

**Columbia University  
Graduate School of Arts & Sciences  
Human Rights Studies Master of Arts Program**

**Green Governmentality: China and the Environmental Politics of Pastoralism**

**Naika C. Pierre**

**Thesis Adviser: Rainer Braun**

**Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts**

**January 2017**

## Acknowledgements

I want to thank my advisor, Rainer Braun, first for accepting the most muddled of advising requests, but most importantly, for his continued guidance throughout every step of this process, and for never once allowing me to succumb to self-doubt.

To my mother, thank you for your unrelenting love and support each and every day. You are and will always be the source of all of my accomplishments. To my father, thank you for instilling in me an insatiable curiosity regarding our world and for showing me that the realization of our best self comes when we dedicate ourselves to the service of others. Thank you to my family for their continued love and support. I extend a special thank you to my little brother, Ghiscard, who has always been the voice of reason and to the wonderful Ari for being my little spell checkers that could.

To my friends, who are likewise my family, thank for you remembering even the smallest of deadlines and rooting for me every step of the way. Last but not least, to my ISHR family, I could not have done this with you. Thank you for being the greatest source of inspiration, guidance, laughter and self-care.

**Abstract**

Over the past decade, the Chinese government has embarked on a massive campaign of relocation and rehousing targeted at Tibetan nomads, which has resulted in claims of human rights violations dealing with forcible evictions, lack of transparency, and consultation, as well as with the preservation of indigenous culture, identity, land, and knowledge. Attributing the degradation of the grasslands across the Tibetan Plateau to overgrazing, the government has framed the forced sedentarization of nomads as a prerequisite to ecological and developmental progress. Utilizing the framework of green governmentality, this thesis will research the construction of the Communist Party's creation of environmental truths, linking the governing of nature with the governing of people as a means of population control. Through the examination of government policies and statements, it will document the process of subject forming that relegates Tibetan nomads into a population needing to be governed over, while justifying and promoting the necessity of the Chinese government to exist in the role of governor.

## Table of Contents

1. Introduction	5
1.1 Green Governmentality in the Chinese Context	7
2. An Introduction to Foucault’s Governmentality	11
2.1 Developments in the Field of Governmentality	12
2.2 The Transition from Governmentality to Green Governmentality	15
3. Foucault, Governmentality, and Human Rights	20
3.1 Governmentality and Human Rights: A Necessary Relationship	21
4. The Human Rights Implications of Relocation and Rehousing	25
5. Methodological Framework	29
6. An Analysis of Green Governmentality in China	34
6.1 Forms of Visibility: The 1 <sup>st</sup> Dimension of Governmentality	34
6.2 Techne of Government: The 2 <sup>nd</sup> Dimension of Governmentality	40
6.3 Episteme of Government: The 3 <sup>rd</sup> Dimension of Governmentality	41
6.4 Forms of Identification: The 4 <sup>th</sup> Dimension of Governmentality	44
7. Conclusion	46
Bibliography	50

## **1. Introduction**

The economic opening of the People's Republic of China in the 1980s saw the country open up to "foreign trade and investment" and to "domestic structural economic reform" (Démurger 2000, 9), as well as the introduction of Special Economic Zones, which "allowed China to exploit its comparative export advantages and also to acquire foreign technology through foreign direct investment" (Démurger 2000, 21). Yet the government's "choice of a "sequential" regional development strategy", which sought "to form growth centres in the eastern part of the country specializing in production of relatively technology-intensive goods for export" and sought to "transmit their growth dynamic to the inland provinces [only] in the long term" (Démurger 2000, 14), resulted in economic and social imbalances that today still remain to be addressed. With the government committed to continued economic development, this has reemerged onto the top of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s agenda, as the government seeks to counteract the systematic rural-urban inequality and wealth disparity that threatens to disrupt the political and social stability (Jeong 2015, 2). Thus in 2000, "with the aim of building infrastructure and telecommunications, improving people's living conditions, and protecting the environment" (Foggin 2008, 26), the government introduced the Western Development Strategy in an attempt to promote regional development and bring the perceived underdeveloped parts of the country on par with the rest (Wen 2009).

The government's pivot to the western regions has cemented the CCP's push to "improve" the environment by exercise power over the control of nature in the form of environmental governance and has provided the justification for environmental projects through "invoking a scientific logic that interprets the territory as degraded", resulting in

a “broader value coding embedded in state development discourse of the peoples of the west as underdeveloped, impoverished and a potential threat to social stability” (Yeh 2005, 13). Within this development discourse taken up by the state, Tibet has become central to the government’s development and economic plans due to importance of the region. Tibet since the Seventeen Point Agreement of 1951 which allowed for the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) to remain in control over its “cultural, economic, and even domestic political affairs” (Smith 2004) has been incorporated as a territory within China. Contrary to the aims of the Seventeen Point Agreement however, a system rather of quasi-autonomy is being practiced that continues to be plagued by political and social contestations between the Tibetan population and the Chinese government. This has manifested in numerous state sponsored attempts of suppression which target Tibetan identity, culture, and religion (Smith 2004) which continue to be denounced on the international human rights stage.

As part of Tibet, the Tibetan Plateau itself, known as “The Water Tower of Asia,” supplies 1.3 billion people throughout the continent with access to water and is rich in natural resources (Tenzin 2012). Protection of the natural resources located within the region have become pivotal to the Chinese government within the context of a dire and increasingly depleted global environment. Looking specifically at Tibetan nomads, who account for 25 percent of Tibet’s 6 million population (Hays 2015 and International Campaign for Tibet 2016a), the Chinese government has maintained that the degradation of the grasslands is largely attributed to overgrazing by Tibetan nomads and has looked to the prohibition of grazing to both protect and reverse the damage done to the grasslands (Xinhua 2011). Nomads known as drokpa or “high-pasture people” in Tibetan have

historically been traced back to as early as the Xia Dynasty (2205 – 1766 BC) and maintain a livelihood through migrating “across the Tibetan plateau whilst raising yaks and other livestock” (Miller 2008, 118-119). Living either nomadic or semi-nomadic livelihoods, nomads herd sheep, yak, cattle, goats, and horses across the Tibetan grassland (Hays 2016). Moving approximately two to three times within a year (“Tibetan Nomads” 2016), they at times supplement herding with farming to sustain themselves. In this way, much of the Tibetan nomadic identity exists around a culture interchangeably tied to the land. The inherently migratory lifestyle of nomads has made it difficult for the Chinese government to track and govern over the population. In answer to this to this problem of governing, the government has continued to construct an identity of the larger Tibetan population and Tibetan nomads as underdeveloped, backwards, and unproductive in terms of social and economic advancement (Foggin 2008, 27). This has resulted in the creation of a discourse geared towards the Foucauldian camp that views the population as an impediment to the country’s development aims, thus justifying the necessity of governance and increased urbanization. Within this realm of governmentality, through maintaining control over the environment, the Chinese government has interchangeably sought to maintain control over the nomadic population, resulting in a radical transformation of the nomadic identity.

### **1.1 Green Governmentality in the Chinese Context**

The justifiability of the government’s environmental governance agenda has however been challenged by human rights activists, scientists, and environmentalists who maintain that is it the government’s own “policies that have led to privatization of use

rights and household enclosures [that] are more important drivers of degradation” (Cao, Yeh, Holden, Qin, and Ren 2013, 81). The official stance of Chinese officials however has been to continue to maintain that

“for development to be achieved in Tibetan nomadic areas, nomads must be settled, houses and barns should replace the traditional nomad yak hair tent, rangeland must be divided into individual family units and fenced, herds need to be restructured, livestock numbers should be adjusted to carrying capacity, fodder has to be grown for the winter, and, for the rangelands, 'ecological engineering' and 'grassland construction' needs to be undertaken (Miller 2000, 86).

Such designated “ecological engineering” has taken the form of various government programs designated to revitalize the grasslands, through the massive undertaking of relocation and rehousing of nomads throughout the country. This has resulted in the creation of a discourse surrounding China’s narrative of sedentarization of Tibetan nomads and of all nomads for that matter, as a necessity of ecological protection and by extension. In particular, these include the 2006 New Socialist Countryside Campaign (jianshe xin shehuizhuyi nongcun) which intends to “ 'let rural farmers upstairs' (rang nongmin shanglou) by incorporating them into urban citizenship and township residence” (Chuang 2014, 650) through transforming the countryside and reducing the overall rural population (Ahlers and Schubert, 2009, 36). This essentially aims to promote rural-urban integration through the relocation of rural citizens into townships (Chuang 2014, 650) thereby promoting further economic growth within the country.

Such a desired transformation has been assisted by the Comfortable Housing (anju gongcheng) policy and the New Socialist Villages (xinshehuizhuyi nongcun) policy, which aim to remodel the existing structure of rural villages upon newly defined



government standards that embrace this notion of modernization (HRW 2013, 40-41) and “transform rural housing by improving living conditions and providing access to transportation, communication, electricity, water, health care, and schooling” (De Schutter 2012,15). Additional policies that have also been introduced are the environmental migration schemes of “reverting farmland to forest (tuigeng huanlin)” and “reverting pasture to grassland (tuimu huancao)”, which promote a shift off the land in favor of alternative livelihoods and implemented seasonal, temporary, or total bans on grazing”, respectively (HRW 2013, 39-40). Such policies have worked to essentially invalidate leaseholds ranging from 30 to 50 years that nomads had been granted since the 1990s, effectively nullifying nomadic land tenure (Norbu 2012) and shifting governance of the land and of the environment out of the hands of nomads into the hands of the central government. Although a rather convincing argument exists that the “experiences and intimate knowledge of pastoral nomads should be incorporated into rangeland management practices” (Norbu 2012), the exclusion of Tibetan nomads within this governance structure highlights the process by which through the exercise of green governmentality, “alternative knowledge get submerged, co-opted, and deemed illegitimate” (Goldman, 2001, 516-517). This gives rise to a noticeable selectivity where the government has only weakly and discriminately chosen to enforce its environmental laws (Ma 2007). The Chinese example effectively highlights how green governmentality becomes a concept linked to the improvement of a people or community as defined by externally imposed state or institutional standards that calls for a rejection of certain types of knowledge which it views as traditional or backwards. This value-based system of

environmental governance has been viewed as ineffective, and academics such as Bollier and Weston have instead called for the establishment of a

“governance paradigm based on, first, a logic of respect for nature, sufficiency, interdependence, shared responsibility and fairness among all human beings; and, second, an ethic of integrated global and local citizenship that insists upon transparency and accountability in all activities affecting the integrity of the environment” (Bollier and Weston 2016).

Until, however, such a paradigm can be established and effectively implemented to include previously excluded citizens, ecological protection in the context of green governmentality becomes a major component of the Chinese government’s justifiability of its western development aims, particularly with regards to Tibet. As such, the collective implementation of such policies has reduced and eliminated “the migratory herd movements between seasonal rangelands, [which represents] a fundamental characteristic of traditional nomadic pastoralism” (Miller 2000, 103). The Communist Party’s policies represent a forced rejection of the nomadic lifestyle and a desire to transform Tibetan nomads into livestock farmers and promote “sedentary livestock production systems” (Miller 2000, 103). Through the construction of what can be characterized as “environmental truths”, the Chinese government is able to justify its regulations and governance over the environment and over the grasslands. It becomes then, that “the production of this kind of truth about nature necessitates its regulation, management and governing” (Rutherford S. 2007, 295). Thus this perceived need for governance gives rise to the notion that “the resources of the earth can be rationalized, indexed, measured, assessed and made better through the application of various technologies and modalities of rule” (Rutherford 2007, 298). Justifying its imposition of

scientific knowledge and solutions, the government places itself in a position where it exclusively is equipped to provide the necessary protections to better protect not only the environment, but also Tibetan nomadic society. The protective measures that the government chooses to implement however, only succeed in completely excluding nomadic knowledge and contributions concerning environmental protection.

## **2. An Introduction to Foucault's Governmentality**

Governmentality, the theoretical framework that this research is grounded in refers to the concept first introduced by Michel Foucault during his time teaching at the Collège de France from 1971 to 1984 (Foucault 2007, 11). In his lectures, Foucault proposed the study of governmentality as a solution to tackling “the problem of the state and population” (Foucault 2007, 161). It encompasses aspects of control that directly correlate to population, and more specifically, to governance over the individual subjects that make up said population. Governmentality, as Foucault describes it, provides a means of understanding “the type of power that we call government” (Foucault 2007, 161). Within the Foucauldian framework, governmentality specifically refers to the

“institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument” (Foucault 2007, 144).

Consequently, at the root of Foucault's lectures stands the notion of population and how the state or other institutions will exercise control over the population (Foucault 2007, 167). Outlining that “population comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end of government”, Foucault finds that the purpose of government is to deal with “the welfare

of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth” etc. (Foucault in Miller, Gordon, Burchell 1991, 100) “and the means that the government uses to attain these ends are themselves in some sense immanent to the population” (Foucault in Miller, Gordon, Burchell 1991,100). Governance in this manner is concerned with the action of controlling a population in order to ensure the security of the state, while governmentality deals specifically with the study of the methods and means that governments employ to exercise their power. Pivotal to such a study is the existence of what Foucault characterizes as “the politics of truth” (Foucault 2007, 17), which finds governmentality to center on the manifestations of truths that give both credibility and justification to rule. The construction of such “truths” occur through the “development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses” and through “the development of a series of knowledges” (Foucault 2007, 161) that result in the desired end of managing the population. In the process of bringing about this very end, the state directs the actions of individuals to conform with the expectations that it sets.

### **2.1 Developments in the Field of Governmentality**

Since Foucault’s introduction of governmentality, others have followed suit and continued to contribute to the development of the concept. In particular, Miller, Gordon, and Burchill in their work *The Foucault effect: studies in governmentality: with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault* (1991) have added to the growing literature on governmentality. Linking government and governance to governmentality, they define government as “a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or person” (Miller, Gordon, Burchell 1991, 1). With government

rooted as such in the intricacies of relations, they hone in on Foucault's governmentality as a means of assessing "relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty" (Miller, Gordon, Burchell 1991, 2). This interpretation of governmentality focusing on "how to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being governed, [and] how to become the best possible governor" (Foucault in Miller, Gordon, Burchell 1991, 7) has been encapsulated by Foucault as the question of "how to govern", which he characterizes as the primary concern of governmentality. Further contributing to Foucault's reflections on state constructs, they reiterate Foucault's emphasis on sovereignty being grounded in the very manifestations of truth that the state employs (Miller, Gordon, Burchell 1991, 8). Others, such as Mitchell Dean, in his work, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* (2010) outline governmentality as "any attempt to shape with some degree of deliberation aspects of our behavior according to particular sets of norms and for a variety of ends" (Dean 2010, 18). This encompasses

"various forms of thought about the nature of rule and knowledge of who and what are to be governed", "employs particular techniques and tactics in achieving its goals, allows for the government to establish "definite identities for the governed and the governors", and "involves a more or less subtle direction of the conduct of the governed" (Dean 2010, 28).

According to Dean, such analysis allows for the creation of a structure with which to effectively study governmentality. At the core of such a structure exists the manifestations of truth employed by the state that result in the creation of the identities of the governors and the governed, in order to effectively manage and direct the population. As part of this structure, Dean designates four dimensions necessary to the study of governmentality, which he refers to as forms of visibility, techne of government,

episteme of government, and forms of identification (Dean 2010). “Characteristic *forms of visibility* [or] ways of seeing and perceiving” (Dean 2010, 3) is characterized by Dean as “ways of visualizing fields to be governed” that

“make it possible to 'picture' who and what is to be governed, how relations of authority and obedience are constituted in space, how different locales and agents are to be connected with one another, what problems are to be solved and what objectives are to be sought” (Dean 2010, 41).

Visualized in the forms of charts, data or other forms of representation, they represent the “displays needed to sustain regimes” as well as “delimit objects to be governed” (Rogers et al. 2016, 431). The *techne of government* represent the “mechanism, procedures, technologies through which rule is accomplished” (Rogers et al. 2016, 431). Dean asserts that

“If government is to achieve ends, or seeks to realize values, it must use technical means. Those technical means are a condition of governing and often impose limits over what it is possible to do” (Dean 2010, 42).

The third dimension refers to the “forms of knowledge that arise from and inform the activity of governing” or rather the *episteme of government* (Dean 2010, 42). Within the third dimension arises the “reason and expertise that [come to] justify and inform the *techne of governing*” (Rogers et al. 2016, 431). The fourth and final dimension, referred to as the forms of identification, places emphasis on how identities are formed, looking particularly at the “specific practices and programmes of government” that are involved in the creation of said identities (Dean 2010, 43). Within this fourth realm lie the identities “promoted and presupposed” and imposed by the government or rather governing bodies (Dean 2010, 43). “Used as way to analyze construction of a regime's

truth and ways of speaking [or] representing”, forms of identification account for the “process by which identities of those who govern and are governed are constructed and reified through forms of visibility, administrative practices, and knowledge claims” (Rogers et al. 2016, 431). This framework outlined by Dean to study governmentality will be employed throughout this paper and will serve as the methodological foundation for this research.

## **2.2 The Transition from Governmentality to Green Governmentality**

Although Foucault himself failed to delve deeply into issues concerning the environment, the most recent application of governmentality has focused on assessing how nature is governed over. Most recently, governmentality has been co-opted in order to assess the power relations at play when dealing with how the environment is managed and politicized. This application of governmentality finds its place amidst a pervasive discourse of our planet being in peril that has permeated public, political, and academic debate globally. Scientists have ventured as far as to mark the beginning of “a new geological epoch, [known as] the Anthropocene”, which dictates that “atmospheric, geological, hydrological, biological and other Earth System processes are being altered by human activity” (United Nations Environment Programme 2012, XVIII). Framed as an unprecedented moment of environmental crisis, humankind appears to be in a race against time as we seek to tackle numerous environmental concerns such as rising sea levels and global temperatures, increases in greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation, destruction of natural habitats, extinction of species, ozone depletion, and climate change (United Nations Environment Programme 2012), to name but a few. Confronted with

escalating mismanagement, the environment is recongized more and more as a resource pool intended to be universally accessible and is viewed as “non-excludable and non-rivalrous” in that “countries are not rivals when it comes to consuming these goods” (Uitto 2016, 108). Human rights are, likewise, increasingly linked to the environment with the awareness that human beings “are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature” (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 1992, Principle 1) and that the

“the natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or management, as appropriate” (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 1972 Principle 2).

This induces the necessity of collective cooperation that further promotes this notion of a shared right to the enjoyment of a healthy and clean environment. Specifically, this refers to the

“notion of an interconnected world in which all inhabitants of the planet have an equal claim on wealth and freedom, opening, rather than closing, national boundaries and national identities in a recognition of all that joins us, rather than separates us as human beings sharing this planet with each other and the rest of nature” (King 1997, 2).

Yet the very awareness of the planet’s limited and fragile resources and threat that this may pose to a state has conflicted with the notion of the environment as being universally accessible. The pressures of this conflict of interest have resulted in a rise in government involvement in environmental governance. Environmental governance here refers “to the set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through which political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes” (Lemos and Agrawal 2008, 299).



Intended to encompass “the actions of the state” as well as additional “actors such as communities, businesses, and NGOs” (Lemos and Agrawal 2008, 299), power and control over the environment has largely shifted solely into the state, who views environmental crises as a direct threat to its sovereignty. With so much at stake, civil society has progressively been excluded from environmental decisions. This comes as a result of the state moving to cement itself as the sole authority over decisions made regarding nature. This has resulted in the so-called “greening” of national interests and national security, where our planet’s resources are being “continually monitored and watched over by the new technologies of oversight” (King 1997, 3).

This very management of “knowledge and political processes in order to regulate citizens and make problems governable” (Forsyth and Walker 2014, 408) has evolved into the framework now recognized as green governmentality or eco-governmentality. Green or eco-governmentality represents a method of management of nature and resources that aims to “classify, colonize, and transnationalize territory in the name of 'eco-governance' ” (Goldman 2001, 499). It represents an attempt by the State to create a discourse surrounding what is regarded as “environmental truth” (Goldman 2001, 501) and which assigns culpability to individuals or communities for ecological degradation. Governmentality lends itself to the critique of environmental governance as it “deals with issues of (state) 'security', techniques of control of the population, and new forms of knowledge” (Darier 1999, 22). Eric Darier goes on to outline that

“according to the framework of governmentality, the 'security' of the state is guaranteed not so much directly by the control of a territory (space), but rather through the increasing control of the population living in that territory” (Darier 1999, 23).

The applicability of governmentality to the environmental sphere becomes present with the awareness that “modern thinking about the natural environment is characterized by the belief that nature can be managed or governed through the application of the scientific principles of ecology” (Rutherford 1999, 37). Timothy Luke goes on to further expand upon this, noting that

“Government comes into its own when it has the welfare of a population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health and so on, as its object. And ecology gives rational governments all of life's biodiversity to reformat as 'endangered populations', needing various state ministrations as objects of managerial control ignorant of what is being done to them as part and parcel of 'a range of absolute new tactics and techniques' ” (Luke 1999, 122).

Governmentality ultimately comes to allow for the justification of “human actions in the name of 'nature' ” and also allows for “the construction of a 'voice' [that] that can legitimately speak for nature” (Darier 1999, 23). With the state becoming the prevailing spokesperson for the environment, the government exercises its power by controlling certain communities and individuals through excluding their voices from the governing table. The continued framing of the environment as being in crisis leads to a formulation of a certain and uneasily contestable environmental truth, that calls for an assessment not only of how knowledge surrounding the environment comes into being, but also into how these “truths” are made and governed (Rutherford 2007, 295). Stephanie Rutherford maintains that the construction of the discourse surrounding the environment as being in dire need of governance and technological solutions by experts, who become the prevailing authority, transforms ecology into a regime of knowledge and power that produces a specific and singular notion of truth regarding nature (Rutherford 2007, 298). Enabled with such truth telling apparatus, green governmentality can be transformed into

a system used by the state to legitimize making local populations “visible and accountable” (Yeh 2008, 24) for their perceived environmental transgressions, while linking “the governing of nature with the 'improvement' of people” (Yeh 2008, 14).

Criticism of the model however, have taken issue with its perceived black and white formulations of power relations and its failure to account for the complexities of multiple sites of governance that occur within the framework of neoliberal governance (Rutherford 2007, 292). O’Malley, Weir, and Shearing refer to this as a failure to understand “the messy actualities of social relations” (O’Malley, Weir, and Shearing 1997, 509). As a theoretical framework, green or eco-governmentality, has been faulted for its failure to recognize that “governing does not arise as a fully realized project, but is debated, revised, fine-tuned and continuously in need of re-articulation” (Rutherford 2007, 300). Others such as Forsyth and Walker,

“argue that environmentality should not just be seen in terms of the state invoking ‘power over’ citizens, but as the active engagement of both state and social actors in establishing authoritative knowledge claims simultaneously with claims about appropriate social order, which also exclude other significant social perspectives and environmental management options” (Forsyth and Walker 2014, 414).

Their rejection of green governmentality as a functional theoretical framework represents a rejection of its perceived assumption that relations between the state and society “should only be understood in terms of opposition and resistance” (Forsyth and Walker 2014). Green governmentality, in this way, is viewed as missing the mark in providing the space to take into account the alliances that form between social actors and the state “in the generation and legitimization of knowledge” (Forsyth and Walker 2014), or rather of environmental truths. Looking past however the rather state-centric application of

green governmentality which fails to account for the proliferation of “nongovernmental organizations, corporations, research institutions, the media and other actors” in its analysis of power (Rutherford 2007, 303), the concept does still provide a platform to assess systems of power relations that are tied to nature and resource management. It allows for the study of environmental politics and “to understand and describe how modern forms of power and regulation achieve their full effects not by forcing people toward state-mandated goals but by turning them into accomplices” (Agrawal 2005, 216-217). Its introduction of a value system that is assigned to “groups of people and parcels of environment” (Goldman 2001, 515) allows for

“the making of hegemonic forms of rationality that translate into effects of government: constructing the environmental science and art of targeting populations, production practices, and behaviors vis-à-vis nature that are judged as guilty or innocent of ecological degradation” (Goldman 2001, 516).

This act of designating the guilty from the innocent represents a form of identity construction, which allows for larger analysis surrounding the state’s motivations and ultimate end goal.

### **3. Foucault, Governmentality, and Human Rights**

Generally characterized as anti-humanist, earlier in his career Foucault largely rejected the universality with which human rights finds its basis. Although perceiving human rights to hold some value, he rejected their association “with human nature or the essence of the human being in general” (Foucault 2014, 324), holding that the vocation of governments is to not respect human rights (Foucault 2014, 324). Foucault went on even

to designate human rights as solely the “rights of the governed” (Foucault 2014, 324). Yet he does not completely reject the notion of human rights and later on in his career seems to have given them further thought. At a press conference in 1981 believed to mark the announcement of the formation of the International Committee Against Piracy, Foucault noted that

“because of their claim to care for the wellbeing of societies, governments arrogate to themselves the right to treat in terms of profit and loss the human suffering which their decisions cause and their negligence allows”(Foucault 1981).

Aware of the predominance of such abuses of power, Foucault spoke of the need for an “international citizenship” bound by duties and rights, “obliged to stand up against all forms of abuse of power, no matter who commits them, no matter who are their victims” (Foucault 1981). He characterizes this as “the right of private individuals to intervene actively and materially in the order of international politics and strategy” so as to counteract state monopoly over the will of the people (Foucault 1981). Although perhaps unintentionally, Foucault comes to promote the existence of rights that are inherent to individuals, which are often threatened by the actions of state and other external actors. The existence of this looming threat further accentuates the need for human rights amidst the systems of governmentality that necessitate oversight, accountability, and protection from government infractions.

### **3.1 Governmentality and Human Rights: A Necessary Relationship**

Scholars in connecting human rights to governmentality have focused largely on characterizing human rights as “technologies of government” (Sokhi-Bulley 2016, 9),

viewing the language of rights as the “language of governance or governmentally” (Sokhi-Bulley 2016, 5). They warn of “hegemonic state actors [who] instrumentalise human rights as operational tools for exercising power” (Narkunas 2015, 210). Within this assessment, human rights take on the role of the dominant discourse and “provide(s) a set of norms with reference to which agents may exercise power over other agents, as well as over themselves, to ensure conformity” (Manokha 2009, 430). More specifically, “rights become a complex, authentic, and self-reinforcing discourse of conducting power that creates an empowered and righteous identity for (rights) experts” while working to disempower “other subject identities” (Sokhi-Bulley 2016, 12). Such a narrative centers on this need for resistance rooted in the “refusal of the form of been conducted” and a rejection of the proposed truths of the human rights regime (Sokhi-Bulley 2016, 119). Yet, this reiteration of the very viable threat of the state abusing power through systems of governmentality seems to only reinforce the importance of human rights in resisting and preventing such abuses.

“Good governance and human rights are mutually reinforcing” (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner 2017).

Governmentality alone deals with how and whom the state governs and, thus, the assessment of governmentality also warrant analysis of the processes through which governing materializes. Within this process, human rights “provide a set of values to guide the work of governments and other political and social actors” (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner 2017). The UN outlines that “transparent, responsible, accountable and participatory government, responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people” is the foundation of good governance and, likewise, serves as the foundation “for

the promotion of human rights”(UN Commission on Human Rights, *Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/64*). Human rights deals extensively with power structures such as governmentality that center around inclusion and exclusion. Exclusion from power structures and a lack of inclusion and participation in the act of governing constitutes a direct threat to the realization of human rights. Human rights allow for accountability and call for participation by the people in order to meet the needs of the people. Human rights are, in this way, positioned to demand transparency, participation, and inclusion so as to fully realize the rights of individuals “to take part in the conduct of public affairs” (UN General Assembly, *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, Art 25). The study of governmentality, in its emphasis on power relations, often identifies gaps that specifically pin point the existence of the very participation and exclusion of communities that human rights demand. Particularly with regards to governing over the environment, the state’s exclusion of indigenous or ethnic minority groups represents an unjust distribution of power that fails to provide indigenous peoples with control over

“developments affecting them and their lands, territories and resources [that] will enable them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs” (UN General Assembly, *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*).

Through the practice of governmentality, states are able then to exclude indigenous knowledge claims. Indigenous traditional knowledge here refers to the “cumulative body of knowledge, know-how, practices and representations maintained and developed by peoples with extended histories of interaction with the natural environment (International Council for Science 2002, 10-11). This permits the state to

target certain communities, identifying them as guilty of environmental transgressions, thus allowing for “natures and natural resource-dependent communities [to be held] legible and accountable” (Goldman 2001, 508). This carried out, while simultaneously regulating “alternative knowledge” as illegitimate (Goldman 2001, 516-517). Such a practice becomes in fact a human rights violation as state’s fail to fulfill the obligations placed upon them, which outline “that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper management of the environment” (UN General Assembly, *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*). Disregarding that such communities “have best observed the environment [and] are thus best positioned to begin to frame sustainable solutions” (Chanza and De Wit 2016), the state rejects fully contributions stemming from the indigenous knowledge base. This ultimately prevents these individuals from questioning the state’s application of governmentality and places increasing limitations upon the exercise of their free will with regards to the use of nature and natural resources that have been part of their livelihoods and cultural traditions for thousands of years. In doing so, the state sets in motion the means with which to destroy indigenous identity. With land and nature at the root of cultural identity, the severing of the access of indigenous communities to nature and natural resources brings about a loss of that very identity. Deeming such communities to not be capable of living off the land responsibly, the state promotes a sedentarization driven agenda that requires a forfeiture of one’s indigenous identity, in favor of a newly constructed identity crafted in the image of the idealized citizen of the state. This new citizen in turn, must accept the limitations



imposed upon their mobility, embrace an urban sedentary lifestyle, as well as, accept unconditionally the technical expertise of the government in managing the environment.

#### **4. The Human Rights Implications of Relocation and Rehousing**

Following the implementation of the government's relocation and rehousing programs, out of 1,062,436 households labeled as partly or completely pastoral—spanning across the Tibet Autonomous Region, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Gansu—897,424 households have been sedentarized as of 2012 (Tibetan Center For Human Rights and Democracy 2015, 15). The success of the government's initial deployment of such policies has also resulted in an expansion of the resettlement policy to include non-herders and has sought to rehouse or relocate the larger Tibetan rural population into New Socialist Villages (De Schutter 2012, 15). Between 2006 and 2011, an estimated two million people consisting of farmers and herders were resettled into new housing or had their homes renovated as part of the Comfortable Housing Policy program (HRW 2013, 4). The process of relocation and rehousing has and continues to be marred with human rights violations, seen in the lack of transparency and forcible nature of the relocations, loss of traditional indigenous livelihoods resulting in the loss of culture, identity, and access to land, as well as the creation of cycles of dependency (Jeong 2015, Kernan 2013, and Norbu 2012). Relocation and rehousing is largely considered to be forcible, as a result, of a lack of viable alternatives to relocation and rehousing provided by the state and also due to the coercive measures employed by government officials to compel nomads to turn from their migratory lifestyles and their traditional habitats in order to adopt a sedentary lifestyle (HRW 2013). Chinese officials continue to rely on scientific

determinations by government experts rather than through consultation with ethnic communities in governing the grasslands, thus completely excluding nomads from the decision process surrounding relocate and rehousing.

The sedentarization programs sponsored by the state also call into question the need for the protection of indigenous rights. While the Communist Party maintains that the country has no indigenous peoples, it chooses instead to refer to those native to certain regions within Chinese territories as national minorities. Although the United Nations has yet to adopt an official definition of the term indigenous, consensus does maintain that

“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system” (Martínez-Cobo 2004, 2).

Given such a definition, Tibetans as a whole and by extension, Tibetan nomads can be considered as an indigenous population. As such, under the international human rights system, they maintain “the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture” (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 2007, Article 8). Article 10 and 11 of the declaration goes on to guarantee indigenous peoples the right to “free, prior and informed consent” and “just and fair compensation” with regards to removal off of their land, as well as provides indigenous peoples “the right to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs.” The process of relocation

and rehousing which is surrounded by claims of a lack of transparency, consultation, and participation has, however, stripped Tibetans nomads of the right to property and security of land tenure, as well as resulted in the involuntary assimilation and cultural destruction of nomads within the region.

Additional ramifications of the government's relocation and rehousing agenda include the growing risk of plunging Tibetan households into accumulated debt, as nomads and other non-herders often find themselves forced to shoulder the financial burdens and costs of modernization. The Chinese government also requires that Tibetans "contribute about 60 percent of reconstruction costs" (HRW 2013, 89) and such stipulations place a heavy financial burden on the family unit that is already confronted with the immediate loss of traditional sources of revenue. Following the resettlement experience, critics have highlighted a correlation between the resulting loss of revenue and the loss of land, increases in the selling and slaughter of animals, and the loss of economic independence and increased food insecurity (De Schutter 2012, 15-16). The Communist Party itself has also admitted to these concerns, as its 2009 study conducted by the Reform Commission of the State Council found that village houses provided to Tibetan nomads lacked in design and in meeting the needs of the population, as well as negatively resulted in cutting pastoralists off from their herds (HRW 2013, 9). This represents a failure on the part of the State to fulfill its responsibility to ensure the right to adequate housing. Turning to the implementation of the New Socialist Countryside Campaign, the execution of the campaign has been largely left to the care of local governments, yet the existing inequalities between local government financing capabilities has resulted in a "lack of state funds to cover vocational training classes"

(Ptackova 2012, 219). This coupled with existing inadequacies in government subsidies, needed to cover expenditures have resulted in the failure to bring about the successful integration of Tibetan nomads into a newly urban environment (Ptackova 2012, 219). Already forced to compete with Han Chinese migrants seeking new job opportunities in the region, Tibetan nomads lacking in professional skills training, education, and forced to overcome language and communication barriers find themselves disadvantaged within the job market.

Relocation and rehousing in its current form has largely thrust the nomadic population rather unwillingly into a state constructed and unfamiliar urban environment, without the necessary tools and the capacity with which to succeed. Looking first, at the creation of New Socialist Villages, the government's use of space and enclosure to create what can be characterized as rural cities represents a method of population control. The government itself in 2011 announced plans "to dispatch over 20,000 Party and government cadres to be stationed in Tibetan villages, to "live, eat and work" with the local population, ensure that stability is maintained, "conduct propaganda work," and promote the objectives of the Comfortable Housing policy" (HRW 2013, 8). The creation of what, in essence, are political surveillance units within these New Socialist Villages highlight government motivations that extend beyond the proclaimed aims of the New Socialist Countryside Campaign and hint at a greater agenda of state control. Within such an agenda, the restrictions on the freedom of movement of Tibetan nomads are seen as integral to maintaining power and both eradicating separatist inclinations within the region, as well as securing the complete transformation of nomadic culture and identity.

## **5. Methodological Framework**

Through the assessment of this lack of transparency and accountability, this paper will utilize the framework of green governmentality to assess the construction of the Chinese government's creation of environmental truths or "knowledge claims" (Rogers et al. 2016). In doing so, this research will also document the process of subject forming that relegates Tibetan nomads into a population needing to be governed, while justifying and promoting the necessity of the Chinese government to take up the role of governor. The methodology employed throughout this paper is based on the methodological framework utilized by Rogers, Barnett, Webber, Finlayson, and Wang in their paper submitted to the *Royal Geographical Society*, "Governmentality and the conduct of water: China's South-North Water Transfer Project" (2016). Their research assesses China's South-North Water Transfer (SNWT) project, as "a programme of government that attempts to render the distribution of water across space more governable and administrable" (Rogers et al. 2016, 429). Utilizing the framework of Mitchel Dean, and his proposed four dimensions which consists of the *forms of visibility*, *techne of government*, *episteme of government*, and *forms of identification* (Dean 2010), with which to analyze governance, Rogers et al. look at China's South-North Water Transfer (SNWT) project "as an attempt to steer forms of conduct and to render subjects and spaces governable and administrable" (Rogers et al. 2016, 430). This paper will utilize a similar approach to that of Rogers et al. in focusing on the analysis of "English and Chinese academic, media and government documents through a governmentality lens" (Rogers et al. 2016, 429).

**Table 1** listed below provides a list of sources that I have selected to analyze in order to assess the rhetoric of the state through a governmentality framework. The sources compiled represent official documents, reports, laws, statistics, and statements by government officials published and circulated by the People's Republic of China. All sources selected have been translated into English by the government and disseminated to the nation's citizens and to the international public. As the practice of the Chinese government is to publish information across multiple media venues, no real value is placed on the specific origin of the source selected, as the majority of sources analyzed can be found across multiple government news agency websites as well as through the online publications of various international embassies and diplomatic missions of the PRC (refer to *Table 1*). The decision to analyze specifically government documents and statements was made in order to limit claims of misinterpretation of the government's policies and the motivations that drive these policies from possible invalid and biased assessments made by third parties. As such, the collection of these sources best highlight the use of green governmentality by the Chinese government through the interpretation of the Communist Party's own declarations regarding Tibetan society, economy, and the environment; keeping in mind the limited availability of resources concerning issues related to Tibet made public by the government. The sources listed here have been selected in order to touch upon the beginning of the passing of the *Grassland Law of the People's Republic of China* (2002), which served as a precursor to the start of the government's relocation and rehousing programs in 2006 and continue on to document the government's agenda within the current time frame. This was done, partly to depict that the coercive sedentarization of Tibetan nomads in the name of ecological

preservation is still an ongoing practice of the state, as well as to more effectively capture and trace how the government identifies who and what is to be governed over, the process with which the central government goes about governing, and the foundations it lays to sustain and justify its regime from year to year.

**Table 1: Source Compilation and Composition**

Source	Alternative Sources
<p><i>Grassland Law of the People's Republic of China</i>. 2002. National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China. December 28. Accessed March 15, 2016. <a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383951.htm">http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383951.htm</a>.</p>	<p>-Published online on <i>China Internet Information Center</i>, a portal site authorized by the Chinese government, under the auspices of the State Council Information Office.</p> <p><i>Available here:</i> <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2007-08/20/content_1034338.htm">http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2007-08/20/content_1034338.htm</a></p>
<p>State Council. 2006. "Abstract of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan outline". <i>People's Daily Online</i>. March 08, 2006. <a href="http://en.people.cn/200603/08/eng20060308_248953.html">http://en.people.cn/200603/08/eng20060308_248953.html</a>.</p>	<p>-Published online via the PRC's official web portal on March 8, 2016.</p> <p><i>Available here:</i> <a href="http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-03/08/content_246973.htm">http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-03/08/content_246973.htm</a></p>
<p><i>Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America</i>. 2008. "Facts and Figures of Tibetan development". March 27. Accessed December 15, 2016. <a href="http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/zgxz/t418918.htm">http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/zgxz/t418918.htm</a>.</p>	<p>-Published online via <i>China Daily</i>, the government's English-language newspaper on March 27, 2008.</p> <p><i>Available here:</i> <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-03/27/content_6570764.htm">http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-03/27/content_6570764.htm</a></p>
<p>White Paper 2008. <i>Protection and Development of Tibetan Culture</i>. Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China. September. 30. <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/xzwt/t521512.htm">http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/xzwt/t521512.htm</a></p>	<p>-Published online via the website of the National People's Congress (NPC) on March 16, 2009.</p> <p><i>Available here:</i> <a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Special_NP_C_Delegation/2009-03/16/content_1493485.htm">http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Special_NP_C_Delegation/2009-03/16/content_1493485.htm</a></p>

	<p>-Published online via the <i>China Internet Information Center</i> on September 25, 2008.</p> <p><i>Available here-</i>  <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7054682.htm">http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7054682.htm</a></p>
<p>Wen, Jiabao. 2009. "Towards Greater Development and Opening-up of Western China". Speech, Second Western China International Cooperation Forum, October 16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China.  <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t621406.shtml">http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t621406.shtml</a></p>	
<p>White Paper 2009. <i>Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet</i>. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China. <i>March 2. Beijing</i>.  <a href="http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/xzwt/t539939.htm">http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/xzwt/t539939.htm</a></p>	<p>-Published online via <i>Xinhuanet</i>, the official news agency of the PRC on March 2, 2009.</p> <p><i>Available here-</i>  <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/02/content_10928003.htm">http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/02/content_10928003.htm</a></p>
<p>Xinhua. 2010. "Chinese President stresses "leapfrog development, lasting stability" in Tibet". March 03.  <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010/china/2010-03/06/c_13199976.htm">http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010/china/2010-03/06/c_13199976.htm</a>.</p>	<p>-Published online via <i>China Tibet Online</i>, a website established by People's Daily Online, an official newspaper of the CCP on March 7, 2010.</p> <p><i>Available here-</i>  <a href="http://chinatibet.people.com.cn/6910983.html">http://chinatibet.people.com.cn/6910983.html</a></p>
<p><i>Fifth Tibet Work Forum</i>. 2015. Rao ai min. 2010. 'Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Zhaokai Di Wuci Xizang Gongzuo Zuotanhui.' ['The CPC Central Committee and the State Council held the Fifth Forum on Work in</p>	



<p>Tibet.’] January 18-20. <i>Renmin Daily</i>. Accessed August 16, 2016. <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-01/22/content_12858927.htm">http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-01/22/content_12858927.htm</a>.</p>	
<p>White Paper. 2015b. <i>Successful Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet</i>. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Beijing. September. <a href="http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/09/06/content_281475183815861.htm">http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/09/06/content_281475183815861.htm</a></p>	<p>-Published online via <i>China Daily</i>, the government’s English-language newspaper on September 6, 2015.</p> <p>Available here - <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-09/06/content_21796860_3.htm">http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-09/06/content_21796860_3.htm</a></p> <p>-Published online via <i>Xinhuanet</i>, the official news agency of the PRC on September 6, 2015.</p> <p>Available here – <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-09/06/c_134594114_2.htm">http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-09/06/c_134594114_2.htm</a></p>
<p>White Paper. 2015a. <i>Tibet’s Path of Development Is Driven by an Irresistible Historical Tide</i>. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. April 15. Beijing. <a href="http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/04/15/content_281475089444218.htm">http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/04/15/content_281475089444218.htm</a>.</p>	<p>-Published online via <i>Xinhuanet</i>, the official news agency of the PRC on April 15, 2015.</p> <p>Available here- <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-04/15/c_134152612.htm">http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-04/15/c_134152612.htm</a></p>
<p>2016 China Statistical Yearbook: Figure 6-29 Per Capita Disposable Income of Rural Households by Region. Compiled by the National Bureau of Statics of China. China Statistics Press. <a href="http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm">http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm</a></p>	

## **6. An Analysis of Green Governmentality in China**

Green governmentality in China has been implemented particularly within the western regions and within Tibet. It has manifested from the link that the Chinese government has created between “environmental improvement and economic growth” (Yeh 2009, 884). The state in its application of green governmentality has created a discourse surrounding the backwardness of Tibetan nomads and the threat that they constitute to the environment. The government has highlighted ecological degradation with it attributes to overgrazing as a serious threat to both areas downstream which consist of “China's major population centres”, as well as to “national social development” (Yeh 2005, 24). The response of the State to this perceived threat has been to identify itself as a technological expert, best equipped to govern and improve both nature and the people. Such improvements materialize into sedentarization policies that “constitute a dramatic re-making of the pastoral landscape” (Yeh 2005, 24) and which represent an exercise of state control over a once problematic migratory population. Further in depth analysis of green governmentality in the context of Chinese sedentarization driven policies that target the Tibetan nomadic population will be conducted through Dean’s framework of the four dimensions to analyze governmentality.

### **6.1 Forms of Visibility: The 1<sup>st</sup> Dimension of Governmentality**

Dean, in pinpointing the forms of visibility that exist as a dimension of governmentality focuses in on the action taken by state actors to “delimit objects to be governed” (Rogers et al. 2016, 431). This line of action is evident in the Communist Party’s introduction of the 11<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan (2006-2010), which set out to designate

what objectives would later become the focal point of the government's sphere of governance, as well as outline the problems and necessary set of solutions laid out by the State. The framing of an underdeveloped China existing in the shadow and at the detriment of Beijing and other developed regions of the country has provided the justification for the government's development aims in the western regions and within Tibet. Under the tagline of "promoting balanced regional development", with the launch of the 11<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan, the government

"proposes to boost balanced regional development to gradually form development arrangement that has clear function positioning, virtuous interaction among the eastern, central and western regions, and narrows gap in public service and people's living standards" (The State Council 2006).

Here the government's five year plans refers to the "blueprint for China's economic and social development in the next five years", which serves as the "common action guidelines for all ethnic groups in China as well as the important basis for the government to carry out economic regulation, market supervision, social administration and public service" (The State Council 2006). The statements made by the Communist Party within the 11<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan outlines specifically what Dean refers to as "how different locales and agents are to be connected with one another" (Dean 2010, 41) and how authority is designated. Having established the existence of a lagging and unproductive western region, holding back the larger society, the government further outlines the plan

"to give overall planning to population distribution, economic deployment, land utilization and urbanization pattern in light of the carrying capacity of resources and environment, existing development density and potential,

so as to classify the land space into four categories: optimized development, key development, restricted and banned development zones” (The State Council 2006).

This emphasis on “land utilization” renders the usage of space and of the environment that occurs outside of the government’s planning as problematic. It further places the government in an authoritative role that later allows for and justifies the governing of nature, particularly with regards to excluding nomads within that sphere of governance. This very act of making visible the nomadic population and problematizing the prior management of the environment, so as to provide justification and a sole designated set of solutions is similarly outlined in the 11<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan through the creation of the New Socialist Countryside Campaign. The plan here, announced that

“while actively promoting urbanization, solid and steady progress will be made in building a new socialist countryside according to the requirement of advanced production, improved livelihood, a civilized social atmosphere, clean and tidy villages and democratic administration” (State Council 2006).

Directed largely towards the Western region and later implemented throughout Tibet, the New Socialist Countryside Campaign calls for a radical transformation of rural society. In the process, the campaign also designates certain standards that are to dictate modernity and urbanization. This pursuit of the creation of “clean and tidy villages” when implemented amongst the nomadic population represents the government’s use of space and enclosure to create what can be characterized as rural cities which allows for more rigid population control. Following the introduction of such programs and policies, the Chinese government has continued to employ a reflective stance that only continues to sustain and add credibility to the regime’s governance. In an address at the Second Western China International Cooperation Forum, Premier Wen Jiabo notes that

“Ten years ago, the Chinese government made a major strategic decision to implement the Western Development Strategy with a view to changing the backward outlook of western China, building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, improving national land development pattern, promoting balanced regional development, expanding the scope of opening-up both internally and externally, and fostering new economic growth areas. Over the past 10 years, the Chinese government has been scaling up support for the western region through planning guidance, policy support, financial input, project development and human resources exchanges” (Wen 2009).

With regards to forms of visibility, the government reiterates its perception of the regions and the peoples of the West as underdeveloped and backwards. In problematizing the West, the government is able to validate its own technical expertise and position itself as savior and protector of these territories. The state’s realm of expertise is rooted in the rhetoric of environmental degradation that is promoted, as well as through the self-identifies effectiveness of the government’s unilateral environmental governance. Through attributing “the rapid economic development in Tibet” with “the strong support of the central government” (Wen 2009), the Communist Party legitimizes its role as a technical expert within the region. The emphasis on technical solutions to the protection and maintenance of nature that the government sets into place focuses solely on “advanced technologies, equipments and managerial expertise” (Wen 2009). This set of expertise deems Tibetan nomads to be the problem rather than part of the solution needed to combat grassland and other environmental degradation. As a result, ecological revitalization and preservation projects implemented in Western China and throughout the Tibetan region such as “returning farmland and grazing land to forest and grassland” make invisible nomadic ties to the land and rejects the inclusion and participation of nomads within environmental governance structures. Ultimately, the government relies

on the dissemination of data and figures that it puts out to continue to designate and legitimize who and what is to be governed. Through statistics, the government maintains that “the per capita net income of farmers and herdsmen maintained double-digit growth for five consecutive years” (Wen 2009) and that “the economy of Tibet has been growing at an annual rate of 12 percent or more over the past seven years” (Embassy of the PRC in the USA 2008). Government publications further state that

“Tibet’s GDP soared from 327 million yuan in 1965 to 92.08 billion yuan in 2014, a 281-fold increase. Since 1994, the local GDP has grown at an annual rate of 12.4 percent on average, registering double-digit growth for 20 consecutive years. Local fiscal revenues increased from 22.39 million yuan in 1965 to 16.475 billion yuan in 2014, an average annual increase of 14.46 percent, further enhancing Tibet’s self-development capabilities” (White Paper 2015b).

In such a manner, the government continues to selectively stress the positive effects of urbanization to the Tibetan and Chinese society, constructing state approved guidelines dictating what it means to have succeeded. This narrative of success employed by the government, however, fails to account for the still existing wealth disparity that exists regional. Looking particularly at Tibet, the *2016 China Statistical Yearbook* compiled by the National Bureau of Statics of China, in looking at the per capita disposable income of rural households by region marked the disposal income of Tibet to have increased in 2013 from 6,553.4 yuan to 8,243.7 yuan in 2015 (2016 China Statistical Yearbook). This remains still lower than the national average disposal income recorded at 9,249.6 yuan in 2013 and 11,421.7 yuan in 2015 and dwarfs in comparison to the recorded increase in disposable income from 17,101.2 yuan in 2013 to 20,568.7 yuan in 2015 seen in Beijing (2016 China Statistical Yearbook). The discrepancies in income that continue to persist in

Tibet are not readily underscored by the government, bringing forth once more, questions concerning the effectiveness and success of the government's development driven policies to the Tibetan populace.

Such discrepancies regarding gaps in achievement markers that designate development successes are further reiterated when concerning the Tibetan nomadic community. Following the introduction in 2006 of a program to construct houses for 220,000 local farming and herding households by the year 2010, the government noted that "the per capita housing area for Tibetan herders has reached 36.4 square meters, 16.8 square meters more than before the project" (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America 2008). The government maintains this is in conjunction with the aims of protecting the environment, and directs attention to financial investments in the region, such as in noting that "during the 10th five-year plan (2001-2005), more than 120 million yuan was spent to protect wetlands and grasslands in Tibet" (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America 2008). Such selective visibility characterizes Tibetans as not being a vulnerable population, marginalized by economic progress, but rather, positions the state as the source of advancement and development in the region. Through the introduction of new government initiatives that frame developing the west, building a new socialist countryside, and shifting nomads off of the grazing land as the solution to China's problem of underdevelopment and environmental concerns, the government is able to shift blame to those identified as backwards. With development and stability tied in to environmental protection (Xinhua 2010), the government successfully constructs and makes visible its agenda for Tibet. Within the framework of such an agenda, those, such as Tibetan nomads who become

burdened with the label of being underdeveloped and backwards find themselves identified as subjects to be governed and by extension find the land and environment as the objects demarcated by the State to be governed over.

## **6. 2 Techne of Government: The 2<sup>nd</sup> Dimension of Governmentality**

In pinpointing the “mechanism, procedures, [and] technologies through which rule is accomplished” (Rogers et al. 2016, 431), it becomes perhaps best to look into the laws, programs, and plans that the Chinese government has put forward, which identify the importance of technology within their structures of governances. The reintroduction of the Grassland Law in 2002 “increased governmental power to limit herds and resettle people to 'protect, develop and make rational use of grasslands' ” (HRW 2013, 40) (Grassland Law of the People's Republic of China 2002, Art 18, 45, 48). Article 1 states that the

“law is enacted with a view to protecting, developing and making rational use of grasslands, improving the ecological environment, maintaining the diversity of living things, modernizing animal husbandry and promoting the sustainable development of the economy and society” (Grassland Law of the People's Republic of China 2002).

Article 3 goes on to clarify that

“with regard to grasslands, the State applies the principles of scientific planning, all-round protection, giving priority to the development of key grasslands, and rational use, in order to promote the sustainable use of grasslands and the harmonious development of the ecology, economy and society” (Grassland Law of the People's Republic of China 2002).

Such clauses represent the technical means with which the government seeks to achieve its ends of ecological, economic, and societal development (Grassland Law of the



People's Republic of China 2002). Scientific planning, then, takes on the role of the techne of government. The promotion of “scientific research in protection, development, use and monitoring of grasslands” designates scientists and technicians (Grassland Law of the People's Republic of China 2002) as experts to the grassland, thus limiting who is deemed qualified or not to govern over nature. In the midst of such reasoning, Tibetan nomads are deemed unknowledgeable and incapable of rangeland management, ignoring the centuries of care that nomads have contributed to the land and to the environment. Dean in his work asserts “technical means are a condition of governing” (Dean 2010, 42) and it is solely the State who holds the power to task the administrative department under the State Council with supervising the grasslands (Grassland Law of the People's Republic of China 2002, Art. 42). The end goal of the government has been the transformation and development of the Western regions in the image of the more developed eastern and coastal regions. The realization of this image is dependent on the technical solutions that the State introduces. Such solutions however exclude nomadic contributions and devalue nomadic knowledge regarding environmental management.

### **6. 3 Episteme of Government: The 3<sup>rd</sup> Dimension of Governmentality**

In analyzing governmentality, an analysis of the epistemene of government or the justifications given for governance is evident in the creation of the discourse of Tibet and Tibetan nomads as backwards and in need of constant oversight by the Community Party. In speaking of Tibet, the government has continued to frame the existence of two Tibet's. State media speaks repeatedly of a Tibet of the past prior to being under Chinese rule and of a new Tibet flourishing under the guidance of the Communist Party. The government

often characterizes this old Tibet as being “a stagnant society on the edge of collapse” (White Paper 2009). It labels such a Tibet, without the assistance of the Chinese government as being

“in a state of extreme isolation and backwardness, almost without a trace of modern industry, commerce, science and technology, education, culture or health care. Primitive farming methods were still being used, and herdsmen had to travel from place to place to find pasture for their livestock” (White Paper 2009).

This becomes further justification for governance as this reinforces the state’s claims of Tibetans and Tibetan nomads as being incapable of successfully governing themselves and of course of governing over the environment. Focusing specifically on Tibetan nomads, the Communist Party maintains, “before the democratic reform in 1959, Tibetan peasants and herdsmen had barely any means of production”(White Paper 2009). Such characterizations work to give credibility to the necessity of intervention by the central government. It contributes to the formation of a knowledge system promoted by the central government that states, “modern science and technology in Tibet started from scratch” (White Paper 2008). As such, the scientific advancements seen in the region are intended to be viewed as a direct result of the implementation of numerous “policies, laws and regulations,” as well as financial investments that promote and develop science and technology throughout the region (White Paper 2008).

“Guided by the Scientific Outlook on Development, the central government lays great emphasis on environmental protection, deeming it as an important part of development. Aiming at the strategic objectives of building the ecological safety barrier as well as ecological and beautiful Tibet, the regional government strives to establish and follow a new sustainable pattern of development on the Tibet plateau.

Both the central and regional governments have adopted quite a number of strict measures for environmental protection. Projects have been carried out to protect natural forests, to reforest cultivated land, and to restore grassland by prohibiting grazing, as have grassland ecological environment improving programs like conservation and recovery of natural grassland, settlement of nomads, man-made grassland, and deteriorated pastureland improvement.” (White Paper 2015a)

The government transforms itself into the representatives of knowledge, prioritizing the “scientific outlook on development” within the framework of environmental governance, and connects this notion of governance with social stability, livelihood improvement, and economic development (Fifth Tibet Work Forum 2015). The notion then, of “environmentally sustainable development becomes a new technology of government” (Yeh 2005, 14). This allows for the designations and justifications of how best to care for the environment. The protective measures that the government then introduces as solutions to grassland degradation allow for the exclusion of nomads who have been labeled as a threat to the grasslands. Nomads existing within their traditional livelihoods and migrating across the grasslands with their herds essentially become classified as “problems of government” (Yeh 2005, 9). They constitute as a perceived threat and it is this perception of threat that “makes local herders visible and accountable for their purportedly degradation-inducing range practices” (Yeh 2005, 24). Once visible, they are subject to a package of 'improvements' including resettlement” (Yeh 2005, 24). Having successfully delegitimized the capabilities of the Tibetan populace, the government consequently is left unchallenged in asserting that:

“the will of the people of all ethnic groups in China, including the Tibetans, shall never be shaken from safeguarding national unity and sovereignty, from following the socialist road with Chinese characteristics

under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, from holding on to the system of regional autonomy, from promoting the realization of modernization in Tibet, and from building a new, united and democratic Tibet with a prosperous, civilized and harmonious society” (White Paper 2009).

This results in the co-opting of the will of Tibetans and Tibetan nomads with the will of the Central government, allowing for the state to link as Emily Yeh has previously suggested, environmental governance with improving certain communities (Yeh 2005). Ultimately, this grants the central government “greater control over both the resources and the people who use them” (Yeh, 2005, 16).

#### **6. 4 Forms of Identification: The 4<sup>th</sup> Dimension of Governmentality**

The Chinese government’s construction and framing of the nomadic identity within the larger Han Chinese majority society has long been rooted in this discourse of backwardness. The existence of this discourse has allowed for the government to step in as governors of a population depicted as being in desperate need of governance. The central government has continued to promote this image of the old Tibet as a “society of theocratic feudal serfdom (White Paper 2015a) consisting of “serfs and slaves” who “suffered destitution, cruel oppression and exploitation, and possessed no means of production or personal freedom whatsoever, not to mention other basic human rights” (White Paper 2009). Such a Tibet is portrayed as “closed, backward and isolated from modern civilization” (White Paper 2015a), necessitating the need for the intervention of a benevolent governor. The Communist Party positions itself to be exactly that and maintains that “following the launch of reform and opening up in 1978, the drive for modernization has brought extensive benefits to Tibet as much as to any other part of the

country” (White Paper 2015a). Continuing, the Party notes that:

“through more than 60 years of development, the people of Tibet have found a path of development that is both characteristically Chinese and suited to the actual prevailing conditions in Tibet” (White Paper 2015, “Tibet's Path of Development Is Driven by an Irresistible Historical Tide”).

In this way, the government constructs the identity of Tibetans as lacking in knowledge of self-development. Ultimately, this works to exclude the Tibetan population from the discourse surrounding development. This then allows for the Chinese government to assert that in this case, only the Communist Party knows best and it is only through the implementation of administrative practices and knowledge claims promoted by the central government that the peoples of Tibet can be bettered. Supported and financed by the government, the CCP’s political agenda maintains that in Tibet, “the drive for modernization continues” (White Paper 2015a). No room is left to question what this modernization looks like, whom it threatens to leave behind, and more importantly, whether it includes Tibetans and Tibetan nomads as the recipients of its benefits.

The framing of Tibet - China relations as “a single family sharing a common destiny” pursuing “the [so called] Chinese Dream of the great renewal of the nation” (White Paper 2015a), represents a rejection of an individual Tibetan identity, choosing instead to completely disregard a rich and separate cultural history distinct from that of the larger Han Chinese majority. Former President Hu Jintao further expanded upon this in 2010, stressing, “awareness of being part of the Chinese nation and being law-abiding citizens must be constantly enhanced among cadre and the masses in Tibet” (Xinhua 2010). Characterized best as the Communist Party’s construction of representation, we witness the relegating of Tibetans and by extension of Tibetan nomads to the role of

subjects. As subjects, according to the government, they have proven their incapability to develop when left alone. In 2009, with the marking of the 50th Anniversary of the Democratic Reform in Tibet, the government stressed once more that

“it is conducive to telling the right from wrong in history and helps the world better understand a real Tibet in progress for us to review the overwhelming democratic reform and the profound historical changes that have taken place in Tibet over the past 50 years, to shed light on the laws governing the social development of Tibet” (White Paper 2009).

Reiterating this occurrence of the truths that regime construct in order to govern, it becomes possible to witness again the designation of the government as the holder of “truth”, once more legitimizing the rule of the central government, while simultaneously invalidating other voices that are cast out of the sphere of governance.

## **7. Conclusion**

Governmentality dictates that the ends of government lie in the population. To the Chinese government, continued economic growth and development in the western regions is dependent on controlling the Tibetan population and in particular, in controlling the nomadic population. Within the system of green governmentality practiced by the PRC, Tibetan nomads become both the means and the ends of the state’s larger development agenda. Contrary to the desired ends of the Communist Party, Tibetan nomads have long presented an obstacle to Beijing’s urbanization driven agenda. The migratory nature of nomads has thwarted effective supervision over the population and their rejection of the market-economy has, in the eyes of the state, been characterized as a failure to contribute to the Communist Party’s advancement. Yet the development of the

west and the increased exploitation of Tibet's resources are dependent on governing nature, the very nature that within the limits of the Tibetan Plateau had previously been under the domain of nomads. The Chinese government has worked however to successfully counteract this by promoting the discourse of a dire earth and of an increased threat to the Tibetan Plateau and to all Chinese citizens. In framing nomads as the main perpetrators of environmental degradation, the government has been able to successfully gain control over the environment and of the land, as well as successfully sedentarize a large majority of the nomadic population.

In this way, state control within the region is seen as dependent upon sedentarization and the larger objective of sedentarization is to be to bring forth the realization of the idealized Chinese citizen. Tibetan nomads within Chinese society have and continue to exist as the Other and as a vestige of the past. Their pastoral livelihood amplified through such a lens thus represents something that is inherently at odds with that of the Han Chinese citizen committed to urbanization and economic prosperity. To the state, it is precisely such a citizen that is regarded as useful to the advancement the nation. In a governing framework where unity and conformity is the key to power, the existence of the Tibetan nomad connected to the very land, rich in natural resources that will aid in the continued development of the nation is a direct threat. Accordingly, the Chinese government has responded to this threat through the guise of ecological protection efforts that call for relocation and rehousing, which leads towards a complete shift off of the land. With land inherently at the root of the identity of Tibetan nomads, the eradication of nomadic land tenure highlights the expectations of governmentality in the Chinese context. The demands of governmentality come to require of the Tibetan nomadic

population greater complacency and assimilation into the larger society. Such demands however, are set up to come at the loss of culture, identity, and nomadic knowledge. Redefining the spatial distribution of the grassland pushes Tibetan nomads towards urban settlements and inevitably accounts for a loss of nomadic identity, as we begin to factor in the prolonged implications to future generations, looking particularly at indigenous culture and pastoral knowledge. The failure of the Chinese government to take into account nomadic knowledge regarding the management of nature brings to question the truthfulness of the proposed aim of the Communist Party to combat ecological degradation and effectively manage the Tibetan ecosystem.

As of 2009, there have been a reported 146 instances of self-immolation (International Campaign for Tibet 2016b). Of these individuals, many have originated from nomadic communities in Tibet and have employed the practice as form of protest against attacks on their culture and identity by the government (International Campaign for Tibet 2016b). Following the outbreaks of such protests, the government has responded with arrests, crackdowns, and with the increased presence of security forces, all of which further threatens cultural expression and Tibetan ethnic identity (International Campaign for Tibet 2016b). The lost lives of these individuals' comes to represent how through the Chinese government's exercise of governmentality, most at stake ultimately remains the very root of nomadic identity. With nomadic identity inexplicably linked to the land, the government's sedentarization programs bring about a destruction of identity. The precise act of sedentarization is marred in loss with the realization that to be sedentary is to no longer be nomadic. The government's relocation and rehousing programs come to represent a discarding of what is regarded as the old and



backwards, in favor of what has been legitimized as the new and correct urban lifestyle. This is due to the promotion of environmental truths that pave the way for scientific approaches to environmental management. The reconceptualization of the other into the status quo destroys the existence of an alternative lifestyle that has been outside of the government's sphere of governance. The existence of the nomadic lifestyle has long presented a threat to the governance structure of the PRC, which seeks to affirm itself as having sole legitimacy of rule. The continued immobilization of Tibetans as whole and a reshaping of the traditional landscape of Tibetan settlements and society represents a state directed process of destruction intended to fracture a unified identity that is inherently separate from that of the established Han Chinese majority identity. What ultimately remains is a state-constructed identity that Tibetan nomads struggle to familiarize themselves with. Yet, not provided by the central government with the necessary services needed to facilitate their successful integration into urban society, nomads are left with only the path leading toward increased dependency upon the State. Ultimately, this once more works to legitimize the government's knowledge claims and exercise of governmentality within the region, thus creating a cycle that ultimately concludes with the nomad giving way to the state. And with the state never quite satisfied with the limits of its power, it will continue to move on, seeking the next object of its governmentality. In its wake, unless prevented from being so, will remain merely remnants of stories passed down amongst generations, of the rich cultural traditions and ecological contributions of a nomadic people who once thrived for thousands of years across the grasslands.

## **Bibliography**

Agrawal, Arun. 2005. *Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making of Subjects*. Duke University Press. 1-344.  
<http://read.dukeupress.edu/content/9780822386421/9780822386421>.

Bollier, David and Burns H. Weston. 2013. *Green Governance ecological survival, human rights, and the law of the commons*. Cambridge University Press. 1-336.

Cao, Jianjun, Emily T.Yeh, Nicholas M. Holden, Yanyan Qin, and Zhengwei Ren. 2013. "The Roles of Overgrazing, Climate Change and Policy As Drivers of Degradation of China's Grasslands". *Nomadic Peoples* 17, no.2: 82-101. EBSCOhost.

Chanza, Nelson and de Wit, Anton. 2016. "Enhancing Climate Governance Through Indigenous Knowledge: Case in Sustainability Science". *South African Journal of Science*, 112(3), 1-7.  
doi:<http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/10.17159/sajs.2016/20140286>

Chuang, Julia. 2014. "China's Rural Land Politics: Bureaucratic Absorption and the Muting of Rightful Resistance". *The China Quarterly*, 219. 649-669. doi:10.1017/S030574101400068X

Darier, Eric. 1999. "Foucault and the Environment: An Introduction". In *Discourses of the Environment*. Edited by Eric Darier. Oxford. Blackwell Publisher Ltd. 1-34.

Dean, Mitchell. 2010. *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*. SAGE Publications LTd. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. 1-286.

Démurger, Sylvie. 2000. *Economic Opening and Growth in China*. OECD Publishing. Paris. 1-89. doi: <http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/10.1787/9789264181076-en>

De Schutter, Olivier. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter: Mission to China. Rep. N.p. 20 Jan. 2012. *United Nations*.  
<http://www.srfood.org/en/official-reports>.

*Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America*. 2008. "Facts and Figures of Tibetan development". March 27. <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/zgxz/t418918.htm>.

*Fifth Tibet Work Forum*. 2015. Rao ai min. 2010. 'Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Zhaokai Di Wuci Xizang Gongzuo Zuotanhui.' ['The CPC Central Committee and the State Council held the Fifth Forum on Work in Tibet.']. January 18-20. *Renmin Daily*. Accessed August 16, 2016. [http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-01/22/content\\_12858927.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-01/22/content_12858927.htm).

- Foggin, Marc J. 2008. "Depopulating the Tibetan Grasslands: National Policies and Perspectives for the Future of Tibetan Herders in Qinghai Province, China". *Mountain Research and Development* 28(1). 26-31. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1659/mrd.0972>.
- Forsyth T, Walker A. 2014. "Hidden Alliances: Rethinking Environmentalism and the Politics of Knowledge in Thailand's Campaign for Community Forestry". *Conservation and Society*. <http://www.conservationandsociety.org/text.asp?2014/12/4/408/155584>
- Foucault, Michel. 2007. *Michel Foucault, Lectures at the Collège de France: Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977 - 78*. Edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. London, GB: Palgrave Macmillan. 1-361. ProQuest.
- Foucault, Michel. 1981. Statement at press conference. June 19. Originally published: 1984. "Confronting governments, human rights" ("Face aux gouvernements, les droits de l'homme"). *Liberation* no 967, 30 June /1 July. p. 22. Dits et écrits IV p 707-8 (355), Gallimard 1994. *OpenDemocracy*. 2015. The Rights and Duties of International Citizenship. November 13. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/michel-foucault/rights-and-duties-of-international-citizenship>.
- Foucault, Michel. 2014. *Wrong-Doing Truth Telling: The Functional Avowal in Justice*. Edited by Fabienne Brion and Bernard E. Harcourt. Translated by Stephen W. Sawyer. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1-567. Scribd.
- Goldman, Michael. 2001. "Constructing an Environmental State: Eco-governmentality and Other Transnational Practices of a 'Green' World Bank". Oxford University Press: 499–523. doi:10.1525/sp.2001.48.4.499.
- Grassland Law of the People's Republic of China*. 2002. National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China. December 28. [http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content\\_1383951.htm](http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383951.htm).
- Hays, Jeffrey. 2015. "Tibet Nomads: Facts and Details." Accessed April 6, 2016. <http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat6/sub35/item209.html>.
- Human Rights Watch*. 2013. "They Say We Should Be Grateful". n.p., 27 June. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/27/they-say-we-should-be-grateful/mass-rehousing-and-relocation-programs-tibetan>.
- International Campaign for Tibet*. 2016a. "Tibet Statistics." Accessed November 30, 2016. <https://www.savetibet.org/resources/all-about-tibet/tibet-statistics/>.
- International Campaign for Tibet*. 2016b. "Self-Immolations by Tibetans". December 9. Accessed January 12, 2017. <http://www.savetibet.org/resources/fact-sheets/self-immolations-by-tibetans/>.

*International Council for Science*. 2002, Science and Traditional Knowledge, Report from the ICSU Study Group on Science and Traditional Knowledge, Paper delivered to 27th General Assembly of ICSU, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. September. 1-15. <http://www.icsu.org/publications/reports-and-reviews/science-traditional-knowledge/science-traditional-knowledge>.

Jeong, Jihyeon. 2015. "Ethnic Minorities in China's Western Development Plan". *Journal of International and Area Studies* 22 (1): 1-17. <http://ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/docview/1705679716?accountid=10226>.

Kernan, Mark. 2013. "The Displacement of Tibetan Nomads, International Law and the Loss of Global Indigenous Culture". *Global Policy Journal*. March 6. <http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/articles/international-law-and-human-rights/displacement-tibetan-nomads-international-law-and-loss-g>.

King, Y. 1997. "Managerial environmentalism, population control and the new national insecurity: towards a feminist critique". *Political Environments* 5. Proquest.

Lemos, Maria Carmen and Arun Agrawal, Arun. 2008. "Environmental Governance" *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*. 297-325. doi:10.1146/annurev.energy.31.042605.135621.

Luke, Timothy. 1999. "Environmentality as Green Governmentality." In *Discourses of the Environment*. Edited by Eric Darier. Oxford. Blackwell Publisher Ltd. 121-151.

Ma Xiangcong. 2007. "China's environmental governance". *ChinaDialogue*. February 21. <https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/789-China-s-environmental-governance>.

Manokha, Ivan. 2009. *Foucault's Concept of Power and the Global Discourse of Human Rights*. *Global Society*, 23:4, 429-452. doi: 10.1080/13600820903198792.

Martínez-Cobo, José (1986/87). Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations. Prepared by Special Rapporteur to the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. UN DOC E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7. <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfi>

Miller, Peter Michael, Gordon, C. , Burchill, G., Foucault, M. 1991. *The Foucault effect: studies in governmentality: with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault*. London. Harvester Wheatsheaf. 1-307.

Narkunas, J. Paul. 2015. "Human Rights and States of Emergency: Humanitarians and Governmentality". *Culture, Theory and Critique*. 56:2. 208-227. doi: 10.1080/14735784.2014.910739

Norbu, Tenzin. 2012 “A Culture Endangered: Depopulating the Grasslands of the Tibetan Plateau.” *Human Rights in China*. July 2. <http://www.hrichina.org/en/crf/article/6136>.

O'Malley, Pat, Lorna Weir & Clifford Shearing. 1997. “Governmentality, Criticism, Politics”. *Economy and Society*. 26:4, 501-517, doi: 10.1080/03085149700000026

Ptackova, Jarmila. 2012.”Implementation of Resettlement Programmes amongst Pastoralist Communities in Eastern Tibet”. Chapter 12 in *Pastoral Practices in High Asia: Agency of ‘development’ effected by modernization, resettlement and transformation*. (ed.) Hermann Kreutzmann: Springer Publications

Rogers, S., Barnett J., Webber, M., Finlayson, B., and Wang M. 2016. “Governmentality and the conduct of water: China’s South-North Water Transfer Project”. *Transaction of the Institute of British Geographers*. 429-441.  
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/doi/10.1111/tran.12141/epdf>

Rutherford, Paul. 1999. “The Entry of Life into History.” In *Discourses of the Environment*. Edited by Eric Darier. Oxford. Blackwell Publisher Ltd. 37-62.

Rutherford, Stephanie. 2007. “Green governmentality: Insights and opportunities in the study of nature's rule”. *Progress in Human Geography* 31, (3) (06): 291-307,  
<http://ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/230699790?accountid=10226>.

Smith, Warren W. “China's Policy on Tibetan Autonomy”. 2004. Vol. No. 2. Washington, DC. *EastWest Center Washington*. Oct. 2004.  
<http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/chinas-policy-tibetan-autonomy>

Sokhi-Bulley, Bal. *Governing (Through) Rights*. 2016. Hart Publishing. Oxford and Oregon. 3-167.

State Council. 2006. “Abstract of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan outline”. *People’s Daily Online*. March 08, 2006. [http://en.people.cn/200603/08/eng20060308\\_248953.html](http://en.people.cn/200603/08/eng20060308_248953.html).

Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy. 2015. Resettlement is Displacement: A Rights Based Perspective on the Internally Displaced in Tibet. <http://tchrd.org/>.

“Tibetan Nomads.” 2016. *The Land of Snows*. Accessed November 30.  
[http://kekexili.typepad.com/life\\_on\\_the\\_tibetan\\_plate/2010/01/tibetan-nomads.html](http://kekexili.typepad.com/life_on_the_tibetan_plate/2010/01/tibetan-nomads.html).

Uitto, Juha I. 2016. “Evaluating the Environment as a Global Public Good.” *Evaluation* 22 (1): 108–15. doi:10.1177/1356389015623135.

UN Commission on Human Rights, *Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/64. The role of good governance in the promotion of human rights*. 27 April 2000. E/CN.4/RES/2000/64. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f28414.html>

UN General Assembly, *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999.  
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx>

UN General Assembly, *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295*.  
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/Declaration.aspx>.

United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. 1972. *Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment*. New York. United Nations.  
<http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503>.

United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. 1992. *Rio Declaration on Environment and Development*. New York. United Nations.  
<http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163>.

United Nations Environment Programme. 2012. *Global environment outlook GEO 5: environment for the future we want*. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Program. [http://www.unep.org/geo/GEO5\\_ebook/index.html](http://www.unep.org/geo/GEO5_ebook/index.html).

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner. 2017. "Good Governance and Human Rights." <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx>.

Wen, Jiabao. 2009. "Towards Greater Development and Opening-up of Western China". Speech, Second Western China International Cooperation Forum, October 16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China.  
[http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjdt\\_665385/zyjh\\_665391/t621406.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t621406.shtml)

White Paper. 2015a. *Tibet's Path of Development Is Driven by an Irresistible Historical Tide*. The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. April 15. Beijing.  
[http://english.gov.cn/archive/white\\_paper/2015/04/15/content\\_281475089444218.htm](http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/04/15/content_281475089444218.htm).

White Paper. 2015b. *Successful Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet*. The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. Beijing. September.  
[http://english.gov.cn/archive/white\\_paper/2015/09/06/content\\_281475183815861.htm](http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/09/06/content_281475183815861.htm)

White Paper 2009. *Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet*. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China. March 2. Beijing. <http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/xzwt/t539939.htm>

White Paper 2008. *Protection and Development of Tibetan Culture*. Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China. September. 30.  
<http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/xzwt/t521512.htm>

Xinhua. 2011. "China to Subsidize Herdsmen to Curb Overgrazing." June 6. Accessed June 6, 2016. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-05/06/content\\_12459023.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-05/06/content_12459023.htm).

Xinhua. 2010. "Chinese President stresses "leapfrog development, lasting stability" in Tibet". March 03. Accessed June 6, 2016.  
[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-03/06/c\\_13199976.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-03/06/c_13199976.htm)

Yeh, Emily T. 2005. "Green Governmentality and Pastoralism in Western China: Converting Pastures to Grasslands." *Nomadic Peoples* 9 (1/2). White Horse Press: 9–30.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/43123745>.

Yeh, Emily T. 2009. Greening western China: A critical view. *Geoforum*. Volume 40, Issue 5. 884-994.  
<http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/10.1016/j.geoforum.2009.06.004>.

*2016 China Statistical Yearbook*: Figure 6-29 Per Capita Disposable Income of Rural Households by Region. Compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Statistics Press. <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm>.