2013 Reports
Incentive Pay and Performance: Insider Econometrics in a Multi-Unit Firm
We exploit organizational reforms in a foreign-owned bank in Central-East Europe to study the implementation of modern HRM policies in an emerging market context. We have branch-level data and use our knowledge of the process that led to the adoption of the reforms to implement two estimators that address endogeneity bias in a complementary fashion: an IV approach and Generalized Propensity Score estimation. Our results show that some of the reforms had a positive impact on productivity, but they also underscore the risks of quantity-based incentives where quality is important.
Files
- WP_10_-_Bogaard_Svejnar.pdf application/pdf 1.27 MB Download File
More About This Work
- Academic Units
- Center on Global Economic Governance
- Center for Development Economics and Policy
- Series
- CDEP-CGEG Working Papers, 10
- Published Here
- March 17, 2016