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Bidding with Securities

Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo

Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005, henceforth DKS) analyzed auctions in which bidders compete in securities. They show that a steeper security leads to a higher expected revenue for the seller, and also use this to establish the revenue ranking between standard auctions. In this comment, we obtain the opposite results to DKS's by assuming that a higher return requires a higher investment cost. Given this latter assumption, steeper securities are more vulnerable to adverse selection, and may yield lower expected revenue, than flatter ones.

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Academic Units
Economics
Publisher
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Series
Department of Economics Discussion Papers, 0809-10
Published Here
March 28, 2011
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