Columbia University
Graduate School of Arts & Sciences
Human Rights Studies Master of Arts Program

Aiding and Abetting Egypt:
The Impact of U.S. Foreign Aid on Human Rights Conditions in Egypt from 2001 to 2010

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

February 2016
Abstract

Since the 1980s, the United States has promoted human rights and democracy as a major part of its foreign policy. This was an important departure from the traditional US foreign policy posture that relied on authoritarian governments as the most expedient means to ensuring American influence abroad, especially in the third world. But the post-Cold War era ushered in a new approach: the US began promoting its values vis-à-vis democracy and human rights abroad with the use of foreign aid. Following the September 9, 2001 terrorist attacks, US foreign aid to the Middle East strengthened its emphasis on democracy, human rights and socio-economic reforms. The reorientation was premised on the idea that an Arab world with these reforms would be less likely to serve as breeding grounds for radicalism and possibly counter existing extremism. For decades, policymakers and scholars have grappled with the question of whether or not US aid indeed has any impact on the improvement of human rights conditions, and the Middle East has been of particular relevance in this context because of historical US interest in the region. This study examines the impact of US foreign aid on human rights, specifically physical integrity rights, in Egypt during the intermediate years after the 9/11 attacks (2001) and before the Arab Spring unrest (2010). The objective is to determine whether or not the distribution of US democracy aid had a positive or negative—or any noticeable—effect on physical integrity rights in Egypt during that period. It uses the Political Terror Scale (PTS) as the main measure of the outcome of interest, and the findings reveal indiscernible to a near negative relationship between US aid (democracy aid) and physical integrity rights in Egypt.
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1.1 Introduction

From 2001 to 2010, the United States doled out more than a quarter trillion dollars in foreign aid to Egypt, among which contained about $300 million allocated for human rights, democracy and good governance promotion.\textsuperscript{1} Egypt isn’t unique in its receipt of US aid. The US dispenses foreign aid to over 100 countries – most of which are outside Western Europe, Australia and Canada – for various reasons including bolstering strategic alliances, alleviating poverty, and promoting economic stability and democracy.\textsuperscript{2} The US has, however, maintained a long-standing, special alliance with Egypt. The specific amount of aid to Egypt varies from year to year but has averaged at about $2 billion annually since 1979, the year Israel and Egypt signed an important peace treaty. The majority of US assistance is allocated toward the military in Egypt, which has positioned the country as a top recipient of US aid over the last 2 decades.\textsuperscript{3}

One reason behind the continued significant US aid to Egypt is because of strategic military alliances for the maintenance of peace and security in the region; Middle East stability is one of US’s highest national security priorities.\textsuperscript{4} For almost three decades, under the military rule of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt experienced relative stability. But Egypt wasn’t immune to the “Tunisia effect” that swept the Middle East, and it descended into turmoil in 2011. Egyptians took to the streets en masse to protest political repression, social injustice, financial corruption, and economic and social stagnation. After much unrest, a wave of democratic elections brought about new leadership in Egypt but it lasted only briefly and a coup d’état soon followed. The country is back under a military rule, a regime accused of intense government crackdowns against Islamists and other dissidents, and is yet to regain full stability.\textsuperscript{5} The chaos in Egypt has sparked many questions regarding what role US aid should play in Egypt’s stability and Egyptian’s pursuit for democracy and human rights protections.

Since the 1980s, the US has promoted human rights and democracy as a major part of its foreign policy. This was an important redirection from the traditional US foreign policy posture, which relied on authoritarian governments as the most expedient way of ensuring US influence abroad, especially in the third world.\textsuperscript{6} But a new era ushered in a new approach: the US began

\begin{enumerate}
\item Tarnoff 2011
\item M. Sharp 2013
\item Ibid.
\item Dunne 2006
\item Bakr 2012
\item Apodaca and Stohl 1999
\end{enumerate}
promoting its interests vis-à-vis democracy and human rights abroad with the use of foreign aid. Following the September 9, 2011 terrorist attacks, US foreign aid to the Middle East strengthened its emphasis on human rights, democratization and socio-economic reforms. The reorientation was premised on the idea that an Arab world with these reforms would be less likely to serve as breeding grounds for radicalism and possibly counter existing extremism. Policymakers and scholars have for decades grappled with the question of whether or not US aid has any impact on the improvement of human rights conditions abroad, and the Middle East has been of particular relevance in this context because of historical US interest in the region. This study examines the impact of US foreign aid on human rights in Egypt from 2001 to 2010, during the intermediate years after the 9/11 attacks and before the Arab Spring unrest. It focuses on the human rights subcategory known as physical integrity rights and employs the Political Terror Scale (PTS) as the main measure of the outcome of interest (human rights in Egypt). The goal of this study is to determine whether or not the distribution of US foreign assistance (democracy aid) had a positive or negative—or any noticeable—effect on the physical integrity rights in Egypt from 2001 to 2010. The findings ultimately reveal indiscernible to a near negative relationship between US aid (democracy aid) and the physical integrity rights in Egypt. For instance, even with occasional upticks in US (via USAID) grants toward human rights and democracy projects, the Egyptian government’s human rights record remained deplorable with a negative or no movement at all on the PTS. This study suggests that the distribution of US foreign assistance had little to no effect on physical integrity rights in Egypt during this timeframe. We begin with a comprehensive overview of how aid works, including the history surrounding US foreign assistance and the debate regarding its effectiveness and ineffectiveness. Now regarded as a major foreign policy agenda, we explore the relationship between human rights, foreign policy and foreign assistance. Following this discussion, we provide background on the Middle East and take a closer look at Egypt: her background, human rights record, and relationship with the US. After a detailed literature review, we offer an analysis of US funding—intended to influence human rights conditions positively—to Egypt and compare this funding trend with the physical integrity rights levels, discussing what events may account for the discrepancy in the results.
1.2 What is Foreign Aid?

In the international community, foreign aid from developed countries to developing countries is known as Official Development Assistance (ODA). The phrase was coined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an international economic group comprised of 34 member nations, including many of the most economically advanced countries. OECD is charged with monitoring the flow of resources, especially ODA, to developing countries. They define foreign aid as capital flows, financial or technical assistance, from developed countries to less-developed countries, provided in the form of grants and subsidized loans that are geared primarily towards the promotion of economic development and welfare improvement. This study focuses on the foreign aid between governments and from government to NGOs in foreign countries. We subscribe to a simple and broad definition of foreign aid as economic, technical, or military assistance from one party to another for human, security, or economic development purposes.

1.3 What are Human Rights and how are they Measured?

On December 10, 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which outlines the fundamental rights and freedoms shared by all human beings. The UDHR established the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of all people. Human rights are regarded as the rights inherent to the human being, and they are protected and upheld by international and national laws and treaties. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, human rights are defined as “norms that help to protect all people everywhere from severe political, legal, and social abuses.”

The US, although a signatory to the Declaration, has often embraced a narrower definition of human rights. “The American liberal tradition,” Schoultz argues, “define human rights as ‘the rights to liberty and the integrity of the person in the sense that they cannot be denied without the impartial application of due process of law.’” For this study, we focus on the subset of rights known as physical integrity rights, sometimes referred to as personal integrity.

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7 World Bank and OECD 2013
8 Ibid.
9 Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984
10 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2003
11 Schoultz 1981
12 Schoultz 1994
rights. These rights constitute the rights not to be tortured, extrajudicially killed, forcefully disappeared, or imprisoned for political beliefs.13 A general definition is characterizing physical integrity rights simply as the right to life and liberty.14 The definition of personal integrity rights have broadened over time. Political theorist Herbert Spencer in 1897 defined physical integrity rights as the right to be free from severe physical harm.15 His definition has been expanded to include issues beyond physical harm. In 1932, legal scholar Leon Green submitted that “physical integrity… represents the ‘going’ concern we call the person, with all his paraphernalia of dress and adornment, powers of speech and movement.”16 This is the standard used by the US Department of State and Congress in their foreign assistance considerations. For instance, Section 502B(c) (d) (l) of the Foreign Assistance Act 1976 defines gross violations of internationally recognized human rights as including “… torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty and the security of the person.”17

Our focus on physical integrity rights is justified for several reasons. These rights are widely considered as the most fundamental human right and scholars the world over have long advocated for its recognition and protection.18 Roscoe Pound, a renowned legal scholar, wrote in a 1915 article for the Harvard Law Review that the “inviolability of the physical person is universally put first among the demands which the individual may make.”19 It is the violation of these rights when carried out by the state that primarily concerns political scientists.20 Poe and Tate describe physical integrity violations as synonymous with “state terror.”21 In addition to its wide acceptance by the political science community, the bulk of empirical studies have focused on physical integrity rights’ violations.22 Consequently, it is “the most frequent object of inquiry in the social science literature that examines cross-national patterns of human rights violations.”23

13 Cingranelli and Richards 2010, Peter Haschke 2011
14 Sieghart 1983
15 Herbert Spencer 1893
16 Leon Green 1932
17 USAID
18 Paulsen 1899, Pound 1915
19 Roscoe Pound 1915; Harvard Law Review
20 Peter Haschke 2011
21 Pope and Tate 1994
22 Peter Haschke 2011
23 W. Hill 2013
Lastly, our attention on this subset of rights is merited because the violations to these rights offend the broadly shared norms of appropriate government behavior for basic human rights.²⁴

How are physical integrity rights measured? There are three common measures for government human rights practices regularly used in human rights analyses. These standard-based measures construct a set of human rights criteria for various degrees and then use these standards to calculate governments’ human rights practices.²⁵ One common measure is the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) human rights index. It contains “both disaggregated measures of specific human rights practices, which can be analyzed separately or combined into valid and reliable indices, as well as two already-aggregated indices.”²⁶ Its coding index is based on a nine-point scale that ranges from 0 (absolutely no respect for rights) to 8 (full respect for rights). The second common measure is the Freedom House index for political rights and civil rights, which are mainly derived from the UDHR. Utilizing a seven-point ordinal scale for each category—political and civil—, the index rates countries based on the extent that government provide its citizens with political rights and civil liberties. It is important to note that some scholars, Capellan and Gomez (2007), regard the Freedom House measure as more an indicator of democracy rather than human rights.²⁷ Finally, a third widely used measure is the Political Terror Scale (PTS). Developed by Michael Stohl, the PTS has a five-point scale which is designed to measure physical integrity rights. It reflects political terrors such as political imprisonment, torture, threats against relatives occurring within a state, and extrajudicial killing.²⁸ The description for each of the PTS’s five point coding scheme is as follows:

²⁴ Ibid.
²⁵ Callaway and Matthews 2008
²⁶ CIRI Human Rights Data Project 2011
²⁷ Capellán and Gomez 2007
²⁸ Callaway and Matthews 2008
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The PTS and CIRI measures are both based off the annual reports on human rights practices from Amnesty International and the US Department of State (*Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*). The major distinction between the two is that while CIRI rankings are measured in terms of government respect for human rights, the PTS is presented in terms of government violations of human rights.

Our study employs the PTS as the main measure of the outcome of human rights conditions in Egypt. We do not combine the PTS together with the CIRI measure because both are obtained from the same source materials and record the same class of human rights violations. Because the PTS relies on data from the State Department and Amnesty International's annual reports, any inaccuracies in those reports would be evident in the PTS indices. The annual State Department report have been accused, especially in the Cold War era,
of unfairly targeting countries with differing political ideologies from the US’s. For example, “State Department reports for communist Cuba prior to 1989 suffered from ‘exaggeration and undocumented conclusions’ whereas reports for U.S. allies such as El Salvador in the 1980s were “extremely politicized.” Reports from Amnesty International and similar non-governmental organizations may, on the other hand, be biased because such organizations may have incentives to consistently present bad news despite improvements in a country’s human rights records. Peter Haschke writes that “If human rights records across the world improve sufficiently, Amnesty International’s ability to mobilize members and attract donations would arguably be eroded. In short, Amnesty International has an incentive to change its standards, or to focus its attention to violations ignored in the past to remain relevant.” Other scholars, however, find that Amnesty International has generally observed high reporting standards in spite of incentives to overemphasize allegations of human rights violations. The PTS’s primary focus is on state behavior and political violence carried out by state-sponsored or affiliated groups are accounted in PTS calculations. Thus, this means that domestic and societal violence, or violence from insurgent groups and non-state actors aren’t factored into the PTS calculations.

A number of literature and governmental agencies in fact have often used human rights interchangeably with democracy. This could be misguided approach as both imply different understandings at least on the substantive level. Some democracies can be merely nominal – one doesn’t necessarily constitute the other. Nevertheless, both human rights and democracy share similar tenets and an often positive relationship. In other words, the more democratic a country is, the less likely it is thought to violate its citizens’ human rights. Democracies, in addition, are believed to empower citizens and reduce government tendencies to be oppressive, hence the empowered citizens are more capable of confronting government violations; democracy provides a conducive environment for human rights. The FH index is described as the more ideal measure for democracy. It rates countries in categories of political rights and civil liberties from a

29 Gastil 1997
30 Poe, Carey, and Vazquez 2001
31 Simmons 2009
32 Hill, Moore, and Mukherjee 2013
33 Reed Wood and Mark 2007
34 Ibid.
35 Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Callaway and Matthews 2008
36 Cingranelli and Richards 1999
scale of 1 to 7 (the lower, the freer). From its founding up until 1988, the index was put together solely by Raymond D. Gastil. It has since however been produced by a survey team. The index, Gastil noted, was originally intended to survey freedom but has evolved “essentially [to] a survey of democracy.”\textsuperscript{37} Under political rights, the essential markers to cross include the competition or openness of choice in the process of the selection of the “chief authority” and legislature, the equality, fairness and meaningfulness of elections, whether there are multiple political parties and a significant opposition vote, whether there were recent shifts in political power through elections, whether a country is free of military or foreign control, whether there is some decentralization of political power, whether major groups are denied self-determination and, finally, whether there is some informal consensus on major matters through which preferences of the opposition or minorities are taken into account, especially in cases where there is no formal participation of the opposition.”\textsuperscript{38} The markers for civil liberties include “the freedom of media, public discussion, assembly, organization and the freedom from political terror, gross socioeconomic inequality and gross government corruption. In addition, it factors in the rule of law and accounts for whether there are free businesses, unions, professional organizations and religious organizations. From the political rights markers, it can be reasonably deduced that the factors under political rights constitute a modern representative democracy.\textsuperscript{39} From the markers under civil liberties, some of the factors included reflect the broad conceptualization of democracy and inclusiveness.\textsuperscript{40} The combination of both markers, thus, leads to a reasonable measure for overall democracy.

1.4 Birth of American Foreign Aid

The 1947 Marshall Plan is usually heralded as the first instance of American foreign aid. But to the contrary, US economic and technical contributions to foreign countries and projects dates back much further. For instance, the US supported the Committee for Relief in 1915, providing Belgium with food supplies after the German invasion. According to Jacob J. Kaplan, former Director of International Development Organizations at the Department of State, the

\[\text{Gastil 1990: 26}\]
\[\text{Gastil 1990: 30-35}\]
\[\text{Gastil 1990: 26}\]
\[\text{Gastil 1990: 30-35}\]
\[\text{Per a common definition, for example Dahl’s 1971 as “a possible operationalization of polyarchy dimensions ‘contestation’ and ‘participation’ with contestation weighted more heavily”}\]
\[\text{For example such things as the guarantee of property rights or the freedom from gross socioeconomic inequality}\]
“[US] spent about fifteen billion dollars on foreign aid before the Marshall Plan, various kinds, in various parts of the world.”\textsuperscript{41} The Marshall Plan, however, marked the first sustained and institutional US foreign aid program. The Plan, also known as the European Recovery Program, provided technical and financial assistance to Europe, helping to rebuild its economy after World War II ended, and was also used to limit the spread of German influence in the Western Hemisphere.\textsuperscript{42} It was formally established in 1948 by the Economic Cooperation Act of Congress. The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) was responsible for coordinating the Plan, which served as a useful precursor in shaping future international development assistance programs. In his 1949 inaugural address, 33rd US President Harry S. Truman introduced the Point Four Program. The stated purpose of the program was to: reduce and eliminate the threat of communism by supporting countries to succeed under capitalism, and to expand American markets overseas by combating poverty and increasing production in developing countries.\textsuperscript{43} For Truman, the Program provided an opportunity for America to win the “hearts and minds” of countries in the developing world and promote democracy and capitalism while countering communism.\textsuperscript{44} Truman’s program drew from the success of the Marshall Plan and emphasized more technical assistance, or ““know-how,”” and capital projects as the common forms of American aid. Altogether, the Plan dispensed about $13 billion to 14 European countries. The program lasted for five years and was in widely hailed as a success, “bringing Western Europe back onto a strong economic footing, providing the US with the vehicle to influence foreign policy, winning it allies in Western Europe and building a solid foundation for US -led multilateralism. Aid had restored broken infrastructure. Aid had brought political stability, restored hope....”\textsuperscript{45} Up until 1961, various agencies were created to administer US aid, from 1951 to 1953: Mutual Security Agency; from 1953 to 1955: Foreign Operations Administration; and from 1955 to 1961: International Cooperation Administration (ICA). In 1961, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act and through executive order (Executive Order 10973), President Kennedy created the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to concentrate all American development aid efforts under a single umbrella and carry out the provisions contained in the Foreign Assistance Act.

\textsuperscript{41} Kaplan 1999
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Illusions of Point Four
\textsuperscript{44} Stohl 1999
\textsuperscript{45} Moyo 2009
1.5 USAID Today

USAID has focused on different priorities over several decades. It has been in operation for more than 50 years and has maintained the stated mission to “end extreme poverty and to promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity.” Their mission underlies two themes: eradicating poverty and promoting democracy and peace, which they argue are intrinsically connected and directly linked to America’s security. This relationship is an important one. It reveals what some might characterize as a situation of competing priorities. This relationship is what David Forsythe described as a conflict between commitment to human values and exercise of power for other interests. In fact, the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act’s text, which birth USAID, explicitly states that “the individual liberties, economic prosperity, and security of the people of the United States are best sustained and enhanced in a community of nations which respect individual civil and economic rights and freedoms and which work together to use wisely the world’s limited resources in an open and equitable international economic system.” This begs the question as to which priority, security or value (human rights), takes precedence in the distribution of US foreign assistance.

USAID is the major international humanitarian and development agency of the US government. According to the Congressional Research Service, USAID is “responsible for more than $20 billion in appropriations, representing more than half of all traditional foreign aid appropriations and more than two-thirds of total U.S. humanitarian and development funding in that year.” Contrary to popular misconception among Americans, many of who overestimate the share of US budget devoted to foreign aid, less than 1 percent of the US annual federal budget, which totals in the trillions, goes toward aid. It’s important to note that although common discussion around aid mostly discusses government to government aid, the majority of USAID’s assistance doesn’t go directly to governments. They’re directed instead to NGOs, contractors and educational institutions, whose projects may be directly related and beneficial to a government agency’s efforts. Other times, US aid may avoid middlemen altogether and go

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46 USAID
47 USAID
48 Forsythe 2007
49 M. Sharp 2013
50 Ibid.
51 USAID
directly to local populations and groups. USAID is made up of both geographic and functional divisions known as bureaus. The geographic bureaus cover Africa, Asia, Europe and Eurasia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East. The functional bureaus, on the other hand, include the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and Environment, Bureau for Food Security, Bureau for Global Health, and U.S. Global Development Lab.

1.6 Human Rights in US Foreign Policy

The roots of human rights within US foreign policy can be traced back to the late 1960s. There was widespread criticism over the Vietnam War, the My Lai massacre at the hands of American troops, the covert Cambodia bombings, and the lack of ethics with which President Richard Nixon conducted foreign policy, let alone the Watergate Scandal. These events sparked conversations that called for a foreign policy that reflected American values. Congressional interest peaked on the matter when Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, resisted Congressional efforts to tie foreign aid with human rights requirements – they opted for a realpolitik model instead. Kissinger said that he believed that “it [was] dangerous for us [the US] to make the domestic policy of countries around the world a direct objective of US foreign policy.” Stohl et al. describe well the Nixon-Kissinger position: “Mr. Kissinger and the President he served [believed] that human rights were made possible by security and were of secondary priority to the pursuit of the American national security interest.” But Congress disagreed. The House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee, released a report in 1974 entitled “Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for US Leadership.” The report was issued after a number of hearings and called on the State Department to place a heightened emphasis on human rights in foreign policy. Among the recommendations contained in the report were calls for the US government to limit military and economic aid to governments that consistently disregarded its citizens’ human rights and take greater efforts to raise awareness about human

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52 Callaway and Matthews 2008
53 Apodaca and Stohl 1999
54 Callaway and Matthews 2008
55 Stohl, Carleton & Johnson 1984
56 Ibid.
rights issues in international forums such as the United Nations.\textsuperscript{57} Although there was general consensus on the issue with members of Congress, the motivations behind integrating human rights in US foreign policy were different. “For liberals,” Apodaca argues, “human rights provided a moral and ethical component to U.S. foreign policy and a penance for Watergate, the Vietnam War, and CIA excesses.” On the other hand, conservatives supported the measure because human rights presented a convenient means to reprimand the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{58} Accordingly, the Congress passed laws that restricted aid to foreign governments accused of engaging in human rights violations. They also, in response to Executive obstructions, strengthened the language in existing laws in order to compel the Department of State to submit reports on the human rights conditions in aid recipient countries.\textsuperscript{59} The 1974 Foreign Assistance Act was revised to include the Humphrey-Cranston Amendment, or Section 502B, which restricts security assistance to governments that violate human rights. In the following year, the Foreign Assistance Act was further revised with the Harkin Amendment, or Section 116, which forbids economic assistance to countries that violate human rights “unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country.” Both amendments are not without flaws, as scholars and analysts have long debated.\textsuperscript{60} One key flaw has been the ambiguity of the language contained in the amendments. Administrations have seized on the lack of precision in the language to adopt interpretations that have best suited their political agendas.\textsuperscript{61} Presidents have also invoked Executive Orders privilege to waive Congressional requirements – restriction of foreign aid to countries consistently violating human rights – allegedly because it interferes with their flexibility to protect US national interests. The Foreign Assistance Act, with all its amendments, remains in force today.

The Department of State, often called the “State Department,” is the federal agency responsible for US’s foreign affairs. It is headed by the Secretary of State, who is, at least in theory, the chief foreign policy advisor to the President. Within the State Department is the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL). DRL, according to their website, “leads the U.S.
efforts to promote democracy, protect human rights and international religious freedom, and advance labor rights globally.\textsuperscript{62}

Since its founding, the US has hailed human rights as one of its core principles. The concepts of freedom and individual liberties are proclaimed prominently in the US constitution and bill of rights. In his 1978 piece for \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Arthur Schlesinger asserts that “The United States was founded on the proclamation of ’unalienable’ rights, and human rights ever since have had a peculiar resonance in the American tradition.”\textsuperscript{63} The US, led by the then-first lady Eleanor Roosevelt, was a champion for the adoption of the Universal Declaration for Human Rights (UDHR) by the United Nations.\textsuperscript{64} The US has incorporated the promotion of respect for human rights as not only a national interest but also a principal objective of its foreign policy.\textsuperscript{65} But this was arguably never always the case. It was not until President Jimmy Carter declared unequivocally in his 1977 inaugural speech that human rights was a “central concern” of foreign policy did human rights take an important role in American diplomacy.\textsuperscript{66} Carter argued that promoting freedom globally was in keeping with cherished American values and maintaining national interest. He suggested that US security would be strengthened if human rights and democracy flourished around the world, while helping to improve America’s moral stature on the world stage.\textsuperscript{67} Carter led the elevation of human rights and “morality” in American foreign policy. His Administration reportedly limited relations with the Iranian government partly because of the Shah’s alleged human rights abuses.\textsuperscript{68}

\section*{1.7 Foreign Aid in US Foreign Policy}

In February of 1978, the Carter Administration issued Presidential Directive 30. The directive defined US policy on human rights moving forward and outlined measures to incorporate human rights more forcefully into US foreign policy.\textsuperscript{69} It also tied US economic and military aid to human rights records – consideration for aid allocation was henceforth to be made

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item USAID  
\item Schlesinger 1978  
\item Glendon 2001  
\item Apodaca 2005  
\item \textit{Ibid}.  
\item Schlesinger 1978  
\item Glendn 2001  
\item Callaway and Matthews 2008
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
only to countries with favorable or improving human rights record and vice versa.\textsuperscript{70} 

Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the UDHR’s signing on May 22 1977 at the White House, President Carter shared: “In distributing the scarce resources of our foreign assistance programs, we will demonstrate that our deepest affinities are with nations which commit themselves to a democratic path to development. Toward regimes which persist in wholesale violations of human rights, we will not hesitate to convey our outrage, nor will we pretend that our relations are unaffected.”\textsuperscript{71} Some scholars contend that Carter’s human rights agenda was bold in rhetoric but yielded little in actual policy implementation. They cite that of the 57 countries that violated human rights in 1977, the Carter Administration restricted aid to only 3 countries: Argentina, Uruguay and Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{72} In all, throughout his 4 years in office, Carter restricted aid to a total of 8 countries—Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay—on the basis of human rights violations.\textsuperscript{73} Nevertheless, it remains widely accepted that Carter ushered in a climate where human rights assumed a more important place on the foreign policy agenda.\textsuperscript{74}

During the Cold War era, the US and the Soviet Union used aid to compete for the support of developing countries. They did so without much concern for whether or not the aid was directed toward developmental purposes; they didn’t necessarily push for political reforms.\textsuperscript{75} And in so doing, US foreign aid was often used as merely a tool to secure alliances and deter the spread of communism.\textsuperscript{76} But since that time, US foreign aid, which was used mainly to contain communism, has taken on new dynamics and began to emphasize political conditionality, encouraging recipient countries to embrace political reforms such as the adoption of human rights measures. Lancaster and Van Dusen (2005) confirmed that:

“[T]he spread of democracy in developing countries during the 1990s – especially in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America – gave rise to the use of aid to promoted democratic

\begin{footnotes}
\item[70] Ibid.
\item[71] Apodaca 2006
\item[72] Jensen 1982, p. 103
\item[73] Cohen 1982, p. 270
\item[74] Apodaca 2006
\item[75] Ibid.
\item[76] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
institutions. The many civil conflicts that persisted in Africa and elsewhere and caused so much death, destruction, and displacement promoted the use of aid not just provide relief but to support post-conflict transitions. ... In all cases, the use of diplomacy alone could not bring about the necessary changes sought by the United States. Foreign aid, focused on development institutions and development processes, became a major tool to pursue national objectives.  

Some scholars have opined that political conditionality wasn’t popular earlier (before and during the Cold War) because the decolonization era placed a lot of attention on national sovereignty and the deep ideological rift between the West and East (democracy versus communism). The use of foreign aid is just one of many ways through which the US can promote human rights. Other tools available include quiet diplomacy and public condemnation. Quiet diplomacy involves negotiations between the US and countries accused of violating human rights behind back doors, without causing public embarrassment. This approach usually veils the indifference and neglect of such issues. On the other hand, public condemnation involves open criticism of a country’s poor human rights record, often engaging the media and public. The US’s Country Reports on Human Right Practices, which is “a detailed chronicle of documented torture, state-sanctioned killings, censorship and other forms of political repression committed by foreign government on their own citizens,” is an important instrument for this approach. The US Secretary of State is required by both the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Trade Act of 1974 to submit to Congress the Reports on the human rights conditions for all US-aid-recipient countries and all UN member states. Other countries, such as China and Taiwan, have employed foreign aid in their attempts to gain support and recognition for their governments from countries around the world. Some other countries provide sizable aid to their former colonies as a means of supporting “reconstruction and reconciliation” efforts as well as to retain some political influence. Foreign aid allocation may be a valuable instrument to promote human

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77 Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005
78 Burnell 1997
79 Apodaca 2006
80 Ibid.
81 Hoffman 2011
82 Apodaca 2006
83 Alesina and Dollar 2000
rights abroad, but its denial can also be an effective tool. The restriction of aid is useful because it may incite a response from the target country, as well as present an opportunity for “the US Congress [to] prod the White House into action on issues that it may be reluctant to address and send a strong signal to foreign governments about the seriousness with which the United States regards particular human rights issues.” Foreign assistance is considered an important part of American foreign policy by many, and after the 9/11 attacks, it has also been increasingly regarded as part of American national security policy. This was evident when in 2002; for the first time in American history, the National Security Strategy included global development as a third pillar of US national security, alongside defense and diplomacy.

2 Is Foreign Aid Effective?

A vigorous debate over the effectiveness of foreign aid has raged for decades now. Some scholars and experts (Easterly, Moyo, etc.) argue that aid has only gone to boost government coffers, enriching the elite in poor countries while enlarging government bureaucracies and perpetuating bad governance. Others (Sachs, Friedman, etc.) contend that foreign aid has been instrumental in bringing about poverty reduction and growth while preventing bad governance practices in the recipient countries. The controversies surrounding foreign aid remain today and can be discussed under two major competing theories: public interest theory and public choice perspective. The public interest theory has remained a key argument for the use of foreign aid. Its proponents argue that foreign aid is important in order to make up for a financing or investment gap which would consequently allow countries to transition out of poverty. Within this school (public interest theory), there are some scholars who argue that the level of impact of foreign aid on growth is based on the recipient country’s policies, while others believe that foreign aid’s impact isn’t contingent on the local policy regime. Svensson (1999) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that when aid is combined with the right conditions it may prove to have

84 Laing-Fenton 2004
85 R. Gates 2004
86 Ibid.
87 Williamson 2009
88 Sachs 2005
a positive effect on growth. These conditions would include primarily the right policy and institution environments. However, Lesson presents an alternate reasoning behind this module. Weak institutions and bad policies in developing countries have contributed to poverty levels. “Thus,” Lesson argues “where aid is needed, it will be unhelpful because the necessary institutions are lacking. Where it can do some good, in those countries with good policies and institutions, it is not needed.”

In contrast, advocates of the public choice perspective contend that foreign aid is ineffective and poses possible damages to recipient countries. Easterly, Friedman and Bauer, among many other notable scholars, have been major critics of foreign aid. They have often cited the widespread poverty in African and South Asia despite decades of foreign aid to back up their arguments, as well as countries like New Guinea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and Haiti which hold deplorable records in spite of substantial foreign aid. The bulk of empirical literature today shows that there’s little evidence to confirm a positive relationship between foreign aid and direct sustained growth (or other indicators of poverty).

The evidence is less clear in terms of good governance. In fact, Knack (2004) concludes that any positive effects of foreign aid on democratization “are compensated by other effects of aid that tend to undermine democratic development.” Williamson (2008) adds that the process of foreign aid distribution in and of itself is ineffective. He argues that the decision-making process that surrounds aid allocation is fraught with different stakeholders, special interests, and rent-seeking processes. He adds that “the aid process entails various layers of self-interested actors that include donor and recipient governments, donor agencies, producers, and citizen interest groups.” Stephen Knack, a senior research economist at the World Bank, hypothesizes that aid can potentially contribute to democratization. He highlights 3 ways it can be achieved: one is through technical assistance concentrated on reforming the electoral process and measures of checks and balances, and promoting civil society organizations. The second way is through conditionality, and the third way is by improving education and increasing per capita income. His study adopts a “multivariable analysis of aid on democratization in a large sample of recipient nations over the 1975—2000 period.” He uses “alternative democracy indexes and measures of

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91 Svensson 1999; Burnside and Dollar 2000
92 Bauer 2000; Easterly 2008
93 Bonne 1996; Collier 1997; Crawford 1997; Knack 2001; Ovaska 2003; Easterly et al. 2004; Williamson 2008
94 Knack 2004
95 Ibid.
aid intensity.” Knack’s studies find that aid ultimately doesn’t promote democracy. He mentions, however, that his findings do not necessarily imply that all democracy-promoting programs are ineffective. He notes that the successful programs are too few and thus their effects are undetectable in his aggregated data.\footnote{Ibid.} Milton Friedman, a strident critic of aid, has argued that foreign aid is harmful to civil liberties and undermines democracy.\footnote{Friedman 1958} He contends that because most aid is directed at the governments, it is likely “to strengthen the role of the government sector in general economic activity relative to the private sector.” For Friedman, the organization of economic activity by the government doesn’t bode well for the prospect of democracy and freedom.\footnote{Ibid.} Extensive aid flows also stands the risk of strengthening the supremacy of the executive over other branches of government in new democracies. This is largely because aid is allocated to projects that are outside of the country’s budget, which is usually decided by a collaboration of the executive and legislative branches of government. Therefore outside funding that is directed to the executive (or to projects exclusively under their purview) prevents legislative oversight, and therefore reinforcing executive dominance.\footnote{Brautigam 2000} Other aid critics go as far as to accuse aid of facilitating military coups and political instability, often citing the case of Somalia where “violent competition for control over large-scale food aid contributed to the breakdown of government.”\footnote{Maren 1977}

Aid conditionality evolved from being largely economical to political since the end of the Cold War.\footnote{Baehr 1994} Following a decade of aid conditionality with requirements for economic reforms (structural adjustments), “the end of the Cold War, the collapse of single-party regimes, and the emergence of democratization movements in developing countries legitimized the use of political conditionality.”\footnote{Baehr 1999} That is to say, foreign aid could now be conditioned on requirements calling for political reforms such as human rights and democracy promotion. Studies pioneered by Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) have suggested a two-stage framework to describe the process of US foreign aid allocation: the gatekeeping stage and the level stage.\footnote{Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Carleton and Stohl 1987; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe 1992; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998; Blanton 2000; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Gibler 2008} In the first stage, the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textit{Friedman 1958}
\item \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textit{Brautigam 2000}
\item \textit{Maren 1977}
\item \textit{Baehr 1994}
\item \textit{Baehr 1999}
\item \textit{Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Carleton and Stohl 1987; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe 1992; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998; Blanton 2000; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Gibler 2008}
\end{itemize}
gatekeeping stage, both recipient and non-recipient countries are included to see of human rights are a determining factor in foreign aid allocation. In the second, the level stage, the decision on allocation amount involves inly the recipient countries. Probing the case of Latin American countries, Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) found that in the gatekeeping stage human rights were not a concern in a aid allocation. However, they find a positive correlation between respect for human rights and US aid at the level stage. That is, countries with favorable human rights profiles tended to receive higher levels of aid. Carleton and Stohl (1987) and McCormick and Mitchell (1988) questioned this approach citing issues with sampling, which they argued aren’t immune to the exclusion of outliers. They stated that “…the results were due to deficiencies in the researchers’ design.” McCormick and Mitchell (1988) revealed that the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid was considerably less when El Salvador, which was considered as an outlier in the Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s study, was factored in. Poe (1992), attempting to rectify the discrepancies, looked solely at economic aid, conducted a more inclusive statistical analysis of the second aid process, and found that in Carter and Reagan administrations, human rights considerations were important determinants of the level of aid allocation. Meernik, Krueger and Poe (1998), on the other hand, discovered that after it’s agreed upon to allocate aid, concerns for human rights weren’t considered in the amount of aid allocated—in fact, the most aid was given to those countries with the worst human rights records. However, Apodaca and Stohl (1999) examinations showed more favorable results in both the gatekeeping and level stages and that “human rights only mattered for economic aid and that human rights were not the most important consideration in U.S. aid allocation.” But human rights considerations in the allocation process are different than in the implementation process.

According to Carey (2007), because foreign aid accounts as a major source of revenue for many developing countries, connecting aid to human rights conditions could present a powerful tool to improve the protection of universal human rights. What Carey describes is the process known as political conditioning of aid. This implies the allocation of foreign aid with attachments or stipulations that require—in this context human rights and democratic political processes—as conditions for the distribution of foreign aid. These conditions have to be met by the recipient country as a term for making an aid agreement or continuing to receive aid, ultimately implying that aid can be employed “as a policy instrument to push for particular

104 Poe 1994
changes in developing countries.” Gibler (2008) argues that American foreign aid has had an indirect impact on human rights policies in non-recipient countries. He suggests that “while the observed U.S. aid disbursements clearly had no relationship with respect for human rights, U.S. aid would alter human rights policies of non-recipient countries, which were not eligible for aid based on their human rights abuses, because they would consider their opportunity cost, or loss of potential income, in expectation to receive future aid.” Contradicting Gibler’s findings were studies by Callaway and Matthews (2008), which pointed to deleterious effects on human rights due to US foreign aid. They used a qualitative analysis and pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis covering 1976 to 2003 and most nations. They further found that military aid was even more detrimental to human rights conditions. Other studies argue that the US has little to no incentive not to pursue the promotion of human rights and democracy with its foreign aid since it no longer commits its aid towards the containment of Communism.

3.1 Egypt

Egypt, conventionally known as the “Arab Republic of Egypt,” is the largest country in the Arab world and has a population of close to 90 million people. Located in Northern Africa, Egypt borders the Mediterranean Sea and is surrounded by the Gaza Strip, Libya, and the Red Sea. The Nile valley runs through Egypt and it has served as a prominent source for much of the country’s economic activities. Egypt is situated in the Middle East. The Middle East and North Africa are often grouped together, collectively known as “Middle East and North Africa or MENA.” This classification is mostly due to geopolitical reasons and the shared historical and cultural activities in the region. In the last couple of decades, the region has been fraught with turmoil. Israel and Palestine continue to wrestle over the resolution of a centuries-old struggle. Conflicts continue today in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, while Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia are undergoing political transitions or economic upheavals. The Middle East is also known for its abundance of oil; its oil reserves makes up about 80% of the world’s known reserves.

105 Carey 2007
106 Gibler 2008
107 Callaway and Matthews 2008
108 Lai 2003
109 World Bank
3.2 Egypt—U.S. Relations

The United States and Egypt established diplomatic relations in 1922, after Egypt gained its independence from the United Kingdom. They have remained key partners in terms of military activities and diplomatic agreements, particularly since Egypt assumed a leading role in the Arab-Israeli peace process in the 1970s. For one, the geography of Egypt presents a strategic importance to the US because it oversees the Suez Canal where 8% of all global maritime shipping passes through every year. Egypt accelerates the transit of many US vessels through the Canal, providing a strategic benefit to US forces deploying to the Mediterranean Sea or Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean basin for time-sensitive operations. Beyond geostrategic reasons, Egypt is important because of demographics as well. It is the largest Arab country with a population of about 90 million people, and it has occupied a leading role in the Arab world for decades, wielding soft power. Egypt is also home to the Arab League, the influential association

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10 The Gulf: The Bush Presidencies and The Middle East 2012
11 CIA World Factbook
12 U.S. Department of State Egypt Country Profile
of countries whose peoples are mostly Arabic speaking or where Arabic is an official language,\textsuperscript{113} and Al Azhar University.\textsuperscript{114} Although relations between Israelis and Egyptians may not necessarily be amiable on the individual basis, the Egypt—Israel 1979 Peace Treaty remains one of the most important diplomatic accomplishments toward the achievement of Arab—Israeli peace. Both parties have engaged in collaborative efforts in order to curb Islamist militants and instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip.\textsuperscript{115} The US and Egypt share a strong mutual commitment to combating terrorism in the region. Since the late 1970s, the US has provided considerable foreign assistance—military and economic assistance—to Egypt. According to the Congressional Research Service, “between 1948 and 2015, the United States provided Egypt with $76 billion\textsuperscript{116} in bilateral foreign aid, including $1.3 billion a year in military aid from 1987 to the present.”

The US government supports human rights and democratic practices in Egypt primarily through USAID. They administer democracy and governance activities either through a bilateral agreement or a direct grants program.\textsuperscript{117} The annual average for funding that was distributed toward democracy and governance programs in Egypt, from 1999 to 2009, was $24 million.\textsuperscript{118} USAID and the Egyptian government, under a bilateral agreement, agree to pursue programs in 3 main sections: rule of law and human rights, good governance, and civil society program.\textsuperscript{119} Through the direct grants program, on the other hand, USAID bypasses the Egyptian government and works directly with NGOs and civil society organizations within Egypt.

The September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks reoriented US foreign policy and strategy towards Egypt. Before the attack, bilateral relationship between the two countries had dealt mostly with promoting regional peace and stability. Egypt has ranked as one of the top recipient of US foreign aid. The US has supported Egypt with financial assistance since the Camp David Peace Accords back in 1979. Following the attacks the US government was forced to reorient

\textsuperscript{113} BBC Profile: Arab League, 05/02/2015. Click \url{here} to access document
\textsuperscript{114} Al Azhar University is claimed to be the oldest university still in operation. It holds symbolic relevance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship.
\textsuperscript{115} Hoffman 2011
\textsuperscript{116} Calculated in historical dollars, not adjusted for inflation
\textsuperscript{117} USAID Egypt Report
\textsuperscript{118} USAID Egypt Report
\textsuperscript{119} Figure 1 illustrates this distribution
US policy as it was widely considered that there was a linkage between authoritarianism and terrorism. Egypt has remained a cardinal part of this reorientation. It is alleged that multiple Egyptian terrorists formed the original core of Al Qaeda, the group that orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist attacks, killing more than 2000 Americans.\textsuperscript{120} Some US officials have argued that Egypt’s authoritarian governance and the denial of basic human and political rights have created an atmosphere conducive to the growth of violent extremism. The Egyptian government has for the most part refuted the allegations that its system of government is responsible for transnational Islamist terrorism.\textsuperscript{121}

The 9/11 attacks and conditions in Egypt presented serious challenges to the US, and Presidents Bush and Obama have sought to balance the competing US priorities in that region. On the one hand, the US is in favor of an Egypt that is more democratic and embraces human rights and market-based economic practices, conditions that could potentially appease the grievances of the young burgeoning Egyptian population. But on the other hand, Egypt’s military, which has been unreceptive of good governance practices since the conclusion of the 1952 monarchy, remains Egypt’s primary political actor, a factor that could be potentially beneficial to short-term U.S. national interests, but arguably impede long-term goals for stability and development in Egypt. Simply, if the U.S. administration fully embraced the Egyptian military in spite of their criticized practices, they take the risk of alienating the Egyptians who support liberal democracy. And on the offset, if the U.S. administration is to emphasize human rights and democracy, typically the Egyptian military would turn hostile, accusing U.S. government of circumventing their authority, which could potentially undermine the country’s stability. According to a report, “by fiscal year 2009, the level of annual U.S. democracy aid in the Middle East was more than the total amount spent between 1991 to 2001.”\textsuperscript{122}

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 also may have profoundly and negatively impacted how some U.S. policymakers viewed Egypt. Whereas the bilateral relationship had previously focused on promoting regional peace and stability, the 9/11 attacks reoriented U.S. policy, as Americans considered the possibility that popular disillusionment from authoritarianism might

\textsuperscript{120} Hoffman 2011
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Hamid 2001
contribute to terrorism. Egypt has been at the forefront of this reorientation, as several prominent Egyptian terrorists helped form the original core of Al Qaeda. The Egyptian government has largely rejected the idea that its authoritarian governance has fostered transnational Islamist terrorism and has resisted changes in US policy that have gradually increased calls for political reform in Egypt.

3.3. Human Rights in Egypt

The PTS is the index we use to gauge human rights conditions in Egypt. It measures the security rights of citizens. Included in the PTS (as described in earlier chapter) are the State Department and Amnesty International indexes (the Freedom House index hasn’t been factored into the PTS, in the case of Egypt, up until 2013). We average the State Department and Amnesty levels to produce a singular score. This helps paint a clearer picture of the measure of “state terror” within Egypt. Our logic is reasonable because in the case of Egypt both the State Department and Amnesty International scores are almost always identical or share only one level disagreement, such that when the State Department’s score is 3, Amnesty International’s is 2. Furthermore, the PTS researchers suggest that the disagreement in scores is limited to only certain countries. This disagreement is because they find the reports issued by the State Department to be more critical of former Easter Bloc countries and some countries with deep political or ideological differences with the US including Vietnam, Mozambique, Angola, and Nicaragua. On the other hand, they argue that the report issued by Amnesty International tends to be more critical of prominent US allied countries such as Israel, Western Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Colombia. Egypt, our case study, isn’t included as susceptible to the bias of either report. Below we highlight some of the violations to physical integrity rights committed by the state (which is the central issue measures by the PTS) that occurred in Egypt from 2000 to 2010. We draw from both the annual reports on human rights released from both the US State Department and Amnesty International. Egypt is a social democracy, according to its constitution. Islam is the state religion and the country is widely considered to be a nominal democracy by the international community. Until 2011, Egypt was led by the National Democratic Party (NDP), which wielded uncontested power over all state affairs since its

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123 The Egyptian national Mohamed Atta was one of the leaders of the 9/11 attacks and the Egyptian cleric Ayman alZawahiri remains the head of Al Qaeda worldwide
founding in 1978. Egypt is a member of the United Nations, a signatory to the UDHR and a non-party state to the International Criminal Court.\footnote{CIA World Factbook}

2001 (PTS score: 3)

State Security Investigations Service (SSI) used tortured criminal suspects in police custody employing techniques that included “electric shocks, beatings, suspension by the wrists or ankles and various forms of psychological torture, including death threats and threats of rape or sexual abuse of the detainee or a female relative.” The Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 1981 and was renewed for another 3 years in June, continued to restrict many basic rights. The security forces continued to arrest and detain suspected members of terrorist groups, and mistreat and torture prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, hold detainees in prolonged pretrial detention, and occasionally engage in mass arrests. Local police killed, tortured, and otherwise abused both criminal suspects and other persons.

A local human right, Human Rights Centre for the Assistance of Prisoners accused that they had located two detainees who had "disappeared" in previous years. Police also committed extrajudicial killings. Human rights organizations and the press reported on the death in custody of the following 8 persons during the year, all of whom allegedly were tortured while being detained by police under suspicion of criminal activity. Torture is said to take place in SSIS offices, including its headquarters in Cairo, and at Central Security Force camps. Torture victims usually are taken to an SSIS office, where they are handcuffed, blindfolded, and questioned about their associations, religious beliefs, and political views. Torture is used to extract information, coerce the victims to end their antigovernment activities, and deter others from similar activities. In January the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) released a report detailing 13 cases of torture that occurred in police stations during the latter half of 1999, two of which ended in death.

2002 (PTS score: 3.5)

The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) investigated the case of one extrajudicial killing by police. 19 year old Mosaad Abou Seif, was surprised by police officers
in his home and was shot and killed on sight. Human rights organizations and the press reported the death in custody of 4 people, all of whom allegedly were tortured while being detained by police under suspicion of criminal activity. Several cases of death under police torture from previous years remain unresolved. Local human rights organizations reported 4 new cases of disappearance that took place between 1995 and 2000, all of which followed arrests by the security services or police.

30 prisoners of conscience were sentenced to between 4 months' and 5 years' imprisonment while 20 remained held at the end of the year. 8 prisoners of conscience sentenced in 1999 remained in detention at the end of 2000. Hundreds of suspected supporters of banned Islamist groups were held without charge or trial. Others served sentences imposed after grossly unfair trials before military courts. Torture and ill-treatment of detainees continued to be widespread, and the majority of cases occurred in police stations.

2003 (PTS score: 3.5)
At least 32 people with differing political or religious ideologies form the Egyptian government were sentenced to prison terms of up to 7 years. At the end of 2002, 28 prisoners of conscience, including 7 people imprisoned in previous years, remained held. Thousands of suspected supporters of banned Islamist groups remained in detention without charge or trial. Others were serving sentences imposed after grossly unfair trials before military courts. Torture and ill-treatment of detainees continued to be systematic. At least 48 people were sentenced to death and at least 17 were executed.

In April, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) released a report called "Torture Should be Stopped." It documented 5 cases of alleged death due to torture which occurred in police stations and detention centers in 2002. The report also included 31 cases of torture, 9 of which the report states "are expected to end in death." On September 12, Mohammad Abdel-Sattar Musri, an electronics engineer, reportedly died of torture while in custody at the headquarters of El Fayoum SSIS. He was detained 3 days after the detention of his brother who was accused of disseminating anti-war propaganda.
During the year, the EOHR reported the February 9 disappearance of Adel Mohammed Kamiha, a coffee shop owner, who reportedly disappeared following his transfer from police custody to the custody of State Security in Alexandria. His whereabouts remained unknown at year’s end. On August 11, Reda Helal, a journalist, disappeared. At year’s end, at least 50 other cases of disappearance from previous years documented by human rights organizations remained unsolved.

In April, Amnesty International reported that 7 students, journalists, and activists were subjected to torture and beatings at the Cairo headquarters of the SSIS. Activist Manal Khaled and lawyer Aiad Abdel Hamid al-Uleimi were reportedly beaten severely with sticks and belts and Khaled also was threatened with rape upon arrest. In March, at least 5 detainees were tortured with electro shock at the Lazoghili SSIS Headquarters.

2004 (PTS score: 3.5)
This year, human rights organizations and the press reported that at least 10 people died in custody at police stations or prisons. In June, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) issued a report entitled documenting 41 cases of torture in police stations resulting in 15 deaths in custody from April 2003 to April 2004. EOHR also asserted that from April 1993 to April 2004, it documented 412 cases of torture in police stations, including 120 cases where detainees died as a direct result of torture. In 2004, EOHR reported that it had been following 59 cases of disappearance within the country since 1992.

2005 (PTS score: 3.5)
Human rights violations continued to be justified by the global "war on terror" as security forces across the Middle East responded to attacks by armed groups they accused of terrorist links. Dozens of members of the Muslim Brothers organization were arrested and several remained in detention without charge or trial. Torture in detention continued to be systematic and deaths in custody were reported.
Security forces killed a number of opposition voters and protesters during the parliamentary elections. At least 27 Sudanese protesters were killed on December 30 when security forces cleared a squatters camp in a Cairo park, erected to protest treatment of Sudanese refugees.

During the year, human rights organizations and the press reported that at least 7 persons died in custody at police stations or prisons. In June 2004, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) issued a report documenting 15 deaths in custody among 41 cases of torture in police stations from April 2003 to April 2004. On March 15, Nefissa el-Marakby, age 38 died after her release from police custody, following a series of police raids on the village. The Land Center for Human Rights (LCHR) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that security forces, in an attempt to locate men suspected of involvement in an ongoing land dispute, arrested scores of women and children and interrogated them in makeshift detention centers. Security forces reportedly physically and psychologically abused and humiliated el-Marakby and others, according to other women detained with her. El-Marakby was released to her family on March 14 and taken to Damanhour hospital, where it was determined that she was paralyzed. El-Marakby later died. In March, 6 police officers were convicted of torturing people to death. On June 23, EOHR reported it had documented 292 torture cases between 1993 and 2004, and 120 cases in which the victim concerned died as a result of suspected torture or mistreatment. In 2004 EOHR monitored 42 cases of torture and 23 deaths. As of June 23 2005, EOHR reported it had monitored 27 cases of torture and 5 deaths during the year.

2006 (PTS score: 4)

Peaceful demonstrations calling for political reform were violently dispersed and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) continued to operate under restrictive laws. Hundreds of members of the banned Muslim Brothers organization were arrested and thousands of suspected supporters of banned Islamist groups, including possible prisoners of conscience, remained in detention without charge or trial. Torture and ill-treatment in detention continued to be systematic. Deaths in custody were reported. In the majority of torture cases, the perpetrators were not brought to justice. At least 2 people were sentenced to death.
Muhammad Youssef and Ashraf Youssef both died soon after being detained. On January 23, the independent newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm reported that 19 Islamist prisoners had died in captivity of unspecified causes. By year's end, there had not been any public governmental or NGO investigation of this story. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) reported that 81 detainees were tortured to death inside police stations between 2000 and 2004 and that 21 detainees were reportedly tortured to death in police stations between April 2004 and July 2005. EOHR further reported that detainees were kicked, burned with cigarettes, shackled, forcibly stripped, beaten with water hoses, and dragged on the floor.

According to HRW, "Torture is pervasive in Egyptian detention centers." There were numerous, credible reports that security forces tortured and mistreated prisoners and detainees. Domestic and international human rights groups reported that the SSIS, police, and other government entities continued to employ torture to extract information or force confessions. On September 7, EOHR issued a report on cases of torture and death in police stations. The report recorded 156 cases of torture between 2000 and 2004 (75 nonfatal) and 59 cases (38 nonfatal) between April 2005 and April 2006. There were varied and conflicting estimates of the number of extraordinary detainees Some NGOs estimated that there were 6,000-10,000 detainees in addition to those prisoners in the ordinary criminal justice system. The government did not release any official data on detainees. Citing a senior interior ministry source, a leading journalist reported that there were at least 4,000 detainees.

The government used the Emergency Law under the official state of emergency to try non-security cases in the emergency courts and to restrict many other basic rights. Police also arbitrarily arrested and detained hundreds of people involved with unlicensed demonstrations including internet bloggers.

2007 (PTS score: 3.5)
There were reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. In its August 8 report, the EOHR reported 3 cases of death in custody due to torture during the first 7 months of the year. Domestic and international human rights groups reported that the SSIS, police, and other government entities continued to employ torture to extract information or force confessions. In numerous trials, defendants alleged that police tortured them during questioning. In its August 8 report on torture, the EOHR stated that between 1993 and July 2007, it documented more than 567 cases of torture inside police stations, including 167 deaths that the EOHR concluded were caused by torture and mistreatment. According to the report, between January and August of 2007 police officers tortured 26 individuals, resulting in 3 deaths.

As in previous years, the government arrested and detained hundreds of Muslim Brother members and supporters without charge or trial with estimates ranging from 900 to more than 3,000 in detention.

2008 (PTS score: 3.5)

Constitutional amendments rushed through parliament were the most serious setback for human rights since the state of emergency was reintroduced in 1981. The amendments cemented the sweeping powers of the police and entrenched in permanent law emergency powers that have been used systematically to violate human rights, including prolonged detention without charge, torture and other ill-treatment, restrictions on freedom of speech, association and assembly, and grossly unfair trials before military courts and special emergency courts. About 18,000 administrative detainees remained in prison. Some had been held for more than a decade, including many whose release had been repeatedly ordered by courts. Egyptian nationals suspected of terrorism, who had been unlawfully transferred to Egypt by other governments, remained in prison. Political activists, journalists and bloggers were jailed for protests.

Torture continued to be widespread and systematic. Videos showing torture by police were posted on the internet by Egyptian bloggers. Commonly cited torture methods included electric shocks, beatings, suspension in painful positions, solitary confinement, rape and
threats of death, sexual abuse and attacks on relatives. Allegations of torture were rarely investigated. In August 13-year-old Mohamed Rahman died after alleged police torture. Although the exact number of deaths was unknown, the Al-Nadim Center for Psychological Rehabilitation of the Victims of Torture documented 32 cases of police officers torturing victims to death in a 9-month period from June 2007 to March.

2009 (PTS score: 3.5)
The renewal of the state of emergency and rising food prices coupled with growing poverty continued to cause widespread discontent. While a new antiterrorism law was still being prepared, thousands of political prisoners continued to be held in administrative detention under emergency legislation, many of them for more than a decade. Torture and other ill-treatment remained widespread. The Interior Ministry stated in January that the number of administrative detainees did not exceed 1,500. Unofficial sources suggested, however, that the real figure was considerably higher, possibly up to 10,000, and included people who had been held continuously without charge or trial for years.

Torture remained systematic in police stations, prisons and SSI detention centers. Impunity continued for most perpetrators, exacerbated by police threatening victims with re-arrest or the arrest of relatives if they lodged complaints. According to the National Council for Human Rights, Ahmed Ismail Al Sheikh disappeared from a prison in Damanhour in May 2008. The government and the prison gave the family contradictory accounts of his whereabouts.

2010 (PTS score: 4)
The government continued to use state of emergency powers to detain peaceful critics and opponents as well as people suspected of security offences or involvement in terrorism. Some were held under administrative detention orders without charge or trial and others were sentenced to prison terms after unfair trials before military courts. Torture remained widespread in police cells, security police detention centers and prisons, and in most cases was committed with impunity. Hundreds of families residing in Cairo’s “unsafe areas” were forcibly evicted. In November, an Alexandria court sentenced a police officer to 5 years in
prison for torturing Rajai Sultan in July 2008 by beating him until he suffered a brain haemorrhage. Mona Thabet and her husband were harassed and intimidated by police after she submitted a complaint to the Interior Ministry that her husband had been tortured by police before his release because he had refused to become an informer. She reported that police slapped and beat her, stubbed out a cigarette on her face, forcibly shaved her head and threatened to rape her unless she withdraw the complaint.

At year’s end the government had not publicly taken action to investigate the 2008 killing by security forces of 4 individuals during violent clashes between police and protesters in Mahalla el Kubra or the 2008 killing by Central Security Forces (CSF) of 3 Bedouin tribesmen during demonstrations that followed the CSF killing of a suspected drug smuggler. According to the most recent UN Human Rights Council Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, there were 36 outstanding disappearance cases.

2011 was a particularly interesting year in Egypt. Inspired by uprisings in Tunisia, hundreds of Egyptians flocked to the streets to protest President Mubarak’s 30-year-old government with calls for economic, justice and political reforms. The demonstrations eventually intensified, leading to mass demonstrations and occupations and clashes with the police. Internet and telecommunication services were shut down at the behest of the government and the people refused to accept Mubarak’s concessions (e.g., baring himself and his son from seeking reelection or office, appointing a new cabinet and Omar Suleiman as vice president, etc.). Within 18 days of the uprisings, Mubarak and his National Democratic Party (NDP) were ousted from power on February 11. Following which, the Egyptian military (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces ([SCAF]) seized power, dissolving the parliament and suspending the constitution. Fresh elections were conducted in 2011–12 and the Muslim Brotherhood garnered the majority of the parliamentary seats. The Brotherhood elected Mohamed Morsi as president and he “swiftly revoked a controversial Scaf decree that limited his powers, dissolved the House of Representatives and changed the military’s leadership, naming Gen Abdul Fattah al-Sisi as chief

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of staff and defense minister.”\textsuperscript{127} Morsi’s actions steered public outcry and led to his overthrow by the military in June of 2013. These events and the ultimate return of authoritarian rule in Egypt has left US lawmakers challenged. The Obama Administration has argued that these undemocratic conditions and disregard for human rights give rise to violent extremism. But the Egyptian government has rebuked those comments, describing them as attempts to interfere in matters of their internal affairs.\textsuperscript{128} The military government continues to crackdown heavily on dissent describing their adversaries as terrorists.

5 Discussion

In many of these instances of violations to physical integrity rights, especially in cases widely reported by the media, the US government under both Presidents Bush and Obama often publicly condemned the Egyptian authorities and called for improved measures of good governance and inclusiveness. But the tremor seemed to stop there—the rhetoric didn’t match their actions. Despite multiple White House statements and existing US laws calling for the suspension of aid to any state found to violate the rights of its citizens, the US continued to grant foreign aid to Egypt. The US defended its position by arguing the importance for maintaining relations with Egypt, which is central to its national security priorities. Thus, we contend that the US appears to downplay human rights abuses in order to ensure its alliance with Egypt, including securing Egypt’s role in the US’s global “war on terror.” This posture stands in contrast to the 2002 US National Security Strategy which described a new approach to aid, calling for funding to be directed toward "countries whose governments rule justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom."\textsuperscript{129} The numbers show that despite a proclaimed strategy to promote US values (human rights and democracy) with the use of aid, Egypt continued to receive funding in spite of a poor record on physical integrity rights as seen through the PTS.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{128} Open Source Center, “Egypt Criticizes US Diplomat Over ‘Meddling In Internal Affairs,’” Cairo MENA June 2015

The “democracy aid” numbers represent the total funds from USAID under its total annual Democracy, Human Rights and Governance appropriations toward Egypt. Ideally, a subset of the funds that are directed specifically to human rights (and more specifically to physical integrity rights) promotion will be the most relevant data to our research. However, distinguishing the human rights funds from the other funding buckets is nearly impractical due to the nature of USAID’s reports. US democracy aid in Egypt is distributed either (through direct grants) to NGOs and civil society organizations or through (bilateral agreements) partnership projects with the Egyptian government. USAID promotes human rights through education, advocacy and support for activists. According to the USAID audit of democracy and governance programs in Egypt in 2009, from 1999 to 2009, an average of $24 million was directed to democracy and governance programs implementers. The allocation levels increased by 97 percent in 2004 and was maintained from 2006 to 2008. The report revealed that between 1999 and 2008, USAID designed and awarded $181 million in program activities that focused on rule of law and human rights, good governance, and civil society. From 2000 to 2005, USAID’s democracy aid centered around increasing the availability of effective legal services, strengthening NGOs, increasing local government service delivery, and enhancing citizen participation. About $12 million was provided annually during this period. In 2005, Kansas Senator Brownback successfully amended the
foreign assistance bill to include that “the provision of assistance for Egypt for democracy and governance activities, the organizations implementing such assistance and the specific nature of that assistance shall not be subject to the prior approval by the Government of Egypt.” As a result of this change to the distribution mechanism of US democracy assistance, more funds were distributed directly to local NGOs. This was carried out primarily through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), a grants program administered by the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. However, partly due to stiff objections from the Egyptian government, by 2005, USAID resumed as administrator of the bulk of US democracy aid, receiving $51 million, the third largest democracy and governance program in the Near East. In 2009, the sharp drop in democracy can be ascribed to the overall cut in economic aid to Egypt by more than fifty percent. This was due in part to the spending caps issued by Congress, who in past had issued only spending floors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PTS SCORES</th>
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<th>Democracy Aid</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>Averaged PTS</td>
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We average the PTS scores to produce a single score in order to reflect an objective mean. This approach takes into account that both Amnesty International and the State Department report human rights practices through their own lens and each has its distinct limitations and incentives to present their reports in the manner they choose. To reiterate the justification we described earlier, our averaging of the State Department and Amnesty scores helps us to paint a clearer picture of the measure of “state terror” within Egypt. In the case of Egypt both the State Department and Amnesty International scores are almost always identical or share only one level of disagreement, such that when the State Department score is 3, Amnesty International’s is 2. In addition, the PTS research team states that the disagreement in scores is limited to only certain countries. This disagreement is because they find the report issued by the State Department to be more critical of former Easter Bloc countries and some countries with deep political or ideological differences with the US. On the other hand, they argue that the report from Amnesty International tends to be more critical of prominent US allies such as Israel, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Colombia. Our case study, Egypt, isn’t included or noted as susceptible to the bias of either report. We gather from the data presented above that during the height of democracy funding, between 2005 and 2009, Egypt maintained a pretty consistent “3.5” streak. On the PTS scale this indicates conditions of extensive political imprisonment,
brutality and disappearances.\textsuperscript{130} In fact, this peak period of democracy aid saw increased government crackdowns with revelations of SISS torture, indefinite imprisonment of bloggers and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the expansion of military tribunals.

The Egyptian government has long been critical of any US efforts to interfere in its domestic affairs with the use of aid. Military aid to Egypt has remained mostly unchanged since the 1979 Peace Treaty. This was largely the result of the strategic advantage provided by the Egyptian military. But economic aid (which includes democracy aid) was not as consistent as military funding. Drawing from the 9/11 attacks and arguments to utilize democracy aid as a means to curb radicalism and terrorism in the Arab world, President Bush looked to Egypt as an important case for his democracy and governance promotion agenda. Egypt was after all the most populous state in the Arab world and with cultural importance and a leadership role in the region. With this, there was a bit of steady increments in democracy funding. In 2005, the then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said during a speech in Egypt that “For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East, and we achieved neither. Now we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people.”

My findings point that the failure of US democracy funding to improve human rights conditions (particularly physical integrity rights in our case) in Egypt can be attributed to a set of factors. One reason is the way the aid is distributed. Since the Brownback Amendment (allowing the US to directly fund NGOs in Egypt, including blacklisted ones\textsuperscript{131}), it seemed to incite increased scrutiny toward democracy and human rights organizations—and accusations from Egyptian authorities that the US is meddling in its internal affairs. The new funding structure may very well have made an already restrictive political environment even more tense—and ultimately, more repressive—toward NGOs and civil society organization. This was evident in the annual

\textsuperscript{130} A “3” on the PTS: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted. A “4” on the PTS: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

\textsuperscript{131} The Egyptian government through its Ministry of Social Affairs regulates civil society organizations and is generally hostile to organizations who don’t share their political or religious views.
reports released from both Amnesty International and the State Department, both of which document increased arbitrary detentions and disappearances during that timeframe. These findings are corroborated by our data which shows that Egypt’s score spiked (worsened) on the PTS scale from “3.5” to “4.” A presumably well-intentioned effort to promote human rights by directly funding to local Egyptian organizations may have had the opposite effect of spurring the government to become more oppressive, which had an overall negative effect on physical integrity rights. Another possible reason for the failure is that notwithstanding Egypt’s human rights record, the Egypt-US relationship appears to be guided by shared security priorities. Among them are terrorism, nuclear proliferation and relationship with Israel. And realpolitik concerns have arguably preceded human rights considerations, i.e., consistent military funding compared to the inconsistent economic (democracy) aid. Egypt has often invoked the “war on terror,” a campaign against global terrorism championed by the US following the 9/11 attacks, in order to justify several activities and legislation that threaten to violate human rights for the sake of national security. So why should the US continue to allocate millions in democracy and human rights promotion funding to Egypt? First, it’s important to acknowledge that micro-level human rights efforts carried out through USAID initiatives and supported projects cannot be expected to overwhelmingly (or immediately) translate into macro-level results, which will usually be reflected on the PTS. Still, it is likely that the symbolic weight that US funding carries, irrespective of its results, conveys a strong message to the Egyptian authorities and public. In other words, the presence of US democracy funding for democracy and human rights projects can help to incite constructive conversations and encourage actions on that front, indicating that the US is invested in achieving and promoting democracy and human rights. On a broader level, and within the context of our research question, we can surmise that the major challenge with democracy and human rights promotion aid is that it doesn’t change the fundamental power and regime structure on the ground in Egypt. That is to say that US democracy funding goes toward projects carried out in partnership with the Egyptian government, who is often the “aggressor”, and to organizations that often protest and expose government cooption, advocate the release of unjustly detained prisoners and new laws against torture, and the like. However, these organizations or programs don’t necessarily address the primary problem which is the authoritarian system of government in place, which is reminiscent of a situation of treating the symptoms instead of the disease. As we have seen, with increased
US democracy and good governance funding, human rights conditions in Egypt remained poor because the Egyptian government was able to resist it—at least that is one of the primary reasons as the reports from Amnesty International and the State Department reveal. The authoritarian structure in place allows the government to cultivate an environment that makes it challenging, and sometimes impossible, for human rights promoters to function adequately or for programs to be implemented appropriately. If this system of government continues it is reasonable to suppose that there is very little that US democracy aid can do. Rather, as we learned from the Arab Spring, what’s could be more effective at sparking change than democracy funding is citizen mobilization coupled with digital tools. If the US government continues funding domestic NGOs and human rights programs in Egypt, it might risk strategic security cooperation with the Egyptian military. A long-term approach that seeks a delicate balance between human rights promotion and security would offer the most reasonable strategy in this case. The Egyptian government and military may not embrace human right practices. But the Egyptian people, a relative young population are increasingly demanding more protection of and respect for their rights. A smart approach would be to target this population and invest more resources developing a strategic alliance with this group—just as much as the former.
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