in their factories, reconceived as defensive fortresses expressing a state-within-a-state, or what Tilly would call a distinct sovereignty.

As I have said in the theory and model, citizenship regimes are two-way streets whose social resources permit reciprocal modes of communication and coercion – here the principle is captured in the duality of the plant as prison and refuge. In 1980, with a symbolism perhaps lost on priest and party member alike, Solidarity fulfilled the teleology installed in 1970. It grew a practically independent, non-violent government from chaotic street demonstrations; vengeful attacks on police stations, party headquarters, and jails; massacres and mass casualties; and the cycle of protest and short-term policy fix. From the physical space of the factory and shipyard, union organizers counseled civilians, collected and distributed dues, circulated information, consulted with emissaries from the Church, and received “foreign” dignitaries from the PZPR.
The political space of the factory, then, encapsulates the dialectics of the citizenship regime – the state provided a social resource partially constituting Poles as worker-citizens whose agency was confined and enabled through the political space of production sites. The workplace was, then, a key component in the social resource that constituted worker-citizenship, permitting a stronghold for dissidents to couple their labor power with secure physical means to symbolize and enact ruling elites’ dependency on the working class.

These discussions of horizontal, cooperative social ties and segmented, ambivalent, and converted politicized spaces illustrate the concepts of the model and the movements across its causal pathway. On the one hand, forming an authoritarian, communist politics of production based on a large working class concentrated in labor-intensive workplaces constituted Poles as the subjects of a worker-citizen regime. Visible trajectories in the use and refinement of worker fidelity and physical contiguity reveal the working out of this systemic subjectivity, as described in the theory chapter outlining the explanatory model. But at the same time, these variations in the citizenship regime appear to have a secondary impact on the dependent variable, as we see in the case of Poland, and in the comparison with Algeria. Specifically, I have proposed, based on my analysis of the relevant histories, that social ties and political spaces matter but cannot be attributed primary causal or determining effect on opposition strategies. I suspect that this case study clarifies this distinction.

My argument, again, is that the exhaustion of subjectivity as provided and practiced in the citizenship regime – here among worker-citizens – is the condition of the turn to violence because effectively expelled non-citizens will reclaim their willful subjectivity by forcing it on the state if all other channels appear foreclosed. This is a severally modified dehumanization
thesis as it minimally associates the turn to violence with conditions approaching objectification in an inescapably dominant social order. That is, we could infer from Poland’s history that social ties guaranteeing solidarity or solace among fellow workers in political spaces supporting a mini-state with active mini-citizens would offset the experience of objectification. This emerges from the case study, that the worker-citizenship regime’s social and spatial provisions defrayed the sense of desolation and vulnerability under extreme duress that otherwise would enforce a reified social condition; and that relationships and spaces characterize the social resources of citizen-subjectivity. But it does not seem that horizontal social ties or relatively secure political spaces, while they palliate social suffering, would favor non-violence over violence, particularly when those ties and spaces have been decimated under martial law. Indeed, the violation of these aspects of worker-citizenship, their violent usurpation, would seem to destroy at least these secure resources of the regime, exacerbating the experience of internal expulsion.

In this sense, the removal of the social and spatial elements of worker-citizenship, and thus of significant practical components of Poles’ systemic subjectivity, sharpens the puzzle and commends the final variation in the regime: its enduring status under fiscal crisis and the state of exception. Again the argument here is that citizenship regimes differ on a third aspect of the social resources that constitute subjects and subjectivities. Citizens are incorporated as subjects of ruling elites’ formal political organizations and informal social networks whose least common denominator is to create a relatively systematic distribution of materials goods. Citizens are, on this register, always formed in regimes primarily defined by material exchanges between state and citizen. As I said in presenting the explanatory model, worker-citizens and client-citizens are generated at the cash nexus – workers produce state revenues from which they are then paid;
patrons accrue state revenues with which they recruit clients. In my model and cases, there is no citizenship regime without a material exchange; in turn, the social resource – the strike in Poland – is constituted on this material exchange, acts through it, and depends on it. Workers’ very ability to mobilize the social resource requires that the material substance of worker-citizenship be in place. This is what it means to say that effective citizenship depends on state provision of a weapon or tool to use against the state; for the strike resource to secure of worker-citizenship, withdrawal of labor power – i.e., self-removal from the material exchange that grounds the regime – must materially affect the state. It is there that the material structure the citizenship regime differs with primary causal effect on the outcomes.

Much as these regimes diverge in social and spatial pedagogies, patterns, and practices, they vary in the status or endurance of the citizenship regime when this material interaction at its base erodes. As I have suggested, variations in a citizenship regime’s features – type, space, and duration of its subjects – occupy qualitatively distinct positions in the formation of those regimes. The material exchange is the founding dynamic and the social ties and political spaces are its derivatives, which we can see more clearly in relationship to the strike as the resource that essentially structures worker-subjectivity. Citizens become subjects as workers through the strike, the indispensable tool they can use to threaten incumbents. They cannot use horizontal social ties or political spaces directly as weapons against ruling classes or bureaucracies. Rather, the social and spatial specificities of workers’ actions and plans serve or qualify the strike option and, in that sense, contribute to its deployment, if dependently. Without the power of strikes, walkouts, and sit-ins to force communist apparatchiks to pay attention and withdraw reforms, the gradually refined mobilization of cooperative social ties and appropriation of work spaces
would not have afforded workers power against the state. Thus, worker-subjectivity was built in Poland as a system of labor, compensation, and remuneration, from which derive patterns of relationships and spaces of activity. The chains of dependency run from the material to the social and spatial relations (to oversimplify for expository purposes). Variation in the status or endurance of this material exchange, then, is crucial to the sustenance of worker-citizenship.

Citizenship regimes have differentiated or undifferentiated material foundations; they are either autonomous from or parasitic on state solvency. The strike option in Poland did not rely for its existence and operability on the wellbeing of state finances, to put it simply. The test for this is both logical and empirical. The capacity to cripple an employer, whether corporate or statist, does not routinely decline with the loss of corporate or state revenues. Indeed, a fiscal crisis that weakens the business or government may enhance labor’s leverage against owners’ prerogative. Throughout the history reviewed, we have seen precisely this pattern, in which the state justifies price hikes on the grounds of imminent insolvency and Polish workers resisted with only increasingly sophisticated strikes and walkouts (1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980). Thus, differentiated citizenship regimes retain even in hard times the “contract” binding state and non-state agencies in the material exchange that produces the social resources that constitute systemic subjectivity. Fiscal crisis and martial law under a differentiated regime leave intact the social resources of worker-citizenship; however critical the macro-economic picture or state brutality, they do not annul the power of strikes and cannot exert complete or unmediated sovereignty over workers. To test the claim that the worker-citizenship regime is differentiated, affording Polish workers enduring resources under state crisis and aggression, we explore the pattern of state reactions during martial law to see if the state is acting “as if” anticipating
worker actions. We examine, then, the continuity before and under martial law of the state’s repeatedly capitulating to worker demands, albeit as the means necessary to retain power and stabilize the economy. We ask whether the ruling class still acted on or carried out the stated demands of Solidarity, despite banning the party and its activities. As we have seen, absent Solidarity and strikes, both outlawed under martial law, communist elites felt unimpeded in raising prices drastically while implementing watered-down versions of previous independent union demands, such as a role in management decisions in small and medium-sized firms.

The latter comments might suggest that differentiation of effective citizenship from the fiscal condition of the state is a semantic or academic exercise, but here my explanation turns on the conviction that citizens respond to state actions as subjects constituted in citizenship regimes. They ask, as I have said, not only whether they still have the items they want, whether they face unjust or miserable conditions, but also whether they still exist as systemic subjects. They also answer this question as citizen-subjects, evaluating their environment for the social resources they have used in the past in struggles with the state. But this evaluation is historical, experiential, cumulative – a subjective reading of the state’s actions in terms of its effect on the possession, in the case of Poland, of the strike resource. This experiential, subjective evaluation combines distinct assessments. Worker-citizen-subjects ask if their weapons and tools are gone, suspended, or operable. Under a differentiated regime, I argue, Poles evaluated their resources as intact, held in abeyance, potent as an irrepressible immanent weapon. This is why I have said that even when, objectively, in 1982 or 1983, under comprehensive state assault on workers and unions, Poles’ material and political losses were absolute but their subjective evaluation of their condition was not of abjection but anticipation. Within my historical narrative, evidence
for this inference appears in consistent remarks of underground and imprisoned dissidents who explicitly disavow violence on the grounds that workers’ struggle with the state is merely in an unusually vicious stage; that the state was buying time; and that martial law signaled the state’s weakness, its “legs of steel and hands of clay” the last gasp of an absurd behemoth whose only effective response to the uprising of the whole society was that of a risible, if perilous, clown.

In the capacity of Solidarity underground to plausibly dissuade radicals from anti-state coercive measures and in the prison memoirs of activists we hear a consistent message that the regime has defeated neither the labor movement nor the civil society stemming from its social means. In the second evaluation I discussed in the model, the one morally appraising the ruling class, Poles knew they retained, through their social resources, their subjective potential under a differentiated citizenship structure. But, as I also emphasized in the model, this positive subjective evaluation was not based on fantasy or mere hope, it rested on the material power of strikes. The factories and shipyards and infrastructure had to remain viable, rendering the communist nomenklatura vulnerable to working class actions. Indeed, labor-intensive production sites and state reliance on labor power remained, so that workers’ systemic subjectivity did not require violence.

§4.d  Concluding comments

As I conclude this argument linking Poland’s worker-citizenship regime to opponents’ sustained non-violent response, familiar vulnerabilities in its architecture remain and perhaps, from a higher altitude, new challenges emerge. My rhetorical strategy has been to adduce evidence from my historical narrative in the language of my theoretical model, and vice-versa to re-read that narrative through the variables and causal pathway of my explanation. My goal
has not been to offer a dispositive proof that differentiated citizenship regimes prevent violent reactions to state coercion or material deprivation; indeed, I have not concluded, and have not designed a project to establish, that systemic subjectivity, or effective citizenship, is a necessary or sufficient condition in general for avoiding physical resistance to state policies. Rather, I have attempted to claim plausibly that worker-citizenship constructed a systemic Polish subjectivity that endured fiscal crisis and martial law, diminishing incentives for social violence by retaining a positive evaluation of the citizenship regime. Having expressed relatively modest ambitions about the explanatory parameters and case-specificity of my project, I should address, qualify, or deflect objections to my argument. I should clarify from the outset that my objective in these concluding comments is not to debate opponents but to persuade readers of the feasibility of the worker-citizenship regime’s defining contribution to Polish non-violence against alternative explanations that I cannot comprehensively impeach.

Most prominent of these objections is the case-specific emphasis on the absence of Polish sovereignty – absolute or relative to Algeria – and the violence-inhibiting prospect of a Soviet invasion. I have challenged the adequacy of this explanation of Polish non-violence in the previous chapter (§3.c.3); but will reiterate succinctly the central points. It is true the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia left a daunting and lasting impression on all Central Europeans, noted by activists and writers, and it is also true that the Soviets demanded martial law under threat of force. But it remains unclear that we may infer a successful explanation of Polish non-violence from testimonials about a potential incursion, despite its commonsense feasibility. Here I recall a remark Karpinski makes about Poles’ reaction, knowing of recent massacres, to being fired on in Elblag, 1970: “At the end of the week in some factories strikes
were only just beginning, or threatening to erupt. Anyone who believed that shooting at workers would pacify them was wrong.”\(^{182}\) That is to say, while the Soviet presence certainly affected Polish decisions, it only seems to follow that the effect was to pacify them, especially given the stakes, nationalist history, and resentment of Russian imperialism. Even assuming away, again, Helsinki, Afghanistan, NATO, and an explicit threat by the US, all of which changed conditions gravely since the 1950s and 1960s, it still seems Solidarity was a profound threat to USSR, yet audacious in its activities. Finally, attributing Polish non-violence to the Soviet threat invokes a constant, but we have seen the progression toward grassroots, “committee-building rather than committee burning,” deliberative, and non-violent campaigns stemming from the pedagogical dialectics of the state-citizen struggles. To locate the source of the non-violent, “self-limiting” strategy outside Solidarity discredits the movement’s internal development and pointedly replaces the revolutionary ethos of dissidents with the mundane desire for physical survival. I do not refute the intervention/pacification thesis, and accept that the Soviets intimidated Polish activists; but I suspect that the evaluation of the threat passed through the lens of domestic social resources, while the Polish regime declared a state of exception.

Likewise, I would propose that another strong influence worked through the historical evaluations of dissidents, namely, the critique of violence among KOR intellectual activists. The view here is that when academics, rights advocates, teachers, lawyers, and others created KOR in 1976 and over the next few years advised them, they brought to disorganized and reactive workers ideas and tactics framed in non-violent commitments typical of Polish professionals and professors. This argument would displace the impetus to peaceful mobilization away from workers, portraying an intellectual takeover of labor strategies. It does seem that increased
worker discipline and overt commitment to non-violent means corresponded with the post-1976 coordination of workers, intellectuals, and professionals, who described non-violence as a constitutive feature of Polish liberal rationalism. Indeed, deep traditions of Polish civic ethics or political beliefs may generally endorse non-violence, such that communism distorted the typical exercise of Polish values. In this case, intellectuals were properly placed to remind potentially violent workers of the values of gradual processes and rational deliberations. But I would at least supplement this explanation with the conditions of viability that allow advocacy of non-violence to be persuasive to people who did not already agree. That is, if KOR or independent intellectuals influenced worker decisions, presumably they persuaded them of new ideas, but it would seem requisite that this process of persuasion refer not merely to the rhetorical skills of intellectuals but a fit between their ideas and lived conditions that they addressed. Indeed, we might describe this meeting of workers and advisors as an alliance of the “universal class” of labor and particular class of analysts merging into a sort of strategic universal analysis.

At the same time, when we stress conditions of possibility, not only possible conditions, we may say that between intellectuals and the working class, the latter was the sine qua non of the former, a non-equivalent, asymmetric relationship in effectively deploying regime-provided resources effectively against the state. Worker-citizenship posited labor as the universal class in just this sense; its weapons facilitate publicly relevant activism in the name of all, and as an address to all (including members of the ruling class). In short, Solidarity could exist and oppose the state with or without KOR, but the inverse cannot be said – KOR would not have existed effectively without the social class capable of crippling the state by withdrawing its labor power as the provenance of sustainable state revenue. The view that KOR domesticated, tamed, or
pacified workers by disciplining, training, or cajoling them into docile forbearance is doubtful, given what we have seen of the rapidly evolving and self-defined labor movement and its many concentric circles throughout the Polish society and polity. Even had intellectual or professional advisors convinced or prevailed upon Solidarity to adopt methodical, steadfast, visionary non-violence, this would nonetheless indicate a positive manipulation of an existing social resource, the capacity to strike refined into a more potent weapon.

Having discussed two regnant counter-explanations of non-violence in Poland, it seems beneficial at this juncture to raise significant protests against my explanation, grouped under a general rubric, the humanist objection. I mean by this phrase to acknowledge the limitations of the sort of explanation, theory, and model I have developed and explicated; and to do this by recognizing several intangible elements of Polish life that may have contributed to non-violence as the universal mode of address to the PZPR and to fellow citizens. These objections are drawn from educated intuitions about Polish political sensibilities in the period in question, not from the academic literature – in other words, by posing what one might call humanist objections to my heuristic model, I can engage specific and paradigmatic challenges at once. First, it must be considered that despite its “post-totalitarian status, the Polish state apparatus was an efficient police state capable of monitoring, reporting, and detaining the population comprehensively, perhaps with a unique infrastructural power derived from the citizenship-regime’s reciprocity with society itself. Worker-citizens may retain systemic subjectivity because of a differentiated regime, but for this reason state and citizen are intimately bound to each other at the point of production. In short, the Polish state may have suffocated its opponents for a considerable time after martial law, precluding violence through law enforcement. Similarly, it is likely that fatigue
or resignation produced Poles’ peaceful response to the state’s violence. After decades of effort to resist ruthless communist despotism, Poles had formed an unprecedented social movement of millions of highly committed adherents, wrestling from the PZPR the 21-point agreement in the besieged city of Gdańsk, granting workers autonomy. In one day, 13 December 1981, the state radically reversed course, as if to return to pre-1956 Poland, and perhaps this ought to be interpreted as an exhausting defeat – the defiant and mocking words of Michnik and countless underground activists amounting to just so much proud, high spirited, emboldening bluster.

Perhaps by 1980 Poles had been so traumatized by 30, 70, or 200 years of aggressive political contests that resistance was defeated in advance by a larger historical, or experiential evaluation than the one I have rooted in the structure of meaningful citizenship. We cannot rule out that an irreducibly particular set of events, injuries, or memories erupted at a moment like August 1980 but were eventfully offset the next year. One senses a wounded conviction, perhaps, in Poles’ immediate reaction when asked why Poles did not turn to violence when the conditions seemed propitious or inevitable. They tend to respond with incredulity, as though it were unthinkable. Their own view that the peaceful and procedural value-system among Poles prevailed over state taunts must be taken seriously, especially given the respect for equality, fairness, and accountability genuinely evinced through the Solidarity period. Indeed, this alternative – that Poles congenitally are, or by the 1980s had become, averse to social violence, must be recognized as a deep challenge. At the same time, the retention or emergence of just such a value-system may be seen as effect as well as cause, leaving the success of Polish non-violence to be explained, as background to what it explains. Finally, the humanist objection might invoke all of these and other factors in a kind of ensemble variable that opposes, in a
skeptical ideographic or anthropological language, the explanation I am offering. This is, of course, an anxiety in my own presentation – that the model may be too complicated to capture the events in Poland in 1980, the theory too convoluted; or, conversely, that it is too simple to convey the complexity.¹⁸³

With humanist objections in mind, I might rephrase while defending my explanation of Polish non-violence. It seems faithful to the accounts I have written and events I have adduced to infer that possession of material resources to threaten the communist state lessened their temptation to take up arms in defending their claims. Explanations of Polish non-violence advance both humanist and causal understanding, at least potentially, by working back from martial law into the history of Polish subjectivity. In the next chapter, we will encounter Algeria’s distinct authoritarian citizenship regime, one explicitly determined to avoid horizontal class formation, segmented public spaces, and differentiated systemic subjectivity, and whose contrasting trajectory may throw Poland’s transition into greater relief.
CHAPTER FIVE

Algerian clients at war

The city commonly known as Algiers — infamous these days for the great and ceaseless harm its people inflict on all the coasts and provinces of the Christian world…

*Antonio de Sosa*¹

Almost everything that sets us above savages has come to us from the shores of the Mediterranean.

*Samuel Johnson*²

If...we were to demonstrate by our behavior...that in our eyes the old inhabitants of Algeria are just an obstacle to be pushed aside or trampled underfoot, if we surround their populations, not to lift them in our arms toward well-being and enlightenment but to destroy and smother them, the two races would confront a life or death situation. Sooner or later, Algeria would become a closed field, a walled arena, where the two peoples would have to fight without mercy and one of the two would have to die.

*Alexis de Tocqueville*³

Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my fatherland.

*Ahmad Tewfiq al-Madani*⁴

The natives’ challenge to the colonial world...is not a treatise on the universal, but the untidy affirmation of an original idea propounded as an absolute.

*Frantz Fanon*⁵

It is like two insane people, crazed with wrath, deciding to turn into a fatal embrace their forced marriage...Forced to live together but incapable of uniting, they decide at least to die together... [T]he fire is spreading and tomorrow Algeria will be a land of ruins and corpses that no force, no power in the world, will be able to revive in this century.

*Albert Camus*⁶

[Now] the ideological struggle must take the place of the war for [political] liberation, and [become]...a struggle for the realization of the democratic people’s revolution..., the militant movement of the agitated Algerian people striving to build a new society and a new state.

*FLN (Front de liberation national)*

*Program for Algeria*⁷

As a consolation he tries to convince himself that compared to others, who can’t even afford to fill their shopping baskets, he can’t complain, but nonetheless his Algeria has changed an awful lot. So he’d better to get down to work rather than carrying on about it and making it worse by chewing over this resentment and those insidious thoughts which are, there’s no doubt about it, the work of the Evil one who perniciously distils the poison of despair in the minds of decent people.

*Merzak Allouache*⁸
§5.a  Summary

This chapter seeks to assess my explanation attributing the violence against the Algerian state under martial law to the undifferentiated client-citizenship regime that evaporated under state insolvency, leaving citizens bereft of systemic subjectivity when the government annulled the results of its subsequent experiment with voter-citizenship. The chapter will replicate the rhetorical framework, but not theoretical recapitulations, of the previous chapter on Poland; it will present a short historical narrative of key institutional, ideational, and social events from Algerian state formation to the Islamist-state war as the empirical basis for interrogating the theoretical model given in the introduction. The history will emphasize the logics of regime and subject formation in light of continuous struggles, under and after colonial rule, for institutional recognition and autonomy from centralized-state encroachment. As in the Poland chapter, this narrative selects key political events that may have contributed to the puzzling outcome (here, the Islamists’ violent uprising after election results were annulled in 1992), not those that may contribute to my theoretical model and conditional explanation.

The theoretical section will read this account through the lens of the model’s variables and causal derivation of violent resistance to state coercion from the parasitic client-citizenship regime. It will explore the hypothesis that Algeria’s undifferentiated regime resulted in violent social agitation by illustrating how, under state crisis, Algerian clients lost the social resource – withdrawn or switched support for patrons – that secured their effective citizenship. In turn, it will track the uprising as a consequence of systemic dispossession and its aggression as a means to force state attention, concessions, or weakness. The empirical extrapolation, then, is that the Algerian military-state incorporated citizens as clients beholden to discretionary office-holders
or party-elites, thus diminishing the threat of autonomous social movements or political spaces and constituting potential rivals as subjects whose systemic relevance depended on state largesse. The theoretical interpretation of this citizenship structure that must be substantiated is that by rendering citizens parasitic on the state with no autonomous social resources, the Algerian state created a perverse double movement of complete material attachment to state distribution followed by complete political detachment under state retrenchment. Fiscal crisis forced the first evaluation I have discussed – of fair policies and legitimate policy-makers -- and martial law forced the second evaluation – of systemic subjectivity. The theoretical section will, then, be principally concerned to confirm that these material and political crises eradicated the citizenship regime of Algerian activists, increasing incentives to violence by confining the means of subjectivity, or re-subjectivization, to anti-systemic strategies.

The Algerian narrative will diverge from its Polish counterpart by emphasizing in greater detail the formative events before as well as since Algerian independence in 1962. This choice is to reflect that the sources and dynamics of Algerian state institutions and citizen-subjectivity were more continual or cumulative than Poland’s. In contrast to Poland, whose procrustean communist governance had a delineated timeframe, 1948-1989, Algeria’s state apparatus is difficult to temporize; thus, the account requires a relatively fluid periodization. This assertion refers to an ongoing debate about the extent of Algerian “stateness,” itself reflecting disputes in specialized reviews about the social composition of Algeria’s polity. Two leading scholars of Algerian political history, for instance, disagree on Algerian state’s consolidation and coherence. On the one hand, Ruedy dates Algerian stateness to the beginning of French colonization:
While the Regency of Algiers of 1830 was theoretically a dependency of the Ottoman sultanate, the state that had come into being possessed all the classical attributes of sovereign independence: a defined territory, a human community, organized political authority, effective independence, and recognition by other states.9

Ruedy is proposing that under Ottoman rule, which ruled the coastal cities in a highly mediated imperial over-stretch, Algerians essentially had developed an incipient state organization. But Roberts restricts Algerian state-formation to post-French post-colonialism, insisting, “the state established by the FLN is the first ever Algerian state. The state tradition in Algeria is a tradition of alien (Turkish, French) states imposed upon the Algerian population; the indigenous tradition is one of eternal resistance to such states by a fragmented population of self-governing tribes.”10 Representing broader controversies, Ruedy and Roberts adopt Weberian criteria of sovereignty but disagree on the timing of Algerian stateness. A broad consensus on Algeria’s eventual state institutions, however, depicts its ruling class as high in despotic power, low in infrastructural power, and minimal in state-society dialectics, in Mann’s terms (§2.b).

While military and party elites have retained incumbency and subjugated domestic enemies, that is, the state is not viewed as a historically effective organization: one that has the consistent capacity to adopt and implement binding policies; tax its population; delineate and control its borders; establish a legible juridical order, regulate its markets, or secure popular support. Reason usually given for Algeria’s weak infrastructural state have several variations identifying different forms of capture or constraint of state offices and resources. That broad argument – often applied to the MENA countries generally – is that the centralized apparatus of the state cannot overcome primary social identities or sectoral interests, that is, remains the enemy or instrument of sub-populations, a pattern converted from tribe or clan or ‘ulema into elusive, anastomotic entrepreneurial networks. The groups that resist or appropriate Algeria’s
state efficaciously and enduringly vary from ethnic, religious, or “tribal” to bourgeois, military, and bureaucratic. In this light, Roberts’s statement about “eternal resistance” by a “fragmented population” to the state draws us back beyond 1962 to formative periods of self-collectivization among indigenous Algerians under Ottomans and French imperial rule. The overarching story, one might say, is of increasing social organization without centralization; from urban centers to rural areas and mountain villages, the Algerian dialectic has been less between state and citizen and more among citizens against the state. It remains to be seen whether this bifurcation plays an explanatory role in Algerian Islamist militancy, even if a parallel alienation marked Poland.

As I mentioned above (§3.b.1), zawiyaa and turuq social networks – self-conscious mini-states of Muslim lineages organized as “brotherhoods” – asserted independence from coastal centralizers, resisting foreign domination violently while nonetheless responding to external pressures by gradually forming the rudiments of central statehood (1783-1871). This period of political collectivization and religious polarization yielded to imperial pacification, cooptation, bargaining, repression, intensification, and de-collectivization (1871-1914). Colonial destruction of autochthonous moral economies and religious autonomy fragmented Algerian distributive systems and capitalized or commodified local property and production. In the early twentieth century French rule intensified Islamist and nationalist identification while re-territorializing Algerian life: mass urbanization, impoverishment, emigration, and deracination re-arranged the fabric of Algerian social life – in ways replicated by the war of independence and post-1962 independent state. As a result, nationalists, Islamists, and Francophones organized to confront programs for acceptable subordination or uprising (1920-1939). Immediately after WWII the latter proved inevitable and erupted into anti-imperial revolution (1945-196211), punctuated by
periods of superficial calm. The war re-collectivized the divided Algerian polity within micro-regimes, repressing deep differences in a unified cause. French forces decimated, imprisoned, and tortured Algerians who turned to terrorism and warfare eventually to expel French colons.

The independent state initially sought to retain the coalition established in the war: “Islamic-Socialism” favorable to women, Berbers, Islamists, peasants, industrial workers, technocrats, state-capitalists, bureaucrats, and the military (1962-). Within a few years, the military-FLN state had classified, distributed, and begun integrating citizen claimants into the centralizing bureaucracy by their social, economic, and religious identities.

During this period the Algerian state’s standardization proceeded through various forms of collectivization, especially nationalized industries and communalization of rural production. The state “Arabized” schools to placate Islamists excluded from Francophone higher education, with implications for employment not least within the state apparatus. The FLN attempted to consolidate an agreed Berber-Arab party, and even to “feminize” the government by increasing gender equality in official positions. From the beginning, inclusionary maneuvers proceeded via vertical bargaining, interest-group appeals, negotiated concessions, reciprocal benefits, issue-specific resolutions, and informal channels of side-payment distribution. This mode of interest representation, grievance articulation, and claim-making, encouraged Algerian non-state agents to organize according to its logic, creating competitive bids for state policies, straining intra-elite cohesion. Two examples already mentioned – the state’s selective bargains with Islamists and women – were rehearsed with Islamists and urban elite French-speakers. The incentive put in place by the very effort to create a governing coalition responsive to all, in the absence of an
organizing political or economic principle outside the state, fostered divided, incompatible subgroups as the state’s constituency, albeit succeeding in preventing supra-state class-formation.

As I have detailed (§3.b.1, §3.c.2), Algeria based its development agenda on oil-revenue distribution and loan-subtended capital-intensive import-substituting industrialization. Within a generation of military, single-party hegemony, the toxic assets of mineral-export-reliant growth collapsed with the oil-price plunge of the mid-1980s. State cutbacks, unemployment, increasing class disparities, and manifest corruption led to riots in October 1988. After the state repressed the protests, killing hundreds of non-violent protesters, the government suddenly announced reforms featuring unprecedented multiparty elections following a presidential referendum. During this reform period, “Algeria underwent a radical political transformation. From late 1988 until early 1992, the country exhibited the most authentic and robust form of democracy ever experienced in the Arab world. Indeed, that democratic ‘moment’ exposed a populist bent towards pluralism within Algerian civil society.”

Fervent electioneering proceeded, and despite the regime’s panicked arrest of the upper echelons of the FIS, the opposition remained procedural, non-violent, and assured with each local electoral victory of eventual, peaceful defeat of the regime. When Islamists won national elections in December 1991, the military annulled the results, declaring martial law, banning the Islamist party, and arresting thousands of Algerian regime opponents. In the ensuing state-Islamist war (1992-1999) the suffocation and domestication of FIS inspired the Armed Islamic Group to take to the hills and towns and wage a military campaign against the state and its supporters. The chaotic slaughter that followed (1994-1999) the canceled elections and martial law were another battle in the historical Algerian resistance to centralized state formation.
But the war of the 1990s marked a departure. The previous Algerian cycle of militant resistance, quietist detachment, and civic mobilization exhibited a sort of accordion-style triple movement in and out of convergence and divergence, but unified in each stage by a purpose. In anti-state revolts (1830-1871, 1945-1962, 1992-1999) protean Algerian groups subordinated their internal and mutual differences to collective struggle. After defeats, Algerians gradually reasserted their displaced demands, needs, and desires in the public sphere – in strategic compromise (1871-1914, 1962-1979, 1989-1992) or civil agitation (1920-1954, 1979-1992). These waves express a long-standing Algerian diversity-in-unity in which a consensus among different localities and identities pressed against state centralizers for social autonomy – for distinct ethnicities, moral economies, political geographies, and the like. But one can also find in this categorical repetition a crucial change. From the Algerian struggles against the French to their the war against the Algerian state, there are signs that the suffocation had consistently intensified as this fight grew more internal, compressed, socially suicidal.13 The symptom of this progression is the unsupported savagery of state and Islamists on Algerians themselves.

§5.b Historical narrative

In 1519 Kheir ad-Din, ruler of Algiers, invited the Ottomans to defend his Andalusian population from Spanish Hapsburg attacks begun in 1509. The Ottomans gained political sovereignty over Algiers in exchange for military protection. After the mid-century shoreline battles of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Cyprus, and the Ottoman defeat at Lepanto (1571) and victory at Tunis (1574), the Habsburg-Ottoman peace treaty of 1580 ended the Mediterranean wars and established a stable “Christian-Muslim” corridor.14 This settlement permitted the
consolidation of Ottoman social, political, and military order in Algiers. *Pashas* sent by Istanbul reigned, but by 1659 Ottoman military forces (or *ujaq*) ruled. The Janissaries, renowned for their Anatolian solidarity and military prowess, formed the core of the *ujaq* in Algiers, while the *ta’ifa* band of seamen defended and financed the operation. Two enduring patterns emerged. First, an ethnic social stratification created a spectrum from the minority Janissary corps to the majority indigenous peoples inland.\(^{15}\) Ottoman Algeria thus ramified into two populations. “The *usaha* constituted a foreign ruling group, exercising authority upon the fellow Muslim Algerian community without wishing to become integrated in [the] predominantly tribal character of the indigenous Algerian society.”\(^{16}\) But this “authority” initially conferred greater disparity in status than power, as the inland agricultural producers and indigenous Islamic orders retained considerable autonomy from central rule. The second pattern, apposite to this social division, was the exacerbated isolation of the urban political-military elites given the need for external sources of income. “Because Algerian agricultural surplus was smaller, less accessible geographically, and tapped by many levels of intermediate extraction, the primary sources of funds to pay the Janissaries and run the government were overseas trade, especially corsair operations.”\(^{17}\) The effort to turn the aggressive North African and North American trade disputes into an anti-western *jihad* that Europeans mistook for mere piracy is forced.\(^{18}\) Indeed, from “the seventeenth century, as central authority weakened, real power in the capitals of distant provinces, such as Algeria, Egypt, or Baghdad, passed [to] a new ruling class in the provinces” signaling *intra*-Islamic division.\(^{19}\)

As the center of Ottoman life slowly weakened, metropolitan-rural conflicts intensified, as state intermediaries institutionalized a system of ethnic discrimination and oppressive
taxation. Finally, in 1783, Algerian Sufi brotherhoods launched a series of uprisings against the Ottomans for whom Algeria was a key strategic outpost against imperial Hapsburg. The moral and economic basis of the uprisings was “popular religious” communities: mystical, syncretic, and charismatic Sufi Islamic orders or zawiya-centered collectivities. These forms of resistance among the Tijaniyya, Qadariyya, and other turuq established deepened a tradition of Muslim-founded resistance to external or centralizing rule. But the “Islamic” nature of this resistance must be understood in its full social implications; Islam formed for these associations an entire life, but that life could never be reduced to Islam. “Islam” meant the life of the community; an ethically grounded economy, education, politics, and bookkeeping must, by definition, respond to multiple non-religious demands.

Muslim resistance continued from Ottoman to French suzerainty but the latter were had greater military force and determination to eliminate intermediate social powers. “The French remained remarkably loyal to the early humanist idea that one is entitled to conquer and rule the less civilized with the intention of civilizing them,” a notion spanning Christianization of the godless natives and reorganization of indigenous trade route territories for settled agricultural cultivation. Some “influential Parisians” were also lured by exoticized expansion; in France “hashish’s public profile was inexorably raised as the colonization of Algeria developed.” By extension ferocious resistance inspired the justificatory modernist doctrine of occupatio bellica “as a legal institution [that] can be seen as part of the wider effort to re-found and restore the concrete spatial order of the jus publicum Europeum, in response to the twin perils of revolutionary war and wars of liberation.” Expecting victory over the “capital” to bring broad native submission, the French found “their first ventures into the interior and the uplands
brought swift retaliation...In North Africa, as in most areas where nearly all were Muslim, the people were ready for a dogged fight.” French imperial repression of Islamist uprisings, most notoriously of ‘Abd el-Qader, was harsh and deliberate. The Marquis de la Gervaisais, hardly alone in his awareness, predicted, “The development of agricultural colonization will produce a fatal and detestable necessity: the expulsion and extermination of the natives.” Alexis de Tocqueville similarly and darkly prognosticated,

If...we were to demonstrate by our behavior...that in our eyes the old inhabitants of Algeria are just an obstacle to be pushed aside or trampled underfoot, if we surround their populations, not to lift them in our arms toward well-being and enlightenment but to destroy and smother them, the two races would confront a life or death situation. Sooner or later, Algeria would become a closed field, a walled arena, where the two peoples would have to fight without mercy and one of the two would have to die.”

This was prescient. The logic of extermination that played out in the French-Algerian war of the 1950s and the FLN-HCE/FIS-GIA war of the 1990s first surfaced in the earliest phase of France’s colonial consolidation or “liberal imperialism.”

Clemens Lamping’s 1848 travelogue typified the racism among French travelers and generals. Only fifty years after the Terror, she wrote, “The most contradictory qualities are often united in the Arab nature – harshness and benevolence, cruelty and generosity, rapacity and munificence: we should beware how we condemn them without further knowledge of their character, and we must on no account measure them by our Christian and European standard.”

Yet the French were wary of Islam’s power. In 1841, the French obtained a fatwa – supported by the rivals of the Fez leadership and ‘Abd el-Qader, the Tijaniyya Sufi order – from the ‘ulema of Qairawan, Tunisia. The Tunisian ‘ulema declared that, “having resisted as much as could be expected, the Muslim tribes of Algeria were to submit to the French without becoming infidels
so long as the French did not interfere with their practice of Islam or violate the honor of their women.” This modus vivendi would be strategic, after the staged defeat (1847, 1871, 1882) of military resistance. By 1852, the French had seized 864.5 thousand acres via “sequestration, expropriation, and a form of districting (cantonnement) designed to drive out the native population into designated areas away from the coast,” swelling the European farming community from 100,000 in 1864 to 200,000 by 1900. These “designated areas,” progenitors to the internment camps, biopolitically enforced population shifts within a transformed mode of productive exploitation. This mass resettlement of Muslim Algerians under imperial-capitalist expropriation also has the political effect of weakening the opposition. Two great uprisings constituted the death throes of violent anti-colonialism until 1954. “The great Algerian rising of 1871, precipitated both by the withdrawal of French troops during the Franco-Prussian War and the mass resettlement of Alsatians and Lorrainers in Algeria after it, is an analogous phenomenon [to the Indian Rising of 1857-8]...a mass colonial rebellion of past against present.” The 1881 uprising marked the conquest of Algeria by the French.

But “the cosmopolitan life of Algiers” bustled by 1880 with Italian and Spanish traders, Jewish traders, uprooted peasants, and the French army “everywhere in evidence.” No multicultural paradise, Algiers was a site of rapine, opportunism, and exploitation; a “splendidly barbarous parade,” Algiers was “schizophrenic” with cultural division, anarchic with poverty, homelessness, violence, crime, and lost orphans. Algeria was a holding pen for criminals. The “first fugueur” or “mad traveler,” Albert Dadas, was “sentenced to three years hard labor in Algeria” for desertion in 1882, having meandered unseen in the Algerian “province” for years. Algeria’s cities were repository for Algerian peasants but also Europe’s dispossessed.
Although Algerians never capitulated, they never troubled the French order, which grew only more entrenched and efficient in its sovereignty. “Although French colonial occupation of the country provided the most potent stimulus for the formation of rural resistance movements, social and economic conditions inherited from the pre-French period impose[d] considerable limits on these movements.”³⁹ Surely by the 1870s capitalist growth and its institutional and legal and proprietary institutionalization were doing as much conquering as the French military forces. By then the marabout were cooperating with French, turning from military territorialization to modernization – a reterritorialization of self from collective external conflict to semi-individuated internal struggle [jihad]. An exemplary instance of Muslim adaptation was the reformist progressivism of the shaykh of the al-Hamil zawiyya and leader of the Rahmaniyya Sufi tariqa, Muhammad ibn Abi al-Qasim.⁴⁰ The political-economic structure of Algeria under Ottoman and threatened by French rule comprised decentralized Sufi brotherhoods (turuq) astride highly organized and reliable religious and moral-economic institutions. Often led by a charismatic “saint” or ‘alim (a learned theological scholar), the tariqa maintained schools, libraries, cultural records, and the “reciprocity, redistribution, symmetry, and centricity” of a socially “embedded” economy – material production and circulation “submerged in...social relations.”⁴¹

Simultaneously, from “1871-1919, French colonial administrators extended their political authority over religious institutions...by creating and appointing an official Muslim clergy – [note] that an organized clergy had never existed before in Algeria – and then the authorities determined that only they had the authority to pay this group of clergymen.”⁴² As a result, many Muslims took refuge in traditional Sufi turuq, which grew in this period.⁴³ This
plasticity and adaptation of Islamic identity merit comment; Algeria’s Islamists maneuvers challenges the High-Low cultural dichotomy often said to fragment Muslims along rural and urban, charismatic and literate/legalistic lines. In post-war retrenchment, a consolidated apparatus of political and economic imperial domination, then, generated a strategic self-modification among Islamists and other groups. After wartime rigidification of identity, this politics of artful dissimulation and hegemonic accommodation prepares the ground for the later irruption of ideas, emotions, and actions among Algerians to re-assert their multiplicity and establish their public.

The French were conflicted in the seizure of imperial lands for Enlightenment objectives. French Representative Baron Camille de la Roncière Le Noury opened the 2nd International Congress of Geographical Sciences (1875) by declaring, “Gentlemen, Providence has dictated to us the obligation of knowing the earth and making the conquest of it. This supreme command is one of the imperious duties inscribed on our intelligence and on our activities.” Such triumphalism had odd lines of exception, such as a considerable readership of anarchist publications among the colons. French administrators were less ambivalent. In 1881 the code de l’indigènat mandated the corvée, permitting the colons to conscript Algerians for civil projects such as infrastructure; the “combination of systematic dispossession of their land by legal machinations, higher taxation, and involuntary recruitment into forced labor reduced the Algerian people, who had been primarily agriculturalists and pastoralists, from being owners of their own communally owned farms into sharecropping.” A distinction was institutionalized between two types of land acquisition in one publicly funded system. Large land units were awarded as free concessions with longer sale schedules and prohibitions against rentals to
indigenous Algerians. Smaller plots were sold with a quarter-value down installment plan. The large French units, with massively subsidized inputs, reached higher economies of scale than the Algerian – respectively, 7.24 quintals/hec-tare hard wheat and 6.58 soft versus 5.2 and 5.07.\textsuperscript{48} The imperial territorialization of Algeria has to be imagined physically as the spread of vast, highly efficient, machine-like farming areas pushing indigenous peoples off small plots and increasingly into smaller, usually urban or poor sub-urban dwellings.

Note that France, well into the colonization project, was itself still a developing country by the usual criteria of \textit{étatiste} centralization, institutionalization, and standardization.\textsuperscript{49} The extension of French development techniques, strategies, and ideologies from home to the Algerian territory and population may account for its seeming naturalization among the \textit{colons}. Indeed, the French pacification of Algeria and subsequent assault on its cultural autonomy directly re-applied the Republic’s tactics in battling the \textit{Vendée}. French military theorist and leader Thomas-Robert Bugeaud in the 1830s found “his Algerian assignments provided an opportunity to revive the principles of mobility, morale, and leadership, which he considered as applicable to western France as to either Spain or North Africa.”\textsuperscript{50} Similarly, cooptation and secularization of Muslims and Islamic institutions replayed French policies in \textit{Vendée} – following the coercive and repressive techniques it innovated there and refined in Egypt.\textsuperscript{51} Those policies, which “made the Church a state agency, and the priests elected civil servants,” included “abolition of the tithe, curtailment of other fiscal privileges, the abolition of religious orders, the confiscation of church lands,” “reorganization of the territorial divisions of the French church to correspond to new civil divisions,” “fixed clerical salaries paid by the government.”\textsuperscript{52} Internal and external pacification and homogenization were similar and coterminous projects of
French imperialism, in this light. That unified whole was the means to ramifying the French and Algerian fates into developed/underdeveloped but my concern here is to note the crude state machineries in play in this period, relative to the Fourth Republic in the 1950s and the Algerian regime in the 1990s.

By the turn of the century, paired dilemmas common in empires plagued French control and Algerian defiance. On the one hand, “the scarcity of whites made it essential to use natives on a large scale to administer and overawe them on behalf of their rulers, and these had in any case to administer through the already existing local institutions, at least at the local level. In other words, they faced the dual problem of creating a body of assimilated natives to take the place of white men and of bending the traditional institutions of the countries, often far from suitable to their purposes...The indigenous peoples confronted the challenge of westernization as something much more complex than mere resistance...In French Algeria, resistance was centered in the Moslem clergy (oulema) who were already organizing, while the secular évolutés tried to become Frenchmen of the republican left.” The logic of imperialism reversed the centralization scheme eliminating middle or native social power, just as colonial hegemony came under ideological challenge. By WWI “the parallel between localized discontent and global crisis was not coincidental...The colonized observed an international system that could not maintain the peace, a war that in pitting Europeans against each other destroyed the myth of white racial solidarity, and a capitalist system that could not prevent precipitous worldwide declines in employment and production. In justifying colonialism, Europeans argued that they dominated the world because they were morally intellectually, and culturally as well as materially and technologically more advanced than others...The more their performance
contradicted their claims, the less credible and the more hypocritical and narrowly self-serving appeals to civilizational superiority became.\(^{55}\)

Revulsion at WWI’s irrationality further discredited French prestige among Algerians. France recruited 300,000 Algerian Muslims to military and factory work with the “understanding – encouraged by Prime Minister Georges Clemenceu’s comments in 1914, 1917, and again in 1919 – that the Muslim majority would participate more actively in Algerian and French electoral politics after the war,” when France would stop conditioning Algerian enfranchisement on religious abjuration.\(^{56}\) “Clemenceau strongly implied that French citizenship would soon be granted without altering the Muslims’ personal status,” but France’s 1919 reform predicated Algerian naturalization on Muslim tergiversation.\(^{57}\) Blum’s ascendance did not augur well. His “first act, as a chef de cabinet in the 1914 Union Sacrée government, was to betray the Socialists’ solemn pre-war promise not to participate in the mutual slaughter of the Great War. In 1925, at the height of the Rif colonial war, he informed the Assembly that there was ‘not only a right, but a duty for what are known as the superior races to draw towards themselves the races which have not attained the same degree of culture and civilization.’”\(^{58}\) By the end of WWI the colons and French were disparaging indigenous Algerians as bicots and ratons (rats).\(^{59}\)

Beginning in the 1920s French and Algerians burst into creative political activity. French and pieds noir politics ranged from communist to fascist, the former debating but rejecting Algerian independence.\(^{60}\) Algerian Muslim civil society also relaxed its strictures, opening a rich discourse about independence, economics, nationalism, religiosity, secularism – again, a civil agitation intensifying expression, display, invention, and reclamation of identities relevant to
indigenous public life. Sheikh Abd al-Hamid ibn Badis, or Ben Badis, the central figure of the ‘ulema who accepted the salafi message, led the Islamist reformists who – following Muhammad Abduh and his follower Rashid Rida – condemned “adulteration of their values by Western thought,” “focused on the ills from which their society suffered, and proceeded to elaborate ways to remedy them within the framework of Islam.” Ben Badis mobilized “to promote a reformed, scripturalist and puritan Islam and the revival of Arabic language and culture,” a goal that after a decade of activity culminated in the Association des Ouléma d’Algérie (1931). The principal rivals of these ‘ulema were Ferhat Abbas’s Jeune Algérien movement which favored equal rights under realized French values (egalité) and sovereignty; murabit; the communists (PF); and Messali Hadj’s militant nationalist Etoile Nord-Africaine (ENA). Aggressive attacks on the ENA – founded 1926, dissolved twice (1929, 1937), and reconstituted as he Parti du Peuple Algérien (1937) – foreshadowed France-Algerian hostilities suspended by WWII. These groups were articulate, organized, partisan, and cosmopolitan. The AOA, for example, founded several periodicals [al-muntaqid (critic), 1925; al-shihab (shooting star), 1926; and La Défense, 1934] and the Tijanniya proselytizer Muhammad bin Abd al-Malik al-Alami influenced – in typically anti-parochial Algerian fashion – the Palestinian Islamist nationalist and populist ‘Izz al-Din al Qassam, agitator against Zionist settlement, British complicity, and Palestinian elitism. On the eve of the resumption of world war, then, Algerian political life had thrown off its static conformity for a fragmental, agitated civics.

Blum’s first act, as a chef de cabinet in the 1914 Union Sacrée government, was to betray the Socialists’ pre-war promise not to participate in the mutual slaughter of the Great War. Camus’s summary statements on Algeria were less novel than their supporting rhetoric;
he harnesses his sympathy for “its poorest men” to depict Algeria as a society divided into still youthful children. During the War, French Minister of Colonies Pleven intoned, “The loyalty of these native peoples means for us great responsibilities…A new phase in our colonial life must begin. It is a matter...of pursuing the conquest of hearts.” This was partly a reply to organized Algerian resistance. Following the discrediting fall of France in 1940, the liberation of Algeria in 1942, and unification of Algerian anti-imperialist activists, “the growing militancy of Algerian nationalism was expressed in the formation of the Amis du Manifeste de la Liberté on 14 March 1944 in the town of Sétif.” The “conquest of hearts” was already a chimera at war’s end with the riots and massacres at Sétif, Guelma, and Kherrata on 8 May 1945. Starting 1 May 1945 Ferhat Abbas’s coalition of Amis du Manifeste de la Liberté and the banned PPA had protested for independence. The French violently threatened Algerian demonstrators who then viciously attacked Europeans, unleashing monstrous French repression. “8 May means two different things. In France, it means the jubilation of the Liberation. In Algeria, it means the horror of repression...That was the day the Algerian war began.” Between fifteen and forty-five thousand natives were massacred. “[W]hile the Nurenberg Tribunal was still fresh in people’s minds, the French colonial administration in Algeria had [killed] 45,000 Algerians at Sétif to set ‘an example.’ In other words, the Nuremberg judgments could not apply to the peoples of the Third World. For they were not really human beings.” As Hélène Cixous, born in Oran to Ashkenazi German refugees, recalled poetically:

We always lived in the episodes of a brutal Algeria, thrown from birth into one of the camps crudely fashioned by the demon of Coloniality. One said: ‘the Arabs’; ‘the French.’ And one was forcibly played in the play, with a false identity. Caricature-camps. The masks hold forth with the archetypal discourses that accompany the determined oppositions like battle drums.
Postwar French imperialism remained tenacious not only for materialist, nationalist, and racist reasons but also because “the humiliating defeat of 1940 and the subsequent use of North Africa as a retreat and reinvasion point made French physical presence there emotionally and militarily vital to many Frenchmen.”

Epitomized by a century of educational reforms that testified to French efforts to integrate Algerians into elite administration, further qualifications to French racism emerged from novel post-war citizenship policies. In 1947 the National Assembly passed the “Statute on Algeria” which defined the country as “a group of departments endowed with a civic personality, financial autonomy, and a special organization” – an Algerian Assembly with two colleges, one Muslim and one mixed. “Muslims were finally considered full French citizens with the right to keep their personal Qur’anic status and were granted the right to work in France without further formalities. Military territories in the south would be abolished and Arabic would become the language of instruction at all levels.”

Indeed, until 1962 Algerian immigrants automatically received citizenship on jus soli nationality criteria regarding Algeria France and Algerians French. But such measures expressed refusal, not recognition, of Algerian independence, a stubbornness perhaps linked to colonial “mediocrity – a kind of etiolation, if one can call it that, produced by administrative consanguinity.”

Arendt, bearing witness, remarked: “The French incorporated Algeria as a province of the mother country, but could not bring themselves to impose their own laws upon Arab people. They continued rather to respect Islamic law and granted their citizens ‘personal status,’ producing the nonsensical hybrid of a nominally French territory, legally as much a part of France as the Département de la Seine, whose inhabitants are not French citizens.”
Arab nationalism emerged in the 1950s, an international re-coding of the particular Arab peoples into an ambiguously *ummatic* universal nation.\textsuperscript{81} Nasser’s 1952 revolution traumatized the “west.” On 20 August 1953 Moroccan Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef was deposed and exiled by the French, spurring a “steady wave of urban terrorism and guerrilla attacks aimed at French settlers. The same violent unrest was spreading to Tunisia, the oldest French protectorate in North Africa...By the end of 1955 the French...were ready to grant broad autonomy evolving rapidly into full independence to Morocco and Tunisia in March 1956, while vowing to hold firm on Algeria.”\textsuperscript{82} Similar, disruptive state-building and economic modernization efforts in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine spurred episodic popular uprisings, but in “countries that had fallen under foreign rule, such as Algeria and India, Muslims’ reactions were more militant and more sustained.”\textsuperscript{83} Algerian grievances by 1954 were beyond colonial redress. Recall that French imperialism had achieved comprehensive alienation of land from indigenous peoples (1830-1880); commercialization, capitalization, and exportation of agriculture (1880-1939)\textsuperscript{84}; infrastructural, extractive, and industrial development fostering widespread poverty, dependence, and a “small Algerian working class concentrated in mining and services” (1900-1954).\textsuperscript{85} As Germaine Tillion lamented, “[T]hough [the Algerians] have always loyally stood by us in our hours of peril, they have almost always – or at least more often than not – been excluded from our successes and good fortunes, and that is certainly the principal cause of the present tragedy.”\textsuperscript{86} Of the 1.2 million non muslims and eight million Muslims, she recorded, there were 19,700 settlers of whom 7,432 own less than 25 acres: “The ‘real settlers’ number about 12,000, of whom 300 are rich and a dozen or so extremely rich: this handful of millionaires probably have more money among them than all the rest put
together.” The Algerians, in contrast, were bitterly impoverished and “it is here that the words which have engendered the rebellion assume their true significance, and it is only here that we can hear them: ‘Why should we keep on being your inferiors? Why can’t we belong to both the Arab world and to the West? Why must we earn lower salaries? Why is our condition necessarily one of contempt?...‘All I ask is to choose my own death.’”

Following Dien Bien Phu, on 1 Nov 1954 FLN’s attacks in the Aurès drew fervent demands to protect French *colons* in Algeria. On 12 Nov 1954, Minister of the Interior François Mitterrand declared to the Parliament, “I will not agree to negotiate with the enemies of the homeland. The only negotiation is war!” On that day, Pierre Mendès-France “stated that the government would never agree to any kind of compromise.” Algerian nationalists pushed “the Algeria question” onto 10th General Assembly UN agenda in 1955, prompting French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay to walk out. Despite the infamous 1954 start-date, the “savage war” did not start until the 20 August 1955 Philippeville massacre in which 123 *colons* were slaughtered, prompting a massive retaliation. French tenacity was rooted in domestic elite contestation within Fourth Republic politics – especially divisive parties’ emboldening extremist irredentists and weakening civilian leverage against the military. In Algeria “fighting was generalized throughout the country” among Algerian factions as well as between the latter and French occupation forces; it is true that “supporters of the FLN and Messali Hadj’s *Mouvement National Algérien* (MNA) fought each other throughout the war, leaving more than ten thousand dead and twenty-five thousand wounded in France and Algeria.” The revolution was indeed a coercive, brutal affair internally, in which France-Muslim polarization and intra-native-Algerian regimentation was strictly enforced. The revolutionary population repressed their
diversity for the sake of war,

holding their heterogeneity in abeyance. The Algerian uprising created a cohesive war apparatus to counter the integration of fragmented Algerian objects into the colonial state apparatus.

With implications for the durability of their ideological tradition, the French military encompassed a series of legal re-codings and physical re-territorializations.

[T]he Special Powers Law of March 16, 1956 permitted the prefect of Algiers to delegate to the military exceptional authority beyond ordinary police powers. These powers, as exercised in the circumstances prevailing in Algiers in early 1957, opened the door to the practice of torture...In Algiers the paratroopers arrested and detained for questioning hundreds of men and women suspected of nothing more than possessing useful information. The key provision in the Special Powers Law, and in some respects the key to much of the controversy over the Battle of Algiers, was the authority to intern suspects, the right of assignation à résidence [house arrest (S.R.)]. In effect, a prefecture official’s signature on an order of internment regularized arrests to which no judicial authority had given approval. Requests for orders of internment were to follow immediately on the arrests of suspected terrorists. And the paratroopers were supposed to hand over expeditiously for internment suspects for whom a case for detention had been made. But the Algerians who actually ended up in internment camps could consider themselves fortunate indeed. Those who aroused the army’s interest ran the greatest risk when they were in the hands of its specialists in interrogation. Many in the custody of the paratroops, subjected to endless interrogations, found their internment repeatedly delayed. Many never reached the internment camps at all, but disappeared.

In short, in the camps, torture was legally, morally, and strategically legitimized. Emergency conditions required suspension of law, mass arrests, torture, executions, disappearances, and camps for the sake of order. It matters that torture was not the worst the French considered and not to be isolated from broader colonial coercion. For instance, the French General Massu claimed the pieds noirs were preparing to subvert the police and military if they did not defeat the FLN, and launch an all-out attack by flooding with gas and burning the entire Casbah – with its 70,000 population – to a crisp. Still, atrocious prisoner conditions were perpetuated with impunity. One rebellious colon reported, “One of my friends serving in the army saw the
inmates of a relocation camp crouching to drink from a gutter into which cistern water had been emptied. Had they been animals they would have been led to a watering tough.”

He added, “One of our army units, whose name is on everyone’s lips yet no one dares denounce, subjects the rebels to torture by electrodes and immersion to obtain information.” In 1958 women were searched and tortured for the first time, an astounding violation of war norms.

It is worth pausing over French reaction to its actions in this period, particularly the lax and ambivalent manner in which it confronted its own atrocities. On one level, a surreal war of position was fought over the legal status of torture and combat malice. Throughout the war, uncertainty about law and sovereignty surrounding France-in-Algeria at this time; specifically whether France was fighting a “war” subject to international jurisdiction or a political uprising among its subject citizens. In addition, as late as 1959 France was disseminating pacific and harmonious images of progress and stability in Algeria. De Gaulle’s landmark 16 Sep 1959 speech broadening the spectrum of possible settlement arrangements – excluding French oil holdings – augured well for Arab-Algerian independence. Amidst the savagery of the war (Horne estimates one million Algerians killed), de Gaulle’s indecision or evasiveness in the face of a seemingly obvious impasse seems utterly bizarre. As one observer put it:

[S]o long as the colonial power was unwilling to allow the same institutional ground rules for power sharing in the colonies as were used at home, they could not retain legitimacy. As the events of the late 1950s revealed, for example, the Fourth French Republic could not square the circle and institute for Algeria a set of democratic reforms that it enjoyed at home without encountering one of these originally unacceptable outcomes: losing the colony in free elections, having an unacceptably large number of Algerian deputies sitting in the French parliament (the “integration” it claimed to stand for), and ceding rule in the colony to the Arab majority, or provoking a revolt by its white settlers and their sympathizers at home.
De Gaulle showed consternation over France’s intentions for Algérie française, wavering between a broader African expansion and a narrower Algerian accommodation.\textsuperscript{108} He seems to have vaguely conceived and orchestrated, if fleetingly, colonial stabilization or even hegemonic expansion via collaborative modernization.\textsuperscript{109} As this vacillation at the top showed movement toward concessions, France internalized the war.\textsuperscript{110} Unwittingly facilitating enemy recruitment,

\begin{quote}
[a]s the FLN campaign hit a peak in 1960, the Paris authorities launched a counter-offensive, adopting methods that had proven so successful in Algeria. A small group of ‘loyal’ harkis was created in the capital to track down FLN operatives...Within less than a year the harkis suffered twenty-four dead and sixty-seven wounded, but the results seemed to pay off...[F]rom spring 1960 to the end of the war nearly 1,200 terrorists were rounded up.\textsuperscript{111}
\end{quote}

In addition to the systematic counter-revolutionary reaction, French nationalists carried out symbolic assassinations on the eve of independence, precipitated by progress in the Evian talks. “The whole horror and absurdity of those years of violence and terror,” Bourdieu writes, “are somehow condensed in the savage execution of [Mould Feraoun] and his friends from the Centres Sociaux by a group of OAS killers, on March morning in 1962, only a few days before the ceasefire that was to lead to the end of the war.”\textsuperscript{112} As one thousand five hundred “terrorists” inhabited Fresnes prison we might conclude that internment camps were indigenized to French soil. Ultimately, the French counter-revolution “failed, partly because of the obstinate non-cooperation of indigenous French inhabitants, partly because the French people made it clear that they were unwilling to support another prolonged colonial war involving unsavory means, and partly because of the irreconcilable dilemma implied by their slogan, l’Algérie française.”\textsuperscript{113}

At independence, Algerians’ strategies for reconciling the diverse interests and identities were on display in negotiating at Evian.\textsuperscript{114} The FLN’s apparent wartime unity dissolved upon
victory. Three contestants for power: the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA); the wilaya commands (six generals of the military regions); external army, the National Liberation Army (ALN). “At issue were wartime misdemeanors, ideology, ethnic and clan ties, loyalties to specific individuals, and competing perspectives on the nature of post-independence Algerian society. At stake was the very center of political power in the society.” In May 1962, the Tripoli Program elected a political bureau of the FLN and drew up political-economic plans with had three major goals: modernizing agriculture, decolonizing the economy, and socialist-industrial economic development.

From 1962, Algerian party-military rule established a rigorously methodical clientelistic, top-down, discretionary regime committed to eliminating alternative sources of social power and integrating non-state actors into the centralizing state through what Lowi calls patrimonial distribution of oil-wealth. Citizen and state bargaining often resulted in paralyzing inertia, but the state repressed social conflict immediately and enduringly. It is significant that “complete civil war between loyal ALN forces and dissident wilaya leaders was averted partly because of mass demonstrations against the fighting organized by the [Union Général des Travailleurs], or UGTA.” As with the Islamists, such early demonstrations of potential state-threatening social power caused rulers concern and a long-term strategy of hierarchic governance committed to minimizing labor actions and integrating Islamist activists. In general terms the corresponding economic program, in part to assimilate potentially disruptive workers and Islamists, would be to pursue import-substituting capital-intensive industrialization, urban-biased infrastructure and distribution of side payments to popular classes, and legal outlays to constituent claimants on public valuation. The Algerian government imposed autarkic socialism, eventually revised
semi-officially as “state capitalism,” financed by mineral receipts and heavy commercial borrowing – their particular version of a broad trend in developmental state investment. There seems to be little doubt among otherwise contentious scholars about the commitment of Algeria’s ruling elites to “revolutionary” nationalist public policies, especially some form of equality, although the coercive means toward this end were evident early as was the construction of a political economy largely to fragment, isolate, and privatize the population into interest group-oriented identities responsive to individuated state and military leaders.

The objective of import-substituting production, accumulation, and re-distribution was, then, economic, social, statist, and nationalist: “to promote economic diversification by building new skills within the workforce, to capture for national purposes the value added in processing that had heretofore accrued to the advanced industrial nations, and to reduce the states’ dependency upon unstable world markets for primary produce.” 117 Algeria thus nationalized its industries, taking “majority ownership of its French-built industry in February 1971,” 118 and monopolizing its mineral deposits in state coffers for leverage with citizens. Beginning in 1966, SONATRACH established partnerships with nine oilfield service firms [under terms ensuring] that in the period during which the foreign firm realizes its profit – about 15 years – technology and know-how [were] localized. By first nationalizing the technical structure serving the oil industry, Algeria was able to acquire 100 percent ownership of the exploration and production companies by 1974 and achieve almost total control of operations. Dependence on foreign sources of exploration and production technology was reduced or eliminated. 119

Quandt has summarized the early years of Algerian state formation in this way:
In Algeria the problem of intra-elit conflict has dominated internal politics during the entire period from 1954-1968. There has been a constant turnover in top political leadership and political careers are made and unmade with great rapidity...Rather than developing into a ‘political class’ that jealously guards its prerogatives and power, the Algerian political elite has been composed of numerous clans, factions, and cliques, none of which has been powerful enough to dominate the entire political system.\textsuperscript{120}

This elite-level disunity produced two related class-political trends. The \textit{first} was to precocious-Keynesian settling of elite conflicts through side-payments to constituents, managed by military leaders and effectively replacing political with developmental collective action problems – that is, trading political for economic coherence (§3.b.1). Waldner’s account of the early stages of state-formation may need to be adjusted or modified, however, to grasp Algeria’s specificity.\textsuperscript{121}

On the one hand, if the Algerian state resolved or overcame rather than deflected intra-elit conflict, itself unclear, it did so by physical and political force more than by coalition-based popular-class incorporation. In the latter image, suiting the Syrian and Turkish experience, the side-payments to popular, horizontal, class-based constituencies afforded non-state agents collective power to frustrate subsequent state policies. In Algeria, the state provided public outlays on a class basis while parcellizing citizens through competitive access to officials. Thus, Algerians were politically incorporated or integrated into the centralized state not as a class-constituency but as individual or sectoral constituents – in short, creating a mirror-image state-society hierarchy of discrete patron-client relationships to preclude class-conscious actions.

Integration of Algerians through material distribution and identity bargaining formed its client-centralization regime. By the end of 1967, Lowi writes, a polity based on technocratic management, military fiefdoms, party-prerogatives, and economic distribution was established:
Developing the economy, building up infrastructure, and educating the population, at the same time as consolidating power and authority, became the major preoccupations of the leaders. By the end of 1967, after the attempted coup d'état led by Tahar Zbiri, Boumediene was firmly in control of the state apparatus. Moreover, all mechanisms that could function as conduits for popular pressure had been neutralized...The practice of silencing alternative voices – inaugurated by Ben Bella and reinforced by Boumediene – became an integral part of the system...With the neutralization of the party, the harnessing of nascent civil society organizations, and the muzzling of independent actors, Algerian society appeared to become increasingly depoliticized. External rents played an instrumental role in this process, egging on the already considerable patrimonial tendencies that characterized le système.122

Material distribution constituted clientelism through discretionary social welfare.123 Anderson points out that Algeria thus developed a “politicized bureaucracy,” where the demands of mass inclusion compelled the state to “inadvertently or purposely divert participatory impulses into the administration itself.”124 Algeria’s post-colonial state was built, then, through a distributive scheme whose rationale was the integration of citizens as separate interests and identities repressed or channeled into one-to-one material interactions with ruling elites. More specifically, the persistent political structure of the Algerian state combined technocratic, military, and capitalist oligarchic rule designed specifically along vertical lines that could be monitored, disciplined, and responded to readily. Roberts repays extensive quotation on this aspect of Algerian politics:

Fundamental to an understanding of the Algerian technocracy is the realization that the political sphere has been dominated by the military ever since 1962, and that the civilian politicians and especially the technocrats have accordingly been very junior partners in the successive provisional formulas for governing Algeria on which the men who command the army have periodically agreed among themselves. One cannot hope to appreciate the behavior and ideology of the technocracy unless the dependent political positions of its individual members, the extent to which their careers depend on the patronage of powerful military figures, but also the narrowness in their political outlook which results from this client status and subaltern political role, their frustration at their dependent and limited situation and their resentful will to power over the less educated but more unscrupulous, more cunning, and more political power-brokers and maneuverers who make, frustrate, and break them, are all taken into account.125
This account describes the combine social, economic, and political bases of Algerian
statism, in which multi-tiered, surveilled, managed, and striated concentric circles radiate out
from the core of technocratic-military state managers and investors through middle-figures and
then out to the lower levels. Laremont dates the system to an attempt to remove Boumediène
in 1967. “Soon after the failed coup, Boumediène, as part of his effort to improve...the
performance of the economy, began shifting his bases of political support from a coalition
comprising the army and the conservative and religiously oriented ulema to a new coalition
comprising the army and conservative yet not as religiously oriented technocrats.”
Algerian state-formation, then, became a paradigm instance of centralized, nationalized, technocratic
high-modernism constructed on a command-economic platform intended to assimilate citizens
as dependents loyal to the equation of public wealth with private welfare. In Roberts’s striking
prose, “The state is actually controlled by the men who control the guns...For the civilian figure
with political ambitions, the political primacy of the military leaves open the role of ‘alim as a
career option, and since the post-colonial Algerian state has been attempting to perform a vast
number of functions never even dreamed of by its pre-colonial predecessor, and many of these
functions presuppose for their performance a combination of specialized knowledge and the
authority which goes with this, a secularized version of the ‘alim’s role has become available as
a career option to thousands of Algerians.” Startlingly, he adds that “one is tempted to say that
the technocrats are the real ‘ulema of the contemporary Algerian state.”
From the first
decade, and well into the 1970s, Algerian ruling elites busied themselves creating a top-down
technocratic apparatus that sidelined the Islamist opposition in organizational or official terms
while gaining their provisional support with individual policy preferences (e.g., exemptions from
land reforms, Arabization of secondary schools). But overall this incorporation strategy was manifestly founded on successful state economic performance, strong global oil markets, and the ability to continue satisfying but institutionally marginalizing the Islamists. As Zartman implies, there was good reason for optimism in the mid 1970s, given the singular strength and pervasiveness of the army and abundance of state revenues. But he, too, noted at the time, “criteria for entry into the political class are changing from wartime experience to technical competence,” a change which that brings the mostly rural “mujahideen” military leaders into direct conflict with the new urban and skilled professional policymakers capable of managing the economy.  

“Governing over this sort of dichotomized political class requires mediating leaders or brokers,” Zartman adds, “who can combine skills and legitimacy to meet expectations.” What is more significant than the burgeoning bureaucracy and growing personnel mandated by all this positioning among contending elites is the fluidity of the patron-client system:

No single tie, experience, or origin is the key to the army's political action, and no constant hierarchy of ties can be established as a source of motivations. Moreover, no combination of past ties, experiences, and origins is sure to produce the same action, reaction, allegiance, or alliance in any two individuals. Any search for such simple motivations seems quite vain. By the same token, such restrictions are also applicable to the mujahideen-technician dichotomy.

The need for “technocratic” competence that eventually forged an intra-elite coalition between the army and educated professional managers, economists, lawyers, and the like seems to be the improvisational complexity of the mixed economy. First, Algeria’s economy has long been motored by oil-revenue extraction and “soft budget constraints” that created a “pre-industrial welfare state” through public outlays, fostering “a citizenry...financially dependent on the
state.” From 1969 forward Algeria’s rapid industrialization program – based on nationalized production, accumulation, distribution, and marketing of oil and natural gas – satisfied anti-imperialist demands for a defended sovereignty as well as elite-engineered coalition building. Presently and before the oil glut depressed prices, the paradoxes of dependent nationalism and socialist capitalism became hotly debated and local fiscal crisis proved the constraints of this development pattern. It is telling that at this time “demands of organized urban labor and attendant struggles over resources and rules generated economic policies explicitly designed to redistribute wealth.” Supported by public spending, non-agricultural employment rose from 330,000 to 2,555,000 between independence and 1984; but, repeating century-old patterns, “this impressive growth was inadequate to absorb all the new urban job seekers. Unemployment rates remained very high during the expansionary phase of import-substitution industrialization – 22% in 1977 and 18% in 1984 – and rose to 24% in 1990 when the state-led development was in serious crisis.” When oil prices plunged Algeria’s political and economic system depended entirely on revenues accrued from hydrocarbon exports, leaving citizens and the state alike exposed and vulnerable to even small shifts in global demand.

The second feature of Algeria’s domestic political economy, in addition to the insecure “petro-state” macro-structural distributive scheme and its putative socio-political implications (§3.c.2) was Algeria’s capitalist-socialist economic-productive amalgam. The mixture of private or hidden market speculation and large-scale, state-owned public firms in heavy manufactures was apparently intended to benefit military- and party-savvy capitalists while distributing state oil riches to popular classes. The structural effect of this combination of disaggregated private market activities and highly centralized conglomerates was to prevent bourgeois and worker
class formation. The perverse result of this outcome was a productive system that was wholly articulated, even as a political regime, by monetary and investment interactions, yet without a primary class constituency. With the partial exception of the UGTA, a proportionally small if vocal union in a capital-intensive authoritarian political economy, Algeria’s rulers grew wealthy while distributing stabilizing side-payments without organized “civil-societal” opposition.

During this first stage, c. 1962-1985, of Algeria’s post-colonial political economy we see the growth of intra-capitalist-statist tensions across business sectors, supervised by the state with decreasing efficacy and authority. At the top of the productive system lay the massive state-owned industries, but within a generation a growing small capitalist class was poised to credibly condemn state mismanagement of the public sector and advocate for deregulation and decentralization. This growing petty bourgeoisie, cultivated and facilitated by state agencies or offices, internally disputed the composition of the economy. Thus “commerce and light industry want[ed] to promote a consumer society to foster sales; it oppose[d] rapid development of state industry based on relatively low wages and a high level of investment.” The state subsidized or licensed private investment that “statistically account[ed] for a low rate of investment [but] produce[d] a high rate of profit,” creating “substantial wealth outside state control” as entrepreneurs angled to “decrease the state’s dense network of administrative regulation.” The state responded by adopting structural economic reforms in the early 1980s, even before being “compelled” to by diminishing oil coffers. In the Five-Year plan of 1980-1984, successor to President Boumediène Chadli Benjedid “aimed...at making state enterprises more efficient and productive. Very large state companies were broken into smaller ones that specialized...in producing specific outputs [on the hope] that restructuring would make state
enterprises more efficient and self-reliant [,less] unproductive and [reliant on] the state to bail them our of their deficits.”¹³⁷ This murky liberalization effort had an ambivalent relationship to capitalization or neoliberalism; state industries, union labor, and public social provisions faced retrenchment but the resulting free(r) trade was neither competitive nor transparent, but an extension of informal, protected entrepreneurial activity. Finally, the incremental privatization and deregulation of the public sector; growing commodification of labor, housing, education, and social services; and the intensifying financial fluidity and investment liquidity were hardly apolitical desiderata of impersonal economic forces. Rather, these developments constituted a disciplinary apparatus continually refining its mechanisms. Leca notes that “a distancing from the central economic positions of bourgeois society such as landowners, industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, and salaried industrial workers” turned Algeria’s weak class formation into a flexible means of social power: “Industrialization was set in motion by actors who saw in it above all a political goal and a political means to legitimize their power.”¹³⁸

Indeed, this political nature of the weakening command economy made it a crisis of rule by the early 1980s when growing foreign indebtedness and economic inefficiency forced the state to abandon ISI. Central planning, urban-labor biased planning twinned with nationalized agricultural cooperatives, and huge public sector enterprises phased out in favor of service and small industry, market decentralization, and an expanded private sector. But just as the state was diminishing its economic obligations, non-state actors were becoming impoverished. “As elsewhere in the world, economic liberalization led to greater inequalities of income, increasing unemployment and more obvious corruption, while cuts in subsidies and imports were a stimulus to inflation, currency depreciation and the growth of a black market.”¹³⁹ Still, as
d’Aigremont and J. Dean report, the appearance of corruption and expensive lifestyles seemed unhindered by spiraling domestic economic paralysis:

In the year 1986 alone, and despite a sharp drop in oil and natural gas revenues owing to depressed world prices, Algeria, nonetheless, succeeded in budgeting some 38.5 billion Dinars (approximately £5.33 billion) for purchases abroad. Capital goods and semi-finished products accounted for approximately 50 per cent of that amount.¹⁴⁰

For ordinary Algerians, rents were no longer available to cushion the costs of deregulation and structural adjustment in social suffering, and by early 1980s Algeria began disintegrating state-farms and, by 1986, oil-price declines spurred unprecedentedly “severe cuts in imports [and] new efforts to stimulate public-sector efficiency by such measures as abolishing the mininstry of planning, giving greater freedom to the managers of public enterprises and encouraging more competition among the state-owned banks.”¹⁴¹ All the while, and ostentatiously, “in the midst of [this] economic and managerial crisis, a few people succeeded in not only increasing their wealth but also displaying it in the form of late-model cars, new villa construction and new businesses.”¹⁴² By the mid-1980s, Algeria – once an agricultural economy – imported over half its food, a widely noted symptom of decline in the nation’s production portfolio.¹⁴³

In his political economy of Algerian rent-seeking Dillman laments the collapse of the state’s development program:

What happened to Algeria? How could a seemingly dynamic strategy of development produce severe economic decline and a host of political dilemmas? The key to answering this question lies in an analysis of the developmental contradictions arising from the relationship between a rentier-state – a state that derives a large proportion of its revenues from the sale of natural resources abroad rather than through taxation of its citizens – and a tributary private sector. The private sector that survived or thrived did so by maintaining access to state resources or escaping into the omnipresent parallel economy.¹⁴⁴
Parallel to this general implosion of rentier-state economy, with its increasingly infuriated and improverished citizens, was the rise of an essentially autonomous Islamist movement. Its strength had already been seen in the state’s concession, most notably in education policies, the gradual domestication of women, and favorable status under the botched land reform. The reversal of land redistribution perhaps best exemplifies the growing state-within-a-state social and political power of the Islamist movement. The state had pursued socialist labor in the countryside, also known as agricultural auto-gestion, which proved an unpopular, unproductive technical land reform and allocation scheme abandoned by the early 1970s, as introduced above (§3.b.1). This decision overlapped with government anxiety over the growing Islamist movement and futile efforts to coopt and centralize it. As Bennoune implies, rather than attract or incorporate Islamist constituents, land concessions merely granted them more autonomy, confidence, and resources:

The state decided to promote land reform, limiting the Algerian landlords’ property to twenty hectares. The rest would be bought by the state and distributed to peasants who were organized in cooperatives...[the rural Sheikh ‘abd al-Latif] Soltani issued a fatwa declaring land reform un-Islamic...[decreeing] that prayer performed on nationalized land would not be accepted by God. They [allied] with petty intellectuals and landlords who financed them.¹⁴⁶

In the end, party and government leaders withdrew from the countryside, relinquishing control of peasantry to traditional leaders, holy men, and rural power-holders.¹⁴⁷

Another example of the Algerian state’s failed efforts to draw motivated Islamists into a practical or informal coalition with the military-party regime occurred in gender and the social and political treatment of women. In 1962 the first Algerian constituent assembly had, of 196 delegates, ten women, “one of the highest proportions of women in a national assembly in the
world, higher than France or Sweden”; but the second National Assembly had two women and from 1965-1982 there were none.\textsuperscript{148} This narrowing of women’s equality from its height during the anti-imperial war and right after independence culminated in the Family Code, opposed by a large cross-section of Algerian women. By the mid-1980s the Algerian state was resorting to crass social compromises and transparent symbolic gestures, in other words, to compensate for declining governmental suzerainty.

For instance, the ruling classes continued trying to rally the population ideologically to “pan-Arab-nationalism.” Algeria, among others – Iraq, South Yemen, Libya, the PLO, and Syria – “vehemently objected to Sadat’s peace initiative with Israel, decrying [it] as a dire threat to the Arab nation [that would] fragment and weaken its ranks.”\textsuperscript{149} Algerian rulers, who self-identified as the vanguard of revolutionary Arab nationalism, enjoyed hosting great political events, such as the Iraq-Iran negotiations over the militant Kurdish Democratic Party (1975)\textsuperscript{150} and the PLO’s recognition of Israel (Nov 1988).\textsuperscript{151} As the domestic infrastructure, governing coalition, and “revolutionary legitimacy” frayed at home, Algerian rulers imagined themselves “capable of inspiring or supporting revolutions well beyond the frontiers of Arabism or Islam. It is no accident that the Non-Aligned Conference [was] held in Algiers in 1973, or that Houari Boumèdiene was then elected the movement’s president.”\textsuperscript{152} In short, it testifies to the detached if not delusional mindset of Algeria’s ruling class that it expected to sustain popular devotion through the trope of its “revolutionary” ideological pedigree and nationalist renown. The “legitimacy” of the FLN and the generals, much remarked in the literature on postcolonial Algerian governance, proved incapable of guaranteeing incumbency, much less widespread cross-class and religious support.
Indeed, by the 1980s Islamists but also Berbers, women, the poor, workers, students, and many others were beginning to demand and even protest for reforms. While the state had *mukhabarat* (intelligence) services, biopolitical surveillance, and an extant disciplinary market regime, these diverse, articulate, and proliferating social mobilizations could not be coopted or manipulated. Indeed, the onset of global neoliberal integration, economic retrenchment, global depression, and popular pro-democracy agitations, found Algerian ruling elites contemplating a state of exception to counter civil strife, recalling depredations of French rule. With the rise of militant, if sporadic Islamic opposition and Berber movements, the new President Benjedid “faced...his first popular uprising. This was quite different [from] what happened under Ben Bella and Boumediene. Then opposition had been about court politics within the system, usually taking the form of underground conspiracies by those disaffected not because they contested the form of the regime but because they had lost out in the struggle for power. Now, however, opposition took on a different hue. It was about mass protest and a challenge to the very nature of post-independence politics.”\(^{153}\) Parallel to this rise of public contestation, the Islamists were sprouting underground movements and multiple clandestine factions, divided enough in the early 1980s to give rulers anxious comfort, but looming as a potentially unified dissident movement with no fundamental fealty to the secular state and its formal deference or episodic policy concessions to Muslim values. In just one instance of the impending war, “From April 7 to 29, 1985, 135 members of an underground Islamic movement were tried; 70 were condemned to prison,” and this after “both Boumediene and Benjadjid ha[d] encouraged Islamic tendencies” with publicly funded mosque constructions, Friday replacing Sunday as the national holiday, agreement to ban alcohol in some cities, recognition of religious festivals, and Muslim
teachings endorsed in public schools and presented on state TV and radio.\textsuperscript{154} Despite, or because of, such concessions Islamist activists were emboldened through the very mechanisms that permitted them autonomous extra-systemic social resources to oppose state prerogative.

To summarize the argument thus far: The Algerian state created a citizenship regime of client-integration that operated through the deliberate fragmenting of all potential civil society achieved largely through the increasingly disciplinary commodification of public and private life. In the meantime, principally but not exclusively Islamist sources of resistance found themselves benefitting from the absence of any differentiated social resources and systemic subjectivity; in other words being forced by the coterminous impoverishment of state and citizen to develop private means of survival inaccessible to state encroachment that permitted great latitude in the definition of resistant identities and objectives. The Algerian state found itself hemmed into a situation where all the reforms with which it hoped to curry favor with potential opponents deepened the estrangement of state and citizen, unwittingly conveying to anti-state activists that they would have to deploy anti-state weapons to reclaim subjectivity, at least in reaching goals involving state agencies.\textsuperscript{155} The coeval rise of Islamism and collapse of the governmental regime encapsulates this trajectory in client-citizenship under Algerian oil-driven distributive politics. As Lowi, summarizes this dynamic:

\begin{quote}
The regime’s monopoly over distribution enhanced personal ties between the leadership and particular individuals. With this model to draw upon, Algerians were motivated to adopt social strategies that would bring them close to the regime, rather than form interest groups with like-minded cohorts. Proximity to leadership became the principal avenue to social promotion and access to resources; it was, in and of itself, a highly valued good. Thus, the system of redistribution reinforced clientelism, which in turn bolstered the already strong collegial networks and regional ties that had carried over from the colonial period.\textsuperscript{156}
\end{quote}
Perhaps the most pointed example of the inner workings of the client-citizenship regime is the alienation of non-state actors from one another, in sharp contrast to the constellation of Polish activists and citizens gathered under the Solidarity umbrella. In Algeria Islamists and workers were estranged with only intensifying hostility, despite coincident protest desires. In the 1970s and 1980s, members of the UGTA and Islamists, equally opposed to the authoritarian rule, corruption, and state coercion, failed to find common purpose. As Alexander has shown:

Launched politicized strike campaigns against authoritarian rule and rising social inequality. Because this surge in labor militancy coincided with the politicization of the Islamist movements, Islamist leaders might have seen the unions as important targets of opportunity. By taking up workers’ grievances; by developing interpretive frameworks that enabled workers to think about wages, prices, and inequality in Islamic terms; and by devising strategies to penetrate union structures, Islamist might have used the unions as vehicles for expanding their own organizations...What is striking is...how little effort they made to build support within the labor milieu and how late those efforts came...Algerian Islamists played no visible role in the strike waves that rocked the industrial sector in the mid-1970s and again in the late 1980s.157

Across the political spectrum, in fact, a nearly unanimous but not unified opposition formed, guided by enemy-of-my-enemy logic that impeded a coherent movement boosting an “address-to-all.” The Algerian opposition inadvertently embodied to the experienced citizenship regime, in which the state was nearing fiscal collapse, by organizing as competitive, sectional, vertical, issue-oriented claimaints rather than as a “class-action” mobilization. Somewhat paradoxically, Berbers, students, women, intellectuals, Islamists, workers, peasants, and others experiencing dispossession economically adhered even in opposition to the divisive citizenship regime, failing to converge on anything like the order of Solidarity in Poland.

Algerians ethically resented and bodily resisted this state “system of power, patronage and privilege that entrenched interests in the party, government and economy are unwilling to
sacrifice in the name of some larger good.”\textsuperscript{158} Finally with the sharp decline in oil prices, and thus the state’s capacity to finance the client-citizenship regime, Algerians demanded “to know, as one student bitterly stated...why more than half of them are jobless ‘while we earn billions per year from natural gas, and [the former head of the ruling party] lives like a king’.”\textsuperscript{159} Such sentiments and sporadic populist\textsuperscript{160} protest actions finally peaked in the October 1988 riots.\textsuperscript{161} These were spontaneous demonstrations that directly challenged the ruling class by taking to the streets. Established and organized throughout Algeria but roughly constituting a separate state within Algiers, Islamists, according to witnesses, guided and oriented the protests without demanding political direction. The discourse of the rioters stressed “corruption,” an umbrella concept for protesters graspable by diverse activists with money or networks to translate multi-group resentment into sustained collective agitation.

The Islamist movement, variegated but reciprocally supportive from its initial stirrings in Constantine in 1970\textsuperscript{162}, were ascending as savvy political strategists. In the midst of rioting and state of emergency in 1988, Volpi reports,

In the suburb of Belcourt the soldiers negotiated with Ali Belhadj, the local preacher leading a 10,000 strong mob, in order to avoid clashes between the security forces and the demonstrators. Belhadj’s intervention indicated that, at that stage, although Islamic leaders had used their organizational capacities and religious authority to transform an ill-focused food riot into a more explicitly political protest, they wanted only to attract the attention of the regime (to obtain political concessions), not to bring about its collapse. In fact, in his own Friday sermon, Belhadj had declared that he was ready “to meet the authorities and to discuss the situation with them.” He even suggested that he could “ask President Chadli to replace the state of emergency [with] Islamic Law.”\textsuperscript{163}

In 1989 Islamists mobilized dissent into an organized party, the \textit{Front islamique du salut} (FIS), or \textit{al-jabha al-islamiyya lil-inqadh}. FIS’s rapid response to the fortuitous 29 October 1989 Tipasa earthquake, in contrast to the state’s detached incompetence, solidified the Islamists’ aura and
creditibility. More systemically, the Benjedid regime – steadily liberalizing the economy since Boumèdienne’s death in 1979 – opened up the political system to what Islamists sneeringly called “partyism” (hizbiyya) while amending the 1976 Constitution to legalize competitive parties, free expression, and eventually elections. On 5 July 1989 the National Assembly established procedures for official registration from the Interior Ministry for political parties.

Algerian “civil society” blossomed with parties of all persuasions – though the Islamist opposition retained and nurtured its dominant position. “Algeria was a classic harmonic state,” Brumberg writes: “For nearly 30 years, its generals and ruling-party hacks had been absorbing all potential opposition into a quasi-socialist order that celebrated the alleged harmony of ‘the Algerian people’. Islamic leaders and institutions were drafted into this hegemonic project, thereby ironically ensuring, in the wake of liberalization, populist Islam would emerge as the counterhegemonic force [against] the corrupt rule of a minority that was more French than Arab, or more Berber than Muslim.” Meanwhile, 12 Sep 1989 the government ratified the International Covenants on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and Civil and Political rights (CCPR) as well as the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), although with telling caveats asserting autonomy from outside interference. Algerian ruling elites evinced a heightened concern for their jurisdiction over their citizens, notably “with respect to the organization and exercise of the right to organize.” This locution, too, is revealing: they wished to “organize the right to organize,” even adding a stipulation to Algeria’s 1972 ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination limiting external authorities to “receive and consider communication from individuals or groups within [Algeria’s] jurisdiction claiming to be victims.”
According to Moussaoui: “The relative calm that Algeria enjoyed in 1989 was merely a truce in the violence launched by the six days of riots in October. Le pouvoir...maintained the illusion of change in response to the violent protests through accelerated institutional reforms:

A law on political associations was signed, timidly recognizing multipartyism. The presidential elections held on 22 December 1989 were meant to re-elect Chadli for a five-year term and pass a referendum on a new constitution removing all references to socialism and the FLN. The 1989 constitution definitively consecrated political pluralism and the equal institutional [position of Islam]. This maneuver reaffirmed the state’s monopoly on religion while symbolically gesturing toward more and more dominant Islamist leadership.169

For Roberts, similarly, 1989 is the critical juncture in postcolonial Algerian history – not because of democratic-constitutional reforms, but because of the neoliberal and military restoration:

[T]he moment one accepts that the single most important locus of power in independent Algeria has been the army, the fact that its commanders were no longer members of the Party of the FLN from 1989 onwards can no longer be ignored as a side issue, let alone seen as positive in itself, for it meant that they could no longer be held to account in any political institution whatever. In 1989 they withdrew from the Central Committee of the FLN and in July 1990 they forced President Chadli to surrender the defense portfolio to the then Chief of Staff, Major General Nezzar; from that point on, they were a law unto themselves to a degree...without precedent since 1965.170

The stage was set in 1989 for both the imminent state of exception171, and for a clash between secular generals and salafi Muslims. In 1990, the Sécurité Militaire was reorganized into the Département de Renseignement et de Sécurité (DRS), “tightening the grip of power.” The clash was not directly between Islam and secularism, but between extreme expressions of ruling-class market-statism and populist-Islamism, both unencumbered and unconstrained by institutions. The FLN/FIS battle is poorly reflected by opposing secular to religious, democratic to authoritarian, or socialist to capitalist interests. The conflict instead concerned the radically opposed desires for the organization of public life, not a dispute historically endemic to Algeria
but constituted by the client-regime that precluded enduring processes of value-negotiation. It emerged initially with the relentless desire by ruling elites for unfettered access to crony-capitalist profiteering backed by military force.\textsuperscript{172}

The first election results stunned observers and Algerians alike, suggesting that Islamists had captured Algerians’ anti-state populism beyond any intrinsic desire for Islamist rule or \textit{sharia} law. On 12 June 1990 the FIS won local elections, garnering 54% compared to the FLN’s 28%, and independents 12%; FIS thus controlled 856 of 1,541 Popular Community Assemblies and won an absolute majority in 31 of 44 Popular Wilaya Assemblies.\textsuperscript{173} As Kapil elaborated on these figures at the time,

The scale of the FLN defeat and FIS victory cannot be overstated. The FIS won 54 percent of the popular vote nationally and took control of 854 (55%) of the 1,541 communal (municipal) assemblies. This is all the more impressive given that the FIS did not even run candidates in 276 communes. The FLN, which ran almost everywhere, came in a distant second place, with only 28% of the popular vote and 487 communes (32%)... The FIS also won 32 of the 48 wilaya (provincial) assemblies, with the FLN taking only 14. The FIS made a clean sweep of all the major cities, including Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Annaba. In Algiers, the FIS scored decisive victories in even the more well-to-do districts.\textsuperscript{174}

The success of the FIS over the FLN was unanticipated, indeed shocking, not least as Algeria is a largely secular society, in the monastic sense of dividing religious sacredness from secular or profane occupations to preserve the strengths of each. The FIS’s candidates and spokespeople were bold in their religious agendas, referring openly to modifications in dress codes, cuisine, and the like.\textsuperscript{175} Moreover, once victorious they fulfilled their promises. In Khadra’s words, early Islamist rule augured poorly for secular Algerians should Islamists rise to national power:

This was how they set about cleansing the environment; sympathizers’ posts were renewed, while the puppets of the tottering regime were hounded out \textit{manu militari}. Women were forced to wear the \textit{hijab}, and a beard was compulsory for men. From under his plane tree, Dactylo
watched the village turn into a fortress, the good-naturedness of old transformed into aggression, idleness giving birth to chaos.\textsuperscript{176}

The Islamists referred to the regime not only as \textit{le pouvoir} but \textit{at-Taghut}, an “impious” tyrant accused of idol-worship and praying to false gods.\textsuperscript{177} Islamists supported democratic participations even after clashes with the state over election procedures in summer 1991 led officials to postpone elections, arrest FIS leaders Madani and Benhadj, and declare emergency conditions. At the time, the so-called Gulf crisis had radicalized Islamists beyond their “leaders.”

The FIS leadership had initially opposed Iraq’s secular regime, expressing muted support for the Gulf state, but its base forced it to change course.\textsuperscript{178} Islamist strategists conformed to “popular feeling in Algeria over the Gulf crisis [that] obliged [senior] Islamists to modify their positions very considerably in order to stay in touch with their popular constituency.”\textsuperscript{179} In reversing its opposition to Iraq’s invasion, the FIS risked indispensable Saudi subsidies\textsuperscript{180} but demonstrated that the Islamists were grassroots-driven, a genuinely populist agitation with responsive elites – in radical contrast to common experiences with client-citizenship.\textsuperscript{181} More important, neither the arrests of its leaders nor the corruption, immiseration, parasitic capital-securitization, and military westernization of the state provoked Islamist violence \textit{as long as democracy promised a significant, continuous opposition to the state}. Intriguingly, at this point hope for the democratic process \textit{stalled} violent responses to the government’s repression. Soon after, Prime Minister Hamrouche resigned and was replaced by Sid Ahmed Ghozali who favored proceeding with the vote.\textsuperscript{182} On 30 July 1991, President Ghozali called 3-day meeting with 45 political parties to diffuse political tensions. This was a significant communication of dependability by the state regarding the continuation of elections despite regime losses.
I emphasize that this resort to reforms and elections since 1989 constituted a deliberate shift in the citizenship regime from client- to voter-based. Each of these citizenship regimes is undifferentiated, even though clearly they operate distinctly, in market-based and democracy-based representative schemes. Algerians recognized by the mid-1980s that client-citizenship was bankrupt and, as Roberts argues, we may see the abrupt adoption of political reforms as an insidious tactic to secure economic via political liberalization (precisely the double-movement Marx exposes in his discussion of “political emancipation” in “On the Jewish Question”). Despite their differences, client-based and voter-based citizenship provide no enduring social resources without state financial and political support. Algerians proceeded willingly, even hopefully, from the exhausted client arrangement to the promising voter mobilization, and retained their non-violent, intra-systemic participation despite appearances of state infractions and duplicity.

It is worth noting the connection here between the continuous absence of segmented public spaces across the undifferentiated client- and voter-citizenship regimes. Two marches in 1990 capture this crucial aspect of the zero-sum game imposed by a citizenship structure bereft of autonomous physical sites of assembly, identification, and inspiration. In April, the FIS held a massive march to express defiance of the FLN and the state: “The sheer size of the participation and the discipline with which it was conducted were impressive enough,” Hafez writes, “but what made the march significant was the fact that it was scheduled on the same day the FLN was scheduled to hold its march against the political use of mosques by Islamists.”183 The FLN decided to cancel its march. One month later, in May, “a demonstration in favor of democracy and against Islamic intransigence attracted as many supporters as a FIS demonstration – some estimates [claimed] a million people in the streets of Algiers.”184 This shows deepening public
secular-Islamist tensions\textsuperscript{185}, to be sure, and signals that “public displays of preference in mass demonstrations [were becoming] important to political status,” Crenshaw says. For purposes of analyzing the political geography or spatialization of citizenship regimes, it is crucial to interpret these marches as embodied expressions, performed on the same seamless public territory, the \textit{same} grounds of the either-or contest. Such marches in public streets and town squares in the end conveyed physically the non-negotiable value-orientations of the increasingly polarized activist groups. Similarly, there is a direct connection between the undifferentiated citizenship regime of client-incorporation, oil-dependence, low-taxation informality, and spatial autonomy. One reason for the growing, enduring power of Islamist organization was the state’s decision to de-fund local communities, evidently to punish those beholden or faithful to Islamist discourse. As a result, the Islamists expanded their reach and popular support through “the emergence of many [“charitable”] neighborhood associations in vulnerable quarters...places where there are chronic problems” of poverty, unemployment, over-crowding, and psychological despair.\textsuperscript{186} In this way, the Islamists acted as the effective state many Algerians wished they had — capable, efficient, conscientious, generous, and responsive — precisely by occupying \textit{towns, cities, homes, and} other sites coveted by the state — unlike the segmented workplace in Poland, for instance, the FIS constructed its movement on places of citizenship relinquished by the Algerian state.\textsuperscript{187}

Continued signals of state mendicancy and extravagance hardly helped the FLN’s cause. It was disclosed, for example, that China was building a nuclear reactor for Algeria who pledged to submit to IAEA supervision.\textsuperscript{188} In 1992 over a hundred Muslim political activists would hand Saudi Arabia a “Memorandum of Advice” concerning the US-Saudi alliance and citing Algeria as a case meriting “a strengthening of relations with all Islamic tendencies, be they states, political
movements, or individuals.” 189 Meanwhile, the end of the American-Iraq war dropped oil prices to roughly eighteen dollars a barrel, forcing Algeria “to readjust its request from the IMF and the World Bank and to make greater concessions to them” 190, deepening the popular sense of neo-colonial state subservience and duplicity. Entrenched Algerian rulers before and during the elections were seen as beholden to foreign powers, detached, and disloyal to religious or national values endorsed openly by FIS’s voters. “I voted for the FIS out of revenge,” said one voter in 1990; another said, “In this country [a young man has] only four choices: you can remain unemployed and celibate because there are no jobs and apartments to live in; you can work in the black market and risk being arrested; you can try to emigrate to France to sweep the streets of Paris or Marseilles; or you can vote for FIS and vote for Islam.” 191 Such support in and outside devout Islamist circles resulted in a federal-election victory in December 1991.

On 11 January 1992 the state canceled these elections and on 12 January the military leaders formed the High Council of State (HCE), taking power with the resignation of Benjedid. On 9 February a state of emergency was called and instantly “five detention centers opened in the Sahara to hold thousands of FIS activists, including 500 mayors and councilors.” 192 “Special courts,...banned under the 1989 constitution, were reestablished to prosecute ‘terrorists.’...As time went on, the state closed down all the cultural and charitable organizations of the FIS and ordered the destruction of all unofficial mosques, which were popular with Islamists. In 1992 and 1993, a total of 166 Islamists were sentenced to death.” 193 These were the same activists and democrats who had participated in the state-called elections and had won a plurality if not a majority, only months earlier. 194 As even a writer sympathetic to the government’s reaction said, “Thousands of arrests were made and new judicial councils created to expedite trials
began handing down death sentences with chilling regularity.”195 While the regime engaged in torture, its periodization is contested. In 1992, the US State Department reported less “torture and brutal treatment than in prior years” and, even more dramatically, a “medical team under the auspices of the Algerian League of Human Rights found no evidence of torture in the detention camps.”196 The state banned FIS on 4 March 1992. On 29 June President Boudiaf – a revered revolutionary recently recalled from exile to direct his credentials to repairing the country – was assassinated. On 15 July Madani and Benhadj were given twelve-year prison terms by the Blida military tribunal. A month and half later, on 26 August 1992, a bomb attack in Algiers air terminal became the first indiscriminate terrorist attack since independence, i.e., since the war with France. In 1992 Algeria veered toward total war. “Every day police officers, gendarmes, or soldiers were murdered, nearly four hundred between the promulgation of the state of emergency on February 9, 1992, and September 1, 1992.”197 Starting 5 December 1992, “for an indeterminate period of time,” a 10:00pm-6:00am curfew was imposed in Algiers, Blida, Tipaza, Boumerdes, Bouira, and Ain Defla wilayat, broadly a national curfew.198 On 14 December 1992, near Apreval mosque in Kouba, a machine-gun attack on a halted police patrol vehicle killed five officers – “the most deadly action...in 1992 against officers of the law.”199

Meanwhile, “l’État d’urgence” became quasi-institutionalized to the resounding silence of outsiders. In February 1993 attorneys Brahim Taouti and Ali Zouita were imprisoned as legal council of the FIS. They were arrested as the Algerian Supreme Court prepared to hear their appeals of the 1992 sentencing of seven Islamists to between four and twelve years, including Benhadj and Abdelkader Hachani (respectively). In Spring 1993 Amnesty International “accused the Algerian government of having used torture since the installation of the state of
emergency..., [indicating] that whereas torture had ‘practically disappeared between 1989 and 1991,’ it was now again being used against the ‘extremists’ and ‘was reported regularly in in twenty detention centers, mostly located in the Algiers region, but also in other cities.’

The result among the disenfranchised was, predictably, a radicalization of interpretation, approach, and action. The Islamist critique conflated democracy with western hypocrisy and authoritarian manipulation, especially given the generally positive response of other putative pro-democracy regimes, such as the US. As Ghannoushi, a prominent Tunisian Islamist put it,

The Western response to the cancellation of elections in Algeria has been a source of great dismay and disappointment for many Muslims around the world. Muslims have discovered that only the ends matters to the Western political rationale. Ethics and human rights are subservient to interests; values are only necessary if they will bring to power ‘liberals’ (as in Eastern Europe), but they are dispensable if the result is power for the genuine and sincere children of the land, and an end to minority regimes that are the legacy of the colonial era. To prevent the latter situation, prisons may be packed with political opponents and the state may resort to torture, economic deprivation and even rape, as has become official policy as evident in Amnesty International’s reports on Tunisia and Algeria. Islamists today are the victims, repressed under the pretext – witness Algeria – of saving democracy from themselves.

The west was officially paralyzed over the annulled elections, belying the simplistic claim then and now that Islamism had replaced communism. Unlike “anti-communism,” anti-Islamism has not become a “categorical imperative.” There were no Senators supporting the Islamists, as John F. Kennedy and the CIA had backed the FLN in 1957, but nonetheless the reaction was muted more than anti-FIS. Anglo-European consternation redounded to perplexity about how Islam related to democracy, modernity, tradition, and globalization. Islamists were anti-democrats winning elections against corrupt and avaricious authoritarians. The conventional reply – “democracy is the solution” to trump “Islam is the solution” – supplemented equally unpersuasive views of Algerian politics and impugned democratic principles. “The idea is that
‘sovereign’ Algerians cannot be allowed to elect Islamists (supposedly anti-democratic) who appeared on the verge of winning a majority. It is, however, acceptable for Western citizens to vote into office leaders (supposedly democratic) who, if need be, are prepared to go to war and bomb cities in the name of the national interest.”\textsuperscript{208}

Anger at this hypocrisy is widely attributed to the subsequent actions: “What made the violence so intense was not just that the Government canceled the elections but, as important, the fact that the international community let the Government \textit{get away} with canceling the elections.”\textsuperscript{209} The HCE takeover, criminalization of the FIS, and resort to concentration camps make activist Mohamed Talbi’s remark poignant: “I shall not forget that western democracy said to me in the year 1960 that Algeria is an inseparable part of France and that it is French territory. And I shall not forget that French democracy killed millions of Algerians, claiming that they had contravened international law. So whom do we fool by this word ‘democracy’?”\textsuperscript{210} As Spencer summarizes the point:

\begin{quote}
Since early 1992 the suspension of the constitution and the prohibition of the FIS as a legal political party have changed the dynamics of the Islamist movement within Algeria. In the past, the FIS represented and encompassed a wide range of opinions and approaches; however, the dismantling of the public organizational networks of the FIS undermined its cohesion and balance. As both moderates and radicals were forced from the public arena of Algerian politics (many through arrest, imprisonment, and military exile), the focus of Islamist activism devolved to clandestine and military groups engaged in violent opposition to the military-backed government and the statements of its dispersed leadership.\textsuperscript{211}
\end{quote}

Ali Benhadj made the same argument, linking western liberalism with abrogation of duty and valorization of selfishness.\textsuperscript{212} In sum, “The victory of the Islamic Salvation Front was a clear indication that the majority of the Algerian people sought a change after three decades of enforced secularization. Free democratic elections have proved secularization to be unpopular
with the masses...Fearing defeat, contemporary secularists appealed to the army to intervene. They cheered as tanks crushed the ballot boxes and as thousands of citizens were jailed in detention camps set up in the desert. They claimed they were protecting democracy from the majority, because according to them the majority could not be trusted.”

As Burke III puts it: “It is important to note that the Islamists at first followed the path of legality in contesting the December 1991 parliamentary elections....In retrospect, [the coup] seems a catastrophic political miscalculatin. The repression that followed drove the Islamists to take up arms and ignited a low-intensity civil war...”

“But then,” as one BBC report remarks, “when the Islamic Salvation Front was poised to sweep the board in a 1992 general election, they annulled the whole process and took power back. The political ferment immediately moved into violence. Armed Islamists mounted attacks across Algeria; the security forces fought back; and sometimes it was hard to tell which group had carried out which atrocity.”

Thus, the FIS, a “mass social movement”, had been stopped from winning an election, banned, arrested en masse, then forced to defend its moderation from militarist Islamists inspired by al-Qa’ida.

Blocked from running the state, the FIS was banned in March 1992. A subsequent crackdown drove its moderate wing to rejoin the radicals, who resorted to violence after the elections' annulment. The Islamists targeted military vehicles, barracks, the police, and government buildings. Another Islamist organization, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), then appeared and went even further, killing intellectuals, journalists, women, and foreigners and massacring villagers in western Algeria. But the lack of information about the GIA murders bred widespread skepticism about the group's identity. Many observers suspect that the GIA is a product of the state's intelligence service, designed to discredit the Islamists. These suspicions have been heightened by the Algerian government's sharp refusal to allow any international inquiry into the massacres.

At this time “Algeria featured prominently in Saudi public debates, not least because Sahwist preachers such as Safar al-Hawali took a great interest in the Algerian war and criticized the
Saudi regime for not supporting the FIS. The entire Saudi Islamist field was sympathetic to the Algerian Islamists, but for most Saudi jihadists getting militarily involved in Algeria was out of the question on the grounds that it was an internal conflict, not a classical *jihad* pitting Muslims [against] non-Muslims. Usama bin Laden had sporadic contacts with Algerian militants from his base in Sudan, but it seems that he did not send people to Algeria.\(^{218}\)

The progression toward total war, the concentration camp, and psychotic violence in Algeria mobilized the GIA, marginalized FIS, and created self-reinforcing militarist dialectics. The GIA created a political economy of terror, drawing strength in part from rural Algerians from abandoned socialist villages like Hai Bounab.\(^ {219}\) But credible accounts of recruitment of fighters and retention of frightening loyalty to the GIA testify that state brutality radicalized Muslim commitments more than any other influence. One pseudonymous but credible witness recalls:

> However, from spring 1994, the situation will completely change. Fighters 'Islamists' are unknown to emerge in several areas (especially in Algiers) and impose a terror that goes along with the takeover of these areas by the army. And paradoxically, notwithstanding that the DRS is gradually and secretly control of the whole direction of the GIA, a major part of the true underground opposition, armed or not - and above all the tendency of the most politicized Jaz 'ara, which includes many intellectuals - the rallies, ignoring the scale of the manipulation of the GIA by the DRS. With the takeover by Djamel Zitouni Officer (DRS) in October 1994, the GIA became a veritable tool in the fight against insurgency, in the hands of chiefs of the DRS.\(^ {220}\)

Similarly, one unapologetic memoir about life with a GIA *emir* says:

> From what Ahmed told me, he decided to join the GIA the day he was arrested in the Mosque at Benramdane. He was there for Friday services when the police surrounded the building and forced everyone to go outside. They hauled him down to the police station along with the others suspected of having links with terrorists. They were all beaten. Ahmad was locked up in a cell for three days and made to do disgusting chores, like clean the toilets. He told me that was the day he decided to join, to get back at the police. But I think he wanted to join much earlier, because he started reciting prayers and hanging around the group long before that. Besides, ever since I’d known him, he hated the police and anything related to the government...He was just waiting for the right occasion to take the plunge...Ahmed was naturally predisposed to terrorism.\(^ {221}\)
Finally, a fifteen-year-old became a torturer for the GIA once traumatized by state violence:

Ahmed told me the boy had seen his four brothers, all terrorists, killed in a skirmish with the military. During the same operation, a helicopter bombed their house and killed their mother. Her body was crushed under the rubble. He was the only one in the family who escaped. After that he turned heartless, devoid of any emotion. He dreamed of nothing but violence. All he thought about was getting even...He was full of hate.  

“By May of 1994, over fifty imams had been murdered for condemning the killing of civilians.” By this time many of the 2800 Algerians who had joined anti-Soviet jihad had returned to Algeria “in three waves” of anti-government militarization. The state reacted with mass killings of Islamists. After the murder of two television journalists and a police officer, for instance, the state killed fifty-seven people in a week, mostly in Algiers. Bin Laden wanted to target the French-supported Algerian state in 1994, evidently In the summer of the same year a compromise between the generals and FIS seemed promising and imminent, under which moderate Islamists would agree to the pluralism framework of the 1989 constitution and disavow violence in exchange for Zeroual’s provisional recognition of FIS at least as participants in a “national dialogue.” But upon the reward of his release, Madani insisted on convening a “full meeting of the FIS executive council...in order to formulate a negotiating position,” and the potential cooperation ended “because of residual doubts over whether this meeting would also include representatives of militant groups.”

Between 1994 and 1999 Algeria’s violence was an unthinkable “rain of blood, a snow of bone...” Worse still, of the Algerian atrocities “only the victims are known, visible,” not their ghostly killers whose faces, fury, or cold-hearted inhumanity remain shrouded. By 1996, 116 prisons held 43,737 prisoners, half accused of terrorism. In the 1994 Tazoult prison break, 300
of the thousand escapees were condemned to death. “The gravest development since 1993, however, was the almost daily killing of Islamists, either through manhunts or clashes during searches. Rights advocates condemned the military regime’s use of torture, “disappearances,” and the extrajudicial killing of suspected Islamists.”

Even apologists for militant anti-Islamism recoiled at “this politics of zeal and cruelty...[t]he chasm between Francophiles and Arab-Islamists at the root of the terror in Algeria...its terror and counter-terror: armed Islamic groups campaigning against perceived Francophiles, secularists, and emancipated women; reprisals by the state and its ‘eradicationists,’ who pass off their violence as the defense of modernity itself; state-sponsored killer squads, the ninjas with their ski masks.”

Recent research and reports suggest, worse still, that the state may have perpetrated or facilitated atrocities linked to violent Islamists. By the end of the 20th-century, estimates ranged up to 100,000 killed, with impunity for the state, its death squads, its torture chambers, its withdrawn elections, and its internment camps. The massacres, executions, and disappearances peaked in 1997, the year the AIS disarmed and new elections were called; the GIA remained at war. So, too, did the “self-defense” groups, who reflected an unsettled strand in the Algerian client-citizenship regime: the failure of the state to integrate in a lasting manner the general population, creating any fundamental dedication or identification beyond the cash nexus. Indeed, “some of the violent massacres [from this time were] related to [unresolved, unaddressed] sociological phenomena such as familial or tribal conflicts” that could feed off the chaotic atmosphere to settle scores or establish some political gain.

Likewise, the backstory of the violence continued to reinforce the political-economic history of the client-citizenship regime, left untouched by the ultimately manipulative gesture.
of political elections. As Martinez says, the FIS and Islamist-state war created an “opportunistic coalition of four social groups with contradictory demands: the military entrepreneur, the petty trader, the ‘hittiste’, and the devout Muslim activist,” a marriage of convenience ultimately originating in the absence of systemic subjectivity more than “factors relating to identity and culture along.” Indeed, it is the continuity of the long trajectory of Algeria’s political economy that is, in light of the eruptive war, almost eerie. As Dillman writes,

> After 1991, structural adjustment and debt rescheduling took place as regime oligopolists dominated trade and privatization in a country whose infrastructure was partially destroyed by civil conflict. Instead of an Islamic republic, Algeria ended up with something more like a banana republic. The pre-coup dirigiste state was replaced by a state of rent-seekers. Military officers, functionaries, and businesspeople, collectively referred to as a political-financial mafia, systematically privatized public resources. Corruption, bribery, influence peddling, and violence became the norm rather than the exception.

The Algerian civil war is generally dated 1992-1997. The latter date marks the October 1997 unilateral cease-fire of the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS, the military wing of the FIS) and the peak intensity of violence. By then, Ashour says, the necessary conditions for “pragmatic de-radicalization” prevailed: roughly, battle fatigue and leadership capable of compromise. Still, among the AIS, lawless violence, massacres, and the state of emergency continued after that atrocious peak. How to characterize the 1992- fighting in Algeria has been contested, pointedly over the diffusion and representation of the violence. The pervasive militarization of Algerian society by the 1990s underdetermines and under-specifies the political dynamics of Islamist/state conflict from the 1980s forward. Some writers emphasize that tiny minorities were at war with scant popular followings, a view of increasing plausibility with the emergence of the Groupe Armée Islamique (GIA) in 1994. An entrepreneurial model of violence must not
be dismissed just for confusing rational or strategic with irrational or vengeful elements; rationalized war-machines may be more efficient, comprehensive, and legitimized under a single ideological regime. The nominal concern with “civil war” arises in this context, where the society-at-war view promotes an image of cultural or historical clashes between Islamic and Francophone values. But structural arguments can explore cultural and institutional sources without reducing violence to old hatreds or historical inevitability.

Despite the putative conclusion of major hostilities by then, in 1999 Amnesty reported thousands of civilians killed, often “extrajudiciously by security forces or by militias armed by the state, others were deliberately and arbitrarily killed by armed groups defining themselves as ‘Islamic.’” The report also indicated unfair trials; random detentions under “anti-terrorist” laws; detentions without trial; “torture and ill-treatment by security forces especially during secret detentions but also in prisons”; dozens of disappearances following arrest by security forces; “hundreds of people sentenced to death, the vast majority in absentia; and “scores” of abductions as well as torture and rape by armed groups. Algeria’s Criminal Code Article 144, amended in 2001, allows one-year detentions for defaming persons or institutions of the government. As recently as 2006 President Bouteflika pardoned journalists imprisoned on this charge. While that may be good for the journalists, it is still an act of clemency, hence of a state of exception. Finally, in 2006 SIPRI for the first time since 1992 removed Algeria from its list of major armed conflicts, defined as 1000 battle-related deaths per annum. Algeria seems to be inching toward a period of repressive social cooperation, if not peace, in a revived client-citizenship regime.
§5.c  Theory and Evidence

My theoretical model, presented in the introduction (§I.b.3) and reiterated above (§3.c), derives Algerian violence under martial law from the undifferentiated client-citizenship regime that eradicated systemic subjectivity under fiscal crisis, effectively expelling dissidents from publicly relevant social action. The argument specifies that the state incorporated non-state agents in distributive networks that linked state and citizen through the discretionary, informal, undifferentiated social resource of private loyalty. My explanation claims that the asymmetrical dependence of social resources on state revenues is the source of Algeria’s violence, and the core distinction from Poland’s differentiated worker-citizenship. It adds that in these two cases social and spatial aspects of citizenship regimes were derivative, secondary influences on dissident actions and decisions; that is, social ties and political spaces defines the of agents and spaces engaged in the violent reclamation of subjectivity under undifferentiated citizenship structures. In contrast to Poland’s horizontal social ties among workers and segmented factory spaces, Algeria’s client-citizens were integrated into the state in competitive social relationships and seamless or zero-sum public spaces. The Algerian state’s abrupt replacement of the client-regime with a voter-regime appeared to promise a differentiated citizenship-regime based on institutionally guaranteed electoral processes. Annulment of election results and suspension of democracy thus returned voters to their status as objectified clients of an insolvent state. This double loss of systemic subjectivity, I argue, provoked anti-systemic Algerian violence.

The history of Algeria’s distributive client-citizenship eventuating in a sadistic terrorist war between the state and Islamists confirms, I think, my hypothesis that the undifferentiated social resource of loyalty power – versus Poles’ labor power – and discretionary bargaining
encouraged the violent response to martial law by extinguishing effective membership in Algerian political life. This section will analyze the plausibility of this explanation by working the model back through the historical narrative, revisiting the history more explicitly in terms of the model. I will ask if the emergence of FIS/GIA corroborates, qualifies, or challenges my account of the variables in the causal pathway from citizenship regime to opposition strategies. A test of my model’s validity will adduce evidence from the actions and discourses of Algerian activists, focusing on key moments of state-citizen interaction from the revolution against France to state formation, imposition of martial law, and the Islamist uprising. As in the corresponding section in the last chapter, I will address variations in the citizenship regime, beginning with non-explanatory social ties and political spaces, then elaborating the effects of undifferentiated systemic subjectivity and experiential evaluation.

My theoretical model claims that client-citizenship fosters vertical and competitive social ties, because the state creates an institutional incentive system in which non-state actors must compete for scarce resources doled out from the oil-revenues of ruling patrons. This is a predictable developmental choice given the availability of monocultural export rents that could deploy precocious Keynesian development to assimilate under a state apparatus the unusually pertinacious sub-populations pressing demands on the state at independence. In this sense, as we have seen, the Algerian client-citizenship regime minimized transaction costs of integrating multiple identities and claims. Despite sharing religious homogeneity with Polish Catholics, discussed in chapter three, Algerian state builders did not enjoy a cohesive cultural landscape, although this difference does not bear explanatory weight. The historical narrative clarified how deeply plural Algerian social ties have affected state centralization efforts for three centuries, to
some extent creating a fight “around” the state between, ultimately, the military and Islamists.

This commentary refers to a double movement. On one hand, Algeria had a given social field of deep, labile value pluralism. Muslims are Berbers, Arabs, Salafi reformers, secularists, or militants.\textsuperscript{251} Workers are labor-intensive peasants, capital-intensive oil-sector workers, street merchants, ex-patriots, or bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{252} Feminists are secularists, Islamists, Berbers, and Francophone.\textsuperscript{253} Citizens speak Arabic, French, Berber and have never settled this contested linguistic politics.\textsuperscript{254} Finally, as we witnessed in the state’s brief post-1988 experiment with liberal reforms promising a differentiated voter-citizenship, Algerian democrats are populists, Islamists, conservatives, anti-étatistes, third-worldists, and nationalists.\textsuperscript{255} In short, the Algerian state inherited contentious ethnic, class, linguistic, regional, and religious social formations that proliferated a series of tactically or temporarily shifting relations among vertically integrated social ties. The state formation pattern, therefore, received a political society accustomed to negotiating rather fluidly multiple hierarchies and identities – rather than an Algerian people inclined to stable horizontal social ties on the order of a universal class of Algerian citizens. On the other hand, the state then exploited by deepening this historical pattern by modernizing this social structure of competing “identitarian striations” under bureaucratic, industrializing, and standardizing state centralization stabilized by rent distribution.

A central indicator of this is the counter-intuitive case, in light of the Polish experience, that Alexander reveals of Islamist-labor alienation under the common suffering of dictatorship and incipient liberalization in the 1970s. Rather than join forces, Islamists and the UGTA barely acknowledged each other, deploying the discrete social resources of client-citizenship. Islamists sought their own bargaining power and intra-systemic benefits, as a result, effectively against
labor as a systemic competitor. We saw this dynamic as well in Islamist and secular gender agendas, as well as in Berber struggles against the “Arab nationalist” state. In each instance, the structure of citizenship seems to have prevented possible social alliances across identities, not to mention the elevation of declared grievances or claims to transcendent political or economic programs. As one result of this, under extreme duress Islam served as the expected umbrella identity that could, if only abstractly and temporarily, constitute the “we” of Algerian citizens against the state’s citizenship system.

In addition, and relatedly, the mosque became the political kernel of the movement, but only by replicating Algeria’s zero-sum, seamless contest over physical sovereignty and spatial prerogative. Again, we saw here the double movement of intensifying and instrumentalizing a proclivity endemic to Algerian political spaces, exemplified in the Muslim turuq networks. Post-colonial Algerian state builders, deliberately avoiding concentrations of horizontally identified regime opponents or civil societal associations, prevented the creation of civic spaces. This may have reflected nationalist commitments to an indivisible public sphere, but the result was the absence of any counterpart to the factory-fortress in Poland. In Algeria, as we discover in the historical narrative, the absence of segmented or compartmentalized or designated political places for dissidents meant instant confrontations with the state over the public sphere at the first sign of congregation or reciprocal visibility as activists. When Algerians opposed the state, they took to the streets, but when the state cracked down they took to the mosques or to the Islamic political party. But this secondary space failed to provide a site of activism distinct from state claims, as Algerian ruling elites felt equally threatened by non-state actors requisitioning religious sites, inherently seen as public. Thus in Algeria political space was always seamless and
imposed automatic winner-take-all claims against the state’s equal right to the public commons or the mosque. Without segregated, political spaces, there was no protected or guaranteed or non-threatening site of dissident convocation. In addition to forcing the mosque to stand in as the resort of activist recognition, it raised the stakes against a state that saw itself as Muslim. In short, the political arrogation of mosques, compelled by the state’s undifferentiated citizenship regime, constituted another attack on state power itself. This compression stands in contrast to Poland’s communist regime, which did not envision itself as the working class itself but as the government, representative, management, or union of the working class.

Finally, and with singular causal weight in my model, we have seen the effects in the historical narrative of the undifferentiated citizenship regime. Algerian ruling elites created a systemic subjectivity, as I have emphasized, reliant on asymmetrical state-citizen status. That is, the effective citizenship of Algerians relied on state solvency, and vanished therefore without it. This is in contradistinction to, for instance, labor-citizenship or voter-citizenship, institutionally secure social resources, generally speaking, that do not remove their constituents from citizen status when the state itself is in crisis (financial or political); production facilities and electoral processes endure because their procedures and resources have autonomy from state revenues. This is not, of course, a general claim about the endurance of production- or election-based incorporation strategies but about the effects on systemic subjectivity absent enduring social resources for effective citizenship. Surely electoral procedures and worker-citizenship can come to be imperiled by a drastic fiscal crisis, so that striking and voting are ineffective and increase the likelihood of violent social agitation.
Indeed, the narrative suggests that Algerian ruling elites discerned this correlation in the period following the 1988 riots and state repression. The liberalization feint in the political realm, in this light, represents a meaningful shift from client- to voter-citizenship, tantamount to a promised move from undifferentiated to differentiated citizenship. Moreover, we have in the historical record, I believe, evidence of the powerful disincentive of differentiated citizen-regimes precisely in this brief electoral opening in Algeria between 1989 and 1992. In that short time we found the state attacking Islamists, even arresting their leaders and attempting to obstruct the FIS and discourage its adherents, and yet only with the cancellation of the federal-level elections, i.e., only with the removal of differentiated social resources – campaigning and voting that sustained non-violence despite manifest state coercion – did Algerian activists resort to sustained collective violence. This was the moment when the Algerian military-state expelled Algerian citizens from meaningful political membership, throwing them back upon the bankrupt and undifferentiated citizenship regime of crony-capitalist clientelism.

§5.d Concluding comments

Familiarity with the narrative of Algeria in the 1990s would not necessarily assist one in predicting the country’s place in the Arab uprisings since 2011. Algeria’s horrific, even sadistic violence, followed by pallid resolution through episodic referendums, formulaic elections, and discretionary amnesties might suggest exhaustion, a desire for peace at any cost. On the other hand, with so little reform but so much already sacrificed, one could equally imagine a nothing-
left-to-lose revolt to justify retroactively the losses that have ravaged Algerians’ memory and bequeathed a lost generation. In the event, Algeria fittingly played a mixed role in the MENA rebellions against entrenched authoritarian rule. Algerians were among the first protestors to come out in force, coeval with the self-immolation of a mortified Tunisian in Jan 2013, but have also formed among the more muted long-term democratic movements. All is surprisingly quiet on the Algerian western front, relative to other Arab and Muslim populations, for many reasons: policing that banned processions or concentrations of protests in public spaces, battle- and loss- fatigue, and increased acceptance or efficiency of the regime under what Nathan refers to, in the Chinese context, as legitimizing “input institutions.”

Given the narrative of the violence in the 1990s, the surprising or unpredictable results of more recent Algerian political activism deepens hesitations I have addressed above regarding explanations of the Polish case and our capacity generally to explain opposition strategies with apodictic surety. I wish here to focus on the core political-philosophical-analytical problem that hounds this account of the fighting in Algeria. That problem deserves a fine point for my study and any social explanation deriving violence from objective conditions of suffering or exclusion: the circularity where suffering (dispossession, exclusion, or hunger) is said to cause violence as resistance, perhaps even as a reclamation of one’s existence of human dignity or capacity; and violence is said to measure or index suffering. My explanatory model is tautological in this way if it does not separate its concepts from its causal pathway – that is, if it fails to establish distinct, non-conflicted indices of violence and suffering, and to persuade one of their reciprocal rather than identical dynamics. But at the same time, there is a reason social science continues to debate the status of functionalist explanation or any account in which cause and measurement
are imbricated conceptually or practically. After all, if suffering causes violence, it is difficult to imagine what a falsifiable explanatory model of this interaction would look like.

Having noted the ambiguous status of the tautology claim, I will take up the problem of circularity as helpfully as I can for the Algerian case. Describing Algerians’ “popular response [to] the decline in the financial means of the state, the growing debt burden, and the return of shortages...on the heels of an industrial disinvestment strategy and the stimulation of domestic consumption,” Lowi concludes:

The violence in Algeria between 1992 and 2002 was...a form of (political expression). It is what remains when all other avenues are closed. Violence serves to fill the void left by failing social and political relations. In this context, violence functions as a type of social institution: one that assumes...responsibility for punishing mistreatment and repairing or overcoming the condition of exclusion, marginality, having been dishonored or humiliated. Violence, in this sense, is a phenomenon of pure affirmation of the subject.

Algeria has occasioned this line of reasoning before, typically from reflections on the revolution against France. Sartre voiced a logic of violence against a “false bourgeois universality” similar to my analysis earlier (§2.e): “What the intellectuals failed to understand was that the Algerian rebellion – an insurrection of the poor, disarmed, and hunted by a police regime – could not but choose guerrilla war and the use of bombs.”259 Hafez’s summary remark offers a more prosaic expression of this position: “The [case of Algeria shows] how shifts from political inclusion to expulsion contribute to the rise of rebellious Islamist movements...The absence of institutional channels for conflict mediation and political contestation encourages rebellion by delegitimizing the ruling regime and disempowering moderate voices within the movement.”260

To make sense of such arguments, perhaps we must uncover the enthymeme at their core. Given the terrifying risk to one’s wellbeing, we may interpret such arguments as claiming
that injury or death in battling oppressive rule has a greater value than acquiescence. This is, as scholars of suicide bombing have noted, a dangerous turn for ruling elites and state-builders, as sovereign power is constructed entirely on the sanctity of the physical body – that is, on its primary, unequaled sacredness to citizens. Revolutionary risk-taking and self-sacrificial violence always breaks the bracing contract of sovereign power, at which point anything can be justified or witnessed. Parallel to this inversion of state intimidation and prerogative, inscribed on the fearful body, the subject of this released embodiment changes, too. It is not merely that the fighter’s body is offered, but in that process the human value on which sovereign power and citizen subordination relies also collapses. Death, in sum, is revalued. In his On Suicide: a Discourse on Voluntary Death, Jean Améry provides a moving if slightly tangential insight into the suicidal mind. He argues nearly romantically that death by one’s own hand represents the ultimate freedom of humanity; defending or advocating suicide, he declares, “We arrive at ourselves only in a freely chosen death” that flees this “ridiculously everyday life and its alienation.” Instead of Selbstmord (self-murder) Améry refers to Freitod (voluntary death), and “insists that psychology belongs to the ‘logic of life’ while suicide lies ‘outside of this logic.’”

Améry’s embrace of self-willed self-annihilation is a response to the Shoah, especially the madness of murder “where there is no why,” that is, an utterly evacuated life/death in the extermination camp. In this juxtaposition, a dignified, willful, voluntary death seems more than justified – it seems necessary, admirable, or even saintly. The political self-sacrifice or suicide mission of the saint (Socrates, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., et al.) consecrates in blood the transcendence of the sovereign’s possession of the human body. As Cioran says, “Sainthood is transfigured physiology, maybe even divine physiology. Every bodily function becomes a
movement toward the sky. Blood is one of its constant obsessions. Saintliness is a triumph over blood.” To spill blood for a higher purpose than mere survival, to preserve bare biological life to “triumph over blood” means to see something as of greater value than one’s physical life. On this reasoning, Husserl held “that one’s death signifies a voluntary sacrifice [and] bestows sublime dignity and elevates the individual’s suffering to a sphere which is beyond each individuality. We can no longer live as private people.” If these remarks seem excessively abstract or jarring in a discussion of savage, malicious violence against others, often bystander citizens, it is not to equate exterminated Jews to the GIA, of course, but to broach the problem of explaining a willful embrace of death, given our usual predicates about the sanctity of life. As it is for the sovereign, so it is for social science – without the fear of death, perhaps we are lost.

Even if that overstates the dilemma for social science of revolutionary self-sacrificial risk, we are left with a potentially circular explanation of violence, now adding a sort of valorization of willful, embraced, dignified death to the more animal-in-a-cage image of the repression-into-resistance thesis. No longer does the beast or thing stir, bounce, and erupt; it is human will at the height of its fully formed, conscious decision-making. None other than Michnik offers us the “ethics” of combat in conditions of systemic expulsion and debasement:

He channels Dostoyevsky who asks skeptically of liberal equality: “what liberty?...Understand me: voluntary, completely conscious self-sacrifice...is, in my opinion, a sign of...the highest form of self-mastery, the greatest freedom of one’s own will.” However, in local discursive terms,
this is surely the moralized political ethos of Algerian Islamists at war with a greater force that showed no sign of compromise or negotiation.

But, as I have said, such an explanation seems, if descriptively compelling, plausible, or informative, still problematic. Most simply, it would seem difficult to match the extent of state and Islamist infringements on overall Algerian welfare in an adequately precise way to assess interactive effects. For instance, we might need to pinpoint, measure, and ascertain how much state repression corresponds with and “causes” how much citizen violence, which seems always an elusive register. A more vernacular formulation of this potential objection is to say that if the Algerian society and polity were so suffocating as to “cause” the GIA to slaughter whole villages of unarmed civilians, why was violent Islamist militancy attractive to so few people, who could numerically have been simply the average percentage of lunatics? After all, Roberts insists that Algeria’s “main division is not an ideological one, and that, far from their being little or no middle ground, it is the extremes – the hardline eradicators, the doctrinaire secularists of Ettahaddi and the RCD, and the Islamist maximalists of the GIA – which are based on small minorities, with the middle ground virtually everything and everyone else.”

These remain a pressing issue for explanations of social violence – the difficulty of knowing if a small number of violent people or actions are direct responses to a “structural” antecedent cause or are perhaps especially susceptible to responding to that cause in a particular, minority manner for some reason internal to themselves and external to a social explanation.

So, even if “objective” conditions appear to favor social agitation or political resistance, as a general rule reliable predictions of self-risking or -sacrificing behavior will be prohibitively multivariate. As Crenshaw, drawing on Kuran’s preference falsification (§1.a, fn.), remarks, with
particular attention to Algeria’s violence: “The process of revolutionary mobilization...involves a multitude of individual choices based on extremely complex patterns of motivation, even if discontent is high and structural factors...propitious:

The individual’s choice will depend on how much influence he or she has over the expected outcome (a perception of whether or not the action will actually make any difference to society’s decision), the anticipated sanctions associated with a public position, and the emotional need to act autonomously and to avoid anger, shame, or guilt. The individual cannot predict the consequences of alternative choices, so the anticipation of sanctions is also contingent on cognitive processes such as selective information processing...Individual behavior will matter[,] as it alters the equilibrium of people’s revolutionary thresholds – the tipping point at which it becomes worthwhile for the individual to make public a private opposition to the existing order. So while it is intuitively and historically compelling to think that Algeria’s state of emergency would trigger physical resistance comparable to countless uprisings against slavery, colonialism, apartheid, and comparable forms of effective mass incarceration, the argument that violence results from systemic reification raises hard questions about alternatives to harsh and vicious self-sacrificial aggression against the state. I have challenged the repression-resistance thesis (I, §2.d) on philosophical-conceptual grounds that it relies on a distinction between objectification and near-objectification that generates the double paradox of objectively caused resistance. If besieged persons are reduced to objects, it is difficult to see where the energy, desire, or will to revolt comes from; but if they are not yet “things,” it is difficult to see how their actions can be objectively caused. We may choose to stipulate here probabilistic claims, invoking the language of conditionality, likelihood, or contribution, as Hafez does cautiously.

But as Dunn says, there are many responses to repressive or brutalizing conditions:

If I do not wish to be ruled by you, and you control the territory on which I live, I have in essence three options. I can leave the territory. I can accept your authority, however resentfully. Or I can
attempt to capture that territory from you. If you resist my attempts (as you no doubt will), and if you can secure the cooperation of many others in your resistance, I face a pressing temptation to expel not merely you but also a substantial proportion of your collaborators from the territory.269

We may ask, in light of Dunn’s observation (which recalls Hirschman’s exit, voice, and loyalty options), whether any group ever has no resources, so that it must resort to violence to reclaim subjectivity. Indeed, given the options, it is obvious that violence is not an automatic or perhaps even common reaction to objectifying conditions. Far more typical is the response of one Chinese dissident: “[The Communist Party] had me tight in their fists for fifteen years until, when the breath of my life was almost squeezed out, I finally fled.”270 Walzer insists that this reaction – peaceful flight – proves that it is never true that there is no choice except resort to violence.271 Why, we might re-ask, were mosques not akin to Polish factories, and the removal of support to the state similar to the strike option? Perhaps the initial social divisions in Algerian society forced the state to adopt vertical and discretionary citizenship structure as a path of least resistance. It seems that some supporting ideological and socio-political factors interceded at the point where the victims of state emergency decided in the first instance that it was worth it to risk their lives to defend their society or their loved ones. More simply put, an explanation of Algeria’s violence must provide supporting or supplemental reasons that exit, flight, or flat-out cowering in docility was not the response to Algerian despotism. This is not to deny that the systemic elimination of the citizenship regime and eradication of Algerian systemic subjectivity is not the central condition of possibility or likelihood of social violence; but it is to suggest the presence of crucial intervening variables between repression and resistance, as we have seen.
This deduction means that the structural and hermeneutic argument linking eradication of citizen-subjectivity to political violence requires some other factor that converts the impetus, temptation, or provocation to angry uprising into actualized aggression. My explanatory model claims that the absence of a citizenship regime forced Algerians to assert themselves coercively, that is, to reclaim their subjectivity anti-systemically, in order to impede state prerogative. This model makes two bold assumptions that (1) people desire subjectivity and (2) if they are denied this desire, they will risk themselves to fulfill it. But an inherent need for systemic subjectivity seems dubious, as does the willingness to fight for it physically. Why risk one’s health or life rather than wait, hide, flee, acquiesce, or collaborate, or some other commonsense alternative? Hence we may need more than a supplemental explanatory factor that tipped Algerians over the fence toward violence; we may need an explanation for what put them on the fence in the first place – what made Algerians react to oppressive, exclusive, punishing conditions violently when there presumably were other options? Several possibilities present themselves here.

First, maybe there were no other reasonable options in this case. As I have said, there is a difference between two kinds of absent systemic subjectivity. One can lack any capacity to impede ruling elites, yet be relatively unburdened by state policies; in contrast, one can lack all criteria of meaningful citizenship and, in addition, feel suffocated by state actions. I assume that in most cases, the latter condition will create greater incentives to violent resistance, short of totalitarian destruction of all human will. I believe the evidence shows this circumstance held in Algeria, in which the state surrounded and suffocated the opposition without controlling the territory available popular revolt. One intervening or enabling factor that might supplement the repression-into-resistance thesis could then be the balance between the state’s aggression and
capacity: the relationship between the state’s simultaneous despotic and infrastructural power. In addition, second, as I have tried to show in one thread of the narrative, Algerians possessed the ethical propensity and political resources to revolt against centralizing governments that attacked them, as the Algerian state manifestly did. One need not cite old-fashioned notions of anti-modern tribes and clans to revisit Shils’s remarks about tensions between “society” and “state” under circumstances like Algeria’s:

Efforts might be made to form societies, but without a common self-denomination, societies will not be formed by the populations who live in the territory which bears the name. Steps toward the transcendence of parochiality in postcolonial Africa...have come to nothing...The governmentally promulgated societies of Africa and the middle east have not attained integration; they had not commonly used names. They had no common center on which to focus their attention. They did not have an effective center to begin to create the institutions from which a common culture could be formed. There was no sufficient attachment to the territory of all the different and separate societies living on them to support resistance to disintegration. There was no institutional arrangement to which the partners of the union had enough of an attachment to cause them to attempt to coerce others – and their own fellow countrymen – and to prevent the union from collapsing.272

Certainly the ability to resist state centralization or standardization of the citizenry may be just as “modern” as the state’s desire to politicize or administer the population. Having said that, it seems clear that the state could imprison the Algerian population but not control the prisoners in part because they refused to construct a citizenship regime that could endow citizens with effective social resources that would secure incumbency and private economic cupidity. When we add to this primary causal condition of withdrawn systemic subjectivity the positive social resources outside sovereign control and deployed previously by anti-colonial revolutionaries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we begin to resolve the collective action and free rider problems of militant activism.
CONCLUSION

Oh, you people who, when you talk about anything, must immediately declare: that is foolish, that is clever, that is good, that is bad! And what does it all amount to? Do you think you can uncover the vital circumstances of an action with your questions? Are you sure you know how to get at the heart of the matter: why did it happen? Why did it have to happen? If you were, you wouldn’t be so hasty with your decisions.

JW von Goethe

This conception of history depends on our ability to expound the real process of production, starting out from the material production of life itself, and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected with this and created by this mode of production (i.e., civil society in its various stages), as the basis of all history; and to show it in its action as State, to explain all the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics, etc., etc., and trace their origins and growth from that basis; by which means, of course, the whole thing can be depicted in its totality.

Karl Marx

This conclusion has three brief sections. The first reviews the arguments of my project to convey their coherence in explaining violent and non-violent resistance to despotic coercion. The second section responds to analytical challenges to those arguments beyond the concerns raised at the end of each narrative. The third draws theoretical insights from those arguments, should they prove persuasive or provocative.

My project presupposes that self-risking political violence remains to be adequately explained or theorized, despite the proximity of my causal model to intuitive and academic studies that link physical uprising to suffocation, frustration, humiliation, and to the absence of institutional means of getting attention or satisfying needs. People tend to see violence of any kind, but particularly social or political violence, as a kind of double rupture in the equilibrium between a system and its inhabitants. In this image of violence, conventionally defined (§2.b), an existing balance or symmetry between social system and agent is reciprocally fractured or
exceeded, leading to exceptional acts of destruction. This disturbed-equilibrium model is often supported with causal claims. First, some third term must disrupt the balance between system and subject by causing, e.g., a systemic shock or new social grievance. Second, different kinds of violence index distinct qualities of these disruptions – shame from exclusion may trigger self-sacrificial, impulsive violence while anger over corruption may inspire self-preserving, strategic violence. In sum, violence is conceived as the menacing or destructive physical aggression triggered when the reciprocity between system and subject is breached such that they fail or forbid each other’s fundamental demands; and the form of this breach specifies the form of the reactive violence. An explanation of violence, then, entails temporally ordering these factors: balance (of systemic and social demands) \( \Rightarrow \) disruption \( \Rightarrow \) imbalance \( \Rightarrow \) violence. This image/model implies that disruptions to the balance between systemic and social demands explain violence.

Given the different results of Polish and Algerian martial law, the reasonable if partial presuppositions in this view have inspired the puzzle, historical narratives, research design, causal explanation, theoretical model, and conceptual analyses of my project. I have provided, I hope, reasons to link self-risking political violence to expulsion, by compulsory political systems, from citizenship regimes that had constituted citizen-subjectivity in the habituating use of social resources. Distinguishing the effects of differentiated or undifferentiated citizenship regimes in sustaining or eliminating the material means of systemic willing, I have urged that we replace, in general, immediate with experiential evaluations and human with subjective social ontology. I have endorsed the framework of the dehumanization thesis while qualifying its constitutive conceptual and theoretical predicates to give it more focused explanatory power.
Thus, I began the project by critically reviewing Fanon’s argument that revolution results from a subjective resistance to encroaching objectification. My overall purpose in this detailed textual account of the dehumanization thesis was to locate an impasse for social explanation in the gap between objective conditions and subjective evaluations of human suffering. If it is the willful subject, and not the inanimate object, that resists dehumanization, then an explanation of violence will relocate from a social ontology of human universals to that of subject formation and specific situations. If a violation of subjective rather than human conditions causes violence it would appear to withdraw us from social scientific explanation to anthropological description. But I inverted these inferences from the object-subject divide to propose that by receding from the immediate point of violence – the disturbed-equilibrium image – to the historical processes of subject formation we may access the relevant causal pathways.

Prompted by these productive tensions in Fanon’s paradigmatic dehumanization thesis, I then held up the contrasting dissident responses to brutal martial law in Poland and Algeria as an example of the intercession of institutional arrangements between objective and subjective conditions. Reporting on research into postwar Polish and postcolonial Algerian state formation and social movements, I proposed that Polish non-violence and Algerian violence derived from the distinct citizenship regimes that, in hard times, sustained Poles’ systemic subjectivity but eliminated Algerians’, reducing the latter to systemic objects or “dehumanized” entities whose capacity to obstruct state absolutism was forced outside of a legible, existing system. Similar objective (political, social, and material) deprivations, I discerned, were mediated by differential subjectivities in the two citizenship regimes. The Polish state constituted citizens as subjects in labor-intensive production sites, that is, as worker-citizens whose primary means of compelling
policy changes was the strike. Because workers retained the social resource of labor power to contest sovereign power under state crisis, Polish citizens retained their systemic subjectivity and thus the credibility of a sustained non-violent strategy. The Algerian state cultivated client-citizens whose social resource for challenging state decisions was the threat of shifting loyalty and withdrawing support. This capacity depended on Algerian state solvency and vanished with fiscal crisis and state coercion, eradicating Algerians’ effective membership in the polity and restricting recuperation of their subjective will to anti-systemic violence.

Given comparable objective deprivation under states of emergency, I then inferred that opposition strategies stemmed from citizens’ experiential evaluations of state performance in terms of systemic subjectivity. In responding strategically, agents appraised the practical effect and political meaning of martial law, based on the actual or potential continuity of the social resources of effective citizenship. Activists evaluated their immediate conditions through their historical experiences of interacting with ruling classes through the institutional resources that transformed their citizenship into subjectivity. Citizen-subjects integrated into the centralizing state in dominant modes of state-society coercion and cooperation reacted, in the decision on violence, not to empty bellies or cruel rulers, but to the status of their systemic subjectivity. Thinking as citizen-subjects in political regimes, people under duress asked not only if the state was meeting their particular needs or respecting their grievances, but if they retained the social resources that had constituted their citizen-subjectivity. They asked if they remained citizens as objects of the state or as subjects in the state. To answer that question entails an evaluation of present, objective social conditions and resources that continue or disrupt dissidents’ systemic-subjective experience. Activists weighing violence and non-violence react to what they want
and need and to who they are. Polish worker-citizens and Algerian client- or voter-citizens who used their social resources to press material grievances responded to martial law as an effect on political personhood – on the citizen-subjectivity that promotes intra-systemic dissent.

This explanation and theoretical model prompted me to examine in related discussions the concepts of violence and subjectivity, to texture the descriptions of opposition strategies. In an extended critical treatment of the dependent variable, violence, I addressed the subjects, objects, and evaluations that constitute actions and analyses of violence (and non-violence). This discussion analyzed the combined but discrete elements of my argument, which invokes subjective evaluations of objectification. My contention in these assessments was that we will not explain sustained collective violence as a reaction to objective, immediate constraints on human desires; rather, we will get better traction by asking how particular conditions sustain or infringe subjects in given regimes of practical citizenship. In turn, this thesis provoked me to contend that reliable social knowledge – i.e., comparative social explanation – requires a theory of the subject. The logic was that if we wish to include in social science an ongoing examination of its rational procedures and premises, we must inquire into the ontological substrate that justifies ethnography’s explanatory inferences and theories. I mobilized the distinction between universals and mechanisms, then, to endorse subject-formation over abstract human dignity as the preferred image of our concept of political agency. To propose this subjective ontology I revisited the Polish and Algerian experiences in light of fundamental commitments and events – that is, the universal dynamics of subject formation in particular situations that may offer a way to integrate theoretical models and discrete social outcomes in social explanation.
My explanatory model of how experiential evaluations of the social resources that form citizenship regimes determines non-violent versus violent resistance under martial law remains, however, vulnerable to several criticisms. My objective here will be more to qualify than reject or contest weakness in my thesis; it seems more instructive to sustain that reject compelling problems confronting unresolved aspects of one’s project. Hence I will qualify the limitations of my approach, assess loose hinges in my argument, and discuss problems with the theory. As to qualifications I will work from the problems in my approach to specific issues with my account.

First, one must be candid about inferences drawn from low-N samples. My conceit is to have analyzed, compared, and held constant similar and different variables drawn from modern Polish and Algerian political history (§3) but this is a modestly valuable procedure. However carefully constructed, a two-case research design cannot generate dispositive natural or social scientific findings. I have attempted to disclaim general theoretical proof, promising to offer a partially speculative model that may inform other projects or be correct in just these two cases. But then this may be evasive. I appear to have chosen a two-case puzzle and then disavowed theoretical pretensions on grounds that my project has only two cases, all the while speaking in robust scientific phraseology about causal pathways, models, mechanisms, and variables. I have adduced findings from more cases – such as the consensus in MENA studies that participation and violence are inversely related – but one must ask: Is there a theory here or just two stories?

One blunt reply is that what happened in Algeria has little or no interpretive bearing on whether labor-power and worker-citizenship prevented violent militancy against communist Polish rule. The reason for this is analytically clear and perhaps too obvious to delve into here. But, in short, the standard practice of comparing variables to eliminate alternative explanations
may be simply invalid. For instance, in discussing “similarities,” I claimed that because Algeria and Poland share histories of religious militancy, Catholic or Algerian religious discourses seem unlikely to explain the divergent outcomes. But there is no apodictic reason to suppose that Algeria’s political-religious historical experience tells us anything about Poland; indeed, there are commonsense reasons to think that to know whether Polish Catholicism deserves credit for non-violence in a specific historical period one should confine oneself to studying the one case over time. My response is to agree on the primacy of inferences drawn from the historical logic extracted from case narratives and to add merely that comparisons raise puzzles and suggest explanatory variables, but do not establish definitive causal pathways. The historical narratives and the comparisons are for this reason structured as parallel case studies whose explanations should stand on their own within the cases. So there are two stories here, but with a single theory about citizens and subjects that offers a plausible explanation for their different results.

Along these lines, with respect to my specific account of citizenship regimes and protest outcomes, I will stress that I do not propose that worker- and client- citizenship have timeless or uniform relationships to systemic subjectivity. If Polish Solidarity mobilized its strike capacity as an address-to-all that rippled beyond the working class across horizons of Polish subjectivity, it does not mean that worker-citizenship is generally differentiated, universal, or systemically subjective. The qualitative nature of regime differentiation itself depends on the super-ordinate disciplinary or infrastructural apparatus that workers occupy – the specific production regime of state-labor centralization, shop floor dynamics, effects of skilling and de-skilling, and so on will shape in specific political systems and historical periods the citizenship-regimes in practice that I have modeled. Worker- and client-citizenship are merely instances of the key variable my
argument proposes, systemic subjectivity formed by social resources in the development of a citizenship regime. I do not wish to generalize about these particular and circumstantial social resources for other cases or periods, but to offer this approach to empirical and practical ethics as it brings regimes and citizens as objects and subjects into the real politics of social violence.

Something similar could be said about the three variations in the citizenship regime that I have stressed. I claimed that, in Poland and Algeria, differentiation of the citizenship regime was the variation that explained the outcomes, and the one that decided the public relevance of social ties and political space as refined tools of systemic subjects. But, again, I do not think of this as a universal rule of social protest outcomes. It seems plausible that the existence of an operable regime of effective citizenship is the sine qua non of other effects of the regime, but one can imagine a different lexical or causal order. For instance, in the Algerian revolution, the militants lacked French-provided social resources to found a citizenship regime; but the Casbah secured political space to form the FLN underground movement and state, seemingly reversing the order presented in my study – political space was a necessary condition for the address-to-all of the anti-imperial revolt. For the variables, argument, and mechanism upheld in my work this principle of situated universals recommends dialectical social logics over time that will vary in, for instance, the temporal-spatial order of explanatory effects.

As to the weaknesses in my argument, I have raised several in concluding the narratives of Polish and Algerian state and subject formation. As to specific flaws in the comparison, every difference between the two cases presents a potential misinterpretation in my analysis. Poland and Algeria had, evidently, distinct bureaucratic apparatuses, literary cultures, ideological links between communist versus socialist state and religion, relationship to WWII and the Holocaust;
or urban versus rural cruces of anti-state activism over time. Indeed, as I have intimated, there is only so much theoretical or explanatory purchase one can find in comparing variables across cases. But I think the abundant counter-theses raise a more difficult problem from my project, that of falsifiability. This category of analysis has come under critical pressure in the philosophy of natural and social science, as well, but in ordinary language terms it is important to ask, how would we know if the explanation is wrong? Here, specifically, one might ask, how do we know that sustained non-violence does not prove the presence of differentiated citizen-subjectivity?

Through the thesis I have attempted to distinguish between objective conditions and subjective evaluations in large measure as a response to this objection. In the Polish case, for instance, it seems objectively incontrovertible that neither fiscal crisis nor martial law had systematic effect on the strike option, whether or not Solidarity activists felt defeated. Likewise, Algerians had measurably no effective systemic political resources after the annulment of the 1991 elections results, and so were political denaturalized by the retracted offer of a differentiated voter-citizen regime. I have tried, on these grounds, to argue that the model does not sneak a theory into its variables because the presence or absence of a differentiated citizenship regime is objectively measurable apart from its effects, as seen in the brief histories.

As to the theory or model, I will qualify the mechanism of subjectivity as a human drive relevant to the materialist interpretation of citizenship regimes. My argument largely rests on the mechanism – universal causal property – of subjectivity, or willfulness Nietzsche describes in the Genealogy but I believe appears in these and other cases that I have researched. My first reply, just to set it aside, would be to insist that an objection here should be to this mechanism of subjectivity, not to mechanisms in general. Social science requires some specification of the
causal substrate that justifies explanation, but surely the need for systemic subjectivity may not be it. Subjectivity may be non-measurable in conventional terms, but I do think it is observable as an effect of political systems when agents are heard making arguments and pursuing causes to secure their capacity for agency in whatever system of prohibition can satisfy their subjective drive. That is, subjectivity is not the drive to secure freedom, but to fulfill one’s will, to live in the vanishing point Fanon unwittingly discerned between structure and agency, object and subject, regime and actor. I have also conceived subjectivity, unusually, as physically borne of regimes-of-becoming that allow one to act in a meaningful field. If this is not a mechanism for social research to adopt, especially the process of subject-formation, it may still help to explain the dynamics of violent and non-violent dissidents. Subjectivity could, for instance, be a sort of human bottom line, as suggested by the dehumanization thesis, where its determining impact on our actions diminishes once our essential needs are met. This is why I have espoused the *mechanism of subject-formation* as the universal and predictive feature of our social lives as an experimental *substrate* of explanatory models rather than as, itself, such a model.

Finally, I have described citizenship regimes as necessarily *material* in linking state and non-state actors – the capacity of citizens to compel concessions or reforms from the state in both cases derived from their use of their social resource to withdraw material support from ruling elites. Poles could withdraw labor power and Algerians could take their loyalty to another patron. Once again, this may apply only to my cases as a sort of contingent or coincidental commonality across these specific resources, though it seems evident that states form regular patterns of interactions with citizens that, construed as routine regimes between formal and informal consistency, have causal effects. I would accept an objection that my model, as stated,
is strangely materialist rather than subjective, as long as the latter is not construed as “idealist.” That is, while I gesture repeatedly to the subjective effects of un/differentiated citizen-regimes, the “action” of the thesis really rests with the material properties of the regimes themselves, and thus could stand alone without ever mentioning experience, memory, internalized iterated interactions, and the like.\textsuperscript{5} This objection deepens given my stipulation that the causal power of differentiated citizenship regimes is that they remained materially present and immanently if not immediately operable. It is the material presence, the endurance of the visible weapon as a reference to its past and future utility, one might say, that enables the experiential evaluation to perceive systemic subjectivity although it remains virtual. Accounts of experiential-historical evaluation seem causally secondary, particularly because I do not claim that memories of past state-provided tools have a path-dependent effect beyond immediate conditions. Indeed, the latter would offer a “purely idealistic” description of past experience trumping present, which is an outcome I find suspect for reasons sketched above (§2.e). It may seem less than pristine or parsimonious, but the cases suggest to me the interdigitation of “ideal” and “material” factors in shaping protest decisions, an imbrication that seems to reflect political complexities without yielding to nihilistic particularism or schematic modeling.\textsuperscript{6}

Nonetheless, it is correct to receive my argument as primarily materialist, from one angle, as differentiation of social resources within citizenship regimes is the independent variable, and thus achieves the explanation, while experiential-historical evaluation is an intervening variable inseparable from the material regime and resources. In short, a thoroughly materialist account of differentiated citizenship regimes correlating with violent/non-violent outcomes could, if it is persuasive, suffice while removing consternation about subjectivity (i.e.,
over half the thesis). It is true that the explanation of the contrasting results of comparable martial law in Poland and Algeria “boils down” to the continuity versus discontinuity of material resources to use against the state – the enduring potential of the strike versus eradication of voting and patronage. As a spare model, the thesis could have been confined to a single set of descriptions of variations in citizenship regimes as they form subjects of sociality, spatiality, and regularity. The ambiguous optical status of the extant strike option, however, cannot be dismissed in retrospect, as though martial law did not appear explicitly to eradicate previous social resources from Polish political life. Indeed, it is fidelity to a materialist framework that compels the resort to experiential and subjective citizen evaluation because objectively Poles, like Algerians, lacked material weapons against the state for a significant period under martial law without resort to violence. If the objective persistence of potentially recuperated resources against the state permitted Poles to remain non-violent, on material grounds this correlation requires an explanatory supplement. Indeed, I have faced the reverse objection: if the material social resources (the strike) were manifestly impotent under martial law, then citizenship regimes and social resources did not matter, as the state of emergency decimated them. I have also, along these lines, been told that “material” resources had no effect if they were still present but for objective reasons were perceived to be absent, in which case it proves the opposite of my argument: that systemic subjectivity is trivial, as my own cases prove. For this reason, given the ambivalent implications of a material account of differentiated citizenship regimes under state crack-down, I have felt compelled analytically to add systemic-subjectivity, experienced historically, as a causal factor linking sustained or ruptured citizen-subject-regimes with non-violent or violent protest.
I will conclude with a theoretical meta-commentary on my explanation and model. If my argument is right, it raises important political-philosophical paradoxes for our understanding of regimes, sovereignty, subjectivity, and violence. First, states that wish to prevent violent and potentially incumbency-threatening opposition should afford citizens social resources that give them effective means to challenge the state, specifically to constrain its prerogative. This means that sustained, collective, violent social agitation registers rulers’ strategic incompetence but the state’s fealty to the sovereign imperative. If states refuse to offer citizens resources to demand and win state concessions they reduce activists to disenfranchised expellees without systemic subjectivity, tempting blowback. Whether the Algerian state crippled or benefitted itself in the long run by cancelling elections and declaring war on its opponents may never be resolved, but it is dubious that retaining voter-citizenship would have prevented ruling elites from retaining dominant social power. Rulers increase the longevity of their incumbency, all things equal, by providing non-state actors systemic, reliable, legible means of limiting state power. If this sounds like how-to advice for reactionary governance, the oddity is that only via genuine social “empowerment” in effective citizenship structures can ruling elites secure their positions. This practical observation echoes classical contract theories, of course, by imagining the fates of state and citizen bound together in a symbiotic regime, lest the center not hold.

If this position constituted the whole of one’s political imagination, it would of course be an affront to anarchist and other theories skeptical of sovereign power or antagonistic to state primacy in determining ordinary people’s fortunes. But this “advice to the king” is contextual, not absolute, and applies only as long as states and citizens constitute distinct social locations and citizenship regimes. If this fundamental political order of state-and-citizen remains regnant,
then it appears that maximal benefit to each from the arrangement would be reciprocal; that is, the interest of each is tethered to the interest of the other and that this mutuality is secured by both parties cooperatively and simultaneously yielding and gaining systemic agency. Of course this could be seen as simply a social-democratic platitude, leaning on harmonious dreamscapes denying ontological clashes between organized political machines and plural individual desires. But the point in observing this reciprocity is itself critical and realist, not naïve or utopian, in our current, increasingly post-sovereign environment. There is a second paradox, related to the first about relinquishing power in order to retain it. The first paradox arising from the above analysis of differentiated citizenship regimes suggests that providing citizens with social resources limits the state’s subsequent capacity to determine citizens’ demands while also constituting citizens as subjects who remain non-violent, intra-systemic, or docile as they press for their grievances to be resolved. If a state provides an effective citizenship regime it gains control over the means of systemic subjectivity but cedes control over the objectives of citizens’ resistance. If the state denies effective citizenship, then, it sacrifices control of subjectivity for control of citizenship. The state in this sense determines the form and extent of its own indeterminacy; in designating citizen-subjectivities, states decide whether to control subjects or citizens. The obverse of this paradox emerges in the neo-liberal dissolution of systemic-subjectivity and effective citizenship regimes altogether. The second paradox arises in the shared experiential evaluation under high-modernist, centralized, territorial sovereign and post-modernist, capitalist-statist-militarist non-sovereign conditions. The unitary experience of reification and expulsion – of life at the whim of unaccountable socio-political forces in a regime devoted to preventing systemic subjectivity – in despotic and neo-liberal polities alike hints that in the post-authoritarian landscape people are
reduced to dreaming only of a citizenship regime in which a recovered state will yield its power in exchange for compliance.
I will defend this assumption by explaining my last-minute decision to drop from the final draft of the thesis its most theoretical and speculative chapter, on the subject in social science. Social explanation entails explicit, perspicuous ontological statements about the universal substrate or causal mechanism that validates inferences drawn from comparative research. This desideratum has forced social sciences to confront problems of universal versus particular ethnographic claims since the nineteenth-century. The main dilemma is that theories respecting particularity cannot be converted into universal explanations while theories providing universal statements produce more particular exceptions than general rules. Because scientific ambition desires generalization, our tendency has been to name universal human characteristics that define or motivate all social behavior. Early expressions of this will-to-universalize were biological (“all humans laugh the same way”); abstract (“all humans seek dignity” or “to maximize profits”); or a combination of these (“all humans ban incest”). Observing the priority social sciences have assigned to the second tendency – abstracting from diverse social activities a general human trait, typically dignity – I held in chapter six that universal abstractions cannot be mechanisms precisely because they had to be evacuated of particular subjective motivations. I emphasized subjective, not cultural, particularity to think about how “evental subjectivization” affects social explanation, including mine of Polish non-violence and Algerian violence under state coercion. In short, borrowing from psychoanalysis, I encouraged social sciences to replace abstract human characteristics with situated-subjective intensifications as its ontological premise. Subject-formation provides social research a general substrate, with irredually particular expressions, that is superior to concepts like “dignity.” A comment by Slavoj Žižek urged me in this direction, especially as it invoked the central categories of my project, subjectivity and evaluation:

“...illusions by means of which the Substance perceives itself in distorted (“subjective”) form. More crucially, the fact is here generally overlooked that such a type of judgment on the correspondence of an object to its own Notion implies a kind of reflexive redoubling of the Subject’s will and desire [For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor (Verso 1991), 131].

My sixth chapter was a response to this attack on naive images of subjectivity. Žižek scorns the conceit that we can understand or explain social action on the assumption that agents know, express, pursue, or can satisfy the fundamental desires that might drive them to outcomes like violence. If the psychoanalytic trajectory of the last century is at all instructive, it radically discourses our basic premises that subjects can report, correct, translate, or foreclose their desires in the form of remediable grievances. Žižek’s psychoanalytic subjectivity integrates universal patterns of intensification or meaning-making and particular cultural or social or political symbols, images, and fantasies. The concern that compelled a sixth chapter, then, was the prospect that Polish and Algerian subjects may have responded to historical events, in Alain Badiou’s sense, effecting their actions in ways my model excludes. Specifically, if conjecturably, resentment of the post-colonial state may have formed as an expression of the “unfinished revolution” that constituted Algerians as warriors denied victory, captive to the “modern” institutions and ethics that justified martial law. In turn, the historical achievement of labor and intellectual activism culminating in Solidarity may have achieved the universal revolution of the address-to-all-citizens, hence constituting Poles as peaceful subjects of a dying authoritarian colossus. Subject-formation plays out in many ways, but the point is: I would not wish to exclude the possibility that “evental subjectivization” constituted Polish and Algerian subjects as distinct candidates for violence. I thus devoted a final chapter to contrasting theories of the subject, on the intellectual-analytical grounds that we should not exclude potentially damaging theoretical challenges to the assumptions that shape our discipline. Put another way, I examined whether theories that subjects are constituted by a “gap between the object and its Notion” undermine reigning social-scientific predicates, whether subject-formation confounds or confines explanations based on rational actors or abstract humans.

My project was initially designed to test the limits of social explanation by working from inside out: case studies would complicate universality, which would yield subjectivity. A separate treatment of subject-formation answered the dehumanization problematic posed in the introduction, which may now seem unanswered. This silence could be the apopposite dialectical response to the psychoanalytic challenge to liberal-detached abstract humanity. But I excised the chapter for a more prosaic reason, if with an analytic rationale. A stand-alone chapter on subjectivity threatened to demote or subsume the specific discussion of citizenship regimes, itself the potential groundwork for asking whether the structural-experiential model needs a psychoanalytic supplement. This more modest account may be necessary in either explaining violence/non-violence or revealing what variables are missing.
EPICGRAPH


NOTE ON STYLE


3 Merton was answering Bernard Bailyn’s comment that the aphorism “appears to have a rather impressive antiquity.”

4 Vis., The squirrel’s.


6 Hemingway said about one Hemingway scholar: “If you shot him he’d probably bleed footnotes” [Philip Young, “The Writer in Decline,” D. Noble, ed., Hemingway: A Revaluation (Whitston 1983), 231]. The staunchly anti-academic Hemingway filled his novels with literary citations, references, influences, and theories, of course.

7 Gnome aptly means “maxim, aphorism” and “an ageless and often deformed dwarf of folklore who lives in the earth and usually guards precious ores or treasures” [Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (Merriam 1981), 487]. As either aphorism or troglodyte, the dwarf de-forms by living in the earth (or archive) and guarding his treasures (or documents).

8 Merton, On the Shoulders of Giants, 3 fn. *

9 By “ethnography” I mean “writing about people.” Ethnos (ἔθνος) refers to people, as in Volk, a people, and connotes language-users or “ethnicity”; graphia (γραφία), writing. That ethnography has come to refer to a specific kind of writing about language-users merits a separate genealogy, or perhaps ethnography. Writing about language-users now implies writing about them in one way, about their ethnic or linguistic traits, presuming what is central to human action is its ethnic or meaning-giving properties that social researchers must take it as their job to capture or inscribe.


11 Note a related question concerning Derrida’s critique of exemplarity vis-à-vis social explanation, e.g., visible in legal theory. Derrida denies the logic of exemplarity in which hegemonic systems subsume others, thus: (1) law exemplifies “rule of law,” (2) law/“rule of law” exemplifies society; (3) law/“rule of law”/society exemplifies progress; (4) law/“rule of law”/society/ progress exemplifies value, etc. Derrida thinks such exemplary subsumptions or “instantiations” leave remainders, elements that overflow the two terms in the example. Derrida may ignore discernible patterns or logics in how discourses posit exemplary subsumptions; he himself adduces examples whose meaning, by his argument, should be indecisive or obscure [Irene Harvey, “Derrida and the Issues of Exemplarity,” D. Wood, ed., Derrida: A Critical Reader (Blackwell 1992), 199]. Here is the claim that one must stake an epistemological ground determine what meanings cannot be determined. Derrida may provide an example of non-exemplarity, but that could advance his claim about the permanent and irreducible remainder of any example. I merely wish to seize Derrida’s insight that interstitial meanings and practices support but exceed logos, law, codification, regulation – returning to the juridical plane, that law is not merely “founded on non-law,” i.e., borne of social violence, improvisation, power, or barbarism; and not merely sustained by non-law; but is also perpetuated necessarily by multiple culturally inscribed ethical exceptions. This insight pertains, in its various formulations, to the problem in this project of subjectivity, objectification, violence, and “ideality” {see Étienne Balibar, “Violence, Ideality, and Cruelty,” Politics and the Other Scene, C. Turner, et al., trs. (Verso 2011 [1995]).
INTRODUCTION: Violence Between Freedom and Will

12 James Wood, “A Reply to the Editors,” n + 1, no. 3 (Fall 2005), 139. Wood recounts a lecture on Beethoven’s piano sonatas in which Alfred Brendel kept interrupting his “quotations...of the music with his Viennese mumbling.” Gradually “his ‘quotations' overwhelmed his commentary; in a sense, he was incapable of quoting. Or rather, he could only quote: Brendel had approached Benjamin’s idea of a book entirely made of quotes.” Are Brendel’s performances of Beethoven thus also merely uninterrupted quotation? If so, it is his Beethoven for which we applaud Brendel, as much as a real Beethoven we applaud through Brendel.

13 In his 1966 work, Les Mots et les choses, rendered as The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (Vintage 1970), with his approval, Michel Foucault churlishly made a “request to the English-speaking reader: ‘In France, certain half-witted ‘commentators’ persist in labeling me a ‘structuralist.’ I have been unable to get it into their tiny minds that I have used none of the methods, concepts, or key terms that characterize structural analysis. I should be grateful if a…” Foucault’s remark is apposite in light of this dissertation’s oral defense, which probed whether my structural explanation of Polish non-violence and Algerian violence requires supplemental discussions of a quasi-hermeneutics of iterated citizen-subjectivity. I am grateful to the committee for urging me to clarify the need for this supplement, which I attempt below (§1.b.3.b, §1.b.3.c).


16 Mario Vargas Llosa, “Cien Años de Soledad: Realidad Total, Novela Total,” Introduction, Gabriel García Márquez, Cien Años de Soledad (Real Academia Española 2007 [1967]), xxvii [“Este proceso es, literalmente, una canibilización: esos materiales son digeridos plenamente por la nueva realidad, trocados en una sustancia distinta y homogénea”] [SR, tr.].

17 David F. Wallace, Interview with C. Rose, quoted in Jenny Turner, “Move Your Head and the Picture Changes,” Review of Helen DeWitt and Ilya Gridneff, Your Name Here (helendewitt.com), London Review, 30:17 (11 Sep 2008), 23. In this view – which might apply to good writing in history, anthropology, or social science – veracity anneals efficacy. As Wallace remarked, similarly if more severely, Tolstoy’s narratives reflected a time-space experience one would be false to imitate: “I just – stuff that’s like that, I enjoy reading, but it doesn’t feel true at all. I read it as a relief from what’s true. I read it as a relief from the fact that I received five hundred thousand discrete bits of information today, of which maybe twenty-five are important. And how am I going to sort those out, you know?” [quoted in Wyatt Mason, “Smarter than You Think,” NYRB, LVII:12 (15 July 2010), 12]. Mason adds that reliable narratives are “fantasies – a ‘making visible.’ They put before us things that cannot be seen in life: other hearts, other minds. Their endurance is the proof of their value and the confirmation of our need for such shows of rationality” (15).


19 Evidently tin-eared to the potency of eclecticism, Carlin Romano resentfully damns “eponymous crutches – Derridean this and Foucauldian that – all citations to prestigious academics meant to add false authority to your views.” Cheering up, he urges us all, sincerely, to write novels dedicated “for Susan Sontag,” to celebrate singularity – if only hers [“The Newspaper Appreciation as Death Kit,” Chronicle Review, 51:19 (14 Jan 2005), B12].


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2 The classic binary freedom/tyranny is notoriously problematic, especially if the terms are posited as symmetrical or ontological. We are wont to think that freedom as the absence of tyranny but not tyranny as the absence of freedom; that tyranny is a concrete political regime but freedom an abstract existential condition; that ordinary language correctly says humans are naturally free but not tyrannical; that tyranny is “more possible,” concrete, or “real” than freedom; etc. For empirical political philosophy, such as
this project assays, the opposition cannot be resolved and need not be retained as an abstract conceptual dichotomy [Hilary Putnam distinguishes dualism from dichotomy in The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (Harvard 2003), 9ff.].

3 In a related framework, Jeff Goodwin calls “state constructionism” the process “in which certain state structures and practices actively form or ‘construct’ revolutionary movements as effectively as the best professional revolutionaries, by channeling and organizing political dissent along radical lines” [No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 (Cambridge 2001), 25].

4 In a similar, if more ambitiously totalizing, account Stathis Kalyvas argues that, despite expressive variation, civil wars possess a “deep structure” across cases [The Logic of Civil War (Cambridge 2006), 9]. In my relatively modest study, I would offer only that the citizenship regime as a mode of subject-formation helpful in refining the objectification-freedom binary.

5 Emmanuel Levinas calls this potential “infinition” – ethical and empirical life merged in a radical becoming. “The relation with infinity cannot, to be sure, be stated in terms of experience, for infinity overflows the thought that thinks it. Its very infinition is produced precisely in this overflowing. The relation with infinity will have to be stated in terms other than those of objective experience; but if experience precisely means a relation with the absolutely other, that is, with what always overflows thought, the relation with infinity accomplishes experience in the fullest sense of the word.” One might say: only the infinite attests coherently to freedom (“Preface,” Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Klower 1991 [1961]), 23, 25).

6 James Gilligan, Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic (Vintage 1996). Indignity or pain may also silence the voice or etiolate the will [Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery: The aftermath of violence – from domestic abuse to political terror (Basic 1992)]. These two options – resistance or necropolitics – typify the symptomatic alternatives attributed to violence: either enlivening negation (vengeance) or deadening survivalism (death-in-life repression). Note that either may be seen as the purely biological and automatic response of the animal man.

7 This raises a central problem in studies of violence, the seemingly equal likelihood that a desire for greater freedom will induce one to comply with rather than confront a social system – as such, radically opposed strategies derived from the same desire. This is to suggest, as well, that survival will often be preferred to freedom as its necessary antecedent condition of possibility.

8 Bertolt Brecht expressed this sensibility in suggesting it would be easier for the East German government in 1953 to “dissolve the people and elect another” [“Wäre es da/ Nicht doch einfacher, die Regierung/ Löste das Volk auf und/ Wähle ein anderes?”] (“The Solution” [“Die Lösung” (1953)])


10 I.e., the Middle East and North Africa, or MENA. It is unclear whether the admirable anti-colonial effort to rename “Middle East” as “West Asia,” will catch on or, if so, have a significant impact.

11 In most European and Anglo-American political theory (and ideology) authoritarianism precedes “free” political constitutions, i.e., is the generic regime that liberty must overcome and purge. In this view authoritarianism’s internal dissidents must choose to support or impede enlightened principles and practices, by either adopting or refusing norms external to the tyrannical regime. In this impression, the inhabitants of authoritarian political systems must draw their liberating commitments from elsewhere, outside the political system. This seemingly obvious premise has critical implications. First, it suggests that authoritarian regimes do not offer internal resources for resistance or negotiation, which is false. Second, it suggests that, for so-called reasons of state, rulers could be justified in repressing dissent, on the grounds that dissidents necessarily represent foreign values, desires, or objectives.

12 Note the implication, resonant in human rights discourses, that physically coercive uprisings against authoritarian regimes are not meaningfully violent because they seek to undo dehumanizing violence; conversely, liberal-democratic regimes opposed with physical means are seen as confronting violence or terrorism that undermines the conditions of human flourishing.

13 Technically, mechanisms are causal by definition, as universal statements with robust causal properties (see fn. 41 below).

14 This theory is vividly portrayed in the film “Total Recall,” in which a corporation has monopolized and charged a fee for the oxygen in a space station on Mars. When rebels resist the fees, the company cuts off the air supply, mutating and crippling the inhabitants, and leading to a Maoist revolution. Critically, the native inhabitants have been dehumanized beyond autochthonous revolt, requiring an outsider still strong enough to lead their militant uprising.

This indifference was, typically, exacerbated by instrumenal familiarity [see Kalyvas, Logic of Violence (2006), 234-235.

The status of Fanon’s psychoanalytic revisionism exceeds this study, but his rejection of standard Freudian models alludes to “the difficulties of seeking to ‘cure’ a native properly, that is to say, when seeking to make him thoroughly a part of the a social background of the colonial type. Because it is a systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the other person all attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the people it dominates to ask themselves the question constantly, ‘In reality, who am I?’…It seems to us that in the cases here chosen the events giving rise to the disorder are chiefly the bloodthirsty and pitiless atmosphere, the generalization of inhuman practices, and the firm impression that people have of being caught up in a veritable Apocalypse”[Wretched of the Earth, C. Farrington, tr. (Grove 1963 [1961]), 250-251]. French-trained analyst Fanon condemned the equation of strong mental health with normalized, pacified adjustment to domination. Slavoj Žižek insists that such political objections define the opposed logics of psychoanalytic theory and practice, which – as Fanon says – ought not to be fused. “The theoretical ‘regression’ of revisionism,” Žižek writes,

emerges most clearly in the relationship posited between theory and therapy. By putting theory at the service of therapy, revisionism obliterates their dialectical tension: in an alienated society, therapy is ultimately destined to fail, and the reasons for this failure are provided by theory itself. Therapeutic “success” amounts to the “normalization” of the patient, his adaptation to the “normal” functioning of existing society, whereas the crucial achievement of psychoanalytic theory is precisely its explanation of how “mental illness” is based on a certain “discontent” endemic to civilization as such. The subordination of theory to therapy thus requires the loss of the critical dimension of psychoanalysis [“Is There a Cause of the Subject?” J. Copjec, ed., Supposing the Subject (Verso 1994), 88].

Žižek holds that a hermeneutic of suspicion is endogenous, not external, to psychoanalysis. Quoting Russel Jacoby, he stresses, “Psychoanalysis is a theory of an unfree society that necessitates psychoanalysis as a therapy” [Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing (Harvester 1977), 122; Žižek, “Is There a Cause of the Subject (1994) 88]. This is an important sub-argument to have in place about contested theories of subjectivity.

Fanon’s practical-theoretical views betray a conventional enlightenment moral psychology in which militant action restores the truth of the whole person. Revolutionary moments overcome the split between conscious object and unconscious subject within the colonized. These alignments invert the liberal binary, conscious subject and unconscious object, but retain the potential for revolutionary re-unification of conscious subjects. As Françoise Vergès writes,

In Fanonian psychology, difference can only be invidious, and the unconscious is the negative of consciousness; it masks the consciousness. The goal is therefore to destroy the white mask on black consciousness. Behind the mask is the truth…To Fanon, emancipation was the recovery of a wounded masculinity. In Algeria, Fanon found the virile male that would belie the colonial construction of emasculated masculinity. With the Algerian nationalist fighter, Fanon found a man whose masculinity had been wounded but who had, in contrast to the black man of the Antilles, the courage to attack the castrating master, the Frenchman, and to castrate him in return [Monsters and Revolutionaries: Colonial Family Romance and Métissage (Duke 1999), 210]

I am deliberately conflating distinctions in Fanon’s analysis among oppression, suppression, and repression. Repression is the proper concept for the redirection of urges into the unconscious. Fanon appears uninterested in creative processes of sublimation, perhaps since racist violence foregrounds physical-psychic trauma over cooperative social repression. Hence, his essay, “Colonial War and Mental Disorders,” Wretched of the Earth, records only destructively repressed rather than productively sublimated traumas: impotence after a wife’s rape, “undifferentiated homicidal impulses” after surviving a “mass murder,” “anxiety disorders of the depersonalization type” after murdering a French woman, and so on.

It is central to Fanon’s vision, and to my project, to envisage human being as human becoming, but not as a trendy post-modern wink. I think Fanon shared Sartre’s “existentialist” position that subjects are neither radically autonomous nor imprisoned; rather, belief in only those options showed “bad faith,” where “good faith” consists in living through our situated and immanent selves simultaneously [Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, H. Barnes, tr. (Washington Square 1966 [1943]), 56ff.]. Where Fanon departed from Sartre – and, I suspect, social science must depart from axioms of rational detachment – is in partitioning subjectivity as free/un-free, or willful/habitual. Fanon does not endorse, suitably, Sartre’s distinction between accidental actions and those that “intentionally realize a conscious project” (529).
Fanon assimilates, I believe, Nietzsche’s monistic subjectivity to a Marxism adjusted for colonial race and class composition:

A quantum of power is just such a quantum of drive, will, effect – more precisely, it is nothing other than this very driving, willing, effecting, and only through the seduction of language (and the…errors of reason petrified therein), which…misunderstands all effecting as conditioned by an effecting something, by a ‘subject,’ can it appear otherwise. For just as common people separate the lightning from its flash and take the latter as doing as an effect of a subject called lightning, so popular morality…separates strength from the expression of strength as if there were behind the strong an indifferent substratum that is free to express strength – or not to. But there is no such substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind the doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is simply fabricated into the doing – the doing is everything” [Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, M. Clark/A. Swensen, trs. (Hackett 1998 [1887]), 25].

Fanon makes this point strongly, whether or not the point is strong. Objects cannot will objects, subjects cannot will subjects; the key point being that subjects cannot will themselves, at least not in the dualistic sense that at time T there is a subject and at a later time T2 this subject has, qua agential decision-maker, willed her own subjectivity. Fanon’s view, a key one in my findings, is that subjectivity and willing are not agential in this sense. Agitators will as subjects, from within their subjectivity; they do not choose but express this subjectivity. This does not imply that their capacity to exercise their subjective will is constant; conditions permitting or impeding subjective will vary. But this variation does not suggest, Fanon thinks, that there are conditions of more or less “freedom” in deciding what one’s subjective will is.

Again Fanon echoes Nietzsche, here the last line in the Genealogy of Morality: “man would rather will nothingness than not will…” (op. cit., 118). In a simple sense, Fanon reiterates the view that humans are willful creatures that defend willing itself; between not exercising my will and exercising it destructively, I would rather destroy. This drives not only Fanon’s theory of violence, but also his anxiety that violence can express a will-to-nothingness, in Nietzsche’s words “an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life [that] is and remains a will.” For Fanon, this negation would take the form of post-colonial nationalism, parochialism, and regression from the project of universal human emancipation.

The Fanon literature debates whether this claim simply means dehumanization re-humanizes. But this claim has two meanings, one cynically fatalist, one cheerfully open-ended. For some, “On Violence,” a seminal essay but insufficient for grasping Fanon’s social-psychology, deploys Hegel’s master-slave dialectic to say, cynically, that dehumanization is a necessary stage in achieving fully human, i.e., self-conscious freedom. If so, Fanon must think the Algerians owe France a debt of gratitude for freeing them. This is Judith Butler’s critique of Jean-Paul Sartre’s preface to Wretched of the Earth: “Indeed, his view makes the colonizer into the primary subject of violence. And this claim seems to contradict his other claim, namely, that under these conditions, violence can be understood to bring the human into being. If we subscribe to his first thesis, we are left with the conclusion, surely faulty, that colonization is a precondition for humanization, something that civilizational justifications for colonization have always maintained, and a view which…Sartre wanted vehemently to oppose” [“Violence, Non-Violence: Sartre on Fanon,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 27:1 (2006), 12]. Fanon’s account avoids Butler’s reproach. He seems to think that people naturally struggle with all virtual and actual limits and promises of human life; it is not necessary in general but in Algeria to achieve this existence through a horrifying war of independence from imperial dehumanization. The near-object who rebels, re-subjectivizes or re-humanizes herself, transcends a cruel condition; this does not entail that cruelty is a necessary condition of transcendence.


Refining this argument, Goodwin writes that “the formation of strong revolutionary movements is found in peripheral societies in which especially repressive and disorganized states possess geographically and socially delimited power [No Other Way Out (2001), 26].

Along just these lines, Fanon explains violence rufefully; he does not “defend” it. Indeed, his physicalism is pitched against ethical views that confuse justification and explanation on grounds that we can always choose our actions. It is this view Fanon attributes to collaborating “native intellectuals,” a view that is anything but trivially polemical on his part and for purposes of social research. For Fanon, as psychoanalytist and Marxist, the belief in liberal or rational detachment is a political and analytical error in that it expresses without comprehending the elitism of its own premises. For Marx or Dewey, it mistakes the position and ideology of privilege with those of everybody else, and misunderstands the ideological basis of its own thought, thus instantiating “pure ideology” (§ 2.e).

The need to ground reliable social knowledge in a physical ontology is more openly stated where natural science is integrating social research, e.g., when medical anthropologist Arthur Kleinman says, “somatisation is the norm worldwide, even in the more
psychologically minded West” [Rethinking Psychiatry: From Cultural Category to Personal Experience (Free 1988), 150]. To be sure, this integration varies in quality, e.g., ideological derivations of social outcomes from biological needs: “The claims that human warfare, sexual dominance, love of private property, and hate of strangers are human universal are found over and over in the writings of socio-biologists, whether they be biologists, economists, psychologists, or political scientists” [Richard Lewontin, Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA (Harper 1992), 91]. A bad practice does not, of course, condemn the practice itself.

32 See Michael Ignatieff’s attempt at a universally acceptable “human rights minimalism” limited to physical security [“I. Human Rights as Politics II. Human Rights as Idolatry,” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Delivered at Princeton University (April 2000)]; Wendy Brown’s dismissal of it [“The Most We Can Hope For . . .”: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism,” South Atlantic Quarterly, 103:2/3 (Spr/Sum 2004); and Raymond Geuss’s critique of any “universal right” [History and Illusion in Politics, (Cambridge 2001), 131-152].

33 Conceived in the early 1990s among United Nations personnel to counter the perceived priority of military security, “human security” should comprise (1) physical [welfare]; (2) juridical [rights]; (3) subjective [power]. Physical safety and juridical rights do not secure resources to compel the state to respect civilian demands. Political subjectivity is one primal right that conditions effective demands for other rights, e.g., food, shelter, or speech. Which component of human security is the primary condition of the others is, however, indeterminate. Citizens need minimal caloric intake, legal space, and coercive capacity to advance their human security. They lack, and see themselves as lacking, these aspects of human security in varying ways across time and place. How physical, juridical, or subjective capacities are weighted objectively and subjectively in particular contexts needs to be specified, which remains a problem for efforts to universalize the concept of human security.

34 The “perestroïkan” assault on the universal ontology underlying quantitative, rational-choice, and game-theoretic methods was in part a simple reaction to the apparent rise of incommensurable national/religious identity movements. In retrospect the assault may have been an anxious projection re: the capacity of qualitative particularists to proceed without universal assumptions.

35 It is plausible to argue that all nouns convey process and endpoint. If I am in the process of driving I have achieved driving. This confusion plagues nouns ending in tion that “fall upon the facts like soft snow, blurring the outline and covering up all the detail,” as Orwell said, with “pacification” as his main example [“Politics and the English Language” (1946)].


41 “For proponents of process tracing, the distinction between a causal pathway and a causal mechanism imposes an obligation to not claim too much. Identifying causal pathways in a critical ingredient of science. But the identification of mechanisms has been celebrated as going one step further, as adding deep explanatory knowledge... Those who identify processes but not mechanisms should take great pains to demarcate properly their explanatory accomplishments” [David Waldner, "What are Mechanisms and What are They Good For?" (manuscript on file with author]; and “Process Tracing and Causal Mechanisms,” H. Kincaid, ed., Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Science (Oxford 2011), 6].


CHAPTER ONE: Citizen-Subjectivity, experiential evaluation, and violence/non-violence

1 Angelus is a Roman Catholic prayer ritual, called by a ringing bell, commemorating Christ’s incarnation.


6 As I argue below (§3.c.1) culture and dignity poorly predict variable outcomes. As *constants* they cannot explain change; as *variables*, their own changes must be explained. In terms of culture, empirical research crucially makes this correction. “Islam” and “Catholicism” cannot explain variation in Muslim and Catholic political decisions over time and space. Religious culture *interacts* with other variables to influence social action. This is *not* to proffer a materialist or realist view that culture or religion *does not matter*; but to insist that culture matters as one evaluative prism subject to material or realist pressures. Culture refers to *regularities and legible patterns* in social action or signification that include variation, strategy, adaptation, or inconsistence [Katherine Ewing, “The Illusion of Wholeness: Culture, Self, and the Experience of Inconsistency,” *Ethos*, 18:3 (Sep. 1990), 252].

7 For a critique of dominant analytical perspectives from this period, see my “Global Books and Local Stories: Theory and Anti-Theory in Social Research,” C. Lowney, ed., *Identities* [Institute for Human Sciences (Vienna) 1998].

8 Relevant theories, not yet a recognized literature, remain scattered but promising. Timur Kuran argues that bandwagon effects under widespread preference falsification can produce unpredicted revolutions, reconciling “structuralism and individualism,” but in a seemingly circular model [*“Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolutions of 1989.” World Politics*, 44:1 (Oct 1991), 22, passim]. James Ron shows that democratic consolidation can *increase* violence where radical state opponents fear losing their systemic relevance, but it is unclear if this is a model or narrative [*“Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation.” Journal of Peace Research*, 38:5 (Sep 2001)]. Michael Liu attributes the difference between Poland’s 1981 coup and Iran’s 1979 revolution to “the capacity of the leadership, bureaucracy, and military to deal with revolutionary situations,” although the explanatory variable eventually diffuses to include “state relations to other states, classes, and religion, as well as relations between the religious elite and classes” [*“States and Urban Revolutions: Explaining the Revolutionary Outcomes in Iran and Poland,” Theory and Society*, 17:2 (Mar 1988), 180, passim].

9 Two decades later, we still must heed Lucian Pye’s call for “finer shades of typologies of political systems between classic polar opposites of authoritarian and democratic. In the wake of the crisis of authoritarianism we can expect a wide variety of systems that will become part authoritarian and part free and will fall far short of any reasonable definitions of democracy” [*“Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism,” APSR*, 84: 2 (1990), 13]. But we must also refine typologies of *pre-crisis* authoritarianism [David and Ruth Collier, “Inducements Versus Constraints: Disaggregating ‘Corporatism.’” *APSR*, 73:4 (1979)] as we continue to re-map formal “regime-type” and social power [see David Waldner, “Policy History: Regimes,” *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (Elsevier Science LTD 2001)].

10 It may not be wise to compare the 2011 Arab uprisings to the 1989 Central European transitions. Poland scholar Michael Kennedy rejects the comparison, citing three structural differences: *non-violent ruling elites and opponents; imperial cooperation* (the USSR ultimately used its power to facilitate 1989’s democratic extension. By contrast, the counter-revolutionary position in
2011 has many more geopolitical actors with very different associations with and commitments to democracy.”); **global economic recession.** In short, “civil society could institutionalize transformations following 1989 because national authoritarians and global geopolitical forces reinforced that change with a prosperous economic outlook channeling that trajectory” [*Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, and Historical Frames: 2011, 1989, 1968,* Jadaliyya (11 Oct 2012), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2853/arab-spring-occupy-wall-street-and-historical-fram]. Hugh Roberts rejects Algeria-Communism analogies, insisting the FLN – unlike the CP’s – was not socialist, a party, or opposed ideologically by a mass movement [*Battlefield Algeria* (2003), 108-111]. Note these views reject likening, not comparing, the cases. The equation is common among journalists and regime opponents. Anthony Shadid reported: “Tunisia’s uprising [has] electrified the region. The most enthusiastic suggested it was the Arab world’s Gdansk, the birthplace of Solidarity in Poland, which heralded the end to Communist rule in Eastern Europe” [*Joy as Tunisian President Flees Offers Lesson to Arab Leaders,* NYT (14 Jan 2011), at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/world/africa/15region.html?_r=2&h].

11 “The basis of the system [is] the same as it was before the war…Local fortunes are to be made in imports, property, and construction and the domestic economy is one of consumption rather than production, dependent on the pipelines leaving Algeria’s ports and the container ships coming in, without a self-sustaining base that might survive the interruption of either” [James McDougall, “After the War: Algeria’s Transition to Uncertainty,” *Middle East Report*, no. 245, 37:4 (Win 2007), 40].


14 To most outsiders, Algeria connotes only the violence represented by its celebrated signifiers: eminent French émigrés such as Hélène Cixous and Jacques Derrida who fled effective statelessness or anti-Semitism; Fanon’s analysis of anti-imperial militancy in *Les Damnés de la Terre* (1962) and Gillo Pontecorvo’s portrait of it in *La battaglia di Algeri* (1966), used by the American military in counter-insurgency training; and images of Arab piracy invoked by pugilists to attack Islam [e.g., Christopher Hitchens, *God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything* (Twelve 2007), 176-177]. These images of US state builders’ battling with Muslim corsairs to free American captives in the 18th-19th centuries recalls events in which Christian universal egalitarianism trumped anti-Muslim racism in American thought – and hypocrisy eroded cultural sanctimony. Evidently, owning slaves made it hard to moralize about being made into slaves [Anouar Majid, *Freedom and Orthodoxy: Islam and Difference in the Post-Andalusian Age* (Stanford 2004), 65-73; for a brisk history, see Frederick Leiner, “At War with Algiers,” *The End of Barbary Terror: America’s 1815 War against the Pirates of North Africa* (Oxford 2006)].


16 Reactionary states and oppositions are often seen as mutually caused, as in Saudi Arabia [Robert Vitalis, *America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier* (Verso 2009); Asad Abukhalil, *The Battle for Saudi Arabia: Royalty, Fundamentalism, and Global Power* (Seven Stories 2003)].


18 Noah Feldman, *After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy* (Farrar, Straus, & Giroux 2003), 19. Even ignoring the 2011 Arab uprisings, Feldman poses the puzzle poorly with respect to Algeria. Muslims did form a “popular democratic movement” precisely because they saw “democracy as the solution to what all[ed] their country” if it brought them to power. Feldman explicitly thinks Islamists are not “freedom-loving” because they are not liberals. This conflation of democracy, liberalism, freedom, and secularization exposes the tendentious exclusions of those “universal” ethical postures.

19 Democratic or participatory inclusion has incorporated Islamists peacefully in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, with Yemen and Egypt as unclear case; aggressive political exclusion has militarized Islamists in Afghanistan, Gaza, Chechnya, Xinjiang, Algeria, Iraq, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, FATA, and the Ferghana Valley. In some cases, the state has massacred Islamist opponents (pre-invasion Iraq, Syria), creating a third category of genocidal repression (§3.a).

20 Algerian rulers claimed to derive legitimacy from their Islamic faith and participation in the liberation war against France. The Algerian state thus “sacralized” itself in religious and revolutionary terms as directly representing Algerians’ fundamental beliefs.
Poland’s leaders, in contrast, sanctified communism in secular and modern terms as negotiating with or transforming Poles’ basic beliefs. But neither Algeria’s religious nor Poland’s secular “sacralization” project succeeded. Both regimes had to bargain and pay for “legitimacy” and were anyway discredited, or “de-sacralized,” long before they imposed martial law.

21 This does not imply that Algerian Muslims or Polish Catholics gave their primary allegiances elsewhere or could not legitimize national-secular states. It is simply one, and a minor one, of their shared traits that their religious movements had global support.

22 This wrangling over assets should not be construed as either a religiously coded material contest or a materially coded secular/religious contest. Material wealth is required to defend beliefs and to build institutions, whatever faith they express. Note, too, that the presence of religious agitation against secular states implies neither a basic conflict between religious and secular beliefs nor any inherent polarity in the social logics of secular and religious faith, symbols, rituals, desires, or sacrifice.


24 My category of systemic subjectivity is similar in this respect to the concept of intentionality in David Waldner’s account:

[Intentionality is an invariant principle, taken to be a constant feature of human consciousness. Intentionality means, informally, that consciousness is directed upon an object, that humans have desires about objects, and that agency pursues these desires. We can easily intervene to shape specific preferences; subsidizing an object increases demand for that object. But that intervention, like making fuel present or absent, is not a variable; the mechanism, here intentionality, is an invariant property [“What are Mechanisms and What are They Good For?” (manuscript on file with author); also see “Process Tracing and Causal Mechanisms” (2011), 6].

25 This “dominant pattern” by which a citizenship regime constitutes systemic subjectivity may be a constellation of state tactics and techniques rather than one reductive means. The citizenship regime is not a zero-sum contest among, e.g., urban labor, rural peasants, national-party voters, or clients. Effective citizenship can be any simple or complex arrangement of systemic subjective interpellations. That Algeria fostered client-citizenship and Poland labor-citizenship does not mean every country’s citizenship regime is similarly dominated by a single recruitment scheme. The citizenship regime may instead subjectivize non-state actors in overlapping and discrete modes of incorporation that nonetheless constitute a single pattern, as under Mexico’s PRI: “By breaking society down into three main sectors – the labor sector, the agrarian sector, and the populist sector – and through creating the means for their political representation, the PRI’s corporate approach to governance claimed a comprehensiveness that, theoretically at least, placed it above contestation” [Nicholas Higgins, Understanding the Chiapas Rebellion: Modernist Visions and the Invisible Indian (Texas 2004), 128].

26 At the risk of overclarifying, I am distinguishing “mere” juridical, formal citizenship (passport and specified rights conferred within a bounded territory) from effective citizenship or citizen-subjectivity. Unless otherwise noted, citizenship will refer below to effective means of state-citizen interaction that situate citizens as systemic subjects by affording them useful social resources.

27 I am grateful to Mark Kesselman for helping me to develop this terminology.

28 An additional stipulation concerns limitations on the exit option; the resort to anti-systemic violence also depends on agents’ ability to realize their will by withdrawing from a given system and re-situating their subjectivity in another system.


30 I thank certain members of my committee for ribbing me sympathetically about my model-fetish – the old-fashioned wish to insert carefully conceived variables into causal pathways. I do not defend “positivist” rigor except to say that this stylized and formal presentation is not intended to rigidly order practical, conditional, messy human affairs, but in part to explore whether an “excessively” modeled argument sheds light on the whoop and wharf of political life.

31 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge 1990), 30-31. “Common-pool resource refers to a natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits for its use.”


Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (Columbia 2000), 72.

Mark Lichbach extends rational-actor models of dissent (including modes of mobilization and motivation) to the “non-rational or irrational behavior” of, e.g., “philanthropic or religious” groups [*The Rebel’s Dilemma* (Michigan 1998), chs. 7-11].

For Ian Hacking “social constructionism” should be associated exclusively with contingent social processes and dissociated from anti-universal or anti-essentialist contentions [*The Social Construction of What?* (Harvard 1999), 6-19].


Jillian Schwedler shows that inclusion in state policy procedures pacified Yemeni Islamists behaviorally but not ideologically; here the analysis of institutional effect on social mobilization emphasizes state capacity to contain ideological differences within a shared incentive structure [*Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (Cambridge 2006)].


For a similar account, see Ignacio Lewkowicz, *Pensar Sin Estado: La Subjetividad En La Era De La Fluidez* (Paidos 2004).


Michael Burawoy and János Lukács, *The Radiant Past: Ideology and Reality in Hungary’s Road to Capitalism* (Chicago 1992), 113-114. In a critique of Burawoy’s explication of the politics of production, Adam Przeworski offers a similar account:

> At any moment there exist in any society several organizations that seek to realize goals that entail militancy, support, collaboration, or at least compliance of large numbers of individuals. As they pursue their goals, organizations compete to instill in individuals particular collective identities and to evoke from them particular behaviors….Their strategies involve symbols and organization; persuasion and coercion. Hence, struggle about class precedes eventual struggles between classes. The result of this strategic interaction at every moment is some structure of identities on the basis of which individuals act in collective life, the structure of collective action. In turn, the effect of collective actions is a structure of identity. And so history marches on [“Class, Production, and Politics: A Reply to Burawoy,” *Socialist Review*, 89:2 (1989), 94].

Elsewhere, he writes, similarly: “Economic, political, and ideological conditions jointly structure the realm of struggles that have as their effect the organization, disorganization, and reorganization of classes. Classes must thus be viewed as the effects of struggles structured by objective conditions that are simultaneously economic, political, and ideological” [*Capitalism and Social Democracy* (Cambridge 1985), 47].

Vincent Crapanzano, *Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan* (Chicago 1980), xi. The author notes that “all sorts of analytic strategies have been devised to distinguish what is specific to an encounter and what is typical, general, or even universal. Such strategies, which include multiple and repetitive questioning in different contexts, the use of several modes of elicitation, the search for pattern, consistency, and redundancy, confirmation in the research of others, the evaluation of informants, and, ultimately, self-reflection and evaluation, must be regarded with a certain skepticism, for they may – and often do – serve as rationalizations for the objectification of the negotiated reality and its attribution to the Other. They frequently presuppose a degree of lucidity that is impossible for any participant within the encounter (x).


Fields, “Slavery, Race, and Ideology” (1990), 106, 110. She continues:

It is not a material entity, a thing of any sort, that you can hand down like an old garment, pass on like a germ, spread like a rumor, or impose like a code of dress or etiquette. Nor is it a collection of disassociated beliefs – “attitudes” is the favored jargon among American social scientists and the historians they have mesmerized – that you can extract from their context and measure by current or retrospective survey research…Nor is it a Frankenstein monster that takes on a life of its own…

Fields, “Slavery, Race, and Ideology” (1990), 112.


The subject in this model adopts the naïve view of agents as capable of ascertaining, describing, and pursuing her desires publicly. Once explicated and interrogated, the model could engage two other images of the subject, the psychological and the psychoanalytic, either of which could be contribute to founding and mobilizing a political regime. The psychological subject may manipulate expressions of desires strategically, requiring social analysis to adapt to a complex communication game. In contrast, the psychoanalytic subject is monistically constituted by desire, thus may be capable of neither perceiving nor manipulating desires, requiring analysis to infer or expose underlying ambitions (for more, see fn. 1).


I adopt “social agitation” from Eric Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Norton 1959) 1, 51, passim. I am grateful to Ira Katznelson for discussing this concept/variable with me.


**CHAPTER TWO: Questions of Violence**


2 Setting aside the forbidding problem of *intention* makes only stronger my claim that the simple statement “X injures Y” is itself far more complex than generally recognized. The legal international definition of genocide contains the most notorious example of including intentionality in the concept of violence. According to the Genocide Convention, if a lunatic with poor math skills *intends* to exterminate all Catholics by killing one every year until he dies, he is guilty of genocide; in contrast, someone who
kills thousands of Catholics to drive them out of a territory, but does not intend to exterminate them, is not guilty of genocide. Between the two equally mad murderers, the one who kills far fewer Catholics commits genocide even if he succeeds in killing only one Catholic. Meanwhile, with this inevitably adlepted definition, genocide is considered the greatest of all crimes.


4 Applying this principle to “peace” of mutual assured destruction, for example, Daniel Ellsberg writes:

> The notion common to nearly all Americans that ‘no nuclear weapon has been used since Nagasaki is mistaken…Again and again, generally in secret from the American public, US nuclear weapons have been used, for quite different purposes: in the precise way that a gun is used when you point it at someone’s head in a direct confrontation, whether or not the trigger is pulled (“Call to Mutiny,” Introduction, EP Thompson and Dan Smith, eds., Protest and Survive (Monthly Review 1981), reprinted in Monthly Review, 33:4 (Sept 1981), 1].

5 Alain Badiou, “We Need a Popular Discipline: Contemporary Politics and the Crisis of the Negative,” Interview by Filippo Del Lucchese and Jason Smith, Critical Inquiry, 34 (Summer 2008), 653.

6 This complication applies to derivations of violence from deprivation. Violence “for fun” may be seen as resistance against being deprived of fun [Oskar Verhaaik, Migrants and Militants: Fun and Urban Violence in Pakistan (Princeton 2004), ch. 4]. Clearly in such a case, any action at all can be described as a response to deprivation, i.e., as attacking or removing an absence. It is a relevant insight here because motivations of laughter, enjoyment, or pleasure clarify that wounds, actions, interpretations, and amusements are not neatly arrayed along a spectrum from “objective” to “subjective” criteria of violence. Put simply, jouissance is not obviously a more subjective than objective criterion of violence, just as visible physical wounds are not necessarily more injurious than verbal insults. Again the point is that conceptually “violence” can coherently mean nearly anything, and thus must be stipulated purposefully to isolate dependent variables, while recognizing that ideal-types are fictive.

7 Charles Tilly, “Violent and Nonviolent Trajectories in Contentious Politics,” K. Worcester, et al., Violence and Politics: Globalization’s Paradox (Routledge 2002), 17. This definition exemplifies heuristic concept-formation; it is partial but useful. It excludes, for example, “impulsive” destruction, yet hooliganism seems like collective violence [Bill Buford, Among the Thugs: The Experience, and the Seduction, of Crowd Violence (Norton 1991)]. The same ambiguity applies to his other excluded terms, such as accidental, incremental, and even individual violence, which counterpose the concept “structural violence.” Concepts are never right or wrong, complete or incomplete, of course, but more or less useful for certain explanatory or descriptive objectives.

8 By this definition, operations of an army surgical unit would be “violent” because they constitute “episodic social interaction that immediately inflicts physical damage on persons and/or objects [and] results at least in part from coordination among persons who perform the damaging acts.” We might specify non-palliative or non-medical “physical damage,” stressing it must “include forcible seizure that overcomes restraint or resistance” or violates the desire of the victim.

9 Alas, Slavoj Žižek, who has intervened in debates on violence dating from Sorel and Benjamin, creates more confusion than clarity in declaring Gandhi more violent than Hitler:

> My point is what people perceive as violence is the direct subjective violence. It’s crucial to see violence that has to be done repeatedly to keep the things the way they are. I am not just talking about structural violence, symbolic violence, violence in language, etc. In that sense Gandhi was more violent than Hitler. Hitler killed millions of people. It was more reactive killing. Hitler was active all the time not to change things but to prevent change…Gandhi didn’t support killing. With his actions – boycott and all that – he helped the British imperialists to stay in India longer. This is something Hitler never wanted. Gandhi didn’t do anything to stop the functioning of the British Empire or the way it functioned here. You have to think why was India called the jewel of the empire? That for me is a problem. Let us locate violence properly [Shobhan Saxena, “Was Gandhi more violent than Hitler?” Interview with Žižek, Indian Times (12 Jan 2010), http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Main-Street/entry/was-gandhi-more-violent-than].

Žižek insists that physical force, whether disruptive or preservative of social arrangements, is violent. Beyond that equivalence he wants to claim reactionaryaries are less disruptive of those arrangements than revolutionaries, and in that specific sense Hitler was not violent to existing modes of coercion and domination. His claim that Gandhi’s non-violence was more reactionary and thus more violent than Hitler’s is, of course, preposterous even if his campaigns did delay decolonization. Žižek had said something different not long before: that with “passive revolution [Gandhi] led the anti-British resistance. Instead of directly attacking the colonial state, he organized movements of civil disobedience, of boycotting British products, of creating a social space outside the scope of the colonial state” [Slavoj Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes (Verso 2008), 372]. Setting aside his heterodox views of
Gandhi, Žižek is right to recognize that if violence is conceived as *disruption of prevailing or hegemonic conditions*, then non-violence, as in Poland, could be seen as “more violent” than Algeria’s fighting, which effectively sustained the dominant order.

10 Hence Eqbal Ahmad refers to revolutionary Iranians’ “nonviolent but militant character” [“Comments on Skocpol,” *Theory and Society*, 11: 3 (May 1982), 294].

11 The timing of Polish working class unification and organization associated with militant non-violence depends on whether one thinks the intellectuals led the workers, or vice-versa, to the Solidarity uprising, itself a debate about the relationship between the 1970 strikes and 1976 founding of the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR). I cannot adjudicate disagreements among leading researchers on Poland, but it seems justified to locate a critical juncture in December 1970, when organizational composure and interpretative clarity replaced confusion and chaos following state brutality and massacres. In 1970, several elements of non-violent militancy that would define Solidarity appeared: “a national working-class insurrection”; “workers…in control of…factories”; zones of self-rule; an elected inter-factory strike committee which kept order in the streets and organized essential supplies”; and twenty-one demands presented to the state and reissued in 1980 at Gdansk [Neil Ascherson, *The Polish August: The Self-Limiting Revolution* (Viking 1982), 101-102].


14 This is a central argument presented by John Stuart Mill in *On Liberty* (Longman, Roberts & Green, 1869).

15 On the constitutve trace of violence in “history” and “law,” Hent de Vries says, “Since one cannot avoid speaking, since there can be no denunciation of violence without the act or gesture of a certain *phraye*in, one must oppose violence, if not in the name, then at least with the help of another – less violent – violence” [“Violence and Testimony: Kierkegaardian Meditations,” *Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida* (Johns Hopkins 2002), 136].


17 Michael Taussig belittles social science for ignoring this paradox in *Law in a Lawless Land: Diary of a Limpiiezca* (Chicago 2003), 5, passim]. His account of the cyclical, reactive, ad hoc violence in Colombia recalls the post-1992 Algerian atrocities.

18 In *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Hannah Arendt poses this problem in terms of the capacity to hold a genocidal *society* responsible.


21 James Scott’s phrase denotes “the aspiration to the administrative ordering of nature and society,” including expansive state commitments to “the improvement of all the members of society – their health, skills, and education, longevity, productivity, morals, and family life” – producing a “population [whose] skills, vigor, civic morals, and work habits would increase its tax base and field better armies” [See *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Yale 1998), 88, 91].

23 Foucault states: ‘We must cease once and for all to describe the effect of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes,’ it ‘represses,’ it ‘censors,’ it ‘abstracts,’ it ‘masks,’ it ‘conceals.’ In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production’ (194); see James Scott’s version of productive anatamopolitics in *Seeing Like a State* (1998).

24 Foucault “is not looking for a relation between two givens, power and knowledge. As always, he is trying to rethink the entire subject matter, and his knowledge and power are to be something else. Nobody knows this knowledge; no one weilds this power” [Ian Hacking, “The Archaeology of Michel Foucault,” *Historical Ontology* (Harvard 2002), 74].

25 I should concede the vulnerability of this comparison. In contrast to Mann’s dyadic transition from despotic to infrastructural power, Foucault delineates three sequential but overlapping modes of power: sovereign, disciplinary, and governmental or biopolitical (anatamopolitica and thanatopolitical). To be sure, Mann is concerned with how despotic and infrastructural power foster distinct trajectories of state-society interactions more than with periodization of the two; still, the dialectical logic of state-society contention that gradually yields cooperation and even synthesis or synchronicity implies a succession of one power by the other. The relationships among Foucault’s forms of power are more numerous, dense, contradictory, even mystifying. It seems to me Foucault realized that even as modern European social practices and political institutions turned to training productive and docile bodies or creating surveillance systems and internalized normative obligations to populations, he recognized the continuity of the force of last resort, sovereign power. It may seem counterintuitive that these forms of power overlap as they posit radically variegated subjectivization processes. The sovereign rules by letting live and making die; the disciplinarian rules by training, regulating, and systematizing; and biopower governs by making live and letting die. The subjects of sovereign, disciplinary, and bio-power are distinct kinds of people, he says, from unseen/punished rebel to trained/fired worker to achieving/dying monad (the rough models of these types are peasants; workers, soldiers, students, analysands; and neo-liberal citizens). More technically one might express Foucault’s typology and genealogy of sequentially predominant “technologies of power” via the subject/object configuration in the relevant persons. Sovereign power constitutes state-society relations as subject versus object, that is, as two forces external to each other that episodically clash mortally over the prince’s capacity to prevent social change. In disciplinary power manager and worker, commanding officer and grunt, therapist and patient, teacher and pupil perform as subject and object, perhaps; but rather than the alienated alterity of sovereignty, trainer and trainee together perform mutually dependent work that generates and stabilizes social change by empowering productive subjects. In another contrast the biopolitical subject internalizes her individual responsibilities to a population, and thus the requirement to act as both subject and object of her survival [William Walters, “Some Critical Notes On ‘Governance,’” *Studies in Political Economy*, 73 (Spr/Sum 2004). Thomas Biebricher and Eric Vance Johnson, “What's Wrong with Neoliberalism?” *New Political Science*, 34:2 (2012); Tim Goddard, “Post-welfarist risk managers? Risk, crime prevention and the responsibilization of community-based organizations,” *Theoretical Criminology*, 16:3 (2012); Ronen Shamir, “The age of responsibilization: on marketembedded morality,” *Economy and Society*, 37:1 (2008); Elizabeth Comack and Tracey Peter, “How the Criminal Justice System Responds to Sexual Assault Survivors: The Slippage between ‘Responsibilization’ and ‘Blaming the Victim,’” *Canadian Journal of Women and the Law*, 17:2 (2005); John Clarke, “New Labour’s citizens: activated, empowered, responsibilized, abandoned?” *Critical Social Policy*, 25:4 (2005); Garry Gray, “The Responsibilization Strategy of Health and Safety: Neo-liberalism and the Reconfiguration of Individual Responsibility for Risk,” *British Journal of Criminology*, 49 (2009); Christopher Grey, “Management as a Technical Practice: Professionalization or Responsibilization?,” *Systems Practice*, 10:6 (1997); Jane Scoular and Maggie O’Neill, “Regulating Prostitution: Social Inclusion, Responsibilization and the Politics of Prostitution Reform,” *British Journal of Criminology*, 47 (2007); Martin Silverstein, “What’s Race Got to Do with It? Responsibilization Strategies at Parole Hearings,” *British Journal of Criminology*, 45 (2005); Christopher Spearin, “Against the Current? Somali Pirates, Private Security, and American Responsibilization,” *Contemporary Security Policy*, 31:3 (2010); Bilge Yesil, “Watching Ourselves: Video surveillance, urban space and self-responsibilization,” *Cultural Studies*, 20:4 (Jul/Sept 2006); Jonathan Dean, “Baden-Powell’s Scouting for Boys: governmentality, state power and the responsibilization of youth,” Conference paper, “Contesting the State,” University of Kent (13 May, 2011). How these distinct kinds of power, with their evident trajectory toward increasingly “internalized” subject-object imbrication, can co-exist seems perplexing, unless they “inhabit” one another. The central example and tendency here would be the deployment of sovereign means to enforce biopolitical ends – e.g., the state can order its police to defend the biopolitical system of “letting die” in which those who cannot afford insurance perish. Sovereign power here reinforces biopower rather than sovereign power itself by securing neo-liberal corporate prerogatives, compliant customers, and a “favorable investment environment” (i.e., no protests).

activists. Oversimplifying, if a terrorist sabotages a train, the regimes had little control over state capacity, not its subjective personnel. This possibility ramifies into two alternatives. A regime may fail to determine its institutions, those citizens' subjectivity within those institutions, and procedures. As Michel de Certeau reconstructs this rarely attended distinction, even disciplinary power – renamed for the allegedly internalized panoptic gaze of the central punitive figure – is "refined and extended without recourse to an ideology:"

Through a cellular space of the same type for everyone (schoolboys, soldiers, workers, criminals, or the ill), the techniques perfected the visibility and the gridwork of this space in order to make of it a tool capable of disciplining under control and "treating" any human group whatever. The development is a matter of technological details, miniscule and decisive procedures. The details overcome theory: through these procedures the universalization of a uniform penalty – imprisonment – is imposed, which inverts revolutionary institutions from within and establishes everywhere the "penitentiary" in place of penal justice ["The Character of Calculability," Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (California 2002), 92-93].

Certeau’s reading ramifications in polar inferences: (1) the construction of subjects is so pervasive an embodied rigor that it annihilates ideology; or (2) the constitution of disciplined and "docile" bodies, by narrowing power to physical prowess, frees ideology. The latter incapsulates Certeau’s œvre and the related claim I urge about these cases: that the regimes produced a gap between their precurdential and normative assimilation of non-state agents. Put another way, the Polish and Algerian states failed to inculcate normative consensus and to generate a physical, regulatory, or disciplinary rigor that obviated inculcated, statist normativity.

So there are at least two ways a regime’s plans to structure citizens may go awry. It may lose control over the direction of its own institutions, even if they continue to determine citizens’ subjectivity. This insight appears in Marx’s comments on liberalism. Liberal democracy may dig its own grave but still transform people into individualists. Second, the regime may fail to determine those citizens’ subjectivity within those institutions; in a reversal of Marx’s argument, a regime may determine its institutions but not its subjective personnel. This possibility ramifies into two alternatives. A regime may fail to determine its institutions and its subjective personnel; or, as in Poland and Algeria, it may partially succeed in shaping its subjective personnel. In the latter cases, the regimes had little control over state capacity and citizen loyalty, while still defining the subjective orientation of its leading activists. Oversimplifying, if a terrorist sabotages a train, his plan for the runaway train may fail and passengers may not react as

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27 James Ron, State Violence in Serbia and Israel: Frontiers and Ghettos (California 2003), 20. Ron is one of few who detect the Foucault/Mann overlap, though he stresses the replacement of despotic with infrastructural power without sufficient explication. More penetrating is his insight that infrastructural power achieves its efficacy when subjects’ exaggerate its virtues relative to despotic power. Thanks to Xiaoyu for directing me to this passage.

28 I am echoing Marx’s insight, confirmed in personal experience, that systems like states and firms shape but under-determine subjects. Long before Foucault generalized that enclosed social practices yield remainders, extant desires, wills, or “resistances,” Marx provided a concrete, if complex, variable for this incompleteness: socio-political appropriation of productive competence, ingenuity, and income. Capital creates the subject of labor through the very skills (community, literacy, endurance, and technê) it converts into weapons to transcend bourgeois values and incentives. In a line Deleuze pursues, Marx perceives that exploitative subjectivization always deposits the seeds, or immanent logics, of its own undoing within the physicality of the subject. His line about the bourgeoisie’s digging its own grave is too casually recalled only as a “systemic contradiction” between production and consumption, at the expense of his parallel claim about the novel social powers of worker-subjectivity entailed by the system they would undermine. That is, for Marx the internal-systemic impetus to revolutionary overthrow was imbued in workers’ subjective lives, steeply defined by physical immiseration, only to erupt when objective contradictions overwhelmed the ideological binders of commodity fetishism (when objective-systemic contradictions reordered subjects from commodity fetishism, liberal fantasy, or religio-palliative to worker consciousness). If Marx located systemic contradiction in dualistic subjectivity that retained an unstable citizenship apparatus, later “post-structuralist” theorists worried that homogenized liberal democratic societies stabilized monistic subjectivity, relocating the contradiction to the ideational plane. In this sense, 20th-century society is said to be socially and politically consolidated but analytically vulnerable – unable, to put it simply, to give an account of itself, or to foreclose its incoherence. The Foucauldian political economist Timothy Mitchell has meticulously portrayed this shift:

The twentieth century’s new regime of calculation did not produce, necessarily, a more accurate knowledge of the world, despite its claims, nor even any overall increase in the quantity of knowledge. Its achievement was to redistribute forms of knowledge, increasing it in some places and decreasing it in others. At the same time, it transferred this knowledge to new sites. By a series of removals, it opened up a certain distance, the distance between the field and the computing office, between the farmer and the colonial survey officer, between the iron triangulation marker and the paper map. The distance of such removals, repeated countless times in the cadastral survey and in increasing numbers of other projects, was to have a strange effect. The act of removal began to appear not as an action but as something more profound. The distance from the field to the map and back again, from the village to the computing office, would come to mark what seemed an absolute gap: the divide between reality and its representation, between an image-world and its object. The question of accuracy or truth could now be cast as the degree of correspondence between the objectworld on one side of this divide and the maps, images, and numbers on the other. This strange effect gave rise to new objects and forms of calculation—among the most important of them, the economy [“The Character of Calculability,” Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (California 2002), 92-93].
he planned, but the runaway train will still shape their actions and subjective states. Indeed, survivors may have been re-constituted by the sabotaged train, perhaps becoming committed anti-terrorist activists thwarting the saboteur’s future objectives.

31 Wlodzimierz Brus, quoted in Boris Kagarlitsky, The Dialectic of Change, R. Simon, tr. (Verso 1990), 164. In a letter titled, “The Polish War,” Adam Michnik refers to “the Polish Jaruzelskian war (to use the term coined in the streets of Warsaw)” [“The Polish War: Letter from Bialoleka, 1982,” Letters from Prison and other essays, M. Latynski, tr. (California 1987), 40]. Martial law was formally and typically referred to as a “declaration of war.”

32 High Roberts rejects the phrase “civil war” to denote the violence in Algeria under martial law, given the small, opportunistic uprising of the GIA, against Luis Martinez’s view that the fighting signaled a civil “war economy” [Hugh Roberts, “Algeria’s Veiled Drama,” Battlefield Algeria (2003), 255-259; Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998, J. Derrick, tr (Columbia 2000 [1998]), 116ff.]. Citing Algeria’s “mass violence against civilians” and “large-scale civil war violence,” Stathis Kalyvas apparently disagrees with Roberts [“Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria,” Rationality and Society, 11:3 (1999), 244]. But the positions may be bridged if we use his thesis to combine qualitative and quantitative indices of civil war; that is, if combatants’ minority violence shows a perceived need to conscript or persuade majority followers, as Kalyvas argues, then it is not the quantity but quality of violence which may decide the validity of the term “civil war.”

33 William Saroyan, “My Cousin, Dikran, the Orator,” My Name is Aram (Faber and Faber 1963 [1941]), 132-133.

34 Quoted in Slavoj Žižek, On Belief (Routledge 2001), 37-38, emphasis added. Historical and causal explanation may normalize violence, too. As such, Alon Confino claims, “Holocaust historiography has seen the strangeness of the past – for example, the difficulty that contemporaries had with grasping...the extermination – as something history writing has to overcome, instead of seeing it as a historical sensation of the period that shaped the event as a subjective experience of contemporaries. This enormous body of work characterized by an almost positivist attachment to facts banished from the story of the Holocaust the strangeness of the period instead of integrating them into the narration of how things were” [Foundational Past: The Holocaust as Historical Understanding (Cambridge 2012), 52].

35 The scene is an interview-based ethnography of a cotton workers’ strike of 1933. “In 1934 Steinbeck befriended several labor organizers and was...engrossed by their stories,” an experience “that led to his best work,” a “radically new...straightforward and gritty” style [Robert Gottlieb, “The Rescue of John Steinbeck,” The New York Review, LV:6 (17 Apr 2008), 81].

36 In Dubious Battle (Penguin 1979 [1936]), compiled from 163-171.

37 Roberto Esposito, “Community and Violence,” T. Campbell, tr., unpublished manuscript, 6. Also see Kalyvas’s explanation of “barbarism,” that is, exceptionally vicious violence in civil war, as “a function of the degree of insecurity faced by armed actors,” as posited by “the security thesis” [The Logic of Violence in Civil War (2006), 84].

38 This desired lawman is “the modern subject: an autonomous individual who has liberated himself from all merely traditional bonds and has independently assumed responsibility for the organization of his own life. Since this individual is subordinated to the law of rational specificity, it is tempting to conceive the optimal organization of life as a form of rational self-legislation” [Raymond Geuss, “The Actual and Another Modernity: Order and Imagination in Don Quixote,” History of European Ideas, 34 (2008), 15].


40 Perhaps too simply, but it is ambiguous whether Steinbeck portrays or advocates a philosophically naïve understanding of law as potentially an exception to violence. In his 1989 lecture at Cardozo Law School, “Force De Loi: ‘Le Fondement Mystique De L’autorité’” Jacques Derrida emphasizes the centrality of “force” in “law enforcement.” More important is the kind of force at play in law’s claim to constitute itself lawfully, justly, representatively – conflating is and ought in stating legal or juridical coherence. In illocutionary performance, the founding law says that it empirically does and ethically should represent the nation or people [Danilyn Rutherford, Laughing at Leviathan: Sovereignty and Audience in West Papua (Chicago 2012), 183]. This presents two contrasting problems for law’s self-description. If law represents a consensual people, culture, society, or nation, then it is “thin,” lacking autonomous features and warranting no specific attention. If law transcends a people, culture, society, or nation, it raises concerns about its unifying force, i.e., about its utility in a divided polity. One defense of law, usually as “rule of law,” conjoins these representative and transcendent aspects of law, rendering law a unique process that incrementally brings a people to its higher disposition or nature [see Giorgio Agamben, “The Messiah and the Sovereign: The Problem of Law in Walter Benjamin,” D. Heller-Roazen, ed., tr., Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy (Stanford 1999 [1992 lecture, 1998 publication]; Hent deVries, Religion and Violence (2002), 275ff.; Margaret Davies, “Derrida and Law: Legitimate Fictions,” T.

41 Tahar Ben Jelloun *This Blinding Absence of Light*, L. Coverdale, tr. (Penguin 2006), 23. The book “is based on real events drawn from the testimony of former inmate of Tazmamart Prison, Morocco.”


43 We may distinguish here two kinds of prohibition: (1) the repressive, incapacitating *ban by the tyrant*; and (2) the productive, empowering sublimation of the subject, captured in Julia Kristeva’s claim that “there is no revolt without prohibition of some sort” {Revolt, She Said, Interview with Philippe Petit, S. Lotringer, ed., B. O’Keefe, tr. (Semiotext[e] 2002), 31}. As I suggested in the Introduction to and motivating design of this project, we must not be glib about the repression-resistance connection, which is mediated by multiple material and ideational variables. So, given Kristeva’s remark conditioning revolt on prohibition, which in most practical situations will combine repression and sublimation, a crucial question is how these will interact – at what point will repression snuff out the re-directed energies of revolt to create totalitarian suffocation? This section raises this problem.

44 When in danger the sea-cucumber divides itself in two…
We know how to divide ourselves, how true, we too.
But only into a body and an interrupted whisper.
Into body and poetry


If we must die, let it not be like hogs
Hunted and penned in an inglorious spot,
While round us bark the mad and hungry dogs,
Making their mock at our accursed lot.
If we must die, O let us nobly die,
So that our precious blood may not be shed
In Vain; then even the monsters we defy
Shall be constrained to honor us though dead!
O kinsmen! We must meet the common foe!
Though far outnumbered let us show us brave,
And for their thousand blows deal one deathblow!
What though before us lies the open grave?
Like men we’ll face the murderous, cowardly pack,
Pressed to the well, dying, but fighting back!


46 To simplify a complex and layered discussion, I am bracketing potentially poignant distinctions raised by recent social theory between *reification* and *objectification* [Timothy Bewes, *Reification, or the Anxiety of Late Capitalism* (Verso 2002), 102-110].

47 As Avery Gordon writes,

It’s hard to convey what happens to someone confined indefinitely in conditions designed to break down all resistance to authority, the self’s or another’s, in twenty-four to forty-eight hours. The ones who beat it have a worn strength, dignified, that nevertheless lets you know the cost of the battle; the others have become shadows, mournful specters. Under such deficient and deadly conditions, prisoners are no longer (and to the extent to which they were before is questionable) conceived as human in any meaningful sense at all [“Abu Ghraib: imprisonment and the war on terror,” *Race and Class*, 48:1 (2006), 51].
It would not be possible for power relations to exist without points of insubordination which, by definition, are means of escape. Accordingly, every intensification, every extension of power relations to make the insubordinate submit can only result in the limits of power. The latter reaches its final term either in a type of action which reduces the other to total impotence (in which case victory over the adversary replaces the exercise of power) or by a confrontation with those whom one governs and their transformation into adversaries...[B]etween a relationship of power and a strategy of struggle there is reciprocal appeal, a perpetual linking and a perpetual reversal. At every moment the relationship of power may become a confrontation between two adversaries. Equally, the relationship between adversaries in society may, at every moment, [occasion] mechanisms of power. The consequence of this instability is the ability to decipher the same events and the same transformations either from inside the history of struggle or from the standpoint of the power relationships. The interpretations which result will not consist of the same elements of meaning or the same links or the same types of intelligibility, although they refer to the same historical fabric and each of the two analyses must have reference to the other. In fact it is...the disparities between the two readings that make visible those fundamental phenomena of 'domination' which are present in a large number of human societies ["How is Power Exercised?" L. Sawyer, tr., Afterword, Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago 1983), 225-226 [translation altered].


50 Timur Kuran, Public Lies, Private Truths: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (Harvard 1995), 31ff. He adds, “Conversely, when we opt to suppress a thought, misrepresent a want, or assume a phony demeanor, we feel discomfort at having compromised our personhood” (31). Here the “need for self assertion” refers to an “individual’s quest for autonomy” (31-32); subjectivity is thus confined to individualism, apparently ruling out by fiat collective subjectivity. The potency of retaining non-compromised...personhood” may, though, be collective-social as well as individual-personal.

51 Tzvetan Todorov, Facing the Extreme (1996), 16.


53 Again, this raises a paradox in our concept of dehumanization. Is pure abjection – the execution of the regicide Damien in the beginning of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, for instance – a condition of indignity (where dignity is violated) or a condition of no-dignity (of the absence of any dignity to be violated)? It seems we need, minimally, three categories: dignity, indignity, and no-dignity to capture the (perhaps undefinable) path from humanization to dehumanization.

54 But then, as I have insinuated, there is no reason to think the systematically objectified beast or thing would rise up; rather, we would expect, with Fanon, the motivating provenance of such an uprising to be the remnant of the subject in the beast-becoming. Here I should clarify that I am using “beast” and “animal” to signal a conventional separation from humanity (or human animals) on grounds of language, reflexivity, consciousness, or transcendence, while eschewing an essential differentiation [along these lines, see Steve Baker, “The Animal’s Line of Flight,” The Postmodern Animal (Reaktion 2000), esp. 136ff.].

55 Here, humiliation must be socially compelled, not collectively desired – symptomatic rather than endemic {see Gilles Deleuze, “Psychoanalysis and the Problem of Masochism,” Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty, J. McNeil, tr. (Zone 1991 [1971])}.

56 Given many forms of voluntary, passionate humiliation, an inescapable regime must impose such indignity for an explanation of social violence to invoke the concept usefully. “Indignity” must here exclude, e.g., repentant humiliation of willful sacrificial obedience to affirm the Christian monastic calling [Talal Asad, “Discipline and Humility in Christian Mysticism,” Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Johns Hopkins 1993), 155ff; also see the remarks on “why women stay” in Linda Mills, Insult to Injury: Rethinking Our Responses to Intimate Abuse (Princeton 2003), 9, 60ff., passim].
As contrasted with a freedom that consists in being able to do as one wishes, [freedom of choice] might be described as freedom to will as one wishes" [Mortimer Adler, Ten Philosophical Mistakes (Collier 1985), 147]. In this context, it is striking that Irving Goffman compares religious militancy to quotidian self-restraint:

Personal documents about religious asylums and radical political movements suggest...that an individual can voluntarily renounce his will, take on the “armor of obedience, and actively embrace curtailments of what he would ordinarily consider to be his self-interests. Militancy of this kind can thus be seen as a game the individual plays against himself. A minor domestic version is found in self-discipline techniques: an individual who is his strong-minded self while shopping does not allow himself to buy favorite sweet foods, knowing that at home there will be times when he will be weak-minded self [Strategic Interaction (Pennsylvania 1969), 86-87, fn. 1].

As Freud insisted, it appears to be inherent in human willfulness to denigrate aspects of our dignity to achieve other aspects that we hold more dear, “binding ourselves to the mast” and “rebuking the heart” to achieve an objective other than immediate comforts, as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno put it: “The ‘self’ – autos – is not spoken of until...the repression of the instinct by reason has succeeded...[T]he identical ‘I’ of Homer could be seen as the result of a mastery of nature carried out within the individual. This new self trembles within its thing-itself – a body – once the heart has been rebuked” [Dialectic of Enlightenment, J. Cumming, tr. (Continuum 1990 [1944]), 48, fn. 5]. For contrast, see the comments and references in Brian Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari (MIT 1992), 191-192, fn. 43.

Among many nineteenth-century political philosophers anxious about the “leveling” of human value under social and political equality, Nietzsche was among the first to identify modern European egalitarian “slave moralism” with nihilistic self-repression.

In a related finding, Eugene Genovese discusses the evolving ideologies of slaves under seigneurialism and capitalism from restorationist secession to egalitarian revolt [From Rebellion to Revolution (Louisiana 1979)].


Albert Camus, Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt, A, Bower, tr. (Vintage 1991 [1951]), 8-11; Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, C. Farrington, tr. (Grove 1963 [1961]), 43: “The native knows all this [colonial dehumanization] and laughs to himself every time he spots an allusion to the animal world in the other’s words...[T]he native laughs in mockery when Western values are mentioned in front of him...in revenge...[for] the violence with which the supremacy of white values is affirmed and aggressiveness which has permeated the victory of these values over the ways of life and of thought of the native.” James refers to slaves’ “remarkable liveliness of intellect and vivacity of spirit...and secret pride and feeling of superiority to their masters” [Black Jacobins (1989 [1963]), 17-18]. The master has the mirror anxiety: “And my whole life, every white man’s life in the East, was one long struggle not to be laughed at” (George Orwell, “Shooting an Elephant,” Inside the Whale and Other Essays (Penguin 1957 [1936]), 96). These are all highly politicized versions of Ian Hacking insight: “[W]hat makes the laughable possible is the existence of the polarity” within a consciousness “[Truthfulness,” Common Knowledge, 11:1 (2005), 171].


It is crucial to remember that even within conditions of detention and torture there are distinct subject positions. For instance, Henri Alleg, a French Algerian tortured during the revolution, writes: “In any case it was in their interest to look after me: if they wanted to torture me again, I must not be too weak; if they decided on the other hand to execute me, they had to have (other than the normal bullet wounds) a ‘clean’ body in case of an autopsy” (The Question, J. Calder, tr. (Nebraska 2006 [1958]), 83).

The promise of freedom seems to replace ironic sarcasm about hypocritical despots with grave militant discipline. During the war, the “indigenous Algerians [were] very disciplined...[S]ome young men were assaulting smokers” [Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955-1962: Reflections on the French-Algerian War*, J. Le Sueur, ed., M. Wolf/C. Fouillade, trs. (Nebraska 2000 [12 Nov 1955]), 15]. Similarly, as Polish strikers took over the Gdansk shipyard their “guards saw to it that no strangers entered the area and that no alcohol was distributed” [Stanislaw Starcki, *Class Struggle in Classless Poland* (South End 1982), 62]. It seems revolutionary fervor, sprung from hope, favors serious activity, where short-term defeats against inevitably defeated foes spark haughty laughter. Fanon reports the Algerian “Djamila Boughired’s laughter on hearing...her death sentence...that smile...the quiet manifestation of inner certainty that [remains] unshakeable” [“Concerning a Plea,” *Toward the African Revolution*, H. Chevalier, tr. (Grove 1967 [al-Moudhahid, no. 12 [15 Nov 1957]), 73].


72 Mourad Benchellali, with Antoine Audouard, “Detainees in Despair,” *NYT* (14 Jun 2006), A23. He adds, “After months of disappointment [with the process], you try to develop an immunity to hope, but hope is an incurable disease.” Humiliation as a mechanism of control – under conditions of total biopolitical capture – is consciously deployed [David Rose, *Guantánamo: The War on Human Rights* (Free 2004), chs. 2, 4].


74 I concede that I may be generalizing from personal experience, but I recall feeling especially tormented when asked to decide my own punishment. I also felt pained by having no audience for efforts at comedic reprieve, e.g., asking my sentence to reflect “time served.” This latter point has perhaps sensitized me to the crucial element of communal humor among captives.


78 To study “mechanisms of power...involves investigating where and how, between whom, between what points, according to what processes, and with what effects, power is applied” [Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population* (2007 [1978]), 2].

79 Heller-Roazen translates Agamben’s terms as “human/inhuman,” where one suspects “non-human” would be preferable to convey a state of pure abandon between human life and biological death. “Inhuman” also implies cruelty, an unusual epithet for camp dwellers. But if cruelty is refigured as brutality (”brute”), then we find “the inhuman is in fact something that is all too human. We use the word inhuman not to denote higher and lower orders (such as gods or animals) but instead to refer to human behavior that is...below the bar of civilization, unworthy of how we would like humans to be” [Leland de la Durantaye, *Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction* (Stanford 2009), 284]. The tension between inhuman (a degraded human condition) and non-human (a “reduction” to an animal or objective state) only reiterates or illustrates Agamben’s depiction of the unsayable line between human and inhuman.

80 During the American invasion of German-occupied Brittany, the French resistance figure and translator Louis Guilloux wrote, “The least effort is costly; I often have trouble dragging myself from one place to the next; I go to bed tired; I wake up tired” [quoted in Alice Kaplan, *The Interpreter* (Free 2006 [July 1944]), 19]. We can make this weakening body an object of thought
by comparing it to our attitude toward life from one day to the next. Apart from some of Woody Allen’s characters, most people do not regard every dawn as another day closer to death, although it is. We consider ourselves in an either thriving or unnatural condition. Guilleix’s dehification affronts this attitude, rather than being seen as merely some hastened version of human fate.


[84] In photographs of prisoners, visitors to Auschwitz encounter this speechless death-in-life. In a wrenching description of his visit, David Lodge (in character) writes, “The faces are haunting: some look impassive, some angry, some mad. A few even smile faintly, perhaps hoping this would ingratiate them with their captors” [Deaf Sentence (Penguin 2008), 252]. He adds, “It has been said often enough that there are no words adequate to describe the horror of what happened at Auschwitz… There are no adequate thoughts, either, no adequate emotional responses, available to the visitor whose life has contained nothing even remotely comparable. One feels pity, of course, and sorrow, and anger, but these feelings seem as superfluous to the immensity of woe this place evokes as tears dropped into the ocean” (255). It seems that the unspeakable in the speechless faces of the photographs is infectious, that the site of the Shoah, “with the heartbreaking heaps of women’s hair, children’s clothing, and shoes, displayed behind glass” (253), leaves a shard of posthumous life in the pre-humous genocide tourist. Is this why “Auschwitz” remains a camp, never a “museum” lifted from its eternal essence, forever testifying against testimony? Is the offense to human dignity not, in this sense, to seize the prerogative of death, the fascist arrogation of the “final” problem as the solution, to specify that decision of God’s or indecision of nature, the universal and infinite, as one’s own?

[85] Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz (1999 [1998]), 58; cf. Pierre Bourdieu’s haunting notion of “social aging” in environments that deny life a purpose, value, or reason [Pascalian Meditations, R. Nice, tr. (Cambridge 2000), 240ff.; The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature (Cambridge 1993), 104-107, the latter quoted in Ghassan Hage, “‘Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm’: Understanding Palestinian Suicide Bombers in Times of Exigophobia,” Public Culture, 15:1 (2003), 78]. Orlando Patterson’s concept of “social death” helps us distinguish two forms of death-in-life or socio-political-death-inside-biological-life: (1) exclusion from a symbolic order or from normative or juridical recognition; (2) inclusion in a regime of death, a necrotic enclosure that does not expel or marginalize but consumes or exterminates [Slavery and Social Death (Harvard 1982)].

[86] Note that it is not clear where objectification occurs on the spectrum of bio-life ⇔ human life ⇔ human death ⇔ bio-death, more specifically: whether it occurs at some nexus between human life ⇔ bio-death or human death ⇔ bio-death.


[89] To the extent that the state of exception that places bio-political life over individual life and thus expresses the immanent logic of modern states, this is not the reductive argument that modernity is itself a camp. In this sense – in which the political concept of the population tends to identify and suspend the rights of cancerous rogues, this prerogative differs across tyrannies.


[91] Inga Clendinnen, Aztecs: An Interpretation (Cambridge 1991), 92. Note how much rides on the debate about whether drugs were required to induce stupor in the victims (92-93). Also, unlike Foucault’s passage on the sovereign’s spectacular destruction of the regicide Damien, Clendinnen portrays something closer to a machinic death camp:

Mexica victims were purely victims. We gulp at Roman circuses, but think we recognize something of the desperate excitement of violent lethal contest: an excitement that can infect actors and audience alike. It is the combination of violence with apparent impersonality, the bureaucratic calculation of these elaborated Mexica brutalities, together with their habituated and apparently casual incorporation into the world of the everyday, that chills. Faces with that terrible, matter-of-factness we are given neither a secure footing for judgment nor a threshold for fantasy, so that curiosity sickens. And we in this century are haunted by the shadows of those other victims who filed to their deaths, incredulous still, even as the tacit signs multiplied, that men could so coldly design the death of their fellows (89-90).


Steven Marcus, “Hunger and Ideology,” *Representations: Essays on Literature and Society* (Columbia 1990 [1963]), 7. It is critical that a “camp” is not required to create the “living dead...The scenes of mass starvation and death endlessly follow[ed] the evictions from Irish homes: of human beings dying alone, deserted, forgotten, abandoned by their very families; of bodies lying unburied and unknown along the roads and in ditches; of corpses or persons who died of starvation being eaten by cats and rats who were themselves skeletons. The island had become a death-camp...” (8). Again the refrain of observers of famine emerges: “‘It cannot be described’...Reality itself had grown so monstrous that human consciousness could scarcely conceive or apprehend it; reality overwhelmed the human capacity to respond coherently to it” (10). On the genocidal de-humanization of captive occupied populations compared to the Irish famine, see Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World* (Verso 2001), 31: “India like Ireland before had become a Utilitarian laboratory where millions of lives were wagered against dogmatic faith in omnipotent markets.”

Marcus, “Hunger and Ideology” (1990 [1963]), 6.; he adds, “however mad, wild, or grotesque art may seem to be, it can never touch or approach the madness of reality.” In a similar vein, see John Berger, *Ways of Seeing* (Penguin 1972), 8, 11.


It is worth noting here J. Peter Euben’s remark that “Jonathan Schell’s discussion of Polish Solidarity in his introduction to Adam Michnik’s prison writings...could not have been written without Arendt, which suggests that though Weber’s definition of the modern state may be more ‘realistic’ than Arendt’s romantic image of the polis, the state is not the same is politics and her discussion of the latter may be as essential as his of the former” [“Conventions and Misgivings,” *The Tragedy of Political Theory* (Princeton 1990), 11].


That a game scored by cutting others with glass is thrilling, not appalling, on certain playgrounds is equally significant.


In his study of the racial effects of the G.I. Bill, Ira Katznelson remarks, in a parallel vein, “Jim Crow did not come to a halt at the threshold of non-collegiate education and training. To the contrary, the values and institutions of white supremacy were constitutive of how these...provisions were implemented in the South” [“African-American Veterans and the G.I. Bill: Arguments and Evidence,” in Katznelson and Suzanne Mettler, “On Race and Policy History: A Dialogue about the G. I. Bill,” *APSR*, 6:3 (Sep 2008), 524].


109 Ira Katznelson, Marxism and the City (Oxford 1993), 41.

110 A study comparing the attitudes of middle class white “fathers’ rights” advocates and poor black fathers with kids on welfare adds a provocative twist with similar implications. Their complaints were similar and class/race-insensitive but their language and actions vis-à-vis the “system” differed radically [Joel K. Crowley, Margaret Watson, and Maureen Waller, “Understanding ‘Power Talk’: Language, Public Policy, and Democracy,” Perspectives on Politics, 6:1 (Mar 2008)].

111 For a portrayal of social construction from childhood, with pointed relevance to worker-citizenship, see Paul Willis, Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs (Columbia 1977).


113 Veena Das, Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary (California 2007), 88.


117 Slavoj Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology (Verso 1989), esp. 24-33.

118 Given the hermeneutic density of the statement, “I don’t know what I’m doing,” I would highlight two distinct senses: (1) I am deliberately doing X and thoughtlessly doing Z; (2) I am thoughtlessly doing X itself, e.g., I am doing X without knowing my motivations.

119 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” R. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader (Norton 1978 [1843]), 32. Marx says “man frees himself from a constraint in a political way, through the state, when he transcends his limitations, in contradiction with himself, and in an abstract, narrow, and partial way” (32). Species being confers an ethical substantiality subversively endorsing democracy (“political emancipation”) as an expression of human willing incompletely realized through the secular-liberal state that bans religion and capital from the public, communal sphere. Just as privatization of capital and religion represents a ban on their public privilege, democracy represents (1) an elite design to institutionalize individual self-determination but (2) a popular rejection of aggressively anti-social individualization, symbolized by aggregated universal expression.


121 “The highest point attained by contemplative materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals in civil society” {Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” R. Tucker, ed., Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd Ed. (Norton 1978 [1845]), 145}.


123 “It would be an error to believe that content determines expression by causal action, even if expression is accorded the power not only to ‘reflect’ content by to react upon it in an active way. This kind of ideological conception of the statement, which subordinates it to a primary economic content, runs into all kinds of difficulties inherent to dialectics” {Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (1987 [1980]), 89}. 
CHAPTER THREE: Cases and Explanations


3 See the implicit debate between David Waldner, “Anti-Anti-Determinism: Or What Happens When Schrödinger’s Cat and Lorenz’s Butterfly Meet Laplace’s Demon in the Study of Political and Economic Development,” APSR Annual Conference (2002) and Mark Bevir and Asaf Kedar, “Concept Formation in Political Science: An Anti-Naturalist Critique of Qualitative Methodology,” Perspectives in Politics, 6:3 (Sep 2008). Bevir differentiates rational choice from modernist empiricism since it (1) is deductive, not inductive; (2) countenances unobservable objects; (3) prefers deductive models to “inductive correlations and classifications.” This propaedeutic distinction among rational choice, positivism, and modernist empiricism proposes a methodological analysis that joins rational choice and ideational analysis, a highly abstract assessment. We may set this aside for Bevir’s central regret that “modern political science coalesces around an empiricist epistemology, realist ontology, and formal explanations... so out of date [philosophically] that it barely appears in undergraduate textbooks.” He prefers “meaning holism,” which “asserts that the meaning of a proposition depends on the paradigm, web of beliefs, or language game in which it is located,” though how this is to be accomplished without any notion of representation or verification remains puzzling [“Meta-Methodology: Clearing the Underbrush,” L. Box-Steffensmeier, et al., eds., The Oxford Handbook for Political Methodology (Oxford forthcoming)].


My project qualifies and extends works linking institutional profiles to sustained collective action: see Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Random House 1978); Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (1979); Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton 1970); D McAdam, J. McCarthy, and M. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge 1996).


Dehumanization or exclusion can also inspire non-activist efforts to secure one’s needs [Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard 1965); James Scott, Weapons of the Weak (1985), Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (Cambridge 1990)].

Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge 1991), 1. He interweaves several temporal aspects of explanation. He asks why the revolution happened “so quickly and so smoothly” and “if we are wise now, why were we not equally sage before?” This “we” that did not anticipate the fall of the Soviet empire may have been a sort of guild that excluded those who did anticipate it – in my first course on Soviet politics in college (1985) the empire’s collapse was presumed to be inevitable. For a published example, see W. Griffith, ed., Central and Eastern Europe: The Opening Curtain? (Westview 1989).

Raymond Geuss, Public Goods, Private Goods (Princeton 2001), xviii. Extending this idea, Gilles Deleuze interprets theories that fail as mismatches, misaligned objects of inquiry and knowledge system, or the importation of a problem and solution from discordant fields. Indeed, they do not fail as much as enable, in these gaps between problem and solution, unexpected ideas:

A solution always has the truth it deserves according to the problem to which it is a response, and the problem always has the solution it deserves in proportion to its own truth or falsity – in other words, in proportion to its sense. This is what is meant by such famous formulae as: “The really great problems are posed only once they are solved” or “Mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve” – not because practical or speculative problems are only the shadow of pre-existing solutions but, on the contrary, because the solution necessarily follows from the complete conditions under which the problem is determined as a problem, from the means and the terms which are employed in order to pose it (Difference and Repetition, P. Patton, tr. (Columbia 1994 [1968]), 159).


Conceived as historically northern-oriented, Algeria’s large cities like Tlemcen were embedded in the “trans-Saharan trade with West Africa,” “of strategic importance to North Africa, the Near East, and even to Europe” [Eric Wolfe, Europe and the People Without History (California 1997), 37-41].


Alexander Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism (Council on Foreign Relations 1993), 149.

Richard Rhodes, Masters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust (Knopf 2002), 5


Christopher Clark, Review of Zamoyski, Warsaw 1920 (2008), The Sunday Times (23 Mar 2008),


33 Wolfe, “Algeria,” *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (1969), 214, 229. This chapter is a classic overview.


40 I adopt the term and analysis of “crony capitalism” from Yahya Sadowski, *Political Vegetables? Businessman and Bureaucrat in the Development of Egyptian Agriculture* (Brookings 1991), ch. 4 and 315ff. For the application to Algeria, see 196.

41 Andrew Michta’s description applies equally to Algeria: “It appears that in the Polish Army, the movement between regular commands, party and governmental appointments, and the [People’s Army’s Main Political Administration was] common; this pattern was initiated in the 1960 and continues to this day” [*Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988* (Hoover/Stanford 1990), 77].

42 Grzegorz Ekiert, *The State Against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe* (Princeton 1996), 216ff., he cites Joseph Rothschild [*Return to Diversity* (Oxford 1989), 133-134] on the relative flexibility of the regime toward the clergy, continued use of “traditional Polish military uniforms and other national symbols,” and “gingerly” approach to the peasantry. And “the so-called Polish Titoists were dealt with more civilly than and less violently than were the victims of any neighboring purge.”


45 Eqbal Ahmad conceives the postcolonial regime-type as the bureaucratic, militarist, surveillant, and instrumental conquest of public over private capital [*“Postcolonial Systems of Power,”* C. Bengelsdorf, et al., eds. *The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad* (Columbia 2006 [1980]), 137-140]. In Poland and Algeria the “conquest of private capital” was an ambivalent feature, given the strength of rural property holders and the growth of the informal economy.


48 David Waldner, *State Building and Late Development* (1999), 50-51. Precocious Keynesianism “refers to the simultaneity of state transformation [to unmediated rule], cross-class coalition construction, and the onset of industrial development,” in contrast
to Keynesian stages of “substantial industrial development and the construction of legal-rational administrative structures” and then cross-class coalition formation and side-payment distribution.”


50 A.F.K. Organski remarks, in this vein:

has not included a treatment of bureaucracy as a major institution of modernization and this is to be regretted, for such a treatment would have complemented the treatment of the political party. For if parties mobilize and organize men, bureaucracies mobilize and organize non human resources as well. While mobilization affected by parties is massive and undifferentiated, bureaucracies mobilize selectively and rationally. The different functions suggest why before social mobilization begins in earnest it is bureaucracies that are preeminent, while it is parties that become central during modernization and why with modernity bureaucracies return to the center of the stage managing both human and non human resources [Review of Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale 1968), APSR, 63:3 (Sep 1969), 922].


52 Hence, in “development” studies “no satisfactory explanation is given…for the dynamics of change: The origins of social mobilization are never explained and the critical aspects of mobilization are never specified” but are instead naturalized to ignore “imperialism, decolonization, neocolonialism, and the cold war” [Mark Kesselman, “Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology,” World Politics, 26:1 (Oct 1973), 148ff.].

53 Note Ahmad’s remark: “[I]n Algeria, where the leadership has commanded some authority on the basis of its role in the war of national liberation, where regional and ethnic interests are better represented in the structures of power, and where a well-rooted progressive opposition does not threaten the ruling elite, violations of human rights have been few, infrequent, and progressively declining” [“Postcolonial Systems of Power” (2006 [1980]), 136]. In contrast, by the time when Solidarity arose in 1980, Polish activists had carried out multi-generational iterations of mass collective protest.

54 Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland (Cambridge 2002), 243.


60 Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History, J. Todd, tr. (Cornell 2001), 146. “The best lands were already under public control (the so-called self-managed holdings),” he adds, qualifying the previous figures on large private estates.

61 Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History (NYU 1996), 50.


63 On socialist compromise with rural prerogative (e.g., mixed-market private farming, erosion of command price-setting, elimination of central distribution-planning), see János Kornai, Vision and Reality, Market and State (Routledge 1990), 118ff.


This exemplifies “mobilization-repression-bargaining” “mechanism” for deepening “mutual obligations between citizens and governmental agents” [Charles Tilly, *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000* (Cambridge 2004), 20].


Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale 1968), 401. “For Algeria as for China, economic development is not priority number one, but priority number three. The prime objective is the building of the State; the second, the formation of the national ruling class” (401). Indeed, rural inequality precipitates social mobilization that the party politically demobilizes. Hence Algeria’s political party and Poland’s social (land) reform (383) prevent strain.

Waldner, “Democracy and Dictatorship in the Post-Colonial World” (2005), 26. Because of the interactive effects of classes – landed elites/labor, urban elites/labor, military elites/labor, bureaucratic elites/labor, etc. – contending for power, timing has path dependent effects in Waldner’s account. I add that specific desires and meanings determine reactions to specific incorporation schemes.

Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Beacon 1966), 433ff. Algeria’s “labor-repressive agrarian system,” alliance of social (‘ulema) and landed reactionaries, and state-capitalist authoritarianism appear to have, against formula, generated a revolution from below against the one from above.

Jeff Frieden, “Third World Indebted Industrialization: International Finance and State Capitalism in Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, and South Korea,” *International Organization*, 35:3 (Sum 1981), 408. “The picture is quite clear: since the late 1960s LDCs have borrowed more heavily than ever before, and more of this borrowing has been done from private banks than anyone had imagined possible” (409). The irony was nationalist autonomy leveraged against international financial dependency. Frieden’s analysis and figures [Table 3 (412)] reject the uniqueness of OPEC-member-states in this key feature of government allocation, incorporation, and sovereignty.


Roberts, *Battlefield Algeria* (2003), 64-65; also see Volpi, *Islam and Democracy* (2003), 49: FIS “only began to support Iraq, under mounting popular pressure, when American troops landed in Saudi Arabia.”


Frédéric Volpi, *Islam and Democracy* (2003), ch. 3 (misspellings corrected).

Neal Ascherson, “Introduction,” *Book of Lech Wałęsa: A Collective Portrait by Solidarity Members and Friends* (Touchstone 1982), 9. “Is it possible to combine passionate loyalty and affectionate contempt?” he asks; “It was just because the workers saw that ‘Leszek’ was one of them – and no better than they – that they managed to square that psychological circle.”


On military rule in Algeria, see Roberts, *The Battlefield Algeria* (2003), 203ff., passim. Roberts says this was not a coup, but a defense of the people against the corrupt Chadli and minority Islamists (121).

Michta, *Red Eagle* (1990), 8-10, including following quotation.

The “High Committee of State” (Algeria) and the “Military Council of National Salvation” (Poland), respectively, led by similar generals. One of the “seven chiefs” of the original FLN (1 Nov 1954), Muhammad Boudiaf returned from a 27-year exile to replace Chadli Benjadel, the latter blamed for setting the ALN upon the 1988 protesters and then losing control of the reform tactic. In Poland, General Wojciech Jaruzelski – admired for modernizing the military and relative moderation during the 1976 Radom-Ursus riots – replaced Stanisław Kania, considered too irresolute to handle Solidarity [Michta, *Red Eagle* (1990), 11]. The result differed; the Algerian liberator was assassinated immediately [cf. Eqbal Ahmad, “Algeria Began Badly: Remembering Sidi Mohammed,” C. Bengelsdorf, et al., eds., *The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad* (Columbia 2006).]


Perversely, this includes the argument that democracy forces systemic resignation, for instance by insulating capitalism from the process [John Gaventa, *The Power of Powerlessness* (1980)].

Demands for social cooperation rather than episodic voting routines, now matter how procedurally coherent, may explain the low regard for elections in Poland and Algerians. A study of 154 recent elections showed that Polish elections garnered the 17th lowest participation rate, but Algeria’s “compromised elections” had the 34th lowest turnout [Sources: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Freedom House, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance; compiled in “Election Collage,” *National Geographic*, 214:5 (Nov 2008), 24].

The usual claim is that democracy – rule of law, individualism, &c. – needs mental-cultural *westernization*, not only material or symbolic *modernization* [Samuel Huntington, “The West: Unique, Not Universal,” *Foreign Affairs* (Nov/Dec 1996)]. The usual technique is philological – to expose hidden connotations inhospitable to the original concepts imported by traditionalists’ neologisms. Thus, Bernard Lewis held that the concept “citizen” is absent and “compatriot” [*muwattan*] inherently nationalistic and anti-libertarian among Arabs on linguistic grounds [*The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago 1988), 63-64].

The comparability of practical, if not doctrinal, European and Islamic democratic principles is of growing intellectual concern. On the propinquity of Islamic and Kantian political deliberation, see Talal Asad, “The Limits of Religious Criticism: Notes on Islamic Public Argument,” Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Johns Hopkins 1993). Tariq Ramadan locates the Islamic public sphere in textual imperative: “Re-reading the scriptures sheds light on a concept of the citizens’ attitude toward the state that is compatible with modern life in the West: the Quran reinforces the idea of consultation when it speaks of the shura, which could be a council of advisers to the government: ‘The Muslims are those who consult each other [about] their affairs.’ The idea of consultation is also at the heart of Western democracy,” he adds [“What the West Can Learn from Islam,” Chronicle of Higher Education (16 Feb 2007), B7].

Ricardo Laremont, Islam and the Politics of Resistance in Algeria (2000), 28ff. While both cases were motivated by agricultural independence, Algeria’s communities centered on religious organizations, called zawiyas.

This and prior quote, Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland (Cambridge 2001), 48-49, 70-71.


Polish writers had long sought freedom from Russian dominion and “western” encroachment [Beth Holmgren, Rewriting Capitalism: Literature and the Market in Late Tsarist Russia and the Kingdom of Poland (Pittsburgh 1998)].


For an account of interwar Polish literary life, see Marci Shore, Caviar and Ashes: A Warsaw Generation’s Life and Death in Marxism, 1918-1968 (Yale 2006), chs. 1-5. Polish literature and philosophy, concerned with phenomenology, futurism, and existentialism, differed from Algerian literary concerns. Nonetheless, it is hard to ascribe an effect of this difference in tendencies toward violent protest, which did not emerge in Algeria at this time, one of open discontent, widespread nationalist mobilization, and unmet demands for great independence.

Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland (Cambridge 2001), 270.

H. Nelson, ed., Algeria: a country study (American 1979), 132-133. Within a few years social agitation emerged among groups as diverse as the Berbers and Islamists, arguably close to the timing and content of Polish post-“reform” restiveness.


Roberts, Battleground Algeria (2003), 200: “[T]he real constitution of the Algerian state precludes political accountability, because of the peculiar nature of the supremacy of the army in this state.”

Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton 2001), 23. “Political identities,” he says, “form a starting point for the forging of identities ‘from below’ – for the simple reason that this forging ‘from below’ is not in isolation but in contention with power.”

Michael Bernhard, “Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East Central Europe,” Political Science Quarterly, 108:2 (Sum 1993), 310. Civil society exists in “a public spacestructurally located between official public and private life and populated
by a range of different autonomous organizations…[But more,] for these agents to constitute civil society they need the sanction of the state; the public space must be guaranteed as a realm of freedom by the state itself. Thus civil society must be separated from the state by law, and the actors within it must guaranteed specific personal and group liberties so that they may pursue their broadly conceived interests” (309).

112 Brian Downing locates the institutional-cultural underpinning of democratic potential earlier than, for example, Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship (1966) [The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton 1992)]. In a related ideational vein, Victor Hanson traces “western” hegemony to ancient cultural dynamism [see Culture and Carnage: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (Doubleday 2001)] while Anthony Marx derives modern state centralization – prerequisite to liberal-democratic forms – from early modern proto-nationalist religious activism [Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism (Oxford 2003)]. Because such “idealistic” accounts tend to remain descriptive or abstract they are especially prone to restatement; e.g., see the anticipation of Marx, Faith in Nation, in Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300 (Prentice-Hall 1964).

113 Charles Mills, for instance, tracks the contractual mentality to an age-old descriptive-normative confusion in political and legal philosophy that continues to miscast the issue of “race” [The Racial Contract (Cornell 1997)].


115 Mark Kurlanski, Nonviolence: Twenty-Five Lessons from the History of a Dangerous Idea (Modern 2006), 167-173. Algeria is mentioned in this work only regarding Fanon and the anti-colonial war (159); the Palestinian uprising of 1987 is dismissed as violent (176-177), but in any event would never be positioned as an extension of the global rebellion of 1968.


122 Douglas Porch, The Conquest of the Sahara (Knopf 1984), 100; Wood, “Remembering the Jews of Algeria” (2003), 258; Ruedy, Modern Algeria (1992), 110. Wood corrects the view that the 1870 decree spurred the 1871 Muslim uprisings in Constantine, Aurès, and Kabylia. French integration policy may have reacted to Ottoman reforms from the 1830s, “recognizing the rights of life, property, and honor, and the equality of all religious groups before the law,” an institutional pitch for non-Muslim loyalty that succeeded [Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge 1988), 599]. Hence the “Oriental” Ottomans offered universal pluralist religiosity while the “enlightened” French offered chauvinist homogeneous laicism.


Jacques Derrida, with Mustapha Chérif, “To Have Lived, and to Remember, as an Algerian,” Islam and the West: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, T. Fagan, tr. (Chicago 2008), 29. As Derrida notes, these were Algerian Muslims living under an apartheid favoring Francophone Jews, for whom Arabic was offered in school “as an optional foreign language” (33).

Edward Baring, The Young Derrida and French Philosophy (Cambridge 2011), 17. The author continues: “Derrida was then French, but according to many other Français d’Algérie not French enough, marginalized by a group who were themselves at the edge of French society and suffered under the condescending gaze of their metropolitan concitoyens.” Despite or because of the abrogation of the decree, many French Jews’ considered French assimilation their “most precious possession” [Benjamin Stora, Trois Exiles (Editions Stock 2006), 106; quoted in Baring.

Robert Satloff, Among the Righteous: Lost Stories from the Holocaust’s Long Reach into Arab Lands (Public Affairs 2006), 105-108. José Aboulker, leader of the Algerian Jewish resistance, declared, “As regards the Jews [the Muslims] are perfect.”


Jacques Derrida, Monolinguisme de l’autre: ou la prothèse de l’origine (Galilée 1996). The few who recall this Algerian story usually simplify it. After the Sabra and Shatila massacres (1982), Alain Finkielkraut asked, “If we are the absolute victims, the insulted and injured of history, trapped between an ordeal that has led us to catastrophe and the various threats which weigh upon us, caught between Hitler and Ben Bella, then perhaps we have no responsibility towards the non-Jew” “[Ethics and Politics,” S. Hand, ed., The Levinas Reader (Blackwell 1989), 291; orig. Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas, S. Malka, interview, Radio Communauté (28 Sep 1982), transcribed in Les Nouveaux Cahiers, 18 (1982-1983)].

Michael Fischback, Jewish Property Claims Against Arab Countries (Columbia 2008), 154-155. He notes “that Algerian Jews [mobilized] their efforts to deal with their sudden and massive dispossession” as French citizens, not as Jews, although the Association des Juifs originaires d’Algérie had successfully advocated for the retention of much Jewish communal property.

For instance, the conspicuous and vulnerable practice of “matrilocal residence of young Jewish married couples” (Yiddish keshet) to support the husband’s religious studies, with “deep roots in the Polish Commonwealth” [Nathaniel Deutsch, The Jewish Dark Continent: Life and Death in the Russian Pale of Settlement (Harvard 2011), 234-235, fns. 441, 442].

Mark Roseman, The Villa, the Lake, the Meeting: Wannsee and the Final Solution (Allen Lane/Penguin 2002), 18.


Block and Drucker, Rescuers (1992), 158.

Stefan Korbonski, The Jews and the Poles in World War II (Hippocrene 1989), 48-49. A later declaration responded to more minatory conditions: “The Polish people, themselves the victims of a horrible reign of terror, are witnessing with horror and compassion the slaughter of the remnants of the Jewish population in Poland….Their effective assistance to Jews escaping from ghettos or extermination camps prompted the German occupiers to publish a decree, threatening with death all Poles who render help to Jews in hiding….Some individuals, devoid of honor and conscience and recruited from the criminal world, have now
discovered a new, impious source of profit in blackmailing the Poles who shelter Jews, and the Jews themselves. The Directorate…warns that every instance of such blackmail will be recorded and prosecuted with all severity of the law” (50). Amazingly, the underground courts condemned and executed several Poles for crimes against Jews.


139 Iranek-Osmecki, He Who Saves One Life (1971), 146. In Lwów, Żegota found “spontaneous assistance organized by a group of courageous and determined Poles beg[u]n as early as July 1941, shortly after the city was occupied by German troops.” Still, one intimate account of the Kraków ghetto barely mentions such help [cf. Tadeusz Pankiewicz, The Cracow Ghetto Pharmacy, H. Tilles, tr. (Holocaust Library 1985 [1947]), 25].


141 Korbonski, The Jews and the Poles in World War II (1989), 49. “In Warsaw alone the council was taking care of four thousand persons,” 600 of them children.


147 Testimony of Emanuel Tanay, in Rittner /Myers, eds., The Courage to Care (1986), 54.

148 Tec, When Light Pierced the Darkness (1986), 101-102. Further complicating the measurement of anti-Semitism by rescue actions, many Jews paid Poles to rescue them (87-98).


150 Modern Arabic has the words sahyuni (Zionist) and isra’eeli (Israeli) but Arabs, deferring to the Zionist term “Jewish state,” may use yuhud (Jew) to mean Zionist/Israeli [Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, JM Cohan, ed. (Librairie du Liban [Beirut] 1980), 16, 528]. Note that sahyuni does not derive from the root sin-ha-nun [سَحَنَنُ ] – “to crush, pound, bruise, grind” (401) – nor does it connote those direct meanings in everyday usage.


152 It is asymmetrical that Polish anti-Semites refer to Jews as “Zionists” while Arab anti-Zionists refer to Zionists – especially Israelis – as “Jews.” For Arabs, unlike Poles, the discursive conflation reflects a politicized confusion of references to Israelis.


154 I am grateful to participants for helpful comments on my conference paper, “Mobilization of Polish Protest Before and After Freedom,” Association for the Study of Nationalities, 3rd Annual Convention (Columbia University, 16 April 1998].


158 Such “minor” but publicly nasty anti-Semitic moments have appeared regularly throughout Polish history. Robert Pinsky, for example, reports witnessing a “smaller counterdemonstration” during a Solidarity action in March 1981, “estimated variously as being of a few hundred people up to a thousand, [that was] anti-Semitic in nature” [Poetry and the World (Ecco 1988), 163].

159 Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture (MIT 1995) and May ’68 and its Afterlives (Chicago 1968).

160 Stanislaw Starcki, Class Struggle in Classless Poland (South End 1982), 85.


162 Chris Harman, A People’s History of the World: From the Stone Age to the New Millennium (Verso 2008), 344.

163 Pawel Kloczowski, quoted in Arthur Lebow, “The Last of His Kind,” Threepenny Review, 31:1 (Spr 2010), 7. Obviously, this tradition carried on into the twentieth-century, when Paris hosted Miłocz, Herbert, and Zagajewski.


165 Norman Davies, Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland (Oxford 1984), 258. On immigration, see 254-262.


168 But always in a more complex strategic milieu than that offering only “assimilation or petrification,” with “assimilation being refused” {Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, H. Greenfeld, tr. (Beacon 1991 [1957]), 102ff.}.

169 See Jan Pachonski and Reuel Wilson, Poland’s Caribbean Tragedy: A Study of Polish Legions in the Haitian War of Independence, 1802-1803 (Columbia 1986).


171 Anita Lobel, No Pretty Pictures: a child of war (Avon 1998), 2. In a telling detail, Lobel’s nanny felt free to mumble, “Jews!” when Khasids passed by the window below to her Jewish charge (3).

172 Michel Warschawski, On the Border, L. Laub, tr. (South End 2005), 7-11.

173 Here the Poles’ direct lessons – i.e., ideas unsullied by imperial duplicity – would resemble those of many poor-country elite modernizers, notably in the anti-Ottoman revolt (1908-): “Influenced heavily by French positivism, the Young Turks identified less with 1789 and 1848 and more with the science-oriented reaction against popular government” [Daniel Gordon, “Review Forum: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing,” Review essay on Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy (Cambridge 2005), Canadian Journal of Sociology Online, (May-Jun 2005), 3].

174 Leszek Kolakowski invoked “civil society” to assail the “non-differentiation between state and society” under communism, a view apparently confirmed when “the advent of Solidarnosc marked the exhaustion of attempts to revise Marxism: civil society seemed to be reborn, thus manifesting its ability to survive, its unquenchable vitality, in a country still ruled…by the communist party” [Dominique Colas, Civil Society and Fanaticism: Conjoined Histories, A. Jacobs, tr. (Stanford 1997), 33-34].

175 See Eva Hoffman’s account of her post-1989 visit to Adam Michnik at the Gazeta Wybocza: “There seems to be none of the pecking-order anxiety often prevailing in comparable American establishments…Everything has to be decided from the ground
up – and somehow it’s done without pomposity, with that sharpness of wit that Poles identify with style” [Exit into History: A Journey Through the New Eastern Europe (Penguin 1993)], 19.

176 Secularism is prescriptive advocacy for segregating religious practices and public obligations – in contrast to secularization, a descriptive thesis about the mechanical demise of religious practice under modern pressures. Casanova describes Polish Catholic mobilization against communism as pro-secularist but anti-secularization [Public Religions in the Modern World (1994)]. The distinction is a sociological heuristic, not an analytical duality; as Talal Asad insists, we can not “assume that the categories of the secular and of the religious are clear-cut...[or that] certain state forms [are] secular only in appearance but not in reality” [David Scott, “Appendix: The Trouble of Thinking: An Interview with Talal Asad,” Scott/C. Hirshkind, eds., Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors (Stanford 2006), 284].

177 Ruedy, Modern Algeria (1992), 99. In this period colonial commercialized agriculture created mass proletarianization.

178 Ruedy, Modern Algeria (1992), 104-107. Figures for the increase in French education of Muslims are on 105.

179 Ruedy, Modern Algeria (1992), 126. By 1954 300,000 Algerians were working in France; “[m]ostly bachelors, who rotated in and out of the French work force, these young workers had a profound impact in political and cultural life in Algeria, both because of... their experiences in Europe and because of the levelling their ideas and attitudes provided once they came home again” (125).

180 This conjugation of West European, Polish, and Algerian desire for self-determination is an overarching commonality whose minor qualifications remain intriguing. Again, Polish nationalism had a direct, uncomplicated affinity with French state building whereas Algeria’s had a schizoid complex toward France – rejecting meant echoing its nationalist ethos. This also involved a repudiation of particular French colonial constructions, a décolonisation des esprits; e.g., asserting, pace the Kabyle Myth, a historical Algerian-Berber identification [Paul Silverstein, Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation (Indiana 2004), 68-70; see Patricia Lorcín, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Race in Colonial Algeria (I.B. Tauris 1995)].

181 Davies, Heart of Europe (1984), 85. Anti-imperialism was, too, a broad umbrella covering similarly diverse tendencies in both cases [cf. Davies, Heart of Europe (1986), 85ff; Ruedy, Modern Algeria (1992), 144ff.].

182 Davies, Heart of Europe (1986), 86ff. “After the fall of France caused near catastrophe,” “all of the survivors of the Polish Armed Forces [came] under British command – Churchill, [General Władysław] Sikorski, and de Gaulle sharing the distinction of being the only allied leaders who ‘fought on’” (87). Polish soldiers in the Levant were stationed in French Syria.


184 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (Penguin 2005), 286. The internal quote is not sourced.


186 Islamists, like many secular Muslims, condemned the failure of Algeria to create modern socio-political conditions. We may consider Islamist modernism a compelling practical political philosophy, noting the prestige and reception afforded to Muslim thinkers by linking them to European philosophers, such as Martin Heidegger [cf. Roxanne Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism (Princeton 1999)]. In one of my non-residential research trips, a five-part radio program for American Public Radio and supported by the Middle East Institute (DC) in 1992. I had extensive discussions about the political situations in Jordan, Palestine, Algeria, and Sudan, and it was impossible to conceive Islamist politics as anti-modern – following a long traditions of “reformist” or “modernist” Islamic thought, Islamists advocated for statist development.

187 See also Fanon, “Algeria Unveiled,” Dying Colonialism, reprinted Monthly Review Press (1965). But Assia Djebar portrays a more gendered dynamic in the maquis, where the revolutionary “thinks of his wife, in her corner at home, for whom there is nothing left to do but watch – watch, as they all do” {Children of the New World: A Novel of the Algerian War, M de Jager, tr. (CUNY Feminist Press 2005 [1962]), 5}.

As I have mentioned, the literature heatedly debates Solidarity’s debt to intellectual (KOR) versus labor (MKS) initiative [e.g., David Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland Since 1968 (Temple 1990) and Lawrence Goodwyn, Breaking the Barrier: The Rise of Solidarity in Poland (Oxford 1991)]. But across this divide most analysts agree that the Church added its support last to the formation of the radically anti-statist, egalitarian, triumvirate “civil society.”


Fanny Colonna critiques this before/after periodization – based on the alleged lacuna of Islamist anti-imperial agitation from the 19th-C. uprisings to the 1930s reformist pro-independence discourse (“The Transformation of a Saintly Lineage in the North West Aurès Mountains (Algeria): Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” E. Burke/I. Lapidus, eds., *Islam, Politics, and...*)


208 Elevated in colonial status by the “Hamitic Hypothesis,” the Berbers may have been a privileged ethnic (not religious) minority in Algeria, unlike Poland’s Jewish minority, during the 19th century; it seems, however, implausible that this discrepant attitude toward the minority – itself unsure given Jewish protection and seclusion – directly affected late 20th-century protest patterns. On “Hamitic” colonial racialism, see Mammadani, When Victims Became Killers (2001), 79-87; on the Berbers, 86.


215 James Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States (Cambridge 1986); Piscatori and Dale Eickelman, Muslim Politics (Princeton 1996); Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People, and the State (IB Taurus 1993); Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, C. Volk, tr. (Harvard 1994); John Esposito, Islam and Politics, 2nd ed. (Syracuse 1987), ch. 4.

216 Akeel Bilgrami, “The Clash within Civilizations,” Dædalus (Summer 2003) and see other contributions in the issue.

217 Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (Columbia 1983); Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories (Cambridge 1997); Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Texas 1982); Armando Salvatore, Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity (Ithaca 1997); Azia al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (Verso 1993).
much higher percentage of the American population is schizophrenic but Muslims, which is plenty to disrupt others’ lives, but cannot be the basis of inferences about Islam generally. By comparison, a Muslim assimilates as a member of a group that remains intact but without practical impact, then they would seem tangential to real politics. Conversely, we may read Schwedler challenges is that participation inclusion, in the form of political action, Separating “ideology” from strategy presumes that change? What’s more at least for my project behavior/action matter so isolating ideology diminishes its relevance. For instance, action. Islamist assimilates as a member of a group that remains intact but without practical impact, then they would seem tangential to real politics. Conversely, we may read Schwedler shows that democracy lacks its putative moderating effect because it affected Jordanian and Yemeni Islamist commitments, since the theory Schwedler challenges is that participation changes the ideologies of incorporated social agents. But for Yemeni Islamists to join a ruling coalition or participate in national politics might itself be considered by definition a modification if not pacification of the initial commitments. If this is not true, i.e., if peaceful participation signals no change in Islamist commitments, then beliefs may be seen as simply trivial to practical politics. Thus if Islamist principles do not change under democratic inclusion, that is, if they remain intact but without practical impact, then they would seem tangential to real politics. Conversely, we may read Schwedler as saying that Yemeni-Islamist assimilation or cooperation – affecting behavior but not ideology – demonstrates the strategic and vibrant nature of Islamism. In this reading, radical ideology does not fall away as an effect of political inclusion; rather, political inclusion, in the form of peaceful radicalism, is itself a tactic of radical ideology.

A uniquely Islamic violence is often inferred from the inversion: “most Muslims aren’t terrorists, but most terrorists are Muslims.” This confection is worth assessing. The inference is problematic. First, Al-Qaeda membership is .0001% of 1.2 billion Muslims, which is plenty to disrupt others’ lives, but cannot be the basis of inferences about Islam generally. By comparison, a much higher percentage of the American population is schizophrenic but we cannot necessarily infer anything about the United

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223 Robert Lifton conflates Palestinian Hamas, Charles Manson, Aum Shinrikyō, Jewish fundamentalists, Timothy McVeigh, and Hindu extremists as one global system of apocalyptic violence under “certain psychological parallels” [Destroying the World to Save It: *Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence, and the New Global Terrorism* (Owl 1999), 4].


225 Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (Ecco 2003), xix]. Michael Ignatieff, whose phrase “apocalyptic nihilism” for 9/11 may have influenced the general view of Islam, endorsed Stern’s and Juergensmeyer’s works.

226 Yahya Sadowski has rebutted the “clash of civilizations” and “Muslim rage” theses of Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis, casting extensive doubt on mentalist essentialism more broadly [The Myth of Global Chaos (Brookings 1998)].


229 Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism* (Chicago 1986); Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy* (1986). In my view ideology (1) encompasses means and ends (2) matters only as it affects social action. Separating “ideology” from strategy presumes that changes in strategy are not themselves ideological; but how do they change? What’s more at least for my project behavior/action matter so isolating ideology diminishes its relevance. For instance, Schwedler shows that democracy lacks its putative moderating effect because it affected Jordanian and Yemeni Islamist ideology differently, but not Jordanian and Yemeni actions: both remained intra-systemically peaceful [Faith in Moderation (2006)]. But if “moderate” Jordanian Islamists and still-radical Yemeni Islamists act the same in democratic regimes, continuity of “radical” Islamist convictions in Yemen but not Jordan seems irrelevant to social action, where the democratic peace argument appears to hold. The significance of the study depends on the interpretation of Yemenis’ in-government Islamist radicalism, since the theory Schwedler challenges is that participation changes the ideologies of incorporated social agents. But for Yemeni Islamists to join a ruling coalition or participate in national politics might itself be considered by definition a modification if not pacification of the initial commitments. If this is not true, i.e., if peaceful participation signals no change in Islamist commitments, then beliefs may be seen as simply trivial to practical politics. Thus if Islamist principles do not change under democratic inclusion, that is, if they remain intact but without practical impact, then they would seem tangential to real politics. Conversely, we may read Schwedler as saying that Yemeni-Islamist assimilation or cooperation – affecting behavior but not ideology – demonstrates the strategic and vibrant nature of Islamism. In this reading, radical ideology does not fall away as an effect of political inclusion; rather, political inclusion, in the form of peaceful radicalism, is itself a tactic of radical ideology.
States from this figure. Second, terrorist, militant, communitarian, and personal Muslims correspond less to one another than to their counterparts in other faiths or secular communities [Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11* (Chicago 2003)]. Finally, conditional probability requires an alternative measure of the ratio of violent to all Muslims relative to other religious faiths [see John Paulos, *A Mathematician Reads the Newspaper* (Basic 1995), 72-73]. The .0001% of Muslims who are involved in terrorism would have to be compared to the same figure for other religions (lest other factors such as hegemony, invasions, sanctions, and war be bracketed), and the result is


233 Khalidi, Rashid, *Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East* (Beacon 2005), 17.


240 Davies, *Heart of Europe* (1984), 179. The passage artificially separates “social philosophies” from “reactions to oppression.” He means only that the absolutism “of the partitioning powers,” like Polish national sentiment, is a constant that cannot explain variation in rebellious activity. But we still need to explain “people’s varying reactions to oppression,” likely caused by sub-regime-type political-economic or institutional change.


242 The better writing has historicized the politics of religiosity and politicized the history of secularism; e.g., Gil Anidjar’s essay on secularism as a luxurious cover for triumphant Christianity: “Secularism,” *Critical Inquiry*, 33 (Aut 2006).

243 Islamist capitalism surprises outsiders even more than its scientism, viz. its draw among engineers, chemists, and other hard scientists; but bourgeois Islamism follows the earlier logic of minority-status Christian and Jewish entrepreneurialism under

A central secular intellectual behind the movement, Adam Michnik, for instance, envisions a public role for religion as a source of ethical commitment in the modern world. Implicit in this argument is a distinctively post-liberal conception of public life. On this view, democracy means more than an accountable, representative government, establishing procedures that allow civil concerns to remain securely private. It means the liberation of civil society as a space where values are formed, debated, and transmitted [and] citizens surpass the isolation of their private lives and freely associate and act upon their values [Jeffrey Isaac, “Adam Michnik: Politics and the Church,” *Salmagundi*, no. 103 (1994), 205].


See, for example, Edmund Burke III and Paul Lubeck, “Explaining Social Movements in Two Oil-Exporting States: Divergent Outcomes in Nigeria and Iran,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 29:4 (Oct 1987). Their argument is that “Islamic revolutionary movements” cannot be explained without including the effects of oil-price fluctuations on “urban social networks.” Similarly, see Skocpol, “Rentier State” (1982).

My concern is with oil/gas-resources effects on activism, not other rent-state outcomes. But political-economic skepticism regarding broad political patterns of petro-states – e.g., authoritarian regimes and lifeless civil societies derived directly from distribution – have been partially vindicated by the turn to more structural or material intervening variables in revised rentier-state arguments. For instance, a recent study shows that gender inequality in Algeria and all oil-rich countries derives from the structure of the labor force, not Islam or distribution [Michael Ross, “Oil, Islam, and Women,” *APSRe*, 102:1 (Feb 1008)].

Among oil-wealthy states, structures of ownership, production inputs, property, downstream activities, classes, coalitions, and state autonomy have varied, imbuing, e.g., nationalist Algeria, dependent Nigeria, and hegemonic Saudi Arabia distinct domestic and international policy profiles [Petter Nore, “Oil and the State: A Study of Nationalization in the Oil Industry,” Nore and T. Turner, eds., *Oil and Class Struggle* (Zed 1980), 78ff.].

Daniel Hellinger, “The Breakdown of Puntofijismo and the Rise of Chavismo,” S. Ellner/Hellinger, eds., *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict* (Lynne Rienner 2004), 27. *Puntofijismo* refers to the post-1958 Venezuelan democratic consolidation conjoining oil-based distributive justice and the iron lawyers of oligarchy of the AD (labor-allied) and COPEI (capital-allied) parties. Venezuela’s “petro-state” democratization and peaceful transition provide a contrast-case for the view that formal regime-type, informal citizenship regime, or protest strategies derive directly from mineral wealth. Poland and Venezuela – each comparable to Algeria by respective criteria of political regime-type or economic rentier-type – were equated as “populist neoliberal” in this period [Kurt Weyland, “Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe,” *Comparative Politics*, 31:4 (Jul 1999), 381], but have since been contrasted as fully and “semi” democratic [Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, “Regime Legacies and Democratization: Explaining Variance in the Level of Democracy in Latin America, 1978-2004,” Working Paper no. 354 (Kellogg Publications Dec 2008), 2-3].


David Waldner, *State Building and Late Development* (Cornell 1999), 106.

Oil thus de-develops rent-countries, rather than merely delaying “probably the long-term trend” in which Arab “personalist legitimacy is increasingly vulnerable to erosion as societies modernize and become exposed to norms hostile to absolutism and dictatorship” [Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (Yale 1977), 20].


Waldner, *State Building and Late Development* (1999), 47.
ed., enlisted military rec

corporate multiple cultural members into an efficient property 

social mechanics of primary goods revenue streams into 

deterministic input-output functions, implying that oil-wealth obviates politics.

A variant of this outsider-regime argument emerged during the 2009 Iranian protests and repression after an allegedly rigged election. “Part of the reason the regime proved vulnerable was that Poles themselves saw it as a foreign implant…[In Iran, however,] the mullahs may be many things – fundamentalist, intolerant, even vote fixers – but their trump card is that they are Iranian to core [sic.]…” [David Sanger, “Repression 101,” NYT (28 Jun 2009), WK 4]. Obviously this is precisely the sort of argument that explanations of social movement success or regime failure should avoid; the explanans (perceived foreignness of the regime) is measured by the explanandum (regime vulnerability). In Iran, as in Algeria earlier, the regime had become foreign to much of the population. Iranians did not say, “The mullahs may be fundamentalist, intolerant, coercive, corrupt; we may be opposing them at risk to our lives – but they are we to our national core and so they have imposed nothing foreign on us.”


This testimony appears in the video “Solidarity, Polish Union,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CYpPgGDVxOU.

It is unclear whether Michnik meant to suggest that the USSR was simply joining an already-occurring “Afghan conflict,” but this is misleading, consistent with Michnik’s naïve grasp of imperial intervention, notably the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.


John Entelis, Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized (Westview 1986), 171-172, 202-203; Martin Stone, Agony of Algeria (1997), 86, 132, 244-245. Beginning with the 1963 delivery of the Soviets’ “first military credit” worth $100 million, throughout the 1980s the Soviet Union supplied Algeria with 90% of its foreign assistance. Between 1980 and 1986 the USSR agreed to supply $5.5 billion in weapons under favorable (low-interest) conditions – including T-72 tanks, BMP 1 & 2 infantry fighting vehicles, MIG-23 and -25 fighter aircraft, Mi-24 attack helicopters, and SA-2 and -3 air defense missiles. 3,500 officers and enlisted military received Soviet military training, about the same number of Soviet “advisors” stationed in Algeria [Helen Metz, ed., Algeria: A Country Study (GPO/Library of Congress 1994), http://countrystudies.us/algeria/172.htm].
I would not wish to take too literally the self-descriptions of “Cold warriors” in characterizing US-USSR competition.


The 1975 Helsinki Agreement involving the US and the USSR “committed the signatories to respect the sovereignty of each nation, renounce ‘the threat or use of force,’ and respect basic human rights, including ‘freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief’...This move encouraged Solidarity in Poland, the most important democratic movement in the communist world before Gorbachev” [Robert Kaiser, Why Gorbachev Happened: His Triumph, His Failure, and His Fall (Touchstone1992), 90-91]. The Declaration of Human Rights, officially published at this time, “became a Magna Carta of the Polish democratic opposition” [Jerzy Holzer, Solidarnosc, 1980-1981 (Instytut Literacki 1984), 58-59], cited in Grzegorz Ekiert, The State Against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe (Princeton 1996), 384, fn. 13.


Perhaps the Soviets were warding off a Polish invasion, as they revived the jamming of radio-broadcasts “to prevent news of Solidarity’s successes from reaching the Soviet public” [Kaiser, Why Gorbachev Happened (1992), 57]. Gorbachev deserves credit for Central Europe’s peaceful transition, but “what tends to get obscured...is the extent to which Gorbachev himself rose up...as a response to Poland’s Solidarity movement” [Lawrence Weschler, “Afterword,” Maciej Lopinski, Marcin Moskit, and Mariusz Wilk, Konspira: Solidarity Underground, J. Cave, tr. (California 1990), 251].

Quoted in Johanna Granville, “Satellites or Prime Movers? Polish and Hungarian Reactions to the 1956 Events: New Archival Evidence,” East European Quarterly, xxxv:4 (Jan 2002), 440. According to Granville the archives prove “the Moscow leaders were indeed deterred from intervening in Poland by the Polish threat of counter-force” (439-440). Perhaps the threat of Polish state counterforce had diminished with the subordination of the PZPR by the 1980s, removing all protection by the regime of the workers and freeing the Soviets to intervene with impunity unlike in 1956.


Lech Wałęsa, The Struggle and the Triumph: An Autobiography, F. Philip/H. Mahut, trs. (Arcade 1992), 4. We see Solidarity youth moving from (1) Gandhian normative detachment from the hegemon’s traits to (2) Fanonian causal attachment to them: “Comparisons between Solidarity and the Indian independence movement, they argued,” Wałęsa adds, “were wrong. Gandhi was from another era, and anyway, he had been dealing with the British, with men of principle. He would have failed here because Communists pay no attention either to principle or to public opinion. I told them I agreed – Gandhi would have had a tough time in Poland...Sure, I could [espouse non-violence], since I was pretty well off (house, car, some money), but they had nothing and saw no future for themselves. ‘Mr. Wałęsa,’[‘they’d say,’ ‘why don’t you join in the demonstrations anymore? As soon as the ZOMO [riot police] show up, you hop into your car and take off’]” (4). Likewise, as late as 1985, Michnik insisted that dissidents must “admit the possibility of armed defense against aggressive despotism.” He also invoked Gandhi, a preoccupation clearly of Polish dissidents: “Pacifism as a mass movement aims to avoid suffering; pacifists often say that no cause is worth suffering or dying for. The ethics of Solidarity are based on an opposite premise: that there are causes worth suffering and dying for. Gandhi and King died for the same cause as the minors of Wujek who rejected the belief that it is better to remain a willing slave than to become a victim of murder. In this belief Solidarity activists consciously reject the idea of adhering to doctrinal consistency at all cost” (“Letter from Gdansk Prison,” Stokes, ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism (1996 [1985]), 226).
Soviet communist intentions were mysterious to many involved. At the time, George Kennan, for instance, fretted over US-SU militarization and hostility, but worried little about satellite countries [see “Cease This Madness,” Atlantic (Jan 1981)].

Wałęsa, The Struggle and the Triumph (1992), 3. Admittedly, Wałęsa also says, “For decades we were told, ‘If you challenge [Russian] authority, they’ll crush us all.’ This argument prevailed until as late as 1985, when…Gorbachev assumed the leadership of the USSR” (147). But by this standard previous Polish protest actions were “challenging Russian authority.”


The longue durée of Soviet imperialism may have been exhausted by the 1970s. The ethno-nationalist and class resentment of Russian aggression filling Dostoyevsky’s The Devils stretched from Partition, when “Russia held Poland in an iron grip,” until NKVD and Soviet armies burst into Polish towns “spewing vile obscenities. The worst is when they call someoe a bourgeois” [Ryszard Kapuściński, Imperium, K. Glowczewska, tr. (Knopf 1994), 10]. Past the mid-1950s one cannot imagine Soviets calling Poles “bourgeois” or making them learn Russian declensions, such was the erosion of their ideological credibility.

Andrzej Kutylowski, “Non-Violence in the Polish Breakthrough: An Introduction,” Journal of Peace Research, 19:2 (1982). This was the editor’s conclusion in a publication on Polish non-violence by activists, writers, and researchers in the early 1980s.


CHAPTER FOUR: Polish worker-citizens and non-violence


6 Adam Zagajewski, “Solidarity, Solitude,” Solidarity, Solitude: Essays by Adam Zagajewski, L. Vallee, tr. (Ecco 1990), 85. Based in Kraków, Zagajewski was a major figure in Poland’s 1960s-1970s literary New Wave. His range exemplifies Polish intellectual concerns. As a student of the Husserlian philosopher Roman Ingarden, Zagajewski sought a literary epiphanic phenomenology – to capture the material-intentional essence of external objects in “authentic contact” [Bozena Shallcross, “The Divining Moment: Adam Zagajewski’s Aesthetics of Epiphany,” Slavic and East European Journal, 44:2 (Sum 2000); for a helpful brief on the variant of phenomenology Ingarden brought Kraków from Lwów, see Ruth Crowley and Ken Olson,
“Translators’ Introduction” to Ingarden, The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, Crowley and Olson, trs. (Northwestern 1973). This rarefied pursuit suited his political commitment to resist all coercive language or formulaic thought and champion “literatures written by mere mortals; by people who love or not, who hate or are bored; by artists devoting their lives to a search for meaning, symbol, expression; by people who have known suffering and happiness” [“Solidarity, Solitude,” 84]. “They [Gombrowicz, Stempowski, Milosz, et al.] hungered for the great, universal subjects and ideas, they yearned for metaphysics – but they could achieve these only by laboriously hacking a path through the jungle of questions springing from the social and political terrain” [“Writing in Polish,” A Defense of Ardor, C. Cavanagh, tr. (FSG 2004), 195; see too Larry Wolff, “The Poetry and Prose of Everyday Life in Communist Kraków: Moths, Old Maids, and the Memoirs of Adam Zagajewski,” Slavic Review, 61:2 (Sum 2002)].


9 Norman Davies, Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland (Oxford 1984), 281ff.


13 Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, A. Kropotkin, rev. tr., (Winston 1949 [1869]), 404. Napoleon was “probably still more excited, however, by the fact that in making this statement he was uttering a palpable falsehood.”


15 Ruth Ediger, “History of an Institution as a Factor for Predicting Church Institutional Behavior: The Cases of the Catholic Church in Poland, the Orthodox Church in Romania, and the Protestant Churches in East Germany,” East European Quarterly, XXXIX:3 (Sep 2005), 302.


17 This does not imply continual or seamless Polish-Catholic national identity, unity, or uniformity.

18 Davies, God’s Playground (1982), 37.


20 Lukowski and Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland (2001), 218; this section is largely based on this source, ch. 6

21 Christopher Cviic claims the intelligentsia was “put off by the Church’s traditionalism, exclusivism, and…intense anti-Semitic prejudice” [“The Church” (1983), 93]. Lukowski and Zawadzki: “the Church’s concern for easing social tensions helped to weaken the anticlericalism that had been widespread among the left-wing and liberal intelligentsia…and promoted the emergence of a new open-minded Catholic intelligentsia [A Concise History of Poland (2001), 218].


23 Otto Friedrich, Before the Deluge: A Portrait of Berlin in the 1920’s (Harper & Row 1972), 94-95. By 1922 inflation and bankruptcies in Germany permitted Poles to buy up German homes (147), insinuating an economic invasion by nationalistic Poles who had just fought off the Russians, Germany’s standing enemy, in 1920.


Civic, “The Church” (1983), 95ff. He says intellectuals were “put off by the Church’s traditionalism, exclusivism, and... intense anti-Semitic prejudice” (93). Lukowski and Zawadzki add that “the Church’s concern for easing social tensions helped to weaken the anticlericalism that had been widespread among the left-wing and liberal intelligentsia…and promoted the emergence of a new open-minded Catholic intelligentsia [*A Concise History of Poland* (2001), 218].


For an affecting portrait of the contradictions in Poland’s “revolutionary era” between its extant feudal and industrial orders – “Horse-drawn carts still amble on muddy streets in the shadows of the giant modern steel works named after Lenin and its surrounding work settlement, Nowa Huta, in the vicinity of Cracow” – see Joseph Fiszman, *Revolution and Tradition in People’s Poland: Education and Socialization* (Princeton 1972), ch. 2.

Fiszman, *Revolution and Tradition in People’s Poland* (1972), 5-6. Fiszman discovers that older teachers were more doctrinal than their students-turned-teachers, though the latter were educated and trained wholly within the socialist pedagogy. Evidently, “youth culture” and “concomitant rebellion against existing norms and expectations,” as well as “traditional” values, prevailed over crass inculcation (9).


Grzegorz Ekiert, *The State Against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe* (Princeton 1996), 216. He also mentions the Soviets’ western aid-driven “adherence to international laws” (220), of which protests were aware.


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46 Fiszman, Revolution and Tradition in People’s Poland (1972), 17.


50 David Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault: A Biography (Pantheon 1993), 85.

51 Michel Foucault, quoted in Claude Mauriac, Le Temps Immobile Tome 3: Et comme l'Espérance est violente (Livre de Poche 1986), 574; quoted in Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault (1993), 85.


56 Davies, Heart of Europe (1994), 10-11. In 1957 the emigration ban was lifted for Jews [Eva Hoffman, Lost in Translation: A Life in a New Language (Penguin 1989), 83. Hoffman asks, “What are the ceremonies for such departures – departures…neither entirely chosen nor entirely forced, and that are chosen and forced at the same time?”].


59 Denis MacShane, Solidarity: Poland’s Independent Trade Union (Spokesman 1981), 89.


64 For a textual explanation of the play’s censure, see J. M. Bates Dziady, “Forefather’s Eve,” D. Jones, ed., Censorship: A World Encyclopedia (Fitzroy Dearborn 2000), http://www.arts.gla.ac.uk/Slavonic/Dziady.html. Russia has censored or banned the play repeatedly since the 1833 publication of its Act III – implying Poles’ willingness to tempt Russian repression with overt political contempt for tyranny and foreign domination.

65 David Mason, “Poland,” S. White, et al., eds., Developments in East European Politics (Duke 1993), 38
[“Polska czeka na swego Dubceka’]; translation (tweaked) in Mason, “Poland” (1993), 38.


76 Ascherson captures rather tragically the despair over lost revisionist hope:

> Some nourished the thought that Polish Communism could, in spite of its past failures, find within itself the power to create a new synthesis of socialism and democracy that had never been seen in Europe. Others cradled the idea that the Soviet Union might one day be transformed or, less improbably, decide to withdraw behind its own frontiers. Meanwhile, they raised children and, in their turn, now hear themselves explaining to sons and daughters – as their parents had explained to them – the difference between the real history of Poland and history taught at school. And life flowed away [Neal Ascherson, *The Polish August: The Self-Limiting Revolution* (Viking 1982), 9].

77 Andrzej Tymowski, “In Memorium: Jacek Kuron, March, 3 1934 –June 17, 2004,” *East European Politics and Societies*, 19:1 (2005), 9. It seems a significant index of the regime’s laxity at this time that Kuron’s phone number (39-39-64), according to the author, “became known to, and used by, hundreds of activists who did this defense work.”


83 Poland’s largely commercial foreign debt ballooned from $1.2B in 1971 to $23.5B in 1980 [Ekiert, *The State Against Society* (1996), 224].
Arthur Lebow, "The Last of His Kind," *Threepenny Review*, 31:1 (Spr 2010), 9. Adam Michnik's companion, an actress from Warsaw, persuaded Zagajewski to join the opposition more actively at dinner in the Krakow home of Wislawa Szymborska. This indicates the renown of opposition members and how leniently the state reacted to them. Zagajewski signed and circulated the letter quite publicly; he was sacked but never arrested and questioned for only an hour by “a not unfriendly inquisitor.”


107 Michael Burawoy and Jānus Lučāns, *The Radiant Past: Ideology and Reality in Hungary’s Road to Capitalism* (Chicago 1992), 186, fn 7; the authors endorse Staniszkiś’s minority view [Poland’s Self-Limiting Revolution (1984)] that Solidarity “act[ed] as conduits for governmental restraint” against more radical working class attitudes, guaranteeing the self-limiting revolution from top-down.


113 The whole city of Lublin [pop. 300,000] came to a halt: “including a truck plant; building, transport, and chemical enterprises; as well as bakeries – [all] standing still. City transport was on strike, so were the railway workers, halting trains on their way to the Soviet Union” [Singer, “Class Struggles in Poland”(1980), 16-17].


115 A devoted and highly decorated worker since 1950, as well as a member of the strike committee in 1970, Walentynowicz had been severally relocated and finally fired for supporting an independent trade union initiative and distributing *Robotnik*, an opposition publication put out by the union movement and KOR. The strikers at Gdańsk were aware that between 17 April and 30 July, despite being officially reinstated, Walentynowicz had been effectively demoted, pilloried, even sequestered. After suggesting she be reassigned, on 7 Aug a letter arrived at her home announcing her termination “because of a grave crime against the duties of a worker” [Stanisław Starcki, Class Struggle in Classless Poland (South End 1982), 58-59]. My account of the events of August 1980 will draw extensively on Starcki. The author is pseudonymous and his detailed account is itself a summary of a diary written at the time by eyewitness Adam Orchoński. Both were activists, so I have consulted all other available accounts for corroboration and confrontation.


Singer, “Class Struggles in Poland” (1980), 20. As Singer notes, the good faith of the state remained suspect not least because of continued arrests of supporters like Kuron and Michnik (on an every-two-day catch-and-release rotation in compliance with the legal maximum for administrative detention without trial), blocking of phone-lines, and split bargaining across industries.


For statements by relatively overlooked groups, see Peter Raina, Independent Social Movements in Poland (Orbis 1981).

Starski, Class Struggle in Classless Poland (1982), 72.

Starski, Class Struggle in Classless Poland (1982), 72.


Starski relays an anecdote that exemplifies how profoundly the Polish people created Solidarity:

On being released after 48 hours [in detention, Wałęsa] was without money, so in order to use city transportation to get home he had to borrow and beg for change on stations and at stops. This demanded some introduction – and some of his political speeches were created on the spur of the moment, as he approached strangers and explained where he came from and why he was imprisoned. He never had to wait. He not only got money to get home – he got involved in heated discussions, explaining his reasons for free independent trade unions [60-61].

Starski, Class Struggle in Classless Poland (1982), 73.


Michnik, “We Can Talk without Hatred” (1998 [25-26 Apr 1992]), 266. Michnik also says, intriguingly: “Looking at things from [the point of view of Solidarity’s options under martial law], you can see why we became convinced that the system wasn’t run by Poles, why we thought those in charge were an alien group, Sovietized Poles” (268).

MacShane, Solidarity (1981), 81-82.

“Poland in March 1981 [there was] an endless parade of political meetings, mass rallies, and private discussion groups, dealing with issues as diverse as…anti-Semitism in Poland, the theory and practice of union democracy, or the proper income of steelworkers as a percentage of gross national product.” [David Ost, “Introduction” to Jan Mur, A Prisoner of Martial Law, Poland: 1981-1982, L. Vallee, tr. (HBJ 1984), x-xix].


Lopinski, et al., eds., Konspira (1990), 16, fn. 8.

145 The SB (Służba bezpieczenstwa), security services, had refined policing operations for a decade, shifting the state’s repressive tactics from outright coercion to “pressure,” concentrating on “the use of new technology and the profitability of various enterprises. Breakdowns no longer led to arrest of workers, but to discreet pressure from the Party organization for the removal of inefficient managers...The SB’s comprehensive penetration of public groups undermined many attempts to form illegal organizations” (385-386). Two remarks are needed here. First, the capacity for security services to “penetrate” society and apply more sophisticated pressures to dissuade dissidence does not equal the capacity for effective infrastructural or disciplinary power (§2.b, §2.e), in terms of subjectivizing citizens as the state desires, to train away oppositional tendencies; but it creates a complex refinement of sovereign power through more invasive punitive means. Second, following on this, the updated or modernized SB techniques were implicated in the experience of effective, comprehensive repression and encroaching systemic expulsion. Hence:

With the exception of the first few weeks after 13 December 1981, Poland did not again experience a period of repression comparable to that of 1949-1956. The security apparatus did use a number of new methods, known in the language of the secret service as ‘disinformation and disorientation,’ which had already been practiced in the 1970s when the Ministry of Internal affairs set up autonomous Group D of the Fourth Department...After martial law was proclaimed it broadened its activities [from focus on the Church and other civic organizations] to include Solidarity and carried out a series of attacks against the union’s properties. Group D also burned union buildings, set fire to cars, beat up Solidarity militants, sent death threats, and distributed false tracts and fake underground newspapers.” Many were drugged and beaten, several to death, including a schoolboy called Grzegorz Przemyk, who was killed in a police station in 1983 (385-386).

In addition, the unpunished murders of Solidarity-aligned priests continued, most notoriously of Father Popieluszko in 1984.


147 Quoted in Maciej Lopinski, Marcin Moskit, and Mariusz Wilk, Konspra: Solidarity Underground, J. Cave, tr. (California 1990), 2.

148 Zygmunt Bauman, Review of Ray Taras, Ideology in a Socialist State: Poland 1956-1983 (Cambridge 1984), Soviet Studies, 37:4 (Oct 1985), 577. He notes: “The phraseology of the coup d’etat overtly beckoned to the memories of 1926, while the idea of the PRON (Patriotic Front of the National Resurrection) can be better understood as a bid to capitalize on Pilsudski’s BBWR (Non-Party Block of Co-Operation with the Government.”

149 Hughes, “Sixteen Months of Solidarity” (1988), 85


152 Again, the power of Solidarity to attract workers among lower-rank PZPR members suggests an intra-party horizontalist trend that prefugured the confusing status of the PZPR under martial law; in short, alienation from the state was occurring not only outside the “workers’ party” but inside as well [Werner Hahn, Democracy in a communist party: Poland’s Experience since 1980 (Columbia 1987)].

153 Adam Przeworski, “‘The Man of Iron’ and Men of Power in Poland,” PS, 15:1 (Win 1982), 18-19. Adding that “workers' struggles for this right [have] had one of three outcomes: repression, revolution, or devolution,” Przeworski implies Poland should be headed toward devolution, the gradual expansion of suffrage, shift to parliamentary rule, and normalization of intra-systemic union involvement in governance.

But something went wrong in Poland. At several moments in the past year it seemed that the old system of power would be transformed, that the party would undergo a process of internal democratization, that it would acquire a new vision, propose a new program, and lead the society on the path of reform. None of this happened. As Solidarity continues to mobilize the allegiances of millions, as farmers, the Church, students and several other groups develop into autonomous forces, as economic conditions bring people into the streets in acts of desperation, the party simply clings to its only strategic axiom: the monopoly of power. Moreover, the party is not able to define any uses for the power it so zealously guards: it has no program, no vision, no conception that could mobilize even its own members (19-20).


158 Kazimierz Poznański, Poland’s Protracted Transition: Institutional Change and Economic Growth, 1970-1994 (Cambridge 1996), 88. These were, he notes, reactivated and defanged workers councils relative to the ones explicitly demanded by Solidarity in fall 1981.


165 Lawrence Weschler, “Afterword,” Lopinski, et al., eds. (1990), 252. It is worth noting that if martial law “saved” Poland from the Soviets, according to Michnik and Jaruzelski, it may have also saved Solidarity from itself. Mariusz Wilk told Weschler, “If not for martial law, I’d probably have continued to drift away from Solidarity,” because of its factionalism, and “was playing with the idea of moving back down south and raising sheep. But martial law made me mad. They went and arrested all those people I’d been having so much trouble with, and it really got me furious” (254). Wilk’s ambivalence about Solidarity pales next to that of Bogdan Borusewicz, who claimed in Oct 1982 that Solidarity was rife with nationalists, right-wing Catholics, climbers, and toadies who would not tolerate dissent (6-9).

166 It is hard to assess the impact of external support in buoying the spirits of repressed regime opponents, but it must be noted that in 1983 the Pope visited (June) and Walesa received the Nobel Prize for Peace (October), three years after Milosz received the Prize for Literature [Lopinski, et al., eds., Konspira (1990), xvi-xvii].


168 Beylin, “Language and Pluralism” (1995 [1983]), 95, 98. He suggested, too, that in retrospect it had become unclear whether “Solidarity mobilized…an already collective subjectivity or…merely crowds who had been deprived of feelings of their common participation in a world of values different from the existing ones” (93).

169 Własysław Frasyniuk, quoted in Lopinski, et al., eds., Konspira (1990), 120-121. It is significant that he refers to violence as “terrorism” even when proposed against the state.

170 Bogdan Lis quoted in Lopinski, et al., eds., Konspira (1990), 121.


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178 This could be a Central European version of Benedict Anderson’s view that the roots of national identification in modern state formation lie in print capitalism, although in Poland’s case it could be called print communism or anti-communism [Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso 1983)].


180 Ira Katznelson, Marxism and the City (Oxford 1993), 203. Katznelson specifies, in an important comment in this account:

If any good social theory will profit from making space integral to an understanding of the structuring of social relationships, it is even more manifest that it is not possible to pursue adequately questions of working-class formation in the nineteenth century without an urban-geographical dimension. Class formation is a process concerned with experience in a double sense: experience of the world and learning to act within and on it. No one meets capitalism in general or directly engages the abstract commodity form whose very essence is that it is fetishized. Capitalism is lived in particular locations at particular times (204)


CHAPTER FIVE: Algerian clients at war

1 Antonio de Sosa, in M. Garcés, ed., An Early Modern Dialogue with Islam: Antonio de Sosa’s Topography of Algiers (1612), D. Wilson, tr. (Notre Dame 2011), 93.

2 Samuel Johnson, quoted in Bernard Berenson, Aesthetics and History (Doubleday 1954 [1948]), epigraph.


Hisham Sharabi, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World* (Van Nostrand 1966), part 2, doc. 10; 124-5. These FLN goals framed the (27 May 1964) “platform of the Algerian government, and groundwork for the Algerian constitution” (121). The full text blends Leninist authoritarianism, Comtean positivism, and Islamist democratic populism, reflecting elites’ awareness but clumsy management of contentious strains in Algerian society.

Merzak Allouache, *Bab el-Oued*, A. Brewer, tr. (Lynne Rienner 1998), 17-18. In the poor heart of Algiers, “Babouedians” have suffered French, Algerian, and Islamist appropriation, coercion, and murder; the novel limns the ironic, cynical, and humane fatalism of “decent people” so objectified that they see their own despairing thoughts as distilled Evil. Goodness, in contrast, manifests in routinized work, machine-like and unreflective, the only way to become not the enemy.


These dates are unorthodox (usually the war is 1954-1962), but reflect the long-war hostilities since Sétif (May 1945).


The 1954-1962 war killed and tortured more people, but the Algerian population became only in 1992; turning on itself reduced it to a pure violence – vengeful, hateful, non-instrumental; an aestheticized violence unassimilable to a collective national project against an Other.


The mixed-race ta’ifa and kulughlis – the progeny of Turkish soldiers and native women – held secondary status.


Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300* (Phoenix 1994), 118.


19 June 1830 the French attacked Algiers from the nearby beach of Sidi-Ferruch where they had quietly anchored five days earlier, a plan Napoleon had prepared in 1808.
Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford 1999), 45-46. Tuck traces these convictions to the “humanist” doctrine of expansion for the Glory of respublica and “global society” from Cicero, Gentili, and Grotius to modern theories of “liberal agency” (8-9).

Richard Davenport-Hines, *The Pursuit of Oblivion: A Global History of Narcotics* (Norton 2001), 92. He quotes the great French writer Théophile Gautier (1845): “Hashish is replacing champaigne... We believe we have conquered Algeria but Algeria has conquered us” [93; citing Joanna Richardson, *Théophile Gautier: His Life and Times* (Max Reinhardt 1958), 76].


Marwan Buheiry, “The Conquest of Algeria and the Apocalyptic Vision of La Gervaisai,” *The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World* (Darwin 1989), 4; cited in Rashid Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East* (Beacon 2005), 182-183, fn. 35. Gervaisai’s “apocalyptic” perspective may better Khalidi’s apocalyptic Fanonist retrospective; France’s atrocious colonization did not “produce 132 years of conflict with the local population” (17).


James Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (Cambridge 1986), 79-80. Piscatori this *fatwa* crystalized the invention of “Algeria” as a coherent political entity. Algerian nationalists date it earlier, but by 1841 Algeria was cohesive as a regime, or site of patterned contestation.


This relocation was precipitated by “partitioning” measures taken between 1847 and 1863... to make the lands available for colonization,” destroy the livelihood of small farmers, and commodify agriculture [Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000* (2001), 6.


Ian Hacking, *Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illness* (Virginia 1998), 23, 147. His diary, unlike those of “sane” French exoticists like Gide or opportunists like Rimbaud, suggests a porous border and seamless motility between France and Algeria available to a psychotic Frenchman unavailable to Algerians (e.g., 137); see Mary Pratt, “Mapping Ideology: Gide, Camus, and Algeria,” *College Literature*, 8:2 (Spring, 1981).


46 Benedict Anderson, Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination (Verso 2005), 72, fn. 32.


48 Roger Owen, “Settler Colonization in the Middle East and North Africa” (2005), 173. In addition to plows and tools, the French state subsidized population transfer, settlement, and production. Between 1871 and 1884, settlement authorities gave 1,235,000 acres of state-held land (70% to individuals) and provided housing, equipment, town halls, and schools—costing Fr 66 million: 5,000 per holding and 2,000 per settler (174).


50 Antony Sullivan, France and Algeria, 1784-1849: Politics, Power, and the Good Society (Archon 1983), 77. In fact, strategies deployed and tested on non-French subjects were often imported: “Resistance in the Vendée to the new juste milieu embodied by Louis Philippe led [Bugeaud] to recommend use there of antiguerrilla tactics first developed in Napoleonic Spain” (77).

51 French “savage reprisals against uncooperative Egyptian peasants and townspeople recalled the way the revolutionary army dealt with the pro-monarchy, pro-church revolt of the peasants of the Vendée in western France in the period 1793-1796. There, too, the revolutionary army had burned towns and villages and summarily executed rebels…General Kléber’s chief of staff, Adj. Gen. E. F. Damas, later wrote of the battles with the Bedouins and peasants as the French descended from Alexandria, ’It is a more destructive war, on my soul than that of the Vendée’” [Juan Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt: Invading the Middle East (Palgrave 2007), 47]. The internal quotation is from Damas (27 Jul 1798) is from Copies of Original Letters from the Army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, Intercepted by the Fleet Under the Command of Admiral Lord Nelson. Part the first (London 1798), 77 [in Cole, 255, fn. 5]. Note the intersection of sovereign, piratical, and informational power involved in this knowledge.


53 For a splendid exploration of these parallels, see Frederick Cooper, “States, Empires, and Political Imagination,” Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (California 2005).

During WWI “Marceilles, Paris, and the north emerged as the first settlement centers for Algerians. The state became all at once recruiter, importer, placement agent, and supervisor of colonial labor…78,566 Algerians…entered France between 1915 and 1918,” and another flood arrived between 1920-1924 [Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000 (2001), 14].

Abernethy, Global Dominance (2005), 127. More audaciously, Clemenceau was then resisting the conversion of Algeria from French colonial rule to mandatory administration (1) in the name of sovereignty (2) given the Algerians’ centrality in defeating Germany. France’s right to sovereignty negated Algeria’s on the claim – reversing the Mandate precept – that the weak should protect the strong [Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (Random 2003), 99-100].


One colon recalled an earlier, affectionate term, figuiers (fig trees), “probably because they liked to sit in the shade” [Jules Roy, The War in Algeria, R. Howard, tr. (Greenwood 1975 [1961]), 15]. If this prefigured the term hittiste (unemployed or lazy “wall-supporter”) of the 1980s its kindness to the native may be overstated.

Stora, Algeria 1830-2000 (2001), 16ff. The rightist Colonel de la Rocque inaugurated the Croid-de-Feu in Algeria (1931) and then the Parti Social-français (1936) after the Front Populaire disbanded his group. The broad colon right at this time had formed the Rassemblement National d’Action Sociale. The Parti Communiste Française and PF dropped the demand for Algerian independence on the claim that it would benefit the fascist movement.


In December 1936 the Blum-Violette Bill proposed abandoning Muslim-specific civil and political restrictions.


Hadj and five associates were arrested at a time (1937) when the ENA boasted 5,000 militants.


Martin Evans, The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War (1954-1962) (Oxford 1997), 26. Abbas had drawn up a “Manifesto of the Algerian People;” “breaking with the assimilationist stance” for good in 1943. The unity of the PPA, ‘ulema, and Abbas’s nationalists was short lived but signaled a cross-factional demand for autonomy if not independence.

Boucif Mekhaled, Chroniques d’un massacre: 8 mai 1945, Sétif, Guelma, Kherrata (Syros 1995). This was not the first attack; e.g., Muslims attacked the colon village of Margueritte on 26 April 1901 [Stora, Algeria 1830-2000 (2001), 246].

Rachid Boudjedra, Lettres algériennes (Grasset 1995), p 165-166; quoted in David Macey, Frantz Fanon (Picador 2000), 204.
The exterminationist mentality of the imperial regime ranged across increasingly sophisticated means of control from the 1830s forward [Lindqvist (1996)].

Hélène Cixous, “My Algerian, in other Words: To Depart not to Arrive from Algeria,” Stigmata, E. Prenowitz, tr. (Routledge 1998), 128.


Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Harvard 1992), 139-142. Article 23 grants citizenship at birth to third-generation immigrants and Article 44 naturalizes second-generation 18-year-olds resident since age 13 (140).

Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, H. Greenfeld, tr. (Beacon 1991 [1957]), 48ff., quote on 50.

Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (HBJ 1979 [1951]), 127.

Pan-Arabism and -Islamism remained deeply conflictual in the many secular-nationalist movements.


The bridge between expropriation and capitalization was the emergence of French political-imperial geography in the 1870s, according to Agnes Murphy, The Ideology of French Imperialism, 1817-1881 (Catholic 1968).

Karen Farsoun, “State Capitalism in Algeria,” MERIP Reports, 35 (Feb 1975), 3. Sample statistics follow. Algerian incomes declined from 1880-1955. Wealthiest class of Algerians was $502, of colons $3181. The one million Europeans enjoyed 47% of national income, while the Algerian rural population at 55% of population had 18% national income (4).


Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah (2002), 2. The author briefly commanded the Service Action unit of the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage (the SDECE is the equivalent of the CIA), “authorized to operate secretly outside France and undertake violent action against persons and property that could endanger the French Republic” (172). Aussaresses’s book is a memoir of his military experience in Algeria, controversial for its frank discussion of French state-sanctioned torture and extra-judicial executions.
Standardization increased and decreased violence; i.e., it re-territorialized violence, intensifying coercion against anti-FLN activists while briefly revolutionizing patriarchal equality. See the commentary on Jean Genet’s play “The Screens,” portraying the respatialization of gender in which “it is the women who are the revolution” as the indigenous revolt reverses the stiation of hostility from colon to Arab man to Arab women [Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (Equinox 1970), 356ff]. This is not evidence, but an illustration. While “what he does insist on is that each moment in the play is something he has personally experienced, as a lightening rod experiences electricity,” Genet still demurred, “I have never copied life—an event or a person, the Algerian war or the colonists—but quite naturally life has developed images within me or clarified them if they were already in me. These were images I’ve translated either into characters or into acts” [Edmund White, Genet: A Biography (Knopf 1993), 491].

Again, gender was an ambiguous case where Islamist and secular women’s identities were blended and instrumentalized for revolutionary purposes. Famously depicted in Pontecorvo’s “Battle of Algiers” and Fanon’s essay, “Algeria Unveiled,” Studies in a Dying Colonialism, H. Chevalier, tr. (Earthscan 1989 [1959]), gender equality quickly proved a fleeting strategy; cf. Ranjana Khanna, “The Battle of Algiers and The Nouba of the Women: From Third to Fourth Cinema,” Algeria Cuts: Women and Representation, 1830 to the Present (Stanford 2008); Suzanne Gauch, Liberating Shahrazad: Feminism, Postcolonialism, and Islam (Minnesota 2007), 84ff. To complicate matters, France’s “forced unveiling of a few women…increased emphasis on revealing and veiling” as an anti-colonial act but, Fanon claimed, this dialectical unveiling/veiling converted traditional garb into a liberating weapon [Marnia Lazreg, The Eloquence of Silence (1994), 135].


The British suppression of the Mao Mau matched France’s imperial fervor in Algeria, in its cruelty but also its “politically dominant settler populations,” “the co-option of large ‘loyalist’ militias from…the indigenous population,” and both “colonial governments[’] studiously avoid[ing] declaring the conflicts to be wars” [David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (Norton 2005), 292].

Frantz Fanon, “Algeria Face to Face with the French Torturers,” Toward the African Revolution, H. Chevalier, tr. (Grove 1967 [al-Moudjahid, no. 10 (Sep 1957)]). “Torture is inherent in the whole colonialist configuration” (64).


Jules Roy, The War in Algeria, R. Howard, tr. (Greenwood 1975 [1961]), 12. He adds, “It is for these and other humiliations of the same kind that the FLN murders and mutilates.” Roy’s book sold one hundred thousand copies in France, an astounding number for a pied noir at the time assailing French militarism in Algeria [cf. David Shoenbrun, “Introduction,” 9].
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104 Raphaëlle Branche, “Torture and Other Violations of the Law by the French Army during the Algerian War,” A. Jones, ed., *Genocide, War Crimes, and the West: m History and Complicity* (Zed 2004). Indeed, the GPRA leader Ferhat Abbas declared the Algerians adherence to the Geneva Conventions as a deliberate preemptive claim to statehood during the war.


108 On the Prince de l’équivoque toward Algeria in this period, see Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (MacMillan 1977), 377ff. Contemporary policy makers might note that de Gaulle rejected “integration” as “an ingenious and empty formula” and the “status quo” that kept “France politically, financially, and militarily bogged down in a bottomless quagmire when she needed her hands free to bring about the domestic transformation necessitated by the twentieth century and to exercise her influence abroad unencumbered. At the same time it would condemn our forces to a futile and interminable task of colonial repression…” [*Mémoires d’espoir* (1970), quote on 379].


110 For an exhaustive account of the underground war against Algerian self-determination, see Paul Henissart, *Wolves in the City: The Death of French Algeria* (Simon and Schuster 1970); also see Pierre Miquel, *La Guerre d’Algérie* (Fayard 1993), ch. X.


Waldner argues that Turkey and Syria – otherwise distinct in regime-type, property relations, and accumulation systems – had similar intra-elites conflicts, compelling their rulers to outbid one another by forming coalitions with popular classes. Although the contrast-space in his work is Korea and Taiwan, which resolved intra-elite conflict without popular-class coalition-formation and thus avoided eventual Kaldorian and Gerschenkronian collective action obstructions to value-added productive growth, there is no reasons to think Waldner recommends generalizing precocious Keynesianism along the standard East Asia-versus MENA developmental divide.


126 Roberts, *Battlefield Algeria* (Verso 2003), 91. Laremont says as much: “By empowering the technocrats…Boumedienne rearranged the composition of his alliances at the expense of his previously prominent allies: the ulema” (154).


132 Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, *The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East* (Cornell 1997), 142. Again, note the pattern in which single-interest, vertical petitioning wins discretionary, expedient pay-offs from the state.


134 Deborah Harrold, “The Menace and Appeal of Algeria’s Parallel Economy,” *Middle East Report*, 25:1 (Jan-Feb 1995), 18. Harrold directs this account of the informal economy toward its effects in the 1990s, including its political effect: “Invested in politics and society, this private wealth contributes to the social welfare organizations that undergird Islamic politics, and may well fund armed resistance to the state.”


138 Roger Owen, *State, power and politics in the making of the modern Middle East* (Routledge 1992), 144ff.


Mahfoud Bennoune, in *Karima Bennoune* (2002), 76. A hectare = 2.47 acres. What “petty intellectuals” are is unclear.


This followed the Arab League summit of July 1988 in Algiers, confirming the PLO’s representation of the Palestinian national struggle against novel Islamist contention [Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (2001), 457-466].


This last phrase is to anticipate the objection that once a significant social or protest movement establishes a “state-within-a-state,” with adequate resources and a loyal constituency, it is unclear why they would need to deal with state agencies at all; why not, in other words, simply ignore the state? But the state retains juridical, financial, territorial, military, and other resources that its opponents may wish to affect.


John Entelis, “Algeria under Chadli: Liberalization without Democratization or, Perestroika, Yes, Glasnost, No,” *Middle East Insight*, (Fall 1988), 52-53.


See Boutheina Cheriet, “The Resilience of Algerian Populism,” *Middle East Reports*, (Jan-Feb 1002), 9ff.


Michael Willis provides an excellent, detailed overview of the rise of Algerian Islamism in *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History* (NYU 1996).


Islamist grassroots activists condemned “partyism” (*hizbiyya*) as a sort of secular fetishism.


One recalls a similar state strategy in Pakistan, when Ayub Khan handed power over to Yahya Khan who announced general elections while “securing for himself the power to veto any constitutional document produced by the national assembly” and “the continued dominance of the military and the bureaucracy” [John Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistian, America, and International Terrorism* (Pluto 2002), 39].


Yasmina Khadra, *In the Name of God* [*Les agneaux du Seigneur*], L. Black, tr. (Toby 2000 [1998]), 89. Khadra is the pen name of an Algerian soldier named Mohammad Moulessehoul, who has written intricate series of novels on Islamism in Iraq, Palestine/Israel, Afghanistan, and Algeria. Khadra depicts the spiritual, material, social, and generational malaise against which Islamism appears dignified, assertive, responsive, accountable, and incorruptible. In contrast to his other novels, poignantly, his work on his Islamist compatriots is misleading, compressed, and one-sided—alas, unreliable as a novel of the Algerian violence.

Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War* (2000), 120; Hans Wehr, J. Cowan, ed., *Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (Librairie du Liban 1980), 561; cf. Goldberg, “Smashing Idols and the State” (1992), 15: “To describe human political power, Qutb conflates two words, taghut and tughyan. Although given as separate forms in classical dictionaries, the two words are easy to relate in meaning. Tughyan has to do with overstepping boundaries (including “going beyond in disbelief”), whereas taghut seems to be associated with ‘that which is worshipped other than God.’” Sayyid Qutb is a pivotal Egyptian theorist of *jihad* against fallen Muslims.


Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (2003), 38.


Although Crenshaw carefully notes that “many elements within the FLN were as puritanical in regard to Islamic precepts as followers of the FIS,” I’m grateful to Ghassan Salamé for challenging this “secularism”/“Islamism” binary with me (Paris, April 1992), and emphasizing the difficulty of mapping Arab conservative social values neatly along the secular-religious divide.


It is notable that the seamless political spacialization – absence of public space – of Algeria’s citizenship regime(s) seems to completely invert the colonial “systematization of space [that] broke well-established lines of communication, along which the economic, spiritual, and intellectual life of the region was channeled” [James McDougal, Colonial Worlds (2002), 59].


One bizarre explanation for the dismantling of electoralism was, instead of a deep conflict over the design of the country, “insufficient trust to uphold democracy [in] the Algerian elections of 1991. The (secular) government expected the Islamic Salvation Front to win and said that the Front, once in power, could not be trusted to give up power again, so the elections were canceled” [Stefan Voight, “Islam and the Institutions of a Free Society,” Independent Review, X:1 (Sum 2005), 70, n. 14].


It was at this time that I visited Algeria and interviewed FIS activists and government officials. I conducted extensive, open-ended interviews in Arabic, French, and English in Paris and Algiers in April 1992 with several anonymous Islamists and official figures in the Algerian government. The intransigence and alterity of the sides was insurmountable by then, and indeed it was my interviews from this research trip that formed the question and inspired the argument of this project.

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209 Naturally the government accused Iran and Sudan of meddling and destabilizing “from the Gulf to the Atlantic.”


206 “Democracy itself is a movable feast,” one Muslim scholar has hissed. “It is desirable only when the pro-western side wins an election in a non-western country. It can be ‘canceled,’ to the applause of the west, as it was in Algeria, when the undesirable ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ won the general election” [Ziauddin Sardar, Postmodernism and the Other: The New Imperialism of Western Culture (Pluto 1998), 58]. The author compares the case to the removal of Allende in Chile, which may underestimate US ambivalence toward Algerian Islamism, a key point in grasping the strategic ambiguity developing in this period (ch. 6).


204 As President in 1962, Kennedy told Egyptian President Nasser, “As you know, I have long taken a special interest in Algeria and I share your judgment that the success of the Algerian government in its efforts to bring stability to this key country is very much in the interest of both our nations” [Quoted in Lloyd Gardner, The Road to Tahrir Square: Egypt and the United States from the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak (New 2011), 97]. Gardner attributes Kennedy’s “special interest in Algeria” to his resentment of French foreign policy in the 1950s, especially the Suez crisis, for “joining in the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion on the basis not only of the canal nationalization, but also Nasser’s support for Algerian rebels” (98).


199 -producing countries of the world” (75).

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E.g., Michael Field, “How to Stop Militant Islam,” NYT (3 Jul 1995), A21. Field writes that “Islamist coups are unlikely because Arab governments have learned to defend themselves against their own armies” and “the middle classes are now less naïve. So long as their members hold on to positions of authority in the armed forces and the civil services, their governments’ ability to deal with subversion, terrorism and nonviolent popular movements remains formidable. It is only when the middle classes join the revolutionaries, and the people at the top of government lose confidence in their ability to survive, that regimes collapse.” Such views misunderstand Algerian political dynamics. The “middle classes” were divided but many were pro-Islamist and did not “hold on to positions of authority in the armed forces”; the Algeria ruling class was the military so could not “defend” itself against its “own army.” More interestingly, Fried says, “Islamist movements draw strength not from any surge in religious zeal among Middle Eastern peoples but from political failure – brutal government, military defeat, economic mismanagement and corruption.” He is right about the failures, but the inference that social resistance is irreligious is false. It is as though grounding militant religion in non-religious political-economic factors precludes progressive religious politics. Similarly, Princeton Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison claim, “the terrorist threat in West and Central Africa comes less from religion and politics than from lack of sovereign control and general debility” (“The Terrorist Threat in Africa,” Foreign Affairs, 83:1 (Jan/Feb 2004), 83).

197 Larbi Sadiki, The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses (Columbia 2004), 356. Larbi quotes Jim Hoagland: “by neither criticizing nor approving the Algerian army’s action, Western countries cloak their real attitude – that democracy is fine up to a certain point” [“Washington’s Algeria Dilemma,” Washington Post (6 Feb 1992), A27]. On 13 Jan 1992 the White House supported the coup as “constitutional” but the next day demurred about its legality [Larbi (2004), 356].


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Militancy: States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist IslamIn Wars: Afghanistan, America, and In New Jackals: Ramzi Youssef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism

the 1996 murder of cloistered but embraced Trappist monks traces Islamist disputes about religious targets to this time (ch. 14).

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GIA when they acted with equal brutality and hypocrisy. Indeed, it was "a young man who had collaborated with the GIA a few

other Writings
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century observations, see the short story "Blue Jacket," Isabelle Eberhardt,

I, Nadia, Wife of a Terrorist

[All the happiness he had felt on arriving home [in the countryside from the barracks] was dissipated. He understood that for the people he would always be the askart, the soldier, and that in their eyes he was virtually a traitor…Kaddour went out one morning without a word of fareell to his kinfolk, his heart hardened and closed in upon itself permanent. He walked along the road. The dry wind, completing its work of cracking open the earth, whipped against the muscles of his legs under the rags of his gandoura and his burnous. Gaunt, his eyes blazing, he was on his way down there, to the city, to wear the blue jacket and the scarlet fez once again…[T]he condemned man continued along the dusty road, shrugging his shoulders. Let the whole pla go up in smoke! He thought. Down below in the barracks at least there’s food.”

Gacemi, I, Nadia, Wife of a Terrorist (2006 [1998]), 68. “Nadia” also notes that this logic inverted, turning recruits against the GIA when they acted with equal brutality and hypocrisy. Indeed, it was “a young man who had collaborated with the GIA a few months earlier” who eventually betrayed “Nadia”: “After his comrades-in-arms killed his brother, he turned against the group and asked for ‘penitent status’ so he could fall under the protection of the rahna [1995 clemency] law” (104).


James Bruce, “Blowback from the Afghan Battlefield,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (1 Apr 1995).


Michael Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam (Cambridge 2003), 115. Cook discusses modern Sunni radicalism as reflecting Islamist “attraction and repulsion” of the West (113-118).


Lahouari Addi, “Algeria’s Army, Algeria’s Agony,” Foreign Affairs, 77:4 (Jul-Aug 1998), 44.

Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979 (Cambrigde 2010), 53. The author notes that only one prominent Saudi Islamist worked in Algeria: Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, after meeting Algerians in Bosnia. But by 1997, Saudi shayukh were “crucial in convincing many Algerian salafists who had gone underground during the civil war to stop fighting. The Algerian regime, in tacit cooperation with Riyadh, turned to these eminent clerics for fatwas designed to bring armed jihadists back to the apolitical salafist way” [Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds, Ghazaleh, tr. (Harvard 2004), 262].


Baya Gacemi, I, Nadia, Wife of a Terrorist, P. Côté/C. Mitchell, trs. (Nebaska 2006 [1998]), 47. This account reiterates with a long-standing rural suspicion and resentment of the soldier or officer as an instrument of the central state. For a portrayal of this tension from nineteenth-century observations, see the short story “Blue Jacket,” Isabelle Eberhardt, The Oblivion Seekers and other Writings, Bowles, tr. (City Lights 1972 [1920, orig. 1904], 27-30:

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226 Unsigned, “57 Fundamentalists Are Reported Killed By Algerian Forces,” NYT (17 Mar 1994), A10. The slain journalists were Abdelqader Hireche (28 Feb) and Hassan Benoua (5 Mar).


229 Martin Amis, Time’s Arrow (Harmony 1991), 84. For a visceral sense of the savage slit throats, gushing wounds, and primal screams of Algerian bloodlust after 1992, see Cormac McCarthy, Blood Meridian, or the Evening Redness in the West (Vintage 1995), 51-54. Witnesses echo Philip Gourevitch’s haunting words: “amidst the beds of exquisite, decadent, death-fertilized flowers blooming over the corpses, it was still strangely unimaginable. I mean one still had to imagine it” [We Wish to Inform you....: Stories from Rwanda (F, S & G 1998), 16].


234 Selima Ghezali, “Diminishing Possibilities in Algeria: Interview with Salima Ghezali,” Middle East Reports, no. 203 (Spr 1997), 42.


236 Dillman, State and Private Sector in Algeria (2000), 129.


238 The official government death toll for 1992-1997 (given in Jan 1998) was 26,536, while the US Department of State and most unofficial estimates were 70,000 ["Algeria," World Report (Human Rights Watch 1999), http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/mideast/algeria.html. As important as the numbers is the sheer sadism of the actions and the desired “porno market of death” that records that sadism [Fisk (2005), 547ff; quote on 548].


245 Hugh Roberts tackles essentialist “civil war” claims in “Algeria’s Veiled Drama,” Battlefield Algeria, 1988-1992 (Verso 2003), 250ff. For one such account, see Gilbert Grandguillaume, “Comment a-t-on pu arriver là?” Les violences en Algérie (Éditions Odile Jacob 1998) [orig. Esprit (Jan 1995)].
Algeria’s early state

the difference between formal and practical political action in Algeria. As Slyomovics says in a follow-up commentary:

While re-routing, dispersing, and disrupting activists, the state lifted the two-decade state of emergency as if to call attention to the difference between formal and practical political action in Algeria. As Slyomovics says in a follow-up commentary:

Algeria adopted a comprehensive model of counterinsurgency against armed Islamist groups that was a paradigm of hegemonic control: Gendarmerie roadblocks and checkpoints proliferated throughout the country to play a double-edged role as possible deterrents to terrorism but also as an effective means to harass and shakedown the population.

On February 24, 2011, responding to the pressure of events in neighboring North African states, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika lifted the state of emergency in effect throughout the country. Only Algerians remain in a state of exception, meaning that forming associations or participating in marches and demonstrations continue to be prohibited absent official authorizations rarely granted [“Algeria’s Military Capabilities,” Jadaliyya (27 Feb 2011), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/751/algerias-military-capabilities].

China’s recent governmental “norm of neutrality”: “The military is still a ‘Party army,’” for instance, “but it has also become smaller, more technically competent, and more professional. The officers being promoted to the CMC in the current succession are, as a group, distinguished more for their professional accomplishments and less for their political loyalties than was the case with previous CMC cohorts” (11-12).


260 Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (2003), 27.


267 I must briefly clarify two crucial points here. First, it does not impeach the causal argument to show that an intervening factor determined which sub-population will react strongly to a given even than other sub-populations. For instance, 11 September 2001 generally angered Americans, yet only some citizens converted that anger into violence, presumably because of traits specific to them (racism, genetic predisposition, insanity, etc.). Whatever the nature of this specificity, it leaves the causal explanation intact, merely requiring the intervening variables to be supplied. Second, and following on this, this particularity does make a general causal explanation seem less likely, given the nature of cultural specificities. It seems intuitively and empirically unlikely that every culture would respond identically or perhaps even similarly to an event similar to 11 September 2001.

268 Crenshaw, “Political Violence in Algeria” (1994), 263.

269 John Dunn, The Cunning of Reason: Making Sense of Politics (Basic 2000), 119. He adds, “If war is hell, ethnic warfare in a multi-ethnic territory is likely to prove hell of a peculiarly intimate and ghastly kind.” The same surely could be said for secular and religious conceptions of the public sphere.

270Unnamed Chinese economist arrested and imprisoned during the “hundred flowers” campaign [quoted in B. Michael Frolic, Mao’s People: Sixteen Portraits of Life in Revolutionary China (Harvard 1980), 179.


CONCLUSION

1 JW von Goethe, The Sorrows of Young Werther and selected writings, C. Hutter, tr. (Signet 1982 [1774]), 59.

3 In such associations another balance is struck between system and subject – the offense of one defines the violence of the other. This implies a corollary distinction between violence and insanity. As long as violence reflects a legible offense it is not generally perceived as insane but perhaps “excessive”; insanity is a term reserved for violent acts that cannot be inferred from conditions.

4 Foucault’s central example of undifferentiated subjectivization is the regimentation of the nineteenth-century shop floor that produced a “new political anatomy” of docile bodies {Discipline and Punish (1979 [1975]), 135ff.}. Similarly, Wally Seccombe emphasizes that “the standard Marxist depiction of a loss of skills in this period is more accurately described as a loss of autonomy in production. The close monitoring of work flow entailed a more exacting standard of time-keeping and a deeper intrusion into the workers’ sphere [Weathering the Storm: Working-Class Families from the Industrial Revolution to the Fertility Decline (Verso 1993) 87].

5 This was the main consensual objection raised against this thesis during its oral defense, for which I thank Ira Katznelson, Mark Kesselman, Jillian Schwedler, Andy Nathan, and David Johnston.

6 Parenthetically, I would respond in the same way to the objection that of the three intra-regime variations, differentiation and not social ties or political spaces provide the final causal property of effective citizenship structures. Again, this is accurate, since differentiation of the citizenship regime is the independent variable and social ties and political spaces are intervening variables in these two cases. But as I have suggested, the temporal or explanatory ordering of these variables may shift, with any one of the three – or perhaps others not mentioned – acting as conditions of possibility for the others. In addition, I have wanted to suggest a research agenda that may detect a tendency of these intra-regime elements to coalesce into predictable constellations of subject positions, a prospective thesis that exceeds the ambit of this project.

7 It is not certain, to be sure, that the political economy of military-industrial complexes gives state incumbents an overriding incentive to avoid violent opposition in either domestic or international realms.
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