Understanding Resistance to Foreign Occupation

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ABSTRACT

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There have been some 163 foreign occupations since 1900. In many cases, military occupations have led to bloody and protracted resistance, while in most cases occupiers faced little resistance at all. This dissertation seeks to answer the puzzle: under what conditions do foreign occupations produce consequential resistance? Conventional wisdom holds that resistance is driven by nationalism. However, states exhibit different levels of resistance to different occupiers, indicating that not only the nature of the occupied but also the nature and the policies of occupiers play a role. Specifically, I look at the role of political dislocation and trust. First, domestic groups that would have otherwise waited out the occupation may be driven to resistance when occupiers implement policies or establish institutions that permanently weaken their relative domestic position, what I call political dislocation. Second, resistance will be muted when occupiers can credibly commit to treating the population benignly and vacating occupied territory promptly. I argue that democracies, international organizations, and co-religionists are better able to make credible commitments and therefore more likely to elicit trust among occupied communities. Conversely, occupiers that victimize the occupied population will face greater resistance. I test these hypotheses on an original dataset of occupier fatalities in every occupation since 1900. Drawing on geospatial data, I then conduct a sub-national quantitative and qualitative study of resistance in Afghanistan. Finally, in order to ensure that these findings are generalizable, I conduct a set of case studies comparing the Soviet and German occupations of Lithuania; the Vietnamese and UN occupations of Cambodia; and the Syrian, Multinational, UN, and Israeli occupations of Lebanon. I find that political dislocation, in the form of forceful regime change, increases the likelihood of resistance. I also find that occupations led by democracies, international organizations, and co-religionists are generally less likely to face resistance. Thus, the nature and context of occupation are some of the most important predictors of resistance.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

“My belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.”

- Vice-President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, 16 March 2003

1.1 The Puzzle of Resistance

Governments and international organizations frequently choose to intervene overseas in counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and nation-building operations. These missions can require short to long-term military occupation and such occupations can generate local resistance.

The phenomenon of resistance remains a puzzle for International Relations. As Clausewitz noted: “Sometimes, stunned and panic-stricken, the enemy may lay down his arms, at other times he may be seized by a fit of enthusiasm: there is a general rush to arms, and resistance is much stronger after the first defeat than it was before” ([1832] 2007, 569). Two historical cases help illustrate the wide variation in resistance to occupation. The Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr is an example of a low resistance occupation. Following the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was forced to pay punitive reparations. When the German government defaulted, France and Belgium occupied the wealthy industrial region of the Ruhr to extract reparations themselves. The occupation lasted from 1923 until 1925. Occupying forces faced mainly passive resistance, losing a total of 12 troops during the entire course of the occupation (Liberman 1996, 92; Reynolds 1928). In contrast, the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia is a classic example of a high resistance occupation. Yugoslavia was invaded by Italy and Germany, with the support
of Bulgarian and Hungarian formations, in April 1941. Soon guerrilla warfare was launched by Serbian nationalist Chetniks and pan-Yugoslav Communist partisans. Yugoslav resistance was fierce, far greater than any other occupied territory during the Second World War. Indeed German SS officer Edmund Veesenmeyer declared: “A day in Yugoslavia was more dangerous than a year in Hungary” (Eby 2007, 36). By the end of the occupation in 1944, Axis occupying forces lost some 24,000 troops. Despite six massive counterinsurgency campaigns, some deploying as much as 66,000 troops, Yugoslavia was never pacified. On the contrary, Yugoslavia became the only country to liberate itself from Axis occupation during the Second World War (Trifkovic 2011).

Some descriptive statistics further help illustrate this puzzle. Occupation is a frequent tool of statecraft, but violent resistance is not. Between 1900 and 2010, resistance to foreign occupation caused over 544,000 fatalities, not including fatalities from anti-colonial struggles. Fatalities per occupation range from zero to 49,721 in the case of the US occupation of Vietnam (see Figure 1.1). These figures are undoubtedly high, but the median occupation generated just under 20 fatalities. Beyond fatality statistics, it is important to remember that rather than generating resistance, many occupations benefit from the support of occupied societies.

These statistical and historical illustrations show the wide variation in resistance to occupation.
This variation has real human, military, and political consequences. The puzzle this dissertation therefore seeks to answer is: what accounts for variation in violent resistance to occupation?

This puzzle is not merely academic and explaining this variation is by no means obvious. Policy-makers tend to be poor predictors of resistance to occupation. Prior to Operation Just Cause the US invasion and occupation of Panama in 1989 President George H. W. Bush asked: “Would the plan work… How many casualties would there be? How much damage would be done?” Ultimately, after consulting with his advisors he said: “Okay, let’s do it. The hell with it!” (Cole 1995). Two years into the US’ post-war occupation of Japan, General Macarthur told the US Congress: “History points to an unmistakable lesson that military occupations serve their purpose at best for only a limited time, after which deterioration rapidly sets in” (1947). Yet, the seven year American occupation was largely peaceful.

Policy-makers tend to greatly over- or underestimate the likelihood of resistance. Most often, assessments are based on the last intervention rather than systematic analysis of the causes of resistance. The American experiences in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope), Haiti (Operation Uphold Democracy), and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) provide cases in point. The Clinton Administration was shocked when 19 US Rangers were killed in a brutal firefight in Mogadishu during Operation Restore Hope. After all, who would attack forces serving to protect humanitarian convoys in one of the poorest countries in the world? A year later when the US was considering sending 20,000 troops to assist Haiti, a Pentagon official warned: “If you liked Somalia, you’ll love Haiti” (Marquis 1993). John McCain took to the US Senate floor to announce his opposition to the occupation: “I do not think it is worth the risk of American lives … the chances of their succeeding are about the same as those of the multinational force that tried and failed in Somalia” (Benjamin 2008). As Washington Post Op-Ed counseled: “Before the Clinton Administration deploys American armed forces in Haiti, it ought to re-examine the painful lessons driven home last year by the Somalian warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid” (Anderson and Binstein, 1994, S16). Contrary to these dire expectations, Operation Uphold Democracy ended with only one US fatality.

In contrast to Haiti, American risk assessment disastrously underestimated the likelihood of resistance in Iraq. A pre-war US Department of Defense document titled “Overview of Requirements” referred to “a short, extremely intense period of combat operations using a full range of U.S. and coalition forces. This phase will eliminate any significant organized resistance to U.S.
coalition forces and will end the current regime.” This assessment followed Gen. Curtis Lemay’s adage: “if you can lick the cat, you can lick the kitten”; if other words if you can defeat a state in inter-state war, you can easily defeat insurgents in smaller wars of occupation (Kaplan 2013, 3). In a February 2002 Washington Post Op-Ed, former Reagan defense official Ken Adelman stated: “I believe demolishing Hussein’s military power and liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk.” During Congressional testimony on 27 February 2003, Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated: “it’s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army.” Appearing on the television program Face the Nation on 16 March 2003, Vice-President Dick Cheney said the war in Iraq would be “weeks rather than months.” Later on Meet the Press, Cheney said, “I think things have gotten so bad inside Iraq, from the standpoint of the Iraqi people, my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.” Similarly, chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board Richard Perle, said the regime of Saddam Hussein is “much weaker than we think he is…support for Saddam, including within his military organization, will collapse at the first whiff of gunpowder.”\footnote{There were, no doubt, many dissenting opinions within the American national security establishment regarding the wisdom of intervening in Iraq. Political manipulation also played a role in preventing more informed risk assessment (see Kaufmann 2004).} In the first weeks of the Iraq War, Ken Adelman wrote a follow up Op-Ed where he crowed: “Administration critics should feel shock over their bellyaching about the wayward war plan. All of us feel awe over the professionalism and power of the U.S. military” (Adelman 2003). Of course, all these assessments proved to be misguided, not because the invasion was a failure—it was, in fact, a success— but rather because the overthrow of Saddam Hussein did not represent the end of the conflict. Soon after the defeat of the Iraqi military, a fierce insurgency emerged against American occupation. Ultimately, the Operation Iraqi Freedom caused 4,804, fatalities among the US-led coalition, with the peak number of fatalities occurring some 4 years after the declared end of hostilities (iCasualties 2012).\footnote{Academics have been equally bad at predicting insurgencies. A statistical model developed by Bennett and Stam correctly predicted the duration of the conventional phase of the 2003 Iraq War but missed the insurgency that ultimately caused more military fatalities than the conventional phase of the conflict (Bennett and Stam 1996, 2006).}

That uncertainty exists in war and peace is nothing new (Blainey 1973, Fearon 1995, Gartzke 1999). However, this uncertainty exists both in war and in its aftermath. More than a mere byproduct of conflict, resistance can be decisive factor in inter-state war. Consider, for example, that the...
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

longest war in US history, the Afghanistan War, was mainly resistance to occupation. The variation in resistance presents a real puzzle for International Relations scholars and a potential challenge for states. Ultimately, policy-makers need to know the risks of occupation prior to interventions, and to adopt appropriate measures to mitigate these risks should intervention be deemed necessary.

1.2 Explanations and Shortfalls

While there are numerous historical accounts of resistance to occupation, and renewed interest in the topic of insurgency and counterinsurgency as a result of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, the field of International Relations (and Comparative Politics) offers relatively few systematic explanations of this phenomenon.\(^3\) What explanations do exist can be divided into three categories: nationalism, opportunity structure, and international context. Nationalism is the most common explanation of resistance to occupation (in this dissertation, I refer specifically to civic nationalism). Nationalism is the ideology that political and national boundaries should be congruent. By violating this principle, occupiers generate resentment that is translated into violence. According to opportunity structures theories, nationalism may well motivate resistance, but rational individuals are also sensitive to factors that shape the relative costs of such an undertaking, such as military capacity, terrain, economic conditions, foreign support, and social structures. International context theories tend to emphasize the role of the threat environment. Occupied populations may come to accept foreign occupation as a temporary evil, so long as it protects them from the threat posed by third-party states.

I argue that these explanations fail to explain variation in resistance to occupation. Ideological explanations of resistance, such as nationalism, tend to over-predict the likelihood of resistance while under-predicting their location. Moreover, they fail to account for the anomaly that many individuals actively seek to collaborate with, rather than fight against, foreign occupiers. Opportunity structure theories, for their part, fail to explain why the same countries exhibit different levels of resistance to different occupiers when structural characteristics remain constant. Lastly, international context theory relies too heavily on the perception of third-party threats, which are

\(^3\)Notable exceptions include Edelstein 2004, 2008a; and Darden Forthcoming.
relatively rare, and whose perception often varies within the occupied state itself. All in all, these explanations tend to emphasize the characteristics of the occupied state rather than those of the occupying force.

1.3 Argument

The central claim of this dissertation is that resistance is not simply a nationalist reflex to occupation: the nature and the behavior of occupiers also matter in explaining resistance. Specifically, I argue that resistance can be explained by political dislocation and the breakdown in trust between occupiers and occupied societies.

I begin by positing that under most circumstances, resistance to occupation should be deemed irrational. Violent resistance is a dangerous activity for individuals and their communities and occupations are usually temporary. Moreover, occupation does not necessarily lead to a deterioration of governance quality, and resistance does not necessarily shorten the period of occupation. If occupied populations could obtain guarantees that occupation would be peaceful and temporary, individuals should rationally choose to wait for occupiers to leave rather than fight.

Resistance may become a rational course of action when these assumptions break down. First, groups might undertake resistance when occupiers permanently weaken their political power within occupied society, what I call political dislocation. Political dislocation can take the form of leadership decapitation, regime change, or broader social and economic reforms, among others. Occupiers sometimes undertake political dislocation in a bid to address the root causes of conflict with the occupied state, and therefore to secure their gains over the longer term. While affected groups would have preferred to wait rather than fight, political dislocation forces them to choose between resistance and a permanent reduction of their political clout. Indeed, resistance is usually only undertaken by certain segments of the occupied society, and such resistance is usually organized along political lines. A corollary of political dislocation theory is that resistance is not simply a way of achieving national liberation, but also as a way of gaining political power within occupied society itself. The political and security vacuum in the aftermath of occupation pushes groups to arm to protect their interests. In so doing, they may clash in an effort to rule post-occupation societies, what I call the factional politics dimension of resistance. This helps ex-
plain why resistance groups often fight against each other even when they should rationally pool their resources against numerically superior occupying forces. It also helps explain the robust empirical connection between occupation, foreign imposed regime change, and post-occupation civil war (Reiter and Peic 2010, Downes 2011). Thus, political dislocation theory focuses on the domestic balance of power within occupied societies to explain resistance.

Second, resistance may emerge in response to a breakdown in trust in occupied societies. Occupiers and occupied exist in a state of anarchy: there is nothing to hold occupiers to account should they victimize occupied civilians or fail to vacate occupied territory. This generates an inherent level of mistrust and animosity towards occupiers. Occupiers that victimize the population of the occupying state are more likely to generate resistance. Indeed, when faced with the prospect of indiscriminate punishment, citizens of occupied states will turn to resistance as a strategy of survival. Moreover, the “type” of occupying state varies on spectrum from predatory to benign and it may be difficult for occupied populations to discern which type of occupier they face. Factors that allow occupiers to credibly commit their benign intentions should be expected to reduce the likelihood of resistance. I propose three such factors: regime type, international organization mandate, and religious affinity, can help assure local populations that the use of force will be restrained and judicious. They do so by providing greater transparency, oversight, checks, balances, and guarantees to the occupied population.

In sum I provide a novel theoretical framework, one based on the nature and behavior of occupying forces, to explain variation in resistance to occupation. Unlike nationalist explanations of resistance to occupation, which effectively treat resistance as a public good, political dislocation and trust theories understand resistance as a private good or a club good, intended to promote the political interest of specific groups or to protect those who join resistance groups. In many ways the competing explanations of political dislocation, trust and victimization, and nationalism correspond to Hobbes’ explanations of the causes of war, namely competition, diffidence (insecurity), and glory. According to Hobbes: “The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation” ([1651] 1994, 62).
1.4 Outline

With these hypotheses in mind, I then set out to explain the phenomenon of resistance to occupation as follows. In Chapter 2, I frame the parameters of the debate by defining the terms resistance and occupation. This task is essential since both occupation and resistance are highly politicized terms and how one conceives of the universe of cases could affect findings. I focus narrowly on violent resistance to occupation, with a specific interest in fatalities incurred by occupying forces. While non-violent resistance in undoubtedly significant, and in many instances effective, violent resistance is politically salient and more consistently recorded (for an theory of non-violent resistance see Chenoweth and Stephan 2008, 2011). I define occupation as the stationing of armed forces by a state or an intergovernmental organization in all or part of a foreign state’s territory for at least one month, exercising coercive authority over the local population. This definition includes certain kinds of peacekeeping but excludes the domination of separatist groups, what I term “domestic occupation.” After reviewing the various types of occupations and their causes, I take stock of existing theories of resistance to occupation and their limitations. Chapter 3 then outlines in greater detail the main arguments of this dissertation.

Having set the parameters of the debate and advanced my hypotheses, I then turn to testing my theory empirically using quantitative and qualitative data. Chapter 4 presents a novel dataset of resistance to occupation. Based on extensive primary and secondary sources, I identify every foreign occupation worldwide from 1900 until 2010 — 163 in total. This dataset presents an unprecedented overview of the history of occupation, including the location and duration of occupation, the number of occupier-force fatalities, and a series of other variables. The descriptive statistics indicate that violent resistance to occupation tends to be the exception rather than the norm. The median occupation generates just under 20 fatalities. Moreover, I note the qualitative evolution of occupations, which are becoming more multilateral and less likely to emerge from wars of aggression.

A key methodological challenge in assessing the causal effect of political dislocation and trust is the risk of selection bias. This could occur if potential occupiers systematically avoided invading countries they expected to generate fierce resistance, thereby leading to a biased sample. I tackle potential selection bias through a two-stage process. First, I model the onset of occupa-
on, looking at every country in the international system for every year going back to 1900 and then saving the predicted probabilities of the model. Second, I test whether the predicted probability of occupation has a statistically significant effect on resistance to occupation, controlling for other relevant factors. I find that the predicted probability of occupation fails to register any statistically significant effect, thereby assuaging concerns that selection bias is driving the results. Employing this dataset of occupation as well as a battery of controls, I then test competing theories of resistance to occupation. I find support for political dislocation and trust theory, partial support for opportunity structures, and little or no systematic effect for nationalism or the international context. I conclude this chapter by conducting survival analysis of occupation duration, in order to see whether the factors that affect the virulence of resistance also affect the duration of occupations. Although I do find that the motivation of occupation (liberation, aggression, invited intervention), affects the duration of occupation, the survival model does not find that the predictors of resistance intensity are related to those of occupation duration.

The cross-national quantitative evidence provides a first cut at understanding resistance to occupation. But could the findings be spurious? Moreover, resistance varies within, as well as across states, and this variation can tell us something about its causes. Chapter 5 therefore takes a mixed methods approach to resistance in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010. Drawing on geospatial data, I model the factors determining regional variations in resistance. The findings are powerful, if counter-intuitive: more than poverty or terrain, political dislocation is the greatest predictor of resistance. Resistance was not national, but largely concentrated in those areas inhabited by Pashtuns, where the Taliban traditionally found bases of support. This indicates that unless reconciliation efforts gain traction, no amount of economic development is likely to end the insurgency. Moreover, since resistance efforts can be seen as a contest for power within Afghan society, the end of occupation is likely to lead to civil war rather than peace.

But is Afghanistan unique? In order to see if these findings are generalizable, I select four well-predicted cases from the cross-national chapter for deeper qualitative analysis. The selected cases of Lithuania, Cambodia, and Lebanon represent a geographic and temporal cross-section of the universe of occupations. They also provide within-case variation, as these states were occupied several times during the period under study.

Chapter 6 examines the Soviet and German occupations of Lithuania between 1940 and 1953.
Table 1.1: Case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupied State</th>
<th>Occupying State</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>US/NATO/ISAF</td>
<td>2001-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1940-1941/1944-1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1941-1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1979-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>1991-1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1976-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1982-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>1982-1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>2006-2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both the Soviet Union and Germany faced resistance, but they faced resistance from different groups within Lithuanian society. For instance, resistance to German occupation was organized by Communists and Jews fearing persecution, while right wing Lithuanian “nationalists” actively collaborated with Nazi rule. In contrast, resistance to Soviet occupation was undertaken by a broad spectrum of disenfranchised wealthier landowners, industrialists, and traditional political parties who stood to lose from radical Soviet reforms, as well as Poles who resented the allocation of Polish-inhabited territory to Lithuania. Interestingly, resistance groups feared and often fought against each other, as they struggled to rule post-occupation Lithuania. The case of Lithuania also demonstrates the role of trust and victimization: many Lithuanians did not take up arms against the Soviet Union or Germany until the advent of forced deportation and the Holocaust. Religion also provided occupied a prism through which to understand the intentions of occupying forces, and the Catholic church proved to be an enable of resistance to Soviet rule.

Chapter 7 turns to Southeast Asia and the Vietnamese and UN occupations of Cambodia between 1979 and 1993. Cambodia is an ideal laboratory of occupation, as Vietnam and the UN undertook different approaches to ruling the same foreign country. Whereas Vietnam installed a pliant communist regime and excluded all other factions from power, the UN set out to conduct elections and democratic reform. As political dislocation would predict, Vietnam faced resistance among marginalized and disenfranchised monarchist, republican, and Khmer Rouge factions of Cambodian society. The UN, in contrast, only experienced resistance from the Khmer Rouge, which expected to gain more from spoiling the democratic process than from taking part in it.
This case study also illustrates the role of trust in resistance. Whereas the UN could credibly guarantee to leave Cambodia promptly (some would say too promptly), many Cambodians feared that Vietnam had come to colonize their country permanently and to brutalize its population. The organization of the UN, as well as the democratic norms that governed the largest contributors to UNTAC, helped assure a degree of oversight and accountability. As a consequence, the UN faced far less resistance than did Vietnam.

Chapter 8 compares the occupations of Lebanon by Syria, Israel, the Multinational Forces, and UNIFIL between 1976 and 2010. Lebanon is a deeply divided society that experienced sectarian civil war during much of the period under study. The polarization of Lebanese society made political factions particularly sensitive to the effects of political dislocation. Indeed resistance, by Maronite Christians, Sunnis, Shias, and Druze was determined primarily by the impact of occupation on the domestic balance of power. Many of these factions closely collaborated with foreign occupiers when it suited their interests, as was the case with the Maronites and Israel or the Shia and Syria. The case of Lebanon also provides strong indications of the risk of factional politics in resistance struggles. Warring groups within Lebanon sought to check the influence of their rivals, as much as that of their occupiers. For much of its occupation, UNIFIL managed to maintain the trust of local factions, whereas the Multinational Forces led by the US, France, and Italy suffered major resistance once they decided to take sides in the conflict.

Chapter 9 concludes by arguing that far from receding into the dustbin of history, foreign occupation will remain a tool of modern statecraft, albeit geared to address a different set of strategic and humanitarian challenges. I also put forward a number of policy recommendations and propose avenues for further research.

1.5 Contribution

This dissertation makes a contribution to both academia and policy. It provides the first and only dataset of every foreign occupation over the last century, which helps understand the extent of the phenomenon as well as its qualitative evolution. Moreover, by collecting data on the number of
occupier-force fatalities it also provides a first cut at understanding the true costs of occupation. This, in turn, helps overcome availability bias that might occur by focusing solely on widely-publicized incidences of violent resistance to occupation (peaceful occupation, especially by non-Western countries rarely garner media attention) (Kahneman and Tversky 1973). In addition, this dissertation provides the first cross-national quantitative analysis of resistance to occupation. While there exist many accounts of occupation in specific countries, regions, or conflicts, there exists no comprehensive quantitative analysis of resistance to foreign occupation.

Second, this dissertation provides a novel theoretical framework for understanding resistance to occupation. I undertake the only systematic review of the theoretical literature and propose theories of resistance based on domestic politics in the occupied state and the nature and behavior of the occupier. Usually understood as being a manifestation of nationalism, I demonstrate that resistance in fact reflects a wider array of motives. This theoretical framework also helps bridge the academic literature in International Relations and Comparative Politics. Indeed, foreign occupation is often a product of interstate war or foreign intervention, while resistance is often a product of intrastate politics as well as the socio-economic factors often associated with civil wars.

Third, this dissertation provides policy-makers with a tool to better understand and predict resistance to occupation. As discussed above, policy-makers have limited systematic information on the probability of resistance, sometimes leading to costly foreign policy mistakes. At a time when foreign interventions—including occupations—remain a policy option, understanding these risks is as important as ever. Indeed, once states commit troops, they may fall prey to a “commitment trap.” If and when they face violent resistance to occupation, moderately committed states may maintain or increase their military commitment out of fear of losing face or displaying weakness towards resistance groups. Poorly planned occupations can take lives of their own as reputational concerns push occupiers to increase their commitment well beyond their initial political aims, thereby making occupations more costly and resistance struggles harder to resolve. In order to avoid this commitment trap, the risks of foreign occupation are therefore best assessed prior to the commitment of troops to the ground.

4A more comprehensive account would identify both dead and wounded military casualties, as well as the civilian casualties of occupation, which are often significant though less well documented.
1.6 Caveats

This dissertation is ambitious in its scope but retains a number of caveats. It does not examine the morality of occupation. Cognizant of the misery and suffering commonly caused by foreign occupation (and that this suffering can lead to resistance), I do not examine the morality of occupation. I treat the issue as an empirical puzzle, not a normative problem. Conversely, I do not assume all resistance to occupation is inherently righteous. As I hope to demonstrate, resistance doesn’t always seek to advance the public good, however it may be defined.

This dissertation also doesn’t seek to explain why occupations succeed or fail.\(^5\) I treat the empirical question of why occupations generate resistance as separate from the political question of what constitutes occupation success. Whether the costs of occupation are deemed acceptable depends to a great degree on the objectives sought and the importance attached to such objectives. Similarly, this dissertation does not seek to explain why resistance succeeds or fails. Mirroring the question of occupation success and failure, the success of resistance depends to a large degree on the willingness of occupiers to assume the costs necessary to achieve the objectives of occupation. It cannot simply be deduced from the intensity of resistance. Moreover, it is difficult to identify the causal link between the intensity of resistance and the end of occupation. For instance, did the occupier relent because of resistance, in spite of resistance, or for other reasons entirely (e.g. domestic considerations)? Lastly, this dissertation doesn’t answer how many troops are necessary in order to stabilize an occupied territory. The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the causes of resistance, and to draw attention to the role of domestic politics, victimization, and trust in the generation of political violence under occupation.

\(^5\)This task is undertaken by Edelstein 2008a.
Chapter 2

Occupation and Resistance: Framing the Issue

"The aggressor is always peace loving... He would always prefer to take over the country unopposed."

-Carl von Clausewitz, On War

2.1 Introduction

The terms occupation and resistance tend to be emotive and politically charged. Precisely for this reason groups and social movements often seek to appropriate these terms to advance social, economic, or political goals. In order to provide the conceptual clarity necessary to undertake a rigorous analysis of resistance, this chapter seeks to define and survey the academic literature on resistance and occupation. First, I explain why resistance to occupation should be studied separately from interstate and civil war. Second, I provide a working definition of the term occupation, the unit of analysis of this study. I also provide a typology of occupations and seek to explain basic variation in types of occupations. Third, I provide a working definition of the term resistance, the main dependent variable of this study. Fourth, I take stock of existing theories of resistance to occupation, namely: nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context. For each theory,

\footnote{Clausewitz [1832] 2007, 370.}
I then note some of their main critiques and drawbacks. Although resistance is a significant issue in international relations, I conclude that the concept has to date been poorly defined and that existing theories provide only part of the answer. In the next chapter, I will introduce the theories of political dislocation and trust to better explain variation in resistance to occupation.

2.2 Why Study Occupation Separately?

A legitimate question to ask is why study occupation separately from other forms of violent political conflict. After all, resistance is often an extension of interstate war and may even occur in parallel with interstate war. There already exists a rich literature on civil wars and insurgencies, much of which incorporates resistance struggles. Lastly, if occupations are not distinct or unique, analyzing them in isolation might lead to inefficient or biased statistical estimates because we are arbitrarily restricting analysis to a subsample of the data (Sambanis 2004, 261). What then makes resistance to occupation different?

Resistance to occupation lies at the intersection of interstate and civil war, and yet is distinct from each in significant ways. It is distinct from interstate wars because of the massive asymmetries of power involved. Even when resistance groups emerge to contest occupation, the occupier is usually militarily dominant. Resistance groups are irregular and ad hoc since few countries train citizens to take up arms once their national armies have been defeated. Such power imbalances usually compel resisters to employ asymmetric tactics such as guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and, occasionally, terrorism. On a political level, occupations are distinct from interstate war since they may involve the direct administration of territory. In short, the actors, the tactics, and the political roles of occupations are different from those of interstate wars.

Occupations are distinct from civil wars because, by definition, they involve foreign actors. We should expect this to affect the dynamics of conflict since occupations emerge from an exogenous process (usually interstate war), rather than an endogenous contest for power. Unlike civil wars, both the occupier and the occupied are recognized members of the international community. Occupations are regulated differently than civil wars under international law. The Hague

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2The term guerrilla derives from Spanish, meaning “little war.” It emerged to describe resistance against Napoleon’s occupation of Spain beginning in 1808.
Regulations and Geneva Conventions lay out specific roles and responsibilities for the occupier and occupied. Many aspects of these conventions have no corresponding application to civil war. Finally, occupations are unique insofar as they are meant to be temporally limited under international law. Similarly, unlike civil wars, occupiers can always leave the country. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, the distinction between occupations and interstate and civil wars are significant because they affect the strategic choices faced by relevant actors and therefore the incentives to assume risk in undertaking resistance.

2.3 Occupation

2.3.1 Defining Occupation

Occupation is the unit of analysis of this dissertation. But what exactly do we mean when we speak of occupation? This question is far from esoteric. Aside from understanding the impetus of resistance, the application of the term has legal and moral implications.

Definitions of occupation in academia and international law are many and sometimes contradictory. Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land states: “territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.” According to the British Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict: “classically, this [belligerent occupation] refers to the occupation of enemy territory, that is, when a belligerent in an armed conflict is in control of some of the adversary’s territory and is directly responsible for administering that territory” (MOD 2005). In a study on success and failure in military occupations, Edelstein defines occupation as: “the temporary control of a territory by a state (or group of allied states) that makes no claim to permanent sovereignty over that territory” (2004, 52). Edelstein also notes: “the intended duration of a military occupation must be temporary and finite” (2008a, 3). A major problem with Edelstein’s definition of occupation is that it requires some subjective knowledge of the state’s intent at the onset of occupation. Such knowledge may be impossible, especially since intentions may shift over time. Additionally, many well-known and controversial occupations are not temporary and gradually become annexations. In a study of the international law of occupation, Benvenisti defines military occupation as “the effective control of a power…over a territory to which that power has no sovereign title, without the violation of the
sovereignty of that territory” (1993, 4). As will be discussed later, the issue of violation is highly problematic in the context of foreign coercion. In his overview of the term, Roberts defines occupations as “operations involving the armed forces of a state exercising some kind of domination or authority over inhabited territory outside its borders” (1984, 300). Pape defines occupation as “the exertion of political control over territory by an outside group” (2005, 83). He further adds that the critical requirement is that the occupying power’s political control must depend on employing coercive assets that are controlled from outside the occupied territory. Occupation is deemed to come to an end when an occupant withdraws from a territory, or is driven out of it (Oppenheim 1952).

It is important to be careful in defining occupation since its definition determines the universe of relevant cases, which in turn can affect the findings of any analysis of resistance to occupation. For the purpose of this dissertation, occupation is defined as: The stationing of armed forces by a state or an intergovernmental organization in all or part of a foreign state’s territory for at least one month, exercising coercive authority over the local population. Occupation is distinct from interstate war since one of the belligerents (the occupier) is no longer fighting the organized military forces of the opposing state. In order to code this distinction consistently, in the case of interstate war occupation is deemed to begin one month after the cessation of hostilities with the organized military forces of the occupied state on enemy territory.

This definition attempts, as much as possible, to establish clear and replicable criteria for identifying cases of occupations. This definition is cumbersome, however, so it is useful to unpack its component parts. First the stationing of armed forces of a state on the territory of another state is a fundamental requirement of occupation, distinguishing it from other types of state activity such as diplomatic postings, which involve stationing on foreign territory without a military function, and airstrikes and naval operations, which involve a military function without stationing on foreign territory. Second, occupations are conducted by states or intergovernmental organizations. Thus, even the extensive presence of non-state actors, such as Hezbollah in South Lebanon or the PLO in Jordan during the 1970s, do not constitute occupation. Third, consistent with the Hague Regu-

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3When occupiers face resistance, it is generally not the organized military forces of the state. One potential exception was the use by the Soviet Union of partisan forces in German-occupied territory. These forces were trained in the USSR and deployed by the Soviet Union behind German enemy lines.
lations, occupation can involve partial or complete control of foreign territory. Complete control is not a prerequisite for occupation. Fourth, occupations take place on foreign territory, in states that were independent prior to occupation. This distinction is made for legal and methodological reasons. Under international law, separatist groups and colonies cannot claim to be “occupied” by a central government, though they may still seek self-determination. Methodologically, in order to understand the causes of resistance to occupation, it is important to look at cases where there was resistance and at null cases where no resistance occurred. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the universe of potential cases. Independent states constitute a bounded universe of cases. Sub-national separatist groups, in contrast, do not constitute a bounded universe of cases. Theoretically, the number of separatist groups could be as large as the population itself. It is impossible to know a priori all potential separatist groups within a territory or to measure variables of interest pertaining to all such groups. Therefore, occupation is only deemed to occur on the territory of foreign states. Sixth, occupation occurs after the cessation of such hostilities. This feature distinguishes occupation from interstate war. It is important to note that occupation in one geographic area can occur while states continue interstate war in another area. This is consistent with the concept that territorial control need not be complete in order for occupation to occur. Moreover, not all occupations occur after interstate hostilities. Some occupations occur to prevent or curtail civil wars. Lastly, and most critically, the definition of occupation requires foreign forces to exercise independent coercive authority over the local population. These functions can involve policing and crowd control, governance and administration, or direct military activities such as counter-insurgency. This distinguishes occupation from more circumscribed military activities such as defending embassies, evacuating foreign nationals, providing military advisors to foreign states, or establishing purely logistical military bases.

The definition and application of occupation is frequently contested. Occupiers have become increasingly reluctant to refer to their activities explicitly as occupation. While not completely banned under international law, occupations are increasingly seen as illegitimate (Zacher 2001). The legitimacy of occupation has been challenged by prohibitions on the use of force, the sanctity of state borders, and the widening practice of democracy. Rather than defining an objective condition in International Relations, the term has acquired negative moral connotations. Upon taking over as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, Paul Bremer stated: “Occu-
Occupation is an ugly word, not one Americans feel comfortable with, but it is a fact” (Wilson 2003). States have argued against the label of occupation on the basis that an occupation was conducted in self-defense or to support human rights in a foreign country. However, intentions can never be verified. Therefore, international law has considered occupation as a question of fact, not intent (Chesterman 2004b, 61).

The concept of occupation tends to be intertwined with the concept of resistance. Occupations are more likely to be seen as such when they face resistance, because resistance movements claim to be fighting against the exercise of illegitimate foreign rule. However, the Fourth Geneva Convention clearly states that the laws of occupation apply “even if the…occupation meets with no armed resistance” (1949). Resistance need not occur for the presence of foreign troops to be considered an occupation. Identifying occupation based on the presence of resistance causes selection bias. By overlooking peaceful occupations, it leads to the false conclusion that all occupations cause resistance. Alternatively, tying occupation to resistance would overlook the most brutal cases of occupation where resistance is deterred by fear of retaliation (Willard-Foster 2009, 36).

According to Schelling ([1966] 2008, 30) “A well-behaved occupied country is not one in which violence plays no part; it may be one in which latent violence is used so skillfully that it need not be spent in punishment.”

The concept of occupation also needs to be separated from the concept of state consent. States occasionally invite foreign troops to occupy part of their territory in order to address domestic security crises. The British Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict excludes from its definition of occupation liberation of allied territory, international administration of territory by the UN, and the presence of armed forces in another state in accordance with some treaty or agreement (MOD 2005). This distinction is moot, however. Invited occupations share virtually all the characteristics of imposed occupation, bar consent. Even consent can be cajoled, manipulated, or coerced. For

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4Interestingly occupiers may resist this appellation because international law assigns costly responsibilities on the occupier. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations imposes burdens on the occupier to restore and maintain public order and civil life, including public welfare, in an occupied territory. During the multilateral UNITAF mission in Somalia in 1992-1993 Australian forces recognized the application of the law of occupation. However the commanders of the UNITAF subsequently rejected recognition in order to restrict broader responsibility in what it considered to be a strictly humanitarian mission (Stirk 2009, 50).

5Lyall (2010a, 178) makes a mistake in this regard by arguing that “military occupation is typically a losing proposition” because he observes that occupiers are less likely to defeat insurgencies than native counter-insurgents. However, Lyall’s assessment selects on the dependent variable: occupiers may be less successful counterinsurgents, but the vast majority of occupiers never face a sustained insurgency to begin with, therefore not factoring into his analysis.
example, the process of *Anschluss* in Austria was sanctioned by a legislative act that was subject to ratification by a plebiscite in Austria. Prior to the plebiscite, Social Democrat and Communists dissenters, as well as Jews, were imprisoned or sent to concentration camps. Ballots were not secret and highly misleading (see Figure 2.1). While consent was technically sought and obtained, it was meaningless in the shadow of coercion.

![Ballot from 10 April 1938 Austrian plebiscite. The ballot reads: “Do you agree with the reunification of Austria with the German Reich that was enacted on 13 March 1938, and do you vote for the party of our leader Adolf Hitler?” Note that the large circle indicates “yes” and the smaller circle indicates “no.”](image)

In some instances, invited interventions slide into imposed occupations, as the invited troops remain beyond their mandate. Moreover, reflecting a growing consensus among international legal scholars, certain multilateral peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations constitute occupations under this definition (Chesterman 2004a; 2004b; Ratner 2005; Fox 2007; Stahn 2008; Edelstein 2008a. For a contrary view see Sassòli 2005). Consider, for example, “robust” peacekeeping operations such UNMIL and UNAMSIL in Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively. These missions involved troops deployed overseas to patrol territory, police the local population, and tackle rebel groups. Though the assignment of legal responsibility is more complex, the act of occupation is essentially the same (Marten 2004).

As a matter of policy, the UN seeks to obtain consent from the occupied state. However, even with the UN, such consent can be obtained under strong international pressure. In other circumstances multilateral humanitarian interventions occur precisely because there is no functioning local government that could provide consent (Fox 2007, 10). Ultimately, the definition of occupation proposed here relies as much as possible on the actual behavior of states, which can be more
easily observed and measured, rather than their intentions, which cannot.

2.3.2 Typology of Occupation

This section outlines a typology of occupation. There exists great variation among occupations. Some are short, bloodless, and limited, while others are protracted, vicious, and radically restructure the occupied polity. On a broad level, occupations can be distinguished by two central attributes: their context and their objectives. The context describes the origins of the occupation. The objective describes the policies undertaken by occupiers.

Context

Occupations emerge from aggression, retaliation, liberation, or invited intervention. First, occupation can be the result of state aggression when a state initiates the invasion of another state’s territory. Aggression can be pursued for a variety of objectives such as expanding territory, plundering, responding to perceived security needs, conducting humanitarian intervention in support of a subnational group, or promoting an ideology. Examples of occupation in the context of aggression include the Libyan invasion of the Aouzou Strip in Chad in 1973 and the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990. Aggression can at times occur without a shot being fired, through the threat of the use of force.

Second, occupation can be the result of retaliation when a state responds to aggression by another state by occupying all or part of the aggressor’s territory. Retaliatory occupation may serve to defeat the enemy’s army, to remove its leadership, to change its regime, or to annex it altogether. The difference between aggression and retaliation is mainly one of sequence rather than intent. Aggression initiates an interstate dispute whereas retaliation succeeds it.

Third, occupation can be the outcome of liberation. Liberation, occurs when a first state invades a territory of a second state to liberate it from occupation by a third state. Examples of occupation in the context of liberation include the UN occupation of East Timor between 1999 and 2002.

Lastly, occupation can result of invited intervention by the occupied state. States jealously guard their sovereignty, but at times invite temporary foreign occupation in order to help counter
domestic or foreign threats. For example, during the North Yemen civil war, republican President Abdullah al-Sallal called upon Egyptian support to defeat royalist forces. Both liberation and invited intervention involve foreign forces occupying territory in favor of the occupied state. The key distinction between the two is the locus of sovereignty. Liberation occurs when the occupied state has already lost sovereignty. Invited intervention occurs when the occupied state retains sovereignty.⁶

Objectives

The objectives of occupation can involve decapitation of leadership, regime change, nation-building, or annexation. Occupation can also be the residual outcome of interstate conflict. The objectives of occupation are often nested. Annexation necessarily involves regime change, decapitation, and tactical occupation. Nation building can involve regime change and decapitation, and so forth. The following section describes the different objectives of occupations, listed from least to most intrusive.

*Tactical Occupation.* First, occupation can be tactical. In the course of conflict, states invade foreign territory to engage military forces, hold strategically important terrain, or neutralize enemy economic resources, infrastructure, and communications. Here, invasion is purely a military instrument. Not all occupations are imposed. States occasionally call upon allies to help quell domestic unrest. For example, in 1968, 1973, 1978, and 1983, Chad called upon France to help suppress FROLINAT (Tanca 1993). The US’s role in South Vietnam was also ostensibly to support the existing regime. Sullivan and Karreth term these occupations as “foreign regime maintenance interventions” (2010). Weak or failing states have also invited regional and international organizations to maintain law and order and build institutions. For example, in 1999 the Democratic Republic of Congo requested that the UN send troops to help police its restive eastern provinces (Prunier 2009). Whether invited or not, tactical occupations tend to impose temporary or regional military administration and leave the political and administrative structure in place.

*Residual Occupation.* At the end of an interstate conflict, foreign military forces find themselves

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⁶As with other political phenomena, context is highly controversial. Context is tied to legitimacy, and legitimacy affects the social costs of foreign policy. States have strong incentives to manipulate the perceived context of occupation. No state wants to be labeled as an aggressor. Instead, they will seek to have aggression masquerade as liberation. Similarly, states will seek to portray aggression as retaliation to some action undertaken by the occupied state.
on enemy territory. Residual occupation reflects the simple fact that it takes time to redeploy military forces from theaters of operation. For example, at the end of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, Chinese forces were 15-20 kilometers into Northern Vietnam before withdrawing back to Chinese territory (Jencks 1979). Residual occupation corresponds most closely to the principles of occupation outlined under the Hague Convention. Indeed, delegates to the Hague Convention saw occupation as a transient situation, for short periods between end of hostilities and signing of peace treaty. The Hague convention’s focus on temporary occupation made sense given the patterns of warfare during the 19th century (Benvenisti 1993, 16). Because this dissertation only counts occupations lasting at least one month, it includes few residual occupations.

**Decapitation.** Third, occupiers can decapitate the leadership of the occupied state. Decapitation is usually only possible if the occupier controls most of the enemy territory including the capital or if occupiers happen to capture the leader of the enemy state. The purpose of decapitation is to mete punishment, strengthen deterrence, and ensure a sustainable outcome to the dispute. At war’s end occupying leaders, forces, or domestic audiences may demand to punish those it considers responsible for conflict by removing them from power, pushing them into exile, or executing them. Leadership decapitation can also serve to deter other foreign leaders from undertaking undesirable courses of action by raising the potential personal costs of conflict.\(^7\)

**Regime Change.** Fourth, occupiers can undertake regime change in the occupied state. Unlike decapitation, regime change involves removing both the incumbent leader and the institutions for selecting leaders or organizing society. Regime change can be accompanied by other measures such as the formal renunciation of war as an instrument of policy, banning the deployment of troops outside national borders, or accepting limits on the size of the military. For example, in 1944, US Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau had planned to permanently incapacitate Germany by abolishing its military, annexing its main centers of mining and industry, dismantling all heavy industry, and dismembering its territory into two independent states (Beschloss 2003). Similarly, following the Second World War in Japan, the US Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) sought to bury Japanese industrial militarism by disbanding the army and breaking up the *Zaibatsu* conglomerates (Dower 2000). As such, regime change seeks to hardwire

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\(^7\)Leadership decapitation can have unintended consequences. See Goemans 2000 and Downs and Rocke 1995.
pacifism into the constitutions or laws of defeated nations.\textsuperscript{8}

\textit{Nation Building}. Fifth, in conjunction with decapitation and regime change, occupiers can undertake nation-building in occupied territory, what Edelstein terms “comprehensive occupation” (2004, 53). Nation building involves reinforcing the capacity of the state to carry out security and governance functions. A prime example of nation-building occupation is US/International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)’s occupation of Afghanistan since 2001. Having overthrown the Taliban regime, the international community sought to strengthen the capacity of the Afghan government in order to prevent the Taliban from recapturing power and terrorist groups from using the territory of Afghanistan as a staging point for attacks on the West. As with tactical occupations, not all nation-building occupations are imposed. Poor, weak, and vulnerable states may request the support of foreign states or international organizations in order to spur economic growth and strengthen state institutions in order to maintain domestic security.\textsuperscript{9}

\textit{Annexation}. Fifth, occupying states may annex the occupied state. Unlike decapitation, regime change or nation-building, annexation entails the permanent loss of sovereignty of all or part of the occupied territory. There has been a secular decline in the number of annexations since 1945, due to innovations in military technology and changes in international law. Militarily, the emergence of nuclear weapons, extended nuclear deterrence by nuclear-armed allies, as well as cheaper, lighter, and more effective conventional weapons have raised the cost of both war and annexation (Mueller 1989, Sagan and Waltz 2002). Changes in international law in the later half of the 20th century have reinforced the concept of state sovereignty and the immutability of state borders. Article II of the 1945 UN Charter instructs member states to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (UN 1945). The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations from 1970 states:

\textsuperscript{8}It should be noted that regime change of occupied territory is technically illegal under the laws of war. Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land states: “The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country” (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{9}Of course the occupier’s intention to pursue nation-building by no means entails that nation-building will succeed. Nation building is not a “settled technology, like building bridges or removing gallbladders” (Payne 2005, 14).
“the territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter” (UN 1970). Thus since the Second World War, occupation and occupation law itself has seemed at odds with other core tenets of international law (Chesterman 2004b, 51). In many ways, the increase of “transformative occupations” through decapitation, regime change, and nation-building increased as a result of opposition to annexation and colonialism (Fazal 2007).

Ambiguous. Sixth, occupying states can maintain an ambiguous policy towards occupied territory. They may undertake extended tactical occupation, without formally replacing the leadership of the state, nor restoring full sovereign powers. The best example of this phenomenon is Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. Israel claims it has not annexed the West Bank. Instead, it claims it is “holding” the disputed territory. Ambiguity has its uses. Territories held under ambiguous occupation can be used as a political bargaining chip for other concessions. Ambiguous occupation can serve as a stepping-stone towards annexation at a time when outright annexation has become unacceptable (Roberts 1990). Indeed, it may be difficult to distinguish indefinite tactical occupation from annexation.

2.3.3 Explaining Variation in Types of Occupation

States undertake a range of occupations strategies with different objectives. These different types of occupations serve to address the perceived root cause of the conflict and to overcome the credible commitment problem of the defeated state.

Commitment Problem

States generally pursue occupation to overcome commitment problems. According to Powell (2006, 170) the commitment problem refers to a situation in international politics where states may be unable to commit themselves to following through on an agreement and may also have incentives to renege on it. The commitment problem is common in international politics because of the condition of anarchy, which precludes the automatic enforcement of agreements. As noted by Reiter (2009), credible commitment problems loom large in war termination. Although their forces are defeated today, the defeated state cannot credibly commit to respecting the outcome of
the war in the future once the occupier has left and their forces have regained strength. Clausewitz’s famous dictum is particularly relevant here: “In war the result is never final. The defeated state may consider the outcome a ‘transitory evil’ that can be remedied as soon as capabilities are reconstituted” ([1832] 2007, 80). Since war is costly, victors wish to ensure that the political outcome achieved by the war is maintained in the foreseeable future. From this perspective, occupation is a way of anchoring political gains. A US Army handbook, distributed to soldiers in occupied Germany, illustrates the commitment problem:

“Don’t forget that you’re ordered to Germany now partly because your fathers forgot so soon what the war was about last time. They took it for granted that the friendly reception the Germans gave them after the Armistice in 1918 proved that Germany meant well after all. Our whole country let down its guard too easily last time” (US Army 1944, 6-7).

Similarly, the handbook states: “The occupation of Germany will give you your chance to build up a personal guarantee that as soon as you turn your back to go home, the German will not pick up his shooting irons and start throwing lead and lies at an unsuspecting world once more” (US Army 1944, 1). Ultimately, states may use occupation to install friendly leaders or regimes in order to help overcome the credible commitment problem, at least in the near term. The next sections discuss this point in greater detail.

**Causes of War**

The commitment problem provides only part of the answer of why states pursue different forms of occupation. After all, if anarchy and the attendant commitment problem are constants in International Relations, why is there variation in forms of occupation? The answer is the perceived cause of war. Victors seek to overcome the commitment problem by addressing what they perceive to be the root causes of the war. So long as the root causes are not addressed, war losers cannot credibly commit to respecting its outcome. Broadly speaking, the causes of war fall under the three “images” described by Waltz (1959): the individual, the state, and the international system. Where resources permit, victors will pursue forms of occupation that seek address the perceived cause of war.
The first image is the individual. States will pursue a policy of decapitation (usually figuratively) when they believe particular leaders are the cause of conflict. For instance, in a 2002 speech in Cincinnati outlining the case for war against Iraq, President George W. Bush argued:

“Saddam Hussein is a threat to peace and must disarm. We agree that the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons, and diseases, and gases, and atomic weapons” (New York Times 2002).

Although Bush was wrong about Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, such ad hominem attacks on opponents is common in international affairs. They highlight that victory in war may not lead to sustainable outcomes if the leadership deemed responsible for the conflict remains in power. After all, the leadership and its preferences remain the same and they may seek revenge. The occupier cannot guarantee that the defeated state will remain contained should the balance of power shift (Freedman 2006, 61; Downes 2008). Occupiers may therefore seek to ensure a more sustainable outcome by permanently removing leaders from power and installing leaders friendlier to their interests. A good example of decapitation occupation is the Uganda-Tanzania War of 1978-1979. In 1978 Tanzania invaded Uganda after Ugandan President Idi Amin attempted to annex parts of the Kagera region of Tanzania. The clash over Kagera and the subsequent invasion of Uganda were the latest in a series of acrimonious disputes between the states. Seeing Amin as irrevocably reckless and threatening, Tanzania decided to oust him once and for all (Ofcansky 1996). The same goes for occupations staged on humanitarian grounds. A state may invade and occupy another state in order to halt human rights abuses, and overthrow the leadership to ensure that such abuses do not reoccur as soon as the occupier leaves.

The second image is the state. Victors will pursue a policy of regime change or nation-building when they believe the political structures and state weakness are causes of conflict. As with decapitation, occupiers seek regime change in order to solve credible commitment problems. Occupiers may see not only leadership, but also the regime type of the occupied state as a root cause of conflict. If both leaders and regimes are a cause of conflict, replacing leaders will be insufficient to secure post-war gains. Only a reform of the institutions for selecting leaders or organizing society will provide the basis for sustainable gains. The most successful examples of regime change in occupations are Germany and Japan following the Second World War. Through extensive politi-
cal and economic reform, Western powers successfully pacified some of the most dangerous and militaristic rivals. More broadly, empirical research indicates that peace is more likely to endure between states following foreign imposed regime change (FIRC) (Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter 2008). States may also impose regime change for broader ideological motives. For example, France, the UK, and the US were deeply concerned about Bolshevik subversion in Germany and saw occupation as a way to prevent negative post-war shifts in political allegiance. Similarly, Stalin noted: “whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own social system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise” (Djilas 1962, 114). The USSR ensured that Eastern Europe adopted communism just as the US and the UK sought to establish liberal democracies in Western Europe. Such transformational occupations provided physical and ideological buffers between Cold War rivals.

Ideology aside, liberal International Relations theorists have argued there are strong pragmatic reasons for seeking regime change. Liberal democracies, according to this school of thought, do not go to war against each other (Kant [1795] 2003; Doyle 1986; Oneal and Russett 2001). The task of regime change has also been adopted by international organizations under the guise of peacebuilding. Following the end of the Cold War, the UN and other organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Organization of American States (OAS) began playing a greater role in the reconstruction of post-conflict states. The type of regime change implemented by international organizations reflected a growing liberal consensus surrounding free markets and democratization as long-term solutions to conflict and underdevelopment (Paris 2004).

Nation building is usually conducted in tandem with regime change, but reflects a distinct cause of war. Nation building occupations reflects a deeper commitment problem in the occupied state. Despite favorable leadership or regime type, occupied states cannot credibly commit to respecting the outcome of the conflict if their institutional capacity is weak. The state needs to be strong enough to resist internal and external challengers who may seek to reverse the policies or leadership put in place by the occupier. The international context is also important. Occupiers may undertake nation-building as a form of balancing against foreign powers or to prevent the spillover of domestic conflicts.

The third image cause of war is the international system. The absence of a supranational au-
authority creates a self-help system in which the resort to force is an ever present and sometimes necessary option. Efforts at improving a state’s security may inadvertently make other states less secure. States view each other not according to their leaders or regimes, but by their relative capabilities. Tragically, war may occur although no state wishes it. According to the third image, the relative distribution of capabilities and international anarchy are causes of war (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). The process of interstate war may destroy some of the industrial and military capabilities of the opposing state. However, war often ends short of the total annihilation of opposing forces, leaving the defeated state in a position to potentially revise the outcome of the war (Reiter 2009).

The occupier may therefore see the occupied state as a potential threat in and of itself. Efforts at reforming leadership, regime type, or state capacity cannot eliminate the risk that the occupied state will reemerge as a greater threat in the future. Intentions cannot be directly observed and future capabilities are hard to predict. Under conditions of anarchy in the international system, states have no recourse should the occupied state eventually turn against them. The occupying state may therefore seek to use temporary domination over the occupied state to neutralize the risk permanently (Morgenthau [1949] 1985, 24). States will seek to reduce the potential risk by reducing the capability of the occupied state or by annexing it in whole or in part. Occupying enemy territory also serves to deny the enemy the use of that territory for military purposes (Clausewitz [1832] 2007, 181). For instance, following the First World War, France, Belgium, and to a lesser extent, the UK, saw the industrial potential of Germany as a latent threat to their security. Since industrial might forms the sinews of military power, they sought the demilitarization of the industrial heart of Germany, the Rhineland, as well as the direct Allied administration of the coal-rich Saar. France, for its part, sought unsuccessfully to separate the Saar permanently from Germany (MacMillan 2003, 170-171).

When occupiers see enemy territory itself as a strategic liability against third-party threats, degrading military capabilities may not be enough. Occupiers may feel compelled to annex or permanently occupy the territory in an effort to address the security dilemma. For example, one of the goals of the US occupation of Haiti between 1915 and 1934 was to prevent Germany from establishing a naval base in the Western Hemisphere and threaten access to the Panama Canal (Plummer 1988). States also annex occupied territory to form a buffer against rivals (Stirk 2009,
Table 2.1: Occupation and the causes of war

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Cause of War</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Aggressive leaders</td>
<td>Decapitation</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Uganda 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Weak or autocratic</td>
<td>Regime change</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Japan 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>governments</td>
<td>Nation building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>Anarchy</td>
<td>Annexation</td>
<td>Indefinite</td>
<td>Golan 1967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For instance, Israel occupied a so-called “security zone” in Southern Lebanon from 1985 until 2000 to prevent the territory from being used by Palestinian and Hezbollah forces to launch attacks against Northern Israel. Similarly, Israel formally annexed the Golan Heights after the 1967 War to prevent Syria from using the high ground to shell Israeli towns. As Fazal (2007) has demonstrated, buffer states are more likely to be occupied and annexed because rival powers fear that if they do not do so their enemies will. Finally, at a broader level, an occupier may also seek to annex a territory for its own enrichment or to help balance against other powers. A summary of the link between the perceived causes of war and the types of occupation is provided in Table 2.1.

Of course, these objectives also reflect the balance of power between the occupying and the occupied state. Relatively weak occupiers are less likely to undertake costly and long-term nation-building than relatively strong ones. They are forced to balance the cost and probability of success of occupations against the intensity and probability of future threats. As a result, they may settle for temporary military administration or decapitation of leadership instead of comprehensive regime change and nation-building.
2.4 Defining Resistance

Resistance is the principal dependent variable in this study. Unlike the term occupation, resistance is not defined in international law. For the purposes of this dissertation, I define resistance as: *The deliberate use of violence by members of the occupied population against occupying forces or officials.*

First, this definition of resistance focuses on conflict between an occupier and an occupied population. It does not refer to resistance against indigenous governments, against domestic coercive apparatus such as police, or against corporations. Nor does the term as it is used here refer to resistance against ideologies or policies outside the context of occupation. Indeed, activists have frequently sought to appropriate the romantic and righteous image of resistance to unrelated political agendas. Moreover, the term does not refer to strictly military resistance in the course of interstate conflict outside of occupied territory. Second, this definition avoids making assumptions about the purpose of resistance. I simply assume that the act of resistance is directed by the occupied against the occupier. As I will argue in the next chapter, objectives such as the restoration of full sovereignty of the occupied state are only some of the potential objectives sought by resistance groups.

Third, this definition consciously focuses on violent forms of resistance to occupation. I acknowledge that resistance can take several forms and that non-violent resistance to occupation can be significant and at times effective (see Chenoweth and Stephan 2008, 2011). As will be discussed further in the cross-national analysis of resistance to occupation, I focus on violent forms of resistance to occupation for two reasons. First, violent resistance to occupation tends to be more salient because it presents occupiers with both political and military challenges to achieving their objectives. Second, from a methodological perspective, violent resistance to occupation can be measured more reliably, therefore providing a better basis for cross-case comparison.

Fourth, this definition assumes that territory is occupied as defined above. The occupier need not exercise absolute control of the territory and may in fact be invited by the occupied government. However, this distinction is important since it helps separate cases of occupation from cases of ongoing interstate war. Lastly, although I focus on resistance taking place in occupied territory,

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10 However, identifying what makes resistance successful is difficult to measure. Put simply, even if occupiers leave a territory, it is difficult to assess the counterfactual of what an occupier would have done in the absence of resistance and what role resistance played in the decision of the occupier.
I do not assume that all acts of resistance take place in the occupied territory itself. Enhancements in communication, transport, combined with the globalization of the state have increased the range of potential targets for resistance. Whereas resistance groups were once limited to occupied territory, they increasingly target citizens and assets of the occupier at home or overseas, wherever attacks will have the greatest effect and chance of success. For example, in July 2010, the Somali insurgent group Shahab conducted terrorist attacks in Kampala to coerce Uganda to withdraw African Union peacekeepers from Somalia (Kron and Ibrahim 2010).

2.5 Explaining Variation in Intensity of Resistance

The historical literature is replete with rich accounts of resistance against foreign occupation. However, systematic explanations of resistance remain few. Moreover, historical accounts of resistance tend to be biased since they focus on instances where resistance occurred rather than those instances where it did not. Put simply, there is much less interest, and indeed some embarrassment, in describing historical non-events. However, in so doing, such historical accounts overstate the prevalence of resistance. Discussion of resistance in political science, sociology, and economics, for their part, tend to be combined into assessments of either interstate or civil war. As discussed previously, conflating the study of resistance with that of interstate or civil war tends to eclipse important causal mechanisms in the generation of resistance to occupation. As a result of insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been a growing, albeit still limited, literature on resistance to occupation.

This section outlines the main theories for variation in resistance to occupation. Theories fall under three broad categories: nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context. These categories do not refer to coherent theoretical schools, but rather to types of independent variables. For each section I first outline the principal mechanisms proposed to explain resistance to occupation, and then take note of the weaknesses and critiques.
2.5.1 Nationalism

Mechanisms

Nationalism is the most conventional explanation of resistance to occupation. When I use the term nationalism in this dissertation, I am referring to civic nationalism, a form of nationalism that is based on loyalty primarily to the political institution of the state (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 52). Nationalism affects resistance in four ways. First, nationalism provides the ideological basis of political legitimacy. Second, the ideology of nationalism is perpetuated through mass schooling, providing a deeply engrained sense of loyalty. Third, the violation of this ideology provokes a potentially violent emotional response among the affected national group. Fourth, the existence of pre-defined national groups and nationalist sentiment provide partial means for overcoming collective action problems.

The basic premise of nationalism is that national and political units should be congruent (Gellner 1983, 1). Rulers are more likely to reflect the interests of their constituents when they share their distinct culture, values, and norms: in short their identity. When the principle of nationalism is violated, the feeling of anger produced is nationalist sentiment. In fact, for individuals with strong convictions, there may be real psychic costs to inaction against foreign occupation. The principle of nationalism is closely associated with that of self-determination and resistance is considered a means by which this self-determination is achieved. Nationalism also commands unique loyalty and self-sacrifice. The French writer Ernest Renan stated: “A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future” ([1882] 1990, 19). As such, nationalism provides a strong motivation to take up arms.

According to the modernist school, nationalism is a modern phenomenon that arose as a result of industrialization, democracy, and print capitalism (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991; Snyder 2000). Nationalism was not only an ideology, but also a military innovation that was harnessed by the state. As Posen (1993b) argues, following the French Revolution nationalism allowed for the “levée en masse” which vastly increased the mobilization potential of the state. Beyond sheer numbers, nationalism increased the intensity of war through a sense of collective identity and self-sacrifice. Warfare and the mass army exercised positive feedback on nationalism. National-
ism allowed for the mass army, the fraternization and hardship experienced in mass army boosted nationalism, and the glory of combat reinforced the nation. As a result, the wars at the beginning of the nationalist era were of unprecedented severity. Fierce interstate competition in Europe ensured that all Western states adopted the military innovation of nationalism.

Varying degrees of “nationalization” can translate into different levels of resistance. A core driver of nationalization is the national education system. Modernity and industrialization created the need for a more mobile, skilled, and integrated workforce. In order to achieve this, generic training such as literacy provided through a mass schooling system was required (Gellner 1983, 35). The advent of mass literacy as with other forms of mass communication fostered a shared sense of nationhood (Anderson 1991; Deutsch 1953). According to Darden (Forthcoming), this mass schooling also provides a useful explanation for variation in resistance to occupation. Fixed and durable national loyalties are instilled in a population during the first round of mass schooling. Mass schooling fosters nationalism in three ways. First mass schooling places children in a bounded and controlled environment with peers over the course of several years. Second, schooling provides literacy in the national vernacular, which further tightens individuals’ connection with a nation, its history, and its culture. Finally, schools infuse their pupils with nationalist ideology through a managed curriculum. Once these nationalist principles are put in place, according to Darden, they remain resilient across generations. Nationalized occupied populations will be more likely to undertake resistance to occupation against those governments that did not initiate the first round of mass schooling and less likely to undertake resistance against those that did. In short, mass schooling cements loyalty and nationalism towards specific governments and fosters resistance against others.

Nationalism also helps explain how individuals mobilize for collective action. It is important to remember that states rarely prepare for civilian resistance once their armies have been defeated in war. Resistance therefore requires individuals to organize absent the coercive authority of the state. Collective action, particularly when it involves great personal risk, is notoriously difficult to achieve (Olson 1965). Citizens may desire self-determination, but may be loath to assume the costs, especially if others are ready to assume them. Moreover, individuals know that resistance will be futile unless a critical mass is achieved to stand a chance of defeating the occupier (Granovetter 1978; Schelling [1978] 2006; Kuran 1991; Petersen 2001, 22-23; Wood 2003). The concept
of nationalism can help resolve these twin collective action problems. First, nationalism provides the normative basis to impose social sanctions. If national self-determination is virtuous, then defending the nation is heroic, just as failing to defend it is cowardly. These social sanctions provide the selective incentives (praise, shame) necessary to spur collective action. Similarly, some of the strongest norms and sanctions are reserved for those who betray their nation. Treason is punishable by death, so can collaboration with foreign occupiers (Hechter 2009, 290). Nationalism as an ideology also reduces the moral, psychological, and social costs of killing (Darden Forthcoming).

Second, nationalism helps coordinate collective action. If the nation is a defined population, if nationalist resistance is promoted through social sanction as described above, and if individuals are aware of the previous two assumptions, then they will have greater confidence that sufficient collective action will be achieved (Liberman 1996, 23). At a minimum, co-nationals may supply the information, food, and shelter necessary to conduct guerrilla warfare. Overall, nationalism provides both the necessary motivation and the coordination for resistance.

Nationalism provides a compelling explanation for resistance. First, nationalism figures prominently in historical accounts of resistance and personal views of resisters. For example, in 1920: “Resistance movements emerged in various parts of the Syrian countryside on the eve of the French occupation... nationalist feelings and ideas were on the rise all over the country” (Provence 2005, 48). Over eighty years later in neighboring Iraq, an resister explained his participation in the anti-American insurgency: “We do not want to see our country occupied by forces clearly pursuing their own interests, rather than being poised to return Iraq to the Iraqis” (Hashim 2005, 100). Second, nationalist themes permeate resistance messages. In Soviet occupied Latvia, resistance leaders called upon former Latvian soldiers to “Uphold your holy obligations towards the freedom and independence of our fatherland” (Swain 2007, 206). Third, the names of resistance groups such as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army, the Luxembourgian Patriot League, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, and the Korean Patriot Legion, among many others, provide some indication of nationalist aspirations. Fourth, resistance fighters are principally drawn from occupied national groups as opposed to non-occupied national groups, even in conflicts that involve some foreign fighters.

According to nationalist theory, resistance is a predictable—if not inevitable—result of occu-
Occupation. Resistance has been likened to an “antibody response” against foreign troops in the host country (Kilcullen 2009, 285). The rise of nationalism in the modern world helps explain why outright conquest has become increasingly rare.\textsuperscript{11} Nationalism bolstered the will of states to resist foreign domination, and therefore increased the cost of occupation and annexation. As Knorr (1975, 112) points out, “the French required only thirty thousand men to subdue Algeria in 1830. In 1962, they could not subdue her with a force twenty times as large.” Obviously, the nationalist rejection of foreign rule presents a dilemma for occupiers. According to Edelstein (2004, 50-51) successful occupations can only succeed if they are lengthy. However, lengthier occupations tend to provoke greater nationalist backlash, thereby reducing their likelihood of success. Furthermore, efforts to quash resistance only inflame nationalist sentiment, drawing occupiers into a spiral of repression and revenge. For these reasons, nationalist theory is generally pessimistic regarding the likelihood of peaceful occupations.

Criticism of Nationalist Theories of Resistance

This section outlines some of the main criticisms of the nationalist account for resistance to occupation. First, nationalist theory greatly over-predicts the intensity of resistance. According to the theory, nationalist sentiment is enflamed when the national and the political are not congruent. However, the vast majority of occupations generate little resistance. Resistance to occupation is the exception, not the rule, presenting a major anomaly for nationalist theory. Even controlling for the strength of occupying forces vis-à-vis the local population, we tend to observe far less resistance than nationalist theory would predict.\textsuperscript{12}

Second, most occupations not only fail to generate resistance, but elicit the active—sometimes enthusiastic—collaboration of some members of the local population. Occupied France provides a number of examples. In July 1942, the nominally independent Vichy government planned and

\textsuperscript{11}A number of factors aside from nationalism have also contributed to the decreasing appeal of conquest, such as the declining value of land as a factor of production in modern society, the increase in economic interdependence and global production which made conquest less appealing and more disruptive to normal trade patterns, the rise of knowledge-based economies, the growing liberal norm against conquest, and globalization which has provided access to technology that facilitates resistance (Van Evera 1990/1991; Liberman 1996; Brooks 1999; Fazal 2007). Posen (1993b) argues to the contrary that through the mass army, nationalism has made conquest more likely.

\textsuperscript{12}Conversely, the pre-nationalist era saw several groups resisting occupation, such as the Jews under the Zealots against Roman rule, the Scots under William Wallace against British rule, the Shawnee Native Americans under Tecumseh against American rule, and the Dutch under William of Orange against Spanish occupation.
executed the *Vélo­drome d’Hiver* roundup by its own initiative, which arrested over 13,000 French Jews, interned them in squalid conditions, and shipped many to concentration camps (Marrus and Paxton 1995). In December 1942, French Prime Minister Pierre Laval stated: “Victory for Germany will save our civilization from sinking into communism.” The French automotive magnate Louis Renault regularly asked German occupiers for more orders: “My will is to give you material of the best possible quality, given our metal supply. We will make everything that you want” (Liberman 1996, 59, 63). Nationalists may call inaction cowardice, and collaboration treachery, but nationalist theory fails to provide an account for widespread collaboration in occupied societies.

Third, nationalist theories fail to predict the location of resistance. Indeed, there is much cross-national variation in resistance to occupation. If resistance is a natural reflex to foreign occupation, why do we see so much cross-national variation? Why was the UN occupation of Somalia so bloody and its occupation of Haiti so peaceful? Similarly, nationalist theories of resistance fail to account for sub-national variation in resistance within countries. Why did the US face stiff resistance in the so-called Sunni triangle but not in Iraqi Kurdistan? After all, even in considering ethnic nationalism, both groups were being ruled by foreigners. Nationalism theory fails to explain temporal variation in resistance to the same occupation. If we consider nationalism to be a constant, this variation in resistance is puzzling.

Fourth, the mobilizing and coordinating functions of nationalism are not unique and therefore not necessary conditions for mobilization. Political ideology and religion can provide the impetus for action and justifications for violence. As is clear in the civil war literature, they can construct powerful peer groups that provide the selective incentives to overcome collective action problems. Therefore, there is nothing unique to nationalism regarding the potential to overcome collective action problems and to incite violence. Furthermore, nationalist explanations of resistance may be confusing the cause of resistance with its effect. For instance, political entrepreneurs may drum up nationalism in order to mobilize individuals to their cause. As Mansfield and Snyder (1995) observe in the context of democratic transitions, elites sometimes use nationalist appeals in order to compete for votes and mass support. Alternatively, non-nationalist resistance from segments of the occupied population could generate indiscriminate retaliation from an occupier. The process of violence may polarize and heighten nationalist sentiment, a process often seen in ethnic civil wars (Kaufman 1996). While nationalism may be an instrument or an end result of mobilization
and violence, it is not in and of itself the cause of resistance to occupation.

Lastly, the concepts of nation and nationalism remain ill-defined (for a review of the debate see Smith 2001). Particularly problematic for nationalist theories of resistance is the distinction between civic nationalism (loyalty to the state, often called patriotism) and ethnic nationalism (loyalty to the ethnic group). Nationalist theories of resistance do not specify which conception of the nation they refer to, and generally employ both. This distinction is important as it may lead to contradictory predictions regarding resistance to occupation. Civic nationalism would predict resistance to all foreign occupation, whereas ethnic nationalism (insofar as there is more than one ethnic group in a state) would not necessarily predict resistance if occupation strengthens the position of one ethnic group vis-à-vis another within a state. Indeed, unitary nation-states are extremely rare and occupiers frequently use divide and conquer strategies to control populations (Tilly 1992, 3).

2.5.2 Opportunity Structures

Mechanisms

A second type of explanation of resistance to occupation is what I term “opportunity structures.” These explanations emerged principally in the civil war literature as a reaction to grievance-based explanations of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Opportunity structures explanations follow a broadly rationalist approach: nationalism may provide an ideological impetus to fight occupation, but those fighting are rational individuals who are sensitive to the costs and benefits of resistance. Opportunity structures explains resistance by highlighting the military, social, economic, and geographic factors that hinder or facilitate mobilization and combat.

First, military factors can explain the likelihood of resistance. Occupiers may be able to deter resistance by deploying a larger number of troops in occupied territory or undertaking other shows of force.\(^{13}\) For example, after the surrender of Japan in 1945, there was a steady stream of

\(^{13}\)Note that opportunity structure and nationalist theories of resistance to occupation reach contradictory predictions regarding the effects of troops in occupied territory. Opportunity structure theory predicts that large deployments of troops are more likely to deter resistance to occupation whereas nationalist theorist would predict large numbers of troops to inflame nationalist sentiment.
B-29 bombers flying over Japan. According to the Air Staff of the US Army Air Force (AAF): “A major mission of the AAF is a display of force for the continued intimidation of the Japanese during the interim from their capitulation until the actual arrival of the occupation forces” (Willard-Foster 2009, 50). Similarly, facing Soviet occupation, a Latvian recalled: “Friends say come to the forest, the British and Americans are coming; but I say: you know, dear friends, real friends, if the German Army could not stand up to the Red Army, you with your rifles in the forests never will” (Swain 2007, 195). Nationalists in the occupied populations may be ideologically opposed to foreign occupation but they are usually not suicidal and will refrain from resistance when faced with strong opposition. The general level of risk will be a function of the troop-to-population and troop-to-area ratios. Assuming the local population is sympathetic to the resistance struggle, a larger population provides the human cover for insurgency as well as a greater recruitment pool for resistance (Mao [1937] 2000). The larger the population, the less likely it will be that a member of a resistance group will be caught and punished by the occupier. Conversely large troop-to-population ratios increase the ability of the occupying forces to deter and defeat resistance by gathering intelligence, providing security to the local population, covering terrain, and responding to attacks in a timely fashion. Consequently some analysts have recommended a minimum number of troops necessary to police occupied territory (Quinlivan 1996). While recognizing that no force level guarantees victory for either side, the US Counterinsurgency Field Manual recommends some 20 to 25 counterinsurgents per thousand civilians (US Army 2007, 23).

In anticipation of defeat and occupation, some governments have sought to actively shape opportunity structures to enable resistance. The most common method for ensuring resistance is military service, which trains (usually male) citizens in warfare. For example, during the Cold War, Singapore adopted a “poison shrimp” defense strategy: while it could easily be overrun, the population would be trained to expel the occupier (Tan 1999). During the First World War, the Serbian government trained “Komitadjis” or guerrilla fighters to continue the fight should they be defeated by Austro-Hungarian forces (Gumz 2009, 21). Similarly, with impending defeat in March 2003, the government of Saddam Hussein opened its arms caches to equip insurgents (Ricks 2006, 14).

For a counterpoint see Friedman 2011.

Interestingly, despite government-sponsored resistance, there is no case since 1900 of an individual leaders ousted through occupation regaining power through resistance alone.
Switzerland epitomizes this institutionalized approach to citizen resistance. Prior to the First World War, US General George Wingate observed: “Switzerland has no regular army, but depends for defense on her riflemen. Though poor, she spends annually large amounts in developing them, both in and out of the schools. Out of a population of but three million —less than that of the City of New York in 1904— she had 3,656 rifle clubs with a membership of 218,815.” When queried by German Kaiser Wilhelm II what Switzerland’s quarter-million man force would do when faced with an invasion of half a million Germans, a Swiss militiaman replied “Shoot twice” (Halbrook 2003, 18). As late as the 1970s, Switzerland launched “Project 26,” which involved a stay-behind army of 2,000 resistance fighters trained to wage guerrilla warfare in the event of a Soviet invasion (Grimes 2011).

Second, foreign sanctuary and support can facilitate resistance struggles. Foreign occupations frequently affect the balance of power between states. Whether to dislodge rivals from occupied strategic territory or to simply bleed them white, foreign states may retaliate by fomenting resistance in occupied territory. Foreign support for self-determination serves as a shrewd cover for the application of the balance of power, without assuming risk or courting full-blown retaliation. This strategy is also commonly used in civil wars and insurgencies, sometimes as an alternative to occupation itself (Salehyan 2007, 2008, 2009). Foreign support for resistance can range from direct combat, to supplying and training local resisters, to providing cross-border sanctuary. Aside from proxy warfare, outside support can serve to further other goals such as prestige, support for coreligionists or co-ethnics, and regional influence, which are independent of foreign occupation (Byman et al. 2001).

Examples of such outside support include Syrian and Iranian support for Hezbollah against Israel in South Lebanon, US and Pakistani support for the Mujihadeen against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Iranian support for the Mahdi Army against the US in Iraq, and Soviet deployment of partisans joining resistance groups against Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe. The Special Operations Executive (SOE) during the Second World War provides one of the most sophisticated examples of proxy warfare through resistance. The SOE was created by Churchill to “set Europe ablaze” by supporting local resistance movements and opening an internal front against Germany, which would divert its resources from attacks against the UK (Hastings 2010, 364). The efforts of the SOE went beyond harassment of the enemy, however. During Operation Gunnerside
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in the winter of 1942-1943, the SOE, in tandem with Norwegian resisters, successfully sabotaged a heavy water plant, crucially setting back German efforts at manufacturing nuclear weapons (Rhodes 1986; Gallagher 2002).

Third, geographic features of occupied territory such as configuration, terrain, and international borders can enable resistance (Galula [1964] 2006, 23-24). Territory that is highly “compartmentalized” by barriers such as deserts and oceans makes it easier for occupiers to seal off and defeat resistance. Several studies have found that “rough terrain” affects the likelihood of insurgency (Buhaug and Gates 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), though this effect is not consistent across studies (Lyall 2009a). Some of the most renowned resistance groups such as the French Maquisard and the Baltic Forest Brothers are named after the terrain that facilitated their struggles. In occupied Greece, Marxist resisters formed what was known as the “Mountain Government,” named after the mountains where the resistance group was based (DeRouen 2007, 370). Rough terrain, including mountains and forests, provide cover for irregular forces. Mountains can be defended more easily and with smaller forces (Guevara [1968] 1998). Rough terrain also narrows the advantage of conventional militaries by making it more difficult to maneuver and project force with heavy military equipment. Lastly, international land borders can facilitate resistance by providing logistical supply routes and safe havens for resistance groups.

Fourth, economic conditions in the occupied state may also affect the propensity of resistance to occupation. A number of studies have identified poverty as one of the most important predictors of insurgency and rebellion. However, the nature and direction of the causality remains contested (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Levels of economic development and prosperity in the occupied population can have a number of effects on their propensity to take up arms against occupiers. Low levels of economic development reduce the opportunity cost of taking up arms. Insurgency is generally considered to be a full-time occupation. Resistance activity requires individuals to take time away from other productive activities and the risk involved in resistance may compromise future income. Income foregone will be higher in richer states, therefore increasing the opportunity cost of fighting. The correlation between income and life expectancy further magnifies the opportunity cost of taking up arms, as richer individuals are risking larger income streams over a longer period of time. There may be convergence between geographic and economic explanations of insur-
eas tend to have rougher terrain, and insurgencies tend to be fought on rough terrain (Kalyvas 2006, 423). Recent scholarship has sought to test economic arguments of insurgency looking at micro-level data. Hanson, Iyengar, and Monten (2009) found that labor-intensive reconstruction projects in occupied Iraq reduced insurgent incidents by sapping the labor pool available to insurgent organizations and by improving outside options for potential recruits. However, Berman et al. (2011) found that rising unemployment did not have a significant effect on insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the Philippines. Edelstein (2004, 60) argues that when occupied territory has been devastated by interstate war, the occupied population is more likely to accept the occupation as a necessary evil. Indeed, without the help of occupiers, those countries would not be able to rebuild. Lastly, Liberman (1996) notes that the economic division of labor is greater in wealthier industrialized societies. This division of labor makes society as a whole more productive, but individuals less self-sufficient. As a result individuals in modern industrialized societies are more vulnerable to occupier pressure, and therefore less likely to resist occupation. In addition, because economic modernization is strongly correlated with urbanization, and because density increases the ability of the occupier to monitor and control populations, economic development can weaken resistance.

Fourth, increasing scholarship has focused on the effects of social structure and social cohesion on rebel mobilization. In an extensive study of resistance to occupation in Eastern Europe, Petersen (2001) argues variation in the structure and cohesion of communities helps explain variation in rebellion. Petersen conceptualizes resistance on a spectrum ranging from collaboration to neutrality to unorganized resistance to organized resistance and finally to violent rebellion. Most individuals start off as neutral. Resentment against occupation, often triggered by changes in the status of a group within occupied society, might push the group’s members towards resistance. However, such resistance is fraught with risk. In addition, political parties, freedom of association, and travel are frequently restricted during occupation, complicating mobilization. If mobilization is detected by the occupier, occupiers may mete severe punishment on resisters and their communities. Potential resisters must invest an incredible amount of trust in co-conspirators they may have never met. Lastly, the fewer the number of resisters, the greater the risk to those who choose to resist, so achieving a critical mass is essential.

Drawing on the work of Taylor (1988), Petersen argues that tight-knit communities are essen-
tial in moving individuals along the spectrum towards resistance, and – critically – to sustaining them once they have committed to rebellion. Tight-knit communities are better able to cope with the risks of recruitment through trust built into long-standing social interactions. Indeed, individuals are less likely to join an organization with people they don’t know or haven’t met. Additionally, tight-knit communities are better able to administer status rewards in order to incentivize individuals to undertake and sustain resistance to occupation. Simply put, the judgment of close peers, with whom one has shared values and experiences, and is to have iterated interactions in the future, weighs more than the judgment of strangers. Similarly, tight-knit communities are better able to leverage norms of reciprocity. Individuals carry out sacrifices with the expectation or reciprocal benefits in the future. The familiarity bred in close communities also helps overcome threshold collective action problems. Individuals need assurances that they will not be the only ones to rebel, especially when rebellion requires a minimum threshold to succeed. Intimate knowledge of the community, and community-specific signaling mechanisms, help individuals gauge the likelihood of community mobilization and to coordinate on collective action. Tight-knit communities are better able to threaten to retaliate against informants and collaborators with the occupier. Aside from being more attached to the community, collaborators know they are being watched. Petersen concludes by asserting that strong communities – those with direct relations between members, many-sided social economic and cultural relations, reciprocity, rough equality of material conditions, and a common set of values and beliefs – are better able to mobilize active resistance to occupation. Weak communities, in contrast, will at best be able to mobilize passive resistance to occupation.

Petersen’s findings in Eastern Europe have been echoed in studies in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Examining the causes of large-scale violent Christian-Muslim riots in northern Nigeria, Scacco (2008) discovered that economic grievances were not sufficient to trigger the participation of individuals. Rather, she found that it is the interaction between grievances and membership in certain types of neighborhood-level social networks that made rioting more likely. In a survey of Palestinians in the West Bank, Argo (2009) noted that professed willingness to participate in rebellion, especially violent rebellion, is positively correlated with communal orientation and negatively correlated with self-enhancement values. Moreover, some individuals were primarily motivated by norms of reciprocity. In her study of insurgency in El Salvador, Wood (2003)
found that community shaped individuals’ political culture. She stresses how the peasants who joined the insurgency “came to interpret insurgency as justified by the injustice of existing social relations and state violence, and to interpret its costs, even the highest of them, as meaningful sacrifices” (Wood 2003, 225).

Petersen’s argument on social structure also ties to a much larger literature that posits that ethnic diversity inhibits collective action and the provision of public goods (Alesina et al. 1999; Miguel and Gugerty 2005). Ethnic diversity undermines collective action through three broad mechanisms: preferences, communication and coordination, and enforcement. Co-ethnics are more likely to share preferences and to take each other’s welfare into account. Co-ethnics are also better able to communicate and work together, partly through common culture and partly through a longer history of cooperation. Lastly, because of better monitoring and a long shadow of the future, co-ethnics are better able to enforce cooperation amongst themselves (Habyarimana et al. 2007, 2009; Fearon and Laitin 1996).

**Criticism of Opportunity Structure Theories of Resistance**

This section outlines some of the main criticisms of the opportunity structure explanations of resistance to occupation. First, while opportunity structure explanations can better address spatial variation in resistance to occupation, they provide weak explanations for temporal variation. Many of the factors highlighted in the literature change very slowly (general levels of income, community structure) or not at all (geography). Without temporal variation in the independent variable, such factors cannot explain the observed differences in the dependent variable of resistance. Moreover, for the case of community structure, showing that actors mobilized through a community network does not account for variation of resistance to occupation since networks are ubiquitous. As Darden (2008, 12) jokes: “If the implicit null hypothesis is that those who unite in an armed insurgency are friendless and without family or communal bonds, it is not surprising that the network explanations outperform.”

Second, social structure explanations of resistance suffer from endogeneity and selection is-

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16National liberation, it could be argued, is a public good insofar as it is nonrival and non-excludable. Once a foreign occupier has left, all members of the occupied community are freed, regardless of their contribution to resistance.

17i.e. temporal variation in resistance within a single spell of occupation or variation in resistance across different spells of occupations in the same country.
sues. For example, there may be some self-selection in the formation of community organizations. More nationalist individuals may be more likely to join community organizations, a reasonable assumption given their ideological attachment to those communities, and therefore be more likely to take up arms against foreign occupiers. It would therefore be nationalism, not community structure, which accounts for the intensity of resistance to occupation. The community organizations often used to identify network density would be consequences, rather than causes, of nationalism (Darden 2008, 26). Alternatively, as Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) note, some of the factors commonly associated with insurgency, such as poverty, may simply indicate individual’s propensity to be manipulated by elites. Therefore it is difficult to ascertain whether these factors increase grievances, enable resistance, or simply facilitate political manipulation.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, military, geographic, and economic factors do not cause resistance directly. Occupied populations won’t initiate resistance simply because they are armed or poor, or because they live around high mountains and thick vegetation. Opportunity structures are at best enablers or facilitators, not motivators or drivers, of resistance. The same goes for social structures. Without some motivation, whether greed, grievance, or something else entirely, it is hard to see how such factors provide a direct impetus for resistance. Of course, it is possible that these factors work in tandem: nationalism providing the ideological impetus for resistance and opportunity structures moderating how much resistance is actually observed. Yet even this multi-causal explanation would fail to explain why the same country exhibits variation in resistance to different occupiers.

2.5.3 International Context

Mechanisms

A third type of explanation of resistance to occupation falls under what can be termed international context. According to Edelstein (2004, 2008a), occupations will be successful if there is recognition by the occupying power and the occupied population of a common threat to the occupied territory. Under such circumstances, the occupier will have an incentive to offer protection to a territory where it has invested significant resources and the occupied population will value such protection. Occupied populations are pragmatic: they would prefer not to be ruled by for-
eigners but they also consider the alternatives to occupation. If occupiers seem like the lesser evil, they will accept occupation at least temporarily. Thus occupied states which face greater threats from third states will be less likely to generate resistance whereas those that do not perceive such threats are more likely to generate resistance. In this sense, Edelstein’s theory draws much from Realist International Relations theory, specifically Walt’s (1987) balance of threat theory of alliance formation. Following Edelstein’s (restrictive) definition of occupation, six out of seven occupations facing a common external threat between 1815 and 2003 ended in success, compared with one in 11 occupations that faced no such threat (Edelstein 2004, 66).

For example, East Timor accepted direct UN administration including the deployment of UN troops on its territory between 1999 and 2002 as protection against reinvasion by Indonesia. As Kilkullen writes: “Indeed, to the extent that there was a backlash against intervention in East Timor, it was directed at the initial 1975 intervention by the Indonesian government, which most East Timorese always had seen as a foreign external actor” (2009, 206). Likewise, the USSR encountered relatively little resistance after it invaded and annexed Armenia in 1920. Faced with ongoing war with Azerbaijan and Georgia and the prospect of Turkish invasion (less than a decade after the Armenian genocide), Soviet occupation provided Armenians with a protection of sorts. According to Edelstein, a principal reason for why West Germany and Japan accepted large-scale and long-term American occupation was the fear of Soviet invasion. In contrast, the US occupation of Haiti between 1915 and 1934 failed because Haiti faced few commonly agreed external threats.\(^\text{18}\)

**Criticism of International Context Theories of Resistance**

Edelstein has made a valuable addition to the literature on resistance to occupation, by importing key concepts from the International Relations literature. The external threat hypothesis is not without some major drawbacks, however. First, external threats are rarely self-evident. Different segments of the occupied population may perceive foreign threats differently. Moreover, different segments of the occupied population may perceive internal threats to be graver than external threats. Constructivists would argue that occupiers deliberately manipulate threat perception in

\(^{18}\)Edelstein’s focus is not on resistance, but on the success or failure of occupation. However, resistance is frequently a cause of occupation failure.
order to gain the support of the occupied (Desch 2008, 865). Edelstein himself notes:

“My book relies heavily on a structural notion of threat…Future research might in-
vestigate further how threat perceptions evolve within societies, how elite perceptions
might differ from the masses, and how occupying powers might manipulate those
threat perceptions and promote certain elites over others based on those perceptions”
(Edelstein 2008b).

Worse still, occupied territory may become more threatened precisely because of the presence of an occupier that is a rival to a third party.

Second, there is an identification problem in examining the effect of external threat. Specif-
ically, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of external threats from the effect of deterrence in
occupied territory because occupiers are more likely to place troops in territory that is deemed
threatened by a third-party. Deployed troops serve double duty deterring internal and external
challengers to occupied territory. The finding that states facing large external threats are less likely
to resist may simply be picking up this deterrent effect.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter sought to frame the broad themes of resistance to occupation. I began by explaining
the puzzle of resistance and noting that resistance to occupation is a distinct form of political
violence from interstate and civil wars. I then laid out a definition and typology of occupation and
provided a basic theory to explain variation in types of occupation. Indeed, states will undertake
different types of occupation based on their perception of the root causes of their conflict with the
occupied state and the latter’s ability to credibly commit to certain outcomes. Next, I outlined a
definition of resistance. I then took note of the varying schools of thought to explain variation
in resistance: nationalism, opportunity structure, and international context. While these theories
provides rich accounts of resistance, I noted that they fail to explain much cross and subnational
variation in resistance to occupation. Notably, mainstream nationalist theories of resistance to
occupation grossly over-predict the intensity of resistance. The next chapter seeks to improve
explanations of resistance by looking at key aspects of occupation policy, specifically political
dislocation and trust.
Chapter 3

Political Dislocation, Trust, and Resistance to Occupation

"Taking initiative in introducing a new form of government is very difficult and dangerous, and unlikely to succeed. The reason is that all those who profit from the old order will be opposed to the innovator, whereas all the who might benefit from the new order are, at best, tepid supporters of him."

-Machiavelli, The Prince

3.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces a theory to explain resistance to occupation. The underlying premise of this theory is that resistance to occupation is irrational under most circumstances. Resistance is risky and occupation is usually temporary. So why fight? I argue that two factors may incite segments of the occupied population to resist occupation, namely political dislocation and a breakdown in trust.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I lay out three propositions to argue that resistance is generally not a rational strategy against occupation. Second, I argue resistance may become rational when some of these propositions are challenged. Specifically, I posit that resistance may occur

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when occupiers cause political dislocation, especially when it spurs competition among domestic factions of the occupied population. Therefore strategies of indigenous rule and population security are likely to mitigate the risk of resistance caused by political dislocation. Third, I argue that resistance may occur when there is a breakdown in trust between the occupier and the occupied. This breakdown in trust may be caused by the victimization of the occupied population or by the failure of occupiers to credibly commit to treating the occupied population benignly and vacating occupied territory promptly. Democracies, international organizations, and occupiers with religious affinities are less likely to face resistance because they are better able to overcome these credible commitment issues.

3.2 Propositions

The theory starts with three propositions. First, resistance is a tremendously risky activity. Individuals partaking in resistance can be arrested, abused, injured, or killed. Under the law of occupation, attacks on occupiers are considered “war treason,” usually punishable by execution. Resisters are not always afforded the protections allowed to belligerents under the laws of armed conflict (Stirk 2009, 129, 131). To make things worse, most individuals are poorly disposed to committing acts of violence (such as resistance), even within the context of trained armies. As Collins (2009) notes, cowardice and incompetence in acts of violence are more prevalent than is often acknowledged. Worse still, resistance can endanger the family and community of resisters because occupiers may resort to collective punishment. For instance, Israel closed borders, set up checkpoints, and imposed curfews on towns in the West Bank in response to the Palestinian Intifadas, causing tremendous economic hardship on the whole population. Far more brutally, Germany implemented a policy whereby ten civilians were executed for every one German soldier killed in attacks in occupied territory (Slim 2008, 145). As Hitler stated regarding the Partisan movement: “I want to fight the terror of sabotage and attacks...with exactly the same weapons...” (Macksey 1975, 11). In Poland, sporadic resistance by Jews and Poles induced the SS to accelerate “liquidation” programs. Resistance can also be counterproductive by spurring the occupier to further restrict the sovereignty of the occupied state. Thus, resistance may weaken rather than strengthen sovereignty. For example, following the German invasion of the Netherlands in 1940,
former Prime Minister Henrij Colijn saw collaboration as the only way to maintain some semblance of independence (Hirschfeld 1981, 472). Risk aside, resistance is also costly. In addition to the opportunity cost of rebellion, resistance groups incur costs to mobilize, sustain, and arm combatants. If resistance is a risky activity that imposes costs on the resisters and their community, why partake in resistance? At a minimum, if we consider national liberation to be a public good, why do individuals not just free ride on the efforts of others?

Second, occupation is usually a temporary phenomenon. This is a crucial distinction between occupation and other asymmetric conflict such as civil wars, where belligerents on both sides remain in the same country in the aftermath of war. Occupation is considered temporary under international law because sovereignty is merely suspended, not extinguished (Stirk 2009, 154). Under Article 43 the 1907 Hague Convention, occupiers are required to adhere to the laws in place in occupied territory “unless absolutely prevented” (ICRC 2010). In other words, occupiers must respect the domestic status quo. Moreover, under Article 45 occupiers are prohibited from forcing the occupied population to take an oath to the hostile power. Temporary occupation is not merely a fiction of international law. As seen in Figure 3.1 (a), the median occupation between 1900 and 2010 lasted 51 months. More importantly, as seen in Figure 3.1 (b), resistance is not associated with a decrease in occupation duration. Resistance can in fact have the opposite effect, by pushing occupiers to steel their resolve and redouble efforts in order to save face and recoup sunk costs (Edelstein 2004, 2008a). Indeed, occupiers may worry that conceding to resistance will weaken their reputation, and the credibility of their commitments over the long term (Schelling [1966] 2008; Walter 2009). Why then do individuals assume great risk to themselves and to their communities in order to reach a goal that can usually be achieved without resistance?

Third, there is sometimes no difference in the quality of governance between occupiers and the local governments that precede them. For all its faults, the US-run Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq was far less bloody and far more transparent than the regime of Saddam Hussein. Whether under the rule of the Serbian House of Karadjordjevic or the occupation of the Austro-Hungarian House of Habsburg-Lorraine, Serbia was not a democracy between 1914 and 1918. If government is not run by the people why then should it matter who the people in govern-

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2The positive correlation between resistance and occupation duration is, of course, complex and potentially endogenous. Resistance may emerge in those cases where occupiers refuse to leave.
ment are, even temporarily? For most history, empires were run by rulers who were ethnically or linguistically different from the majority of their subjects (Tilly 1992, 3; Hechter 2009a, 292). These multinational empires are not simply vestiges of the pre-national era. Many modern states are composites of different nationalities, with separatism being a common trait of contemporary International Relations (Fearon 2004; Fazal and Griffiths 2008; Coggins 2011). A study of Acehnese separatism reminds us: “Indonesia is seen as a purely artificial entity — no more than a Javanese colonial empire enslaving the different peoples of the archipelago whose only common denominator was that they had all been colonized by the Dutch” (Schulze 2004, 7). According to Hechter “this antipathy to alien rule is inconsistent with the logic of modern forms of social organization. At least in principle, the office holders in modern states are supposed to be selected on the basis of their competence rather than their identity” (2010, 402). Yet, resistance often emerges against occupations that have no discernable effect on the quality of local governance. In fact, resistance may emerge in occupations that replace repressive autocracies with democracies.

What these propositions suggest is that under most circumstances resistance is futile. If resistance against occupation is a historical exception rather than the norm, it is because resistance is not rational. Rather, strategies of passive neutrality such as fence-sitting or attentisme should be
preferable. But occasionally, we do see resistance. Why is this the case? I argue that resistance is more likely to emerge once these propositions fail due to political dislocation and a breakdown in trust.

3.3 Political Dislocation

The first mechanism for resistance is what I call political dislocation. Recall that resistance to occupation is irrational when resistance is dangerous, occupations are temporary and benign, and when occupiers are no worse than existing forms of government. However, occupation will not be seen as temporary or benign when occupiers seek to alter the domestic balance of power in occupied territory.

3.3.1 Dislocation

When occupiers enter states, they willingly or not wade into its domestic politics. The population of occupied states is not single or unitary but potentially riven by tribal, ethnic, religious, political, or ideological divisions. Such groups may perceive the occupation differently, depending on how it affects their interests and their relative power. When occupied societies are highly polarized, occupation may come to be seen in zero-sum terms. This is most obviously the case in foreign interventions into civil wars. Edelstein points out that “some internal groups may value the occupation as protection against other ethnic or religious groups, but others will view the occupation as an impediment to the achievement of their goals” (2004, 64). Nationalist theories of resistance assume that social groups will put disagreements aside in order to fight foreign occupiers, regardless of the distributional consequences of occupation and resistance. Nationalist theories also assume that the primary and most powerful form of attachment as well as the prime driver for action is the nation, as opposed to sub- or transnational identities. However, individuals may come to view the meaning of occupation through the prism of their primary social groups. In fact, when domestic cleavages are salient, groups may fear each other as much as they fear occupiers.

The central argument of political dislocation is the following: occupiers are more likely to face resistance the greater they disrupt the balance of political power in occupied societies. Political dislocation can involve ousting local or national leaders, changing laws or constitutions, altering the
mechanisms for selecting leaders, or undertaking economic reforms that affect the distribution of wealth. There is also great variation in the scale of political dislocation, from the demilitarization of a region, to constitutional reform, all the way up to annexation. In some cases dislocation is a deliberate strategy of occupiers. For example, the US occupied Grenada in 1983 to depose Hudson Austin’s military government. In other instances, political dislocation is incidental. For example, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) intervened in the civil war in Sierra Leone in 1997 and facilitated elections that brought new leaders to power. The initial purpose of intervention was to end civil war rather than put in place specific leaders. In other cases still, political dislocation is both deliberate and incidental. When the US invaded Iraq in 2003, it deposed Saddam Hussein, who was seen as a threat to US security. In deposing Saddam, however, the US also dislocated the clans, tribes, and religious groups which the US did not necessarily oppose but whose power and status were derived from Saddam’s leadership. According to Ricks (2006), the Coalition Provisional Authority then carried out three catastrophic blunders. First, the CPA ordered the de-Baathification of the Iraqi civil service, which put up to 85,000 individuals out of work. Second, it dissolved the Iraqi armed forces, which created unemployment, anger, and resentment among men with military training. Third, the US undertook rapid shock therapy toward a market economy, which alienated Iraq’s middle class. The result of the intentional and accidental political dislocation was to create resentment against the occupation.

According to Petersen (2001, 33-35), political dislocation is provocative because it reorders the political-social hierarchy of occupied societies. This reordering of hierarchies generates resentment, with the specific type of reordering affecting the direction and intensity of this resentment. Resentment will be produced when occupiers place themselves above the majority group in the social hierarchy of occupied society. Resentment will be further exacerbated if the occupied places a former minority in power in occupied society. The resentment caused by political dislocation then causes anger, which according to Petersen makes individuals more risk accepting. Likewise, Galula ([1964] 2006, 14) argued that leaders of insurgents come from the “rejected elite.” Such elites are better educated from the rest of the population and have aspirations to power that remain unfulfilled through the existing political system (Byman 2007, 6). For instance, in US-occupied Iraq a Sunni noted: “We were on top of the system. We had dreams. Now we are the losers. We lost our positions, our status, the security of our families, stability. Curse the Ameri-
cans” (Allawi 2007, 240).

When occupiers undertake political dislocation, particularly when they reform political institutions in a way that permanently marginalizes certain segments of the population, they also create incentives for those groups to act rather than wait. Political dislocation creates a window of opportunity for communities to act in order to avert future losses. Occupation may be temporary but reforms make its effects permanent. There are parallels to occupation, dislocation, and resistance in the realm of economics. For example, racism and xenophobia are more likely among those groups losing economic opportunities from perceived outsiders, particularly those outsiders that are clearly identifiable (Wimmer 2002).

Implicit in dislocation theory is an assumption that domestic political orders can be resilient to exogenous shock. Domestic political orders are maintained through a ruling coalition’s demographic weight, as well as its access to resources (to buy off opponents) and means of violence (to suppress them). When political orders reflect the distribution of such resources, they tend to be stable. When a disconnect emerges between resources available to the ruling coalition and the policies being implemented, civil strife is likely until a new equilibrium is reached. The political equilibrium in place within a state may not always suit the interests of the occupier. In fact, it is often precisely because the equilibrium is at odds with the interests of the occupier that invasion and political dislocation might be deemed necessary. When foreign occupiers undertake political dislocation, they threaten or weaken a ruling coalition’s access to resources or capacity for violence. In the cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide, they may also affect the ruling coalition’s demographic weight. However, unless the capabilities of the coalition are permanently weakened (in other words, the political reforms implemented by occupiers accurately reflect the new political equilibrium), greater political dislocation will increase the risk of resistance to occupation as disenfranchised groups challenge the policies of the occupiers. The real challenge for occupiers is to establish a domestic political equilibrium in occupied societies that both reflects the interests of the occupier and is self-sustaining once occupiers and their capabilities are withdrawn.

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3I am grateful to Jack Snyder for this observation.

4Political dislocation theory is distinct from balance of power theory in International Relations theory. Political dislocation theory posits that resistance is likely when there is a major disruption to the domestic balance of power. It does not refer to the propensity of certain groups to challenge the hegemonic interests of other domestic groups, unless of course, they do not reflect the domestic distribution of resources.
Viewed from the perspective of political dislocation, the goal of resistance is not necessarily to evict the occupier. Instead, resisters may seek to halt or reverse political reforms that are seen as detrimental to the social group. In other words, political dislocation sees resistance groups as much more pragmatic in their calculation. Violent resistance is simply a form of coercive bargaining to protect interests. This provides a major difference between the prediction of nationalist theory and political dislocation theory. According to nationalist theory resistance will not cease until the occupier has left occupied territory. According to political dislocation theory, resistance is more likely to cease once the desired change in occupier policy has been achieved.

Findings in the domain of psychology, microeconomics, and sociology help explain how political dislocation increases the likelihood of resistance. Political dislocation is a perceived negative shift in power compared to the status quo. Sociological theories of emotions explain that negative emotions are likely to be aroused following loss of power and prestige. When leaders can point to a specific group or individuals for the downgrading of their prestige, anger and resentment increase and individuals become more willing to fight to reestablish the preexisting social hierarchy (Petersen 2002; Turner and Strets 2005; Cederman et al. 2010). Similarly, according to framing theory, different objectives and alternatives are evaluated based on a certain point of reference. Prospect theory posits that individuals’ attitude toward risk depends upon whether the outcomes are perceived as gains or losses, relative to the reference point (Quattrone and Tversky 1988, 722). People generally tend to be risk-averse preferring sure gains over gambles offering a higher expected payoff. People are more risk accepting when trying to fend off losses. What framing and prospect theory tell us is that for people living through social or economic transformations, such as those created by political dislocation in occupation, the status quo is not seen as neutral, but instead as a loss. Individuals from communities suffering political dislocation, will therefore be more risk accepting and more likely to undertake resistance. Indeed, leaders of revolutions and rebellions frequently seek to frame the situation as a radical departure from an idyllic status quo (Berejikian 1992, 653). Framing and prospect theory illustrate how structure and individual actions are intimately related. Structural factors such as political dislocation affect the environment in which individuals undertake cost-benefit calculations, which in turn affect the likelihood of resistance.

Political dislocation also explains why segments of the occupied population may choose to
actively collaborate with occupiers. Political dislocation can have negative as well as positive repercussions for social groups. In many instances, the occupied population may side with the occupier because they genuinely support their objectives. Most Bangladeshis saw India’s occupation of East Pakistan between 1971 and 1972 as liberation from the repression of West Pakistan. Similarly, many Turkish-speaking Cypriots welcomed the 1974 Turkish invasion as a blessing, not a curse. The US occupation of Haiti following a catastrophic earthquake in 2010 was seen by most as a well-intentioned gesture to help the devastated nation ensure security and get back on its feet (Lacey 2010). The Armenian occupation of part of Nagorno-Karabagh was perceived differently whether one was of the Karabakh Armenian or of the Karabakh Azeri: “For one side, the Armenian possession of Nagorny Karabakh... was an enemy occupation; for the other, it was a fact of historical justice” (de Waal 2003, 3). One of the most infamous cases of collaboration was the government of Vidkun Quisling, who ruled Norway on behalf of Nazi Germany between 1942 and 1945. Quisling, whose name has become synonymous with treasonous collaboration, was not a purely opportunistic collaborator. Long before the occupation of Norway, he had founded Nasjonal Samling (National Gathering), a far right national socialist party whose ideology was consistent with Nazi Germany’s. Overall, although collaboration is seen as pejorative, the strategy of active or passive collaboration is the historical norm, not the exception. The necessary association of occupation with aggression and collaboration with treason simply does not reflect the reality faced by many occupied societies.

Not every occupation is welcomed, of course. When collaboration is not forthcoming, it can be compelled through a strategy of carrots and sticks. Occupiers can extort collaboration through sheer brutality. However, there are limits to what can be achieved through force alone, especially when dealing the non-material — but equally vital — commodities such as information (Van Evera 1990/1991; Liberman 1996; Brooks 1999; Baldwin 1999). As Kalyvas notes (2006, 89), collaborators are essential for solving identification problems in occupied societies, where foreign occupiers may be unable to distinguish resisters in the civilian population. In other instances, occupied populations are offered incentives to support occupation. Occupiers may favor certain groups in occupied society because they share some ethnic, religious, or ideological affinity. They may also incentivize collaboration as a way for individuals to gain power, accrue wealth, and to settle scores.
with rivals.\footnote{Collaborators may come to use the occupiers as much as the occupiers use collaborators. For example, Kalyvas (2003) and Chayes (2006) describe the manifold ways Afghan leaders exploited American ignorance of local conditions to extract economic benefits and have their rivals killed, claiming they were Taliban.} Incentivizing collaborators may involve providing protection against domestic enemies. Occupiers must therefore provide anonymity, direct physical protection, or the resources necessary to allow collaborators to entrench their position and defend themselves from reprisals. The relative risk of collaboration is partly a function of the degree of political dislocation and the occupier’s control of territory. As Kalyvas (2006) has shown, the less contested the ground between occupier and resisters, the greater the likelihood of collaboration with the occupier. When the occupier has strong control, locals are less likely to inform on collaborators and resisters are less likely to be able to liquidate collaborators. Of course, the process of control and collaboration are partially endogenous: occupiers are more likely to gain strong control with the help of collaborators, which in turns increases the likelihood of collaboration.

Cunning occupiers frequently employ divide and rule tactics to break down political resistance and rule occupied societies.\footnote{Such divide and rule tactics are also used outside the context of occupation to dominate deeply divided societies. See Lustick 1979.} They may also use proxy governments to reduce the perception of occupation. According to Hechter (2008, 23), because the costs of social control are usually greater for foreign rulers that are resented by the occupied population, using native intermediaries also reduces the costs of foreign rule. By placing collaborators in power, occupiers may seek to anchor their objectives over the longer term. In this sense, political dislocation can be a deliberate strategy employed by occupiers to rule occupied societies.

Political dislocation can, of course, occur in the absence of occupation. Resistance to Soviet occupation in the Baltics during the 1940s and 1950s paralleled resistance to Sovietization during the Russian Civil War. Moreover, ethnic groups excluded from state power are more likely to rebel than their included counterparts, and more likely to rebel if their status has been downgraded (Cederman et al. 2010). However, political dislocation in the context of occupations is particularly destabilizing because it is exogenous. Unlike endogenous dislocation, which may carry greater legitimacy or reflect the domestic balance of power, exogenous dislocation is imposed by the occupier with a temporary influx of capabilities. Such dislocation is more likely to lack both legitimacy and support in the target state and fail to reflect domestic social, economic, and military
conditions. Were it to reflect the local distribution of power, it would probably not be necessary to begin with. There is an increasing body of research demonstrating the destabilizing effects of political dislocation. Enterline and Greig (2008) show that imposed polities are more likely to face domestic challenges. Downes (2011) finds that Foreign Imposed Regime Change (FIRCs) significantly increases the likelihood that the target state will suffer a civil war in the subsequent ten years. As further evidence of the effect of political dislocation, Downes finds that FIRCs that impose new leaders increase the likelihood of experiencing civil wars whereas FIRCs that restore former leaders decrease the likelihood of experiencing civil war. Finally Peic and Reiter (2010) confirm that FIRCs increase the likelihood of civil war particularly when they are accompanied by inter-state war that weakens state capacity, a phenomenon most commonly associated with occupations. Such findings are consonant with a broader literature regarding the effects of structural change and domestic instability (Huntington 1968). Wimmer and Min (2006) find that many wars are fought to determine the state’s governing structure, and are more likely to occur when the institutions are in flux due to external geopolitical forces. This conclusion echoes Skocpol (1979), who argued that international factors such as economic and security competition could precipitate a crisis of the state and social revolution.

### 3.3.2 Factional Politics

An important corollary of political dislocation theory is that resistance is not simply a matter of removing occupiers. With the state weakened and the incumbent overthrown, resistance may at times be a method of attaining power itself, what I call the factional politics dimension of political dislocation. The term “Partisan” defines both a member of an armed group formed to fight against an occupying force and a strong supporter of a political party. When power is zero-sum and leadership is indivisible, national liberation is not necessarily a public good (non-rivalrous, non-excludable) but instead shares many of the characteristics of private goods (a summary of different theoretical understandings of resistance and national liberation is provided in Table 3.1). Such dynamics occur in both resistance struggles and in civil wars. Liberation is frequently tied to post-occupation rule and power, which are private. Ousting foreign occupiers can be a means to bolster domestic power (US Army 2007, 3). Post-colonial struggles are replete with examples of national
CHAPTER 3. POLITICAL DISLOCATION, TRUST, AND RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION

liberation leaders turning into heads of state. The same can be said for resistance movements such as Tito in Yugoslavia, Hoxha in Albania, or de Gaulle in France. Resistance not only builds prestige but also provides social groups with tools of coercion through the mobilization, training, and armament of its members. If resistance movements do not put their leaders into power, at a minimum they provide them with greater political capital. Ironically, those who make war sit at the peace table and get a say in the post-war political structure. As Almond (1947) found, examining pre- and post-war electoral outcomes, the political composition of resistance groups during the Second World War greatly influenced the relative strength of the post-war parties. Of particular note were the communist parties of Western Europe, which had been active leaders of resistance and who thrived in the early post-war period. Even when groups do not seek to gain national leadership, they may seek to use occupation to increase their relative power. For instance, McCoy notes that provincial and municipal leaders in the Western Visayas region of the Philippines readily adapted to successive US and Japanese occupations, using the resources of the occupiers to their own advantage and to the detriment of their rivals (McCoy 1980 cited in Kalyvas 2003). Similarly, in examining variation in nationalist violence against colonial rule, Lawrence (2010) finds that competition amongst different nationalist actors explained much variation in violence. Nationalist actors used violence to demonstrate their commitment to the nationalist cause, consolidate control over particular localities, and eliminate rivals. Lastly, Cunningham et al. (2012) find that in self-determination struggles, the greater the number of factions, the more likely it is that each faction will resort to violence both against the state and against co-ethnics.

The theory of political dislocation and factional politics partly help explain the puzzle of why we tend to observe different resistance groups emerge on the same territory when logic would dictate such groups pool their efforts. For instance Belgium had twelve different resistance groups whose factionalism led to squabbles over the allocation of provisions. There was also much misinformation and propaganda among different resistance groups. French communists, for instance, claimed to kill 550 Germans a month, a clear exaggeration that served to boost its domestic prestige (Macksey 1975, 112). In German-occupied Poland, resistance formed around three factions: the Jewish resistance, the Home Army loyal to the government in exile, and the People’s Guard

Although they share many similarities with resistance to occupation, national liberation struggles against colonialism are not the focus of this dissertation.
Table 3.1: Different theoretical understandings of resistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Type of Good</th>
<th>Incentives</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>Resistance serve to provide national liberation, which all occupied citizens benefit from, regardless of their contribution</td>
<td>Public good (nonrival, non-excludable)</td>
<td>Shame and praise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Dislocation</td>
<td>Resistance serves to maintain or enhance the power and prestige of domestic factions</td>
<td>Private good (rival, excludable)</td>
<td>Political power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust/Victimization</td>
<td>Resistance serves to protect individuals from occupier abuses</td>
<td>Club good (nonrival, excludable)</td>
<td>Personal protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
formed by Soviet-backed communists (factions from the latter two would clash at the end of German occupation). Palestinian resistance groups were heavily splintered, including groups such as Fatah, the more Islamist Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the Syrian backed Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Maoist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, among others (Baracskay 2011). For many years, Namibia’s struggle against South African occupation was carried out by a multiplicity of groups such as the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), the Namibia African People’s Democratic Organization, and finally the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) (Katjavivi 1988). Were national liberation a pure public good, we would expect groups to coordinate and seek economies of scale. However, because national liberation is not an unalloyed public good, domestic political considerations counsel groups to pursue efforts separately in order to defend factional interests and to maintain a coercive bargaining position post-occupation. In Iraqi-occupied Kuwait, resistance fighters complained that the exiled ruling Sabah family released information that endangered resistance operations, and, in an effort to prevent political rivals emerging from the resistance, sought to ensure that those groups led by members of the ruling Sabah family received the most assistance (Murphy 1991).

Factional competition among resistance groups provides a second mechanism to explain the destabilizing effects of political dislocation during occupation. Political dislocation causes certain social groups to mobilize against occupation. In order to protect themselves from the potential political and military ascendency of these groups, other rival social groups mobilize (Byman 2009, 610). By the end of occupation a formerly occupied territory may find itself with different armed factions, some expecting their sacrifices to translate into political power. As Posen (1993a) has argued, the collapse of the state, which may occur as a result of occupation, creates a situation of functional anarchy and a concomitant security dilemma that heightens the likelihood of ethnic conflict. While the interest of the state might be best served by a general demobilization of resistance groups, none wishes to be suckered into unilateral disarmament. As Ikenberry notes: the destruction caused by war and the breakdown of the old order provide opportunities to establish new basic rules and organizing arrangements... the stakes are high (Ikenberry 2001, 50).

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8 Social structure theorists of resistance would argue that factional resistance is, in fact, deliberate and superior to broad based resistance. Precisely because resistance is so risky, only tight-knit networks, such as clans, ethnic groups, or political parties can supply the level of trust necessary to mobilize in secret against occupation. Although this reasoning is convincing, it grossly under-predicts which groups will band together against occupiers.
Unless a third-party imposes a settlement on the various resistance groups, such groups cannot credibly commit not using their coercive capacity to achieve political objectives beyond national liberation. This is a well-documented phenomenon in civil wars, and one with many cases in post-occupation conflict (Walter 2001). For example, Greek resistance to Nazi occupation involved a number of resistance groups representing communists (EAM) and republicans (EDES, EKKA). As early as 1943, before the withdrawal of Axis forces from Greece, EAM began clashing with other resistance groups for power and control. Following the Second World War, Greece descended into full-scale civil war between the Greek government backed by the UK and the US and Greek communist forces. A similar dynamic was apparent in Albania, where Hoxha’s resistance forces assumed power after defeating the Ballis and Zogists in a brief civil war (Clodfelter 2002, 895). Grandi (2011) shows that patterns of violence in early post-war Italy – which killed some 15,000 – were largely driven by former resisters seeking a greater share of political power. In Iraq, Sunnis organized the first resistance against the US-led occupation, but soon found themselves in a vicious civil war against Shia militias. Often forgotten, in 1947 and 1948 France was seen to be sliding towards civil war as the French Communist Party, strengthened through its role in the resistance, became an increasingly vociferous critic of the coalition government (Judt 2005, 116). When occupiers enter a country experiencing civil war, various factions frequently reengage in conflict as soon as the occupier leaves, as seen during the Chinese Civil War which resumed following the end of Japanese occupation.

### 3.3.3 Mitigation

Political dislocation theory identifies a number of factors that increase the likelihood of resistance to occupation. Understanding these factors also identifies policies that can mitigate resistance. Specifically, occupiers can employ strategies of indigenous rule and population security to reduce resistance.

**Indigenous Rule**

Political dislocation theory argues that occupiers that disrupt the balance of political power in occupied societies are more likely to face resistance. What this suggests is that occupations that
maintain indigenous rule or practice accommodation tend to face less resistance. This conclusion is consistent with other studies of resistance. Petersen (2001, 35) argues that occupations that do not drastically reorder the social hierarchy of occupied societies will generate less resentment and therefore less resistance. Edelstein notes:

“Credible guarantees of independent, indigenous rule reduce the likelihood of costly resistance from the occupied population and may minimize domestic opposition to the occupation, and thereby make a long and successful occupation possible” (2004, 65).

Similarly, in their examination of the Japanese occupation of Taiwan and Korea, Hechter et al. (2009b, 53) conclude: “the greater the opportunities afforded to native elites, the weaker the resistance to alien rule.” The policy of indigenous rule was explicitly called for in the initial stages of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 1967 and 1980. Rejecting calls for a more direct and intrusive rule of occupied territories, Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan called for an “invisible occupation,” which would encourage self-rule and “allow the population of the areas to carry on their life and activities just as they had been used to until the 5th of June 1967.” Indeed, the first years of Israeli occupation resistance was relatively modest, with 49 Israeli fatalities (military and civilian) in 1968, 59 in 1969, and 17 in 1970 (Sayigh 1997, 209). Crucially, indigenous rule should reflect the domestic balance of power among relevant social groups in occupied society. Regimes lacking domestic support and propped up by foreign occupiers are more likely to be challenged once the occupiers leave (Sullivan and Karreth 2010). In fact, being propped up by foreigners will erode the legitimacy of such regimes.

The strategy of indigenous rule or accommodation seems intuitive. Why then do occupiers not employ this strategy more often? It is important to remember that occupiers are not only focused on avoiding resistance. Occupiers may rationally select an occupation strategy that causes political dislocation and resistance in order to pursue other interests of greater value, when the anticipated benefits of political dislocation outweigh the cost of resistance. For instance, South Africa deployed troops to southern Angolan to support rebels from the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) against the Angola government led by the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Clearly, South Africa knew its occupation of southern Angola would create political dislocation, but it saw the MPLA as the vanguard of a communist threat to
its national security (George 2005). In fact, in some cases the very point of undertaking occupation is to cement political dislocation on the territory of the defeated state.

**Population Security**

Political dislocation theory argues that factional resistance may emerge as different groups in occupied society vie for power and their place in the post-occupation political hierarchy. Notably militias may emerge to counterbalance rival resistance factions that threaten their security. It is therefore critical to prevent anarchy emerging during occupation from exacerbating inter-group competition. If occupied populations cannot rely on the occupier to reestablish security, they will be compelled to take security into their own hands. The failure to provide security may also generate additional resentment against the occupier. Central to the task, therefore, are the reestablishment of law and order and the protection of civilian populations. This may involve, for example, patrolling and policing duties and the physical separation of warring factions. As the occupation of Iraq has gruesomely demonstrated, an occupier’s failure to provide security to the local population against factional insurgent groups encourages the development of other factional militias, who could eventually turn against the occupiers in a bid to advance their political interests. The focus on population security dovetails with more recent counterinsurgency doctrine. According to Galula ([1964] 2006, 4), “the battle for the population is the major characteristic of the revolutionary war.” Likewise, the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual “directs US forces to make securing the civilian, rather than destroying the enemy, their top priority” (US Army 2007, XXV). Critically, population security serves to counter ongoing resistance, as well as preventing resistance from occurring to begin with.

### 3.4 Trust

A second causal mechanism to explain resistance to occupation is trust. Recall that resistance to occupation is not rational when resistance is dangerous, when occupation is temporary and benign, and when occupiers are no worse than local government. This cost-benefit calculation of resistance will be altered when there is a breakdown in trust with occupiers. Specifically, a breakdown in trust will occur when occupiers victimize the occupied population or when they are
incapable of credibly committing to treating the occupied population benignly or leaving occupied territory. As such, a breakdown of trust occurs when the assumption of temporary and benign occupation is eroded.

### 3.4.1 Vulnerability

Occupations can create tremendous vulnerability for occupied populations. Occupiers usually enter the occupied state with military capabilities in order impose order and deter challengers. Because occupation frequently occurs in the aftermath of war, the national armies of the occupied stand defeated and many of their men of fighting age are dead, wounded, or captured. This creates asymmetries of power that make occupied populations exceptionally vulnerable. This vulnerability is exacerbated by post-conflict psychological factors. During war, individuals are primed with nationalist rhetoric causing antagonisms between occupied and occupiers. Moreover, the trauma of battle may lead occupying soldiers to thirst for revenge and consequently to engage in acts of aggression against the occupied population. Rape, pillage, and murder are sadly common. The large corpus of international humanitarian law regarding occupation emerged precisely to address the acute vulnerability of occupied societies, and the risk of abuse and exploitation. Occupier and occupied societies find themselves essentially in a state of anarchy in the sense that the occupied have no higher recourse should the occupier abuse them. As Morgenthau writes in such situations “the imperialist policy may have no limits but those set by the power of resistance of the prospective victims” (Morgenthau [1949] 1985, 69). Marines in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, perceived how this power asymmetry could generate mistrust: “Don’t they know we’re here to help? No they don’t know. They don’t know if we are here to invade and take it over. We just look like these guys that are from somewhere else. Somewhere else very very far away” (Scantling 2011).

### 3.4.2 Victimization

Because resistance is costly and occupation is generally temporary, individuals in occupied territory should rationally decide to wait rather than fight the occupier. Moreover, if national liberation is a public good, then individuals should rationally choose to free ride on the efforts of others
rather than assume the risk themselves. This cost-benefit calculation is reversed when occupiers begin to victimize the occupied population (Mason and Krane 1989; Goodwin 2001). Victimization can include arbitrary arrest, beating, torture, mass killing, and genocide. If individuals in occupied territory run a high risk of being victimized regardless of their behavior, then *attentisme* and fence-sitting may prove to be no safer than participation in resistance. This logic was summarized by Hobbes ([1651] 1994, 87): “For man by nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting, rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting.” In German-occupied Belarus, a German report described the calculations of civilians as such:

“If I stay with the Germans, I shall be shot when the Bolsheviks come; if the Bolsheviks don’t come, I shall be shot sooner or later by the Germans. Thus, if I stay with the Germans, it means certain death; if I join the partisans, I shall probably save myself” (Statiev 2010, 75).

Further, reflecting on German occupation policy, the French historian Henri Michel (1972, 185) stated: “The best recruiting agents for the Resistance were the savagery of the SS, the ineptitude of the occupying regime and the severity of the economic exploitation.” Mao described a similar phenomenon in Chinese resistance to brutal Japanese occupation: “This rage is engendered by the reactionary and barbarous character of Japan’s war —‘there is no escape from fate,’ and hence an absolute hostility has crystallized” (Tse-Tung [1938] 1967, 24). In Nazi occupied Greece mass reprisals against civilians “did little to pacify Greece, fight communism, or control the population. In general, the result was just the opposite. Burning villages left many male inhabitants with little place to turn except guerilla bands. Killing women, children, and old men fed the growing hatred of the Germans and the desire for vengeance” (Condit 1961, 268). The effect of victimization can be seen in temporal variation in resistance. Resistance to Soviet rule in Latvia only truly took off after 13 June 1941, when 16,000 Latvians were shipped to labor camps in Siberia (Ciganovs 1999, 127). More recently, a study of the effects of house demolitions by the Israeli Defense Forces in occupied territories found demolitions of the homes of suicide bombers deterred future suicide attacks against Israel whereas demolishing homes that did not produce bombers for “security” reasons increased the production of suicide bombers (Benmelech et al. 2011).
In some circumstances, victimization of occupied population makes it safer for individuals to join resistance. By providing shelter, escape routes, safe houses, food, and weapons, resistance groups may provide a degree of protection unavailable to those who do not resist. Because the protection from the occupiers is nonrival but can be excluded to individuals, it is a club good. As such, individuals are incentivized to participate in resistance in order to gain access to protection afforded by resistance groups. As Kalyvas and Kocher argue, individuals may partake in rebellion “not in spite of risk but in order to better manage it” (2007, 183). The greater and the more indiscriminate the abuses committed by occupying forces, the greater the likelihood that the occupied population will be pushed into the arms of resisters. Deliberate victimization (such as genocide, mass killing or ethnic cleansing) or accidental victimization as a result of discriminate attacks (such as collateral damage) may have the same effect on the cost-benefit calculations of civilians, albeit to different degrees. This point is significant since well-intentioned occupiers with poor local knowledge and less ability to discriminate rebels from the civilian population may find themselves aggravating resistance (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Indeed, a recent study of insurgency in Iraq found clear evidence that Coalition forces are punished with more insurgent attacks for the collateral damage they inflict on civilians (Condra and Shapiro, 2012).

Victimization of civilian populations in occupied society may also trigger a powerful emotional response against occupation. A desire for revenge clouds judgment and causes individuals to underestimate the risk of taking up arms (Petersen 2002). In her study of rebellion in El Salvador, Wood identified defiance as another emotional response to victimization. Activists joined rebels because of feelings of moral outrage at the unwarranted persecution of their families or neighbors (Wood 2003, 223). Victimization may also create a sense of “relative deprivation” among victimized individuals, insofar as they perceive the occupier as responsible for a discrepancy between value expectations such as safety, welfare, and dignity and their actual value capabilities (Gurr 1970). Revenge also figures prominently in many studies of insurgent motivations (Bloom 2005; Petersen 2001; Hashim 2005; Condra et al. 2010; US Army 2007). Precisely because occupier and occupied interact under conditions of anarchy, occupiers cannot be held accountable for their actions after they depart. Justice must therefore be met directly through armed resistance, or not at all. At a minimum the emotional response to victimization reduces the desire of occupied populations to collaborate with occupiers. In German-occupied Estonia:
“Soon after midnight on July 1, (1941) thousands of residents of Kivioli awoke to shouts and the rattle of gunfire... sporadic waves of machine gun fire and shouts and screams filled the night. And yet the residents, aroused from their sleep, remained calm and felt some satisfaction in knowing that something was finally happening” (Laar 1992, 11).

The victimization-resistance mechanism is self-reinforcing. As a result of victimization, members of the occupied society may initiate resistance to occupation. This resistance, in turn, may lead the occupier to retaliate against those communities deemed responsible for resistance. However, because occupiers are by definition foreigners, they frequently have less information regarding those responsible for resistance and therefore are less willing or able to discriminate in their retaliation and more likely to cause collateral damage. Precisely because of resistance, occupiers may also lack sufficient control of territory to exercise selective violence, thereby resorting to less discriminate violence (Kalyvas 2006). Moreover, as Lyall (2010b, 1). demonstrates in his analysis of counterinsurgency in Chechnya, co-ethnics “enmeshed in dense intraethnic networks, are better positioned to identify insurgents within the population and to issue credible threats against civilians for noncooperation.” In many instances, occupiers deliberately employ collective punishment of occupied communities in order to deter future attacks. Indeed, Valentino et al. (2004) find that strategies of mass killing are most commonly employed during guerilla warfare out of frustration with conventional tactics. By failing to discriminate those responsible from innocent bystanders, occupiers thereby generate greater resentment, anger, fear, and often resistance, what Kilkullen (2009) calls “accidental guerilla syndrome.” This escalation of violence exists in both civil wars and occupations, but is aggravated in occupations where occupying troops have a shorter history of interaction with locals, and suffer from cultural and linguistic differences.

Resistance groups can actively stoke the victimization-resistance cycle. A common tactic for insurgent groups, especially those embedded among civilians, is to provoke their opponents with the expectation that they will respond disproportionately, causing collateral damage. Cunning insurgents may launch attacks from buildings with strong national or religious significance, such as churches and mosques. They can also disguise themselves as protected members of their society, such as women. Such attacks invite occupiers to respond by attacking sacrosanct spaces or
violating cultural norms (Fair and Ganguly 2008). The occupier’s disproportionate response, in turn, shatters the legitimacy of the occupier, alienates the local population, and creates grievances. Locals are then more likely to provide insurgents with men, material, and sanctuary in return for protection. This insurgent provocation strategy leverages information asymmetries regarding the type of the occupier. Since occupied populations are vulnerable and cannot directly observe the intentions of occupiers, resisters will claim that such responses reveal the “true nature” of the occupier.

Two counterpoints should be addressed regarding the effect of victimization and resistance, namely endogeneity and effectiveness. The first point is that in the midst of insurgency it is difficult to understand whether victimization causes violence or whether violence causes victimization (Lyall 2009a). Of course, the inability to identify the direction of causation does not preclude the possibility that resistance causes greater victimization and that greater victimization causes greater insurgency. In other words, these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. More importantly, the endogeneity question is more tractable in the context of foreign occupations. Unlike civil wars and insurgencies, violence is not a necessary baseline condition in occupations. The majority of occupations are fairly peaceful. Moreover, occupiers may enter a state with the ideological or religious objective to victimize a certain population. It can therefore be considered to be an exogenous shock on a given polity. Such characteristics give a better handle on whether occupier-initiated violence in the midst of an otherwise peaceful occupation is a trigger of resistance. A second counterpoint is indiscriminate violence helps defeat insurgencies by deterring attacks, depriving insurgents of recruits, supplies, sanctuary, and intelligence, complicating logistics, creating a wedge between locals and insurgents, and by underlining the insurgent’s inability to protect the population (Lyall 2009a; Downes 2007a, 2007b, 2008). Indeed, if indiscriminate violence were so counterproductive, it would be surprising that it would be used so frequently as a tactic of warfare. Adjudicating this debate goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. Suffice to say that the effect of indiscriminate violence on the generation of resistance is a distinct question from its effect on conflict outcomes. There may be a non-linear effect whereby moderate levels of victimization provoke resistance whereas large-scale victimization simply crushes it (see Greenhill, Forthcoming).  

In a similar vein, Kydd and Walter (2006) argue that groups will only want to employ terrorist strategies of provocation when a government is expected to respond with “middling levels of brutality.” In other words, low levels of
ization can create resistance, although the same victimization may also defeat the resistance it creates.

3.4.3 Credible Commitment

Occupations may generate resistance when occupiers cannot credibly commit to the wellbeing or the eventual sovereignty of the occupied population. Not all occupiers are malevolent. Instead, we can conceive of occupiers as existing on a spectrum from predatory to benign. At one extreme are those occupiers who seek to use their temporary monopoly of force over occupied territory to abuse and exploit the population or to extinguish the sovereignty of the state. At the other extreme are those occupiers who intend to treat the occupied population well and restore sovereignty as soon as possible and with minimal disruption. The Nazi occupation of Poland between 1939 and 1945 would be an illustration of the former whereas the multinational occupation of the Solomon Islands since 2003 to foil a military coup and dampen ethnic conflict would be an example of the latter. Because intentions cannot be directly observed, and because occupiers may have incentives to misrepresent their true type, the occupied population can never be fully certain of the type of the occupier.

Even if occupiers are well intentioned, they may have trouble credibly committing to the well-being of the occupied population. First, because occupiers are foreign, there is generally a shorter history of interaction, and therefore less familiarity, making it harder to gauge the intentions and likely future actions of the occupiers (Kirschner 2010). This generates a baseline level of distrust. Second, because occupation is temporary, it shortens the horizon of interactions between occupiers and occupied. With fewer future rounds of payoffs to be gained from cooperation, occupiers have fewer incentives not to exploit occupied populations (Axelrod [1985] 2006). Occupiers are therefore like Olson’s “roving bandit,” whose short tenure creates incentives for excess taxation (Olson 1993). Third, occupiers can simply return to their homelands to escape retribution, and extradition treaties are particularly unlikely in the case of states engaged in interstate war (Hechter 2009a, 291). Fourth, as noted above, the asymmetry of power in occupied territory decreases the ability of the occupied to hold occupiers in check or to retaliate against the abuses of the occupier.

government brutality will fail to arouse further revolt and extreme levels of brutality may deter revolt entirely.
Because occupiers and occupied effectively operate under conditions of anarchy, occupiers may have trouble credibly committing to leaving occupied territory. For example, during the British occupation of Mesopotamia (present day Iraq), “A further source of unease among groups of urban notables was the Residency’s failure to make an unambiguous declaration of policy…This suspicion towards Britain’s designs became important in 1919-20 as many of the collaborative elements of Mesopotamian society, including the Jewish community and many Baghdadi notables, toned down their support for the British” (Ulrichsen 2007, 372). Similarly, riots broke out in Gaza on 10 March 1956 after the UN appointed Colonel Carl Engholm as Military Governor of Gaza, with rioters taking the appointment as an indication of prolonged UN administration (Keesing’s 1957, 15448).

Occupiers can still have trouble making credible commitments despite public promises. For example during the US occupation of Beirut in 1958, American jets dropped one million leaflets all over Lebanon with the following message in Arabic: “American troops have entered your country in response to a request by your constitutional government. They are there to help you maintain Lebanon’s independence in the face of threats by those who wish to interfere in your affairs and who have endangered the security of your country. American forces will leave your country as soon as the UN takes measures to guarantee Lebanon’s independence” (Attié 2004, 200). The Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran between 1941 and 1946 provides another example. In 1941, the UK and Russia occupied separate sections of neutral Iran over fears that the Shah could side with Germany thereby depriving the Allies of critical reserves of oil. The Shah was forced to abdicate in favor of his son. The new Shah was then pressured into signing a Treaty of Alliance with the UK and the Soviet Union in January 1942. Through this treaty, the UK and the Soviet Union sought to provide Iran assurances that occupation would be temporary. Specifically, Article Five of the treaty committed the Allies to leaving Iran “not more than six months after the cessation of hostilities.” When the deadline for withdrawal arrived on 2 March 1946, six months after the end of the Second World War, the British began to withdraw, but Moscow balked, citing threats to its security (Eshraghi 1984). Worse still, the Soviet Union had begun aiding Azeri and Kurdish separatists to set up autonomous Soviet republics. The Soviet Union eventually left Iran, but only under intense pressure from the US and the UK, and a rebuke from the UN Security Council (Blake 2009). Even when occupiers have no designs over the sovereignty of the occupied territory, their
promises not to mistreat occupied civilians may ring hollow. When Soviet troops were deployed
to suppress the Prague Spring in 1968, Brezhnev declared: “We are not occupiers, we came to
Czechoslovakia as friends, as people worried about the fate of socialism in that country” (Navratil
2006, 508).

These examples illustrate that promises to leave occupied territory are cheap talk. Since they
are relatively costless and there are no automatic consequences if occupiers rescind on them,
promises do not constitute costly signals. Consequently, they do not reveal additional information
regarding the type of the occupier. Both well-intentioned occupiers and predatory annexationists
have incentives to portray their presence as temporary in order to avoid international censure and
resistance in occupied territory. Moreover, because the consequences of defection (in this case
abusing or annexing occupied territory) are so high, signals must be particularly costly in order to
be perceived as credible (Kydd 2000, 326). Occupiers can try to make their promises more credible
by making withdrawal contingent on behavior. However, this does not resolve the problem if oc-
cupiers are themselves the judge of compliant behavior (Edelstein 2004, 68). These difficulties are
compounded by the logic of counter-insurgency. On the one hand, in order to defeat resisters and
to recruit collaborators, occupiers must make a long-term commitment to defeating resistance. On
the other hand, in order to prevent resistance, occupiers must commit to leaving occupied ter-
ritory. Such reassurances obviously work at cross-purposes and the attendant hypocrisy creates
distrust among the occupied population. Lastly, resistance can generate self-fulfilling prophecies
regarding long-term occupation. Efforts by resisters to expel occupiers only encourage occupiers
to stay longer and redouble their efforts, thereby confirming the suspicion of resisters that occu-
piers never intended leaving in the first place (Edelstein 2004).

Can occupiers signal their benign type by sinking costs? For example, could contributions to-
wards humanitarian aid, reconstruction, infrastructure, and development separate the predatory
occupiers from the benign ones? Unfortunately, sinking costs may be insufficient. Such contribu-
tions may simply be seen as propaganda. Furthermore, if the occupied population is concerned
about being annexed by the occupying state, contributions towards development and infrastruc-
ture will be seen as investments rather than sunk costs. Finally, as the sabotaging of factories in
Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe and the torching of schools in modern day Afghanistan indicate,
such contributions can provide targets for resisters driven by political dislocation.
3.4.4 Mitigation

So far, I have argued that resistance is not rational against short and benign occupations. However, occupiers may find it difficult to signal credibly their intentions to treat the populations benignly and to leave occupied territory promptly. Trust between occupied and occupier is essential since the occupied have no higher recourse should the occupier abuse the occupied. I argue three mechanisms, regime type, international organizations, and religious affinity, help occupiers more credibly signal benign intentions and help reduce the likelihood of resistance. Such mechanisms reinforce trust by providing occupiers with legitimacy, transparency, and accountability.

Regime Type

Regime type is one mechanism to ascertain political intentions of occupiers. In particular, democratic occupiers are more likely to maintain trust with occupied populations for four reasons: they are more likely to comply with the laws of war, less likely to victimize the occupied population, better able to make credible commitments, and less likely to annex occupied territory.

First, democracies are less likely to victimize civilians. Liberal norms make democratic regimes more likely to promote tolerance, nonviolence, and human rights (Valentino et al. 2004, 382). Such human rights norms are more likely to be embedded in the domestic laws of occupiers, making them harder to violate. Democracies are more likely to ratify human rights conventions, at least in part because they are more likely to respect them to begin with (Landman 2005; Simmons 2010). Democracies are more likely to include human rights NGOs that will monitor the government’s compliance with human rights at home and abroad. Democracies also worry that departure from accepted standards of behavior in war would damage their international reputation, especially with other democracies (Merom 2003, 25; Finnemore 2003). When occupiers are democracies, members of occupied populations can more easily seek redress for human rights violations either through international NGOs and media, or the political institutions of the occupying state, which tend to be more open than in non-democratic states.

The claim that democratic occupiers tend to be more benign is borne out in a number of empirical studies. Valentino et al. (2004, 398) find that highly democratic regimes are 32 percent less likely to undertake mass killings than their highly autocratic counterparts. Similarly, Rummel
(1995) found that democracies are less likely to kill foreign civilians. Part of the reason democratic occupiers are less likely to victimize occupied populations is that they are more likely to comply with the laws of war. According to Morrow (2007), democracies are more likely than non-democracies to comply with the laws of war pertaining to the treatment of civilians.\textsuperscript{10}

Second, democratic occupiers are less likely to annex occupied territory. Because of their form of government, democracies are more sensitive to the right to self-determination and less likely to absorb populations against their will. When democracies occupy foreign territory, it creates cognitive dissonance between the values that govern democratic administration at home and non-democratic administration in occupied territory (Ratner 2005). Moreover, when annexing relatively populous foreign territory, occupiers face the dilemma of either integrating an electorate whose preferences may diverge from their own, or creating second class citizens within their society in violation of their democratic ideals. This dilemma was illustrated most prominently in regards to Israel’s relations with occupied Palestinian territories. Israel could either be a democratic nation by affording Palestinians full citizenship, or a Jewish nation by excluding Palestinians from certain rights as citizens, but never both fully democratic and Jewish (Friedman 1989, 254). As Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was fond of saying, in 1967 Israel “got a lovely dowry. The trouble is that the dowry comes with a wife” (Goremberg 2007, 130). Summary statistics indicate that democracies are, in fact, less likely to annex foreign territory by force. Non-democratic states were responsible for 84.05 percent of annexations since 1900 (based on data from Tir et al. 1998).\textsuperscript{11} Similarly, Walter (2006, 2009) found that democracies were more likely to offer concessions than to fight against separatist groups. Thus, democracies are less likely to suppress national self-determination at any cost. The greater the confidence the occupier will not annex occupied territory, the less likely they will be to undertake costly acts of resistance. This point is also significant because one of the main reasons Downes (2006, 2007a) found democracies to target civilians was to depopulate annexed territory.

Third, democratic regimes are better able to make credible commitments to policies on which they may otherwise have incentives to renege. Democracies are better able to credibly commit

\textsuperscript{10} In contrast, Downes (2007a, 2008) find that democracies are more likely than non-democracies to target civilians when they are desperate to win interstate wars.

\textsuperscript{11} Annexation is coded as 1 when the process of territorial change came about from conquest or annexation (Tir et al. 1998). Democracy is coded 1 when the country-year Polity IV score is above 7 (Gurr et. al. 2009).
because when democratic leaders make promises, they not only send a signal of their intentions to the occupied population, they also generate audience costs with their domestic population. Because they are more transparent and meant to be domestically accountable, democratic leaders find it more difficult to send one message to occupied populations and another contradictory message to their own domestic audiences. Moreover, democratic leaders are punished domestically for reneging on threats or promises made. According to Fearon (1994, 581), both democratic and non-democratic leaders may incur audience costs, but democratic leaders pay added domestic political costs for “engaging the national honor” and subsequently changing their position.\textsuperscript{12} The same logic underpins democracies’ respect for international law pertaining to human rights and the laws of war. As Morrow (2007) suggests, democracies are more likely to comply with treaty obligations because the ratification of such treaties creates audience costs and therefore incentives to follow through with commitments. Martin (2000) argues that because treaties are more costly to ratify in democracies, for example because they may require the consent of the legislature, they constitute more credible signals of states intentions. The very procedural inefficiencies that are often seen to hobble democracies in their interactions with other states are precisely what enable democracies to send costly signals of their commitment. As a result democratic occupiers are better able to credibly commit to treating occupied populations benignly and to credibly commit to vacating occupied territory. Such commitments, in turn, reduce occupied populations’ perceived utility of undertaking resistance against occupation.

In sum, because they are less likely to victimize occupied populations or to annex occupied territory, and because they are better able to make credible commitments, we should expect democratic occupiers to face less resistance than non-democratic occupiers.

**International Organizations**

Occupations undertaken under the aegis of regional or international organizations (IOs), what I term multilateral occupations, are more likely to maintain trust with occupied populations for four reasons: legitimacy, transparency, checks and balances, and non-annexation.

First, multilateral occupations are more likely to be pursued with the right intentions, and

\textsuperscript{12} For a rebuttal of audience cost theory, see Borghard and Snyder 2011.
therefore to be seen as legitimate by the occupied population. States often proclaim altruistic motives (e.g. human rights, self-determination) to pursue purely selfish interest in foreign interventions. It may be difficult to distinguish ex ante acts of aggression from benevolent intervention. Because of their broad membership IOs are commonly perceived as gatekeepers of international legitimacy (Coleman 2007). The deliberative process of IOs makes them better able to represent the interests of the occupied society and of the international community. Of course, certain incidents such as Libya’s 2003 chairmanship of the UN Human Rights Commission or North Korea’s 2011 chairmanship of the UN Conference on Disarmament question the legitimacy of multilateral institutions. However, these examples highlight that if anything multilateral organizations tend to be overly conservative, failing to act when (arguably) they should rather than acting when (arguably) they shouldn’t. IOs are therefore less likely to undertake occupations that are considered illegitimate. Lastly, by conferring greater legitimacy to occupations, IOs increase the reputational costs of domestic and foreign actors to undertake resistance. As a result, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) recommended that interventions be conducted multilaterally to ensure that they are being pursued with the right intentions (ICISS 2001, XII). Similarly, Finnemore (2003) notes that multilateralism is increasingly seen as the only legitimate way to carry out interventions. On a more conceptual level, by ensuring occupation is being pursued for the right intentions, IOs provide a screening device for occupied populations to determine the type of the occupier.\(^\text{13}\)

Second, IOs are better able to generate trust because they tend to be more transparent than unilateral occupations. International organizations, while weak, possess one unique asset: legitimacy. They trade conditional legitimacy for oversight of state actions. Such oversight may deter abuses or increase the likelihood that abuses will be detected should they occur. The dramatic debate regarding the invasion of Iraq in 2003 provides a case in point. The US saw UN authorization to intervene in Iraq as valuable because it saw such authorization as conferring legitimacy to US actions. However, in seeking UN authorization for action the US was forced to justify intervention and share intelligence regarding Iraq’s alleged weapons program. In short, the UN provided a more transparent decision-making process for intervention. Transparency is enhanced

\(^{13}\) For a rebuttal of the effects of multilateralism on occupation, see Edelstein 2008a, 136-152.
further when states depend on the IO to finance, or to coordinate the finance, of occupation. Fiscal
dependence on IOs opens the occupation to greater outside scrutiny, making it more transparent.

Third, IOs generate trust by providing checks and balances on the actions of occupiers. Conser-
ervative political theorists such as Burke and Fénélon argued that even with good values and
moderate domestic politics, states behave with moderation and decency only if checked by others
(Jervis 1993, 66). International organizations can therefore channel and constrain state actions. Be-
fore making major decisions, occupiers must consult with other partners in the multilateral coali-
tion as well as with the international organization itself. This multiplicity of actors creates veto
points, which reduce the likelihood of flagrant abuses against the occupied population (Tsebelis
1995, for a counterpoint see Ratner 2005). Powerful states themselves may have strong incentives
to bind themselves to international institutions (Ikenberry 2000). By establishing constraints and
clear rules of the game, they elicit voluntary cooperation from weaker actors that would otherwise
avoid cooperation out of fear of defection. Thus, what occupiers lose in efficiency and freedom of
action, they may gain in greater cooperation from the international community and the occupied
population (not to mention burden-sharing).

Interestingly, third-party states may prefer multilateral occupations because they provide guar-
antees that their rivals will not exploit occupations to their advantage. For example, warring states
may agree to multilateral occupation of contested territory, as was the case with the Free City
of Danzig (1920-1939) and Upper Silesia (1922), and was proposed for Fiume in Dalmatia (1919),
Meme (1921-1923), Alexandretta in Syria (1937), Jerusalem (since 1947), and Sarajevo (1994) (Wilde
2001, 587). Similarly, multilateral occupation may provide an important restraint on feuding al-
lies. For example, following the First World War, the UK insisted on a multilateral occupation of
Istanbul to check the presence of France (Criss 1999, 63).

Fourth, IOs can more credibly commit to vacating occupied territories. Because international
organizations are not states, they do not have the institutions to govern territories on a perma-
nent basis (with the possible exception of the defunct UN Trusteeship Council). The concept of
annexation simply has no parallel with regards to IOs. In addition, multilateral occupations must
retain the support of their members to persist. Multilateral occupations usually require periodic
renewals of their authorization. In other words, withdrawal of occupying forces is the default
policy. Because the actors undertaking occupation are different from those authorizing them, such
“sunset” clauses help better ensure that occupations remain temporary. Ultimately, because multilateral occupations tend to be perceived as more legitimate and transparent, because they provide checks and balances to the occupiers, and because they are unable to annex territory, they are more likely to maintain the trust of the occupied population and therefore elicit less resistance. States may therefore have an interest in tying their hands through IOs in order to boost the credibility of their commitments.

**Religious Affinity**

Occupations undertaken by coreligionists are less likely to face resistance than occupations undertaken by groups of a different religion because of greater legitimacy, shared values, and moral community. The 1555 Peace of Augsburg established the principle of *cuius regio eius religio* (to each prince his own religion), meaning rulers had the right to determine the religion of their subjects (Krasner 1999, 79). This principle, which would later be recognized in the Peace of Westphalia, effectively called for non-intervention in the religious affairs of the state. According to Huntington (1993), civilizations represented through the world’s major religions, will take over from ideology as the main sources of friction in International Relations. Religion provides an alternate basis of identity and community from the nation. If shared identity and community are a basis for the legitimacy of rulers, occupations undertaken by coreligionists will be seen as more legitimate. But what are the specific mechanisms of religious affinity?

First, trust is a function of shared values. Religious affinity between occupier and occupied boosts trust by increasing confidence that the occupiers will rule according to values and norms acceptable to the occupied population. This is what makes it different than other forms of affinity such as language or ethnicity, which does not necessarily entail shared values or norms. Conversely, religious difference heightens the perceived gap between “in-groups” and “out-groups” (Wood 2003). Occupied populations may come to fear occupiers of different religions if they believe occupiers have come to change their way of life or govern them according to an incompatible set of values. Such religious dissimilarity magnifies the perceived difference in governance between native and foreign rule. The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual recognizes such concerns and recommends: “U.S. forces must make clear that they do not
intend to undermine or change the local religion or traditions” (US Army 2007, 219). Of course such promises made by occupying forces will not be seen as credible by occupied populations, especially if the occupier’s religion is evangelical.

Second, religious affinity creates a shared moral community between occupiers and occupied. This shared moral community reinforces trust because it increases the moral costs of abusing the occupied population. Members of a common religion cannot as easily be demonized or labeled as sub-human. Some religions possess theological institutions with clear hierarchies. Such overarching institutions provide recourse to abused occupied populations and moral sanctions against abusive occupiers. Additionally, the sanctions for killing coreligionists are usually greater than those for killing members of other religions. Thus, on a moral level at least, religious affinities help address the condition of anarchy between occupiers and occupied. Religious differences also make it easier for resistance leaders to portray their struggle in zero-sum terms, as well as to demonize their opponents (Pape 2005). However, if occupier and occupied are of the same community, political gains for one are not necessarily assumed to be political losses for the other. Thus shared values and a sense of moral community help occupiers better credibly commit to treating the occupied population benignly.

Third, religious affinity helps neutralize some of the most effective mobilizers of resistance: religious leaders. Religious leaders benefit from a number of advantages in stoking resistance. They possess moral legitimacy, which is important when instructing individuals to risk their lives while claiming others. The power of religious leaders is not derived from political power, and therefore can transcend occupation and regime change. Religious leaders can draw on a large community of followers, with a strong sense of devotion. Religious ceremonies provide a focal point and plausible deniability for large public gathering and protests. Religious leaders can draw on a broader set of selective incentives than non-religious activists. Unlike nationalism, religion can provide the promise of redemption in an afterlife, a potentially strong if unverifiable incentive for action. However, when occupiers and occupied are of the same religion, these leaders are less likely to mobilize against their coreligionists. Consequently, religious leaders are frequently leaders of resistance. For example, during the First World War, Orthodox priests in Serbia called for resistance against Austro-Hungarian occupations during sermons (Mitrovic 2007). Similarly, the religious leader Muqtada al-Sadr was instrumental in launching the Shia insurgency against
the US occupation of Iraq (Patel 2007).

The effect of religious affinity overlaps with the mechanisms of political dislocation and opportunity structure. For example religious differences may provoke fear of victimization or of eventual political dislocation. Furthermore, distinct religious communities may be uniquely suited to resolving coordination problems (Petersen 2001). Because of the effect of religious affinity, occupiers try whenever practicable to deploy troops of the same religion as the occupied population or to solicit coreligionist coalition partners. During the 1991 and 2003 invasions of Iraq, the US went to extraordinary lengths to bring on board Muslim coalition members, despite their modest military contributions. Such token forces serve mainly to vouch for the good intentions of the occupiers to their coreligionists. Similarly in deploying UNIFIL troops in the wake of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon War, UN Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown argued, “a European-Muslim force (would be preferable) because of both groups interest in this situation” (Coleman 2007, 322). In a series of articles and books, Pape (2003, 2005, 2010) finds that democratic occupiers of different religion from the occupied population are more likely to suffer suicide attacks, than coreligionist occupiers.

Through legitimacy, shared values, and moral community, religious affinity can increase trust between occupiers and occupied. With greater confidence in benign treatment, religious affinity thereby reduces incentives to take up arms against occupiers. We should therefore expect coreligionist occupiers to experience less resistance than occupiers of different religion than the occupied population.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter started with the proposition that resistance is irrational under most circumstances because resistance is dangerous, occupations are temporary, and the governance of occupying powers may be no worse than those of preceding governments. I then argued that two factors: political dislocation and a breakdown in trust, increase the likelihood of resistance to occupation by alienating powerful segments of the occupied population, stirring domestic competition for power, victimizing the occupied population, and failing to credibly commit to treating the occupied population benignly or vacating occupied territory promptly. In short, political dislocation and a
breakdown in trust erode the conditions under which resistance is not rational. I proposed that indigenous rule and population security could mitigate the risks of political dislocation whereas democracy, international organizations, and religious affinity could mitigate breakdowns in trust. Understanding resistance as partly a domestic struggle for power in occupied territory, rather than a simple reflex against foreign rule, can help explain otherwise puzzling characteristics of resistance such as collaboration, fractionalized resistance groups, and post-occupation civil war. Thus, political dislocation is what Lakatos terms a progressive research program: it can account for novel facts without requiring auxiliary hypotheses (Lakatos 1970).

The mechanisms of political dislocation and trust can be interlinked. When an occupation causes political dislocation, it may trigger resistance from the affected segment of the occupied population. Lacking sufficiently fine-grained local knowledge to discriminate between resisters and innocent civilians, the occupier may engage in accidental victimization of the occupied population. Because the occupied population cannot adequately judge the type (predatory or benevolent) of the occupier, they may be unable to discern whether the violence inflicted was accidental or deliberate. Reassurances from the occupier that incidents of violence were unintended will not necessarily be meaningful. This, in turn, may lead to a breakdown in trust between the occupier and occupied, as individuals seek the protection of resistance groups. What was once factional resistance against foreign occupation becomes a broader based reaction against perceived victimization. A summary of the theoretical mechanisms of political dislocation and trust is provided in Figure 3.2.

In contrast to existing theories of resistance to occupation, both political dislocation and trust relate to the nature and policies of occupiers. This distinction is significant because it means that occupiers may be able to take steps to mitigate resistance. It should also be noted that the mechanisms of political dislocation and trust are consonant with the international law of occupation. Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Convention explicitly bans some forms of political dislocation, requiring occupiers to obey the laws in force in the occupied territory. Article 43 also admonishes occupiers to maintain “public order and safety,” which according to the mechanism of factional resistance serves not only the needs of the occupied population, but also dampens anarchy, the emergence of a security dilemma among domestic factions of occupied society, and the development of militias that could eventually turn against occupiers. Lastly, the international law of oc-
Occupation strictly bans the victimization of the occupied, with Article 46 of the Hague Convention stating: “Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected.” While international law has been seen at times as a costly impediment to the successful conduct of warfare, in fact it highlights many of the factors that prevent resistance.

The effects of political dislocation and trust may be plausible in theory, but how do they fare against the empirical record? The next chapter tests these theories using a novel dataset of resistance to occupation from 1900 until 2010.
Chapter 4

Cross-National Evidence on Resistance to Occupation

*But has the last word been said? Must hope disappear? Is defeat final? No!*

-Charles de Gaulle, 18 June 1940

4.1 Introduction

Some of the greatest US foreign policy failures in the post-war period—as in Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iraq, have involved resistance to US occupation. Indeed, statesmen have generally been bad at predicting resistance, often with disastrous political, military, and human consequences. With these failures in mind, this chapter presents a cross-national study of resistance to occupation using an original dataset. First, I outline a research design that takes into account potential selection bias in the onset of occupation. Second, using a probit model, I explore occupation onset: where occupations occur and which countries are at risk for occupation. Third, I describe a set of explanatory variables of resistance to occupation, their coding, and their hypothesized effects. Fourth, using a negative binomial count model, I examine why certain occupations generate significant resistance while others do not. Fifth, I use a survival model to explore variation in the duration of occupations. This chapter concludes by selecting case studies for further analysis.

To preview the results, I find that factors that increase trust between the occupied and the occu-
pier, such as the level of democracy in the occupying state, international or regional organization mandates for occupation, or shared religion, tend to reduce the number of occupier-force fatalities. I also find evidence that political dislocation plays a strong role in stoking resistance. Occupations that result in the overthrow of political leaders tend to generate greater fatalities among occupiers than those that leave governing structures in place. Other factors such as poverty, mountainous terrain, and the duration of occupation are also found to increase resistance to occupation. Notably, nationalism is found to be a poor predictor of resistance to occupation. All measures of nationalism fail to register any statistically significant effect on resistance or have effects contrary to predictions. Lastly, employing a survival model, I find that the predictors of resistance to occupation do not predict the duration of occupations.

4.2 Research Design

The unit of analysis for this chapter is the occupation-year for the occupation onset models and occupation for the resistance models. The universe of cases is determined using extensive secondary source research, as well as the definition of occupation outlined in the previous chapter:

“The stationing of armed forces by a state or an intergovernmental organization in all or part of a foreign state’s territory for at least one month, exercising coercive authority over the local population.” Using this definition of occupation, I identify 163 occupations since 1900, listed in Appendix 4.8.3. This is the first and only dataset of occupations of its kind.

The principle dependent variable in this chapter is resistance to military occupation, measured by the number of occupier fatalities. A key methodological concern in such a non-experimental study is selection bias. This occurs when the observed population reflects only part of a latent distribution. Selection is problematic because failing to take into account non-events may lead to biased estimates. However, in order for there to be a bias in the estimates, there must be an endogenous, as opposed to exogenous, selection process. In other words, some of the factors that determine whether a state is occupied also affect the level of resistance to occupation. An endogenous selection effect will bias the coefficients, whereas an exogenous selection effect will

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1 Ideally, the unit of analysis would be the occupation-year. Unfortunately, there is insufficiently granular data on occupier strength and occupier-force fatalities to break down the analysis at this level.
simply lead to a loss of efficiency in the estimates.

There may be reason to believe that selection bias is at work in resistance to occupation. States do not occupy foreign territories at random. Instead, they are cognizant of the balance of power and its effects on the cost and outcome of war. According to rationalist theories of war, states will refrain from starting wars they know they will lose; similarly, states may refrain from occupying territories they know will generate bloody resistance. Thus, we would observe a disproportionate number of occupations with low levels of resistance, which is indeed the case (see Figure 4.3). This could lead to the erroneous view that occupations do not cause resistance, when, in fact, states are simply prudent enough to avoid difficult occupations. For example, when the US National Security Council debated the risks of a preventative war against the Soviet Union in 1954, it became apparent that the US would need to occupy Soviet territory in the aftermath of the war. President Eisenhower balked: “The colossal job of occupying the territories of the defeated enemy would be far beyond the resources of the United States at the end of such a war” (Foreign Relations of the US 1984, 636). Similarly, in their study of peacekeeping, Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) find that the UN generally avoids sending missions to powerful countries.  

Despite these concerns, there are also several factors militating against selection bias. The process determining occupation may also be extremely “noisy,” with a complex set of factors making it difficult for states to estimate the cost of occupation a priori. Noise in the occupation selection process emerges from three factors: imperfect information, cognitive biases, and issue tradeoffs. First, would-be occupiers have incomplete information regarding the capabilities and intentions of the local population; the ability and will of the local population to mobilize resistance; the impact of novel technologies and tactics on resistance; and the possibility and impact of foreign support for resistance. Incomplete information may, therefore, lead occupiers to miscalculate the costs of occupation. Second, even if occupiers possessed perfect information, they might still be liable to underestimate the costs of occupation due to cognitive biases. Occupiers may overestimate the perceived legitimacy of their mission due to cognitive dissonance, propaganda, or deliberate misinformation from domestic or government actors. Militaries may ignore the risks of occupa-

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2Edelstein (2008, 9-10) argues that there may actually be reverse selection effects in occupation. States are likely to employ occupation as a tactic of last resort only when there are few other palatable options. Therefore, the universe of observed occupations would be disproportionately hard, leading to failures in occupation.
tion since they see such tasks as beyond their purview. Third, the selection process may be noisy because occupiers undertake issue tradeoffs. Occupiers may be aware of the high costs of occupation, but are willing to incur them in order to advance more important ideological or material goals. Indeed, military casualties are, by their very nature, sacrifices made in the name of a national interest. Alternatively, when the balance of power among players is shifting, occupiers may be willing to incur the high costs of occupation in time $t$ in order to prevent even higher costs in time $t + 1$ (Powell 2006).

In order to address selection bias, I employ a two-stage process. In the first stage, using a probit model, I estimate the factors that put states more at risk for occupation. Importantly, I include potentially endogenous variables that we may expect to affect both the probability of occupation and the degree of resistance in occupied territory. In the second stage, using a negative binomial count model, I estimate the factors that cause occupier fatalities. Third, I include the predicted probabilities of occupation in the negative binomial model in order to test for selection. If the predicted probability of occupation onset is not correlated with the error term in the resistance model, this will allay concerns of selection bias in the estimate of occupier-force fatalities. Appendix 4.8.2 provides a formal proof of this method, as well as the full selection-bias test. As will be demonstrated, the factors determining occupation are largely distinct from those determining resistance.

### 4.3 Who Gets Occupied?

#### 4.3.1 Unit of Analysis and Dependent Variable

First, I develop a basic model to estimate occupation onset. This model sets out to estimate the probability that a state will experience occupation. The unit of analysis is state-years. I start with a list of every state in the Polity IV dataset starting in 1900. To this list, I add a number of states not in the Polity dataset that were occupied as soon as or very shortly after they were created or achieved independence (Palestine, North Korea, South Korea, Western Sahara, East Timor, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Namibia) (Gurr et. al. 2009). The dependent variable in the model is occupation onset using an original dataset and drawing from the aforementioned definition of occupation. The dataset was built from extensive research in primary and secondary sources and
is the first and only one of its kind. The dataset starts in 1900, including occupations ongoing
during that year. The 1900 start date is arbitrary, driven principally by data availability. Each
occupation corresponds to one observation in the dataset, although the same country-year can
experience several occupations.

4.3.2 Independent Variables

The factors determining the propensity of a state to experience occupation fall under two broad
categories: capabilities and international context. I hypothesize that military capabilities, alliances,
population size, and mountainous terrain can play a role in determining occupation onset. Of
these factors, I expect only population and mountainous terrain to predict both occupation onset
and resistance to occupation. According to the Realist theory of International Relations, more-
powerful states are better able to deter attack and less likely to be defeated in war. As a con-
sequence, we should expect states with great military capabilities to be less likely to experience
occupation. Therefore, I include as a control the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC)
drawn from the Correlates of War project (Singer et al. 1972). Smaller states can compensate for
the relative weakness by forging alliances with other states. In order to capture this effect, I include
a measure of alliance membership drawn from the Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance
Dataset (Gibler and Sarkees 2004). This Alliance variable is coded as the highest level of alliance
commitment, where 0 indicates no alliance, 1 indicates a neutrality or non-aggression pact, 2 indi-
cates an entente, and 3 indicates a defensive alliance. Generally speaking, we should expect states
involved in defensive alliances to be less at risk for occupation than states engaged in a neutrality
pact.

Large population size will make occupations more costly, forcing occupiers to spread them-
sesthes thin to police the population. Indeed, force-to-population ratios play an important role
in military planning. I hypothesize that populous countries are less likely to be occupied than
sparsely-populated ones. I draw data on total population size from the Correlates of War project
(Singer et al. 1972). Mountainous terrain can also play a role in deterring occupation, either by
providing a natural bulwark against the passage of armored vehicles or by facilitating cover and
concealment of defensive forces (Clausewitz [1832] 2007). Therefore, I include a measure of the
Table 4.1: Description of variables for occupation-onset models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post1945</td>
<td>Time period after 1945</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate War Loser</td>
<td>State lost an interstate war</td>
<td>Ghosn et al. 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>Highest level of alliance commitment. 3=Defense 2=Entente 1=Neutrality or non-aggression 0= None</td>
<td>Gibler and Sarkees 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log. Mountainous</td>
<td>Log. percent mountainous terrain</td>
<td>Fearon and Laitin 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffer State</td>
<td>State is a buffer between great powers</td>
<td>Fazal 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>State experienced a civil war</td>
<td>Sarkees and Wayman 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capabilities</td>
<td>CINC score</td>
<td>Singer et al. 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log. Population</td>
<td>Log of total population of state</td>
<td>Singer et al. 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Polity score of potential occupying state</td>
<td>Gurr et. al. 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Difference</td>
<td>Coded 1 if main religion of dyads is different</td>
<td>CIA 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Contiguity</td>
<td>Coded 1 if dyads share a direct land border</td>
<td>Tir et al. 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

percent of the state that is mountainous, drawn from Gerrard (2000). Because the defensive benefits of mountainous terrain do not accrue in a linear fashion, consistent with other studies, I take the log of the measure of mountainous terrain.

Naturally, we may expect the international context to play an important role in determining the onset of occupation. Among other factors, war outcomes, civil war, the norm of state sovereignty, and buffer-state status affect incentives for states to intervene and occupy other states. First, states that lose wars are more likely to be occupied. They may be weakened by the process of war, and their opponents may have incentives and capabilities to occupy the country in order to plunder resources or decapitate the regime. As has been discussed, states may use occupation as a way to prevent the reoccurrence of interstate war. To code states that have been defeated in an interstate war, I use the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset (Ghosn et al. 2010). Second, states experiencing civil war may be more at risk for experiencing occupation. Such states will be weakened and distracted by internal conflict, making them more vulnerable to foreign attack. The international community may have stronger incentives to intervene in such states, to protect domestic clients and allies, monitor and enforce ceasefires, or stem humanitarian disasters such as genocide or mass migration (Fortna 2004; Walter 2001; Finnemore 2003). I code states experiencing civil war according to the Correlates of War Intra-state War dataset (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).
Some International Relations theorists have posited that the probability of experiencing occupation has declined since the middle of the 20th century as a result of strengthened norms regarding state sovereignty, decolonization, and the crystallization of customary international law. In addition, Article 4, Section 2 of the 1945 UN Charter states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (UN 1945). This principle was reinforced in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations, and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which stated:

“Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues” (UN 1970).

The legal and normative innovations have raised the costs of undertaking occupation. Invasion and occupation have not been abolished in International Relations, but they have clearly become more controversial. In order to control for this effect, I create a dummy variable for state-years after 1945. Lastly, recent scholarship has found that buffer states—that is, states geographically located between two other states engaged in a rivalry—are more likely to experience occupation, invasion, and state death. As Fazal notes, “Regional or great powers surrounding buffer states face a strategic imperative to take over buffer states: if these powers fail to act against the buffer, they fear that their opponent will take it over in their stead” (Fazal 2007, 312). I create a variable for buffer states following the coding rules provided by Fazal. A summary of the definitions and descriptive statistics are provided in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.

4.3.3 Model Specification

The dependent variable in the onset model is binary, with 0 indicating that a state is not occupied in a state-year and 1 indicating that the state is occupied in the state-year. I therefore employ a
Table 4.2: Summary statistics for onset models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monadic data</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied State</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post 1945</td>
<td>0.731</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate War Loser</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>1.429</td>
<td>1.298</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log. Mountains</td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td>0.647</td>
<td>-2.351</td>
<td>1.514</td>
<td>9750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffer State</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capabilities</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.428</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>9923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dyadic data</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied State</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1104218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post 1945</td>
<td>0.858</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1110858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate War Loser</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1110854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log. Pop</td>
<td>8.960</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>2.651</td>
<td>14.078</td>
<td>1086010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>1.646</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1110854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log. Mountains</td>
<td>0.656</td>
<td>0.644</td>
<td>-2.351</td>
<td>4.311</td>
<td>1110858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffer State</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1110858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1110858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capabilities</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>1085478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.516</td>
<td>7.365</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1093713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Clash</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1110858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Contiguity</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1110858</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
probit model and cluster observations at the state level.

4.3.4 Findings of Occupation-Onset Model

The results of the occupation-onset model, shown in Table 4.3, provide some insight into the probability that states will be occupied. Consistent with rationalist theories of war, state capabilities play some role in predicting the likelihood of being occupied. As predicted, the proxy for military capabilities is found to have a negative effect on the probability of being occupied, but this effect is not found to be statistically significant. Populous states are found to be less likely to be occupied, but this effect is not found to be statistically significant. Mountainous terrain and alliance status also do not have a statistically significant effect.

The international context is also seen as playing a key role in occupation. Predictably, states that have lost an interstate war are more likely to be occupied. Holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode, states that have lost inter-state wars are four-percent more likely to experience occupation. States experiencing civil war are two-percent more likely to be occupied. Changes in the international system after the Second World War also appear to have reduced the risk of occupation. Indeed, post-1945 states are approximately one-percent less likely to be occupied than those prior to 1945. Buffer-state status also increases the likelihood of being occupied, consistent with Fazal’s findings.

As a robustness check, I rerun the models employing a rare events logit to account for the possibility that the effect will be biased by the rarity of the incidence of occupation (King and Zeng 2001). Employing a rare events logit does not change the direction or statistical significance of the results.

4.3.5 Selection Bias?

The results of the occupation-onset model provide evidence against selection bias with regard to resistance to occupation. While the process of occupation is not random (civil and interstate war, buffer-state status, and the post-1945 time period all play a role), the factors determining the onset of occupation are distinct from those that would predict the intensity of resistance. Among the factors that states consider when occupying foreign countries, the probability of resistance...
Table 4.3: Risk of occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Probit</th>
<th>RE Logit</th>
<th>Dyadic Probit 1</th>
<th>Dyadic Probit 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post 1945</td>
<td>-0.34***</td>
<td>-0.80**</td>
<td>-0.26***</td>
<td>-0.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate War Loser</td>
<td>1.51***</td>
<td>3.03***</td>
<td>0.80***</td>
<td>0.83***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.05**</td>
<td>-0.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log. Mountains</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffer State</td>
<td>0.34**</td>
<td>0.84**</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>0.79***</td>
<td>1.79***</td>
<td>0.65***</td>
<td>0.67***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capabilities</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>-3.19</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
<td>(5.81)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log. Population</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.10***</td>
<td>-0.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Clash</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Contiguity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.68***</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.52***</td>
<td>-2.75**</td>
<td>-2.56***</td>
<td>-2.53***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.92)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>9303</td>
<td>9303</td>
<td>1085424</td>
<td>1069004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
does not appear to figure prominently. As such, we should expect the selection process to be exogenous to resistance, and thus, not bias the estimates of the resistance model. Section 4.8.2 in the appendix provides a further test for selection effects by employing the predicted probabilities of the occupation-onset model as an independent variable for the resistance model described in upcoming Section 4.4.

4.3.6 Modeling Occupation Onset Dyadically

As a last robustness check, I model occupation onset dyadically. The occupation-onset model described in the last section uses the state-year as the unit of analysis. A drawback with this monadic unit of analysis is that it cannot take into account characteristics of the occupier in determining occupation onset, which trust theory suggests are relevant to resistance. Indeed, if potential occupiers are aware that democracy and religious affinity dampen the likelihood of resistance (as trust theory suggests they do) then such factors may also affect the selection of occupations. In order to account for the characteristics of the occupying state, I therefore create a directed dyadic dataset for all state-dyads for every year in the international system between 1900 and 2010 (over 1,100,000 observations in total). Each dyad includes a potentially occupied state and a potentially occupying state. This dataset is “directed” insofar as the dyad “State A-State B” is different from the dyad “State B-State A.”

Using a dyadic dataset allows me to employ a number of new variables to model occupation onset. First, I measure the regime type of the potential occupying state, using the Polity IV dataset (Gurr et. al. 2009). Regime type is measured on a scale from -10 to 10, with -10 being the most autocratic and 10 being the most democratic. Polity scores are coded to the closest available year. Second, I code whether the dyads are territorially contiguous using the Correlates of War Project’s Direct Contiguity Dataset (Tir et al. 2006). Territorial continuity is expected to increase the likelihood of occupation onset, as states need not overcome the stopping power of water or third states to deploy military forces. Third, I code for religious differences in state dyads. Religious difference is a dummy variable representing a difference in the dominant religion of dyads.

---

3I include colonies and dependencies in determining territorial contiguity for colonial powers.

4The religion of each state is coded as Buddhist, Christian, Confucian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, Shinto, Taoist, or other. Each state is coded as the largest religious group in the state, according to the US Central Intelligence Agency.
As with the monadic occupation-onset models, the dependent variable codes whether occupation occurs in a given directed state-dyad-year. I employ a probit regression and cluster observations at the state-dyad level. The results are included in Table 4.3. I run two models, one restricted to those variables found in the monadic occupation-onset models and one adding dyadic variables that measure religious difference, regime type, and direct territorial contiguity. The results are largely consistent in direction, magnitude, and statistical significance, with the monadic occupation-onset model, with one exception. I find that the population of the potentially occupied state in negatively associated with the probability of occupation onset dyad. Unlike the monadic models, this effect of population is statistically significant, though substantively quite small. In other words, the dyadic model finds that more populous states are less likely to be occupied. This is not surprising in and of itself, but could cause concern about selection bias. In order to account for this possibility, Section 4.8.2 in the Appendix employs the predicted probabilities of the dyadic occupation-onset model as independent variables for the resistance model (presented in the next section). As is described in the Appendix, none of the predicted probabilities are found to be statistically significant, thus assuaging concerns of selection bias.

### 4.4 Who Resists Occupation?

The previous section examined the factors that predict occupation. This section seeks to explain why certain occupations generate resistance, measured in terms of occupier forces’ fatalities.

#### 4.4.1 Unit of Analysis and Dependent Variable

The unit of analysis is occupations, drawn from an original dataset. The dependent variable is resistance to occupation. I operationalize resistance as the number of fatalities incurred by occupying forces in occupied territory during the course of the occupation. This measure does not include forces killed in the course of an inter-state war between the occupiers and the occupied prior to occupation.\(^5\)

---

\(^5\)Occasionally, I found disagreement in the historical literature on the number of fatalities. When faced with conflicting estimates, I used the figure most commonly cited in the literature. If there was no tendency in the literature towards certain estimates, I took the average. For the cases of Serbia in 1918, Poland in 1939, and Latvia in 1940, estimates were
The dependent variable of occupier-force fatalities poses some methodological issues. Given the difficulties of obtaining data on fatalities in the midst of war, there is inevitably some measurement error. However, it is important to note that this measurement error is non-systematic. Reports of occupier-force fatalities are not drawn exclusively from occupiers or resistance forces. Therefore, the error is noise that is not correlated with the independent variables. Although the measurement reduces the efficiency of the statistical analysis, it does not bias the results (Keohane et al. 1994).

Another methodological issue is the use of fatalities as the sole measure of resistance. Resistance can take a variety of shapes and forms, from assistance to insurgents, to protests, strikes, sabotage, and assassinations, all the way up to suicide attacks on occupying forces. Occupier-force fatalities are, therefore, only the most extreme manifestation of resistance, and by ignoring other forms of resistance we are seeing only part of the picture. While the other forms of resistance can affect occupations, most face problems of measurability, systematic bias, and comparability. Most forms of resistance are not serious enough to be systematically counted, though they may add up to a sizeable effect over the long term. When acts of resistance are measured, they often suffer from reporting bias. Take, for example, the use of membership in a resistance group as a measure of resistance. Because resistance is a risky activity, individuals do not always openly identify with resistance movements during the course of the conflict. If resistance succeeds, membership tends to be over-reported; if it fails, membership tends to be under-reported, systematically biasing the results. Moreover, even when acts of resistance can be counted reliably, many cannot easily be compared. Cutting a local telephone line and blowing up a strategic bridge are both individual acts of sabotage, but they are in no way comparable in their effect. Counting the members of a resistance group is not very meaningful if some members are mere sympathizers while others are hardened guerillas. Ultimately, occupier-force fatalities are the most reliable measure of resistance to occupation. Moreover, fatalities are the most politically salient cost of occupation, particularly in normally casualty-averse democracies.

Imputed based on accounts of resistance. As a robustness check, I dropped these cases without significantly affecting the results. References for all cases are available.
4.4.2 Principal Independent Variables

I posit that two sets of factors play an important role in explaining resistance to occupation: political dislocation and trust.

Political Dislocation

One of my key theoretical propositions is that resistance will be greater when occupiers undertake policies that cause political dislocation. Occupiers may be reluctant to withdraw from occupied territory unless they can obtain guarantees that the political outcome of the conflict will not be reversed as soon as they withdraw (Reiter 2009; Downes 2009). This commitment problem gives occupiers incentives to change the leadership or implement reform in the occupied states. Political reform serves as an exit strategy that anchors political gains. In conducting reform, however, occupiers may come to disrupt the domestic distribution of political power, what I term political dislocation. Domestic groups that would have otherwise waited out the occupation may be driven to resist. Groups weigh the immediate risk of resistance against the costs of a weakened political position in the future. Understanding resistance partly as a domestic struggle for power in an occupied territory, rather than as a simple reflex against invasion, can help explain why only certain groups take up arms. Indeed, resistance movements frequently have ethnic or ideological inclinations, and occupations often turn into civil wars, as factions turn against each other in the aftermath of occupation.

Forced leadership change (overthrow). I measure political dislocation by looking at changes in leadership and the context of occupation. Political dislocation theory predicts that resistance will be greater when outsiders impose changes to the political balance of power. Changes of leadership that are endogenous—i.e., that emerge from organic or domestic movements rather than from foreign impositions—may be perceived as more legitimate and/or better reflect the domestic balance of power. Conversely, forceful foreign-imposed leadership change may be seen as illegitimate. Domestic actors may see the foreign occupier as the cause of political dislocation and, therefore, target foreign troops in order to prevent or reverse it before they become entrenched. Therefore, I code cases for whether there was a forceful change in the leadership of the state: assassination, coups, or forced exile. The coding for this variable draws in part from the Downes’
dataset on foreign-imposed regime changes (FIRCs). Indeed, there is increasing evidence that forceful regime overthrow is a determinant of civil war, when a weakening of the state following interstate war and occupation, and the generation of resentment because of regime change lead to greater political contestation (Downes 2011; Reiter 2010). It is important to remember that not all foreign occupations result in leadership change. In fact, foreign occupation results in the overthrow of the regime in only 44.17 percent of occupations. For instance, rulers may invite foreign armies to help put down domestic insurgencies, as was often the case in France’s support of Chad. The purpose of the occupation is, therefore, to maintain, rather than to overthrow, incumbents. In other circumstances, occupiers may control only part of the occupied state and are, therefore, unable to carry out a more sweeping regime change. For example, Germany controlled vast swathes of Western USSR during the Second World War but failed to overthrow Stalin.

**Hypothesis 1** Occupations that forcefully remove the leader of the occupied state will experience more resistance.

**Trust**

Another key proposition is that resistance emerges as a reaction to occupation policies. As with other aspects of International Relations, the occupier and the occupied interact under conditions of anarchy. Fear of future occupation and potential abuse act as a catalyst of resistance to occupation. Resistance will be muted, however, if mechanisms are put into place to check the power of the occupier and build trust with the occupied population.

*Regime type.* There are a number of variables that may affect the level of trust during occupations. The nature of the occupying state may have an impact on the level of trust. Specifically, while authoritarian states may have few restrictions and inhibitions in repressing occupied populations, democracies may be less likely to annex occupied states. Indeed, while democracies have often engaged in colonialism, only three states deemed to be democracies (UK, Israel, and Armenia) have annexed occupied territory since 1900. Thus, using the Polity IV dataset, I code the political regime of the occupying state for the year prior to the occupation (Gurr et. al. 2009).

---

6There is not a complete overlap between my dataset and the Downes dataset since not all FIRCs involve occupations.
In the cases of multinational occupations, the variable is coded as the average Polity score of the three largest troop-contributing states.

International organizations. Multilateral occupations may affect trust and, thus, resistance to military occupation. Regional or international institutions such as the UN, NATO, ECOWAS or the AU can provide checks on the power of occupying forces. International institutions may also increase transparency and oversight in occupation (for a contrary view, see Ratner 2005 and Edelstein 2008a). International organizations can serve as gatekeepers of international legitimacy and, consequently, signal benign intent (Finnemore 2003). In addition, multilateral operations must maintain the support of their members to persist. In other words, withdrawal of occupying forces is the default policy. By providing additional veto points, multilateral occupations reduce the fear of abuse, permanent occupation, and annexation. There are different levels of multilateral occupation. An occupation may have an international mandate with international organization command and control of military forces and territorial administration. The international organization can provide a mandate for an occupation but delegate autonomous operational responsibility to states. Furthermore, an international organization may provide its blessing to a unilateral or multilateral occupation once it has already begun, such as the 2001 occupation of Afghanistan and the 2003 occupation of Iraq. Alternatively, an occupation can be multilateral—that is, carried out by several states, but without the blessing of an international organization. Moreover, multilateral occupations can have international organization mandate, from the UN or the League of Nations, or can have regional organization mandates from organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Organization for African Unity (OAU), NATO, the European Union (EU), the Arab League, the OAS, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Regional organizations may also be expected to provide legitimacy, though perhaps not beyond their area of membership.

In order to capture the effect of multilateralism on resistance to occupation, I create an international organization dummy variable for occupations operating under the League of Nations or the UN. The list of League of Nations and UN occupations is drawn from van Ginneken (2006) and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). Because the effect of a regional organization mandate may differ from that of an international organization, I create a separate dummy
variable for occupations operating under the mandate of a regional organization. The list of regional organization occupations is drawn from Bellamy and Williams (2005) and complemented by secondary sources for more-recent cases. Regional and international occupations are not mutually exclusive. Clearly, not all multilateral peacekeeping operations are considered occupations under the definition used here. Traditional peacekeeping operations, where UN troops are interposed between opposing forces on an international boundary, are not considered occupations. In order to qualify as an occupation, occupying forces must exercise some coercive authority, such as patrolling or policing, over the local population. Importantly, an international mandate must be obtained before the occupation to be coded as an international-organization-approved occupation. Thus, the US occupation of Iraq since 2003, which acquired a UN mandate following the invasion, does not meet this criterion.

Religious difference. Trust between the occupiers and the occupied may be a function of shared values. Occupied populations may come to fear occupiers if they believe that the occupiers have come to change their way of life or govern them according to a different set of values. According to Huntington (1993), civilizations represented through the world’s major religions will take over from ideology as the main sources of friction in International Relations. Religion can affect resistance by heightening the perceived differences between “in-groups” and “out-groups,” as well as diminishing the perceived legitimacy of the occupier (Wood 2003). Religious differences also make it easier for resistance leaders to portray their struggle in zero-sum terms, as well as to demonize their opponents (Pape 2005). The religion of states is coded as Buddhist, Christian, Confucian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, Shinto, Taoist, or other. Each state is coded as the largest religious group in the state, according to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA 2010). Religious difference is a dummy variable representing a difference in the dominant religion of the occupied and the occupying state.

Mass killing. Finally, trust will break down when occupiers undertake policies of indiscriminate violence and mass killing. In such situations, the costs of passivity will outweigh those of resistance (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Prospect theory also explains that individuals are more likely to take risks when facing the prospects of loss rather than the chances of gain (Gurr 1970; Scott 1985). Because violence is indiscriminate, it should also provoke resistance by a wide range of groups within the occupied state. Mass killing is defined as the killing of more than 50,000 civil-
ians in a period of five years or less. Data on mass violence is drawn from Valentino et al. (2004) and complemented by secondary sources for the 1900-1945 and 2000-2010 time periods. While finer-grained data on occupier abuses would be useful, it faces strong endogeneity problems. It is difficult to identify whether occupier abuses caused resistance, whether resistance triggered occupier abuses, or, more likely, both.

The following is a summary of hypotheses regarding the effect of trust on resistance to occupation:

**Hypothesis 2** *Occupations with a mandate from an international organization will experience less resistance.*

**Hypothesis 3** *Occupations with a mandate from a regional organization will experience less resistance.*

**Hypothesis 4** *Occupations by autocratic states will experience more resistance than those by democratic states.*

**Hypothesis 5** *Occupations that implement policies of mass killing against the occupied state will experience greater resistance.*

**Hypothesis 6** *Occupations in which the dominant religion is different between the occupier and the occupied will experience more resistance.*

### 4.4.3 Alternative Theories

I posit that trust and political dislocation play an important role in predicting resistance to occupation. However, there are a range of other factors and alternative theories that should also be taken into account in modeling resistance to occupation. These factors fall under three broad categories: nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context.

**Nationalism**

Although many scholars argue that nationalism is a powerful force in International Relations, there exists no single or ideal measure of nationalism. This is a major shortcoming of the literature on nationalism, one that cannot be addressed here. It should also be noted that because
nationalism is generally thought to have arisen through the process of modernity, in a dataset that begins in 1900, we can test only the intensity of nationalism rather than the existence of nationalism (Gellner 1983). These complications aside, a number of variables are coded in order to capture the potential effect of nationalism on resistance to occupation.

State age. Nationalist sentiment may be related to the age of the state. Older states may be expected to draw greater loyalty from their citizens due to deep cultural heritage, traditions, symbolism, and legitimacy. Older states may also cultivate a more defined sense of identity. The age of the state is coded by the year that it entered the international system, according to the Correlates of War State System Membership, with adjustments made for states not listed in the Correlates of War (COW) dataset.

Literacy. Similarly, education can inculcate a strong sense of nationalism. The advent of mass schooling in the 19th century served both to enhance economic growth and to consolidate nation-states through cultural homogenization. Following Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006), I proxy mass schooling by the adult literacy rate at the beginning of the occupation, using data from UNESCO and the Cross-National Time Series dataset, as well as other secondary sources when necessary (Banks 2011). When data are not available for the year of occupation, I code for the closest available year.

Ethno-linguistic fractionalization. The effect of nationalism on resistance to occupation may be contingent on the homogeneity of the occupied society. Ethnic fractionalization dilutes the absolute commitment to the nation by creating competing loyalties. In so doing, it also reduces individuals’ commitment and self-sacrifice in defending the nation. All other things being equal, we would expect relatively homogeneous societies to exhibit greater levels of nationalist resistance than relatively heterogeneous societies. I code ethnic fractionalization employing the widely-used Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF) based on the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) and drawn from Collier et al. (2007).7

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7It should be recognized that ELF is a blunt and imperfect measure of fractionalization. ELF is based on ascriptive and primordialist categories and, therefore, often fails to capture relevant and evolving cleavages within a society (Kalyvas 2006; Posner 2004). For our purposes, however, ELF is sufficient to measure the existence of some heterogeneity, even if this heterogeneity does not capture the full complexity of occupied societies.
Opportunity Structures

Groups and individuals that participate in resistance are sensitive to incentive structures. Factors that affect the cost of taking up arms will, all other things being equal, affect the likelihood and intensity of resistance. This is particularly the case in resistance movements, which are usually irregular and relatively weak in comparison to occupying forces.

*Terrain.* Previous studies have found that “rough terrain” affects the likelihood of insurgency (Buhaug and Gates 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), though this effect is not consistent across studies (Lyall 2009a). Some of the most renowned resistance groups, such as the French *Maquisard* and the Lithuanian Forest Brothers, are named after the terrain that facilitated their struggles. Rough terrain, including mountains and forests, provide cover for irregular forces. Mountains can be defended more easily and with smaller forces (Guevara [1968] 1998). Rough terrain also narrows the advantage of conventional militaries by making it more difficult to maneuver and project force with heavy military equipment. Using data from Gerrard (2000), I measure the percentage of a country’s terrain that is mountainous.

*Population.* Second, I control for demographic factors that affect the costs and opportunities of undertaking resistance. The most obvious factor is the size of the population in the occupied state. Assuming that the local population is sympathetic to the resistance struggle, a larger population provides the human cover for insurgency, as well as a greater recruitment pool for resistance (Mao [1937] 2000). The larger the population, the less likely it will be that the occupier will capture and punish a member of a resistance group. Larger populations make it costlier to search the population or to inflict collective punishment for acts of resistance. Conversely, large troop-to-population ratios increase the ability of the occupying forces to deter and defeat resistance by gathering intelligence, providing security to the local population, covering terrain, and responding to attacks in a timely fashion. 8

*Per capita GDP.* Economic conditions in the occupied state may also affect the propensity of resistance to occupation. A wide range of studies have identified low per capita GDP as one of the most important predictors of insurgency and rebellion. However, the nature and direction

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8 Some widely-cited studies have recommended minimum troop densities of 20 to 25 soldiers per 1,000 local inhabitants in order to successfully conduct stabilization and nation-building operations (Quinlivan 1996; Dobbins et al. 2003). However, these studies have recently been questioned (Friedman 2011).
of the causality remains contested (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Levels of economic development and prosperity in the occupied population can have a number of effects on their propensity to take up arms against occupiers. Low levels of economic development reduce the opportunity cost of taking up arms. That is, resistance activity requires individuals to take time away from other productive activities, and the risk involved in resistance may compromise future income. Income forgone will be higher in richer states, therefore increasing the opportunity cost of fighting. The correlation between income and life expectancy further magnifies the opportunity cost of taking up arms, as richer individuals are risking larger income streams over a longer period of time. Lastly, Liberman notes that the economic division of labor is greater in wealthier industrialized societies. This division of labor makes individuals less self-sufficient, more vulnerable to occupier pressure, and, therefore, less likely to resist occupation (Liberman 1998). Thus, I code the per capita GDP of the target state at the beginning of the occupation in constant 1990 dollars, using the closest available year (Maddison 2005). Because the marginal effect of per capita GDP is so small, I also rescaled the variable by dividing per capita GDP by 100.

Perhaps the most salient demographic determinant of resistance to occupation is community cohesion. Tight-knit communities can better monitor and mobilize individuals to resistance by providing status rewards to those who fight and punishing those who do not (Petersen 2001; Wood 2003). Here again, I proxy community cohesion using the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF) (Atlas Narodov Mira 1964; Collier et al. 2007).

**Foreign Troops.** Occupiers deploy troops in occupied territory to maintain order and prevent instability. We should, therefore, expect the number of foreign troops to affect the likelihood of resistance. I include a variable for the number of troops deployed in the occupied state. Measures of the number of occupying troops are drawn from historical accounts in the secondary source literature. Due to fluctuations in the numbers of troops deployed to an occupied state, I code the highest number of troops deployed to the occupied state in the span of the occupation. The number of occupying troops leads to conflicting predictions regarding occupier-troop fatalities. On the one hand, more occupying troops will create more exposure and more targets for resistance fighters. Moreover, more troops may be deployed precisely to those occupied states generating the most resistance. Thus, we would expect more occupying troops to be associated with more fatalities. On the other hand, large numbers of occupying forces may deter attacks from resistance
fighters. In such cases, we should expect overwhelming shows of force to be associated with lower levels of resistance.

*Duration.* Lastly, I include a control for the duration of an occupation. As with the number of occupying troops, longer occupations will generate more exposure for occupiers and increase the likelihood that they will experience fatalities. The duration of occupations is counted in months from the beginning of occupation until the foreign forces are removed or until they cease exercising coercive authority over the local population.\(^9\)

**International Context**

In one of the more extensive studies on military occupation, Edelstein argues that the international threat environment has an impact on the likelihood that an occupied population will rise against its occupier. Edelstein does not provide a definition of foreign threat; nor does he test his argument quantitatively. Threat is generically defined as the product of intention and capability. Determining intentions is inherently idiosyncratic and subject to misperceptions and cognitive biases that have long formed a staple of International Relations theory (Waltz 1959; Jervis 1978; Wendt 1996; Walt 1987; Press 2005). Capabilities are also hard to define, for they include more than simple “bean counting” of enemy forces and equipment, and can involve vague but critical inputs such as doctrine and tactics (Biddle 2004). These present serious conceptual issues, but for my limited purposes, I adapt Bennett’s (2007) formula to operationalize the aggregate amount of foreign threat faced by an occupied state.

First, the enemies of occupied state \(X\) are identified based on past conflict with state \(X\). Any state with whom \(X\) has engaged in a reciprocated militarized dispute that lasted at least 30 days in the five years prior to the occupation is listed as an enemy. History of conflict, therefore, serves as a proxy for threatening intent. Reciprocated militarized disputes are drawn from Maoz (2005). I dropped from this list the occupying state itself since it does not constitute a third-party threat to the occupied state. Second, I identify supporters of \(X\) as those states that joined state \(X\) against the particular enemy in the previously identified militarized dispute. I do the same for those

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\(^9\)Because the duration of occupation might be endogenous to the level of resistance, in the next section, I conduct a survival analysis of occupation duration. As will be demonstrated, the level of resistance is not, in fact, systematically related to occupation duration, allaying endogeneity concerns.
supporters of enemies of state $X$. Third, I measure the military capability of state $X$, its enemies, and the supporters of $X$, based on the Correlates of War Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC, Singer et al. 1972). Fourth, I sum over all the enemies of $X$. Given $n$ enemies, the threat faced by occupied state $X$ is:

$$\text{Threat} = - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\text{Capabilities}(\text{Enemy}_i) + \text{Capabilities}(\text{Supporters}_\text{Enemy}_i)}{\text{Capabilities}(X) + \text{Capabilities}(\text{Supporters}_X)}$$

The values of the threat variable theoretically range from 0 when state $X$ is very secure to negative infinity when state $X$ has no capabilities or allies and faces strong enemies. All other things being equal, we should expect occupied states facing greater foreign threats to generate less resistance than occupied states facing lesser foreign threats. Table 4.4 provides descriptive statistics of the main dependent and explanatory variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Occupier</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>7.943</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Mandate</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Mandate</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Age</td>
<td>44.141</td>
<td>39.275</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>112.46</td>
<td>165.757</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>20.107</td>
<td>17.182</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>129.55</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Difference</td>
<td>0.558</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Killing</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Threats</td>
<td>-23.862</td>
<td>65.406</td>
<td>-425.424</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log. Foreign Troops</td>
<td>3.639</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.615</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overthrow</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log. Mountains</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>0.548</td>
<td>-0.634</td>
<td>1.484</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Occupier)</td>
<td>6839.095</td>
<td>6656.265</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>29037</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.4.4 Descriptive Statistics

Figure 4.1 shows the number of military occupations ongoing since 1900. Consistent with the occupation-onset model, the number of occupations is correlated with interstate war. The largest spike in occupations occurred during the Second World War and its aftermath, as Germany sought to expand its empire and the Allies counterattacked. Interestingly, although the norm against ter-
Table 4.5: Description of variables for resistance models (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupier Fatalities</td>
<td>Fatalities incurred by occupying forces in occupied territory during period of occupation</td>
<td>Secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Occupier International Mandate</td>
<td>Polity score of occupying state</td>
<td>Gurr et. al. 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Mandate</td>
<td>Occupier operating under mandate of regional organization</td>
<td>Secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Difference</td>
<td>Coded 1 if religion of occupier is different from religion of majority of occupied state</td>
<td>CIA 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Killing</td>
<td>Coded 1 if over 50,000 civilians in occupied state were killed in period of five years or less</td>
<td>Valentino et al. 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overthrow</td>
<td>Leader of occupied state was forcefully overthrown during occupation</td>
<td>Secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invited</td>
<td>Occupier was invited by leader of occupied state</td>
<td>Secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
<td>Ethno-linguistic fractionalization of occupied state</td>
<td>Fearon and Laitin 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Age</td>
<td>Age of occupied state at time of occupation onset</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log. Population</td>
<td>Log of total population of occupied state</td>
<td>Singer et al. 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Per capita GDP of occupied state (divided by 100)</td>
<td>Maddison 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Duration of occupation in months</td>
<td>Secondary Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log. Foreign Troops</td>
<td>Log of number of occupier troops in occupied state (high)</td>
<td>Secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log. Mountainous</td>
<td>Log of percent of occupied state that is mountainous terrain</td>
<td>Fearon and Laitin 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Threats</td>
<td>Sum of balance of power between enemies and allies of occupied state in five years prior to occupation</td>
<td>Singer et al. 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>Literacy rate of occupied state</td>
<td>Secondary sources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ritorial conquest has solidified over the course of the 20th century, the incidence of occupation has remained between ten and 20 ongoing occupations per year. Thus, occupation remains a common tool of statecraft. This fact is attributable to the increase in invited interventions and “robust peacekeeping” missions, which are considered occupations under the definition used here. However, it is also interesting to note that the number of occupations relative to the number of states in the international system is generally declining. In other words, while occupation remains common, it is experienced by a smaller percentage of states.

![Figure 4.1: Evolution of occupations since 1900](image)

There have been qualitative changes in the nature of occupations over the 20th century. The percent of occupations with regional or international organization mandates has shifted: They had been prevalent in the inter-war period and since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the end of the Cold War was widely seen as expanding the freedom of action of the UN and an increased need
to contain ethnic conflict and civil wars. As Finnemore (2003) notes, to be perceived as legitimate by the international community, even humanitarian interventions must be multilateral.

Of the 163 occupations that have occurred since 1900, 13 have taken place in Latin America, 23 in Asia, 23 in Western Europe, 29 in the Middle East, 35 in Subsaharan Africa, and 40 in Eastern Europe. The relatively high rates of occupation in regions such as Eastern Europe and the Middle East confirm the theory that “buffer states” between great powers are more likely to experience occupation.

Nationalist theory predicts that violent resistance is a likely consequence of occupation. Figure 4.3, which displays the range of occupier fatalities, tells another story. Far from generating consistently high levels of resistance, most occupations generate fairly few occupier fatalities. The vast majority of occupations generate fewer than 1,000 occupier-troop fatalities. In fact, the majority of occupations cause fewer than 200 fatalities per occupation. Take, for example, the US occupation of Nicaragua between 1909 and 1925. US Marines initially occupied Nicaragua to support conservative forces against the liberal President of Nicaragua, José Santos Zelaya. Although the US used the pretext of the killing of two American mercenaries by Zelaya’s forces, it was also concerned about the potential construction of a rival to the Panama canal by Japan and Germany.
During the course of this occupation, the US suffered seven fatalities (Langley 1983; US Navy 2010). Returning to the broader dataset, even when focusing on the ratio of occupier-force fatalities per occupied person, resistance is fairly low. The results of the occupation-onset model provide evidence that these relatively low levels of resistance are not simply a result of selection bias. As was described, the process of occupation onset is largely exogenous to the hypothesized process of resistance to occupation.

Even when controlling for selection effects in occupation onset, these figures may be deceptive. Low fatality levels do not mean that occupations are costless or inevitably successful. Rationalist theories of war would predict that occupations should generate few fatalities. Occupiers will seek to minimize the risk of resistance by deploying sufficient troops to deter members of the occupied population from taking up arms. Alternatively, occupations may generate low fatalities because occupiers may choose to withdraw in anticipation of incurring high fatalities. As such, low fatality figures do not mean that the occupations are necessarily successful or even achieve any of their policy objectives.
4.4.5 Model Specification

The dependent variable—the number of occupier-force fatalities—is a count variable that can take only nonnegative integer values. In order to select the appropriate count model, I conduct a dispersion test, which clearly shows that occupier-force fatalities are over-dispersed, meaning that the variance is larger than the mean (see Figure 4.8 in Appendix 4.8.4). Given the nature of the data, I employ a negative binomial model.

4.4.6 Findings of Resistance Model

The principle dependent variable of interest is the occupier forces’ fatalities. The negative binomial model provides estimates on those predictor variables that affect the number of fatalities suffered by occupying forces. Table 4.17 in Appendix 4.8.4 displays the correlation between explanatory variables. There is a relatively strong correlation between key variables, such as regional organization mandate and international organization mandate or between ethno-linguistic fractionalization, country age, and per capita GDP. High correlation can lead to multicollinearity in the model. Because of the number of explanatory variables and relatively few observations, I run a set of different models.

The results of the negative binomial models are shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. For ease of understanding, I interpret the coefficients as: the percentage change in the number of occupier-force fatalities as follows: \( \% \Delta fatalities = 100 \times \exp(\beta_k \times \delta) - 1 \). Where \( \% \Delta fatalities \) is the percent change in occupier fatalities, \( \beta_k \) is the coefficient for the particular variable, and \( \delta \) is the unit change for the estimated effect.

4.4.7 Political Dislocation

The results provide support for the theory of political dislocation. Forced leadership change is found to have a strong and statistically significant effect on the level of resistance to occupation across all model specifications. Occupations that overthrow the incumbent regime experience a 475-percent increase in fatalities. Replacing forced overthrow with other measures of political dislocation, such as constitutional revisions (dummy variable for occupiers undertaking revisions to the constitution of the occupied country) or democratization (dummy variable for democratiza-
Table 4.6: Determinants of resistance (baseline models)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trust</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Occupier</td>
<td>−0.19***</td>
<td>−0.19***</td>
<td>−0.19***</td>
<td>−0.19***</td>
<td>−0.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Mandate</td>
<td>−1.47***</td>
<td>−1.31**</td>
<td>−1.48***</td>
<td>−1.56***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Dislocation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overthrow</td>
<td>1.56***</td>
<td>1.36***</td>
<td>1.57***</td>
<td>1.59***</td>
<td>1.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
<td>1.40</td>
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<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.24</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.40)</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>(1.57)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Age</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>−0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log. Population</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>−0.05***</td>
<td>−0.05***</td>
<td>−0.05***</td>
<td>−0.05***</td>
<td>−0.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log. Foreign Troops</td>
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<td>0.35*</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
<td>0.37*</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
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<td>(0.17)</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 4.7: Determinants of resistance (alternative theories)

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Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
CHAPTER 4. CROSS-NATIONAL EVIDENCE ON RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION

This result dovetails with recent scholarship that finds that Foreign-Imposed Regime Change (FIRC) increases the likelihood of civil war by undercutting the legitimacy of political institutions. Importantly, Goran and Reiter (2010, 16) note that it is not the presence of foreign troops *per se* (as nationalist theory would predict), but, rather, their effects on political institutions, that trigger violence.

4.4.8 Trust

Consistent with trust theory, the nature and behavior of occupiers is shown to be one of the stronger predictors of resistance to occupation. Unsurprisingly, mass killing, that is the killing of over 50,000 civilians under five years, has a strong effect on the propensity of resistance to occupation. Skeptics may argue that this effect is endogenous: mass killing is more likely to be undertaken to quash strong resistance and not the other way around. An examination of the cases of mass killing, such as Germany’s invasion of Poland or Japan’s invasion of China shows that for the most part, mass killings as defined here were undertaken as part of a deliberate and ideological strategy to dominate occupied societies rather than reactions to resistance itself. However, the effect of mass killing is not found to be statistically significant across all model specifications.

The most robust finding is the effect of regime type on resistance to occupations. More democratic occupiers face far less resistance than non-democratic occupiers. Every one-unit change in the Polity IV score reduces the number of occupier-force fatalities by 82 percent, holding other variables constant at their mean or mode. This effect is robust across all model specifications.

International organizations are theorized to affect the likelihood of resistance both in their benign treatment of the occupied and in the trust that they will not annex occupied territory. The models show that international organizations have a strong substantive impact on the number of fatalities suffered by occupiers. As predicted, international-mandate occupations generate less resistance than occupations without an international mandate. Indeed, occupations with an international mandate, decrease fatalities by 22 percent, holding other variables constant at their

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10 Other forms of political dislocation, such as massive economic reform or redistricting, also increase the likelihood of resistance, although their effects are not found to be statistically significant (not shown).

11 This effect may be even stronger than reported here. For example, it is possible that coverage of fatalities will be greater in democratic occupations than in non-democratic occupations. If this is correct, then the underreporting of fatalities in non-democracies should give us even greater confidence in the robustness of the results.
mean. This effect remains even when controlling for the regime type of the occupier. Thus, the dampening effect of international institutions on fatalities does not simply operate via the level of democracy among the main contributors of multilateral occupations. I run a separate model for occupations under regional organization mandates, dropping the international organization mandate variable. I find that regional organizations also have a dampening effect on resistance to occupation, reducing fatalities by 68 percent.

Lastly, I examine whether a difference of religion between the occupier and the occupied plays a role in stoking resistance. Indeed, consistent with the theory, religious difference is a powerful predictor of resistance to occupation. A clash of religion increases occupier-force fatalities by over 500 percent, and this effect is statistically significant across model specifications. In sum, trust between occupiers and the occupied is found to play a strong role in reducing occupier fatalities.

4.4.9 Alternative Theories

The data show little support for nationalism as a predictor of resistance to occupation. As mentioned above, resistance is not a universal reaction to occupation. Approximately 58 percent of occupations generate fewer than 50 occupier fatalities, while 53 percent generate fewer than 25. A first measure of nationalism, country age, is not found to be statistically significant in any of the models. The second measure of nationalism, literacy, has a highly statistically significant effect (I run literacy and per capita GDP in separate models since they are highly correlated). However, literacy is found to decrease the intensity of resistance, the opposite of Darden’s prediction. Because the effect of literacy may accrue over time, I add an interaction term between the literacy rate and the age of the occupied state at the beginning of the occupation. This does not change the results (not shown). Although Darden provides a compelling theory for why nationwide education can enhance nationalist sentiment, it is also the case that literacy rates are correlated with per capita GDP. As a cause and consequence of economic growth, states invest more in their education systems. Moreover, if modernization theorists of nationalism are correct, nationalism itself is a result of economic growth and transformation (Smith 1998). Because the opportunity cost of fighting will be higher for richer individuals than for poorer ones, this correlation between per

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12The results refer to coefficients in baseline model 1 unless otherwise indicated.
capita GDP may not show an effect in large cross-national studies. The third proxy for nationalism, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, does not exhibit any consistent or statistically significant effect on resistance to occupation. In sum, the data show that the measures of nationalism are, in fact, poor predictors of resistance to occupation. While the discipline of political science and International Relations has so far failed to provide a measure of nationalism, what is clear is that nationalism is not a constant with a determinate effect on resistance to occupation.

What role do international threats play in resistance to occupation? International threats, measured as the sum of the balance of power between enemies and allies of the occupied state in the five years prior to occupation, show no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of resistance. Therefore, I find no cross-national evidence to support Edelstein’s theory of resistance to occupation.

One of the most significant findings of the recent civil war literature has been the effect of opportunity structures on the propensity for rebellion. Factors such as mountainous terrain, levels of poverty, and overall population size have been proven to be strong predictors of rebellion. Only some of these findings from civil wars carry over to resistance to occupations. The principle economic factor of opportunity structures—per capita GDP of the occupied territory—is shown to have an effect on resistance. As expected, richer occupied states are less likely to resist occupation than poorer ones. Every $1,000 increase in per capita GDP reduces fatalities by 62 percent. This result supports existing findings in the civil war literature. It also makes a valuable addition by helping to better clarify the causal mechanisms of economic factors. Traditionally, the civil war literature has faced an identification problem in interpreting the effect of per capita GDP on the likelihood of insurrection. It was not clear whether poverty created grievances that spurred individuals to take up arms, or whether poverty reduced the opportunity cost of fighting or, more complicated still, whether low per capita GDP also reflected government weakness. I am able solve at least part of this identification problem by looking at occupations. Since occupations are, by definition, foreign and exogenous, the per capita GDP of the occupied population does not reflect the resources of the government. Additionally, per capita GDP at time $t − 1$ does not reflect economic grievances against occupiers since occupiers are usually not responsible for pre-existing economic conditions in the occupied state. The effect of per capita GDP would, therefore, be more likely to reflect the opportunity costs of fighting.
Consistent with the findings of Fearon and Laitin (2003), mountainous terrain is found to have a positive effect on resistance to occupation. This effect is statistically significant in all but one of the model specifications. Demographic factors, such as population size, are found to have a positive effect on occupier fatalities, but the results are not consistently statistically significant. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization, theorized to affect both nationalist sentiment and the costs of mobilizing individuals to rebellion, also fails to register statistically significant effects.

For many policy makers, a key question is how many troops should be deployed to successfully manage an occupation. I find a positive effect of foreign troops on the number of fatalities incurred, although this effect is not significant across all models. Are nationalism theorists therefore correct in arguing that more troops on foreign soil will only generate more resistance? The interpretation of this finding is more problematic. First, the deployment of troops can simply increase exposure: It is hard to generate fatalities when there are a limited number of occupying troops to shoot at. Thus, more troops create more targets for resistance. Second, the number of troops often reflects the intensity of preexisting resistance. States will send more troops to put down insurrections in an occupied territory. Just as the correlation between firefighters and house fires does not indicate that firefighters cause house fires, the correlation between troops and resistance does not necessarily indicate that more troops cause more resistance. Without finer-grained time-series data on troop levels and resistance, it is impossible to separate these effects.

As a robustness check, I rerun the baseline model using a quadratic transformation of the measure of foreign troops. This is to account for the possibility of a hump-shaped effect of foreign troops on resistance. Low levels of troops could be less provocative to nationalist sentiment, whereas high levels of troops would deter resistance. The measure of troops is no longer significant, but the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) indicates a worse model fit. The standard measure of foreign troops is, therefore, more appropriate for this model.

What effect does duration have on levels of resistance? The data generally support the hypothesis that longer occupations will generate greater fatalities. Every additional year of occupation increases occupier-force fatalities by 104 percent. What these data do not tell us is how occupier-force fatalities are distributed over time. Do they steadily accrue? Do they rise exponentially as the occupation drags on? Do they peter out after an initial burst of resistance? This could be a fruitful avenue for future research.
4.4.10 Robustness Checks

Occupations differ in a number of significant ways that may affect the main findings. In order to address this concern, a battery of robustness checks are included in the tables in Appendix 4.8.3.

Second World War. As the descriptive statistics show, a significant percentage of the cases of occupation since 1900 occurred during the Second World War, particularly under Nazi Germany. Such a concentration of occupations could be driving the estimated effects. In order to control for this, I create two dummy variables, Nazi and WWII, which represent occupations imposed by Nazi Germany and occupations occurring during the Second World War, respectively. Since there is substantive overlap between these two dummy variables, I run separate regressions for each. Neither variable is found to be statistically significant, and the Second World War variable is negatively signed, contrary to expectations. Lastly, I rerun the regressions dropping all cases from the Second World War, but find that the main results remain statistically significant.

Post-1945. It is possible that the effects of occupation are different in the post-1945 timeframe. In order to control for this effect, I rerun the baseline model dropping all cases of occupation starting prior to 1945. Dropping these cases does not change the direction of the main findings. However, with roughly half as many observations (83), the measures of religious difference, overthrow, mountainous terrain and per capita are no longer statistically significant.

Context. Furthermore, although the occupation-onset model does not indicate selection effects, perhaps democracies are simply better than non-democracies at selecting into successful military occupations, as they are with interstate wars. As Reiter and Stam (2002) explain, elected leaders will only embark on wars they think they can win because they understand that losing a war would mean electoral defeat. For instance, democracies may be more likely to engage in occupation as the result of wars of liberation or invitation than of wars of conquest. Since occupations resulting from conquest may be hypothesized to generate more resistance than those resulting from liberation, this could potentially account for the results. I rerun the regression adding dummy variables for conquest and liberation, but the results remain the same.

Force protection. One of the stronger findings of the baseline model is that democratic occupiers generate less resistance than do non-democratic occupiers. The effect of regime type may be spurious, however, if this effect reflects greater defensive measures rather than lesser resis-
tance. For example, democracies may be more casualty-averse and, therefore, undertake greater force-protection measures. Force-protection measures can reduce the exposure, vulnerability, and, therefore, the number of fatalities experienced by occupying forces. Force protection can involve, among other things, body armor, blastproof vehicles, and medical evacuation and treatment. These effects can be seen in the ratio of killed-to-wounded in conflict. During the Second World War, the US army experienced one killed for every 2.4 wounded soldiers, a ratio of 41 percent. During the Vietnam War, the US experienced one killed for every 3.12 wounded soldiers, a ratio of 32 percent. In the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, only one soldier was dying for every 8.3 soldiers wounded, demonstrating a much-improved killed-to-wounded ratio of 12 percent.

There is no clean measure of force protection. The nature of strategy ensures that the reliable force-protection measure of today becomes obsolete tomorrow. However, there is a very strong correlation between levels of economic development and force-protection measures. Wealthier states are better able to afford the added costs of force protection. For example, the approximate uniform and equipment cost per US soldier was $170 during the Second World War, $1,112 during the Vietnam War, and $17,472 during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (Jelinek 2007). In order to capture this effect, I proxy force protection with per capita GDP of the occupying force. I use the per capita GDP of the occupying state at the beginning of the occupation in constant 1990 dollars, using the closest available year (Maddison 2005). In the cases of multinational occupations, the variable is coded as the average per capita GDP of the three largest troop-contributing states. The per capita GDP of occupiers, which operates as proxy for the force-protection capacity of occupying forces, shows no significant effect on fatalities or on the significance of the regime-type variable.

Peacekeeping and UN missions. It could be argued that including cases of peacekeeping in a database on foreign occupations is like comparing apples to oranges, since peacekeeping troops are deployed in a different political context. Therefore, I run two additional models, the first dropping all cases coded as peacekeeping and the second dropping all occupations under the aegis of the UN. The main results still hold.

Great power occupiers. As realists might expect, a large share of occupations were undertaken by great powers such as the US (11 percent), Germany (11 percent), and the Soviet Union (11 percent). There may be concerns that this concentration of occupations may be driving results. In order to
test for this possibility, I run a set of regressions that drops the US, Germany, and the Soviet Union. All the main findings remain robust.

Geographic area. The geographic area of the occupied state might have an impact on the likelihood of resistance. For instance, in larger states, where occupying troops will be more spread out, lower force-to-space ratios might make troops more vulnerable. I find no evidence for the role of geographic area. Other main findings remain consistent.

Variations in democracy. Political regime type—in particular, democracy—has been seen as an important variable in International Relations. However, recent literature on civil wars has shown the existence of non-linear effects for democracy (Hegre et al. 2001). In order to account for this possibility, I include a quadratic form of the Polity score. The transformed polity score does not exhibit any statistically significant effect. As an added robustness check on the measure of democracy, I run a model with a dummy democracy variable. The dummied democracy variable retains a negative and statistically significant effect.

Outliers. As a robustness check, I run the regressions dropping outliers with fatality rates of over 40,000. This does not affect the significance levels of the covariates. Even at 20,000 and 10,000, the results are fairly stable. Furthermore, I run the regression with the dependent variable as the ratio of fatalities to troop size (not shown) and again with the dependent variable as the ratio of fatalities to the population size of the occupied country. Once again, the statistical significance of all variables remains the same. Lastly, I run the regressions, including a variable for pre-existing civil war in the occupied country, and I don’t find that it changes the statistical significance or direction of the main results (not shown).

4.5 How Long Do Occupations Last?

The previous section provided insight into the causes of resistance to occupation. Do these same factors help explain the duration of occupations? As the dataset shows, there is wide variation in the duration of occupations: from a few weeks to 82 years. Many of those occupations slide into permanent annexation. What explains this variation?
4.5.1 Model Specification

In order to estimate the determinants of the duration of occupations, I use a survival model, also known as a duration or hazard model. The purpose of survival analysis is to estimate the probability at time $t$ that a given unit will disappear given that it survived until time $t - 1$, controlling for a range of covariates. The survival function is defined as: $S(t) = Pr(T > t)$ where $t$ is some time, $T$ is a random variable denoting the time of death, and $Pr$ is the probability.

Survival models can be parametric or non-parametric. Parametric survival models, such as the exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, or log-logistic models, specify the theorized distribution of the hazard rate. The hazard rate indicates at what rate a given unit will disappear. For example, the Weibull model assumes that the hazard rate consistently increases or consistently decreases over time. In other words, units become more likely or less likely to die off over time. The principal advantage of parametric models is that they provide more-precise estimates, especially with smaller datasets. Non-parametric or semi-parametric models, such as the Cox proportional hazards model, make no assumptions regarding the distribution of the hazard rate. These models provide greater flexibility regarding the assumptions of the hazard rate, but at the cost of some efficiency in the estimates. For the case of occupation duration, a semi-parametric model is most appropriate. We cannot make assumptions regarding the hazard rate of the duration of occupations. On the one hand, occupations are more likely to end over time, as the occupiers may face mounting resistance in occupied territory, as well as growing costs and impatience at home. On the other hand, the likelihood that an occupation will end may decrease over time as the resistance is defeated or exhausted or the occupying state consolidates its power. As Alexander the Great stated following his conquests in the Middle East: “What we are dealing with is a pack of wild animals; they are naturally intractable, and even captured and confined they will only be tamed by the passage of time” (Rufus 1984). The Cox proportional hazards model is expressed as: $h_t(t) = h_0(t)exp(\beta'X)$ where $h_0$ is the baseline hazard function and $\beta'X$ are the covariates and regression parameters (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).
4.5.2 Findings of Duration Model

The results of the survival model provide only some indication of the determinants of occupation duration. I begin by plotting the baseline hazard of termination of occupation through a Kaplan-Meier estimator of occupation duration (Figure 4.4(a)). The Kaplan-Meier confirms some of the findings from the descriptive statistics—namely, that the majority of military occupations die off within two years, with only a minority of occupations turning into permanent annexations.

As noted above, there are strong theoretical reasons for assuming that parametric models are not appropriate for estimating the duration of occupations. In order to decide whether the Cox proportional hazards model is appropriate, however, I estimate the Cox-Snell residuals of a baseline model of occupation duration. The Cox-Snell residuals are plotted in Figure 4.4(b). If the Cox proportional hazard model holds, the estimated hazard rate of the Cox-Snell residuals plotted against the Cox-Snell residuals should fall roughly on the 45-degree reference line. I find that the Cox proportional hazards model does, in fact, fit the data closely. This provides some confidence that the Cox-proportional hazard model provides an appropriate semi-parametric form.

The results of the Cox proportional hazards model are shown in Table 4.8. Coefficients in
Table 4.8: Determinants of occupation duration (Cox PH)

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Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Cox proportional hazards model indicate the effect of variables on the hazard of the occupation terminating. The $\exp(coef)$ term indicates the hazard ratio. The interpretation of hazard ratios differs from that of coefficients, which take negative and positive values. Hazard ratios are interpreted relative to a baseline of 1.0. Variables with hazard ratios greater than 1.0 increase the risk of occupation termination; those with hazard ratios less than 1.0 decrease the risk of occupation termination. Thus, a ratio of 0.50, for example, indicates that the hazard of the occupation terminating is cut in half, while a ratio of 2.0 indicates a doubling of the risk of occupation termination.

I begin by running a baseline model with the main explanatory variables from the occupation resistance model. Perhaps the most important aspects of the survival models are the many variables that are not significant. Virtually none of the predictors of resistance to occupation are found to be determinants of the duration of occupations. Although variables denoting trust were found to reduce occupier fatalities, such factors do not affect the duration of occupations. Interestingly, the level of occupier-force fatalities does not show any consistent statistically significant effect on occupation duration. Characteristics of the occupied state, such as mountainous terrain, population, and per capita GDP, all show no statistically significant effect on the duration of occupations. Country age, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and literacy rate of the occupied state, which are used as proxies for nationalism, do not exhibit any effect on occupation duration. This is a surprising finding since we should expect greater nationalism to put an end to occupations more quickly. The only factor that is found to have any statistically significant effect in the baseline model on occupation duration is forceful regime change. The hazard ratio of forceful regime change is 0.65 meaning that such occupations terminate more slowly than other occupations, on average. However, this result is not statistically significant across models.

I then run two sets of models to test alternative theories of resistance to occupation put forth by Edelstein and Darden, who look at foreign threats and mass schooling, respectively. As in the resistance model, I find no statistically significant effect of either on the duration of occupation.

Because the duration of occupation may be a function of whether it occurred with the consent of the occupied state, I run a separate model looking at whether occupying forces were invited by the occupied state. As expected, invited occupations end much more quickly than non-invited occupations—more than two and a half times faster, in fact. I then run a set of regressions looking at whether the occupation was the result of aggression, retaliation, or liberation, using invited
Table 4.9: Description of additional variables for duration models

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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<td>Invited</td>
<td>State invited to occupy territory by government of another state</td>
<td>Secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexation</td>
<td>Occupier explicitly integrates all or part of another state into its sovereign territory</td>
<td>Secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invasion</td>
<td>State invades another state unprovoked</td>
<td>Secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retaliation</td>
<td>State responds to aggression by another state by occupying all or part of its territory</td>
<td>Secondary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation</td>
<td>A first state invades a territory of a second state to liberate it from occupation by a third state</td>
<td>Secondary sources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

occupations as the base category. The definitions employed for invited intervention, annexation, invasion, retaliation, and liberation are provided in Table 4.9. I find that, on average, occupations resulting from wars of retaliation and liberation end more slowly than invited occupations. I then run a model to examine the effect of annexation. Naturally, we should expect a policy of annexation to increase the duration of occupations. The hazard ratio of annexation is 0.61, meaning that such occupations end approximately 39 percent more slowly than other occupations on average. This is not surprising in and of itself. Moreover, it is not clear if annexation is the cause or the consequence of extended occupation. The effects of invited occupations and annexations are shown quite clearly in the Kaplan Meier plots in Figures 4.5(b) and 4.5(c). An additional set of robustness checks are provided in Appendix 4.8.5. As a last robustness check, I rerun the main duration models using a parametric Weibull model. The results and statistical significance remain largely the same.

To sum up, survival analysis indicates that the context of occupation is the best predictor of occupation duration. Perhaps the most surprising finding of the survival analysis is just how little the factors determining occupier-force fatalities determine occupation duration. This suggests that the context of occupation is a better predictor of the duration of occupations than the costs sustained in administering occupation. It should also alleviate concerns that the effect of duration on occupier forces’ fatalities is endogenous.
Figure 4.5: Kaplan Meier plots of key independent variables
4.6 From Large-n to Case Studies

Large-n cross-national analysis allows us simultaneously to estimate the effects of rival explanations and to control variables on resistance to occupation. However, it cannot provide the rich historical account necessary to demonstrate the causal mechanisms at play. As Darden (Forthcoming) notes, there are “significant losses in the quality of measurement, over-aggregation of units, and the omission of critical variables that are too difficult to code across many countries and time periods.” Therefore, following Lieberman (2005), I employ a nested approach with two stages. The first stage, completed in this chapter, involves a large-n analysis to provide a general assessment of the theory. Once the model is well specified and the results are robust, the second stage employs model-testing small-n analysis. This second stage employs process tracing and historical case studies in order to verify the hypotheses and their causal mechanisms.

Case selection methodology is an important aspect of the second stage of nested analysis as poor case selection can bias results (Geddes 1990). According to Lieberman, cases that are well-predicted in the model should be selected. Thus, I plot the predicted occupier-force fatalities from the best-fitting model against the actual occupier fatalities. The results are shown in Figure 4.6 below. The 45-degree reference line represents the location of perfect model prediction. There are a number of well-predicted cases that fall roughly along the line. In order to choose among the well-predicted cases, I look for variation in key explanatory variables, as well as variation in time period and geographic region, among the well-predicted subset of cases (Keohane et al. 1994; Gerring 2006). Some cases are also excellent candidates for case studies because they involve countries that have been occupied by different kinds of actors at different times. This effectively allows us to control for most variables, and better isolate the effect of key variables of interest. I therefore select cases of Lithuania (1939-1991), Lebanon (1976-2005), and Cambodia (1979-1993). Also displayed is the case of Afghanistan (2001-Present), which will be examined in the next chapter to explore sub-national variation in resistance to occupation.
4.7 Conclusion

Rather than demonstrating the universal effect of nationalism on resistance, the cross-national data shows that resistance tends to be pragmatic in nature. Not every occupation generates resistance. Indeed, the principal and counter-intuitive finding of this cross-national analysis is that nationalism is a poor predictor of resistance to occupation. Instead, occupied societies appear to be sensitive to the policies and nature of the occupier. Faced with occupation, populations are influenced by both the behavior of the occupiers and their effects on local political institutions. Who the occupiers are and how they behave during the occupation both play a role in how the occupied population reacts to their presence. Specifically, occupations carried out by democratic states, with international or regional organization mandates, and involving shared religion between the occupier and the occupied tend to incur fewer fatalities in the course of the occupation. Consistently with the predictions, political dislocation is also a predictor of occupier fatalities. Lastly, I found that most of the factors that predict the intensity of resistance to occupation fail to predict the duration of occupations. Instead, the context in which the occupation emerged provides better explanations of occupation duration.
In a cross-national analysis with a relatively small sample size, some caveats should be noted. First, cross-national studies necessarily employ blunt measures that fail to reflect the key independent variables with sufficient granularity. In some cases, imperfect proxies must be used as measures of important explanatory variables. For instance, despite its centrality to political science, there exists no good measure for nationalism. Conversely, some variables reflect several contradictory factors simultaneously. I noted that per capita GDP is correlated with literacy. While the former reduces the likelihood of resistance by increasing the opportunity cost of fighting, the latter is expected to enhance it by cultivating nationalist sentiment. Such contradictory effects will attenuate the coefficients of the explanatory variables. Second, aggregation of measures at the state level obscures sub-national variation in resistance, which, in fact, can be as wide as cross-national variation as the chapter on Afghanistan will demonstrate. Third, large-n quantitative analyses suffer from what can be called “measurability bias.” By necessity, quantitative analysis elevates those factors that can be measured easily and reliably while discounting those that cannot. However, not all measurable factors are important, and not all important factors are measurable. Additionally, not all important factors that can be measured can be measured well. This forces scholars to rely on a pared-down explanatory toolkit for what is an extremely complex social phenomenon.
## 4.8 Appendices

### 4.8.1 List of Occupations

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Table 4.10: List of Occupations (1900-2010)

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Table 4.10: List of Occupations (1900-2010)

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<td>Haiti</td>
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4.8.2 Robustness Checks for Selection Effects

This section explains the method for testing for selection effects in occupier fatalities. It is important to note that this section is simply a test and does not correct for potential selection bias.

In a latent model of resistance, $F^* = X\beta + \epsilon$, $F^*$ is the number of occupier fatalities; $X\beta$ is a set of explanatory variables; and $\epsilon$ is an error term with a distribution $G(\cdot)$. This model predicts the number of fatalities in the absence of any selection.

A state is more likely to be occupied if fatalities are reckoned to be low. To formalize this model of occupation, suppose that occupation $y = 1$ is determined by:

$$y = 1(F^* \leq \bar{F}(Z) + \eta)$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.1)

If the expected level of occupier-force fatalities in a state exceeds this threshold $\bar{F}$, then potential occupiers will refrain from occupying the state and there will be 0 fatalities. Otherwise, there will be occupation, with the resulting number of fatalities $F^*$. Thus, the actual observed model of resistance ($F = X\beta + \tilde{\epsilon}$) is determined by the following data-generating process:

$$F = \begin{cases} F^* & \text{if } F^* \leq \bar{F}(Z) + \eta \\ 0 & \text{if } F^* \geq \bar{F}(Z) + \eta \end{cases}$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.2)

Selection bias occurs when explanatory variables of the selection model are correlated with the error term in the resistance model because this will cause a truncation of the range of observed fatalities. However, if expected fatalities fall below a specific threshold, then there will be no truncation, and the error from the latent model and the observed model will be the same.

Specifically, define the regression done on the data as:

$$F = X\beta + \tilde{\epsilon}$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.3)

where the unobservable $\tilde{\epsilon} \sim G(\cdot | \tilde{\epsilon} \leq -X\beta + \bar{F}(Z) + \eta)$. Denote this conditional distribution as $\tilde{G}$. Notice that the truncation above a certain fatality threshold of $G(\cdot)$ means that the higher is $\bar{F}(Z)$, the less truncated is $\tilde{G}(\cdot)$. This implies directly that the expectation of $\tilde{\epsilon}$ conditional on $X$
and $\bar{F}(Z)$ denoted $H(X, \bar{F}(Z))$ and defined more formally as:

$$H(X, \bar{F}(Z)) = E_\eta E_{\tilde{\varepsilon}|X\beta + \varepsilon \leq \bar{F}(Z) + \eta}$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.4)$$

is increasing in $\bar{F}(Z)$ and decreasing in $X\beta$. Put another way, if a Country A will be invaded as long expected fatalities are below 10,000, and a Country B is invaded as long as the number of fatalities are below 1,000,000, then the unobservable in Country B will be less selected than in Country A. Thus, the bias due to selection will lead to a higher observed $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ in Country B than in Country A.

Denote the propensity score $\hat{y}$ as the predicted probability of invasion from the regression in equation (4.1), i.e.:

$$\hat{y} = E[y|X, Z]$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.5)$$

Thus, I can rewrite equation (4.4) as

$$H(X, \bar{F}(Z)) = E[\tilde{\varepsilon}|\hat{y}(X, Z)]$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.6)$$

Thus, the higher the predicted probability of invasion, the less truncated will be $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ and, hence, in the regression of fatalities:

$$F = X\beta + a\hat{y} + \nu$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.7)$$
and we should expect the coefficient $a$ to be positive and significant since a country with a predicted invasion probability will have a less truncated and, thus, higher distribution of unobservables.

Figure 4.7 provides an illustration of the selection effect. As discussed above, Country B is invaded so long as fatalities remain below 1,000,000 ($F(Z)_B$), whereas Country A is invaded only if fatalities remain below 10,000 people ($F(Z)_A$). We can see that the unobservable for Country A is much greater than for Country B. Assume that the predicted probability $\hat{y}$ of occupying Country A is 25 percent, and the predicted probability of occupying Country B is 75 percent. Then, $\hat{y}$ would be correlated with the truncation of $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ leading to a positive and significant coefficient $a$.

In Table 4.11 $Pr(occupied)$ represents the predicted probability of occupation ($a$) from the monadic
selection models in Table 4.3. Tables 4.12 and 4.12 do the same employing the predicted probabilities from the dyadic selection models in Table 4.3. As is shown, the predicted probabilities of both monadic and dyadic occupation models have no statistically significant relation with the number of occupier fatalities, assuaging concerns of selection bias.

Figure 4.7: Selection as a function of expected fatalities
Table 4.11: Determinants of resistance (testing for selection effects)

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Observations 150 150 150 150 150

Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 4.12: Determinants of resistance (testing for dyadic selection effects 1)

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4.8.3 Robustness Checks for Resistance Model
Table 4.14: Determinants of resistance (robustness checks 1)

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Table 4.15: Determinants of resistance (robustness checks 2)

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Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 4.16: Determinants of resistance (robustness checks 3)

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Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
4.8.4 Correlations and Model Specification

Table 4.17: Correlation among selected independent variables

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Figure 4.8: Dispersion test
4.8.5 Robustness Checks for Duration Model

This section provides additional robustness checks on the results of the survival models. First, I run the regressions, dropping outliers with fatality rates of over 40,000, over 20,000, and over 10,000. These do not affect the significance levels of the covariates. Second, some may argue that comparing foreign occupations, traditionally understood, to UN peacekeeping is misleading since they are politically distinct military activities. While I do not agree with this assessment, as a robustness check I run two separate duration models, one excluding all cases of peacekeeping and one excluding all cases of UN occupation. With the exception of the variable Country Age (which is now statistically significant), there is no major difference in the direction or magnitude of the variables. Third, I plot the deviance residuals of the different models against the observations, adding a smoothed residuals lowess line (Figure 4.9). The purpose of the deviance residuals is to assess whether there exist major outliers that are poorly predicted by the model. The deviance residuals are generally distributed around 0, without major outliers, indicating a suitable fit for the model. I also plot the deviance residuals over time for each of the models. The downward-sloping lowess lines on these plots show that as an occupation continues, the predictions of the model become less accurate. This is not uncommon and is more likely driven by very few outliers in longer occupations.

To test whether any of these outliers could strongly bias the estimated coefficients, I plot the score residuals for the first model (Figure 4.10). Score residuals indicate whether certain observations have disproportionate leverage on the estimated coefficients of the survival model. Consistent with most small datasets, the plots indicate a wide range of score residuals. However, none of the score residuals of certain observations have a strong effect on the statistically significant variables.

Next, I use the estimates from the first model to plot the Martingale residuals against the different variables. The purpose of the Martingale residuals is to show whether adjustments to the functional form of certain variables are required. These plots are shown in Figure 4.11 with smoothed residual lowess lines. These plots suggest that no adjustments are needed for the functional forms of covariates; since there is no substantial deviation from linearity.
Table 4.18: Determinants of occupation duration (robustness checks)

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Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

* \( p < 0.05 \), ** \( p < 0.01 \), *** \( p < 0.001 \)
Table 4.19: Determinants of occupation duration (Weibull)

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Observations: 154 154 153 154 150 154

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Figure 4.9: Deviance residuals
Figure 4.10: Score residuals
Figure 4.11: Martingale residuals
Chapter 5

Resistance to Occupation in Afghanistan (2001-2010)

All these races were accustomed to the rule and authority of another and they have no affinity to us in religion, culture, or language. Do you really think that the battle that conquered them subdued them as well?

-Alexander the Great

Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should 'have his head examined,' as General MacArthur so delicately put it.

- US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

5.1 Introduction

Afghanistan has been described as the “Graveyard of Empires” (Bearden 2001). As a gateway between the Occident and the Orient and a buffer state between the British and Russian empires, it has a long history of occupation. Most of these occupations have generated fierce resistance. The recent war in Afghanistan is no exception, as the US has become embroiled in the longest war in

1Cited in Rufus 1984, 122.
its history. This chapter sets out to describe how resistance emerged in Afghanistan and to answer the question of why it emerged the way it did. In so doing, it will shed light on which policies could be effective at addressing insurgency.

This chapter proceeds in three sections. First, I provide a sketch of the war and occupation in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010. Second, drawing on geocoded data of resistance events and a range of social, economic, and geographic indicators, I conduct a cross-sectional analysis of violence at the district level. The results indicate that political dislocation is a strong predictor of resistance, and provide only mixed support for alternative theories of nationalism and opportunity structure. Resistance against Western occupation was not national, but instead concentrated in Pashtun-dominated regions. Indeed, Pashtuns would have the greatest incentive to resist, according to political dislocation theory: the Taliban were almost exclusively Pashtun, and the overthrow of the Taliban shifted Afghanistan’s balance of political power away from the Pashtun community. This chapter concludes by drawing the policy implications of the statistical findings.

5.2 Historical Context

5.2.1 Invasion

As with many other occupations, the Afghanistan War began in response to chaos in the periphery. In the early 1990s, Afghanistan was engulfed in a vicious civil war. In 1996, the Taliban swept through Afghanistan, defeated rival warlords, gained control of Kabul, and became the de facto government. Following the attacks of 9/11, the US called on the Taliban government to hand over al Qaeda leaders based on their territory and to shut down terrorist training camps. After the Taliban rejected this ultimatum, the US launched military operations in Afghanistan in October 2001 with the stated purpose of disrupting the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations (Coll 2004). During the invasion, the US relied on a loose confederation of Tajik and Uzbek warlords opposed to the Taliban regime known as the Northern Alliance, to conduct ground operations. The combined efforts of US airpower and special forces and the Northern Alliance led to the swift collapse of the Taliban regime. By early December 2001, senior Taliban leaders and as many as 10,000 Taliban fighters fled into Pakistan, effectively ending Taliban rule (Rashid 2008).
5.2.2 Establishment of a New Government

As the US and the Northern Alliance fought the Taliban, diplomatic efforts sought to establish a government to take its place. On 14 November 2001, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for a central role for the UN in establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and to help deliver aid. After the fall of Kabul, the UN invited major Afghan factions—though not the Taliban—to an international conference in Bonn to decide on a plan for governing Afghanistan (Katzman 2010, 10). The Bonn Agreement, reached on 5 December 2001, set out a plan for the drafting of a new constitution and the establishment of a representative and freely elected government. The UN Security Council then passed a resolution creating the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF): “to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas” (UN 2001). On 22 December 2001, Hamid Karzai, a moderate Pashtun, took over the interim administration of Afghanistan.

The US and Karzai faced the challenge of establishing a new government in the wake of a civil war in an ethnically diverse country. Regime change in such a fragmented and polarized society inevitably led to significant political dislocation. While the President was a Pashtun, ministries were divvied up as spoils of war. Tajik and Uzbek leaders of the Northern Alliance took over key ministries such as foreign affairs, intelligence, interior, and defense (Barfield 2010, 284). Pashtun leader Haji Qadir left the Bonn conference claiming the Pashtuns were being underrepresented (Jones 2009b, 137).

The selection of Karzai and his cabinet was only the beginning of an extended political process. In June 2002 an emergency Loya jirga accepted a provisional government for a period of two years until a constitution could be agreed and elections held. In January 2004, a Loya jirga approved the constitution which created a strongly centralized government (Barfield 2010, 297). Generally peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections were held in October 2004 and September 2005 respectively. Karzai converted his initial appointment into a commanding electoral majority. The Taliban were the only important political group to be excluded from the Bonn process (Jones

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2The population of Afghanistan is composed of 42 percent Pashtun, 27 percent Tajik, 9 percent Hazara, 9 percent Uzbek, 4 percent Turkmen, and 2 percent Baloch, with a small number of other ethnic groups such as Nuristanis and Aimak (CIA 2010).
2009b, 145). The sweeping political reform of Afghanistan stood in stark contrast to the “light footprint” approach adopted by the US military and its allies. The mandate of ISAF was initially restricted to providing security in Kabul. In 2002, only 8,000 US soldiers, alongside a handful of British, Australian, and Canadian troops, carried periodic operations on suspected al Qaeda sites (Jones 2009b).

5.2.3 Resistance groups

As late as 2005, many in the US and the West were optimistic about ending the occupation of Afghanistan. The Taliban appeared to have been routed. A new constitution had been approved and presidential and parliamentary elections had been held. Foreign aid had led to breakneck economic growth. Violence was relatively low by Afghan standards. The US did not even use the word counterinsurgency in discussing its operations (Jones 2009b, 108, 142). Having accomplished most of the objectives it had set for itself, the US began drawing down troops from Afghanistan, transferred operational responsibility of ISAF to NATO (Barfield 2010, 318). US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced an end to “major combat” in Afghanistan in May 2003 (Katzman 2010, 9).

However, the pacification of Afghanistan proved to be an illusion. The political reforms initiated under ISAF occupation had alienated key segments of the Afghan population, while the presence of ISAF forces attracted anti-Western Islamist insurgents. Resistance to ISAF occupation is currently led by four groups: the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani network, and to a lesser extent, al Qaeda (the conflict is ongoing at time of writing). There is evidence of coordination among the different groups at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, though they do not have a unified leadership (Bergen et al. 2010, 68). With the exception of al Qaeda, all the major resistance groups are primarily Pashtun.

The Taliban is the principal insurgent group operating in Afghanistan. Following their overthrow, surviving Taliban leadership headed by Mullah Omar resettled in Quetta, Pakistan (Johnson and Mason 2008, 57). Commanders operate in a hierarchical chain of command with the senior leadership providing direction and guidance and operations being delegated to local commanders (Giustozzi 2008). The Taliban’s financial infrastructure is based Karachi and derive profits from
opium production (Jones 2009b, 107). As early as 2002, the Taliban began moving weapons, ammunition, and food supplies back in Afghanistan in preparation for combat. By the summer of 2006, the Taliban were again controlling entire districts. More than any other insurgent group, the Taliban have sought to set up a shadow government, and continue to refer to themselves as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The stated objectives of the Taliban are to expel foreign forces and overthrow the Karzai government in order to re-impose a fundamentalist regime based on Deobandism (Jones 2009b, 230). The Taliban primarily consists of rural Pashtuns from the Ghilzai confederation with some support from the Kakar tribe of the Ghurghusht confederation (Johnson and Mason 2007). Kandahar province is the traditional home of the Taliban, who are also very active in Helmand, Nimruz, Uruzgan, and Zabul. Although numbers are infamously unreliable, Giustozzi estimates the total strength of the Taliban at 17,000, with 2,000 additional foreign volunteers (Giustozzi 2008, 35).

A secondary, yet potent, resistance group is Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). Led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Mujahedeen leader and former Prime Minister, HIG’s stated objective have been to eject foreign forces, which it considers to be infidels occupying Muslim lands and to establish an Islamic government (Roy and Sfeir 2007, 131). HIG operates principally in the eastern provinces of Kunar, Laghman, Paktia, and Kapisa and recruits mostly from the Pashtun community (Jones 2009b, 234; Johnson 2007, 108).

The third main resistance group is known as the Haqqani network, headed by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin. In many regards, the Haqqani network is unified with the Taliban, although this remains an issue of debate (Rutting 2009, 60). Haqqani himself had been Minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs in the Taliban government. The Haqqani family is composed of Pashtuns from the Zadran tribe in Paktia province. The group’s traditional base of power is Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces, an area known as the Loya Paktia region (Dressler 2010). As with HIG, the Haqqani network maintains a close association with al Qaeda and espouses a radical Islamist ideology.

Lastly, al Qaeda has operated against ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Unlike other resistance groups, which are based in Afghanistan’s Pashtun community, al Qaeda emerged out a network of Arab Islamists who had joined the Mujahedeen in fighting Soviet occupation. al Qaeda’s objectives are both local and transnational. In Afghanistan, it seeks to overthrow what it considers to be
the apostate regime of Karzai. As with other insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan, it seeks to have the government replaced by a more orthodox regime, following a radical vision of Sharia. Globally, al Qaeda has sought to weaken Western governments and expulse them from what it considers to be Muslim land. Interestingly, though the US occupied Afghanistan principally to neutralize al Qaeda, the terrorist network is not the main insurgent organization. It does not have an indigenous basis of support, aside from its insurgent allies. al Qaeda has generally acted as a force multiplier for other insurgent groups, helping manufacture and carry out IED attacks and better execute suicide bombings and strategic communications (Jones 2009b, 291).

5.2.4 Insurgency

As resistance groups emerged, violence rose in Afghanistan. In April 2002 insurgent attacks were orchestrated in Kandahar, Khost, and Nangarhar provinces. The next year, insurgents launched attacks further into Helmand and Zabul provinces. In June 2003, the UN designated 31 districts in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan as “high-risk.” By June 2004, the number of high-risk districts rose to 78. By May 2007, the UN reported that approximately 41 percent of Afghanistan, or 163 districts, were inaccessible to the UN on a permanent or semi-permanent basis due to security concerns. Tactics honed in Iraq, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks, migrated to Afghanistan with devastating effect. In June 2003, the first suicide attack took place using a car bomb against a bus carrying German ISAF soldiers. The same year, attacks against Afghan officials, coalition forces, and aid workers became frequent enough that aid agencies became concerned about their security in the South and East of the country (Tarzi 2008, 283).

In hindsight, the light footprint approach proved to be a strategic mistake because there were still powerful elements in the society that continued to oppose reform (Biddle 2003, 31). The approach emboldened opponents of the regime, allowed criminal networks and warlords to reemerge, and made it harder to control the porous border with Pakistan (Jones 2009b, 115). The inability of the Afghan state or its foreign allies to effectively hold and police territory left civilians vulnerable to insurgents. Without the guaranteed protection of the state, many Afghans were forced to provide passive support to insurgents.

Afghanistan and its foreign partners eventually acknowledged their hard-earned gains were
being eroded by the insurgency. In response, the US established regional command headquarters for the more restive South and Eastern provinces of Afghanistan in 2003. In February 2004, NATO Defense Ministers agreed to a plan for the phased expansion of ISAF throughout Afghanistan. The expansion proceeded from the areas that experienced the least violence towards those that experienced the most. Thus, ISAF established Regional Command (RC) North in October 2004, RC West in September 2005, RC South in July 2006; and RC East in October 2006 (Jones 2009b, 142). In tandem with the spread of regional commands, ISAF expanded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to help promote the delivery of humanitarian aid and small-scale development projects. The short-term effect of ISAF expansion in Afghanistan was a sharp increase in violence and fatalities among civilians, insurgents, and Afghan and ISAF troops. The first six months of 2006 witnessed the greatest number of conflict related deaths since the fall of the Taliban (Rashid 2008, 364). As ISAF expanded, it found itself facing insurgent forces that had filled the power vacuum after the fall of the Taliban.

5.2.5 Uncertain Future

In 2009, President Obama called for a short term surge of 30,000 American troops to help defeat insurgent groups and solidify the security capacity of the Afghan government. By the end of 2010, the future of the government remained precarious. The surge had not achieved its intended effects. While the Afghan government and its international backers still struggled to contain the insurgency, it’s ability to survive fiscally and militarily was uncertain. Afghanistan remained almost completely dependent on foreign aid. Conversely, insurgent groups benefited from a booming drug economy. Even if insurgent groups could not hope to overthrow the government of Afghanistan, they could erode Western military support for the regime leading Afghans to question its legitimacy (Woodward 2010). By the end of 2012, the Afghanistan War had caused 3,249 ISAF fatalities (iCasualties 2013). Outright military victory and political settlement to the conflict remained elusive. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon in 2010, Western forces finally announced their intention to fold ISAF by 2014.
5.3 Quantitative Analysis

The occupation of Afghanistan has led to an escalation of violence carried out by a number of groups. However, there is widespread variation in patterns of violence. What then explains subnational variation in violent resistance? The Afghanistan War is extremely data-rich, with fine-grained information being collected on the frequency and location of attacks, as well as the ethnic and socio-economic composition of insurgents. As such, it provides a helpful case to explore violent resistance to occupation. Leveraging this data, this section uses a cross-sectional analysis of district-level violence to help explain violent resistance, and evaluate competing theories of resistance to occupation. This section proceeds as follows. First, I describe the unit of observation—Afghan districts—and the two dependent variables pertaining to violence and fatalities. Second, I introduce a number of independent variables meant to measure the effect of rival theories of resistance to occupation, namely nationalism, opportunity structures, and political dislocation. Third, I discuss the main results of the cross-sectional analysis. Last, I address a number of potential counterpoints to the findings.

5.3.1 Unit of Observation

The unit of observation for this cross-sectional study is Afghan districts. Districts are the smallest administrative boundary on which there is systematic collection of data on independent variables of interest. Prior to 2004, there were 329 districts.\(^3\)

5.3.2 Dependent Variables

The dependent variable, broadly defined, is violent resistance to occupation. A concern in the collection of conflict data is that the availability of data will be correlated with key explanatory variables, thereby biasing results. For instance, violence may prevent journalists from accessing precisely those regions most affected by violent resistance, thereby leading to an underreporting of violent events. It is epistemologically difficult to ascertain the completeness of any dataset, especially given a rare or unique phenomenon. While complete certainty is impossible, diversifying

\(^3\)This number was subsequently increased to 397 districts in 2004. Since most district level data dates from 2003, I use older district boundaries.
sources of information can help reduce this bias and increase confidence in estimates. In order to capture the phenomenon of violent resistance in the context of Afghanistan, I employ two sources.

First, I examine the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010). ACLED includes reported information on internal political conflict, disaggregated by date, location, and actor. The unit of observation in ACLED is an individual event that occurred at a given location. Events take place between conflict actors and are coded for a specific point location and on a specific day. Conflict actors include governments, rebel groups, militaries, and organized political groups who are involved in interactions over issues of political authority (i.e. territorial control, government control, access to resources, etc.). ACLED data are based on a secondary sources, such as articles and news reports. The ACLED dataset on Afghanistan includes 3,384 events between January 2004 and February 2010. The main drawback of ACLED is that it doesn’t cover the period between 2001 and 2004 and has limited coverage for 2005 and 2006 (correspondence with Raleigh 2011).

Second, I employ fatality data drawn from 76,911 geocoded US Significant Action reports (SIGACTs) between 2004 and January 2010. These reports were released by Wikileaks.org. The reports cover most units from the US Army with the exception of most US Special Forces’ activities (Wikileaks 2010). The SIGACT dataset has the benefit of distinguishing ISAF from Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) fatalities. This helps confirm that variation in resistance events does not simply reflect variation in targeting. As with the ACLED data, their main limitation is that they do not cover the period between the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and 2004. SIGACTS has the added limitation of being drawn exclusively from US military sources. Despite drawing on different sources, the ACLED and SIGACT datasets are highly correlated (O’Loughlin et al. 2010). For the ACLED and SIGACT datasets, I employ Arc GIS to sum incidents occurring within each district. Figure 5.1 provides a summary of the dependent variables.

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Table 5.1: Summary of dependent variables

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<th>Source</th>
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<td>2004-2010</td>
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<td>Open source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGACTs</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>76,911</td>
<td>US Army</td>
</tr>
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ISAF reports relatively few fatalities prior to 2004 (iCasualties 2011). Moreover, qualitative accounts of violence during this time period do not contradict findings from the 2004-2010 time period.
Figure 5.1: Geography of violence
Examining temporal and spatial variation in these dependent variables provides some preliminary insight into the causes of resistance. Resistance in Afghanistan exhibits clear temporal and spatial trends. First, there is temporal variation in violence in Afghanistan, with violence increasingly rapidly after 2005. Whether because of a weakened or deterred Taliban, a sense of gratitude for expelling religious extremists, or massive foreign subsidies, resistance was muted in the first three years of occupation (Sinno 2009, 266). These attenuating factors disappeared in 2005 and 2006 when the number of fatalities among foreign forces spiked (see Figure 5.2 (a) and Figure 5.3 (a)). Part of this spike in fatalities can be explained by a large increase in the number of foreign troops. More troops, deployed to more areas of the country, simply generated more exposure. Yet this can only be part of the answer. First, the number of troops deployed is endogenous to the level of resistance encountered during the occupation. ISAF gradually expanded its presence to the different provinces of Afghanistan precisely to counter what it saw as being a growing insurgency. Thus, while more troops created more exposure, the preexisting level of insurgency could explain an increase in fatalities. Second, while increased exposure can increase the recorded level of resistance, greater levels of troops could also plausibly deter more attacks. For example, while initially causing a spike in violence, the “surge” in the Iraq War eventually led to a decline in violence (Ricks 2009). Therefore these figures do not give us reason to believe there is a necessary linear or monotonic relation between troops and resistance.

Part of the answer may lie in the insurgents’ increased use of certain tactics. As seen in Figure 5.2 (b), suicide attacks were almost unknown in Afghanistan until 2003 and IEDs only became a major tool of insurgency after 2004. While these tactics existed before the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, Iraqi insurgents perfected their employment. Transnational Jihadist movements, such as al Qaeda, then transferred this tactical knowledge to their allies in Afghanistan (Horowitz 2010). These groups also helped Afghan insurgents more effectively adopt and employ such tactics against hardened ISAF targets, which in turn explained the spike in coalition fatalities. As the insurgent leader Jalaluddin Haqqani stated: “The American invasion of Iraq was very positive for us. It distracted the United States from Afghanistan. Until 2004 or so, we were using traditional means of fighting like we used against the Soviets—AK-47s and RPGs. But then our

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5The effect of the surge in Iraq remains a subject of debate. See Biddle et al. 2012.
resistance became more lethal, with new weapons and techniques: bigger and better IEDs for roadside bombings, and suicide attacks” (Yousafzai 2009).

Explaining temporal dimensions of resistance in Afghanistan is tricky. Many trends converged simultaneously, creating an identification problem: the regrouping of Taliban, migration of insurgent technologies from Iraq, forward deployment of more Western forces which increased friction, expansion of poppy cultivation, growing impatience with corruption and the pace of economic growth, etc… Analysts have described this as the “perfect storm” that caused the spike in insurgency in 2005-2006 (Jones 2009b). Additionally many of these factors are endogenous, meaning it can be difficult to ascertain whether resistance was the cause or the consequence of other trends. For instance, did poppy cultivation generate funds for insurgent activity or did insurgent activity create the legal vacuum for the cultivation of poppy (Lind 2010)? Did frustration with the pace of economic growth build support for the insurgency or did the insurgency create instability that undercut investment and economic growth?

Looking at the spatial variation of resistance can resolve some of these identification and endogeneity problems. Indeed, by relying on crude geographic features, the field of International Relations has tended to privilege temporal variation over spatial variation in its explanation of
violence (Raleigh et al. 2010). As will be shown later, aggregated analysis of Afghanistan tends to eclipse some of the most important regional patterns in insurgency. The spatial dimension in insurgency undermines simple explanations of variation in resistance based on coalition troop levels or insurgent tactics. Although the insurgency has gradually spread since 2002, it remains regionally concentrated in the South and East of the country. Between 2004 and 2010, ACLED recorded 45.91 percent of events occurring in the South (The provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Day Kundi, Nimroz, and Zabul) and 32.27 percent occurring in the East (the provinces of Bamyan, Ghazni, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar, Laghmán, Logar, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktya, Paktika, Parwan, and Wardak). Similarly, SIGACT data from the same time period shows 39 percent of events took place in the South and 49 percent of events took place in the East.\(^6\) ISAF fatalities figures tell a similar story: 56 percent of coalition fatalities were suffered in the South and 29 percent in the East (iCasualties 2011). Taken on a per capita basis, these spatial patterns are starker: 78 percent of ACLED events, 88 percent of SIGACTs, and 85 percent of fatalities were occurring in a part of the country that represents only 46 percent of the population. Although suicide attacks and IEDs

\(^6\)This discrepancy may be due to the fact that the US initially had a greater presence in the East than in the South of Afghanistan and SIGACT reports are drawn from US sources.
were becoming more lethal, their use remained geographically limited.

5.3.3 Independent Variables

This section describes a number of independent variables to explain this spatial variation in resistance. The independent variables are grouped along rival explanations of resistance to occupation: nationalism, opportunity structures, political dislocation, and trust.

Nationalism

Nationalism is perhaps the most common explanation for resistance to occupation in Afghanistan. Insurgent leaders frequently refer to nationalism in discussing their goals and objectives. In a statement, the leader of Hezb-i-Islami, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar demanded: “Withdrawal of foreign troops without any preconditions, allowing all Afghans and groups to set together and decide their future and formation of a government to be acceptable to all are the prerequisites for the peace talks in the country.” Later, in an interview, he said:

“The presence of foreign troops is the fundamental reason for the continued fighting. Foreign troops should leave Afghanistan…Right now I just want the freedom of my country. I am not thinking about other issues. I don’t want anything for myself, nor have we asked for anything for me or Hizb-e-Islami” (Gopal 2010).

Al Qaeda has called for the removal of foreign troops from all Muslim countries, including Afghanistan. In 2010, bin Laden stated: “How can it be right that you participate in the occupation of our lands, support the Americans in the killing of our women and children and yet want to live in peace and security?” (Associated Press 2010). Mullah Omar, the leader of the Quetta Shura Taliban said: “The current Jihad and resistance in Afghanistan against the foreign invaders and their puppets, is a legitimate Jihad, being waged for the defense of the sovereignty of the Islamic country and Islam” (Middle East Media Research Institute 2010). Elsewhere Omar said:

“The Islamic Emirate believes peace and stability will not return to Afghanistan unless and until all foreign forces pull out of the country. The unremitting continuation of

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7In the context of resistance to occupation, nationalism refers to an attachment to the Afghan nation. Sub-national or ethnic nationalism, while relevant, is considered conceptually distinct since it overlaps with political dislocation.
foreign interference will pave the way for more casualties and destructions” (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 2010).

Reports from discussions with lower-level insurgents also indicate nationalist motives: A former Taliban ambassador said: “The Taliban have no problem with the Afghan government. We have no problem with Karzai or the Afghans. The problem lies with the Americans” (Ghaith 2010). Interviews of Taliban foot soldiers in Kandahar also revealed nationalist motives among insurgents: “He fervently believes that expelling the foreigners will set things right in his troubled country... They use the language of radical Islam, but their message often consists of nothing more than xenophobia and a desire to protect their way of life” (Smith 2008, A16).

To measure the effect of nationalism I use two variables: the presence of foreign troops and the degree of ethnic fractionalization.

**Foreign troops.** Because nationalist sentiment may be inflamed by the presence of foreigners, I include a variable to measure the effect of foreign forces. Although this variable is an essential component to estimating the causes of resistance, it is also highly problematic. As noted earlier, the presence of foreign troops may be endogenous to the prevalence of resistance. However, failing to account for the presence of foreign troops can create omitted variable bias. In order to address these problems I use an instrumental variable approach. To be valid, the instrument should be correlated with an endogenous independent variable (the presence of foreign troops), but not correlated with the dependent variable (occurrence of resistance) other than through the endogenous independent variable. A promising instrument is the location of military airbases. Because they act as logistical hubs for ISAF forces, airbases tend to be correlated with the presence of foreign troops. Indeed, because Afghanistan is land-locked, virtually all Coalition troops arrive in Afghanistan through airbases and airbases play a role in certain military operations within the country. However, because all airbases in Afghanistan were built prior to 2001, their location is not correlated with the current occurrence of resistance. Data on the location of 13 airbases in Afghanistan is drawn from the Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS). I then employ Arc GIS to calculate the average distance of a district to the closest airbase. Data on foreign troop strength is drawn from the Institute for the Study of War (New York Times 2009).

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8Dube and Naidu employ a similar instrumental variable approach in examining the effect of military assistance on political conflict in Colombia (Dube and Naidu 2009).
A critical factor in considering airbases as instruments for troop presence is whether patterns of violence during the Soviet occupation differ from those in the Coalition occupation of Afghanistan since 2001. Indeed, seven air bases (Herat, Shindand, Farah, Kandahar, Kabul International Airport, Bagram, and Jalalabad) were built or improved by the Soviet Union (Nelson 1985). If the location of airbases reflects patterns of violence faced by both Soviet and Coalition forces, then the instrument will suffer from the same endogeneity problems as a measure of the distribution of troops. However, the historical record indicates that patterns of violence differed considerably between the Soviet and ISAF occupations of Afghanistan. Unlike ISAF—which faces resistance mainly in Pashtun community in the South and East of Afghanistan—the Soviet Union faced resistance from all regions and all ethnic and linguistic groups. Figure 5.4 displays the location of anti-Soviet insurgent groups. By 1981, Mujihadeen were active in 325 districts in all 29 provinces of Afghanistan (Rasanayagam 2005, 111). The US government estimated that 75 percent of the territory and two thirds of the population were under effective insurgent control (Amstutz 1986 132). Unlike the Taliban insurgency which is led almost exclusively by Pashtuns, the anti-Soviet resistance was also led by Tajiks in the North East and West such as Shah Masood and Ismael Khan (Tomsen 2011, 215). Thus, the USSR faced major uprisings in the cities of Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, as well as the Panjshir valley and the Hazarajat, areas that have been particularly quiescent during the ISAF occupation. Differing patterns of violence led to differing patterns of troop deployment. Among the 85,000 troops deployed by the USSR, approximately half were based in and around Kabul and the remainder focused on Jalalabad, Asadabad, Gardez and Ghazni in the East, and Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz, and Faizabad in the North (Rasanayagam 2005, 112-113). In contrast, the bulk of ISAF troops are deployed in the South and East of Afghanistan. Because the geographic distributions of violence during the Soviet occupation and subsequent civil war differ from the current occupation of Afghanistan, this alleviates concerns that the placement of previously constructed airbases reflects ongoing patterns of conflict.

Ethno-linguistic fractionalization. Community cohesion has been theorized to affect the probability of resistance to occupation. First more ethnically or linguistically homogeneous communities may have a stronger sense of identity. Second, ethno-linguistically homogeneous communities may be better suited at administering selective incentives and sanctions to mobilize resistance to occupation (see Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). I therefore calculate a measure of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization (ELF) by looking at different linguistic groups in Afghanistan. It reflects the likelihood that two people chosen at random will be from different ethnic groups. ELF is calculated using the Herfindahl concentration formula: 

\[ ELF = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i^2 \]

where \( s_i \) indicates the share of the population of group \( i \) (Posner 2004, 849). Province-level data on the share of different linguistic groups is drawn from the CSO Socio-Economic and Demographic Profile (CSO 2007). ELF ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 represents a perfectly homogenous society and 1 represents a perfectly heterogeneous society.

The following hypotheses summarize the effect of the nationalism variables on resistance to occupation:

**Hypothesis 7** Districts closer to airbases will experience greater levels of resistance.

**Hypothesis 8** Districts with less ethno-linguistic fractionalization will experience greater levels of resistance.
Opportunity Structures

A second explanation for resistance in Afghanistan centers on opportunity structures provided by economic and geographic conditions as well as weak institutions. To examine the effect of opportunity structures, I include measures of poverty, mountainous terrain, corruption, and distance to Pakistan.

**Poverty.** Poverty has been offered as a cause of resistance and insurgency in the context of Afghanistan. In a 2009 Oxfam survey of Afghans, 70 percent of respondents said that poverty and unemployment were the principal causes of violence in the country (Oxfam 2009). Surveys conducted by the Asia Foundation have consistently identified poverty, poor economic conditions, and unemployment as some of the more pressing concerns of Afghans (Asia Foundation 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010). During a press conference, the chief ISAF intelligence officer noted: “Who is ‘the enemy’ in Afghanistan?… The enemy is illiteracy, it’s poverty, it’s unemployment” (Lobjakas 2007). Coalition forces have observed local declines in insurgent activity during the harvest months, as potential fighters are taken out of the insurgency “labor market.” Coalition officials have argued that small-scale make-work projects, such as cleaning drainage ditches could be sufficient to sap the insurgency of potential recruits. Not only are young males gainfully employed, but they are also too tired to pick up a gun after they put down their shovel (Correspondence with Canadian PRT official 2007).

In order to measure poverty, I employ province-level poverty rates. The level of poverty is coded on a 5-point scale: 1 (9-20 percent), 2 (21-30 percent), 3 (31-43 percent), 4 (44-54 percent), 5 (55-76 percent). This data is drawn from the CSO’s 2007-2008 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (CSO 2008). Once district-level unemployment data collected by ISAF becomes declassified, it will be possible to gain a more precise understanding of the effect of economic conditions on resistance.

**Mountainous terrain.** Geographic conditions such as mountainous terrain have often been seen as facilitators of insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The Panjshir valley northeast of Kabul was a deadly trap for Soviet troops and the Korengal valley in Kunar Province has proven to be an extremely difficult for coalition forces to hold (Rubin 2008). On several occasions, armored vehicles could not navigate winding mountain trails forcing troops to dismount and making them more
vulnerable to attacks. Coalition data shows some of the effects of geography on resistance. For example, there is a seasonal dip in fatalities during winter months when cold weather and snow in mountain passes reduce the mobility of insurgents. Conversely, insurgent “spring offensives” occur when these impediments literally melt away.

Many spatial analyses of conflict employ altitude as a proxy for mountainous terrain (e.g. Kalyvas 2006; Lyall 2009a). This is problematic since altitude does not adequately describe the suitability of terrain for insurgency. For instance, high altitude plateaus provide little or no cover for insurgents whereas low-altitude valleys and canyons can provide ideal terrain for ambushes. Fearon and Laitin employ a variable for mountainous terrain, but it is not available at the Afghanistan district level (Fearon and Laitin 2003). I therefore estimate terrain roughness by changes in elevation at a micro-level. I begin with a digital elevation map taken from the GTOPO30 dataset (US Geological Survey 2007). For every cell in an Afghanistan GIS elevation grid, I measure the standard deviation in altitude between that cell and the 8 neighboring cells. I then measure the mean standard deviation of all cells within a district. Note that greater average standard deviation does not necessarily indicate higher altitude. It indicates greater variation in altitude within the district. Because the incremental advantages of mountainous terrain may be expected to decline, I then take the log of the mean standard deviation.

Corruption. Many policy analysts have traced the origin of the Afghan insurgency in whole or in part to widespread corruption and poor governance (Chayes 2006; Jones 2009b; Rubin 2007; International Crisis Group 2006). According to this view, resistance to occupation is in fact resistance to a corrupt regime that is seen as supported by foreigners. Financial and military support from abroad reduces the Afghan government’s incentives to be responsive to complaints at home. Afghanistan regularly ranks among the five most corrupt countries according to Transparency International (Transparency International 2010). The Taliban came to prominence in the 1990s precisely by restoring law and order and combatting warlords and brigands. Corruption would therefore increase the pool of aggrieved individuals to draw from. In order to estimate this effect, I measure the percentage of individuals who report to have bribed a policeman in 2009, drawn from Integrity Watch’s National Corruption Survey (Integrity Watch 2010).

Pakistan border. Foreign support and sanctuary has been shown to play a critical role in sustaining insurgencies (Salehyan 2007). Afghanistan has generally weak control of its borders, but
its border with Pakistan is considered especially vulnerable. Insurgents have used sanctuaries in Pakistan to regroup, plan, and launch attacks against ISAF and the Afghan government. All major insurgent groups have their headquarters in Pakistan. There is considerable evidence that Afghan insurgents also received intelligence and material support from Pakistan’s ISI (Rashid 2008, Johnson and Mason 2008). In order to estimate the effect of Pakistani sanctuary on resistance in Afghanistan, I measure the average distance of each district to the border with Pakistan using ArcGIS. Although this is an incomplete measure—terrain and roads are also critical—we should generally expect higher levels of insurgencies in districts near or bordering Pakistan. Although Afghanistan also borders Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China, only Pakistan has been known to provide sanctuary for resistance forces (Rashid 2008).

Population. Last, I control for the population size of each district. We should expect that the larger the population, the greater the number of individuals to be recruited for resistance. District level population data in 2003 is drawn from the Central Statistical Organization (CSO 2003). The mean district has a population of 62,662.

The following hypotheses summarize the effect of opportunity structure variables on resistance to occupation:

**Hypothesis 9** Districts with higher poverty rates will experience greater levels of resistance.

**Hypothesis 10** Districts with more mountainous terrain will experience greater levels of resistance.

**Hypothesis 11** Districts with greater levels of corruption will experience greater levels of resistance.

**Hypothesis 12** Districts closer to the border with Pakistan will experience greater levels of resistance.

**Hypothesis 13** Districts with larger populations will experience greater levels of resistance.

**Political Dislocation**

The theory of political dislocation posits that resistance to occupation will be strongest among those groups that stand most to lose from political reform under foreign occupation. Conversely, groups that stand to gain from changes implemented by occupiers will be less likely to undertake...
resistance to occupation. In the case of Afghanistan, reforms initiated under ISAF occupation led to political dislocation. This political dislocation affected two groups: 1) the Taliban who lost power and were hunted down and exiled, and to a lesser degree, 2) the broader Pashtun community who saw a weakening of their relative domestic position.

First, members and supporters of the Taliban were immediately dislocated. Mullah Omar was removed as the leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and replaced with Hamid Karzai. Reforms led to the Taliban losing monopolistic control over the military. Through the Bonn process, a new democratic constitution replaced the theocratic Taliban regime. No member of the Taliban was invited to the Bonn peace talks. The conflation of al Qaeda and the Taliban in the minds of American policy-makers made it all but impossible for moderate Taliban to join the post-2001 political transition. Discussion regarding the possibility of rejoining the political process in 2002 and 2004 came to little. Moreover, Afghan officials could not provide credible assurances to Taliban who wanted to rejoin the process that they would be protected from detention by the US (Rashid and Rubin 2008, 39; Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2011). UN Special Representative for the Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi lamented: “The Taliban should have been at Bonn. This was our original sin” (Rashid 2008, 104).

Second, members of the broader Pashtun population were dislocated. During Afghanistan’s civil war in the 1990s regional militias and political parties appealed directly to ethnolinguistic affiliation. As a consequence, Afghan politics became particularly “ethnicized” (Dorronsoro 2005). Competition between Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks made groups sensitive to any change in the ethnic balance of power. A 2001 CIA assessment noted: “Afghanistan truly is a zero sum game. Anytime anyone advances all others consider this to be at their expense” (Berntsen and Pezzullo 2005, 219). As former CIA Pakistan station chief Milton Bearden ominously wrote in Foreign Affairs in November 2001:

“Strident calls to add the overthrow of the Taliban regime to the list of American objectives may be attractive in terms of human rights, but that objective, too, must be weighed against the goal of making certain that the events of September 11 are not repeated…Some have called for arming and forming an alliance with Afghanistan’s now-leaderless Northern Alliance…the more likely consequences of a U.S. alliance
with the late Masoud’s fighters would be the coalescing of Afghanistan’s majority Pashtun tribes around their Taliban leaders and the rekindling of a brutal, general civil war that would continue until the United States simply gave up. The dominant tribe in Afghanistan, which also happens to be the largest, will dominate; replacing the Pashtun Taliban with the largely Tajik and Uzbek Northern Alliance is close to impossible” (Bearden 2001, 28-29).

Although not all Pashtuns supported the Taliban, the Taliban were undoubtedly the most powerful group to advance Pashtun interests. Moreover, during their conquest of Afghanistan the Taliban had effectively eliminated rival Pashtun groups. Therefore, when the Taliban were overthrown in 2001, a political vacuum emerged. Non-Taliban Pashtuns were poorly organized, and thus the Pashtun community —the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan— was politically weakened.

This weakness led to political marginalization. According to Dorronsoro (2005, 342-343): The fall of the Taliban led to a new imbalance in representation in the national institutions. The Uzbeks are able to a point to regard themselves as represented by Dostum, while the Hazaras are represented by Hezb-i Wahdat and the Persian speakers of the northeast by Jamiyat-i Islami. However, the Pashtuns, the most numerous ethnic community, have unquestionably been marginalised by the new regime.” Though efforts were made to incorporate some Pashtun groups, the Bonn process was a victor’s peace with ministries distributed as spoils of war. During the Bonn talks, the United Front obtained 17 of the 20 seats it demanded in cabinet. More importantly, the United Front controlled the key ministries of defense, intelligence, foreign affairs, and interior (Rashid 2008, 129). A consequence of the light footprint approach initially adopted by the US was a reliance on Tajik-dominated warlords from the Northern Alliance as local proxies. Pashtuns were also marginalized from the military: although Pashtuns made up 40 percent of the population of Afghanistan and accounted for more than 52 percent of the troops in the Afghan National Army, only about 36 percent of the noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and 32 percent of officers were Pashtun. In comparison, the Tajiks, who constituted roughly 25 percent of the Afghan population and 37 percent of troops, made up 53 percent of NCOs and almost 56 percent of officers (Tarzi 2008, 287).
For ethnic minorities such as the Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara communities, who had been marginalized or persecuted under the Taliban regime, the occupation of Afghanistan provided net benefits. Ethnic minorities and their languages were given official status and Shias were given legal parity with Sunnis. Many of the political gains acquired by ethnic minorities were mirrored by losses by the Taliban and for Pashtuns more generally (Dorronsoro 2005, 343). The political marginalization of the Pashtun community was historically unprecedented. There were only two brief periods in recent Afghan history when Pashtuns haven’t been in power: once in 1929 when Habibullah Kalkani (a Tajik), seized power for a few months and the second when Burhanuddin Rabbani (another Tajik) became president, a position during the civil war that accorded virtually no power. According to longtime Afghan observer Gilles Dorronsoro (2010):

“since 2001, perceptions of Pashtuns and other groups are diverging due to the role of the Afghan state and the international community. Most Pashtuns regard the central government as being in the hands of non-Pashtun leaders. (although Karzai is from an aristocratic family from Kandahar, he is often seen as being under the influence of the United States.)”

Political power aside, the political dislocation of Pashtuns led directly to insecurity. After the fall of the Taliban, there were reports of extortion, looting, killing, rape, and other forms of persecution against Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan. In 2002, some 20,000 Pashtuns fled Northern Afghanistan because of ethnic persecution (Dorronsoro 2005, 343). Some Pashtuns felt they were unfairly targeted by coalition forces that did not distinguish between Pashtuns and Taliban. As one elder stated: “The Taliban did the crimes, but the punishment was for us” (Human Rights Watch 2002, 1).

The theory of political dislocation would predict that those groups marginalized in the course of occupation are more likely to take up arms against occupiers. Resistance will be more acute when occupiers take steps to institutionalize changes in political structures. In the case of Afghanistan, dislocation was institutionalized through constitutional reform, a process undertaken in the absence of Taliban or full Pashtun representation.

Pashto speakers. I have argued that political dislocation in Afghanistan affected the Pashtun community generally and within this Pashtun community, the Taliban specifically. To measure
political dislocation, I therefore measure the percentage of each province that is Pashto speaking. The ethnic characteristics of Afghanistan facilitate the identification of the effects of political dislocation. The Pashtun ethnic group speaks primarily Pashto, and Pashto speakers (as most linguistic groups in Afghanistan) tend to be regionally concentrated.\(^\text{10}\) Data on Pashto speakers is drawn from the CSO Socio-Economic and Demographic Profile (CSO 2007). Once again, it is important to be clear about the meaning of this measure. It does not indicate that all Pastho speakers oppose foreign occupation of Afghanistan or support the Taliban. Being a Pashto speaker is considered a necessary but not sufficient condition for support for political dislocation.

**Hypothesis 14** *Districts with higher percentages of Pashto speakers will experience greater levels of resistance.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLED Events</td>
<td>10.311</td>
<td>24.716</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF + ANSF Fatalities</td>
<td>14.921</td>
<td>30.358</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Distance to Airbase</td>
<td>81247.3</td>
<td>54807.185</td>
<td>3747.136</td>
<td>358210.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Distance to Pakistan/10000</td>
<td>18.386</td>
<td>15.562</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>58.992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Population/10000</td>
<td>6.266</td>
<td>14.431</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>230.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashto Speakers</td>
<td>51.65</td>
<td>34.998</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>99.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dari Speakers</td>
<td>33.109</td>
<td>29.769</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>97.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>2.966</td>
<td>1.478</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainous Terrain (log)</td>
<td>3.994</td>
<td>1.071</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>5.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of ISAF Battalions in Province</td>
<td>1.454</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.3.4 Model Specification

The dependent variables (number of resistance events, coalition fatalities) are count variables. In order to determine the appropriate count model, I conduct a dispersion test. With a large number of zeros, the test clearly shows that a negative binomial model is most appropriate (see Figure 5.7). Moreover, because one of the key explanatory variables, the number of foreign forces in the area of a district, is endogenous to the dependent variables, the number of resistance events or fatalities,  

\(^{10}\text{There are also significant pockets of Pashto-speakers in Faryab, Balkh, Kunduz and Baghlan in northern Afghanistan.}\)
(a) Location of Airbases

(b) Distance to Airbase

(c) ELF

(d) Pashto Speakers

(e) Poverty

Figure 5.5: Independent variables 1
(a) Standard Deviations in Altitude

(b) Mountainous Terrain

(c) Population

(d) Ethnicity

Figure 5.6: Independent variables 2
Table 5.3: Coding of variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pashto Speakers</td>
<td>Percent of Pashto speaking villages in province</td>
<td>CSO 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
<td>Ethno-linguistic fractionalization in province</td>
<td>CSO 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Percent of individuals in province who report paying bribes in 2009</td>
<td>Integrity Watch 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Troops</td>
<td>Number of ISAF/OEF battalions in province (high)</td>
<td>Institute for the Study of War 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Distance to Pakistan</td>
<td>Average distance to Pakistan divided by 10,000</td>
<td>Arc GIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Population</td>
<td>District population divided by 10,000</td>
<td>CSO 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Level of poverty in province</td>
<td>CSO 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1=9-20 percent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2=21-30 percent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3=31-43 percent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4=44-54 percent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5=55-76 percent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainous Terrain (log)</td>
<td>Log. of average standard deviation in altitude</td>
<td>USGS 2007, Arc GIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Distance to Airbase</td>
<td>Average distance to airbase</td>
<td>Arc GIS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I employ an instrumental variable approach. As discussed above, I employ distance to an airfield as an instrument of the presence of foreign troops. The instrumental variable approach involves a two-stage regression. In the first stage of this model I regress the endogenous variable on the other explanatory variables including the instrumental variable and save the predicted values. In the second stage, I regress the dependent variable on the explanatory variables and the predicted values of the endogenous variable from the first stage regression. While this approach does not bias the coefficients, its principal disadvantage is that it may lead to inflated standard errors.

5.4 Discussion of Results

In this section I discuss the results of the quantitative analysis of resistance in Afghanistan. The results are displayed in Table 5.4. The dependent variable in the first three models is SIGACTs and the dependent variable for the subsequent three models is ACLED events. To preview the main results: I find evidence of political dislocation as a driver of resistance. Factors such as poverty and mountainous terrain are also significant in certain models, but in the opposite direction than predicted.
Table 5.4: Determinants of resistance in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S1</th>
<th>S2</th>
<th>S3</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pashto Speakers</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>0.10**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
<td></td>
<td>-10.54*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-10.39*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(4.80)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.87)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>0.30*</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.25*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Troops</td>
<td>-1.05</td>
<td>-1.69</td>
<td>-3.05</td>
<td>-1.66*</td>
<td>-2.20*</td>
<td>-3.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td>(1.92)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(0.94)</td>
<td>(1.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Distance to Pakistan</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/10000</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Population/10000</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>0.07***</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.64*</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
<td>-0.67*</td>
<td>-0.79*</td>
<td>-1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainous Terrain (log)</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.31*</td>
<td>-1.16*</td>
<td>-0.36**</td>
<td>-0.42**</td>
<td>-1.32*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>14.84*</td>
<td>-1.38</td>
<td>-1.21</td>
<td>15.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(6.21)</td>
<td>(1.36)</td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td>(6.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inalpha</td>
<td>0.85***</td>
<td>0.86***</td>
<td>1.02***</td>
<td>0.81***</td>
<td>0.81***</td>
<td>0.93***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 328

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001
5.4.1 Nationalism

The results of the quantitative analysis provide only weak support for the nationalist theory of resistance. First, the effect of foreign troops, proxied through distance to airbases, is inconclusive. There is no consistently significant effect. Once again, it is important to be careful in interpreting this result. In some circumstances, it may indicate that greater number of foreign troops may be deterring attacks, while in other cases it may be indicating that troops increase exposure to attack. It may also indicate that resentment against foreigners in conditional on ethnicity. For example, Germany has over time been the second or third largest troop contributor to the ISAF mission but has suffered relatively few fatalities since they are principally deployed to ethnically Tajik Provinces of Regional Command-North.

Second, ethno-linguistic fractionalization exhibits a statistically significant effect on resistance. As expected greater fractionalization predicts lower levels of resistance. For every 0.1 change in ELF (with 0 representing a perfectly homogenous society and 1 representing a perfectly heterogeneous society), there is a 65.15 percent decrease in the number of ACLED events or 64.6 percent decrease in the number of coalition fatalities in the SIGACT data. This finding is consistent with the argument put forth by Humphreys and Weinstein and by Petersen that ethnic fractionalization impedes mobilization (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, Petersen 2001). What is not clear from these findings is whether ethno-linguistic fractionalization lessens resistance by diluting nationalist sentiment, by impeding collective action, or both.

Quantitative findings aside, a number of additional factors undermine the nationalist explanation of resistance in Afghanistan. First, the spatial distribution of attacks is not consistent with population size, but is lopsided towards populous Pashtun districts. According to Barfield: “that insurgency was far from nationwide, and Afghaniains receptivity to a returned Taliban was decidedly local” (Barfield 2010, 322). Indeed, when rerunning the models substituting the Pashto variable with a Dari variable, I find a negative but not statistically significant relation with the number of attacks (not shown). Indeed, Dari is the language spoken mainly by non-Pashtun groups in Afghanistan, and those groups most commonly opposed to the Taliban. Second, just as some explain the resistance as anti-foreign, others have claimed that the problem was precisely that international forces were not deployed soon enough to restore law and order and help ensure
better governance in the South of Afghanistan. According to Ahmed Rashid many Afghans “were literally on their knees begging for a greater international presence” (Rashid 2008, 196). The lack of a Western presence meant more power for warlords and less security and economic development. Similarly the International Crisis Group noted: “The Taliban never decisively defeated and expectations running high among the population, however, the Pashtun belt was largely left to fester without the troops who would have then been welcomed with open arms” (International Crisis Group 2006, 4). Therefore, far from rejecting foreign troops as nationalism would predict, many were welcoming more.

Third, despite calling for the expulsion of foreign forces, some insurgent groups were foreign-financed or employed foreign fighters. For example, the Haqqani network received funding and support from al Qaeda and employed Arabs, Pakistanis, Uzbeks, Chechens, and Turks. This would seem to indicate that at least some of their fighters could not have been motivated by nationalism as it is traditionally understood. Fourth, an examination of the Global Terrorism Database shows of the 862 incidents between 2001 and 2008 committed by the Taliban and Hizb-al-Islami, 138 were committed against military targets and 19 were committed against diplomatic targets. Thus 81 percent of attacks listed between 2001 and 2008 were directed against Afghan—not foreign—targets as nationalism would predict (Global Terrorism Database 2010). Sixth, if foreign occupation were the sole driver of resistance in Afghanistan, then we would expect insurgency to cease once occupation ended. We cannot directly evaluate this claim as long as the foreign occupation of Afghanistan persists. However, counterfactuals can provide important insight into the causal mechanisms of resistance (Fearon 1991). Most importantly the expectation that violence would cease if the foreign presence would end seems profoundly unrealistic given historical precedent. All the main insurgent groups, except for the Quetta Shura Taliban, fought the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and all insurgent groups including the Taliban continued to fight the government once the occupation ceased.

It is also worth noting that if nationalism were a key driver of resistance to occupation we would expect to see more support for groups such as the Taliban and less support for the established government of Afghanistan. Instead, polling has tended to show strong opposition to the Taliban and relatively stronger support for the government of Afghanistan (see for instance ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, February 2009). Naturally we should be skeptical about such polls since
the incentives for preference falsification in conflict zones are great. For instance, villagers may not trust unknown pollsters, especially when expressing support for an insurgent group. Many pollsters were unable to conduct polls in provinces such as Zabul or Uruzgan, which are Taliban strongholds. Pashtuns also tend to be under-sampled in most polls (Giustozzi 2008, 35-36). Support for government is probably inflated in such polls, but the fact that polling still shows regional variation despite these polling biases confirms the regional character of the resistance.

5.4.2 Opportunity Structures

A quantitative analysis of violence in Afghanistan also contradicts many common assumptions regarding the effect of opportunity structure on resistance to occupation. Insofar as they are found to be statistically significant, factors such as poverty and terrain roughness have an unexpectedly negative effect on resistance.

First, I find poverty has a negative impact on resistance, although this effect is not statistically significant across models or with the SIGACT data. In the ACLED data every one-unit change in the five-point poverty classification, resistance events decrease by 48.6 percent. Thus, contrary to the common assumption that insurgency is a product of economic desperation; areas with higher levels of poverty are less likely to experience resistance than their richer counterparts. Indeed, examining the geography of poverty, we find that some of the poorest regions of Afghanistan are found in the northeast of the country as well as the Hazarjat in central Afghanistan. The South, where much of the resistance is located, experiences lower poverty rates than the country average. It is important to note that poverty was measured in 2003, that is, prior to the intensification of insurgency in Afghanistan in 2005-2006 and the rise in poppy cultivation in insurgent-affected areas. This measure also averts endogeneity concerns whereby economic conditions could be affected by the insurgency itself (Miguel et al. 2004). This measure is therefore not contaminated by the effect of subsequent insurgency. This findings runs counter to much of the findings of “greed” literature in civil wars (notably Collier and Hoefllier 2004) which claims among other things that poverty may lower the opportunity costs to fighting. The finding is consistent with other micro-level empirical studies of insurgency in Afghanistan. For instance, in examining district-level changes in unemployment in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2009 Berman et al. “emphatically
reject a positive correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and allied forces” (Berman et al. 2011, 496). In fact, consistent with my findings, Berman et al. note there is a negative effect of unemployment and insurgency. Although they do not provide conclusive explanations for the unexpected negative relation between unemployment and insurgency, they note that economic effects may be swamped by other factors. Additionally, since cross-national studies of insurgency and of resistance to occupation show that poverty is a significant variable, it may simply be the case that economic condition can predict the general propensity of conflict but not its precise location.

Second, I find that terrain roughness is negatively associated with resistance to occupation. Although this effect is consistently negative, the effect is not statistically significant in most models. In the ACLED data, each increase in the standard deviation of altitude leads to a 32.3 percent decrease in resistance events. Indeed, looking at the distribution of mountainous terrain and insurgency, it is notable that some of the hotspots of resistance activity are in the agricultural plains surrounding Kandahar City and Lashkar Gah. The most rugged terrain in Afghanistan in the Hindu Kush northeast of Kabul is simply inaccessible by insurgents and government forces alike making it unlikely to be the setting of insurgent activity. Notably, rugged terrain of the central Hazarajat is nearly absent of insurgent activity. This finding is at odds with previous findings that mountainous terrain is a predictor of civil war and insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

However, some caution is warranted in interpreting this result. Mountainous terrain can provide shelter for insurgent groups even if mountainous terrain itself is not the site of confrontation between insurgents and occupation forces. Indeed, because it is inaccessible to occupation forces, such terrain will not be a predictor of resistance activity. Alternatively, stronger insurgent groups may choose to fight in flat terrain, whereas weaker groups might be able to fight only in the mountains.11 Moreover, mountainous terrain may be able to predict the onset of insurgency—the object of Fearon and Laitin’s study—rather than the location of fighting. Additionally, in the context of Afghanistan the effect of terrain might be highly contingent on other factors such as political alignment of the population inhabiting the terrain. Regardless, this finding should lead scholars to be more cautious in the use of terrain as an explanatory variable for insurgency. Specifically

11Thanks to Jack Snyder for suggesting these strategic effects.
scholars should be careful about: 1) the level of aggregation in the measure of terrain (i.e. national vs. sub-national measures of terrain), 2) measuring actual terrain roughness rather than proxies such as altitude, 3) distinguishing onset, occurrence, and intensity of insurgency as a product of terrain, 4) evaluating the effect of terrain in the context of political alignments, and 5) taking into account selection and strategic interaction effects of terrain on insurgency.

Third, corruption is found to have a positive effect on insurgency, with attacks and fatalities more likely in areas where reports of corruption are greater. However the effect of this variable is not statistically significant across models. Fourth, I find no statistically significant effect of proximity to Pakistan on resistance to occupation. Because distance to Pakistan and percentage of Pashto speakers are correlated at the −0.56 level, I run two separate models. Furthermore, because the effect of proximity to Pakistan may not be monotonic, I run the models with a squared term for distance to Pakistan. The null finding remains regardless of model specifications. Thus, although there is extensive evidence that Pakistani sanctuaries provide critical support for the insurgency, there is no direct relation of proximity to Pakistan and the location of resistance to occupation. This may also indicate that cross-border insurgents do not necessarily target close to the border, but instead actively seek higher value targets inland, using safe-house and other logistical hubs. Alternatively, it might simply be indicating that distance is a poor predictor of insurgency because it is so dependent on terrain and infrastructure.

Fourth, district population positively predicts resistance in Afghanistan. More populous districts are more likely to experience resistance than less populous districts. This finding is robust and statistically significant in the ACLED data but is not robust using the SIGACT data. Moreover, the substantive effect is relatively weak. Every 1,000-person increase in district population leads to a 0.73 percent increase in ACLED events. What this quantitative evidence cannot tell us, however, is whether population centers provide deeper pools of recruitment, a form of safety in numbers, or some combination of the two.

5.4.3 Political Dislocation

Consistent with political dislocation theory, I find the proxy for political dislocation—the percentage of Pashto speakers—is a robust predictor of resistance incidents across both dependent vari-
ables. For every 1 percent increase in Pashto speakers, the number of ACLED incidents increases by 9.1 percent and the number of coalition fatalities increases 7.2 percent (effects refer to models 1 and 4 unless otherwise noted). This finding is robust across model specification and significant at the 0.05 level.

Groups such as the Taliban, being politically dislocated in the aftermath of the US invasion, mobilized resistance against coalition forces. Process tracing the decision to undertake resistance against occupation is difficult in this case, particularly since the subjects go to great lengths not to be traced at all. Yet, all the main insurgent groups are almost exclusively led and composed of Pashtuns. The majority of Taliban Shuras were composed of former members of the Taliban government. For example, the four commanders appointed by Mullah Omar to organize the Taliban in southern Afghanistan were former deputy Defense Minister Mullah Baradir, former army chief Akhtar Muhammad Uthmani, former corps commander Mullah Dadullah, and former Interior Minister Adbul Razzaq (Stenersen 2010, 42). Being almost entirely Pashtun, groups such as the Taliban, Hizb-al-Islami, and the Haqqani Network were principally able to recruit from the Pashto speaking community and operate within Pashtun-inhabited areas. Not all Pashtuns supported the Taliban, and many were forcefully recruited, but the Taliban and other insurgent groups were drawn almost entirely from the Pashtun community. According to Giustozzi, the Taliban recruited: “all those who had supported the Taliban regime and who had been marginalized afterwards” (Giustozzi 2008, 48). Gen. David Petraeus stated:

“the rank and file of the insurgency is, indeed, local Afghans. It is Pashtun brothers. It is largely a Pashtun insurgency. There are some other ethnic groups involved in it, certainly, and some transnational elements as well, but essentially it is a Pashtun insurgency” (2010).

All the commanders who have been named by the Taliban are of Pashtun origin. Aside from Pashtun pockets in Faryab, Balkh, Kunduz and Baghlan, the Taliban have had much more trouble recruiting in the non-Pashtun north of Afghanistan (Giustozzi and Reuter 2010). Indeed, according to Dorronsoro, the Taliban faced a dilemma: “how can the Taliban use the Pashtun resentment in the South and simultaneously broaden the insurgency and include other ethnic groups in the North?” (2009, 14). Reflecting the narrow political base of the resistance, insurgent groups do not
use the traditional name or flag of Afghanistan but use the symbols imposed by the Taliban during their rule from 1996 to 2001 (Stenersen 2010, 55-57). Virtually all regionally-disaggregated polls in Afghanistan show sympathy or support for the Taliban is greatest in more Pashto-speaking areas (e.g. ABC 2009, Asia Foundation 2004-2009). As a result the number and frequency of attacks on coalition forces is highly correlated with Pashto-speaking regions. Indeed, observing the frequency of attacks matches the distribution of ethnic groups in the country, with attacks being far more likely in the Pashtun belt.

The effect of political dislocation can also be seen in decisions of certain insurgent commanders. For instance, in 2002 Hekmatyar declared a jihad to liberate Afghanistan from foreign domination and claimed he had formed an alliance with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Again in 2006, Hekmatyar denounced what he considered the puppet government of Karzai and pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda leadership (International Crisis Group 2006, 10). However later on, Hekmatyar expressed a willingness to cooperate if Karzai ceded enough power to him (Barfield 2010, 326). In 2007, Hekmatyar said he was willing to discuss a ceasefire with the government of Karzai, conditional on the withdrawal of foreign forces and elections under a neutral caretaker government. However in 2008 Hekmatyar decided he could gain more leverage on a weak government through insurgency (Katzman 2010, 23).

These findings show that political dislocation can provide an explanation for why some groups take up arms against occupying forces, whereas other groups do not. Importantly, these findings question the assumption that nationalism is what drives resistance to occupation. Although it is frequently noted that the Taliban sought the removal of coalition forces from Afghanistan, what is less often noted is that the Taliban wish to reestablish control of Afghanistan and impose their political agenda. In other words, the Taliban is a political faction as much as it is a resistance movement. The war in Afghanistan is better understood as a civil war with a foreign-backed government, rather than a resistance struggle.

5.4.4 Trust

One of the principal findings of the cross-national study of resistance to occupation was the role of trust. Specifically, resistance was found to be less likely in instances where occupier and occupied
shared a common religion, when occupations operated under an international mandate, and when occupations were carried out by democracies.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to evaluate the effects of all these critical variables in a cross-sectional analysis of the Afghanistan War because there is no sub-national variation in the treatment. For instance, although insurgents frequently employ fiery religious rhetoric, the effect of religious dissimilarity cannot be estimated because Afghanistan is almost entirely Muslim (with meaningful distinctions between Shia and Sunnis). Similarly, it is impossible to estimate the effect of an international organization mandate since ISAF has always operated under a mandate from the UN. US-lead Operation Enduring Freedom does not operate under the same mandate, but it is unclear whether Afghans perceived this distinction. Lastly, although the main troop contributors to ISAF vary over time and space in Afghanistan, they have always been established democracies (with the exception of Turkey).

One aspect of trust that can be more precisely measured in the context of occupation of Afghanistan is the abuse of civilians. In the cross-national study, abuse of civilians was theorized to be a predictor of resistance. While cases of civilian abuse are not systematically tracked, there are records of civilians casualties. In a study of insurgency in Afghanistan, Condra et al. find strong evidence that local exposure to civilian casualties lead to a long-term increase in insurgent violence, what they term a “revenge effect” (Condra et al. 2010). Specifically, by matching districts on pre-existing levels of violence, Condra et al. find that counterinsurgent-generated civilian casualties from a typical incident are responsible for 1 additional violent incident in an average sized district in the following 6 weeks and lead to increased violence over the next 6 months. Indeed, the Pashtun social code (Pashtunwali) places a high value on personal revenge. If a Pashtun man is dishonored, he must avenge that dishonor or he will lose face and social status to the point of becoming an outcast (Johnson and Mason 2008, 63). A 2008 poll found that among those who sympathized with the Taliban, 40 percent were motivated by resentment caused by civilian casualties in ISAF airstrikes (Charney Associates 2008). Another poll conducted by ABC News, the BBC, and ARD found that among those who believed it was acceptable to target coalition forces, between 8 and 11 percent believed such attacks were justified as retaliation for abuses (ABC/BBC/ARD 2007). Another poll indicated that 80 percent of Afghans viewed airstrikes, which are responsible for much collateral damage, as unacceptable (Cohen and Agiesta 2009).
Of course, foreign forces are not the only belligerents to kill civilians. The Taliban and other insurgents have been involved in extensive abuses themselves (Human Rights Watch 2007). Why should foreign victimization alone cause a breakdown in trust? Recent research provides some insights. A recent survey experiment by Lyall et al. (2011) from 204 randomly selected villages across 21 districts in Pashtun-dominated provinces found that Afghan attitudes towards combatants is affected by exposure to violence. However, attitudes towards combatants depend in large part on the identity of the perpetrators of violence. Harm inflicted by ISAF forces results in decreased support for ISAF and increased Taliban support, while harm inflicted by Taliban forces reduces support for the Taliban but does not translate into greater support for ISAF. This difference is partly explained by “hedonistic” bias, which predisposes individuals to perceive in-group behavior as conditioned by circumstance and out-group behavior to be conditioned by predisposition. Regardless, this survey data —although deliberately restricted to Pashtun-dominated provinces and focused on levels of support rather than violence committed— indicates that victimization plays an important role in supporting resistance. Thus, while claims regarding victimization in resistance to occupation cannot be directly tested here, existing studies examining the same country in roughly the same period confirm their effect.

### 5.4.5 Robustness Checks

In order to verify the validity of the findings, I conduct a number of robustness checks. First, certain influential outliers may be biasing the coefficients. I therefore rerun the models dropping observations from Helmand province, a highly Pashto speaking province that accounts for a disproportionate amount of violent incidents and fatalities. In fact, 20 percent of ACLED events and 16 percent of SIGACTS occurred in Helmand, a province that represents 2 percent of Afghanistan’s population. Dropping Helmand reduces the substantive effect of Pashto and ELF, but increases their statistical significance. Other results remain the same.

Second, I check for interaction effects. Although variables such as mountainous terrain, poverty, or proximity to Pakistan may not be triggers of resistance they may be facilitators of resistance. In other words, they may increase the effect of other factors by decreasing the cost of taking action. After all, mountainous terrain only helps sustain insurgency: slope and elevation are not direct
causes of resistance. I therefore run all the models with interaction effects between political dislocation and poverty and distance to Pakistan and mountainous terrain. These checks do not alter the direction or the statistical significance of the findings.

5.4.6 Counterpoints

The results of the sub-national quantitative analysis support the hypothesis that political dislocation is an important driver of resistance to occupation. This section addresses six important counterpoints to these findings. First, as noted by certain Afghan area experts, Pashtuns may simply be a particularly pugnacious ethnic group, regardless of political dislocation. As far back as 1809, an elder Pashtun tribesman in Afghanistan told the British Envoy Mountstuart Elphinstone: “We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood…we will never be content with a master” (Tanner 2009, 134). As a character in Rudyard Kipling’s novel Kim noted: “Trust a Brahmin before a snake, and a snake before an harlot, and an harlot before a Pathan (Pashtun)” (Kipling 1914, 174). Indeed, British forces suffered a crushing defeat during the First Anglo-Afghan war of 1839-1842 and suffered major setbacks in the Third Anglo-Afghan war of 1919. Describing the Pashtun belt on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region Winston Churchill noted:

“The inhabitants of these wild but wealthy valleys are of many tribes, but of similar character and condition. The abundant crops, which a warm sun and copious rains raise from a fertile soil, support a numerous population in a state of warlike leisure. Except at the times of sowing and of harvest, a continual state of feud and strife prevails throughout the land. Tribe wars with tribe. The people of one valley fight with those of the next. To the quarrels of communities are added the combats of individuals. Khan assails khan, each supported by his retainers. Every tribesman has a blood feud with his neighbor. Every man’s hand is against the other, and all against the stranger” (Churchill 1901, 15).

According to Johnson and Mason “Historically, the rural Pashtuns have dominated their neighbors and have avoided subjugation or integration by a larger nation…This characteristic makes Pashtuns the perfect insurgents” (Johnson and Mason 2008, 50). Indeed, the Pashtun-populated
areas of neighboring Pakistan are also afflicted by insurgency, despite the absence of foreign occupation. Thus resistance may be a product of culture rather than political dislocation.

While widespread, this belief is questionable. Much of the warlike depiction of the Pashtun is drawn from colonial-era England and its bitter encounters with the Pashtuns of South Asia (Johnson and Mason 2008, 52). Yet because British occupation was limited to the Pashtun belt in the South and East of Afghanistan, it shouldn’t be a surprise that resistance was encountered where British troops were actually present. Greater insight can be gained by contrasting the British and current occupations of Afghanistan with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. In contrast to the British occupation, the Soviet occupation covered the entire country and helped implement radical social and economic reforms that affected all social and ethnic groups. And indeed the Soviet occupation provoked resistance from all segments of the Afghan population. Resistance emerged from a cross-section of Afghan society: Hizb-i-Islmai, Jam’iyyat-i-Islami, Harakat-I inqilab-I Islami, Jabha-yi nejat-I milli, Mahaz-I Islami among the Sunnis, and Shura-yi ittifagh-I Islami, Harakat-I Islami and Seph-I Pasdaran among the Shia (Roy 1990, 235-236). Lastly it is instructive to examine the civil war period in Afghanistan between 1993 and 2001. Upon gaining power in 1996, the Taliban continued to face fierce opposition not from the Pashtun belt in the South and the East, but from Tajik and Uzbek warlords such as Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Rashid Dostum in North and West. Up until his death, the former was considered one of Afghanistan’s most successful Mujahedeen leaders. There is therefore no strong evidence that Pashtuns are the only group to take up arms.

A second counterpoint is that the effect of political dislocation is spurious. Because the Pashtun belt straddles the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the proportion of Pashtun speakers is highly correlated with proximity to Pakistan. Perhaps it is Pakistani support for insurgents, rather than Pashtun political dislocation, that is responsible for resistance to occupation. In order to control for a possible spurious effect, I run all the models dropping the Pashto speaker variable. I find that proximity to the Pakistani border alone does not robustly predict the likelihood of resistance. In those models where there is a statistically significant effect, it runs contrary to predictions.

A third counterpoint is that Pashtuns were not politically dislocated at all. President Karzai was Pashtun and the allocation of cabinet positions reflected the demographic weight of the Pashtun community. Yet, while the cabinet reflected their demographic weight, it still represented a
sweeping change from the status quo ante with a loss of the Pashtun monopoly of power. According to prospect theory, individuals will be more sensitive and risk accepting when facing the prospect of loss rather than the prospect of gain (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Additionally, no southern Pashtuns—a significant community that previously held power—were represented in the initial cabinet, except for Karzai himself (Rashid 2008, 105). Furthermore, Karzai came to be seen as a front man for the Northern Alliance, a belief only further confirmed by his cabinet appointments. According to a Pashtun delegate to the Loya Jirga peace process: “The perception that Karzai had betrayed his ethnic Pashtuns is now firmly in the minds of the Pashtuns” (International Crisis Group 2003, 9; Tarzi 2008, 285). Insurgent groups have consistently argued that Karzai does not represent Afghans since he is an agent of foreigners. For example, the Taliban have stated:

“Karzai is a tool for the foreigners who appointed him, he has no competent authority, and he failed in his promises to the Afghan people... If he was free he should stop the killing of Afghans, and stop the occupation of the country” (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 2007).

A fourth, and related, counterpoint is that it was Islamist Pashtuns specifically, not Pashtuns as a whole, that opposed occupation. Although the Taliban and other resistance groups drew from the Pasho speaking population, Pashtuns themselves were not necessarily politically dislocated. Aside from some violent incidents, Pashtuns have been integrated in Afghanistan’s political system. Employing Pashto speakers as a variable is therefore too blunt a measure. It reinforces the same stereotypes about Pashtun support for insurgents that erroneously caused them to be targeted in the first place. This line of criticism is largely valid, but it points to the fact that resistance, far from being nationalistic, is in fact highly concentrated among certain ethno-linguistic groups. The question becomes how, rather than if, political dislocation causes resistance, and how narrowly we seek to define political dislocation.

A fifth counterpoint is evidence that the insurgency in Afghanistan was not motivated by ethnic concerns. Ethnicity did not figure prominently in the vote for President Karzai in 2004 and 2010. Only 2 percent of Afghans said they voted for candidates based on ethnic concerns. Opinion polls conducted by the State Department showed that most Afghans did not view ethnicity as
divisive. Afghans rarely use the terms Pashtun or Tajik within the country (Jones 2009b, 160). In fact, divisions within ethnic groups may be as salient as divisions between them. These are serious criticisms, but they fail to account for how resistance was almost exclusively centered on a single ethno-linguistic group. Table 5.5 shows a positive correlation between the percentage of Pashtun per district and incidents of violence while exhibiting a negative correlation between the percentage of Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Turkmen, and violence. Moreover, these criticisms fail to account for preference falsification. In Afghanistan, as in other cases of resistance, insurgents often sought to conceal their narrow parochial objectives under the pretense of broad nationalism. As Barfield notes, there has been a shift in the message of insurgent groups. They downplayed their ideological calls opting instead to argue for the expelling of foreign infidels from the country (Barfield 2010, 327). Similarly, the Taliban have been careful to avoid ethnic or tribal appeals. It has also consistently dismissed any rumors of splits in the “resistance” movement, even denying the very existence of separate movements (Stenersen 2010, 54). By framing their struggle as one of self-determination, rather than the imposition of a radical Islamist regime or ethnic nationalism, these groups have sought to broaden their base of support in Afghan society.

Table 5.5: Correlation of ethnic groups and resistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>SIGACTs</th>
<th>ACLED Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>0.2470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>-0.224</td>
<td>-0.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazara</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>-0.179</td>
<td>-0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A sixth counterpoint is that insurgents themselves have refused to negotiate with the government and coalition forces. If political dislocation caused resistance, then we would expect reconciliation to be welcomed, not refused. For example the Taliban leadership has often stated that it would not engage in negotiations so long as Afghanistan remained occupied: “There is nothing to discuss with the Kabul government until all aggressing forces pull out from all areas of Afghanistan, and until Islamic rule is established in Afghanistan” (Saeed, 2009). Alternatively, it has stated that it does not seek political power, but merely the departure of foreign forces and

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12 Data ethnic groups drawn from Afghan National Quarterly Assessment Report (ANQAR).
the restoration of Afghan sovereignty. This logic is misleading for two reasons. First, negotiations are aimed at moderates who may be willing to compromise while insurgent statements are issued by hardliners who prefer to fight for more concessions. Second, having launched an insurgency, resistance groups may feel there is more to be gained by fighting than by talking. Third, insurgents know that the bargaining position of the government is bolstered by the presence of foreign troops. Insurgents therefore have strong incentives to insist on the removal of foreign forces as a precondition for negotiations.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to test rival theories of resistance to foreign occupation in the context of Afghanistan. I began by outlining the history of the occupation of Afghanistan and the composition and objectives of the principle resistance groups. I then carried out a cross-sectional analysis of attacks and coalition fatalities in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2010 at the district level. Political dislocation, in this case the marginalization of Pashtuns and the Taliban specifically, was found to be a robust predictor of insurgency. Although the hypothesis could not be tested directly using cross-sectional data, I also found support for the contention that trust plays a role in explaining variation in resistance. Importantly, political dislocation theory outperformed other theories of resistance to occupation. Although population size and ethnic fractionalization were found to affect the intensity of resistance, the main predictions of nationalism did not bear out in a careful analysis of attacks on coalition and Afghan forces. Similarly factors related to opportunity structure such as poverty, terrain, and proximity to Pakistan were found to have no statistically significant effect or effects contrary to predictions.

What are the implications of these findings in the context of Afghanistan? First, if nationalism is not a principal driver of violence then we should not expect violence to cease once foreigners withdraw. For insurgents the desired end-state is not the departure of foreign troops, but the installment of an Islamic regime in Kabul (Stenersen 2010, 51). In fact, rather than predicting an tapering of violence with the end of occupation, political dislocation theory predicts the exact opposite: the departure of foreign forces may lead to an escalation in violence as political institutions are suddenly misaligned with the domestic balance of power. In this regard, efforts to strengthen
Afghan National Security Forces may help reduce the risk of civil war, given sufficient resources and training. Second, political dislocation may be a trigger for resistance, but collateral damage incurred in countering resistance can stimulate insurgent recruitment. These two factors are therefore interlinked. Third, if economic factors are not essential drivers of conflict, then reconstruction and economic development alone will not tackle the causes of resistance and insurgency. There may be strong normative and humanitarian reasons for fostering economic development, but they should not be seen as a panacea to an insurgency driven by political grievances. Fourth, the findings reinforce the argument that democratization can be profoundly destabilizing when it leads to political dislocation and the generation of powerful spoilers (Stedman 1997).

Lastly, if the insurgency in Afghanistan is being driven in part by political dislocation, might negotiations and political accommodation lessen resistance? A number of scholars and practitioners have in fact advocated direct negotiations with the Taliban (Christia and Semple 2009; Rashid and Rubin 2008; Chandrasekaran 2012). This position was also adopted by the Afghan and US governments, among others (Rondeaux 2008; Dreazon et al. 2008). While political accommodation can in theory help address violence stemming from political dislocation, the prospects of a negotiated outcome are complicated by the splintering of Taliban factions, remaining incompatibilities of interests with the Afghan government and Western forces and shifting bargaining leverage. As noted above, both the Taliban and the Pashtun community were dislocated. Insofar as negotiations may help address the grievances of the Pashtun community for greater representation, they may be effective at sapping some of the power of the insurgency. However, such accommodation may be insufficient for more radical Islamist insurgents whose demands go beyond the expulsion of foreign forces and greater Pashtun representation. Critically, most Western powers would view accommodation with extremist demands as anathema to their values and interests.\(^{13}\) Political accommodation must also be understood in the context of the military balance of power. Resistance forces may believe they can eventually achieve their preferred objectives through violence, and if the costs of carrying out such violence is lesser than costs of accommodation (that is, the difference between their ideal preference and the negotiated outcome), then

\(^{13}\)Withdrawal of forces would lead to a similar outcome but without the political cost of explicitly acknowledging or accepting extremist demands. Alternatively, the Taliban could provide Western forces a face-saving exit by publicly committing to a democratic Afghanistan and simply resume insurgency once foreign forces leave after a “decent interval” as Kissinger termed it (Gardner 2011, 229).
political accommodation is unlikely to succeed. Given the US’s public commitment to withdrawing of the bulk of its forces by 2014, resistance groups may loath to negotiate away what they believe they can achieve through violence after the withdrawal. Comparing negotiations with the US to the holy month of Ramadan, some Taliban ask: “Why abandon the fast five minutes before sunrise?” In sum, the combination of extremist demands and shrinking horizon of Western forces make negotiating an end to resistance in Afghanistan harder to achieve. Negotiations have yet to achieve tangible results. In November 2010, a man claiming to be Taliban official Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour was revealed to be an impostor (Filkins and Gall 2010). In September 2011, men claiming to be Taliban representatives killed chief interlocutor and the head of the country’s High Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani in a suicide attack (Rubin 2011). In March 2012, the Taliban suspended talks, accusing the US of being too “shaky, erratic, and vague” (Doucet 2013). By early 2013, negotiations had yet to resume.
Chapter 6

Resistance to Occupation in Lithuania
(1940-1953)

You must take a good look at reality and understand that in the future small nations will have to disappear.

-Soviet Foreign Secretary Vyacheslav Molotov, 2 July 1940

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a case study of resistance to foreign occupation in Lithuania between 1940 and 1953. Lithuania’s identity is tightly coupled with the experience of occupation. A buffer state of three million squeezed between Germany and Russia, it has long lived under foreign rule. Independent Lithuania only re-emerged in the 20th century through a favorable confluence of events: the Bolshevik revolution and civil war in Russia and the defeat of Germany following the First World War. However, Lithuanian independence was short-lived. It was occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union in June 1940, followed by Germany in 1941, and again by the Soviet Union in 1944 until the USSR’s collapse in 1991.

Why study Lithuania? Lithuania is a useful case study of resistance to occupation for four reasons. First, it exhibits variation in the treatment of occupation. Regrettably for Lithuania,

1Cited in Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 25
the country experienced several consecutive occupations, and these occupations provide varying treatments of political dislocation and trust. By holding socio-economic and geographic factors constant, Lithuania became an unwilling laboratory of occupation and resistance. Second, Lithuanian resistance to occupation, as with all the cases studies in this dissertation, is well predicted by the cross-national model presented in Chapter 4. In order to ensure that the model’s findings are not spurious, case studies are necessary to trace the theoretical mechanisms outlined in Chapter 3. Third, a significant percentage of occupations since 1900 occurred during the Second World War. The Lithuania case study helps ensure that the theoretical mechanisms apply to this critical juncture in history. Lastly, Petersen (2001) and Darden (forthcoming) study the case of Lithuania in other prominent works on resistance to occupation. Examining Lithuania, therefore, allows us to compare the predictions of competing theories of resistance on common ground.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section outlines the sequence of events during the Soviet and German occupations. For each occupation, I also describe the occupier policies, resistance events, and the composition of resistance groups. The second section assesses the theories of political dislocation and trust. The third section compares the predictions of political dislocation and trust to the prediction of alternative theories of resistance to occupation, namely — nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context.

To preview the results, the case study demonstrates the role of trust and political dislocation in triggering resistance. Contrary to nationalism theory, there was no automatic or unified response to occupation. In fact, many Lithuanians collaborated with the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany for financial or political gain. Moreover, different groups undertook resistance against different occupiers. Soviet policies were opposed by disenfranchised wealthier landowners, industrialists, and traditional political parties, whereas German occupation was principally opposed by Jews and communists fearing persecution. Lastly, as predicted by the political fractionalization corollary, resistance groups often fought against each other in order to secure a better post-war outcome for themselves.
6.2 Historical Context

6.2.1 First Soviet Occupation (1940-1941)

Invasion

On 23 August 1939, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop flew to Moscow to sign a non-aggression pact with his Soviet counterpart, Vyacheslav Molotov. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, as it came to be known, called on each state to remain neutral in the event of an attack by a third party. However, a secret additional protocol to the Pact assigned Estonia and Latvia to a Soviet sphere of influence, Lithuania to a German sphere, and parts of Poland to both. Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, triggering the Second World War, and the Soviet Union followed on 17 September 1939 (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 15).

Following the invasion of Poland, Stalin sought to tighten his control over the Baltics. On 10 October 1939, he proposed a Pact of Defense and Mutual Assistance with Lithuania. The pact guaranteed Lithuanian independence and re-iterated Soviet non-interference in domestic affairs. To sweeten the deal, Stalin offered Vilnius, the historic capital of Lithuania which had been lost to Poland in 1921 (Snyder 2003). Lithuania signed the Pact and, on 28 October 1939, Vilnius was restored as its capital (see Figure 6.1). Despite the concession of Vilnius, Lithuania had little reason to trust Soviet guarantees: Lithuania had been ruled by Imperial Russia and had just witnessed the Soviet invasion of neighboring Poland. However, it had little choice but to acquiesce to Soviet demands. It could not turn to Germany, which was allied with the USSR, and both nations vastly outgunned Lithuania (Vardys and Sedaitis 1997, 47). Moreover, there were now 20,000 Soviet troops on its territory. Stationed in bases, these troops did not formally constitute an occupation, but, nonetheless restricted Lithuanian autonomy. The New York Times referred to it as a ”virtual sacrifice of independence” (Gedye 1939, 6).

Having restricted Lithuanian autonomy, the USSR then moved to extinguish its sovereignty. Unbeknownst to Lithuania, a modification to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had assigned Lithuania to the Soviet sphere, and by February 1940, the USSR had made the decision to annex Lithuania altogether. Under Soviet guidance, activities by the outlawed Lithuanian Communist Party increased sharply (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 15, 18). On 25 May 1940, the Soviet Union men-
diciously accused Lithuania of kidnapping two Soviet soldiers garrisoned on Lithuanian territory. Lithuanian Prime Minister Antanas Merkys was then summoned to Moscow, where Molotov castigated him for violating of the Defense and Mutual Assistance Pact. At midnight on 14 June 1940, Molotov handed Lithuanian Foreign Minister Juozas Urbašys an ultimatum to settle the disagreement. The ultimatum called for the formation of a Lithuanian government “capable of assuring the proper fulfillment” of the Pact and the stationing of Soviet troops on Lithuanian soil. The Lithuanian government was given six hours to reply (Vardys and Sedaitis 1997, 47).

In a late-night meeting to respond to the ultimatum, President Smetona called for military resistance against the Soviet Union. The military balked, arguing that such resistance would be suicidal. Rather than preside over the fall of his country, Smetona chose to flee Lithuania. Prime Minister Merkys resigned to comply with the ultimatum. Soviet deputy commissar for Foreign Affairs Vladimir Dekanozov was then sent to Lithuania to directly supervise the formation of a new government. On 15 June 1940, 300,000 Soviet troops crossed the border, initiating the First Soviet occupation of Lithuania (Petersen 2001, 90).

In the first stages of the occupation, there was great uncertainty among both elites and the public about Soviet intentions. Lithuanians continued to hope for some nominal independence, and Foreign Minister Vincas Krėvė-Mickevičius traveled to Moscow to request a loosening of Soviet control over Lithuania. In a meeting reminiscent of Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue, Soviet Foreign Secretary Molotov replied bluntly: “You must take a good look at reality and understand that in the future small nations will have to disappear. Your Lithuania along with the other Baltic nations, including Finland, will have to join the glorious family of the Soviet Union. Therefore you should begin now to initiate your people into the Soviet system, which in the future shall reign everywhere” (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 25).

**Reforms**

With the Red Army in firm control, the Soviet Union began to transform Lithuania into a Soviet republic, what Vardys and Sedaitis (1997, 50) called the “synthetic revolution.” Parliament was disbanded on 1 July 1940. In June and July 1940, leading Lithuanian statesmen were arrested and deported. Communist parties, which had been illegal prior to the occupation, were made the only
Figure 6.1: Borders of Lithuania 1939-1991
legal parties in the country. The leadership of the Lithuanian national guard was eliminated on 13 July. By 14 July 1940, merely one month after the Soviet invasion, Lithuania held elections for “People’s Assemblies” (Petersen 2001, 90). Among the alleged 95.5 percent voter turnout recorded by the Soviets, 99.2 percent of votes were for communist candidates.\(^2\) Indeed, only communist-party candidates were allowed to run, and Soviet officials were present in voting booths (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 27). At its first meeting, the People’s Assembly called for the nationalization of most rural and urban property, as well as all factories and banks. The Assembly formed a delegation to be sent to Moscow to request the formal incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Despite some protests in Lithuania, the Soviet Union “granted” the request for annexation. Most Western states never recognized the annexation (Brandišauskas 1999, 10).

Dramatic political and economic reforms followed the formal annexation of Lithuania. In July 1940, 11 of the 12 mayors of Lithuania’s principal cities, 19 of the 23 mayors of towns and 175 of the 261 county heads were dismissed (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 24). All factories with 20 or more workers were nationalized. All businesses over specified sizes were expropriated. Thus, in 1940, some 1,597 stores and warehouses, 43 hotels, and 2,555 buildings were taken over by the state. The ruble was made the official currency at a highly unfavorable exchange rate. Limits were placed on how much individuals could withdraw from bank accounts (the rest seized by the state). About 385,000 hectares were confiscated from 27,000 landowners (Kaszeta 1988; Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 31-32).

As political and economic reforms started to sink in, preparations for resistance emerged. On 19 September 1940, Lithuanian diplomats met in Rome to form the Lithuanian National Committee (LTK), with the purpose of coordinating the efforts of Lithuanian partisans opposed to Soviet occupation (Brandišauskas 1999, 10). On 9 October 1940, the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF) was founded by Kasys Škirpa, a former Lithuanian military attaché to Germany. The LAF was organized around two centers, in Vilnius and Kaunas, supplemented by hundreds of three-man cells across the country (Kaszeta 1988). Concurrently, the LAF sought to unify emerging resistance groups such as Lithuania’s Defense League, Iron Wolf, and the Lithuanian Freedom Army (Inviskis 1965, 65-66). The LTK and the LAF lay dormant for most of the first Soviet occupation.

\(^2\) Real turnout was estimated at 20 percent (Petersen 2001, 91).
Resistance was mainly passive, consisting of anti-Soviet graffiti, jokes, and pamphlets calling for sabotage and the boycotting of elections (Petersen 2001, 94-96). The LTK waited for a propitious moment to revolt (Brandišauskas 1999, 12; Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 43).

Resistance

In June 1941, three events triggered an upheaval against Soviet occupation. First, the Soviet regime began massive purges against what it described as “counter-revolutionary” segments of the population. Counter-revolutionaries were defined very broadly, and included members of all non-communist parties, elites of patriotic, religious, and youth organizations, former officers of the Lithuanian military, former law-enforcement officials, and priests and ministers, among others (Vardys 1963, 506). Between 10 and 17 July 1940, some 500 members of former political parties were arrested (Brandišauskas 1999, 13). Second, from 13 to 18 June 1941, the USSR deported some 35,000 Lithuanians to remote labor camps in Siberia and Kazakhstan. The purpose of the deportations was literally to remove potential opponents of reforms and their families (Snyder 2010). Lastly, on 21 June 1941, Hitler launched a surprise attack against the Soviet Union, known as Operation Barbarossa.

Operation Barbarossa shifted the balance of power between Lithuania and Soviet Union. Alone, Lithuania stood no chance at liberating itself from Soviet control. However, with Soviet forces tied up in battle with Germany, resistance groups saw an opportunity for liberation. Thus, as news of the German offensive reached Lithuania in June 1941, a massive LAF-led revolt erupted. On 22 June, the LAF seized the radio tower in Kaunas and announced the re-establishment of the state of Lithuania and the composition of a new government. Revolt spread to Vilnius on 23 June, where the post office, the radio tower, and other buildings were taken. Amidst the revolt, membership in the LAF swelled to 20,000 (Brandišauskas 1999, 16-18). The revolts in Kaunas and Vilnius were catalysts to broader resistance across the country, which continued until 27 June 1941 (Stašaitis 2000, 115). Approximately 2,000 Lithuanian civilians and partisans died in the 1941 uprising, and the Soviets executed a further 1,500 prisoners (Mackevičius 1986; Kaszeta 1988). By some accounts, the Soviet soldiers and activists suffered 5,000 fatalities in June 1941 (Brandišauskas 1999).

Both Soviets and Lithuanian sources tended to inflate the number of partisans during the first Soviet occupation: the former to justify brutal repression, the latter to promote nationalism.
6.2.2 German Occupation (1941-1944)

Invasion and Transitional Government

German forces entered Lithuania on 22 June 1941, finding much of the country already under the control of Lithuanian partisans. Partisan control of Lithuania did not mean peace, however. Following the departure of the Soviets, pogroms spontaneously arose in Vilnius and Kaunas, where 1,200 to 4,000 Jews were killed, often by forces of the LAF (Greenbaum 1995, 306; Levin 1995, 64). To many Lithuanians, Jews needed to be punished for their collaboration, real or perceived, with the Soviet Union. Anticipating the occupation of Germany and local reprisals, many Jews fled to the Soviet Union (Levin 1995, 279).

The LAF set up a provisional government on 24 June 1941. It immediately started rolling back Soviet reforms by de-nationalizing land, enterprises, and real estate, and by restoring local administrative units and police. At the same time, the provisional government worked with German occupation authorities. Unaware of Germany’s plans for the eventual colonization of Eastern Europe, the provisional government hoped that collaboration would provide the goodwill to secure political independence (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 45).

Along with Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia, Lithuania was placed under the administration of the Reichskommissariat Ostland. On 17 July 1941, Alfred Rosenberg was appointed Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Unlike other countries under Germany’s control in Eastern Europe, Lithuania was initially provided a degree of self-government, with local directorates led by sympathetic Lithuanians. Such directorates helped channel demands through local authorities, which helped mask the reality of occupation (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 50). On 28 July 1941, Reichskommissar Heinrich Lohse announced the establishment of a civilian government in Lithuania. Soon thereafter, Petras Kubiliūnas, a Lithuanian extreme nationalist, who had attempted a coup in 1934, was appointed First General Counselor in the civilian government.

Many aspects of Lithuanian life, such as culture, education, and the Church, were left untouched. This contrasted with Soviet rule, which had strongly persecuted the Lithuanian Church (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 52). Over the course of WWII, Lithuania developed the reputation of being one of the closer collaborators of Nazi Germany. For instance, at any given time, there were approximately 8,000 Lithuanians serving in “Defense Battalions” under German command
Mobilization, Repression, and the Holocaust

The goodwill established between Germany and the provisional government was short-lived. German administrative efforts effectively sidelined the LAF and the provisional government. Germany initially ordered LAF not to establish a government, and refused to coordinate with the provisional government that was established. Hitler ignored an LAF memorandum calling for Lithuanian independence and, instead, ordered the LAF to disarm. On 5 August 1941, the provisional government disbanded because restrictions imposed by the German civilian administration made it impossible to perform its duties. On 22 September, the German government banned the LAF altogether (Inviskis 1965, 71, 76).

As time wore on, dissatisfaction with German occupation grew. Germany failed to return property and land expropriated by the Soviets to their rightful owners (Alexiev 1982, 19). Worse still, Germany began settling colonists on Lithuanian land. By the fall of 1942, 16,300 German colonists had been settled on Lithuanian farms (Inviskis 1965, 74). Additionally, economic conditions worsened as the Second World War dragged on, with food shortages becoming more frequent. Pressure on the front led Germany to squeeze Lithuania for more resources and manpower. On 19 December 1941, Rosenberg issued a decree announcing a general work obligation and in 1942 called for 100,000 laborers. After only five percent of this quota was filled, Germany started resorting to harsher conscription methods. Villages were destroyed and youths deported when Lithuanian officials failed to provide the requisite quota (Statiev 2010, 63). By 1944, Germany had sent some 75,000 Lithuanians to Germany (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 54; Kaszeta 1988).

On 6 March 1943, following defeat at the battle of Stalingrad, Germany also sought to conscript Lithuanians into military units. At first, Germany experienced difficulties recruiting soldiers, as Lithuanians already resented German occupation and had even fewer incentives to join the Wehrmacht now that it was losing the war. In order to hasten recruitment, Germany began arresting and deporting members of the Lithuanian elite and closing down schools (Mackevičius 1986). In 1944, facing both manpower shortages and an intensifying Soviet partisan campaign, Germany acquiesced to the formation of a "territorial force" or "local detachments" composed
of Lithuanians, commanded by Lithuanians, and designed to operate solely in the Baltics as a rear guard to tackle Soviet partisans. This was appealing to many Lithuanians, who saw the Soviet Union as a grave threat. Military units under Lithuanian command would also assure that they would defend Lithuania against Soviet occupation rather than become cannon fodder for a collapsing German front. Thus, recruitment of a territorial force under Lithuanian control was tremendously popular (Kaszeta 1988). But, Germany rescinded its promises, and the force was ordered to take an oath to Hitler, to serve in Germany and other theaters of operation, and to come under the control of the SS. When Lithuanian General Plechavičius refused to carry out these orders and thousands of soldiers quit, he and 40 other officers were arrested and sent to concentration camps. Lithuanian soldiers then were executed at random (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 55; Mackevičius 1986).

The greatest victims of the German occupation were the Jews of Lithuania. At the beginning of the occupation, Lithuania was home to approximately 200,000 Jews. Vilnius, with 70,000 Jewish inhabitants, was known as the Jerusalem of the North and was a major center of Jewish culture and scholarship (Greenbaum 1995). Within a month of the occupation, the German administration began to issue anti-Semitic decrees. At the same time, the German SS paramilitary death squads, known as the Einsatzgruppen, killed 5,000 Jewish men in Ponary forest, 11 kilometers outside Vilnius. In September 1941, Jews were corralled into two ghettos. The first ghetto was destroyed in October 1941. By the end of 1941, some 40,000 Jews had been killed in Ponary (Laqueur 2001). During the occupation, some ten Lithuanian police battalions took part in the Holocaust, killing some 78,000 Jews inside and outside Lithuania (Bubnys 2002, 32). The Vilnius Ghetto was destroyed on 23 September 1943. By the end of the Second World War, roughly 195,000 Lithuanian Jews had been killed.

**Resistance**

Following the battle of Stalingrad, the tide of the Second World War began to turn against Germany. As the front collapsed, repression of occupied Lithuania intensified. And as repression intensified, so did preparations for resistance. Organized resistance started in the fall of 1941, following the disbanding of the provisional government and the suppression of the LAF (Misiunas
and Taagepera 1983, 63).

Four distinct categories of resistance movements emerged: anti-communist, Polish, Jewish, and Soviet. First was the anti-communist, anti-German underground, often considered the “nationalist” resistance. This movement was itself divided between the Lithuanian Front (LF), which grew out of the LAF, and the Union of Lithuanian Freedom Fighters (LLKS). The LF was more Catholic, whereas the LLKS was more secular and militantly anti-German. Both groups engaged in passive resistance but avoided armed confrontation with German troops, fearing it would only help the USSR. Second, the Polish Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*) operated in Eastern Lithuania. Since Vilnius and its surrounding regions were part of Poland prior to 1939, the vast majority of the population of Vilnius was Polish or Jewish, not Lithuanian.

Third, some 5,000 Soviet partisans operated in Eastern Lithuania. These partisans were composed of communist Lithuanians, as well as Red Army soldiers who were either left behind during the German invasion or subsequently infiltrated behind enemy lines. In many cases, knowledge of the inhumane conditions in German POW camps pushed Soviet soldiers to go underground as partisans rather than surrender to the Wehrmacht. In July 1941, Stalin called on loyal communists to organize partisan units in territory occupied by Germany. In May 1942, the Soviet Union established a Central Staff of the Partisan Movement in Moscow (Snyder 2010, 233). On 26 November 1942, a Lithuanian Partisan Movement command, headed by Lithuanian communist Antanas Sniečkus, was created with the Central Staff. Unlike the Special Operation Executive (SOE) set up by Churchill to provide support and coordination to resistance movements in continental Europe, the Soviet Union directly provided the majority of the manpower and political directives to the partisans.

Fourth, some Jewish Lithuanians undertook organized resistance under the United Partisan Organization (*Fareynegte Partizaner Organizatsye*) or FPO, founded on 1 January 1942 by the Zionist party youth branch (Arad 2010, 207). In the beginning, the FPO undertook mainly in passive resistance, securing hideouts and weapons in the Vilnius Ghetto while preparing for more active resistance. In early September 1943, realizing that Germany intended the wholesale destruction of the Ghetto, the FPO clashed with German forces that had entered the Ghetto to begin deporting Jews (Eckman and Lazar 1977, 24, 29). According to some sources, the total number of Lithuanian Jewish partisans reached 1,650, including those partisans fighting in Belarus and Jews operating
in non-Jewish partisan movements (Kowalski 1984, 275).

6.2.3 Second Soviet Occupation (1944-1991)

Re-invasion and Re-imposition of Reforms

Although resistance in Lithuania was relatively limited, it nevertheless tied down German troops as they fought a losing war against the Soviet Union. Ultimately, it was the Soviet invasion, rather than resistance, that ended the German occupation. In early July 1944, Soviet forces entered eastern Lithuania, capturing Vilnius by 13 July and Kaunas by 1 August 1944. Immediately upon their arrival, Soviet troops began reintroducing sweeping social reforms, and, just as quickly, resistance to Soviet occupation re-emerged. Unlike the first Soviet occupation, the Soviet Union made no effort to win hearts and minds (Petersen 2001, 170).

Lithuania was again incorporated into the Soviet Union. A Soviet government was reestablished, led by First Party Secretary Antanas Sniečkus, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Mečislovas Gedvilas, and Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of the Supreme Soviet Justas Paleckis (Vardys and Sedaidis 1997, 60). The USSR also assigned Russian Soviets to oversee Lithuanian Soviet leaders (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 81). Much of the administration of Soviet Lithuania was now conducted in Russian.

In 1949, the Soviets introduced a new land-reform law that imposed collectivization of farms. The collectivization led to a steep drop in agricultural production, which took a decade to recover (Vardys and Sedaitis 1997, 65). In order to facilitate collectivization and weaken the opposition, the Soviet regime began mass deportations. Based on its experience in Russia, the Soviet Union had expected resistance to collectivization and explicitly sought to "drain the sea" by depriving opponents of Soviet policies sources of food, shelter, and supplies (Statiev 2005). The Soviets deported an estimated 60,000 Lithuanians between August and September 1944, some 70,000 in 1947, and another 70,000 in May 1948 (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 70, 96). Ultimately, the Soviet Union would deport 12 percent of Lithuania’s pre-war population (Stašaitis 2000, 115). Predictably, the deportations had a mixed effect. On the one hand, it pushed some to flee to the forests and join the resistance rather than risk death in the Siberian steppe. On the other hand, the sheer scale of deportations incapacitated resistance to collectivization.
The Soviet crackdown on Lithuania was both physical and spiritual. During the first Soviet occupation, church property had been nationalized and the clergy had been deported or assassinated, the separation of Church and state codified, and the concordat with the Holy See discontinued. These policies were reinstated in the second Soviet occupation. On 9 July 1948, the government passed a decree on the nationalization of houses of prayer and other church property. It also sought to obstruct the training of new clerics, thereby threatening the viability of the clergy (Streikus 1999, 93, 99). From 1946 to 1949, 180 priests were deported to labor camps. Between 1940 and 1965, the number of parish churches and chapels declined from 708 and 314 to 575 and 0, respectively (Vignieri 1965, 221).

Resistance

Violent resistance to Soviet occupation started with the arrival of Soviet troops in 1944 and lasted until 1953. Unlike the first Soviet occupation, resistance was protracted and mostly rural. Additionally, unlike the June 1941 revolt, Lithuanian resistance groups were far better organized. Some, though not all, had gained experience during the first Soviet and subsequent German occupations. But, Lithuanians were no longer under any illusions regarding the intentions of the Soviet Union. They had gained a clear understanding of the type of occupier they were facing, and the brutal experience of nationalization, collectivization, and deportation in 1940-1941 had a galvanizing effect on resistance. Between 1944 and 1950, a total of 100,000 Lithuanians participated in resistance activities (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 86). At its height in the mid 1940s, approximately one percent of the entire population was fighting with the partisans (Vardys and Sedaitis 1997, 82). By way of comparison, this is the equivalent of peak Vietcong strength during the Vietnam War. Resistance included three different types: active partisans who fought and hid in bunkers or farms; passive partisans who continued about their lives, but occasionally fought with the resistance; and supporters who provided intelligence, shelter, and supplies (Vardys and Sedaitis 1997, 82). Partisans ranged from groups of 800 men and women down to individuals simply seeking to escape Soviet rule (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 81, 83).

Faced with mounting resistance, in September 1944, the Soviet Union sent General Sergei

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4 As Jewish leaders understood it, both Soviets and Germans were a threat. The former killed Jewish souls through atheism, while the latter killed Jewish bodies through massacres (Levin 1995, 36).
Kruglov to direct counterinsurgency in Lithuania (Vardys 1963, 518). Soviet counterinsurgency forces were composed of units from the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence agency known as the Ministry of State Security (MGB), the Soviet secret police agency known as the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). These government units were supported by a network of approximately 7,000 local militias called Istrebiteli (”destroyers”) (Statiev 2010; Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 88). Government forces operated a network of informants, and carried out periodic sweeps of forests where partisans were suspected of hiding.

The history of post-war resistance to Soviet occupation can be divided into three phases. In the first phase, between July 1944 and May 1946, the resistance operated throughout Lithuania and effectively controlled much of the countryside. Partisans numbering up to 30,000 launched pitched battles against Soviet troops. As Figure 6.2 (b) shows, this tactic proved to be disastrous given the disparity of power between Soviet and partisan forces, and partisans suffered heavy losses (Vardys 1963, 500). Resistance groups also conducted raids and ambushes against Soviet MVD units, assassinated collaborators, warned civilians of deportations, and liberated prisoners and deportees. Resistance groups also published a number of anti-Soviet pamphlets. Despite major military setbacks, the resistance made it much harder for the Soviet regime to recruit local government officials or to enforce government policies, especially the collectivization of farms and land reform (Vardys 1963, 513).

During the second phase of resistance, between May 1946 and November 1948, partisans responded to heavy losses by making organizational and tactical changes. Instead of pitched battles, decentralized units employed guerrilla warfare. During this phase of the war, partisans split into smaller groups and went into hiding. By this time, the Soviet Union had deployed some 100,000 troops to Lithuania (Stasaitis 2000, 117).

The third phase of resistance, between November 1948 and May 1953, saw the steady decline of resistance as a result of relentless Soviet attacks and deportations. Rather than focus on attacking Soviet forces, partisans went underground, sometimes literally hiding in bunkers built under homes, farms, and roads. Resistance shifted from confrontation to survival. As the movement weakened, it became increasingly difficult to communicate and coordinate actions. The last known leader of the Lithuanian resistance, Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas was arrested and killed.
by the NKVD in 1956 (Kaszeta 1988).

Both Soviets and partisans attacked civilians throughout the war. Lithuanian partisans sentenced to death some 1,977 alleged collaborators (Anušauskas 1999, 67). On 20 October 1944, the USSR instituted an official policy of collective punishment, allowing the arrest, imprisonment and deportation of families of partisans. Starting in 1945, Soviet authorities would also publicly display dead partisans in public squares in order to intimidate the Lithuanian population and to observe the reaction of villagers to identify those associated with the resistance (Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė 1999, 30-31).

From the beginning, lack of partisan supplies, particularly weapons and ammunition, were a major problem. Unlike many other resistance groups during the Second World War, Lithuanian partisans during the second Soviet occupation sustained themselves almost completely without foreign support. Lithuania was also boxed in by Soviet-dominated states and, thus, could expect no support from its neighbors (Vardys 1963, 515; Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 84). By the time the resistance was wiped out in 1953, partisans had suffered an estimated 20,000 to 50,000 fatalities, and Soviet losses totaled some 20,000 (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 84, 88). Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of troops and fatalities as estimated by the Soviet Union (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 277).

As with other periods of occupation, resistance was fractured into different groups. At first, many uncoordinated groups emerged spontaneously (Vardys 1963, 500). Eventually, though, resistance consolidated around four main groups: the Liberation Committee of Lithuania, the Partisan Union of Lithuania, the Lithuanian Freedom Army, and the National Council of Lithuania. Although the Polish Armija Krajowa continued to be active around Vilnius, by 1946, most Polish partisans had surrendered (Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė 1999, 41). In February 1949, the various Lithuanian partisan groups merged into the Movement for Lithuania’s Struggle (LLKS) (Vardys 1963, 500). At that point, however, the movement was so weak that the merger had no military effect. On the contrary, the USSR actively encouraged the centralization of resistance groups in order to simplify their decapitation (Petersen 2001, 172).
6.3 Theoretical Explanations

The case of Lithuania presents of number of puzzles. Why did individuals resist occupation? Why was there mainly passive resistance to German occupation, but bloody decade-long resistance to Soviet occupation? Why did different groups in different parts of the country undertake resistance at different times? This section seeks to evaluate the predictions of the theories of political dislocation and trust in the context of Lithuania.

6.3.1 Political Dislocation

Political dislocation theory posits that occupiers are more likely to face resistance the more they disrupt the balance of political power in occupied societies. Moreover, the specific type of political dislocation will determine the direction and intensity of resistance. The Soviet and German occupations each caused considerable political dislocation. Governments were toppled, political parties were banned, and massive social and economic reforms fundamentally challenged the bases of domestic political order. Additionally, the political dislocation of Soviet and German occupations affected different groups: large landowners, industrialists, and traditional political parties.
in the case of the Soviet occupation; and Jews and communists in the case of German occupation. The differential impact of each occupier’s policy, as well as the sequence of political dislocation and resistance and the composition of resistance groups, helps us identify the effect of political dislocation.

**First Soviet Occupation**

Contrary to nationalist assumptions, not all segments of Lithuanian society were equally opposed to the first Soviet occupation. At first, the Soviet Union did not make its intentions clear: After occupying the country, Soviet troops quickly withdrew from posts and government buildings. Most Lithuanians were also unaware of the Soviet ultimatum or the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Resistance was muted. In addition, prior to occupation, Lithuania had been ruled by Antanas Smetona, an autocrat who came to power in a coup in 1926. Observers who compared the occupation of Lithuania with the concurrent occupations of neighboring Estonia and Latvia thought that the Lithuanians showed more enthusiasm for the new order imposed by the Soviets than the Latvians or Estonians did. One possible factor, in their opinion, was that Soviet occupation had led to the flight of the broadly despised President Smetona (Senn 2007, 119).

Another Lithuanian group that was more likely to welcome the arrival of Soviet troops was Lithuania’s Jewish community, representing some ten percent of the population. True, the proportion of communists and leftists was much greater among the Jewish Lithuanian population than among the non-Jewish population. Yet even to those non-communist Jews, the Soviet Union was seen as a bulwark against the threat of Nazi Germany. As Red Army columns approached Lithuanian cities, Jews greeted them with cheers and flowers, thanking God and saying “better Stalin than Hitler” (Levin 1995, 36). Self-preservation aside, some Jews also had political reasons for supporting the Soviet regime. Political reforms implemented by the Soviet government initially empowered the Jewish population. Like many other states in Eastern Europe at the time, Lithuanian law and widespread anti-Semitism imposed strong restrictions on Jewish political participation. Under Soviet rule, Jews could be appointed to government positions, elected office, and academic institutions. The Jewish press in Lithuania, therefore, encouraged its readers to take part in the elections of the Soviet People’s Assemblies: “The present elections are doubly significant for
us Jews. For us, the new regime not only signals the socialist liberation of oppressed social strata, but also the national liberation of all Jews in Lithuania, with no exception whatsoever” (Levin 1995, 51). As a result of Soviet rule, Jews were able to join the cabinet as well as the internal security services.\(^5\)

The reaction of the Jewish community contrasted with pamphlets being circulated by the emerging anti-Soviet resistance: “Son of the enslaved Fatherland! Today the hour has struck for you to show that you are a Lithuanian. A real Lithuanian prefers death, rather than raise his hand for Lithuania’s traitors. Do not go into the voting hall, because there you will be forced to betray brothers, freedom, and faith” (Budreckis 1968, 24). To many Lithuanians, the Soviet emancipation of Jews was a double treachery. First, Jews became inextricably bound in the minds of many with Bolshevism, and the excesses of its internal security services. Second, the rise of Jews to administrative and security roles, reversed the traditional— and to some, natural —hierarchy in Lithuanian society. This role-reversal generated strong resentment against the Soviet Union and Jews more generally (Petersen 2001). A Šiauliai police report from 24 June 1940 noted that the “irresponsible Jewish element, especially the youth... do not even allow Lithuanians to pass on the sidewalk Lithuanians complain that the Jews are bragging: ‘we are now the masters’ ” (Sužuedėlis 2004, 322).

As Soviet policy towards Lithuania became more repressive, it began to face more resistance. The purges and deportations initiated in 1941 were a shock to the Lithuanian population. Whatever illusions Lithuanians may have held regarding the Soviet regime were swiftly dispelled. These policies also alienated virtually every relevant political group in Lithuania. Indeed, these deportations targeted potential opponents of Soviet policies. Precisely because the Soviet regime had so greatly alienated diverse strata of the Lithuanian population, a broad-based anti-Soviet underground rose in armed revolt (Vardys 1963, 502). As one Lithuanian recalled:

> Our entire family was deported in the early morning of June 13, 1941. Seven soldiers came, forced us from our sleep; they seated father on a stool, ordered him to raise his hands and pointed a pistol at him. They seated us, four children, at the table; we were crying and screaming, afraid for father... After they finished the search, they piled all

\(^5\) The first Soviet occupation was not necessarily kind to Jews. The Soviet regime banned Zionist organizations, abolished Hebrew education, and deported some 12,000 Jews (Levin 2001, 52).
our books in the yard and set them on fire telling us that they were bourgeois literature.

My youngest sister was only two years old (Balkelis 2005).

This indiscriminate violence pushed Lithuanians to revolt. As Petersen notes (2001, 118) the village Svainikai saw no resistance prior to June 1941. Despite resentment against the Soviet Union, villagers waited for German liberation. However, deportations between 14 and 21 June triggered a violent response and the first violent resistance to Soviet rule. Similarly, skirmishes between Lithuanian partisans and Soviet forces occurred in Rokiškis, Marijampolė, and Utena counties on 16 and 17 July as the Soviet Union organized mass deportations (Budreckis 1968, 44). Thus, the sequence of repression and rebellion is instructive in identifying some of the causes of resistance.

Despite its strengths, political dislocation as an explanation of resistance in the case of first Soviet occupation has two lacunae. First, the theory over-predicts resistance in the first phases of the Soviet occupation. With the government overthrown, politicians jailed and exiled, and the economic system overturned, we should expect violent resistance from dislocated elites in 1940. Instead, it took the German invasion of the Soviet Union for Lithuanians to rise up against Soviet occupation. Second, why did Lithuanians fight the Soviet Union rather than wait to be liberated by Germany? By many accounts, Lithuanian resistance leaders hoped to establish some provisional government before Germany entered Lithuania in order to maintain bargaining leverage for self-rule.

**German Occupation**

The effect of political dislocation becomes clearer when comparing anti-Soviet and anti-German resistance. Rather than fight German occupiers, as they had just done against the Soviets, nationalist groups actively collaborated with them. Moreover, collaboration with Germany served the specific aim of destroying nationalists’ domestic enemies. For example, during the first week of German occupation, the provisional Lithuanian government signed an agreement “to assist with all their might the German nation in its fight with Europe’s mortal enemy – Bolshevism”; to abstain from raising any political issues during the war; and not to accept and carry out any instructions without prior coordination with the respective authorities of the German army (Brandišauskas 1999, 20). Far-right nationalist groups also actively sought to collaborate with Germany, seeing oc-
cupation as an instrument to achieving their own domestic political agenda (Sužiedėlis 2011, 136). The banned Lithuanian fascist party Geležinis Vilkas (Iron Wolf) stated: “...The Wolves should not forget the Lithuanian struggle for liberation from Jewish economic slavery” (Nikžentaitis, Schreiner, and Staliūnas 2004, 131). Notably, “Partisan Liberators of Lithuania” under the LAF carried out pogroms against the Jewish population well before the arrival of German troops (Faiteelson 1996, 21).

A Lithuanian newspaper at the time captured the logic of political dislocation:

“It is an unusually beautiful sight when the German soldiers and tanks are decked with flowers, the soldiers are fed, while they give sweets to children and cigarettes to adults. Lithuanian citizens! Assist the German army further in all possible ways, so that our woods and bushes are soon as possible cleared of Jews, Bolsheviks, and other elements alien to our country, as well as Lithuanian traitors” (Brandišauskas 1999, 18).

Notably, far more Lithuanians volunteered in the police against Soviet partisans than in the partisans against German occupiers (Statiev 2010, 76). Some poorer farmers favored the land reform implemented by the Soviet regime, but not enthusiastically enough to join the Soviet partisans. Conversely, many Lithuanians hated the Soviets enough to collaborate with Germany against Soviet partisans.

Lithuanian nationalists initially collaborated with the Germans, but stopped once it became clear that Germany intended to sideline them and impose their own government. In February 1942, Josef Wutz of the Einsatzstab reported that “the mood of the [Lithuanian] population vis-à-vis the Germans has noticeably worsened in the last quarter,” noting that “the national demands for the regaining of independence or, at least, a recognition of cultural autonomy, are equally strong among all strata” (Sužiedėlis 2004, 352). The theory of political dislocation can explain why nationalist and right-wing groups refrained from undertaking resistance even once they were sidelined and Germany started repressing the Lithuanian population. Most Lithuanians saw the Soviet Union as a greater threat than Germany, since Soviet occupation policy involved not only brutality, but also wide-ranging social and economic dislocation. In the midst of the German-Soviet war, Lithuanian resistance leaders were concerned that by fighting German occupation, they would only facilitate the return of the Red Army. Therefore, resistance to Germany was
mainly passive, seeking to restrain the excesses of Nazi occupation by sabotaging German plans for economic and military mobilization rather than overthrowing it altogether. (Vardys 1963, 505).

**Second Soviet Occupation**

Political dislocation during the second Soviet occupation also shaped the nature of resistance. According to Statiev:

> the guerrilla units consisted of ideological enemies of communism, such as nationalists, Nazi collaborators fearing Soviet reprisals, including national guards, deserters from SS units, auxiliary police, and civilians involved in the extermination of Jews, communists, and Soviet prisoners of war (POWs); those attacked by the communists as class enemies; and most of all, farmers hurt by the Soviet agrarian policy (Statiev 2010, 98).

In fact, radical agrarian reforms were intended to attract supporters and neutralize resistance through class confrontation between the winners and losers of such reforms. In other words, Soviet occupiers employed political dislocation as a strategy of divide and rule. According to Misiunas and Taagepera (1983, 89): “Redistribution pitted those who lost against those who received land. The latter had an apparent economic stake in the continuation of the Soviet regime…in conflict with their national and, in Lithuania, their religious feeling.” This strategy fed onto itself, with Soviets confiscating the land of suspected partisans (often richer peasants) and giving it to poorer peasants, many of whom were recruited into Soviet auxiliary battalions (Lieven 1994, 88).

More than any other occupation policy, fear of collectivization fueled anti-Soviet sentiments, and prosperous farmers such as *kulaks* and *sereniaks* stood more to lose than any other social group. As the chair of the presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, Justas Paleckis, stated:

> “After the taxation scale based on land quality was abolished, the peasants who live in infertile regions found themselves in an extremely hard situation…Some complained that they had to sell their last horse in order to pay the taxes. Naturally, the political situation in such areas is the gravest and banditry is widespread” (Statiev 2010, 155).

Evidence of political dislocation can be seen in both the agents and the targets of anti-Soviet resistance. According to the NKVD, farmers represented 79.7 percent of all (apprehended) par-
Artisans, not surprising given that Lithuania was primarily agricultural and that insurgencies tend to be rural. However, among farmers, those with larger land holdings were better represented among the anti-Soviet resistance (Statiev 2010, 100). Lastly, even in its dying days, when resources became scarce, the anti-Soviet resistance directed its efforts at preventing a specific policy: the collectivization of farms (Vardys 1963, 521).

6.3.2 Factional Politics

A corollary of political dislocation theory is that resistance is not simply a matter of removing occupiers, but also a method of attaining power itself. Resistance, from this point of view, is a private good. The history of resistance to occupation during the German and second Soviet occupations of Lithuania provides extensive evidence in support of this corollary. Resistance movements fought over goals and strategies, seldom pooled their resources, and often fought against each other.

German Occupation

Anti-German resistance was not monolithic. Instead, it was divided into bitterly antagonistic anticommunist, Polish, Jewish, and Soviet partisan movements. Relations between Polish and Lithuanian resistance groups were fraught with tensions. Poland and Lithuania had gone to war over Vilnius between 1919 and 1921, and Lithuanian (re)possession of the city in 1939 was followed by a policy of discrimination and ethnic cleansing against ethnic Poles (Zubek 1993; Balkelis 2007). Polish resistance leaders envisioned a return to the borders of pre-war Poland, including Polish Vilnius. Indeed, in July 1944, right before the defeat of Germany and reoccupation by the Soviet Union, the Home Army launched Operation Ostra Brama to recapture Vilnius (Ciechanowski 2002, 207). Fundamental disagreement over the final status of Vilnius made it difficult for Polish and Lithuanian resistance groups to cooperate. Worse still, unlike other resistance groups operating in Lithuania, the Polish Home Army fought both the Nazi occupation and local Lithuanian police and administration. The result was a low-level irredentist civil war nested within a broader antioccupation struggle (Snyder 2003, 84). At a broader level, Polish and Lithuanian resistance groups did not share threat assessments. To the Lithuanian resistance, the Soviet Union was the prime

6It should be noted that non-occupied Soviet Russia also saw acts of resistance – though less violent – against collectivization.
enemy, whereas Germany was the secondary enemy. The reverse was true for Polish partisans. Although both occupations had been catastrophic, the Soviet Union at least officially recognized the right to Polish statehood, whereas Lithuania had been annexed by the Soviets altogether (Bubnys 2004).

The case of the Polish resistance is by no means unique. Soviet partisans often clashed with both the Polish Home Army and anti-communist Lithuanian partisans operating in Eastern Lithuania. Poland had never accepted the Soviet dismemberment of Polish-majority Eastern Lithuania following the 1939 Soviet invasion. Soviet partisans also clashed with Lithuanian anti-communist partisans, who saw the Soviet Union as a threat and the behavior of Soviet partisans as reckless. In addition to killing German collaborators, Soviet partisans killed German troops in the knowledge that they would retaliate indiscriminately against the civilian population, thereby encouraging Lithuanians to take up arms against German occupiers (Sheppard 2010; Snyder 2010, 238). Because of these provocations, in the view of many Lithuanians, the partisans were as much of a threat as the German occupiers themselves.

Divisions persisted within the anti-communist Lithuanian groups. Discussions regarding the structure of the resistance movement were complicated by the presence of different political parties. According to Lušys (1963):

The question inevitably arose as to which parties and resistance groupings would be qualified and authorized to participate in the new resistance center. We agreed on the following formula: the groups would include all political parties that had been represented in the last parliament of democratic Lithuania and all resistance organizations that had made a tangible contribution in the fight against the occupant.

Every political party wanted to be represented, but including representatives from so many different parties could compromise the clandestine operations of the resistance. Talks held in 1943 failed to get different political parties to agree to combine representatives because “the groupings...differed on matters of principle and could therefore not merge to such an extent that one person could properly represent two or three groupings” (Lušys 1963).

Relations between the Jewish FPO and anti-communist Lithuanian and Polish partisan groups were minimal and, in some cases, confrontational. Many partisans considered the Jewish com-
munity to be a Soviet fifth column. In Lithuania and across Eastern Europe, armed Jewish men were often rejected by other partisan groups and sometimes killed for their weapons. When the FPO contacted the Polish Home Army to obtain weapons in their fight against Germany, the latter declined, unconvinced that the group was not communist and wouldn’t favor Soviet or Lithuanian control of Vilnius after German defeat (Arad 2010, 209). Lacking support from local partisans for weapons and supplies, the FPO contacted Polish, Lithuanian, and Soviet communists instead (Eckman and Lazar 1977, 27; Sužiedėlis 2011, 252). Incredibly, there were also tensions within the Jewish resistance itself, between the communists and the Zionist resistance in Kaunas (Porat 1997).

Second Soviet Occupation

Several resistance groups also emerged during the second Soviet occupation starting in 1944. Polish Home Army partisans continued to fight Soviet occupation until 1946, all the while opposing Lithuanian nationalists. Notably, Polish and Lithuanians continued to clash, despite the fact that they were hopelessly outnumbered by a common enemy: the Soviet Union. Competition and political disagreements, driven in part by party membership, persisted among Lithuanian groups. According to Mykolas Krupavičius, the chairman of the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania (VLIK):

> The left were the first to organize themselves, and the [National] Front are keeping up with them. The Party of Freedom Fighters is very active and aggressive, and the National Party are following in their footsteps. The Christian Democrats have not yet started organizational work, but, in the light of these facts, they will have to keep up with the others” (Kuodytė 1999, 75).

Disagreements also emerged among different political factions of the resistance over who could speak on the resistance’s behalf overseas (Streikus 1999, 79). On 12 January 1947, the national conference of partisan leaders rejected the strategy proposed by the United Movement for Democratic Resistance. Many partisans “refused to assume the role of a mere home army without a direct influence on the future self-government of the country” (Vardys 1963, 517).
6.3.3 Trust

First Soviet Occupation

According to trust theory, resistance will emerge when there is a fundamental breakdown in trust between occupiers and the occupied. This breakdown in trust can be triggered by the occupier’s inability to credibly commit to leaving the territory or to treating the occupied population benignly. If individuals in occupied territory run a high risk of being victimized regardless of their behavior, then resistance will be seen as a practical survival strategy. Resistance, from this point of view, is a club good, whereby individuals contribute to resistance in return for protection from predatory occupiers.

The history of Lithuania provides strong evidence for trust theory. Despite nationalist rhetoric, Lithuanians waited rather than revolting immediately upon the arrival of Soviet troops in 1940. After all, at the beginning of the occupation, Soviet authorities deliberately concealed their intentions. Most Lithuanians were unaware of the ultimatum delivered by the USSR or the annexation, mass deportation, and colonization that lay ahead. Soviet intentions were painfully revealed through a sweeping set of political reforms initiated in 1940. Yet it was the deportation of tens of thousands of Lithuanians in mid-June 1941 that was the principal trigger for action at the end of June 1941. The deportations, estimated at 35,000, were unprecedented in their scope. In theory, the deportations were aimed at specified “class enemies,” but in practice, they were so broad as to appear arbitrary. In such circumstances, attentisme became a less viable strategy. After all, deportation was an effective death sentence, with forced labor, starvation, and diseases accounting for the death of approximately 25 percent of deportees (International Commission on Crimes of Nazi and Soviet Occupation 2005). Moreover, the deportations meant that Lithuanians could not simply wait out the occupation since they would not be in their own country if and when it was freed. In sum, it was only once Soviet policies altered individuals’ calculus of survival that support for active resistance emerged.

German Occupation

For most Lithuanians, German occupation was more benign than Soviet rule. Political parties sought to collaborate with the Nazi regime, hoping to maintain a semblance of sovereignty, whereas
the majority of the population simply avoided confrontation and waited for the storm to pass. *At-tentisme* was a rational strategy for most Lithuanians but became impossible for Jews. Unlike the non-Jewish Lithuanian population, Jews were confined to ghettos, massacred in forests, and sent to concentration camps. The Soviet Union, it was hoped, would liberate them from German rule, but there were no guarantees that the Soviet Union would arrive on time. Consequently, resistance became necessary for survival. The statement issued by FPO leader Abba Kovner in January 1942, illustrates this logic:

> Before our eyes they took away our parents, our brothers and sisters... Of those taken out through the gates of the Ghetto not a single one has returned... You who hesitate, cast aside all illusions. Your children, your wives and husbands are no longer alive... Hitler plans to destroy all the Jews of Europe, and the Jews of Lithuania have been chosen as the first in line. We will not be led like sheep to the slaughter! True, we are weak and defenseless, but the only reply to the murderer is revolt! Brothers! Better to fall as free fighters than to live by the mercy of the murderers. Resist! Resist with your last breath! (Bauer and Rotenstreich 1981, 81).

Similarly, Jewish partisan Samuel Lato recounted his calculation of risk in joining the Partisans: "I was terrified. If caught smuggling bullets into the ghetto I would be shot on the spot... The stakes were terribly high, but I was convinced I was going to die anyways. We all were." (Lato 2006, 76). "There was no question that we would be next... I wasn’t going to wait around. I decided to take action" (Lato 2006, 74).

If Jews faced such an existential threat under German occupation, why, then, was there not more Jewish resistance? To understand relative Jewish inaction, it is important to understand the role of information and the strategic environment faced by Jews. During much of the Second World War, the Jewish population was unaware of the extent of the unfolding genocide, including the whereabouts of those who had been deported from the ghettos and the Final Solution. Germany had an evolving policy towards the "Jewish Problem," and German administrators had deliberately given the impression that Jews who had been deported were being sent to labor camps, not to gas chambers. Conditions in the Vilnius Ghetto were difficult, but stable for almost two years. Under such conditions, leaders of the *Judenrat* (Jewish administrative council)—those most
likely to mobilize the population—opposed resistance. Instead, they argued that Jews should save their lives by working in Ghetto factories, thereby demonstrating their value to Germany. It was appeasement on a small scale, and it too would be catastrophic (Einwohner 2009, 416-417; Tushnet 1972; Arad 1982).

Moreover, ghettos allowed Germany to hold entire Jewish communities hostage. This captivity presented an agonizing dilemma for would-be resisters. If the Jews undertook resistance, retaliation against their community would be swift and certain. The case of Yitzak Wittenberg provides an illustration of the hostage problem. After the Gestapo captured Jewish members of the communist underground operating outside the confines of the Vilnius Ghetto, Germany threatened to destroy the Ghetto unless FPO leader Yitzak Wittenberg surrendered himself (Einwohner 2007, 1314). Faced with this ultimatum, Ghetto police ran through the courtyards shouting “The Ghetto will soon be reduced to ruins! We shall all die! Help find Wittenberg!...Save the Ghetto!” (Eckman and Lazar 1977, 32). Jewish newspapers also stated: “It is the duty of every Jew in his behalf as well as in the behalf of the Ghetto to inform of any activity which might endanger the existence of the Ghetto” (Eckman and Lazar 1977, 34). Faced with such pressure, Wittenberg surrendered and was killed the next day. In essence, so long as the Judenrat saw collaboration as a viable alternative, resistance was considered reckless.

The only way to make resistance attractive was to convince the population that genocide was certain. Only when death was certain did the risk of resistance seem relatively appealing. It is precisely this tension between attentisme and resistance that the FPO sought to overcome. Unfortunately, as the discussion of opportunity structures will show, circumstances made resistance particularly challenging for the Jewish population. Thus, by the time the Gestapo came to destroy the Vilnius Ghetto in 1943, the population was cornered and mostly unarmed.

The Jewish community was the principal victim of German occupation, but not the only one. Over time, German rule became more heavy-handed, due to military exigencies and hardening ideology. For instance, counterinsurgency against Soviet partisans led Germany to undertake collective punishment against civilians. Although Lithuanians were not sympathetic to Soviet partisans, Germany’s retaliatory policy alienated the population. Germany’s forced labor and conscription campaigns also swelled the ranks of the resistance. Throughout the Baltics, many partisans were individuals escaping German conscription. By 1944, Lithuanians were aware that
the war was turning against Germany and reckoned that they had a better chance of surviving as partisans than as SS conscripts (Swain 2004, 139).

Second Soviet Occupation

The second Soviet occupation was marred by a lack of trust from the very beginning. The first Soviet occupation, particularly the wave of deportations in 1941, had provided Lithuanians with a clear signal of occupier type. Soviet promises to treat Lithuanians benignly would simply not be credible, and, in fact, the USSR did not even attempt to win hearts in minds after 1944.

As with the first Soviet occupation, the mechanism of trust and victimization can be observed in both the correlation and sequence of indiscriminate repression and resistance activity. The Soviets organized a brutal campaign of liquidation of farm households through massacres, deportations, and forced collectivization (Kuodyte and Tracevskis 2006, 36). Violent resistance tended to spike immediately after repressive Soviet actions such as deportations and massacres and would tend to shrink once the dangers had tapered off (Vardys 1963, 510). As one partisan recalled: “Legal life was becoming more and more dangerous for me. I began working on establishing ties with the partisans operating in my native region, so that in a critical situation I would have somewhere to run” (Lukša 2009, 131). Another partisan explained his motives thus:

“I found myself under the flag of anti-Soviet underground, the Movement for the Freedom Struggle of Lithuania, not because I did not like the idea of socialism—I was then too young to orient myself sufficiently in theory—but because the Soviet government, brought to Lithuania by the Red Army, dealt with the people who did not accept the incomprehensible new order with excessive and criminal cruelty” (Remeikis 1980, 53).

We can observe the effect of political dislocation and breakdowns in trust by the temporal sequence of resistance. As the Soviet Union initiated its deportation campaign in 1944, going from 8,711 to 19,973 in 1945, resistance intensified. What the Soviet MVD described as “terrorist acts” increased from 854 to 3,324, and its estimated number of “armed nationalists” jumped from 4,515 to 17,524 (Stašaitis 2000, 122). The effect of Soviet policies was so dramatic that the Lithuanian communist party itself eventually admitted that its policies were, at least in part, responsible for the resistance. At the 22nd Communist Party Congress, Antanas Sniečkus stated that its policies
had made it quite difficult for the communists to win popular support (Vardys 1963, 508).

The evolution of partisan tactics further indicates the role of trust in resistance. For instance, there are several accounts of individuals joining the partisans to evade occupiers rather than to confront them. According to Statiev (2010, 112): “The immediate goal [of resistance groups] was not independence but to avoid conscription, arrests, and deportations.” A Stefaniša Kucinskiene recounts: “When the Russians came, that was terrible. Real hardship began. All of my three brothers were to be recruited by the Soviet army but they all took to the forest” (Leinarte 2010, 54). Resistance groups played an important role in warning civilians of impending attacks and deportations. Indeed, a 1947 top-secret directive from the United Democratic Resistance Movement stated:

“Since we do not foresee new possibilities in our struggle, our suggestions of new forms of warfare are based on...the need to help the greatest number of Lithuanians to stay in their motherland, to avoid the hardships of exile, and not to drag needlessly hundreds of our peaceful countrymen into suffering and ruin” (Remeikis 1980, 217, emphasis in original).

As Vardys (1969) notes:

Another important task of the freedom fighters was the protection of the civilian population. This was necessary for the morale of their civilian supporters and and for self-preservation. The partisans frequently assumed police functions and tracked down thieves and robbers, very numerous in the immediate postwar period. They restrained Soviet military and civilian officials from ”confiscating” food and valuables.

During the later stages of the second Soviet occupation, the resistance focused on survival rather than on combat (Misiunas and Taagepera, 1983, 84). This behavior is consonant with the idea of resistance groups as providers of club goods such as protection.

### 6.3.4 Credible Commitment

The trust theory of resistance to occupation posits that factors such as regime type, international mandate, and religious affinity strengthen credible commitment and maintain trust, thereby mitigating resistance. Since Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were totalitarian states operating
without an international mandate, within-case comparison provides limited insight into regime type or international mandates. Moreover, the scope of political dislocation and the sheer scale of victimization would have probably drowned out such factors. That being said, the international community clearly entered into Lithuanians’ calculation of resistance. Specifically, resisters looked to the USSR’s Anglo-American allies as sources of constraint on Soviet behavior. They expected the Atlantic Charter to force the Soviet Union to restore sovereignty and self-determination. Although the Soviets did not operate under an international mandate, it is clear that such a mandate would have precluded annexation and political deportations.

Similarly, the Catholic Church played a role in resistance. Lithuania was deeply religious in 1940: Some 85 percent of the population (94 percent of all ethnic Lithuanians) was Roman Catholic and the Church played a central role in everyday life (Vignieri 1965, 215). For the most part, the Lithuanian Church tried to avoid politicization. However, it could not remain indifferent to an atheist Soviet regime that actively vowed to destroy it. Religious grievances were the earliest and loudest form of dissent, and Catholic parishes represented a grassroots institution that helped recruit resistance members (Vardys and Sedaitis 1997, 85; Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, 82). Religious figures, such as Bishop Ramanauskas, firmly rejected collaboration with the Soviet regime. The majority of priests were sympathetic to the resistance struggle, but often avoided direct contact since they feared it would provide the Soviet government with the pretext to further repress the Church (Streikus 1999, 85-88; Vardys 1978). A few priests contributed more directly to the resistance against the USSR. Resistance members usually held prayer meetings and frequented sacraments of the Roman Catholic Church, to which the majority of the partisans belonged (Vardys 1965, 96). When armed resistance was crushed in the early 1950s, the Church remained one of the few sources of symbolic and spiritual resistance. It went on to play a crucial role as a focal point for protest leading up to the end of Soviet rule in 1991.

This case study helps address two counterpoints to the trust theory of resistance, namely endogeneity and the effectiveness of repression. First, the endogeneity critique posits that resistance may trigger victimization, rather than victimization triggering resistance (Lyall 2009a). Analyzing the origins of occupier policies and the temporal sequence of resistance helps isolate the causal effect of victimization. During the Soviet and German occupations, attentisme and collaboration were the initial responses, with resistance following mass deportation, forced conscription, and
the Holocaust. Soviet and German motives for victimization were exogenous, driven by ideology (deportation, Holocaust) or the military necessities of interstate war (forced conscription and labor). Once resistance emerged, however, there was, indeed, an endogenous spiral of resistance and repression. For instance, the Soviet Union made it a policy to deport the families of suspected resistance fighters. Second, it can be argued that the breakdown in trust was irrelevant to the outcome of occupation. It was precisely Soviet and German brutality that subdued Lithuania. While there is no doubt that sheer brutality eventually wiped out resistance, our principal concern here is the level of resistance, not the outcome of occupation. The outcome of occupation and the level of resistance diverged substantially, especially in the initial stages of the occupation.7

But could one go further and argue that a breakdown in trust was not only a necessary, but also a sufficient, condition for resistance? Indeed, repression deterred Lithuanians from undertaking resistance by raising the threshold for collective action. Eventually, repression and victimization triggered resistance by equalizing the costs of action (resistance) and inaction (victimization). Finally, repression defeated resistance groups. In sum, it was brutality that triggered resistance and it was brutality that suppressed it. Yet, Lithuanian resistance cannot be attributed solely to repression and victimization; repression was not the sole trigger of resistance in Lithuania. Resistance was also motivated by political and economic dislocation caused by collectivization and the imposition of communist rule. Consequently, resistance was not undertaken by all groups in Lithuanian society equally, but by those most affected by political dislocation. Moreover, the timing of resistance followed the occurrence of political dislocation. For example, resistance units began to form against Nazi occupation only once it became clear that political autonomy was not forthcoming. Lastly, trust theory cannot explain the degree not only of resistance, but also of collaboration in occupied Lithuania. In all these respects, political dislocation provides part of the explanation of resistance to occupation in Lithuania.

7 We should be wary of drawing practical lessons from the Soviet or German “successes” in Lithuania. The second Soviet occupation, for example, defeated the resistance at a cost of 13,000 to 20,000 Soviet fatalities and 30,000 partisan and civilian fatalities. These casualty figures are high, especially considering that Lithuania was a country of approximately three million at the time. These resistance to population/year ratios would be equivalent to 134,000 occupier fatalities in a conflict like the NATO/ISAF occupation of Afghanistan. Such losses, not to mention the morally and politically unconscionable brutality that accompanied them, would hardly be considered a success in modern-day democracies.
6.4 Alternative Theories

The theories of political dislocation and trust provide a useful framework for understanding resistance to occupation in Lithuania. But how do these theories stand up to competing explanations of resistance? This section briefly assesses the validity and drawbacks of alternative theories.

6.4.1 Nationalism

Nationalism was the most common narrative of resistance in Lithuania, but ultimately provides little explanatory leverage. Nationalism undoubtedly played some role in stoking resistance to Soviet occupation: Lithuania’s declaration of independence was still within the living memory of many Lithuanians’ and most resistance to foreign rule was framed in reference to the Lithuanian nation. Many Lithuanian nationalists claim that resistance was inevitable because Lithuania was a “rebel nation,” that had fought for its independence and would not so easily give it up.\(^8\) Membership to many resistance groups was restricted to those of Lithuanian origin, although exceptions were made for Latvians. Members of the resistance wore Lithuanian uniforms with Lithuanian flags and symbols such as the cross of Vytis (Vardys 1963, 510-511). Nationalism figures prominently in memoirs of partisans and in the statements of partisan groups.

However, nationalist explanations of resistance have two serious flaws. They fail to explain collaboration with the occupiers and the splintering of resistance groups. First nationalist groups in Lithuania collaborated with Germans more than they resisted them (Statiev 2010, 90). Far-right nationalists—precisely those groups which nationalism theory would expect to resist most forcefully—actively sought collaboration with Nazi occupiers. They only turned against their occupiers once they were politically marginalized by the occupation government. Moreover, if nationalism is considered to be a constant, it also fails to explain why different groups took up arms to different degrees against different occupiers in Lithuania.

Second, nationalist explanations tend to overstate the unity of Lithuanian resistance. Indeed,

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\(^8\)Interestingly, a study of the Soviet Union, prepared for the *Wehrmacht* High Command before the German invasion, concluded precisely the opposite. Of Soviet nationalities, Lithuanians were described as timid, insecure, and of “characteristic Eastern subservience.” Furthermore, the study claimed that Lithuanians were incapable of independent initiative and totally lacking in organizational talent (Alexiev 1983, 5). Lithuanian boasts were overstated, and German assessments were fundamentally racist, but both highlight the futility of sweeping nationalist claims in predicting resistance.
two contradictory forms of nationalism co-existed in Lithuania: one civic and one ethnic. These contradictions are important because they lead to opposite predictions regarding resistance. Civic nationalism predicts a unified response to foreigners whereas ethnic nationalism predicts factionalized resistance. Nationalist resistance was not unified because Lithuania itself was comprised of different and sometimes conflicting nations: (ethnic) Lithuanians, Poles, and Jews. Even within ethnically Lithuanian groups, nationalism was only the lowest common denominator among different political factions. In historical accounts of resistance, the term nationalist is used variously to describe members of the far-right, ethnic Lithuanians, and Lithuanian citizens more broadly. As a priest recalled in 1943: “Life was complicated. The [Polish] Home Army fought the Germans, the Lithuanians and the Soviet partisans simultaneously… They burned the houses of German informers and killed their families. Later, in the same villages, Lithuanian partisans did the same to Soviet informers” (Lieven 1994, 87). When resistance groups involve Poles fighting Lithuanians, Germans, and Soviets, Lithuanians fighting Jews and Soviets and collaborating with Germans, and Jews collaborating with Soviets, nationalist theories provide little theoretical leverage on such splintering and fratricide.

According to Darden (forthcoming) these anomalies can be addressed by recognizing that nationalism is not a constant but a variable. Nations that develop mass literacy (which Darden identifies as over 50 percent literacy) under the rule of a state will be more likely to maintain political loyalty to that state, even after they attain independence. Darden assesses this claim directly in Lithuania. Lithuania crossed the 50 percent literacy threshold around 1897. Because the Catholic Church ran Lithuanian schools at the end of the 19th century, and because the Lithuanian Church had an antagonistic relation with Orthodox Russia, Darden argues that Lithuanians developed a distinct Catholic-Lithuanian form of nationalism. Further evidence in favor of Darden’s theory can be found in the demographic composition of partisans. For example, the first partisans against Soviet occupation in 1941 were students at Kaunas and Vilnius Universities, the first generation of Lithuanians to have been raised in an independent Lithuania and schooled completely in a Lithuanian curriculum (Inviskis 1965, 63).

However, a closer examination of patterns of resistance undercuts Darden’s theory. When Lithuania crossed the 50 percent literacy threshold, it was not independent, but part of imperial Russia. Lithuania should therefore have generated greater resistance to German occupation
than Soviet/Russian occupation. In fact, the opposite occurred. Additionally, while individuals schooled under the Lithuanian curriculum were the first to take up arms against the Soviets, young males generally have a higher propensity to partake in warfare. Therefore, any causal explanation is marred by an identification problem. Moreover, Vilnius was part of Poland, not Lithuania until 1939, meaning it would not have been exposed to the same Lithuanian nationalist curriculum. Lastly, although Darden argues that schooling by the Catholic Church created a hybrid Catholic-Lithuanian form of nationalism, this explanation fails to explain why more Lithuanians resisted Soviet occupation than German occupation. In sum, nationalism may have been one of the many forces animating Lithuanian resistance, and not necessarily the most potent one.

### 6.4.2 Opportunity Structures

According to opportunity structure explanations of resistance, potential resisters are rational individuals who are sensitive to the costs and benefits of resistance. Variation in resistance can be explained by military, social, economic, and geographic factors that hinder or facilitate mobilization and combat. First, military factors can be seen playing a role in resistance. Both the Soviet Union and Germany flooded Lithuania with troops, making resistance particularly daunting. When individuals took up arms, they were likely to have some military training. Of the known guerrilla commanders among the Lithuanian partisans, 37 percent were former military officers and another ten percent were former police officers (Statiev 2010, 97). Martial training reduced the risk of taking up arms, and, therefore, increased propensity for resistance. Moreover, the timeline of resistance to occupation shows a general correlation between shocks to the military capacity of occupiers and the onset of resistance. Upticks in resistance occurred during Operation Barbarossa in 1941 and during the Soviet counterattack in 1944, which severely weakened Soviet and German military capacity, respectively. Instructions drafted by the LAF in 1941 stated: “When to begin the uprising: The sign for starting the uprising should be considered as the moment when the German Army crosses the border and attacks the Russians” (Budreckis 1968, 35). Moreover, Lithuanian partisans expected a war between the Soviet Union and the US and the UK to break out following the Second World War. Lithuanians saw such military shocks as windows of opportunity for resistance. Ultimately, the resistance movement during the second anti-Soviet occupation
fizzled not because nationalism weakened, or because political dislocation ended, or because trust was reestablished. Rather, as Figure 6.2 (a) shows, the resistance was crushed through the overwhelming military strength of the Soviet Union and its willingness to sustain staggeringly high casualties.

One concern in examining the role of military capability is endogeneity; that is, we cannot determine the role of military forces on the course of resistance since the number of troops deployed, and their attrition might be a function of the very strength of the resistance movement under study. In the case of Lithuania, shocks to the balance of power can be considered exogenous, insofar as they were a product of interstate war between Germany and the Soviet Union, rather than preexisting Lithuanian resentment of Soviet rule and armed resistance. Hitler and Stalin had strategic, logistical, and ideological reasons for waging war on the Eastern Front, and Lithuanian resistance, however heroic, played little role in the course of this titanic struggle (Snyder 2010).

At the other extreme, it could be argued that military factors were not only a relevant factor, but the sole relevant factor in determining resistance to occupation. What determines whether individuals collaborate or resist occupation is the degree of territorial control exercised by opposing forces, irrelevant of occupier policies (Kalyvas 2003, 2006). Civilians caught in war between Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and various partisan groups decide to collaborate or resist based on their assessment of relative risk. Individuals prioritize personal safety over political preferences. Indeed, when Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, Lithuanians revolted against Soviet rule. When the tide of war turned against Germany following the battle of Stalingrad, many collaborating police officers abandoned their uniforms, some to join the Soviet partisans. Individuals are opportunists, rather than ideologues according to this point of view (Snyder 2010). This approach undoubtedly has it merits, but fails to explain why patterns of opportunism did not translate evenly across different social and economic groups. Presumably, political preferences played an intervening role. Moreover, we should have greater confidence in the causal mechanisms of political dislocation and trust if they can be observed despite the effects of rival territorial control.

Second, opportunity structures would predict an effect of geography and terrain. The traditional measure of terrain—mountains—played no role in Lithuanian resistance since the country is essentially flat. Instead, forests, covering 20.7 percent of Lithuania’s territory, were crucial in sustaining resistance, providing cover and concealment (see Figure 8.2). When Soviet troops
conducted periodic sweeps of the forests, they proceeded on foot and, therefore, were more vulnerable to ambushes by small groups armed with light weapons. Indeed, the NKVD eliminated post-war partisans in neighboring but unforested western Ukraine more quickly than in forested Lithuania (Statiev 2010, 109). Forests were so critical, in fact, that anti-Soviet partisans came to be known as the Forest Brothers. Speaking more broadly, resistance was clustered in rural, rather than urban, areas. Partisans could more easily sustain themselves in the countryside, and low force-to-space ratios made it difficult for occupying troops to police the population. Geographic factors clearly played a role in explaining resistance, but, ultimately, the basic geographic composition of Lithuania did not change across the Soviet and German occupations. While some geographic factors may have facilitated resistance, they cannot explain the variation between occupations.

Third, economic factors can be seen to play a role in resistance. Lower opportunity costs help explain why the majority of partisans were under the age of thirty, and declining economic conditions may have also lowered certain individuals’ aversion to risk (Vardys 1963, 509; Petersen 2001). Variation in economic modernization also led to differing patterns in resistance. As societies modernize, they generally become more urban, making it easier for occupiers to monitor and control. Indeed, urban resistance to the second Soviet occupation was curbed by frequent MGB checks led by a denser network of agents and informants (Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė 1999, 42). Additionally, economic modernization is associated with a division of labor, which makes societies as
a whole wealthier, but individuals less self-sufficient (Liberman 1996). This dynamic was most evident in Jewish resistance to German rule. Due to centuries-old property laws, Jews tended not own rural property, concentrating instead in towns and cities where they prospered as craftsmen and professionals. The concentration of Jews in cities made it easier for Germany to create ghettos, where the entire Jewish community was essentially held hostage. Moreover, while the countryside provided the most propitious terrain for resistance, economic specialization meant that urban Jews did not have the skill set necessary to survive. Anti-Semitism, more prevalent in rural areas, also prevented Jews from blending in with the population or relying on them for support (Levin 2001, 548; Eckman and Lazar 1977, 14).

Fourth, according to Petersen (2001), tight-knit communities are more likely to resist occupation. Such communities provide the monitoring and status rewards to trigger collective action and deter collaboration. In an extensive study of Lithuania, Petersen shows that resistance occurred in a two-stage process. During the first stage, small acts of resistance were committed, such as jokes, pamphlets, and songs. These acts were meant to communicate opposition to the occupying regime, without triggering repression. Importantly, the signals were perceptible only to the members of the community. At the same time, these acts served as signals of the latent number of individuals willing to revolt, therefore helping to coordinate expectations. Petersen shows that an individual’s set of closest connections, his community, became the key source of information and influence. Moving from protest to insurgency, especially in face of Soviet and German occupation required organization and discipline. Therefore, as Petersen argues, Lithuanian resistance groups therefore grew out of pre-existing social groups that could provide the secrecy and monitoring necessary to deter collaboration, as well as the supplies needed to sustain resistance. For this reason, resistance to occupation often originated in groups such as unions, political parties, nationalist groups such as Union of Šiauliai or the Union of Young Lithuania, and Ateitis during the first Soviet occupation; and the Zionist party during the German occupation (Petersen 2001, 110). While these social groups were not themselves resistance groups, they mobilized their members to join the resistance. Petersen’s social structure argument provides a compelling micro-level explanation of resistance. However, as Petersen acknowledges, the causal mechanisms of political dislocation precede the mechanism of social structure. Resistance is motivated by resentment, and resentment is formed through changes in status hierarchy (Petersen 2001, 34).
6.4.3 International Context

International context theory posits that occupiers are less likely to face resistance when they are seen as protection from greater third-party threats (Edelstein 2008a). This theory performs well in explaining resistance to occupation in Lithuania, a country that faced multiple occupations in the midst of an interstate conflict. Lithuanians made decisions on whether or not to resist occupation, and to what extent to resist, partly on what they perceived to be the lesser evil between two potential occupiers. As mentioned earlier, for example, Jewish Lithuanian preferences were summarized in the slogan “better Stalin than Hitler.” The former entailed economic dislocation, whereas the latter entailed genocide (Levin 1995). For non-Jewish Lithuanians, the lesser evil was Nazi Germany since its occupation entailed lesser political and economic dislocation. As a result, most non-Jewish Lithuanians undertook passive resistance to German rule and active resistance to Soviet rule, whereas Jewish Lithuanians did the reverse.

The case of Lithuania also demonstrates the limits of international context theory, which tends to aggregate the preferences of occupied societies, whereas political dislocation theory argues that differing domestic preferences matter in interpreting foreign threats. Not only did Lithuanians perceive the threat of the Soviet Union and Germany differently, but different segments of the Lithuanian population also perceived the effect of each occupation differently. In other words, the effect of the international context is contingent on the perception of political dislocation by different segments of the occupied population. This, in turn, helps explain why different segments of the population cooperated or resisted occupation.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter examined the effects of political dislocation and trust in the context of the Soviet and German occupations of Lithuania. First, I described the sequence of events and policies during the three occupations between 1940 and 1953. I noted that rather than generating a unified nationalist response, varying foreign occupations generated distinct reactions from different groups at different times. Second, examining the sequence and timing of resistance, I illustrated that resistance was triggered by political dislocation and victimization rather than by nationalism. Specifically, Soviet policies were opposed by disenfranchised wealthier landowners, industrialists, and
traditional political parties, whereas German occupation was principally opposed by Jews and communists fearing persecution. Resistance tended to emerge after occupiers implemented policies that sidelined or victimized specific groups. Just as important, Soviet occupation was initially supported by certain segments of the Jewish population, whereas German occupation received the strong initial support of Lithuanian nationalists. Soviet leaders went so far as to employ political dislocation to engineer class war between segments of the Lithuanian population. Third, I noted the contributions of alternative theories of resistance: nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context. While partisans were often motivated by nationalist ideals, the theory fails to explain such wide variation in reactions to occupation, not to mention collaboration and fratricide. Theories relating to opportunity structures fare somewhat better, explaining some of the temporal variation in resistance, although geographic and economic constants cannot predict observed swings in resistance activity. International context theory provides good theoretical leverage to differing reactions to Soviet and German occupation. However, I argued that this theory was essentially contingent on varying domestic assessment of the effects of political dislocation.
Chapter 7

Resistance to Occupation in Cambodia
(1979-1993)

"Before the major issue was to liberate the country from the Vietnamese. Now...We must make preparations for the second stage where it is necessary to protect the rank and file."

-Khmer Rouge

7.1 Introduction

Between 1970 and 1993, Cambodia was afflicted by civil war, genocide, and foreign occupation. The twin occupations of Cambodia by Vietnam and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) provide a good opportunity to examine theories of resistance to occupation, in particular theories of political dislocation and trust. Indeed, the challenge in cross-national studies is to draw valid causal inference from strongly heterogeneous units. States can be different in a number of ways, some that can be measured and accounted for, others not, and such unobservables could explain some of the theorized variation in outcome. Within-case studies can help overcome such

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1 Cited in Chandra 1999, 40-41.

2 The state currently known as Cambodia has been referred to by different names in the last 30 years. Democratic Kampuchea (DK) refers to Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) refers to Cambodia under the Kampuchean Communist Party between 1979 and 1989, the State of Cambodia (SOC) refers to Cambodia under the Cambodian People’s Party (Kampuchean Communist Party under a new name) between 1989 and 1993, and Cambodia after 1993. I refer to Cambodia throughout when referring to the geographic area of Cambodia rather than any specific government.
pitfalls by holding constant many factors and unobservables while allowing variation on variables of interest.

Cambodia provides an almost ideal within-case study of occupation. Cambodia was occupied twice and quasi-sequentially in a 14-year period. Many of the main structural characteristics of the occupied country thus remained constant. However, Vietnam and UNTAC undertook dramatically different occupation policies. This variation is shown in Table 7.1. First, Vietnam undertook extensive political dislocation, whereas the UN did not. Vietnam entered Cambodia and installed a Soviet client regime, while the UN implemented an agreed plan for democratic reform that gave all parties a stake in the process and potential access to power. By ousting the Khmer Rouge and effectively shutting out royalists and republicans, Vietnam triggered resistance from a broader range of the political spectrum. In contrast, the UN did not face royalist or republican resistance, though it continued to face resistance from the Khmer Rouge who saw little to gain from democracy. Second, while not undertaking the large-scale victimization of Cambodia, Vietnamese rule was noticeably more brutal than UNTAC occupation. Real or feared atrocities committed by Vietnamese soldiers, as well as arbitrary forced-labor practices pushed many Cambodian to flee to the Thai border, where many joined resistance groups. This within-case comparison provides some support for trust theory as well. Many Cambodians feared that Vietnam had not come to save them from the Khmer Rouge, but rather to colonize and annex Cambodia. The UN, in contrast, never faced such fears since it was formed by a constellation of states and accountable to the UN Security Council (where most political factions had allies). In fact, the UN may have had the opposite problem of Vietnam, by which it could not credibly commit to staying in Cambodia long enough to ensure stability. Relatedly, the UN went to great lengths to ensure transparency, launching radio stations and releasing yearly reports. Vietnam, an authoritarian single party state had no credible lines of communication or oversight. The twin occupations of Cambodia do not demonstrate a strong role for religion. Vietnam, a communist state, was nominally Buddhist in cultural heritage, and it’s reopening of religious practices in Cambodia generated goodwill. UNTAC was an amalgam of different cultures, and religions, though this did not generate mistrust. Therefore, the trust generated by common religion did not appear to play a central role across both occupations.

With less political dislocation and victimization, and greater trust generated by democratic
institutions, backed by an international organization, UNTAC experienced far less resistance than did Vietnam. UNTAC lost 59 soldiers in an 18-month period, whereas Vietnam is estimated to have lost 25,300 troops against a strong resistance movement over 128 months of occupation. Even when accounting for Vietnam’s greater exposure due to longer occupation and more troops, this case study illustrates significant differences in resistance.

Table 7.1: Occupier characteristics in Cambodia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
<th>UNTAC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Dislocation</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victimization</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Mandate</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Religion</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Occupier</td>
<td></td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops (peak)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>15,547†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>25,300</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† This figure does not include the 893 military observers and 3,500 civilian police that were part of UNTAC.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides a historical narrative of the Vietnamese and UN occupations of Cambodia, with particular attention to the causes of occupation, the policies undertaken by occupiers, and the composition and intensity of resistance. The second section evaluates the explanatory power of political dislocation and trust in the Cambodian context. The last section compares those theories to alternative explanations of resistance to occupation, namely, nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context.

### 7.2 Historical Context

#### 7.2.1 Vietnamese Occupation (1979-1989)

**Invasion**

The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was the culmination of years of cross-border tensions. Upon gaining power in 1975, Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge, became convinced that Vietnam was expansionist. In order to counter this perceived threat, Pol Pot ousted Vietnamese advisors as well as party members that were friendly to Vietnam. Soon thereafter, he began order-
ing the systematic killing of Vietnamese in Cambodia. Purges within Cambodia were combined with raids in Vietnam over disputed land borders and islands, killing hundreds of civilians and laying waste to large tracks of farmland (Kroef 1979, 747; Chanda 1989, 27-28; Slocomb 2003, 43). Internationally, the Khmer Rouge allied itself with Maoist China in opposition to pro-Soviet Vietnam. In 1977, Cambodia severed diplomatic ties with Vietnam. In 1978, Pol Pot began an extensive purge of the political and military leadership in the Eastern Zone of the country, causing experienced cadres to be killed or flee to Vietnam (Morris 1999, 232). Purges, cross-border raids, and alignment with China were intended by Pol Pot to thwart Vietnamese expansion. Ultimately, they only precipitated it.

Vietnam saw Cambodia’s behavior as more than a nuisance. It was concerned that to do nothing would be interpreted as a sign of weakness that would invite further incursions. In order to solve its “Cambodia problem,” in February 1978, Vietnam decided to overthrow the Khmer Rouge and install a friendlier regime (Slocomb 2003, 44). The decision to invade and occupy was calculated and deliberate. There were many indicators that the Vietnamese would be welcomed as liberators by much of the Cambodian population that was suffering under the Khmer Rouge (Quinn-Judge 2006, 212). The People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) also assured Vietnam’s political leadership that the matter could be resolved in a maximum of six months (Ross 1990).


Numerically stronger and better equipped, Vietnamese forces decimated the army of Democratic Kampuchea, as Cambodia was then known. The wounded Khmer Rouge was not completely neutralized, however. Remnants of the regime dispersed to the Thai and Laotian border areas in the Northwest of Cambodia taking with them as many Cambodian civilians as possible
(Morris 1999, 221; Gottesman 2003, 4). Pol Pot fled to Thailand by helicopter (Chandler 1997, 47). Ultimately, the invasion cost the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese army some 30,000 and 25,300 fatalities, respectively (Clodfelter 2002, 692-693).

Despite overthrowing a genocidal regime, the invasion of Cambodia was generally condemned by the international community. In January 1979, China chastised Vietnam’s invasion at the UN Security Council and on 17 February 1979, it launched a two-week “punitive war” led by 250,000 troops against Vietnam (Morris 1999, 221; Becker 1986, 349). The international community refused to recognize the Vietnam-installed government and Europe cut off food aid to Vietnam (Morris 1999, 222).

**Regime Change and State Building**

Vietnam acted quickly to establish a new regime. On 8 January 1979, a provisional government was announced under an eight-person Kampuchean Revolutionary Council. The Council, which was to govern Cambodia until elections, was headed by Heng Samrin, a purged Khmer Rouge commander who had fled to Vietnam in September 1978 and joined the KNUFNS (Becker 1986, 438; Slocomb 2003, 48). On 10 January, Democratic Kampuchea was renamed the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). In February 1979, Cambodia and Vietnam signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation (Gottesman 2003, 11; Martin 1994, 216).

The political transition following the invasion was relatively peaceful (Chanda 1989, 30). To most Cambodians, traumatized by the Khmer Rouge, the arrival of Vietnam meant a return to peace. The Vietnamese were therefore welcomed by many as liberators, and grateful Khmer helped occupying troops uncover arms caches and to arrest Khmer Rouge officials (Martin 1994, 215). The Vietnamese found a country decimated by war and misrule. There was no currency, no financial institutions, no public transport, and no telephones. Difficulties in reestablishing a new government were compounded by a lack of educated Cambodians, many of whom had been killed under Pol Pot (Quinn-Judge 2006, 215).

Guided by Vietnamese advisors, the PRK was established along communist lines: a single party state led by the Khmer People’s Party (Gottesman 2003, 48). Vietnam retained responsibility for Cambodia’s defense, internal security, and foreign affairs, leaving other domestic issues under
nominal Cambodian control (Keller 2005, 136). Yet even domestic issues were decided with significant oversight by Vietnamese advisors. Every decision was cleared by advisors, if not dictated entirely by them. Vietnam set up three advisory organizations to keep a tight rein on the new governments policies (Quinn-Judge 2006, 216). Vietnamese advisors were deployed to each ministry, where they reviewed policies enacted by the fledging Cambodian bureaucracy. All Cambodian leaders were guarded —and therefore monitored— by Vietnamese soldiers. Cambodian officials who contradicted Vietnamese directives were promptly removed (Gottesman 2003, 106, 131).

The PRK claimed that it united “all nationalities of the country and rallies all patriotic forces, regardless of political and religious tendencies —workers, peasants, petty bourgeois, intellectuals, Buddhist monks, and nuns” (Gottesman 2003, 8). It invited educated Cambodians to return to the civil service. Thousands of Cambodians flocked to the bureaucracy, though mainly as a means of survival amidst poverty. Among them were past leaders from the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes. However, interested individuals were still subject to political vetting and Vietnamese advisors made sure officials from previous regimes did not dominate the administration (Gottesman 2003, 50-56). Because the Khmer Rouge had so decimated the educated class, the PRK continued to staff many positions with Vietnamese advisors (Slocomb 2003, 60).

In 1981, a new constitution was drafted by the Cambodian government and then substantively revised by Vietnamese advisors to make it more in line with Vietnam’s constitution (Gottesman 2003, 109-113). Tightly controlled single party elections were held in 1981. The outcome of the election was preordained and largely irrelevant. The Cambodian National Assembly had no real power and never stood for reelection (Gottesman 2003, 216; Keller 2005, 137). The PRK promised to respect human rights, but was quite severe in dealing with its political opponents (Chandler 2008, 277-278).

The new regime pursued technocratic socialist policies, based on the Vietnamese model, and sustained by substantial Vietnamese and Soviet aid. At first, these policies involved reestablishing the bureaucracy, economy, and education system, all of which had been virtually wiped out under the Khmer Rouge. The PRK reestablished markets and currency. Collective farms were initially broken up and family farming was reintroduced. Individuals were allowed to move around the country, leading to a swelling of the population of Phnom Penh (Chandler 1997, 48). The government made a point of stressing freedom of religion and to rebuilding temples and religious schools
destroyed by the Khmer Rouge (Kroef 1979, 737; Chandler 2008, 278). Vietnam’s embrace of Buddhism in Cambodia was not purely altruistic. In Cambodia, as in Vietnam, it closely monitored religious practices in order to prevent challenges to the state. For most Cambodians, the attitude and policies of the Vietnamese PRK contrasted favorably with the experience of the Khmer Rouge. Despite welcome reforms, other policies remained controversial. For instance, it is estimated that between 100,000 and 250,000 Vietnamese civilians settled in Cambodia between 1979 and 1989 (Quinn Judge 2006, 217-218).

Resistance

Backed by approximately 150,000 Vietnamese troops, the PRK controlled 80 percent of Cambodia’s territory (Keller 2005, 137). By 1982, the Vietnamese government declared the war to be over (Ross 1990). However, the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia did not completely extinguish the Khmer Rouge. From the ashes of Democratic Kampuchea, three resistance groups emerged to challenge the PRK and its Vietnamese patrons: the Khmer Rouge, the National Union Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (known by its French acronym FUNCINPEC), and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (known by its French acronym FNLPK).

The Maoist Khmer Rouge was led by Khieu Samphan and to a lesser degree, Pol Pot. In February 1979, the Khmer Rouge asserted its refusal to accept the administration of “Vietnamese aggressors” and that its “proletarian state administration...still remains intact” (Kroef 1979, 733). Militarily, the Khmer Rouge was the strongest of Cambodia’s resistance groups, with forces numbering between 20,000 and 30,000 (Doyle 1995 17). It controlled territory near the Thai border and several of the refugee camps in Thailand itself (see Figure 7.1).

The royalist FUNCINPEC was created in March 1981 by the exiled King Norodom Sihanouk. FUNCINPEC drew on the forces that had been loyal to the Sihanouk government between 1954 and 1970 as well as the Mouvement pour la libération nationale du Kampuchea (MOULINAKA) and two other monarchist resistance groups. FUNCINPEC created an armed wing called the Armée nationaliste Sihanoukiste (ANS) (Martin 1994, 244). At its peak, the ANS had between 7,000 and 11,000 fighters. In 1987, Sihanouk claimed ANS combatants were deployed in five Cambodian
Table 7.2: Main actors in Cambodian resistance (1979-1989)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Subnational</th>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
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<td>US</td>
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<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
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provinces, including Batdambang, Siem Reap, and Otdar Meanchey on the western border with Thailand and as far east as Kampong Thum (Ross 1990).

The third resistance group was the republican FNLPK. It originated in 1975, prior to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, by loyalists of the republican government of Son Sann which ruled Cambodia between 1970 and 1975. However, Sann and his allies did not have the supplies and the manpower to take on the Khmer Rouge regime between 1975 and 1979. When Vietnam invaded in 1979, Sann called for armed resistance. In 1981, the FNLPK had approximately 7,000 fighters, which it used to protect refugee camps and launch periodic raids into Cambodia. Although it was militarily insignificant, it presented another non-communist alternative to the Khmer Rouge resistance (Gottesman 2003, 57). Combat elements were reportedly operating in three provinces of western Cambodia: Batdambang, Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey, and Pouthisat (Ross 1990).

The three factions worked to unify their efforts. In early 1981, Sihanouk met with the Samphan of the Khmer Rouge to discuss the formation of a coalition. Sann of the FNLPK was originally reluctant to join the talks, but eventually relented. On 4 September 1981, under heavy pressure from their Chinese, Thai, and American patrons, the three factions met in Singapore to create the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) (Morris 1999, 226). Announced on 22 June 1982, the CGDK was to be the official government in exile, recognized by the international community and claiming Cambodia’s seat the UN. As a precondition for the agreement, the Khmer Rouge officially renounced socialism. Although not credible, this rhetorical shift provided the cover necessary for the US to support the CGDK (Chandler 2008, 284).

Resistance groups benefited from the sanctuary provided by Thailand. The presence of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia alarmed Thailand and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thailand therefore allowed resistance
groups to operate in the refugee camps across the border. It also provided clothing, weapons, and food to Khmer Rouge. Supplies from other foreign sponsors of the resistance were ferried through Thai ports (Chandler 2008, 281). As such, the resistance struggle was embedded within a regional and global power struggle (see Table 7.2). Resistance groups used the refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodia border to rest, resupply, regroup, and recruit (see Figure 7.1). Thanks to its foreign sanctuary, the Cambodian resistance could not be eliminated. At the same time, the resistance was too weak to overcome larger and better-equipped Vietnamese and PRK forces (Chandler 1997, 49).

![Figure 7.1: Terrain and refugee camps of Cambodia 1979-1993](image)

Vietnam had borne the brunt of the resistance while being heavily engaged in defending its northern border against China (Mahbubani 1983, 407). In order to reduce its defense burden, Vietnam and the PRK developed a two-pronged strategy. First, Vietnam undertook a massive offensive during the 1984-1985 dry season to dislodge resistance from its strongholds within Cambodia (Slocomb 2003, 228; Gottesman 2003, 223; Martin 1994, 240). Second, Vietnam and the PRK began developing a vast fortification program along the Thai border intended to prevent infiltration.
and supply of insurgents. The program, known as K5 or the “bamboo curtain,” involved clearing forests, laying mines, and constructing roads and walls from Laos to the maritime border with Thailand (Slocomb 2001, 198). The PRK resorted to mass conscription to complete K5, involving upwards of 150,000 Cambodians. Conditions on the K5 sites were deplorable with hard labor, little shelter, insufficient food, malaria, and the ever-present danger of land mines (Gottesman 2003, 231-236; Chandler 2008, 284). The K5 plan was a gamble for the PRK. It could weaken resistance movements and limit their access to Cambodian territory. At the same time, conscription and the horrendous conditions of conscripts were hugely unpopular. Following the institution of conscription, there was a large uptick in the number of refugees arriving in Thailand, where undoubtedly some joined resistance groups (Slocomb 2003, 240-241).

The dry season offensive and the K5 barriers partly succeeded in stemming the insurgency. More importantly, they fundamentally changed the nature of the conflict from border confrontation to infiltration. No longer able to control territory inside Cambodia, the resistance sent smaller armed groups to infiltrate deeper into Cambodian territory to attack civilians and the administration. According to the PRK, there were 15,300 such insurgents operating within Cambodia in
1984 and 21,000 in 1987 (Gottesman 2003, 224, Slocomb 2003, 227). Highways and roads were occasionally interdicted by resistance activity (Ross 1990). In short, stalemate persisted, albeit in a different form. Clashes between resistance and PRK and Vietnamese forces resulted in 48,800 deaths between 1979 and 1986 (Brogan 1998, 155).

**Vietnamese Withdrawal and Civil War**

The standoff between the PRK and the Cambodian resistance became increasingly unsustainable as the Cold War drew to a close. For Vietnam, the occupation was tremendously costly and perpetuated a dangerous confrontation with China. Economic and diplomatic isolation barred Vietnam’s access to world markets and forced it into an embarrassing level of dependence on the Soviet Union (Doyle 1999, 192). The festering conflict between Soviet-backed Vietnam and Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge was also costly to Moscow and prevented a desired rapprochement with China (Quinn-Judge 2006, 224). Therefore, as the Soviet Union began to collapse, so did aid to Vietnam and the PRK. Infusions of Soviet aid, which propped up the PRK, dropped from $200 million a year by the mid 1980s to $18 million by the end of the Cold War (Chandler 1997, 50). Ultimately, it was the contraction in Soviet aid, rather than the insurgency itself, that forced Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Cambodia (Morris 1999, 226). In 1985, Vietnam expressed its willingness to negotiate a solution for Cambodia. The same year, the Foreign Minister of Vietnam announced the complete withdrawal from Cambodia by 1990 (Quinn-Judge 2006, 219).

As Vietnamese aid dwindled, the PRK sought to negotiate a settlement with resistance groups. However, the presence of Vietnamese troops and concerns over a return of the Khmer Rouge gridlocked negotiations. Highlighting the issue of credible commitment in conflict outcomes, Vietnam was reluctant to withdraw from Cambodia if it would mean a return of the Khmer Rouge. After all, what would have been the purpose of its sacrifices in Cambodia if it were again to face a belligerent neighbor? Hanoi had concluded a set of defense agreements with the PRK in June 1981 to anchor its position, but would the agreements be observed should the PRK be overthrown (Gottesman 2003, 115)? Conversely, for resistance groups, especially the Khmer Rouge, peace negotiations with the PRK were unacceptable so long as Vietnamese forces were on Cambodian soil. The presence of such forces gave the incumbent an unacceptable bargaining advantage.
Vietnam sought to break the deadlock by gradually withdrawing its forces while training indigenous Cambodian forces to contain the insurgency. The PRK’s army grew from 30,000 in 1982 to 100,000 regular troops and 200,000 militia in 1989 (Quinn-Judge 2006, 219). In May 1988, Vietnam announced it would withdraw 50,000 troops from Cambodia by the end of the year. On 6 January 1979, Vietnam declared it would withdraw all of the remaining 26,000 troops by September 1989 (Martin 1994, 281). Vietnam completed the withdrawal of its forces and advisors on 26 September 1989 (Slocomb 2003, 248).

At the same time the PRK built up forces to confront the insurgency, it also altered policies in order to accommodate the more moderate factions of the resistance. In 1987 and early 1988, PRK Prime Minister Hun Sen held discussions with Sihanouk. In 1989, Cambodia undertook a number of liberalizing measures, including greater freedom of commerce and the return of privately-owned land. On 29 April 1989 the constitution of Cambodia was reformed. As a result of the change, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea was renamed the State of Cambodia (SOC), with a new flag and coat of arms. Buddhism was also restored as the state religion (Gottesman 2003, 303).

Neither the withdrawal of the Vietnamese, nor the liberalizing policies of the SOC, succeeded in mollifying the resistance. Instead, as Vietnamese troops withdrew, Cambodia descended into civil war. A resigned Hun Sen stated: “We knew that when the Vietnamese army left, we wouldn’t be able to hold onto 100 percent of the territory” (Gottesman 2003, 309). Indeed, the CGDK tested the SOC’s staying power in the absence of Vietnamese support (Doyle 1995, 23). In the fall of 1989, resistance groups scored important victories in Western Cambodia and by 1990, they controlled approximately a quarter of Cambodia (Chandler 1997, 50-51).

### 7.2.2 UNTAC Occupation (1991-1993)

#### Peace Process

The international community undertook a number of initiatives to halt Cambodia’s slide toward civil war. In 1988 and 1989, ASEAN held a series of informal gatherings with members of the resistance, the Cambodian government, and other neighboring countries, in what came to be known as the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) (Martin 1994, 280-281). Timing worked in ASEAN’s favor: Sihanouk was getting older, Hun Sen craved international recognition, and Sann experienced
internal dissent that further weakened the military strength of the FNLPK. All parties were also militarily exhausted (Doyle 1995, 21). During the July 1988 meeting, the PRK government called for the formation of a national reconciliation council that would include itself and all three resistance groups with Sihanouk as chairman (Chanda 1989, 30). This quadripartite government would then organize elections that would put an end to the civil war. In parallel, France initiated a Paris Peace Conference between July and August 1989. At the conference, the parties agreed to the withdrawal of any remaining foreign forces, the neutralization of Cambodia, and the return of refugees (Keller 2005, 144). However, the parties to the conflict did not trust each other enough to form a temporary coalition government. The SOC could not credibly commit to abiding by the agreement once factions put down their arms. Needed was an international mechanism to supervise the implementation of the peace agreement (Doyle 1995, 22).

It became clear that for any peace agreement to hold, the international community would need to directly intervene among the factions. In October 1989, US Congressman Stephen Solarz proposed a temporary UN administration of Cambodia to help in the implementation of a peace agreement. On 27 August 1990, the P5 agreed (without the presence of Cambodia) on a consensus framework for Cambodia, which would involve a transitional UN-run administration (Doyle 1995, 24; Gottesman 2003, 337).

Once a mechanism for ensuring the implementation of a peace agreement was established, peace negotiations proceeded more smoothly. On 10 January 1990, the Cambodian factions formed the Supreme National Council (SNC), which included all the factions of the conflict and was chaired by Sihanouk. In June 1991, this SNC agreed to an indefinite ceasefire (Doyle 1995, 20). Finally, on 23 October 1991, the factions signed the Paris Peace Agreements. The agreements committed the factions to a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodian territory, the cessation of external military assistance, the cantonment and demobilization of a least 70 percent of resistance forces prior to electoral registration, the demobilization of the remaining 30 percent or their incorporation into a new national army immediately after the elections, and the release of all POWs and civilian political prisoners. Each faction would retain control of their territory until the election (Findlay 1994, 5). The Paris Agreements also identified of the SNC as the unique legitimating body and source of authority in which the sovereignty of Cambodia would be enshrined throughout the transitional period (Doyle 1995, 25). Importantly, the Paris Agreements called for
UNTAC, which was established on 28 February 1992 under UN Security Council resolution 745. King Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh on 14 November 1991 and on 2 March 1992, the first UNTAC military contingents deployed to Cambodia.

**UNTAC Mandate**

UNTAC was tasked with ambitious objectives and a limited timeframe. Luckily for backers of the mandate, the Paris Agreement gave the UN extraordinary power. As Doyle (1995, 1) notes: "Not since the colonial era and the post—World War II Allied occupations of Germany and Japan had a foreign presence held so much formal administrative jurisdiction over the civilian functions of an independent country."

UNTAC was divided between a civilian and military mandate. UNTAC’s civil component of 7,000 civilians was headed by Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) Yasushi Akashi of Japan. Akashi controlled the aspects of civil administration that could directly affect the elections (defense, foreign affairs, finance, public security, and information) and monitored others that could otherwise influence such elections. Furthermore, UNTAC was to monitor and promote human rights, repatriate refugees, restore and rehabilitate aspects of Cambodia’s infrastructure, and oversee the drafting of a new constitution (Findlay 1994, 6). In order to achieve these objectives, UNTAC could issue binding directives to the Cambodian bureaucracy, as well as review and change policies put forth by the bureaucracy. The civil administration of UNTAC established offices in all of Cambodia’s 21 provinces (Doyle 1995, 35-38). UNTAC personnel controlled the armed forces, trained Cambodian officers of the judiciary in penal law and human rights, and verified public revenue and expenditures (Keller 2005, 162). Lastly, UNTAC allowed for the formation of political parties, so long as their platforms were consistent with the Paris Agreements. Under the Paris Agreements, the SNC could overrule a decision of UNTAC so long as the decision was reach by consensus and consistent with the Paris Agreements.

The military component of UNTAC was headed by Australian Lt. Gen. John Sanderson and included the largest peacekeeping mission up to that time: 12 infantry battalions from 11 countries for a total of 16,000 military personnel. It’s mandate was to monitor the ceasefire and disengagement of forces, monitor withdrawal of foreign forces, monitor demobilization and disarmament,
and clear land mines (Doyle 1995, 27; Lindley 2007, 161). The Paris Agreements put the police forces of the different factions under the supervision or control of a 3,600 strong UNTAC police force to ensure law and order were maintained with impartiality (Sanderson 1995, 31). Although UNTAC was originally deployed to monitor the ceasefire and cantonment, it later redeployed to support the national election (Doyle 1995, 30-31). In sum, UNTAC had wide-ranging powers, but for very specific and limited objectives: organizing national elections and assuring a neutral political environment for such elections.

**Resistance**

UNTAC faced relatively minor resistance during its 18-month mandate. Unlike resistance to Vietnamese occupation, which was led by FUNCINPEC, the Khmer Rouge, and FNLPK, resistance to UNTAC was undertaken almost exclusively by the Khmer Rouge. Starting in January 1992, politically-motivated assassinations occurred in Phnom Penh. In February 1992, the Khmer Rouge fired on a UN helicopter, wounding a peacekeeper. In May 1992, the Khmer Rouge expanded the territory under its control and refused to be monitored by the UN or to disarm its forces (Chandler 2008, 287). On 13 October 1992, it announced it was boycotting the elections altogether. The Khmer Rouge’s pullout from the Paris Agreements triggered a series of tit-for-tat retaliations by UNTAC and the SOC. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on the Khmer Rouge on 30 November 1992. On December 13 and 14 1992, the Khmer Rouge attacked UN barracks. On 24 and 25 December, Khmer Rouge artillery shells landed near UNTAC troops in Siem Reap province. The area came under shelling again on 31 December (UN 2003). On 13 January 1993, the SOC launched a series of attacks against the Khmer Rouge. Starting in March 1993, the Khmer Rouge resorted to the killing of ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia. In April and May 1993, it carried out attacks in an attempt to sabotage the elections, including bombing an UNTAC base on 4-5 May 1993.

Although a formal objective of the Paris Agreements, democratization and elections created problems of their own: opposition political offices were attacked, ransacked, and burned and party members were beaten, kidnapped, and killed (Doyle 1995, 56). The Khmer Rouge’s unwillingness to allow UNTAC to enter territory under its control and to supervise the disarmament of its members fundamentally undermined the Paris Agreements. None of the parties could be
expected to disarm if one of the most powerful among them refused to do so. Faced with Khmer Rouge recalcitrance, UNTAC shifted from supervising the ceasefire and disarmament process to providing security for the elections (Sanderson 1995, 34).

By the time of the elections in May 1993, the Khmer Rouge had killed some 104 Vietnamese and assassinated 37 political opponents. They were not the only ones to commit violence. UNTAC assigned SOC responsibility for 46 political assassinations (Doyle 1995, 47). Total casualties, military and civilian, during the UNTAC period were about 225 (UCDP 2011). UNTAC itself suffered 59 military fatalities (UN 2003).

Withdrawal of UNTAC

National elections took place between 23 and 28 May 1993. Despite the Khmer Rouge boycott, they were considered a success. More than 4.6 million people voted (a turnout of 90 percent), there was little violence on election day, and the elections were declared free and fair (Findlay 1994, 6; Akashi 1994). The constituent assembly was then able to draft and approve a constitution on schedule on 21 September 1993. The mandate entrusted to UNTAC was concluded on 24 September 1993 when Sihanouk formally promulgated the new constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia and on 4 November 1993, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 880, terminating UNTAC. The last peacekeepers left Cambodia on 14 November 1993 (UN 2003).

The UN mission did not completely end the Cambodian civil war. It simply deescalated and de-internationalized it, while politically isolating the Khmer Rouge (Findlay 1994, 5). The Khmer Rouge was banned from Cambodia in 1994. By the mid 1990s, it still had some 5,000 armed men, but was struggling with defections (Chandler 2008, 289). The Khmer Rouge was not the only post-election challenge facing Cambodia. FUNCINPEC won the election with 45.47 percent of the vote followed by the CPP with 38.23 percent. The SOC/CPP was shocked by its electoral loss, and Hun Sen (the former head of the SOC) refused to accept defeat. In the two weeks after the election, his CPP party resorted to violence to blackmail FUNCINPEC and UNTAC into reversing the election results (Shawcross 1994, 26). Eventually Sihanouk and Hun Sen agreed to form a coalition government with a shared Prime Minister position and cabinet positions divided between their parties (Lindley 2007, 168; Chandler 2008, 288).
7.3 Theoretical Explanations

Resistance, first against Vietnamese occupation and then against UNTAC occupation, defined Cambodian politics for over a decade. Yet the occupations could not be more different. The Vietnamese occupation generated tremendous resistance, leaving thousands dead on both sides. The UNTAC occupation of Cambodia was far more peaceful. This section applies the theories of political dislocation and trust to the case of Cambodia. How do these theories help us understand resistance?

7.3.1 Political Dislocation

Political dislocation theory argues that resistance is caused by a disruption of the domestic balance of political power. Those groups that stand to lose politically from occupation will be more likely to take up arms. Conversely, those who stand to gain from occupation will be more likely to collaborate.

Vietnamese Occupation

To this day, there remains strong disagreement in Cambodia whether Cambodia was liberated or invaded in December 1978. Opponents of Vietnam and the Hun Sen regime highlight the oppressive nature of Vietnamese rule whereas his supporters highlight their role in nation-building after the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge (Gottesman 2003, x-xi). As this section shows, views on Vietnamese occupation map broadly on preexisting political preferences.

Vietnam did not simply invade Cambodia. It overthrew the regime, dramatically reshaped the government in its image, and marginalized opposition groups. The biggest losers of Vietnamese occupation were Pol Pot and his inner circle. They were removed from power, tried in absentia, and spent 15 years exiled in a literal wilderness in the jungles of Western Cambodia and Thailand (Morris 1999, 219). Thus, as political dislocation theory would predict, the largest resistance group was the Khmer Rouge.

The Khmer Rouge was the principal, but by no means the sole, target of political dislocation in occupied Cambodia. Vietnam imposed a single party socialist state. Opposition parties were prevented from partaking in elections and critics of PRK rule were barred from positions in gov-
ernment. Television and movie theaters played only censored news and political films. Only books dealing favorably with Vietnam and communism were permitted (Martin 1994, 235). Even opportunities in higher education were reserved for the family members of political apparatchiks. Also marginalized were royalists and republicans, the other ideological contenders to rule in Cambodia.

Understanding resistance as a product of political dislocation helps explain certain features of the Cambodian resistance. Resistance groups were organized ideologically rather than functionally or regionally. Each resistance group represented former rulers of Cambodia. King Sihanouk, who ruled Cambodia from 1954 until he was overthrown in a republican-backed coup in 1970, headed FUNCINPEC. The republican FDNLK was headed by Sann, a former Prime Minister, and members of the Cambodian military who had overthrown Sihanouk in 1970. The Khmer Rouge, represented the regime that seized power in 1975 and was overthrown by Vietnam in 1979. Viewed from this angle, resistance was simply a continuation of the violent contest for political power in Cambodia beginning in 1970 (Chanda 1989, 27).

Both the PRK and their Vietnamese patrons grasped the effect of political dislocation on resistance. They understood that purging all members of the Khmer Rouge would needlessly exacerbate resistance, and consequently were willing to integrate mid-to-low-level cadres. Integrating such cadres would deprive the Khmer Rouge of recruits, without posing a challenge to the PRK (Chanda 1999, 33; Gottesman 2003, 68). Vietnam believed it would be easier to integrate these cadres than the nationalists or the upper echelons of the Khmer Rouge (Martin 1999, 218). Besides, if it was to rule effectively, the PRK needed manpower to staff the bureaucracy, much of which had been wiped out by the Khmer Rouge.

As is often the case, high profile acts of violent resistance overshadow the extent of collaboration in occupied Cambodia. The majority of Cambodia saw little resistance. Most Cambodians saw the arrival of Vietnamese troops as liberation from a genocidal regime. The PRK focused on reestablishing the state, and purposely avoided the more disruptive elements of socialism. For instance, it never fully implemented the collectivization of agriculture. By the late 1980s, anticipating the withdrawal of Vietnam, it undertook a number of liberalizing measures. As it reformed the economy, the PRK looked to the prerevolutionary past as a model. By the time of the Paris Agreements Cambodia had a functioning economy, and semi-free markets. Poverty was down
and school enrollment was up (Slocomb 2003, xii). The limits of the reforms, and the return to the status quo ante, preempted broader resistance (Gottesman 2003, 19). The PRK’s achievements in rebuilding Cambodia may also explain why its successor, the CPP, received 35 percent of the vote in the 1993 election.\(^3\)

**UNTAC Occupation**

The effects of political dislocation become clearer when comparing the Vietnamese and UNTAC occupations. Vietnamese occupation caused significant dislocation by overthrowing the Khmer Rouge and permanently marginalizing other political opposition. In contrast, UNTAC went to extraordinary lengths to include all factions in the political process leading to a general election. UNTAC was the outcome of years of negotiations. Consequently, it benefitted from the consent of all the parties (albeit with significant pressure from the international community). For the first time in Cambodian history all factions were allowed to “flourish simultaneously, under UN protection” (Chandler 1997, 51). This consent was buttressed by the institution of the SNC. UNTAC had the authority to govern Cambodia, but the SNC served to legitimate its actions. The SNC remained the locus of Cambodian sovereignty and the shared power relationship provided some accountability to the transitional authority (Keller 2005, 169). In January 1992, the SNC announced that any Cambodian could form a political party and in September 1993, Sihanouk once again became the constitutional monarch (Gottesman 2003, 347; Chandler 1997, 25).

By definition, the election ensured that the political outcome reflected some latent distribution of support for government. However, as the literature on spoilers conveys, elections alone do not ensure peace (Stedman 1997). Thus, beyond the desirability of elections, it is important to note that most factions also saw the UNTAC mandate as politically expedient. FUNCINPEC and the FNLPK were relatively weak militarily and could not expect to seize power through force. Because they did not believe their military capacity reflected their political support, the elections process promised opportunities for political gain. The incumbent SOC saw benefits from the electoral process as well. Even if it would lose its political monopoly, the SOC (and its political party the CPP) recognized that its power was waning due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the

\(^3\)Since the 1993 election was undertaken and monitored by the UN, and because the CPP did not actually win the election, we can assume that this level of support was not simply the product of fraud.
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. Its pariah status prevented it from benefitting from the fruits of international trade. The SOC saw the cantonment mandated by the Paris Agreements as a way to cripple the Khmer Rouge militarily, knowing the Khmer Rouge had little domestic political support otherwise (Doyle 1995, 69). Critically, the CPP wrongly assumed it would win the elections (Ratner 1995, 178). Based on this flawed assumption, elections promised significant gains for relatively small concessions. Finally, the Khmer Rouge initially accepted UNTAC’s mandate only because it never intended to fully comply with it. It hoped UNTAC would dismantle the SOC’s control over government without forcing the Khmer Rouge to disarm.

Beyond the initial mandate and cooperation with the SNC, UNTAC’s leadership was extremely cautious —some would say much too cautious— in maintaining the support of the parties and limiting the use of force. The purpose of UNTAC was stabilization and the creation of a neutral political environment (Sanderson 1995, 30). In one famous incident, SRSG Akashi and Lt. Gen. Sanderson were refused entry, as allowed by the Paris Agreements, into Khmer Rouge-controlled territory. The Khmer Rouge had erected a road block composed only of a thin bamboo pole. Yet, Akashi and Sanderson refused to breach this symbolic barrier. The UNTAC mandate did not include for enforcement by UN peacekeepers. To do so would have risked escalation and required a much larger military force structured and equipped for protracted conflict. Moreover, according to Sanderson (1995, 32): “such a mission would have been doomed for disaster even if it had been given wide international support, since it would have required a UN force to take sides in an internal conflict.”

Ultimately, the Khmer Rouge did come to see UNTAC as a political threat. Publicly, the Khmer Rouge also accused UNTAC of favoring Vietnam and their Cambodian clients over the Khmer Rouge (Morris 1999, 226). This may have been a red herring, however. The Khmer Rouge had little to gain from elections since it had little popular support. Moreover, the elections would unify the other factions against it. Unable to win the election or to accept electoral defeat, the Khmer Rouge sought to derail the peace process altogether. It withdrew its consent from the UN mission and subsequently rejected the ceasefire (Roberts 2006, 29; Sanderson 1995, 33). To recapitulate, UNTAC entered a highly polarized political environment in Cambodia. Political dislocation helps explain why it was the Khmer Rouge, and not other factions that had fought Vietnamese occupation, which were responsible for the lion’s share of resistance to UNTAC.
7.3.2 Factional Politics

A corollary of political dislocation theory is the mechanism of factional politics. Occupiers may disrupt the domestic balance of power in occupied society. This can trigger not only resistance against the occupier, but also clashes between different groups. Indeed, groups may use resistance not only as a means to evict the occupier, but also to seize power for themselves.

Vietnamese Occupation

Cambodian resistance provides an excellent illustration of factional politics. Resistance was divided along political and ideological lines. There are two potential explanations for such divisions. The first is that pre-existing political organizations, with their membership, social networks, and funds, were better suited than random individuals to mobilize resistance (Petersen 2001). Yet, if political organizations could better mobilize initially, over time we would expect to see such groups merge. Indeed, logic would dictate that different groups pool their efforts to capitalize on comparative advantages and economies of scale. An alternative explanation is that such groups saw resistance as a way to maximize relative power.

Resistance groups espoused competing visions for the future of Cambodia: royalism for FUNCINPEC, Maoism for the Khmer Rouge, and republican parliamentarism for FNLPK (Chandler 1997, 25). These ideologies were deemed incompatible. The royalists had been overthrown by the republicans in 1970, who in turn had been overthrown by the Khmer Rouge in 1975. Although they shared a common enemy, they also deeply distrusted each other. Both the FNLPK and FUNCINPEC stated in their founding declarations their opposition to a return of the Khmer Rouge (Corfield 1991, 15, 21). This distrust manifested itself in the failure of resistance groups to unify but also in fratricidal clashes. According to Martin: “In practice, each movement reproduces traditional Cambodian society in microcosm: each faction is inspired by the feudal scheme of things” (1994, 246).

Outgunned and outmanned, the resistance factions had every reason to join forces, but such efforts repeatedly failed. Following the invasion of Cambodia, the UN General Assembly called on the UN Security Council to organize an international conference on Cambodia. This conference did not take place because of dissent among resistance groups over its objectives (Keller 2005, 142).
Even the non-communist resistance, with narrower ideological disagreements, failed to unify. For instance, throughout 1981 and 1982, FNLPK proposed a merger with the FUNCINPEC, even offering Sihanouk its presidency, and offer he refused (Martin 1994, 242; Corfield 1991, 16). Within the FNLPK itself, struggles for power emerged as the main issue of contention being Sann’s family monopoly over top positions (Martin 1994, 247).

The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), formed in 1982 under tremendous international pressure, was as Kiernan notes: “neither a coalition, nor a government, nor democratic” (1985, 37). The CGDK was designed to preserve the power of each faction, with Sihanouk as President, Sann as Prime Minister, and Samphan as Vice President for Foreign Affairs (Etcheson 1987, 187). Foreign sponsors pressured Cambodian factions to form a unified front in order to increase the effectiveness of the resistance and to provide a fig leaf for funding the Khmer Rouge. According to Martin: “The CGDK . . . can be considered a sham alliance that allowed foreign powers to keep their consciences clean while they refused to accept the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia” (1994, 246). Ultimately, the structure of the CGDK was insufficient to overcome mistrust and competition.

All the factions were deeply wary of each other’s relative power. By 1982, the Khmer Rouge was becoming an increasingly effective fighting force (Chandler 2008, 281). This was a cause of great concern for the non-communist resistance. The ANS and the FNLPK were, according to CIA assessments, fragile and no match militarily for the Khmer Rouge or the PRK (CIA 1989, 2). On the one hand, they could not wage an effective insurgency against the PRK and Vietnam without the help of the Khmer Rouge. As Sihanouk stated in an interview: “without the Khmer Rouge, we have no credibility on the battlefield.” On the other hand an alliance with the Khmer Rouge presented dangers over the long term. Sann, the leader of the FNLPK was extremely reticent to join forces with the Khmer Rouge. He noted: “Choosing between the Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge is like choosing between plague and cholera” (Etcheson 1987, 200). The non-communist resistance feared that following the end of occupation the Khmer Rouge would then turn its sights on them (Pao-min 1987, 758; Mahbubani 1983, 416). Sihanouk stated: “Personally, I have no sympathy for the Khmer Rouge. They killed several members of my family. I want the whole truth to be told of them. That is why I require guarantees. If I do not obtain them, I will not cooperate” (Etcheson 1987, 198). Indeed, the Khmer Rouge regularly fought against FNLPK and the ANS.
forces (Martin 1994, 246; Ross 1990). If the non-communist resistance was going to survive in post-occupation Cambodia, it needed the means to defend itself. Throughout the 1980s, the three resistance forces therefore remained non-integrated, each maintaining separate bases, command structures, and operational planning, and controlling separate refugee camps in Thailand (Ross 1990; Etchesen 1987).

**UNTAC Occupation**

Factional politics plays a lesser role in explaining resistance to UNTAC occupation since the Khmer Rouge was the only group contesting the UN presence. However, the frame of factional politics is critical to understanding why the UN was called to occupy Cambodia to begin with. As political dislocation and factional politics theories would expect, the end of Vietnamese occupation did not end violence. Instead, resistance simply turned into civil war. The Khmer Rouge built up arms caches and actively prevented its cadres from reintegrating into Cambodian society. As a Khmer Rouge document put it: "Before the major issue was to liberate the country from the Vietnamese. Now national defense is the major issue. We must make preparation for the second stage where it is necessary to protect the rank and file" (Chanda 1989, 40-41). With the Vietnamese now out of Cambodia, the fundamental question of "who rules?" remained.

The international community tried to bring the resistance groups and SOC government together through the Jakarta Informal Meetings and the Paris peace talks. During international negotiations, the two non-communist resistance groups showed a lack of organization and ongoing incompatibility of interests, as they negotiated the future of Cambodia. The Cambodian factions eventually agreed to form a SNC composed of six delegates from the GCKD and six from the SOC, which would represent Cambodia at the UN. However, during its first meeting, the SNC could not agree on a President or a vice-President, leading to a vacant seat at the UN for a year. The Paris peace talks constantly broke down over the question of power sharing in the interim period before elections (Martin 1994, 284-285). Mistrust among the factions, many of which had allied to fight Vietnamese occupation, remained a fundamental barrier to any negotiated settlement. Ironically, because resistance groups could not reach a consensus, they required another foreign occupation, this time by the UN, to oversee the ceasefire and the implementation of elections.
Once UNTAC was in place, each resistance group registered a separate political party in order to contest the election. Each group used its history of fighting Vietnamese occupation to build public support in the elections (Heder and Ledgerwood 1996). As factional politics theory would predict, resistance was directly tied to future political rule. Moreover, each party opposed different aspects of the UNTAC mandate, seeking to manipulate the peace process to enhance their electoral prospects (Doyle 1995, 13; Findlay 1995). UNTAC was sensitive as to how the implementation of the peace plan would affect the relative power of the different factions and sought to provide, as best possible, a neutral political environment. After the Khmer Rouge refused to canton its forces, UNTAC forces commander Lt. Gen. Sanderson became concerned it would trigger a renewal of fighting among the factions: “in early 1992 I could feel the ground moving from under myself and those moderates of all military factions who were committed to the peace process” (Sanderson 1995, 31). In sum, factional politics helps explain why Cambodia’s resistance groups failed to disband upon the departure of Vietnamese troops, why these groups transformed into political parties, and why Cambodia descended into a civil war between 1989 and 1991.

7.3.3 Trust

According to trust theory, occupiers will have difficulty credibly committing to treating the occupied population benignly and to vacating occupied territory promptly, creating the potential for a breakdown in trust. This breakdown in trust will be most acute when the behavior of occupiers makes resistance less risky than inaction and attentisme.

Vietnamese Occupation

Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia was by no means peaceful. Tens of thousands of fatalities were sustained on both sides and political opponents to the communist regime were persecuted and jailed. However, Vietnam generally did not undertake a systematic campaign of civilian victimization. When Vietnamese troops first invaded Cambodia, they did not mistreat the population (Martin 1994, 215). Officially, Vietnamese troops were ordered to protect all Cambodians, though many stood aside as Cambodians took revenge on Khmer Rouge cadres (Gottesman 2003, 37-38). Interviews with Cambodian refugees in 1979 found:
The Vietnamese appear anxious to win the hearts and minds of the people and seem to behave well toward them. They distribute rice and cooking utensils so that families can once again eat *en famille* instead of en masse. They also either appoint or supervise the election of new village officials. Refugees give the impression that these changes are widely welcomed, despite the fact that they are imposed by the ancient enemy of the Khmers (Kiernan 1979).

In many ways, Vietnamese occupation benefitted directly from Khmer Rouge atrocities. Whereas victimization theory predicts that indiscriminate violence by occupiers encourages individuals to seek protection among resistance forces, during the initial stages of the Vietnamese occupation it was indiscriminate violence by the Khmer Rouge that sent Cambodians into the arms of their Vietnamese occupiers.

However, abuses against the Cambodian population did occur under Vietnamese occupation and those instances of abuse highlight the trust mechanism of resistance. For example, Cambodian soldiers working alongside Vietnamese soldiers defected to the resistance in 1985 after witnessing abuses committed by their counterparts (Martin 1994, 240). Far more damaging to trust between Cambodian civilians and Vietnamese troops was the forced conscription starting in 1982 and intensified in 1983 as part of the K5 program. According to Slocomb:

”it panicked the people and turned whatever goodwill the regime had earned between 1979 and 1984 into bitter and long-lasting resentment, particularly over the methods used to recruit labor and conscript troops. In this way, the PRK played easily into the hands of its detractors. The combined resistance forces successfully employed K5 against the PRK regime by using it in their political propaganda to win over the people’s sympathy and turn them against what they could claim, with obvious justification but no apparent irony, was an oppressive regime” (2001, 209).

Ultimately, as Gottesman notes: “the resentment that Cambodians felt toward the Vietnamese was not constant; it was intensified and diminished in response to specific actions taken by Vietnamese officials, the PRK leadership, and the resistance” (2003, 138).

Cambodian reaction to Vietnamese abuses was mitigated by two factors: fear of the Khmer Rouge and territorial control. As trust theory emphasizes, resistance can be motivated by self-
protection as much as nationalism. Many Cambodians feared that a withdrawal of Vietnamese troops would mean the return of the far more brutal Khmer Rouge. A refugee was quoted as saying: "We do not want to return to the country as long as the Vietnamese are there; we are afraid of them and even more of the Khmer Rouge" (Martin 1994, 241). At first, most Cambodians were simply relieved that the Khmer Rouge were out of power and they sought to recover a normal life (Martin 1994, 239). Moreover, the successful quarantine of resistance to the periphery of Cambodia played an important role in reducing civilian victimization. For most of the occupation, resistance and government forces faced off along a front in remote and sparsely populated territory. The separation of forces reduced the identification problem that so often leads to the deliberate or accidental killing of civilians (Kalyvas 2006). Because the forces of Vietnam and the PRK did not systematically target civilians, civilians had few incentives to turn to resistance forces in order to gain protection.

UNTAC Occupation

UNTAC did not undertake a program of civilian victimization. On the contrary, a pillar of its mission was the promotion of human rights (Findlay 1995). UNTAC undertook a countrywide human rights education campaign and overhauled the judicial system to better address human rights cases (Lindley 2007, 167). UNTAC pushed the SNC to adopt all major human rights conventions, freed political prisoners, sought to reform prisons, lifted restrictions on personal freedom of movement, allowed for the expansion of human rights groups and the free press (Doyle 1995, 33, 45-46; Chandler 2008, 288).

The presence of UN troops did generate some frictions and animosity. There were some reported incidents of civilian abuse, particularly by the Bulgarian police contingent (Ratner 1995, 195-196; Cumming-Bruce 1993, 10). Moreover, the deployment of UNTAC led to skyrocketing inflation and prostitution (And attendant increases in HIV/AIDS infections) (Whitworth 2004, 72). However serious, these did not amount to widespread abuse, let alone systematic victimization. Moreover, the UN went to great lengths to address allegations of mistreatment of Cambodians. When the Khmer Rouge accused UNTAC of collaborating with the Vietnamese to colonize Cambodia or of raping Cambodian women, UNTAC set up community relations offices to handle
the allegations (Ledgerwood 1994). Consequently, there is no evidence of Cambodians forming resistance groups to protect against victimization by UNTAC. There is also no evidence of individuals joining the Khmer Rouge to avoid victimization, unsurprising given the Khmer Rouge’s own record of genocide. As the next section explains, the UN was also uniquely capable of making credible commitments towards the sovereignty and wellbeing of the Cambodian population.

7.3.4 Credible Commitment

The trust theory of resistance posits that factors such as regime type, international mandate, and religious affinity help mitigate resistance. They do so by increasing the ability of occupiers to credibly commit to the wellbeing of the occupied population. I find evidence that credible commitment played a role in resistance to occupation. UNTAC, an occupation under the aegis of an international organization, faced less resistance than the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The UN was better able to credibly commit to the independence of Cambodia.

Vietnamese Occupation

Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia illustrates the difficulties of credibly committing to occupied populations. Despite earning the gratitude of many Cambodians for overthrowing the Khmer Rouge, distrust remained. When the Vietnamese arrived, many wondered whether they were there to protect them from the Khmer Rouge or to annex and exploit the country? In other words, what type of occupier was Vietnam? Cambodia and Vietnam had a long history of ethnic animosity dating as far back as Vietnam’s occupation of the 1830s (Corfield 2009, 17-18; Gottesman 2003, ix, 15). Moreover, some feared Vietnam would try to colonize Cambodia. Vietnam was 71 million in population against Cambodia’s nine million and needed to expand agricultural areas, potentially in sparsely populated Cambodia (Abuza 1995, 441). During the rule of the Khmer Rouge, Samphan declared: "the number one enemy is not U.S. imperialism, but Vietnam, ready to swallow up Cambodia" (Pouvatchy 1986, 447). Vietnam’s enemies stoked fears of annexation, with China accusing Vietnam of trying to force Cambodia into an Indochinese Federation (Gottesman 2003, 43). Added to the difficulties in establishing trust was the fact that Vietnam did seek revisions to its borders with Cambodia. These changes confirmed through treaties, the first pertaining
CHAPTER 7. RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION IN CAMBODIA (1979-1993)

To maritime boundaries in 12 November 1982 and the second pertaining to land borders on 27 December 1985 (Martin 1994, 229). The treaties were harshly criticized by all resistance groups. FUNCINPEC and the KPLNF both rejected these treaties. The Khmer Rouge stated “All of this is a device to allow Vietnam to occupy Kampuchea’s territorial waters and plunder Kampuchea’s natural resources in the sea and on the seabed” (BBC Monitoring 1982). King Sihanouk accused Vietnam of “nibbling away” Cambodian territory (Thayer 2012, 68)

Absent the transparency and oversight provided by democracies or international organizations, Vietnam could not signal its type. Vietnam and the PRK were closed regimes with limited lines of communication with the Cambodian population. There were almost no Westerners in Cambodia to provide information, aside from a few humanitarian workers. What news of the regime did transpire came from refugees, usually political exiles opposed to the regime to begin with. Moreover, there were few or no checks on Vietnamese power. The Vietnamese army operating in Cambodia did not answer to Cambodia’s council of ministers, but to the Party’s military committee, which effectively responded to the wishes of Vietnam. Neither Vietnam nor the PRK was a democracy, but instead single party communist regimes (Gottesman 2003, 57, 206, 229). In the absence of credible commitment mechanisms, revisions to Cambodia’s laws and borders were more problematic. Were the demands in fact limited, or the first step in a broader annexionist agenda? Absent oversight, how could Cambodians tell the difference, and absent checks and balances, how could they prevent it? The lack of checks and balances on Vietnamese occupation helps explain why Vietnamese immigration became such an issue of contention. Vietnam had sought to repatriate ethnically Vietnamese Cambodians. To Vietnam, repatriation was repairing the wrongs committed by the Khmer Rouge. To many in Cambodia, it was imposed demographic colonization aimed at erasing Khmer independence (Gottesman 2003, 124; Martin 1994, 227).

Two factors helped counteract the complete breakdown in trust in Vietnamese-occupied Cambodia: the liberalization of religion and relatively low civilian victimization, as discussed previously. First, common religion bolstered trust between Cambodia and Vietnam. Both Vietnam and Cambodia are overwhelmingly Buddhist and Buddhism had traditionally been an important source of social authority in Cambodia.\(^4\) Organized religion had been decimated by the Khmer

\(^4\)Note that Cambodia is Theravada Buddhist whereas Vietnam is predominantly Mahayana Buddhist.
Rouge, which had killed Buddhist monks and destroyed temples and religious texts. Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia saw a revival of Buddhism. Through a measure of respect for Buddhism—something that had been completely absent under the rule of Khmer Rouge—Vietnam was able to restore a badly needed sense of normalcy and allay fears that it sought to completely reorder Cambodia’s way of life. The regime put in place by Vietnam pledged to guarantee the people’s freedom of religion” and that temples, pagodas, and historical relics” said to have been destroyed by the Pol Pot regime will be repaired and maintained “according to the people’s needs” and the “practical conditions” prevailing in local areas (van der Kroef 1979, 737). Buddhist schools were reopened and monks were once again allowed to receive offerings from the population (Quinn-Judge 2006, 216).

As the PRK sought to broaden its basis of social support, further religious restrictions were lifted and Buddhism itself was restored as the state religion in 1989 (Gyallay-Pap 2007, 91). The restoration of Buddhism was a popular policy in Cambodia. According to Prince Sihanouk (Kamm 1998, 194), Cambodians preferred a “Vietnamese protectorate” to a Khmer Rouge “genocide”, “Many people enjoy family life again, no longer slave at forced labor, and observe Buddhism. The Vietnamese have brought relative peace.” Similarly, peasants interviewed in 1979 noted that the decision by the Vietnamese-backed government to encourage the practice of Buddhism was a popular move (Kiernan 1979). At the same time, Vietnam and the PRK understood that religion could be a potent source of dissent, particularly due to its association with King Sihanouk. Therefore the regime did make sure to retain some control over the religious hierarchy, so that monks not “take advantage and use Buddhism and the beliefs of the people to go and conduct activities to destroy the principles of the pure revolution or to propagate and divide national solidarity” (Gottesman 2003, 71). The policy was successful, as religious leaders did not side with the resistance movement.

UNTAC Occupation

In contrast to Vietnamese occupation, UNTAC used its international mandate to better credibly commit to the sovereignty and wellbeing of Cambodia. Specifically, it was able to maintain trust with a clear and limited mandate with multilateral oversight. UNTAC was established by UN

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5For a description of ongoing restrictions on Buddhism under the PRK, see Martin 1994, 237.
Security Council resolution 745 with a period not to exceed 18 months. Elections, mandated in the Paris Agreements, provided a focal point for the end of UNTAC. As one observer noted: “It’s very jarring physically when you see foreigners running your country…if they are not taking UNTAC to task, it’s because they know that UNTAC was going to leave anyway. There was a calendar, there was a clear statement that UNTAC was not going to be there forever” (Carney 1993, 42).

Trust was further maintained through overlapping oversight of UNTAC. Under the Paris Agreements, the SNC enshrined Cambodian sovereignty and would act as an advisory body to UNTAC and UNTAC had to abide by any unanimous decision by the SNC. As such, all four factions to the conflict maintained sovereignty and oversight of UNTAC. UN Security Council resolution 745 also called the UN Secretary General to report on the implementation of the mandate publicly and by a specific set of dates. The UN Security Council maintained further oversight of UNTAC’s operations, condemning violence (Resolution 823), endorsing election results (Resolution 840), and terminating UNTAC (Resolution 860). Importantly, the Security Council included the patrons of the major factions of the conflict, which could act to intervene on their client’s behalf. Indeed, China abstained from Resolution 792, which called upon UNTAC to proceed with elections despite Khmer Rouge recalcitrance, arguing elections without Khmer Rouge participation would be harmful to the peace process (Sorpong 2000, 263). Additionally, the core group of major powers and regional actors that supported UNTAC and the SNC needed to coordinate, and thereby provided a degree of transparency to the UNTAC mission. Beyond the need to build trust in the UN, transparency was hardwired in UNTAC’s mandate in order build and maintain trust between the factions in Cambodia and to ensure that UNTAC maintain a neutral political environment.

Lastly, the multinational nature of UNTAC prevented occupation from turning into permanent annexation. UNTAC was created out of the Paris Agreements with the support of the UN Security Council and funding from UN member states. The UN had historically been a major proponent of Cambodian independence, passing yearly resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodia (Morris 1999, 223). If UNTAC was established with the support of all the factions, the UN had no way of maintaining indefinite rule of Cambodia. In fact, a key legal question in establishing UNTAC was whether the UN had the authority to administer territory, even temporarily, at all. Article 78 of the Charter states that the trusteeship did not apply to territories such
as Cambodia that had become members of the UN (Keller 2005, 157).

Lastly, some of the factors that undermined UNTAC’s effectiveness were the same that guaranteed its limited mandate. Put simply, UNTAC did not have the political or military unity to maintain an occupation beyond its mandate. As Lt. Gen. Sanderson reported: “Generating cohesion among 16,000 troops, representing 34 member states of the UN, was not an easy task” (1995, 33). Moreover, no single troop contributor could have maintained the mission absent support from the international community.

Although this case study shows the effect of credible commitment, it is also important to recognize that other factors also played a role. First, UNTAC was able to neutralize political opposition though collective decision-making encompassing the main parties of the conflict. By placing emphasis on mitigating political dislocation, UNTAC avoided stoking resistance. Second, and relatedly, UNTAC was able to minimize fatalities because it was excessively cautious, and thus avoided placing its soldiers in harm’s way.

7.4 Alternative Theories

This section examines the explanatory power of alternative theories of resistance to foreign occupation, namely nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context. As will be demonstrated, nationalism provides limited insight to variation in resistance patterns, opportunity structure helps explain some of the location of resistance, and international context is either irrelevant or makes predictions contrary to observed patterns of resistance.

7.4.1 Nationalism

Superficially, the resistance seemed motivated by nationalism. Nationalist and independence themes peppered the rhetoric of resistance groups. Sihanouk declared: “We fought against the Viet Minh in 1953/54 as we fought against the Siamese [Thai] and Annamese [Vietnamese] who were invading our country in the past centuries and because they wanted to colonize us in place of the French colonists” (Pouvatchy 1986, 441). Similarly, the Khmer Rouge argued they had prevented “the Vietnamese from annexing Cambodia and...from turning present-day Cambodia into the second Kampuchean Krom [Vietnamese province]” (Abuza 1995, 436, 438). During the
UNTAC period, all of the opposition parties sought to boost their political legitimacy by making reference to their resistance against Vietnam (Friesen 1996, 184). Conversely, Vietnam went to great lengths to depict the 1979 invasion as Cambodian-led, going so far as to initially deny they were fighting the war at all. Instead the KUFNS was credited for leading the fighting and capturing the capital (Becker 1986, 438).

Concretely, nationalist rhetoric was translated in xenophobia against Vietnamese soldiers and ethnically Vietnamese Cambodians (Doyle 1999, 198). The Khmer had a profound sense of inferiority and deep resentment against Vietnam and Vietnamese culture (Morris 1999, 17; Pao-min 1987, 750). Relations between ethnically Khmer and ethnically Vietnamese Cambodians—many who had lived in Cambodia for generations—could be tense. As one Khmer put it: “we talk to one another, but we are not friendly. Everyone would be happy to see them leave” (Martin 1994, 261). Resistance groups argued that Khmer should not fight Khmer, in other words that Cambodians should not collaborate with the PRK in order to fight Cambodian resistance groups (Gottesman 2003, 228). Similarly, Cambodians saw the teaching of Vietnamese under PRK rule as a fundamental threat to Cambodian independence. Both when in power and when resisting Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge considered any foreigner as a potential threat. It banned foreign languages and cultures, including those of minorities living in Cambodia (Gottesman 2003, 29). During the UNTAC period, the Khmer Rouge massacred ethnic Vietnamese, claiming that Vietnam was still secretly running the country (Chandler 2008, 288). When UNTAC drafted electoral laws that allowed any person born in Cambodia with one parent born in Cambodia with the right to vote, resistance factions demanded that ethnic Khmer living in Vietnam, as well as Cambodians living overseas, also be granted the right to vote in the elections. In contrast, resistance factions insisted that any ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia, regardless of how long they lived in Cambodia, be barred from voting (Ratner 1995, 178).

The role of royalist resistance factions can also be seen as evidence of nationalism. The royalist FUNCINPEC was one of three main resistance groups. At some point, every resistance faction swore fealty to King Sihanouk, a leader and symbol of the Cambodian nation (Keller 2005, 129). Moreover, both the Khmer Rouge and the republican FNLPK sought to boost their legitimacy by trying to recruit Sihanouk. Lastly, during the Paris peace talks and UNTAC occupation, Sihanouk played a role as the focal point of negotiations.
Upon closer examination, nationalist explanations provide limited insight into the dynamics of resistance. Nationalism may have characterized resistance rhetoric under Vietnamese occupations, but factions turned against each other once the occupation ended, an anomaly for nationalism. Furthermore, two of the three major resistance groups that fought Vietnamese occupation did not fight UN rule. The Khmer Rouge and the republican FNPLK may have sought Sihanouk’s support, but in power they had overthrown Sihanouk himself. Royalist factions were among the weakest resistance groups. In short, it is hard to argue that royalist nationalism was a major factor since groups that had previously opposed the King were using him in a cynical bid to mobilize precisely those who were not fighting. Lastly, it bears repeating that the vast majority of Cambodians saw the Vietnamese as protection from the return of the Khmer Rouge and government jobs as a precious opportunity to escape poverty.

What about the role of mass schooling in stoking nationalism? As Darden (Forthcoming) argues, durable political loyalties are forged in the first round of mass schooling. This theory provides limited purchase in explaining resistance in Cambodia. The first round of schooling was set up in 1917 during the colonial period, when both Cambodia and Vietnam were part of French Indochina (Ross 1990). Even if one dates the beginning of mass schooling to 1953 when Cambodia achieved independence, the education hypothesis fails to explain why Cambodia generated more resistance to Vietnam than to UNTAC, since neither state initiated the first round of schooling in Cambodia.

7.4.2 Opportunity Structures

Opportunity structure theories argue that resistance will be more likely when barriers to mobilization and combat are lowered. Factors that affect the ease of undertaking resistance include terrain, economic conditions, community structures, and military capacity. Unlike nationalist theories of resistance, opportunity structures provide partial explanation for resistance in Cambodia.

Terrain and foreign sanctuary were critical components of resistance to Vietnamese rule and help explain the location of resistance to Vietnamese occupation. Following the Vietnamese invasion in 1979, the Khmer Rouge executed a strategic retreat to the mountains and dense jungle of Western Cambodia (Slocomb 2001, 195). These mountains provided cover for resistance while
slowing the advance of mechanized Vietnamese forces. Subsequently, most resistance took place in the countryside. The memoirs of a Chinese diplomat traveling with the Khmer Rouge in the Cardamom Mountains provide a vivid account of the terrain:

"High on the mountain the forest was dense. The grass was deep and the way slippery. It was tough going. Forty degree temperatures and 40-plus-kilogram packs made the level of difficulty unimaginable. Sweat flowed and clothes soaked through. It took an entire day to climb one mountain" (Shui 2006, 16).

"In the forest... Twisted roots and gnarled branches connected the trees. The vines had long thorns and were twisted into a bramble. It might as well have been 'hell's gate' " (Shui 2006, 18). Throughout the Vietnamese occupation, many resistance camps were set up along the Dângrêk mountainous range on the Thai border.

Terrain was also influenced by weather patterns. Cambodia alternates between a wet season of monsoons from May to October and a dry season from November to April. Monsoon patterns and attendant flooding and road damage, affected the ability of parties to deploy heavy weapons. Vietnam planned its invasion of Cambodia for December 1978, when the terrain would be dry and therefore more suitable for armored vehicles and when the rice harvest would be available to its army (Gottesman 2003, 31). Towards the end of each year, the rain stopped and the roads dried off. This played in favor of incumbent forces, which used the opportunity to move in heavy weapons and destroy rebel bases. Large counterinsurgency operations, including the 1984/1985 offensive that drove much of the resistance out of Cambodia, were generally conducted during the dry season. The same patterns characterized resistance during the UNTAC period where ceasefire violations typically increased with the onset of the dry season (UN 2003).

The single most important facilitator of resistance to Vietnamese occupation was the foreign sanctuary provided by Thailand. There were as many as one million Cambodian refugees on the Thai border, providing a deep recruitment pool for resistance groups (Corfield 1991, 18). Undoubtedly, Thai sanctuary prevented the collapse of resistance groups following the 1984/1985 dry season offensive.

Resistance to Vietnamese occupation demonstrates the role of military capacity. During the invasion and the subsequent counterinsurgency campaign, Vietnam flooded Cambodia with troops.
At the height of the occupation in 1985, there were approximately 200,000 Vietnamese soldiers backed by 30,000 Cambodian troops. However, as the Cold War drew to a close, funding and supplies from Moscow dried up. This had secondary effects for Vietnamese and PRK military capacity. Importantly, the end of the Cold War can be seen as an exogenous shock to the military capacity of Vietnam and the PRK. It affected the military capacity of both but it was not the Cambodian resistance itself that determined the end of the Cold War. As such, it provides a useful angle to observe the impact of military capabilities. Indeed, the departure of Vietnamese troops created a security vacuum in Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge and resistance groups were able to reestablish control over a quarter of the country. Ultimately, as its military capacity diminished, Cambodia was forced to look for diplomatic ways of resolving the conflict. Military factors were also crucial in UNTAC occupation. The late deployment of the UNTAC military contingent emboldened the Cambodian factions to violate the Paris Agreements and jeopardized UNTAC’s mission (Findlay 1994, 7). Once deployed, the mere presence of UNTAC decreased the number of attacks in Cambodia (Doyle 1995, 33).

Resistance in Cambodia illustrates the role of certain economic factors. General poverty rates by province do not correlate with presence of resistance (Ministry of Planning 2006). The greatest determinant of resistance was proximity to sanctuaries in Thailand, rather than the opportunity cost of fighting. Recruits in the resistance did not come from any specific socio-economic groups, although resistance occurred predominantly in rural areas. Poverty and dim economic prospects appear to have pushed more to collaborate with the PRK regime to secure jobs rather than resist it to secure independence. Certain collaborators “were above all concerned with ensuring a bare minimum for their family cell and denounced their neighbors if that could win them a promotion” (Martin 1994, 240). According to Herder, working with the Vietnamese “usually meant a more secure standard of living: for those working in committees, in militias, or in factories there was more rice than for those working in the fields” (Heder 1980, 58). One economic factor that did play a role was access to timber and gems. Timber, exported through Thailand, helped fund resistance groups during Vietnamese occupation. The UN Security Council asked that UNTAC impose a timber export ban to starve resistance groups (Collier 2003, 145).

Lastly, resistance in Cambodia does not follow the role of community structures in sustaining resistance. Resistance groups recruited mainly from refugee camps, not territory under Viet-
namese or UNTAC control. This fact is significant because potential resisters did not face the risks and restrictions that make tight-knit communities necessary for recruitment into resistance groups. On the contrary it was precisely their control of various refugee camps that allowed resistance groups to sustain their forces. Patterns of resistance did partially map on ethno-linguistic diversity. Cambodia is 90 percent ethnic Khmer and 5 percent Vietnamese. Ethnically Vietnamese Cambodian live in urban centers such as Phnom Penh, a substantial number lived in the South and Southeast along the lower Mekong and Basak rivers as well as on the shores of the Tonle Sap (Ross 1990). It is unclear whether resistance was weaker in regions with larger Vietnamese populations because of preexisting political preferences (as political dislocation theory would expect), because of impediments to mobilization (as opportunity structure theory would expect), or due to other factors altogether. However, since few resisters organized within Cambodia proper, it is doubtful ethnic homogeneity was the prime determinant of resistance.

Opportunity structures alone are insufficient to understand variation in resistance. Cambodia’s weather patterns and mountain ranges did not change between Vietnam’s occupation and UNTAC’s. Yet the level of resistance was radically altered. Even military factors cannot explain variation in resistance, absent an understanding of the political context. As Lt. Gen. Sanderson notes (1995, 32) and as the theory of political dislocation would predict, troop strength must be calibrated to the political objectives sought. Vietnam deployed over 13 times the number of troops of UNTAC. However, Vietnam’s political objectives were far more sweeping than those of UNTAC and therefore required far more troops to enforce them. In sum, opportunity structures help understand those factors that facilitate or hinder resistance, but not those that motivate it.

7.4.3 International Context

International context theory of resistance posits that foreign threats play an important role in shaping incentives to undertake resistance. When occupied societies face a greater threat from a third-party state than from their occupiers, they will accept the lesser evil of occupation rather than undertaking resistance. However, this theory fails to explain variation in resistance to occupation in Cambodia.

According to Edelstein (2008a, 188), there was no commonly perceived threat to Cambodia
during the Vietnamese occupation between 1979 and 1989. Therefore, in line with international context theory, there was significant resistance in Vietnam. During the UNTAC occupation, which Edelstein does not include in his definition of occupation, it could be argued Cambodia faced the continued threat of Vietnam. Therefore, in line with predictions, there was little resistance to occupation.

However, a closer examination of the case demonstrates that international factors played a secondary role, at best. First, contrary to Edelstein, many Cambodians did perceive a third-party threat during Vietnamese occupation. This perceived threat was not a state, but the Khmer Rouge itself. If anything the fear of the return of the Khmer Rouge pushed many towards collaboration with the PRK government. Second, it is not clear that Vietnam constituted a commonly perceived third-party threat during the UNTAC occupation. The international environment became notably less threatening with the close of the Cold War. If this were the case, we should expect to see more resistance to UNTAC, not less. Moreover, it was the end of the Cold War and international isolation that pushed Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia in 1989. The subsequent civil war led to calls for the deployment of a multinational force to oversee a ceasefire and the organization of elections. Cambodians were willing to stomach UN occupation because the alternative was civil war. Thus, it was not the threat of Vietnamese occupation that led to UNTAC, but precisely the security vacuum caused by its departure.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter studied the case of Cambodia to test various theories of resistance to occupation. First I described the context of Vietnamese occupation between 1979 and 1989 and UN occupation between 1991 and 1993. I noted that Vietnamese occupation generated significant resistance whereas the UN occupation generated relatively little resistance.

Second, I argued that the theory of political dislocation helps explain the composition of resistance groups. As predicted, those groups that stood most to lose politically from Vietnamese occupation took up arms. Moreover, as the corollary of factional politics would expect, resistance groups were not unified, but divided along political lines. When the occupation ended and Vietnamese troops withdrew, these factions turned against each other. Indeed, resistance served not
only to expel foreign occupiers, but also to preserve and enhance the relative position of political contenders. Conversely, the UN went to great lengths to minimize political dislocation, and as a consequence faced less resistance. Furthermore, I argued that trust theory of resistance could shed light on the sources of resistance. Specifically, the UN could better credibly commit to treating the local population benignly and vacating Cambodia and therefore faced less resistance than did Vietnam.

Third, I took stock of alternative theories of resistance to occupation. I found that nationalism, while offering a superficially plausible explanation of resistance, fails to explain variation in resistance between the Vietnamese and the UN occupations. Opportunity structure theories of resistance, in particular those relating to terrain and foreign sanctuary, help understand the location of resistance, but not the origins of resistance itself. Opportunity structure theories relating to economic conditions and community structure provide limited explanatory power. Lastly, the predictions of international context fail to account for patterns in resistance. The greatest threats to the Cambodian population were domestic, not international. There is little evidence that Cambodians took into account foreign threats in deciding whether to resist occupation.
Chapter 8

Resistance to Occupation in Lebanon

(1976-2010)

"We want to know if Lebanon is a sovereign state or a whorehouse."

-President Camille Chamoun, March 1978

8.1 Introduction

Lebanon has lived under foreign occupation for centuries. During the 19th century France, the UK, and Russia intervened in Ottoman Lebanon to protect Maronite, Druze, and Orthodox communities, respectively. Following the First World War, Lebanon and Syria became French protectorates under a League of Nations mandate. Soon after Lebanon became an independent republic in 1943, Syria, Egypt, and Israel all began meddling in Lebanese politics (Winslow 1996, 208).

This chapter focuses on the years between 1976 and 2010, a particularly painful era in Lebanon’s history, marked by devastating intra-communal warfare and foreign occupation. By the early 1980s, Lebanon was occupied by no less than three different foreign armies: Syria, Israel, and the Multinational Forces. These simultaneous occupations provide a useful within-case comparison for various theories of resistance to occupation because it holds temporal and socio-economic factors constant while allowing for variation on the key characteristics of the occupiers and type of

\[^{1}\text{Fisk 1990, 140.}\]
occupations. Indeed, occupations varied in force size, political dislocation, civilian victimization, religion, regime type, and international mandate. Moreover, although occupation forces operated in the same country in the same time frame, they attracted varying levels of resistance from different groups. As such, Lebanon provides a unique opportunity to understand the dynamics of violent resistance.

Because Lebanon was afflicted by civil war for much of the period under study, it also represents a critical test for political dislocation theory and the factionalism corollary. Recall that political dislocation theory predicts that resistance will be most acute when it alters the domestic balance of political power in an occupied society. Polarized societies, notably those engulfed in civil war, should be particularly sensitive to political dislocation caused by occupation and therefore more likely to generate resistance. As will be demonstrated, this was indeed the case. In fact, the theory of political dislocation performs better than alternative theories of nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides a brief overview of the civil war in Lebanon. The second section provides the context of the Syrian, Israeli, Multinational Forces, and UN occupations of Lebanon and patterns of resistance. The third section assesses the theories of political dislocation and trust. The fourth section compares the predictions of political dislocation and trust to the prediction of alternative theories of resistance to occupation, namely: nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context.

To preview the results, the case of Lebanon provides strong support for the theory of political dislocation. Resistance was not a spontaneous reaction to occupation. Factions of Lebanese society adopted strategies of resistance, neutrality, or collaboration toward different occupiers depending on the perceived effect of each on the domestic balance of political power. Moreover, resistance factions competed to improve their political fortunes. I also find evidence of the impact of trust on resistance. Although no foreign occupier entered Lebanon with the purpose of victimizing the population, the failure to distinguish civilians from insurgents led to indiscriminate violence, which in turn was used to mobilize resistance. Religious affinity did help close the trust gap between occupiers and occupied, but there is limited evidence that an international mandate and regime type could compensate for instability caused by political dislocation. Importantly, I find little evidence to support the assertion that resistance was motivated primarily by nationalism.
8.2 Historical Context

8.2.1 Origins of the Civil War

To understand the causes of both occupation and resistance in Lebanon, it is important to understand the schisms within Lebanese society. Lebanon is half the size of Connecticut with a population of 3,250,000 in the mid 1970s. Though ethnically and linguistically Arab, it contains a wide array of religious groups, including Christian Maronites, Sunnis, Shias, Druze, Orthodox, and Catholics, among others (see Figure 8.1(a)). Upon independence in 1943, Lebanon’s power brokers agreed to manage this sectarian diversity through what was known as the National Pact. This Pact was an unwritten agreement by which the main political positions were to be distributed according to religious affiliation. Under this Pact, the President would be a Maronite, the Prime Minister would be a Sunni, and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies would be a Shia (Russell 1985, 17). The National Pact reflected the demographic composition of Lebanon at the time, and the Maronites’ dominance within it.\(^2\)

Over time, the Pact came under strain due to differential birth rates between sectarian groups and a massive influx of Palestinian refugees. Where Maronites represented some 54 percent of the population in 1956, they were only a third of the population by the 1970s (Collelo 1988). The Maronites’ predicament was aggravated by the influx of some 120,000 (Sunni) Palestinian refugees who were expelled from Jordan in 1971. In southern Lebanon and in the refugee districts of Beirut, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) assumed quasi-sovereign authority, using Lebanese territory to conduct periodic raids on Israel (Weinberger 1986, 123). Maronite leaders came to see Palestinians and their associated Fedayeen as threats to the National Pact and their preeminent place within it. The PLO provided manpower and weapons to help the Maronites’ Muslim rivals in Lebanon press for greater power and representation (Friedman 1989, 17).

Gradually, Lebanon became polarized between the status quo Maronites and revisionist Palestinians, Druze, and Sunnis. Maronites formed private armies such as the Phalangists, the Tigers, and the Guardians of the Cedars to protect the status quo. The revisionists camp, in turn formed

\(^2\)The literature on Lebanon frequently uses the terms Christian and Maronite interchangeably. Maronites, Orthodox, and other Christian groups usually allied during the civil war, and the founder of the South Lebanon Army (SLA), was led by the Greek Catholic Saad Haddad. I use the term Maronite since they were the driving force within the Christian bloc.
Figure 8.1: Sectarian groups and occupation zones of Lebanon
its own private armies including the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Lebanese Communist Party, and Sunni Nasserites who allied with Palestinian militia (Badran 2009, 43).

These tensions came to a head on 13 April 1975 when gunmen opened fire on a Maronite congregation outside a church in suburban Beirut. Suspecting Palestinians were responsible for the attack, Maronite Phalangists retaliated against a bus of Palestinians setting off a spiral of violence that became the civil war (Collelo 1988; Friedman 1989, 17). Druze, Palestinian, and other Muslim revisionist factions launched a series of coordinated attacks, pushing back Maronite forces. It soon became clear that revisionist factions not only intended to punish Maronite militias, but also to overthrow President Franjieh and replace him with a leader more amenable to reforms. As the Druze leader of the PSP Kamal Jumblatt stated: the other side had ruled for 140 years and now “it’s our turn” (Winslow 1996, 197). By 1976, Christian and government forces were on the defensive against revisionist forces. In such dire straits, the President of Lebanon called upon Syria to help.

### 8.2.2 Syrian Occupation (1976-2005)

**Invasion**

Lebanon’s slide toward civil war worried Syria. If it didn’t heed the Maronites’ call for assistance, Israel would invade Lebanon in order to forestall a leftist Palestinian-led government. Such a contingency would expose Syria’s western flank to Israeli attack (Rabinovich 1984, 48; Hinnebusch 2005, 151). Moreover, if the sectarian conflict spilled over into Syria, it could have dire consequences for the ruling Alawite regime. Thus, although Syria had previously supported Palestinian and Muslim groups in Lebanon, more immediate security concerns dictated that Syria intervene on behalf of the Maronite government.

On 9 April 1976, some 3,000 Syrian regulars crossed the border into Lebanon. Syrian forces deployed throughout Northern and Central Lebanon, principally in areas outside Maronite control (Colleleo 1988; Seale 1990). In the initial stage of the occupation, Syria faced resistance from Palestinian and leftist groups along the Beirut-Damascus highway, the mountains surrounding Beirut, Sidon, and parts of Tripoli (Winslow 1996, 202; Fisk 1990, 85; Rabinovitch 1984, 55; Pollack
On 1 June 1976, Assad dispatched an additional 12,000 troops and 300 tanks to forestall a PLO-leftist victory against the Christian led government. Over time, Syria’s commitment escalated to 25,000 troops and 800 tanks (Clodfelter 2002, 657). By October 1976, Syria and its Maronite clients had caused significant damage to leftists and Palestinian groups.

Syria did not completely eliminate the resistance. Peace conferences held by the Arab League in Riyadh and Cairo in October 1976 secured a temporary halt in fighting among Lebanese factions and with Syria. Importantly, the conferences created an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), which provided the fig leaf of multilateral legitimacy and funding for Syrian forces already in Lebanon (Fisk 1990, 187).

Resistance

Syria faced initial opposition from members of Lebanon’s Palestinian and Sunni communities. As Syria settled into a more permanent role in Lebanon under the aegis of the ADF, relations with the Maronite community began to collapse. Hostilities between Syrian occupation forces and Maronite factions broke out in February and again in July 1978 in East Beirut. On 27 September 1978, Syria escalated the conflict by shelling Christian East Beirut. When the clashes ended on 7 October 1978, 200 Syrian soldiers were dead and several hundred wounded (Clodfelter 2002, 648). 1978 marked the clear break in the alliance between Maronite Lebanon and Syria. Further hostilities between Maronite militias and Syrian troops erupted in April 1981 in East Beirut and Zahle.

The mandate of the ADF was renewed several times until 26 September 1982, when President Amine Gemayel announced he would not be asking for a renewed mandate (Cassese 1986, 156). In 1986, the Lebanese government formally requested an end to the Syrian presence in Lebanon (Von Glahn 1992, 688). However, the Syrian occupation of Lebanon is a textbook case of how invited intervention can turn into imposed occupation. Syrian forces generally concentrated in the east and north of the country, particularly during the 1978 and 1982 Israeli invasions of Southern Lebanon. As Israel retreated to South Lebanon, Syria reestablished itself westward, entering West Beirut with 7,000 troops and 60 tanks on February 1987. There it encountered minor resistance.

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3It could be argued that Palestinians could not constitute resistance groups, properly understood, since they themselves were outsiders in Lebanon.
from Hezbollah as it attempted to seize control of the group’s headquarters (O’Ballance 1998, 174). Gradually, Lebanon became dominated by Syria, with the threat of force and the fear of renewed civil war deterring political leaders from challenging Syria intrusions in Lebanese politics.

The last major armed resistance campaign against Syria occurred in 1989, as Lebanon’s civil war was reaching its own bloody crescendo. In 1988, the term of President Amine Gemayel expired. Unable to convene a quorum in the chamber of deputies, Gemayel appointed Michel Aoun, commander of the Lebanese army as interim leader of Lebanon. Salim al-Hoss, the Sunni Prime Minister countered that if a quorum could not be reached to constitutionally appoint a new president, he should be the interim executive (Winslow 1996, 258). Faced with gridlock, Lebanon ended up with two governments, both based in Beirut and neither fully controlling much of Lebanon. With the assistance of Iraq, Aoun embarked on a “war of consolidation” to bring Lebanon under his control (Mackey 2008, 262). Faced with a hostile Maronite Prime Minister allied with Iraq, Syria sided with the government of Salim al-Hoss. In March 1989, the Syrian army and its local allies launched an attack on Aoun’s forces and shelled East Beirut (Winslow 1996, 259). Finally, on 13 October 1990, Syria launched a major operation defeating Aoun’s forces and sending him into exile (Clodfelter 2002).

The removal of Aoun marked the beginning of the end of the civil war. Slowly with the support of the Syrian army the Lebanese army gained control of a greater part of the country. All militias, with the notable exception of Hezbollah, agreed to disarm. Despite the end of the civil war, Syria remained in Lebanon with 30,000 troops. The visibility of Syrian troops in everyday life, however, was greatly diminished. Much of the management of checkpoints and traffic was being handed over the reconstituted Lebanese army (Winslow 1996, 281). In 1991, Lebanon and Syria signed a Treaty of “Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination,” which legitimized Syria’s military presence in Lebanon. It stipulated that Lebanon would not be made a threat to Syria’s security and that Syria was responsible for protecting Lebanon from external threats, essentially formalizing Lebanon’s status as a protectorate of Syria (Fisk 1990, 223).

Syria’s presence began to be challenged, albeit peacefully, in the late 1990s. In 1998, Syria rigged presidential elections in favor of Emile Lahoud. Syria also increased its intrusion into the affairs of Lebanon, such as harsh repressions of student demonstrations and censoring of critical Lebanese media (International Crisis Group 2010, 5). On 9 September 2004, the UN Security
Council passed resolution 1559, calling for noninterference of all parties in Lebanese affairs and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon (Mackey 2008, 208). On 14 February 2005, popular former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was killed by a massive car bomb. Although the involvement of Syria was not confirmed, Hariri had only recently resigned from his positions as Prime Minister as a protest against Syrian support for President Lahoud. Hariri’s assassination provoked strong reactions from all segments of Lebanon, in what came to be known as the “Cedar Revolution.” On 28 February, protests ousted Syria’s handpicked Prime Minister, Omar Karami (Mackey 2008, 209-210). On 14 March 2005, a million Lebanese participated in an anti-Syrian Lebanese independence demonstration (Blanford 2006, 161). Faced with the largest protests in Lebanese history, Syria removed all its troops from Lebanon on 26 April 2005.

8.2.3 Israeli Occupation (1978, 1982-2000)

Operation Litani

Israel viewed the establishment of the PLO during the 1970s on its northern border with even greater alarm than Syria. As early as 1976, Israel started arming and training Christian militias to attack Palestinians in South Lebanon (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984; Winslow 1996, 204, 210). This proxy warfare proved insufficient to prevent Palestinian attacks on Israel. On 11 March 1978, Fatah gunmen hijacked Israeli buses in Tel Aviv, resulting in the death of 35 Israelis. On 15 March 1978, Israel retaliated by attacking PLO positions in South Lebanon. The invasion was known as Operation Litani, referring to the Litani river at the northmost tip of the invasion. Fighting involved mainly Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) allied with Maronite militiamen from the South Lebanon Army (SLA) against the PLO and its leftist allies. On 19 March 1978, the UN Security Council called for Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory and on 21 March Israel accepted a UN-sponsored ceasefire. The war had succeeded in temporarily dislodging the PLO from most of its positions south of the Litani with the UN patrolling a buffer zone on the Lebanon-Israel border (Clodfelter 2002 639-640; Winslow 1996, 213).
Operation Peace for Galilee

Operation Litani only temporarily solved the issue of Palestinian infiltration of South Lebanon. The Lebanese government, crippled and divided as it was by sectarian warfare, could not credibly commit to restraining the PLO. The UN was seen as too weak militarily and politically to make up for Lebanon’s deficiencies. Thus, Palestinian forces simply redeployed to Southern Lebanon after the departure of Israeli forces. Meanwhile, all parties fanned the flames of Lebanon’s civil war by providing weapons to sectarian factions. Arab states continued to supply the PLO through their Druze allies, whereas Israel had negotiated a weapons deal with Bashir Gemayel, the head of the Maronite Phalangist militia (Fisk 1990, 139).

By 1982, Israeli Prime Minister Begin had decided more drastic action was necessary. As Friedman notes: “The idea that Israel might finally be able once and for all to bring an end to the physical and existential challenge of the Palestinians was an intoxicating notion that touched the soul of the vast majority of Israelis.” (1989, 143). The question was not whether to occupy Lebanon, but only how much and when. On 3 June 1982, Palestinian riflemen from the Abu Nidal Organization gravely wounded Israel’s Ambassador Schlomo Argov in London. Although the PLO was not responsible for the attack (Abu Nidal was its rival) Israel used this incident as a pretext for a long-planned invasion of PLO-controlled South Lebanon (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 98).

On 6 June 1982, Israel launched Operation Peace for Galilee with 60,000 troops (Clodfelter 2002, 653; Winslow 1996, 222). The war quickly escalated, as the IDF engaged Syrian forces in the Bekaa valley. Syria sent 35,000 troops to reinforce the 30,000 troops already present in Lebanon. Israeli and Syrian tanks clashed while the largest air battle since the Second World War raged overhead. On 11 June, Syria and Israel agreed to a ceasefire. At this point, Israel controlled Southern Lebanon including the cities of Sidon and Tyre (Clodfelter 2002, 653). Israeli forces reached Beirut on 14 June 1982 and began to lay siege to Muslim West Beirut, demanding the expulsion of the PLO. The siege was lifted on 21 August 1982, when the PLO agreed to evacuate the city under the supervision of a Multinational Force.

Israel’s occupation of Lebanon was set back on 15 September 1982, when newly elected president Bashir Gemayel was killed in an explosion at the Phalange party’s headquarters. To prevent full-scale war between leftists and their Palestinian allies and Maronites, Israel occupied West
Beirut. The incursion proved to be disastrous. Phalangists, operating under the watch of Israeli forces, entered the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila in southern Beirut, and massacred between 700 and 2,000 Palestinians (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 282). Although it had entered Lebanon seeking to counter the PLO, Israel was quickly being drawn into the broader Lebanese civil war.

Israel faced a classic occupier’s dilemma (Edelstein 2008a). Staying in Lebanon would only aggravate resistance, adding to the human, financial, and political costs of the war. Exiting Lebanon would jeopardize hard-earned gains. To extricate itself from this predicament, Israel attempted to normalize relations with the newly elected government of Amine Gemayel (the late Bashir’s brother). On 17 May 1983, Israel and the government of Amine Gemayel signed a peace treaty. However, the treaty was extremely controversial, both within Lebanon and throughout the Arab world. Massive domestic and Syrian pressure forced the Lebanese government to abrogate the treaty in March 1984 (Dassa Kaye 2002, 564).

Security Zone

Faced with these setbacks, Israel began pulling back from Lebanon. In August 1983, Israel withdrew from the Shouf surrounding Beirut south the Awali river. Following the formation of a new government of national unity in January 1985, Israel announced a further withdrawal to Southern Lebanon (Mowles 1986, 1361). By 7 June 1985, Israel had completely withdrawn from Lebanon except for an 850-square kilometer stretch of land known as the security zone alongside the Israeli border (Byman 2011, 219). Israel considered this security zone, representing some 10 percent of Lebanon’s territory, as an essential buffer protecting Israel from direct attacks. Instead, the security zone became a magnet for attacks by Lebanese militias, predominantly Hezbollah (Norton 2007, 41).

The security zone prevented ground infiltration of Northern Israel but failed to prevent mortar and rocket attacks from Hezbollah and Palestinian groups (Luft 2000). In response, Israel launched Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996. As Israeli casualties in Lebanon mounted—eventually surpassing those of the Six Day War—domestic support in Israel for the occupation dried up. By 1999, a majority of Israelis saw the presence of the IDF

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4 Israeli intelligence estimated between 700 and 800 casualties, whereas the Palestinian Red Crescent put the death toll at over 2,000.
in South Lebanon as a major liability (Dassa Kaye 2002). Finally, on 24 May 2000 Israel completed a unilateral withdrawal of South Lebanon, fulfilling a campaign pledge made by Prime Minister Barak (Norton 2007, 115).

**Resistance**

Israel entered Lebanon with simple—if unrealistic—objectives: drive out the PLO, neutralize Syria, prop up a friendly regime led by Bashir Gemayel, and normalize relations through a peace treaty (Friedman 1989, 1). Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon predicted the whole operation would last six weeks (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 46). Such simple objectives soon faced stiff resistance from Palestinian and Shia militants.

During the first stages of the 1982 invasion, Israel faced the bulk of resistance from the some 6,000 Palestinian militants in the mountains, orchards, and refugee camps in South Lebanon, Tyre, Sidon, and West Beirut (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 121, 134; Rabinovitch 1984, 135). During its siege of Beirut in 1982 and 1983, Israel faced continued ambushes, snipers, and roadside bombs set up by Palestinian militants and the Shia group Amal. By the time the PLO evacuated Beirut, Israel lost some 400 troops in combat with Palestinians, Amal, and the Syrian army.

The evacuation of the PLO and the retreat of Syria did not end the conflict. Soon Israel faced stiff resistance from Shia groups in South Lebanon. On 11 November 1982, a suicide bomber blew up the IDF’s headquarters in Tyre, killing 75 Israelis. The attack was claimed by Islamic Jihad, a front for Hezbollah. On 4 November 1983, a Hezbollah operative detonated another massive car bomb in Tyre, killing 28 Israelis (Byman 2011, 209-210). During the course of Israel’s occupation of Lebanon, Hezbollah would pioneer the use of suicide attacks. Between 1982 and 2000, there were 35 suicide attacks aimed at the IDF causing 709 Israeli and Lebanese deaths (CPOST 2011).

Following Israel’s withdrawal to the security zone in June 1985, the IDF faced relentless ambushes, rocket attacks, and roadside bombs from Hezbollah (Blanford 2011a). By the end of April 1983, Israel had lost 476 in Lebanon and by September 1983 it was 516 (Clodfelter 2002, 654). Following the Taif accords in 1989, and the disbanding of most sectarian militias, resistance against Israel was mainly conducted by Hezbollah and other smaller Shia and Palestinian groups. Hezbollah did not limit its attacks to Lebanon. It struck the Israeli embassy and a Jewish cultural center
in Buenos Aires, a synagogue in Istanbul, and Israeli officials in Ankara (Byman 2011, 222-223). It also engaged in hostage taking to coerce Israel and Western countries to cease their support of Israel and the Maronite regime in Lebanon. By the time Israel finally withdrew from Lebanon, the IDF sustained some 901 fatalities (Clodfelter 2002, 654).

8.2.4 MNF Occupation (1982-1984)

Crisis Deployment

In 1982, as Israel besieged Beirut, diplomatic efforts were undertaken by US special envoy Philip Habib to defuse the confrontation between Israel, Syria, and the PLO. Eventually, Habib negotiated a ceasefire and the evacuation of Syrian and PLO troops from Beirut, overseen by a multinational peacekeeping force (MNF). The MNF’s one-month mandate was to assist the Lebanese army in the safe evacuation of the PLO and to help restore the Lebanese government’s control over Beirut (Kelly 1996, 192). The MNF deployed between 20 and 25 August 1982 with some 2,300 troops from France, Italy, and the US (Colleleo 1988; Cimbala and Forster 2010, 36). After succeeding in its initial objective of overseeing the departure of the PLO on 30 August, the MNF withdrew in 12 September 1982.

Second Deployment and Resistance

The deployment of the MNF helped to address the Israeli-Palestinian dimension of the Lebanese conflict, but failed to resolve underlying sectarian grievances. Less than a week after the departure of the MNF, president-elect Bashir Gemayel was assassinated. The subsequent Phalangist massacres of Sabra and Shatila and Israeli deployment to West Beirut led Bashir Gemayel’s brother, Amine, to call on the MNF to defuse the crisis. The MNF (known as MNF-II) returned to Beirut on 29 September 1982 as a symbol of support for the government. Like its predecessor, MNF-II served as a buffer between the IDF and the Lebanese population and was tasked with assisting the central government in reestablishing control of Beirut. The MNF-II consisted of 4,800 American, Italian, French, and UK troops (Collelo 1988).

Welcomed at first, the MNF was surprised by the amount of resistance it soon faced. During its first deployment to Beirut, the MNF felt so safe that Italian and French soldiers could be found
dining at local restaurants (Fisk 1990, 444-447). The second deployment would prove to be more controversial because the MNF was now seen as supporting the Maronite government of Lebanon at the same time as this government was battling Druze and Shia militias with strong support from Syria. In March 1983, French, Italian, and American contingents were hit by grenade attacks. On 18 April 1983, a suicide car bomber struck the US Embassy in Beirut, killing 63. The attack was claimed by the Hezbollah front, Islamic Jihad. In August, US forces stationed near the Beirut International Airport came under frequent attacks by Shia and Druze militants. Responding to these attacks, President Reagan approved a change of the MNF rules of engagement to allow for greater use of force in support of the Lebanese army (Kelly 1996, 99). Thus, when Druze forces attacked US positions on 8-9 September, the 6th fleet shelled Druze position near the town of Souk al Gharb, five miles south of Beirut (Winslow 1995, 234). On 13 October 1983, suicide bombers from Islamic Jihad struck the US and French barracks, killing 241 US marines and 58 French soldiers. On 14 December 1983, French soldiers were again targeted by a truck bomb. By early 1984, the MNF was sinking into Lebanon’s civil war. On 7 February 1984, President Reagan ordered the withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon. In total, the US, France, and Italy suffered 265, 89, and 2 fatalities respectively (Clodfelter 2002, 654).

8.2.5 UN Occupation (2006-2010)

UNIFIL

Following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in the 1978 Litani Operation, the UN Security Council established the 2,000-person United National Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm the withdraw of Israeli forces. Because this first UNIFIL deployment served primarily as a buffer between Lebanon and Israel, it is not coded as a formal occupation in this study. UNIFIL largely failed to fulfill its mandate during the 1980s and 1990s, and remained in Lebanon in an observer role following Israel’s formal withdrawal in 2000.

In July 2006, hostilities between Israel and Lebanon flared up again when Hezbollah launched rockets at IDF positions in Northern Israel, killed three Israeli soldiers, and took two hostages within Israeli territory. Israel retaliated by launching massive airstrikes on Hezbollah positions
and Lebanese infrastructure, imposing a maritime blockade, and invading Southern Lebanon.\(^5\)

On 11 August, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1701 calling for a cessation of hostilities. As a consequence of resolution 1701, the mandate of UNIFIL expanded considerably. The number of UN troops increased from 2,000 to 15,000. These troops were to accompany and support the Lebanese army and help ensure the area of South Lebanon be free of armed personnel, assets, and weapons. This second UNIFIL deployment is coded as an occupation in Southern Lebanon.

Resistance

UNIFIL faced far less resistance than other occupying forces in Lebanon. In some instances it was attacked by those who opposed the UN’s presence in Southern Lebanon, while in others it was targeted to send a signal to the international community. On 23 June 2007, six Spanish peacekeepers were killed when their armored personnel carrier was struck by a car bomb. Although many suspected Hezbollah was responsible for the attack, there was also evidence the attack was orchestrated by a local affiliate of al Qaeda in response to Spain’s participation in the Iraq War (Chassay 2007). On 13 July 2007, a roadside bomb was detonated beside Tanzanian military police north of Tyre. On 8 January 2008, an Irish UNIFIL jeep was struck by a roadside bomb (Blanford 2011a, AFP 2007). In sum, UNIFIL suffered relatively limited resistance since 2006.

8.3 Theoretical Explanations

The conflict in Lebanon is remarkably complex, involving thousands of fighters and hundreds of groups. How does one understand resistance to simultaneous occupations in the context of intra-communal conflict? As this section will demonstrate, political dislocation and trust theories

\(^5\)The 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon does not count as an occupation by the definition of this study because the ground campaign lasted less than one month. Israeli forces only entered Lebanon on 17 July 2006 and the ceasefire came into effect on 14 August 2006. The conflict is also rather unusual because it directly involved non-state resistance rather than an interstate war followed by non-state resistance. Yet, even for the short duration of the conflict, it corresponds to patterns identified by political dislocation theory. The vast majority of resistance to the Israeli ground invasion was carried out by Hezbollah, as opposed to the state or the other sectarian groups of Lebanon. In fact, several Lebanese politicians were critical of Hezbollah for provoking Israel. Resistance, and therefore Lebanese combat fatalities, was borne primarily by Hezbollah. An estimated 500 fatalities were Hezbollah against some 43 Lebanese Armed Forces and Police fatalities (Bishop 2006, 12; AFP 2006). This is unsurprising since the IDF was targeting Hezbollah specifically, Hezbollah was the only major militia left in Lebanon after the civil war and thus already armed and mobilized, and the Lebanese Armed Forces reckoned they stood little chance of success in holding back an Israeli invasion and largely avoided direct clashes with the IDF (for an excellent military analysis of the conflict, see Biddle and Friedman 2008).
provide valuable lenses to understand the conflict.

8.3.1 Political Dislocation

Political dislocation theory posits that resistance is a function of the disruption of the domestic balance of political power in occupied societies. In Lebanon, occupiers caused political dislocation by aligning with various domestic factions. Indeed, occupiers such as Israel and Syria hoped to secure their long-term political interests by strengthening local allies. In the context of Lebanon’s sectarian tensions, such political dislocation was extremely destabilizing. The MNF, for its part, appeared to stumble into political dislocation by supporting what it saw as the legitimate Maronite government, only to find its position challenged by Shia, Druze, and Palestinian resistance. Particularly telling in all cases were the varying responses to foreign occupation by different groups.

Syria

Syria occupied most of Lebanon from 1976 until 2005 and faced significant resistance. Variation in the timing and intensity of resistance provides important insight into its causes. Syria’s occupation faced stiff resistance from Palestinian, Sunni, and Druze militants, the targets of Syria’s initial intervention. Kamal Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze PSP, condemned Syria’s “blatant military invasion” (O’Ballance 1998, 50). Conversely, the Maronite community welcomed Syria’s initial intervention. Upon arriving in the Christian suburb of Hazmiyeh, Maronites threw rice and roses at incoming tank crews (Fisk 1990, 87).

Despite their misgivings about Syrian rule, Maronite leaders calculated that foreign occupation was preferable to being defeated by leftist forces. After all, Syria was fighting and disarming its enemies. Within a week of the initial Syrian intervention, Christian militias issued a statement supporting the invasion (Winslow 1996, 202). Maronite leader Pierre Gemayel initially opposed Syrian intervention promising to “fight to the last man.” Eventually he reconsidered his stance stating: “it would be pigheaded to oppose the entry of foreign forces that can save the homeland from disintegration” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 19). Following Syria’s assassination of Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, the Phalangist Bashir Gemayel went out of his way to praise President Assad (Fisk 1990, 119).
However, Syrian and Maronite political objectives were not perfectly aligned. Syria’s objective was not to prop up the Maronite regime but rather to control Lebanon by pitting factions against each other. The Maronites, for their part, sought to use Syria to weaken the PLO, expand their territorial control, and (for some) to create an independent Maronite state. Such frictions explain eventual Maronite resistance to Syrian occupation. Following peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel, Syria saw an opportunity to increase its influence in the Arab world by realigning with the PLO rather than with Lebanon’s Maronite community. Moreover, Syria resented the Maronites collaboration with Israel during Operation Litani (Rabinovich and Zamir 1979, 605). When Phalangist and Tiger forces sought to take advantage of the Syrian invasion to expand areas under their control, Syria kept them in check (Rabil 2003, 54). Syrian forces were bombed in Beirut by Christian forces following rumors that they would take control of Maronite neighborhoods (O’Ballance 1998, 72; Fisk 1990, 140). When Syria responded by setting up a series of checkpoints, a Christian soldier from a nearby barrack lowered his anti-aircraft gun and blasted a Syrian checkpoint, killing 15 soldiers (Winslow 1996, 212). Clashes spiraled once Syria sought to disarm Maronite militias. By the end of February 1978, former Lebanese President and influential Maronite power broker Camille Chamoun was denouncing the Syrian forces as an “army of occupation” and asking: “We want to know if Lebanon is a sovereign country or a whorehouse” (O’Ballance 1998, 73; Fisk 1990, 140). Thus, Maronites cooperated with Syria as long as it acted on their behalf but turned against it as soon as Assad challenged Christian supremacy in Lebanon (Winslow 1996, 206).

In some circumstances, political dislocation occurred within sectarian groups themselves. For example, in 1981 Syria promoted a “Program of National Reconciliation” to install Suleiman Franjieh—a powerful and more pro-Syrian Maronite—as president. Rather than promoting reconciliation, this program triggered clashes between Syrian forces and Phalangists from Franjieh’s Maronite rival Bashir Gemayel (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 32).

The effects of political dislocation can also be seen in Michel Aoun’s resistance against Syria in 1989. Starting in 1988, Aoun sought to consolidate his control over Lebanon, not to confront Syrian occupation. Only once Syria sided with the rival government of Salim al-Hoss did Aoun publically call for a “war of liberation.” al-Hoss, in contrast, did not believe resistance to occupation was a priority. As he argued: “We need political reform. After this we can talk about sovereignty.”
Aoun and al-Hoss’s different views on occupation stemmed from the differential impact of Syria on the bargaining power of each. Syrian occupation increased al-Hoss’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the Maronite government and weakened Aoun’s. Consequently, Aoun wanted the Syrians out before negotiating, whereas al-Hoss wanted the reverse (Fisk 1990, 634). Tellingly, Sunni, Shia, and Druze communities—those who would most benefit from the dilution of Maronite power in Lebanon—did not heed to Aoun’s call for liberation. For Jumblatt, national liberation concerns were secondary to domestic politics: “It is impossible to reach a common denominator with Aoun: he wants to skip the internal conflict” (Harris 1997, 245).

Following the end of Lebanon’s civil war, different views persisted with regards to Syria’s occupation. Pax Syriana prevailed domestically and Lebanon and Syria signed a treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination in 1991. Certain newspapers stated that Syria provided stability and continuity in Lebanon whereas others emphasized the need for more Lebanese independence (Sakr 2005, 90).

Political dislocation can be positive or negative. Indeed, certain members of the Shia community held very favorable views of Syrian occupation. While Hezbollah, a self-proclaimed resistance movement, confronted Israeli occupation in the South, it praised Syria’s long-standing presence in Lebanon. According to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah: “We emphasize the need to maintain the distinguished relations between Lebanon and Syria, for they are a common political, security, and economic needs dictated by the interests of the two countries and the two peoples, the needs of political geography, and the requirements of Lebanon’s stability and the confrontation of common challenges” (Addis and Blanchard 2011, 12). When massive anti-Syrian demonstrations rocked Lebanon in 2005, Hezbollah organized a million-man counter-demonstration in support of Syria (Norton 2007, 7; Mackey 2008, 209-210). Even following the withdrawal of Syria, Hezbollah stated: “We want to keep our special relationship with Syria” (Blanford 2005). Hezbollah had good reason to support Syrian occupation. Syria was an important patron as well as a conduit for Iranian weapons. Similarly, the Druze chose to work with Syria in Lebanon if it would keep their Maronite rivals in check. According to Jumblatt: “You have to understand that as a leader of a minority group, I had to make a deal with the devil to counter Maronite ambitions” (interview, 24

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6Hezbollah not only supported Syria but some of its members have been indicted for carrying out the attack itself (Chulov 2011).
May 2012).

Israel

Political dislocation provides a powerful explanation for resistance to Israeli occupation. Unlike Syria, which acted as an external balancer among Lebanon’s factions, Israel sought to promote Maronites, and Bashir Gemayel more specifically, as the leader of Lebanon.

Israel’s occupation of Lebanon was such a quagmire that it is often forgotten that many Maronite and Shia groups actually welcomed the initial invasion. Indeed, the 1978 and 1982 invasions were aimed at dislodging the PLO from Lebanon. Working in Israel’s favor was Lebanon’s simmering frustration towards the Palestinian presence. The PLO had ruled parts of Southern Lebanon, complete with military police and “revolutionary courts.” Palestinian gunmen manned roadblocks, collected customs, extorted villagers, and expropriated buildings. Among the lower ranks, rape and robbery were common (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 80). Some Shias went so far as to form a self-defense militia known as the National Front for the Safeguard of the South (O’Ballance 1998, 72). Shias also saw Palestinians as a major liability since Israeli strikes aimed at Palestinians often ended up hitting Shia homes. As Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the first leader of Hezbollah, stated:

“There was political, material, and spiritual weariness; and chaos dominated the south as a result of the disorderly Palestinian political expansion… The situation became suffocating: a breathing space, any breathing space, was needed irrespective of its nature” (Fadlallah 1987, 4).

Similarly, Musa al-Sadr, the founder of Amal said of the PLO: “It is not a revolution… it is a military machine that terrorizes the Arab world” (Byman 2011, 61).

The Shia community generally supported the objective of removing the PLO from Lebanon and therefore did not resist the initial Israeli occupation. Mahmoud Ghadar, the military commander of the Shia group Amal, ordered his men not to resist the entry of Israeli army and even to surrender weapons if necessary (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 134). Just as the Maronites had originally greeted the Syrians in 1976, Shia villagers showered incoming Israeli troops with rice and flowers (Mowles 1986, 1352). More than the Shias, Maronites tended to welcome Israeli intervention. The
Maronite community had closer links to Israel than any other Arab group in the region. As far back as the 1919 Paris peace conference, Zionists had supported the objective of an independent Maronite homeland (Weinberger 1986, 278). Both Israel and Lebanon’s Maronites had come to resent the Palestinian community. Founder of the Phalangist party Pierre Gemayel saw Palestinians as the “filthiest people” and its alliance with leftists a threat to Maronite rule (Byman 2011, 61).

The convergence of interests led to military support. At the beginning of the civil war Israel provided Maronite militias with weapons and ammunition (Badran 2009, 49). Israeli Prime Minister Begin considered the Maronites to be full partners in the struggle against the PLO. Israel went so far as to plan its 1982 invasion in coordination with certain Maronite leaders and planned for the IDF to link up with Phalangists in East Beirut (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 61). Months before the invasion, Chamoun pressed Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon: “Will you really come to Beirut as you have said, or is this just really talk?” Sharon replied: “We’ll get there! Don’t you worry” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 50).

Maronites had strong pragmatic reasons not to resist Israeli occupation. When Israeli troops arrived in East Beirut in June 1982 “local Christian families ran into the street, some of them crying with happiness, their faces wreathed in smiles… There was no apprehension, rather a sense of relief, almost merriment, combined with the sort of suspense that accompanies a meeting with a potential lover” (Fisk 1990, 234). A Christian villager in South Lebanon stated: “The Israelis came here to save us. They saved us all. Now we no longer live in fear of the terrorists” (Fisk 1990, 545). When the IDF sought to withdraw prior to the evacuation of the PLO, Bashir Gemayel countered: “Under no circumstances you should do it [withdraw]… The terrorists will never leave the city” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 209).

Militants from the Druze community took a more passive approach. Consistent with political dislocation theory, in the initial stages of the Israeli occupation, they thought it better to wait than fight. Although the PLO had been an ally of the Druze, the PSP was less concerned about Israeli-Palestinian conflicts than preserving their own power in Lebanon. Therefore, Jumblatt ordered his men to take off their uniforms, hide their weapons, and not to fire on the IDF. Meanwhile, he spoke to Arafat and counseled him that it would be best if he left Beirut (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 134, 208).

The positive or neutral attitude of certain Lebanese communities reflected the limited objec-
tives of Israel’s initial campaign aimed at dislodging the PLO. However, Israel’s 1982 occupation went beyond those limited objectives. For the first time, it conquered an Arab capital and installed a new regime. Common to many occupiers seeking to overcome credible commitment problems, Israel planned to anchor its gains by strengthening a local ally, in this case Bashir Gemayel. Israeli Defense Minister Sharon did not believe the PLO could be permanently routed from Lebanon without establishing a “new political order” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 43).

Israel invested massively in Bashir Gemayel and his Phalangist militia. It armed and clothed its soldiers (Fisk 1990, 191). Over the years, Israel pumped some $150 million to support the Maronite community (Byman 2011, 62). During the siege of Beirut, Sharon treated Maronite and non-Maronite groups differently: “The northern part of Beirut [Christian Maronite neighborhoods] should be pampered with electricity, water, food, every possible comfort... but the southern part [Palestinian camps adjacent to Shia neighborhoods] must be destroyed, razed to the ground” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 211). Most importantly, Israel embarked on a campaign to get Bashir Gemayel elected president. Gemayel did not expect to win the election against other Maronite candidates such as Chamoun, Frangieh, or Sarkis without direct Israeli intervention. Worse still, the Muslim faction of parliament specifically opposed the election of Gemayel. So long as both the Muslim bloc and Gemayel’s rivals boycotted parliament, he could not be elected. Israel therefore pressured all those delegates it could to form a vote for Bashir (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 46, 230).

Israel’s strong support of the Maronites, and Bashir Gemayel specifically, was tremendously provocative in the context of Lebanon’s civil war. Israel appeared to have overestimated the military and demographic strength of the Maronites, and underestimated the deep political grievances of Lebanon’s under-represented sectarian groups that were driving the civil war. As Israel laid siege to Beirut, Gemayel met Walid Jumblatt who warned him: “I don’t deny that you’re likely to emerge the big winner from Israel’s intervention... but this is not the time to exploit the situation for political gain” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 200). Meanwhile Jumblatt told the Israelis: ”You’re turning the majority of Lebanon against you, which is hardly politic if you hope to obtain a peace treaty. You entered Lebanon to solve the Palestinian problem and succeeded at it... But now you are acting against your interests!” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 243). Similarly, the leader of Shia Amal complained that Maronites “want the foreign and internal occupation to stay. They want to use Israel as a backup for them” (Wright 1984).
Rather than using Israel’s support to stabilize Lebanon and try to address the grievances of the other communities, Gemayel sought to maximize his political and military power (Friedman 1989, 176). He saw no reason to make concessions that would give Muslims a larger role in the government or to relinquish the power of the Phalanges (Fisk 1990, 471). Thus, under Israel’s watch, the kidnapping of Sunnis continued unabated and Shias were offered a pittance for reconstruction in South Beirut. During the 1982-1983 “Mountain War,” the IDF allowed Phalangists to enter the Druze heartland of the Shouf, where they attacked local villagers. In South Lebanon, Israel handed over territory to the SLA and allowed it to extend its control further north to the Awali river (Mowles 1986, 1351-1354). Most tragically, Phalangists massacred thousands of Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila.

Israel’s support for the Maronites was especially ill-timed given the political and demographic ascendancy of the Shia community. Before the civil war and before the occupation, Lebanon’s Shia community had been mobilizing for greater power and representation. Israel’s occupation ended up being the spark that lit the flame. War in South Lebanon had led Shias to migrate to the slums of South Beirut, where many were radicalized (Ajami 1986; Rabil 2003, 56). The Israeli invasion had replaced the tyranny of the PLO with that of the Maronites. Shia villagers in the south resented the extortion of the Israeli-appointed SLA (Fisk 1990, 546). When Israel was occupying Beirut, the Higher Shia Council met to condemn the “establishment of local administrations in South Lebanon under various names and pretexts” (Fisk 1990, 541). Similarly Hezbollah’s 1985 political manifesto clearly states its opposition to Maronite hegemony: “The politics followed by the chiefs of political Maronism through the ‘Lebanese Front’ and the ‘Lebanese Forces’ cannot guarantee peace and tranquility for the Christians of Lebanon, whereas it is predicated upon ‘asabiyya (narrow-minded particularism), on confessional privileges and on the alliance with colonialism” (Norton 1987, 167-187). By allying with the Maronites and supporting the SLA, Israel was standing in the way of greater Shia political ambitions. Indeed, it is only in the second phase of Israel’s occupation of Lebanon, in which it openly supported Bashir Gemayel, did Hezbollah emerge as a powerful force of resistance.
MNF

In a meeting with US Secretary of State George Shultz in the spring of 1983, Yitzhak Rabin warned: “Lebanon is a quagmire... Anyone there will get drawn deeper and deeper into the engulfing morass” (Shultz 1993, 233). Indeed, the fate of the multinational peacekeeping mission in Lebanon is in many ways a microcosm of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. As with the Israeli occupation, the MNF occupation of Lebanon had two stages. In the first stage, MNF-I oversaw the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut. The MNF faced no significant resistance during this stage. Aside from a US marine killed by a landmine on 30 September, MNF-I was generally welcomed by the long-suffering population of Beirut. In line with political dislocation theory, many groups in Lebanon had come to resent the presence of the PLO and welcomed international efforts at removing them.

However, the MNF returned to Beirut 18 days later to help cope with the crisis triggered by Bashir Gemayel’s assassination. Unlike MNF-I, which addressed the Israeli-Palestinian dimension of the Lebanon conflict, MNF-II propped up the government of Amine Gemayel. By responding to the invitation of the Gemayel government to intervene, the Reagan administration thought it was supporting the right of a sovereign government to control its territory. To the Druze and Shia faction of the Lebanese civil war, who contested the very legitimacy of this government, the MNF was simply perpetuating Christian domination of Lebanon (Fisk 1990, 450; Friedman 1989, 200). For example, the MNF worked with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to collect weapons from Muslims in West Beirut but did not touch the Phalangists who were responsible for Sabra and Shatila (Fisk 1990, 462). MNF and Maronite troops had co-located command posts and conducted joint patrols (Pelcovits 1991, 51). US soldiers provided khaki uniforms to Maronite militias they were training, making the two almost indistinguishable at checkpoints (Friedman 1989, 194). Rather than an impartial peacekeeping force, the Lebanese newspaper Al Safir began to refer to the MNF as the “international militia” (Norton 1991, 226). As such, by backing Gemayel the MNF became entangled in the Lebanese civil war.

The effect of political dislocation becomes clearer when comparing the reaction of different sectarian groups in Lebanon to the presence of the MNF. Hezbollah warned: “We tell the United States, don’t expect that the people of this region will welcome you with roses and jasmine. The people of this region will welcome you with rifles, blood, and martyrdom operations” (Norton
2007, 118). Jumblatt, for his part, originally welcomed the MNF but told *Al Shiraa* at the end of January 1984 that the MNF should withdraw unconditionally, since it had come to represent support for a “hated system” (Pelcovits 1991, 67). Maronite leaders held a more positive view of the MNF. Reagan noted: “During a visit to Washington, [Amine Gemayel] urged me to keep marines in Lebanon while efforts continued to reach a settlement” (1990, 439).

Once political antagonisms were set, an endogenous conflict dynamic emerged. Attacks on the MNF were meant to remove a powerful supporter of the Maronite regime. However, the US perceived these attacks as endangering their credibility, pushing them to retaliate, therefore deepening their involvement in the conflict and their perceived support for the Maronites. President Reagan wrote in his diary: “Our problem is do we expand our mission to aid the Lebanese army with artillery and air support? This could be seen as putting us in the war” (1990, 446). For instance, following attacks on American positions near the Beirut Airport in May 1983, US battleships shelled Druze positions in the Shouf Mountains (Kelly 1996, 99). As the veteran Lebanon reporter Robert Fisk noted: “The very second that the first US navy shell landed among the Druze at Souq al-Gharb, the Americans would have aligned themselves with the Phalange in open war against the Muslims of Lebanon” (1990, 505). When ordered to fire on Druze positions, US MNF commander Col. Geraghty argued: “Sir, I can’t do that. This will cost us our neutrality. Do you realize if you do that, we’ll get slaughtered down here?” (Wright 1985, 78).

Political dislocation theory therefore explains why the MNF encountered resistance during the second stage of the mission, but not the first, and why it encountered resistance exclusively from Shia and Druze groups.

**UNIFIL**

Unlike the MNF, UNIFIL did not face significant resistance in Lebanon. UNIFIL was initially deployed in 1978, following Operation *Litani* in 1978 to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli forces and to serve as a buffer between Israel and Lebanon. The 2,000-person was military weak and politically constrained. Its principal task was to observe and record violations of the ceasefire agreement. From the standpoint of political dislocation, UNIFIL held a major advantage compared to MNF because it was not deployed in Beirut. As such, it was less likely to become embroiled in the
domestic politics and policing highly contested territory (Weinberger 1995, 158).

Hezbollah initially opposed UNIFIL, in part because its existence was a tacit acknowledgement of the legitimacy of Israel. In its 1985 manifesto, Hezbollah stated: “With special vehemence we reject UNIFIL as they were sent by world arrogance to occupy areas evacuated by Israel and serve for the latter as a buffer zone. They should be treated much like the Zionists.” Similarly, some in the PLO opposed the deployment of UNIFIL to areas that had not been occupied by Israel. This posturing did not result in much resistance since UNIFIL accommodated the Palestinian demands (though clashes resulted when the UN sought to disarm Palestinian militias) (Fisk 1990, 136; Göksel 2007, 55). UNIFIL also worked a quid pro quo with Hezbollah. A longtime UNIFIL spokesperson recounted a discussion with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah: “I told him: ‘Look, we don’t have to like each other, but we don’t have to shoot at each other either. We can talk.’ He says ‘Yes. That’s what I want also.’” UNIFIL’s weakness and unwillingness to confront the PLO or Hezbollah in South Lebanon ensured that the political cost of resistance outweighed its military benefits (Göksel 2007, 72).

To Israel and its SLA proxies, UNIFIL was not an enemy of Hezbollah and the PLO, but in fact an unwitting ally. The Israelis saw UNIFIL as less than useless. It did not stop or attempt to stop attacks on Israel. It merely recorded attacks and in Israel’s view provided a human shield for Palestinian and Hezbollah strikes (Byman 2011, 64). Indeed, most of the attacks conducted against UNIFIL were undertaken by Israel or by the SLA. The SLA’s resistance was not based on nationalism, but rather on the assessment that UNIFIL was protecting its enemies the PLO and (later) Hezbollah.

The second stage of the UNIFIL deployment after 2006 was potentially more provocative because it was mandated to extend the control of the Lebanese army. As the new force debarked in South Lebanon, UN Undersecretary for Peacekeeping Operation Jean-Marie Ghehenno said: “The UN of 2006 is not the UN of ten years ago... We have drawn lessons from past experience” (Blanford 2011b, 419). At first, Hezbollah took a wary wait-and-see approach, adopting a lower profile and instructing residents not to interact with the new peacekeepers. In an interview Nasrallah stated: “The task of UNIFIL today is not disarming the resistance. As long as this is not the task, and as long as its main task is backing the Lebanese army —and we approve and support the role played by the Lebanese army— I do not think there will be any problem at all” (Noe 2007, 384).
As it became clearer that the “new” UNIFIL mandate would not challenge its dominant political position in South Lebanon, Hezbollah accepted foreign occupation.

### 8.3.2 Factional Politics

The factional politics corollary of political dislocation theory states that resistance is not only a reaction to foreign occupation but also a way to attain power itself. The political vacuum sometimes created by departing occupiers can allow resistance groups to seize power for themselves. The factional dimension of resistance looms large in the context of Lebanon. Groups were already mobilized and engaged in an armed contest for power because of an ongoing intra-communal civil war.

First, despite strong nationalist rhetoric and pragmatic reasons to pool resources, resistance groups were not integrated. Rather than unifying the nation, resistance exposed its internal fissures. Resistance groups were divided along sectarian lines, usually with several resistance groups per sectarian group. Although some groups did coordinate, there was no major instance of any unified cross-sectarian resistance. For instance the Tigers, Phalangists, and Guardians of the Cedars fought for the Maronite camp, whereas Amal and Hezbollah sought to represent the Shia community. When some factions did band together, it was often against their will. For instance, between 1978 and 1980 Bashir Gemayel launched a brutal unification campaign against fellow Maronite militias of the Tigers and the Marada Brigades. In the process, he eliminated Tony Franjieh and Danny Chamoun, the heirs to rival Maronite political dynasties.

Second, factional politics can be seen in the highly partisan nature of resistance, by which militias were tied to political parties. As Lebanon descended into civil war in the mid 1970s, political parties formed armed wings to protect their interests. Due to preexisting social organization and funding, political parties were particularly able to mobilize resistance to occupation. They also had much to gain politically from resistance. For example, Hezbollah surged in popularity for leading a successful resistance campaign against Israeli forces (Mackey 2008, 181). In 1992, it entered mainstream politics and won 12 seats in Lebanon’s 128-seat parliament. Hezbollah electoral signs declared:

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7 During the initial stages of the sectarian civil war, different militias within the same sectarian groups often failed to unify. For example, the Tigers under Tony Chamoun and the Phalangists under Bashir Gemayel refused to coordinate against leftist forces. Indeed, each militia represented a contender to the leadership of the Maronite community (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 20).
"They resist with their blood. Resist with your vote" (Norton 2007, 152). In 2005, Hezbollah even entered the coalition government of Fouad Siniora. Long after the withdrawal of Israel, Hezbollah maintained an independent "resistance" force in Lebanon, which provided useful leverage in domestic politics.

Hezbollah’s success also pushed Amal to turn against Israel (Winslow 1996, 216). As Fisk notes: "At first unwilling to become involved in the war against the Israelis, Amal was now anxious to establish itself as the principal nationalist movement in southern Lebanon… The guerrilla organisations cooperated, but their desire to assault the retreating Israelis was prompted as much by the need to earn political credentials and hold territory for the future as to prove their patriotism" (1990, 571). Most political parties involved in the civil war and resistance persisted following the end of occupation. In fact, the greatest expansion in Hezbollah’s military power occurred after the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Third, as predicted by the factional politics corollary, Lebanon experienced fratricidal clashes among resistance groups. Such clashes are to be expected in the context of Lebanon’s civil war. Yet what is notable in Lebanon is that clashes persisted among factions that were ostensibly allied against a common foreign occupier. As noted above, Maronite militias fought each other in 1980 and again in 1989 as they sought to expulse Syria. Hezbollah and Amal, both opposed to Israel, fought each other between 1988 and 1989. Similarly, the PSP and Palestinian militias fought Amal between 1985 and 1989. At times, the withdrawal of occupiers increased violence, as rival groups filled the void. For instance, the retreat of the IDF from the Shouf in 1983 precipitated clashes between Maronites and Druze. When Israel withdrew further in 1985, heavy fighting broke out between Christian militias and Amal and the PSP near Sidon (Fisk 1990, 571; Winslow 1996, 251). Thus, rather than causing Lebanese factions to rally around the flag, as predicted by nationalism, foreign interventions highlighted sectarian divisions.

8.3.3 Trust

A fundamental problem faced by occupiers is maintaining trust with the occupied population. Occupiers tend to have coercive superiority without lines of accountability. Therefore, occupiers are unable to credibly commit to leaving the territory or to treating the occupied population be-
nignly. According to trust theory, resistance will emerge when there is a fundamental breakdown in trust between occupiers and occupied. For instance, if individuals in occupied territory run a high risk of being victimized regardless of their behavior, then resistance will be seen as a practical survival strategy. Did the occupiers of Lebanon face resistance because of a breakdown of trust?

The case of Lebanon provides some evidence in support of trust theory. Lebanese elites were suspicious of the true intentions of foreign occupiers. Moreover, while neither Israel nor Syria occupied Lebanon with the objective of victimizing civilians, conventional warfare and counterinsurgency set off endogenous processes of victimization that alienated the Lebanese population.

Syria

Intentions

Consistent with trust theory, Syria struggled to gain the trust of the occupied population in Lebanon. While grateful of Syria’s intervention in the civil war, many Lebanese were wary of Syrian intentions. Syria gave assurances that the occupation was “temporary, legal, and necessary.” Yet Syria had often adopted an ambiguously irredentist policy towards Lebanon. It refused to establish diplomatic relations after Lebanese independence and bandied the notion of a “greater Syria” that included Lebanon (Weinberger 1986, 60). Assad had given a speech in 1976 where he stated: “throughout history, Syria and Lebanon have been one country and one people…our history is one, our future is one, and our destiny is one.” In May 1982, he referred to Lebanon as “Arab land that belongs to us” (Pipes 1992, 119). Ironically, proximity, co-ethnicity, and cultural affinity worsened Syria’s credible commitment problem.

Such statements were cause of concern, particularly for the Maronite community that saw an independent Lebanon as a bulwark against minority status. The Maronites had invited Syrian intervention, but only to forestall defeat at the hand of revisionist forces. As Bashir Gemayel fretted: “History is rife with examples of armies that come to aid their neighbors in distress and stayed as occupiers” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 22). Upon the arrival of Syrian forces in 1976, some Christian residents noticed that the Syrians had come prepared for more than just a few days’ stay. With such suspicions, some Maronite factions were alarmed by Syria’s call to disarm in 1976. Some turned
against Syria fearing that disarmament would be a first step toward eventual Syrian annexation (Clodfelter 2002, 647). The mandate from the Arab League provided some assurances that occupation would be temporary, but Syria’s presence continued well beyond the expiration of the ADF.

Victimization

Victimization played a role in the intensity and scope of resistance to Syrian occupation in Lebanon. Syria did not enter Lebanon with the aim of victimization. Rather, consistent with Kalyvas’ (2006) theory of violence in civil wars, victimization was a function of territorial control. In this regard, Syria’s occupation can be divided into two stages. The first stage, from 1976 until 1989, was marked by indiscriminate violence as Syria sought to quell resistance factions. The second stage, from 1989 until 2005, was marked by brutal but more targeted killings of dissidents as Syria consolidated its control.

In the first stages of its intervention in Lebanon, Syria caused extensive civilian casualties. Such casualties were the result of a heavy-handed military strategy aimed at quelling resistance factions, such as heavy shelling of densely populated areas. For example, Syria and the Lebanese Forces laid siege to the 30,000 person refugee camps of Tel-al-Zaatar killing some 2,000, including many civilians (Clodfelter 2002, 647). Similarly, Syrian forces turned against Maronite factions in 1978, extensively shelling East Beirut and causing at least 700 casualties (Fisk 1990, 144). According to Colleleo: “Syria’s heavy use of artillery, both against Muslim factions in earlier fighting and against Christian factions later, caused widespread criticism that the bombardments were indiscriminately killing civilians and that Syrian troops were pursuing a policy of genocide toward Lebanese Christians” (1988). The behavior of Syrian troops, especially the rising incidence of pillage and rape, arbitrary arrests, and confiscation of property, also alienated otherwise sympathetic Lebanese civilians (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 23). Pierre Gemayel warned of “popular [anti-Syrian] sentiment rising” if Syrian and ADF forces became a “source of threat and fright for the citizens” (Rabinovich 1981, 609).

The end of Lebanon’s civil war in 1989, led to a gradual disarmament of most armed factions with the exception of Syrian-backed Hezbollah. As the militias disarmed, Syrian control of Lebanon tightened. Syrian military intelligence (Mukhabarat) extended its network of informants
and operatives. As territorial control increased, repression became more targeted, albeit still brutal. In the decade following the end of Lebanon’s civil war, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International documented extensive imprisonment, torture, assassination, and forced disappearances conducted by Syrian officials, often in collaboration with the government of Lebanon (Human Rights Watch 1990, 1997b; Amnesty International 1990). According to a lawyer interviewed by Human Rights Watch (1997b): "No one in Lebanon will talk about the reality. Our government is not a government. Syrian intelligence forces are controlling this country. We are moving toward a police state. Here in Lebanon, there are masters and servants. Lebanese government officials are the servants of Syria.”

Overall, resistance to Syrian occupation was greatest in the first stage of the occupation when Syrian victimization was most indiscriminate. As Syria gained greater control of Lebanese territory, especially at the end of the civil war, violence became more targeted and resistance dampened.8

Israel

Intentions

As with Syria, Lebanese elites worried about Israel’s long-term intentions. Such concerns were cultivated by decades of Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the anarchy of the international system. Israeli officials frequently gave assurances regarding the nature and duration of occupation, only to break them soon afterwards. At the onset of the 1982 invasion, Israel proclaimed its purpose was to gain control of a zone only 40 kilometers deep to remove PLO fighters. By the end of the second day of the invasion, however, the IDF had proceeded beyond its self-proclaimed 40-kilometer limit and was on its way to Beirut (Winslow 1996, 222-224). Israel stated its objectives in Lebanon were limited but ended up occupying Beirut and installing a new regime. When the IDF redeployed south in 1985, Defense Minister Rabin stated: “The IDF will deploy in the security zone in South Lebanon, north of the Israeli border for one month” (Brilliant 1985). That month turned into

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8It must be noted that changes in the type of victimization alone cannot account for differences in resistance. By many accounts, militias were simply exhausted after the civil war and Syria had deftly penetrated, divided, and weakened most opposition groups (interview with Lebanese Forces member, 24 May 2012).
15 years. Added to this mistrust was Israel’s decade-long occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights (the latter formally annexed in 1981). Lastly, how could Lebanese trust Israeli intentions when the Israeli public and Prime Minister Begin himself had been misled by Defense Minister Sharon on the scope of the mission? As predicted by trust theory, Israeli promises were cheap talk. Even Lebanese allies such as Bashir Gemayel worried about Israeli intentions: “Perhaps I’ll come out the winner and perhaps not... I still haven’t forgotten our experience with the Syrians you know. Everyone thought their intervention would work in our favor, but in the end fate reversed itself” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 200).

Victimization

Civilian casualties were a major issue during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Although Israel did not embark on a systematic campaign of victimization, many Lebanese saw it as less than careless in its treatment of civilians. During the invasion of Lebanon, Israel extensively bombed the city of Sidon where PLO fighters were based. Similarly on 12 August 1982, on the eve of the agreed withdrawal of the PLO, Israel launched a massive artillery campaign against Beirut (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 225). Both campaigns were seen as largely random by Lebanese civilians (Fisk 1990, 255, 321). In many incidents, cluster bombs and phosphorus shells were employed in civilian areas. There were reports of abuses of prisoners. Attacks on the Ain’ al-Hiweh refugee camp in 1982 left some 40,000 Palestinians homeless (Mowles 1986, 1353). The invasion of Lebanon in 1982 resulted in 9,583 killed among the Lebanese and Palestinian population, with another 16,608 wounded (Clodfelter 2002, 647).9

Civilian victimization was partly caused by an identification problem, which prevented Israel from distinguishing insurgents from civilians. Unlike Syria, the IDF did not share any linguistic or close cultural affinity with Lebanon. In order to overcome the identification problem, Israel would employ local informants. However, as is often the case informants would use information asymmetry to advance their own interests. For instance, informants would accuse innocent Lebanese civilians in order to get friends through lineups (Fisk 1990, 251). In part because militants would

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9Israel claimed only 331 civilians were killed during this phase of the conflict.
mingle with civilians, some victimization was inevitable. For example, during the initial stages of the occupation, the IDF would often round up Shia along with Palestinians suspects. In the later stages of the occupation, Israeli forces would fail to distinguish Amal from Hezbollah supporters. The IDF often blew up the houses of Amal supporters after Hezbollah attacks on Israeli troops (Byman 2011, 216). The identification problem gave the appearance that the application of violence was random, thereby pushing Lebanese into the arms of resistance forces. At the same time the identification problem eroded Israeli morale and discipline, spurring further civilian victimization.

Collateral damage was often accidental, while in other circumstances collective punishment was used as a deliberate strategy to separate civilians from insurgents (B’tselem 2000). In 1993, Defense Minister Rabin told the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the point of Operation Accountability was to “provoke an exodus of inhabitants from Southern Lebanon towards the North in order to put pressure on the Lebanese government” (Jones 1997, 106).

Many of the worst atrocities were undertaken not by Israel but by its local allies. Human Rights Watch (1999) reported on systematic abuses carried out by the SLA, a proxy of Israel, including murder, extortion, and forced displacement. Under the watch of the IDF Phalangists committed massacres in Sabra and Shatila. Prime Minister Begin initially dismissed the massacres as “goyim killing goyim” [Non-Jews killing non-Jews]. However, many Lebanese blamed Israel for enabling such abuses (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 278).

Physical violence was accompanied by economic hardship. In 1985, Israel implemented an “Iron Fist” policy in South Lebanon, imposing dusk till dawn curfews and barring travel by car or motorcycle (Fisher 1985). The IDF arbitrarily imposed bans on the import of certain types of goods such as building materials and medicine. Villages suspected of supporting the resistance were subjected to weeklong blockades (Mowles 1986, 1359-1362). Following suicide attacks against the IDF headquarter in Tyre in 1983, Israel closed the Awali bridge, a critical conduit between Beirut and South Lebanon. According to Clinton Baily, Israel’s liaison officer in the South: “The basis of the Southern economy collapsed. It was this event that finally smashed the last friendly sentiment toward Israel” (Ajami 1986, 202-203).

Above all, victimization encouraged individuals to join the resistance. Hezbollah’s 1985 Manifesto stated: “They invaded our country, destroyed our villages, slit the throats of our children,
violated our sanctuaries and appointed masters over our people who committed the worst mas-
sacres against our *umma.*” Amal threatened to punish Israel itself for civilian abuses in Lebanon:
“If the razing of houses and killing of innocents continue, we are obliged to transfer it… The more
arbitrary practices that Israel takes, the more energetic our action will get” (Wright 1985, 235).
What is notable is this and other quotes is anger at the perceived arbitrary nature of Israeli vi-
olence. In fact, such indiscriminate violence became a rallying cry for resistance groups. Khalil
Jerardi of Amal said:

“The brutality of the Israelis has proved to everyone in southern Lebanon that the Is-
raeli want to humiliate them…so they are more determined to resist the occupation
—both civil resistance and military resistance…The arrests Israelis make are of ordi-
nary people. When this happens, the people become more united” (Fisk 1990, 578).

Resistance groups sought to capitalize on such indiscriminate violence. For example, Haj
Ibrahim, the head of a Palestinian resistance faction in Sidon, prevented civilians from surren-
dering to the IDF by warning that they would be shot: “The Jews are killing everyone…Better to
die in the camp, at home, bearing arms, than on your knees in front of a firing squad!” (Schiff and
Ya’ari 1984, 148). Nasrallah noted that victimization boosted support for Hezbollah: “the fact that
the resistance cared about the people on the Lebanon side of the border has helped them carry
out their operations with a greater degree of precision, and has made the people like them and
feel the need to protect them” (Noe 2007, 201-202). Indeed, Operations Accountability and Grapes
of Wrath had devastating effects on Shia villages in South Lebanon, and drove many into the arms
of Hezbollah, which promised protection, social services, and revenge (Mackey 2008, 175).

**MNF**

MNF faced stiff resistance in Lebanon, an anomaly for trust theory. First, prior to embassy and
barrack bombings, the MNF did not undertake any systematic victimization of civilians. There
were few, if any, reports of MNF civilian abuses. US shelling of Syrian and Druze positions in
the Shouf close to populated areas undoubtedly caused civilian casualties, but this occurred at the
end of the occupation, well after the initiation of resistance. Second, the MNF benefited from
a multinational mandate. This mandate was essential to the legitimacy and credibility of the
mission. The PLO saw the US as a guarantor of its safe withdrawal and Italy as sympathetic to its cause. Israel was opposed in principle to the MNF, but could accept a US-led MNF (Cimbala and Forster 2010, 36-39). Third, the MNF was initially seen as relatively benign. To the resident of Beirut, suffering under siege and civil war for two months, the MNF were initially seen as saviors and were welcomed by non-combatants from all parts of Lebanese society (Fisk 1990, 447). French troops helped clear mines from the streets and Italy committed billions of Lira to humanitarian aid. A semblance of normalcy was reestablished, albeit temporarily. While counterfactuals can never be verified, its likely that the benign conduct of the MNF reduced or at least delayed the onset of resistance against the MNF.

Although the treatment of non-victimization was constant for both MNF-I and MNF-II, trust is not the only factor affecting resistance. The degree of political dislocation varied significantly between MNF-I and MNF-II. By publicly backing the regime of Amine Gemayel, the MNF became a party to the conflict. Indeed, the MNF provides a cautionary tale about how intervening powers can face resistance even when they take care not to not mistreat civilians and provide humanitarian assistance. Unfortunately, American forces would face a similar fiasco a decade later during UNOSOM II in Somalia.

**UNIFIL**

As for all other occupiers of Lebanon, UNIFIL faced some initial wariness from domestic warring factions. Hezbollah worried that “certain contingents” of UNIFIL would spy for Israel (Andoni 2010). Consistent with trust theory, UNIFIL engaged is no systematic civilian victimization and consequently suffered limited resistance. Although UNIFIL largely failed in its political mission, it was seen as a source of protection by many in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL provided humanitarian assistance and protection for civilians. According to former UNIFIL official Timur Göksel (2007, 76): "I think UNIFIL’s biggest success...was its relations with the people. When UNIFIL came in 1978, nobody else was coming to south Lebanon...In those days you could almost say that those who remained needed UNIFIL to survive...we helped them in every way we could.

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10 Although supportive of a UN force, the USSR opposed the US-led MNF.

11 Interestingly, some members of the IDF also thought UNIFIL was working with Hezbollah and Palestinian groups (Nachmias 1999, 105).
We helped them with their schools; we provided their medical services... The Lebanese government could not return to the south because the civil war was still going on. But even in these conditions, UNIFIL brought a sense of security.” These sentiments are reflected in what little polling is available. A 2006 Gallup poll found that 75 percent of Lebanese favored the presence of UN peacekeepers and a 2008 public opinion survey indicated 86.77 percent support for UNIFIL, although this support was stronger among Christians and Druze than among Sunnis and Shias (Gallup 2006; Kumetat 2008, 5)

Overall, I find general support for trust theory. Consistent with trust theory, Lebanese civilians were concerned about the intentions of foreign occupiers due to limited information and leverage. Moreover, victimization is found to be a partial explanation of resistance. UNIFIL was extremely circumspect in its interactions with civilians and faced very little resistance. Syria and Israel did not enter Lebanon with the objective of victimizing civilians, but did engage in indiscriminate violence in response to resistance caused by political dislocation. The identification problem, exacerbated in the case of Israel by cultural and linguistic differences, led to civilian casualties. In this regard, the process of victimization was endogenous. Political dislocation was the prime driver of resistance, but victimization hardened antipathy towards occupying forces. Lastly, the MNF mission was an anomaly for trust theory. The MNF did not victimize civilians but faced stiff resistance due to their association with the contested Maronite regime.

8.3.4 Credible Commitment

According to trust theory, factors such as religious affinity, international mandate, and regime type can reduce credible commitment problems for occupiers. The case of Lebanon provides partial support of these theories.

Religion

Consistent with trust theory, Syria faced greater resistance from Christian factions in Lebanon than Muslim factions (Shia, Sunni, and Druze). Notwithstanding the significant differences between Shia, Sunni, Druze, and Alawi Islam, the Maronite community saw potential annexation by Syria as a serious challenge to its way of life. Indeed, an independent Lebanon (preferably
with a Christian or Maronite majority) provided guarantees of religious freedom. Conversely, many of Lebanon’s Muslims had initially pushed for unification with Syria upon gaining independence from France (Weinberger 1986, 55-56). Different sectarian reactions to foreign occupation were also magnified by the ongoing civil war. A survey conducted in 2000 indicated that a majority of Christians supported a redeployment of Syrian forces whereas Muslims, with the exception of the Druze, called for maintaining the status quo and for complete engagement with Syria (Haddad 2001, 469). Members of the Maronite church were some of the harshest critics of Syrian occupation. For example, Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir complained: “Syria’s interference exhausted Lebanon…Syria is the one that rules, appointing rulers and organizing elections and bringing to power whoever it wants” (UPI 2004). During the civil war and Syrian occupation, wealthy Maronite monastic orders provided financial assistance to Maronite militias (Rabinovitch 1984, 68).

Religion played a prominent role in resistance to Israeli occupation. Israel faced the bulk of resistance from Sunni (PLO) and Shia militants (Amal, Hezbollah), those same groups that largely accepted Syrian rule. Hezbollah was founded by the conservative Shia clerics Sayyed Abbas Musawi, inspired by religious mentors Musa Sadr and Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, and the 1979 Iranian revolution. Hezbollah originally sought to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon and saw its Shia rival Amal as too corrupt and secular. Defense of religion figured prominently in Hezbollah’s justification of resistance. It’s 1985 manifesto stated:

“We declare openly and loudly that we are an umma which fears God only and is by no means ready to tolerate injustice, aggression and humiliation…This is why we are, more and more, in a state of permanent alert in order to repel aggression and defend our religion, our existence, our dignity.”

Religious symbols formed a rallying point for resistance. For instance, on 16 October 1983, during the Shia day of Ashura marking the death of the Imam Hussein, an Israeli armed convoy provoked a riot by insisting on driving through a crowd of 50,000 worshippers. The Israelis were stoned, their trucks overturned and burned. Facing a frenzied crowd, the soldiers opened fire, killing seven (Fisk 1990, 557; Norton 2007). The following day, Mahdi Shams al Din, the deputy leader of the Shia high council, issued a fatwa calling for ”civil disobedience” and ”resistance to occupation
in the south” (Ajami 1986, 202). The Ashura incident was a turning point for Shia-Israeli relations, spurring fence sitters to take up arms against what they saw as a religious affront. However, the IDF was not always so ham-fisted in dealing with sensitive religious issues. For example, it selected Israeli-Druze soldiers (the Herev Battalion) to deploy to Druze villages in the Shouf at the beginning of the conflict. Thus, for the most part the Druze in the Shouf “had watched the arrival of the Israelis armored columns with complete docility” (Fisk 1990, 213, 215).

Religion played an undeniable role in fostering resistance in Lebanon. However, an anomaly for trust theory is Maronite cooperation with Israeli occupation. Israel and Lebanon’s Maronites shared little other than their antagonism towards the Palestinians and Syria. It is one of the many ironies of the Lebanon War that Israel ended up cooperating so closely with the Phalange, a nationalist group originally inspired by European fascist parties (Colleleo 1988).

Though religion figured less prominently in attacks on UNIFIL, it still influenced the targets. Hezbollah regularly accused UNIFIL of acting in support of Israel and drew on divine inspiration in its defiance of the MNF. According to Mousavi: “God is capable of giving Muslims victory, whether the aggression comes from France or America or Italy or any other force” (Fisk 1990, 521). The gravest resistance to UNIFIL appears to have come from jihadist groups affiliated with al Qaeda. Some months before a devastating attack on a UNIFIL convoy in 2007, al Qaeda’s deputy leader, Ayman al Zawahiri encouraged attacks against UNIFIL, seen as Western forces on Muslim land. Moreover al-Zawahiri said: “What I want from the generation of jihad in Lebanon is to prepare itself for getting in Palestine and expelling from Lebanon the invading crusade force, which claims to be a peacekeeping force. They should not accept Resolution 1701.” He also accused UNIFIL of being “enemies of Islam.” Western troop contributors were keenly aware of the effect of religion on perceptions of the mission. In discussions regarding the formation of UNIFIL, Europeans countries and the UN agreed the force must have a strong Muslim component to give it credibility (Associated Press 2006). Moreover, French Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie explicitly called on Muslim countries to contribute: “Certainly, we want European, but also Muslim countries as we must absolutely avoid giving the impression that it is the Western countries imposing peace on the Muslim world” (KUNA 2006).
International Mandate

The constraints of international mandates did not appear to have stemmed resistance. Lebanon is a useful—and somewhat unique—case study of occupation because it experienced two occupations under an international mandate with Syria also operating under a more ambiguous Arab League mandate. Despite international mandates, UNIFIL and the MNF experienced different levels of resistance. UNIFIL experienced much less resistance than Israel in Southern Lebanon, even taking into account its recent establishment in 2006. The MNF, however, experienced significant resistance from Palestinian, Druze, and Shia militants. Concerns about political dislocation seem to have determined the level of resistance rather than concerns about credible commitment to a long-term occupation.

A problem in examining UNIFIL and the MNF is that it is impossible to observe the counterfactual of how much resistance each occupation would have faced in the absence of an international mandate. Perhaps each would have faced greater resistance, even accounting for differences caused by varying political dislocation on the ongoing civil war. The case of Lebanon provides two ways of overcoming this problem. First, it is instructive to compare the MNF occupation to the first stages of the Israeli occupation. Both occupations operated in Beirut and undertook similar degrees of political dislocation. Unlike the MNF, Israel’s occupation did not have any international mandate (in fact, UN Security Council Resolution 520 explicitly called on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon). Yet both the MNF and the Israeli occupation experienced significant resistance from similar groups. This would indicate that the credible commitment generated by an international mandate was insufficient to counteract the destabilizing effects of political dislocation.

Second, we can examine the case of Syria, which operated both with and without an international mandate. Syria obtained a mandate from the Arab League in 1976. However, this mandate expired in 1982 after President Gemayel refused to grant an extension. With or without a mandate from the Arab League, Syria faced significant resistance, mainly from Maronite factions in 1976, 1981, and 1989, with and without an international mandate. That Lebanon sought an Arab League mandate is a testament to the perceived legitimating power of international institutions. However, there is little evidence that it affected resistance, given ongoing patterns of violence. Perhaps this is because the Arab League mandate did not constitute a true constraint on Syria. The vast majority
of the ADF was Syrian. Although, the ADF was technically under the command of the President of Lebanon, and the commander was meant to be Lebanese, de facto power remained in Syrian hands. The ADF frequently overreached its mandate and broke its rules of engagement. Its neutrality was so compromised, that Maronite leaders called for the replacement of the ADF by an alternative international peacekeeping force (Pogany 1987, 132, 162). For instance, on 6 July 1978 President Sarkis announced he would resign if he was not given more authority over the ADF. He alleged that the ADF was conducting operations behind his back and without his approval (O’Ballance 1998, 82). Thus, overall, we do not observe a strong effect of international mandates in the case of Lebanon.

**Regime Type**

Another hypothesis of trust theory is that certain occupiers will better be able to maintain trust with the occupied population because of the constraints imposed upon them by their domestic political institutions. Once again, Lebanon is a useful laboratory for resistance to occupation because it was occupied by different types of regimes. According to the POLITY dataset (Gurr et. al. 2009), Israel was a democracy (score of 9) during the occupation period, whereas Syria was largely non-democratic (-8). Multinational forces such as UNIFIL and the MNF were composed of democratic states, with average POLITY scores of 9.67 and 10, respectively.

Consistent with the hypothesis, non-democratic Syria experienced greater resistance measured in terms of fatalities than more democratic Israel and even more democratic UNIFIL and MNF. However, it is not clear that differences in resistance were due to increased trust generated by democratic institutions. Overall, I find that regime type imposed different levels of constraints on the behavior of Israel and Syria, but there is little evidence that such constraints affected the calculations of potential resisters.

First, democratic institutions provided some constraints on the actions of the IDF. During the siege of Beirut, brigade commander Eli Geva refused to lead his troops into the city citing endangerment to his forces and to civilians. He was dismissed from the IDF but his actions stirred controversy and debate in Israel (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 215). During the bombing of Beirut on 12 August 1982, known as Black Thursday, Israel’s cabinet was highly critical of Defense Minister
Sharon (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 226). On 25 September 1982, the NGO Peace Now held a 400,000-person demonstration calling for an inquiry into the massacres of Sabra and Shatila. The protest was the largest to be held in Israel up until that time (Byman 2011, 69). Partly as a result of such protests, a commission of inquiry was established and headed by the President of Israel’s Supreme Court Yitzhak Kahan. The findings of the Kahan Commission led to the dismissal of Defense Minister Sharon and strong pressure on PM Begin to resign. While a majority of Israelis supported the limited occupation in South Lebanon, protests against the occupation of South Lebanon grew until 2000, spearheaded in particular by the ”Four Mothers Movement” (Dassa Kaye 2002).

Despite such constraints, there is no evidence that the Lebanese population saw Israel itself as constrained in Lebanon. If anything, fears about Israel’s non-democratic behavior, such as partial territorial annexation, was used extensively in resistance rhetoric. Hezbollah argued that Israel could not credibly commit to a limited campaign: ”Israel’s borders stop where its arm, tanks, and spears can reach” (Noe 2007, 189). Thus Hezbollah argued that without resistance, Israel would have no incentive to withdraw. Similarly, according to Ajami:

”There had always existed in Lebanon as suspicion that Israel coveted the lands of the south and the waters of the Litani river. A body of literature had popularized that theme. There was enough Zionist literature scripture around, and enough Palestinian reiterations of it, to make men wonder and worry. Israel could never provide sufficient assurance that its presence would be temporary. And the longer Israeli troops stayed, the more credible the suspicions became” (1986, 200).

Indeed, Israel is unique among democracies for undertaking territorial annexation after the Second World War. In this sense, Israel is the exception that proves the rule.

As an autocratic regime, Syria did not experience the same restrictions as Israel during its occupation of Lebanon. The decision to deploy troops to Lebanon were not made by an elected body. Unlike Israel, there were no protests in Syria against the occupation of Lebanon although Syria suffered far greater casualties than Israel, nor against large scale shelling of civilian neighborhoods. It wasn’t until 2005 that Syrian newspapers even criticized the behavior of Syrian forces in Lebanon (Jerusalem Post 2005, 12). If anything, a major concern for Assad was that having troops in Lebanon would divert resources needed to subdue his own population (Seale 1990). Some in
Lebanon took note of Syria’s regime in calling for the end of occupation. According to Jumblatt: “The explanations given to us by our leaders, as by the Syrian leaders, regarding the need for the continued Syrian presence in Lebanon as stemming from the shared destiny both nations are unsatisfactory. After all, we have a democracy in Lebanon and Syria has a one-party system, and therefore we cannot understand what this shared destiny is that Bashar al-Asad preaches to us” (Zisser 2007, 188).

Yet, when Syria was ultimately forced out of Lebanon, it was under pressure from Lebanese protesters, not domestic ones as was the case in Israel. Insofar as regime type affected Lebanese calculations for resistance, it goes opposite predictions. Precisely because Syria was autocratic, it was able to deploy a lethal intelligence apparatus in Lebanon to monitor, arrest, and eliminate opponents of Syrian occupation (Deeb 2004, 181). Therefore, in the case of Syria if anything, the lack of democratic constraints in Syria may have deterred resistance. Overall, while there is evidence that regime type affected the constraints faced by the occupying states, there is little evidence that the Lebanese population perceived these constraints in deciding on resistance.

A summary of occupier characteristics is provided in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1: Occupier characteristics in Lebanon

<table>
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<th>Syria</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>MNF</th>
<th>UNIFIL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political Dislocation</td>
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<td>Victimization</td>
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<td>International Mandate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common Religion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Occupier</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops (peak)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>12,455</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

◊ Syria operated under an Arab League mandate between 1976 and 1982.

* UNIFIL is ongoing, but the analysis in this study is limited to pre-2010.

8.4 Alternative Theories

So far, I’ve argued that political dislocation and victimization help explain the phenomenon of resistance to occupation in Lebanon. This section briefly assesses the validity and drawbacks of
alternative theories.

8.4.1 Nationalism

Nationalist themes permeated the rhetoric of resistance in Lebanon. The Phalanges, an ultranationalist militia and one of the principal resistance groups fighting Syrian occupation, claimed to be safeguarding the Lebanese nation (Collelo 1988). Maronites tried to frame their sectarian action through a nationalist lens. For instance, when fighting broke out with Syria in 1978 Chamoun stated: “It is absolutely wrong to say that we are fighting because we are Christian... It happens that those fighting for the freedom of Lebanon are Christians” (Fisk 1990, 141). Hezbollah described resistance to Israeli occupation as a “national cause” and “duty” which is waged on behalf of all Lebanese. Hezbollah flew the Lebanese flag next to its own and played the Lebanese national anthem before holding prayers (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002, 84). Similarly, in its 1985 open letter, Hezbollah stated: “We have risen to liberate our country, to drive the imperialists and the invaders out of it, and to determine our fate by our own hands” (Norton 1987, 170). Lastly despite their many differences, most warring militias clung to the concept of a unified Lebanon, not divided along sectarian lines.

Pan-Arab nationalism was also a potent force in the occupation of Lebanon. Linguistically and ethnically Arab Syrian forces, initially operating under the mandate of the Arab League were seen as more legitimate than Israeli forces. The Taif Accord, which ended Lebanon’s civil war, emphasized pan-Arab bonds. Such pan-Arab nationalism also undermined cooperation with Israel. When Amine Gemayel signed a peace treaty with Israel in May 1983, it was so unpopular in Lebanon and the broader Arab world, that he was forced to renege. As Amine Gemayel’s father Pierre stated: “If we open one gate to Israel, we will lose twenty gates to the Arab world because of it” (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984, 291).

Generally, however, nationalism is a poor predictor of resistance in Lebanon. Nationalist rhetoric did not translate to a coherent political program or a cohesive military effort. Civil war in Lebanon had hardened sectarian factions. Lebanese resistance groups were primarily concerned with advancing their relative position within Lebanon, and were only secondarily concerned with safeguarding Lebanese sovereignty.
First, violent resistance was not a nationalist reflex or an “antibody response” to foreign occupation. Most groups adopted a wait-and-see approach to foreign invasion. When resistance was undertaken it was not by a representative cross-section of the population, but rather by specific political factions. Thus, Druze and Palestinians and later Maronites resisted Syrian occupation. Conversely, Maronites did not resist Israeli occupation unlike the Palestinians and Shias. Contrary to the predictions of nationalism, many groups in Lebanon celebrated the arrival of foreign troops and actively collaborated with occupying forces. Nor was this collaboration always an endogenous reaction to territorial control: in the case of the Phalangists, collaboration with Israel preceded the actual invasion. Hezbollah fought bitterly against Israel, while praising Syria: “No one can expel Syria from Lebanon, or from the Lebanese people’s minds, hearts, and future” (Noe 2007, 321).

Second, Lebanon expressed not one form of nationalism, but four: sectarian nationalism, Lebanese civic nationalism, “Greater Syria” nationalism, and pan-Arab nationalism. Maronite nationalists had pushed for an independent Maronite enclave centered on Mt. Lebanon. Syrian nationalists, found mainly among Shia and Sunni groups, advocated union with a Greater Syria. Finally, pan-Arab nationalists saw states in the Middle East as constructions of Western imperialism designed to weaken Arabs (Salibi 1988; Firro 2003). Without well-defined boundaries, nationalism provides contradictory predictions for resistance to occupation. Pan-Arab and Syrian nationalism would predict collaboration with Syria whereas sectarian or state nationalism would predict the opposite. Which nationalism should prevail? More practically, such contending nationalisms prevented factions from joining in fighting a commonly perceived foreign threat or containing the fissiparous currents of religion.

Third, alternative nationalist explanations fail to account for variation in resistance. Darden (2011) argues that nationalist sentiment is affected by the historical experience of mass schooling. Populations will develop durable loyalties with the states that implement the first round of mass schooling, and will be less likely to resist occupation by such states. This theory does not square with the facts in Lebanon. The first round of mass schooling in Lebanon was implemented by the Ottoman Empire following the 1869 Public Education Regulations (Masters and Ágoston 2010, 203). By the 1980s, Lebanon had one of the most literate populations in the Middle East, albeit with major disparities between sectarian groups (Collelo 1988). Darden’s theory is indeterminate
in predicting resistance since neither Syria, Israel, nor the members of UNIFIL or the MNF implemented the first round of schooling in Lebanon. Despite the common null treatment in mass schooling, there was variation in the incidence of resistance.

In sum, nationalist resistance was not automatic, nor unified, and alternative measures of nationalist sentiment do not explain resistance. Thus, although nationalist sentiment was prevalent during the period under study, it provides limited traction in understanding variation in resistance to occupation.

8.4.2 Opportunity Structures

According to opportunity structure explanations, variation in resistance can be explained by those military social, economic, and geographic factors that facilitate mobilization and combat. Overall, I find only partial support for opportunity costs theories.

First, military factors provide partial explanations of variation in resistance. Actors in Lebanon were eminently pragmatic and chose their battles carefully. For instance, most militant groups stood aside while Israel—the region’s dominant military power—waged war against Palestinians on Lebanese soil. So long as Israel did not weaken their political base, it was best to preserve strength for the ongoing civil war where the real political power was at stake. Thus the Druze army of Walid Jumblatt did not resist Israeli occupation of the Shouf during the siege of Beirut (interview, 24 May 2012). In other instances, militants chose to hedge until it became apparent who would ultimately prevail. For example, Amal tacitly cooperated with Israel, the MNF, and Bashir Gemayel until Hezbollah began a major campaign against the Maronite government (Byman 2011, 211). Therefore, as Kalyvas (2006) has argued, resistance and collaboration was partly endogenous to the degree of military control.

The impact of opportunity structures can be observed through exogenous changes to the military capability. The clearest exogenous changes in military capability occurred through foreign sponsorship. For example, prior to 1982, the Shia population of Lebanon was a secondary player in the civil war and the resistance struggle. Following the Iranian revolution of 1979, Iran and Syria began arming and financing Shia groups such as Hezbollah, turning a rag-tag militia into a competent military force. In addition to dispatching advisors, weapons, and members of the Is-
lamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), it is estimated that Tehran provided Hezbollah $10-15 million a month for several years (Byman 2011, 213). The consequence of this foreign sponsorship was a significant increase in the military capability of Hezbollah and a concomitant surge in resistance to Israeli occupation. Nasrallah acknowledged the impact of foreign sponsorship: “The Lebanese resistance and the handful of Palestinians would have not succeeded in doing what they did, had there not been a presence to protect, support, defend, and strengthen them, as President Assad’s leadership has done” (Noe 2007, 205). Hezbollah was not the only group to receive foreign sponsorship. The “war of liberation” undertaken by the Christian General Michel Aoun in 1989 followed a large influx of weapons from Iraq. The regime of Saddam Hussein sought to weaken its Syrian Baathist rival and the end of the Iran-Iraq War allowed it to export more weapons (Winslow 1996, 262).

Despite such examples, Lebanon provides limited evidence of any direct relation between military capacity and resistance. At its peak, Syria deployed 25,000 troops, Israel 60,000, the MNF 5,200, and UNIFIL 15,000 to occupy Lebanon. Even taking into account the duration of occupation, the quality of troops, and force-to-space and force-to-population ratios (see Figure 8.1), military strength is a poor predictor of resistance. Moreover, opportunity structures cannot explain why different groups decided to resist or collaborate with different occupiers.

Second, there is only limited support for the effect of terrain on resistance. Lebanon has ideal terrain for resistance warfare with two mountain ranges (the Lebanon and anti-Lebanon mountains) stretching north to south. The hills, shrubs, and woods of South Lebanon and the Mt. Lebanon range provided extensive cover and concealment for Hezbollah and Maronite forces, respectively. The Druze were able to exercise disproportionate leverage due to their strategic position in the Shouf Mountains overlooking the capital as well as the Beirut-Damascus highway. Despite the undeniable advantages provided by Lebanon’s mountainous terrain, geography fails to explain subnational variation in resistance. Mountainous terrain is basically a constant in Lebanon (see Figure 8.2). With such a universal treatment, it cannot explain why specific groups in Lebanon elected to resist specific occupations at specific times.

Third, evidence points against the role of economic factors in spurring resistance in Lebanon. Liberman (1998) argues that the division of labor in modern urban societies makes individuals less self-reliant and therefore more vulnerable to coercion by occupiers. In theory, this would in-
Figure 8.2: Terrain of Lebanon
dicate that Lebanon, one of the more urbanized countries in the Middle East should be easier to dominate. The evidence seems to point to the contrary. Resistance in Lebanon was an unusually urban phenomenon (Kalyvas 2004, 2). While much of Hezbollah’s resistance took place in rural or semi-rural areas in South Lebanon, Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation and Maronite resistance to Syrian occupation took place largely in the cities of Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre. Indeed, the concentration of troops in cities is what made Hezbollah’s use of suicide tactics so devastatingly effective. The Shia population was disproportionately rural and disproportionately active in resistance to Israeli occupation. However, most scholars agree that the radicalization of the Shia grew precisely out the social anomie caused by migration from rural villages to urban slums (Ajami 1986; Blanford 2011b).

Economic factors do not appear to have played a consistent role in stoking resistance. As would be expected by economic models of mobilization, the vast majority of militants partaking in resistance were young, with lower opportunity costs for fighting. Data on deceased Hezbollah fighters reveals that 41 percent were 18-20 years old or less, and another 42 percent were ages 21-25 (Krueger and Malečková 2003, 131). When it comes to levels of income, however, resistance was undertaken both by Maronites (Lebanon’s economically dominant group) and Shias (traditionally one of Lebanon’s most destitute). Poverty rates among Hezbollah fighters were actually lower than average: 28 percent for Hezbollah against 33 percent for the general population (Krueger and Malečková 2003, 131). According to Kavanagh (2011), this anomaly might be explained by an interaction effect between poverty and education in the recruitment of insurgents. Because highly skilled individuals are considered more effective insurgents, groups such as Hezbollah seek educated recruits. However, more educated recruits also tend to have higher incomes, which increases their opportunity cost for participation in high risk activities such as insurgency. Using Krueger and Malečková’s data on Hezbollah fighters, Kavanagh therefore shows that it is highly educated, yet poorer, recruits that are more likely to fight.12

Fourth, consistent with Petersen (2001), sectarian homogeneity was correlated with resistance.12

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12Similarly, examining terrorism in colonial Bengal, Lee (2011) finds a non-linear effect for poverty. Whereas the poorest and least educated members of a society are less likely to be politically engaged, and therefore to undertake political violence, the very wealthiest members of a society have higher opportunity costs for undertaking political violence and are also unlikely to undertake terrorism. Lee finds that it the poorest members of the politically aware class that are most likely to undertake terrorism.
Resistance to occupation was greatest in East Beirut for Maronites, South Lebanon where Shia and Israeli occupiers interacted, and the Shouf for Druze attacks on the MNF. As Petersen predicts, resistance groups recruited largely through religious and political networks and depended on the active (food, shelter, intelligence) or passive (secrecy) support of the civilian population. Coordination across social groups was complicated by the civil war, which made communities mistrust each other. This explanation is plausible but a fundamental identification problem remains. Did individuals fail to coordinate because their social networks were not as closely integrated or rather because different communities had different incentives to fight, or both? Indeed, if sectarian homogeneity facilitated resistance, why didn’t sectarian homogeneity trigger resistance to all occupations rather than just some?

The case of Lebanon offers mixed support for opportunity structure theories of resistance. While there is evidence that foreign support, mountainous terrain, and social cohesion affected the costs of resistance, there was no clear relation between force size or poverty and resistance. Above all, opportunity structures appeared to have been facilitators, rather than drivers of resistance. They were contingent on the incentives to fight provided by political dislocation or victimization.

8.4.3 International Context

According to international context theory, the international threat environment shapes incentives to undertake resistance. Occupied populations will refrain from undertaking resistance when they face a credible third-party threat. Under such conditions, occupied societies will accept the lesser evil of occupation (Edelstein 2008a). As its simultaneous occupations attest, Lebanon was a weak state in a volatile strategic environment.

On many occasions, third-party threats pushed Lebanese into the arms of their occupiers. Maronites collaborated extensively with Israel. Whereas Israel sought to use the Phalangists to rid Lebanon of the PLO, Phalangists sought to use Israel to rid Lebanon of the Syrians (among others). Indeed, while Maronites had originally welcomed the Syrians to fend off their revisionist enemies, they came to see Syria as a greater threat. Ongoing clashes in East Beirut, the Syrian sponsored assassination of Bashir Gemayel, and irredentist statements only aggravated these fear. Thus consistent with international context theory, we find strong collaboration between Maronites
and their Israeli occupiers. On several occasions, Maronite leaders pressured Israel to attack Syria (Schiff and Ya’ari 1984). In December 1980, Prime Minister Begin pledged to defend the Christian community stating: “We won’t let [Syria] perpetrate genocide in Lebanon” (Spyer 2009, 199). True to his pledge, the Israeli Air Force downed two Syrian helicopters during Syria’s siege of the Christian town of Zahle in April 1981.

Consistent with international context theory those groups that feared Israel aligned with Syria. Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam promised to “give support to any Lebanese that was working to save Lebanon from the Israeli occupation” (Deeb 2004, 88). As with Israel, Syrian support was purely pragmatic: to use local allies to control a buffer state. Regardless, such support and protection was welcomed by certain segments of Lebanese society. According to Nasrallah: “Had there not been a state in the region by the name of Syria, led by a president of the stature of Hafez al-Assad, Lebanon would still be wallowing in the Israeli era” (Noe 2007, 204). When this perceived threat receded with the Israeli withdrawal, many starting openly questioning Syrian occupation. The Lebanese Council of Bishops declared in September 2000: “After Israel’s withdrawal, isn’t it time for the Syrian army to redeploy here in preparation for its final withdrawal in accordance with the Taif Accord and UN Security Council Resolution 520?” (Norton 2000, 48). Even Jumblatt, a former ally of Syria, suggested that a redeployment, other than what was required for “strategic” and “Syrian national security” purposes (Gambill 2000). This restlessness exploded into massive protests, following the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005.

To a lesser extent, concerns about Israeli actions in Lebanon facilitated MNF and UNIFIL occupation. For example, Muslims in West Beirut generally welcomed the initial deployment of the MNF since they saw the international force as a protection from Israeli shelling. Similarly, residents of Southern Lebanon initially hoped UNIFIL would shield them from Israeli invasion as well as the collateral damage caused by Israeli attacks on Palestinian and Hezbollah militants. Some villages wrote to UNIFIL to deploy to areas experiencing IDF-Hezbollah clashes (Diab 2001). Others would ask for UN assistance in dealing with the SLA extortion. According to a Shia villager: “If we don’t [pay protection money], there will be trouble for us from the Israelis and the Haddad men. Haim says he wants the money from twenty-eight villages and that he needs the money to pay people to protect us from terrorists. But we want United Nations soldiers here” (Fisk 1990, 547). During fighting between Hezbollah and the IDF, Lebanese civilians would congregate on
UN bases. Consistent with international context theory, some of the sharper criticism of UNIFIL emerged when it failed to protect the local population (interview with Timur Göksel 19 August 2010).

On the surface, international context theory performs well in explaining variation in resistance to occupation in Lebanon. However, a closer examination reveals major anomalies to the theory. First, there was no unified perception of third-party threats within Lebanon. Threats were perceived through the prism of identity and political affiliation. Syria and Israel were largely seen as threats depending on their effect on the power of different sectarian groups. Second, to the sectarian factions engaged in civil war, foreign occupiers were often lesser threats than domestic militias. Therefore, while international context did shape incentives to undertake resistance, it was largely contingent on political dislocation.

8.5 Conclusion

This chapter has tested alternative theories of resistance in the context of Lebanon between 1976 and 2010. During the course of four different Syrian, Israeli, MNF, and UN occupations, I noted the variation in the source and intensity of resistance. Occupiers did not all experience similar levels of violence from the same sectors of Lebanese society.

I argued that political dislocation best explains this variation in resistance. Lebanese politics between the 1970s and 1990s were complex, polarized, and violent. Given the circumstances, it is unsurprising that occupiers quickly became entangled in Lebanon’s contest for political power. As military commentator Edgar O’Ballance put it: “Machiavelli would have been out of his depth in this web of intrigue and violence” (1998, ix). Nationalist theories argue that foreign occupation unifies the population in a common struggle. In Lebanon, it was precisely the opposite. Foreign occupation exposed the deep fissures in Lebanese society as each group sought to maximize political gains through collaboration, neutrality, or resistance.

Consistent with trust theory, I found that indiscriminate violence committed by Syrian and Israeli forces hardened views against occupation. Moreover, there is evidence that religious divisions between occupiers and occupied was a source of mistrust in some cases. However, these effects appeared to be secondary to that of political dislocation. In addition, contrary to the find-
ings of the cross-national quantitative chapter, I found little evidence that international mandates or the regime of the occupier affected calculations of resistance. Although democracy and international organizations did impose real constraints on the behavior of occupiers, these constraints were not perceived as sufficient to overcome mistrust and broader concerns regarding political dislocation.

Importantly, I found limited support for alternative theories of resistance such as nationalism, opportunity structures, and international context. Nationalism—at least in its civic form—was not a prime determinant of resistance. Lebanon’s factions never rallied around the flag to fend off foreign invaders. Rather, each faction used and exploited foreign intervention to their advantage against domestic rivals. To those engaged in civil war, sectarian identity trumped national loyalty, even in the face of protracted occupation. Opportunity structures did not play a consistent role in occupation. Occupier troop strength, terrain, and economic conditions did not map to resistance. Tight social networks helped groups mobilize against occupation, but such mobilization was contingent on the perceived political impact of occupation. International context is a promising alternative explanation for variation in resistance, since Lebanese leaders sought to balance foreign powers against each other. However, I noted that international context theory fails to account for internal divisions in occupied society, which are equally if not more important in assessing foreign threats.
Chapter 9

Conclusion

“There is nothing perhaps more adverse to nature and reason than to hold in obedience remote countries and foreign nations, in opposition to their inclination or interest.”

-Edward Gibbon

9.1 The Puzzle of Resistance

Violence does not always cease at war’s end. As this study has shown, foreign occupations that follow wars can also be domains of conflict. The puzzle this study addresses is what explains the variation in violence against foreign occupations? In the 163 cases of occupation since 1900, the median occupation suffered 17 occupier fatalities, whereas the bloodiest occupation experienced over 30,000 fatalities. In seeking to understand this variation, I first argued that the nationalist explanation of resistance is unsatisfactory because it tends to over-predict the likelihood of resistance. If nationalism is a constant in the post-colonial era, why do we see little resistance overall, and so much variation within the resistance that does occur? Second, I noted that, in theory, resistance should not be rational because resistance is dangerous and occupation is usually temporary. Individuals in occupied societies should rationally decide to wait rather than fight. Third, I have argued that resistance will emerge when assumptions regarding neutrality break down. Specifically, resistance is more likely to emerge when occupiers take steps to alter the balance of

1Gibbon [1788]1822.
power in occupied society. Under such conditions, certain groups will have incentives to act rather than wait in order to foreSTALL any permanent loss of power. This theoretical explanation has the benefit of accounting for “novel facts,” insofar as it can explain the nationalist anomaly of collaboration with occupiers in addition to explaining variation in resistance. Moreover, resistance is more likely to emerge when there is a breakdown in trust between occupiers and the occupied population. This can occur when occupiers victimize the civilian population, or when occupiers cannot credibly commit to leaving occupied territory promptly or treating the civilian population benignly. I hypothesized that certain factors such as international mandates, regime type, and shared religion can help occupiers signal benign intent.

9.2 Summary of Findings

This study has provided the first comprehensive cross-national study of resistance to occupation. The following is a summary of the key findings.

9.2.1 Cross-national Quantitative Analysis

Chapter 4 tested these theories quantitatively by examining a cross-national dataset of 163 occupations going back to 1900. The number of fatalities incurred by occupying forces was used as a proxy for the intensity of resistance. This dataset showed that consistent with the assumptions guiding the theory, violent resistance to occupation tends to be the exception rather than the norm. Generally, citizens of occupied countries adopt a wait-and-see approach instead of rushing to take up arms. When resistance does emerge, political dislocation is found to be an important trigger. Indeed, those occupiers that sought to change the leadership of the occupied country faced significantly more resistance than those that left political leaders in place. Forced political dislocation provided the immediate and targeted incentives for groups to assume the risks of resistance. The cross-national chapter also supported many of the hypotheses regarding trust. Democratic occupiers and occupiers operating under the mandate of an international organization faced significantly less resistance. Such occupiers could better credibly commit to treating the occupied population benignly and vacating occupied territory promptly. Conversely, those occupiers that were of a different religion or victimized the occupied population faced greater resistance, al-
though the statistical significance of the latter was not robust. What these findings suggest is that
the nature and behavior of occupiers can play an important role in determining the level of resis-
tance. Practically, this would suggest that there are strategies interveners can undertake to reduce
the likelihood of resistance.

The cross-national statistical chapter also provided insight regarding alternative theories of
resistance. I found that various measures of nationalism, such as country age, ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, and literacy rates failed to predict levels of resistance. The degree of foreign
threat was also not found to play a significant role. Therefore contrary to international context
theory, resistance is not generally a product of the occupied population’s pragmatic assessment of
relative risks of occupation. I did find that occupied populations were sensitive to some factors
that facilitated or hindered resistance, what I termed opportunity structures. In particular, terrain
and wealth were shown to affect the levels of resistance. Controls such as the duration of the
occupation were found to increase the number of occupying troops felled by resistance forces,
mainly by increasing exposure.

A major concern in such a study is that lower levels of resistance may simply reflect the abil-
ity of occupiers to anticipate and avoid bloody occupations. I argued that, while serious, such
selection effects are mitigated by incomplete information, cognitive biases, and issue tradeoffs.
Occupiers can miscalculate risk or undertake difficult occupations in order to further more im-
portant goals. These factors would therefore reduce systematic selection bias. In order to test for
selection effects, I developed a model of occupation onset and found that the probability of being
occupied is not statistically associated with the degree of resistance.

9.2.2 Case Studies

The cross-national quantitative data suggests a systematic link between political dislocation, a
breakdown in trust, and violent resistance. However, resistance is a complex phenomenon, quan-
titative measures are imperfect, and the results of the statistical analysis could be spurious. More-
over, certain causal processes simply cannot be observed in cross-national analysis. In order to
further probe the validity of the theories of political dislocation and trust, I complemented the
cross-national statistical data with a set of four case studies: Afghanistan since 2001, Lithuania

**Afghanistan**

First, I developed a mixed-method case study of resistance in Afghanistan. Although usually referred to as the Afghanistan War, the vast majority of violence is in fact concentrated in the Pashtun belt in the south and east of the country. Resistance in Afghanistan was primarily a response to political dislocation: the Taliban who were overthrown in 2001 were drawn almost exclusively from the Pashtun population. Although not all Pashtun were supportive of the Taliban, resistance was concentrated amongst those groups that stood the most to lose from the new regime put into place by the US and its allies. In contrast, many Afghans welcomed Coalition forces since they broke the Taliban monopoly on political power. By supporting regime change, I argued that Coalition forces got caught in a civil war among Afghan factions vying for power. Violence in Afghanistan is likely to recede not with the departure of foreign forces, but when a political settlement is reached among Afghan groups themselves. Importantly, the effect of political dislocation was found to be more powerful than other factors commonly thought to trigger resistance such as poverty and terrain. Trust also played a role in shaping resistance to occupation since a number of studies have documented how air strikes and civilian casualties increased the subsequent number of attacks on coalition forces in the near term.

**Lithuania, Cambodia, and Lebanon**

Second, I undertook three within-case studies of the occupations of Lithuania, Cambodia, and Lebanon. These cases provide strong evidence of the role of political dislocation and demonstrate the linkages between international and domestic politics. Foreign occupation is undoubtedly an international event, but the mobilization of resistance is fundamentally shaped by domestic politics as much as by a sense of nationalism. Indeed, one of the most important findings of this dissertation is that resistance is rarely undertaken by a broad cross-section of the population, but rather by those specific groups who stand to lose domestically from occupation. Thus the Soviet occupation of Lithuania was opposed by disenfranchised wealthier landowners, industrialists, and traditional political parties, whereas the German occupation of Lithuania was principally opposed
by Jews and communists fearing persecution. Vietnamese occupiers in Cambodia faced resistance from royalists and republican factions who were sidelined by Vietnam’s local proxies and by the Khmer Rouge who had been forcefully removed from power. Lebanese political factions, themselves engaged in a vicious civil war, resisted or collaborated with Syrian, Israeli, UN, and MNF occupation based on the assessed effect of foreigners on their share of domestic power. All the case studies also provided strong support for the corollary of factional politics. Partisan rivalries permeated resistance struggles. In the case of Cambodia, Lebanon, and most likely Afghanistan in the future, resistance struggles morphed into civil wars as resistance groups scrambled to seize power.

The case studies also provide evidence of trust theory. Soviet and German victimization of civilians through deportation and genocide respectively, played a strong role in stoking resistance in Lithuania. In the case of Lebanon, indiscriminate violence by Syrian and Israeli forces hardened views against occupation. Factors such as international mandates, religion, and regime type were also found to play a significant role in the case studies. UNTAC, operating under a robust international mandate could credibly commit to withdrawing from Cambodia in a way that Vietnam never could, and faced far less resistance. Lithuania and Lebanon provide good illustrations of the role played by religion in building or breaking trust with occupiers. Catholic leaders in Lithuania provided moral leadership and focal points to oppose Soviet policies and religious identity was central to Jewish resistance to German rule. Similarly, religion was a rallying cry against Israeli occupation and religious concerns figured prominently in Christian resistance to Syria. Lastly, the opacity and abuses of non-democratic occupiers frayed local trust during Soviet and German occupation of Lithuania, the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and the Syrian occupation of Lebanon.

Despite strong support for political dislocation and trust, not all findings in the case studies were fully consistent with these theories. Trust was not found to be the preeminent factor determining resistance in Cambodia and Lebanon, where Vietnamese and Multinational forces faced resistance in the absence of systematic victimization. The role of international organizations was inconsistent in Lebanon, where MNF forces faced significant resistance and UNIFIL did not. Lastly, contrary to expectation, democratic credentials did not appear to dampen resistance to Israeli and MNF occupation of Lebanon. In this, as in many cases, the effect of political dislocation...
may simply have been the predominant factor determining resistance.

9.3 Implications for Academia

9.3.1 The Resistance Myth

The findings of this study have a number of implications for future academic research. First, and foremost, this study has challenged what I call "the resistance myth." This myth has positive and normative dimensions. The positive resistance myth posits that resistance is an inevitable product of foreign occupation. A number of International Relations scholars have posited that conquest has become more costly in the modern world due to the advent of nationalism. The influential American diplomat George Kennan was fond of quoting Edward Gibbon in predicting the Soviet Union’s demise in Eastern Europe: “There is nothing perhaps more adverse to nature and reason than to hold in obedience remote countries and foreign nations, in opposition to their inclination or interest.”

Defensive realists have picked up on this argument in arguing how nationalism could sometimes have a pacifying effect on International Relations. If nationalism strengthens the defense, thereby making conquest more costly, states would have fewer incentives to take preemptive action against each other to forestall defeat (Jervis 1978, 195). This study challenges this assumption. Resistance, I have shown, is not always a nationalist reflex to foreign occupation.

The average occupation generates relatively little resistance and is sensitive the policies, behavior, and nature of occupiers. Therefore, nationalism does not inherently confer an advantage to the defense. The normative dimension of resistance, more commonplace in popular than academic circles, posits that resistance is inherently good.

The case studies have illustrated that resistance to occupation is not necessarily selfless or heroic (although it certainly can be). In many instances, resistance parading itself as nationalist clearly served parochial interests. Furthermore, resistance groups have often been used against domestic rivals in addition to occupation forces. Thus resistance should be seen as an extension of domestic politics, rather than a democratic symbol of

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2This passage was misquoted by George Kennan, and subsequently re-cited, as: "There is nothing more contrary to nature than the attempt to hold in obedience distant provinces."

3Of course, most occupations in the modern world also do not result in annexation.

4See, for example, Gannon 2008.
9.3.2 The Ghost of Nationalism

In this study, I have been critical of nationalism. The concept is notoriously difficult to measure because it is ideological, not material. Thus the "ghost of nationalism" can animate collective action without being observed directly. Moreover, nationalism as a cause of resistance is frequently confused with nationalism as a product of resistance. Because we can only observe the effects of nationalism, rather than its presence, there is a strong potential for bias. That being said, nationalism is one of the most important organizing principles of International Relations. Just as importantly, nationalism emerges time and time again in resistance discourse. Thus nationalism may simply be a poorly measured cause of resistance rather than an invalid one. The task ahead for scholars is therefore how to find meaningful and reliable ways to measure variation in nationalism cross-nationally.

Part of the answer may lie in recognizing that nationalism itself is not unitary. As noted by Snyder (2000), nationalism can take civic, ethnic, revolutionary, or counterrevolutionary forms. In the case studies of Lebanon, Lithuania, and Afghanistan, I noted that different conceptions of nationalism could lead to diametrically opposite predictions regarding the likelihood of resistance. Recent scholarship by Schrock-Jacobson (2012) has shown that different types of nationalism have different effects on the prospects of inter-state war initiation. What's a stake in the definition of nationalism goes beyond semantics. Strong civic nationalism impedes the ability of occupiers to dominate occupied societies. Ethnic other sub-national forms of nationalism can be exploited by occupiers to divide and rule occupied societies. Once again, whether nationalism provides dominance to the defense or the offense in International Relations hinges to some degree on this distinction. Future research would do well to explore how different types of nationalism affect resistance to occupation. This would involve coding types of nationalism across occupied societies.

9.3.3 Paths of Resistance

In several case studies, I have shown that indiscriminate violence can galvanize resistance to occupation as civilians are forced to fight to survive. In theory, victimization and political dislocation
should have different effects on the shape and composition of resistance groups. For instance, indiscriminate violence may trigger broader-based resistance groups, organized territorially to protect the greatest number of civilians. In contrast, we might expect political dislocation to trigger narrower resistance groups, organized territorially to maximize the chances of protecting political interests. Further data on the composition and location of resistance groups should be collected to test these hypotheses.

While under many circumstances victimization can trigger a violent response from the occupied population, under other circumstances, particularly brutal repression succeeded in deterring resistance altogether. For example, the Soviet Union faced fierce resistance in Lithuania between 1945 and 1953, but relatively little between 1953 and 1991. Resistance disappeared, not because the Soviet Union abandoned political dislocation or victimization, but precisely because it executed, imprisoned, and deported most resistance fighters. Similarly, Syria managed to dominate Lebanon with relatively little resistance after 1990 by killing and exiling Maronite leaders and deploying a ruthless intelligence service to deter further dissent. This would suggest that repression has a non-linear effect on the likelihood and intensity of resistance. Further research could examine under what circumstances ruthless repression succeeds in cowing an occupied population or stirring revolt. It should also be noted that such research could apply to foreign occupations as well as domestic dictatorships.

9.3.4 The Domestic Politics of International Threats

In one of the main theories of resistance to occupation, Edelstein (2008a) posits that variation in resistance can be explained by the occupied societies’ assessment of foreign threats. Occupied societies are less likely to resist occupation when the occupier is seen as protecting from greater threats. In this view, incentives to undertake resistance are shaped by the international environment. The theory is powerful and intuitively convincing. However, it was not confirmed in the cross-national study. Part of the reason, I argue, is that threat assessments are not unitary. Parts of the occupied society may perceive foreign threats differently, leading to varying reactions to occupation. As the Lithuania and Lebanon case studies demonstrated, this theory could be significantly improved by not treating the occupied territory as unitary, but rather formed by different
political groups. Domestic fissures matter in assessing international threats, as groups may leverage foreign powers to achieve domestic political objectives. International context theory could therefore be improved by integrating political dislocation theory.\(^5\)

### 9.3.5 Strategies of Survival

In some cases of occupation, resistance emerged as a way to protect civilians from occupier victimization. However, aside from resistance, civilians actually have a much broader range of strategies available to them to reduce their exposure to risk in the course of conflict. These strategies can include exit (migration), concealment (hiding), and collaboration, in addition to violent resistance against occupiers. While security studies have tended to focus on why states and armed groups adopt certain `offensive` measures (e.g. terrorism, mass killing and genocide, rape, indiscriminate violence), relatively little cross-national research has examined what `defensive` measures civilians adopt in times of conflict. Thus, further studies could examine why civilians adopt different types of strategies or combinations thereof, and which strategies hold the most chance of success under different circumstances. As such this research could advise governments and NGOs on how to better protect civilians in the course of conflict, or at a minimum better predict the location of civilians in order to better assist them. Importantly, such studies could go well beyond the case of occupations to include interstate and civil wars. Presumably, the selection of different survival strategies might be shaped by factors such as the type of war, the environment, and the expected duration of conflict.

### 9.3.6 Outliers

Lastly, further research could examine outliers in resistance to occupation. The case studies in this dissertation have focus on those countries that were well predicted by the cross-national model in order to verify the different theories. However, greater theory development could be achieved by examining “off-the-line” cases, that is, those cases poorly predicted by the model (Lieberman 2005). Indeed, the theory can over and under predict resistance. First, states in the Middle East remain major outliers, with levels of resistance far greater than other states with similar socio-

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\(^5\) Edelstein has acknowledged this much in more recent work (2008b, 31).
economic characteristics and levels of political dislocation. Although the volatile nature of the Middle East is now well known to policy makers it is not entirely clear why this is the case. Second, some other cases present real outliers in terms of non-resistance to occupation. A notable example is post-Second World War Japan where the US unilaterally occupied a social homogeneous and strongly nationalist state, and carried extensive political reforms, all this after conducting extensive bombing of civilians (Dower 2000). The theories of trust and political dislocation would predict extensive resistance to US occupation. It would be of great interest to understand why resistance was so muted, in particular because the US experience in Japan appeared to have informed US thinking about occupation prior to the largely failed occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq.

9.4 Implications for Policy

9.4.1 The Future of Foreign Occupation

The study was conducted with the explicit aim of better informing public policy. However, before presenting policy recommendations, a fundamental question is whether the issue of foreign occupation is still relevant. Superficially, it would seem not. Since 1900, the risk of foreign occupation has declined. While occupations remain, they tend to be less bloody, more multilateral, and rarely annexationist. The value of territorial control has decreased as societies have moved from resource extraction and centralized manufacturing (which can be pillaged) to services and decentralized technology industries (which cannot) (Brooks 1999). While the benefits of occupation have declined, the costs have risen. Waves of democratization have increased the cognitive dissonance associated with ruling other people outside accountable institutions. Democratic states are therefore more reticent ideologically to undertake occupation. Foreign occupations have become politically toxic following the bruising experiences of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed during the 2012 US presidential debate on foreign policy, Republican challenger Mitt Romney stated: “We don’t want another Iraq, we don’t want another Afghanistan. That’s not the right course for us” (New York Times 2012). Public support for these missions has dwindled across the West. Such “occupation fatigue” is also reflected in recent US military policy. The US Department of Defense 2012 Strategic Guidance, states bluntly: ”U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct
large-scale, prolonged stability operations” (DOD 2012, 6). In sum, many would argue foreign occupations are costly, unpopular, and anachronistic. We should therefore not expect the issue to remain relevant to International Relations.

Such optimism would be misguided. The age of imperialism and territorial conquest may be closing, but the age of foreign intervention is far from over. Although the number of occupations relative to the number of states has declined over the past century, the absolute number remains constant. Occupation remains a tool of statecraft because states often have little choice but to engage in it. As Leon Trotsky said: “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” The US military sought to forget the painful experiences of counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War and in the 1990s, no one expected the US to become involved in such a strategic backwater as Afghanistan. Yet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan consumed vast political, military, and financial resources since 2001. In the future there will remain scenarios where occupation is likely to be used.

First, some form of occupation is likely to be used to address humanitarian emergencies. Faced with massive human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing, or genocide, states may feel compelled to deploy ground troops to put an end to violence. Such interventions have been legitimated by the concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P). One of the pillars of R2P is that if the state fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures including military intervention in the last resort (ICISS 2001). Such forms of intervention were seen in Kosovo in 1999 and were advocated by some in Syria in 2012. Second, occupation will persist in certain types of robust peacekeeping. First generation peacekeeping during the Cold War was generally “interpositional” designed to halt inter-state conflict along borders. Second generation peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War has tended to deploy to civil war environments, where peace enforcement may be necessary in the absence of consent from all parties. In other words, second generation peace enforcement is much closer to foreign occupation, and demand for such missions has not dissipated. Third, short-term occupation may be necessary to secure weapons of mass destruction in failed or failing states or in states afflicted by civil war. Such concerns are not farfetched: consider Pakistan’s gradual slide into chaos, a catastrophic collapse of the North Korean state, or fears that Syrian chemical weapons might be seized by Islamic extremists (O’Hanlon
2005, 95-120). In 2013, France launched an intervention in Mali to prevent Islamist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda from overthrowing the government. Fourth, states may choose to undertake occupation to stabilize strategically critical regions. Potential scenarios could include a coup in Saudi Arabia that would send oil prices soaring, a shut down of the Panama Canal that would cripple international trade, or an intervention to stabilize border regions of Mexico overwhelmed by drug violence. Lastly, occupation may be necessary to stabilize opposing states in the wake of interstate wars. States may prefer containment, but faced with aggressive leaders, occupation and regime change will remain appealing options. It is instructive to remember that neither Vietnam nor the US sought a war with Cambodia or Afghanistan. Cross-border violence and terrorism pushed them to commit troops. In sum, occupation remains a necessary tool of statecraft in an age of transnational threats and humanitarian emergencies.

9.4.2 Policy Recommendations

If occupations are likely to reoccur, what can be done to minimize the loss of life caused by occupation and resistance? This study provides some recommendations for future foreign interventions.

Avoid set formulas. Interveners should be wary of simple force-to-space and force-to-population ratios in planning occupations. Although population and geography are relevant factors, force planning must also be calibrated to the political objectives being sought. As Eric Shinseki said in his farewell address as Army Chief of Staff: “Beware the twelve-division strategy for a ten-division Army” (Baumgardner 2003). A smaller force may be sufficient in occupations with limited political objectives, but may be insufficient for more ambitious ones.

Cultivate diplomatic and intelligence assets. Interveners should cultivate extensive diplomatic and intelligence assets to understand the potential political impact of occupation. Ideally, such assets should be deployed prior to military engagement. Intelligence agencies are used to estimating the military capabilities of their opponents. This study suggests it may be equally important to weigh the interests of political, social, and religious groups and identify potential spoilers and their capabilities. When possible, states should consult extensively with local parties to solicit their views prior to intervention.

Note that such recommendations are not meant to condone occupation, only to minimize unintended violence.
Leverage local contacts, but beware of capture. Foreigners often rely on local contacts to understand political dynamics of occupied countries and to address identification problems (distinguishing civilians from insurgents). While this local knowledge is critical, it comes with risks of its own. Occupiers face a principal-agent problem with those actors who volunteer to assist them. Such local allies can help occupiers overcome information asymmetries while simultaneously exploiting such asymmetries to their own advantage (Kalyvas 2003). When such capture occurs, political dislocation can occur against the wishes of the intervening forces. Information asymmetries can never be totally avoided, but the risk of capture can be mitigated by diversifying local contacts and triangulating information among sources from different political, ethnic, regional, and religious groups.

Minimize political dislocation. All other things being equal, interveners should minimize political dislocation. As such occupiers should keep political objectives limited, accommodate local actors, and plan for an early exit. Of course, in some circumstances political dislocation is not only inevitable, but actually the purpose of the occupation. As noted, political dislocation can help occupiers overcome the credible commitment problem among leaders of occupied states. When political dislocation is necessary, occupiers should seek to divide potential spoilers with side-payments. If side-payments are insufficient to placate spoilers, or politically unpalatable, occupiers should deploy sufficient forces early on to deter or defeat them. In short, occupiers should seek to avoid, accommodate, compensate, divide, deter, and defeat spoilers, in that order.7

Democracy is no panacea. Interveners have occasionally sought to establish democracies, with varying degrees of success. Democratization retains strong normative appeal, especially among democratic interveners. Elections serve as focal points, deliverables, and exit strategies. They can provide a face-saving measure for faltering missions. However well-intentioned, and at times effective, democratization itself can be a major source of political dislocation. Elites may lose privileges and influence as they are forced to compete with other constituencies for political power. Rather than welcoming democracy, these elites may turn to resistance against occupation to safe-

7It should be noted that the pursuit of limited political objectives dovetails with most US public opinion. In an analysis of 1,092 survey questions in public opinion polls from 1981 until early 2005 during 22 episodes of conflict, Einchenberg (2005) found that Americans are more likely to support the use of military force for “foreign policy restraint” (i.e. preventing states from undertaking undesirable actions) than to support what is coded as internal political change.
guard their political influence (in some circumstances such spoilers have the courtesy to wait until the departure of occupiers to reassert themselves). Indeed, democratization can sometimes lead to conflict, as opportunistic elites drum up nationalist sentiment. Importantly, the interests of spoilers are often better organized and more strongly incentivized than those of the broader public. Therefore, although democratization may still retain strong normative appeal for foreign interveners, it can’t be assumed the occupied population will necessarily welcome it.

Similarly, occupiers can face resistance by backing fledgling democracies in occupied states. Newly elected governments may undertake policies that counter the interests of certain domestic constituencies. Such constituencies may undertake resistance against what they see as the government’s foreign enablers. Thus, occupiers face a quandary. Although they may wish to avoid resistance, occupiers are committed to supporting the new regime to secure the gains of intervention over the longer term. Moreover, occupiers may find it harder to openly criticize the democratically elected leaders of the occupied government. Thus, occupiers may become “tethered” to new democracies in occupied states, even as they face the prospect of violent resistance (interview with Jean-Marie Ghéhéno, 19 October 2010).

*Winning hearts and minds is necessary but not sufficient.* Recent American COIN doctrine has emphasized the importance of winning hearts and minds (US Army 2007). Similarly trust theory indicates occupied societies are more likely to resist foreign occupation if they see themselves as being victimized by occupying forces. However, political dislocation theory argues that even well-behaved occupying forces may face resistance from those who stand to lose from occupation. Therefore, winning and hearts and minds may not be sufficient to prevent or quell resistance. That being said, occupying forces need to use care and discrimination in responding to factionalized resistance in order to avoid broadening the resistance’s base of recruitment.

*Beware of cheering crowds and initial calm.* Many cases in this dissertation described instances where occupiers were initially welcomed by cheering crowds. Occupiers took such crowds as symbols of support for their mission when in fact they were precursors to violent resistance. The cheering crowds were not representative of the broader population, but rather those groups who stood to gain from political dislocation. Similarly, occupiers should not be lulled into complacency by initial calm in occupied territory. Most individuals prefer to sit on the fence. Domestic actors will wait and see what policies occupiers intend to promote before deciding to take action.
addition, aggrieved parties may take time to assemble and generate a fighting force. The initial calm of occupation is the best time to reach out to potential spoilers.

*Send costly signals.* Trust theory argued that major asymmetries of power and information between occupiers and the occupied could generate fear and mistrust. Occupiers should therefore not assume that their motives and objectives will be clearly understood by the occupied population (especially if there are elites who stand to gain by sowing fear). Efforts to alleviate fears are cheap talk since powerful occupiers pay no price for rescinding on their promises. Occupiers can better signal benign intentions by sending costly signals, that is, signals that a more predatory occupier would refuse to send. These can include seeking a mandate from an international organization, setting up multinational forces, and undertaking extensive and public local consultations. Such actions can be complex, cumbersome, and time consuming. But it is precisely because they are inconvenient that they make occupiers more credible.

*Timing is essential.* The timing of political engagement with potential spoilers is essential. Political accommodation is much harder to achieve once violent resistance has occurred. Insurgencies can generate endogenous cycles of violence. Responding to resistance, occupiers will often cause collateral damage. Collateral damage, in turn, can inflame resentment, generating further resistance. Thus, an insurgency driven by a narrow set of grievances by a certain set of the population can widen as civilians react to what they see as an arbitrary exercise of force by occupiers. As Betts (1994, 23) notes, once violent conflict begins: "emotions intensify, sunk costs grow, demands for recompense escalate." Issues of credibility, honor, and face-saving can unnecessarily prolong conflict. Therefore, occupiers need to engage potential spoilers early to prevent factional resistance from turning into broad based resistance against perceived victimization.

*Plan for post-occupation.* States frequently descend into civil war following foreign occupations. Interstate war can destroy the state’s coercive apparatus and economic infrastructure while occupation can create political dislocation. Moreover, rival resistance groups may vie for political power upon the withdrawal of foreign troops. Resistance does not necessarily end once occupiers have left. To minimize the chances of post-occupation civil war, occupiers should seek to bolster state capacity, reduce political dislocation (e.g. reconciling potential spoilers), or both. Interna-

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8Vocal skepticism of the UN notwithstanding, Americans tend to be more supportive of the use of military force when it is undertaken in a multilateral context (Jentleson 1992; Einchenberg 2005).
tional and regional organizations may be required to monitor and mediate among post-occupation factions.

Maintain COIN capabilities and training. Lastly, states such as the US should maintain counterinsurgency training and doctrine. Foreign occupations will remain a tool of state policy, albeit a difficult one. Having ground forces trained in community relations, human intelligence, and cultural sensitivity, as well as being capable of navigating the challenges of insurgents operating amongst foreign civilians will be essential. Importantly, these are skills that cannot be ramped up quickly or easily; they require years of training. At the same time, as mentioned above, the timing is essential in stemming resistance. It is therefore necessary to have adequately trained forces deployed to theaters of operations early in order to preempt spirals of violence caused by potential political dislocation and civilian victimization.

As I have sought to demonstrate, foreign interventions and occupations are likely to persist in world politics not only because of predatory states, but also due to ongoing humanitarian and security challenges. Occupation remains a necessary tool of statecraft, but is still an extremely complex undertaking, often tied to the vagaries of local politics. Powerful armies have been defeated by resistance forces, and even “successful” occupations have often only done so at an extremely high sacrifice. Even when fatalities are low, economic and political costs can be great. Whatever policy recommendations may be given, occupation must be employed with the utmost caution. The findings of this study are not the first nor the last word on the subject, but hopefully a modest contribution to reducing unintended violence.
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