INTRODUCTION

On June 21, 2013, bonfires, torched cards, demolished lampposts, and a million people filled the streets of Brazil. The protesters gathered to denounce corruption, poor public services, police brutality, and — to the disbelief of FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) organizers and investors — the upcoming 2014 World Cup. While this was not the first time that a host country had experienced political and social unrest in the days and months leading up to FIFA’s flagship event, most observers had believed that the fabled Brazilian attachment to soccer would prevent any large-scale protests, even in the face of ballooning government spending on the event. Popular opinion of the 2014 World Cup in Brazil seemed headed in the same direction as that of the South African FIFA World Cup in 2010, which suffered a similar controversy in light of unpopular multi-billion-dollar stadium construction costs and contentious securitization policies.

Much of the discontent revolved around the belief that corporate interests determined political decision-making. Ever since Uruguay held the inaugural 1930 FIFA World Cup, the mega-event has been used as a platform to rebrand countries, regenerate economies, and accumulate social capital. These benefits weigh heavily on the minds of bidding countries during the process of selecting a host nation. More recently, FIFA appears to have been making a concerted effort to have the Cup hosted in developing countries. In the past 15 years, FIFA has accepted bids to host the event from countries in both Asia and Africa. The 2010 games were held in South Africa; and the 2014 event will be held in Brazil, while the 2018 and 2022 Cups will occur in Russia and Qatar, respectively.

This pivot to developing countries underscores the commercialization of the World Cup, manifested through deregulation and privatization, hallmarks of corporate-driven governance. Corporate-driven governance in this paper refers to actions that large, private associations take to dictate political decisions, thereby circumventing existing democratic procedures. While politicians and corporate bodies often claim that mega-events such as the World Cup spur development and ultimately benefit the public, this paper will demonstrate that corporate-driven governance, manifested through stadium construction and securitization, subordinates the interests of those living on or near the mega-event sites to corporate interests. I look specifically at stadium construction and securitization and their effects on local development and local democratization in the South Africa and Brazil World Cups and argue that the processes of FIFA World Cup stadium development and securitization are deceptive development and democratization: stadium construction and securitization in the FIFA World Cup host countries of South Africa and Brazil

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ABSTRACT

The past few decades has seen increasing attention given toward mega sporting events in the context of development. As countries, especially in developing regions of the world, strive to enhance their political, economic, and social standing, hosting mega events is viewed as an opportune path to growth. However, this view often does not take into consideration how fall-out, particularly for local communities, affects a country’s overall experience with the event it hosts. The question I pose to test these two competing views of mega event hosting is the following: are mega-sporting events, specifically the FIFA World Cup, a viable avenue for furthering development and democratization? I examine the dual processes of stadium development and securitization for the 2010 and 2014 FIFA World Cups to answer this question, and argue that the neoliberal governance that drives FIFA World Cup securitization and stadium construction results in significant consequences for local development and compromises democratization for developing host countries.

DECEPTIVE DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION: STADIUM CONSTRUCTION AND SECURITIZATION IN THE FIFA WORLD CUP HOST COUNTRIES OF SOUTH AFRICA AND BRAZIL
DECEPTIVE DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION

guided by corporate-driven development principles that significantly and negatively impact local development and democratization.

I have chosen the 2010 South Africa World Cup and the 2014 Brazil World Cup as case studies because they are highly comparable examples of securitization and stadium construction. Furthermore, because the two countries undertook the momentous tasks of securitization and stadium construction very recently and within just a few years of each other, temporal bias can be eliminated. Because Brazil will also host the 2016 Summer Olympic Games, there is some overlap with World Cup and Olympic Securitization policies. Similarly, South Africa has hosted mega-events such as the Rugby World Cup in 1995 and also plans to host other major sporting events in the future with its greatly augmented mega-event infrastructure.

As the world’s largest single-event sporting competition, the World Cup has substantial political, economic, and social implications for the host countries. It is thus reasonable to assume such countries will pursue securitization measures for the World Cup. Securitization is the process through which an actor enacts and enforces measures to protect an object it feels is threatened; relevant stakeholders identify security risks and risk groups and then implement risk-management policies. In this study, corporate and state interests are the actors creating and enforcing such policies that aim to protect the World Cup. When the whole world is watching, the stakes are high. The securitization process consists of exclusion zones, stringent stadium design requirements, and heightened security at the transnational, national, and local-urban levels. Some of these policies are designed to ensure that the World Cup games run smoothly, yet many of these required rules and policies exist primarily to promote the financial interests of FIFA and its corporate sponsors. This trend toward a policy of profit-seeking can also be seen in FIFA’s gradual expansion of monopolistic control over event venues, surrounding areas, and — more recently — main infrastructure (airports, train stations) and accommodation sites (hotels, training centers, etc.).

The other manifestation of corporate-driven governance, stadium construction, operates under similar market rationalities. Large corporate bodies influence national policies to direct public tax dollars toward stadium construction despite the effects such policies have on displaced residents.

The paper is divided into five main sections, beginning with the grounding of the theory of corporate-driven governance in the common literature of mega-event research. It then examines the processes of securitization and stadium construction using the cases of the 2010 South Africa FIFA World Cup and the 2014 Brazil FIFA World Cup.

The twin processes of securitization and stadium development are the most glaring manifestations of corporate-driven governance in mega-event planning. The processes of FIFA World Cup stadium construction in developing countries like South Africa and Brazil result in a governance structure “where decisions of public policy are made by business coalitions and international organizations like the IOC and FIFA.” Informed by corporate-driven governance, securitization and stadium construction curbs or suspend the civil liberties of the local community, under the assumption that mega-events such as the World Cup are held for the “good of the public.” To further explain this, I turn to the phenomenon Cornelissen calls discursive framing, which legitimizes stadium building and securitization as “extraordinary and extra-legal [practices] to protect the collective.” While these processes may provide the local community with development and democratization, corporate-driven governance still dictates priorities, thus subordinating the public interest.

Discursive framing, a concept originally defined by French social theorist Michel Foucault, is a rhetorical framework employed by a privileged group in order to direct and shape particular ideas, actions, and preferences in the larger group. When Swiss football administrator Sepp Blatter, the eighth and current president of FIFA, outlined FIFA’s legacy in a recent interview about the upcoming games in Brazil, he framed the prevailing discourse around football and the “greater good:”

“In football, the whole country gets the legacy… Football involves the whole country. The country improves airports, hotels, highways, telecommunications, [and] sustainability programs.”

While there are undoubtedly some immediate short-term benefits from World Cup securitization
and stadium construction policies, the systemic influence of FIFA through corporate-driven governance channels power away from local communities and toward mega-event organizers, international corporate sponsors, and government officials, thereby inhibiting sustainable local development.

Securitization measures are not illogical. As successful bids for hosting mega-sporting events pivot from Western nations to the global South, there are added securitization obstacles arising from the inherent political, social, and economic conditions of these developing host nations. Leading mega-event scholar Scarlett Cornelissen details the increased securitization complications and needs:

“...In settings where heightened income polarities, societal violence, porous borders and disputed state capacities overlap with ‘standard’ security risks such as terrorism, increased attention and investment is being given to this process of securitization.”

Addressing these complications is an arduous task for developing nations such as Brazil and South Africa. The ramifications of addressing the complications surrounding securitization amount to a political mega-project spanning local, national, and transnational levels of policy. However, through discursive framing, policy makers and FIFA officials are able to justify far-reaching securitization policies. When justifying stadium construction, they use discursive framing to over-emphasize the potential economic, political, and societal advancements that follow these mega-events.

By portraying both securitization and stadium construction as public goods, officials implicitly fail to take into account how their supposed societal benefits harm individuals. This mode of corporate-driven governance sets a dangerous precedent with a legacy far more pernicious than an unused stadium or a new hotel. Eick describes how the heightened securitization can potentially create a “new military urbanism,” where the precedent of a wide-reaching and advanced security apparatus remains influential even after the fans leave. The perceived success of a World Cup can also shift priority away from legislative procedural norms in order to suit the needs and desires of a corporate environment at the cost of civil liberties. The broader implications make it even more imperative to better understand how stadium construction and securitization policies influence development and democratization in developing contexts.

With this recent trend of successful bids from developing countries of the Global South in mind, however, it becomes increasingly important to analyze the impacts of the Cup on the host country. Proponents of the cup insist that economic growth generated by the Cup makes hosting it a net gain for the country. Detractors point to the enormous political, economic, and social investment a host country must make to host the World Cup as evidence of the event’s harm. Yet, no prior literature on the subject offers the in-depth look at stadium construction and securitization necessary to make a nuanced argument about the ultimate effect of the World Cup on host countries. To fill this gap in the literature, this paper analyzes the specific repercussions of these two particular sets of costs on local development and democratization associated with the two cases of the 2010 South Africa FIFA World Cup and the 2014 Brazil FIFA World Cup.

2010 SOUTH AFRICA WORLD CUP: STRUGGLES OF SECURITIZATION

South Africa, with a GINI Index of 63.1, is the second-most economically unequal state in the world, only behind Lesotho. This differs greatly from the 2006 World Cup host country, Germany, which scores thirty-six points higher in the GINI Index. In addition to being economically unequal, South Africa is one of the world’s most dangerous countries. Hundreds of thousands of South Africans live in massive slums, and the national unemployment rate is roughly 25 percent. Combined, these factors raised security concerns for the mega-event and necessitated extensive securitization procedures during the run-up to the event.

Unfortunately, this need for securitization was co-opted by the interests of event developers and came at the expense of local individuals in South African communities. FIFA, the South African 2010 Local Organizing Committee (LOC), the South African government, and multi-national corporate sponsors saw these games as a platform to position their products instead of an opportunity to improve the collective welfare of the South African people. A “beautification” campaign created extensive exclusion zones for sponsors such as McDonald’s and Coca-Cola while marginalizing local, non-
FIFA affiliated actors such as the slum-dwellers’ organizations and other local community voices. This corporate-driven governance was seen primarily in extensive slum-eviction legislation passed for the purposes of security and “beautification”. One of the more controversial legislative acts, the *KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and Prevention of Re-emergence of Slums Act of 2007*, aimed “[t]o provide for the progressive elimination of slums in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal; to provide for measures for the prevention of the re-emergence of slums; to provide for the upgrading and control of existing slums; and to provide for matters connected therewith.” Another controversial policy was the N2 Gateway Pilot Project, a state-sponsored housing and relocation project in the city of Cape Town, which was criticized by major organizations such as COHRE as being harmful to the local communities’ wellbeing and having the narrow aim of a “beautification project” for the World Cup. The Act authorized evictions of hundreds of slums without providing sustainably adequate housing alternatives as guaranteed by *The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998*, *The National Housing Act 107 of 1997*, and *The National Housing Code*. Acclaimed international reporter Dan McDougall conveyed local accounts of evictions carried out by state-sponsored mercenaries known as the Red Ants. In April, right before the 2010 World Cup began, McDougall wrote that the Red Ants “have become a growing force in the past few months as South African cities have begun a campaign of ‘beautification’ before the World Cup begins in June.” These state-sanctioned mercenaries have allegedly aided in the forcible clearing of hundreds of shacks, destroyed slum-dwellers’ property, and were notorious for their brutality and violence. Xenophobic rhetoric led many to believe that the Red Ants’ actions were motivated by ethnic tensions. The Red Ants evicted mostly Zimbabwean immigrants from more than 100 shacks within the two-kilometer radius of the Mbombela Stadium. These actions were justified under the FIFA requirements of a two-kilometer exclusion zone to give FIFA-licensed corporate sponsors a monopoly on food and merchandise sales. The Center on Housing Rights & Evictions (COHRE) has proclaimed that much of the escalation in slum eradication was directly linked to the 2010 World Cup preparations.

These events soon sparked persistent and organized protest by the 20,000 strong slum-dwellers’ movement, Abhali baseMjondlo (AbM). In 2005, AbM staged a dramatic roadblock to resist state-sponsored police oppression and intimidation of the slum-dwellers. The use of live ammunition, armored vehicles, and helicopters against the AbM highlighted the extent to which the state deployed violent forces against the slum-dwellers.

The opposition to the Slums Act and subsequent state backlash directed against the AbM reveal dramatic obstacles to democratization that occurred as a result of the pressures of securitization policy leading up the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Though the South African Constitutional Court overturned the Slums Act in 2009, the initial formulation and implementation of the Act demonstrates how far the South African legislature was willing to go in order to “securitize” the cities in preparation for the 2010 FIFA World Cup—even at the expense of the welfare of slum-dwellers.

The consequences of these securitization policies are still being seen. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that “tens of thousands of South Africa’s poorest people face eviction from inner-city suburbs across the country ahead of the 2010 World Cup.” This report also focuses on the movement of evictees to temporary housing commonly known as “transit camps,” which are not intended for extended use. One resident recalled, “[t]hey promised us toilets and good houses at the transit camp...but we are left to die. We have been thrown away.” A Durban High court recognized the decrepit state of the ‘transit camps,’ and ruled on September 19 that city officials would be imprisoned if permanent housing was not properly sought.

While the corporate-driven governance preceding the World Cup did make South Africa more accessible to foreign viewers, it came at a significant expense. It is important to note that, in some circumstances, the securitization processes led to an improvement in urban planning, as dilapidated buildings were cleared out of inner city areas and replaced by new housing and commercial developments. However, the local low-income communities that lived there previously were sent to the periphery of the city, where job opportunities
and livelihoods are scarce, schools are far away, and housing is unsatisfactory. These peripheral relocations have been shown to perpetuate the sprawling, fragmented, and racially divided character of South African cities.\textsuperscript{27} COHRE, in one of its “key findings” from its 2006 report on South African development, \textit{State of the Cities}, found a myriad of development risks associated with peripheral relocation.\textsuperscript{28} These effects include heightened racial division, high concentrations of the poor in areas with little development opportunities, high rates of HIV infection, and a reduction in women’s economic autonomy.\textsuperscript{29}

\textbf{2014 BRAZIL WORLD CUP SECURITIZATION: DECEPTIVE DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION}

The securitization controversy prior to the Brazil World Cup has centered on the government occupation of the Brazilian slums. This process, deemed “pacification” by the Brazilian government and “cleansings” by many anti-slum occupation activists, pertains largely to Brazil’s urban centers, which are home to some of the world’s most vastly populated slums and unlicensed living developments, commonly called favelas. These favelas consist of large unregulated settlements, are often in geographically precarious locations, and in some cases date back to the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{1} They usually began as temporary living spaces for displaced workers and former slaves, but eventually turned into permanent living spaces. Strangely, favelas are commonly located in highly urban settings, often in close proximity to wealthy neighborhoods. The close proximity of these favela neighborhoods to the major wealth centers of cities, which serve as sites for mega-event complexes, has heightened the interest in securitizing the areas through the government termed processes of “pacification.” At the same time, the slum neighborhoods had developed complicated socio-political structures and forms of self-governance that are averse to governmental interference and securitization measures.\textsuperscript{30}

The security concerns associated with the favelas, as well as the close proximity of some of them to the football stadium in Rio, have made securitization procedures in the favelas necessary as Brazil prepares for the World Cup. The securitization of these favelas can best be broken down into three phases: first, by creating the necessary legal and institutional framework for securitization through the 2011 Master Plan, then by actually carrying out pacification, and finally through the use of discursive framing in order to sell the securitization. At each stage of this process, corporate-driven governance played an intimate role in framing government policy.

Despite oftentimes vocal local opposition, the city government in Rio de Janeiro enacted its securitization policy in preparation for the World Cup. To do this, it first created the legal and institutional basis for the pacification process, which resulted in the revised 2011 \textit{Plano Diretor do Município do Rio de Janeiro} (Rio de Janeiro Municipal Master Plan). The Master Plan was created and implemented by the \textit{Poder Executivo Municipal} (the executive council) of Rio de Janeiro to form a basis for urban development strategy in advance of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. This plan lays out clear favela development objectives to “urbanize” and “develop” these slum areas to allow private partnerships and corporate-driven development to occur.\textsuperscript{31} Section VI, “Do Reassentamento de Populações de Baixa Renda Oriundas de Áreas de Risco” (The Resettlement of Populations of Low Income from Risk Areas), of the plan identifies the geographic areas considered “risk areas” such as “fragile hillsides,” “lowlands characterized as areas of geotechnical or environmental risk,” and other geographic areas of the city where favelas exist as targets of relocation.\textsuperscript{32} In addition, Section VII extends this favela targeting, citing other geographic areas in the city where favelas are typically located as “underutilized properties” and “risk areas.” These locales are subsequently zoned to become sites of new housing projects at the discretion of the executive council, which has the additional authority to label the favelas as illegal and subject to “regulation.”\textsuperscript{33} Chapter VI specifically authorizes police and military control of riverbanks, hillsides, and other areas where favelas are present. The policies of this Master Plan are extremely broad and vague, giving a large amount of discretion and power to the UPP forces without thorough democratic oversight, despite significant protests by many local

\begin{footnotesize}

\footnote{1 Some favelas in Brazil date back to the late 19th century as a place of residence for former slaves with no options for work or land ownership. Modern favelas, those which I refer to, developed in the 1960s and 70s as a result of rural exodus.}

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community members. Thus, the new Master Plan policies dismantled existing power structures within the favelas and asserted the authority of the state in preparation for pacification.

Given this institutional framework for pacification, the Brazilian government then took the next step of forming an elite paramilitary police force, the Unidad de Policia Pacificadora (Pacifying police Unit or UPP) in 2008. This force has commanded thousands of military personnel, tanks, and helicopters into individual favelas in order to drive out gang leaders that controlled the slums. After a larger intervention to begin the securitization process, protocol called for the institution of a smaller UPP force consisting of a command center within the favela in order to maintain order.

In some cases, these policies have been implemented peacefully and successfully, as in slums such as the Lins favela in the Northern Zone of Rio de Janeiro. In that case, military forces moved at dawn without a shot fired, secured the territory, and were welcomed by the inhabitants. As Jonathan Watts describes in his account: "Then [followed] street cleaners with brooms and buckets of whitewash, and finally satellite TV salesmen with a three-month special offer to first-time subscribers."

Other favelas, however, have seen another side, such as massacres and alleged executions by UPP forces. The "pacification" of the Complexo do Alemão favela is no exception to the violence and controversy that has characterized the securitization process. In June 2007, in anticipation of the upcoming Pan-American Games, the Brazilian government ordered 1,300 state and federal police to surround the favela. According to an official investigation, nineteen residents were killed in the next step of forming of an elite paramilitary police force, the Unidad de Policia Pacificadora (Pacifying police Unit or UPP) in 2008. This force has commanded thousands of military personnel, tanks, and helicopters into individual favelas in order to drive out gang leaders that controlled the slums. After a larger intervention to begin the securitization process, protocol called for the institution of a smaller UPP force consisting of a command center within the favela in order to maintain order.

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Second, UPP actions have been plagued by disregard for local input in development decision making. UPP policies have limited the freedoms of those living in the favelas, particularly by preventing typical lifestyle practices and inhibiting the expression of cultural identities. For example, the policies subjected artists to arrests for lyrics deemed politically threatening, which are typically understood to include songs of the genre baile funk, an important cultural cornerstone to the musical and art life of the favela. The disadvantaged political position of the tens of thousands of favela residents has stifled their opinions regarding local development priorities, increasing their vulnerability to instrumentalized policies such as the PAC. In the interviews conducted by Sluis in the Complexo do Alemão favela, one favela resident expressed frustration at the government’s decisions.

If they'd asked what the community really needed, they would have built schools, or a university. In what is considered the biggest complex of favelas of Rio de Janeiro there are only two schools, let alone a university. But they don't listen to us. Instead, they built a teleférico
The sidelining of local interests through the use of discursive framing to further empower large business coalitions and international organizations and corporations exemplifies the executive committee’s instrumentalization of the PAC program. The 2011 Master Plan also laid the ground for other types of securitization policies, namely city planning programs such as PAC (Growth Acceleration Program) and PAC2 (Growth Acceleration Program-2). The PAC and PAC2 projects invested nearly $306 billion through 2010 in Rio de Janeiro, with a commitment that promised additional expenditures of $582 billion from 2011 to 2014. While, on the surface, many of these programs would seem to have been beneficial to the areas, they often led to problems. One such significant PACs-funded project was the construction of a cable car in the Complexo do Alemão favela in Rio de Janeiro. The cable car was intended to connect the favelas and make them more safely accessible to tourists; however, it resulted in small restaurant and store developments around the various cable car stations throughout the favela, which were tightly regulated by the government and which gave contracts to fast food chains like McDonald's and Bob's Burgers. The prioritizing of corporate interests marginalizes the involvement of the local community and has left the residents of the favela with only low wage positions at these chain restaurants. In addition, these cable car stations are built in areas that the master plan defined as “areas of risk” which contradicts the regulation set forth by the 2011 municipal development plan.

At the same time, state-sponsored development policies such as PAC and PAC2 are overseen by organizations such as the executive council and other corporate-influenced government institutions. Evidence of this oversight can be seen through the selective targeting of favelas that are only in areas deemed of interest to the business coalitions and international organizations such as FIFA and the IOC. This examination into “pacification” policy implemented for the World Cup in Brazil further demonstrates that this mega-event securitization policy fails to address local development interests due to its lack of sustainability and corporate-driven aims, such as in the case of the Complexo do Alemão Cable Car project. Instead, these projects are driven by corporate interest and serve to harm locals.

The harm to locals caused by the dominance of corporate-driven governance of securitization procedures has also been felt in the establishment of stadium exclusion zones. These stadium exclusion zones have been a critical aspect of FIFA’s profits in the two previous World Cups, with the zones often extending “far beyond the stadia and the inner cities.” In the case of Brazil, the zones occupied a two-kilometer radius around the stadiums. These exclusion zones are tightly controlled rings of security that not only maintain peace, but also regulate the vendors. Within these areas, hundreds of traditional local vendors would be displaced, usually from profitable city center areas, to make way for the FIFA-approved vendors. The surrender of autonomy to business interests through this controversial set of legislation is yet another example of the decrease in democratization that the FIFA World Cup brought to the local communities through stadium construction.

The final mechanism that the government has utilized to push through its securitization policies for the World Cup has been to frame them positively in public media, through discursive framing techniques. The goal of this framing was to imply that the favelas were unsafe, which would thereby legitimize securitization procedures, regardless of the costs to locals. A clear example of the language used to make this argument is found in the 2011 Master Plan, which used terms such as “underutilized properties” and “areas of risk.” Favela residents found themselves in a significantly hampered legal position due to their illegal geographic location. Additionally, serious cultural and racial divisions between the residents of the favelas and those of the asfalto, further complicated the integration of the favela residents into the political arena. The 2011 Master Plan’s distinction between the illegality of the favela and the need to preserve the city serves as further political justification and framing so as to implement undemocratic securitization policies.

The discursive framing of the favelas as illegal and in need of relocation exacerbates the marginalization of local political involvement and facilitates an incursion on the lives of the slum-
dwellers.

Delving deeper into the corporate-driven governance of pacification policies we can see the pervasive discursive framing and the consequential jeopardized development opportunities for local communities. Yet the sustainability of this model is highly questionable, even if the implementation of some progressive social programs and infrastructure in specific favelas succeeded.

AFRICA 2010: STADIUM CONSTRUCTION POLICIES AND IMPACT

Much like development in Brazil, corporate-driven discursive framing and instrumentalization of the law legitimized stadium development in preparation for the South African World Cup. Here, we must note that the construction of stadiums forms an integral part of two main objectives that Maguire cited as underlying a host country’s responsibilities: first, using the mega-event as a form of “soft power,” and second, leveraging the games as a way to address internal concerns such as economic regeneration, nation-building, and development. Maenning and Plessis describe the importance of stadium developing, arguing that Durban’s new King Senzahgakhona would be “the anchor of a concept to develop the city area and re-image Durban as one of the leading sports cities in Africa.”

From the beginning, the decision to build the new Moses Mabhida stadium was controversial. Although the initial plan was to renovate the preexisting Kings Park Stadium, the agreement fell apart when a policy shift required the construction of an entirely new stadium. This new stadium would be built on the site of the Kings Park Soccer Stadium, costing the city an additional $240.7 million, compared to the projected cost of $5.3 million for the renovation of Kings Park. This controversial decision to build the Moses Mabhida Stadium delivered the same seating capacity that Kings Park Stadium would have offered: 70,000 for the World Cup and 54,000 after the games. The choices behind this change in construction plans can be attributed to corporate-driven governance when considering the potential for greater profits from the construction of a new stadium as compared to a relatively simple renovation.

As a centerpiece of development, Durban’s new stadium was of great importance to the plans of FIFA and the LOC. However, it is not obvious whether local South Africans, and indeed the country as a whole, truly benefitted from the construction of the new stadium. According to a study by Grant Thornton, after accounting for $1.8 billion in construction costs, the Games increased GDP by one and a half percentage points, infusing $3 billion into the South African economy. A study conducted by Bohlmann and van Heerden disputes these numbers, which have been found to vary significantly, and concluded that the games have only contributed to a 0.94 percentage point increase in GDP. This lack of consensus on the economic effect of stadium building makes an economic justification for the stadium difficult.

In fact, we see a detrimental impact on local development after examining construction labor policies, as well as the decisions of corporations that received contracts for the Soccer City stadium construction. Although many politicians claimed that funding the stadium was justified by the influx of local, high-quality construction jobs, a closer examination undermines these claims. Seventy percent of the local job opportunities from these ventures paid less than $245 per month, which is 10 percent below the national median income. Seventy percent of the 2,200 local employees were also only on limited contracts, and were thus subject to high levels of job instability. One example of this fluctuation is the decision by security firm Stallion Security to fire over 3,600 contracted security workers “without warning.” More broadly, only one hundred workers were offered permanent employment with the main contractor after the project was completed.

In addition, the sudden change in focus of the quinquennial Johannesburg Integrated Development Plan (IDP) reflected the financial burdens of the 2010 World Cup. According to Hlatchwayo, in 2000, the IDP issued extensive policy recommendations to increase local public participation, with priorities such as “the provision of infrastructure, housing, and township establishment, development planning, local economic development, the protection of the environment, the provision of public health services, local safety and security, and a focus on delivering services such as water, housing, and electricity.” Following the 2006 elections, with the kickoff of the World Cup less than five years away,
priorities shifted, as demonstrated by the new five-year 2009/2010 IDP. "The 2010 World Cup is the biggest project the city of Johannesburg has ever undertaken. It is therefore not surprising that in the current IDP revision, the 2010 project features prominently." Ward meetings, regional meetings, sectorial meetings, and the Growth and Development summit promoting the 2006/2011 IDP did not serve as forums for genuine public discourse, because they operated under the terms of corporate-driven government. Often, these gatherings existed solely to serve as a "rubber stamp" for government policies. This marginalization of the public exacerbated developmental issues, and made locals unable to voice their needs through accountable, democratic institutions.

A massive budget shortfall, which occurred as a result of underestimating construction costs for the Soccer City stadium, was balanced by decreasing funding for public services, a move that exacerbated the project's detrimental impacts on local economic welfare. In the area affected by the budget shortfall, the eThekwini municipality, features a 44 percent poverty rate. Moreover, 8.5 percent of households have no annual income and 9.9 percent of households have an annual income of less than $948, with the average family of four earning less than $1 per day per person. However, the stadium's final construction cost of $98.3 million drastically overshot the initial allotment of $34 million, and "put pressure on a council that [was] under pressure to deliver basic services." City department heads were required to slash their budgets by $65.86 million, prompting eThekwini’s deputy mayor Logie Naidoo to speak on the matter and note that "the extra 2010 World Cup costs ‘will certainly affect service delivery.’" The $334.2 million spent on the construction of Soccer City could have provided 202,380 people with permanent housing in the province of Gauteng through the local government's Reconstruction and Development Program. This comparison illustrates the significant opportunity costs of the World Cup stadium construction projects.

In this way, instrumentalized law and corporate-driven discursive framing produced troublesome development projects and policies for local South African communities that were in close proximity to stadium constructions. Pillay and Bass's conception of “associated development prospects”—additional development projects incidental to the required infrastructure—reveal a corporate-driven approach that sidelined local development projects. We can therefore see that corporate-driven governance is far less effective at promoting long-term local community and infrastructure development, largely because of FIFA's strict regulations regarding stadium construction, which sacrifice local community development interests in favor of private, corporate interests.

After the drone of fans and their vuvuzelas faded and the multi-national sponsors and construction companies left South Africa, the true impact of the World Cup stadium constructions became apparent. Despite the billions of dollars allocated for World Cup preparation, South African President Jacob Zuma insisted that, "it was worth every penny spent." However, when looking at various construction projects that were not only over-budget but detrimental to local community development, this statement seems increasingly unsubstantiated. President Zuma’s claim embodies the rampant discursive framing that rationalized the stadium construction policies on the basis of supposed economic benefits for local communities.

**BRAZIL 2014: CONTENTIOUS WORLD CUP STADIUM CONSTRUCTION**

The headline read “Soccer Stadium the Stage as Brazilian Anger Erupts,” as tens of thousands of people protested outside of the newly built stadium in the Brazilian City of Belo Horizonte. Shortly after, for the first time in twenty-five years, the Brazilian Supreme Court sentenced a Member of Parliament to thirteen years in prison on corruption charges. Tensions remained high across Brazil as twelve new or remodeled stadiums are prepared for FIFA inspections. At the time of this writing, Brazil is projected to spend $18 billion in construction and remodeling—out of $33 billion over all—with stadium construction alone projected at least to cost $3.3 billion. As in South Africa, Brazil’s controversial expenditures has been scrutinized for prioritizing public funding of stadiums that serve private interests over much needed public social services. Mega-event expert and theorist Christopher Gaffney speaks of the evolution of mega-event ideology, comparing Brazil's hosting of
the upcoming 2014 World Cup to the time it hosted the 1950 World Cup. Contrary to the democratic ideologies that were at the forefront of the 1950 World Cup, the discourses surrounding the 2014 World Cup reflect the exigencies of an increasingly globalized and corporate-influenced political economy. This ideological shift and its effects on World Cup stadium construction in Brazil have sidelined local democratization and development interests in the name of “civic boosterism” and broader corporate-privileged development.

I argue that, as in the case of the 2010 South Africa World Cup, Brazil’s stadium construction policies were delivered through a model of corporate-driven governance, in which deregulation, privatization, and the funneling public funds toward corporate interests dominated government policy. In turn, corporate-driven governance undemocratically directed funding and policy attention away from local development issues, creating environments that threatened local civil rights and hampered local development. As Gaffney stresses, the driving mantra of mega-events is “accelerated development” that creates corporate-privileged “dreamworlds.” These “dreamworlds” empower the executive government to meet the stringent deadlines set by FIFA and ensure that all event-related projects are carried out so as to fully cash-in on the benefits of “civic boosterism.” While the effects of stadium construction are known to positively affect certain aspects of society, they adversely influence democratization within the local communities. This section analyzes the impact of Brazilian stadium construction prior to the 2014 World Cup on local communities.

The construction of the Arena da Baixada, a stadium located in the southern city of Curitiba, is an important example of how corporate-driven governance was able to work in practice. On January 13, 2010, it was determined that Curitiba’s Arena da Baixada would be one of the twelve World Cup stadiums. The private club that used the stadium, Atlético Paranaense, realized that they would be short on funding for the necessary renovations, to which FIFA president Marcos Malucelli responded that the club should not go into debt because of the World Cup. Malucelli claimed that additional responsibilities resided with the local city and state, prompting the Municipality of Curitiba to allocate roughly $40 million toward “special building potential” to Atlético Paranaense’s private construction project of Américo Guimarães Stadium.

However, this private funding of the Arena da Baixada led to a significant decrease in public involvement in policy-making. One of Brazil’s rising domestic investigative journalism organizations, Comitês Populares, takes a close examination of the funding streams in their article, “A Partnership for the Cup: The People Pay and the Club Takes.” Although the process of issuing a building certificate, along with the requisite funds, was legally permitted under the Municipal Master plans, the process remained thoroughly undemocratic. The allocation of this large sum of public funds was not subject to local referenda or any other significant process involving public input. Comitês Populares reported that the only public engagement in the decision making process were two public hearings where citizens, civil society organizations, and social activists voiced strong concerns and strong objections. Furthermore, requests for specific information regarding these projects and participation went entirely unanswered. Leandro Franklin, Chair of the Human Rights Legal Practice department at the University Federal do Paraná, points out that this form of public funding is often given without public consultation, and can be deceptively sold to the public as private expenditures. Marginalization of the general public and exploitation of public funds under the guise of mega-event “civic boosterism” displays the rampant corporate-driven governance fomented by the World Cup stadium construction process.

The political process for funding the Arena da Baixada in Curitiba highlights significant local development concerns. These concerns involve the exclusion zone policy, which prioritizes the short-term business interests of large national construction conglomerates and FIFA and its international corporate sponsors. The allocation of public funds away from local development and into stadiums is a clear example of Gaffney’s discussion of “neoliberal dreamworlds,” where public space is restructured and commoditized “in the image of global capital.” In 2007, the then-Sports Minister Orlando Silva, like many other World Cup promoters, asserted that stadium projects wouldn’t require public money; however, the latest estimates, however, show that 91
percent of costs associated with the 2014 World Cup will be publicly funded.\textsuperscript{80} This use of public funds carries with it substantial pernicious impacts on local public services. Thus, as was the case in South Africa, corporate-driven governance has also affected the long-term prospects for local development in some parts of Brazil. While local organizing committees and pro-mega-event evaluators laud the renovation and construction of all twelve World Cup stadiums, serious concerns remain regarding the legacy of these state-of-the-art stadiums. Stadiums such as the Arena da Amazônia in Manaus, which cost $256.7 million dollars, are in communities with lower league soccer teams, whose games are attended by less than 500 spectators in a stadium with a host capacity of 46,000.\textsuperscript{81} These stadiums may see little public use after the end of the World Cup and cost significant time and resources in areas where both are in short supply and have pressing public service needs. For example, government sources in 2012 reveal that 20.2 percent of houses in Manaus do not have proper plumbing. Nationally, roughly 15.1 percent of Brazilian children up to four years old live in areas where sewage runs outdoors.\textsuperscript{82} Thus, rather than being spent on much-needed infrastructure in places like Manaus, public money has been spent on what are expected to be, in the aftermath of the World Cup, largely underutilized football stadiums.

Diminished labor rights for stadium construction workers further exemplify the lack of substantive public oversight that resulted from corporate-driven governance in Brazil. Outcry over the paucity of workers’ rights, as in the case of the construction of the Arena da Baixada, demonstrated the failings of stadium construction policy. For instance, work on this stadium project in Curitiba, Brazil, was suspended when Brazilian judge, Leonora Colnago, ruled that there were safety concerns.\textsuperscript{83} Judge Colnago wrote, “countless infractions have been committed, in various stages of the building project…[that there was] a serious risk of workers being buried, run over and of collision, falling from heights and being hit by construction material, among other serious risks.”\textsuperscript{84} This placed pressure on preparations as FIFA was unrelenting in its demand that all twelve stadiums, including Arena da Baixada, be “ready for delivery in December and [that] no delays will be tolerated.”\textsuperscript{85} The inflexibility of FIFA policy further aggravated civil rights disputes because local politicians were given little room or time to address labor safety issues. The pressures FIFA and powerful government actors placed on local officials and workers were further exacerbated when the Judge Colnago’s ruling was overturned to reopen construction a day after FIFA inspection visits began.\textsuperscript{86} The threat to workers’ safety and rights was not limited to Curitiba, and in just one example of workplace tragedy, a twenty-two year old construction worker fell 115 feet to his death on December 14, 2013 at the Arena Amazonia only weeks before the stadiums were due for completion.\textsuperscript{87}

Given their influence in local politics, FIFA also plays a very significant role in fueling the practices of instrumentalization of law and general corporate-driven governance. The then-recently passed “World Cup Law” signed by Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff highlights the nature of controversial and sweeping FIFA-oriented legislation. The law entailed a series of legislative measures that Roberto Gurgel, Brazil’s Federal Prosecutor, challenged as unconstitutional. Gurgel contended that the law violated citizens’ “constitutional guarantee to equal treatment, as well as provisions of Brazilian tax law.”\textsuperscript{88} Gurgel, in his filing, writes:

> The World Cup law violates the constitution by requiring the state to assume civil responsibility - instead of FIFA - for any damages during the events. “The exception given to FIFA, its subsidiaries, legal representatives, consultants and its employees manifestly violate” the taxpayers’ equal status under Brazilian law. ...
> “Legislators cannot favor a taxpayer in detriment to another, but may only identify situations in which there are differences which justify different treatment.”\textsuperscript{89}

The questions posed by the Federal Prosecutor raise important concerns surrounding the general democratic procedures through which policy at all levels of government is implemented. These allegations of civil rights violations apply not only to government politics, but also to the FIFA-mandated “stadium exclusion zones” and the resulting labor rights standards violations, evictions, and displacements.

**CONCLUSIONS**

This paper advances the existing theoretical
notions of development and democratization in hosting the 2010 South African and 2014 Brazilian FIFA World Cups. More specifically, it scrutinizes the securitization and stadium development processes. As mega-event hosting venues in developed nations fade in importance and developing nations increasingly host them, the impacts on local democratization and development are even more hazardous. The harmful effect of hosting mega-events in developing nations becomes most apparent upon dissecting the implications of corporate-driven governance via processes inherent in the political, social, and economic environment surrounding the World Cup. For both Brazil and South Africa, corporate-driven governance has taken the forms of discursive framing and instrumentalized law. The detrimental effects of policies that have been promoted and implemented as a result of corporate-driven discursive framing and instrumentalized law include the disenfranchisement of the local population of their rights to just governance and sustainable development. These forms of marginalization, which originate from both World Cup securitization and stadium development, weaken the political and socioeconomic participation of the local communities while building and fortifying a hegemonic corporate-driven system that consistently undermines local interests.

The magnitude and regularity with which corporate-driven governance marginalizes local communities in developing nations necessitates the reconsideration of hosting the FIFA World Cup as a mechanism for development. The World Cup is headed to Brazil, Russia, and Qatar. These three countries share much in common with South Africa, particularly with respect to the existence of many contentious debates about democracy and the outlook for overall development. While the 2014 FIFA World Cup has not yet taken place, immense infrastructural development and new policies have and their effects on democratization and local development are slowly being revealed. While the 2022 World Cup games remain years ahead, the initial stages of stadium construction have already brought controversy. A recent assessment of stadium construction in Qatar by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) projects that more than 4,000 workers will risk their lives in the next seven years while working on World Cup facilities, with a weekly death toll that could rise to twelve workers.90 The reality is clear. Developing nations will continue to struggle with maintaining ethical standards for development and democratization as they host mega-events such as the World Cup.

Addressing these issues will require significant international cooperation and investment commensurate with the abandonment of existing corporate-driven policies and norms. The incredible monopoly that the FIFA brand possesses over the world’s most popular and profitable sport promises immense opportunities for host countries. Yet FIFA’s ability to demand sweeping legislation in host countries, set its own security and construction standards, and put on a show for almost half of the world places unparalleled power in the hands of its executives. Though this concentration of power has proven to be highly vulnerable to corporate-driven governance, a reorientation of development policy toward local and more democratically accepted priorities in the host countries is essential in order to ensure that the hosting of mega-events does not come at the expense of the host countries’ citizens.

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