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Shareholding interlocks in the Keiretsu, Japan's financial groups

Flath, David

Banks and insurance companies in Japan have been more inclined to hold stock directly and indirectly in clients that borrow more intensely from them, based on analysis of 1980 data. This evidence is consistent with the rationale for such stockholding being to resolve agency problems of debt. In carrying out this investigation a new measure of indirect shareholding is developed.

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Academic Units
Center on Japanese Economy and Business
Publisher
Center on Japanese Economy and Business, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University
Series
Center on Japanese Economy and Business Working Papers, 43
Published Here
February 8, 2011
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