Party Variation in Religiosity & Women’s Leadership Lebanon in Comparative Perspective

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Abstract

Gender inequality is a pervasive global phenomenon, particularly in parliamentary representation and the political realm as a whole. Previous scholarship looked for explanations in the countries’ national development levels, political regimes and electoral systems. Some scholars searched for answers at the domestic level within societies’ religious and cultural value systems. This dissertation departs from prior research by looking beyond the national domestic level into individual party-level explanations for women’s political leadership, broadly defined to include their station within parties’ decision-making inner structures. A core assumption in this thesis is that political institutions, mainly political parties, are the main vehicles – forklifts -- for women’s ascendance to political leadership. This dissertation attempts to identify what party-level characteristics enhance or impede women’s leadership in political parties, and how these characteristics vary across different parties.

The theory advanced in this dissertation is that party-level characteristics, especially their religiosities and secularisms, influence women’s chances in assuming leadership positions within parties’ inner structures. I argue that the root of the problematic of women’s leadership lies in party variation in religiosity, which can explain variation in women’s shares in parties’ executive and legislative bodies. This is premised on a multivocal understanding of religions implying that there is a continuum of multiple religiosities and secularisms. Religiosity of political parties refers to the religious components on their political platforms or the extent to which religion
penetrates their political agendas. The core argument in this dissertation is that as religiosity in party platforms increases women’s leadership is more likely to fall. This implies that in parties with more extensive religious goals women’s leadership is likely to prove stunted. It is my contention that parties with extremist religiosity are less accommodating to women’s demands for leadership than parties with more secular and civil platforms.

The theory of party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership is explored in-depth and tested in Lebanon as a single country case-study. Political parties are the unit of analysis and women’s leadership in political parties is the main dependent variable. Female nominations for national parliamentary and local municipal councils are other dependent variables. Other party-level characteristics are explored as explanatory variables besides religiosity, notably, institutionalization as indicated by democratic procedures in leadership transitions and decentralized decision-making, pluralism in religious affiliation of members, and the size of female membership.
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Acknowledgments & Dedication

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which -- at times -- was at the expense of exercising my role as a grandmother to
Yasmeen and Ferris.

I dedicate this dissertation to my late husband, Ziad Kassem, who inspired my
return to school, twenty years after earning my first Masters degree in 1970. He believed
in me and was my source of intellectual motivation. He would have been proud that
finally I made it: Better late than never.
Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

Gender inequality is a pervasive global phenomenon, particularly inequality in political representation. In the last few decades, and, despite attention to women’s participation in public office the gains in female political participation have lagged behind women’s advancement in educational attainment and professional status in the private sector.¹ These gender gaps are most pronounced in developing countries, where socio-cultural, demographic and political characteristics are said to impede women’s advancement and political empowerment.² However, the extent of gender gaps varies widely across and within countries in the same region and also across different types of political parties within the same country.

This dissertation aims to identify and explore the factors driving these observed phenomena particularly in developing countries such as Lebanon, where women have

¹ The year 1975 marked the beginning of the Decade for Women declared in the first of four world conferences on women organized by the United Nations and held in New Mexico (1975), Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985) and Beijing (1995). One indicator is that female participation in non-agricultural labor increased from 36% in 1990 to 40% in 2005 (ILO. Women in labour markets: Measuring progress and identifying challenges, March 2010, 72). Also, in 32 countries worldwide more women than men are now enrolled at the tertiary level. Overall, the rate of female to male enrolment was less than half in 1970 and now it is nearly 70%. See: UNDP, Human Development Report 1995 (New York: United Nations).

² It has been established that equal access to education and economic resources are prerequisites not only for improving women’s socio-economic status but also for their political empowerment, notably for improved representation in public office (Georgia Duerst-Lahti 2006). Studies suggest that women’s attainment of higher education is instrumental for their advancement to leadership and decision-making positions in both the private and public sectors, and for narrowing gender inequalities. The findings of these studies show a positive relationship between female educational attainment and women’s assumption to decision-making positions. R. Anker (2005) also concludes that “…it is precisely the participation of women at the highest decision-making levels in political and economic life that can drive the change for greater equality between men and women”. Consistent with theoretical expectations of this work, empirical findings show that women’s economic performance improved along with their educational attainment since 1975, although their political representation remains low, with wide variation across countries and regions. See: United Nations, World Survey 2009: Role of Women in Development; International Labour Office (ILO). 2009. Trends in Econometric Models (Geneva: ILO); www.worldbank.org; www.ilo.org (ILO, 2009); United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).2010, Progress in the World’s Women 2008/2009 (New York: UNIFEM), on implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
achieved high levels of education and economic participation. It offers a new explanation for women’s political under-representation. This explanation focuses on political parties—the main vehicles for political participation and leadership—and on variations across parties in intensity of religiosity. Various scholars posit that some religions are less hospitable while others are presumed more tolerant to women’s advancement. However, this work will focus not on distinctions as between religions per se, but on the degree of religiosity built into parties’ political platforms and its impact on women’s leadership. I argue that political parties with lower religiosity—that is to say, more secular parties—are more likely to have higher female representation in their leadership bodies and on their electoral lists than parties whose platforms incorporate higher religiosity. An in-depth case study of Lebanon will test this theory of party variation in religiosity and gauge this and the impact of other party-level characteristics on women’s political leadership.

A. Motivating Facts

This section highlights empirical evidence that female representation in decision-making and leadership positions is lower in the public sector than in the private sector. It also outlines the broad contours of the theory elaborated in this work around the impact of religiosity on women’s leadership.

1. The Conundrum of Women’s Political Leadership

Between 1995 and 2010, the share of women among heads of state and government (excluding ruling monarchs and queens) grew only by close to two percentage points, while the corresponding change in their share as chief executive
officers (CEOs) grew by five times as much (around ten percent). During the same period, the increase of women occupying ministerial positions was only 3.4 percentage points, while the increase in board seats held by women was more than twice as much (8.5 percentage points). Table 1.1 provides this data and shows that female parliamentary representation, the most common indicator used by researchers for measuring women’s political participation, grew by 7.4 percentage points, only half the increase recorded as corporate managers. This suggests that while gains have indeed been made in female representation in top level decision-making positions in the public sector, these gains are still below those seen in the private sector.

Table 1.1 Women in decision-making positions in public versus private institutions worldwide, 1995-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Political Leadership (%)</th>
<th>Private Sector Leadership (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heads of State &amp; Governments (excl. queens, ruling monarchs)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Ministers</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parliament (Lower House)</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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3 In 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing and the Beijing Platform for Action was adopted by all United Nations member States. This is the last world conference on women convened by the United Nations.

4 Industrialized countries also see higher representation in the private sector than in the public sector, although the gender gaps are narrower than they are worldwide. In 2010, women accounted for 38% of CEOs in Fortune 500 companies and firms in the USA, Canada, and Western Europe, compared to 13.2% worldwide; and 12% of heads of state and governments compared to 7.7% worldwide. Also, women occupied 28% of board seats and an equivalent share as corporate managers, but just 29% of ministerial positions in cabinet and 25% in parliaments, respectively.
Table 1.2 shows that in 2010, the global average for female representation in lower houses stood well below parity at 19.1%, with considerable variation across regions. This average was highest in the Nordic countries at 42% and lowest in Arab states at 10%. This data not only reflect an enduring mismatch between women’s economic and political performances but also wide disparities and lingering inequalities in female representation worldwide.

Table 1.2 Women in Parliaments: World and Regional Averages, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>Women members (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nordic Countries (NC)</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD Countries</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Excluding NC</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Arab Muslim-majority</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-majority Countries</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>10.1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WORLD</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.1</strong></td>
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Source: Based on the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), accessed on November 30, 2010 (www.ipu.org), and computations by author. See, Annex 1.1 to this chapter for definition of regions as per the IPU.

2. **A Theory of Party Variation in Religiosity & Women’s Leadership**

The theory presented here posits party-level characteristics as the primary factors accounting for variations in women’s leadership. These include, party religiosity, institutionalization specifically democratic procedures (leadership transitions and decentralized decision-making), as well as female membership, and pluralism as indicated by religious affiliations of party members. Religiosity is a core party-level characteristic, which is assumed to influence strongly women’s chances in leadership. It is reflected by the components articulated in party platforms and the extent to which
religious goals penetrate these agendas. This research moves beyond extant scholarship -
- to a different level of analysis at the domestic level -- by focusing on women’s first
level of entry into the political domain: political parties. It examines variation across
political parties in religiosity as well as other party-specific characteristics to explain the
share held by women in parties’ decision-making bodies and on their electoral lists.

Understanding women’s advancement within inner party echelons, I argue, is
important for explaining female parliamentary representation. This has not been
addressed by studies pitched at the country level. As feminists and students of political
parties have argued, political parties can be the principal vehicles for women’s
ascendance to leadership positions. Why some parties are superior vehicles for
women’s advancement and leadership is the central question that this research addresses
and hopes to explain.

Women’s leadership refers to the presence of women in the executive and
legislative decision-making bodies within political parties, on high-level organizational
committees like supreme councils, politburos, executive and legislative committees. This
dissertation focuses on women’s leadership in decision-making bodies within parties.
This is distinct and different from an analysis that might look to female representation in
parliaments, the most commonly invoked indicator for women’s political participation.
Because ultimate representation in elected office is also dependent on the electoral
system and voters’ preferences, it offers an incomplete snapshot of female leadership

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5 One need only consider the different roles that women play in political parties. For instance,
women may be leaders of parties or heads of government as in the Christian Democratic Party in Germany
or in the Labour Party in Britain. However, their role is virtually non-existent in the Taliban in Afghanistan,
or in the Calvinist Party in the Netherlands (where women were first not allowed to be members and now
are not allowed to compete for leadership).

and may be a noisy signal of party attitudes towards and support for women. Indeed, women’s assumption of leadership positions in parties’ inner bodies as well as their nomination to electoral lists—which may or may not result in electoral victory—are important indicators of female political leadership, which cannot be captured by data that only counts elected politicians.

B. Previous Explanations for Female Representation and Leadership

The analysis of factors influencing women’s political leadership necessitates engagement with the aforementioned scholarship that seeks to explain persistent gender inequalities and low levels of female representation in elected public office. Five main socio-political explanations have been advanced for the status of women and their representation in public office. These include a country’s development level, political regime, electoral system, political culture and religion.

Development and modernization theories point to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita as an indicator of the level of development and economic growth in a country. Feminists and scholars have observed that countries with higher GDP per capita supply a higher status for women. They argue that as the country’s GDP per capita rises, the socio-economic and political status of women improves as a result of better educational attainment, economic contribution and political representation. Disparities in the status of women are attributed to lower growth and productivity, waste and inefficient

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7 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1995 (New York: United Nations); United Nations, World Survey 2009: Role of Women in Development. See also, footnote 3 on female representation in industrialized countries (USA, Canada, and Western Europe), whose per capita GDP is amongst the highest in the world.

use of scarce resources, which manifest themselves, inter alia, in the ‘feminization of poverty,’ especially in conflict-stricken and poorer countries. Indeed, poverty has a differential impact on women because of gender bias resulting in unequal access to resources (wealth and land), services (health and education), and opportunities (education and employment). This results in lower representation of women in decision-making positions and in political leadership in poorer countries. However, more recent studies analyzing these phenomena find that GDP per capita alone is not a dispositive factor in explaining variations in female representation.9

Indeed, this is also supported by initial analysis undertaken on a non-random sample of 80 countries representing 42.6% of the entire universe of existing countries. The data set is composed of the 34 advanced, industrialized economies that are members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the five Nordic countries, plus all 48 Muslim-majority countries (Arab and non-Arab) countries, for which data are available.10 On average, countries with higher GDP per capita have higher female representation (MPs) and those with lower GDP per capita have lower female representation, as Chart 1.1 shows. However, one also observes that there are overachievers and underachievers amongst both groups of countries, and variations in the middle. For instance, countries with low GDP per capita and high female representation

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10 Muslim-majority (Arab and non-Arab) countries are of special interest given the role of religiosity in this research. They are also developing countries with a variety of political regimes. The OECD countries are selected for comparative purposes because they are advanced, higher income democracies and are the more secular states. It would be useful to extend this exercise to the whole universe of countries for which data are available.
(viz., Rwanda) and some with high per capita but low female representation (viz., Luxembourg or Kuwait) or none at all (viz., Qatar, Oman or Saudi Arabia).\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{Chart 1.1  Female MPS by GDP/Capita in 80 Countries}

Therefore, while this relationship matters, there are deviations and wide variations, especially in the middle income group, which explanations based on countries’ income levels do not fully explain.\textsuperscript{12}

Other scholars observe that the status of women and female representation is higher in democratic than in autocratic and authoritarian regimes.\textsuperscript{13} Steven Fish suggests that, “\textquote{t}he station of women may be conditioned by regime type, with more democratic

\textsuperscript{11} The outliers in chart 1.1 are Luxembourg and Qatar.

\textsuperscript{12} Rwanda boasts the highest female representation worldwide at 56.3%. It has one of the lowest GDP/capita in the world ($800/capita ranking 167/186), with a low Human Development Index (HDI) ranking (ranking 167/182. Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia have high GDP per capita, yet zero women in public office with a Gender Equality Measurement Index (GEM), which measures the status of women, among the lowest worldwide. Rwanda may be an outlier among developing countries; and wealth derived from oil revenues in the Arab Gulf countries is not the same implied by modernization and development theories. See also, UNDP, \textit{Human Development Report 2009} (New York: UNDP). Fatima Sbaity Kassem, ed. 2006a. \textit{Status of Arab Women Report 2005: History of Women's movements in the Arab World}, (New York: United Nations).

\textsuperscript{13} See, Jennifer Gandhi (2008), Steven Fish (2002), Mark Tessler (2002), and Daniela Donno and Bruce Russett (2004), among others.
regimes providing the basis for … higher status for women.” (2002: 29-37) Amrita Basu also argues that different political regimes offer different opportunities for women in the political arena, whether in political participation or representation in public office (2005: 34). This scholarship maintains that countries characterized by democratic deficits impede women’s advancement and are generally not conducive to female representation. Such regimes have a differential impact on women by withholding their rights to participate and compete for leadership positions. In contrast to democracies, non-democracies are not premised on principles of freedom of expression, contestation, transparency, competition, free and fair elections, and equality among all citizens.

The observed pattern of inherent discriminatory and non-democratic practices is manifested in these countries’ political institutions. This is behind the sub-standard status of women and their low representation in public office. In fact, one observes that almost all democracies have high levels of female representation while autocracies invariably have lower or no female representation, if they maintain parliaments or similar democratic institutions in the first place. There is general support for this argument. The majority of high level income democracies have higher levels of female representation than in low-income autocracies. However, one also observes that there are countries that fall short among the first group (viz., Japan, Ireland, Luxembourg), and super overachievers among autocracies with higher income (viz., the UAE) or low income non-

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democracies (viz., Afghanistan or Bangladesh or Kyrgyzstan). On average, female representation in democracies is higher than in autocracies, as Chart 1.2 clearly shows. However, one also observes that there are overachievers among autocratic regimes (viz., the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, or Tunisia). There are also underachievers among democracies or democratizing countries with low female representation (viz., Japan, Comoros, or Lebanon). There is also a large group of countries in the middle (medium income level and democratizing countries) with unexplained variation in female representation. These variations call for explanation which an argument based solely on differences in political regimes does not seem to provide.

A third line of argument is premised on specific electoral systems, quotas for women and other tangible affirmative action measures that countries employ, which have enhanced the level of female representation. Scholars find that countries employing proportional electoral systems maintain higher levels of female representation than mixed or majoritarian systems. Moreover, it makes a difference for female representation

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whether or not countries have legislated quotas for women, as well as parties’ use of voluntary quotas, and explicit, gender-related candidate rules. The lack of incentives offered to parties to nominate women, the size of districts, and the type of electoral lists are serious impediments embedded in electoral systems, which are inherently not “women-friendly.” Empirical evidence shows that the most “women-friendly” electoral system is the party list proportional representation (PR) used by most industrialized countries, followed by semi-proportional (STV and MMP) and lastly majoritarian systems. Chart 1.3 demonstrates the superiority of the PR electoral system for female representation over all other systems.

Under the PR system, each party presents a list of candidates for a multi-member electoral district, where voters vote for a party and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote. This provides incentives for parties to nominate women

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16 I refer to ‘women-friendly’ electoral systems as those that improve female representation in public office. See also, Mala N. Htun (2005), Mona Lena Krook (2005), and Drude Dahlerup (2006), Guillaume R. Frechette, François Maniquet, and Massimo Morelli (2006).

17 Electoral systems could be Party List Proportional Representation (List PR), Single Transferrable Vote (STV), Mixed Membership Proportional (MMP), Two-Round Systems (TRS), First Past the Post (FPTP), Single Non-Transferrable Vote (SNTV), Parallel, Bloc Vote (BV), Party Bloc Vote (PBV), or No system (N).
since they do not risk losing seats because of gender-bias. By contrast, in systems like the Bloc Vote (BV) where voters vote for candidates instead of political parties, parties are not offered any incentives to nominate women. A key feature of electoral systems affecting women’s representation is the use of open or Closed electoral lists. Closed lists have specified placement, top rank-ordered or zipper quotas, in which the winning candidates are taken from the lists in the order of their position on these electoral lists. If the lists are ‘open’ or ‘free’ the voters can influence the order of the candidates by marking individual preferences. In such voting systems, prejudice or gender bias among voters may cause them to favor male over female candidates. Thus, ballot systems that do not allow substitution according to candidate attributes such as gender are more favorable to women’s advancement. Therefore, closed electoral lists with rank-ordered or zipped lists as articulated in the electoral law, offer women greater chances of electability than open electoral lists because they eliminate gender bias and the possibility that women are knocked off the lists by voters or replaced by male candidates. There is no chance for gender bias.

In a closely linked argument, scholars point to affirmative action measures, such as temporary quotas for women, as critical for improving female representation.¹⁸ Scholars maintain that legislated and constitutional quotas (percentage shares or reserved seats for candidates) and/or voluntary internal and electoral party quotas are effective.

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These increase female representation to a level that will eventually make a difference in decision-making (the critical mass theory). In effect, the most effective formula for raising female representation is to combine a PR system in large electoral districts with Closed, rank-ordered lists (top-ranking, zipper quotas), with percentage quotas for women (www.idea.int). However, as Norris cogently argues, “By itself the electoral system is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to guarantee women’s representation. Nevertheless, the electoral system functions as a facilitating mechanism, which expedites implementation of measures within parties, like affirmative action for female candidates.” (1999:2). Further, I argue that electoral systems and quotas, while effective in enhancing female representation, may be employed by countries irrespective of their GDP per capita or whether or not they are democracies or autocracies, as chart 1.4 clearly shows.

Chart 1.4 Female MPs by Democracy & PR System in 80 countries
(PolityIV: Autocracies (-6 to -10), Democratizing &/or In-transition (+5 to -5); Democracies (+6 to +10)

Thus, in an attempt to explain deviations from the general pattern drawn above, I look at the joint influence of GDP per capita, political regimes and electoral systems on female representation (see, Annex 1.2 to this chapter). Indeed, high income democracies
employing PR systems still produce higher female representation than all other groups of countries. However, there are countries within that group also employing PR systems but producing much lower female representation (viz., Japan). Income level differences, disparities in political regimes or electoral systems do not explain these phenomena. There are also variations in the middle and underachievers amongst the OECD countries, which cannot be explained, singularly or in combination by any of three variables. Chief amongst these is the Nordic countries, which outshine other democracies with high GDP, mostly employing PR, Closed lists and voluntary party quotas, and boasting highest female representation than all other regions in the world. Consequently, high per capita income, democratic regimes and “women-friendly” electoral systems are necessary but not sufficient conditions for explaining female representation. However, variations signal the presence of other—as of yet un-theorized—explanatory variables for female leadership and representation.

Estimating a regression model which incorporates these three variables, we find that while the coefficients on GDP/capita and PR systems are positive and significant, the coefficient on democracy is not. However, incorporating in the model dummies for the Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries still produces significant coefficients. This indicates that GDP/Capita, democracy and electoral systems, included in the multivariate regression equation, do not fully explain observed cross-national variation in female representation. In fact, the performance of some Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries on a number of indicators of democracy and women’s rights including female representation has been the subject of interest to scholars who have sought explanations of these comparative outcomes. One possible explanation may be found at a
different level of analysis than income levels or regimes or PR systems and quotas, in religion. Another explanation, which scholars also offer is political culture. These explanations, though, cannot be easily quantified or measured and arguments relating to the role of religion and political culture have often relied on case study methods.

These arguments focus on cultural barriers (traditions, customs, norms and conservative values) and entrenched patriarchy in the society. This is reflected in the attitudes of party elites who block women’s access to leadership positions by relying on discourses positing that “women’s place is at home” and “politics-is-a-man’s-business”, following Dahlerup (2006). A political culture argument might explain low female representation and leadership in political institutions within the same country or across countries with traditional and conservative values. However, it fails to account for variations in female leadership across different parties and institutions that exist within the same country, and that share the same political culture, norms, traditions and values.

In this connection, some scholars find that political explanations are superior to cultural ones, which weakens the case for political culture as a sufficient explanation on its own.

Closely related to a political culture explanation for low female representation is the argument built on the salience of religion. Predictions dating back to Voltaire and

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20 Following Pippa Norris (1993), I refer to political culture as “…the dominant values and attitudes towards the role of women in society and in political life. Where traditional values prevail, it might be expected that women would be hesitant to pursue a political career, selectors would be hesitant to choose them as candidates, and parties would be unwilling to introduce effective gender equality policies” (Lovenduski and Norris 1993, 312). This allows me to move from patriarchy and culture in the society to party variation in political culture vis-à-vis women. Such an understanding is not constant across all parties within the same political culture.

21 See also, Adam Przeworski, Jose Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, “Culture and Democracy” in World Culture report: Culture, Creativity and Market (Paris: UNESCO, 1998); Daniella Donno and Bruce Russett 2004, Alfred Stepan 2003, among others.
Nietzsche suggested that the dominance of religion would wane as societies became modernized and less traditional, at which time secularism or “laïcité” would take over.\textsuperscript{22} However, historical developments have belied these expectations and secularism has not proven inevitable or irreversible. Scholars now note that “[i]t is obvious that religion has not disappeared from the world, nor does it seem likely to do so. … [And], especially… in developing societies, we would predict that religion would continue to play an important role in politics.” These scholars also predict that “[t]he expanding gap between the sacred and the secular societies around the globe will have important consequences for world politics, making the role of religion increasingly salient on the global agenda.”\textsuperscript{23} These conclusions carve out a role for religion in today’s politics.

Feminists and social scientists alike have broadly explored the relation between religions or religious cultures and female empowerment. Anke Schuster recognizes the tension between religion and democracy and the influence of both on the station of women. She points out that, “[r]eligion is frequently the reason for discrimination, injustice and exclusion, a marker for social marginalization, which is a central concern of multiculturalism.” (2007: 2). More specifically, she finds that one of the reasons religion is thought to be inimical to liberal-democratic policies is that “conservative and fundamentalist religious groups frequently hold and proclaim opinions that are illiberal. One of the most contentious issues in this respect is the attitude of religious groups towards the role of women.” (2007: 3). Schuster indicates that these religious groups

\textsuperscript{22} Eighteenth and Nineteenth century philosophers like Voltaire and Nietzsche predicted that,” …religion’s influence on public life would decline in modern times…” (Brian S. Turner, Religion and Social theory, Second ed. (London: Sage, 1991); in Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, 2005: 1)

\textsuperscript{23} See, Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 4, 22, 241
often have affiliated parties that carry their conservative values into politics, adversely influencing women’s prospects for leadership and public office. In this respect, religions function not unlike other ideologies in that they provide a unified, structured way of seeing the world, affecting the lives and thoughts of adherents, including women. Moreover, religious tenets are often conflated with traditions and norms, especially in conservative societies, stunting women’s advancement. In this vein, Tyra Bouhamdan argues that, “[s]ocial and religious history often drives legal traditions to evolve. …, gender issues are often primarily dictated by culture (i.e. traditions, customs, norms, social identifications, etc.) …” (2009: 20).

Other scholars argue that some world religions (viz., Catholicism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Judaism) are at least in some ways particularly hostile toward women.24 The differentiation by religious family suggests that different religions have different consequences for female empowerment and leadership and that even the influence of the same religion on women is not uniform or a constant. Scholars argue that Islam is inherently undemocratic, pointing to the more marginal status of women in some Muslim and Arab countries.25 Fish specifically maintains that “the station of women … links Islam and the democratic deficit” (2002: 29). However, other scholars interested in Islam and/or the Arab region question the arguments above and note that it is not Islam but “Arab exceptionalism” that should be investigated.26 These scholars argue that Islam

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25 See, Samuel Huntington (1996), Steven Fish (2002), Jonathan Fox (2006), among others

26 See, Alfred Stepan and Graeme Robertson, “An Arab More Than Muslim Electoral Gap?” Journal of Democracy (14 July 2003); and their debate, “Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism” Journal of Democracy, volume 14, Number 4 (October 2004); Daniela Donno and Bruce Russett, “Islam,
is not a bar to women’s political leadership since in certain non-Arab Muslim-majority
countries women are heads of state and government. Also, wide variation is observed
across Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries, with several countries boasting female
representation above the 19% world average and closer to that in advanced countries.\textsuperscript{27}
This suggests two conclusions. First, Islam by itself does not seem to be a bar to near-
average female parliamentary representation in some Arab and non-Arab Muslim-
majority countries. Second, the low female representation in Arab states must not be
attributed solely to Islam. Third, there remains a great deal of unexplained variation
within Muslim-majority, conservative societies, particularly the lower levels in Arab
countries, begging for an explanatory theory.

These theories do not necessarily rest on the notion that all religions are
essentially un-egalitarian. However, since men continue to dominate the theological
realm, they exercise a near monopoly over jurisprudence and the interpretation of
document. As Georgia Duerst-Lahti (2006) argues, many religions have been formally
structured by men to exclude women from key roles and to retain gendered power
advantages over women. Thus, according to this view, women’s advancement to
leadership positions within formal religious structures was often blocked by the men who
dominated those spaces (Elin Bjarnergard 2008). By extension, whenever clergymen
double as party leaders, they also tend to thwart women’s leadership in the political
realm. Simultaneously, they have the authority to execute women unfriendly policies at

\textit{Authoritarianism, and Female Empowerment: What are the linkages?}” World Politics 56 (July 2004), 582-607.

\textsuperscript{27} Wide variations in female representation are depicted across Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries
ranging between 28-27% in Tunisia and Afghanistan to no representation in Saudi Arabia and Qatar (see
Annex 1.2 to this chapter).
the party level. While this body of work analyzes party-level characteristics to understand female parliamentary representation, it does not explore the influence of party variation in religiosity on women’s presence in leadership and decision-making bodies and on parties’ electoral lists for public office. Thus, arguments which are based on the hostility of world religions — particularly Islam to women — do not fully explain observed variation in female representation and leadership across Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries. However, even among religious countries, there are significant variations in female representation. Further, religions can be and are continuously being reinterpreted. Therefore, how do we understand and test the role of religion in influencing women’s chances in leadership and public office representation?

There is also real and profound variation in female representation across different types of parties in Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries.

None of the previous scholarship directly addresses the relationship between party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership in their decision-making bodies. However, some scholars identify party-specific factors that explain female representations. One broad argument posits that female representation is largely influenced by parties’ formal commitment to gender equality as indicated by affirmative action measures including quotas and explicit, gender-specific rules that are transparent and allow for accountability. This body of work focuses only on female parliamentary representation and looks into the barriers to such representation including political

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28 In some religions women are blocked from public leadership because of the doctrine using the pretext of doctrinal violations; while in some democratically deficit countries, women are not given equal opportunities to run for public office or compete for party leadership positions. Consequently, women are subjected to double jeopardy that of gender bias and religion-related hostility, reducing their chances in representation and leadership.
culture, electoral systems and/or political regimes. Another broad argument suggests that independent variables like institutionalization and placement of parties along the political spectrum (left, right, or center) explain female representation. A third line of argument maintains that female representation is influenced by the behaviour of political parties as opposed to social movements, especially women’s movements.

In sum, these previous arguments, singularly or combined, can explain and predict broadly female representation across countries of different income levels, political regimes and employing specific electoral systems and quotas. However, these explanations overlook observed variations at the middle and cannot explain the presence of extreme cases as in over or underachievers. For instance, most of the five Nordic overachievers have social democratic parties and these parties have high shares of female legislators. One important observation is that these parties play an important role in advancing women and nominating them to public office. Therefore, we should look at the type of party for a plausible explanation of variations in female representation, but also in providing an answer to my main research question: Why are some parties superior to others in enhancing women’s leadership? I argue that one may find the explanation for female representation in the different types and religiosities of parties functioning within

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30 See, Teresa Sacchet 2005, Miki Kittilson 1997

31 See: Amrita Basu 2005 and Miki Kittilson 1997. Frances Rosenbluth, Rod Salmond and Michael F. Thies (2006) argue that the key to female representation lies in welfare state policies that empower women economically and create incentives for parties to compete for the female vote by including more women in their parliamentary lists and delegations. This line of argument rests on national interests, which should prompt and motivate the state and political groups to involve more women in politics. In a close vein, other scholars find that, “…women’s participation in democratization and development is important, and an increased political presence could positively benefit societies.” (Rohini Pande and Alexandra Cirone, 2009: 7). Elin Bjarnergard (2008) also points to male-domination in parliaments offering an argument based on corruption within political parties such as clientelism and vote buying, which impede women’s chances for leadership.
countries. Thus, political parties provide the missing link. Previous theories do not fully account for observed variation in women’s participation, which begs for additional explanation, one that examines the primary institutional vehicles for individual advancement in the political world—political parties—and highlights the factors that determine parties’ support for women’s leadership. Further, while some of the extant scholarship analyzes party-level characteristics to understand female parliamentary representation, including formal commitment to gender equality, it does not explore the influence of party variation in religiosity on women’s presence in leadership and decision-making bodies and on parties’ electoral lists for public office. \(^{32}\) Therefore, an alternative theory is needed, one that generates plausible explanations of variation in female representation and leadership across political parties within a given polity. This is the theory posited in this dissertation.

### C. Debates Motivating a Theory of Party Variation in Religiosity & Women’s Leadership

This dissertation posits that variation in party-level characteristics, particularly in the intensity of party religiosity as reflected by political platforms, influences women’s shares in leadership and on electoral lists. It explores the relationship between party variation, religiosity and women’s leadership. It adopts a multivocal understanding of religion in that there are many voices within the same religion (Stepan 2001). This implies that there are multiple secularisms and religiosities. It follows that the intensity of religiosity and degree of secularism embodied by party platforms vary along a continuum and not a dichotomy. Varying intensities of religiosity and secularism are expected to

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\(^{32}\) However, Norris (1993) suggests that future research should look deeply into the role of party ideology, including their religious ideology.
have varying impact on women’s leadership chances. In this section, I address some key conceptual questions raised by this undertaking.

1. **Why Political Parties?**

   Political parties are the main vehicles for women’s political involvement and leadership. Scholars studying political parties and/or female representation accord those political institutions a central role as gatekeepers since they recruit, select, and nominate candidates for public office. Political parties provide resources and opportunities and create a pool or a critical mass of eligible women for leadership (Pitre 2006). Therefore, I argue that these institutions are critical to enhancing or impeding women’s path to a political career. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) recognizes the central role that these organizations play in enhancing women’s leadership, reporting that:

   There is a growing realization of the critical role played by political parties in democracy building and in the sustainability of democratic institutions. A country’s democratic sustainability is often linked to the state of its political parties and its political actors. The quality and capacity of political parties has a direct impact on parliamentary performance and organization affecting among other things the legislative capacity of members elected, the promotion of equal participation and representation of women in politics and the representatives with political positions in the parliamentary structures. (IDEA, 2010)

Female representation encompasses women’s presence in local and national legislatures, as well as in executive and judiciary bodies. However, this dissertation holds that a

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complete analysis of the determinants of female leadership ought to begin where women most often join the political process, that is, when they join political parties, with a focus on the factors that determine their path within those parties. Political regimes, electoral and party systems, and political parties themselves, comprise the setting within which women’s prospects for political leadership are conceived and drawn. However, different parties offer women different opportunities for leadership. This difference in outcomes is what this dissertation sets out to explore by focusing on party variation in religiosity as a core explanation for variations in women’s leadership across different types of political parties.

2. **Why Party Religiosity?**

Much of the research on women in politics finds that secular parties are more accommodating to women’s demands and more tolerant of diversity than religious parties. Mervat Hatem (1994), however, finds that liberals (secularists) and Islamists do not differ in their views with respect to women and their political empowerment. In contrast, I argue that different parties offer women different opportunities in their political career path. This starts by exploring which parties promote women more to leadership positions within their decision-making bodies and which do not. This dissertation explores the validity of these opposing arguments by looking at party variation in religiosities and secularisms and how it relates to women’s leadership. Towards this end, this work adopts a multivocal understanding of religiosity in that there are many voices within the same religion, articulating multiple secularisms and

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religiosities that are often socially constructed. This multiplicity of religiosities and secularisms is reflected in the extent to which religion penetrates parties’ political agendas. However, in order to be accepted by their communities, some parties declare adherence to religious positions as an almost reflexive and, in a sense, self-protective measure, while others openly claim secularity or separation between religion and politics. For example, parties in some non-Arab Muslim-majority countries such as Senegal, Indonesia, Albania, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Malaysia, have each adopted the level of secularism that fits its society without risking antagonizing religious authorities.

Similarly, Safinaz Kazim (1986) finds that, “In most of the Arab countries, particularly those which proclaim Islam as the religion of the state or the leadership, everyone who is secular finds a way around using this term.” (in Hatem 1994: 674). These arguments extend to political parties within these countries. This reality confers value on the study of party variation in religiosity as it examines parties’ political platforms, distinguishing public rhetoric from concrete political commitments, actions and behaviour.

At the individual level, religiosity may be understood as dogmatic and rigid adherence to doctrine. At the aggregate, party level, religious precepts can have important

See, Stepan 2001: 234-236; and 2009; Deeb 2006, among others. For instance, Deeb describes the multivocality of religion as the “emergent public faces of religiosities around the globe” (Deeb 2006: 26).

This may not apply to the 1960s and 1970s, when the Ba’athist and Nasserist regimes were openly secular, at least initially.

For instance, in Indonesia no party would want to be labeled ‘secular’, as that might cost it the votes of religious individuals. The same applies in Senegal, where ‘laïcité’ is used instead of secular, or in Albania where secular is linked to atheism. In certain countries there is a negative connotation to religiosity, such as the hostile secularism in Turkey, while in others religiosity is more popularly accepted or at least not socially rejected. Amrita Basu (2005) notes that in Pakistan “…the steady growth of political Islam has made many feminists rethink the value of a wholly secular approach that would separate them from the large majority of women, for whom religion is central in their daily lives.” (Basu, 2005: 15). Kazim (1986) holds that secularists in Muslim countries tend to use religious emblems to fend off charges of being a-religious and secular, because the society is more accepting of religious-oriented politics.
influence on attitudes and behavioral patterns of party leaders and party members and therefore impact women’s chances in leadership. This work posits that it is not religion or religiosity in individuals per se but the intensity of religiosity in party platforms, or the extent to which religious goals and components penetrate political agendas, that is the critical determinant of women’s advancement and their political empowerment, representation and leadership.\textsuperscript{38} This is essentially because religious interpretations, particularly when clergymen double as party leaders, are then brought to bear on issues pertaining to women in parties and their leadership chances. For instance, in a strong argument on the role of religion in women’s lives, Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights asserts that,

> We all recognized that if there’s one overarching issue for women it’s the way that religion can be manipulated to subjugate women. There is of course plenty of fodder, in both the Koran and the Bible, for those who seek a theology of discrimination. (“Women and Religion”, New York Times, January 10, 2010)

Furthermore, former USA President Jimmy Carter also asserts that, “Women are prevented from playing a full and equal role in many faiths, creating an environment in which violations against women are justified.” (Nicolas Kristof, 2009).\textsuperscript{39}

Nonetheless, employing a multivocal understanding of religiosity implies that there are varying intensities of religiosities and secularisms reflected across different party platforms. In other words, religiosities and secularisms are neither constant nor uniform across individuals or political parties. Indeed, within any particular religious group, different voices and intensities are modulated, from the Islamist Taliban and

\textsuperscript{38} Basu (2005) recognizes that religiosity, broadly defined, is one of the variables explaining variations in female representation in her comparative study in South Asia. Kittilson (1997) considers that religious ideology is of paramount influence on female representation in Great Britain. This lends credence to party-level religiosity as a core explanatory variable for women’s leadership in the inner structures of political parties.

\textsuperscript{39} Op-Ed on the Parliament of the World’s Religions (Australia, December 2009)
radical Al-Qaeda schools of thought, to the Christian Calvinists and the Jewish SHAS, to
the less traditional and more tolerant positions of some parties in Indonesia (e.g. PAN or
PKB) and in Senegal (e.g. MDRS or RP). Thus, in this analysis, religiosity of parties as
embodied by their political platforms is the core explanatory variable for variations in
women’s leadership. As religiosity varies in parties’ platforms, women’s leadership is
expected to vary accordingly. This yields the following hypothesis:

**H1. The share of women in decision-making and leadership bodies is likely
to be higher in parties whose platforms reflect less religiosity (more
secularism) than in those containing high religiosity (low secularism).**

That said democratic procedures and pluralism are other party-level characteristics that
can enhance women’s chances in leadership. These relationships are laid out in the
following section.

3. **Party Variation in Democratic Procedures, Pluralism and Female Membership**

Institutionalization of political parties is seen by many students of political parties
as one of the basic determinants for their effectiveness in the political arena. The concept
of institutionalization may be unpacked into its various elements in order to select those
that influence women’s leadership. Institutionalization encompasses such elements as
party organization, centralization and decision-making processes, scope of membership,
democratic practices in operating procedures, and employment of explicit rules that are
transparent to permit accountability. In Samuel P. Huntington’s words,

“Institutionalization is a process by which organizations and procedures acquire value
and stability. [It is]…stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior…” (in Kenneth Janda
1980: 19). In the same vein, Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully look at party
institutionalization as a prerequisite for democratic consolidation and, “…a process by
which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not
universally accepted.” (1995: 1). Similarly, Janda describes an institutionalized party as
“…one that is reified in the public mind so that ‘the party’ exists as a social organization
apart from its momentary leaders, and this organization demonstrates recurring patterns
of behaviour valued by those who identify with it.” (1980:19).40

Furthermore, Janda (1980) identifies six criteria to measure institutionalization of
political institutions, namely year of origin, name changes, organizational discontinuity,
leadership competition, legislative instability, and electoral instability. Other students of
political parties identify four measures of a party’s institutionalization: (1) stability in
rules and nature of interparty competition or “patterns of party competition manifest
regularly” using Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility41; (2) roots in society and
linkages between parties, citizens, and organized interests of the constituency or how
deeply parties penetrate society; (3) legitimacy to electoral processes as indicated by the
fact that parties and elections are the means of determining who governs; and (4) party
organization, i.e., when the interests of the party are not subordinated to interests of
ambitious or charismatic leaders and when the party acquires an independent status and
value on its own.42 This work focuses on facets of institutionalization that are of import to
women’s leadership. Democratic practices in parties’ operating procedures, pluralism in

40 See also: Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, (eds.), How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation
in Party Organizations in Western Europe (London: Sage Publications, 1994); Scott Mainwaring and
Timothy R. Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1995); Kenneth Janda, A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis
of Political Parties; Comparative Political Series Number:01-002 Volume 1 (London: Sage Publications,

41 Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility is derived “by adding the net change in percentage of seats
(or votes) gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, then dividing by two.” (Mainwaring
and Scully, 1995: 6)

42 See, Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 1-6
membership, and party age (as distinct from longevity) will each be examined in turn, with attention paid to their influence on women’s leadership.

(a) Democratic practices (or the lack thereof) in parties’ operating procedures include internal decision-making processes and periodically held competitive elections to transfer leadership. Norris and Lovenduski (1995) establish operating procedures as an integral part of institutionalization in pragmatic decision-making, while Janda (1980) does the same with his focus on transfer of leadership. This study hypothesizes that democratic operating procedures are likelier to offer women opportunities for leadership than non-democratic ones. The assessment herein of party variation will take into account both dimensions—democratic practices as reflected by decision-making processes and in transfer of leadership. This study also expands the argument that democracies are more egalitarian than authoritarian regimes since they offer women more chances for advancement to the performance of political parties in terms of women’s leadership.

Party institutionalization, measured by democratic practices in operating procedures and in leadership transitions, is expected to influence women’s chances at political leadership, whether at the level of parties or on electoral lists for public office. This yields the following hypothesis:

**H2. Parties employing democratic practices in their operating procedures, particularly in decision-making and transfer of leadership, are more likely to enhance women’s leadership than parties that do not employ such practices.**

(b) Pluralism in membership: Pluralism is the extent of a party’s tolerance of diversity and its openness to diverse participation without formal restrictions or discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, religious sect, class, ethnicity or race. A party can be deemed pluralist from a confessional standpoint when, for example,
its membership is inclusive and composed of more than one sect. The presence of women and men as well as a mix of different religious sects signals tolerance, diversity, openness and dialogue. Parties with plural memberships are expected to attract more women and to have a more positive influence on women’s leadership than parties that are dominated by a single religious sect. More pertinently, it is argued that plural parties are more accommodating to women’s demands for leadership than exclusive parties (Kittilson 1997). Schuster (2007) cites the case of the Calvinist party in the Netherlands, which was closed to women as members until June 2006, and now for leadership in public office.\footnote{Anke Schuster reports that the SGP was losing about 800,000 Euros per year in governmental subsidies. In June 2006, the party convention decided with a majority vote of 73\% that women are to be admitted as members with normal membership status. Yet, women are still excluded from executive positions such as in local councils or parliament. (1997:21)} Other examples include exclusionary membership of specific religious sects and/or affiliations. Scholars studying female representation, argue that the composition of membership, whether open or exclusive, influences parties’ attitude and behavioral patterns vis-à-vis women and their political participation.\footnote{See, Kittilson 1997, Lovenduski and Norris (1993, 1995), and Inglehart & Norris 2004, among others} These arguments set the stage for the test implemented herein to measure whether plural parties are likely to have more women in their membership and leadership bodies than non-plural parties. The following hypothesis was derived from that inquiry:

\begin{quote}
\textit{H3. Parties with plural and inclusive membership, open to all regardless of religion or gender, are more likely to enhance women’s leadership than parties with closed membership and those dominated by a single sect.}
\end{quote}

(c) \textit{Does Female Party Membership Matter for Leadership?}

In studying factors that enhance female representation, Kittilson (1997) highlights the potency of women actors and party activists and argues that female party membership...
influences their share on electoral lists. Nonetheless, she suggests that the huge presence of women at the rank-and-file may not be matched by corresponding levels in leadership bodies. Similar remarks are offered by Basu that, “[i]ndeed in all South Asian countries, right-wing groups, often ethnic and religious in character, have enormous capacity to mobilize women’s movements while undermining women’s advancement.” (2005: 35). Indeed, many parties have special women’s wings, which potentially marginalize or ‘ghettoize’ women and divert them away from ascending to leadership positions in inner decision-making bodies.

These phenomena have been observed by other scholars studying Islamist and other religious parties.\textsuperscript{45} Many of these religious parties are popular social movements with broad-based, grassroots constituencies and coordinate with parallel and like-minded women’s groups. These religious and confessional parties draw large numbers of youth—women and men—into their membership. As discussed earlier, women’s faith and religious convictions drive them to join political parties in large numbers, especially when they are poor and in settings of violence and conflict. Indeed, under these settings women tend to become more religious than men, which might explain their huge presence at the rank-and-file of many religious parties. In fact, women join parties voluntarily, while their ascendance to leadership is in the hands of party elites. Given this, I do not expect party religiosity to influence women’s membership as it is expected to bear on their leadership chances. Nonetheless, democratic practices and pluralism are expected to influence female party membership as they are assumed to impact their leadership prospects. This produces a replicate of the hypotheses for women’s leadership:

**H2A.** Parties employing democratic practices in their operating procedures, particularly in decision-making and transfer of leadership, are more likely to enhance women’s shares in party membership than parties that do not employ such practices.

**H3A.** Parties with plural and inclusive membership, open to all regardless of religion or gender, are more likely to enhance women’s membership than parties with Closed membership and those dominated by a single sect.

Thus, this research also explores the correlation between female party membership and leadership to find out whether female party membership is a prerequisite for and affects women’s leadership, as many scholars argue. As such, female membership is an endogenous variable for women’s leadership, but may also be an intervening variable which will be examined in quantitative analysis. This yields the following hypothesis:

**H4.** The share of women in decision-making and leadership bodies is likely to increase as their share in party membership expands.

(d) **Party age:** Janda (1980) argues that one of the basic criteria for party institutionalization is party age. He looks at older parties as more organized, which indicates more stability and political clout. This argument is used by other scholars as a party-level characteristic that is more conducive to female representation.\(^{46}\) I look at party-age not as longevity or a causal variable but as a useful proxy for capturing changes and shifts in party-level characteristics overtime. More specifically, party-age is a proxy in relation to some historical or political watershed, like a civil war or major conflict, which may have restructured the party system into pre-conflict and post-conflict parties. In this sense, party-age correlates often to conflict and party variation in religiosity.

Conflict often revives intrinsic identity politics, by which individuals combine and mobilize around ascriptive identities like confessional affiliations. This can re-animate religion as an organizing principle for political behavior, especially of political

\(^{46}\) See, Kittilson 1997, Sacchet 2005
parties, which entrenches conservative values and favors patriarchy in a manner that is not hospitable to women’s advancement. In effect, research on conflict and the salience of religious and ethnic cleavages is well-developed in political science. Jan-Erik Lane and Svante O. Ersson (1987) maintain that wars and conflict exacerbate existing social cleavages, including those that are religious-based, and create additional ones. Therefore, in situations of social distress and tension, conflicts tend to widen and intensify religious cleavages, as Norris and Inglehart argue that “…religiosity persists most strongly among vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer nations, facing personal survival-threatening risks” and predict that, “…the religious gap will lead to greater ethno-religious conflict and violence” (2004: 5 and 241). This may exert a negative influence on women’s leadership within parties in which religiosity is heightened in the aftermath of the conflict as a watershed. In their article on “Islam, Authoritarianism and Female Empowerment: What Are the Linkages?” Donno and Russett call for more research on the impact of conflict on women’s empowerment, which this dissertation does, noting that, “In addition to culture, the effects of other variables –international and civil conflict- on both democracy and women’s rights need to be probed more deeply.” (2004:602).

Indeed, wars and conflict tend to have a differential impact on women.⁴⁷ In such a setting, while some political parties support the status quo or the status quo ante, new parties arise or mutate to reflect emerging interests, including heightened religiosities in the aftermath of conflict. This translates, inter alia, into variations in attitudes of pre-war

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and post-war parties’ vis-à-vis women, otherwise referred to as political culture, which is reflected in employment of different and new mobilization strategies during the crucible of war than in its aftermath. Theoretically, one would expect that widening religious cleavages and heightened religiosity in parties’ platforms should limit women’s chances in leadership altogether. However, post-war parties, particularly those with non-religious platforms, tend to use state of the art modern, women-friendly and more effective mobilization strategies than pre-war parties do. This militates against or undercuts and limits the adverse influence of heightened religiosity and widened religious cleavages obtained during and after conflict.

Given this, party-age can serve as a proxy, or analytic framework if you will, for distinguishing between distinct pre-war, war and post-war party characteristics especially their attitude vis-à-vis women’s leadership. In this sense, party-age does not count as an aspect of party institutionalization. Therefore, by looking at parties that formed along the civil war timeline and around heightened social and especially religious cleavages, I can examine the expected influence on women’s leadership. This yields the following hypothesis:

**H5. The proportion of women in party membership and in leadership bodies is likely to be higher in post-war parties than in pre-war parties.**

D. **Methods and Measurement**

This dissertation explores the hypotheses enumerated above by carrying out a focused case-study of Lebanon based on data and information collected from a profusion of political parties. This approach yields multiple cases within a single controlled setting. The advantage of a single country case-study is that since the political regime and electoral system are identical for all parties within the country, we are able to isolate the
influence of party-level characteristics, while holding constant these ‘macro’ features of the institutional context. More specifically, this allows for in-depth examination of the influence of party variation in religiosity, democratic practices and pluralism on women’s leadership, while holding constant the influence of the political and electoral systems. I explore the theory and related hypotheses and analyze the findings qualitatively before evaluating and testing them quantitatively. The qualitative analysis is based on data and information culled between 2006 and 2009 through 150 interviews with party leaders, administrators, and female activists. These mixed research methods are used to test expectations specified in the five hypotheses and to estimate a regression model for women’s political leadership based on the country case-study of Lebanon.

1. **Methods: Why a Single Case-Study of Lebanon?**

   Lebanon demonstrates the mismatch or discrepancy between women’s high socio-economic profile and their low political performance in elected public office. It also offers a particularly useful case for exploring party variation in religiosity and its influence on women’s leadership share and their nominations for public office.

   Judged by their educational attainment and economic achievements, Lebanese women are among the most qualified in the Arab region. In 2010, female to male gross enrolment ratio at the university level stood at 1.2, and 31% of women (15 years and above) are economically active with their share in the labor force standing at 33% (see, [www.cas.gov.lb](http://www.cas.gov.lb)). Of this share, 30% are administrators, 40% are specialists and professionals, and 10% are CEOs and corporate managers in top decision-making and leadership positions. However, in the political domain, those highly accomplished women occupy a meager 3% of the 128 parliamentary seats, less than 5% in 2010 municipal
councils, and less than 7% in the 2009 government. This dismal performance prompted Tyra Bouhamdan to remark that,

Even in Lebanon, the so-called ‘Switzerland of the Middle East’, where women have more opportunities than men do in the workforce, where modernity is the constant social trend, the country is yet to usher in a female political leader, … a woman’s political career remains gravely limited by social, cultural and religious norms. (Bouhamdan 2009: 39)

Since its independence in 1943, Lebanon continues to be one of a very few Arab countries with a strong, albeit much interrupted, tradition of competitive elections among political parties and blocs. It is ranked second only to Comoros among the 22 Arab countries on the democracy and political freedoms scale of Polity IV and Freedom House, and close to Senegal, one of the top ranking democratizing non-Arab Muslim-majority countries, on the Bertelsmann BTI 2010 (see, Annex 1.2 to this chapter).48

Lebanon provides a particularly useful case-study of the influence of party religiosity on women’s leadership. It is an Arab, Muslim-majority, conflict-stricken country marked by a 15-year civil war fought along religious lines and marked by multiple cross-cutting social cleavages which heighten existing religious cleavages. More specifically, the mosaic fabric of Lebanese society—comprised of 18 different religious sects—offers a unique laboratory for studying the influence of party variation in religiosity on women’s leadership. Religious communities with larger constituencies (viz., Christian Maronites, Muslim Shiites, and Muslim Sunnis) form their own political parties and compete fiercely, vying for control and power over the polity. Smaller communities struggle for better political representation by allying themselves with stronger political blocs. This confessional society is also characterized by wide income

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disparities and the presence of ethnic minorities (Armenians and Palestinians), which have created class and ethnic cleavages in addition to religious ones. The 15-year civil war (1975-1990) is a watershed that destabilized the complex fabric of society, deepened already-existing social and created new war cleavages. Despite periods of intermittent peace, conflict continues to erupt frequently. This exacerbates and reinforces social cleavages but especially religious-based ones, which have shaped and structured the Lebanese party system into multiple and diverse parties.

Lebanon also offers great within-country variation across its political parties. The Lebanese multiparty system is characterized by more than 80 registered and active parties. It comprises a wide range and diversity of competing political parties with a variety of platforms. This characteristic, too, is useful for studying and comparing multiple parties within a single country.

2. **Measurement and Operationalization of Variables**

This research takes the political party as its unit of analysis. The hypothesis is that religious parties of varying religiosities may be less conducive to women’s political leadership than non-religious parties of varying secularisms. The testing of this hypothesis requires that we measure and observe the explanatory variables outlined in the previous section and that we also gauge the dependent variables below.

(a) **Dependent variables: women in leadership bodies and on electoral lists of political parties**

Since the unit of analysis is the political party, I look for variation across parties in women’s percentage shares (i) in leadership of executive and legislative decision-making bodies (e.g., politburos, supreme councils and boards, executive committees); (ii)
as candidates and nominees on parties’ electoral lists for parliament; and (iii) as candidates on parties’ electoral lists for municipal councils. This study deliberately excludes from consideration women who were elected members of the legislature and to local councils because their election to public office also depends on other factors, including the electoral system, voter preferences and voter turnout. Focusing strictly on nominations and internal party leadership offers a more direct test of party behavior and attitudes towards women’s leadership.

(b) Independent Variables: Religiosity, Democratic Procedures, Pluralism, & female membership

(i) Party religiosity is conceptualized as a continuum. A religiosity scale honors and acknowledges the full realm of intensity of religiosities in parties’ political platforms and their influence on women’s leadership positions within parties’ inner structures and on their electoral lists. Parties are situated along a continuum based on the contents of their platforms and their explicit goals rather than whether or not they nominally refer to themselves or are viewed as religious or secular parties. Parties are classified by religiosity into three generic categories and sub-categories, based on a review of party literature and studies. Labeling parties was done after undertaking a thorough content analysis of party platforms and extensive consultations with party leaders and their advisers, female party officials, scholars and national experts on political parties in Lebanon. Parties are labeled: (1) religious parties with varying intensities of religiosity depending upon the religious components in their political platforms are labeled
extremist, conservative or tolerant;\textsuperscript{49} (2) confessional parties with civil and national goals and varying degrees of secularisms;\textsuperscript{50} and (3) secular parties that are a-religious (e.g. leftist, communist, Marxist, socialist parties). They are coded along a 5-point religiosity continuum from those marked by extensive religious components on their agendas as higher religiosity to those with fewer or minimal religious contents as lower religiosity.\\ (ii) \textbf{Democratic practices} in operating procedures is measured by data gathered from statements by party leaders and administrators and from interviews with female party activists conducted over three years (2006-2009) of field research in Lebanon. Information on consultation and sharing in decision-making processes within parties is used in the qualitative analysis. Data on transfer of leadership covers the term in office and periodicity of elections, nominations to office, competitiveness and contestation, as well as by-laws ensuring transparency and smoothness of the process.\\ (iii) \textbf{Pluralism in membership} is based on data compiled from party leaders, administrators, and female activists, especially on their motivations for joining parties. Pre-war parties do not maintain computerized databases. Therefore, manual compilation from membership registers was undertaken. Religious affiliation in some parties is not recorded as evidence that it does not matter for party membership. Thus, guess estimates were made because of difficulties in differentiating Christian from Muslim surnames. In post-war parties, this data and information was more readily available.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{49} Taliban in Afghanistan; PKS, PKB and Nahdatul-Ulama (NU) in Indonesia; Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Jordan; Hamas in Palestine and Hizbullah in Lebanon; SHAS in Israel; the Calvinists in the Netherlands are just examples of how religiosity might vary across parties.\\ \textsuperscript{50} Examples include but are not exclusive of progressive, labor, liberal, and democratic parties of all types.\\ \textsuperscript{51} Membership of parties may also be exclusive to women or men, as in some parties in the Netherlands.
(iv) **Female party membership** is operationalized by collecting data on the percentage shares of women in party membership. The data was compiled simultaneously with religious composition of party membership based on registers of membership. The unisex names presented some difficulties and led to some informed official estimates as released by pre-war party administrators. In post-war parties this data is readily available.

(v) **Party-age** splits parties along the civil-war timeline: pre-1975 and post-1975. Since there are only five parties with religious platforms, war-origin (1975-1990) and post-war are considered one group.

E. **Conclusions**

This dissertation begins by highlighting a puzzling discrepancy between women’s improved socio-economic profile and smaller advances in female representation at the political level. Focusing as it has on female parliamentary representation, previous scholarship has largely ignored the main vehicle driving potential gains for women in the political realm: political parties. This dissertation examines the relationship between party-level characteristics and women’s leadership in political parties’ inner structures and on their electoral lists. Party characteristics reliably account for variation in women’s representation in leadership across parties and on parties’ electoral lists for public office. Particularly relevant as a determinant of women’s leadership is party variation in the intensity of religiosity reflected in the political platform. Other explanatory variables include democratic practices in parties’ operating procedures and pluralism in composition of party membership.
In sum, this dissertation examines variation in the aforementioned party characteristics in order to determine which types of parties are more or less likely to advance women to leadership positions within parties. The study focuses on women in political parties in Lebanon and investigates whether or not the intensity of religiosity in parties’ platforms influences the potential for women to pursue effective careers in political leadership. It hopes to contribute to our understanding of the multiple forces that conspire to impede women’s leadership chances in public representation and the mutable role of religion among those forces.

A Road Map to the Dissertation

The dissertation proceeds in six chapters with an epilogue and brief concluding remarks. The exposition of the main argument, in this introductory chapter, is followed by five chapters, which provide the qualitative and quantitative analysis of women in 18 relevant political parties. Chapter Two discusses the advantages of exploring the hypotheses in a single country case study and the overall research design and data collection, with special emphasis on the impact of the 15-year civil war and of social cleavages, particularly religious cleavages, on the country’s party system.

Chapter Three examines variation across parties in Lebanon along the key independent variable of religiosity. This chapter offers initial indications, from qualitative data based on interviews, of whether or not religiosity influences women’s leadership in Lebanon. In this chapter, a gender-sensitive coding of parties is developed to facilitate the analysis. This highlights the important role that religiosity and secularism play in enhancing or reducing women’s chances in leadership. In Chapter Four, party variation in democratic procedures and pluralism in membership are also taken into account.
Preliminary indications based on qualitative information from interviews with party leaders and female party activist are examined to gauge their potential influence on women’s membership and leadership chances. Parties are coded in terms of their democratic procedures and plural membership for quantitative analysis.

Chapter Five provides party variation in magnitude and relative shares of women in membership of parties and solicits views of party leaders and female activists – as political practitioners -- on party elites’ attitudes vis-à-vis women’s leadership in order to explain the data produced. It also examines party variation in mobilization strategies and modalities, especially religious mobilization and financial incentives that parties employ to attract women. This chapter also addresses the role of special women’s wings as mechanisms for mobilizing women, creating a critical mass for leadership or simply for electioneering purposes.

Finally, Chapter Six responds to the main research question of whether party religiosity influences women’s chances in leadership and can explain variations thereof across parties. First, it gives data on the shares of women in parties’ leadership bodies. Then it provides qualitative and quantitative evidence to substantiate the data and support the theory of party variation in religiosity and the related five hypotheses. This chapter concludes by estimating a model for women’s leadership, which incorporates party religiosity and secularism, democratic practices, pluralism, and female membership. This multivariate regression model strongly supports the theory of party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership posited in this dissertation. It demonstrates that a religiosity argument is superior to other arguments (e.g. development level, political and electoral
systems, religion or political culture) for explaining a larger range of variation in women’s leadership in parties’ inner structures.

The Epilogue asks whether women can break through. This question is explored qualitatively and quantitatively by looking at women as electoral candidates. This research shows that the chances for women’s leadership are improved when women bring into parties particular skills and advantages, like local name recognition and mobilization, which parties cannot achieve single handedly. The Epilogue highlights the strategic motivations that parties will advance women when it is in their interest to do so, including nominating them on their municipal more than parliamentary electoral lists. Municipalities, as such, constitute a breakthrough for women into a career in politics, if they choose to. The dissertation ends with brief concluding remarks proposing a research agenda on women in politics and the building of a global database to facilitate research on women in political parties.52

52 A separate and additional work extends the analysis of the role of party religiosity on women’s leadership to a cross-national sample of 330 parties in 26 countries—including Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries, as well as five European countries with Christian democratic parties and Israel. The theory of party variation in religiosity is also borne out in this cross-national sample, in that women are likelier to assume leadership positions in parties with lower religiosity. The correlation between shares of women in party membership, leadership and nominations for parliament draw a career path for women in politics. It indicates that the “upstream” focus in this theory can determine ‘downstream’ electoral outcomes. This is the subject matter of future research linking female leadership and party nominations to electoral outcomes. Preliminary results are shown in the Appendix to this dissertation. This constitutes an article, which is being reviewed for publication by the Feminist Formations Journal, published by the National Women’s Studies Association. The raw data covering 26 countries compiled from party administrators in 26 countries constitute the nucleus for a global database on women in political parties alongside databases built by the IPU on female representation and by the IDEA on gender quotas. Building such a database requires high investment and continuous updating. To my knowledge, this comprehensive original dataset on women in political parties is not available anywhere else. This dataset provides a valuable contribution to existing data on women in political parties.
Annex 1.1 Definition of Regions per the IPU

**Americas**: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela

**North America**: Canada, Mexico, United States of America

**Non-Arab Muslim-majority countries**: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenstan, Uzbekistan (no data are available on Brunei)

**Arab States**: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen (Comoros, Somalia, Mauritania, are included under Sub-Saharan Africa; and Palestine under Special Territories)

**Asia**:

**East Asia**: China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Republic of Korea

**Central Asia**: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

**South Asia**: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

**South East Asia**: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam

**Europe**: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The F.Y.R. of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan

**Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)**: Luxembourg, Norway, USA, Switzerland, Netherlands, Ireland, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, Finland, France, Spain, Japan, Italy, New Zealand, Greece, Israel, Slovenia, South Korea, Czech Republic, Portugal, Slovakia Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Poland, Turkey, Chile, Mexico

**Nordic countries**: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden

**European Union**: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom

**Pacific**: Australia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

**Sub-Saharan Africa**: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa (1), Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe
## Annex 1.2. Female MPs in Muslim-Majority & OECD Countries by GDP/Capita, Democracy, Electoral Systems & Lists, & Quotas for Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Female MPs %</th>
<th>GDP/Capita (US $)</th>
<th>Democracy Polity IV</th>
<th>Electoral Systems</th>
<th>Electoral Lists</th>
<th>Quotas Legislated</th>
<th>Quotas Voluntary</th>
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**Nordic and Other Advanced countries not members in OECD countries (for reference)**

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**Sources:**
For Female MPs: The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Women in National Parliaments database, World Classification of 188 countries, [www.ipu.org](http://www.ipu.org) November 2010. For GDP/Capita (in US$): The World Bank database ([www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) database ([www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org)) accessed December 15, 2010. For democracy scores (Polity IV 2006-2009): The "Polity Score" captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (least democratic) to +10 (most democratic). Autocracies are assigned scores from (-10 to -6) and are coded (0), democracies from (+6 to +10) are coded (2); regimes in-between (-5 to +5) are coded (1). For electoral systems, electoral lists and quotas for women: the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Global Database of Quotas for Women ([www.quotaproject.org](http://www.quotaproject.org)); and the IPU, as well as for Palestinian Occupied Territory data (update November 2009). Acronyms for electoral systems based on the IDEA database ([www.idea.int](http://www.idea.int)): PR Party list proportional representation; MMP Mixed Membership Proportional; FPTP First Past the Post; BV Bloc Vote; Parallel systems; PBV Party Bloc Vote; STV Single Transferable Vote; SNTV Single Non-Transferable Vote; TRS Two-Round Systems; N (no electoral system in place). PR systems are coded (1); all others (0). Closed electoral lists are coded (1); Open electoral lists are coded (0). When legislated & voluntary quotas are coded (1) when employed and (0) if not employed.
Chapter Two
Lebanon in Comparative Perspective

Introduction

The introductory chapter to this dissertation points to a lingering global gender gap in female representation in public office relative to their participation in the private sector. This is especially observed in developing countries, with wide variations across regions, countries, and political parties. Chapter One also poses the conundrum of a mismatch between women’s high socio-economic profile and their low political representation. These observations motivated the development of a theory on party variation in religiosity to explain variation in women’s leadership in parties’ decision-making bodies and on their electoral lists. This dissertation takes Lebanon as an in-depth, single country case-study for testing this theory.

By placing Lebanon in comparative perspective, I address concerns voiced by Donno and Russett (2004) who called for more theory and research rooted in focused case studies. The advantages of a single case-study in establishing causality and not mere association have been emphasized by researchers including Stathis Kalyvas, himself a staunch supporter of multiple cases (Kalyvas, 1996:14). A focused case-study has the advantages of investigating in-depth a phenomenon within a controlled socio-political environment, while holding constant unmeasured variables that might influence the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Thus, a single case-study can isolate the influence of political parties, the independent variable, functioning within one society, on women’s leadership, the dependent variable, while holding constant the political regime and electoral system which may also influence women’s leadership. Hence, one important advantage of single country case studies is that it is feasible to examine social dynamics within one country, which is not plausible in multi-
country studies. This means that with a single case study, it is possible to conduct an analysis that controls for contextual variables to a significant degree as well as taking social variables into account that may be considered endogenous to the relationships examined in this dissertation.

This chapter lays out the research design and data collection methods employed in the field work to test the theory posited in the dissertation. I look at the multiparty system in Lebanon through the lens of religious cleavages and the impact of a 15-year civil war. This chapter also offers a socio-economic and political profile of Lebanese women that substantiate the mismatch between their high socio-economic qualifications and low political representation. It concludes by recapitulating the advantages of taking Lebanon as a single case-study: A country marked by multiple social cleavages resulting in an extraordinary profusion of political parties with varying intensities of religiosities and secularisms.

A. Research Design and Data Collection

Are political parties the veritable forklifts for women’s leadership that this thesis states? What types of political parties work better for women’s leadership? What are the party-related variables that explain this choice? These are the research questions for which data and information are collected. Accurate and reliable data on the share of women in party membership and leadership and on electoral lists for public office, however, are rare and, when available, are often obsolete.¹ The paucity of research on women in parties and related sex-disaggregated data is highlighted in the official annual reports of the National Commission for Lebanese Women.

¹ Only rough estimates are available on female party membership in some industrialized countries dating back to the last century (Lane and Ersson, 1987). In the Arab countries, female party membership is estimated at 10% in Egypt, 2% in Yemen, and 7-8% in Lebanon. (Mousa Shtay, 2004: 144).
(NCLW), and by researchers and scholars. These scholars also criticize the failure of political scientists to engender their research and address the political participation of women (Shay, 2004: 143-144). In the light of the lack of data, the thesis research presented here included the collection of an original data set on women in political parties, which was obtained first-hand from party administrators. To my knowledge, the data is original and unique in its coverage, scope and quality.

The field research covered 18 out of some 80 political parties, which are deemed ‘relevant’ for the case-study of Lebanon. Combined, these 18 relevant parties account for over 70% of the 128-seat parliament, with each party occupying at least one seat (0.8%) in any of the five post-war parliaments (1992, 1996, 2000, 2005, and 2009). The post-war era witnessed the birth of new powerful parties, with some parties surviving the civil war, while others becoming offshoots of pre-war parties and some defunct.

Based on questionnaires, information is also gathered from 150 structured and semi-structured interviews conducted during 2006-2009. The author personally conducted all interviews with party leaders and their senior advisers, female party activists, parliamentarians

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3 According to Sartori, relevant parties are those that occupy at least 3 percent of seats in the legislature (Sartori, 1976: 122-23). However, in order to get more observations, the threshold is lowered to one seat out of 128 in any of the post-war parliaments (1992, 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2009).

4 The relevant parties include the Syrian Social National (Qawmi Suri), Arab Renaissance Socialist of Lebanon (Ba’ath), Communist, Progressive Socialist (Ishtiraki), National Bloc (Qutlah), National Liberals (Ahrar), Phalanges (Kata’eb), Islamic Group (Jama’a Islamiah), Unitarian Movement (Tawhid), Islamic Action Front (Jabhat Al-Amal), Party of God (Hizbullah), Hope Movement (Amal), Future Movement, Free Patriotic Movement (Tayyar Watani Hurr), Lebanese Forces, Democratic Renewal (Tajaddod), and Giants (Marada).

5 See, Annex 1 to the dissertation for the questionnaires. All interviews were conducted in Arabic and audio-taped by permission of respondents. These were translated into English by the author and are unedited. For the sake of anonymity, the names of interviewees are not provided, but only their position and the generic type of the party. However, identities are retained when given in citations.
and scholars. I interviewed 14 party leaders, four of which were clergymen and religious leaders, and senior male advisers to these party leaders. I interviewed all six female MPs in the 2005 parliament, and three out of the four ever female cabinet ministers. I also interviewed the majority of women in leadership positions in parties’ decision-making bodies, including two party leaders, one vice-president and two secretaries-general; as well as all current and former heads of women’s wings in 13 (out of 18) parties that house such wings. Lastly, I interviewed a sample of 14 female candidates (2.5%) who were on the municipal lists of the 10 out of 18 parties that nominated women in these elections. In general, party leaders and/or their senior advisers selected and referred me directly to female party officials for interviewing. Most of the women interviewed are in leadership positions, activists and politically informed, educated and professionals (lawyers, physicians, architects, engineers), career and business women, or scholars and university professors. Although those highly profiled women interviewed are not the whole universe of women in leadership positions, nonetheless they are a representative sample. This lends credence to the information they provided and substantiates the findings of this research. I am grateful for the openness and welcoming spirit that my interlocutors showed and that this research topic received from most party leaders and political activists.

Notwithstanding the above, this was not an easy or smooth task, given the political instability and stringent requirements of few religious parties for granting interviews. I had to submit pro-forma applications specifying the name or position of party official to be interviewed, purpose of research, list of questions, personal data with affiliation and official letter of introduction. Generally, female officials in extremist and conservative religious parties had to obtain prior permission from party leadership for the interview. Given the high security alert especially after the July 2006 war on Lebanon, interviews with top ranking officials were not
granted, or were conducted by phone. Sometimes, interviews with female officials were not granted since they are not politically involved. Moreover, access to political elites and leaders is extremely difficult, unless this was done by personal referrals or ‘wasta’. This was especially true during the research period owing to the explosive security situation and attendant political concerns preoccupying potential interviewees. Through various personal and professional connections, appointments were secured with party leaders or their senior advisors, male and female party officials and parliamentarians. Meetings were held under very tight security measures in fortified parliamentary offices, at party headquarters, and in private homes, remote safe houses, hotel rooms and other safe havens. This was necessary as many of the interviewees were at risk of assassination during that critical period.6

In addition, obtaining composition of membership by gender and religious sect posed another problem, especially in some of the older parties that do not collect information on gender or religious affiliation from membership applications and registers. The problem is that, in the absence of such registers, compiling data needed on sex-disaggregated membership from names of members was a tough task, especially when first names are unisex (e.g., Nidal, Najah, Rida, Claude, Nour, Safa, Raja, Amal, Salam, Ismat, Isam, Najat, etc…).7 However, this task was easier for distribution by religious sect, since there are typical Muslim and Christian names and surnames.

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6 Preliminary interviews were held during September-October 2006, immediately following the 33-day Israeli invasion of Lebanon in July 2006. These were followed by three rounds of structured and semi-structured interviews in December 2007- January 2008, March-April and July-December 2008; and concluded in June-September 2009. The interviews were interrupted during 2007 and 2008 because of frequent eruptions of fighting in camps, street fighting or long-lasting closures of the city by the opposition. The situation somewhat stabilized following the election of Michel Suleiman as President of the Republic in October 2008, but remains volatile to date.

7 This problem has also been raised by scholars studying parties in the Netherlands: “In the past most parties have not counted their membership according to sex.” (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993: 212)
Information gathered from structured and semi-structured interviews is invaluable in its comprehensive coverage of women in political parties as party activists and potential agents of change. This information covered types of parties, goals, mobilization strategies, membership and operating procedures; as well as their attitude towards women’s leadership. Such information is essential for developing a sensitive classification, labeling and accurate coding of political parties in order to test the theory and related hypotheses that this dissertation lays out. The rich information culled from interviews also provides insight into the mismatch between women’s high socio-economic profile and their low political representation. In addition, information is gathered on the role of party variation in political culture on women’s leadership, or the attitude of party elites vis-à-vis women’s leadership.\footnote{Following Norris and Inglehart (1993) in comparing egalitarian to traditional parties, they refer to ‘political culture’ as the dominant set of values, norms, and attitudes vis-à-vis women.} In this connection, scholars advise that “Gathering empirical evidence on how individual attitudes, cultural norms about appropriate work for women, and political institutions affect participation is essential…” (Pande and Cirone, 2009: 7). Heeding their advice, the views of party leaders and female party activists are gauged on a basic assumption upon which my theory of party variation in religiosity is premised, namely, “Are political parties the main vehicle for women’s political leadership?”

The majority of interlocutors support the central role that parties play in promoting women’s leadership, while few others expressed dissenting views. A five-time elected female MP and a cabinet minister maintains that there is no magic formula for women’s leadership. Nonetheless,

Only political parties can offer women leadership positions. Running as independents is not a formula for success. However, women should build alliances with their male colleagues in political parties in order to convince decision-makers to introduce affirmative action policies. Political expertise is not a degree that one gets, but is acquired overtime. At the end of the day, women will be recognized by their presence as leaders.
This echoes the argument that, “…, the only way that (political) institutions will change is through the politics of their (women’s) presence” (Anne Phillips, 1995, in Duerst-Lahti, 2006:10). Similarly, the International Labour Office (ILO) flag that, “…, there is no evidence to show that once women attain upper levels of management and leadership, attitudes towards them are not much different to those towards men.” (ILO, 2004: 2). However, Basu (2005) expresses reservations that parties may not be particularly conducive to women’s leadership, a view shared by a religious party leader in that,

It is not a question of whether or not political parties offer women chances in leadership, but whether women impose their presence in politics. Unfortunately, no women did. In the Asian Muslim and in western countries women imposed themselves and proved that they are good politicians. But, in the Arab countries neither women nor men have a great opportunity in politics; this relates to basic human rights and not a gender issue.

In a similar vein, a female MP questions the viability of political parties as conduits for women’s leadership in that, “Parties fail to train women when they join or provide them with opportunities to become leaders and decision-makers, or nominate them for public office.” However, another female MP maintains that women’s opportunities for leadership depend on the parties’ strength, as measured by the number of seats parties occupy in parliament (Lane and Ersson 1987). She argues that the party’s strength will eventually determine how much risk the party is willing to undertake by nominating women on their electoral lists. Similarly, a female party official points out that, “If parties are strong they can afford to nominate women for public office and are more willing to promote them to leadership positions.” Thus, powerful parties have less to lose than weaker parties by nominating women to public office. In effect, “Women stand a much better chance of winning in elections if they run within an electoral list of a strong party than a weaker party.”
Another line of argument that supports the central role of parties for advancing women’s leadership and representation in public office is that, “Women’s chances in winning are slim if they run as independent nominees.” This argument is corroborated by another female MP who stressed that,

Powerful parties are best placed to include women on their electoral list. Given the patriarchal mentality, parties are women’s only avenue to a career in politics. Men may accept to compete with women in business and employment but they will not cede their seats to them willingly in parliament. Therefore, if women run without support of parties as independents, their chances in winning are nil.

Indeed, female candidates who ran as independents all failed. But, this is common elsewhere not only in Lebanon. However, these failed candidates were either not supported by their parties or were not party members. In either case, their failure as independent candidates provides support to the assumption that political parties are essential for women’s leadership.

In the first instance, a female MP candidate expressed her disappointment that she ran twice for elections and in both instances her party did not support her because, “Parties are not committed to gender equality and do not take any measures to ensure it. Otherwise, we should have seen more women on their electoral lists.” Similar sentiments are expressed by other failed female candidates. Few argue that civil society may be an alternative route for women’s leadership, while raising the issue of tokenism and effective leadership:

Women in parliament are not equipped for legislation, because parties fail to prepare them. They are seat-warmers. Civil society works better for women’s leadership, as the cases of female ministers rising from NGOs attest to in Jordan and Kuwait. Political parties should have the political will to empower women and to ally with civil society in that endeavour.

This echoes the argument by Basu (2005) that women’s movements are an alternative to political parties, provided they build alliances with political parties and have leverage as pressure groups.

But, a former female minister suggested other alternatives for women’s leadership:
Parties are not the only vehicle for female representation and leadership. State intervention by legislating affirmative action and gender quotas may be combined with parties’ support for women. Municipalities work for women, because family networks and tribal affiliations are more essential than parties’ support. Civil society is women’s forte, they are active, visible and experienced. This has worked for women in Europe and the USA as well as in Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait. So, why not in Lebanon?

In the second instance, a female municipal candidate studied political parties and remarked that, “Being a political activist from the South, I am exposed to the ideologies of Hizbullah, Amal, Ba’ath and the Syrian Social parties. I am appalled by their disregard for women, despite their rhetoric, and decided not to join any.” Despite this aversion to parties, she accepts to be on their electoral list, which lends further support to the assumption that political parties are, in fact, the main vehicles for women’s leadership. Another political activist while conceding that, “Parties are the only avenue for women’s leadership,” she suggests that women establish all-female parties emulating the few in the USA, the Netherlands, Ukraine, Jordan, and Syria, among others. She also highlighted the importance of establishing networks to exchange good practices in this domain. However, the experience of all-female parties is not altogether encouraging. Such exclusively female parties marginalize women instead of advancing them, a process which feminists would undoubtedly argue against. Indeed, women need to work with the flow and not oppose it.

With few dissenting views proposing alternatives, statements of interviewees support the assumption that political parties are the main vehicles for women’s leadership, as also widely documented in scholarly and feminist literature. The following section provides an overview of the salient features of political parties in Lebanon.

B. Political Parties: An Overview

“Lebanon is a mix of fabrics, sects, convictions, contradictions, cleavages, and communities. Political parties are but a reflection of this society.”, as a party leader aptly
describes the multi-religious fabric of society marked by a multiparty system formed around multiple social cleavages. Scholars note that social cleavages shape and structure a party system and reflect the degree of society’s cohesiveness and homogeneity (Almond and Verba 1965, Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Lane and Ersson 1987).\textsuperscript{9} Political parties forming around these cleavages mark how closely they are linked to local communities and to the society at large, and explain how they function within these segmented societies. However, these scholars also argue that such cleavages are central for a meaningful functioning of democracies and for party competition (Almond and Verba 1965, Dahl 1965 and 1982). In Lebanon, these cleavages are reflected in some 80 active and diverse types of parties, but with 18 ‘relevant’ parties competing and vying for power and control. The diversity and profusion in the multiparty system has been recognized by politicians, clergymen, scholars and political scientists studying the roots of political instability and perpetual conflict in the country.\textsuperscript{10} In this vein, a Lebanese scholar remarks that,

\ldots, [T]he most apparent characteristic of the Lebanese party-system is diversity in features, multiplicity in numbers and complexity in classification. The party-system is endowed with many parties with differences and disparities in their inner workings, organizational structures, and ideologies. (Shtay, 2004: 130)

This multiparty system features a handful of powerful parties and several minor ones that do not stand a chance unless they join political blocs and coalitions for electioneering

\textsuperscript{9} Cleavages may be segmental like racial, linguistic, and religious (Eckstein: 1966). They may be cultural (young-old, urban-rural, traditional-modern, authoritarian-libertarian), or socio-economic as in class, status, role, and gender (Flanagan, 1963:64). Eckstein (1966) lists sex, tribe, race, region, rural-urban, young-old, language, religion, as well as differences in values, norms, and belief systems, as social cleavages (in Lane and Ersson, 1987:41).

\textsuperscript{10} See also, Mohamad Sha’ya, 2006, “Why are we divided when faced with existential questions?” (An-Nahar, August 31, 2006); Patriarch Georges Khodr, “Lebanese politics and the Clergymen” (An.Nahar May 3, 2008); Former Prime Minister Salim El-Hoss, 2008, “We are all Sectarian” (As-Safir, June 24, 2008); Sami Efeish, 2006 “Confessional imbalance ensures instability in Lebanon” (An-Nahar, September 18, 2006); Raghid El-Sohl, “Consociational Democracy in Lebanon: Competition or Consensus”, 2008 (Issam Fares Center for Lebanon, Beirut); Mas’oud El-Daher, “Towards a serious confrontation with sectarian discourse in Lebanon” (As Safir, April 26, 2008).
purposes. The impact of social cleavages is depicted by measuring the strength or fragmentation of the party system. Laakso and Taagepera developed an index for the “effective” number of parties within a party system, which takes into account their relative size and measures their strength in terms of the proportion of seats they occupy in the legislature. They suggest that, “The number of effective parties is the number of hypothetical equal-size parties that would have the same total effect on fractionalization of the system as have equal parties of unequal size.” (1979: 2). This is useful for comparative purposes, as the effective number of parties is a frequent operationalization for the fractionalization and segmentation of party systems. Accordingly, the Lebanese parliament is effectively a 4.9 party system with a fractionalization index of 0.94, which is borderline high, since anything above 5.0 is high (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979: 24). This reflects the wide disparities in relative sizes and strengths of parties as only a handful of the 18 relevant parties wield power. It also reveals a high degree of fragmentation permeating the Lebanese legislature, as a result of the multi-social and religious cleavages.

The majority of parties in Lebanon are confessional, single-sect dominated, with civil, national, and/or religious orientations. They rally around leaders from the same dominant sect and few have plural membership. Their labels vary depending on self-definition (self-location), declared objectives and programmatic orientations. These parties may not fully conform to the standards or classical features and common nuances and norms of parties in as far as institutionalization, ideologies and/or the mixture of religious and secular components in their

11 The effective number of parties is calculated by dividing one by the sum of squares of shares occupied by the relevant parties (i.e. occupying at least 1% of seats in current parliament): \( N_s = \frac{1}{\sum p^2} \). The fractionalization index is the complement of the number of effective parties, calculated as \( 1/N \). (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979: 8, 24). The number of parties equals the effective number of parties only when all parties have equal strength. In any other case, the effective number of parties is lower than the actual number of parties. For instance, the number of effective parties in some parliamentary systems stood at (2.1) in India, (2.4) in Austria, (3.2) in Germany, (3.6) in Israel, (3.8) in the Netherlands, (3.9) in Italy and (7.0) in Belgium (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 181-182).
political platforms. The intensity of religiosity and degree of secularism of these parties is denoted by examining their political platforms and determining the extent to which religious and secular components penetrate their agendas. However, one finds across the party-system in Lebanon not only multiple religiosities but also multiple secularisms. For instance, a female activist notes that, “We established non-denominational kindergartens, as models for children in the South. These were approved by Hizbullah, which indicates that even in the most religious parties, one finds secularist tendencies.” This is testimony of the prevalence of multiple secularisms and religiosities in Lebanon. It also demonstrates that efforts continue to be exerted to bridge religious cleavages in Lebanon.

Some confessional parties maintain a religious denominational identity but declare non-religious objectives, while pushing for civil goals and national sovereignty. They generally lack a political ideology per se and their outreach ranges from limited territorial to less than wide national control. In this sense, parties in Lebanon may look after the interests of one of the 18 religious communities, but not after the whole population with its multi-denominational affiliations. This aggregation of confessional parties is what makes up the Lebanese Republic, as a party leader states that,

Lebanon is a confederation of 18 religious communities, each concerned with its own identity and survival as enclaves. It is a federation of minorities that govern by proportional confessional representation within a consociational political system. Unlike other Arab countries, Lebanon is a civil and secular not a religious state. It boasts a tolerant constitution stipulating freedom of religious convictions, expression and practices.

12 Indeed, the resurgence of a rich debate on the sacred and secular recognized the fluidity of the relationship and highlights the persistence, permanence, centrality and complexity of religiosity in secular lives. The theory that secularism will overtake religiosity with the advent of modernism in industrial and post-industrial societies is being called into question. Scholars and social scientists (viz., Stepan, Norris, Inglehart) are revisiting and rethinking theories of secularisms and religiosities, and their connection with the political, social and cultural spheres. See also, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (New York: Cambridge University Press). For more details, see the introductory chapter for a detailed discussion of the secularism debate.
In this connection, a leader of Maronite-dominated party points out that religious cleavages also prevail in other Arab countries (Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, and Egypt) that have Christian minorities but Islam is the state religion. However, they are not as intense or conflict-bearing as in Lebanon. He adds that, “Lebanon is the only Arab country which does not impose one religion on all its citizens. Moreover, the confessional quota reveals the importance of religion in society. It governs the social and public life as well as political and party systems.”

This testimony is substantively significant in that religion and politics in Lebanon are intertwined with no evidence of clear separation between the two. Beyond the confessional identity which brings the constituents together, the locomotive or driving force behind the formation of these parties lies in self-serving interests of political leaders for electoral power, patronage and clientelism. Feudal or “rentier” type clientilistic behaviour keeps the party in the political arena, as the leader uses his affluence for vote-buying or offering financial and in-kind incentives to secure higher voter turnout. In this respect, capitalizing on a common confessional identity for electoral purposes is a classic case in political parties, as scholars point out that, “One’s religious identity provided a cue that oriented voters toward political parties, and helped define one’s ideological position on the political spectrum.” (Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 228).

Based on information gathered from party leaders and administrators as well as observations of national scholars, most political parties remain tools in the hands of their leaders, which may be a cause for alarm regarding the democratic process in their operating procedures. These democratic deficits are prevalent in leadership transfers, especially when the founder or current leader of the party passes away or is assassinated, or when the leaders’ term in office expires. In such instances, the party’s by-laws are magically amended and approved by the party’s council to accommodate a renewal of the term of office of the current leader, often a warlord
and/or a religious leader. In other instances, the leader may be ceremoniously re-elected or wins by acclamation, since no one dares to run against him. Or, leadership becomes a legacy as it is passed on to a family member, often a male. Democratic practices are also compromised when hierarchical and obsolete mechanisms lead to concentration of decision-making in the hands of few political elites. The fact that the majority of political parties suffer from democratic deficits and autocratic leadership does not augur well for women’s chances in political leadership. In contrast, in the case of parties with secular platforms and leftist orientations, religion is confined to the private sphere. Their imported ideologies guide their mission statements and political agendas. These parties enjoy plural membership, hold periodic competitive elections to transfer leadership, and employ decentralization in the decision-making processes.

Further, there is a variety of religious parties that uphold the Islamic Shari’a and the doctrine in their political platforms and use politics to achieve religious and politico-religious goals, which may vary in line with the intensity of religiosity in their political agendas. The relationship between the state and religious leadership ebbs and flows, as a party leader explains that, “The multi-religious composition of society is not the major problem. It is the implicit understanding between strong religious leaders and a weak state to maintain the status quo because it is in their mutual interest.”13 In this vein, scholars point out that, “In Lebanon, where the state incorporated the religious/ethnic heterogeneity of society in its formal structure, the government relinquished matters of family and personal status to religious authorities of the various communities.” (Deniz Kandiyoti, 1991: 12) Another researcher finds that, “… in

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13 The Jonathan Fox Religion and State (RAS) index on religion-state regulation assigns a high score of 22 to Lebanon, equivalent to that of France and India (Kunkler: 2009). This high level of cooperation between the state and religious authorities begs the question of whether such cooperation is attained consciously through efforts of the willing, or the government is coerced into accepting the status quo in order to ensure stability and security. The political situation in Lebanon is in continuous flux. There is a lot of muscle-flexing and “not-so-peaceful” status as the July 2006, June 2007, and May 2008 events demonstrate. A case in point is Hizbullah’s maintenance of a fully armed militia within the boundaries of the state, reflecting a state within a state situation akin to that existing before the eruption of the civil war in 1975 with the Palestinian camps and their armed militias.
religiously pluralist systems, like Lebanon, Palestine and to a lesser extent Israel, religious leaders often institutionalize traditional norms and values which, … are often contrary to gender equality…” (Bouhamdan, 2009:18). Therefore, such implicit cooperation-cooptation between religious leaders and the state may not work in favor of women’s advancement or their leadership chances since religious leaders will have the upper hand in deciding the station and lives of women. As discussed earlier, women’s chances in leadership are limited overall, but I argue that they are infinitesimal in parties whose platforms contain religious components. For instance, these parties with religious platforms occupy around one-fifth of parliamentary seats in the 2009 parliament and are all-male, which reflects the potential influence they have on women’s leadership and provides initial support to the theory of party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership.

Notwithstanding these observations, information gathered from interviewees reveals that religious leaders of Muslim-oriented parties, like other party leaders, will support women’s leadership when it is in their interest to do so. If supporting women improves their public image or voter turnout, religious leaders relax their conservative stance or overlook the doctrine. This somewhat contradicts the argument that, “While Islamists are not at all committed to the liberal process, secularists are only committed to it if liberalization does not dislodge them from their position of power.” (Hatem, 1994: 676)¹⁴ But, in such instances one is hard pressed to stress that it is common for parties to employ ‘strategic maneuverings’, in this case supporting women’s leadership, if it is in their interests to do so (Clark and Schwedler, 2003). Therefore, women aspiring to leadership must identify where parties’ interests lie and strategize accordingly; a behaviour that may lead to favourable outcomes and breakthroughs. This is exactly why the

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¹⁴ Mervat Hatem, “Egyptian Discourses on Gender and political liberalization: Do secularists and Islamists views really differ?” The Middle East Journal, Autumn 1994; Volume 48, No.4; p.661-676.
interaction between religious cleavages and the diversity of political parties in Lebanon constitute an interesting and compelling case for in-depth examination to probe their influence on women’s leadership.

In the following section, I look at women’s high socio-economic profile and examine the mismatch with their low political representation.

C. A Socio-Economic & Political Profile of Women

The mismatch between women’s high socio-economic profile and their low parliamentary representation in Lebanon is the puzzle that motivated this research. Lebanese women acquired suffrage rights in 1952, ahead of many Arab countries. A number of articles in the personal status and family legal codes were amended to ensure equality between women and men. Despite this, there is still a wide gap between the de jure existence of laws and legislation on the books and their de facto application particularly the family and personal status codes as well as nationality law.

The Lebanese population is estimated at 3.8 millions, of which 51% are women. It is composed of 18 Christian and Muslim sects, which have proportional representation in parliament in line with a confessional quota.15 As indicator of the sensitivity of this issue, the last population census was conducted in 1932, before Lebanon gained its independence in 1943. The 1989 Ta’if Accords resolved the controversy over who has majority population, when the major political blocs reached a common understanding to add 30 seats to parliament and split the 128 seats equally between Christians and Muslims.16

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15 www.cas.gov.lb (Lebanese official site of the Central Administration of Statistics); Lebanese National Commission for Women (LNCW), statistical database www.lcnw.org.lb

16 Unofficial estimates show that Christians, Muslim Shiites, and Muslim Sunnis are each one-third of the populations. Other estimates point to around 60% Muslims (Shiite, Sunni, Druze, and Alawites), and 39% Christians (Maronite, Catholic including Armenians, Orthodox, Chaldean, Assyrian, Copt and Protestant) and one percent other religious sects including Jews. These sources estimate around four million Lebanese in the Diaspora, the majority of who are Christians followed by Muslim Shiites.
In the educational domain, females recorded higher enrolment rates than males at all levels (www.cas.org.lb). Female to male enrolment ratio stood at 1.2, so that more women than men are enrolled at the university level. Statistics show that 9% of women graduated in business administration, 24% in medicine and engineering including agricultural engineering, and 20% in law. In the economic domain, almost 31% of Lebanese women (15 years and above) are economically active, comprising 33% of the labour force, of which, 30% are administrators, 39% are specialists and professionals, and 9% executives, decision-makers and managers in the private sector. Women are also elected presidents and members of executive committees in professional associations (pharmacists, engineers, and lawyers’ order). See table 2.1 here below.

Table 2.1 Lebanese women: A socio-economic and political profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education, 2007</th>
<th>Economic Participation, 2008 (Rates; % shares of total)</th>
<th>Political Participation, 2010 (% shares in total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education (Female /male ratio)</td>
<td>Female economic activity rate (over 15 years)</td>
<td>Share in Labor Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, in the political domain, those highly accomplished women occupy a meager 3.1% of elected parliamentary seats, 4.7% of elected seats in municipalities, and 6.7% of the government positions for which incumbents are appointed after consultations with major political blocs and

17 One of the two female ministers is carrying the finance portfolio, as minister of Finance, a ministry of critical importance.
parties. For the first time, a female minister carries the finance portfolio, which bodes well for women in political leadership.

The exception lies in the judiciary, where women represent 37% of the judiciary corps. As shown above, 20% of women graduated in law, which buoys the supply side of the equation. Women join the Institute of Higher Judiciary Studies and sit for gender-blind, competitive, qualifying exams and they pass in large numbers. The relatively high ratio of women in the judiciary is among the highest in the region. This is largely attributed to the gender-blind exams which inject meritocratic features into that particular system. Moreover, in the mid 1980s during the civil war, a large number of female judges were assigned to replace massive (forced) resignations by male judges because of large-scale corruption. However, positions at the supreme courts are by appointment and subject to confessional quotas. Women constitute 18% of the Administrative Court (the Consultative or Shoura Council) and 17% of the State Supreme Court; while there are no women in the Constitutional Council. Moreover, all family litigations go to confessional religious courts, where only the Protestant and Armenian Orthodox courts have women. Thus, there is no civil family court.

What is puzzling is that while Lebanese women are quite accomplished in education and economic terms, they are severely underrepresented in the public sphere in comparative perspective to other Arab countries. At tertiary level, female to male gross enrolment ratio is higher in Lebanon (1.2) than in most Arab countries, except for Qatar and Kuwait. See, table 2.2 here below.

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18 This is similar to the situation in Israel, which is also characterized by religious pluralism. In both of these countries, civil marriages are not allowed and civil courts do not perform such functions. Therefore, couples have to go elsewhere, mostly to Cyprus, to obtain a civil marriage certificate which they can then register at home.

19 In Oman and Bahrain, this high ratio may be explained by the fact that men often travel abroad to study (so are not counted in national universities enrollment), or are employed by public sector with lucrative salaries and privileges; while women stay at home and have no other alternative but to study.
Table 2.2 Arab countries: Female to male enrolment ratio at university level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Oman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female/male ratio</td>
<td>2.72-2.20</td>
<td>1.20-1.05</td>
<td>0.97-0.80</td>
<td>0.78-0.72</td>
<td>0.52-0.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), *Status of Arab Women 2005: History of Women’s Movements in the Arab World* (E/ESCWA/ECW/2005/1), Beirut, 2005 (in Arabic); based on ESCWA statistical database compiled from national sources.

Table 2.3 also shows that the share of Lebanese women in the labour force (33%) surpasses most Arab countries except the agricultural-based Comoros, Mauritania, Somalia and Morocco. However, using wage employment in the non-agricultural sector, Lebanese women rank at the top.

Table 2.3  Arab Countries: Women in the Labour Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Arab States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of women (%)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35-30</td>
<td>28-20</td>
<td>18-13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), *Status of Arab Women 2005: History of Women’s Movements in the Arab World* (E/ESCWA/ECW/2005/1), Beirut, 2005 (in Arabic); based on ESCWA statistical database compiled from national sources.

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20 There are 22 League of Arab States (LAS). These are Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Data are not available on female to male enrolment ratios in Algeria, Somalia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

21 Paradoxically, the highest rate for women’s labor force participation is depicted in the least developed countries, where women traditionally work in the agricultural sector.


23 Data was compiled for 20 out of 22 Arab countries only. No data were available for Palestine and Djibouti.
Yet, in terms of female representation, as table 2.4 shows, female representation in Lebanon is less than in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Algeria and Jordan, which ranked lower in education and economic participation.

### Table 2.4 Arab countries: Women in parliaments, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average share for 22 countries (10.1%)</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of women MPs (%)</td>
<td>27.6 - 22.1</td>
<td>18.9 - 12.4</td>
<td>10.5 - 6.4</td>
<td>3.1 - 0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Parliamentary Union (IPU) [www.ipu.org](http://www.ipu.org), updated 28 February 2010

Indeed, Lebanon displays all the features and trappings of an enabling environment for women’s political leadership. However, empirical evidence demonstrates that female representation in Lebanon is lower than in most Arab countries of comparable educational and economic levels, as well as in many non-Arab Muslim-majority countries (see, Annex 1.2 in chapter One). This is corroborated by the findings of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) serving as international observers in 2009 parliamentary elections and remarking that,

The level of women's representation in Lebanon's Parliament falls below international norms. Even within the Arab world, Lebanon has one of the lowest levels of women's political participation. ...But as other electoral reforms are pursued, consideration should be given to the best means to increase women's political representation as elected officials, in political party leadership, in the government, and as election administrators. (National Development Institute (NDI) 2009: 54)

In addition, one observes that women in the Lebanese legislature are mostly those “garbed in black” denoting that they are in a state of mourning for the accidental loss, natural death, imprisonment or assassination of a husband, father or brother.24 As also a researcher explains that, “...[T]he country is yet to usher in a female political leader or Member of

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Parliament, who is not a wife, the sister, the daughter or the mother of a prominent political martyr. Without blood ties to male political icons, a woman’s political career remains gravely limited by social, cultural and religious norms.” (Bouhamdan 2009: 39). Indeed, with a single exception in 2000 and 2005 parliaments, all other female MPs join the council as widows, sisters, or daughters of martyred political leaders, as also the NDI 2009 observes. However, this is not \textit{sui generis} to Lebanon. Denise Baer (2006) suggests seven types of political recruitment for women, namely, institutional, sponsored, lateral, widow, proxy, movement, and dynastic. As such, women in politics are informal proxies and tokens.

Table 2.5 shows that between 1953 and 1972 or before the civil war erupted, the majority of female candidates (93%) belonged to the widows and dynastic political families’ category. The pattern shifted in the period of the post-war elections (1992-2009) during which 74% of female candidates were nominated by political parties (including those ‘women-garbed-in-black’).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Widows/Dynastic</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Political Parties (including ‘women-garbed-in-black’)
\footnote{26} | 0         | 74        | 100       |
| Independent                                    | 0         | 21        | 81 (100%) |
| Women’s Movement                              | 7         | 5         | 19 (100%) |
| TOTAL                                        | 100 (n=14)| 100 (n=61)| 100 (n=45)| 100 (n=16) |


\footnote{25} It is also difficult for men to run for elections if they do not come from a political family or are not supported by a political party. However, women suffer from the double jeopardy of gender bias and dire need for patronage without which their chances in leadership remain slim.

\footnote{26} This includes only one female MP (around 2%) who was nominated by a party but was not ‘garbed-in-black’.
Most of the women when they first run for elections are widows or belong to the dynastic category. In subsequent rounds, they are nominated by powerful parties because they are winners. In other words, there is congruence between these two categories in that their belonging to the women “garbed-in-black” category or to a political family serves as an entry point for women into public office. Overtime, those female MPs gained political maturity and are not anymore ‘tokens’ but became decision-makers and legislators. However, which of these categories offers women more chances in winning? Table 2.5 shows that 100% of women who were nominated by political parties (who also belong to the widows/dynastic category), won in elections. However, none of the women who ran as independents or were supported by the women’s movement made it to the parliament to date. The inefficacy of these avenues for women’s political leadership may also be observed in other countries.27 These findings support the core assumption in this thesis that political parties are the main vehicles for women’s leadership. Given that parties select and nominate winners, the central question is which type offers women more chances for leadership: parties with extensive or minimal religious platforms?

To sum up, measured by regional standards, progress achieved by Lebanese women in academic and professional achievements in the private sector is not matched by their political representation in public office, except to some extent in the judiciary. This mismatch demonstrates why Lebanon offers a particularly useful, albeit puzzling showcase of women’s political leadership. The diversity in competing political parties provides the opportunity to

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27 A study on a sample of 74 Yemeni female candidates, who ran for elections in 2003 and 2006, showed that 64 percent of the candidates were party members while 36 percent ran as independents. The findings show that 62 percent of the party members won in elections, while only 8 percent of independents made it to parliament. Freidreck Eibert Stifung Foundation, *Breaking the Stereotypes: Yemeni Female Candidates in Elections* (Al-Majed for Publishing Co. LTD, Sana’a, 2008). Unfortunately, the study focused on women candidates and did not provide comparable figures for men. This would have been very useful for comparative purposes.
examine multiple cases within one single case-study, while controlling for the effects of political and electoral systems. The prevalence of varying intensities of religiosity and secularism on parties’ platforms offers good grounds for exploring the hypothesis that parties with higher religiosity are less likely than parties with lower religiosity to enhance women’s chances in leadership. The following section makes the case for Lebanon in comparative perspective.

D. The Case for Lebanon: Religious Cleavages, Political Parties & Women’s Leadership

Lebanon is a small country with a multi-religious society. It has the largest Christian population among the predominantly other Muslim Arab countries. This demographic characteristic has significant implications on conflict as a result of fierce competition among the three major communities, Christian Maronites, Muslim Shiites and Muslim Sunnis, for control and power over the polity. It is also marked by multiple cross-cutting cleavages, producing class disparities due to uneven income distribution, gender disequilibria, and wider religious cleavages instigating conflict and political instability. These cleavages drowned the country in a 15-year civil war, a watershed which heightened religious extremism and exacerbated religious and class cleavages. As a result, political parties mushroomed, forming around these cleavages and attracting poor and deprived communities where religious extremism thrives, mostly in South and North-West Lebanon, the birth place of most religious parties. This phenomenon is not sui generis to Lebanon as scholars establish:

We believe that the importance of religiosity persists most strongly among vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer nations, facing personal survival-threatening risks. We argue that feelings of vulnerability to physical, societal, and personal risks are a key factor driving religiosity… Societies where people’s daily lives

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28 There are Christian minorities in Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, and Sudan. In Lebanon, the Christians were majority. However, immigration increased as a result of the civil war and Christians are estimated to be one-third of the population, excluding those in Diaspora.
are shaped by the threat of poverty… and …death, remain as religious today as centuries ago. (Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 4-5, 216)²⁹

In this context, scholars observe that, “…religion is a more salient independent variable among women than among men, apparently because women are more religious… the higher level of religiosity among women helps to account for their greater conservatism relative to men.” (Mark Tessler 2004: 4; Jelen and Wilcox, 1994: 1171-1186) Indeed, this phenomenon is also observed in conflict-stricken Lebanon where poor women are often more religious than poor men. Research and studies point out that, wars, civil strife and armed conflict have a differential impact on women and that this thwarts efforts to balance gender disequilibria, including in the political arena.³⁰

This diversity in political parties is useful for testing a theory of party variation in religiosity and in which the influence of one political regime and one electoral system is controlled.³¹ Further, despite an assumption of homogeneity because of a common language, history and culture, there are slight nuances, which offer a fertile ground for studying party variation in political culture. In this connection, a Lebanese sociologist remarks that, “Lebanon has a very complex, diverse and global culture, influenced by Western culture, Arab satellite

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²⁹ They point to exceptions in the case of Bin laden who is extremely rich but fanatically religious (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 5).


³¹ An electoral system based on list proportional representation or List (PR), associated with large electoral districts and closed rank-order electoral lists, combined with gender quotas especially reserved seats, offers women more chances in public office than other types of electoral systems. In Lebanon, the bloc vote (BV) electoral system, unfortunately, does not offer any incentives to political parties to nominate women.
channels, the Koran, the Bible; …” (The Media Line, February 9, 2010). Thus, Lebanon is particularly useful for examining the impact of religious cleavages on the party system and exploring interlinkages with party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership.

There is a host of examples of social and religious cleavages that are at the root of conflict and political stability around the world and as such demonstrate their relevance to the structure of political systems, party-formation, and in turn to a study of women’s leadership therein. Lebanon is a case in point. It presents a show case with its multi-religious society, and the plethora of a diversity of political parties forming around multiple social cleavages, especially conflict-bearing religious-based ones. Therefore, religious cleavages are at the root of conflict that led to a 15-year civil war, which heightened religious extremism and are assumed to have intensified party religiosity, thereby severely impeding women’s chances in leadership. In other words, in a conflict-stricken country like Lebanon marked by multiple cross-cutting cleavages and a dominance of religious-based ones, widening religious cleavages may thwart women’s advancement and stunt their leadership prospects in political parties.

Conflicts reinforce cleavages that mobilize religion and, hence, reduce the potential for women

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32 In Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium, among others, one finds ethno-linguistic cleavages. Religious cleavages have emerged in Denmark, France and England with the influx of Muslim immigrants. In Pakistan and India there are religious and ethnic cleavages. The caste system in India is especially unfavorable for Muslim women from a lower cast. Religious extremism and gender segregation in Afghanistan have created a schism in the society. In Ireland, South Africa, Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are conflict-bearing racial and ethnic cleavages, which led to “ethnic cleansing”, apartheid, and other war atrocities. In the Arab countries, which enjoy a common language, religion, race and cultural heritage, one perceives also conflict-bearing ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages between minorities (Kurds, Armenians, Berbers, Christians and Copts, Assyrians, Druze, Alawites) and a majority of Arab Muslims e.g. in Morocco and the Western Sahara, Egypt, Iraq, Bahrain, Sudan and Somalia, as well as Lebanon.

33 Scholars note that, “...the more pronounced the social cleavages are, the less stable is the political system.” (Lane and Ersson, 1987: 39-40, 93, 315). Similarly, Norris and Inglehart (2004) argue that some cleavages are behind the fragmentation of society and thus threaten its wellbeing and stability, especially religious cleavages which are conflict-bearing. Other scholars argue that cleavages are essential for democracy (Almond and Verba 1965, Dahl 1965 and 1982).

34 Civil conflict has also been attributed to Palestinian refugees and Syrian troops (which left in 2005), unlike the minority Armenian community, which is more integrated in society.
to break through the glass ceiling into leadership positions within parties. This is why conflict and cleavages are relevant to a study of party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership.  

Additionally, Lebanon is the only Arab country which has a tradition of holding competitive elections-- although this was interrupted during the 15-year civil war. Until 1975, Lebanon was the only Arab country that was ever close to being ranked as a ‘democracy’ by credible international standards. For instance, up to 1975, the Freedom House (Gatskil index) gave Lebanon a score of ‘3’ (partly free) on a 7-point scale where 1 is highest and 7 lowest for civil liberties and political freedoms. Nonetheless, due to reasons of “stakeness”, or not having monopoly over the legitimate use of force and the presence of foreign armies on its soil during the 15-year civil war, Lebanon’s ranking on the democracy scale dropped and has not regained its standing since then. Notwithstanding this setback, in 1992 Lebanon resumed holding parliamentary elections every four years and municipal elections every six years with parties competing freely in these elections. Further, the last round of elections, held in June 2009, was labeled as ‘free and fair’ by international observers, which boosted its ranking on the civil liberties scale. For instance, the BTI 2010 assigned Lebanon a 6.25 score on the 10-point

Gender cleavages are not conflict-bearing, so far. But, they are relevant to a study of women’s leadership in a majority-Muslim country, where political culture is conflated with religious doctrine and Islamic Shari’a.

The Lebanese also suffer from external threats from neighboring Syria for intervention in internal politics and Israel for assault. This has accentuated political instability. In effect, Lebanon scored +5 in 1974 on Ted Gurr’s Polity IV index for democracy on a 21-point scale from +10 to 0 to -10. In 2004, Polity IV index for Lebanon was -66, denoting the political instability and dysfunctional democracy prevailing. During 2005-2008, Polity IV index registered an improvement for Lebanon up to +7 on the Democracy score. The Freedom House Index (1-7 point scale) for three consecutive years (2006-2008) assigned a score of 5 for Lebanon, which improved on the democracy scale by one point in 2009.


According to Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World 2010”, Lebanon’s rank improved from 4 to 3 on account of “noteworthy gains” in civil liberties. Moreover, the Austrian-based Global Democracy Ranking cited Lebanon as the second most improved democratizing developing country in the world after Nepal, and the most improved in the Middle East and the Arab countries (January 8, 2010). See also, Daily Star, January 14, 2010, Beirut, Lebanon.
democracy scale (from 1 lowest to 10 highest). This score is higher than most Arab countries (scoring between 3 and 4) and closer to the non-Arab Muslim-majority Senegal (6.30) and Indonesia (7.00), considered by comparativist along with India as the best democracies in the developing world. In addition, Polity IV also gave top ranking on its democracy scale to Lebanon among other Arab countries second only to Comoros (Annex 1.2). Moreover, in its Global Report 2009, Polity IV classified Lebanon’s regime type as a ‘democracy’, although it is still in the process of democratization and lacks several essential elements qualifying it as such. The above lends support and adds credence to the choice of Lebanon as a case-study for testing the theory posited in this dissertation on the role of political parties in advancing women’s political representation and the influence of religiosity/secularism in that process.

Thus, the Lebanese demographics, a 15-year civil war, multiple social and widening religious cleavages, a party system of diverse competing and multiple parties, and an acceptable rating on political freedoms and democracy scales of international credible standards make Lebanon a particularly useful case study for testing the theory posited in this dissertation. More specifically, it demonstrates how conflict-bearing religious cleavages, which widen sectarian schisms and heighten religious extremism, intensify party religiosity and reduce women’s chances in political leadership.

Conclusions

Lebanon’s mosaic and diverse society of 18 religious communities is marked with multiple cross-cutting social and religious cleavages that shape and structure its political and party system. Its multiparty system is composed of diverse types of powerful religious and not so religious political parties that vie for power, control, and for electoral prowess. Lebanon is the only Arab country with a tradition of competitive elections since 1943. The diverse types of
parties performing within a single country under the same political and electoral systems provide a useful setting for comparative analysis. A single country case-study shows variations in women’s leadership, the dependent variable, while holding constant the potential influence of political regime and electoral system, to isolate the influence of party variation in religiosity, the independent variable. Lebanon demonstrates the interlinkages between multiple social cleavages (viz., religious, class, ethnic, war), party-formation in a widely diversified complex party-system with a conflict-stricken society, and women’s leadership.

Lebanon demonstrates the mismatch between women’s high socio-economic profile and their low political performance in elected public office. It also offers a particularly useful case for exploring party variation in religiosity and its influence on women's shares in leadership and their nominations for public office. The structural aspects, the very nature of the Lebanese political system reflected in political parties – as opposed to a mix of socio-economic and cultural factors – might account to some degree for the constraints and barriers to better political performance and more leadership opportunities for women. By privileging confessionally-identified actors and constituencies, some political institutions give religious and conservative cultural values a backdoor entry, erecting an indirect barrier to women’s presence. This is exacerbated under conditions of conflict or in post-conflict situations. It is not so much that religious values contrary to women’s advancement infuse Lebanese society directly and account entirely for women’s limited ascension to positions of power. Instead, those values are incorporated into the political skeleton of confessionally-defined political parties and wield their influence from there. This thesis attempts to explain the counter-intuitive Lebanese disconnect between high socio-economic indicators relating to women and low political presence of women in leadership positions.
Can party variation in religiosity explain women’s leadership? The following chapter looks at party variation in religiosity along the civil war timeline through the lens of parties’ attitudes vis-à-vis women’s leadership. The diversity in parties’ political platforms constitutes the basis for developing a classification, which is sensitive to depicting distinct party-level characteristics, especially religious-based, influencing women’s leadership.
Chapter Three
Party Variation in Religiosity & the Civil War

Little in-depth research has been undertaken to date on women’s leadership in political parties, particularly on interlinkages with religiosity in party platforms. This dissertation aims to narrow this gap. In this chapter, I explore party variation in religiosity -- under a setting of conflict-bearing religious cleavages widened by a 15-year civil war in Lebanon -- and explain how I classify, label and code party variation.

This chapter is organized in three sections. At the outset, I look at religiosity in party platforms as a core explanatory variable of women’s leadership. Religiosity refers to the religious components on party platforms or the extent to which religion penetrates their agendas. Section A differentiates between ‘religion’ as influencing women’s social life, and ‘religiosity’ as affecting their political life and leadership chances within party structures. Section B focuses on how widening religious cleavages, exacerbated by the 15-year civil war, reshaped and restructured the party system. In section C, a classification for parties which is sensitive to varying religiosities and secularisms on their platforms is developed. Parties are labeled and coded along a 5-point religiosity continuum that best captures varying intensities of religiosities and secularisms. This lays the ground work for the qualitative analysis and later on for testing using quantitative tools of analysis.

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2 For conceptualization of religiosity and women’s leadership, refer to chapter One.
Political science is rich with definitions of political parties, description of their functions, forms, and goals. For instance, Alan Ware looks at a political party as, “..., an institution that (a) seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in government, and (b) usually consists of more than one single interest in the society and so to some degree attempts to ‘aggregate interests’.” (1987: 5). Similarly, LaPalombara & Weiner (1966a) define political parties as “…, organized collectivities oriented towards the pursuit of some combination of the goal of electoral success and the end of political effectiveness or the capacity of parties to have an impact upon government policy-making.” (in Lane and Ersson, 1987: 96-97). Moreover, Blondel (1969: 221) describes parties as “… multiform and are at the cross-roads between the institutional and behavioural aspects of politics.” (in Lane and Ersson, 1987: 94). Pippa Norris, one of the few scholars who link parties to female representation, highlights that,

Political parties serve vital functions as one of the main linkages between citizens and government: structuring electoral choice, recruiting legislative candidates, providing a legislative agenda in government. Parties provide a range of opportunities for women to participate in political life from the political booth to local meetings, the conference platform, legislature and cabinet. (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993: 308)

Political parties in Lebanon fit the general descriptions given above, albeit with slight nuances. They form around interests of specific communities and as such fail to aggregate interests nationwide. They also pursue specific goals and undertake similar functions, especially as gatekeepers in selecting and nominating for public office. This highlights that while political parties in Lebanon do not fully conform to the standard models of parties, nonetheless they are not sui generis. However, some scholars argue that Lebanese parties have their own specificities especially in the aftermath of the civil war, and as such diverge from the norm; while others

3 See, Burke, Blondel, Duverger, LaPalombara, Sartori, Panebianco, Janda, Lipset and Rokkan, Epstein, among others.
concur with the view advocated in this dissertation that they are not *sui generis*. Such a conclusion is valuable when studying single country case-studies because this allows for generalization of findings and predicting parties’ behaviour vis-à-vis women’s political leadership in the future. Nonetheless, parties are the main vehicles for women’s leadership. However, what party-level features enhance or impede women’s leadership? In the following section, I explore party variation in religiosity as a core explanatory variable of women’s leadership in decision-making bodies.

A. **Party Variation in Religiosity & Women’s Leadership**

In Lebanon, a Muslim-majority country with a large proportion of Christians, religion and religious affiliation play an important role in politics. Religion is inextricably intertwined with politics. In effect, ‘religion is politics’ in that the state combines government and civil society and no one has the right to deprive any citizen of his/her political orientations, be it religious or non-religious, unless it affects the safety and freedom of others (Harik 2001: 321-322). Indeed, separating religion from politics does not imply separating religion from the society and people. However, when people are religiously committed and at the same time they

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5 Iliya Harik argues in *Democracy and the challenges of modernization: Between East and West* (2001), that, “The majority of Muslim countries have a secular constitution, while retaining some manifestations of religiosity that do not violate secularism. There are diversity and degrees of secularisms even in more advanced Western democracies. It is not at all possible to separate fully religion from the state or the state from religion. Combining religion and politics is a matter of realization and perception and not a contextual matter. In my view, this is akin to realizing full democracy without state intervention, or laissez-faire without managing trade, or complete implementation of Marxism, socialism and communism. This has never been witnessed to date in any country. So, why do we expect that the case be different for religion and politics?” (Harik, 2001: 321)
are in decision-making positions, they tend to follow their faith and convictions also in legislative decisions. I argue that as such, this influences their attitudes towards women’s leadership prospects. In this vein, a national scholar also remarks that,

…[S]ecularism…eliminates elitism in religious decisions but does not eliminate its religiosity. Therefore, when religion matters to people, one tends to see a mutual reinforcement between society and the political system that affects public affairs. This is why contemporary Islamists face a dilemma between the principle of representation and the Shari’a law in government. (Fouad Khoury in Harik, 2001: 255).

Similarly, Schuster argues that,

…conservative and fundamentalist religious groups take part in politics on the basis of their faith, sometimes even seeking to make the public order conform to the ordinances of faith. … One of the most contentious issues ….is the attitude of religious groups towards the role of women (Schuster, 2007:3).

In the first round of interviews in my field research, I solicited my informants’ views on the role that ‘religion’ plays in party politics but especially on women’s leadership. I sought their views as political practitioners in order to substantiate my hypothesis that ‘religiosity not ‘religion’ in party platforms influences women’s ascendance to leadership. In other words, I wanted to see if they also make the same distinction that I do between religion and religiosity or between individual religiosity affecting women’s social life and party religiosity affecting their political life and leadership. The leader of a party with a religious platform responds that, “Religious extremism and not religion is the barrier to women’s leadership, along with patriarchy, traditions and customs. However, women are not fit for or interested in politics. Politics is for men and God wants women to stay at home.”

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6 Anke Schuster, “Religious Political Parties: A Gap in Multicultural Theories”, Paper submitted for the Workshop “Multiculturalism and Moral Conflict”, University of Durham, 21-23 March 2007). Schuster argues that, “Religion is frequently the reason for discrimination, injustice and exclusion, a marker for social marginalization. …religion is often believed to be inimical to liberal-democratic policies. …. conservative and fundamentalist religious groups frequently hold and proclaim opinions that are illiberal.” She refers to two definitions for religion: religion is primarily a matter of individual conscience which is no variant than moral belief (Amy Gutmann); and, religion is a set of rules and practices with no difference to culture (Jeff Spinner-Halev). (Schuster, 2007: 2-3).
This religious leader, who doubles as a party leader, sees ‘religion’ as distinct from religious ‘extremism’, implying that extremism is a more intense level of religious commitment than ‘religion’ per se. Thus, his statement substantiates the correctness of the conceptual framework upon which my theory is built. However, he also employs the patriarchal discourse of ‘politic-is-men’s-business’ (see, Dahlerup 2006). More importantly, he invokes God’s ultimate authority to confine women at home. This is also perceived by scholars studying religious parties in that,

What is truly distinctive at least about Christianity, Islam and Judaism, though never theorized outside of religious science, is the reference of religious groups to the higher authority of God. Maybe, and certainly in the eye of the believer, this is what makes religion special: the reference to a higher, transcendental truth; what, if any, normative consequences this has needs to be explored. (Schuster, 2007: 21)\(^7\)

The statement of the religious leader also shows that such a party headed by a clergyman who exhibits this conservative attitude, is unlikely to advance women to leadership positions.

Responses of other religious leaders reveal similar views in defending religion but also pointing to religious extremism and built-in barriers in the doctrine as well as in society which prevent women from assuming leadership. For instance, another religious leader states that, “Islamist extremist movements, like ours, do not approve of women’s leadership; while moderate movements like the Islamic Brotherhood allow women to assume leadership and even nominate them to office.” Such statements do not only exhibit attitudes that block women from leadership but also show that there is party variation in religiosity which imports on women’s leadership.

Further, a female official in a party with civil goals but single-sect membership highlights cross-party differences and asserts that,

In religious parties and in confessional but not religious parties, religion has no influence on women’s leadership, since all members belong to the same sect. In secular and leftist parties, religion is a private matter. It is not religion and religious affiliation but religious extremism, traditions and patriarchy that block women’s leadership. Religious affiliation

not ‘religion’ limits women’s chances in public office only because of the confessional quota stipulated in the electoral law. Do not blame religion for women’s low representation.

This statement provides a simple and useful classification of parties into secular, leftist, religious and confessional parties depending on the contents of party goals. Other party officials also refer to ‘religion’ as synonymous to individual religiosity and ‘religious commitment’, which is reflected in religious practices (rituals) or belonging to a specific sect cum religious affiliation and identity. Several interviewees in religious parties also stress that, while their parties give predominance to religion, their doctrine is no bar to women’s leadership. However, sometimes the responses of interviewees from parties with religious platforms are diplomatic and strategic. Nonetheless, this indicates that party elites are aware of what they are expected to say but the situation of women in these parties and their actions to enhance it are limited whether by the Shari’a in their platforms or by patriarchy in society or both. These responses differentiate between religion cum religious affiliation and religious extremism as a variant of individual religiosity and commitment or adherence to the doctrine. They show that religious extremism is a variant of the intensity of party religiosity.

Statements by other interviewees provide insight on how, as politicians, they conceive of ‘religion’ and whether it influences party politics and women’s leadership. For instance, the only woman in the politburo of a party with a religious platform stresses that ‘religion’ drives the party’s political agenda and is paramount in its platform. Nevertheless, it is not a barrier to women’s leadership and her presence in the party’s politburo attests to this:

Religion plays a very important role in the party’s culture in as far as values, norms, practices and convictions are concerned. Religious doctrine informs our political agenda,

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8 As a reminder, I should note that the interviews were conducted in Arabic and translated by the author into English without formal editing. I also use generic or self-identified party labels given by informants until a classification of parties is developed. The names of party officials interviewed are kept anonymous, unless mentioned explicitly in the citations. Confidentiality was a condition for audio-taping the 150 interviews.
since Islam guides our social and political life. This party is a religious but not extremist party. We are open and tolerant to other religions. Religion is not a deterrent to women’s leadership. I am the perfect example!

Echoing this line of argument, another female official in a religious party also emphasizes that,

Our religious convictions and values guide our activities. Religion matters but it has nothing to do with women’s chances for leadership. The dismal situation of women in Afghanistan is not because of religion but because of religious extremism of the Taliban. Islam is being misinterpreted and accused for women’s poor lot. This should be set straight.

Other interviewees also raise the issue of religious interpretation as influencing women’s leadership. For instance, the senior adviser to a religious leader emphasizes that, “Islamic Shari’a is the only guide to governing the country. You do not need anything else. It is open to interpretation and is for all places and times.” This implies that the doctrine plays a dominant role not only in the party’s platform but is also expected to play that role in governance. For instance, a party elite points out that “Some parties have religious goals and aim to change the political system in accordance with these goals; i.e. they use politics to serve their religious goals. These are the religious parties.” In this connection, the second top-ranking official in Hizbullah, Sheikh Naim Qassem, invokes ‘Wilayat Al-Faqih’ in interpreting the Shari’a. This also highlights the tension between religious extremism and moderation on the one hand, and modernization on the other. He states that this tension may be resolved by “…settling for the centralism of the Jurist-Theologian, who lays down the general rules for the nation of Islam.” (2005: 225). These rules are comprehensive and by necessity, impact women and the level of their political participation within party echelons and in public office. Therefore, how the doctrine is interpreted and by whom is of great import to women’s leadership within parties whose platforms contain numerous religious components. More specifically, in parties with religious platforms, elites are all-male and leaders are generally clergymen and Ulama.
Interpretations of the doctrine may vary across these parties and this may influence women’s leadership accordingly. Enlightened clerics, who are open to Ijtihad, offer women-friendly interpretations of the Shari’a, while conservative and extremist clergymen do not. This invariably affects women’s chances in leadership as reflected in responses of party elites and/or those entrusted with interpreting the doctrine. In this connection, a female party official asserts that,

One of the misconceptions is that religion prevents women from assuming leadership positions. The truth is that it is not religion but religious parties that do not offer women any incentives and do not have policies to promote women to leadership positions, unlike pluralist and secular parties like Tayyar.

Indeed, the leader of a party with ‘Salafi platform, himself a cleric, invokes that women’s leadership would be a violation of the Shari’a and explains that,

Religion is an obstacle to women’s political leadership. Women cannot lead men. This would be violating the Shari’a and the principle of ‘Al-Qiwama’. Moreover, women are physically weaker and more emotional than men. This makes men wiser and better leaders. Women are aware of the shortcomings they are born with. They are meant to serve men and stay at home for their families. They do not tolerate the hard work of rough politics, a man’s job.

Effectively, this statement is not in defense of women or their right to leadership. It is representative of how the clergy interpret the Shari’a and may conflate it with patriarchy. This demonstrates how the clergymen resort to religious (violating Shari’a) and patriarchal (‘politics-is-a-man’s-business’) discourses to block women from leadership. In this sense, religious doctrine as enshrined in party platforms defines a religiosity that can create boundaries blocking women from assuming leadership positions in decision-making and policy-making bodies. The

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9 "Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (next), refuse to share their beds, (and last) beat them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not against them means (of annoyance)… " The Book of Women 4.34 Translated by A. Yusufali; [www.csmonitor.com/2001/1219/p10s1-wogi.html](http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1219/p10s1-wogi.html)
interview responses are testimonies to the influence of religiosity on attitudes towards women’s leadership. The attitudes of these party elites do not augur well for women’s leadership.

Furthermore, examining the text of Qassem’s book, “Hizbullah: The Story from Within” (Qassem 2005) shows that there is only one reference to women. This is made in connection with civil and mixed religious marriages, which are disallowed in Islam. He also refers to ‘women’ in a footnote criticizing the banning of headscarves in French public schools. This explains why the ‘Index’ to the book does not carry a single reference to ‘women’. However, the book dedicates a whole section to “Recruiting Young Men with Imam Hussein (PBUH) as a Role Model” (2005: 43-47).10 This indicates that women’s concerns remain peripheral and do not figure on party platforms and their political agendas, which supports the impressions gained from responses of other officials that women’s leadership is not factored into religious parties’ concerns. These statements indicate that leaders of parties with religious platforms are not supportive of women’s leadership on religious and patriarchal grounds. What is also revealing is that women in most of these parties do not seem to seek leadership positions on similar religious and traditional grounds. If the doctrine incorporated on party platforms is interpreted to imply that women should not lead, it is unlikely that such parties will advance women to leadership positions or that women will demand it, as also scholars find and I expect to substantiate.11 This information provides initial indications that religiosity in party platforms, not religion per se, may influence women’s party leadership.

10 PBUH stands for ‘Peace Be Upon Him’

11 Scholars also find that, “Where traditional attitudes prevail it might be expected that women would be hesitant to pursue a political career, selectors would be reluctant to choose them as candidates, and parties would be unwilling to introduce effective gender equality policies. In contrast, in egalitarian cultures we would expect the goal of gender equality to be widely shared by all parties across the political spectrum.” (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993: 312)
Turning to parties with secular, leftist, and civil platforms, I pose the same question on whether religion is a barrier to women’s leadership, in order to find out whether the distinction between religion and religiosity is valid. In general, responses also substantiate that it is party religiosity not religion per se or individual religiosity that influences women’s leadership. Several party leaders and elites stress that religion is a private matter and that their religious affiliation is simply an identity that does not influence the goals of the party or women’s leadership. An elite in a Christian-dominated party with a civil-secular platform remarks that, 

Religion is central as a value system for the society and for the party. But, we do not have religious goals and we do not want to change the political system. We are pluralist, democratic, modern, and tolerant of diversity. We encourage women’s leadership irrespective of religious affiliation.

Similarly, a senior adviser to the leader of a Muslim-dominated party with a civil-secular platform stresses that,

Personally, I am a practicing but not ‘fanatic’ Muslim. The party separates between religion or religious affiliation and personal religious commitment and religiosity as opposed to its religion-free political agenda. Leadership positions are competitive and determined by internal rules and by-laws not by religious convictions, as in religious parties.

In the same vein, a party leader stresses that, “Religion is a private matter. We do not have any religious goals, although our membership hails from one sect, which might lead some to think that we do. Women’s leadership is by seniority, competition and availability of posts.” Further, an official in a party with leftist tendencies flags that, “Religion plays a significant role in politics. Our party considers it cultural heritage and we are anti-religion in politics. Promotions are based solely on merit and performance not on religious affiliation.” As further evidence that religion is a private matter, several interviewees point out that application forms to join the party

12 ‘Fanatic’ is irrational and inflexible in his religious commitment but not extremist.
and membership cards do not carry slots for religious affiliation or gender, as the words of this party leader denote:

We do not include the religious sect or gender on the application forms or on membership cards. This is one of the problems that we face during elections, because the electoral system is based on confessional affiliation and it is important to know the sect of candidates and voters. This may be detected from names and surnames; but, it is also inaccurate.13

In comparative perspective and as further evidence, a female MP representing a party with a civil platform asserts that, “Had I been a member in a religious party, I would have had much more difficulties in assuming political leadership in the party and in public office, than in my own party.” Also, as a senior female official in a leftist party points out, “Sectarianism interferes with the social and political life of citizens. I would not have made it to this high-level decision-making position in a religious party.” Indeed, she was elected the first-ever female vice-president of the Communist party in summer 2009. However, some distinctions set parties with leftist tendencies apart from the others in this group, in as far as religiosity relates to women’s leadership. In leftist parties, religion is not relevant for any of the functions undertaken by the party or for decisions pertaining to women’s leadership. In parties with civil goals and confessional membership -- dominated by a single sect-- religion is an ‘identity’ and a mobilization tool for electioneering purposes. However, religion cum religious commitment, as in practicing rituals in everyday life, remains confined to the private sphere. Their religious affiliation, however, represents their identity in politics, given the confessional quotas in the

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13 Indeed, for certain parties, I had to go through lists of membership manually in order to compute party membership by gender and religious affiliation, as essential for determining plural and female membership. This was problematic since not all names and surnames are typical of Muslims and Christians and also there are unisex names (e.g., Nidal, Najah, Rida, Claude, Nour, Safa, Raja, Amal, Salam, Ismat, Isam, Najat, etc…). The issue of gender-blind membership applications has also been raised in studying political parties in the Netherlands: “In the past most parties have not counted their membership according to sex.” (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993: 212)
electoral law. Religious components in their platforms, albeit varying across this group of parties, remain at a minimum.

Thus, elites in parties with secular, leftist and civil or national platforms do not deny the importance of religion in their personal lives but distinguish religion from religious goals in party agendas and from their own political orientations. They assert that neither religious convictions nor religious affiliation steer women away from leadership positions in these parties. Responses of female and male officials in these parties are consistent in that religion is a private matter, and religious commitment does not influence women’s chances in leadership, since party platforms do not contain specific religious goals. These statements reflect a more receptive attitude towards women’s leadership than that perceived by officials in parties with religious platforms. These responses are valuable in that they differentiate between religion in personal lives and religious components on party platforms, which I refer to as religiosity.

Responses of party officials substantiate the conception that religiosity, not religion per se as distinguished from religious extremism, influences and may produce variations across parties in women’s leadership. Information gleaned shows that there is an association between women’s leadership and religiosity and secularism in party platforms. These statements point to limited chances for women in parties whose platforms contain expansive, religious components with multiple references to the religious doctrine in their programmatic agendas. This substantiates the argument that parties with religious platforms exhibit dictatorial and authoritarian tendencies, which renders them less hospitable to women’s leadership than parties with leftist, secular or civil platforms. This information enriches our understanding of how ‘religiosity’ is perceived by various parties and that there are multiple secularisms and religiosities, which is essential for labeling and coding political parties. In summary, information
gathered from party officials supports the claim that party religiosity is a plausible explanatory variable for women’s leadership. In the following section, I examine the impact of the 15-year civil war (1975-1990) on widening religious cleavages, which restructured the party system. This is reflected in membership and attitudinal shifts vis-à-vis a political role for women across pre-war, war-origin and post-war parties.

B. The Civil War, Religious Cleavages & Attitudinal Shifts Across Parties

In 1989, the Tai’f Accord put an end to the 15-year ‘sectarian’ civil war that rocked the country’s political and social stability since 1975. During the civil war, Christian-dominated and Muslim-dominated parties built militias and held arms against each other. Despite the cessation of armed hostilities in 1990, political instability lingered with the continued presence of foreign armies on Lebanese soil (Arab troops and the Syrian army), militias other than the Lebanese army, and threats from neighbouring Israel. The civil war widened religious cleavages, which restructured the party system and profoundly influenced the contents of party platforms, although this was not uniform in terms of religiosities. Furthermore, it created new parties with a whole different attitude towards the role of women than that of pre-war parties, which this section examines by looking at responses of party elites and female activist.

Thus, the civil war exacerbated existing social cleavages (religious, class, ethnic, and gender). It reproduced these same cleavages with wider magnitudes around which new post-war parties formed. Several pre-war parties and war-origin (militias) either transformed or became

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14 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines sectarian as “of, reflecting to, or characteristic of a sect or sectarian.” The Free Online Dictionary adds “Adhering or confined to the dogmatic limits of a sect or denomination; partisan.” The civil war was labeled as sectarian because it pitted Muslims and Christians against each other. It is also referred to as a confessional war. The second top-ranking official in Hizbullah states that, “Sectarianism, …,represents the association of individuals with particular sect due to birth as such and therefore being partial to that sect for the mere fact of belonging to it. This is akin to familial, tribal or regional fanaticism, the difference being in the title and the number of those involved. (Qassem, 2005: 209).
The polarization of religious cleavages restructured the party system and manifested itself in mushrooming of parties, many with single-sect confessional dominations and others with religious platforms. In fact, confessional identities strengthened in the post-war era relative to the pre-war era. For instance, national scholars find that, secular, leftist and national parties with non-sectarian tendencies flourished in the pre-1975 era (El-Khazen, 2002:44-45).

However, after the war this changed, as a party elite reports that, “The majority of parties are confessional, but may not be religious parties. Their membership is dominated by one sect, or one of the two religions. These do not have religious goals and claim to be secular (laique), separating religion from political goals. There are also progressive and leftist parties who are fully secular”. Indeed, the number of active parties reached around 80 by 2010 as opposed to 15 in the pre-war period and around 26 political groups and parties by 1997, or after the war broke in 1975.

However, these parties are not all relevant and their political agendas are of varying agendas and religiosities. The impact of widening religious cleavages on party platforms is not

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15 These parties include the Labour, Socialist, Arab Nationalist, and Arab Ba’ath Socialist (or renaissance), which split into Iraqi and Syrian chapters, and the Nasserites Murabitoun, a Muslim-Sunni militia supported by the armed Palestinians in refugee camps. A number of these parties became irrelevant, obsolete or defunct. In fact, pre-war Muslim-dominated militias and parties disbanded or became defunct in the post-war period.

16 Tessler also finds that, “Islam plays a critical role in shaping political culture… Islam has become increasingly influential in Arab culture and political life during the last quarter-century” (Tessler, 2002: 2). This situation manifested itself in a mushrooming of popular religious parties of Islamic orientations.

17 Religious cleavages widened between Muslims and Christians, as well as Sunnis and Shiites. Class cleavages deepened with an increasingly disappearing middle class, which widened the gap between the poor and deprived Shiites in the South and Sunnis in North with other communities. Ethnic cleavages also emerged between the Palestinian Sunni refugees and Lebanese Christians, although with Armenians these cleavages remain docile. Gender inequalities were accentuated by wider religious cleavages and the war has a differential impact on women than men.


uniform. This is more visible in parties with religious platforms, while some of the other parties are more concerned with maintaining a religious identity than a religious platform.

Cessation of hostilities in 1990 saw the leftist parties (viz., Communist, Arab Socialist, and Syrian Social; as well as Progressive Socialist), lose power, a large portion of their constituencies, and diminished pluralism. This coincided with the end of the Cold War when Communism lost ground and when leftist ideologies were marginalized worldwide or rendered obsolete by rapid systemic and global changes. A similar fate hit the Christian-dominated parties (Phalanges, National Bloc, and National Liberals), as they lost ground to former militias, notably to Hizbullah and to a lesser extent to Amal, as well as the Free Patriotic (Tayyar). These militias transformed in the post-war era into full fledged parties along with newly emerging popular movements like the Future (Mustaqbal). At the same time, new parties emerged (viz., Lebanese Forces) as offshoots of former militarized parties (viz., Kata’eb), or formed around socio-religious cleavages (viz., Wa’ad and the Giants). Most of the pre-war parties with religious platforms also lost relevance, except for one, the Sunni-dominated Jama’a Islamiah. The sectarian civil war saw three militias cum resistance movements forming, notably two Shiite-dominated (Amal and Hizbullah) and one Sunni-dominated (Jabhat Al-Amal Al-Islami). These joined the electoral process and became fully fledged parties after the war. Several Sunni parties with religious platforms formed, but only one Sunni-dominated party, the Unitarian Tawhid party, an offshoot of the Jama’a Islamiah, is relevant.\(^2\) (See, table 3.1 for the 18 parties).

Therefore, the pre-war era saw the golden age of non-confessional (leftist, secular, Arab national and national) parties with plural membership, which shrank nationwide after the war. In

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\(^2\) In effect, there were several offshoots of Al-Qaeda (e.g. Soldiers of Islam, Jund El-Islam, Fath-el-Islam, and others), which are not relevant or were silenced in 2007 by the Lebanese Army in Nahr-El-Bared Palestinian Camp North of Lebanon. There is also the Sunni-dominated, Al-Ahbash party, which provides social and welfare services and has many charity projects. It is one of the Salafists, but not a relevant party.
this context, the senior adviser to the leader of a pre-war progressive party offers a succinct description:

In the post-1943 independence era, political parties were formed along ideological lines, nurtured by the Arab-Israeli conflict, and influenced by regional and international trends like Arab nationalism, socialism, communism and Marxism. During the 15-year civil war, parties became militarized along confessional lines: Maronites, Sunnis, and Shiites. The end of civil war coincided with breakdown of USSR and end of Cold War, with leftist and Marxist parties, as well as many others barely surviving, but with lost power and plural membership. After the Ta’if Accord in 1989, these parties shed their arms and transformed into fully-fledged parties and new powerful parties formed. Some took the religious road while others combined civil goals with a confessional identity.

Similar testimonies are given by other interlocutors encapsulating the impact of widening religious cleavages on the party system. For instance, a female party activist observes that,

Before the war, the party was more pluralist and much less sectarian than it is now. After the war, the tendency for those most affected by the civil war, including the poor and women, was to step behind their religious sects for protection. The war turned people into extremists and into sectarian communities, and enclaves within which they sought refuge and security that their government failed to provide.

These sectarian cleavages are observed not only across parties and individuals but also among children, as a female party activist cites that, “When I asked my neighbor’s ten-year old son why he is wearing a huge cross, I was appalled to hear his response that ‘it is better than being mistaken for a Muslim Shiite’. It is unfortunate how sectarian and extremists even our children have become after the war.” Thus, while the civil war revived religious cleavages and nurtured sectarian tendencies, it influenced attitudes of individuals but also parties in a manner that imports on women’s role in politics.

Thus, the watershed of the civil war restructured the party system and redefined party-level characteristics, including their religiosity levels. The post-war era saw parties emerge with a whole new approach to mobilizing women distinct from pre-war parties. Therefore, not only did this upheaval shift party membership but it also transformed the attitudes of party elites.
towards women’s political involvement across parties. These attitudes are independent of and separate from party religiosity, understood as religious goals on party platforms. It is inevitable, however, that individual - cum personal- religiosity of party elites, especially when they are also clergymen, would not map on party political culture.\footnote{For the concept of political culture, refer to chapter One. See also, Norris 1993, Sartori 1976, and Janda 1970 and 1980, among others, on how party-level characteristics shape the behaviour and overall performance of parties.} In order to capture these attitudinal shifts, parties are split along the 1975 civil war timeline into pre-war (pre-1974), war-origin and post-war (thereafter, post-war parties). Splitting these parties by party-age should not be construed as a causal variable but only as a rough proxy for capturing unobserved changes in parties’ attitudes vis-à-vis women’s political involvement. In an effort to evaluate how attitudinal shifts in political culture are correlated with the war experience and might have affected women’s leadership across parties, I seek the views of multiple respondents. In general, the pre-war parties are viewed as more traditional and less receptive towards women’s leadership than war and post-war parties. In the following paragraphs I examine the statements of party officials describing or reflecting on party elites’ attitudes towards women’s leadership across pre-war, war and post-war parties of various political platforms and goals.

1. Pre-war versus post-war parties with leftist, secular and civil platforms

(a) Pre-war parties with leftist, secular and civil platforms

In the post-war period, surviving pre-war parties dominated by a single sect are often led by patrons (Zai’m) and older generation, traditional and conservative party elites who set stringent, gender-blind rules. These party leaders, while nominally gender-blind are also not very supportive of women, as reflected in their political agendas where women’s concerns are not visible. Indeed, these parties’ interests do not include advancing women but focus on party survival or their confessional community’s existence. This may partially explain a less receptive
attitude towards women’s leadership in these parties than in leftist-oriented parties. In addition, the lack of openings for women is also linked to the decline in these parties’ membership compared to the pre-war period, as several informants note. In such a setting, the leader of a pre-war Christian-dominated party remarks that,

We are fighting for our existence and working under very strenuous circumstances. These are not normal times for all political parties and the political system as a whole. It is an era of survival and not reconstruction and building; and of course not for women. Their demands for leadership are not a priority on our agendas!

Moreover, the leader of another Christian-dominated party stresses that, “We are not willing to change our convictions to suit the situation and become more flexible. However, why should we, when women’s priorities are not in politics?” Similar sentiments are expressed by leaders and party elites in other pre-war Christian-dominated parties, as this response shows:

It is true that there is nothing in the Charter to encourage women to join or to promote them to leadership positions. However, if women were as qualified as they claim and politically mature or active, nothing prevents them from running for leadership posts. But, women are their own enemies. They are the problem not the Party!

Other party elites stress that, “There is no discrimination against women in the party. We have a meritocratic system, where everyone must compete for leadership. Unfortunately, women are not committed to party politics or dedicated to attending its meetings as men are.” This response is representative of other pre-war party leaders and elites, which reflects a ‘gender-neutral’ approach and a ‘hands-off’ stance or what I see as ‘laissez faire’ attitude towards women’s leadership. Another common alibi employed by party elites is that, “Only few women are eligible, interested or qualified for leadership!” This refers to absence of a ‘critical mass of women’, which these parties use for not promoting women to leadership positions. However, as shown earlier, there is no shortage of high-profiled and qualified women in Lebanon, which makes this a moot argument. Indeed, such non-committal statements indicate a traditional and
patriarchal stance towards women’s leadership. Such arguments offered by party elites assume that all men in politics possess the requisite skills, merit and competence for effective leadership, while women do not. This is an unsubstantiated assumption (see, also Dahlerup 2006). This is further substantiated by the response of a female activist pointing to the society’s attitude regarding women in politics. She flags that patriarchy is being reproduced in party elites’ attitudes towards women, especially when they are of an older and more traditional generation. She adds that, “The society does not look favorably upon women in political parties. It continues to be male-dominated and patriarchal, despite the fact that some women are highly qualified.” To demonstrate the point about the society, a female activist cites that, “Women in leftist and communist parties, particularly coming from conservative and religious communities, prefer to remain anonymous. Their affiliation with these agnostic parties jeopardizes their personal lives and their careers.”

Furthermore, when responses of female party activists in pre-war parties are pitted against those of their male colleagues, similar voices and views are heard. There is congruence in views reflecting a traditional stance towards women. Female activists in these parties echo the traditional and conservative views, ‘gender neutrality’ and ‘hands-off’ arguments of their colleagues. This is especially pronounced when counter-intuitively women fend off charges of deliberate discrimination against them. For instance, a female party activist defends her party’s stance towards women in that,

The Party believes in gender equality and in promoting women to leadership posts. The civil war has put us 20 years behind and put women in a political coma. During the war, women were more interested in the safety and survival of their families than politics. Women are less interested in politics or politically motivated than men. They lack the requisite skills for decision-making or leadership. This patriarchal society doesn’t accept women as leaders.

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22 This respondent was not at liberty to provide contact information of other women to be interviewed for this research in order to corroborate this claim.
Thus, the traditional and conservative attitudes of most pre-war parties with civil and secular platforms not only prevail but are accentuated in the post-war era. However, this was not uniform across all pre-war parties. Examining the attitudes of elites in leftist parties, marked by modern-ness and egalitarianism, gives the impression that they are more receptive to women’s leadership than other pre-war parties. Indeed, a female activist stresses that, “This is a leftist party where women are given equal opportunities as men to assume leadership positions. Merit and competence are basic determinants for decision-making posts. Men are generally supportive of women’s leadership.” However, leftist parties lost their modern-ness because they are being led by traditional elites, whose attitudes became less favorable towards women’s leadership. In this respect, a female activist states that, “The traditionalism of older members surfaced after the war as they directed their attention to sectarian and confessional issues. It is a pity that our enlightened Christian and Muslim members failed to re-build liberal institutions that are modern, egalitarian, and secular.” Similarly, another female activist testifies that,

The party lost some of its openness and tolerance after the civil war. Its overall performance slipped into traditional, conservatism, with decision-making centralized in the hands of a few and a personalized leadership. This caused overall membership to dwindle, including the share of women in membership and leadership. In this post-war era, the party’s main concerns are existential and survival; women’s advancement did not emerge as a priority.

In a similar vein, a scholar and political scientist describes this transformation in the post-war era as,

The party’s motto is, ‘Our women are men and our men are strong men’. In the pre-war era, the party had mixed male-female membership at a time when segregation was the norm. It provided a rare chance for liberating women in a conservative and traditional society. In the post-war era, the party was taken over by traditional men and its liberal and modern stance was lost, especially vis-à-vis women’ leadership. Patriarchy and traditionalism transformed the egalitarian qualities of the party.
This regression or attitudinal shift from modern-ness into sectarianism and traditionalism instigated several women to withdraw from leftist parties, as this female activist explains:

I believed in this secular, leftist socialist party, because it is premised on separation between religion and politics. Before the war, the party was more open, pluralist, egalitarian, and liberal. In the post-war era, it veered off track into traditionalism, conservatism and sectarian politics, relinquishing its egalitarian ideology.

These statements reflect shifts, if not regression, in the attitude of pre-war leftist parties in the post-war period from modern-ness into traditionalism, conservatism and sectarianism. These shifts marred their egalitarian stance towards women and influenced their plural membership. It is worthwhile noting that none of the male officials interviewed from pre-war leftist parties raise this important issue. They do not observe this shift. Women do. In this respect, several scholars find that incentives of party elites affect the rules set-up to encourage women and enhance their leadership prospects.\(^\text{23}\) Shrinking membership in pre-war parties leaves older generation party elites in charge. This may explain a more traditional and conservative stance towards women’s leadership in pre-war compared to post-war parties.

\textit{(b) Post-war parties with secular and civil platforms}

Post-war parties with secular and civil platforms appear to be more flexible, accommodating and supportive of women and their leadership, as a party leader boasts that, “We are modern, liberal and committed to gender equality. This is explicit in our charter and not rhetoric. Our actions speak for themselves, as evidenced by presence of many women in our decision-making and policy-making bodies as full partners.” In this group of post-war parties, leaders and elites shy away from being labeled ‘religious’ parties. They self-locate as “Definitely, secular with no religious goals.” These elites point out that their parties “Target all citizens without discrimination or gender-bias.” They explain that the party “introduced special

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measures for ensuring that women are promoted to leadership positions. This is why we attract more women to our parties.”

Similar testimonies are offered by elites in other post-war parties with secular and civil agendas and with confessional membership, exhibiting more favorable and ‘women-friendly’ attitude towards women’s leadership. Several interviewees point to their charters and mission statements as evidence of being ‘women-friendly’. One of the party elite notes that, “The charter and by-laws attest to the party’s commitment to women’s empowerment. Indeed, we are modern and tolerant. We empower women and encourage their ascendance to leadership.” Another leader stresses that, “The mission statement explicitly mentions that the party offers women equal opportunities as men for leadership and specifies the special measures it takes towards that end.” A case in point is offered by a party leader who cites that, “If there is a tie in elections between equally qualified women and men, we give preference to women. This empowers women and creates a critical mass for leadership.” Thus, this hospitable attitude towards women’s leadership is supported by concrete measures. It shows clearly the distinct differences which set them apart from their pre-war counterpart parties.

Thus, pre-war parties with confessional membership tend to rely upon a ‘laissez-faire’ or ‘hands-off’ approach for women’s leadership such that market forces will correct (gender) anomalies and produce the requisite equilibrium (gender balance). In this scenario, these parties expect that meritocracy will eventually place women in leadership positions without special measures and assistance. By contrast, post-war parties are willing to intervene, manage the trade-off between supply and demand for women’s leadership, in order to create more opportunities for women’s leadership. Interviewees’ responses provide initial substantiation to the hypothesis
that post-war parties with secular and civil goals are more receptive to women’s leadership than pre-war parties.

2. **Pre-war versus post-war parties with religious platforms**

   The civil war led to the emergence of several Christian and Muslim militias. None of the five Christian militias—with their offshoots—which transformed into parties and remained ‘relevant’ carry expansive religious platforms. In contrast, all five of the Muslim militias—with their offshoots—which transformed into parties and are relevant, have religious platforms.24

   There are a few pre-war but minor parties with religious platforms but these are not relevant.25

   Widening religious cleavages after the war increased the number of relevant parties with religious platforms fivefold.26

   The attitude of elites towards women’s leadership in these parties is more complex than in secular parties with leftist goals or civil parties with confessional membership. In order to extract information, I asked party officials about the parties’ policies towards women’s leadership and whether they perceive any changes in the post-war compared to pre-war period.

   The 15-year civil war and prevailing political instability in Lebanon intensified authoritarian, dictatorial and undemocratic tendencies among parties with religious platforms, especially those that wield power and use it to their advantage. Information gathered from party officials reveals that differences in attitudes vis-à-vis-women are observed between Sunni-dominated and Shiite-dominated religious parties more than between pre and post-war parties.

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24 To recapitulate, these include the Sunni-dominated Unitarian (Al-Tawhid) formed in the post-war period, an offshoot of a pre-war party; and two Shiite-dominated, namely, the Hope Movement (Amal) and the Party of God (Hizbullah). There is also one pre-war Sunni-dominated party (Jama’a Islamiah). See, table 3.1, page 107.

25 In effect, there were several offshoots of Al-Qaeda (e.g. Soldiers of Islam, Jund El-Islam) which were silenced in 2007 by the Lebanese Army in Nahr-El-Bared Palestinian Camp North of Lebanon.

26 The 18 relevant parties include a single pre-war party, but four war-origin and post-war parties with religious platforms.
Sunni-dominated parties are the least hospitable to women’s leadership. This is linked to authoritarianism that permeates theocratic parties but also to the fact that ‘Ijtihad’ or interpretation of the Shari’a is still open amongst Shiites. How the Shari’a is interpreted by party elites affects their attitude towards women and may pose a real danger for their political involvement.\footnote{See, chapter One for a discussion of authoritarianism and women’s advancement and scholarly debates on these relationship by Huntington 1995, Tessler 2002, Fish 2002, Stepan and Robertson 2004, Donno and Russett 2004, Schuster 2007, Hatem 1994, among others.} The response of an elite in a pre-war religious party demonstrates this attitude, “Women are our mothers, daughters and sisters and must be cherished at all times. Their main functions lie in the women’s department to provide social services to families of fighters and the needy in the community.” This statement reflects a patronizing attitude, which confines women home and to the traditional ‘female-labeled’ tasks of providing social and welfare services. Similar views are offered by elites in Sunni-dominated religious parties.

Similar sentiments, albeit less extremist, are encapsulated in responses of party elites from Shiite-dominated parties. These leaders and elites, as shown earlier, have token women in their top echelons as a symbol of the modern. For instance, a male MP from a war-origin party empathizes with the “weaker sex’ lest they are overloaded beyond their physical and psychological capabilities.” He stresses that, “Women are already juggling multiple tasks on top of caring for their families. It is not fair to overload them beyond their physical capacities. Their place is not in politics but at home.” In general, these parties’ policies also do not encourage women to take the lead and prefer to work them in social services and electioneering purposes via women’s wings.

However, some parties are more tolerant towards women’s leadership than Sunni-dominated and other Shiite-dominated parties. One party (Amal) is not headed by a clergyman and is apparently more enlightened and encouraging to women’s leadership. A female official
from that party points to a perceptible change in the attitude of party elites towards women in the post-war era. She cites that,

After the war, our party seems to be more tolerant and receptive to new ideas. For instance, I did not dare raise issues dealing with women’s demands for leadership before the war or even five years ago. But, now I feel confident and comfortable in raising them in meetings. This is indicative of fast-track transformation, a continuing process of change.

This female official recognizes that there is transformation and capitalizes on it by lobbying to improve women’s share in leadership positions, an effort that eventually bears fruit. At a minimum, this shows party variation in attitudes of party elites’ vis-à-vis women within the group of parties with religious platforms. Such information is valuable in that it provides initial guidelines and indicators on the varying intensities of religiosity across religious parties’ platforms. This is a step forward towards labeling and coding parties by religiosity on their platforms.

To sum up, this section describes how the 15-year civil war exacerbated social but especially religious cleavages, which reshaped the party system. This is reflected in the mushrooming of parties of varying religiosities, but also in attitudinal shifts towards women across pre-war, war-origin and post-war parties. Indeed, the civil war did not only widen religious cleavages but created a new set of post-war parties with a whole different ‘women-friendly’ approach towards mobilizing women into politics. This women-friendly attitude differentiated them from pre-war more traditional parties. Party variation in attitudes towards women’s leadership -- political culture -- reflects the political dynamics, and the ramifications of the civil war on the party system. Party-age offers a sensitive framework for studying attitudinal shifts vis-à-vis women’s political involvement across pre-war and post-war parties. In general, pre-war parties are more traditional and conservative towards women’s leadership
than war and post-war parties. This implies that women’s chances in leadership are more likely to be adversely affected in pre-war than in post-war parties, with variations within each category. There is also diversity and difference in parties’ attitudes towards women’s leadership within each group. Before the civil war, pre-war leftist parties were modern and egalitarianism. In the post-war period, they underwent an attitudinal shift as they regressed into a traditional and conservative mode similar to that observed in other pre-war parties with secular and civil platforms. Post-war parties with secular and civil platforms reveal a receptive and women-friendly stance towards women’s leadership. Parties with religious platforms exhibit conservative and hostile or non-receptive attitudes toward women’s leadership, which is more pronounced in Sunni-dominated than in Shiite-dominated parties.

Moreover, the polarization of religious cleavages after the civil war may lead one to expect that women’s chances in leadership in the post-war period should diminish. Responses of interviewees denote the contrary. The post-war period saw post-war parties emerge with women-friendly attitudes that pre-war parties did not match. These responses indicate that the pre-war parties, especially those with single sect domination that survived the civil-war and remained relevant are resistant to change. They are set in their own ways like “old wine in new bottles”. Pre-war parties are less accommodating and receptive than war and post-war parties to women’s leadership, even among parties with religious platforms. Finally, the testimonies of party officials and the information they provided paved the ground work for the most complex task of classifying, labeling and coding parties by religiosity in the following section.

C. Classifying, Labeling & Coding Parties by Religiosity

Several interviewees stress that the civil war widened religious cleavages and restructured the party system, but also shifted party membership and transformed attitudes
towards women. Widening religious cleavages also created separate enclaves across various religious communities focusing on religious affiliation as an identity. As observed earlier, these cleavages are reflected in the mushrooming of diverse types of parties with confessional and single-sect domination. Some of those parties incorporate religious doctrine into their platforms, while others with civil and secular agendas treat religion as a private matter. I used the opportunity of the interviews in order to generate a coding system for religiosity that is sensitive to the conceptions that practitioners themselves use. In order to gauge how these politicians understood both their party and its differences from others, I asked them how they describe and classify their parties.

1. **Classifying parties into three generic categories: secular, confessional, and religious**

   Examining the responses of party officials reveals the complexity of developing a classification that captures the intensity of religiosity in party platforms. Views offered by interlocutors or national scholars dismiss a left-right or religious-secular divide but also highlight the complex process of developing a realistic classification of parties in Lebanon. Noting these difficulties, a leader of a pre-war progressive party remarks that,

   Classifying Lebanese parties is complex, since there are no left or right parties. There are confessional parties with civil, national or religious orientations, which confuse secular with religious parties. However, by looking at their agendas, you can separate them. Religious parties are sectarian and anti-secular in which religion acts supreme. These do not separate their religious from political goals. Secular parties do not have religious objectives. Some are pluralist, but few are democratic. I believe in separating religion from politics, but I am skeptical that a religious-secular divide is not realistic.

   Scholars also recognize the blurred line that separates religiosity from secularism, but also that, “…, the traditional unidimensional Left/Right ideological continuum may be too simple to describe how ideology affects women’s representation.” (Kittilson, 1979: 4)²⁸

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²⁸ A similar conclusion is reached in studying parties in Western Europe that, “The standard approach to the programmatic orientation of political parties is to employ the right-left continuum. Although it is true … the simple
Statements of party leaders and elites as well as female party activist did not only dismiss a left-right dichotomy but also highlight that party platforms carry varying religiosities. Programmatic orientations and goals are indicators of party religiosity, which is also central for labeling and coding parties by religiosity.

Even the most committed secularists in Lebanon do not give up their confessional identity. The intertwining of religion and politics in Lebanon is a fact that all interviewees recognize. Therefore, it is imperative for the sustainability of multiple secularisms in Lebanon to do so by remaining within the realm of religious and confessional politics. Secularism and religiosity co-exist in varying proportions on parties’ agendas. This is why a continuum of multiple religiosities and secularisms is adopted to capture party variation in religiosity. The realization that there are varying religiosities guides the process of classifying parties away from a right left or religious secular divide and along a continuum of religiosities and secularisms. A female in a post-war party alludes to this duality between confessionalism and secularism by stating that, “This is a secular party with a civil intonation and confessional domination. A secular party calls for separation between religion and politics, while a civil party may have religious orientations.

These nuances highlight that religion is a private matter but it also organizes the party along secular interests.” These distinctions are worthwhile noting in examining how parties with religious platforms self-identify. In his book on Hizbullah, Sheikh Qassem self-locates the party as an ‘ideological and not a sectarian party’, where members join because of their allegiance to the doctrine and not to the religious sect they belong to. He explains that,

right-left model is too crude to capture crucial distinctions between party ideologies and party practices…” (Lane & Ersson, 1987: 131

29 See, As.Safir, September 10, 2008.
There is quite a difference between a sectarian, confessional confederacy and a systematic, doctrinal one. The first draws its disciples based on the influence of birth and belonging irrespective of substance, while the second is founded on conviction and commitment, and harbours a set of guidelines as to moral and practical execution. (Qassem, 2005: 33).

However, irrespective of semantics and motivations for joining the party, membership in Hizbullah is strictly limited to Muslim Shiites or those who convert and adopt Shi’ism. Sheikh Qassem defends the party’s goal in establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon. He explains that,

Such a project is the natural expression of allegiance for any committed Muslim holding on to Islamic conviction and persuaded by its code. It represents the ultimate justice to which man aspires. However, we seek here to detail the difference between the intellectual vision and its practical manifestation, where in the first we summon the creation of an Islamic state and encourage others to adopt it as the supreme representation of human happiness; while on the second, practical level, we recognize that such development requires a proper foundation that accommodates the creation of the state. (Qassem, 2005: 30)

However, he stresses that there is no compulsion in Islam, leaving it in the hands of the Lebanese to decide whether or not to establish an Islamic state:

We confirm our conviction in Islam as a tenet and system, both intellectual and legislative, calling on all to learn of it and abide by its code. And we summon the people to adopt it and commit to its instructions, at the individual, political and social levels. Where the freedom of choosing a governing system is attributed to our people in Lebanon, they will not find a better alternative to Islam. Hence, we call for the implementation of the Islamic system based on direct and free choice of the people, and not through forceful imposition as may be assumed by some. (Qassem, 2005:31)

This demonstrates, in no uncertain terms, that Hizbullah’s ultimate goal is to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon when it becomes timely to do so. Such religious goals aim to change the political system, an indication of the intensity of religiosity in the party platform, which is useful for labeling and coding parties.

30 A similar argument was advanced by Rachid Al-Ghannoushi, a major Islamic leader in Tunisia, in an interview conducted by Alfred Stepan: “... that the ideal form of government would be an Islamic government. He acknowledged that in the modern pluralist world it is extremely difficult to achieve this ideal.” (Stepan, 2001: 235).

31 Interviews with the Secretary-General of Hizbullah or his deputy were not granted because of the security situation following the July 2006 war. However, his book “Hizbullah: The Story from Within”, provided some answers to my questions.
This information is invaluable in that it distinguishes between parties with confessional membership: some have religious while others have civil platforms. In the latter, religious affiliation is an identity and religion is confined to the private sphere but programmatic orientations are civil and national. In the former, party platforms have religious components. Parties that self-identify as civil or secular and nationalist are often confessionally dominated, but keep religion in the private realm while retaining it as an identity. They market themselves away from confessionalism by claiming secularity in order to distance themselves from being labeled ‘religious parties’. In post-war Lebanon, it is a stigma for civil and confessional parties to be labeled ‘religious’ based only on confessionally-dominated membership, especially with the negative connotation attached to ‘extremists’ in the aftermath of the civil war. Even, Hizbullah, the most powerful religious party, has been calling for elimination of political sectarianism in the country.³²

Further, confessional parties maintain strong links with their confessional constituencies and identify with their religious affiliation and sect. This religious affiliation is not only an identity, but it is also a ticket to amass voters from the same religious denomination. Voting behavior is a case in point, as some scholars suggest that, “…, one’s religious identity provided a cue that oriented voters toward political parties, and helped define one’s ideological position on the political spectrum.” (Norris and Inglehart, 2004:228). For instance, it is considered an act of treason to the sect if someone votes outside her/his religious sect, or for the party that represents that sect, or declares support for the party of another sect, religious or non-religious. Several

³² It has been suggested that the ulterior motive is that Shiites will get a bigger share of the political pie, since they outnumber other communities in Lebanon (An-Nahar, 25 and 30 July 2009). When Hizbullah published its political platform in April 2009, it was also pointed out that, “The document calls for the abolition of sectarian politics and enactment of a new election law… in order to emphasize the group’s priorities … to attract optimal representation and perhaps even a majority in parliament…. This will advance Hizbullah toward its fundamental goal: the establishment of an Islamic state that provides expression to the Shiite majority.” (Jerusalem Post, June 7, 2009).
scholars have addressed this contentious issue especially after the July 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. This denotes that these parties are protective of their constituencies, controlling of their allegiances, and less tolerant to diversity or differences in opinion.

The views of other party officials point to a preference for separating religion from political agendas but recognize that this is a difficult goal. In this context, a male MP states that,

This party functions within a confessional society but has civil goals. It pursues a bottom-up approach to instill secularism at the grassroots level. But, this is a difficult task. Secularism is like democracy, cannot be imported or imposed from the top. Both should be woven into the fabric of society early on.

What is a certainty, however, is that religion will always be an integral component of the political and party system. This is explained by the leader of a post-war party:

Parties form around one religious sect, rally around a leader or founder from that sect, and their membership is dominated by that same single sect. Since parties form along confessional lines instead of socio-economic or political ideologies, any classification into left, right or center of the political spectrum or religious-secular divide becomes meaningless in a country like Lebanon.

This leader concludes by proposing a listing of parties in terms of their agendas and memberships. For instance, in the South, Hizbullah and Amal are dominated by Muslim Shiites. In the North and Mount Lebanon, the Giants (Marada) and Free Patriotic (Tayyar) parties are dominated by Christian Maronites. In the Shouf district, parties are Druze-dominated, while in Beirut, the Future is Sunni-dominated. In the post-war era, the closest to a concept of a secular


34 In a society marred by wide conflict-bearing religious cleavages, individuals are born, raised and registered into one of the 18 confessional communities. In this society, secularism and religiosity carry different connotations. Indeed, religious affiliations and identities matter more to constituencies as an organizing principle and in ‘aggregating interests’ of religious communities than left-right, economic, political or other ideologies. Therefore, an objective of full secularism starting at the grassroots is utopian in a country like Lebanon, where secularism is socially constructed but not imposed. Nevertheless, efforts to separate religion from politics continue. A new civil society movement composed of male and female scholars and political activists was established in May 2010 calling for secularization and freeing the state from religious domination.
party is Tajaddod, given its plural membership and non-religious platform. However, in the pre-war era, Al-Kutlah was a secular and plural party until its founder went into exile in France during the civil war. This party, like all the pre-war leftist parties, lost clout in the wake of the civil war. This enumeration of relevant and powerful parties in terms of their agendas and memberships lays down the foundations of a framework for classifying and labeling these parties. (Table 3.1 lists the 18 relevant parties)

There is consensus among scholars, political activists and practitioners (interviewees) on the presence of a continuum of multiple secularisms and religiosities, which rules out left-right or religious-secular dichotomies. I extend the multivocal approach to religion, which this dissertation adopts, from the individual to institutional level of political parties.\(^{35}\) Such a spectrum of religiosities and secularisms in party platforms produces party variation in religiosity and offers a working basis for classifying, labeling and coding parties to capture variation in women’s leadership. The statements of party officials so far guided the process of grouping parties into three generic categories: (1) secular and a-religious, (2) civil-secularism and confessional (hereafter civil-confessional), and (3) religious with varying religiosities (hereafter religious). Parties with religious platforms are split into three sub-categories upon examining their platforms and determining the extent to which religion penetrates each of their agendas. In the following section, the process of labeling and coding of parties is described.

2. **Labeling and coding parties**

The process of coding parties on a spectrum of religiosity and secularism is based on content analysis of mission statements, charters, and more specifically, political platforms. Content analysis of party platforms revealed a host of goals ranging from secular, leftist, national

\(^{35}\) I am aware that religiosity of individuals, especially when in leadership and decision-making positions, would necessarily influence their attitude towards women’s leadership. Therefore, an element of subjectivity in interviewees’ responses is inevitable but is factored into the findings.
and civil to religious objectives which aim to change the political system in line with religious doctrine. In addition, the literature on parties and different ways of classifying them was extensively reviewed, with a special focus on researchers studying parties in Lebanon. Moreover, in an initial phase of the field research I posed questions to party leaders and elites on how they classify their parties. This information was also essential for developing a preliminary classification to propose to party leaders and female activists during the second and third round of structured and semi-structured interviews. I sought their views, as politicians and practitioners, on labeling and coding parties and refined the classification based on the data and information they offered, or on the adjustments they proposed. The process of consultation with party leaders, male and female party activists, national experts and scholars was conducted over the three-year field research. During 2006-2009, the process of labeling and coding parties was transparent and underwent several adjustments and refinements until consensus was reached.

Several interviewees note that secular parties with leftist orientations contain no religious goals. Indeed, a female activist in a pre-war leftist party stresses that,

I do not practice any religious rituals. I cannot carry two faiths and have double allegiance. My faith lies in the ideology of the party that I belong to and I am at peace with myself. I have no choice of being born as a Christian. This is the main problem in Lebanon: the interference of religion and confessionalism with our social and political lives.

Thus, the three pre-war leftist parties (Communist, Baath and Syrian Social) have the least religiosity among the other parties. However, their being anti-religion did not prevent these parties from building alliances with strong religious parties in the post-war era. This was essential to survive and for strategic and electoral reasons.

The second generic category includes those parties whose platforms contain a mixture of secular, civil, national sovereignty, and the goals to ensure continued existence as a confessional
community. These parties include religious affiliation concerns in their agendas but they do not aim to change the political system to match their confessional concerns. They are merely issues of survival, especially for parties whose membership is dominated by, but not limited to, a Christian majority. The Muslim-dominated confessional party (Mustaqbal) does not have any concerns and qualms in this respect, since Lebanon is a Muslim-majority country, after all. In an attempt to compare goals and agendas even within the same category, a female party activist points out that,

The Kata‘èb, Marada, or Lebanese Forces tend to have more religious components in their platforms than the Tayyar or Wa’ad. Also, Mustaqbal has less religiosity than the extremist Jama’a Islamiah, where there are no women in leadership. These are extremely conservative, especially the Sunni Islamist parties, closer to the ‘Wahabi’ in Saudi Arabia.

Taking this comparison in stride, one would further split the nine post-war civil-confessional parties into different religiosities, as this respondent suggests. However, reverting to the content analysis of their platforms, consulting with other party elites and scholars, and also noting that there are only 18 parties, these parties are retained within the same category. Another female activist states that,

Civil-confessional parties are premised on religious value system but have a civil agenda. They are pluralist, tolerant, democratic and gender-sensitive. Secular parties are not religious at all, but lapsed into traditionalism after the war. Religious parties are conservative and look at the doctrine as a political and social contract.

Moreover, officials in a couple of Christian-dominated parties highlight that they start their meetings with prayer and that their party logo carries the cross. In addition, their platform is guided by Christian values while their main concern is to exist as a community in Lebanon. A case in point is the testimony of a female official in one of these parties:

I am committed to Christianity before politics. The party is existential and our priority is protecting Christians in Lebanon and the Middle East. This takes precedence over other political goals. The party’s logo -- the cross -- attests to this and so does our mission
statement which is premised on Christian values. We pledge to defend our religion when we join and start our meetings with prayers. Maintaining our Christian identity is our concern.\textsuperscript{36}

Essentially, these parties do not aim to change the political system, but they definitely have few religious-related goals. Therefore, this category is labeled civil-confessional parties and assigned a coding on the religiosity scale less than that assigned to secular parties, because of their concerns about maintaining their confessional identity qua goal of existence as a religious community.

The third generic category is parties with religious platforms and varying religiosities. Three of these parties are led by clergymen. They are Sunni-dominated and incorporate the doctrine in their platforms. These parties are guided by the doctrine in their social and political lives. Their ultimate goal and objective is to change the political system into an Islamic state and to be governed by the Shari’a, which they consider as all one needs for governance. For them, Islam is the solution and the only path. These parties are not open to ‘Ijtihad’ or interpreting the Shari’a. They stick to the letter and verse of the Shari’a and are ultra-conservative in interpreting the doctrine. They are Salafists by self-location. These are labeled religious extremists and are assigned the code of highest religiosity.

The second sub-category of religious party comprises only one party, the Shiite-dominated Hizbullah. This party is headed by a clergy who is charismatic and well versed in jurisprudence. The party’s platform also incorporates the doctrine and aims for an Islamic state in Lebanon. However, the party’s goals have undergone several transformations overtime, which point that such a goal is untimely and cannot be imposed on the people of Lebanon. This has to come by choice since there is no compulsion in Islam and the time in Lebanon is not ripe

\textsuperscript{36} Content analysis of party platform shows that there are no religious goals pertaining to state politics, except protecting their interests and preserving their identity as Christians. The leader self-identified his party as a secular party with civil and national goals but Maronite domination.
for fulfilling the goal of an Islamic state. This also implies that while the party is guided by the doctrine, it is also open to interpretations that allow them to enter politics and be tolerant to differences by allying with Christian-dominated parties. Based on their own self-location and placement among the religious parties, they are labeled as conservative but not extremist. They are assigned a score of less religiosity than the extremist parties.

The third and last sub-category of parties with religious platforms is the Shiite-dominated Amal. This party is the only religious party led by a political leader who is not a clergyman, which really ties in with the assumption that elites’ attitudes flow into party platforms. In this vein, a female activist in civil-confessional Maronite-dominated party states that, “Parties with strong bonds to religion and where the cleric and politician are collapsed into one, religious tenets affect politics and take precedence over democratic and egalitarian values.”

The political platform of this party is guided by a doctrine with religious components but has also secular goals of governance. Conforming to the correct religious path is a main religious goal but there is no indication of imposing an Islamic state on Lebanon, or on all Lebanese citizens irrespective of their religious affiliation. Accordingly, this party is labeled as religious but tolerant and assigned a coding in religiosity lower than the conservative but not extremist religious parties but higher than civil-confessional parties.


The fundamentalist parties seek to reorganize state and society around strict reading of religious doctrinal principles, while denominational-mass parties are pluralist and incremental in their agenda. For fundamentalist parties, there is little or no room for conflicting interpretations of the religious norms and scriptures that serve as the basis of the party’s program and of the laws that it seeks to impose on all the society. … In this theocratic party model, there is no separation between the religion and the state, and
religious norms are imposed on all citizens within the polity irrespective of their own personal religious beliefs. (Schuster 2007: 20-21)

Shuster explains why denominational-mass parties, like the Dutch CDA or the German CDU, are not a problem for democracy unlike religious fundamentalist parties, like the Dutch SGP, which potentially are. Denominational-mass parties are equivalent to those labeled ‘confessional but civil secularism’. Religious fundamentalist parties are parallel to those labeled religious extremists in that they aim to impose their religious beliefs on all citizens. This distinguishes them from ‘religious conservative, but not extremist’ in that the latter try to convert others by convincing them and not by coercion since there is no compulsion in Islam (see, Qassem 2005). In addition, they are open to re-interpretation of the doctrine and at times are willing to overlook the Shari’a if it is in their political interest to do so and for strategic maneuverings.

Coding parties by religiosity was a continuous process throughout the research period. It was essentially a heuristic exercise in which I turned to my interviewees not only for consultation but also as a spring board. The labeling and coding of these 18 parties passed through several phases in order to revisit and refine the coding in line with statements of interviewees or suggestions from politicians and national experts. However, in as much as possible, this process was transparent, realistic and sensitive to varying intensities of religiosity. In fact, it was finalized by consensus with party leaders and activists. This is critical and crucial for the qualitative analysis and quantitative testing of the theory by estimating a regression model for women’s leadership with which the dissertation concludes.

Given the above, secular and a-religious parties with leftist tendencies do not have perceptible religious components in their platforms and are thus assigned a score of ‘5’ (highest degree of secularism and lowest intensity of religiosity). Civil-confessional parties maintain a religious identify, albeit not in the title, and declare that religion is private and personal. These
parties are assigned a score of ‘4’, lower score on secularism than secular a-religious, but also lower on the religiosity scale than religious parties. The generic broad category of religious parties is broken down into three labels according to the extent that religious goals penetrate their political agendas. These are religious extremists assigned a score of ‘1’, conservative but not extremists assigned a score of ‘2’, and tolerant religiosities assigned a score of ‘3’ in terms of the intensity of religiosity in their platforms. Table 3.1 gives a 2x5 matrix of the 18 relevant parties that occupy at least one percent of the 128 parliamentary seats in any of the five post-war elections (1992, 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2009).

**Table 3.1 Party Variation in Lebanon (5-point scale from ‘1’ highest religiosity to ‘5’ lowest religiosity)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category/religiosity score</th>
<th>Religious Extremist (1)</th>
<th>Religious Conservative but not extremist (2)</th>
<th>Religious &amp; Tolerant (3)</th>
<th>Confessional but civil-secularism (4)</th>
<th>Secular &amp; a-religious (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-war parties</strong> (1924-1974)</td>
<td>Islamic Group-Sunni (Jama’a Islamiah)</td>
<td>Phalanges –Maronite (Kata’eb)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Communist – pluralist (Al-Shuyou’i)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Progressive Socialist – Druze (Al-Takddumi Al-Ishiraki)</td>
<td>Arab Socialist Renaissance - pluralist (Al-Ba’ath)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Liberals – Maronite (Al-Wataniyyine Al-Ahrar)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic Action Front- Sunni (Jabhat Al-A’mal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Secular National –Christian (Wa’ad)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanese Forces – Maronite (Al-Qawwat)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement – Maronite (Al-Tayyar Al-Watani Al-Hurr)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Giants – Maronite (Marada)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

In a society marred by wide conflict-bearing religious cleavages, individuals are born, raised and registered into one of the 18 confessional communities. In this society, secularism and religiosity carry different connotations. Indeed, religious affiliations and identities matter more to constituencies as an organizing principle and in ‘aggregating interests’ of religious communities than left-right, economic, political or other ideologies. Therefore, an objective of full secularism starting at the grassroots is, at a minimum, utopian in a country like Lebanon where secularism is socially constructed but not imposed.37

Based on information gathered from interviewees, the most significant finding in this chapter is that religiosity—not religion per se—is seen at the root of variations across parties in women’s leadership. The testimonies indicate that variation in intensity of religiosity appear to be a core variable for explaining women’s leadership in parties’ decision-making bodies. Information and data show that the 15-year civil war (1975-1990) widened religious cleavages, and restructured the party system into multiple parties of varying intensities of religiosity and secularism. This is also reflected in attitudinal shifts vis-à-vis women’s role across pre-war, war-origin and post-war parties. The influence of widening religious cleavages on heightening extremism is not uniform across parties.

In religious parties, this intensified religiosity and negatively influenced their elites’ attitude vis-à-vis women’s leadership. For example, a more tolerant attitude transpires towards women’s leadership in Amal, which bodes better for women’s leadership than in Hizbullah. In Hizbullah, strict adherence to religious doctrine is highlighted and women’s leadership is not accorded priority. Party leaders and elites employ patriarchal and doctrinal discourses, viz., that

37 Nevertheless, efforts to separate religion from politics continue. A new civil society movement composed of male and female scholars and political activists was established in May 2010 calling for secularization and freeing the state from religious domination.
‘politics-is-men’s-business’, women cannot lead men as stipulated in ‘Al-Qiwama’, and that
‘women’s-place-is-home’. However, since 1982, Hizbullah’s political agenda has been
undergoing transformation, a process that continues to date pointing to change in intensity of
religiosity on their platforms overtime.\textsuperscript{38} Such transformations are common in the lifetime of
political parties, as in the case of the Christian Democratic parties in Europe (Kalyvas 1996).
Transformation or rather adaptation to social change is raised by a female activist in a pre-war
leftist party, reflecting on her personal experience with Hizbullah:

I was teaching sciences and math to prepare girls and boys for the high school
governmental exam in a segregated school of Hizbullah. One tool of instruction required
girls and boys to mix. The students were apprehensive and sought approval from
Hizbullah. To my surprise, this was given and justified as a learning process. Based on
this example, I believe that eventually Hizbullah will advance women.

These religious parties are well organized, hierarchical, strongly integrated, and popular with
huge membership, including of women. Scholars studying Christian democratic parties in the
1980s, remark that except for the OVP in Austria and the ARP in the Netherlands, “Most
religious parties are weakly integrated: the organization and the position of the party leadership
is weak and there is not always a homogeneous behaviour within the party.” (Lane & Ersson,
1987:121) Two decades later, Kalyvas argues that,

Christian Democracy has always had strong integrative capacities by virtue of its
(religiously inspired) political ideology. Precisely because Christian Democracy relied on
religion as the foundations of their political message … religion is the foundational
element of confessional parties, the core element of their identity; …, their religious
appeal turned these parties into highly heterogeneous coalitions of interest groups united
only by their initial adherence to religion. (Kalyvas, 2009: 4, 10).

Therefore, parties with religious platforms have varying religiosities that appear to
influence women’s leadership. In secular parties with leftist orientations, pluralism shrank but

\textsuperscript{38} In 1982, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hizbullah, declared in a public speech that the
objective of Hizbullah is to establish an Islamic State in Lebanon. ‘Sayyed’ refers to those who are -or claim to be-
descendant of Prophet Mohammad’s lineage, as in the case of the ruling monarchs of Jordan and Morocco.
was not lost, but this did not dilute their egalitarian attitude towards women. In the post-war era, new parties with civil goals and confessional membership emerged which are more receptive towards women’s leadership. This chapter concludes by labeling parties into extremists, conservative and tolerant religiosities, confessional with civil secularism and secular a-religious. They are coded by the intensity of religiosity on their platforms along a 5-point religiosity continuum with ‘1’ for highest religiosity and ‘5’ for lowest religiosity. The next chapter examines pluralism and democratic procedures as potential variables for explaining women’s membership and leadership.
Chapter Four
Party Variation in Democratic Practices & Pluralism

Based on interviews with party leaders and female party activists, the preceding chapter established that religiosity in party platforms is a potential core explanatory variable for women’s leadership. While party officials interviewed do not see that religion is inimically hostile to women, many point to the chilling effects of religiosity (and extremism) on the opportunities for women to advance to leadership positions. This provided the groundwork for classifying, labeling and coding the 18 relevant parties in Lebanon. Parties are labeled as religious extremists, religious conservative but not extremists, religious but tolerant; confessional but civil secularism, and secular a-religious. The chapter also looked at the impact of the 15-year civil war on widening religious cleavages which restructured the party system. This is reflected in mushrooming of parties with confessional and single-sect memberships as well as membership and attitudinal shifts vis-à-vis the role of women and their political involvement across pre-war, war and post-war parties.

This chapter explores other party-level characteristics that may influence women’s leadership besides the level of religiosity in their platforms and whether the party was established before, during or after the civil war. It is organized in two sections. The first section looks at democratic practices in operating procedures, specifically in the transfer of leadership and in decision-making processes. The second section examines multi-religious pluralism in the composition of party membership. The information gathered from interviewees is used to establish whether parties’ pluralism and democratic procedures are viewed by politicians in Lebanon as factors that can explain variations in women’s membership and leadership prospects. Finally, the in-depth interview responses are also used as a preliminary check of the
hypotheses -- to see whether individuals actively engaged in parties see a link between democracy, pluralism, and outcomes for women.¹

A. Democratic Practices in Operating Procedures

Scholars maintain that the level of parties’ institutionalization (e.g., party-age, organizational structure, internal rules, membership, operating procedures and practices, links to society) influences female parliamentary representation.² Guided by this scholarship, I look at parties that employ democratic practices in the transfer of leadership and decision-making to find out whether these practices influence female party membership and enhance their leadership prospects. Democratic practices imply granting equal opportunity to all members to compete for any position and at any level.³ I expect that parties employing democratic procedures enhance female membership and leadership more than parties that do not employ these procedures (hypothesis H2); and examine whether my informants also find this. In order, though, to assess whether this theory finds support among the party leaders, female members and activists included in my survey, I analyze their responses to the question “Do you find that democratic procedures enhance women’s membership and leadership chances?”

A female activist and political scientist in a civil-confessional party that sees itself as democratic lists democratic procedures and other elements of import to women’s leadership:

First and foremost, secularism is at the top of the list since once religion (Christianity or Islam) enters into the formula it is automatically associated with patriarchy, which is the major barrier to women’s leadership. Second, institutionalization, and the presence of

¹ For a conceptualization of pluralism in party membership and democratic procedures, refer to chapter One.


³ For detailed theoretical justification, see chapter One. For instance, Basu suggests that, “In general, the stronger democratic institutions and practices are, the greater the opportunities this affords to women to achieve representation through the party system.” (2005: 34). Thus, more in-depth research is needed to study how different operating procedures within parties influence women’s leadership (See also, Fish 2002, Donno and Russett 2004, Norris and Lovenduski 1993, Basu 2005, and Deeb 2006, among others).
explicit, clear, transparent, replicable rules which allow for accountability are critical. Third, democratic procedures that include competitive elections, consultative decision-making, and meritocratic promotion system are free of gender bias or nepotism.

In this connection, a female activist in a pre-war secular, leftist, democratic and pluralist party critically remarks that,

Parties marked by democratic deficits and in which the consultative process in decision-making is weak do not work well for women’s leadership. This is mainly because women are not given equal opportunities in recruitment, selection, promotion, and nomination to office.

Another respondent, a former female MP candidate from an Islamist party asserts that,

Men block women from leadership positions, especially in religious parties. If democracy is practiced instead of being proclaimed, women would have had a greater chance of assuming leadership. In effect, the democratic deficit in Islamist parties is the reason why women do not share in decision-making and are not present in their leadership bodies.4

These statements indicate that democratic practices are recognized by respondents as factors of import for women’s leadership. These politicians and activists, who are also scholars, are reporting from their own vantage points. They are both in top leadership positions, which is reassuring because it substantiates my theoretical expectations.

Information from party by-laws, supported by party administrators, provides data on the process of leadership transition and on the composition of membership by religious affiliation (plural or otherwise). However, in the case of decision-making, information is based solely on statements of party leaders and female activists. In the following paragraphs, I examine separately transfer of leadership and decision-making practices in the inner working of political parties.

1. Transfer of leadership

4 In effect, interviews conducted with women in many religious parties had to be cleared by party leadership, which reflects democratic deficits and authoritarianism permeating some of these parties. They control women -- but also men -- and decisions are centralized within the hierarchical party structure, despite the claim of shoura and consultative process.
One indicator of democratic practices is the smooth, peaceful and competitive process by which leadership is transferred among party elites. In this context, Tessler notes that, “Institutional and process considerations call attention to the need for mechanisms that make political leaders accountable to those they govern, including free, competitive, and regular elections.” (2002: 337).

Data on transfer of leadership cover the term in office and periodicity of elections, nominations to office, competitiveness and contestation, as well as by-laws ensuring transparency and smoothness of the process. Information from party by-laws and party administrators is used to evaluate the composition of membership by religious affiliation (plural or otherwise) and the process of leadership transitions. Information gathered from these sources shows that only five out of the 18 relevant parties pursue democratic process in leadership transitions. More precisely, in the three pre-war secular a-religious (Communist, Syrian Social and Baath) and two of the Sunni-dominated religious extremist parties (Islamic Group and Islamic Action), leadership is transferred in accordance with due democratic process via periodic and competitive elections as stipulated in the by-laws. Leadership in the other parties is personalized. In civil-confessional and in most religious parties, the same leaders are voted again and again into office, violating or amending the by-laws in the process. In these cases, no one dares to run against the current leader. The same leaders are either automatically renewed or they continue to lead by acclamation. More often than not, leadership in these parties is simply inherited as a family heirloom or as head of a religious sect. Party leaders are generally the feudal lords (Zai’m, political boss or patron, charismatic leader) of the district where the party
initially formed. In most of these cases, party leadership is but a reflection of the prevalence of confessional identity over democratic process in leadership transitions.\(^5\)

How does democratic process in leadership transitions affect women’s chances in advancement and promotion to leadership? Responses of some female interviewees in post-war civil-confessional parties point to a gap between *de jure* by-laws and *de facto* practices. Even in parties that claim pursuit of due democratic process in leadership transfers – as in holding regular elections and open nominations for others to compete -- there is built-in gender-bias and/or fear of rocking the establishment, or both. In other words, women are afraid of antagonizing the current leader by running against him. For example, a female activist in a civil-confessional party justifies that, “Women have not managed to build alliances and are not supported by the party’s rules and by-laws. It may be against the conventional wisdom to run for the top post.” This female activist implies that women have (a) to build alliances with men in the party to secure their support if they run for top position(s); and (b) that the party by-laws must include special measures to ensure that women are guaranteed opportunity in this process. To corroborate her statement, the only female Secretary-General in a post-war civil-confessional party states that,

> I have a dream to lead the party one day. But, I know that I will have limited support not because I am a woman, but because the party unanimously elected the son of the assassinated founder of the party as the leader. He is young, driven, and performing well. However, in order to influence decision-making, women should be visible and impose their presence.

This supports the argument of Anne Phillips’ (1995) that “…the only way that institutions will change is through the politics of their (women’s) presence (in Duerst-Lahti, 2006:10). Opinions of other interlocutors differ from this female activist. For instance, a female activist in a civil-

\(^5\) For instance, the by-laws of a war-origin religious conservative but not extremist party were amended to re-elect the current leader, who took office after the assassination of his predecessor.
confessional party remarks that, “There is no need to run against our leader, especially since he is young, liberal, modern, tolerant and above all charismatic. Continuity in leadership outweighs change.” She does not feel right about rocking a boat, which is on track. However, she is aware that nothing should prevent women from competing for top position(s) since democratic procedures in the party are in place. Therefore, this may be a matter of personal choice by women but not a failure of democratic process.

In contrast, a female party activist in a pre-war secular party musters her courage to run against the current male leader. In so doing, she is making a statement that competition is open to all and that democratic process in the party is not a failure. She stresses that, “I am determined to run for leadership of the party, although I have slim chances of winning. But, I want to make a statement. Women constitute a good proportion of the party’s membership and they deserve more representation in leadership positions.” Indeed, she ran in party elections during summer 2010 and she is now vice president of the Communist Party. Another case in point is that in a post-war civil-confessional party, a female was elected as president of the party and ran the party for eleven years until her husband was released from prison in the post-war period. Although this demonstrates that the transition process did not block a female candidate, this episode may still count as an instance of a within-family leadership transition, rather than as a transparent and rule-guided process. However, when she was interviewed, she sang the praises of democratic process in the party and how she ran the party for eleven years and the difficulties she faced as a woman until she imposed her presence ‘a-la-Phillips’.

Nevertheless, impressions gained from responses of party leaders and female activists indicate that democratic procedures in leadership transitions are viewed as a factor explaining women’s prospects and that sometimes the absence of open competition for party leadership has
deterred women from seeking top posts. Are women involved in the decision-making process? The following section addresses this issue to see whether women’s involvement or lack of it can explain party behaviour towards their chances for leadership.

2. **Decision-making process**

Political parties may have a centralized or decentralized system of decision-making. Scholars suggest that, “It may make a difference whether the party is centralized, whether it has close connections with interest organizations of various kinds, and how large its membership is.” (Lane and Ersson, 1987:96) However, Kittilson (1997) maintains that centralization – seen as decisions taken centrally but not necessarily by top elites only -- is better for women’s leadership. Other scholars argue – and I share their views-- that decentralization in decision-making works better for women’s leadership because it involves consultation, allows contestation and freedom of expression. I refer to centralization or decentralization in decision-making as the ‘how’ and ‘by whom’ not as to ‘where’ decisions are taken within the parties’ organizational structure. In other words, if this process is centralized in the hands of a few elites at the top or decentralized via a consultative process in which women are involved. In the previous section, parties are categorized as democratic or not, on the basis of the process of how

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6 The United Nations provides guidelines for policy-makers in democratizing and conflict-stricken areas to empower women and promote leadership in political parties. This checklist includes the following queries: “(1) Have the constitution, manifesto, policies and structures of each political party incorporated gender equality and women’s empowerment objectives to ensure equal representation and participation of women and men in decision-making at all levels? (2) Do the procedures to select candidates for decision-making positions within the party structures, as well as nomination to presidential, parliamentary, provincial and local government positions, allow for gender equality between women and men? Are the party leadership and nomination structures democratic, transparent, gender balanced and gender sensitive? (3) Do the political parties have programmes to ensure an increased number of women in party decision-making structures at all levels and for the nomination to parliamentary provincial and local councils so that a minimum target of at least 30% of women in such bodies is achieved? (4) Do political parties include commitments to promote gender equality as a priority issue in their manifestos and campaign platforms? (5) Do political parties have awareness raising, training and capacity building programmes, specifically for women members, aimed at enhancing their capacities and competences? (6) Have the political parties set norms and standards aimed at promoting the position of women …?” (United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), “Women and Electoral Resource Guide: Enhancing Women’s Participation in Electoral Processes in Post-conflict Countries” (New York: United Nations), 2004:. 3. See, Lovenduski and Norris 1993.
leadership is transferred. I also examine the process – decentralized or centralized-- by which decisions are taken within the inner workings of parties; and whether women see that this affects their leadership prospects. Both of these indicators of democratic procedures are coded for quantitative testing.

Responses of interviewees describing whether the process of decision-making is centralized or decentralized and whether women are involved provides data on the inner workings of the 18 relevant parties in this respect. Twelve out of the 18 relevant parties pursue decentralized decision-making in which women are involved. These include all four secular parties (Communist, Syrian Social and Baath, and Tajaddod), and eight of the nine civil-confessional parties (except National Liberals). However, all five parties with religious platforms do not involve women in the decision-making process.\(^7\)

The following discussion relates to democratic procedures, especially how few elites in some parties continue to hold the decision-making powers within their hands, although this may favor women’s leadership. For example, a female activist in a civil-confessional party reports that, “The party leader wanted more women in leadership positions. So, he encouraged those who are qualified to run for executive office. I ran but when I did not win, he appointed me to the council.” Another case in point is the one-time appointment of six women to leadership positions by the leader of a religious but tolerant party, just before elections. This was hailed by the media, but feminists and political observers are skeptical that such a step will not be sustained since it did not follow due process and is not institutionalized. The leader of a pre-war secular party criticizes such decisions in that, “This was only to improve the image in the public

\(^7\) The situation in these religious parties does not support the findings of Mervat Hatem (1994) in her research on Islamist parties in Egypt that there is no difference between liberal and Islamist parties with respect to women’s leadership. But, it somewhat supports Fish’s argument if extended from political regimes to political parties, since one sees less women in leadership positions in these parties. Although other studies show that some Islamist parties have women at their helm in Pakistan, Bangladesh or Malaysia (Basu 2005), as well as in Morocco or Algeria (Charrad 1998). See, also detailed discussion on authoritarianism in religious parties in chapter One.
eye in view of forthcoming elections. If the party is committed to empowering women, the rules and by-laws should be amended, and an internal quota for women introduced after consultations. This will enhance women’s share in leadership bodies.” Despite the fact that the share of women in leadership increased, the leader’s action was taken unilaterally without due democratic process of consultation and outside of party by-laws. This is what Clark refers to as ‘strategic maneuverings’ to advance women for purposes other than empowering them and for discrete objectives (Schwedler and Clark, 2003: 303).

Such decisions do not augur well for women’s leadership, since these decisions are not transformed into explicit or replicable rules, and do not allow for accountability (Lovenduski and Norris 1993: 215). Similar criticisms of what scholars refer to as ‘benevolent autocracy’ are expressed by political observers highlighting the risks to democratic procedures of such unilateral decision-making. ⁸ In comparison and for purposes of demonstrating how decentralized and transparent decision-making favors women’s advancement, the leader of a pre-war secular party reports that,

The legislative body of the communist party proposed to nominate at least one woman in each electoral list of the party. Towards this end, and after thorough consultation, the by-laws were amended to ensure adequate representation of the youth and women.

In order to find out whether women are involved in the decision-making process and in which parties they are more likely to do so, I asked party officials the question “Are women involved in the decision-making process within the party?” A female deputy officer of public relations department in a conservative religious party states as a matter of fact that, “In our

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⁸ Scholars note that, “…, if party leaders are sympathetic to the need to promote gender equality, for example if they want to appeal to women voters, then they have considerable power to do so. Through patronage party leaders can improve the position of women in party lists or place them in good constituencies. As a result under the system of ‘benevolent autocracy’ women can be promoted relatively quickly although without institutional safeguards the gains can be quickly reversed. … Since the process is not rule-governed, changing the rules will not change the outcomes. (Lovenduski & Norris, 1993: 323)
society, men take decisions alone without taking women’s opinion. So, why should you expect this to be different in political parties?” Also, the head of another women’s wing in a religious extremist party remarks that,

As women, we do not deal with politics but leave this to men in the party. They are the political decision-makers. Women do not share in political decision-making. We are happy providing social services and religious advocacy. There is no coordination at all with men in the party, except maybe during elections when we receive our assignments. We are essential to amass women’s votes, which men cannot do in conservative religious communities.

Further, the head of the women’s wing in a religious extremist party reports that, “Women do not share in the decision-making process and are not members in leadership bodies. They convey demands to the leader by phone or in writing without imposing them or contesting his decisions. He is the decision-maker.” A similar attestation is given by a female in another religious extremist party who states that, “Women are not consulted on nominations or any political decisions. But, our most valuable contribution is in elections. If our opinion is solicited, we communicate our views in writing to the leadership or to the decision-making committee.” The resolve to communicate by ‘remote control’ and without direct consultation or contestation reflects the centralization of decision-making process in these religious extremist parties. In most of these parties, as a female official explains, “The leader consults with us on women’s issues, which are low priority and on social issues but not on political policies. In other words, in matters of ‘soft’ not ‘hard’ politics.” Similarly, the head of a women’s wing in a religious conservative party explains that, “Women are not members in decision-making bodies. We are consulted ‘as needed’ and on social matters, but not in politics. Political decisions are considered men’s specialization and are beyond women’s capabilities.”
In general, most female officials in religious parties accept this marginalization in decision-making. Some even blame women for this situation, as the head of women’s wing in a religious extremist party justifies that,

Women lack political awareness and are not equipped to share in decision-making. For example, during elections women are handed the ballot and they just drop it in the box without questioning. Moreover, how do you expect them to share in important decisions when their mobility is restricted, especially in conservative communities? Decisions are taken at the top in this party by the leader without consultation with men or women.

In contrast, however, women in the religious tolerant party (viz., Amal) are taking a more assertive stance, as the head of the women’s wing points out that, “Women do not share in decision-making, especially not in important national decisions. But, we complained to the party leader requesting that women should share in decision-making and in leadership.” This position demonstrates that even amongst parties with religious platforms, women’s views differ and reflect a less passive attitude towards their own status within the party. They are not as passive as those in extremist and conservative religious parties.

Having examined the involvement of women in the decision-making process within extremist, conservative, and tolerant religious parties, I now turn to secular and civil-confessional parties. The views of female activists in these relatively more democratic and/or decentralized in decision-making processes are also solicited to see whether they find that their involvement in the decision-making process does indeed enhance their leadership chances. For instance, the head of a women’s wing in a post-war civil-confessional party where women are involved in decision-making at all levels, firmly states that,

As members in decision-making bodies, women share in all decisions, soft and hard politics. The leader himself is a feminist and a democrat and makes it a point to consult with women. Democratic practices in decision-making are essential because they offer women equal opportunities for leadership. After all, we had a woman at the helm for eleven years.
Similarly, a female party activist in another pre-war civil-confessional party with decentralized decision-making re-iterates that,

Democratic practices are explicit in the party’s by-laws and are manifest in its operating procedures, especially in consultation, dialogue and contestation. Once women are in leadership positions, they share in all decisions. These democratic practices raise women’s political maturity and build a critical mass of women, which enhances their prospects for leadership and for public office.

In a slightly different line of argument but still to drive the point that democratic practices work for women’s leadership, a female interviewee argues that Christian-dominated parties pursue more democratic process than Muslim-dominated parties. She belongs to a civil-confessional party that involves women in the decision-making process, and she is reflecting how this translates into more opportunities for women in leadership. She justifies her position by stating that, “Christians do not discriminate against women. We follow democratic process in selection, election, and decision-making. This explains why there are more women in leadership and in decision-making positions in Christian than in Muslim parties and countries.”

These representative statements reveal that in secular and civil-confessional parties the influence of democratic practices in decision-making and transfer of leadership on women’s leadership is broadly recognized. In practice, there is party variation in women’s involvement in decision-making across parties. In secular and civil-confessional parties, women are more likely to share in decision-making and to be effective. In extremist, conservative and tolerant religious parties, women do not share in the decision-making process. However, in extremist and conservative religious parties, women are more accepting and passive about it, while in the religious tolerant party (Amal), women are assertive and demand to share. This demonstrates that democratic process in decision-making might bear an influence on women’s chances in
leadership. Women are prepared to attest that democratic practices have been important for their ability to advance and are an important part of opening party politics to women.

What is also revealing is the comparison in responses of female and male interviewees, especially in parties with religious platforms. One finds congruence in attitudes but also the use of rhetoric in comparing the responses of party leaders and elites in religious parties to those of female officials on the decisions-making process. For instance, the leader of a religious extremist party states that, “Democratic practices in Islam are by shoura and consultation as stipulated in the doctrine. We consult with women in the party only as needed.” Similar emphasis on the doctrine and shoura is given by another leader of another religious extremist party,

Democracy in decision-making originated in Islam not in the West. The Koran dictates that, ‘Make your daily decisions by consultation and shoura’, but also ‘do not let women run your affairs’. As for women, they belong at home where their role is more effective. In the party, they are consulted as needed on social and women’s issues but they cannot lead men. This violates the Shari’a.

Similar views are offered by leaders and their senior advisers in other religious parties. The views of leaders and male elites do not essentially differ from the reality described and accepted by female officials in these parties. However, whether these views are de facto put in practice or remain in the normative realm, I argue, may explain at least part of the variation in women’s leadership –or lack thereof- across these parties. One should be cautious that statements of party elites or women in leadership positions may sometimes be strategic in that they say what they think they should say in order to project a better image of the party. This is especially the case for female activists and elites in parties with extremist and conservative religious platforms. These officials declare, rhetorically, that their parties’ inner workings follow Shoura and consultative process, which implies that women ought to be involved.
However, information culled from female activists reveals that heads of women’s wings in conservative religious parties are ex-officio but non-voting members in decision-making bodies. They are not even members of decision-making bodies in religious extremist parties. This situation has severe ramifications on women’s chances in leadership. For instance, the only female in the politburo of a religious conservative party asserts that, “In my capacity as a politburo member, I share in decision-making. This is not the case in other Islamist parties where heads of women’s wings are ex-officio non-voting members in decision-making bodies. This is also the case in my party. However, once women are in leadership positions, they impose their presence and their marginalization ceases.” This statement corroborates the ‘women’s presence’ argument, cited earlier (Phillips 1995). But, I find that some authoritarian religious parties are listening. Also, even if this solitary case is in the politburo of a religious conservative party, how effective can she be in an all-male politburo? This raises the issue of tokenism with respect to women’s representation in these women-unfriendly environments. In this respect, the head of the women’s wing in a religious conservative party states that, “I am a member of the executive council but have no voting power.” This intervention demonstrates the subordinate role that women’s wings have in the decision-making process within religious parties. Indeed, the views of party leaders and their male advisers in religious parties reveal a circumscribed role for women in the decision-making process in comparison to those in secular and post-war civil-confessional parties. The heads of women’s wings in pre-war secular and post-war civil-confessional parties are full-fledged voting members in decision-making and policy-making bodies.

In sum, data gathered from party administrators and by-laws show that in five out of the 18 relevant parties, leadership transitions follow democratic procedures of open and fair
competition. In decision-making, information from party officials reveals that 12 out of the 18 relevant parties have decentralized decision-making. These two indicators of democratic practices are combined into one variable and coded on a 3-point scale: Three parties that pursue democratic practices in both leadership transition and decision-making are assigned a score of ‘2’. Eleven parties which are democratic in one of the two indicators are assigned a score of ‘1’. Four parties with democratic deficits on both counts are assigned a score of ‘0’. This coding is essential for running the qualitative tests in chapter Six (see, Annex 6.1 on coding by party-level characteristics).

B. Pluralism in Composition of Membership

Pluralism implies tolerance to diversity and refers to inclusiveness in membership without formal restrictions or discrimination on the basis of gender, sect, or ethnicity. The party is said to be plural when the composition of its membership is multi-religious or when it is not confined to a single sect. Other scholars also consider composition of membership as affecting parties’ overall performance and attitude especially towards women. 9 This section explores pluralism as an explanatory variable for female party membership and whether pluralism also influences their prospects for leadership. I expect party pluralism in membership to attract women and plural parties to enhance women’s leadership more than single-sect parties (hypothesis H3).

Information on the composition of membership was gathered from party administrators. As mentioned earlier, this data was difficult to obtain, because pre-war parties did not maintain a computerized database to facilitate retrieval of such information. Moreover, in the pre-war period, information on party membership was considered confidential. However, thanks to the

receptiveness of party administrators, I was given access to party records and registers and was assisted by party personnel to compile the data manually. Religious affiliation in some parties is not recorded as evidence that it does not matter for party membership. Thus, guess estimates had to be taken because of unisex names for female membership and difficulties in differentiating Christian from Muslim surnames. In post-war parties, this data and information was more readily available. The information gathered shows that there are seven out of the 18 relevant parties that have plural membership. There are four secular parties (viz., Communist, Syrian Social National, and the Arab Socialist Ba’ath; as well as Tajaddod), and three civil-confessional parties (viz., Progressive Socialist, Tayyar and Future). All three pre-war secular parties with leftist tendencies have plural membership, although the diversity in membership, in terms of variety of sects, shrunk after the war. Post-war secular parties like the Democratic Renewal party (Tajaddod) have plural membership, which was set by its founding members who profiled and invited women and men to join the party. Despite gender balance and confessional representation, such a selective process renders the party elitist, closed and exclusive. This elicited criticism among political circles, as a female scholar remarks that, “Pluralism is a plus and encourages women to join such parties. The Tajaddod, however, is a sham, because its sole objective is promoting the founder and current leader (a Maronite Christian) to public office and the presidency. The party is elitist and exclusive.”

In addition, data compiled indicate that the majority of political parties in Lebanon are confessionally-dominated. Some parties are dominated by a single sect with membership exclusive to that sect and denied to all others unless they convert, as several interviewees noted

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10 Other pluralist parties are the National Secular Democratic Party, and Democratic Left, or the Civil Centre for National Initiative, which are minor parties. These have no presence in the parliament, therefore they are not covered.
and as also clear from these parties’ by-laws. This group comprises all parties with religious platforms. Membership in pre-war, war and post-war religious parties is exclusive to one sect, either to Muslim Sunnis or Shiites. Pre-war and post-war Sunni-dominated religious extremist parties like the Islamic Group (Jama’a Islamiah), the Unitarian Movement (Al-Tawhid), and the Islamic Action Front (Jabhat Al-‘Amal) have strong links to the Sunni community in the North. War-origin Shiite-dominated religious conservative and tolerant parties are powerful. The Party of God (Hizbullah) and Hope Movement (Amal), for instance, have vast memberships -- including women -- strong ties to society, and a stronghold over the Shiite community in the South.

By definition, civil-confessional parties are dominated by a single sect, albeit membership is open to other sects. In other words, there is nothing in the by-laws preventing people of other confessional denominations from joining civil-confessional parties. These include parties dominated by Druze (Progressive Socialist), Christian-Maronites (viz., Tayyar), and Muslim-Sunnis (viz., Future). However, these parties have members from other religious affiliations and sects. The other pre-war and post-war Maronite-dominated parties (Kata’èb, Kutlah, Ahrar, Wa’ad, Quwwat, and Marada) are open to other sects. Unlike religious parties whose membership is exclusive and closed to a single sect, membership in civil-confessional parties is open to other sects without the need to convert to the dominant sect. This is simply because for these parties religious affiliation is an identity and is not a religious goal. Civil-confessional parties that do not have plural membership are evidence of religious cleavages, fragmentation and existence of separate islands and religious communities within the Lebanese society and polity.

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11 The Sunni-dominated Islamic Welfare Projects Association (Al-Ahbash) or the Christian Democratic parties have no parliamentary representation. They are not ‘relevant’ parties and as such are not covered in this dissertation.
Indeed, widening religious cleavages also saw party memberships shift from pre-war secular to post-war religious parties. This watershed strengthened confessional identities in such a manner that people tended to join parties of their own sect and/or religious affiliation, thereby reducing pluralism nationwide. This process was hardest on the pre-war leftist parties that saw membership and pluralism in their membership decline. Such a fate was shared by several pre-war civil-confessional Christian and Druze dominated parties. In this respect, a senior official remarks that, “Pluralist membership shrank after the war in parties of secular and civil orientations, which discouraged women from joining these parties.” Similar analysis is offered by pre-war civil-confessional parties (viz., Kata’eb and Ahrar). Similarly, a leader of a pre-war civil-confessional party states that, “The plural character of the party was lost after the civil war as membership became largely dominated by Maronites. Membership from different sects dwindled, as did the number of women willing to join the party.” The statements of several party leaders and female activists link the widening religious cleavages in the aftermath of the civil war and the loss of plural character in parties’ membership to women’s party membership and their leadership prospects. For instance, a leader of a pre-war civil-confessional party stresses that,

The civil war saw growing religious extremism, ethnicities and racism but also shrinking pluralism. This is reflected not only in the society but also in its parties in which the multi-religious mix in membership declined. There are now less Shiites, Sunnis or Druze in our party, but also fewer women joining and more who left after the war. Women are attracted by open, transparent, pluralist and inclusive environment.

In this setting, Christians felt a fear of being marginalized, as a minority amongst Muslim-majorities. This resulted in increased immigration but also loss of pluralism and more
membership shifts in parties. A case in point is reported by another female activist who notes that heightened extremism also affected Muslims and they withdrew from membership of Christian-dominated parties, which adversely influenced pluralism therein. She explains that,

Religious extremism increased after the war, especially among Muslim as opposed to more tolerant Christian members. Muslims in this Christian-dominated party became a minority and withdrew. The decline in pluralism discouraged other women from joining and the rise in fundamentalism chased them away into their own communities.

In a similar comparison, a female activist in another post-war civil-confessional party observes, however, that religious extremism hit Christians and Muslims equally. Christian-dominated parties are attracting more Christians, which is undermining these parties’ plural membership.

Similar sentiments and fears are raised by a female activist in a pre-war civil-confessional party. She notes that the sectarian and confessional discourse, which emerged strongly and intensified in the post-war era, threatens the mere existence of Christians, as a minority amongst the Muslim-majority in Lebanon. She states that,

The discourse about the existential status of Christians in Lebanon emerged strongly after the war, which strengthened extremism and confessionalism. Preserving the identity and existence of Christians in Lebanon is a major concern. Pluralism is suffering in the process, which is bridged by building alliances with Muslim Shiites. However, this loss of pluralism does not influence women’s leadership.

The response of this female official may be justified, since she observes that the loss of pluralism after the war did not change the party’s policies towards women’s leadership. This is because membership in the party now hails from a single-sect, Maronites only. It is not because pluralism does not count, but because it does not exist anymore. However, this did not change women’s

In an article entitled “Christians tempted to emigrate as Lebanon grows increasingly ‘Islamized’”, Josie Ensor, Center for Arab Christian Research and Documentation (CEDRAC), notes that Christians who constituted 50% in Lebanon are down to 34%: One-third left during the civil war and over 70,000 fled in July 2006 Israeli invasion. A poll (Information International) shows that half of the Maronites are considering emigrating because of Hizbullah. Similar situations are witnessed among other Arab Christians in Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine, which prompted Pope Benedict XVI to call for a special Synod of Bishops in October 2010. He cites an enlightened Christian patriarch who remarks that “Lebanon has always been a bastion of religious tolerance, but now is moving toward a model of ‘Islamization’ seen in Iraq and Egypt.” (Daily Star, September 29, 2009).
chances in leadership but changed the composition of the party’s membership and the share of non-Maronite members, particularly women.

Thus, in general, the impressions gained from the statements by party leaders and female activists, particularly in secular and civil-confessional parties, reveal that pluralism is an attribute that parties care to maintain and/or regain. In order to find out whether party leaders and female activists also find – as hypothesized -- that pluralism influences female party membership and leadership, I examine their responses to the question -- *Does pluralism matter for women’s membership and leadership in parties?*

Several party officials stress that pluralism attracts more women to join parties, which raises their share in membership. For example, a female activist in a post-war civil-confessional party states that,

> Pluralist parties, although Christian-dominated, are definitely more attractive to women. Once they join, their leadership prospects are enhanced in plural parties. Indeed, we have huge female membership and women’s share in our leadership bodies is good. Our members include Christians from all sects and even veiled Muslim women, who joined in large numbers because of our openness and pluralism.

A similar supportive testimony is offered by a female, who is the chef de cabinet of the leader in the same plural party, stressing that,

> Our Christian-dominated party is liberal, modern, tolerant to diversity, and pluralist. These party characteristics encourage women to join in large numbers. In fact, female membership has grown immensely and is close to that in Hizbullah. Pluralism is synonymous to religious tolerance and this is attractive to women in politics. We have high shares of women in leadership.

These are strong testaments of the influence of pluralism on both, female membership and their leadership prospects. Another female activist in a post-war civil-confessional party not only expressed support for pluralism, but also broadened the concept of pluralism to include minority groups. She suggests that, “Pluralism implies tolerance to religious diversity. But, this should
also encompass openness and tolerance to homosexuals and lesbians, which enlarges the scope
and attracts more women to join. Such plural and open parties, by definition, are more receptive
to women’s leadership.” These views are shared by a Christian female in leadership position in a
Druze-dominated pre-war civil-confessional party, who states that,

The plural character and disposition of our party continues to attract women from other
sects, though in less proportions after the war. Pluralism in the party has attracted
women from all sects, Christians, Sunnis, Shiites and Druze, because they are
recognized as equals, irrespective of their religious affiliation. I am a Christian in
leadership position in a Druze-dominated party. Isn’t this ample evidence that pluralism
matters for women’s leadership?

These statements provide evidence that, despite the waning of pluralism in the aftermath of the
civil war, this party-level characteristic continues to be recognized as an attribute that women
factor into their consideration in joining parties and has, indeed, enhanced their ascendance to
leadership posts.

Responses of other party officials, especially those from single-sect and/or
confessionally-dominated parties, reflect ambivalence about the influence of pluralism on
membership and, in turn on leadership. For instance, a female activist in a post-war civil-
confessional party that is not plural observes that,

Individuals tend to join parties of their own confessional sect. They must be very
courageous to join a party outside their own faith (e.g. a Muslim to join a Christian-
dominated party, or vice-versa). Therefore, I do not see a case for pluralism as a factor
influencing women’s membership or their leadership prospects, at least, not in a
confessional society as Lebanon.

Similarly, a female activist in a post-war secular a-religious and plural party highlights, that
while pluralism is important, its significance is essentially a factor of individual religiosity. She
explains that, “In principle, pluralism may be attractive to women who are less religious and
more secular. However, women who are religiously committed may identify with and join
parties formed along their own sect. In this case, pluralism does not influence their choice of a
party.” This statement is important in that it shows that personal preferences – as religious commitment – in some instances motivate women’s political involvement more than pluralism, while the contrary is true in the case of women who are more secularly-inclined. This view is corroborated by a female official in pre-war Sunni-dominated not plural religious extremist party stating that, “Pluralism in membership is not a must for women, since religion is not a barrier to women in religious parties. Religious commitment and conviction is much more attractive to women than pluralism for party membership.” This respondent also suggests that pluralism is not relevant for women in parties dominated by a single-sect. These statements link women’s membership and leadership to parties’ pluralism and religiosity but mainly to women’s religious affiliation and their personal religious convictions and preferences. In this case, pluralism seems to be a function of women’s own religious affiliation. These respondents do not deny that pluralism is important for parties that are not single-sect or confessionally dominated. However, they say it is not relevant in single-sect dominated parties where all members hail from the same sect, and in turn may not influence leadership prospects. More precisely, pluralism is attractive but can be trumped by religious conviction for women who are religious. Women may join such parties out of conviction, but this doesn't mean they will be promoted to leadership transitions.

A third category of responses point out that pluralism matters to female party membership but is not relevant for their ascendance to leadership. For instance, a female MP in a post-war secular pluralist party remarks that “Pluralism in political parties attracts more women to join as members. But, whether this leads to leadership positions depends upon the type of party, its by-laws as well as party elites.” Similarly, a female activist in a pre-war secular leftist party that boasts plural membership who sees that,

Pluralism and inclusiveness in parties encourage women to join and become politically active. This is because plural parties do not discriminate against women on the basis of
religious or sectarian affiliation, which provides a women-friendly environment for political involvement. As for leadership, this is a different equation.

Also, a senior adviser to the leader of a post-war civil-confessional Sunni-dominated party notes that,

Around one-fourth of the party membership is from other religious sects. The party’s openness, tolerance to diversity, and pluralism are at the root of its popularity among women. However, their assumption of leadership positions depends upon merit, performance, and fair competition.

These statements highlight that while pluralism increases female membership, it is not an entry ticket into leadership bodies.

A fourth category of responses from officials in religious parties also support pluralism, in theory, but among sects within the same religious domination. All these parties do not have plural membership, as mentioned above, but they have a different conception or variant of pluralism. The leader of a post-war Sunni-dominated religious extremist party stresses that his party is plural in that,

The party’s membership is Sunnis and ‘Alawites’. For me, this is the pluralism that attracts women and men. As for tolerance to diversity and openness, I am a Sufi Muslim in ideology and philosophy. I will not differ with anyone who does not differ with me.\textsuperscript{13}

Apparently, this is a different conception of pluralism, which may not reflect tolerance to diversity and openness to dialogue. In practice, pluralism is not relevant to religious parties since these parties are exclusive and closed to single-sect membership, despite their claims otherwise. They are open to other sects once applicants convert and commit to their religious and political platforms. For instance, a female in a religious tolerant party remarks that, “Pluralism in thought and ideology enriches the party in all its forms. Confessional pluralism is okay, but only if it

\textsuperscript{13} ‘Alawites’ are a separate sub-sect within the Sunni sect. But, this clergy being a salafist and religious extremist, he does not consider them as such. There are minor differences in jurisprudence and in religious rituals and practices.
does not contradict the main religious goals of the party.” In this vein, a female official in a pre-war religious extremist party responds that,

Pluralism represents openness, tolerance and enlightenment. These are essential prerequisites for spreading the religious thought and for recruiting other women. Other sects are welcome to join and we are willing to teach them the correct doctrine. This is how we understand pluralism and how we apply it.

These statements reveal a *de jure* support for pluralism but not a *de facto* one. Resorting to a different line of argument on the relevance of pluralism, a senior adviser to the leader of a religious conservative party explains that,

The Party is open to all those who believe in its ideology and are committed to its goals. We are open to all sects, all classes, the poor and rich, and all those who believe in our cause. However, only Shiites and those who believe in our ideology can join the party. The others can join the Saraya of resistance.

Moreover, in laying out the party’s membership rules, the second-top ranking official in Hizbullah, Sheikh Qassem, stresses that,

This does not mean that other groups or individuals would be denied commitment to the objectives and organizational setup of the Party, nor allegiance to its trajectory. This is so given that the participation of some Shi’is in Hizbullah was the result of doctrinal and not confessional allegiance, as many other Party members do not follow the sectarian element – thus rendering the common ground doctrinal as opposed to confessional. (Qassem, 2005: 33)

This declaration of openness to diversity and pluralism is oxymoron, since membership is contingent upon full commitment (including converting) to the tenets of Shi’ism, which in effect closes the main body of the party to Shiites and puts a hold on any claim of pluralism. This is also evidenced in the statement of another senior official who stresses that applicants must be committed to the religious goals of the party in order to be accepted as members. He states that, “There are applicants for membership who have been declined because they did not pass the basic criteria of religious commitment. Those who are interested but are not believers in our religious thought and ideology can always join as supporters to our resistance movement.”
Turning to a similar reasoning, a female official in another Shiite-dominated religious but tolerant party suggests that,

The party has a Shiite majority and leadership. In fact, we had more Christians and Sunnis from the South when Imam Musa El-Sadr founded the Party. This pluralism is lost after the war. Nonetheless, there are no rules that prevent other sects from joining the party, except commitment to our goals and values.

As these statements demonstrate, religious parties view pluralism, in theory and normative terms, as an attribute that they care to project since it improves their image in the public eye. They see pluralism as a mobilization and recruitment tool, especially of women, but not for leadership. This tension between reality and perceptions is reflected in a statement by a female party official in that,

Contrary to public view and common misconceptions, Hizbullah is a democratic party, where we enjoy freedom of expression and contestation. There is pluralism in the party’s resistance wing, Al-Saraya. We also are open and tolerant as evidenced from our alliances with parties of other religious sects (e.g. Christians of Tayyar). This demonstrates our pluralism, openness, and tolerance to diversity.

This begs the question of the meaning and implications of pluralism in a single-sect religious party, which represents a contradiction in terms. In contrast to parties with secular and civil-confessional platforms, the majority of religious parties will acknowledge that pluralism is attractive to women but will argue that it does not matter for their leadership prospects. Indeed, religious parties compensate for their plural-deficient membership via building alliances with parties whose membership is dominated by other religious sects.14 This also serves, however, as evidence that pluralism is considered a welcome attribute even in these parties.

In broad strokes, then, the party officials interviewed are supportive of the proposition that pluralism influences female party membership, although there are mixed views on how this might affect women’s leadership opportunities. More specifically, secular a-religious and civil-

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14 There are currently two major competing political blocs in Lebanon, each of which is composed of various Christian and Muslim factions. Thus, ensuring that at a minimum the coalitions have a pluralist composition.
confessional parties view that pluralism attracts more women to membership, which paves the road for leadership. Officials of these parties provide empirical accounts that pluralism attracts more women to join and assume leadership positions. At the same time, while several religious parties, in principle, support pluralism for membership, they see it as irrelevant for women’s leadership. Some political leaders and female party activists, I must admit, say what they think should be said and what they see as strategic in projecting an acceptable image. In general, party officials from these plural-deficient parties downplayed or even denied the importance of pluralism for membership, given that they are single-sect parties and that the only way that members of different sects will be admitted if they convert, which by itself is oxymoron. The importance given to pluralism by many informants, however, even amongst some in parties with religious platforms, supports my expectation that pluralism attracts women to join parties. The presence of these women is likely to influence their leadership prospects in parties’ decision-making bodies. These findings guide the quantitative research in chapter Six.

In sum, returning to factors theorized to affect women’s leadership, the insights gained from many party officials support the expectation that democratic practices in transfer of leadership and decision-making bear on women’s leadership chances. Parties employing democratic process offer women equal opportunities to compete for all positions, which bode well for their ascendance to leadership. The majority of responses from party leaders and female activists point to the centrality of democratic practices in operating procedures in enhancing women’s chances in leadership. This justifies consideration of democratic practices, as well as pluralism, as potential explanatory factors for women’s leadership in political parties.

These statements reflect the negative influence of conflict on religiosity and pluralism as these factors relate to women’s membership and in turn on their leadership prospects. The
analysis offered by pre-war parties with secular and civil platforms and plural membership supports the assumption that parties’ pluralism is attractive to women and as such influences their leadership prospects. In effect, shrinking pluralism in pre-war parties is attributed to membership shifts to powerful war-origin religious and post-war civil-confessional parties, as shown earlier. All these factors combined to thwart attempts to regain lost pluralism and membership, including of women. That conflict has negative implications on widening religious-based cleavages and heightening extremist tendencies is by no means sui generis to Lebanon. However, this phenomenon appears to bear a negative influence on plural membership of parties. This is evidenced by the mushrooming of confessionally-dominated and single-sect membership parties in the post-war era, which is hypothesized to influence women’s membership and their leadership chances. The following chapter addresses female membership as another potential variable in explaining women’s leadership. The chapter focuses on party variation in mobilization, modalities and mechanisms targeting women and how these influence female membership.
Chapter Five
Female Membership & Party Mobilization

The preceding chapters explore whether party variation in religiosity, democratic procedures in leadership transitions and decision-making, and pluralism in membership could explain variation in female membership and leadership across parties. In these chapters, the views of politicians in Lebanese parties on the role of these factors are solicited and initial evidence of their effect on women’s leadership is drawn. In the early exposition of the theory, I argue that democratic practices and pluralism influence female party membership, which in turn affects women’s leadership. Within this conceptual framework and the understandings gained, I expect that female party membership increases in parties employing democratic procedures and whose membership is plural. However, I do not expect the intensity of religiosity on party platforms to influence female membership. This is premised on the fact that women tend to join parties voluntarily and by choice, motivated by their personal interests and preferences, while their ascendance to leadership is in the hands of party elites. Further, information gleaned indicates that the post-war era saw a new set of parties emerge with a whole new outlook to the role of women in politics. Indeed, elites in post war secular and civil-confessional parties exhibit a more receptive attitude towards women than most pre-war parties. These parties are more traditional, less modern and women-friendly than their counterpart post-war parties. Even some of the religious parties, like Amal, are relatively more receptive to women than pre-war religious extremist parties. However, many post-war parties seek women as members but may not be ‘women-friendly’. Therefore, in general, pre-war parties are less geared to mobilizing and involving women than post-war parties. Therefore, I expect female membership to be higher in post-war than in pre-war parties (H5).

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1 See, chapter One for the hypotheses H2A – H3A and H4 – H5 on female party membership.
This chapter provides data on female party membership in the 18 relevant parties and presents information drawn from the statements of party leaders and female party activists on the subject of membership to see if those statements support my theoretical expectations. Party variation in mobilization strategies is examined from answers of interviewees to questions on the motivations of parties for mobilizing women, and the modalities and mechanisms they employ in this process. The chapter proceeds in three sections. The introductory paragraphs report data on female party membership. Section A examines party variation in motivations for mobilizing women by focusing on (1) public image enhancements, and (2) the special contributions that women make. Section B lays out the modalities that parties employ in targeting women with particular attention to (1) religious mobilization, and (2) in-kind and financial incentives. Section C addresses the effectiveness of special women’s wings in (1) recruiting women and increasing their share in party membership; (2) creating a critical mass of women for leadership; and (3) amassing women’s votes for elections. Finally, this chapter explores the likely effect of female membership on women’s leadership, studying particularly the role of women’s wings as a mechanism for marginalizing women in political parties.

Female party membership is presented graphically in charts 5.1 to 5.9 (next pages). Chart 5.1 shows that, on average, the share of female membership in post-war parties is higher than in pre-war parties, as hypothesized (H5). A difference of means test is significant across pre-war and war/post-war parties (17.2 compared to 34.8, respectively). Given that there is a small number of relevant parties (n=18), the five relevant religious parties (extremist, conservative, and tolerant) are collapsed into one religious group in charts 5.3 (see, table 3.1 in chapter Three and Annex 6.1 in chapter Six on coding party-level variables.

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Data on female membership are obtained from party administrators and elites in the 18 relevant parties based on a questionnaire (see, Annex 1 to dissertation). In addition, manual compilation from registers of parties was undertaken in the case of pre-war parties, which do not maintain computerized databases.
Chart 5.2 shows that, female membership is highest in the war-origin conservative but not extremist religious party. Chart 5.3 shows that, on average, the share of women in membership of the group of religious parties is higher than it is in civil-confessional and secular parties. This is also confirmed in chart 5.4 which looks at these variations by party-age. Among the pre-war parties, average female membership is higher in religious extremist parties than in other categories. There are no conservative and tolerant parties in the pre-war period. Amongst the war and post-war parties, Hizbullah, the only conservative religious party, has the highest membership, followed by the group of post-war civil-confessional parties. In chart 5.5, average female membership in slightly higher in post-war civil-confessional parties than in war and post-war religious parties, as a group. Data on individual parties’
female membership reveal that most religious parties, both those established prior to the civil war and those afterwards, have high levels of female membership as chart 5.6 shows.

However, female membership is highest in Tayyar (51%) followed closely by Marada and Hizbullah (50%): two civil-confessional parties (Tayyar and Marada), and a conservative but not extremist religious party (Hizbullah). This is despite the fact that these parties have low (4) as well as high (2) scores on religiosity; and two parties are marked by plural and democratic deficits. Further, female membership is higher in Shiite-dominated than in Sunni-dominated religious parties, an observation that requires further examination. Large female membership in religious parties is a common

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3 Party ID codes are: Communists (1), Syrian Social (2), Phalanges (3), National Bloc (4), Baath (5), Progressive Socialist (6), Liberals (7), Islamic Group (8), Hope (9), Unitarian (10), Hizbullah (11), Wa’ad (12), Renewal (13), Tayyar (14), Forces (15), Islamic Action (16), Future (17), and Giants (18)
phenomenon observed by several scholars studying these parties in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and India, as well as in Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, among others.4

Charts 5.7 and 5.8 show that, on average, female membership is highest in parties marked by deficits in democracy and pluralism.5 Parties that are democratic on both indicators, leadership transitions and decision-making, have significantly smaller average share of female membership than other parties. Further, the difference in means for pluralism on female membership shows that it is not significant (28.2 for single-sect parties and 24.9 for multi-religious membership parties). Moreover, female membership is higher in parties with higher religiosity and deficits in democratic practices and pluralism as well as those with lower religiosity but employ democratic process in decision-making and have plural membership than other parties (see, Chart 5.9).

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5 Parties are coded ‘2’ when they employ democratic practices in leadership transitions and in decision-making. They are assigned ‘1’ when they employ one of these two indicators; and ‘0’ when they are not democratic in both indicators. Parties that have plural membership are assigned ‘1’ and those that are not plural are assigned ‘0’.
These initial results are not consistent with the hypotheses H2A and H3A. In order to explain these unanticipated results, additional information will be sought from party officials and given in the following sections.

A. Motivations: Pre-war & post-war parties

Total membership, including women, in pre-war secular a-religious parties dwindled and their pluralism shrank in the aftermath of the civil war. Widening religious cleavages in the post-war era split the population into separate enclaves and isolated islands of different religious communities.\(^6\) This is reflected in memberships shifting from weakened pre-war secular parties to stronger and/or affluent war-origin religious conservative (Hizbullah) and tolerant (Amal) parties. Many women, especially the poor and deprived, turned to religion and took refuge in parties of their own sects. This provides a partial explanation for the lower female membership in pre-war secular parties compared to war and post-war religious parties.\(^7\)

On the supply side of female party membership, information gathered from female party activists, shows that women are motivated to join parties for a plethora of different reasons. Women join secular leftist parties owing to ideology, pluralism, democratic practices, family affiliations, community allegiance, women’s rights and social equity issues, as well as the charisma of leadership. They join civil-confessional parties because they are politically driven by national sovereignty, existentialism, and preservation of their confessional identities, whether Muslim or Christian. In these parties, women have political ambitions and are assertive in demanding leadership positions. In contrast, women, especially the poor and deprived, join religious parties because of their faith and

\(^6\) Until 1990, Beirut was split into East for Christians and West for Muslims, as well as the rest of the country, which restricted mobility of citizens for fear of assassinations on the basis of religious identity.

\(^7\) Since pre-war secular parties did not maintain records of party membership in the pre-war period, it will be difficult to confirm whether they had higher female membership before the civil war. As mentioned earlier, this was prior to the age of computerized databases. Also, party membership was kept confidential for security purposes, and women’s party membership, as interviewees note, was not socially accepted.
religious convictions. Therefore, a different class of women is seen in religious than in secular and civil-confessional parties. In the latter, women tend to be more educated and politically mature. Moreover, women in religious parties articulate minimal interest in politics per se, while conceding that it is a man’s turf and that the society is not yet ready for women in leadership! To demonstrate this, a female in a religious party cites that, ”I lived in a poor and deprived area in the South. I joined the party because religion is the solution, the key to justice and fairness. It held promise of change to improve the quality of our lives as the marginalized and oppressed poor in the South.”

However, on the demand side of the equation, parties mobilize women in order to face competition, avoid risk of loss in elections or extinction, and ensure party stability and strength (measured by the number of parliamentary seats). Mobilization themes in Lebanon shift in response to political events, particularly a watershed like the civil war. In the pre-war era, ideological mobilization prevailed and was effective. Several pre-war parties adopted imported leftist, secular and egalitarian ideologies premised on Marxism, communism, socialism and Arab adaptations thereof (viz., Ba’athism, Nasserism, and Arab Nationalism). Most of these parties address women’s issues especially emancipation and acquisition of full rights. This attracts women to join these parties, as several older generation of female activists point out: “[I] joined this party in the early 1960s. I was attracted to the party’s leftist ideology and democratic stance, especially its egalitarian goals which include women’s liberalization and equality with men. The party was a mix of all religions not like now.” Another female official cites, “[I] joined the party after attending several lectures in the party on Marx and Engels. I embraced leftist ideologies and their egalitarian principles and values, especially women’s rights.” Also, an old timer states that, “The party represented all my dreams of

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8 This phenomenon is also reflected in scholarly observations that, “… more vulnerable social sectors within any given society, such as the poor, the elderly, those with lower education and literacy, and women, will be more religious…” (Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 29).
eliminating discrimination against women and poverty. I felt deeply about these issues and the party addressed them.”

During the civil war, militarized parties were preoccupied with resistance but also their survival as specific confessional communities. Parties mobilized women to provide social and relief services. In the post-war era, these existential themes are re-enforced by widening religious cleavages, building a civil state, and maintaining national sovereignty in the face of prolonged Syrian sponsorship (until 2005) and ongoing threats from neighbouring Israel. Parties wanted to establish a strong foothold in their local communities by expanding membership into untapped and marginalized groups. Women provided that special niche. Several interviewees highlight that parties also mobilize women to enhance the parties’ public image and for the special contributions that women make. These two motivations are addressed in the next paragraphs.

1. Women enhance public image

Parties mobilize women to expand membership but also to enhance their public image, as several party officials stress. This enhances the parties’ marketability and competitiveness, thereby increasing voter turnout, the ultimate goal of electorally competitive parties. As a female MP from a post-war civil-confessional party remarks,

Parties are aware that women’s presence improves their public image and their electoral success. Women are also aware that parties use them as bait for recruiting other women. Parties often use rhetoric in their public speeches, like claiming that women’s rights are on their agenda. This is merely window-dressing for public consumption. They need women.

In this context, scholars refer to three strategies that parties use to demonstrate their responsiveness to female representation, namely, rhetorical, affirmative action and positive discrimination strategies (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993:8). However, the use of this rhetoric does not go unnoticed by the media or political observers. A case in point is that in the process of consultations to form a new 30-member cabinet in 2009, some post-war parties proposed four women. A female journalist questions
whether these parties are serious in empowering women or this is a ploy and ‘strategic maneuvering’ to gain more female supporters? 9 This cogent criticism fell on deaf ears, since only two women are in the 2009 cabinet, one of them without a portfolio. However, the flip side is that this demonstrates that parties realize that women’s presence, even symbolically, is welcome and useful as a tool to fight competition. In this respect, scholars also find that parties in Canada and the USA ceased to be inherently opposed to women and even to ‘feminism’ “…when they saw the potential for electoral benefits.” Young describes this pattern of parties’ responsiveness as “co-optation … in an effort to mask or soften the party’s stance on these issues.”(Lisa Young, 2000: 26). This is basically using women to improve parties’ public image and amass votes. For instance, parties with religious platforms frequently organize large conventions and gatherings in which women have huge presence. These events receive wide national, regional and international multi-media coverage. Only religious parties employ such tactics, which may indicate that the use of women in these fora is part of a rhetorical campaign even though the party does not hold a deep-seated commitment to advancing women. 10 These contradictory but intriguing impressions prompted posing the question “Does the presence of women improve the party’s image?” to solicit the views of party leaders and female party activists in this regard.

Some leaders in religious parties deny that they target women for public image enhancements, while others stress that by showing-off that there are many women in their parties they are sending a message to the West that Islam advances women. However, in either case, women are considered a ‘symbol of the modern’ and as such their presence brings in added value to the party. For instance, the leader of a pre-war religious extremist party remarks defensively that,

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9 As.Safir, September 9, 2009 (Arabic daily)

10 See chapter Three for evidence that several leaders and elites are ‘anti-women-as-leaders’ and are less likely to advance them to leadership on religious and patriarchal grounds.
Gender equality is a Western-oriented and politically motivated concept. After 9/11, they started linking the situation of women to Islam and to Islamist parties. In fact, we invite women to attend these conventions to raise their political awareness. This has nothing to do with improving our image in the media. We really do not need women to do that for us!

Similarly, the leader of a war-origin religious extremist party shows his dismay in that this is a “western” concept and that religious parties do not ‘use’ women for political motivations. He stresses that as full-fledged party members, women attend these conventions.11

Examining responses of female officials in religious parties provides insight and a more nuanced perspective than that offered by party leaders.12 A female official who heads public relations in a war-origin religious tolerant party responds that,

This is true. Women attract more women to join and improve the image of the party. However, the huge presence of women in these conventions is also a message to the West that Islam is not an obstacle to women’s political activism. In effect, we sent a strong message via the international media when veiled women sat side by side with men in the demonstration tents, which closed downtown Beirut for nine-months during 2006-2007. The media was intrigued by the overwhelming presence of women.

Such statements highlight the keen interest of these parties on improving their image nationally and internationally, albeit for different reasons. At the international level, they aim to correct misperceptions about linking Islam to the status of women. At the national level, their main concern is recruiting more women to ensure higher voter turnout. In this context, the former head of women’s wing in the party elaborates that,

Religious parties use women to improve their image, but also take special measures to attract them. They transport them in large numbers to sites of congregations and public conventions from the South to Dahiyeh in Beirut. They arrange for women to appear on TV talk shows to demonstrate that the party is modern and tolerant. They delegate them to represent them in meetings. This is a powerful and effective marketing tool. But this is also window-dressing.

11 Similar reactions by the clerics on western concepts are common as Basu observes in Bangladesh that, “…, there has been the growth of organizations of Muslim clerics … that have attacked what they deem to be Westernized …” (Basu, 2005: 35).

12 As discussed in chapter Two, females interviewed were referred by party leaders and/or party elites. These were selected because they are in leadership positions or in senior levels. In general, these female activists hold first level university degrees and are professionals, or business and career women of high socio-economic profile. These women are a representative sample of a critical mass of women for leadership in Lebanon.
In this vein, the head of the women’s wing in a post-war religious extremist party explains that,

The huge presence of women in conventions improves the party’s image. The party is killing two birds with one stone: improving its electoral chances and sending a message to the West, that the party is modern, open-minded and tolerant. In effect, women are summoned to these conventions. I wonder, if transportation were not ensured, will there such huge presence?

As one may surmise, this female party official is critical of these parties’ behaviour and cautions that women’s presence might not hold if transportation were not offered. Nonetheless, she is justifying it in terms of countering western stereotypes. Some party officials also justify this behaviour in terms of women’s empowerment for the public good. A female activist in a post-war civil-confessional party sees that,

It is true that these parties ensure women’s huge presence in these conventions, because this improves their image. However, they are keen on transmitting to the West that the party is building women’s capabilities and politically empowering them. The positive side is that the leader recognizes that by empowering women, he is elevating the whole community. Maybe this is why women are committed to this party.

Thus, explanations along this line are shared by female activists in secular and civil-confessional parties that are staunch allies of religious parties, which highlight that being in a political coalition might color party officials’ views for strategic reasons. Similarly, the head of the women’s wing in a pre-war secular a-religious party also justifies the actions of their powerful allies in that,

The huge presence of women in popular conventions improves the parties’ marketability, because it projects a modern and tolerant image. This is also a message to the West that Muslim women are not confined to their homes and are politically involved. This exposure has raised women’s political awareness, but has not yet empowered them.

Hence, several female interviewees offer strategically and politically informed explanations, while others conceive of these public declarations of women’s empowerment as rhetoric and strategic maneuvers for elections. Nonetheless, the fact that women are placed in public display is an indication that these religious parties recognize that women’s presence and visibility are valuable for enhancing their image and for voter turnout.
Paradoxically, however, a female head of the media sector in a post-war civil-confessional party argues that the overwhelming presence of women in these conventions may produce unintended consequences. She explains that, “Instead of appreciating the huge participation of women in these conventions, the international media looks at them as a mockery and theatrically staged by religious parties to convey a false message to the West about the parties’ inclusiveness and tolerance.” Another female activist in a pre-war civil-confessional party also observes that, “Definitely, women sitting in the front rows project a better image for any party. But, segregation in religious parties’ conventions makes women stand out. They are especially conspicuous in their black chadors. I am not sure this projects a good image.”

Other party officials generalize that women’s presence at any level would, by necessity, improve the image of all parties, religious or secular or civil-confessional. A female activist in a post-war secular party maintains that all and not only religious parties use women for ‘window-dressing’ whenever it is in their interest to do so:

Many parties consider the presence of women an indicator of modernity and openness. They delegate women, invite them to public gatherings, and nominate them for local councils. Women increase parties’ visibility and up their marketability in elections. But, what are parties offering women in return? This is window-dressing at little cost, without formal commitment. Sure, women are an added value to parties.

In this vein, a female activist in a pre-war civil-confessional party with progressive socialist orientations also observes that, “Indeed, all parties use women for window dressing and projecting a liberal, tolerant and modern image. In reality, however, none of these parties is committed to gender equality.” Even when the allegations are denied, the impact on the media cannot be disregarded or dismissed. Parties recognize that women’s presence carries weight. This motivates parties target women in their mobilization strategies.

2. Women’s special contributions to parties
Parties also target women because of the special contributions they make. In this respect, the leader of a post-war religious extremist party remarks that, in addition to their central role as mothers, daughters, sisters and wives, “Women may be more committed religiously than men. They are also more dependable and less corruptible. We have observed this fact over the years.” This statement is testimony that religious parties see that women have value added but in their social not political contributions to the party.

Leaders and elites in secular and post-war civil-confessional parties also point to women’s special contributions, as a party leader notes that, “Women bring into the party a new perspective and a breath of fresh hope for peace in the country.” Similarly, another senior official responds that, “Women bring into the party dynamisms that men do not possess. They are more serious, committed, and more effective in serving society.” Another leader states that, “Women bring a new perspective into politics. They are sharp and skilled negotiators, patient, less aggressive and confrontational than men. They are an asset.” The leader of a post-war civil-confessional party flags other contributions:

Women are less corrupt, more driven and committed than men. Men work in return for material reward, and when they don’t get it, they leave the party. Women are willing to work towards achieving the goals irrespective of rewards. Women work harder to stand up to the challenge and expectations.

Similar testimonies of women’s special contributions are offered by leaders and party elites in post-war secular and civil-confessional parties. These views essentialize women and go against the grain of the gender paradigm in that gender roles are socially constructed and dynamic. Nevertheless, these are corroborated by scholarly findings as a party elite points out that, “Studies have shown that women’s corruptibility is much less than that of men. Women’s role is central to the performance of the party!” Corruption is an evil that should be avoided in all institutions and if
women are less corruptible than men, then this is an asset. Others also indicate that women are also skilled in fund-raising, organizing social events and providing social and welfare services.

Several party elites recognize the valuable contributions that women bring into party politics, including patience, tolerance, dialogue, negotiation skills, drive and dedication. These statements reflect that parties gain from women’s presence. In fact, this links to statements about empowering women for the public good, cited earlier. Women share these views as a female activist in a post-war secular party flags that, “It is in the interest of the party and the nation to have women on board. The society is missing out if women are not politically involved. Women are an added value to the functioning of political parties.” These are supported by the findings of scholarly research. From economists’ vantage point, parties and politicians will seek women out when they realize that it is in their interest to do so, especially when women’s contributions to the economy become substantial. (Frances Rosenbluth, Rob Salmond and Michael F. Thies, 2006: 165-189). Of course, this is contingent upon women being given equal opportunity in party politics but also given an equal opportunity to choose.

3. Interpretations & partial explanations of variation in female party membership

The “raison d’être” of militarized parties in defending their confessional constituencies ceased to exist at the end of the civil war in 1990. Widening religious cleavages heightened confessionalism, reduced pluralism, reshuffled party memberships, and limited outreach. This triggered the need for

The issue of women and corruption has received attention from many scholars (Elin Bjaarnegard 2008, and Rohini Pande and Alexandra Cirone 2009, among others). There are also studies carried out by international organizations on the Grameen Bank, which was established in Bangladesh by the Nobel Prize laureate, Mohamad Yunis, showing that 95 percent of poor women who received micro-credit loans repaid them. These studies support the claim that women are less corruptible than men; although there is a risk that this essentializes both, women and men. More on women and corruption can be seen in the Epilogue.

These views tally with the scholarly findings that, “…, the social marginalization of women may remove distinctive voices and influences from politics. Some political psychologists have found that women are superior to men in some aspects of building consensus. (Fish, 2002: 30-31)
parties to search for new electoral niches among marginalized groups and untapped strata within given confessional and religious communities. Women offered this special niche and were a perfect target. It is a common mobilization strategy among parties—to look for new electoral niches—as scholars observe:

Parties use a number of strategies to reduce the risk of a negative electoral development, ending in organizational extinction. Parties search for electoral niches at a certain level of electoral support. … Political parties try to identify key groups on whose continuous support they hope to rely (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1966). These core groups often have special social characteristics defining the social niche of the party. … Parties propose measures that could attract marginal voters … (Lane & Ersson, 1987; p. 96).

More precisely, the post-war period saw memberships shift from pre-war secular leftist to war-origin religious conservative and tolerant parties, especially to Hizbullah and Amal. Pre-war parties exerted concerted efforts to regain their membership and pluralism, by mapping local and remote areas and also targeting women. Recruiting campaigns by many parties were undertaken to reach out to different communities. In this context, a female official in a post-war civil-confessional Muslim-dominated party cites that, “The party leader strategized to expand plural membership by targeting women. He dispatched Christians to Christian-majority regions. Being a Christian and in leadership position in a Muslim-dominated party encouraged other Christian women to join. This had a domino effect on their family members as well.” These factors increased competition among parties, especially since they are targeting the same group, women. Similar strategies targeting women in different religious communities to expand plural membership were undertaken by other parties. For instance, the head of a women’s wing in pre-war secular party describes that, “After the war, my main task was to recruit more women from different sects to fight extremism and sectarianism. I dispatched Christians and Muslims to their respective communities and vice-versa in a

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15 The Lebanese Resistance Front, which fought along the borders during the civil war, was composed of most secular and leftist parties with plural membership, including the Syrian Social, Progressive Socialist, Communist and Ba’ath parties.
heuristic attempt to regain pluralism. This always attracts women.” In the first case, a Christian to a Christian community demonstrates openness and tolerance of a Muslim-dominated party. In the second strategy, a Christian to a Muslim region or vice-versa is evidence that the party is still plural, despite heightened confessionalism. However, the data show that the former strategy was more successful than the latter. Thus, while pre-war secular parties employ leftist mobilization ideologies in recruitment, this had mixed results in the face of entrenched and widening religious cleavages and fierce competition. Female membership dwindled and shrunk in the post-war era and is much lower than in other parties (see charts 5.1 to 5.9). In addition, an important factor is that the more powerful and affluent post-war parties -- besides employing ideological or religious mobilization—offer other incentives to attract women, some of which are discussed in the following sections.

In sum, this section has given special attention to the electoral advantages of public image enhancements, and the special contributions that women make, which motivate parties to target women in their mobilization strategies. All parties found in women a special electoral niche and targeted them in their mobilization strategies. This increased competition translated into higher female membership in post-war parties, as hypothesized (H5). War-origin and post-war religious parties target women to enhance their public image but also employ other mobilization modalities. These modalities increase female membership as evidenced by the presence of women at the grassroots and in popular conventions. Examining party motivations for targeting women provides rich information and insight into probable explanations for variations in female membership across parties. These findings show that, on average, the lowest shares of female membership in secular a-religious parties despite their plural membership and democratic practices, and the highest shares in religious parties with plural and democratic deficits. These results are not consistent with the hypotheses H2A and H3A, that pluralism and democratic practices enhance female party
membership. Women’s use for public image enhancements and their special contributions provide partial explanation of variations in female party membership. The following section sheds light on additional explanations.

B. Modalities: Religious Mobilization, In-Kind & Financial Incentives

Statements by female party officials on motivations for joining parties reveal that ideological (viz., parties with secular and leftist platforms) and religious mobilization (parties with religious platforms), are employed to attract women. As shown above, ideological mobilization employed by pre-war secular a-religious parties brought limited success, while religious mobilization brought huge female membership. In this section, information is sought on modalities, tools and tactics that various parties employ in targeting women. These might explain observed variations in outcome and justify why some of my expectations, particularly the influence of pluralism and democratic practices on women’s membership are not borne out. Thus, the question, “What are the modalities and tactics that parties employ in mobilizing women?” is posed to party leaders and female party activists to gather information in this respect. First, religious mobilization tools and tactics employed by religious parties are addressed. Then, in-kind and financial incentives offered by affluent parties are examined.

1. Religious mobilization, tactics and tools

In the post-war era, religious mobilization gained momentum and attracted more people to join parties with religious platforms than ideological mobilization did for secular and leftist parties, as responses of party officials reveal. Other researchers studying Lebanon also observe that, “…religion emerged as a mobilizing factor for Lebanese Shi’is in response to the failures of the left, the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the Israeli invasions and occupation of Lebanon.” (Deeb, 2006:6). Similar findings on religiously pluralist systems, like Lebanon and Israel, point out that, “With the State offering no secular support for women …, women’s dominant avenue … to
participation in the state apparatus often becomes dependent upon their association with or adherence to religious values and norms.” (Bouhamdan, 2009: 19). In these settings, more women tend to join religious parties.

Indeed, religious mobilization is powerful and most effective in recruiting women, as evidenced by their sizeable shares in religious parties. This is especially depicted in the conservative religious party, Hizbullah, which boasts a membership that is 50 percent female. As discussed earlier, in the wake of the civil war atrocities, many women, including the poor, turned to religion. They joined religious parties seeking spiritual support and refuge in religion, as a female official observes that, “Religious mobilization is attracting young women, because of the violence they have seen in wars. They find that their salvation lies in religion. Spiritual and moral incentives are paramount to material and financial incentives.” 16 Another female official in a religious conservative party highlights that the secret of the effectiveness of these religious mobilization tools lies in that often women are more religious than men and under difficult situations turn to religion as the solution. 17 She adds that, “Religious mobilization attracts women to these parties because religion promises women better life and reward in the afterlife. This is why we see huge presence of women at the grassroots.” Thus, religious mobilization attracts more women because they tend to be more religious than men. This is corroborated by scholarly findings that, “… religion is a more salient independent variable among women than among men, apparently because women are more religious and are thus more likely to be influenced by the teachings of their religion, as they understand it.” (Tessler, 2002:8). Indeed, when women join parties with religious platforms they tend to be more conservative

16 Other researchers have shown that “… men hold attitudes that are more conducive to authoritarianism. …, that men have a stronger “social dominance” orientation than women; women are generally less comfortable with hierarchy and inequality… women tend to be more averse to extremism and violence in politics.” (Fish, 2002: 30-31)

17 Tessler also finds that, “In all probability, women are discontent with the socioeconomic status quo, more so than men, and thus favor policies guided by the values they associate with Islam …” (2002: 8).
and traditional than men (see, also Tessler, 2002: 4). Testimonies by several female officials in religious extremist and conservative parties corroborate this view, as well as those from other parties. In this context, a female party activist from a secular party observes that,

During the war, we used ideological mobilization and publicized our political platform via fact-finding missions, disseminating information, writing flyers and distributing them door-to-door and even car-to-car. After the war, we are fighting growing extremism and confessionalism by targeting the youth and women. Imagine, young women who wore bathing suits before the war are now wearing veils and chadors. Society is transformed. This may explain women’s massive presence at the grassroots in many religious parties. In this sense, religious leaders, doubling as party leaders, are in a position to provide not only spiritual, moral and religious support but also more control over the social and political lives of their followers, especially women. In this connection, Kandiyoti also argues that,

…it is no accident that Zia ul-Haq’s “Islamisation” package took women as its prime target. Establishing Islamic credentials through retrogressive legislation primarily affecting women was a logical step in a context where the control of women and their appropriate conduct had long been used to demarcate the identity and boundaries of the Muslim community. (Kandiyoti, 1991: 6)

The above sheds light on the rush of women into political parties with religious platforms. Turning to religion as the solution to violence, class and poverty problems is not surprising especially when the state does not provide and when religious authorities or groups take on board social welfare and serve as social safety nets. Indeed, women join religious parties as a recluse. However, this is sustained via various tools and incentives that religious parties offer to feed the soul and body. When these elements are combined, one finds an influx of supporters, especially women, in parties with religious platforms that are not found in secular a-religious parties. In my view, this is a necessary but not sufficient condition for justifying the huge share of women in party membership, especially that there is also sizeable levels of women in membership of post-war civil-confessional parties.
However, the justification that a female MP representing a post-war civil-confessional party offers may be plausible in that, “In practice, religious parties are smart because they employ traditional tools in a resourceful and creative manner to mobilize more women.” One of these tools is providing religious guidance and counseling to women by women. Until only recently, religious counseling and advocacy was done by men. Therefore, this is a new task entrusted to women. A female in a pre-war religious extremist party describes that, “Before the war, only men were religious preachers. After the war, women are also carrying this missionary torch to recruit Muslim women and guide them to piety; but, also to convert Christian women to Islam. This is what the Christian missionaries did in Lebanon.”

Religious counseling is extensively used by most religious parties. It is offered by women who are religious scholars and well versed in jurisprudence, with explicit missionary but also mobilization goals. They are dispatched by party leaders to teach the Shari’a during social events organized by women at their homes, in parties’ headquarters and branches, or in special spaces allocated for women in mosques. When asked whether there are any statistics on female counselors, and whether the contents of religious lectures are cleared beforehand, a leader of a pre-war religious extremist party responds that, “We do not have any statistics on the number of female counselors but they are numerous in the Islamic movement. They double as recruitment officers and guide other women to join the right path.” He adds, however, that the party does not clear the contents of these lectures but Dar-El-Fatwa does.\footnote{Dar-El-Fatwa is the official government body entrusted with Shari’a interpretations and administers the religious courts for Muslim Sunnis.} A female counselor asserts that, “No one clears these lectures. Dar-El-Fatwa guides us and provides the topics we should discuss. There is an Arab network of religious counselors to exchange lectures and to disseminate them. Sometimes, they are aired on Arab satellites.” These religious counseling tools are supported by the state, since some of these guidance
counselors are on Dar-El-Fatwa payroll, as party leaders and female counselors report. The post-war period saw more women attending these events, as a female counselor reports:

[I] started giving religious lessons to women on a voluntary basis and without any financial remuneration, first at homes of family, friends and neighbors. As their number increased, the party convinced the Sheikh to allocate special spaces in mosques not only for praying but also for giving these counseling sessions. Thus, special space, specific times, entrance and exit for women were assigned. But, even the space in mosques became small since more women showed up. Then, the party rented out special conference halls.

In this connection, the head of a women’s wing in a post-war religious extremist party highlights that, “The party relies heavily on religious counselors as recruitment agents, because this has a ripple effect on their husbands and families, friends and neighbors. In fact, religious advocacy has effectively increased female party membership.”

These testimonies indicate that religious counseling proved to be an effective tool for enhancing female membership in most religious parties. Another tool, which the religious counselors mentioned is allocating special areas for women to pray in mosques. Several female interviewees report that in the post-war period, women complained to leaders of Sunni-dominated parties that they wish to pray in mosques on Fridays or during Ramadan, as women do in Shiite mosques. This practice is not common for women but it is also not prohibited, since in the Pilgrimage to Mecca women and men walk and pray side by side. In their view, this is discriminatory and limits them from fully practicing their religious rituals. The leaders skillfully negotiated with official government clerics (Muftis, Imams and Sheikhs) to allocate special spaces for women to pray in mosques. This raised criticism in conservative communities, as a party leader of a religious extremist party remarks that, “Allocating special areas for women to pray in mosques is a “Bid’ah” in Islam. Women should pray in their homes and not in mosques with men.”¹⁹ Thus, by accommodating women’s requests, party leaders provided additional incentives for women to join parties. They demonstrated that the

¹⁹ ‘Bid’ah’ in Islam refers to aberration from the doctrine or heresy.
party is resourceful in finding solutions and attending to their concerns. In a sense, this co-optation brought favorable results.

Another tool that religious parties employ in recruiting women is match-making, which is spearheaded by women’s wings in emulating similar programs run via the Internet. The head of the women’s wing in a post-war religious extremist party describes this process: “We search for pious women and match them with party officials. As an incentive to the males, the party covers wedding and post-wedding expenses. This attracts more women to join the party and is particularly effective among poor, single and widowed women.” There are other forms of popular forms besides match-making advocated by parties besides the traditional one, like the ‘Urfi’ and ’Misyar’ marriages. These arrangements are convenient in periods of war and conflict and attract widows and older single women. Hence, these women end up joining religious parties that offer such options and services. This may provide additional explanation for the higher shares of female membership in some parties with extensive religious platforms.

Thus, allocating special areas in mosques, providing religious counseling and match-making find fertile grounds amongst women as recruitment tactics and tools. Such needs-based enticements demonstrate how religious parties are employing traditional tools in a resourceful and creative manner to attract women. These findings explain why, on average, the level of female membership in

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20 This is common in Arab countries (e.g. Egypt, the UAE, Tunisia), where NGOs are especially set-up for match-making.

21 ‘Urfi’ (‘Muta’h’ or pleasure) marriage is one without an official contract. Couples just repeat their vows in the presence of two witnesses and sign a contract in duplicate. This absolves the man from legal financial responsibilities in case of separation or if there are kids. This is not recognized by Shari’a laws. This may be of a fixed or prolonged duration. ‘Misyar’ is a traveler’s marriage, which is popular in the rich Gulf countries. It is officially recognized to sanction extra-marital sexual relations. Both partners give up their rights willingly and continue to live separately. Therefore, it is temporary and may be dissolved at any time without any obligations like alimony or other conditions. Urfi marriage is more common amongst the Shiites and Misyar amongst the conservative Sunnis. Urfi marriage is close to a ‘common law’ marriage in the west.
religious parties is sizeable. Indeed, this phenomenon is common in religious parties of other countries, as the findings of several scholars show.  

22

2. In-kind and financial incentives

Various tools are also employed by parties in the post-war era in comparison with the war period. These are succinctly summarized by a female activist in a war-origin religious tolerant party:

During the civil war, patriotism and resistance attracted women to join warring parties. However, parties also offered in-kind and financial incentives in terms of clientilistic favors such as employment and job placements, and provision of health, social and educational services; but, also money enticing women to veil. In the post-war period, new tactics emerged targeting university students and especially women. However, our party faced severe competition in attracting women to join, especially from Hizbullah. They are affluent, use modern tools and offer financial incentives to lure women.

The issue of ‘money for veiling’ will be investigated later in this section. The respondent, however, indicates that religious affluent parties also resort to in-kind and financial incentives in order to attract women. However, these incentives are offered by all affluent parties, as a former female minister stresses that, “Motivated by clientilistic, ideological and electoral purposes, not only religious parties but all rich parties employ financial incentives to attract members, including women who are easy targets when poor.” She adds that, “In-kind and financial incentives come in a package, which includes monthly allowances, provision of educational, social and health services, employment, and even low-cost housing facilities.” The importance of these incentives cannot be underestimated because they are offered directly to women. In this regard, a female activist in a civil-confessional party remarks that, “Ideology and religious conviction combined with financial incentives are powerful tools to attract women, especially the poor and deprived. In Hizbullah, for instance, males go to the resistance front, while women are given all sorts of compensations including financial

security for the husband when he returns from combat.” A female activist in a pre-war a-religious secular party describes that,

In the 1980s, resistance mobilized us into the party. After the war, our party became too traditional, lost clout, outreach and membership to more affluent parties like Hizbullah. Such parties not only employ religious mobilization, but combine this with other incentives that our party cannot match like jobs, social, health, education, and housing services to attract new members. They even give women monthly allowances if they wear the veil.

Again, this statement refers to ‘money for veiling’ as one of the effective financial tools offered by religious parties. This is examined in the following paragraphs after addressing in-kind incentives.

(a) *In-kind incentives*

Affluent post-war civil-confessional parties employ in-kind incentives to attract young men and women. For instance, one of these parties established a scholarship fund for higher education of all Lebanese young men and women, without discrimination on the basis of sect or gender. This created a wide base of highly educated youth who later joined the party. Such long-term needs-based mobilization tools are smart and pro-active, but have a lagged effect. Affluent parties also offer short-term in-kind incentives with immediate effects, including provision of social services, setting-up educational and health facilities and mobile infirmaries with fully equipped dispensaries to cater to all citizens without discrimination on the basis of sect, gender or region. In addition, as a female activist in a post-war civil-confessional party reports that, “Affluent parties distribute staple food items such as oil, wheat, sugar and rice, and clothing; build low-cost housing complexes, and offer employment opportunities, targeting the poor and deprived.” One wonders what makes such tools effective in Lebanon.

The impact of the civil war and the Arab-Israeli regional conflict on Lebanon together with the adverse effects of globalization has increased poverty, especially among women. The number of

23 This benefited some 300,000 young men and women from all religious affiliations. However, distribution of fellowships by sex and sect are not available.
female headed households has more than tripled in Lebanon after the war (UN-ESCWA, 2006). These females are the poorest of the poor in the population, what is referred to as the “feminization of poverty” syndrome in post-conflict areas. Poor women are the main beneficiaries from food staples, social and health-care services and other in-kind incentives. Indeed, these poor women become vehement supporters of their benevolent providers. Moreover, such in-kind incentives fill in the vacuum left by the state for not providing a safety net. In this context, a female MP who is also a minister observes that,” Parties fill in the vacuum left by the state by providing such services, which guarantees their votes.”

In contrast, responses of officials from pre-war parties show that they tend to use traditional tools and techniques; while post-war parties employ more modern, state-of-the art tools. They show more resourcefulness in targeting women. These include, inter alia, nationwide recruitment fairs and public gatherings, town-hall meetings, recruitment drives at universities and women’s dormitories, and women’s non-governmental organizations (NGOs); as well as vast use of all forms of multimedia communications including the internet, web sites and blogs, newspapers, audio-visual broadcasting, pamphlets, and dissemination of door-to-door flyers. These tools have succeeded in securing higher female membership in post-war parties, while pre-war secular and civil-confessional parties have lagged behind, as charts 5.1 to 5.9 show.

(b) Financial incentives: Money for veiling

Statements by interviewees also show that in-kind and financial incentives are extensively used by affluent parties. Other financial incentives to ensure electoral success include vote-buying as a female MP candidate points that, “In 2009 elections, women constituted 61 percent of voter turnout. This is why mobilizing women using any means at parties’ disposal including financial incentives and vote-buying becomes very important. Women make a difference in elections.” Thus, under
conditions of fierce competition, in-kind and financial incentives, including ‘money for veiling’ or vote-buying, can attract women to join particular parties. Further, the statement of a female minister reveals that such incentives are most effective in conflict-stricken Lebanon, with widening class cleavages and increasing poverty especially among women. She stresses that, “Financial incentives are part of a package of social and educational services to needy people including women. What is unique, however, is that this is contingent upon women veiling, which explains the phenomenon of veiled women in the post-war era.” Thus, poverty hits women in conflicts and wars, which in turn makes them more religious, as discussed earlier, and of which religious parties take double advantage. However, while concurring with the other statements, the head of women’s NGO in a pre-war secular party cautions that, “Poverty and deprivation force women to accept money for veiling, job placements and basic services to ensure their families’ livelihood. However, I am afraid that the minute the flow of money stops, women will unveil and recipients will revolt against their donors.” She is being cynical but cautions that women will unveil when the flow of funds stop, based on precedence and especially unfortunate events in 2007.  

Several female officials in extremist and conservative religious parties stress that spiritual gains are paramount to material gains and that they joined these parties for the public good not for personal gains. These statements also point to an ethical controversy in parties’ use of in-kind and financial incentives to lure women to join these parties. This issue is more contentious and acute in the case of ‘money for veiling’. This may explain the surge of veiled women in the post-war period,

\[24\] A case in point is the 2007 clashes of Fatah-El-Islam with the Lebanese army of Nahr-el-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in Tripoli, North Lebanon.

\[25\] The issue of February 7, 2010 of the French magazine Paris Match reports that two men disguised as women wearing the “burqa” robbed a bank. In a veil-hostile setting, the article highlights that the veil is used as camouflage for criminal acts. Similar incidents are reported in Jordan and Lebanon, where veiled women stopped cars, while men committed crimes as kidnapping, abducting or stealing. The hazards of veiling are also raised in connection with official exams or voting in elections, where personal identification is concealed (pictures showing only eyes). In this connection, scholars report that in 1993 Yemeni elections, “…, conservative voices within Islah … questioned whether it was
which substantiates the high share of female membership in religious parties. In fact, several female interviewees point out that, the post-war period saw a phenomenal rise in the number of veiled women. There are no statistics to substantiate these observations or compare the number of veiled women before and after the civil war. However, looking at the huge share of women in membership of religious parties – where all women are in fact veiled --, calls for further exploration into the ‘money for veiling’ syndrome.

‘Money for veiling’ as a tool is generally administered by female religious counselors and proved especially effective among the poor and less educated women in remote areas, as they report. In this context, a female official in a religious extremist party explains that, “Through religious counselors, the party offers women monthly allowances when they veil and join the party.” Many officials in religious extremist and conservative parties argue that while there is no compulsion in Islam, “Veiling is not a matter of choice for women. It is stipulated in the Shari’a.”

This argument justifies the possibility that, “in order to guide them into the right path for their own salvation, there is no problem in enticing them to veil by offering money in return.” In order to ascertain whether such a toll is indeed employed by religious parties, I posed the question “Did religious parties offer women ‘money for veiling’”? Since responses by officials in other parties may be construed as defamatory acceptable for women to vote because they would have to reveal their faces to a stranger to be photographed for their voter registration card. Aware of this potentially pivotal role female voters might play in elections, Islah officials urged the party’s (elected) spiritual leader, ... to issue a fatwa stating that it was acceptable for women to be photographed in order to vote. They need to mobilize voters and win seats to enable the party to realize its goals, they argued, far outweigh other concerns.” (Clark and Schwedler, 2003: 300). Anecdotal evidence also denote that a woman running for ‘Mukhtar’ (registrar) post in 1998 municipal elections in Lebanon did not post her picture (because she is veiled) but that of her husband with the following caption ‘vote for my wife’. She won the post.”

In this connection, Qassem of Hizbullah stated that, “Western democracies have often failed the test of freedom of expression, as when some students wearing headscarves were denied enrolment in French and … public schools under the pretext that such dress is a demonstration of religious ceremony that challenges the traditions of Western society. This was done despite the knowledge that this dress code is a part of the faith and not a form of competition for a slogan. They also failed to recognize the freedom of the other when they stood up to the Islamic movements in Algeria and some other countries, discrediting their elections under the pretext of an impending Islamic danger.” (Qassem, 2005: 212). Also, in an article “SOS Fantomes” on interviews with veiled women in France (Statistics estimate that around 1,900,000 women are veiled in France) the phenomenon of financial incentives for veiling was also noted (see, Paris Match, July 22, 2009).
from competing parties or unsubstantiated rumors, the focus is on responses of leaders and female officials in religious parties.

Some leaders of religious parties argue that since unveiled women cannot be party members, there is no ethical problem in offering them ‘money for veiling’, while others justify this on theological grounds. For example, the leader of a post-war Sunni-dominated religious extremist party, an offshoot of a pre-war extremist party, who is a cleric, argues that,

We must use any tool at our disposal, even money, to convince people to commit to Islam. There is no problem in offering financial incentives to women to veil. This tool was used by the Prophet himself. We even buy them the veil and offer their husbands jobs. This is not only ethical but also in the spirit of religion. However, we do not put conditions or force women to veil. It is their choice, since there is no compulsion in Islam.

This statement confirms that religious parties employ ‘money for veiling’ and provides ethical and religious grounds in that ‘the ends justify the means’. Similarly, a female official in a pre-war religious extremist party justifies that, “Some rich parties resort to this tool in order to guide women to the right path and convince them to join the party, especially in poor and deprived North and South Lebanon.” A religious counselor in a post-war Sunni-dominated extremist party cautions that,

During the war, women received financial incentives from parties like Al-Ahbash and Hizbullah, for veiling (Hijab) and for wearing the (Jilbab) or chador. Secondary school students in the Shiite Dahiyeh of Beirut receive until today a monthly allowance of LL 350,000 ($200) for veiling and LL 450,000 ($300) for the chador. However, I am confident that once these monthly allowances stop, the girls will most likely unveil and withdraw from these parties.

This response provides monetary evidence that women receive ‘money for veiling’. It also echoes the concerns voiced by the head of a women’s NGO in a secular party that once the flow of money stops, women will unveil. Another female official in a post-war religious tolerant party quotes that, “During and after the civil war, financial incentives were paid to women for veiling (around $500/month).” Other female officials also cite that ‘money for veiling’ compensations ranged between $300 and $500 a month. This is a lot of money for the poor and young.
However, I should stress that none of the females interviewed -- all veiled-- report that they received ‘money for veiling’, while others stated that others may have done so. For instance, a female official in a religious tolerant party states that, “There is no religious connotation attached to wearing the veil. It is a statement. Therefore, nothing prevents parties from paying and prevents women from receiving money for veiling. I cannot vouch except for myself.” Similarly, a female official in a post-war religious extremist party states that, “I heard about money for veiling but have not seen it in my party.” In other words, these responses are confirming the use of ‘money for veiling’ but only in the case of other parties. Also, she looks at the veil as a statement and not as stipulated by the Shari’a, which carries a different connotation for pious people. This implies that officials in religious tolerant parties do not deny the use of this tool as officials in conservative and extremist parties do. The leader of a pre-war extremist party refutes the allegation:

This is not true! Women are veiled because of their religious convictions and not for money. Women in Hizbullah and Amal are all veiled. However, as a party, Amal is by far less religiously committed than Hizbullah. We are on top of the list in religious commitment. Yes, these parties have funds but they use them as in-kind incentives and not for veiling their women. Also, all Shiite girls should veil when they are nine and Sunni girls by twelve.27

Similarly, a female official in a pre-war religious extremist party states that,

We do not have funds to entice women to veil and we do not need to use such a tool. Suffice it to say that in some Muslim countries, unveiled women are abducted, or acid water thrown on their faces, and are forbidden from entering religious shrines and mosques. These practices violate the Shari’a. There is no compulsion or coercion in Islam. If women receive money to wear the veil or the Islamic dress, they tend to remove it once funds stop flowing. We are veiled out of conviction and not for financial gains.

In this vein, a religious counselor remarks that, “Islamists parties, like Al-Ahbash, do not need to pay pious women for veiling. Most of their female members are veiled as wives of Salafis who aim for an

27 Such statements support the coding that I used for the religiosity of parties, which is essential for testing my theory quantitatively.
Islamic country.”

Indeed, when I approached the leader of a post-war religious extremist party with this question, he was offended and considered mere asking is absurd. Similar denials are encapsulated in statements of female officials in various religious parties. The most vehement reactions came from affluent parties like Hizbullah that indeed can afford to use ‘money for veiling’ as a tool to increase female membership and voters’ support. A female official in that party categorically denies that, “Hizbullah never pays money to women for veiling. We also do not accept unveiled women or employ them if they veil for that purpose. Women must be committed to the party and its religious platform in order to be accepted as members. Other parties might accept, but we do not!”

Similar denials also came from officials in non-affluent religious parties. For instance, in a telephone interview with the leader of a war-origin extremist party, he stresses that, “My party is not rich and does not need to pay for women to veil. All our women are veiled.” Some officials also noted that these may be rumors. A female in a pre-war religious extremist party responds that, “These are rumors. We are not a rich party. I am the first young woman in Beirut who wore the veil in the 1960s, when all were unveiled. Women wear the Hijab out of religious conviction and not for money.” There is no way of substantiating her claim. Finally, a female official in a religious conservative party argues that, “Women must be convinced not paid to veil. It is easy to unveil by removing the pin, but very difficult for a believer to do so.” This female is essentially echoing what others said that a woman who veils for money will unveil easily when the flow of money stops. There must be no compulsion in Islam. Therefore, whether or not ‘money for veiling’ is employed by

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28 This statement contradicts an earlier one confirming that Al-Ahbash paid women for veiling during the war. She adds that, “One cannot meet with these women or interview them without permission of their husbands or party leaders; even then it is doubtful that permission is granted.” However, Al-Ahbash is not a ‘relevant’ party for this research.

29 I tried to schedule an appointment with him and with female members in the women’s wing. His response was that, “women are not involved in politics and are all religious counselors.” This highlights the extent of women’s political involvement in parties with extremist religious platforms, which will be addressed in chapter six.
parties, women should have the freedom of choice and not coerced to veil for joining parties under the pretext of conviction and piety.

The bulk of responses of party officials support that religious affluent parties employ ‘money for veiling’ as a mobilization tool. However, officials from extremist and conservative religious parties denied the use of this tool and some branded it as ‘rumors’, non-committal, and/or defamatory propaganda. What is interesting is that many female officials in tolerant religious parties did not deny its use. I should note that ‘money for veiling’ is linked to Hizbullah, as the affluent party. Thus, there is some evidence that financial inducements for veiling have been offered to women. However, there is no clear admission by party leaders, except in one case who justified its use on religious grounds.

There is no iron clad proof that affluent parties employ ‘money for veiling’ to mobilize women. What this tells us, however, is that religious parties, as other political parties, are willing to go to any length to guarantee electoral success and strength, going by ‘the means justify the ends’. ‘Money for veiling’, if employed, is an effective tool, especially for poor women. Poverty is a fertile ground for the provision of financial and in-kind incentives, because women become ‘captive’ of the continued flow of material support in return for their votes. This is particularly effective when topped by vote-buying, as some party officials note.

To recap, the data show that, on average, female membership in war and post-war parties is higher than in pre-war parties. Parties employ modern and state-of-the-art techniques, and offer in-kind and financial incentives to recruit women. The variety of mobilization tools and smart tactics (financial incentives, social services, religious counseling, arranged marriages, aggressive recruitment sprees) bore fruit and succeeded where efforts of pre-war secular parties lagged behind. Some post-war civil-confessional and religious parties show more resourcefulness in mobilizing women than pre-war parties. The lower female membership in pre-war secular and civil-confessional parties is
largely due to the traditional tools they employ but more importantly to fierce competition from affluent parties offering in-kind and financial incentives. This is evidenced by wide disparities between the shares of women in pre-war secular and civil-confessional parties and post-war civil-confessional and religious parties. These findings are against expectations given that secular parties are characterized by pluralism and democratic procedures, while religious parties have plural and democratic deficits. These combined factors explain the higher shares of female membership in war and post-war than in pre-war parties, as hypothesized.

Many parties target women in poor and deprived districts. In-kind and financial incentives explain the high female membership in post-war civil-confessional parties and in war and post-war religious parties. Religious and ideological mobilizations are the building blocks for enhancing female membership. Religious commitment, religious counseling and advocacy, in-kind (social, health and educational services) and other financial incentives including the potential use of ‘money for veiling’, help in explaining the sizeable shares of female membership of religious parties. These external party tools are avenues that political parties utilize to mobilize and recruit women. Political parties also employ internal mechanisms –like women’s wings- for recruiting women to join their parties. Women’s wings are being examined because they are hypothesized as the link from female membership to female leadership. These mechanisms are set-up to recruit women. Studying the role of women’s wings is essential for exploring the association between female membership and leadership. The following section addresses the role and functions of women’s wings, and their effectiveness in mobilizing women and creating a critical mass for leadership.

C. Mechanisms for Mobilization: Women’s Wings

Women’s wings are arms of parties and a central mechanism for mobilizing women. The functions, forms and goals for which women’s wings are established do not vary across parties. They
are either set-up within parties’ inner structures or externally as autonomous, parallel women’s organizations (NGOs). Information, obtained from party administrators, shows that out of the 18 relevant parties, only five parties (post-war secular and civil-confessional) do not maintain women’s wings. All five religious and eight civil-confessional parties do. Similar patterns are perceived among some progressive and religious parties in Western democracies in the mid-twentieth century. For instance, the communist and leftist parties did not have separate women’s wings, while Catholic and protestant parties did, with varying programmatic orientations. More specifically,

In the religious parties separate organizations for women were formed… In general the women’s organizations have been, and still are, an important factor in the process of getting more women involved in party politics…. Their main aims were to educate women politically and to mobilize them into becoming party members. Now the women’s wings are much more concerned with party policies on gender equality. … Currently the most important goal is to increase the number of party delegates. (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993:210-211).

Political parties establish women’s wings as recruitment mechanisms, but as importantly – albeit implicitly-- as electioneering machineries to amass the female vote. Some parties envisage that these wings create a critical mass of women for leadership. Women’s wings address women’s issues within the party but also organize social events, raise funds through welfare and charity work, and provide social and relief services, as needed. Some scholars hold that,

Political parties have a greater propensity to respond to gender-related demands when a number of structural, institutional and agency factors are in place. … Political parties that have an internal organization of women that is well coordinated, and which are able to mobilize resources, tend to respond better to women’s demands.” (Sacchet, 2005: 9)

This statement highlights that women’s wings engender parties and increase their receptiveness to women’s demands. However, other scholars argue that, “…, the introduction of separate, “parallel” women’s sectors reflects the efforts of party leaders to ghettoize women’s activities rather than envision meaningful gender equality within the party.” (Clark and Schwedler, 2003: 302). Similarly, Basu maintains that,
Most political parties have women’s wings that mobilize women to vote during elections. Whether, these increase women’s involvement with party politics is another matter. Women’s wings allow parties to “ghettoize” women and women’s issues; … Even when parties have neglected women’s interests, they have profited from employing gendered imagery, drawing on women’s votes and using women in electioneering. (Basu, 2005: 14, 33)

From my vantage point, I find that women’s wings are useful in the short-term as temporary mechanisms to place women’s issues on parties’ agendas and to lobby for leadership positions. The effectiveness of these wings is enhanced only when they are supported by leadership, led at the highest levels and not by junior officials, and share in the decision-making process. However, more often than not, this is not the case. These wings marginalize women instead of creating a critical mass for leadership. Moreover, the extent to which they are effective as recruiting, electioneering and empowering mechanisms is dependent upon the salient features of parties that maintain them.

This section explores the effectiveness of women’s wings in (1) increasing female membership, (2) amassing the female vote, and (3) creating a critical mass of women for leadership. Information gleaned from the first two rounds of interviews pointed to a significant role that women’s wings play in women’s membership and leadership. Based on this, a third round of 58 interviews was conducted during 2008-2009. The question “Are women’s wings effective mobilization mechanisms?” was posed to heads of women’s wings in the 13 out of the 18 relevant parties that maintain these entities, as well as to party leaders and other female party activists. Responses of interviewees are expected to supply additional explanations for observed variation in female membership across parties. Moreover, female membership is expected to influence women’s leadership. Since women’s wings are the main mechanism for recruiting women, it is important to examine their role in this respect.

At the outset, the views of female activists are solicited and then these views are compared with those of party leaders. In the pre-war era, the feminist discourse attracted women to join secular parties with leftist orientations, which was largely accomplished via women’s wings. During the civil war, militarization and violence drove many women away from parties. They turned to relief work and assumed new roles within more modern post-war parties including lobbying for women’s rights and demanding leadership positions.³¹ As several interviewees observe, female membership in pre-war secular and civil-confessional parties declined after the war. This prompted them to look for ways to recruit women. This included setting up women’s wings, as a female activist reports that,

In the post-war period, the women’s sector exerted efforts to mobilize women in addition to its traditional role of providing family support, eliminating discrimination against women and empowering them. Unfortunately, it failed to increase female membership or to be instrumental in elections.

She concludes that, “It takes much more than women’s wings to empower women. It requires more assertiveness by women, as well as political will and special measures by party elites to prepare women for leadership positions.” Another female activist suggests that, “Women’s wings outlived their utility overtime and must be dismantled, especially since they failed to increase female membership.” Moreover, some female activists see that, “Women’s wings place them in a small box and throw that box in a corner, which separates them from real politics.”

³¹ This is comparable to the new roles that women assumed in the USA after World War I, when the welfare state extended benefits to veterans and to women, which led to expanding the franchise for women in the 1920s. Women got organized and lobbied for new policies. As pressure groups, they were able to push the government to adopt public social policies for women and families. Skocpol finds that, “Acting in pursuit of their career interests, and engaged in conflicts or alliances with one another, political leaders try to use existing governmental and party organizations to devise and implement policies that will attract support of various groups…. In the 1920s American women built voluntary associations and engaged in the ‘municipal housekeeping’ and proposed public social policies. They believed that their moral and educational styles of political practice could help clean up political corruption in the USA. … Women built parallel organizations to male-dominated ones. They were more organized and could spread a policy idea quickly. They served as pressure groups and lobbied for their demands. The USA government … separately administered benefits and protection for women…” (Theda Skocpol, 1992. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social policy in the United States (Harvard University Press: USA), 527-535.)
The views on women’s wings of female officials in pre-war secular and in post-war civil-confessional parties are similar. The female secretary-general of a post-war civil-confessional party justifies not having a women’s wing because, “These wings frame women and marginalize them instead of empowering them.” A female activist takes a strong stand and submits a proposal to dismantle them, which was approved but implementation postponed until after the 2009 elections. She states that, “We have to meet and liaise with women’s wings in religious parties. These are our allies in elections.” The heads of women’s wings in other parties also voiced their concerns about marginalizing women and indicated that these wings ought to be dismantled. This trend is increasingly emerging among post-war civil-confessional parties. In this context, a female MP remarks that, “Women’s wings are effective in mobilizing women before and during elections. However, it is indisputable that they marginalize women. They are ineffective in empowering them. They must be dismantled.” Also, a female official remarks that, “Women’s wings keep women outside the decision-making circles. As such, women remain tokens in decision-making, but they are effective in increasing female membership.” Moreover, a female party official explains that,

Women’s wings provide relief during conflict and are effective in recruiting women, indoctrinating them and guaranteeing the female vote. However, these parallel entities isolate women and dilute their demands for leadership. They really marginalize women and do not empower them. They are only effective in recruiting women and in elections, which can be accomplished from within the party. They should be dismantled and the party leader agrees.

This is analogous to the description of women’s wings in the early European parties that,

… [T]hese sections were peripheral to the power structure of the party and did not provide a route for women into positions of political influence. …, since positions of influence in parties were scarce, parties did not want to make it easy for women to enter these positions. This would have created conflict with the existing hierarchies, and that conflict could be avoided by admitting women only as ‘second-class participants’. …, because they were usually denied positions of influence, women had little incentive to become involved in parties. (Ware, 1996: 81)

Indeed, a female activist in a post-war civil-confessional party remarks that,
Parties deliberately want to keep women in a separate corner and women’s wings are just perfect for this. Men do not want to have to compete with women for the limited leadership positions. Also, men still consider politics to be a man’s turf and women are trespassing. The only advantage is that these wings are good for recruiting women and for elections.

The views of female officials in pre-war secular and post-war civil-confessional parties converge. These stress that such mechanisms marginalize rather than empower women. Many advocate dismantling them in order to limit their adverse effects on women’s chances in leadership. These views are also shared by leaders and elites in these parties. Responses of party leaders are along the same wave length as those of female officials. For instance, the leader of a pre-war secular party responds that they already took the drastic measure of dismantling the women’s wing since, “It is ineffective in raising female membership and amassing votes in elections.” He adds that, “Competition is severe and other parties appear to be more attractive to women and offer them more chances in leadership. Maybe, by mainstreaming women’s issues, more women will be encouraged to join. We should do better by emulation!” This information on the ineffectiveness of women’s wings provides additional explanation for the low shares of female membership in pre-war secular parties. Another party leader states that,

The women’s wing is instrumental in mobilizing women and in amassing the female vote in elections. However, we have seen that it is not as effective in creating a critical mass of women for leadership. It marginalizes women and keeps them away from party politics. We are deliberating dismantling it after the elections.

Leaders and senior advisers in other parties re-iterate the same intentions. However, such radical measures are postponed until after elections for, “Strategic alliances with our allies in religious parties”. Another party leader informs that, “The party already dismantled the women’s wing because women demanded that and they felt it marginalizes them. However, it is effective as a mobilization and electioneering mechanism.” He adds that, “In effect, by dismantling the women’s wing, a critical mass of women will be created via mainstreaming women within the party.” In this context, scholars
studying women’s wings in western democracies in the mid-twentieth century find that they were also concerned with mobilization and elections more than with female leadership and representation (Lovenduski and Norris 1993). Adopting a linear approach to development, one perceives that post-war secular and civil-confessional parties characterized with lower religiosity, democratic practices and/or plural membership, are ‘avant guardiste’ in that they aim to be more effective in creating a critical mass of women. In fact, responses of party leaders converge with those of female officials in post-war secular and civil-confessional parties.

Indeed, some pre-war secular and post-war civil-confessional parties dismantled women’s wings in response to proposals by female officials and their lobbying efforts with party elites. Other parties are deliberating such an action and have to postpone due to strategic alliances with religious parties. These statements also inform us that women’s wings in post-war civil-confessional parties are effective mechanisms for recruiting women and amassing their votes for elections, which explains the higher shares of female membership in these parties. The majority of post-war secular and civil-confessional parties, however, perceive that women’s wings marginalize women.

In pre-war civil-confessional parties, heads of women’s wings maintain that they should be retained because they are effective mechanisms for recruitment and for elections. Female officials list their achievements in that, “The women’s wing has succeeded in recruiting more women, coordinating activities with our allies in religious parties like fund raising, organizing social events, and running campaigns for elections.” Some argue that women’s wings cater to all generations of female members, address women’s issues and help in representing parties in conferences and meetings on women’s issues. The head of the women’s wing explains that, “Younger female members prefer to work within professional and specialized sectors, while older members are more comfortable working with other women in special women’s wings. Therefore, both arrangements are
doable and female membership increased. A female activist justifies retaining women’s wings because, “We are still in a patriarchal society. Women’s wings are needed. They do not marginalize women but cater to their needs, build their political capabilities, and empower them. They offer women the choice to be as involved in politics as they want.” Another female official highlights that developed countries also maintain them and this is why they should be retained;

Even in developed countries, parties maintain special women’s wings, ministries for women and equal opportunities, or other forms of national machineries for women. We should emulate these practices because they succeeded in empowering women and improving female representations.

Similarly, interviewees from religious parties also see that women’s wings are effective. The head of women’s wing in a religious tolerant party stresses that, “Women’s wings are not only mechanisms for recruiting women, but are excellent electoral machineries. They spearhead electoral committees at the district level and work efficiently during elections.” Another female official notes that, “We do not only recruit women but we are extremely effective during elections. These are our main function, whether publicized or not!” Furthermore, the head of the women’s wing in a pre-war religious extremist party reports that in the 2009 elections,

The women’s section mapped prospective voters, estimated their number and paid them visits to discuss their needs and the party’s electoral platform. I also represented the party on TV talk shows to show that women are politically active and empowered and publicize our role in running the electoral campaign for the party. We arranged to transport female voters to ballot sites and monitored elections. Our role is very effective, especially that women are 60% of voter turnout.

This key role that female party officials and women play in elections is recognized by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) as international observers of elections in Lebanon. More specifically, the NDI stated in its 2009 report that, “Despite the decrease in the number of parliamentary seats they occupy, women were active in other parts of the electoral process, serving as poll workers (for the first time), and in key positions in their political parties.” (NDI, 2009: 54). Other post-war civil-
confessional, secular and religious parties report similar testimonies on the role of women’s wings in 2009 elections. The high voter turnout of women (over 61%) demonstrates the key role that women’s wings of competing parties played in 2009 elections.

In general, the views of leaders in religious parties and their male advisers on women’s wings also converge with those of female party officials. For instance, the leader of a pre-war religious extremist party stresses that, “the most important task of women’s wings is recruiting women, employing religious mobilization and helping the party during elections.” However, some party leaders tend to boast that these wings empower women and to downplay the role they serve as recruitment and election mechanisms. In this respect, a senior adviser to the leader of a religious conservative but not extremist party explains that,

Our women’s association is creating a critical mass of women for leadership starting at middle management. We have women heading their own sectors and, as such, they have an informal influence on the party’s decisions. We have very few women at the top but this should definitely improve overtime.

To corroborate these positive views, the head of the women’s wing in a post-war religious conservative party maintains that, “Women’s wings are essential and effective mechanisms for recruitment, education and bringing more women to the ballots. They do not marginalize women, but empower them. This is the only way that women can become politically active, given the segregation between women and men.” These statements carry hope that eventually women’s wings will have sufficient influence to lobby and push for women’s leadership. Therefore, consensus among religious parties is to maintain their women’s wings, given the segregation between women and men. Women’s wings are effective in mobilizing women, guiding them in the right religious path, and in amassing their votes during elections. The large share of female membership in religious parties attests to their effectiveness.
Therefore, women’s wings in the 13 out of the 18 parties which maintain them are formally
established to mobilize women, but also to serve as “electioneering” machineries. The effectiveness
of women’s wings is examined in (1) mobilizing women, (2) creating a critical mass of women for
leadership, and (3) amassing female vote during elections. Post-war civil-confessional parties attest to
their effectiveness in increasing female membership and in amassing the female vote. They are
generally regarded of limited effectiveness in creating a critical mass of women for leadership,
especially by parties that dismantled them or plan to do that. This is not specific to parties in Lebanon
as scholars studying religious and Islamist parties in Arab and non-Arab countries attest to similar
dynamics.\textsuperscript{32} Unlike officials in secular and civil-confessional parties, interviewees from religious
parties see them as effective tools in fulfilling all the three goals for which they are established. They
claim that these units may also become more effective in creating a critical mass of women for
leadership in the future. In this connection, one may wonder why women’s wings succeeded in some
parties but failed in others in increasing female membership. This requires further investigation,
which falls outside the scope of this dissertation, since political parties are the unit of analysis.

Conclusions

Data show that female membership is higher in post-war than in pre-war parties, as
hypothesized. On average, the share of female membership is higher in post-war civil-confessional
parties with lower religiosity, plural membership and democratic decision-making. Female membership
is also higher in war and post-war religious parties of higher religiosity, and with plural and democratic
deficits, than in pre-war secular parties with lower religiosity, more pluralism and democratic
procedures. These results are not consistent with the hypotheses H2A and H3A. On the one hand,
affluent post-war civil-confessional and religious parties targeting women, especially the poor, tend to
employ effective mobilization strategies, modalities (financial and in-kind incentives), and mechanisms

\textsuperscript{32} See, Clark and Schwedler 2003, Basu 2005, among others
(women’s wings). On the other hand, pre-war secular and civil-confessional parties are disadvantaged because of fierce competition from affluent parties, shifting memberships and shrinking pluralism after the war. Further, women’s wings play a central role as mobilization and electioneering machineries, but are frequently seen as inimical to women’s prospects for leadership within a party. In this context, I note Basu’s findings that religious parties have an “enormous capacity to mobilize women’s movements while undermining women’s advancement.” (Basu, 2005: 35). Does female party membership always translate into women’s leadership? This will be addressed in the following chapter.
Chapter Six
Does Party Religiosity Explain Women’s Leadership?

In the previous chapters, I advanced an original theory of party variation in religiosity that parties with lower religiosity are more likely to enhance women’s leadership than parties with higher religiosity. This chapter presents qualitative and quantitative analysis to support this theory in that religiosity is a core explanation for variation in women’s leadership across parties. It is organized in three sections. Section A provides data on women in leadership bodies of the 18 relevant parties and compares women’s shares in leadership to their shares in party membership. This data on women in parties are substantiated by views of party elites reflecting their attitudes towards women’s leadership. The intensity of religiosity on party platforms maps onto attitudes of party elites, qua political culture vis-à-vis women’s leadership. These views are pitched against those of female party activists, especially on which parties work better for female leadership. Section B examines the mismatch between the high female membership and low leadership in religious parties and tests whether female party membership matters for leadership. Section C concludes by estimating a multivariate regression model for women’s leadership in Lebanon. As expected, religiosity is a core explanatory variable for variations in women’s leadership across five categories of parties of varying religiosities. This provides strong statistical support to the theory of party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership.

A. Women in Leadership Bodies of Political Parties

Data compiled from party administrators on female leadership by party-age and party-religiosity are presented in charts 6.1 to 6.6 (next pages). These bar charts provide initial evidence in support of the theory of party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership. The shares of women in leadership bodies are lower in religious than all other categories of parties.
Chart 6.1 shows that female leadership is higher in post-war than in pre-war parties, with the difference in means significant (12.4 compared to 7.6, respectively).

As discussed earlier, in the post-war era, transformations and attitudinal shifts of party elites towards the role of women in parties and their political involvement are observed. In general, post-war parties are more tolerant and receptive to women’s leadership than pre-war parties. Women’s share in leadership bodies of all religious extremist parties (scoring 1 on the religiosity scale) are the lowest across parties. Women are non-existent in pre-war extremist parties and their shares in post-war extremist parties are infinitesimal, as charts 6.2 and 6.4 clearly show.

Female leadership is highest in secular parties, on average, but especially in post-war secular parties (scoring 5 on the religiosity scale). Moreover, female leadership in post-war (war-origin) religious parties, especially the Shiite-dominated Amal of tolerant religiosity (scoring 3) is higher than in other religious parties. (See, Annex 6.1 for coding of parties and Annex 6.2 for the hypotheses).

Impressions gained from interviews reveal an ultra-conservative stance in Sunni-dominated religious extremist parties compared to post-war Shiite-dominated conservative and tolerant religious parties. This provides further evidence and support to the hypothesis (H1) that
as the intensity of religiosity rises as in religious extremist parties, the share of women in leadership falls to infinitesimal levels (see, charts 6.3 to 6.5).

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1 Party ID codes in Chart 6.6 are: Communists (1), Syrian Social (2), Phalanges (3), National Bloc (4), Baath (5), Progressive Socialist (6), Liberals (7), Islamic Group (8), Hope (9), Unitarian (10), Hizbullah (11), Wa’ad (12), Renewal (13), Tayyar (14), Forces (15), Islamic Action (16), Future (17), and Giants (18)
Chart 6.6 shows female leadership in each of the 18 relevant parties (see table 3.1 p. 107 and Annex 6.1 for a list of parties with religiosity scores).

Charts 6.7 and 6.8 show that as parties employ more democratic practices (leadership transitions and decision-making) and as parties become more plural the share of women in leadership rises, as hypothesized (H2 and H3). In fact, difference in means is significant between plural (14.2) and non-plural (7.8) female membership. Women’s leadership in parties employing leadership transitions and decision-making, or are democratic in both counts, or in either one of these indicators appears to be close, on average. However, chart 6.9 does not establish an upward sloping positive and linear correlation between female membership and leadership, as anticipated (H4). This is initial indication that female membership does not matter for women’s leadership, particularly in parties with religious platforms. Chart 6.10 shows that, on average, the highest shares of female leadership are in secular parties of lowest religiosity (5 score), with decentralized decision-making and plural membership. These post-war secular parties are closely followed by civil-confessional parties (4 score) with plural membership and democratic procedures in involving women in decision-making. This provides initial support to the theory and related hypotheses posited in this thesis.
Pre-war civil-confessional parties, also have lower religiosity, but are characterized by plural and democratic deficit in transfer of leadership and decision-making. This partially explains why pre-war parties have lower shares of women in leadership than their post-war counterparts. Thus, the lowest shares for women’s leadership are seen in religious parties with higher religiosity, and deficits in democratic procedures and plural membership.

The question “Which parties work better for women’s leadership?” is posed to gauge the views of party elites (leaders and their senior advisers) on women’s leadership. Table 6.1 presents a summary of responses offered by elites in each of the five party categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Category</th>
<th>Pre-war Parties Pre-1975</th>
<th>War &amp; Post-war Parties Post-1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secular a-religious</td>
<td>Secular leftist but not religious parties</td>
<td>Secular pluralist but not religious parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-confessional</td>
<td>Civil-confessional but not religious parties</td>
<td>Secular and civil-confessional parties but never Islamist extremist parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious (all) (extremist, conservative &amp; tolerant)</td>
<td>Religious parties are equal to or better than secular parties</td>
<td>Secular same as religious parties; Political culture and patriarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>But: women cannot lead men, this violates Shari’a (doctrine)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plus: political culture and patriarchy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One observes that leaders and elites in religious parties justify the low proportion of women’s leadership by referring to external factors or deny the problem altogether. In fact, they attribute this situation to patriarchy and culture, or invoke the Shari’a in that women cannot lead men. Similar views on patriarchy and culture are offered by some elites from pre-war secular and civil-confessional parties. These also stress that there are no internal structural obstacles to

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2 A third round of interviews was conducted during summer 2009. In addition to addressing specific issues raised during the first and second rounds which required further examination, I consulted with party leaders, female activists, scholars and national experts on the classification, labeling and coding of political parties.
women’s leadership but that women should be more interested, politically mature and prove themselves by competing with men. In contrast, elites from post-war secular or civil-confessional parties boast their support by focusing on differences with religious parties towards women’s leadership. In fact, these parties, of lower religiosity and higher secularism, exhibit a more ‘women-friendly’ attitude towards women’s leadership than pre-war civil-confessional or any of the religious parties. Several indicated that they are taking formal and concrete measures or made proposals to adopt affirmative action measures (e.g. internal party quotas) for enhancing women’s leadership.

Leaders and elites in eleven out of the 18 relevant parties confirmed that they have recommended, adopted, or are in the process of introducing voluntary internal party quotas for women. Some of these parties considered these measures within a restructuring exercise. These parties include all four secular and five post-war civil-confessional parties as well as two pre-war civil-confessional parties (Kata’eb and Progressive Socialist). This leaves out two pre-war civil-confessional (Liberals and Al-Kutlah) and all five religious parties (see, table 3.1 for list of tables).

Several party elites in secular and civil-confessional parties are critical of the status of women in parties with religious platforms by way of comparison with their own parties. For instance, a leader remarks that, “Religious parties are dogmatic and hostile to women’s leadership. They are run by dictat. How do you want women to become leaders there?” Secular and post-war civil-confessional parties boast that the presence of women in their leadership bodies is a symbol of being modern (see also, Dahlerup, 2006: 295). In this connection, the leader of a post-war civil-confessional party also remarks that,

Religious parties will never give women leadership posts. They give a conservative interpretation of the doctrine. The parties that have secular and civil goals are modern and
forward-looking. They encourage women to compete for leadership and are willing to adopt internal party quotas to increase their share in top positions.

Another party leader also remarks that, “Our actions speak for themselves. We are gender sensitive and we are serious about gender equality. We have the highest shares of women in leadership bodies.” Similar views are given by party elites of ‘avant guardiste’ secular and post-war civil-confessional parties. They employ gender-sensitive terminology such as gender roles, gender equality, and commitment to gender. This reflects a gender-sensitive and women-friendly political culture, which bodes well for women’s leadership.³ This disposition to modern paradigms and a feminist discourse is attractive to women, especially that this holds the promise for promotions.

Looking next at the religious parties, Sunni-dominated, ultra-conservative extremist parties are seen as less hospitable toward women’s leadership than Shiite-dominated parties.⁴ In this respect, a leader of a pre-war religious extremist party states that “We have more important business in these odd times than to worry about women in leadership positions when people are being assassinated and killed every day.” Further, religious extremist parties invariably invoke the doctrine and any action that violates the Shari’a, especially ‘Al-Qiwama’.⁵ For instance, the leader of an extremist religious party states that,

³ As mentioned earlier, all interviews were conducted in Arabic and translated into English by the author without formal editing. Interviews were audio-taped by permission. In general, female interviewees were referred by party elites and were in leadership and decision-making positions within their respective parties. They were mostly career women and professionals of good standing in their communities.

⁴ Scholars also find that, Christian religious parties (viz. SGP, GPV and RPF) “… are openly against women participating in the public sphere…” (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993:210)

⁵ “Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband’s) absence what Allah would have them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (next), refuse to share their beds, (and last) beat them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not against them means (of annoyance):... ” The Book of Women 4.34 Translated by A. Yusufali; www.csmonitor.com/2001/1219/p10s1-wogi.html
First, our society is patriarchal. Men do not approve of women’s presence in politics. Second, it is mentioned in the “Hadeeth”\(^6\) that no community ‘Ummah’ will ever succeed if led by a woman. Third, if women relinquish their domestic duties and join the labor force, families break, and the society will become dysfunctional.

In this vein, a senior adviser to the leader warns that, “Women’s place is at home. But, once they step out, they will not be able to discharge their multiple roles effectively. Eventually, there will be a trade-off at the expense of family welfare.” Similarly, a senior adviser in an extremist party also stresses that there is a difference between women in civil society and their work in politics:

Women lead NGOs but cannot become leaders in politics. When women moved beyond their God-given roles and worked like men, the society became dysfunctional, as studies show. Look at the West. Women’s place is at home as God dictated. They are not fit for leadership because of menopause, mood swings and emotional imbalances. They should leave the hard domain of politics to men!

Several leaders and male advisers highlight that women are satisfied and make no demands for leadership. And, if they run for office, the party will not support them. As this leader of an extremist party explained that, “Women comprise one-third of membership, but we have no women in leadership. The party was against a female member who defied the rules and ran for parliamentary elections, because this is against Koran. There is no place for women in hard politics.”\(^7\) In general, elites in religious parties see that all parties, irrespective of their platforms, offer women the same chances in leadership. In this context, a male MP in a war-origin religious conservative party remarks that, “Politics is for men. But, it is customs and traditions that keep women at home for domestic and family duties. There is no difference between religious and other parties at all with respect to women’s leadership.” Further, a leader

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\(^6\) The Prophet’s views on controversial issues are sought by his disciples. These are recorded and his responses are revered as sacrosanct judgments on specific issues that are sometimes contested by the Ulama and learned clerics.

\(^7\) She is the only female Islamist from a pre-war religious extremist party to ever run for office. Instead of supporting her, the party nominated the leader, her husband, which forced her to withdraw from the race and the party. She ran again as independent but did not win. She is the President of a religious Sunni University. She does not come from a political family but her husband is the founder and leader of the party. This phenomenon is widely spread in religious parties with wives of party leaders also serving as heads of women’s wings.
in an extremist party argues that, “by keeping women at home to take care of their families, we are relieving them from the heavy burden of politics and protecting them from fierce competition.” This attitude is condescending and reflects poorly on women’s capabilities in meeting the challenges of a political career.

However, as several party elites in religious extremist and conservative parties point out that, “We are bound by built-in barriers in the doctrine, which prevent women from leading men. This is why secular parties offer women more chances in leadership than Islamist parties.” In addition, the statement by the leader of another extremist religious party highlights that, “Islamist extremist movements, like ours, do not approve of women’s political leadership; while moderate movements like the Islamic Brotherhood allow women to assume leadership and even nominate them to office.” Voiced by the leader of an extremist party, this statement carries weight not only because it demonstrates that indeed there are multiple religiosities with varying influence on women’s leadership but also it supports the theory of party variation in religiosity. These responses show that even party leaders and advisors, who are expected to support the reputation of their own parties, will sometimes acknowledge that their religious framing constrains the roles they can give to women. Similarly, one of the party elites stresses that,

Muslim women are veiled and should not mix with men. This is ‘haram’, forbidden by Shari’a. But, above all they cannot lead men as this violates the Shari’a. Moreover, politics is for men and their place is at home. I do not advise women to join secular parties, because only Islamist parties can secure happiness in the afterlife.

Testimonies of elites in religious extremist parties provide evidence that women’s chances in leadership bodies within parties of higher religiosity are very limited indeed. These conservative views, which support the conceptual framework of the theory advanced, are not close by any measure to notions of gender equality or concepts embraced by a gender paradigm. Statements of party elites in Shiite-dominated religious parties with conservative and tolerant religiosities and
in pre-war civil-confessional parties reflect convergence on patriarchy and cultural barriers as table 6.1 shows.

Similarly, views of party elites in pre-war civil-confessional parties are also traditional towards women’s leadership. As one of the leaders in a pre-war civil-confessional party remarks that, “Even if we want to promote women to leadership positions, we do not have a sufficient number of women who are willing and able to assume leadership positions.” Nonetheless, a party leader sounds optimistic that, “Despite patriarchy and the hostile attitude of men towards women’s leadership, snatching away their rightful positions, once women prove themselves, male members will accept them.” This echoes the arguments in favor of ‘the politics of presence’ (Phillips 1995) but also points to a vicious circle of the ‘chicken and egg’. How can women prove themselves in politics if they are not given the chance to do so? These parties emphasize that entrenched patriarchy and overarching cultural barriers justify the lower shares of women in their leadership bodies. Thus, while political culture cannot be measured and is not a variable in this theory, nevertheless it is a mechanism that embodies and translates into measurable terms how religiosity affects the shares of women in leadership bodies. The impressions gained from examining these views reinforce the link between party elites’ attitudes, party religiosity and women’s leadership. This shows how religiosity is connected to party political culture.

In order to get a complete picture of which parties work more for women’s leadership, the views of female party activists, all heads of women’s wings, MPs, ministers, and municipal candidates are also solicited. Few female party activists see that religious parties offer women chances in leadership; while the large majority views secular and civil-confessional parties as offering women more chances in leadership. Moreover, many female officials from parties with religious platforms are also of the opinion that civil-confessional and the more secular parties
work best for women’s leadership. This is indicative that, while female officials – especially in parties with extremist and conservative religiosities – do not complain about their position, nonetheless they recognize that civil-confessional and more secular parties work better for women’s leadership than parties with high religiosity. However, few female activists from the more secular parties see that religious parties work for women. This can be explained by the fact that often political coalitions influence interviewees’ replies. This is more pronounced coming from members in weaker secular parties that are in alliance with stronger, affluent religious parties. Notwithstanding this, the impressions gained are that the majority of female party activists see that parties with lower religiosity offer women more chances for leadership than all others.

More specifically, a female official in a pre-war secular party sees that, “Secular, leftist, pluralist, democratic parties give women more chances in leadership than other parties. These parties are premised on liberal and egalitarian ideologies, progressive thought, and are modern.” Indeed, and reinforcing this perception, during summer 2010, the Communist party elected for the first time, a female vice-president. In contrast, a female official in a post-war religious extremist party responds that, “Women’s leadership is at the same low level across all parties, Christian or Muslim parties. Maybe, women in secular leftist parties have a better chance in leadership because these do not have religious goals.” Coming from a female in a religious extremist party, this statement emphasizes party goals as a decisive factor in advancing women to leadership positions. Similarly, a female in leadership position in a religious but tolerant party remarks that, “Women have negligible chances for leadership in all parties. But, their chances are better in secular parties with confessional membership, because as a value system religion
unites them but is not a barrier to their leadership.” In a similar vein, a female official predicts that,

Women’s chances for leadership are least in religious extremist parties, then in pluralist and democratic parties with secular and civil orientation. These parties recognize women’s merit and competence. We are hopeful if women prove themselves overtime, we will reach the all-male supreme council.

Moreover, a young female MP, who led a post-war civil-confessional party for eleven years, emphasizes that, “Secular parties with civil goals are, by far, more open and accommodating to women’s leadership than religious parties. I led this party for eleven years and created a critical mass of women for leadership. Now women occupy 25% of leadership positions.” Another official summarizes that,

Religious parties offer women least chances for leadership, with Shiite-dominated relatively better than Sunni-dominated parties. These parties might promote women for public consumption or strategic ‘artificial’ reasons but not to advance women. In this case, women remain tokens but not decision-makers. Finally, secular and modern civil parties like Tayyar and Future offer women best chances for leadership.

These statements are representative of the views of female officials in different party categories. These show convergence that secular and civil-confessional parties offer women more chances in leadership than other categories, albeit due to different reasons, as the following paragraphs indicate.

Interviews with other female officials in extremist and conservative religious parties give the impression that they are content and are not complaining or demanding to ascend to leadership positions. A few officials are bold and venture to voice their personal opinions – albeit rarely—but this also gives the impression that they are saying what they think they should say and not what is actually taking place within the inner structures of these parties. For instance, the only female in the politburo of Hizbullah resorts to comparisons with the status of women in
extremist cases like Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia to highlight that in Hizbullah she is an example of how women rise to leadership. She states that,

Some religious extremist parties bar women from leadership. There are no pure secular parties but only confessional communities around which parties form and where patriarchy prevails. In our party, decision-making is by ‘Shoura’ or consultation, which paves the road for more women to assume leadership, when and if they are ready. I am the example.

But, she is a solitary, single example. Nonetheless, her statement reflects that Shari’a is no bar to women’s leadership but it is the intensity of religiosit in parties that strongly influences women’s chances in leadership. Such a testimony is very important especially that it is coming from a female in leadership position in one of the conservative religious parties. Others stress that there is a seniority system in Hizbullah and women are promoted from the ranks to middle management then to leadership positions: “Hizbullah has never stopped anyone from demanding leadership positions. But, women have to summon their courage to do so.”

Statements by other female officials in religious parties, however, justify their middle-level managerial positions, just as party elites do, by also employing discourses that ‘women’s place is at home’ and that ‘politics is a man’s business’, but above all invoking the Shari’a. For instance, a female official in a post-war religious extremist party argues that, “In Islam women are not allowed to lead men by Al-Qiwama. So, how do you expect pious women to violate the doctrine and aspire to leadership positions?”

Another female official in a religious extremist party stresses that, “Women should leave politics to men. Our tasks are to provide social services, religious advocacy and guidance, and gather women’s votes in elections.” Similarly, a

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8 Findings of other scholars on this issue support my impressions (Basu 2005, Sacchet 2005). However, some scholars find that, “…, Islamist women’s struggle for voice within their own political parties illustrates not an exceptional case, but a more generalizable phenomenon of intraparty mobilization within an environment of changing political opportunity structures. (Clark & Schwedler, 2003: 309). I only heard these voices and demands for leadership amongst female officials in tolerant religious parties.
female in post-war religious conservative party also insists that, “In our party, women prefer to stay in second or third level roles, as recipients and followers not as leaders. However, I believe that secular and leftist or civil parties offer women more chances in leadership than our parties. Such parties build women’s political capacities.”⁹ Along these lines, a female official in another pre-war religious extremist party sees that, “Even if women were given the chance, they remain followers. Let us face it: Women have no place in politics. That is why Islamist parties do not offer women leadership positions.” More often than not, female officials in these parties echo the views of party elites. For instance, a female in a religious conservative party states that,

> Despite the fact that our women work very hard, our chances in leadership remain slim because of the Shari’a. In Hizbullah, the Koran is our guide and salvation, but we are not extremist parties here. They are Wahabi like Saudi Arabia, where women’s chances in leadership are nil.

Another female official remarks that, “If women are assertive and impose themselves as they do in parties like the secular Syrian Social party, they will be promoted on meritocratic grounds. These are the parties that offer women more chances for leadership. Our parties are interested in wider welfare issues. I am not here for leadership but to serve society and my religion.”

Indeed, responses by other female officials also reveal that women in religious parties prefer to remain on the receiving end and accept a passive role in politics as dictated by the doctrine. For example, some officials in extremist religious parties recognize that, “Women’s chances in leadership are limited in all religious parties, especially in extremist Salafis, like ours. However, I have no problem and no leadership ambitions at all, since I believe that religious commitment is essential and I work for Islam as the solution and right path.” Nonetheless, others highlight that, “If the party finds that it is in its interest to promote women to leadership or to

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⁹ Indeed, few parties require members to enroll in political formation institutes attached to their parties and to take competitive examinations for acceptance and promotions. The Lebanese Forces Party has a university and requires men and women to enroll. This is how a critical mass of women is created.
nominate them to public office, they will comply with the party’s orders; otherwise they are content and have no ambitions.” Therefore, if it is for ‘strategic maneuvering”, a religious party is willing to reinterpret the doctrine, slide over the principle of ‘Al-Qiwa’ and promote women.

However, I wonder whether had women been more assertive, would the results have been different? The findings of scholars studying women in religious parties show that there is a pattern in that women are not empowered or visible in leadership bodies within religious parties. In this context, a female official in a civil-confessional party remarks that, “Women have a much more difficult and thorny route in religious parties. Nonetheless, parties with religious platforms may decide to promote women to leadership or nominate them on their lists to compete with other parties, but definitely not to empower them.” These impressions are also corroborated by findings of scholars studying Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen in that, “Women’s presence in the councils has not, thus far, resulted in an influential or vocal role for women in the party.” (Clark & Schwedler, 2003: 309). In effect, a female scholar explains this phenomenon in that,

For women in religious parties, spiritual returns and the public good not personal gains are sufficient. They go by a different set of values than women in secular and civil-confessional parties. These are governed by religious convictions without any expectations of rewards and recognition. However, women in other parties work for material gains and personal recognition and rewards.

To a certain extent, differences in value systems, religious commitment and adherence to Shari’a may explain the reluctance of female officials in most religious parties in demanding recognition and leadership positions. However, there are more mundane factors suppressing women’s demands for leadership in religious parties. These include in-kind and financial incentives that women receive from affluent parties, which may explain their silence – rather passiveness – in

asking for leadership. Indeed, a female official remarks that, “Financial and in-kind incentives that religious parties offer poor women can explain why women are passive and accept their inferior position within the party.” Nonetheless, providing further in-depth analysis based on values systems, a female in a post-war civil-confessional party states that, “Value systems change imperceptibly but are contextual. Parties, including those with religious platforms, transform overtime to reflect the political situation within which they function and their attitude towards women’s leadership will eventually change. Religious parties will promote women when it is in their interest to do so, by-passing jurisprudence for political gains.” In the same vein, a female MP in a civil-confessional party maintains that, “Religious and other parties offer women leadership positions when it is in their interest to do so. Parties function along ‘the ends justify the means’.” She cites cases of women in Islamic parties in Palestine, Algeria, Morocco, and Jordan.11

Notwithstanding the views expressed by female officials in extremist and conservative religious parties, there are a few dissenting voices that conceive of a light at the end of the tunnel. In effect, as a female official in a tolerant religious party notes that, “The Shari’a must be interpreted in favor of women. Any interpretation that puts women back home leads to inefficient use of human resources. This is not in the interest of the country.” For instance, another female official in the tolerant religious party, Amal, notes that, “If our Islamist party is led by a young, religious leader who is enlightened, educated, and open-minded, women will move to leadership levels. I am willing to run for leadership positions as long as my husband

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11 In Jordan 2003 elections, a religious extremist party nominated a female, which raised criticism but also did not raise hopes for female representation. Clark argues that, “While Musini’s candidacy was a landmark for IAF women it does not ensure an expanded role for women in the party in the future. So long as ideological contention over women’s roles continues to exist within IAF, the party’s leaders will avoid creating a firm policy that could provoke further divisions among the rank-and-file. Instead, the leadership will continue to balance ideology with pragmatism, evaluating women’s participation on a case-by-case basis and advancing women when strategically useful. (Clark 2004:7)
approves.” This statement reflects that attitudes of party elites are crucial for women’s leadership and that some women in tolerant parties are more aspiring to leadership positions than those in conservative and extremist parties. Indeed, except for Amal, the leaders of other religious parties are all clergymen. The fact that they are clerics as well as leaders of religious parties does not only influence the intensity of religiosity on party platforms but also tunes their attitudes toward women’s leadership --qua political culture. The responses of female activists in the only tolerant party in the sample surveyed, Amal with lower religiosity (scoring 3) substantiate the conceptual link between female leadership and party variation in religiosity. Indeed, the inter-linkage between party elites, party religiosities, and women’s leadership is also cogently expressed by a female activist in civil-confessional Maronite-dominated party in that, “Parties with strong bonds to religion and where the cleric and politician are collapsed into one, offer women less chances in leadership than other parties. In these parties, religious tenets affect politics and take precedence over democratic and egalitarian values.” Another female activist argues that the religious value system shapes parties’ attitude towards women’s leadership. She justifies the choices she makes on the following grounds:

Women’s chances in leadership are highest in civil-confessional parties, which are premised on religious value system but have a civil agenda. They are pluralist, tolerant, democratic and gender-sensitive. Secular parties got caught after the war between their liberal, leftist ideologies and traditional values. Women’s chances in these parties are, in principle, good, but shrinking due to competition. Lastly, women’s chances are least likely in religious parties because these are conservative, discriminatory, consider women inferior to men, and are anti-women’s leadership.

Furthermore, several female activists in civil-confessional parties also observe that Christian-dominated parties offer women more chances in leadership than Muslim-dominated parties. This observation is worthwhile exploring. In fact, scholars studying parties in Western Europe also argue that different religions impact women differently. This may make sense in a
multi-religious society, like Lebanon composed of 18 religious sects, where cultural differences may still arise between Christians and Muslims, and even between Muslim Shiites and Muslim Sunnis. Indeed, different religions may impact the society in different ways as scholars suggest:

Besides the influence on the party system and the government it has been assumed that religion has special effects on the development of society. … It seems possible to demonstrate that different religions are coupled with differences in attitudes to the development of society.” (Lane and Ersson 1978: 56).

Extending this argument to women invokes ‘modern-ness’ versus ‘traditionalism’ between Christians and Muslims, and ‘conservatism’ versus ‘tolerance’ between Muslim Sunnis and Shiites, especially for women. In this vein, a female official states that,

Islam looks at women as second class citizens and inferior to men. Our parties offer women more chances in leadership than Muslim-dominated non-religious parties, like Future. Religious parties like Hizbullah are less progressive and more conservative. They have one woman in their politburo and have never nominated women to parliament.

Similar views are offered by another female activist who sees that, “Christian-dominated parties (viz., Giants, Lebanese Forces, Wa’ad, and Tayyar) actually promote women more than the Muslim-dominated Mustaqbal.” Other female activists maintain that confessional affiliation may be more relevant to women’s leadership than different religions, since even amongst parties within the same confessional denomination there are variations that influence women’s leadership. A female official points out few cases in point in that,

The Kata’eb, Marada, or Lebanese Forces tend to have more religious components in their platforms than the Tayyar or Wa’ad. The latter parties have more women in leadership positions than the other civil-confessional parties. Also, Mustaqbal has less religiosity than the extremist Jama’a Islamiyah. Islamist extremist parties do not have women in leadership. These are extremely conservative, especially the Sunni Islamist parties, closer to the ‘Wahabi’ in Saudi Arabia.

These views are substantiated by data in chart 6.6. However, these also add insight on how religion is indeed multivocal and how party’s political culture and elites’ attitudes towards

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women’s leadership vary with religiosity, even within the same religious family. This substantiates the theoretical framework of party variation in religiosity posited and tested here. There is, however, a correlation between the degree of religiosity and major religious traditions. Indeed, parties with higher religiosity are all Muslim-dominated. Further, Christian-dominated parties outnumber Muslim-dominated parties within the group labeled civil-confessional parties and coded with lower religiosity (scoring 4). Moreover, the share of women in leadership bodies of the affluent Muslim-dominated party, Future (Al-Musta’qbal), is half of that of the powerful Christian-dominated party, Free Patriotic Movement (Tayyar). This information relates party religiosity to party elites’ attitudes towards women’s leadership as observed through the lens of Christianity versus Islam. The correlation is not complete, though, and the intensity of religiosity has an independent effect even within separate religious families. Thus, even within Muslim or Christian-dominated parties, as religiosity declines women’s leadership rises. In fact, the issues of political culture and party elites’ attitudes vis-à-vis women’s leadership map out very closely to religiosity.

Other issues raised by female officials shed light and increase our understanding of the mechanisms and factors that result in high shares of female leadership in some parties but not in others. For instance, the female chef de cabinet in the Tayyar, a post-war civil-confessional Christian-dominated party, emphasizes that, “Religious parties have theocratic and dictatorial tendencies which block women from leadership, while democratic parties offer women better chances.” Further, statements of officials from post-war secular and civil-confessional parties, especially those employing democratic procedures at least in decision-making and have plural membership, highlight the positive impact of these two factors on parties’ political culture. Indeed, post-war secular and civil-confessional parties generally exhibit a more modern, tolerant
and women-friendly political culture than pre-war civil-confessional and all religious parties, as chapter Four has shown and as data in charts 6.7 and 6.8 show. However, manifestations of democratic practices do not seem to be prevalent in most religious parties and these parties have lower shares of women in leadership, as charts 6.7 and 6.10 have shown.

In pitting the statements of party leaders against those of female party activists, one finds in general a disjuncture between the normative statements of party elites and the reality described by females, or between the de jure and de facto. Some leaders directly rebut a cultural and patriarchal explanation for women’s leadership in political parties. Apart from religious parties, pre-war parties attribute the low share of women in leadership bodies to cultural barriers; while post-war parties encourage women and plan to introduce internal quotas to enhance their already relatively higher shares in leadership bodies. For instance, even a female activist in a civil-confessional party offers a cultural explanation for the shares of women in leadership bodies:

Patriarchy prevails and is reflected in political parties. Even in modern and ‘avant gardiste’ parties like ours, women continue to be tasked with secondary and supportive roles, while men remain at the helm even if they are not as qualified. I am always appointed secretary of the executive committee, although I do all the work, while the chief gets all the credit. I resigned and complained because I felt slighted. Although the party leader is a feminist, he is surrounded by senior advisers who are sexists and threatened by qualified and competent women.

In a similar vein, a female official in another post-war civil-confessional party argues that, “Discrimination against women prevails even in the most hospitable of parties. Men receive preferential treatment irrespective of qualifications and competence; while more stringent eligibility requirements are imposed on women attesting to prevalence of patriarchy and a sexist mentality.” She adds that, “Unless women are exceptionally qualified, assertive and pushy, they
are not nominated or elected to leadership positions. Parties demand that women must be 100% perfect, while they settle for less in the case of men.”

Responses of female officials also reflect variation in parties’ political culture and the observed influence on their chances in leadership. The attitude of post-war secular and civil-confessional parties towards women’s leadership is more welcoming than that of pre-war and all religious parties. These party variations in political culture vis-à-vis women’s leadership may partly explain why post-war civil-confessional parties have higher shares of women in leadership than pre-war and post-war religious parties due to what I refer to as an ‘anti-women-as-leaders’ attitude. Moreover, the ultra-conservative stance and hostile attitude of pre-war religious extremist parties explains the absence of women from their leadership bodies. The share of women in leadership bodies of the war-origin conservative but not extremist religious party is slightly higher, albeit still infinitesimal. However, in the war-origin tolerant religious party, women’s share in leadership is visibly larger as party religiosity falls. Statements of pre-war civil-confessional as well as pre-war, war and post-war religious parties, flag patriarchy and cultural explanations, and religious doctrine in the case of religious parties, for the low share of women in their leadership bodies.

What do these statements imply for the hypothesis presented and tested in this thesis?”

These responses highlight that, parties with religious agendas – as other parties-- may be willing to promote women for strategic reasons employing an ‘ends justify the means’ justification. Moreover, parties use women to enhance their image or their special contributions for electoral success. This means that parties recognize the value added presence of women in parties. However, the puzzle is that these parties do not advance women but women do not complain.

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13 Dahlerup also argues that, “… Stigmatization of political women … are based on double standards (women are seen as tokens as if the men in politics were never that), and the femininity of women politicians is questioned – a woman politician is a kind of a she-man.” (Dahlerup, 2006: 297)
This section has shown that religiosity is observed by female party activists and to some extent by leaders and elites especially in secular and post-war civil-confessional parties, to affect party attitudes and the likelihood of support to women’s advancement. On the one hand, leaders of pre-war secular and civil-confessional parties stress that women have equal chances for leadership in all parties, because they face the same cultural and patriarchal barriers. Party elites in pre-war, war-origin and post-war religious parties invoke the Shari’a and the principle of ‘Al-Qiwama’ as well as ‘women’s place is at home’ and ‘politics-is-a man’s-business’ discourses to disqualify women from leadership.\textsuperscript{14} In contrast, leaders of post-war secular and civil-confessional parties see that their parties offer women more leadership chances, which is reflected in the higher shares in leadership bodies. On the other hand, female officials in religious parties agree that party religiosity influences women’s leadership. Some highlight that there is variation in parties’ religiosities and accordingly different leadership chances. Originating from women in religious parties, such testimonies carry weight in support of the theory of party variation in religiosity. Some interlocutors also raised the issue of parties’ interests as driving women’s chances in leadership even if this implies re-interpreting the doctrine. Data on shares of women in leadership bodies across parties show that as religiosity increases women’s shares in leadership fall. These shares are infinitesimal in religious extremist parties lending support to the main hypothesis.

In sum, statements of interviewees support the conceptualization that party religiosity influences women’s leadership. The impressions gained from responses point to the link between

\textsuperscript{14} In Jordan religious extremist parties also block women from leadership as Clark cites that, “…, the Executive Bureau took a strong stance against Jordan’s new electoral quota system for women, arguing that quotas violate the principle of equality articulated by Islam. …, the IAF (Islamic Action Front) nominated Musini (a female member of Shoura Council) for purely strategic reasons, over the objections of party members who declared her candidacy ‘haram’ (prohibited by Islam). (Clark, 2004: 7).
elites’ attitudes, party religiosity and women’s ascendance to leadership positions. Leaders and elites of parties with higher religiosity, especially in extremist parties, appear to be against advancing women. In contrast, leaders and elites in secular and post-war civil-confessional parties indicate that they are more likely to do that. What is intriguing is that the huge female membership in religious parties does not translate into meaningful representation in leadership bodies, contrary to theoretical expectations. The following section examines this puzzle.

B. Does Female Membership Matter for Party Leadership?

The qualitative findings in the previous section raise the issue whether female membership matters for party leadership. This section responds to this query. Comparing charts 5.1 to 5.9 on female membership (chapter Five) to charts 6.1 to 6.10 on female leadership show that the shares of female membership and leadership in post-war secular and civil-confessional parties support the hypotheses (see, H2 and H3A, H4 and H5 in chapter Five). However, the corresponding shares in religious parties do not. Rather, these shares point to a mismatch between membership and leadership, which is more pronounced in religious conservative parties with higher religiosity combined with plural and democratic deficits. These parties have huge female membership in the rank and file but infinitesimal shares of women in leadership bodies, with these parties seeing a huge female ‘presence’ that does not seem to impose itself (Phillips, 1995). This phenomenon may come as no surprise, since other scholars find a similar pattern in religious popular parties (Basu 2005, Clark and Schwedler 2003, among others). Nonetheless, this mismatch is against my theoretical expectations and the findings of Kittilson 1997, Lovenduski and Norris 1995, that higher female membership is correlated with higher leadership. This calls for more in-depth probing to explore how and why the mismatch is sustained.
Female officials in extremist and conservative religious parties do not demand leadership unlike those in religious tolerant parties, as shown above. In this context, the head of women’s wing clarifies that, “Religious commitment attracts women to join Hizbullah or other religious parties. They do not join because of ambitions for leadership. This is against the Shari’a. As believers, we do not seek or demand leadership posts.” Another female official notes that, “Women in Hizbullah do not feel marginalized and do not complain. Pious women are better off when not in politics. Their chances in leadership are limited in other parties, including in secular parties.” Similar views are expressed by other female officials in extremist and conservative religious parties. For instance, a female official in charge of the public relations and media stresses that, “I do not consider that I am short-changed or slighted. I joined the party because of my religious convictions and not for personal gains or political ambitions.” The head of the women’s wing in a pre-war religious extremist party explains that,

Women join parties much later than men. Therefore, it is normal to see more men in leadership positions than women who are not politically mature. Moreover, politics is not a woman’s domain since they work on social issues only. Why don’t you pose these questions to my husband? He is the party leader.

Such replies demonstrate that even when they are in leadership positions, women in extremist parties defer to men as more politically savvy and better placed to respond to political questions.15

In contrast, female activists in other parties are demanding leadership positions, proposing measures in that direction, but also recognize that more effort is needed to attain these positions. For instance, a female activist in a pre-war secular party maintains that, “Unless women get organized in balancing their multiple tasks and men share domestic duties, the active involvement of married women in parties will be jeopardized during a period in their life cycle

15 As mentioned earlier, the majority of heads of women’s wings in religious parties of varying religiosities are also wives of party leaders or senior party elites.
when they are raising a family.” However, a female activist cautions that, “Even if there is partnership in the family, the share of women in leadership might not increase, irrespective of the share of married women in parties’ membership.” She concludes that, “We cannot claim that being married is an obstacle to leadership. Some women have the ambition, interest, or drive for political leadership. But, women are part of this patriarchal society. They often reproduce it and willingly allow men to remain the decision-makers.” Indeed, several party leaders in pre-war civil-confessional parties express skepticism that, “even if women are politically active, once they get married and start forming a family their involvement declines.” These statements raise certain issues about leadership in that women (1) should be interested in politics, (2) must get organized to handle their multi-tasks; (3) their activity follows a life-cycle pattern; and (4) should be assertive in demanding leadership posts. In this vein, a female activist explains that, “The fact that women’s activism declines once they get married and resumes when their kids grow up is normal. This might explain why parties hesitate to invest in women, same as employers hesitate before they employ single young women.” Parties do not compile statistics on the marital status of female members or the share of those who withdraw upon getting married in order to substantiate these claims.

Moreover, testimonies of heads of women’s wings in war-origin religious and post-war civil-confessional parties, which have huge female membership, confirm that a high share of women in the rank and file are indeed married. More often than not, both wives and husbands are members in the same religious parties.\(^\text{16}\) However, what is not obvious is whether truly women’s careers follow a life cycle path and whether this influences their leadership chances.\(^\text{17}\) The role of family responsibilities may provide partial explanation of the mismatch between female

\(^{16}\) Scholars studying voting patterns within families also find that husbands and wives vote similarly.

\(^{17}\) This falls outside the scope of this thesis and may be a topic in a future research agenda.
membership and leadership within parties but why is this gap much wider in religious than in secular and civil-confessional parties demands further investigation. I look for explanations in party religiosity, as well as in pluralism and democratic procedures. In this connection, a female activist in a pre-war secular party suggests in a normative manner that,

The responsibility for this mismatch is a joint one between female officials and party leaders. Women should lobby for recognition and demand leadership. Rights are acquired not granted. Parties should introduce affirmative action measures, establish implementation mechanisms, and set a time frame for increasing women’s share in leadership positions.

These suggestions echo the scholarly arguments in drawing a political career path for women by linking female membership to their leadership chances. This scholarship maintains that women’s participation at the grassroots is a stepping stone to leadership within parties and in public office. Scholars suggest that once women join parties at the lower ranks, they could directly increase the pressure for representation at higher levels (Lovenduski and Norris 1995). Other scholars argue that the presence of women at higher levels and in leadership positions within parties’ inner structures appears to reinforce female parliamentary representation. Kittilson adds that,

…, women’s participation inside the party as party activists at the local level, as organizers of intraparty women’s groups, and as internal officeholders should buoy women’s power in the party.” However, she concludes that, “…parties with higher proportions of women activists will display correspondingly high proportions of women MPs. (Kittilson, 1997:5)

She points to Putnam’s law of increasing disproportions, which implies that, “… the representation of women should be lower at higher organizational levels.” (Kittilson, 1997:13) Hence, if this law is applicable, then the share of female leadership would always be lower than female membership as levels rise. The sizeable female membership (50%) in Hizbullah, a conservative religious party, does not translate into significant or meaningful share in leadership

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(7%). In this vein, the leader of a pre-war religious extremist party admits that, “In Hizbullah and other Islamic parties we have an active and a large number of women in membership. You don’t find that many in secular and leftist parties. It is true we don’t have many women at the top, but so is the case in other parties.” This is a valuable admission on women’s leadership in religious parties especially coming from a leader of an extremist religious party. However, in Tayyar, a post-war civil-confessional parties, the huge female membership (51%) produced a meaningful share in leadership (25%), which corroborates Putnam’s law (2000) but also shows that as female membership expands leadership follows suit (H4).

Modern mobilization strategies, modalities and mechanisms employed by religious parties as well as by secular and civil-confessional parties explain the high female membership but cannot simultaneously explain party variation in women’s leadership. Religious mobilization, in-kind and financial incentives explain why women, especially the poor and deprived, initially join religious parties. Financial incentives and religious convictions combined can explain a large part of the huge female representation in religious parties. The issue of ‘veiling for money’ may also explain women’s passive attitude towards leadership and subsequently their meager share in leadership positions in religious parties. Women accept to remain in lower-level positions, or rather do not complain or demand leadership positions, because they are captive of and want to sustain their source of livelihood. These women generally articulate minimal interest in politics, while conceding that politics is a man’s turf and the society is not yet ready for women to play a major role in decision-making and political leadership. Women in religious parties appear to be content with the role that their male colleagues bestow upon them. Indeed, a female official in a post-war religious but tolerant party metaphorically but cynically describes women’s status in most religious parties as, “A masochist tendency in that women like it that
men continue to lead and have authority over them, while they remain obedient and content
followers.” In this vein, a female official in a post-war civil-confessional party in alliance with a
powerful religious parties, observes that,

The paradox today is that in Amal, women are the most involved in politics among other
parties. They are present on the ground and at the grassroots. Their women are engaged in
media politics and received awards as best TV hosts and anchor persons. However, their
influence in decision-making remains negligible and does not go beyond middle level
management. In Hizbullah, there is only one woman at the top. She does not wield power
or influence nor can she be considered a decision-maker.

In fact, this is not a paradox at all. Religiosity in Amal is lower than in extremist and conservative
religious parties. It is a party with tolerant religiosity and has a higher share of women in
leadership bodies (10%) than any other religious party, which supports the theory of party
variation in religiosity.

Although female membership in most religious parties is sizeable, female officials are
passive, lack political ambition, and are not assertive. They are not ‘activists’ or agents of
change, which is why throughout the dissertation, I refer to them as ‘officials’ but less so as
‘activists’. Except for those in the tolerant religious party, Amal, women in other parties do not
lobby, form pressure groups, or demand leadership positions. Women join religious parties out of
conviction, but the huge membership is also associated with receipt of in-kind and financial
incentives. Party elites influence how platforms are drawn and the intensity of religiosity on their
agendas, which in turn reflects their attitudes vis-à-vis women’s leadership, as discussed earlier.
Therefore, the negligible share of women in leadership positions in religious parties is also a
reflection of their political culture as ‘anti-women-as-leaders’. This is in line with earlier
scholarship, since several scholars find that religious parties do not advance women despite a
sizeable share in rank and file (Basu 2005, Clark and Schwedler 2003). This ‘anti-women-as-
leaders’ attitude of religious parties, which is essentially how party religiosity tunes party elites’
attitudes towards women’s leadership, sheds more light into the mismatch between the high shares of women in membership and their infinitesimally low shares in leadership bodies.

These interventions demonstrate the gap between theory and practice. Female membership in many religious parties does not matter for party leadership, as findings of scholars in Arab, non-Arab and even in consolidated democracies show. The higher shares of women in membership in extremist and conservative religious parties do not translate into comparable shares in leadership bodies. Even when women are in leadership bodies as in women’s wings, they are ex-officio non-voting members and as such remain voiceless and lack influence in decision-making. The association between female membership and leadership in tolerant religious parties is more meaningful. In religious parties, financial incentives do not only explain the huge share of female membership but are also behind their meager shares in leadership bodies, which explains the mismatch between female membership and leadership, against expectations.\(^\text{19}\) In contrast, women in post-war secular a-religious and civil-confessional parties are more visible not only in membership but also in decision-making bodies, as reflected by the relatively higher shares of women in leadership bodies. Therefore, female membership matters for their leadership in post-war secular and civil-confessional parties but not in religious parties. Party variation in religiosity can explain variations in women’s leadership. Higher religiosity in religious parties’ platforms can explain the low share of women in leadership bodies.

In the following section, these qualitative findings are substantiated by quantitative tools of analysis to statistically support the relationships posited in the theory of party variation in religiosity.

\(^\text{19}\) This phenomenon may be comparable to the inability of citizens to hold political representatives accountable because they receive handouts (viz., in rentier states) instead of paying taxes: a ‘no representation without taxation’ in undemocratic polities. A similar phenomenon is found in party systems where representatives and party leaders are not accountable to their constituencies because of clientelism.
C. A Regression Model for Women’s Leadership in Political Parties

The interview responses give good ground for inferring that religiosity is important for party culture and women’s leadership chances. However, only multivariate analysis can inform us whether religiosity is still observed to have a significant effect on outcomes once we control for other party factors that are likely to affect women’s advancement. The preliminary findings from the qualitative review chapters do not show which variables have more import on women’s leadership, which only quantitative tools of analysis will reveal. This section shows the complementarity between the qualitative and the quantitative data in testing the theory of party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership. In this section, I examine the influence of religiosity in party platforms on women’s leadership. I conclude by estimating a model for women’s leadership in political parties based on the case study of Lebanon.20

This exercise covers 18 relevant parties that occupy at least one seat in any of the five post-war parliaments (1992-2009).21 I use this low threshold in order to include as many and as diverse parties as possible out of an almost 80 active parties, many of which are weak and fringe parties. Political parties are the unit of analysis. Women’s leadership in parties’ policy-making and decision-making bodies is the main dependent variable.22 Party variation in religiosity is the core explanatory variable. Other party-level characteristics hypothesized to affect female membership and leadership are democratic procedures in leadership transition and decision-

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20 For the concepts of party religiosity and women’s leadership employed in this dissertation, see chapter One.

21 Parties are broken down along the civil war timeline into pre-war (before 1975) and war-origin plus post-war parties (post-1975). Since ‘n=3’ (small), war-origin and post-war parties are collapsed in one group. Parties are labeled by their religiosity into secular a-religious, confessional but civil secularists; and religious tolerant, conservative but not extremist, and extremist parties.

22 Party variations in the shares of women on parties’ electoral lists for parliament and for municipalities are two other dependent variables. These are examined in the Epilogue.
making, as well as pluralism in composition of membership. Female membership is an endogenous variable which is also expected to influence women’s leadership.\(^{23}\)

1. **Examining party-level characteristics**

   Encouraged by the supportive qualitative findings, I estimate a multivariate regression equation of women’s leadership. I test the influence on women’s leadership of religiosity, democratic procedures, pluralism, and female membership. Women’s leadership, the main dependent variable, is operationalized by using percentage shares of women in policy-making and in decision-making bodies within the inner structures of political parties.

   Political parties are coded along a religiosity continuum of a five-point scale with a score of ‘1’ for parties with highest religiosity (lowest secularism) and a score of ‘5’ for parties with lowest religiosity (highest secularism).\(^{24}\) The labeling and coding of parties’ religiosity is informed by content analysis of party platforms, as well as extensive consultations with party leaders, female activists, scholars and national experts on political parties in Lebanon.

   Democratic practices in parties’ operating procedures are measured by transfer of leadership and decision-making processes in their inner workings. This variable combines both indicators and is operationalized, by assigning ‘0’ to parties that do not employ democratic procedures in both indicators (transfer leadership and decision-making); ‘1’ those that employ one of the two indicators of democratic practices; and ‘2’ for parties that employ both indicators of democratic procedures. Pluralism denotes multi-religious composition of party membership as opposed to

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\(^{23}\) Female membership may be an intervening variable and may have indirect effects on women’s leadership through party-age or pluralism or democratic procedures. This will be examined in the empirical section, but is not expected to have significant effects.

\(^{24}\) I use ‘secularism’ in the model instead of ‘religiosity’ since the intensity of religiosity scale is in ascending order of secularisms from ‘1’ lowest secularism to ‘5’ highest secularism. This also shows that parties’ platforms are composed of both religiosities and secularism components following the findings in the field research in Lebanon, which point to multiple religiosities and secularisms.
exclusivity to a single sect. It is operationalized by dichotomizing the variable and assigning ‘0’ for parties of single sect membership and ‘1’ for multi-religious membership.

Female membership is expected to influence women’s leadership, although it may not be a prerequisite for it. It is also influenced by democratic practices and pluralism. It is operationalized by using the percentage shares of women in total party membership in the 18 relevant parties. Party-age is a proxy that captures party variation in political culture and distinct differences in party elites’ attitude vis-à-vis women’s leadership in the wake of the 15-year civil war in Lebanon. Party-age is dichotomized by assigning ‘0’ for parties established before 1974 or pre-war and ‘1’ for war-origin and post 1975, thereafter post-war parties. Annex 6.1 to this chapter provides the list of parties and coding of various variables, for reference.

2. Scatter Plots

Scatter plots 6.1 to 6.4 (next pages) are visual descriptions of associations between the dependent variable, women’s leadership, and each of the independent variables, religiosity, pluralism and democratic procedures, as well as female membership. Indirect effects are also considered. The diagrams provide initial verification of the theory and relevant hypotheses that this dissertation advances and indicate the full range of the data. Plot 6.1 depicts a positive association between female leadership and secularism with an upward sloping regression line; or a negative association looking at this from the religiosity end of the continuum. Regressing female leadership on secularism, Pearson’s coefficient (r = .62) denotes minimum dispersion around the estimated regression line, with secularism estimated to explain .34 (or 34%) of the variation in women’s leadership across parties. Bivariate analysis confirms the strong influence of religiosity on women’s leadership. The correlation coefficient denotes that as secularism rises
(or religiosity falls) women’s leadership will incrementally increase by 2.96 percent, with a statistically significant t-score.\textsuperscript{25}

**Plot 6.1 Female leadership & secularism**  
Leadership= -.26 + 2.96 (secularism)  
\((r = .62; \beta = 2.96***; t=3.15)\)

**Plot 6.2 Female leadership & pluralism**  
Leadership= 7.78 + 6.42 (pluralism)  
\((\text{Diff. in means '0' } = 7.78 & \text{ '1' } = 14.2; t=2.23)\)

The fact that pre-war a-religious secular parties, with a score of ‘5’ on secularism and religiosity scale, have lower shares of women in their leadership bodies than expected does not violate the core hypothesis in the theory. Despite their lower religiosity, pre-war secular and civil-confessional parties, especially those with leftist tendencies like the Baath and the Syrian Social, lost clout and outreach, as they faced fierce competition from affluent and strong post-war parties, notably Hizbullah and the Future. They failed to recruit more women not only because they employed traditional mobilization tools but also due to widened religious cleavages in the aftermath of the civil war. This led to shifting membership from pre-war secular to post-war religious conservative and civil-confessional powerful parties, which reduced pluralism nationwide and openings for women’s leadership as well. Moreover, pre-war civil-confessional parties like the Phalanges and National Liberals are entrenched in their own ways, more conservative and less hospitable to women’s leadership than the modern ‘avant gardiste’ post-

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\textsuperscript{25} Scatter plot 6.1 depicts one leverage outlier, the post-war civil-confessional party Tayyar. Dropping this outlier does not affect the upward slope of the regression line. The influence of religiosity on women’s leadership remains statistically significant.
war stronger parties, like the Future and Tayyar. These findings support the hypothesis that women’s leadership is higher in post-war than in pre-war parties (H5).

Scatter plot 6.2 shows the relationship between female leadership and pluralism. The coefficient ($r = .48$) denotes low dispersion around the regression line, with pluralism explaining 0.24 (or 24%) of the variance in women’s leadership, controlling for other variables. The bivariate regression coefficient ($b = 6.42$) is statistically significant. More specifically, the difference in means between plural and non-plural parties (14.2 and 7.78, respectively) is statistically significant, which implies that we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in means between plural and non-plural membership. Indeed, post-war civil-confessional parties like Tayyar, Future or Tajaddod with plural membership have higher shares of women in leadership than other parties. Therefore, these results are statistically and substantively significant and consistent with the hypothesis that pluralism exerts a strong positive influence on women’s leadership (H3).

Plot 6.3 shows that the relationship between women’s leadership and democratic procedures is in the expected direction with a coefficient of 1.96, but not statistically significant. This implies that, contrary to theoretical expectations (H2) and substantive justifications, the influence of democratic procedures on women’s leadership is not established statistically. Parties with democratic procedures in either leadership transitions or decentralized decision-making have slightly higher shares in women’s leadership than parties that are fully democratic. Moreover, parties with democratic deficits have comparable shares of women in leadership to those that are fully democratic. Therefore, the statistical and substantive findings on the influence of democratic procedures on women’s leadership do not
tally. This, however, should not imply that democratic process does not matter for female leadership. It is just not statistically significant.

**Plot 6.3 Female leadership & democracy**

Leadership = 8.43 + 1.96(democracy)

(t=0.77; F=0.4532)

**Plot 6.4 Female leadership & membership**

Leadership = 7.95 + .09(membership)

(r = .1745; b = .0867; t=0.71)

These results are substantiated in that the post-war civil-confessional parties with the highest shares of female leadership (viz., Tayyar, Wa’ad, Tajaddod, Quwwat and Future), are marked by non-democratic leadership transitions but decentralization in decision-making. In contrast, the couple of religious extremist parties (viz., Jama’a Islamiyah and Jabhat El-‘Amal), that pursue due democratic process in leadership transitions but not in decision-making, have no women in their leadership bodies.

Plot 6.4 shows no discernable pattern for the relationship between women’s leadership and membership. There is wide dispersion around the regression line, low t-score, a correlation coefficient which is not statistically significant, and a standard error that is double that of the coefficient. All this implies that we cannot safely reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between female membership and their leadership prospects. This statistical finding for the whole sample of 18 parties is not in the expected direction. But, this does not mean that female membership does not matter for leadership in all parties. This is most likely because of the presence of huge female membership in separate and segregated women’s wings in parties with higher religiosity. These parties have managed to block a
linear career path for women and instead re-directed women and ‘ghettoized’ them in women’s wings freeing the space for continued male-domination. However, the scatter plots and bivariate analysis of the relationship between female membership and leadership for parties that have less religious components in their platforms (13 out of 18) and for parties that do not maintain women’s wings (five out of 18), produces positive and statistically significant results, as anticipated. This relationship is tight, significant and substantively important. Each one percent increase in membership is associated with one percent increase in leadership. However, since there are five parties that do not have wings, we are unable to estimate the full model for just those instances in which parties do not operate wings. For the more secular parties, however, the relationship is positive and significant, although less significant and the estimated marginal effect is smaller.

The correlation matrix between the dependent and independent variables shows collinearity between the independent variables (see, Annex 6.3). Regressing each of the independent variables against all others, the mean variance inflation factors (VIF) ranged between 1.83 and 1.34, which does not seem to be problematic. However, this slight collinearity makes it more difficult to find a significant coefficient when these variables are incorporated together in a multivariate regression model. Notwithstanding this, we are able to estimate significant coefficients for at least two of the posited explanatory variables, secularism and pluralism.

3. **A multivariate regression model for women’s leadership in political parties**

The influence of religiosity and secularism on women’s leadership stands out in terms of statistical significance of the coefficients. This finding provides robust support for the

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26 Because of the strong potential for heteroskedasticity in the error terms, the models were re-estimated using Huber-White standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity. Results were qualitatively similar. The model was re-run excluding one outlier, for the post-war secular party (Tayyar), and results were qualitatively similar.
hypothesis that as religiosity increases, the share of female leadership in parties’ inner decision-making bodies diminishes (H1). Table 6.3 reports the results from estimating a multivariate model for women’s leadership based on the case study of Lebanon. In this model, female leadership is regressed on secularism, pluralism, democracy, female membership and party-age. The model estimated in this multivariate regression equation is as follows:

\[ \text{Leadership} = b_0 + b_1 (\text{secularism}) + b_2 (\text{pluralism}) + b_3 (\text{democracy}) + b_4 (\text{female membership}) + b_5 (\text{party-age}) \]

Table 6.3  Party Characteristics & Women’s Leadership in Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables (Standard errors)</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secularism &amp; Religiosity</td>
<td>3.4663*** (.9550)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>3.1032* (2.6970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-1.1112 (2.1437)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Membership</td>
<td>.0343 (.1029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-Age</td>
<td>6.9931** (2.6614)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (base)</td>
<td>-7.0099* (4.4637)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Official data from party administrators compiled and processed by author.

***=P.01; **=P.05; *=P.10

In table 6.3 presenting the estimated model, the predicted marginal increase in women’s leadership of jumping one category on the secularism and religiosity scale is estimated at 3.47 percentage points, controlling for other variables. However, rather than assuming that incremental changes between categories have uniform effects, the model was re-estimated using dummies for different sets of non-religious parties. Results are substantively similar. The Dummy variables are created for secular and civil-confessional parties to replace secularism. This would capture their effect on the predicted marginal increase in female leadership above and beyond that.
relationship between party religiosity and women’s leadership produces a statistically significant t-statistic. At this level of statistical confidence (0.01), we can safely reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between women’s leadership and degree of secularism in party platforms. The combined effect of the variables in the model produces an $R^2$ which can explain 0.75 of the variance and adjusted $R^2$ at 0.65 (around 65%) of variations in women’s leadership across political parties. This is also substantively significant since the lowest shares of women in leadership positions are in parties with highest religiosity like the Unitarian, Jama’a Islamiah, or Hizbullah parties.

With respect to democratic procedures, the coefficient is negative (-1.1), not statistically significant, and associated with high standard errors. These results imply that we cannot safely reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between women’s leadership and democratic practices. This means that, controlling for other variables, the share of women’s leadership drops by 1.1 units when parties move from non-democratic behaviour ‘0’ to ‘1’ for a single indicator of democratic procedures, either leadership transitions or decentralization in decision-making, or from ‘1’ to ‘2’ for all democratic practices. These counter-intuitive results in the regression model have substantive interpretations in the parties’ political culture reflected in the attitude of party elites towards women’s leadership.

in religious parties, controlling for everything else. One model takes all independent variables, while another one drops party-age. Comparing the two models with dummies, we get much higher coefficients in regressing leadership on secular (5.7) and civil-confessional (6.1) parties than in model with only the coefficient on civil-confessional parties statistically significant. Their effect on leadership compared to religious parties is about the same judging by the closeness in magnitude of these two coefficients. This indicates that variations in leadership shares are less pronounced in the category of civil-confessional secular parties compared to religious parties. Hence, we can be confident in stating that secular and civil-confessional parties are likely to offer women more chances in leadership than any other category, all else remaining equal. However, the adjusted $R^2$ explains only 53% and 51% of the variance in leadership. This is lower than what the full model can do, when secularism as a whole was used. The advantage is that using the secularism categorical variable with a 5-point scale allows us to pick up the variations across the full range of parties.
Women’s leadership is highest in post-war secular and civil-confessional parties marked by democratic practices in decision-making but not in leadership transitions. In contrast, women’s leadership is lowest in religious extremist parties, two out of three of which show democratic process in leadership transitions but not in decision-making. These results lead us to infer that democracy, contrary to expectations, has no observed effect on enhancing women’s leadership (H2). But, this should not be construed as the norm, since the work of many scholars and students of political parties, associates democratic practices with higher chances for women’s leadership. In effect, three out of the only five parties that employ democratic procedures are the pre-war secular parties with leftist orientations (viz., Baath, Communist and Syrian Social). These are assigned lowest religiosity and have the highest shares of women in their leadership bodies amongst pre-war parties (see chart 6.4). Moreover, many of the post-war parties emerged from militarized and democratically deficient political institutions. This has influenced attitudes of party elites towards women. As such, candidate selection may be based on military male-models rather than open, women-friendly or gender-sensitive, and democratic models. At the same time, these post-war parties found a niche in women and intentionally reached out to them as a marginalized group that could mobilize and assist them. These statistical and substantive results corroborate the findings from the qualitative analysis.

Moreover, the positive coefficient on pluralism in membership implies that when parties move from non-plural membership (score ‘0’) to a plural membership (score ‘1’), women’s leadership is predicted to increase by 3.1 incremental units. The coefficient of pluralism is positive and statistically significant. Hence, we can safely reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between women’s leadership and pluralism. This statistical finding supports the hypothesis (H3) that pluralism influences women’s leadership.
Examining the influence of female membership on women’s leadership, while controlling for the other variables, produces negligible b coefficient (around 0.03) that is not statistically significant and high standard errors. Thus, the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between female membership and women’s leadership cannot be safely rejected, which implies that female membership does not influence women’s leadership.\(^\text{28}\) This is substantiated by the findings from qualitative analysis depicting a mismatch between huge membership of women in religious parties and their shares in leadership. The pattern or phenomenon that religious parties maintain large women’s wings and huge female membership at the rank-and-file, but very few women in leadership positions, is not \textit{sui generis} to Lebanon.\(^\text{29}\) However, in post-war civil-confessional parties, it is observed that high levels of female membership are translated into more meaningful, albeit not matching shares in leadership, as per the law of increasing disproportions (Putnam 2000). This supports hypothesis (H4) that as female membership increases, the share of women in leadership bodies will increase, though disproportionately. The qualitative findings point to several post-war religious parties with high female membership but infinitesimal shares or none at all in leadership; while in post-war secular and civil-confessional parties (e.g. Tajaddod, Tayyar, Mustaqbal, Marada and Lebanese Forces), high female membership seems to translate into meaningful shares in their leadership bodies.

\(^{28}\) Indirect effects of female membership on women’s leadership cannot be large or statistically significant. As the model shows, the coefficient on female membership itself is not significant for the sample as a whole. Moreover, estimating a separate model for female membership produces only party-age as significant. Therefore, female membership cannot have significant indirect effects on women’s leadership. Given this lack of significance, a path analysis is not conducted.

\(^{29}\) As mentioned earlier, this has been observed in the USA in the 1950s (Skocpol 1992) and in conservative parties in Europe (Lovenduski) as well as in Islamist parties in South Asia (Basu, 1997) and in other Arab countries (Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, Albania, Malaysia), besides Lebanon. Some scholars even argue that women’s membership even at the rank-and-file matters to push for leadership positions which creates a critical mass of women for leadership and improves female parliamentary representation (Lovenduski and Norris 1993, and Kittilson 1997).
Party-age is a rough proxy for unobserved changes in pre-war and post-war parties’ strategies and their attitude towards women’s leadership. Other variables in the model capture the effect of party-age on women’s leadership. For instance, post-war parties are expected to be more plural and have more female members and higher representation of women in leadership bodies (H5). Party-age is negatively correlated with secularism, pluralism and democracy but positively correlated with female party membership and leadership (see, correlation matrix in Annex 6.3). The regression coefficient on party-age is positive with a high nominal magnitude of 6.99 and a statistically significant t-score. It is statistically significant. This is substantively also significant because post-war parties have higher shares in leadership and in membership than pre-war parties.

Including party-age in the model is important in case there are some unobserved features (left out bias) of post-war parties that are also helping to drive the results. There is a need to control for party-age in the regression model, while fully aware that as a proxy, it does not fully capture variations in party strategies and behaviour towards women’s leadership across pre-war and post-war parties. If party-age is dropped from the model, secularism remains statistically significant; while female membership becomes significant. The coefficient on pluralism is positive and in the right direction, but not statistically significant. However, democracy remains negative and statistically insignificant. This is re-assuring, especially of the importance of religiosity as an explanatory variable for women’s leadership, but also that the omission of party-age from the model might introduce bias.  

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30 If party-age is dropped, the model explains between four to eight percentage points less of the variations in female leadership than when party-age is incorporated. This implies that party-age does not capture much of the variation in women’s leadership across parties. Dropping party-age from the model changes the magnitude of the coefficients but not their direction.
Indeed, party variation in religiosity, continues to be the strongest explanatory variable for women’s leadership in political parties. No matter how we change the specifications of the model, religiosity stands out as an explanatory variable for variations in women’s leadership across parties, which a priori is a robust finding. This is reflected in statistically significant b coefficient for secularism at 3.47 in the estimated regression model, which means that we can safely reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between women’s leadership and religiosity. This large regression coefficient is associated with small standard error of much less than half of their numerical values, which is very re-assuring. Moreover, the estimated coefficient for pluralism is predicted to be positive but is negative for democracy. This implies that pluralism enhances women’s leadership, as hypothesized; whereas, democratic procedures and practices may not have a significant effect on leadership, at least not in Lebanon. In addition, the model is estimated to explain around 65 percent of variance in women’s leadership. The results of this regression model strongly support the theory that party variation in religiosity is linked to women’s leadership. As parties move one unit towards further secularism, women’s leadership is likely to rise by close to four percentage points.

**Conclusions**

The first two sections in this chapter concluded the qualitative interpretation of findings on women’s leadership in political parties in Lebanon. These findings support the hypothesis that as party religiosity rises, the share of women in their leadership bodies falls. Indeed, the average shares of women in leadership positions are lowest in religious extremist parties with highest religiosity and with plural and democratic deficits. They are highest in post-war secular and civil-confessional parties with lower religiosities, plural membership and democratic procedures in decision-making.
How do the qualitative and quantitative findings complement each other? What do the statements given by party leaders and female party activists and the data compiled from party administrators imply for the theory and hypotheses presented and tested in this thesis? The findings support the theory of party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership. Indeed, women’s leadership is lowest in religious extremist parties and highest in secular parties. However, there are other findings worth pointing out.

First, religious parties may be willing to re-interpret religious doctrine when it is in their interest to do so. Second, religious parties use women to improve their public image for electoral purposes, because women are a symbol of the modern. Third, religious parties have huge female membership but minimal shares in leadership bodies. They fail to advance them to leadership positions or have visible representation in decision-making bodies. Fourth, party variation in elites’ attitudes and political culture are shaped by party religiosity and serve as a barometer for women’s leadership. Finally, female membership matters for party leadership relatively more in post-war secular and civil-confessional parties than in religious parties. It is translated into comparable shares in line with Putnam’s law of increasing disproportions. In religious parties, however, there is mismatch between the sizeable level of female membership and their infinitesimal shares in leadership. This is explained by religious mobilization, other tools and mechanisms targeting women. These include financial, ‘money for veiling’ possibilities, and in-kind incentives, which co-opt women into silence. Many leaders and elites in religious parties do not only invoke the Shari’a and Al-Qiwama, but also the traditional discourses that ‘politics-is-a-men’s-business’ and ‘women’s place is at home’,
which block women from ascending to leadership positions.\(^{31}\) In a multi-religious country like Lebanon, attitudes of party elites who double as leaders of religious parties are decisive not only in interpreting the doctrine but also in setting political agendas and determining party religiosities, which in turn influence women’s leadership. Coming from officials in some of the most powerful religious and affluent parties, these views carry weight since they indicate that such parties are unlikely to advance women to leadership bodies unless they transform and the intensity of religiosity in their platforms falls. These findings are robust and strongly support the theory of party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership. These findings also explain the mismatch between women’s high socio-economic profile and their low political representation, the conundrum that motivated this dissertation.

\(^{31}\) Dahlerup also argues that, “The problem is not seen as the absence of women from the political institutions, but rather their intrusion. The argument is that political involvement will ruin the family, and who is going to take care of the children?” (Dahlerup, 2006: 297)
Annex 6.1 Political Parties: Coding by Party-Level Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties (Listed in ascending order by party-age or year of birth)</th>
<th>Party Labels</th>
<th>Party-Age pre-war (0)</th>
<th>Religiosity</th>
<th>Democratic procedures</th>
<th>Pluralism in membership</th>
<th>Women’s Wings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>war &amp; post-war (1)</td>
<td>‘1’ highest</td>
<td>‘5’ lowest</td>
<td>‘2’ democratic;</td>
<td>‘1’ multi-religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(DEM) stands for democratic procedures: This is a combined variable of leadership transitions and decision-making. (L) stands for leadership transitions, which is dichotomized by assigning ‘1’ for parties that follow democratic transitions; and ‘0’ for those that do not. (D) stands for decision-making, which is dichotomized by assigning ‘1’ for decentralization or for parties which involve women in decision-making and ‘0’ for centralization or for parties that do not involved women in decision-making.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-War parties (Pre-1975)</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>DEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist Secular</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Social - Al-Qawmi Al-Souri Secular</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phalanges - Kata’eb Civil-conf.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Bloc -Kutlah Civil-conf.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renaissance – Ba’ath Secular</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Socialist –Takaddomi Ishtiraki Civil-conf.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberals Ahrar Civil-conf.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Group - Jama’a Islamiah Religious extremist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War &amp; Post-War Parties (Post-1975)</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>DEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hope – Amal Religious tolerant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of God - Hizbullah Religious conservativ e</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitarian Islamic - Tawhid Religious extremist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic -Wa’ad Civil-conf.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal Democratic -Tajaddod Secular</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Patriotic – Tayyar Civil-conf.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Forces – Quwwat Civil-conf.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Action Front Jabhat El-‘Amal Religious extremist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future - Mustaqbal Civil-conf.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giants – Marada Civil-conf.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 6.2
Theory of Party Variation in Religiosity & Women’s leadership

**Hypotheses on Female Leadership**

H1. The share of women in decision-making and leadership bodies is likely to be higher in parties whose platforms reflect less religiosity (more secularism) than in those containing high religiosity (low secularism).

H2. Parties employing democratic practices in their operating procedures, particularly in decision-making and transfer of leadership, are more likely to enhance women’s leadership than parties that do not employ such practices.

H3. Parties with plural and inclusive membership, open to all regardless of religion or gender, are more likely to enhance women’s leadership than parties with closed membership and those dominated by a single sect.

H4. The share of women in decision-making and leadership bodies is likely to increase as their share in party membership expands.

H5. The proportion of women in party membership and in leadership bodies is likely to be higher in post-war parties than in pre-war parties.

**Hypotheses on Female Membership**

H2A. Parties employing democratic practices in their operating procedures, particularly in decision-making and transfer of leadership, are more likely to enhance women’s shares in party membership than parties that do not employ such practices.

H3A. Parties with plural and inclusive membership, open to all regardless of religion or gender, are more likely to enhance women’s membership than parties with closed membership and those dominated by a single sect.

**Annex 6.3 Correlation Matrix (obs=18)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>seclrsm</th>
<th>Plur</th>
<th>democracy</th>
<th>f_mem</th>
<th>f_lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seclrsm</td>
<td>-0.2961</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plur</td>
<td>-0.2039</td>
<td>0.6036</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy</td>
<td>-0.4400</td>
<td>0.5700</td>
<td>0.6218</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f_mem</td>
<td>0.6829</td>
<td>-0.3766</td>
<td>-0.1251</td>
<td>-0.3599</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f_lead</td>
<td>0.3722</td>
<td>0.6182</td>
<td>0.4863</td>
<td>0.1887</td>
<td>0.1745</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Data compiled from party administrators and processed by author. See Annex 6.2 for Party coding and operationalization. Female Leadership (f_lead); Female membership (f_mem); Secularism (seclrsm); Pluralism (Plur); Democracy (Dem); Party-Age (age)*
EPILOGUE

Can Women Break Through?

I conclude this dissertation with an epilogue that keeps open a research agenda on women in politics and their leadership prospects. In the dissertation, I pursue a level of analysis approach to women’s leadership. I study women in political parties as the local entry level into their representation in public office at the national level. In the Epilogue, I explore whether women can break through into a political career at the local municipality level.

In previous chapters, I examined the role of party religiosity in affecting women’s leadership. I explored the extent to which religious components penetrate political agendas -- party religiosity -- as an explanation for variation in women’s leadership across parties. In order to test the theory of party variation in religiosity, I use Lebanon as a particularly useful case-study. During 2006-2009 field research, I employed structured and semi-structured interviews with party leaders and female party activists to compile information and an original dataset on women in parties. Information gleaned provides substantive and statistical support to the theory posited that as religiosity increases, women’s shares in leadership fall.

However, impressions gained during two rounds of interviews pointed to different but promising dynamics for women in municipal rather than in parliamentary elections. Nominations for municipalities are made by political parties in close consultation with local communities, particularly selections of candidates by dominant families, family networks, community and religious leaders. In contrast, parliamentary nominations are controlled by political parties as gatekeepers for recruiting, selecting and nominating candidates. These observations motivated a third round of interviews during the summer of 2009 in order to investigate whether party
variation in religiosity also influences women’s nomination on parties’ electoral lists for parliaments and municipalities. Accordingly, I test the following hypotheses:

**H1B.** The share of female nominees on electoral lists for parliaments and municipalities is likely to be higher in parties whose platforms reflect less religiosity (more secularism) than in those containing high religiosity (low secularism).

**H2B.** Parties employing democratic practices in their operating procedures, particularly in decision-making and transfer of leadership, are likely to nominate more women on their electoral lists than parties that do not.

**H3B.** Parties with plural membership are likely to nominate more women on their electoral lists than parties with closed membership and those dominated by a single sect.

**H4B.** The share of female nominees on parties’ electoral lists for parliament and municipalities is likely to increase as their share in party membership expands.

**H5B.** The proportion of female nominees for parliamentary and municipal elections is likely to be higher in post-war parties than in pre-war parties.

The Epilogue takes the research from the institutional party-level to the local municipal level of analysis. It moves beyond female leadership within political parties’ inner structures to the logical “outcome”, notably party nominations for representation in public office. It explores whether party variation in religiosity is also an explanatory variable for variation in shares of female nominees on parties’ electoral lists. The Epilogue poses the research question whether local municipal councils are a breakthrough for female representation in public office in comparison with national parliamentary councils. It is organized in three sections. Sections A and B examine female candidacy for national parliamentary councils in comparative perspective to local municipal councils, respectively. Section C presents the qualitative and quantitative analysis of findings, estimates regression models for female nominations on parties’ electoral lists for public office, and responds to the question “Can women break through?”

**A. Female Parliamentary Nominations by Party Religiosity**

Parliamentary elections in Lebanon are held every four years. There have been five rounds of elections in the post-war era starting in 1992. Political parties are not only conduits for
women’s party leadership but are also gatekeepers by nominating them for public office. Ever since Lebanese women were granted suffrage rights in 1952, women who made it to parliament are those ‘garbed-in-black’. Parties recognizing the merit of including on their electoral lists the widows, sisters, and daughters of assassinated, deceased or powerful political leaders have done so because these women are winners. These women invariably amass votes out of empathy, respect for lost leaders, or vote-buying, which undercuts gender-bias.

Table E.1 Lebanon: Broad Categories of Female Candidates for Parliament
*(Cumulative 1992-2009, in percent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Winners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political parties’ sponsored ‘Women-garbed-in-black’</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>97.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Movement</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(n=61) (n=45)*

Source: Based on official statistics in [www.nclw.org.lb](http://www.nclw.org.lb); Lebanese Parliament, International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES), and calculations by author. See also, table 2.5 in chapter Two.

Table E.1 shows that, 72% of women candidates for parliament in the post-war period belong to the category of widows or dynastic member. Moreover, this category accounted for almost all of the women candidates sponsored by political parties. In all parliamentary elections history, only one woman ever made it to parliament without being ‘garbed-in-black’. All of the women nominated by parties became MPs, while none of those who ran as independents or from the women’s movement won. This finding reinforces that parties are veritable gatekeepers for a parliamentary career.

Some party officials argue that the low share of women on parties’ electoral lists is that women themselves do not come forward and are not interested in politics or in embarking on a political career. In other words, women’s low parliamentary representation represents a positive choice. However, judging by the fact that women comprise around 61% of voter turnout in June
2009 parliamentary elections, it seems unlikely that women are not interested in politics. I have also shown earlier that a critical mass of qualified women for leadership is available in Lebanon. Table E.1 shows that, the women nominated for parliament by political parties enjoy a 100% success rate. Despite this, female parliamentary representation dropped from six to four or from 5.9% in 2005 to 3.1% in 2009. Given the availability of qualified women, and their past success in parliamentary elections, I seek an explanation for their low level of representation in nominations by examining party variation in religiosity, democratic procedures and pluralism; and, how this affects party elites’ attitude vis-à-vis women’s nomination for parliament.

Data gathered from official government sources and party administrators is presented in chart E.1. This shows that the average share of female MP candidates is higher in electoral lists of post-war civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity than in religious extremist, conservative or tolerant parties with higher religiosity.

Indeed, all six female MPs in 2005 and four in 2009 parliaments belong to and are nominated by post-war civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity. Religious extremist and conservative parties, whether Shiite or Sunni-dominated, never nominated women to parliament. Moreover,
even when a female enlightened Islamist mustered her courage to run as independent, the religious extremist party disclaimed her and nominated her husband, the founder and party leader. This forced her to withdraw, but she ran as independent in the next round and did not make it. Citing her daunting experience she stresses that,

The party refused to nominate me. But, I borrowed money to pay for nomination fees and ran as independent. I wanted to make a statement and encourage other enlightened Muslim women to run for office. The Shari’a and Al-Qiwama, which the clergy invoke and use as ‘fatwa’, do not prevent women from leadership. It is the clergymen’s interpretation of the doctrine that is hostile to women. In the Friday prayers at the Mosques, the clerics ran defamatory stories unworthy of holy men that I am violating the Shari’a. They criticized my western-oriented political platform for stressing women’s rights as human rights and gender equality.

In fact, the only one party with a tolerant religiosity level (Amal) that ever included a female candidate on its electoral list did so for purely strategic maneuverings. The female candidate is the sister of the then head of government and founder of a powerful post-war civil-confessional party (Future). She could not be included in her party’s list because of the distribution of electoral districts stipulated in the electoral law, which is one of the shortcomings of the electoral law in force.

The electoral system in Lebanon is not that ‘women-friendly’. It is a plurality/majority Block Vote (BV) electoral system with multi-member districts. This system has systemic limitations in which parties have no incentives to include women on their electoral lists. In BV systems, voters vote for candidates and not for parties, which raises the risk of gender-bias and electoral loss, especially because of open lists where they use as many or as few of their votes as they wish. The electoral law has no provisions or quotas for women, neither as shares nor as reserved candidate seats, and parties do not employ internal or electoral voluntary quotas for
women. Confessional quotas are the only quotas in place, by which the 128-seat parliament is split equally between Christians and Muslims and proportionally for sects within each group. As in other countries with electoral systems that are not women-friendly and where a dominant political culture makes parties hesitate in nominating women, improving female representation becomes a difficult endeavour (see, also Basu 2005).

All six female MPs (2005 parliament) interviewed see that extremist religious parties offer women the least chances in leadership, while parties with secular and civil platforms offer women better chances in leadership. In this vein, a five-time female MP and former minister suggests that,

The debate is not about secular or religious parties, but about women taking men’s seats in parliament. In general, parties prefer to nominate women (and men) who toe the line and are winners. However, religious extremist parties are strict in that women’s leadership violates the Shari’a. This happens in dogmatic parties that politicize Islam and use it to achieve their goals.

A female official in a religious conservative party justifies why the party never nominated a woman to parliament in that, “Religious parties do not nominate women to public office because they are afraid that veiled women will not be accepted in the public sphere. This is what happened in Turkey. Moreover, our society is not ready for women in politics, especially not veiled women.” This is a lame justification, in my view, since one of the female MPs (from a post-war civil-confessional party) started wearing a head scarf since 2005 and is perfectly

---

1 In Block Vote (BV) systems, electors have as many votes as there are candidates to be elected. The candidates with the highest vote totals win the seats. Usually voters vote for candidates rather than parties and in most systems may use as many, or as few, of their votes as they wish. The best fit for female representation is to combine BV with a quota of reserved seats. Reserving a tier where only women can stand is guaranteed to elect as many women as the quota makes provisions for. Another combination with BV is ‘reserved seats best loser system’, as the one used in Mauritius and Palestine for underrepresented groups, albeit not specifically for women. This combination works unless there are not enough women candidates. It gives parties incentives to field women candidates in order not to lose any seats to competing parties, as in the case of Jordan. (See, Drude Dahlerup 2006, www.idea.int; and The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), “2010 Municipal Elections in Lebanon” (www.ifes.net).
accepted and respected. Furthermore, Turkey’s hostile version of secularism, being anti-religion, is not at all comparable to the existing cooperation between the state and religious authorities in Lebanon. However, parties with high religiosity are not the only group of parties that did not nominate women for parliament. Despite lower religiosity, plural membership, and democratic practices, pre-war secular parties also did not include women on their electoral lists. These egalitarian leftist parties lost political strength after the war. They are not affluent to buy votes in order to avoid gender-bias, and cannot afford risking the loss of one of the few seats they occupy in parliament by nominating women. Political strength is another element that parties consider in nominating women to parliament. This is measured by the number of seats parties occupy in parliament.  

Statements of party officials also highlight the prevalence of patriarchy and cultural barriers in society. For instance, in the 2009 elections, two female MPs ceded their seats for their sons, although the daughter is more politically involved than the son. This led to the drop from six to four female MPs in 2009. Also, a female MP cites the reaction of a young educated woman to a proposal she made in this connection: “[I] encouraged the affluent daughter of Lebanon’s former president to run for elections, but surprisingly her response was “Why? Are there no men in the family?” Similarly, the head of a women’s wing in a pre-war religious extremist party also questions, “Why should I run if my husband is doing the job? If he is representing me, why should we compete?” These responses reveal that patriarchy reproduces itself and is reproduced by women who suffer from its consequences. In this context, a female chef de cabinet in a post-war civil-confessional party offers the following analysis for the low female representation:

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Women tend to reproduce patriarchy within their own families by discriminating between their sons and daughters. They rarely support or vote for other women (see, Emily’s List). They are reluctant to leave lucrative and financially remunerative business or professional careers for politics. Moreover, women do not always have the financial means to approach parties to nominate them, since parties expect remuneration in return. Even when these hurdles are overcome, women might still not opt for a political career as a matter of choice.

However, this analysis highlights possible explanations for women’s low representation focusing not on what motivates women to run but on what motivates parties not to nominate them. My concerns lie in explaining parties’ attitude vis-à-vis women’s candidacy for public office when women are willing, able and make the choice to run for a career in politics. Another issue several party officials raise is that parties of high religiosity tend to overlook the Shari’a when it is in their political interest to do so for strategic reasons. For instance, a member of the supreme council who is also an MP, states that,

Hizbullah voted in favor of a parliamentary quota for women, which was proposed by our main allies. Unfortunately, it did not pass because the majority bloc is afraid that this will give the opposition bloc the upper hand in parliament.

The fact that a party with higher religiosity votes favorably for a gender quota should not be construed as an indicator of the party’s commitment to women’s leadership. On closer scrutiny, it appears to be far more a show of support for a staunch political ally by employing rhetorical strategies to diffuse public impressions that the party is not ‘anti-women-as-leaders’, even if this implies overlooking sacred Shari’a tenets. Otherwise, we would have seen these parties introduce voluntary internal and electoral quotas for women, or have a higher share of women in leadership

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3 The female respondent was brought up in the States during the civil war. She is familiar with Emily’s list.
bodies or on their electoral lists, especially with a huge female membership. But, this is not the case. These parties will not promote women unless it is in their political interest to do so.\(^4\)

However, the controversy around a parliamentary quota for women is more of a demographic than a gender or patriarchal issue. In the 2009 parliament, there are twelve Christian-dominated and six Muslim-dominated relevant parties.\(^5\) The proposal to reserve 14 additional seats for women did not pass because of considerations rooted in religious and class-based cleavages. The overarching problem in Lebanon is that Muslims do not want Christians to have the upper hand in politics and Christians are fighting to protect their existence. No electoral change will be countenanced if it might upset the delicate balance between the religious blocs. In addition, cultural differences between Christian and Muslim women play a role in their political involvement. As scholars suggest that,

> Besides the influence on the party system and the government, it has been assumed that religion has special effects on the development of society. … It seems possible to demonstrate that different religions are coupled with differences in attitudes to the development of society. (Lane and Ersson, 1987:56)

Empirical evidence shows that there are fewer Muslim than Christian female parliamentary candidates, which translates into lower representation. In fact, all post-war parliaments had more female Christian than Muslim MPs. Even a Muslim-dominated post-war civil-confessional party nominated a Christian female in its electoral list for 2009 elections. In the 2009 parliament there

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4 Scholars report that in 1993 Yemeni elections, “…, conservative voices within Islah … questioned whether it was acceptable for women to vote because they would have to reveal their faces to a stranger to be photographed for their voter registration card. Aware of this potentially pivotal role female voters might play in elections, Islah officials urged the party’s (elected) spiritual leader, … - to issue a *fatwa* stating that it was acceptable for women to be photographed in order to vote. They need to mobilize voters and win seats to enable the party to realize its goals, they argued, far outweigh other concerns.” (Clark and Schwedler, 2003: 300). The Yemeni religious extremist party, Islah, has huge female membership and are all veiled.

5 The Tai’f Accord in 1989 increased the parliament to 128 seats split equally between Christians and Muslims.
are four female MPs: three Christians and one Muslim. In 2005 parliament, there were six female MPs: four Christians and two Muslims. Thus, if a quota of 14 additional reserved seats for women were to be approved, it is likely that more Christian than Muslim women end up in parliament. This may tip the confessional balance.

These empirical findings are consistent with the hypothesis that as party religiosity rises, women’s share on electoral lists fall. However, the reality is that only civil-confessional and war-origin Amal nominated women to parliament in the five post-war rounds of elections. In other words, secular parties with lowest religiosity did not nominate women. The fact that pre-war secular parties did not nominate any women is attributed to their electoral weakness. Even if they wanted to – and I argue that they do – they cannot risk losing the limited seats they have in parliament by nominating women because of gender-bias, and the BV electoral system that is not ‘women-friendly’. Indeed, the share of female nominees on parliamentary electoral lists actually disappears for parties of highest religiosity (extremist and conservative), as well as lowest religiosity (pre-war secular). Thus, we have here a mixed outcome. Despite the fact that civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity show highest female nominations, one is hard pressed to infer that maybe religiosity is not as significant for parliamentary elections as it was found to be for women’s leadership. This will be determined in qualitative and multivariate analysis.

However, maybe in municipal nominations the picture is more promising. The following section examines women’s candidacy for municipal elections in comparative perspective to parliamentary elections.

B. Female Municipal Nominations by Party Religiosity

Municipal elections are held every six years, the last of which was in May 2010. Parties play a more modest role in municipal elections than they do in parliamentary elections. However,
this role is gaining momentum as they come to realize that municipalities are also a key for their electoral strength. Parties are forging strong ties with dominant intervention points within local communities, especially family networks, local community and religious leaders, particularly in smaller districts and rural areas. Data compiled from party administrators denote that ten out of the 18 relevant political parties nominated women in the last two rounds of elections in 2004 and 2010. These include all three pre-war a-religious secular parties with leftist tendencies, only one pre-war civil-confessional party with progressive orientations, four post-war civil-confessional, one religious conservative but not extremist party, and a religious tolerant party.

Comparing data on the last two rounds of municipal and parliamentary elections, one observes that, in absolute and relative terms, more women are running for municipal than for parliamentary elections (see, table E.2).

Table E.2  Female candidates & winners: parliamentary versus municipal elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total seats</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th></th>
<th>Winners</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>% of total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>candidates</td>
<td>candidates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary elections (2005)</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary elections (2009)</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal elections (2004)</td>
<td>8976</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal elections (2010)</td>
<td>11424</td>
<td>1346</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Competition in parliament is over 128 seats across 26 electoral districts, while in municipal elections it is over 11,424 seats in 969 municipalities. The rate of female candidacy was almost three times as high in the most recent municipal election than in the most recent parliamentary elections. This implies that parties are nominating more women in municipal than parliamentary
elections and that women, themselves, are more daring in running for municipal than parliamentary elections. Thus, in relative terms, the share of female nominees for municipalities doubled between 2004 and 2010 to 5.6%, while the corresponding share for parliament was almost halved to 2% between 2005 and 2009. In fact, in February 2010 the Lebanese Cabinet approved a 20% quota for women in municipal councils. This boosted the share of women in parties’ electoral lists during the campaign until the parliament killed the proposal just before elections in May 2010. However, its positive impact on boosting female nominations is reflected in a doubling of their share between 2004 and 2010. These findings are indicative that a window of opportunity is opening for women in politics in municipal elections.

Tables E.3 to E.5 (next pages) present sex-disaggregated data on municipal candidates broken down by party, religious affiliation, and rural/urban divide, respectively. Table E.3 shows that the share of female municipal candidates is relatively higher in rural than in urban districts.

<p>| Table E.3 Municipal elections by gender and urban/rural divide (%) |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>URBAN</th>
<th>RURAL</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Interior, [www.moim.gov.lb](http://www.moim.gov.lb); estimates are based on official sex-disaggregated data by electoral districts.

In smaller rural electoral districts like villages and remote areas, municipal lists reflect strong family networks and are candidate-centric supported by a local same-sect community including

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6 Official data on elections are only available by gender and electoral districts from the Ministry of Interior and the Universal Center for Information (UCI) in Lebanon. Estimates for distribution of municipal candidates by rural/urban divide, religious affiliation and by political party are based on actual sex-disaggregated data by electoral districts. These estimates are computed on the basis of official zoning of electoral districts into urban and rural areas, majority religious sect dominating the district, and associated with parties that have a stronghold in electoral districts. This was done in close consultation with the National Elections Bureau in the Ministry of Interior, party administrators, and the UCI.
religious, community and party leaders. This ensures wider support for women candidates, based on their familial reputation, which encourages more women to run for municipal elections and entices parties to nominate them.⁷ A case in point is made by a female municipal candidate that, “Hizbullah did not actually nominate women but the party included on their lists those who are chosen by family networks and after consultation with community leaders.” Community support is paramount in municipal elections. This includes families, religious leaders and political parties, in that order. In larger electoral districts like cities and urban areas, municipal elections are as equally influenced as parliamentary elections by religious and class cleavages. In such large districts, where dwellers are of mixed religious denominations, confessional affiliation matters in nominations.

Unlike the parliamentary law, municipal law is a non-confessional law. Municipal seats are not distributed by religious affiliation. This offers women more chances in nomination and success than in parliamentary elections. Further, municipal law works better for women than parliamentary law, since upon marriage women take up their husbands’ sect, if different. This limits their chances in receiving support because voters do not consider that they belong to the community (see also El-Helou 1999: 433). Since seats in municipal councils are not earmarked by sect and smaller communities are homogeneous sect-wise, this issue does not arise. Another factor is that municipal law also follows the Bloc Vote (BV) electoral system like parliamentary law. However, in local elections, the BV system has the advantage of strengthening the development of political parties and encouraging cross-confessional voting as parties/candidates

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⁷ This may not tally with the scholarship that larger electoral districts are better for female parliamentary representation than smaller districts (Dahlerup 2006), Norris and Lovenduski (1993), among others). See also, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), “Interactive Overview of combinations of Electoral Systems and Quota Types”, www.idea.int/publications/designing_for_equality/dyntable.cfm (updated September 7, 2007).
increase the likelihood of winning votes by building alliances with parties from other confessional groups.\(^8\)

Table E.4 shows that more Christian than Muslim female nominees run for municipal office, while the opposite is true for men.\(^9\) This suggests that Muslim-dominated communities are more reserved than Christian-dominated ones vis-à-vis women’s political participation.\(^10\)

**Table E.4 Municipal candidates by gender and religion (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Interior, [www.moim.gov.lb](http://www.moim.gov.lb); estimates are based on official sex-disaggregated data by electoral districts.

In this vein, a female activist in a civil-confessional party notes that, “Patriarchy is more prominent in Muslim than in Christian communities. In fact, there is a large margin of freedom for women in our Christian-dominated parties than Muslim-dominated ones.” She reports that in joint meetings, female members in Muslim-dominated parties fear of being blamed for neglecting their domestic duties if they stay late. She adds that, “If women in Hizbullah are called for an interview they have to obtain prior permission from the party leadership. We do not.” Indeed, I had to obtain prior permission to conduct my interviews with female officials in extremist and conservative parties.

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\(^9\) Crude estimates also show that there were three times as much Christian as Muslim female candidates in 1998 and twice as much in 2004 municipal elections (El-Helou: 1999, 425-426; and NCLW: 2004, 49; NCLW: 2006, 50).

\(^10\) As discussed earlier, it may be that different religions influence the behaviour of societies in different ways, including towards women (Lane and Ersson 1987: 56).
Table E.5 provides sex-disaggregated data on distribution of female municipal candidates by party religiosity and urban/rural divide.

**Table E.5 Municipal candidates by party, religiosity, gender & rural/urban divide**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Religiosity Score</th>
<th>Candidates %</th>
<th>Urban %</th>
<th>Rural %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marada</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Social</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tayyar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baath</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Socialist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizbullah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Forces</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Interior, [www.moim.gov.lb](http://www.moim.gov.lb); and estimates based on official sex-disaggregated data by electoral districts.

Data show that, on average, the highest shares for female nominations are by secular a-religious and civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity, except for one outlier party (Lebanese Forces). It also shows that these parties which are marked by plural and democratic procedures are, in effect, nominating more women in rural than in urban areas. As mentioned earlier, the electoral base of pre-war secular parties with leftist a-religious platforms shrank amidst widening religious cleavages and shifting party memberships in the aftermath of the civil war. They found their niche in municipal elections, which exhibit different dynamics in that they cover numerous, smaller electoral districts, and compete over a larger number of seats than parliamentary elections. They quickly stepped in when stronger parties failed to accord municipal elections the same weight they do for parliaments. As such, local municipal elections offer pre-war secular parties another chance for regaining part of their lost foothold. However, eight out of the 18 relevant parties did not nominate women. These include all three extremist
religious parties with the lowest religiosity score (1), and five civil-confessional parties (Kata’eb, Liberals, Kutlah, Wa’ad and Tajaddod) with religiosity score of (4). This implies that even in municipal nominations, extremist parties did not nominate women while conservative and tolerant parties -- with lower religiosities -- did.

Another element is that by law, civil servants in public administrations including state universities or the army have to resign their posts within a specified period of time before they can run for elections.\(^1\) It is noteworthy to mention that the public sector including the army is the largest employer of men from poorer districts in North and South Lebanon. Therefore, in order for men to retain their tenure and privileges, their wives run instead, as a national elections expert informs that, “When men are not allowed by law to run unless they resign as civil servants, women’s chances in getting nominated for municipal elections increase.” These cases are more pronounced in the lower civil service echelons. This explains why the share of female municipal candidates is higher in rural than urban districts, despite religious, traditional and class considerations (see, tables E.3 and E.5). Furthermore, contrary to prior scholarship, we find that smaller electoral districts at the village level are better for female municipal candidacy than larger urban areas, as El-Helou (1999) also finds in studying 1998 municipal elections.\(^2\)

Chart E.2 shows graphically party variation in female municipal nominations. On average, pre-war secular and post-war civil-confessional parties of lower religiosity nominated a higher proportion of women on their electoral lists than conservative or tolerant religious parties.

\(^{11}\) One of the seven female chairs of municipal councils had to resign from her tenured position to run for municipal elections. On the occasion of preparing for the 2010 round of municipal elections, she addressed an open letter to the President of the Republic proposing an amendment to this law. (As-Safir, 3 February 2010).

\(^{12}\) See, Dahlerup (2006), Norris and Lovenduski (1993), among others; also, www.idea.int (September 7, 2007)
with higher religiosity. In fact, extremist religious parties with the highest religiosity level did not nominate any women for municipal elections. Comparing current to previous rounds of municipal elections reveals that even religious conservative parties transform. In effect, in the 1998 municipal elections, Hizbullah announced that they do not support female municipal candidates in their districts, unlike Amal that included women on their electoral lists (El-Helou, 1999). In more recent municipal elections, however, and in the face of competition from other parties, Hizbullah has been willing to nominate a growing number of women. Information from female party officials substantiates these findings.

**Chart E.2 Female Municipal Nominations by Party-Religiosity & Party-Age**

1. ‘1’ extremist, ‘2’ conservative, ‘3’ tolerant, ‘4’ civil-confessional, ‘5’ secular

Municipal elections differ from parliamentary elections in several important ways. One of the important elements relates to the influence of clerics at the small community level in the selection process of candidates. Interviews with female municipal candidates reveal that in conservative traditional villages it is necessary for party leaders to intervene with religious leaders to secure their support for female candidates. This collaboration among families, community leaders, clergymen and party leaders is indicative of how politics and religion work hand in hand in Lebanon. Therefore, support for female municipal candidates does not only
come from families and family networks but also from the community clerics who often hold more clout at the village level than they do in larger districts. Thus, political parties find it in their interest to collaborate with local communities in managing the municipal electoral process. If need be, they seek the support and intervention of the local communities’ religious leaders for female candidates, aware that they are not the sole players in municipal as in parliamentary elections.

In this context, a female municipal candidate remarks that, “Support of the party is not sufficient at the municipal level. Families and the village community as well as the clergy are essential in the selection process and together with political parties they determine winners or losers, women or men.” A case in point is that the husband of a veiled female candidate running for a ‘Mukhtar’ post in a small conservative village posted his picture with “Vote for my Wife” as a show of family support. She won. This way she did not antagonize the community and the clergy by posting her own picture. Another example is offered by one of seven female chairpersons of a municipal councils who explains that,

Since the community in villages is religiously homogeneous, or people belong to the same sect, the clergy have strong influence in municipal elections. For instance, the Sheikh in our Druze community was against women in politics. However, the party leader convinced him to support my candidacy for the local council as a service to the community.

The party leader intervened because it was in the interest of the party to have a female representing the party in the village municipality. However, when parties disregard the communities’ preferences, the consequences are not favorable. For example, a female candidate

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13 The Mukhtar (mayor or official civil registrar) is a civil servant. They are responsible for all civil registers and lists of eligible voters based on official birth and death certificates. This is extremely important in elections because the Mukhtar can shift names from one electoral district to another, if need be, which can sway the results in favour of one list against another. Very few women run for this post and, if they run, fewer still are elected.
from a religious tolerant party describes the strong resistance she faced from her community and
the clergy in running for elections: “In our conservative village, the dominant families and the
religious leader opposed nominating women and insisted on selecting men. However, the party
disregarded the community’s selection and nominated a woman, because the competing list has a
woman. She did not win.” Another incident points to Lebanon’s mosaic society, which is full
of contradictions. A female municipal candidate was selected by a religious community in a
conservative village although she is leftist. She cites that, “270 people signed a petition
nominating me for the municipal council because of my contributions to the community.” She
explains that,

Hizbullah included me on their list because I have many supporters, despite my being a
woman and a leftist. My inclusion on the party’s list is good for competition because the
other list also had a woman. This projects a modern and tolerant image of the party. The
party also financed my nomination fees and my electoral campaign.

In effect, these incidents demonstrate the strength of family and community networks,
especially the religious leaders, in municipal elections and how parties need to work in tandem
with key community entities to ensure their electoral success. The importance of family networks
in municipal elections, which are candidate-centric more than they ‘party-centric’, cannot be
underestimated. More often than not, especially in conservative villages, selection of candidates,
women or men, has to run by both the dominant families and the clergy/religious leaders in these
villages. These choices guide parties’ nominations of winning candidates, women or men. Three
issues stand out from these statements and lessons can be drawn, in general. First, this religious
tolerant party (Amal) failed to secure the support of dominant community families and the
clergy. Second, the party nominated women as a symbol of the modern in order to fight
competition and amass the female vote. Third, this religious party was willing to overlook the
Shari’a by nominating women, because this is in its electoral interest. These justifications give parties incentives to field women as municipal candidates in order not to lose seats to competing parties. This is not *sui generis* to Lebanon, as scholars find in local elections in Canada as well that, “…when at least one woman’s name was officially placed in nominations for a local party candidacy, a female candidate was selected 73 percent of the time.” (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993: 75). These scholars maintain that,

…, there is a different ‘logic of choice’ … parties have a rational incentive to present a ‘balanced ticket’. With a list of names it is unlikely that any votes will be lost by the presence of women candidates on the list. And their absence may cause offense, by advertising party prejudice, thereby narrowing the party’s appeal. (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993: 314-315)

Hence, different dynamics are discerned between municipal and parliamentary elections vis-à-vis women’s candidacy. Moreover, municipal councils hold many more seats than the parliament does. There are 969 municipalities and each council holds an average of 12 seats (in large districts up to 24 seats). Therefore, women’s chances are greater in municipalities than in a 128-seat parliament distributed proportionally among 18 confessions. Municipal law is non-confessional while parliamentary law is. Family networks play a greater role in municipal elections especially in smaller districts where everyone knows everyone else than in parliamentary level. In larger districts and urban areas, female candidates have to have party support first and foremost especially if they come from minority religious denominations. More importantly, political parties maneuver strategically with family networks and the local community including religious leaders, while they play a solitary but more controlling and decisive role in parliamentary elections. The interaction between political parties and clerics also represents strategic maneuvering for parties’ political interests. This has also been observed in Yemen where parties intervened with the clergy to issue a ‘fatwa’ so that veiled women can
unveil to be photographed for voting purposes. Also in Jordan, the clergy intervened to support the nomination of a woman by an extremist party for parliament. Another case in point is the 2005 ‘Mudawana’ in Morocco where the women’s movement allied with religious leaders to interpret the family law in favor of women. Thus “…while religion is part of the problem, it can also be part of the solution.” (Kristof 2010)

In brief, women are running in municipal more than in parliamentary elections and are being nominated by competing political parties that have strong presence in smaller more than in larger electoral districts. There are two issues that can be drawn from interviewees’ statements. One is about the opportunities for women at the municipal level and the second is about how this is bigger for parties with lower religiosity. With respect to women’s opportunities, data shows that in villages where family networks have the upper hand, electoral lists are drawn by parties in close consultation with dominant family networks and religious leaders. Women are often included in parties’ electoral lists to fight competition, amass electoral votes, and for the special contributions they offer local communities. This is especially significant since municipalities are increasingly being considered by political parties as the key first tier in developing electoral strength. Women now have higher shares in municipal than parliamentary nominations.

However, some parties offer women more chances of getting nominated than others, and in the next section I examine which parties offer more support and open windows for women in municipal councils. I expect parties of lower religiosity to offer more chances. In fact, data show that secular and civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity had higher shares of women nominees on their electoral lists than conservative and tolerant religious parties with higher religiosity. Therefore, one may infer that municipalities augur well for women’s leadership in public office and may offer women a window of opportunity for a career in politics. Is this the
expected breakthrough for women? The following section responds to this question and estimates a regression model for women’s party nominations for municipal and parliamentary elections.

C. Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Findings

As the previous sections show, data compiled from official sources and party administrators reveal that, on average, parties nominate more women for municipal than parliamentary councils, in absolute and relative terms. Statements culled from interviews with party leaders and female municipal candidates and/or council members substantiate these findings. For instance, a female municipal member from a religious party of tolerant religiosity succinctly summarizes the factors driving these results in that, Women’s chances in municipal councils are higher than in parliament because of the larger number of seats available. Municipal elections are family-based and rely heavily on personal contacts and friends. Women are better known in smaller communities than larger cities, which is a less risky scenario for parties to nominate them. Women are nominated by parties to compete and to show that they are modern. Anyways, women fit more for social work in municipalities than in politics. Moreover, parliamentary representation carries more prestige, visibility, and financial remuneration than municipal councils. Therefore, parties nominate more men for parliament than women.

Similar and additional factors comparing municipal to parliamentary female nominations are also raised by a municipal candidate from a post-war civil-confessional party, who provides the following analysis,

In parliamentary elections, parties select candidates. In municipal elections, families select and parties nominate candidates. Municipal candidates do not need huge financial outlays, which is a major hurdle in parliamentary elections. Parties accord less importance to municipal than parliamentary elections. Hence, they nominate more women in order to appease them and their demands for advancement. Parties in conservative communities see that municipal service is more fitting for women since it

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14 Interviews were conducted with female members and candidates in 2004 municipal elections, since the last round took place in May 2010 and field research was completed in summer 2009.
akins to community development, social welfare and voluntary work in civil-society. Also, women are less corruptible than men.

1. Qualitative analysis of findings

The comparative analysis by these two interviewees raises issues that call for in-depth exploration. More specifically, (1) women are nominated in municipal elections to fight competition with other parties; (2) women are a less risky scenario in municipal than parliamentary elections; (3) women fit more for municipal social work than parliamentary political office, including their less corruptibility; and (4) municipal work is a stepping stone for parliamentary representation. The following paragraphs address each of these factors separately.

(a) Women are nominated in municipal elections to fight competition

Information collected from female municipal candidates reveals that in districts where there is no competition and electoral lists win by acclamation, women are rarely nominated. For example, a female candidate cites that in her village, “Hizbullah’s list included 21 male candidates but not a single woman. There were no other competing lists. The list won by acclamation without elections.” Another female candidate from a religious tolerant party notes that, “The party decided to nominate women on every municipal list to fight competition. Therefore, they nominated me for the village council since the opposing list had also a woman nominee.” Thus, when there are competing lists, women are invariably included, even in the most conservative villages. In effect, parties are consumed by “peer pressure” or “emulation” to match other parties. If this calls for drastic measures like overlooking traditions or the Shari’a by nominating women to improve the parties’ public image for strategic and electoral purposes, then so be it. In this connection, the leader of a pre-war secular party describes how this competitive setting works more for women’s candidacy:
Hizbullah and Amal wield power in the South with its traditional and conservative communities. In such religiously committed settings, a-religious parties like the communist party are not well accepted. However, being the weaker party in the area, we allied with Hizbullah during elections. My wife ran on the joint parties’ electoral list for the village’s municipal council. This forced the competing list to nominate a woman on their list.

This pattern is also observed in other villages. Similarly, a female candidate explains that her nomination by the pre-war secular a-religious party prompts the other competing religious parties to include women on their lists. Another testimony by a female candidate of a Christian-dominated post-war civil-confessional party also describes how women are used as tools to fight party competition. She states that,

> My cousin drew up an electoral list against the opposing traditional one and invited me to join. The other party in the village also invited me to join their list because they wanted to compete with a woman. I did not want a feud in the village, so I withdrew from elections. Therefore, the two lists did not include women and there are no women in our village municipality.

These testimonies demonstrate that, in districts where there are competing parties, invariably there would be one woman on each electoral list. If one party includes a woman, the competing party follows suit. This bodes well for female municipal candidacy, especially in smaller districts. This pattern is also observed in the 1998 round of municipal elections in that, “… higher female candidacy is associated with more competition between parties.” (El-Helou 1999)\(^{15}\) This is paradoxical. Party competition is sometimes associated with higher female municipal candidacy but lower parliamentary candidacy. This is especially the case for weaker parties (viz., pre-war secular parties) that risk losing precious parliamentary seats by nominating women. This mixed pattern is also observed by scholars studying parties and female representation in ten western democracies:

\(^{15}\) A similar survey may be undertaken for 2004 and 2010 municipal elections in order to explore whether such a pattern can be established.
Accordingly, does the nature of the party competition influence women’s representation? It seems plausible to hypothesize, as Sainsbury suggests, that increased competition, combined with the growth of new parties, would provide more opportunities for women candidates. Yet once more the evidence is mixed, there is limited systematic research, and we need to take care to observe the complex interactions of political culture, the party system and the electoral system. … We can conclude that this would be a fruitful area for further research, to establish a systematic case, but we need to go beyond simple classifications of party competition, to see how party ideology and party organization also play a role. (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993: 319)

These phenomena are depicted mostly in the South where weaker (judging by the number of seats in parliament) pre-war secular parties compete with stronger conservative and tolerant religious parties like Hizbullah and Amal. Therefore, including women on secular parties’ electoral lists is strategic for fighting competition, which at the same time prompts Hizbullah and Amal to nominate women as well. This pattern is also observed in other parties. For instance, a leader of a post-war civil-confessional party admits that, “We nominate women on our municipal lists to show competing parties that we are also modern and women-friendly.” Including a woman on the party’s ballot is also bait for the more hesitant voters in the district. Competition becomes keen when there are two female candidates. This implies that women are used to market the electoral lists of competing parties in municipal but not in parliamentary elections. This is more useful for weaker pre-war secular parties with leftist orientations who are effectively nominating a higher share of female municipal candidates than other parties (table E.5 and chart E.2). A similar behaviour is also observed by Kittilson, who finds that, …, smaller, weaker parties, which tend to be fringe parties, may be positively related to women’s representation… Left parties are more likely to support women’s candidacies than Right parties because Left parties espouse more egalitarian ideologies … Left parties may be more likely to see fit to support an underrepresented group, such as women… feel a need to be sensitive to groups traditionally excluded from the circles of power. (Kittilson 1997: 4, 10)
These scholarly findings, which are based on research conducted elsewhere and more than a decade ago, add confidence to the conceptual framework and findings in this dissertation. What seems to explain this paradoxical phenomenon is that political parties use women to compete with other parties, improve their image and, more significantly, for strategic electioneering purposes.\textsuperscript{16} It is feasible at the municipal level, because, as several interviewees stress, nominating women for municipalities does not threaten male parliamentary incumbents. It does not take away their ‘acquired’ privileges (financial and prestige-wise). Municipal seats are numerous, while parliamentary seats are limited.

The above information demonstrates that fierce competition between parties may be both a blessing and a curse for women’s leadership and their political career. However, despite few exceptions, more often than not and especially in smaller districts, competition among parties enhances female municipal candidacy. Political parties employ all means to serve their interests including nominating more women, building alliances with other parties, intervening with local religious leaders and collaborating with family networks to reach their goals. This information helps to explain variations in shares of female municipal candidates across parties as tables E.1 to E.5 and charts E.1 and E.2 show. These preliminary findings indicate that municipalities can be a breakthrough for women’s leadership. However, there are other factors that parties take into consideration, which may add clarity to the puzzle of women’s political leadership.

(b) Women are a less risky scenario in municipal elections

\textsuperscript{16} Clark cites the case of a religious party in Jordan nominating a woman for parliament to fight fierce competition, that, “…, [T]he IAF (Islamic Action Front) nominated Musini (a female member of Shoura Council) for purely strategic reasons, over the objections of party members who declared her candidacy ‘haram’ (prohibited by Islam). … Musini’s strong grassroots support in the city of Zarqa, a stronghold of IAF, made her a good bet to win a seat.” (Clark, 2004: 7).
Several party elites and officials stress that parties are always interested in minimizing the risks to their electoral strength. According to information culled, women seem to be a less risky scenario for parties in municipal than in parliamentary elections, especially in smaller than larger electoral districts. Women are better known in smaller districts. This enhances their chances in winning, which encourages more women to run in municipal elections and parties to nominate them. As a female candidate from a post-war civil-confessional party observes that, “Parties tend to nominate more women for municipalities than for parliament, because of the lower risk involved. Women are a winning ticket in municipal elections. They are well-known in the small community. Their nomination improves the party’s public image.” To corroborate these views, a female municipal candidate who was running for the second time, admits that she was clearly at a disadvantage because she belongs to a minority religious denomination. Her nomination was risky to the party because she is not well known in the larger district. However, she only made it because she was nominated by a strong party, where the whole list was voted for without omitting any of the candidates. She argues that the party supported her for strategic competitive reasons and that,

Nominating women for public office is in the interest of competing parties. However, it is less risky for parties to nominate women for municipal than for parliamentary councils, where every seat counts. Nonetheless, parties are realizing that municipal elections are essential for their parliamentary electoral base, and women are their winning ticket under severe competition. I predict that in the 2010 municipal elections parties will nominate many more women as an alternative to parliament, where women constitute a higher risk than municipalities.

Indeed, her predictions materialized since the share of women in municipal elections doubled between 2004 and 2010, as shown earlier. However, other female interviewees argue along a different line that, “Families, friends and communities support women for municipal councils. Parties nominate them because there is less risk involved in nominating women for
municipalities than for parliament.” Therefore, parties recognize the merit of nominating women for municipalities because they are winners and constitute less risk, especially for weaker parties. Hence, this enhances women’s chances and constitutes a window of opportunity for them in politics.

(c) **Women are more fit for municipal office and less corruptible than men**

Parties look at municipal elections as less politically important for their political and electoral strength than parliamentary elections. Moreover, parties see that municipal work falls under the rubric of social and community development more than hard core politics. A female former cabinet minister responds that, “Work in municipalities is not as politically oriented as parliamentary work. It requires closer contact with the community, which women do better than men.” As such, women fit more for municipal than parliamentary service.

Municipal service is voluntary, and does not entail financial remuneration for members, except that the chair of the council receives a budget for projects and an allowance for public relations as long as he/she are in office. In contrast, parliamentary representation is more financially rewarding with lifelong salary and fringe benefits. This is more appealing to men since it carries lifelong prestige, as a female candidate of a religious tolerant party analyzes that, “First, municipal work does not have same visibility, clout or privileges like parliamentary work. Second, parties are appeasing women by nominating them for municipalities in response to their demands for leadership positions.”

Another female municipal member explains that, “Municipal work is more fitting for a woman than parliamentary work. This is a man’s world. Women work closer to the community, are patient, committed, deliver, and above all, are less corruptible.” This may be true, but it is amazing that even women themselves consider that municipal service is social more than
political work and that women’s place is not in politics. In this vein, another female municipal member remarks that, “Unfortunately, some women look at municipal service as inferior to parliamentary service. Women should realize that municipal work is as important especially in decision-making and community development.” Moreover, these statements highlight women’s less corruptibility as a criterion for the choice of parties. But, I also think for the choice of the community too. Hence, a female municipal candidate from a post-war civil-confessional party also highlights women’s special traits as attractive to parties and factor into their nomination choices in that,

Women are patient, better negotiators, less corruptible, and closer to the community than men. By nominating women to municipal councils, parties are not only appeasing them in response to their demands for leadership, but are also guaranteeing that they will serve them well in parliamentary elections.

Similar explanations are given by party leaders and female candidates attesting to the special contributions that women make to municipal work which also include their accountability, efficiency in discharging functions, lower level of risk-taking and their ability to meet serious community challenges. Several party officials explain the lower corruptibility of women by invoking their moral values in that, “Women in municipalities are less corruptible than men because of the strong value system they uphold. They are likely to succeed in municipal work more than men.” While this statement is judgmental and essentializes both men and women it also captures a widely-held perception.

Nonetheless, other statements point with certainty to women’s lower corruptibility especially in explaining why only seven women are elected as chairpersons of municipal councils (0.01%). Only four out of the seven female chairpersons are party officials. I interviewed all four of them in the third round of interviews conducted during summer 2009. Chairpersons of municipalities are either elected by the winners or the member who gets the
highest number of votes automatically becomes chair. In this respect, a female municipal member from a pre-war secular a-religious party cites the formidable challenges she faced within the council and from its male members after winning elections. She reports that she ran against all odds in a conservative religious village and highlights blocks barring women from chairing the council implicitly for control over resources: “Although I received the highest number of votes on the list, I was not elected chair of the council. First, because I am a woman and single; and second, because they do not want to relinquish the chair’s funds to a woman who will have control over men.” In this respect, a female candidate in a pre-war secular a-religious party explains the link between the budget and corruption in that, “The budget for projects and public relations goes to the chair of the municipal council who is not accountable to anyone. Therefore, this opens a wide margin for corruption and explains why very few women are elected chairpersons of municipalities.” However, one of the female municipal council chairpersons explains how and why she was elected as chair:

The villagers were convinced that because I am a woman, I will take their requests seriously and deliver. But, above all they believed that because I am a woman, there will be less corruption, which branded the previous chairman. They were confident that I will make a better chair. So, they voted for me.

She stresses that in her second term in office, she had proved herself as a democratic chair and consults with all members on decisions pertaining to the council and to expenditures on projects. Furthermore, she opted to use all the funds allocated to the council for community development projects and her own funds for public relations to prove that she is not corrupt as the previous chair.
Statements of interviewees also refer to the perception that women uphold higher values and are less corruptible than men, as this statement by a female municipal member from a pre-war secular party demonstrates:

As a secretary of the council, I sign all expenditures on education, health and public works sectors, after inspection. Unfortunately, I discovered that the specifications I signed for do not tally with the projects executed, disclosing disparities and kickbacks collected by the project manager. I refused to be party to corruption. So, I reported this to the Chairman, who was also corrupt. Women are less corrupt and more conscientious than men. This is why fewer women are elected chairs of municipal councils.

In this connection, recent studies on corruption attest to the less corruptibility of women. Several scholars find that,

…, even more significantly, current research suggests that women politicians are equal to or better than their male counterparts. Duflo and Topalova (2004), for example, find that women leaders provide more public goods for their villages than men, and that these goods are of higher quality. Women politicians are also less likely to take bribes. Dollar, Fisman and Gatti (2001) also find that, across many countries, higher levels of female representation in parliament bring lower levels of corruption. This suggests that not only are women leaders needed to reflect the policy preferences of women voters, but that they may be more effective in doing so. (Pande and Cirone, 2009: 4)\(^\text{17}\)

Also, recent scholarship, using men instead of women as the dependent variable, provides empirical evidence that, “…high political representation of women decreases corruption levels, suggesting that women are inherently less corruptible than men.” (Bjarnegard, 2008: 2).\(^\text{18}\) In fact, these statements essentialize women by placing them on a pedestal, which might not be true for all, men or women. However, this provides some justification for why parties are nominating more women for municipal than for parliamentary service.

(d) **Municipalities are a stepping stone for parliaments**

\(^\text{17}\) Rohini Pande and Alexandra Cirone, “Women in Politics: Quotas, Voter Attitudes and Female Leadership”. (Policy Brief No. 10, Dubai School of Government, February 2009), 1-8

Additional factors are raised by informants for parties’ nominations of women for municipal councils. For instance, a leader of a pre-war civil-confessional party states that, “Municipal work allows women to gain political maturity and leadership skills, which are prerequisites for effective political careers.” One of the party elites in another pre-war civil-confessional party also flags that, “Let us start in municipalities. If women succeed, then we will nominate them to parliament.” This is collaborated by another party elite in a religious tolerant party who also sees that municipal work is a stepping stone into the more complex work of parliaments and cites that,

The party nominated one woman in each of the electoral lists, since work in municipalities is a stepping stone into parliamentary office. Women acquire the requisite skills and political experience for leadership through their work in municipalities. This is training. Women succeed in social, environmental and developmental work more than men. They are more dedicated and driven. Above all, women are less corruptible than men.

Similar views are encapsulated in statements of other party leaders and elites, particularly of traditional pre-war civil-confessional parties as well as tolerant religious parties. These male views reflect a preference for a phased and gradual entry of women into politics before entrusting them with higher responsibilities in parliamentary positions. However, a female chairperson of the municipality in her village neatly summarizes how municipalities offer women a window of opportunity in politics:

The village wanted me to run but I declined because I did not want to resign from the State University. In 2004, the Party nominated me as head of the list and I was elected chair of the nine-member council. The competing list had a woman but she did not win. I won with majority of votes because I was supported by the party leader, family, community and the clerics. Municipal service opens the door wide for an effective political career.

In brief, parties justify why they are nominating more women for municipalities than for parliamentary councils by reference to a host of factors. These include the lower corruptibility
of women, the greater fit of women for social work, and the nomination of women a tool for fighting party competition. Statements based on information from interviewees explain and justify the higher shares of female nomination for municipalities than for parliaments. More significantly, parties consider that municipal work is a stepping stone for higher level politics in parliamentary office. In other words, this is a ‘levels of analysis’ argument for a linear development in women’s career in politics.

Moreover, information culled from statements of interviewees and from data compiled also explains the higher shares of female municipal nominees. Indeed, pre-war secular and post-war civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity, more plural and democratic procedures have higher shares of female nominees than in conservative and tolerant parties with higher religiosity, and plural and democratic deficits. These findings support the theory of party variation in religiosity and related hypotheses in that as religiosity falls, shares of women in municipal electoral lists rise. Furthermore, this evidence denotes that municipalities may very well be the window of opportunity for women in politics. The following paragraphs provide statistical support to these qualitative findings by estimating multivariate regression models for female municipal and parliamentary candidacy across parties.

2. Regression Models for Female Party Nominations to Parliament and Municipalities

Out of the 18 relevant political parties covered in this case study, only four nominated women for parliamentary elections and ten for municipal elections. Scatter plot E.1 shows that all four parties that nominated women to parliament have a score of 4 on the secularism scale (i.e. show lower levels of religiosity). The bivariate regression produces coefficients and t-scores that are small in magnitude and are in the right direction, but are not statistically significant. This implies that a relationship exists between women’s nominations and party religiosity, but it is not
significant. These four parties are all post-war civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity, as anticipated.

**Plot E.1**
Female parliamentary nominees by party religiosity

F-Nominees=.5493+.9736(secularism)
(r=.1600; b=.9736; t=0.65)

**Plot E.2**
Female municipal nominees by party

F-Nominees=-1.011+.8781(secularism)
(r=.4616; b=.8781**; t=2.08)

Scatter plot E.2 also shows that parties with lowest religiosity nominated the highest shares of women in municipal elections. The bivariate regression produces a small but positive coefficient and a significant t-score, which implies that when parties move up on the secularism scale the share of women’s nominations on parties’ municipal list increases by less than one percent (0.88%). This relationship is statistically significant, which means that we can safely reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between religiosity and female municipal nominations. The scatter plot shows one leverage outlier (Amal), a religious tolerant party with relatively lower religiosity (score 3) than the extremist and conservative parties. However, dropping this party from the bivariate regression does not change the slope of the regression line.

In the following paragraphs, a multivariate regression model for female nominations in parliaments and another one in municipalities are estimated. Table E.6 presents both models. In estimating the multivariate regression models of female party nominations for parliament and for
municipalities, I incorporate the same variables that influence women’s leadership in political parties. These are religiosity, pluralism, democratic practices, female membership and party-age. This produces one model for parliamentary nominations and the second for municipal nominations.

**Table E.6  Regression models for female nominations for municipalities & parliaments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables (Standard errors)</th>
<th>Female Party Nominations for</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliaments</td>
<td>Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secularism (religiosity)</strong></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.8879</td>
<td>.8385*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.2047)</td>
<td>(.4151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party-Age</strong></td>
<td>4.4643</td>
<td>-1.5726*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.1442)</td>
<td>(1.1569)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pluralism</strong></td>
<td>4.6597</td>
<td>-.4432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.2332)</td>
<td>(1.1737)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td>-.8103</td>
<td>2.1204**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.9491)</td>
<td>(.9318)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership</strong></td>
<td>.0640</td>
<td>.1637***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.2376)</td>
<td>(0.0447)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant (base)</strong></td>
<td>-4.3947</td>
<td>-6.2278***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.3048)</td>
<td>(1.940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Degrees freedom</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R²</strong></td>
<td>0.1882</td>
<td>0.7052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjust R²</strong></td>
<td>-0.1501</td>
<td>0.5824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F</strong></td>
<td>0.56 &lt; 3.11</td>
<td>5.74 &gt; 3.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Official data from party administrators compiled and processed by author. ***P<.01; **P<.05; *P<.10

(a) **Model 1: Female parliamentary nominations**

Regressing female nominations for parliamentary elections on secularism (religiosity), party-age, pluralism, democracy and female membership produces the following equation:

\[
\text{Female parliamentary nominations} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ (secularism)} + b_2 \text{ (party-age)} + b_3 \text{ (pluralism)} + b_4 \text{ (democracy)} + b_5 \text{ (female membership)}
\]

The statistical results in this model show that these variables poorly explain female parliamentary candidacy. The coefficients are not statistically significant, the t-scores are small, and the standard
errors are very high. Moreover, the model cannot explain a significant proportion of the variations in the shares of women’s nominations across parties \((R^2 = .18\) and the adjusted \(R^2\) is negative). The F-test for the model is not significant \((0.56\) is less than the critical value of the F-statistics is 3.11\), which means we cannot reject the null hypothesis. The negative coefficient on democracy is driven particularly by the level female nominations in the two religious extremist parties that are not plural, but internally democratic in leadership transitions, albeit not in decision-making. There are also parties that are plural and democratic in decision-making but not in leadership transitions (like Tayyar, Tajaddod, and Future), that are contributing to pluralism, which has a high coefficient \((4.66)\), but not statistically significant and with a high standard error. It is very hard to estimate the effects of these institutional variables, when they are together in the model because they are highly correlated; for instance, secularism and pluralism \((0.5852)\), secularism and democracy \((0.5106)\), and, pluralism and democracy \((0.6574)\). This is why the results of this model have to be interpreted jointly with the results of qualitative evidence and interview data.

On the substantive level, one war-origin religious tolerant party (Amal) as well as a pre-war (Kata’ëb) and two post-war civil-confessional (Tayyar and Future) parties nominated women to parliament. The highest share of female nominees to parliament are by the civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity (score 4) than the religious tolerant party (score 3). These parties employ democratic process in decision-making and have plural membership despite their being dominated by a single sect. These results are in line with the theory but in statistical terms, the results as shown above are not significant. Religiosity is borne out but is not statistically significant. This implies that this model cannot explain female parliamentary nominations. In this instance the estimated model does not show that the variables, religiosity, democracy, pluralism or female membership influence female parliamentary nominations, as the F-statistic showed.
This may be due to the small number of nominees. That is why we are not able to estimate the effects of the variables very well. This estimated model has neither predictive nor explanatory powers. The low share of female party nominations to parliament remains a puzzle and a bone of contention in civil society and the women’s movement. The fact that around 61% of the voters in 2009 elections were women means that women can sway election results. Electoral and parliamentary quotas have not been approved by the parliament despite petitions and lobbying by the women’s movement. Explanations include other factors, especially political culture but also determined by women’s own choice to pursue a political career, since a critical mass of women for leadership is certainly available, at least in Lebanon.

(b) Model 2: Female municipal nominations

Regressing female party nominations for municipalities on secularism, party-age, pluralism, democracy and female membership produces the same regression model as the one estimated for parliamentary candidates. The F-statistic (5.74 > the critical value 3.11) implies that we can safely reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the equation are not zero. The equation explains 58% of the variations in women’s municipal nominations across parties. Overall, the coefficients on religiosity and female membership are small but in the right direction and the standard errors are small. The coefficient on religiosity is small in magnitude (.84) but positive and statistically significant, and so is the t-statistic. This implies that we can safely reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between female municipal nominations and party religiosity. It means that as secularism improves by one score, the share of female nominations for municipalities will incrementally increase by almost one percentage point. This is substantively important since female nominations start at such a low level. Female membership shows a significant t-statistic and a probability of less than .3% that b is zero under
the null hypothesis, or 99% confidence level, confirming the strength of the regression coefficient at .16. This means that there is a strong relationship between membership and nominations to municipalities. The coefficient on democratic practices is (2.12) and statistically significant with a t-score of 2.28, which confirms that there is a relationship between female nominations and democratic practices. Thus, the standardized regression coefficients on religiosity, female membership, and democratic practices show the relative strength of these variables as predictors in this model.

These results are statistically and substantively significant. This is substantiated by the fact that, on average, the highest shares of female municipal nominations are in pre-war secular parties with lowest religiosity, plural membership and democratic practices. These parties had adopted a policy to nominate women on each electoral list starting in 2004 municipal elections and this ratio increased in 2010 because of the 20% quota for women in local councils. The parliament did not pass the 20% quota just before elections took place. In addition, competition between parties enhanced the share of female nominations on parties’ municipal lists, especially in rural and small electoral districts. Religious parties (both conservative and tolerant) with high female membership also nominated women to municipalities, though with lower shares compared to secular parties, as expected. Therefore, the estimated model provides robust support to the theory of party variation in religiosity and variation in women’s nominations for municipalities. Female municipal candidacy increases as party religiosity falls. It is also positively influenced by democratic practices and female membership.

Conclusions

The quantitative findings demonstrate the different party dynamics in female nominations for municipalities and parliamentary councils. These findings suggest that municipalities open a
window of opportunity for women to break through into politics. More specifically, municipal elections are family-centric, do not abide by a confessional quota and are not as controlled by political parties as parliamentary elections. Party religiosity influences the share of women in parliamentary lists according to some interview accounts but is not found to have a statistically significant effect. Looking at the average percentage of women nominees across party families, it was found that secular parties with lowest religiosity (score 5) did not nominate women to parliament, while parties with higher religiosity, such as the civil-confessional (score 4) and religious tolerant (score 3) parties did. The lack of female nominees from religious extremist parties is explained by their ultra-conservative stance towards the role of women in politics; while those from conservative religious parties are ‘anti-women-as-leaders’ on religious and traditional grounds. Moreover, pre-war secular parties that are of lowest religiosity, democratic and plural are electorally weak and cannot fight gender-bias. They do not want to risk the loss of the one or two seats that they occupy in parliament by nominating women.

In contrast, municipal nominations are family-centric and community-driven. Parties nominate women in close consultation with family networks, and community and religious leaders. Women are more encouraged to run in municipal than parliamentary nominations, especially in smaller districts. They are well known and receive great support because of the special contributions they make to community development and the perceptions that they are less corruptible than men. Parties nominate women to face competition from other parties. Weaker parties, like the pre-war secular parties find their niche in municipal elections and nominate higher shares of women than other parties do. They also have less to lose in municipal elections than they do in parliamentary elections, because of the larger number of seats available for competition. Religious conservative and tolerant parties nominate women in municipal and not in
parliamentary elections because they consider municipal work as social not political work. This is more fitting for women and does not violate the Shari’a. In addition, several parties consider that municipal work is a stepping stone to higher level political leadership in parliamentary office. These factors enhance women’s chances in municipal more than parliamentary nominations. The estimated model for female municipal nominations is substantively and statistically consistent with the theory of party variation in religiosity.

These findings show that more women run for municipal elections (in absolute and relative terms) than for parliamentary councils. Moreover, with a non-confessional municipal law and smaller electoral districts, women stand a better chance of winning. Consequently, municipal elections offer women more chances in leadership than parliamentary elections, especially because of a tripartite relationship between family networks, religious leaders and dominant political parties. Women are nominated by a wider variety of parties at the municipal level. More specifically, secular and civil-confessional parties nominate more women for municipal elections than religious conservative and tolerant parties, whereas, as theorized, extremist parties did not nominate any women at this local level. This strongly supports the theory of party variation posited in this dissertation that as party religiosity declines (secularism increases), women’s leadership rises in decision-making bodies and on their electoral lists for parliament and municipal councils. The higher shares of female nominees in municipal councils attest to the fact that, despite party competition, municipal elections are more women-friendly than parliamentary elections. These provide the breakthrough and a window of opportunity where women can exercise rational choice if they wish to start on a political career.

In conclusion, there are four main justifications that substantiate a positive response to the question that the Epilogue poses: can women breakthrough? First, parties support women’s
leadership when it is in their interest to do so even by overlooking traditions or Shari’a. They often look at women as a symbol of the modern. Second, family networks, and community and religious leaders nominate more women in smaller electoral districts and traditional rural areas more than in larger cities and urban districts. Parties and the community recognize the special contributions that women make to community development and their less corruptibility than men. Third, parties see that municipal work is a stepping stone to parliamentary office. In fact, municipalities constitute a second-level entry point to political leadership after political parties. Parties nominate more women for municipal than parliamentary councils because this strengthens their foothold at the grassroots level. As such, municipalities constitute an additional electioneering mechanism akin to women’s wings. Parties find more incentives to nominate women in for municipalities than for parliaments. Fourth, women muster more courage to run in municipal than in parliamentary elections. Therefore, municipalities are a window of opportunity for women into political leadership.
Concluding Remarks

The first wave of twentieth century feminism hit Lebanon during the 1950s. It focused on the emancipation of women and suffrage rights as an entry point into their participation in national development. Yet, despite improvements in women’s educational attainments and labor force participation, their political participation lags behind their achievements in the professional realm. Gender gaps linger even after the subsequent waves of feminism, including the paradigmatic shift from ‘women in development’ to ‘women and development’ and now to ‘gender and development’ focusing on gender mainstreaming for gender equality. The conundrum of the mismatch between women’s high socio-economic profile and their low political representation remains today and is the phenomenon that drives and motivates this thesis.

This dissertation provided a new explanation for the observed low level of female representation -- one that departs from prior scholarship which looks to national-level variables including countries’ development levels, political regimes and electoral systems. Previous research also sought to explain female representation by considering the effects of culture and religion within societies; while this research pushes beyond the domestic level into a lower level of analysis, examining individual political parties. The dissertation advances a theory of party variation in religiosity to explain variation in women’s leadership across parties of varying religiosities and secularisms. It follows a multivocal understanding of religions in that there is a continuum of multiple religiosities and secularisms on party platforms that bear a varying influence on women’s leadership in parties’ decision-making bodies. The theory and related hypotheses are tested in Lebanon as a single in-depth and focused case study.
Political parties are the main vehicles for women’s leadership as gatekeepers. They recruit, select, promote, and nominate women to leadership and public office. Parties that are committed to gender equality take special measures to guarantee women’s advancement such as introducing voluntary internal and electoral party quotas to enhance female representation. Political parties are thus not just the prime mover in the theory of women’s empowerment that is advanced and tested here; they are also the unit of analysis. Religiosity, democratic procedures in leadership transitions and decentralized decision-making, pluralism by religious affiliation in membership, and female membership are explanatory variables for women’s leadership in parties’ inner bodies and on their electoral lists for public office. The qualitative analysis is based on structured and semi-structured interviews conducted over a period of three years (2006-2009) with party leaders and female party activists in 18 relevant parties. Information gleaned from 150 interviews substantiates the conceptual framework of the role of party religiosity in women’s leadership.

The findings from both qualitative and quantitative data support the central role of parties in the political career advancement of women and the role of party religiosity in that process. Women’s chances in leadership are higher in parties with lower religiosity and plural membership. These conditions are forged with a ‘women-friendly’ political culture. However, despite attestations by many interviewees that democratic procedures (in leadership transitions and decentralized decision-making) influence women’s leadership, this is not borne out in the statistical analysis. One has to go beyond numbers to explain this. The democratic deficit, especially in leadership transitions in many parties, has its roots in the personalized pattern of political leadership. This is generally based on family legacies and/or political and feudal
patrons, in addition to war-lords and leaders of former militias. Many parties that emerged or consolidated in the post-war era fought in the 15-year civil war and had their own militias. The heads of these militias became the party leaders in the post-war period. Most of these party leaders tend to be autocrats, being former heads of militias where it is part of the trade to issue orders by dictat. Such authoritarian and dictatorial tendencies left their imprint on the attitudes of party elites towards the political role of women and on the status of democratic practices in many parties, but mostly in parties with theocratic platforms –albeit with few exceptions. Indeed, elites in extremist and conservative religious parties exhibit an ‘anti-women-as-leaders’ attitudes towards women and their political careers. These attitudes are more pronounced and entrenched when party leaders are also clerics entrusted with interpreting the doctrine and controlling the fate of women within these parties. As such, these ‘women un-friendly’ attitudes and regressive discourses, notably that ‘politics-is-men’s-business’, ‘women’s place is at home’, and Shari’a violations, perceptibly block women’s ascendance to leadership in religious parties in comparative perspective to secular and civil-confessional parties. Even when the formal procedures for leadership transitions are relatively open and formally democratic, political culture blocks women’s ascendance into leadership roles. Thus, there are formal procedures which are not in tandem with informal political culture in parties with theocratic agendas, which tend to bar women’s leadership in these parties.

In addition, many parties maintain special women’s wings to mobilize women and serve as electioneering mechanisms. The majority of secular and civil-confessional parties recognizes that special women’s wings ‘ghettoize’ women and are not effective in creating a critical mass of women for leadership. Thus, many of the more secular parties have either dismantled these units
or plan to do that. In contrast, religious parties rely heavily on women’s wings in mobilizing women at the rank-and-file level and to serve as electoral mechanisms, but fail to advance them to leadership positions. They reach out to women and are extremely successful in mobilizing them. They employ religious mobilization and particularly enticing financial and in-kind tools targeting especially poor and deprived women who tend to turn to religion as their salvation and promise of a better life. However, beyond promises of the afterlife, these parties do not advance women to leadership and control their contributions by limiting it to social instead of political tasks. Counterintuitively, this research shows that female officials in extremist and conservative religious parties are passive. They do not complain and do not demand to be promoted to leadership, reflecting the extent of control that such parties exert over women members. Nonetheless, this varies depending on party religiosity. Thus, in parties with tolerant religiosities, women resent their secondary status and are more vocal in demanding their rightful place in the party, unlike women in parties with extremist or conservative platforms. Indeed, they are not and are not suffering from false consciousness. The findings in this research show that women’s wings not only marginalize them but also reduce their activism in lobbying for leadership positions and their potential role as agents of change. Indeed, women’s wings should only be used as temporary mechanisms and must be led at the highest levels in order to ensure that women share in decision-making and gain political maturity equipping them for leadership positions.

Therefore, what this dissertation clearly brings out is that many of the religious parties have vast female membership which does not translate into meaningful representation in leadership bodies. Further, the substantive and statistical findings do not support the hypothesis
that female membership matters for party leadership. While aware of Putnam’s law of increasing disproportions in all political institutions, this dissertation sought answers to this mismatch. In conservative religious parties (where deficits also exist in pluralism and democracy), women are almost invisible in leadership positions. In extremist religious parties with the highest observed levels of religiosity, women’s leadership is non-existent, despite the practice of periodic and regular leadership transitions in some of them. This is more pronounced in the Sunni-dominated extremist religious parties than in Shiite-dominated conservative and tolerant religious parties. The more openness to ‘Ijtihad’ of the Shiites than amongst the Sunnis with relatively more enlightened interpretation of the doctrine and jurisprudence (Al-Fiqh) works more in favor of women’s leadership. This is also seen from variations in intensity of religiosity that affects the share of women in leadership bodies, albeit smaller shares than in secular and civil-confessional parties. One may look at the tolerant religious party, Amal, to see glimpses of hope for women’s leadership among parties of similar religiosity. This attests to the multivocality of religions and how variations in religiosity positively influence women’s leadership.

Consequently, notwithstanding some of these findings, one can still see light at the end of the tunnel for women’s leadership, even among religious parties. First, transformation in their platforms and religious goals is inevitable, based on precedent observations. For instance, Hizbullah’s ultimate goal for an Islamic state was tuned down in 1982 and also in 2009 on grounds of unseemliness in the light of the political scene. This continuous adaptation and modification of religious goals and components may reduce the intensity of religiosity – since the religious components on party platforms will change -- and as such will positively influence women’s leadership, as per the theory of party variation in religiosity. Second, sometimes
religion – by these party elites’ own admission-- is part of the problem, but, I argue, that it could also be part of the solution. It is really a function of who is entrusted to interpret the doctrine and how women-friendly and enlightened they are. Third, some religious parties look at women as a symbol of the modern, recognizing their value added to party image and performance, which implies that they may still promote them to leadership positions for these same reasons. Fourth, some religious parties are willing to overlook their conservative religious stance (e.g. invoking Al-Qiwama) against women’ leadership, when it is in their interest to do so. In this case a motivation premised on ‘the ends justify the means’ augurs well for women’s leadership, emulating successful experiences in other countries. So, why not in Lebanon?

The qualitative findings that are reported in chapters Three through Five enrich our understanding of the dynamics driving women’s political leadership. However, the quantitative analysis shows that party religiosity is also statistically significant as explanatory variable for women’s leadership. This allows for generalization and gives predictive power to the theory posited in this dissertation. (See summary table of findings).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables for Women’s Leadership</th>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Qualitative Support</th>
<th>Statistical Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity &amp; Secularism</td>
<td>H1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic practices (leadership transitions &amp; decision-making)</td>
<td>H2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism in composition of membership by sect</td>
<td>H3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female membership</td>
<td>H4</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-age [pre-war, war (1975-1990) &amp; post-war]: proxy variable for political culture</td>
<td>H5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dissertation concludes with an epilogue studying the possibility that municipalities present a window of opportunity and a breakthrough for women if they choose a career in politics. The case for female candidates in municipal elections projects a different dynamic than
in parliamentary elections. This case highlights that social cohesion at the smaller community level works well for women’s nominations in comparative perspective with social cleavages nationwide at parliamentary level. Municipal nominations reflect the modest role that parties play in the selection process as opposed to a more decisive and controlling role in parliamentary nominations. Parties work in close consultation with family networks, community and religious leaders in drawing nomination lists including women candidates, especially in smaller electoral districts. The findings from the field research show that when women bring into politics their personal attributes in terms of family and community networks, parties find it in their interest to nominate them on their municipal lists. Subsequently, women’s shares in party nominations are enhanced under conditions of party competition and as being a less risky scenario for parties than parliamentary elections. This is especially the case in pre-war secular and post-war civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity. The Epilogue demonstrates that women are able and willing to break through into politics starting with the entry point in municipal elections and moving next to the national level. As several party leaders suggest, municipalities are a stepping stone into parliamentary representation. This augurs well for the future of women’s leadership. However, even if all these conditions are met, women’s involvement in politics remains a matter of personal choice as an optimistic female interviewee suggests that,

I have confidence that women will make it to politics and in their political abilities and the special contributions they can make to political parties and politics per se. But, this is largely a matter of choice and particularly when they break this circle of fear from politics and summon their courage to compete for leadership, provided they are given the opportunity.

In general, parties require that women be 100% perfect and eligible for leadership although many men in these positions are not. One should go beyond numbers and shares, since
these are only indicators for measuring women’s political leadership and representation. The desired outcome, however, should be effective leadership. At present, it is observed that women’s legislative representation follows the pattern of the ‘women-garbed-in-black’, which is not *sui generis* to Lebanon, and which takes precedence over other qualifications and considerations in nominating women for public office. Moreover, parties must be enticed by incentives such as gaining electoral strength for nominating more women on their electoral lists. These incentives undercut voter and gender-bias.

The ambition behind this research is to make a contribution to feminist political science. I have attempted to do so through the original dataset collected on women in political parties and the comprehensive information on their inner workings. Party variation in religiosity explains variations in women’s leadership in the inner decision-making bodies of their political parties. However, I do not claim that joining political parties is a magical wand or formula for women’s empowerment and leadership. My theory is a necessary but not sufficient step for enhancing women’s leadership. This is also dependent upon women’s interests and preferences, but above all, freedom of choice in picking their own career path. This is why the dissertation calls for more in-depth research on women in politics with particular attention to building accurate, replicable and reliable databases on women in political parties.
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Annex 1
Questionnaires

Institutionalization
(Collect published materials: Charters, mission statements, by-laws)

1. What is the year of establishment of the political party?
2. How many branches nation-wide?
4. What is the source of funding for the operations and activities of the party?

Composition of membership by sex and religious affiliation

5. What is the total number of members disaggregated by sex, if available?
6. What is the religious sect-affiliation of members?
7. What is the age bracket of members?
8. What is the income bracket of members?
9. What is the educational level of members?
10. What is the family or feudal affiliation of members?
11. How does one join the political party to become a member? Any application forms? Interview process?

Women's leadership in Political parties

12. What is the total number of members in the executive committee?
13. Are there women in the executive committees? How many? What is the percentage of leadership seats occupied by women?
14. How many women in parliament from the party?
15. Are there any women in decision-making and executive positions in the party? If so, where and in which committees?
16. Are there specific references in the Charter of the Party to commitment to gender equality in recruitment, selection, nomination and election of women?
17. Did you nominate any women members to run for elections at any time in the past four elections?
18. Is there any internal gender quota for women to be members of decision-making and executive bodies in the party?

---

1. During 2006-2009, this questionnaire was used to gather information on women in political parties from party leaders, senior advisers to leaders, administrators, female officials and activists, female MPs and cabinet ministers, political scientists and national experts. Officials of the following 18 ‘relevant’ parties were the main source of information: Islamic Action, Islamic Group, Unitarian, Hizbullah Party of God, Amal Hope Movement, Ba’ath Party of Lebanon, Communist Party of Lebanon, Syrian National Social Party, Kata’eb Phalange, Liberal Nationalist Party, National Bloc, Progressive Socialist Party, Tayyar National Patriotic Free Movement, Mustaqbal Future Movement, Tajaddod Renovation Party, Lebanese Forces, Marada Party, and Wa’ad.
19. Do you explicitly include and target women on your list for parliamentary or municipal elections?
20. Did any of the women nominated make it in the elections?
21. Is there anywhere in your by-laws any restrictions or encouragement for women to join as members in the party?
22. Is there a chapter for women (women’s wing)? What are its TORs / activities/role?

Quotas for women, leadership transitions, decision-making process

23. Is there any internal gender quota for executive & legislative committees?
24. Is there a quota for women on the electoral list for parliament? Explain
25. Number and % share of party seats in last three parliaments?
26. Share of women nominated by the Party?
27. Share of women MPs by party (%)
28. What is the process by which political party leaders are selected? By general elections, elections via executive committee, by succession or appointment, or by acclamation? What is the term of the leader?
29. How are decisions taken? Who is the decision-maker: the party leader, party elites, or by consultation and sharing?
30. Did the party join the elections with an electoral list?
31. Did the list include women? How many or % of women in electoral lists? How many won in the elections? Which years?

Religion & Party Religiosity

28. What role does religion play in the activities of the party?
29. Are any of the goals of the party religious goals? i.e. does the party use politics to achieve religious aims? Does the Part have religious functions?
30. Is the religious sect included on the membership application form?
31. Is membership restricted to any religious sect?
32. Do you pray daily?
33. How many times per week do you go to church or Mosque?
34. Do you practice all religious rituals?
35. Why did you join the party? (i) Religious affiliation? (ii) ideology (iii) pressure to get a job (iv) elections (v) women’s rights (vi) other
36. What were the challenges you faced? Did men support you?
37. What are your views regarding internal gender quotas?
38. Women’s wings: are they effective in mobilizing women and taking decisions?

Attitudes vis-à-vis women’s leadership: Views of Female MPs & Candidates

2 Questions to women who ran and were elected to Parliament and those who did not make it (Based on Maureen McTeer (2006))
39. Nomination process: main challenges in getting nominated by the party
40. How did you become a candidate?
41. How did you contest elections?
42. How did you run the electoral campaign? How did you mobilize support?
43. Fundraising: What methods did you use to raise funds to run for elections, or to run and manage your campaign? Did the fact that you are a woman assist or hinder? If neither, did your financial situation or any other specific factor help?
44. Campaign organization: Did you appoint women to help in running your election campaign?
45. Media portrayal: Did women support you or vote for other men competing for the same seat? In your opinion, how did the media portray your candidacy as a woman? Was this different from men candidates?
46. How do elected women progress and access leadership roles within their parties and in the parliament?
47. How do women work together in politics?
48. General observations: In your opinion, why didn’t other women run for elections?
49. Religious affiliation
50. Are you a member of the Political party?
51. Do you serve in any executive committee in the Parliament?
52. Did you run for office and did not win? Why didn’t you make it? What are the main reasons for failure? Will you try again? Explain.
53. Is there a difference between men’s and women’s attitudes and perceptions regarding women in politics: in voting turnout; behaviour within parties; behaviour within the parliament? Explain.
54. How do elected women progress and access leadership roles within their parties and parliament?

Questionnaire for third round of interviews (summer 2009)

**Religion and culture, municipal elections, mobilization strategies & benefits**

1. **Religion**: Is religiosity a barrier to women’s leadership in political parties, municipal and parliamentary elections?
2. **Family**: Did family and domestic duties deter women’s active participation in political parties?
3. What is the percentage of married women in total women’s membership in the party?
4. **Culture**: Is culture (traditions and norms) a barrier to women’s leadership and their active political involvement?
5. **Municipal elections**: Did the party nominate women in the last municipal elections? What is the percentage of women nominated and elected?
6. **Municipal elections**: Why do women have more chances in winning in municipal elections compared to parliamentary elections? Are women less of a challenge to men in municipal than in parliamentary elections?
7. **Municipal elections**: Why did women make it in the judicial and municipal bodies but not in the parliamentary and executive bodies, given the same cultural environment prevail?
8. **Mobilization strategies**: Is there a difference in strategies used by the party before and after the civil-war?
9. **Religious mobilization mechanisms**: Do religious parties continue to employ pious women to conduct religious lectures in order to attract other women to the veil and to join religious parties?

10. **Religious mobilization tools**: Is there financial remuneration for women to wear the head scarf or veil and to join the party?

11. **Women’s membership and leadership in religious parties**: Why do women constitute half of the membership in Shiite religious parties, while their share in leadership positions is very low? Can this phenomenon be explained by the financial remuneration that women receive?

12. **Are political parties the main vehicle for women’s leadership?**

13. **What are the characteristics of political parties that enhance women’s chances for political leadership?** Do these factors include secularity and religiosity?

14. **Commitment to gender**: Do party-related features like liberal and modern tendencies, tolerance, diversity, pluralism, and democratic practices enhance gender-awareness and women’s chances for leadership, while their absence decreases such chances? Do these factors lead to formal commitment to gender equality and non-discriminatory practices by political parties via adoption of affirmative action policies (e.g. internal and electoral quotas)?

15. **What type of parties provides women with more chances for leadership**: religious/sectarian, secular/confessional-civil parties, or secular/pluralist-leftist?

### Information and data provided by party administrators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Year of origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of party (describe) civil, religious, secular, national, leftist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader (M/F)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of party seats in parliament</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of party seats in parliament</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of party seats in parliament</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal quota for women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral quota</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of members in executive &amp; legislative bodies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader F/M of committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # &amp; % of women in executive and legislative bodies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Nominees</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female MPs from party</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2

Positions of 150 Party Officials Interviewed during 2006-2009
Party Leaders & Senior Advisers, Women in Leadership, Political Activists

(6) Communist Party (leftist, pluralist)

1. Vice-President of the Party (F)
2. MP candidate and former member of Executive Council (F)
3. Member of the Supreme Council (F)
4. Member of municipality (F)
5. Member of the Executive Committee (M)
6. Head of women’s wing – now dismantled (F)

(17) Syrian Social National Party (leftist, secular)

1. Party Leader (M)
2. Senior adviser to party leader (M)
3. Senior member of the judiciary council (M)
4. Chairperson of the supreme council of executives (M)
5. Head of internal affairs (M)
6. Chief of information and media (M)
7. Senior adviser to leader and son of co-founder of party (M)
8. Former chairperson of the supreme council (F)
9. Daughter of assassinated founder of party and a political scientist (F)
10. Head of women’s wing (F)
11. Member of the supreme council (F)
12. Member of the executive committee (F)
13. Chair of environment committee (F)
14. Former cabinet minister (F)
15. Member of municipality (F)
16. Member of Judiciary council (F)
17. Municipal candidate (F)

(8) Phalanges Kata’eb (Maronite-dominated)

1. Executive Secretary of the party (M)
2. Senior Vice-President (M)
3. Senior adviser to President of the party (M)
4. Member of Parliament (M)
5. Member of 2000 and 2005 Parliament (F)
6. Member of the politburo (F)
7. Head of women’s wing (F)
8. Member of the executive committee (F)

(6) National Bloc Al-Kutlah (Christian-dominated)
1. **Current Secretary-General (M)**
2. Former Secretary-General (F)
3. Chairperson of the council (M)
4. Member of the executive council (F)
5. Member of the board (F)
6. Member of the legal department (F)

(5) Arab Ba’ath Party of Lebanon (leftist, plural)

1. **Party leader (M)**
2. Senior adviser to leader (M)
3. Member of the political bureau (M)
4. Member of the executive Board (F)

(9) Progressive Socialist Party (Druze-dominated)

1. **Vice-President, Member of Parliament (MP), & current minister (M)**
2. Senior adviser to the leader and chief of internal administrative & legislative affairs, (M)
3. Member of the supreme council (F)
4. Member of the executive council (F)
5. Head of the women’s department (F)
6. Head of the women’s federation --NGO (F)
7. Delegate of the women’s affairs for political empowerment (F)
8. Chair of municipal council (F)
9. Chair of municipal council and head of federation of seven municipalities (F)

(4) National Liberals Party (Maronite-dominated)

1. **Party Leader (M)**
2. Secretary-General (M)
3. Head of media and information (F)
4. Former head of women’s wing – now dismantled (F)

(5) Islamic Group Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiah (Sunni, single-sect)

1. **Party Leader (M, clergy)**
2. Head of the women’s wing, wife of vice-President (F)
3. Head of the social welfare and media sector (F)
4. Religious counselor (F)
5. MP candidate (F)

(11) Hope Amal (Shiite, single-sect party)

1. **Party Leader (M)**
2. Vice-President and Secretary-General (M)
3. Head of women’s wing (F)
4. Member of the political council (F)
5. Member of the executive committee (F)
6. Head of the central committee for women (F)
7. Member of municipal council (F)
8. Member of the executive committee (F)
9. Head of the media sector (F)
10. Former Chair of the women’s wing and current member of the political council (F)
11. Member of municipal council (F)

(13) Party of God – Hizbullah (Shiite, single-sect party)

1. Senior political adviser to Secretary-General, member of the politburo, member of the supreme shoura council, Member of Parliament, & Minister (M)
2. Official spokesperson for the Secretary-General of Party and head of research studies (M)
3. Member of politburo (F)
4. Head of the women’s wing (F)
5. Vice-Chair of public relations (F)
6. Member of municipal council (F)
7. Head of media (F)
8. Responsible for external relations, directorate for support of resistance and wife to an MP who is senior adviser to the leader (F)
9. Municipal candidate (F)
10. Municipal candidate (F)
11. Municipal council member (F)
12. Assistant-head of the media sector (F)
13. Municipal council member (F)

(3) National Secular Democratic Party Wa’ad (Christian-dominated)

1. Secretary-General (F)
2. Member of the executive committee (F)
3. Member of Parliament (M)

(4) Unitarian Tawhid (Sunni, single-sect)

1. Party Leader and secretary-General (M, clergy)
2. Head of the women’s wing & wife of party leader (F)
3. Responsible for the media (F)
4. Religious counselor (F)

(5) Renewal Tajaddod (Secular, plural)

1. Secretary-General (M)
2. Senior adviser to President (M)
3. Member of the executive board (F)
4. Member of the legislative council (F)
5. Member of the general assembly (F)

(21) Free patriotic Movement Tayyar (Christian-dominated)

1. **Party Leader (M)**
2. Secretary-General for administrative affairs (M)
3. Member of Parliament (M)
4. Head of diplomatic and external relations (M)
5. Official spokesperson for the party and member of the executive committee (F)
6. Foreign press ‘attaché’ for the party leader (F)
7. Head of women’s wing – to be dismantled (F)
8. Head of social sector (F)
9. Chef de cabinet of the leader (F)
10. Head of outreach (Diaspora) and recruitment (F)
11. Member of 2005 and 2009 Parliament (F)
12. Head of finance sector (F)
13. Liaison Officer with government institutions (F)
14. Head of environment sector (F)
15. Member of the consultative council and politburo (F)
16. Head of the local and international media (F)
17. Member of the executive committee (F)
18. Chair of the research and studies department, former vice-chair of the executive committee and responsible for women’s mobilization in the party (F)
19. Member of the party in charge of psychological wellbeing of members (F)
20. Municipal candidate (F)
21. Municipal candidate (F)

(5) Lebanese Forces (Maronite-dominated)

1. **Party leader (M)**
2. Former party leader and MP in 2000, 2005 and 2009 (F)
3. Chair of the women’s department (F)
4. Member of the executive committee and head of the pharmacists sector (F)
5. Coordinator of the medical and nurses sector (F)

(3) Islamic Action Front Jabhat El-‘Amal (Sunni, single-sect)

1. **Party Leader (M, clergy)**
2. Head of the women’s clergy and wife of party leader (F)
3. Religious counselor (F)

(13) Future, Al-Mustaqbal (Sunni-dominated)
1. **Senior Vice-President and Adviser to leader (M)**
2. Senior adviser to former assassinated leader (M)
3. Head of professional associations sector (M)
4. Head of youth sector (M)
5. Coordinator of education sector and current Minister of Education (M)
6. MP in 2000 & 2005 (F)
9. Head of social sector and women’s department (F)
10. Member of municipality (F)
11. Sister of Vice-President of party and former Prime Minister (F)
12. Member of municipality and head of the community development (F)
13. Member of municipality in charge of social welfare projects (F)

(4) **Giants Marada (Maronite-dominated)**

1. **Senior adviser to the leader (M)**
2. Spokesperson of the party and member of the political bureau (F)
3. Head of the women’s wing in the North (F)
4. Chair of the central women’s committees (F)

(7) Scholars, national experts, and political activists
### Lebanon: Women in Political Parties

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### Column numbers & explanatory notes on coding of variables

1. Party name
2. Year of origin of political party (year established)
3. Party age: ‘0’ for pre-war (before 1975); ‘1’ for war-origin & post-war (after 1975)
4. % seats occupied by party in Parliament
5. Pluralism in membership where ‘0’ is assigned for single-sect & ‘1’ for plural or multi-sect
6. Democratic practices in leadership transitions: ‘0’ is assigned to parties that do not follow due democratic process and ‘1’ for those that hold periodic and competitive elections.
7. Democratic practices in decision-making: ‘0’ is assigned for centralized decision-making and ‘1’ for decentralized and democratic process
8. Combined democracy score in transfer of leadership & decision-making: ‘0’ is assigned to parties that are democratically deficit in both indicators; ‘1’ for parties that employ democratic process either in leadership or decision-making; and ‘2’ for parties that are democratic in both indicators.
9. Religiosity and secularism 5-point scale: parties are coded ‘1’ extremist religiosity; ‘2’ conservative but not extremist; ‘3’ tolerant religiosity; ‘4’ confessional but civil secularism; and ‘5’ a-religious & secular parties.
10. Percentage share of female membership (in %)
11. Percentage share of women in decision-making bodies (in %)
12. Percentage share of female nominees on parties’ electoral lists for parliament (in %)
13. Percentage share of female nominees on parties’ electoral lists for municipalities (in %)
14. Internal voluntary party quotas where ‘0’ is assigned to parties not employing quotas; ‘1’ for those that have recommended; and ‘2’ for those employing quotas to increase women’s leadership
15. Electoral quotas for women where ‘0’ is assigned to parties not employing quotas and ‘1’ for those employing quotas for women to increase their share on electoral lists.
Appendix 1
Party Variation in Religiosity & Women’s Leadership
A Cross-National Perspective

Introduction

Political parties are gatekeepers. They recruit women as party members, select them for promotion to leadership positions, and nominate them as candidates for public office. As such, parties are the main vehicles for women’s representation and political leadership. Nonetheless, average female parliamentary representation remains below parity worldwide. In 2010, the global average for women as members in parliament stood at 19.1%, with wide variations across regions ranging between a low 10% for Arab states and a high of 42% in Nordic countries. This picture suggests that gender imbalances are still present, particularly in female representation. Indeed, parties vary in the extent to which they promote women to leadership positions in their executive and legislative decision-making structures, and nominate them for public office.

In this Appendix, I advance a theory of party variation in religiosity to explain variation in women’s leadership. Party religiosity refers to the programmatic orientations in parties’ agendas or the extent to which religious goals penetrate their political platforms. I argue that women’s party leadership in decision-making bodies is endogenous to party-level characteristics, specifically the intensity of religiosity on party platforms. This in turn influences their inclusion in electoral lists and determines the outcome of female parliamentary representation, the most commonly invoked indicator for women’s political participation. This paper introduces women’s leadership cum their

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1 Rwanda is the only country that crossed the parity line with 56.3% female representation (see, the Inter-Parliamentary Union IPU, www.ipu.org)
share in parties’ legislative and executive inner bodies (politburos, supreme councils, executive committees, etc…) and as nominees on their electoral lists, as additional indicators.

My argument departs from prior scholarship in several ways. First, I offer a theory of party-level variation in characteristics rather than country-level development, political regime, and electoral system or socio-cultural characteristics to explain variation in female leadership. Second, rather than conceptualizing a relationship between religions, such as Islam, Christianity or Judaism, and female representation and leadership, broadly defined, I develop an ordinal measure of religiosity based on the salience of religious components in party platforms. Third, I suggest a linear career path for women in politics, one that assumes upward mobility from party cadres to leadership in public office. Finally, I test this theory using an original cross-national dataset of women in 330 political parties of varying religiosities and secularisms across 26 Muslim, Christian and Jewish majority countries.

This manuscript builds on a theoretical framework developed and tested on a single country case-study of Lebanon. Section A recapitulates the theory of party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership setting out the testable hypotheses, the variables and their operationalization. Section B describes the dataset or the process of selecting countries for the three sub-samples as well as the methods of data collection and the coding process for testing the hypotheses. Section C and section D present the results of the estimated multivariate regression models for women’s party leadership and nominations on electoral lists.

A. The Theory of Party variation in Religiosity & Women’s Leadership
My core hypothesis is that as religiosity on party platforms increases, the share of women in leadership bodies is likely to fall. Other party-level characteristics are expected to influence women’s leadership and candidacy for public office. These include female party membership and affirmative action measures, particularly legislated and voluntary party quotas for women. This research takes political parties as the unit of analysis and looks for party variation in the share of women in (1) executive and legislative decision-making bodies (e.g., politburos, supreme councils and boards, executive committees); and (2) electoral lists for parliament.²

1. Religiosity and Secularism³

Previous scholarship suggests that some world religions (e.g. Islam, Catholicism, Hinduism or Judaism) have negative effects on women’s representation and leadership. I extend this argument of religions in societies to political parties and argue that it is not religions per se but the intensity of religiosity in party platforms that affects outcomes for women’s leadership. Religiosity is not a constant since there are different degrees and varying intensities within the Islamic world and elsewhere, where other religions are also dominant. I posit that a better predictor of female leadership -- rather than religions broadly conceived-- is the intensity of religiosity enshrined in party platforms (Sbaity Kassem 2011). This paper adopts a multivocal understanding of religions, which is extended from individuals to parties and implies a continuum of varying intensities of religiosities and secularisms. A religiosity scale honors and acknowledges the full realm

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² I do not study outcomes, as in female representation, because their election to public office depends on the electoral system, voters’ preferences and voters’ turnout, which is not within the purview of political parties.

³ Religiosity is used interchangeably with secularism to reflect that these are placed along a continuum of varying intensities of religiosities and secularisms. I look at this religiosity-secularism continuum in ascending order of secularism (from lowest ‘1’ to highest ‘5’), or highest religiosity ‘1’ to lowest religiosity ‘5’.
of possible religiosities and may be more sensitive to capturing varying intensities in party platforms and their influence on women’s chances for ascendance to leadership positions within party inner structures and on their electoral lists. Religiosity of parties, as observed in their political platforms, is the main explanatory variable for variations in women’s leadership. I argue that as party religiosity falls, the share of women in leadership bodies and on electoral lists is likely to increase. A party-level argument affects country-level explanations in that when the share of women in leadership bodies and as nominees improve, female representation in public office will be enhanced. This yields the following hypothesis:

**H1. The share of women in decision-making and leadership bodies is likely to be higher in parties whose platforms reflect less religiosity (more secularism) than in those containing high religiosity (low secularism)**

2. **Affirmative Action Measures: Quotas for women**

Quotas for women can be voluntarily introduced by parties to increase the share of women in parties’ inner leadership structures (internal quotas) and/or on their electoral lists (electoral quotas). Or, they may be legislated quotas imposed on all parties with percentage shares or reserved seats for women to increase female parliamentary representation. The introduction of legislated or voluntary quotas for women has invariably resulted in increasing female representation at all levels, wherever employed uniformly and without internal resistance at the party level. However, quotas for women

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are only a temporary measure and must be introduced at all decision-making levels. This is specified at 30% in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action.⁵

Indeed, empirical evidence shows that quotas for women boost female leadership and representation, especially when combined with ‘women-friendly’ electoral systems.⁶ Many consolidated democracies, including the Nordic countries with highest female representation worldwide, have employed quotas for women as an interim measure to boost their share in parliament.⁷ The advocates of quotas stress that such measures do not only increase female representation but they also create a critical mass of women for leadership, which makes a difference in the long run for women’s leadership in the political domain. Voluntary party internal and electoral quotas for women are looked at as explanatory variables for women’s leadership. These are within the purview of parties and may produce variation in women’s shares in leadership or as nominees on party electoral lists. Legislated quotas which are imposed on all parties irrespective of their categorization do not cause party variation. However, this produces variation in the magnitude of women’s shares on parties’ electoral lists. Therefore, they are also considered. This yields the following hypotheses:

**H₂. Women’s shares in parties’ leadership bodies are more likely to increase in parties that employ internal quotas for women than in parties that do not.**

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⁶ Party list proportional representation (PR) electoral systems applied in large districts and combined with closed lists and rank-order rules for nominations (top-ranking, zipper quotas) constitute a proven formula for improving women’s representation. See, Drude Dahlerup, 2006 and the International Institute for Democratic Electoral Assistance (IDEA) website www.idea.int and www.quotaproject.org

⁷ In these countries, the rank-ordering in which women are placed in electoral lists is also specified, such as closed or zipped lists.
3. **Female party membership**

Female party membership is assumed to influence women’s leadership. In studying factors that enhance female representation in Great Britain, Kittilson (1997) highlights the potency of women as actors and party activists and argues that women’s party membership influences their share on electoral lists. However, parties may have huge female membership without corresponding levels of female leadership, as per Putnam’s law (2000) of increasing disproportions. In this context, Basu remarks that “[i]ndeed in all South Asian countries, right-wing groups, often ethnic and religious in character, have enormous capacity to mobilize women’s movements while undermining women’s advancement” (2005: 35). This phenomenon has also been observed by other scholars studying Islamist and other religious parties.8 This is an important consideration, since most of these religious parties are essentially social movements with broad-based, grassroots constituencies, drawing in youth --women and men-- into their membership. Parties also recruit women for electioneering purposes and ghettoize them into special women’s wings.9 Thus, different parties offer women different opportunities in leadership

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(Basu 2005). In effect, female party membership may influence leadership but is not a match for it; nor is it affected by party religiosity as the findings of research has shown for women’s leadership (Sbaity Kassem 2011).

Scholars also argue that as the share of women in party membership increases, their activism increases in political parties—which serve as the gatekeepers to political leadership— they push for more women to assume leadership positions in the inner structures of political parties. Female activists are rewarded for their dedication, loyalty and contributions by being promoted to leadership positions in parties’ inner structures. Once this critical mass is in decision-making positions, they lobby with party elites to include more women on their electoral lists, thus increasing women’s chances of electability to public office. Thus, a key variable in feminist analysis is female party membership and their level of activism at the grassroots. Therefore, consistent with this tripartite path, this paper posits that political parties constitute the first level entry point for female leadership into a political career. This level marks the first step in their upward mobility within party cadres and into public office. I dub this as the ‘linear career path’ for women in politics. This research explores the congruence or a mismatch between female party membership and leadership, which yields the following two-pronged hypothesis:

**H4. (a) The share of women in decision-making and leadership bodies is likely to increase as their share in party membership expands; and (b) in turn, as women’s share in leadership bodies increases, their share in parties’ electoral lists for public office is likely to increase.**

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B. The Dataset

These four hypotheses are tested on a sample of 330 political parties of varying religiosities across 26 Arab and non-Arab Muslim, Christian and Jewish-dominated developing and developed countries in Asia, Europe and Africa. An original set of data and information on women in these parties is compiled which, to my knowledge, is not available anywhere else.\(^{11}\) I include ‘relevant’ parties or those that have occupied at least one seat in any of the last three parliaments in their respective countries.\(^{12}\) In the following paragraphs, criteria for selecting countries to test this theory are laid out. Subsequently, the process of data collection and caveats is described.

1. Selection of countries for the Arab, non-Arab Muslim-majority, Europe & Israel datasets

The interest in the multivocality of religion(s), especially Islam, and how party religiosity influences female representation and leadership prompted the selection of countries which have Muslim, Christian or Jewish majority populations. It was not possible for time and cost constraints to cover all the countries in the world. The whole set of 49 Muslim-majority (over 50\% population) countries is considered and split between Arab and non-Arab countries into two sub-samples, which have a diversity of civil, national, secular and theocratic Islamic parties.\(^{13}\) Only countries that (1) allow political parties to

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\(^{11}\) See, Annex to the Appendix for this original dataset on women in 26 countries across 330 political parties.

\(^{12}\) Sartori defines ‘relevant’ parties as those occupying at least 3\% of parliamentary seats (1976: 121-3). In order to obtain more observations, this threshold is lowered for all parties included in this exercise.

\(^{13}\) The 49 Muslim-majority countries (over 50\% population) include 22 Arab countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen plus the Palestinian Territories); and the 27 non-Arab Muslim-majority countries (Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran,
form, function and compete; and (2) hold regular elections are selected. This is largely determined by reference to comparative democracy scales prepared by credible sources like Polity IV and the Freedom House.

Comparing the scores on freedom, political liberties and democracy scales for the last three consecutive years published by the Ted Gurr’s Polity IV, the Freedom House Index (FHI), and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2010 BTI produced 7 out of the 27 non-Arab Muslim-majority countries. This is the whole set of non-Arab Muslim-majority countries that meet the criteria set above. These include Afghanistan, Albania, Indonesia, Senegal, Turkey, Bangladesh and Bosnia-Herzegovina (see, Annex Tables A.1 and A.2). The same criteria are applied to the 22 Arab states, allowing parties to form and holding regular elections but lowering the threshold on democracy scores in order to cover more observations. This process yields the whole set of 13 Arab countries. These include Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, and Palestine.

Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Palestine is not an independent state. It is granted observer status in the United Nations, but is recognized as a full-fledged member of the League of Arab States. The five European countries are the Stathis Kalyvas (1996) set for Christian democratic parties.

Nine countries drop out: Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, Sudan and Syria either do not allow parties to form and/or have ruling parties; or do not hold elections. Somalia is a failed state. Iraq drops out because of the state of anarchy that permeates the country since 2003, although parties form and elections are held.

Comoros is the closest to being ranked as a ‘Free’ country in the Arab region. For the past five years, it scored 3 on the FHI 7-point scale. Lebanon scored 3 until 1975 when the 15-year civil war broke, thereafter its ranking dropped significantly due to civil strife and presence of foreign armies on its soil affecting sovereignty. Since the beginning of the 21st century, when the Israeli occupation of the South ended and in 2005 when the Syrian troops left, its ranking has risen to 5. The United Nations accords Palestine an observer Status among its states members, however, the League of Arab States considers it one of its 22 member states. It is included in the Arab dataset, although it is not an independent state, because it allows parties to form and holds elections periodically with competing powerful religious and non-religious parties in which women are politically active.
For comparative purposes, countries with Christian-majority populations and those that have Christian democratic and/or social parties are considered. In fact, all the countries in Europe and in Latin America, among others, have Christian-majority populations and many have Christian social and democratic parties. However, I take advantage of the well-defined and defended set by Stathis Kalyvas (1996) of five European countries with Christian democratic parties, and I add to that sub-sample Israel, as the only Jewish country. These include Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, which together with Israel constitute one sub-sample with Christian democratic and Jewish parties that are relevant and strong.\(^{16}\)

Including these cases enriches the analysis in two ways. First, it makes the case that religious parties do not necessarily equate with high religiosity parties. For instance, the European Christian parties are low on the religiosity scale and high in female representation at both the party and country levels, which offers leverage in comparative perspective. Second, it permits assessing if high religiosity -- where it is pervasive -- always translates into low female representation. Christian democratic parties in Europe have been traditionally religious parties, but transformed overtime. Religion remains an identity and is retained in the title, but their platforms have no religious components. These six countries offer a valuable comparison: the countries are developed democracies and use ‘women-friendly’ electoral systems combined with voluntary party quotas. However, in the recent past these countries have employed legislated quotas for women on a temporary basis, and are more developed and advanced democracies, as well as more peaceful, compared to countries in the other two datasets. The “Christian” parties in the

\(^{16}\) Chile and Venezuela in Latin America also have prominent Christian parties. These and other existing countries have not been included in this cross-national comparison due to time and cost constraints. However, future research in this area will cover the whole global set of countries.
European countries have shed their religiosity overtime, at a time when party religiosity in some Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries appears to be on the rise. This cross-national comparative review engages with the scholarship that Muslim-majority countries differ widely in the status of women and political empowerment than countries belonging to other religious affiliations.\footnote{Anne Schuster cites, “With the attacks of September 11 and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, the public fear of Islam has led to a rethinking of the relationship between state and church in the Netherlands.” (Kennedy and Valenta 2006, in Schuster 2007: 4). See also, Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson. 2004. “Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism”, Journal of Democracy (Volume 15, Number 4, October 2004) pp. 140-146. See also, Norris and Inglehart 2004, Clark and Schwedler 2003, Steven Fish, 2002, among others.}

I am aware that these countries are at different levels of development, have different political regimes, employ different electoral systems, and belong to different cultures and have different religious affiliations, which may raise some criticism in as far as comparability is concerned. In order to account for this, I use country fixed effects in estimating the regression models for women’s leadership and candidacy, which hold constant these variables within each country. Moreover, I am guided by scholars like Laurie Brand (1994) and Brian Barry (2000) who see that such comparisons across societies and cultures are permissible. Further, the United Nations and other international research outfits conduct global comparisons across different development, political and electoral systems. Prior explanations for female representation, while these are generally supported by existing patterns, cannot fully account for variations across countries of the same level of development and political regimes or employing the same electoral systems.\footnote{These variables are operationalized as follows: political regimes are dichotomized by assigning ‘1’ for those countries that scored between +6 and +10 on the Polity IV scale for democracies, and ‘0’ for all others. Electoral systems are dichotomized by assigning ‘1’ for List PR systems and ‘0’ for all others; and ‘1’ for closed lists and ‘0’ for all others. In order to control for the influence of these exogenous variables}
2. **Data Collection: Process and Problems**

During 2007-2010, national consultants in each of the 26 countries selected for inclusion in the dataset were engaged to collect data and information on women in ‘relevant’ political parties. These local researchers were provided with a letter of introduction explaining the research project and its objectives. Data and information from official and primary sources are compiled by conducting structured interviews with party officials and party administrators based on a questionnaire (see, Annex). This include party-age, programmatic orientations and goals, voluntary internal and electoral quotas for women, seats and share by party in the last three parliaments, and shares of women in party membership, leadership bodies, and as nominees on parties’ electoral lists for parliament.

Published data on women in political parties, worldwide, are scarce and often times, if available, obsolete, as for instance in some European and few Arab countries. The process of data collection is hampered by the paucity of sex-disaggregated data in parties’ inner structures, especially on female membership in some non-Arab Muslim countries. Data on female membership are missing for five out of the seven countries in the non-Arab Muslim-majority dataset, namely Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Indonesia, Senegal, and Turkey; and for some parties in Israel. Data on composition of women’s leadership and nominations, these are incorporated in the regression equations given above. The results on the secularism variable are unaltered neither in direction nor in statistical significance, which strongly support the theory of party variation in religiosity. See, Annex A.4 for scatter plots (Graphs A.14 to A.16) showing the relationship between women’s leadership, political regimes, electoral systems and types of electoral lists.

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19 A wide network of connections, having served in the United Nations for 35 years, facilitated the identification of national consultants. These were all researchers, university professors, political scientists, feminists, and scholars. A letter of introduction addressed to all parties facilitated the collection process. The author personally compiled data on Lebanon, as a single case-study to test the theory of party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership. A list of national consultants is given in Appendix 3.
membership are not available because there are no membership rolls or is classified information in some religious extremist parties. Women comprise 10% of parties’ membership in Egypt, 2% in Yemen, and 8% in Lebanon, compared to an average of 10% worldwide (Shtay, 2004: 144). Data on female membership in major parties in 18 western democracies and Japan date back to 1992 (see, Annex Table A.3).

To my knowledge, data on women in politburos, executive committees, supreme decision-making councils, and other legislative and executive leadership bodies within the inner structures of political parties is not available anywhere. Moreover, unless electoral quotas are in place, whether party-wise or legislated, there are no data available on female nominees by party. This was compiled for all 330 parties, wherever it was possible to do so although it may not have been readily available.

3. **Operationalization and Coding Variables**

The proportion of women in leadership and decision-making bodies of parties and in electoral lists, the two independent variables, are compiled and used to measure female leadership and candidacy for public office.

The core explanatory variable, religiosity, is operationalized by first labeling the 330 political parties into broad generic categories according to their political agendas, then coding them according to the intensity of religiosity on their platforms. This coding is based on self-identification by party officials and administrators and extensive consultation with local researchers and the author who also consulted with scholars and national experts on political parties in countries in the three sub-samples. This transparent process helped in reaching consensus on the coding of parties utilized in the quantitative
analysis. This process is based on (1) self-identification and self-location by party administrators, and (2) reviewing their programmatic orientations and goals by local researchers and proposing the labeling of parties into generic broad groups. Subsequently, parties are coded from lowest secularism ‘1’ (highest religiosity) to highest secularism ‘5’ (lowest religiosity) on a continuum of 5-point religiosity and secularism scale.

Female membership is operationalized by collecting data on the percentage shares of women in membership of parties that are ‘relevant’. The tripartite relationship between female party membership, leadership and nominations to public office – women’s linear career path -- is examined in comparative perspective and tested at the country and sub-regional levels. Lastly, legislated and voluntary internal and electoral party quotas for women are dichotomized by assigning ‘1’ for parties that apply these quotas and ‘0’ for those that do not.

C. Regression Models for Women’s Leadership in Political Parties

Bivariate regressions establish a positive relationship between women’s leadership and party religiosity for all 26 countries in the sample, as well as for each of the regional sub-samples separately. However, because some countries may have as few as four relevant parties while others go up to 25 parties in parliament, a ‘country-by-country’ bivariate regression is undertaken to ensure that no single country is driving the results. This produced eight out of the 26 countries for which the null hypothesis could not be rejected that religiosity does not affect women’s leadership. A relationship between women’s leadership and party religiosity could not be established in the

The process of labeling and coding parties in the case study of Lebanon informed the cross-national exercise. The field research in Lebanon was carried out for a PhD dissertation.
following countries: Kuwait (n=6) and Mauritania (n=6); Albania (n=5), Bosnia-Herzegovina (n=12), and Senegal (n=9); and in Germany (n=6), Belgium (n=8), and Israel (n=16): where ‘n’ is the number of relevant parties.

**Female leadership & secularism**

**Graph A.1 Cross-national (26 countries)**
Leadership= -.30 + 4.11 (secularism) ***
(t= 6.52; r^2 = .1271)

**Graph A.2 Arab countries (13)**
Leadership= .59 + 3.13 (secularism) ***
(t=4.51; r^2 = .1372)

These bivariate relationships are presented graphically in charts A.1 to A.4. Linear bivariate regressions produce ‘r’ correlation coefficients between .36 and .37 and ‘b’ bivariate regression coefficients which are statistically significant, with t-statistics between 3.14 and 6.52. This implies that we can safely reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between secularism and women’s leadership with 99% certainty. Estimating these bivariate relationships using a nonlinear regression equation produces closely similar results. 21

In 18 out of the 26 countries in the three datasets, one can observe a significant relationship between religiosity and female party leadership. Moreover, in the eight countries for which a relationship could not be established, the estimated coefficients are always positive, as hypothesized, albeit not significant. This implies that the relationship

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21 Chart A.1 (r^2 = 0.1271 vs. 0.1184); chart A.2 (r^2 = 0.1372 vs. 0.1224); chart A.3 (r^2 = 0.1358 vs. 0.1393); and chart A.4 (r^2 = 0.1338 vs. 0.1291). However, the equation that explains a larger proportion of the variance is reported.
between women’s leadership and party religiosity, which is observed in the majority of countries, is never disconfirmed in any individual country.

**Graph A.3 Non-Arab Muslim countries (7)**

Leadership = 1.82 + 10.01 (log secularism) ***

(t = 3.94; r² = .1393)

**Graph A.4 Europe & Israel (6)**

Lead= -.84 + 6.01 (secularism) ***

(t = 3.14; r² = .1338)

The bivariate regression for female leadership on internal quotas for women is not robust as hypothesized. The t-statistic is 3.62 with ‘r’ coefficient of .2073 (r²=0.043) denoting wide dispersion around the regression line, and ability to explain very little (4.3%) of variance in women’s leadership. Nonetheless, the positive coefficient is reassuring since it shows that when political parties start applying internal quotas (dichotomized variable) women’s leadership is predicted to increase. In fact, the difference in means is significant (14.6 against 22.6). Therefore, the null hypothesis can be safely rejected that there is no relationship between women’s leadership and internal quotas.

Graphs A.5 show that the relationship between female membership and party leadership is significant and that the null hypothesis can be rejected with 99% certainty.

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22 The Trots of Netherlands (TON) party is a one-woman party, or 100% female membership and leadership. TON was founded by the former female minister, Rita Verdonk, after she resigned from the VVD party. At the time of writing, Ms. Verdonk held one seat in the Netherlands Parliament.
level. The t-score is strong at 10.69 and there is little dispersion around the regression line.

**Graph A.5 Female leadership & membership (26 countries)**

Leadership$= 2.25 + .63$ (secularism) ***  
(t=10.69; $r^2 = 0.3843$)  

Leadership$= -9.60 + 9.20$ (log secularism) ***  
(t= 6.82; $r^2 =0.2128$)

Running the bivariate relationship by estimating a nonlinear regression and comparing it with a linear regression produces the two graphs shown above with different $r^2$ and fits. There is one outlier party, TON of the Netherlands. The reported results are very similar when we account for the presence of this outlier party by incorporating a dummy variable in the regression on which Graphs A.1 and A.4 are based.

These results encourage further statistical analysis and the estimation of a multivariate regression model incorporating female party leadership, secularism (religiosity), voluntary internal party quotas for women, and female membership:

**Female leadership** = $a + b$ (secularism) + $b_1$ (internal quotas) + $b_2$ (female membership)

I estimate four OLS regression models, each of which includes country fixed effects. Model 1A covers all 26 countries and model 1B covers 19 countries, excluding the seven non-Arab Muslim-majority countries. Model 2 covers the 13 Arab countries and Model 3 covers the seven non-Arab Muslim-majority countries, while Model 4 comprises the
Kalyvas set of five European countries to which Israel is added. The dataset for the seven non-Arab Muslim-majority countries is affected by missing values on female membership in 83 out of the 98 relevant parties. It is likely that the 83 parties for which female membership is missing may differ in systematic ways from the 15 parties for which full data are available. Hence, given the concern that missing values are not “at random”, the small sample cannot be taken as fully representative of party behaviour in the non-Arab Muslim-majority countries. Therefore, Model 1B is estimated without non-Arab Muslim countries because of missing data on female membership for that sub-sample.

The regression results in Model 1B show that the estimated coefficients on secularism, internal quotas and female membership are in the same direction and significance as in Model 1A. For similar reasons, Model 3 for the non-Arab Muslim-majority cases is estimated by dropping the female membership variable. Although this raises the risk that the coefficients on the remaining variables are affected by bias from missing variables, it means that the model is estimated on the full set of parties from this country grouping. The estimated coefficients for the model with female membership are different in magnitude, direction and level of significance from Model 3, with membership dropped.

All models are run with country fixed effects in order to check how the slope coefficients on the other explanatory variables would behave. This is especially important since the 26 countries do not only have different levels of development, political regimes and electoral systems, but also different religious affiliations and cultures with varying influence on female leadership, which fixed effects take care of. The Europe and Israel
sub-sample have a higher level of development and, clearly, a different political culture than the Arab or non-Arab Muslim-majority sub-samples. The results are produced in table A.1.

**Table A.1 Fixed effects regression models for women’s leadership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables (Robust standard errors) FE by country</th>
<th>Model 1A (26 Countries)</th>
<th>Model 1B (19 countries Excl. non-Arab Muslim-majority)</th>
<th>Model 2 (13) Arab countries</th>
<th>Model 3 (7) countries Non-Arab Muslim-majority</th>
<th>Model 4 (6) countries 5 Europe + Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secularism</td>
<td>3.1032*** (.8910)</td>
<td>3.6719*** (.7865)</td>
<td>4.3789*** (.6147)</td>
<td>2.1926* (1.2008)</td>
<td>.5747 (.9193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal quotas</td>
<td>5.1890** (2.0830)</td>
<td>4.7419** (1.9888)</td>
<td>3.3625 (3.0322)</td>
<td>16.5753*** (2.9530)</td>
<td>4.3161 (3.2126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Membership</td>
<td>.4985*** (.1009)</td>
<td>.5152*** (1.012)</td>
<td>.2966*** (.0651)</td>
<td>Excluded Missing data</td>
<td>.9229*** (.0771)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>13.5307*** (2.9031)</td>
<td>21.6720*** (3.0310)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>1.7078* (1.064)</td>
<td>7.8197*** (.9392)</td>
<td>-13.1384*** (3.0737)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>-5.4430*** (1.1084)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-21.4821*** (3.1939)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2.5301* (1.7775)</td>
<td>8.1730*** (2.0254)</td>
<td>-17.6965*** (3.7212)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1.5303* (.8214)</td>
<td>7.3398*** (.4833)</td>
<td>-14.3967*** (3.2036)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>5.1956*** (1.1755)</td>
<td>11.8734*** (1.4097)</td>
<td>-9.2014*** (1.8449)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>-5.8111*** (1.3892)</td>
<td>.4458 (1.3366)</td>
<td>-19.8009*** (1.9970)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>11.7730*** (1.0732)</td>
<td>17.3071*** (.4304)</td>
<td>-4.6398 (3.5085)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>-2.6673** (1.1179)</td>
<td>2.9754*** (.5119)</td>
<td>-18.3557*** (3.4358)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>-.0177* (1.1303)</td>
<td>3.5554*** (.3346)</td>
<td>-17.4810*** (3.1996)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>6.2673*** (.9557)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-16.6765*** (2.6322)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>5.0662*** (1.5441)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.6729*** (.74215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.7386*** (1.1804)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.4862** (.3599)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.7295*** (1.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.5259*** (1.1003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>8.8391***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15.4705***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Austria   10.3598***  15.8925***  (1.0272)   
(1.1354)  (.2653)  
Belgium  6.0143***  11.4523***  -7.3902***  
(2.0904) (1.5012) (1.2790)  
Germany 18.2780***  23.5738***  8.5240***  
(1.3597) (.3984) (.44076) 
Italy  .8668*  6.7227***  -7.0993***  
(.5851) (.5360) (.7213)  
Netherlands  28.6995***  34.1082***  12.1147***  
(2.3952) (1.7376) (1.0602)  
Israel  3.1587***  9.7455***  -1.7452*  
(2.3952) (1.7376) (1.0909)  
Constant (base)  -11.8077**  -20.2375***  -6.5476  
(2.7378) (3.1813) (4.5958) 
(1.3185) (3.3498) (4.5958)  
N  185  170  116  98  54  
Degrees freedom  163  150  102  89  45  
$R^2$  0.6747  0.7129  0.4556  0.3494  0.8985  
Adjusted $R^2$  0.6328  0.6766  0.3862  0.2910  0.8805  
F-Test  16.10  19.61  6.57  5.98  49.80  

Source: Official data compiled by national consultants from party administrators and processed by author. Clustered standard errors are reported. ***=P.01; **=P.05; *=P.10

1. **Secularism and Religiosity**

The results in all models show that there is a positive relationship between religiosity and women’s leadership. This relationship is robust and statistically significant in the large majority of countries covered in this exercise, particularly in the Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority sub-samples. In Model 4 covering the five European countries and Israel, the relationship is positive and in the right direction but the coefficient is not statistically significant. Nonetheless, these results imply that we can safely reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between women’s leadership and party religiosity. The results of the multivariate analysis in model 4 do not change even if we account for the one outlier party, TON in the Netherlands that has an all-female membership and leadership collapsed in one person.

Models 1A and 1B show that the regression coefficient of secularism on female leadership is statistically significant. As secularism jumps one point/category on the
religiosity scale, women’s leadership is estimated to increase by between 3.1 and 3.7 percentage points, respectively, as hypothesized (H1). Similar strong regression coefficients with statistical significance in all other models are shown, except for the European model. The highest coefficient (4.4) is depicted in Model 2 for the Arab countries and the lowest (2.2) in Model 3 for the non-Arab Muslim-majority countries. This is really a reflection of the differences in the extent to which religious goals penetrate parties’ agendas in each of these subsamples. This also explains why the coefficient in the European sub-sample is weakest compared to the other two subsamples. Thus, a different picture emerges in Model 4 covering the five European countries and Israel. Although the coefficient on secularism is positive, as anticipated, it is not statistically significant. In substantive terms, while there is not much variation within the sample, this behaviour may also be attributed to the less salience of religion in politics, at least in the five European countries. This observation is supported by the Fox (2005) religion and state (RAS) index, which is lower for European than for Muslim-majority countries.

2. Voluntary internal party quotas for women:

The multivariate regression models produced positive and large in magnitude regression coefficients on internal quotas in all models, which attest to the impact of

23 The results of the bivariate regressions of women’s leadership on party secularism and religiosity in Belgium, Germany and Israel show that the null hypothesis could not be safely rejected. However, strong and statistically significant coefficients are seen in Austria (r = .8941) with a strong t-score of 3.46; and Italy (r = .4473) with a t-score of 2.12, both have statistically significant regression coefficients. In the Netherlands (r = .4531) with a weak t-score of 1.52, but it is statistically significant.

24 The overall separation of religion and state in 2001 averaged for Western democracies (18.99) and for the Middle East and North Africa including Iran and Israel (49.44). The t-score is statistically significant at less than .001. See, Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler. 2005. “Separation of Religion and State in the Twenty-First Century: Comparing the Middle East and Western Democracies” Comparative Politics (April 2005), p. 326; and Jonathan Fox. 2006. “World Separation of Religion and State Into the 21st Century” Comparative Political Studies (Volume 39 Number 5) June 2006, 537-569.
affirmative action measures on women’s leadership. These coefficients are statistically significant in Models 1A and 1B as well as for the non-Arab Muslim-majority sub-sample, with fixed effects by country. In Model 1A, the coefficient is 5.19 and is statistically significant. This implies that as parties start employing voluntary internal quotas, women’s leadership will increase by over 5 percentage points.

Model 3 does not control for female membership since this variable is dropped due to missing data. The estimated coefficient is 16.58 and is statistically significant. This implies that as parties start employing voluntary party internal quotas, the marginal increase on women’s leadership is estimated to increase by close to 17 percentage points. It should be noted that despite the theoretical association between women’s leadership and voluntary party internal quotas, the coefficient of internal quotas on women’s leadership in the Arab and European models are not found to be statistically significant, although these are in the hypothesized direction. This may be attributed, particularly in the Arab sub-sample, to the seriousness with which parties commit to gender equality, but also to a lagged effect of enforcing quotas. Also, this may be due to absence of sufficient variation especially in the European and Israel sub-sample. Data compiled show that 50 out of 330 parties, around 15% of the sample, have such voluntary internal party quotas in place. Some parties have recommended but not yet implemented internal quotas. In fact, 33 parties in the European plus Israel and the non-Arab Muslim-majority sub-samples employ internal quotas, while 17 parties belong to the Arab sub-sample (of which ten parties in Lebanon have made recommendations but have not yet put them in force).

Since global databases on quotas (viz., International IDEA) exclude internal party measures, this information was also collected from party administrators. I am not aware that this may be available or published anywhere else.
These results support the hypothesis (H2) that, once voluntary party internal quotas are introduced, the share of women in leadership bodies will increase.

3. Female party membership

In the models that incorporate female membership, the regression coefficients are positive and statistically significant, although they are small in magnitude. These results support the hypothesis that female party membership enhances female leadership (H4). In Model 3, female membership is excluded because of missing data in four out of seven countries in the dataset, as explained earlier.26 The findings of studies covering parties with religious platforms in the Muslim-majority sub-samples show that these parties have sizeable levels of female membership confined in special women’s wings, but very few in leadership positions (Basu 2005, Sbaity Kassem 2011). Nonetheless, the predicted marginal increase in female leadership is by less than one percentage point for one unit of increase in female membership. Although this increase is relatively small, it supports the overall thrust of the hypothesis. The regression coefficient is highest in the European and Israel dataset, albeit still less than one percentage point. These results have also substantive significance and support the assumption that female membership enhances women’s chances in leadership in political parties by creating a critical mass of women.27 Therefore, as hypothesized, female membership can partially explain variation in women’s leadership across different parties. These results provide initial support for a

26 We are not sure that the lack of data is random or whether the estimation of the relationship, with just 15 parties in the non-Arab Muslim dataset, may not be valuable as a guide to the whole group since these parties may not be representative. The probability that the missing data on female membership may have produced unsatisfactory statistical results cannot be ruled out. The number of observations jumped from 15 to 98 by excluding female membership and the estimated coefficients for secularism and internal quotas turned positive and statistically significant.

27 In this connection, the findings of a case-study testing this theory in Lebanon show that higher female membership, particularly in parties with high religiosity, is not translated into higher shares in leadership. Women are confined to special women’s wings, which marginalizes them.
linear career path of women in politics, which is expected to be fully supported by results from multivariate regressions estimating a model for female parliamentary nominations in the following section.

Finally, Model 1A explains 63% of variation in female leadership, while Model 1B with fewer observations can explain a slightly larger amount of variation (by five percentage points). However, Model 1A covers more countries -- 26 compared to 19 countries --, produces statistically significant coefficients, as well as ability to explain a large amount of the variance in women’s leadership. This implies that the missing data on female membership, which is taken care of in Model 1B, does not change the overall results. Thus, Model 1A is superior to Model 1B.

The above statistical findings provide strong support to the theory of party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership and related hypotheses. These results point to the influence of party religiosity, voluntary internal quotas, and female membership on women’s leadership in parties’ decision-making bodies. More specifically, the results of the multivariate regression models establish that as secularism in parties’ political platforms increases, female membership expands and as parties start employing internal quotas, the proportion of women in parties’ leadership bodies increases accordingly. These results are generalizeable, given that the sub-samples represent the whole sets of Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries, which meet both criteria of allowing parties to form and holding periodical elections. This is also applicable to the sub-sample of the five European countries with Christian democratic parties and Israel, as the only country with Jewish parties. The estimated model for women’s leadership in the Arab sub-sample explains 45% of variance, while the model
for the non-Arab Muslim sub-sample can explain 35%, leaving a lot of the variance unexplained. The model for Europe and Israel, however, explains almost 90% of the variations in female leadership, notwithstanding the limited variation within this sub-sample and the results of fixed effects estimation.

D. Regression Models for Female Nominations to Parliament

The share of female nominees on parties’ electoral lists for public office is invariably influenced by legislated and voluntary party electoral quotas for women. It is also influenced by women’s shares in party membership (as activists) and in leadership bodies (critical mass). I expect party variation in religiosity and secularism to partially explain variations in female nominations to public office.

Graph A.6
Female nominations & secularism
Nominations= 2.88+ 2.86 (secularism)***
(t= 3.31; r² = 0.0373)

Graph A.7
Female nominations & membership
Nominations= -.52 + .55 (membership)***
(t=7.78; r² =0.2539)

Graphs A.6 to A.10 (next page) show the bivariate relationship between female nominations and each of these variables for the 26 countries. In all these graphs there are three outliers reporting 100% female nominations, notably, two parties in Senegal (viz., Alliance for Progress and Justice and the National Patriotic Union), and the Trots of Netherlands (TON).
The reported results are very similar when we account for the presence of these outlier parties by incorporating dummy variables in the bivariate regressions on which Graphs A.6 to A.8 and A.11 to A.13 are based. The linear are compared with nonlinear regressions and are found to explain more of the variance in female nominations. These graphs show high t-scores and positive coefficients, which are statistically significant. This implies that there is a relationship between female nominations and each of the independent variables, as hypothesized (H1 to H4). The results are given here below.

**Graph A.8**
Female nominations & legislated quotas
Nominations = 11.74 + 4.89 (L-quotas)***
Diff. in means (11.74 & 16.63); (t=2.24)

**Graph A.9**
Female nominations & electoral quotas
Nominations = 12.32 + 16.37 (E-quotas)***
Diff. in means (12.32 vs. 28.69); (t =4.81)

This overall picture may differ across the three sub-regional samples as graphs A.11 to A.13 for female nominations and leadership show. However, in all three sub-samples, the influence of female leadership on nominations is established and statistically significant. These graphs show high t-scores and statistically significant bivariate coefficients for Europe and Israel dataset, explaining 69% of the variance. For the non-Arab Muslim sub-sample, the t-score is small and so is the magnitude of the coefficient, although it is positive, which denotes that an association exists between women’s nominations and their share in parties’ leadership bodies. In the Arab sub-sample, while the t-statistic is high and the coefficient is statistically significant, this bivariate relationship explains less than 9% of variance.
These positive results encouraged further analysis. The five explanatory variables are incorporated to estimate a model for female nominations by political parties. This produced the following multivariate regression equation:

\[
\text{Female nominations} = a + b_1 \text{ (secularism)} + b_2 \text{ (female membership)} + b_3 \text{ (female leadership)} + b_4 \text{ (electoral quotas)} + b_5 \text{ (legislated quotas)}
\]

Fixed effects by country are used as dummies in estimating multivariate regression models for female parliamentary nominations for all 26 countries as well as for the Arab, non-Arab Muslim-majority and Europe plus Israel sub-regional samples. The results are given in table A.2.
Table A.2 Fixed Effects Regression Models for Female Parliamentary Nominations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables (robust Std. errors)</th>
<th>Model 1A (26) countries</th>
<th>Model 1B (19) countries Excl. Non-Arab Muslim</th>
<th>Model 2 (13) Arab Countries</th>
<th>Model 3 (7) Non-Arab Muslim-majority</th>
<th>Model 4 (6) countries 5 Europe &amp; Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secularism</td>
<td>.0020 (.7942)</td>
<td>.484 (.5145)</td>
<td>1.117* (.6142)</td>
<td>.7708 (1.6788)</td>
<td>-.4739 (.9089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female membership</td>
<td>.1063* (.0714)</td>
<td>.1275* (.0735)</td>
<td>.0692 (.0798)</td>
<td>Excluded Missing data</td>
<td>.4337* (.1929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female leadership</td>
<td>.2611*** (.0925)</td>
<td>.2244** (.0989)</td>
<td>.0360 (.0689)</td>
<td>.1694 (.1632)</td>
<td>.2453 (.1777)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral voluntary Party quotas</td>
<td>5.7666* (3.0219)</td>
<td>5.8905* (3.0729)</td>
<td>-5.3362*** (1.1790)</td>
<td>-2.6812 (3.7686)</td>
<td>3.3602 (2.3309)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislated quotas</td>
<td>41.8974*** (6.6862)</td>
<td>42.6644*** (7.3184)</td>
<td>-1.0491** (.4380)</td>
<td>8.4641*** (.7458)</td>
<td>20.5541*** (3.5078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>39.6011*** (7.4518)</td>
<td>-1.0165 (1.0039)</td>
<td>-1.6600*** (.4556)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>-1.4545* (1.0771)</td>
<td>-43.5679*** (6.9686)</td>
<td>.6005 (.7870)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>.9519 (1.0500)</td>
<td>-40.8413*** (7.7669)</td>
<td>-.4573 (1.1185)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>-3.3198*** (.7697)</td>
<td>-44.922*** (6.4931)</td>
<td>-2.1629*** (.6130)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>40.4883*** (7.4082)</td>
<td>.282 (1.1575)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>43.2504*** (7.2191)</td>
<td>2.3909*** (.6886)</td>
<td>.9353* (.6118)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>20.1998*** (1.6907)</td>
<td>-21.1914*** (5.8122)</td>
<td>23.5295*** (1.3221)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>9.0481*** (8.730)</td>
<td>-32.7872*** (6.5560)</td>
<td>9.5310*** (.7879)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>41.1636*** (6.6497)</td>
<td>-3.0162*** (.6632)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td></td>
<td>-41.4426*** (7.2411)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>16.6059*** (1.2530)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.933*** (1.5930)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.5529* (1.8227)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-9.1768*** (2.0608)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21.0802*** (.7648)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>11.4683*** (.7308)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.4882 (2.1519)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>55.0324*** (7.7464)</td>
<td>14.2861*** (2.2770)</td>
<td>5.2483*** (.86810)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>38.5892*** (2.2355)</td>
<td>-3.0857 (5.5443)</td>
<td>6.6919* (2.8066)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>65.6491*** (8.1960)</td>
<td>25.0497*** (2.9064)</td>
<td>16.3541*** (2.1315)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Italy | 51.8263*** | 10.8972*** | 3.4709***  
   | (6.7940) | (1.2550) | (.7106)  
Netherlands | 66.1742*** | 26.0723*** | 13.9980***  
   | (9.5464) | (3.8307) | (2.9008)  
Israel | 45.2293*** | 4.5516** | -0.5493  
   | (6.0765) | (1.8724) | (2.7482)  
Constant (base) | -44.8152*** | -5.8654*** | -3.1547  
   | (6.2827) | (2.1669) | (2.3520)  
   | 2.5723 | (5.9541) | (5.9541)  
N | 179 | 164 | 110  
Degrees freedom | 156 | 143 | 90  
R² | 0.8288 | 0.8536 | 0.5279  
   | 0.3702 | 0.9157  
Adjusted R² | 0.8046 | 0.8331 | 0.4640  
   | 0.2993 | 0.8962  
F-test | 34.33 | 41.68 | 8.26  
   | 5.22 | 46.74  

Source: Official data compiled by national consultants from party administrators and processed by author. Clustered standard errors are reported; ***=P.01; **=P.05; *=P.10

The fixed effects regression models estimate female electoral nominations as a function of religiosity (secularism), female membership and leadership, legislated and electoral voluntary party quotas for women. What emerges is that the coefficients on secularism are positive but small in magnitude (less than one percentage point) in all models, except in Model 4 for the Europe and Israel sub-sample where it is negative. However, the coefficient on secularism is statistically significant only in the Arab sub-sample with a higher magnitude (1.12). The negative coefficient on secularism in model 4 may be explained by the fact that there is really not much variation observed across these countries in women’s leadership and nominations, except in Israel. In addition, these results may be due to the lower dominance of religion on politics in Europe compared to the Muslim-majority countries, as the Fox RAS index indicates (see, earlier). Therefore, the overriding factors of more statistical significance for female parliamentary nominations may be the size of female party membership and party leadership more than religiosity and secularism per se in that model. The coefficient on female membership is positive and significant, as expected, in all models except for the Arab sub-sample. However, the coefficient on female leadership is found to be significant.
only in the full model but not in any of the sub-regional samples, although it is positive but small in magnitude. This implies that the influence of leadership on nominations is not that strong.

The coefficients on legislated quotas in all models are large and statistically significant, except for the Arab countries model where it is negative but statistically significant. The coefficients on electoral party quotas are positive and large for the full models and statistically significant, as expected. However, while it is statistically significant for the Arab sub-sample, it is negative. This may be explained by the less popularity of these quotas in the Arab countries. Data collected from party administrators and from the IDEA quota project show that 33 (10%) out of the 330 parties across 26 countries apply voluntary electoral quotas for women. These belong mostly to the European and Israel sub-sample, except for Belgium. In contrast, with the exception of few parties in Albania and few Arab countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), none of the parties in the Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries employ voluntary electoral quotas for women.

It is hard to compare the three sub-samples for obvious reasons of coverage. However, the results of how much of the variance in female nominations each model explains are reported. Models 1A and 1B produce strong and statistically significant coefficients, as hypothesized. Model 1A covering all 26 countries can explain over 80% of variations in female nominations, while Model 1B can explain slightly more (83%) of the variance but covers fewer countries (19). In Model 1A, the coefficients on female membership and leadership are positive and small, but statistically significant. This means that the predicted increase on female nominations is less than 1 (slopes are
Positive, large and statistically significant coefficients on electoral and legislated quotas are depicted for Models 1A (26 countries) and 1B (19 countries). This implies that as soon as affirmative action measures are introduced by parties and adopted by governments female nominations will automatically increase (by around 6 and 42 percentage points, respectively). The F-tests indicate that the fixed effects by country are consistently jointly significant. Model 1B explains almost the same proportion of the variance (three more percentage points) in female nominations than model 1A. However, Model 1A covers more countries (26 versus 19) and more data points. This implies that the missing data on female membership did not affect the results in Model 1A, since the coefficients are statistically significant in both models. Therefore, Model 1A with all countries is superior to the one with lesser countries.

Model 2 for the Arab sub-sample can explain 46% of variations, while Model 3 for the non-Arab Muslim countries, with missing female membership explains around 30% of variations in female nominations. The results in models 2 and 3 for the Arab and non-Arab Muslim sub-samples point to positive but small coefficients on religiosity, which is statistically significant for the Arab sub-sample but not for the non-Arab sub-sample. Similar results are borne for female leadership, which show positive but small coefficients but statistically not significant for both sub-samples. The Arab model explains 46%, while the non-Arab model explains around 30% of the variance in female nominations across parties. However, the results in these two models with respect to a

---

28 Running the regression model with interaction of female membership with female leadership for all models did not produce significant results. The model with interaction of female leadership and membership is not an alternative. Employing the Chow test, shows that the null hypothesis cannot be safely rejected in a model with interaction, since it did not result in an increase in the amount that the regression equation can explain in the model for all countries combined. Therefore, we infer that these models with interaction between membership and leadership do not explain a statistically significant additional proportion of the variance than the equation without any interaction.
linear career path for women in politics are not borne out. There is no clear link between women’s membership, leadership and nominations, as hypothesized. In the Arab sub-sample, the coefficient on female membership is positive but small. This reflects the situation in parties with higher religiosity where there is huge female membership and absence of a critical mass of women for leadership, as an outcome of ‘ghettoizing’ women in women’s wings (Sbait Kassem 2010). However, once a critical mass of women is attained, such a linear career path becomes plausible. This is especially the case in the sub-sample of non-Arab Muslim-majority countries, where the coefficients on religiosity and female leadership, albeit positive but are not statistically significant. This augurs well for a career path in politics.

In comparative perspective, the results in Model 4 do not denote a positive association between female nominations and religiosity, given the lesser salience of religiosity in parties’ platforms. Moreover, what also stands out in this model is the strong coefficient (20.5) on legislated quotas, which is statistically significant, leaving no doubt that as soon as parties start applying legislated quotas for women, female nominations are estimated to jump by close to 21 percentage points. This regression equation can explain up to 90% of variations in women’s leadership in the dataset for Europe and Israel. It supports the tripartite relationship between female party membership, leadership and nominations, the linear career path for women in politics. This relationship is both statistically and substantively significant in the dataset for Europe and Israel. It is also borne out for the full Model 1A, the 19 countries’ Model 1B and for the Arab sub-sample.
Conclusions

This Appendix advances a new explanation for women’s leadership by positing a theory of party variation in religiosity to explain variation in women’s leadership within parties under different political regimes and electoral systems, but also under the influence of different religions. Some scholars studying the Arab region argue that it is religion (Islam), authoritarian regimes, women-unfriendly electoral systems, or political culture, which most strongly produce the gender gap in female leadership and representation. This paper controls for the influence of Islam on female representation by showing that even in countries with Muslim-majority populations, one sees variations and wide disparities in female leadership. This cross-national research was only possible after compiling an original dataset of women in 330 political parties across 26 countries in Asia, Africa and Europe. This is an original dataset, which as far as I am aware is not available elsewhere. It constitutes a nucleus for a future research project to build a global database on women in political parties akin to those of the IPU on women in parliaments, or the IDEA on gender quotas, which are valuable to feminists and students of political parties.

The findings from the cross-national comparative exercise provide strong empirical support for the hypothesis that women’s chances in leadership are lower as religiosity in political parties rises and secularism in their political platforms diminishes, and vice versa. The quantitative examination of the influence of secularism on women’s leadership produces results that have high statistical significance for the pooled sample of

26 countries. This relationship is especially significant for the Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries, but not the Europe and Israel dataset. Furthermore, the multivariate regression results also show that internal quotas for women have a strong influence on women’s leadership in the non-Arab Muslim-majority dataset, since many parties in these countries employ such affirmative action measures, while fewer parties covered in the Arab countries do. Many parties look at women as a ‘symbol of the modern’. They may not be seriously committed to gender equality, but do so for window-dressing and public consumption, or to enhance their image for electoral success. They also employ rhetoric and strategic maneuverings when it is in their interest to do so. However, parties’ platforms transform overtime -- even those with religious platforms -- and their religiosity levels may decline. This augurs well for women’s leadership in these parties signaling the presence of a light at the end of the tunnel.

Lastly, the results in the full model of 26 countries denote the presence of a tripartite relationship between female party membership, leadership and nominations. The findings in the Europe and Israel sub-sample support the expectation that female membership and activism within parties increases the share of women on party electoral lists. Moreover, the share of women in leadership bodies has a positive but not statistically significant influence on female nominations. These results indicate that women’s political leadership pursues a linear career path. More precisely, an increase in women’s party membership -- as activists -- creates a critical mass of women for leadership, as shown in the leadership model. In turn, women in leadership bodies become agents of change and a pressure group within political parties as they lobby for a bigger share of women’s nominations on parties’ electoral lists to public office. These
findings augur well for the future of women in politics. Women can make a breakthrough into leadership positions with lower party religiosity, women-friendly electoral systems and a gender-sensitive political culture. Once a critical mass of women is created that imposes itself in parties’ inner structures and lobbies for a bigger share in the political pie, a linear career path for women is drawn.
## Annex Table A.1 Comparative Democracy Scores by FHI, Polity IV and BTI 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab countries (hold elections periodically &amp; allow parties to form and compete)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>4.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5 (6 in 2009)</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>4.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>5 (6 in 2009)</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>4.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine N.A.</td>
<td>5 (6 in 2009)</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>5 (6 in 2009)</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>4.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>4.37</td>
</tr>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>4.22</td>
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<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>3.78</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Arab Muslim-Majority Countries (electoral democracies)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2 (3 in 2009)</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td>6.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td>7.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>7.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td>7.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td>5.39</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
<td>3 (5 in 2009)</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>4 (3 in 2009)</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>6.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-66 (special values)</td>
<td>6.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 FHI is a 7-point scale which measures freedom as indicated by political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL). Countries whose combined score on political rights and civil liberties, average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered ‘Free’, 3.0 to 5.0 ‘Partly Free’, and 5.5 to 7.0 ‘Not Free’.

31 Polity IV does not include Palestine, because it is not recognized as an independent state. Data on Brunei, Maldives and Kosovo are not available in Polity IV Country Time Series 1800-2009.

32 The "Polity Score" captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (least democratic) to +10 (most democratic). Autocracies are assigned scores from (-10 to -6), democracies (+6 to +10), and all regimes in-between (-5 to +5). The combined Polity score is computed by subtracting “autocratic” score from “democratic” score: +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

33 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Transformation Index BTI 2010. Transformation Index 2010 [www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de](http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de). Data on Comoros, Djibouti, Maldives, Brunei and Palestine are not available. DEM= Democracy Status which is a composite complex index (e.g. No interference of religious dogma; Political participation; Free and fair elections, Civil Rights; Stability and Social Integration; Political and Social integration; Party System, etc…).

34 Sierra Leone, Niger and Mali do not qualify for inclusion in the dataset, despite their ranking. Due to frequent outbursts of violence, political instability and rampant corruption, and claims of fraudulent elections in Niger and Sierra Leone, comparatists including Alfred Stepan, argue that these do not fit the criteria of free and fair competitive elections. Also, Mali does not allow religious parties to form and function.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>Combined Polity scores</td>
<td>DEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1 most free to 7 not free)</td>
<td>(Democracies (+6 to +10))</td>
<td>(10 most to 1 least)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-66 (special values)</td>
<td>2.80</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European countries (Kalyvas set of Christian democratic parties) and Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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35 FHI is a 7-point scale which measures freedom as indicated by political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL). Countries whose combined score on political rights and civil liberties, average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered ‘Free’, 3.0 to 5.0 ‘Partly Free’, and 5.5 to 7.0 ‘Not Free’.

36 Polity IV does not include Palestine, because it is not recognized as an independent state. Data on Brunei, Maldives and Kosovo are not available in Polity IV Country Time Series 1800-2009.

37 The "Polity Score" captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (least democratic) to +10 (most democratic). Autocracies are assigned scores from (-10 to -6), democracies (+6 to +10), and all regimes in-between (-5 to +5). The combined Polity score is computed by subtracting “autocratic” score from “democratic” score: +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

38 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Transformation Index BTI 2010. Transformation Index 2010 (www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de). Data on Comoros, Djibouti, Maldives, Brunei and Palestine are not available. DEM= Democracy Status which is a composite complex index (e.g. No interference of religious dogma; Political participation; Free and fair elections, Civil Rights; Stability and Social Integration; Political and Social integration; Party System, etc…).
Annex Table A.2 Female MPs by Democracy scores, Electoral systems, & Quotas for Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Female MPs (in %)</th>
<th>Electoral systems PR &amp; others</th>
<th>Closed or Open Lists</th>
<th>Legislated quotas for women</th>
<th>Voluntary Party quotas</th>
<th>Polity IV 2006-2008 Democracy scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arab Countries (allow parties to form &amp; hold elections)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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Classification of 186 countries, (www.ipu.org) November 2010; for electoral systems and quotas: the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral, Assistance (IDEA), Global Database of Quotas for Women (www.quotaproject.org), as well as for Palestinian Occupied Territory data (update November 2009). Electoral system acronyms: List (PR) proportional representation; FPTP First Past the Post; BV Bloc Vote; MMP Mixed Membership Proportional; Parallel systems; PBV Party Bloc Vote; STV Single Transferable Vote; SNTV Single Non-Transferable Vote; TRS Two-Round Systems; N (no electoral system in place). Polity IV combined democracy scores are for democracies (+6 to +10); autocracies (-5 to -10); and other regimes (+5 to -4).

**Coding:** open lists (0), closed lists (1); PR (1), all other electoral systems (0); Democracies from +6 to +10 (1), all others (0).

### Annex Table A.3
Female membership in parties of advanced industrialized countries, 1992

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Source: Wane, 1996: 82; based IPU and other sources including Appleton and Mazur, Norris and Inglehart, and Kolinsky.
Annex A.4

Graph A.14 Female leadership & political regimes
Leadership = 12.6648 + 6.7782(democracy)***
Difference in means (12.66; 19.44); (t=4.15; $r^2=0.0558$)

Graph A.15 Female leadership & electoral systems
Leadership = 14.3572 + 4.0428(PR systems)***
Difference in means (14.36; 18.4); (t=2.37; $r^2=0.0189$)
The share of female MPs in a dataset of 80 countries, or the whole universe of Muslim-majority and the OECD countries, is regressed against these countries’ GDP/Capita, political regimes, and electoral systems. The statistical results support the argument that explanations of female representation based solely on either of these three theories do not fully explain variations perceived across countries or parties within these countries. These findings are also presented graphically in chapter One.
Appendix 2
Data on Women in Political Parties in 26 Countries

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ARAB COUNTRIES

**ALGERIA**

National Liberation Front 4
National Rally for Dem. 4
El-Islah (MRN/MI) 1999 1
HAMAS 9.8 1 1 10 15 20
Workers’ Party (PT) 5 1
National Front (FNA) 4
El-Nahda 1990 3
Renewal (PRA) 4
National Entente (MEN) 4
Front of Socialist Forces 5
Rally for Culture & Dem RCD 5
Movement for Dem MDA 5
Arouch Citizens 5
Islamic Salvation (FIS) 2

**BAHRAIN**

National Democratic Wa’d 2001 0 4 1 0 25.9 15.4 16.7
National Conciliation
Alwefaq 2001 42.5 1 0 0 10 9.3 0
National Dem. Rally 2001 0 5 0 0 23.3 9.5 0
Islamic Action Society 2002 0 2 0 0 25 7.3 0
Dem. Progressive Tribute 2001 7.5 5 0 0 11.3 19.6 1
Arab Islamic Center 2002 0 3 0 0 28 0 0
National Islamic Forum 2000 17.5 3 0 0 30 16.3 0
Islamic Fundament Al-Asalah 2002 20 1 0 0 9.8 0 0
Islamic Shoura 2002 5 3 0 0 14.8 0 1
Constitution Al-Meethaq 2001 10 4 0 0 40 23.5 4
National Dem. Solidarity 2002 2.5 5 0 0 25 27.6 0
N. Free Thought 2002 0 4 0 0 60 47.8 0
N. Constitutional Solidarity 2002 0 4 0 0 32.4 37.5 0
N. Brotherhood 2003 0 3 0 0 34.8 0 0
Islamic Line 2007 0 3 0 0 44.1 15.8 0
Islamic Alliance Rabitah 2002 10 3 0 0 28 0 0
N. Justice Movement 2006 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
N. Dialogue 2006 0 4 0 0 39.5 20.2 0
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Jatia Party Irshad       1986  9   3  0  0  0    4.2  
Communist Party          1948  1   5  0  0  14  5.4  
Jatiyo Shomajtantrik Dal INU 1972  1   4  0  0  14.9 0    
Workers Party            1992  1   5  0  0  4.8  0    
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Islamic Unity Front (Oikya) 1990  1   1  0  0  0    0    
National Party (Manju)    1999  1   3  0  0  10.9 0    
Jatiya Samajtantrik -RAB  1999  1   4  0  0  1.8  2.3  
Krishak Sramik Janata     1999  1   4  0  0  16.9 0    
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Gono Forum                1993  1   4  0  0  9.9  8.9  
Bikalpa Dhara             2006  1   2  0  0  3.3  6.4  
National People’s Party NPP 2001  1   2  0  0  3   3.4  

**BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**

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Alliance Ind. Social Dem. 1990  17.5  5  0  0  17.4 37.5  
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Dem. People Community      1993  1.8  5  0  0  20   34.8  
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Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996  15.8 4  0  0  26.3 36.6  
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Column contents & explanatory notes on coding of variables

1. “prtynme”: party name
2. “yrorgn” : Year of origin of political party (year established)
3. “seat%pmt”: seats occupied by party in current or last parliament (in %)
4. “seclrsm”: Religiosity and secularism 5-point scale, where parties are coded ‘1’ extremist religiosity; ‘2’ conservative but not extremist; ‘3’ tolerant religiosity; ‘4’ confessional but civil secularism; and ‘5’ a-religious & secular parties.
5. “I-quota”: Internal voluntary party quotas where ‘0’ is assigned to parties not employing quotas; ‘1’ for those that have recommended; and ‘2’ for those employing quotas to increase women’s leadership
6. “E-quota”: Electoral quotas for women where ‘0’ is assigned to parties not employing quotas and ‘1’ for those employing quotas for women to increase their share on electoral lists.
7. “f%mem”: Percentage share of female membership (in %)
8. “f%lead”: Percentage share of women in decision-making bodies (in %)
9. “f-nompmt”: Percentage share of female nominees on parties' electoral lists for parliament (in %)
Appendix 3

List of National Consultants

Mona Fadhel (Bahrain), researcher, author, gender expert
Fatouma Hadji Djaffar (Comoros), researcher, Ministry of Women
Amina Said Chire (Djibouti), Professor of Political Science, Djibouti University
Nahed Nassr (Egypt), researcher, gender expert
Raedah Farahat (Jordan), Jordanian National Committee for Women
Lubna Al-Kazi (Kuwait), Professor of Political Science, Kuwait University
Ely Cheikh Ould Aghailass (Mauritania), Director of Research, SVA
Idriss Lagrini (Morocco), Professor of Political Science, Mohammed Fifth University
Mohamed Saadi (Morocco), Former Minister of Social Affairs
Mohamed El-Ghali (Morocco), Professor of Political Science, Mohammed Fifth University
Sabah Ikhmayees (Palestine), Ph.D. Candidate, Bethlehem City University
Boutheina Gribaa (Tunisia), Regional Adviser, UN-INSTRAW/CAWTAR
Rashida Hamadani (Yemen), Chairperson, National Commission for Women
Jeta Katro (Albania), Professor of Political Science, Tirana University
Hamid Awaludin (Indonesia), Former Minister of Social Affairs
Ihsan Ali Fauzi (Indonesia), Chief Researcher, Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, Jakarta
Selly Ba (Senegal), researcher and political activist
Penda Mbow (Senegal), University Professor
Serpi Cakir (Turkey), Professor of Political Science, Istanbul University
Alten Ayken (Turkey), researcher and scholar, Istanbul University
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