Ethnoconfessional Nationalism in the Balkans: Analysis, Manifestations and Management

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
2013
ABSTRACT

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For at least the past two hundred years, ethnoconfessional nationalism has been the most powerful ideology and force shaping political and social developments in southeastern Europe. This dissertation argues that Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism is such an important element in southeastern Europe because it is a collective, chronic and non-economic phenomenon which transcends other political ideologies, generations, or socio-economic classes. As such, conventional Marxist-based approaches to understanding the phenomenon of nationalism, and their intellectual descendants such as the more materially-based forms of social constructivism and instrumentalism, consistently fail to both understand and predict its appeal and success in southeastern Europe. The dissertation concludes by arguing that there are severe limitations to the extent to which outsiders can manage the outcome of ethnoconfessional conflicts; hence, in terms of policy prescriptions, the analysis provided in this dissertation argues for a cautious and modest understanding of the extent to which intervention by the international community can transform Balkans states and societies.
# Table of Contents

## Acknowledgements

Acknowledgements: iv

## Dedication

Dedication: v

### Chapter I. The Problem and a Proposed Explanation


### Chapter II: Alternative Explanations

I: Introduction, 59; II: Elite-based Theories, 60; III: Modernism and Balkan Nationalism, 86; IV: Rationalist and Economic Explanations, 97; V: Conclusions, 119.

### Chapter III: Three Theses on Balkan Ethnoconfessional Nationalism


### Chapter IV: The Ethnoconfessional Disintegration of the Western Balkans: Historical Narrative and Empirical Evidence

Chapter V: Nations Making States

I: On Elites and Institutions, 275; II: Microcase Study 1: Serbia, 283; III: Microcase Study 2: Nationalisms in Bosnia & Herzegovina, 288; IV: Microcase Study 3: Macedonianism, 301; V. Microcase Study 4: Alexander’s Integral Yugoslavism, 308; VI: Conclusions, 314.

Chapter VI: Policy Implications


SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY: 398

APPENDIX: 425

-----1910 Bosnia-Herzegovina Sabor (Parliament) Elections
-----1921 Ratification Vote of Vidovdan Constitution
-----1974 Josifovski Study on Ethnic Distance in Polog District, Macedonia
-----1990 Bosnian Elections
-----August-September 1990 Krajina Serb Referendum on Autonomy
-----December 1990 Slovenian Plebiscite on Independence
-----December 1990 Serbian Parliamentary Elections
-----May 1991 Croatian Referendum on Sovereignty
-----September 1991 Macedonian Referendum on Independence
-----September 1991 Kosovo Independence Referendum
-----October 1991 Sandžak referendum on political and cultural autonomy
-----November 1991 Public Opinion Survey on Sustainability of BiH
-----January 1992 Albanian Referendum on “Illyria”
-----March 1992 Preševo Valley Referendum on Unification with Kosovo
-----February 1992 Bosnia-Herzegovina Referendum on Independence
-----April 1998 USIA Public Opinion Surveys in Bosnia & Herzegovina
-----1999 Serb Vote on International Mediation in Kosovo
-----November 2000 Herceg-Bosna Referendum on Autonomy within BiH
-----April 2002 Montenegro Public Opinion Survey
-----October 2004 Kosovo Parliamentary Elections (Serb Boycott)
-----July 2005 BiH Public Opinion Survey on Formation of a Croat Entity
-----September 2005 RS Public Opinion Survey on RS secession/unification with Serbia
-----May 2006 Montenegrin Independence Referendum Analysis of Voting by Municipality
-----February 2007 Serbian parliament vote on Ahtisaari Plan
-----April-June 2007 Kosovo Early Warning Report
-----June 2007 Greek Public Opinion Survey on FYROM name issue
-----October 2007 Macedonian Constitutional Court Decision on Flag Displays
-----February 2010 Gallup Balkan Monitor survey on “Greater Albania”
-----July 2010 Public Opinion Survey on Macedonia Name Issue
-----July 2010 Gallup Balkan Monitor survey on Kosovo Independence
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For the friendship, collegial support, and intellectual inspiration they have provided to me over the years, I would like to thank Jeffrey K. Amann, Dominique Arel, Eduardo Ayala, Karen Barkey, Volker Berghahn, Sumantra Bose, Vangelis Calotychos, Kerry Capell, Amy Christen, Alexander Cooley, David Crowe, Istvan Deak, the late Professor Edwin Fedder, Jan Frantzen, Shpetim Gashi, Ingrid Gerstmann, Joel Glassman, Radmila Gorup, Robert Greenberg, Stephanie Grepo, Alex N. Grigorev-Roinishvili, Kevin Hallinan, Robert Hayden, Mary Hines, Kevin Eric Laney, Robert Legvold, Fr. John Anthony McGuckin, John Micgiel, Zoran Milutinovic, Lincoln Mitchell, Neni Panourgia, Fredrick S. Pearson, Roger Petersen, Deena Reyes, J. Martin Rochester, the late Professor Joseph Rothschild, Sherrill Stroschein, Aristotle Tziampiris, Elizabeth Kridl-Valkenier, Mitja Velikonja, Lana Vierdag, Mark Von Hagen, Dean Vuletic, Susan L. Woodward, and the many other people whose love, support and encouragement made this dissertation possible.

I wish to express my particular thanks to the members of my dissertation committee, Timothy Frye, Macartan Humphreys, Kimberly Marten, Alexander Motyl, and Jack Lewis Snyder.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Radmila, my wife, Katsiaryna, to the memory of my father, Emil, to Mr. Robert Baumann, Professor Joyce Marie Mushaben, Professor Jack Lewis Snyder, and all of my other friends and colleagues, with heartfelt and constant gratitude.

I would also like to express a long-unpaid debt of gratitude to an old generation of Yugoslav immigrants in St. Louis, Missouri, many now long dead, whose tales of village life and wartime adventures sparked a little boy’s imagination, and led him on a lifelong pursuit of all things Balkan.
Chapter I

The Problem and a Proposed Explanation

The state makes the nation.
Josef Pilsudski

Nations are created and abolished by God, and not by ministers or dictators.
Only what springs up from the people can be long-lasting.
Vladko Maček

The attempt, through the use of state power, to create in the shortest possible time a Yugoslav nationalism that would suffocate Serbian and Croatian nationalism—did not succeed.
Slobodan Jovanović

We have up until now tried everything possible to maintain Yugoslavia: first it was a unitary state, then it became a federation, and now we are moving towards a confederation. If even that does not succeed, then it only remains for us to admit that the Comintern was right when it claimed that Yugoslavia was an artificial creation, and that we—Yugoslav communists—had made a mistake.
Eduard Kardelj

I. The Problem of Ethnoconfessional Nationalism

The dominant force in Balkan politics and society for the past 200 years has been ethnoconfessional nationalism. Some one hundred years ago, it led to the breakup of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, and sparked the beginning of the First World War. In the 1990s, it has led to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the wars accompanying its breakup. For the past two decades, trying to control its often violent manifestations has been a major focus of international attention. Former U.S. president Bill Clinton called the war in Bosnia “the most

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1 Precisely which countries belong to “the Balkans” is controversial among scholars, with some now preferring the term “southeastern Europe.” Traditionally, “the Balkans” have referred to Europe south and east of the Drava and Danube rivers, hence including all of present-day Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey west of the Bosphorus, and all of the former Yugoslavia. For the purposes of this dissertation, the two terms will be used interchangeably.
frustrating and complex foreign policy issue in the world today,” and Secretary of State Warren Christopher famously called the Bosnian war “a problem from hell.” In terms of the resources devoted trying to ameliorate, control, and contain Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism, Bosnia & Herzegovina has received more financial assistance per capita than was allocated to any country in Europe under the Marshall Plan, and as of 2006, NATO countries had devoted 25 times more troops and 50 times more money to Kosovo per capita than to their efforts in Afghanistan. Yet despite these considerable expenditures of time, treasure, and effort, a blue-ribbon international panel in 2004 noted that the state- and nation-building efforts in the Balkans remained as close to failure as they were to success. More recent analyses have been equally pessimistic.

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3 Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher made these remarks during a visit to Capitol Hill on 18 May 1993, as reported by National Public Radio’s *All Things Considered*, 18 May 1993.


This presents a puzzle for both a considerable body of academic theory and for international policy towards the Balkans, as well as other areas of the world confronting similar problems: namely, why is ethnoconfessional nationalism such a powerful political and social force, despite the considerable efforts made in trying to control it?

II. The Argument in Brief

The answer to this puzzle lies in the fact that the ontological assumptions of the two dominant theoretical approaches (among both scholars and policymakers) attempting to explain and manage ethnoconfessional nationalism—constructivist and rationalist/instrumentalist theories based on the primacy of politics, on the role of elites or institutions in “constructing” ethnic identities and inciting interethnic violence, on the ultimate fluidity and malleability of individual identities, and/or the economic and material bases of nationalism—are fundamentally flawed. Thus, where constructivist and rationalist explanations stress the role of elites and institutions, this dissertation will argue that the problem is mass-based, insofar as numerous Balkan cases reveal that it is identities that shape institutions as opposed to the standard political science explanation that institutions determine identities; instead of the stress on political elites, I point to the widespread “naturally occurring diversity”\(^8\) obvious in ethnoconfessional nationalist movements, and where constructivist and rationalist explanations stress the importance of economic interests over ethnoconfessional identities and loyalties, I argue that in many Balkan

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\(^8\) The phrase “naturally occurring diversity” is used by filmmaker Ken Burns to describe the large number of Americans from many different social categories—men and women, African-American, Native American, Hispanic, and Caucasian, republicans and democrats, etc., who all contributed to the creation of the U.S. National Park system. The “naturally occurring diversity” of people involved in Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalist efforts will be discussed in more detail in Chapter II; here, however, it bears noting that on the basis of the many books and articles discussing the phenomenon in the 1990s, the following groups have been involved: thugs, criminals, journalists, historians, priests, émigrés, politicians, musicians, soldiers, secret agents, terrorists, artists, and painters. Several other categories could easily be included as well.
cases identities have more frequently determined interests, and that human motivations other than material gain have demonstrably proven more important in determining the course and outcome of political conflict.

This dissertation argues that the particular strength of ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans is based on the overlap of two independent variables. The first is psychological and social—the universal human tendency to identify with particular groups, most importantly with an ethnic group or nation. The second independent variable is historical and structural—the impact the Ottoman millet system has had on Balkan political culture. The overlap of these two variables explains both why ethnoconfessional nationalism has been such a persistent feature of Balkan history, and its specific characteristics and manifestations. The dissertation will then propose an alternative way of understanding the phenomenon and argue that ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans has three main characteristics—it is collective, chronic, and non-economic. Understood in this way, the dissertation will then go on to show why various constructivist nation- and state-building projects in southeastern Europe over the past 150 years have repeatedly failed, and propose a set of policymaking options for dealing with ethnoconfessional nationalism consistent with the understanding of the phenomenon provided herein.

The standard storyline of constructivist and rationalist/instrumentalist theories of nationalism and identity-formation holds that individual identities are fluid, malleable, and endogenous to politics, that elites manipulate these identities in ways that enhance their own power (or, alternatively, that institutions can mold these identities in ways conducive to purposes of the
state), and that to a significant degree nationalism and the ethnic-identity formation process can be explained by group competition for resources and the interest-maximizing benefits of particulars forms of identification.⁹

Yet a considerable amount of evidence suggests serious problems with each of these explanations. First, identities are actually not as fluid and malleable as constructivists and rationalists suggest.¹⁰ Even in Western Europe and the US, for instance, a substantial majority of individuals maintains the religious affiliations they inherited from their families,¹¹ and several generations of families maintain their distinct ethnic or religious heritages.¹² Identities, moreover, become good predictors of political loyalties. Thus, since 1945 between 60-90 percent of Jewish-Americans have consistently voted Democratic,¹³ as has been true of African-Americans as well.

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¹⁰ As Keith Darden notes, “the empirical basis upon which [the theoretical position regarding the fluidity of identity] rests is precarious, particularly with regard to national identities. The national identity of individuals on a given territory—their perceived bonds to a broader community which they believe to enjoy a natural right to self-rule (sovereignty)—is remarkably and universally stable over time, and national loyalties have proven to be quite durable . . . Empirically, national identity seems remarkably fixed . . . Under a variety of very adverse conditions, national loyalties have proven remarkably durable.” See Darden, “The Causes and Consequences of Enduring National Loyalties,” draft manuscript, Chapter 1, 4-6.


In southeastern Europe, what L. S. Stavrianos has called “the preservation of ethnic groups” has been even more pronounced; thus, the Balkan experience suggests that for a significant majority of people—i.e., anywhere from two-thirds to ninety percent—ethnoconfessional identities are fixed, unidimensional, and exogenous to politics. In this view, culture and society play much more independent and important roles in determining identities. Thus, the role of political elites in the identity formation process is significantly less important than constructivist and rationalist theories maintain. This is why it is more accurate to say that in the Balkans the nation has been making the state, rather than vice versa.

In contrast to constructivist and rationalist theories of nationalism and ethnic-identity formation arguing that ethnic groups are the social engineering products of interest-maximizing elites that result in “imagined communities,” I argue that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a mass-based, and, consequently, much more complex phenomenon. In this view, ethnoconfessional nationalism is a phenomenon so widespread and pervasive that it is best understood as what William H. Sewell has termed an “ideological formation” which is “anonymous, collective, and transpersonal.”


17 See Sewell, “Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case,” The Journal of Modern History 57 (March 1985), 60-61. Along similar lines, Motyl has argued that it is perfectly logically possible for “national ‘self-awareness’ . . . to be generated ‘unconsciously’ by the force of numerous cumulative acts with unintended
As a collective phenomenon, I demonstrate that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a sentiment or emotion that consistently draws the support of two-thirds to ninety percent of a specific ethnic group or nation, and that one’s ethnoconfessional background determines (or at least significantly influences) an individual’s beliefs and behavior on a wide range of issues: voting preferences, choice of marriage partner, settlement patterns, etc. Furthermore, ethnoconfessional nationalism is a phenomenon that unites ideologically-dissimilar individuals from across the political spectrum horizontally and vertically as well, thereby undermining the usually posited dichotomy of elites and masses, or between classes.

The Balkan experience also suggests that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a chronic phenomenon, insofar as it has been a more or less constant feature of Balkan and/or East Central European politics. As Daniel Chirot has pointed out, a striking feature of East Central Europe’s 20th century history is the fact that almost all of the competing nationalist problems have either persisted, or have ultimately been resolved through the use of violence. This claim is consistent with other studies of civil conflict that have found them exceedingly difficult to resolve through negotiations. In this sense, they can be categorized as “never-ending” conflicts, i.e. civil

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conflicts in which the parties attach roughly equal importance to political dominance. In the Balkans, a comparison of historical case studies related to Bosnia, Kosovo, or the former Yugoslavia more generally with contemporary news stories bears this point out, as the same issues and problems these areas were dealing with in the 19th century regarding the division of power between ethnic groups, control over territory, and the appropriate forms of state organization remain acute problems today. There is, moreover, a demonstrable historical continuity (examined in Chapter III) to efforts by Albanians, Croats, Serbs and others to create their own “greater” national states. Importantly, even during politically quieter times these goals or tendencies have not been eliminated; instead, such relative calm was more the result of what Timur Kuran has called “preference falsification under conditions of oppression,” or what

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19 Dmitriy Gershenson and Herschel I. Grossman, “Civil Conflict: Ended or Never Ending?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (December 2000), 805-822. Similarly, Albert Hirschman has argued that disputes over national or religious identities frequently become “either/or” conflicts, or “non-divisible” conflicts. (This is discussed in more detail in Chapter III, section 3.) See Hirschman, “Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Economy,” Political Theory 22, 203-18.


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Hudson Meadwell has called a “strategic expression of preferences,” then to ethnoconfessional nationalism’s total disappearance.

Understanding ethnoconfessional nationalism as a chronic phenomenon sometimes hidden by preference falsification or strategic expressions of preference thus explains what de Figueredo and Weingast have described as one of the fundamental puzzles of the ethnification of politics, namely, how to explain the often sudden eruption of ethnic violence, especially after long periods of apparent peace.

By non-economic, I argue that ethnoconfessional nationalism is based on “non-rational” roots: emotional, psychological, or sentimental loyalties and attachments to one’s ethnoconfessional group, rather than on calculations interest-maximizing individuals make regarding their personal economic welfare. Many rationalist and instrumentalist explanations for nationalism, for instance, reveal what Joseph Rothschild once called the “intellectually facile and politically


26 Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict, 46.
unsound” belief that “ethnicity can be compartmentalized and prevented from contaminating those ‘essential’ areas of modern economic and political life that require ‘rational’ universalistic behavior and values.”

Thus, while many constructivist and rationalist explanations for nationalism start from the Marxist premise that existence determines consciousness, they fail to account for the possibility that an individual’s identity can just as easily determine her economic interests. Moreover, the excessive economic determinism of many rationalist and materialist explanations for ethnoconfessional nationalism often deny the possibility (indeed, reality) that individuals can be motivated by different things to different extents. Ashutosh Varshney, for instances, argues that individuals exhibit both “value rationality” in which behavior is based on conscious ethical, aesthetic or religious beliefs which operate regardless of whether there is a prospect for the success of such behavior (and can “consciously embrace great personal sacrifices”), and “instrumental rationality” which, according to Varshney, “entails a strict cost-

27 See Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 25-26. Evidence for Rothschild’s claim can be found in a recent study from Germany, for instance, which showed that cultural preferences are the most powerful predictor of migration patterns within the country. See Falck, Heblich, Lameli, and Südekum, “Dialects, Cultural Identity, and Economic Exchange,” (Berlin: Institute for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper no. 4743), February 2010. As the authors note (pp. 3-4), “cultural differences at the regional level are persistent over time and have long-lasting causal effects on economic behavior, such as migration decisions.” These findings mirror similar demographic movements in the former Yugoslavia; this will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter IV.

benefit calculus with respect to goals, necessitating the abandonment or adjustment of goals if the costs of realizing them are too high.”

This, in turn, explains the second of the fundamental puzzles related to the ethnification of politics, i.e., why individuals and groups engage in violent conflict when cooperation has greater economic payoffs. Understood as a non-economic phenomenon, ethnoconfessional nationalism is about more than group struggles for economic resources. The claim will be demonstrated through analysis of numerous historical and contemporary political issues in which the respective actors clearly choose non-economically rational courses of action.

The argument that ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans is a collective and chronic phenomenon has an important implication for political science insofar as it supports the view that for the purposes of most political analysis ethnic groups can indeed be considered unitary political actors, even across generations. Chapter’s IV and V support this claim by providing evidence of both the mass-based nature of the nation- and state building projects in southeastern Europe over the past two-hundred years, and the continuity of political goals the various ethnic groups have had in the region. Chapter VI will then summarize this analysis by suggesting what

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29 Ashutosh Varshney, “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality,” [www.apsanet.org](http://www.apsanet.org) (March 2003), Vol. 1/No. 1, 85-99. Along similar lines, Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod argue that “sacred values,” i.e., concern for the welfare of one’s family and country, or commitment to one’s religion, to honor, or to justice, can drive behavior in ways that disassociated from their ultimate prospects for success, and are often considered to be absolute and inviolable. See Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod, “Reframing Sacred Values,” *Negotiation Journal* (July 2008), 221-246.

the practical, policy-making implications are of such an understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism.

III. Defining Ethnoconfessional Nationalism

Defining terms such as “nations” and “nationalism” has been a difficult proposition. With regard to the term nationalism itself, Ernest Gellner provided the most commonly cited definition, according to which nationalism is the political principle which holds that political and cultural units should be congruent. John Breuilly has provided another widely accepted definition, according to which nationalism is a specifically political phenomenon. Both Gellner and Breuilly are modernists, in that they both consider nationalism a post-1789 phenomenon.

The primary problem with such definitions is that the dividing line they draw between similar activities and beliefs that existed before that date rests on a questionable historical assumption: that people living prior to 1789 had no preferences as to whether they would be governed by their own kind as opposed to an alien people speaking an alien tongue, and possessing an alien

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31 As Hugh Seton-Watson once noted, “I am driven to the conclusion that no ‘scientific definition’ of the nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists.” See Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), 5. Similarly, Charles Tilly claimed that the “nation” is “one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon.” Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe, 6. The concept of “identity” is similarly problematic; for instance, Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper have found at least five different uses of the term in the scholarly literature. See Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity’,” Theory and Society 29 (February 2000), 1-47. See also Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001), 399. Such semantic debates extend beyond the social sciences; legal scholars, for instance, have had similar difficulties in agreeing on what constitutes a “minority.” See, for instance, Joseph Marko, “Processes of Ethnic Mobilization in the Former Yugoslav Republics Reconsidered,” Southeastern Europe 34 (2010), 3.


33 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993, 2nd Edition), 1. Thus, according to Breuilly, “To focus upon culture, ideology, identity, class or modernization is to neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics and that politics is about power.”
religion and culture. Yet the historical record suggests quite the opposite, namely, that nationalist sentiment and activity were both theoretically possible and historically evident long before 1789.\textsuperscript{34}

Second, both Gellner’s and Breuilly’s definitions are too restrictive insofar as they limit nationalism to political phenomena, ignoring the fact that social or economic activism can have essentially the same goal or consequences as political nationalism, or that the latter constitutes a logical progression from the former. In fact, nationalists’ demands can quickly change as circumstances permit. As Will Kymlicka notes,

> there seems to be no natural stopping-point to the demands for increasing self-government. If limited autonomy is granted to nationalist leaders, this may simply fuel the ambitions of nationalist leaders, who may be satisfied with nothing short of their own nation-state.\textsuperscript{35}

Thus, movements for greater cultural, educational, or economic rights can rapidly become fully-fledged independence movements if external conditions allow. Obviously, in periods in which great empires were the structural norm in the international system it would have been difficult for people to struggle for smaller, ethnically homogenous, self-governing entities. Yet

\textsuperscript{34} This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter II, but here one example should suffice to prove the point. In \textit{The Peloponnesian War}, Thucydides attributes the following speech to Pericles,

> This land of ours, in which the same people have never ceased to dwell in an unbroken line of successive generations, they by their valor transmitted to our times a free state . . . We live under a form of government which does not emulate the institutions of our neighbors; on the contrary, we are ourselves a model which some follow rather than the imitators of other peoples . . . We have provided for the spirit many relaxations from toil, we have games and sacrifices regularly throughout the year and homes fitted out with good taste and elegance . . .

Thucydides here clearly provides an unambiguous list of all the elements that modernists suggest is a way of thinking that emerged only after 1789: namely, that there is a defined group of people with their own identity, based on their own specific ancestry, living continuously on a specific territory, with their own form of government, and with their own developed cultural practices and rituals. See \textit{The Peloponnesian War}, Book II, xxxvi.

struggles on behalf of greater cultural, educational, or economic rights can be understood as nationalist efforts veiled by strategic expressions of preference that quickly change and become more explicitly political as circumstances warranted. Efforts such as these on behalf of concepts like “Poland,” “Germany,” “Italy,” “Croatia” or “Serbia” made nationalist thought and action on behalf of such entities exist long before the entities themselves did.

A few Balkan examples—one religious, one social and political, one educational, and one economic—illustrate this point. First the religious example: in the late 12th—early 13th century, Sava Nemanjić (popularly known as Saint Sava), the founder of the independent Serbian Orthodox Church and son of Stefan Nemanja, the founder of the medieval Serbian Nemanjić dynasty, began reforming the Orthodox Church’s structure in territories inhabited by Serbs, replacing Greek hierarchs with local Serbs, and ordering that captions under frescoes in churches and monasteries be in Cyrillic rather than in Greek. With the Latin crusader’s capture of Constantinople in 1204, however, and the subsequent weakening of Byzantine power in the Balkans, Sava saw an opportunity to gain even more independence for the Serbian church. His efforts culminated in 1219 when he successfully petitioned the Byzantine emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople to grant autocephaly to the Serbian church. The fact that Sava’s brother Stefan proclaimed himself the first-crowned king of the Serbs should not be seen as a coincidence.

From the social and political realm, in the late 17th-early 18th centuries (i.e., at least 100 years before explanations such as those of Gellner and Breuilly would admit), Serbs in the Habsburg

Monarchy were petitioning Emperor Joseph I for a wide range of canonical, political, cultural, military, and economic rights as a corporate group, albeit their demands fell short of calls for outright independence and fully recognized the lands on which they lived as part of the Habsburg Empire and Joseph I as their rightful sovereign.\textsuperscript{37} A century later, as Peter Sugar points out, “The first of the successful revolutions, the Serbian of 1804, shows quite clearly how the demands of the inhabitants of the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire escalated rapidly from efficient government, to home rule, and finally to the conviction that only independence would satisfy their minimal demands for security of life and property.”\textsuperscript{38}

As a third example, educational initiatives can often similarly serve as nationalist actions. In 2000, the Albanian education minister, Ethem Ruka, called for the development of an Albanian-language grade-school primer that would be used in Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro. According to Ruka, “The unified Albanian-language book would be a cornerstone for national unification.”\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{37} Rajko Veselinović, “Narodnoocrvena i privilegijska pitanja Srba u Habsburškoj monarhiji 1699-1716 godine.” \textit{Istorija Srpskog Naroda}, Vol. IV-1, 39-50. Denying that such efforts were “nationalistic” is in some ways a logical corollary to the common European belief in earlier centuries that the peoples of southeastern Europe had no desire to rule themselves; as J.A.R. Marriott once noted regarding the attitudes of European statesmen during 17th-19th centuries, “That the submerged nationalities of the Balkan peninsula would ever again be in a position to exercise any decisive influence upon the destinies of the lands they still peopled was an idea too remote from actualities to engage even the passing attention of diplomacy.” See Marriott, \textit{The Eastern Question: A Study in European Diplomacy} (London: Oxford University Press, 1917), 5-6.

\textsuperscript{38} Peter Sugar, \textit{Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804} (Seattle: University of Washington Press, ), 208.

\textsuperscript{39} See “Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?” (Tirana/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2005), 6-29. Similarly, one of the grand old men of Balkan politics, former Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov, told the present author in 2003 that the first time it crossed his mind that Yugoslavia would ultimately disintegrate came in 1967 when Croatian scholars repudiated the 1954 Novi Sad agreement which had supported the view that Croatian and Serbian were the same language.
And finally, a more recent example from the economic realm: in 1999, then-Montenegrin president Milo Đukanović’s government abandoned the Yugoslav dinar and adopt the deutsche mark (and subsequently the euro in 2002). Although ostensibly intended to promote economic stability in Montenegro (and thus, not qualifying as a nationalist initiative according to Breuilly’s and Gellner’s definitions), the political consequences of establishing such economic independence from Belgrade were obvious and were fulfilled with Montenegro’s declaration of independence in 2006.

In each of these cases, to claim that these activities were not “nationalist” until the latter, explicitly political stages of the process ignores the fact that ethnic groups adopt a wide variety of tactics, strategies and goals over time to further their ambitions, given their international environment and historical circumstances.40

For these reasons, I propose a different definition—ethnoconfessional nationalism is a sentiment in which a distinct group of people, recognizing themselves as such, strives to accumulate as much political, religious, military, economic, cultural, or educational self-government as possible. Use of the term “ethnoconfessional” is meant to emphasize the fact that, as Milorad Ekmečić has argued, nations in southeastern Europe are based on religious ties rather than linguistic ones.41

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40 These issues will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter II.

41 See Milorad Ekmečić, Radovi iz istorije Bosne i Hercegovine XIX veka (Belgrade 1997), 9-11. It is important to note, however, that use of the term “ethnoconfessional” is not meant to imply that conflict in southeastern Europe is based on differences of theology or a clash of teleological worldviews. Rather, it reinforces the importance that the region’s faiths (Catholicism, Islam, and Orthodoxy) and their respective institutions have had on the secular identities of each of their congregations. These issues will be discussed in more detail in Chapters II and III.
There are several advantages to this definition. First, it does not limit nationalism to a specific period in history, and it does not make the ontological assumption that there has been some great discontinuity in human aspirations before and after 1789 (for which in any case there is no empirical evidence). Activities by an ethnic group or a segment thereof in the Middle Ages to garner more ability to run its own affairs can be admitted to be just as “nationalist” as such efforts explicitly aimed at creating a state in the 19th or 20th centuries.

Second, instead of being surprised by the “explosion” of nationalist movements around the world after 1789, this definition anticipates them; thus, this “explosion” is fully compatible with the ontological assumptions provided above by explicitly recognizing that, *ceteris paribus*, distinctive human collectivities prefer to run their own affairs, and generally always have, not just after 1789. It is also compatible with the understanding that an ethnic group can adopt a wide variety of strategies and tactics geared towards achieving a greater ability to determine its own affairs. If we recognize that ethnic group struggles to gain greater self-determination have been a long-term historical phenomenon, and that ethnic groups’ strategies and tactics to gain such increased self-determination change along with historical circumstances, then Yugoslavia’s breakup in the 1990s is considerably more foreseeable. Moreover, it also increases the predictive capacity of our theoretical understandings of such problems. Just because Slovenes were not openly calling for an independent state in the early 1960s during the Slovenian road-building crisis, for instance, does not mean that this was not a nationalist initiative, or that the Croatian “Declaration” on the independence of the Croatian language in 1967 was not the same.
Moreover, the narrower definition of nationalism, i.e., conscious political action towards gaining a state, somewhat arbitrarily suggests that individuals such as Dobrica Čosić, Franjo Tudjman, or Alija Izetbegović only became nationalists in 1991 or 1992. Common sense, of course, suggests something else, and it is important to note that many actors in these dramas see their actions, or understand history, in terms of the broader definition of nationalism provided above.

There are several logical implications to this definition. First, understanding ethnoconfessional nationalism as a phenomenon manifested in one form or another as far back as the Middle Ages, if not earlier, suggests that it is a belief or attitude shared by numerous generations of a particular group. This supports the claim that it is a chronic phenomenon. Second, the above definition allows for individuals from across the political spectrum to share nationalist ideals, regardless of whether they are loyal imperial subjects, clericalists, fascists, communists, or liberal democrats. It also allows for nationalism to be considered an ideal that can be shared by both elites and the general population. Thus, it can be considered a collective phenomenon. Third, the fact that nationalism is a sentiment shared by individuals from across the political spectrum and across generational divides suggests that there is something inherent in the idea that transcends ordinary political or materialistic ideologies; or, put another way, that it is a non-economic phenomenon. Each of these claims, however, rest on the assumption that we can treat ethnic groups as unitary actors possessing a common will, a thesis that will be tested at various points throughout the dissertation.

42 As early as the 1960s, for instance, Tudjman had already become convinced that an historic “Croat-Serb compromise” would include some division of Bosnia & Herzegovina along the lines of the Cvetković-Maček sporazum of 1939, and that Croatia’s “natural borders” followed the line of the Vrbas and Neretva rivers. See Darko Hudelist, Tudjman: Biografija (Zagreb: Profil International, 2004), 467, 686. In 1969, for instance, Tudjman hosted a visit to Zagreb by Dobrica Čosić at which these issues were discussed.
IV. The Psychological and Social Roots of Ethnoconfessional Nationalism

The most dominant socio-political feature of the modern era is the power and ubiquity of nationalism. Anthony Smith, for instance, has claimed that nations are “indispensable” in the modern world, and that “nothing so clearly marks out the modern era and defines our attitudes and sentiments as national consciousness and nationalist ideology . . . The modern world has become inconceivable and unintelligible without nations and nationalism.” For Benedict Anderson, “nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time.” To Anthony Marx, nationalism “is the central organizing political principle of modern times,” while for Liah Greenfeld, “nationality is the constitutive principle of modernity.” For Ernest Gellner, nationalism (defined as the belief that political and national units should be congruent) is a “necessity” given modern productive techniques and the organization of society they imply. For István Deák, “the creation of nation-states has been so much a part of modern European history as to allow us to call it inevitable.” Tom Nairn, arguing from a Marxist perspective, has claimed that nationalism is “an inescapable phenomenon of modern history.” Hans Kohn claimed that the twentieth century represented “the first period in history in which

44 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 3.
47 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 40.
the whole of mankind has accepted one and the same political attitude, that of nationalism.”

For Miroslav Hroch, once the national movement gained mass support “the process of nation-forming acquired an irreversible character.” For A.J.P. Taylor “The conflict between a supranational dynastic state and the national principle had to be fought to the finish; and so, too, had the conflict between the master and subject nations . . . The national principle, once launched, had to work itself out to its conclusion.” And with specific reference to the Balkans, Sumantra Bose has argued that “historical context and institutional precedent combine to make national-collective identities an inescapable feature of the political landscape.”

Even the academic study of the modern era cannot escape nationalism’s omnipresence. To paraphrase Mark Von Hagen, the geopolitical reality of nationalism has come to be reflected even in the intellectual structures that contemporary academia has built up to organize our thinking about the phenomenon. Thus, constructivism itself is an argument for “the inevitability of ethnicity in modern societies,” and scholars pay comparatively little attention to stateless

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ethnic groups or nations; as Geoff Eley notes, “the faculty of attained statehood is an
*indispensable* condition for historiographical legitimacy.”

The empirical evidence regarding the process of state formation over the past two hundred
years fully supports the above observations. This process has especially picked up pace in recent
years, as the 1990s saw the single greatest burst of new-state creation since decolonization in the
1960s. As Niall Ferguson points out,

> ... one of the great paradoxes of our time is that the economic integration of the
world has coincided with its political disintegration. Excluding sub-Saharan
Africa, there were 64 independent countries in the world in 1871. Forty-three
years later, on the eve of World War I, imperialism had reduced the number to 59. But since World War II, there have been sustained increases. In 1946, there were
74 independent countries; in 1950, 89. By 1995, the number was 192.

Viewed in this historical and comparative context, three points bear stressing. First, what has
been happening in the Balkans over the past two hundred years is fully consistent with European
and world history, and is not the result of some specifically Balkan tendency toward
disintegration and violence. Seen in this light, the nation-building process in southeastern

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57 As John Allcock has noted, “It is only possible to understand the South Slav lands by paying attention to the context within which they are situated. The trajectory of their development needs to be explained in relation to wider processes, involving neighboring states, the Mediterranean region, the continent of Europe as a whole and indeed the world. See Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000) 13, 20. The importance of looking at Balkan history in a comparative way is a crucial point. Much of southeastern Europe’s development has followed a common pattern, making it both difficult and artificial to isolate specific countries, nations, or ethnic groups in one’s analysis. In the nineteenth century, for instance, as Barbara Jelavich points out, “In their internal
Europe should thus be understood as simply a later manifestation of something that has been happening throughout Europe itself over the past few hundred years. As Gale Stokes notes, Remapping state boundaries onto ethnic lines is one of the major threads of post-French Revolutionary European history. The process began with the unifications of Italy and Germany, ran through the creation of new states at the end of World War I, and had its most catastrophic outcomes at the end of World War II with the Holocaust and the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe . . . the wars of Yugoslav succession are not some aberrant Balkan phenomenon; they are the last stages of a process of European redefinition that has been going on since the French revolution.58

Along similar lines, Rogers Brubaker notes that “Everywhere, political space has been reconfigured along putatively national lines.”59

The second point is more theoretical. Given the ubiquity of nationalism, it is difficult to sustain the view that it is some accidental aberration in human affairs caused by small elite groups or “evil leaders.” If nationalism is indeed “inevitable,” “inescapable,” and “indispensable,” then this suggests that nationalist ideologies and nationalist struggles would have emerged and erupted regardless of which leaders or elites were in power. This conclusion, in turn, suggests two things. First, that the phenomenon is more a product of structure than of human agency or contingency. The second is the need to shift the analytical emphasis from the individual level to that of the collective.

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The universality of nationalism suggests that the human condition itself should be taken as an independent variable in understanding its power and ubiquity in politics and society. Put a different way, part of the explanation for the dominance of ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans comes from the universal psychological and social roots of human behavior. Common to human development in all societies is that the process of identity formation begins in early childhood as the infant begins to distinguish between itself and others, and then between others (parents, siblings, neighbors, etc.) considered part of the in-group, and others considered part of the out-group. The powerful role that one’s family background has on forming individual political opinions is clear; thus, for instance, one recent study found that at least fifty percent of an individual’s political ideology seems to result from inherited genetic traits rather than the environmental context in which one is situated; thus, “correlations of social and political attitudes among people with greater or lesser shared genotypes suggest that behaviors are often shaped by forces of which the actors themselves are not consciously aware,” and consequently “To the extent that political ideologies are inherited and not learned, they become more difficult to manipulate.”

As the child grows towards adulthood and the socialization process proceeds, the relevant in-group expands to include aggregations in which the individual’s most immediate in-groups

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61 Joseph Rudolph, for instance, has suggested that the strength of ethnic identities and loyalties lies in “the elemental fact that for most people, socialization in ethnic identity predates the more structured socialization processes encountered in schools and later life.” See Rudolf, *Politics and Ethnicity*, 209.

(family, neighborhood, school, workplace) are embedded. Most commonly, as Donald Horowitz notes, the largest such in-group with which the individual identifies, or the terminal group for attracting an individual’s affective loyalties, becomes the ethnic group or nation.63

Categorization, as takes place when the individual divides the world between in-groups and out-groups, is a key (and universal) part of every individual’s psychological and intellectual development. As Brubaker et. al. note regarding the central importance categorization plays in human thinking and behavior,

> Categories are utterly central to seeing and thinking, but they are equally central to talking and acting. . . Categories structure and order the world for us. We use categories to parse the flow of experience into discriminable and interpretable objects, attributes, and events. Categories permit—indeed, entail—massive cognitive, social, and political simplification. . . . They allow us to see different things—and treat different cases—as the same. They focus our attention and channel our limited energies, leaving us—individuals and organizations alike—free to disattend to “irrelevant” stimuli. They thereby make the natural and social worlds intelligible, interpretable, communicable, and transformable . . . Thus categories underlie not only seeing and thinking but the most basic forms of doing as well, including both everyday action and more complex, institutionalized forms of “doing.”64

Such universal tendencies to categorize ethnic, racial, and national groups has led some scholars to suggest that the tendency may in fact be “grounded in the human cognitive apparatus.”65

Individuals’ identify with groups for a variety of reasons, both affective and instrumental, whether out of a sense of sentimentality towards their in-group, a desire to help the in-group,


65 Ibid., 50.
because it gives them a sense of identity, or because such group identities provide instrumental means for the individual to attain certain material or status/prestige goals. Whatever the reason(s) however, this tendency is so common that one scholar has suggested that “group (not national) identification is a primordial condition.”

Another common human tendency is the development of in-group bias, which has been called “endemic” to the human species. Thus, one tends to favor one’s in-group and to discriminate against, or have negative views, of out-groups. There are varying ways in which individuals can perceive outgroups, however, ranging from the more prejudicial or hostile to the more neutral or even favorable; furthermore, such views are not stable but can vary depending upon context and situation. Such in-group biases, in turn, generate loyalties which differentiate whom in their environment it is appropriate to support and whom to avoid. And such loyalties can foster a consensus among members that becomes self-fulfilling and difficult to change. The stronger the loyalty, the more likely members of a group are to hold similar views and endorse similar strategies. They approach the world in lockstep, perceiving and defining others in the world similarly. There is little, if any, chance for discrepant information to filter through or for reasons to change to be considered.

Importantly, even rationalists accept many of these presuppositions; in rationalist terms, for instance, such in-group biases and the group loyalties and collective self-consciousness they generate helps resolve many collective action problems because it increases cohesion within the...
Identification with a specific group thus generates a tendency to follow the prescribed behavior of that group. This in turn improves the group’s performance in competition with other groups; hence, “There is a reinforcing effect of loyalty and cohesion—groups whose members are loyal perform better, leading the group to become more cohesive and the members more loyal.”

Perceived cultural differences with outgroups, conversely, generate mistrust and less intensive relationships. For instance, a recent study of attitudes among business managers in Europe has shown that individuals trust their fellow countrymen more than foreigners, and that factors such as geographical distance, degree of commonality between languages, the commonality between legal traditions, religious traditions, and the history of conflict between different countries all significantly influence levels of trust European business managers exhibit in other Europeans; moreover, attributing higher levels of trust to culturally-similar groups occurs across economic income levels. Thus, as Guiso et al. note, “cultural effects are not limited to unsophisticated consumers, but are also present among sophisticated professionals such as mutual fund managers.”

There are important social and political implications to the above discussion. On a macro level, political entities whose citizens exhibit higher degrees of in-group loyalty and

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69 Druckman, “Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty,” 56.

70 See Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, “Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 2009), 1098. With respect to the impact of religious commonality, for instance, Guiso et al. show that in a pair of countries in which 90% of the inhabitants are of the same religion, the level of bilateral trust between the two countries increases by a one-quarter standard deviation.
identification should function more efficiently and successfully than those that do not. Thus, political science treatments of this subject, from John Stuart Mill through to Dankwort Rustow, Robert Dahl, and Linz and Stepan have generally concurred that multiethnic or multicultural states are weaker than more ethnically or culturally homogenous ones. As Banerjee, Somanathan, and Iyer argue,

One of the most powerful hypotheses in political economy is the notion that social divisions undermine economic progress, not just in extremis, as in the case of civil war, but also in more normal times. The idea is that even in a market economy there are numerous transactions that rely on the cooperation of others: trade often requires trust, providing public goods needs collective action and the rule of law is only possible if everyone accepts the rights of others. Homogenous societies, it is suggested, have an advantage because there may be more contact across the population, which builds understanding, trust and empathy and shared interests. This makes it more likely that they will all be on the same side. If true, this hypothesis has a number of important implications. Among these is an

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71 In discussing the prerequisites for a successful democratic transition, for instance, Dankwort Rustow noted one single background condition: “national unity.” Thus, “the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.” See Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” in Lisa Anderson, ed., Transitions to Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 26.


73 As Linz and Stepan note, “Under what empirical conditions are the logics of state policies aimed at nation-building and the logics of state policies aimed at crafting democracy congruent? Conflicts between these different policies are reduced when empirically almost all the residents of the state identify with one subjective idea of the nation, and that nation is virtually contiguous with the state. These conditions are met only if there is no significant irredenta outside the state’s boundaries, if there is only one nation existing (or awakened) in the state, and if there is low cultural diversity within the state. Virtually only in these circumstances can leaders of the government simultaneously pursue democratization policies and nation-state policies. Such congruity between the polity and the demos would facilitate the creation of a democratic nation-state. This congruence empirically eliminates most stateness problems and thus should be considered supportive conditions for democratic consolidation.” See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 25.

74 See, for instance, See Zachary Elkins and John Sides, “Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States?” American Political Science Review 101 (November 2007), 693-708. As the nineteenth century liberal John Stuart Mill argued, “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities . . . especially if they read and speak different languages . . . The boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities.” See Mill, Considerations on Representative Government. That this has been a problem with establishing stable democratic polities in the Balkans has long been recognized; thus, with reference to the Balkans specifically, Joseph S. Roucek noted in the 1940s that the Balkans’ “scores of tongues, dialects and religions” resulted in the region suffering from a “handicap of heterogeneity.” See Roucek, Balkan Politics: International Relations in No Man’s Land (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1948), 7.
argument for a high degree of sensitivity to distributional issues since the memory, real or imagined, of having been exploited can create a divide that will continue to hurt the economy many years into the future.\textsuperscript{75}

In this view, ethnically homogeneous groups or areas have more efficient communication networks, or better sanctioning mechanisms against individuals who do not contribute to collective efforts. In Uganda, for instance, Habyarimana, et.al., have found that ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods in Kampala are better at providing public goods than ethnically heterogeneous ones because in the former more homogeneous ethnic groups “possess both norms and networks that facilitate the sanctioning of community members who fail to contribute to collective endeavors.”\textsuperscript{76}

Evidence from Eastern Europe supports similar conclusions. Vachudová and Snyder have argued that in six eastern European states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) the most important determinant of their developmental paths have been what they term “ethnic nationalism.” According to the authors, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are examples of states that have not exhibited high levels of ethnic nationalism; Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia have.\textsuperscript{77} The latter, of course, have significantly higher numbers of ethnic


\textsuperscript{76} See James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?” \textit{American Political Science Review} 101 (November 2007), 721-22. Another recent cross-national study of fifty-one countries showed that ethnic minorities are ten times less likely to identify with the state than ethnic majorities. Importantly, grievances over the level of autonomy a group enjoys were shown to matter more than other political, cultural or economic grievances. See Elkins and Sides, “Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States?” op. cit. For a useful review of the links between ethnic heterogeneity and democracy, see Benjamin Reilly, “Democracy, Ethnic Fragmentation, and Internal Conflict: Confused Theories, Faulty Data, and the ‘Crucial Case’ of Papua New Guinea,” \textit{International Security} 25 (Winter 2000/2001), 162-166.

\textsuperscript{77} See Vachudová and Snyder, “Are Transitions Transitory? Two Types of Political Change in Eastern Europe Since 1989,” \textit{East European Politics and Societies} 11 (Winter 1997), 1-35. It is also important to note the potential danger ethnic cleavages pose even in what are generally considered (although perhaps erroneously) Balkan success stories. In Bulgaria, for instance, one analyst has argued that “those who believe that during 17 years of transition to
minorities, while the former more monoethnic states have been the postcommunist success stories.

In fact, throughout post-1989 East Central Europe, the more ethnically homogenous states have been more successful in adopting the political, legal, and economic reforms required for European Union accession than the more ethnically heterogeneous ones. For instance, in the twelve countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, the “state-nation’s” percentage of the population is 82.5%. By way of comparison, Table 1 points out the comparative percentages for three Balkan states that are considered to be far behind in their efforts to adopt the political and economic reforms required for EU integration.

democracy Bulgaria has bridged the gaps between its ethnic groups on the basis of new democratic values and beliefs in human rights are deluding themselves. What has happened over these years is the opposite; the ethnic groups are further apart than ever.” See Albena Shkodrova, “Ethnic Groups in Bulgaria Are More Apart Than Many Believe,” BIRN Balkan Insight, 17 July 2007, available at: http://www.birn.eu.com/en/93/10/3622/?ILStart=20
Similarly, Bernd Rechl has noted that the notion of a unique “Bulgarian ethnic model” that has supposedly transcended the ethnic problems typical of other parts of East Central Europe suffers from several problems: “the continued, but poorly acknowledged, existence of racism, discrimination and socio-economic exclusion; the almost complete absence of positive minority rights; and the electoral support of nationalist parties . . . for many years, even the existence of minorities was not acknowledged in the state. . . The right to free ethnic self-expression has been denied to Pomaks and Macedonians . . . post-communist Bulgaria has adopted constitutional and legal provisions aimed at preventing the political participation of minorities.” See Rechel, “The ‘Bulgarian Ethnic Model’—Reality or Ideology?” Europe-Asia Studies 59 (November 2007), 1201-1215.
Table 1: Ethnic Homogeneity by “State-Nation’s” Percentage of the Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2006 estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New EU member average</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 reveals the fundamental empirical problems facing many of the Balkan states. Nation-building and democratization are, as Linz and Stepan have pointed out, conceptually different enterprises, and democratization is significantly complicated when a state has a large ethnic irredenta outside its borders, when a state has high levels of cultural diversity within its border, or when a state has more than one large “awakened” ethnic group.

The difficulties that ethnic irredenta, awakened ethnic groups, and high levels of cultural diversity pose are of course most clearly in evidence in the continuing instability facing southeastern Europe’s remaining multiethnic states. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, for instance, public opinion polls over the past several years have consistently shown that sizeable majorities of Serbs in the Republika Srpska (RS) would support making the RS either independent or a part of Serbia. Much the same could be said for Bosnian Croats and their views towards Croatia. Macedonia in 2001 was on the verge of all out civil war when Albanian insurgents organized an

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78 All figures according to The World Factbook, available at: [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html). Note: Macedonia’s “state-nation” percentage is probably declining due to differences in demographic growth rates between the Albanian and Macedonian segments of the population. Some estimates have suggested that Albanians could become a numerical majority in Macedonia by 2025. The above measures of ethnic homogeneity are admittedly rather crude. For instance, some might argue that Macedonia is actually more ethnically divided than Bosnia & Herzegovina despite the fact that the state-nation makes up a greater percentage of the overall population because in Macedonia the distance between the state’s two main ethnic groups (Macedonians and Albanians) is both religious and linguistic, whereas in Bosnia & Herzegovina, although the three main ethnic groups (Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs) are of course divided by religion, they at least share what is essentially the same language. For a detailed discussion of the problems of measuring ethnic fractionalization, see James D. Fearon, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country,” Journal of Economic Growth 8 (June 2003), 195-222.
insurrection to demand greater rights. In October 2007, the leader of the largest ethnic Albanian party in Macedonia, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), Ali Ahmeti again raised the possibility of an Albanian insurrection in Macedonia unless the government did more to satisfy Albanian demands in the country. Recent public opinion polls conducted in Macedonia show that these two communities are drifting further apart—for instance, by large margins, people on both sides of the ethnic divide say that they do not support mixed marriages, or Albanian and Macedonian children going to school together.⁷⁹

In Montenegro, on one end of the political and ethnic spectrum, that state’s Serb population (some 35%) rejects the country’s new constitution, while on the other side of the ethnic spectrum, the September 2006 arrest of a dozen ethnic Albanians (several of whom were on the government payroll) for planning a terrorist action raises serious questions about the ultimate...

⁷⁹ See, for instance, Tim Judah, “‘Greater Albania’ Gains Support,” IWPR Balkan Crisis Report No. 341, 7 June 2002. As a report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance published in 2001 noted in the case of Macedonia,

. . . each of the main ethnic communities tends to live in a relatively homogeneous world of its own. Even where members of different ethnic groups live and even work alongside each other, they often have limited contact in daily life. Although interaction is increasing, particularly among young people and the educated and professional segments of society, many members of the various groups still tend to go to different restaurants, different cafes, different stores and even different schools. The organizations and associations of civil society too, are in large part divided along ethnic lines, as are the political parties . . . Public debate takes place within each community rather than between communities, each receiving information about events within the community, the country and the region from media in its own language, produced by members of its own ethnic group.

loyalty of another 7 percent of that country’s population. Importantly, neither Albanian nor Serb political parties in Montenegro supported passage of the country’s new constitution in October 2007.

In the case of Serbia, Kosovo’s decades-long effort to break its ties with Belgrade culminated in February 2008 with its declaration of independence. Importantly, ethnic Albanians in the Preševo Valley (a region in Serbia proper directly adjacent to Kosovo) either support Kosovo’s claims to independence and/or demand unification with Kosovo as well. In Kosovo itself, the Kosovo Serb population north of the Ibar River (estimated to number some 40,000) is playing an analogous role vis-a-vis the Kosovo Albanian government in Priština.

As the above examples show, consistent with the political science literature that stresses the problems ethnic, religious, and cultural heterogeneity within states often cause, these Balkan examples reveal the problems and inefficiencies southeastern Europe’s remaining multiethnic states face. Political uncertainty makes enacting reforms and attracting foreign investment considerably more difficult, and the longer or more “chronic” they appear to be, the more they become essentially structural problems in these states and societies. Thus, multiethnic states face considerably greater challenges in conducting “normal” politics, and, ultimately, becoming stable democracies.

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80 For a discussion of ethnic politics in Montenegro, see Miša Djurković, “Montenegro: Headed for New Divisions?” (Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, Conflict Studies Research Centre 07/11, March 2007).

81 As Gidon Gottlieb argues, “Homogenous national entities may be more likely to evolve into peaceable democracies than states rent by harsh linguistic and cultural antagonisms.” See Gottlieb, “Nations Without States,” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 1994), 101.
V. The Millet System as an Independent Variable Effecting Ethnoconfessional Nationalism in the Balkans

The previous section argued that the group identities and loyalties fostered by the identity–formation process and in-group bias is a universal feature of the human condition. It also pointed out the difficulties and disadvantages states possessing higher levels of ethnoconfessional heterogeneity have in maintaining the loyalty of their populations.

In southeastern Europe, what has compounded the above difficulties, and given its specifically ethnoconfessional character, is a second independent variable: the structural influence the Ottoman millet system has had on Balkan political culture. If “the Balkans are the Ottoman legacy” as Maria Todorova has argued, then the institutions, traditions and practices of this period are crucial for understanding Balkan reality today.82

The Ottoman millet system was a form of indirect rule and corporate self-government by ethnoconfessional groups first established in 1454 by Sultan Mehmet II upon the fall of Constantinople. The millet system has been described as “basically a minority home-rule policy based on religious affiliation,” the roots of which can be found in Ottoman rule in Sasanid Iran, and even in some of Justinian’s edicts concerning Jews in the Byzantine Empire.83 The millet system’s equation of religion with ethnicity (the term millet itself has been translated by one

82 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 12.
83 Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 5, 44.
Turkish author as “church-nation”\textsuperscript{84} has had significant influence on every subsequent political system in the Balkans; as John Allcock has noted “this element of Ottoman social organization has had profound significance for the subsequent development of the relationship between ethnicity and political culture in the Balkans.”\textsuperscript{85}

The Habsburgs adopted many features of the millet system when Serbs began to settle the Habsburg regions bordering the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, and this form of ethnoconfessional self-governance was again adopted and modified by the South Slavs’ national movements in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Throughout the past two hundred years, attempts to overcome the ethnoconfessional segmentation of Balkan society the millet system institutionalized—whether in the form of Ottomanism, bo\v{s}nja\v{s}tvo, or Yugoslavism—have repeatedly come to naught. Indeed, it has been argued that even international treaties in the early twentieth century and current constitutional arrangements in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Macedonia are reformulations of various aspects of the millet system.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{84} Halide Edib, \textit{Turkey Faces West: A Turkish View on Recent Changes and Their Origins} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1930), 68, as cited by Bozidar Ježernik, \textit{Wild Europe: The Balkans in the Gaze of Western Travellers} (London: Saqi, 2004), 179.

\textsuperscript{85} Allcock, \textit{Explaining Yugoslavia}, 148. Robin Okey notes that when the Habsburg Empire occupied Bosnia & Herzegovina in 1878, “In many ways, the monarchy continued the Ottoman millet system of treating Bosnians as religious rather than national groups, to be governed through reshaped religious hierarchies.” See Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism: The Habsburg’s ‘Civilizing Mission’ in Bosnia, 1878-1914} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), viii. Subsequently, the nascent Serbian state in the early 1800s would itself adopt many of these features; thus, “the Serbian idea of a modern state was imported from the Vojvodina with the same conflation of corporate and national rights that predominated over individual rights in the Habsburg or Ottoman lands.” See Lampe, \textit{Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Edition), 47.

The most prominent feature of the millet system was the power it delegated to the Ottoman Empire’s various religious organizations to administer their respective flocks. Under Islamic conceptions of the state, religion and law were closely intertwined; thus, “religion, law, and administrative structure and, therefore, correct behavior and salvation were closely tied together.” Thus, under the *millet* system,

non-Muslim subjects of the Porte were provided with an autonomous self-government under their respective religious leaders, the term conveying both nationality and religion in the Ottoman scheme of things. The non-Muslim *millets* (Orthodox, Jewish, Armenian) were subject to their own native regulations and not to the Şeriat (Islamic Law). Their dealings with the Ottoman state were conducted through their respective community leaders. As ethnarchs of the Serbs, the patriarchs of Peć thus had not only all the prerogatives of their spiritual station but also the authority that belonged to medieval Serbian kings. In transactions with the Porte, they were the sole representatives of the Orthodox faithful under their jurisdiction, and these were by no means all Serbs. The Patriarchate also acquired a significant amount of judicial power within the Orthodox community, and it was largely due to the influence of the church that consciousness of Serbian state and national traditions not only survived but was even extended to communities where they had never before existed. In short, the Ottoman overlordship had the paradoxical effect of investing the Serbs with a great instrument of national expansion.”

Given such a system, for most inhabitants of the Balkan peninsula their main contact with governmental authority did not come in the form of interaction with Muslim/Ottoman officials, but with communal leaders of their own religious group or their own ecclesiastical authorities,

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88 Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, 64-65. Sugar adds that under the millet system, “Besides full ecclesiastical powers and jurisdiction, the patriarch acquired legal powers in those cases, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, that were regulated by canon law. Comcommittant with these legal powers were certain police powers that even included a patriarchal jail in Istanbul. Naturally, the church was also permitted to collect the usual ecclesiastical dues, but it was also made responsible and was often consulted in the assessing and collecting of taxes due the state. Finally, ecclesiastical courts had the right to hear and decide cases in which all litigants were Christians, provided they voluntarily submitted their cases to church courts rather than to the kadi.” Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule*, 46.
who were responsible for collecting taxes and the distribution of state land. In 1557, for instance, the restored Serbian Patriarchate of Peć undertook “as far as was possible under foreign rule, the functions of the former Serbian government. The church had its own law courts and administrative system; it conducted foreign policy and eventually even provided military leadership. In essence the Serbian church became the Serbian state.”

Under this style of rule, multiconfessional and multiethnic areas of the Balkans became “segmented societies” in which “Serbs, Croats, and Muslims each could live their lives wholly within the framework of their own Serb, Croat, or Muslim institutions.” Indicative of the degree of ethnoconfessional segregation in Bosnia in the nineteenth century is an examination of how rural villages were divided along such lines; when the Habsburg occupation began, there were 1,412 “Orthodox villages” in Bosnia, 793 “Muslim,” and 437 “Catholic.” The Ottoman system also created an ethnic division of labor, whereby, as one traveler at the turn of the twentieth century noted, in Macedonia “Turk meant government official, Greek merchant, Bulgar peasant, and Wallachian shepherd.”

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91 Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 20. An Austrian official, describing Bosnia in the mid-nineteenth century, would claim that not only could the different ethnic groups in Bosnia live the lives wholly within their own institutions, but they “had no desire for mutual contact.” K. Sax, Skizzen über die Bewohner Bosniens (Separatabdruck aus den Mitteilungen der k. Geographischen Gesellschaft, 7. Jahrgang) (Vienna, 1864), 5, as cited by Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 3.

92 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 2.

Apart from the imposition of a “millet mentality” on the peoples of southeastern Europe, the nature of Ottoman/Muslim rule in the Balkans also created severe social divisions between Muslims and non-Muslims. Cathie Carmichael, for instance, has called the Ottoman millet system a form of religious apartheid.94 Despite formal prescriptions about how non-Muslim “people of the book” should be treated, in practice, under the millet system non-Muslims were clearly second-class citizens: non-Muslims had to wear clothes of inferior quality and more modest colors than those of Muslims; they had to allow Muslims a seat if the latter needed one; upon meeting on the street, Christians had to put their backs to the wall to allow Muslims to pass; they were not allowed to ride horses; their houses could not be larger than those of Muslim neighbors; their churches could not exceed a certain height; their liturgical ceremonies had to be conducted in quiet, without bells or holiday processions; and in any legal dispute conducted in an Islamic judicial institution between a Muslim and non-Muslim, only Muslim testimony was considered valid because non-Muslims had no status as legal subjects in Islamic courts. Throughout the Balkans, many Christian churches were converted into mosques.95

Ottoman rule also severely retarded the social and intellectual development of the vast majority of Balkan Christians. Ottoman elites had little interest in fostering the education of their

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Christian subjects (and, in any case, education was the responsibility of the millets themselves) so given their lack of access to income-producing occupations it was very difficult for most Christians to obtain even a rudimentary education. All told, in the Ottoman system there was a definite sense that the Christian raya owed deference and submission to their Muslim superiors, not just because they were of higher social rank, but also because they were Muslim. And perhaps the most important privilege was not one contained in the kanun-i-ray; it was the principle that Christians could not bring law-suits against Muslims, and that their testimony could not be used against a Muslim in court. This was a serious form of legal discrimination, and must have been most keenly felt when the Christians and Muslims concerned were in fact social equals—townsmen and villagers.

The political culture fostered by the millet system ultimately proved unable to transform itself enough to provide forms of citizenship based on territorial rather than cultural ties. In the 1830s, the Tanzimat reforms, a last-gasp Ottoman effort at modernization and reform, included an effort to create a civic, Ottoman identity for all of the ethnoconfessional groups in the empire, but this belated attempt “was a utopian experiment doomed at the outset,” for the millet mentality was insufficiently transformed to provide the basis for a homogeneous Ottoman nation.
too deeply entrenched by this point. As Kemal Karpat notes, the Balkan states emerging from the
Ottoman empire in the nineteenth century

. . . attached themselves to territorial bonds of secular citizenship and historical
memories while their group identity, internal cohesion and social-political values
as a nation were determined by their long experience in the millet system.
Nationality, in the sense of ethnic-national identity, drew its essence from the
religious-communal experience in the millet, while citizenship—a secular
concept—was determined by territory. In effect, the political, social and cultural
crises which have buffeted the national states of the Balkans and the Middle East
since their emergence can be attributed in large measure to the incompatibility of
the secular idea of state with the religious concept of nation rooted in the millet
philosophy. 99

Paradoxically, then, attempts to adopt or impose Western forms of identity and constitutional
rights on the Balkan peoples only exacerbated their ethnoconfessional divisions. Economic
modernization had similarly paradoxical effects; as Mazower argued, modernity sharpened
religious boundaries and gave them new political meaning. 100 Some scholars have gone even
further and suggested that economic change and urbanization even fostered different lifestyles
amongst the Balkan peoples; thus, for instance, Çaglar Keyder claims that “not only religious
practice, but also schools and community organization, patterns of consumption and levels of
Westernization, material culture and lifestyles increasingly diverged.” 101

From a theoretical standpoint, and especially with regard to materialist and rationalist
explanations for identity-formation, it is important to note that economic modernization and the

99 Karpat, “Millets and Nationality,” 141. It is also worth noting, however, that Karpat claims the creation of the
millet system was to some degree born out of the necessity of dealing with the already inherited organizations and
cultures of the Balkan peoples as they were conquered. As he notes (141-142), “The system provided, on the one
hand, a degree of religious, cultural, and ethnic continuity within these communities, while on the other it permitted
their incorporation into the Ottoman administrative, economic political system.”

100 Mazower, The Balkans, 68.

101 Çaglar Keyder, “The Ottoman Empire,” in Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen, After Empire: Multiethnic
Societies and Nation-Building. The Soviet Union and the Russian Ottoman and Habsburg Empires (Boulder, Co:
overall breakdown of the millet system did not mean that new identities were being created; rather, old identities were again coming to the fore. Thus,

What emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not the disintegration of the Orthodox millet opening the door to new foci of loyalty. What emerged were old differences and antagonisms that could not be expressed openly so long as the millet leadership was protected by the power of a strong state and could not be challenged.\textsuperscript{102}

Thus, the result of several centuries of Ottoman rule was the entrenchment of un-malleable, un-fluid ethnoconfessional identities on the peoples of southeastern Europe. In Bosnia specifically, during the Ottoman period “to a great degree the basis for a common political identity among the Bosnian population was destroyed.”\textsuperscript{103} The unavoidable reality of physical, spatial proximity, of course, meant that the separate ethnoconfessional groups in the Balkans would come into contact, and even, to a limited extent, share each other’s religious and cultural practices,\textsuperscript{104} but by and large they lived in separate institutional and psychological worlds. As Maria Todorova has concluded, “Not only was there no feeling of belonging to a common society but the population felt it belonged to disparate (religious, social, or other) groups that would not converge.”\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{102} Sugar, \textit{Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule}, 232.

\textsuperscript{103} Dzaja, \textit{Konfesionalnost i Nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine}, 223. Dzaja concludes his study by claiming “Ottoman-Islamic repressive religious tolerance, in truth, tolerated a pluralistic society, but at the same time manipulated specific groups in their mutual conflicts and prevented a true spiritual communication. The consequences were a fear for one’s own identity, over-sensitivity, many taboos, distrust and a deep spiritual estrangement amongst the confessions.” Barbara Jelavich voices the same beliefs, noting that by the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, “The parting of the ways between Christian and Muslim was clear at the beginning of the century, and the [Tanzimat] reform era made the divisions even more apparent. If communal and church authority was reduced, the Balkan people wanted their own national governments, not continued control from a centralized administration in Constantinople.” See Jelavich, \textit{History of the Balkans, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries}, 287.


\textsuperscript{105} Todorova, \textit{Imagining the Balkans}, 163.
Moreover, while by the nineteenth century the concepts of liberty and equality were spreading to the Ottoman Empire, instead of following the western European pattern in which such demands were made on behalf of the individual, in the Ottoman lands they were made on behalf of ethnoconfessional groups. As would be repeatedly seen throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the millet system’s most important features, especially those provisions giving ethnoconfessional groups large degrees of self-governance, would henceforth become an unavoidable expectation and demand of the various ethnoconfessional groups in the Balkans, reproduced and transplanted across time and into different political regimes.

VI. Religion and Balkan Ethnoconfessional Nationalism

Paradoxically, while the peoples of the former Yugoslavia were not known for being particularly devout during the socialist period, religion has nevertheless been the most powerful marker of differentiation between groups in the Balkans. Nations in southeastern Europe, as Milorad Ekmecic has argued, were formed on the basis of religion, not language, and this has had important implications for the character and manifestations of ethnoconfessional nationalism in the region. As Adrian Hastings has argued, the more influential religion has been in the “construction” of a nation, the more influence it is likely to have over every expression of its specific nationalism. Moreover, the fact that these are in many ways “church-nations”

106 As Albert Hourani has noted, “Most non-Muslims, and many non-Turkish Muslims, meant by liberty and equality liberty for the community and equality between communities, and saw their own interest not in strengthening the power and increasing the intervention of the central government, but in maintaining the rights of the communities and strengthening the administrative autonomy of the provinces.” See Hourani, Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 281, as cited by Caglar, “The Ottoman Empire,” 37.

intensifies the already strong ties between religion and nationalism that many scholars have noted. Thus, nationalism is not simply a “cognitive doctrine” of religion,” but, as Elie Kedourie notes, it is “a method of spiritual mobilization, of eliciting, activating, and canalizing dormant political energies.”108 In this sense, religion can serve as a force multiplier for nationalist movements, “inspiring greater zeal and sacrifice from the masses.”109 Some scholars, such as Eric Hobsbawm, have argued that religion becomes an especially important component of nationalism the moment it allegedly spread from intellectuals and activists to the masses,110 and Hans Kohn similarly noted that religious revivals tend to foreshadow nationalist upsurges. Explaining ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans thus requires an analysis of how religion has become such an important factor in the region.

In examining how religion affects politics, Weber described the need to look for the “practical impulses for action which are founded in the psychological and pragmatic contexts of religion.”111 Similarly, David Laitin has noted that if religion is defined as “an original doctrine [which not only] announces the faith, but also provides guidance for living a moral life consistent


109 See Walter A. McDougall’s “Introduction” to a special edition on religion and politics in *Orbis* 42 (Spring 1998), 162.

110 As Hobsbawm notes, “The links between religion and national consciousness can be very close . . . In fact, the relation seems to grow closer where nationalism becomes a mass force than in its phase as a minority ideology and activists’ movement . . . Religion is an ancient and well-tried method of establishing communion through common practice and a sort of brotherhood between people who otherwise have nothing much in common.” See Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 67.

with the religious conceptualization” it is “intuitively obvious” that this has consequences for the organization of political life and for political values.112

The task thus becomes analyzing what Laitin calls “the transference of values from the religious sphere to the political sphere,”113 and understanding how religion (or, put more broadly, political culture) “constrains preferences and how preferences affect culture . . . the critical factor underlying preference stability is the social and psychological constraints that act upon it.”114 For religion to be a useful tool in understanding political phenomenon, however, “it must be able to explain why and when people choose a particular course of action over others and the likelihood that these choices will be widely shared.”115 Clifford Geertz made an attempt in this direction when he described how “sacred symbols” impact daily life:

sacred symbols function to synthesize a people’s ethos—the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood—and their worldview—the picture they have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive ideas of order. In religious belief and practice a group’s ethos is rendered intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life ideally adapted to the actual state of affairs the worldview describes, while the worldview is rendered emotionally convincing by being presented as an image of an actual state of affairs peculiarly well-arranged to accommodate such a way of life. . . . The notion that religion tunes human actions to an envisaged cosmic order and projects images of cosmic order onto the plane of human experience is hardly novel. But it is hardly investigated either, so that we have very little idea of how, in empirical terms, this particular miracle is accomplished. We just know that it is done, annually, weekly, daily, for some people almost hourly; and we have an enormous ethnographic literature to demonstrate it. But the theoretical

115 Wilson, op. cit., 248.
account of the sort we can provide for lineage segmentation, political succession, labor exchange, or the socialization of the child, does not exist.\textsuperscript{116}

Geertz’s claim that we have a relatively poor understanding of how religion tunes human action parallels other descriptions which see it as a subconscious or subliminal phenomenon.\textsuperscript{117}

While this brings to mind Anthony Smith’s “irreducible ethnopsychological element[s] in nations and nationalism” that seemingly have a subconscious or non-rational aspect to them, it still begs the question of how these non-rational beliefs get translated into concrete political action. For this reason, an analysis of the roles religious organizations play in Balkan society reveals how and why religion has become such an important factor in ethnoconfessional identity

\textsuperscript{116} Clifford Geertz, \textit{The Interpretation of Cultures} (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 89-90. It bears noting here that part of the reason we know relatively little about how religion affects political beliefs and behavior in the former Yugoslavia is because during the communist period local scholars showed little interest in the topic. As John Alcock notes, “The task of providing a more balanced account of the importance of religion among the South Slavs is hampered by the relative indifference to these problems on the part of indigenous social scientists.” See Alcock, \textit{Explaining Yugoslavia}, 367. Yugoslav social scientists were not the only ones who did not pay sufficient attention to the role of religion in public and private life, since of course Western social scientists have also for many years been under the impression that it would become a less important feature of modernizing, industrializing societies. Thus, in recent decades phenomena such as religious nationalism or political theology have been seen as “an atavism requiring psychological or sociological analysis but not serious intellectual engagement.” See Mark Lilla, “The Politics of God,” \textit{The New York Times Magazine}, 19 August 2007. Yet as Peter Berger has noted, “the assumption that we live in a secularized world is false: The world today . . . is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so.” Berger, “Secularism in Retreat,” \textit{The National Interest} (Winter 1996/97), 3. Similarly, Walter A. McDougall has argued that “faith-based political action seems more influential in world affairs today than at any time since the Enlightenment.” See McDougall, “Introduction,” \textit{Orbis} 42 (Spring 1998), 159 (special edition dedicated to Religion in World Affairs). Along similar lines, in describing the growth of religiously-based political movements around the world, Timothy Samuel Shah and Monica Duffy Toft have argued that “In contest after contest, when people are given a choice between the sacred and the secular, faith prevails . . . Democracy is giving the world’s people’s their voice, and they want to talk about God.” \textit{Foreign Policy} (July/August 2006), 39.

\textsuperscript{117} Geertz’s claim that we have a relatively poor understanding of how religion tunes human action recalls other descriptions which see it as a subconscious or subliminal phenomenon. In his famous short story “\textit{A Letter from 1920}” Ivo Andrić described this aspect of how religious affiliations have played on the Bosnian psyche in the following way: “Whoever lies awake in Sarajevo hears the voices of the Sarajevo night. The clock on the Catholic cathedral strikes the hour with weighty confidence: 2am. More than a minute passes (to be exact, seventy-five seconds— I counted) and only then with a rather weaker, but piercing sound does the Orthodox church announce the hour, and chime its own 2 am. A moment after it the tower clock on the Bey’s mosque strikes 11, the ghostly Turkish hour, by the strange calculation of distant and alien parts of the world. The Jews have no clock to sound their hour, so God alone knows what time it is for them by the Sephardic reckoning or the Ashkenazy. Thus at night, while everyone is sleeping, division keeps vigil in the counting of the late, small hours, and separates these sleeping people who, awake, rejoice and mourn, feast and fast by four different and antagonistic calendars, and send all their prayers and wishes to one heaven in four different ecclesiastical languages. “A Letter from 1920,” in \textit{The Damned Yard and Other Stories}, Celia Hawkesworth, editor. (London: Forest Books, 1992), 117.
in southeastern Europe. Here we can point to two distinct roles religious organizations play: 1) church and mosque as cultural guardian and moral conscience of the group; and 2) church and mosque as political ally and legitimator of ethnoconfessional nationalist movements.

a. Church and Mosque as Cultural Guardian and Moral Conscience

Perhaps the most important role religious organizations in the Balkans have played has been in maintaining or perpetuating the existence of ethnoconfessional groups themselves. Both the Croatian Catholic and Serbian Orthodox churches, for instance, frequently claim that they played the leading and decisive role in the survival of their respective flocks during centuries of foreign occupation. In Croatia, the Roman Catholic Church promoted the view that throughout Croatian history it played a determining role in developing and maintaining the Croatian nation through its role in schooling, art, culture, and various forms of charity.\(^{118}\) For the Orthodox populations of southeastern Europe in general, the Orthodox Church “kept the Christian community almost unchanged in an ideological sense until the age of national movements,” and in the routines of everyday life the average Balkan Christian, “was surrounded by Christian symbols, by crosses and icons, and not by reminders of Ottoman domination.”\(^{119}\) As Vjekoslav Perica has noted with regard to this aspect of the role of religious institutions:

Ethnic churches are designed as instruments for the survival of ethnic communities . . . They are authoritarian-minded and centralized organizations capable of organizing resistance against an outside threat and maintaining stability inside the community. The upper section of clerical hierarchies exercise a hegemony in ecclesiastical affairs (at the expense of the lower clergy and lay members). Ethnoclericalism is thus both an ecclesiastical concept and political ideology. It champions a strong homogeneous church in a strong homogenous

\(^{118}\) This was a popular theme for grade-school religion class textbooks in Croatia in the 1970s and 1980s; see Ivan Perić, *Suvremeni hrvatski nacionalizam* (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1984), 46-47.

state, with both institutions working together as guardians of the ethnic community. Ethnic churches depend on the nation state as much as the nation depends on them. Needless to say, ethnoclericalism as an ideology holds that the ethnic community would perish without its own church and state. Thanks to its church and state, the ethnic community becomes a nation.\textsuperscript{120}

As noted here, religious institutions play an important role in Balkan society simply by virtue of having a coherent, hierarchical institutional structure, recognized rules of procedure, their own organizational networks, forms of public media, etc. Moreover, as inherently conservative organizations, they instinctively maintain and perpetuate the traditions and beliefs of their respective peoples through the centuries, making them often appear to be the authentic ethnic or national institution. Thus, the persisting popularity of religious rituals in the life-cycle, such as infant baptism, marriage, funerals, the \textit{slava} celebration among Serbs, etc. are not only rituals to mark important milestones in life, but also ways to affirm an individual’s and a family’s ethnoconfessional identity.\textsuperscript{121} As Tone Bringa notes in her study of Bosnian Muslims, the celebration of Ramadan “serves as a vehicle for the expression of a distinctive Muslim \textit{nacija} identity vis-à-vis other non-Muslim Bosnians.”\textsuperscript{122}

The often all-encompassing nature of religious proscriptions means that in the Balkans religious faith and practice has influenced what people eat and drink, how they dress, the style of architecture they choose to build their houses and places of worship, their choice of marriage partners, the yearly rhythms of their celebrations and holidays, the rituals by which they are brought into the world and how they depart from it, and on and on. Thus, in Balkan Islam, for


\textsuperscript{121} For more on this aspect of the role of religious organizations, see Allcock, \textit{Explaining Yugoslavia}, 374-75.

instance, “the teachings and daily practice of the faith, and the associated customs, serve to create a consolidated sense of community; these customs and the distinctive way of life that goes with them separate Muslims from their non-Muslim neighbors even where faith has been eroded.”

In recent years, religious institutions have played this role by acting as cultural arbiters—proferring public judgement on what is “acceptable” for a member of an ethnic group to wear, to eat, to watch on television, etc. The leader of Bosnia’s Islamic Community, reis-ul-ulema Mustafa ef. Cerić, for example, has been noted for his frequent attacks on public programming on Sarajevo’s television stations, such as his complaints during the 1998 holiday season of “excessive Christian content” on state television, while more radical Muslim leaders, such as the imam of the King Fahd mosque in Sarajevo, Nezim Halilović, has often warned worshippers to reject the “alien and hostile influence of the West.” Cerić has also discouraged Bosniacs from entering into close personal relations with members of other ethnoconfessional groups, going so far as to claim that interethnic marriages “are just another form of genocide against the Bosnian people.”

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123 Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki, “Introduction,” in Muslim Identity and the Balkan State, Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki, editors (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), 3-4. It is interesting to note, for instance, that despite that fact that church attendance amongst Serbs is generally low, by large margins, Serbs in Serbia proper, in Kosovo, and in Bosnia say that the church is their most-trusted institution. See Gallup Balkan Monitor: Insights and Perceptions: Voices from the Balkans, 2009 Summary of Findings, 22-23.

124 Perica, Balkan Idols, 169.

125 See Mustafa ef. Cerić’s comments as cited by Roger Cohen, “Bosnians Fear a Rising Islamic Authoritarianism,” The New York Times, 10 October 1994, A3. Some observers currently consider Cerić to be the most important Bosnian leader in the country, with the ability to make or break political careers and ambitions for high office.
A corollary to understanding the role of churches and mosques as a given ethnic group’s cultural guardian is their role as the “moral conscience” of the group. Balkan religious organizations see themselves, and are seen by their peoples, as the ultimate “guardians” of the nation’s identity, values, and freedom. As a high-ranking official in the Serbian Orthodox Church has noted, “the mission of the Serbian Orthodox Church is to be the conscience of its people” and to make moral pronouncements. As this official noted, “When discussing our Church and her public pronouncements, she does not do this with some political plan, but as the bearer of the moral conscience of society. For years, the Church in our society was not allowed to represent her people and to express the ethical dimensions of Saint Sava-hood before her people.”

b. Church and Mosque as Political Ally and Legitimator

Because of their traditional values, religious institutions are frequently natural allies of conservative, right-of-center political movements. On a whole host of issues, such as abortion, pornography, businesses operating on religious holidays, gay marriage, etc., conservative political parties frequently find natural allies among religious institutions. Thus, it is no surprise that as the communist system in the former Yugoslavia disintegrated in the 1980s, the right-of-center national movements that developed during this time received substantial support from Catholic, Islamic, and Orthodox religious organizations throughout the country. The Bosnian intellectual Ivan Lovrenović has claimed that the 1980s witnessed the “de-secularization” of

\[126\] See the statements by Fr. Irinej Dobrijević “Crkva ne treba da se meša u politiku,” Politika (Belgrade), 12 January 2005.
society in Bosnia, and this could indeed be said of political and social life throughout the former Yugoslavia.  

Most prominently, this de-secularization of society has taken the form of religious leaders and religious ceremonies again becoming prominent features of social and political life in the former Yugoslav republics. Religious leaders are frequently featured at political functions, and for politicians the presence of a religious leader by their side is now considered *de rigeur*. At ceremonies marking the opening of a new facility for the Sarajevo water works in September 1997 attended by several leading *Stranka za Demokratske Akcije* (Party for Democratic Action, or SDA) officials, a sheep was ritually slaughtered in traditional Islamic fashion. At the inauguration of the RS National Assembly in October 1996, members were called on to swear an oath of allegiance on a bible and kiss a cross held by an Orthodox prelate, a ritual obviously unacceptable to Bosniac and Croat representatives. Religion classes are now mandatory for all grade school students in the RS. Similarly, in many Bosniac-populated areas of BiH, organizations from Islamic countries provide funds to rebuild schools, but under the proviso that these schools offer classes in Islamic religious doctrine and in the Arabic language. Croats in Sarajevo have attacked the increasing use of religious greetings, such as the traditional Muslim greeting “Selam aleikum” in public institutions. Further evidence of the return of religion to social life is the literal building boom occurring in the construction of mosques and churches, much of which is government supported. Throughout the Balkans, state-owned TV stations have

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128 *Oslobodjenje* (Sarajevo), 4 October 1997, 32.

129 *Slobodna Bosna* (Sarajevo), 12 January 1996, 10-11. For similar developments in Kosovo, see Isa Blumi, “The Islamist Challenge in Kosova,” *Current History* 102 (March 2003), 124-134.
pushed religious programs to the forefront, especially those dealing with the close ties between the church and the ethnconfessional group, and airwaves are now regularly filled with programs on the historical/national importance of a famous mosque, monastery, or religious figure.

As the failures of the communist system began to be openly discussed in the late 1980s, people’s faith in religious institutions increased. On Vidovdan\textsuperscript{130} 1990, one of the most important Serb politicians at the time in the former Yugoslavia, Dr. Jovan Rašković, the founder of the Croatian branch of the \textit{Srpska Demokratska Stranka} (Serb Democratic Party, or SDS), said in a speech in Kosovo that

\begin{quote}
The Serbs were dormant for nearly 50 years. We forgot our name, our faith, our roots. Now, the time for awakening has come. What the Serbs must do first, is to pay tribute to our Serbian Orthodox Church . . . Our Orthodox Church is our mother . . . She was a weeping and lonely mother deserted by her children. We must return to its altar, because the Serbian Church is our mother. The Serbian nation was born at the holy altar of our Serbian Orthodox Church in the year 1219 as the first European political nation.\textsuperscript{131}
\end{quote}

Similarly, Radovan Karadžić would note in 1990 that “The Serbian Orthodox Church is not merely a religious organization, it is a cultural institution and part of national leadership; the Church is highly important for all Serbs, and it is irrelevant whether one believes in God or not.”\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{130} Vidovdan is the South Slavic word for St. Vitus’ Day, celebrated on June 28\textsuperscript{\textordmasculine{a}}. Vidovdan is of course famous among the Yugoslavs for the numerous monumental events that have occurred on that day: the legendary Battle of Kosovo in 1389; the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, and Stalin’s excommunication of Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from the Communist International in 1948.

\textsuperscript{131} Perica, \textit{Balkan Idols}, 162.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
Increasing the importance of religious organizations in secular politics is the fact that religious organizations possess a well-established organizational structure, encompassing cadres, properties, and propaganda resources. Thus, the ability of religious organizations to bring people together and send a message to large numbers of people is obvious. In the case of the Bosnian HDZ, for instance,

... the Bosnian branch of the HDZ was organized and prepared for the 1990 elections through the parish system of the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian Catholic bishops and most of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian clergy ... made possible the electoral victory of the HDZ, even though it was obvious that this party’s goal was the dismemberment of the republic.\(^\text{133}\)

Importantly, the Islamic Organization in Bosnia and the Serbian Orthodox Church in Bosnia played similar roles for the SDA and the SDS; thus, “the ulema took part in the foundation of the SDA and carried out most of the logistics for the election campaign. Among forty founding members of the SDA, eight were former ‘Young Muslims’ and some two dozen included prominent imams from the Sarajevo theological school and the Zagreb mosque, the mufti of Mostar, and officials of the Community’s Sarajevo headquarters.” During the election campaign, green flags with Arabic script were prominent as SDA gatherings.\(^\text{134}\)

\(^{133}\) Perica, *Balkan Idols*, 142.

\(^{134}\) Ibid. Here it is also important to note, however, that religious leaders have also played positive roles in promoting reconciliation as well. As Brank Peuraca has noted, “Clerics may lead by example. Such a simple act as an Orthodox priest and a Franciscan monk sharing coffee publicly in a café in Tuzla received attention as a demonstration of overcoming rifts between faith traditions. One NGO activist recalled that Croats warily participating in a workshop with Serbian returnees were greatly reassured and encouraged by the arrival of a Catholic priest. Another reported that in one town in central Bosnia, Croats were reluctant to join Bosniaks in activities sponsored by an NGO. When a Catholic priest newly assigned to the town encouraged participation, however, Croat youth became much more comfortable joining. When that priest was transferred, Croat attendance dropped once more. That example again demonstrates clerics’ great influence: when they fail to undertake interfaith reconciliation, their followers may be that much less apt to do so.” See Peuraca, “Can Faith-Based NGOs Advance Interfaith Reconciliation? The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” *United States Institute of Peace Special Report* 103, March 2003.
Throughout the postcommunist period, there has been an increasing tendency to blur the lines between the state, the ethnic group, and religion. The extent to which church and state have become intermingled can be seen in the fact that Alija Izetbegović personally appointed the current head of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993, and the SDA makes most of the important personnel decisions within the Islamic Community. Many religious figures, for their part, have eagerly become participants in politics, sometimes openly supporting individual political leaders and/or parties. During the September 1996 elections campaign, for instance, the Orthodox bishop of Banja Luka openly called on Serbs to vote for the SDS. Bosniac Muslim clerics have in similar fashion called on Bosniacs to vote for the SDA. In a different vein, religious organizations in the region have sometimes come under criticism for not standing up to what are perceived to be various nationalistic policies; thus, for instance, one Bosnian intellectual attacked the Catholic Church hierarchy in BiH for not speaking out forcefully against the HDZ's campaign to resettle Croats from central Bosnia.

As the above discussion reveals, religious institutions in the Balkans have played important roles in their societies by virtue of their role in forming identities, in providing the institutional and mobilizational resources they have to contribute to specific political platforms, and also because of the much more difficult to quantify emotional and psychological influence they have on their respective flocks. Yet what also emerges from this analysis is that, as stated at the beginning of this section, to claim that nationalism in the Balkans is ethnoconfessional is not to suggest that it has anything to do with theology; rather, it is about the political importance and

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135 Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 26 November 1997, 2.

136 See, for instance, the comments by Dubravko Lovrenović in Dani (Sarajevo), 13 April 1998, 8-12.
symbolic power that religious institutions and traditions can assume in any society over the course of centuries.

VII. Structure of the Dissertation and Academic and Policymaking Implications

Chapter II will examine and debate two specific categories of constructivist and rationalist/instrumentalist explanations 1) theories that focus on the often pernicious motivations and goals of individuals and/or specific groups of leaders, and the advantages they have to gain by playing the “nationalist card” to gain or keep power, and; 2) economic-based theories stressing that nationalism is a result of group struggles for control of resources.

Chapter III examines in depth and provides empirical evidence for the claim that Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism is a collective, chronic, and non-economic phenomenon. It will also discuss how such an understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans contributes to ongoing debates between primordialists, perennialists, instrumentalists and constructivists regarding identity-formation and nation-building.

Chapter IV provides an historical and empirical analysis of the segmentation of Balkan society along ethnoconfessional lines, and further amplifies the argument that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a collective, chronic, and non-economic phenomenon. An important part of this chapter is devoted to addressing the issue of whether ethnic groups can be considered unitary political actors. Many constructivists argue against such a view.137 Other scholars, however have

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137 See, for instance, Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, op. cit., 14-15; Kanchan Chandra, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (June 2005), 235-252; Laitin, Identity in Formation, 345; Gagnon, Jr., The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s, 12, 188.
argued that for the purpose of most political analysis it is permissible to treat ethnic groups as unitary political actors, or, as one scholar has argued that in the Yugoslav case, can ethnoconfessional group interests really be considered “de facto monolithic.”

Methodologically, several scholars have noted that given the right precautions, it is possible to assign preferences to groups or collectivities. The historical and empirical evidence presented in Chapter IV will show that the preponderance of available evidence does in fact suggest that according to a wide array of political and social behaviors the different Balkan ethnoconfessional groups can be considered unitary political actors.

The evidence provided in Chapter IV is supplemented by information provided in the Appendix, which is an analysis of approximately thirty elections, referenda and public opinion polls conducted in southeastern Europe over the past century, in each of which distinct differences and preferences can be seen based on ethnoconfessional identity. While the evidence provided in the Appendix is not meant to be exhaustive, it should be considered representative of actual attitudes and preferences in southeastern Europe. Both the historical and empirical evidence, and the information provided in the Appendix is intended to support the thesis that for the historically delimited period analyzed, ethnoconfessional nationalism should be considered a collective phenomenon.

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Chapter V will provide a series of micro case-studies analyzing and comparing several state- and nation-building efforts in the Balkan over the past two centuries. First it will look at constructivist failures: Bošnjaštvo, King Alexander’s “Yugoslav integralism,” and Titoist Yugoslavism. Each of these efforts failed, but what is noteworthy from a social science standpoint is that they failed against competing identity projects (e.g., Croatian, Macedonian, and Serbian) over which they had immeasurable advantages in terms of state power and material resources. Understanding and explaining why some identity projects lacking conventional levers of conventional power succeeded while others failed is of considerable importance for constructivist theory,¹⁴¹ and will support the argument that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a non-economic phenomenon.

In conclusion, Chapter VI will discuss the implications such an analysis of ethnoconfessional nationalism has for the study of nationalism, for our understanding of the identity-formation process, and for practical policymaking, all of which will be discussed and tested in Chapter VI.

With respect to the academic study of nationalism, one of the arguments consistently made in the dissertation—that identities are far less fluid and malleable than is commonly assumed—has an important implication for political science, insofar as it contributes to the debate as to whether or not it is appropriate to consider ethnic groups or nations unitary political actors or not. The evidence presented in this dissertation will argue that while ethnic groups are not homogenous,

undifferentiated wholes, for the purposes of most political analysis and political strategy, ethnic
groups and/or nations do represent decisive political majorities.

Another major claim of this dissertation—contra rationalist and materialist explanations for
nationalism—will be that economic and material factors do not have a major influence on
ethnoconfessional nationalism. In southeastern Europe, non-tangible and non-quantifiable factors
more related to psychology and emotions are thus seen as the most important elements in
understanding the phenomenon.

These findings have important implications for policymaking. Most importantly, they suggest
that certain types of institutional design are more appropriate for ethnoconfessionally-segmented
societies than others. Specifically, consociational-federal systems (which assume that individuals
and communities have more fixed identities) are the most appropriate forms of governmental
organization for the multiethnic political entities in southeastern Europe, for two reasons. First,
as the Balkan experience has repeatedly shown, unitary, highly-centralized political systems can
only be imposed using considerable amounts of coercion, which would be difficult to sustain for
longer periods. Second, in states and societies in which an individual’s ethnoconfessional
identity is the primary social and political referent, ordinary democratic majoritarian politics
characterized by “one person, one vote” in which there are numerous cross-cutting interests and
cleavages are generally unfeasible because of ethnic bloc voting, and may in fact exacerbate
communal tensions rather than mitigate them.¹⁴²

¹⁴² See Florian Bieber, “Consociationalism—Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in Bosnia? The Case of
Belgium as a Possible Example.” *South-East Europe Review* 2 (October 1999), 79-94; Bose, *Bosnia After Dayton;*
Nina Casperson, “Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? A Comparison of Conflict-Regulation Strategies in Postwar
Bosnia.” *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (September 2004), 569-588; Frank S. Cohen, “Proportional Versus
A second implication for policymaking of this understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism has to do with its collective nature. If, as argued here, ethnoconfessional nationalism is a mass phenomenon, then managing it entails far more than replacing (or removing) uncooperative elites or developing new institutional designs. Many rationalist proposals for managing ethnic relations which stress the value of ethnic minority affirmative action programs, providing more freedom for various forms of personal identification, etc., were all tried and failed in the former Yugoslavia, and the experience with such efforts in post-1995 Bosnia and Kosovo have also been disappointing. This suggests that strategies commonly used to combat ethnoconfessional nationalism, such as holding democratic elections or indicting leaders deemed to be inciting ethnic conflict, will have little bearing on the problem.

Third, the finding that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a non-economic phenomenon that does not exhibit a unilinear relationship to economic forces suggests that economic or financial instruments will not have a significant effect in managing it. The experiences of the former Yugoslavia, or contemporary Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo, suggest that it is extremely difficult to “buy off” ethnoconfessional groups using financial or economic incentives. This in

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turn suggests that the emphasis in state-building efforts and post-conflict situations should be geared more towards providing military and political security for various groups than towards using economic levers to create unitary, integrated political entities.

Fourth, and as a result of all of the above, this dissertation will demonstrate that nation-building is an inherently more complex process than both constructivists in the academic world and policymakers in the so-called “real world” normally assume. This in turn supports a considerable body of academic literature arguing that there are significant limits to what outsiders can accomplish (in terms of developing stable political arrangements for deeply-divided states) around the world, and, hence, that a more cautious and conservative approach to international intervention in ethnoconfessional conflicts is both more appropriate, and perhaps even more beneficial in the long-run.144

Chapter II
Alternative Explanations

I.

“The basic logical process of science,” according to Arthur Stinchombe, “is the elimination of alternative theories (both those we know and those we do not) by investigating as many of the empirical consequences of each theory as is practical, always testing for the greatest possible variety in the implications tested.”¹ This chapter will examine three general categories of theories proposed to explain Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism: elite-based, modernist and economic-or materialist-based theories, and examine the strengths and limitations of each. These three categories are neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily contradictory; in fact, they share a number of similarities. Each, however, has a distinctive emphasis, which makes it useful to analyze each of them independently.

Important insights can be gained from comparing various theoretical approaches and examining their strengths and weaknesses as explanatory models. With respect to the three main theories used to explain the presence or absence of nationalism in the Balkans in the 19th century (primordialism, nationalism as a Western import, and nationalism as a structural feature or a phenomenon related to modernization), Chirot and Barkey note that each should be recognized as having some scholarly validity.² Yet some theories inevitably have more explanatory power than others, and, as a result, contribute more towards understanding ethnoconfessional nationalism than others do. By examining the empirical and logical consequences of elite-based,

¹ Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories, 22.
modernist and economic- or materialist-based theories, this chapter will reveal each theory’s strengths and weaknesses, and sharpen the analytical focus of the alternative explanation of ethnoconfessional nationalism proposed in the next chapter.

II. Elite-based theories

Perhaps the most prominent theory attempting to explain Balkan nationalism in recent years has been the belief that “evil leaders” or otherwise malevolent elites were the independent causal variable determining the disintegration and violence which afflicted the former Yugoslavia in its final days. An analogous academic school of thought argues that such politicians intentionally provoke conflict to create or foster new identities amongst certain segments of the population. In this view, variables such as history, culture, religion, or a more genuinely felt sense of nationalism among the general population assume secondary or tertiary importance as explanatory variables.

Elite-based theories have been popular with many diplomats, journalists, and Western scholars. Richard Holbrooke, for instance, has claimed that “Yugoslavia's tragedy was not foreordained. It was the product of bad, even criminal, political leaders who encouraged ethnic confrontation for personal, political, and financial gain.”3 Along similar lines, Warren Zimmerman has noted that "Yugoslavia's death and the violence that followed resulted from the conscious actions of nationalist leaders who coopted, intimidated, circumvented, or eliminated

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all opposition to their demagogic designs. Yugoslavia was destroyed from the top down.\textsuperscript{4}

Similar explanations are provided for earlier instances of interethnic conflict in the region. Thus, with reference to the early nineteenth century Serbian uprisings against Ottoman rule, Snyder has argued that “it would be wrong to view Serbia’s war for autonomy from the Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth century as an outpouring of ancient popular nationalist sentiment . . . this struggle was more a commercial enterprise by a multiethnic cabal of pig-traders than a war of national liberation.”\textsuperscript{5} Along similar lines, Gagnon also argues that earlier instances of ethnic conflict in the Balkans—and the way in which they shaped identities—were the deliberate consequence of elite struggles for power and dominance; thus,

\textit{\ldots the dynamics of the wars of the 1990s in many ways are a replay of earlier conflicts that are often cited as “proof” of the existence of ancient ethnic hatreds and the overwhelming power of ethnic identity. Yet looking at it from a social constructivist perspective, what becomes clear is that in those cases too the goals and strategies of elites were of vital importance in determining outcomes. Existing identities, and the meanings of those identities, were in these cases obstacles to elite goals rather than the means by which elites achieved their goals. In response, elites fomented and provoked conflict in ethnic terms in order to change the meanings of ethnic identities and the nature of ethnic groupness, that is, the nature of the relationships among people who identify in common ethnic terms. Violence was thus used to force a change in how people identified and what it meant to identify in particular ways . . . . elites, because of their control over resources (including economic, military, political, and informational), are able to use violence to try to create a particular notion of groupness that did not exist before; that is, the violence seeks to change what it means to identify as Serb or Croat and to impose an equivalence between ethnic identity and political position—in other words, a political homogeneity.}\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{4} Warren Zimmerman, \textit{Origins of a Catastrophe} (New York: Times Books, 1993), vii. The view that a few individuals were responsible for the former Yugoslavia’s disintegration and subsequent wars has also been provided to explain why the peace process in Bosnia & Herzegovina has shown relatively weak results. Thus, one OHR spokesperson in January 2002 claimed that Karadžić and Mladić remaining at large continued to be “the main obstacle to the total implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords.” See “Stranci ne znaju sto s Karadžicevim i Mladićevim kalendariima?” \textit{Oslobodjenje} (Sarajevo), 16 January 2002.

\textsuperscript{5} Snyder, \textit{From Voting to Violence}, 35.

\textsuperscript{6} See Gagnon, \textit{The Myth of Ethnic War}, op. cit., xvi—xvii.
This understanding of interethnic conflict derives from a version of social constructivist thinking about the role of political and cultural elites in the emergence and development of nationalism. Social constructivism, according to Fearon and Laitin, implies that “social categories, their membership rules, content, and valuation are the products of human action and speech, and that as a result they can and do change over time.” According to this view, political, intellectual and social elites develop various nation-building or “identity projects,” usually based on rational choice calculations as to what constitutes a personally advantageous outcome or position, be it power, prestige, or material or financial gain. The potential of elites to succeed with such identity projects, in turn, is predicated upon the fact that individuals have multiple, fluid, and malleable identities, which elites can manipulate. Thus, according to David Laitin,

All societies—perhaps especially today—have cultural entrepreneurs who offer new identity categories (racial, sexual, regional), hoping to find “buyers.” If their product sells, these entrepreneurs become leaders of newly formed ethnic, cultural, religious, or other forms of identity groups . . . Construction and choice, rather than blood and inheritance, is now the standard story line about identities.

Two issues are worth examining at length here. The first is how powerful elites are in this process. The second concerns the fluidity and malleability of individual identities, and, ultimately, the extent to which individuals believe that all of their identities are equally salient.

The power of elites: For many constructivists, voluntaristic political intervention is at least a necessary condition for the emergence of nations and ethnic groups; as Eley and Suny note,

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7 As James Fearon and David Laitin note, “If individuals are viewed as agents who construct ethnic identities, then constructivist explanations for ethnic violence tend to merge with rationalist, strategic analyses, particularly those that emphasize elite manipulation of mass publics but also those that see violence stemming from ethnic interactions ‘on the ground’ . . . In this approach, the insights of a ‘constructivist’ approach merge with, or become hard to distinguish from, a rationalist or strategic choice approach.” See Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” International Organization 54 (Autumn 2000), 846-48, 853.

8 Laitin, Identity in Formation, 11-12.
“coherent political action is required to transform a segmented and disunited population into a coherent nationality.”

Similarly, in his critique of the constructivist argument Alexander Motyl notes that “Constructivism . . . must argue that national identity can arise only if elites, as the active imaginers, inventors, and constructors . . . consciously take preexisting building blocks and transform them into national identity.”

The degree to which the masses can be manipulated is apparent from an argument proposed by Nicholas Miller:

. . . in southeastern Europe, the idea of the nation was brought to the masses by intellectuals who had the opportunity to pick and choose which elements of a collective personality they wished to emphasize. Only then was this personality communicated to the populace, which was becoming literate as it imbibed the nation-building educational efforts of newly formed state elites. Thus this person whom we know as a Serb today might very well have become something else: a Croat, a Bulgarian, a Yugoslav, depending on the relative merits of the cultural and political arguments for the different options and the capabilities of those who influenced them.

In the arguments of both Laitin and Miller, the emphasis is clearly on the role of elites.

“Cultural entrepreneurs” “pick and choose” what “product” they want to sell to the masses.

Nevertheless, it is also clear from these accounts that the “masses” are not entirely passive; thus, Laitin admits that “cultural entrepreneurs” have to find “buyers” for their “product,” who presumably have some ability to pick and choose among the various “products” on the market.


11 Miller, Between Nation and State, 25. Michael Hechter makes the same argument in more abstract terms, claiming that nation-builders must overcome relatively micro-ecological differences in cultures “by promulgating an arbitrary set of culturally distinctive practices and beliefs, including some sanctioned story of the nation, as a standard to be adopted throughout the territory. Although this task is ultimately educational, it can proceed, in the absence of formal schools, on the basis of oral tradition or written texts. It only succeeds, however, to the degree that the target population is dependent on nation-builders, and that these nation-builders have the capacity to monitor and sanction their dependants.” See Hechter, Containing Nationalism, 24.

12 The most extreme example of the constructivist argument that I have found is proposed by Nelson Kasfir, who argues that one person alone can create an ethnic group; thus, Kasfir claims that “an ethnic group may be carefully constructed by an upwardly mobile entrepreneur looking for a political base.” See Kasfir, “Explaining Ethnic Political Participation,” World Politics 31 (April 1979), 376.
For Miller, this process is determined to some extent by the relative merits of elite arguments. This view of elite manipulation, however, provides what Fearon and Laitin call “a major puzzle,” namely, the problem of explaining “how elites can convince their followers to adopt false beliefs and take actions that the followers would not want to take if they understood what the leaders were up to . . . why do [the masses] pay extravagant costs to fulfill elite power interests?”

How do elites achieve their goal of imposing their chosen “identity project” on the masses? Fearon and Laitin argue that elites are able to exploit the constitutional and political leadership roles they have to influence conflict-prone situations to their advantage, or that the masses give them the benefit of the doubt in conflict situations because they assume that political elites have access to more or better information about the intentions of “others,” or simply because in crisis situations people feel that they do not have the luxury of searching for new leadership.

Often, elite control of the mass media or the educational system is considered key to such power and influence; thus, in this view “the emotions of an inert mass are waiting to be aroused and channeled by elites as part of an exercise in social engineering.” With respect to the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, the role of journalists and the media has been extensively analyzed, and many politicians, journalists and scholars have made strong claims about the media’s ability

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13 Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” 853, 868. In their analysis of Paul Brass’ account of communal violence in India, Fearon and Laitin admit that even Brass “seems aware that it is odd that he should find the politicians’ machinations transparent while the Indian public is duped.”


15 Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 128.
to influence (or inflame) public opinion. A prominent Bosnian intellectual, Zlatko Dizdarević, for instance, has claimed that former Bosniac president Alija Izetbegović manipulated popular opinion to gain power, in the full knowledge that such policies would lead to war. According to Dizdarević,

... nations, especially in this region [but referring specifically to the Bosniacs], without any strong democratic tradition can be molded like dough if the molder is smart, lucid and knows how to do that. I do not want to say that [Izetbegović] took them into the war, but I want to say that he accepted the concept for which he had to know would lead to a war. Why did he do that? To come to power.\(^ \text{17} \)

The Serbian writer and politician Vuk Drašković has likewise pointed to the power of politicians or government-controlled media to mold peoples’ attitudes. Speaking with reference to Serbs in the 1990s, Drašković once claimed that

The tragedy of this people is in the fact that, like a drunk, it goes for the propaganda of those who are in power, not thinking about the suffering of their children, their families, their nation and state; rather, they think through the television, as if on their shoulders people were not carrying their heads, but state TV screens.\(^ \text{18} \)

A sustained analysis of elite-led arguments, however, fails on at least eleven counts. First, and perhaps most importantly, the contemporaneous breakups of the USSR and Czechoslovakia (and perhaps even Belgium in the future) suggests that the problems confronting multiethnic federations are structural or systemic rather than the result of machinations by individual leaders.\(^ \text{19} \) Along somewhat similar lines, Barry R. Posen has argued that technological and


\(^{17}\) Interview with Dizdarević in *Dani* (Sarajevo), 15 October 1999.

\(^{18}\) See the interview with Vuk Drašković in *NIN* (Belgrade), 13 March 2003.

geographical facts of the former Yugoslavia’s disintegration created a set of incentives (if not imperatives) that greatly increased the likelihood of violent ethnic conflict.\textsuperscript{20} Other scholars have gone further, arguing that the violent disintegration of multiethnic states in East-Central Europe was “predestined” or “over-determined.”\textsuperscript{21} Such views obviously reduce the role of individual leaders or elites in these processes, and suggest that a more powerful or convincing explanation for the phenomenon should be found at the systemic or structural level.

Second, elite-led theories of nationalism and ethnic-identity formation exaggerate the importance of the political world, while underplaying the autonomy and importance of social and cultural developments.\textsuperscript{22} An example of the autonomous action social and cultural forces can have from state control was seen in the former Yugoslavia in the late 1960s, when, during the “Croatian Spring” it was Croatian cultural figures, student groups, and the Roman Catholic Church that led the movement, not party or government officials.\textsuperscript{23} The early stages of the Serb protest movement in Kosovo in the 1980s similarly appeared devoid of conventional elites.\textsuperscript{24} Yet another example can be found in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century during the Herzegovinian rebellion, when a


\textsuperscript{22} Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” \textit{American Historical Review} 102 (December 1997), 1394-95.

\textsuperscript{23} Ivan Perić, \textit{Suvremeni hrvatski nacionalizam} (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1984), 24. Along these lines, as Jasna Dragović-Soso points out, the first common Yugoslav institution to disintegrate in the 1980s was the Yugoslav Writers Union. See Dragović-Soso, “Why Did Yugoslavia Disintegrate? An Overview of Contending Explanations,” 21.

\textsuperscript{24} See, for instance, Nebojša Vladisavljević, “Grass Roots Groups, Milošević or Dissident Intellectuals? A Controversy over the Origins and Dynamics of the Mobilization of Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s,” \textit{Nationalities Papers} 32 (December 2004), 781-96.
Serb peasant uprising adopted substantially different goals from those intended by both the Belgrade government and by local Serbian urban and commercial elites in Bosnian cities. Related to this problem is the fact that elite-led theories often assume that political leaders operate in a strategic vacuum in which their actions are always self-initiated, and are not influenced by events beyond their control. One scholar, for instance, has claimed that violence was avoided in Macedonia after the breakup of Yugoslavia because politicians “sought calm accommodation.” In reality, violence did break out in Macedonia (precisely at the time the article in question was published). In part, this was due to the fact that Macedonia shared the same structural-demographic problems other Yugoslav republics faced (i.e., areas in which territorial and ethnic/cultural boundaries were not congruent), but also because of exogenous shocks such as the breakdown of governmental authority in Albania in 1997 and the spillover effects of the Kosovo War in 1999. In either case, theories which over-emphasize the role of elites underestimate the dangers inherent in specific structural situations, and therefore weaken their own predictive capacity.

Thus, by subjugating society and culture to the political world, elite-led theories of nationalism grant the former little autonomous power in relation to the latter. As Alon Confino notes when discussing the topic of “national memory,”

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25 Milorad Ekmečić, *Radovi iz Istorije Bosne i Hercegovine XIX Veka* (Belgrade: Bigz, 1997), 25-46. As Ekmečić points out, the goals of both the Belgrade government and the Bosnian Serb urban commercial elites during the years prior to and during the Herzegovinian insurrection in 1876 were to forge an alliance with the Bosnian Muslims in order to obtain their support for Bosnia & Herzegovina’s unification with Serbia. For the sake of obtaining such Bosnian Muslim support, both the authorities in Belgrade and Bosnian Serb urban elites were willing to sacrifice agrarian reform. This was unacceptable to the peasant insurrectionists, however, who demanded both unification with Serbia and agrarian reform.

By sanctifying the political while underplaying the social, and by sacrificing the cultural to the political, we transform memory into a ‘natural’ corollary of political development and interests . . . Furthermore, one unfortunate side effect of treating memory as a symptom of politics is the lack of explorations of power in areas that are not politically evident . . . We miss a whole world of human activities that cannot be immediately recognized (and categorized) as political, although they are decisive to the way people construct and contest images of the past.27

Confino’s observation about the autonomy of the social and the cultural brings back into focus an important fact: the various Yugoslav republics in the 1990s were not totalitarian entities in which political elites were all-powerful; other broad sectors of Yugoslav society had their own perspectives, goals and interests which should be considered independently of political elites. What is interesting in the Yugoslav case of the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, is the extent to which what Jasna Dragović-Soso has termed “national homogenization” occurred; that is, the adoption of the same nationalist perspective by political, intellectual, cultural, and religious elites, along with the general population as a whole.28 This issue will be explored in greater detail in Chapter IV, but here it is sufficient to stress the inaccuracy of the claim that the various nationalist political elites in the Yugoslav republics “imposed” a particular perspective on their respective societies. Rather, it is more correct to say that in a period of “national homogenization” different segments of society coming from considerably different ideological perspectives reached the same conclusions about the problems affecting their respective ethnoconfessional group, and, sometimes more problematically, the means needed to resolve these problems.

27 Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History,” 1394-95. Dejan Jović notes that in the former Yugoslavia, alongside “official memories” there were also “private memories” each family possessed, and through which it passed along its joys and tragedies through the generations through family oral history. See Jović, “‘Official Memories’ in Post-Authoritarianism: An Analytical Framework,” The Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 6 (2004), 97-108.

Third, cruder forms of the elite-led argument imply that “the masses” are "passive dupes, vehicles or objects of manipulative designs" instead of "active participants" and "political subjects in their own right," or suffer from a cynical “post-modern shiftlessness,” with no notion of solidarity until one is given to them by a state. Or, put a slightly differently way, it exemplifies “a belief in the power of authority to overawe unsophisticated folk,” despite the fact that considerable evidence from around the world suggests that this is not the case.

Similarly, the ability of elites and/or governments to manipulate public opinion using print or electronic media is usually overstated. Studies of stock market investors, for instance, have found that individual behavior is more typically influenced or generated by interpersonal communication than by information an individual may obtain from print media, television, or radio. Evidence from the Balkans suggests that in the 1990s most people were able to

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29 See Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 72. As Brubaker goes on to note, among the Serbs of the Krajina region in the 1980s, “representations of wartime atrocities . . . were not imports. They were locally rooted, sustained within family and village circles, and transmitted to the postwar generations.” Similarly, Anthony Smith argues that in such theories the masses “are passive, acted upon, and usually manipulated by elites for political ends, but their cultures and social networks, even where they have a measure of autonomy, have no political relevance,” and that according to such views, the majority of the population does not possess indigenous traditions and beliefs for which they are willing to sacrifice, fight, and die. See Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 127-128.


31 Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, 70.

32 Thus, Donald Horowitz has argued that “the assumption that elite machinations and deception bring the masses along—requires a leap of faith, and a far-reaching one at that. What it suggests is that non-elites are suffering from a case of ‘false consciousness,’ for they are serving interests other than their own . . . Such an explanation presumes that enormous masses of people in country after country do not have a sound conception of what concerns them. This is a presumption difficult to square with mounting evidence that non-elites in Asia and Africa are far from ignorant about politics.” See Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 104-105.

distinguish between legitimate sources of information and outright propaganda. Thus, despite the propaganda campaigns conducted throughout the late 1980s—early 1990s, the views of most individuals seem to have remained more or less constant over time. In Croatia, for instance, “what is most striking . . . throughout this entire period is the degree to which the basic value orientations and priorities of the population remained remarkably consistent over time, despite the war and the propaganda of the HDZ.”

Similarly, in Serbia media consumers “refused to swallow every lie whole;” in one poll conducted in 1992, for example, only 8 percent of respondents said that state television kept them well-informed, while 43 percent said that the independent media did. Another longitudinal study of public opinion in Croatia across two decades (from roughly the mid-1980s to 2004) found that “macro-political deterioration did not translate into increased intolerance on the personal level,” again revealing the autonomy of individual attitudes vis-à-vis the intentions of state-sponsored propaganda campaigns. Such a conclusion was also found in a recent study of how individuals in postwar Bosnia develop

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35 Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*, 217-218. On the responses of individuals (especially ethnic Serbs) in Croatia to developments in that republic, it is also worth considering what they did know was happening, despite or in addition to what was being spread in the media: 1) that genocide did occur in the “Independent State of Croatia” from 1941-44, and many Croatian Serbs were either survivors of or the descendants of victims of the genocide; 2) that Tudjman’s HDZ was resurrecting many historic symbols of Croatian statehood that had been appropriated by the Ustaša regime, which, rightly or wrongly, was interpreted by Serbs as signifying a rehabilitation of the NDH; 3) that upon coming to power, the HDZ did begin removing large numbers of Serbs from prominent positions throughout Croatia; 4) and, finally, that Tudjman had on a number of occasions made highly provocative and/or racist statements with regards to Serbs and other ethnic groups; for instance, on one occasion saying “Thank God my wife is neither a Serb nor a Jew.” Regardless of the extent to which Tudjman was or was not personally intolerant of other groups (a number of individuals who knew Tudjman personally have told the present writer that he had no personal antipathies towards Serbs), such statements and actions obviously inflamed tensions in what was already a difficult situation, making the “authenticity” of the Serb reaction in Croatia more believable. On these issues, see Bette Denitch, “Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide.” *American Ethnologist* 21 (May 1994), 367-390.

strategies regarding their personal lives which are often at odds with the intentions of nationalistic elites.\textsuperscript{37}

Such evidence suggests that ordinary citizens are more sophisticated in their reasoning than elite-based theories admit. In the “marketplace of ideas” many different ideologies, political platforms, positions, etc., are competing, again raising the issue of reception and begging the question of why the nationalist argument so often wins the day. As Ernest Gellner notes,

There is something bizarre in the suggestion that a force so widespread and pervasive, a flame that springs up so strongly and spontaneously in so many disconnected places, and which needs so very little fanning to become a devouring forest blaze, should spring from nothing more than some extremely abstruse lucubrations of philosophers. For better or worse, our ideas seldom have quite such power. In an age of cheap paper, print, and widespread literacy and easy communication, any number of ideologies are spawned and compete for our favor; and they are often formulated and propagated by men with greater literary and propagandistic gifts than those which nature chose to bestow on the prophets of nationalism. Yet these other forms of nonsense have never had a remotely comparable impact upon mankind.\textsuperscript{38}

Fourth, elite-focused theories of nationalism and ethnic conflict do not explain why—especially in a region of transient regimes—some states have been able to impose their identities


\textsuperscript{38} Gellner, \textit{Nations and Nationalism}, 125-26. Along similar lines, Anthony Smith argues that “The passion that the nation could evoke, especially in time of danger, the sacrifices it could command from ‘the poor and unlettered’ as well as the middle classes, cannot be convincingly explained by the propaganda of politicians and intellectuals, or the ritual and pageantry of mass ceremonies—unless, that is, the public was already attuned to both propaganda and ceremonial. It is hard to believe that most people would willingly lay down their lives for an artifact or be duped by propaganda and ritual over a long period, unless that ritual and propaganda expressed and amplified pre-existing popular sentiments which saw the ethnic nation as the family and locality writ large.” See Smith, \textit{Nationalism and Modernism}, 131. Similarly, Keith Darden has argued that “It is likely that the nationalism of newspapers and literature reflects rather than drives the creation of the ‘nationalist’ public, and that the ‘market’ for such content is driven by demand rather than supply.” See Darden, “The Causes and Consequences of Enduring National Loyalties,” draft manuscript, Chapter 1, 16. To take but one example of the weakness of this argument--in February 2000 NATO peacekeepers shut down what was called a Croat nationalist TV station in Mostar. Nine months later, the HDZ and a smaller allied nationalist party won 93 percent of the Croat vote in Bosnia. See Bose, \textit{Bosnia After Dayton}, 145.
on individuals, while others have not. A resident of Kosovo or Serbia born in the 1930s had by 2010 lived in six different internationally recognized countries. Thus, when several competing political programs or identity-projects are on offer at any given moment, this then begs the question of why some succeed while others fail, or, put another way, the question of reception. As Alon Confino notes,

... the crucial issue ... is not how a past is represented but why it was received or rejected. For every society sets up images of the past. Yet to make a difference in a society, it is not enough for a certain past to be selected. It must steer emotions, motivate people to act, be received; in short, it must become a socio-cultural mode of action. Why is it that some pasts triumph while others fail? Why do people prefer one image of the past over another? ... the crucial issue is not what is represented but how this representation has been interpreted and received.

Confino’s question regarding why “some pasts triumph while others fail” and why some images of the past are accepted while others are rejected is a crucial point. The historical experience of the Balkans over the past 150-200 years has been one in which political “solutions” prove fairly temporary; throughout this period, political regimes have come and gone with considerable regularity. This begs the question of which one formed an individual’s identity, and why it was successful where others failed. As Keith Brown points out, a weakness of elite-based or state-sponsored theories of identity-formation is that

... in a region of transient regimes, what is emphasized about the inhabitants is their supposed willingness to adopt another national affiliation quickly. In parallel fashion, the new state is presumed to be ready and able to accept them as tabulae

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39 Brown, The Past in Question, op. cit., 128-29. While perhaps an extreme example of how transient regimes in the region can be, a Bosnian scholar has pointed out that he and his two brothers were born in the same house in the same town only five years apart—yet each was born in a different state. See Ivan Cvitković, Hrvatski identitet u Bosni i Hercegovini: Hrvati između nacionalnog i građanskog (Zagreb: Synopsis, 2006), 296. The first brother was born in 1940 in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The second brother was born during World War II in the “Independent State of Croatia.” The third brother was born in 1945 in Tito’s communist federation.

rasae and to inscribe national identity on them anew. Such a view at best credits the population with cynicism, a sort of post-modern shiftlessness; at worst, perceived from the stance of the nation-state, it presumes they have no notion of solidarity until given to them by a state (for, in this logic, only states make nations) and thereby makes them into ciphers. What one might term “experienced” history drops out of sight as the rhythm of every aspect of life is taken to be determined by the continuities or disjunctures in ‘top-down’ history.41

Thus, in a region of transient regimes, the popular reception of particular images of the past—why certain images are internalized while others are not—suggests that elites and political orders are not as omnipotent in imposing their identity projects on their respective populations as many constructivist or instrumentalist theories would suggest. Thus, instead of stressing the role of elites in imposing identities on any given population, a more appropriate way of understanding Balkan societies is to recognize that large segments of the population are relatively autonomous in the formation of their identities, attitudes, and worldviews.

Fifth, elite-led theories of nationalism and identity formation suggest that there is an essential dichotomy between the goals and ambitions of elites, and those of the masses, a viewpoint frequently expressed by international policymakers working in the former Yugoslavia.42

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41 Brown, The Past in Question, 128-129. Brown goes on to note an alternative understanding of these problems: “people’s constructions of their social reality may escape the categories and plans of the centralizing state, and that the life of a small community may serve as a locus of continuity far more effectively than the often more fleeting existence that a territorially bound polity may enjoy. This approach is one in which the anthropological imagination is invoked in a consideration of what have variously been called the micropractices, cultural codes or habitus of a society, which form continuities in individual and group life less visible in the national frame.” Brown, The Past in Question, 129.

42 Along with the popularity of this thesis with social constructivists, it has also been popular with international officials in the Balkans. For instance, the former international High Representative in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown, claimed that there was a large difference between the ambitions and desires of the people of Bosnia & Herzegovina, and the desires and dreams of people in power and in politics—a rather far-reaching statement for someone who did not speak the language of Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, and who had never won an election in the country he governed with almost limitless authority. See “Ja sam visoki predstavnik, nisam Bog,” Dani (Sarajevo), 28 June 2002. Ashdown, however, is only the latest in a long line of international bureaucrats appointed to the Balkans with such views. Robin Okey, for instance, notes that during Benjamin Kállay’s administration of Bosnia, a prominent view of problems in the province was that “a minority of ‘radicals’ or ‘malcontents’ were unrepresentative of the great bulk of the (peasant) population at large.” See Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, ix.
There are several problems with this mode of thinking. The first is that it underestimates the willingness of lower classes to identify with the history and traditions of upper classes from their own cultural/religious communities.\textsuperscript{43} Or, put another way, it assumes that there is an essential dichotomy between the goals, ambitions, and interests of elites, and the goals, interests and ambitions of “the masses,” which, arguably, is probably not the case during a period of “national homogenization.” But it also assumes that “the masses” do not understand what is in their true interests, while the observer does, or that outside observers can determine the true interests and motivations of a given actor, even if the actor in question claims otherwise.\textsuperscript{44} As John Breuilly argues,

To argue that a particular class is manipulated implies that there is an objective class interest which is independent of the perceived interest of members of that class. This objective interest can be identified by the observer . . . [yet] one never encounters completely irrational action or the complete realization of particular class interests. A number of classes can benefit to a greater or lesser degree from a particular set of policies.\textsuperscript{45}

Substituting “classes” for “ethnic groups” or “nations” leads to the same conclusion. Consequently, instead of blaming an upsurge in nationalism in the former Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 1990s on “small groups of conservatives and extremists,” a more plausible argument would suggest that both leaders and led were absorbed by the logic of national homogenization

\textsuperscript{43} On these issues, see Aleksa Djilas, \textit{The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 16. Theodor Hanf has made a similar point, noting “Even the economically deprived members [of a group defined in terms of a cultural marker] are better off identifying with the privileged members of their community than with people in a similar economic situation from other communities.” See Hanf, “The Sacred Marker: Religion, Communalism and Nationalism,” \textit{Social Compass} 41 (1994), 13.


\textsuperscript{45} See Breuilly, \textit{Nationalism and the State} (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Edition, 1993), 410-411. This has been a problem for liberal thinkers since the Enlightenment. As Aleksa Djilas has noted, the Enlightenment underestimated the propensity of the lower social classes to identify with the ruling class and to see its history as their own. The peasantry simply was not ahistorical to the degree that the Enlightenment and, especially, the Enlightenment’s latterday partial heirs, the socialists and Communists, believed.” Djilas, \textit{The Contested Country}, 16.
and ethnic solidarity during a period of systemic breakdown. Elites can be just as frequently in the grip of nationalist passions as the masses, and often just as prepared for self-sacrifice; thus, “Nationalism did not erase class differences or antagonisms, but it certainly could override them in moments of external danger, and temporarily unify the classes to achieve common goals.”

Sixth, regarding the elites in the former Yugoslavia themselves, the degree to which their decisions to “become nationalists” were the result of interest-maximizing rationality is questionable. Many of the protagonists in the most recent Balkan conflicts became nationalists long before it could rationally be assumed that “playing the national card” was an interest-maximizing career choice.

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46 Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 128. On the issue of the instrumental rationality of elites in the former Yugoslavias, Dejan Jović cautions that much analysis along these lines is an example of what Quentin Skinner has described as the myth of prolepsis: the problem of searching for a causal explanation tying together intentions, actions, and consequences, in such a way that a specific result is the consequence of a specific intention. Jović himself argues that it was not the intention of any of the elite groups in the former Yugoslavia to destroy the country. According to Jović, a careful analysis of the public statements and actions of the various leaders in the former Yugoslavia suggests that many of them were in fact genuinely surprised by the outcome. Jović, Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla, 93.

47 While Slobodan Milošević is often held up as an example of a politician who cynically adopted nationalist policies to further his personal political ambitions, an analysis of the lives and careers of many of the other protagonists in Yugoslavia’s breakup reveals that they had become nationalists long before such orientations could have been considered rational political moves. Many of them, moreover, abandoned successful careers to embrace what would be considered nationalist positions. Franjo Tuđman, for instance, enjoyed a very successful career in communist Yugoslavia, becoming a general in Tito’s Yugoslav People’s Army, holding the prestigious position of president of Belgrade’s Partizan soccer club (although Red Star fans might argue that no honorable individual would be associated with Partizan), and being named the director of an historical research institute in Zagreb. Despite these career successes, his views became increasingly nationalistic, even at a time at which such views were counterproductive personally. In 1946, forty-four years before he first ran for elected office, Alija Izetbegović was arrested and imprisoned for anticommunist activities and involvement in an anti-state Muslim organization. Haris Silajdžić came from a family of prominent Islamic clerics, studied Arab languages and Islamic studies in Libya, and obtained a Ph.D. at the University of Priština. His doctoral thesis was on Albanian nationalism. Stipe Mesić started out his public career as a communist party member, received a law degree, but in the 1970s became a supporter of the “Croatian Spring” movement, because of which he was eventually tried and imprisoned. Vojislav Šešelj’s career started off with considerable promise, as he became the youngest person ever to earn a Ph.D. in Yugoslavia, yet his nationalist views earned him a jail sentence in 1984. Vuk Drašković was a communist party member and had a successful career in Yugoslav journalism, but after embarking on a new career as a fiction writer focusing on the Serb historical experience in the 20th century, his novels moved him in the direction of becoming a dissident. Dobroslav Paraga, the founder of the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), early in his life became an anti-communist dissident known for his strongly Croatian nationalist views. Dobrica Ćosić, perhaps the most prominent 20th century Serbian writer, had a very successful career in communist Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s and was close to Tito.
Seventh, elite-led theories have difficulties explaining why so many leaders from across the political spectrum, i.e., not just “nationalists” adopt nationalist positions. Over the past 150 years, for instance, the banner of Croatian nationalism has been waved by people from across the ideological spectrum, from Ante Starčević and the Croatian Party of Right, to peasant radicals such as Stjepan Radić, fascists such as Ante Pavelić, clericalists such as Alojzije Stepinac, communists such as Vladimir Bakarić, communists-turned-nationalists such as Franjo Tudjman, and social democrats such as Dražen Budiša. That such different political personalities across time and from such different ideological perspectives all adopted nationalist positions suggests something more fundamental at work than elite manipulation.48

Eighth, in the estimations of many of these leaders themselves, they were following public opinion more than they were leading it, which in effect reverses the causal direction of the

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48 Sabrina Ramet put the issue in somewhat similar terms when she noted that “regardless of what the particular interests of Croatian peasants, merchants, sailors, priests, and intellectuals may have been, they united to support the same program in the conviction that their principal foe was one and the same (Serbian hegemonism).” Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 7. This can also be seen in the fact that, as the case of the former Yugoslavia demonstrated, political dissidents were much more willing to collaborate with political opponents of their own nationality than with like-minded individuals of a different nationality. Reviewing the history of state-opposition relations in the Titoist period, Vladimir Gligorov noted that, “Opposition groups are more ready to cooperate with the Communists of their own nationality than with the opposition of some other nationality.” See Gligorov, “The Discovery of Liberalism in Yugoslavia,” East European Politics and Societies 5 (Winter 1991), 15. Along similar lines, Dejan Jović has noted that “Although ideological differences between them were great, between elites and counter-elites there was not a great difference with respect to the national question and the protection of “national interests.” See Jović, Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla, 424. Such cross-ideological cooperation on national issues was also evident in Macedonia during World War II, when Macedonia’s communist leadership supported the Bulgarian occupation authorities’ efforts, despite the fact that Bulgaria was an ally in Germany’s war against the Soviet Union. As Keith Brown notes, “‘National’ rejection of Yugoslav rule had been affirmed as more important than any communist opposition to the old Yugoslav elites or to fascism more generally.” See Keith Brown, The Past in Question, 135.
process. As Zoran Djindjić, one of the principal leaders of the anti-Miloševid opposition in the 1990s, noted at the time “if we want to build a popular movement, we must use nationalism to do it. Our primary goal is to reform the economy and push Yugoslavia into Western Europe, but we cannot rally popular support around an economic program. This is why we are building our movement on Serbian nationalism.”

Alija Izetbegović noted the same problem facing Bosnian politicians when he observed, “If you call for an open forum on democracy, a hundred intellectuals show up. If the forum is about nationalism, you will get 10 thousand people from all walks of life on the streets.”

Earlier historical examples provide similar cases in point. In the 1870s, Serbian leaders such as the Serbian king at the time, Milan Obrenović, were opposed to an aggressive foreign policy vis-à-vis the Ottoman empire; however, “elections had returned a majority that favored military action . . . [and despite Milan’s reluctance] The combination of Serbian public pressure and public enthusiasm was too strong for Milan.”

In the latter half of the 19th century, rejecting the tradition that local intellectuals should draw their inspiration from Vienna or Paris, Croatia’s most important and influential politician of the late 19th-early 20th century, Stjepan Radić, would note, “we must seek our political ideas, a political directive, in the people. From these national ideas let us conceive our national ideals.”

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50 Cited by Carsten Wieland, “Izetbegovic und Jinnah-die selektive Vereinnahung zweier ‘Muslim-Fuhrer’." *Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen* (1999/Nr. 4), 351. When Izetbegović had to choose between staying in a smaller, modified Yugoslavia, or opting for independence for Bosnia, he chose the latter, noting “That is not a situation we created. That is a situation created by the disintegration of Yugoslavia. No matter who was in charge, he would find himself in completely the same situation. . . .” As quoted by Burg and Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 77. Emphasis added. Saćir Filandra, a leading Bosniac intellectual, confirmed Izetbegović’s dilemma, and the constraints placed upon him by public opinion when he noted “. . . there was no other choice except state independence for Bosnia. If [Izetbegovic] at that time had made a mistake, we as a people would have chosen that course; because that is simply the logic of historical events and nothing else could have been chosen at the time.” See the interview with Filandra in *Dani* (Sarajevo), 8 December 1997, 34. Emphasis added.


Ninth, elite-led theories of nationalism and ethnic conflict imply that a change in elites should help resolve nationalist/ethnic problems, or that, when so inclined, elites should be able to “whip down” ethnic frenzies and even “un-create nations.”\textsuperscript{53} In post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, this has been an implicit belief of international strategy, as seen by the authorities granted to the internationally-appointed High Representative to remove uncooperative elites from power. Yet the intractability of many nationalist/ethnic conflicts in the Balkan reveals that their resolution is seldom achieved by changing elites. Evidence for this claim can be found in the fact that so many current conflicts in the region—such as the Kosovo question (especially since 1981), the Greek-Macedonian name dispute issue, and various aspects of the Bosnian problem—have outlasted several generations of elites.\textsuperscript{54}

Tenth, in many instances of ethnic conflict, violence can spring up spontaneously, or, put a different way, it is not clear who the leaders of such conflicts are.\textsuperscript{55} Roger Petersen, for instance,


\textsuperscript{54} In the Kosovo case, evidence of this can be found in the fact that since 1981, several different sets of leadership in Belgrade (i.e., post-Tito Yugoslav federal authorities, Milošević, Koštunica, Djindjić, Tadić) have proven unable to develop a satisfactory solution to the problem. Similarly, in the case of the Greek-Macedonian name dispute issue, several changes of elites in both Athens and Skopje have been unable to resolve the problem since 1991. Likewise, in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the country is dealing with the same sets of constitutional and political questions it has confronted since 1990-1991, despite several changes of leadership and a 43-month war. For instance, Bosniac-Croat disputes, such as re-unifying the divided city of Mostar, or resolving the status of the Adriatic ports of Neum and Ploče, have been on the table since the 1990s, despite the fact that there have been numerous changes in leadership in Zagreb (e.g., from Tudjman, to Ivica Račan, to Ivo Sanader and Stipe Mesić, and to the current tandem of Ivo Josipović and Jadranka Kosor).

\textsuperscript{55} For various examples of this, see Dejan Jović, *Jugoslavija-država koja je odumrla* (Belgrade: Samizdat B92, 2003), 326; Roger D. Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence*, op. cit., 5, 36, 251. As Petersen goes on to note, "One senses that the portrayal of events as elite led is well intentioned. It reduces the responsibility of the mass of perpetrators by placing blame on a few evil leaders. Good intentions have little to do with social science, however." On the superfluity of elites in the instigation of ethnic conflict, Joseph Rudolf notes that this has been true in many cases in advanced western democracies as well; for instance, in the Los Angeles riots associated with the Rodney King affair, and the 2005 riots between Roma and Muslims in southern French cities in 2005. See Rudolf, *Politics and Ethnicity*, op. cit., 210.
claims that in many cases of ethnic violence in 20th century East Central Europe, leadership has often been "superfluous . . . in several instances of ethnic violence in Eastern Europe, it is difficult to identify leaders." In the specific case of the former Yugoslavia, Dejan Jović has similarly argued that the image of leaders manipulating masses is too simplistic. According to Jović, there were in fact three independent sets of actors involved in the various events leading up to Yugoslavia’s disintegration—elites, critical intelligentsia, and dissatisfied segments of the population. According to Jović, in the relations between these three groups, “one cannot determine exactly who was the initiator and who was the follower in these relations: those two roles frequently changed.”

This has been evident in several cases in the former Yugoslavia, from Kosovo to the Krajina.

Eleventh, many elite-led theories of nationalism assume that leaders operate in an historical and political vacuum. For instance, one account of the Croat-Serb conflict of the 1990s suggests that it was a result of

. . . the policy of the small groups of conservatives and extremists on both sides who were seeking to impose their own political preferences on populations who had very different values and preferences . . . violence and threats were necessary to ethnicize a society that had until then not been divided along those lines.

What is debatable here is not whether “small groups of conservatives and extremists” can initiate violence. The ability of elites (especially those in a centralized communist hierarchy) to

56 See Jović, Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla, 326.

57 Amongst both Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, for instance, problems in the province were put on the political agenda by a number of non-state actors such as the Serbian Orthodox Church or the Kosovo Albanian students’ movement, not by official political elites. Jasna Dragović-Soso claims the same could be said for the Slovenian youth and social movements of the 1980s. See Dragović-Soso, “Why Did Yugoslavia Disintegrate? An Overview of Contending Explanations,” 22.

initiate violence is relatively uncontroversial. Moreover, in key moments of rapid change, the power of political leaders often assumes even greater importance. Yet in the above passage the claims about elite power are more far-reaching. They assume that leaders are essentially operating in an historical and political vacuum, as a result of which they are able to impose, through the use of violence, their vision of ethnic identity on otherwise reluctant populations, and are able to “ethnicize” a society which otherwise could have split along different lines. Each of these claims should be examined in some detail.

First, the assumption that political leaders act in an historical or political vacuum free of constraints imposed upon them by the past, or by the expectations of their own populations, is difficult to sustain; as Woodward points out, the stress on evil leaders “ignores the conditions that make such leaders possible and popular and therefore also ignores the policies necessary to end their rule.” It also discounts point eight above—the possibility that the causal direction in the process might be the opposite of what elite-led theories of ethnic conflict argue: that the masses are pushing elites along a certain course. Addressing both of these issues, Roger Petersen notes that

59 As Susan Woodward has noted in the case of the former Yugoslavia, “The enormous real difficulties of managing this triple transition—to multiparty democracy, market economies, and independent statehood—require a rare combination of leadership skills. The fact that its timing was set by political developments elsewhere reduced substantially the probability that the available leaders would have what was necessary. At the same time, the collapse of established political procedures and the political instability placed a premium on individual leadership. Politicians who rode the nationalist tide to power had to shift roles rapidly with little preparation. They moved almost overnight from Communist party sinecures or from the political isolation of individual dissent (including prison) to positions that required organizational talents and statesmanship, to build party organizations and to keep the newly independent state from further breakdown of civil order and war. The disadvantage of their region in the strategic balance of power is thus compounded by the inexperience of their leaders, which increases the probability of costly and even tragic tactical mistakes.” See Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 352. On this point, see also Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions, 36.

60 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 15.
. . . history matters. Such a statement may seem banal, but many, if not most, political science treatments of the Yugoslav violence stress recent elite manipulations or the situational dynamics of Fear and the security dilemma. . . . If history is important, then it will serve as a constraint on the strategies of elites. Elite attempts at manipulation will fail if they do not resonate with historical experience. The elite versus mass question, is, in most cases, a matter of degree. Certainly, charismatic leaders can organize and motivate populations with their ideas; of course, elites can use the control of the media to distort information and manipulate numbers of people. But there is no reason to assume that elites always constrain and manipulate masses rather than the other way around. Many times it is impossible to determine who is leading whom.\textsuperscript{61}

Sumantra Bose has expressed this idea in a somewhat different way, by evoking the metaphor of the “boiling cauldron” of ethnic conflict, which, he notes, “was stirred by elites until it boiled over—however, this implies the existence of a cauldron, or at least ingredients thereof, that could be stirred in this manner. Elites can provoke and precipitate violent conflict, but they cannot invent or fabricate such conflicts out of thin air.”\textsuperscript{62}

Twelfth, the definition of “elites” used in many constructivist and rationalist accounts is somewhat fuzzy. If all of the individuals and groups engaging in nationalist activities and constructing ethnic identities are in fact a part of these processes, then the overall segment of the population involved in such activities becomes quite large. For instance, Fearon and Laitin argue that an important part in the identity construction process is played by thugs and ordinary criminals.\textsuperscript{63} Other accounts add the importance of journalists,\textsuperscript{64} clerics,\textsuperscript{65} writers, historians, and

\textsuperscript{61} Petersen, \textit{Understanding Ethnic Violence}, 251.

\textsuperscript{62} Bose, \textit{Bosnia After Dayton}, 249.


\textsuperscript{64} Again, see Kurspahić, \textit{Prime Time Crime}, op. cit., and Thompson, \textit{Forging War}, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{65} On the role of religious leaders and religious organizations in the 1990s, see Mirko Blagojević, \textit{Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva} (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2005); Paul Mojzes, \textit{Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans} (New York: Continuum, 1994); Vjekoslav Perica, \textit{Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in
scholars, émigrés, the bards of the gusla and other musicians, secret agents and terrorists, and artists and painters. If to this list we add the architects who design places of worship and family homes in ethnoconfessionally distinctive ways, the chefs who cook specific “national” cuisines, and the seamstresses and artisans who craft folk arts in similarly distinctive “national” ways, the “elites” who produce and reproduce ethnic identity becomes rather large. As these examples show, rather than understanding nationalism as a project promoted by interest-
maximizing elites, nationalism in southeastern Europe is in fact better understood as the product of a “naturally occurring diversity” comprising large segments of a given population.72

Thirteenth and finally, if nationalism is an “inevitable,” “inescapable,” and “indispensable” “necessity” of the modern era,73 then this again suggests that nationalist ideologies and nationalist struggles would have emerged and erupted regardless of which leaders or elites were in power. All of these factors suggest that nationalism and the process of ethnic-identity formation is more a product of structure and of the human condition than merely one of human agency or contingency, and, correspondingly, that in trying to understand and explain ethnoconfessional nationalism the level-of-analysis needs to be shifted from the individual to the collective or the structural.

Given the aforementioned weaknesses of elite-led explanations for nationalism, it becomes clear that a more complex and sophisticated understanding is needed. Eley and Suny, for instance, note the multicausal complexity of nationalism and identity-formation when they claim that “nationality is best conceived as a complex, uneven, and unpredictable process, forged from an interaction of cultural coalescence and specific political intervention.”74 Similarly, Fearon and Laitin show that constructivism provides three different approaches by which identities are

72 The phrase “naturally occurring diversity” is used by filmmaker Ken Burns to describe the large number of Americans from many different social categories—men and women, African-American, Native American, Hispanic, and Caucasian, republicans and democrats, etc., who all worked to create the U.S. National Park system.


constructed: through broad structural forces (i.e., economic modernization or technological progress), through “discursive formations or symbolic or cultural systems that have their own logic or agency”, or though individual human agency, although they also note that the constructivist literature is weak when it comes to describing “the specific process by which identities are produced and reproduced in action and speech.” Joanne Nagel provides a similarly complex argument, claiming that,

> Boundaries, identities, and cultures are negotiated, defined, and produced through social interaction inside and outside ethnic communities . . . the origin, content, and form of ethnicity reflect the creative choices of individuals and groups as they define themselves and others in ethnic ways. Through the actions and designations of ethnic groups, their antagonists, political authorities, and economic interest groups, ethnic boundaries are erected dividing some populations and unifying others . . . Ethnicity is the product of actions undertaken by ethnic groups as they shape and reshape their self-definition and culture; however, ethnicity is also constructed by external social, economic, and political processes and actors as they shape and reshape ethnic categories and definitions . . . ethnic identity is both optional and mandatory.

It should be noted, however, that the price paid for this more sophisticated understanding of the nationalism (albeit one that makes it more realistic) is conceptual and theoretical simplicity. The arguments by Eley, Suny, and Nagel have moved away from the more simplistic arguments about human agency to more complex arguments that involve both human agency and structural factors. Thus, ethnic identity formation becomes a product of both individual and group actions

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75 See Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” 850-51. They also note (855-72) that some constructivist theories suggest “that social identities are produced and reproduced through the everyday actions of ordinary folk, that is, ‘on the ground.’ Individuals think of themselves in terms of a particular set of social categories, which lead them to act in ways that collectively confirm, reinforce, and propagate these identities . . . identity construction . . . might also be developed by focusing on strategic actions at ground level by ordinary folk.” (Emphasis added).

76 Nagel, “Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture,” Social Forces 41 (February 1994), 152-156. Emphasis in the original. Paul C. Stern similarly provides a complex explanation for why national loyalties exhibit such strength; according to Stern, “national loyalty has deeply emotional and normative components; it involves a perception of collective interest; it is socially constructed and manipulated by national leaders; and it must, to be effective, outcompete both self interest considerations and individuals’ loyalties to other social groups. The challenge for theory is to develop an account that is consistent with all these valid insights.” See Stern, “Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?”, Political Psychology 16 (June 1995), 219.
(i.e., human agency) and more anonymous processes and actors (structures). Lake and Rothchild, for instance, claim that “Analytically, ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs are as much a product as a producer of ethnic fears and are dependent for their ‘success’ upon the underlying strategic dilemmas [facing individual ethnic groups].”\(^{77}\) At this point, the entire image of “construction” begins to give a somewhat false impression of the process, as Motyl notes, “To point out that nations are humanly constructed may therefore be true . . . but it is as true as the larger statement that all nonmolecular, nonatomic reality is constructed . . .”\(^{78}\)

Given all of the above considerations, both identity-formation and the nation-building process in general are clearly very complex, multi-dimensional processes in which it is extremely difficult to trace the causal origins or direction of the process. As one group of authors recently noted,

> Often designated as elite-led and mass-led ethnic mobilization . . . there is actually an interactive process that goes on between political leaders, intellectuals, journalists, and other opinion makers and the public, a process that defies a one-directional characterization of mobilization, including the intensification of ethnic hostility. Political entrepreneurs and opinion leaders are limited in how far the definition of an ethnic other can be construed as a threat to personal and public safety, and even the degree of ambiguity they can introduce in order to generate fear of the other.\(^{79}\)

At this point, we can conclude the discussion of elite-led theories of identity-formation by noting the following: First, elite-based theories which stress the role of instruments of state power to impose identities on individuals overestimate the role of the state and the ability of media to form identities or attitudes, while at the same time underestimating the intelligence of

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\(^{77}\) Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” 55.

\(^{78}\) Motyl, Revolutions, Nations, Empires, 94.

the average individual, or the autonomy of social and cultural actors from political ones. This makes it difficult to view the process of identity formation, or nation-building, as a unidirectional, top-down process. As insights from the constructivist literature suggest, identity formation is the result of a complex process involving both specific human agency and more anonymous structural processes.

III. Modernism and Balkan Nationalism

Elite-based theories of identity formation and nation-building are related to what Anthony Smith calls the modernist theory of nationalism. The modernist argument runs along the following lines: nationalism as a political ideology (in the Gellnerian sense that cultural and political units should be congruent) emerged in Western Europe about the time of the French Revolution, subsequently spread to Eastern Europe, and then throughout the world. Prior to that time, the vast majority of the world’s population had little or no sense of ethnic identity or nationality, and was largely indifferent to who governed it. With specific reference to Eastern Europe and the Balkans, nationalism as an ideology was imported from the West and only become a serious political force sometime in the mid-19th century (with specific respect to Serbia, Gale Stokes puts it sometime after 184080). At this point in time, nationally conscious elites began spreading the nationalist gospel and “inventing” national myths and traditions. Within the space of a few decades, intellectuals and other “ethnic entrepreneurs” managed to implant or impose their vision of what these people’s identity should be on them; Hobsbawm, for instance, argues that “the popular masses—workers, servants, peasants” were the last to be

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80 See Stokes, The Absence of Nationalism in Serbian Politics before 1840."
affected by “national consciousness”\textsuperscript{81} through state institutions such as the school system (largely a nineteenth century innovation), the military and the government bureaucracy. Technological innovations such as the invention of printing accelerated this process. This vision of national identity then became so powerful that great masses of people were not merely willing to kill each other for the sake of such “imagined communities,” but to die for them as well.

There are several problems with this argument. The first concerns the historical origins of the birth and emergence of nations. Nationalism as an idea (again, in the Gellnerian sense) was not an invention of 19\textsuperscript{th} century nationally-conscious elites. The roots of what is called “modern” nationalist thought can be traced well back into history. In Genesis (Chapter 10), the sons of Noah have “their families, their languages, their lands, and their nations,” clearly combining elements crucial to the nationalist idea—a distinct people, on a distinct land, with their own distinct mode of communication, forming a distinct collectivity. As Adrian Hastings notes,

The Bible . . . presented in Israel itself a developed model of what it means to be a nation—a unity of people, language, religion, territory, and government. Perhaps it was an all too terrifyingly monolithic ideal, productive ever after of all sorts of dangerous fantasies, but it was there, an all too obvious exemplar for Bible readers of what every other nation too might be, a mirror of national self-imaging.\textsuperscript{82}

Ancient Greece provides an even more explicit example of the existence of nationalist thought and practice. In The Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, for example, attributes the following speech to Pericles,

This land of ours, in which the same people have never ceased to dwell in an unbroken line of successive generations, they by their valor transmitted to our times a free state . . . We live under a form of government which does not emulate

\textsuperscript{81} Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 12.

\textsuperscript{82} See Hastings, The Construction of Ethnicity, 18.
the institutions of our neighbors; on the contrary, we are ourselves a model which some follow rather than the imitators of other peoples . . . We have provided for the spirit many relaxations from toil, we have games and sacrifices regularly throughout the year and homes fitted out with good taste and elegance . . .

Thucydides here provides an even clearer expression of nationalist thought—a common people, living continuously on a specific territory, with their own form of government, and with their own developed cultural practices and rituals. Thus, the human tendency to favor and take pride in one’s own ways—what social psychologists today call in-group favoritism—existed amongst the ancients as well; as Herodotus wrote several hundred years before the common era, “everyone believes his own native customs, and the religion he was brought up in, to be the best; and that being so, it is unlikely that anyone but a madman would mock at such things.”84 Since Herodotus’ times, psychological studies have repeatedly shown that the loyalties which produce in-group favoritism are common to all human collectivities and groupings.85 This in-group favoritism is also apparent in the preference of people to be ruled by their own kind, another thing that is not an exclusively modern phenomenon. In the early sixteenth century, for instance, the Frenchman Claude Seyssel claimed that “All nations and reasonable men prefer to be governed by men of their own country and nation—who know their habits, laws and customs and share the same language and lifestyle as them, rather than by strangers.”86


84 *The Histories*, Book III, Chapter 38.

85 In the U.S., for instance, a study by Peter Marsden on the core social networks (defined as “those persons with whom one discusses important matters” e.g., family, finances, health, politics, etc.) of Americans broken down by age, education, sex, size of place, and race/ethnicity found the latter to be the most pronounced. Moreover, network heterogeneity according to race/sex decreases as a person gets older. See Peter V. Marsden, “Core Discussion Networks of Americans,” *American Sociological Review* 52 (February 1987), 126, 128.

86 Quoted by Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood*, 114. Of course, in the modern era this has become an ever more powerful emotion. More recently, Joseph Rothschild has seconded Seyssel’s view, noting that “today most people would rather be governed poorly by their own ethnic brethren than well by aliens, occupiers, and colonizers . . . Indeed, to be ruled by ethnic strangers is perceived as worse than oppressive, as degrading.” See Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework*, 14-15. With specific reference to the Partisan struggle in
These issues raise the question of the extent to which individuals and groups prior to 1789 thought, or could think, in terms of ethnic loyalties and nation-states. A common debate in studies of Bosnia & Herzegovina, for instance, is the extent to which Christians in Bosnia (i.e., Catholics and Orthodox) had any sense of being Croats or Serbs, respectively, prior to the 19th century. Not surprisingly, Bosniac historiography (and Western accounts derivative of it) tends to discount such a possibility. Similarly, in the case of Serbia, Gale Stokes cites the eighteenth century Serbian historian Pavle Julinac as expressing the hope “that the Almighty might be pleased to deliver all the Serbs from the barbarian yoke . . . and give them such gracious masters as the Austrian rulers.” Stokes suggests that Julinac “would have been shocked at any suggestion that Serbia should be an independent country.” Yet another explanation for Julinac’s expression might simply have been that given the current balance of forces in southeastern Europe, and the fact that the Serbs had little chance of defeating either the Habsburgs or the Ottomans in the effort to create an independent polity, it would be better to simply accept Habsburg suzerainty. In the case of Macedonia, for instance, although all of the Macedonian movements of the 19th and 20th centuries had

. . . sought the establishment of a Macedonian state—a “free Macedonia” (slobodna Makedonija)—statehood did not necessarily or always denote total independence. Many Macedonian spokesmen, conscious of the relative weakness

Yugoslavia during World War II, Paul Shoup has argued that “it is incontrovertible that the driving force behind the peasants’ nationalism was an attitude which had played an important role in the history of the Balkan peoples for centuries: deep-rooted hostility toward rule by ethnically alien elements. It was a sentiment with a glorious tradition. It was also primitive, ethnocentric, and provincial.” See Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, 98-99.

87 See, for instance, Nedim Filipović, *Islamizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini* (Tešanj: Centar za kulturu i obrazovanje, 2005), especially 57-58, and Enver Imamović, *Prijeklo i pripadnost stanovništva Bosne i Hercegovine* (Sarajevo: Bosanski korijeni, 1998), 35-36. Imamović, however, goes on (39-40) to discuss the existence of Croats and Serbs in Bosnia in the later Middle Ages. Noel Malcolm’s *Bosnia: A Short History*, makes many similar arguments.

of Macedonian nationalism and the comparative combined strength of its opposition, assumed a more pragmatic stance. They sought a place for a free or autonomous Macedonian state in a larger unit or supranational association: a Balkan federation, a Balkan socialist federation, a reorganized Ottoman empire, in the period before 1912; and a Balkan communist federation, a South Slav federation, or a Yugoslav federation in the years after the partition.89

Rossos’ observations on the different tactics Macedonian movements of various ideological or political stripes adopted support the view that ethnic groups adopt a variety of strategies and tactics depending upon the strategic situation they confront. As Joseph Rothschild has noted, ethnic groups may

for prudential reasons . . . adopt a low profile or, indeed, on occasion even leave the overt political arena for an interval. This is not tantamount to depoliticizing or demobilizing the group—any more than an individual’s decision not to engage his ethnic identity in every social encounter is tantamount to his assimilation or “passing” out of the group. Quite the contrary. A group decision to withdraw from the political arena as a corporate combatant may be a sophisticated political strategy in the interest of group survival and/or consolidation. It may also embed a long-term intention, reculer pour mieux sauter. In any event, it illustrates that ethnic groups (like ethnic individuals) have a variegated and flexible repertoire of political options—more flexible, ironically, than states have.90

Moreover, the hope to be granted “such gracious masters as the Austrian rulers” does not necessarily imply a rejection of the desire for one’s own state or kingdom; as Daniel Chirot has noted, “The extent to which various local populations and their lords were or were not loyal to the great empires, and for how long, is . . . a matter of considerable historical contention.”91

89 Rossos, “Great Britain and Macedonian Statehood and Unification, 1940-1949,” 122. A similar case in point reveals the problems encountered when one assumes a strictly semantic definition of “nationalist activities” (i.e., those geared towards gaining an independent state) as opposed to a common sense approach. For instance, Franjo Tudjman in 1990 was promoting the idea of a confederation of Yugoslav states. Since he was not arguing for a completely independent Croatia at this point, was he, in the strictest definition of the term, a nationalist? Probably not, even though, as one of his collaborators during this period, Zdravko Tomac, notes, Tudjman’s promotion of a confederation was simply a ruse to buy time for Croatia to gain more international diplomatic support from important European countries, and to mobilize more financial support from Croatian émigrés for Croatian independence. See Tomac, Predsjednik: Protiv krivotvorina i zaborava (Zagreb: Slovo M, 2004), 55-58.

90 Rothschild, Ethnopolitics, 7-8.

Another question worth asking is why local elites might have been, rhetorically at least, loyal to the sultan, such as was the case at the beginning of the First Serbian Uprising in 1804. Sugar, for instance, claims that local power holders in the Ottoman empire “understood the need for a ‘legal’ power basis and knew who could provide it.”\(^92\) Understood in these terms, one should not overestimate the degree to which either rhetorical expressions of loyalty or specific expressions of goals might reflect either actual loyalties or ultimate intentions.

Moreover, the argument that people in the Balkans were indifferent with regard to both who ruled them and to the polity in which they lived is at odds with much of what we know about the myths and traditions nurtured by the various Balkan populations throughout the later Middle Ages and the early modern period. Mazower, for instance, notes that the Christian peasantry of the Balkans “carefully preserved folk songs and ancestral legends about the rebirth of a Christian empire. Predictions, laments and prophecies had circulated among them ever since the fall of Constantinople that fateful Tuesday in 1453.”\(^93\) In the Western Balkans, the Orthodox Christian

\(^92\) Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule*, 240.

\(^93\) Mazower, *The Balkans*, 69. Emphasis added. The claim that such national myths and traditions are “invented” by self-conscious elites is also problematic. Motyl, for instance, notes that “Orally transmitted myths, such as epics, poems, and songs, are collective undertakings as much as they are the creations of a Homer or the preserve of the actual storytellers. Their collective telling and retelling—and the listening to their telling and retelling—translate into a continual process of textual creation and recreation within which authors and readers are more or less equally implicated . . . Like national myths, national traditions can emerge without elites. Some customary ways of doing things appear to be rooted in their functionality within a given material context, and what is functional—such as cattle grazing in a flatland or wine growing on a mountainside—then “becomes,” for reasons that anthropologists may be better equipped to answer, natural, meaningful, symbolically inevitable, and profoundly national without the necessary intervention of elites.” See Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires*, 74-75. Debate continues to revolve around when and which socio-economic class wrote the old epic poems about Kosovo and pre-Kosovo events. For an argument in favor of the view that the poems were developed contemporaneously (or near-contemporaneously) with the events and the individuals they describe, and that they were the product of the popular masses rather than the creation of the nobility, see Vojislav Đurić, *Antologija narodnih junačkih pesama* (Belgrade: Srpska Književna Zadruga, 1973), 134-159. The issue of when and by whom such epic poetry was written of course has important implications for our understanding of the ethnoconfessional identity- and nation-building process; as Adrian Hastings notes, “The enormous, and deeply nationalist, influence of such oral poetry is indeed evidence of how dangerous it is to follow too closely the Benedict Anderson line that a nation is unimaginable before the coming of mass-print capitalism.” Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood*, 135.
peasantry was obviously lamenting the loss of the medieval Nemanjić dynasty, which was a distinctly Serbian dynasty, not an a-national or anonymous Christian empire. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that as early as the eighteenth century (if not sooner), the various Slavic peoples of the Ottoman empire did not feel that they belonged to one “nation” as the millet system categorized them, creating serious problems both for their Ottoman rulers and for the Ecumenical patriarch himself.94 Throughout the Ottoman period, popular loyalty to “national” churches, typical of the Eastern Orthodox tradition whereby each national group had its own church, represented, according to Peter Sugar, “a continuation of previous loyalties,” not the creation of new ones.95 Stavrianos has a similar view, arguing that during Ottoman rule “the several Balkan ethnic groups were able to retain their identity and to emerge finally as independent peoples with essentially unimpaired national cultures.”96 Thus, Hobsbawm is probably more correct on this issue when he notes

There is no reason to deny proto-national feelings to pre-nineteenth century Serbs, not because they were Orthodox as against neighboring Catholics and Muslims—this would not have distinguished them from Bulgars—but because the memory of an old kingdom defeated by the Turks was preserved in song and heroic story, and, perhaps more to the point, in the daily liturgy of the Serbian church which had canonized most of its kings.97

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94 Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 47. Sugar goes on to note that “the Orthodox millet . . . was by no means united internally. Linguistic, ecclesiastic, and even proto-national differences that predated the Ottoman conquest, and equally long-standing regional and professional differences not only survived, but were sharpened when the Orthodox millet was placed under the Patriarch at Istanbul and the Greeks and the Greek language became dominant . . . What emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not the disintegration of the Orthodox millet opening the door to new foci of loyalty. What emerged were old differences and antagonisms that could not be expressed openly so long as the millet leadership was protected by the power of a strong state and could not be challenged.” See Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 232.

95 Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 278.

96 Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, 840.

97 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 75-76.
In Croatia, the Serb population was already exhibiting signs of national consciousness at the turn of the seventeenth century, a full one hundred years before most modernists would admit the phenomenon existed. Some historians have also found evidence of the existence of national, or even nationalist, consciousness in the Balkans prior to the French Revolution in the activities of the ubiquitous Balkan outlaws or bandits, variously known as *hajduks, klephts, uskoks*, or *morlaks*, who emerged as soon as the Ottomans conquered the Balkans, but whose activities really became prominent after 1630. According to Bistra Cvetkova, the *hajduks* represented both a permanent resistance movement to the Ottomans, an expression of the national conscience of the various Balkan peoples, and a force that enjoyed significant support amongst the bulk of the population.

Another problem with the modernist argument is that it specifically limits nationalism or nationalist activity to political demands. As Roman Szporluk has argued, however, other forms of nationalism (and other types of nationalists) such as cultural nationalists, existed in Eastern Europe long before political nationalists, which is what made it possible for a cultural Germany

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98 Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, 171. Similarly, Nicholas J. Miller has argued that “by the late medieval period, a Croat was of the western church, and a Serb most definitely of the eastern.” See Miller, *Between Nation and State: Serbian Politics in Croatia Before the First World War* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 4. This has clear implications for the origins of ethnic identity in Bosnia & Herzegovina among the Catholic and Orthodox populations, which makes it very difficult to sustain Noel Malcolm’s argument that these groups did not have a sense of ethnic identity. These issues will be discussed in more detail below.

99 Bistra Cvetkova, *Hajdutstvoto v Bulgarskite zemi prez 15/18 vek* (Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1971), as summarized by Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule*, 242-43. Nevertheless, Sugar himself cautions that we should avoid reading too much in to the *hajduk* tradition; as he notes, “Although today hajduks are considered national heroes and forerunners of the successful revolutionaries of the nineteenth century, attribution of modern nationalistic feelings and motivations to them appears unjustified, as does speaking of a resistance movement in the sense in which this expression is used to describe nineteenth and twentieth century phenomenon. True enough, folk songs and tales of considerably earlier origin also treat them as champions of the downtrodden, the Christian masses suffering under the misrule of the Muslims. No doubt, by the end of the eighteenth century something like a national consciousness existed among the various Balkan people, and the difference between them—let alone the feeling that separated them from the Turks—became clearer and clearer. It would be reading present-day concepts into the past, however, to attribute national motives to the hajduks as early as in the early eighteenth century.” Sugar, ibid., 244.
or a cultural Poland to exist long before these units became political realities.\textsuperscript{100} For these reasons, the modernist argument about nationalism seems unsustainable, and it is safer to conclude, as Banac suggests, that “Both national consciousness and national movements existed long before nationalism.”\textsuperscript{101}

In contrast to the modernist view of nationalism as a post-1789 phenomenon, many historians and political scientists argue that the origins of nations and nationalism can be traced at least to the medieval period;\textsuperscript{102} moreover, if, as Lewis Namier has claimed, “religion is a sixteenth century word for nationalism,” then many of the confessional conflicts that raged across Europe in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century could be considered precursors of what would later be defined as ethno-national conflicts. For Miroslav Hroch, for instance, “the modern nation is not the product of ‘nationalism,’ but the consequence of long-term social processes in the transition from feudal to capitalist society.”\textsuperscript{103} Alexander Motyl explicitly argues that

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no grounds exist for arguing that national identity formation could not have taken place before, say, 1789. The ancient Israelites, whose national belief system provided them with a distinct place in time and space, were as much of a nation as most contemporary nations. The Romans, especially during the republic, appear to have fit the definitional requirements as well. So too did the Byzantine Greeks, whose myths provided them with origins and whose distaste for “barbarians” testified to their refined sense of “the other.”\textsuperscript{104}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{\(100\)} Szporluk, “In Search of the Drama of History, Or, National Roads to Modernity,” 143.

\textsuperscript{\(101\)} Banac, \textit{The National Question in Yugoslavia}, 27.


\textsuperscript{\(104\)} Motyl, \textit{Revolutions, Nations, Empires}, 99.
In the Balkans as well, examples of what modernists consider to be nationalist thinking and behavior were apparent in the Balkans long before 1789. Already in the 13th century, for instance, the founder of the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church, Saint Sava, decreed that the writing on frescoes in Serbian monasteries should be in Cyrillic, not in Greek, and that Serbs should replace Greeks as hierarchs in the Serbian church and as the abbots of important monasteries. Russian culture in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, according to Dmitri Obolensky, was already exhibiting signs of “overt nationalism,” and many Russians at this time were distinguishing between religion and ethnicity. Patriarch Nikon, for instance, claimed that “I am a Russian, but my faith and my religion are Greek,” clearly revealing his recognition that national background, culture, and religion could come from separate places, or even that an individual at this time could have multiple identities.

Leaving aside the theoretical and semantic debate about when nationalism might have arisen, however, there is another serious difficulty with the modernist position, insofar as we simply

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105 Miodrag Petrović, “Simfonija crkve i države,” Geopolitika (Belgrade), No. 11, 28 June 2003, 38-40. Jovan Cvijić claimed that “national feeling had always been alive” among the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to Cvijić, this was evident as early as the 16th century in an account by Benedikt Kuripešić, a Slovene accompanying a German delegation to Constantinople in 1530. According to Kuripešić, the older people who remembered Bosnia before its fall to the Turks would tell younger people that “Our aristocracy, before they fell at Kosovo, were just like these gentlemen,” and then would go on to tell stories of the mythic hero Miloš Obilić. See Cvijić, Балканско полуострво (Belgrade: Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti, 2000), 377. It should be pointed out that Cvijić was not a simple primordialist; he claimed, for instance, that Byzantine culture was based more on religion than on nationality, and in similar fashion that most people in the Balkans at this time did not have a “real sense of national feeling.” However, Cvijić did detect a difference amongst the Serbs, essentially because of the nationalizing efforts of Saint Sava mentioned above. See Cvijić, Балканско полуострво, 119.

By way of contrast, the Bosniac scholar Ahmed S. Aličić argues that it was Bosniacs who in fact had a sense of national consciousness in the first half of the nineteenth century, and that the Christian populations of Bosnia & Herzegovina had no real sense of national identity at the time. See Aličić, Pokret za Autonomiju Bosne od 1831. do 1832. Godine (Sarajevo: Orientalni Institut, 1996), 366-371.

cannot claim to know with any certainty how the vast majority of people felt in the pre-modern era, or what they considered to be the main lines of cleavage in their societies. Noel Malcolm, for instance, has argued in the case of 19th century Bosnia that “The main basis of hostility was not ethnic or religious but economic: the resentment felt by the members of a mainly (but not exclusively) Christian peasantry towards their Muslim landowners.” But Malcolm’s thesis is questionable. Since ethnoconfessional and economic-class identities overlapped in nineteenth-century Bosnia it is “difficult to separate peasant-agrarian from national goals” in any meaningful way. Moreover, since the overwhelming majority of the population in the Balkans (and, indeed, throughout the world at this time) was illiterate and left no written record of its thoughts and feelings, we simply do not know how most people felt about such issues; as Barbara Jelavich has argued, “It is impossible to judge the extent to which the people in any Balkan area held deeply nationalistic convictions—that is, in the sense of believing that the nation-state was the natural moral and political division of mankind that should command the first allegiance of the citizen.” Similarly, Eric Hobsbawm has argued that it is simply

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107 Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. xxi.

108 See Djordjevic and Fischer-Galati, The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition, 230. A further problem with Malcolm’s thesis is that he discounts the fact that members of disadvantaged classes are often more willing to identify with upper classes sharing their own cultural or religious attributes rather than identifying with members of similar class background coming from other cultures. This will be discussed in more detail in Section III below.

109 Moreover, the further back in time we go, the less we know about the thoughts, feelings, identities, and loyalties of individuals. For the early medieval period in the Balkans, there are few written records, so most of what we know comes only from archaeological or anthropological sources, or what can be gleaned from the study of language; see Jelavich, History of the Balkans, 15. Even our knowledge about the history of various institutions (not to mention the thoughts and feelings of individuals) is scarce. For instance, as Michael Boro Petrovich points out with regard to the Serbian Orthodox Church after the Ottoman conquest, “There is not sufficient evidence to conclude with certainty what happened to the Serbian church at the time the Serbian principalities were wiped out by the Ottoman invasion.” See Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia (Vol. 1), 10.

impossible to know the “sentiments of the illiterate who formed the overwhelming majority of
the world’s population before the twentieth century.”

In sum, there is no a priori reason why individuals in the Balkans could not feel a sense of
national identity prior to 1789. From what social psychology tells us about human behavior, in-
group biases and loyalties are common to all human collectivities, and there is no reason to
believe that such thoughts, emotions, and motivations did not exist more than two hundred years
ago. As numerous historical examples show us, individuals have long placed a value on the
essential elements that compose what modernists call nationalism—the belief that a distinct
cultural group should be self-governing. This belief should not be considered either a recent
phenomenon, or the result of self-interested elite action.

IV. Rationalist and Economic Explanations

"Man does not live by bread alone."  

In “A Letter from 1920,” the protagonist of Bosnian Nobel Laureate Ivo Andrić’s classic
short story, Max Levenfeld, wrote: “I’m afraid that in these [Bosnian urban] circles, under the
cover of all these contemporary maxims, old instincts and Cain-like plans may only be

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111 Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 48

slumbering, and will live on until the foundations of material and spiritual life in Bosnia are altogether changed.\textsuperscript{113}

Andrić’s belief that Bosnia would not change until the foundations of material and spiritual life change is a crucial point, for it touches upon one of the most fundamental issues in the study of historical and social development. As Ernest Gellner has asked, what should be considered “the units or sub-units in terms of which the structural transformation of human society are to be characterized?” Gellner himself proposed that the principal candidates to play the role of the “dramatis personae of history” are classes and nations.\textsuperscript{114} Thus, albeit in different ways, both Andrić and Gellner are pointing to a fundamental ontological distinction in how social reality is to be viewed and understood. An emphasis on “material life” and “classes” suggests that economics and the quest for material or financial gain are what drive human history, whereas a belief in the importance of “imagined communities,” or of other intangibles such as the power of ideas, or the importance of spiritual life (or religion more generally) suggests a quite different driving force.

A second important category of explanations of the identity formation process and of nationalism itself focuses on their rational, economic, material, and physical causes, such as economic deprivation or the advantages of nationalist policies to interest-maximizing elites. Part of the popularity of such theories is due to the preferences (and prejudices) of the social sciences, which generally view quantitative analysis as more scientific and rigorous than qualitative


analysis or historical narratives, and therefore prefer research designs stressing the former rather than the latter. Since nationalism and/or the strength of an individual’s religious or ethnic identity are difficult to measure using quantitative methodologies, however, it was perhaps almost inevitable that many social scientists would begin to view nationalism or religious movements as epiphenomena of economic realities or changes in material conditions which are more quantifiable than variables stressing culture or history. Quantitative analysis does not readily lend itself to the “invisible boundaries” and “invisible barriers” between Balkan ethnoconfessional groups that anthropologists and political scientists have described.\(^{115}\)

Such approaches, however, have led to several important failures in social and political analysis in recent decades, perhaps most notably, the failure of modernization theory to predict the upsurge in both nationalism and religious activism over the past three decades. Modernization theory, for several decades one of the dominant paradigms of western intellectual thought regarding individual ethnic and religious identity, rested on the assumption that industrialization, urbanization, and education would weaken “non-rational” ethnic and religious

\(^{115}\) The perceived existence of “invisible boundaries” and “invisible barriers” between ethnic groups is frequent theme in the scholarly literature on southeastern Europe. On “invisible boundaries” and “invisible barriers” see the articles by the anthropologist William G. Lockwood, “Converts and Consanguinity: The Social Organization of Moslem Slavs in Western Bosnia.” *Ethnology* 11 (January 1972), 66; the political scientist Gary K. Bertsch, “A Cross-National Analysis of the Community-Building Process in Yugoslavia,” *Comparative Political Studies* 4 (January 1972), 442; and the historian Nadine Akhund, “Muslim Representation in the Three Ottoman vilayets of Macedonia: Administration and Military Power (1878-1908),” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 29 (December 2009), 453, who cites the fact that “religious affiliations maintained invisible barriers” in Ottoman Macedonia. Beyond the Balkans, scholars studying religiously and culturally based trends point to similarly hard-to-quantify phenomenon. In Germany, for instance, a recent paper on the effects of dialects and culture on migration trends notes that “there are intangible cultural borders within a country that impede economic exchange across its regions. These intangible borders are enormously persistent over time; they have been developed over centuries, and so they are likely to be there also tomorrow. Even on a low geographical level people seem to be unwilling to move to culturally unfamiliar environments.” See Falck, Heblich, Lameli, et. al., “Dialects, Cultural Identity, and Economic Exchange,” 30. If accurate, the existence of such “invisible” and “intangible” boundaries and barriers of course has important methodological implications for social scientists in their attempts to study and understand the region, insofar as it is by definition quantitatively (and qualitatively) difficult to analyze such phenomenon.
identities, and that individuals would increasingly adopt more “rational” identities based on economic class, professional specialization, or the territorial unit within which one lived.

Events over the past several decades (e.g., the Iranian revolution, the Roman Catholic Church’s role in precipitating the fall of communism in Poland, and the rise of the religious right in the United States) have cast doubt on many of modernization theory’s assumptions. Thus, instead of modernization weakening the religious affiliations most individuals hold, “the period in which economic and political modernization has been most intense—the last 30 to 40 years—has witnessed a jump in religious vitality around the world . . . God is winning in global politics. And modernization, democratization, and globalization have only made him stronger.”

Modernization theory (and those who believed in it, such as the members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia) also failed to realize that nationalist tendencies could overpower the forces of modernity. With specific regard to Yugoslavia, for instance,

. . . the postwar Titoist regime set out to establish a new social, political, and economic order that would engender individual characteristics and value systems conducive to the evolution of an integrated socialist community . . . In effect, the Yugoslavs have approached the community-building problem by coupling modernization logic with Marxist principles to predict the evolution of a more mobilized, modernized, and universalistic citizenry; in short, a citizenry better equipped to live within the setting of a complex, multinational state.

These failures of both modernization theorists and Yugoslav communists were at least in part due to the fact that they failed to anticipate that material and economic progress, rather than reducing or alleviating ethnic conflict and competition, could have the opposite effect. Thus, as Walker Connor has noted,

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116 Timothy Samuel Shah and Monica Duffy Taft, “Why God is Winning.” *Foreign Policy* (July/August 2006), 40-43.

the substantial body of data which is available supports the proposition that material increases in what [Karl] Deutsch termed social mobilization and communication tend to increase cultural awareness and to exacerbate ethnic conflict . . . improvements in the quality and quantity of communication and transportation media progressively curtail the cultural isolation in which an ethnic group could formerly cloak its cultural chasteness from the perverting influences of other cultures within the same state. The reaction to such curtailment is very apt to be one of xenophobic hostility.\textsuperscript{118}

Modernization theory also proved weak in several other respects. First, it could not predict which ethnic group would adopt a nationalist position. Kosovo Albanians, for instance, enjoyed much higher levels of economic prosperity and political freedom than their ethnic kin in neighboring Albania for much of the postwar period; nevertheless, the majority of Kosovo Albanians remained hostile to the Yugoslav state and favorably disposed to Albania. Similarly, both the most economically advanced Yugoslav republic (Slovenia) and the most economically backward province (Kosovo) had identically hostile positions vis-à-vis the future of the Yugoslav federation.\textsuperscript{119}

Second, modernization theory also proved weak in predicting the timing of nationalist movements: for instance, it could not explain why the former Yugoslavia experienced its most serious ethnic tensions just as the country was enjoying its most impressive spurt of post-WWII economic growth. The Croatian national movement of the late 1960s-early 1970s, for instance, followed upon a decade in which Croatia experienced rapid economic growth,\textsuperscript{120} yet it was

\textsuperscript{118}See Connor, op. cit., 36-37.

\textsuperscript{119}Jović, Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla, 32.

\textsuperscript{120}Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 90. Similarly, Gagnon notes that Yugoslavia experienced one of the highest growth rates in the world in the 1960s. Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War, 54. Khalil Shikaki has made a similar point with regard to the two Palestinian intifidas in 1987 and 2000, which also erupted during periods of relatively good economic conditions in the Palestinian territories. See Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Leader Says Ready to Talk with Palestinians,” International Herald Tribune, 1 April 2009.
precisely during this most economically successful decade of Yugoslavia’s existence (the 1960s) that the country experienced the most political and social turmoil: the Croatian Spring, demonstrations and riots in Belgrade and Kosovo, the Ranković affair, etc.\textsuperscript{121} In fact, during the Croatian Spring, even communists—whom one would suspect of adhering to the view that class distinctions were more important than national distinctions—would claim, as did the then leader of the League of Communists of Croatia, Miko Tripalo, that “national and class interests were the same as nation and class had become identical.”\textsuperscript{122}

Two of the phenomenon described above—the Kosovo Albanians’ unwillingness to identify with the Yugoslav state, despite their relatively advantageous economic position within it as compared to the Albanians in Albania proper, and the outbreak of nationalist dissatisfaction even during periods of economic growth—also show that conventional rational choice analyses of how and why individuals identify with certain national groups or nationalist projects has significant limitations. As Paul Stern notes, rational choice theory “predicts that when a multinational state has a growing economy . . . identification with the nominal nationality should strengthen at the expense of the national minority or other group identifications, and people should become more willing to sacrifice for the state . . . [but] no evidence [exists] that minority groups trade in their identities for those of the majority when times are good.”\textsuperscript{123} As Stern goes on to note,

\begin{quote}
People resist changing their national identities, even when they can expect to benefit. Rational choice theory fails to explain people’s unwillingness to adopt the favored identities of a conquering power. Consider recent events in the former
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{121}Jović,\textit{ Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla}, 29.

\textsuperscript{122}As cited by Vjekoslav Perica,\textit{ Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States}, 56.

\textsuperscript{123}Stern, “Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?”, 222.
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Despite benefits made available to those who identified with dominant national groups, people passed on their ancestral identities as Ruthenians, Ossetians, Azeris, and the like for generations with little hope of collective gain. In some cases, such as those of Turks in Bulgaria or Hungarians in Romania, people held on to their identities in the face of active or acute discrimination. Ethnic groups and their languages and customs do become extinct as a function of conquest, migration, modernization, dispersion, and genocide, but they are remarkably resistant to such threats, as the histories of Jews and Armenians attest.\(^{124}\)

The problem with modernization theory, and more generally the various economic and rationalist theories offered to explain identity formation and ethnic conflict and competition, is that such views of the origins of individual identity and nationalism rely on a unidimensional understanding of human nature. “Human agents,” as George and Bennett note, “are reflective—that is, they contemplate, anticipate, and can work to change their social and material environments and they have long-term intentions as well as immediate desires and wants.”\(^{125}\)

Thus, rationalist and economic explanations for identity-formation and nationalism give insufficient recognition to the fact that human behavior is often motivated by many issues besides financial or material gain, such as a belief in reciprocity, altruism, fairness, justice, a sense of group,\(^{126}\) on non-egoistic based commitments,\(^{127}\) or on the dignity and self-respect Ashutosh Varshney claims form the microfoundations of the “nationalism of resistance” dominated groups practice to preserve their cultural identity and resist the dominant group’s

\(^{124}\) Stern, “Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?”, 223.

\(^{125}\) George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 129. Emphasis in the original.


\(^{127}\) See Amartya K. Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6 (Summer 1977), 341. However, as Moses Shayo points out, “altruism is ‘parochial’ rather than universal; it only applies to ingroup members... when actions affect an outgroup that competes with the ingroup for status, we may observe behavior that harms outgroup members.” See Shayo, “A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution,” *American Political Science Review* 103 (May 2009), 152.
hegemony.\textsuperscript{128} In a cross-national study of 15 small societies around the world, for instance, the self-interest model of human behavior failed in all of the cases, while group-level differences appeared to explain a substantial portion of variation across societies.\textsuperscript{129} Other examples showing that individuals are often motivated by more than economic or material inducements are evident as well. Anti-communist, nationalist dissidents in the Soviet Union clearly showed little regard for material or financial advantage.\textsuperscript{130} And in times of war, nationalist appeals often succeed most with that segment of the population that stands the most to lose—young men going off to war.\textsuperscript{131} In the Yugoslav case specifically, Burg and Berbaum found that a sense of “Yugoslav identity” was more correlated with interethnic contact and educational levels than with levels of material well-being.\textsuperscript{132}

A substantial body of empirical evidence from comparative studies of nationalist movements around the world supports the view that the correlation between economics and ethnic nationalism is tenuous. In his study of ethnic conflict in Africa and Asia, for instance, Donald Horowitz found that “what emerges quite clearly is the willingness of ethnic groups to sacrifice economic interest for the sake of other kinds of gain.”\textsuperscript{133} Walker Connor reached similar

\textsuperscript{128} Ashutosh Varshney, “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality,” \texttt{www.apsanet.org} (March 2003), Vol. 1/No. 1, 86. Moreover, as Varshney adds, “Driven by such values, resisting nationalists are willing to endure very high costs—and for long periods of time.”


\textsuperscript{130} Motyl, \textit{Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality}, 147-151.

\textsuperscript{131} Stern, “Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?”, 224.

\textsuperscript{132} See Burg and Berbaum, “Community, Integration, and Stability in Multinational Yugoslavia,” 535.

\textsuperscript{133} Donald Horowitz, \textit{Ethnic Groups in Conflict} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 131.
conclusions, noting that “economic factors are likely to come in a poor second when competing with the emotionalism of ethnic nationalism.”\textsuperscript{134} In the former USSR, for instance, Ghia Nodia argued that in the various Soviet republics, national independence and sovereignty were ends in themselves, not means towards a more economically beneficial future: “Leaders from independence-minded republics were asked what they hoped to gain economically from independence, while the would-be nations themselves saw sovereignty as an end in itself rather than as a mere means to prosperity.”\textsuperscript{135} In the Yugoslav case, it is difficult to believe that a desire for economic gain was driving many of the group demands for sovereignty and/or independence; as Rodney Hall notes “One might argue that Slovenia was sufficiently economically better off than its former Yugoslav partners to rationally seek separation from Yugoslavia, but could a Bosnian Serb republic governed from Pale be economically viable?”\textsuperscript{136} Similarly, Stuart J. Kaufman has observed that

\ldots if the root of Yugoslavia’s problem was economic, no one could have considered that a rational solution was a war that would sever economic ties between different parts of the country, provoke international economic sanctions against some areas while other areas were bombed to rubble, promote massive looting, and destroy the rule of law that made normal economic life possible. If different regions could not agree on an economic policy, they could have amicably split, as the Czech Republic and Slovakia did. All would have been better off economically had they done so.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{134} Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, 47.

\textsuperscript{135} Nodia, “Nationalism and Democracy,” 8.

\textsuperscript{136} Rodney Bruce Hall, National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 27. As Hall goes on to note, “Rational instrumental accounts of the motivations and interests of international actors suggest that instrumental advantage accrues to the creation and maintenance of large states, not smaller, ethnically, linguistically, or culturally homogenous states.”

\textsuperscript{137} Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 8. These issues will be further discussed in Chapter III.
While Kaufman fails to appreciate the many differences between the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak cases, he does make an important point when noting that political leaders who were thinking in economically rational terms would not have adopted the policies that they did.

Given these considerations, the economic reductionism of many explanations for identity-formation and nationalism becomes, as Walker Connor once noted, “an unwarranted exaggeration of the influence of materialism upon human affairs” which does not correlate with most experience we have of nationalism in the real world. The theoretical result has been to mistake the outward manifestation of nationalism for its essence; thus, according to Connor, “The tendency to stress economic forces can be viewed as one manifestation of a broader tendency to mistake the overt characteristics of a nation for its essence,” resulting in a tendency to “perceive ethnic restlessness in terms of a group’s choice of battlefields, that is, in terms of economic statistics or an aspect of culture such as language.” Connor also faults the a-historicity of many scholars here; as he notes, reducing nationalism to economics is a result of “a general disregard for historical perspective. If . . . one credits the rise of nationalism within a particular ethnic community solely to economic discrimination (the theory of economic deprivation), then there is little need to search history for antecedents or for the germination and development of an abstract notion of a kindred people.”

138 See Connor, “Nation-building or Nation-Destroying?” as published in Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 36-37. Connor’s original article of the same title was published in 1972. Connor notes that this exaggerated faith in the role of materialism in determining ethnic relations has been particularly prominent among American policymakers. As Connor adds, there has been “a propensity on the part of American statesman and scholars of the post-World War II era to assume that economic considerations represent the determining force in human affairs.”

139 Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, 145, 179.

140 Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, 174-75.
Michael Hechter and Kanchan Chandra both provide prominent recent examples from this category of explanations. Hechter argues that national identities are essentially the result of functional or class differences; or, as he puts it, “the establishment and maintenance of a cultural division of labor is decisive for the salience of national identity.”¹⁴¹ Such a cultural division of labor, according to Hechter, can emerge in three ways: through conquest, as a by-product of institutional arrangements, or through immigration. Applying Hechter’s analysis to the Balkans, all three ways of establishing a cultural division of labor are in place: the Ottoman military conquest of the region in the 14th and 15th centuries, the institutional arrangements of the millet system, and the immigration of Anatolian Turks, janissaries, and others from Istanbul to the Balkans, all of which combined produced the cultural division of labor that Hechter describes—the vast majority of Balkan Christians were peasants who worked the land, while Muslims made up the landowning class and filled the ranks of government and military officialdom. In essence, Hechter has provided a Marxist argument for the establishment and maintenance of national identities, insofar as the existence of individuals within a cultural division of labor determines their (ethnic) consciousness.

Hechter’s thesis has been criticized on several grounds: that it ignores the fact that a cultural division of labor does not affect all members of a given ethnic group equally; that it ignores the difference between choice and constraint; and that it ignores temporal issues, i.e., why ethnicity

¹⁴¹ Hechter, Containing Nationalism, 96.
seems to be a salient issue at some times and not at others. But perhaps the most serious problem facing Hechter’s explanation is that ethnoconfessional identities existed in the Balkans before the Ottoman conquest, before the imposition of the *millet* system, or the subsequent creation of a cultural division of labor in the region. As Stanford Shaw described the problem facing the Ottomans after their conquest of southeastern Europe,

> The Ottomans did not invent [the *millet* system], but, rather, *were forced to accept and preserve it by the peculiar social conditions of the area which they came to rule* . . . In a sense, the Ottomans were, indeed, going against the trend of Balkan history, at least by choosing to make religion the primary basis of their institutionalized communal system. But *what other choice did they have?* The previous Balkan states had decayed. This was the main reason for the rapid successes of the Ottoman army. Members of the Balkan ruling classes who still survived could hardly be trusted to administer their former principalities and states as autonomous vassals under Ottoman suzerainty, as the failure of several experiments in this direction clearly showed even before 1453. The only other bases of local self-organization which could have been relied on for the organization of the heterogeneous social structure which the Ottomans were codifying were the religious and economic. And in accepting these, the Ottomans were doing no more than relying on the experience and practice of Muslim lands from which they came, where religion and those expert in its laws were given a far more important place in daily life than that which they had in the West.

As the above passage argues, the Ottomans did *not* create the categories of Muslims and Christians; consequently, Hechter’s argument that a cultural division of labor is decisive for the salience of national identities cannot explain the emergence and salience of the identities of the various Balkan peoples before the Ottomans had imposed such a cultural division of labor on the inhabitants of the region. In other words, the Ottoman *millet* system did not create Bulgars, Croats, Greeks, and Serbs; on the contrary, the existence of these peoples and their religious and cultural traditions compelled the Ottomans to adapt their system of rule to the demographic

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realities they confronted upon conquering southeastern Europe. In essence, identities formed institutions, and not vice versa.

Hechter’s argument has many parallels in the literature on Balkan nationalism—one version of the argument, for instance, claims that in the 19th century the Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches turned Bosnian Christian peasants into Serbs and Croats, respectively, or, more recently, that the institutions created by Dayton prevent citizens from becoming “Bosnians.” Yet deeper historical analysis reveals a quite different dynamic at work—rather than institutions forming the identities of these individuals and peoples, it is the institutions that have to reconcile themselves to the cleavages and popular pressures within Balkan societies, and the aspirations for self-government each of the Balkan ethnoconfessional groups have had. Thus, the millet system as an institution had to reconcile itself to the already-existing cleavages it confronted in southeastern Europe, and Dayton’s architects had to reconcile themselves to the reality that Bosnia’s Croats and Serbs each demanded large measures of self-government. The same is true in Macedonia, where, according to Robert Hislope,

The cleavage lines that separate the ethnic groups are firm and deep. Consequently, those cleavages structure the political system, shaping the modes of political organization (viz., the monopolization of all political expression by ethnic parties) and the issues that dominate the political agenda.144

A further problem with Hechter’s argument about group boundaries flowing from “institutions of control” rather than pre-established social identities is the fact that it cannot explain why certain “institutions of control” are able to impose a set of identities on a defined population while others are not. As noted previously, there have been numerous attempts to

create new identities for individuals and populations in southeastern Europe (e.g., Ottomanism, Bošnjaštvo, the “integral Yugoslavism” of the interwar kingdom, post-WWII communist attempts to foster “brotherhood and unity,” etc.). Yet despite significant financial, logistical and material advantages, each of these efforts failed, begging the question of why some identity projects succeed and take root while others fail. (These issues will be explored in more detail in Chapter V.)

With regard to the relationship between institutions and ethnic identity, Kanchan Chandra has argued that

... fixity is not an intrinsic quality of ethnic identities but a product of the institutional context in which ethnic groups are politicized. Some institutional contexts impose an artificial fixity on ethnic identities, while others allow their inherent fluidity to flourish. Consequently, some institutional contexts produce benign forms of ethnic politics, while others produce malign forms.\textsuperscript{145}

Here again, however, a sustained historical analysis of the evolution of institutions in the former Yugoslavia reveals the weaknesses of Chandra’s thesis. Chandra claims that the 1974 Yugoslav constitution privileged “nations” (her quotation marks) “at the expense of other potentially crosscutting identities,” yet this begs the question of why the 1974 constitution was designed and written in such a way.\textsuperscript{146} As noted above, the history of previous efforts to deal with Yugoslavia’s national question, which included several new institutional designs intended to promote more broad-based loyalties and identifications (discussed in more detail in Chapter V) repeatedly failed, ultimately because popular resistance to such integration proved too strong.

\textsuperscript{145} Chandra, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” \textit{Perspectives on Politics} 3 (June 2005), 245.

\textsuperscript{146} Chandra herself (247) notes that her theory does not account for how such institutions are originally formed, and adds that this is a task for further research.
A related line of rationalist explanations also sees economic considerations as being at the heart of ethnic competition and conflict. Lake and Rothchild, for instance, argue that

Competition for resources typically lies at the heart of ethnic conflict. Property rights, jobs, scholarships, educational admissions, language rights, government contracts, and development allocations all confer benefits on individuals and groups. All such resources are scarce and, thus, objects of competition and occasionally struggle between individuals and, when organized, groups.¹⁴⁷

According to this perspective, violent ethnic conflict most frequently erupts as a consequence of state weakness and failure, when the state can no longer adequately divide resources among various groups, and information failures, problems of credible commitments, and security dilemmas between ethnic groups take hold. These problems are then exploited by political entrepreneurs and ethnic activists, who manipulate the general population’s non-rational myths and emotions to fan social and political tensions.

The problem with such explanations is that they reduce nationalism and ethnic conflict to the problem of fulfilling an economic plan, and do not recognize that Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism is often about fulfilling a dream.¹⁴⁸ Rationalist arguments suggest that sufficient GDP growth should prevent ethnic conflict in multiethnic societies. Yet the experience of the former Yugoslavia does not bear this out, as Allcock and Jović noted above when they showed that post-1945 Yugoslavia experienced its greatest ethnic tensions at the same time it was experiencing its greatest economic growth. Lake and Rothchild’s argument also does not stand up if one accepts the above arguments by Connor, Horowitz, Fukuyama, and others that


¹⁴⁸ The late Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, for instance, was fond of saying that by gaining independence in 1991, Croats had fulfilled “a thousand-year-old dream.” See Marcus Tanner, *Croatia: A Nation Forged in War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), ix.
nationalist sentiment is fundamentally about emotions, sentiments, and the desire for human dignity rather than economic matters. Support for this thesis can be seen in a recent study by Moses Shayo, in which he shows that “in almost all modern democracies, poorer individuals are more likely to be nationalistic . . . In almost every country, lower income is associated with more national identification.”

149 See Shayo, “A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class and Redistribution,” op. cit., 148, 168. With respect to Lake and Rothchild, moreover, many other aspects of their argument are debatable; for instance, the claim that information failures were responsible for the outbreak of violent ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Here again, deeper investigation reveals that this was not the case. First, the consequences of the increasing nationalization of Yugoslav politics were clear to almost anyone who knew Yugoslav history and politics. As Tito himself told Pamela Harriman in 1979, “After me, there will be chaos” (Quoted by Woodward, Socialist Unemployment, 345). In the mid-1980s, when the then Yugoslav prime minister Branko Mikulić was asked why the League of Communists would not allow a multi-party system, Mikulić claimed

If we allow [a] multiparty system in this country, all . . . the people would get would be several new ethnic and religious parties without any specific political or economic agenda and issues except hatred for one another and their leaders’ cries for partitions and secessions. We would have another Lebanon in this country, and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia will never let it happen. (Quoted by Perica, Balkan Idols, 95).

Second, many of the protagonists in the Yugoslav conflict, such as Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegović, had well-established historical records of their views, so there was nothing either surprising or unknown about their political positions and aims. At least since the 1970s, both Tudjman and Izetbegović had been arguing (albeit indirectly to some extent) that their republics or peoples should be independent, and Tudjman had also suggested in his writings that Bosnia-Herzegovina historically belonged to Croatia. Similarly, Milošević had been relatively forthright in his position that if Yugoslavia disintegrated, Serbia would demand changes to republican borders.

Third, by mid-1990 at the latest it had become clear to many people that violence was extremely likely, if not inevitable. A secret CIA report leaked at this time on the situation in Yugoslavia, for instance, said that the country was likely to breakup violently within eighteen months. The present author can relate a personal story to this effect: in the summer of 1990, United Press International (UPI) decided to re-open its Belgrade bureau. The new bureau chief, Jonathan Landay, was a reporter who had been working in India for the past five years. Within one week of his arrival in Yugoslavia, Landay said “this place is going to blow up.” Moreover, during this period, both Yugoslav counter-intelligence and the intelligence services of the various republics were well aware of the plans the various sides were making, their secret efforts to obtain weapons, etc., as the Špegelj affair in Croatia makes clear.

Fourth, there were numerous negotiations and discussions among the different leaders and other officials about the country’s fate, both secret and public. Throughout this period, what was evident was not that the different sides did not know enough about the other’s positions and intentions, it was that these positions and intentions were diametrically opposed to each other, and none of the sides were willing to compromise. Moreover, despite the fact that different peoples and republics were at war with each other, a remarkable fact was the willingness of the different republican leaders to continue to cut deals with each other. The last American ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, relates a frustrating meeting with Tudjman, where Tudjman announces that he is going to make a separate deal with Milošević. When Zimmerman asked Tudjman how he could do such a thing, Tudjman replied, “Because I can trust Milošević.” See Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, 183. In total, then, the argument that information failures were one of the causes of the Yugoslav conflict is not convincing.
Moving away from the above-mentioned unidimensional understandings of human behavior based on material and economic calculations allows us to understand the importance individuals, groups, and societies attach to many actions and forms of behavior that seem counter-productive or non-rational from the economic standpoint. This, in turn, allows “national identification . . . [to become] so powerful as to overcome considerations of self-interest and win a contest of altruisms with primary social groups in the name of an ‘imagined community’. “150 Evolutionary biologists, for instance, have noted that in virtually all human societies, human beings engage in a variety of religious rituals that seemly costly and inefficient—rituals such as circumcision, various forms of genital mutilation, scarification, or the expensive initiation ceremonies and rites of passage found in almost all societies. As Richard Sosis asks,

How can we begin to understand such behavior? If human beings are rational creatures, then why do we spend so much time, energy and resources on acts that can be so painful or, at the very least, uncomfortable? Archeologists tell us that our species has engaged in ritual behavior for at least 100,000 years, and every known culture practices some form of religion. It even survives covertly in those cultures where governments have attempted to eliminate spiritual practice. And, despite the unparalleled triumph of scientific rationalism in the 20th century, religion continued to flourish . . . Why do religious beliefs, practices and institutions continue to be an essential component of human and social life? . . . If our species is designed to optimize the rate at which we extract energy from the environment, why would we engage in religious behavior that seems so counterproductive? Indeed, some religious practices, such as ritual sacrifices, are a conspicuous display of wasted resources. Anthropologists can explain why foragers regularly share their food with others in the group, but why would anyone share their food with a dead ancestor by burning it to ashes on an altar?151


All of these things suggest that “individuals act out of . . . social motives that deviate from the assumptions of rational choice theory.” As constructivists point out, for instance, internationally accepted norms cannot always be reduced to the interests of the powerful; as Finnemore and Sikkink note, “Human rights norms, the preference of the weak, have been shown to triumph over strong actors and strong states; environmental norms prevail over powerful corporate business preferences;” moreover, economic and materialist explanations of interest-maximizing behavior cannot explain why people fight for the rights of people living far away from them, or to protect whales and dolphins. Fukuyama has argued that neither materialism nor economism can fully explain many aspects of human (and, consequently, political) behavior; for Fukuyama, it is neither industrial development nor capitalist economics that “gets us to the gates of the Promised Land of liberal democracy” but “a totally noneconomic drive, the struggle for recognition,” i.e., the struggle for human dignity.

Considerable evidence supports the thesis that non-economic impulses and incentives drive a significant amount of individual political behavior. In a cross-country survey of examining Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland, for instance, Arend Lijphart found religious affiliation to be the most powerful determinant of party choice, followed by linguistic affiliation, with class ties being only a distant third. Lijphart’s findings on the importance of non-material or non-economic characteristics of a person’s identity are consistent with similar studies from the

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152 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 140.


Balkans. For instance, one group of researchers found that after cross-tabulating responses from individuals polled in public opinion surveys by education, age, income, and socio-economic status, the only variable that was statistically significant was ethnicity; as they note, “ethnicity in BiH dominates all the usual socio-demographic cleavages that one sees in modern societies.”

Similarly, a recent report commissioned by the U.N. Development Program asking Bosnian citizens how much they trusted their government noted that

In institutional trust, religion plays a major role . . . Interesting is the absence of life satisfaction, economic measures and age. In other words, economic considerations do not impact on the way respondents perceive the State government. Trust in State government thus does not appear to be affected by rational economic considerations.157

In Serbia, a study comparing survey data from 1989 and 2003 tracing the rise of nationalist sentiment in Serbia, Mladen Lazić found no correlation between socioeconomic status and

156 See Gearóid Ó Tuathail, (Gerald Toal), John O’Loughlin, and Dino Djipa, “Bosnia-Herzegovina Ten Years after Dayton: Constitutional Change and Public Opinion,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 47 (January-February 2006), 72. Numerous other public opinion researchers have come to similar conclusions. A March 2007 study by the Washington-based National Democratic Institute, for instance, found that “the defining division in Montenegro continues to be one’s ethnic identification, which has been the case since NDI began to conduct opinion research in Montenegro since 2001.” See “National Democratic Institute for International Affairs Montenegro Key Findings Baseline Poll—February 2007 (March 9, 2007),” available at: http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2128_mm_focusgroups_030907.pdf (accessed on 2 July 2007). In Bosnia, a recent report by the UNDP found that religion (which in Bosnia-Herzegovina of course is equated with ethnicity) is the major determinant in levels of trust one expresses for state institutions at the national level. Interesting, other variables such as life satisfaction, economic measures, or age were not seen to be important factors. See “Silent Majority” 16-17. An earlier report on Bosnian public opinion completed in 1996 noted that “The country is divided by three distinct visions. If there is some evidence of common ground, we could not find it . . . Outside of Central Bosnia [the population of which was overwhelmingly Bosniac in 1996] any serious discussion of a unified and multi-ethnic state has ceased. Indeed, the subject appeared beyond debate . . . Although some participants entertained the idea that perhaps after ’10 years or so’ of separation, some joint political arrangements might be possible, consensus for separation was absolute in all of these groups . . . The Serb participants were unwilling to consider any party that did not affirm a separate Serb future. Voters are willing to consider opposition parties, but not ones that are uncertain about their Serb identity. The Serb vote ‘can’t be divided,’ ‘can’t be split,’ as one of the participants concluded, ‘any party that wants to live with the other side is not good.’ Any party must promote ‘Serb interests.’ . . . The Bosnian Croats were simply unwilling to consider any party other than HDZ.” See Stanley B. Greenberg and Amy Phee, Political Change in Bosnia. (National Democratic Institute: September 1996). Available at: http://www.greenbergresearch.com/articles/1627/1425_NDIBosnia_report.pdf. Accessed on 3 August 2007. The present author helped organize several of these sessions.

nationalist values. In Kosovo in the 1980s, less than 20% of Serb migrants from the province cited economic reasons as their motivation for leaving. Most claimed they were leaving due to harassment, persecution, and discrimination, and fear for the children. All of this evidence suggests, as one scholar has concluded, that “to put economic issues at the center of the analysis means to miss the primary point, namely, that ethnic movements are indeed ethnic and not economic.”

Given these considerations, a proper understanding of Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism needs to look to other sources to explain its origins and longevity. To understand the human motivations that inspire the passions, emotions, and sacrifices of nationalism requires analyzing its psychological or spiritual origins; as the founder of French Romantic literature, Chateaubriand, claimed “Men don’t allow themselves to be killed for their interests; they allow themselves to be killed for their passions.” In a more contemporary vein, Benedict Anderson updated this sentiment by noting that “in themselves, market-zones, ‘natural’-geographic or politico-administrative, do not create attachments. Who will willingly die for Comecon or the EEC?”

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158 The Lazić study was cited by Vladimir Matic, “Serbia at the Crossroads Again” (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Special Report #128, November 2004), 17.


162 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 53. Hechter disagrees with the view that nations or ethnic groups are special in this regard, or that they can inspire more self-sacrifice than other forms of association; as he argues, “This seems misguided. Nations are not any more or less natural than other kinds of groups . . . People may be willing to sacrifice
Of course, one cannot claim that national and/or ethnic interests will consistently prove more important in determining individual loyalties and behavior than rational or economic interests. As Theodor Hanf has noted, “Although it has been shown that economistic factors alone do not determine the behavior of individuals and groups, this does not imply that the reverse is true, namely that, in the final analysis, behavior is rooted in ‘cultural identity’, however that may be defined.” In reality, we have cases in which one wins out, and other cases in which the other does. Human behavior does change; thus, sometimes economic interests may influence how one chooses to identify more than ethnic or cultural interests, and at other times other affiliations may influence the determination of one’s economic interests.

Ultimately, establishing the dominance of either economic/material interests or psychological/spiritual values in the creation of ethnic identities and loyalties is difficult. Recognizing this fact, Rogers M. Smith notes that, “though the relationship of political identities to human interests is complex, there is good reason to think that it is reciprocal—that just as economic interests influence our affiliations, so those affiliations shape our sense of our

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164 An example of this can be seen in early 20th century Bosnia, when Bosniac elites at the time were more intent in defending their economic interests than their national interests. Thus, the origins of the 1911 coalition between Bosniacs and Croats lie in a trade made by Bosniac elites, in which they agreed to support a Croatian proposal that the official language be called “Croatian” or “Serbian” and that the official alphabet be recognized as either Latin or Cyrillic. In return, the Croats agreed to support the Bosniac position on land reform issues. According to Saćir Filandra, “The questions of language and the way in which kmets were bought out are large political questions. By placing the emphasis on land, and not on the language question, the Bosniac leadership behaved pragmatically and politically. In such a way they satisfied economic and landholding interests, but lost the battle on the political, linguistic plain, which was much more important for the people’s spiritual and national development.” See Filandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, 33.
economic interests.”165 Yet another way to think about the complex, multidimensional, and interactive nature of the influence of material factors on human consciousness is by considering the constructivist insight that the relationship between agents and structures is mutually constitutive; thus, “structures are social as well as material, and . . . agents and structures are mutually constitutive. In other words, social and material environments both socialize and constrain individuals and enable them to take actions intelligible to others, including actions that intentionally change social norms and material circumstances.”166 Nevertheless, it is clear that a purely material or economic understanding of nationalism fails to appreciate the emotional and spiritual components of the phenomenon. As Anthony Smith notes, the

irreducible ethnopsychological element in nations and nationalism means that rational explanations for these phenomenon always miss the point. Economic or political explanations in terms of state power and institutions, or individualistic rational choice theories of the strategic manipulations of the intelligentsia, must by their very nature fail to ‘reflect the emotional depth of national identity’, and the love, hatred and self-sacrifice it inspires.167

To summarize the discussion in this section: a significant body of evidence suggests that human behavior cannot be reduced solely to the pursuit of economic or material gain. Altruism, love, group loyalty, devotion to tradition and culture all play a role in fostering nationalist thought and sentiment. Consequently, a proper theoretical understanding of Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism has to recognize the importance of both the psychological and

165 See Smith, “The politics of identities,” 51. Similarly, Walker Connor argues that “The conclusion that ethnonationalism appears to operate remarkably independent from the economic variable is not tantamount to denying a role to economic factors. The latter are vary apt to serve as catalytic agent, exacerbator, or choice of battleground. They can also exert a significant effect upon immigration to or emigration from the ethnic homeland, migrations which in turn can become highly volatile issues. But catalysts and indirect forces should not be confused with cause.” Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, 161.

166 George and Bennett, “Case Studies and Theory Development,” 129.

spiritual aspects of the phenomenon. This has important consequences for policymaking as well, an issue that will be dealt with in Chapter VI.

V. Conclusions

As the evidence presented in this chapter has shown, each of the categories of explanations for identity-formation and nationalism presented above—elite-based theories, modernist views of ethnicity and nationalism, and economic and materialistic explanations—make important contributions to our understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism. Elite-based theories remind us of the role politicians and government leaders play during unstable periods, and how, given their positions within a state hierarchy, they can determine whether violence will be used, and the levels of such violence. This is especially apparent when Yugoslav elite policies are compared to those adopted by Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and others during the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, there are limits to this argument. Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the strengths of elite-based theories of identity formation and nationalism in general are overshadowed by their weaknesses, or at least by their failure to appreciate the complexity of these phenomena: the inability to explain why “the masses” so consistently respond to the calls of political elites promoting nationalist agendas, but not to the calls of political elites promoting agendas based on other forms of social identity or group solidarity; the failure to recognize the power of “the masses” or their role as active participants in this process, with their own interests, traditions, loyalties, and attachments, independent of those of the elites; the ability of “the masses” to pick and choose which identities they choose to give their loyalties to, and which they
do not. All of this suggests that Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism is better understood as a phenomenon with deep resonance on behalf of the vast majority of any given population, rather than as an elite-project imposed on people from above.

The modernist argument, for its part, suffers from the fact that it rests on an unverifiable premise; i.e., that individuals who lived prior to the nineteenth century had little or no sense of ethnic or national identity, even though we have no written record of the thoughts, feelings, sentiments and loyalties of the vast mass of illiterate individuals who were alive prior to 1900. Meanwhile, the least objectionable claim of constructivism, that nations are human constructs, is ultimately somewhat banal. As Motyl notes, “this proposition is interesting only as a counterpoint to the preposterous claims of extreme primordialism . . . To point out that nations are humanly constructed may therefore be true . . . but it is as true as the larger statement that all non-molecular, non atomic reality is constructed, in other words, that culture is a reality and that nations are cultural artifacts.”

Thus, neither the explanations focusing on human agency or structure can satisfactorily come to grips with what Andrew Janos has called the “same stubborn facts” of politics in East Central Europe over the past two-hundred years. Ultimately, elite-based, modernist, and materialist-economic explanations cannot answer the question of why ethno-national problems have persisted in the region, why would-be nation- and state-builders always seem stymied by the national problem, and why solutions to this problem always seem to fall along ethnoconfessional lines. In the following chapter, I will provide an alternative theory of Balkan ethnoconfessional

168 Motyl, Revolutions, Nations, Empires, 94.
nationalism which attempts to do so by focusing on the emotional, psychological, and spiritual roots of the phenomenon.
Chapter III

Three Theses on Balkan Ethnoconfessional Nationalism

I. Introduction

The ethnic homogenization of existing and new states has been an intrinsic part of European history for the past two centuries. What has been driving this process, however, is a matter of considerable debate. According to Gale Stokes, it has not been socio-economic change, as Ernest Gellner would argue, but something more metaphysical, or at least more intangible—an attempt to implement the ideas of the French Revolution. Thus, with specific reference to the European experience, Stokes has noted that

...Much of the political history of nineteenth and twentieth-century Europe can be read as a working out of a homogenizing style of autonomy within the state system, a redrawing of state borders onto ethnic lines. In 1850, most of Europe was governed by four great multiethnic empires—Russian, Austrian, Ottoman, and German (in the last case by the German confederation, the heir to the Holy Roman Empire). Today Europe consists of dozens of independent, self-governing entities, most of which are more or less ethnically homogenous... In this context, the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s are not an anomaly but rather a late phase of a deep transformation that is only tangentially related to industrialization or the development of capitalism but is fundamentally related to specific attempts to put into effect certain inspiring notions from the eighteenth century... social change and class relations were not the primary ingredients in the formulation of the principles and actualities of the nation-state. Nationalism is a specific way of trying to effectuate the ideas of popular sovereignty, equity, and freedom within an already existing state system. Separating out these ideological and structural determinants from the socioeconomic factors that also are part and parcel of European history after the French Revolution makes it possible to think clearly about the wars of Yugoslav succession.\(^1\)

Over the past several decades, the dominance of nationalism as an ideology has been accompanied by the resurgence of religion in public life. According to one specialist on religion and public life, “faith-based political action seems more influential in world affairs today than at

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\(^1\) Stokes, “Solving the Wars of Yugoslav Succession,” 200.
any time since the Enlightenment.”² This proposition has been especially true in the former Yugoslavia; one Yugoslav specialist has noted that “the disintegration of the Yugoslav state has brought religion closer to the state than at any time in the past,”³ while the Bosnian intellectual Ivan Lovrenović has argued that since the fall of communism the postcommunist Yugoslav republics have experienced a de-secularization of society.⁴ Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that throughout the region the number of self-professed believers has been increasing since the 1980s, and religious organizations have consistently been regarded as the most trustworthy institutions in these societies.⁵ Over the past two decades, political leaders such as Alija

² See Walter A. McDougall, “Introduction,” Orbis 42 (Spring 1998), 159 (special edition dedicated to Religion in World Affairs). The sociologist Peter L. Berger has made a similar argument, claiming that “the assumption that we live in a secularized world is false: The world today . . . is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so.” Berger, “Secularism in Retreat,” The National Interest (Winter 1996/97), 3. A number of reasons have been put forth as to why religion has again become such an important factor in world and public affairs, among which the most prominent are: 1) that it simply never ceased to be an important factor in politics and society, but modernization and secularization theorists failed to see its continuing relevance; 2) societal modernization itself has left vast numbers of people seeking existential answers for many of the problems inherent in the human condition for which rational/scientific theories cannot provide satisfactory answers; and 3) the end of the Cold War has removed many of the systemic constraints on various types of conflict, including religious ones. Jonathan Fox provides a useful review of these issues, as well as a quantitative study on how religion impacts ethnic conflicts around the world; see Fox, “The Salience of Religious Issues in Ethnic Conflicts: A Large-N Study,” Nationalism & Ethnic Politics 3 (Autumn 1997), 1-19.

³ Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 300. Allcock goes on to claim that this development has had the effect of making religion a less effective component of civil society. For similar views, especially with respect to the role of the Orthodox Church in Serbia and Montenegro, see Mirko Blagojević, Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2005), 381-83.

⁴ Lovrenović, Bosna, Kraj Stoljeća (Zagreb: Durieux, 1997). Much public opinion data from the former Yugoslavia, discussed below, supports the argument that religion has again assumed significant importance in social and political life.

⁵ For instance, the number of declared believers in Croatia increased from 47 percent in 1989 to 76 percent in 1996. See Sekulić, Duško, Massey, Garth, and Hodson, Randy, “Ethnic Intolerance and Ethnic Conflict in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 29 (September 2006), 814. In Serbia, a public opinion poll released in July 2007 showed that the Serbian Orthodox Church was by far the most respected public institution in the country, with 62 percent of respondents claiming that they trusted the church, as opposed to 43 percent who declared trust in the army, 31 percent who declared trust in the police, 31 per cent in the president of the republic, 21 percent in the government, 23 percent in the judiciary, and 18 percent who declared trust in parliament. See “Rezultati istraživanje javnog menja, jun 2007,” available at www.cesid.org.yu. Similarly, a 2002 public opinion survey in Montenegro found the Serbian Orthodox Church to be the most trusted institutions in the republic. See Public Opinion in Montenegro 2002 (Podgorica: Centar za demokratiju i ljudska prava, April 2002).
Izetbegović have come to power with explicitly religious, or pseudo-religious, agendas.\(^6\)

Religious organizations and hierarchs have also been very active in various forms of politics; for

\(^6\) In his most famous political manifesto, *The Islamic Declaration*, in 1970 Izetbegović had declared,

There is no peace or co-existence between Islamic faith and non-Islamic social and political institutions . . . The Islamic rebirth cannot begin without a religious [one], but it cannot be successfully continued and completed without a political revolution . . . [but] Accentuating the priority of a religious-moral renewal does not mean—nor can it be interpreted to mean—that the Islamic rebirth can be achieved without Islamic government. This position means simply that our path does not begin with the conquest of power, but with the conquest of people’s hearts, and that the Islamic rebirth is first of all a revolution in the realm of upbringing, and only after that in the realm of politics . . . Our means are personal example, the book, and the word. When will force be added to these means? The choice of this moment is always a concrete question and depends on a variety of factors. However, one general rule can be postulated: the Islamic movement can and may move to take power once it is morally and numerically strong enough, not only to destroy the existing non-Islamic government, but to build a new Islamic government.


Such views do not, however, hold up under serious examination. The fact that Izetbegović devotes a section in the tract (pp. 44-46) to Pakistan—a religiously “clean” country formed by its violent secession from a larger multi-religious and multi-ethnic entity, and which Izetbegović called “our great hope”—had clear implications for Izetbegović’s views regarding multi-religious Yugoslavia. (I am thankful to Xavier Bougarel for impressing the importance of this point upon me.) This is in contrast to the very critical view Izetbegović exhibits in the *Islamic Declaration* towards reformers in the Muslim world such as Kemal Ataturk. As Vjekoslav Perica notes, “The [Islamic] Declaration designated Pakistan as a model country to be emulated by Muslim revolutionaries worldwide.

The Pakistan parallel also revealed Izetbegović’s vision of Yugoslavia’s fate as analogous to that of India after 1948.” See Perica, *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States* (New York: Oxford, 2002), 77. As Zlatko Dizdarević, a prominent Bosniac journalist who has followed Izetbegović’s career for years has noted,

. . . there is an infinite amount of proof for the claim that in the case of Izetbegović we are talking about a consistent concept of life and politics which he has realized, from which he has not stepped back, and which he, in the end, has realized . . . today we are the victims of a consistent view of the world which has shown itself to be fundamentally conservative, anachronistic, and fundamentally unacceptable for modern politics and the modern way of life . . . when you today read that same text and know that behind it in these ten years has existed the possibility of realizing that platform with the support of something which is called the state, which are called institutions of that state, such as the army, the police, etc., that those things, which 10 or 30 years ago one could proclaim a citizen’s right to their own opinion, grows into something which has a different dimension . . . the *Islamic Declaration* has been realized.
instance, the Catholic archbishop of Zagreb has appealed to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to allow an indicted war criminal, General Ante Gotovina, to await trial in Croatia.⁷

Viewed in this historical and comparative context, what has been happening in the Balkans over the past two hundred years is thus fully consistent with European and world history, and is not the result of some specifically Balkan tendency toward disintegration and violence. As John Allcock has noted, “It is only possible to understand the South Slav lands by paying attention to the context within which they are situated. The trajectory of their development needs to be explained in relation to wider processes, involving neighboring states, the Mediterranean region, the continent of Europe as a whole and indeed the world.”⁸ Seen in this light, the nation-building

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(See the interview with Zlatko Dizdarević in Dani (Sarajevo), No. 124, October 1999). For an interesting series of critiques of Izetbegović’s writings, see Dr. Jasna Samić’s series of articles in Dani (Sarajevo), No. 145, “Cari Arapskog Jezika,” 10 March 2000; and “Zašto postoji nesto a ne ništa?” Dani (Sarajevo), No. 146, 17 March 2000. International officials who had sustained dealings with Izetbegović frequently expressed doubts about his true beliefs; General Sir Michael Rose, the commander of UNPROFOR in 1994-95, for instance, noted that after a year in Bosnia “I came to believe that his talk of creating a multi-religious, multi-cultural state in Bosnia was a disguise for the extension of his own political power and the furtherance of Islam.” See Rose, Fighting for Peace (London: Harvill, 1998), 38.

The most serious and sustained analysis of Izetbegović’s background and ties to Islamic movements in the Middle-East is provided by John R. Schindler, a former analyst at the National Security Agency and currently Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College; see Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida and the Rise of Global Jihad (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2007).


⁸ Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 13, 20. The importance of looking at Balkan history in a comparative way is a crucial point. Much of southeastern Europe’s historical evolution and development has followed a common pattern, making it both difficult and artificial to isolate the historical experiences of specific countries, nations, or ethnic groups. In the nineteenth century, for instance, as Barbara Jelavich points out, “In their internal development the new national regimes tended to follow the same general pattern and to face similar difficulties.” Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 298. Here it should be noted that in addition to the necessity of looking at the international context of events in southeastern Europe, it is also important to understand the importance of how interactive Balkan ethnoconfessionalisms are; as Jasna Dragović-Soso notes, “accounts of the process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration have often neglected the interactive nature of the various particularist nationalisms or of the policies and decisions of the different federal, republic, and province leaderships.” See Dragović-Soso, “Why Did Yugoslavia Disintegrate? An Overview of Contending Explanations,” 29.
process in southeastern Europe should not be considered some atavistic Balkan anomaly; it is, instead, simply part and parcel of what has been going on around the world over the past two centuries.

II. Ethnoconfessional Nationalism as a Collective Phenomenon

In a provocative essay entitled “Primordialism Lives!” Stephen Van Evera asked whether “we should take ethnic groups as fixed for the purposes of political analysis?” Writing before the advent of social constructivism, in *The Idea of Nationalism*, Hans Kohn argued in the affirmative, claiming that “In the age of nationalism, nations are the great corporate personalities of history.” Kohn did not believe that what he called the “character” of nations was determined biologically, or that it was fixed for all time, but he did believe that such a national character existed as the “product of social and intellectual development, of countless gradations of behavior and reaction.”

Many contemporary scholars reject such views. Rogers Brubaker, for instance, has attacked an understanding of nationalism and nations that “presupposes the existence of nations, and expresses their strivings for autonomy and independence . . . conceived as collective individuals,

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11 An analogous debate in evolutionary biology similarly questions the extent to which human groups can function as single organisms. Here too, religion figures prominently in the debate, as scientists ask why religious groups seem to have had more success in surviving than non-religious groups. Among the reasons for why societies based on some form of religious feeling may have been more successful are the fact that they were “more cohesive, more likely to contain individuals willing to make sacrifices for the group and more adept at sharing resources and preparing for warfare.” See Robin Marantz Henig, “Darwin’s God,” *The New York Times Magazine*, 4 March 2007.
capable of coherent, purposeful action” as “sociologically naïve.”12 James D. Fearon has argued that “Anyone with primordialist leanings should be quickly disabused of them by undertaking to code ‘ethnic groups’ in many different countries . . . Constructivist or instrumentalist arguments about the contingent, fuzzy, and situational character of ethnicity seem amply supported.”13 David Laitin claims that “it is misleading to assume that nations (or putative nations)” are unitary actors, and making such a mistake “can lead to policy recommendations that promote not ethnic peace, but violent conflict.”14 Similarly, V.P. Gagnon has questioned . . . the concepts of groupness and solidarity, that is, whether, even if people do identify as Croats, it is in any way meaningful to assume that all such people are ipso facto members of an ethnic group with identifiable interests and borders, or that they all share an identical sense of what such an identification as Croat means in their relationships with other Croats and non Croats . . . the social constructivist approach means not assuming the existence of “groups” as unitary actors with a common identity and single notion of groupness.15

Skepticism regarding the reality of ethnic or national groups is at the heart of social constructivism, which emphasizes, according to Kanchan Chandra, two fundamental points: first, that individuals have multiple identities; and second, that these identities vary “depending upon some specified causal variable.”16 Yet often this skepticism seems somewhat semantic. Thus, David Laitin in the same paragraph argues that “The search for ‘real’ nations living with ‘real’ boundaries . . . is a chimera . . . [yet] it would be foolhardy for liberals to ignore the social reality


14 Laitin, Identity in Formation, 331.

15 Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War, 12, 188.

16 Kanchan Chandra, “Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics,” APSA-CP: Newsletter of the Comparative Politics Section of the American Political Science Association (Winter 2001), 7
of nations in search of that very same chimera.”\textsuperscript{17} Often such views are combined with a dismissal of the importance of either religion or ethnicity in public life; with specific reference to the Balkans, for instance, one author has written that in pre-1992 Bosnia “religion and ethnicity were not the most salient features of identity.”\textsuperscript{18}

But in trying to understand the long-term, secular trend toward ever smaller and more ethnically-homogeneous nation-states both in the Balkans and throughout the rest of Europe, it is worth reconsidering whether the social-constructivist approach, with its stress on individual choice and the actions of specific elites, has the same explanatory power as an approach that places more emphasis on structure as opposed to either agency or contingency. Accounts describing the “indispensability,” “inescapability,” and “inevitability” of nationalism suggest that there is something more to the structural transformation of the world and the triumph of nationalism as an ideology than the voluntaristic intervention of nationalist elites. In place of an approach that dismisses the potential that ethnic groups or nations can indeed act as unitary actors, it is worth considering whether a holistic approach, which, according to Susan James, attempts to discern “the social regularities which control classes of people”\textsuperscript{19} provides a more powerful explanatory model for understanding nationalism’s enduring strength. In purely methodological terms, Ira Katznelson has argued that “so long as one does not turn social

\textsuperscript{17} Laitin, \textit{Identity in Formation}, 345. In what seems to be a similarly forced attempt to reject an acceptance of ethnic groups as objective entities, Brubaker et. al. argue for shifting analytical attention away from the notion of “groups” and thinking in terms of the subject act of “group-making” and “grouping.” Thus, “Race, ethnicity and nationality . . . are not things \textit{in} the world, but perspectives \textit{on} the world—not ontological but epistemological realities.” See Brubaker, et. al., “Ethnicity as Cognition,” 45. Emphasis in the original.


\textsuperscript{19} Susan James, \textit{The Content of Social Explanation} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 177.
categories into fictional collective actors, it is permissible to assign preferences to collectivities, but only with great care, with self-conscious provisionality, and with the recognition that, ultimately, all preferences are held by persons, not roles,”20 and Van Evera has explicitly argued in favor of treating ethnic groups or nations as political actors. Similarly, as George and Bennett note “If all individuals behave the same in the same social structure, then the interesting causal and explanatory action is at the level of the social structure, even if it must operate through the perceptions and calculations of individuals.”21

To what extent can we speak of what Kohn calls “the will of nations” in the Balkans? Before explicitly addressing this question, it is worth noting the strong historical streak of collectivism that runs through Balkan political culture. The origins of this collectivism can be traced back to the Middle Ages; for instance, notions such as collective responsibility for crimes, and, consequently, collective punishment for the families of those committing crimes, were a notable feature of Balkan peasant communities extending back to Byzantine times, if not even earlier.22 Embedding this sense of collective identity in the region’s political culture were pre-Ottoman institutions such as the zadrugra (collective household) which in Ottoman times was the primary unit of taxation. As Leopold von Ranke noted in the case of Serbia,

These family households, supplying all their own wants, and shut up each within itself—a state of things which was continued under the Turks, because the taxes were chiefly leveled upon the households—formed the basis of Servian nationality. Individual interest was thus merged, as it were, with that of the household.23

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21 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 141-42.
22 Mazower, The Balkans, 151.
Such collectivism had considerable implications for the region’s political culture; specifically, whether Balkan societies would stress group or individual rights. Again, to cite Allcock, “long-standing forms of collectivism in the political culture of the region” resulted in “a general failure to develop a sense in practice (and often also in law) of individual rights and an institutionalized tendency to think in terms of collective rights, which subsume the person.”

In Kosovo, for instance, Ger Duijzings has found a strong fixation on the family or lineage; distrust towards those who are not one’s kin; a strong pressure to protect the family’s integrity and to avenge infringements upon its reputation; a tendency to conceal information or to mislead and deceive others, which corresponds to an instrumental view of relations outside the family. In this type of atomized society, in which the struggle for survival dominates life and violent conflict is a recurring phenomenon, loyalties beyond one’s own family are highly unstable, changeable and fluid. . . It is clear that lack of social and economic integration has inhibited the development of stable, wider identifications.

Importantly, modernization made only limited inroads into southeastern Europe’s political culture; thus, “The persistence of the reliance upon kinship, clientship and locality in South Slav society is therefore interesting as an indication both of the failure to develop these kinds of relations of impersonal trust and of the continuing life of pre-modern attitudes.”

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24 Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 434.

25 Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo, 6-7. Distrust towards outsiders is not of course a unique characteristic of Albanians in southeastern Europe; as Keith Brown notes in his study of the Macedonian town of Kruševo, “Secrecy, concealment of truth, and attention to maintaining a public face were all perceived as components of a well-lived life.” See Brown, The Past in Question, 228.

26 Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 366. Here it is worth noting that international policy toward the region (specifically, the economic sanctions regime enforced against the FRY in the 1990s) has often reinforced the very ties upon which collectivism and nationalism in general are based. Susan Woodward, for instance, notes that “Sanctions, by imposing economic hardship, were intended to create an angry public opinion that would turn against Milosevic and demand a change in policy toward Bosnia, or, if necessary, overthrow his rule altogether. But economic hardship had nurtured nationalist sentiments in the first place. Further economic hardship would require individuals to spend more time on daily survival and less on political action. It would reinforce the informal networks and social obligations that define ethnicity—family, cousins, godparents—or crime. The sanctions, instead of undermining the sitting regime, increased the power of the government and of Milosevic personally . . . “ See Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 293.
The historical legacy of collectivism in the Balkans has resulted in a socio-political environment in which ethnoconfessional group identities, and, consequently, ethnoconfessional group interests, have become paramount for understanding contemporary Balkan politics and society. While individuals in southeastern Europe may, as constructivists would argue, possess multiple identities, the salience of the various identities varies, and in a significant majority of cases, each individual’s collective group identity is of paramount importance. In the Balkans, as will be demonstrated below, the cleavage that has clearly had the most resonance, the one to which people feel what Kohn called a “supreme loyalty,” is by and large the national one (or, to be more precise in the Balkan case, the ethnoconfessional one). As Kohn argued, although people do have multiple identities,

Within these pluralistic, and sometimes conflicting, kinds of group consciousness there is generally one which is recognized by man as the supreme and most important, to which therefore, in the case of conflict of group-loyalties, he owes supreme loyalty. He identifies himself with the group and its existence, frequently not only for the span of his life, but for the continuity of his existence beyond this span. The feeling of solidarity between the individual and the group may go, at certain times, as far as complete submergence of the individual in the group. The whole education of the members of the group is directed to a common mental preparedness for common attitudes and common actions.\(^{27}\)

Thus, while we can concede the constructivist claim that individuals possess multiple identities, by far the most important of these is the national one. There are, of course, numerous ranges of opinion within each Balkan ethnoconfessional group, competitions for power within elites, etc.\(^{28}\) Nevertheless, within each ethnoconfessional group there is also something which


Alon Confino calls “symbolic common denominators” that have been internalized in the vernacular memories (as opposed to official, state-sponsored memories) of a given population.

The interesting question, then, is how the nation-state came to be a vernacular memory, or “how did people internalize the nation and make it in a remarkably short time an everyday mental property—a memory as intimate and authentic as the local, ethnic and family past?” As Confino goes on to note,

National memory, for example, is constituted by different, often opposing, memories that, in spite of their rivalries, construct common denominators that overcome on the symbolic level real social and political differences to create an imagined community . . . It is obviously important to avoid essentialism and to reject arguments that impose cultural homogeneity on a heterogeneous society . . . Differences are real. People are sometimes ready to die for their vision of the past, and nations sometimes break because of memory conflicts. But all this only begs the question: how, then, in spite of all these differences and difficulties, do nations hold together? . . . many a national memory succeeds to represent, for a broad section of the population, a common destiny that overcomes symbolically real social and political conflicts in order to give the illusion of a community of people who in fact have very different interests. People construct representations of the nation that conceal through symbols real friction in their society.

Confino’s warning that we should not privilege the political over the social or cultural is useful when one reflects upon how broad-based many upsurges in nationalist activity in the former Yugoslavia were, in contrast to many elite-led explanations for nationalism in the former Yugoslavia. The movement known as the “Croatian Spring,” for instance, was not led by political or state officials, but by cultural organizations, student groups, the Roman Catholic Church, and even to a limited extent Croatian émigré groups, independently of Croatian

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Accepting that society and culture possess an autonomous power independent of the state also begins to spread the network of “nationalists” into an ever-larger segment of the population. The Balkan experience, for instance, shows that a very wide range of people can be considered “nationalists”—from politicians, to clerics, writers, intellectuals, artists, musicians, journalists, military officers, even criminals turned nationalist warlords. Here we can continue asking how deep the social roots of ethnoconfessional nationalism are by positing the question of whether “nationalists” could be considered individuals who choose a marriage partner of their own ethnic background, people who decide on where to settle based on ethnic demographic patterns (both of these issues will be discussed in Chapter IV), or businesspeople who financially supported nationalist political parties representing 70-90 percent of the political spectrum in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, or Serbia?

Examined in these terms, and in the context of the earlier discussion of the universality, indispensability, inescapability, and inevitability of nationalism, the phenomenon of ethnoconfessional nationalism begins to appear much broader and massive than the emphasis on elites many narrower versions of social constructivism imply. Here it is useful to borrow William H. Sewell’s concept of “ideological formations” to explain how nationalism involves more than voluntaristic elite intervention. In critiquing Theda Skocpol’s structural explanation for the

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31 On these issues, see Ivan Perić, *Suvremeni hrvatski nacionalizam* (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1984), 23-33.

32 See the discussion of these issues in Chapter II.
outbreak of social revolutions, Sewell suggests more weight be given to the importance of ideology, or what he calls “ideological formations.” Thus, he sees a need

. . . to shift the emphasis from highly self-conscious, purposive individuals attempting to elaborate or enact “blueprints” for change” to relatively anonymous, collective, transpersonal ideologies that “undergo continuous reproduction and/or transformations as a result of the combined willful actions of more or less knowledgeable actors within the constraints and the possibilities supplied by preexisting systems. It is, consequently, not quite right to speak of ideological structures as “non-voluntary” or “non-voluntarist,” since both the reproduction and the transformation of these structures are carried out by a very large number of willful actors. Ideological structures are, however, anonymous. The whole of an ideological structure (with its inevitable contradictions and discontinuities) is never present in the consciousness of any single actor—not even a Robespierre, a Napoleon, a Lenin, or a Mao—but in the collectivity. An ideological structure is not some self-consistent “blueprint,” but the outcome of the often contradictory or antagonistic action of a large number of actors or groups of actors . . . [This is] a conception of ideology as an anonymous, collective, but transformable, structure . . . [which informs] the structure of institutions, the nature of social cooperation and conflict, and the attitudes and predispositions of the population.33

The preceding discussion has important implications for our understanding of the Balkan political spectrum. Many scholars have noted nationalism’s ability to transcend political and/or ideological boundaries. Woodward, for instance, has argued that nationalism “[gathers] into its fold all forms of reaction—from those in genuine opposition, those politically excluded from the previous regime, to opportunists—regardless of their substantive policy positions.”34 One could go even further and claim that nationalism does more than gather “all forms of reaction” into its folds; nationalism gathers almost everyone into its folds. As Alexander Motyl puts it, nationalism “can coexist with a variety of other political doctrines and behaviors, including communism . . . All that nationalism innately opposes are doctrines that explicitly deny the existence of nations and the possibility of states. In the twentieth century, however, such doctrines have been


34 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 124-125.
In other words, nationalism’s power is most strongly seen in the willingness of people from across the political spectrum and representing different class interests to adopt a common view or position about the desirability of ethnic or national self-governance. As Dejan Jović has argued,

The strength of nationalism lies in its internal pluralism, and its ability to include liberal, socialist, conservative and other values and to tie and direct them toward one goal—the creation or the preservation of the nation-state. Nationalism is the doctrine of extraordinary conditions in which political space is limited and suspended. It makes its appearance in place of regular politics, as an alternative to the ordinary division of the political spectrum.

This point can be illustrated by providing two different ways of understanding the political spectrum in post-Yugoslav states. The first example, “Ideology Trumps Ethnicity,” suggests that individuals sharing common ideological positions but different ethnic backgrounds can overcome their ethnic differences and join forces for a common political purpose. The Balkan political spectrum according to this view thus looks something like this:

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37 Rogers M. Smith describes the phenomenon of “trumping” identities in the following way: “some identities define persons’ trumping allegiances in cases where the demands of those memberships conflict with ones advanced on behalf of other human associations, groups, or societies (whether those are ‘nation-states,’ different levels of government, religious bodies, racial or ethnic communities, corporate, worker, or other class organizations, or other groups) . . . political activities of various sorts play important roles in determining which become salient political identities.” See Smith, “The politics of identities,” 50.
Thus, Croat moderate \( (a^1) \) should be more willing to collaborate with Serb moderate \( (b) \) than with Croat extreme nationalist \( (a) \), or Serb moderate \( (b) \) should be more willing to collaborate with Croat moderate \( (a^1) \) than with Serb extreme nationalist \( (b^1) \). In other words, ideology trumps ethnicity.

Considerable historical evidence, however, shows that this understanding of the Balkan political spectrum is substantially off the mark. An alternative understanding of the Balkan political spectrum is to approach it from the belief that ethnicity trumps ideology. For the vast majority of people (roughly two-thirds to ninety percent), one’s ethnoconfessional identity determines their political positions vis-à-vis a host of issues, and trumps ideological similarities they may share with people from across the ethnoconfessional divide; to quote a turn-of-phrase coined by Keith Brown, national identity does indeed determine perspective.\(^{38}\) Consequently, the Balkan political spectrum in reality looks something like this:

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\(^{38}\) See Brown, *The Past in Question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 19. Keith Darden goes perhaps even further with this claim; thus, according to Darden “if one knows the national content of the initial schooling in a community, one knows the most basic political loyalties of that community. This gives one remarkable power to predict how that community will align even more than a century hence.” See Darden, “The Causes and Consequences of Enduring National Loyalties,” Draft Manuscript, Chapter 1, 11 (emphasis added). Another term that could be used to describe the impact of ethnoconfessional identity on behavior is “govern,” as Robert Donia used the term when describing the motivations of political and
According to this view, Croat moderate \((a^1)\) will find it much easier to collaborate with Croat extreme nationalist \((a)\) than with Serb moderate \((b)\), and vice versa.

The exceptions to this understanding are in many ways politically irrelevant.\(^39\) As Vladko Maček would note in interwar Yugoslavia, defectors from the national camp are like “branches of a tree” broken “in a heavy storm”—“once no longer attached to the tree that gave them life, social leaders in Bosnia in 1878; thus, “The various local actors in the 1878 Sarajevo revolution were leaders and members of religious communities, and their religious affiliations and loyalties governed much of their behavior.” See Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 57.

\(^39\) In this category one could include individuals in Bosnia such as the Croat Ivo Komšić and the Serb Mirko Pejanović. There have also been occasional instances in history in which prečani Serbs disagreed with the view of Serbs from Serbia proper. Woodward notes that the “assertion . . . that Serbs outside of Serbia would always choose to vote their national identity as an ethnic people rather than their identity as a member of the territorial people of a republic . . . [is] an assumption that had no basis in historical experience, where Serbs from Croatia and Vojvodina, for example, were most often in conflict with Serbs from Serbia proper.” See Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 430-431, footnote 38. But examples such as these are by and large exceptions that prove the rule. In the case of the prečani Serbs, for instance, for a significant period of time between 1918 and 1934, they supported Belgrade’s centralizing policies in interwar Yugoslavia (as opposed to their Croatian counterparts). It was only when the leader of the prečani Serbs, Svetozar Pribišević, had a falling out with King Alexander that a clear break between Belgrade and the prečani Serbs appeared. Before the break, Pribišević had been considered “among the staunchest centralists.” See Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 43.
they would dry up.” In fact, the Balkan experience of the past two centuries provides substantial evidence that ethnoconfessional identity has consistently trumped ideology—i.e., that individuals with different political programs or ideologies have found it much easier to unite around ethnic/national issues, whereas individuals with similar political ideologies but from different ethnoconfessional backgrounds have found it difficult to bridge the ethnic divide. Thus, in the 19th century,

The national factor was so strong that it dominated Balkan politics in the past and continues to do so in the present. The right, the center, and the left all exploited nationalism and fostered national issues. They differed in methods as well as in substance but, basically, followed the same national endeavors. Conservatives preached the establishment of a strong state as a prerequisite for the sake of national unification. The liberals related freedom at home to freedom abroad. Socialists preached the fusion of both revolutions, the national and the social, into one. The social democrats were not immune to nationalistic influences; in fact, Balkan social democracy, based on the revolutionary tradition, never understood nor had sympathy for Austro-Marxist theories of cultural and individual national autonomy.41

Similarly, during the interwar Yugoslav period, “ethnic differentiation subverts class consciousness across the board.”42 Such findings are consistent with the arguments noted above regarding nationalism’s compatibility with a variety of political ideologies of both the right and the left, even across time (an issue which will be discussed in the next section).

A few empirical examples help illustrate this point. In Macedonia, according to Andrew Rossos

40 As cited by Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*, 78. Importantly, this is a mistake occupiers and interventionists have repeatedly made in the Balkans. During the Habsburg period, for instance, as Robin Okey notes, Benjamin Kállay’s efforts to split “moderates” from more extreme elements within national groups came to naught, as “moderation . . . did not mean inclination to become ‘national renegades’ . . . “ See Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, 139.


A “Free Macedonia” became the central plank in the program of virtually all Macedonian patriotic, revolutionary, and national organizations and movements after the 1878 Congress of Berlin. This was true of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) of the Ilinden period as well as the Makedonisti of the generation of K.P. Misirkov, the leading ideologist of Macedonian nationalism after the turn of the century. It was equally true of both the Macedonian right and left, which, in the much more difficult circumstances of post-Ottoman, post-partition, divided Macedonia called, at least until the end of the Civil War in Greece in 1949, for a united Macedonian state.\(^{43}\)

Just as tellingly, during World War II Macedonia’s communist leadership supported the Bulgarian occupation authorities’ efforts, despite the fact that Bulgaria was an ally in Germany’s war against the Soviet Union; as Keith Brown notes, “‘National’ rejection of Yugoslav rule had been affirmed as more important than any communist opposition to the old Yugoslav elites or to fascism more generally.”\(^{44}\) In interwar Yugoslavia, while Serb opposition parties were dissatisfied with the royal dictatorship, they in the main did not object to the centralizing features of the government’s program.\(^ {45}\) In Serbia in the 1980s, the plight of Kosovo Serbs became an issue that cut across ideological and political persuasions: “liberals,” “nationalists” and the “new left” all joined efforts to support their cause.\(^ {46}\) In Slovenia in the early 1980s, efforts to introduce a “common-core curricula” throughout Yugoslavia “united critical intellectuals and the communist leadership” against the campaign.\(^ {47}\) Reviewing the history of state-opposition relations in the Titoist period, Vladimir Gligorov noted that, “Opposition groups are more ready

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\(^{45}\) Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*, 126.

\(^{46}\) Dragović-Soso, *Saviours of the Nation*, 139. Moreover, in contrast to analyses that see Slobodan Milošević or Serbian political elites as those most responsible for the “re-emergence” of Serbian nationalism, Mirko Blagojević argues that it was “[Serbian] Orthodoxy . . . that became the most important, and one would say the key factor in constructing an awakened Serbian collective identity” at the beginning of the 1980s, i.e., several years before Milošević came to power. See Blagojević, *Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva*, 384.

\(^{47}\) Dragović-Soso, *Saviours of the Nation*, 166. Emphasis added.
to cooperate with the Communists of their own nationality than with the opposition of some other nationality.”48 Along similar lines, Dejan Jović has noted that “Although ideological differences between them were great, between elites and counter-elites there was not a great difference with respect to the national question and the protection of “national interests.”49 Here it also bears noting that in the final days of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, governments of national unity were formed in most of the republics composed of parties from across the political spectrum. All of these facts stand in marked contrast to what constructivist and/or instrumentalist views of nationalism would predict. Moreover, as will be seen in Chapter VI, it also stands in contrast to how the international community has understood the problems of ethnoconfessional nationalism, and how it has attempted to deal with it.

A logical corollary to the ability of ethnoconfessional nationalism to unite people across the ideological spectrum is the fact that resolving the “national question” takes precedence over “normal” politics, such as the struggle for civil rights, or debates over economic policy. Gavrilo Princip, for instance, frequently repeated the view that he and his co-conspirators in Mlada Bosna (the organization behind the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand) would be socialists if it were not for the unfinished matter of the Serb national question.50 A decade later, Vladko Maček would similarly note that “The first and foremost question is the Croatian


50 See Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, 214. One of Princip’s friends in *Mlada Bosna*, Nedeljko Čabrinović (who had spent much of his early life as a socialist), would likewise say that he and his socialist friends had “Serb souls.”
question. The question of dictatorship, civil liberties, and political freedoms comes second, even if it is of the utmost importance.”

Given these considerations, instead of understanding nationalism as an elite-construct, it is better viewed, as Benedict Anderson has suggested, as “a deep, horizontal comradeship . . . regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail.” This suggests that apart from nationalism being an ideology that transcends ideological differences, it is also an ideology that transcends class differences. During the Croatian Spring in the late 1960s, for instance, the then leader of the League of Communists of Croatia, Miko Tripalo, would claim that “national and class interests were the same as nation and class had become identical.”

Along similar lines, Sabrina Ramet has argued that “regardless of what the particular interests of Croatian peasants, merchants, sailors, priests, and intellectuals may have been, they united to support the same program in the conviction that their principal foe was one and the same (Serbian hegemonism).” Such monolithic group interests explain why widely dissimilar parties, such as Vladko Maček’s Croatian Peasant’s Party and Ante Pavelić’s Ustaša movement, were able to collaborate with each other.

In Macedonia during World War II, for instance, the British vice-

51 As quoted by Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*, 89.

52 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991), 7. This also explains the virulence and strength of nationalism, for as Benedict Anderson notes, “Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.”


55 Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia*, 7-8. In Croatia prior to and during World War II, anti-Serbianism was something most (albeit perhaps not all) Croatian political forces shared; according to Aleksa Djilas, “the simple, and, perhaps, terrible truth is that the essentials of the Ustašas’ ideology were not much outside the mainstream of Croatian nationalism, and very close to the special tradition of Starčević, Kvaternik and Frank.” Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 114.
consul in Skopje, a certain Mr. Thomas, would estimate that “90 percent of all Slav Macedonians are autonomists in one sense or another.” In interwar Bosnia, despite the fact that some segments of the Bosnian Muslim population were more Serb-oriented and some more Croat-oriented, “all Bosniac political and cultural actors were united in the defense of Bosnian rights, proving that the defense of Bosnia’s rights were above and beyond national ‘determinations.’” In a more recent Bosnian example, Sulejman Tihić, the head of the Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA, the political party formed by the late Alija Izetbegović), noted that in discussions on constitutional changes the Serb delegation (which included people from across the political spectrum such as Mladen Ivanić, Milorad Dodik, and Dragan Kalinić) was “united, they only expressed themselves in different ways.” In Albania and amongst Albanians in general, one of


57 See Filandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, 112.

58 See the interview with Tihić in Dani (Sarajevo), 29 March 2002, 10. A Serb member of the Bosnian collective state presidency, Nebojša Radmanović, expressed the same view about his Bosniac interlocutors, claiming that “there was no great difference between Bosniac politicians” regardless of whether they were from the SDA, the SBiH, or the SDP, when it came to their views of the RS or the future of Bosnia. See the interview with Radmanović in Politika (Belgrade), 1 August 2007. Similarly, the “non-nationalists” who were victorious in Croatia’s 2000 elections did little to encourage the return of Serbs to Croatia. As the former High Representative in BiH, Wolfgang Petritsch, noted in April 2002, “One of the worst sides of the events in Croatia is the passive behavior of the Račan government in accepting their own citizens who live within the territory of Bosnia. There are around 50,000 Serbs living in the Republic of Srpska, mainly occupying Bosniac and Croat houses, which means that the behavior of the Croatian government impedes the normalization in the Republic of Srpska and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.” See Petritsch’s interview in Danas (Belgrade), 10 April 2002. Similarly, changes in government in both Sarajevo and Zagreb over the past several years have done little to change the fundamental problems affecting relations between Bosnia and Croatia, such as a resolution of the status of the port of Ploče, or the belief of Croatian officials that they have a “constitutional obligation” to protect the rights of Croats “in the diaspora.” Thus, despite the fact that both states in 2002 had governments led by social-democrats, little progress could be achieved in fundamental relations. See Zija Dizdarević, “Zagreb umjesto Sarajeva,” Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 17 February 2002. Numerous similar examples can be found further back in history; for instance, even such bitter political enemies as Ivan Stambolić and Slobodan Milošević shared the same, or nearly the same, positions on most political issues facing Serbia and Serbs in the 1980s (e.g., the 1974 Constitution, the status of Kosovo, the position of Serbia in Yugoslavia, etc). See the interview by Slobodan Reljić with Slavoljub Djukić, “Ivan, Slobodan, i Ona,” NIN (Belgrade), 3 April 2003. Similarly, in Kosovo, the Albanians “are deeply divided on every conceivable political issue except one: all want independence [from Serbia] within Kosovo’s existing borders.” Serbia After Djindjic (Brussels/Belgrade: International Crisis Group Balkans Report No. 141), 18 March 2003, 13. In interwar Yugoslavia, Stjepan Radić once expressed his view that all Serb politicians “are largely identical, especially with regard to Croatia . . . [it would be difficult to find] such a Serb statesman and Serb party, who will comprehend that there can be no honorable and just agreement with the Croats’ until there was a recognition of Croat political rights.” As cited by Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 181.
the few issues that politicians across the left-right divide agree upon is the issue of Kosovo; thus, “in a generally bitterly divided political arena, Kosovo is one of the few issues to cross the left-right divide.”

In Slovenia, although the political spectrum consists of the full range of left-of-center socialist parties to right-of-center Christian Democratic parties, “virtually all parties which emerged post-1989 were in some sense ‘Slovene nationalists.’

Another important aspect of the collective nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism, in addition to providing for Anderson’s “deep horizontal comradeship” is to recognize that it also provides a vertical comradeship as well, insofar as there are fewer differences between elites and masses than many elite-based arguments admit. While elites and individual leaders can of course be cynical and manipulative, they can also be “true believers” in the nationalist cause. As Donald Horowitz has pointed out,

The tacit assumption [of instrumentalist or constructivist arguments] is usually that political entrepreneurs are cynical manipulators whose activities are governed by self-interest alone. But what if political entrepreneurs are themselves

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59 See Frida Malaj, “In Politically Split Albania, Independence for Kosovo is one of the few issues that Cause No Controversy for Berisha,” Balkan Investigative Reporting Network Balkan Insight, 2 November 2006; for similar views, see Elez Biberaj, “The Current Political Situation in Kosovo and the Changing Social Order,” The Harriman Review 9 (Summer 1996), 27. Albanian interest in Kosovo’s future status is not, of course, a new development, as will be discussed in more detail below. In discussing how Kosovo Albanian’s viewed various politicians in Belgrade, Janjić, et. al., note the following: “Panić openly supported an improvement of conditions for Kosovo Albanians and the reopening of schools and hospitals, claiming at the same time that Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia. Although he believed in respecting the Kosovo Albanians’ human rights, he expected them to participate in the political life of Yugoslavia and take part in upcoming elections. However, according to LDK, there was almost no difference between Panić and Milošević . . . Although one million Albanian votes could have toppled Milošević, Kosovo Albanian leaders freely admitted that they did not want him removed from power because his regime was creating a framework for the final success of the Albanian national project.” See Janjić, Lalaj, and Pula, “Kosovo Under the Milošević Regime,” 288, 300. Note here that the issue dividing Albanians and Serbs was thus not improving the Albanian population’s human rights, material conditions, or overall quality of life—a set of policies rationalist approaches to ethnic conflict maintain could have defused the situation—the issue was a zero sum struggle to decide whether or not Kosovo would be independent. Had the Kosovo Albanian population been willing to participate in Yugoslavia’s political life during the 1990s, it has been estimated that they would have gained control of 24 out of 29 municipalities in Kosovo, twenty-four seats in the Serbian parliament (out of 250), and twelve seats in the federal Yugoslav parliament.

60 Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 435.
primordialists? . . . There is no necessary contradiction between the pursuit of self-interest and the utilization of a primordial cognitive frame . . . If ethnicity is commonly experienced primordially, it is, at the very least, an important empirical question whether political entrepreneurs depart in significant ways from prevailing patterns of cognition . . . the blanket assertion that political entrepreneurs are merely self-interested, cynical manipulators is just that: an assertion.\textsuperscript{61}

Walker Connor similarly suggests that the elite-mass dichotomy favored by constructivists and instrumentalists is overdone; according to Connor, “nationalism is a mass phenomenon, and the degree to which the leaders are true believers does not affect the reality.”\textsuperscript{62}

It also bears noting that public pressure can compel leaders to adopt certain policies even against their own better judgement. When the Herzegovinian rebellion erupted in 1875, the Serbian monarch at the time, King Milan, was intent on keeping Serbia out of the conflict; nevertheless, popular pressure was too strong. Stavrianos points up the problems facing Milan in the following excerpt, in which he intersperses his own observations with those of the British consul in Belgrade at the time.

“. . . Whenever a decided advocate of Revolutionary War against Turkey was confronted by a doubtful candidate, the preference was given by the electors to the former one.” Milan fought hard to restrain his bellicose subjects. A coalition cabinet was formed, and when it showed signs of yielding to the popular clamor he summarily dismissed it. The succeeding ministry failed to stand more firmly. “I find very little difference amongst public men here, whether Radical or Conservative,” the British consul reported; “of whatever shade of opinion, all are equally imbued with the desire to see Servian aggrandizement accomplished . . .


\textsuperscript{62} Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, 76.

Other leaders in more recent times have confronted the same problem. Moreover, the power of such mass, collective sentiments usually increase during periods of state disintegration or collapse, when “the emotional power of ethnic attachments is typically increased by the unifying effects of what are perceived to be external threats.”\(^{64}\) As the former Yugoslavia was disintegrating in the early 1990s, one could rightly ask whether leaders were stirring up nationalist feeling, or whether they were only responding to what their respective constituencies wanted. In the case of Macedonia, Andrew Rossos has argued “the declaration of complete sovereignty and independence . . . was the only option acceptable to the Macedonian majority of the population, as well as to the overwhelming majority of the total population of the republic, including the Albanians of Macedonia.”\(^{65}\)

The implication of all of these things—that ethnoconfessional nationalism trumps ideological differences, that it unites people from across the political spectrum, that it provides for both a deep horizontal comradeship and strong vertical linkages between leaders and led—is that a more powerful explanatory model for understanding the phenomenon of ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans should place the explanatory emphasis on its collective, mass base. Instead of the state making the nation, in the former Yugoslavia, as Susan Woodward argues, the nation has been making the state.\(^{66}\)

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64 Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” 56.

65 See Rossos, “The Macedonian Question and Instability in the Balkans,” 156. Emphasis added. For further evidence along these lines, see Chapter II, pp. 52-53.

III. Ethnoconfessional Nationalism as a Chronic Phenomenon

A satisfactory explanation for ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans has to provide convincing evidence of the stability of preferences for such things as a “Greater Albania,” “Greater Croatia,” “Greater Serbia,” etc., and their enduring strength across many generations and over long periods of time. One explanation for the stability and enduring strength of such preferences can be found in the view of some theorists that the nationalist idea has an intrinsic quality that defies conventional understandings of time; Hans Kohn, for instance, attributed a metaphysical quality to nationalism, claiming that for the average individual, “the supreme loyalty” (i.e., loyalty to the nation) lasted “not only for the span of his life, but for the continuity of his existence beyond this span.”

At a very abstract and theoretical level time can in fact be measured and understood in different ways, a problem which physicists, historians, and novelists have each articulated in their own ways. Karl Mannheim, for instance, looked at the difference between Enlightenment and similar lines, Anthony Smith has said that nationalism “implies a deeper need transcending individuals, generations and classes, a need for collective immortality through posterity, that will relativize and diminish the oblivion and futility of death . . . For only in the chain of generations of those who share an historic and quasi-familial bond, can individuals hope to achieve a sense of immortality in eras of purely terrestrial horizons.” See Smith, “The Origins of Nations,” op. cit., 362. That nationalism has become such a powerful force in international affairs may to some extent result from the fact that other major philosophies or worldviews have simply ceded this metaphysical ground to it. As Benedict Anderson notes, for instance, “neither Marxism nor Liberalism is much concerned with death and immortality.” See Anderson, Imagined Communities, 10.

As opposed to many policymakers and political scientists, physicists and novelists often understand time in ways more similar to those in which people in the Balkans are typically accused of viewing it. Upon the death of a close friend, for instance, Albert Einstein noted “Now Besso has departed from this strange world a little ahead of me. That means nothing. People like us . . . know that the distinction between past, present, and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion.” As quoted by Robert Lanza, “A New Theory of the Universe,” The American Scholar 76 (Spring 2007), 24. Many writers have expressed much the same sentiment; consider, for instance, the following: “The past is never dead. It’s not even past,” William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun (1951), “There is no present or future, only the past happening over and over again,” Eugene O’Neill; “Time present and time past/Are both perhaps present in time future/And time future contained in time past.” T.S. Elliot, Burnt Norton (No. 1 of Four Quartets).
approaches to time, seen as a unilinear progression of events understood in quantitative terms, to the understanding of time influenced by German romanticism, which believed in the existence of “an interior time that cannot be measured but only experienced in purely qualitative terms.”\textsuperscript{69} In this view, the chronological overlap of generations within distinct human groups transfers knowledge and collective experiences through time.\textsuperscript{70} This transfer of knowledge and experience creates links between individuals and generations living in different eras and compresses the elapsed time between generations or historical events. Gavrilo Princip, for instance, was raised hearing tales of the 1875 Serb rebellion in Herzegovina, in 1914 he assassinated the Habsburg heir to the throne, and in August 1941 his nephew led an attack that destroyed a German armored column east of Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{71} Thus, while for outsiders with an “objective,” unilinear understanding of time, in the Balkans (or any other geographical area which has its own historical legacy) where people are often seen as consumed by “irrational historical grievances,” at least part of the explanation for such obsessions with history—victories, defeats, massacres, who settled which piece of land first, etc.—lies in the infinitely more direct and subjective impact such events have had on the local populations. As L.S. Stavrianos describes this understanding of time

\textquotedblright\textbf{... the past— even the very distant past—and the present are side by side in the Balkans. Centuries chronologically remote from each other are really contemporary. Governments and peoples, particularly intellectuals, have based their attitudes and actions on what happened, or what they believed to have happened, several centuries ago. The reason is that during the almost five centuries of Turkish rule the Balkan peoples had no history. Time stood still for...}\textquotedblright


\textsuperscript{70} There is debate amongst both psychologists and anthropologists over how the transmission of knowledge exactly happens. Cornelia Sorabji, for instance, posits that instead of elders transmitting knowledge down to their descendants, her research in Bosnia suggests that younger generations infer knowledge based on the experiences of the predecessors. See Sorabji,”Managing Memories in Post-War Sarajevo: Individuals, Bad Memories, and New Wars,” \textit{Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute} 12 (2006), 1-16.

them. Consequently when they won their independence in the nineteenth century their point of reference was to the pre-Turkish period—to the medieval ages or beyond.\textsuperscript{72}

The chronic nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism is also apparent in the longevity of such conflicts. In the Balkans, such longevity is largely due to the unwillingness of ethnoconfessional groups to accept the political dominance of another ethnic group. Gershenson and Grossman, for instance, have examined the difference between civil conflicts that have “ended” and those that appear to be “never ending,” and have argued that the primary difference between the two lies in the attitude of one of the two parties to such a conflict. Civil conflicts that “end” are the result of situations in which one party to the conflict attaches less importance to political dominance than the other side. Civil conflicts that are “never ending,” according to Gershenson and Grossman, are those in which both sides attach roughly equal importance to political dominance.\textsuperscript{73} Thus, as Jasna Dragović-Soso points out, throughout the twentieth century there was never a satisfactory answer to the “Yugoslav national question”; as she noted, “the dilemma of satisfying desires for national statehood and of defining the principles governing the notion of self-determination, as

\textsuperscript{72} Stavrianos, \textit{The Balkans since 1453}, 13. In a similar vein, discussing the thought-processes of his fellow Montenegrins in the eighteenth century, Milovan Djilas would note that “Obilić and Kosovo were not something that happened some time ago and far away, but they were here—in daily thoughts and feelings and life and struggle with the Turks.” See Djilas, \textit{Njegoš: Poet, Prince, Bishop} (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovic, 1966), 11. It should be obvious that such concern with distant historical events is not some Balkan peculiarity, as anyone familiar with the legacy slavery has had on African-Americans’ understanding of American politics, American Southerners’ views of the Civil War, Shia-Sunni disputes over the role of Imam Ali, or the Israeli and Jewish focus on centuries of exile, European discrimination, and the Holocaust would recognize. Of course, the dangers inherent in such a compression of time and obsession with historical wrongs, taken to its darkest conclusions, are often tragic. On the eve of the Srebrenica massacres, for instance, where several thousand Bosniac men and boys were killed, the then Bosnian Serb military commander, General Ratko Mladić would claim “Finally, after the rebellion of the Dahijas, the time has come to take revenge on the Turks in this region.” As quoted by Michael Mann, \textit{The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 405. The rebellion Mladić was “taking revenge for” had happened in 1804.

well as the issue of how to divide sovereignty and power within a single political entity were present in 1918, in 1945, and throughout Yugoslavia’s existence until 1991.\textsuperscript{74}

This difference between the “objective” way in which outsiders understand time and the “subjective” way in which the Balkan peninsula’s inhabitants view it leads to a problem Walker Connor once pointed out: while students of nationalism often ask the question “But why now?” when confronted by an upsurge in nationalist activity, the more appropriate question would be “Why not now?” Connor argues that the problem often stems from the fact that many scholars perceive ethnonationalist conflicts to be “historically rootless” and therefore generally find them unpredictable and/or unexpected. Connor partly attributes this in part to “a general disregard for historical perspective,” an over-emphasis on economism, and ultimately, a sense that “there is little need to search history for antecedents or for the germination and development of an abstract notion of a kindred people.”\textsuperscript{75}

Yet as will be seen below, many different political systems attempted to use many different institutional mechanisms to mitigate or reduce nationalist ambitions in the territory comprising the former Yugoslavia. None of them succeeded in the long term, but many observers nevertheless tended to view relatively short historical periods in which there was an absence of outright conflict as proof that stable multietnic and multiconfessional polities had been produced. Hence the “But why now?” question posed by numerous social scientists in the late 1980s and early 1990s.


\textsuperscript{75} Connor, \textit{Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding}, 174-75.
The problems associated with this mode of thinking in the former Yugoslavia were similar to a broader failure to foresee not just the hostilities and disintegration of Yugoslavia, but the rapid disintegration of the Soviet bloc itself in 1989. Timur Kuran has shown how quickly communism collapsed in Eastern Europe at this time: in May 1989, there was relative peace and order throughout the Eastern Bloc, while by the end of the year all of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe had fallen. At least part of the reason for the rapidity with which such momentous geopolitical changes could occur, and why they took academic observers by surprise, is that they did not recognize that Eastern Europe’s façade of order and stability was based on what Kuran termed “preference falsification” under conditions of oppression, whereby people’s public support for these regimes did not reflect their true attitudes and beliefs. As David Laitin notes, under such conditions of oppression “there can be long periods of quiet under conditions of profound enmity.”76 Joseph Rudolf puts the matter in a slightly different way when he notes “ethnic identity does not have to be persistently active to be politically significant.”77

Preference falsification reminds us that what appears to be a relatively stable equilibrium in multiethnic and multiconfessional states might not be quite so stable, especially given Klymicka’s observation stated above that “there seems to be no natural stopping-point to the demands for increasing self-government.”78 Klymicka’s argument was borne out in the Yugoslav case; as will be seen in Chapter IV, repeated rounds of de-centralization and governmental devolution in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s consistently led to even greater demands for de-


77 Rudolf, Politics and Ethnicity, 211.

centralization and devolution, ultimately culminating in proposals in 1990-91 that Yugoslavia become a confederation of independent states. If this reading of Yugoslavia’s post-1945 history is correct, then it proves the accuracy of Hudson Meadwell’s suggestion that the difference between calls for greater regionalization and outright independence might only be a result of a “strategic expression of preferences” in which “entrepreneurs take up regionalism or independence as circumstances warrant.” More recently, Erin K. Jenne has provided a related argument, claiming that ethnic minorities will tend to increase their demands from affirmative action policies to autonomy to outright secession depending upon their perceived bargaining power (frequently based on the degree of support they can obtain from outside powers). This argument is consistent with rational choice hypotheses suggesting that identification with a nominal state (i.e., not the nation-state to which the individual belongs) will be greater when a foreign power or military attack leads to calculations that the potential aggressor is a more serious threat than the regime in power. Given the right domestic and international strategic and political circumstances, demands for more regional autonomy can quickly escalate into demands for outright independence. As Anthony Smith notes, we should not distinguish too sharply between movements for outright secession and those which aim for more limited autonomy, whether a cultural autonomy or home rule. Secession movements have adopted a variety of strategies to suit their purposes and the prevailing political climate. In some cases, they have been content with control over their schools and courts and press . . . In other cases, they desire full internal control over their finances and political self-expression, but are content to remain within the framework of the wider 'nation-state' . . . In yet other cases, they opt for

79 Hudson Meadwell, “A Rational Choice Approach to Political Regionalism,” *Comparative Politics* 23 (July 1991), 402. A similar dynamic was evident in Belgium’s post-1945 evolution; see, for instance, Florian Bieber, “Consociationalism—Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in Bosnia? The Case of Belgium as a Possible Example,” *South-East Europe Review* 2 (October 1999), 81.


81 Stern, “Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?” 221.
separation, but if the political opposition proves insurmountable, are quite ready to accept an autonomist compromise. Since it is often genuinely difficult to be sure whether a given strategy represents a sincerely held belief or is only a tactic (and this may vary within the overall 'movement'), it seems wiser not to make too sharp a distinction between autonomism and separatism.\textsuperscript{82}

An example of this can be seen in the case of Macedonia. According to Andrew Rossos, at the turn of the twentieth century Macedonian nationalists kept their options open regarding their ultimate political goals. Thus,

Although they all sought the establishment of a Macedonian state—a “free Macedonia,” to use the most frequently employed term—statehood did not necessarily or always denote total independence. Many Macedonian spokesmen, conscious of the relative weakness of Macedonian nationalism and the comparative combined strength of its opposition, assumed a more pragmatic stance. They sought a place for a free or autonomous Macedonian state in a larger unit or supranational association: a Balkan federation, a Balkan socialist federation, a reorganized Ottoman Empire in the period before 1912, and a Balkan communist federation, a South Slav federation, a Yugoslav federation, and so forth in the years after the partition of Macedonia.\textsuperscript{83}

Further support for the claim that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a chronic phenomenon is seen in the fact that there are seldom “solutions” to such problems; they are long-term structural problems built into the very nature of group structure and competition, and as such can be managed with greater or lesser degrees of success, but rarely eliminated altogether. Lake and Rothchild, for instance, note that they

see no permanent solutions [to ethnic conflicts], only “temporary fixes.” In the end, ethnic groups are left without reliable safety nets. There is no form of insurance sufficient to protect against the dilemmas that produce collective fears and violence. We can only hope to contain ethnic fears, not permanently eliminate them.\textsuperscript{84}


\textsuperscript{83} Rossos, “The Macedonian Question and Instability in the Balkans,” 153.

\textsuperscript{84} Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” 57.
Other studies have found that the age of a state (i.e., the length of the states existence) does not appear to be a factor in promoting pride and attachment to a state, at least amongst minority groups. All of these facts suggest that ethnoconfessionally divided societies in southeastern Europe are inherently brittle, and that, as Ivan Šiber has noted, although the intensity of social traumas and violence such as World War II will wax and wane over time, they will continue to have an impact on future generations—sometimes more, and sometimes less, depending on the degree of stability or crisis a society is undergoing at any particular moment in time. This supports the argument made by Van Evera that multiethnic societies become exceptionally threatened when states become weak, thereby reducing their ability to provide security guarantees and enforce social contracts between ethnic groups.

As the following micro-case studies of four efforts to create “greater” states in southeastern Europe will show, ethnoconfessional conflicts in the Balkans can accurately fall under the category of “never ending.” This makes it possible to support the claim that Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism is a chronic phenomenon.

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86 See Šiber, Ivan. “Povijesni i etnički rascjepi u hrvatskom društvu,” in Mirjana Kasapović, Ivan Šiber, and Nenad Zakošek, eds., *Birači i Demokratija: Utjecaj ideoloških rascjepa na političkom životu.* Zagreb: Alinea, 1998), 52. Paul C. Stern has echoed these views, noting the many constructivist theories “point out that ethnic or national consciousness tends to arise during periods of crisis, such as rapid modernization, and tends to be “brokered” by intellectual entrepreneurs who create national histories, traditions, identities, perceived interests, and even languages.” See Stern, “Why do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?” 218.

87 See Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War.”
Microcase Study I: “Greater Albania”

For the past 150 years, efforts to unite the Albanian populations of the southern and western Balkans have been a persistent feature of Balkan politics. The Balkan Wars of the 1990s have given this feature new momentum. As Christopher Hill, a former US ambassador to both Albania and Macedonia noted in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, “We spent the 1990’s worrying about Greater Serbia. That’s finished. We are going to spend time well into the next century worrying about a Greater Albania.”88

The “League of Prizren” held in 1878, was an early manifestation of this effort. Those gathered at the Prizren meeting claimed large parts of modern-day Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia for a future Albanian state that would be formed out of bits and pieces of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. At the London Conference of Ambassadors in December 1912, Albanian activists called for the towns of Peć, Djakovica, Prizren, Mitrovica, Priština, Skopje and Monastir to be part of a new, compact, Albanian political unit,89 but their hopes were dashed when Serbia was granted control over these areas after the First and Second Balkan Wars in 1912-1913. All of these towns were subsequently incorporated into the newly formed Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in 1918. Kosovo political exiles, meanwhile, at this time formed a “Committee for the Defense of Kosovo,” the goal of which was to advocate for the creation of an independent Kosovo and the unification of all “Albanian lands” in the Balkans.”90 Unwilling to accept their incorporation into the new state, the Albanian population in Kosovo responded with


89 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 80.

a large-scale uprising (the Kaçak rebellion), which kept parts of Kosovo in a state of “permanent revolt” in the early 1920s.⁹¹

During World War II, a “Greater Albania” came into formal existence under Italian fascist and Nazi German sponsorship. Together, Mussolini and Hitler agreed that Albania would be allowed to annex most of Kosovo, large parts of Western Macedonia (from a line running from Lake Ohrid to Prizren), as well as the Montenegrin municipalities of Plav and Gusinje and some other Montenegrin territory on Lake Scutari. Albania also asked (unsuccessfully) to be awarded the city of Skopje as well. In September 1943, a “Second League of Prizren for the Defense of

Kosovo” was formed to lobby Hitler on behalf of the Kosovo Albanians. 

Traveling secretly through Albania and Kosovo at this time, a British Foreign Office official noted

The question of the future status of Kosovo was one of a burning anxiety in the minds of all—even of people living a long way from Kosovo, people of such widely differing views as Enver Hoxha, Mustapha Gjinishi, Ymer Disnica. All agreed on the importance to Albania of a just settlement of the Kosovo problem—which they all agreed could only be secured by a return to Albania of Kosovo.

Significantly, the small group of Albanians who joined Tito’s partisan movement was just as intent on promoting unification between Albania and Kosovo as their collaborationist co-nationals. In August 1943, in the middle of World War II, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) sponsored a conference in the village of Bujan (near Djakovica) which subsequently became known as the Bujan Conference. The conference was attended by 49 communist representatives from both Albania and Yugoslavia, including 43 Albanians, 3 Serbs, and 3 Montenegrins. As the conference’s conclusions noted, “Kosovo and the Plain of Dukagjin represent a territory largely inhabited by the Albanian people, which still today, as always, wish to unite with Albania.”

The Axis’ defeat in World War II spelled the end of this attempt at forming a “Greater Albania.” Nevertheless, efforts on behalf of such an entity continued throughout the post-WWII period. In 1968, the first dramatic reminder of the problems Yugoslavia continued to face regarding its national question

... took the form of widespread, apparently well-organised, and sometimes violent demonstrations by Albanians in the Kosovo Autonomous Province, significantly timed to coincide with neighboring Albania’s own National Day, on

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November 27, and less than a week after the minority’s problems had had an unusually open airing at the 6th Congress of the League of Communists of Serbia. Instead of being gratefully satisfied with the considerable increase in equality and personal security which they had enjoyed since the taming of the Province’s Serb-dominated UDBa after July 1966, politicized strata of the rapidly growing minority, now nearly 1 million in number, were demanding more of the same and the transformation of their region into a seventh Yugoslav republic in which the Albanians, as the local majority, would in fact be politically dominant. The demonstrations in Kosovo and their echoes in western Macedonia, alarming in scale and in the context of historic Greater Albanian irredentism, also witnessed the return of the national question to center stage among Yugoslavia’s problems.\textsuperscript{95}

Large-scale demonstrations in Kosovo in March 1981 again witnessed demands ranging from elevating Kosovo’s status from that of an autonomous province of Serbia to that of a fully-fledged republic in the Yugoslav federation, to demands for outright independence and/or unification with Albania. Kosovo’s most famous dissident/political prisoner during this period, Adem Demaçi, was a well-known supporter of Albanian separatism and pan-Albanian unification, as was Rexhep Qosja, one of Albania’s leading intellectuals. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Albanian organizations throughout the region were coordinating their activities and planning on eventual unification. Thus,

\dots documents from Albanian organizations outside Kosovo have shown that the unification of all those regions into one state had been prepared for quite some time and that such regions would be united with Albania, specifically within the ethnic boundaries claimed by the Albanian movement in 1913 \dots After all, the desire for unification was common for all Albanian groups and parties \dots \textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{95} Rusinow, \textit{The Yugoslav Experiment}, 245. UDBa refers to \textit{Ured Državne Bezbednosti} (Office of State Security), the secret police service in Tito’s Yugoslavia. In the above passage by Rusinow, it is of course worth noting how he echoes the previous statements by Anthony Smith and Hudson Meadwell on how quickly the demands of nationalist movements can escalate. On the 1968 demonstrations in Kosovo, see also Aydin Babuna, “The Bosnian Muslims and Albanians: Islam and Nationalism,” \textit{Nationalities Papers} 32 (June 2004), 306.

During the 1980s-1990s, Albanian society in Kosovo developed a complete parallel system of education, health care, and local administration, culminating in an outright declaration of independence by the “Republic of Kosova” on 2 July 1990. The only state to recognize the Republic of Kosova was neighboring Albania, with the Albanian president at the time, Sali Berisha, promising to bring down “the Balkan Wall” separating Albania from Kosovo and unify the two Albanian entities.\(^97\) By June 1991, as the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia began, radical currents within Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) began calling for unification with Albania.\(^98\) On 26-30 September 1990, Kosovo Albanians organized an independence referendum in which some 89 percent of Kosovo’s Albanian voters reportedly cast ballots. 99% of those turning out voted in favor of independence.\(^99\) In 1992, Rugova warned that if the international community agreed to the partition of Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo Albanians would demand unification with Albania.\(^100\)

Another key territorial component of the greater Albania project is the Preševo Valley, an area of southern Serbia adjoining Kosovo composed of three municipalities—Bujanovac, Medvedja, and Preševo. Altogether, some 70,000 Albanians live in the three municipalities, with 90 percent of the population of Preševo municipality itself composed of ethnic Albanians, 54.2 of Bujanovac municipality, and 30 percent of Medvedja. In March 1992, Albanians in the Preševo Valley held a referendum asking voters whether or not they supported gaining autonomy

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\(^97\) As noted by Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining*, 171.


within Serbia, and possible unification with Kosovo. Over 90 percent of the Albanian population in the Preševo Valley participated in the referendum, with reportedly more than 99 percent voting in favor of the measures.\(^{101}\)

The disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s gave new impetus to efforts to create a greater Albanian political unit in the southern Balkans. In 1998, the Albanian Academy of Arts and Sciences issued a paper noting that “every Albanian, whether on this or that side of the border, within or outside the ethnic lands, desires a quick unification of [his] lands into one unique Albanian state as the Great Albanian Renaissance men of the last century put down in their programs.”\(^{102}\) In the same vein, one of Kosovo’s leading academics at the time, Rexhep Qosja, would note that “Albania has never accepted its existing borders and has always tried to remind international circles that these borders are unjust, dividing the Albanian land in two.”\(^{103}\) Pan-Albanian unification was the express goal of the “Kosovo Liberation Army” (KLA) during this period, as noted by Jakup Krasniqi, the KLA’s spokesman.\(^{104}\) In 2002, a KLA-splinter group, the “Albanian National Army,” and its political wing, the “National Committee for the Liberation and Defense of Albanian Lands,” merged with the Tirana-based Party of National Unity to form the Albanian National Union Front, whose explicit agenda was the unification of all “Albanian lands” in the Balkans.\(^{105}\) Importantly, mainstream Albanian politicians (such as Sali Berisha and


\(^{103}\) “Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?” 11-12.

\(^{104}\) Ibid., 6.

\(^{105}\) Ibid., 13, 18.
Ibrahim Rugova, as noted above) endorsed such views, as further evidenced by the statement of Arben Imami, a member of Albania’s then ruling coalition, the Democratic Alliance, who announced that unification of Albania and Kosovo was one of his party’s goals.

Such explicit rhetoric, however, was subsequently tempered by more ambiguous language, as it became clear that international officials were not willing to tolerate continued instability in southeastern Europe on behalf of the greater Albanian cause. Thus, as Louis Sells (a US diplomat with considerable experience in southeastern Europe) pointed out,

Kosovo Albanians have learned to talk the talk of international diplomacy. For now all of the Kosovo-Albanian leaders are prepared to renounce claims to union with their brethren in Macedonia and Albania. But how long the Albanians would be prepared to adhere to a separate existence is questionable. Albanians throughout the Balkans understand that union now is out of the question, but the 1999 war caused a qualitative change in the relationship among all three elements of the Albanian body politic. Albanian political opinion has become more nationalistic, and Albanians across the Balkans now enjoy closer ties than at any time since the collapse of the Ottoman empire.  

Albanian-populated parts of Vardar Macedonia are also part of various “Greater Albania” scenarios, and a specialist on Albanian issues in the Balkans has gone so far as to say that “the 25 percent minority of Albanians living in Macedonia are among the most militant nationalists.” By the 1990s, the activities of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia were already

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106 See Louis Sell, “Kosovo: Getting Out with Peace and Honor Intact,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 48 (March/April 2001), 12. As one KLA leader at the time noted, “Kosova starts in Tivar [Bar in Montenegro] and ends in Manastir [Bitola in Macedonia]. We don’t care what America and England think about it, we should unite with actions, not with words. We don’t care what Clinton and other devils think!” See Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 103-104.

107 Consistent with this view of ethnoconfessional nationalism is the interest an ethnoconfessional group in one state takes in its co-nationals in another state. In 1996, for instance, Menduh Thaci, one of the leaders of the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDPA) in Macedonia, noted that in response to the growing violence in Kosovo, “If there is fighting in Kosovo we cannot just sit back and watch it on television. This is the struggle of all Albanians.” As cited by Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 296.

being coordinated, and demonstrations in Western Macedonia at this time called for independence of Albanian-populated areas of Macedonia, and slogans such as “We want Greater Albania” were frequently heard at such events. In September 1991, Macedonia’s Albanian population (variously estimated to account for between one-quarter to one-third of Macedonia’s population) boycotted the country’s independence referendum, a boycott which some observers have interpreted as suggesting that the Albanian population’s support for the country was questionable. On January 11-12, 1991, the two main ethnic Albanian political parties in Macedonia at the time, the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and the People’s Democratic Party (NDP) organized a referendum in Albanian-populated areas which, according to different versions, either called for autonomy for Albanian-populated regions in Macedonia, collectively named “Illyria,” or their secession from the republic altogether. Over 90 percent of the Albanian electorate in these areas turned out for the referendum, of which 99 percent voted in favor of the proposed measures. By 2005, one public opinion survey conducted in the region showed that majorities in both Albania and Kosovo favored a breakup of Macedonia.

Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008 led to an increase in demands for autonomy by Albanian groups in both Macedonia and the Preševo Valley. In April 2009, the Albanian mayor of the Macedonian town of Gostivar, Rufi Osmani, publicly called for

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Microcase Study II: Greater Bosnia

A constant in Bosnian Muslim politics for more than a century has been the effort to maintain Bosnia & Herzegovina as a distinct and coherent political entity, regardless of the larger political entity in which it was based. This was a cornerstone of the policies of Mehmed Spaho’s Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO) in the 1920s and 30s in interwar Yugoslavia. It was also the bottom line for Alija Izetbegović and the SDA in the negotiations over Yugoslavia’s future in 1990-91, as well as more liberal Bosniacs such as Adil Zulfikarpašić.119

In some cases, this policy position in Bosnian Muslim politics has been more expansive and includes the Sandžak as well. In May 2009, for instance, the reis-ul-ulema of Bosnia’s Islamic Community, Mustafa ef. Cerić, told listeners that “there is no force in the world which will divide [Sarajevo] from the Sandžak . . . above all our spiritual, cultural, human, brotherly, cultural-civilizational, historical, and all other ties.”120 In August 2010, a representative of the Sandžak National Council called for the region to again be given the level of autonomy it enjoyed from 1943-45 (i.e., during World War II, when Tito’s Partisan Movement did not have control over large parts of the country), and justified this called based on the 1991 Sandžak referendum results noted above. In response to concerns that this would threaten the territorial

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119 On these issues, see Saćir Filandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, Adil Zulfikarpašić, and Ivan Cvitković, Hrvatski identitet u Bosni i Hercegovini, 138.

integrity of the Serbian state, the representative noted that this would only occur as a result of the breakup of Bosnia & Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{121}

**Microcase Study III: Greater Croatia**

In the 1980s, the Croatian sociologist Ivan Perić called nationalism in Croatia and throughout the former Yugoslavia “permanently extant in social currents.”\textsuperscript{122} As with the Serbs, the idea of an independent state, often coupled with the goal of a “Greater Croatia,” in various configurations, is a chronic feature in Croatian political thought.\textsuperscript{123} As a March 1945 pastoral letter by the Bishop’s Conference of Croatia stated (even as the Nazi-puppet “Independent State of Croatia” was on the verge of collapse), “History is the witness that the Croatian people through all its 1,300 years has never ceased to proclaim through plebiscites that it will never renounce the right to freedom and independence which every other nation desires.”\textsuperscript{124}

An early example of ambitions to create a “Greater Croatia” could be seen in 1831, when Count Janko Drašković published his *Disertacija* which called for the unification of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, as well as the Slovene areas of Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria. Drašković also demanded the return of the *vojna krajina* to his proposed new entity.\textsuperscript{125} In

\textsuperscript{121} See the comments of Džemail Suljević in “Zukorlićevo hoće ‘partizansku autonomiju’ Sandžaka,” *Blic* (Belgrade), available at: http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/202040/Zukorlicevi-hoce-partizansku-autonomiju-Sandzaka/print Accessed on 10 August 2010 at: 12:24pm EST

\textsuperscript{122} See Perić, *Suvremni hrvatski nacionalizam* (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1984), 7.

\textsuperscript{123} For a useful review of the different territorial conceptions of “Greater Croatia” and “Greater Serbia” have had over the past two centuries, see Gerard Toal and Carl T. Dahlman, *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 50-66.

\textsuperscript{124} As cited in Stella Alexander, *Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 40.

subsequent years, perhaps the most important goal of Croatian nationalist ideology has been incorporating Bosnia & Herzegovina (in whole or in part) into some form of Croatian political unit. In 1894, both wings of the Croatian political spectrum, the obzoraši gathered around Strossmayer and Rački, and the pravaši of Ante Starčević, agreed on a platform to unite all the “Croat lands,” defined as Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Medjimurje, Rijeka, and, ultimately, Slovene territories as well. In 1900, the Catholic archbishop of Sarajevo, Josip Stadler, was publicly rebuked by Emperor Francis Joseph II for stating that Bosnia & Herzegovina should be united to “the Croatian motherland.” Towards this end, Stadler was in favor of building a Croatian Catholic clericalist movement that would support Trialism in the Habsburg Monarchy, and thus unite Bosnia & Herzegovina with Croatia proper. By 1908, Stjepan Radić had similarly begun to support the idea that Bosnia & Herzegovina was an integral part of Croatia based on Croatian state right.

After the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, in 1921 Radić’s Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) called for the creation of a neutral Croatian peasant’s republic within Yugoslavia, with Croat-populated areas of Bosnia & Herzegovina joining the Croatian republic if so decided by plebiscite. By the 1930s, some HSS leaders were suggesting that parts of Vojvodina (e.g., the area bounded by Subotica-Sombor-Bačka Palanka-Ilok) be incorporated

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127 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 117.

128 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 235. Trialism was the political proposal to transform the Habsburg Dual Monarchy, led by the Austrians and the Magyars, into a triadic monarchy with the addition of a third, Slav component, based on Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Vojvodina, and Bosnia & Herzegovina.

129 Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 103.
into a Croatian entity as well.\textsuperscript{130} After Radić’s assassination in 1926, his successor as leader of the HSS, Vladko Maček, adopted a maximalist negotiating position of demanding two-thirds of Bosnia & Herzegovina for this project, and a minimalist position of accepting only BiH territory west of the Vrbas River.\textsuperscript{131} The Cvetković-Maček \textit{sporazum} of 1939 formally made much of both Bosnia & Herzegovina part of the Croatian \textit{banovina} in interwar Yugoslavia. Thus, Bosnian towns such as Brčko, Derventa, Gradačac, Fojnica, and Travnik were all incorporated into the Croatian \textit{banovina}.

In 1941, Bosnia & Herzegovina in its entirety, as well as Croat-populated parts of Vojvodina, were incorporated into the so-called “Independent State of Croatia,” (\textit{Nezavisna Država Hrvatska}, or NDH) led by an extreme nationalist organization, the Ustaša. As is typical for such extreme movements, one of the Ustaša goals was creating an ethnically homogenous territory; thus, as the NDH foreign minister Mladen Lorković noted in May 1941,

\begin{quote}
...the Croatian nation needs to be cleansed from all the elements which are a misfortune for that nation, who are alien and foreign in that nation, who melt down the healthy strength of that nation, who for decades have pushing that nation from one disaster to another. Those [elements] are our Serbs and Jews.\textsuperscript{132}
\end{quote}

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, members of the Croatian Communist Party such as Andrija Hebrang again called for the inclusion of parts of Vojvodina into the Croatian unit of Tito’s postwar federation; thus, according to Milovan Djilas’, “The war had hardly ended when [Hebrang] began to speak out in his circle, narrow as it was, arguing for the Croatian borders

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{130} See Djokić, \textit{Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia}, 51, 96.
\item \textsuperscript{131} See Tomasevich, \textit{War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945}, 488.
\item \textsuperscript{132} As cited by Tomislav Dulić, “Ethnic Violence in Occupied Yugoslavia: Mass Killing from Above and Below,” in Dejan Djokić and James Ker-Lindsay, eds., \textit{New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies} (London: Routledge, 2011), 83.
\end{itemize}
with Serbia as they had existed in Austria-Hungary before 1918 . . . ‘The border of Croatia is known,’ thundered Hebrang, unappeased and belligerent. ‘It extends to the town of Zemun, right across the Sava from Belgrade’!”

In the late 1960s-early 1970s, during the mass popular movement known as the Croatian Spring, Croat nationalists again called for parts of Western Herzegovina to be detached from Bosnia & Herzegovina and joined with Croatia. During this time, Ustaša units began to form in Western Herzegovina and sporadic attacks on government institutions, arms depots, party officials, and local Serb villages were carried out. By the late 1970s, the Ustaša organization throughout Bosnia & Herzegovina allegedly numbered several thousand men. Concurrently, the territory of the sporazum “was the object of Croatian nationalist demands in 1971 and again in 1992, when Hercegovinian Croats proclaimed the “Republic of Herceg-Bosna” and received military backing from the regime in Zagreb.” Franjo Tudjman (elected president of Croatia in 1990) was at this time promoting the Cvetković-Maček sporazum as the ideal solution for the Croat-Serb problem with the Serbian writer Dobrica Ćosić, and arguing that Croatia’s “natural” borders follow the line of the Vrbas and Neretva rivers.

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133 See Milovan Djilas, Rise and Fall, 99. It bears mentioning here that more than sixty years after these events, the HDZ nominated Hebrang’s son to be their party’s presidential candidate in Croatia’s December 2009 presidential elections. Hebrang Jr. is considered one of the current HDZ’s most hardline nationalist members.

134 See Mart Bax, Medjugorje: Religion, Politics, and Violence in Rural Bosnia (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1995), 105.

135 Donia and Fine, Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 132. Some Croat nationalists demanded parts of Montenegro as well. See Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation, 42.

Tito’s death in 1980 sparked an intense debate amongst Croat nationalists as to the prospects for the emergence of an independent Croat state, and the conditions under which such a state might come about. In an uncannily prophetic analysis by Mate Meštrović published in 1980 (i.e. eleven years before the disintegration of Yugoslavia), he laid out the following:

What kind of changes will occur in Yugoslavia depends first on the internal situation and the relation of patriotic forces. Outside factors, such as the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, America, Western Europe, will not begin to get significantly involved up until internal political quakes and changes do not begin. If it were shown in a crisis situation that the existing status quo cannot be maintained any longer, Washington would in a very short time change its position regarding the maintenance of Yugoslavia’s national and state ‘unity’.

During the most recent conflict in Bosnia in the 1990s, similar ideas were again revived. At the founding congress of Tudjman’s Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ) in 1990, for instance, Tudjman claimed that the Muslims of Bosnia & Herzegovina were “a constituent part of the Croatian national body (korpus).” Implicit in Tudjman’s claim that BiH’s Bosniac population was Croat, of course, was the belief that the territory of Bosnia & Herzegovina belonged to Croatia as well. This was further evident in the formation of the HDZ’s BiH branch, which, according to the party’s statutes (Article 4) was a part of a united HDZ organization in both Croatia and BiH.

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137 See Meštrović, “Mi smo temelj—Na nama treba graditi državu,” Hrvatska Revija 3 (1980), 349, as quoted by Perić, Suvremeni hrvatski nacionalizam, 57. Emphasis added. The article’s title in translation is “We ourselves are the foundation—the state should be built on us.” Perić goes on to point (p. 58) out that the Croat nationalist émigrés even at this relatively early date recognized the importance of using Croatian communist dissidents (such as Franjo Tudjman) outside of Yugoslavia to show the country’s state of crisis and instability. It should be pointed out that Mate Meštrović was a major figure on the Croatian émigré political scene. His father was the famous Croatian sculptor, Ivan Meštrović. For a time, he led the Croatian Academy of America, and from 1982-1990 was president of the Croatian National Council, an umbrella group of Croatian émigré organizations in the United States. From 1993-1997, Meštrović served as a deputy in the Croatian parliament. In the 1980s he had helped publish Franjo Tudjman’s book, Nationalism in Contemporary Europe, in the United States.

138 See Cvitković, Hrvatski identitet u Bosni i Hercegovini, 140. The claim that the Muslims of Bosnia & Herzegovina were in reality “Croats of the Islamic faith” had of course been an Ustaša thesis that Ante Pavelić himself had proposed in the lead article of the first issue of the Ustaša ideological weekly Spremnost. See Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-45, 376-79.
Attempts to incorporate parts of BiH into Croatia proper were visible even before Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia on 21 June 1991, according to reports of a meeting between Croat leaders from Herzegovina and Central Bosnia in Zagreb on 13-14 June 1991 with Croatian president Franjo Tudjman. The Croat para-state of “The Croat Community Herceg-Bosna” (hereafter, HZ H-B) was officially proclaimed in the Herzegovinian town of Grude on 18 December 1991. The minutes of the second session of the presidency of the HZ H-B (held on 23 December 1991, and attended by members of the presidency of the HDZ BiH and Croat representatives in the BiH parliament) noted the following:

2. The Croat Community Herceg-Bosna once again confirms the will of the entire Croat people of Herceg-Bosna, expressed on 18 December 1991 in Grude, [which], in bringing the historical decision to create the HZ H-B, represents the legal foundation for bringing these territories into the Republic of Croatia. 3. The HZ H-B gives full legitimacy to Dr. Franjo Tudjman, as president of the Republic of Croatia and president of the HDZ, to represent the interests of the HZ H-B before international officials, as well as at inter-party and inter-republican negotiations over determining the final borders of the Republic of Croatia.

Thus, while the Tudjman government did not publicly lay claim to Herceg-Bosna, in reality the creation of this entity was a prelude to formal annexation, if and when the international community formally recognized the disintegration of BiH.  

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140 This is one of the most important but little known aspects of the Bosnian tragedy. Conventional accounts of BiH’s March 1992 independence referendum claim that a majority of BiH’s citizens voted for independence. While technically correct, this interpretation obscures more than it reveals. In fact, according to former leaders of the HDZ-BiH themselves, such as Stejpan Kljujić from the pro-Bosnian faction of the HDZ-BiH, and Jadranko Prlić (Prime Minister of Herceg-Bosna, 1992-96; Foreign Minister of BiH, 1996-2001) and Vladimir Šoljić (Herceg-Bosna Defense Minister, 1992-95; President of the Federation of BiH, 1997), from the pro-Zagreb, Herzegovinian faction of the HDZ-BiH, Croats in BiH were really voting for two things—first, Bosnia & Herzegovina’s secession from Yugoslavia as a necessary first step to Herceg-Bosna’s own secession from Bosnia & Herzegovina, and second, to help strengthen Croatia’s secession from Yugoslavia. (Author’s interview with Jadranko Prlić and Vladimir Šoljić, Zagreb, 2003). Before the March 1992 referendum, for instance, the HDZ-Croatia had tried to change the formulation of the referendum question, having it ask merely whether citizens supported BiH’s secession from Yugoslavia. Franjo Tudjman himself would tell members of the HDZ BiH’s presidency at a meeting in Zagreb in December 1991 that “Just as we took advantage of this historical moment to create an independent, internationally-recognized Croatia, I believe it is time that we take advantage [of this opportunity] to gather the Croat national being
The Banovina of Croatia, 1939

in the maximally-greatest possible borders.” At this same meeting, an HDZ BiH official from central Bosnia, Dario Kordić, would note “For six months we have been bloodily developing our idea from June 13-20th [1991] which you have expressed to us here . . . the Croat people in the Travnik regional, subregional community, lives with the idea of its ultimate annexation to the Croatian state and is ready to achieve this through all means, and the Croatian spirit is simmering in the young men.” On these issues, see Ivo Komšić, “Ustavopravni Položaj Hrvata nakon Daytona—Kontinuitet Depolitizacije,” in Ivan Markešić, ed., Hrvati u BiH: Ustavni Položaj, Kulturalni Razvoj i Nacionalni Identitet (Zagreb: Centar za Demociju Miko Tripalo, 2010), 7-21. From 1991-1995, Komšić was a member of BiH collective state presidency, and in 1993 had founded the Croatian Peasant’s Party of BiH. For the most serious analysis of the constitutional illegality of the March 1992 referendum, see Robert Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999), Chapter 5.
The Banovina of Croatia according to the Cvetković-Maček sporazum of 1939. Note that large parts of Western Herzegovina and Central Bosnia are included in the expanded Croatian banovina.
The Washington Agreement of 1994 formally allowed for a “special parallel relationship” between Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia. In the post-Dayton period, efforts to resurrect “Herceg-Bosna” or create a third, Croat entity in the country have been a consistent theme in Bosnian Croat politics. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Croat public opinion in BiH continued to essentially reject the new state; for instance, prior to BiH’s September 1996 general
elections, one survey reported that 89% of Croats in BiH believed their future lay more with Croatia than with BiH.\textsuperscript{141}

The casual observer driving through Croat-controlled territory in 1996-97 would have been hard-pressed to recognize that they were in fact in Bosnia & Herzegovina. On the roads, cars drove with license plates almost identical to those in Croatia proper. In stores, the preferred medium of exchange was the Croatian \textit{kuna} (along with the ubiquitous Deutsche Mark). Newsstands sold Croatian publications. Zagreb stations fill local TV screens. People in Ljubuški or Široki Brijeg called Zagreb without dialing the country code for Croatia. HDZ political gatherings and campaign rallies in places such as Kiseljak or Tomislav Grad began with the Croatian national anthem. Residents of those areas voted in Croatian elections and travelled abroad with Croatian passports. High-ranking Croat officials in the Bosniac-Croat Federation sat in the Croatian parliament. Young lovelies from central Bosnia and western Herzegovina competed in the Miss Croatia beauty pageant. On the roadsides were giant billboards of Franjo Tudjman promoting the HDZ. Police and military personnel wore the insignia of the “Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna.” A popular HDZ campaign billboard seen throughout Herceg-Bosna during this period read as follows:

\textit{Srušili smo JNA.}
\textit{Razbili smo Jugoslaviju.}
\textit{Oterali smo četnike.}
\textit{I naravno da će te da glasujete za nas--HDZ.}\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{141} Cited in \textit{Oslobodjenje} (Sarajevo), 9 August 1996, 7.

\textsuperscript{142} The translation reads: "We destroyed the JNA [i.e., the “Yugoslav People’s Army”]. We broke up Yugoslavia. We drove off the Četniks. And of course you will vote for us--the HDZ."
Thus, while in theory Croat-populated areas were parts of the Bosniac-Croat Federation, in reality, throughout the post-Dayton period Herceg-Bosna tottered between being the unofficial third entity in Bosnia & Herzegovina and de facto annexation by Croatia proper.

On 19 December 1996, the Croat member of BiH’s collective state presidency, Krešimir Zubak, announced that Herceg-Bosna had ceased to exist two days earlier, and that all documents, stamps, and stationary with Herceg-Bosna insignia and symbols would be taken out of use. Within a few weeks, however, Croat officials were already alluding to its resurrection in another form. On 27 January 1997, for instance, HDZ–B-H President Božo Rajić proposed that all Croatian organizations in Bosnia & Herzegovina form a "Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna" which would reportedly be a form of political and cultural organization for B-H Croats. Rajić would later explain the Croat refusal to disband Herceg-Bosna as a result of the fact that the Bosniacs had monopolized Bosnia & Herzegovina’s diplomatic representation abroad (and, importantly, at The Hague Tribunal), and the formerly common radio, TV, and cultural, scientific, and sports associations. Even more threatening, from the Croat perspective, was the formation of the SDA’s secret intelligence service, AID. These moves, according to Rajić, left the Croats no choice but to form their own organizations.

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143 *OMRI Daily Digest*, 20 December 1996. This was in accord with an agreement reached to have the Bosniacs transfer Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina functions and authorities to the Federation.

144 *OMRI Daily Digest*, 28 January 1997. Plans for replacing the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna with the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna had been around for several months; for instance, immediately after the August 1990 agreement to disband Herceg-Bosna, Ivan Bender had proposed the creation of the "Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna." *OMRI Daily Digest*, 3 September 1996.

145 See Rajić’s interview in *Horizont* (Mostar), 1 August 1997, 13.
In November 2000, in parallel with official state elections in BiH, the HZ-HB held an unofficial referendum in which voters were asked whether “Croats should have their own political, educational, scientific, cultural and other institutions on the entire territory of BiH.” The results of the referendum reportedly showed that of the 70 percent of Croat voters in BiH who cast a ballot, 99 percent approved. Subsequently, the Croat National Assembly held in Mostar on 3 March 2001 called for the formation of a Croat third entity in BiH, which many observers saw as a resurrection of Herceg Bosna. Even as of 2010, the issue is still being debated in Bosnian Croat political circles.

Microcase study IV: “Greater Serbia”

The origins of the concept of “Greater Serbia” are frequently attributed to Ilija Garašanin, the foreign minister of the Principality of Serbia, who in his 1844 Načertanije (Memorandum) laid out a plan in which Serbia would conduct a campaign to re-construct the medieval Serbian empire. Even before Garašanin, however, in 1809, the leader of the First Serbian Insurrection, Karadjordje (Black George) Petrović had sent a letter to the French vice-consul in Bucharest asking for support for Serb efforts against the Ottomans. In passing along his regards to Napoleon, Karadjordje wrote,

The Serbians reassure his Imperial and Royal Majesty that their compatriots, the inhabitants of Bosnia and of the duchy of Herzegovina, and those who live in the kingdom of Hungary, not excepting the Bulgarians who derive, so to speak, from the same branch, will follow their example at the first move which is made.


147 Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, 212. Indeed, at Rothenberg points out, many of the Orthodox Grenzer in the Croatian vojna krajina were eager to cross the Sava river and join Karadjordje’s rebellion. As one Habsburg report at the time noted, “numerous confidential reports indicate a most dangerous disposition among the non-Uniat Greeks.” See Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881, 105. This is an important point, because it points to the weakness of arguments claiming that the Orthodox population in Bosnia did not have any sense of ethnic identity at this point in time. Thus we have the anomaly that in 1804 the Orthodox population in Serbia proper considered itself
Karadjordje’s confidence in the Serb consciousness of the Orthodox populations scattered throughout Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Pannonian plains reveals the belief that regardless of whose political jurisdiction a group of people fell under, their collective consciousness and sense of identity would compel them to join in a Balkan-wide struggle against the Turks. Indeed, at the beginning of the 1804 Serb revolt, the Serbs of eastern Herzegovina urged the Montenegrin Prince-Bishop Peter I to join in the action.148 Almost seven decades later, in the midst of the Eastern Crisis of the 1870s, the leaders of the Serb revolt in Bosnia & Herzegovina in 1876 issued what has become known as the "Unification Proclamation":

> After so much waiting and without hope for any type of help, we resolve that from today we forever break with the non-Christian rule of Constantinople, and desiring to share our fate with our Serb brothers . . . proclaim that we are uniting our homeland Bosnia to the Principality of Serbia.\(^{149}\)

During the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Kosovo Serbs sent an appeal to the delegates asking that Kosovo be united with Kingdom of Serbia.150 In Croatia-Slavonia at this time, the Serb Independents (the most important Serb political party in the Habsburg Monarchy at the time) sought the unification of all “Serb lands” with Serbia.151 In the closing months of World War I, to be Serb, the Orthodox population in Croatia apparently did as well (at least if their willingness to join Karadjordje’s insurrection is any indication of their ethnoconfessional identities and loyalties), and yet the Orthodox population in Bosnia & Herzegovina allegedly did not. The reference to “non-Uniat Greeks” also reminds us that the unwillingness to grant a group its own ethnoconfessional identity is often more a product of the observer’s prejudices than of historical reality.

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149 “The Unification Proclamation” of 1876, as quoted by Nebojša Radmanović in *Krajiški Vojnik* (Banja Luka), 28 June 1997, 34.
the Serbs of the Bihać region would again call for unification with Serbia,\textsuperscript{152} as did Serb municipalities in Vojvodina.\textsuperscript{153} In the aftermath of the 1939 Cvetković-Maček sporazum which created a separate Croat \textit{banovina} (composed of Croatia-proper, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Croat-populated parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina), “the Serbs began to unite around calls for a Serbian \textit{banovina}, which, they argued, should include Serb-populated areas of the newly established autonomous Croatia” and “\textit{virtually all Serbs} argued that Bosnia should be part of a future Serbian \textit{banovina}.”\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{152} Banac, \textit{The National Question in Yugoslavia}, 131. Nikola Pašić would claim at this time that “a Serb, no matter where he lived, wishes to unite with Serbia, without asking about its internal organization.” As cited by Banac, \textit{The National Question in Yugoslavia}, 166.

\textsuperscript{153} Djokić, \textit{Elusive Compromise}, 35.

\textsuperscript{154} Djokić, \textit{Elusive Compromise}, 222, 235. Emphasis added. As Djokić points out (p. 241), various Serb groups from Mostar in Herzegovina to Glina in Croatia proper began to organize efforts to secede from the Croatian \textit{banovina} at this time.
A map of territories claimed for “Greater Serbia” in 1941, including large parts of present-day Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Available at: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3f/Homogena_Srbija.gif

The historical pattern of Serbs west of the Drina River exploiting instability and state disintegration to unify with Serbia proper was again reproduced in the wars of the 1990s. In August 1990, a referendum in the Krajina region of Croatia was organized in which the almost exclusively Serb population was asked whether they approved of Serb “sovereignty and autonomy” within Croatia. Some 99.7% of respondents answered affirmatively, although the Zagreb government declared the referendum invalid and illegal. As the situation in Croatia continued to deteriorate during the course of the year, on the 21 December 1990 a “Serb
Autonomous Oblast (SAO) of Krajina” was declared, and an SAO Western Slavonia and SAO of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem soon followed. On 16 March 1991, residents of the Krajina were asked in a new referendum "Are you in favour of the SAO Krajina joining the Republic of Serbia and staying in Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro and others who wish to preserve Yugoslavia?” to which 99.8% of those participating in the referendum reportedly answered yes. With these results in hand, the Assembly of the SAO Krajina issued a declaration proclaiming that "the territory of the SAO Krajina is a constitutive part of the unified state territory of the Republic of Serbia." On 19 December 1991, the SAO Krajina proclaimed itself the “Republic of Serb Krajina,” to which on 26 February 1992, the SAO’s of Western Slavonia and Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem acceded. The Republika Srpska Krajina had an unhappy and short existence, however, and essentially ceased to exist in August 1995, when, during the Croatian military operation known as Operation Storm, tens of thousands of Serbs fled the region.
The denouement of the Bosnian Serb story was somewhat different. On 24 October 1991, Serb deputies in the parliament of Bosnia & Herzegovina proclaimed an “Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia & Herzegovina,” and on 9 January 1992 this body proclaimed the “Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia & Herzegovina.” On 12 August 1992, the name “Republika Srpska” was officially adopted. Republika Srpska was granted legal recognition in the November 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, and given the right to have a “special parallel relationship” with Serbia proper. Throughout the post-Dayton period, by large majorities Serbs in the Republika Srpska have repeatedly expressed themselves to be in favor of either unification with Serbia or outright independence.155

155 For example, a public opinion survey conducted by Agencija Partner Marketing of Banja Luka in mid-September 2005 asked 850 participants of legal voting age in a representative sample the following question: “Should Republika Srpska secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina and join Serbia if Kosovo is granted independence?” The results are as follows:

- Completely agree: 54.1 percent
- Generally agree: 21.6 percent
- Generally do not agree: 8.2 percent
- Do not agree at all: 6.2 percent
- Do not know/refuse to answer: 9.8 percent

As can be seen from the above, 75.7 percent of RS respondents either agreed to some measure with the proposition that the RS should secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina and join Serbia if Kosovo became independent.

The results of this survey become more ethnically-uniform, however, when one takes into account the fact that according to 2005 estimates, 88.4 percent of the RS population is Serb, while 11.6 percent is estimated to be either Bosniac or Croat. Thus, were the survey to have been broken down along ethnic lines, it is highly likely that “Generally do not agree” or “Do not agree at all responses” would have come mainly from Bosniaks and Croats. Conversely, it is safe to assume that over 80 percent of Serb respondents would have answered either “Completely agree” or “Generally agree.”

What is also noteworthy about this survey is that there are fairly consistent attitudes towards this question regardless of age. 81 percent of respondents aged 29-45 agreed with the above proposition, 77 percent of respondents 46-59 agreed, while for older respondents (60 and above; i.e., those with more experience of the former Yugoslavia), support was somewhat lower (69 percent).
Public statements by officials in both Serbia proper and the RS reflect similar sentiments. For instance, in September 2002, the-then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Vojislav Koštunica, claimed that the RS was “a part of the family that is dear to us, near, temporarily split off, but always in our heart.”\textsuperscript{156} In a similar vein, in an interview in 2009, the then prime-minister of the RS, Milorad Dodik, noted

\begin{quote}
I accept the Dayton agreement and Bosnia as such. But in terms of sentiment, it's natural that we Serbs think of Serbia as our homeland, and that we feel Serbia is part of us, much more than Bosnia-Herzegovina. We accept Bosnia because we must, and because it is part of the agreement we signed. But that agreement says nothing about love, and if we're talking about love, it's an intimate feeling and I have the right to feel the way I do. In other words, we will continue to support the Serbian football team, just as I rooted for Novak Djokovic in the finals in
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{156} As quoted by Sabrina Ramet, \textit{The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005} (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 527.
Monaco, and just as I celebrate every victory by [Belgrade's] FC Partizan. No one can deny me that right, because it's what I love.\textsuperscript{157}

Finally, one can also point out to efforts of Serbs in the Pannonian plains to achieve as large a measure of self-government as possible under the Habsburgs. On November 18, 1849, for instance, the Habsburgs created a “Duchy of Serbia and Temes Banat” which, while not creating a separate federal territorial unit, did grant local Serbs a distinct administrative unit with significant church and school autonomy. Hungarian resistance to such autonomy led to its revocation in 1860, but popular pressure again forced Hungarian authorities to re-establish some degree of local self-government for the Vojvodina Serbs in 1868, until such privileges were again abolished in 1912.\textsuperscript{158} In late November 1918, Serbian municipalities in both Vojvodina and Bosnia voted for unification with Serbia before the formal proclamation of the new state.\textsuperscript{159}

In concluding the discussion of the chronic nature of Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism, it is important to place a limitation on the term “chronic.” As George and Bennett have noted, “there are no immutable foundational truths in social life. Thus, most social generalizations are necessarily contingent and time-bound, or conditioned by ideas and institutions that hold only for finite periods . . . “\textsuperscript{160} Similarly, Maria Todorova has argued that

. . . legacies are not perennial, let alone primordial. Any reification of their characteristics along immobile and unreformable civilisational fault lines cannot be a legitimate working hypothesis for historically minded humanists. Thinking in

\textsuperscript{157} See “Milorad Dodik: One Foot in Bosnia, but his Heart in Serbia,” available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Milorad_Dodik__One_Foot_In_Bosnia_But_His_Heart_In_Serbia/1617635.html Accessed on 28 July 2010 at: 4:21pm EST.


\textsuperscript{159} Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 35.

\textsuperscript{160} George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 130.
terms of historical legacies, with their simultaneity and overlapping, and with their gradually waning effects, allows us to emphasize the plasticity of the historical process.\textsuperscript{161}

Accepting these reservations, the point here is not to argue that ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans has been (and always will be) collective, chronic, and non-economic; however, it is to argue that over the past approximately 200 years, these are the traits that characterize it, and as of yet there is little sign of significant change in this regard in the foreseeable future.

IV. Ethnoconfessional Nationalism as a Non-Economic Phenomenon

The collective and chronic nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism, along with the ubiquity of nationalism in general, suggests that it is a sentiment or ideology qualitatively different from ordinary party politics. Many scholars consider nationalism to be a non-rational phenomenon—a phenomenon based more on emotional, psychological, and sentimental loyalties and attachments than on decision-making based on economic or material costs and benefits.\textsuperscript{162} Rupert Emerson, for instance, claimed that “nationalism, like other profound emotions such as love and hate, is more than the sum of the parts which are susceptible of cold and rational analysis.”\textsuperscript{163} Ivo Banac


\textsuperscript{162} Even someone with a materialist outlook such as Max Weber nevertheless understood the complicated role of religion and ideas on politics and society. As Weber noted, religion expresses “a rational need for a theodicy of suffering and of dying . . . Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest . . . The various great ways of leading a rational and methodical life have been characterized by irrational presuppositions, which have been accepted simply as ‘given’ and which have been incorporated into such ways of life . . . Furthermore, the irrational elements in the rationalization of reality have been the loci to which the irrepressible quest of intellectualism for the possession of supernatural values has been compelled to retreat.” See Weber, “The Social Psychology of the World Religions,” in H.H. Gerth, C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) 275-282.

\textsuperscript{163} Emerson, From Empire to Nation, 102.
has argued that "some of the aspects [of the emotional side of nationhood] are of a sacred or privileged character that defy ordinary analysis." For Clifford Geertz

... congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbor, one’s fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself... for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural—some would say spiritual—affinity than from social interaction.

Importantly, even theorists who see nationalism as an essentially political activity concede that as an expression of deeper human emotional needs, it is ultimately non-rational, and, consequently, a tremendously difficult, if not impossible, phenomenon for social scientists to deal with. Thus, as John Breuilly concedes,

People do yearn for communal membership, do have a strong sense of us and them, of territories and homelands, of belonging to culturally defined and bounded worlds which give their lives meaning. Ultimately much of this is beyond rational analysis and, I believe, the explanatory powers of the historian.

Adopting the premise that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a phenomenon defying the use of ordinary cost-benefit, material or economic analysis carries with it important implications. The most important of these is that it should be wrong to assume that manifestations of

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164 Ivo Banac, The Yugoslav National Question: History, Origins, Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 25. Emphasis added. Numerous other authors have pointed to the non-rational nature of ethnic nationalism as well. See, for instance, George Schöpflin, “The Functions of Myths and a Taxonomy of Myths,” in Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin, eds., Myths and Nationhood (New York: Routledge), 19-35; Paul Brass, “Elite groups, symbol manipulation and ethnic identity among the Muslims of South Asia,” in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (eds.) Political Identity and South Asia (Dublin: Curzon Press, 38), as cited by Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 154; Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood, 32; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, op. cit, 337. This non-rational aspect of nationalism and identification with one’s ethnic or national group may in part be attributed to the fact that many of an individual’s categorizations, or schemas, “function automatically, outside of conscious awareness... much cognition (and schema-governed cognition in particular) is unselfconscious and quasi-automatic rather than deliberate and controlled.” See Brubaker et.al., “Ethnicity as Cognition,” 41, 51.

165 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 259-260. Emphasis added.

166 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, op. cit., 401. Emphasis added.
ethnoconfessional nationalism can always (or exclusively) be reduced to economistic or materialistic motives on the part of cost-benefit maximizing individuals. As Anthony Smith argues, the “irreducible ethnopsychological element in nations and nationalism means that rational explanations for these phenomena always miss the point. Economic or political explanations in terms of state power and institutions, or individualistic rational choice theories of the strategic manipulations of the intelligentsia, must by their very nature fail to ‘reflect the emotional depth of national identity’, and the love, hatred and self-sacrifice it inspires.” Smith also notes that

... we have to concede that, in the last analysis, there remain ‘non-rational’ elements of explosive power and tenacity in the structure of nations and the outlook and myth of nationalism... The conflicts that embitter the geo-politics of our planet often betray deeper roots than a clash of economic interests and political calculations would suggest, and many of these conflicts, and perhaps the most bitter and protracted, stem from just these underlying non-rational elements.”

Recent Balkan history is replete with evidence that much of the decision-making by both elites and the general public is not based on standard “rational” determinations as defined by Russell Hardin, who takes “rationality” to mean having “narrowly self-interested intentions.” Importantly, understanding ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans in this way helps to explain the second of the fundamental puzzles de Figueredo and Weingast pose about the ethnification of politics, i.e., why individuals and groups engage in such conflicts when cooperation has much greater economic payoffs than conflict and violence. Understood as a

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170 On these notes, see Rui J. P. de Figueredo Jr. and Barry Weingast, “The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict,” in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and*
non-economic phenomenon, therefore, ethnoconfessional nationalism is about much more than
group struggles for economic resources. In the Yugoslav case, for instance, it is difficult to
sustain the argument that a desire for economic gain was driving many of the group demands for
sovereignty and/or independence; as Rodney Hall notes “One might argue that Slovenia was
sufficiently economically better off than its former Yugoslav partners to rationally seek
separation from Yugoslavia, but could a Bosnian Serb republic governed from Pale be
economically viable?” Similarly, Stuart J. Kaufman has observed that,

\[\text{\ldots if the root of Yugoslavia’s problem was economic, no one could have considered that a rational solution was a war that would sever economic ties between different parts of the country, provoke international economic sanctions against some areas while other areas were bombed to rubble, promote massive looting, and destroy the rule of law that made normal economic life possible. If different regions could not agree on an economic policy, they could have amicably split, as the Czech Republic and Slovakia did. All would have been better off economically had they done so.}^{172}\]

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. . . nationalists are imbued with an intrinsically powerful idea that does not relate significantly to economic factors. An excellent demonstration of this was the unwillingness of the Yugoslav republics to bury the hatchet in 1991, despite the large number of contracts with foreign firms that had been signed under Ante Marković’s regime and despite the significant financing that the international community was prepared to offer a stable Yugoslav state. The eagerness of nationalists throughout the former Yugoslavia to destroy economic assets in the name of their nation, not to mention to kill neighbors and burn villages, should make it clear that nationalists in their crudest form are motivated primarily by an idea, not by any cost-benefit calculus.” Stokes, “Solving the Wars of Yugoslav Succession,” 204. An example in support of the thesis that “nationalists” are primarily motivated by an idea, and not by a cost-benefit analysis, comes in the recent decision by the Albanian government to build a highway joining the Albanian coast with Kosovo. The $600 million project, Albania’s largest infrastructure development effort to date, has been criticized from numerous quarters as being motivated more by politics than economics; many experts argued that a more efficient use of Albania’s economic resources would have been to concentrate on building the Albanian segment of European Corridor 8, which is supposed to connect Albania with Macedonia and Bulgaria. As one analyst noted, “The political dimension of this project looks bigger than the economic dimension . . . Spending 600 million euros is a rather pharaonic project for Albania right now.” One Kosovo contractor, meanwhile, expressed the nationalist motivations inherent in such decisions, and their non-economic nature, by noting “I would have worked for free just to see this road unite
While Kaufman misses the many differences between the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak cases, he does make an important point when noting that political leaders who were thinking in economically rational terms would not have adopted the policies that they did.

The claim that ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans is a non-economic phenomenon can be demonstrated by looking at six historical and contemporary cases in which the cause for ethnoconfessional mobilization and action is unclear, or contrary to economically rational courses of action.

1) The Croatian Spring: The first example comes with the Croatian national movement of the late 1960s-early 1970s, which followed upon a decade in which Croatia experienced rapid economic growth. Yet it was precisely during this most economically successful decade of Yugoslavia’s existence that the country experienced the most political and social turmoil: the Croatian Spring, demonstrations and riots in Belgrade and Kosovo, the Ranković affair, etc. In fact, during the Croatian Spring, even communists—whom one would suspect of adhering to the view that class distinctions were more important than national distinctions—would claim, as did

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the then leader of the League of Communists of Croatia, Miko Tripalo, that “national and class interests were the same as nation and class had become identical.”

2) **Kosovo Albanian nationalism**: Kosovo Albanian dissatisfaction with the Yugoslav state in the early 1980s (i.e., before Milošević came to power) provides another example of the non-economic nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism. In the 1980s, for instance, Branko Horvat, perhaps postwar Yugoslavia’s most important economist, wrote a book entitled “Kosovsko Pitanje” (“The Kosovo Question”) in which he categorically stated that the Kosovo issue could not be resolved through economic measures.

After the late 1960’s, Kosovo for all intents and purposes became an Albanian-governed province within Yugoslavia with rights that were essentially equal to those of the other Yugoslav republics. Kosovo also enjoyed the benefits of large revenue-transfers from the other republics. Kosovo Albanians were represented at the highest levels of the Yugoslav state and party; for instance, in 1984-85, the president of the presidium of the League of Yugoslav

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175 As cited by Vjekoslav Perica, *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States*, 56.

176 See Horvat, *Kosovsko Pitanje* (Zagreb: Globus, 1989), 243-248. It should be added here, however, that Horvat also claims that it could not be solved without economic measures, either.

177 As Hugh Poulton notes, “in the 1980s the Kosovo Albanians were not repressed culturally. Kosovo was in effect an Albanian polity with the Albanian language in official use, Albanian television, radio and press, and with an ethnic Albanian government. Even the courts which were used to persecute those calling for a republic for Kosovo were staffed by ethnic Albanian judges.” See Poulton, “Macedonians and Albanians as Yugoslavs,” 131. Jović further points out the scale of the Yugoslav government’s efforts in Kosovo when he notes that in 1948, 62.2% of Kosovo’s population was illiterate. In 1981, Kosovo had the third largest university in Yugoslavia, with some 50,000 students. Kosovo had some 30 students per 1000 in the population, giving it the highest concentration of students in Yugoslavia. As a federal unit within Yugoslavia, Kosovo received the following shares in the distribution of the Fund for the Development of the Under-Developed Regions: 1971-75—33.3%; 1976-1980—37%; 1981-85—42.8%. For the period from 1981-1986, of the 136 billion dinars invested in Kosovo, only 8.7 billion came from Kosovo, the rest coming from other Yugoslav republics. See Jović, *Jugoslavija, džava koja je odumrla*, 265-67. For a detailed analysis of Kosovo during this period, see Momčilo Pavlović, “Kosovo Under Autonomy, 1974-1990,” in Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert, eds., *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholar’s Initiative* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2009), 49-80.
Communists was Ali Shukrija, and in 1986-87, the president of Yugoslavia was Sinan Hasani. This was at a time, moreover, when Albanians in both neighboring Albania proper and in Macedonia were politically and economically much worse off than those in Kosovo. In Albania during this period, for instance, the political and cultural repression people faced were such that citizens were not allowed to own cars or play tennis (considered a bourgeois sport), and in 1975 the Hoxha regime decided that people with “inappropriate names or offensive surnames from a political, ideological and moral viewpoint [were] obliged to change them.”

Moreover, given the Yugoslav state’s overwhelming advantage in terms of military resources and international legitimacy, any violent attempt to gain independence could only lead to immense losses for the Albanian side. In sum, rational economic explanations cannot satisfactorily account for Kosovo Albanian nationalism at this time; by almost any measure, in economic terms, Kosovo was better off as a part of Yugoslavia than as an independent entity, yet something about the emotional appeal of national independence proved more powerful than rational economic thinking.

3) Croatian-Slovenian territorial dispute: A third example can be found in the contemporary dispute (which in fact goes back to the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991) between Croatia and Slovenia over the demarcation of their common land and maritime borders. The land dispute essentially concerns whether or not to move the border a few hundred meters in one direction or the other. The maritime dispute concerns where to draw the borders in the Bay of Piran. Slovenia


179 This sentiment was perfectly captured in a slogan on a t-shirt popular in Kosovo around the time of the independence declaration in February 2008. To wit: “Independence is better than having electricity.”
insists on drawing the line so that it has access to international waters in the Adriatic Sea; Croatia insists on the more standard international practice of allowing states to claim as their maritime border a certain number of kilometers from their shoreline. Apart from the legal arguments involved in this dispute, however, what is clear is that Croatia’s unwillingness to compromise on this issue has cost it several years (at least) in its EU aspiration efforts. From the perspective of economic rationality, a more logical position for Croatia to have taken over the past several years would have been to compromise with Slovenia for the sake of getting into the EU more quickly, especially given the fact that Croatia’s maritime borders already exceed 1,100 kilometers. From this perspective, ceding 150 kilometers of its maritime borders (where, moreover, no major Croatian ports are located) to Slovenia would still leave Croatia with approximately 900 kilometers of coastline within its sovereign territory.

4) Serbia-Kosovo: A fourth example of the non-economic nature of Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism can be provided by looking at the ongoing diplomatic dispute over Kosovo’s status. There is clearly no economic rationale behind the Serbian government’s efforts to maintain its sovereign claims to Kosovo. As was seen in the 1990s, imposing Serbian control over a hostile Kosovo Albanian population entailed tremendous costs, in terms blood, treasure, and international prestige. One estimate suggests that the Serbian state spent upwards of six billion dollars trying to maintain its control over Kosovo after 1989. In 2009, i.e., one year after Kosovo declared independence and was recognized by most EU states, the Serbian government

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180 See Janjić, Lalaj, and Pula, “Kosovo Under the Milošević Regime,” 288. Another estimate, by the Belgrade-based website Koliko Kosta Kosovo (i.e., “How Much Does Kosovo Cost”) estimates that from June 10th, 1999 to March 1st, 2011, the Serbian government has spent some EUR 5.8 billion on Kosovo. See http://www.kolikokostakosovo.info/index.html
reportedly spent Euro 450 million on Kosovo. Nevertheless, there is uniform agreement amongst politicians whose parties together win approximately 95 percent of the votes in Serbian elections that maintaining Serbia’s sovereign claims to Kosovo is one of the state’s central political and strategic goals. A 2009 public opinion survey found that 70 percent of respondents said that Serbia should not give up its claims to Kosovo, even at the cost of EU membership.

5) Republika Srpska and Bosnian integration: A fifth case in point is the current refusal of Serbs in Republika Srpska to accept international demands that they give up a measure of their autonomy for the sake of a more centralized, unitary state in Bosnia & Herzegovina. By extension, this means that both political leaders and voters in the RS are forfeiting millions of dollars in potential EU accession funds for candidate countries. As was seen in the Croatian case, however, both politicians and ordinary citizens are willing to sacrifice economic interests for the sake of a more intangible good that is considered non-negotiable.

6) The Macedonian name dispute: Finally, the sixth example of the non-economic nature of Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism can be found in the current dispute between Greece and Macedonia over the name issue. Since 1991, Athens and Skopje have been involved in a tense dispute over legitimate rights to the term of “Macedonia.” Greece insists that it alone has the right to use the term, and that Skopje’s appropriation of the term implies both a historical misappropriation of the legacy of Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great, but also that it implies that Skopje has territorial pretensions to the Greek province of Macedonia (as evidence,

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182 See “Focus On: Kosovo’s Independence,” Gallup Balkan Monitor (July 2010), 5.
the Greek government has cited Skopje’s earlier use of the White Tower in Thessaloniki on Macedonian currency).

As with the cases of Croatia and the RS in Bosnia & Herzegovina, from a strictly rational economic perspective it would be better for Skopje to compromise with Athens as quickly as possible to gain access to pre-accession funding available to EU candidate countries. In terms of Macedonian internal politics, this would also be the preferred course, since public opinion surveys in the country reveal that the Albanian population in Macedonia is both more willing to compromise on the name issue and is becoming increasing impatient with the lack of progress in Macedonia’s EU accession hopes since it was accepted as a candidate country in 2005. Nevertheless, the emotional and psychological importance of the name issue, which so directly touches upon Macedonians’ identity, has prevented the Macedonian Slav population from compromising on this issue, with the result that it has persisted for the better part of two decades.

What is important to note for each of the above issues is that it is not the behavior of politicians that is counter-intuitive from an economic/rational choice standpoint, but that of the

183 For instance, in a July 2010 poll in Macedonia, 66.5 percent of respondents said that maintaining the country’s constitutional name (i.e., “The Republic of Macedonia”) was more important than either NATO or EU membership. Broken down by ethnicity, 82.1 percent of ethnic Macedonians said that the name issue was more important to them than NATO and EU membership; however, 77.1 percent of ethnic Albanian respondents said that NATO and EU membership was more important to them than the name issue. See Sinisa Jakov Marusic, “Macedonians Opt for Name Over EU, NATO,” available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/29413/ Accessed on 14 July 2010 at 11:45pm EST. A similar poll conducted by the newspaper Dnevnik (Skopje) two months earlier returned largely similar results. See “Нема расположение за компромис,” available at: http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/?ItemID=2E19B43FC694054A8EDE9F92B01B2601 Accessed on 26 May 2010 at: 10:30am EST.
general population. Politician’s behavior can be rationalized by their fear of losing elections if they choose economically rational courses of action, although on this point it would have to be empirically proven that these politicians really were acting out of selfish instrumental reasons rather than out of genuine conviction. What is more interesting, however, is the attitude of the general population in each of these countries, who clearly have more to gain economically through compromise and negotiation than through a resort to war, or acceptance of long-running disputes.

V. Conclusions

The evidence provided by this analysis of ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans suggests that while constructivism’s claim that individual identities are fluid and malleable may be correct, this seems true only for relatively limited sections of the population. In fact, according to a wide-range of political and social behaviors, on a consistent basis anywhere between two-thirds and 90 percent of a given population behave with considerable predictability (this claim will be demonstrated empirically in Chapter IV). Of course, there are always individuals and groups of individuals who challenge the prevailing group orthodoxy, social norms, etc. Thus, we can always find individuals who consider themselves to be first and foremost Yugoslavs, or politicians in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, or Serbia who promote non-nationalist alternatives. But a review of Balkan history shows that these individuals and groups are always a distinct and generally politically irrelevant minority.

There are a number of reasons for this. First, the Balkans are inhabited by long-settled ethnoconfessional groups, as opposed to the United States or Australia with their large immigrant
populations, and, consequently, there is a significant difference in attitudes between the two types of societies. Theodor Hanf, for instance, argues that,

As a rule, emigrants tend to be people who are ready to give up (a part of) their old cultural identity and take their chances in a new world, which claims to judge each individual not by background but by ability and achievement. By contrast, those who remain in their native place are part of an existing order, whether they like it or not. In most cases, though, they do like it: they want to continue living in the way their forefathers lived, in other words, not in a meritocratic, but in an ascriptive society in which entire groups rather than individuals rise and fall. 184

Second, changing one’s ethnoconfessional identity is not as easy or cost-free as constructivists, or those who argue that identities are fluid and malleable, often suggest the process to be. In fact, switching one’s ethnoconfessional identity, assimilating, or attempting to “pass” into a different group, often involves considerable costs; as Caselli and Coleman note, changing ethnic group identity may involve considerable loss of ethnicity-specific human capital and entail painful psychic costs as well. 185

Third, “internationalists,” or individuals willing to give up the ascriptive identities they are born with are generally distinct minorities within their own communities. With regard to the internationalist outlook of the Yugoslav communists in the interwar period,

In many respects the young Yugoslav communists of the 1930s, though active in arousing the masses, were psychologically outside society. In this sense they were not integrated in their own nation. They lived for prolonged periods in close-knit groups that became not only their political and ideological universe but also a kind of family. For many revolutionaries this ideological-political family was

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185 As Caselli and Coleman note, “For example, one may have to sacrifice business contacts, or leave a profession that has an ethnic connotation to it. Changing identity may also involve geographical relocation to an area where one’s ancestry is not known, with attendant further loss of business contacts or location specific human capital. It may also involve some kind of primitive surgery, the payment of bribes to counterfeit identification documents or change names, payments to families of other groups in order to marry (one’s children) into them, etc. . . . Finally, there are the obvious psychic costs.” See Francesco Caselli and Wilbur John Coleman II, “On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict” (London: LSE Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper No. 732, 2006), 6.
more important than attachment to their nations . . . For them, the idea that one
day all people could feel an international political loyalty stronger and
emotionally deeper than the loyalty to one’s nation was based on personal
experience and not simply on theory. For since all today’s real Communists were
internationalists, then tomorrow, when everyone became a Communist, everyone
would also be an internationalist.  

Empirical evidence supporting the view that only small minorities of people are willing to
change their identity can be found in the limited number of people who formally adopted a
“Yugoslav” identity between 1918 and 1991. Thus, despite the fact that by 1981 Yugoslavia in
its pre-World War II and post-World War II permutations had existed for some for some 60-plus
years, less than six percent of the population listed itself as “Yugoslav” in the census. (At this
pace, simple mathematical extrapolation suggests it would have taken some 560 years for
approximately one half of Yugoslavia’s population to identify themselves as “Yugoslav.”)

Other exceptions to the rule can also be seen in certain micro-regions, such as the Istrian
peninsula, where the local political and social culture has not shown the characteristics of

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186 Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 90-91. Some communists, on the other hand, were fighting for socialism as an
ideology itself; for instance, Eduard Kardelj, the second most important political figure in post-1945 Yugoslavia
(and perhaps the most important political figure in post-1974 Yugoslavia), once said that “I did not fight for
Yugoslavia, but for socialism.” See Jović, *Yugoslavija—Država koja je odumrla*, 136. Even during the war Kardelj’s
relatively limited dedication to Yugoslavia as a whole was visible: he resisted joining the Partisan Supreme
Command, preferring instead to stay in Slovenia, and in one letter to Tito jokingly admitted that “You know, I was
always a little bit of a ‘local patriot’.” As cited by Shoup, *Yugoslav Communism and the National Question*, 71.

187 Burg, Steven L., and Berbaum, Michael L., “Community, Integration, and Stability in Multinational Yugoslavia,”
*American Political Science Review* 83 (June 1989), 535-554.
ethnoconfessional nationalism evident in other parts of the Balkan peninsula. Another identifiable category of individuals in this regard, according to the sociologist Mitja Velikonja, were non-conformist groups and individuals in the former Yugoslavia—youth movements, feminists, rock n’ rollers and punk rockers, people in the ecological movement, gays and lesbians, pacifists, and children from mixed marriages—who associated with each other more on the basis of their interests, activities, music, sexual orientation, etc., rather than on the basis of nationality. Even for these groups, however, Velikonja argues that Yugoslavism was not so much a national or supranational identity as much as it was an escape from increasingly exclusive national identities.

Taken in sum, these facts explain why ethnoconfessional nationalism is so successful in the Balkans, and why politicians are so easily tempted to play the proverbial “national card.” Clearly, any politician’s hopes for coming to power cannot be achieved by ignoring or going against the views of two-thirds to 90 percent of their constituency. Thus, while the constructivist argument that individual identities may be fluid and malleable is, in a narrow sense, correct, it does not seem to apply to substantial majorities of individuals. Similarly, while ethnoconfessional groups in the Balkans do not represent uniform, undifferentiated wholes, for the purposes of most political and social analysis, they do represent decisive political majorities.

The above of course has important implications for ongoing debates on whether identities are primordial or constructed/instrumental. Primordialists have generally assumed that an


189 Personal communication, 9 August 2007.
individual’s ethnic/national identity is a more or less objective, given attribute, essentially impervious to change or willful manipulation, and that it assumes much greater importance than any other identity an individual may possess. Edward Shils, for instance, claimed that “the attachment to another member of one’s kinship group is not just a function of interaction . . . It is because a certain ineffable significance is attributed to the tie of blood.” In the same vein, Clifford Geertz has argued that the primordial attachments and individual possesses

... are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves . . . at least in great part by virtues of some unaccountable absolute importance attributed to the very tie itself . . . for virtually every person, in every society, at all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural—some would say spiritual—affinity than from social interaction.

Until recently, most scholars had rejected the primordialist understanding of identity. To some scholars, the term primordial is itself unacceptable. Insofar as it is taken to mean “a priori, ineffable, and coercive—which it must if it is to be genuinely primordial—then the evidence suggests conclusively that the term is only inappropriately assigned to most of the ethnic phenomena of our day . . . [the term is] unscientific and thoroughly unsociological . . . and [as an analytical concept] it offers no mechanism for the genesis of its phenomena, nor does it recognize or explicate any significant relationship between ethnic attachments and the ongoing social experiences of ethnic members.”

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192 See Jack David Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, Reed M. “The Poverty of Primordialism: the Demystification of Ethnic Attachments,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 16 (April 1993), 199, 194, 184, respectively. As they go on to claim, “primordialism presents us with a picture of undervived and socially-unconstructed emotions that are unanalysable and overpowering and coercive yet varying. A more unintelligible and unsociological concept would be hard to imagine, and furthermore, from a variety of sources—including sociobiology, anthropology, and psychology—material has emerged in recent years that renders the concept theoretically vacuous and empirically indefensible.”
In contrast to the perceived weaknesses of primordialism, an alternative view emphasizes instead identity’s contingent, dynamic, and constructed qualities, and that individuals possess multiple identities, any one of which can be instrumentally exploited given a specific social context, or the manipulation of a particular causal variable; as one group of scholars put it, ethnicity is “an instrumental adaptation to shifting economic and political circumstances.”

Seen in this way, ethnic/national identities are not objective qualities, but in fact subjective “beliefs, perceptions, understandings, and identifications.” Put another way, ethnic identities and loyalties grow out of social interaction within a given setting, and are not the result of some mystical or spiritual attribute of congruities of blood, speech, or custom that exist prior to such social interaction.

But a perceptible shift in scholarly thinking about this topic is again occurring, as specialists have begun to argue that ethnic and national identities are more fixed, durable and deeply ingrained than simpler constructivist theories suggest. In this view, once established, ethnic identities are much longer-lasting, and much less fluid and malleable, than most constructivists allow. Moreover, an individual’s primary, ethnic/national identity, is recognized as being much more salient in determining the individual’s perceptions and actions than the instrumentalists’ multiple-identities perspective.

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193 Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov, “Ethnicity as Congnition,” 49. Along these lines, see also the works by Brubaker, Chandra, Fearon and Laitin cited above.


196 Some scholars, for instance, question the supposed “construction” of new ethnicities in Africa, which has frequently been used as proof of how easily new forms of identity and new loyalties can be created. As Murat Bayar has argued recently, “new ethnic groups did not appear arbitrarily in sub-Saharan Africa; they were constructed on the basis of kinship, language, geography and other commonalities.” See Bayar, “Reconsidering Primordialism: An Alternative Approach to the Study of Ethnicity,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 32 (November 2009), 1644.
Within the context of these debates, understanding ethnoconfessional nationalism (and the identities and loyalties associated with it) as a collective, chronic, and non-economic phenomenon places the identity-formation process somewhere along the continuum between what has been termed weak and strong primordialism. Thus, the claim has not been made that specific ethnic groups have existed since time immemorial, merely that there is no \textit{a priori} reason not to believe that they could have emerged in the Middle Ages, or even earlier. The characteristics of ethnoconfessional nationalism articulated above also suggest that ethnic groups are, \textit{contra} constructivist views, “ontologically real groups of people who share ontologically real features.”\textsuperscript{197}

The next chapter will provide an historical narrative and further empirical evidence of the claims made above. Part 1 of the next chapter focuses on the evolution of group identities in the Balkans. Part 2 will then describe the practical, everyday manifestations of the ethnoconfessional segmentation of Balkan society that has resulted from this institutional structure. The evidence provided throughout Chapter 4 will support the claim that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a chronic, collective, and non-economic phenomenon.

\textsuperscript{197} See Motyl, \textit{Revolutions, Nations, Empires}, 94-96.
Chapter IV

The Ethnoconfessional Distintegration of the Western Balkans:
Historical Narrative & Empirical Evidence

I. Introduction

Prior to the 1990s, a casual look at urban life in many parts of the former Yugoslavia could lead to the conclusion that ethnoconfessional identity had become a thing of the past. With respect to urban Bosnians, for instance, before 1991 it was possible to claim that

After fifty years of a very secular and secularizing Yugoslav state . . . their ways of life are the same, and when one meets a Bosnian, if one does not notice the personal name, one may spend considerable time with that Bosnian and then go on one’s way, unaware of his ethnic identity.¹

It has also been suggested that this was true of the former Yugoslavia as a whole, and that in fact the primary divide in Yugoslav society had been between urban residents and country folk.² Few observers, however, would make such claims after the conflicts of the 1990s; as Senad Slatina has noted,

Visitors to Bosnia and Herzegovina need not ask whether a local is Serb, Bosniak (Muslim Bosnian), or Croat. Such information is easily ascertained by observing a person’s choice in cigarettes, beer, or cellular telephones. Ten years after the war

¹ Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 9. To a considerable degree, the belief that prewar Bosnia constituted some form of neutral, non-ethnic idyll is based on the cult of the komšiluk (from the Turkish word for neighborhood) which governed personal relations between individuals regardless of ethnoconfessional identity. In the postwar period, this cult has largely been associated with the Bosniac perspective, although, as Paula Pickering has noted, “One-sided portrayals of the war and the intrusion of religion into public schools have made a mockery of Bošnjak authorities’ so-called commitment to the cult of the neighborhood.” See Pickering, Peacebuilding in the Balkans, 42.

² Christopher Bennet, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), 63. Some have suggested that the wars in the former Yugoslavia were in fact wars of the countryside against the cities. This view, however, is only of limited utility, as one did not see rural Croats attacking Croat cities, or rural Bosniacs attacking Bosniac-majority cities. For critiques of the view that the Yugoslav wars were an urban-rural conflict, see Xavier Bougarel, “Yugoslav Wars: The ‘Revenge of the Countryside’ Between Sociological Reality and Nationalist Myth,” East European Quarterly XXXIII (June 1999), 157-175; and Marko Živković, “Violent Highlanders and Peaceful Lowlanders: Uses and Abuses of Ethno-Geography in the Balkans from Versailles to Dayton,” Replika (Special Issues), 1997, online version available at: http://www.c3.hu/scripta/scripta0/replika/honlap/english/02/08zivk.htm
in Bosnia ended, almost all commercial brands in the country are exclusive to one ethnicity or another.³ Importantly, this situation is true not only of war-torn Bosnia. Another of the former Yugoslavia’s more multiethnic republics, Macedonia, exhibits many of the same characteristics. Thus,

Macedonia is an exemplar of an ethnically-divided society. Macedonians and Albanians are separated by language, religion (Orthodoxy and Islam, respectively) employment patterns and traditions. Social networks tend to be intra-ethnic (nightclubs, restaurants and shops have clientele exclusively of one or other group). Intermarriages are virtually non-existent.⁴

This state-of-affairs in southeastern Europe, however, is not merely the result of the wars of the 1990s. In reality, to a large extent it existed even before the 1990s, and is the result of several centuries of historical development that has segmented Balkan society along ethnoconfessional lines. Long before the breakup of Yugoslavia, ethnoconfessional identity significantly influenced (if not determined) one’s behavior and political outlook on a whole range of issues, from voting behavior, the choice of one’s spouse, settlement patterns, to the rituals and ceremonies with which members of the different ethnoconfessional groups are brought into this world, celebrate its milestones, and end their physical existence. Indeed, religious affiliation

... became the source of a host of minor but highly significant differences in dress, cuisine, dialect, oral tradition, folk music, housing style, furnishings, and many other everyday cultural practices ... These cultural characteristics and practices evolved from religious allegiance but had no religious significance per se. They became distinctive markers of group differentiation, a sort of ‘code’ to assert one’s allegiance and identity that carried great significance for the

³ See Senad Slatina, “Brand Wars,” at www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2845, accessed on 15 August 2005. It has even been claimed that the way Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs have traditionally enjoyed their coffee reveals ethnic differences: Bosniacs tended to sip coffee with a piece of lokum (Turkish delight) in their mouths, Serbs liked to add sugar to the coffee while it was brewing, and Croats preferred to add sugar to their coffee when it was brought to the table. See Patrick Moore, “The Demise of Turkish Coffee?” RFE/RL Newsline, 1 April 1998.

individuals who displayed them, whether or not those individuals held to the tenets of a faith or engaged in religious practices.\textsuperscript{5}

These “minor but highly significant” differences played an important role in Yugoslavia’s postwar political evolution, even under an ideology that was officially internationalist and dedicated to “brotherhood and unity.”\textsuperscript{6} In what was a long term, secular trend, throughout the twentieth century the Yugoslav lands exhibited ever greater disintegration along ethno-regional (and, consequently, ethnoconfessional) lines in almost every field of political, social and economic life. Whether one looks at education, artistic, cultural and intellectual endeavor, the work of dissidents and alternative opposition groups, the media or religion, in the period after 1945 Yugoslav society disintegrated along ethnoconfessional lines in almost every way imaginable. As Susan Woodward has described the totality with which the Yugoslav system collapsed in its final years,

While politicians and parliaments bent on sovereignty or radical change were challenging the legitimacy of the federal government and party, \textit{all} the less visible bonds that hold any society together were collapsing—the rules of mutual obligation, the checks and balances, the equilibrating mechanisms, the assumption of minimal security of one’s person and status.\textsuperscript{7}

In the vast majority of cases, these bonds collapsed along ethnoconfessional lines.

Understanding why and how this was the case requires reconsidering the nature of relations between ethnoconfessional groups in the Balkans. In recent years, two views have predominated in their attempt to explain the nature of these relations: the first, the “ancient ethnic hatreds”

\textsuperscript{5} Donia and Fine, \textit{Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed}, 83. Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{6} As Samuel Huntington has warned, however, it is a mistake think of religious differences as “minor.” For Huntington, “Millenia of human history have shown that religion is not a ‘small difference’ but possibly the most profound difference that can exist between people.” See Huntington, \textit{The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order}, 254. Ernest Gellner has also stressed the important hold that religion can have on individuals, noting that “genetically transmitted or deeply engrained religious-cultural habits are impossible or difficult to drop . . . some deeply engrained religious-cultural habits possess a vigor and tenacity which can virtually equal those which are rooted in our genetic constitution.” See Gellner, \textit{Nations and Nationalism}, 46, 71.

\textsuperscript{7} Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}, 116. Emphasis added.
view, has stressed that the varying Balkan ethnoconfessional groups have been bitterly and often violently at odds with each other for centuries. A more recent view has argued that coexistence and tolerance rather than violence have characterized ethnoconfessional relations throughout Balkan history.

As will be argued in this chapter, neither view fully captures the complexity of ethnoconfessional relations in the region. As Xavier Bougarel has aptly noted, “the words ‘tolerance’, ‘hate’, ‘coexistence’, and ‘fear’ are all equally applicable” in the case of Bosnia, and much the same could be said of the rest of the Balkan peninsula. Given these considerations, a more accurate understanding of the nature of relations among the various Balkan ethnoconfessional groups is one provided by Robert Hayden, who has termed these relations “antagonistic tolerance.” Hayden argues that in and of itself, coexistence does not indicate a belief in tolerance per se as a positive moral attitude, but rather a simply pragmatic one; according to Hayden,

coexistence may be a matter of competition between members of different groups manifesting the negative definition of tolerance as passive noninterference and premised on a lack of ability of either group to overcome the other. . . . In such a setting, there is much sharing of physical space but also a great deal of social segregation, which may not be based on overt hostility most of the time but is still based on a principle of separation. . . close examination of shared religious sites in India and the Balkans reveals competition between groups and “tolerance” that is a pragmatic adaptation to a situation in which repression of the other group’s practices may not be possible rather than an active embrace of the Other.

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9 Hayden, “Antagonistic Tolerance: Competitive Sharing of Religious Sites in South Asia and the Balkans,” Current Anthropology 43 (April 2002), 205-206, 216. The responses of local Muslim elites to the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms of the 1930s lend considerable support to Hayden’s thesis. In Bosnia, the Tanzimat reforms were never even enacted because Muslim elites considered granting equality to Christians “outrageous.” See Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 62. The same was true in Kosovo as well, where conservative opposition from the ulama and most Ottoman officials served to undermine the Ottoman court’s westernizing efforts; thus, “Muslim believers resented the doctrine of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, seeing it as against the natural order
As noted in Chapter I, this system of ethnoconfessional separation developed under the Ottoman millet system, although some historians believe that the already-existing cleavages in medieval Balkan societies forced the Ottomans to adopt such a system of rule in southeastern Europe.

II. Inter-ethnoconfessional Relations in the Balkans: Historical Context

Appreciating the historical context of inter-ethnoconfessional relations in the Balkans is crucial to understanding both developments in the 1990s, and the possibilities for the future evolution of these relations given such historical experiences and constraints. In the 1990s, two theories purporting to explain Balkan history predominated amongst most observers: the theory of “evil leaders” and the “ancient ethnic hatreds” thesis. Those arguing that multiethnic societies in the Balkans were impossible, or arguing against foreign military intervention, would frequently point to the “ancient” nature of ethnic conflict there; as former British Prime Minister John Major said in 1993, “The conflict in Bosnia was a product of impersonal and inevitable forces beyond anyone’s control.” On the other hand, those arguing in favor of “multiethnic societies” claimed that interethnic or interconfessional conflict was the exception to the rule in southeastern Europe, and that by eliminating “the nationalists” Bosnia & Herzegovina could again become the harmonious society it once was. As one historian has noted, the political stakes in this debate are considerable.

At stake of course is not simply historical understanding for its own sake. Behind the ancient-hatreds thesis, there often is, or is seen to be, an argument against

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10 As cited by Mazower, The Balkans, 147.
outside involvement and in favor of ethnic partition. At the other extreme, interpretations that dismiss the force of history altogether and focus solely on contemporary elites can serve the cause of intervention of one kind or another. Dueling historical analogies are even more clearly tied to rival policies.\textsuperscript{11}

At the academic level, many scholars have rejected the “ancient ethnic hatreds” thesis; thus, in the case of the former Soviet Union, for instance, David Laitin bluntly states “journalistic tales of ancient hatreds erupting as soon as central authority disappeared can be ignored.”\textsuperscript{12} Such views are based on a conscious decision to dismiss the role of historical events on contemporary ethnic conflict. Laitin, for instance, does not admit that the legacy of World War II might have had anything to do with the violence that occurred in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Instead, according to Laitin, international relations theory and Brubaker’s triadic nexus argument suffice to explain the outbreak of violence there; thus, “in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, when the national homeland took an inordinate interest in their brethren in the near abroad, it gave incentive for the national minorities in these republics to take full advantage of their windows of opportunity.”\textsuperscript{13}

Recent scholarship on whether “ancient ethnic hatreds” have been operative in the Balkans has been reflected in differing views of the Ottoman legacy and the division between what Srečko Dzaja has called the Turkophile scholars and a Turkophobe school. According to the Turkophiles, the Ottomans brought order, religious tolerance, and possibilities for social advancement to lower classes after their conquest of Bosnia. Conversion to Islam was voluntary, and the Ottomans also bequeathed to Bosnia rich Oriental cultural values. For Turkophobes, on


\textsuperscript{12} Laitin, \textit{Identity in Formation}, 329.

\textsuperscript{13} Laitin, \textit{Identity in Formation}, 330.
the other hand, the Ottoman conquest halted the political and cultural development of the region, and, through Islamification, estranged many inhabitants of the Balkans from their native identities. Çaglar Keydar has offered another version of this argument, claiming that one’s “political commitments” vis-à-vis the issue of nation-state versus empire often determine one’s explanation for the decline and fall of the Ottoman empire; as Keydar notes, “As the dominant versions of history written since the end of the Great War have consciously or unwittingly adopted the perspective of the nation state, the collapse of the empire has often been viewed as the inevitable result of the destiny of the nation.”

Although in recent years the view of the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans as being benign and tolerant is most commonly associated with Bosniac writers and politicians and scholars advocating international intervention in the Balkan wars, even many Bosniac historiographies—when writing for their own domestic, Bosniac audiences—deny the allegedly peaceful and harmonious nature of pre-1992 Bosnian and Balkan history. For instance, one Bosnian intellectual has claimed that “All of the existing documentation reliably confirms that genocide has been committed against Bosniacs in a permanent continuity since 1683.” Another leading Bosniac intellectual, Rusmir Mahmutčehajić, pushes the persecution of Bosniacs even further back in history; according to Mahmutčehajić, the persecution of the Arians in Bosnia, the “Bosnian Christians,” and ultimately the Bosnian Muslims (and all the Muslims in southeastern Europe) extends back at least into the 12th century. Bosnia, according to Mahmutčehajić, is the

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14 Dzaja, Konfesionalnost i Nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine, 82.
15 Keydar, “The Ottoman Empire,” 30.
16 Emphasis added. The remarks belong to Smail Čekić, the Director of the Institute for Crimes Against Humanity in Sarajevo. See the Čekić interview in Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 10 October 1997, 5.
victim of a “centuries-old tragedy, a victim of satanic forces,” and claims that “The Bosniac national community which lives in Bosnia today represents the historically continuous remainder of [a community] always exposed to persecution and genocide.” A recent book on the Sandzak reports that the Muslim population on the territory of the former Yugoslavia has been exposed to a “horrible genocide” dating back 300 years. Saçir Filandra talks about the “clear religious-mythic source of the Serbian criminal and genocidal consciousness,” while Atif Purivatra has claimed that the “basic goal of agrarian reform [in Bosnia in the early 20th century] was economic genocide against the Muslims.” The main Islamic religious and political leader in the Sandzak, Mufti Muamer ef. Zukorlić, argues that the Bosniacs of both Bosnia & Herzegovina and the Sandzak have been the victims of “eleven genocides,” with Srebrenica being only the latest. Mustafa Cerić recently claimed that in the past 100 years, the Bosnian Muslims have experienced “one hundred Srebrenica’s.” Here it bears pointing out that these interpretations of Balkan history ostensibly reflect the experience of the ethnoconfessional group that was dominant politically, economically and militarily in the region for a number of centuries. Recognizing this fact should serve as a useful corrective to the view that the native or local


18 See the introduction by Avdija Avdić to Sandzak: Porobljena Zemlja, authored by Harun Crnovršanin and Nuro Sadiković, (Zagreb: Grafomark, 2001), 20.

19 Filandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, 52.

20 Atif Purivatra, Ekonomski genocid nad Bosanskim Muslimanima (Sarajevo: MAG, 1993), 60, as cited by Filandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, 65.


histories of the Christian peoples of southeastern Europe have an excessively negative view of the Ottoman era.

Much of the ancient ethnic hatreds argument ultimately rests on one’s interpretation of the Ottoman Empire and its impact on the Balkans. This legacy is contradictory. In some ways, the Ottoman Empire in the 16th and 17th centuries proved more accepting of religious diversity than most Western European states, where, especially after the Protestant Reformation religious warfare was common; as Mazower notes, “there was no Muslim analogue to the widespread Christian impulse to drive out the infidel and the heretic,”23 and the Ottomans provided “a system of rule that, compared with those current elsewhere in Europe, offered an unparalleled degree of religious tolerance.”24

Moreover, until the 20th century, ethnic territorial homogenization of the type carried out in Western Europe over the centuries was relatively unknown. As L. S. Stavrianos points out,

. . . the unique feature of Balkan ethnic evolution is that virtually all the races that have actually settled there in the past, as distinguished from those that have simply marched through, have been able to preserve their identity to the present. The significance of this may be illustrated by imagining a Balkan type of ethnic development in England. Had that occurred, we would meet, in a journey through England today, Britons speaking Welsh, Romans speaking Latin, Angles and Saxons speaking their Germanic dialects, Scandinavians speaking Danish, and Normans speaking Old French. Furthermore, religious diversity would match the ethnic. Some of these peoples would be Roman Catholic, others Anglican, and still others non-conformists of various types. In an English setting, such a situation seems fantastic. And yet this preservation of ethnic groups through the centuries is precisely what has happened in the Balkans.25

23 Mazower, The Balkans, 48.

24 Mazower, The Balkans, 54. For a similarly favorable assessment of the Ottoman system in comparison to contemporary developments in Western Europe, at least during the first two centuries of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, see Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, Chapter 6.

25 Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, 13.
Nevertheless, “coexistence did not mean toleration,”26 and a competing school of thought sees more conflict and less coexistence in Balkan history. Cathie Carmichael, for instance, has called the Ottoman *millet* system a form of religious apartheid,27 which certainly does not conjure up images of a tolerant multiconfessional society. Indeed, upon closer examination the issue is more complicated than either school of thought admits. Although many authors have claimed that there was no serious evidence of “ancient ethnic hatreds” between Albanians and Slavs prior to the twentieth century, the claim is debatable. Outsiders’ accounts of the Balkans in the 19th century, for instance, tended to stress the “hatred” between the different ethnoconfessional groups, and especially, the “fanaticism” of the Moslem ruling classes there. Traveling through these parts at the turn of the 20th century, Mary Edith Durham would note that the Albanian “believes that his is the oldest thing in the Balkan peninsula—it was his before the coming of the Slav or Turk, and he hates each with a bitter Balkan hatred.”28 Evidence of this can be found in the words of one Albanian epic poem:

As always, Albanian and Slav  
Were at blood since a tragic fate  
Placed fire and gunpowder side by side.  
Placed side by side Albania and Montenegro!29

Along similar lines, Milovan Djilas, as keen an observer of Balkan history and politics as any, would note that “the hatred between the Orthodox and the Moslems in these parts is primeval.”30


In Bosnia, Ivo Andrić similarly was an adherent of the view that there was an almost primordial hatred between the different ethnoconfessional groups, as expressed in his short story, *The Woman from Sarajevo*:

Adherents of the three main faiths, they hate each other, from birth to death, senselessly and profoundly, carrying that hatred even into the afterlife, which they imagine as glory and triumph for themselves, and shame and defeat for their infidel neighbor. They are born, grow and die in this hatred, this truly physical revulsion for their neighbor of different faith, frequently their whole life passes without their having an opportunity to express their hatred in its full force and horror; but whenever the established order of things is shaken by some important event, and reason and the law are suspended for a few hours or days, then this mob, or rather a section of it, finding at last an adequate motive, overflows into the town, which is otherwise known for the polished cordiality of its social life and its polite speech.\(^{31}\)

Indeed, in contrast to portrayals popular in the 1990s of historically cordial interethnic relations among Bosnia & Herzegovina’s peoples, perhaps the most common byword used by 19\(^{th}\) century visitors to the Balkans to describe the attitudes of the Muslim ruling classes in Bosnia was “fanatic.” Charles Pertusier, a Frenchmen traveling through Bosnia in 1822, claimed that “the Muslim takes his faith to the most extreme form of fanaticism.”\(^{32}\) Leopold von Ranke, the great nineteenth century German historian of the Balkans, would claim that “Sarayevo was considered the focus of fanaticism” of Bosnia’s Muslim ruling class; quite a different perspective from contemporary portrayals of Sarajevo (and Bosnia-Herzegovina by extension) as a multicultural paradise.\(^{33}\)

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\(^{31}\) See Andrić, “The Woman from Sarajevo,” as quoted by Andrew Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 166.

\(^{32}\) As quoted by Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, 106.

\(^{33}\) Von Ranke, *History of Servia and the Servian Revolution*, 319. As late as 1871, an attempt to build a bell tower for the Serb church in Sarajevo drew such protests amongst conservative Muslims that Russian diplomats raised the issue with the Ottoman sultan. A few years later, among the demands of a Muslim revolt against the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia in 1878 were the imposition of Islamic canon law (shariat) law in Bosnia, a ban on bells in churches, and the dismissal of all Christian officials in Ottoman service. Donia, *Sarajevo: A Biography*, 34, 40. Despite the views of such Europeans traveling through the Balkans at this time, Robert Donia argues that “The
Hungary, “the free, warlike, and fanatic Moslem peasantry . . . engaged in frequent plunder raids into Austrian territory.” By the mid-nineteenth century, a typical European view of the conditions in the Balkans claimed that for the Christian rayah,

The fanaticism of their Moslem rulers is so strongly opposed to every attempt of the Servians and Bulgarians to form educational institutions, and even to acquire the elements of Christian knowledge, that it is only by a foreign intervention—not the less effectual for being of a peaceful kind—that the means and opportunities so earnestly desired by the Christian population of these countries can be afforded them.

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34 See Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881, 128. It is important to bear in mind the historical legacy of distrust and bitterness such constant raiding and plundering (by both Christians and Muslims) must have had on the peoples in these regions, as such repeated actions over years and decades always resulted in livestock stolen, homes destroyed, and lives lost. In just one raid in the summer of 1836, for instance, Rothenberg points out that over 600 individuals were killed on both sides, Muslim and Christian. Such raids were taking place on an almost yearly basis for most of the 1830s. Along these lines, it is also worth noting that, in attempting to put down the first Serbian rebellion (1804-1813), the Ottoman authorities mainly used Bosnian Muslim forces (Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 27). Francine Friedman claims that there were at least 132 military conflicts between Ottoman/Bosnian Muslim forces on the one side, and Habsburg armies composed of Croats, Montenegrins, Slovenes, and Serbs on the other. The result of both such constant warfare and the unequal socio-economic status of Muslims as landlords and Christians (Croats and Serbs) as landbound tenant farmers was, according to Friedman, “The Christian peasants . . . hated the local Muslim landlords because of their exploitative practices and because they represented whichever empire currently dominated at the local level.” See Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation, 75. In terms of the fluidity of borders in the region, it is also important to remember that in the early nineteenth century, Bosnian Muslims controlled six nahiye (Ottoman administrative districts) on the right bank of the Drina River, i.e., in today’s Serbia proper.

35 See Henry G. Bohn’s preface to the English edition of Leopold von Ranke’s History of Servia and the Servian Revolution (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853), vi. Robert Donia reports that to the foreign consuls in Sarajevo during the brief uprising against the Habsburg occupation in 1878, “the movement leaders were religious fanatics, driven to irrational behavior by their hatred of non-Muslims.” Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 54. Glenny strikes a somewhat different note, admitting that while “By the end of the nineteenth century, chronic poverty, strained social relations, arbitrary official cruelty and bitter resentment towards Istanbul flowed through the Ottoman Empire like poisoned blood, but no other province could match Bosnia and Herzegovina for the severity of its symptoms” at the same time, “nationalism was probably the least important force pushing Bosnia steadily towards centre stage in the Balkan drama.” Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 73. Nevertheless, it bears noting that many international observers during this period, such as Habsburg foreign minister Gyula Andrásy (admittedly for perhaps self-interested reasons) were already at this time claiming that internal divisions within Bosnian society, coupled with the ambitions of regional neighbors, made it extremely difficult to survive as an independent entity. See Robin Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 1.
The ability of religion to create deep cleavages between groups speaking the same language was also obvious at this time. In northern Albania, as the French consul in Shkodra in the mid-nineteenth century, Hyacinthe Hecquard, reported,

Oppressed because of their fanaticism, or possibly fanatical because of their oppression, the Catholics of Shkodra seem to have been singled out for grievous measures. They were forbidden to build a wall around the cemetery. Situated as it was outside the city, Muslim hoodlums delighted in enraging the Catholics by breaking or overturning the headstones, sometimes even exhuming dead bodies. The intimidated Christians did not dare to make complaints, and the government took no punitive measures.  

Similar anti-Christian fanaticism was evident in Kosovo at the time as well. Historically, one of the earliest manifestations of Albanian nationalism in the Balkans was the League of Prizren, founded in 1878, which attracted delegates from Kosovo as well as from northern Albania and Macedonia, and whose goal was to unite four Albanian-populated Ottoman administrative units encompassing territory in present day Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo into one entity.  

According to the British Consul General in northern Albania at this time,  

Prizren, let me tell you, is the headquarters of the Albanian League, an organization of the most fanatical Mussulmen of the country. These men are now worked up to a high pitch of religious zeal, and hatred of the Christians. Prizren is, with perhaps the exception of Mecca, the most dangerous spot for Christians in all Mohammedan countries.  

Further north, such ethnoconfessionally-based xenophobia was also apparent in relations between Croats and Serbs in Croatia-Slavonia. Although it is commonly claimed that there were no serious outbreaks of Croat-Serb violence until the 20th century, deeper historical analysis

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reveals a relationship that was at the least antagonistic for centuries. The rights and privileges granted to the Serb population in the voina krajina (military frontier) of the Austrian Empire, an institution created at the beginning of the 16th century, proved to be an almost perpetual source of animosity between the Serbs in this region and Croatia’s nobility and clerical circles. For Croatia’s nobility, the voina krajina represented what they considered to be the administrative expropriation of large amounts of territory traditionally considered part of Croatia (and hence part of their estates). Exacerbating the problem was the fact that in the effort to protect their rights and privileges, the population of the voina krajina consistently stressed its loyalty to the Habsburg throne rather than to the Croatian Sabor. For Croatia’s Catholic authorities, meanwhile, the existence of this large Orthodox population constituted the existence of a large and in some ways even favored schismatic community of heretics in their midst. Consequently, since the 16th century, Croatian clerical authorities repeatedly engaged in various efforts to convert the Serbs to Catholicism, or at least to Uniatism. Thus, for centuries, the Serb population of these areas was seen as a type of disloyal fifth column to Croat state, political, and religious interests—and sometimes even worse.39

Croats and Serbs in Bosnia & Herzegovina, for their part, clearly nurtured an understanding that their relative lack of development was due to their inferior position in the Ottoman system. As the Serb journalist Risto Radulović would note in 1913:

39 For a sustained analysis of these issues, see Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatian, 1740-1881: A Study of an Imperial Institution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). Consider, for instance, the views of Ante Starčević, one of the leading Croatian politicians in the latter half of the 19th century: “[The Serbs] are a race of slaves, beasts worse than any. There are three levels of human perfection: that of the animal, that of comprehension, and that of reason. Slavo-Serbs have not quite reached the first level, and cannot rise above it . . . “As quoted by Srdjan Trifković, “The First Yugoslavia and the Origins of Croatian Separatism,” East European Quarterly XXXVI (September 1992), 365. According to Trifković, the political philosophy of Starčević’s Party of Rights “may be connected in a direct line of development with the Ustaša movement, three generations later.”
Nonetheless, there is something unfinished, incomplete, empty . . . We feel all of us at every moment in collective and individual life, that for many centuries we have been cut off in obscurity from the entire world, because choked under the yoke of a nation incapable of culture, a state which had as its basis inequality—social injustice . . . centuries in which we could take no step forward, while other nations free and less encumbered, laboured intensively and advanced in progress . . . Entering the wealth of their cultures and creativity of their spirit, we feel like beggars in a palace.\footnote{40}

In view of the above, there is clearly considerable evidence that the problems in inter-ethnoconfessional relations in the Balkans have a much deeper historical context than much contemporary scholarship grants. Despite such evidence, however, while it is clear that ethnic hatreds did exist to some extent in the region, they cannot in and of themselves be considered sufficient conditions for the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, or for the outbreak of interethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The French and the Germans, of course, had a long mutual history of conflict, yet (at least since 1945) have been able to overcome this history. As Andrew Wachtel has noted,

\begin{quote}
Ancient hatreds were undoubtedly present, but they are not sufficient for understanding systematic, large-scale violence in the Balkans, or elsewhere for that matter. To be sure, there was always a certain amount of tension present among the various South Slav groups, but there were few instances of widespread violent conflict among them in Yugoslavia’s history or pre-history. Indeed, at least as far as Serbs and Croats are concerned (and it is their inability to get along that was ultimately fatal), there is little evidence of such hatred before the second half of the nineteenth century . . . [and] even in later periods one finds at least as much evidence of Serb-Croat cooperation as of animosity . . . The point is that if potentials for mutual enmity can be found in almost any country, they have little or no explanatory power in and of themselves.\footnote{41}
\end{quote}

The fundamental point that interethnic tensions can be found in any society, and that the presence of such tensions alone do not explain mass violence in the Balkans, is certainly right.\footnote{42}

\footnote{40}As cited by Robin Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 228.

\footnote{41}Wachtel, \textit{Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation}, 14-15.

\footnote{42}James Fearon and David Laitin make a similar point, noting that theories of ethnic conflict based on past tensions between groups, narratives of blame, or the possibility that one ethnic group may potentially be a threat to another
Large scale forced expulsions and massacres do not occur spontaneously; they result from decisions made and orders given by political and military elites. As Mazower notes,

“Ethnic cleansing”—whether in the Balkans in 1912-1913, in Anatolia in 1921-1922, or in erstwhile Yugoslavia in 1991-1995—was not, then, the spontaneous eruption of primeval hatreds but the deliberate use of organized violence against civilians by paramilitary squads and army units; it represented the extreme force required by nationalists to break apart a society that was otherwise capable of ignoring the mundane fractures of class and ethnicity.43

In sum, while the imagery of “ancient ethnic hatreds” as some strong, irrational force (e.g., the “Balkan Ghosts” of Robert Kaplan’s well known and influential book) should be seen as an exaggeration, neither can it be rejected outright, or be reduced to economic inequalities in Ottoman Balkan societies. The Ottoman Empire, as will be seen in Chapter III, clearly discriminated against non-Muslims in a range of political, judicial, religious, cultural, and economic ways, leading to repeated insurrections and uprisings on the part of the empire’s Christian communities. Underestimating the importance of the transfer of these memories and experiences from one Balkan generation to the next significantly distorts one’s understanding of Balkan social and political life. This underestimation, in turn, distorts one’s understanding of political possibilities in the region, leading to overly optimistic beliefs about the bases on which one can construct “multiethnic” polities and societies in the region, as well as to underestimations about the resources and time needed to construct such polities and societies.

III. Ethnoconfessional Identities and Divisions in the 19th Century

In contrast to the contemporary social science view that identities are fluid and contextual, social identities in mixed areas of Bosnia and Croatia by the 19th century seemed anything but.

group tend to overpredict the potential for such violence. See Fearon and Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 90 (December 1996), 715-735.

43 Mazower, The Balkans, 148.
There were numerous legal proscriptions in this regard; for instance, it was strictly forbidden, under penalty of death, for a Muslim to convert to Christianity under Ottoman law. In Bosnia, although there had been a limited number of conversions to Islam in the early periods of Ottoman rule, they probably numbered fewer than commonly believed. A census of the Ottoman provinces in Europe conducted from 1520-30 suggests that less than ten percent of the indigenous Christian population of these regions had converted to Islam, after over eighty years of Ottoman rule.\footnote{\textsuperscript{44} The estimate is derived from Speros Vryonis, Jr., “Religious Changes and Patterns in the Balkans, 14\textsuperscript{th}-16\textsuperscript{th} Centuries,” in Henrik Birnbaum and Speros Vryonis, Jr., eds. Aspects of the Balkans: Continuity and Change (The Hague-Paris: Mouton, 1972), as cited by Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804, 50-51. Sugar (54-55) argues that in Europe, “conversion was limited pretty much to certain elements who had never understood or practiced their faith correctly and for whom, therefore, apostasy was less a question of belief than of convenience.”}

By the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, conversions from one faith to another were \textit{extraordinarily} rare; one estimate suggests that around the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, in a population of over 1,570,000 people there were only twenty-five conversions per year.\footnote{\textsuperscript{45} As cited by Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 267. Around the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the Catholic Church registered gaining 93 adherents through conversion over a ten year period and losing 118; for the Islamic community, 44 individuals became Muslims and 65 Muslims became Christians, while the Serbian Orthodox Church registered gaining 88 new converts and losing 46. Similarly, Mark Mazower notes that “American Protestant missionaries in the 1820s printed more than a million tracts and educated scores of young boys at a cost of a quarter of a million dollars—all for three conversions.” Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History, 76. In earlier periods, however, under duress and persecution, conversions were probably more frequent. Mazower, for instance, also cites an account claiming that the persecution of Roman Catholics in the Drina river valley in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century had led many of the local inhabitants to convert to Islam. Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History, 47.}

Mixed marriages were “foreign to Bosnian society as it emerged from the Ottoman Empire, in which there was strict communal endogamy.”\footnote{\textsuperscript{46} Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 375. High rates of confessional endogamous marriages are not a uniquely Balkan phenomenon, of course; in the territories comprising modern-day Germany, for instance, even into the nineteenth century “it was uncommon, if not completely unheard of, to marry across religious borders; Protestants marry Protestants, Catholic marry Catholics.” See Falck, Heblich, Lameli, et. al., “Dialects, Cultural Identity, and Economic Exchange,” 10.}

When theater groups began to be founded in Bosnia during the Habsburg period, Muslims refused to play non-Muslims,\footnote{\textsuperscript{47} Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 240.} and Muslim groups also
demanded that Muslim supervisors be appointed to supervise Muslim factory workers.\textsuperscript{48} Different ethnoconfessional groups in Bosnia were even allegedly unable to understand each other’s artistic achievements; for instance, Smail Balić has argued that the Christian peasant masses in Bosnia were unable to comprehend Bosnian Muslim romantic poetry and ballads because of their primitive living conditions.\textsuperscript{49} In the latter half of the nineteenth century, as Bosnia’s ethnoconfessional groups slowly began to found literary and cultural publications, “Intellectual initiatives developed on independent confessional lines, \textit{as if without question.}”\textsuperscript{50} As late as 1910, the economic division of Bosnian society along ethnoconfessional lines was remarkable. As Aydin Babuna notes,

\begin{quote}
According to the statistics of 1910, 91.15\% of the landowners with kmets (tenants), 70.62\% of the landowners without kmets and 56.65\% of the free peasants were Muslim. Only 4.58\% of the kmets were Muslim while 73.92\% of them were Orthodox and 21.49\% Catholic. \textit{In a society with this social structure it was extremely difficult to separate religious rights from economic ones. The rights of the landowners meant Muslim rights and the rights of the kmets meant Christian rights.} Given these circumstances it was not difficult for the Muslim landowners to incite the religious feelings of their co-religionists in order to protect their own economic interests.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

Political reforms in Bosnia during this period paid due respect to ethnoconfessional divisions, and followed the ethnoconfessional key; thus, when administrative reforms were adopted in

\textsuperscript{48} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 107.

\textsuperscript{49} See Balić, \textit{Kultura Bošnjaka}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition (Tuzla, PP “R&R,” 1994), 41.

\textsuperscript{50} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 24. To this one could add military initiatives as well. When resistance to the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia & Herzegovina erupted in 1878, the units “were segregated by confession: each unit drew volunteers from a single religious community, and units subsequently dispatched [from Sarajevo] were likewise segregated.” See Donia, \textit{Sarajevo: A Biography}, 49.

\textsuperscript{51} Aydin Babuna, “The Bosnian Muslims and Albanians: Islam and Nationalism,” \textit{Nationalities Papers} 32 (June 2004), 292. Emphasis added. This is not to suggest that Christians were any kinder to their fellow Christians when given similar opportunities to exploit the peasantry. One Russian traveler in the Balkans in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Alexander Gilferding, would note that “Many Orthodox traders buy up the right to collect the tithe . . . and woe betide those peasants who fall into their hands: the Orthodox traders plunder them worse than the Muslims.” As cited by Glenny, \textit{The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers}, 103.
1865, in the regional council for Bosnia, each of Bosnia’s seven districts was allowed four seats, two for Muslims, and two for non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{52} The Habsburg occupation regime of BiH continued using the ethnoconfessional key in determining the allocation of governmental positions; thus, the Sarajevo City Council formed in August 1878 consisted of six Serb Orthodox members, five Muslims, four Jews, and three Croat Catholics. Sarajevo’s city council statute adopted in 1882 continued the tradition of appointments to the council based on confession.\textsuperscript{53} The tradition continued with the formation of the new Bosnian parliament (Sabor) in 1910, in which “electoral districts were segregated by confession, and ethnonational quotas were built into the parliament’s composition.”\textsuperscript{54} Students in Bosnia at this time “organized primarily according to religious or national affiliations and most frequently separately, for one set of events motivated Serb students and other motivated Croat students. There were common undertakings, but rarely and with few participants.”\textsuperscript{55} Indeed, ethnic divisions among the peoples of Bosnia & Herzegovina were so firmly drawn by the beginning of the 20th century that even financial institutions were divided along ethnoconfessional lines, with the creation of banks such as the “Prva muslimanska banka” (i.e., the “First Muslim Bank”) in Brčko, the “Hrvatska trgovačka banka i štedionica” (the “Croatian Commercial and Savings Bank”) in Livno, and the “Prva srpska štedionica” (the “First Serbian Savings Bank”) in Prijedor.\textsuperscript{56} According to one estimate, by 1908, Muslims had registered some 124 different associations or societies; every

\textsuperscript{52} Donia, \textit{Sarajevo: A Biography}, 35.

\textsuperscript{53} Donia, \textit{Sarajevo: A Biography}, 74.


\textsuperscript{56} See Peter Sugar, \textit{The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1878-1918} (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1963), 242-43.
single one of them carried the prefix “muslimanska.” In Civil Croatia and the vojna krajina as well, financial institutions were often segregated and seen as important resources for ethnoconfessional survival; thus,

These institutions were viewed by their founders as ammunition in a battle to maintain the nation . . . a concentrated effort to build a network of loan agencies, cooperatives, banks, and educational initiatives directed at the Serbian farmer was mounted at the end of the nineteenth century in Croatia, and its inspiration was indeed the belief that Serbs needed support in order to nurture the nation’s consciousness.

What was not clear to many of the creators of the original South Slav state in 1918, but would become increasingly so after the various peoples of Yugoslavia had entered the new state, was that Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims had entered the new entity with firmly established identities; thus,

By the end of the nineteenth century, if not long before, it appeared almost inconceivable that a Croat could be anything but Catholic, that a Serb could be anything but Orthodox, and the rival claims made upon the Muslims could not conceal the fact that Islam likewise had come to define an ethnocultural identity.

In what would have even more ominous implications for the future, by the 1870s (if not earlier), Croat-Serb relations had started to deteriorate and serious interethnic animosities were already visible just beneath the surface of civil and political life. Contemporary observers of Croat-Serb relations in mid-nineteenth century Croatia-Slavonia did not see the two groups as being exceptionally close; the writer Fran Kurelac, for instance, described the ethnic distance between the two groups at this time in the following way: “If each [Serb or Croat] threw his own

57 Filandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, 16.
58 Miller, Between Nation and State, 23.
beef into a pot, even the soup would not mix.”\textsuperscript{61} Many Croats at this time objected to the large
degree of religious and educational autonomy Serbs in Croatia-Slavonia and the \textit{vojna krajina}
enjoyed, as, for instance, guaranteed in Hungarian Law IX of 1868.\textsuperscript{62} The main Croatian political
party of the period, the Party of Right, or \textit{frankovci}, refused to allow the use of the word “Serb”
as either a noun or a qualifier in the Croatian Sabor.\textsuperscript{63} In Zagreb in September 1902, the Serbian
newspaper \textit{Srbobran} reprinted an article from a Belgrade journal which had belittled Croat
history and national character, and argued that eventually all Croats would be assimilated by the
Serbs. Large-scale riots (involving by some estimates 20,000 people) ensued, with mobs
attacking Serb homes, businesses and other institutions. The rioting was only quelled after three
days when martial law was declared.\textsuperscript{64} Such an outpouring of violence based on one newspaper
article seems difficult to reconcile with the claim that there was a healthy basis to Croat-Serb
relations. As Stjepan Radić would almost prophetically note in the aftermath of the September
riots, “everything around us . . . testifies that the battle is leading to extermination, yours and
ours.”\textsuperscript{65} Attempts at Croat-Serb collaboration during this period were fragile and short-lived. The

\textsuperscript{61} As cited by Ivan Cvitković, \textit{Hrvatski identitet u Bosni i Hercegovini}, 89.


\textsuperscript{63} Miller, \textit{Between Nation and State}, 102. The \textit{frankovci} would consistently exhibit an extreme, violent attitude
toward the Serb population in Croatia. According to Miller, Josip Frank argued that “Serbs [were] traitors to the
Croatian state idea: the Serbian name was unheard of until recently; the Serbian Orthodox church had always been
the Greek-Eastern church; Cyrillic had not been used by those Greek-Easterners until recently; when a special name
was used for this population, it was called Vlach, not Serb.” Miller, \textit{Between Nation and State}, 128. During World
War II, Ante Pavelić’s Ustaša movement adopted many of these views.

\textsuperscript{64} Miller, \textit{Between Nation and State}, 53-54. The assassination of Habsburg Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo
on 28 June 1914 resulted in similar anti-Serb riots. Thus, “The assassination deeply divided Sarajevans along
ethnonational lines . . . His assassination led angry Croats and Muslims in Sarajevo to engage in violent anti-Serb
demonstrations . . . the crowd directed its anger principally at Serb shops in the marketplace and at the residences of
prominent Serbs . . . Photos and government reports indicate that the demonstrators commanded widespread support
among Sarajevo’s non-Serbs . . . The stern Austro-Hungarian ultimatum delivered to the Kingdom of Serbia on July
23 evoked further rallies by Croats and Muslims elated with the empire’s belligerence toward Serbia.” See Donia,

\textsuperscript{65} As cited by Miller, \textit{Between Nation and State}, 59.
Croat-Serb coalition in the Croatia Diet, formed in the autumn of 1910 to coordinate agrarian reform, already fell apart in the spring of 1911 due to disagreements over what to call the common language.66

**IV: Interwar Yugoslavia**

On December 1st, 1918, the heir to the Serbian throne, Crown Prince Alexander Karadjordjević proclaimed the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in Belgrade. Alexander’s proclamation was the culmination of decades of debates and discussion among South Slav intellectual and political elites, primarily Croat and Serb, on the benefits of such unification. By the end of World War I, South Slav unification seemed to have become a generally popular idea. Many of the South Slavs’ leading intellectuals and cultural luminaries supported the idea of Yugoslav unity.67 In 1918, the Habsburg commander of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stefan Sarkotić, estimated that by August 60 percent of the population had been “infected with the Yugoslav idea,”68 and Alexander’s proclamation “was greeted by waves of celebrations all over the territory of Yugoslavia.”69

It soon became apparent, however, that support for Yugoslavia’s creation was broad but not deep; according to Charles Jelavich, “The immediate euphoria surrounding the formation of the

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66 Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, 190.

67 As Aleksa Dijlas would note, “the greatest people in our history were pro-Yugoslav oriented. Andrić, Krleža, Meštrović, Tesla, Pupin, Mažuranić, Njegoš, Štrosmajer, Rački . . .” See Mirjana Kalezić, ed. *Razgovori za Jugoslaviju* (Novi Sad: Prometej, 1993), 166. On the other hand, as Stjepan Radić once said, for the South Slavs, “our greatest misfortune is that hitherto we have not had great politicians, economists, and philosophers, instead of great historians and philologists.” As quoted by Biondich, *Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization*, 47. There were, however, some important exceptions to this intellectual support for the Yugoslav idea. Bosniacs, for instance, did not participate in the country’s creation in any meaningful way and “did not feel it to be a satisfactory resolution of their interests.” Filandra, *Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću*, 54.

68 As cited by Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 108.

kingdom on December 1, 1918, did not extend through the end of the month,”70 and by the end of the 1920s, Yugoslavia was in “an almost perpetual political crisis.”71 As an ideology, Yugoslavism did not have widespread acceptance amongst the general populace, for it appealed “to idealists, but not to those who had to deal with the realities of the South Slav world . . . South Slav unity or Yugoslavism was at its best . . . a remote vision.”72 Yugoslavism’s “principal pool” of active proponents came mostly from Croatia’s “intellectual class”--clergy, officials, soldiers, artists and students--which by 1910 numbered only some 16,000 people, barely one percent of Croatia-Slavonia’s population at the time. Conversely, Ante Starčević’s Croatian nationalist Party of Right drew most of its support from the considerably larger Croatian petite bourgeoisie, composed primarily of small-scale retailers and tradesman,73 and in many segments of Croatian society there were “strong elements of ultranationalism and outright Serbophobia.”74

70 Charles Jelavich, “South Slav Education,” 98.

71 Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 41.

72 See Jelavich, South Slav Nationalisms: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union Before 1914 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1990), 272-273. Robin Okey would likewise say that “The Yugoslavism of 1914 was conceived between youthful members of two ill-matched families on little acquaintance and brought to term prematurely by extraordinary events. It cannot bear the historic weight which was later put upon it.” See Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 216. Indeed, “Yugoslavist” student movements in pre-WWI Bosnia were divided between the differing visions of Croat and Serb students, the former seeing Zagreb as the center of a future South Slav state, and the latter. See Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 113.

73 Dennison Rusinow, “The Yugoslav Idea before Yugoslavia,” in Dejan Djokić, ed., Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992 (Madison, Wi.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 13-15. As Vladko Maček would note on the tenth anniversary of Yugoslavia’s founding on 1 December 1928, “The Croat Peasant Party, and with it the entire Croat people, never celebrated December 1, because the entire act of December 1, 1918, was brought about without the approval of the Croat people by a numerically small intelligentsia, which was regrettably so distant from the people, that it did not even bother to consider the people’s disposition.” As quoted by Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 243. According to Lenard Cohen, “the majority of Croatian citizens and political activists at the turn of the century still viewed Serbia with suspicion and generally believed that any rhetorical commitment to the Yugoslav idea emanating from Belgrade was cloak for Serbia’s territorial ambitions.” See Cohen, Broken Bonds, 9.

74 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 7. The founder of the Party of Right, Ante Starčević, would have an important role in Croatian political thought. As Biondich notes, “he shaped an entire generation of Croatian youth in Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.” See Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 14.
Even those Croats most sympathetic to the Yugoslav idea, such as Cardinal Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Franjo Rački, “though prepared to work towards Yugoslav cultural unity and to recognize the ‘genetic’ distinctiveness of the Serbs and Slovenes, they nevertheless laid claim to Croatia’s historic state right to virtually all of the South Slav territories of the Habsburg monarchy, which they wanted federalized.”

A similar situation obtained in other parts of the future state. In Bosnia on the eve of World War I, even among Yugoslav oriented young Muslims, “the social force of Muslim specificity led Muslim groups to operate apart, so that Serbophiles or Croatophiles formed their own student groups rather than joining Serb or Croat ones.”

Significantly, Yugoslavism “did not really catch on among Serbs,” either in the Habsburg empire, or in Serbia proper; according to Stevan K. Pavlowitch, “The memories and myths of medieval Serbia were too strong among the Habsburgs Orthodox South Slavs. In Belgrade, there was little need for the Illyrian-Yugoslav vision, and a reluctance to give up a name upheld by Serbia’s rising statehood.”

When Serbs did accept it, it was largely because they saw it as a version of a pan-Serbianism; thus, the historical yearning of the diasporic Serbian communities for closer cultural and political ties with their ethnic brethren in ‘Serbia proper” . . . support for various ‘Pan-Yugoslav’ notions was closely linked to the idea of ‘Pan-Serbianism’ or interregional Serbian solidarity.

Numerous problems plagued the country from the outset. Widespread violence was the most immediate; armed protests, in some areas verging on civil war, erupted in many parts of the new

75 Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 8.

76 Robin Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism: The Habsburg ‘Civilizing Mission’ in Bosnia, 1878-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 244.


78 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 127.
state, including Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Sandžak, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Politically, the problems of unification and integration were manifested by frequent changes of government, and fierce debate over the new state’s fundamental structure: was it to be a centralized kingdom, or a multinational federation? The debate over this question was played out between the different ethnoconfessional groups in the fight over the new country’s constitution. The vast majority of Serbs, viewing the new state as the culmination of a century of struggle for unification and the liberation of the South Slavs in different empires, and brimming with confidence in their successful, independent state and military institutions, viewed the new state simply as a geographical extension of the pre-WWI Kingdom of Serbia; as Cohen notes, “Obsessed with the idea of liberating subjected Serbs, nearly all segments of the Serbian elite—including many who flirted with Yugoslavism—had little tolerance for the idea of democratic compromise among the South Slavs.” Many Habsburg Serbs supported this centralized vision for the new state; for instance, the most important Serb politician from Croatia, Svetozar Pribićević, supported “a centralized regime that would secure the position of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs.”

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79 Charles Jelavich points out that in its first decade of existence, “when political stability was most essential, the kingdom had seven prime ministers and twenty-four cabinet reorganizations, an average of one every five months.” See Jelavich, “South Slav Education,” 99.

80 The debate had in fact started even during the negotiations between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee as World War I was still being fought. Moreover, the individuals comprising the Yugoslav Committee were not representative of the Habsburg areas as a whole; as John Allcock notes, “The ‘Yugoslav Committee’ itself, for instance, which issued the Corfu Declaration, was not a formally constituted and accountable body but an impromptu collection of individuals brought together by shared common concern. They were emphatically not a government in exile. What is more, they were a highly skewed collection of Croatian political opinion, with, for example, a heavy over-representation of Dalmatians.” See Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 226-27.

81 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 7.

82 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 136. Djokić says Pribićević was during this period a “among the staunchest centralists.” See Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 43.
The other South Slavs, however, envisioned a different kind of state. Both the Croats and the Slovenes supported various forms of federation or even confederation. In January 1924, Stjepan Radić produced a plan for a south Slav confederation of states called “the Yugoslav Union,” symbolically represented by the Karadjordjević dynasty. Within such a confederation, Croatia would have its own constitution, parliament, and membership in the League of Nations. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Vojvodina would get similar levels of autonomy.\(^{83}\) The main Croatian proposal put forth for the organization of the state was likened to “the American Confederation of 1781-1787.”\(^{84}\) Although the Slovenes, “enthusiastically supported the creation of the new state,” their support was due at least in part to threats coming from Italy and Austria, and the lack of any regret for the passing of the Habsburg empire.\(^{85}\) The main Slovene political party of this era, the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS), led by Monsignor Anton Korošec, supported a confederal organization of the country.\(^{86}\) The Bosniacs played practically no role in the creation of Yugoslavia and “did not feel it to be a satisfactory resolution of their interests.”\(^{87}\) Their primary aim throughout the interwar period was to struggle for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territorial unity.

\(^{83}\) Biondich, *Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization*, 193. Pointing to the chronic nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism, Franjo Tudjman would propose many of the same ideas in 1991. In another historical parallel, it has also been argued that what Radić really wanted was a position for Croatia similar to what Hungary had in the Dual Monarchy. See Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 124.

\(^{84}\) Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 127.


\(^{86}\) Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 136.

\(^{87}\) Filandra, *Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću*, 54. Paradoxically, however, Xavier Bougarel adds that, “Bosnian Muslims hardly contributed to the formulation of the Yugoslav idea, but they had probably been the last among the Yugoslav nations who sincerely held onto it.” See Bougarel, “Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea,” in Djokić, op. cit., 100.
The complexity of problems such as the country’s organization or what to do about Bosnia-Herzegovina were such that “even genuine advocates of the Yugoslav idea would find little common ground.”\(^88\) Two years of political debate over these issues ended in a pyrrhic victory for the Serbian vision of a centralized state. Due in part to a refusal by Radić’s Croatian Peasant Party to participate in the work of the Constituent Assembly for the new constitution, what would become known as the Vidovdan Constitution of 1921 resulted in what was considered “a framework for centralization. This was to be a state dominated by the monarch, the Belgrade ministries, and Serbian political leaders.”\(^89\)

Ratification of the Vidovdan Constitution ran predominantly along ethnoconfessional lines: the two primary Serb parties in the constituent assembly, the Radicals and the Democrats, cast 176 votes in favor of the constitution, and they were joined by eleven ethnic Croats and three Slovenes. On the other hand, the 158 members of Radic’s Croatian Peasant Party abstained from the vote, as did 27 members of the Slovenian People’s Party. Twenty-one delegates from the Serbian Agrarian Party voted against the constitution.\(^90\) The obvious ethnoconfessional imbalance in the support for the Vidovdan Constitution and the new state’s structure wound up satisfying few of the new kingdom’s constituents and would haunt interwar Yugoslavia throughout its brief existence; the smaller South Slav ethnic groups, such as the Montenegrins and the Macedonians, and non-Slavic minorities such as the Albanians or the Hungarians, “received no constitutional recognition at all, let alone any de facto influence on

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\(^{88}\) Cohen, Broken Bonds, 7.

\(^{89}\) Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 121.

\(^{90}\) Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 125.
decisionmaking,” and “the three-nation monopoly officially directing the new state fell far short of the pan-Yugoslav ideology embraced by earlier generations of Croatian-Slovenian idealists while also managing to offend the several unrecognized ‘tribal’ components of the new kingdom.” Ivo Banac goes so far as to claim that “the first Yugoslav state failed, not in 1941 when it disintegrated, but in 1921 with the adoption of the centralist constitution.”

An analysis of party voting by ethnicity during the 1920s reveals how strong the tendency was towards what Ramet called “the prominence of ethnocentrism in political choice.” Thus, in elections to the Skupština in 1923, of 155 parliamentarians who had declared themselves as Serbs, 146 voted for the three main Serbian parties. Of the 93 individuals who declared themselves as Croats, 68 voted for the Croatian Republican Peasants Party (HRSS), and a further 17 voted for the Yugoslav Muslim Organization. Of the 22 people who declared themselves as Slovenes, 21 voted for the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS). The 1927 parliamentary election produced similar results. With specific regard to the Bosnian Muslims,

Throughout the era of royal Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Muslims displayed remarkable political cohesion by voting in overwhelming numbers for the Yugoslav Muslim Organization. Although three other Muslim parties sought votes in the 1920 election to the Constituent Assembly, together they garnered less than 2% of that vote and soon disappeared from the scene. The number of

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91 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 15.

92 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 15.


94 See the tables provided by Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 159. Such ethnocentrism in political choice would continue into the 1930s; for instance, in the last pre-World War II elections to the Skupština, the SLS won 78.7 percent of the Slovène vote. See Velikonja, “Slovenia’s Yugoslav Century,” 88. In the December 1938 Yugoslav parliamentary elections, Vladko Maček’s HSS won 767,000 of 799,000 Croat votes. See Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 187. By 1925, Mark Biondich has estimated that Radić’s HRSS was getting eight out of every ten Croat votes in Yugoslavia. See Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 206.
votes for the YMO from one election to another varied by only 20% over seven years, a testimony to the solid foundation of Bosnian Muslim identity and the stability of Muslim voting patterns.\(^95\)

Ultimately, the Vidovdan Constitution could not solve the Kingdom’s problems, and the ethnic and political tensions of the 1920s culminated in 1926 when a Montenegrin parliamentary deputy shot Radić in the National Assembly. (Radić died of his wounds two months later).\(^96\)

Efforts throughout the 1930s to promote Croat-Serb collaboration achieve only very limited successes. The United Opposition formed by Maček’s HSS and Serbian parties opposed to the dictatorship was in many ways only a formal collaboration; for instance, in the December 1938 elections the United Opposition did not issue a single joint manifesto.\(^97\) A final effort to resolve the Croatian problem in interwar Yugoslavia resulted in the Cvetković-Macek *Sporazum* (Agreement) of 1939.\(^98\) Importantly, the *Sporazum* adopted many of the institutional features that had been hallmarks of earlier attempts to deal with the national question. Most prominently, the *Sporazum* created a Banovina of Croatia, carved out of two primarily Croat-populated banovine from the 1931 system (the Savska and Primorska), to which were added large parts of western Herzegovina and parts of central Bosnia almost to the outskirts of Sarajevo.\(^99\) The Serbian


\(^96\) Charles Jelavich would claim that Radić’s assassination “ended whatever hope there may have been to reconcile the differences that had emerged between the Serbs and Croats, because now the Croatian electorate turned against the very concept of the Yugoslav state.” Jelavich, “South Slav Education,” 105.

\(^97\) Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*, 186.

\(^98\) Cvetković was at the time prime minister of the royal government, Maček was Radić’s successor as leader of the Croatian Peasant Party.

\(^99\) The *Sporazum* would have a significant influence on subsequent Croat ambitions in Bosnia-Herzegovina; as Donia and Fine note, “this territory was the object of Croatian nationalist demands in 1971 and again in 1992, when Hercegovenian Croats proclaimed the “Republic of Herceg-Bosna” and received military backing from the regime in Zagreb.” Donia and Fine, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed*, 132.
Orthodox Church protested publicly about the creation of the new Banovina Hrvatska and its inclusion of a large number of Serbs. The Croatian banovina was to be largely autonomous, having, for instance, its own parliament (the Sabor) with control over all administrative matters apart from defense, foreign policy, and international trade. Although the Sporazum brought Maček back into the government (accepting a position as vice-premier), “he understood his vice-premiership primarily as a position from which to fight for Croatian interests and only secondarily as one from which to participate in governing Yugoslavia.”

The Sporazum also represented the first official recognition that the Yugoslav “tribes” were not moving in the direction of some form of “national unity.” As Dejan Jović notes,

. . . while the idea of national unity foresaw that the differences between the individual Yugoslav tribes would weaken and a Yugoslav identity would strengthen, in 1939 it became clear that the opposite process was occurring. The devolutionary processes in relation to Croatia announced that the decentralizing trends were stronger than the centralizing ones. The direction away from centralism was exactly the opposite of the direction in which Germany and Italy had gone at the end of the 19th century.

Despite the fact that the sporazum was conceived of and implemented as an effort to achieve a compromise with the Croats, it had the effect of increasing Serb dissatisfaction with political arrangements in interwar Yugoslavia and increasing centrifugal tendencies within the country. Thus, “Soon after the Cvetković-Maček agreement, the Serbs began to unite around calls for a

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101 Djilas, The Contested Country, 130-131; Cohen, Broken Bonds, 18. Significantly, the devolution of greater powers and responsibilities to the Croatian banovina resulted in an upsurge of discrimination against the Serb population of the new entity, which at that point made up 25 percent of its population. In a harbinger of what would happen in 1941 and again in 1990-91, large numbers of Serbs were removed from positions in the civil service, schools, and police forces in the Croatian banovina. Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 244.

102 Jović, Jugoslavija—Država koja je odumrila, 112; see also Djokić, “(Dis)integrating Yugoslavia: King Alexander and Interwar Yugoslavism,” 153.
Serbian banovina, which, they argued, should include Serb-populated areas of the newly established autonomous Croatia. \(^{103}\) Nor did the sporazum seem to increase Croat acceptance of Yugoslavia or the Yugoslav ideal either. In January 1940, for instance, eleven new associations were formed on the territory of the Croatian banovina, most with “Croatian” as a prefix, and none with the word “Yugoslav.” In February 1940, eight new associations were formed, each with the prefix “Croatian.” \(^{104}\)

Interestingly, however, because of their ideological blinders, Yugoslav communists at the time of the unification seemed unable to recognize the importance of the national question in the new state. Thus, the April 1919 Congress of Unification of the various communist organizations on the territory of the new state “completely underestimated the importance of the national question for Yugoslav politics and for the future of the country, as well as for Communist revolutionary action. The majority of delegates did not even seem to be aware that the national question existed as a genuine problem . . . “\(^{105}\) Even the officially internationalist communists, however, could not ignore the importance of Yugoslavia’s ethnoconfessional problems for long. Thus, the CPY’s fourth party congress in December 1934 decided to follow the inescapable logic of ethnoconfessional organization and create separate communist party organizations for both Croatia and Slovenia (and a separate communist party for Macedonia as soon as there were enough cadres; all these institutions, however, remained within the overall organization of the

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\(^{103}\) Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*, 222. In fact, the government at the time appears to have believed that the creation of a mainly Croat banovina would only be the first step in the reorganization of the entire country along ethnic lines. See Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*, 230-238.

\(^{104}\) Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*, 226.

Communist Party of Yugoslavia).\(^{106}\) In adopting this organizational division along ethnoconfessional lines, the communists were merely following the trend throughout Yugoslav society; along with the churches and political parties, many other aspects of social and political life, such as the media, were also divided along parochial lines, and few print publications at this time were able to claim a pan-Yugoslav audience.\(^{107}\) The thinking of bankers showed an ethnoconfessional bias as well; for instance, Zagreb’s commercial banks “. . . refused to participate in the new kingdom’s central bank in Belgrade . . . Instead, they turned to investment banking within Croatia . . . “\(^{108}\) In the end, the first Yugoslavia had made three different attempts to form a viable multiethnic state. The first two foundered on the shoals of Yugoslavia’s ethnoconfessional cleavage. The third attempt was cut short by World War II.

**V: The Second Yugoslavia**

Tito’s Yugoslavia (1945-1991) is often seen as the high-water mark of positive interethnic relations among the South Slavs. Yet even during this period, and within the (at least formally) anti-nationalist, multiethnic, Marxist-internationalist Yugoslav communist movement, the logic of Balkan ethnoconfessionalism quickly manifested itself and came to dominate political, social, and economic life, just as it had for the interwar kingdom.\(^{109}\) As a result, the key feature of

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\(^{108}\) Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 120.

\(^{109}\) As John Allcock has noted, “Everywhere the basis of political division was drawn along ethno-religious lines.” Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia*, 302. Emphasis added. Similarly, Sabrina Ramet has claimed that “Yugoslavia has always been a Tower of Babel, with its builders not only speaking different languages but talking past each other . . . Disintegration seemed to be sewn into the very fabric of the state.” Ramet, *Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture and Religion in Yugoslavia*, 175. Emphasis added.
Yugoslavia’s post-1945 existence was a long-term, secular trend toward ever-greater de-centralization and devolution of political authority to ethnoconfessional groups.\footnote{110}

As the winners in the multi-dimensional conflict that Yugoslavia suffered from 1941-45, the communists were in the strongest position to propagate their version of why they had won. The standard explanation for the victory of Tito’s Partisan movement in Yugoslav communist hagiography was its commitment to a federal reorganization of the country, and its positive message of “brotherhood and unity.” The attraction of the latter to a population disgusted by and tired of fratricidal slaughter should certainly not be underestimated. But just as important was the CPY’s recognition of the differences in Yugoslav society as manifested in its commitment to federalism, and its willingness to pay at least lip service to the diverse and often contradictory aspirations of Yugoslavia’s various ethnoconfessional groups. Susan Woodward, for instance, has noted that the “commitment to recognize the separate existence of Yugoslav nations and their sovereign rights in a federal system was critical to the communist victory after 1943,” while Ivo Banac has expressed a similar opinion in a somewhat different fashion, arguing that the Communists were most successful “when they argued for the clear identity of all the constituent parts . . . They did not win the war under the banner of Yugoslav unitarism; they won under the banner of the national liberation of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and so on.”\footnote{111}

\footnote{110} There were occasional half-hearted efforts at re-centralization throughout the post-1945 period when Tito thought things were spinning out of control, but the overall trend in this regard is clear enough.

\footnote{111} See, respectively, Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}, 30 (Emphasis added), and “Separating History from Myth: An Interview with Ivo Banac,” in Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifshultz, eds. \textit{Why Bosnia?} (Stony Creek, CT: Pampleteer’s Press, 1993), 141. Paul Shoup similarly notes that “It would also be a mistake to conclude that those who sided with the Partisans were motivated by pro-Yugoslav sentiments.” See Shoup, \textit{Communism and the Yugoslav National Question}, 95. In further support of this point, Hugh Poulton has pointed out the often utilitarian nature of support for the Yugoslav state amongst many of its component ethnic groups: “Yugoslavism, as an ethnic label, was very weak in Macedonia. The attraction of the Yugoslav state was in that it allowed and supported the Macedonian identity and that without it Macedonia might be torn apart by the ‘the four wolves.’” (The “four wolves” in this case meaning Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia). See Poulton, “Macedonians and Albanians as Yugoslavs,” 125. Matteo J.
words, people did not join the Partisans primarily to fight for “brotherhood and unity” or for a united Yugoslavia; they joined to fight for the liberation of their own native regions, or were driven into the Partisans out of the necessities of self-defense. Moreover, here it bears noting that the Partisan movement itself was not the mass, popular multiethnic movement it is sometimes portrayed as being; in fact, for long periods of time and across wide swathes of Yugoslavia, the Partisan movement was largely monoethnic.112

Milazzo reached many of the same conclusions in his study of WWII Yugoslavia, noting that “Even the Partisans, so often credited, and with considerable justification, for pulling the country together, were an overwhelmingly Serb movement until well into 1943, and there is considerable evidence that they often expanded their ranks by appealing to national sentiments which had little to do with allegiance to the Yugoslav idea.” See Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement & the Yugoslav Resistance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 186.

112 For instance, Paul Shoup has noted that “The Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina (West Herzegovina in particular) were strongly under Ustaši influence and were totally hostile to the Partisans . . . Some Moslem regions did support the Communists . . . [b]ut in most areas the Moslems were to be found in the ranks of the Ustaši or in the service of the occupation garrisons. This proved to be true even in East Sandžak and Montenegro where Moslems were exposed to Chetnik atrocities . . . As a result of the hostility of the Croats and Moslems, the support of the Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sandžak became absolutely crucial for the success of the Partisan movement. In this situation lay one of the great and unforeseen paradoxes of the resistance struggle; driven out of Serbia by the Germans and the Chetniks, the Partisans under the Supreme Command were still predominantly Serbs . . . in the best organized and most permanent liberated areas in Croatia . . . [t]he Serbian Communists were powerfully influenced by their sense of duty to the Serbian peasants of the region, and seemed to put little stock in the Party’s policy of promoting brotherhood and unity. Partisan units refused to accept Croats in their ranks, and it was reported that the practice had grown up, among the Serbian rank and file, of surreptitiously sending notes to the Croatian villages threatening them with reprisals for outrages against Serbs . . . Occasionally discipline would break down entirely, and a Croatian village would be burned and its inhabitants terrorized . . . Serbian units were practically the only forces the Croatian party had at its disposal . . . the Slovenian partisans managed—in fact insisted—on staying on their own soil . . . the national liberation struggle in Croatia became an almost entirely Serbian affair during the course of 1942 . . . It would [b]e a mistake to conclude that those who sided with the Partisans were motivated by pro-Yugoslav sentiments . . . among the Serbs, the Croats, and especially the Macedonians, the resistance struggle was largely inspired by more narrow regional loyalties.” See Shoup, Yugoslav Communism and the National Question, 66-95. Dušan Bilandžić has similarly noted that “For the success of the National-Liberationary War, especially in its first phase, the decisive factor were the Serbs . . . the Communist Party of Croatia in 1942 succeeded in raising for battle about 7,000 people, the majority Serbs. By the middle of 1942, number had grown to 12,000 again mainly Serbs.” See Bilandžić, Hrvatska Moderna Povijest (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 1999), 129, 141. Similarly, Matteo Milazzo has noted that “Even the Partisans, so often credited, and with considerable justification, for pulling the country together, were an overwhelmingly Serb movement until well into 1943, and there is considerable evidence that they often expanded their ranks by appealing to national sentiments which had little to do with allegiance to the Yugoslav idea.” See Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement & the Yugoslav Resistance (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1975), 186. Xavier Bourgarel points out that in order to attract more Muslims to the Partisans, separate “Muslim brigades” were created in which the main tenets of Islam were more strictly adhered to. See Bourgarel, “Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea,” 105-06. In Kosovo, according to Jozo Tomasevich, “Membership in the prewar Communist Party in the Kosovo region was small and almost exclusively limited to Serbian and Montenegrin settlers, with a handful of Albanian intellectuals who had few contacts and no real influence. After the former left the region, the Albanian people, largely peasants dominated by reactionary chieftains, were readily caught up in the strongly nationalistic regime instituted by the Italians with the cooperation
Alongside the CPY’s political goals of creating a federal system and promoting “brotherhood and unity” was a commitment to the country’s economic modernization, which was also viewed as a crucial element in promoting better interethnic relations. Tito himself claimed that socialism would unite not only the South Slavs, but also the non-Slavs of Yugoslavia, and Yugoslav communists in general believed that economic modernization would create a new “Yugoslav consciousness” among the country’s diverse ethnic groups, which would help transcend Yugoslavia’s seemingly chronic national problems.

Another point worth noting is that while the dedication of many members of the communist leadership to “brotherhood and unity” was undoubtedly genuine, many of these individuals were anomalies amongst their own people. As Aleksa Djilas notes,

> In many respects the young Yugoslav communists of the 1930s, though active in arousing the masses, were psychologically outside society. In this sense they were not integrated in their own nation. They lived for prolonged periods in close-knit groups that became not only their political and ideological universe but also a kind of family. For many revolutionaries this ideological-political family was more important than attachment to their nations . . . For them, the idea that one day all people could feel an international political loyalty stronger and emotionally deeper than the loyalty to one’s nation was based on personal experience and not simply on theory. For since all today’s real Communists were of many chieftains. They were easily persuaded to see the Partisan movement as not only a Serbian and Montenegrin movement—as indeed it was in that area—but also as Christian and Communist-controlled and thus opposed to the political and social interests of Albanian Muslims.” See Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia*, 155.


115 Yugoslavia did in fact register very impressive economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s; for instance, from 1956-1979, gross domestic product increased by 6 percent or more per year, while real personal incomes between 1956 and 1972 registered similarly impressive growth. See Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 30-31.
internationalists, then tomorrow, when everyone became a Communist, everyone would also be an internationalist.\textsuperscript{116}

Very early on, however, the logic of Balkan ethnoconfessionalism began to influence and transform Yugoslav Marxism itself. This was apparent even as Tito and the CPY took power.\textsuperscript{117}

Given the horrors of the war, this was perhaps to be expected. The Slovene writer, poet and politician Edvard Kocbek, for instance, noted in the early 1950s that “In Belgrade, such a bjesomucna hatred of Croats rules, and in Zagreb towards Serbs, that both would at the beginning of a war or of civil unrest kill, slaughter and torture each other as never before in history.”\textsuperscript{118} Coming just six years after the horrors of World War II, this was an ominous and depressing summation of the chances for interethnic reconciliation in the new state.

\textsuperscript{116} Djilas, \textit{The Contested Country}, 90-91. Some communists, on the other hand, were fighting for the socialist ideology itself; for instance, Eduard Kardelj, the second most important political figure in post-1945 Yugoslavia (and perhaps the most important political figure in post-1974 Yugoslavia), would go so far as to say in one meeting that “I did not fight for Yugoslavia, but for socialism.” See Jović, \textit{Jugoslavija—Država koja je odumrla}, 136. Even during the war Kardelj’s relatively limited dedication to Yugoslavia as a whole was visible: he resisted joining the Partisan Supreme Command, preferring instead to stay in Slovenia, and in one letter to Tito jokingly admitted that “You know, I was always a little bit of a ‘local patriot’.” As cited by Shoup, \textit{Yugoslav Communism and the National Question}, 71.

The adherents of what little there was of a Balkan Enlightenment also had a tendency to underestimate the power of ethnoconfessional identity in the Balkans, and were similar anomalies in their societies. Dositej Obradović, for instance, claimed that “I shall pay no heed whatever to what religion and faith any man belongs, nor is that a matter for consideration in the present enlightened age . . . You are my brother, regardless of your religion.” (As quoted by George Rapall Noyes, ed., \textit{The Life and Adventures of Dimitrije Obradović} (Berkeley: 1953), 135-36. But as Gale Stokes would note, the individuals of the Balkan Enlightenment “were isolated figures who for reasons of chance and talent happened to discover enlightened Europe.” Stokes, \textit{The Absence of Nationalism in Serbian Politics Before 1840}, 81.

\textsuperscript{117} Typical in this regard was the struggle over the borders of the different republics; as Woodward notes, “Disputes between Croatia and Slovenia over the Istrian peninsula, between Serbia and Macedonia over their common border, between Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina over much of the Bosnian border, and above all between Croatia and Serbia over Vojvodina and Srem (Srijem) were as prickly and contested as the international disputes between Slovenia and Italy over Trieste, the Soca valley, Julian March, and parts of Istra; between Slovenia and Austria over Carinthia; and between Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Greece.” Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}, 31-32.

\textsuperscript{118} As quoted by Ivan Cvitković, \textit{Hrvatski identitet u Bosni i Hercegovini}, 89.
The process of reconciling the Titoist system with the reality of ethnoconfessional nationalism became evident after Yugoslav Stalinism ended in 1949 and the Yugoslav communists began searching for a way to distinguish Yugoslav socialism from the Soviet model. The effort began in the 1950s with significant changes to Yugoslavia’s nationalities policy. The changes of the period 1948-53 were officially enshrined in the "Fundamental Law" adopted on 13 January 1953. The reforms agreed to limited the federal government’s policymaking authorities only to those areas exclusively granted to the federation by the constitution (foreign affairs, defense, internal affairs, finance, and commodity trade). Execution and administration of governmental affairs in all other areas was left to the republics and local organs of government. By the end of 1952, Yugoslavia was effectively economically decentralized. Even during this early period in communist rule, the reform debate had already begun to resemble the interregional and interethnic conflicts of the interwar period. As Dennison Rusinow noted, less than ten years after the communists had come to power, the Yugoslav system had developed into... an effective pluralism in which consensus was to prove peculiarly evasive, primarily because the regional element in the conflict of interests would be perceived by most of the participants as an ethnic conflict and thus elevated to a transcendent and emotional level which made mutual understanding and compromise extraordinarily difficult. Thus it was that the Yugoslav national

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119 Information on the constitutional changes of this period is based on George W. Hoffman and Fred W. Neal, *Yugoslavia & the New Communism* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), Chapter 13; Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, Chapter 2, Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, Chapter 5. While in theory only modifying the 1946 Constitution's Stalinist bent, the changes embodied in the Fundamental Law were so dramatic (a total of 115 articles were added to the 1946 Constitution) that it could rightly be termed a new constitution. One oddity of the changes put into place by the Fundamental Law, however, was that it revoked the right of republic to sovereignty and secession, which had been guaranteed in the 1946 Constitution. Nevertheless, the overall impact of the decentralizing tendencies of the Fundamental Law ensured that the republics, and especially local governments, "in some ways acquired more autonomy and greater administrative powers than they had previously." See Hoffman and Neal, *Yugoslavia & the New Communism*, 213-214.

120 Hoffman and Neal, *Yugoslavia & the New Communism*, 221-223; Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia*, 71. A further indication of the weakening of the federal apparatus was apparent in its downsizing—from 47,310 employees in 1947 to 10,328 in 1956.
question', relatively dormant since the war, again became Yugoslavia's central question.\textsuperscript{121}

As a result of this “re-emergence” of the Yugoslav national questions, what was already evident by the early 1950s was a process by which over the next three decades power would continually devolve from the federal government to ethnoconfessionally-based republics. Moreover, even at this early date the Yugoslav communists themselves were beginning to voice their doubts as to the country’s long-term viability. In 1957, Kardelj was already claiming, according to Dobrica Čosić, that Yugoslavia “was a temporary historical creation . . . with the development of processes of global integration and the overcoming of the imperialist epoch, her peoples will enter into new associations and integrations according to their civilizational and spiritual affinities . . .”\textsuperscript{122}

Throughout this period, although much of the rhetoric of reform was obscured in theoretical guise as a struggle for "de-etatization," “de-centralization” or “democratization,” the real underpinning of support for the reform process was nationalism; thus,

Although the movement for reform drew its real strength from the revival of nationalistic feelings, the reformers were careful to try to disguise this aspect. For example, Bakarić, the Croatian Party leader, succeeded in switching the demand of the reformers away from 'decentralization', with its nationalistic connotation, towards 'de-etatization' . . . But sophisticated managers, economists, or politicians knew well that the demand for de-etatisation was directed primarily against the power of the federal government, and was implicitly a demand for strengthening the power of republican and provincial governments and of groups of enterprises within each region.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{121} Rusinow, \textit{The Yugoslav Experiment}, 118.

\textsuperscript{122} As cited by Jović, \textit{Jugoslavija—Država koja je odumrla}, 137.

\textsuperscript{123} Harold Lydall, \textit{Yugoslav Socialism: Theory and Practice} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 78. Steven Burg would express much the same analysis in the following way: after the Ninth Congress “nationalist attention in Yugoslavia shifted from traditional cultural concerns to the defense of regional economic interests. Inter-nationality conflict became linked to economic and ideological issues, reinforcing existing divisions within the leadership based on
The devolution of central authority to the republics continued in the 1960s. The 1963 Constitution reinstated the right to secession “of the peoples of Yugoslavia” (a right that had, as noted above, been guaranteed in the original 1946 Constitution but left out of the Fundamental Law of 1953). Although the Yugoslav central leadership had in 1958 officially endorsed an attempt to create a supranational Yugoslav identity, this had already been abandoned by the early 1960s. The 1963 Constitution also marked the first time Yugoslavia’s Muslims were formally recognized as a separate nation. Decision-making in Yugoslavia underwent numerous changes during the 1960s, all in favor of more devolution of power along republican lines and assuming more explicitly consociational features. After Ranković’s removal in 1966 the principle of proportional representation (i.e., based on the size of the regional party unit) was introduced into central party organs, but by 1970, proportional representation had given way to outright parity representation for all republican and provincial organizations, thereby giving each regional party organization equal representation in central party organs regardless of the size of its population. Croats at this time successfully pushed the process one step further by insisting on the principle of unanimity in decision-making, effectively giving every republic and province a veto over state and party policy. In keeping with such trends, the regime used “ethnic arithmetic” to determine the composition and staffing of key party and government positions.

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126 Filandra, *Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću*, 236. Filandra (252) adds that the recognition of the Muslims as a separate nation, and later, the increased powers given to the republic by the 1974 constitution, led a number of Croat and Serb intellectuals in Bosnia to move to Zagreb and Belgrade, respectively.
127 Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia*, 97; Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia*, 34; Burg, “Decision-making in Yugoslavia,” 5. Although the Croats were the primary proponents of these reforms, it
Other changes during the 1960s similarly showed how political power was shifting to the republics. The Eighth LCY Congress, held in December 1964, endorsed changes allowing for republican and provincial congresses to be convened before the federal party congress, which reduced the all-Yugoslav Party Congress to "a synthesis of the results of the congresses of the Leagues of Communists of the republics"—a clear indication that power was shifting to the republics and away from central party organs. Nominations to the LCY’s Presidium would be made by the republican congresses, and republican representatives would be accountable to the authorities in their home republic. In effect, the republics would be ruled and represented by their own.129

The LCY at this time also adopted a shift in policy away from promoting a common Yugoslav identity and in favor of more narrow, ethnically based identities. The most obvious evidence of this is the fact that at the Eighth Congress of the LCY in 1964, in the space signifying a party member’s ethnic identity, Tito for the first time was listed as a Croat, not as a Yugoslav.130 Even Yugoslav Marxist theory (which, as the quip went, was “more Groucho than Karl”) was giving in to the power of the country’s ethnoconfessional realities; prominent Yugoslav communists were arguing, contra the orthodox Marxist standpoint that the proletariat has no homeland, that while there was no “Yugoslav” working class, there were in fact “national

should be pointed out that they were popular among all the republican politicians, for they enhanced each of their powers.

128 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 53.


130 Jović, Jugoslavija—Država koja je odumrla, 149.
working classes” in Yugoslavia. Thus, by the 1960s, ethnoconfessionalism was pervading every aspect of political and public life in Yugoslavia; as Dennison Rusinow noted at this time,

The tendency to subsume all other questions and conflicts to the national one and to interpret and simplify every issue in national terms, reminiscent of old Yugoslavia and of the Habsburg monarchy before it and always an important sub-theme in the new Yugoslavia, was again becoming nearly universal. There was thus recreated the atmosphere and intensity of emotion which come to surround the question of nationality when all discontent and every grievance, every perception of injustice, oppression or relative deprivation, is projected as a national issue.

Evidence of how different ethnoconfessional identities influenced one’s views could be found in the different reactions members of different ethnoconfessional groups had to the same event. Thus, when the longtime head of the Yugoslav secret police, Aleksandr Ranković, was purged in 1966, “most Serbs and nearly all Croats were inclined to view Rankovic’s fall . . . as a Serbian defeat.” In Zagreb, there was an “almost universal tendency to interpret it as primarily a victory for Croatian interests,” while “In Serbia and among Serbs outside of Serbia . . . the affair was viewed as an attack on the Serb nation and its position in Yugoslavia.”

An interesting political experiment by the LCY in multicandidate elections at this time showed how problematic ethnoconfessional allegiances continued to be, even during an economically successful period in Yugoslavia’s history. In Bosnia, as Sabrina Ramet noted,

Yugoslavia’s brief flirtation with multicandidate elections confirmed the prominence of ethnocentrism in political choice. In local elections held in Derventa during July and August 1968, for instance, voters overwhelmingly cast their ballots along ethnic lines—Serbs supporting Serbs, Croats voting for Croats,

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131 Jović, Jugoslavija—Država koja je odumrla, 213.
and Muslim for Muslims. As might be expected, however, very few (about 3 percent), when asked about their voting patterns, would admit that ethnicity had anything to do with their choices.\textsuperscript{135}

The most serious outbreak of nationalism to challenge the Yugoslav communist order in the Titoist period was what would become known as “the Croatian Spring” of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In March 1967, a “Declaration Concerning the Name and Position of the Croatian Literary Language,” signed by 144 intellectuals from 19 different Croatian cultural institutions, called for a separation of Croatian from Serbian, and making Croatian one of the four literary languages of Yugoslavia (in addition to Slovenian, Macedonian, and Serbo-Croatian). Interestingly, more than half the signatories were party members.\textsuperscript{136} The “Declaration” was a direct repudiation of the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement, which had been signed by leading Serbian and Croatian intellectuals in more unificatory days . . . in demanding recognition of the Croatian literary language as an independent entity, it undermined the only remaining historical connection to the original Yugoslav movements of the nineteenth century . . . By opening the door to full linguistic separation, the Croatian cultural nationalists thus called all other types of Serb-Croat cooperation into question.\textsuperscript{137}

Among the various demands participants in the “Croatian Spring” voiced were calls for the creation of separate Croatian territorial defense forces, a separate seat for Croatia at the United Nations, and a territorial revision of Yugoslavia’s internal borders in favor of Croatia and at the expense of Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{138} Members of \textit{Matica Hrvatska}, a Croatian

\textsuperscript{135} Ramet, \textit{Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia}, 22. Ramet defined ethnocentrism as “an attitudinal orientation that incline one to condemn the culture, language, and customs of another ethnic group as inferior and ‘wrong’.”

\textsuperscript{136} Dragović-Soso, \textit{Saviours of the Nation}, 32-33.

\textsuperscript{137} Wachtel, \textit{Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation}, 185. Kiro Gligorov would later claim that the Croatian declaration was the first time he believed that Yugoslavia was falling apart. (Interview with the author, Ohrid, June 2002.)

\textsuperscript{138} Dragović-Soso, \textit{Saviours of the Nation}, 42. Although it is sometimes claimed that the main demands of the Croatian Spring were economic, as Bette Denitch notes, “the economic demands were expressed in an ideological context that revived concepts of Croatian nationhood that had proved so divisive in the recent past.” See Denitch, “Dismembering Yugoslavia,” 371. Similarly, Allcock notes that, “One of the areas to benefit most dramatically from
cultural organization, claimed that Croats in Bosnia were being denied many basic rights, and that Croats in Bosnia were underrepresented in all major political, social, and economic institutions. Some extremists called for Croat–populated areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be annexed by Croatia. In a harbinger of what would happen during a subsequent era of national homogenization, Serbs in Croatia counter-mobilized and called for a federalization of Croatia, increased political, cultural and national rights, and separate representation for Serbs as a national group in the Croatian parliament. Tito himself claimed in a speech in July 1971 that “under the cover of ‘national interest’ all hell collects, . . . even to counter-revolution . . . in some villages because of nervousness the Serbs are drilling and arming themselves . . . Do we want to have 1941 again?"

One of the most important legacies of the Croatian Spring was that it showed the ability of the national issue to unite broad sections of the public around a common, national, goal. As Jasna Dragović-Soso notes,

for the first time since 1945, ‘national homogenisation’ had taken place in one republic—bringing together the Party leadership, intellectuals and wider segments of society—around the goal of creating a national state. The Croatian experience thus set a precedent for what was to take place in Serbia and Slovenia in the latter part of the 1980s.

the reform process was Croatia, which during the 1960s experienced rapidly growing prosperity on the basis of the expansion of its tourist trade” See Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 90.

Donia and Fine, Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 183; See also Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 304-305.

Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation, 42.

As cited by Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 299.

Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation, 47. From today’s perspective, an observation by Steven Burg about this period in Yugoslavia’s history, made in the early 1980s, seems tragically prophetic: “at the mass level, international hostility continued to intensify and, by mid-1971, threatened to erupt in renewed fratricidal war. Such war promised not only to tear Yugoslavia apart but to destroy several of the republics and provinces as well.” Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia, 83.
The process of devolution along ethnoconfessional lines continued into the 1970s, against a backdrop of increasing public concern in Yugoslavia about the state of interethnic relations. Amendments to the federal constitution adopted in 1971 stripped the federal government of most of its remaining powers. Croats generally tended to view them as only the first step toward achieving full sovereignty, while in Belgrade many Serbs viewed the new amendments as the first step toward the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and began to voice concern about the fate of Serbs left outside of inner Serbia. The Croatian weekly *Hrvatski tjednik* (at the time one of the largest circulation publications in Croatia) claimed that the 1971 amendments were “only the first step towards a full realization of Croatian ‘national aspirations’.” In the end, Tito himself intervened to end the “Croatian Spring” in December 1971 by personally demanding the resignation of the Croatian party leadership after it had become clear that they had lost control of the situation in Croatia.

Nevertheless, while losing the battle for reform of the Yugoslav system, in many ways the protagonists of the Croatian Spring and like-minded allies in other republics eventually won the war with the adoption of Yugoslavia’s controversial 1974 Constitution. An unbearably long, confusing, and obtuse document, “surpassing in number of articles and equaling in number of words the previous record-holder, the Constitution of India,” formally endorsed the

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143 Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 32. By the end of the 1970s, according to Cohen (37), “Political tensions among the society’s diverse ethnic groups were more apparent than at any time since World War II.”

144 Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 283. As Steven Burg would note, “Although the 1971 amendments reflected almost complete acceptance of the positions formulated by the Croatian political leadership, including even the establishment of an effective regional veto over federal decision-making, nationalists in Croatia remained unsatisfied.” Burg, “Decision-making in Yugoslavia,” 9.

constitutional amendments of 1971 making the republics sovereign entities, and created a confederal relationship between the republics and the federal government. Among the more important features of the 1974 Constitution was the creation of a State Presidency composed of nine members, one from each republic and province (plus Tito, who, in his capacity as LCY president, served in the state presidency for a term “without mandate,” suggesting that even human mortality would not interfere with his position). The earlier decision to require unanimity in decision making, thereby giving each federal unit a veto over federal policy, was also officially enshrined in the 1974 constitution, “despite the often prolonged and futile character of such consultation and agreement seeking procedures.” Thus, in both symbolic and practical terms, the republics and provinces had achieved de jure and de facto sovereign equality, regardless of the size of their populations. The same emphasis on regional parity was reflected in the bicameral Federal Assembly. The 1974 Constitution would subsequently become the subject of considerable debate as to whether it provided a mechanism for the country to survive, or whether it in fact doomed the country to inevitable disintegration. Regardless of one’s views on the ultimate historical effects of the 1974 Constitution, what is clear is that, in the long tradition of


147 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 33.

148 Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 330; see also Burg, “Decision-making in Yugoslavia,” 13. Both chambers in the Assembly were formed on the basis of regional parity, and, importantly, the republican delegations were to be responsible to their regional assemblies rather than to federal executive organs.

149 Allcock, for instance, argues that “taken together, the Constitution of 1974 and the ZUR (Law on Associated Labor) contributed as much as any other features of Yugoslavia’s history to its eventual collapse.” Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 93. Robert Hayden has been similarly critical of the 1974 Constitution, arguing that “While perhaps no federal structure could have contained the political pressures of Yugoslavia in 1989-91, the flaws of the 1974 constitution served to ensure that they became unmanageable, thus making civil war virtually inevitable.” Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided, 52. For an interesting critique from the Serbian perspective, see Vojislav Koštunica, “The Constitution and the Federal States,” in Dennison Rusinow, ed., Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism (Washington, DC: The Wilson Center Press, 1988), 78-92.
ethnoconfessional corporate self-government, it granted the ethnically--based republics and provinces a very significant amount of control over their own internal affairs. As Dennison Rusinow noted, by the end of the 1970s,

The individual republics now have nearly as much control over their economic fortunes and cultural identities as the sovereign states in the European Economic Community (which means that their control is not unlimited or free of intra-Yugoslav and wider interdependence!). Their local political leaderships, while actually less freely and competitively elected than in the late 1960s, are at least their own, internally imposed by co-nationals rather than externally imposed; and those who represent the republics in federal institutions are genuinely delegated by and responsible to these local and native leaderships.\(^{150}\)

Yugoslav specialists continue to debate whether the impetus for the 1974 constitution was economic or nationalist; in other words, were those proposing reforms to Yugoslavia’s constitutional, political, and economic system at this time acting out of a desire to democratize Yugoslavia’s political system and create a more market-oriented economy, or were they operating from more fundamentally nationalist motives? Arguably, the latter should be considered a more convincing motive. As noted above (p. 164, footnote 84), individuals with an implicitly nationalist agenda at the time had learned the advantages of strategically expressing their preferences; thus, knowing that nationalist discontent could not be expressed openly, it was frequently cloaked in the guise of more politically-acceptable rhetoric regarding the need for the “de-etatization” of society. Thus, as Dennison Rusinow points out, although the Croatian strategy in the late 1960s-early 1970s for transferring power and authority away from Belgrade and towards the individual republics was publicly justified by the need to democratize both the LCY and Yugoslav society,

\(^{150}\) Rusinow, “Unfinished Business: The Yugoslav ‘National Question’,” *American Universities Field Staff Reports* (1981/No. 35), 10. Similarly, Susan Woodward has noted that “Decentralization by the early 1970s had led to so much de facto independence that political life was primarily centered in the republics. The republics’ authority over culture and education had substantially eroded all-Yugoslav means of communication. Each republic party controlled its own cadre, and republic-level elections and party congresses preceded the federal. To combat fears of majority tyranny, voting rights emphasized minority protections through consensus, parity, and proportional representation of republican-based organizations.” Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 40-41.
and to remove old communists from power who were preventing political and economic modernization,

Implicitly underlying this line of attack were other ethnic and historical considerations. The metaphor for all that was outdated, centralist, and authoritarian was “Belgrade.” Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. Serbia, whose notorious “Serbian bourgeoisie” had ruled and ruthlessly exploited richer, more sophisticated Croatia and Slovenia in prewar Yugoslavia, and who had recently attempted a repeat performance with Ranković and a Serbian-dominated Party and police bureaucracy. Serbian politicians, primitive by education, hardfisted by training, and therefore ‘neo-Stalinist’ or at least ‘dogmatic Communist’ by definition. Serbian hegemony, exploitative and authoritarian, the primary—perhaps the only—reason why Croatia was not already as rich and democratic as . . . Denmark? The Croatian strategy had from the start two faces: one nationalist, one socialist. As early as 1967, before and after the language crisis, the new leadership had become sensitive to the charge that in their opening to the masses in the name of decentralization they were playing with Croatian nationalism. 151

Yugoslavia’s final years yet again revealed the “predominance of ethnocentrism in political choice.” By the 1980s, it had become essentially impossible to try to turn the country into a one-person, one-vote, majoritarian democracy. As Slovenian president Milan Kucan argued, “Can the imposition of majority decisionmaking in a multinational community by those who are the most numerous be anything else but the violation of the principle of the equality of nations, the negation of its sovereignty and therefore the right to autonomous decisionmaking . . . “152 On July 2nd, 1990, the Slovene legislature adopted—by a margin of 178-3 (with 2 abstentions)—a “Declaration on the

151 Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 250-51.

152 As quoted by Cohen, Broken Bonds, 62. The unity of views of Serbian parties at this point in time regarding the national issue is another instance of both historical continuity, and of the fact that the national issue is able to transcend ordinary political cleavages between left and right, or between more conservative and liberal political forces. As Nicholas Miller points out, in pre-1914 Serbia, “Serbia’s four major political parties, the Radicals, Independent Radicals, Progressives, and Nationals, did not differ by their national ideologies and programs for the expansion of Serbia. Their party programs all envisioned the unification of all Serbs into one Serbian kingdom.” Miller, Between Nation and State, 148. Gale Stokes has made a similar observation, noting that “liberal nationalists in Serbia in the 1860s demanded not only that the Prince of Serbia seek to unify all Serbs into one independent state, but that he make Serbia worthy of this great task by introducing freedom of the press, a responsible legislature, and other features of a liberal political system.” See Stokes, “Cognition and the Function of Nationalism,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 4 (Spring 1974), 539.
Sovereignty of the State of the Republic of Slovenia.” Meanwhile, ethnoconfessional homogenization was making similar progress in Serbia. In the December 1990 elections to the Serbian parliament, 88 percent of the seats went to three parties (the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Serbian Renewal Movement, and the Democratic Party) all of which supported continued Serbian control over Kosovo and the redrawing of borders to bring all Serbs into one state if Yugoslavia were to disintegrate. By contrast, the weakness of multiethnic, all-Yugoslav sentiment was evident in the poor showing of Ante Marković’s Alliance of Reform Forces; in the four republics in which Marković’s party competed, it took only 50 of the 735 parliamentary seats (6.8 percent) up for grabs.

As various competing plans to federalize or confederalize the country were brought to the table, one’s position predictably fell along ethnoconfessional lines; thus, Slovenes, Croats and Albanians strongly supported the confederal option, while Serbs (especially Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina), Montenegrins, Macedonians and Yugoslavs favored maintaining the federation.

By the 1970s, even the architects of communist Yugoslavia had begun to understand the magnitude of the problems they were dealing with, and had begun to accept the possibility that their efforts had been quixotic. As Eduard Kardelj told a colleague in 1971, “We have up until now tried everything possible to maintain Yugoslavia: first it was a unitary state, then it became

153 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 120.
155 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 160.
156 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 181.
a federation, and now we are moving towards a confederation. If even that does not succeed, then it only remains for us to admit that the Comintern was right when it claimed that Yugoslavia was an artificial creation, and that we—Yugoslav communists—had made a mistake.”

VI. The Ethno-Confessional Segmentation of Yugoslav Society—1945-1999

In trying to understand the ethno-confessional disintegration of Yugoslavia, it is useful to start with some basic facts. In Croatia, 89.6 percent of the population is ethnically Croat, while 87.8 percent of the population is Roman Catholic. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 48 percent of the population is Bosniac, while 40 percent of the population is Muslim; 37.1 percent of the population is ethnically Serb, while 31 percent of the population is Orthodox; and 14.3 percent of the population is Croat, while 15 percent of the population is Roman Catholic. In Macedonia, 66 percent of the population is either ethnically Macedonian or Serbian, while 70 percent of the population is Orthodox; 29 percent of the population is either Albanian or Turkish, while 29 percent of the population is Muslim (see Figures 1-3).

157 See the description of Kardelj’s conversation with Dušan Bilandžić as quoted in Jović, Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla, 199.

158 All figures are derived from The World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004).
Clearly, there is an intimate link between religious and ethnic identities in the Balkans, and it is symptomatic of the problems the former Yugoslavia confronted that the Islamic, Roman Catholic, and Serbian Orthodox religious establishments, in the view of one expert on inter-religious ties in the former Yugoslavia “never, during the seventy year’s of Yugoslavia’s existence, established genuine cooperation.” After World War II and its attendant

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159 Radmila Radić, “Religion in a Multinational State: The Case of Yugoslavia,” in Dejan Djokić, ed., *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 196. Emphasis added. An indication of how bad relations were between the Catholic and Orthodox churches in the postwar period is the fact that for twenty years, the Catholic Archbishop of Belgrade never met with the Serbian Patriarch, despite the fact that both lived in Belgrade (Radić, “Religion in a Multinational State,” 206). Perica is marginally more sanguine in his appraisal of relations between the different religious organizations in Yugoslavia, noting that —“interfaith cooperation between Croatian Catholicism and Serbian Orthodoxy or good relations of the two churches with Slavic Muslim clergy was a sporadic practice and, by and large, a result of individual enthusiasm.” Perica also claims that neither the first nor the second Yugoslavia’s “secured legitimation from its two largest churches . . . New Yugoslavia had strong opposition at home and abroad, and the churches were pillars of the domestic opposition.” See Perica, *Balkan Idols*, 15, 42.
ethnoconfessional conflicts (particularly in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia) the divisions between the different religious organizations and their adherents widened. As Perica notes,

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Catholic-Orthodox relations, observed at the level of Croat and Serb religious elites, seemed strikingly analogous to the Concordat crisis of the 1930s and the prewar mobilization of the churches from 1937 to 1941. This time, points of conflict included an even larger number of concrete issues, plus a propaganda war over the causes of the current crisis and controversies from the history of World War II.\(^{160}\)

While the divisive nature of religion in the Balkans caused problems from the bottom up, communist attempts to manipulate both ethnoconfessional identity and religious organizations per se also played a role in furthering ethnic divides. Several features of the regime’s religious policies—for instance, recognizing the Muslims in Bosnia & Herzegovina as a separate nation, or the creation of an independent Orthodox church organization in Macedonia—had the effect of emphasizing “the specifically religious lineaments of national identity, ensuring that, with the eruption of conflict in an ethnic framework, it would also have a religious coloring.”\(^{161}\)

By the 1980s, some religious officials were already calling for a breakup of Yugoslavia along “civilizational” lines. In October 1987, a Serbian Orthodox Church official (anticipating Samuel Huntington by several years), in the official church organ *Pravoslavlje*, wrote an article claiming that Yugoslavia should be partitioned into an “Eastern Orthodox-Byzantine sphere of influence” and a “western Roman Catholic sphere of influence” because “the two incompatible worlds sharply differ from one another in religion, culture, historical development, ethics, psychology and mentality, and therefore previous conflicts that culminated with massacres in the Second

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\(^{160}\) Perica, *Balkan Idols*, 145.

\(^{161}\) Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia*, 299.
World War could be repeated." In 1987, the Serbian Patriarch German had come to the conclusion that “Never was I closer to the truth that the Serbian question can only be solved in a Serbian state.” Attitudes in the Catholic Church were similarly becoming more explicitly opposed to the common state; by May 1991, on the eve of Croatia’s secession from Yugoslavia, an editorial in Glas Koncila claimed “We can say, with a clear conscience, that Yugoslavia, every one up to now and also the present one, was a negative experience for the Croats and Catholics.” Years later, Glas Koncila’s editor, Živko Kustić, would go even further, noting that together, the Catholic Church and Franjo Tudjman’s HDZ “destroyed Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had to be destroyed, that was a question of honor. Those who didn’t want to destroy Yugoslavia were not honorable people.”

Religious divisions, however, were only one aspect of post-1945 Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Official governmental educational policy also showed the effects of Yugoslav society’s division along ethnoconfessional lines. In the immediate postwar years the individual republics had already been granted responsibility over education on their own territory, and after 1948 there was no federal level ministry of education. By the 1960s, Yugoslav educational policy in the various republics had turned away from an emphasis on Yugoslavia and “brotherhood and unity,” and towards an emphasis on each individual nation and republic, or what would become

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162 As cited by Perica, Balkan Idols, 158.


164 Perica, Balkan Idols, 293. Emphasis added.

165 Buchenau, “What Went Wrong?” 561.

166 Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation, 136. Given the Tito-Stalin split and the ideological realities of the time, however, there were of course limits as to what the individual republics could do in the realm of educational policy.
known as cultural particularism. As Andrew Wachtel notes, “it was the gradual victory of cultural particularism that laid the crucial groundwork for the ultimate political collapse of Yugoslavia. After completing an important public opinion survey in the late 1980s, Burg and Berbaum concluded that “our findings lend indirect support to the commonly held notion that a university education socializes one to Croatian nationalism in Croatia, tends to foster Bosnian Muslim ethnic and political identity in Bosnia, and contributes to the promulgation of Macedonian national identity in Macedonia.”

The visible effect of cultural particularism was that Yugoslav citizens had fewer and fewer opportunities to learn about or exchange information with other ethnic groups in the state. In Croatia “for all intents and purposes the [educational] program here was one of full-scale, or almost full-scale, Croatian nationalism . . . although the language taught was said to be ‘Croatian or Serbian,’ no provision in this normative program was made for schools in majority Serb districts.” In the Macedonian education plan for 1974, “In the section on the romantic period . . . five class hours were supposed to be devoted to Pushkin, Lermontov, and Byron, nine hours to Vuk [Karadžić], Zmaj, Njegoš, Mažuranić and Prešeren, and fourteen hours to the almost non-existent Macedonian romantic tradition.” In Slovenia, “things had gone so far [in the teaching of history] that the life of Boris Kidrić received more attention than did that of Tito.” By the 1980s, “no federal control or even recommendations in the field of education were to be tolerated . . . Given these attitudes toward the central government and the idea of a shared culture it is hard to see how Yugoslavia could have survived, even had the most able and compromising political

167 Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation, 174.
leaders emerged after the death of Tito.”169 In 1976-77, Croatian theaters “did not present a single work written by a dramatist from another republic, and only one book was translated into Croatian from a language of another Yugoslav nationality.”170 The media in the former Yugoslavia also broke up along ethno-regional lines.171 Even the editorial boards of major journals became increasingly mono-ethnic in the postwar period, with the result being that “when the project of creating Yugoslav socialist culture was basically abandoned in the 1960s, splits along national lines occurred more quickly and were more extreme than they would have been had there been a tradition of working together.172

The fragmentation of the educational system limited the ability of students to learn about other parts of what was nominally their own country, or to interact with students from other republics. In Zagreb in the 1970s, it was easier to find a foreign language school in which one could study German or English rather than a school where one could learn Albanian, Macedonian, or Slovenian. Similarly, it was easier at the time to get a fellowship to study in


170 According to Stipe Šuvar as cited by Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 22.

171 As John Allcock has noted, “A feature of the Yugoslav media was the lack of any federal network of communications . . . Television broadcasting was organized on a republican basis, and even quite small towns had their own radio stations. Fragmentation matched the process of political decentralization, with the diversity of titles not only reflecting the structure of republics and provinces but also accommodating the pattern of local ethnic minorities . . . the dominant characteristic of the Yugoslav communications media remained (as in the pre-war years) their parochialism and a tendency to reinforce local and especially ethnic identities.” See Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 292.

172 Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation, 148. Wachtel notes that this was in contrast to the practice during the interwar period, when editorial boards tended to be more multiethnic.
Britain rather than in Skopje. Countrywide, on average less than ten percent of all students left their native republics to study in another Yugoslav republic.  

The disintegration and fragmentation of Yugoslavia’s socio-political and economic space was also reflected in a similar dynamic occurring amongst alternative political and intellectual elites, where concern for the nation (i.e., gaining or enhancing the nation’s autonomy, sovereignty, or independence) often was of more importance than the struggle for democracy; in Yugoslavia, as Vladimir Gligorov has argued, “Opposition groups [were] more ready to cooperate with the Communists of their own nationality than with the opposition of some other nationality.” In Croatia in the 1960s and 70s, “most dissidents saw the central task as the achievement of national sovereignty, while the issue of one-party rule was less important, and they conditioned cooperation with Belgrade on the acceptance of Croatia’s right to secede—a goal that was hardly conducive to unite dissidents across republics.” In 1984, intellectuals from Croatia and Slovenia refused to join in efforts initiated by Dobrica Cosić, and supported by the Slovenian

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173 Jović, Jugoslavija—Drzava koja je odumrla, 219. In both Slovenia and Macedonia, more than 96% of students stayed in their home republics for their studies.

174 Gligorov, “The Discovery of Liberalism in Yugoslavia,” East European Politics and Societies 5 (Winter 1991), 15. This had been true in interwar Yugoslavia as well; the Croatian Peasant’s Party, for instance, “could accommodate people with completely opposed ideologies, as long as they favored more political autonomy for Croatia.” See Djilas, The Contested Country, 132. This is in keeping with Ramet’s observation, noted above, that in socialist Yugoslavia, ethnoconfessional interests (or what she termed “group interests”) were “monolithic” and took precedence over individual or class interests. According to Ramet, “group interests may be treated as de facto monolithic, at least within the context of intergroup conflict, for regardless of what the particular interests of Croatian peasants, merchants, sailors, priests, and intellectuals may have been, they united to support the same program in the conviction that their principal foe was one and the same (Serbian hegemonism).” Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 7.

175 Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation, 52; see also Jović, Jugoslavija—drzava koja je odumrla, 344. This often brought Croatian alternative/opposition elites and dissidents closer to official Croatian communist elites than to their fellow opposition elites and dissidents in other republics. Thus, for members of the CCP, “Although they rarely expressed a demand for an entirely independent state, the concept of full sovereignty always underlay their nationalism. This autonomous Croatian state unit, and not parliament and free elections, was their chief goal.” See Djilas, The Contested Country, 154. In the case of Vlatko Maček in the interwar period, the goal was “autonomy for Croatia, not necessarily democracy for Yugoslavia.” Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 210.
intellectual Taras Kermauner and the Croatian Praxist philosopher Rudi Supek to create an all-Yugoslav “Committee for the Defense of Thought and Freedom,” preferring instead to create their own separate, republic organizations. Even the way the regime dealt with dissidents followed an ethnoconfessional logic; thus, in the early 1980s, after Alija Izetbegović and several other Muslims were convicted in a Sarajevo court for Muslim fundamentalism, similar trials of Croats and Serbs had to follow; thus, “Trials in Bosnia (as, in any case, with everything else in that republic) had to follow the national key: the trial of Muslim dissidents meant that soon the trials of Serb and Croat dissidents in that republic would follow.”

Even the ability of Yugoslavia’s scholars to cooperate with each other began to wane in the 1960s. By the end of the 1960s “it became increasingly clear that the unity of Yugoslav historiography was dependent on regime unity.” Pan-Yugoslav efforts to engage in joint scholarly endeavors or to write common histories were already collapsing by the 1970s; two such efforts, *The History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia*, and the *History of the Communist Party/League of Communists of Yugoslavia*, came to a halt in the early 1970s and were replaced by more particularist projects dedicated to the study of individual republics and/or peoples. Croatian dissatisfaction with attempts to publish a joint dictionary of the Serbo-Croatian

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177 Jović, *Jugoslavija—drzava koja je odumrla*, 335. The obverse of this was typically true as well. In Bosnia (and, in fact, throughout most of the former Yugoslavia) hiring policies were done strictly according to the ethnic key; thus, “To encourage ethnic harmony, the Communists introduced a three key system in the republic. If a Croat was promoted in the administration, a Serb and a Muslim would also have to be advanced. If a Serb were arrested for political offences, it was only a matter of time before the police picked up a Muslim and a Croat and charged them as well.” See Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers*, 642-643.


179 Dragović-Soso, *Saviours of the Nation*, 71.
language led to the project’s demise in the 1960s after the first three volumes came out. Croatian linguists at this time began asserting the existence of a “Croatian standard language,” which, as Robert Greenberg has noted

would be a ‘Croat’ language, that is, the language of ethnic Croats, and not the language of people residing within the borders of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. Croat linguists found it necessary to distance the speech of Croats from that of the neighboring ‘non-Croats,’ no matter how similar their dialect is.\(^{180}\)

By the 1970s an academic division of intellectual labor along ethnoconfessional lines was also visible; thus, “according to an unwritten rule authors were expected to write about their own ethnic groups and publish works in the appropriate ‘ethnic’ journals.” According to this “unwritten rule,” Croat scholars would study the dialects of ethnic Croats and publish their findings in a Croatian journal, and Serb scholars would study the dialects of ethnic Serbs and publish their articles in a Serbian journal.\(^{181}\) The intellectual results of such a system were predictable; at the Eighth Congress of Yugoslav Historians, a news report at the time noted, it was possible “to predict a scholar’s polemical arguments by his national origin.”\(^{182}\)

The history of the Bosnia-Herzegovinian Dialectological Journal, founded in 1975, shows the extent to which ethnoconfessional concerns dominated intellectual endeavour. Since Bosnia & Herzegovina was officially a multiethnic republic, a journal such as the “Bosnia-Herzegovinian Dialectological Journal” could not formally be ethnically-oriented. Very quickly, however, it did become so to all intents and purposes:

the vast majority of dialect studies published in the journal were dedicated to the speech of either ethnic Croats or Muslims, and the journal seemed to have


\(^{182}\) As quoted by Dragović-Soso, \textit{Saviours of the Nation}, 60.
provided the impetus for a marked increase in the number of ethnocentric dialect studies. A summary of the twenty-one most important ethnocentric studies for ethnically mixed regions published from 1970 through 1986 shows that ten were written about ethnic Serb dialects, five about Muslim dialects, four about Croat dialects, and only two about the dialect of all three ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{183}

The overwhelming centrality of national issues in Yugoslavia also manifested itself in many other areas of social life, perhaps most importantly in marriage patterns. Traditionally, the millet system and the various Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox religious organizations discouraged interethnic or interconfessional marriage; as Barbara Jelavich has noted, under the millet system, “All religious organizations forbade intermarriage. . . . There was little chance of conversions from the Muslim community to Christianity, since this action was punishable by death. In general, both Christian and Muslim authorities acted to maintain the religious status quo.”\textsuperscript{184}

The traditional social and religious tendency to frown upon interethnic or interconfessional marriages continued to have a visible impact in 20\textsuperscript{th} century Yugoslavia. Throughout the post-1945 period, interethnic marriage rates held steady at 12-13 percent of all marriages; seen a different way, 87-88 percent of the population chose as a marriage partner a member of the same ethnic group. Nicolai Botev suggests that there were what he has termed three “zones of attraction” visible in the former Yugoslavia: people from the “Western” tradition (former Austro-Hungarian territories, i.e, Croatia and Slovenia) who are predominantly Catholic have a greater tendency to intermarry, as do people from the “Balkan tradition” (Orthodox Christians--

\textsuperscript{183} Greenberg, “The Politics of Dialects Among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in the Former Yugoslavia,” \textit{op. cit.}, 406. For similar problems surrounding the attempt by the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Bosnia & Herzegovina to produce a “History of the Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina” in the 1970s and 1980s, see Filandra, \textit{Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću}, 280.

\textsuperscript{184} Jelavich, \textit{History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries}, pp. 52-53.
Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Serbs) from formerly Ottoman areas, and people from the Middle-Eastern tradition (Bosniacs and Albanians). As Botev notes, “those who marry outside their own ethnic group prefer partners from their own cultural tradition.”

Even in multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1981 only some 15.3 percent of the marriages were interethnic/interconfessional, and the overwhelming majority of these occurred primarily between Serbs and Croats; 95.3 percent of Muslim women and 92.9 percent of Muslim men married endogamously. In the midst of Bosnia’s civil war in the 1990s, the leading Islamic

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185 See Nicholai Botev, “Seeing Past the Barricades: Interethnic Marriage in Former Yugoslavia, 1962-1989,” in Joel M. Halpern and David A. Kideckel, eds., Neighbors at War: Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity, Culture and History (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 219—233. As Botev adds, “ethnic endogamy has been the norm in Yugoslavia, and over the years studied (1962 to 1989) no clear trend emerged, either in terms of increasing rates of intermarriage or decreasing social distance between the various ethnic groups” (232). A study by Marie-Paul Canapa done in the 1980s suggests that there were exceptions to the rule of “zones of attraction;” for instance, she argues that Bosnian Muslims preferred to marry Croats or Serbs (with whom they shared a common language) rather than Kosovo Albanians. See Canapa, “L’islam et la question des nationalités en Yougoslavie,” in Olivier Carré and Paul Dumont (eds.), Radicalismes islamiques (Paris: L’Harmattan, Vol. 2, 100-150), as cited by Duijzengs, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo, 128. John Allcock has reached conclusions similar to Botev’s, arguing that “In the eighties the percentage of mixed marriages in Bosnia-Herzegovina (about 12%) was equivalent to that in Yugoslavia as a whole. Given the importance of the mixture of populations in Bosnia such a percentage perhaps indicates rather the permanence of communal barriers . . . In Bosnia-Herzegovina mixed marriages were essentially a feature of the urban elite and manual workers, and were the most frequent between Serbs and Croats.” See Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 376. Certain ethnic groups, however, were more likely to marry endogamously than others. Ramet, for instance, claims that this was particularly true of smaller ethnic groups in Yugoslavia such as the Italians, Ruthenes, and Bulgarians. See Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 22. Similarly, Tone Bringa points out that “In rural areas of central Bosnia, marriages between members of different religious communities were rare, as the social costs in terms of opposition from the respective families and the general community were often adjudged too high.” Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way, 149. According to Islamic law, it is haram (forbidden) for a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim man. (Bringa, 152). In Kosovo and Macedonia, Hugh Poulton has noted that “the incidence of intermarriage between the two largest groups—in both cases predominantly Muslim Albanians and Orthodox Slavs—was almost negligible.” Poulton, “Macedonians and Albanians as Yugoslavs,” in Djokić, Yugoslavia: Histories of a Failed Idea, 123.

186 See Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 42. Some Bosniac historians have begun suggesting that the Bosnian Muslims even have few blood ties with Croats or Serbs. Mustafa Imamović, the author of a recent major history entitled Historija Bošnjaka, suggests that throughout their history the Bosnian Muslims intermixed very little with neighboring Slav populations. According to Imamović, “the Bosnian Slavs, later the Bošnjaks or Bosnian Muslims . . . mixed very little with other peoples . . . Bošnjaks rarely mixed blood even with other non-Slavic Muslims, despite the strong spiritual ties with the Islamic Orient.” See Imamović, Historija Bošnjaka (Sarajevo: Preporod, 1998), 23. This theme has been taken up by Muslim clerics in the Sandzak as well; for instance, the Mufti of the Islamic Community in Serbia, Muamer Zukorlić, is urging his followers to claim Illyrian descent rather than Slavic; see “Zukorlić: Mi Bošnjaci smo poreklom Iliri,” Politika (Belgrade), 6 May 2010.
cleric in Bosnia, Mustafa Cerić, would go so far as to claim that interethnic marriages “are just another form of genocide against the Bosnian people.” As Ramet argues,

Religion plays an important role in nurturing ethnocentrism, and certain religious groups, such as the Muslims, have shown a marked predisposition toward ethnocentrism. The dramatically lower incidence of intermarriage between members of Yugoslavia’s Muslim community and members of other ethnoreligious communities may indicate a greater ethnocentrism rating for that community.

The pattern of ethnoconfessional marriage endogamy has continued into Bosnia & Herzegovina’s postwar period. In the capital of Herzegovina, Mostar, in 1991, some ten percent of all marriages were mixed. In 2001, however, out of 176 recorded marriages in the town, not a single marriage was between a Bosniac and a Croat. In 2004, 0.7 percent of the marriages in Mostar were between Bosniacs and Croats, while in 2008, the figure had risen to 1.6 percent.

A 1998 USIA public opinion survey also found little evidence of interethnic unions; for instance, 99% of Bosnian Muslim respondents said that their mother had been Muslim, and 98% said their fathers had been Muslims. Among Bosnian Serbs, the respective figures were 95% and 98%, and among Bosnian Croats, the respective figures were 99% and 100%.

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Table 1: Bosnia & Herzegovina, 1988: Marriages by Ethnicity\textsuperscript{191}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Bosniac</th>
<th>Croat</th>
<th>Serb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Bosniac</td>
<td>15,622</td>
<td>14,702</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Croat</td>
<td>5,957</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>4,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>9,571</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inter-ethnonconfessional marriages were also extremely rare in Macedonia. A study of Albanian, Turkish, and Macedonian households in the areas of Tetovo and Gostivar in Western Macedonia, published in 1974 by the sociologist Ilija Josifovski, showed that 96 percent of the heads of Albanian and Macedonian households, and 84 percent of the heads of Turkish households would not let their sons marry women of another nationality.”\textsuperscript{192} The popular opposition to interethnic and inter-confessional marriage in Macedonia as expressed in public opinion polls was also apparent practice; for instance, according to figures for selected years compiled by Ulf Brunnbauer, between 1952 and 1999 mixed Albanian-Macedonian marriages always accounted for significantly less than one half of one percent of all marriages in Macedonia.\textsuperscript{193}

\textsuperscript{191} Source: Demografska statistika 1988 (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1990), Table 5-3, page 234.

\textsuperscript{192} Ilija Josifovski, Makedonskoto, albanskoto i turskoto naselenie na selo vo Polog: Sociološka studija (Skopje: Institut za Sociološki i Političko-Pravni Istražuvanja pri Univerzitetot ‘Kiril i Metodij’ vo Skopje, 1974), 156-57.

\textsuperscript{193} See also Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict (London: Minority Rights Group, 1993), 83.
Significantly, religion even served as an important divide among the Albanians of Albania proper; thus, Duijzengs reports that in the 1980s, only five percent of the marriages in Shkodra were interconfessional, i.e., between Catholics and Muslims.\textsuperscript{194} Even family planning in the former Yugoslavia could have ethnic/nationalist connotations; in Kosovo, for instance, “Having a large number of children, apart from other perceived advantages, was also seen as ensuring for Kosovo an Albanian as opposed to a Serbian future.”\textsuperscript{195}

As throughout much of Balkan history over the past several hundred years, ethnoconfessional identity also had a considerable influence on settlement patterns during the post-1945 period. Ottoman regulations had traditionally prescribed that people of different religious confessions live in separate \textit{mahale} (quarters or neighborhoods) centered on each ethnoreligious community’s house of worship in towns and cities, and “the vast majority” of Balkan villages were mono-ethnic, or less frequently, two different groups might live side by side in one village.\textsuperscript{196} As the French social geographer Michel Roux has noted,

\textsuperscript{194} See Duijzengs, \textit{Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo}, 163. Such empirical evidence belies the often-heard view that religion is irrelevant amongst Albanians. In northern Albanian, for instance, Stephanie Schwander-Sievers notes that Catholic Albanians typically view Muslim Albanians as “unfaithful” and southern Orthodox Christian Albanians as “potentially unfaithful” because of the former religious conversion to Islam, and because they latter are considered to be susceptible to Greek influence. See Schwander-Sievers, “Time Past: References for the Construction of Local Order in Present-Day Albania,” in Maria Todorova, ed., \textit{Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory} (New York: New York University Press, 2004), 107.

\textsuperscript{195} Vickers, \textit{Between Serb and Albanian}, 172. Ethnoconfessional background, at least in the pre-socialist period, also influenced the choice of names children were given. Thus, “common practice dictated that given names reflect ethnic background, often by adopting the masculine or feminine form of the name of a Christian saint or Islamic holy person.” See Donia and Fine, \textit{Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed}, 185.

\textsuperscript{196} Donia and Fine, \textit{Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed}, 87, 186; Traian Stoianovich, “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant,” \textit{The Journal of Economic History} 20 (June 1960), 251. Although these regulations were eased in the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries due to the increasing importance of Christian and Jewish merchants in the Ottoman Empire’s economic life and their subsequent need to have an urban presence, the legacy of these regulations lasted much longer. Such ethnoconfessional segregation, of course, was not only a feature of the Ottoman empire at this time; as Stoianovich (304) goes on to note, villages in Croatia and northern Bosnia at the end of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century were similarly divided into “Christian-towns” (i.e., Serbian Orthodox) and “Latin-towns” (Roman Catholic). According to Robert Donia, in Sarajevo the religious segregation of the population based on the mahala
the element of mixture often only applied to the region as a whole: the habitat and ‘lived spaces’ (*espaces vécus*) of different ethnic groups were always quite separate and segregated, especially at the village level. In most general terms, one can see a pattern of juxtaposition in rural areas—ethnically ‘pure’ villages forming an absolute majority—whereas mixture is more characteristic of urban areas. But even in towns, ethnic groups are concentrated in particular quarters (*mahale*).\(^{197}\)

Physical proximity, however, did not mean that ethnic or cultural borders between people did not exist. In the Bosnian countryside,

> While in the village people of different ethnoreligious backgrounds would live side by side and often have close friendships, they would rarely intermarry. In some neighborhoods they would not even live side by side and would know little about each other. And while some families would have a long tradition of friendship across ethnoreligious communities, others would not.\(^{198}\)

Such ethnoconfessional spatial and symbolic divisions were visible in small towns as well.

As part of their effort to secure the main strategic lines of communication, the Ottomans settled Anatolian Turks along main roads, fortified points or military outposts, and in urban areas.\(^{199}\)

Throughout most of the Ottoman period, towns were traditionally inhabited by Muslims and the countryside by the Christian peasantry, making urban areas ethnoconfessionally alien to the Christian population; thus, “When a Serb, Rumanian, or Bulgarian went into a town in his native land he found himself a foreigner.”\(^{200}\) The extent to which what one scholar has called “the cult

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\(^{197}\) As cited by Duijzings, *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo*, 10. Roux here is referring specifically to Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Vojvodina.

\(^{198}\) Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way*, 4.

\(^{199}\) Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804*, 50. In many areas of the Balkans even today it is common for houses belonging to Muslim families to be located along the main roads, with Christian dwellings located further up along hillsides or away from the main traffic arteries. Often these properties belonging to Muslim families are in more convenient or desirable areas, adding an element of economic resentment to interethnic relations.

of Muslim precedence and prestige” existed in urban areas is apparent from the fact that of sixty-one towns in Bosnia during the Habsburg period, fifty-eight of them had Muslim mayors.\textsuperscript{201} As Wayne Vucinich once noted,

since the city population was predominantly Muslim and the Balkan rural population predominantly Christian, the city symbolized the place of the Muslim ruler, tax collector, and security agent. Conversely, the village symbolized the home of the oppressed and exploited Christian peasant, taxpayer, and food-producer. The two societal components came to represent a struggle between two ways of life, which deepened and expanded as time went on. The protracted separation of village from city with hardly any interchange between them led to a dichotomy of mores, habits, and customs. The city dweller and the peasant differed in many basic aspects of their lives—in their food, dress, song, speech, folklore, and world outlook. After the Ottoman Empire expired, the village-city conflict continued, even though the city lost its Turkish character. The unbridged chasm is one of the major present-day problems.\textsuperscript{202}

This “unbridged chasm” between the Balkans’ different ethnoconfessional groups persisted throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} century; as Ivan Cvitković notes, even before the latest war in Bosnia & Herzegovina, “suburban, and especially rural settlements were nationally and confessionally ‘clean.’ Even the old parts of urban areas (in Banja Luka, Tuzla, Sarajevo, Mostar . . . ) were nationally and confessionally ‘clean.’”\textsuperscript{203}

Different ethno-confessional groups used different architectural styles to build their homes, so even in mixed areas one could often tell the occupant’s ethnoconfessional background by the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 97.
\item Vucinich, “The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman Rule,” \textit{Slavic Review} 21 (December 1962), 603; for similar views, see Mazower, \textit{The Balkans: A Short History}, 34, and 67, where Mazower notes, “In the cities, where the Muslim presence was stronger, the dynamics of interaction were . . . marked by concentrations of rumor, of fanaticism and of violence against non-Muslims. Constantinople was a dangerous place for non-Muslims until the early nineteenth century; at Ramadan they kept off the streets if they were prudent. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the janissaries often attacked Christians and Jews with impunity.”
\item See Cvitković, \textit{Hrvatski identitet u Bosni i Hercegovini: hrvati između nacionalnog i gradanskog}, 34-35.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
style of the house.\textsuperscript{204} Muslim houses in Bosnia, for instance, were generally square with a four-sided roof (similar to the construction of the village mosque), while Catholic houses in central Bosnia were mainly rectangular, with the roof sloping down on two sides.\textsuperscript{205} Non-Muslim \textit{mahalle} (neighborhoods) in the cities and towns were immediately identifiable by the absence of minarets, and by the fact that the buildings and houses in non-Muslim \textit{mahalle} were not as tall; under Ottoman law, Muslim buildings, both religious and secular, had to be taller than Christian ones.\textsuperscript{206} Some towns, such as Kruševo in Macedonia, had traditionally discouraged members of “other” ethnoconfessional groups (in the Kruševo case, Muslims) from settling in “their” town, even going so far as refusing to patronize businesses opened by Muslims.\textsuperscript{207} By the end of the seventeenth century, the traditionally non-denominational trade guilds began to split along confessional lines.\textsuperscript{208} Even food preparation revealed ethnoconfessional differences and made neighborly visits awkward; in Central Bosnia in the 1980s, for instance, “The food in Catholic houses was clearly a major problem for Muslims and was often what made them uncomfortable visiting them.”\textsuperscript{209} One American anthropologist doing field work in Bosnia in the 1960s reported that there appeared to be an “invisible boundary” between different ethnoconfessional groups:

\textsuperscript{204} Donia and Fine, \textit{Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed}, 88.

\textsuperscript{205} Bringa, \textit{Being Muslim the Bosnian Way}, 39. However, Bringa notes that these differences in house-building techniques were slowly fading in Bosnia at this time, as younger couples began adopting the more typical European mountain-chalke style.

\textsuperscript{206} Sugar, \textit{Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804}, 76.

\textsuperscript{207} Brown, \textit{The Past in Question}, 223.

\textsuperscript{208} Sugar, \textit{Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804}, 227.

\textsuperscript{209} Bringa, \textit{Being Muslim the Bosnian Way}, 79. Bringa also (p. 80) relates the limits to the amount of intimacy possible between people of different ethnoconfessional backgrounds; as one of her Muslim informants notes (when speaking about a Catholic neighbor), “We get along well and we have a good time together, but this is one thing. It is another to have somebody from a different religion together with you in the kitchen. When two who prepare the same foods and keep different holy days share the same house many problems arise.”
Moslem gatherings are never attended by Christians and *vice versa*. Moslems and Christians sharing a community observe their own holidays. On one occasion in Gornji Vakuf, when a Moslem *mehlud* and a Catholic celebration fell on the same day, the town was evenly divided. The Moslem festivities were held at one end of town and the Croatian at the other, with youths of each group strolling the main street of town only to the invisible boundary which separated the two halves.\(^{210}\)

Such “invisible boundaries” between ethnoconfessional groups would continue after death as well. Many cemeteries in Bosnia, for instance, are divided into separate sections for Catholics, Muslims, Orthodox, and atheists.\(^{211}\)

Ethnoconfessional identity also played a role in determining such things as, on a micro-level, which apartment building one chose to move in to, or, on the macro level, which republic one moved to. In the 1974 Josifovski study in Macedonia, for instance, 71% of Albanians, 80% of Macedonians, and 73% of the Turks surveyed said they preferred to live in a building in which members of their own ethnic group lived.\(^{212}\) On an all-Yugoslav level, in the post-1945 period (but before the wars of the 1990s had started), the prevailing pattern of ethnic migration was that of Serbs from Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo moving to Serbia, Croats from Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia moving to Croatia, and Muslims from throughout Yugoslavia moving to Bosnia & Herzegovina.\(^{213}\) In 1981 alone, five times more Serbs and Croats moved out of Bosnia & Herzegovina than moved into it, while for Bosnian Muslims the number of

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\(^{210}\) William G. Lockwood, “Converts and Consanguinity: The Social Organization of Moslem Slavs in Western Bosnia,” *Ethnology* 11 (January 1972), 66. The present writer observed the same phenomenon in the Kosovo town of Djakovica in 1976, where, during the evening *korzo* (stroll), Albanians would make the customary walking loops along one side of the main street in the center of town, while Serbs would do the same along the other.

\(^{211}\) Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way*, 186.

\(^{212}\) Josifovski, *Makedonskoto, albanskoto i turskoto nasenlenie na selo vo Polog*, 153, Table 82.

emigrants was equal to the number of immigrants.\textsuperscript{214} Two prominent Yugoslav social scientists, Stipe Šuvar and Dušan Bilandžić, both determined that the direction of migration was characterized more by the national and religious identities of the migrants than by economic considerations.\textsuperscript{215} After 1968, there was also a noticeable movement of Albanians from Macedonia, Montenegro, and southern Serbia into Kosovo, as well as Muslims from the Sandzak moving into Kosovo as well.\textsuperscript{216} By 1989, Kosovo society was “almost wholly segregated, with Albanian and Serbian children attending school in different shifts or in separate rooms.”\textsuperscript{217} This has continued into the present, as Serbs continue to move out of the Sandzak and into Serbia proper, Macedonian Slavs move out of Albanian-dominated municipalities in western Macedonia, and Croats emigrate from Bosnia & Herzegovina to Croatia.\textsuperscript{218} The various republican governments in the former Yugoslavia also played an active role in trying to control the movement of people according to ethnoconfessional criteria; Slovenian officials, for instance, by the 1980s had decided that they could no longer accept more Bosnians and Albanians migrating to Slovenia in search of jobs into their republic.\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{214} Bringa, \textit{Being Muslim the Bosnian Way}, 234.


\textsuperscript{216} Vickers, \textit{Between Serb and Albanian}, 170.

\textsuperscript{217} King and Mason, \textit{Peace at Any Price}, 38.


\textsuperscript{219} Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}, 64.
The extent of this ethnoconfessional division of Balkan society has been both pervasive and long lasting. As a report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance published in 2001 noted in the case of Macedonia,

... each of the main ethnic communities tends to live in a relatively homogeneous world of its own. Even where members of different ethnic groups live and even work alongside each other, they often have limited contact in daily life. Although interaction is increasing, particularly among young people and the educated and professional segments of society, many members of the various groups still tend to go to different restaurants, different cafes, different stores and even different schools. The organizations and associations of civil society too, are in large part divided along ethnic lines, as are the political parties... Public debate takes place within each community rather than between communities, each receiving information about events within the community, the country and the region from media in its own language, produced by members of its own ethnic group.220

Such social divisions, of course, had political implications as well. As Yugoslavia entered its final days, what is noteworthy is the large degree to which individuals voted along ethnoconfessional lines in deciding Yugoslavia’s fate, re-confirming the prominence of ethnocentrism in political choice. From Slovenia to Macedonia, overwhelming majorities of the titular ethnoconfessional group in each republic or province turned out to vote in various sovereignty referenda. From August 9th—September 2nd, 1990, Serbs in Serb-majority regions in Croatia organized a referendum asking whether people supported autonomy for Serb-inhabited regions. Of 756,781 people who participated in the referendum, over 99% voted in favor of autonomy. On May 12th, 1991, the vote was repeated, again with the same result.221 In the December 23rd 1990 Slovenian plebiscite on independence, voters were asked “Should the Republic of Slovenia become an autonomous and independent state?” 93.5 percent of eligible


voters turned out, and 88.5 percent approved.\textsuperscript{222} On May 19\textsuperscript{th}, 1991, Croatian voters were asked “Do you agree that the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign and independent state, which guarantees cultural autonomy and all civil rights to Serbs and members of other nationalities in Croatia, may enter into an alliance with other republics?” 83.6 percent of voters turned out, and 93 percent approved.\textsuperscript{223} A separate question asking whether Croatia should stay in a federal Yugoslavia was rejected by 92 percent of the voters.\textsuperscript{224} On September 8\textsuperscript{th}, 1991, Macedonian voters were asked whether they approved of Macedonian independence. Turnout was 71.85 percent of the total electorate, of which 95.09 percent approved. In total, 71 percent voted in favor. The referendum, however, was boycotted by both Albanians and Serbs in the republic, which means that ethnic Macedonians almost unanimously voted in favor of independence.\textsuperscript{225} In September 1991, Kosovo Albanians held a referendum asking voters whether they supported making Kosovo an independent republic; organizers claimed that 940,802 people voted out of an eligible population of 1,051,357. Of those, over 99 percent reportedly voted in favor of the proposal.\textsuperscript{226} In January 1992, Albanians in Macedonia held a referendum on territorial autonomy within Macedonia; of the 92 percent of eligible voters who turned out, 74 percent voted in favor.\textsuperscript{227} In a referendum held in Bosnia & Herzegovina in February 1992 asking citizens whether Bosnia & Herzegovina should become an independent state, 64.4 percent of the

\textsuperscript{222} Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}, 139.

\textsuperscript{223} Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}, 143.

\textsuperscript{224} Cohen, \textit{Broken Bonds}, 212. Cohen also points out that a vote organized by Krajina Serbs one week earlier on whether the Krajina should unite with Serbia was approved by a reputed 99.8 percent of the population.

\textsuperscript{225} Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}, 179, and footnote 92, 466.

\textsuperscript{226} Poulton, “Macedonians and Albanians as Yugoslavs,” 133-34.

\textsuperscript{227} As cited by Alice Ackerman, \textit{Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia} (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 61.
electorate turned out to vote, the overwhelming majority of whom were Bosniacs and Croats (according to the 1991 Bosnian census, Bosniacs and Croats made up 61 percent of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina). Of these, 99.7 percent voted in favor of independence. The vast majority of Bosnia’s Serbs (31 percent of the population) boycotted the referendum.  

Thus, as Robert Hayden has noted, Bosnia’s 1990 democratic election was essentially an ethnic census. Given the chance to vote as Bosnians, the population of Bosnia & Herzegovina chose instead to vote, overwhelmingly, as Muslims, Serbs, and Croats.” This has been a pattern visible throughout Bosnia’s 20th century history (and into the 21st century as well). Thus, regardless of the political regime under which elections in Bosnia have been held:

The results [of the 1990 elections] demonstrate remarkable historical consistency with previous Bosnian multiparty elections, whether in 1910 (the Austrian period) or in the 1920s (the royal Yugoslav era). In 1990, Bosnians again voted overwhelmingly for ethnically based parties, and a single party achieved an overwhelming majority among the voters of each nationality.

Years of bloodshed in the 1990s did little to change the Bosnian population’s predilection for nationalist parties. In the 1997 municipal elections, parties with a multiethnic base of support won only six percent of the vote statewide (12 percent in the Federation, and 2 percent in the

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228 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 237. Despite the ostensible majority in favor of independence, however, this did not represent real support for Bosnia & Herzegovina’s independence at the time. In fact, Croatian leaders in BiH have subsequently been very candid about the real strategy of the HDZ and the Croat population in general in supporting the February 1992 referendum on Bosnian independence. First, it was seen as the initial step in the Croats’ plans to ultimately secede from Bosnia itself and unite Croat-populated areas with Croatia proper, and second, as a way of helping Croatia in its own independence bid by opening a second front for the JNA. Author’s interview with Jadranko Prlić and Vladimir Šoljić, Zagreb, November 2003. See also Chapter III, Microcase Study III on “Greater Croatia” for more on this issue.

229 Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided, 92. Interestingly, Radovan Karadžić would claim that the victory of the Serb Democratic Party in the 1990 Bosnian elections was based on the Serbs’ “preference to live together in their own state (i.e., the Yugoslav federation, or, in lieu of that, in an enlarged Serbia) rather than the “bread, democracy, and dollars” platform of Prime Minister Marković.” Cohen, Broken Bonds, 146.

230 Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 211. One might add here that in 1910, Bosnia’s Social Democratic Party, which supported interconfessional politics and schools, “failed to win any seats in the first parliamentary elections held in 1910.” See Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 82.
RS). The three leading nationalist parties again captured 67% of the popular vote. Even this level of support for multiethnic parties was somewhat misleading, however, for "multiethnic" parties such as the Social Democratic Party (SDP) or the Union of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Social Democrats in reality only garnered votes in Bosniac-populated territory.231

Many observers have cautioned that the voting results of these referenda should be analyzed cautiously, and that a vote for “sovereignty” or “independence” did not necessarily mean a vote to break up Yugoslavia. Woodward, for instance, argues that “A vote in 1990 for a political party that emphasized ethnonational identity was not the same thing as a vote for a national state, and even a vote for the sovereignty of one’s republic was not necessarily a vote for independence, let alone commitment to war, should that be necessary.”232 Similarly, Burg and Shoup caution that with reference to the 1990 Bosnian elections, “The victory of the nationalist parties in the elections of 1990 was in some sense fraudulent, based on fear rather than on popular support for the views of the nationalists themselves . . . Everywhere, a feeling of fear drove persons to vote for the nationalist parties, even when they did not necessarily support these parties’ aims.”233 And Robert Hayden has pointed out that even into 1990 a majority of citizens of the former Yugoslavia (57 percent according to one credible poll) were believed to still be in favor of a continuation of the country in some form.234 Nevertheless, viewed in a historical context, the

231 See the summary of the International Crisis Group’s report in Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 15 October 1997, 5.

232 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 225. Similarly, and specifically with respect to Bosnia, Woodward (228) points out that public opinion polls taken in 1990 and 1991 showed “overwhelming majorities” against separation from Yugoslavia and against an ethnically divided republic.


234 Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided, 64.
voting in all of these elections is consistent with long-term historical patterns, and as such should not be written off as accidents of history.

VII: Conclusions

Robyn M. Dawes has argued that “‘the role of the social scientist’ should not be in understanding and communicating to people ‘what we are like,’ but rather in analyzing and characterizing the influences that are likely to operate in human life and how they may lead on a probabilistic basis to change.”235 This chapter has attempted to show that at this particular time in southeastern Europe, and for perhaps the past 150 years, the most important indicator of the influences likely to operate in an individual’s life is his or her ethnoconfessional identity.

Moreover, the analysis provided in this chapter provides considerable evidence contradicting many premises of social constructivist theory. There are four primary points which should be noted here. First, Balkan ethnoconfessional groups can be considered unitary actors in many situations, especially those in which ethnic or national interests are exceptionally salient. The evidence provided above supports Ramet’s claim that ethnoconfessional group interests in the Balkans can be considered “monolithic.” This in turn contradicts many constructivist arguments questioning the validity of concepts such as “groupness.” Second, ethnoconfessional identity clearly provides a reliable indicator of a wide range of political and social behaviors. Third, the Balkan experience shows that ethnic identities are not as fluid and malleable as constructivism suggests, and that while individuals may have multiple identities, the salience of certain identities—most especially, ethnoconfessional identities—far outweigh the salience of others. In

fact, much evidence from southeastern Europe suggests that only some 10-20 percent of a given population possess “fluid, malleable” identities in any politically meaningful sense, making them in most cases politically irrelevant. Fourth, the Balkan experience also shows that ethnic groups or ethnic identities are not endogenous variables dependent upon other political, social, or economic processes. As the preceding analysis has shown, for the overwhelming majority of the population in the Balkans, ethnic identities have been fairly concrete and consistent over time, regardless of political regime, economic conditions, or conditions of war or peace.

This has many implications. First, it suggests that group rights will figure much more prominently in multiethnic political entities in the Balkans than in more monoethnic entities, and that traditional liberal democratic emphases on the individual will have to be balanced with such group rights. It also suggests that the functioning of political systems in multiethnic political systems will be considerably more complicated. As Roucek noted in the 1930s, the multiethnic states in the Balkans suffer from a “handicap of heterogeneity,” and evidence from the former Yugoslavia, and, more recently, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, amply bears out the difficulties that heterogeneous ethnic populations pose for the various states in southeastern Europe.

The evidence provided above also suggests that churches and mosques will likely play a much larger role in Balkan political and social life than in other democratic systems. Several factors—the legacy of the millet system, the fact that ethnic groups in the region have evolved as “church-nations,” and the fact that the secularizing ideas of the Enlightenment never had a major
impact on the Balkans—combine to make the intertwining of church and state a normal feature of social and political life for most politicians and average citizens.

The argument also suggests that it would be wrong to believe that the problem of Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism has ever been “solved.” The effort to create national states in the Balkans has been an ongoing process (albeit of greater or lesser intensities) for the past two hundred years. During this period, many of the multiethnic entities imposed on the region by outsiders have lacked the legitimacy (and, hence, internal stability) a state enjoying true support and loyalty from its population possesses. This has made multiethnic states in the Balkans inherently fragile and susceptible to disintegration whenever geo-political circumstances permit. Given the analysis provided above, as long as the Age of Nationalism lasts, it would be wrong to believe that these problems have been “solved.” Even as outsiders have attempted to promote multiethnic polities and societies, they have had to succumb to the power of ethnoconfessional nationalism in the region. As one scholar notes,

Institutional change in former Yugoslavia, both domestically and internationally generated, has been moving towards the primacy of ethnicity. Some systems have been mono-national, other agreements established bi- or tri-national states. Only in Macedonia, some aspects of the Ohrid Agreement constitute a move away from institutionalized ethnicity. Even here this move away is at the symbolic level (in the preamble of the constitution), while the institutions of the state are given strong ethnic qualifiers.

Finally, the collective nature of Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism suggests that dealing with the problem is much more complex than many “outsiders” realize. As seen above, the constructivist and instrumentalist emphasis on elites must be tempered with a greater appreciation for the interests and aspirations of the general population. Being a mass-phenomenon, however, also means that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a much more deeply-
rooted and complex phenomenon than is commonly assumed, and much less susceptible to the ethnic conflict management strategies that will be discussed in Chapter VI.
Chapter V.
Nations Making States

I. On Elites and Institutions

A major constructivist research problem is identifying the mechanisms and processes by which social construction occurs. One approach has focused on the individuals or activists working to affect social change. This involves an interesting puzzle for social scientists, however, because activists working to affect change are often at a disadvantage with respect to forces supporting the status quo, such as governments, corporations, or other extant institutions.¹ Explanations based on elite power or state institutions, on the other hand, suggest that these forces have the ability to impose a sense of identity on the great mass of any given population.

An analysis of how constructivist explanations fare when applied to the various Balkan identity-projects and nation-building attempts is of particular interest because it reveals the importance of several things frequently overlooked in such accounts: the crucial importance of when a constructivist identity-formation or nation-building project is embarked upon; the fact that the economic or material incentives which integrating or centralizing institutions offer often fail to change either identities or behaviors, and the fact that identity-projects enjoying significant resource or material advantages over their ideological competitors frequently fail. Moreover, a review of a number of constructivist projects in southeastern Europe also reveals a somewhat more disturbing and problematic aspect of constructivism: the fact that constructivist

¹ As Finnemore and Sikkink point out, “activists working for change often have few levers of conventional power relative to those controlling existing structures (often the state or corporations); to the extent that activists succeed, these situations are not easily explained by dominant utilitarian approaches, and they open space for constructivist alternatives.” See Finnemore and Sikkink, “Taking Stock,” 400.
projects—whether those of Habsburg bureaucrats or 21st century liberal internationalists—require a considerable amount of coercion, and the denial of fundamental political rights and civil liberties that supposed domestic patriots or foreign officials usually claim to be acting on behalf of.

In the context of the overall debate about the merits of constructivism, the Balkan experience is interesting because it has frequently shown the limits of elite or government power. In discussing the difficulties confronting such theories, one scholar has asked whether nations

[can] . . . be created ab ovo, from an idea shared by five-six, or even fifty or sixty dreamers and like-minded individuals? Was the Yugoslav idea really the result of semi-sober discussions in Prague beer halls, a few songs about Yugoslavism, and a dozen sculptures, even if they were Meštrović’s? On the other hand—and in the same vein—was a group of writers gathered at Francuska 7 or those in Republic Square (today, Ban Jelačić’s Square) in Zagreb able to destroy the existence of a Yugoslav nation, even if they had (and if they could have) such intentions? Did the academicians in the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) really have such power over the hearts and minds (of many) Serbs (and some others) to reorient them away from Yugoslavism and towards Serbianism, and at that in a half-finished document (the so-called Memorandum) which the Academy officially published only after Yugoslavia had formally disintegrated?

The extent to which elites really are so influential and consequential in identity-formation is related to theories focusing on the role of institutions (such as government bureaucracies, school systems, religious institutions, or military organizations) in this process. Yet Balkan history is replete with examples in which would-be nation-builders work on the assumption that such institutions are crucial in determining the “fluid and malleable” identities of their subjects, only to learn that their attempts had the opposite of their intended effect. Keith Darden, for instance, has recently suggested that the onset of mass schooling—“when a community shifts from an oral

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2 Jović, Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla, 62. “Francuska 7” refers to the address of the Serbian Writer’s Association, an organization frequently seen as one of the focal points of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s.
to a literate mass culture”—is the point at which ethnic and national loyalties become fixed. Yet numerous examples from the Balkans suggest a number of problems with this type of explanation. First, in 19th century Serbia and in Bosnia & Herzegovina, identities seem to have hardened and become fixed even when overwhelming majorities of the population were illiterate and unschooled. Second, schooling can also produce the opposite of the effect that Darden predicts. One example comes from the efforts of nineteenth century Hellenizers to educate the children of Bulgarian chorbadjii (the Bulgarian equivalent of Greek notables or Serbian knezes) and transform their identities:

At some point in the education of these young men, a spark appeared to inflame their Bulgarian consciousness. The catalyst might be the reading of Paisius’ History; it might be the arrival of a converted fellow student. Once pushed over the threshold the young Slav began fervently to apply the lessons so well taught by his Greek teachers. He looked for ways to define and to defend his own nationality in the face of Greek exaggerations and belittlement of other peoples. He searched ancient sources for arguments to use to contradict his teachers. Going further, he instigated his fellow Bulgars to form a student society to look after Slav interests in the now unfriendly confines of a Greek school.

The passage above shows how elite strategies, or those of institutions such as educational systems, can have unpredictable and even counter-productive results. Note that the Greeks have the advantages of both organization and resources, yet some “spark” within the young Bulgars forces them to reject such Hellenization.

A similar example can be found in Bosnia during the Kállay period, when Habsburg efforts to cultivate indigenous Bosnian elites loyal to the monarchy, epitomized by the resources devoted

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3 See Darden, “The Causes and Consequences of Enduring National Loyalties,” draft manuscript, Chapter 1, 10. It should be pointed out, however, that Darden is among what is perhaps the minority of contemporary scholars who stress the strength of ethnic and national identities and do not believe they can be reoriented using material or political incentives.

to educating young Bosnians such as Safvet-beg Bašagić, Vladimir Ćorović, or Tugumir Alaupović, “showed how the Austrian system could bring forward talented Bosnians into its civil service, but could not win their hearts.”⁵ Amongst Macedonians in the latter half of the nineteenth century,

Virtually all members of the small Macedonian intelligentsia were educated in schools operated by the neighboring Balkan nationalist institutions in Macedonia or, with their financial support, in Athens, Belgrade, or Sofia. With the exception of those of them who were for all practical purposes assimilated into what appeared as a superior culture and embraced the nationalist ideology and aims of the host-benefactor state, they repudiated assimilation and the outside nationalist ideologies and assumed leadership positions in both the Macedonian national and revolutionary movements. They rejected all schemes for the annexation or partition of their land and instead put forward the idea of Macedonian statehood.⁶

Several factors bear noting here. The first, already made above, is that educational indoctrination does not have the effect that constructivist theories based on elite action might desire. Instead of educational enrollment turning Macedonians into Greeks, Serbs, or Bulgars, the effect was quite the opposite. Second, the above description of the early stages of the Macedonian national movement suggests that the fluidity of identities seems limited, and that relatively small numbers of people are willing to assimilate to supposedly “superior” cultures. Most educated Macedonians at this time appear to have chosen to fight for an independent Macedonia. This choice raises an interesting question about human motivations: if identities are fluid, individuals are rational interest-maximizers (in the economic sense), and opportunities for assimilation exist, why would educated individuals support an underdog movement acting on

⁵ Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, 245. As Donia notes on this score, “Austro-Hungarian administrators were to share with colonial administrators elsewhere the realization that secular education, far from churning out loyal followers of the regime, incubated resentment of colonialism and spawned revolutionary intellectuals who turned to radical European ideologies for their inspiration . . . Through the halls of Sarajevo’s secular public schools passed many who would become the empire’s most passionate critics, including a few who would hatch a conspiracy to assassinate the heir apparent to the imperial throne.” Donia, *Sarajevo: A Biography*, 88.

behalf of an unorganized, backward, illiterate, peasant mass? A surer strategy for personal success (and longevity) would be to throw one’s lot in with the ruling powers. Struggling for a “free Macedonia” at this time was by any measure a long shot, and even if such a “free Macedonia” were achieved—and if one avoided being executed or having their house burned down in the process—the material or financial payoffs would be far down the road. Working for the ruling elites would certainly seem like a safer strategy, and yet most individuals did not go that route.⁷

Another problem with theories stressing the importance of educational institutions is that they overstate how strong and effective such institutions are. As late as 1880, for instance, some 75 percent of the overall population of Croatia-Slavonia was illiterate.⁸ In these areas, moreover, it would be difficult to say that Serb confessional schools were mechanisms for a nationalist revival. As late as the 1840s, there was not a single gimnazija or pedagogical school for the Serbs in Croatia, Slavonia, or the military frontier, and only 32 Serbian primary schools (mainly of a religious character) for a population of over 500,000 people. One historian has claimed that the schools at this time “were frequently unable to provide even the most basic knowledge, much

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⁷ As Ernest Gellner has noted along these lines, “There is . . . no need to assume any conscious long-term calculation of interest on anyone’s part. The nationalist intellectuals were full of warm and generous ardour on behalf of the co-nationals. When they donned folk costume and trekked over the hills, composing poems in the forest clearings, they did not also dream of one day becoming powerful bureaucrats, ambassadors and ministers. Likewise, the peasants and workers whom they succeeded in reaching felt resentment at their condition, but had no reveries about plans of industrial development which one day would bring a steel mill (quite useless, as it then turned out) to the very heart of the Ruritanian valleys, thus totally ruining quite a sizeable area of surrounding arable land and pasture. It would be genuinely wrong to try to reduce these sentiments to calculations of material advantage or social mobility.” Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 61.

⁸ Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 11-12.
less to influence the development and strengthening of national consciousness.”

Croatia as a whole only gained control of its educational system in 1868, decades after the struggle between the Croatian sabor and the Hungarian Diet had begun.

Even if we do grant the view that educational institutions are crucial in the formation of national consciousness, the Balkan experience with regard to the role of educational indoctrination in the identity-formation process suggests that the time it would take to do so is considerable. In examining the failure of interwar Yugoslavism, one of Serbia’s leading scholars of the early 20th century (and a prime minister in Yugoslavia’s World War II government-in-exile), Slobodan Jovanović, believed that it would have taken one hundred years of peace and prosperity for an educational system to instill a sense of common identity amongst Croats, Serbs and Slovenes. Balkan history, unfortunately, rarely gives states such long periods of either peace or prosperity.

Along with schools, religious institutions are also frequently cited as important factors in the identity-formation process. Yet a detailed look at the role of churches and church hierarchies at this time shows that there were problems with regard to their relationship to the nation-building project as well, insofar as the wishes and directives of religious elites did not easily translate into successful identity-formation efforts. After the Patriarchate of Peć was abolished in 1766, for instance, many of the Orthodox hierarchs in the lands inhabited by people speaking

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10 Jelavich, “South Slav Education,” 96.

11 As cited by Jelavich, “South Slav Education,” 94.
“Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian” were Greeks bent on Hellenizing their flocks, not Serb proto-nationalists. Between 1778 and 1882, the Habsburg administrators of BiH had taken control of both the budgets and the personnel appointments in the Orthodox and Catholic churches there, the purpose of which was to prevent Croat or Serb nationalists from gaining positions of power or influence.

Nor is the argument that the Orthodox Church in areas populated by Serbs during this period enjoyed resource, material, or even intellectual advantages in promoting their own preferred

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12 See, for instance, Samardžić, “Srpska pravoslavna crkva u XVI i XVII veku.” As Samardžić points out (p. 60), towards the end of the eighteenth century many of the metropolitans of Belgrade were Greeks. Indeed, Barbara Jelavich claims that for the Bulgarians, Romanians, and Serbs, the attempt to shake off Greek ecclesiastical rule was the first step in the formation of the Balkan national movements. See Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, 57. Charles Jelavich notes that “In 1766 the Patriarchate of Peć was abolished and the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople was extended to cover purely Serbian territories . . . Once in control of the new lands and peoples, the patriarch of Constantinople gradually began to replace the Serbian church hierarchy with a Greek one. The change was greeted with violent dissatisfaction by the Serbs . . . they could only see that their nationality, which had been spared Islamization for centuries, was now being subjected to Hellenization.” See Charles Jelavich, “Some Aspect of Serbian Religious Development in the Eighteenth Century,” 149. Along similar lines, Mazower has noted that “In nineteenth century Bosnia . . . the Greek Patriarch takes good care that these eparchies shall be filled by none but Fanariots, and thus it happens that the . . . Orthodox Christians of Bosnia, who form the majority of the population, are subject to ecclesiastics alien in blood, in language, in sympathies, who oppress them hand in hand with the Turkish officials and set them, often, an even worse example of moral depravity.” See Mazower, *The Balkans*, 52. Dušan Bataković notes that in Kosovo, between 1830 and 1896, a series of “anti-Serbian orientated” Greek bishops had been enthroned. See Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 58. See also Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers*, 75. On the role of the Fanariots in Bosnia, see also Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, 9. During this period, education for the Orthodox millet, “. . . was [the] responsibility of the local Church leaders. Needless to say, shortage of funds and the frequently low quality of the responsible ecclesiastics meant that education was not available in many places; usually only the episcopal centers could be counted on to provide schools, and their quality depended on the interest of the given bishop. Since few bishops took much interest in education, the few schools that did achieve some standards were rarely able to achieve any continuity, usually declining or even closing after the death or departure of the individual bishop who had taken an interest in them. And, when the Patriarch of Constantinople regained his control over the Slavic dioceses in 1766, he began regularly to appoint Greeks as their bishops. Few of the Greek ecclesiastics whom he appointed knew any Slavic language and even fewer had any interest in sponsoring schools taught in the vernacular.” Donia and Fine, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed*, 66. A similar situation obtained in the Habsburg Empire. According to Nicholas Miller, “There was a wide disparity in the education, wealth, and general competence of priests in parishes of the Orthodox church. Whereas the higher clergy of the church would generally be well-educated, literate, and prosperous, the parish clergymen might well be illiterate and poorer than some of his peasant compatriots.” See Miller, *Between Nation and State*, 18.

13 Donia, *Sarajevo: A Tradition Betrayed*, 76. As Donia points out, in March 1880 the Habsburg emperor, in an agreement with the Patriarch of Constantinople, was given the right to dismiss and appoint the Orthodox metropolitans in Tuzla, Mostar, and Sarajevo at will. In an interesting example of how such apparent power can occasionally backfire, in 1891 the emperor appointed as Sarajevo metropolitan Sava Kosanović, an individual believed to be loyal to Austria-Hungary, but who subsequently turned out to be a “Serbian nationalist.”
identity—projects very persuasive. Apart from its Greek leadership, the Orthodox Church was also a poor institution; because of the exodus of Serbs from Ottoman lands in the late seventeenth century “. . . the Serbian patriarchate became increasingly impoverished. The departure of tens of thousands of Serbs from Old Serbia—among them the wealthiest—deprived the Serbian church of revenues formerly available to it.” Many accounts of the time have described the low-educational level of the Orthodox clerics in these areas, at least in comparison to their Catholic colleagues, while accounts of the higher-ranking Orthodox clergy in the Ottoman Empire saw it as is opportunistic and solely motivated by its own interests. By contrast, the lower, secular clergy was seen as having the most influence on the development and nurturing of national consciousness among the Balkan peasantry, despite its relative poverty and lack of education.

This is a crucial point. The lower clergy in these areas came from the same social strata as the vast majority of the peasant population—they were the same illiterate sons (and daughters, in the case of female monastics) of the poor peasants who made up their flocks. Educational training or attainment did not distinguish them; most village priests had no formal training, and performed their duties only by virtue of rote memorization of religious texts and ceremonies. Consequently, whatever ethnic identities and nationalist sentiments the lower clergy had must have come from such already existing sentiments in the general population. This in turn reveals the mass-based

14 Stoianovich, “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant,” 293.

15 Dzaja, Konfesionalnost i Nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine, 113; Mazower, The Balkans, 56-57. According to Gunther Rothenberg, in the 18th and 19th centuries “The education of the Orthodox clergy was extremely primitive; often the priests could neither read nor write. In contrast with the government supported Roman Catholic ‘German’ schools, the Orthodox, or ‘national’ schools received no aid and were supported entirely by their own, often poverty-stricken, communities.” See Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881, 87. Rothenberg goes on to note (p. 98) that apart from these material disadvantages, limits were also placed on the number of Orthodox men who could study for the priesthood, a limit which did not apply to Catholics.

nature of ethnoconfessional identity in southeastern Europe, and belies the constructivist argument that elites and institutions impose identities from above.

If explanations based on the role of educational and religious institutions in the determination and transmission of identity in southeastern Europe are not plausible, this then raises the issue of the actual mechanics or logistics of nation-building and identity formation. Eric Hobsbawm, for instance, suggests that “Nations and their associated phenomena must . . . . . be analyzed in terms of political, technical, administrative, economic and other conditions and requirements.”\(^{17}\) In the case of the nation-building processes in southeastern Europe, what were these conditions and requirements, and to what extent were they satisfied?

In the following series of micro-case studies, the plausibility of several aspects of constructivist and modernist claims about nation-building and identity formation will be analyzed and tested. First, who were these elites ostensibly “building nations” in southeastern Europe, and how many of them were there? Second, what means of communication did they have to spread their message, and what instruments of state power did they have at their disposal? Third, why did some of these efforts succeed while others failed? All three of these questions can be summed up in one: how plausible is the elite-led constructivist model of the formation and transmission of ethnoconfessional identity in southeastern Europe?

**Micro-Case Study 1: Serbia**

19\(^{th}\) century Serbia provides a good place in which to test many of the premises of the constructivist argument regarding the importance of state power on the identity-formation

\(^{17}\) Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 10.
process, and the role of institutions such as the media or the school system in fostering a specific identity. Recent treatments of 19th century Serbian history, for instance, suggest that most inhabitants of what is today considered Serbia proper had little or no sense of ethnic identity or national awareness, but through a process of diffusion during the course of the 19th century, a modernizing elite and state bureaucracy, adopting ideas imported from Western Europe, produced an essentially nationalized (and nationalistic) population.

A detailed analysis of Serbia and the Serbian government at this point in time, however, reveals several problems with such a view, and/or the constructivist argument in general. These problems mainly revolve around whether the fledgling Serbian state and educational institutions really had the capabilities to carry out such a nationalizing project given their actual resources and weak capacities. In 1839, for instance, at the end of the reign of Prince Miloš Obrenović, the Serbian government consisted of 672 state officials (out of a total population of approximately one million), of whom 201 were policemen. Since most people throughout history have usually shied away from contact with the police, that leaves 471 state officials to spread the nationalist gospel to one million people (the ratio is approximately 1: 2,123) when they were not busy attending to the duties of everyday government administration. Moreover, such institutions as Serbia possessed at this time were uniformly weak; Stokes, for instance, has described nineteenth century Serbia as possessing “a traditional agricultural economy, an ineffectual church, no aristocracy, a minuscule army, and undersized bureaucracy, and a weak royal apparatus.”

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A second category of people frequently seen as evangelists of nationalism were Serbs who were educated or had lived in Western European countries. According to this view, these individuals spread the “modern” conceptions of ethnic identity and nationalism they had imbibed in Western Europe. In this category one could include the Habsburg Serbs as well, and particularly those living in the town of Novi Sad, one of the main centers of learning and culture for the Serbs in the Habsburg monarchy. Thus, as one version of this theory argues:

... locally born but European-educated elites made attempts to superimpose Western European ideas of nation and nation-state—ideas that had grown up more or less organically in Western Europe over hundreds of years—onto the existing mix of peoples in the region... But as a result of geography and history, nations of this sort did not exist in the Balkans, so the European-educated elites had to create them, through a cultural process of national “awakening.”

This view of the identity-formation and nation-building process raises a number of important questions about the simple mechanics and logistics of the nation-building process. In the eighteenth century, for instance, it has been estimated that only some one hundred Habsburg Serbs had been educated in Western Europe.21 Allowing for the fact that by 1840 the number of “enlightened,” nationally-conscious Serb intellectuals and politicians might have increased ten-fold, by 1840 there might have been some one thousand such Serbs spreading the nationalist gospel. The modernist understanding of Balkan ethnoconfessional identity then suggests that these “nationally-conscious” Serbs then imposed or instilled a sense of identity on not just the one million inhabitants of Serbia proper, but on the Orthodox population of Bosnia & Herzegovina as well.

20 See Andrew Baruch Wachtel, The Balkans in World History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 7. Note that with respect to Western Europe, Baruch argues that notions of the “nation” and “nation-state” grew up “more or less organically... over hundreds of years,” but that in the case of the Balkans such ideas were imported and imposed. Throughout this dissertation, of course, the argument has been made that identity-building and the “creation” of nations in the Balkans has been a similarly organic, long-term process.

21 Vucinich, “The Serbs of Austria-Hungary.”
How they might have done this, however, is an important question. Mass media such as radio, television, and the internet obviously did not exist at this time. But it is also doubtful that newspapers or books could have fostered or promoted a sense of common identity in the nineteenth century, because the vast majority of the Balkans’ population during this period could neither read nor write. In 1866, for instance, only 4.2 percent of the Principality of Serbia’s population was literate.22 Printing presses did not even exist in Serbian-speaking areas in the eighteenth century,23 and as late as 1897 the Serbian census shows that the literacy rate for males in larger towns was not quite 50 percent, while for females urban literacy was only 23 percent. In the countryside, where the overwhelming majority of the population lived, the corresponding figures were estimated to be 10 percent and 1 percent, respectively.24

It is also doubtful that the Serbian school system could have fostered a strong sense of national identity during this period, as it has been argued was the case with Germany. Bismarck, for instance, had reputedly said that the German nation had been created by its schoolmasters, and in 1807, Fichte’s stress on the importance of a universal educational system for the German states was condensed into the saying that “a good education system is worth an army.”25

22 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 20. Along these lines, Mark Mazower notes that “Most people remained illiterate, ignorant of books and the new doctrines they contained, inhabitants of a much more circumscribed world.” Mazower, The Balkans, 74.


24 See Gale Stokes, Politics as Development: The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth Century Serbia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 1. As Stokes further points out (p. 300), all the political groups in nineteenth-century Serbia “used their newspapers to make their cases, although these could have little immediate impact on the illiterate peasant voter . . . the ordinary Serb was not able to read the newspapers in which such [nationalist] arguments appeared.”

Serbia’s fledgling educational system at this time, however, does not seem to have been a particularly powerful institution for spreading the nationalist gospel. As late as 1810, for instance, there were only two elementary schools in the Paşalik of Belgrade (the core of future Serbia). In both, the language of instruction was Greek.\(^{26}\) A full one-hundred years later, in 1910, only 5.8 percent of the Serbian population was attending primary school.\(^{27}\) In the 25-year period between 1838-1863, Serbia’s highest institution of learning, the Lycée in Belgrade, graduated a total of 1,205 students; in the 1863-64 academic year, the Lycée boasted a total of 28 students.\(^{28}\)

Another important question is how the evangelists of nationalism would have gotten around. Serbia’s transportation networks were so poor that there were only two carriages in all of Serbia in the first half of the nineteenth century,\(^{29}\) and the first railway in the country was only built in the 1880s.\(^{30}\) There was not a single large bridge in Serbia in 1860, nor any commercial river vessels, and riparian transport within Serbia’s interior was non-existent. The first telegraph line was built in 1855, and Serbia’s postal system did not get a four-wheeled coach until after 1868.\(^{31}\)

Given these demographic, physical and technological realities, the diffusion argument, whereby over the course of a few decades Western-influenced elites imposed their own preferred

\(^{26}\) Mazower, *The Balkans*, 74.

\(^{27}\) Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 426, ft. 22.


\(^{29}\) L.S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, 251.

\(^{30}\) Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 426, ft. 22.

sense of identity on a population whose identity was otherwise ambiguous, does not seem sustainable. It is hard to see how such relatively small numbers of people could, in a relatively short amount of time, impose their preferred sense of identity on large peasant masses, spread out over large areas, who are moreover traditionally weary of new ideas coming from city folk. On the contrary, a more plausible argument in the case of 19th century Serbia would be that these elites promoted projects and policies compatible with the beliefs, traditions, and cultural values of the vast majority of the given populations they were dealing with. Again, this suggests that the causal direction in the identity-formation process proceeds from the level of mass society rather than the opposite.

**Micro-Case Study 2: Nationalisms in Bosnia & Herzegovina**

The failure of a 19th century attempt to create a pan-Bosnian identity for Muslims, Croats, and Serbs provides another example of the difficulties would-be nation-builders and constructivists face. After Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia & Herzegovina in 1878, the province’s Habsburg administrators realized that ethnoconfessional divisions within Bosnia created numerous obstacles towards the primary strategic goal of the occupation: reducing the dissatisfaction of the Habsburg monarchy’s South Slavs, and limiting the threat Serbia posed as a potential Piedmont for Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs in the monarchy. Habsburg officials thus embarked on what was an explicitly constructivist effort to create and foster a new identity, *bošnjaštvo*, for Bosnia & Herzegovina’s Croats, Muslims, and Serbs.\(^{32}\)

\(^{32}\) It is worth noting that the Habsburg administrators of Bosnia & Herzegovina embarked on this effort, even though similar such campaigns had failed. For example, in the 1860s, an effort by the Bosnian Franciscan Antun Knežević to propagate a non-confessional Bosnian identity “found practically no response from the Bosnian population.” See Dzaja, *Konfessionalnost i Nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine*, 13.
The Habsburg constructivist campaign to promote *bošnjaštvo* faced serious competition. The nature of this competition, however, is a point of debate. Most recent scholarship suggests that *bošnjaštvo* competed with simultaneous identity projects promoted by Croat and Serb nationalists seeking to create new identities for BiH’s Catholic and Orthodox populations, respectively. An opposing view argues that *bošnjaštvo* was in competition with the already-existing identities of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s peoples.

In essence, this debate stems from disagreement as to the degree to which BiH’s peoples in the nineteenth century already had established ethnoconfessional identities. One school of thought argues (perhaps most strongly by Noel Malcolm) that differences between social groups in BiH at this time were based on economic class (i.e., whether one was a land-holder or not) rather than on ethnicity or cultural background. Thus, according to this view, while the Catholic or Orthodox populations of BiH might have had a different identity from the Bosnian Muslim population, these different identities had little ethnic or national content, and it was only the actions of nationalizing elites from Croatia and Serbia that turned Catholics and Orthodox, respectively, into Croats and Serbs.

With regard to the Bosnian Muslims, there has been considerable debate (both amongst Bosnian Muslims themselves, and amongst scholars studying their history) as to their ethnogenesis as well. Some Bosnian scholars have argued that the Bosnian Muslims are descendants of the original Illyrian population that lived in the Balkans prior to the Slavic migrations of the 7th & 8th centuries who later (and to a very limited extent), intermixed with the

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33 See Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*.
Slavs over the following centuries. Sometimes this argument is combined with the thesis that the Bosnian Muslims are descendants of a medieval Bosnian heretical sect, the Bogomils. Another view (not surprisingly, more popular in Croat or Serb historiography, respectively) has argued that Bosnia’s Muslims are descendants of Croats or Serbs who converted to Islam after the 15th century to preserve their economic privileges.

Considerable debate also remains as to the extent to which the Bosnian Muslims had a separate sense of identity to distinguish them from the Catholic or Orthodox populations of BiH, or from the Ottomans/Turks in BiH, and when they developed such a separate identity. In the early part of the 20th century, for instance, prominent experts on southeastern Europe such as Hugh Seton-Watson claimed that “Bosnia’s Mohammedans do not know whether they are Serbs or Croats.” Other historians, however, have claimed that a sense of separate Bosnian Muslim identity was already visible with Husein-beg Gradaščević’s revolt in 1831-32 against Ottoman rule which showed “the existence of a strong Bosnian Muslim identity with its own historical

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34 See, for instance, Enver Imamović, Porijeklo i Pripadnost Stanovništva Bosne i Hercegovine (Sarajevo: Bosanski Korijeni, 1998), 29-52. See also Mustafa Imamović, Historija Bošnjaka (Sarajevo: Preporod, 1998), 23.

35 For a useful survey of these debates, see Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1996), 7-27.

36 As to the extent to which Bosnia’s Muslim population had an identity separate from that of the Ottoman Turks, it is interesting to note that as late as the Habsburg occupation, Bosnian Muslim clerics were literate mainly only in Turkish or Arabic (some two-thousand in the former and several hundred in the latter), showing how weakly developed education in the local vernacular was at this time. Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 96.

37 As quoted by Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 195. Even Alija Izetbegović, for instance, would claim in 1991 that “Yes, I was a Serb while I still didn’t know exactly who I was and what I was. I followed my older brothers, who chose to be Serbs between the two wars . . . When they asked me afterwards what I was I said that I didn’t know. We came out of World War II in a state of great delusion and confusion. We were forced to be Croats during the period of the Independent State of Croatia. Probably out of spite for being forcibly Croatized, I immediately declared myself as a Serb. But after I thought about it a little, I saw that I was neither a Serb, nor a Croat, but a Muslim.” Izetbegović originally made the comments in Svijet (Sarajevo) in 1991. They were reprinted in Svijet, 29 May 1997, 17.
perspective . . . with relevance for what was to come.”

Later Bosnian Muslim resistance to the Habsburg occupation of BiH in 1878 is seen as a continuation and confirmation of this already existing separate sense of Bosnian Muslim identity. Yet another view claims that the Bosnian Muslim’s identity was too firmly fixed by 1900 for it to be subsumed by either Croat or Serb national ideologies. Thus, in pre-1914 Bosnia, the term “muslimanski narod” was already as pervasive as the equivalent “srpski narod” or hrvatski narod.

It was in the context of such ambiguities and debates that the Austro-Hungarian minister of finance, Benjamin Kállay (1882-1903) made the first explicit and sustained constructivist attempt to create a common identity for Bosnia & Herzegovina’s Muslims, Croats and Serbs. Kállay saw his mission, and that of the Habsburg Empire, as that of “a great Occidental empire, charged with the mission of carrying civilization to Oriental peoples.” In keeping with this “civilizing mission,” one of the cornerstones of Kállay’s strategy (and of many subsequent international interveners as well) was that religious tolerance and equality under the law for Bosnia’s ethnoconfessional groups would assimilate them into the Habsburg empire. Anticipating by some one hundred years the constructivist thinking and strategies of 20th century international high representatives to promote a common Bosnian identity, Kállay

38 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 5-6.

39 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 23.

40 Donia and Fine, Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 112.

41 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 242.

42 Donia, Islam Under the Double Eagle, 14.

43 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 57. Donia, for his part, claims that Kállay “believed that the masses should be showered with benefits but deprived of rights,” obviously a belief that for “ordinary people,” economic and material benefits outweigh considerations of political importance. See Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 62.
felt that the best antidote to popular unrest was a rational, fair and generous government. Kállay, along with many other imperial civil servants, believed in the Habsburg monarchy’s ‘civilizing mission’ in Bosnia, and for two decades he worked to mold Bosnia and Sarajevo into his vision of an enlightened European state and society. He aggressively promoted economic development, Westernization, cultural modernization, and administrative and legal reform. Such innovations, he believed, would result in a docile, contented, and grateful population.44

Kállay’s strategy to create a new pan-ethnoconfessional identity included all of the fundamental assumptions and tenets of constructivism and modernization theory. He believed that economic progress had to precede political reforms; as Okey notes, “in the first instance, his mission was an economic one.”45 Another implicit assumption underlying Kállay’s bošnjaštvo campaign was the belief that the identities of Bosnia’s peoples were fluid and malleable; for instance, Kállay believed that Bosnia’s Muslims would eventually convert to Catholicism rather than Orthodoxy if the former was supported as a privileged religion.46 In keeping with constructivists’ stress on the role of the media, Kállay tried to create a pro-Bosnian press, an important example of which was the newspaper Bošnjak launched in 1891 to promote the new multiconfessional identity. Within a short time, however, “the paper gradually abandoned bošnjaštvo when that concept failed to gain popular support.”47 Kállay’s constructivist efforts also included promoting his preferred version of Bosnian history through such things as the creation of the Zemaljski (sometimes translated as “Regional”) Museum in Sarajevo, and

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45 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 59.

46 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 60.

“romanticizing [Bosnia’s] cultural traditions.”

New textbooks for Bosnian schoolchildren were written designed to strengthen their “Bosnian self-consciousness,” and it became mandatory to use the term “Bosnian language,” while use of the terms “Croatian language” or “Serbian language” were prohibited.”

Other similarly repressive measures included prohibiting the creation of ethnoconfessionally “exclusive” organizations or groups, no matter how seemingly benign such groups might have been, as seen in the denial of a request to create a “Serb Singing Society” in Mostar, and a proposed “Croat Singing Society” in Sarajevo had to change its name to “Trebević.”

Even architecture was invoked in the campaign to build a common Bosnian identity for Croats, Muslims, and Serbs; thus, a style that became known as “neo-Orientalism” was developed that was supposed to reflect Bosnian conditions.

Kállay’s strategy also rested on the belief that identities and loyalties in BiH could be altered if the local ethnoconfessional groups could be cutoff from outside influences. Towards this end, Croats, Muslims, and Serbs were to be isolated from the “corrupting” influences of Zagreb, Constantinople, and Belgrade as much as possible, while his version of an indigenous Bosnian identity was promoted. Plays performed in theaters were altered or banned if censors believed

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49 Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, 67-68.

50 Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, 76.


52 See Donia’s description of the work of the famous Viennese architect Josip Vancaš in Sarajevo during this period; Donia, *Sarajevo: A Biography*, 72.

53 Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, 62.
they did not promote the official line of Bosnian unity.\textsuperscript{54} Controls over contacts with people from neighboring states were put into place; thus, “Visits to Bosnia from neighboring south Slav states were very rare and were vigourously controlled, as with a party of Belgrade Gymnasium students in 1890, who, through an ‘outwardly quite friendly considerateness’, were to be kept from any unobserved contact with Bosnians.”\textsuperscript{55} Other forms of repression were adopted as well; for instance, some 235 Serbs and 42 Muslims suspected of having contacts with Serbia and Montenegro had their mail monitored, and the railway authorities were instructed to submit all suspicious shipments to the Provincial Government for inspection. “Hostile” newspapers were also prohibited from entering Bosnia.\textsuperscript{56}

Despite these efforts, however, Kállay’s twenty-year effort to construct a non-confessional, pan-ethnic Bosnian identity ultimately failed, although he did attract some limited support from the Bosnian Muslims and some Bosnian Croats. As Saçir Filandra notes,

Kállay’s form of bošnjaštvo, according to which all inhabitants of Bosnia were Bošnjaks regardless of their religious adherence [for the sake of state-political goals] violated the real course of organizing life along religious-national lines, so that by 1903 the occupational authorities were already abandoning it. \ldots That attempt to build a united Bosnian political people, completely in keeping with western, modern theories of the construction of society and the relationship between state and nation, in Bosnia, despite five decades of effort, simply did not succeed, neither for the Ottomans, nor for the Dual Monarchy. The particularities of Bosnian reality were such that they eluded all rational models and schematizations, which in numerous other examples showed and proved themselves to be successful.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{54} Donia, \textit{Sarajevo: A Tradition Betrayed}, 83.

\textsuperscript{55} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 73.

\textsuperscript{56} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 82.

\textsuperscript{57} Filandra, \textit{Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću}, 13-17.
By the end of Habsburg rule in Bosnia, BiH’s Croats and Serbs were definitively looking more towards Zagreb and Belgrade, respectively, than they would ever henceforth look towards Sarajevo; the Bosnian Croats, for instance, entered the 20th century “as a part of a united Croatian national, political, spiritual and cultural collective.” Importantly, both clericalist and secular tendencies in Bosnian Croat society supported a Trialist solution to the Dual Monarchy’s, which envisioned the creation of a third, South Slav unit within the empire, led by Croatia and which would have included Bosnia & Herzegovina.

The failure of bošnjaštvo opens the issue of the identities and loyalties of BiH’s Catholic (Croat) and Orthodox (Serb) populations. As noted above, one school of historical thought has argued that the Catholic and Orthodox populations in BiH had no sense of national consciousness until relatively late in the 19th century. Thus, in the case of the Croats in Bosnia “The great bulk of Bosnian Catholics continued to identify themselves as ‘Latins’ and their language as ‘Slav’, ‘Bosnian’ or simply ‘ours’.” Noel Malcolm has similarly claimed that before the late nineteenth century, the Catholic and Orthodox populations of BiH had no sense of identity as Croats or Serbs, respectively, and only came to develop such identities under the influence of nationalistic elite propaganda coming from Croatia and Serbia. Predictably, this thesis is especially popular with Bosniac writers.

58 Filandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, 15.
59 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 166.
60 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 13.
61 Malcolm appears a bit confused about his own argument, however, for he also notes that in 1557 the Grand Vizier Mehmed Paša Sokolović re-established the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate of Peć. Malcolm claims that Sokolović came from a Bosnian Serb family, but by his own account this was some 300 years prior to when Orthodox inhabitants of Bosnia should have had a Serb identity or consciousness. Nevertheless, it could be said that this perspective is at present the conventional scholarly wisdom on this issue. Mazower, for instance, similarly argues that in the Ottoman Empire, the “indifference to nationalist categories among the Sultan’s Christian subjects
Here it is worth pointing out that an earlier generation of Balkan scholarship took a different view of these issues. Peter Sugar, for instance, in his study of the industrialization of Bosnia & Herzegovina during the Habsburg period reached significantly different conclusions about the nature of identities in Bosnia during this period, and is worth quoting at length. Thus, according to Sugar, surveying the local populations according to confessional background

\[\ldots\text{indicates not only religious differences which were vital in themselves, but also delineates self-centered and mutually-antagonistic social groups, cultural orientations with their historical causes, and in some cases even social and economic status. Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism have indicated more than forms of worship in Bosnia-Herzegovina and do even to the present day. Historically they represented three different cultures which, like the religions, came from three different sources. The Muslims looked to Istanbul and called themselves Turks. The Orthodox sympathized with Montenegro and later also with Serbia and considered themselves Serbs, while the Catholics looked to Hungary, Venice, and later to Austria and Zagreb for leadership and spoke of themselves as Croats. Sharp as these dividing lines still are at present, they were unimportant if we compare them with the meaning and importance they had under the Ottoman and later under Austria-Hungary.}\]

Yet as in the case of Serbia and the “spread” of a Serbian national consciousness within Serbia proper analyzed above, it is hard to see how the diffusion and transmission of the nationalist idea might have taken place amongst BiH’s non-Muslim populations within the overall context of a severely poor and underdeveloped province. Bosnia only received its first reflected their sense of belonging to a community defined by religion, where the linguistic differences between Greek and Bulgarian mattered less than their shared belief in Orthodoxy.” See Mazower, *The Balkans*, 39-40. Similarly, John Lampe has argued that “the populations of such medieval polities surely attached more importance, at the time, to their religious identity in newly accepted Christian churches than to brief native states.” Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 14.

62 See, for instance, Aličić, *Pokret za autonomiju Bosne od 1831. do 1832. godine*, 355-371. In the case of the Orthodox population of Bosnia, for instance, Aličić argues that they were mainly Vlach shepherds who converted to Orthodoxy in the medieval period, and then adopted a Serb national identity in the nineteenth century.

63 Emphasis added. It is worth stressing the point that Sugar’s claims about the strength and importance of identities and the mutual antagonism of various social groups was made in the early 1960s, i.e., at least a quarter of a century before anyone had ever heard of people such as Slobodan Milošević or Radovan Karadžić. See Sugar, *The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1963), 6.
printing press in 1866, and it was used to print official publications of the Bosnian regional government.\textsuperscript{64} From 1879-1893 there was only one public high school in Bosnia (in Sarajevo), of course, for male students only.\textsuperscript{65} Gale Stokes claims that in the 1870s less than one percent of Bosnia’s population was literate, and even this small reading public would probably have had a hard time acquiring nationalist literature because even in the 1870s there was not a single bookstore in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{66} As late as 1910, 88\% of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s population was still illiterate.\textsuperscript{67} Organizations dedicated to fostering national consciousness had relatively weak memberships. In 1909, for instance, the Serb cultural organization \textit{Prosvjeta} (“Enlightenment”) had 5,101 members, the Croat \textit{Napredak} (“Progress”) had 3,156 in 1912, and the Muslim organization \textit{Gajret} some 2,089 in 1910, for a total BiH population of some 1,900,000 at the time.\textsuperscript{68} By the end of the Habsburg occupation, only some 1,779 individuals had completed secondary education in BiH and could be considered its intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{69} In 1899-1900, out of a total of nineteen secondary school professors in BiH (seventeen of whom were Catholics), there was only one native Bosnian (a Muslim teacher of Arabic), while at least half of the lawyers, printers, and booksellers in BiH in 1913 were foreigners.\textsuperscript{70} Out of 114 doctors listed in a

\textsuperscript{64} Donia, \textit{Sarajevo: A Biography}, 35.

\textsuperscript{65} Donia, \textit{Sarajevo: A Biography}, 85. In 1882, Donia points out, a secondary school for women opened in Sarajevo. In 1904-05, but pointing to the ethnoconfessional segregation of the time, enrollment in the school was as follows: “84 Catholics, 67 were Jews, and 36 were Serbian Orthodox. \textit{Not a single Muslim attended}, as the life of a Muslim girl was largely confined to her parents’ home.” Donia, \textit{Sarajevo: A Biography}, 85 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{66} See Stokes, \textit{Politics as Development}, 92.

\textsuperscript{67} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 184. Okey cites figures showing that the comparable rate of illiteracy in Croatia-Slavonia in 1900 was 56\% percent, and in Serbia, 77\% percent. Okey (p. 222) claims 99.7\% percent of Muslim women were illiterate in 1910.

\textsuperscript{68} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 162. According to these figures, each member of one of these organizations would have been responsible for converting some 184 members to the national cause.

\textsuperscript{69} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 218.

\textsuperscript{70} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 221.
provincial yearbook for 1904, only twelve had local sounding names, reflecting the fact that most professionals in Bosnia at this time came from other parts of the Habsburg empire.\textsuperscript{71} In 1878 there were a total of fifty-four Catholic schools in BiH.\textsuperscript{72} A Bosnian Serb literary review, \textit{Bosanska vila}, founded in 1886, had a total of 387 subscribers in Bosnia (157 of whom were in Sarajevo).\textsuperscript{73} The first permanent Bosnian Serb school in Sarajevo was only founded in 1850,\textsuperscript{74} and such Bosnian Serb schools as were founded during this period were not very strong; in 1879, the Austrians recorded the existence of 56 Serb schools with some 3,500 students, out of a Serb population of 600,000.\textsuperscript{75} Such confessional schools, moreover, were generally poor; at the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, “[F]inancially secure Serb schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be counted on the fingers of one hand.”\textsuperscript{76} Bureaucratic ordinances frequently hindered the ability of Catholic or Orthodox confessional schools to operate in an efficient way; an ordinance passed in 1892, for instance, demanded that teachers in confessional schools obtain a certificate of political reliability, the effect of which was to delay the hiring of new teachers for significant periods. This was especially detrimental for BiH’s many one-teacher schools; for instance, the school in Glamoć was apparently closed for four years for this reason, while the school in Ljubuški was

\textsuperscript{71} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 171.

\textsuperscript{72} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 15.

\textsuperscript{73} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 84.

\textsuperscript{74} Donia, \textit{Sarajevo: A Biography}, 33.

\textsuperscript{75} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 12. Writing in the early part of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Jovan Cvijić provided figures claiming that in 1906 there were 253 state elementary schools (which of course propagated the official pan-confessional ideology) as opposed to 70 elementary schools supported by local Orthodox church parochial organizations and 31 elementary schools supported by Catholic church parochial organizations. See Cvijić, “Дух и смисао аустроугарске управе у Босни,” in Cvijić, \textit{Сабрана дела}, Volume 3 (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2000), 174.

\textsuperscript{76} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 158.
closed for seven.\textsuperscript{77} There were only 71 [Serb] confessional school teachers in BiH in 1881-82, of which only 27 were qualified. All of them, moreover, were “wretchedly paid.” More Serb schools closed than opened in 1882, and the numbers enrolled in these schools fell by thirteen percent in 1882 as compared to the previous year. In comparison, 40 of 59 government teachers were considered to be qualified, while enrollment in state schools increased by 28 percent in the same period.\textsuperscript{78} Although various members of the Belgrade government during the nineteenth century organized networks of agents to promote Serb national consciousness and agitate in favor of unification with Serbia, their numbers were small and the success of their efforts questionable.\textsuperscript{79}

There were strict prohibitions on ethnic identifications during this time as well; thus, it was mandatory to use the term “Bosnian” for the language one spoke, and historic Serb figures (with the exception of Saint Sava) were banned from Serb confessional schools. Serb reading rooms in Sarajevo and Livno were also refused permission to operate because of their “national and religious exclusiveness.”\textsuperscript{80} The 1860s and 70s “were a time of mounting government pressure on Serb national feeling. Educational and religious leaders were expelled or imprisoned, textbooks

\textsuperscript{77} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 86.

\textsuperscript{78} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 52. In the period between 1881-1890, the number of Serb schools increased from 57 to 61. However, during this same period there were significant fluctuations; for instance, thirty-three new schools opened, while 29 closed, suggesting that the educational system was both unstable and relatively weak. See Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 76.

\textsuperscript{79} On the work of such clandestine networks and organizations during this period, which David MacKenzie called “small and generally ineffective,” see MacKenzie, “Serbian Nationalist and Military Organizations and the Piedmont Idea, 1844-1914,” \textit{East European Quarterly} 16 (Fall 1982), 323-344.

\textsuperscript{80} Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 87.
confiscated, foreign south Slav newspapers banned and the expressions ‘Bosnian language’ and ‘Bosnian nation’ enforced at the expense of the suspect term ‘Serb’. ”

Another interesting question is how receptive the rural peasantry might have been to this supposed conversion to the national ideal being spread by the Balkan apostles of nationalism. The peasantry is, overall, traditionally considered to be conservative in its thinking and suspicious of city people. In Bosnia in the 1870s, for instance, in rural areas “Christians were, overwhelmingly, illiterate peasants who impressed observers by their ‘extreme abjectness of mind as the result of long and harsh serfdom’, their ignorance, poverty and fanaticism, their ‘total engrossment in the problem of daily subsistence’. ” A local official at this time described the Bosnian peasant as “atavistically burdened by great suspicion, overall wants to hear nothing of newspapers, and the efforts of Serbo-enthusiasts founder on the passive resistance of the rural population.” Meanwhile, the elite that was supposedly fostering a Serb national consciousness in Bosnia was “small, cautious and moreover divided.”

81 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 7.

82 Consider, for instance, the experience of Ernest Čimić, a Croatian bureaucrat in interwar Yugoslavia charged with keeping tabs on what the peasants were doing in his district. As Čimić reported to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Belgrade, “peasants assemble in and outside the villages, but that it cannot be determined what they are discussing . . . because it is impossible to induce a single one of them to inform for us for any sum of money or profit. The psychology of the masses has a particularly great role in this and from it stems the fear that he [informant] will be considered a ‘national traitor,’ so that this is stronger than the desire for profit.” As cited by Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 177. Emphasis in the original.

83 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 8.

84 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 213.

85 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 9.
As was the case with Serbia discussed above, infrastructural and communications limitations also makes the diffusion theory suspect. Mid-nineteenth century Sarajevo, for instance, only had two carriages, one for the vizier and the other for the Austrian consul, neither of which was probably being used to convey Croat or Serb nationalist missionaries; even if they had, “roads in the Western sense of the term did not exist” in Bosnia at this time.\textsuperscript{86} Bosnia did not receive its first printing press until 1866, and railway construction only started in the 1870s.\textsuperscript{87} There were approximately 130 civilian telephone subscribers in 1898, and about 870 in 1914.\textsuperscript{88}

In sum, it is difficult to see how identity-projects such as “Serbianism” or “Croatianism” could have succeeded in 19\textsuperscript{th} century Bosnia & Herzegovina given their organizational and resource disadvantages in comparison to the Austro-Hungarian state, and in comparison to the sheer number of people it was necessary to “convert” to a new form of identity. As in the case of 19\textsuperscript{th} century Serbia proper, it is much more plausible to claim that the success of Croat and Serb nationalists in 19\textsuperscript{th} century Bosnia & Herzegovina could be attributed to the fact that their identity-projects were in tune with the already extant traditions and sentiments of the people they were allegedly trying to convert. This in turn suggests the rather limited strategic room for maneuver would-be nation-builders face, and, by extension, the limits of constructivism itself.

**Micro-Case Study 3: Macedonianism**

The “construction” and emergence of a Macedonian state provides perhaps the most interesting case defying constructivist logic regarding the formation of ethnic groups and

\textsuperscript{86} Božidar Jezernik, *Wild Europe: The Balkans in the Gaze of Western Travelers*, 93.

\textsuperscript{87} Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, 6; Donia, *Sarajevo: A Biography*, 65.

\textsuperscript{88} Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, 217.
national identities. The emergence of the modern Macedonian nationalist movement is often traced to the founding of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Movement (IMRO) in 1893 by six young intellectuals. For four hundred years prior to this date, the term Macedonia did not even exist as a geographical/administrative unit within the Ottoman Empire, as the territory comprising most of historic Macedonia throughout this period was divided into several Ottoman vilayets.\footnote{See Nadine Akhund, “Muslim Representation in the Three Ottoman vilayets of Macedonia: Administration and Military Power (1878-1908),” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 29 (December 2009), 443-445. “Historic Macedonia” refers to the three regions traditionally understood to comprise Macedonia: Pirin Macedonia, in Bulgaria; Aegean Macedonia, in Greece; and Vardar Macedonia, in the current Republic of Macedonia. In the Ottoman period, this area roughly comprised the vilayets of Selanik (Thessaloniki), Manastir (contemporary Bitolj), and Üsküb (Skopje). According to a 1912 estimate of the population of these regions based on language, there were an estimated 1,150,000 Slavs, 400,000 Turks, 300,000 Greeks, 200,000 Vlachs, 120,000 Albanians, and 100,000 Jews living in “historic Macedonia.” Most of the Turks were expelled or fled during the Greek-Turkish population exchanges of the 1920s; the vast majority of the Jews were killed during World War II. For a more detailed discussion of the population of Macedonia in the 19th and 20th centuries, see Elizabeth Barker, “The Origin of the Macedonian Dispute,” and James Pettifer, “The New Macedonian Question,” both in James Pettifer, ed., *The New Macedonian Question* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). Throughout this chapter, “Macedonia” will refer to Vardar Macedonia, i.e., the territory and the Slavic population comprising the current Republic of Macedonia.} Many scholars claim that the Slavic inhabitants of this region were an “amorphous” mass of Balkan peasants with no strong sense of identity or national consciousness. Perhaps the most important exponent of this view of the Slavic inhabitants of the southern Balkans as an “amorphous” mass was the great Serbian ethnographer and geographer Jovan Cvijić, who spent decades exploring and researching the Balkan peninsula in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries.\footnote{For Cvijić’s views on the identity of the population of present-day Macedonia, and his arguments that they were more Serb than Bulgarian, see “Из проматрања о етнографији Македоније,” in Cvijić, *Сабрани дела*, Volume 3 (Београд: Српска Академија Наука и Уметност, 2000), 153-158. For similar arguments on the origins of the Macedonians (from a Serb historian), see Djoko Slijepčević, *The Macedonian Question: The Struggle for Southern Serbia* (Chicago: American Institute for Balkan Affairs, 1958).} According to Jezernik,

\ldots till the beginning of the twentieth century the Slavic people in Macedonia developed no clear consciousness of nationality; those who did not belong to their local community were strangers \ldots many people simply could not understand the concept of nationality and ‘I am an Orthodox, I was an Exarchist, but now I am a Serb.’ Only when directly asked again whether they were Bulgarians or Serbs, might they answer: ‘I was a Bulgarian, now I am a Serb.’\footnote{Jezernik, *Wild Europe*, p. 181.}
Well into the 20th century, the Macedonian Slav population had none of the institutions constructivism argues are necessary for a successful identity-project: no school system controlled by local Macedonians, no state apparatus or governmental bureaucracy, no autonomous church, and no independent military organization. By way of contrast, by the mid-19th century the already-established Bulgarian, Greek and Serb states all had developed programs attempting to claim the population of Macedonia as “theirs.” Yet despite these disadvantages, popular and social pressure and support for the creation of an independent Macedonian political entity was so strong that in November 1943, Tito’s communist movement recognized the existence of a separate Macedonian people and endorsed the creation of a separate Macedonian republic within the planned postwar Yugoslav federation.

Such an outcome, however, was far from certain even just a couple of decades earlier. Historically, most things about Macedonia and the Macedonians have been bitterly contested. Serbs tended to claim that the Macedonians were “southern Serbs,” Bulgarians that they were “western Bulgarians,” and Greeks that they were “Slavophone Greeks.” Historically, Bulgars had laid claim to Macedonia based on the fact that much of present-day Macedonia had been part of Tsar Samuel’s Bulgarian empire in the 10th and 11th centuries. Serbs, meanwhile, laid claim to both the Macedonians as a people and to the territory because Skopje had been the capital of Serbian Tsar Dušan’s 14th century Serbian empire, and due to the fact that Serb ethnographers found many cultural similarities between the populations of Macedonia and of Serbia proper. Linguistically, although the Slavic dialect spoken in the Vardar valley grammatically most closely resembles modern Bulgarian, there were enough similarities (especially phonetically) to allow Serb ethnographers to make a plausible claim to the Macedonians on linguistic grounds as
well. Even today, many Bulgarian (and some Serb) scholars deny that Macedonians really constitute a separate nation or ethnic group.

No independent Macedonian institutions existed during the period of Ottoman rule. Although an essentially Bulgarian “Archbishopric of Ohrid” existed as an autocephalous church organization until 1777, in that year it was abolished and control over the church in Macedonia was returned to the Patriarch of Constantinople, who installed Greek hierarchs throughout Macedonia. In 1870, the newly-established Exarchate of Bulgaria obtained jurisdictional control over many of the dioceses and churches in Vardar Macedonia, as a result of which the Bulgarians were able to send many priests and teachers to Macedonia in an effort to Bulgarianize the local population.\(^\text{92}\) In terms of governmental administration, the Ottoman state apparatus, bureaucracy and military during this period were all almost exclusively Muslim/Turkish.\(^\text{93}\)

Under Russian sponsorship, in March 1878 the Treaty of San Stefano established a greater Bulgaria which included Pirin and Vardar Macedonia, as well as large parts of Aegean Macedonia. Unwillingness to accept the creation of such a powerful potential Russian client state in the Balkans, however, led the great powers to convene the Congress of Berlin in July 1878 to create a new Balkan political order. The Congress of Berlin formally recognized the full independence of Bulgaria and Serbia (the Hellenic Republic had been recognized as fully independent in 1833), and “Turkey in Europe” was essentially limited to Albania and


\(^{93}\) On these issues, see Nadine Akhund, “Muslim Representation in the Three Ottoman vilayets of Macedonia: Administration and Military Power (1878-1908),” op. cit.
Macedonia. Throughout this period, various nationalist/bandit groups, known as komitadji (“committee men”) operated in Macedonia, some sponsored by Belgrade, some by Sofia, and some by Athens. While ostensibly dedicated to expelling the Turks from Macedonia, the various komitadji bands frequently betrayed each other to the Turks when necessary. Indigenous Macedonian armed movements, meanwhile, were split between factions that supported Bulgarian hopes of annexing Macedonia, an autonomous Macedonian political option, or full independence. Indicative of the relative weakness of the elites in these movements is the fact that many of them had little fixed sense of their long-term political/strategic goals: often the same individual would adopt a pro-Bulgar policy at one point while later adopting a Macedonian-separatist position.

The Macedonian national movement traces its origins to the second quarter of the nineteenth century, with the first Slav anti-Patriarchist, anti-Greek, and anti-Turkish movements. Decades later, the short-lived Ilinden (St. Elijah’s Day) rebellion of 1904 created the “Kruševo Republic” and which was quickly defeated by Ottoman forces. As a result of the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and World War I, the territory of present-day Macedonia was incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbia (and, after 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929). During the interwar period, the inhabitants of Macedonia were officially considered “southern Serbs,” and the existence of a separate Macedonian identity was officially rejected.

Here again, as in the cases analyzed above, the plausibility of a relatively small, politically mobilized group of activists imposing their sense of national identity on a defined group of people, at the expense of similar attempts by neighboring states endowed with significantly greater resources, does not seem persuasive. The Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian states all claimed that the inhabitants of Slavic Macedonia belonged to their respective ethnic groups. Moreover, given their advantages as recognized, independent states, each had well-organized and well-financed campaigns to impose the identity of their choice upon the Slav population of Macedonia. In their efforts, they deployed the full panoply of constructivist techniques and institutions to try to win the Macedonians over to their side. Thus,

In order to prove their respective claims they became directly involved in every sphere of life in Macedonia. Each sought to establish or control the local churches, schools, communal organizations, reading rooms, guilds and so on. Until the 1890s they carried on the struggle mainly through extremely well-financed propaganda institutions and campaigns and relied on pressure tactics and intimidation.\(^95\)

Macedonia, in fact, became the target of “the determined efforts on the part of the three states to destroy all signs of Macedonian particularism, patriotism, and nationalism.”\(^96\)

In contrast to these organized and government-financed campaigns by neighboring states, the local inhabitants of this part of the Balkans had few organizational advantages or resources to combat such concerted attempts to transform their identity. Macedonia (along with Kosovo and Montenegro) had traditionally been amongst the poorest and most under-developed regions in southeastern Europe. For much of the 19th century, Greek bishops in Macedonia forbade use of the local language/dialect, insisting that Greek be used in liturgical services. The educational

\(^{95}\) Rossos, “The Macedonian Question and Stability in the Balkans,” 142.

system in Macedonia was extremely poorly developed, even by Balkan standards. In the 19th century, a rudimentary educational system emerged, primarily devoted to teaching students religious fundamentals; secular schools only emerged in Macedonia after 1838. The first two “lower secondary” schools in Macedonia were founded in 1857, one by a Serb, the other by a Bulgarian. Yet in the 1870s, “schooling in Macedonia went into a permanent decline because of the weaker economic situation of Macedonian citizens. At the same time, the activity of the neighboring countries, Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, grew stronger in Macedonia. They opened their own schools and through them introduced their national politics into Macedonia.”

As late as the 1940s, sixty-four percent of Macedonia’s population was illiterate, and as late as 1948, only 2.5 percent of Macedonia’s population went to secondary school. By 1971, this number had only reached 14 percent.

Yet despite such disadvantages, a Macedonian nationalist movement consistently gained strength and momentum throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. During this period, various individuals and groups worked unsuccessfully for the re-establishment of an independent Archbishopric of Ohrid, separate from that of the newly established Exarchate of Bulgaria, and in 1893, a revolutionary-terrorist organization, the Vnatreshna Makedono Revolucionerna

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97 See Risto Kantardzhiev and Lazo Lazaroski, “Schools and Education,” in Mihailo Apostolski and Haralampié Polenakovich, eds., The Socialist Republic of Macedonia (Skopje: Macedonian Review Editions, 1974), 107-108. James Pettifer (“The New Macedonian Question,” op. cit.) claims that there were 1,400 Greek schools in Macedonia by 1895, but he does not define whether he means historic Macedonia or Vardar Macedonia (in which case such a large number would be difficult to imagine); moreover, his article is plagued by numerous factual inaccuracies, making the reliability of many of his claims questionable.


100 See Mihailo Apostolski, “Historical Development of the Macedonian People,” in Mihailo Apostolski and Haralampié Polenakovich, eds., The Socialist Republic of Macedonia (Skopje: Macedonian Review Editions, 1974),
Organizacija (VMRO) had been created to combat both Turkish control over Macedonia and attempts to impose a Bulgarian hegemony over the Macedonians.

As seen in the previous case-studies, the emergence and ultimate success of the Macedonian nation-building process again reveals the weaknesses of constructivist arguments about identity-formation and the role of elites and institutions. In the case of Macedonia, as in that of Bosnia & Herzegovina analyzed earlier, financial and organizational advantages in and of themselves clearly were not enough for constructivist identity projects to succeed. In fact, the success of the Macedonian nation- and state-building project provides perhaps the best counter-example to constructivist views that elites and institutions are crucial, necessary components in identity-formation and nation-building. In the Macedonian case, what we see is not governments, schools, churches, or military organizations creating an ethnic group or a nation, but an ethnic group creating its own institutions. The Macedonian case thus shows that identity-formation and nation-building are much more complex, deeply-rooted, and long-term processes than many constructivists recognize.

Micro-Case Study 4: Alexander’s Integral Yugoslavism

On January 6, 1929, King Alexander Karadjordjević dissolved the parliament of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, proclaimed a royal dictatorship, and, following his contemporary Marshal Pilsudski’s dictum that “the state makes the nation,” embarked upon a constructivist campaign to forge new political identities and loyalties among his subjects by creating a new, 28-29. According to the traditions of the Orthodox Church, autocephalous churches are allowed to name and consecrate their own hierarchs, and do not need the consent of any other Orthodox church. Church organizations that only have autonomy, on the other hand, do require such consent. In this context, autocephaly for the Archbishopric of Ohrid meant allowing local bishops to choose their own canonical leader of their own independent church organization, as opposed to having the Patriarch of Constantinople choose him.
“integral” Yugoslav consciousness. John Allcock claims that “this is the period par excellence of the building of ‘imagined communities’ and hence the incorporation of people into groups with temporally and spatially extended identities wider than those of kinship and locality.”

“Integral Yugoslavism” was based on the belief that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were members of one ethnic nation who had become separated by centuries of foreign rule. Before World War I, many South Slav and foreign observers, such as R.W. Seton-Watson, believed that these “races” would eventually meld into one “race,” in the same way that the Germans and Italians had supposedly done.

Yet Alexander’s efforts were based on weak foundations. Despite the fact that many intellectuals in the South Slav lands adopted “Yugoslavism” in the 19th and 20th centuries, the general population on the whole maintained their narrower Croat or Serb national ideologies. Thus,

Yugoslavism was restricted mainly to the intelligentsia, which in the underdeveloped and semiliterate lands of the South Slavs included even those with only secondary education, since it presupposed an ability for abstract thinking about social and political matters, a way of thinking that was impossible without at least some systematic secularized education. The Croatian and Serbian national ideologies also were initially the creation and concern of the cultural and political elites, but in the second half of the nineteenth century they spread much faster than Yugoslavism, primarily because they corresponded to a premodern sense of identity based on the memories of medieval Croatian and Serbian politics. Not only was Yugoslavism from the very beginning primarily the

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102 For a useful analysis of the various strains of thinking behind Yugoslav ideology during this period, see Pieter Troch, “Yugoslavism between the World Wars: Indecisive Nation-Building,” *Nationalities Papers* 38 (March 2010), 227-244.

concern of the educated, but it rarely reached the peasantry. When it did, the masses of Croats and Serbs did not accept it.\textsuperscript{104}

In keeping with the new campaign for integral Yugoslavism, in 1929 the ethnoconfessionally specific “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes” was renamed the “Kingdom of Yugoslavia,” and on October 3\textsuperscript{rd}, Alexander redrew the internal, historical and/or ethnoconfessional borders of Yugoslavia and replaced them with purely administrative borders intended to foster a broader, pan-ethnoconfessional Yugoslav consciousness. The new administrative districts, named \textit{banovine} (in the plural; the singular form is “banovina”) “established with intentional disregard for the national aspirations of Croats and Serbs,”\textsuperscript{105} abolished historical names associated with specific ethnic groups, and were largely organized along major river valleys to promote economic integration.\textsuperscript{106} Using the names of rivers for the various \textit{banovine} was also meant to have symbolic value, as rivers are seen as geographical features that promote fusion.\textsuperscript{107} The constructivist (and de-constructivist) purpose of the new arrangements was clear from the fact that many ethnic groups were split into separate \textit{banovine}: Croats, for instance, found themselves in four separate \textit{banovinas}, which, according to Sabrina Ramet, were intended to break down a sense of Croat identity and cultivate instead the development of separate regional identities such

\textsuperscript{104} Djilas, \textit{The Contested Country}, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{105} Djilas, \textit{The Contested Country}, 80. The Croats and Serbs were not the only ones to be unhappy with the new borders. Bosnia & Herzegovina, for instance, was divided between four different \textit{banovinas}. See Bougarel, “Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea,” 103. Importantly, however, King Alexander’s decision to proclaim a dictatorship was seen by many political forces as necessary; among those were the Croatian Peasants Party and the Independent Democrats. See Djokić, “(Dis)integrating Yugoslavia: King Alexander and Interwar Yugoslavism,” 147.

\textsuperscript{106} Lampe, \textit{Yugoslavia as History}, 165.

\textsuperscript{107} Djokić, \textit{Elusive Compromise}, 73.
as Istrian, Dalmatian, and Slavonian. As a government manifesto issued in October 1929 claimed

The administrative division [into 9 banovinas] has forever erased historic borders . . . This Law [of 3 October 1929] has laid the foundations for the following absolute principle: *a single nation and single sense of national belonging.*

In 1931, Alexander promulgated a new constitution which was a further attempt to deal with Yugoslavia’s ethnoconfessional divisions by administrative diktat. Under the 1931 constitution, parties or associations organized on a religious, ethnic or regional basis were outlawed, and in parliamentary elections held in November 1931, only parties which fielded candidates in all constituencies were allowed to compete; however, as a result of the difficulty in fielding candidates throughout the country, and since many political organizations decided to boycott the elections, the practical result was that the only party on the voter’s lists was the government’s “Yugoslav National Party.”

A centralized educational system was considered a crucial element in promoting Alexander’s integral Yugoslavism and sense of common Yugoslav identity. In a hand-written letter (in the Latin script) to the eleventh convention of the Yugoslav Teachers Society in August 1931, King Alexander would note

The Yugoslav teachers, imbued with love for their people and for their difficult but exalted calling, are the architects of the national soul, its national conscience and culture. In order that they respond completely to the wishes and hopes which their king and nation has entrusted to them, the Yugoslav Teachers Society,

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108 Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia*, 105. Croats, of course, were not the only ethnoconfessional group to be divided between different banovinas, for the Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims found themselves in a number of different banovinas as well.

109 “Historički zaključci Ministarskog Savjeta,” *Novo doba* (Zagreb), 5 June 1930 (emphasis in the original), as cited by Djokić, “(Dis)integrating Yugoslavia: King Alexander and Interwar Yugoslavism,” 149.

uniting all current and future Yugoslav teachers, must be the focus of education, the pillar of Yugoslav nationalism and stimulus for all the beautiful aspirations in the future of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{111}

Despite this rhetoric, however, in reality, the combined difficulties of trying to reconcile several different educational systems amidst the overall difficulties of the interwar years,\textsuperscript{112} meant that Alexander’s attempts to use a centralized, standardized educational system to promote a common Yugoslav identity never really got off the ground, and in many ways, Alexander’s constructivist attempt to promote a unitary sense of Yugoslav consciousness had the opposite effect of that intended. As could be expected, a significant amount of coercion was needed to make Alexander’s Yugoslavism work. Civil liberties were suspended, censorship of the press was instituted, and many actual or potential opponents of the dictatorship were jailed.\textsuperscript{113} As Aleksa Djilas notes, the 1931 Constitution,

was intended not only to strengthen centralism but also to generate a unitary Yugoslav national consciousness. The existence of a Croatian or any other national question was simply not admitted; only Yugoslav nationality was recognized. The king hoped to solve the national question simply by abolishing it . . . The administrative reorganization of Yugoslavia, the suppression of political parties that had defended particular national interests, and the reform of the educational system in order to promote Yugoslavism were expected to create a new Yugoslav nation . . . Instead of dissolving traditional Croatian nationalism, the dictatorship strengthened the extremists.\textsuperscript{114}

Thus, following upon the earlier failures of bošnjaštvo, the first constructivist attempt to create a pan-confessional, Yugoslav identity failed as well; as Slobodan Jovanović put it bluntly in

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Učitelj} 45, no. 1 (1931-32), 3, as cited by Jelavich, “South Slav Education,” 106.

\textsuperscript{112} For a balanced assessment of the problems confronting the new kingdom in the interwar period, see Joseph Rothschild, \textit{East-Central Europe Between the Two World Wars} (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1974), Chapter 5.


\textsuperscript{114} Djilas, \textit{The Contested Country}, 80.
1939, “the attempt, through the use of state power, to create in the shortest possible time a Yugoslav nationalism that would suffocate Serbian and Croatian nationalism—did not succeed.”\textsuperscript{115} Alexander himself was assassinated in 1934 by a Croatian/Macedonian conspiracy while on a state visit to France in 1934, and his Yugoslavism did not long outlast him; as Charles Jelavich notes, “By the mid-1930s, Yugoslavism as a unifying concept was dead for all practical purposes.”\textsuperscript{116}

Thus, despite Alexander’s efforts, in interwar Yugoslavia, instead of the state making the nation, it was the structure of Yugoslav society itself that reinforced the divisions of loyalty and identity along regional and ethnoconfessional lines.\textsuperscript{117} Although Serbs were generally considered to be those who most strongly identified with the interwar state, this was largely because “they perceived it as a Serbian creation, led by the Serbian monarchy, in which the Serbs were finally united. But Serbs never became Yugoslavs in the sense of developing a new national consciousness, either political or cultural . . . “\textsuperscript{118} For the other ethnoconfessional groups in Yugoslavia this was even more so. The weak attachment of most Croats to the new Yugoslav state was evident in the fact that “Frankovci,” a generic name for a variety of Croatian separatist groups in the 1930s (many of whose members were allied to or sympathetic to Ante Pavelić and the Ustaša movement) “were the largest student group at the University of Zagreb in 1940.”\textsuperscript{119}


\textsuperscript{116} Jelavich, “South Slav Education,” 113.

\textsuperscript{117} Allcock, \textit{Explaining Yugoslavia}, 287-288.

\textsuperscript{118} Djilas, \textit{The Contested Country}, 59-60.

The consequences of such widely diverging loyalties and affinities became very obvious during the interethnic civil conflict that engulfed Yugoslavia in the midst of World War II.

Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter has been to raise some fundamental questions about identity-formation and nation-building in the Balkans that are usually taken for granted or left unexplored by constructivist and modernist accounts of this these issues. The conventional wisdom on these matters claims that most individuals in southeastern Europe had no sense of an ethnic or national identity until “nationally-conscious” elites and state institutions gave them such identities at various points in the nineteenth century through carefully conceived identity-formation and nation-building projects. Yet an examination of the track record of such attempts, and analysis of the actual logistics and mechanics that would have been involved in making such attempts—based on the assumptions that the peasant masses have no sense of their own identity in ethnic or national terms, that their identities are “fluid and malleable,” and that clever constructivists can impose their own preferred sense of identity upon them—reveals the weaknesses and shortcomings of such explanations. Explanations based on the role of the media or educational institutions in identity-formation and nation-building, for instance, clearly have difficulty explaining the success of such efforts among largely illiterate populations. And, as was seen in the Macedonian case (and, to a lesser extent, in the case of Croat and Serb nationalisms in Bosnia & Herzegovina as well), giving a decisive role to institutions (such as churches, militaries, schools, or governmental bureaucracies) in the identity-formation and nation-building process clearly is not tenable in cases where such institutions do not even exist.
The micro-case studies examined in this chapter offer specific lessons in the problems confronting would-be nation builders. The first is the crucial importance of timing. Thus, even granting the constructivist argument that identities are fluid and malleable, the failure of efforts such as *bošnjaštvo* and “integral Yugoslavism” suggests that they are not always so, and that if group identities really can change, they do so only during specific historical windows of opportunity. Adrian Hastings and Steven Van Evera, for instance, have suggested that ethnic identities solidify once a group’s sacred scriptures are translated into its own indigenous language. If accurate, the aforementioned constructivist projects came far too late to have had a serious chance of succeeding. This also suggests that similar contemporary projects to create pan-ethnoconfessional “Bosnian,” “Kosovar,” or “Macedonian” identities will face the same fate.

A second lesson for would-be nation-builders is both the time and the resources required for such efforts, even when “only” confronted with the beliefs and identities of relatively poor, uneducated, and unorganized masses of people and small groups of activists. Any comparison of the material and resource advantages enjoyed by Bosnia & Herzegovina’s Habsburg administrators in their effort to promote *bošnjaštvo* as an alternative to Croat or Serb ethnoconfessional identities would be overwhelmingly in favor of the former, yet *bošnjaštvo* clearly failed while the other ethnoconfessional identities proved long-lasting. Alternatively, the success and longevity of these other ethnoconfessional identities shows the limits and constraints under which elites, institutions, and resources operate in the identity-formation and nation-building process when they are not compatible with the attitudes, beliefs, traditions and perceptions of a given population. These issues will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter VI,
which will examine the implications of this understanding of identity-formation, nation-building, and ethnoconfessional nationalism in general for policymakers.
Chapter VI

Policy Implications

And when it is said to them, 'do not make mischief in the land', they say, 'we are but peacemakers.' Nay, of a surety they are the mischief makers, but they do not understand.

--Quran, 2:11-12

The analysis of Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism provided in this dissertation has numerous implications for the management of interethnic relations. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a coherent critique of the various possibilities for ethnic conflict management in southeastern Europe consistent with the collective, chronic, and non-economic characteristics of ethnoconfessional nationalism described in this dissertation.

Students of nationalism and international policymakers dealing with ethnic conflict have differed significantly in their views of the ability of outsiders to improve interethnic relations to any great degree in any given setting. Some have consistently proposed extensive interventionist policies in trouble-spots around the world.\(^1\) On the other hand, a more cautious approach to dealing with ethnic conflict was once famously offered by former U.S. Secretary of State Warren

\(^1\) Groups favoring extensive interventions and state- and nation-building campaigns often have a vested self-interest in exaggerating the successes of such efforts; on this, see Gerald Knaus and Marcus Cox, “The ‘Helsinki Moment’ in Southeastern Europe,” *The Journal of Democracy* 16 (January 2005), 49.
Christopher, who claimed that Bosnia was “an intractable ‘problem from hell’ that no one can be expected to solve . . . a tribal feud that no outsider could hope to settle.”

Upon closer examination, it is clear that the many efforts to resolve ethnic conflict in the Balkans, whether theoretical or practical, have fallen short of their goals. This was just as true for the Habsburg administrators of Bosnia at the close of the nineteenth century as it is for European Union and NATO administrators in the 21st century, perhaps because a common thread in the policies of both sets of outsiders has been the belief that “rational” forms of governing these regions would ameliorate ethnic tensions. Worse still, sometimes the policies outsiders’ have adopted have simply been counterproductive; in fact, many international attempts to reduce communal conflict in war-torn states, relying on liberal-internationalist beliefs in democratic elections and market economic reforms, have had the effect of exacerbating communal tensions.

Intellectually, the range of policies available to deal with ethnic conflict are relatively limited; one telling example is that in David Laitin’s 363-page (minus appendices) study of identity formation in the former Soviet Union, *Identity in Formation*, a total of two pages are devoted to


3 With respect to the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia & Herzegovina, for instance, Okey notes that it was based on a belief that “basic public works, like communications, irrigation or drainage,” confessional even-handedness, equality before the law and a few European-style schools” would produce a satisfied and loyal population. See Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, 26.

4 Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism.” Along these lines, for a useful analysis (and strong critique) of how the OHR in Bosnia mismanaged police reform there from 2004-2007, see Kristof Bender and Gerald Knaus, “The Worst in Class: How the International Protectorate Hurts the European Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *Journal of Intervention and State Building* 1 (December 2007, Special Supplement), 24-37. The most important recent analysis of the dangers inherent in holding elections in divided societies is Jack Snyder’s *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000). International officials often (belatedly) come to this conclusion as well; for instance, former High Representative Paddy Ashdown now argues that the biggest failing of the international community in its strategy in the Balkans has been to promote democratization without first establishing the rule of law; see Ashdown’s op-ed piece entitled “What I Learned in Bosnia,” *New York Times*, 28 October 2002.
policy recommendations for dealing with ethnic conflict and violence. Another sobering example is provided by John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, who claim that there are eight distinct methods of ethnic-conflict regulation, which can either eliminate ethnic differences, or manage them. Most are neither intellectually nor morally appealing: 1) genocide; 2) forced mass-population transfers; 3) partition and/or secession; 4) integration and/or assimilation; 5) hegemonic control; 6) arbitration (third-party intervention); 7) cantonization and/or federalization; 8) consociationalism or power-sharing.

Democracy itself is no panacea for resolving ethnically-based conflicts, Belgium, for instance, has been called “the most successful ‘failed state’ of all time,” yet relations between the Flemish and Walloon population continue to deteriorate. As Rabushka and Shepsle succinctly ask but somewhat dismally answer “is the resolution of intense but conflicting preferences in the plural society manageable in a democratic framework. We think not.” The political science

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8 Rabushka and Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies*, 217. The rather pessimistic view on the very limited ability of outsiders to “solve” ethnic conflicts around the world seems, arguably, to be the scholarly consensus. Donald Horowitz has called the problems of ethnic politics and ethnic conflict “intractable,” noting that to study the sources and patterns of ethnic conflict is “to emphasize the constraints on policy innovation, for it is to see in advance just how intractable a force ethnicity can be. The evidence suggests that serious ethnic conflicts are likely to be resistant to sweeping change . . . The whole structure of ethnic politics conspires to make the problem of conflict intractable.” Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 564-566. Similarly, Lake and Rothchild note that “Managing ethnic conflicts, whether by local elites and governments or concerned members of the international community, is a continuing process with no end point or final resolution . . . Ethnic conflict can be contained, but it cannot be entirely resolved.” Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” *International Security* 21 (Fall 1996), 42. Roger Petersen has been similarly pessimistic; in his view, “ethnic violence is very difficult to prevent.” See Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence*, 267. I. William Zartman similarly notes that “Conflicts as deep and complex as ethnic disputes have, of course, no solution. Solutions apply at best to legal divisions among consumables, or at least among possessables, that can be used, marked, carted away, or cut up. They do not adequately cover human feelings, memories, and relations, particularly when new generations can regenerate the conflict, using past histories to color current situations and current grievances to stain historic settlements.”
literature that has attempted to measure the effectiveness of the various institutions and strategies used to deal with ethnic conflict—such as federalism, consociationalism, electoral engineering, and democracy itself—often provides either inconclusive or contradictory results. Further pointing to the relatively small toolbox political scientists have for dealing with ethnic conflict is the fact that even widely-varying assumptions about the phenomenon often propose the same solutions for it.  

Policymakers have often similarly expressed frustrations in dealing with ethnoconfessional conflict; as one international official described the problems experienced in trying to impose the international agenda on Bosnia,

> We’ve played all the cards: the money, the advice, the pressure. We have done everything my country has learned to do in two hundred years of meddling in other countries. I still wonder if it is enough to achieve what we want.  

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9 Elkins and Sides provide a good review of the state of the literature on all these issues. On consociationalism, for instance, they note that “Evidence of the effects of consensual institutions is inconclusive,” and on the utility of federalist solutions, or various electoral engineering efforts, “there is no agreement—either theoretically or empirically—that either type of reform actually builds unity within the state.” See Elkins and Sides, “Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States?” American Political Science Review 101 (November 2007), 694.

10 As Timothy Sisk points out, despite the fact that Horowitz’s support for integrationist mechanisms for reducing conflict in deeply-divided societies is considerably at odds with Arend Lijphart’s consociational approach, both overlap in several important ways, notably, their support for federalism, proportionality, and ethnic balance. See Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 40.

11 Mike O’Connor, “Bosnian Elections Test Western Resolve,” The New York Times, 13 September 1998. Such frustration dealing with ethnic conflicts is not uncommon. In very similar language, a recent report on the upsurge of violent incidents in Kashmir over the past three years claimed that “they signal the failure of decades of efforts to win the assent of Kashmiris using just about any tool available: money, elections and overwhelming force.” See Lydia Polgreen, “Indian Forces Face Broader Revolt in Kashmir,” The New York Times, 13 August 2010, A1. Contrast this exasperation with the thoughts of one of the protagonists in Ivo Andrić’s novel Bosnian Chronicle, Hamdi Bey Teškeredžić, who, upon learning that a French consul was being sent to his central Bosnian town of Travnik exclaimed, “We’re on our own ground here, and anyone else who comes is a stranger and won’t be able to hold out long. Many people have come here intending to stay, but so far we’ve seen the back of all of them.” Ivo Andrić, Bosnian Chronicle (London: Harvill Press, 1992), 3. In Bosnia in 1996, the present author was told the following story: during debates amongst the Bosnian Serb leadership over whether or not to accept the Dayton Peace
A fundamental point of this dissertation has been ethnoconfessional nationalism’s utter complexity, both as a phenomenon to understand and as a phenomenon to deal with. Another important point has been how “massive” the problem is, insofar as it is not a function of dealing with small groups of elites over a limited period of time, but rather of large collectivities over extended historical periods. This position stands in stark contrast to the pro-interventionist position, which generally views southeastern Europe’s problems in the 1990s as a-historical and a-typical events provoked by malevolent elites, which, consequently, can be dealt with rather quickly and easily; hence the reliance on quick fix measures such as replacing elites, writing new constitutions, and holding donor’s conferences.\(^{12}\)

Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have been foiled by the same problem. In discussing local attitudes towards the US/NATO presence in Afghanistan, for instance, William Dalyrymple related the following anecdote: “During lunch, as my hosts casually pointed out the various places in the village where the British had been massacred in 1842, I asked them if they saw any parallels between that war and the present situation. ‘It is exactly the same,’ said Anwar Khan Jegdalek. ‘Both times the foreigners have come for their own interests, not for ours. They say, ‘We are your friends, we want democracy, we want to help.’ But they are lying. Whoever comes to Afghanistan, even now, they will face the fate of Burnes, Macnaghten and Dr. Brydon,’ said Mohammad Khan, our host in the village and the owner of the orchard where we were sitting. The names of the fighters of 1842, long forgotten in their home country, were still known here.” See Dalyrymple, “Why the Taliban is Winning in Afghanistan,” *The New Statesman*, 22 June 2010.

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\(^{12}\) This has been a failure of U.S. and/or international policy in many parts of the world; as Joseph Rudolph has noted, “in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia, international workers speak optimistically of nation-building as though such projects had not repeatedly failed in the past in both the Third World and multinational communist states.” See Rudolph, *Politics and Ethnicity*, 209. Critics of U.S. policy in the Middle-East have also noted that American policy in Lebanon and Iraq failed because U.S. policymakers did not understood that liberal approaches to dealing with interethnic conflicts stressing the rights of the individual rather than collective or communal group interests were incompatible with local political cultures. As Vali Nasr has argued, “When the U.S. government toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, it thought regime change would help bring democracy to Iraq and then to the rest of the region. The Bush administration thought of politics as the relationship between individuals and the state, and so it failed to recognize that people in the Middle East see politics also as the balance of power among communities. Rather than viewing the fall of Saddam as an occasion to create a liberal democracy, therefore, many Iraqis viewed it as an opportunity to redress injustices in the distribution of power among the country’s major communities.” See Vali Nasr, “When the Shites Rise,” *Foreign Affairs* 85 (July/August 2006), 58. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has indirectly acknowledged Nasr’s critique, noting after a trip to Baghdad in 2007 that “In some ways we probably all underestimated the depth of the mistrust and how difficult it would be for these guys [Sunni, Shia, and Kurds] to come together on legislation, which, let's face it, is not some kind of secondary thing.” See Josh White, “Gates: U.S. Misjudged Iraqi Leaders’ Discord,” *The Washington Post*, 3 August 2007, A10.
Compounding the difficulty in dealing with ethnoconfessional nationalism lies in the fact that “nationalists,” “anti-nationalists,” and “outsiders” all have to deal with numerous and complex historical, political, and social constraints in trying to influence the development of Balkan societies. These constraints significantly limit political options, and again reveal the large role that autonomous popular demands and expectations play in determining the outcome of nationalist conflicts. As Anthony Smith notes with respect to the problems facing “nationalists,” but which also apply to “anti-nationalists” or “outsiders,”

... nationalists can sometimes use the ‘ethnic past’ for their own ends, but not in the long run: they soon find themselves locked into its framework and sequences, and the assumptions that underlie the interpretations of successive generations ... Our understandings of past cultures set limits to the degree to which they can be transformed; the richer and better documented that past and those cultures, and the greater knowledge and understanding of them, the more complex and more difficult the task will be ... To achieve success, the nationalist presumption must be able to sustain itself in the face of historical enquiry and criticism, either because there is some well attested documentation of early ethnic origins or because the latter are so shrouded in obscurity as to be impervious to disconfirmation and refutation.¹³

Thus, the longer the historical record of a particular “ethnic past” the more difficult it is to transform the intellectual framework and social milieu which influence the behavior of its members.¹⁴ In the Balkan case, the already entrenched national identities of most of the region’s peoples, together with the longevity of the ethnic conflicts in the region, suggests little cause for optimism on this score. Here it is important to note, however, that the difficulties in creating (or imposing) multiethnic, multicultural societies in the Balkans are not due to some atavistic, irrational streak amongst the Balkan peoples themselves, as the more strident versions of the


¹⁴ Several other scholars, such as Snyder and Van Evera, have made similar observations.
“ancient ethnic hatreds” school would suggest. Rather, the problem stems from the inherent contradictions in liberal democratic theory between individual and group rights, and the difficulty in resolving these issues in an environment of geo-political instability, institutional weakness, systemic breakdown, and war. Many of these problems are present throughout much of the world, which is why a study of the successes and failures of international intervention in southeastern Europe can serve an important purpose for future efforts in other regions.

Another intellectual problem facing scholars and policymakers dealing with nation- and state-building in the Balkans is the fact that the supposed western European “solutions” to “national questions” and interethnic relations currently being imposed upon the region are expected to succeed in states and among nations that have not experienced the same social, political, and economic development as western European states. This expectation is based on the assumption that there is one “proper” course of socio-political development, and that other states and nations can accelerate their own development by simply adopting the institutional forms and mechanisms that emerged over hundreds of years in other cultural environments and other political and historical circumstances. Both of these assumptions remain unproven. Gale Stokes categorically denies that it is even possible, noting that

. . . our current policy of imposing multiculturalism and tolerance on Bosnia and Kosovo cannot work. Democracy and the attributes that go with it cannot be imposed—they must be chosen. The Balkan peoples will be able to develop the confidence needed to choose to enter into the multifaceted system of buffering mechanisms and negotiating modes that constitutes today’s security system in Europe only when each of them has their own, self-contained country.\textsuperscript{15}

If Stokes is right, then to become stable democracies, the Balkan states will have to follow the same developmental course that the western European states have followed, which means they

\textsuperscript{15} Stokes, “Solving the Wars of Yugoslav Succession,” 194.
will have to become more ethnically homogeneous. Timothy Garton Ash has come to similar conclusions, noting that

. . . we in Western Europe have long since been molded into nation-states, in a process that lasted from the Middle Ages to the early twentieth-century . . . It’s precisely on this basis of clear separation into nation-states that we have been getting together in the European Union, as well as becoming more ethnically mixed again, through immigration.\textsuperscript{16}

In a later essay, Ash developed this point further:

. . . this separating out into small states or sub-state units with clear ethnic majorities, driven though it has been by manipulative and often cynical post-communist nationalism, nonetheless has powerful precedents and counterparts in the rest of Europe. Elsewhere in Europe, too, people generally prefer to be ruled by those they consider somehow ‘of their own kind.’ Only once thus constituted, in some version of a nation-state, are they prepared (up to a point) to come together in larger regional and all-European units. A realistic liberal internationalism for the twenty-first century needs to take on board the insights of liberal nationalists from the nineteenth.\textsuperscript{17}

If correct, the assumption that the Balkan states will have to follow, at least to some degree, the western European historical experience of forming more or less ethnically-homogenous nation-states again suggests that the essence of the phenomenon is not a matter of malevolent elites (i.e., human agency) but of certain universal realities of politics and society in the modern era. The phenomenon is thereby inherently more complex, and hence more difficult to deal with.

One other point bears noting here as well: the international efforts in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo probably qualify as the most ambitious constructivist state-building projects ever attempted, under the most favorable circumstances and enjoying the greatest allocation of resources ever given to such projects, and it is doubtful that we will ever see international

\textsuperscript{16} See Ash, “Cry, the Dismembered Country,” 32

experiments of this relative magnitude again.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, the international community’s interventions in southeastern Europe are qualitatively different from other interventions around the world. Whereas historically most internationally-mediated agreements between warring factions have focused on negotiating cease-fires or demarcating borders between warring parties, the recent Balkan interventions have been far more ambitious insofar as they have involved long-term efforts in writing constitutions, designing governmental institutions, trying to codify relations between different ethnic groups, aiding refugee returns, and creating institutions to protect human and civil rights. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the international organizations implementing these have taken on executive, legislative, and judicial functions, and international personnel staff various governmental institutions and agencies in these countries (for instance, in the case of Bosnia, the Constitutional Court and the Central Bank).\textsuperscript{19} In this sense, the

\textsuperscript{18} Coming up with a precise figure for how much the US, the EU, NATO, the United Nations, and the various other international organizations and agencies active in the Balkans over the past fifteen years have spent is practically impossible to determine, but somewhere in the neighborhood of $200 billion seems roughly accurate. The following is a sample of some of the estimates that have been put forth. Between 1992-2000, one Bosnian magazine estimated that the international community had spent in between $50-90 billion in Bosnia & Herzegovina alone. See Jasna Hasović, “Pola budžeta za plate službenika,” Dani (Sarajevo), 8 September 2000. Determining a precise amount is impossible because different agencies use different methodologies for calculating their expenses. Hasović and others estimated that over half of this amount had been spent on the salaries of foreign “experts” themselves. Elizabeth Pond cites figures showing that the U.S. spent $22 billion in southeastern Europe between 1992-2003, while the E.U. spent €33 billion in the region between 2001-2005 alone. Aid to Bosnia per capita in 1996-97 exceeded aid given to postwar Germany or Japan in their first two postwar years. See Pond, \textit{Endgame in the Balkans}, 278. One estimate of the cost of the Kosovo war to NATO itself was $40 billion. See Michael R. Sest, "Cost of Kosovo War Could Hit $40 Billion, Biggest Economic Impact Could Turn Out to be End of Peace Dividend," \textit{The Wall Street Journal}, 29 June 1999. All By way of comparison, Misha Glenny has estimated that the annual budget for the U.N. Mission in Kosovo amounted to less than one-half of one day’s bombing. See Glenny, "The Muddle in Kosovo," \textit{The Wall Street Journal}, 23 February 2000. Jain King and Whit Mason have determined that NATO countries devoted 25 times more troops and 50 times more money to the effort in Kosovo than to the effort in Afghanistan. See King and Mason, \textit{Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo}, 21. Walter Mayr has claimed that the U.N. has spent $33 billion (U.S.) in Kosovo since 1999, or approximately 1,750 Euro per capita—160 times more than the U.N. spent on the entire developing world per capita. See Mayr, “Elefanten vor dem Wasserloch,” \textit{Der Spiegel} (Hamburg), 21 April 2008, available at: http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/dokument/12/30/dokument.html?titel=Elefanten+vor+dem+Wasserloch&id=56670321&top=SPIEGEL&suchbegriff=walter+mayr+kosovo&quellen=&vl=0 Accessed on 16 July 2008 at 4:09pm EST. One estimate suggests the EU spent more than €300 million on reconstruction and state-building programs in Macedonia between 2001-2008. See Chivvis, “The Making of Macedonia,” \textit{Survival} 50 (April-May 2008), 154.

international effort in Bosnia (and, to lesser extents, in Kosovo and Macedonia as well) constitute “crucial cases” for the study of constructivist nation-building projects. It is hard to imagine, for instance, that would-be state-builders will ever have the powers granted to the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia, which, as one analysis noted, reflects “an extraordinary political reality in contemporary Europe: the unlimited authority of an international mission to overrule all of the democratic institutions of a sovereign member state of the United Nations.”\(^{20}\)

The authors go on to point out that

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\ldots \text{outsiders actually set [the reform agenda], impose it, and punish with sanctions those who refuse to implement it. At the center of this system is the OHR, which can interpret its own mandate and so has essentially unlimited legal powers. It can dismiss presidents, prime ministers, judges, and mayors without having to submit its decisions for review by any independent appeals body. It can veto candidates for ministerial positions without needing publicly to present any evidence for its stance. It can impose legislation and create new institutions without having to estimate the cost to the Bosnian taxpayer. In fact, the OHR is not accountable to any elected institution at all . . . Bosnia is a country where expatriates make major decisions, where key appointments must receive foreign .}
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\(^{20}\) See Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, “Travails of the European Raj: Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina,” \textit{Journal of Democracy} 14 (July 2003), 60. Transparency International has gone even further in its critique of the High Representative’s powers, suggesting that many of the OHR’s actions would be construed as criminal in other countries. Thus, “the High Representative has demonstrated that he can bring charges against any individual in BiH without presenting sufficient (or any) evidence and that the entire process of ‘democratic’ elections comes close to being a farce. Dispossessing legal entities of their funds without a proper public investigation and a trial would be classified as theft in any Western democracy.” \textit{National Integrity Systems Country Study Report Bosnia and Herzegovina} (Berlin: Transparency International, 2004), 24. Lest one think that these are just the musings of professional naysayers, on this score it is worth quoting Matthew T. Parish, head of the OHR Legal Department from 2005-2007. Parish has described the “gross lack of due process” in the High Representative’s exercise of his “unlimited legal powers,” noting that “The right to amend legislation, and to dismiss public officials, could be exercised without any prior reference to any affected party. Bosnia’s democratically elected parliaments did not have to be consulted. Where officials were removed, they did not have to be given any notice, or an opportunity to respond to the evidence against them. Indeed, the evidence did not even have to exist. There was no possibility of appeal or review of a decision, even if one lost one’s job or otherwise suffered direct and individual harm as a result.” See Parish, “The Demise of the Dayton Protectorate,” \textit{Journal of Intervention and State Building} 1 (December 2007, Special Supplement), 15. Here it is worth noting that the post-Dayton international effort in BiH is largely following a blueprint already designed by the Habsburg administrators of Bosnia in the late 19th-early 20th centuries. As Robin Okey has noted, “democracy was incompatible with the mystique on which the cultural mission in Bosnia was founded, which derived ultimately from Habsburg traditions of enlightened despotism: the rule of impartial, dispassionate bureaucrats who appropriated to themselves the sphere of modern administration.” Okey, moreover, points out that then, just as now, it is a mistake to believe that resistance to outsiders’ initiatives automatically constitutes a rejection of democracy per se; as he notes, “western values have always been more acceptable than foreign rule.” See Okey, \textit{Taming Balkan Nationalism}, 249, 253. All of these points reflect the argument made in Chapter V as to the fact that constructivism often requires a significant degree of coercion.
approval, and where key reforms are enacted at the decree of international organizations.  

It is worth noting that a constructivist identity- and state-building project could hardly hope to be endowed with more power than has been granted to the OHR, yet even here such wide-ranging powers have achieved only limited success. The international experience in Kosovo serves as a similar case in point, where, it has been argued,

The most generously supported and ambitious nation-building exercise in recent history (if not ever) is now a humbling reminder of humanity’s limitations. Kosovo has exposed the weaknesses of all the most powerful global international institutions, including the United Nations, NATO and the European Union. The fact remains that the world seems to have tried its best and has failed to achieve a creditable degree of ethnic integration, to embed the rule of law, or to regenerate the economy.

All things considered, it is understandable why many students of ethnic and national problems consider them relatively intractable. Even as original a thinker as Ernest Gellner, for instance, admitted that the solutions he could propose for dealing with nationalism were relatively “banal;” all Gellner could recommend was

. . . a preference for stability, an avoidance of destabilization without strong cause and without provision for an orderly passage to a successor regime; affluence; centralization of major order-maintaining functions and a cantonisation of social ones; cultural pluralism, de-fetishisation of land. These recommendations may be

21 Knaus and Martin, “Travails of the European Raj,” 61-62. As Robert Hayden similarly notes, “it is surely an odd democracy in which the unelected representative of foreign powers can ignore the elected representatives of the people of the country . . . Ironically, the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia, supposedly embodying the will of the international community, now runs the country much in the same way that the League of Communist of Yugoslavia did, promulgating laws by fiat, dismissing elected officials for political and moral unsuitability, and controlling the press.” Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided, 137, 174.

22 There are three specific reasons for this. First, the consequences of political interventions have proven difficult to predict, and local politicians have frequently responded to political initiatives and constitutional changes in ways that both defy the spirit of these initiatives and outsmart their designers. Second, implementing such initiatives has far too often required substantial violations of democratic norms and principles, which consequently means that these initiatives have less legitimacy in the eyes of local politicians and populations. Third, the ability of the international community to accurately assess local problems, develop policies to deal with them, and then find the energy and the resources to implement such policies has been lacking.

banal, but they are at least set in the context of a coherent overall theory of what constitutes the problem.\textsuperscript{24}

A proper appreciation for the complexities of ethnoconfessional nationalism makes Gellner’s advice seem more wise than banal. As a 2004 report by the International Commission on the Balkans noted, more than a decade of ambitious attempts to solve the problems of southeastern Europe through constitutional engineering, ambiguous political arrangements, and economic development, have come up short:

In the past decade, the international community has regarded the Balkans primarily as a post-conflict region. This has led to a raft of provisional solutions to constitutional problems and to policies based on what might be termed ‘constructive ambiguity,’ embodied in documents like the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 or the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro. At the same time the international community has been working on the assumption that economic development would reduce the pressing need to solve the open status issues. Unfortunately, this assumption has turned out to be false.\textsuperscript{25}

While plagued by a raft of false assumptions and failed policy initiatives, however, the international community has also achieved some successes worth noting in the Balkans. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, basic institutional infrastructures have been created, several rounds of elections have been successfully held, a considerable amount of infrastructure and public services have been rebuilt and restored, and, most importantly, since the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, a return to large-scale violence has been prevented.\textsuperscript{26} In Macedonia, the relatively rapid international diplomatic reaction to conflict between Albanians and Macedonian Slavs prevented an all-out war. These successes suggest the importance of examining what has and has not worked in the region, and then determining the reasons for these different outcomes. The three

\textsuperscript{24} Gellner, \textit{Nationalism}, 108.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{The Balkans in Europe’s Future}, 13.

\textsuperscript{26} On the successes of international efforts in the Balkans, see Knaus and Cox, “The ‘Helsinki Moment’ in Southeastern Europe,” 48.
theses on ethnoconfessional nationalism proposed here predict that international intervention and assistance will have a higher likelihood of success in certain functional areas that are logically related to the rationalist, liberal-internationalist worldview, and a lower likelihood of success in other functional areas more logically related to culturally-based understandings of interethnic conflict and the problem of nationalism in general. The purpose of this chapter is to outline exactly how these two approaches play out.

Developing a proper understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism, and developing the right institutions to manage ethnic-conflict in the region, is not simply an academic exercise; as Nina Casperson notes “the right choice of approach can make the difference between continued warfare and gradual development of peace and stability.” Arguably, this was the case in Bosnia & Herzegovina in 1993-95, when several opportunities to end the war were vetoed by U.S. policymakers. Moreover, developing an accurate understanding of the phenomenon one is

27 Caspersen, “Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? A Comparison of Conflict-Regulation Strategies in Postwar Bosnia,” 569. Along similar lines, Sherrill Stroschein has argued that in the case of Bosnia “The stakes in such decisions [i.e., the choice of institutional design] are high. Forcing groups to cooperate in unitary structures may alienate them from the democratic process, as they might find their demands better represented through protests or violence rather than through parliament. At the same time, institutions that codify ethnic or linguistic cleavages may reduce the possibility of group cooperation and exchange in the political process.” See Stroschein, “What Belgium Can Teach Bosnia: The Uses of Autonomy in ‘Divided House’ States.” Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 3 (2003), 1.

28 Throughout this period, the Clinton Administration insisted that the political solution to the war must include the creation of a unitary, centralized Bosnian state. Both the Europeans and the Russians, however, were willing to accept a political solution which would create a more decentralized, federalized, or cantonized Bosnia-Herzegovina. On how flawed U.S. policies prolonged the war in Bosnia, see the essay by the former deputy supreme commander of NATO, General Charles G. Boyd, “Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth About Bosnia,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 1995); see also General Sir Michael Rose’s memoir of this period, Fighting for Peace (London: Harvill, 1998), 239-241 (General Rose was the commander of the UN Protection Force, UNPROFOR, in Bosnia in 1994. Both men make clear that had the Clinton Administration supported agreements acceptable to the Europeans and the Russians, there is a strong likelihood that the Bosnian war could have been over as early as 1993. The Clinton Administration eventually did accept such positions, but only after such tragedies as Srebrenica and the cleansing of the Krajina Serbs. For the turnaround in U.S. policy in the summer of 1995 which made Dayton possible, see Carl Bildt, “Holbrooke’s History,” Survival 40 (Autumn 1998). On the US role in bringing about the failure of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) in 1993, one of its authors, Lord David Owen, noted that the Clinton Administration “were not ready to stand up to the Bosnian Serb leaders with the backing of the FRY, the Serbian and Montenegrin Presidents, the Greek Prime Minister, the EC governments and Russia . . . It is rare for history to
dealing with is important for would-be interveners themselves. As current problems in Iraq make clear, intellectual over-confidence and ill-conceived plans for dealing with complex historical and social problems lead to massive losses of blood and treasure, and destabilize entire regions of the world in the process.

I. Ethnoconfessional Nationalism and Political Interventions

Given the collective, chronic, and non-economic nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism, ambitious attempts to substantially restructure interethnic relations and reorient individual loyalties and identities will not work—at least not within the life-span of most of the proponents of such policies. In a similar way, the time needed to develop a proper understanding of the Balkans generally exceeds the limited time academic specialists can devote to the topic, or that international policymakers have to spend on the region before being seconded to their next post. There is little reason to believe that either of these problems will go away, which suggests show within a few years the folly of government’s decisions, but by August 1995 it was painfully apparent how damaging the US decision to ditch the VOPP in May 1993 had been. The Bosnian Muslims had now been ethnically cleansed from Zepa and Srebrenica and the Croatian Serbs from the Krajina. There was no longer any talk, or hope, of reversing ethnic cleansing.” See Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Jovanovic, 1995), 184. On Owen’s views of the US prolonging the war, see p. 365.

29 As John Lewis Gaddis has noted, in fields such as astronomy, geology, or paleontology, the time required to see the results of experiments often exceeds the lifespan of the researchers involved. See Gaddis, “History, Theory, and Common Ground,” *International Security* 22 (Summer 1997), 75-85.

30 As one critique has noted, the international effort in the Balkans has been “hampered by a rapid turnover of often unqualified personnel, lacking relevant experience, including sometimes in senior positions.” See *Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles* (Sarajevo/Brussels: International Crisis Group Report No. 104), 18 December 2000, 17. Peter Maass has argued that United Nations field offices, “though staffed by some well-qualified individuals, infrequently rise above mediocrity.” “Trying to Rebuild Iraq, While Watching Their Backs,” *The New York Times*, 11 May 2003, (Week in Review), 3. Sumantra Bose has described many of the international officials working in the Balkans as “so many adventure seekers, missionary zealots on civilizing field expeditions and careerists from comparatively dull and boring post-industrial Western societies.” Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton*, 12. Jacques Klein, the head of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia, once noted that “There are more people (in Sarajevo) who know nothing about this place than in any other capital where I’ve ever served.” See Klein’s comments as quoted by Robert Wright, Irena Guzelova, and Jonathan Birchall, “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Fear proves to be the biggest vote-winner,” *The Financial Times* (London), 18 December 2000, Bosnia-Herzegovina Country Survey.
that more conservative projects would better match the resources, expertise and commitment the international community has to devote to the Balkans.

But a deeper problem in dealing with Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism is structural. Given the fact that foreign governments have few vital interests at stake in the Balkans, few

Another aspect of the personnel problem is that international policy towards the region is being relegated to increasingly lower ranking bureaucrats. As one European diplomat noted in February 2003, “The problem is that the Balkans are now in the hands of middle-ranking bureaucrats who aren’t decision makers and don’t cut it analytically.” As quoted by Daniel Simpson, “Croatia Waiting for a European Balkans Plan,” The New York Times, 23 February 2003, 6. Morton Abramowitz and Heather Hurlburt have made a similar observation, noting “Responsibility for Balkan decision-making at the State Department has drifted down from ‘7th floor’ special envoys and political figures to the ‘6th and 5th floor’ mid-level career officials and out to the embassies themselves—a reduction not necessarily in competence, but certainly in high-level attention.” See Abramowitz and Hurlburt, “Can the EU Hack the Balkans? A Proving Ground for Brussels,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2002).

Finally, Richard Holbrooke has suggested that part of the reason why the Bush Administration ignored the Balkans during its first term in office had to do with partisan politics; according to Holbrooke, “the new Bush team hated anything it had inherited from Bill Clinton—even (perhaps especially) his greatest successes—and made no effort to advance policy in Kosovo until 2005 and ignored Bosnia.” See Holbrooke, “Back to the Brink in the Balkans,” The Washington Post, 25 November 2007, B07.

In addition to the structural difficulties inherent in seconding personnel to crisis areas (and the often mediocre quality of many of them), a further critique is that the background and training of many of these individuals makes them insensitive to complexity of ethnoconfessional conflicts. As Peter L. Berger has noted,

There exists an international subculture of people with Western-type higher education, especially in the humanities and the social sciences, which is indeed secularized by any measure. This subculture is the principal ‘carrier’ of progressive, Enlightenment beliefs and values. While the people in this subculture are relatively thin on the ground, they are very influential, as they control the institutions that provide the ‘official’ definitions of reality (notably the educational system, the media of mass communication, and the higher reaches of the legal system). They are remarkably similar all over the world today as they have been for a long time (though, as we have seen, there are also defectors from this subculture, especially in the Muslim countries) (See Berger, “Secularism in Retreat,” The National Interest, Winter 1996/97, 8).

Along very similar lines, Samuel Huntington has described the existence of a “Davos Culture”

. . . shared almost exclusively by people who hold university degrees in the physical sciences, social sciences, business, or law, work with words or numbers, are reasonably fluent in English, are employed by governments, corporations, and academic institutions with extensive international involvements, and travel frequently outside their home country. They generally share beliefs in individualism, market economies, and political democracy . . . Davos people control virtually all international institutions, many of the world’s governments, and the bulk of the world’s economic and military capabilities. (Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 57-58).
governments or individuals are willing to make the sustained effort needed to accomplish serious work in the region. Even during major crises such as the Bosnian war, Western powers were faced with what Woodward has aptly called “the dilemma of moral pressure without strategic significance.” As one report put it, “With no real stake in these territories, international representatives insist on quick results to complex problems; they dabble in social engineering but are not held accountable when their policies go wrong.” Worse still, such interventionism can be counterproductive; as international actors who lack the political stamina to enforce an agreement for the long-term, or have weak interests in a particular region, often produce ambiguous policies local actors do not trust.

Despite these strictures, scholars and policymakers have promoted various stratagems for regulating interethnic relations in the Balkans, making the region in many ways an ideal

31 Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 289. Woodward also notes (see page 298) that in September and October of 1992, both then-President George H. W. Bush and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, claimed in separate interviews that they could see no major US strategic interest in the Balkans. This, of course, has been a consistent problem in European approaches to the Balkans. Bismarck had famously said that the Balkans were not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier, and even earlier, Napoleon had chastised one of his commanders in the Balkans for getting involved in the incessant border raids between Ottoman-controlled Bosnia and French-controlled Krajina, telling him that “French blood is too precious to be shed for such trifles.” As quoted in Gunther E. Rothenburg, *The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881: A Study of an Imperial Institution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 113. Similarly, during World War II, when discussing the relative merits of supporting either Tito’s communist movement or General Draža Mihailović’s Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, Winston Churchill asked his personal emissary to Tito, General Fitzroy Maclean, “Do you intend to make Yugoslavia your home after the war?” to which Maclean replied “No, Sir,” whereupon Churchill said, “Neither do I. And that being so, the less you and I worry about the form of Government they set up, the better. That is for them to decide.” See Maclean, *Eastern Approaches* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1949), 402-403.

32 See *The Balkans in Europe’s Future* (International Commission on the Balkans), 11. Michael Ignatieff has described this problem in the following terms: “The activists, experts, and bureaucrats who do the work of promoting democracy talk sometimes as if democracy were just a piece of technology, like a water pump, that needs only the right installation to work in foreign climes.” See Ignatieff, “Who Are Americans to Think That Freedom Is Theirs to Spread?”, *The New York Times Magazine*, 26 June 2005.

33 As Lake and Rothchild note “Countries with weak interests in the conflict . . . will tend to lack or will be perceived as lacking the political stamina to enforce any new ethnic contract in the future . . . Weak commitments produce ambiguous policies that may, in the end, exacerbate rather than resolve conflicts . . . An external guarantee that the parties expect will evaporate is no guarantee at all.” Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” 69-70.
laboratory for testing their efficacy. In reviewing these efforts, however, the conflicting political goals that outsiders and locals have often result in conflicting preferences about the types of constitutional and political solutions needed for ethnic conflict management. In Bosnia, for instance, both consociational and integrative techniques are in evidence, often operating at cross purposes, and making it difficult to accurately determine their efficacy.

Among the most ambitious ethnic conflict management strategies implemented in southeastern Europe have been political and constitutional reforms aimed at transforming the very nature of interethnic relations in a given state, or to change the nature of individual loyalties. Figuring most prominently among these are the creation of federal systems intended to decentralize decision-making authority to lower-level, ethnically based units; the adoption of consociational governing practices; and the adoption of electoral mechanisms designed to keep ethnic extremists out of power. More mundane tactics, such as simply replacing uncooperative politicians, have also been used. Several of these techniques, which according to their scope and ambition are labeled higher-order and lower-order political interventions, will be examined below. In various forms, each of these ethnic conflict management strategies have been used by a succession of political regimes in the lands of the former Yugoslavia since at least the Habsburg era—during Benjamin Kállay’s governorship of Bosnia, during interwar Yugoslavia’s brief period of democracy and royal dictatorship, in communist Yugoslavia, and, currently, in the international protectorates in Bosnia and Kosovo. None have proven exceptionally successful. In

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34 On the part of outsiders, for instance, the primary political goal has been to achieve “stability,” often meaning simply avoiding the bloodshed and violence that would put the Balkans back in the newspaper headlines. Such goals generally result in a more pragmatic willingness to compromise important aspects of the political reform agenda to the locals’ desire to push a stronger “national” agenda. On the other hand, there has also been a moral component to the political goals expressed by outsiders in the region; this would include such things as insisting that war criminals be apprehended, that ethnic cleansing be reversed, that refugees and displaced persons be allowed to return to their homes, etc. When these goals take precedence, outsiders have generally pushed for more integrative strategies.
fact, the history of these efforts shows that despite the various systems’ preferences in promoting either a class-based consciousness among citizens or liberal-individualistic “rational” identities based on non-ascriptive identities, none succeeded in developing new forms of political loyalty more powerful than the “non-rational” identities at the core of ethnoconfessional nationalism. These failures can be ascribed to what Joseph Rothschild once called the “intellectually facile and politically unsound” belief that “ethnicity can be compartmentalized and prevented from contaminating those ‘essential’ areas of modern economic and political life that require ‘rational’ universalistic behavior and values.” As Rothschild noted,

The compartmentalization scenario appears to misunderstand the meaning and the role of culture in social life. Culture cannot be so readily split and isolated from the daily decisions, contacts, values, experiences, and patterns that people confront in their economic, professional, and political lives. The suggested compartmentalization of culture and of behavior into separate ‘ethnic’ and putatively “rational-universalistic” sectors postulates an oversimplified and unrealistic world in which a supposedly autonomous ethnic culture is detached from the critical dilemmas, opportunities, promotions, demotions, satisfactions, and distresses of career or market, and of public affairs. But in the fabric and texture of real life, these two sectors are always interwoven more or less densely.35

The following sections outline the main ethnic-conflict management techniques that have been used in the Balkans, and assess the successes and failures of each in light of the understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism proposed in this dissertation.

1) Higher-order political interventions

The most ambitious ethnic conflict management strategies used in the Balkans over the past several decades have involved political and constitutional engineering projects which attempt to

transform interethnic relations by redistributing power amongst different ethnic groups, or that
place them within an institutional framework which awards moderation and cooperation rather
than extremism and conflict. The implicit assumptions behind such strategies is that a fairer
distribution of power and public goods and the institutionalization of transparent rules governing
interethnic relations will reshape the loyalties and identities of individuals within a state, and
help attract moderates across ethnic groups to such efforts.36

The three most prominent forms of higher-order political intervention are federalism,
consociational powersharing, and integrative power-sharing arrangements. The latter two
(consociationalism and integrative power-sharing arrangements) are based on differing
assumptions about the nature of individual identity, and, consequently, the basis upon which
polities should be built. Consociationalism assumes that individual identities are relatively stable,
and that the essential unit within a polity is the ethnic group.37 The premise of integrative models
is that identities are fluid and malleable, and, consequently, that a state should opt towards
developing political institutions that bring individuals towards a hypothetical, non-ethnic, central
position. The following pages will examine each of these institutional arrangements in detail,
and test the track record each arrangement has had in the Balkans over the past several decades.

36 Whether the hopes behind such assumptions are historically justified is questionable. During the Habsburg period,
Benjamin Kállay’s efforts “posited collaboration of conservatives and moderates with the authorities [that] proved
disappointingly elusive . . . Through its confidential informers, its dealings with ‘moderates’, its journalistic ventures
and its financial incentives, it aimed to isolate ‘radicals’ and cajole a sufficient body of opinion toward the
government position.” See Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 126, 132.

37 Fearon and Laitin, for instance, argue that “analyses of consociation border on primordialism as they assume
Federalism has long been considered one of the most important mechanisms for distributing power equitably within ethnically-divided polities. As a form of indirect rule, federalism seeks to decentralize as much power and authority as is practicable to lower-level, territorially or ethnically based units so as to make the central government less of a focal point for ethnic grievances. According to federalist logic, devolving educational, cultural, and judicial powers to territorial sub-units reduces ethnic conflict, while ensuring that certain state functions, such as those needed to assure the functioning of a common market, fiscal and monetary responsibilities, and defense and security, remain with the central state. Increasing minority group rights is frequently seen as a corollary to federalism.  

The scholarly literature on federalism’s utility for combating nationalism is mixed; Elkins and Sides, for instance, note that “there is no agreement—either theoretically or empirically—that either [federalism or proportional representation] actually builds unity within the state . . . [and] there is no definitive evidence that either proportional electoral systems or federalism remedy divisions in plural societies.” Michael Hechter is more enthusiastic about such efforts, claiming that federalism and other forms of indirect rule reduce demands for sovereignty, and hence the potential for interethnic conflict. Jack Snyder, on the other hand, is more critical, arguing that federalism “has a terrible track record . . . [federalism] tends to heighten and politicize ethnic consciousness, creating a self-conscious intelligentsia and the organizational structures of an

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38 Thus, “Effective management of ethnic conflicts by local elites and governments and by external states and organizations must reassure minority groups of their physical and cultural safety.” See Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” 56.

39 Elkins and Sides, “Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States?” 694.
ethnic state-in-waiting.” Similarly, David Laitin suggests that increasing minority rights may only provoke the emergence of new nationalisms because the recognition of minority rights “might give incentives for cultural entrepreneurs to create new minorities!” Thus, according to this more skeptical perspective, ethnofederal systems may be more prone to disintegration along ethnic lines because they endow ethnic groups with the governmental and administrative capacity to become independent states, given the right geo-political circumstances. Moreover, the implicit assumption that a fair and logical decentralization of authority will strengthen an individual’s loyalty to the central government, and thereby encourage them to identify with it, often proves false; in fact, ethnofederal systems often help reify ethnic identities based on the ethnofederal units.

Implicit in all of these arguments is the assumption that institutions are the causal variable in determining individual identities; in other words, that different institutional forms and structures create different individual identities and loyalties. The Balkan historical experience with federalism, however, suggests something quite different—that causation runs in the opposite direction—i.e., that the strength of individual and group identities determine the institutional form of the state. As discussed in detail in Chapter IV, in ethnically divided polities such as the former Habsburg Empire, the former Yugoslavia, or contemporary Bosnia & Herzegovina or

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40 Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*, 327. Yugoslav history has tended to bear out Snyder’s concerns. In the interwar period, for instance, one Yugoslav prime minister from the period warned “One thing is certain, a federation would mean weakness, and very likely the disintegration of the country.” As quoted by Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*, 174.

41 Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, 344. For a similarly negative view of federalism as a means of resolving ethnic conflict, see Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Conflict*, 269. As an aphorism common in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s went, “Why should I be a minority in your state when you can be a minority in mine?”

42 Motyl, *Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality*, chapters 6-7. See also Bunce, *Subversive Institutions*, 45-52.

43 Hechter, *Containing Nationalism*, 142;
Macedonia, where ethnoconfessional groups have achieved high levels of identity and self-awareness, it in fact proves very difficult to avoid creating a federal system. Throughout the histories of both the First and the Second Yugoslavia’s, for example, attempts at greater centralization inevitably led to so much popular opposition that they were abandoned, especially since neither state had the institutional capacity to maintain the high levels of coercion that would have been needed to impose such a centralized regime. Again, the experiences of contemporary Bosnia & Herzegovina and Macedonia are similar.

Second, the Yugoslav experience also suggests that in the long run a federal system is unlikely to satisfy ethnoconfessional group demands for complete self-government. Given the right opportunity, it is highly likely that these groups will ultimately opt for independence. As seen in Chapter IV, the former Yugoslavia exhibited a pattern in which each round of federalization was followed by demands for an even greater devolution of central powers and responsibilities by Yugoslavia’s ethnoconfessional groups. In this case, arguably, the difference between calls for greater regionalization and outright independence were only the result of what Hudson Meadwell called a “strategic expression of preferences;” thus, “entrepreneurs [took up] regionalism or independence as circumstances warrant[ed].” Given the right circumstances,

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44 This point can perhaps be most strongly made by citing the experience of General Draža Mihailović’s “Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland” movement during World War II. Mihailović’s movement, more commonly known at the Chetnik movement, was originally founded by scattered groups of Serb officers who had refused to surrender after the capitulation of the Yugoslav state in April 1941. The officers’ movement was explicitly royalist and “Greater Serbian” in orientation, whose preferred vision of a post-World War II Yugoslavia was a centralized, unitary state. Even Mihailović and his fellow officers, however, had to eventually compromise with the reality of multiethnic Yugoslavia, and in January 1944 issued a new political platform calling for a federal Yugoslavia. On these notes, see Matteo J. Millazo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

45 Hudson Meadwell, “A Rational Choice Approach to Political Regionalism,” Comparative Politics 23 (July 1991), 402. Importantly, Belgium’s post-1945 evolution showed a similar escalatory dynamic, with each round of decentralization leading to ever more extensive demands for a devolution of governmental authority to Belgium’s
then, demands for more regional autonomy can quickly become demands for outright independence. Recent public opinion polls from Bosnia & Herzegovina suggest just such a possibility were Bosnia’s strategic environment to change. In sum, then, the Balkan experience with federalism suggests that it has been both dangerous for state polities, but also unavoidable.

Consociational powersharing is the second form of higher-order political intervention used to manage interethnic relations promoted in the Balkans. Most commonly associated with the work of Arend Lijphart, consociationalism is a theoretical approach to ethnic conflict-regulation and mediation stressing the importance of equal recognition of different ethnic groups (regardless of size) and large measures of cultural autonomy. The four main principles of consociationalism include: 1) executive power sharing by a “grand coalition” representing all of the major ethnic groups of a given state; 2) segmental autonomy, which can take the form of territorial federalism, or of autonomy for segments defined in some other way; 3) proportional representation in government institutions; and 4) a minority veto on governmental policy deemed to be of vital national importance to a specific ethnic group.46 The success of consociational powersharing schemes is generally believed to be based on there being a limited number of ethnic groups in a given state; that none of them enjoy overwhelming predominance; and that the ethnic groups will have relatively little interaction with each other. Instead, decision-making should remain the preserve of, and dependent upon, the good will of ethnic-group leaders. The

ethnic groups; see, for instance, Florian Bieber, “Consociationalism—Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in Bosnia? The Case of Belgium as a Possible Example,” South-East Europe Review 2 (October 1999), 81.

intent of all of these rules is to give ethnic groups a large measure of self-government. Consociational systems also tend to be more successful in smaller states.⁴⁷

Enthusiasm for consociationalism has waxed and waned over the past several decades, as experiences from Lebanon to the former Yugoslavia have revealed its many flaws. In the former Yugoslavia and its various successor states, different manifestations of consociational agreements have included the constitutional amendments to the Yugoslav constitution in the 1960s; the 1974 Yugoslav constitution; the Washington Agreement on the Bosniac-Croat Federation of April 1994; Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Accords; the Ohrid Accords of August 2001; the State Union Agreement for Serbia-Montenegro of February 2003; and several aspects of the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo.

As we saw with the case of federalism, consociationalism’s record on dealing with complex ethnic and socioeconomic problems is mixed. Markus Crepaz, for instance, has argued that an analysis of 162 elections in eighteen different countries shows that consociational constitutional structures have favorable impacts on a state’s macroeconomic performance, and, when a larger number of parties are included in government (hence increasing popular perceptions of governmental legitimacy), governmental policies tend to be more responsive to popular opinion.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Hechter, *Containing Nationalism*, 136. As Hechter points out, however, among consociationalism’s drawbacks it that it avoids popular participation, it relies on elite bargaining carried out in secret, and it promotes group as opposed to individual rights.

Yet whether such relative effectiveness ultimately translates into public support for such systems is questionable. As seen in Chapter IV, there were significant problems associated with consociational powersharing mechanisms in the former Yugoslavia, and many of these same problems have also been evident in the consociational features built into political institutions in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Macedonia. As consociationalism’s critics note, it tends to make all politics ethnic politics. Moreover, once political conflicts become understood as matters of vital national interests, they become increasingly intractable. Unfortunately, consociational institutions, in and of themselves, do not provide any built-in mechanism for promoting inter-group cooperation. Post-Dayton Bosnia provides ample proof of this; for instance, one Bosnian thinktank has estimated that at the current pace at which Bosnia’s various governmental bodies are working, it will take them fifty years to pass the various laws and regulations required for BiH to implement its Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU.

49 Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*, 330-31. In the former Yugoslavia, this was very evident by the 1960s, as Dennison Rusinow noted: The tendency to subsume all other questions and conflicts to the national one and to interpret and simplify every issue in national terms, reminiscent of old Yugoslavia and of the Habsburg monarchy before it and always an important sub-theme in the new Yugoslavia, was again becoming nearly universal. There was thus recreated the atmosphere and intensity of emotion which come to surround the question of nationality when all discontent and every grievance, every perception of injustice, oppression or relative deprivation, is projected as a national issue.” See Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 272-73. Emphasis added.


51 See “Bosnian Governments’Utterly Ineffective’,” available at http://balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/11068/ Accessed on 17 June 2008 at 9:58am EST. At a conference at the University of Graz in February 2011, the current international High Representative in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Valentin Inzko, was seated next to the present author. When I mentioned this estimate during part of the public discussions, Inzko turned to me and whispered “850 years.” Another frequently heard criticism of the consociational system Dayton put into place is that it created an expensive governmental bureaucracy. Thus, High Representative Miroslav Lajcak in May 2008 criticized the fact that Bosnia had “Two entities [for] three constituent peoples; five presidents, four vice-presidents, 13 prime ministers, 14 parliaments, 147 ministers and 700 members of parliament, all of who serve a population of just under four million people.” As quoted by Edward R. Joseph and R. Bruce Hitchner, “Making Bosnia Work: Why EU Accession is Not Enough” (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, June 2008), 2. Yet a detailed comparative analysis of Bosnia’s system with that of other European countries completed by the European Stability Initiative (ESI) showed that Bosnia’s governmental apparatus employs only 5 percent of the country’s population, as opposed to 5.3 percent in Croatia, and 8.1 percent for the Czech Republic. The overall average in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union is 6.9. As the ESI report concludes, “There is no reason to believe that federalism itself makes the Bosnian state too expensive.” See “Making Federalism Work—A Radical Proposal for Practical Reform” (Berlin: European Stability Initiative, 8 January 2004), 8-9.
The former Yugoslavia’s consociational system also proved susceptible to another weakness identified by consociationalism’s critics, such as the fact that such systems are dependent upon the dedication of elites to the preservation of the state. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the passing of the World War II “partisan generation” of leaders—Tito, Kardelj, Ranković, Bakarić (and several thousand lower level officials in all the various republics)—from the 1960s-1980s removed a group of leaders from the scene who had been personally dedicated to at least some form of Yugoslavia, and their replacement by a younger generation of elites whose formative experiences made them more oriented towards their native republics. At the same time, the pronounced goal of their efforts—to create a system whose legitimacy was accepted by all the country’s ethnic groups, clearly failed. Here the Yugoslav case is consistent with the finding that there appears to be no evidence that consociational systems, or distributing power more widely across state institutions, promotes greater attachment to the state by either majority or minority populations.

Similarly, actual or potential changes in the ethnoconfessional or communal balance of power also make consociational powersharing systems inherently fragile. In the case of the former Yugoslavia in the 1980s, the debate over whether socialist Yugoslavia should move towards a majoritarian, “one person, one vote” system (which many people in Slovenia or Croatia thought would have favored the Serbs and/or Serbia) was one of the precipitant causes of the crisis that

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53 Elkins and Sides, “Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States?”, 705.

54 For a general discussion of the importance of a given ethnic group’s demographic size in multiethnic polities, and both violent and non-violent ways of affecting it, see Milica Zarkovic Bookman, *The Demographic Struggle for Power: The Political Economy of Demographic Engineering in the Modern World* (London: Frank Cass, 1997).
led to country’s disintegration. In the early 1990s, for instance, as Slobodan Milošević was attempting to reform the Yugoslav federation along the lines of “one person, one vote,” Slovenian president Milan Kučan argued, “Can the imposition of majority decisionmaking in a multinational community by those who are the most numerous be anything else but the violation of the principle of the equality of nations, the negation of its sovereignty and therefore the right to autonomous decisionmaking . . . “55 The same has been true for Bosnia-Herzegovina, both in 1990-92 when the breakdown of the consociational mechanisms protecting the major ethnic groups’ constitutional rights was one of the primary factors that provoked the Bosnian civil war in April 1992, 56 as well as in the post-Dayton period, where some of the most serious political crises have erupted after attempts to modify guarantees of political equality among the various ethnoconfessional groups. Most recently, many of the problems Bosnia & Herzegovina has experienced over the past 18+ months is directly a result of attempts, under the guise of promoting majoritarian democracy and more “efficient” government (the same things Milošević claimed he wanted to achieve in the late 1980s), to overturn the essence of Dayton by reducing or eliminating many of the Dayton constitution’s consociational features. 57 Similarly, both the Lebanese civil


56 This point is somewhat debateable. Steven Burg, for instance, has argued that while the Bosnian political system prior to 1992 had some consociational features, the absence of a mutual veto was a “crucial missing institutional component” of the system. As Burg notes, “Although the tripartite coalition appears to have been formed on the basis of an agreement to rule by consensus, the most controversial parliamentary and governmental decisions were taken over the objections of one of the ostensibly ruling parties.” See Burg, “Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Case of failed democratization,” in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., Politics, Power and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 139.

57 Richard Holbrooke, for instance, has implicitly made this same point with respect to Bosnia, noting that “Bosnia is a federal state. It has to be structured as a federal state. You cannot have a unitary government, because then the country would go back into fighting. And that’s the reason that the Dayton agreement has been probably the most successful peace agreement in the world in the last generation, because it recognized the reality” (emphasis added). See the interview with Holbrooke, entitled “Kosovo Independence Declaration Could Spark Crisis,” at: http://www.cfr.org/publication/14968/holbrooke.html. Daniel Serwer of the United States Institute for Peace has placed much of the blame for the current problems in promoting constitutional reform in Bosnia on the current
war in the 1970s and the Iraqi civil war that erupted after 2003 were both in part a result of shifting demographics and the changes in the balance of power that this entailed. In the Lebanese case, systemic crisis and breakdown erupted when the Christian Maronite community was unable to come to some accommodation with growing Sunni and Shia’ Muslim communities as to how to reform the powersharing system given the former community’s decreasing numbers and the latter communities’ increasing number. Similarly, in the Iraqi case, the eruption of civil war after 2003 was to some degree a result of the inability of the Sunni Muslim community, which though numerically weaker had been politically dominant during the Saddam period, to accommodate the Shia’ Muslim community’s demands for a greater share of power in post-Saddam Iraq.

Another criticism related to the inherent fragility of consociational systems is a function of their effectiveness. Lake and Rothchild, for instance, claim that consociational arrangements “with ethnic balances of power constantly evolving . . . are necessarily transitional ones.” Such structural instability clearly has implications for governmental effectiveness, as the Balkan experience bears out. For instance, after Nikola Gruevski’s VMRO-DPMNE party came to power in Macedonia’s July 2006 parliamentary elections and chose to form a coalition government with Arben Xhaferi and Menduh Thaci’s Democratic Party of Albanians rather than ...
Ali Ahmeti’s Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), Ahmeti’s party boycotted parliament for much of 2006 and 2007, making it impossible for several months to pass legislation required for EU accession.

The governmental paralysis visible in Bosnia & Herzegovina and in Macedonia in recent years, however, is only a replay of the problems the former Yugoslavia faced in the 1960s and 1970s. The vetoes inherent in a political system in which different federal units had such widely varying interests resulted in a situation in which any policies adopted generally came in the form of the least-effective, lowest-common denominator agreements possible. The post-1995 Bosnian experience with consociationalism has been similar. Passage of legislation in Bosnia’s consociational institutions, such as the State Parliament, was exceedingly slow in the first four years after Dayton; from 1996-2000, only twenty-five laws were passed by this body. The pattern has repeated itself in Macedonia. Article 78 of the original Macedonian Constitution provided for the creation of a “Council for Interethnic Relations” which was to be composed of two members of each of Macedonia’s recognized ethnic groups (Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Vlachs and Romanies) as well as two members representing the other nationalities in Macedonia. The speaker of the National Assembly served as president of the council. The work of this body, however, has been disappointing; as one observer noted, “the results of the council’s work in the first decade of independence have proved to be negligible or nonexistent.”


60 See Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy, 69.
Another weakness of consociational powersharing mechanisms is their reliance on elites. An important premise of consociationalism is that elites have monopoly (or at least near monopoly) control over their respective groups, which gives them more freedom to negotiate across ethnic lines. In the Balkans over the past 15 years, however, with the exception of a few brief periods, no national or subnational set of political leaders have enjoyed such power. As a result, ruling elites in southeastern Europe have generally been exposed to the threat of ethnic-outbidding by more nationalist segments of their own populations. In such a situation, as Horowitz points out, “where some group leaders opt for cooperation with other groups, we have seen that intragroup competition tends to arise, and it is usually based on the argument that group interests have been sold out... intraethnic competition... [challenges] interethnic arrangements as a sacrifice of vital group interests.”\(^{62}\) This, for instance, proved to be the case in 1990 when a more moderate Croatian leadership centered in the League of Communists of Slovenia led by Ivica Račan was outmaneuvered by Franjo Tudjman’s HDZ; it was also apparent in the challenges more extreme nationalists such as Vojislav Šešelj and his Serbian Radical Party posed to Slobodan Milošević at various points in the 1990s. Conversely, of course, if elite control of their respective segments of the population is too strong, this obviously has serious implications for democratization within the state and its subunits.

A problem related to consociationalism’s reliance on elites stems from the fact that by necessity the system depends upon the actual commitment of elites to the multinational states in which they find themselves. Ian Lustick, for instance, notes that “at the core of all consociational

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\(^{61}\) Here we could note Slobodan Milošević’s early years in power, from 1988-1989 (after which he was already being seriously threatened by nascent democratic, albeit nationalist, forces in Serbia), or, similarly, the first years of Franjo Tudjman and the HDZ’s assumption of power in 1990-1991.

approaches is an image of an elite cartel whose members share an overarching commitment to the survival of the arena within which their groups compete, and who seek to negotiate among themselves and enforce, within their groups, the terms of mutually acceptable compromises.”

But the history of all the consociational experiments in the Balkans over the past several decades (former Yugoslavia; post-Dayton BiH; post-1999 Kosovo; the State Union of Serbia-Montenegro; and post-Ohrid Macedonia) shows that such commitment is often questionable or tentative. The “grand coalition” of nationalist parties that came to power in Bosnia in 1990 quickly fell apart, and in the post-Dayton period, as one scholar has noted, elite support for Dayton’s implementation “was in most cases primarily motivated by their attempt to avoid penalization by international organizations rather than by support for the actual agreement.” In the absence of such commitment, moreover, the centrifugal forces operating in consociational systems make them extremely prone to disintegration. Consequently, without firm international guarantees and support for the integrity and survival of such states, their constituent parts are likely to go their own ways.

Yet despite all of the theoretical drawbacks of federalist and consociational solutions to ethnic conflict outlined above, and despite the Yugoslav experience with them, international efforts to mediate ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia have often reproduced many of their features.

As one report summed up the experience of all of these efforts,

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64 Admittedly, this is a debatable assertion. For an account of Yugoslavia’s gradual disintegration that argues that until very late into the process the various Yugoslav republican elites were committed to the state, see Jović, *Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla*.

After the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, constitutions were written for several states and other entities in the region. But five years after the wars ended, the governments created by those constitutions remain weak, unpopular, and as yet unable to persuade either their people or the international community that they are ready to enter the European Union.66

This reveals the fact that the problem in dealing with Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism is mainly due to the lack of viable alternative strategies, which in turn reminds us of the importance of the “same stubborn facts” of political and social life in East Central Europe that political leaders and policymakers so often are constrained by. Nevertheless, an important implication of this dissertation and its emphasis on the collective nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism is that adopting consociational practices is extremely difficult to avoid. As was argued in Chapter’s III and IV, ethnoconfessional groups in southeastern Europe understand themselves and generally behave as unitary political actors which deserve equal and sovereign rights and recognitions. This has been a feature of Balkan political culture for hundreds of years, thanks to both the Ottoman millet system and the Habsburg Empire’s mechanisms for ethno-corporate self-governance. Attempts to impose political institutions or processes based on majoritarian principles in southeastern Europe, though frequently recommended by interventionist organizations,67 hence lead to tremendous social dissatisfaction, complaints about unfairness and inequality, and conflict. Thus, despite consociationalism’s overall deficiencies and poor track

66 The Balkans in Europe’s Future, 15.

67 The International Crisis Group has been a frequent critic of Dayton’s consociational features; in one report, for instance, the ICG criticizes the Bosnian parliaments House of Peoples, which “contributes nothing to the democratic debate, and institutionalizes ethnic discrimination. The real purpose of House of Peoples (sic) is to give the three ethnic groups the right to veto legislation on the ground it is against their ‘national interest.’” See Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement (Sarajevo: ICG Balkan Report #80, 28 October 1999), 23. Similar critiques of consociational practices and institutions can be found in Bosnia’s Next Five Years: Dayton and Beyond (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 3 November 2000).
record, “there may be no alternative to consociationalism” in southeastern Europe’s deeply divided societies.”68

**Integrative institutions** provide a third form of higher-order political intervention used to manage interethnic relations. In Bosnia, for instance, such integrative institutions would include the Constitutional Court, the Central Bank, the Human Rights Chamber and Commission, and the Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees. Although membership in all of these bodies is based on ethnic parity representation (together with representatives of the international community), decisionmaking within these institutions is by simple majority and there are no provisions for ethnic vetoes.69

Another integrative practice has been the adoption of preferential electoral systems (also known at alternative vote systems) designed to encourage moderation and move both political candidates and individual citizens towards a hypothetically “ethnically-neutral” position on the political spectrum. In a preferential voting system, citizens are allowed to vote for a number of candidates for office in the rank order in which they prefer specific candidates. Theoretically, those candidates getting the most overall votes should be the most moderate and have the most overall appeal. The intent behind such voting systems is to allow political candidates to draw support from voters of any ethnic affiliation.70 Some scholars have argued that it is even possible for politicians of one ethnic group to “pass” as members of another ethnic group. This approach

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68 Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton*, 248.

69 Casperson, “Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?” 573.

70 For one example of such proposals, see *Breaking the Mould: Electoral Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Sarajevo: International Crisis Group Balkans Report No. 56, 4 March 1999).
quite clearly draws its theoretical inspiration from constructivism: if individuals have fluid and malleable identities this should allow political parties to “pass” various candidates as members of the ethnic group specific groups of voters favor. Kanchan Chandra, for instance, argues that

If voters prefer elites and parties that represent their “own” category, then one way in which political entrepreneurs can manipulate electoral outcomes is to pass as members of the voter’s “own” category. The many ambiguities that shroud the origin and markers of ethnic categories make such “passing” possible.71

The Balkan experience, however, provides no evidence of such “passing” by political entrepreneurs. From a more general perspective, however, it is clear that most political-engineering efforts to manipulate voter thinking and behavior through integrative mechanisms have failed. Instead, what the available evidence suggests is that both political parties and voters are generally able to see through such integrative efforts and react according to the logic of Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism, not according to constructivist logic. Thus, when international officials tried to manipulate Mostar’s electoral system to the detriment of the nationalist parties “the SDA and the HDZ . . . figured out the logic behind the design of the electoral system and [r]efined their tactics in response . . . the experience of Mostar illustrates the limits of electoral engineering designed to encourage cross-national politics.”72 A similar attempt by the OSCE to impose a draft electoral law in the election of delegates to the BiH House of Peoples in 2000 created a crisis with the HDZ which opposed the measures, as a result


72 Bose, Bosnia After Dayton, 122-123. Further evidence of the complexity foreign interventions into internal conflicts had been recognized by some of the more prescient international officials, who realized that locals had the advantage in manipulating whatever electoral system outsiders devised. As the first international High Representative to Bosnia & Herzegovina, Carl Bildt, noted, “local talent when it came to rigging elections was probably streets ahead of our talent in spotting such behaviour. We were only half joking when we said later that we were concentrating our efforts on preventing the dead from voting more than once.” See Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), 257-258.
of which “the HDZ were able to use [the crisis] to consolidate their electoral base. Therefore, the attempt to impose an integrative solution backfired.”

In elections in the RS in that year, a system of alternative voting was applied in the November 2000 election for the Republika Srpska’s presidential and vice-presidential offices. The intent of this change was to improve chances for electing moderate candidates by allowing voters to rank their preferences, rather than simply casting one vote per office. However, this system could not erase the strong preferences for the nationalist candidates, who managed to win the most votes.

In sum, as Bose notes, “realities on the ground in Mostar (indeed, in Bosnia as a whole) tend to be at variance with neat formulas and formal arrangements” for re-aligning voter preferences in deeply-divided societies. The experience of many integrative efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as Casperson notes, suggests that

the imposition of an unpopular integrative structure may make it even more difficult to create a self-sustaining peace . . . in the Bosnian case, the consociational model has been more effective in promoting stability, despite the international presence which makes the need for local acceptance less pressing. The greater effectiveness of the consociational model has been due to the deep divisions in the population, the dominance of self-determination claims in the conflict and the absence of a majority group.

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73 Casperson, “Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?” 582.


75 Bose, Bosnia After Dayton, 118.

76 Casperson, “Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?” 585. Other scholars have also concluded that consociational models are more appropriate for Bosnia given ethnic divisions within the country. Sherrill Stroschein, for instance, has argued that “In spite of proposals for more integrationist institutions, the removal of consociational institutions would be likely to eliminate the persistence of nationalist elites and ethnic parties. Given the violent and persistent nature of the 1992-95 war, it is simply unrealistic to expect the citizens of Bosnia to quickly lose their ethnic affiliations in the political arena. Rather, Bosnian institutions should reflect these cleavages if the institutions are to be treated as legitimate by the population. It is a paradox of Bosnian governing structures that less centralization can in fact produce more state stability.” See Stroschein, “What Belgium Can Teach Bosnia: The Uses of Autonomy in ‘Divided House’ States,” 17-18. Similarly, Florian Bieber argues that “ . . . in the case of Bosnia a devolution of powers could actually render the bureaucracy more efficiently. In Western Europe, the popularity of the term “subsidiarity” reflects the recognition that decision-making is more efficient at the lower levels of administration. If this succeeds, there is no reason why consensus democracy, coupled with a devolution of powers in Bosnia, should not make administration more efficient and cooperative for all of its citizens.” See Bieber, “Consociationalism—Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in Bosnia? The Case of Belgium as a Possible Example.” South-East Europe Review 2 (October 1999), 89. Italics in the original.
There is, however, some evidence that with the passage of time integrative mechanisms and institutions may be more accepted and ultimately successful. Thus, while in early post-conflict periods consociationalism may provide more appropriate institutional mechanisms for maintaining inter-ethnic peace, with longer periods of peace and stability, popular resistance to closer forms of interethnic cooperation can weaken (but not disappear altogether). There is also some evidence to suggest that over time people become less hostile to integrative institutions and policies—at least up to a point. As one recent analysis of post-Dayton Bosnia has noted,

. . . if Bosnia and Herzegovina succeeds further in the gradual transformation process of its institutions, this could be an indication that what might initially seem excessively consociationalist is, in fact, necessary to assure communities and their political representatives that they can engage in political processes with their erstwhile enemies on the battlefield without fear of losing politically what they did not lose militarily . . . there is nothing absolutely permanent about even as rigid a consociational design as the one adopted by the Dayton constitution. Coupled with strong international involvement and security guarantees, and complemented by strong individual human and minority rights provisions, consociational designs have proven their immense value as transformative institutional designs, which, rather than permanently entrenching adversarial ethnic identities, instead generate the space and time necessary to enable the parties to move beyond some of the initially necessary rigidity of institutions aimed at protecting weaker parties in conflict settlements. Internationalized state building can thus serve the stabilization of states emerging from conflict well if it draws on a well balanced approach of consociational techniques, moderated by integrative policies, tempered by a wider regional outlook and sustained by resourceful and skilled international involvement.77

The above discussion on the role that time plays in reducing ethnic tensions and hostility towards integrative institutions brings up a related issue—the timing and sequencing of elections; in essence, the pace of democratization itself.

If elections provide only symbolic representation for ethnic minorities without allowing them to meaningfully protect their communal/group interests, then elections and the democratic process itself can be perceived as just a smokescreen allowing ethnic majorities to legitimate and dominate ethnic minorities. Hence, in multiethnic states elections have to be complemented by a host of other mechanisms and institutional features such as federalism and/or regional autonomy and multiparty coalitions.  

For instance, a number of scholars and policy analysts have argued that one of the failures of international efforts in Bosnia & Herzegovina can be attributed to the fact that elections were held too soon after the war ended, thereby allowing nationalists to cement ethnic divisions in the country. Others have argued that the governmental level at which elections are held is also crucial for pre-conflict multiethnic federal states. According to this view, by first holding elections at a state-wide level, federal politicians and institutions can gain greater legitimacy in dealing with more narrowly-based ethnic or regional leaders.

Evidence from southeastern Europe suggests that there are problems with both arguments. Pre-1990 Bosnian history, for instance, shows that Bosnia’s population has always voted along ethnic lines, so there is no historical evidence to support the argument that in postwar Bosnia waiting several more years to hold elections would have significantly changed the Bosnian population’s historical pattern of voting along strictly ethnoconfessional lines (see Chapter IV).

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78 See, for instance, Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” 60.

79 See, for instance, James Dobbins, et. al, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand, 2003), 107-108. See also Snyder, Paris.

80 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,” Daedalus 121 (Spring 1992), 123-139.
In Bosnia’s 1990 elections (held 45 years after the last previous bout of interethnic conflict in Bosnia) eighty-four percent of the electorate voted for the three main ethnic parties. Debates over the timing of elections, or the sequencing of democratization, meanwhile, center on whether enhancing the rule-of-law in transitioning states can be accomplished without political liberalization.  

To summarize: as predicted by an understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism that sees it as a collective, chronic, and non-economic phenomenon, political and constitutional engineering projects aimed at quickly transforming individual identities and loyalties have not succeeded in the region. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia continue to be defined by sharp and even growing divisions along ethnoconfessional lines, despite more than a decade of effort on the part of tens of thousands of outsiders spending billions of dollars, and enjoying countless organizational and financial advantages. Such lack of success suggests that the phenomenon being dealt with is much more massive and deeply-rooted than is generally assumed.

2) Lower-order political interventions

Together with the political and constitutional engineering strategies outlined above, the international effort in the Balkans over the past decade has also included less ambitious efforts as well. Two of these—the effort to create “multinational” administrations and governmental bureaucracies, and the effort to purge “un-cooperative” elected officials from office—deserve

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81 See Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy,” *The Journal of Democracy* 18 (January 2007), 12-27. Carothers does concede, however, that “Where a state has completely collapsed or failed under the lash of civil conflict or other accumulated calamities, moving rapidly toward open political competition and elections makes no sense. The state will need to have at lease minimal functional capacity as well as something resembling a monopoly of force before such a country can pull itself onto the path of sustainable, pluralistic development.” It is not clear how Carothers would classify Bosnia in 1996 in this regard.
detailed examination. Considerable time, political capital, and resources have been devoted to both of these efforts, which have included some or all of the following: directly or indirectly endorsing so-called “moderate” parties; holding frequent elections to get “uncooperative” officials out of office (or more “cooperative” officials into office); banning parties or individuals from office because of their programs; and enforcing electoral rules which would be considered more favorable to moderate parties.82

Both of these strategies and efforts contradict a fundamental assumption of the understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism outlined in this dissertation: that is, that it is a collective phenomenon. As predicted by an understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism that sees it as a collective phenomenon, efforts to create “multiethnic coalitions” or to replace “uncooperative” individuals will be of little or no utility, because such “multiethnic coalitions” or “cooperative” individuals intending to create a liberal democratic system based on individual rather than group rights will be politically irrelevant and/or will have no serious popular support. Moreover, even when “multiethnic coalitions” are formed, they will be so only in form, not in function.83

These strategies and efforts also deserve examination because they are directly related to consociational theories stressing the importance of elites. As noted above, cooperative elites are seen as the crucial element in such systems; according to Eric Nordlinger, the role of conflict group leaders is “critical” because “In each case of conflict regulation it was the conflict group

82 Bieber, “Institutionalizing Ethnicity in Former Yugoslavia: Domestic vs. Internationally Driven Processes of Institutional (Re-) Design,” 11.

83 This applies equally both to when the parties in the coalition are considered “nationalist” (i.e., the SDA-SDS-HDZ coalition that has ruled Bosnia-Herzegovina for much of the post-Dayton period, or the VMRO-DPMNE—PDP coalition ruling in Macedonia), or to when the coalition partners are allegedly “civic-oriented” or non-nationalist (as in the case of Bosnia’s Alliance for Change coalition, or Macedonia’s SDSM-DUI coalition).
leaders who took the initiative in working out the various conflict-regulating mechanisms, who put them into operation, and who did so at least partly with the goal in mind of arriving at a conflict-regulating outcome.” Thus, what needs examining is whether such critically-important elites can be imposed on a society by outsiders, and whether (for these elites to play their assigned roles seriously) they have to have genuine support from their domestic constituencies.

This point is important because international officials have expended enormous amounts of time and energy on such efforts. For instance, former Bosnia High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch claimed in one of his farewell interviews that he could divide his tenure (August 1999-May 2002) into two parts. During the first one and a half years, Petritsch removed over 70 publicly elected officials from office and passed many laws aimed at curbing the power of nationalist parties. The second half of his tenure, according to Petritsch, was marked by efforts to “establish a partnership with the new political forces that had come to power,” largely as a result of political maneuvering by the OHR. Six months after Petritsch left his position, however, the “new political forces” he had spent so much time installing in office lost power, which leads to the question of the utility of Petritsch’s three-years of work.

An example from 2000 provides a neat illustration of this point. Following Bosnia’s November elections that year, the OHR was intent on keeping the HDZ out of power because it had become increasingly critical of international efforts to centralize power within the Bosniac-Croat federation. Thus, the OHR played midwife to a coalition government which excluded

84 Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies* (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Papers No. 29: 1972), 10.

members of the HDZ, but included Croat politicians from a number of smaller groups. As a result, the Federation government formed after Bosnia’s November 2000 parliamentary elections, composed of parties in the so-called “Alliance for Change” did not include members of the HDZ, which won 93 percent of the Croat vote in the elections, but did include Croats belonging to politically insignificant political parties and HDZ breakaway groups. The failures of the “Alliance for Change” also set the stage for a quick return to power of the main nationalist parties in the Federation; as one Bosnian journalist described the entire experience: “The short and brutal life of the Alliance for Change seems not only to have damaged the parties involved but the concept of multi-ethnic government in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole—and may have provided the nationalist parties with a head start in this crucial electoral race.” Moreover, even within the supposedly non-nationalist “Alliance for Change,” accusations quickly started flying that Croat members of the coalition were taking control of the Federation’s finances.

Another widely-questioned tactic that the international community has adopted in its efforts to promote political reform and interethnic reconciliation in Bosnia & Herzegovina has been removing publicly-elected officials from office if they are deemed to be obstructing the peace.

86 Bose, Bosnia After Dayton, 129.

87 Senad Slatina, “Bosnia: Ethnic Divide Widens as Elections Loom,” IWPR Balkan Crisis Report No. 357, 9 August 2002. In a further indication of how futile such efforts are, in November 2002 the Social-Democratic Party of Bosnia & Herzegovina, largely cobbled together by international officials during the mandate of former High Representative Carlos Westendorp, split into its two traditional competing factions.

88 See, for instance, Azhar Kalamujić, “Alijansa pokrice za hrvatski finansijski lobi?”, Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 11 January 2002; Azhar Kalamujić, “Hrvatske firme utajile milione KM poreza,” Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 16 January 2002. See also the cover story for the 30 May 2002 issue of Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo), “Ima li ‘poštenih’ Hrvata?” Croat members of the Alliance for Change had a variety of complaints of their own. For instance, the Croat Minister of Defense for the Federation, Mijo Anić, charged that Bosniac members of the Alliance were maintaining a double-standard with regards to war crimes indictees, demanding that Bosniac indictees be released until their trial dates, but not asking for similar rights for Croat indictees. See Emir Habul, “Začarani krug,” Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 18 December 2001.
process (a logical consequence of the constructivist stress on elites). Between 1998 and 2005, for instance, various high representatives removed 119 people from office. In one day alone, on 30 June 2004, High Representative Paddy Ashdown removed fifty-eight people from public office. The legality and legitimacy of many of these actions have raised serious concerns, even by OHR officials themselves.\textsuperscript{89}

Moreover, instead of producing more “acceptable” Bosnian politicians, what has been seen instead is that there is an endless supply of individuals willing to “obstruct” the DPA, and by trying to find “people we can work with” the international community has in the process undermined domestic institutions and delegitimized the electoral process.\textsuperscript{90} Outsiders, moreover,

\textsuperscript{89} The former head of the OHR’s legal department, Matthew Parish, is worth citing at length on this issue: “One has to wonder whether, in these and countless other cases where dismissals occurred en masse, adequate consideration was given to the individual circumstances of each individual dismissed. The reasons given in the text of decisions were usually quite inadequate. Generally there was reference to a policy failure by a domestic institution, together with a broad assertion that the person removed had to be held responsible for that failure, but without citing specific behavior by the individual that constituted clear wrongdoing. The paucity of reasoning contained in removal decisions was hardly surprising: OHR had no investigators who could conduct any kind of detailed investigation into an official’s wrongdoing. Its approach was inevitably broad brush and frequently quite unfair to the individuals involved. Sometimes the ‘real’ reason for a dismissal, discussed in the hallways of OHR but never made clear to the victim of the removal, was a piece of supposed military intelligence that condemned the person. But the quality of international military intelligence in post-war Bosnia was poor. Bored peacekeepers, without significant intelligence training, were instructed to collect intelligence in coffee bars; the reports they prepared were placed on files without a serious filtering process and were subsequently cited as gospel.” In March 2007, BiH’s Constitutional Court ruled that such removals violated the European Convention on Human Rights. The High Representative promptly annulled the ruling. See Parish, “The Demise of the Dayton Protectorate,” 15-16.

\textsuperscript{90} Richard Caplan, for instance, has noted that “dismissals by the high representative have often led to the appointment by the local authorities of successor officials every much as problematic as those removed.” See Caplan, “International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” \textit{Global Governance} 10 (January-March 2004), 59. Similarly, a comparative analysis of international efforts in the Balkans, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq has noted that “Creating space for political action and expression is within the remit of international administration, while determining the ideological character of politics are more treacherous waters. Distinctions between ‘hardliners’ and ‘moderates’ have proven over time to be unreliable as political tactics on behalf of external and local actors change. Likewise, banning parties that do not sit well with Western sensibilities but reflect indigenous dispositions has not proven to be effective, and can contribute to the cause of extremists by alienating disaffected youth. Despite Western charges of barbarism, radical movements are a product of the political ecology in which they evolved, and they express real sentiments within society.” See Christopher P. Freeman, “Liberal Trusteeship: The Convergence of Interest and Ideology in International Administration,” in Tony Brems Knudsen and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, eds., \textit{Kosovo Between War and Peace: Nationalism, Peacebuilding and International Trusteeship} (New York: Routledge, 2006), 180.
have also had a poor track record in picking partners with whom to work in the region, so there
has been little reason to believe that installing new individuals in power will produce a
qualitative improvement in the peace process, or mark a significant advance in interethnic
relations.91 As Sumantra Bose argues,

Bosnia’s future as a democratic country depends on institutions and
institutionalization, not on particular individuals or political factions . . .
Individuals and cliques who are given to believe that they are the chosen favorites
of powerful Western countries and international agencies tend to rapidly develop
a sense of impunity, and degenerate habits of authoritarianism and corruption.92

David Laitin has suggested another strategy for reducing ethnic conflict in multiethnic states
which he calls the “most favored lord” option: in essence, developing affirmative action
programs for ethnic minority elites. The purpose of such programs is to increase social mobility
and possibilities for economic gain for these elites within the larger, multiethnic setting, thereby
reducing their potential grievances against the state while increasing their incentives for
cooperation. Thus, the dangers of ethnic outbidding would be reduced “as aspirants for wealth

91 For instance, in 1998, Richard Holbrooke called the new RS prime minister, Milorad Dodik, “the most promising
leader of his generation in his country (RFE/RL Newsline, 3 September 1999). Yet in 2002, Dodik declared “My
political and life story is oriented towards the RS. I accept Bosnia and Herzegovina because I am being forced to.
And nothing more.” As quoted by Zija Dizdarević, “Dodikova ljubav,” Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 2 May 2002.
Similarly, in the summer of 1997, the international community strongly supported RS president Biljana Plavšić
when she dissolved the RS parliament, which at the time was controlled by Radovan Karadžić’s SDS. A few years
later, she was indicted by the ICTY.

Poor judgement in picking local leaderships is of course a common problem for interventionists. In Afghanistan, for
instance, as William Dalrymple has noted, “NATO has helped install a former CIA asset accused by a high-ranking
UN diplomat of drug abuse and of having a history of mental instability, with little to recommend him other than
that he was once run out of Langley.” See Dalrymple, “Why the Taliban is Winning in Afghanistan,” The New
Statesman, 22 June 2010. Similarly, in Iraq, “the failure of the elite that the United States helped to choose may
serve as a lasting American legacy here, raising fundamental questions about the body politic it leaves behind as the
American military departs by 2012.” See Anthony Shadid, “Iraq Leaders Fear for Future After Their Past Missteps,”

92 Bose, Bosnia After Dayton, 274.
and power in the region would be reluctant to lose the possibility for higher rewards at the political center.”

Although such arguments are intuitively appealing, the degree to which such stratagems succeed in reducing ethnic conflict is questionable, for several reasons. The first is their assumption that nationalism is both a function of economics (i.e., frustrated job-seekers) and an elite phenomenon in general, neither of which (as was argued in Chapter’s II, III, and IV), are borne out by the Balkan experience. Second, such policies have already been repeatedly tried in southeastern Europe, and have repeatedly failed. During Benjamin Kállay’s reign in Bosnia, for instance, Austro-Hungarian policies put great emphasis on installing confessional leaders whom they themselves had vetted and approved of, as opposed to the then current practice of confessional leaders being chosen by religious organizations headquartered outside of Bosnia. Through agreements with the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1880 and with the Vatican in 1881, the Austro-Hungarian administration succeeded in gaining control over the appointments of leaders for both the Serbian Orthodox and the Roman Catholic churches, respectively, and over their budgets as well. The purpose of the entire effort was to foster the growth of local elites that would promote a sense of indigenous Bosnian identity, yet their efforts came to naught, at least among the Serb population of Bosnia, since (as pointed out in Chapter’s IV and V), despite the appointment of such leaders, Serb popular opinion in Bosnia continued to overwhelmingly favor unification with Serbia at this time.

93 Laitin, Identity in Formation, 344. For a similar argument, see Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” 58-59.

94 Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 76-77.
A more recent example can be taken from the experiences of Tito’s Yugoslavia. Post-1945 Yugoslavia adopted amongst the most comprehensive policies for ethnic affirmative action imaginable, yet these policies nevertheless failed to instill the loyalty to the central state that the architects of such policies envisioned. As politicians and government officials in the former Yugoslavia correctly understood, the center of legitimate power in such deeply divided societies is often their home or native region. This pattern has continued to be apparent in both post-Dayton Bosnia, and in Serbia-Montenegro between 1997-2006. All of this suggests that Darden was accurate in predicting that many constructivist attempts to re-orient ethnic and national loyalties are doomed to failure. As he notes,

Efforts to conscript, to re-educate, or to economically develop a community should meet either with resistance or with no effect on the loyalties of the communities in question. Once in place, the national loyalties can be accommodated or emboldened, or any outward manifestation of them can be violently repressed, but they cannot be substituted or switched and authentic group attachments cannot be bought for a price.

Thus, given the reality that outsiders or the local hegemon are highly unlikely to shift the locus of popularly-legitimate political power within such deeply divided societies from the ethnic groups to the central government, it is doubtful that a most-favored lord approach would succeed.

As Sabrina Ramet has noted, “in the Tito era, Yugoslav politicians tended to eschew removal to the center, so that the real talent generally remained at the republic level. This practice set the pattern for the post-Tito era as well.” See Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia (2nd Edition), 71. Dennison Rusinow made a similar observation, noting that “those with political ambitions, knowing that their careers are dependent on the approval of the republican/provincial apparatuses who send them to Belgrade and to whose ranks they must return, were often reluctant to accept a federal post and always responsive to their home constituencies. This further increased the power (and attractiveness) of local offices while it reduced the power (and quality) of central ones.” See Rusinow, “Unfinished Business: The Yugoslav ‘National Question’,” (Hanover, NH: American Universities Field Staff Report (Europe) No. 35, 1981), 9.

In sum, ethnic conflict regulation strategies based upon punishing or rewarding individuals using extra-institutional means often end up by simply diminishing the legitimacy of such efforts in the minds of many domestic politicians and its citizens. As David Chandler has noted,

The manipulation of pliant political elites, isolated from any electoral base in society, may make it easy for international legislators to impose good governance decrees but can only institutionalize societal divisions rather than overcoming them. Politicians who have little representational legitimacy are unlikely to be able to build bridges within society and lack the capacity to resolve conflicts. The weak position of the new elites highlights the artificial nature of this internationally enforced process, in which decisions arrived at are dependent upon international supervision. This increases insecurity on all sides, as there is little local control or ownership of the political process, necessary for the settlement to be self-sustaining after international withdrawal.  

The ability of international officials to dismiss democratically-elected officials from office and the power to impose pieces of legislations, laws, decrees, etc., have also created a secondary negative dynamic. Instead of Bosniacs, Croats, Kosovar Albanians, Macedonians, and Serbs believing that their most important goal should be to gain the political support of their neighbors for specific reforms, the large role of the international community has forced them to conclude that the best way to protect or further their political interests is by getting an outside actor on their side, be it the High Representative, the Special Representative, or the local U.S. ambassador. Thus, the nature of the political game in the post-conflict international protectorates prevents local ethnoconfessional groups from developing the habits of mutual cooperation, compromise, and trust needed for effective politics. As a European Stability Initiative (ESI) report on Bosnia-Herzegovina argued,

One reason why there has been so little real constitutional debate in Bosnia in recent years has been the assumption among many that in the end the shape of the country—and all decisive issues over distribution of power and resources—will be decided upon by foreigners. Better to wait and see, defend what one has and advance maximalist positions than to explore how through negotiations and

compromise the highly imperfect system bequeathed by years of violent conflict could be made to work better.  

**International Successes:** Successful outside interventions into interethnic conflicts in the Balkans have usually involved problems of a more technical and less political or cultural nature. The implementation of the two major peace agreements in the Balkans, the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) and UNSCR 1244, provides important examples of the functional fields in which outsiders can successfully intervene in ethnic conflicts. For instance, military implementation of both agreements was incredibly successful by almost any measure. Armed forces were withdrawn from confrontation lines, de-armed, and demobilized largely according to schedule. Similarly, regional arms reduction efforts fostered by the OSCE and other organizations have also been impressively successful. 

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98 See Making Federalism Work—A Radical Proposal for Practical Reform (Berlin-Brussels-Sarajevo: European Stability Initiative, 8 January 2004), 10. David Chandler has made similar arguments, noting that “If there is any lesson from six years of international rule over Bosnia, it is that high-handed intervention in the political sphere has done little to help overcome insecurities and divisions, while undermining collective political bodies in which Serb, Croat, and Muslim representatives can negotiate solutions.” See Chandler, “Bosnia’s New Colonial Governor,” The Guardian (London), 9 July 2002. Similar views have been echoed regarding the two-year long battle for constitutional reform aimed at making Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs “constituent peoples” throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As one report noted, despite cries in the Bosnian press about this issue, “the atmosphere of extreme urgency [was] entirely artificial.” Demands that the High Representative bypass normal legislative and judicial channels and impose a solution would make sure that “in the name of political equality, these problems will be exacerbated by the constitutional reforms now on the table.” See Imposing Constitutional Reform? The Case for Ownership (Berlin-Sarajevo: European Stability Initiative Discussion Paper, 20 March 2002), 1, 8. These critiques of the OHR and its powers have now become conventional wisdom. The report of the International Commission on the Balkans, for instance, notes that “as the agenda of Bosnian politics has shifted to the . . . issues of democratic consolidation and development, the powers and activities of the High Representative continue to dominate Bosnian politics. This has blocked the development of self-government which is a precondition to becoming an EU candidate state . . . The talks in Bosnia convinced us that the OHR has outlived its usefulness.” See The Balkans in Europe’s Future, 24-25.

99 At the same time, imposing a safe and secure environment in which interethnic relations can develop peacefully, however, is impossible in the absence of serious international political will. For instance, according to the Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, despite putting “25 times more money and 50 times more troops per capita in post-conflict Kosovo than in Afghanistan . . . The international community has clearly failed in its attempts to bring security and development to the province. A multi-ethnic Kosovo does not exist except in the bureaucratic assessments of the international community. The events of March 2004 amounted to the strongest signal yet that the situation could explode. Since then UNMIK has demonstrated neither the capacity nor the courage to reverse this trend. Serbs in Kosovo are living imprisoned in their enclaves with no freedom of movement, no jobs, and with neither hope nor opportunity for meaningful integration into Kosovo society. The position of the Serbian minority is
Conversely, the struggle to adopt a unified Bosnian passport, currency, and license plates reveals both the problems and the benefits that surround efforts by international officials to promote reform in ethnically-divided societies. During negotiations over the design of a new Bosnian passport in 1998-99, large amounts of time were spent on disagreements over whether “Republika Srpska” should appear in three millimeters on the cover of the BiH passport. After a particularly difficult period of negotiations, former Deputy High Representative Jacques Klein claimed “Never in the history of diplomacy was so much time and effort expended by so many diplomats over such trivia.” In effect, enormous amounts of outsiders’ limited time and energy was expended on matters of symbolism that ultimately had very little effect on the quality of life of most Bosnian citizens, while at the same time the polemics accompanying the dispute increased political tensions in Bosnia considerably.

On the other hand, the effort to create a common currency and license plates in Bosnia, which were necessary for citizens to enjoy freedom of movement throughout the country and for Bosnia to function as a common economic zone, have widely been hailed as amongst the most successful things the international community has accomplished in Bosnia. Public opinion supports this view; for instance, a recent survey showed that the BiH Central Bank is the institution Bosnian citizens have the most trust in.

As the above analysis suggests, strategies favoring ambitious, long-term, expensive and intensive international efforts in the Balkans are doubly questionable: on the one hand, the costs of such interventions are unlikely to be acceptable to electorates back home, and on the other hand, the degree to which outsiders have the political skills needed to deal with these problems is questionable. The Bosnian and Kosovo cases will in all likelihood prove to be the most powerful international state- and nation-building projects in recent times, yet their futures are not promising. Thus, it is doubtful that outsiders have the political will, the resources, or the knowledge to make such constructivist efforts successful. The essence of politics—gauging the public’s mood, communicating with citizens in an idiom they understand, and determining the right moment for political action—is something local politicians have an inherent advantage over outsiders in, and technocratic, scientific-rational approaches to the problems of ethnoconfessional nationalism will not be able to pull at the emotional and sentimental loyalties of people the way local politicians and cultural elites are able to.

II. Ethnoconfessional Nationalism and Social Interventions

A major theoretical implication of this understanding of Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism is that managing it requires concentrating on the popular, mass base of the phenomenon. An alternative strategy for affecting political change and improving interethnic relations that does not suffer from the drawbacks of involvement in high-level political and constitutional engineering is working from the bottom up to manage ethnoconfessional nationalism or at least to make it more “benign.” Examples of such work would include initiatives such as the numerous programs sponsored by the international community in southeastern Europe—OSCE efforts to train individuals in election-monitoring and human
rights, the UNMiBH’s work training police recruits, projects sponsored by NGO’s to train journalists, future parliamentarians, judicial officials, etc. As part of a coherent, coordinated plan, such social engagement can become

a set of catalytic activities meant ‘to show the way.’ . . . to demonstrate to different institutions in the host country how to draw on duly approved international standards and experience gained in their implementation by countries on their way to civil society. [In Macedonia] many of these endeavors promoted indirect peacebuilding through support for the revival and development of a network of civic, professional and other nongovernmental organizations all of which were committed to societal development and stability.¹⁰¹

I will focus on three types of “catalytic activities” that have been used in the Balkans to examine the strengths and weaknesses of each approach: education reform, media reform, and NGO work in general, and to test how effective this aspect of managing ethnoconfessional nationalism actually is.

1) Educational reforms: The educational systems in southeastern Europe have long been seen as institutions that inculcate nationalist sentiment and emotions by distorting or providing an extremely subjective version of an ethnic group’s history, casting neighbors in an unremittingly negative light while casting one’s own people in a similarly positive one.¹⁰² Consequently, education reform and increasing educational attainment levels in general are often seen as important tools for combating ethnic intolerance and preventing the dissemination of controversial and dubious accounts of historical relations between ethnic groups. Throughout southeastern Europe, public opinion surveys have consistently found that higher levels of educational achievement indicate a lower tendency to vote for the most extreme nationalist


parties. In Croatia, higher educational attainment has been found to be a significant factor in reducing levels of intolerance amongst the Croatian population. A study of Serb voting behavior in Serbia proper, Montenegro, and in the RS found that the most extreme nationalist political movement, the Serbian Radical Party, generally drew its support from the least educated and lowest paid segments of society. A study of Federation citizens on the eve of the September 1997 elections found that 67% of the respondents falling into the category of “urban, highly-educated” were favorably disposed to opposition parties as opposed to the ruling nationalist parties. At the same time, individuals with only an elementary education were more likely to vote for the Bosniac-nationalist SDA.

Apart from the benefits to promoting ethnic tolerance at the individual level that appear to derive from increased educational attainment, education system reform itself is also considered a key part of managing nationalist tensions. In post-1999 Kosovo, for instance, UNMIK’s failures can in part be attributed to its failure to fully exploit “the levers of soft power” such as control over the education system or the media. Yet the Bosnian experience has shown how difficult it is for outsiders to carry out educational reform when locals themselves cannot agree on their own history. For instance, an attempt sponsored by several international NGO’s to promote


104 See Ognjen Pribićević, Vlast i Opozicija u Srbiji (Belgrade: 1997), 57.

105 According to the results of a survey conducted by the Center for the Promotion of Civil Society, Sarajevo, and published in Večernje novine (Sarajevo), 20/21 September 1997, 7; see also Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 12 September 1997, 11.

106 Thus, “the failure of international administration to transform Kosovo into a multi-ethnic society subject to the rule of law resulted from a misunderstanding and misappropriation of power. UNMIK neglected soft power by putting local politicians in charge of education, attempting to regulate the media with cumbersome after-the-fact investigations and ineffectual penalties.” See King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 24.
interethnic reconciliation by developing common textbooks for use in Bosniac, Croat, and Serb schools was abandoned after much agonizing effort to come up with a common history text. Significantly, however, attempts by the OHR to design a common curriculum for the teaching of general subjects such as math and science were more successful. In Kosovo, apart from rebuilding schools, UNMIK paid little attention to education, with the result being that “no systematic effort to prevent inter-ethnic hatred fermenting in the education system, or distorted versions of history” was made. Instead, Kosovo’s school system was allowed to become “an enormous patronage network” for Kosovo’s political bosses, and “instead of harnessing education as a vehicle for progressive change, UNMIK’s priority was simply to get the schools back to work.”

In Macedonia, implementing educational reform has encountered similar difficulties. Especially since the Albanian-Macedonian conflict of 2000-2001, the Macedonian school system has become increasingly ethnically segregated; in some cases, students attend entirely different school buildings, in others, they share the same school building but attend courses in different shifts. At Zef Ljus Marku High School in Skopje, for instance, Macedonian students attend classes in the morning, while Albanian students go to school in the afternoon. Sometimes it is the parents that demand such segregation, in other cases it is the students themselves. In 2001, in Kumanovo, Macedonia’s third largest city, 1,700 Albanian refused to attend classes with Macedonian students. At Kiril Pejcinovic high school in Tetovo, Albanian students study only the history of Albania, not that of Macedonia itself. A former Macedonian Education and

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108 King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 85.
Science Minister, Aziz Polozani, has noted that teachers themselves, and especially those teaching history, language and social sciences, often believe that “they must fight for the ideals of their nationality.” As one account has described the problem of school segregation in Macedonia:

When the students do run into each other, the encounters often end in fights. But the problems don’t end with students. There is even a divide among the teachers: the Macedonian instructors meet in one school office, while the Albanian ones meet in another . . . “According to what [my daughter] tells me, students are separating by themselves, we cannot do anything,” says a Macedonian mother from an area near Skopje. “In the future, the segregation among students will increase more.”

As these experiences suggest, the very nature of the educational process—the attempt to teach children and adolescents important elements of a society’s or an ethnic group’s history, tradition, culture, etc.—is readily politicized and easily becomes a part of the ethnoconfessional struggle in multiethnic societies. The Yugoslav experience, moreover, shows that in a multiethnic, multiconfessional setting, struggles over different versions of history and the proper curricula in general will be more or less chronic problems (on these issues in post-1945 Yugoslavia, see Chapter IV).

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109 Information on ethnic segregation in the Macedonian school system are drawn from Ljubica Grozdanovska, “Macedonia: Class Struggle,” *Transitions Online*, 1 October 2007, available at: [http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=237&NrSection=1&NrArticle=19030](http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=237&NrSection=1&NrArticle=19030). Not surprisingly, officials dealing with such problems exhibit little optimism that their efforts will succeed; at another former Macedonian government education official noted when discussing the problem of ethnic segregation in the school system, “I don’t know how to solve it. I don’t know, simply don’t know.” Similar problems have been reported in Struga, where Macedonian students from two high schools, Niko Nestor and Ibraim Temo, repeatedly staged protests in March 2008 to demand separate ethnic shifts in their school buildings after numerous fights broke out between Albanian and Macedonian students. See “Macedonian high-school students in Struga stage protests again,” Makfax vesnik, 17 March 2008, available at [www.makfax.com.mk](http://www.makfax.com.mk). Accessed on 17 March 2008 at 3:57 EST.
2) *Media reforms*: Considerable effort has also been expended on media reform in the Balkans, based on the belief that more objective, professional media can reduce ethnic conflict. As was pointed out in Chapter II, however, the record suggests that there are limits as to how much the media affects voter behavior. In Bosnia, numerous attempts to shut down “nationalist” media outlets have had little success in encouraging people to vote across ethnic lines. In 1997-98, for instance, the international community undertook a number of actions designed to weaken the strength of the SDS: five transmitters broadcasting SRT’s main evening news program were occupied, an international “technical administrator” was assigned to oversee SRT’s broadcasts, and SDS directors from 16 radio and television stations around the RS were dismissed. Nevertheless, while these actions did seem to influence voter behavior to some extent (insofar as there was a noticeable increase in the votes RS opposition parties gained), it was not enough to change the *ethnoconfessional* pattern of RS voter behavior in the September 1998 Bosnian general elections; in effect, while improving the media environment may encourage people to voter for a wider variety of parties *within* their ethnoconfessional group, it has not up until now seemed able to encourage people to vote for political candidates of a different ethnoconfessional group.\(^{110}\)

In Kosovo, media reform efforts have been disappointing. Despite the fact that UNMIK had appointed an international “Temporary Media Commissioner” to monitor and supervise Kosovo’s media institutions after 1999, such international watchdogs were unable to control local journalists. For instance, after ethnic unrest in March 2004 resulted in twenty deaths, the

\(^{110}\) In another example of how efforts to control nationalist media can often backfire, in February 2000 NATO peacekeepers shut down what was called a Croat nationalist TV station for allegedly broadcasting in Mostar. Nine months later, the HDZ and a smaller allied nationalist party won 93 percent of the Croat vote in Bosnia. See Bose, *Bosnia After Dayton*, 145.
destruction of approximately 30 churches and monasteries, and the expulsion of 4000 people from their homes, one analysis of the media reaction in Kosovo noted, “Kosovo’s media, above all its foreign-funded public broadcaster, played a leading role in whipping up enthusiasm for this pogrom.” Even after such incidents, international efforts to reform Kosovo’s media made little progress. Given these realities, efforts either to control the flow of information or to substantively change popular beliefs through media regulation are unlikely to be successful; as Roger Petersen notes, “discourse follows large structural changes at least as much as it shapes it,” and elite actions are not major determinants of this process.

3) Promoting civil society: Promoting the work of NGO’s has also been a major feature of international efforts to manage interethnic conflict in southeastern Europe. In sum, the actual experience of NGO’s operating in southeastern Europe suggests that there are limits to what they can achieve. Paula Pickering, for instance, has found that many people in Bosnia believe that NGO’s exist either for the benefit of the individuals working in the NGO’s themselves, or to promote the agenda of outsiders. The track record of faith-based NGO’s, likewise, has not been exceptionally successful. Vjekoslav Perica, for instance, has noted that “According to one account, the religious peace-building operation in the Balkans expanded into the most massive such operation in the history of humanitarian work and peacemaking . . . [however] the

111 See King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 5. These problems continued into 2007; in August 2007, for instance, from March-May 2007, the Kosovo newspaper Infopress began publishing a series of articles giving the names of Kosovo Serbs alleged to have committed war crimes in 1998-99. Similar actions in the past had led to the deaths of individuals named in such articles. The OSCE, however, exhibited no ability to either punish or prohibit Infopress for publishing such articles. See “OSCE Mission in Kosovo condemns unprofessional, irresponsible journalism by local daily,” (Prishtine/Pristina, 7 August 2007).

112 Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence, 269-270.

impressive quantity but low quality of this ‘religious statecraft’ (i.e., little if any real effect in eliminating the cause of the conflict) is one of its most remarkable characteristics.”

In sum, reforming educational systems, the media, judicial systems, polices forces, etc., are clearly large-scale projects requiring long-term political commitment. In the short-term (i.e., over a period of 10-15 years) such efforts appear to have negligible impact in terms of moderating individual ethnoconfessional loyalties or voter behavior. At the same time, their contributions to Balkan stability and development are undeniable, and the available evidence suggest that while such efforts will not make breakdown the strong attachments individuals feel towards their specific ethnoconfessional identities, it may be possible, as Van Evera suggests, to make ethnic identities in southeastern Europe more benign.

III. Nationalism and Economic Interventions

One of the primary components of the understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism outlined in this dissertation has been that improvements in the material and economic standards of life for the inhabitants of southeastern Europe do not eliminate ethnic problems in the region. As was argued in Chapter II, social science has not established any direct correlation between the emergence of nationalism and economic conditions; as Donald Horowitz has argued, “The psychological sources of ethnic conflict do not readily lend themselves to modification by the

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114 See Perica, Balkan Idols, 180.

manipulation of material benefits that is so often the stuff of modern policymaking.”

Nevertheless, it is clearly wrong to claim that economic conditions have no impact on interethnic relations. The question thus becomes what kinds of economic policies improve interethnic relations, or, conversely, worsen them?

First, it should be pointed out that economic policies cannot be promoted independently of the political process, and attempting to promote economic reform after interethnic conflict poses exceptional difficulties. A fatal flaw in many post-conflict peace building efforts has been the presumption of the existence of stable governments and working financial and legal institutions which can properly implement economic reforms and absorb international aid. Yet this is rarely the case in ethnically-divided, post-conflict states, since developing common markets for capital and labor in divided societies will generally conflict with the nationalist political goals over which ethnic groups went to war over in the first place. Moreover, an implicit assumption of contemporary peace-building operations is that the natural goal of developing states should be the creation of a market economy which is assumed to bring with it peace and prosperity. Such a view, however, ignores the fact that creating a market economy is itself a conflict-ridden process.

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116 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 566.


The neo-liberal economic agenda currently promoted by many international agencies has also been attacked for unwittingly increasing the power of the very political forces that these agencies are supposedly struggling against. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, according to Michael Pugh,

Not only did the international agencies underwrite the nationalist’s grip on power (through ethnically stratified elections in Bosnia), but the economic priorities of the post-conflict “protectorates” presented opportunities for the winners to reap further riches . . . Through its emphasis on privatization, advocates of the neo-liberal agenda in Bosnia have enriched an elite of war entrepreneurs, their political protectors, and the forces of law and order tasked with controlling criminal activity (police, customs, tax officials, and special forces). By the late 1990s, nationalist elites were gaining control of socially owned assets . . . Rather than building up state competence, the economic de-regulation and privatization compounded the many problems caused by a weak central authority.119

All things considered, promoting economic reform in ethnically-divided post-conflict societies is clearly a difficult task. It is precisely here, however, that the understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism presented in this dissertation suggests that prudent, selective intervention in the political process can be justified, as opposed to interventions into areas of purely symbolic importance (such as the issue of the passports described above). A side-benefit of job-creation, for instance, appears to be that it reduces ethnic intolerance. One study of public opinion in Croatia, for example, found “a strong positive relationship between unemployment status and ethnic intolerance.”120 Another recent study has found that the most positive interethnic contacts in post-1999 Bosnia appear to be made at the workplace, rather than in schools or among neighbors; thus,

119 See Pugh, “Rubbing Salt into War Wounds: Shadow Economies and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Kosovo,” Problems of Post-Communism 51 (May/June 2004), 54-57. Roland Paris similarly notes that many of the austerity measures imposed upon countries such as El Salvador, Nicaragua and Mozambique in their post-conflict phases have impaired each government’s ability to fund peacebuilding programs, rebuild infrastructure, and pay for social welfare services, while at the same time increasing economic disparities within each country. See Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” 67-69.

Mixed workplaces may provide opportunities for repeated interethnic interaction among colleagues of equal status, allow for norms of professionalism, and enable people to form relations of varied intimacy with colleagues of another background. These characteristics and much-needed salaries make the mixed workplace the most fertile environment for promoting interethnic cooperation.\textsuperscript{121}

While on the one hand this suggests that (at least for now) there are limits to the degree of familiarity people want to have with individuals across the ethnoconfessional divide, it also suggests that the professional requirements of the workplace makes it the best setting for improving interethnic relations.

David Laitin has suggested that a system of revenue transfers from the center to autonomous regions can also help reduce ethnic tensions; thus,

the center could negotiate with its autonomous regions a system of transfer payments that increased per capita with the size of the group. Such a policy would give leaders of protected minority groups an incentive to reward leaders of potential spin-off groups from holding back their nationalist aspirations.\textsuperscript{122}

While this idea is intuitively appealing, the Balkan experience does not provide substantial evidence that such policies work. In the period leading up to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, for example, substantial financial rewards to the various republics to keep the country together failed to deter them from the nationalist goals.\textsuperscript{123} A similar example was the refusal of \textit{Republika Srpska} leaders in 1996 to attend a donor’s conference for Bosnia as part of a united Bosnia & Herzegovina delegation, despite the fact that refusing to agree to such terms resulted in several hundreds of millions of dollars of aid being denied to the RS. In Bosnia’s September 1998 elections, “strong international backing for reformist candidates—including pledges of additional

\textsuperscript{121} See Pickering, “Generating Social Capital for Bridging Ethnic Divisions in the Balkans: Case Studies of Two Bosniak Cities.”

\textsuperscript{122} Laitin, \textit{Identity in Formation}, 345.

\textsuperscript{123} Stokes, “Solving the Wars of Yugoslav Succession,” 204.
financial assistance—seems to have contributed to their defeat, as some voters resented the intervention of the international community.”

Such mistakes were made yet again in Bosnia’s October 2002 elections, when an implicit threat by the U.S. ambassador to Bosnia only two weeks before the elections that a victory of nationalist parties in the RS would lead to a cutoff of U.S. aid to that entity backfired. Despite the warnings, the nationalist parties nevertheless won, again suggesting that Laitin’s argument that financial incentives can reduce or moderate nationalist aspirations seems weak. Still later, RS politicians from 2006-2007 repeatedly made it clear that “the carrot of EU membership is an incentive for Serb cooperation, but not a decisive one. In both words and deeds, Serb leaders have made it clear that ‘when the choice is made between Brussels and Republika Srpska, we choose Republika Srpska’.” As Daniele Conversi notes, such examples suggest that “To put economic issues at the center of the analysis means to miss the primary point, namely, that ethnic movements are indeed ethnic and not economic.”

Moreover, the results of such political conditionality are often at odds with other goals a peace-building or ethnic-reconciliation process may have. For instance, the severe political conditionality imposed on the RS in 1996-97 delayed its economic recovery for several years,

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125 Thus, on 22 October 2002, only two weeks before Bosnia’s general elections, the U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia & Herzegovina, Clifford Bond, told the Banja Luka daily Nezavisne novine that only moderate parties would be considered partners for the U.S. government—the obvious implication being that a victory by nationalist parties would lead to a cutoff in U.S. aid. Nevertheless, in the subsequent elections, the SDS again was confirmed as the most popular political party in the RS. See the report by Dragan Stanimirović and Anes Alić, “Forming Bosnia’s Future,” 23 October 2002, Transitions OnLine, available at http://balkanreport.tol.cz


hampering the return of refugees and displaced persons to that half of Bosnia because jobs, housing, and social benefits in the RS were lower than those in the Federation. Thus, as Cousens and Cater note, “although imposing political conditionality on Republika Srpska was apparently intended to induce Dayton compliance, it has actually had the unintended consequence of undermining the international community’s initial strategy of promoting political moderation through facilitating demographic shifts toward multiethnicity.”

On the other hand, the Yugoslav experience shows that certain economic policies can and do intensify the nationalist dynamic. Thus, the international economic sanctions regime imposed upon Serbia in the 1990s had the opposite effect of what it had intended: instead of forcing the Milošević regime to end the war in Bosnia (which the regime in any case had very little ability to resolve unilaterally), the sanctions regime led to a collapse of the Serbian economy, provided Milošević with a ready-made external excuse for the country’s economic problems, thereby homogenizing public opinion, and forced citizens to resort for help to the very bases of ethnic nationalism itself—family and community. Similarly, many neo-liberal economic reform measures international financial institutions impose on post-conflict states can increase communal tensions. Thus, austerity measures that cut public spending on social services such as education or poverty-reduction programs, or on programs to reintegrate ex-soldiers into a peacetime economy can lead to a rise in violence and insecurity, and thereby again reinforce

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individual’s reliance on what Woodward has called “the informal networks and social obligations that define ethnicity—family, cousins, godparents—or crime.”

The implications of the evidence cited above suggests that outsiders should focus their efforts on economic issues that are important to people regardless of their ethnicity. Such a strategy makes even more sense since the skill sets of so many of the outsiders working to affect change in southeastern Europe lie precisely in dealing with technological issues such as infrastructure reconstruction and renewal, technological modernization, negotiating international trade treaties, and economic reform programs in general. In postwar Bosnia, for instance (as noted above), the most unambiguous successes of the international effort there have been precisely on these sorts of issues—establishing a stable currency and common license plates to promote freedom of movement. Nevertheless, even such politically-neutral interventions should not be mistaken to be a panacea that can “solve” ethnoconfessional conflicts. As was pointed out in Chapter II, the very forces of economic modernization such policies promote can intensify ethnic conflict rather than ameliorate it.

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130 For instance, public opinion surveys conducted by the National Democratic Institute in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 2000-2002 show that the top three concerns of citizens across ethnic groups have been employment, the struggle against corruption, and improving social and health protections. See “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Polling Results on Voter Attitudes Regarding October 5, 2002 BiH Elections” (Sarajevo: National Democratic Institute, 2002), 9.
IV. Temporal Horizons

“Better to let them do it imperfectly than to do it perfectly yourself, for it is their country, their way, and your time is short.”
T.E. Lawrence

As has been argued in this dissertation, one of the key characteristics of ethnoconfessional nationalism is that it is a chronic phenomenon. As seen from numerous examples around the world—for example, Israel-Palestine, Northern Ireland, Kashmir, to name but a few—ethnic conflicts tend to be long-lasting. Another characteristic of intrastate conflicts (of which ethnoconfessional conflicts are typically a subset) is that they are usually very difficult to resolve through negotiations. Roy Licklider, for instance, has found that of 57 civil wars fought between 1945 and 1993 he examined, only fourteen were resolved through negotiations.132 In the Balkan case specifically, Florian Bieber has found that over half of the fourteen cases of international intervention in the Balkans between 1991-2002 resulted in failure.133

Unfortunately, patience has not been one of the hallmarks of international efforts in the Balkans. Quite often more time has been spent on debates over deadlines and exit strategies than on getting the job done, while expectations of what should be done and what should be achieved within given time frames have been driven by the length of an international official’s

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secondment, or by the cycles of the American electoral process.\textsuperscript{134} Moreover, public debates over pull-outs often encourage protagonists in an ethnic conflict to just wait the foreigners out.\textsuperscript{135} The problem with such short temporal timeframes for international intervention in ethnoconfessional conflicts is that it creates considerable uncertainty about the future amongst the protagonists, and, ultimately, fear that security arrangements arrived at today can be reversed tomorrow. As Lake and Rothchild note,

In a way not sufficiently appreciated by current policy makers in Washington and elsewhere, external guarantees work only when the local parties to the conflict believe that the outside powers are resolved to enforce the ethnic contract in a fair manner into the indefinite future. The behavior of the external powers is not the crucial factor. Rather, a more fundamental question is whether the warring parties or potential combatants believe the external powers will be there to protect them tomorrow, and in the days and years after that. Absent a belief in the fair-mindedness and stamina of the external powers, intervention in any form will fail to mitigate conflict.\textsuperscript{136}

A second problem with the relatively short nature of the temporal timeframes with which many outsiders view ethnoconfessional conflicts is that they reflect unrealistic expectations about the rate at which war-torn and divided societies are supposed to reform themselves and act more “European” or “Western.” As Roland Paris has noted,

Not only are [war-shattered states] expected to become democracies and market economies in the space of a few years—effectively completing a transformation that took several centuries in the oldest European states—but they must carry out this monumental task in the fragile political circumstances of states that are just in the process of emerging from civil war.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{134} As one joke circulating in Bosnia in 1996 went, “OSCE” stood for “Organization to Secure Clinton’s Election.”

\textsuperscript{135} A point made by Cousens and Cater, \textit{Toward Peace in Bosnia}, 147. Similarly, Lake and Rothchild note that “External interventions that the warring parties fear will soon fade away may be worse than no intervention at all.” See Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” 42. See also Bieber, “Institutionalizing Ethnicity in Former Yugoslavia: Domestic vs. Internationally Driven Processes of Institutional (Re-) Design,” 6.

\textsuperscript{136} Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” 68.

\textsuperscript{137} Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” 78.
What is clear from the analysis provided in this dissertation, however, is that even if we grant the possibility that constructivist nation- and state-building efforts can succeed, the process is both incredibly complex and very time- and resource-consuming. Even in the small town of Mostar, as Sumantra Bose notes, “Seven years of international presence and engagement have certainly not undone or substantially reversed” Mostar’s partition, leading Bose to conclude that “A gradual, incremental approach may eventually yield better dividends in the longer term even if unsatisfying in the short run.”\(^{138}\)

Given the limited success of ethnic-reconciliation efforts in even small towns like Mostar, it is clear that interethnic peacekeeping, reconciliation and powersharing efforts on larger scales will take commensurately longer. Paris, for instance, has suggested that the time-frame for peacebuilding operations be extended from the current 1-3 years to a more realistic 7-9 years,\(^ {139}\) yet even this seems optimistic. Robert Putnam’s study of democratic institution building in Italy concluded that “Where institution building (and not mere constitution writing) is concerned, time is measured in decades,”\(^ {140}\) and the most prominent Serbian historian of the early 20\(^{th}\) century, Slobodan Jovanović, claimed it would take one hundred years of peace and prosperity for the educational system to inculcate a sense of common identity among the various Yugoslav peoples.\(^ {141}\)

\(^{138}\) Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton*, 146-147. Bose made this assessment in 2002; eight years later, the situation remains unchanged.

\(^{139}\) Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” 58.


\(^{141}\) According to Charles Jelavich, “South Slav Education, 94.
Liberal democracies, however, generally have little willingness to commit to longer-term international engagements. As Kimberly Marten has argued,

There is unlikely ever to be sufficient political will in the current international system by any liberal democratic state or coalition to put together a coherent, long-term operation whose purpose is to direct political developments abroad. This fact should matter to the international community, because it implies that the lack of forceful will when dealing with peace operations and governorship of foreign countries is a permanent feature of the foreign policy of powerful states.\(^{142}\)

The conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that Gellner was most probably right when he expressed a “preference for stability” in dealing with ethnic conflicts, and that diplomatic intervention in a potential crisis in its early stages is crucial. As Lake and Rothchild argue, early assistance to “failing” states is preferable to allowing violence to breakout and then having to confront the logic and dynamics of war.\(^{143}\) Once violence breaks out and “the potentially uncontrollable psychological mechanism” of nationalism takes over, it becomes much more difficult for would-be interveners to control the situation.\(^{144}\) After severe ethnoconfessional conflict, the Balkan experience has shown that people have little desire to rebuild their societies as they had been, even despite massive international interventions.

V. “When All Else Fails”: Partition as a Solution to Ethnoconfessional Conflict

Given the relative intractability of ethnoconfessional conflict, some scholars have suggested that the only stable solution to these problems is to make state borders congruent with ethnic borders. Steven Van Evera, for instance, has suggested that one way of reducing ethnic conflict

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\(^{143}\) Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” 74.

\(^{144}\) Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 337.
is to increase the proportion of nations having their own states; in effect, to redraw numerous state borders and partition a number of existing states. Robert Hayden has gone a step further, arguing that the forced reestablishment of a multiethnic state after war may in fact hinder that state’s democratic development down the line; according to Hayden,

If a multiethnic (or multinational or multireligious) polity has been disrupted . . . the morally satisfying position of mandating restoration of the status quo ante to the greatest extent possible may be detrimental to the establishment of democracy, accountability, and prosperity in the newly consolidated territories. Recall the greater stability and prosperity after 1989 of those East European states that were forcibly homogenized earlier in the 20th century.  

The arguments made by Van Evera and Hayden are based both on European historical experience and on the need to resolve the security dilemma that emerges when different ethnic groups are intermixed on the same territory. Gale Stokes, for instance, has argued that . . . the historical fact is that the homogenization of national entities has proceeded in Europe not through tolerance and civility but through rampant violence and copious bloodshed. Only after the violence created more or less ethnically homogenous entities did the Europeans develop a method of interacting with a significant level of tolerance. If Europe’s experience is any guide, a genuine, voluntary, multiethnic solution can arise in the Balkans only when the remapping process is complete there. Only when the peoples of the region feel that they are included in the state system as authentic, autonomous units enclosing most of their own peoples and excluding most others will they be able to develop the confidence necessary to reach accommodation with their neighbors . . . We need to take a realistic, fresh look at the only long-term solution to the endemic unrest of the past decade in the former Yugoslavia—creating compact, ethnically homogenous states for the majority Balkan peoples.  

In sum, given the fact that so many historical and structural factors seem to be operating in favor of the nation-state, and, as pointed out above, there are limited options available for combating ethnoconfessional nationalism, the few remaining multiethnic states in the Balkans

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(Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro) would appear to face a difficult future. As Timothy Garton Ash once noted, “what we are proposing to do in our Balkan quasi protectorates is not just to freeze war. It is also to freeze history.”

On the other hand, many scholars argue against considering partition a valid, viable, and morally acceptable solution to ethnic conflict. Laitin, for instance, calls the policy of rewarding nations with states “liberal ethnic cleansing.” Donald Horowitz claims that such moves only increase the chance that other nationalist/secessionist conflicts will erupt within the newer, smaller political units; thus, according to Horowitz’s law of infinite regress, “As the importance of a given political unit increases, so does the importance of the highest available level of identification immediately beneath the level of that unit, for that is the level at which judgements of likeness are made and contrasts take hold.” Laitin has come to a similar conclusion, arguing that “Changing boundaries (e.g. by giving territorial autonomy to a successful nationalism) will unleash national differentiation politics at a lower level.”

Bosnia & Herzegovina’s post-1992 experience provides a useful example of the validity of these arguments, but also of the real world limits as to how much theoretical insights can prevent ethnic conflict. As Horowitz predicts, the recognition of Bosnian independence in 1992 made Croat and Serb identities in such an independent state even more politically salient than they had


148 Laitin, Identity in Formation, 338. For other arguments against partition in the Balkans, see Radha Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition (London: Verso, 1997), and Bose, Bosnia after Dayton, Chapter 4.


150 Laitin, Identity in Formation, 339.
been in Bosnia while it was a part of the Yugoslav federation. Certainly, by March-April 1992 it was clear that recognizing Bosnian independence would lead to civil war; despite this, the Bosniac political agenda at this time remained creating an independent Bosnia which they, as the numerically largest ethnic group, could dominate, while the Bosnian Serb political agenda was to prevent such a development at all costs. Here, then, we have a depressing example in which our theoretical understanding of certain problems could not ultimately prevent real world power struggles amongst political movements with diametrically opposed programs.

Regardless of these debates, what is undeniable is that an “unmixing of peoples” in the Balkans has been going on for the past 200 years and has continued in entities such as Bosnia and Kosovo even as they have become international protectorates. The Ottoman withdrawal from Europe between 1821 and 1923 is estimated to have been accompanied by the deaths of some five and a half million Muslims, and more than five million were forcibly expelled or fled from southeastern Europe.\(^{151}\) Other ethnoconfessional groups have experienced similar demographic and territorial changes. To understand the scale and magnitude of these ethnic demographic movements, it is worth quoting Stavrianos at length; thus, the population shifts that began with the Balkan Wars

\[ \ldots \text{first occurred in 1912, when about 100,000 Turks fled before the successful armies of the Balkan League. Then with the second Balkan War and the Bucharest Treaty that concluded it, other mass migrations occurred, involving approximately 50,000 Turks, 60,000 Bulgarians, and 70,000 Greeks. During 1914 the population movements continued as many people found themselves on the wrong side of the newly created frontiers. About 115,000 Moslems left Greece, another 135,000 left the other Balkan countries, and 115,000 Greeks departed from Turkish Eastern Thrace. During World War I the migratory movements ceased, though the Bulgarians expelled about 36,000 Greeks from Eastern} \]

Macedonia in 1916 when they occupied that region. With the end of the war the migrations resumed, the largest being the voluntary exchange of Greek and Bulgarian minorities provided for under the Neuilly Treaty, and the compulsory exchange of Greek and Turkish minorities required by the agreement reached at Lausanne. It is estimated that 53,000 Bulgarians emigrated from Greece and 30,000 Greeks left Bulgaria. The Greco-Turkish exchange was of an altogether different magnitude, involving some 400,000 Turks and 1,300,000 Greeks . . . According to an ethnographic map of the League of Nations Refugees’ Settlement Commission, whereas in 1912 the population of the portion of Macedonia now belonging to Greece was 42.6 percent Greek, 39.4 percent Moslem, 9.9 percent Bulgarian, and 8.1 percent miscellaneous (including Saloniki Jews), by 1926 it had become 88.8 percent Greek, 0.1 percent Moslem, 5.1 percent Bulgarian, and 6 percent miscellaneous (again including the Saloniki Jews).  

World War II continued these population movements. In 1941, there were 500,000 ethnic Germans on the territory of Yugoslavia; by the late 1940s their numbers had fallen to 55,000. Throughout the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, for every one Croat or Serb who moved to Bosnia & Herzegovina, three to seven would leave, while at the same time, the number of Muslims moving to or from Bosnia-Herzegovina was relatively equal. Much the same was true for Croatia and Serbia as well, with Croats and Serbs from throughout the former Yugoslavia moving to their “home” republics in far larger numbers than those moving out of them.  

Anecdotal evidence from Bosnia suggests that despite superficially encouraging numbers, most so-called minority returns (i.e., those in which the returnee is not a member of the local ethnic majority) are old people returning to die on their own land, not young people going back to start their lives anew, or people reclaiming their property with the intent of selling it as quickly as possible and

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152 Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, 590-591.

153 Petrović, *Migracije u Jugoslaviji i etnički aspekt*, 12, 74-92. Ivan Cvitković cites 1966 as the year in which these internal migrations gained force; importantly, Cvitković does not claim that economic reasons determined where individuals would move, noting rather that “the main influencing factor in the direction of the migrations was national belonging (pripadnost). As if this was a harbinger of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia & Herzegovina’ future.” See Cvitković, *Hrvatski identitet u Bosni i Hercegovini: hrvati između nacionalnog i gradanskog*, 34. For a similar analysis stressing the ethnic determinants of these migrations rather than economic ones, on the movement of Serbs and Montenegrins out of Kosovo in the 1970s and 1980s, see Ruža Petrović and Marina Blagojević, *Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca sa Kosovo i iz Metohije: Rezultati ankete sprovedene 1985-1986 godine* (Belgrade: Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti, 1989).
returning to areas in which they are part of the ethnic majority.\textsuperscript{154} Sarajevo has for all intents and purposes become a monoethnic Bosniac city; one study completed in 2002 found that of 7,349 employees who work for the cantonal, city, and municipal governments, only 202 (i.e., 2.7 percent) are Croats.\textsuperscript{155} In 2005, for the first time in its history, there was not a single Serb on the Sarajevo City Council.\textsuperscript{156} Between 1996 and 2003, half the population of the predominantly Bosniac city of Goražde left the strategically and economically isolated enclave.\textsuperscript{157} Croatia’s ethnic composition changed dramatically in the 1990s; from 1989 to 1996, the Croat percentage of the population increased from 74.1 percent to 92.2 percent. During the same time period, approximately 280,000 Serbs emigrated, fled, or were forcibly expelled from Croatia.\textsuperscript{158} Among Croatian Serb refugees in Serbia, a poll conducted in 2001 showed that 65 percent of those surveyed did not intend to return to their homes, and that only 6-7 percent were actively planning their return.\textsuperscript{159} The net outflow of Serbs from Croatia continued into 2007; in that year, for instance, an estimated 1,400 Serbs moved from Serbia to Croatia, while 3,800 Serbs left Croatia

\textsuperscript{154} See Amra Kebo, “Od povratka ni dovratka,” Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 30 January 2002. The UNDP has come to a similar conclusion on the refugee and property return process in BiH; see Social Inclusion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 49.

\textsuperscript{155} “U organima Kantona Sarajevo rade samo 202 hrvata,” Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 12 February 2002. A more recent study has shown further declines. Thus, in 2008, Sarajevo’s various municipal governments employ some 1,237 individuals. Of those, 1,118 are Bosniacs, 38 Serbs, 51 Croats, and 30 whose nationality is undetermined. At the level of Sarajevo canton, out of 597 employees, 546 are Bosniacs, 22 are Serbs, and 29 are Croats. See “Sarajevo postalo monoetnički grad,” Politika (Belgrade), 28 August 2008, available at: http://www.politika.co.yu/rubrike/tema-dana/Sarajevo-postalo-monoetnichki-grad_sr.html Accessed on 29 August 2008 at 3:17pm EST

\textsuperscript{156} This of course is not unexpected, given the Serb siege of the city during the Bosnian war. For an anthropological analysis of the problems residents of the city have in accepting Serb returnees, see Cornelia Sorabji, “Managing Memories in Postwar Sarajevo: Individuals, Bad Memories, and New Wars,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 12 (2006), 1-18.


\textsuperscript{159} J. Tusup, “Samo sedam odsto izbeglih želi da se vrati,” Danas (Belgrade), 9 May 2002.
for Serbia. According to a report released in 2007, 80 percent of high school graduates in Banja Luka have never been to Sarajevo. In the central Bosnian town of Bugojno, of the 16,500 Croats and 9,000 Serbs who lived there before 1992, only 4,500 Croats and 300 Serbs, respectively, had returned as of January 2008. Many of the returnees are older people. In Serbia’s Sandzak region, recent political moves suggest the town of Novi Pazar might be heading towards an ethnically divided territorial-administrative structure, with separate police stations, schools, and health centers. As in many other aspects of social and political life in southeastern Europe, then, ethnoconfessional identity plays a large role even in influencing where individuals choose to live.

VI: International Determinants of the Success of Ethnoconfessional Movements

An important issue that remains to be examined is under what circumstances do Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalisms become successful? “Success” here is defined as the ethnoconfessional movement actually achieving international recognition and becoming a fully-fledged member of the international community, or, to paraphrase Gellner, achieving the goal of the nation having its own state. It is here that the issue moves from the world of ethnic politics into the realm of international politics.


Traditionally, the international recognition of fledgling states has been governed by the Montevideo Convention of 1933, which declared that the criteria for statehood should be based on an entity having: 1) a stable population; 2) a defined territory; 3) a functioning government; and 4) that the aspiring government has the capacity to enter into relations with other states. For most of the subsequent six decades, the international community more or less adhered to these criteria. Beginning with the breakup of Yugoslavia, however, a less realist and more idealist norm about the use of international recognition, began to be promoted. Abandoning the heretofore concrete, tangible, realist criteria pertaining to international recognition (i.e., control of territory and people), certain segments in the international policymaking community began to espouse a doctrine in which recognition would be used as a conflict-prevention tool, or to endorse one party or faction in an internal civil conflict.

The latter emphasis was most clearly seen in the international recognitions of Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia, and more recently, a similar logic can be seen in the international recognition of the anti-Qaddafi movement in Libya and the anti-Assad movement in Syria. In the Yugoslav case, at the moment of international recognition for Croatia (15 January 1992) and Bosnia & Herzegovina (6 April 1992) neither state enjoyed criteria 1 and 2 of the Montevideo Convention. In both cases, indigenous Serb ethnoconfessional movements morphed into territorial rebellions that gained control of approximately 30 percent of Croatian territory, and

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probably over 70 percent of Bosnian territory by the end of 1992, so in neither Bosnia nor Croatia did the two newly-recognized governments have control over either the territory or the populations. Nevertheless, various governments and lobbies in Europe and the United States argued that pre-emptive recognitions of these specific ethnoconfessional movements was a way to limit or contain the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Conversely, the Bosnian and Croatian self-declared para-states of “Republika Srpska” and “Republika Srpska Krajina” which did on the face of it fulfill Montevideo Convention criteria, did not gain recognition. Other similar, albeit more minor and somewhat comical scenarios played out in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, for instance, with the declaration of the “Republic of Illyrida” in Albanian-populated western Macedonia in 1992.

A somewhat different dynamic played out from 1988-2008 with respect to the battle for international sovereignty over Kosovo. Although in terms of international law and international recognition the Republic of Serbia was the sovereign power in Kosovo during this time, the

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166 There is a voluminous literature on the way the international community dealt with the Yugoslav conflict at this stage. For critical appraisals of European and US diplomacy at this time (especially the German role), see Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Publishers, 1999), 79-120; Ana Trbovich, A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia’s Disintegration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 239-282; and Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), 146-198. For the view that recognition of the Yugoslav republics was the correct policy to adopt at the time, see Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavia’s: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918—2005 (Bloomington, In.: Indiana University Press, 2006), 401-418; James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav Crisis (London: Hurst & Co., 1997). For a defense of Germany’s policy towards the recognition of the Yugoslav republics, see Michael Libal, Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991—1992 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997).

167 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is pretty unambiguous on this count, clearly stating that all member states reaffirm their commitment “to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” The full text of UNSCR 1244 is available in full at http://www.nato.int/Kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm
local Albanian self-determination/insurgent movement, represented by Ibrahim Rugova’s more pacifist Democratic League of Kosovo (PDK) and Hashim Thaci’s Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), over the course of these two decades gradually gained more supporters among some members of the international community. With the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo in 1999 and the ensuing NATO occupation of the province, a hybrid situation emerged in Kosovo in which official international sovereignty over Kosovo remained with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (in 2003, the Republic of Serbia became the official successor state to the FRY), but NATO in fact had control of the territory and population of Kosovo (the first two Montevideo Convention criteria), which from 1999-2008 it gradually turned over to Albanian institutions.

Thus, the Yugoslav case over the two decades from 1988-2008 shows significant variation in the success of ethnonational movements in terms of gaining their own states. The first pattern, exhibited by the cases of Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia, show that ethnonationalist movements that did not satisfy Montevideo Convention criteria were nevertheless successful in achieving international recognition and statehood. The second pattern, as exemplified by the Serb para-states in Bosnia and Croatia, show that entities that did meet Montevideo Convention criteria nevertheless were not successful in achieving international recognition and statehood. Finally, the case of Kosovo shows that a local ethnoconfessional movement that controlled neither territory, nor a defined population, nor was internationally recognized as the sovereign power within the province did ultimately achieve a limited degree of international recognition and acceptance.168

168 The word “limited” here is used to denote the fact that there is still serious debate about Kosovo’s declaration of independence, with five out of 27 EU member states refusing to recognize Kosovo independence, as well as all of
In comparing the above cases, what becomes clear is that the determining factor in making some of these ethnoconfessional movements successful and others just nationalist pipe-dreams has been the degree of international support these movements have received. This confirms the observation that it is the great powers that to a large extent create new states, or “reward” ethnoconfessional movements. Thus, as Motyl has noted, “only other states are new-state makers. Great power gatherings at Vienna, Berlin, Versailles, Teheran, and Yalta testify to the accuracy of this observation . . . the capacity of local entrepreneurs to transform incipient states into actual states . . . was a function of factors largely beyond their control.” In other words, it was neither the military strength or the domestic popularity of the various Balkan ethnoconfessional movements that ultimately determined whether or not they successfully gained international recognition, it was the support these various movements received from what is conveniently called the “international community.” This of course only holds true for to explain the outcomes from 1988 to 2011. If, as this dissertation has argued, Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism is indeed a chronic phenomenon, ethnoconfessional struggles in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia may only be lying dormant, awaiting their next opportunity to take the stage.

When “the next opportunity to take the stage” occurs is again largely a function of international or European geo-politics. The Balkan pattern for approximately 220 years has been

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the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China, two of which are of course permanent member of the UN Security Council), and some 90 other states as well. As a result, Kosovo still cannot become a member of the United Nations or numerous other international organizations, such as the International Olympic Committee, the Council of Europe, etc.

that ethnoconfessional rebellions, upheavals, and insurgencies are generally timed to wider breakdowns in the European geo-political order. Thus, the “First Serbian Rebellion” in 1804 was at least in part a result of the breakdown of the European order initiated by the French Revolution in 1789 and the subsequent struggle for power between France and Russia, and, to a tertiary degree, the effects of this struggle on the Ottoman Empire. The Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Congress of Berlin in 1877, the Versailles Treaty in 1919, the Yalta and Potsdam agreements in 1944 and 1945, respectively, and the end of the Cold War in 1989-1992 all played determining roles in deciding upon which ethnoconfessional movement would be “successful” in the Balkans and which ones would not. The regularity of this pattern—i.e., the fact that the geo-political order in Europe changes with some regularity every two to three generations—begs a somewhat tantalizing question, especially from the perspective of the crisis in Europe in 2011—namely, if large-scale change in Europe occurs every 40-60 years, and if the last such large-scale change in the European geo-political order last occurred some twenty years ago, and if Europe’s current leaders fail to come to grips with what is considered the most serious threat to the EU’s unity in its history, are we then, are we then on the cusp of a new reshuffling of the geopolitical deck in southeastern Europe? Hopefully not, because the history of such geo-political upheaval has shown that it is always accompanied by tremendous bloodshed and destruction.

VII. Conclusions

A common bias amongst U.S. and Western European intellectual and political elites is that Europe and America represent the “ideal” model of socio-political and economic development, and that with the fall of communism we have reached the “end of history” in which liberal democratic, market economies become the logical (and moral) endpoint of human social development.

In reality, it is by no means clear that political and social solutions achieved in the West over the past two hundred years can be reproduced at this point in time in the Balkans, or anywhere else in the world. As Arnold Toynbee warned, we should beware the “parochialism and impertinence” of those in the West who believe that there is “only one river of civilization, our own, and that all others are either tributary to it or lost in the desert sands.”\(^{171}\) Moreover, the assumption that Balkan societies should evolve along the same lines as those in the West assumes that “the West” has successfully resolved its own national, ethnic, and racial problems—something hard to accept if we look at the continuing problems of the Basque region, Belgium, Corsica, Northern Ireland, French cities, or racial tensions in the U.S.

This philosophical skepticism regarding western teleological assumptions about the “end of history” and the supposedly inevitable triumph of western liberal democracy is matched with a similarly skeptical attitude about the theoretical premises upon which constructivist nation-building projects are built, a realistic appreciation for their costs, and skepticism regarding the willingness of outsiders to shoulder the political and financial burden of such projects over the

long-haul in areas of the world that are not strategically vital to their interests. As has been argued above, the international nation- and state building projects in Bosnia and Kosovo are likely to have been the most massive and ambitious in history, but both nevertheless failed in several significant ways. Thus, the chances for success of less well-funded future efforts are questionable.

Another important issue in this regard is whether and when it is politically or morally right for outsiders to intervene in situations which are the result, as has been argued throughout this dissertation, of long-term historical, political and social processes. Roger Petersen raises many important points when he notes,

> . . . if there are social processes with their own progressions and dynamics, then we must ask whether it is wise, or possible, to intervene to change or deflect the course of that progression. The discussion of “prevention” assumes that humans can create political institutions that can positively shape the course of social interactions. Creating institutions that are divorced from “broad social processes” may have unintended, counterproductive, and possibly deadly results. ¹⁷²

The understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism presented in this dissertation—that it is collective, chronic, and non-economic—has considerable implications for the choice of policies appropriate for dealing with the problem. The collective nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism suggests that policies designed to deal with elites will be superficial and only deal with the symptoms of the problem, not with its root causes. A serious effort to deal with the problem must be focused on transforming the political culture of southeastern Europe as a whole, which is obviously a long-term project, and will, ultimately, depend primarily upon the willingness of the peoples of southeastern Europe to change their attitudes and beliefs about the nature of political and social relations within their respective states. In other words, such a transformation cannot be

imposed; it will have to be a voluntary decision by the general population to adopt a new framework for governing their societies. The chronic nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism means that we should be skeptical of the belief that multiethnic, multicultural political units in southeastern Europe will, in the long-term, be stable or successful, unless the fundamental premise upon which the contemporary international political order is based—the nation-state—is superceded. Thus, until this change occurs, these states will remain especially prone to conflict and disintegration during times of geo-political upheaval. As has been repeatedly evident over the past two-hundred years, breakdowns in the European order have given the various Balkan ethnoconfessional groups opportunities to attempt to realize their national projects. Consequently, we should beware the temptation to think that ethnoconfessional problems in the region have been “solved.”

Finally, the non-economic nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism suggests that economic strategies intended to combat the phenomenon will be of only limited utility. The various Balkan ethnoconfessional groups have quite often sacrificed economic goals for national ones. While international donor’s conferences and World Bank loans are good things in and of themselves, the belief that financial or material gain will ultimately prove more seductive to the various ethnoconfessional groups in the Balkans than their nation-building projects has often shown itself to be futile.

Ultimately, this analysis suggests a modest, conservative approach to dealing with Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism. In the final analysis, the ability of outsiders to control the
phenomenon is limited. Probably the most that can be done is to avoid policies that exacerbate the problem, and attempt to manage Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism in a manner consistent with a realistic understanding of the phenomenon, and the time and resources available to would-be interveners. Even this, however, would be a significant step forward, because there is still a tremendous difference between aggravating a bad situation, or making a bad situation marginally better.

\[173\] For instance, Louis Sells, a career U.S. diplomat who served as Carl Bildt’s political advisor in the OHR, noted that “Perhaps there are lessons to be learned about the unhappy experience of international implementation of peace in Sarajevo and Kosovo . . . Perhaps international police can never substitute for local ones. And perhaps there are limits to the international ability to exercise even benevolent control in ways that run counter to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of a region’s inhabitants.” See Sells, “The Serb Flight From Sarajevo: Dayton’s First Failure,” *East European Politics and Society* 14 (December 1999), 202.
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Appendix

1910 Bosnian Sabor (Parliament) Elections

During the last years of the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia & Herzegovina, the first democratic elections for a newly-formed provincial parliament were held, subsequent to Bosnia’s formal annexation by the Dual-Monarchy in 1909.¹

A number of parties formed and competed in the elections for the 61-seat parliament. Each ethноconfessional group in Bosnia was allotted a certain number of seats according to its proportion of BiH’s total population. Thus, sixteen seats were reserved for Catholics (Croats), 24 for the Muslims, and 31 for the Orthodox (Serbs). The Srpska narodna organizacija (Serb National Organization) won all thirty-one seats reserved for Serbs. The Croat seats were divided between the clericalist Hrvatska katolička udruga (Croatian Catholic Association, or HKU) and the more secular Hrvatska narodna zajednica (Croatian National Union, HNZ), which gained . All of the seats reserved for Muslims were taken by the Muslimanska narodna organizacija (MNO). The non-ethnoconfessional, Social Democratic Party, won zero seats.

1921 Ratification Vote of the Vidovdan Constitution

On 28 November 1920, the post-World War I “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes” held its first national elections for skupština (parliament). One of the most urgent tasks of the new parliament was to adopt a constitution for the country. As such, the 1921 vote in the skupština provides a clear example of how ethnic groups and the political parties/movements based on them vote in predictable blocs.

The fundamental issue facing the new kingdom was whether to have a unitary, centralized state (modeled on the French system), as preferred by Serbia and Serbs in general, or to have a decentralized, federal system, which was the preference of most non-Serb ethnic groups. When it became clear that the non-Serb parties did not have the power to prevent the Serb factions from passing their preferred version through the skupština, most of them boycotted the legislature. Nevertheless, the constitution was passed, despite the boycott by several ethnically-based parties, on 28th June 1921, hence the new constitution became known as the Vidovdan (St. Vitus’ Day) Constitution.

### November 1920 Skupština Elections

#### Total Seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th>Percentage, Total Vote</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Radical</td>
<td>284,575</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Democrat</td>
<td>319,448</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian and Slovene Agrarian</td>
<td>151,603</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Peasant</td>
<td>230,590</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovene Populist &amp; Croatian Clerical</td>
<td>111,274</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniac Muslim (JMO)</td>
<td>110,895</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Džemijet (Albanian Muslim)</td>
<td>30,029</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>198,736</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrat</td>
<td>46,792</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian bourgeois (four lists)</td>
<td>81,728</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (nine lists)</td>
<td>41,865</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,607,535</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>419</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The voting for the Vidovdan Constitution, and the boycotts that accompanied it, broke down along the following lines:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Absent/Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Radicals</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Democrats</td>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2. Source: Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1974), 215. Please note: determining how many votes each party received by the ethnicity of each voter is difficult to ascertain because only adult males were eligible to vote, and I have not found the statistical data allowing the required calculations. Note also that other sources provide slightly different numbers for both the November 1920 parliamentary elections and for the voting for the Vidovan Constitution. See, most importantly, Charles A. Beard and George Radin, *The Balkan Pivot: Yugoslavia, A Study in Government and Administration* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), 39-56; Dejan Djokic, *Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia* (London: Hurst & Co., 2007), 43-53; John Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 120-125.

3. Note: 30 of these seats went to Serbs, 9 to Slovenes.
As seen in the above, the Serb-dominated Radicals and Democrats overwhelmingly voted in favor of the Vidovdan Constitution (albeit, as John Lampe points out, eleven of the Democrats’ votes came from Croat, Slovene, Macedonian, and Montenegrin members of the party). The Bosnian Muslim JMO and the Kosovo Albanian Džemijet party also voted in favor of the Vidovdan Constitution in return for guarantees that Muslim landlords in Bosnia and Kosovo would be given compensation in the anticipated land-reform process. Not knowing the ethnic composition of the Yugoslav communists at this time makes it difficult to give precise figures about how individual representatives voted for the constitution when broken down by ethnicity, but in approximate terms it seems reasonable to assume that about 80 percent of the Slovenes and 90 percent of the Croats did not support passage of the Vidovdan Constitution, while over 75 percent of the Serbs did.

**1974 Josifovski Study on Ethnic Distance in Macedonia**

In 1974, the Macedonian sociologist Ilija Josifovski published the results of his study of ethnic distance in the Macedonian town of Polog. Josifovski asked his informants a wide range of questions, the most interesting of which were the following:

*If you had to move to the city, would you prefer to live in a building with members of?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Your Own Nationality</th>
<th>Any Other Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>80.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*What is the ethnicity of your three closest friends?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All three my own nationality</th>
<th>One of my nationality, two of another</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>88.5%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Would you allow your son to marry a woman of another ethnic group?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>95.6%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>95.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**August-September 1990 Krajina Serb Referendum on Autonomy**

From August 9th—September 2nd, 1990, Serbs in Serb-majority regions in Croatia organized a referendum asking whether people supported autonomy for Serb-inhabited regions. Of 756,781 people who participated in the referendum, over 99% voted in favor of autonomy. On May 12th, 1991, the vote was repeated, again with the same result.5

**1990 Bosnia & Herzegovina Elections**

Bosnia & Herzegovina held its first multiparty elections after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1990. Following a pattern established for over a century in Bosnia, voters almost uniformly voted along ethnoconfessional lines for their own nationalist parties. To illustrate this point, it is worth comparing the ethnic structure of Bosnia’s population with the voting results for the three main nationalist parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina Ethnic Structure of Population, 1981</th>
<th>November 1990 Election Results by Nationalist Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>SDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniacs</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>37.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>14.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>26.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another of other parties competed in the elections as well; should they be included, it would show that the voting along ethnoconfessional lines was even greater than the above results suggest. Thus, for instance, the political party led by prominent Bosniac businessman and intellectual Adil Zulfikarpašić, the *Muslimanska Bošnjačka Organizacija* (MBO) gained a further 0.80 percent of the Bosniac vote, while primarily Serb parties such as Vuk Drašković’s *Srpski Pokret Obnove* (Serbian Renewal Movement) or Vojislav Koštunica’s *Demokratska Stranka Srbije* (Democratic Party of Serbia) similarly gained 0.80 percent of the Serb vote. Civic, non-ethnic parties in the 1990 Bosnian elections were represented by the reformed/renamed *Savez Komunista—Socijal Demokratska Partija* (SK SDP, League of Communists—Social Democratic Party), which gained 6 percent of the total vote, and the reform party of Yugoslav federal prime minister Ante Marković (himself a Bosnian Croat) which gained

5.60 percent. All told, approximately 87-88% of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s voters in 1990 voted for nationalist parties.6

December 1990 Slovenian Plebiscite on Independence

In the December 23rd 1990 Slovenian plebiscite on independence, voters were asked “Should the Republic of Slovenia become an autonomous and independent state?” 93.5 percent of eligible voters turned out, and 88.5 percent approved.7

May 1991 Croatian Referendum on Independence

On May 19th, 1991, Croatian voters were asked “Do you agree that the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign and independent state, which guarantees cultural autonomy and all civil rights to Serbs and members of other nationalities in Croatia, may enter into an alliance with other republics?” 83.6 percent of voters turned out, and 93 percent approved.8 A separate question asking whether Croatia should stay in a federal Yugoslavia was rejected by 92 percent of the voters.9

September 1991 Macedonian Referendum on Independence

On 8 September 1991, Macedonia held a referendum in which voters were asked the following question: “Do you agree to a sovereign or an independent State of Macedonia, with the right to join a future union of sovereign states of Yugoslavia?”

Turnout for the referendum was 71.85 percent of the eligible electorate of 1,495,626 registered voters. Of these, 95.09 percent supported the measure. The referendum, however, was boycotted by both the Albanian and Serb communities in Macedonia, who represented 23 and 2.3 percent, respectively, of Macedonia’s population at the time. Taken in sum, this suggests that ethnically Macedonian eligible voters in the referendum voted almost unanimously in favor of independence.

In the aftermath of the referendum, Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov gave a speech noting that the voting results expressed “the centuries-long strivings of the Macedonian people.”10

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7 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 139.

8 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 143.

9 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 212. Cohen also points out that a vote organized by Krajina Serbs one week earlier on whether the Krajina should unite with Serbia was approved by a reputed 99.8 percent of the population.

November 1991 Public Opinion Survey on Sustainability of BiH

In November 1991, an opinion poll of 900 students throughout Bosnia & Herzegovina was carried out asking respondents whether they thought BiH could survive as an independent country. Responses in the main were along ethnic lines, with 71% of Croatian students responding in the affirmative, 61% of Bosniac students, while only 6% of Serb students answered affirmatively.

September 1991 Kosovo Independence Referendum

Between 26-30 September 1991, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova, organized a referendum asking whether or not Kosovo should become independent, both from Serbia, and from the Yugoslav federation. Chronologically, the referendum was being held in the same time period as similar referenda were taking place in republics throughout the former Yugoslavia. Since Kosovo was officially a province of Serbia, however, Serbian authorities declared the referendum to be illegal, unconstitutional, and invalid.

Nevertheless, Rugova and the LDK proceeded. According to most reports, the referendum succeeded by an overwhelming margin. Out of 914,802 votes counted (representing 87 percent of Kosovo’s electorate at the time) 99.87 percent reportedly voted in favor of independence. 164 votes were reported to have been cast against the ballot, and 933 ballots were declared to be invalid.

October 1991 Sandžak Referendum on Political and Territorial Autonomy

The Sandžak is a mountainous area straddling the border of Serbia and Montenegro with a predominantly Muslim/Bosniac population. Traditionally, the Sandžak is considered to include eleven municipalities: six on the Serbian side (Nova Varoš, Novi Pazar, Priboj, Prijeponje, Sjenica, and Tutin), and five on the Montenegrin side (Bijelo Polje, Ivangrad, Plav, Plevlje, and Rožaje). According to the last official Yugoslav census completed in 1991, the population of these eleven municipalities was approximately 440,789, of which 52 percent (229,160) were Muslims/Bosniacs.

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On October 25-27 1991, Muslim/Bosniac political organizations in the Sandžak region, a mountainous areas straddling both sides of the border between Serbia and Montenegro, organized a referendum which asked voters whether they supported the region’s “full political and territorial autonomy” and its “right to [integration with] one of the sovereign republics” of the former Yugoslavia, which in this instance implied Bosnia-Herzegovina. The organizations supporting the referendum included the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Muslim Association, local branches of the Reform Forces of Plav and Bijelo Polje, and the Association of Sandžak Writers. The Serbian government declared that the referendum was illegal, unconstitutional and invalid; nevertheless, the organizers of the effort went forward with it.

The published results of the referendum claim that 70.2 percent of eligible voters in the Sandžak region (185,437 out of 264,156) participated in the referendum, of which it was claimed that 98.9 percent (183,301) voted in favor of autonomy.

It is impossible to verify the accuracy of the results; however, even if the official results of the referendum are artificially inflated, there seems to be little doubt that a substantial majority of Muslims in the Sandžak did in fact vote in favor of it.

**January 1992 Albanian Referendum on “Illyria”**

On January 11-12, 1991, the two main ethnic Albanian political parties in Macedonia at the time, the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and the People’s Democratic Party (NDP) organized a referendum in Albanian-populated areas of Macedonia which, according to different versions, either called for autonomy for Albanian-populated regions in Macedonia, collectively named “Illyria,” or their secession from the republic altogether. According to one report, over 90 percent of the Albanian electorate in these areas turned out for the referendum, of which 99 percent voted in favor of the proposed measures.\(^{14}\)

**March 1992 Preševo Valley Referendum on Unification with Kosovo**

The Preševo Valley, in an area of southern Serbia adjoining Kosovo, is composed of three municipalities—Bujanovac, Medvedja, and Preševo. Altogether, some 70,000 Albanians live in the three municipalities, with 90 percent of the population of Preševo municipality itself composed of ethnic Albanians, 54.2 of Bujanovac municipality, and 30 percent of Medvedja.

In March 1992, Albanians in the Preševo Valley held a referendum asking voters whether or not they supported gaining autonomy within Serbia, and possible unification with Kosovo. Over 90 percent of the Albanian population in the Preševo Valley participated in the referendum, with reportedly over 99 percent voting in favor of the measures.\(^{15}\)

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April 1998 USIA Public Opinion Surveys in Bosnia & Herzegovina

In April 1998, the United State Information Agency (USIA) published the findings of a detailed survey of public opinion in Bosnia & Herzegovina approximately two years after the end of hostilities. Questions posed to survey participants ranged from queries on the state of the economy, to survey participants views of international affairs, to the state of interethnic relations and trust in public institutions. A representative review of sample questions returns the following answers:

Table 6, February 1998: How much confidence do you have in SFOR/IFOR? Bosnian Serbs, 26%; Bosnian Croats, 28%; Bosnian Muslims, 82%

Table 10, February 1998: How much confidence do you have in the High Representative? Bosnian Serbs, 22%; Bosnian Croats, 27%; Bosnian Muslims, 78%

Table 22: February 1998: What is your opinion of the provision that Bosnia & Herzegovina will remain a single state? Bosnian Serbs, 18%; Bosnian Croats, 36%; Bosnian Muslims, 97%

Table 24, February 1998: Some people say that it is inevitable that the country will be partitioned into three ethnic communities. Others say that we will ultimately be able to live together peacefully. Which view is closer to your own? Three ethnic communities: Bosnian Serbs, 85%; Bosnian Croats, 78%; Bosnian Muslims, 5%. Will be able to live together: Bosnian Serbs, 5%; Bosnian Croats, 15%; Bosnian Muslims, 90%.

Table 25, February 1998: Do you favor or oppose the existence of the Bosnian Serb Republic? Bosnian Serbs, 98% strongly or somewhat favor; Bosnian Croats, 47% strongly or somewhat favor; Bosnian Muslims, 11% strongly or somewhat favor.

Table 59, February 1998: Nationality-mixed marriages are generally not a good thing: Bosnian Serbs, 70% agree; Bosnian Croats, 80 percent agree, Bosnian Muslims, 44% agree.

Table 121, February 1998: Do you think that Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat students should be taught from the same curriculum or different curricula? Same curricula: Bosnian Croats, 15%; Bosnian Muslims, 94%. Different curricula: Bosnian Croats, 78%; Bosnian Muslims, 3%.

Table 145, February 1998: How much confidence do you have in TVBiH television news broadcasts? Great deal and fair amount confident, 3%; Bosnian Muslims, Great deal and fair amount confident, 89%16

April 2002 Public Opinion Survey in Montenegro

In April 2002, the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Podgorica, Montenegro (CEDEM) carried out a public opinion poll throughout Montenegro in the aftermath of the signing of the March 2002 Belgrade Agreement, which had established the State Union of Serbia-Montenegro. Individuals surveyed were asked a number of question regarding their support for the Belgrade Agreement, and overall attitudes about the political situation in Montenegro.

Amongst the most interesting findings are the following:

- When asked whether or not they supported the Belgrade Agreement, overall, 61.6 percent of respondents answered “Yes,” 23.0 percent answered “No,” and 15.4 percent were “Uncertain.” When broken down by ethnic group, however, the responses were significantly different. Thus, 57.6 percent of Montenegrins expressed support for the Belgrade Agreement, 77.1 percent of Serbs, 39.2 percent of Muslims, and 15.4 percent of Albanians.
- When asked whether or not they would vote in favor of a referendum on independence for Montenegro rather than on the Belgrade Agreement, 57.8 percent of Montenegrins, 86.5 percent of Muslims, and 96.2 percent of Albanians voted “Yes.” Serbs were the only ethnic group to vote “No” on this question, with 79.0 percent being opposed.
- When asked to express their confidence in leading institutions in Montenegro, the Serbian Orthodox Church emerged as the public institution in which Montenegrin citizens had the highest levels of confidence, surpassing in this regard the President of Montenegro, the government, the Yugoslav Army, police, judiciary, etc. However, there were significant differences in the responses to this question according to ethnic group. Thus, while 75.9 percent of Serbs expressed “Great” and “Medium” confidence in the Serbian Orthodox Church, while 47.4 percent of Montenegrins, 66.1 percent of Albanians, and 54.7 percent of Muslims expressed “Very Little Confidence” or “No Confidence” in it.
- When asked to express their confidence in the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (at the time, Vojislav Kostunica), 59.8 percent of Serbs expressed “Medium Confidence” or “Great Confidence” in the federal president, while 87.5 percent of Croats expressed “Little Confidence” or “No Confidence”, 85.1 percent of Muslims, 64.7 percent of Montenegrins, and 61.5 percent of Albanians.
- Interestingly, the poll also noted the following: “In this research it is characteristic for Albanians that in their attitude towards institutions, especially towards federal institutions, besides the negative attitude expressed in the text, a considerable percent of them declared themselves neutral. No subject of Albanian nationality with positive attitude towards some of the federal institutions has been registered.”
- When asked whether or not they supported cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the “Yes” and “No” responses according to

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ethnic group were as follows: Montenegrins, 47.5 percent/35 percent; Serbs, 10.4 percent/76.5 percent; Muslims 89.2 percent/1.4 percent; Albanians, 84.6 percent/3.9 percent

November 2000 Herceg-Bosna Referendum in BiH

On November 11th, 2000, the Croatian National Congress (HNS), an umbrella organization comprising several smaller Croat political parties in BiH, together with the main Croat political organization, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), held a referendum asking citizens to approve a “Declaration on the Rights and Position of the Croat People,” to be organized concurrently with BiH’s parliamentary elections. Voters were asked to say whether or not they approved measures calling for “full political and cultural equality” for Croats in BiH, to include the establishment of independent Croat political, scientific, educational, and information institutions in BiH. Although the wording itself was not completely explicit, most observers interpreted the referendum as asking Bosnian Croat voters whether or not they supported the formation of a third, specifically Croat, entity in Bosnia. Of the 303,367 Croats registered to vote in BiH, 216,191 (71.02 percent) participated in the referendum, of which 213,994 (98.96 percent) voted in favor of the declaration. 1,252 (0.57 percent) voted against. Importantly, even Croats in Bosniac-dominated areas of BiH, such as Sarajevo, participated in the vote. 18

October 2004 Kosovo Parliamentary Elections (Serb Boycott)19

On October 23, 2004, Kosovo held its second parliamentary elections after an international protectorate had been established in the disputed Serbian province in June 1999. The elections were held in the aftermath of large-scale violence against Serbs and other ethnic groups in Kosovo had erupted in March 2004. Given concerns over freedom of movement, Kosovo Serbs overwhelmingly chose to boycott the elections. Kosovo’s Central Election Commission and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) reported that 99 percent of Serbs registered to vote in Kosovo refused to vote in the parliamentary elections. Other sources reported that out of 96,000 Serbs registered to vote in Kosovo, only 300 cast ballots.

Overall, Kosovo’s Central Election Commission and the OSCE reported that 53.08 percent of Kosovo’s registered voters cast ballots in the parliamentary elections (670,000 out of 1,412,000 total).


**Bosnia-Herzegovina Public Opinion Survey, July 2005**

A public opinion survey conducted by Agencija Partner Marketing of Banja Luka at the beginning of July 2005 asked 1,200 citizens across Bosnia-Herzegovina of legal voting age the following question: “Should Croats get their own entity in BiH?” Respondents were broken down according to ethnicity. The results were as follows:

Among Croat respondents:

- Completely agree: 42 percent
- Agree in general: 29 percent
- Generally do not agree: 15 percent
- Do not agree at all: 11 percent
- Do not know/refuse to answer: 3 percent

Among Serb respondents:

- Completely agree: 20 percent
- Agree in general: 23 percent
- Generally do not agree: 22 percent
- Do not agree at all: 29 percent
- Do not know/refuse to answer: 5 percent

Among Bosniak respondents, responses were even more uniformly opposed, with 91 percent of Bosniaks answering “Generally do not agree” (17 percent), or “Do not agree at all” (74 percent).

**September 2005 Republika Srpska--Bosnia-Herzegovina Public Opinion Survey**

A public opinion survey conducted by Agencija Partner Marketing of Banja Luka in mid-September 2005 asked 850 participants of legal voting age in a representative sample the following question: “Should Republika Srpska secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina and join Serbia if Kosovo is granted independence?” The results are as follows:

- Completely agree: 54.1 percent
- Generally agree: 21.6 percent
- Generally do not agree: 8.2 percent
- Do not agree at all: 6.2 percent
- Do not know/refuse to answer: 9.8 percent

As can be seen from the above, 75.7 percent of RS respondents either agreed to some measure with the proposition that the RS should secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina and join Serbia if Kosovo became independent.
The results of this survey become more ethnically-uniform, however, when one takes into account the fact that according to 2005 estimates, 88.4 percent of the RS population is Serb, while 11.6 percent is estimated to be either Bosniac or Croat. Thus, were the survey to have been broken down along ethnic lines, it is highly likely that “Generally do not agree” or “Do not agree at all responses” would have come mainly from Bosniaks and Croats. Conversely, it is safe to assume that over 80 percent of Serb respondents would have answered either “Completely agree” or “Generally agree.”

What is also noteworthy about this survey is that there are fairly consistent attitudes towards this question regardless of age. 81 percent of respondents aged 29-45 agreed with the above proposition, 77 percent of respondents 46-59 agreed, while for older respondents (60 and above; i.e., those with more experience of the former Yugoslavia), support was somewhat lower (69 percent).

May 2006 Montenegrin Independence Referendum

On 21 May 2006, Montenegrin citizens were asked to vote on the following question: “Do you want the Republic of Montenegro to be an independent state with full international and legal personality?”

According to official results, 55.49 percent of valid votes cast in the referendum approved of the vote, while 44.11 percent of the valid votes disapproved.

A breakdown of the Montenegrin independence referendum by municipality (see below) shows that voting was largely along ethnoconfessional lines. Municipalities shaded in blue (mainly bordering Serbia and/or Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina), voted against the referendum. Municipalities shaded in red voted in favor of the referendum.
However, looking at the referendum results and comparing them to the ethnoconfessional demographics of each municipality reveals the degree to which ethnoconfessional groups vote as unitary actors. For instance, in Cetinje, the old royal capital of Montenegro, 93% of the population according to the 2003 Montenegrin census is Montenegrin, and 2.62% is Serb. 86.38% of voters in Cetinje municipality voted in favor of independence.

Referendum results were similar in municipalities with large Albanian, Bosniak, or Muslim populations. For instance, in Rožaje municipality, the ethnoconfessional breakdown of the population is as follows: Bosniaks, 82.09%; Muslims, 6.65%; Albanians, 4.44%; Serbs, 3.98%; Montenegrins, 1.94%. Thus, Bosniaks, Muslims, and Albanians constituted roughly 94% of Rožaje municipality’s population. 91.33% of Rožaje municipality voted in favor of independence.

In Plav municipality, the ethnoconfessional breakdown of the population is as follows: 49.32% Bosniak; 5.71% Muslim; 19.70% Albanian, 5.54% Montenegrin; and 18.93% Serb. In total, 80% of Plav municipality’s population consists of Bosniaks, Muslims, Albanians, and Montenegrins; 78.92% of Plav municipality’s population voted in favor of independence.

In Herceg Novi municipality, 52.88% of the population declared themselves to be Serbs in the 2003 Montenegrin census; 28.6% declared themselves to be Montenegrin; 2.42 percent declared
themselves as Croats, and 8.60% were nationally undeclared. 61% of Herceg Novi’s population voted against independence.

In sum, as a March 2007 NDI study on Montenegro noted, “the defining division in Montenegro continues to be one’s ethnic identification, which has been the case since NDI began to conduct opinion research in Montenegro since 2001.”

February 2007 Serbian Parliament Vote on Ahtisaari Plan

On 14 February 2007, the 250 seat Serbian parliament debated a resolution entitled “Resolution following UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari’s "Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement” and continuation of negotiations on the future status of Kosovo-Metohija.” The resolution rejected the UNSG’s Special Envoy for Kosovo plan to give Kosovo conditional independence from Kosovo. Part of the Resolution is as follows:

“The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia therefore rejects all articles in the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy's Proposal which breach the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia as an internationally recognised state. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia warns that this questions the possibility of coming to a compromise solution reached through agreement which would represent the basic goal of talks on Kosovo-Metohija's future status.”

The resolution passed the parliament with 225 representatives voting in favor (out of 240 present), and 15 against. The coalition in favor of the resolution included all of the major political parties in the country—DSS, DS, G17, SRS, SPS. Those voting against were members of the Liberal Democratic Party, the Gradjanski Savez, and a member of the Albanian party from the Presevo Valley.

April-June 2007 Early Warning Report Kosovo

The April-June Early Warning Report Kosovo was based on an opinion poll conducted during the first half of 2007, based on face-to-face interviews with 1,250 respondents: 851 Kosovo

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Albanians, 206 Kosovo Serbs, and 193 respondents from other nationalities (Bosnians, Gorani, Turks, Ashkali, Roma, and Egyptians).

Respondents were asked a variety of questions, including the following:

*What is your preferred option for Kosovo’s future status?* 96 percent of Kosovo Albanians surveyed indicated independence was the best option; 77 percent of Kosovo Serbs said autonomous status within Serbia was the best option.

*Is the Ahtisaari Plan fair?* 97 percent of Kosovo Serbs answered negatively; 65 percent of Kosovo Albanians, and 69 percent of “Others” answered positively.

*Do you agree with the establishment of special zones around cultural monuments?* 65 percent of Kosovo Albanians disagreed with such a move; 71 percent of Serbs agreed or strongly agreed.

*Do you agree that Kosovo Serb municipalities should have the right to special relations with each other and with Serbia?* 67 percent of Kosovo Albanians overwhelmingly disagree, and 26 percent strongly disagree with this proposal; 54 percent of Kosovo Serbs agree with the proposal, and 31 percent strongly agree.

*Are you satisfied with the performance of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)?* 89 percent of Kosovo Albanians responded positively, while only 5 percent of Kosovo Serb respondents did.

**June 2007 Greek Public Opinion Poll on FYROM Name Issue**

A public opinion poll conducted by the GPO polling organization in Greece in June 2007, and published in the *To Proto Thema* (Athens) weekly newspaper on 10 June 2007, asked Greek citizens the following question: “Should the Greek government veto FYROM’s accession to NATO using the name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia?”

82.3 percent of the respondents replied "yes" and "probably yes," while 16.8 percent replied "no" and "probably no," 2.3 percent didn't reply.

Seven in 10 respondents rejected any name that included the term "Macedonia" in FYROM's name, with 67.9 percent calling on the government to insist to the end on a name that does not contain "Macedonia", while 61.3 percent were in favor of a referendum on the name issue.

86.1 percent of the respondents considered the FYROM name issue to be of great importance to Greece.

February 2010 Gallup Balkan Monitor survey on “Greater Albania”

In February 2010, the Gallup Balkan Monitor organized a public opinion survey in Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia asking respondents “Would you personally support the formation of Greater Albania?” In Albania, out of a sample of 1000 individuals, 70.5 percent responded positively. In Kosovo (n=931) 74.2 responded affirmatively. In Macedonia (n=1008) 13.6 percent of the respondents answered positively.\(^{24}\)

Since the survey’s methodology was not published, it is unclear why a significantly lower percentage of people responded to the question positively. One explanation may be that the survey was conducted amongst both Albanians and Macedonians, in which case it would be predictable that Macedonians would answer negatively.

July 2010 Public Opinion Survey on Macedonian Name Issue

In July 2010, a public opinion survey conducted amongst 1110 respondents in the Republic of Macedonia asked them whether they considered the name dispute with Greece to be more important than membership in NATO and the EU. Among ethnic Macedonian respondents, 82.1% said that maintaining the country’s constitutional name (i.e., “The Republic of Macedonia”) was more important than NATO and EU membership. Among ethnic Albanian respondents, on the other hand, 77.8% said that NATO and EU membership was the more important issue for them.\(^{25}\)

July 2010 Gallup Balkan Monitor survey on Kosovo Independence

In July 2010, a Gallup Balkan Monitor survey published the views of respondents throughout southeastern Europe regarding how they viewed Kosovo’s February 2008 Declaration of Independence and its consequences. Among the more interesting responses were the following: “Do you feel secure in independent Kosovo?” Albanians, 92%; Serbs, 7%. When asking citizens of Serbia proper whether they believed that Serbia should recognize Kosovo for the sake of EU membership, 70% replied negatively.\(^{26}\)

