Academic Commons

Articles

Pork Versus Public Goods: An Experimental Study of Public Good Provision Within a Legislative Bargaining Framework

Fr├ęchette, Guillaume R.; Kagel, John H.; Morelli, Massimo

We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: there is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the "mixed" region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods. As in past experiments, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory.

Files

Also Published In

Title
Economic Theory
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0611-0

More About This Work

Academic Units
Political Science
Published Here
November 23, 2011
Academic Commons provides global access to research and scholarship produced at Columbia University, Barnard College, Teachers College, Union Theological Seminary and Jewish Theological Seminary. Academic Commons is managed by the Columbia University Libraries.