NAVIGATING THE POST-DISASTER LANDSCAPE:
HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND RECOVERY IN THREE NEW ORLEANS NEIGHBORHOODS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIA: American Institute of Architects
APA: American Planning Association
BNOB: Bring New Orleans Back
CBD HDLC: Central Business District Historic District Landmarks Commission
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency
GNOCDC: Greater New Orleans Community Data Center
HDLC: Historic District Landmarks Commission
LLT: Louisiana Land Trust
LRA: Louisiana Recovery Authority
NCPTT: National Center for Preservation Technology and Training
NHPA: National Historic Preservation Act
NONRP: New Orleans Neighborhood Revitalization Plan (Lambert Plan)
NORA: New Orleans Redevelopment Authority
NTHP: National Trust for Historic Preservation
PRCNO: Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans
RTNO: Rebuilding Together New Orleans
SHPO: State Historic Preservation Office
TNO: Tarp New Orleans
UNOP: United New Orleans Plan
USACE: United States Army Corps of Engineers
VCC: Vieux Carre Commission
VCPORA: Vieux Carre Property Owners and Residents Association
WMF: World Monuments Fund
PREFACE

In September 2010, I arrived in New York – to begin my first year of the Historic Preservation Program at Columbia University - just days after the first, of three, large earthquakes struck Christchurch, New Zealand. Following the earthquakes, it was difficult to truly comprehend the scale of devastation that confronted the country’s second largest city. The disaster left 185 people dead, and it is estimated that almost sixty percent of the historic city center was damaged. The city was unique in New Zealand, not only for its collection of mid-nineteenth century gothic revival buildings, but also for those built in the mid-twentieth century “Canterbury School” style, which grew out of the brutalism of postwar Britain.

It quickly became apparent that the disaster response in the city was largely ad hoc and political. The disaster recovery legislation overruled all existing planning regulations - which included the protection of the city’s significant architectural and cultural heritage. The multiple disasters rendered the city’s identity at risk.

After visiting the devastated city in August 2011, I could do little but endeavor to find the lessons learnt by other urban centers in the United States that have faced a similar crisis. The recovery of New Orleans, Louisiana, following Hurricane Katrina provided just those lessons. Through this thesis I hoped to dissect the recovery in New Orleans in order to extract the policy and strategic decisions that have impacted the protection of heritage resources in the city. I believe that the terms of the next disaster will be defined by the response to the previous catastrophe. In light of this, heritage professionals working in New Orleans have a moral obligation to reflect on their role in the city’s recovery - and on the lessons learned - in order to ensure the most effective action in the future. After almost seven years of recovery the city presents a complex narrative, but one that I hope serves as both hope and warning to other city’s facing response and recovery following natural disaster.
INTRODUCTION

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the coast of the Gulf Coast of Mexico and devastated broad swathes of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. The Hurricane itself was designated a Category 3 Storm at landfall, yet it was the unprecedented extent of its aftermath that marked the event as the costliest natural disaster - and one of the five deadliest hurricanes - in the history of the United States. The storm dealt its most devastating blow indirectly to the City of New Orleans, Louisiana, where it triggered the most significant human tragedy as eighty percent of the city flooded when the engineered levee systems failed. This thesis acknowledges the human dimension of the event by examining the impact of the disaster on the physical built environment of three New Orleans neighborhoods that contribute to part of the city’s historic landscape.

The storm, and its prolonged aftermath, altered the cultural landscape of the city – destroying entire neighborhoods, displacing whole communities, and jarring the city’s identity. This thesis uses the event of Hurricane Katrina, and its aftermath, to reflect on how the legal frameworks of preservation have shaped the city of New Orleans and how they continue to reshape the city. The goal of this thesis is three-fold: to examine the preservation frameworks in place before the disaster and to identify New Orleans's particular sense of place; to discuss how these frameworks have been impacted following the disaster; and, to think about how the new and old (pre-existing and newly established) frameworks reshape the city – engaging new constituencies in preservation, and broadening an understanding of what is “historic” in New Orleans.
The City of New Orleans, between significant water bodies: the Mississippi River, Lake Pontchartrain, and Lake Borgne, and their associated waterways. As an existing Native American portage, it was a strategic, but narrow strip of land, between the river, and Bayou St. John, which connected the River to Lake Pontchartrain, and further into the resource-rich interior of the country. Image, ESRI Satellite Image, 2012.
The Risk to the Historic Built Environment

Following natural disasters, the first priority of response is preserving human life and protecting public safety; historic preservation and the protection of historic resources is relegated to be a lesser concern. In New Orleans, the humanitarian crisis was largely represented by the loss of interconnection and communality within communities, which before the storm had helped define the boundaries of their physical neighborhoods. Addressing these injuries falls within the purview of historic preservation. In reaction to the unprecedented scale of the devastation in New Orleans and the unfolding crisis of the city’s recovery, the then-president of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, Richard Moe, observed that the storm’s destruction was “not only a terrible human tragedy, but perhaps the greatest cultural disaster in American History.”

As the enormity of the disaster continued to reveal itself, the Harvard University economist Edward Glaeser asked: "Should [the] government rebuild New Orleans?" This uneasy question was echoed by many observers who questioned whether the city should be rebuilt at all given its vulnerable location, subsiding terrain, declining population, and relative poverty. Others, however, including the city’s residents hoped that New Orleans could be built back better than before. The argument however, quickly shifted to a question of how best to rebuild, as residents and business owners, relying on savings, insurance money, and other resources, returned to the city and began to rebuild. The disparate opinions, priorities, and agendas of various stakeholders in the city’s response to the event shaped the post-disaster landscape and the city’s recovery. Within the context of the post-disaster landscape, the role of historic preservation in the protection of cultural resources and the rebuilding of a sense of place responds to, and is defined by, the authority of disaster management and the prioritized needs of a community's long-term recovery. In recollection of Hurricane Katrina’s impact on New Orleans’s historic built environment, University of Pennsylvania Professor Frank Matero stressed:

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2 Edward L. Glaeser, "Should the Government Rebuild New Orleans, Or Just Give Residents Checks?," The Economists' Voice 2, no. 4 (2005), http://are.berkeley.edu/~ligon/Teaching/EEP100/glaeser05.pdf.
4 Ibid.
“If there ever was a moment when conservation of the built environment had something to contribute to the current state of social and political strife, economic recession, and environmental destruction, it is now. On the surface, conservation is concerned with the protection of cultural heritage from loss and damage so that existing built works and places deemed significant and valuable can continue to inspire, to admonish, or simply to provide continuity from the past to the present. We advocate for preservation because objects and places hold important information, associations, and meanings; because they embody social and cultural memory that, if lost, would make the world a less rich place in which to live and visit.”

The disaster itself has necessitated an understanding of the city's urban growth and history to appreciate its cultural and architectural resources -- its buildings, streetscapes, and historic landscapes. This thesis seeks to understand the significance of the built environment before the storm, what was lost in the storm’s aftermath, and what new possibilities lie ahead for the city’s recovering cultural landscape. The thesis dissects the city’s recovery efforts immediately following the storm in order to understand the inherent limits and challenges that the city faces in its recovery and reconstruction. The city’s contentious and over-looked history must be addressed, including its immense race and class segregation, the tourism industry, and the consequences of the environmental and infrastructure campaigns needed to maintain the city’s existence and growth.

The Profile of the City

Repopulating the city is widely seen by planners and preservationists as the key to its regeneration and stabilization. Yet, this requires reversing the city’s pre-storm demographic trends, including a stagnant economy, more than a quarter of the population living in poverty, and a staggeringly high rate of unemployment. New Orleans’s population has been shrinking since its peak in 1960, a challenge similar to the one found in many cities across the United States. The steady decline has strained city services, reduced funding for infrastructure, and left thousands of excess homes, commercial, and institutional buildings abandoned.

According to the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center’s (GNOCDC) study that compared United States Census data for the years 2000 and 2010 shows an almost 30 percent decline in the city’s total population, and estimates a 25 percent decline in the five years following Hurricane Katrina. The city’s 2000 population was comprised of a majority African American population with 67 percent, compared to the 27 percent white population. By 2010, the census results suggest that African Americans were the least likely to return after Katrina (with a 37 percent decline in African American population), followed by the white population (showing a 19 percent decline), while the city experienced an influx of Hispanics following Katrina (a 20 percent increase over the ten year period). Nonetheless, African Americans still represent the majority of the city's population at 60 percent, compared to the state’s 32 percent, and the nation’s 12 percent.

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8 Allison Plyer, "Population Loss and Vacant Housing in New Orleans Neighborhoods," (New Orleans: Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2011). These percentages were calculated from the 2000 total population equaling 484,674, with the 2010 population reduced by 140,845 persons, to 343,829. The Census Bureau estimates that the city lost nearly 30,000 residents in the five years immediately preceding Hurricane Katrina, suggesting that the net loss after the storm was about 110,000 people. The study found that the 2010 population was roughly the same as it was 100 years previously according to the 1910 census. In this time, the city’s physical footprint and built environment overlay have expanded significantly since 1910, particularly in the development of the latter half of the twentieth century.
The 2010 Census counted 189,896 housing units in New Orleans, down from 25,195 in 2000. This 12 percent decline largely reflects the damage wrought by Hurricane Katrina and the widespread demolition that has taken place in the city since. The GNODC notes that the Census Bureau requires that a residential building not be open to the elements – residential buildings needed to have a roof, windows, and doors for protection -- therefore some of the most severely blighted homes in New Orleans may not have been included in this count.\textsuperscript{10} While New Orleans now has fewer housing units, there are more vacant homes among those that remain. In 2010 one in four housing units were counted as vacant, significantly higher than the 12 percent found across the city in 2000. New Orleans’s housing stock is relatively old with 45 percent of all housing units being built before 1950, compared with only 21 percent across the country. The vast majority of the residential units are comprised of single-family units with some two-family units, and many consist of wood frame one and two story dwellings.\textsuperscript{11} The combination of population and housing statistics is commonly used as an indicator of blight across the city. They depict a severe challenge for the ongoing rebuilding and recovery efforts.

\textsuperscript{10} Plyer, "Population Loss and Vacant Housing in New Orleans Neighborhoods."
\textsuperscript{11} Schrayer, "New Orleans Affordable Housing Assessment: Lessons Learned a Report on the Responses to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma and their Effects on the State of Housing." It is important to remember that there are often multiple units per structure in New Orleans, for example double shotgun houses.
The Profile of the City: Racial Composition, 2000

Legend:
Proportion of Total Population Black or African American by Census Tract

- Less than 21%
- 22% - 47%
- 48% - 68%
- 69% - 87%
- 88% or more
- Case Studies
- Green Space
- Water

City average 67%

The Profile of the City: Racial Composition, 2010

Legend:
Proportion of Total Population Black or African American by Census Tract

- Less than 23%
- 24% - 53%
- 54% - 75%
- 76% - 89%
- 90% or more
- Case Studies
- Green Space
- Water

City average 60%
Over 50 percent of the total housing units in New Orleans are rent-occupied. In both 2000 and 2010, the city had a significantly higher proportion than Louisiana, 32-33 percent, and the country, 34-35 percent. Furthermore, in New Orleans, the owner-occupied statistics can often represent the generational aspect of housing in the city. One generation would commonly leave a mortgage-free home to later generations. In New Orleans, high generational homeownership is commonly attributed to inadequate homeowner flood and hurricane insurance - as insurance is only regulated at a sale transfer of a property – leading to compound problems following Hurricane Katrina.\(^\text{12}\)

It is the practice of preservation working within this socio-economic landscape in the aftermath of the storm that will be analyzed according to its impact to specific neighborhoods and their particular sense of place. Chapter One, provides a context for the discussion by examining the pre-disaster landscape of New Orleans; the development of the city’s built environment, the resulting physical character, and the achievements in historic preservation that have acted to protect the physical fabric. Chapter Two looks more closely at three historic neighborhoods in the city -- Holy Cross, Tremé, and Broadmoor – to understand the particular challenges faced by historic preservation in the post-disaster landscape. Chapter Three relates the key challenges of the neighborhood’s post-disaster recovery to the intersections with historic preservation and describes the opportunities for preservation that have been created in the post-disaster landscape.

The Profile of the City: Vacant Housing Units, 2000

Legend:
Proportion of Total Housing Units Vacant by Census Tract

- Less than 8%
- 9% - 14%
- 15% - 21%
- 22% - 33%
- 34% or more

Case Studies
Green Space
Water

City average 12%

The Profile of the City: Vacant Housing Units, 2010

Legend:
Proportion of Total Housing Units Vacant by Census Tract

- Less than 16%
- 17% - 27%
- 28% - 37%
- 38% - 60%
- 61% or more

Case Studies
Green Space
Water

City average 25%
The Profile of the City: Renter Occupied Housing Units, 2000

Legend:
Proportion of Total Housing Units Renter Occupied by Census Tract

- Less than 24%
- 25% - 47%
- 48% - 65%
- 66% - 82%
- 83% or more
- Case Studies
- Green Space
- Water

City average 54%

The Profile of the City: Renter Occupied Housing Units, 2010

Legend:
Proportion of Total Housing Units Renter Occupied by Census Tract

- Less than 25%
- 26% - 45%
- 46% - 58%
- 59% - 75%
- 76% or more
- Case Studies
- Green Space
- Water

City average 52%
1. THE PRE-DISASTER LANDSCAPE

The built environment in New Orleans is celebrated as the sum of its parts. Its value derives from its multifaceted cultural landscape, collected within the boundaries of the city's diverse neighborhoods. Each neighborhood is defined by the expression of its character, visible in the physical built environment, and its soul, apparent in its residents and their cultural heritage. While this may be true of neighborhoods in general, in New Orleans there is the understanding that buildings, like people, if they are to meaningfully survive, must do so within the total context of their community. It is from this mutual relationship between a neighborhoods' character and soul that provides its ultimate meaning. These complex and multifaceted relationships were rendered most at threat following the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina.

In order to be effective in the recovery, the field of historic preservation must wade through the city's contested history to understand the complex layers of challenges, vulnerabilities, and resilience that existed in the city well before the disaster. Not only to attempt to make sense of the tragic aftermath of the hurricane, but with the intention of realizing the potential for the city's rehabilitation and redevelopment.

NEW ORLEANS: THE SHAPE OF THE CITY

The Historic Development of the City

The site of New Orleans was chosen at the tightest curl of the Mississippi River, whose ninety-degree curve to the south created a wide and elevated natural levee sloping north. As an existing Native American portage, it was a strategic but narrow strip of land between the river, and Bayou St. John, which connected the River to Lake Pontchartrain. Founded in 1718 for France by Jean-Baptiste Le Monye, Sieur de Bienville, the original French military camp plan remains in the preserved footprint of the Vieux Carré.\(^\text{15}\) Laid out for its strategic defensive position, the site attracted the Spanish, who governed the growing city between 1763 and 1803. Following the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, the city rapidly grew with the influx of Americans and European immigrants moving west, to expand beyond the boundaries of the original city.\(^\text{16}\) The city spread along the natural levees, denoting the deposits of high ground, formed by the river and Bayou systems. Cultural tension between the Creole's and the incoming Americans promoted development across Canal Street from the Vieux Carré, establishing industry in the Warehouse district and residential enclaves along St. Charles Avenue.\(^\text{17}\) The city's expansion was initially limited by the amount of high ground, and the city's earliest residents, regardless of class or race lived in close proximity. The earliest plantations that had stretched from a narrow river frontage, north towards Lake Pontchartrain were gradually subdivided into the new urban faubourgs (neighborhoods) whose boundaries created the major radial avenues of the city.\(^\text{18}\)

As a result of the growing population, development was pushed into the areas of low-lying swamp land. Habitation of these areas was subsequently made possible by modern technologies, including the complex system of underground and above ground canals and levees, developed to combat the below-sea-level geometry of the enlarged city. Flooding still remained a real threat in


\(^{16}\) Ibid.

\(^{17}\) To this day, median strips along city streets remain known as neutral ground in reference to the open hostility between the original French settlers and the influx of Americans.

Map of historical development of the city denoted by buildings constructed before 1950
The city’s development bandwidths can be seen with the earlies developed land adjacent to the natural high land of the Mississippi River and Esplanade Ridge.
The Profile of the City: Median Household Income, 2000

Legend:
Median Household Income by Census Tract

- $79,626 and above
- $43,259 - 79,625
- $27,527 - $43,258
- $15,805 - $27,526
- $15,804 and under

Case Studies
Green Space
Water

City median $27,133

The Profile of the City: Median House Value, 2000

Legend:
Median House Value by Census Tract

- $162,601 or more
- $99,401 - 162,600
- $77,401 - 99,400
- $65,701 - 77,400
- $56,201 - $65,700
- less than $56,200

Case Studies
Green Space
Water
these areas, and accordingly the highest land values have historically been largely attributed to the highest ground. High ground has been at a premium since the city's founding, and as a result, the development patterns in New Orleans largely follow class and race divisions. The flooding of 80 percent of the city revealed that the poorest residents had lived for generations in many of the lowest lying neighborhoods. The social and racial hierarchies subsequently determined the distribution of building types and styles across the city’s neighborhoods.

A Multicultural City

The city's historic location, surrounded by swamps, linked the river to the bayou and lake systems that provided a convenient route to the Gulf of Mexico. The mercantile empires of France, Spain, England, and the United States constructed the city as a base for expanding their access into the resource-rich interior of the country. The city rapidly became a trans-shipment hub for the sugar economy of the Caribbean, the cotton economy of the southern United States, the grain economy of the Midwestern United States, and the petroleum economy of the Gulf of Mexico. As a hub amid these long distance routes, New Orleans's historic neighborhoods housed a true multicultural population. The city’s residential vernacular architecture was established as a synthesis of the influences derived from its European, Caribbean, and North American prototypes. For example, the ubiquitous New Orleans shotgun house attributes its origins to the vernacular house designs from the Caribbean, Haiti, and West Africa. These influences have been transformed by local adaptations, and are valued for their regional differentiation. Virtually all other collections along the Gulf Coast comprise plain humble structures with little or no architectural treatment. Whereas the shotgun house type found in New Orleans are adorned with a high degree of architectural styling. The shotgun house type

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22 Phil Steinberg and Rob Shields, eds., *What is a City? Rethinking the Urban After Hurricane Katrina* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2008), 10.
The New Orleans Shotgun house attributes its origins to the vernacular house designs from the Caribbean, Haiti, and West Africa. The shotgun house type optimizes in its architecture the relationships between structure, construction economy, and the configuration of social space, light and ventilation and symbolic representation. This pair shows a shotgun double on the left, with a standard single shotgun on the left. Treme Historic District, January 2012. Image, author.
optimizes in its architecture the relationships between structure, construction economy, and the configuration of social space, light and ventilation and symbolic representation.\textsuperscript{24}

More than any other city in the United States, New Orleans derives its significance through the assimilation of people, culture and the built environment. And this assimilation is celebrated in the city, and attracts tourists. Randall Mason makes a case for promoting cultural preservation in the post-disaster landscape, by defining the variety of New Orleans culture as being as essential in its immaterial phenomena of knowledge, habits and traditions as in its material expression:

"The cultural values of New Orleans include the celebrated cuisine, music, literature, and celebrated events… that fuse Old and New Worlds, North and South Americas, Latin and Protestant worlds and gregariously mix races and identities… New Orleans's cultural values bridge historic and contemporary periods; they relate to the built environment as well as the more immaterial, ephemeral expressions of culture."\textsuperscript{25}

However, it is important to acknowledge the particular characteristics of New Orleans's culture that is more typical of American cities in general - its racism, devastating tolerance for inner-city poverty, and ignorance of environmental planning.\textsuperscript{26} The city's cultural values frame an understanding of place, where the city's neighborhoods are defined through the intersections of history, topography, race, class, aesthetic tastes, jazz, and today, the height of the high watermark denoting Katrina’s flood levels.

**The Built Environment**

New Orleans' built environment is made up of an abundance of historic architecture resulting in the celebrated diversity of architectural styles, types, shapes, sizes, and details that are evident throughout the city’s historic neighborhoods. The city’s unique architectural inventory includes the New Orleans raised basement, shotgun, camelback, Creole cottage, and the Creole


\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 262-65.
townhouse. The range of styles includes, Creole, Federal, Greek Revival, Italianate, Queen Anne, Colonial Revival, Arts and Crafts, and a mix of eclectic and exotic styles; Egyptian Revival, West Indian, and Regional Modernism. These styles provide the evidence of New Orleans's natural growth over time. It is the repetition and variation of house type, block after block, street after street that fosters a sense of identity and community within the city’s neighborhoods.

The city's planning department commissioned the architecture and planning firm of Curtis and Davis to compile their New Orleans Housing and Neighborhood Preservation Study in 1973 which identified and delineated sixty-two official city neighborhoods that were based on historical perceptions, natural geographical barriers and major transportation arteries, social and economic patterns, and census tract boundaries. New Orleans geographer, Richard Campanella, recalls how the effort altered the city’s perceptions of “place, space and nomenclature in the city.”

New Orleans’s Neighborhoods

Stephen Verderber defines the New Orleans architectural development by collecting the city’s neighborhoods into bandwidths. The first band consists of the so-called Sliver-by-the-River neighborhoods whose development follows the narrow high ground of the River's edge both downriver and upriver from the Vieux Carré: Faubourg Marigny, Bywater, Holy Cross, the Warehouse District, Central Business District, Lower Garden District, Irish Channel, and the river side of the Uptown and Carrollton neighborhoods. These neighborhoods constitute the spine of the city's historic neighborhoods and each articulates its own particular architectural identity. The typical tourist images depict the Vieux Carré through cast-iron balconies, and

28 Curtis and Davis Architects and Planners, New Orleans Housing and Neighborhood Preservation Study (New Orleans: City of New Orleans Administration with the Mayor's Housing and Neighborhood Preservation Study Advisory Committee, 1974).
31 Ibid.
New Orleans Neighborhoods

0. St. Bernard
1. Tulane/Gravier
2. Midcity
3. Gentilly Woods
4. Gentilly Terrace
5. Dillard
6. Pontchartrain Park
7. Milneburg
8. St. Anthony
9. Filmore
10. Lake Terrace / Lake Oaks
11. Lakeview
12. Lakewood
13. Lakewood
14. Parkview
15. City Park
16. Lakeshore
17. Lakeshore
18. READ Boulevard West A
19. Plum Orchard
20. READ Boulevard West B
21. Florida
22. Bywater
23. St. Claude
24. Desire Projects
25. Florida Projects
27. Irish Channel
28. East Riverside
29. St. Thomas Project
30. Warehouse District
31. River Park
32. Brechtel
33. Aurora
34. Behrmann
35. Algiers Naval Station
36. Algiers-Fischer
37. Algiers Whitney
38. McDonogh
39. Algiers Point
40. Village de L’Est
41. Venetia Island
42. Edgelake
43. READ Boulevard East
44. Pines Village
45. Lower Ninth Ward
46. Holy Cross
47. Marigny
48. Vieux Carre
49. Central Business District
50. West Riverside
51. Calliope
52. Gerttown / Zion City
53. Central City
54. Garden District
55. Touro
56. Milan
57. Uptown
58. Feret
59. Broadmoor
60. Fountainbleau
61. Audubon / University
62. Holygrove
63. East Carrollton
64. Black Pearl
65. Leonidas / West Carrollton
66. Desire
67. St. Roch
68. Iberville Project
69. Seventh Ward
70. Treme / Lafitte
71. Bayou St. John
72. Fairgrounds
73. Lower Garden District
the Garden District in its juxtaposition of its highly styled great mansions and more modest homes straddling St. Charles Avenue.

The Creole cottages and ornamented shotgun houses comprise the city's historic working neighborhoods. These vernacular neighborhoods include the heritage of everyday life and appear more characteristic of the city's built environment through their colorful shutters, wooden weatherboards, and the decorative eaves overhanging modest porches. The second bandwidth of urban neighborhoods was originally subdivided in the nineteenth century from the historic plantations on the edge of the historic swamp-lands. This band includes, Tremé, immediately behind the Vieux Carré, Esplanade Ridge, Bayou St. John, and New Marigny.

The next band of development was made possible by the infrastructure advancements that enabled the expansion of the city into the low lying swamps. These neighborhoods express a gradual growth pattern in their eclectic range of early twentieth century architectural styles. They are particularly characterized by the high proportion of raised basement houses that respond to the neighborhood’s low-lying geography. This band comprises Uptown, Central City, Mid-City, Broadmoor, and the Upper Carrollton neighborhoods.

The city's final bandwidth constitutes the twentieth century neighborhoods situated further to the north toward Lake Pontchartrain that resulted from the urban flight following the development of the city's transportation infrastructure and include Orleans East; Gentilly Terrace; and Ponchartrain Park, the first suburban development constructed for segregated African Americans. The ability to develop beyond the newly constructed levee and floodwall systems resulted in a sense of security that allowed developers to build foundation slabs directly on the newly drained ground. These neighborhoods are largely characterized by low-slung mid-century ranch houses that exploited twentieth construction technologies, and the comforts of air conditioning.
The Vieux Carre and its subsequent expansion uptown and downtown constitute the spine of the city’s historic neighborhoods and each articulates its own particular architectural identity. The typical tourist images depict the Vieux Carré through cast-iron balconies. Vieux Carre, January 2012. Image, author.
The stability and longevity of New Orleans's neighborhood boundaries have fostered an association between geography and social, economic, and political status. They are stitched together through the historical pattern of wide boulevards, oak-lined avenues, and intimate residential streets. The city's prevalent vegetation encloses, covers, defines, veils, and shades space in New Orleans which creates a unified sense of scale to a place celebrated for its distinctive architectural shapes and forms. Consequently, in New Orleans, the historic built environment is celebrated not only for its great individual buildings, but even more so, as a place that derives its value from the harmonious ensemble of the collection.

Initially considered in the Vieux Carré, the *tout ensemble* defines the assemblage of parts considered as forming the whole, with its value in the total impression or effect. A unique concept to New Orleans, the consideration of the *tout ensemble* was included in the New Orleans Historic Preservation ordinance to express: "the assemblage of parts or details, as in a work of art, considered as forming a whole; the overall unity of the district." The physical and functional components of the *tout ensemble* contribute a visual quality and include: buildings, street furniture, street facades, levees, embankments, open spaces, landscape features, as well as landmarks and other points of visual dominance, viewpoints and vistas. The ensemble also references physical elements in the environment that evoke mental associations, and may not necessarily have historic significance.

In more recent preservation discourse, the *tout ensemble* can be understood as defining the notion of the city as a cultural landscape. In New Orleans this landscape is shaped by the cultural practices executed within and around the collection's built components that engage every sense through music, art, food, faith, celebrations, and the strong sense of neighborhood. The collective

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35 "Glossary."
approach of the *tout ensemble* in New Orleans is significant in that it simultaneously values the connections between elements of the built environment, and also recognizes the relationship between the continuity and evolution of human interactions.
In light of the city's extraordinary wealth of architectural heritage, New Orleans has established a multilayered and comprehensive framework to encourage the protection of the city's historic resources. The complexity of New Orleans's preservation frameworks renders the city an outlier in the United States. The city includes the mandates of three separate local government Historic Landmark Commissions, with their own jurisdictions and regulatory functions. Local preservation laws generally exist to govern private actions affecting historic resources, yet an area's preservation program needs to be reinforced by a correlation between historic preservation at the local, state, and national levels. The particularly rich architectural heritage of the city has supported the large number of National Register Historic District nominations in the city, contributing an additional layer of preservation legislation.

**Early Efforts: The Vieux Carré Commission**

New Orleans was one of the first cities in the United States to formalize historic preservation regulation in legislation. Locally, concern for the city’s historical and architectural heritage began in the 1920s in reaction to proposed demolitions and the impoverished conditions in the Vieux Carré – the so-called French Quarter - following the Civil War and Reconstruction. It was the efforts of a small group of resident Italian immigrant workers who initially recognized and advocated for the uniqueness of the Quarter. In 1925, New Orleans was the first city to pass an ordinance to create a historic district. An amendment to the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 reestablished the Vieux Carré Commission (VCC) in 1936.\(^{37}\) The authority of the VCC is derived from the Louisiana Constitution and the 1995 Code of the City of New Orleans, and the VCC maintains jurisdiction over only the French Quarter today.

The Catalyst for Preservation

The Post War years of the mid-twentieth century saw the same threats to the city's historic fabric as seen throughout the nation. The economic boom years saw the impact of federal policy decisions in the 1940s and 1950s which begin to negate the successful preservation outcomes in the historic core. Buildings in many peripheral historic neighborhoods were demolished for public housing and federal transportation expressway projects. The horrors of urban renewal became a catalyst for the national preservation movement’s rapid growth and it resulted in an emerging awareness of the value of historic preservation. Exacerbated by “white flight” to the suburbs, as well as the federal policies promoting the suburban living, the city faced a dramatic decline in population; most significantly that of the urban middle class that had generated jobs and tax revenues in the inner city. The population decline accelerated the city’s transformation to a place of blighted main streets, bleak neighborhoods with vacant lots and crumbling buildings, crime, poor city services, and racial polarization. It became clear by the early 1960s that the city's architectural heritage was being eroded through various threats -- from abandonment and blight to, demolition to, careless alteration to, unsympathetic additions and new construction.

In 1969, largely in reaction to this erosion, the friends of the Cabildo (a site whose threatened demolition in 1936 heightened the early efforts for the protection of the Vieux Carré) undertook to record and enlighten the city of the importance of its diverse architecture to its history. The first volume was released in 1971 and documented the Lower Garden District. The subsequent volumes were published from the completed surveys of the American Sector (1973), New

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40 Ibid. In the post war years, entire squares of remaining nineteenth-century buildings in the city's business district were demolished for surface parking, valuably preserved today for RV tailgating lots in close proximity to the city’s Superdome sports arena. This "mid-century issue“ is particularly salient today following the demolition of approximately 27 blocks of the largely residential Mid-Town Historic District for the new state LSU and VA hospital campus designs, particularly the wealth of surface car parking. The scope of this thesis does not allow an in depth examination of the Mid-town Historic District battle and its affiliated Charity Hospital saga but it is imperative to realize the urban renewal projects still accountable for demolition of historically significant resources today.
Orleans Cemeteries (1974), the Creole Faubourgs (1975), Esplanade Ridge (1977), and Faubourg Tremé and the Bayou Road, also in 1977.

The formalization of the preservation movement in the United States, by the passage of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) in 1966 worked towards slowing future damage to culturally significant resources; however it did little to address the ongoing decline caused by the previous damage. The preservation movement in New Orleans was strengthened by the defeat of major proposed transportation projects of the late 1960s and early 1970s. And, the local nonprofit, Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans (PRCNO) was founded in 1974, which helped to foster the preservation philosophy in the city that through advocacy and programming has played a significant role in shaping the city’s historic urban landscape. The urban geographer, Richard Campanella emphasizes that the group inserted a “livable city” philosophy into city discourse, and became the most influential group advocating for the adaptive reuse of historic structures and the improvement of historic neighborhoods.

Local Preservation Frameworks

In 1976, a decade after the 1966 Historic Preservation Act, the city enacted a more general statute applicable to the entire municipality. The New Orleans city's landmarks ordinance was adopted by the City Council under Chapter 84 of the Municipal Code of Ordinances; Historic Preservation, Historic District and Landmarks, resulting in the creation of the City of New Orleans Historic Preservation Landmarks Commission (HDLC). Two years later, the city established the Central Business Historic Landmarks Commission with jurisdiction over four commercially significant districts defined within the boundaries of the city's central working...

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43 Informally known as the "Second Battle for New Orleans" the Vieux Carré Commission and residents, led by Bill Borah as leading advocate, were successful in lobbying against urban renewal mogul Robert Moses and his plans for an elevated riverside expressway running the length of the Vieux Carré's river edge.
44 Campanella, Bienville's Dilemma: A Historical Geography of New Orleans: 57.
45 The City of New Orleans, in Ordinance No. 3992: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)).
The Central Business District Commission is staffed by the HDLC, but remains a separate commission.

The City of New Orleans, coterminous with the Parish of Orleans, is consolidated as a city-parish government, which is centralized in the city council and mayor's office. The New Orleans City Council is the legislative branch of the city government, which considers and enacts all local laws that govern the City of New Orleans. As is the case in many states, the Louisiana constitution grants every city and parish the "police power" which enables local governments to act to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. It has been established that land use regulations, including historic preservation ordinances are authorized under the public welfare element of the police power, and that historic preservation is a valid public purpose qualifying government actions over private property. Furthermore, the Louisiana Government Code specifically authorizes local governments to acquire and protect historic resources.

The New Orleans Historic Preservation statute allowed for the formation of the New Orleans Historic District Landmarks Commission (HDLC), the regulation of contributing properties in historic districts, and provisions for the enforcement of its terms. The historic preservation departments in New Orleans are detached from other land use agencies such as the City Planning Commission, and the city’s historic preservation powers fall under the mandate of the City Council and the Mayor’s veto powers. This means that it is left to individuals within the city’s

46 in Ordinance No. 6699: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans 1978 (Revised 1981)).
49 Ibid.
50 The Division of Historic Preservation is included in the Louisiana State Department of Culture, Recreation, and Tourism, directly under the lieutenant governor and civil service.
51 The City of New Orleans.
52 "Section XIV: Appeals," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans 1980 (Revised 1981)). Any person or persons aggrieved by any decision, act, or proceeding of the Commission shall have a right to apply in writing to the City Council for reversal or modification thereof; and the President of the City Council shall have the right to stay all further action until the City Council can affirm a decision of the Commission by majority vote of all its members. Any such appeal shall be taken within ten (10) days from the date of decision; and the City Council has the right to reverse, change, or modify any decision of the Commission only by a majority vote of all its members.
administration offices to support and advocate for a strong preservation ethos within the city’s policy and planning agendas.

Prior to the storm, the HDLC maintained jurisdiction over thirteen additional local historic districts. New Orleans's ordinance, functions in a similar format to many local historic preservation ordinances and includes key components integral to a local preservation ordinance. Section I of the city's ordinance establishes the statement of purpose, to:

"Promote historic districts and landmarks for the educational, cultural, economic and general welfare of the public through the preservation, protection, and regulation of buildings, sites, monuments, structures, and areas of historic interest or importance within the City of New Orleans; to safeguard the heritage of the City by preserving and regulating historic landmarks and districts which reflect elements of its cultural, social, economic, political and architectural history; to preserve and enhance the environmental quality of neighborhoods; to strengthen the City's economic base by the stimulation of the tourist industry; to establish and improve property values; to foster economic development; and to manage growth."  

The ordinance established the city’s authority to identify, designate, and protect landmarks from inappropriate alterations, construction, or demolition. Section II mandates the fifteen-member New Orleans HDLC for the purpose of regulating historic districts and historic landmarks designated within the city. There are few requirements for the appointment of the HDLC; each historic district in the city must be represented by at least one of its residents or property owners, which differs from many other local historic preservation ordinances. The ordinance defines the criteria and procedures for the designation of individual landmarks, districts, and community districts. Subsequently, the ordinance states the actions reviewable by the Commission, the legal

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53 "Section I," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)).
54 "Section II: New Orleans Historic District Landmarks Commission," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)). Many local historic preservation ordinances include requirements that their review board members have professional backgrounds in planning, architecture, art history, historic preservation, or related fields. The HDLC is appointed by the Mayor, and approved by the city council.
Legend:
Local Historic Districts
0. Esplanade Ridge
1. Treme
2. Vieux Carre [VCC]
3. Faubourg Marigny
4. Bywater
5. Holy Cross
6. Canal Street
7. Picayune Place [CBD]
8. Lafayette Square [CBD]
9. Warehouse District [CBD]
10. Lower Garden District
11. Irish Channel
12. St. Charles Avenue
13. Algiers Point

- Local Historic District
- Green Space
- Water

New Orleans Local Historic Districts
effects of such reviews, and outlines the criteria and procedures established for the review of those actions that significantly affect historic resources (whether individually designated, or recognized as contributing to a local historic district) through an application for a Certificate of Appropriateness.\textsuperscript{55}

The ordinance specifies the criteria that the Commission must take into account when issuing Certificates of Appropriateness for three particular cases. For alterations the considerations include, "…compatibility with the surrounding buildings, the original design, the architectural character, and the historical quality of the building."\textsuperscript{56} For new construction, most apparent in new infill design, the criteria includes, "…visual compatibility and harmony with the \textit{tout ensemble} of the neighborhood and quality and excellence of design."\textsuperscript{57} And, finally for consideration of demolition permits, the criteria includes, "...the building's historical or architectural significance, its importance to the \textit{tout ensemble}, its special character and aesthetic interest, difficulty of reproduction, and the future use of the site."\textsuperscript{58} The ordinance also includes detailed Affirmative maintenance requirements and explicit procedures governing circumstances of demolition by neglect.\textsuperscript{59} As historic preservation laws are only as good as the strength of their enforcement, the ordinance also outlines the penalties applicable in aiding the enforcement of objectives and purpose of the ordinance.\textsuperscript{60} The law empowers the local jurisdiction to issue penalties and enforcements for individual violations.

\textsuperscript{55} "Section VII: Certificate of Appropriateness," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)).
\textsuperscript{56} "Section VIII B: Exterior Alterations," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)).
\textsuperscript{57} "Section VIII A: New Construction," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)).
\textsuperscript{58} "Section VIII D: Demolition," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)).
\textsuperscript{59} "Section XII: Demolition by Neglect," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)).
\textsuperscript{60} "Section XIII: Commission Enforcement Powers," in Ordinance No. 5992: Mayor Council Series (New Orleans1980 (Revised 1981)).
Federal Legislative Frameworks

Nearly all neighborhoods developed prior to the early twentieth-century are listed on the National Register of Historic Places. The Vieux Carré and the Garden District have been designated National Historic Landmarks.\textsuperscript{61} Prior to the storm, the city had eighteen historic districts listed on the National Register that were recognized for their architectural and historic significance. The National Register is administered by the National Park Service, who maintains evaluation criteria and guidelines for the treatment of historic properties on behalf of the United States Secretary of the Interior. It is the Louisiana State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) that is responsible for nominating significant buildings, sites, and districts to the National Register. No other city has such a high concentration of landmark districts on the National Register of Historic Places.\textsuperscript{62} Districts are designated to the register according to their quality of significance; possession of integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association; and in meeting one of four evaluation criteria as defined by the Secretary of the Interior.\textsuperscript{63}

However, the level of protection afforded to these areas varies according to their associated preservation legislation, or in their combination of laws. Many of these historic districts are layered over, and expanded the boundaries of, the fourteen locally designated historic districts.\textsuperscript{64} National Register Historic Districts are not protected by any regulatory governmental entity; instead, designated districts come under the protection of the federal government in an advisory

\textsuperscript{61} Gay, "A City that Really Cares [New Orleans]." 20. Signed into law in 1966, the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) is the primary federal law that introduced a federal policy for a national preservation program with the goal to ensure that federal agencies act as responsible stewards of the United States cultural and historic resources.


\textsuperscript{63} The Secretary of the Interior National Register criteria for evaluation: A. that are associated with events that have made significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history; or B. that are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past; or C. that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction; or D. that have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in prehistory or history.

\textsuperscript{64} It should be noted here, that following the storm, the HDLC designated the Garden District (separate than the Lower Garden District) to the local register, with partial regulatory powers; an area that had already been under National Register jurisdiction since 1974.
Legend:
Local Historic Districts
0. Esplanade Ridge
1. Vieux Carre
2. Faubourg Marigny
3. New Marigny
4. Bywater
5. Holy Cross
6. Upper CBD
7. Lower CBD
8. Algiers Point
9. Midcity
10. Lower Garden District
11. Irish Channel
12. Garden District
13. Central City
14. Uptown
15. Broadmoor
16. Carrollton
17. South Lakeview
18. Gentilly Terrace

New Orleans National Register Historic Districts
Preserving New Orleans: Historic Districts

Legend:
New Orleans Historic District Designations

- Red: Local Historic District
- Orange: National Register Historic District
- Green: Green Space
- Blue: Water

Preserving New Orleans: Areas only designated to the National Register
manner only. The NHPA encouraged the protection of the nation's resources by establishing in Section 106, the regulatory heart of the law that requires federal agencies to consider the effects of federally licensed, assisted, regulated, or funded activities on historic properties listed, or eligible for listing in the National Register.65 Listing on the National Register contributes to preserving historic properties in a number of ways. It provides recognition that a property is of significance to the nation, the state, or the local community; consideration in the planning for federal or federally assisted projects and, qualification for federal assistance for historic preservation when funds are made available. Importantly however, listing of private property on the National Register does not prohibit under federal law any actions which may otherwise be taken by the property owner with respect to the property.66

65 Julia H. Miller, A Layperson's Guide to Historic Preservation Law: A Survey of Federal, State, and Local Laws Governing Historic Resource Protection (Washington D.C.: National Trust for Historic Preservation). 4. In Louisiana the SHPO is administered by the Division of Historic Preservation, which is part of the Office of Cultural Development, Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism. Historic Preservation became an official part of the state government when the office was formed in 1971; David W. Morgan, Nancy I. M. Morgan, and Brenda Barrett, "Finding a Place for the Commonplace: Hurricane Katrina, Communities, and Preservation Law," American Anthropologist 108, no. 4 (2006): 708. The basic premise of the NHPA and its regulations is that the government should not use public funds to damage or destroy places significant to U.S. heritage, unless they have considered the matter in consultation with those affected by their actions and decided the impact is in the public’s best interest. Its importance stems from the fact that only those properties on the National Register or dubbed eligible for listing receive consideration in advance of any kind of federal action.

HURRICANE KATRINA: THE IMPACT ON THE LANDSCAPE

On the morning of August 29, 2005, after the majority of the city had weathered the storm, the predicted windy-disaster of Hurricane Katarina was turned into a catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. New Orleans flooded as a result of the rising storm surge, allowing a deluge of toxic floodwater to engulf approximately 80 percent of the city leaving particular neighborhoods flooded to depths over twenty feet, where water stood for up to 6 weeks. The unprecedented surge levels - directed by the system of canals - funneled the high velocity of storm water into areas that would eventually breach the levee system and worn floodwalls. Most of the streets were inundated and more than 100,000 residential structures were flooded. Of those structures, more than 78,000 were severely damaged or completely destroyed. The severity of the flooding was dictated according to a neighborhood's location. In some areas, more than one disaster unfolded over the event, ensuring that the scale of the impact was highly dependent on the particular location and typography of the area. In the eastern region of the city, including the Lower Ninth Ward, the extensive flooding was caused primarily by the storm surges from Lake Borgne funneled inwards towards the city by the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR-GO) and the Industrial Canal. In the central city, most of the flooding was caused by the failures to the floodwalls in three drainage canals leading to Lake Pontchartrain. Across the city, water continued to pour into the city for three days until the flood levels began to equalize with the surrounding lake levels. In New Orleans the circumstances were of such magnitude that state and local governments could not effectively handle the response, requiring federal intervention through the presidential-declaration of a National State of Emergency.

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71 Ibid.
Flooding in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina with Historic Districts
The Immediate Response
The human cost of the tragedy has been difficult to confirm in numbers, and even more difficult to fathom as narratives of the storm and more shockingly its aftermath, continue to reverberate. As the floodwaters stagnated the city, the media worldwide was captivated by the overwhelmed city and its suffering. The earliest accounts of the storm were defined by the suffering of residents displaced by the mass evacuation and dispersal inland, or as a result of those thousands of residents who could not abide by the mandatory evacuation order and remained trapped on rooftops, or seeking shelter at the City’s poorly-prepared Superdome and Convention Center. Confused and delayed federal response exacerbated the effect of inadequate disaster response planning at both the state and local levels. The shocking physical and social disintegration of New Orleans finally unveiled for the global media the historical struggle within the city, clearly identifying unrepresented groups and the failure of the government to confront their suffering. The media highlighted how the hurricane devastated the built environment, and how that impact, in turn, radically affected people’s lives, livelihoods, and communities. The disaster became a political crisis as international and national attention was focused on the issues of class, race, and poverty that were delineated by the historical development patterns and were strongly defined by the socio-political boundaries of the city’s urban neighborhoods.

The most incomprehensible realization following the storm was that the flooding of New Orleans was not a natural disaster. The disaster was years in the making. And, while ignited by the natural weather event, it has since been attributed to the poor infrastructure, questionable environmental planning, political incompetence, and faulty engineering. New Orleans is a place

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72 Simon Stow, "Do You Know What it Means to Miss New Orleans? George Bush, the Jazz Funeral, and the Politics of Memory," Theory and Event 11, no. 1 (2008): 14. President Bush admitted in his speech following the catastrophe in September 2005: “there’s also some deep, persistent poverty in this region, as well. That poverty has its roots in a history of racial discrimination, which cut off generations from the opportunity of America. We have a duty to confront this poverty with bold action.” These words would come to haunt President Bush, and continue to frustrate residents as little bold action manifested itself following the storm.

73 Steinberg and Shields, What is a City? Rethinking the Urban After Hurricane Katrina, 22. Stow, "Do You Know What it Means to Miss New Orleans? George Bush, the Jazz Funeral, and the Politics of Memory," 15. The media representation of the disaster stood in contrast to the government’s insistence that nature not politics was the cause of the problems, with the President declaring: “In the aftermath, we have seen fellow citizens left stunned and uprooted, searching for loved ones, and grieving for the dead.
Map of historical development of the city denoted by buildings constructed before 1950 with Historic Districts

Legend:
Proportion of Buildings Constructed Before 1950 by Census Tract
- Less than 15%
- 15% - 34%
- 35% - 50%
- 51% - 66%
- 67% - 80%
- 80% or more

Local Historic District
National Register Historic District
Green Space
Water
that exists between natural hazards and infrastructural vulnerability, with a history that has been at the mercy of catastrophic natural-disasters. At Katrina's landfall, an estimated 437,186 citizens lived in the city, half located below sea level.\textsuperscript{74} Disasters have long been a difficult reality throughout the United States and consequently the country has a challenging past of attempting to manage, mitigate and prepare for natural-disaster events. The financial burden identified in places under constant threat and undergoing repetitive damage through natural disasters has had implications on national policy, and lends more weight to Edward Glaeser's question – whether to rebuild the city, or not.

\textbf{The Effect on the Built Environment}

Historical evidence could have easily predicted that the most historic areas of the city were naturally protected from the aftermath's flooding due to their natural elevation. Regional construction technologies (buildings elevated on piers) that had been adapted to the local conditions allowed some of the historic back-of-town neighborhoods to escape some of the worst of the flooding. Approximately 20 percent of the buildings in New Orleans are included within the boundaries of National Register historic districts. Of this 20 percent, almost 80 percent are located in the oldest areas of the city that developed along the ridges of higher land.\textsuperscript{75} The neighborhoods included in the Sliver-by-the-River did not experience severe flooding. In the historic areas that did sustain flooding, the elevated structures ensured that the damage suffered by the historic buildings was largely non-structural.\textsuperscript{76} Of the historic nineteenth century neighborhoods, the Tremé and Holy Cross Historic Districts were impacted the greatest.

\textsuperscript{75} Patricia Gay, "Written Testimony of Patricia H. Gay Executive Director Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans," in \textit{Policy Hearing on Historic Preservation vs. Katrina: What Roles Should Federal, State and Local Governments Play in Preserving Historic Properties} (Washington D.C.: House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Federalism and The Census, 2005). Percentages approximately calculated from, "of the 175,000 - 200,000 buildings in New Orleans, 37,000 buildings are in National Register districts (Approximately 20 percent of buildings). Of these 37,000 buildings, almost 30,000 are in the oldest areas of the city that developed along higher ground."
Lakeview was a neighborhood in the city that had developed beyond the natural boundaries of the city’s elevated land. As a result it sustained heavy flooding and experienced the greatest damage. The destructive potential of flooding became more aggravated by the change in building construction techniques, concurrent with the architectural traditions of the time. Lakeview, October 2005. Image, Matthew Kuhnert.
Although Holy Cross sustained heavy flooding, the designed elevations of the structures ensured that the damage suffered by the historic buildings was largely non-structural. Holy Cross, January 2012. Image, author.
Except for the structures immediately impacted by the levee breaches, the damage sustained was largely similar over the variety of building types in the city, and wind damage was reserved primarily to roofs. It was the neighborhoods that had developed beyond the natural boundaries and limitations of the elevated land that sustained the greatest damage. The destructive potential of flooding became more aggravated by the change in building construction techniques, concurrent with the architectural traditions of the time. Combined with the natural land subsidence, a direct result from the draining practice that accelerated in the twentieth century, the slab-on-grade foundations or limited construction elevations contributed to the magnitude of flood damage in these low-lying areas. Many areas in the city remained underwater for weeks, and some areas were flooded a second time from Hurricane Rita. Damage to infrastructure and public facilities was equally catastrophic. The exposure to the prolonged flooding largely exacerbated interior damage, often with long lasting concealed damage to building envelopes. Additionally, the toxic floodwaters carried bacterial and chemical pollutants into buildings contaminating porous building materials and ruining interior furnishing and finishes.

**Emergency Management**

The federal emergency management before, during, and after the storm in New Orleans has come under scrutiny and has faced intense criticism. An examination of the agencies development reveals an underlying lack of a holistic and flexible approach to disaster management. By Katrina's impact in 2005, FEMA had been consumed under the federal governments new Department of Homeland Security, created in reaction to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City. The balance between local, state, and federal roles in disaster response has changed in the last century, with the second half of the twentieth century seeing dramatic fluctuations in the contribution of the federal government between focused responses to man-made or natural disasters. The multiple layers of laws and regulations

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77 Ibid., 8-6.
confounded the response to Hurricane Katrina, which exposed the disconnect between planning for preparation and response. The widespread evacuation of New Orleans left the city lacking in organization and personnel, and the influx of volunteers from throughout the country played an important role in the recovery of the city. In September 2005, New Orleans began its long, slow process of recovery as the filthy floodwaters were pumped out of the city and electricity was restored - and residents returned to those historic areas of the city, less impacted by the disaster.

Response to Recovery
The extent of the devastation triggered by Hurricane Katrina rendered the city a warzone and in the face of the immediate disaster, the existing preservation frameworks became threatened. Within the context of the humanitarian crisis, the role of historic preservation in the protection of cultural resources and the rebuilding of a sense of place responds to, and is defined by, the authority of disaster management frameworks, the prioritized needs of a community's long-term recovery, and the whims of those in power. However, the built environment is at its greatest risk of violation in the aftermath of a catastrophe. A city's buildings and their respective neighborhoods cannot defend or advocate for themselves from the premeditated, hostile, or covert acts of aggression often plotted against them.

In the classic work on disaster recovery, *Reconstruction Following Disasters*, Haas et al. outline four overlapping periods that a place will navigate following a disaster. First, the “emergency

produced the Disaster Relief Act of 1966, and its amendments in 1969, and 1974, and, the Disaster Assistance Act of 1970. In order to consolidate the fragmented federal disaster management functions, a presidential Executive Order in 1979 established the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Hurricane Hugo in 1989, the Loma Prieta earthquake also in 1989, and Hurricane Andrew in 1992, focused national attention on FEMA. The increasing role of the federal government’s relief efforts generated a series of reviews which enacted the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (The Stafford Act) in 1988. Disaster relief is administered through FEMA according to the guidelines set forth in the Stafford Act and as amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.

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79 Roberts, "FEMA After Katrina".
period,” constitutes the immediate search and rescue campaigns that in New Orleans left commemorative markings on the front elevations of buildings throughout the city’s most devastated neighborhoods. Concurrently, the city was undertaking surveys of the damage sustained in neighborhoods instigating the imminent demolition lists sponsored by FEMA. The second stage, the “restoration period” attempted to reverse the widespread evacuations and dispersal of the city’s residents. A RAND Gulf States Policy Institute study found that a key factor determining how quickly New Orleans could be repopulated was the availability of housing.82 Services, employment, federal funding, and schools will be restored more rapidly as the population rises. In the third stage, the “replacement reconstruction period,” following the impact, institutions recover with the goal to return the city to the level it was prior to the crisis. This stage may have been accelerated if government officials, at all levels, had provided clear and comprehensive information about the city’s progress and the ultimate goals for restoring the essential city services and systems, such as public transportation, levee rehabilitation, public safety, public education, housing and hospitals. The final stage after disaster constitutes the period of improvements to the city, the “commemorative, betterment and developmental reconstruction period.” Redevelopment goals must be coordinated to include the long-term needs of economic, environmental, and social sustainability. According to the authors, each phase takes ten times as long as the stage before it. If the emergency period lasted one month in New Orleans, after which time residents could return to the city, then the restoration period lasted a year. Data provided by the Brookings institute on the Hurricane’s first anniversary recorded a 50 percent return of the pre-storm city population.83 The recovery of the city’s institutional frameworks would then take ten years, and finally, improvements to the city, would not be expected to be completed for 100 years. Haas et al’s recovery trajectory stresses the long-term nature of a city’s recovery.

82 Schrayer, "New Orleans Affordable Housing Assessment: Lessons Learned a Report on the Responses to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma and their Effects on the State of Housing," 27. The RAND Corporation is a national nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making through research and analysis.
In his anticipation of the planning processes for the recovery of New Orleans, environmental planner, Robert Olshansky predicted the possible futures of four distinct yet interrelated cities constituting New Orleans.\textsuperscript{84} The first city is the tourist city, consisting of the waterfront entertainments, Warehouse districts, and the French Quarter, whose rapid recovery was inevitable. The second city is the downtown corporate offices that will survive and recover using its own resources, yet which may end up smaller and less influential than before. The third city consists of neighborhoods housing primarily middle-class homeowners with insurance, as well as neighborhoods that largely escaped flood damage. These owners will take several months to 2 years to obtain funds, hire contractors, and repair or rebuild their homes. These neighborhoods will recover, but they have the potential to be less vibrant places than before. The fourth city consists of those neighborhoods that will stand to lose the most following the disaster. This includes areas occupied by low-income renters and lower-to-middle class homeowners with inadequate insurance. In the long run, Olshansky predicts that, the failure of the fourth city will undermine the future success of the other three.\textsuperscript{85} This assessment of the city’s disparate recovery clearly forces the historic preservation constituency to look beyond the traditional and most historic neighborhoods in New Orleans to instead apply its expertise, knowledge, and energy to those neighborhoods who had less means to recover on their own.


\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
2. THE POST-DISASTER LANDSCAPE

The particular context of each city neighborhood’s recovery greatly defined its intersection with historic preservation – a relationship that in turn redefined the reshaping of the neighborhood following the storm. A neighborhood’s context is defined by its history and geographical location, its architectural significance – as defined through the official reports, its socio-economic characteristics, and its identity within the larger city, as well as the damage sustained during and after Hurricane Katrina. The high number of variables affecting the neighborhood’s recovery is important to recognize as it speaks to the larger issue of attempting to strategically plan across the city.
THE CHANGED LANDSCAPE

After disasters, critical policy choices emerge, forcing unwelcome decisions on local government about whether to rebuild quickly or safely. The city's redevelopment planning processes are important in this discussion as the goals of various processes were to establish the core principles that would help direct future rebuilding efforts. The obscure layering of the city's plans, voices, agendas, and priorities clearly illustrate the city's multiple visions for its future. A disaster is seen by different observers as both tragedy and opportunity. In New Orleans, where so much of the city had been damaged and destroyed, the post-disaster landscape presented to some a blank slate, where a reimagining, and recreation of the city's infrastructure, neighborhoods and housing could take place.\(^{86}\) Countless meetings, symposia, colloquiums and conferences with international, national, and local participation were engaged in thinking and planning for the city's recovery.

New Orleans presented many plans for the future of the city, each of which expressed distinct interests, values, and visions. The stakes were high, and the post-disaster recovery made apparent the tensions between speed and deliberation. Tensions were manifest through the interrelated yet distinct goals that constituted recovery: to enable all residents, even those with the fewest resources to return to the city; to rebuild a "better" New Orleans in order prevent recreating the city's pre-Katrina vulnerabilities and the inequities they represent; and, to provide substantial flood protections, and to restore familiarity to resident's houses, streets, blocks and neighborhoods, all while prioritizing the limited redevelopment resources. With no clear hierarchy or arrangement, the post disaster recovery landscape appeared littered with false starts, ill-fated plans and opaque processes that left residents with little information and confusion.

Planning Schemes

In the two years following Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans had four major citywide recovery planning schemes. In September 2005, as the first residents were being allowed back into the city, there were two local commissions with the authority to lead post-Katrina redevelopment planning. The statutory City Planning Commission (CPC) and the Mayor's Bring Back New Orleans Commission, appointed to provide a first-responder formal planning vehicle to guide reconstruction. Prior to Katrina, the city did not have a post-disaster recovery plan or recovery management structure in place. The American Planning Association's assessment of the city's planning frameworks following the disaster identified that the CPC and the department "did not have a key leadership role in the areas of transportation, economic development, environmental planning, and disaster preparedness." Unsurprisingly it was issues related to these missing planning elements that were at the forefront of the widespread critique of the post-Katrina response and recovery processes.

Following Katrina's impact, as every city department faced funding limits (already seen in the HDLC), the CPC department's staff was cut to eight from twenty-four, a number deemed insufficient even before the disaster. It is also worth noting, that the Planning Associations assessment highlighted the frameworks of preservation as an asset to the city's planning processes in its review and recommendations following the storm. In the Spring of 2006, the

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89 American Planning Association New Orleans Planning Assessment Team, "Charting the Course for Rebuilding a Great American City: An Assessment of the Planning Function in Post-Katrina New Orleans," (Chicago: American Planning Association, 2005), 6-14. New Orleans Planning Commission initiated a master plan process in 1997 to produce a framework and develop the component elements and to establish a process for scheduled review of the mast plan once adopted. Through the review and adoption process it was decided that there would be a total of twelve component elements in the master plan. Prior to the disaster, eight of the twelve elements had been completed and adopted by the City Council. The following four elements still needed to be completed: housing; community facilities and infrastructure; natural hazards and critical sensitive areas; and environmental quality.

90 Ibid., 16.

91 Ibid.
In the two years following Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans had various citywide recovery planning schemes, each of which expressed distinct interests, values, and visions.
city council implemented a neighborhood planning process, the New Orleans Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan (NONRP), commonly referred to as the Lambert plans. The Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA), the state agency charged with planning and coordinating rebuilding efforts and serving as a conduit for federal aid to the city, initiated a planning process funded by local and national philanthropies in the summer of 2006.

The Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) attempted to amalgamate the previous planning attempts through its combination of district wide and citywide plans. The city faced a significant conflict between needing to act quickly to get the city up and running and developing an inclusive, deliberative recovery process. The planning problems especially the ideal inclusionary planning was severely hindered by the fact that most residents, particularly those hardest hit by flooding were, and many remain, scattered throughout the country. How can these planning and policy measures really consider including the importance of a neighborhood’s sense of place when the city has been defined in such disparate ways in regards to its recovery?

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92 Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, and Laska, "Planning, Plans, and People: Professional Expertise, Local Knowledge, and Governmental Action in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans," 26. The plans were named after the planning firm commissioned by the city council to which critics objected to Lambert's hiring on a no-bid contract.
93 Ibid.
THREE NEIGHBORHOODS IN NEW ORLEANS

The existing legal frameworks of historic preservation are examined through three neighborhoods in New Orleans in the post-disaster landscape, to establish the points of conflict when the frameworks are challenged by the particular priorities of emergency management, and most importantly by the needs of the affected communities. It is important to look at the outcomes of policy decisions and recovery decisions in a city like New Orleans where the procedures lack a level transparency and continuity. Three historic districts; Tremé, Holy Cross, and Broadmoor have been chosen for the particular challenges and opportunities that were exposed in their recovery following the disaster. At this point the thesis questions: what is the nature of the relationship between historic preservation and a community’s objectives for redevelopment? The value in studying the post-disaster landscape exists in the opportunity to extract the multitude of actors, processes and practices that have defined the city’s post-disaster response.

Stephen Verderber presents a useful matrix with which to determine the multitude of players in the post-disaster landscape. In his article for the Journal of Urban Design published in August 2009, Verderber summarizes the disparate assortment primary and secondary actors that allows for an analysis of an often disjunctive set of rebuilding initiatives and competing special interests.94 The post-disaster landscape is one that is characterized by local, state, and federal agencies and organizations in the governmental and private, grassroots sector. The matrix arranges the players according to a scale defined by the horizontal and vertical axes - the horizontal axis defined by state and federal government on one end, and non-governmental grassroots organizations on the other. The vertical axis is defined at one point as local government and local institutions with non-government organizations on the other. These axes are bisected diagonally by an additional scale of “Activist-Initiated Engagement” which is scaled low-to-high. Verderber defines this as the degree to which a given organization is grassroots based, and the degree to which it has challenged elected politicians in the ongoing discourse over

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the protection of historic built environment resources in the city.95 Many of the organizations and agencies did not exist before Katrina (shown in red), and many of those that did have altered their organization or program’s mission significantly according to the new opportunities and needs presented following the storm.

The city’s various planning visions and recovery plans combined with the multitude of players generated a specific post-disaster landscape in each of New Orleans’s neighborhoods. When observed temporally, the complex relationships and intersections expose the tensions affecting preservation in practice. Together, the three neighborhoods largely generate a cross-sectional representation of many of the challenges that the city’s historic neighborhoods have faced since Hurricane Katrina.

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95 Ibid.
Holy Cross National Register Historic District, 1986
Local Historic District, 1990

9th Ward
Drainage Basin 2
Census Tracts 7.02, 8
NONRP Recovery District 8
UNOP Planning District 8
The Holy Cross Historic District offers a useful cross section of the difficult post-disaster landscape in a recovering neighborhood. As a sub district of the Lower Ninth Ward, Holy Cross was the relative survivor as houses in the Lower Ninth were swept off their foundations. The submerged landscape of the area was fixed into the nation's consciousness through the media depiction of the unfolding desperation, and largely remained the representation of the city in the storm’s aftermath. The Holy Cross neighborhood is located on the northern-bank and natural levee of the Mississippi River, in the southeast quadrant of the city separated from the Upper Ninth Ward neighborhoods and isolated from downtown by the Industrial Canal. Within the Lower Ninth Ward, Holy Cross is considered as the area south of St. Claude Avenue. As the oldest community in the area, the neighborhood boasts more diversity in architectural style than the remaining Lower Ninth Ward, and the neighborhood's architectural variety was deemed sufficient to merit listing on the National Register for Historic Places in 1986. Additionally the neighborhood received a Local Historic District designation in 1990 with its boundaries roughly defined by Burgundy Street, Delery Street, the Mississippi River, and the Industrial Canal.

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Historic Significance

Neither designation came straightforwardly for the neighborhood due to the large number of non-contributing structures included in the area, predominately post-World War II residential slab-on-grade construction. The National Register designation outlined the significance of the Holy Cross Historic District as meeting Criterion C and states that:

"The Holy Cross Historic District is architecturally significant on the state level as well as in the Gulf coast region as a whole. It has an unusually fine collection of shotguns, a noted regional house type. Moreover, it is a superior concentration of 50-plus year old structures within the context of Louisiana."

The historic district consists of approximately sixty blocks with a mainly single-story residential character, of wooden construction. Most of the historic residential development was completed by the end of the nineteenth century and Creole cottages, side hall houses, bungalows, and commercial structures are integrated amongst the ubiquitous shotgun house in the district’s vernacular inventory. The National Register Designation attributes a measure of the historic district’s significance to the high number of shotgun houses among the neighborhood’s collection of building types, which qualifies it as one of the more concentrated collections in the region. Furthermore, Holy Cross is set apart from other areas in the city for its significant number of pre-twentieth century bungalow-era shotgun houses distinguished by their age and

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98 Koch and Wilson/Urban, "Recommendations for National Register Historic Districts in Community Development Areas," (New Orleans: Historic District Landmarks Commission of the City of New Orleans, 1979), 49. Non-contributing structures are considered to be intrusions on the historic character of the neighborhood. The high proportion of these intrusions resulted in the 1978 survey of the Community Development Block area undertaken by Koch and Wilson concluding that the area was not deemed to be of National Register importance. The area was subsequently designated to the National Register five years later. Eleanor Burke, Deputy Director HDLC, that there had been limited support from the Historic District Landmarks Commission for its Local Designation in 1990. Interview with Perkins and Burke, New Orleans, January 6, 2012.

99 "Holy Cross National Register Historic District," (Louisiana: Office of Cultural Development Division of Historic Preservation). U.S. Department of the Interior, "How to Apply the National Register Criteria for Evaluation: National Register Criteria for Evaluation". “The quality of significance in American history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture is present in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects that possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association, and: C. That embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction.”

100 "Holy Cross National Register Historic District."
quality in Eastlake and Italianate styles. The building's front is the most representative of the structure which depends on the mode of assembling and arranging standard mass-produced elements to create the characteristic style of decoration. The building relies on façade decoration, proportion, and roof profile for exterior articulation and it is the shotgun stoop, overhung by the mail-order scrollwork of the eave, that shapes the traditional space for social interaction. One of the values of the shotgun is in its collection. Houses are set back from the street edge across a grass-edged sidewalk or narrow front yard, and the rows of buildings edging the street serve as sculptural entities. The variance in the setbacks combined with larger lot sizes and generous yards, has given the neighborhood a relatively low-density character. The district’s density is a point of comparison to the city’s other historic urban neighborhoods, and retains the traces of the larger land parcels subdivided from the original plantations in the area. The neighborhood is also unique in the city for its tangible connection to water through accessibility to the Mississippi River levee.

101 Culvahouse, "Stoop, Balcony, Pilot House: Making it Right in the Lower Ninth Ward". The shotgun house type refers to the interior layout of the structure. All of the rooms are arranged directly behind one another, in which the supposed alignment of doors between rooms allows a shotgun blast to pass impeded down the full length of the house. The simple structures are wood frame with weatherboard siding, commonly of the regional cypress and heart pine, and set on brick piers. The typology has evolved over time with varying roof styles including the traditional hipped roofs and gable ends, with multiple bay singles, and multi-family houses known as shotgun doubles, with minor overhangs over the front, or sometimes extended to include a porch. Adaptations also include the camelback shotgun, where the back double-storied portion of the house to the single story portion of the structure.

102 Ibid. Toledano and Christovich, Volume 6: Faubourg Treme and the Bayou Road: 133. The prominence of the shotgun house type is also significant in the district as it has become inherently associated with the Ninth Ward, and representative of the devastating flooding and uneasy recovery to a national and international audience. Yet, the shotgun is a type ubiquitous in New Orleans, although one that has had limited historical and scholarly attention dedicated to it. Following Hurricane Katrina, the shotgun house more than ever represents the working class, and largely African American communities that it housed, and the historical inequalities exposed following the storm. Subsequently, through architectural aid campaigns referencing the regional typology, the shotgun type has been elevated in architectural status.


104 Sarah De Bacher, Vice President of the Holy Cross Neighborhood Association, in conversation with the author, April 30, 2012. De Bacher remarked that this relationship to water is particularly rare in New Orleans inner neighborhoods that are largely separated from the surrounding water bodies by the concrete flood walls.
The shotgun house type relies on façade decoration, proportion, and roof profile for exterior articulation. It is the shotgun stoop, overhung by the mail-order scrollwork of the eave, that shapes the traditional space for social interaction. Holy Cross, January 2012. Image, author.
Neighborhood Development

Following the natural levees of the Mississippi River, the Holy Cross Historic District represents the final downriver extension of the city on subdivided plantation land. The population grew in the early nineteenth century, and development began with the increased Catholic population around 1850, when the Brothers, Priests and Sisters of Holy Cross established an orphanage, and in 1871 with the founding of the Holy Cross High School. Various European immigrants settled seeking isolation from downtown who joined freed African Americans who had worked on the plantations. Many of the development plots were used for small farms supplying produce to the New Orleans markets into the mid-twentieth century. At this time, Holy Cross represented a village on the edge of a large city, whose separateness was enhanced in 1912 when the industrial canal was constructed between the neighborhood and the rest of the city.\(^\text{105}\)

No original plantation structures remained after the 1980s, yet notable structures in the district contribute to the diversity and architectural interest of the neighborhood. Two Doullut Steamboat Houses resemble traditional water-going steamboats with porthole-style windows, upper and lower galleries, ironwork trim, and ornate woodwork, and reference the Japanese exhibit at the 1904 World's Fair (the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition). These unusual houses were built in the early 1900s and were recognized as some of the first historic landmarks in the city in 1977.\(^\text{106}\) Other landmarks include the mid-nineteenth century Romanesque Revival Saint Maurice Church, and the ill-fated three story brick Italianate Holy Cross School.\(^\text{107}\)

Neighborhood Change

The Holy Cross neighborhood was not spared the population decline faced across the city in the post-war years of the twentieth century, to which the 2006 Neighborhood Redevelopment Plan for the Holy Cross, Ninth Ward neighborhoods added; the decline in industrial activity, disaffection with urban living, altered maritime operations, the desegregation of New Orleans' neighborhoods...
schools, and the subsequent increase in abandoned properties, to the neighborhood's decline.\textsuperscript{108} Before the storm, the United States Census Bureau’s 2000 Census recognized the Holy Cross neighborhood as a predominately African American neighborhood, comprising almost 88 percent of the neighborhood’s total population; significantly higher than the city’s 67 percent. The Greater New Orleans Community Data Center’s \textit{Neighborhood Snapshot} characterizes the Holy Cross area as a low-to-moderate income with the median income of the area approximately $20,000 below the city’s median of $27,000.\textsuperscript{109} Homeownership rates in Holy Cross were similar to the proportions calculated for the city at 42 percent of the occupied households owner-occupied, and 58 percent renter occupied. In 2000, 15 percent of the properties were listed as vacant.

\textbf{Hurricane Katrina}

According to data collected from the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau, Holy Cross lost over half of the neighborhood’s 2000 population, following the storm. The area remained predominately African-American at 89 percent.\textsuperscript{110} The neighborhood lost almost one in four housing units over the ten-year period, suggesting high rates of demolition following Hurricane Katrina. Furthermore, vacancy rates more than doubled to over 40 percent of the remaining housing stock. Interestingly, owner-occupant homeownership rose to become the majority with 55 percent. The neighborhood’s aging population showed a similar trajectory to that across the city in 2010, which is concerning with the neighborhood’s significant decline in population under 18 years of age.

It was the combination of two infrastructural developments in the neighborhood that changed the threat of Hurricane Katrina into the devastation of its aftermath. The neighborhood experienced

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{108} City of New Orleans, "Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan: Holy Cross, Planning District 8."
\item \textsuperscript{109} GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3), http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/8/20/income.html. The neighborhood median values are approximated from the median income data by Census Tract from the U.S. Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3), Holy Cross encompasses two census tracts; 7.02 and 8. http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_00_SF3_DP3&prodType=table.
\item \textsuperscript{110} GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) Five Year Estimate 2006-2010, http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/8/HolyCross/index.html
\end{itemize}
between two to six feet of floodwater from the fifteen-foot storm surge that overwhelmed the Lower Ninth Ward. The storm surge was created in the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet and the flood waters poured into the neighborhood from breaches in the industrial canal, overflowing the levee walls by five feet. The flood waters flowed through the neighborhood into the high ground of the Holy Cross district. Winds from the hurricane caused some damage to houses, particularly those in blighted condition before the storm, and did extensive damage to the landscape bringing down overhead telephone and power lines, the street lights and street signs, and uprooting many of the trees particularly around St. Claude and North Claiborne Avenues. Residents had significant challenges to overcome, exacerbated by the lengthy period before they were able to return to their homes to initiate repairs. As a part of the Lower Ninth Ward, Holy Cross was included in the city’s “Look and Leave” policy that restricted resident’s return until May 2006. City services - including power and water - were not restored until the beginning of the summer of 2006.

In Holy Cross the damage caused by flooding was largely mitigated by the historic design of many of the structures in the district. Local craftsmen designed structures for their context that were raised above ground to circulate air below the floor, discourage termites and vermin and cope with excess flooding. However, the slow rate of return to the neighborhood resulted in houses throughout the district being quickly contaminated with toxic mold, instigating excessive gut renovations to the interiors of historic structures. Initially, the preservation community focused on educating homeowners of the resilience of their historic homes, and their opportunity

111 City of New Orleans, "Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan: Holy Cross, Planning District 8." Two events significantly impacted the physical characteristics of the neighborhood and the Lower Ninth Ward; erosion along the Mississippi River led to the construction of the levee in 1912, and the perceived need to create a shipping connection between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain led to the dredging of the Industrial Canal in 1918 and completed in 1923, increasing the neighborhood's isolation from the rest of the city. Furthermore, the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet – referred to in the city as MR GO – was a deep shipping canal built by the Army Corps of Engineers in the late 1950s, which destroyed the surrounding acres of protective coastal wetlands that once provided a storm surge buffer for the city. Even a large barge was forced through the breach near Claiborne Avenue.

112 Ibid.

113 The area was the slowest area of the city to recover basic services following the storm. The city’s “Look and Leave” policy retained the city’s post storm curfew over six months following the disaster. The policy allowed residents into the neighborhood during the day to look, salvage their possessions, and leave. At this time, there was extensive gutting of damaged homes proliferated in preparation for their return.
The slow rate of return for residents to their neighborhood resulted in houses throughout the district being quickly contaminated with toxic mold. New Orleans, October 2005. Image, Matthew Kuhnert.
The widespread mold problem immediately following the storm instigated excessive gut renovations to the interiors of historic structures by volunteers who had limited training. October 2005. Image, Matthew Kuhnert.
for rehabilitation. The PRCNO provided workshops and advice on how to remove wet and moldy materials and possessions, as well as providing cleaning buckets and supplies through their *Welcome Home Workshop* program in conjunction with the National Trust. Further education initiatives were set up to teach volunteer groups how to properly gut historic homes without damaging the architectural fabric, or needlessly losing resilient materials. However, as the scale and threat to historic neighborhoods in the city was so overwhelming, the National Trust with their local partnerships realized that they had to keep pace with the national, state, and local decision-making, in order to advocate for - and demonstrate - alternatives to razing entire neighborhoods.\(^{114}\) The Louisiana Recovery and Rebuilding Conference in November 2005 was presented by the American Institute of Architects in collaboration with the American Planning Association, and supported by the National Trust for Historic Preservation amongst other sponsors.

**Local Frameworks in the Post-Disaster Landscape**

Hurricane Katrina's impact and the ensuing devastation to the city’s historic built environment generated different reactions to the value of historic preservation following the storm. Preservation concerns were thrust into the public consciousness as the emergency response to the disaster triggered review in some National Register historic districts that had been largely spared preservation consideration before the storm. Furthermore, citizens openly expressed concern as they realized the ongoing threat to their historic neighborhoods.

As the immediate disaster response progressed to recovery, and the city began its concentration on its recovery planning processes, the existing legislated frameworks in the city were hindered by the lack of information and an understanding of their role in the post-disaster recovery. This affected the view of Elliott C. Perkins, the Executive Director of the HDLC that the local government administration largely viewed historic preservation as an impediment to the city's recovery.\(^{115}\) Immediately following the storm, Mayor C. Ray Nagin drafted an executive order to


\(^{115}\) Elliott C. Perkins, Director of the HDLC, and Eleanor Burke, Deputy Director HDLC, in conversation with the author, New Orleans, January 6, 2012.
suspend the authority of the city agencies to sign off on demolitions and amendments of historic buildings, effectively eliminating the procedural safeguards for historic neighborhoods at their moment of increased need. Although never signed, the Mayor's proclamation to bypass the HDLC, its Central Business counterpart, and the Housing Conservation District Commission review, reasoned, that in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, "the application of the rules, regulations and review of those commissions and agencies is logistically impossible and impractical." It would then give the mayor the authority to suspend the provisions of any "regulatory ordinance prescribing the procedures for conduct of local business or the orders, rules, or regulation of any local agency in cases where complying with those laws would cause delays."\(^{116}\)

The disconnect between city agencies was made worse by the unprepared nature of the city’s departments and a lack of strong leadership. Greg Meffert, the Nagin aide who oversaw the City Planning Commission and the Historic District Landmarks Commissions before the storm, had no background in planning or historic preservation when he was put in charge of the city’s departments. Even before the storm this clearly articulated to the preservation community that the administration did not make preservation a high priority before the hurricane.\(^{117}\) Following the storm it became clear that the city did not have the expertise available to deal with the unprecedented extent of the issues following the storm. Furthermore, Katrina's impact on New Orleans financially crippled the city’s ability to maintain employment at a functional level. As a result, nearly every city department experienced a reduction in staff through layoffs. With approximately 14,000 buildings under their jurisdiction the HDLC capacity was overrun, with their post-Katrina staff reduced to one inspector and three people working in the field.\(^{118}\)


\(^{118}\) Elliott C. Perkins, Director of the HDLC, and Eleanor Burke, Deputy Director HDLC, in conversation with the author, New Orleans, January 6, 2012; Gay, "Written Testimony of Patricia H. Gay Executive Director Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans." According to Patricia Gay the Executive Director of the city's Preservation Resource Center, there are approximately 175,000 - 200,000 buildings in New Orleans, 36,000 of which are included in NR districts approximately 20 percent of the building stock of the city. If 14,000 buildings are under the locally designated districts this works out to be approximately 7-8 percent of the city's building stock.
The HDLC’s initial actions were to immediately survey and evaluate the condition of the city’s local historic districts in order to gain an understanding as to the scope of the devastation they were facing. The department quickly realized frustration at the inadequate data collected and stored documenting the city’s existing districts before the storm, needed as a point of comparison to the damage following the storm. Though the survey quickly indicated to the staff that many of the city's most historic neighborhoods had endured much of the worst devastation, the damaged sustained in the Holy Cross historic district was more characteristic of the destruction to the built environment, infrastructure, and communities across the city.

Demolition

The largest continuing aftershock for the city was the waves of unheeded demolitions leveling entire swathes of the city. The devastation continued throughout the city, and local and National Register designated districts as the city administration utilized federal funding through FEMA. The brute force of the Army Corps of Engineers razed buildings, whole streetscapes, and some instances entire blocks. The city already maintained the power to tear down those buildings deemed to be in imminent danger of collapse, those threatening life or property, without going through a review process. The Safety and Permit Department administers the city's Flood Damage Prevention Ordinance that mandated the department to conduct substantial damage determination surveys to buildings damaged by Hurricane Katrina. The ordinance did not include variance procedures for historic properties. According to the Preservation Resource Center's November 2005 *Welcome Home Workshop* briefing, Michael Centineo, director of the City's

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119 Elliott C. Perkins, Director of the HDLC, and Eleanor Burke, Deputy Director HDLC, in conversation with the author, New Orleans, January 6, 2012. Binders of paper files containing documentation of boundaries and contributing resources that had not been updated since their original designation proved insufficient to aid in the response effort necessitated.

120 American Planning Association New Orleans Planning Assessment Team, "Charting the Course for Rebuilding a Great American City: An Assessment of the Planning Function in Post-Katrina New Orleans," 9. The Safety and Permit Department administers the city's Flood Damage Prevention Ordinance in which mandated the department to conduct substantial damage determinations surveys to buildings damaged by Katrina (or re-damaged by Rita). The ordinance did not include variance procedures for historic properties.
Holy Cross has lost 25 percent of its total housing units since 2000. In many places all that remain are the traces of houses; concrete slabs or stoops. When these traces are left, these sites are left in an indeterminant condition - not a foundation to be rebuilt, or green space to be upkept. Holy Cross, January 2012. Image, author.
Safety and Permits division stated that: "while no whole neighborhoods were targeted for demolition, over 3000 “red tags” were applied to buildings in the days immediately following the hurricane by Safety and Permit staff to indicate specific buildings that were unsafe to enter."121 Houses were evaluated and assigned a percentage of damage. A “red tag” denoted damage that was greater than 50 percent, and required homeowners to rebuild above the FEMA-mapped flood levels, even though these were not produced until 2006. The tagging was often confirmed through a cursory drive-by visual inspection by nonprofessionals – hairdressers, mailmen and others - and were later proven to be notoriously incorrect.

The damage determination lists quickly became the city and FEMA’s lists to denote houses slated for demolition. After discovering that the lists of structures compiled by the city were prone to significant error, damage determinations were being fabricated and city policies were not being followed correctly, the PRCNO and preservationists in the city began to urgently sound the alarm about the ramifications of destroying so much of the city's irreplaceable cultural heritage. Matt McBride, an attorney in the city campaigned for transparency in the city’s processes, and the blog, Squandered Heritage – a site created by Karen Gadbois, and Laureen Lentz - cataloged the needlessly threatened homes.122 Two years following the storm preservationist, Lentz advocated to the Times-Picayune that of the 1,630 structures listed as imminent health threats by the city, "one-third are wrong, a third need re-evaluation and a third need to go."123

Holy Cross was not spared from the fate of the city’s layered programs for federally funded demolitions have continued following the storm. As the 2010 U.S. Census data illustrates, the Holy Cross neighborhood lost 25 percent of its total housing units since 2000. Three demolition programs were initiated in the city following the storm including: the FEMA Funded Demolition

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Program, that utilized FEMA Public Assistance funds; the Imminent Danger of Collapse Demolition Program financed through HUD Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds applying to properties determined “in danger” by the city’s Department of Safety and Permits system; and the Strategic Demolition for Economic Recovery Program, which also used CDBG funds for its purpose of removing structures where it will “spur investment in neighborhood housing and commercial properties – initially focused around parks and schools and since opened up to properties across the city.”

Further adding to frustration in the process of damage determinations was the fact that in order to challenge FEMA’s determinations, homeowners needed to be present in New Orleans and present evidence contradicting the agency’s decision. This was difficult as many residents remained outside the city, and assembling a counter-claim substantiating a technological assessment of their property was complicated and often required professionals and so deterred many low-income owners.

Federal Funding for Demolition
Funding for localities responding to the aftermath of a presidentially-declared disaster is predominately administered through FEMA. The distribution of aid is provided according to the guidelines set forth in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (The Stafford Act) in 1988, and as amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. The Stafford Act authorizes federal disaster funding for "Essential Assistance" which empowers heads of federal agencies to “distribute aid to victims through state and local governments, perform life

and property-saving assistance, clear debris, and conduct search and rescue missions, among other immediate response services.\footnote{127} 

While "debris clearance" in this statue is necessary to enable search and rescue missions, the Stafford Act goes on to provide assistance specifically for "Debris Removal."\footnote{128} Immediately following the disaster, the destruction considered debris was much easier to identify. The initial campaigns undertaken by the Army Corps of Engineers under directions from FEMA removed the immense variety of debris from public-right-of-ways including, submerged cars, uprooted trees, and even entire houses that had been pushed off their foundations. The demolition campaigns were easily concealed behind the progressive concept of “debris removal,” and contributed to FEMA's mission to "get-in-and-get-out" as quickly as possible.\footnote{129} 

In a measure to streamline review processes for determinations of National Register eligibility as an assessment of FEMA’s actions in Louisiana, a second Programmatic Agreement was signed in 2006 between FEMA, the Louisiana SHPO, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), the City of New Orleans and the United States Army Corps of Engineers. Programmatic Agreements are intended to implement specific models of rapid response solutions for Section 106 review for execution during unique circumstances of post-disaster response.\footnote{130} 

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\item \footnote{127} Department of Homeland Security, "5170b Section 403: Essential Assistance," in \textit{Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act} (United States of America2000).
\item \footnote{128} "5173 Section 407: Debris Removal," in \textit{Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act} (United States of America2000).
\item \footnote{129} This definition of FEMA's mission is taken from interview with Environmental Impact Officer, Katherine Zeringue, New Orleans, January 9, 2012. FEMA's mission is to "support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a nation we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards." Online, "About FEMA," 2012, http://www.fema.gov/about/ (accessed January 16, 2012).
\item \footnote{130} Miller, \textit{A Layperson's Guide to Historic Preservation Law: A Survey of Federal, State, and Local Laws Governing Historic Resource Protection}: 4. Section 106 is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470f of the NHPA. The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head of any Federal department or independent agency having authority to license any undertaking shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior to the issuance of any license, as the case may be, take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. The head of such Federal agency shall afford the Advisory Council of Historic Preservation established under §§ 70i-470v of this title a reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to such undertaking.
\end{itemize}
Immediately following the disaster, the destruction considered “debris, for “debris removal,” was much easier to identify. The initial campaigns undertaken by the Army Corps of Engineers under directions from FEMA removed the immense variety of debris from public-right-of-ways including, submerged cars, uprooted trees, and even entire houses that had been pushed off their foundations. “The Pile,” of collected debris located in Lakeview. October 2005. Image, Matthew Kuhnert.
The Secondary Programmatic Agreement augmented the initial agreement signed in Louisiana prior to the storm, and allowed the use of Public Assistance funds for the demolition of damaged privately owned residential buildings.\(^{131}\) While residents in the Holy Cross district remained unable to access the city and assess the sustained damage of their homes, the institutions were signing power to demolish houses without homeowner approval, or even knowledge.

Early advocacy efforts on behalf of the HDLC supported a proposal to be included in the Secondary Programmatic Agreement which encouraged FEMA and the Army Corps of Engineers, in coordination with the city, to "determine the feasibility of soliciting and managing a contract for deconstruction and salvage of selective architectural elements and other materials from buildings determined by FEMA and SHPO to have retained enough historic integrity in order to be listed in or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places, prior to such buildings being demolished."\(^{132}\) In 2008, the “RTNO Deconstruction and Salvage Program” was established as a program of the Preservation Resource Center’s Rebuilding Together New Orleans (RTNO). In partnership with the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the City of New Orleans, the Mercy Crops, the Louisiana Land Trust, and FEMA. The program provides a “community tool” supporting an alternative to demolitions following Hurricane Katrina. In some aspects the program has been a success and materials have been funneled back to the salvage stores under the Preservation Resource Center, Green Project and Habitat for Humanity and have been used in many restoration projects in the Holy Cross historic district, and throughout the city.\(^{133}\)

**The Vision for Recovery**

Conceptually, the Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) Commission designated the Holy Cross neighborhood an “immediate opportunity area” which designated the area as one where rebuilding could begin sooner than in some other parts of the city. However, the designation was

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\(^{132}\) Ibid.

challenged by the neighborhood’s restrictive curfew. As residents could finally return permanently to the area, a series of community meetings were held to establish the vision for the recovery and rebuilding of the historic neighborhood. In June 2006, the Holy Cross Neighborhood Association published a preliminary plan for the sustainable restoration of the Lower Ninth Ward including the Holy Cross neighborhood. Holy Cross had been selected from by the Tulane/Xavier Center for Bioenvironmental Research and the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in February 2006 as a pilot project to demonstrate the restoration of a damaged neighborhood. The plan documented the recommendations from residents in the area on the sustainable reconstruction, repair, and restoration of their neighborhoods. The vision for the neighborhood included integrating sustainable practices with historic preservation with the resident’s wanting to “achieve historic preservation while maintaining a living and diverse neighborhood.” The recommendations outlined by the residents largely inform those outlined in the plan for District Eight in the City of New Orleans Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan, and reiterate the vision for a sustainable recovery. 

Rebuilding Holy Cross

The community acknowledged that the reconstruction efforts in Holy Cross must take into account the historic context of the urban neighborhood. Richard Moe, the then president of the National Trust for Historic Preservation acknowledged that, following the disaster, "rebuilding is essential, but it must acknowledge the historic character of one of the nation's most distinctive regions." The National Trust for Historic Preservation quickly identified their goal of recovery to be: "allowing residents to come back to health, vibrant, livable places that retain the heritage that makes them unique." The National Trust partnered with both outside organizations and local preservation organizations to work towards this mission, establishing relationships with the World Monuments Fund (WMF), and the PRCNO, who lent office space to enable the National Trust to establish its first field office in New Orleans. It was these agencies – amongst other

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135 Ibid., 6.
137 World Monuments Fund, "World Monuments Fund adds New Orleans and the Gulf Coast as the 101st Site on the 2006 World Monuments Watch List of 100 Most Endangered Sites".
138 Ibid.
groups, and individuals in the city - that rallied in the face of rampant demolitions, negligent city planning, difficult insurance companies, and a federal government that many citizens in New Orleans believed lacked a sense of urgency when it came to funding and managing the rebuilding.\textsuperscript{139} Importantly, these organizations were also charged with educating the communities with whom they were working as to appropriate interventions when dealing with historic structures. Executive director of the HDLC, Elliott C. Perkins acknowledged the high number of permits accepted for retention of the unregulated construction that infiltrated the historic district’s post-disaster landscape.\textsuperscript{140}

The Trust and its partners made an effort to choose their case studies judiciously so to provide the maximum benefits to the most underserved communities, which may lack the resources for restoration.\textsuperscript{141} Patricia Gay argued following the storm that preservationists had to “go beyond preventing demolition – buildings must be put back into service.”\textsuperscript{142} The PRCNO had already designated the area a target neighborhood for its Operation Comeback program in 2002, and had since been working to restore its historic homes.\textsuperscript{143} The PRCNO began the Operation Comeback program to purchase blighted homes, renovate them, and sell them to first-time homebuyers in 1987 as a focused effort to revitalize the Lower Garden District. Additionally in 1988 the PRCNO created the RTNO program as a neighborhood revitalization program - also inaugurated in the Lower Garden District - to “address the needs of existing homeowners, namely the elderly and disabled who had become ill equipped to manage home repair.”\textsuperscript{144} Following the storm, RTNO modified its mission to provide aid to those displaced by the Hurricane Katrina. In collaboration with the National Trust, the PRCNO began to focus on the total renovation and

\textsuperscript{139} Curtis, "Block by Block," 25.
\textsuperscript{140} Elliott C. Perkins, Director of the HDLC, and Eleanor Burke, Deputy Director HDLC, in conversation with the author, New Orleans, January 6, 2012.
\textsuperscript{141} World Monuments Fund, "World Monuments Fund adds New Orleans and the Gulf Coast as the 101st Site on the 2006 World Monuments Watch List of 100 Most Endangered Sites".
\textsuperscript{142} Gay, "Written Testimony of Patricia H. Gay Executive Director Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans."
\textsuperscript{143} Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans, "Operation Comeback," http://www.PRCNOno.org/programs/operationcomeback/
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid. “On July 1, 2008, Operation Comeback launched the Adopt a House program in an effort to give an individual, organization, foundation, or corporation an opportunity to aid in providing a newly constructed or renovated home to a potential homebuyer, at an affordable price, in one of New Orleans’ targeted historic neighborhoods, through donations and volunteer efforts.”
rebuilding of storm-damaged houses to provide a model an educational tool for restoration - as well as to bring homeowners back to their homes. Kevin Mercadel for the PRCNO asserted that the renovations averaged $10,000 per project “making them more cost effective than mass-producing housing or even providing temporary trailers.”

New Infill Design
Through the media, the rebuilding of the Holy Cross neighborhood and Lower Ninth Wards has become synonymous with the celebrity contributions of Brad Pitt's Make it Right Foundation and the sustainable initiatives of Habitat for Humanity and Global Green USA. As the Holy Cross residents were meeting to envision the recovery of their neighborhood, Global Green in partnership with Brad Pitt sponsored an international design competition to design a zero energy affordability housing development in the Holy Cross Neighborhood. The total project was designed to include five single-family homes, an 18-unit apartment building, and a LEED Platinum community center/sustainable design and climate action center. The winning design by the New York based Architecture firm Workshop/apd was considered to be contextual, and a design that “responded well to the needs of people… based on characteristics of the New Orleans vernacular.” The commercially fabricated, metal-lined houses are clearly contemporary and are expressive of technological and sustainable advancements. This is particularly distinctive in Holy Cross whose collection of shotgun houses constitutes the nineteenth century legacy of sustainable craftsman practice to accommodate the environment and climate through vernacular design.

145 Kevin Mercadel, "Field Hearing Housing Options in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita," (New Orleans: House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, 2006). Kevin Mercadel is a Neighborhood Recovery Specialist for the Preservation Resource Center and worked for the New Orleans Field Office for the National Trust for Historic Preservation.
The winning Global Green USA design argued that it’s concept is contextual, and a design that “reponded well to the needs of the people... based on characteristics of the New Orleans vernacular.” The total project was designed to include five single-family homes, an 18-unit apartment building, and a LEED Platinum community center/sustainable design and climate action center. Holy Cross, April 2012 Image, Liz McEnaney.
In the local register historic district, any new infill construction had to comply with the HDLC regulation for new construction. According to Section VIII of the New Orleans Historic Preservation Ordinance, new construction should adhere to the following guidelines:

“... (1) All new construction shall be visually compatible with the buildings and environment with which they are related. (2) The general design, scale, gross volume, arrangement of site plan, texture, material and exterior architectural features of new construction shall be in harmony with its surroundings and shall not impair the "tout ensemble" of the neighborhood. (3) No one architectural style shall be imposed. (4) Quality and excellence in design should be major determinants.”

As New Orleans's historic districts were particularly vulnerable following the storm, any new design must respect historic typologies, scale, and materials, while also meeting the needs of residents who hope to return to their neighborhoods. In December 2007, The HDLC approved the PRCNO’s Operation Comeback’s submission to build “Katrina Cottages” within the Holy Cross historic district. This action was a departure from PRCNO’s traditional focus of restoring historic buildings, but when faced with the high numbers of vacant lots, executive director, Patricia Gay believes it to be important to “set an example for new construction.” The Katrina Cottage was designed by Andres Duany – co-creator of the New Urbanism School of architecture – and Marianne Cusato as an alternative to FEMA’s trailers. The houses follow the vernacular technology of the New Orleans shotgun house and are designed with stoops, porches, architectural brackets, louvered shutters, and high ceilings. The designs integrate sustainable building technologies, and contemporary materials – enhanced termite and rot resistant - retain the appearance of traditional construction materials. The two contemporary house designs – adjacent in the historic district - clearly illustrate the inherent confrontation within preservation theory when contemplating new construction in a historic setting – yet both designs can clearly be argued under the HDLC guidelines.

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148 The City of New Orleans, "Section VII: Certificate of Appropriateness."
150 Pam Bryan, "Operation Comeback to Build First Katrina Cottages," In the News(2008),
Community Redevelopment Imperatives

The concerns of recovery in Holy Cross were extended beyond housing. The historic Holy Cross School exploited the storm and the confusing climate of its aftermath to push forward with plans to relocate the school to a larger constituency in the Gentilly neighborhood. The majority of the school’s historic campus was largely demolished by the end of the twentieth century, but a historic administration building dating from 1895 and an early twentieth century gazebo still exist. The campus of Holy Cross is located at the western boundary of the Holy Cross District, bounded by the Mississippi River and Reynes Street, and was in use until Hurricane Katrina. The move was according to a plan that followed the end of the multiple attempts to determine the city’s recovery plan. 151 The School Facilities Master Plan, which was begun in August 2007, and was completed a year later used $700 million in FEMA Public Assistance funds to completely redesign the city’s school facilities and re-designate school locations. 152 Sarah De Bacher, vice president of the Holy Cross Neighborhood Association, recalls frustration in the public review of the project – according to the federal agency’s mandatory Section 106 process – in attempting to mitigate disparate views in the community. 153 The largely aging population of the neighborhood no longer saw a constituency existing for the current school, while De Bacher recognized the importance of a local school in drawing residents home, and new families to the neighborhood. Additionally, the site chosen in the recovering Gentilly neighborhood for the new school construction was the site of the mid-century modern St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Church designed by the local New Orleans’s firm of Curtis & Davis, in 1963. In his comprehensive account of the saga, in Delirious New Orleans, author and architect, Stephen Verderber describes

152 The Orleans Parish School Board had struggled for years prior to the storm to maintain and provide basic operations and services, as schools received failing grades and facilities fell into worsening condition. Ramsey Green, the Recovery School District’s chief operating officer, estimates the district has 40 empty and unused school buildings around the city. Tremé was also the victim to this plan that lead to the highly contentious demolition of the mid-century modern Phillis Wheatley Elementary School in 2011. Sarah Carr, "Hurricane Katrina Recovery Paradox Reflected in New Orleans Schools," The Times-Picayune, August 27, 2009 2009. Times-Picayune Staff, "Historic Phillis Wheatley Elementary School Torn Down in Tremé," The Times-Picayune, June 17, 2011 2011.
153 Phone Interview with Sarah De Bacher, vice president of the Holy Cross Neighborhood Association, April, 2012.
a frustrating lack of information and transparency of process in the series of events that ultimately led to the church’s destruction, and the abandonment of the historic school.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{154} Verderber, \textit{Delirious New Orleans: Manifesto for an Extraordinary American City}: 205-32.
Holy Cross Neighborhood Recovery
TREMÉ

Esplanade Ridge Historic District, 1980
Local Historic District, 1998

6th Ward
Drainage Basin 1
Census Tracts 39, 40, 44.01, 44.02
NONRP Recovery District 4
UNOP Planning District 4
Tremé is a locally designated historic district regulated by the HDLC and also lies within the Esplanade Ridge National Historic District. Tremé's southern limit shares its boundaries with the rear-side of the Vieux Carre at Rampart Street; the historic perimeter of the original city. Though one of New Orleans’s oldest neighborhoods, Tremé was not designated until 1998, one of the latest designations to the local register prior to Hurricane Katrina.\textsuperscript{155} The district is irregular in shape but includes the area bounded by, Rampart Street, St. Bernard Avenue, North Claiborne Avenue, and the uptown side of Esplanade Avenue, North Broad Street, and Orleans Avenue. The area between North Claiborne Avenue and North Rampart Street is subject to the full control of the HDLC, while the remaining area above North Claiborne Avenue is subject only to control of demolition and demolition by neglect.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{155} Crutcher, \textit{Treme: Race and Place in a New Orleans Neighborhood}: 18.
\textsuperscript{156} Hawkins and Barrier, "Historic Districts." The reduced provisions in this area do not include regulation of new construction or alterations to property by the HDLC. The National Register designation recommends that contributing buildings in this area follow state guidelines (the Secretary of the Interior Guidelines) for any alterations. This area of Tremé experienced the highest levels of flooding in the neighborhood following Hurricane Katrina.
Historic Significance

Tremé falls under the large Esplanade Ridge Historic District designated to the National Register in 1980, which meets the Secretary of the Interior Evaluation criterion A, and C:

“The Esplanade Ridge Historic District represents an aspect of the city's French social and architectural heritage which parallels the American development of the Garden District. This can be seen in its almost 1500 creole style residence. It contains an even greater number of late-19th and early-20th century buildings. Taken as a whole, the area represents the architectural history of Louisiana from 1830 to 1930. More importantly it represents one of the largest and most impressive concentrations of fifty to one hundred and fifty year old buildings in the nation, with over four thousand buildings and only about three hundred intrusions.”157

The large National Register district encompasses the Tremé, Lafitte, Sixth Ward, and Bayou St. John neighborhoods, and parts of the Seventh Ward and Fairgrounds that are adjacent to Esplanade Ridge as it runs from St. Claude, out to Bayou St. John.158 The collection under a single designation reflects many aspects of city's heritage through a mixture of building types, styles and a multiplicity of construction periods that represent many generations of New Orleans architecture. The combination of historic district designations serves different purposes to the neighborhood, and triggers different impacts in the post-disaster recovery. The designations layer local regulatory protection to strengthen the honorific National Register status. The local protection is legislated to maintain the character of the district, while the National Register designation encourages the preservation of the district with no regulatory power to protect the physical fabric.

157 “Esplanade Ridge National Register Historic District,” (Louisiana: Office of Cultural Development Division of Historic Preservation). National Register Criteria for Evaluation, “The quality of significance in American history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture is present in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects that possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association, and: A. That are associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history; or C. That embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction.”
Though the National Register designation attaches Tremé to Esplanade Ridge, the district is instead a growth out of the Vieux Carre. The basic lot shape and lot coverage - the pattern of buildings built to the sidewalks - as well as the variety of building types are more characteristic of the dense French Quarter. However, in Tremé there is an overall scale difference, and a feeling of more openness.\textsuperscript{159} The area is predominately residential; its dwellings small in scale, and vernacular in design and construction. The residential architectural inventory evolved from the French and the Spanish and was adapted to its contemporary context according to the time and locale.\textsuperscript{160} Faubourg Tremé exhibits a variety of historic New Orleans house-types; the Creole cottage, the one and two level side-hall house, the center-hall villa, and the shotgun house. As a collection, they represent a full array of nineteenth century decorative styles. Each housing type maintains the neighborhood’s cohesion through integrity of proportion, scale, texture, and in overall massing.\textsuperscript{161} Creole cottages and Shotgun houses in their innumerable variations are the most abundant in the neighborhood, and each house expresses a particular architectural style and decorative expression. Identifiable characteristics of the shotgun house type in Tremé include the use of pastel and bright colors, and the machine-formed decorative elements that integrate individuality to the houses while simultaneously weaving together the neighborhood’s streetscapes. The hybrid and vernacular architecture combined with odd lots sizes lends a level of structural complexity to the historic neighborhood. The residential landscape is dotted with corner stores, bars, and occasionally more monumental churches and schools.

**Neighborhood Development**

Tremé is one of the oldest African American neighborhoods in the United States dating back to the late eighteenth century. Tremé was named for Claude Tremé, who came to New Orleans from France by 1785 and bought a large portion of the former Morand Plantation on Bayou Road. The history of the neighborhood is in fact the history of the road to Bayou St. John.\textsuperscript{162} The Bayou road - the southern portion of which has been renamed Governor Nicholls Street today -

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item 159 Ibid.
  \item 160 Toledano and Christovich, *Volume 6: Faubourg Treme and the Bayou Road*: 111.
  \item 161 Ibid., 112. Edwards, "New Orleans Shotgun: A Historic Cultural Geography," 52. Throughout the Spanish colonial period, the city’s standard small house was the Creole cottage. The roof ridges of all gabled Creole cottages are parallel to the front of the house and the street.
  \item 162 Toledano and Christovich, *Volume 6: Faubourg Treme and the Bayou Road*: xi.
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Most abundant in Treme are the Creole cottages and shotgun houses in their innumerable variations; each house expresses a particular architectural style and decorative expression. Identifiable characteristics of the shotgun house type in Tremé include the use of pastel and bright colors, and the machine-formed decorative elements that integrate individuality to the houses while simultaneously weaving together the neighborhood’s streetscapes.

Treme, January 2012. Image, author.
predated the European city, and followed a narrow Native American path following high ground that led from the Mississippi River to an intersection with Bayou St. John. The portage was part of the natural levee contiguous with the bayou as it curved its way to Lake Pontchartrain. The tracks of land on either side of the Bayou Road were developed into plantations, which were limited in depth due to the undeveloped swamps beyond. The important collection by the Friends of the Cabildo, New Orleans Architecture, complied in the 1970s sketch the history of the Faubourg through the colorful transactions and legal documents that trace the development of the area's built environment. The documents reveal the customs and life-styles of the inhabitants, and recall the personalities and interactions among families, curators, tutors, and friends that were defined during both the French and Spanish Colonial periods. The land transactions of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries tell of the area being settled by Creoles, especially free people of color and refugees from what are now Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Early residents included builders, architects, land speculators and developers, planters, plantation owners, philanthropists, and military officers.

Cultural Identity

In Tremé: Race and Place in a New Orleans Neighborhood, social geographer, Michael Crutcher documents the integration of Tremé’s society with its built environment. He identifies three dominant identities in the neighborhood prior to the disaster: Tremé as a place of historic architecture, a place of unique African American cultural performance traditions, and a place of significant African American political achievement. Beyond location and appearances, Tremé's significance is tied to its representation within the larger city, what Crutcher sees as the “meanings people have attached to the neighborhood both inside and outside its boundaries.” Tremé is the setting for the colorful and vibrant second line parading traditions unique to New Orleans. In these traditions – distinct from the main street parades – there is no separation of the procession and the audience as it parades through the streets of residential neighborhoods.

163 Ibid.
164 Ibid., xii.
165 Ibid., xiv.
166 Crutcher, Treme: Race and Place in a New Orleans Neighborhood: 16.
167 Ibid.
168 Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, "Treme/Lafitte Neighborhood Snapshot".
Tremé is also a neighborhood where jazz funerals have a long history and are still performed. The masking tradition of the Mardi Gras Indian continues as a tribute to the relationship that African Americans and Native Americans developed as oppressed peoples during the city's colonial and early American periods. Subsequently, Tremé was the site of political activism carried out by its Creole of color residents in the nineteenth century – Crutcher uses the word Creoles and the phrase, Creole of color to describe the descendants from the eighteenth and nineteenth-century relationships between African women and white men. Each of these traditions are rooted in - and have developed - a unique cultural landscape. The National Register designation report fails to describe the architecture specific to Tremé, let alone its significant cultural identity. The HDLC Historic District brochure attributes the district’s “distinctive culture” to the collection of artifacts held by the neighborhood’s Backstreet Cultural Museum, which fails to acknowledge the dynamic and living nature of the traditions. It is the physical manifestation of the built environment including the neighborhood bars, churches, cemeteries, streets, and homes where these traditions lend and derive meaning.

Neighborhood Change

Ironically, Louis Armstrong Park was conceived as the thirty-acre development for a cultural center for the City of New Orleans and in the 1960s nine square blocks of historic houses were leveled to make way for the urban renewal project. The new park amalgamated the National Register Historic Place, Congo Square, a nineteenth century slave and Indian marketplace where African religious and musical customs were practiced and developed. Two historic jazz sites, Economy Hall, and the Gypsy Tea Room were leveled in the renewal campaign. Prior to the storm, the park and complex were in varying levels of disrepair and fenced off to the surrounding district – except for its entrance towards the French Quarter at Rampart Street. The Tremé neighborhood fell victim to urban renewal projects and still suffers from the scar created by the Federal Highway Administration’s Interstate 10 reroute through Tremé, the consequence of the preservation success in the battle for the Vieux Carre’s waterfront. The project eliminated the

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170 Ibid., 17. The author also argues that in New Orleans, the term Creole also calls to mind the act of racial passing, “the act of situational or permanently living as a white person to gain the social or economic benefits of whiteness.”
171 Hawkins and Barrier, "Historic Districts."
oak-tree lined neutral ground of North Claiborne Avenue the spine of the neighborhood's business district that catered to downtown African Americans excluded from shopping in the segregated Canal Street establishments.\textsuperscript{172} The Tremé Community Improvement Association was organized in 1969 to protect the neighborhood from further civic renewal projects. Tremé's ethnically diverse and prosperous character has been in decline from the 1930s, and the interstate literally facilitated urban flight from the inner city to the developing suburbs and peripheral cities, contributing to the abandonment and blight that has challenged Tremé ever since. Prior to Katrina, many of the homes and buildings in Tremé were in mild to moderate disrepair, largely due to a lack of community resources to ensure sufficient maintenance of the historic properties.\textsuperscript{173}

The U.S. Census 2000 data confirmed the neighborhood’s racial composition as 92 percent African American; a significantly higher proportion than the city’s 67 percent. In Tremé, the average resident earned $19,564 per year and 44 percent earning less than $10,000.\textsuperscript{174} Homeownership in Tremé was relatively low with just 22 percent of the households owner-occupied. A closer examination of the housing stock shows that 69 percent of the structures in Tremé were built before 1950 and more than 20 percent of all housing in Tremé was listed as vacant. In their account of the recovery unfolding in Treme following the Hurricane, MIT Professors Isabelle Maret and Barbara Allen indicate that a significant portion of these vacant properties had also appeared on the City of New Orleans' listing of blighted and abandoned properties before the storm.\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{172} Crutcher, Treme: Race and Place in a New Orleans Neighborhood: 12.
\textsuperscript{174} GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3), http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/8/20/income.html. The neighborhood median values are approximated from the median income data by Census Tract from the U.S. Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3), http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_00_SF3_DP3&prodType=table. The median household income is disparate across the neighborhood’s four census tracts ranges from $4,621 (this census tract encompasses the Lafitte Public Housing projects) to $21,360 (this census tract is encompasses the river side of North Claiborne Avenue closest to the French Quarter).
Hurricane Katrina

Following the storm, according to the U.S. ACS 2010, Treme saw a total population decline of 53 percent (compared to the city’s total 29 percent decline). There was a significant decline in the neighborhood’s African American population by 62 percent to only 75 percent of the total neighborhood population. Though the neighborhood’s overall population declined, there was a significant increase in White and Asian populations in the area over the ten-year period – specifically, the White population increase almost 70 percent from 5 percent in 2000, to over 17 percent of the total population by 2010. The data reiterates the city’s aging population in Tremé, and reflects a significant reduction in population under 18 years of age since 2000. The total number of housing units in the area declined by 28 percent, with the vacancy rate rising to almost 40 percent of the total housing units. Comparatively between 2000 and 2010, owner occupied homeownership increased to 34 percent of the total households. Both owner occupied and renter occupied groups saw a decline by 2010, with renters disproportionally reduced by 50 percent.\footnote{GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) Five Year Estimate 2006-2010, http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/8/HolyCross/index.html. It cannot be discerned from the demographic and housing data collected by the census whether these patterns represent homeowners returning to Tremé to rebuild. However the slow rate of renter occupied return to Tremé speaks to the larger challenge of ensuring low-to-moderate renter-households the ability and right to return.}

While the total number of housing units in the area did decline by 28 percent, the properties listed as vacant significantly rose to 37 percent of the total housing units in the neighborhood. Homeownership seems to have increased with 34 percent of the houses now owner-occupied, however still showing a significant proportion of renters.\footnote{All census data extracted from the U.S. Census 2000 and 2010; and from Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, "Treme/Lafitte Neighborhood Snapshot".}

The neighborhood’s location - on the edge of the Mississippi River’s natural levee - safeguarded the historic district from complete inundation by floodwaters when the 17th Street and London Avenue levees were breached following Hurricane Katrina. Extensive flood damage was mitigated in the highest areas of the neighborhood closest to the Mississippi River and Esplanade Ridge; the flooding generally didn’t reach the floor levels of the raised historic homes. Three to four feet of flooding was seen in most of the neighborhood above Claiborne Avenue, which reached a depth of five to six feet along its Orleans Avenue boundary. The neighborhood also...
sustained severe damage from wind during the storm, and high reports of fire and vandalism in its aftermath. The initial flooding was intensified by the failure of the pumping stations, unable to continue to operate under flooded conditions, particularly as the levee walls gave way to storm surges.

**Blight**

Though the flooding damage wasn’t considered as severe across Tremé, compared to the city’s lower lying areas, the storm severely exacerbated the existing condition of many of the buildings in the neighborhood. Blight was a major problem in the neighborhood before the storm – with 20 percent properties listed as vacant. In the intermediate years of the storm’s aftermath, these properties were considered storm-damaged properties – the majority of which were featured between one or both of the city or FEMA’s damage determination and demolition lists. continues to be a visual measure of Katrina’s devastation across the neighborhood, and the city.

Continuing to deal with blight remains a major priority for the city, particularly in its code enforcement department and the New Orleans Recovery Authority (NORA). The GNOCDC confirmed in its 2010 Annual Report, *Optimizing Blight Strategies*, that as of September 2010, one in four residential addresses in the city were blighted or vacant. Though blight continues to be a visual measure of Katrina’s devastation across the neighborhood, the report reiterates that it was not the 2005 levee failures following Hurricane Katrina that were to blame for the extent of the problem. Blight is the direct result of population loss. It became evident in the city's plans following the storm that the established institution of historic preservation was put at odds with the city administration in their continuing goals to eradicate blight in the city. The city's administration quickly exploited the storm as justification for the wide scale clearance of the city's extensive collection of blighted properties.

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180 Allison Plyer, Elaine Ortiz, and Kathryn L. S. Pettit, "Optimizing Blight Strategies: Deploying Limited Resources in Different Neighborhood Housing Markets," (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, The Urban Institute, 2010).
In Treme, blight continues to be a visual measure of Katrina’s devastation across the neighborhood. The report stressed that it was not the 2005 levee failures following Hurricane Katrina that were to blame for the extent of the problem. Blight is the direct result of population loss. Blighted church building in Treme, January 2012. Image, author.
A corporation of the state, NORA was established in 1968 to undertake community improvement projects in conjunction with the city plans and policies to prevent the spread of blight in the city. Following Hurricane Katrina, the agency acquired properties that were blighted before the storm, as well as those abandoned and blighted as a result of the damage. In collaboration with the city council, the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA), federal agencies, NORA’s statutory powers were developed into a focus on comprehensive neighborhood redevelopment. The agency was also charged as the designated receiver of all properties voluntarily sold to the Louisiana Land Trust through the Road Home program. This gave the agency control over a significant number of historic properties.

The perceived state of New Orleans's building stock proved to be a challenge to the representation of historic preservation within the context of the neighborhood reconstruction-planning dialogue following Hurricane Katrina. For the general public, historic preservation is about the survival of the past, and in moments of crisis, such concerns - as noble as we perceive them to be - are considered luxuries. The assumption persisted, that only true progress - physical, economic, or cultural - must be based on that which is newly constructed. The historic resources in New Orleans were considered, by some, as depreciated, broken, and irrelevant. Vacant and blighted properties were solely breeding grounds for vermin and crime, and unsightly obstructions to streetscapes. Difficulty arose as historic preservation regulatory processes were deemed a hindrance to residents urgently wanting access back to their homes and neighborhoods. These attitudes present a challenge to preservation and illustrate a general failure in the city to understand the value of preservation at the \textit{tout ensemble} level. Too many in the preservation community vacant and abandoned properties in historic districts maintained inherent significance in architectural value, contribution to the districts \textit{tout ensemble}, and more importantly present viable housing stock suitable for rehabilitation and re-habitation.


183 Matero, "On Repair and Reparation".
Emergency Response

In realizing the unprecedented threat to the city’s historic built fabric, across such a large percentage of the city’s neighborhoods, the HDLC streamlined their permitting requirements in order to expedite the recovery process and prevent further damage.184 The modifications to their regulatory rules included a waiver on the repair and replacement of roofing material. The HDLC information sheet as disseminated by the PRCNO's Welcome Home Workshops, outlined the most common repairs to historic structures following a hurricane.185 These repairs or replacements were to be permanent with no stipulation for temporary roofing. Many of these amended regulations were handled under "Emergency Repair" applications that served as pre-check forms that could be stamped and signed by HDLC staff. These forms - established only in reaction to the disaster - functioned as applications, guidelines, and approvals and enabled returning residents to expedite the process which was not feasible due to the skeleton staff and funding cuts faced by the HDLC following the hurricane.186

Protecting roof damage – mainly caused by wind damage in the storm – was important immediately following the storm, to prevent rain from further damaging the property. As the crisis moved to response in the city, preservationists began to realize the impact of the decision of the FEMA-U.S. Army Corps of Engineers program, Operation Blue Roof to uphold its standard disqualification of asbestos, slate, tile and metal roofs, from receiving temporary “blue roofs” or tarps, following Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath.187 The agency decision was based on safety and liability concerns, yet the disqualification largely affected older properties throughout New Orleans’s historic neighborhoods. The Tarps New Orleans (TNO) pilot program – founded by Alice-Anne Krishnan in coordination with the National Center for Preservation

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184 Historic District Landmarks Commission, "City of New Orleans Expedited Permitting Process," in Welcome Home Workshop (New Orleans: Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans, 2005). In the initial survey, buildings were categorized Green (building is safe to enter and lawful occupancy permitted), Yellow (building is damaged but repairable), and Red (Building is damaged and unsafe to enter. Occupancy is prohibited). Structures were also classified blue or purple according to historic significance. Many of the determinations and designations in the city seem to use nominal year like "pre-1950s buildings."

185 "HDLC Emergency Certificate of Appropriateness."

186 "City of New Orleans Expedited Permitting Process."

187 Interview with Alice-Anne Krishnan, New Orleans, January 2012.
Technology and Training (NCPTT) - allowed 143 properties to be tarped in the immediate months following the storm and connected with potential resources for preservation.

**A Vision for Recovery**

The Treme historic district fell under District Four’s City of New Orleans Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan for the 6th Ward, Treme, and Lafitte neighborhoods. The plan outlined the community’s vision for its recovery which concentrated on providing “a safe, distinctive, functional neighborhood framework, with institutions and services on par with those of other areas within the city.” Three neighborhood recovery goals included: rebuilding to “pre-Katrina levels in some respects, but clearly to “better than before” levels in others; providing affordable residential opportunities; and, designing an improved civic environment of community resources.

**Housing**

The numerous neighborhood recovery plans established housing as a top priority. There were a series of city, state, and federal initiatives that were planned for New Orleans’s residents to assist them in the process of rebuilding their livelihoods. However, the tools to access the initiatives were not readily made available, and were often proven to be detrimental to historic preservation objectives. For example, in order for homeowners to obtain a building permit for repairs, a house must be raised to FEMA's elevation standards if the estimated cost to repair the structure to its pre-storm condition was more than 50 percent of what it would cost to rebuild new. On the

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189 Campanella, Morrish, and Schimmenti, "District Plans: District 4," 5.
190 Ibid., 52.
191 Karen Sommer Shalett, "To Raise or to Raze... That is the Question: Experts Look at the Issues Involved in Homeowners' Decisions," *Building Materials Reuse Association*, http://www.bmra.org/resources/library/105-general-news/123-to-raise-or-to-raze----that-is-the-question.
other hand, in order to get a building permit and thus money from FEMA and insurance companies to rebuild, a house must have sustained less than 50 percent damage. The lack of major structural damage in parts of Tremé resulted in the historic district being spared the requirement to incorporate FEMA’s Base Flood Elevation guidelines, which would have severe impacts on the historic and architectural character of the neighborhood. The other option provided for homeowners was to demolish the structure. The sheer uncertainty of homeowners about the rules, and the inconsistency of the city’s application and interpretation of the policies was a separate hurdle in and of itself continuing for years following the storm. Tremé, like other neighborhoods faced citywide obstacles that included unnecessary demolition, the negative impact of proposed development projects to the sense of neighborhood, a lack of resources, overzealous gutting of historic house interiors, as well as the looting of character-defining elements, lack of business, and an understaffed HDLC.

**Funding for Homeowners**

Tremé captures what happened throughout the city in regards to federal aid. Homeowners were slow to receive the primary post-disaster funding assistance from the State’s Road Home program reimbursing owners for storm-related damages, up to a limit of $150,000. Residents had to finalize their choices, find contractors, and dig up other financial resources, such as insurance, a difficult task for many.\(^{192}\) Instead of enabling the restoration and rebuilding, the bureaucratic nightmare tied to the financial help mostly served to frustrate residents and slow down rebuilding progress. The Road Home program presented different programs, where eligible homeowners may receive up to $150,000 in compensation for their losses in order to get them back into their homes.\(^{193}\) The program included three different compensation options: to enable homeowners to stay in their homes, to permit them to purchase replacement homes in Louisiana, or to permit them to sell their homes and choose not to remain in the state.\(^{194}\) The main program supports homeowners who agree to stay in the state for three years after they receive assistance and have

\(^{192}\) Maret and Allen, "Treme: The Challenges of an Equitable Recovery in New Orleans." Other shortfalls in reimbursements by insurance companies were due to under insurance and lack of coverage for wind related damage. Road Home was designed to reimburse owners for the difference between the cost of rebuilding and what they were awarded by their insurance companies for damages.


\(^{194}\) Ibid.
the financial capacity to rebuild quickly or buy a new house, as the funds provided were usually not sufficient to rehabilitate a damaged home. However in neighborhoods like Tremé, many residents were renters. The failure to quickly organize a program for rental properties had major consequences for the housing stock throughout the city as occupants couldn’t return if the houses weren’t fixed. Particularly damaging within the inner city historic neighborhoods, vacated sites – made so by means of demolition - remained vacant due to the narrow city lots maintained by city zoning – which proved unattractive to contemporary construction in many instances.

In light of the slow federal funding through the state program, the National Trust led advocacy efforts for the federal government to establish a specific federal preservation grant fund for the disaster struck Louisiana that would be implemented through the State Historic Preservation Office and the National Park Service. The National Trust for Historic Preservation advocated for a $60 million fund for this purpose across the Gulf Coast states that ultimately established the Historic Building Recovery Grant Program (HBRGP). Louisiana received an $11.2 million allocation in July, 2006, and another $10 million in May, 2007. The Lieutenant Governor, Mitch Landrieu - in his position as director of the Louisiana State Department of Culture, Recreation, and Tourism - challenged the criticisms directed at the government for its slow response. The program forced a 45-day limit on evaluations to applications for the funding, and the money was put into the hands of grant recipients so that could immediately begin to repair their homes. The hurried nature of the funding program meant that homeowners often received rebuilding funds before they had received other recovery aid - which resulted in the HBRGP money – capped at $45,000 - being used to reestablish basic utilities to the houses before restorations to the historic fabric could be considered.

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197 Gay, "Written Testimony of Patricia H. Gay Executive Director Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans." Interview with Dabne Whitemore, Director Historic Building Mitigation Grant, New Orleans, January 13, 2012. In Louisiana there were 1,243 applications deemed eligible from the 1,884 submissions. There were a total of 568 grants awarded across both appropriations – 519 of which were awarded in Orleans Parish.
Public Housing

This situation became even more problematic once Mayor Ray C. Nagin and the city council gave the go-ahead, in March 2008 to demolish the neighborhood’s Lafitte Housing Project. This decision was heavily criticized by many housing advocates, who argued: “Lafitte was better designed and maintained than the other complexes being razed and that it was an integral part of the culturally rich 6th Ward.”¹⁹⁸ David Schrayer in his Lessons Learned on the disaster responses and their effect on housing in New Orleans, argued that the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) - had taken virtually no movement to repair housing units under its jurisdiction that could bring back many of the displaced, predominately African American families that had resided in public housing pre-Katrina.¹⁹⁹ HANO had been under HUD receivership since 2002, and before the storm HUD had been planning to redevelop all HANO properties into mixed income housing under the agency’s HOPE VI program. The storm provided the opportunity to accelerate the controversial process. HANO boarded up the units that were left largely intact following the storm and despite pressure; the majority of the structures were demolished. Three original brick buildings were retained and rehabilitated due to pressure from the National Trust for Historic Preservation.

Before the storm, Tremé represented a neighborhood that was more than the sum of its buildings. The neighborhood was a thick concentration of social and cultural heritage, which endowed the area with its defining essence and identity. To enable total recovery, familial, social, and religious networks of survivors and evacuees must be reconnected. Lawrence Vale and Thomas Campanella describe urban recovery as one that: "occurs network by network, district by district, not just building by building; it is about reconstructing the myriad social relations embedded in schools, workplaces, childcare arrangements, shops, places of worship, and places of play and recreation."²⁰⁰ These often intangible – and difficult to measure - networks are based in place. The unique concentration of structures, cultural places and social relations are distinct and

¹⁹⁹ Schrayer, "New Orleans Affordable Housing Assessment: Lessons Learned a Report on the Responses to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma and their Effects on the State of Housing."
identifiable within Tremé and comprise the neighborhood’s *tout ensemble* within the larger city’s whole. This requires historic preservation to employ existing legislative frameworks to enable the continuation and protection of these networks through the protection of the familiar network infrastructure and places occupied.
Broadmoor National Register Historic District, 2003
Boundary Expansion, 2007

12th, 13th, 14th Wards
Drainage Basin 1
Census Tracts 103, 112, 123
UNOP Planning District 3
Historic Significance

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the Broadmoor Historic District was the city’s most recent designation to the National Register of Historic Places. The designation report identified Broadmoor as neighborhood in New Orleans that contributes to an area largely unwritten in the narratives of the city's urban vernacular development. The neighborhood was deemed eligible for listing according to its age – the neighborhood’s period of significance is over 50 years old – and by meeting the Secretary of the Interior Evaluation Criterion C. Broadmoor's designation identified and ascribed significance to two important contributions to the architectural history of the city:

“… (1) Its large collection of styled shotguns and basement houses makes an important contribution to New Orleans’ distinctive architectural identity. (2) It is a good representative historic twentieth century neighborhood reflecting the range of styles popular at the time. The period of significance spans from c.1910, when the first houses were being built, to 1952, the Register’s present 50 year cutoff.”

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the nature of the National Register listing did not regulate the property rights of homeowners of historic properties but provided the expert documentation necessary for desired local designation. The listing also granted eligibility to properties within the boundaries to qualify for the Louisiana State Residential Tax Credit, which is aimed at making rehabilitation of historic homes more affordable. The designation was prompted by a major undertaking of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in their mitigation

201 "Broadmoor National Register Historic District," (Louisiana: Office of Cultural Development Division of Historic Preservation). The Louisiana SHPO believed that to have used something other than the fifty year cutoff would the Broadmoor Historic District was designated to the National Register of Historic Places according to the Secretary of the Interior's Criteria for Evaluation in that "the quality of significance in American history, architecture, archaeology, and culture is present in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects that possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association," and, under Criterion C, the district embodies "the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction."

202 The Louisiana State Office of Cultural Development Division of Historic Preservation, “State Residential Tax Credit,” Tax Incentive Program, http://www.crt.state.la.us/HP/tax_incentives_program.aspx. Homeowners may qualify for a 20 percent tax credit – or 50 percent for vacant and blighted properties – against their individual state income taxes when they rehabilitate their historic home (primary residence).
efforts to alleviate the repetitive damage done to the neighborhood through ongoing flooding largely due to the inadequate flood control systems that had allowed the area to be developed in the first place.\textsuperscript{203} As part of the Section 106 environmental review procedure, a Register eligible district was identified, and the Broadmoor Improvement Association (BIA) requested that the district be nominated.\textsuperscript{204}

The initial boundaries of the historic district encompassed an area that included approximately fifty percent of the Broadmoor neighborhood. The boundaries were carefully selected to include the highest degree of integrity and architectural significance, and are roughly defined by the city’s major thoroughfares; South Broad Street and Fountainebleau Drive, Milan Street, Octavia Street and South Claiborne Avenue. The district's spine is fashioned by Napoleon Avenue, which is characteristic of the city's wide avenues with its central grassy neutral ground with parallel rows of mature oaks – those that survived the storm. The effect of Napoleon Avenue is to transition the neighborhood from the busy thoroughfares, to the shaded residential streets.

The neighborhood is of a decidedly different scale to many of the city's more historic neighborhoods. The streetscape is defined by raised two story structures, thick brick piers, vast front steps reaching towards the street, a variety of distinctive architectural styles, and the uniform arrangements of homes on wide lots. The variety and combination of architectural type

\textsuperscript{203} U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and Louisiana State Historic Preservation Office, "Memorandum of Agreement: Regarding the Uptown Plan of the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project Orleans Parish, Louisiana," (New Orleans2003). Katy Coyle in conversation with the author, New Orleans, January 10, 2012, and March 20, 2012. There is a certain level of irony in the mitigation efforts undertaken by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The agency needed to improve drainage in the area, because of recurring flooding from heavy rains. The pump station in the neighborhood was eligible for National Register Listing, and was going to be damaged in the process and triggered a survey for eligible properties in its surrounding areas – an Area of Potential Effect (APE). Additionally, in 2001 when the Army Corps of Engineers built the canal under the middle of Napoleon Avenue, it didn’t readjust their pile-driving calculations for the extensive drought the area was experiencing, and the work literally shook dozens of historic homes apart. In trying to protect these buildings, the USACE physically damaged them. However, if they hadn’t this neighborhood would not have been on the register, and the residents would not have been eligible for hundreds of thousands of dollars in grant money post-Katrina.

and gives the district its personality and represents its importance as a part of the city’s collective *tout ensemble*. Most recognizable in the district are the New Orleans basement houses that lend their two-storied scale and distinctive architectural styling to the neighborhood. The National Register designation report identifies this building type as contributing to the architectural significance of the neighborhood:

“Broadmoor has one of the city’s largest, most concentrated and most impressive collections of basement houses. Indeed, one in four houses is a basement house. And almost all make quite a strong architectural statement – from Colonial Revival, to Bungalow, to Mediterranean. And like styled shotguns, basement houses, with their prominent sweeping steps, ‘say’ New Orleans.”205

Referencing the areas low-lying relationship with its environment and constant battle with flooding, the raised basement houses can be read as a styled single story cottage raised a full story on a high basement. The most impressive examples display a prominent flight of exterior steps to reach the upper floor, with the lower story - the above ground basement - historically used for service and storage space. The typical Colonial Revival basement house features grouped Tuscan columns with fanlights over the facade openings; others are interpreted in brick with single story pediment entrance porticos.

In the area’s high concentration of shotgun houses, Broadmoor's expression is typically in the double form. These are most commonly expressed in the Bungalow style, particularly manifest in the residence’s heavy front porches. Most of the bungalow shotgun houses feature a standard symmetrical front with the emblematic battered porch piers and articulated structural members such as wooden rafter ends, purling, and angular brackets. The local hybrid bungalow style double shotguns also exist in the neighborhood and are asymmetrically articulated with an off-center front gable. Shotguns in the Colonial Revival styles are also presented with their porches treated with square or round columns, entablatures, elliptical arched openings, and frontal pediments.

205 "Broadmoor National Register Historic District."
Neighborhood Development

The boundaries of the neighborhood are the remnants of the historic elongated plantations that stretched from the River towards the lake to the north. Until the end of the nineteenth century, Broadmoor was a twelve-acre lake and a part of the natural system of waterways that characterized most of the greater New Orleans area at that time. The swampland and subsequent neighborhood development was made possible by the city's adoption of a comprehensive drainage plan in 1895, and the infrastructure construction campaigns between 1897 and 1915. The draining of this area adjacent to the historic neighborhoods of the city was deemed as critical to public safety and public health, and the newly developable land within the Uptown and Carrollton districts enticed new residential construction from the early twentieth century, especially in the building boom following the first world war in the 1920's, and until the city's population decline following the suburban flight. Churches, the neighborhood's landmarked school, and few commercial properties were also built in this time. Broadmoor's value within the context of the wider context of New Orleans is particularly expressed in its appearance as a historic twentieth century neighborhood whose houses were built in a wide variety of styles. The neighborhood can be read as a spectrum of the wide-ranging architectural eclecticism of the early twentieth century. This is particularly valuable within the context of New Orleans, whose other more highly recognized historic districts are celebrated for architectural styles developed largely before the twentieth century.

Neighborhood Change

Today, the neighborhood remains geographically the lowest point in the city. Its dry land continues to be maintained by the complex system of underground and above ground drainage canals and pumping stations surrounding – and now within - its boundaries. The GNOCDC characterizes the area a middle class family neighborhood, reinforced by a high percentage of

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206 Ibid.
207 Broadmoor Improvement Association, "The Redevelopment Plan for Broadmoor, New Orleans, Louisiana," (New Orleans2006). A series of Yellow Fever epidemics during the latter 1900's created a need to drain the nearby marshes to eradicate the breeding grounds for mosquitoes. The successful push to drain Broadmoor and surrounding marsh areas eliminated the Yellow Fever threat with the 1905 epidemic the last in the United States.
owner-occupied households. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, according to the U.S. Census 2000 data, the Broadmoor neighborhood closely reflected the racial composition of the city. 68 percent of the population was African American, with the proportion of White population largely comprising the difference. The median income range of the neighborhood in 2000 was approximately $16,800 to $39,000, ranging higher than the city’s median of $27,000. Homeownership in Broadmoor was similar with to the city’s proportion with 47 percent owner-occupied, and prior to the storm, only 9.5 percent of the total housing units were considered vacant. The 2000 data presents a picture of a neighborhood with means, not only to evacuate prior to the storm, but also to return home, and rally for the future of their particular place in the city's recovery landscape.

The Broadmoor Civic Improvement Association was established in 1930 to address the needs of the developing Broadmoor neighborhood. The Association was incorporated in 1970 as the Broadmoor Improvement Association, Inc., to protect the “well-established, multi-racial/multi-ethnic community already living in harmony.” The Broadmoor Improvement Association (BIA) is one of the oldest neighborhood associations in New Orleans and seeks to protect the neighborhood’s sense of “awareness, unity, and pride.”

Hurricane Katrina

By 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau ACS data depicted the Broadmoor neighborhood as closely reflecting the greater city’s profile. The neighborhood saw a 26 percent decline in its total population. 61 percent of the neighborhood remained African American, and there was an increase in Hispanic population by 34 percent. According to the data, the total number of housing units only fell a single percent, yet the properties identified as vacant rose significantly

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209 Broadmoor Improvement Association, "The Redevelopment Plan for Broadmoor, New Orleans, Louisiana."
210 Ibid.
to just over 30 percent of the neighborhood's total housing units – over the city’s proportion. Owner-occupancy rates remained similar over the ten-year period.\textsuperscript{211}

The Broadmoor area historically acted as a drainage catch basin for the nearby higher ground formed by the natural banks of the Mississippi River. The curve of the river - establishing the city’s namesake “crescent” - almost entirely surrounds the neighborhood with higher ground. The damage was extensive throughout the neighborhood as Broadmoor sustained five to eight feet of flooding following the two most severe levee breaches at the 17th Street and London Avenue canals, with stagnant water sitting in ruined homes for up to three weeks.\textsuperscript{212} Ironically, the raised basement house types were designed according to the conditions of the flood-prone neighborhood. The basement floor of the raised home, the floor of which sits at grade, was intended strictly for storage or garage space. Following Katrina, the risky trend of converting first floor basements into living space or small rental units was exposed.\textsuperscript{213}

**Broadmoor’s Recovery as a Model**

Broadmoor became the poster-child for post-Katrina neighborhood recovery through the grassroots advocacy of the area’s neighborhood association. Following Hurricane Katrina both short-term planning – getting city services back - and long-term planning were necessary, while civic employees and residents were still scattered across the country. Representative of many of the city's lowest-lying neighborhoods, Broadmoor found itself figuratively removed from the city's initial attempt at a local reconstruction plan and then literally removed from subsequent neighborhood redevelopment planning processes due to its productive reaction to the first. The city’s initial process, directed by the Mayor’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission, presented a set of controversial planning initiatives in its citywide plan that focused on urban design and land...

\textsuperscript{211} All census data from US Census 2000 and 2010, and from Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, "Broadmoor Neighborhood Snapshot".

\textsuperscript{212} Broadmoor Improvement Association, "The Redevelopment Plan for Broadmoor, New Orleans, Louisiana," 7.

use solutions to reduce the risk from future flooding, prioritize redevelopment resources, and sustain key services for a smaller projected population.  

The plan promoted the Urban Land Institute – a national nonprofit education and research organization that focuses on “the use of land in order to enhance the total environment” - study for the “rightsizing” of New Orleans's urban footprint. The proposal endorsed a smaller footprint that sustained key services for the smaller projected population, and placed moratoriums on building permits for rehabilitation and renovation in the worst flood-affected areas would require these neighborhoods to demonstrate at least 50 percent inhabitation before infrastructure would be rebuilt. The plan was heavily criticized by the displaced residents of these parts of the city, whose neighborhoods were targeted for conversion into green space for water management systems, denoted to residents via green dots superimposed over their districts. No policies were proposed to facilitate resident's replacement to other parts of the city, and historic preservation was not addressed, particularly in what was to become of historic buildings that were situated within the proposed zones of abandonment. The plans failed to take into account the values and interests of significant portions of the city's population, and the shrinking footprint was ultimately viewed as a means to keep many African American residents from returning.

Broadmoor was one such neighborhood that through its residents demanded the right to return to their houses in their original neighborhoods, prompting the mayor and the city council to reject proposals for a smaller footprint and, instead, to allow redevelopment in all areas of the city, even those most vulnerable to future storm damage. In rejection to the ill-fated proposal to reduce the geographic footprint of the city, an almost feudal condition emerged in which new neighborhood organizations were created across the city, each with its own self-interest, goals,

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215 Ibid. Verderber, "The Unbuilding of Historic Neighborhoods in Post-Katrina New Orleans," 262. The Urban Land Institute (ULI) is a national land use and real estate think tank.
216 Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, and Laska, "Planning, Plans, and People: Professional Expertise, Local Knowledge, and Governmental Action in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans," 29. The other areas that were labeled green space in the proposed plan included the Lower Ninth and parts of the Seventh Ward, Filmore, St. Bernard and Orleans East neighborhoods which have a large African American population.
217 Ibid.
and political constituencies. The Broadmoor Community Development Corporation was one of the first such confederations to form from the well-established Broadmoor Improvement Association, as if in direct defiance of the report's recommendation to create green space at the center of their neighborhood. The Association, with the assistance of Harvard, MIT, Bard and Purdue Colleges completed a rebuilding plan in direct defiance of the city's formal plan. The families and individuals that returned to Broadmoor had a combination of money and the sheer will to return. Generally these were the citizens of some means, and places of personal importance to them, along with their sense of place attachment remained intact or salvageable.

Historic preservation concerns in the neighborhood were not present in the traditional or institutional sense. Instead neighborhood advocates used preservation tools functionally in order to foster the future protection of the neighborhood. By doing so, federal grants could be funneled into the neighborhood specifically for historic properties. Every property in their neighborhood was included in a photographic database complied by the universities, and repeated surveys of all 2,400 properties allowed tracking of the intentions of all property owners in the area. Most importantly, however was the impact of the National Register listing in shaping the neighborhood following Hurricane Katrina, as federal funding was channeled into the city for direct application to the city's recovery. Subsequently - through FEMA's Section 106 requirements - the historic district was resurveyed and its boundaries expanded in 2007. A possible tax credit project was the immediate impetus for SHPO staff to take a fresh look at the northern end of the Broadmoor neighborhood. A building-by-building analysis revealed that there were indeed more noncontributing buildings - than in the existing district - however, it was deemed a small enough percentage to render it eligible for the Register.

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219 Broadmoor Improvement Association, "The Broadmoor Improvement Association,” http://www.broadmoorimprovement.com/BIA/Welcome.html. The group's website reports that it has "leveraged more than $48 million in outside investments and brought in more than 13,000 volunteers, who have committed 362,000 hours to Broadmoor."
221 Kuranda and Coyle, "National Register Assessment of the Broadmoor Neighborhood, New Orleans, Orleans Parish, Louisiana."
City Planning Processes

Mayor Nagin was reelected in 2006 after he distanced himself from the contentious BNOB Commission plan and resisted debates on the politically damaging land use and planning issues. Following his reelection the mayor declared a new recovery strategy.\textsuperscript{222} The city council's New Orleans Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan (NONRP) process was based on the assumption that all areas of the city would be rebuilt. The city council identified the need for resident-generated priorities, and focused the disparate efforts of all the neighborhood groups in order to provide technical assistance to develop project lists, procure funding to facilitate the rebuilding of neighborhoods citywide.\textsuperscript{223} The final NONRP plan included forty-nine of the seventy-six official New Orleans Neighborhoods, ignoring those areas with minimal or no flooding. The plan proved threatening to preservation as the plan's highest-priority land-use initiative was focused on demolition and debris removal. The plan also initiated the “Lot-next-door Program” to counter the "unplanned mix of occupied and vacant houses," where property owners were given the first opportunity to buy the adjacent lot.\textsuperscript{224} As Broadmoor's own neighborhood plan was developed independently of the NONRP process, it was not formally incorporated into the final plan.\textsuperscript{225} Reportedly, it was this exclusion that motivated the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) to approach philanthropic organizations for funding for the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP).\textsuperscript{226}

This Plan was drafted to incorporate the NONRP reports, but included plans for all city neighborhoods, as the LRA would only accept a citywide plan that addressed both the flooded and un-flooded neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{227}

\textsuperscript{222} Olshansky and Johnson, \textit{Clear as Mud: Planning for the Rebuilding of New Orleans}: 76.
\textsuperscript{223} Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, and Laska, "Planning, Plans, and People: Professional Expertise, Local Knowledge, and Governmental Action in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans," 30. The approach was consistent with the city council members' charge to represent their constituents.
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid., 31. Olshansky and Johnson, \textit{Clear as Mud: Planning for the Rebuilding of New Orleans}: 121. The "lot-next-door" policy challenged preservation where vacant structures were demolished to allow larger yards for participating residents. This portion of the plan was implemented by the city.
\textsuperscript{226} The Rockefeller Foundations offered $3.5 million to assist in the planning process.
Unsurprisingly, the UNOP's emergence at the closing of the NONRP planning campaign caused confusion among residents about the legitimacy of the city council planning process as the UNOP enhanced resident and neighborhood groups' participation. Conceptually, Broadmoor was included in the plan under recovery District 3. However, the uncertainty became evident at the conclusion of the process, when the city council approved the UNOP Plan without the input of the Broadmoor Improvement Association. Emerging through the hazy climate of planning processes, Broadmoor became representational for what New Orleans residents could do on their own to revive the city. In the three years following Hurricane Katrina, a remarkable 79 percent of Broadmoor's flooded properties were restored. "Broadmoor is rich in human capital," said Tulane University urban geographer Richard Campanella. "The community is educated and engaged."  

**Impact of Insurance Regulations**

Under protection of its National Register historic district listing, Broadmoor represents a large proportion of the city's historic neighborhoods not protected under the stronger local designation mandate. The neighborhoods' elevation below sea level and its reliance on pumps and drainage canals - to prevent the area from flooding - continues to threaten significant heritage within the historic district. The recovery goals outlined in the District 3 plan for UNOP, principally focused on the requirement for layered hurricane protection and levee strengthening, and improved storm water drainage.

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228 Ibid. Villmoare and Stillman, "Civic Culture and the Politics of Planning for Neighborhoods and Housing in Post-Katrina New Orleans," 25. The UNOP process approved by the city council in May 2007 largely incorporated all previous planning attempts into a single, citywide rebuilding plan. Association representatives insisted that their plans be included in the final framework sent to the LRA. The overall "recovery framework" involved a series of "recovery projects" however it did not establish how projects were to be accomplished or funded. District 3 received a disproportionate level of flooding and included the uptown neighborhoods of: Dixon, Hollygrove, Leonidas/ West Carrollton, East Carrollton, Marlyville/Fontainebleau, Audubon/University, Uptown Triangle/ Black Pearl, Freret, Uptown, and West Riverside. This large recovery district encompassed three different National Register Historic Districts.


Elevations to buildings considered, “intrusions” within the historic district – or non-contributing structures – also greatly affect the character and scale of the neighborhood, and threatens the value of the neighborhood’s collective significance. Elevated building in Broadmoor, April 2006. Image, wikicommmons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:April06_040.jpg
Broadmoor lies entirely within FEMA Flood Zone designation A8 the 100-year floodplain as determined by FEMA, with an average elevation of 1.5 feet above sea level, but with large sections almost four feet below sea level.\textsuperscript{231} Problems with the drainage systems have caused routine flooding within Broadmoor, and initiated more FEMA severe repetitive loss properties than most other New Orleans neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{232} Furthermore, the City of New Orleans participates in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) where regardless of whether residents had flood insurance before Katrina, if they are in a 100-year floodplain they will be required to obtain flood insurance in order to receive a federal grant or loan to repair their structures.\textsuperscript{233}

Though the NFIP contains variance procedures for historic structures, the New Orleans Flood Damage Prevention Ordinance did not include variance procedures for historic structures. Following Katrina, a number Hazard Mitigation and Severe Repetitive Loss grant applications were filed for elevation projects from within the recovering Broadmoor historic district footprint.\textsuperscript{234} These mitigation projects trigger the Section 106 review process and question the interaction of historic preservation regulations with mitigation measures financially incentivized by the federal government. FEMA will only fund a project in a regulatory floodplain that goes to at least the base flood elevation (BFE) or to the most current advisory base flood elevation. FEMA issued their new preliminary base flood maps, finally in August 2006, just under one year

\begin{itemize}
  \item Broadmoor Improvement Association, "The Redevelopment Plan for Broadmoor, New Orleans, Louisiana," 12.
  \item Ibid. Center for Hazards Assessment, "Repetitive Loss Area Analysis #3: City of New Orleans, Broadmoor Neighborhood." Severe repetitive loss properties are defined by the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004, 1-4 family residences that have had four or more claims of more than $5,000 or two to three claims that cumulatively exceed the reported building's value. The Act creates new funding mechanisms to help mitigate flood damage for these properties.
  \item American Planning Association New Orleans Planning Assessment Team, "Charting the Course for Rebuilding a Great American City: An Assessment of the Planning Function in Post-Katrina New Orleans," 9. The hazard mitigation plan for Orleans Parish notes that 69 percent of the structures in Orleans Parish lie within the 100-year floodplain as mapped by FEMA in 1984. The 100-year floodplain generates the base flood elevation (BFE).
  \item Response and Technology Center for Hazards Assessment, "Repetitive Loss Area Revist #1: City of New Orleans, Broadmoor Neighborhood," (New Orleans: University of New Orleans, 2010), 8.
\end{itemize}
following the storm. However, even as New Orleans awaited the long delayed advisory maps, the city's director of permits was approving applications by homeowners to rebuild.235

The University of New Orleans Center for Hazards Assessment, Response and Technology surveyed the Broadmoor Historic District and found that every house had its lowest floor elevation below the existing BFE. Furthermore even in some raised basement homes, where the basement appeared to be used as storage only, the raised first floor of living space was completed below the BFE.236

The most active funding program for mitigation measures following Katrina was the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.237 The periodic flooding that had plagued Broadmoor historically had, ironically, just been reduced following the completion of the Southeast Louisiana Flood Control Project (SELA) drainage project. The historic nature of the repetitive risk and the widespread mistrust of the Army Corps of Engineers’ jurisdiction over the city’s drainage system resulted in homeowners that were eligible under the historic structures variance still selecting to raise their contributing homes above the base flood levels.238 Mitigation by elevation for historic properties inherently impairs the historic character of the structure, through loss and damage to original historic material and through a loss of integrity of design, setting, feeling, and association.239 Elevations to buildings considered, “intrusions” within the historic district also greatly affect the character and scale of the neighborhood, and threatens the value of the neighborhood’s tout ensemble.

235 Schrayer, "New Orleans Affordable Housing Assessment: Lessons Learned a Report on the Responses to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma and their Effects on the State of Housing." Brian Thevenot, "Finally, Rules for Rebuilding: FEMA Targets Slab Home Construction; $2.5 Billion More Slated for Levees," The Times-Picayune, April 13, 2006. “Because of ongoing improvements to the flood-protection system, the base flood elevations for the New Orleans area inside the levees, last adjusted in 1984, were unchanged. Many homeowners had feared dramatic increases in minimum elevation standards after Katrina's floodwaters inundated the city, and preserving the current elevations is an indication that federal officials viewed the flood as caused by problems with the levee system, not an overpowering storm.”
236 Center for Hazards Assessment, "Repetitive Loss Area Analysis #3: City of New Orleans, Broadmoor Neighborhood," 19.
237 The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), authorized by Section 404 of the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. 5170c), funds activities that reduce the impacts of future disasters.
238 Phone conversation with Katy Coyle, March 2012.
239 U.S. Department of the Interior, "How to Apply the National Register Criteria for Evaluation: National Register Criteria for Evaluation".
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>National Register Historic District Designation</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Louisiana Programmatic Agreement signed between FEMA, the Louisiana SHPO, the HDLC, and the ACHP</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Hurricane Rita</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Rebuilding question draws passionate debate: should the city abandon heavily damaged eastern and lakeside subdivisions and rebuild primarily on higher ground, in expectation of smaller population?</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Civic spirit and fear of “footprint shrinkage” inspires the Broadmoor Improvement Association and forms the Broadmoor Community Development Corporation</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>City Council implements the New Orleans Rebuilding Plan (NONRP) or, the Lambert Plan</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>The Louisiana Recovery Authority initiates the United New Orleans Plan (UNOP) attempting to amalgamate the previous planning processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Office of Recovery Management created target areas under Director Ed Blakley</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.2005</td>
<td>Residents allowed back into the city. Only those in the highest areas near the river have basic utilities</td>
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<td>10.2005</td>
<td>Army Corps of Engineers drains city</td>
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<td>01.2006</td>
<td>Mayor Nagin rejects key recommendations of BNOB in the face of lack of support</td>
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<tr>
<td>01.2006</td>
<td>“Bring New Orleans Back Commission” unveils initial recommendations</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>FEMA’s revised Advisory Base Flood Elevation Maps continued to make flood insurance available to heavily flooded areas, thus encouraging their rebuilding</td>
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3. HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN RESPONSE

The different narratives revealed through the recovery of Holy Cross, Tremé, and Broadmoor clearly expose the impact of the storm, and its aftermath, on the existing frameworks of historic preservation in New Orleans. When considered together, the neighborhoods illustrate the complex, multidimensional – and often conflicted – web of recovery imperatives in the city. The long, complicated nature of the story is itself the first lesson. Disaster recovery is a complex process, particularly if it follows an urban catastrophe such as Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. There is no easy way to rebuild after such devastation. Every decision and action has to be made simultaneously. Everyone is under stress, and preexisting conflicts intensify.

In some ways, the recovery narratives in each neighborhood depict how preservation grew in importance as a factor in recovery and reconstruction policy as time went on and the more immediate concerns of safety and emergency infrastructure faded in importance. By untangling each neighborhood’s recovery process set within its particular socio-economic contexts, we are able to identify particular moments that challenged the established frameworks of preservation in the city over this time. The moments of conflict arose at the intersections between the existing historic preservation objectives, the city’s redevelopment visions, and a community’s immediate needs. They are the moments that shape the effective function of historic preservation in the city’s recovery.
CHALLENGES IN THE POST-DISASTER LANDSCAPE

The planning and recovery accounts that have emerged since the storm have presented the myriad of conflicts, opinions, political agendas and priorities. Yet the general consensus between disparate groups seems to be that: “things could have been done better.”\(^{240}\) In light of this, it is logical to examine the responses to the disaster to extract the lessons that can be learned, and find the opportunities to be applied in preparation of future events. By extracting the issues out into their separate pieces, preservationists can begin to see the opportunities where strategic, thoughtful, and creative intervention or advocacy will begin to enhance the functionality of preservation following disasters. This in turn will act to strengthen the value of preservation to the existing communities living within the city’s historic neighborhoods. Bringing these visions together will continue to be local preservationists’ greatest task.

The intersection between the legislation and the recovering communities has been shown within the larger post-disaster setting. The following points of conflict must be examined closely as they address issues specific to preservation while at the same time relating to the larger issues facing the city. The picture generated is one where the frameworks of preservation have been largely compromised. The three case studies present the large variations within the city’s recovery, and how differently neighborhoods endure trauma, and activate and foster their subsequent recovery. These moments of conflict have altered the effectiveness of the existing preservation frameworks in the city. The effects of these challenges were determined by the particular context and moment in time from which they emerged in each neighborhood’s post disaster environment, and the larger issues facing the city. How can preservationists identify the appropriate moments of intervention, and what would these interventions look like? The challenges identify who we, as preservationists, should be working with to initially help them achieve their visions when they align with ours, and, secondly to insert preservation into these visions.

Local Preservation Frameworks

The storm, its aftermath and the ensuing disaster very quickly constrained the ability of the existing local preservation frameworks to work effectively in the city’s historic neighborhoods. The extent of the damage sustained across the city’s neighborhoods simply overwhelmed the already reduced capacity of the city’s historic district landmarks commissions by the sheer amount of processing required. The practical implications of a local city government stretched beyond its functioning capability were made evident as the local preservation frameworks (as well as other city agencies) suffered under a lack of support, personnel, and resources. The nature of the emergency circumstance shifts absolute authority to the executive branch. It is the mayor or other governing official’s personal commitment to preservationist goals that drives the level of involvement historic preservation will have in the recovery of the city. At the neighborhood level, this affected how many of the city’s historic buildings, sites and places were saved in Holy Cross, Tremé and Broadmoor, and how much effort was put into finding alternatives to demolition and advancing documentation. Stephen Verderber believes that within the post-disaster setting, it is important to remember:

“A disaster puts the legitimacy and authority of the government on trial, exposing the shortcomings of political leadership and in some cases even revealing startling abuses of authority. Such revelations can become the catalysts for political change. However, it is important to understand that it is risky to place too much belief in the government following a disaster.”

The public cross-examination of the city government function as a result of the storm’s aftermath roused citizens from their laissez faire attitude of previous decades by encouraging civic participation in the planning of their own futures. However, as Verderber suggests, preservationists in the city cannot rely on a compromised city government to further their goals of post disaster recovery. In New Orleans following the storm, there was little clear relationship or defined coordination between the city’s existing planning and resource management departments mandated by legislation to ensure the city’s recovery and the Mayor’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission pushed forward with this mission immediately following the storm. This problem is not limited only to the city’s Historic District Landmarks Commissions, but

affected the city’s planning department among others. The influx of additional planning and recovery commissions/players in the city not only a result of strained resources but also a lack of transparent understanding as to the mission and job of each department, where did the mandate and expertise of the HDLC fit into the city’s larger recovery vision? The Mayor’s threatened suspension of their duties tells us that it wasn’t considered as either a priority or a tool for the city’s recovery. Furthermore the lack of motivation to share expertise failed to engage with a sustainable and effective way to benefit from the limited resources in these exceptional circumstances. How can we expect a government agency to function with a reduced and remote staff, reduced funding, and experiencing post-disaster trauma stress themselves?

A multitude of players should be implicated in attempting to find solutions to these questions. The American Planning Association’s assessment of the early post-disaster planning climate in New Orleans called for more collaboration between the city’s disparate land use departments.242 Specifically it called for the City Planning Commission and the HDLC to amalgamate their resources by sharing an office in the recovery years which would allow for more cross pollination and a combined review to help maximize the efficiency of the staff. This presents a challenge that speaks to broader issues outside of post disaster circumstances and to the characterization of historic preservation across the United States. To a large extent, the formalization of preservation frameworks purposely separated historic preservation from other city planning departments, as the frameworks were created in reaction to many of the damaging planning policies of the mid twentieth century. In New Orleans a more conducive and feasible relationship should be fostered between the city’s safety and permits department and the HDLC to allow shared expertise to, combine documentation and damage tagging campaigns, and an expedite permit process for home and property owners.

Following the storm the PRCNO identified the roadblock generated by the lack of funding being made available to local authorities to staff the disaster response. Michelle Kimball, Director of Advocacy for the PRCNO, disclosed the expansion of scale in advocacy efforts following the

242 American Planning Association New Orleans Planning Assessment Team, "Charting the Course for Rebuilding a Great American City: An Assessment of the Planning Function in Post-Katrina New Orleans."
storm, now directed towards amendments to the Stafford Act and the federal government.\textsuperscript{243} The goal of the efforts is to allow local authorities to hire additional local employees following disasters through the funding made available from the Federal Government and dictated by the Stafford Act. Although this would not act retroactively, it would prove a positive force in facing the threat of future disasters. It is important for the city to recognize the importance of such advocacy efforts, as success in this area would have far reaching consequences beyond only the effectiveness of the preservation legislative frameworks.

In anticipation of future disasters, what should preservationists be aware of to be able rectify or reduce the negative implications of a compromised legislative function? In a place that exists constantly under threat of natural disaster, New Orleans, should have provisions written into the city’s ordinance specifically for disasters or emergency situations. The challenge of preservationists in the city is to accept a reduced level of protection to historic resources over complete elimination of all procedures applicable to the post disaster context. The HDLC’s emergency regulations implemented in reaction to the storm lack an apparent level of transparency of process and methodology, and an initial step in formalizing this process should focus on solidifying the definition of the duration of these emergency provisions. Currently, the HDLC Ordinance is vague and imprecise citing that the emergency provisions come into effect under “emergency conditions determined to be dangerous to life, health or property."\textsuperscript{244} The uncertainty presented in the vague language questions the measures of such conditions: when should normal procedures come back into effect? Standardizing these processes with the formal disaster declarations could ensure a tangible measure of when these provisions should apply.

The storm and the post-disaster recovery exposed limitations to the current level of protection for historic neighborhoods. Following the heavy flooding the lakeside area of Tremé which was only partially protected under HDLC designation for demolition, and demolition by neglect, saw

\textsuperscript{243} Laureen Lentz, Karen Gadbois, and Michelle Kimball in conversation with the author, New Orleans, January 8, 2012.

\textsuperscript{244} The City of New Orleans, "Section VII: Certificate of Appropriateness." H. This provision provides a solution to individual cases where a property is in such poor condition that it poses an immediate threat to the community. Although this provision could be used during the response to a natural disaster to suspend the requirements of the ordinance, it is limited in scope, and offers no guidance to government officials on how to proceed.
incompatible new construction being built within the historic district without a permit and opportunity for review.

**Blight**

In many of New Orleans historic neighborhoods, it is difficult to isolate the post-disaster conditions from their circumstances prior to the storm. Tremé contained a significant proportion of the city’s blighted properties before Hurricane Katrina, and this number rose dramatically following the disaster. The storm not only accelerated the physical deterioration of abandoned and vacant properties, but it disproportionately affected those communities that had fewer means to return and recover on their own. Even if homeowners could return to their properties they would not have the personal resources to maintain or rehabilitate them.

The problem of blight in the city’s historic neighborhoods has been a challenge for preservationists for a number of interrelated reasons. The issues are complex, and they question the true mandate of preservation working in some of the city’s poorest neighborhoods. The regulations put in place by local historic district designation may be too demanding for low-to-moderate income residents of historic properties to meet, resulting in demolition by neglect or even total abandonment. This issue questions the value of the legislative frameworks in place in these neighborhoods. Traditionally, the city of New Orleans has relied heavily on the local nonprofit preservation organizations, namely the PRCNO, to aid homeowners in managing these regulations. For example the PRCNO RTNO’s home rehabilitation program targets the urban poor, and following Hurricane Katrina, the program modified its mission to include homeowner affected by the disaster. The unprecedented nature of the devastation to historic properties throughout many of the most historic neighborhoods exposes both the importance and the limitations of this dependent relationship. Patricia Gay, the Executive Director of the PRCNO, stressed the need for these programs to be in place immediately following the storm, particularly in the city’s National Register historic districts:

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245 The PRCNO has recognized this in their mission, and have initiated programs to collect; restore and sell back blighted houses. The scale of the epidemic requires a rethink of policy that may allow this mission to be accomplished on a greater scale.
The storm not only accelerated the physical deterioration of abandoned and vacant properties, but it disproportionately affected those communities that had fewer means to return and recover on their own - implying that even if homeowners could return to their properties they would not have the personal resources to maintain or rehabilitate them. Holy Cross, January 2012. Image, author.
"Plans need to be in the making for helping people to restore their homes to livability. Furthermore, without priorities and plans in place, the likelihood increases that owners will not return to their homes and that they, or new owners, will request permits to demolish their buildings, which would not be subject to Section 106 review. Here, there is a concern for the future of all neighborhoods, not just historic neighborhoods."246

The challenge presents itself in finding the right funding sources to support the city’s local preservation nonprofit and neighborhood associations. It is imperative for these organizations to receive funding in the post-disaster landscape; however, the preservation community must ensure that these agencies remain politically independent from their grant sources. The post-disaster landscape illustrated how important these grassroots agencies were to the city’s recovery, in light of the city’s multifaceted rebuilding visions, to give the concerned residents a voice in their own recovery.

In 2010, Alison Plyer, the director of the GNOCDC, stressed that blighted properties are the direct result of the city’s historic population decline. New Orleans’s population has been decreasing since its peak at 627,525 in 1960, and fell to 484,674 in 2000, and 343,829 in 2010, a 29 percent decline. Tremé lost over half its total population in the same ten-year period. Through his work for the National Trust for Historic Preservation, Tulane Law School graduate, Brad Vogel, has understood the need to recast the blight problem in the city in a different light. Instead of characterizing blight as a problem of excessive supply, Vogel believes that there could be hope for a solution if the problem is considered to be insufficient demand for the estimated 43,800 blighted addresses in the city.247 Following the storm, the city’s blight policy emphasized demolition on the assumption that people were not coming back, not enough new people were coming in, and that vacant property would sell better than damaged homes.248 This policy was directed at builders amalgamating lots for larger developments. In order to maintain the historic scale and context of the city’s historic neighborhoods, efforts must instead be made to market the blighted houses for individual buyers looking for affordable living.

246 Gay, "Written Testimony of Patricia H. Gay Executive Director Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans."
247 Vogel, "Don’t Bulldoze Blight. Use it to Lure Newcomers".
In order for this to be successful, the restoration or rehabilitation of historic buildings cannot be seen as the end goal. Preservationists in the city must consider where they can lend their expertise, energy, and creativity in order to entice people to return and rehabilitate whole neighborhoods. Holy Cross is an example where restored and newly constructed houses still remain un-occupied.  

Sarah De Bacher, Vice President of the Holy Cross Neighborhood Association, attributes the loss of the neighborhood’s historic school to the difficulty of attracting families to the historic district. This highlights the importance of a focus and assimilation on the larger recovery initiatives that will ultimately have a knock on effect to ensure preservation’s goals are able to be met. The conditions created out of the disaster have given preservationists the opportunity to engage in fostering resiliency of the city at the neighborhood level.

These issues are ongoing, complex, and pervade much of the city’s time, energy and focus on redevelopment, and recovery initiatives. They are no less straightforward for preservationists, who must articulate the larger social consequences of their decisions and actions. For example, in Tremé, preservationists have to consider the difficulty in mitigating two disparate goals – to entice newcomers into the neighborhoods, while at the same time maintaining the incumbent population and fostering the significance of their cultural and social ties to the historic fabric of the neighborhood. In Holy Cross, preservationists have to find creative ways to integrate their goals, and education, into the community’s beliefs and own visions for the neighborhood.

**Demolition**

The city’s pervasive blight problem before Hurricane Katrina and its escalation following the storm, contributed to local justification for extensive and ongoing demolition campaigns instigated by both the federal and local governments. For preservationists the immediate goal established citywide in New Orleans was to advocate for the stabilization and repair of damaged but salvageable buildings before weather and the elements lead to further erosion of the historic fabric following disasters. However, following the storm there were layers of policy in place to support campaigns for demolition; the city’s Department of Safety and Permits continuing fight against the city’s blight epidemic, and FEMA and USACE wish to show signs of progress in

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249 Global Green USA, "Rebuilding New Orleans: Holy Cross Project".
light of their political failure regarding the city’s flooding and drainage systems, and the emergency response. The fate of thousands of vernacular houses rested on decisions made by planning commissions and recovery agencies. From his 1999 book, *Disasters by Design*, Dennis Mileti remarked that:

> Post-disaster recovery and reconstruction planning and management commonly reflect an effort to balance certain ideal objectives with reality. Recovery is characterized by wanting to: rapidly return to normal; increase safety; and, improve the community… Real decisions are likely to be severely limited by economic pressure and pressure to decide quickly. The pressures to restore normalcy in response to victims’ needs and desires are so strong that safety and community improvement goals... are often compromised or abandoned.”

It is not uncommon for issues that are manifest before disasters to be hastily dealt with following the crisis, taking advantage of the confusion, and overwhelmed nature of the common procedures, heightened by the need to represent a tangible measure of progress in the post-disaster response and recovery; long term thinking of the consequences of vacant lots was not considered at this point in the disaster response.

Demolition was seen as the ultimate failure by Elliott Perkins, Director of the HDLC articulated well when he declared demolitions to be the "junk food of progress, all sugar and rotten teeth."\(^{250}\) Richard Moe, then president for the National Trust for Historic Preservation used the analogy, "like pulling teeth from a beautiful smile" to describe the effect of removing historic houses from its historic streetscape.\(^{251}\) The preservation community in the city largely sees that there was an abuse of power following the storms directly evident in the wholesale demolitions of marginally damaged properties.\(^{252}\) The abuse stems from the policy written into the federal funding statutes; The Stafford Act, that provides Public Assistance funds to be used for “Debris Removal” as opposed to shoring, stabilizing, protection or restoration – more supportive of preservation goals.

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\(^{250}\) Elliott C. Perkins, Director of the HDLC, and Eleanor Burke, Deputy Director HDLC, in conversation with the author, New Orleans, January 6, 2012.


\(^{252}\) The issues of the unheeded demolition campaigns were a common theme in conversation with preservationists working in the city. Elliott C. Perkins, Director of the HDLC, and Eleanor Burke, Deputy Director HDLC, in conversation with the author, New Orleans, January 6, 2012. Laureen Lentz, Karen Gadbois, and Michell Kimball in conversation with the author, January 8, 2012.
By fostering the relationship between the HDLC staff and the City’s Department of Safety and Permits staff the two goals of the initial documentation needed for the city could be accomplished with the necessary/appropriate expertise. The dynamic nature of the post-disaster climate requires a new level of urgency for transparent processes, available data and information easily accessible to aid in furthering the necessary comprehensive documentation of the city’s cultural heritage. Fortunately, as documentation technology has advanced - even since 2005 - tools such as GPS and GIS are invaluable in disseminating information between all interested parties and implicated stakeholders. The opportunity here is that with the ease, adaptability, and capacity of new technology many tasks may be accomplished at the same time with a combination of expertise. This fostered relationship may also go a long way in integrating personnel and resources outside of disaster circumstances.

Section 408 of the Stafford Act guides financial assistance to "Individuals and Households" through the Individual and Household Program (IHP), which includes “financial grants to rent alternative housing, direct assistance through temporary housing units, such as, mobile homes, and limited financial assistance for housing repairs and replacement." However, property owners must have at least filed for insurance benefits - not a certainty in New Orleans. Final funding figures are difficult to confirm across the recovery of the devastated Gulf Coast, but in their account of the storm’s aftermath for the American Planning Association in 2005, Robert Olshansky and Laurie Johnson estimate that most of the $110 billion that the federal government had authorized for Hurricane Katrina relief and reconstruction had been spent on immediate emergency relief. Two-thirds of the housing money was provided for temporary housing, such as trailers and short-term rental assistance." This means that the majority of the funding made available by the federal government was directed at the immediate disaster response, as opposed to providing the necessary funds for the area’s long term reconstruction and rebuilding.


Furthermore, through the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Title VI, P.L. 109-295), the amendments to the Stafford Act eliminated the statutory ceilings on financial aid to be provided for housing repair and but did not eliminate the overall cap of $25,000 that may be provided to each individual or household under Section 408.

254 Olshansky and Johnson, Clear as Mud: Planning for the Rebuilding of New Orleans.
A demolished property in Holy Cross with no clearance. The majority of the funding made available by the federal government was directed at the immediate disaster response, as opposed to providing the necessary funds for the city’s long term reconstruction and rebuilding. Holy Cross, January 2012. Image, author.
This policy reiterates the inherent difficulties in finding a common ground between the mission of federal agencies and historic preservation. FEMA’s Environmental Planning and Historic Preservation (EHP) Program is a relatively new department within the agency, and is charged ensuring that FEMA’s activities and programs comply with federal environmental and historic preservation laws and executive orders.\(^{255}\) It is left to other preservation individuals and organizations to identify the areas in which interventions can be made within the existing agency’s policy framework. The storm presented the opportunity for new programs to make significant developments in integrating more of a preservation ethic into the federal agency. The PRC’s RTNO’s Deconstruction and Salvage program, implemented through FEMA, was considered a success for the preservation community.

However, the reality of implementing deconstruction and salvage strategies within New Orleans’s historic neighborhoods faced a number of challenges. As the legislation was being processed, preservationists became increasingly concerned with the theft of historic architectural elements, and their removal from the city. Furthermore, as the program was initiated under a federal agency – FEMA – any sale of salvaged material must be reimbursed to the federal government, an issue the advocacy department of the PRCNO is currently challenging the federal government to amend.

The impetus of the Tarp New Orleans pilot program was to provide a model program for implementing FEMA and USACE’s Operation Blue Roof in areas containing historic architecture, also at risk in disaster. According to Alice-Anne Krishnan, the founder of the program, there have been no movements by FEMA to integrate the program into their permanent mandate.\(^{256}\) The project was intensive in its dedication to the training of volunteers and the development of effective techniques to temporarily protect the city’s historic buildings. FEMA should not be so quick to discard the value of these volunteer efforts, particularly in a city under consistent threat of natural disaster. In New Orleans following the storm, the recovery has been largely defined by small initiatives like TNO that across the city, add up to big change.

\(^{255}\) Katherine Zeringue, FEMA Environmental Officer, in conversation with the author, January 10, 2012.

\(^{256}\) Alice-Anne Krishnan in conversation with the author, New Orleans, January 9, 2012.
Section 106 Review

The storm exposed the practical nature of protection afforded to National Register historic districts. It became clear following the storm that the Section 106 process must rely on a level of preservation ethos existing within the associated federal agency. The National Trust for Historic Preservation became increasingly concerned with the preservation battles unfolding in the city, where it was perceived that the Section 106 process was not being followed correctly. The need for robust compliance from federal agencies is especially critical in light of the post-disaster response in New Orleans, especially given the unprecedented level of undertakings generated through infrastructure redevelopment and recovery funding. HUD was implicated in the demolitions of 4,500 units of historic public housing, that were not seriously damaged in the storms aftermath, of which Tremé’s Lafitte Housing development was one project. HUD was also associated with the Section 106 review in Broadmoor where the agency’s CDBG funds were used through the Hazard Mitigation Grant program. Section 106 Review was triggered in Holy Cross as FEMA Public Assistance funds were used to relocate the school from its historic campus. Section 106 does not mandate preservation; it merely creates a process to ensure consideration of the adverse effects on historic properties. What has been lacking in these cases is a sound methodology through which these ideas may be passed, to ensure in a fair, consistent, and repeatable manner, that all stakeholders and values weigh in toward making the best decisions, and applying them to the right places.

The National Trust’s concern was heightened by the patterns emerging in New Orleans. The pressure to spend federal funds quickly led to the tendency for agencies to make decisions first and to go through the motions of the Section 106 review as an afterthought. This is a result of the Section 106 review process being poorly integrated into federal agency planning, and is carried out too late to allow project plans to be changed. Katherine Zeringue, an Environmental Officer for FEMA, understands this challenge to exist within FEMA as a result of the poor integration of preservation understanding or principles within the wider agency and its mission.257

In 2010, the National Trust for Historic Preservation commissioned a report by Leslie Barras to explore and address the issue of whether federal agencies are fully complying with the

257 Katherine Zeringue, FEMA Environmental Officer, in conversation with the author, January 10, 2012
consultation obligations of Section 106. The report makes seven specific recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the critical legislative mechanism. The recommendations largely call for federal agencies to endorse and compel compliance with Section 106. The report also recommends that the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) should strongly assert Section 106 as its core mission. The ACHP is an independent federal agency based in Washington D.C. that is mandated to review and comment on agency undertakings. The ACHP is envisioned as a check on the integrity of Section 106 reviews and can be called on to help resolve complaints or grievances about a public consultation process. The National Trust report highlighted the need to readdress the effectiveness of the “cornerstone of federal preservation law” that has diminished over time. In 2011, however, the ACHP released its plan for reviewing the regulations implementing Section 106. Through its analysis of the Section 106 Review process, the ACHP concluded: “that the current Section 106 regulations are not outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and therefore should not be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed.”

The National Trust was also concerned about the role of public involvement in Section 106 consultation. The Section 106 review processes in Holy Cross, Tremé, and Broadmoor engaged a variety of stakeholders -- the federal agency, the ACHP, and Louisiana SHPO -- who are the institutional participants whose involvement is directed by the NHPA. The other stakeholders include advocacy preservationist groups, most commonly the PRCNO and the National Trust for Historic Preservation, who become involved according to the relevancy of the issue to their mission and values. Most importantly, as the entities with a direct stake in the future development, the resident councils, and neighborhood groups are invited to participate in the reviews. These are the groups that may not be able to contribute expertise in historic

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259 Ibid., 2.


261 Barras, "Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act: Back to Basics," 1. This issue is central to the National Trust’s mission as the organization’s congressional charter emphasizes the importance of facilitating public participation in historic preservation.
preservation but they have a strong interest in securing resident’s right to return and in understanding the future of these sites. It is these groups that historic preservation must engage with to ensure the best outcome for the local constituency who is most affected by the outcome. The difficulty here is ensuring that residents are able to attend the public review sessions, which is particularly difficult due to the wide geographic dispersal of residents following Hurricane Katrina. There is a serious gap if these voices are not heard and included. It is important to foster the potential for these public review processes to be used to educate the public. Historic preservation processes should result in a broader understanding of historic and contribute to a community’s understanding of how the past informs the future of their built environment.

The challenge for the preservation community is in find ways to mediate a common ground between the needs of the three stakeholder groups. What do federal agencies gain from fully complying with Section 106 regulations? Full compliance is more likely to result in increased costs and less agency control over the development outcomes. This is in direct conflict from what the affected community and engaged preservationists can gain the protection of home and what matters to their places. It is the duty of the preservation community to continue to think critically about how to ensure agencies will comply with preservation regulations. This issue is continuing to be played out in New Orleans, and the concern remains that the overarching federal policies do not consider the unique tout ensemble.
OPPORTUNITIES IN THE POST DISASTER LANDSCAPE

The tension that the Section 106 review process has highlighted following the disaster – mediating between three stakeholder priorities, of the affected community, the federal agency, and preservation community – can also be recognized as the greatest opportunity for preservation in the post-disaster landscape. The storm has allowed further understanding of the value in broadening preservation’s mandate in the city. One of the foremost problems that has emerged is how to evolve the concept of “significance” which speaks to what communities feel is worthy of remembering and determines what places and narratives, communities act to preserve. In their respective testimonies in response to the question: “what roles should federal, state and local governments play in preserving historic properties?” presented at the hearing on Historic Preservation Versus Katrina, in 2005, Patricia Gay, and Kevin Mercadel emphasized the value of historic preservation in enhancing economic development across the city’s neighborhoods.262 However, we must also make a case for preservation to be a social tool to aid in the recovery of the city’s historic neighborhoods. This isn’t a new concept for preservation. Dolores Hayden argued in The Power of Place in 1997:

“Those who are concerned today with principles of preservation in urban areas navigate “a much more contested terrain of race, gender, and class, set against long-term economic and environmental problems.”263

Legislating a Sense of Place

New Orlean’s sense of place is driven by the culture, politics, history, and economics. However, the existing historic preservation legislation appears to only deal with architecture and the physical fabric of the neighborhoods, when our mandate as preservation extends beyond this to the more intangible qualities of the tout ensemble. The current limitations to the understanding of significance in New Orleans neighborhoods are evident in the historic district designation reports for all three of the neighborhoods in this study. However, the inclusion of Tremé in the larger

262 Gay, "Written Testimony of Patricia H. Gay Executive Director Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans." Mercadel, "Field Hearing Housing Options in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita."
encompassing Esplanade Ridge National Register Historic District is most concerning as it fails to attribute importance or significance of the neighborhood to the three cultural identities presented by Michael Crutcher; a place of historic architecture, a place of unique African American cultural traditions, and a place of important African American political achievement. Treme is undergoing change through its redevelopment and recovery following the disaster, largely as a result of its close proximity to downtown, and the Vieux Carre. The historic preservation jurisdiction in New Orleans should assess what values they assign places in their designations.

However, it is important to acknowledge the efforts being made in the city in order to remedy the consequences of the inadequacy recognized in the current legislative frameworks. These will be the groups and individuals with which the preservation community must engage in order to remedy the limitations. Following Hurricane Katrina, the Cornerstones project, modeled on the New York organization Place Matters, began to document the everyday places of many of New Orleans historic and culturally significant neighborhoods. In collaboration between Tulane University’s City Center and the Neighborhood Story Project initiative, Cornerstones emerged in reaction to concern that the city’s plans for rebuilding might not be sensitive to certain “community environments that build and maintain social and cultural networks.” Additionally, the city’s planning processes following the storm accommodated public participation in the formation of the rebuilding visions for each neighborhood, particularly the NONRP. In Broadmoor, the community had to articulate to the city the value of their neighborhood to make a case for their return and recovery in the face of the BNOB Commission’s plan to transform the neighborhood to green space. This process gave communities the opportunity to articulate what their place meant to them and to document what they perceived to be the best direction for redevelopment. This valuable information can be used to understand where our goals converge and diverge from these communities, in order to effectively find ways to mediate, or alter our

264 Crutcher, Treme: Race and Place in a New Orleans Neighborhood: 16.
266 Neighborhoods had to prove to the city that they had over fifty percent of their pre-storm population back before restoration and rebuilding permits would be issued.
New Orleans is about a sense of place – driven by the culture, politics, history, and economics – of a neighborhood’s community. However, the existing historic preservation legislation appears to only deal with architecture and the physical fabric of the neighborhoods, when our mandate as preservation extends beyond this to the more intangible qualities of the tout ensemble. Treme, January 2012. Image, author.
strategies to better reflect their needs, or pinpoint the moments that communities can be educated as to the real value of preservation as a tool in this sense.

Furthermore, recent scholarship has begun to broaden the historical significance of the shotgun house in New Orleans. The theories of the building type’s origins lie deeply enmeshed in larger cultural debates on race and authority in the city. Some histories understand the shotgun to be a response to the constrained urban lots, while others see the building type as inextricably linked to the city's substantial nineteenth century African American Population. It is almost as if these vernacular houses hold the key to the city's recovery, they maintain traditional design, utilize sustainable construction, retain structural economy and represent the livelihoods of an entire society in New Orleans.

Fortunately, the post-disaster circumstances have essentially provided the opportunity for this to happen. As mandated by the Section 106 review processes, the implicated federal agencies must instigate a review and documentation campaign of the Area of Potential Effect (APE), resulting in the resurveying of National Register historic districts, the expansion of these boundaries, and in some cases new historic districts being found eligible for the National Register. The

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268 "Shotgun - The Most Contested House in America," Building and Landscapes 16, no. 1 (2009): 62. Frederick Starr, "The New Orleans Shotgun: Down but not Out," The New York Times, September 22, 2005. Shotgun house styles can be found in vast numbers across the Southern states in the United States. Examination of the construction method and materiality of these traditional structures has been expanded in the post-disaster landscape. These traditional structures were designed purely for their context. Local craftsman devised structural techniques that allowed houses to stand securely on the city's soft soil with its high water table resisted by construction out of local cypress wood and local cedar. The builders also used circulating air to combat the oppressive humidity that affected both occupiers and buildings. Ceilings were constructed at a ten to twelve foot height, and large windows were chosen to catch the slightest breeze. Furthermore, these historic structures were raised above the ground, to circulate air below the flood levels, discourage termites and vermin and cope with any excess flooding.
269 Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Notice of Proposed Expansion of New Orleans Historic Districts," FEMA Section 106 Notices for Louisiana(2006), http://www.crt.state.la.us/culturalassets/fema106/readnotice.asp?NoticeID=8. Following Hurricane Katrina the boundaries of the Broadmoor National Historic District were expanded north. The Holy Cross, Bywater, Esplanade Ridge, and Carrollton National Register Historic Districts were found to be eligible for expansion, and Edgewood Park and Pontchartrain Park were deemed eligible for historic district designation. The CBD HDLC also expanded the boundaries of the Warehouse District and Lafayette Square historic districts, and added the Lower Garden District to the local register, with limited mandate held by the HDLC.
Legend:
Eligible Boundary Expansions
0. Esplanade Ridge
1. Bywater
2. Holy Cross
3. Broadmoor
4. Carrollton
5. Warehouse District (CBD)
6. Lafayette Square (CBD)

Eligible New Historic Districts
7. Pontchartrain Park
8. Edgewood Park
9. Garden District

Local Historic District
National Register Historic District
Green Space
Water

Map of historical development of the city denoted by buildings constructed before 1950 with Historic Districts
resurvey work is ongoing in the city, and presents a real opportunity to expand the level of documentation that is included in the official report.

**Engaging Other Constituencies**

In light of the lack of support for architectural preservation from political leaders and the reinforced demolition campaigns, the effort falls on local, state, and national grassroots organizations to advocate for the protection of the historic built environment. These groups must play a variety of roles, and mediate the ground between local, state, and federal officials. The future protection of the Holy Cross, Tremé, and Broadmoor neighborhoods and community sense of place is largely conditional on the participation of other constituencies – outside of the traditional preservation community. The recovery of New Orleans’s neighborhoods was significantly defined by the efforts within the neighborhoods which largely fell to the mandate of the neighborhood associations. Richard Campanella recalled after the storm:

> “Katrina’s flood made New Orleans’s architectural legacy and future a controversial topic. Citizens discussed and debated demolition, deconstruction, house raising, footprint shrinkage, green space, environmental sustainability, New Urbanism, and the merits of historicity versus modernism.”

As a mediator between these groups and federal agencies, preservationists must consider the large and long-term consequences of their decisions and actions. Obviously, historic preservation must be concerned with individual buildings, and even the individual features of buildings. However, if it is limited to that, the result may be artificial, theatrical and unrelated to everyday life. Furthermore, in the context of New Orleans blight problem, efforts to restore individual buildings alone may be futile. Preservation efforts will only appear symbolic unless they are accompanied by significant gains in economic justice or tangible benefits to neighborhoods. In their National Trust for Historic Preservation guide regarding the values associated with historic district designation in 1975, William J. Murtagh and G.C. Argan preempted the importance of preservation in the historic districts in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina:

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270 Campanella, *Bienville's Dilemma: A Historical Geography of New Orleans*.  

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"A vision of the totality of the unity and of the interdependence is essential if aesthetic and social integration are to be maintained. This attitude towards preservation has also moral implications in that it imbues a milieu with a character to which man can relate, want to belong to, participate in and protect.\textsuperscript{271}

A key challenge in recovery is balancing the need for both speed and deliberation. Communities must rebuild as quickly as possible in order to maintain existing social and economic networks. But communities must also be thoughtful and deliberate in order to maximize the opportunities disasters provide for improving the city. Kates et al. note: “Cities and regions seeking to reconstruct after a disaster seem to simultaneously pursue goals to rapidly recover the familiar and aspire to reconstruct in safer, better, and sometimes more equitable ways.”\textsuperscript{272} It was the tension between speed and deliberation that created the environment in which Holy Cross recovered. The look and leave policy and the forced slow return of residents ensured that the neighborhoods recovery was dictated by deliberation. The neighborhood association embraced the sustainable and green label, and marketed themselves as such.

Broadmoor was also heavily affected by the speed versus deliberation contest following the disaster. The circumstances of the neighborhood’s recovery were determined by the city’s value of speed recognized in the initial BNOB planning process. The problem with speed is that it causes many problems, such as incomplete analyses, insufficient consideration of all possibilities, and hasty decisions. Not only can speed cause mistakes, but it also allows no time to correct them. For example, the BNOB Commission was so intent on finishing its plan by the end of 2005 that it did not meaningfully involve neighborhoods or the people forced to leave New Orleans after the storm. Broadmoor still stands as a powerful example of what a neighborhood can do on its own - an especially powerful example, considering how closely the demographics of the neighborhood resemble New Orleans as a whole: Before the storm, more than two-thirds of Broadmoor's residents were African-American, and most were lower - to middle-income.

\textsuperscript{271} National Trust for Historic Preservation, \textit{Historic Districts: Identification, Social Aspects and Preservation}.
\textsuperscript{272} Kates et al., "Reconstruction of New Orleans After Hurricane Katrina: A Research Perspective," 14653-60.
Other Redevelopment Imperatives

By engaging with these local constituencies, preservation becomes a tool to aid in achieving their recovery. The storm has shown that historic preservation is a planning tool for supporting livable neighborhoods and buildings and should be recognized as such. It can be seen from the city’s recovery planning documents, that this concept of preservation must be more explicitly articulated. In the citywide UNOP plan, historic preservation concerns are addressed in its own section within the plan’s “Recovery Assessment” and “Summary of Recovery Projects.” The plan envisions a “leading role for historic preservation efforts both in housing and economic development,” yet historic preservation is not mentioned within those corresponding sections, as a tool for their redevelopment.273

In Holy Cross preservation groups have had to facilitate a common ground between the neighborhood’s goals to become a twenty-first century neighborhood with improvement goals strongly aligned with contemporary sustainability practices.274 The concept of green building fostered in Holy Cross following Katrina did not only result in the new state-of-the-art Green Globe USA infill houses. The movement supported the belief that contemporary products, such as double-pane windows or low-E windows are energy efficient solutions to the notoriously drafty New Orleans house. Preservationists argue instead, that the greener solution is to repair and seal old windows, or replace them with salvaged ones. Furthermore, for Sean Vissar, the director of RTNO’s Deconstruction and Salvage Program: “windows are considered architectural elements of houses. They really offer some architectural significance to New Orleans houses, that’s what we try to preserve.”275 This belief is complicated however by replacement accounts that emerged following Hurricane Katrina.276

275 Molly Reid, "Consider Fixing, Instead of Replacing, Old, Drafty Windows," The Times-Picayune 2009. A lessoned learnt in New Orleans following the storm was that the salvage of historic windows had to include the entire set: the sash and frame. The nature of the craftsman constructed structures and the deterioration over time results in window sashes of innumerable variances in size.
276 Sarah De Bacher, Vice President, Holy Cross Neighborhood Association, In conversation with the author, April 30, 2012.
A particular case in Holy Cross involved the unauthorized replacement of windows in a significantly characteristic historic home, which, when reported by a local resident to the HDLC resulted in a “stop-work order.” To which the homeowner responded by simply boarding up the violation which has since remained in place for over a year, leaving the house vacant and deteriorating. As more of these narratives emerge from the post-disaster landscape, preservationist must continue to be more diligent in considering what is the bottom line? This does not have to be a case of one recovery goal being sacrificed for another, but it urges the preservation community to be more proactive to anticipate the outcomes of such conflicts, and design creative measures to rectify them. Furthermore, there is an opportunity for preservationists instead, to find ways to benefit from the recovery initiatives and plans of other groups. Conversely, there is also the opportunity for historic preservation objectives to aid in other groups legislative objectives, for example the city’s School Recovery District, or HUD’s HOPE VI program, in more efficient and appropriate ways.

The post-disaster recovery in Broadmoor highlights the implications of emergency management within historic neighborhoods. Classified within a repetitive flood zone, the legislative regulations of the historic district is at odds with the federal mitigation requirements for areas within the 100-year flood plain. This case emphasizes the dilemma within the purview of historic preservation that mandates for the protection of the historic character of the neighborhood within the context of a community living under constant threat. Richard Campanella characterizes the nature of a dilemma as a “problem involving a difficult or unpleasant choice which will bring undesirable consequences.”277 Historic preservationists in New Orleans have many difficult choices to make at the intersection between preservation and a community’s recovery and redevelopment goals. In these cases, success must be measured by the built outcomes, not by the programs or legislative frameworks that exist. The problems are solvable as long as there is the courage in the city to confront the dilemmas underlying these interactions.

277 Campanella, Bienville's Dilemma: A Historical Geography of New Orleans: 15. Merriam-Webster and Oxford English dictionaries
CONCLUSION

Approaching the seventh anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans is at a point where it can be more optimistic about its future - while at the same time unable to forget its profound losses, or ignore the communities still reeling from the 2005 disaster. The city itself has in many ways recovered. The GNO CDC calculated in 2011 that the city had over 80 percent of its pre-Katrina population. However, this return has not been uniform over all of the city’s neighborhoods, with areas hardest hit by the flooding slowest to return.\(^{278}\) The persistent and overriding problem of inadequate flood protection still remains unsolved which leaves the city under the constant pressure of threat – one that has always existed in the city, however never to the extent of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath.

\(^{278}\) Plyer, "Population Loss and Vacant Housing in New Orleans Neighborhoods."
New Orleans and its recovery can be perceived as an anomaly. The city is unique in relation to the homogeneity of many other cities in the United States; the city’s extraordinary wealth of historic vernacular architecture and cultural associations differentiate the city from its southern neighbors; and, the city’s multiple and disparate planning visions for its future sets it apart from other cities that have recovered from natural disasters. In this context New Orleans is often thought of as an outlier, and an exceptional case. However, Stephen Danley in his study of neighborhood network governance following Katrina argues that New Orleans is a microcosm of the decisions other American cities will have to face over the next 50 years. The post-disaster landscape in New Orleans has provided a unique arena for policy makers to consider both the theory and practice of preservation, in light of the myriad of issues the city has had to face in its recovery. The three neighborhood case studies have presented the volume and complexity of the interconnected issues, and how they have impacted the established preservation frameworks in place before the storm.

Through a deeper understanding of the three neighborhoods in this study, the illogicality of the BNOB Commission’s “right sizing” plan is uncovered. New Orleans's urban neighborhoods are woven together by their particular networks rich in family history and social connections, institutional support systems, modest scale businesses and proximity to family and friends. Furthermore they encompass different chapters of the city’s architectural legacy and its strong cultural soul. None of which are not easily transferred to “green space.” The development of the city’s vision through the recovery planning process -- from the contested citywide concept plan to the more specific neighborhood and district rebuilding plans - emphasized the importance of understanding how the unique neighborhood parts constitute the city as a whole.

However, the narratives of each neighborhood also describe the disparate nature of the immediate response and ongoing recovery following the disaster: those who had the means and resources to move back, who had a place to move back to, and who had a voice in the city’s recovery processes, compared those who had very little. The outcomes of the recovery in each of the neighborhood demonstrate that preservation theory and practice do impact the nature of the

279 Stephen Danley, in conversation with the author, March 5, 2012.
recovery of neighborhoods, and have implications for buildings built, cared for, and occupied by ranges of socio-economic characteristics.

In an extended, drawn-out recovery, like the one in New Orleans, preservation interests are implicated long term. As the urgency of the post-disaster response fades, preservationists remain to mitigate the effects of the post-disaster landscape, and to mend communities over years, as opposed to over the course of a few months. As a result of this, the opportunities available to historic preservation, to affect a community’s recovery are largely tied to engaging with new constituencies and collaborating with neighborhood’s larger redevelopment imperatives. Over the course of the recovery, historic preservation in New Orleans has been forced to broaden its understanding of what is significant in New Orleans to include consideration of a community’s sense of place that informs the city’s *tout ensemble*.

As highlighted in every plan for the city’s recovery, the reconstruction of the levees and floodwalls to protect the city from a 100-year Category 5 storm is the highest priority. The compression of these activities, stakeholders and funding into a short period of time is an occurrence that creates unique challenges during disaster recovery. The attitude of when, not if, the next disaster strikes, should force the preservation constituency in New Orleans to reflect diligently on their roles in the city’s recovery following Hurricane Katrina. Only by understanding the variety of confrontations exposed by the disaster, can the preservation community prepare conscientiously for future challenges of this nature.280

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280 Kates et al., "Reconstruction of New Orleans After Hurricane Katrina: A Research Perspective."
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INTERVIEWS

The following people generously agreed to interviews for this paper: Interviews and meetings were conducted following subject review by the Columbia University International Review Board, January 2012.

Betty Norris, Former Vieux Carre Commissioner, New Orleans, January 5, 2012

Mark Ripple, Partner Eskew+Dumez+Ripple Architects, New Orleans, January 5-10, 2012

Eleanor Burke, Deputy Director HDLC, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 6, 2012

Elliott C. Perkins, Executive Director HDLC, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 6, 2012


Laureen Lentz, Law Student and Preservationist, New Orleans, January 8, 2012

Michelle Kimball, Director of Advocacy, Preservation Resource Center, New Orleans, January 8, 2012

Roberta Gratz, Author, Critic and Urbanist, New Orleans, January 9, 2012

Alice-Anne Krishnan, National Center for Preservation Technology and Training intern, New Orleans, January 9, 2012

Katy Coyle, Preservationist at Goodman Associates, New Orleans, January 10, 2012

Katherine Zeringue, FEMA Environmental Officer, January 10, 2012

Toni DiMaggio, Architect, Wayne Troyer Architects, President of DOCOMOMO Louisiana Chapter, New Orleans, January 10, 2012

Sandra Stokes, Foundation for Historical Louisiana, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 11, 2012

Melissa Schigoda, Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, New Orleans, January 11, 2012

Nicole Hobson-Morris, Executive Director, State Historic Preservation Office, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, January 12, 2012

Bethany Rogers, Tulane University PhD Student and Faculty, January 13, 2012

Dabne Whitemore, Director Historic Building Mitigation Grant, New Orleans, January 13, 2012
Walter Gallas, Former Director of the New Orleans Field Office for the National Trust for Historic Preservation, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February 3, 2012


Stephen Danley, Phone Conversation, March 5, 2012

Sarah De Bacher, Vice President Holy Cross Neighborhood Association, Phone Conversation, 2012