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IIA in Separable Matching Markets

Galichon, Alfred; Salanie, Bernard

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives has figured prominently in social choice and in decision-making under risk. Its extension to two-sided markets is not obvious. We redefine IIA in models of matching with transferable utility; we also define Independence of Irrelevant Type Splits (ITS) and Irrelevance of Type Aggregation (ITA). We discuss these properties in four models: (i) Choo and Siow 2006 (ii) a 2-nest logit model; (iii) a new class of Generalized Random Coe cients models; and (iv) the nonseparable model of Dagsvik 2000.

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Academic Units
Economics
Published Here
November 8, 2017