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ABSTRACT


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Violent events involving female students symbolized the rise and fall of the New Left in Japan, from the death of Kanba Michiko in a mass demonstration of 1960 to the 1972 deaths ordered by Nagata Hiroko in a sectarian purge. This study traces how shifting definitions of violence associated with the student movement map onto changes in popular representations of the female student activist, with broad implications for the role women could play in postwar politics and society.

In considering how gender and violence figured in the formation and dissolution of the New Left in Japan, I trace three phases of the postwar Japanese student movement. The first (1957–1960) was one of idealism, witnessing the emergence of the New Left in 1957 and, within only a few years, some of its largest public demonstrations. Young women became new political actors in the postwar period, their enfranchisement commonly represented as a break from and a bulwark against "male" wartime violence. The participation of females in the student movement after its split from the Old Left of the Japan Communist Party in 1957 served to legitimize the anger of the New Left by appealing to the hegemonic ideal of young women's political purity.

Chapter one introduces the postwar context in which female students represented, in both works of fiction and reportage, new ideals for citizen participation and agency. The 1960 death of activist Kanba Michiko at the frontline of a climactic protest against renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty (Anpo) won an extraordinary amount of public sympathy for the student
movement as a whole in the early 1960s. Kanba stepped into a narrative, forged in the mass media, of young women as victims of violence. However, when considered as an individual, Kanba is far more complicated and even aggressively radical. Chapter two traces the processes by which Kanba Michiko became an icon of New Left sacrifice and the fragility of postwar democracy. It introduces Kanba's own writings to underscore the ironic discrepancy between her public significance and her personal relationship to radical politics.

A phase of backlash (1960–1967) followed the explosive rise of Japan's New Left. During the early and mid-1960s, both leftists and conservatives engaged in a series of seemingly disparate debates about the political place of women, countering ideals of female purity and political utility. In the wake of the 1959–1960 mass demonstrations opposing Anpo and the death of Kanba Michiko, government policies focused on national economic growth sought to quiet the recent tempest of street activism. Chapter three introduces some key tabloid debates that suggested female presence in social institutions such as universities held the potential to "ruin the nation." The powerful influence of these frequently sarcastic but damaging debates, echoed in government policies re-linking young women to domestic labor, confirmed mass media's importance in interpreting the social role of the female student. Although the student movement imagined itself as immune to the logic of the state and the mass media, the practices of the late-1960s campus-based student movement, examined in chapter four, illustrate how larger societal assumptions about gender roles undergirded the gendered hierarchy of labor that emerged in the barricades. I frame these practices as a kind of backlash in light of the theoretical importance of the writings of Tokoro Mitsuko to the organizational ideals of the late-1960s student movement. Tokoro, a student activist of Kanba Michiko's generation, proposed to bring nonviolent and nurturing feminine values to the student movement as a whole. Although Tokoro's ideas of a
non-hierarchical leftist organization influenced the student movement of the late 1960s, opening up a moment of potential liberation for female student activists from the strict gender codes solidifying in Japan's increasingly rationalized economy and society, the dichotomy of "violence" versus "nurturing" created a new hierarchy in the campus-based student movement of 1968–1969.

The final phase (1969–1972) of the student New Left was dominated by two imaginary rather than real female figures, and is best emblematized by the notion of “Gewalt." I use the German term for violence, Gewalt, because of its peculiar resonances within the student movement of the late 1960s. Japanese students employed a transliteration—gebaruto—to distinguish their "counter-violence" from the violence employed by the state. However, the mass media soon picked up on the term and reversed its polarities in order to disparage the students' actions. It was in this late-1960s moment that women, once considered particularly vulnerable to violence, became deeply associated with active incitement to violence. In the case of Japan's New Left, the imaginary embodiment of the rationalized liberal social order and the target of the radical student movement's anger was not "the Man," but "Mama." The conservative order that stepped in after the Anpo demonstrations to organize social life around national economic strength linked women with motherhood and the household, and knitted each household in turn to the Japanese nation. Chapter five explores how student activists' rejection of "Mama" led to an embrace of a particularly masculinist ideal of violence, aligning the student left in many ways with the logic of the far right. Chapter six explores how the mass media, on the other hand, coded female student activism in particular as both terrifying and titillating through its imaginary construction of the "Gewalt Rosa" (Violent Rosa). By 1970, public sympathy, which had sided with the student movement when its members seemed like victims of state violence, faded in the
wake of increasingly violent poses and tactics on the part of the New Left. Demonstrating the shifting meaning of the politics of protest, by the end of the 1960s, few Japanese would have entertained the idea that female students were politically innocent, much less peaceful by nature.

Throughout these three phases, violence may have changed in form, but it provided a common means of pursuing political goals as well as evaluating their significance. The social meaning created by the relationship between female students and violence and disseminated through the mass media critically influenced public reception of student activism. When, in 1972, the mass media revealed a leftist group's bloody internal purge, it marked the definitive "death" of the New Left. The female leader of the group, Nagata Hiroko, stepped all too conveniently into existing media formulations of the "Gewalt Rosa", leading to a general disavowal of the student movement among feminists in the 1970s.
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Introduction

This is the story of one of the most violent but least understood student movements of the twentieth century. In the 1960s, few industrialized nations escaped the eruption of student radicalism. In Japan as elsewhere, the student New Left battled police in the streets, disrupted hundreds of campuses, paralyzed the higher education system, and challenged political institutions. More than any other single factor, female participation defined the postwar student movement in Japan and its relationship to the public. Indeed, I argue that female participation is what made the New Left "new" in the popular imagination. Violent events involving female students symbolized the rise and fall of the New Left in Japan, from the death of Kanba Michiko in a mass demonstration of 1960 to the 1972 deaths ordered by Nagata Hiroko in a sectarian purge. This study traces how shifting definitions of violence associated with the student movement map onto changes in popular representations of the female student activist, with broad implications for the roles women could play in postwar politics and society. The title of my study, "Coed Revolution," emphasizes the newly coeducational character of many universities and of student activism in 1960s Japan, while underlining also that the female "coed" represented a potentially revolutionary figure. The English-language "coed" also carries reactionary valences that make it my favored translation for the Japanese term *joshigakusei* (female student). This literally means "girl student," and I translate this term as the English term "coed" to convey the various implications of secondary status conferred by the term *joshigakusei* in the context of postwar debates on coeducation. Both terms imply that the position of the female student was supplementary and particular in contrast to the
primary and normative position of the male student, who is referred to simply as a gakusei (student), unburdened by the gendered qualifier.

This story is not about a "women's movement." However, it is about women who moved: into formerly all-male institutions of education, into street protests, into campus barricades. The following chapters tell the story of the New Left in postwar Japan from its formation in the late 1950s to its dissolution in the early 1970s through the figure of the female student with the goal of assessing how gender influenced the political possibilities of radical politics in postwar Japan. A focus on the role of female student activists in the dynamic protest movements of the 1960s allows us to answer broader questions that are key both to a history of women in modern Japan and to the global history of 1960s student activism and 1970s feminism.

Postwar reforms in Japan create the context for my history. The Allied Occupation of Japan (1945–1952) inaugurated a gendered political culture that construed female participation in an essentializing way, specifically understanding females as non-violent. Japan's wartime experience and the particular ways in which women were imagined to figure in its resolution offered women a privileged place from which to speak as new citizens. Furthermore, progressive advocates of democracy and women's suffrage attributed feminine characteristics to postwar democracy itself. After democratic reforms ended the longstanding government ban on coeducation beyond the primary level in 1947, the female college student tested the limits of democratic citizenship. While she embodied the new citizenship ideal of a pacifist postwar society, she also threatened received social hierarchies in formerly all-male social institutions and, in the eyes of the male gatekeepers of those institutions, harbored a terrifying potential for radical violence. Policy changes formed the postwar order that I examine. However, I do not wish to overemphasize a sense of rupture with the pre-1945 past. I approach this project along
both diachronic and synchronic lines, situating the figure of the female student in Japan's New Left within the longer history of Japanese women as well as within the growing scholarship on protest in the global 1960s.

A key goal of this project is to unsettle a clear "Left to Lib" trajectory, in which women, ostensibly not addressed in the "men's" New Left movement of the 1960s, supposedly formed their own movement, "women's lib," in the 1970s.¹ As Kathleen Uno has argued of "first-wave" and "second-wave" feminists in Japan, "the personal and organizational ties between first- and second-wave activists [caution us] against assuming a great disjuncture between pre- and post-1970 women's movements."² My project likewise demonstrates that no "great disjuncture" existed between the frequently sexist and self-consciously masculine student movement and the later emergence of women-only activism. It seeks instead to uncover a dynamic history in which a student movement composed of both male and female students, created by postwar policies of coeducation, negotiated rapidly changing ideals of femininity and masculinity. So far there has been little scholarly analysis of how female participation operated within the 1960s student movement in Japan, although a common complaint voiced by feminists in the 1970s indicted the late 1960s movement for relegating young women behind the university barricades to kitchen duty. Even more damning were accounts of sexual assault.³ The facts involved are true enough. However, the historiographic commonplace that the student New Left of 1968–1969 was a male movement and that the subsequent women's liberation movement of the early 1970s was a women's movement does little to explain why student activism, which actually succeeded in

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¹ See, for example, Vera Mackie, *Feminism in Modern Japan: Citizenship, Embodiment, and Sexuality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
mobilizing many young women, including a number who went on to participate as feminist activists, may have inspired the future strategies of women's lib, but ultimately failed to incorporate young women's political interests. As the present study reveals, female students' participation in radical activism alongside male students influenced the theories and strategies of the New Left, and contributed to a rise in young women's consciousness of everyday sexism. Guy Yasko, in his examination of the philosophy of campus-based activism in Japan, noted that the "history of women's thought and struggle were essential ingredients" of late-1960s student radicalism.\(^4\) However, his study does not incorporate an analysis of how those "essential ingredients" became erased in the course of the movement. I offer here an examination of gender—not only femininity but also masculinity—within the Japanese student movement of the 1960s in order to illuminate the processes by which "women's issues" fell out of the New Left.

Scholars such as Setsu Shigematsu on radical women's lib and Patricia Steinhoff on extreme leftist sects have noted that the violent dissolution of the New Left in Japan had everything to do with gender.\(^5\) As Shigematsu demonstrates, a feminist critique of the masculinist practices of the student movement provided the theoretical foundation of radical women's lib, which also strove to understand the violent potential of women, as demonstrated by female leftist activists.\(^6\) Critically, Shigematsu offers a close examination of the thought and practices of Tanaka Mitsu, a key women's-lib theorist, whom previous accounts of activism

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6 Shigematsu, *Scream from the Shadows*, 159.
frequently cited but rarely analyzed. Steinhoff, while arguing that women rose to positions of power in the far-left Japan Red Army only when male leaders could not fulfill their duties, also noted the sexist media frenzy that interpreted their leftist violence for popular consumption. By contrast, my study suggests that ideas about gender, violence, and the role of both in a politics of dissent were crucial considerations for the New Left in Japan from its very inception.

By showing how female participation made the New Left "new" in the Japanese case, I argue for a gendered understanding of radical politics in postwar Japan. My use of the term "New Left" borrows an Anglophone expression to describe a larger global phenomenon. In the United States, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) adopted the term New Left in 1963 from previous British usage, defining a break from the "Old Left" of institutionalized Communist and Social Democratic parties and a commitment to such concerns as social equality, antimilitarism, and antiracism. I use the same term to describe the main current of student leftism in Japan after the late-1950s break from the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Although "women's issues" at no point constituted a major part of the movement's concerns, female participation defined the postwar student movement as distinct from prewar iterations, and influenced public reception of its actions. As Henry Smith has noted in his study of the prewar student left at Tokyo Imperial University, two key factors that distinguished the postwar student movement from its predecessors were a disassociation from the Japan Communist Party and a willingness to resort

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8 Steinhoff, “Death by Defeatism”; Steinhoff, “Three Women Who Loved the Left.”

to physical combat.\textsuperscript{10} In passing, Smith also mentions the presence of female students as a distinctive feature of postwar activism.\textsuperscript{11} I choose to understand all three forms of difference as mutually interrelated, and indeed crucial to understanding how the student movement in postwar Japan organized itself and operated within the popular imagination. To approach social movements from the perspective of gender is to reevaluate in a fundamental way the political dynamics of the postwar order.

Although it is possible, as Takemasa Ando has done, to expand the definition of the New Left in Japan to include citizens' and workers' groups, I limit my project to the student movement.\textsuperscript{12} Not only did the phrase "student power" become a powerful rallying cry among expanding university populations worldwide by the late 1960s, but examining a postwar student New Left across generations of activists and causes between 1957 and 1972 reveals significant shifts in the social meaning of activism at large. Many scholarly works on activism in 1960s Japan frame their research around either the 1960 mass demonstrations surrounding revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty or, alternatively, the late-1960s flurry of protest against the Vietnam War that resonated with similar aesthetic, cultural, and activist cultures globally. Wesley Sasaki-Uemura has shown how 1960 protests centered around Tokyo "marked a paradigm shift in social movements away from ideologies of class struggle and mass movements dominated by workers and the opposition parties to smaller, diverse movements based on citizens as the main actor."\textsuperscript{13} Simon Avenell has recently returned to the protest movement of


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 274.

\textsuperscript{12} Takemasa Ando, \textit{Japan's New Left Movements: Legacies for Civil Society} (Routledge, 2013), 2.

\textsuperscript{13} Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, \textit{Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in Postwar Japan} (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 2.
1960 to discuss how the defeat of the anti-Treaty citizens' protests inspired new modes of citizen activism. My work draws on the above understandings of how a new citizen ethos arose in the course of the 1960 protests and its aftermath. My examination of the New Left reveals how critical gendered social meanings and roles became not only for progressives, but also for radical critiques of civil society from both the left and the right in the 1960s. In focusing on the student left and particularly the role of female participation in that movement, I demonstrate the ways in which young women activists both defined the model postwar citizen and also threatened that ideal.

The swirl of discourses around the "coed" citizen in the 1960s had connotations beyond gender and schooling with roots that traversed the ostensible rupture of 1945. Much like the Modern Girl of the late 1920s, influentially discussed by Barbara Sato and Miriam Silverberg, the coed was as much a creation of the mass media as she was a real person. If, as Silverberg put it, the "Modern Girl appeared during a historical juncture" in which Japanese women acted as "consumers, producers, legal subjects, and political activists," the postwar coed stood at a similarly momentous historical juncture, with the critical difference that she was a newly minted citizen and, at least early on in the postwar period, considered a particularly pacifistic political subjectivity. Postwar reforms transformed the institutional landscape within which the female student accessed public spaces previously forbidden to her. However, conservative reactions to the "coed" in the 1960s often repeated earlier reactions to the appearance of the "Modern Girl" in

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urban landscapes. The female student became a representative of both the potential and the threat of consumer culture and social revolution in the mass media.

Recent scholarship on female political activism in the Meiji Period (1868–1912) demonstrates that a lack of "citizenship" does not categorically bar women from civil society. However, as Marnie Anderson argues, gender constituted a key criterion of one's fitness to participate in formal channels of politics under the modern constitutional order. Anderson finds the 1890 Law on Political Association and Assembly banning women from joining political parties and attending political events to be a "foundation stone of the modern Japanese state." Although in 1922 women were finally allowed to attend political meetings, they would not gain the right to vote or to join political parties until postwar constitutional reforms revolutionized political life. Another reform that postwar authorities instituted alongside women's suffrage was a new policy encouraging coeducation, which overturned a longstanding government ban on educating boys and girls together beyond primary school. My project explores not the history but rather the consequences of changes in access to formerly all-male institutions of education and modes of political activism.

In the high-growth era in Japan, gender difference became important in social and political discourse at the precise moment that other fraught social differences, such as class and ethnicity, were elided in favor of a myth of a classless, homogenous nation of Japanese citizen-subjects. "Women" became the key particularity as a symbol for a host of anxieties about

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18 Anderson, A Place in Public, 53.
massification and democratization in higher education, even as new economic imperatives drove its expansion.

Although ostensibly included in the post-WWII definition of citizenship, sociological studies on the conditions facing Japanese citizens routinely excluded women. Influenced by American sociologists, founders of the 1955 Social Stratification and Social Mobility (SSM) Survey in Japan attempted to collect data on changes in class structure in Japan as economic growth embraced the country. They determined class mobility in patriarchal fashion, by tracing the changed social statuses of sons in relation to fathers. Until the mid-1980s, their sociological definition of the “citizen” who was or was not making class gains assumed that he was male.19

The idealized universal citizen of Japan’s postwar democracy, by the late 1960s, was also middle-class. Although scholars established the SSM Survey to monitor class mobility, by the late 1960s, about ninety percent of respondents to the annual Survey on the People’s Life-Style conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office in Japan identified themselves as belonging to the middle, upper-middle, or lower-middle socio-economic strata.20 While many sociologists and economists used the language of social class to analyze dynamics within Japanese society, fewer people found class a meaningful category for their own lives. They were more inclined to


identify with a mainstream, classless ideal of the “typical” Japanese household. Furthermore, in the wake of the failed coal miners' strikes in Miike, Kyushu in 1960, a class-struggle model for political protest and change came to seem outmoded. This did not mean that the uneven economic development so dramatically highlighted by the embattled coal miners in Japan's hinterlands ceased to exist. However, from 1960 on, the terms of organized labor shifted from “class struggle” to those of a shared strategy between employers and workers for affluence and prosperity. Although access to that prosperity varied in the high-growth period, and the rise of a civic subjectivity that transcended class did not mean that Japanese society had become classless, middle-class aspirations—with deeply gendered inflections and expectations—became a strong ideal not only within mainstream Japanese society, but also within Japan’s unions.

Another strong trend that emerged from the high-growth period and within the crucible of American Cold War policy, insistent upon Japanese ethnic distinctness from the rest of Asia, was to subsume difference in terms of class and ethnicity into a cultural ideal of a homogenous Japanese ethnos. Issues raised by the ongoing presence of those on the outside of a mainstream definition of "Japanese"—"resident Koreans" brought to Japan while subjects of the empire and

21 Kelly, “At the Limits of New Middle Class Japan: Beyond ‘Mainstream Consciousness,’” 234. The question of whether a class exists without its own self-recognition as a collective remains a persistent issue for Marxist and non-Marxist social sciences alike.


24 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 106–107. See Morris-Suzuki's entire chapter on race in modern Japan to see how this postwar link between ethnos and citizenship "narrowed possible ethnic meanings" of being a Japanese national at the same time that there was a "broadening of the political meaning of nationality," as, for example, with the inclusion of previously oppositional political positions and also women.
continually denied citizenship status, indigenous Ainu in the north, the historically outcast burakumin people—failed to spark mass debate. While class faded from popular and political discourse and became chiefly the province of intellectuals in the 1960s, race for the most part escaped the attention of the period’s scholars.25

A vision of an ethnically and increasingly economically homogenous society still allowed for—in fact, it insisted upon—difference between “mainstream” male and female roles.26 As historian Carol Gluck has described the postwar ideal, "The middle-class myth reaffirmed and regendered the family, remarginalized minorities, and reestablished a monolithic, homogenous society of 100 million Japanese as one putative middle class."27 Those excluded from the accepted standards of "Japaneseness" could not test the limits from without; the figures of middle-class Japanese women, however, tested the limits of access to citizen subjectivity from within.

Although the story of the postwar student movement is the story also of this expanding and increasingly hegemonic postwar middle class, this story, too, has transwar dimensions. As Mark Jones has noted of early twentieth-century Japan, "Higher education institutions, urban education societies, and the periodical press were a few of the arenas where the desired [middle-class] community was created and displayed."28 This institutional configuration lasted into the postwar period, so that my study situates the radicalism of college students within the discursive

28 Mark A. Jones, Children as Treasures: Childhood and the Middle Class in Early Twentieth Century Japan (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010), 25.
space of the periodical press to examine not only postwar democracy, but also the postwar middle-class family. In the postwar period of rapid economic growth, the middle class, long an economic and cultural ideal, became mainstream. By the late 1960s, about ninety percent of respondents to the annual Survey on the People's Lifestyle conducted by the Prime Minister's Office identified themselves as belonging to the middle, upper-middle, or lower-middle socioeconomic strata. But self-identification as "middle class" is as much cultural as it is economic, and in postwar Japan, much as in the prewar period, "middle class" identity rested on a gendered division of labor within the home. The Japanese New Left of the 1960s defined itself in many ways as a radical challenge to middle-class values and structures, even as more and more young people entered the "middle class" through expanded access to higher education. Gender, key to the historical definition of a middle-class lifestyle in modern Japan, therefore also informed postwar student critiques, although the meanings generated by gender shifted over the course of the period.

The postwar student movement was "postwar" in the chronological sense of following the Second World War. It was also "postwar" in how it framed its concerns, since the recent history of militarism informed the concerns of the Japanese student movement between the 1950s and 1970s, and especially its relationship to violence. Postwar democracy became the hegemonic

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31 Jeremy Varon has noted the influence a recent past of militarism had on the radical New Left in West Germany. See Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army
ideal for Japanese society, but Japan's Cold War relationship to the United States often stood at odds with what certain people in either country would have defined as radical democracy. New Left activism often reacted against what students saw as hypocritical calls for "peace" within a larger geopolitical order of war and for social harmony within an exploitive and hierarchical economy. Immediately after the war, youth enjoyed a particularly privileged place as new and "pure" social actors. As Charles Kim has noted of the April 1960 eruption of student activism in South Korea, "More so than any other social identity, the South Korean 'student' was assigned the moral duty of serving as the vanguard of postcolonial nation-building and postwar national recovery."32 While Japan's case was post-imperial rather than postcolonial, the Japanese student similarly enjoyed a new moral authority in 1960. That moral authority cannot be grasped fully without understanding its gender dynamics, as the social identity of “college student" and “student activist" had only recently expanded to include young women. While the growing violence of the late-1960s student movement has been attributed to, among other factors, an "excess of ethics" that student radicals felt justified intensified attacks on police, university property, and each other, I carefully trace the shifting relationship between popular support and student activism to reveal a gendered dynamic of violence and vulnerability.33 How violence and vulnerability intersected with gender in the student New Left defined the movement's relationship to its members and to the public at large, as communicated in the expanding mass media of the time.

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33 The term "excess of ethics" is Takemasa Ando's. Ando, Japan's New Left Movements, 5.
The discursive space of the periodical press plays an important role in framing my project. The expanding mass media of the 1960s, which may be seen as an informal educational institution that disseminated knowledge of protest to a more general readership, in many ways defined the social meaning of the student movement. The successes and failures of New Left activism hinged upon media representation. As Todd Gitlin has pointed out in his discussion of the historical relationship between the New Left and the mass media in the United States, "People directly know only tiny regions of social life." Like Gitlin, I emphasize the role of the mass media in "orchestrating everyday consciousness" by virtue of "their pervasiveness, their accessibility, [and] their centralized symbolic capacity." The vast majority of Japanese in the 1960s, like their American counterparts, "relied] on the media for concepts, for images of their heroes, for guiding information, for emotional charges, for a recognition of public values, for symbols in general, even for language."34 Gitlin specifically traces how the mass media first ignored, then hystericized, and finally undermined the American student movement of the 1960s. I find elements of these same processes, along with significant differences, in the relationship between the student New Left and the mass media in Japan. Gitlin is hardly the first thinker to link the news media with social perceptions of daily life. Tosaka Jun, a Japanese Marxist philosopher, noted as early as the 1930s that the press operated as an "agent of ideology" and did not simply communicate, but itself constructed both the idea and content of "public opinion."35 Although I listen also for the voices of student activists, and female student activists in particular, my analysis devotes sustained attention to the role of the mass media as an actor creating social meaning.

34 Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching, 1.
Both Gitlin and Tosaka, writing on the mass media at different times and from different perspectives, include a keyword critical to recent studies of radical activism in 1960s Japan: the "everyday." Radical activism in several sites around the globe in the 1960s defined their battles around not just revolutionizing political structures, but also transforming daily life. The designation New Left describes not only a political, but also a cultural sensibility. Takemasa Ando frames his examination of changes in activism over the 1960s in terms of how New Left groups reacted to the "disciplinization" of everyday life, commonly referred to in Japan as "controlled society" (*kanri shakai*). Ando points out that the latter concept was not merely a translation of Western thinkers such as Marcuse, but also a response to the circumstances in which activists operated. Ando's study of artist-driven attempts to challenge the regulated daily life of the state, in which economic prosperity eclipsed political engagement, demonstrates the importance of artists in identifying "everyday" life as a key site of contestation in the 1960s. I share with Ando and Marotti a concern for the role of "everyday life" as a critical site for 1960s activists and also as an analytic mode for historians examining that era. Indeed, I find that a gendered analysis of this particularly gender-coded moment and movement reveals the limits to the New Left's conceptualization of "everyday life."

The pervasive influence of mass media in the 1960s resulted also in an acute sense of the synchronicity, particularly during the late 1960s, of "student power," as campus-based protests erupted worldwide and images of street demonstrations flew across the globe via print media as well as the moving images of television. Extending the chronology of the Japanese New Left back to the late 1950s split from the Japan Communist Party demonstrates that the late 1960s

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wave of activism in Japan, while galvanized by US involvement in Vietnam, did not arise in
reaction to or as a Japanese version of American counterculture.\textsuperscript{38} Indeed, the youth protests of
1960 in Japan prompted observers to decry Japanese democracy as "immature," setting the scene
for an ironic switch when extraparliamentary protest erupted in the democratically "mature"
United States in the late 1960s.

The feminism of 1970s Japan similarly cannot be dismissed as a Western import. Neither
should it be thought of as an inherently "feminine" reaction to the "masculine" dogmatism and
violence of the student movement. An examination of tensions within the New Left helps
illuminate how gender—that is, issues of femininity and masculinity—became important in the
student movement of the 1960s. A complex interplay between essentializing gender categories
influenced political action and its reception. How gender ideals set up hierarchies of violence and
vulnerability need to be understood, since, as Setsu Shigematsu has pointed out, a tendency
within certain strands of feminism to create a universalizing discourse of the victimhood of
women can obscure the capacity of women to wield power and commit violence.\textsuperscript{39} Although the
story of the student New Left includes cases of sexism toward women from both within the
movement and among its observers, I will show also how assigning women the role of victims
can obscure women's social critiques and quickly flip into a contrasting essentialist idea of
female authority as threat to masculine vulnerability.

Albeit with great variation, similar "Left to Lib" narratives emerge in the wake of nearly
every youth movement around the world considered New Left. Sara Evans pointed out over
thirty years ago how sexism within the civil rights and radical New Left movements led to a

\textsuperscript{38} Eric Zolov makes this point about the Mexican case, contextualizing the counterculture within the
Counterculture} (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1999).

\textsuperscript{39} Shigematsu, \textit{Scream from the Shadows}.  

women's liberation movement in the United States.\textsuperscript{40} Collected memoirs of second-wave feminists assembled in the United States, Germany, and Japan reveal similar understandings of coming into consciousness of women's issues through New Left activism.\textsuperscript{41} While respecting individuals' interpretations of their own life stories, I also suggest that bringing women back into the story of leftist student radicalism in Japan will illuminate the role of gender in the structure of the New Left.\textsuperscript{42}

In considering how gender and violence figured in the formation and dissolution of the New Left in Japan, I trace three phases of the postwar Japanese student movement. The first (1957–1960) was one of idealism, witnessing the emergence of the New Left in 1957 and, within only a few years, some of its largest public demonstrations. Young women became new political actors in the postwar period, their enfranchisement commonly represented as a break from and a bulwark against "male" wartime violence. The participation of females in the student movement after its split from the Old Left of the Japan Communist Party in 1957 served to legitimize the anger of the New Left by appealing to the hegemonic ideal of young women's political purity. Chapter One introduces the postwar context in which female students represented, in both works of fiction and reportage, new ideals for citizen participation and agency. The 1960 death of

\textsuperscript{40} Sara Evans, \textit{Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left} (New York: Knopf, 1979).


female student activist Kanba Michiko at the frontline of a climactic protest against renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty (Anpo) won an extraordinary amount of public sympathy for the student movement as a whole in the early 1960s. Kanba Michiko stepped into a narrative, forged in the mass media, of young women as victims of violence. However, when approached as an individual, Kanba is far more complicated and even aggressively radical. Chapter Two traces the processes by which Kanba became an icon of New Left sacrifice and the fragility of postwar democracy. It introduces Kanba's own writings to underscore the ironic discrepancy between her public significance and her personal relationship to radical politics.

A phase of backlash (1960–1967) followed the explosive rise of Japan's New Left. During the early and mid-1960s, both leftists and conservatives engaged in a series of seemingly disparate debates about the political place of women, countering ideals of female purity and political utility. In the wake of the 1959–1960 mass demonstrations opposing Anpo and the death of Kanba Michiko, government policies focused on national economic growth sought to quiet the recent tempest of street activism. Chapter Three introduces some key tabloid debates that suggested female presence in social institutions such as universities held the potential to "ruin the nation." The powerful influence of these frequently sarcastic but damaging debates, echoed in government policies re-linking young women to domestic labor, confirmed mass media's importance in interpreting the social role of the female student. Although the student movement imagined itself as immune to the logic of the state and the mass media, the practices of the late-1960s campus-based student movement, examined in Chapter Four, illustrate how larger societal assumptions about gender roles undergirded the gendered hierarchy of labor that emerged in the barricades. I frame these practices as a kind of backlash in light of the theoretical importance of the writings of Tokoro Mitsuko to the organizational ideals of the late-1960s student movement.
Tokoro, a student activist of Kanba Michiko's generation, proposed to bring nonviolent and nurturing feminine values to the student movement as a whole. Although Tokoro's ideas of a non-hierarchical leftist organization influenced the student movement of the late 1960s, opening up a moment of potential liberation for female student activists from the strict gender codes solidifying in Japan's increasingly rationalized economy and society, the dichotomy of "violence" versus "nurturing" created a new hierarchy in the campus-based student movement of 1968–1969.

The final phase (1969–1972) of the student New Left was dominated by two imaginary rather than real female figures, and is best emblematized by the notion of "Gewalt." I use the German term for violence, Gewalt, because of its peculiar resonances within the student movement of the late 1960s. Japanese students employed a transliteration—gebaruto—to distinguish their "counter-violence" from the violence employed by the state. However, the mass media soon picked up on the term and reversed its polarities in order to disparage the students' actions. It was in this late-1960s moment that women, once considered particularly vulnerable to violence, became deeply associated with active incitement to violence. In the case of Japan's New Left, the imaginary embodiment of the rationalized liberal social order and the target of the radical student movement's anger was not "the Man," but "Mama." The conservative order that stepped in after the Anpo demonstrations to organize social life around national economic strength linked women with motherhood and the household, and linked each household in turn to the Japanese nation. Chapter Five explores how student activists' rejection of "Mama" led to an embrace of a particularly masculinist ideal of violence, aligning the student left in many ways with the logic of the far right. Chapter Six explores how the mass media, on the other hand, coded female student activism in particular as both terrifying and titillating through its imaginary
construction of the "Gewalt Rosa." Demonstrating the shifting meaning of the politics of protest, by the end of the 1960s public sympathy, which had sided with the student movement when its members seemed like victims of state violence, faded in the wake of increasingly violent poses and tactics on the part of the New Left. By 1970, few Japanese would have entertained the idea that female students were politically innocent, much less peaceful by nature.

Throughout these three phases, violence may have changed in form, but it provided a common means of pursuing political goals as well as evaluating their significance. The social meaning created by the relationship between female students and violence and disseminated through the mass media critically influenced public reception of student activism. When, in 1972, the mass media revealed a leftist group's bloody internal purge, it marked the definitive "death" of the New Left. The female leader of the group, Nagata Hiroko, stepped all too conveniently into existing media formulations of the "Gewalt Rosa" (Violent Rosa), leading to a general disavowal of the student movement among feminists in the 1970s. I touch upon these issues in my epilogue.
1.

Good Citizens and Angry Daughters:
The Moral Authority of Female Students in the New Left

—It's the school's misguided system and the teachers' feudal ideas that caused this tragedy. In order to guarantee our human rights and our academic freedom, we must show the school administrators that all of us students stand together in protest.

—Hear, hear!

Female students in Garden of Women (1954)

Kinoshita Keisuke's 1954 film Garden of Women (Onna no en) opens with a close-up shot of a young woman as she denounces school administrators' "feudal" wrongdoing. Her voice is stern, her brow furrowed in anger. As the camera zooms out, it reveals several uniformed female students gathered around the speaker. Her fists are clenched. In response to her urging that the students stand together in protest, a chorus of female voices declares approval. Men push their way into the applauding group, demanding that the young women "break it up!" The young women move. They rush to the gates of their school and grapple with suited men who attempt to keep them out. They jump the walls of the school grounds. The sound of their running feet accompanies images of a swarm of female students in motion. As the young women descend upon the lecture hall, they again confront adult men. One man urges them to "quiet down" and "think calmly." Instead they raise their voices in song.¹ This opening scene offered 1950s filmgoers a vision of the female student as a democratic citizen. The fictional young women's affirmation of their democratic agency against the restrictive rules of their women's college reflects a common trope of the popular imagination in Japan's early postwar decades: that

¹ Kinoshita Keisuke and Abe Tomoji, Onna No En, 1954.
righteous anger was a form of political affect that came easily to young females, and was possibly even to be lauded.

Introduction

The female higher-education student in postwar Japan stood at the intersection of rapidly changing ideologies of gender and age. A general societal consensus on the need for a "break" with wartime institutions thrust both women and youth into the spotlight as key groups victimized by wartime policy. Under postwar democratic reforms, women gained the vote and the right to coeducation, and college students, such as those depicted in Kinoshita's film, demanded access to decision-making at their campuses. For many postwar Japanese, the female student represented the potential for a new and pure political subjectivity. The present chapter draws on works of literary and cinematic fiction, journalism, and the accounts of witnesses to street protest in the late 1950s to trace the construction of new standards of citizen participation and agency through the figure of the female student.

The fictional prominence of the female student as a symbol of democracy during the late 1950s must be understood against the backdrop of evolving leftist politics. In this period, student activism moved away from established leftist parties. I explore fiction in which female students featured as the protagonist in student literary works criticizing the rigid dogmatism of the institutional left in the late 1950s as the split in the late 1950s between a "New Left" and the "Old Left" of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) marked not only a political but also a cultural rift. The participation of young women in the New Left defined the movement, and also became key to the public sympathy for the "anger" of the New Left and its female student activists, in particular as students figured prominently in the 1960 climax of citizen protest around the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Anpo). The presence of female students in anti-Anpo
street protests attracted sympathy to the student movement, and reports of police violence toward the bodies of female students became emblematic of the potential for the violent excesses of the state in opposition to its citizens. Such accounts, frequently articulated by those who were not female students, extended a hegemonic idea of young women's political purity to legitimize the anger of the New Left.

This chapter explores works of fiction alongside journalistic accounts of student activism. Fictional representations of young women as political figures contributed to the way reading and viewing audiences interpreted press reportage on female students. Converseley, films and literature on student activism drew their subjects from the headlines, presenting interpretations of motives that created political meaning in turn. For example, Kinoshita's 1954 film about a group of students at a women's college battling to form a student council at their restrictive school portrayed the young heroines as victims of "feudal" rules. The unyielding and old-fashioned regulations, enforced for their own sake, crush one young woman in particular, played by cinema idol Takamine Hideko. Her suicide prompts school administrators to blame "red elements." However, the film indicts the unyieldingly hierarchical and strict system of the women's college for trapping not only the female students, but also their teachers and parents. Kinoshita's film imagined how various tensions produced by class differences, gender inequality, and family expectations might define a campus movement. Ultimately, however, it was the young women who remained most vulnerable, and their angered reactions come across as just and earnest.

Postwar Student Activism

Audiences most likely would have already read actual news about student attempts to participate in democratic governance at their schools. After the end of the war in 1945, high school and university students were among the first to apply the new democratic ideals of access
and voice to the institutions that governed them. According to one source, the first student strike of the postwar period took place at a women's high school, Ueno Gakuen High School, when 150 female students initiated a strike on 8 October 1945 to protest misappropriation of rations and demand that faculty who had supported the war effort be fired, while faculty who advocated democracy be hired. A series of isolated student protests at various schools—including women's colleges and high schools—culminated in the formation of Student Self-Governing Associations, or Jichikai, beginning at Tokyo University in January 1947. As students from various campuses began to unite to fight rising fee hikes and governmental educational policy, the call for a general student association led to the September 1948 founding of Zengakuren (short for Zen Nihon gakusei jichikai sōrenō, or All-Japan General Alliance of Student Self-Governing Associations). The resolutions adopted by the 250 student representatives from 145 campuses invoked the language of democracy, freedom of study and student political engagement, and identified their collective enemy, in the very first resolution, as “the fascist-colonialistic reorganization of education.” Zengakuren would become a key element in the mass protests leading up to the 1960 renewal of Anpo. The story of how female participation in Zengakuren influenced popular reception of its specifically "New Left" activism in the late 1950s requires an overview of the changing status of female political participation and of the split between Old Left and New Left. Both are stories of a search for moral authority in the wake of Japan's defeat.

The 1945 surrender and subsequent occupation by Allied Forces demanded a complete reconfiguring not only of political structures but also of moral values.

**Gender in Postwar Politics**

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Efforts to imagine the ideal postwar political citizen embraced defeat as a moment of rupture, and instated a political culture in which political participation by women was gendered in an essentializing way representative of change. There is some debate about the source of the 1945 cabinet decision to include women in the national franchise for the first time. Regardless of the policy's origins, the enactment strengthened a narrative of postwar democratization important to both the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces and the postwar Japanese cabinet. Although women's suffrage activists were not directly responsible for securing the vote, they had publicly campaigned for that goal since before the war, and their arguments enjoyed considerable influence in defining its popular meaning. Mainstream suffragists such as Ichikawa Fusae, in particular, stressed the mutual dependence of female political participation and the ideal of peaceful democracy. The hegemonic postwar interpretation of the final "victory" of women's suffrage after enduring repression and political exclusion in the "dark valley" of wartime framed the woman's vote as a bulwark against violence. This narrative elided wartime participation by women in such organizations as the Patriotic Women's Association and National Defense Women's Association in government-led campaigns, including certain forms of street activism. The period of total war was also one in which women entered public spaces in unprecedented numbers. In the prewar and wartime periods as in the postwar period, women's groups drew on a gendered ideology associating women with "purity" to legitimize campaigns against prostitution or partisan politics.\(^5\)

In the postwar period, women's suffrage activists' equation of politics with the vote wrote out not only women's activities on behalf of the wartime state, but also the political contributions

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\(^5\) Ibid.
of women who did not conform to a liberal ideal of citizenship. Defining postwar democratic reforms as a recuperation of interrupted liberal politics effaced the prewar political activism of socialist women, for example. Many proletarian women's alliances of the prewar period had also demanded "full suffrage" (that is, votes for all adult men and women), but standard postwar accounts of women's suffrage in Japan gave them short shrift.\(^6\) Within a dominant narrative that defined women's suffrage as key to ensuring the success of postwar democracy and pacifism, there was little space for radical women. The cases of women such as Kanno Suga (1881–1911), Itō Noe (1895–1923), and Kaneko Fumiko (1906–1926) sat uneasily alongside the triumphant history of women's suffrage as a force for liberalism and peace. All three became infamous in their time for embracing radical thought, ranging from anarchism to nihilism, as well as for defying moral codes for women. The Japanese mass media reacted to these women with fear and scorn; all three died in confrontations with the state.\(^7\) Attempts to emphasize the role of women in creating dramatic postwar change broke the strong imaginative link forged in an earlier time between political women and violence.

The female student became a "citizen" in postwar Japan within an ideological context that associated women with a politics of liberal pacifism. She found entry not only into the political realm, but also, with new coeducation policies, into formerly all-male spaces of higher education. As we shall see, during the early 1960s, allowing young women into key social institutions generated various specters within the public imagination. However, during the early postwar period, the hegemonic ideal of female political pacifism, along with the moral authority


of postwar youth activism, as demonstrated in the anti-Anpo demonstrations, conferred upon the female student activist a particularly "pure" political subjectivity. This image borrowed from earlier discussions of the essential nature of women, but with a slight difference. The postwar emphasis on democratizing and demilitarizing social institutions insisted on admitting women as a method of reforming society. Whereas prewar ideas about women in politics presumed female incompetence, postwar policies that stood women alongside men as full citizens retained a measure of the belief that women were basically vulnerable, but also insisted upon female political competency as a marker of postwar democracy.

**Students in Postwar Politics**

Like the social category of "women," higher-education students, too, came to be perceived in the postwar period as a group with immense democratic potential. Not only were students among the first to adopt the language of "democracy" and "rights" at their schools, but postwar groups such as the Japan Teachers' Union and the Japan Memorial Society for Students Killed in the War memorialized students as particularly vulnerable victims of war, sent to kill and die as soldiers. Although wartime student-soldiers were male, the narrative of victimization colored the public reception of postwar student activism in general. More than any other social demographic, students emblematized the break between wartime ideology and postwar

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8 The "purity" of youth in general was another matter. The popular "Sun Tribe" films targeting a younger audience in the 1950s featured disillusioned and reckless young people and sparked general moral panic. Representative of this genre are films based on Ishihara Shintarō's books, such as *Season of the Sun* (Taiyō no kisetsu), directed by Furukawa Takumi (1956) and *Crazed Fruit* (Kurutta kajutsu), directed by Nakahira Kō (1956). However, both *Cruel Story of Youth* (Seishun zankoku monogatari), directed by Ōshima Nagisa (1960) and *Dry Lake* (Kawaita mizuumi), directed by Shinoda Masahiro (1961) demonstrated how the genre could be subverted to represent nihilistic and immoral youth as victims. In replicating the themes and aesthetics of Sun Tribe film, the more political creators of these two films—Ōshima, Shinoda, and Shinoda's screenplay writer Terayama Shūji—explored the ways in which postwar youth were trapped by a corrupt society. *Dry Lake* ends as the young, guileless female protagonist joins in an anti-Anpo street protest moments before it clashes with riot police.

democratization by virtue of their certain innocence as children during wartime, contrasted with
the potential complicity of every wartime adult. In the late 1950s, when the left-leaning student
movement broke from the JCP, part of what marked this New Left as “new” for many observers
was precisely the participation of female students. The percentage of student activists who were
young women remained small, but fiction and reportage represented them disproportionately.

The leftist character of postwar student activism also leaned upon ideas about moral
authority in the wake of war. Ostensibly nonpartisan, students affiliated with the postwar
Japanese Communist Party quickly captured control of Zengakuren leadership. Aside from the
general appeal of Marxism among students, which had an antecedent in the prewar period, the
history of communist resistance to Japanese militarism attracted many; the Party was made up of
men and women who had suffered imprisonment or exile for their opposition to the wartime
state.10 For those seeking models of strong-willed individuals who had resisted imperialism and
militarism, the Communists offered living examples.

However, the postwar JCP did not escape the factionalism of the prewar Marxist
movement in Japan, and by the late 1950s, tensions brewing between JCP leadership and
elements within Zengakuren came to a head.11 The Party's 1956 withdrawal of support for armed
struggle disenchanted a generation of earnest would-be guerillas who had left universities to
foment revolution in the countryside.12 This domestic issue compounded the disillusionment

10 Ikeda Kazuo, “Historical Background,” in Zengakuren: Japan's Revolutionary Students, ed. Stuart J.
   Postwar Japan as History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 397.
11 Germaine Hoston, The State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan (Princeton, N.J.:
   Princeton University Press, 1994). Chapter Ten offers the background for key postwar debates in the JCP.
12 Shibata Sho's 1964 novel Saredo warera ga hibi focuses on this disappointed generation and includes a
   fictional account of a communist student's conflicted personal relationship with violence and the JCP. The
title is often translated as Well, That's Our Lot, but a more literal translation might be Well, Those Were
   Our Days. It won the prestigious Akutagawa Prize in literature, and remains in print, and is advertised as
many young people felt with international Communism. In the wake of the brutal Soviet
suppression of a people's movement in Budapest in the autumn of 1956 and the USSR's
complicity with United States policy over the Suez Canal crisis, the institutional Left at home
and abroad seemed more interested in maintaining the contemporary power balance than in
achieving a just social order. The JCP's decision to cultivate a larger presence in elections rather
than focusing on direct agitation stood in stark contrast to ongoing conflicts, such as anti-base
struggles and strikes, that brought politics into the streets. Students who might have otherwise
sympathized with a left-leaning critique of contemporary issues were also wary of the paranoia
and inflexible dogmatism that became associated with the student movement under JCP
leadership. In the context of a postwar ideal of active political subjectivity willing to speak truth
to power, the JCP-led student movements seemed to harden in the 1950s into a system that
suppressed individual voices.

**The Female Student as Democratic Protagonist in late-1950s Student Fiction**

In two late-1950s literary representations critical of the Party, both by student writers on
the verge of literary acclaim, female student protagonists offered a useful vehicle for conveying
the authors' critique of rigid leftism. Ōe Kenzaburō and Kurahashi Yumiko both debuted as
literary voices of a new, postwar generation; Ōe as a male student at elite, and newly
coeducational, Tokyo University and Kurahashi as a female coed at Meiji University. Both
enjoyed the support of literary critic Hirano Ken, himself a leftist who opposed the JCP's
"hegemony in culture." Nearly a decade later, in writing a preface to Ōe's student works from

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the “Bible” of the late 1960s student movement on the back cover of the most recent publishing in 2007.
What is striking about the novel, however, is how, although it is often raised as an example of the
literature born of the betrayed, disappointed, and lost *Rokuzenkyo* generation of student leftists, the central
relationship in the novel is that of an engaged couple and the plot is driven by their increased
miscommunication, fueled by her feelings that her desires are subsumed by his.

the late 1950s, Hirano would note the frequent appearance of female students as characters in Ōe's early stories. These young university coeds, novelties to an older generation of readers, marked the milieu of Ōe's fiction as the postwar university.¹⁴ Kurahashi herself embodied that novelty. As her professor, Hirano Ken pointed out her fiction as representative of a fresh voice. In short stories by these student authors, neither one affiliated with organized leftism, fictional accounts of a female student's uneasy relationship with the JCP-led student movement affirmed the primacy of the individual—and, in both cases, female—body over the hypocrisy and inflexibility of dogmatic ideology.

Ōe Kenzaburō's short story "The Time of False Testimony" (Gishō no toki) took full advantage of literature's power to interpret the motivations and tensions behind events reported in the news. Based on various cases of spy accusations, "lynchings," and false identities, "The Time of False Testimony" appeared in the literary journal Bungakkai in October 1957.¹⁵ Although soon overwhelmed by Ōe's increasingly prolific and ambitious oeuvre, the story inspired the 1960 film False Student (Nise gakusei), directed by Masumura Yasuzō. Ōe's story responded to reported cases of student “spies” held by JCP-affiliated groups at the nation's most prestigious campuses, news of which had made its way into mainstream newspapers since the early 1950s.¹⁶ In 1954, a group of JCP student activists allegedly kidnapped and held a suspected

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¹⁵ Republished in 1966 in a collected volume of Ōe's work. Ōe Kenzaburō, “Gishō no toki,” in Ōe Kenzaburō zensakuhin, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1966), 67–97. The transliterated English term “lynch” is used frequently among the Japanese left to describe extralegal punishments inflicted on members of opposing factions or for various infractions. These punishments range in violence and often took the form of beatings; I have not come across a case in which such a “lynching” results in the hanging that is commonly associated with the word in the United States, although “lynchings” have resulted in accidental and intentional deaths.

student spy for one and a half months in the student dorms of Tokyo Metropolitan University and
the elite Tokyo University. Among the group of seven to eight students who stood guard in the
actual incident, one was female.  

While media reports of the 1954 student kidnapping mentioned the female student only
as one aggressor among many, Ōe chose to narrate his fictional account specifically from the
female student's point of view, representing her as ambivalent to her role as a captor. Ōe's
sensual style links her point of view to her embodied experience of the episode. The story opens
as the female student describes the sensation in her fingers as she struggles to untie knots—knots,
we soon learn, that fasten the ropes binding a “false student.” The narrator, who is never given
a name, is part of a group of students holding this “false student” as a suspected spy on the
student movement at “T” University, most likely a reference to Tokyo University. The student
literally bites the female student's hand as she tries to feed him, and throughout the narrative, as
the “spy” escapes and the key student leaders are put on trial, and as students and faculty
conspire to discredit this outsider, the young woman's festering wound troubles her.

While the narrator's physical pain serves as a constant reminder of her role in the false
student's kidnapping, the elite community of men at the university mobilizes to protect the
reputation of the institution by undermining the false student's accusations of kidnapping. As the
female narrator watches facts about the physical structure of the student dorms change and the
testimony of fellow students and professors shift, her body will not allow her to forget the reality
of the false student's imprisonment. Her worries about creating an alibi to protect herself are

17 “Gakusei ryō wo tenten kankin.”
18 Ōe, “Gishō no toki,” 67.
19 On November 1 of the same year, the Yomiuri shinbun ran an article about a false Tokyo University
acting as student activist leader. When he was discovered to be a false student, student activists captured
him and denounced him a spy. He declared, “I'm not a spy. I did it out of vanity.” “Nise Tōdaisei ga chūo
iiin,” Yomiuri shinbun, November 1, 1957.
interrupted by the violent pain of her wound, which does not allow her to sleep at night.\textsuperscript{20}

Students manage to persuade the police and the court that the false student is insane, and seem to convince even themselves that they are blameless. When the actually guilty student leaders are cleared in court, they hold a gathering to bask in their declared innocence. The female student notes, however, that her wound remains imperfectly healed. As she listens to the self-congratulatory speeches, she tries to believe that she is not an aggressor, attempting to convince herself that “perhaps it is fine just to believe [that it never happened].”\textsuperscript{21} However, “On my palm the wound of the false student's bite remained and blood oozed from it.”\textsuperscript{22} Her infected bite continues to aggravate her and prevents her from willing away the unpleasant details of a crime in which she was complicit. She finally cannot bear listening to the false student apologize to his former captors and instead screams out the truth about his involuntary confinement.\textsuperscript{23} The students respond to her presentation of the physical evidence of violence, manifested in the reddened bite, with laughter. She alone among the students is willing to speak the truth, but her voice is drowned out. Ōe suggests that, aside from the young female student, the institutions, and the male students invested in them, serve themselves, not the truth. In light of the infamous ideological conversions—\textit{tenkō}—of prewar and wartime leftists who rejected dissent to embrace the nationalist cause, and thereby preserve their lives and social positions, Ōe's story challenged the postwar left with the suggestion that young activists remained vulnerable to ideological conversion as a means of maintaining social rank.\textsuperscript{24} Ōe offers a female protagonist as a

\textsuperscript{20} Ōe, “Gishō no toki,” 81.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 93.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 94.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 96.
counterpoint to the self-interested proceedings in which male students and professors cover up the crime.

Kurahashi Yumiko's debut short story, "The Party" (Parutai) features a female student narrator who quickly becomes disillusioned with the Party—a reference to the JCP—and the dogmatic inflexibility of both its organization and the male students devoted to it. The story first ran in the Meiji University newspaper, but it soon attracted notice and was reprinted. The success of "The Party" launched Kurahashi into the public sphere as a voice for her generation. Much as in Ōe's short story "The Time of False Testimony," Kurahashi's female student protagonist is the lone woman among men. Kurahashi's story also presents the young woman as an individual, making no reference to her family or home life.

Representing an array of tensions and misrecognitions among individuals defined only by gender and occupation, Kurahashi's narrative reflects not only an ascendant ideology of individual action in postwar Japan, but also the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre's existential philosophy. Kurahashi wrote her undergraduate thesis on Being and Nothingness, and dots her story with instances where the female protagonist feels a wave of nausea when her individual agency is overwhelmed. In “The Party" as in Ōe's story, the physicality of the protagonist's female body defines her relationships as a woman to the men around her. In the course of these political and sexual relationships, she recognizes the inability of her Party-loyal partner to hear her concerns as an individual; he instead favors institutional procedure.

The threats that Kurahashi’s female student protagonist perceives toward her individual agency create a confluence of political and sexual meaning. The loose narrative follows the

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young woman as she applies to become a Party member, painting her desire for Party membership in much the same terms as her desire for a meaningful romantic relationship. She quarrels with her lover about how to write her life history, a required part of her Party application. As he begins to construct a personal story that would make her membership appear "inevitable," she resists:

I wanted to escape from the past and throw myself into the future. I had chosen the Party and had resolved to let the Party restrict my freedom. I had not arrived at this decision for any clear reason or through some cause-and-effect relationship. Wasn't it enough if the Party accepted this decision? But you disagreed. You called my argument 'intuitionism' and said this is a dangerous ideology.25

Kurahashi's female protagonist prefers to think of her commitment to the Party as one might describe a romantic commitment. She enters the relationship not because she has to, but because she desires a partnership and the restrictions on one's freedom that it brings. What she also reveals in affirming her choice is the historical contingency of her participation. She does not see herself as an inevitably radical subjectivity. Recognizing the contingency of her decision to join the Party, she affirms her political agency, but also rejects forcing the narrative of her personal history into an argument. She finds the exercise artificial, with only an abstract relation to her experience. Much like the female protagonist of the Ōe story, Kurahashi's female student reacts physically to her lover's demands to alter her life history. She feels discomfort in her body,

although this emotional affect manifests physically as nausea rather than an open wound.\textsuperscript{26} He attacks her way of thinking as intuitional, implying that she ought to impose a distinction between her feelings and her thoughts. According to her lover, she ought to prioritize the needs of the institution and adjust her thought to meet those needs. But for Kurahashi's narrator, the key attraction to the Party is not its connection to her history, but rather its promise of a complete break from her history. Her desire for a future completely different from the past stands as a poignant evocation of the political potential represented by young women in postwar Japanese society: their presence promised a complete break from the past of male-dominated political and social institutions.

In addition to the key romantic relationship that mediates the female student protagonist's application for Party membership, the way in which she negotiates sexual desire with two other men also defines her experience of leftist activism. In not only seducing a blue-collar worker, but also determining unilaterally that she will abort the resulting pregnancy, the female student affirms the primacy of her individual desire. She also exposes the gap between her middle-class self and the worker, "as if we were two animals of different species that had accidentally met and copulated on the spot."\textsuperscript{27} The physical contact between the two does not create an intimacy capable of transcending class. By contrast, the unwanted sexual attention of a different male comrade, "S," presents a complete rejection of her agency, leading her to feel "as if [she] were some 'object'." Making "no effort to conceal his desire," S" uses the authority of his position in the Party to pursue his own wants and disregard the needs of others.\textsuperscript{28} The experience with "S"

\textsuperscript{26} Both Ōe and Kurahashi studied French literature and existentialism, and would have been familiar with both the concept of bad faith preventing an individual from acting authentically as enunciated by Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, and of Sartre's novel \textit{Nausea}.

\textsuperscript{27} Kurahashi, “Partei,” 8.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 9.
confirms for the young woman that those with power act only out of self-interest. In these two encounters with men, one a worker and one a comrade, hierarchies of desire trump ideals. The female student protagonist of Kurahashi Yumiko's story finds it impossible to assert the primacy of her agency and at the same time maintain her romance with both the young party member and the Party. When her male partner challenges her definition of "the revolution" and insists that it is inevitable, she aggressively rejects his argument:

I said that "revolution" was not something that existed outside of myself. If revolution was external, how could the "inevitability" of something outside myself affect my freedom and ability to choose. I would join the Party not because the revolution is inevitable but because I want to choose the revolution, I said. I had chosen to restrict my freedom so that ultimately I would be even more free. My participation would make the revolution inevitable for me.²⁹

The protagonist affirms her own will and desire in her decision to participate in revolution in terms similar to how she asserts her own will and desire to abort her pregnancy.³⁰ Her insistence that she needs to "choose the revolution" and "participate" to make it occur also affirms postwar democratic ideals of citizen engagement. Kurahashi's female protagonist stresses that the locus of "the revolution" lies in individual will and action. In the end, the young woman declares the Party to be an inhumane institution, not run by the needs of its members but instead consuming the people within it according to its own mysterious needs. Although the female protagonist had hoped that the Party would give her something larger than herself, she in the end

²⁹ Ibid., 10.

³⁰ Although technically criminalized, the Eugenic Protection Law of 1948 made abortion accessible to protect the physical and economic health of the mother. With this economic clause, induced abortion became widely available.
feels squashed as an individual by the Party's dogmatism. Kurahashi's story plays with the ideal of the earnest female student. Her protagonist is both exploitative (of the male worker) and exploited (by her male comrades). Kurahashi embodies the Party's intransigence and insincerity, however, with male characters, thus gendering the hypocrisies of the Left as male, while the female student operates as an independent-minded critic.

By the time Kurahashi Yumiko's story of a female student rejecting Party-led activism ran in 1960, a considerable number of student activists had decided to avoid the Party in real life. The December 1958 formation of the student-based Communist League – known for short as “Bund,” after Marx's first organization – took lead of the mainstream of Zengakuren and marked the definitive end of the JCP's control of the organization. United more in their opposition to the authoritarianism of the JCP than by any specific goal, the Bund-led Zengakuren offered a response to the kind of mistrust of institutionalized ideology that Ōe and Kurahashi's fictional female students had articulated in literary form.

**The Postwar Student Movement and Democracy**

Although neither Ōe nor Kurahashi were student activists, literary critics such as Hirano Ken hailed them as spokespeople of their postwar generation, and their female protagonists' individualistic insistence on words matching deeds resonated with what came to define the “new” left of the Bund-led Zengakuren. The Bund-led Zengakuren gained the sympathy of many intellectuals because of both its split from the hardline ideology of the JCP and its willingness to

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take physical action at demonstrations and rallies. It seemed to manifest the key concerns of many intellectuals who had weighed in on the postwar debates on political subjectivity, including the influential political scientist Maruyama Masao. Maruyama expounded the idea that “the essence of democracy must reside in each individual citizen assuming the stance and accepting the responsibility of being in charge,” and his vision of the ideal citizen of Japan's postwar democracy included a willingness to participate in political action. Although the limits of that political action were the topic of ongoing debate and negotiation, democracy became equated in the minds of postwar progressives with the cultivation of an authentic, individual subject position. In this context, Ōe Kenzaburō and Kurahashi Yumiko wrote female characters as individuals who were in the position to articulate a truly independent new critique of postwar Japan and its outmoded institutions. The view that young women represented authentic and independent critiques of stale leftist dogma influenced popular reception of female participation in the New Left.

The actual politics of the postwar student movement did not necessarily reflect a new interest in the democratic subjectivity of female participants, since many key members of the

33 Andrew Barshay, *Postwar Social and Political Thought, 1945-1990*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 328. Membership in Zengakuren fluctuated, but estimates put it at 300,000 in 1959. Many students were automatically enrolled in the organization when he entered university, so of that number active membership ranged from 2,000 involved in organizing to 20,000 who came out to support demonstrations. Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, 96.


35 Maruyama himself had rather conservative ideas about protest strategies, which will be explored further in his relationship to the radical student movement and the campus struggles of the late 1960s.

Bund-led Zengakuren were more interested in activism as a means of escalating revolutionary struggle than in expanding democratic access. And most student activists remained male; indeed, most university students remained male. However, in light of the emerging consensus among intellectuals, articulated by Maruyama Masao, that civilian inaction enabled the rise of militarism in prewar Japan, advocates of postwar democracy adopted the idea that active political engagement, in discourse and in demonstrations, was key to protecting postwar democracy.

The postwar hegemonic ideal of pacifist female political participation lent meaning to active protest in which female students participated.

The theme of democracy resonated widely in student activism of the late 1950s, influencing demands for Japan's autonomy from United States Cold War policy and also campus policies that ensured student access to self-governance.

Key issues for the student movement in Japan in the late 1950s included protests focused on the expansion of Tachikawa Air Base, a US military bastion, and struggles against state policies that could be used to encroach upon educational and political freedoms, such as the reinstitution of moral education and a rating system for teacher efficiency, as well as the 1958 Police Bill. Above all these, however, the most iconic mass mobilization in the period was the movement against the 1960 renewal of the

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37 By 1960, only 13.7% of the university student body was female, although 67.5% of the students at junior colleges were young women. However, only 10% of the university-age population pursued higher education, and a university degree remained an elite pursuit. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications: Statistics Bureau, Director-General for Policy Planning & Statistical Research and Training Institute, “Chapter 25-11: Share of Female Teachers, Pupils and Students by Kind of School (1950-2005),” in Historical Statistics of Japan, 2012, 25, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/25.htm.

38 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 103.


40 Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 96.
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, known colloquially as Anpo.\textsuperscript{41} Framed as a battle to preserve Japan's nascent postwar democracy against the fascist arrogance of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration, demonstrations against the Treaty's renewal mobilized not just left-leaning students, but also a wide swath of the Japanese population. Zengakuren became a key group in the prolonged series of extraparliamentary protests that countered the Treaty.\textsuperscript{42}

Although American observers typically interpreted the anti-Anpo protests of 1959 and 1960 as "anti-American rioting," internal conflict over renewal of the Treaty reflected a strong antiwar sensibility rather than out-and-out anti-Americanism. The Treaty originated in the negotiations between Japan and the United States that ended the Allied Occupation in 1952 and incorporated Japan into the larger framework of American postwar military strategies in East Asia.\textsuperscript{43} Under the terms of the Treaty, American troops waged the first hot war of the Cold War in Korea (1950–1953) from bases in Japan, and Okinawa remained occupied by the American military. Although the Korean War had jumpstarted manufacturing in postwar Japan and an American presence in Okinawa did not affect most mainland Japanese, for a war-weary population, the threat of being dragged into another conflict because of an alliance with the


\textsuperscript{43} Packard, \textit{Protest in Tokyo}, 4. George Packard's account of the political events surrounding the 1960 Security Treaty renewal is thorough enough to merit its position as a classic, although his paranoid anti-Communism marks it as a Cold War work. He generally described the “crisis” as a public relations failure on the part of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and is dismissive of the political legitimacy of the mass civilian demonstrations.
United States felt very real. One major newspaper's public-opinion poll in the summer of 1959 showed that almost half of the people questioned feared that the new treaty would increase the chances that Japan would become involved in war.\(^44\) Furthermore, the heavy-handed tactics of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke increasingly worried political observers and citizens that the issue at stake in the revised treaty's ratification was less the what of the treaty than the how. Kishi's authoritarian maneuvering, in other words, was itself read as a threat to Japan's democracy.\(^45\) Even if many Japanese did not understand the terms of the Treaty and even favored an alliance with the US over one with the Communist Bloc, Kishi's administration came across as arrogant and insensitive to public concerns. People turned out in the streets for massive demonstrations to express their political engagement, and among them it was student groups who were most eager to test the limits of what forms of active dissent the state would tolerate.

In the context of public fears for the state of democracy, and with a war of aggression waged a generation previously that had been met with little domestic resistance, the activist students of the Bund-led Zengakuren drew the admiration of several influential intellectuals in Japan, and among large swathes of the general population as well. The bad behavior of elected politicians increased popular sympathy for Zengakuren. As opposition mounted in the streets, quarrels broke out within the Diet itself on 19 May 1960. Physical scuffles between the Socialist-led opposition and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) concluded with the admission of

\(^{44}\) The July 19, 1959 *Tokyo Shinbun* poll showed that 44.5% percent of respondents agreed with this statement, whereas half of that – 21.5% — felt the new treaty would make Japan more secure. Ibid., 148.

\(^{45}\) Opponents to the Treaty and to Kishi's administration were also eager to remind the public of Kishi's wartime employment in the Tōjō Cabinet. Ibid., 197. The heated struggle over the Police Bill in 1958 contained many of the similar elements of the Treaty Revision, including the threat by the opposition parties to physically block the bill, the authoritarian LDP Diet tactics that countered that threat, and the participation of many workers, citizens, and students in street protest to support “democracy.” George Packard interpreted the success of the opposition to the Police Bill as a key factor in setting the stage for the 1960 Treaty Revision “crisis.” Ibid., 103-104.
five hundred police officers to remove the Socialists, who had attempted a sit-in to block the LDP. Amid the confusion, the vote to approve the new treaty was deferred, resulting in a situation where, instead of requiring an affirmative vote, the revision was to automatically gain Diet approval on 19 June 1960 if the House of Councilors took no action against it. The press reported the events as a unilateral approval of the treaty by the LDP. Maruyama Masao, in a speech appealing to his audience to fulfill the democratic promise of a postwar rupture from militarist history, likened Kishi’s “surprise attack” of May 19 to Pearl Harbor. As illustrated by Maruyama's dramatic analogy, many observers of the chaos in the Diet defined the LDP as a threat to Japan’s nascent democracy.

In both contemporary reports and later interpretations of the year 1960, it was the Zengakuren students who captured the public imagination and defined—for good and for ill—the year of political turmoil. Although their tactics were often aggressive, supporters justified the students' actions as an attempt to counter the violence of the nation's voted representatives within the chambers of the Diet. Zengakuren's willingness to take risks at demonstrations garnered respect from influential elements of Japanese public opinion, framed within a common interpretation that the inaction of ordinary people during Japan's wartime had allowed a militarist government to wage war. In light of this wartime history, student activists in 1960 represented in the minds of postwar progressives the active conscience of not just the Japanese left, but the postwar ideal of active citizen subjectivity.

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48 Koschmann, “Intellectuals and Politics,” 408.
49 George Packard, hardly sympathetic to the strategies and the politics of the Zengakuren, nevertheless noted that “the student activists threw themselves into causes with raw energy and naïve idealism, and were tolerated, if not openly admired, by much of the rest of society.” Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, 96.
As mass demonstrations intensified in May and June of 1960, even intellectuals skeptical of Zengakuren described themselves as inspired by the activist language of the Bund-led organization. Students were a clear demographic category committed to action, often at the head of street marches. They forced themselves into the public conversation, provoking controversy and curiosity. Like many on the traditional left, poet and JCP member Sekine Hiroshi became interested in the Zengakuren when both the mainstream press and the JCP publication Akahata—ostensible political enemies—denounced Zengakuren's 17 November 1959 physical incursion into the Diet. On that occasion, about 12,000 activists—not only students, although the leaders of the group were assumed to be Zengakuren—had rushed into the Diet compound during a demonstration and remained on the grounds into the evening, eventually leaving of their own volition. Sekine sought out members of the Bund-led Zengakuren in order to formulate his own independent evaluation of them, he reported in a June 1960 article. Sekine's inquiry led him to write a sympathetic portrayal of the New Left. Countering claims that the Zengakuren was too extreme, Sekine quoted a female student who participated in demonstrations at Tokyo's Haneda Airport on 16 January 1960. She had explained to him that Zengakuren's airport sit-in was a mostly symbolic protest against Prime Minister Kishi's upcoming trip to Washington to sign the renewed Security Treaty. The female student noted that, although Zengakuren activists hoped to

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prevent Kishi’s departure, they were not fanatics hell-bent on clawing him out of the airplane. In her quoted words, “We never intended to stop him by biting the cars or dangling from the propellers.” Sekine agreed that the protests had been successful in garnering public sympathy, and his use of a female student as the voice of moderation and self-aware activism had the effect of presenting the Bund-led Zengakuren in a positive light.

In the course of Sekine's interviews, it emerged that the political earnestness of the Bund-led student movement worried many intellectuals. Literary critic Etō Jun remarked that, “in all senses, the fact that [the Zengakuren] are pure is a minus.” However, the politics of political action carried great moral authority even for those who desired more careful political strategy. Marxist historian Hani Gorō, torn between the callow politics of the Bund-led Zengakuren and the ineffectiveness of the traditional reform parties, framed his evaluation in terms shared by many on the traditional left in Japan. He declared, “the actions of the Zengakuren are correct. [But] the thinking of the JCP is not incorrect.” While Hani objected that the philosophy of the students was too underdeveloped, he recognized that their willingness to take action was valuable, and distinguished student activists from the traditional left as it existed in 1960.

Although the Bund had split from the JCP in 1957, the anti-Anpo demonstrations in particular pitted generations of leftists against each other. The 1960 film Night and Fog in Japan (Nihon no yoru to kiri), which was directed by Ōshima Nagisa and dealt directly with the fallout of the June 1960 protests, illustrates how memories of "spy" imprisonments, betrayals, and

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53 Sekine, “Hitei no shūdan,” 76. Sekine also notes that the Bund-led Zengakuren told him, upon his meeting with them that they also made sure to assign positions to female students within their organization.

54 Ibid., 82.

55 Ibid.

56 By the time of the campus-based protests of the late 1960s, Hani would be one of the greatest allies of the student New Left.
power abused at the service of sexual desire continued to mar the public image of the Old Left and the JCP. Ōshima employs the fictional character of Nakagawa, a Party leader, to personify the moral bankruptcy of an older generation of JCP-affiliated student activists. Nakagawa serves as master of ceremonies in a wedding meant to join two generations in the wake of the mass demonstrations of 15 June 1960. In Ōshima's film, the experience of tumultuous protests around the Diet, in which several students were injured and a female student died, underlined again the betrayal by the dogmatic Left. As represented by the character of Nakagawa, the JCP only blames the students for undermining the Party, unable to recognize the students as victims. Ōshima also illustrates the politics of the Left in gendered terms. The Party man is empty; his wife presents the ultimate evidence for his lack of political earnestness. Provoked by accusations of "domestic bliss," she retorts that while watching the anti-Anpo protests of 15 June 1960 on television, her insistence that they ought to be at the Diet as participants rather than remaining distant observers was met only with her JCP husband's lustful demand for sex.

**Female Students as Legitimating Figures in the 1960 Anpo Demonstrations**

Even for those Japanese who were not particularly invested in leftist ideology, the earnestness of the student movement confirmed the moral authority of its street activism, and the interest of young women in this mode of political participation held tremendous persuasive power. In articles, participant accounts, and even Diet debates, the presence of young women emphasized the approachability, vulnerability, and also the just nature of the new student movement. A Tokyo business owner told the *Asahi Journal* that it was at the urging of his teenage daughter that he had marched on the Diet against treaty renewal. The presence of young women in the Zengakuren demonstrations of 1960 made them approachable even to those

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57 Nagisa Ōshima and Ishido Toshiro, *Nihon No Yoru to Kiri*, 1960.
who would not otherwise participate in street actions. One middle-aged housewife recounted how she surprised herself by moving from the position of passive spectator to that of active demonstrator at the urging of an anonymous young woman. It was the “sunburned face” of the young woman who called out to her and urged her to join that convinced her to march.\(^5^9\) A daughter's conscience prompted a father to protest; a young woman in a demonstration opened that public space to an older woman who would not ordinarily enter it. Whether these stories are true or not, they fit the hegemonic ideal in which young women's outrage provides legitimate justification for public protest.

New postwar political ideologies that allowed young women into contentious political spaces did not mean that parents necessarily approved of their daughters' activism. Despite the strict control that many families still attempted to retain over their daughters—short-term and single-sex colleges were common compromises—many young women were able to join the street protests focused on the Diet Building in Tokyo because they had been allowed to leave home to pursue their education.\(^6^0\) At women's schools, dormitories regulated the comings and goings of the residents. Women's schools like Joshibi University of Art and Design and Ochanomizu University may have had radical reputations, but women's dormitories even there curtailed students' activism with strict curfews. Nevertheless, such institutional rules meant little without proper enforcement. One female Anpo protestor recalled that her dorm matron at Japan Women's University had sympathized with her political engagement and offered what encouragement was possible: making rice balls for her to take to demonstrations and quietly

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\(^{5^9}\) Ibid., 95.

opening the door for her if she returned after curfew.\footnote{Ibid., 97.} Parents' reactions to their daughters' activism also varied, ranging from letters and phone calls forbidding any form of political participation, to the tacit support of progressive parents, to—in the case of at least one family with mixed politics—a loud debate with one parent and a quiet "be careful" from the other.\footnote{Ibid., 98.}

Inasmuch as student activists in 1960 seemed to deny the demands placed on them by parents and other senior figures, they seemed also to attempt a break from the Japanese past. The popular psychoanalyst Doi Takeo likened anti-Anpo Zengakuren activists to the folkloric figure of Momotarō, a boy sprung from a peach and therefore parentless. Like Momotarō, the students saw themselves as sui-generis children of the postwar period. Doi noted in 1960: “In our eyes [Zengakuren] can't help but resemble Momotarō. It doesn't recognize traditional authority. It burns with the desire to subjugate the bad guys.”\footnote{Doi Takeo, “Momotarō to Zengakuren,” in Doi Takeo Zenshū: “Amae” Riron No Haten, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2000), 8. Article originally published in 1960.}

Although the tactics with which Zengakuren expressed its anger, such as breaking into the Diet grounds, unnerved those who felt violence had no place in a democratic society, the right of youth to express anger at the state of postwar Japanese society enjoyed a wide consensus. By 1960, the fiction of Ōe Kenzaburō and Kurahashi Yumiko had conferred upon both authors the status of public intellectuals. Echoing similar sentiments with different foci, both writers penned articles in response to the student protests of that year, affirming the motivations of the young activists while also articulating their own individual critiques. In February 1960, Ōe published an article in which he qualified his support for the Bund-led Zengakuren with an indictment of the latter's “naiveté.” The term used by Ōe, kamatoto, evokes the image of a coy
woman, thus likening Zengakuren to a young female playing dumb. Ōe introduced himself to readers as a “supporter of the student movement," but chided Zengakuren for swaggeringly embracing the bad reputation that had emerged from mainstream press treatment of their activities, especially after forcing entry into the Diet compound on 27 November 1959. Responding to those in the mass media who dubbed the Bund-led Zengakuren the “Red Thunder Gang," Ōe pointed out that, unlike real motorcycle gangs, Zengakuren “does not run over good citizens." He continued, “The [so-called] Red Thunder Gang conducts demonstrations to express their will as young Japanese nationals. That's all. And to demonstrate is an activity in keeping with democratic laws."\(^{64}\) Ōe, while criticizing the Bund's "naiveté," defended the group's existence in the political milieu of the time, recognizing that student activists exercised and thereby protected civil rights in general. For Ōe, it was the LDP politicians and journalists who ran about decrying lawful demonstrations as mob behavior that posed the real threat to Japanese parliamentary procedure and democracy. Their activities, rather than those of student activists, merited disgust and anger.

Writing several months after Ōe, Kurahashi Yumiko likewise criticized the "irritable" actions of the Bund-led Zengakuren, but recommended anger as a useful tool to question society. In a May 1960 journal article, she demanded a deeper critique of the position of students in contemporary Japanese society and the rigid requirements placed on them for entry into a good high school, middle school, elementary school, even kindergarten. Instead of being “irritable," Kurahashi declared, “We should be angry. There are plenty of reasons to be angry." She further elaborated the political views that her sensual fiction suggested, declaring, “Most of us don't have faith in thought and theory. More than anything it is our bodies, our bodies which are much

better developed than those of before the war, that we believe in." Adopting the pronoun "we" to represent her generation of postwar youth, Kurahashi advocated an embodied political subjectivity.\(^{66}\)

Just as the presence of young female bodies at protests legitimated the political activism of the student movement, police violence against female bodies provoked the deepest critiques of state power. Tanaka Sumie, a female screenplay writer for Kinoshita Keisuke among others, decried the violent tactics of the Bund-led Zengakuren in a February 1960 article in *Shisō no kagaku* (Science of Thought).\(^{67}\) However, she also noted that the “400 female students” who participated in the Zengakuren actions made her question her own more apolitical post-student life. Tanaka thrilled to the sight of young women in street demonstrations. Finding police violence against these female activists unforgivable, Tanaka saw female student radicals as earnest and vulnerable citizens.

Police aggression toward female student activists drew the sympathies of even tabloid journalism toward "angry" young women and student demonstrations. The tabloid *Shūkan shinchō* focused its coverage of the 26 April 1960 demonstrations, the first held at the Diet since 27 November 1959, on what it dubbed the "angry daughters of April 26."\(^{68}\) As with the November demonstrations, students clashed with police on this occasion.\(^{69}\) However, a series of


\(^{66}\) Yoshikuni Igarashi offers a reading that contrasts the bodily metaphors of the anti-Anpo movement and the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. He argues that the physical confrontations around the Diet Building "awoke disturbing memories of the past in Japan" that were remembered wordlessly in bodies. See Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970*, 139.


\(^{68}\) “Gurabia: Keikan to ikareru musumetachi,” *Shūkan shinchō*, 16 May 1960.

full-page photographs printed in the periodical rendered female students chiefly as victims, exposing through images the physical force that police had used against them (fig. 1-3).

Figure 1. "Police and the angry daughters." in Shūkan shinchō, 16 May 1960.
Shūkan shinchō’s double-page spread (Figure 2) captures a young female activist, her head forced down by the anonymous hands of authority. All that can be seen of policemen is a
holster, a gun, and a hand gripping the cuff of the young woman's coat. It may be the young women who are "angry," but the rough treatment suggests undue force. Superimposed on the photograph is a quote from a student at the prestigious Women's College of Fine Arts who decried the force employed by the police against the weaker bodies of women. She also noted that the police she faced behaved like Korean police, referring to the force used by South Korean soldiers in concurrent protests by labor and students across the Tsushima straits and suggesting that it was the actions of the police, not the protestors, that threatened Japan's democracy. For many observers of student protest, the state's willingness to confront women's bodies with violence represented the excesses of state force.

The hegemonic ideal of the female student activist as inherently a good citizen, even if she became an angry daughter, affected political discussions in the House of Councilors. The upper house's Committee of Judicial Affairs met on 16 February 1960 to deliberate the correct application of the Subversive Activities Prevention Law of 1952. As part of the hearing, peace activist Takada Nahoko argued against police abuse of the law, giving as examples the detainment of female students—including “Kanbajima [sic] Michiko and Shimoinoue Yoshiko" from Tokyo University—at the Zengakuren sit-in at Haneda Airport in January 1960. Takada suggested that their arrests were based on their leadership positions in the student movement, rather than on their actions at Haneda. Takada implied that the police department collected photographs and files on student leaders, and emphasized that these young women came from good families, were passionate about their studies, and should not be the targets of the

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Subversive Activities Prevention Law.\textsuperscript{71} Takada's purpose in bringing up female students was to illustrate state violations, based on a shared assumption that young women were the most sincere examples of citizen subjectivity. Policing of protest came across as most insidious when it targeted young women.

Although Takada misstated the name of the female student activist Kanba Michiko in her House of Councillors testimony, after 15 June 1960 no one in Japan could make such a mistake. Kanba's death at the south gate of the Diet compound in clashes between students and police marked the first, and most famous, sacrifice of the postwar student left. That Kanba was female meant that she stepped into a narrative already in motion that equated female students with postwar democratic political purity. The death of Kanba Michiko, a female university student at Tokyo University and a New Left activist, gave that postwar narrative real-life confirmation. While Kanba's "sacrifice" tapped into public sympathy for the purity of female students and prompted intellectuals and citizens to criticize the state, ultimately resulting in Prime Minister Kishi's resignation a month later, images of her feminine purity also eclipsed her political opinions. I turn to this tension between the symbolic power of Kanba as a pure maiden sacrifice and Kanba as a social critic and activist in the next chapter.

2.

Ironies of an Icon: The creation of a maiden sacrifice

Beaten by the acacia rains
That is how I want to die
The night will end, the sun will rise
In the morning's light
He'll find my cold body
That certain someone
And I wonder if he'll shed tears for me
“When the Acacia Rains Stop," sung by Nishida Sawako

Nishida Sawako's hit ballad "When the Acacia Rains Stop" still recalls for many Japanese the anti-Anpo protests of 1960. The lyrics evoke beautiful failure, but also a specifically female sacrifice: "Beaten by the acacia rains / that is how I want to die / the night will end, the sun will rise / in the morning's light / he'll find my cold body." For many, this song, released just before the rainy season—the "plum rains (tsuyu)"—of June 1960, provided the soundtrack not only for the dramatic street confrontations of that month, but also for the aftermath of mourning for a young woman who had indeed died, tragically, on the evening of 15 June 1960. Her "cold body" was found by the entire nation in the morning's light of 16 June 1960.

Introduction

The death of Kanba Michiko, a twenty-two-year-old coed, inside the South Gate of the Diet on the evening of 15 June 1960 manifested in highly physical form the social conscience of postwar Japanese society. This chapter analyzes the creation of a New Left heroine out of this young woman who was killed in clashes with police after forcing entry into the Diet compound with a contingent of Bund-led Zengakuren students. The symbolic power of her death not only illuminates the dynamics of gender in the early phases of the postwar student movement in Japan,
but also raises the issue of iconicity and its relation to social movements in general. The idea of an "iconic" figure, in the contemporary cultural sense of someone or something representative of a particular culture or moment, emerged historically within the specific context of 1960s culture. Although applying a Christian-derived term to a non-Western historical context may seem at first glance problematic, the Japanese reception of Kanba Michiko's death nevertheless brings into focus a dynamic played out again and again between radicalizing leftist youth movements and expanding mass media in various contexts in the 1960s and 1970s. The overshadowing of Kanba the real person by Kanba the iconic maiden martyr in the mass media is a process that would find parallels elsewhere.

The present chapter draws on journalistic accounts and works submitted by "citizen" poets to examine the immediate impact of Kanba Michiko's death on public consciousness. It also examines Kanba Michiko's thoughts as articulated in her personal writings in order to identify an ironic discrepancy between Kanba's public significance and her personal relationship to radical politics. Kanba's personal writings reveal a very different side of the person we call Kanba Michiko, and one much more radical than the "iconic" maiden represented in the popular

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1 2006 draft additions to the Oxford English Dictionary introduce this definition, and cite a 1976 *Newsweek* article as the first example, in reference to Robert Smithson's 'Spiral Jetty' landscape art. The examples used to illustrate the term all refer to cases of "icons" created by post-WWII mass media, e.g. JFK, Marilyn Monroe, and the cinema of Ingmar Bergman. *Oxford English Dictionary Online*, 2nd ed., s.v. "iconic."

2 For example, although David Kunzle points out that in the case of Che Guevara, the Christian implications of Che as "icon" remain key to his interpretation. Interestingly, that link between Che and Christ does the same ideological work as the discourse around Kanba in Japan: it "disarms" Che and associates him with social justice and peace. David Kunzle, “Chesucristo: Fusions, Myths, and Realities,” *Latin American Perspectives* 35, no. 2 (March 1, 2008): 97–115.

3 As Peniel E. Joseph notes in his article on the state of the field in studies on the Black Power Movement, "iconic" images often obscure the history of social movements. In his subsequent use of the term "iconic," to describe leaders (male and female) and posters, he reveals how the term denotes the aspects of the Black Power Movement emphasized by the mass media. Peniel E. Joseph, “The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field,” *The Journal of American History* 96, no. 3 (December 1, 2009): 751-776.
press as a "pure" and gentle middle-class daughter. The power of Kanba's iconic status as a maiden sacrifice by the New Left in the immediate aftermath of her 15 June 1960 death rested on a hegemonic ideal of the young female student as the purest expression of civic political agency. A comparison of Kanba Michiko the maiden sacrifice with Princess Michiko, the maiden bride of the Crown Prince, provides further illustration of the power of mass media–generated iconography to efface the voices of postwar female students even as it created public symbols out of them.

**Kanba Michiko as Female Victim**

In the political confusion following the 15 June 1960 demonstration in which Kanba Michiko died, the only "truth" all parties could agree upon was the identity of Kanba as victim. The identity of the victimizer, meanwhile, became a matter of ideological conviction. Major newspapers issued a statement condemning violence (implying that students were responsible for Kanba's death), while student activists and their supporters countered with charges of undue "violence by authorities." A series of autopsies failed to confirm whether Kanba had been killed by blows from a police baton or had been trampled under the feet of fellow protestors. Many were injured in the dramatic confrontations among demonstrators, authorities, and right-wing groups on 15 June 1960, but it was Kanba Michiko's lifeless body—her long hair betraying the gender of her trouser-clad body—that represented for most Japanese the ultimate sacrifice. Some publications, ranging from the mass-audience *Asahi Journal* to the campus newspaper of Tokyo University, even ran photographs of her corpse laid out in the police hospital. Such media

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4 The public sympathy provoked by the tragic death of Kanba Michiko may have led to the prominence of the anti-Anpo protests and the overshadowing of the year-long coal miners' strike at Miike in 1960.


treatment represented Kanba as a passive subject and vulnerable victim.\textsuperscript{7} Although Kanba Michiko had been a vocal leader of the anti-Anpo student movement, public discourse in the wake of her death defined the meaning of her life differently. Conversations reported in the mass media defined Kanba first and foremost as a young woman, obscuring her connection to radical politics.

It was not only the tabloid or student media that set aside Kanba Michiko's politics and reacted emotionally to her "maiden" death. Almost immediately after Kanba's demise, public intellectuals also responded to the news in a personal way. Tsurumi Kazuko, a female intellectual and co-founder of the left-leaning periodical \textit{Shisō no kagaku} (Science of thought), reported her first reaction to the news of the tragedy in a July 1960 as the thought that, “If I was young, that girl could have been me.”\textsuperscript{8} Although Tsurumi did not know Kanba, nor her motivations, she believed that they shared a common political subjectivity. Tsurumi assumed that, if she herself were still young, she would have acted just as Kanba had, and become just as vulnerable. Tsurumi's article related several angry phone calls that she had received from female friends as news of a young woman's death flew between them via telephone. Tsurumi's milieu of powerful intellectual women expressed their anger as mothers and wives. “From a mother's position I can't stay silent. I'm calling Mrs. Kishi in protest,” one woman declared. Another remarked, “How about calling the wife of the Chief Cabinet Secretary as well?” These women feel an imperative to speak, often “as mothers,” not directly to power, but to the women married to power. The fact that the victim of this violence had been a young woman influenced their empathy. As women,

\textsuperscript{7} Hiroko Hirakawa traces the way Kanba was portrayed as a pre-maternal maiden in the mainstream press. The use of her term “martyr” may be problematic considering the radical history that would follow in the 1970s and beyond in which “martyr” became linked with the Middle East. See: Hiroko Hirakawa, “Maiden Martyr for ‘New Japan’: The 1960 Ampo and the Rhetoric of the Other Michiko,” \textit{U.S.-Japan Women's Journal}, no. 23 (2002): 92–109.

they felt they understood how Kanba felt; as mothers, they felt that it was their duty to appeal to other women and protect other young people from violence.

Male public intellectuals could not appeal as directly to a feminine subjectivity of pacifism and protection, but their analyses also revealed the rapid conversion of Kanba Michiko from a student radical into a depoliticized feminine symbol of the excesses of state force. Writing for the journal *Fujin kōron* in September 1960, Tsurumi Kazuko's brother Shunsuke, also a co-founder of *Shisō no kagaku*, attempted an analysis of popular sympathy for Zengakuren. His piece demonstrated not only that the figure of Kanba transcended politics, but also, through a selective choice of sources, that female students in general symbolized political naiveté and purity. It is the voice of an apolitical female student, a sophomore at Tokyo's Rikkyō University, that represents ordinary students in Tsurumi's piece. The student, Asada Mizuko, also embraces that representative role when she declares that for "ordinary students," attending a demonstration is more a matter of becoming an onlooker than a participant. And the only cause for which she herself mobilized was that of commemorating Kanba Michiko. "I only came out for Kanba's memorial gathering," Asada declared. "I don't understand at all the distinction between mainstream and anti-mainstream student activists. I'm a liberal, and I think capitalism is good. Even so, I guess communism has its good points. It's because of Zengakuren that Ike couldn't come and Kishi was toppled." Tsurumi's "ordinary" nonpolitical student, represented in the person of Asada, a female, rejects the wholesale Zengakuren-formulated critique of capitalism although she embraces the moral authority of Zengakuren's actions in the anti-Anpo protests. Only the death of Kanba Michiko draws this apolitical female student into the streets, for an ostensibly apolitical demonstration. The voice of this nonpolitical female student, amplified

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through Tsurumi Shunsuke's article, goes a long way toward depoliticizing the figure of Kanba and the nature of her activism. Although Tsurumi does not discuss his own reactions to the events, his article emphasizes a feminine sense of transcending political ideology through both the figure of the dead female student (Kanba) and the interpretation of the death by a living "ordinary" female student.

It was not only strangers to Kanba Michiko who erased personal politics from the social meaning of her death. Michiko's father Toshio, too, played a crucial role in interpreting the death of his daughter. Toshio, a professor at Chūo University, declared Michiko "a sacrifice for the people (kokumin)."¹⁰ He not only elided her radicalism, but also used her death to dismiss charges of Zengakuren violence. Toshio affirmed that the 15 June 1960 demonstrations, including the actions of the Zengakuren, represented the political will of all citizens. As a father, Professor Kanba emphasized that Michiko, and by extension the movement she participated in, always desired what was right in the world. In his commemoration of his daughter, Toshio also defended her choice to enter the Diet compound with the front line of student activists, even though she only possessed "the body of a female student." He emphasized that what many called a "dangerous place" for women was instead the proper place for a student demonstration protesting the government's anti-democratic actions.¹¹

Up until Kanba Michiko's death, however, Kanba Toshio also opposed his daughter's participation in aggressive political actions. In an August 1960 article titled "The Daughter Who Disappeared in the Tempest at the Diet," Toshio described his conflicts with Michiko, in particular after her arrest during the Zengakuren demonstrations at Haneda Airport in January

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1960. In March of the same year he had gone so far as to publish an article under the headline "A Daughter Stolen by Zengakuren." Half a year later, after Michiko's death, Kanba Toshio shifted his rhetoric from one that chided the student movement for "stealing" his daughter to one that indicted the larger political "tempest" that had made her disappear. Although Toshio described his daughter as confrontational, standing up to him on matters of politics, both of his articles frame Michiko as politically vulnerable and passive. In both cases, although the aggressor changes, Michiko the daughter remains the victim.

Kanba Toshio's opposition to his daughter's involvement in the student movement reflected his disapproval of Zengakuren's aggressive tactics. Like many other "ordinary" citizens, he supported the anti-Anpo movement, and he also took to the streets during the 15 June demonstrations around the Diet Building to protest the Kishi administration's "irrational" and "undemocratic" maneuvers. Kanba Toshio's observations during that protest colored his interpretation of Michiko as a passive victim. In his August 1960 memorial essay, he recounted seeing several bloodied students. Toshio even participated in the moment of silence demanded by a student standing atop an armored police vehicle at the South Gate to commemorate an unnamed "fallen female student." It was only when Professor Kanba stopped in at an eatery on the way home that he heard his daughter's name given as the killed student, broadcast on the radio.

Many other non-student participants remarked upon the violence that broke out around them as they joined the crowd around the Diet, and few faulted student groups for the bloody

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13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 492.
15 Ibid., 492–493.
confusion. Students seemed instead to bear the brunt of police aggression, and rightwing groups also attacked various citizen marchers. Those "ordinary citizens" who witnessed the violence outside the Diet compound were quick to see Kanba Michiko, killed after breaking into the compound, as a victim instead of an aggressor. Many expressed a kinship of vulnerability with the fallen girl. One housewife wrote in an article first published in the daily *Asahi* and subsequently printed in the Tokyo University newspaper that she had just returned home in her ripped clothes, looking "like a refugee," when she heard about Kanba's death. She immediately associated the death with an attack she had herself witnessed in which a male right-winger clubbed a woman accompanied by a child. This violent man, the writer noted, remained untouched by the police. This account pointed to the gendered nature of violence—wrought not only by the police, but also by a male right-winger—while also citing the gendered victimization of a mother. For this observer, Kanba Michiko came to represent the injuries sustained by herself and all vulnerable and peaceful participants in the mass anti-Anpo demonstrations, although Kanba had fallen after pushing her way to the front of the fighting.

Although Zengakuren's aggressive tactics leading up to 15 June 1960 frequently divided generational opinions about the proper mode of "active" politics, the sacrifice of Kanba Michiko united public sentiment. In the wake of Kanba's death, a young woman attending college in Tokyo at the time sent her parents in Nagoya a letter that must have been hard for them to read. She declared that the general mood among students had shifted to one in which self-sacrifice seemed necessary, and that if she were to die in a demonstration her parents ought not to "say something embarrassing like 'Zengakuren took my child.'" The mother's reaction to this opinionated stand exhibited more pride than horror, however; she submitted her daughter's letter

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to the regional edition of the daily *Asahi*. By sending her daughter's private letter to a public source, the mother in effect legitimated her daughter's desire to sacrifice herself publicly for the cause of postwar democracy.

**Kanba Michiko as Representative of Postwar Democracy**

Kanba Michiko, delinked from her radical activist politics through her victimhood, represented a simplified ideal of postwar democratic agency. Echoing postwar debates about how to overcome what was interpreted as the passive acceptance by Japanese subjects of wartime militarism with an "active" democratic subjectivity, Michiko's father defined her death as a failure of democracy. This was because, although the postwar Constitution promised a new democratic order, without action that democracy remained only a promise. Kanba Toshio hoped that Michiko's death would mobilize "citizens awakened to democracy," for if peace and democracy prevailed, he would not regret the death of his only daughter. The idea of an active, awakened, liberal citizen of a postwar democracy borrowed from earlier debates waged among American Occupation reformers and progressive Japanese intellectuals. The idea of women as the most vulnerable members of an order that was not "peaceful" or "democratic" also evoked postwar discussions about the sacrifices of women during a "men's" war. Kanba Michiko, through the accident of her gender and death in a demonstration interpreted as an expression of democratic "citizens," confirmed the impression of anti-democratic violence as a masculine force that victimized women in particular.

Kanba Michiko's parents' access to mass-media outlets as the chief mourners of their daughter's death and guardians of its meaning also emphasized Michiko's social position as not

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only female but also an "ordinary" middle-class daughter. Both mother and father published in the July 1960 special issue of Tokyo University's newspaper, their comments appearing next to each other.¹⁹ In later accounts of Kanba Michiko's death as well, the deep tragedy of her parents' loss remained a central element of the narrative. The fact that Kanba's father had joined in a silent prayer for the unnamed fallen student with the crowd around the Diet only later to hear his daughter's name broadcast on the radio, that her mother had heard the news while resting for a moment at her brother's home, that both had consoled each other "with trembling hands" as they identified their daughter at the police hospital early in the morning of 16 June 1960—all this became part of the tragic narrative of Kanba's death.²⁰ However, Michiko's father already enjoyed access to mass-media sources by virtue of his social position as a professor. It was Kanba Michiko's mother, Kanba Mitsuko, who not only was launched into the public sphere after 15 June 1960, but also retained close links to later generations of student activists and was accorded respect as the mother of the postwar student movement's first sacrifice. It was Kanba Mitsuko who took the initiative in publishing an influential collection of Michiko's poems, stories, letters, and essays. She also published her own essays on Michiko in various news outlets and journals.²¹

Although the mourning parents occupied a privileged place in public discourse on Kanba Michiko's death, those further removed from Michiko also contributed to the iconography of her "sacrifice." When Kanba Toshio's faculty colleague, Kiyomizu Kitarō, gave the address at Michiko's memorial on 23 June 1960, he, too, described her as the greatest "sacrifice" of that

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struggle. Tokyo University professor Yamashita Hajime, in an August 1960 article on Zengakuren similarly declared that "the name of Kanba Michiko, who became a tragic sacrifice, is already known by all citizens." The character of Michiko that emerges from the public statements of these intellectuals is not dissimilar to that of the fictional figures of young women who stubbornly want to see what is right in the world come into being, even to the point of self-sacrifice. Through speeches and articles noting Kanba Michiko's "sacrifice" and linking it to a "citizens" struggle, these male university professors fit her public image into the myth of the pure female student activist that had already become hegemonic by the late 1950s. Kanba Michiko's death seemed to make the myth real.

Outpourings of sympathetic gestures by "the people" both responded to these interpretations and confirmed the iconic power of Kanba Michiko's death. Altars built "by the people's hands" at the Diet's South Gate demonstrated how Michiko as maiden sacrifice resonated with popular opinion. Michiko's father noted an unexpected impact among "ordinary citizens," evidenced also by the "tens of thousands" of people, "old, young, men, women" who came out for her memorial demonstration on 18 June 1960. A widely circulated portrait of Kanba, used at her 18 June 1960 Tokyo University memorial service, offers viewers an image of a round-faced young woman with tidy, modestly coiffed hair and a face free of makeup (fig. 4). This photograph conveyed middle-class femininity more than radical critique.

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24 Kanba, “Arashi no gijidō ni kieta musume,” 496.
Before the year was out, a group of Kyoto University students published a poetry collection to memorialize Kanba Michiko that demonstrated the broad cross-section of people affected by the tragedy. The poetry of all three demographic groups represented in the volume—workers, students, and "ordinary people"—evoked Kanba's particularly feminine purity. The collection, titled *Unending Footsteps* (Ashioto wa tayuru toki naku), emphasized the emotional power of a young woman's death for many people who had never met her. The mostly amateur authors affirmed a collective mourning for the maiden sacrifice. Reflecting the hegemonic ideal of politically pure young women, many poems refer to Kanba's death as "pure," and to Kanba as

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a "maiden," or even a "white-throated female student."\textsuperscript{26} A lecturer at a technical high school in Kobe linked Kanba's femininity and youth to her political sincerity, describing her as both a "beautiful maiden" and a "righteous human."\textsuperscript{27} The introductory poem of the volume, by the female writer and peace activist Fukao Sumako, introduces Kanba as a flower: the “rose of justice, rose of resistance.”\textsuperscript{28} Many of the volume's poems share this floral imagery.\textsuperscript{29} A flower can suggest not only female purity and beauty, but also a particular season, in this case the balmy late spring of Kanba's passing. Alternatively, several poems evoked the June rains, in reference to the rainy season that had witnessed the anti-Anpo protests' climax.\textsuperscript{30} Mentions of fragrant flora and spring showers make these poems seem almost of a piece with Nishida Sawako's popular ballad; a maiden death in the tempest echoes Nishida's "crying in the acacia rains."

By contrast, the cause of Kanba's death is described variously as a bestial evil—"this goblin known as government"—or even as "Satan."\textsuperscript{31} A poem written by "a worker," addressed "to Kanba-san's spirit," describes the death of her "white flesh" and the spilling of her blood as a purification ritual for the government.\textsuperscript{32} Such poetic interpretations cast the complicated political struggles over Anpo as a morality tale in which evil crushed a pure, budding maiden.

Many poets, in particular the female poets represented in the volume, expressed a gendered solidarity with Kanba Michiko. Like Tsurumi Kazuko, they assumed that their shared

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Zen Kyōto shuppan iinkai, \textit{Ashioto wa tayuru toki naku}. A worker described Kanba's death as "pure" (14), a worker and two citizens describe Kanba as an "otome" (50, 157, 161), and it is in a worker's poem that Kanba is described as "white-throated" (16).}
\footnote{Ibid., 44.}
\footnote{Ibid., 2–5.}
\footnote{A teacher from Osaka calls Kanba a "summer flower," and a poem by an office worker features her as a "white flower." Zen Kyōto shuppan iinkai, \textit{Ashioto wa tayuru toki naku.}, 20, 170.}
\footnote{Ibid., 42, 45.}
\footnote{Ibid., 17, 68.}
\footnote{Ibid., 50.}
\end{footnotes}
gender with the dead woman implied a common set of values. The values shared among women included a sincere desire to demonstrate against injustice. As one poet, Umehara Haruko, noted, it was perhaps essential to Kanba's feminine nature that "she earnestly wanted to appeal to Kishi." Many women also based their feelings of intimacy with Kanba on information gleaned from the mass media. As we have seen, Kanba's actual political motivations dropped out of mass-media discussions about the social meaning of her death. Kanba's politics also dropped out of poetic interpretations of her actions. For example, an anonymous woman from the Osaka area described her emotional reaction to Kanba's death as arising from their "same sex." The familiarity that the woman felt toward Kanba Michiko transcends personal specifics: "I knew you / I don't know your face or your voice or your everyday / But even so I / had expectations for you / after the sixteenth day of this month I continue to have expectations for you." In the woman poet's view, "knowing" Kanba Michiko had more to do with understanding Kanba's social role as a maiden sacrifice than with knowing Kanba as an individual, with her own "face or voice" or "everyday." A woman who had been a graduate student when Kanba died described a similar sentiment, noting that although "Kanba Michiko was not even a passing acquaintance," she felt deeply that she could have been the one killed instead. The impression that "that girl could have been me" forged a lasting sentimental relationship to the figure of Kanba, which defined the woman's relationship to the political turmoil of 1960. The feeling that "the girl could have been me" also effaced Kanba's radical personal history, however.

33 Ibid., 34.
34 Ibid., 160.
Although many female student activists participated in, and were even arrested for, Bund-led Zengakuren demonstrations in the late 1950s and in early 1960, Kanba was one of the rare female student leaders within the Bund-led Zengakuren. Kanba, as a student at Tokyo University, was already a member of the social elite; as a female student at the primarily male university, and as a female leader in particular, she was exceptional.\textsuperscript{36} While her position of privilege actually marked her as unusual for her time, one observer recalled in retrospect that Kanba's status heightened the effect of her death on public opinion.\textsuperscript{37} In death, public memorializations emphasizing her general feminine vulnerability and sacrifice repressed her radical politics and her social status.

The Other Icon of Postwar Democracy: Princess Michiko

The fact that Kanba Michiko was a female student at a moment when female students represented a new democratic subjectivity was coincidental to her death in the climactic demonstrations at the Diet on 15 June 1960. But the meaning that her maidenhood created in mass-media memorializations, not just of her person but also of postwar democracy in general, conflated her presumably vulnerable gender and the fragility of postwar democracy. Pointing out a similar coincidence that nevertheless created meaning, Tokyo University Professor Yamashita Hajime pondered the timing of Kanba Michiko's death, just one year after the "Mitchii Boom" created by the 1959 marriage of Crown Prince Akihito to a "commoner" (albeit fabulously wealthy) young woman also named Michiko. If the news coverage of anti-Anpo protests and the death of Kanba Michiko represented the spontaneous creation of a popular icon, the royal wedding and parade was a coordinated media event. The spectacle was broadcast into middle-


\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 106.
class households on black-and-white televisions, the sales of which jumped in the weeks leading up to the April ceremony. It was on those same television sets that many would also watch the anti-Anpo demonstrations swirl around the Diet building. Those without a TV gathered in television-owning families' living rooms; crowds of others congregated in front of electronics-shop windows to catch the flickering images. On remote islands, the Self-Defense Forces opened up base gates to allow neighboring residents a chance to watched the storybook event.\textsuperscript{38}

The Crown Prince had met his Michiko in 1957 on the tennis courts of the resort town of Karuizawa, launching a discussion in the nation's press on the ideal form of the postwar family. The royal couple's first encounter, through social activities rather than through royal arrangement, and the bride's status as a college-educated coed suggested a turn to marriages based on love and a meeting of equals. The newlywed princess's immediate adoption of the role of the domestic, home-managing wife, however, set up an ideal of Japanese womanhood that remained modest and domestic in spite of the unorthodox choice of a "commoner" wife for the Crown Prince. While conservative observers decried the love marriage, others felt it particularly appropriate to align the imperial household with the middle-class family ideal. Echoing newspaper op-ed pieces, Suzuki Mosaburō, chair of the Japan Socialist Party, even declared the match "extremely appropriate to the new constitution."\textsuperscript{39} Writing in retrospect, one woman noted that the popularity of Michiko erased the Imperial family's wartime role for many Japanese. She blamed herself, a university student at the time, for dismissing the royal wedding as mere pageantry: "Even I, who disdained those faddish 'Mitchii Boom' fans and was intoxicated in the whirl of

\textsuperscript{38} Kanō Mikiko, “Mitchii būmu ni megutte," in Onnatachi no 60-nen anpo, vol. 5, Jūgoshi nōto sengohen (Kawasaki: Inpakuto shuppankai, 1990), 149.

Anpo demonstrations, was a supporter of the 'sanitized, harmless' emperor system." Political youth interpreted the "Mitchii Boom" as silly, and chose to gather in protest at the Diet rather than focus on how the royal spectacle erased the link between emperor and Japan's wartime actions in Asia by cultivating an image of an innocuous postwar Imperial Family. The processes by which college-educated Princess Michiko became an iconic figure were similar to those that transformed Kanba Michiko's death into an iconic tragedy; both icons concealed complex political histories.

Some criticism surrounded the royal wedding, but it rarely considered the historical relationship between the imperial institution and Japanese imperialism in Asia. One politically active young woman noted that, although around the time of the "Mitchii Boom," she had debated the role of the imperial family and argued for making citizens of the royals, she recalled being shocked that a resident Korean (zainichi) friend declared that the Emperor deserved the death sentence. For a resident Korean, the legacy of violence and exploitation suffered by peninsular Koreans under Japanese colonial rule remained fresh in memory. "Resident Koreans" were pushed out of postwar Japanese democratic citizenship as well, extending wartime dislocation into postwar alienation. It was only later that this woman, a Japanese citizen, could understand her zainichi friend's position, rooted in wartime policies of coercion enforced in the name of the Emperor. Mass-media coverage of the 1960 royal wedding, however, effaced the historical link between the imperial family and wartime imperialism. Television footage did capture one spontaneous moment of protest that spoke less of historical inequalities and more of contemporary economic unevenness. One of the most frequently remembered aspects of the televised marriage proceedings was the throwing of a rock in protest at the royal carriage by a

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41 Ibid.
nineteen-year-old student, known simply as "N" in the mass media because of his youth. Later questioned about his action, "N" did not offer a sweeping critique of the imperial institution. His motivation, rather, was disgust at the flamboyant display of wealth. The school he had attended had been destroyed by fire, and it proved impossible to collect the forty million yen needed to rebuild it. By contrast, 230 million yen in taxes were spent on renovating the imperial palace for the new couple. What motivated "N," then, was, "anger at that absurdity." Unlike Kanba Michiko, "N" failed to capture the imagination of the left in postwar Japan. His act of protest survived in public memory as an outlying oddity, divorced from any more sweeping narrative of conflict.

A more intellectual critique was levied by journalist Saitō Shigeo, who decried the fact that, while the royal wedding was supposed to represent an opening up of the imperial household to the masses, it was actually the royal family that was forcing its way into the masses' living rooms. Princess Michiko, however, made the Imperial family seem less invasive and more familiar to mainstream audiences increasingly inclined to define themselves as middle class; her entrance as a "commoner" female college graduate into the forbidding Imperial Palace represented to many observers a democratization of Japanese society, as was the case with female student activists of the same period.

Although it was coincidental that two iconic representatives of the early 1960s in Japan shared the name Michiko, both icons rested upon the hegemonic ideal of the politically pure young woman in postwar democracy. Princess Michiko and Kanba Michiko embodied,
respectively, the political quietude of Japanese institutions and the political unrest of mass protest in the early 1960s, but both represented increased democratic access.\textsuperscript{45} Tokyo University's Professor Yamashita, after pointing out the nominal twist of fate, pondered in August 1960 what Princess Michiko thought about the death of Kanba Michiko. Although Kanba Michiko died just across the moat from the Imperial Palace, in a demonstration literally loud enough to reach royal ears, the question was a rhetorical one: the Imperial family, as befitted a symbol, remained quiet about the politics of Anpo. However, Emperor Hirohito bestowed imperial attestation to the Treaty on 21 June 1960, and the Crown Prince and Princess Michiko traveled to the United States in September 1960.\textsuperscript{46} The royal visit created a mass-media iconography of public apology for mass protest. Professor Yamashita appealed to the princess to respond to the death of Kanba Michiko, wanting her to know that some among his students described Japan as a "detestable country (iya na kuni)."\textsuperscript{47} The crown princess's silence on the issue reinforced the power of her image over her words. It is critical to note that Professor Yamashita petitioned the commoner bride rather than the royal husband in the matter of the anti-Anpo protests. In doing so, the professor underscored the critical role that Princess Michiko played in reconnecting the Japanese population to the imperial family; both Michikos represented the potential for democratic access to traditionally closed social institutions.

**Kanba Michiko and the New Postwar Lifestyle**

The two Michikos' position as young women symbolized not only postwar democracy, but also the bright new postwar consumer life of the high-growth era. Princess Michiko met the


\textsuperscript{47} Yamashita, “Zengakuren no wakamonotachi,” 499.
Crown Prince on the tennis courts, a place more egalitarian than what previous generations of royals experienced, but one also associated with increasingly middle-class leisure activities. Whereas the "Mitchii Boom" that greeted the royal wedding marked the climax of a postwar, high-growth-economy "stability boom," according to Yamashita, the death of Kanba Michiko was the "absolute opposite," demonstrating that many students defined themselves as "outsiders" who refused to bathe in the "tepid waters" of mindless economic security. But Kanba Michiko's position as a female student made her death sympathetic even to those who did not define themselves as "outsiders," because the hegemonic ideal of the young woman as liberal democratic subject connected female students to the secure, bright postwar consumer lifestyle. Writing about Kanba Michiko after her death, poet Ono Tōsaburō noted that the "bright voices" of his women's junior-college students as they played tennis after class evoked Kanba for him, although he had never met her. Conflating their cheerful voices and healthy bodies with the idea of Kanba Michiko as the pure victim of the failures of postwar democracy, Ono urged his readers to "stand with the spirit of the young female student who confronted her enemy." Ono invokes the purity of the young female student: her enemy ought to be "our" enemy.

Kanba Michiko's mother Mitsuko appealed to the sympathy of those like poet Ono Tōsaburō by insisting on her daughter's ordinariness. Such statements as “Michiko was an ordinary daughter" affirmed the intimacy that others felt toward Michiko in spite of not knowing her personally. Kanba Mitsuko assembled and published a collection of Michiko's writings within months of her daughter's death. Although the volume, named The Smile Nobody Knows (Hito shirezu hohoeman) for a poem Michiko had written, included the political essays she had

48 Ibid., 505–506.
49 Zen Kyōto shuppan iinkai, Ashioto wa tayuru toki naku, 9.
50 Kanba, “Maegaki,” 5.
penned for university publications, it was Michiko's private writings that generated the greatest impact. Few accounts of the influence of the collection—for example, those given by the later 1960s generation of activists—including comments on the political essays. Indeed, many described the book as deeply affecting in spite of their disagreements with Kanba Michiko's political convictions. One young woman, a high-school student at the time, reflected that she did not care for Kanba's politics, but nevertheless devoured Kanba's posthumously published writings. Years later, the experience of reading the book made "her death feel like a part of my life." As the title suggests, the collection of intimate materials, from journal entries to personal letters, appealed to those who wished to encounter the "real" Kanba Michiko; the writings promised to reveal "the smile nobody knows." However, the publishing of private documents to define Kanba Michiko as an "ordinary daughter" of postwar Japan leapfrogged over Kanba Michiko's own attempts to articulate her political stance publicly.

The posthumous collection included writings stretching back to Kanba Michiko's childhood offer the reader a sense of an intimate and comprehensive view into Michiko's life. Michiko's writings as an elementary-school student reveal a postwar middle-class upbringing, defined by the consumer lifestyle available to an increasingly wider segment of Japanese society. She filled her girlhood journals—most likely kept as part of school assignments over summer and winter vacations—with references to the markers of a bright new life. Although Michiko was born in the fall of 1937, and the first seven years of her life must have been defined by war, her posthumously published works efface this earlier history and begin with school journals kept in fourth grade. Along with the pleasures of the ocean and fireworks, Michiko noted her trips to the cinema in the journal she kept of her fourth-grade summer vacation. She watched Elia

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51 Yamamoto Chie, “Anpo tōsō wa shuppatsu no toki," in Onnatachi no 60-nen anpo, vol. 5, Jūgoshi nōto sengohen (Kawasaki: Inpakuto shuppankai, 1990), 120.
Kazan's *A Tree Grows in Brooklyn*, Otto Preminger's *Laura*, and remarked that the “savages” in *Tarzan* were scary.\(^{52}\) During her winter vacation, she decorated a Christmas tree.\(^{53}\) Cinema, shopping, ice cream, and tennis are all features of her leisure time during school vacations. These pursuits mark Michiko's upbringing as one defined by increased access to the high-growth-era consumer culture of Japan's urban spaces. Other activities of Kanba's were familiar to many suburban and also rural families: she joined her father and brother in weeding the family's vegetable garden in the summer, and sewed while she and her family followed the national high-school baseball championships on the radio. Schoolwork and homework dot Michiko's journals as far back as elementary school, and her letters show an increasing fixation on schoolwork as she prepared for entrance exams. In high school, the collected correspondence deals almost exclusively with her efforts to study. These letters trace not only Michiko's personal history, but also a strengthening social trend toward meritocratic competition in postwar Japanese education.

Although Kanba Michiko was a product of a new postwar consumer culture, her intellectual interests focused on leftist thought. The various essays and articles she penned from middle school until her death offer an intimate portrait of the formation of one young postwar female student's political subjectivity. Kanba conducted her first investigation of leftist ideology in middle school, during the early 1950s, for a school report she wrote “On Socialism.” In her attempt to get to the bottom of the issue, the young Kanba consulted newspapers and “adult magazines" such as *Kaizō* and *Shio*. The publications she found lying about her house revealed her left-leaning intellectual home environment, even as some of the articles they contained—for example, one on the conditions facing African Americans in the United States, the “so-called


representative of democracy"—shocked her. Although Kanba concludes her essay unsure of which "ideology," that of the communist Eastern Bloc or that of the West's "so-called representative of democracy," will become hers, her discussion reflects many of the issues, such as that of lingering racial inequality, that made student activists throughout the 1960s skeptical of the American model of "liberal democracy."

**Ironic Counterpoint: Kanba's Relationship with Postwar Student Activism**

Tucked among the many letters Kanba Michiko wrote to friends as a teenager, often detailing her intensifying studies, one piece from her second year in high school demonstrates a deepening interest in collectively addressing social problems and an awareness of the lingering inequalities between men and women. The brief essay, entitled "We Want to Grow Up!," introduces an informal discussion group that Michiko had formed with some other female students. Written to attract members among other high-school students, a note at the end offers the caveat that, "Even though I say 'we,' our number remains small." However, the group adopted the collective voice of the postwar student generation in outlining what it saw as a dilemma: although the books and teachers that surrounded them as students offered abstract answers about how the world ought to be, members of the discussion group insisted that their own experiences were the best guides for action. In affirming their active subjectivity, this group of high-school girls reflected the influence of the postwar ideal of democratic citizenship. In particular, these young women identified gendered injustice as a key problem in current Japanese society: “We look with eyes of indignation and anxiety at our society. What ought to be done is not done. In particular, we notice too many problems with the way women in Japan live."

Kanba and her friends identified some of the problems facing women in Japan in their own experiences at high school, where they felt stymied in their academic and political pursuits.
They felt "powerless" at the moment to bridge the gap between their reality and the imperative of "equal rights for men and women" enshrined in the postwar constitution. Their desire to "grow up" stemmed from a "zeal to become strong." Kanba and her group located strength not just in growing up, but also in collective action. Envisioning a network that would eventually expand to include "male students and students from other schools," the young women sought to overcome individual weakness and create a space to link personal problems with social issues. They proposed diverse topics for group discussion, from the personal—going on to university, work, marriage, issues at home—to the political—student government, national government, religion, and education.54

Kanba Michiko and her high-school friends were not unique in their interest in collectively discussing the situation of women in postwar Japan in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In May 1960, when Michiko was a fourth-year student at Tokyo University, the campus newspaper announced a "new" campus group devoted to discussing "women's issues"; it remains unclear if Kanba was a participant. Membership was modest at fifteen students, but that number also included six males.55 As the formation of this group and the writings of Kanba Michiko and others suggest, many young people were conscious of a gap between the reality and the ideal of gender equality little over a decade out from democratizing demands to integrate women into political and social institutions. Nevertheless, by 1960, organizing around the cause of "women" drew far fewer students than anti-Anpo activism did. In contrast to participating in small discussion groups that might try to analyze the continued gender imbalance in Japanese society,

joining in a street demonstration against the Kishi administration offered more excitement and a clearer set of demands.

Many young women entering university in the late 1950s and early 1960s also noted that men around them tended to steer them into analyzing "women's issues" in a way that made them feel excluded from "real" scholarship or politics. Some recalled male teachers and colleagues encouraging them to research women's history, for example. One woman expressed her hostile feelings when a professor proposed such a subject of study: "I just hated being told to do the woman thing because I'm a woman."\(^{56}\) Another described her similar experience as a student in the early 1960s: "At that time, I wanted to live aggressively as a person and thought that stopping at 'women's history' was a retreat. It felt like yielding to being a woman." Whatever degree of freedom this particular individual achieved from "being a woman" in the space of higher education, that freedom ended when she left school. "I soon passed out of campus-based democracy and confronted real discrimination."\(^{57}\) When young women of the Anpo generation graduated, they found that they had much less control than in their school days over defining their relationship to being a woman.

In the context of a highly gender-conscious educational system and society, many young women framed their participation in anti-Anpo demonstrations as an attempt to claim a gender-neutral space for women in postwar democratic activism. The early 1970s feminist critique of the 1960s student movement—that it lacked consciousness of issues facing women—sometimes obscures how a consciousness about particularly "female" issues could trap women in a particularly "female" field of study or mode of political participation.

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56 Yamamoto, "Joshi gakusei no anpo tōsō," 104.
57 Yamamoto Chie, "Anpo tōsō wa shuppatsu no toki," 120.
Kanba Michiko's premature death launched her writings into the public sphere, but it is impossible to know how she would have reacted to the sexist challenges of post-university society. What seems clear is that her popular reception as a "maiden sacrifice" and her radical critiques of postwar democracy made for uncomfortable bedfellows. As the mass media memorialized Kanba, she increasingly became representative of the vulnerability of the individual citizen—in particular, the individual female citizen—in political conflict. The processes of iconicity by which Kanba Michiko became a "maiden sacrifice" in the mass media undermined her radical critiques of postwar democracy. A college essay by Kanba critiquing postwar educational guidelines for teaching the social sciences offers an idea of how she framed her ideological stance vis-à-vis postwar democracy. Reflecting on the relationship between pedagogy and citizenship, Kanba rejected the postwar democratic ideal of a liberal individual citizen. She argued that Occupation-era educational reforms, drawn up to create democratic citizens, fell short because they emphasized democracy, but slighted history.\(^{58}\) The problem with a stress on "democracy," Kanba argued, lay with the liberal definition of democratic citizens as individuals. In describing how individual citizens relate to other individuals, to nature, and to society, Kanba noted that the 1947 social-studies guidelines erased the role of collective units, such as class. Emphasizing the individual citizen in contemporary society also effaced larger, structural historical causes. For example, in explaining international wars and conflict, Kanba identified in the postwar social-studies curriculum a failure to address the roots of war. The lesson for students was that atomized individual citizens should assume the responsibility to avoid war and embrace peace.\(^{59}\) Kanba felt that social studies pedagogy in


\(^{59}\) Ibid., 196.
postwar Japan conflated "simple growth and progress," which only confirmed the current social order.60

Kanba's analysis in her college essay displays a left-leaning concern for the historical category of class and its role in producing social contradictions. But Kanba also argued that, perhaps counterintuitively, an emphasis on individual responsibility for democracy and peace actually failed to cultivate an "active attitude" toward history. For Kanba, creating an "active attitude" demanded understanding conflict and resistance.61 She concluded that educational guidelines “put to sleep an active attitude." Instead of cultivating an active citizen subjectivity, Kanba found that contemporary social science pedagogy “erases the people from contemporary society. Organized groups also disappear, leaving only scattered individuals who are supposed to cooperate."62 The popular interpretation of Kanba's individual death as a demand for democracy and peace became an ironic counterpoint to her own preferred mode of historical analysis.

In the creation of Kanba Michiko the maiden sacrifice after her death, memorializations dropped her analytical words for her poetic words. One of Kanba's own poems, frequently published after her death, was entitled "Brumaire," a reference to the second month in the French Republican Calendar established by the French Revolution and part of the title of Karl Marx's critique of the dictatorial rise of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte in 1851. Marx's The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, originally published in 1852, includes one of his most famous aphorisms, modifying Hegel, that history repeats itself "first as tragedy, then as farce." After Kanba's death, the "purity" she invoked in her poem was often ascribed to her, yet the poem

60 Ibid., 189.
62 Kanba, “Rekishi ishiki ikusei no men kara mita sengo no rekishi kyōiku no mondaiteki,” 197.
demonstrated in a simple way her belief that radical change was qualitative change, demanding violence and "ugliness:"

There is ugliness
Like there was in the American Revolution
Like there was in the French Revolution
There is human ugliness
There is tragedy
But
There is unsurpassed, earnest purity
There is a spirit that seeks freedom beyond freedom
These are also there
I think of it this way.

Her parents offered this and other poems by Kanba Michiko to bolster her image as a sacrifice. Kanba's father, while rejecting the idea of "glorifying Michiko's death," recommended in his introduction to Michiko's collected writings that readers should peruse her words and "think calmly about why this person had to die." His comment intimated inevitability, suggesting that the political battles of 1960 had required the death of someone pure. Although Kanba's father described himself as reluctant to glorify his daughter's death, Michiko's mother, in her afterword to the same volume, quoted from a letter written by one of Michiko's close female college friends. “Kanba's purity could surprise you. She was too pure. I've known since our early days at college that Kanba was braver than any of the male students, even those who said radical things." Although contributing to the popular appraisal of Kanba Michiko as "pure" with this statement, Michiko's friend also pointed out that "purity" did not necessarily equal a soft, maidenly purity. In her description, Michiko's "purity" is one of willpower and bravery.

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63 Kanba Michiko, Hito shirezu hohoeman, 67.
64 Kanba Toshio, “Maegaki,” in Hito shirezu hohoeman, 14.
Although Kanba Michiko's death confirmed a hegemonic image of maidenly vulnerability, those close to Kanba recalled the potentially terrifying character of her political commitment. As one of her male professors noted in an article dedicated to Kanba Michiko's memory, Kanba's devotion to radical activities was impressive, but also a bit frightening. In particular, after her arrest at Haneda Airport in January 1960 and her father's disapproving article, Michiko declared to her professor that her father and older brother had abandoned her, forcing her to "get over the petit-bourgeois nature that was inside of me." The professor noted that in the face of Kanba's radical change, "timid male students" feared her. In light of this fact, her mother's continued protestations that Kanba Michiko was "ordinary" and "gentle" come across as a willful strategy to delink Michiko the maiden sacrifice from her frequently militant radical views.

Kanba Michiko became an iconic figure, representative of the citizen protests against Anpo and of the fragility of postwar democracy, because she could fit with a hegemonic ideal of the female activist as a pure and vulnerable citizen. The mass media circulated the words of her mourning parents, who were eager to stress their daughter's "ordinariness" and kindness. Such stories created a feeling of intimacy among those who did not know Kanba Michiko, but imagined her as a tender young woman. This public persona eclipsed Kanba's personal relationship with radical politics. Kanba offered a sympathetic icon, which favorably influenced popular perceptions of student activism in the anti-Anpo protests of 1960. The processes of iconicity, by which popular images circulated in the mass media come to represent a complex moment or movement, do not always create positive impressions, however, as I will show in my

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discussion on the backlash against the female student as a potential "ruiner" of the nation. It is to these debates, conducted in the wake of the political turmoil of 1960, to which I now turn.
3.

“Coeds Ruin the Nation”: Young women at the limits of postwar citizenship

The mass demonstrations against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty that climaxed with Kanba Michiko's 1960 death provoked a crisis in Japanese society. The death of a young woman further legitimized the end of the administration of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, exposing the power of popular protest. However, the vast numbers of citizens protesting in the streets failed to prevent the renewal of the unpopular Treaty, and the party of the disgraced Kishi, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), carried the elections of July 1960. The Bund-led Zengakuren dissolved and the student movement lost momentum. Furthermore, a yearlong strike by coal miners in Kyushu ended in failure, demonstrating an end to open confrontation between labor and capital. Kanba Michiko may have been the sole casualty, but no one was left unscathed. Ikeda Hayato replaced Kishi as prime minister. He spearheaded high-rate economic-growth policies designed in part to lure the population away from politics; his "double-income plan" expanded public-sector spending and lowered taxes. Ikeda drew attention away from Japan's political position vis-à-vis American power and Cold War influence, and focused instead on national economic growth. He pushed for expanded international markets for Japanese products, leading French President Charles de Gaulle to refer to Ikeda as a "transistor radio salesman."\(^1\) Domestically, Ikeda included education as an essential part of his economic program.

Introduction

In the student movement of the late 1960s, massified higher education both fueled student discontent with increasingly rationalized education, and also guaranteed the tremendous impact of student protest. The rapid expansion of higher education in the 1960s fed the late 1960s swell of campus-based activism. Although students in the immediate postwar period and during the anti-Anpo protests of 1959-1960 represented a significant political demographic, they also remained an elite group. By the late 1960s, not only did a greater percentage of young people continue to higher education, there were simply many more young people overall. Here I approach a moment of ostensible political quietude on Japanese higher education campuses to listen for the gendered dynamics critical to the late 1960s student movement and its reception. I find that, if young women were at the avant-garde of ideal postwar citizenship during the anti-Anpo struggle, they became a key demographic to be integrated into the growing national economy in the post-Anpo period. Examining debates waged in the mass media and state bureaucracy, I illustrate how a range of mostly male "experts," usually male, but ranging from professors to politicians, reasserted the link between female education and the household. These efforts to control the hegemonic ideal of the postwar citizen, and her link to her family, drew on ideological strategies from Japan's prewar past. In the pages of the tabloids and in educational policy in the 1960s, a new order emerged that insisted that gendered difference among citizens remained necessary to maintain social stability. Many young women and men at the time dismissed such discussions, as circulated in the expanding mass media, as silly and out-dated, not realizing the enormous influence even tabloids held in influencing policy and popular opinion.

Women in Postwar Education: Democratic Reforms on Paper and in Practice

In spite of the heady optimism in the postwar period about the democratizing potential of the female student's admission to formerly all-male institutions of higher learning, the Japanese experience of postwar coeducation provides an example of how radical reforms on paper meet with both optimism and resistance in practice. Sweeping declarations of equality alone could not bridge the gender gap. The postwar Education Ministry gave local officials generous wiggle room in deciding just how schools addressed the stated ideal of "raising female education to the level of men's education."\(^3\) Even so, higher education for women did expand. In 1955, the percentage of young women pursuing education beyond the compulsory nine years of elementary schooling was a little less than half. Twenty years later, in 1975, it would be 93% – slightly more, even, than the percentage of young men.\(^4\) Over a period of twenty years, then, it became the norm for young women to go on to high school and even beyond. However, most women who pursued a higher degree did so through two-year junior colleges rather than four-year universities. Junior colleges were first developed in postwar Japan as another aspect of American educational reform meant to democratize education.\(^5\) In an effort to abolish the multilayered prewar hierarchy of higher education, postwar higher education was organized into two-year junior colleges and four-year universities.\(^6\) What emerged was a different hierarchy of higher education, and one that ultimately tracked students by gender. In 1950, not quite forty percent of junior college students were female (38.9%), but by the mid-1950s, they made up half of the

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\(^5\) Ibid., 123.

student body. This trend continued, and it was in the 1960s that junior colleges became definitively female spaces of education. By 1975, 86.2% of the students at junior colleges were young women. In the case of junior colleges, democratization equaled feminization. The number of female students remained much more modest at universities, however, where the largest increase was between 1950 and 1955. Throughout the 1960s, the percentage of female four-year students remained under a fifth of the total university population. In the late 1950s, ten years after the legal imperative toward coeducation, inequality persisted in practice.

At the root of lagging efforts toward full integration of women into universities persisted the question of coeducation's purpose. As outlined earlier, in the postwar drive toward radical democratization of key social institutions, female participation held out the promise of "purifying" spaces associated with masculine wartime militarism. However, how much participation was necessary? According to many experts, it was enough to allow young women to attend dances with male students, or to form hiking groups. These kinds of social activities would allow young people to explore what was assumed to be their heterosexual attraction.

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8 Kagawa Setsuko and Kawamura Sadae, Josei to kō to kōgō: kikai kakuchō to shakaiteki sōkoku, Sōsho Hikaku kyōiku (Kyoto: Shōwadō, 2008), 311.

9 Already in 1960, almost 70% of the junior college student population was female (67.5%). In the same period, junior colleges increased the numbers of female instructors they employed, although at a much more gradual rate. Still, the percentage of increase of female faculty at junior colleges was greatest in the period 1950—1955. There was very little change between 1965 and 1990, when the percentage of female instructors hovered at a little under 40 percent. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications: Statistics Bureau, Director-General for Policy Planning & Statistical Research and Training Institute, “Chapter 25-11: Share of Female Teachers, Pupils and Students by Kind of School (1950-2005).”

10 Women went from making up 7.7% of the student population in 1950 to 12.4% in 1955. Ibid.

11 Ibid. The percentage of female students at universities in the 1970s was 18%. It still only hit 21.2% five years later, in 1975.
College became an opportunity not for intellectual exchange, but for forging romantic love, as the Crown Prince and Princess had done on the tennis court. One male author of several advice manuals for women disagreed with women's college students who desired more opportunities for coeducational scholarship. After all, he declared, “there's no need [for male and female students] to debate philosophy.” His brusque statement cut to the heart of the issue. In the post-1960 Anpo milieu, female students would continue to make demands for their education based on a desire to embody the hegemonic ideal of the postwar democratic citizen. In the context of an expanding higher education system driven less by a concern about cultivating a political subjectivity and more interested in how graduates contributed to the growing Japanese economy, what need was there for anyone to debate philosophy?

**Female Students as Representative of the Vagaries of Democratic Education**

Professors of the humanities, witnessing the diminishing powers of their departments, blamed the rising admissions of young women. As presented in the periodical press, intellectuals often framed their concerns about the democratization of higher education, and the diminished position of the humanities in a technology-driven economy, through attacks on female students. In 1962, for example, the violence done to universities through admitting young women became a sensational theme in the tabloid press. Waseda University professor Teruoka Yasutaka sparked what would become an infamous debate with an article in the March 1962 issue of the monthly *Fujin kōron*, in which he outlined his view of coeducation at the university level under the

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hyperbolic title, “Coeds Ruin the Nation Theory” (*Joshigakusei bōkokuron*). Teruoka based his "theory" on the assumption that a humanities education was wasted on young women, who would retreat into the domestic sphere upon graduation. Through his overstated case against female students, Teruoaka set himself up as a pundit against expanded education for young women in the humanities, and echoes of his "theory" continued to resonate in popular culture for years. Ever alert for a polemic, the tabloid *Shūkan shincho* consulted him as an expert when it ran an article in the same month on “student beauties,” using the case of a female Waseda University student who had recently had won an Air France beauty contest as a timely opportunity to consider the character of coeducation. In the tabloid article, he complained, “Male students, if they listen to the lecture, will apply themselves to society in some way in the future. However, girls will, at best, go to bed with a guy and recall, 'You know, Teruoka said something [interesting]…' It's infuriating to think that my lectures are just material for these girls’ pillow talk. I just can't get passionate about lecturing.” He can only imagine women using literary knowledge in an intimate space very far away from the public sphere. While Teruoka assumes his male students will become productive members of society as workers based on the literary knowledge they obtain, he fears that his female students will selfishly employ his lectures to entice men. Teruoka goes so far as to declare that young men are sacrificed in the drive to educate these young women who waste knowledge, and he recommends quotas limiting the number of women admitted to humanities departments. “For the sake of Japanese culture, I'd like

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14 Koyama Shizuka notes that even before this article, Teruoka had suggested in the major newspaper *Asahi shinbun* in early 1961 that the rise in female students was an "issue / problem." Koyama Shizuko, *Sengo kyōiku no jendā chitsujo* (Tokyo: Keisō shobo, 2009), 188.


to limit it at 2,500 [female students] if possible, and admit more men instead." For this professor of the humanities, his academic field lost its social value if his students did not enter the workforce, and he assumed that his female students would not. Even if the political ideals of Japan's postwar constitutional order included integrating women into the public sphere, Teruoka played on an assumption that women—and women's education—belonged to the domestic sphere. Furthermore, at a time when the humanities were increasingly de-emphasized in favor of the industry-supporting sciences, Teruoka chose to define the threat to Japanese culture not as an economic preference for training that had industrial applications, but instead as the admission of too many women to literature departments. Teruoka’s attacks on female students for "ruining" the humanities seem especially misguided in light of at least one conservative party leader's 1960 suggestion that the government abolish humanities and social-science departments altogether. Anxieties about mass rationalized education in the service of the economy, however, targeted the figure of the coed rather than the authorities directing educational policy.

In decrying the vagaries of mass education via the figure of the ostensibly invasive female student, Teruoka also exploited the increased power of the postwar media to circulate catchphrases and pop theories about social problems. As in the prewar period, although in an ever more pervasive and massified form, the mass media after 1945 operated as an informal means of educating the Japanese “public" at large. Particularly in a time of rapidly changing

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17 Ibid., 92. Interestingly, when modern schools for women were first founded in late nineteenth-century Japan, the teachers of such “humanities" courses such as Classical Japanese and calligraphy were often women, while male teachers “were usually in charge of the 'new' knowledge: Western-style mathematics and science." See Martha Caroline Tocco, School Bound: Women's Higher Education in Nineteenth-Century Japan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1994).

18 See Marshall, Learning to Be Modern, 193.

19 For more on the wide reach of popular catchphrases at the time, see also Kanayama Toshiaki, Gurupu 69, and Gurupu Rokujūku, Zenkyōtō imajineishon (Tokyo: Gendai shorin, 1984); Sengo 50-nen nihonjin no hatsugen: The Japanese Utterance (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1995). The latter includes Teruoka's theory as a popular "utterance."
social expectations, the cultural debates that circulated in the print media exercised great influence. The late 1950s saw a dramatic rise in weekly publications—shūkanshi—published independently of the major newspapers; following the model pioneered by Shūkan shincho, which was established in 1956, these tabloids depended upon the "street knowledge" of their staff, who lacked access to the major news sources. Framing themselves as anti-authoritarian and scrappy, these tabloid journals featured gossipy content and shunned larger themes like "civic rights" for human-interest stories. Unlike the major newspapers, which circulated through networks that included delivery right to citizens' doorsteps, the tabloids depended upon sales at train station kiosks and street vendors. They designed their sensational headlines to capture a passing commuters' attention. The unexpected success of Shūkan shincho sparked a boom in tabloids, including several targeting women. Periodicals expressed heterogenous opinions targeting an increasingly nuanced taxonomy of reader-consumers. Yet the overall effect of these various publications created a cohesive sense of a Japanese nation knit together through a single language and an increasingly hegemonic mainstream ideal of the basic Japanese household, obsessed by the same events and fads. While tabloids hinted with each faddish "debate" at new sources of anxiety for society, their brief articles also obscured the histories of social structures. In the 1960s, with the dimming of a class-based political subjectivity, the potential for class struggle also seemed to pass. But as the threat of class warfare receded in a period of high-speed economic growth, that menace was in many ways displaced onto the potential in Japanese society for a battle between the sexes.

20 The high circulation rates of Japanese print media, as well as the high literacy rates of the population, are part of the legacy of the postwar high-growth period. Reiko Ishiyama, “Japan: Why So Few Women Journalists?,” in The Palgrave International Handbook of Women and Journalism, ed. Carolyn Byerly (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 406.

21 Matsuura Sōzō, Gendai jânarizumu jikenshi (Tokyo: Shirakawa Shoin, 1977), 166–171. It was in the late 1950s that the tabloids Shūkan josei, Shūkan josei jishin, Young lady, and Josei seven were born.
The splashy reception the tabloids gave Teruoka's "Coeds Ruin the Nation Theory" revealed at least the immense curiosity, if not out-and-out approval, his arguments provoked in a wide swath of readers. He was not alone in articulating dissatisfaction with the disruptive presence of female students in higher education institutions. Shūkan shinchō found other professors and male students eager to deride coeds. One anonymously quoted literature professor classified his female students as falling into one of two categories: the “ultra-dry faction” (chō-dorai) and the “ultra-feigned-naivety faction” (chō-kamatoto). His classification defined female students as either those who competed intellectually with men and lacked “charm” (in other words, the “ultra-dry”), or as those who sought to entice men sexually, and were therefore not entirely honest about their thoughts and their intelligence (“ultra-feigned-naivety”). According to this professor's view, coeducation failed to instill a sense of "charm" in some young women, and encouraged the worst flirtatious excesses in others. Elaborating on his discomfort in interacting with both kinds of female students, the anonymous professor recounted: “When I lecture on Saikaku, I have to touch upon the subject of wakashu," referring to the younger lover, sometimes a male prostitute, in the male-male sexual relationships that commonly figured in the racy tales of Ihara Saikaku (1642–1693). “Female students will stand up and ask questions like, 'What kind of things does a wakashu do?' Their false naivety is this extreme. There are always one or two brazen kids like that who ask such questions." Of their “ultra-dry” counterparts, he recalled that, “one girl came late to class and nonchalantly seated herself in the very front row. She pulled tissue from her bag, saying, 'Teacher, I have my period today so I'm late.' She didn't need to go so far as to pull out tissues and show me." The examples suggest that, for this educator, it was not a lack of intelligence that defined young women as improper students, but

22 “Waseda kokubunka no bijin no kurasumēto,” 92.
rather a lack of what he perceived as tact. Indeed, just like Teruoka, his colleague found that female students introduced the question of sexuality into the classroom. He would prefer to teach about wakashu without having to discuss explicitly the sexual acts that defined that figure. The worry here, similar to that of the articles in the ladies' pages of the general newspapers, was how to properly integrate young women into the homosocial male society of the university and prevailing middle-class standards for female conduct. Behind the concern about standards of conduct also lay the view that many women were uninterested in academic knowledge, concerned not with the greater good but only with how they could manipulate men.

Some young women also confirmed the popularity and the power of the "Coeds Ruin the Nation Theory." In a 1962 Shūkan shinchō interview with a female undergraduate on her part-time work in the House of Councilors election, the interviewer solicited the young woman's opinion on the "theory." She replied, "It might sound strange coming from me, since I'm a woman, but I think I can agree with it. Women make up one third of my class, and there are a lot of them who seem to want to make school into a fashion show... [but] there are also the drudges in black skirts with white shirts... Me? Hmmm, I'm neither a fashionista nor a drudge. I'm a Dōshikai [a political faction in the House of Councilors], I guess." 23 This young woman preferred not to identify herself in one or another category frequently assigned to female students; she evaded the dichotomy through identifying with a political faction. Much like other iconic figures in the popular imagination, a true "fashionista" or "drudge" remained hard to find in real life.

23 "Watashi no kotoba," Shūkan shinchō, July 23, 1962. In 1960, after the 1955 party system established the LDP as the dominant political party and the Japan Socialist Party as the main opposition party, Ryokufūkai (Green Breeze Society) changed its name to Dōshikai.
Alongside such discursive attacks on the potential threat posed to university education by the admission of female students, Shūkan shinchō ran less hostile articles that nevertheless dismissed female student activism. In contrast to sympathetic reports on "angry daughters" facing off against authorities in 1960, the 1962 coverage of a female student "barricade" at Jissen Girls' School mediated the female students' actions through the interpretations of older male "experts." Students at the school mobilized to support three popular teachers, who had been dismissed in part because of their involvement with union activities at the high school. While the language of the September 1962 dispute, as conveyed by interviews with female students, remained that of "freedom" and "democracy," interviews with school officials made light of the young women's demands, claiming, for example, that the teachers were either too easy on the students, or blinded the girls with their good looks. Subtly siding with the administration, the article also included gossipy, unattributed “quotes” from girl students themselves, related in speech easily recognizable as female.24

The young women at Jissen Girls' School demonstrated their belief in the postwar optimism that the "old-fashioned" ideals of a feminine education could be destroyed through expressing their democratic demands. They recognized that their education did not match democratic ideals. One bemoaned the fact that education had in her experience been a matter of “modesty, reliability, and 'Good Wife, Wise Mother,’” invoking a prewar and wartime slogan for the ideal product of women's education. She qualified her critique by stating that these things were fine, but also that “they've become formalities, and I feel like they are out of character for the times.”25 Just like Kanba Michiko, who had been educated in the postwar coeducational system, the young women at Jissen were aware that cultural double standards for men and

24 e.g. “Nante ittatte, Nakajima-sensei ga ninki aru wa ne.”
women remained. They also assumed, however, that those standards were outmoded and could be overcome through their own actions. This is a strong theme that emerges from memoirs and interviews conducted with women who entered college in the mid- to late 1960s as well: a blithe optimism that older "outmoded" formalities would quickly pass away.\textsuperscript{26} They underestimated the power of social forces that linked women to the duties of the household in that period.

**Prewar Women's Education: Creating "Good Wives, Wise Mothers"

Postwar reforms had ostensibly killed the "Good Wife, Wise Mother" ideal upon which the wartime "family-state" was built, since students educated after 1945 no longer took the ethics curriculum designed to reinforce that ideology.\textsuperscript{27} However, as one historian has demonstrated, and as the female student at Jissen's comment illuminated, several institutions responsible for defining the role of women in society clung to, if not the image of the "good wife," then at least the importance of the "wise mother" to maintaining social order. The historical origin of the "wise mother" lay in a similarly tumultuous time of rapid change in Japan. As Mark Jones demonstrated, Japanese elites at the turn of the century, facing enormous social upheaval created by state policies of technological and institutional modernization, came to the conclusion that a middle class "as ballast and bulwark, an emblem of national strength, and an antidote to social instability" would offer "the sturdy foundation of a rapidly modernizing Japan."\textsuperscript{28} Central to this formula was the figure of the "Good Wife, Wise Mother," who "breathed life into their ideals" of such a middle-class, as the managers of the household.\textsuperscript{29} This was a new iconic formulation of household, wife, and mother, designed to represent the late Meiji middle class moral family,

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\item \textsuperscript{26} Inoshishikai, June 9, 2011. FORMATFumiko Kosaka, June 5, 2011.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Uno, “The Death of ‘Good Wife, Wise Mother’?,” 303.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Jones, *Children as Treasures*, 23.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 116.
\end{itemize}
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conceived by elites as a source of "modern" strength. The Ministry of Education signaled its endorsement of the ideal of "Good Wife, Wise Mother" in educational policy for women from the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{30} Government policies linked women's education with the cultivation of the domestic arts to bolster the nation, and the first government college for women was established in Fukuoka in 1922.\textsuperscript{31}

Creating the ideal "Good Wife, Wise Mother" required an enormous amount of ideological effort, and even before the postwar period of radical democratization and the legitimatization of "angry" political daughters, educating women contained the potential for female student rebellion. In the Meiji period, young women submitted to morality classes for twice as long as their male peers.\textsuperscript{32} Dressed in the wide-legged trousers usually seen on men, the young woman attending girls' higher schools cut quite a figure in urban spaces and in the popular imagination. While conceding that more mobility was necessary for the exercise included in a "modern" curriculum, the Ministry of Education noticed the potentially androgynous territory in which female students trod. In 1883, the Ministry forbade women from wearing "men's attire."\textsuperscript{33} Authorities strove to forge "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" immune to the seductions of both mass culture and dangerous political thought. However, the social necessity for mass literacy and education always produced an uncontrollable excess: once people could read, they could read anything. Reflecting on the interwar period in Japan, Maruyama Masao, one of postwar Japan's leading social scientists, noted that for parents of the 1920s sending their children to colleges, two threats loomed large: the first was that their children would fall prey to the hedonistic culture

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\item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 120.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Beauchamp and Rubinger, \textit{Education in Japan}, 142.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Jones, \textit{Children as Treasures}, 133.
\end{itemize}
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of the dancehalls and the cafes ("the moga [modern girl] and mobo [modern boy] craze"); the second was that “their children might become infected with 'dangerous thought' [i.e., radical thought].”

Maruyama's 1962 description of the 1920s shared much in common with the moment in which he issued it. In many ways, then, the ideological struggles of the post-Anpo era echoed prewar concerns about how to manage rapid socio-economic change, an expanding middle-class, and a growing and potentially subversive student population.

In the post-1945 milieu, the government could not adopt the language of "Good Wife, Wise Mother," which had associations with the wartime ethics curriculum. However, discussions about the degraded state of the postwar family implied a misplaced emphasis on women's role in public, at the expense of their important roles at home. Attempts on the part of government commissions in the 1960s to forge a homogenous national ideal of a Japanese family drew on prewar models, which required both female labor in the home and a link between the family and the nation.

**The "Ideal Person"**

In the early 1960s, government commissions and documents also began to reflect the anxieties underlying the debates first waged in magazines and newspapers. Policymakers' reports and documents from this time expressed their concern for the health of the family at a time of rapid postwar social changes; their distress indicated that complete equality between men

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34 Maruyama Masao. “Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme.” In Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization. Ed. Marius B. Jansen. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1965. P. 489-531. P. 519. As Maruyama elaborates on page 520-1: “Along with the moga and mobo, there were also the 'Marx-boys' and 'Engels-girls,' terms of derision directed against the flippant pretensions displayed by those youths who considered Marxism fashionable… [However] those youths were not so much the direct offspring of the 'subversive' types in the late Meiji as the transformed figures of the mahon seinen (exemplary youths) of the Japanese Empire."

and women might spell out the ruin of the nation after all. A rise in youth crime in the late 1950s and early 1960s drew attention to how the household ought to function. It actually was not until 1960 that a Central Child Welfare Commission document linked this juvenile violence—usually petty theft—with the health of the family; in the late 1950s, the main culprit was seen as mass culture: movies and late-night coffeehouses. However, the 1960 report made it clear that the experts at the Commission saw a "healthy family" with "husband and wife and children at the heart" as a necessary basis for a democratic society, and found the roots of its negligence in the postwar "collapse of the family system." In 1963, a government white paper on child welfare pointed to "a deficiency in the level of nurturing" that put postwar children at risk; this "decline in child welfare" came "in the wake of women's increased penetration of the workforce." State labor policies in the mid-1960s needed to mobilize female labor to manage a shortage in workers. However, as the Economic Deliberative Council's 1963 report emphasized, the ideal form of work for married women remained "reentry employment" and "part-time" work. This allowed for women to fulfill their expected roles of domestic laborers, while married women also functioned as a flexible workforce that supplemented the full-time employment of unmarried women and unmarried and married men.

In the mid-1960s, the Ministry of Education also considered the importance of the family as a site for the development and education of youth in its efforts to address the education of women; the Ministry included “considering the necessity of improving women's qualities as citizens and their important role as educator at home" in its objectives for women's education,

38 Uno, “The Death of 'Good Wife, Wise Mother'?,” 305.
thereby particularizing domestic labor as female, and including education as an essential part of that work.\textsuperscript{39} This mid-1960s Ministry of Education statement, although employing the democratic language of "citizenship," nevertheless emphasized the gendered future of a young woman's labor in the home. In this way, the pronouncement shared an underlying logic with the text from a 1907 edition of a girls' higher education morality textbook: "Women, like men, must fulfill their lifetime purpose by developing and cultivating their personhood. Unlike a man, however, a woman develops her personhood by fulfilling duties such as aiding her husband, governing her house, and raising her children. In other words, a woman fulfills her duty by becoming a good wife, wise mother."\textsuperscript{40} Much like late Meiji definitions about the particularly female duties of women subjects, government policy in the early and mid-1960s accepted the rhetoric of equal citizenship and democracy, while emphasizing the specifically domestic duties assigned to women.

One of the most publicized reports created by the Ministry of Education's Central Educational Commission of Inquiry, although eliding gender particularities to present a vision of a universal “ideal person," carried deeply gendered implications, smuggled in through the social function of the family and its necessity to national unity. The 1965 “The Image of the Ideal Person" (Kitai sareru ningenzō, which can also be translated as the "Image of the Expected Person") included the ideal role of the family in the creation of this ideal person. Crafted by a committee of leading cultural figures with links to prewar fascism, the document reflected many

\textsuperscript{39} Ministry of Education Japan, \textit{Educational Developments in 1965-66. Report Presented at the XXVIIIth International Conference on Public Education, Geneva, 1966}, 24. As far as the role of women as educators outside the home, in the schools, their position as hired labor was still marked by potential motherhood. While the “status and conditions” of women were declared “fundamentally equal to men's." It was also qualified by the provisions granted to women teachers “as the bearers of children": six weeks maternity leave, breaks to nurse an infant, and menstruation leave. Ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{40} Jones, \textit{Children as Treasures}, 120–121.
similarities with the 1937 "Fundamentals of Our National Polity" (Kokutai no hongi), in spite of its repeated claims about "democracy." An attempt to set a moral agenda for Ministry of Education policies, the ideological driving force of the report is a specifically statist interpretation of "democracy." The ultimate goal for the ideal human is defined as happiness, and this human happiness is declared as dependent on stable economic and political conditions. The proper political conditions envisioned in this report are, rather than democratic pluralism, a perpetuation of the status quo. The document states, for example, that those who interpret democracy as "class struggle" cannot prevail or "the essence of democracy will be destroyed." It is not only popular protest that threatens an orderly democracy according to the document; while arguing for efforts to strengthen the national economy, the report also warns against mass culture. The creators emphasized instead a strong work ethic and devotion to family and nation, both of which require resignation to one's socially assigned role rather than an aspirational ideal of democratic equality.

The report is organized into three sections: "As People in the Household," "As People in Society," and "As Japanese" in sequence, implying that the family, society, and the nation are units nestled within each other, in a structure not dissimilar to the prewar family-state. The "ideal person" was rooted in a household that operated within society, and the nation linked the fortunes of that society to the world. The household was to offer an organized space of familial love to cultivate a more general love of the nation. As the report stated: "The household is a component of society and the nation (kokka), and is its foundation. If the household is in disarray, it follows that society and the nation will also be in disarray." The ideal household is declared to

41 The committee that created this report included former Kyoto School of Philosophy members Koyama Iwao and Kōsaka Masa'aki. Koschmann, “Intellectuals and Politics,” 414.

be a hygenic “place of rest,” where workers can retire from “today's hectic social life.” Again, the dangers of mass society are invoked: “In mass society and mass culture, the household is where one can find oneself and recover one's humanity.” What is not clarified is who makes the household this kind of place. While defined as a “place of rest,” it is implicitly female labor that prepares this place, and keeps it clean. The insistence that the home is the place of education, "in cooperation" with schools also confirmed the gendered labor of the household.

To protect against political confrontation and contestation, the report avoided discussions of class and ethnicity (only defining the Japanese as one ethnos, minzoku) and emphasized the need to organize society around production. It also elaborated a demand for people who honor social norms and social order. In this document, “society" meant simply “the workplace;" it was not amenable to more idealistic or political interpretations of society as a pluralistic public sphere. “Society" in the report equaled the place of work and production of wealth, and not the place for negotiating ideas. Nor was it the place of leisure and consumer culture. The wealth accrued in the workplace would lead to a "strong Japan." Continuing the trend Kanba Michiko noted in the educational guidelines of the 1950s toward a recuperation of Japanese foundational mythical histories affirming the divinity of the Emperor, the document cautions against losing "Japan's beautiful myths and national character" amid postwar reforms.

Strangely for a Ministry of Education document, it offered few clues as to how education should function to cultivate ideal persons, although the informal educational space of the

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43 This assumes that the household is outside of mass society and the consumer culture, even at the very moment when what was defining the “typical” household was access (or idealized access) to modern household goods. See William Kelly, “Finding a Place in Metropolitan Japan: Ideologies, Institutions, and Everyday Life,” in Postwar Japan as History, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).


household emerged as a key. The “healthy” cultivation of love in the family was to prepare citizens for the “healthy" love of the Japanese nation. The “Good Wife, Wise Mother” remained unnamed in the discussion of a clean, safe, humane household; the use of these specific terms in prewar women's patriotic education may have made the words unnamable in this postwar document, tainted as they were by Japan's militarist history. Instead, the document made overtures to a postwar ideal of an equal, universal subjectivity: that of the "ideal person." But the role of women in postwar society was smuggled in via the emphasis on the family, considering the prevailing perception that the work of managing a household remained a woman's responsibility.

The report was announced to the Japanese public via the mass media in January 1965. The generally conservative national daily, the *Yomiuri shinbun*, included the Central Council for Education's statement under the headline, "Toward a Healthy Democracy, with Self-Awareness as Japanese," summarizing the report's goal of organizing a specifically nation-centric form of orderly democracy. The headline alone demonstrates a shift in the popular newspaper's sympathies; an article on a similarly moralistic 1951 Ministry of Education document ran under the title "The Amano Doctrine: A Declaration of War on Democratization." In the 1965 article on "The Image of the Ideal Person," the Minister of Education encouraged the Japanese public to discuss the document, hoping that even such discussion alone would define more clearly how society could maintain a sense of its humanity in the midst of rapid change.

Judging from a series of cartoons that subsequently ran in the same paper mocking the "The Image of the Ideal Person," the document failed to ignite debate in the way that the Ministry desired. In one reader-submitted comic strip published shortly after "Image of the Ideal Person," the character says, "The image of the ideal person is not human." This suggests that the document's call for self-awareness as Japanese may have been met with skepticism by the public.

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Person" went public, a professor set to lecture on the document paces the stage of a community center, awaiting an audience (fig. 5). The caption jokes that the turnout did not meet expectations, making a pun on the title of the Ministry of Education document, which can also be translated into English as "Image of the Expected Person." The cartoon played on the underwhelming response the document provoked.

Figure 5. Reader-submitted cartoon. Caption reads: "The turnout is not ideal..." The sign reads: "'The Image of the Ideal Person' with Professor XX." Community Center. Ishikawa Shōji, Yomiuri shinbun, 24 January 1965.48

Another reader-submitted cartoon represented a curious but puzzled populace regarding an abstract sculpture boasting the title "Image of the Ideal Person" (fig. 6). The drawing contrasted the various spectators, in all their specificity across generations and genders, to the "ideal person," which is a formless blob. As if revealing that the emperor stands naked, a little girl asks

48 Ishikawa Shōji, “Kitai sarechaa inain danaa sensei wa...,” Yomiuri shinbun, 24 January 1965, evening edition. My translation here is a bit loose, to resonate with the translation of kitai sareru as "ideal." However, kitai sareru also translates as "expected." A more literal translation of the cartoon would be: "It's not as the professor expected."
her father, "What is it?" This illustrator exposed the vagueness of the document, which described "ideal / expected" personhood in elusive and spiritual terms.

Figure 6. Reader submitted cartoon. Caption: "What is this?"
Title of sculpture: "The Image of the Ideal Person"
Taki Katsuki, Yomiuri shinbun, 24 January 1965.

Among young people, reactions recorded by the author and peace activist Oda Makoto in April 1965 ranged from hostility to indifference. Oda titled his report on interviews with young men and women on "The Image of the Ideal Person" with a question: "ideal for whom?" None of the young people he interviewed felt that the report addressed the concerns facing them. Oda also declared himself more interested in the potential for student activism than in the documents drafted by conservative intellectuals. By 1966, a rise in campus-based protest movements, mostly organized to protest fee increases, also demonstrated increased student interest in the

power of collective action. As we shall see, these protests soon exploded at universities nationwide.

However, regardless of the indifference or puzzlement provoked by "Image of the Ideal Person," the document demonstrated a battle for revising the radically democratic hegemonic ideals of citizenship ascendant during the anti-Anpo demonstrations. A key element of these efforts by conservative elements in the nation's bureaucracy was to reforge an ideological link between the family and the nation, and to place the nation at the center of educational policy. Whereas the socialist opposition in the Japanese Diet of late 1940s heralded the postwar educational reforms for "eliminating thoroughly the error of an education that would put our state at the center of the universe and instead proclaiming solemnly the concepts of democratic education aimed at rearing a humanity that stands for truth and peace," the Ministry of Education's 1965 "The Image of Ideal Person" attempted to emphasize again the particular duties of the Japanese citizen to the Japanese nation. Stressing the importance of the family implicated the gendered roles of citizens. Leaning on an earlier formula for social stability, the foundation of the nation became the Japanese household, and the responsibility for the household lay with the mother.

As mid-1960s student protest and university crises eclipsed the "Coeds Ruin the Nation Theory," female students could imagine that youth revolt would sweep away demands confining women to the home. However, as Maruyama Kunio (1920-1994) noted in a 1966 article in the intellectual journal Shisō no kagaku, female students underestimated conservative opposition at their own risk. Maruyama, the younger and more radical brother of liberal intellectual giant Maruyama Masao, revisited the “Coeds Ruin the Nation" debate, even though it had faded from

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51 Marshall, Learning to Be Modern, 155–156.
tabloid headlines. However, Maruyama described a higher education atmosphere in which university administrators and professors continued to blame young women for ruining university departments. Addressing the ahistoricity with which the popular discourse often discussed the importance of the household and the training of an expert in home economics, he ironically proposed instead the establishment of “household studies” as an academic department. Instead of assuming that the family ought to play a certain role in society, Maruyama described a real course of "household studies" as one that, “would have to include raising questions, from those about the processes that formed the household to those about what the household is at this point in time.” He went on to describe how he would organize his hypothetical “household department,” including which public intellectuals he would hire and insisting that it—like other higher education departments—would be coeducational. "Since men and women would study together, it would be sure to be seething with controversies between students. Among them probably some 'new Noras' [invoking Ibsen's dramatic protagonist] would arise who reject modern home life, reject the one-husband one-wife system, and leave the home on their own."

Although Maruyama's proposal was tongue-in-cheek, he urged young women to articulate a serious counter-attack to the "Coeds Ruin the Nation Theory." He reported several conversations he'd shared with female students who dismissed the argument as simply outdated sexism, or even welcomed the kind of "ruination" coeducation would bring. One young woman told him, "If this is a country that will be ruined by women occupying the universities, then it doesn't matter if it is ruined." Although young educated women tended to dismiss such "debates" as too silly to counter in an organized way, Maruyama believed that young women needed to assert themselves, or else they would "half affirm their critics."

53 Ibid., 82.
Certainly, women were aware of the violent potential of such public debates, and responded in force to the more threatening pronouncements of gendered politics. For example, women of all ages reacted with organized resistance to the statements of Prime Minister Satō Eisaku, made shortly after his 1964 election, that Japanese women ought to bear more children. Satō's declaration raised the specter of the state's wartime pro-natalist policies, and the sensitivity of women's groups to such rhetoric illustrated what one historian has called "the multiplicity of feminisms" that emerged not only in the 1970s, but also in the 1960s. However, state policies interpreting women's work and education as essentially bound to domestic responsibilities triumphed in the 1960s. While young women were scoffing at tabloid debates that derided women's place in coeducation, the Ministry of Education issued a directive in 1969 that required high school girls to take homemaking courses.

The debates examined in this chapter demonstrate that in the early 1960s, the figure of the female student provoked distinct social anxieties. Her presence in formerly homosocial educational institutions threatened conservative academics. The mass media offered these intellectuals a forum in which they could argue their positions, and weekly tabloid publications affirmed their opinions by presenting them as experts. The transition in popular discourse about the female student from model new citizen to social threat set the ground for the public reception of young women as they participated in the student movement of the late 1960s. The enduring and de-historicized link between the social role of women and the household influenced also the politics of the late-1960s student movement. Even as the student left sought to reject bourgeois Japanese morality, the movement's failure to analyze the historical processes by which women

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54 Buckley, “Altered States,” 351.
55 Uno, “The Death of 'Good Wife, Wise Mother'”, 306.
became linked to ideals of the nurturing figure of the household contributed also to the perpetuation of gendered prejudices and violence within the movement itself.
4.

The Barricades as Rupture and Continuity:
The gendered labor of the campus-based student movement

Introduction

In light of the increasingly rationalized "everyday life" of higher education in service of national economic growth, student activists in the late 1960s embraced the occupation of university space as a key strategy. The erection of barricades built within university buildings on campuses claimed an autonomous zone for students, disrupted the operations of schools, and became a place not just to plan strikes and make fliers, but also to remove oneself from society at large. The barricades, defended by walls made of desks and chairs that marked out spaces in which activists organized, ate, slept, and from which they launched marches, challenged the everyday life that sustained the Japanese state and capital. The barricades were also the site in which students performed the everyday operations that reproduced the movement. The theories student activists discussed in the barricades were various and rich in utopian and romantic imagination. This liberatory promise greeted female participants as well as male. Indeed, the loose and open organization of the late 1960s “Zenkyōtō” (Zengaku kyōtō kaigi: "All-Campus Joint Struggle Councils") reflected the philosophy of the female student activist and essayist Tokoro Mitsuko. However, the gendered expectations that came to define the work in the barricades exposed a major gap between the theories and the practices of the student movement.

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Examining the experiences of female student activists in the various nonsectarian campus movements of the late 1960s—commonly referred to by the generic term Zenkyōtō—shows how the student-erected barricades were spaces removed from the quotidian time of Japanese society, and offered a place of escape for all participants, regardless of gender. Here I will introduce Tokoro Mitsuko's influence, trace the rise of the Zenkyōtō movement and its key concerns, and consider how the experiences of female students demonstrated the contradictions between the theories and practices of New Left activism. Although Tokoro's ideas of a non-hierarchical leftist organization influenced the student movement of the late 1960s, opening up a moment of potential liberation for female student activists from the strict gendered codes solidifying in Japan's increasingly rationalized economy and society, the dichotomy of "violence" vs. "nurturing" created a new hierarchy in the campus-based student movement of 1968–1969.

The New Left in late-1960s Japan: The Zenkyōtō

In discussing the late 1960s student movement under the widely employed term "Zenkyōtō" it is important to note that a rich heterogeneity of "Zenkyōtō" experiences become lumped together under one term, obscuring variations of region (urban vs. rural schools), class (public vs. private schools), and age of participants (junior high school students vs. junior professors). All these cases shared a politicized ideal of the student, and a myth of spontaneity: that open, non-hierarchical, non-sectarian movements blossomed on hundreds of campuses nationwide in 1968–1969. However, in very few cases were the ostensibly non-sectarian Zenkyōtō actually free from sectarian power plays, and the two emblematic Zenkyōtō that were—that of Tokyo University and Nihon University—reflected moments rich in possibility that were ultimately foreclosed.2 The student movement of the late 1960s mobilized mainly as

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2 Hoshino Chieko, a student at Hosei University, noted in retrospect that most university Zenkyōtō were not truly nonsectarian, as she understood those at Tōdai and Nichidai to be. Hoshino Chieko, “Kamonegi
opposition to the rationalization of higher education and the Vietnam War, and the ideal of the loosely organized Zenkyōtō defined this generation of student activists' associative aspirations. The decentralized style distinguished the late 1960s student movement from that of the 1960 Anpo generation of Bund-led Zengakuren activists and also from the mid-1960s generation that fought against the Japan-Korea Treaty. Without dismissing the potential of the Zenkyōtō ideals and strategies, I argue that, although state repression and sectarian violence presented significant obstacles to the continuation of even these more "ideal" type movements, a less noted but equally menacing obstacle was the gendered division of labor behind the barricades that reflected an acceptance of the "common sense" that defined that division. Although many vectors of difference existed among the various groups—groups defined by of a handful of students or hundreds of thousands of members—that organized under the banner of a “Zenkyōtō," this gendered division remained particularly salient in the creation not only of different experiences of a supposedly shared movement, but also in the creation of its legacy and commemoration.

Tokoro Mitsuko and the Zenkyōtō

The Zenkyōtō ideal of sect-less horizontality and “endless debate" drew in part from the thought of student activist Tokoro Mitsuko. Tokoro had been an undergraduate at the all-women Ochanomizu University during the 1960 anti-Anpo protests and continued to join demonstrations as a peace activist after a period as a graduate student at Osaka University and Ochanomizu University. She based her opinions about the direction of leftist politics in Japan, which she published in such journals as Shiisō no kagaku and Asahi Journal, on her experiences of activism throughout the 1960s. Tokoro's experiences as an activist, and also as a female activist in

shōjo no sanjū nen," in Zenkyōtō kara ribu e, Jūgoshi nōto sengohen (Kawasaki: Inpakuto shuppankai, 1996), 90.

particular, colored her analyses. Although, with her death in 1968, she was unable to participate in the movement that made some of her male comrades famous, her posthumously published essays, journals, and correspondence became part of the Zenkyōtō literature of the time. Like Kanba's posthumously publishing writings, the volume that came out after Tokoro's death, *My Love, My Rebellion*, included not only her intellectual work, but also intimate diary entries and letters. Her collected writings expose her innermost anxieties about loving and being loved, being accepted or rejected, and her worries about money and work. Similar to the case of Kanba's published works, *My Love, My Rebellion* encouraged the reader to sympathize not just with Tokoro as a thinker, but also to see Tokoro as a vulnerable and specifically female person. Tokoro's collected writings, also published after an untimely death, drew a parallel with Kanba's premature death, echoing the role of the maiden sacrifice.

The media-identified "leader" of the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō, chairman Yamamoto Yoshitaka, in a blurb advertising Tokoro's book, memorialized Tokoro's death as a kind of sacrifice marking the beginning of the Zenkyōtō: "The Zenkyōtō movement began on the day of Tokoro Mitsuko's funeral. The Zenkyōtō movement inherited her approach to life, and it was in the movement that it blossomed." The term "Zenkyōtō" itself originated in the Tokyo University struggle in early July 1968, when an All-Student Joint Struggle Council (Zenkyōtō) was formed at a meeting attended by occupying student activists and "ordinary students" alike. In many other cases Tokyo University set the national standard, perpetuating a hierarchy of higher

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education institutions even in an ostensibly horizontal and spontaneous movement. Tokoro Mitsuko died on 27 January 1968—the very day that Tokyo University medical students voted on an indefinite strike, 229 to 28.\textsuperscript{7} In her short life, Tokoro had participated in all the key battles of the student New Left: she had been at the Diet on 15 June 1960, when Kanba Michiko was killed. She'd been at protests against the Korea-Japan Security Pact in 1965 and in demonstrations against the Vietnam War. She had also been at Ōji, Sunagawa, and at the "Enterprise struggle." Her presence at these iconic moments built her activist pedigree.\textsuperscript{8} Her death at the very beginning of the Tokyo University struggle—which would last a year, capture the imagination of the nation, and attempt to employ the nonhierarchical structure Tokoro theorized—can be seen as a great irony. Indeed, the movement at Tokyo University strove to employ her ideas of horizontality and "endless debate," but dropped Tokoro's insistence that a less coercive organizational style demonstrated a nurturing "women's logic."\textsuperscript{9} Although the Zenkyōtō movement ultimately did not address issues of gendered subjectivity, dropping "women's issues" for a universalist ideal of a revolutionary subjectivity, these ideas were not first discovered by post-Zenkyōtō feminists either. Tokoro's articulations of "women's logic" force us to consider how "women's issues" were erased in the course of the movement. While replicating many essentialist discourses about women as basically vulnerable and nurturing, Tokoro attempted to understand how a gendered subjectivity created meaning in society. Her writings on how the student left ought to relate to both violence and its imagined, and likewise gendered

\textsuperscript{7} Tokoro Mitsuko, \textit{Waga ai to hangyaku} (Tokyo: Zeneisha, 1969).
\textsuperscript{9} Guy Yasko also notes the influence of “women issues" to the formation of Zenkyōtō, and also that the issues were often dropped in the course of the movement." Ibid., 19.
opposite, nurturing, proposed bringing non-violent and nurturing feminine values to the student movement as a whole.

Tokoro Mitsuko was aware of her gendered position as an activist, and her awareness informed her view of how a political organization ought to be structured. The essay many point to when they link Tokoro's ideas to the development of campus-based Zenkyōtō is "Toward the Coming Organization."¹⁰ What Tokoro attempted to discuss in “Toward the Coming Organization" addressed the issues brought up in the late 1950s in the fictional stories of Ōe Kenzaburō and Kurahashi Yumiko regarding the JCP-led student left; Tokoro too was concerned with how an organization could respect the individuality of its members, and her essay articulated the guiding principles for the nonsectarian New Left Zenkyōtō that arose in the late 1960s on college campuses. Similar to the critique launched by Ōe and Kurahashi, Tokoro decried an organization that demanded its members subsume their desires to the group's goals. However, she also rejected an individualist solution, retaining hope for collective action. In her judgment, this would require ongoing debate, and noncoercive and nonhierarchical structures. Zenkyōtō groups attempted to employ these strategies through, for example, inviting all members to participate in debates, and refraining from requiring that all members participate in the group's actions.

Tokoro and "Women's Logic"

Key to Tokoro's essay, however, and her political romanticism in general, was the idea that women embodied an essentially nurturing logic that ought to inform radical organizations. Although her piece on the "coming organization" has been cited as a key influence for the ideals

of the late 1960s student movement, the essay failed to win the contest held by the journal *Shisō no kagaku* for which Tokoro wrote it. Ōno Tsutomu, an editor at the journal at the time, recalled that her essay showed exciting new thinking, but got only one vote. Ōno identified the problem with Tokoro's essay as its second half, in which she began making claims that were too ambitious.¹¹ This latter section is where Tokoro began to elaborate a theory of feminine logic. The inspiration for much of Tokoro's theories of a different future organization was drawn from her own experiences as an activist, but she also responded enthusiastically to thinkers such as Takamura Itsue and Simone Weil, finding in the writings of both these female intellectuals a broader theory of "women's logic." She posited "women's logic" as one against the utilitarian, rationalist scientific thinking of capitalism and the wartime state. Tokoro's ideas about "women's logic" repeated the assumptions common to her intellectual milieu, namely using differences between the sexes as the key marker of social difference, and subsuming discussions about how distinctions of class, ethnicity, nationality, or age might also influence the experiences of "Japanese" women. Her emphasis on female experience as that most indivisibly linked to embodied experience, however, evoked the concerns of other thinkers who rejected the subordination of everyday life to rationalist theoreticism.

Tokoro expressed a clearer articulation of her theories on "women's logic" in a later essay that made it into the pages of a special 1967 issue *Shisō no kagaku* dedicated to the question "What is the Nation to Us?"¹² Writting under her pen name, Tomano Mimie, she explores further the theme of "women's logic" in her essay, “How Do Women Want to Be?” Invoking again the thought of Takamura Itsue, she defines "women's logic" as that which determines existence itself to be enough, and sees value in everything, from the "head of a salted salmon" to the "tail of a

This is supposed to come from women's urge to nurture even the "useless" bodies of weak or disabled children, and stands in stark opposition to utilitarian logic or the logic of American military scientists, who are busily computing how to most effectively kill people in the Vietnam War. It is the logic of women, Tokoro argued, to exhaust all resources to nurture life without calculating the "value" of the life; the "male" logic of science exerts itself to assess the most effective means of eliminating lives considered valueless, regardless of the villages, villagers, jungles, and rice fields that might also be destroyed. For Tokoro, it is this positivist utilitarian logic that is the result not only of the rise of science, but also of capitalism. As productivity became the test of worth, machines could even become considered superior to humans. This logic, for Tokoro, is also where the "nation" as an existence worth more than individual lives appears; the value of people's lives becomes determined by their contribution to the "national interest." Inasmuch as Tokoro emphasized delinking the value of a human life from the "national interest," this element of Tokoro's thought also resonated with late-1960s student activism against rationalized education.

To counter the demands of the "national interest" over the innate value of each life, Tokoro argues for "women's logic," and refers to the historical example of women on the homefront in wartime Japan to illustrate how the "national interest" makes victims of the nation's people. Tokoro's account of wartime women elides the role women played in Japan's empire and militant mobilization; in describing Japanese women as the victims of war, she echoes the arguments of postwar democracy advocates who insisted that incorporating women into the political process would prevent a resurgence of militarism. In advocating for a political

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14 Ibid., 170.
15 Ibid., 173.
organization that responded to "women's logic," she continues this essentialist philosophy of women's political purity and pacifism. However, her mention of "American scientists" who calculate how to kill Vietnamese villagers demonstrates also that she reaches into Japan's recent history to draw parallels between the horrors of war experienced by so many Japanese in the recent past—starvation, fire bombings, dead husbands and children—to the horrors taking place at the time she wrote in Southeast Asia. She blamed not only "Americans," but also condemned a general logic of science, capital, and nation. Her idea of "women's logic" prioritized the experiences of women, but she argued also that men could understand "women's logic" through inheriting their mother's sorrow. She also noted, too, that many contemporary women felt the allure of "men's logic." In particular, "so-called 'career women' have the same relationship to production as men" and dismiss the intuition—based on the reproduction of life—they ought to be proud of.\(^\text{16}\)

Tokoro defined the "intuition" of women by a biological relationship to space and time, based on the experience of birthing a life created within one's body; "logic" itself, Tokoro argues, derived from subjective experiences. "Logic" for Tokoro is not an objective formula; she defines "logic" as the way in which various individual desires are expressed to others. The experience of childbirth, for example, is one of feeling personal individual desires subsumed by the desires of another. In this sense, she diverges from a liberal individualist view of activism as individual self-expression. She takes issue with how the logics of capitalist production and empiricism make claims to objectivity, for under this logic, one cannot criticize the value of prioritizing growth and productivity.\(^\text{17}\) The "mother-child time-space," however, is different from that of Newtonian physics, and is one in which one thing cannot be equaled to another; one worker

\(^\text{16}\) Ibid., 177.
\(^\text{17}\) Ibid., 174.
cannot equal another, nor equal a machine. In women's logic, the uniqueness of any existence makes it impossible to quantitatively compare it to another. In answer to “how do women want to be," Tokoro responds that they want to be able to affirm their own subjective experiences; they don't want to be forced into acting on the "logic" of capital and nation—the logic of empiricism and productivity—but want instead to assert the validity of their own subjective logic.

Tokoro opened her essay, however, with a discussion of a time in which the logic of war created a space literally occupied by only women and children, which she treated with both empathy but also ambivalence: the wartime homefront. She made a parallel between the homefront during war and with contemporary rural villages that depend upon the salaries of men who left to work in factories and urban areas. Still in its nascent stages, the communities of the *danchi*—the high-rise housing projects—were similarly feminine environments. Although *danchi* living targeted nuclear families, the demanding hours of work and commuting for the white-collar husbands / fathers of these families meant that the apartment high-rises resembled women-and-children only communes for most of the time, and made women the leaders of community projects. The ideal of the household as a space of rest and regaining humanity—as managed by a woman—became in practice a space of women and children. Although Tokoro affirms a nurturing "women's logic" against the destructive logic of capital and the nation, she also describes the experience of women on the homefront as one of being trapped in a "mother-child space-time": "Women have a solemn existence in an uninterrupted, unseverable mother-

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18 Ibid., 175–176.  
19 Ibid., 176.  
20 Ibid., 168.  
child time-space. They can't escape it, can't fulfill any other dreams. Their compassion for children sinks other enlivened spirits. They are faced with a history-less existence."

This description bespeaks her ambivalence to the social separating of women into a space-time of maternal care. Although, Tokoro argues, nurturing creates a logic antithetical to rationalism and violence, she also noted that the homefront—and perhaps by the extension, the household—was also a space that confined. As we shall see, student activists' attempts to sever the "space-time" of the bourgeois lifestyle often became a struggle against the mother as a manifestation of the strangling bonds of "mother-child space-time," dropping Tokoro's awareness of a mother's own entrapment in the home.

Indeed, the Zenkyōtō emphasis on events of spectacular confrontation as sites of potential revolutionary rupture over considering the everyday tasks that reproduced the movement's daily life in the occupied barricades effectively forced many female participants into the nurturing roles of "mother-child space-time." This was a space-time outside history. Illustrating the potentially gendered subjective experiences of historical rupture and continuity, Tokoro opened her "how do women want to be" essay with a brief mention of what many noted as a key moment of rupture in Japanese history by quoting the science fiction writer Komatsu Sakyō, who was a fourteen-year-old boy when he listened to the emperor's voice read the Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War. In formal Japanese, the previously unheard voice of the Shōwa emperor, Hirohito, announced the end of the war on 15 August 1945 via a prerecorded radio broadcast. During wartime, Hirohito had been a distant and divine figure. In this moment, his voice entered the public spaces of cities, towns, and villages for the first time. In Komatsu's quote, he noted that it was this "hard to hear" voice on the radio that suddenly transformed the "battleground"

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into "ruins." He recalled this as a moment of absolute internal temporal rupture: "A clock inside of me broke at that moment." Komatsu was a male adolescent at the time, and Tokoro wonders about how the situation must have been experienced by the many women gathered around radios all over the nation listening to the same broadcast, struggling to decipher the stilted classical speech of their emperor. Tokoro wonders if "for women who had been forbidden to mourn husbands lost in battle or sons deployed to the front, this 'moment' in which all became 'ruins' also existed." Tokoro is interested in how this key moment—which many described as one of a vertiginous shift in reality—operated in the space of the homefront, a space from which adult men had disappeared, where only women remained alongside the fragile lives they had to nurture: those of the elderly and children. Perhaps, Tokoro ventures, women did not experience this "moment" in which men's dreams of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere crumbled as a rupture. Women occupied a "battleground" in which it was not enemies they fought, but starvation. It was not battles fought by guns and swords in strategic missions, but battles organized around mealtimes. It was not the war of violent spectacles, but of everyday needs.

Although Tokoro's assessment of "women's logic" bears many of the marks of an essentialist and romantic analysis of gender and feminine vulnerability, her writings also reflect an attempt to understand how a society or social movement can organize around a recognition of varying positions of power and vulnerability through the examples offered by women's experiences. Although her ideas about horizontal decision-making based on "endless debate" inspired the organizational ideas of the late 1960s student movement, the practices of student

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23 Tomano, “Onna wa dō aritai ka," 1969, 168. Tsurumi Kazuko discusses books published in 1964 in which women began to speak out after the war, in which women were beginning to articulate the conflicting emotions they experienced during the war. One example was their feelings of being stuck between the "ideal role of a patriotic mother imposed upon them by the state and the role they actually performed of an intensely loving mother." Tsurumi Kazuko, Social Change and the Individual; Japan before and after Defeat in World War II (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 258–259.
activists in the barricades replicated a marginalization of the labor of everyday care that was gendered female. Whether or not embracing an intuitive "women's logic" offered a solution to the logics of science, capital, and nation, the late 1960s student movement certainly valorized a kind of "masculine logic" that ultimately betrayed the experiences of its female participants. Although attempting to employ horizontal structures to increase access to the movement and to disrupt the hierarchical structures of science, capital, and nation, the iconic “battleground” of the late 1960s student movement remained that of violent spectacles. The work of reproducing the everyday needs of the movement—the rice balls, the mimeographed pamphlets, the jail support for those arrested—remained invisible, trapping female activists relegated to these activities again in a space-time in which they tended a “homefront.”

The Violence of Postwar Peace and the Student Movement

Although much in the practices of the late 1960s student movement undervalued the everyday labor of female students in the barricades, recognizing the violence perpetuated in the name of "peace" in Japan motivated the movement to prioritize disrupting the space-time of the everyday order that undergirded Japanese capital and the state. In an article he published in November 1968 on the "philosophy of the barricades," Tokyo University Zenkyōtō chairman Yamamoto Yoshitaka echoed Tokoro in noting that "the ideology of capitalist society is recognized as rationalism." He identified the barricades and unlimited strikes of the mid- to late-1968 campus movements as a key tactic to interrupt the process by which university "factories" produce students that served capital. Student activists also became involved in the movements that barricaded campus buildings because they made links between the "peaceful"

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25 Ibid., 92.
social order in Japan to the geopolitical situation that facilitated war in nearby Southeast Asia. A "peaceful social order" in Japan included the organization of the universities, especially in cases in which poor facilities and hastily chartered institutions proved that the goal of education was not to enrich students' lives, but to manufacture laborers for Japanese industry.\textsuperscript{26} Many students active in the Zenkyōtō of the late 1960s trace the motivating event for their participation to the dramatic death of Yamazaki Hiroaki, a student at Kyoto University, who died at the 8 October 1967 protests at Haneda Airport protesting Prime Minister Satō Eisaku's visit to South Vietnam. Yamazaki's death called to mind earlier struggles at Haneda Airport during the 1960 anti-Anpo demonstrations, and evoked also the 1960 death of female student activist Kanba Michiko. These past events framed students' interpretations of Yamazaki's death. Although the subsequent Zenkyōtō movement often based its struggles on campuses and even campus-specific demands, his death at an anti-Vietnam War demonstration led many to interpret his death as one "in solidarity" with those dying in Vietnam as well; it was a reminder that the violence of the war across the sea could also spill over into "peaceful" Japanese society.

Unlike the 1960 death of Kanba Michiko, which many pointed to as the mark of the end of 1960 student activism in “failure," Yamazaki's death defined the beginning of the late 1960s wave of activism. In part because of the specter of Kanba's death, the death of Yamazaki provoked many to take up activism. Even if their politics were vague, a sense of the necessity of immediate political action gripped several students at the news that a fellow student had died. One female student related conversations she had with otherwise nonpolitical students who felt

\textsuperscript{26} However, as Oda Makoto, the anti-Vietnam War peace activist remarked, it was often a source of bewilderment that student activists so directly linked their campus-based struggles against rising tuitions with assisting the people of Vietnam. Thomas Havens, \textit{Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan, 1965-1975} (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 188. For more on how Japan was a key beneficiary of U.S. policies to keep Southeast Asian markets "free" and open to Japanese imports, see Ibid., 84–106.
unclear about leftist jargon like overthrowing imperialism or Marxism, but nevertheless felt they needed to do something in the wake of Yamazaki's death. A graduate student reflected that she had been immersed in research instead of the struggle, and that she reproached herself upon hearing of Yamazaki's death: “It was not state power that killed Yamazaki. The one who killed this person who gave his life in solidarity with the Vietnamese people was [I].” An activist group, in a flier distributed at Tokyo University, drew out the parallels between the death of Kanba Michiko in 1960 and that of Yamazaki. In refuting mass media claims that a student who had hijacked a police bus killed Yamazaki, they sought sympathy for this most recent sacrifice in a struggle against state authority by evoking the generally sympathetic figure of Kanba.

Although the actions of university administrations and the Japanese government distressed students even before Yamazaki's death, that a fellow student had died expressing active resistance to unpopular policies induced others to evaluate their inactivity; many felt compelled to act as students in common with Yamazaki.

The death of Yamazaki as catalyst illustrates another common characteristic among several campus-based movements in the late 1960s: the rapidity with which students linked conflicts with university administrations to the larger geopolitical struggles of neo-imperialism, represented most vividly through the war in Vietnam. At both Tokyo University and Nihon

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30 As William Marotti notes in his study of artist activists in the 1960s, it was a marker of the "paradigmatic activist experience during the global moment of the 1960s" that daily life felt "bound up with issues of political protest and violence, law and the Constitution, state authority and legitimacy, the
University, for example, student frustration with university administrations' responses to their concerns—whether those were about allowing the police onto the campus or opaque finances—increased the allure of university-wide activism, a dynamic in common with activism at several other campuses. At Tokyo University, for example, what began as a limited campus dispute on the part of medical students against an internship system that forced them to work without pay quickly sparked much larger debates about the role of Tōdai and its students in Japanese society in general. In particular, the administration's dogged refusal to rescind an unfair punishment demonstrated the institutional inflexibility of the university. The quick chain of events that followed showed how swiftly demands escalated. The penalty was meted out against the student activist Tsubura Kunihiro, included in a list of seventeen medical students who allegedly attacked an administrator, although it was revealed that he had been over 700 miles away in Kyushu at the time of the incident. The sentences in general were judged too harsh, and a key slogan for the spring 1968 movement was "Reconsider the Unreasonable Punishments," which led to attempts to block graduation and entrance ceremonies. At the 1968 entrance ceremony at Tokyo University, the administration requested police protection to maintain order.\textsuperscript{31} After repeated failed negotiations between the administration and the expanding student movement—which organized as a Zenkyōtō on 2 July 1968—all departments at Tōdai went on strike in September 1968. By the time President Ōkōchi resigned and Katō Ichirō, Dean of the Law Department, became the emergency acting president, the slogans of the movement expressed how expansive student demands had become. One declared: "Destroy Tokyo University!"\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{31} Sawara, “The University Struggles,” 136–137.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 140–141.
The two emblematic Zenkyōtō campus disputes of 1968-1969 at both Tokyo University and Nihon University came about in the wake of the activism provoked by the tuition-hike disputes at several campuses nationwide and the spectacular confrontations with police at demonstrations targeting the link between Japan's hosting of U.S. military personnel and support for the war waged in Vietnam. Even as Zenkyōtō formed at several campuses nationwide, each with their own histories and specific sets of concerns, the nation's attention fixed on these two schools based in central Tokyo. Both Tokyo University—Tōdai—and Nihon University—Nichidai—were supposed to be examples of truly nonsectarian Zenkyōtō, even as the schools occupied very different positions in the national hierarchy of universities. Although student strikes, boycotts, and stoppages disrupted over one hundred campuses throughout Japan in 1968, the nonsectarian integrity with which these two very different schools' organizations supposedly manifested the ideals of Zenkyōtō in general, as well as their high-profile locations, contributed to their mythic status. In many ways, however, "Tōdai Zenkyōtō" or "Nichidai Zenkyōtō" came to stand in for the entire Zenkyōtō experience, thus replacing a profusion of voices and positions with two distinct narratives.

The intensity of the national focus on the campus occupations at elite Tokyo University in particular silenced the diversity of activist experiences that made up the "Zenkyōtō generation." Its position as the nation's premier university and recipient of ten percent of the total money allocated to state universities by the Japanese government made Tōdai national news, although at the peak of campus disputes in the late 1960s, about 80 percent of the nation's

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33 Hoshino Chieko, a student at Hosei University, noted in retrospect that most university Zenkyōtō were not truly nonsectarian, as she understood those at Tōdai and Nichidai to be. Hoshino, “Kamonegi shōjo no sanjū nen,” 90.

camperes—165 schools—were involved in some kind of struggle. \(^{35}\) At seventy of these, students built barricades. \(^{36}\) Many school administrations called in the riot police to break up these occupations; the entrance of the riot police on the Tōdai campus in particular, however, prompted debates in the Diet. A student leader involved in blockading the nine-story Yasuda clock tower, a symbol of the university and home of the president's office, declared the occupation of that building as "the bastion of Japan's student movement, no, the bastion of Japan's class struggle." \(^{37}\) The final siege of Yasuda Tower by riot police ejecting occupying students induced six of seven Tokyo television stations to drop their planned programming and offer audiences all-day live coverage. \(^{38}\) The aspects and events of student and citizen activism that the mass media covered influenced movements, even as activists contested the flat and narrow representations carried in the news. Nevertheless, demonstrations required an audience, and media coverage offered access to a nation-wide viewership.

Given the faculty's concern for the safety of the university as an institution, students felt that disrupting the university was an affirmation of the students' power to counter the system. One student at Tokyo University noted her disappointment with university President Ōkōchi Kazuo's meeting with student representatives at Yasuda Auditorium in late June 1968. Instead of listening to the students' views on the use of police force or the unjust punishments meted out to medical school students, President Ōkōchi demanded to be heard by the students. From the meeting, all she could recall was that the President repeatedly asked them to be quiet, and then

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\(^{38}\) Sawara, "The University Struggles," 158.
he emphasized that the student movement had robbed 400 people of their workplace. She was angered that he saw Tokyo University as an organization that needed to be guarded against the students. What was the university there for, she wondered, if not for the students? She felt that this was the view of the university administration, which privileged the institution over the people it served.\(^{39}\) But the issue of for whom the system existed was bigger than that of the university versus its students. Tokyo University, as several student slogans reminded the public, had originally been Tokyo Imperial University, an institution founded to meet the needs of the imperial state. Even with the collapse of the empire and the erasure of the qualifier "imperial" from the university's title, the state and the university retained a deep intimacy. Tōdai students were the nation's elite because they were being groomed to enter coveted positions in the state bureaucracy.

Demonstrating the relative position of Nihon University and the diversity of Zenkyōtō experiences, from the beginning, Nichidai students did not share the same protection from state force that the Tōdai students enjoyed. The Nihon University administration was particularly quick to squash any signs of a movement. Not only were the riot police called for several demonstrations, right-wing students and student athletic clubs meted out vigilante justice to Nichidai demonstrators, to which university officials turned a blind eye.\(^{40}\) The “peasants” of Nihon University did not share the protected status of Tokyo University; many people in places of power considered the Tōdai campus to be an inviolable space, beyond the reach of the state and the police. Intervention by force at Nichidai only increased the numbers that turned out for demonstrations, however. When right-wing students broke up the first demonstration on 23 May


1968, it drew 5,000 students to the protest two days later on May 25 in Shirayama Avenue in Misakichō.\(^{41}\) Soon the number of protesters doubled, and the administration cancelled lectures and locked students out.\(^{42}\) On May 27, a Nihon University Zenkyōtō formed when students from the economics, literature and sciences, law, art, commercial science, and dentistry departments met and decided on a series of demands that ranged from requesting transparency of university accounting to allowing students freedom of assembly.\(^{43}\) On June 11, right-wing students and members of the student affairs office attacked another activist gathering at the economics department. Over 2,000 students were injured in that clash. Rather than quelling student activism, the violence intensified it, and Nihon University students called a strike and occupied university buildings with barricades.\(^{44}\) Also in June 1968 at Tokyo University, in response to the admittance of the riot police, the student self-governing associations of several departments declared unlimited strikes, effectively stopping all university classes.\(^{45}\)

Unlimited strikes were a shared tactic of the Nihon University and Tokyo University movements, and it was out of these unlimited strikes that a Zenkyōtō formed, emphasizing a radically democratic organizational structure and occupation of campus space. While activists framed confrontations between students and campus authorities as attempts to disrupt the everyday operations of universities and, by extension, the aims of the Japanese nation and capital, the barricades offered spaces in which students could conduct their own experiments in reconfiguring education and everyday life.

\(^{41}\) Takazawa, Takagi, and Kurata, *Shinsayoku nijūnenshi*, 118.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 119.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., 118.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., 119.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 122.
Students built barricades at several campuses, although the prominence of Tokyo University Zenkyōtō in both the mass media and also the general social imagination meant that the experience of the barricades at Tokyo University was often generalized to describe the Zenkyōtō experience as a whole. According to the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō chairman, Yamamoto Yoshitaka, the meaning of the barricades was to disrupt the logic of capital and authority. The highly visible and long-lasting student occupation of Yasuda Tower at Tokyo University lasted from early July 1968 through January 1969, when students were finally besieged and dislodged by riot police. In many ways this event defined the climax of student power. The drama of the final siege of Yasuda Tower also overshadowed the everyday life of the barricades, although it was perhaps the everyday life of the barricades, rather than the spectacular battles waged from them, that offered the greatest potential to disrupt received social wisdom.

The Everyday Life of the Campus-Based Student Movement

Although the symbolic focus of the Tokyo University occupation was the clocktower, a “nonpolitical” (nonpoli) group of students erected a tent village in front of Yasuda Tower two days after activist students re-occupied the building in July 1968. The tent village in front of Yasuda Tower attracted many non-sectarian students – “nonpoli,” to indicate “nonpolitical,” although they were certainly politicized – who participated in the middle ground between occupation and apathy in the tent village. This in-between space—not quite an occupation—for student supporters represented the varying levels of commitment possible within and at the peripheries of the Zenkyōtō. The activities of students there included morning campus “persuasion picket” demonstrations, lectures, and debates. Students rotated sleeping there, and

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held their own courses. They assigned themselves readings and wrote reports. In a flier issued by students creating the tent village, they declared their support for students who retook the tower, and noted that they could not be disinterested in the development: "Why is that? Because this issue involves us as well, and it's something we have to actively grapple with. Also because one of the reasons for this occupation, a decisive step that should have been avoided but was unavoidable, is the powerlessness of our current movement." They encouraged "nonpolitical" students—those who share concerns about the unfair punishments for medical students and about the riot police on campus—to gather at the "tent village" to show support and discuss the issues. The students gathered at the tent village supported occupation not as a preferred tactic, but as one necessary to affirm student autonomy in the university.

The occupation strategies of the late 1960s student movement, in which students claimed space away from the everyday processes of the university and attempted to forge new, non-hierarchical methods of protest, were matched by attempts to renegotiate the content and form of university study. This was an attempt to address issues embedded in the everyday life of the state and capital. While students boycotted classes, those occupying Yasuda Tower hosted "autonomous seminars" to address issues not usually discussed in formal seminars. An example was one held to discuss the Kin Kirō (Kwon Hyi-ro) incident of February 1968 and the issue of resident Koreans in Japan in general. Kin had come to national attention when he was chased down by police for killing a gang leader, and he held hostages in a hotel when besieged by officers. His demands for apologies from the police for discriminatory comments linked his

47 Ōhara, Tokeidai wa takakatta, 72.
49 "Gakuyū no minasan! Tachi noborō! Tento mura ni sanka shiyō!," July 1968, Tōdai tōsō shiryo shū, National Diet Library, Tokyo.
plight with that of all resident Koreans in Japan. In the flier, the students noted that such violence toward ethnic minorities were hidden by "the 'everyday life' of the 'good people' in Japan." The flier also advertised an "extracurricular lecture" held on July 26 on Black Power and jazz, which included a "record concert" of the music of John Coltrane, Ornette Coleman, and others. One female student who had been involved in organizing these "concerts" noted that she felt the sounds of Coltrane and Coleman expressed the African-American struggle against authority. The space of the barricaded clock tower promised an autonomous area within which students could reflect upon the “everyday life" outside the barricades, and criticize the inequalities and struggles hidden therein. One student who had some experience with demonstrations noted her disappointment when a protest would end and she would return to her “everyday cycle," saturated with paradoxes. The barricades promised a continuous disruption of the everyday cycle. Another flier addressed to nonpoli students, written by the self-proclaimed "Nonpoli Anti-War Group," collected the statements of various students, urging others to action. The proclamation printed in the largest lettering on the flier reads: "Isn't a 'return to the everyday' actually a defeat? Doesn't 'another strike' actually open up the prospect of victory? Let's overcome the sectarian battles with an all-campus wave of energy!" These “nonpolitical" efforts emphasized the importance of questioning the structures of power that undergirded “everyday" life in Japan. Student activists used occupied university space as an attempt to redesign the everyday practices of campus life.

52 Ōhara, Tokeidai wa takakatta, 13–16.
The barricades and strikes of the student movement offered an exciting disruption to the everyday cycle of work and “common sense,” and opened up “liberated spaces” in which students could relate to each other and society in new ways. For many student activists, the barricades offered the possibility of even an alternative, "motherless" origin. The barricades could become a space to become reborn. An anonymous poem that opened the documentary history of the Nihon University struggle, organized by student activists, described their experience of the space they had created outside of the "everyday" in metaphorical terms that evoked a womb:

We are living we are living we are living 
In this belly called the barricades
We are living 
Every day we take this nourishment called self-directed lectures
We drink this refreshing dose called "talking among friends"
Every day we are living vigorously\textsuperscript{54}

The Zenkyōtō promise of nonhierarchical, open participation set up an alternative to the structures of power and domination in Japanese society at large, including the structures of the bourgeois family. The barricades could forge new kinship ties among friends. Free from the natal or nuclear household, young people envisioned a new kind of nurturing in the name of the movement. However, female participation in the movement exposed major gaps between theory and practice. While the ideal of non-horizontal participation offered the potential for mutual nurturing, many female student activists found that the tasks of providing actual nourishment fell to them.

The Gendered Everyday of the Campus Barricades

The movement's gesture toward openness made it possible for many young women to participate in Zenkyōtō; yet their experience of a gendered division of labor within the movement led many to question the structures that privileged masculine modes of activism. The persistence of a gendered hierarchy of labor in the movement's barricades reflected a failure to note the double meaning of the "everyday," which can constitute the perpetuation of systems of power by foreclosing alternative visions of the future, but is also the terrain in which people define their intimate relationships and live the multiple contradictions that constitute a constant challenge to any hegemonic ideal.55 This failure ensured that the radical student movement in Japan—dramatic and combatative as it was—ultimately failed to disrupt the greater social structures against which it battled.

As campus-based activism intensified at coeducational universities nationwide, men and women negotiated activism in a context in which the demands included deep and radical challenges to social norms. The desire to usurp "everyday life" in the barricades came up against the requirements of everyday life in the barricades. The promises of a greater liberation—from boring lectures, from a rationalized society, from social expectations—attracted many otherwise apolitical students to Zenkyōtō. Young women who were drawn to this expansive call for liberation found new freedoms and also encountered familiar constraints.

The memoir of Ōhara Kimiko, written in the spring of 1969, when the dust of the final siege of Yasuda Tower had not yet truly settled, describes one Tokyo University female student's path from reluctance to join sectarian activism to participation in Zenkyōtō, and the promises and disappointments she faced therein. It wasn't until fall 1968, Ōhara noted, when Zenkyōtō had driven JCP-affiliated Minsei members from the student council of the science department, that

55 Thanks to Harry Harootunian for developing this with me in conversation
she felt engaged at a meeting of sciences students in late September. At the meeting of about 250 students, rather than the usual sectarian dogmatism, she recalled that participants asked more fundamental questions about the radical democratic goals of the movement and the role of Tokyo University in servicing the Japanese state and capital more generally. Through the social bonds created by chatting late into the night over a post-meeting plate of spaghetti, Ōhara felt like she was able to see her individual worries as something shared with others. Casual socializing united the students affectively, even as the opening up of a larger, more ambitious framework for thinking about issues at the university gave them a sense of a great mission and of overcoming the narrow sectarian debates that often dominated student politics.

In general, Zenkyōtō attracted many students like Ōhara who were otherwise intimidated or alienated by sects and conflict. As one former activist at Nihon University noted, it was difficult to draw attendees if one advertised under the name "Sanpa" ("Three Main Sects"), the sectarian coalition that spearheaded radical Zengakuren actions such as the Haneda protests of 1967. The term "Zenkyōtō" implied a more open and democratic structure. Many former student activists recalled feelings similar to the ones Ōhara described: there was a moment in which campus politics shifted from entrenched sectarian debates to an earnest attempt at communication, and this is the moment they point to as defining "Zenkyōtō." For a student at Waseda University, she noted that this happened early in 1966, when negotiations over rising tuition costs with the school administration broke down and student barricades prevented classes from being held. Although the two major competing sects at the time were Kakumaru, which

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56 Ōhara, Tokeidai wa takakatta, 98–99.
57 Ibid., 101–103.
58 Inoshishikai, interview by author, Tokyo, June 7, 2011. For more on "sanpa" and Zengakuren, see: Ando, Japan’s New Left Movements, 54.
controlled the official university student council, and Minsei, which had set up their own 
unofficial student council, she recalled that the small meeting of thirty-five students in her class 
on how to react to the barricades was the first non-sectarian political meeting in which people 
expressed their individual opinions instead of entrenched political stances. She recalled it as very 
fresh, and an attempt at real communication. After a month of continuous debate, the class of 
thirty-five students decided they were against the tuition hikes, and also agreed to go on strike. 
She felt that, unlike the street demonstrations she had participated in before, which required a 
commitment to extreme action, this was a kind of "everyday activism." Her use of the term 
"everyday" drew on a definition of the "everyday" as a potential site of resistance to the 
"everyday" of nation and capital. Although the activism she described was not organized as a 
Zenkyōtō, this campus-focused form of anti-tuition hike activism at Waseda informed the 
campus-based activism of the late 1960s, and demonstrated how loosely the term “Zenkyōtō" is 
used to refer to late 1960s campus-based student activism in general. Another former female 
student activist who had been involved in the student self-governing associations during her 
undergraduate time at Ochanomizu Women's University and continued activism upon entering 
graduate school at Tokyo University felt drawn to the slogans of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution, such as "To Rebel is Justified," and "Continuous Revolution." But she distanced 
herself from sects, especially repulsed by the actions of the JCP-affiliated sect (Minsei) at Tokyo 
University, and their prioritization of the organization over individuals.

Although activism exposed many young women to the deeply ingrained sexist attitudes 
of their male comrades, many still recalled the barricades as spaces that offered a new degree of 

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59 Tokuyama Haruko, “Watashi ga ugokeba yo no naka ga hitori bun ugoku to iu jikkan," in Zenkyōtō 
 kara ribu e, ed. Onnatchi no ima o tō kai, Jūgoshi nōto sengohen (Kawasaki: Inpakuto shuppankai, 
 1996), 85.

60 Funabashi, “Zenkyōtō undō to jendaa," 97.
freedom. Shigenobu Fusako, later infamous for her involvement with the Japan Red Army, attended night school at Meiji University while working for Kikkoman, a major soy sauce manufacturer, in the mid-1960s. She stumbled upon the student movement just before the entrance ceremony in spring 1965, and was impressed by the students sitting in protest of rising fees, since it seemed they were acting not on their own behalf, but for the next generation of students. She described the Meiji University barricades as a place where young people were able to come together and discuss their lives. It wasn't just Meiji University students, either: "At some point students from nearby Bunka Gakuin, some high school students and girls who'd run away from home joined our group. It became a kind of counseling service."61 Although these barricades predated the more famous Zenkyōtō occupations of the late 1960s, the social functions of a student-run space were similar. They were peer groups in which, removed from everyday social hierarchies and constraints, students felt they were able to articulate concerns they could not otherwise discuss. Yonezu Tomoko, who would become a well-known women's lib activist, recalled that she was first able to talk about the physical disabilities that had long convinced her that she'd never live the life of a "normal" wife in the "extraordinarily liberated space" of the student barricades.62 Another young woman reflecting on the barricades of Tokyo University in 1970 recalled: "When in the 'exitless' space of Building 8 [Tokyo University Komaba campus barricades], I was released from my social positions (as a female, as somebody's child, as a Tōdai student, etc.). I lived only in a 'now' that floated away from its


position in connecting the past and the future." For this female student, the barricades promised a kind of temporal rupture that facilitated new forms of engagement with others, even if access to that space was limited to those who were young.

Female student activists who sought to attract other young women to the student movement appealed to a sense of intellectual liberation as well. One appeal written by a female student and circulated among Nihon University students affirmed that young women could establish their own active "human" agency and transcend their sex and society's belief that women belong in the home by participating in the movement at Nichidai. The anonymous female author declared that, "If we want to truly be university students, we need to think for ourselves, assert, and act." It was "no good," she argued to assume that male students would solve the university's problems for them: "Female students are students." For this female student activist, participation in the movement was a way for young women to believe that "women themselves are also truly people."

Many female students noted, however, the incongruity between the liberated space of the movement's barricades and the quotidian sexism that assigned them tasks because of their gender while increasingly privileging the masculine roles associated with more and more aggressive strategies of protest. In the Tokyo University barricades, Ōhara Kimiko found herself making rice balls (onigiri) until late at night with other female students to prepare for meetings. She reflected on how it fell to the women to cook while the men ran the demonstrations. Ōhara noted: "I was frustrated that I didn't have a stout frame that could wield a sword like a boy." This created two clear-cut and gendered roles within the movement: rice balls or "Gewalt sticks"

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64 Ōhara, Tokeidai wa takakatta, 143–145.
(gebabō, an improvised weapon often made from bamboo or wood used in street fighting). That female students activists were relegated to kitchen duty—often described as making endless piles of onigiri—remains a common complaint of the gendered structure of the movement's work.65

Figure 7. A female student making rice balls in the Kyoto University barricades. The activists named the puppy "Che Debara" as a pun on "pudgy" (debu) combined with the name of Latin American revolutionary Che Guevara. Asahi gurafu, 6 June 1969.66

At times, it was not only male students' expectations of women's roles, but also young women's own reluctance to lead that limited female presence in the more public roles of the movement. Ōhara felt that her female comrades shrank from roles like agitation, some of them out of fear that they would ruin their chances at marrying or upset their families. Mori Setsuko, a former student activist at Tama Arts University, noticed that the women in the barricades cleaned up after the men of their own volition. Her refusal to do this was challenged by a male student. A

65 See also Tokuyama, “Watashi ga ugokeba yo no naka ga hitori bun ugoku to iu jikkan,” 88.
66 “Asahi Gurafu Photograph of the Kyoto University Barricades,” 6 June 1969, Takazawa Collection.
male student leader came to her defense, noting that "even though" she was a woman, she also did "real" work: she wrote fliers and gave speeches. Even when a woman could step into other roles, she often did so as an honorary exception, setting up hierarchies of tasks—"masculine" leadership roles were more valuable than "feminine" support roles—and also hierarchies of women: women who performed intellectual work were more fully activists than women who organized food preparation, the mimeographing of fliers, or jail support. The Tokyo University female student leader, Kashiwazaki Chieko, was in a similar "honorary" position. Her unusual status as a female leader gained her notoriety, and her ability to engage in battles and wield a "Gewalt stick" was underscored by her senior position as a graduate student. We shall see later how the mass media seized upon these exceptional women and transformed them into hysterical and infantile figures.

It was not only male students who privileged the "masculine" work of writing and agitating; a former female activist looked back on her participation in the student movement and Marxism, wondering if she joined up in order to become "male" and escape the weaker social position allotted to women. Another young woman at Tokyo University noted that she had first approached the Zenkyōtō movement as a way to liberate herself from a feminine passivity. The allure of activism for some young women was its promise of offering an alternative subjectivity, one that was not marked by passive vulnerability.

The increasing valorization of masculine displays of violence, however, contributed to the alienation of female former activists. Standard narratives of the movement traced the

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spectacular events in which students clashed with authority, such as on Anti-War Day (October 21, known as "10.21") in both 1968 and 1969. Ōhara's comment above about wishing she had a body like a boy's that could wield a sword also affirmed the romantic ideal of the student activist as a street-battling revolutionary. At one of the major demonstrations, the 21 October 1968 International Anti-War Day protest in Shinjuku, the crowd assembled all manner of young people, "student types, salaryman types, older brother types, vagabond types," all of whom burst into applause and cheers when the helmeted student activist groups showed up, greeting them like celebrities. The emblematic image of the Zenkyōtō student was a masculine, helmeted street fighter grasping a "Gewalt stick."

Yet many young women like Ōhara Kimiko were also skeptical of the political significance of this violence. Battles between Zenkyōtō and the JCP-affiliated Minsei, or between leftist sects, however, failed to evoke the threat of state violence. Although Ōhara at Tokyo University blamed Minsei for the intersectarian violence with Zenkyōtō on campus, she also emphatically described both the Minsei and Zenkyōtō participants in the great battle of 12 November 1968 in front of the main library as "boys." When a female student from a women's university stayed overnight in Yasuda Tower and noted how she disliked the collected gebabō there, Ōhara concurred and wondered, "Is it because we're female that we dislike them?" She appreciated the activism of Zenkyōtō that had disrupted the empty and paradoxical everyday life of the university with a strike, and even felt that violence was a potential political tool; she admired Malcolm X over Martin Luther King, Jr., for example. But by the fall of 1968, she objected to the increasing emphasis on violence in the Zenkyōtō. The violent actions of the

70 Ōhara, Tokeidai wa takakatta, 123–125.
71 Ibid., 136.
72 Ibid., 142–143.
movement—organized into confrontational events such as "10.21"—prioritized the power of the students to disrupt the everyday life cycles of capitalist Japanese society. However, as the students became an anti-institutional collective, they needed to reproduce themselves as a kind of counter-institution. The labor that reproduced the daily needs of the movement—food, printing pamphlets and signs, jail support—was made invisible, thus rendering the mostly female labor that did this work invisible as well.

In contrast, female student activists at women's universities experienced the Zenkyōtō movement shielded from some of the injustices of barricade sexism. One woman who had been an activist at Ochanomizu Women's University felt she couldn't really relate to the stories of Zenkyōtō sexism that other women told when she joined the women's liberation movement in the 1970s. She first discovered the gender gap when she left college and was looking for a job.73 Until she entered the greater social structures in which she worked alongside men, she was not forced to address the social expectations that curtailed women's freedoms. However, a former student at Tokyo Women's University qualified the lack of sexism in the activism she participated in by noting that even in a women's college, she felt the shadow cast by "men's governance."74 Another woman who had been active at the same university referred to the liberation within their all-women's movement as "freedom in a birdcage."75 However, even a movement protected from the gendered expectations of male students was not immune to emerging hierarchies. One student activist who entered Tokyo Women's University and the Zenkyōtō a bit later, in 1969, felt busy all day with the movement's tasks: mimeographing

74 Murakami Kyōko, “Jiko hitei wa tsurai iyashi michi e,” in Zenkyōtō kara ribu e, ed. Onna no ima o tō kai, Jūgoshi nōto sengohen (Kawasaki: Inpakuto shuppankai, 1996), 112.
75 Horie Setsuko, “Joshi daisei’ nyūkan tōsō,” in Zenkyōtō kara ribu e, ed. Onnatachi no ima o tō kai, Jūgoshi nōto sengohen (Kawasaki: Inpakuto shuppankai, 1996), 118.
pamphlets and drawing billboards, attending assemblies and debates, and distributing fliers occupied all her time. But she didn't feel a sense that she was expressing herself; she felt like she just did as she was instructed to do by the older girls. Other hierarchies—of age in this case, and most likely of race and class in many other cases—developed in the ostensibly horizontal barricades.

Coeducation played a significant role in allowing many young women to experience the contradiction between the theory of universal human liberation and the practices of differentiated labor and values attached to labor, sharpening their awareness of this gap as a social problem at a young age. The participation of young women in an activist movement that was made up of men and women and framed its demands in such expansive and universal terms made female students aware of sexism, and that they were somehow shut out from a universal subjectivity because of their gender. As one former activist noted, the Tokyo University struggle was supposed to be a total struggle in the name of humanity, but she felt like she was treated differently because she was a woman. Tokoro Mitsuko had hoped the “women's logic" of nurturing would influence leftist movements the more that women participated. Although her ideas about a less hierarchical and more open organization influenced the late 1960s campus-based student activism, certain tasks in the movement became gendered and re-trapped young women in a kind of “mothering" role that affirmed for many of them the necessity of creating a women-only movement. Instead of embracing the influence of an essentializing feminine logic of nurturing, the culture of the late 1960s New Left sought to affirm an aggressive and violent pose to counter the demands of liberal society. This, as we shall see, constituted a kind of "masculine logic."

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"Don't Stop Me, Mama!": The New Left's valorization of masculinity

Sometimes like a motherless child
I want to try to scream loudly
But then my mood soon changes
"Sometimes Like a Motherless Child," sung by Carmen Maki,
lyrics by Terayama Shūji

A former student activist recalled listening to the popular 1969 hit, "Sometimes Like a Motherless Child," in the campus barricades. The mournful song expressed a longing to cut oneself off from the key familial relationship, and he found that it resonated with how he felt at the time.¹ The lyrics, by poet and playwright Terayama Shūji, detailed a yearning to, "at times," live "like a motherless child." Terayama's words described a tension between the desire to break free of the mother-child affective bond and thereby experience total liberation, and the recognition of the safety and comfort of that connection. In the case of the New Left in late 1968 and 1969, the song's ambivalence echoed how many would-be student militants framed their revolt against mainstream Japanese society. As mid-1960s educational directives attempted to enlist the family in the service of the nation, students rebelled against the representative of domesticity: "Mama."

Introduction

The New Left student movement of the late 1960s, in rejecting postwar liberal democratic society, recognized mothers as manifestations of the social order. Here I explore how student activists' rejection of "Mama" led to an embrace of a particularly masculine ideal of violence, aligning the student left in many ways with the far right at a moment in which its

appeal to popular sympathy waned. This covers the period of late 1968 and 1969, in which the student movement faced not only rising state oppression, but also became increasingly estranged from public sympathy. As I discuss the diminishing of popular support, I will illustrate the ascendant privileging of a heterosexual male logic that came to dominate New Left culture by 1970 with writings produced by student activists, and commentaries on the meaning of the 1969 student movement by two prominent and complex writers and cultural figures of the time: Terayama Shūji and Mishima Yukio. Terayama criticized the student movement, particularly at elite Tokyo University, from a radical position, and right-wing author Mishima engaged the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō in a debate that was later circulated by the mass media. Here I explore how, in a movement at many moments defined by female participation, the changing context of masculinity shifted the site of political action in a way that not only diminished the gendered labor of female activists but also attempted to reject any affiliation with femininity. In late 1968 and 1969, the New Left swung toward embracing masculine-coded aggression. In doing so, the student movement lost its broader appeal as a potentially vulnerable segment of society.

The Loss of Popular Sympathy for the Student Movement: From Vulnerable to Violent

Popular support for the student movement and its actions often depended upon an ideal of student vulnerability. The deaths of student activists Kanba Michiko in 1960 and Yamazaki Hiroaki in 1967 marked high points for general sympathy toward the New Left. When students faced off against the better armed riot police at Haneda Airport in fall 1967 and at Sasebo Bay in early 1968, popular opinion sided with the gutsy student activists; this sympathy waned when the targets of activism were no longer clearly authoritarian institutions.2 Rather than images of

unarmed students beaten by armored police, intensifying intersectarian battles between New Left groups and the JCP-affiliated Minsei, and between New Left sects themselves beginning in late 1968 offered the public images of student-initiated violence. Instances of "internal violence"—uchigeba (short for uchi Gewalt, "internal violence")—between leftist sects became more frequent, and weakened student activists' claims that their "Gewalt" was a counter-violence disrupting the state's monopoly on force. The intensification of intersectarian violence also drove many student activists away from participating in the late 1960s student movement. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many young women had a particularly ambivalent relationship to the aggressive street battle tactics of the Zenkyōtō and other sects. By late 1968, the uniform for many student activists included not only the defensive helmet painted with their affiliation and a towel over the face to protect against tear gas, but improvisied weaponry such as staves and bamboo sticks. The student activist was no longer just a social critic and activist, but also a militant. The democratic access symbolized by female participation in the student movement gave way to the figure of the street-fighting student.

In part, this emphasis on force responded to forceful measures on the part of the state and university authorities. The quelling of the two most influential campus-based movements at Nihon University and Tokyo University involved decisions made at the highest levels of government at the behest of university administrations. After Nihon University students assembled 35,000 students on 20 September 1968 and succeeded in extracting promises from the university president and other members of the university's board of directors, the Prime Minister stepped in and determined that the twelve-hour-long "mass negotiations" constituted "group violence." The results were voided, barricades were dismantled, and arrest warrants were issued.

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for Zenkyōtō leaders. After vigorous debate in the Diet, Tokyo University's administration invited the riot police to enter the campus and expel the long-standing student occupation of Yasuda Tower on 18 January 1969. The resulting siege lasted seventy-two hours. Between the police attempting to dislodge students from Yasuda Tower and those mobilized to counter student demonstrations in support of the Tokyo University battle in other neighborhoods, 710 were injured. Of the 400 students arrested at the campus, 270 were wounded. Although there were no casualties, many injuries were serious: one student went blind. Although barricades and organizing continued at various campuses, including at Tokyo University, by early 1969 the concerns of the campus-based New Left shifted from maintaining a non-hierarchical and open relationship between the individual and the organization toward a focus on the confrontational relationship with the law and society in general.

**The New Left and the Politics of Masculinity**

Student activists embraced violence as a strategy not only to counter figures of authority, but also to set the student movement at odds with bourgeois Japanese everyday life, and, in particular, to distinguish New Left youth from the rationalized, domesticated masculinity of the corporate man. The white-collar worker, the "salaryman" (sarariiman), represented the new, high-economic-growth era ideal of masculine responsibility in the late 1960s, in a family structure that required men to earn enough wages to support women's work within the home. However, for student radicals, the sarariiman represented an emasculated cog in the machinery of the state and capital. A comic strip published in the tabloid Shūkan yomiuri played on the idea

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4 Ibid., 119–120.
that the street fighting of student radicals offered otherwise downtrodden men moments of romantic masculinity. In the strip, a helmeted male figure attacks the riot police, seduces a young woman, and then, finally, removes his militant gear to reveal a balding *sarariiman* (fig. 8). He shuffles home and puts himself to bed in his futon alongside his wife and children (fig. 9). New Left slogans making claims about manliness set activist masculinity against what was seen as this subjugated nature of postwar liberal society and the expanding managerial class within it.

![Figure 8. Cartoon of a man battling the riot police and impressing women. Ishimori Shotarō, "Anpo hantai!," Shūkan yomiuri, 2 January 1970, p. 49.](image)

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Although radical student activists embraced street violence as a way to set themselves apart from the emasculated figure of the white-collar worker, the key figure of authority against which students of the influential Tokyo University Zenkyōtō defined their rebellion became the mother. If the postwar order had domesticated manhood, it had emboldened women, and mothers represented the most powerful link between students and bourgeois society. The emblematic poster for the Tokyo University Komaba Festival of November 1968 displayed aspirations for an alternative ethos, embracing violence set against the middle-class family, represented by the mother (fig. 10). In the poster, a tattooed man displays an enormous tattoo of gingko leaves on his back. The figure evokes the actor Takakura Ken, famous for playing yakuza outlaws (fig. 11). Referencing the famous gingko trees of Tokyo University, the text on the poster reads:
"Don't stop me, mama / the gingko on my back are crying / male Tokyo University is going somewhere."\(^8\)

Figure 10. The 19th Annual Tokyo University Komaba Festival Poster. Hashimoto Osamu, November 1968.

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\(^8\) Hashimoto Osamu, 19th Tokyo University Komaba Festival Poster, Poster, 1968.
In the Komaba Festival poster, the mother is set up as the one who might attempt to obstruct the movement's purpose, which is not only gendered male, but is also cast as a yakuza.9 Toei Studios' yakuza films were wildly popular with students in the late 1960s, for reasons not only of entertainment, but also for their romantic portrayal of masculinity.10 The image of manhood in yakuza films contrasted sharply with that of the sarariiman; yakuza films portrayed a code of masculine honor undergirded by violence. The graffiti scrawled on the walls of the barricades of Tokyo University often returned to the theme of Tokyo University affirming its masculinity through the Zenkyōtō movement. One line from the wall of an occupied building read, "with this, Tokyo University has also become a man."11 Such scribblings on the walls of

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10 Kanayama, Gurupu 69, and Gurupu Rokujūku, Zenkyōtō imajineishon, 23.
occupied buildings suggested that many students, much like the *sarariiman* of the tabloid comic strip, found masculine affirmation part of the allure of activism.

In contrast, barricade graffiti often used "female" to indicate a passive and vulnerable contrast to "male" activism. One parody played on the Komaba festival slogan to question the masculinity of the student movement: "Please stop me, Mama / the gingko on my back are laughing / feminine Tokyo University / can't go anywhere."\(^{12}\) In another scribble, a student denigrated the Kakumaru sect using this gendered distinction: "male Tokyo University fought / female Kakumaru does not fight."\(^{13}\) Demonstrating the diversity of voices, other graffiti affirmed "women's autonomy" and "women's liberation."\(^{14}\) However, as a contrast with a position of active "male" fighting, "female" became an insult in the slang of the New Left. One former female student activist at Waseda University recalled reading a student movement billboard that declared, "Actresses can also enter, women can also enter, tuition also rises, the riot police also enter, there's no university student council, what a degraded thing is Waseda."\(^{15}\) Echoing the "Coeds Ruin the Nation" debates of the tabloids, student activists at Waseda University made a parallel between the degradation of higher education and the admission of female students, aligning the logic of the New Left with the logic of more mainstream concerns about postwar masculinity.

**The New Left Versus "Mama"**

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\(^{12}\) Ibid., 117.


\(^{14}\) Okamoto Masami and Murao Kōichi, *Daigaku gerira no uta*, 114.

Beyond attacking "female" weakness in general, however, a major target of the Zenkyōtō at Tokyo University in particular became the maternal link with the bourgeois household in which many had grown up. In late 1968, in the pages of the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō publication, *Shingeki*, alongside articles about disrupting "everyday life" and negating the bourgeois self, activists also penned calls urging students to "Overcome Mama!"¹⁶ This "overcoming" was most likely emotional, rather than intellectual. In Tsurumi Kazuko's mid-1960s student survey on relationships between mothers and their children in Japan, only one student activist out of one hundred surveyed described their mother as influential, although the ideas of students seemed to influence mothers. This, Tsurumi concluded, showed that "the mother-children relationship turns out to be like a one-sided love affair."¹⁷ Student activists even saw their mothers as relatively ignorant, identifying them as "fit targets for 'enlightenment' in political thinking."¹⁸ The generation gap produced a great affective distance between many students and their fathers, but many more students identified the gap between themselves and their mothers as a particularly intellectual one. In spite of the postwar emphasis on mothers as educators in the home, few student activists felt they had grown up with a "Wise Mother."

The aspect of maternal dominance that student activists felt they had to overcome, then, was less an ideological one than an affective one. And mothers who sought to exploit that emotional bond to dissuade students from activism became representatives of "Mama" as an obstacle to the New Left. For example, "caramel mamas" soon became figures featured by the mass media and derided by student activists. Even female student activists, such as Ōhara

¹⁸ Ibid., 321–322.
Kimiko of Tokyo University's Zenkyōtō, ridiculed the older women sometimes seen at sit-ins and other demonstrations, who attempted to dissuade students from activism while handing out caramel candies. She found them intellectually vapid, as they, "without trying to understand anything only talked about how you have to take care of your body."¹⁹ These "caramel mamas" sought to evoke the warm affective feelings students had for their mothers when they were children, hoping that would dissuade them from radical activism. In Ōhara and other student activists' view, mothers were cast in the role of the everyday life of the household that undergirded the Japanese state, ignorant of the larger ideological stakes. They were antithetical to radical thought, and represented the family and its bourgeois morality and concerns.

In the mass media, the presence of "caramel mamas" at Tokyo University in particular offered an opportunity to emphasize the larger, bourgeois family structures to which the student activists were attached. A full-page photograph published in December 1968 in the tabloid Shūkan yomiuri featured the image of a kimono-clad "caramel mama," armed with her box of sweets, outside the placards around the Komaba campus of Tokyo University. The mother stands confidently between the viewer and the festival poster that demanded, "Don't Stop Me, Mama!" In contrast, a uniformed guard behind the photo fidgets and gazes at the ground. The famous gingko trees and clock tower of the Komaba campus, although not the iconic Yasuda Tower that would be besieged by riot police in January 1969, lie beyond a placard painted with large characters calling for, "self-criticism." The slogan resonated in both form and substance with the big-character posters created by young people mobilized to root out bourgeois and capitalist elements during the Chinese Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s. This photograph pits the "caramel mama" against the tattooed illustration in the poster, and situates the mother as the vigilant patroller of the campus's borders.

This anti-mother discourse on campuses informed the context in which Carmen Maki's hit single "Sometimes like a Motherless Child" resonated with student activists in the barricades of 1969. For Terayama Shūji, the writer of the song's lyrics, the mother-child bond constituted a common theme in his various poems, plays, and films. His works featured extreme permutations on this relationship, from matricide to incest, and cannot easily be summarized. However, for Terayama as well as the Zenkyōtō students, the mother embodied the laws of society. For the slightly older Terayama, who was born in 1935, the social order his mother represented was that
of the wartime state. The familial bonds with which she tied him were those forged in the Ministry of Education's 1937 "Fundamentals of Our National Polity" (Kokutai no hongi), in which the emperor represented the familial relationship between Japanese nationals. Terayama didn't see much real change between the prewar family and the ostensibly democratic postwar family; though the language shifted from that of the ie to that of the katei, Japanese society failed to create a "self" outside of the ethics of the family. Countering the language of the "The Image of the Ideal Person," Terayama saw the family and society not as related, one nestled within the other, but rather as antithetical entities. After all, he noted, people in contemporary Japan didn't take comfort in the home. It was in the cabarets, the brothels, the baseball stadiums, and go-go halls where people sought comfort. They found relief when they watched Takakura Ken weave a tale at a late-night screening of a yakuza film. Terayama privileged affiliation over filiation, advocating for the creation of "society people" rather than "family people" in his piece, An Encouragement of Running Away (Iede no susume). Playing on the title of Japanese Enlightenment enthusiast Fukuzawa Yukichi's late nineteenth-century work, An Encouragement of Learning (Gakumon no susume), Terayama subverted Fukuzawa's emphasis on molding educated individuals to contribute to a strong nation.

**Terayama's Radical Critique of the Tokyo University Student Movement**

Terayama's words may have resonated with student activists, but his wariness of any project that contributed to the nation made him cynical of the slogans of the Tokyo University student movement in particular. Terayama, always aware of his origin in the backwater of

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21 Ibid., 238.
22 Ibid., 236.
23 Ibid., 211.
Japan—an Aomori accent marked him as a son of the Tōhoku region—and a college dropout to boot, first entered the Tokyo University campus when it was in ruins in late January 1969.

Although he acknowledged that the slogans of the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō quickly expanded to include broad social questions about the nature of the university in Japanese society, Terayama also noted that it was only because Tokyo University was incapacitated that he felt able to enter its grounds. After all, the issue of the struggle at Tokyo University had such great social significance because of Tokyo University's exalted position in Japanese society. Terayama pointed out the deep, metonymic relationship between the one school and higher education in general in Japan: "The history of Tokyo University is also the history of Japan's modern universities." Tokyo University was built to make Japan modern. And the fervor with which the average citizen greeted the Tokyo University student movement's slogans such as "demolish Tokyo University" reflected, "not only the issue of how the education system ought to be, but also the citizens' (shimin) desire for revenge. It expresses the vigor of a personal grudge toward Tokyo University as the training school for bureaucrats, as a university that assigns class distinctions to brains, as a university that creates the ruling class."24 Even as the general postwar social trend expanded higher education through waves of democratization, Tokyo University retained its elite standing. Tokyo University was the university of the state. In a moment in which "enlightenment" was no longer necessary, however, there was a new questioning of the role of Tokyo University. According to Terayama's observations, this took on an existential questioning aspect for Tokyo University students, in which they battled the social image of

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themselves as coddled Tokyo University students, excessively protected as they transitioned from the safe spaces of their family to the space of the nation.\textsuperscript{25}

In Terayama's opinion, it was this urge to prove that they were not brainy, physically weak, and overprotected that informed the masculine assertions characteristic of the Tokyo University struggle. Terayama suspected that the graffiti remaining in the campus ruins voicing sentiments about "male Tokyo University" or becoming "male" expressed a desire to affirm that Tokyo University students could also act as masculine urban guerillas, although the repression they faced was not as fierce as that on other campuses. As an example, Terayama recalled a roundtable between Tokyo University and Nihon University student activists. The Nihon University students recounted how they faced off against right-wing students armed with deadly weapons such as a sword or a rifle. These activists, Terayama noted, did not need to invoke a "male Nihon University."\textsuperscript{26} He compared the Komaba festival slogan—"Don't stop me, Mama"—to a wartime song for young male soldiers, although the Tokyo University students replaced "woman" with "mama."\textsuperscript{27} In attempting to affirm their potential for violence, Tokyo University students expressed a rejection of any links to nurturing "feminine" relationships, and thus replicated the tenor of militarist songs. Terayama suspected that, although the Tokyo University struggle at many points provoked popular sympathy, the students involved would eventually wake from the "dream" of "male Tokyo University," end the strike, graduate, and take up the task for which they had been selected: that of "building Japan."

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 480.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 481. Nihon University students also recounted that right-wing students would shower any street demonstrations with objects such as metal trash cans and chairs, injuring student activists and observers indiscriminately. Toshiaki Mihashi, \textit{Rojō no zenkyōtō, 1968} (Tokyo: Kawade shobō shinsha, 2010), 61–62.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Terayama Shūji, “Kibō to iu byōki: Tokyo daigaku ron,” 480.
\end{itemize}
Terayama's comments articulated a more general cynicism about the authenticity of the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō cries of "demolish Tokyo University" or the broader, and more ambiguous, theories of "self-negation." By destroying their university, the student activists threatened to topple the educational hierarchy and the social hierarchy it produced. The theory of "self-negation" offered a way for elite university students to reject their privileged social position. However, one Tokyo University student recalled with unease how a person prevented from applying to Tokyo University by the student movement's interruption of the 1969 admission exams noted, "To harm others and then to self-negate the self that is a Tokyo University student is just settling the whole matter with words." In his view, it was all too characteristic of hyper-intellectual Tokyo University students to develop a theoretical solution to a social problem.

**Celebrity and the Student Movement: Man to Man with Mishima Yukio**

The elite status of Tokyo University assured the influence of the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō and conferred a celebrity status upon its leaders that undermined declarations of "self-negation." In spite of the movement's claims for horizontality, the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō chairman, 26-year-old graduate student Yamamoto Yoshitaka, became famous. His speeches were sold as phonograph recordings and women's magazine *Josei jishin* wrote profiles on his relationship with his graphic designer wife. A great deal of this publicity emerged from a mass media desire to identify a leader from within an ostensibly leaderless movement, but the student activists also sought out the press at several points.

Depending on the mass media to disseminate its slogans, many student activists relied upon mass media attention. When a group of Tokyo University students invited Mishima Yukio,

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a right-wing celebrity author, to debate them on 13 May 1969, they demonstrated no less publicity savvy than the flamboyant writer. Mishima arrived at the debate with a cameraman and a stenographer from the publisher Shinchōsha in tow, only to find that the Zenkyōtō students had already alerted journalists. The TV station TBS incorporated a segment on the debate into its evening primetime news show, while the transcribed volume Shinchōsha released a little over a month later became a minor bestseller. Mishima and the students split the royalties.

The mass media flocked to the event because the conversation between Mishima Yukio and the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō promised a clash between two extremes in the contemporary political and cultural milieu. Mishima represented his idiosyncratic extremist right-wing ideology, and the student group took part under the banner of the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō, presumably participating anonymously, representing the collectivist and leftist project of the student movement. The resulting "debate" demonstrated a search for an ideal political subject, which remained rich with contradictions and half-baked ideas. Mishima himself was an alumnus of Tokyo University, having graduated from the Law Department in 1947, and so he shared the elite social caste of the students. All participants were not only all affiliated with Tokyo University, but all were also male. The underlying tone of the debate proceeded from a shared assumption of a masculine subject from which political action emerged.

The romanticized politics of violent action upon which both the Tokyo Zenkyōtō students and Mishima agreed underlined in particular the late-1960s New Left's definitive privileging of "masculine" action. The late 1960s student movement built upon the ideas key to the anti-Anpo demonstrations of the late 1950s and 1960, in which actively expressing one's politics became

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the ideal of citizenship. However, the Zenkyōtō took to task intellectuals such as Maruyama Masao, a Tokyo University law department professor and famous liberal intellectual, for not extending postwar theories of active citizenship to the campus-based struggles. Turning Maruyama Masao's words against him, Tokyo University Zenkyōtō chairman Yamamoto Yoshitaka, who had gone underground and was not present at the debate with Mishima, had previously pondered why the professor could write such a keen study of fascism under the Emperor system, but could not extend his analysis to how Tokyo University functioned in postwar society. Referencing Maruyama's 1961 essay "To Be and To Do," Yamamoto considered Maruyama's own statements about Tokyo University as "being the seat of reason." In Yamamoto's view, declaring that a university is ignores what the university does, and repeats the logic of absolutism. Yamamoto's line of reasoning ran through slogans such as, "Demolish Tokyo University!" The violence demanded in that slogan revealed that, by 1969, the idea of "action" became equated with "violence."

Mishima arrived to the debate with the Zenkyōtō eager to align himself with the radical students' attacks on heady intellectualism. At the outset of the conversation, Mishima and the New Left participants explicitly stated a shared hatred of the contemporary liberal Japanese state and a willingness—an eagerness, even—to use violence as a political strategy. Referring to student assaults on scholars representative of postwar liberal intellectualism, Mishima casts himself as an ally in romantic, physical action, noting that of course his admiration for such actions might be because he is not an intellectual: "If Maruyama Masao himself were to shed his skin and to advocate anti-intellectualism it might satisfy public opinion, but as long as Professor


Maruyama exists he stands for the position of intellectualism. For that, he got a beating.\textsuperscript{34} That the students of Zenkyōtō assaulted the intellectual icon of "postwar democracy," an ally in many ways to the 1960 Tokyo University anti-Anpo student movement, further demonstrated to many their emphasis on violent action over rhetoric. Indeed, Mishima earned their respect—one of them unthinkingly referred to him as "teacher" (sensei) in the debate—by coming into their midst alone.\textsuperscript{35} Such an act was unthinkable for many Tokyo University professors, let alone someone who had come out as a public enemy of the movement. Using this logic, a student who slipped up and called Mishima "teacher" defended his mistake, noting that Mishima deserved the title more than many of their so-called teachers. To the comment Maruyama Masao was rumored to have made about students who confronted him and occupied his office, that "not even the Nazis" would have committed such violence, the student dubbed "Zenkyōtō A" noted that of course the Nazis would not have attacked Tokyo University, since the institution was in the service of fascism during the war.\textsuperscript{36} Although the students and Mishima himself participated in the institution of Tokyo University as students—and in many ways gained popular celebrity through their Tokyo University affiliation—they all framed themselves as critics of the postwar liberal intellectualism for which the university stood.

It is unlikely that the student participants in the debate with Mishima Yukio understood exactly how attracted the author was to the politics of violence. The author maintained a colorful, high-profile public persona, and his oeuvre ranged from minor works with an avid housewife-reader audience to novels that drew the attention of the Nobel Prize committee. In conversation

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 13. Maruyama was rumored to have commented, as Zenkyōtō students occupied his office, that "even the Nazis were not so violent." Kosaka Shūhei, \textit{Shisō to shite no zenkyōtō sedai} (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2006), 107.

\textsuperscript{35} Kosaka Shūhei, \textit{Shisō to shite no zenkyōtō sedai}, 107.

with the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō, he described his political views as an "extremely radical conservative political philosophy," but delivered the line in such a manner that he prompted his audience to laugh.\footnote{Ibid., 15–17.} It is hard to know where Mishima stood; he practiced a kind of social transvestitism, slipping into various poses. In his debate with student activists, he flattered their actions; in an article for the popular journal \textit{Bungei shunjū} he appealed to civil society against the student activists, encouraging them to "turn Tokyo University into a zoo." He was, simultaneously, a militant, a fop, queer, and a womanizer. Mishima's fascination with military culture and masculine violence led him to train with the Self-Defense Forces in 1967. While there, the readership of a popular weekly tabloid awarded him the number one position in its "All-Japan Mr. Dandy" contest.\footnote{Inose and Sato, \textit{Persona}, 488. Actor Mifune Toshirō took second place, and Ishihara Shintarō took fourth. Mushiake Aromu gleefully commented: "Yukio Mishima has said 'I don't want to be a dandy, and I don't think I am one either.' But he got the highest vote... This is ironic. This is exciting."} His 1951 serial novel \textit{Forbidden Colors} introduced audiences to the underground world of gay bars in Tokyo, although Mishima's love affairs included those with high-society women. Shōda Michiko, who married the Crown Prince in 1959, had even met with him for a formal marriage interview.\footnote{Ibid., 314. Also on this page is more information about Michiko as a female student.} The ease with which Mishima wore these various roles made it seem like he was ever playful and never sincere. Mishima's tone of aristocratic irony obscured to many of his contemporaries how invested he was in his militant rightist politics in the late 1960s. The student leftists' view of Mishima was also shaped by the author's dandified public image, and while they traded words with him in an often earnest effort to distinguish their own views from his romantic rightism, it is not likely that they realized the seriousness behind Mishima's frequent provocative flourishes.\footnote{Guy Yasko locates the Mishima - Zenkyōtō debate at a "turning point in Japanese history intellectual history in that left and right had begun to converge." Both left and right challenged postwar rationalism in}
Mishima's associates may have had for his safety entering the company of "violent" students, the mood of the May 1968 Mishima vs. Zenkyōtō debate as recorded by film and transcription seems light: Mishima charms laughter out of his thousand-person strong student audience, dressed casually in a polo shirt.\(^\text{41}\)

Mishima Yukio's interest in political violence as a foil to the postwar liberal democratic order responded to a different set of geopolitical concerns than those of the Zenkyōtō he debated, although both sides ultimately privileged masculine violence as a response. While the late 1960s student movement battled Japanese authorities to disrupt the everyday life of the state and capital that perpetuated violence in Vietnam, Mishima declared his support for the U.S.'s military involvement in Vietnam when *Newsweek* consulted him in 1967. The Japanese weekly tabloid *Heibon Punch* consulted Mishima to clarify his statements made in the American publication; when Mishima replied that, "You can take it as they put it," he also added, "I'm still someone who affirms the Great East Asian War and I support America's Vietnam policy, too."\(^\text{42}\) Mishima's support of not only the current U.S. war in Southeast Asia, but also his unabashed admiration of the wartime imperial project made him an "enemy" of the Zenkyōtō. And yet, Mishima's outreach to college youth addressed a concern common to both the right-wing men who joined his "Shield Society" and many who joined in militant left-wing activism.

At the bottom of both Mishima and the 1969 Tokyo University Zenkyōtō's formulations of the ideal political subject remained an anxiety that postwar liberal democracy emasculated particular, and Yasko marks the debate as an opportunity for the Zenkyōtō to articulate how it differed from the romantic right, as represented by Mishima. Yasko, “The Japanese Student Movement 1968-70: The Zenkyōtō Uprising,” 157.


\(^{42}\) Ibid., 493. Although Mishima dismissed the offer, some members of his Shield Society slipped into the auditorium to ensure his safety. Hosaka Masayuki, *Yūkoku no ronri: Mishima Yukio to Tate no Kai Jiken* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1980), 199–200.
men. For Mishima, this was linked to the postwar order in which, according to Article IX of the "peace constitution," "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the Nation." In his 1967 "Temporary Proposal for JNG" (the "Japan National Guard" that Mishima outlined in this pamphlet, to be used for fundraising among corporations), Mishima—writing anonymously—declared: "The most important issue for Japan under present circumstances is the establishment of a national ideal and to make young men understand with their own bodies 'What is the Great Principle?'"\(^43\) Notable in this statement is Mishima's desire to activate a physical knowledge in young men's "own bodies," and also to link it to "the Great Principle," (\(\mathrm{taigi}\)), a term that echoed wartime Japanese militarism and ideology. Although militant New Left activists framed their protest against the Japanese state, they too sought a way to physically embody great principles. That "Mama" became an obstacle to overcome with a militant subjectivity demonstrated the gendered interpretation of the postwar liberal order, in which mothers represented key figures of authority. Both Mishima and the many in the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō found postwar masculinity particularly vulnerable, however, and sought to affirm it through violence.

In the course of the debate between the right-wing author and left-wing students, several asides about sexual desire also revealed an underlying heterosexual male identity shared among the male participants. Although Mishima was well known in the gay underground of Tokyo, his debate with student activists remained within the heterosexual logic of mainstream Japanese society, demonstrating a limit in the student movement's ostensibly wide-ranging imagination. In their discussions of "free sex," in particular regarding the monogamy that defined the modern

\(^{43}\) Inose and Sato, \textit{Persona}, 536.
imperial institution, "free sex" remained defined as sexual access to women. In a segment in which they considered the self and the other, Mishima pointed out that it was not only violence that made the distinction clear, but also erotic desire. Mishima made a parallel between both violent and erotic confrontations in which the subjectivity of the other presented an obstacle for the desiring self. Defining sexual desire in heterosexual terms, Mishima declared "one of the paradoxes of male-female equality" remained the othering of the desired object. Reflecting the general erasure of gendered concerns within the New Left by 1969, the students do not pursue the political implications of this line of thought about male versus female active and passive subjectivity. To this group of students, the emphasis on militancy pushed out considerations of how affective interpersonal relations also formed political subjectivities.

Mishima Yukio may have mentioned erotic desire in conversation with the students, but it was the late 1960s New Left's focus on violent action that both inspired and terrified him. His sympathy with the violent actions of the student movement stemmed from his evaluation that contemporary Japanese society lacked opportunities for its male youth to enjoy a glorious death. Both Mishima's attraction to the Zenkyōtō and his fear of it arose from the possibility that the leftist student movement may offer young men such a death. Mishima's brand of activism did not consider the political potential of female youth, in spite of the tremendous impact of Kanba Michiko's 1960 death in the anti-Anpo protests. Mishima was almost certainly more interested in the death of Yamazaki Hiroaki at the Haneda Airport protests of 1967, which mobilized popular sympathy and re-ignited student activism. In public comments, however,

Mishima accused those involved in the 1967 demonstration against Prime Minister Satō Eisaku as lacking the "guts" to commit an act of "simple" terrorism by killing the PM.\footnote{Ibid., 661.} Mishima's cadets recalled that he instructed them to "observe and remember" the Zenkyōtō besieged in Yasuda Tower on 18-19 January 1969, for, "when the final moment came, there was not one of them who believed in what he stood for sufficiently to hurl himself out of a window or fall on a sword."\footnote{Nathan, Mishima, 248.} Even as Mishima berated the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō's failure to engage in suicidal sacrifices during the siege of Yasuda Tower in retrospect, at the time of the confrontation he feared their self-sacrifice. During the police siege of the tower, Mishima called the riot police chief of staff, Sassa Atsuyuki—who was also the younger brother of a woman Mishima once dated—concerned that if a student jumped from the Tower in a sacrificial gesture, it would provoke the watching nation.\footnote{Sassa, Tōdai rakujō, 16.} The symbolic power of the student movement, and its ability to capture the mass media and disrupt cities captivated Mishima; by many accounts, those were elements that he hoped to harness for his own political beliefs, which he framed as both a defense against—and an exploitation of—the opportunities created by the leftist student movement.

Throughout 1968, Mishima was excited at the prospect that the student left would provoke such massive chaos that the riot police would require his civilian military group's assistance. Indeed, after the October 1967 Haneda demonstrations and the series of other protests from Sasebo to Shinjuku in 1968, the riot police often found themselves in danger of being overpowered by the students and civilian sympathizers, who—far from remaining a neutral
group of onlookers—frequently joined in throwing stones at the police.\textsuperscript{50} The 21 October 1968 Anti-War Day demonstrations in Japan, as part of a global call to commemorate the 1967 march on the Pentagon in the United States in which demonstrators and U.S. Marshalls had clashed, drew an estimated 1.4 million people.\textsuperscript{51} This was in spite of Public Safety Commission prohibitions on public assemblies and demonstrations for the day. Thousands of students gathered at the University of Tokyo, groups broke into the grounds of the Defense Agency and the Diet, and clashes between protesters and police—described by one Japanese military observer as synchronized "guerilla warfare"—embroiled several Tokyo neighborhoods, from Roppongi to the Ginza.\textsuperscript{52} The evening convergence of demonstrations at Shinjuku Station in particular, at which about a thousand students overran the railroad junction used to transport U.S. military supplies, induced the Metropolitan Police Department to invoke Article 106 of the Criminal Code. In the most sweeping mass arrest in postwar Japan, police detained almost a thousand people nationwide, and 450 in Tokyo alone.\textsuperscript{53} The crime of "riotous assembly" had not been invoked in sixteen years.\textsuperscript{54} Newspaper reports showed that onlookers often enthusiastically cheered on the student demonstrators; they threatened to overwhelm the mobilized police force of twelve thousand.\textsuperscript{55} According to the reports of Colonel Yamamoto Kiyokatsu, intelligence officer for the Self-Defense Forces and an associate of Mishima's, Mishima thrilled to the spectacle of 21 October 1968. Accompanied by a journalist and another intelligence officer, 

\textsuperscript{50} Inose and Sato, \textit{Persona}, 541–2.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 534–5.
\textsuperscript{52} Yamamoto Kiyokatsu, \textit{Mishima yukio yûmon no sokoku bôeifu} (Tokyo: Nihon bungeisha, 1980), 134.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Inose and Sato, \textit{Persona}, 585–90.
Mishima rushed between the embattled areas. He watched with interest as the students of Tokyo Medical and Dental University and Meiji University build barricades in Ochanomizu. Chaos in the Ginza transfixed him for hours. Colonel Yamamoto described Mishima as trembling slightly, amid the "rain of stones," like one witnessing his first battle.\textsuperscript{56} Mishima's mother noted that the event created a change in him, wondering in retrospect if it was the excitement of 21 October 1968 that drove him to more extreme action.\textsuperscript{57}

By the time Mishima debated Tokyo University Zenkyōtō students, he may have imagined that these were young men he would meet in combat on the streets of Tokyo. However, the mass Anti-War Day protests on 21 October 1969 also failed to incite a revolution, disappointing Mishima's hopes. Already in October 1968, Mishima had insisted that the police mobilize the Shield Society to counter student activists. Colonel Yamamoto declined, reading the street violence as more temporary carnival than incipient revolution. Colonel Yamamoto astutely defined the limits of the students' actions as a failure to deeply disrupt the everyday rhythms of the social order: "Even the masses in the demonstration return to their everyday life as commuters when the morning comes." For Yamamoto, the street battles of the New Left, although destructive, remained, "struggles without roots in the space of everyday life."\textsuperscript{58} As invested as the late 1960s student movement became in violent spectacles, the authorities assigned to quell those disturbances understood them only as a superficial threat.

Although deeply embedded in the elite circles of Japanese society, Mishima remained dissatisfied with the "everyday life" of the postwar liberal democratic order. He felt that the postwar "peace constitution" emasculated Japan and its young men. As Mishima noted to the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{56} Yamamoto Kiyokatsu, \textit{Mishima yukio yûmon no sokoku bōeifu}, 135.
  \item \textsuperscript{57} Inose and Sato, \textit{Persona}, 590.
  \item \textsuperscript{58} Yamamoto Kiyokatsu, \textit{Mishima yukio yûmon no sokoku bōeifu}, 136.
\end{itemize}
Tokyo University Zenkyōtō students, he believed that the postwar order with its bourgeois and Western-influenced values thwarted the full expression of manhood for even the Emperor himself. Although the student radicals could have won him over, Mishima told them, if they'd declared their final battle at Yasuda Tower in the name of the Emperor, Mishima's ideal emperor was one of ancient myth, not the domesticated and compromised postwar monarch. Both the student activists and Mishima desired to create a masculine code of violent activism that would define society's priorities through conflict. Because of this, both would almost certainly have felt aversion at hearing the Emperor's response in the aftermath of the battle between the riot police and the Zenkyōtō at Tokyo University's Yasuda Tower in January 1969, although their reasons would differ. According to the police agent who reported on the matter to Hirohito, the Emperor's main concern was only whether anyone had been killed, as if the confrontation were a quarrel among his sons. To an ostensibly apolitical but paternalistic Emperor, harmony among his subjects—the family of Japanese—remained the most important outcome. Mishima would have been disappointed by the sentiments of a pacifist postwar Emperor, while student activists would have winced at an Imperial embrace of kinship, in which the Emperor regarded himself as a paternal figure.

It was most likely not only a desire for social harmony, but also a fear of the uncontrollable power of martyrdom that motivated the Emperor's relief in the wake of the siege at Yasuda Tower. As Mishima Yukio's own final, extreme gesture of violent self-sacrifice demonstrated, however, the making of a martyr required more than death alone. Most likely inspired by how the death of Kanba Michiko and Yamazaki Hiroaki fueled popular sympathy for

60 Sassa, Tōdai rakujō, 306.
the New Left, Mishima planned his own suicide as a sacrifice meant to incite a coup among the Self-Defense Forces. On 25 November 1970, after barricading the commandant's office at the Tokyo headquarters of the Eastern Command of the Self-Defense Forces in Ichigaya, Tokyo, Mishima delivered a speech meant to mobilize the sympathies of the soldiers assembled below. Instead, the men greeted his manifesto with jeers. Back in the commandant's office, Mishima committed ritual suicide, assisted by accompanying Shield Society members. His dramatic death shocked the nation, but did not draw a wave of sympathy for his politics. Not only did Mishima fail to inflame the imaginations of the Self-Defense Forces, he also failed to capture the imagination of youth beyond his small circle. It became a common fad among high school students, dressed in their high-collared uniforms, to mockingly imitate Mishima's final speech at Ichigaya (fig. 12). The author's gesture failed to take into account how pre-existing hegemonic ideals influence the political meaning of death. Mishima Yukio remained an iconic figure, but he did not become a political martyr.

Figure 13. Photograph of high school students imitating Mishima Yukio's final speech. Yomota Inuhiko, Hai sukuuru 1968.

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61 Yomota Inuhiko, Hai sukuuru 1968 (Shinchō bunko, 2004), inset.
Zenkyōtō, on the other hand, retained a romantic appeal for many, but its political efficacy evaporated as popular sympathy declined. The late 1960s student New Left, eager to define itself by "masculine" violent spectacle, disintegrated into sectarian conflict. The ethos of "Gewalt" sought to disrupt the growing conservative consensus that prioritized national economic strength as the goal for family and education, but it also alienated popular sympathy. In the early 1970s, the police conducted a successful campaign to woo the public; student activists became portrayed as dangerous elements from which the police would protect citizens.\textsuperscript{62} Self-representations of the late 1960s movement as aggressively masculine and violent fed into police representations of the social order as vulnerable to student activism. In the end, the nurturing model carried the day, although it was the masculine figures of the police that represented protection of citizens, rather than feminine figures. For while the increasingly masculinist elements of the student New Left saw in mothers a frightening obstacle to liberation, the mass media turned toward the figure of the female student activist in the late 1960s as an emblem of the student movement's excesses.

\textsuperscript{62} Ando, \textit{Japan's New Left Movements}, 87.
"Gewalt Rosas":
The creation of the terrifying, titillating female student activist

On a day in the early 1990s, the scene outside Yasuda Tower differed tremendously from that of the late 1960s. Far from declaring "Destroy Tokyo University," one female admit in bridal dress gushed to journalists, "I'm marrying Tokyo University!" It was this enthusiastic young woman in particular who emphasized for Sassa Atsuyuki, a National Police Agency security agent and a key figure on the riot police side of late 1960s clashes with student activists, the gap between the past and the present. Watching her, Sassa felt the Shōwa Era (1926-1989) slip into irrelevance; he opened his 1993 memoir on the "fall of Yasuda Fortress" with this sign of how dramatically the times had changed. He expressed a kind of nostalgia for the street fighting of the late 1960s, echoing other right-wing longings for those dramatic moments of romantic, masculine conflict.\(^1\) The figure that best represented the changes between the past and the present for Sassa, however, is the female student in the media spotlight: his "flashback" to 19 January 1969 focuses on the figure of a handcuffed female student, roughly forced to stand by the riot police. Sassa noted that she was androgynous; it was only her long black hair, tangled beneath her helmet "like a bird's nest," or her "shrill protest cry" that marked her as female to him. The press surrounded her, urging her to look into their cameras, illuminating her face with their flash.\(^2\)

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Introduction

Much like Sassa, who directed police counter-measures against student protest in the period, the mass media in the late 1960s fixated on the "Gewalt girls" of the New Left, who were by turns titillating and terrifying. The mass media used the figures of young women who adopted radical politics—proportionally less active in the movements than young men, but made much more visible in their reportage—to make sweeping statements about women in politics and the student movement. Through interpreting female student radicals' actions primarily through gendered ideas about behavior, tabloids undermined young women's political positions. In many cases, the mass media also used the prominence of female student activists to challenge the

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3 As Guy Yasko notes, Sassa's memoir offers few insights into the workings of the student movement, but yields a wealth of evidence about the close relationship between the police, the university, and the mass media. Guy Yasko, “The Japanese Student Movement 1968-70: The Zenkyōōō Uprising” (Dissertation, Cornell University, 1997), 6. Footnote 2. On Sassa's access to the Emperor himself, see my Chapter Five.
political significance of the student movement in general, suggesting that female participation reflected irrationality. In a sense, this journalistic interpretation of feminine political agency fit in with earlier formulations of a "pure" female student subjectivity, but emphasized the negative aspects of political purity, such as inexperience, naïveté, and emotionalism. The role of the mass media, an institution responsible in many cases for defining social facts, demonstrated also the gendered inequality of power between male-dominated institutions such as news journalism and female student activists in particular.\(^4\) Here we will examine cases in which mass media print journalism determined gendered categories for female student activism. I will also introduce materials produced by two female student activist targets of mass media attention to demonstrate the relative ineffectiveness of these young women in determining the social meaning of their activism. The discussion will conclude with comical fictional representations of female student activists, which channeled anxieties about an ascendant "Era of Woman Superiority" into gendered categories that tamed the radical potential of the student movement and a truly extreme shift in gender relations into comedy. In the late 1960s, when female participants in the student movement proved that women could also participate in radical politics, and also in violence, the mass media responded by containing their threat through characterizing it as feminine, emotional, and therefore (even comically) apolitical.

**Kikuyabashi 101 and Female Commitment to Activism**

The 1969 case of "Kikuyabashi 101" demonstrated both what became interpreted in the mass media as the exceptional commitment of young women to radical politics and also the mass media's intervention in creating meaning out of female student activism and in affecting legal

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outcomes of student activism. "Kikuyabashi 101," a young woman, was one of 786 students the police arrested as they broke up the Tokyo University campus occupations in January 1969. Of these almost 800 arrested students, 540 were indicted, and 469 of them elected for a unified, rather than individual, trial. This request was refused, and many students and their lawyers boycotted the trials. “Kikuyabashi 101" refused to disclose her name, a common strategy of legal resistance, so she was entered into the police records and referred to in the mass media by the number of her cell at Kikuyabashi Police Station.\(^5\) She remained silent long after many other students had identified themselves, and her identity was not revealed until the tabloid \(Yūkan fuji\) ran her photograph on their front page on 12 March 1969. The magazine \(Young Lady\) picked up the story, republishing the photo of Kikuyabashi 101 in April, and by 1 May 1969, \(Yūkan fuji\) was able to reveal details about her name and identity, again on the front page. For the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō, the tabloid's choice to run the photo of a heretofore unidentified student activist—making her legally and personally vulnerable—reflected a deep alliance between mass media journalism and state authority. The Tokyo University Zenkyōtō newspaper, \(Shingeki\), mobilized the language of human rights to decry the actions of \(Yūkan fuji\) as a violation of the "basic human right" of Kikuyabashi 101 to maintain silence while under arrest.\(^6\)

Although the student activists framed their opposition to the tabloid's publication of Kikuyabashi 101's photograph as a battle between the politics of the radical movement and "bourgeois journalism," \(Yūkan fuji\) made no ideological case for exposing Kikuyabashi 101. Instead, the publication simply reported on the "facts" of the case, while obscuring the greater legal and political meaning of its reportage. In the case of Kikuyabashi 101, information on her


\(^6\) “Hōdō no jiyū' de mokuhi ken assatsu," \(Shingeki\), May 14, 1969.
emphasized the link between her actions and her gender. In determining the facts of her case, the tabloid relied on the testimony of police authorities to establish objectivity. This pattern, in which mass media sources report frequently impressionistic police accounts as expert opinion on student radicalism, demonstrated the deep links between the police and the mass media in defining student activism in the late 1960s. For example, the March 1969 *Yūkan fuji* article on Kikuyabashi 101 quoted a police officer’s estimation that logic will break down male activists, but "once women are bent on something, they won't open their mouths for a while."7 In Kikuyabashi's case she displayed what a police officer classified as a feminine commitment immune to logic. Within this feminine category, however, she struck him as rather extraordinary; she reportedly "brainwashed" a prostitute with whom she shared a cell, provoking the "woman of the night" to use the language of human rights in subsequent interviews with police. Although some police reported finding Kikuyabashi 101 a little "creepy" because of her extreme refusal, another policeman relayed to the magazine *Young Lady* his opinion that her loyalty to the cause demonstrated that she'd make a proper wife.8 Her potential as a figure of terror (brainwashing weaker-willed women) is mitigated by her demonstration of feminine loyalty (that, once domesticated, would make her a good wife).

Although the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō accused the tabloids of identifying Kikuyabashi 101, the actual investigative role of the mass media is not clear. What is unambiguous is the role of tabloids in rapidly disseminating whatever private information had been collected on her. On 1 May 1969, *Yūkan fuji* exposed Kikuyabashi 101's identity, identifying not only her name, but also her place of birth and current residence, the names of all the schools she attended, and names of her academic advisor and family members. In doing so, the tabloid demonstrated the

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power of the mass media to establish the facts about Kikuyabashi 101—named as Katō Hiroko, a young married graduate student at Tokyo University—and also the access that the mass media could gain to people close to those exposed to press scrutiny. Yūkan fuji sought out Katō Hiroko's neighbors and colleagues, capturing the surprise of her various acquaintances and relations—including her father—at the news of her arrest. The various interviews conveyed the sense that extreme political commitment might lurk underneath the quiet exterior of any "ordinary female student."

In her personal writings, Kikuyabashi 101 comes across as much less committed to radical extremism. In letters Kikuyabashi 101 wrote while in jail, published under her alias in an April 1969 volume of student "prison letters," she wrote with a sense of wonder about how someone who had been so "mild" had come to hate certain people and things. She described herself as experiencing conflicting feelings, unable to forgive what she tentatively called a "quasi-ruling class?" personality defined by fear of the unknown and an urge toward self-preservation: "Grappling with how to escape from this existence defined my whole history since entering college." She interpreted her involvement in the leftist student movement as a process of questioning and working through conflicting feelings, rather than a compulsive commitment to the movement.

Although Kikuyabashi 101 does not see herself as particularly committed to the cause of the student movement, her protracted silence becomes a symbol of radical refusal for both the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō and the tabloids. In the second letter of hers published in the volume, dated 11 March 1969, she struggled in particular to counter interpretations of the confrontation between occupying students and the riot police at Yasuda Tower in January 1969.

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9 “Doro numa ureu 'shufu gakusei,'” Yūkan fuji, May 1, 1969.
as a demonstration of extremism. Her interpretation opposed those, such as right-wing author Mishima Yukio, who felt unimpressed by the lack of student sacrifice at the Tokyo University showdown. The stubborn fight of the occupying students, she argued, was by no means an attempt at self-sacrifice. She rejected any interpretation that would align the Zenkyōtō with a "shattering jewel" (gyokusai), the euphemistic wartime term for patriotic suicide. For Kikuyabashi 101, a young woman described in the mass media as an example of extreme feminine self-sacrifice, the more urgent matter remained one of building a collective. Written almost two months after her arrest and before her identity was exposed, in the letter she described the siege as a "decision for a new collective." She identified the context of an "oppressed everyday life" as the major obstacle to this goal of creating meaningful alternative communities. Mass media portrayals of Kikuyabashi 101 and her silent refusal excluded these political convictions.

Kashiwazaki Chieko and Female Activist Violence

Kashiwazaki Chieko, another female graduate student activist at Tokyo University, presented a case of a much more unambiguously radical (and certainly not silent) female student activist. Nevertheless, the mass media's gendered analysis of her position mitigated her voice. Unlike Kikuyabashi 101, Kashiwazaki was a well-known and openly active member of the late 1960s student movement at Tokyo University, who attracted media attention from early 1969. Similar to the treatment of Kikuyabashi 101, however, the mass media frequently interpreted Kashiwazaki's actions through her gender. Such gendered interpretations undermined her own attempts to define the social meaning of her activism.

11 Ibid., 1:1–2.
The term "Gewalt Rosa," which rapidly became a generic term in the mass media for young women involved in the Zenkyōtō movement of the late 1960s, came from a nickname attributed to Kashiwazaki Chieko. The term drew on the German word "Gewalt" (violence) and the name of Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919), the female Marxist theorist and revolutionary. Of Polish descent, Rosa Luxemburg became famous for her activism in Germany, and died a victim of the right-wing militarist Freikorps (Volunteer Corps) in their efforts to quell the communist movement for which she agitated. Kashiwazaki, a student of Polish history, embraced Rosa Luxemburg's revolutionary legacy with her nickname, which emblazoned the cover of the memoir she wrote while in jail in spring 1969.

Although within her memoir Kashiwazaki attempted to reject any gendered interpretation that made her participation "as a woman" a curiosity, her protestations had little effect on the memoir's advertising campaign, launched in mainstream newspapers. One such advertisement, which ran in the mainstream *Yomiuri shinbun*, declared Kashiwazaki's voice as, "the authentic cry of a female student!"\(^{12}\) When the newspaper included her book as one of the standouts among the flood of new publications on Tokyo University "Gewalt," the author included Kashiwazaki's gender as a major point of interest, and deemed the work "very feminine."\(^{13}\) Her memoir inspired gendered analyses in spite of her own protestations. As Kashiwazaki noted in the pages of her book, she reacted with hostility to a journalist who wanted to interview her "as a woman" in the movement. She noted, “Is it really so peculiar that a woman fights? In this struggle, I haven't been conscious of myself as a woman or as a wife at all.”\(^{14}\) Although

\(^{12}\) *Yomiuri shinbun*, 15 July 1969.

\(^{13}\) “Tōdai gebaruto,” *Yomiuri shinbun*, 11 July 1969.

Kashiwazaki rejected a gendered reading of her participation, those writing book reviews and her ad copy sought out her words to gain insight into a specifically "female student" view on the movement. They did not share her assessment that, in the struggle, she does not act "as a woman."

At moments in her narrative, Kashiwazaki undermined her own willful rejection of a gendered subjectivity. In episodes that resonated with the experiences of many female student activists in the barricades, she described how young women cooked for the activists, making rice balls and boiled eggs to prepare for a battle against JCP-affiliated students, or preparing a New Year's feast in the barricades. While Kashiwazaki also occasionally cooked, she attempted to preempt gendered interpretations of that labor: “When I cook for my comrades in the barricades, it's because I really enjoy cooking and am concerned with everyone's health. It's absolutely not because I'm a woman.” However, she also affirmed her own worth as an activist when she succeeded in completing what might be considered men's work. In building the Tokyo University barricades, she joined a men-only group, and noted with satisfaction that she held her own. Although Kashiwazaki declared that, for her, wielding a kitchen knife and brandishing a "Gewalt stick" were equally important, her own proclamations of overcoming her gender approached the individualist interpretations of extraordinary women from earlier generations, which Kanba Michiko identified as an impediment to collective women's action. Kashiwazaki, in rejecting completely the role of gendered labor in creating hierarchies of commitment in the movement also obscured the opinion, expressed by other usually younger female students, that

15 Ibid., 239–243. 249.
16 Ibid., 268–269.
17 Ibid., 207–210.
Kashiwasaki was one of the few women to take up the Gewalt stick. Streetfighting remained the clearest rejection of the virtues of civil society, and participation in or abstention from violence became critical in student movement evaluations of activists' commitment. According to this system of appraisal, "wielding a knife" against a radish was considerably less revolutionary than thrashing a stick against the police or "enemy" students.

The only moment in Kashiwazaki's personal narrative in which she discussed the positive political implications of her female subjectivity was in describing her personal political awakening, which was linked to the 1960 death of Kanba Michiko. Raised in a Protestant, intellectual family (a “typical bourgeois home," as she put it), her three elder brothers had participated as university students in the 1960 anti-Anpo protest. She herself was a second-year high school student at the time, and recalled her deep shock at the 15 June 1960 death of Kanba Michiko. She shared the common view that Kanba's death marked the end of a democratic ideal, for with that tragedy “postwar democracy was completely finished.” She located the depth of her early empathy with the dead female student as a sense of justice shared among women. As was the case for many observers at the time, as we have seen, Kanba Michiko the icon represented political purity and the potential of true postwar democracy for Kashiwazaki Chieko, even as Kashiwazaki so stridently rejected her feminine subjectivity in the late-1960s student movement.

Much like the mass media reaction to Kanba, although with a variation in the meanings created, the mass media of the late 1960s created popular images of Kashiwazaki the "Gewalt

19 Kashiwazaki, Taiyo to arashi to jiyu o, 80.
20 Ibid., 70–72.
21 Ibid., 64–68.
Rosa" that had little in common with Kashiwazaki the real person. Although the tabloids also
published speculative articles on prominent male student activists such as Tokyo University's
Yamamoto Yoshitaka and Nihon University's Akita Akehiro, the figures of female student
activists provoked more emotive responses. A female student activist like Kashiwazaki Chieko
drew dramatically contradictory responses, from articles that accused her of promoting hysterical
violence to those that rejected her significance among student activists. As demonstrated in a
March 1969 article in the Yomiuri shinbun on "Gewalt Rosas," the very prominence of a female
student activist within the movement suggested that the movement as a whole could be dismissed
as irrational. The author used the presence of Kashiwazaki as evidence that the student
movement "prioritizes women based on hysterical, infantile heroism." He also likened her
relationship with student activists to that of "a mother to children studying for entrance exams,"
scolding and cheering them on. In this way, the author reduces Kashiwazaki's claims to
leadership to the very feminine role of the mother, and the "education mama" in particular. In the
postwar period, the term "education mama" took on negative valences in the media discourse.
She represented a kind of perversion of the ideal "wise mother" responsible for guiding learning
in the home. As a female corollary of the emasculated sarariiman, the wage slaves / soldiers of a
rapidly growing national economy, the "education mama" was seen as domineering woman who
invested all of her self into ensuring her children's success in the increasingly competitive
meritocratic system of entrance examinations. Associating a female activist leader with the
figure of the "education mama" assumed that a woman's role in the student movement would

23 Ibid.
replicate a feminine domestic role with potential for danger. In the case of the student movement, the presence of a female activist "education mama" would also intensify the violence, as Kashiwazaki's form of "education" included urging students into more and more dramatic confrontations. The presence of a goading feminine presence threatened to make the student movement more violent, but it also made the movement and its violence ridiculous.

The mass media treatment of Kashiwazaki Chieko demonstrated also that the mass media's strategy of seeking out insider sources often marginalized the very subjects represented in reportage. In the case of female activists, tabloid journalists often undermined young women through a variety of strategies, similar to those employed in the rash of "Coeds Ruin the Nation" articles from the early 1960s. Female students came across as both too earnest and too superficial. Sometimes even the same young woman received both treatments at once. A summer 1969 article published in Shūkan yomiuri on Kashiwazaki Chieko after her release from prison employed quotes from male student activists to dismiss her political ideas completely. The opinions of male students—many of them from competing sects—are presented as insider information, and their comments damn her variously as too passionate ("I acknowledge that she is genuine and pure. But in the real struggle she just gets mad too abruptly.") or exceptionally trivial ("She had her hair cut at a salon especially for the meeting.").

Within the article, a source also unfavorably compared Kashiwazaki to the silent Kikuyabashi 101. Whether one or the other was truly more revolutionary is less at stake than which one could more readily become a symbol for the movement. Kikuyabashi's silence was praised; her silence also meant that others could create meaning about her without the inconvenient intrusion of her own words.

The Mass Media and the Creation of Gendered Political Meaning

Although the mass media had long controlled the meaning of images of vulnerability and threat posed by student activists, tabloid articles from the mid-1960s responded to the increase in campus-based movements and in the participation of female students by relying on police as sources of insider knowledge. In contrast to photographs of police roughly handling young women, tabloids quoted police as expert witnesses of the dynamics of student protest. A police officer quoted in a June 1966 *Shūkan shinchō* article on female student activists declared that a key aspect of an increasingly aggressive student movement was the participation of young women not only dressed like men, but who also acted like the male students with whom they protested.26 Comments ranged from such declarations of potential threat to others in which police ridiculed the idea of female students as a political force. One police officer interviewed by *Shūkan shinchō* in May 1968 declared, "For me, the girls are not really an issue. In the end, what the girls do is just help the boys."27 His opinion of the university student activist in general reflected a view of these elite youth as overprotected bourgeois youth, jumping into "revolution" after years at their mama's side. It is precisely this view of the coddled university student that drove the masculine logic of the student movement and the Tokyo University philosophical effort to negate the bourgeois self that was so dependent upon father and mother's resources and care. Reflecting also the tabloid's reliance upon the "expert" opinions of academics in interpreting the student movement, the article quotes Teruoka Yasutaka, the Waseda professor of the "Coeds Ruin the Nation Theory." For him, the young female activists were more dangerous than male student activists precisely because they were irrational, perhaps even insane. Although Teruoka felt he could talk sense to male student activists in one-on-one conversations, he reacted differently to female activists: “It's like they are crazed. And they have eyes like they've been

possessed by foxes."\textsuperscript{28} Much like tabloid interpretations of Kikuyabashi 101's long silence in jail, Teruoka read female student activism—in particular in its extreme variants—as something rooted in feminine characteristics impenetrable to logic. In many ways, the discourse in the mass media on female students active in the late 1960s New Left movement echoed themes articulated in the "Coeds Ruin the Nation" theory. The lack of intellectualism that supposedly made young women a poor fit for higher educations institutions also made them irrational and potentially dangerous activists.

Assuming also that the inclusion of female bodies introduced rampant sexuality, tabloids relied upon police conjectures as a main source of information for speculative articles on the kinds of sex that occurred as male and female students lived together in campus occupations. As student barricades became a key strategy of the campus-based student movements of the late 1960s, the presence of female bodies led mass media sources to suggest that the "function" of young women participants must be sexual release for the young men.\textsuperscript{29} In publications such as \textit{Shūkan shincho} and \textit{Shūkan playboy}, articles insinuated that coed campuses must be hotbeds of not only political but also sexual activity. Based on police gossip about literally hot beds—one officer reported feeling "the warmth of two bodies" on a futon in the barricades—the headlines of such articles included sensational terms like "free sex."\textsuperscript{30} However, in quotes from the students, which articles buried between hypotheses and rumors, students both male and female not only denied that such salacious behavior occurred, but also reflected a common view that sexual activity was consciously constrained. Students at several different schools reported that their movement codes of conduct were rather strict. A Nihon University student elaborated on

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{29} "Zengakuren' kago danjo gakusei wa nani wo shiteiru?," \textit{Shūkan Playboy}, August 20, 1968. 
\textsuperscript{30} "Akatsuki no teire to hachinin no joshigakusei."
the custom in the campus barricades there, which was to assign a room to female students sleeping over, and to have them lock the door from the inside. Citing the fear of popular opinion as the basis for this policy, he noted, “Some have complained that it's an exaggerated gesture, or that it's bourgeois, but it's our first struggle, so we don't want some silly mistake to become a weapon for our enemies.”31 A former activist at Hosei University repeated this fear on the part of the students that sexual activity could be used as a weapon against them, and noted that the Hosei University barricades also maintained a strict management of sexual activities.32 In spite of student activists' care to avoid mass media accusations of unbridled sexuality, tabloid journalism equated the inclusion of female bodies with the introduction of sexuality. Much like in the logic of the "Coeds Ruin the Nation Theory," in the tabloids, female students sharing space with male students sexualized those spaces.

Periodicals that targeted young women reflected a less dismissive view of female students in the New Left, although preoccupations with the potential for both titillating and terrifying encounters with activism also entered discussions of the student movement in women's magazines. The magazine Josei jishin included both celebratory and wary articles on female student activism.33 Particularly in early 1968, in the context of strong popular support of the student movement, articles on admirable and strong-willed female students introduced the periodical's readership to stories of fortitude, passion, and self-discovery through female student activism.34 Articles in Josei jishin rejected outright the idea that young men dragged young

31 “Zengakuren' kago danjo gakusei wa nani wo shiteiru?".
33 Although the magazine's name suggested female autonomy (meaning, roughly, "Woman herself"), the editorial staff also featured male leadership.
women into the movement, and included bold headlines like "Goodbye, Good Wife and Wise Mother!" In late 1968, however, addressing readers' potential concerns about how to navigate the changing political scene at campuses, which included women's colleges, the magazine featured an article framed around "women's colleges without disputes." Their analysis included not only what campuses were safe from unrest, but also what opportunities thirty schools offered students in terms of opportunities to meet young men, participate in clubs, and take particular courses. However, even while framing the article around schools without activism, the authors concluded by introducing their readers to key student movement terms, such as Gewalt and nonpoli. They also included anecdotes by female students at women's universities who described the excitement of their first awakening to student activism. In this way, even young women who were wary of campus disputes, and the negative impact participation might have on future marriage or employment, became familiar with the vocabulary of the student movement.

A serial comic in women's magazine Josei jishin demonstrated how the idea of the sexual availability of young female bodies in the student movement captured the popular imagination. Ostensibly based on a young woman's real-life account of losing her virginity, the illustrated story drew also on an "expert" on student issues for its claim to veracity. Over the course of four installations, a wealthy young female student became estranged from her father, found camaraderie and excitement when she fell in with two male student activists, and eventually, provoked "by a maternal instinct," undressed and offered her body to them both as an act of

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35 “Funsō no nai joshidai wa koko!,” Josei jishin, 23 December 1968. The five campuses that did have disputes were Ochanomizu Women's University, Tokyo Women's University, Tsuda College, Sagami Women's University, and Nara Women's University. These five schools are defined by the high rates of students who seek employment after graduation and the high number of opportunities to associate with students at coed universities such as Tokyo University that also had high rates of student activism.

36 The illustrator of "The First Morning," Satō Masa'aki, went on to publish an eighteen-volume manga in the 1980s entitled Bōkō (Rape).
selflessness and solidarity.\textsuperscript{37} The female protagonist's submission to the young men's sexual desire in this context suggested a feminine passivity. In this publication targeting young women, as in the tabloids that targeted a largely male readership, the idea of a politically awakened young woman often suggested an accompanying sexual awakening.

**Female Activist as Comedy: "College Sister" and "Campus Kyanko"

Although the campus-based student movement represented its ideal revolutionary subjectivity as a masculine, street-fighting one, mass media representations of the radical shifts in what constituted a young female activist attracted more attention. As an example of this, although the occasional cartoon would lampoon male student activists, two mainstream tabloid serial comics in the late 1960s featured a female student as the protagonist who exposed the twists and turns of the student movement. In some ways, the mass media's disproportionate fascination with the inclusion of female bodies in demonstrations and occupations continued social patterns set in the 1920s and 1930s, in which mass media political cartoons symbolized threats to political and social stability with female characters, whereas leftist and radical publications lacked representations of revolutionary female subjects.\textsuperscript{38} As noted earlier, student activists both male and female often ignored or actively sought to overcome feminine subjectivity in the student movement. The two comic strips, in contrast, demonstrated not only a view of the "new" young woman of the postwar baby boomer generation as overly sexual and greedy, but also illustrated her potential for a kind of revolutionary subjectivity. The earlier of the two was Sonoyama Shunji's "College Sister" (Kareji Neechan), which ran in *Sunday mainichi*


\textsuperscript{38} Mackie, “Picturing Political Space in 1920s and 1930s Japan.”
from September 1968 to July 1970, although the run of Sakurai Isamu's "Campus Kyanko" (Kyanpasu Kyanko), overlapped, running in Shūkan yomiuri from May 1969 through the end of 1970. The fictional female protagonists of both series enjoyed vast appetites for food and men, expressing a corporeality marked by sensuality and sexual availability. Their creators often played their female title characters' brashness to comic effect, suggesting a kind of impossibility for integrating women into higher education; their bodies, drawn as busty and barelegged, always introduced sexuality. However, through including themes of radical activism, in which these female student characters participated, these two comic strips also highlighted female participation as a key characteristic of the late 1960s student movement and appealed to readers' attraction to and fear of the politicized subjectivity of the female student.

Although not all the weekly installments thrust these cartoon coeds into student activism, several episodes revealed the popular interest in such female student activists as Kashiwazaki Chieko and Kikuyabashi 101. At various points, both "College Sister" and "Campus Kyanko" wielded Gewalt sticks and wore helmets like Tokyo University's infamous "Gewalt Rosa"; both of them, like Kikuyabashi 101, claimed their right to remain silent when arrested. Of the two, Sonoyama's "College Sister" is more sympathetic to the student movement. In part, this reflects the shift in popular sympathies away from the student movement in 1969; by the time Sakurai's "Campus Kyanko" began to run in May 1969, the increasingly violent and confrontational student movement failed to elicit the strong public sympathy that it had enjoyed in 1968.

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39 In December 1971, English translations of the "College Neechan" came out to both help students of English learn "good current" phrases, while sharing "a good laugh with our heroine Gewako as she goes about the turbulent business of trying to set the world straight," according to the introduction by Paul Gilbert, an instructor at the Tokyo YMCA English Language School. Sonoyama Shunji, Eiyaku Karejji Nêchan, trans. Uematsu Tomii (Tokyo: Hyôronsha, 1971), 4.

40 College sister declared her silence under arrest in an 11 November 1968 strip, while Campus Kyanko did so a year later, on 28 November 1969. Both these strips most likely responded to the rash of student arrests in the 21 October Anti-War Day demonstrations of both 1968 and 1969.
Although both College Sister and Campus Kyanko represented sexually frank "new" young women, Campus Kyanko embodied a more aggressive sexuality, and a correspondingly more radical politics. In an early Campus Kyanko strip, from July 1969, Kyanko, rather than being scared off by a warning that her date is only out "for her body," vigorously drains the young man of all his resources, out-drinking him, ordering large amounts of food, and, finally, creating a barricaded "liberation zone" when the young man cannot afford a hotel room for the two of them. By creating a barricade to facilitate a sexual encounter, Campus Kyanko's actions resonate with the speculations of tabloids that the campus barricades of a mixed-sex movement represented a "liberation zone" for sexuality, namely male sexuality and access to sex with female students. Kyanko, a sectarian radical as adept in mixing molotov cocktails as she is in seducing men, also wields her sexual power as a political weapon. She lures not only a young man whom she is supposed to tutor, but also the boy's father, to the Zenkyōtō cause (fig. 13). While confirming tabloid fears about the role of young women in the student movement and the potential of female student leaders to goad others into violence, the author also took the popular idea to a comical extreme. In Kyanko's case, she influenced not only an impressionable high school student, but also his conservative father.

Figure 15. Father: "I'm also going to join the Zenkyōtō!"
Similar to many tabloid discussions of female student participation in radical politics, the ideological motivations of both the fictional coed protagonists "College Sister" and "Campus Kyanko" remained obscure. Their activism may have simply functioned as ways for the authors to comment on current events on campuses, and their politics were often undone by their desires. A running gag in both was their attraction to the manly riot police, for example. However, their creators also used the female students to foil the men—and male activists—around them, as the young women responded with earnestness to matters of political radicalism and affirmed their own sexual and political agency. Kyanko, as just demonstrated, attracted men of various generations to her politics through her sexual allure. But College Sister in particular demonstrated a just political subjectivity that exposed the hypocrisies of university authorities, police officers, and male students. For example, a fall 1969 installment contrasted the sincere commitment of "College Sister" with self-serving and careerist male students (fig. 14). In this strip, two male students discuss potential jobs at the Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan and seek to ingratiate themselves with their professor to assure their future careers, while College Sister continues to go about collecting wood to erect campus barricades. To please the professor, the male students interrupt her, and restrain her with her materials. She cries out that she's been betrayed. This strip reflected a more general gendered divide perceived between young men who gave up student activism to take on careers and young women who found this to be a kind of betrayal; already by spring 1969 the Asahi Journal had begun to publish a series on male former student activists who had gone "from Gewalt stick to employment."41 In a roundtable discussion with young men who until their recent employment had been involved in campus-based activism, such topics as what could be brought from the leftist movement to the workplace revealed how

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41 “Gebabō kara shūshoku e no dōtei,” Asahi Journal, 6 April 1969.
both the mass media and also former student activists built a narrative in which an elite white-collar career was not a break from radical activism. The term used for this shift from activist to *sarariiman* was "employment conversion" (shūshoku tenkō), which implied a kind of betrayal, but also alluded to a longer history of "ideological conversion" among leftists in modern Japan. Earlier, I discussed the implications of prewar and wartime leftists who abandoned their position of protest to embrace the nationalist project. In this late 1960s iteration, "ideological conversion" meant that leftist student activists turned from a position of opposition to the structures of Japanese capital and industry to a cooperative stance, in which they both built and benefitted from Japan's powerful national economy in the late 1960s. College Sister's "betrayal" by her male comrades as they prepared to join the white-collar workforce demonstrated the young woman's greater commitment to continued activism; the humor of the "betrayal" lies the knowledge, shared between the author and the reader, that College Sister should have known better than to trust those young men and their liberatory rhetoric in the first place.
As the campus-based student movement seemed to faded into irrelevance for the majority of people in 1970, Sonoyama's "College Sister" comic strip became an "Office Sister" series in summer 1970, while in fall 1970 Sakurai's "Campus Kyanko" dabbled in the women's liberation movement but ultimately became a shop girl. Tensions between men and women remained a key theme for the tabloids in which these comic strips ran. A new catch phrase from mid-1969 characterized the moment as the "Era of Woman Superiority," echoing strains of anxiety about the proper place of women, but more often employed as a humorous slogan. Several sarariiman-themed cartoons published in tabloids targeting a male readership used the idea of the "Era of Woman Superiority" to comic effect precisely because it seemed absurd that women would usurp
men's roles. Such cartoons represented the "Era of Women Superiority" as a complete swap in
gender roles, in which men were demoted to "feminine" roles of serving women tea or of
keeping house. These depictions allowed representations of women stepping into masculine
social roles, but required that men take on feminine roles, thus preserving the significance of
difference and differentiated labor between men and women. Humor contained the potential
threat of women like College Sister entering the workplace as "office ladies." Campus Kyanko,
when she marched in a November 1970 installment with women behind a banner asking "What
is femininity?" drew the jeers of a male onlooker: "Women are superior! Embrace me! Hey,
sister - are you braless?" This prompted Kyanko to end the demonstration and return to campus,
where her male student comrades asked her to pour the tea. She refused, excused herself to use
the toilet, and one young man suggestively insisted she enter the men's room with him, in the
name of "equality." This comic strip in particular exposes the male framing of Campus Kyanko
and her various affiliations, both political and sexual. Namely, the source of Kyanko's meaning is
created in her relationships with the men around her, reflecting not only her male creator's view,
but also the logic of most of the tabloids, which continually defined the role of the female student
activist in terms of her relationship with men and male society.

Even when many young women formed a women-only movement to counter not only
hegemonic structures of sexism in the workplace and the home, but also the sexism of the coed
student movement in the late 1960s, tabloids attempted to define a narrative of "ideological

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43 As E. Ann Kaplan noted in the case of cinema in the United States in the 1970s and early 1980s, "as a result of the recent women's movement, women have been permitted in representation to assume (step into) the position defined as masculine, as long as the man then steps into her position, so as to keep the whole structure intact." E. Ann Kaplan, “Is the Gaze Male?" in Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality, ed. Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell, and Sharon Thompson (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), 319.
"conversion" for female student activists as well. The banner slogan questioning the meaning of "femininity" featured in "Campus Kyanko" referenced a group of two hundred helmeted women marching in an October 1970 peace demonstration who had marched behind those words, in an event that many determined the commencement of a distinct "feminist" movement. Those women unfurled another banner, too, directed at "Mama." It asked her, "Mother, is marriage really bliss?" Unconcerned with the debates circulating among a new generation of self-proclaimed feminists, however, the mass media imagined how young women would transition from "Gewalt Rosas" to become wives and mothers. In some cases, this produced humorous situations. One cartoon featured a young couple out on a formal marriage interview (fig. 16). Although the young woman wears a kimono, her aggressive style, and impeccable aim, as she orders another juice by throwing a bottle at the waiter, betrays her activist background to her potential mate. The strip offered a humorous speculation on how this new breed of politically active young women would integrate into established rituals of courting and marriage. Although former female activists might prove a more aggressive breed of brides, it remained unthinkable that they would go so far as to resist marriage altogether.

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44 Uno, “The Death of ‘Good Wife, Wise Mother’?,” 313.
Figure 17. Cartoon of a formal Marriage Interview.
Young woman: "More juice!"
Young man: "By her throw, I'll bet she's a Gewalt veteran."

In a more earnest vein, although with similar effect, the 5 July 1971 issue of Young Lady placed female student radicals in the past in a feature on a young mother. The piece expressed admiration for the young woman's activism, introducing her story with the headline, "My Child, Remember. Mama Was Once a Fierce 'Gewalt Rosa'."\(^{45}\) However, much like coverage on how young men could apply the lessons of past activism to future career success, the article characterized the young woman's activism as part of her past; motherhood defined her future.

\(^{45}\) "Bōya, oboeteoide. Mama wa mukashi 'Gebaruto Rōza' to iu sugoi onna deshita," Young Lady, 5 July 1971.
By the early 1970s, female students no longer represented political purity. They had proven themselves capable of participation in radical, and even violent, political action. Ideological attempts to associate women to the domestic sphere came to define young women's place in higher education, and the New Left's gendered hierarchy of labor and increasing focus on a masculine ethos of violence convinced a broad segment of leftist-leaning women that a women-only movement offered the only radical opportunity for female political activism. By the early 1970s, the women's liberation movement in Japan constituted an important inheritor of New Left strategies, even as it defined itself against the sexism of the 1960s student movement. As the New Left self-immolated in sectarian violence, women's lib also emphasized its difference from the "masculine" campus-based activism of the late 1960s. As we have seen, however, female participation formed the New Left in postwar Japan. Bringing women into the story of the student movement of the 1960s does not diminish the claims of postwar feminism in Japan, but illuminates further the patterns of media coverage, policy reactions, and activist organization which defined what was politically possible for women in postwar Japan.
If only I had had the independence to take on Kawashima's sexism in a structural way, our activism would have taken a different course. At the least, I think I might have avoided making such terrible mistakes as a leader.¹

—Nagata Hiroko in 1983

Although, by the early 1970s, a proliferation of examples of sectarian violence represented the radicalization of the student movement to the Japanese public, no event symbolized the death of the New Left as dramatically and powerfully as the bloody internal purge waged by the United Red Army (URA) in their mountain retreat, revealed to the nation via the mass media in early 1972. Nagata Hiroko, the young woman who shared power with the male leader, Mori Tsuneo, quickly became emblematic of the perversity of female participation in radical activism. More so than Mori, Nagata came to be representative of the group's extremist violence in the mass media.² As feminist contemporaries noted, male reporters gleefully seized upon Nagata's "extreme emotions" and "cruelty that even men feared." One male commentator, quoted in the mainstream Asahi shinbun even declared, "Women's participation in the movement is not only a problem for the URA, but a new problem today."³ This followed earlier patterns of portraying female student activists as agents of radicalization, as I have shown. With this violent incident, in which a young woman played a key role, both the New Left and the place of women in political movements came under crippling criticism. In a survey conducted twenty years later

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² Patricia Steinhoff, "Three Women Who Loved the Left." 311.
³ Shigematsu, Scream from the Shadows, 145. For more on the complicated reception of URA violence by women's lib activists, see in particular Chapter Five, "Ribu's Response to the United Red Army."
of 563 former Zenkyōtō student activists, 16.9% cited the United Red Army incident as the reason they ended activism.⁴

As demonstrated in the opening retrospective quote, Nagata Hiroko herself, raped by her comrade and leader Kawashima Tsuyoshi in 1969, would conclude that her failure to attack the sexism of her male leaders and the leftist organization in general set the stage for her failure as a revolutionary leader. In this dissertation, I’ve shown how gender—and in particular the contested position of the female student activist—operated in the conception of the New Left in postwar Japan. The gendered circumstances of the New Left's dissolution underlines the importance of my history. The viciousness of the series of self-criticisms that took place during the United Red Army's training camp in the Japanese Alps in the winter of 1971 has undergone various interpretations, but there is no question that the issue of femininity had a great deal to do with it.⁵ Indeed, the killing of twelve members in the space of two months, including a woman eight months pregnant, may be read in part as an effort to purge femininity from a revolutionary subjectivity.⁶ All accounts of the events that took place in the mountain retreat point to the "Toyama incident" as the spark for the violence that followed. In this "incident," Nagata Hiroko confronted Toyama Mieko about Toyama's maintenance of feminine rituals as she underwent guerrilla training: she kept her hair long, and wore a ring and make up. The confrontation between the two women marked two different positions contained within the United Red Army; the URA had formed in summer 1971 as a merger between a faction of the Japanese Red Army

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⁶ Ōtsuka Eiji may overstate his case, based on linking Nagata Hiroko to the shōjo (young girl) culture of the 1970s and 1980s, that the key term around which the purges operated was kawaii (cute), but he does point out the sexism at work in the URA. Ōtsuka Eiji, "Kanojotachi" no rengō sekigun: sabu karuchā to sengo minshushugi (Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1996).
(JRA), under the leadership of Mori Tsuneo, and the Revolutionary Left Faction (Kakusa), led by Nagata Hiroko. Both groups were far-left and operated underground by 1971. Members of the JRA had hijacked an airplane to North Korea in 1970, and other members had left Japan for Lebanon in 1971, where they linked up with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). JRA had money, also, from a series of bank and post office robberies. Kakusa had weapons obtained by robbing a gun shop in 1971. The URA formed out of a mutual desire to pool these resources and wage armed revolution in Japan, but significant differences marked the two sects: differences of class (the JRA boasted mostly middle-class youth, while Kakusa attracted the working-class students of technical colleges), ideology (the internationalism of JRA countered Kakusa's Maoism-inflected nationalism), and different activist cultures. Nagata based her criticism of Toyama on Kakusa's more explicit gender program, in which female members were to prioritize their identities as revolutionaries over their identities as women. In doing so, she touched on issues never discussed in the JRA. Toyama could not articulate a satisfactory response to Nagata, and Mori Tsuneo interpreted the incident as a call to ensure all members had overcome personal weaknesses and revolutionized from within. This eventually escalated into the torture and death of twelve of the young people—four of them female—at the hands of their friends and comrades. Patricia Steinhoff has described the stages by which what began as a consciousness-raising exercise became a deadly endeavor in her scholarly effort to understand URA members as humans, rather than the anomalous monsters the mass media made them out to be. In her account, Mori bears a great deal of responsibility for the intensification of efforts to "communalize" URA members.

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8 Ibid., 199.
In journalistic reports, however, no one came across as more monstrous than Nagata Hiroko, and the "Toyama incident" became in many cases a story of her female jealousy. Nagata, described by journalists as ugly, manly, and—they speculated—infertile attacked Toyama Mieko because Toyama represented a femininity unattainable to Nagata. A full accounting of the whole United Red Army incident, from the purge itself and the final confrontation between the police and five surviving male members on the run, to the media coverage that followed, goes beyond my current project. However, my research illuminates aspects of the misogyny that marked the URA. JRA leader Mori Tsuneo clearly feared the difference that marked women's bodies, at one point declaring his disgust for menstruation. The group assembled in the mountain lodge attempted to disrupt all kinship ties, and literally attacked the body of the soon-to-be mother among them, discussing how to separate the eight-month fetus from its "unrevolutionary" mother to raise it as a child of the revolution. When five male URA members armed with guns faced off against over fifteen hundred riot police in what became a massive media spectacle named for the mountain lodge, Asama Sansō, in which they holed up and took a housewife hostage, the police attempted to lure them out with the would-be revolutionaries' mothers. One young man shot at his mother. These events demonstrated also the power of the televised spectacle in Japan by 1972. If ever there was a single media event that unified the Japanese nation, this was it: "almost the entire nation" witnessed the final arrest of the radicals and rescue of the hostage

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9 Director Wakamatsu Kōji's 2007 film, United Red Army (Rengō seigun), replicates this dynamic. Wakamatsu, famous for his leftist convictions and vast directorial experience in soft-core pornography, portrays Nagata Hiroko as a particularly brutal villainess fit for a horror film.


This violent and masculine stand against state authority offered the extreme fringe of the New Left maximum public exposure, definitively associating leftist activism with violence. But it was the news of the internal purge, which emerged in March 1972, that truly marked the death of popular support for the New Left in general. The URA purge was not the only instance of sectarian violence, although most New Left infighting pitted rival sects against each other. Altogether, more students clashed with other students than they did with the police. Between 1968 and 1975, in the 1,776 internal factional disputes severe enough to merit police attention, 44 young people died and 4,848 more suffered injuries. The blood feud between the far-left sects Kakumaru and Chûkaku lasted for decades, but generally received less coverage than the actions of the URA. Part of this reflects the deep silence, sometimes forced upon former activists with threats of violence, surrounding issues of factional violence in the New Left after 1972. One former activist told me about menacing calls he received on his home phone for many years after he left a far-left sect. He felt that they silenced not only his words, but prevented him from even being able to think about what had happened. However, the fact that the figure of Nagata Hiroko could so easily fit an emerging narrative about the dangers of women in positions of power certainly contributed to the infamy of her leadership and of the URA in general.

The violence conducted by the women of the URA under leadership shared by a woman threatened to smear all feminist activism in the 1970s. While Setsu Shigematsu's research explores efforts by radical women's lib activists, who attempted to use the occasion to understand the potential for female violence, many more feminists in the 1970s distanced themselves from

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13 Shigematsu, *Scream from the Shadows*, 142.


15 Kanô Akihiro, July 28, 2011.
New Left violence and the figure of Nagata Hiroko in particular. Ueno Chizuko, who later became a professor at Tokyo University and an prominent academic feminist, described her reaction as a young woman to the news of the URA purge: it convinced her that collective action was impossible. More conservative women intellectuals, dismissing the political gains of radical women's lib, continue to emphasize a completely non-confrontational history of female activism. Feminism never lost the taint of violence it gained in the early 1970s through associations both real and imaginary with groups like the URA. As Setsu Shigematsu points out, the mass media quickly exposed any ties between URA members and women's lib activists, suggesting that the feminist movement contained a deadly potential similar to that of the far-left sect. This conflation of feminist activism with far-left terrorism challenged the goals of radical women's liberation activists worldwide in the 1970s. As an example, a 9 January 1978 article in The New York Times paraphrased a female criminologist on the rise of women in far-left groups such as the Red Army Faction in West Germany, the Weather Underground in the United States, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to interpret "terrorist activity as [a] deviant expression of feminism." In the context in which feminists risked popular condemnation for radical activism, which by the 1970s was a global discourse, the choice on the part of many women's groups to insist upon an essentially "nurturing" feminine nature makes

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18 Shigematsu, Scream from the Shadows, 149.
sense. In contemporary Japan, popular stereotypes of women's lib continue to define feminism as "radical and harsh" or "radical and overpowering."\(^\text{20}\)

However, the ideal of feminine nurturance can also become part of cultures of violence. The *New York Times* article on female terrorists included mention not of Nagata Hiroko, but of another Japanese woman involved in far-left extremism, Shigenobu Fusako, who in the late 1970s headed the faction of Japan Red Army members that had hooked up with the PFLP in Lebanon. In May 1971, this faction of the JRA organized an attack on Lod Airport in Tel Aviv that launched the Japan Red Army and Shigenobu into the international arena of violent spectacle and terrorist fame. The JRA that relocated to the Middle East was careful to distinguish itself from the purge of the URA in 1972, and Shigenobu's public persona offered a dramatic contrast with Nagata's. Shigenobu was attractive and feminine; *The Observer* described her in 1974 as "the lady terrorist with white gloves," less a "cold theoretician" than a "political tender heart."\(^\text{21}\) The "pre-battle ceremony" conducted by the JRA under Shigenobu's guidance in the 1970s included a verbal oath delivered to a surrogate "mother and father" in a move that reformulated, rather than attempted to destroy, kinship ties.\(^\text{22}\) Shigenobu also portrayed herself as a manifestation of a self-consciously feminine revolutionary subjectivity. In her 1973 televised interview with Yamaguchi Yoshiko, Shigenobu spoke in unfailingly polite and feminine Japanese, brushing her long straight hair back from her modestly smiling face.\(^\text{23}\) A photograph of Shigenobu dressed in a cotton kimono and beaming at her cherubic baby girl, Mei, decorates her


\(^\text{23}\) Yamaguchi Yoshiko became famous as a star of Manchuria Film Productions as Li Xianglan (Ri Köran), and had performed in the United States as Shirley Yamaguchi, before she embarked on her career as a television journalist. “Shigenobu Fusako: Nikkōki hajakku no shinsō kataru,” 3-ji no anata (Fuji Terebi, 14 August 1973).
slim memoir, written after her 2000 arrest. Nagata may have been terrifying for her "unfeminine" violent leadership, but Shigenobu terrifies as a femme fatale. If Nagata's mistake was attempting to outdo men's masculine poses of violence, Shigenobu represents the deadly combination of femininity and violence.

Indeed, the emergence of Shigenobu's brand of feminine global terrorism alongside women's liberation, both sprung from the ashes of the decimated New Left in Japan, undergird a powerful postwar narrative: that men, already the losers in the Fifteen-Year War, lost again in the wake of the defeat of radical activism. As the editor in chief of Japan's premier English-language newspaper, The Japan Times, put it in a 1971 article on women's lib, "there is little from which women of Japan need to be liberated. This has been, in fact, an age of 'female supremacy' and if anyone needs liberation, it is the downtrodden, browbeaten men of Japan." In his view, Mishima Yukio's suicide affirmed a kind of postwar "men's liberation:" Mishima "died to restore masculinity for Japanese men." Statements like this affirm the postwar Japanese saw that, "After the War, only stockings and women got stronger." In some cases, the representative of the dissolved "great cause" of leftist activism in Japan becomes the young girl (shōjo). In a recent collection of the New Left journal Tōku made yukunda... (Going Far), the commentary concluding the volume of late-1960s essays is a contemporary meditation on, "What is the Party, Who is the Young Girl?" It traces a line between the dissolution of the unified left under the "Party" to the fragmented subcultures of contemporary Japan, as represented by the "young girl-ization" of postwar (and "postmodern") Japan. This interpretation echoes the work of comic book editor and social critic Ōtsuka Eiji, who has written on the general "Young-Girl-ization" of

24 Fusako Shigenobu, Ringo ki no shita de anata o umō to kimeta (Tokyo: Gentōsha, 2001).
various aspects of postwar Japanese culture, from the Emperor to the literary critic Etô Jun. Ōtsuka's interpretation of the URA purge, for example, centers around the radicals' attempts to eliminate any element of "cuteness."26

My project illustrates and analyzes how the postwar New Left in Japan, in practices and perceptions, perpetuated a gendered dichotomy that ultimately failed to question social class and its relation to politics. In examining how young women played various roles in the ostensibly "male" student movement, I show the interplay between ideas of femininity and masculinity and how they influenced perceptions and practices of the postwar student movement. However, I'd also like to underscore that the exceptionalizing of gender that took place within the New Left undermined left politics in Japan as well. The New Left's increasing insularity and stress on cultivating a street-combat subjectivity aligned with an emphasis on masculine homosociality. In light of recent street demonstrations in Tokyo to protest government handling of the ongoing nuclear crisis at Fukushima Daiichi and Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's administration's moves to flex the Japanese state's authority in military matters abroad, my story also offers a critical intervention. As the increasing numbers of memoirs documenting the "Zenkyōtō generation" line bookstore shelves in Japan, many of them express nostalgia for earlier struggles. I hope that my history invites more historical critiques, rather than romantic rehabilitations.

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