Development and Initial Validation of the Disavowal of Racial Bias Scale (DRB)

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ABSTRACT

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While research suggests that blatant expressions of racism are on the decline, more subtle forms of bias persist (Dovidio & Gartner, 2004; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). These biases can be automatic and unintentional, often occurring outside conscious awareness. Studies suggest that developing awareness is the first step to moderating discriminatory thoughts and behaviors (Divine & Monteith, 1993; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Durrheim, Hook, & Riggs, 2009; Monteith & Voils, 1998). When White Americans are aware of their biases, they are more likely to adjust their attitudes and alter their behaviors. Crucially, when biases go unacknowledged, there are fewer opportunities to combat unintentional racism. As a result, the tendency to disavow racial biases demands scholarly attention. In order to further research in this area, a way of measuring awareness of racial bias is needed. The purpose of this dissertation was to develop and initially validate the Disavowal of Racial Bias Scale (DRB). A review of the research on racial bias helped generate 38 initial items. An empirical approach was then used to determine an optimal version of the scale. In Phase 1, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of data from 579 participants suggested a 2-factor model with a total of 24 items. The first factor was named *Bias Examples* because it included statements referring to specific examples of racial bias. The second factor was named *Bias Existence* because it included statements referring to the general phenomenon of racial bias. In Phase 2, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of data from a second subsample of 579 participants was used to confirm the factor structure identified in Phase
1. Both subscales demonstrated high internal consistency, providing evidence of the DRB’s reliability. Further psychometric evaluations provided evidence of convergent and discriminant validity. However, the 2-factor model did not appear to be reasonably consistent with the data as evidenced by a poor model fit. Although there are many promising aspects of the final 24-item DRB, more work is needed to make it a valid measure for future use. Limitations of this study and recommendations for future scale development in this area will be discussed.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

On the evening of June 17, 2015, nine black worshipers were shot and killed during Bible study at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. The massacre, which was carried out by a 21-year-old white man in the hopes of igniting a race war (Robles & Stewart, 2015), became the latest tragedy in a year marked by race-related violence. Once again, Americans were left to debate the extent to which racism persists in the United States and, once again, their opinions on the subject varied greatly. Was the shooting at the historically Black church an isolated event carried out by a lone racist fanatic? Or were the racially motivated killings indicative of an enduring and deep-seated contempt for Black Americans? Is racism a problem of the past? Or does racial hatred live on in the institutions and hearts of American citizens?

The divergent answers to these questions reflect a fundamental disagreement about the prevalence and nature of racial discrimination in the United States (Bobo, 2001). Multiple conflicting narratives about the current level and effect of racial bias circulate among public intellectuals, politicians, religious leaders and activists. The empirical social science literature examining race relations is similarly fractured (Bobo, 2001). Scholars routinely debate the definitions of key terms and the validity of certain claims.

Confusion about the prevalence of racism is particularly pronounced among White Americans, whose racial beliefs have long been characterized by contradictions (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2014). Admittedly, White Americans constitute a diverse group of people, with varying views on race. However, surveys suggest that many Whites generally tend to downplay the
importance of racial discrimination (Bobo, 2001). Compared to Blacks and Hispanics, a small percentage of Whites believe that racial minorities face “a lot” of discrimination (Bobo, 2001). In a New York Times/ CBS News poll (2015), 55% of White respondents stated that White and Black people have equal chances of getting ahead in today’s society, and 75% said there’s been real progress eradicating racial discrimination. Furthermore, research indicates that many Whites believe efforts to eradicate racism have been excessive. Roughly three-fourths of a White sample surveyed between 1994 and 2008 agreed that Blacks do not deserve any “special treatment” (Bobo, Charles, Krysan, Simmons, & Fredrickson, 2012). In a 2011 study, a majority of White participants stated that anti-White bias is now a bigger societal problem than anti-Black bias (Norton, & Sommers).

In addition to perceiving low levels of societal racism, many White Americans endorse low levels of personal prejudice. Scholars have documented a steady increase in Whites’ endorsements of racial equality and integration (Bobo, 2001). Following the civil rights legislation of the 1960s, Whites have increasingly supported racial integration in schools, housing, jobs and public transportation (Bobo et al., 2012; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2014). According to a Gallup poll (2013), White approval rates of interracial marriage are at an all-time high of 84%. Fitting with this attitudinal trend towards tolerance, overt expressions of racist sentiments have declined. Studies suggest that Whites are less likely to hold prejudiced views of minority groups (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Madon et al., 2001). Some have interpreted this “sweeping fundamental change in norms regarding race” as a sign that many Whites are, and thus accurately perceive themselves to be, less prejudiced (Bobo et al., 2012, p. 74). According to Dovidio and Gaertner (2004), a nondiscriminatory identity has become increasingly important to many White Americans.
However, White Americans’ optimistic assessments of society and themselves are in conflict with a wealth of social scientific research. While many Whites disavow the significance of racial discrimination, there is evidence to suggest that racial differences inform a wide range of societal issues, shaping access to power and resources in predictable ways (Bobo, 2012). For example, troubling discrepancies can be found across racial groups in the areas of income, wealth, employment rates, educational achievement, health outcomes and criminal justice (U.S. Census Report, 2011; The Poverty and Inequality Report, 2014; Department of Education, 2012; Williams & Wyatt, 2013; Lyons & Pettit, 2011). Similarly, while many readily endorse nonprejudiced beliefs on self-report measures, there is overwhelming data to support the idea that White Americans remain deeply biased. To this point, a number of studies reveal that Whites continue to harbor negative racial stereotypes (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Bobo & Kluegel, 1997). Research has shown that negative stereotypes are often manifested in subtle ways, such as social distance preferences or objections to social policies intended to assist African Americans (Bobo et al., 2012; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Charles, 2006; Tuch and Hughes, 1996; Wilson, 2006). The literature is clear: societal and personal forces continue to sustain racial prejudice and discrimination.

How do scholars make sense of the fact that many Whites deny the existence of racial discrimination when persuasive evidence confirms its persistence? How can we understand the tendency for Whites to disavow their personal prejudice while studies suggest that they remain racially biased? It is worth noting that these two questions are related but distinct. The first concerns Whites’ beliefs about racial discrimination in society: Is the American Justice System racially biased? Does race play a role in the type of health care people receive? The second involves Whites’ awareness of themselves as individuals: Do I experience negative feelings
towards people of color? Have I acted on these negative feelings? Although appraisals of society and oneself are both indicative of larger racial attitudes, they represent two categories of assessment. Crucially, people can acknowledge the existence of racial discrimination in society while simultaneously denying that they themselves are biased.

To date, researchers have been far more interested in the former category than the latter. Surveys and self-report measures often use Whites’ statements about policies, social trends, and other peoples’ behavior as indications of the individual’s personal views. The focus remains on racial attitudes, which are routinely assumed or extrapolated from Whites’ endorsements of certain beliefs or behaviors. In sum, there has been a general lack of research into Whites’ awareness of their own personal biases.

As I will demonstrate, theories of contemporary racism interpret Whites’ appraisals of external factors as indirect expressions of racial prejudice. For example, the theory of symbolic racism argues that prejudicial beliefs can be communicated indirectly through endorsements of traditional conservative values (Sears & McConahay, 1973). In symbolic racism, a belief that racial inequalities are the result of Blacks’ unwillingness to work hard is seen to suggest racial bias, which is communicated indirectly through the individual’s emphasis on hard work and independence. A scale used to measure levels of symbolic racism asks respondents to assess the actions of black leaders, the origins of racial tension, the legacy of slavery, and the prevalence of discrimination (Henry & Sears, 2002). Scales associated with other theories of contemporary racism, such as color-blind racial ideology (CoBRAS; Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee & Brown, 2000) and modern racism (MRS; McConahay, 1986), similarly use Whites’ endorsements of certain beliefs as indications of racial prejudice. Most theories of contemporary racism rely on indirect expressions of racial bias to support its existence.
One exception is research associated with the theory of aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004), which has utilized implicit measures and experimental designs to assess biased responses to racial stimuli. Aversive racism describes an attitudinal paradox in which Whites consciously endorse racial equality while harboring nonconscious negative feelings towards racial minorities. In short, aversive racists are torn between their “denial of personal prejudice” and their “underlying unconscious negative feelings toward and beliefs about blacks” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004, p. 4). There is no single measure to assess aversive racism. Instead, researchers tend to contrast Whites’ expressed attitudes with their biased (albeit subtle) behaviors. In this large body of research, implicit measures are used to assess biased behaviors, which are thought to reveal the “real” racial attitude of the responder (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & Williams, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). As follows, an aversive racist is someone who demonstrates high levels of prejudice on implicit measures while endorsing low levels of prejudice on explicit measures. Unlike other theories of contemporary racism, aversive racism attends to the nonconscious dimensions of bias. However, it does not speak to the ways Whites think about these nonconscious biases.

To date, researchers have tended to neglect the variable of awareness—meaning Whites’ awareness of their personal prejudices and biases. Whites’ appraisals of their own racially biased thoughts, feelings, and behaviors have been consistently overlooked. As a result, an understanding of how Whites perceive and make sense of their own spontaneous and automatic responses to racial stimuli is notably absent from the literature. This absence is particularly conspicuous given evidence that developing an awareness of one’s racial biases is a necessary first step to controlling and mitigating them. Early research by Rokeach and Cochlane (1972) demonstrated that making people aware of inconsistencies between their egalitarian values and
biased attitudes resulted in lower levels of discrimination. Other studies have found that Whites work harder to control prejudiced behavior when they are able to identify their biases (Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Arthur, & Flynn, 2010). It appears that when biases go unexamined, they likely obfuscate opportunities to alter behavior and contribute to the perpetuation of unintentional racism. In sum, a greater understanding of the variability in people’s awareness of their racial bias is needed.

Currently, there are no ways of measuring individual differences in awareness of racial bias. In order to facilitate research in this area, an instrument is needed to explore the extent to which Whites deny or acknowledge both the general existence and manifestations of bias. In response to this need, the present study developed and conducted an initial validation of a scale entitled the “Disavowal of Racial Bias Scale (DRB).” The DRB was designed to assess an individual’s capacity to recognize and report racially biased thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. In other words, it assesses the respondents’ awareness of their own automatic responses to racial stimuli. DRB items were informed by the literature on affective (Bowser and Hunt, 1996; Datum, 1992; Goodman, 2001; Katz, 1978; Kivel, 2002; Spanierman, 2004; Tomlinson-Clarke & Ota-Wang, 1999), cognitive (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Czopp & Monteith, 2006; Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2006; Madon et al., 2001) and behavioral (Bourdieu, 1988; Sue, 2010) dimensions of racial bias. The DRB aims to facilitate an understanding of Whites’ awareness of racial bias by directly measuring the extent to which both the phenomenon and examples of racial bias are denied.

It is important to note that in assessing the extent to which an individual disavows manifestations of racial bias, the proposed scale does not aim to assess whether an individual is biased. Instead of measuring the presence or absence of biased emotions, thoughts and behaviors,
the DRB will examine Whites’ appraisals of these experiences. This is a point of departure from previous studies and measures, many of which are concerned with determining the intensity and content of an individual’s prejudicial attitudes. Historically, the field of psychology has treated racism as an individual problem—the result of a person’s beliefs or cognitions (Durrheim, Hook, & Riggs, 2009). From a personality-based perspective, psychological research has aimed to identify, understand and predict the presence of racial hatred in a single individual (see Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Fromm, 1941). While this individualistic approach may help explain the extremes of racial hatred (Hook, 2006, 2008), it is unable to account for the more insidious nature of contemporary racism. Critical psychologists have drawn attention to the fact that racist ideology, messages, and narratives effectively form a “background” to modern social life, influencing the ways that people think about and relate to the world (Durrheim et al., 2009).

It is a basic premise of this study that Whites are embedded within a sociocultural system and are thus destined to draw from and perpetuate certain social messages—regardless of intention or awareness. The decision to assess an individual’s ability to recognize and report her racial biases is based on an assumption that the individual is indeed biased, the unwitting bearer of prejudicial beliefs. As I will demonstrate, this assumption fits with research on implicit cognition (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, 2002) and implicit racial biases (Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001). Instead of suppressing negative feelings and prejudicial thoughts, a commitment to being non-prejudiced requires the courage to recognize and address them.

By focusing on individual differences in awareness of racial bias, this study promotes a kind of honesty that is not always encouraged in today’s cultural climate. For many, admitting to
having racial biases is tantamount to endorsing racist ideology. However, from a critical psychological perspective, a commitment to racial equality necessarily exists alongside one’s unconscious, unintentional biases, which, if denied, may become even more pernicious (Durrheim et al., 2009). This approach fits with Helms’ White racial identity development model, which supports a movement away from obliviousness towards critical racial consciousness (Helms, 1990). Ideally, one would not have any racial biases. While the idea of being bias-free is a noble aspiration, pretending that one is bias free distorts perceptions of one’s self and obscures the ways that one inevitably perpetuates racial injustice. Such acts of self-deception are bound to have negative consequences. Disavowing racial biases may sap motivation to work towards social change, eliminate the need to take actions to counteract these biases, and fuel the confusion endemic to debates about racism.

Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Research suggests that White Americans are more likely to value racial equality and less likely to espouse prejudicial views than ever before (Bobo, 2001). Many hold optimistic views on racial matters generally, believing that racism is a problem of the past and that they are themselves free of racial bias. Although these perceptions seem to suggest significant societal progress, there is evidence that they misrepresent a more complicated reality. When it comes to matters involving race, what people consciously say or believe is often at odds with what they actually do. While many Whites espouse non-prejudiced views on self-report measures, other methods of assessment reveal that deep-seated racial biases remain (Ross & Agiesta, 2012; Bobo, 2012). And, while many Whites downplay the prevalence of racial discrimination, there is evidence to suggest that troubling racial injustice persists (Alexander, 2010; Bobo, 2001; Cha-Jua, 2009; Wise, 2010). To value racial equality is to desire that oneself and society are free of racial bias. Although this desire is essential to progress, it can also cloud assessments of reality, thus thwarting efforts to effect individual and systemic change.

This chapter begins with an overview of White Americans’ optimistic perceptions of race relations, as indicated by self-reported racial attitudes and beliefs. These perceptions are contrasted with wide-ranging evidence that racism persists, both at a societal level (in the form of troubling racial disparities) and at the individual level (in the form of deep-seated racial biases). After establishing the inaccuracies common to Whites’ views of racial realities, explanations of these inaccuracies are explored. To this end, the insights offered by theories of contemporary racism will be considered. Building on the idea of implicit cognition, these theories argue that racial prejudice can persist in the form of automatic negative thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, regardless of the individual’s conscious intentions. Next, the methods used to measure persistent prejudicial thoughts, feelings, and behaviors will be discussed, with attention paid to the
assumptions, key findings, and gaps in the literature. In this literature, researchers tend to measure racial prejudice indirectly, by assessing either conscious beliefs about racial discrimination or their inadvertent behaviors. To date, there has been a lack of research in the area of Whites’ conscious appraisals of their own personal prejudice. As a result, there are currently no ways to measure the extent to which Whites’ recognize and report having prejudicial thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.

It is a basic premise of this research that the individual is capable of developing an awareness of automatic, nonconscious responses (Devine & Monteith, 1993; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2000; Monteith & Voils, 1998). In fact, there is evidence to suggest that this reflective capacity is key to mitigating prejudicial behavior (Devine & Monteith, 1993; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2000; Monteith & Voils, 1998). In an aim to facilitate research in this area, I propose the development of the Disavowal of Racial Bias Scale (DRB), which will measure the extent to which an individual disavows manifestations of implicit racial biases. More specifically, the DRB will measure the extent to which an individual denies having negative feelings, experiencing prejudicial thoughts, and engaging in discriminatory behaviors, all within the context of prior interracial interactions. Furthermore, the DRB will draw from social psychological research to assess the motivations to disavow personal prejudice. Building on theories of social desirability, the DRB will assess disavowals of prejudice in terms of self-deceptive responding and impression management tendencies.

White Racial Attitudes and Beliefs

The racial minority movements of the 1950s and 1960s irrevocably altered the cultural landscape of the United States. Omi and Winant (1994) refer to this postwar period as a “racial crucible” in which racial politics changed significantly. During this time, the civil rights
movement transformed from a challenge to Black segregation in the South to a national campaign against racial oppression, precipitating unprecedented racial reform (Carson, Garrow, Gill, Harding & Hine, 1991). The passage of anti-discrimination laws and policies placed new limits on employers, educational institutions, and government agencies, thus marking the end of formal racial discrimination (Winant, 2010). In the decades following these structural changes, members of racial minority groups experienced increased rates of social mobility (Winant, 2010).

**White Racial Attitudes.** The structural changes in U.S. society paralleled and accelerated a shift in the racial attitudes of White Americans. Although discrimination persisted beyond the abolition of state and local Jim Crow laws enforcing racial segregation, the civil rights struggles brought about an increased intolerance of overt racial hatred. A number of longitudinal surveys help document this trend over time. For example, survey data collected for a series of *Scientific American* articles depicts a steady increase in pro-integration sentiments among Whites between the mid-1950s and the 1970s (Hyman, Sheatsley, Greeley and Taylor). Based on Whites’ self-reported racial attitudes, the articles’ authors noted a general liberalization on racial issues. The General Social Survey (GSS), which started collecting data in 1972, produced longitudinal data with a similar pattern (General Social Survey, n.d.). In their analysis of the GSS data archive, Bobo and his colleagues (2012) identified a core trend in which fewer Whites supported forms of racial discrimination. The authors noted that the ideals of equal treatment and integration were endorsed at such high levels on the initial GSS that some items were dropped in subsequent versions (Bobo et al., 2012). Gallup public opinion polls have displayed comparable declines in Whites’ prejudicial views of minority groups. According to their statistics, approval rates of marriage between Blacks and Whites increased from 38% in
1983 to 84% in 2013. Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan (1997) documented improvements in the areas of social distancing and stereotyping, with Whites less likely to endorse statements that Blacks are less intelligent and hardworking than Whites. Overall, Whites’ overt expressions of racist sentiments have declined substantially over time (Bobo, 2011; Pearson, Dovidio & Gaertner, 2009).

**White Racial Beliefs.** The trend toward egalitarianism depicted in survey data seems to reflect and reinforce a belief that race is no longer an issue in the United States. Many Whites endorse a favorable narrative about racial progress, citing changes made since slavery, segregation, and Jim Crow as evidence that efforts to combat racism have been successful (Dawson & Bobo, 2009). The minimization of the significance of race is tied to the belief that America is a “post-racial” society, where racial preference, prejudice, and discrimination are no longer issues (Dawson & Bobo, 2009). Many Whites interpreted the election of Barack Obama, the nation’s first Black president, as a sign that America had successfully healed its racial divisions and was moving forward. In a recent Pew survey (2014), a vast majority of Whites reported that they are satisfied with the way Blacks are treated in society. Some Whites have expressed a new kind of dissatisfaction, claiming that efforts to fight racial inequality have been excessive. Recent legal and social controversies regarding “reverse racism” highlight Whites’ increasing concerns about an anti-White bias. In a recent study, researchers found that many Whites believe that anti-White bias is a bigger societal problem than anti-Black bias (Norton & Sommers, 2011).

**Racial Realities**

In contrast to many Whites’ self-reported attitudes and beliefs about society, there is ample evidence that societal and interpersonal forms of racial discrimination persist. First, I
provide examples of cultural and institutional discrimination, which are reflected in statistical data and confirmed by racial disparities research. Second, I summarize some of the attitudinal trends amongst Whites, which belie their endorsements of racial equality and justice. This section aims to show that many Whites’ assessments of society and themselves are indeed optimistic, and that they are often downplaying the significance of racial bias on both a social and personal level.

**Racial Discrimination.** Race continues to shape access to opportunities and resources in the United States. Data suggests that racial differences underlie a wide range of societal issues, and that they shape the daily lives of Americans in myriad ways. Troubling discrepancies across racial groups can be found in the areas of income, wealth, home ownership, employment rates, incarceration rates, educational achievement, and health outcomes. Although such inequities tend to be related and multiply determined, the role race plays in their maintenance has become increasingly clear. Crucially, research reveals that factors linked to race, including racial discrimination and racial bias, are key to understanding systemic inequalities.

**Racial differences.** There are consistent and striking racial differences across numerous domains. The 2011 Census report reveals that the net worth of the average Black household was $6,314, while the average White household hovered at $110,500 (U.S. Census, 2011). Previous census records indicate that this gap has widened over time (Blank, 2001). Comparisons of income rates reveal a similar differential. As of 2014, the Black–White income gap was 40% greater than it was in 1967, with Black unemployment double the White rate (The Poverty and Inequality Report, 2014). The US Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights has documented troubling discrepancies in American public schools. A 2012 report documented that Black, Latino and Native American students have less access to advanced math and science
courses and are more likely to be taught by first-year instructors than White students (DOE, 2012). Students of color are also suspended and expelled at disproportionate rates when compared to their White peers (DOE, 2012). Race-related inconsistencies are notoriously pronounced in the justice system. According to statistics from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, African Americans are incarcerated at nearly six times the rate of Whites (Lyons & Pettit, 2011). A recent report by the Department of Justice found that Black and Hispanic motorists were approximately three times more likely to be searched during a traffic stop than White motorists (Iank & Dabady, 2012).

In the work force, Whites have advantages over Blacks in the initial wage level and in opportunities for advancement (Rosenfeld, 1998). In conditions requiring layoffs, Blacks are more likely to be discriminated relative to Whites (Elvira & Zatzick, 2002). A staggering percentage (47%) of Black Americans reported that they were treated unfairly during the previous months in their own community. More than half (55%) of Blacks within the government workforce reported that discrimination interferes with their career advancement (U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 1997).

Racial differences exist in health outcomes and access to health care. Williams and Mohammad (2009) have written that Blacks have a 30% higher age-adjusted mortality rate than Whites. Blacks have higher death rates than Whites for the fifteen leading causes of death in the United States (Kung et al., 2008). In spite of life expectancy gains across all racial groups, the mortality gap between Blacks and Whites has in fact widened (Williams & Mohammad, 2009). Mortality rates remain higher among Blacks for cancers of the lung and bronchus, colon and rectum, liver and bile duct, stomach, prostate, and uterine cervix (Williams, 2004). In 2005, overall cancer mortality was 37% higher among Black males compared to White males and 17%
higher among Black females compared to White females (Williams, 2004). Data indicates that 100,000 Black individuals die prematurely each year (Levine et al., 2001). Recent studies suggest that over the life span, Black and White patients receive unequal treatment from medical practitioners, resulting in less favorable health-related outcomes for Blacks (Smedley, Stith, & Nelson, 2003; Whaley, 1998).

Racial disparities. The existence of racial differences seems hard to dispute. Fittingly, surveys suggest that many White Americans are cognizant of these differences (Bobo et al., 2012). For example, data from the General Social Survey suggests that most Whites acknowledge Black-White economic inequality (Bobo et al., 2012). However, while Whites may accurately perceive racial differences, they are far less likely to interpret these differences as manifestations of racial discrimination. Between 1977 and 2008, “a lack of willpower” was the most commonly selected explanation of Black economic disadvantage (Bobo et al., 2012). While two in five Whites endorsed “discrimination” as a cause for socioeconomic inequality across racial groups in 1977, only one in three selected “discrimination” by 2008 (Bobo et al., 2012). Clearly, explanations of racial inequality vary greatly. As a result, scholars have worked to go beyond demonstrating racial differences in order to determine why these differences exist.

In a recent statement on racial and ethnic disparities in education, the American Psychology Association (APA, 2012) emphasized the difference between racial differences and racial disparities. The term, “disparities,” is used to imply that a particular difference is unfair or unjust. Listing statistics may strongly imply the presence of racial inequality. However, it does not constitute sufficient evidence. In order to demonstrate racial disparities, researchers must identify the key pathways through which the factors linked to racial status have an effect (APA, 2012). When race-related factors are seen to have an independent effect above and beyond non-
race-related factors, racial differences begin to suggest the presence of systemic racial inequality, bringing racial discrimination and its myriad consequences to light.

Although summarizing the vast and growing literature on racial disparities exceeds the scope of the present study, a brief overview is necessary. It may be tempting to begin with an assumption that institutional, cultural, and interpersonal forms of racism are realities in the United States. Such a position has become widely accepted among many social scientists. However, the prevalence of racial discrimination remains a divisive subject among the American public and continues to be a subject of scholarly debate. It is important to begin with an empirically supported premise that racial discrimination exists. Without establishing this reality, it becomes difficult to consider denials of this reality as acts of denial.

In the health literature, racial discrimination has been identified as a discrete stressor with measurable consequences. Studies indicate that the targets of discrimination are aware of some of the discriminatory behavior directed at them, and that perceptions of unfair treatment generate stress (Clark et al., 1999). Building on the notion that stress is a key determinant in health, research has provided persuasive evidence that perceived discrimination contributes to health disparities (Williams, 2004; Williams & Wyatt, 2013). Studies support the notion that experiences of discrimination predict a broad range of negative health outcomes, and have helped reframe race-based discrimination as an important risk factor for disease (Williams, 2007). For example, studies suggest that there is an inverse association between perceived discrimination and morbidity (Williams, Neighbors, & Jackson, 2003; Krieger, 1999). African Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Latino Americans are more likely to exhibit symptoms of hypertension and diabetes due to discrimination-related chronic stress (Williams & Neighbors, 2001; Kaholokula et al, 2010; McClure et al, 2010). Stress due to experiences of racism can
contribute to adverse birth outcomes, when combined with the effects of general and maternal stress (Nuru-Jeter et al., 2009; Dominguez et al., 2008; Canady et al., 2008).

Similar findings have been found in the literature on mental health. In the last decade, studies have demonstrated that perceived discrimination significantly impacts individual well-being. For example, researchers found significant relationships between discrimination and mood lability among people of color (Broudy et al., 2007), cognitive difficulties among Black college students (Salvatore & Shelton, 2008), and psychiatric diagnoses among Asian Americans (Gee et al., 2007). Research indicates that racial discrimination factors in conduct problems and depressive symptoms among African American adolescents (Brody, et al., 2006) as well as adjustment issues among international college students (Poyrazli & Lopez, 2007).

Taken together, research in the areas of physical and mental health indicate that racial discrimination continues to be a powerful societal force, with a range of negative consequences above and beyond the influence of other factors. Although manifestations of racism are not the only factors contributing to racial differences, they effectively interact with and exacerbate the negative effects of other risk factors. The existence of racial discrimination is essential to the aim of the proposed study, which seeks to measure denials of racial bias—one aspect of racial discrimination. In addition, the methodological difficulties encountered in the racial disparities literature strengthen the rationale for the proposed instrument. If the DRB can demonstrate that Whites acknowledge (i.e. do not deny) that racial biases persist in the form of automatic thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, the persistence of racial discrimination becomes less of a mystery. In other words, the proposed measure could support the argument that racial discrimination continues as the result of deep-racial biases that exist in spite of Whites’
conscious awareness and intentions. Research on racial disparities seeks to make the same argument, albeit in a less direct way.

**Racial attitudes revisited.** Although many Whites endorse racial equality, attitudinal research complicates the notion that Whites are less prejudiced. According to data analyzed by Bobo (2012) and his colleagues, Whites continue to express strong social distancing preferences. Data from the General Social Survey (GSS) suggests that White Americans maintain affective and socioemotional distance, with few Whites expressing closeness to African Americans or embracing them on an emotional level (Bobo et al, 2012). Research shows that negative racial stereotypes remain, although they tend to be rooted in perceived cultural, rather than biological, differences (Bobo et al, 2012; Bobo, 2009). White support for government interventions to improve racial inequality and segregation are limited (Bobo et al., 2012). There continues to be low levels of support for policies that would “uplift African American communities” (Bobo, 2012, p. 54). Experimental research using implicit measures has provided further evidence that many Whites remain racially biased (Dovidio et al., 1986; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997).

**Summary: racial realities.** The research and survey data summarized in this section provides compelling evidence that racial discrimination persists. Evidence shows that there are striking racial differences across the domains of health, housing, employment, criminal justice and education (Blank et al., 2004; Fix and Struyk, 1993). The literature on racial disparities demonstrates that racial differences are indicative of racial discrimination’s stress inducing effect, which has myriad consequences. Attitudinal research suggests that while many Whites endorse racial equality, they also report beliefs and behaviors consistent with racial stereotyping,
affective differentiation, and racial resentment (Bobo et al., 2012). As Bobo and his colleagues make clear, “the all-too-common sociological assertion that the attitudinal record paints a purely and unduly optimistic picture of race relations at odds with actual behavioral data on segregation, inequality, and discrimination is simply wrong” (Bobo et al., 2012, p. 73). In short, there appears to be a high degree of consistency between Whites’ individual attitudes and behaviors (Bobo et al., 2012). With this in mind, the discrepancy that begs scholarly attention is the one between Whites’ attitudes/behaviors and their perceptions of these attitudes/behaviors. In spite of the evidence, many Whites ignore, minimize, distort, or misinterpret the reality that racial discrimination persists on both a societal and personal level.

Defining Key Terms. Although many Whites acknowledge racial differences, they are most likely to attribute these differences to the free will or decisions made by Blacks (Bobo et al., 2012). In general, Whites tend to downplay the prevalence of racial discrimination, both when evaluating aspects of American society and when evaluating themselves. While these views are contradicted by empirical evidence, they may also reflect a perennial confusion about the definitions of certain terms. Words such as “race,” “racism,” and “racial bias” have been defined in various ways, which can further complicate assessments of White racial attitudes. Before proceeding, it is imperative to establish the meanings of key terms.

Race. The confusion that follows race-related terms is not a coincidence. In fact, the ambiguous nature of this term in part accounts for its power. Since its inception, the concept of race has operated as an unstable nexus of social meanings, with no fixed definition (Omi & Winant, 2004). As a social construct capable of assisting diverse agendas, the word “race” has served arbitrary systems of stratification, power, and ideology (Omi & Winant, 2004). Although the word “race” is often associated with biologically based differences between human groups,
most social scientists agree that race is not a fixed, biological phenomenon (Jones, 1972; Omi and Winant, 1986; Stone, 1985). Over the years, research has supported the conclusion that human genetic variations do not aggregate into subgroups that mimic racial categories (Long, Li, & Healy, 2009). In fact, the notion that race is biologically based is often tied to ideas of racial inferiority (Duster, 2005; Gravlee, 2009). However, discounting the biological basis of race does not render it an illusion. Race has been made real by its use as an organizing principle founded on ideologies of difference and domination, which, over time, were produced through and constituted by biologically based human characteristics. Through institutionalized practices of preference and discrimination that were based on the concept of distinct racial groups, racial groups were in effect reified. As a result, race has become an important social factor, informing group and individual identities, various social issues, and daily experience (Winant, 2010).

Racism. The term “racism” has been similarly complex and contested. Before the 1960s, the problem of racial injustice and inequality was understood in terms of prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory practices. From this view, movement towards a more equal society depended on the suppression of racial biases and the prohibition of discriminatory behaviors (Omi & Winant, 1994). The early Civil Rights Movement reflected these two goals in its endorsement of an integrated community and its push for equal legislation (Carson et al., 1991).

By the 1970s, conceptions of racial inequality had changed. The rise of “Black Power” and the founding of radical movement organizations corresponded with the notion that the roots of injustice ran deeper than initially suspected. There was a growing sense that prejudicial beliefs and discriminatory behaviors had become entrenched within the larger society. The concept of racism helped to describe the more pervasive nature of prejudice—the result of centuries of systematic exclusion, exploitation, and disregard for racially defined minorities (Winant, 2010).
Initially, prejudicial beliefs and discriminatory behaviors were understood to be conscious and willful acts, both at the individual and systemic level. In more recent decades, scholars began to recognize the more insidious nature of racism, as well as its enactment through unintentional and unconscious acts. This notion was supported by research suggesting that racist sentiments have changed over time, with explicit expressions of racial hatred morphing into more complex and indirect forms (Bonilla-Silva, 2010). Theories of contemporary racism emerged to describe the processes through which people “otherize softly” in a society that has become more outwardly tolerant (Bonilla-Silva, 2010). While these theories will be discussed in more depth below, it is worth pointing out that the act of labeling these more subtle forms of bias “racism” is in itself contentious.

Racism is an ideology of inferiority that categorizes and ranks discrete racial groups as inherently or culturally superior to others (Jones, 1997). For many White Americans, the term racism only applies to explicit and intentional acts of racial hostility. Whether at an individual or systemic level, many understand racism to be conscious and willful. As follows, to be called a “racist” is to be accused of subscribing to overly racist ideology. Many argue against an expanded definition of racism, claiming that it diminishes its specificity and power (Miles, 1989). Robert Miles (1989) has expressed concerns that if racism refers to wide-ranging attitudes and behaviors, it becomes difficult to describe racial progress. With one term, differences between deliberate, explicit acts and unintentional, unconscious behaviors are collapsed. An all-encompassing term may effectively breed pessimism by suggesting that racism is inextinguishable and that efforts to overcome it are futile (Miles, 1989). More recently, Bobo (2001) highlighted the value of using racism to describe the cultural and societal levels of racism. According to Bobo, using the word “prejudice” to describe individual attitudes maintains greater
conceptual clarity by distinguishing it from systemic forms of racism. Furthermore, it helps
manage affective responses to a historically inflammatory word. In the United States, “the term
‘racism’ has become heavily loaded with potential to alienate as well as to stigmatize, and given
that it has often been used carelessly, there is some value to insisting on delimited and careful
use of the term” (Bobo, 2001, p. 269).

However, using a narrower definition of the term may also collude with the desire to
minimize race. In the current normative climate, there is a tendency to avoid racial terminology
and references. Deeming more contemporary forms of racial bias “racist” helps to acknowledge
that racism remains a central societal force, enacted both through institutions and individuals.
From this point of view, there are clear benefits to using a broader definition of the term. A
broader use of the term “racism” is itself an affirmation that individuals’ racial biases have
serious consequences. Those supporting this line of argument claim that an expanded definition
helps combat assumptions that subtle forms of racial bias are less harmful or more acceptable
than Jim Crow racism. If even the most inadvertent, indirect act or belief can have serious
manifestations, it deserves a serious name. In this tradition, theories of contemporary racism use
the term “racism” to describe individual attitudes and beliefs. According to Bonilla-Silva (1996),
“racism” refers to anything that perpetuates racial inequality in the social order.

*Racial bias.* The proposed study will use the term “racial bias” to describe individual
manifestations of racist ideology. Racial bias is defined as the negative affect associated with
racist ideology, which informs both attitudes (i.e. prejudice) and beliefs (i.e. stereotypes) about
racial groups. Racial biases are seen to result in and thus include differential behaviors (i.e. racial
discrimination), which can be enacted by the individual without intention or awareness.
Although not referred to as racism in the following pages, racial biases are understood to mirror
and promote racist power structures on a societal level.

**Implicit Cognition**

The proposed study takes a critical psychological perspective by assuming that racist ideology forms a “background” to modern social life, influencing the ways that people think about and relate to the world (Bruner, 1973). Because ideas associated with different racial groups have informed everyday processes of social categorization and hierarchization, Whites possess a set of unconscious racial biases, which can be expressed through implicit thoughts, feelings and behaviors. From this view, the individual is embedded within a sociocultural system, receiving and propagating racist messages, regardless of consciously held beliefs and aspirations.

A critical psychological perspective fits with a theory of implicit cognition. Over the last decade, psychology has developed a growing literature on implicit cognition. This literature recognizes that many mental processes occur outside conscious attentional focus and control (Greenwald, Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, 2002). Researchers in social cognition have made a fundamental distinction between explicit and implicit processes (Devine, 1989; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Explicit processes refer to a conscious mode, which can be captured by self-report measures. In contrast, implicit social cognition refers to a form of automatic brain processing that occurs outside conscious awareness. Researchers have explored implicit cognitive processes in the context of implicit memory (Schacter, 1987; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981), implicit perception (Kihlstrom, 1992), implicit attitudes, implicit stereotypes (Greenwald, 1998), implicit self-esteem (Rudman, 2001) and implicit self-concept (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Within the study of implicit memory, scholars developed measures to capture other implicit mental phenomena (Greenwald & Krieger, 2006).
**Implicit Attitudes.** Attitudes refer to an evaluative disposition—a tendency to like or dislike something. Explicit attitudes indicate a consciously held disposition: I like cake. I do not like ice cream. If an explicit attitude is communicated (e.g. I tell someone my dessert preferences), the communication is regarded as an explicit attitude expression. In contrast, an implicit attitude exists outside the individual’s conscious awareness. Although the implicit attitude may be indirectly communicated by a statement or action, the individual remains unaware of his deep-seated convictions. Implicit attitudes are particularly intriguing when they conflict with explicit attitude expressions. In these cases, the mismatch between implicit and explicit attitudes are interpreted as a dissociation.

Dissociations are commonly observed when attitudes involve sensitive subjects, such as race and racism. Implicit biases represent one aspect of the involuntary, nonconscious processing of information. Unlike explicit biases, which are consciously known and can thus be deliberately revealed or concealed on self-report measures, implicit biases are activated spontaneously, without intentional control. Residing deep in the subconscious, feelings and attitudes can develop over time, informed by both direct and indirect messages. Implicit attitudes, which are difficult to capture in self-report measures, are typically assessed using response latency procedures, memory tasks, physiological measures, and indirect self-report measures (Blair, 2001; Dovidio et al., 2001).

**Implicit Racial Attitudes.** The reliance on race as a way to socially categorize humans in the United States has made such categorization processes virtually automatic (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2012). Without effort or control, Whites spontaneously differentiate people by race, with the activation of racial categories triggered by the actual or symbolic presence of a black person. As Durrheim and his colleagues point out, “the groundwork for racism is already laid at
the moment of perception” (Durrheim, Hook, & Riggs, 2009, p. 201). Because of sociocultural influences, these racial categories are associated with negative stereotypes of Blacks (Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986), as well as negative attitudes (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001). Studies have found consistent evidence of Whites’ generally negative implicit attitudes towards Blacks (e.g. Dovidio et al., 1986; Fazio, Jackson, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). These studies have provided evidence that “a vast majority of White Americans harbor unconscious negative associations about Blacks” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2012, p. 20).

Dovidio & Gaertner (1986, 2004, 2012) have theorized that for many Whites, unconscious racial attitudes are “largely dissociated” from their conscious, self-reported attitudes. They hypothesize that the dissociation between explicit (conscious) and implicit (nonconscious) attitudes can shape the ways that Whites behave in racial interactions. Because they are unaware of their negative implicit attitudes, they may also be unaware of how their behaviors communicate racial bias. However, this is not necessarily the case. Fazio and Olson (2003) have helped demonstrate people’s reflective capacity, providing evidence that processing information quickly does not foreclose the possibility of being aware of spontaneous responses. In other words, a lack of intentional control does not rule out the capacity for reflection. For example, an individual may experience a negative feeling or have a prejudicial thought in the context of an interracial interaction. However, that individual may be conscious of this feeling or thought, and accurately identify it as a manifestation of prejudice. In short, the individual may be mindful of her automatic thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, in spite of their nonconscious origins.
Theories of Contemporary Racism

In spite of evidence that racism persists, many Whites minimize the existence of racial discrimination, both on a societal and personal level. A number of theories have emerged to help understand this paradox. In spite of their differences, they all examine contemporary racial attitudes and beliefs within the context of significant societal change. Theories of contemporary racism recognize that as a result of a more tolerant social climate, racial antipathy is often communicated covertly (Sears, 1988; McConahay, 1986; Kinder & Sander, 1996; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Drawing on a theory of implicit cognition, these theories posit that covert forms of racism can operate below the level of conscious awareness and control. In other words, they assume that racial prejudice can be experienced and expressed regardless of the individual’s knowledge or intention. First, a brief overview of color-blind racial ideology (Neville et. al, 1998) and symbolic racism (Sears, 1988) is provided. Both color-blind racial ideology and symbolic racism share the premise that White Americans communicate racial prejudice indirectly through their conscious endorsement of certain beliefs. Next, the theory of aversive racism (Gartner & Dovidio, 1986) is discussed. Rather than focusing on Whites’ self-reported beliefs, aversive racism assumes that spontaneous, nonconscious behaviors are inadvertent communications of racial prejudice. All the three theories discussed in this section share an assumption that Whites experience implicit negative thoughts and feelings, which are communicated indirectly through certain beliefs or behaviors.

Covert Racism. Overt, old-fashioned, Jim Crow racism was public, explicit, and easy to identify. Founded on the belief that Blacks were biologically inferior, overt racism helped maintain a social distance between races through formal discrimination and segregation (Kind & Sears, 1981). In overt racism, undisguised hostility and hatred were expressed through explicit
endorsements of negative racial beliefs. In contrast, covert racism relies on subtler and seemingly passive methods. Contemporary forms of covert racism tend to be hidden or rationalized with socially acceptable explanations. Their indirect nature makes them particularly difficult to detect and easy to dismiss. A number of theories seek to address the workings of contemporary, covert racism (Sears, 1988; McConahay, 1986; Kinder & Sander, 1996; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). While distinct, they share an assumption that new forms of prejudice, embodying both negative feelings towards Blacks as a group and some conservative nonracial values, have become politically dominant (Sears & Henry, 2003). Covert racism acknowledges the implicit nature of racism, which includes nonconscious biases, expectations and tendencies that exist within an individual, regardless of intention or awareness. Theorists are clear to point out that while covert racism appears more muted, its consequences are no less deleterious.

**Color-blind racial ideology.** Modern forms of covert racism are connected to the idea of racial color-blindness. Briefly, the notion of racial color blindness describes the idea that ignoring race and racism will help reduce racial prejudice. The thinking goes that if the concepts of race and racism are discarded, they will disappear on their own. As follows, a color-blind approach advocates that people be “blind” to both race (referred to as color-evasion) and the societal power that it confers (referred to as power-evasion) (Neville et. al, 2013). Scholars have critiqued this view by pointing out that color-blindness is unachievable and that ignoring existing inequalities negates the individual, structural, and cultural manifestations of discrimination (APA, 2012; Neville et al., 2013). Color-blind racial ideology (CBRI) is considered a manifestation of racial discrimination, effectively supporting an inequitable status quo (APA, Presidential Task Force on Preventing Discrimination and Promoting Diversity, 2012; Neville et al., 2013; Bonilla, 2010). Far from reducing prejudice, CBRI reinforces racial discrimination,
and has harmful effects on cognitive functioning (Holoien & Shelton, 2012) and emotional wellbeing (Cater, 2007). In spite of misguided aspirations, CBRI continues to be popular among White Americans, serving to justify and explain away racial inequalities. Those who subscribe to CBRI tend to minimize blatant forms of racism, institutional racism, and racial privilege. Crucially, the individual may not be aware that she is enacting a subtle form of racial discrimination when endorsing CBRI.

**Symbolic racism.** David Sears and John McConahay (1973) have used the term symbolic racism to explain why many White Americans support principles of racial equality while simultaneously undermining programs designed to implement these principles. Although the concept has changed over time, symbolic racism has been used to describe expressions of prejudice towards Black people that are articulated through traditional conservative values. Sears and Henry (2008) characterized symbolic racism as the endorsement of the specific beliefs that Blacks no longer face much prejudice or discrimination, racial inequalities are the result of Blacks’ unwillingness to work hard enough, Blacks are demanding too much too fast, and Blacks have gotten more than they deserve. For example, a symbolic racist may express prejudicial beliefs through their endorsement of certain social and political views, all while denying that these views are directly related to race.

Sears (1988) suggested that symbolic racism could be enacted without conscious awareness of racial antipathy. He emphasized the spontaneous and direct nature of underlying negative affect, which can occur without strong “cognitive mediation.” Subsequent research helps support this notion (Whitley and Kite, 2010). Whitley and Kite (2010) have helped elucidate the underlying factors contributing to symbolic racism, which include: implicitly anti-Black affect and negative stereotypes, racialized belief in traditional values, belief in equality of
opportunity, low belief in equality of outcome, group self-interest, and low knowledge of Black people. According to the authors, while many individuals holding symbolic racist beliefs have implicit negative attitudes, many are not aware that this is the case (Whitley and Kite (2010). Because the symbolic racist lacks extensive personal experience with Blacks, negative stereotypes often go unchallenged. As a result, an individual can subscribe to symbolic racist beliefs while genuinely believing he opposes racism and is not racist. Symbolic racism is presumed to characterize the racial attitudes of more conservative-leaning Whites. Although there are slight conceptual differences, symbolic racism shares significant overlaps with the theories of modern racism (McConahay, 1986) and racial resentment (Kinder & Sanders, 1996). Like CBRI and symbolic racism, theories of modern racism and racial resentment emphasize the gap between conscious intentions and nonconscious responses to racial stimuli.

*Aversive racism.* Building on Joel Kovel’s conceptual framework, Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) have done extensive research in the area of aversive racism. Like symbolic racism, aversive racism describes subtle, indirect expressions of racial bias. In this case, prejudicial attitudes are discreetly communicated through the sustained avoidance of racial or ethnic groups. These everyday, easily rationalized distancing behaviors appear innocuous. However, they are seen to betray deep-seated negative feelings about Blacks and have significant consequences (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986). Unlike the symbolic racist, the aversive racist embraces a more liberal ideology that values fairness, justice, and equality. The subtle manifestations of racial bias enacted by the aversive racist coexist with more progressive sentiments, such as sympathizing with victims of past injustice and readily identifying as nonprejudiced. In past research, aversive racism has been used to describe the racial attitudes of well-educated, liberal Whites.
Similar to the symbolic racist, however, the aversive racist may not be aware of underlying negative feelings. Dovidio and Gaertner (2004) have argued that the conflict between Whites’ denials of personal prejudice and their unconscious negative beliefs about Blacks is an essential aspect of aversive racism. They attribute this central conflict to a larger, cultural schism. On the one hand, Whites are socialized to esteem humanitarianism and egalitarianism. On the other hand, cognitive, motivational, sociocultural, and historical forces foster an insidious intergroup bias. Within this climate, the individual’s negative feelings toward Blacks persist in spite of consciously held views. Because these negative feelings threaten the liberal individual’s self-concept as a “good” non-prejudiced person, they may be actively disavowed and refuted. The conscious commitment to nondiscriminatory principles and the persistence of nonconscious racial biases together create a potentially distressing intrapsychic conflict. This conflict can be made more distressing by the fact that it is often difficult to recognize. The theory of aversive racism shares significant overlap with subtle prejudice (Pettigew & Meertens, 1995), racial ambivalence (Katz, 1981), and laissez-faire racism (Bobo & Smith, 1998).

**Summary: Indirect Expressions of Racial Prejudice.** In general, contemporary theories of racism posit that racist sentiments are now expressed in subtle, indirect ways. Although these expressions can involve negative emotions, feelings, and behavior, theories of covert racism have typically scrutinized Whites’ explicit thoughts (i.e. conscious endorsements of certain beliefs) and implicit behaviors (i.e. certain inadvertent behaviors that are enacted spontaneously). The proposed Disavowal of Racial Bias Scale (DRB) combines these two traditions by assessing explicit thoughts about spontaneous thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. In order to demonstrate the need for the DRB, a review of the existent self-report measures is needed. The following section helps highlight themes and gaps in the empirical literature.
Measuring Expressions of Contemporary Racism

The previous section outlines popular theories of contemporary racism in the social, psychological, and multicultural literature. These theories have helped guide research on racial attitudes and prejudice, and have informed the development of relevant scales. In general, these theories have understood racial prejudice to be communicated indirectly through the explicit endorsements of certain beliefs and the enactments of certain implicit behaviors. While theorists agree that expressions of racism have changed, attempts to measure these new forms have focused on different aspects of contemporary racism.

The present section provides an overview of three self-report measures used in psychological research, which were developed to assess different aspects of contemporary racism. I discuss the intended purpose and strengths of these measures, as well as their limitations. Next, I examine methods used to assess implicit racial biases, which were designed to assess automatic, nonconscious forms of prejudice. Lastly, I highlight gaps in the existing literature. To this end, I demonstrate that most self-report measures were designed to assess indirect expressions of racial bias through the endorsement of certain beliefs. In contrast, implicit tests have been used to assess expressions of racial bias through the observation of inadvertent behaviors. An exception to this trend is a self-report measure used to assess the motivation to control prejudicial responses, which will be discussed in a following section. Unlike the scales discussed in this section, the Internal and the External Motivation To Respond Without Prejudice Scale (IMS/EMS; Plant & Devine, 1998) recognizes that prejudicial thinking engages both automatic and conscious processes (Gamst, Liang, Der-Karabetian, 2011).

Self-Report Measures: Assessing Explicit Beliefs. Three self-report measures will be discussed. First, the Color-blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS; Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee &
Brown, 2000) will be presented. This instrument measures general attitudes regarding racial issues. Second, the Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (SR2K; Henry & Sears, 2002) and the Modern and Old Fashioned Racism Scale (MRS; McConahay, 1986) will be presented. These instruments specifically measure Whites’ racial attitudes in relation to Black Americans. All three measures use Whites’ endorsements of certain beliefs to indirectly communicate racial antipathy. Although a review of these self-report measures helps demonstrate what is missing from the literature, they will also prove critical in establishing the validity of the DRB’s subscales.

**Color-blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS).** The CoBRAS (Neville et al., 2000) was designed to measure the cognitive dimensions of color-blind racial attitudes from a “power-evasion” perspective. According to Neville et al. (2000, 2013), there are three core interrelated types of power-evasion color-blindness. They include the denial/minimization/distortion of (a) racial privilege; (b) institutional discrimination and (c) blatant racial issues. There are several aspects of the CoBRAS that are worth highlighting. First, this scale is designed to assess racial prejudice in the form of an individual’s explicit beliefs. As Neville and her colleagues (2000) point out, “color-blind racial attitudes are cognitive in nature; they are part of a cognitive schema used to interpret racial stimuli” (p. 61). Second, the cognitions assessed on the CoBRAS relate to societal issues, and are akin to political opinions or worldviews. The 20 items ask the responder to consider statements such as “White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin;” “Race plays an important role in who gets sent to prison;” “Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated events.” These statements do not pertain to the respondent’s own experiences, nor do they require any reflective capacity. The CoBRAS’ focus on ideological statements should come as no surprise. The theory of color-blind racial ideology, like the scale,
focuses on indirect expressions of racial antipathy. Presumably, many Whites who endorse high levels of racial color-blindness would score low on measures assessing explicit prejudicial thoughts. Lastly, the CoBRAS measures the respondent’s unawareness of racism. As a result, the instrument is not susceptible to the same desirable responding issues faced by other measures. If the individual is unaware that his views are problematic (i.e. that they communicate racial prejudice), he is likely unaware of a need to distort his responses on the instrument. In the literature, some researchers have used low scores on the CoBRAS to indicate high levels of awareness (Neville et. al, 2013). However, Neville and her colleagues have noted that while high scores on the CoBRAS are used to indicate high levels of unawareness of racism (i.e. color-blindness), low scores do not necessarily indicate an awareness of racism (i.e. color-consciousness). The CoBRAS is not designed to measure the individual’s ability to recognize racism in the forms of racial privilege, institutional discrimination, and blatant racial issues.

**Modern and Old Fashioned Racism Scale (MRS).** The MRS (McConahay, 1986) was developed to measure the cognitive component of White Americans’ racial attitudes toward Black Americans. The original intent of the MRS was to create a theoretically driven and more indirect measure of racism relative to old-fashioned, or blatant, forms of racism. Much of the initial research conducted by researchers on symbolic racism utilized McConahay’s (1986) Modern Racism Scale (MRS). However, citing a number of measurement problems and dated items, Sears and Henry updated the MRS by publishing the Symbolic Racism 2000 (SR2K) Scale in 2002. Although there has been little research on the SR2K’s susceptibility to socially desirable responding, Henry and Sears (2002) report that the MRS has had generally inconsistent and often weak relationships with measures of social desirability. They cite a study done by Lambert, Cronen, Chasteen, and Lickel (1996), in which the Crowne-Marlowe social desirability
scale had a negligible correlation with the MRS \((r = .06)\). In other studies, the MRS has had inconsistent relationships and weak correlations with the self-monitoring scale (a proxy for desiring to present a good image to others) (Fiske & von Hendy, 1992) and the external motivation to appear nonprejudiced scale (used to assess deliberate conformist behavior) (Plant & Devine, 1998). The MRS will not be used in the proposed study. Instead, its successor the SR2KS will be used, which is discussed below.

**Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (SR2KS).** The SR2KS (Sears & Henry, 2002) initially conceived symbolic racism as a unidimensional construct representing prejudice towards Blacks. The scale items were developed around four themes: (1) “work ethic and responsibility for outcomes,” the sense that Blacks’ failure to progress results from an unwillingness to work hard; (2) “excessive demands,” the sense that Blacks are demanding too much; (3) “denial of continuing racial discrimination,” the belief that Blacks no longer face much prejudice in society today; and (4) “underserved advantage,” the sense that Blacks have gotten more than they deserve (Henry & Sears, 2002). The SR2KS (Sears & Henry, 2002) shares a number of key features with the CoBRAS. Like the CoBRAS, the SR2KS assesses the cognitive components of Whites’ racial attitudes. The individual is asked to report explicit, consciously held views. Also like the CoBRAS, these views relate to external, societal issues. No assessment of (or reflection on) the self is solicited directly. However, in the SR2KS, the societal issues being addressed relate directly to Blacks. The 8 items ask the responder to consider statements and questions such as “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they would be just as well off as Whites;” “How much discrimination against Blacks do you feel there is in the United States today, limiting their changes to get ahead?” “Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.” Unlike the CoBRAS, where
statements are more indirect, the SR2KS measures an individual’s racial attitudes by soliciting views of “Black people” specifically. The SR2KS’ more pointed items and direct references to Blacks may increase socially desirable responding. In this sense, distortions could occur at both the levels of perception (i.e. denying that generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower classes) and responding (i.e. downplaying prejudice on the self-report measure to conform with social norms).

**Self-Report Measures: Benefits and Drawbacks.** Self-report measures provide both a convenient and inexpensive way to measure general attitudes regarding racial issues. As a result, they are the standard basis for measuring public opinion across a broad demographic swath of the population. Biernat and Carndall (1999) state that, “the heart of modern-day racial attitudes can be successfully measured through self-report” (p. 298). However, there have long been concerns about the reactivity of self-reported racial attitude measures, particularly as expressions of racism become increasingly stigmatized. In support of this concern, experimental studies done by Schuman et al. (1997) found that Whites’ racial attitudes were more tolerant when expressed to African American interviewers. Similarly, Kuklinski et al. (1997) found that a standard self-report yielded lower levels of racial animosity than did a more unobtrusive measure.

Although research suggests that measures of symbolic racism were less reactive than those of overt racism (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981), a degree of response bias likely remains. Fazio et al. (1995) found that White students were less likely to endorse expressions of modern racism in the presence of an African American experimenter than they were in front of a White experimenter. Similarly, Dunton and Fazio (1997) found that measures of “motivation to control racial prejudices” were negatively correlated with modern racism. These findings
challenge the aforementioned notion that Whites are unconcerned with the potentially problematic nature of their beliefs. They also make a case for more unobtrusive and implicit measures of racism, which are better able to curtail concealment efforts.

**Measuring Implicit Attitudes: Assessing Nonconscious Behavioral Responses.**

Implicit measures of racism have made enormous contributions to the literature on racial attitudes. In the last decade, an increasing number of measures have been made to assess racial attitudes that avoid the self-presentation and social desirability effects that compromise the validity of self-report methods. As a result, we have seen the development of implicit techniques designed to assess the less controllable, nonconscious aspects of stereotyping and prejudice. A number of implicit measures have been developed and used extensively in research. Implicit measures are thought to have relatively greater predictive validity than explicit measures in situations that are socially sensitive, where impression management processes might inhibit people from expressing negative attitudes or stereotypes. These measures are also argued to have relatively greater validity in predicting spontaneous, nonconscious behaviors.

The development of implicit, automatic measures of prejudice has been cause for excitement, both for methodological reasons and because of possible insights they may offer into nonconscious forms of prejudice. It is often assumed that explicit measures better predict abstract, deliberative behaviors, such as political preferences, jury decisions, and attitudes about race-related events (Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio et al., 1995). Implicit measures, on the other hand, are thought to better predict automatic behaviors, such as those occurring in spontaneous interpersonal interactions (Sears, 2010). However, while implicit measures may be capturing racial attitudes, they may be capturing different aspects of racial attitudes (Gawronski & Payne, 2010).
"The Implicit Association Test." The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) is currently one of the most reliable tools for measuring implicit attitudes and benefits from a large effect size (Greenwald et al., 1998; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999). The IAT is an implicit measure. It infers evaluative associations from subtle behavioral responses that cannot be controlled by respondents. In the “Race IAT,” respondents are initially asked to distinguish between Black and White faces. They press a computer key on the left to indicate that the face belongs to one racial group and press a computer key on the right to indicate that the face belongs to the second racial group. Next, the responder practices distinguishing between positive and negative words using an identical method. The next two tasks use combinations of all four categories (Black faces, White faces, positive words, negative words). In one of these two tasks, the respondent presses one key when a White or positive word is presented and presses a second key when Black or a negative word is presented. In the second task, the White faces are paired with negative words while the Black faces are paired with positive words. The implicit attitude measure produced by the IAT is based on the respondent’s relative speeds of responding in the two four-category tasks. It is assumed that response times decrease when the respondent associates two categories with each other. Variance in response times across the different tasks are taken as indications of implicit attitudinal preference. The IAT has been shown to have good predictive validity, with studies establishing correlations between IAT scores and measures of behavior (Hofmann et al., 2005; Rudman et al., 1999).

In spite of their benefits, it is important to recognize the strengths of self-report measures. Wittenbrink et al. (1997) reported that in many studies, the relationships between implicit measures and standard self-report measures were strong. Evidence that unpopular attitudes are
underreported does not alone indicate that self-reported opinions are uncorrelated with true underlying attitudes (Sears, 2010). In addition, measures of social desirability have had inconsistent and weak relationships with self-report measures, which would indicate that people were generally responding honestly.

**Research on aversive racism.** Implicit measures have been particularly helpful in researching aversive racism. Since the early 1970s, Dovidio and Gaertner (1998, 1986, 2012) have conducted numerous experimental studies in an effort to extend and clarify a theory of aversive racism. They have depended on implicit forms of assessment, which often involved observing and recording the inadvertent behaviors of (sometimes inadvertent) participants.

Aversive racists are characterized by a motivation to avoid feelings, beliefs, and behaviors that could be associated with racist intent. They sincerely aspire to be nonprejudiced and make efforts to refrain from certain behaviors when the discriminatory nature of these behaviors is obvious to others or to themselves. In order to avoid the attribution of racist intent, they may treat Blacks equally, or even more favorably, to Whites (Gaertner, 2010). In an experiment conducted by Nail, Harton, and Decker (2003), liberal participants were found to respond more positively towards a Black counterfeit than a White counterfeit when compared to more conservative participants. However, Nail and his colleagues found that only the liberal participants demonstrated elevated physiological arousal states after being touched by a Black versus White person, which the authors interpreted as an indication of aversive racists’ intrapsychic conflict (2003). Because aversive racists are more guarded about appearing prejudiced (i.e. they are invested in appearing liberal) to others and to oneself, they may consciously or unconsciously alter their responses to appear nonprejudiced. This is particularly true in contexts where race is made salient. As a result, aversive racists are prone to appear nonprejudiced on self-report
measures of prejudice (Gaertner, 2010). Recent advances in implicit attitude measurement have helped show how the conscious and unconscious forces within aversive racism operate (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004, 2012).

**Summary: Measuring Expressions of Contemporary Racism**

In this section, I have provided an overview of three self-report measures and one implicit measure used in the psychological study of White racial attitudes. I discussed the intended purpose and strengths of these measures, as well as their limitations. I have demonstrated that most self-report measures have been designed to assess the extent to which Whites downplay the prevalence of racial discrimination. This fits with the notion that explicit measures are best suited to predict conscious beliefs. In contrast, implicit tests have been designed to assess automatic, nonconscious forms of prejudice. While implicit measures may accurately capture automatic behaviors, it remains unclear to what extent the individual acknowledges these experiences. In sum, the existing measures allow researchers to measure the extent to which Whites explicitly deny the realities of racism (e.g. CoBRAS, MRS, SR2KS) as well provide evidence of their own presumably denied racism (e.g. IAT). Crucially, they do not speak to the extent to which the individual is aware of her racial antipathy, regardless of the ways it might be manifested. Currently, there is no way to measure the extent to which an individual denies or acknowledges manifestations of her own racial biases, nor any way to identify what may motivate such a denial.

**Need for Instrument Development**

Currently, there are no instruments designed to assess Whites’ appraisals of their own racial biases. As a result, while researchers can measure the extent to which an individual denies
(or acknowledges) that institutions, policies, and other people are racially biased, there is no way to measure the individual’s awareness of their own implicit racial biases. In this section, I hypothesize why this area of research has been overlooked and demonstrate its need.

A number of assumptions have prevented researchers from developing a measure to assess the denial of racial bias. In light of recent research, these assumptions are worth challenging. For example, scholars have assumed that nonconscious behaviors remain nonconscious. A belief is explicit if it is consciously endorsed (as is assessed by the CoBRAS, MRS, and SK2KS) while an intention to act is conscious if the individual is aware of taking an action for a particular reason (which is assessed by the IMS and EMS, discussed in a later section). The individual may conceal a belief or deny the motivation for a particular action, but it is assumed that she is capable of asserting the belief or identifying the intention that provides the basis for action. In contrast, a science of implicit cognition suggests that actors do not have conscious control over the implicit processes of social perception, impression formation and judgment that spurred their actions (Stevens & Fiske, 1995). Implicit measures were developed on the basis that people lack awareness of spontaneous, inadvertent behaviors.

However, sociologists and psychologists have wondered whether implicit biases can be measured by direct questions (Quillian, 2006; Dovidio and Gaertner, 1986). Fazio and Olson (2003) demonstrate people’s reflective capacity, providing evidence that processing information quickly does not foreclose the possibility of becoming aware of a spontaneous response. In other words, a lack of intentional control does not rule out the capacity for reflection. The individual can have awareness of spontaneous thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, in spite of their nonconscious origins. In sum, the individual can be conscious of the ways she may be
unconscious. Self-report measures present themselves as an ideal tool for assessing this reflective capacity.

The assumption that deep-seated biases are necessarily unconscious and inaccessible may be one reason that the proposed measure has not been developed. A second possible reason is the field’s emphasis on the individual. Historically, the field of psychology has treated racism as an individual problem—the result of a person’s beliefs or cognitions (Durrheim, Hook, & Riggs, 2009; Hook, 2008). Psychological research has often taken a personality-based approach in an attempt to identify, understand and predict varying levels of racial prejudice across individuals (see Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Fromm, 1941). While a personality-based perspective helps identify extreme levels of racial antipathy, this individualistic approach is not suited for contemporary manifestations of racism, which are ubiquitous and difficult to detect. From a critical psychological perspective, racist ideology, messages, and narratives effectively form a “background” to modern social life, informing the way people think, feel, and act. Regardless of individual or awareness, the individual remains a subject embedded within a sociocultural system, bound to receive and relay certain social messages.

To date, the literature on contemporary racism continues to rely on measures that seek to determine the intensity and content of an individual’s racial prejudice. However, a focus on whether (or to what extent) an individual is prejudiced and in what form that prejudice is expressed may not be sufficient to understanding the paradox of White racial attitudes. Given the historic socialization of Whites, it can be assumed that negative attitudes and stereotypical beliefs about Blacks are internalized and habitualized as the result of normal, adaptive cognitive processes (Devine, 1989; Dovidio and Gaertner, 2003). Whites quickly learn to differentiate
people by race, which soon becomes spontaneous, without effort or control. While some Whites may develop a conscious commitment to equality and racial justice, the deep, underlying feelings and thoughts associated with implicit processes do not disappear. Wilson et al.’s (2000) model of the mind argues that the original attitude is stored in memory and is implicit and unconscious, while the newer attitude is explicit and conscious. Explicit attitudes can change and evolve relatively easily whereas implicit attitudes, because they are based in overlearning and habitual reactions, are much more difficult to alter (Wilson, 2000). The social psychological literature suggests that cleansing oneself of unconscious biases is virtually impossible. Possessing racial biases in today’s society seems to be a fact of life for Whites (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2012).

From a critical psychological perspective, the individual is assumed to be racially biased. As an unwitting bearer of prejudicial beliefs and stereotypes, the individual’s ability to recognize racial biases suddenly becomes a critical factor in promoting nondiscriminatory behaviors. From this perspective, discrepancies between Whites’ self-reported racial attitudes and implicit biases can be expected. The individual’s awareness of discrepancies between explicit beliefs and implicit experiences becomes the subject of interest, rather than the discrepancy itself.

The implications of this theoretical shift are promising. Developing the ability to critically reflect on one’s implicit attitudes and behaviors fits with Helms’ (1990) theory of White racial identity development (Helms, 1990). From a developmental perspective, the ability to recognize one’s racial biases represents a movement away from obliviousness, towards the construction of a White anti-racist identity (Helms, 1990). However, traditional prejudice-reduction techniques often focus on changing conscious attitudes and discouraging expressions of bias. Attempts to reduce direct, traditional forms of racial prejudice have typically involved educational strategies that enhance knowledge and appreciation of other racial and cultural
groups. However, emphasizing the immorality of prejudice and negative consequences of discrimination may not be particularly effective at combating today’s covert forms of racism. Aversive racists already recognize that prejudice is bad; they do not recognize that they are prejudiced (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2004, 2012). Perhaps the best way to address aversive racists’ intrapsychic conflict is to offer educational experiences that do not abet the suppression of negative feelings and prejudicial beliefs. Whites may benefit from being able to acknowledge the insidious racial biases that continue to live on in their bodies and minds, regardless of their values and beliefs. From this perspective, recognizing racial biases may be the first step towards changing them. Hing, Li, and Zanna (2002) concluded that making people aware of their biases is particularly effective at reducing biases among people who explicitly endorse egalitarian principles. Other studies have produced similar results (Devine & Monteith, 1993; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2000; Monteith & Voils, 1998). Just as the individual can develop an awareness of implicit thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, she may be able to unlearn or self-regulate certain discriminatory behaviors (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004).

The Disavowal of Racial Bias

As discussed, much has changed since 1965, when the Jim Crow laws enforcing racial segregation in the United States were dismantled. Over the years, there have been increased efforts to ensure basic civil and political rights for African Americans and racial minorities (Winant, 2010). Alongside these structural changes, social norms have shifted. In the current cultural climate, expressions of negative racial beliefs tend to be scorned while overtly prejudiced acts are punished. Against the backdrop of an ostensibly more egalitarian society, Whites have reasons to appear and identify as nonprejudiced. However, endorsing nonprejudiced views does not eliminate the automatic prejudicial thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that Whites
are prone to experience. In fact, research suggests that discrepant attitudes often coexist (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2012).

In order to operationalize the disavowal of racial bias, the construct of racial bias must first be established. In a previous section, the definition of racial bias was seen to include prejudicial attitudes, biased thinking, and discriminatory behaviors. In accordance with this definition, the DRB will evaluate the cognitive, affective, and behavioral components of racial bias. These three components make up what is called the “tripartite model,” which is often used to discuss psychological phenomenon and is a useful framework for understanding complex constructs. In the field of counseling psychology, the tripartite model is frequently used as a basis for scale construction (e.g. Heppner et al., 1995). Although affective, cognitive, and behavioral categories are not mutually exclusive, it is hypothesized that they together best capture the various aspects of racial bias. From this perspective, the disavowal of racial bias was thought to include disavowals of negative emotions, disavowals of biased behaviors, and disavowals of prejudiced thoughts.

**Disavowal of Negative Emotions.** Whites appear to experience a range of negative emotions in response to racial stimuli. Some of these emotional responses are related to Whites’ dominant position within an oppressive racial hierarchy (Bowser and Hunt, 1996; Goodman, 2001; Kivel, 2002). In his handbook for anti-racism training, Katz (1978) helped identify Whites’ emotional reactions to racial issues. Datum (1992) wrote about similar emotional responses to race-related content in the context of the classroom. Tomlinson-Clarke and Ota-Wang (1999) have also referenced the “powerful feelings” that White students experience when discussing race and racism (p. 160). According to the literature, the emotional consequences of racism can include negative feelings such as anxiety, fear, anger, sadness, guilt, shame,
embarrassment, and apathy. Whites can experience these emotions both in response to conversations about race as well as situations directly involving issues of race.

Spanierman has extended the work of these scholars by investigating the affective costs of racism to White individuals (2004). Using Spanierman’s Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites Scale (PCRW; Spanierman, 2004), studies have explored the relationships among the emotional consequences of racism and different levels of racial awareness (Kordesh, Spanierman & Neville, 2013; Spanierman, Poteat, Beer, & Armstrong, 2006; Spanierman, Poteat, Wang & Oh, 2008). In this literature, apathy and fear are regarded to be common responses to racism (Spanierman & Cabrera, 2015). Anger is also common, and can also be a manifestation of fear (Goodman, 2011; Cabrera, 2014). Emotions such as shame and guilt are less instinctive. They are thought to reflect a sense of remorse or self-reproach, and can be indicative of a sense of individual or collective wrongdoing (Spanierman & Cabrera, 2015). Studies suggest that guilt and shame often increase in the course of racial identity development as Whites become more aware of their own personal prejudice and the prevalence of racial discrimination (Spanierman et al., 2004; 2006; 2008; 2015). Guilt and shame are often associated with acknowledging the benefits of White privilege and unearned advantages (Spanierman, 2015).

Anger and sadness. D’Andrea and Daniels (2001) have identified Whites’ overt expressions of anger when issues of racism are discussed. Whites may express anger or sadness in response to learning about racial discrimination or hearing about acts of racial violence (Spanierman, 2004). In this case, anger and sadness communicate a recognition that racial injustice exists. Ancis and Syzmanski (2001) reported similar results in their study of Whites’ reactions to reading about White privilege. In their study, Whites reacted with sadness and disgust to an exercise describing forms of White privilege (Ancis & Syzmanski, 2001).
Alternatively, Whites can also experience anger that Blacks receive “special treatment.” Whites who downplay the prevalence of racial discrimination can become angry when issues of race are highlighted. Studies suggest that there is a growing sense of racial resentment among Whites (Bobo, 2001), and that many are frustrated about the political correctness of the current cultural climate (Bonilla-Silva, Lewis & Embrick, 2004). Other Whites may experience anger as the result of the perception that they are losing power and privilege (Spanierman, 2015). According to Feagin (2010), Whites may also experience anger as the result of straightforward racial antipathy. Angry feelings can take the form of racial hatred, manifested in a sense of arrogance, superiority, and a desire for dominance (Feagin, 2010).

**Anxiety and fear.** Emotions of anxiety and fear are often related to evaluations of danger and safety (Kivel, 1996). Fear and anxiety may appear as a fear of people of other races (e.g. a White person fearing a Black person walking down the street) or a sense of anxiety in certain public spaces (e.g. in a predominantly Black neighborhood). Although associated with a perceived threat, the White individual need not be consciously aware of this threat. Evaluations of danger, as well as the negative emotions they engender, may occur outside the individual’s conscious awareness. Fear is a particularly powerful and instinctive response that can influence both thoughts and behaviors (Kernahan & Davis, 2007; Spanierman, 2015).

**The disavowal of fear and anger.** Studies suggest that Whites experience emotions differentially in accordance to racial identity states or levels of racial awareness (Spanierman, 2004). While it appears that feelings of guilt and shame are associated with higher levels of racial awareness and understanding, the more instinctive emotions of anxiety and fear are likely to be experienced by all Whites, regardless of identity status. Sadness and certain kinds of anger (e.g. anger in response to learning about the effects of systemic racial discrimination) also appear
to be associated with higher levels of racial awareness. However, like anxiety and fear, certain kinds of anger are reflective of more base responses. These manifestations of anger may be in response to the perceived “special treatment” of Blacks, reverse racism, or the constraints of the current cultural climate.

The Disavowal of Racial Bias Scale (DRB) was designed to focus on Whites’ appraisals of their automatic, spontaneous emotional responses, which may conflict with their consciously held views. As a result, DRB items refer to those powerful, instinctual emotional responses most commonly associated with low levels of racial awareness. According to the literature, the most instinctual emotional responses among Whites appear to be fear and anger. These automatic emotional reactions are most likely to exist alongside and contradict more complex thoughts and feelings. Experiencing both fear and anger in response to racial stimuli can threaten a liberal-leaning White’s self-concept as an accepting, nonjudgmental individual. For example, a White individual may be conscious that a Black person walking down the street does not pose a threat but experience heightened levels of anxiety nonetheless. Alternatively, a White individual may experience anger if she perceives a colleague received special privileges on account of being a racial minority. In both these cases, the DRB assesses the extent to which the individual denies that she experiences these nearly unavoidable emotional responses. In sum, the DRB measures disavowals of fearful and angry responses in the context of interracial interactions.

**Disavowal of Prejudiced Thoughts.** As previously discussed, the importance of race as a social category in the United States has made social categorization by race automatic (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2012). Without conscious awareness, Whites automatically differentiate people by race, with the activation of racial categories often triggered by the presence of a non-White individual. Because of sociocultural influences, these racial categories are often associated with
negative thoughts about the members of racial groups (Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001). While the prejudicial thinking produced through cognitive processes and socialization experiences appears virtually unavoidable, many Whites deny that they have prejudicial thoughts. From the perspective of aversive racism, unacknowledged implicit thoughts about Blacks can result in discriminatory behaviors (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2012).

There is ample research on Whites’ negative thoughts about people of color. In social psychology, negative thoughts have been studied as stereotypes about specific racial groups (Fiske, 1998; Jones, 1997). In this literature, there has been an emphasis on Whites’ stereotypes of Blacks (Smith, 1990; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993, 1997). Some studies and self-reported racial attitudes suggest that the consistency and negativity of racial stereotypes have declined over the course of the twenty-first century (Gilbert, 1951; Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969). However, scholars have pointed out the shortcomings of these studies and interpretations, arguing that racial stereotypes have changed rather than disappeared (Bobo, 2001; Devine & Elliot, 1995). Bobo (2001) suggested that racial stereotypes appear to have become more qualified in character, and that they are more likely to be articulated through cultural and volitional terms. Furthermore, Devine and Elliot (1995) highlighted the need to distinguish between knowledge about stereotypes and personal beliefs (Devine & Elliot, 1995). Just because an individual is familiar with a certain racial stereotype does not mean she believes it (Devine & Elliot, 1995).

However, a theory of implicit cognition suggests that Whites may still experience spontaneous thoughts in spite of their consciously held beliefs. As follows, another distinction needs to be made between an individual’s automatic thoughts and her personal beliefs. For
example, an individual who does not believe the accuracy of a certain racial stereotype may still have an automatic thought based on that same stereotype. Although scholars have demonstrated the emergence of positive racial stereotypes (Czopp & Monteith, 2006; Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2006; Madon et al., 2001), the proposed instrument will focus on the disavowal of thoughts associated with negative stereotypes. Because negative thoughts are more likely to threaten the individual’s self-concept as liberal, egalitarian, and nonprejudiced, it is hypothesized that these thoughts are more likely to be disavowed.

**Disavowal of Discriminatory Behaviors.** As overtly racist behaviors have diminished, behavioral expressions of prejudice have taken more subtle forms. Bourdieu has helped describe the ways that subtle, nonconscious behaviors reflect the larger social context (1988). According to Bourdieu, one’s actions, bodily comportment and demeanor effectively communicate unspoken values and attitudes. As Durrheim, Hook, and Riggs (2009) point out, Bourdieu’s theory of non-verbal enactments draws attention to the ways in which prejudice can be enacted through the body. Such a perspective helps to identify the prevalence and meaning of implicit behaviors associated with racial bias.

In this tradition, the concept of racial microaggressions has helped provide a framework for talking about the subtle, behavioral manifestations of racial bias. Microaggressions can refer to everyday nonverbal slights that communicate denigrating messages to a target group (Sue & Capodilupo, 2007). Although subtle in nature, they effectively communicate negative attitudes and beliefs (Sue et al., 2010). Microaggressions tend to be enacted automatically and unconsciously, regardless of intention or awareness. (Sue, Bucceri, Lin, Nadal, & Tornio, 2007). According to the literature on microaggressions, Whites often communicate racial antipathy through their preferential treatment of other Whites as well as through avoidance behaviors. The
emphasis on avoidance behaviors fits with the theory of aversive racism, in which many liberal-leaning Whites are seen to avoid interracial interactions (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). In an effort to extend this literature, the proposed instrument will measure the extent to which Whites disavow engaging in preferential or avoidance behaviors. These behaviors will be understood as inadvertent, spontaneous actions that betray prejudicial thoughts and feelings.

**Summary: The Disavowal of Racial Bias.** In this section, the disavowal of racial bias is proposed to include: (a) disavowals of negative emotions, (b) disavowals of biased behaviors, and (c) disavowals of prejudiced thoughts. Although the affective, cognitive, and behavioral dimensions of racial bias are not mutually exclusive, it is hypothesized that they capture different aspects of implicit racial bias, which are frequently denied.

Furthermore, the proposed measure may reveal relationships among the disavowals of certain thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. The relationship between affect and cognition has been the subject of extensive philosophical and psychological inquiry. In more recent years, neuroscientists have identified distinct neural pathways for separate affective and cognitive systems (Davids & Whalen, 2001; S quirre & Zola, 1996). As Amodio and Devine (2006) point out, these systems are particularly pronounced at the level of implicit processing. Few researchers have explored the relationships among affective, cognitive, and behavioral dimensions of explicit and implicit bias. One notable exception is research done by Amodio and Devine (2006). In a number of studies, Amodio and Devine (2006) found that implicit stereotyping (i.e. cognitive aspects of race bias) and evaluative race biases (i.e. affective aspects of race bias) appear to be conceptually independent constructs. In short, Amodio and Devine’s (2006) findings supported the notion that basic cognitive and affect processes are independent. Furthermore, the authors found that implicit evaluation (associated with affective processes)
corresponded with nonconscious behaviors involving minimal control (Amodio and Devine, 2006). In contrast, implicit stereotyping affects (associated with cognitive processes) were associated with more explicit behaviors that involved a higher degree of cognitive processing (Amodio and Devine, 2006). However, these results only held true when the participant remained unaware of the potentially biasing effects of thoughts and feelings (Amodio and Devine, 2006).

**Motivation to Disavow Racial Bias**

DRB items will be developed to measure the extent to which Whites disavow biased thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. To aid item construction, the concept of disavowal is likened to a form of biased responding. Specifically, it is hypothesized that minimizations of racial bias on the DRB are seen to reflect respondents’ desires to appear less prejudiced to other people and/or to themselves. Drawing from social psychological literature, these desires are seen to reflect two discrete motivational phenomena.

A theory of social desirability helps clarify these two motivational phenomena on a theoretical level. Empirical research in the area of social desirability will also lend itself to the development and initial validation of the proposed scale. To date, Plant and Devine’s (1998) research on the motivation to respond without prejudice is unique in its empirical engagement with Whites’ reflections on racially biased behavior. In this section, I will provide a brief overview of this area of research, including the development of the Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scales (IMS/EMS; Plant and Devine, 1998). I highlight key differences and potential relationships between the IMS/EMS and the proposed scale.
Response Bias. Response bias describes any systematic tendency to distort truthful responses (Paulhus, 1991). It helps explain meaningful discrepancies between people’s self-reported and actual thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Studies suggest that these biased tendencies or “sets” take the form of predictable patterns, each associated with distinct causes and consequences (Paulhus, 1991). Examples include the tendencies to select the most desirable responses, to endorse statements independent of their content, to select only extreme responses, and to select only moderate responses. Regardless of the form it takes, response biases tend to distort observed relationships among variables and can threaten the validity of a study or measure. As a result, the identification and consequent minimization of biased response sets is a concern among social scientists. This is particularly true in the area of psychological research, which depends heavily on self-report questionnaires and surveys (Paulhus, 1991).

Social Desirability. Socially desirable responding is a form of response bias in which the individual casts herself in a favorable light. Paulhus (2002) defines it as the “tendency to give overly positive self-descriptions” (p. 50).

The 2-factor model. A number of early researchers recognized that social desirability was comprised of two factors (Cattall & Sheier, 1961; Edwards, Diers, & Walker, 1962; Jackson & Messick, 1962). In 1964, Wiggins helped develop an empirical rationale for the 2-factor model after factor analyses revealed two relatively independent clusters of measures. He labeled these two factors “Alpha” and “Gamma.” With mounting evidence in favor of two empirical factors, researchers struggled to develop a theoretical explanation for the constructs undergirding two SDR factors.

Self-image and public image. Building on empirical evidence, Damarin and Messick (1965) offered a theoretical interpretation of Alpha and Gamma. They argued that Alpha
involved the defensive distortion of one’s private self-image to be consistent with a global evaluative bias. They proposed the title “autistic bias in self-regard” and associated it with personality traits such as self-esteem and ego-resiliency. Damarin and Messick (1965) labeled Gamma a “propagandistic bias” to signify a tendency to promote a desirable public image. In this case, inaccuracies in reporting were seen to reflect a desire for social approval.

**Other-deception and self-deception.** Sackeim and Gur (1979) worked to further clarify the distinction. They proposed that deception occurs both to oneself and to others. In self-deception, respondents report unrealistically positive self-depictions that they appear to genuinely believe. Drawing from the psychodynamic notion that sexual and aggressive thoughts are frequently experienced and denied, the researchers developed provocative items such as “Have you ever thought about killing someone?” In cases where the respondent overreacted to such a question (as indicated by an extreme response), she was assumed to have self-deceptive tendencies. In other-deception, respondents consciously and deliberately distorted their self-descriptions to deceive other people. To measure other-deception, the authors wrote items describing concrete desirable behaviors that would not be subject to self-deception. For example, one item read, “I always pick up my litter.” Excessive claims to such statements were thought to suggest conscious dissimulation. Sackeim and Gur’s work produced the Self-Deception Questionnaire and the Other-Deception Questionnaire (1979).

**Self-deception and impression management.** Paulhus (1984, 1986) worked to link and integrate the concepts and instruments developed by Sackeim and Gur (1979) with the integrative structure provided by Damarin and Messick (1965). He challenged the idea that other-deception was necessarily deliberate. Following Damarin and Messick (1965), Paulhus (1986) argued that the habitual presentation of a positive public impression could be construed as an aspect of
personality, rather than deception. In other words, he argued that other-deception could, like self-deception, occur on an implicit level. As a result, Paulhus (1986) replaced the term “other-deception” with “impression management.”

**Egoistic bias and moralistic bias.** Paulhus and John (1998) helped clarify these two factors further. He proposed that Alpha and Gamma were two constellations of traits and biases rooted in two fundamental values: agency and communion. Excessive adherence to either one of these values was theorized to result in discrete deceptive tendencies, which were labeled an “egoistic bias” and a “moralistic bias.” In Paulhus and John’s (1998) conceptualization, an egoistic bias is associated with agency, which is seen to be individualistic in nature. An egoistic bias is seen in the tendency to exaggerate one’s social or intellectual status, leading to unrealistically positive self-perceptions on agentic traits such as dominance, fearlessness, emotional stability, intellect, and creativity. Paulhus described high scorers in this area of aspiring to “super hero” qualities. An egoistic bias can also include impression management tendencies in which one deliberately exaggerates one’s attainment of agency values, such as the deliberate promotion of competence, fearlessness, and physical prowess (Paulhus, 2009).

Alternatively, Gamma is associated with communion values. Paulhus (2009) described the associated bias as a moralistic bias. Self-deceptive tendencies related to a moralistic bias are interpreted as denials of socially-deviant impulses. These self-deceptive tendencies are associated with claims of being sanctimonious and “saint-like.” They occur when respondents endorse overly positive self-perceptions of themselves on traits like agreeableness, dutifulness, and restraint. Impression management associated with communion involves excuse-making and damage control. This deliberate minimization of faults is often seen in settings where people strive to uphold the status quo or fear punishment.
**Self-Deception: Distortions in Perception.** Literature in the areas of psychology, cognitive science, psychoanalysis, neuroscience, and sociology affirm that self-deception is a construct capable of being measured. How can we understand the individual’s ability to unconsciously and systematically block certain kinds of information? According to both social psychological and psychodynamic theories, experiences that are in conflict with one’s perception of oneself and the world are experienced as psychologically threatening. In order to protect against conflicting aspects of experience, individuals selectively attend to or re-interpret information to be more consistent with consciously held ideas (Goleman, 1985). From a psychoanalytic point of view, these intrapsychic maneuvers are considered defense mechanisms (Freud, 1936). From a social psychological point of view, attempts at re-interpretation are referred to as cognitive strategies (Broadbent, 1958). Although conceptualizations differ, they share an assumption that people employ unconscious strategies to avoid awareness of painful stimuli. The social psychological literature suggests that these pain-avoidant strategies have an inherent logic, and are in themselves patterned, predictable, and measurable.

Deceiving oneself, or self-deception, is a particularly important area of research in the racial prejudice literature because it can describe the behavioral inconsistencies observed among well-meaning, liberal White Americans who desire (and sincerely believe themselves) to be unbiased. As D’Andrea and Daniels (2001) point out, “most racism that exists in the United States is perpetuated by millions of well-meaning, liberal-thinking White persons” (p. 294). Because these individuals consciously endorse egalitarian values and truly want to be nonprejudiced, they may be particularly motivated to become aware of and reduce unconscious racial biases. However, their investment in being nonprejudiced may simultaneously work against these ideals on an implicit level. Studies suggest that an individual is most likely to
engage in self-deceptive practices when the information encountered threatens one’s sense of self (Bobo, 2009). As follows, a desire to be nonracist may make it more difficult for the individual to acknowledge her racial biases. The proposed scale aims to identify and measure self-deceptive tendencies.

**Psychodynamic theory.** The theory of self-deception finds its genesis in Freud’s theory of the unconscious. According to Freud (1936), people avoid awareness of painful stimuli in unconscious ways. According to psychodynamic theory, experiences that are in conflict with one’s perception of oneself and the world are experienced as psychologically threatening. In order to protect against conflicting aspects of experience, individuals re-interpret information to be more consistent with consciously held ideas. These self-protective strategies are considered defense mechanisms. Because they are employed outside conscious awareness, they can be difficult to detect. However, this theory was the first to argue that defenses operate in accordance to a certain logic and can be both patterned and predictable.

**Contemporary information-processing theory.** From the perspective of information-processing theory, these defensive mechanisms take the form of cognitive strategies, which protect against anxiety by skewing attention. Broadbent’s (1958) filter model of attention shows that the mind receives more information than it can handle. The information gets to a short-term memory store—akin to sensory store—and then flows on to a selective filter, where most of it is weeded out. This filter somehow blocks all but those messages that merit fuller attention. The passage is seemingly instantaneous. The few thousandths of a second it takes allow ample time for the mind to sort through the mass of data in sensory storage and filter out irrelevancies before the information passes into conscious awareness. The information passing through the sensory store is subjected to scrutiny and filtered on the basis of its meaning and relevance.
Deception and Responses to Racial Stimuli

Building on theories of social desirability, there are two ways to approach inaccuracies in Whites’ self-reported responses to racial stimuli. The first approach assumes that, as a result of shifting social norms, Whites have become reluctant to report racial biases. This view implies (but does not assume) the presence of conscious awareness and deliberate concealment. Efforts to conform may reflect an awareness of one’s racial biases, as well as the fact that racial biases are “politically incorrect.” However, efforts to conform may also reflect more implicit attitudes, as well as a desire to be “moral” and “socially conscious.” This form of bias tends to be associated with the desire to maintain harmony, avoid conflict, and evade punishment (Paulhus, 1991).

The second approach assumes that societal changes have spawned new, more difficult-to-detect forms of prejudice. Negative racial attitudes are seen to exist outside conscious awareness, where they can be communicated via less deliberate and direct acts. People who harbor these subtler, but no less insidious, racial biases may do so without their knowledge. From this point of view, inaccuracies in one’s self-reporting are not indicative of any intentional manipulation. Instead of a distortion in the individual’s response, this second view assumes a distortion in the individual’s perception of herself. Theories of contemporary racism have helped identify new forms “covert racism,” and to discern the meanings and motivations behind their operations. In all these theories, the reality of racism is seen to be distorted and denied, albeit in different ways and for different reasons. Paulhus (1991) has shown that self-deceptive tendencies are associated with an “egoistic bias,” which involves the exaggeration of agentic traits such as dominance, fearlessness, emotional stability, control, and physical prowess (Paulhus, 1991).
Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice. To date, there has been a lack of research in the area of Whites’ ability to reflect on their racially biased emotions, thoughts, and behaviors. A notable exception is the research done by Plant and Devine (1998), which has examined the reasons Whites work to reduce prejudicial behavior. Specifically, the IMS/EMS (Plant & Devine, 1998) scale associated with this line of research prompts respondents to assess their own self-regulatory efforts in relation to racially biased behaviors. Although Plant and Devine’s scale (IMS/EMS, 1998) differs from the proposed DRB scale in significant ways, there are important similarities. Relationships between the proposed scale and the IMS/EMS (Plant & Devine, 1998) are expected, which will be used to help demonstrate the DRS’ convergent validity.

Plant and Devine’s theory of internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice helps elucidate why people may work to reduce racial prejudices. Plant and Devine (1998) drew from self-determination theory to better understand the motivation to regulate expressions of racial prejudice. Based on their studies of interracial interactions, they argued that efforts to respond without racial prejudice should be assessed along two dimensions. The first dimension, external motivation, is driven by concerns with how one will appear to others during an interracial interaction. External motivation captures the desire to appear nonracist. In the presence of external social pressure, an externally motivated individual may hide prejudices to comply with social norms and avoid public disapproval. This is often demonstrated by efforts to appear “politically correct” and is captured by the more general theories of social desirability.

The second dimension, internal motivation, is driven by concerns about how one will appear to oneself. In contrast to external motivation, internal motivation expresses the desire to be nonracist. Theoretically, the internally motivated individual reduces prejudicial behaviors in
order to uphold personal attitudes and beliefs. Rather than simply conceal prejudiced beliefs, internally motivated behavior suggests the presence of an intrinsic moral responsibility. According to Plant and Devine’s theory, a motivation to appear nonracist suggests outward compliance with social norms while a motivation to be nonracist suggests an internal sense of identity. Differentiating between these two forms of motivation has posed a challenge for researchers. As stated before, the inaccuracies in Whites’ self-reported racial attitudes raise questions. Are Whites acting less racially biased because of social dictates? Or are their efforts to reduce prejudice indicative of an internalization of society’s shifting values and a deep commitment to eliminating personal prejudices? Plant and Devine help to describe two discrete internal processes, which from the perspective of an outside observer may appear the same.

*Internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice scale (IMS/EMS).* Plant and Devine (1998) designed the IMS and EMS to measure the internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. According to the theory, external motivation to respond without prejudice reflects a desire to comply with external social pressure. In contrast, internal motivation to respond without prejudice reflects a desire to sustain a nonprejudiced self-image. In short, these two scales aim to discern between efforts to *appear* and *be* nonracist. The IMS and EMS are departures from the previous self-report measures summarized in this section. The CoBRAS, MRS, and SR2KS all directly assess one’s beliefs about larger, external, societal concerns. They are not interested in the motivational underpinnings guiding behavior and are more invested in articulating coherent belief systems. Put another way, the aforementioned theories each seek to capture how certain attitudes and beliefs “hang together.” In contrast, the IMS and EMS solicit appraisals of the motivation driving one’s own behavior. Although explicit thoughts are solicited, they are of a different order. This is significant for two reasons. First,
instead of directing attention outward, they require the respondent to reflect inward. Second, they ask why the individual acts, not how one acts. Both the IMS and EMS assume the individual makes an effort to appear or act nonprejudiced and, by making this assumption, are able to assess appraisals of this behavior. Plant and Devine’s (1998) measure does not assess whether respondents are (or consider themselves to be) prejudiced.

In this context, prejudice is not separate from its communication; it is understood as something that is enacted rather than an attitude that is held. Example items include “Because of today’s politically-correct standards I try to appear nonprejudiced towards Black people;” “I try to hide any negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid negative reactions;” “I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced towards Blacks people;” “Being nonprejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept.” In the CoBRAS and the SR2KS, social desirability issues are mitigated by the fact that respondents do not deem their views racist or generally problematic. Because they consider their beliefs to be accurate and just, they are less likely to conceal them. The IMS and EMS may be similarly robust in the face of social desirability biases due to their focus on types of motivation, neither of which is particularly stigmatized. Plant and Devine’s (1998) study seems to confirm this hypothesis. They report that the Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) and the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) were not correlated to scores on the IMS and the EMS.

Plant and Devine’s research has demonstrated that there are meaningful individual differences in the motivations that moderate explicit expressions of prejudice (E.g. Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). IMS appears to be associated with lower levels of racial prejudice on implicit measures (Devine et al., 2002; Gordjin, Hendriks, Koomen, Dijksterhuis & 66
Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, and Vance (2002) found that those high in IMS and low in EMS exhibited less implicit racial bias in a sequential priming task. Hausmann and Ryan (2004) reported that IMS was negatively related to implicit bias. Amodio, Harmon-Jones, and Devine (2003) found that high IMS/low EMS participants exhibited less racial bias as indexed by differential startle eye blinks to Black and White face stimuli. However, there is also evidence to support the notion that biases persist regardless and independent of internal and external motivation Saucier et al. (2005). Research has not revealed that a decline in explicit racism precipitates a decline in implicit racism.

Plant and Devine’s (1998) self-report IMS and EMS measures, which ask respondents why they respond without prejudice, are unique in this respect. Consistent with the other self-report measures mentioned above, the IMS and EMS directly solicit conscious assessments. However, in this case, the conscious assessment is of the motivation driving a certain behavior rather a belief. The respondent is prompted to turn her attention on herself, and to critically reflect on her behavior. It’s worth noting that there are two assumptions here: that respondents are in fact driven to respond without prejudice and that they are consciously aware of what drives this behavior.

In sum, Plant and Devine (1998) devised a scale for people who were driven to respond without prejudice, which allowed them to explore why they were so inclined. They assume that people are capable of acknowledging the negative feelings and thoughts that may cause prejudicial behaviors. In other words, this scale assumes that Whites are conscious and capable of reporting what drove them to respond in a presumably unbiased way.

Similarly, the proposed instrument will assume respondents have implicit racial biases. However, the proposed instrument seeks to determine the extent to which an individual is aware...
of this unsettling fact. Unlike Plant and Devine (1998), there is no assumption that the individual has access to this knowledge. It is hypothesized that people frequently distort the extent to which they are racially biased, both to others (out of a fear of social disapproval) and unconsciously to themselves (to mitigate the distress of internal conflict).

**Purpose of the Proposed Study**

This chapter began by contrasting White Americans’ optimistic perceptions of racism with well-documented racial realities. Inaccuracies were seen in the ways Whites assessed both societal racism and personal prejudice. After establishing the inaccuracies common to Whites’ views of racial realities, explanations offered by theories of contemporary racism were explored. Next, the methods used to measure expressions of contemporary racism were discussed. I argue that Whites’ conscious appraisals of their implicit racial biases have been overlooked in the literature. In order to support research in this area, a scale is needed to measure Whites’ awareness of unintentional racism.

I have demonstrated the need for an instrument to assess the disavowal of racial biases. In an aim to address this need, I have developed the Disavowal of Racial Bias Scale (DRB), which measures the extent to which Whites acknowledge having implicit racial biases. A review of the literature helped identify three aspects of racial bias: (a) negative feelings, (b) prejudicial thoughts, and (c) discriminatory behaviors. I argue that while racial biases may originate spontaneously, the individual has the capacity to acknowledge and identify them. In fact, an awareness of these biases is seen as a necessary first step to combating them. This view fits with White identity development theory (Helms, 1990), where movement towards an anti-racist identity involves acknowledging one’s role in perpetuating racial injustice.
Chapter 3

METHOD

The method outlined in the present chapter will document the creation of the Disavowal of Racial Bias Scale (DRB). DeVellis (2017) has provided a set of specific steps to use in scale development. The following sections are ordered in accordance to this guideline.

Creation of Initial Item Pool

The development of an item pool begins with theory driven conceptualizations (DeVellis, 2017). As explained in Chapter Two, the initial items were drawn from the psychology literature on implicit racial biases. Items were developed to capture the themes that emerged from this literature, which consisted of negative emotions, prejudicial thoughts, and discriminatory behaviors. Item development was further informed by the social desirability literature, which describes response characteristics that reflect impression management and self-deception biases.

A large pool of potential items was assembled to offer statements describing experiences of spontaneous feelings, thoughts, and behaviors, which could be acknowledged or denied. As insurance against poor internal consistency, DeVellis (2017) suggests having a large item pool with three to four times the number of items desired to be in the final scale. As a result, 48 items were generated from the theoretical and empirical literature. A modified 6-point Likert scale was selected as the response format, which is typical of instruments measuring opinions, beliefs, and attitudes (DeVellis, 2017). Items were presented as declarative sentences, followed by response options indicating varying degrees of agreement, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Response items were written so as to have roughly equal intervals with respect to agreement.
Reduction of Initial Item Pool

After the initial item development stage was complete, the items were presented to a number of experts to assess content validity. First, the items were presented to four counseling psychology doctoral students who conduct research in the areas of racial attitudes, minority stress, and scale development. They were asked to review items for relevance and clarity, which reduced the item pool to 43. Second, two anti-racist activists who specialize in working with White people at various stages of racial identity development reviewed the items with a particular focus on clarity and conciseness. Based on their feedback, the wording of seven items was changed and the item pool was reduced to 42. Lastly, the reduced item pool was submitted for independent review to four psychologists with expertise in racial bias research. They were asked for feedback on the relevance and clarity of items as well as whether there were any overlooked items. Based on this final round of feedback, the item pool was further reduced to 38.

Procedures

Data was collected in September and October of 2017. Participants were recruited online using various social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. The study was advertised as a survey about the role of race in daily life. From the online recruitment materials, participants were directed to an online survey hosted by Qualtrics, a widely-used, secure, and HIPPA-compliant online survey database and data management system. The survey began with an informed consent page, which asked respondents to confirm that they were 18 years of age or older. Once respondents confirmed that they met the age criteria, they were asked to read the informed consent. If they gave consent to participate, they were then prompted to complete the survey. All recruitment and survey materials were approved by Teachers College IRB (Protocol # 17-185).
Participants

A total of 1422 White participants completed the demographic questionnaire. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 81 (\(M = 48.48, SD = 13.50, Mdn = 46\)). Roughly 83% of the sample identified as women, 16% identified as men, and less than 1% identified as transgender or gender non-conforming. In terms of sexual orientation, 85% of the sample identified as straight/heterosexual, 6% identified as bisexual, 7% identified as gay or lesbian, and 1% as “other” sexual orientation (e.g. asexual, pansexual). In terms of social class, 3% self-identified as upper class, 26% as upper-middle class, 48% as middle class, 17% as working class, and 5% as low income/poor. Approximately 42% of participants had completed some graduate studies, 33% had completed a 4-year college degree, 14% had completed some college courses, and 6% had discontinued education after earning their high school diploma. In terms of political affiliations, 89% of participants voted for the Democratic candidate in the 2016 presidential election. Of the remaining participants, 2% voted for the Republican candidate, 2% voted for the Independent candidate, 2% voted for another candidate, and 3% did not vote. In terms of belief systems, 35% identified as Christian, 6% identified as Jewish, 3% identified as Buddhist, 20% identified as Atheist, 22% identified as agnostic, and 14% identified as having other religious affiliations (e.g. Muslim, Hindu). Of these, 14% self-identified as very religious/spiritual, 48% as somewhat religious/spiritual, 28% as not at all religious/spiritual.

A total of 1,278 individuals responded to at least one survey item. 264 individuals left 1 or more items blank on the DRB scale and were subsequently removed. Individuals missing more than 20% of overall data (excluding the demographic questions) were also removed. The data cleaning procedures resulted in a sample of 1,158 participants.
**Split Sample.** The development sample was deemed sufficiently large to split. As a result, the development sample of 1,158 participants was split into two subsamples. Using SPSS 24, participants were randomly assigned to one of two equal groups.

Splitting the sample enabled two distinct phases of analysis. Phase 1 used data from the first group of 579 participants to determine the underlying factor structure of the DRB. This primary development sample was used to evaluate items, compute alphas, adjust scale length, and determine an optimal version of the scale. In Phase 2, data from the second group of 579 participants was analyzed to confirm the factor structure identified in Phase 1. This second subsample was used to cross-check and replicate findings.

**Phase 1.** For Phase 1, data from 579 participants was analyzed. All participants self-identified as White and were over the age of 18. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 81 ($M = 48.48$, $SD = 13.50$, $Mdn = 47$). A significant majority of the sample identified as women (84.1%). 15% of the remaining participants identified as men and less than 1% identified as transgender or gender non-conforming. In terms of sexual orientation, 85.7% of the sample identified as straight/heterosexual, 7.3% identified as gay or lesbian, 5.5% identified as bisexual, and 1.5% as an “other” sexual orientation (e.g. asexual, pansexual). In terms of social class, 3.3% self-identified as upper class, 28.7% as upper-middle class, 49.1% as middle class, 15% as working class, and 3.8% as low income/poor. In terms of education level, 42.7% of participants had completed a graduate degree, 32.5% had completed a 4-year college degree, 21% had completed at least some college courses, and 3.8% had discontinued education after earning their high school diploma. In terms of political affiliations, 90.5% of participants voted for the Democratic candidate in the 2016 presidential election. Of the remaining participants, 2.9% did not vote, 1% voted for the Republican candidate, 2.4% voted for the Independent candidate, and...
2.8% voted for an “other” candidate. In terms of belief systems, 33.3% identified as Christian, 5.4% identified as Jewish, 3.1% identified as Buddhist, 22.5% identified as Atheist, 21.6% identified as Agnostic, and 13.4% identified as having a different religious affiliation (e.g. Muslim, Hindu). Of these, 49.4% identified as somewhat religious/spiritual, 38.5% as not at all religious/spiritual, and 12.1% identified as very religious/spiritual.

**Phase 2.** For Phase 2, data from a second group of 579 participants was analyzed. Demographic characteristics did not vary significantly between the two groups. All participants self-identified as White and were over the age of 18. Participants ranged in age from 20 to 77 ($M = 48.48$, $SD = 13.50$, $Mdn = 47$). 82.2% of the sample identified as women, 16.9% identified as men, and less than 1% identified as transgender or gender non-conforming. In terms of sexual orientation, 84.5% of the sample identified as straight/heterosexual, 7.1% identified as gay or lesbian, 6.6% identified as bisexual, and 1.7% as an “other” sexual orientation (e.g. asexual, pansexual). In terms of social class, 2.6% identified as upper class, 25.2% as upper-middle class, 45.9% as middle class, 20.4% as working class, and 5.4% as low income/poor. In terms of education level, 45.1% of participants had completed a graduate degree, 30.9% had completed a 4-year college degree, 19.7% had completed at least some college courses, 4.1% had discontinued education after earning their high school diploma, and less than 1% did not complete high school. In terms of political affiliations, 88.9% of participants voted for the Democratic candidate in the 2016 presidential election. Of the remaining participants, 3.5% did not vote, 3.1% voted for the Independent candidate, 2.2% voted for the Republican candidate, and 1.7% voted for an “other” candidate. In terms of belief systems, 34.5% identified as Christian, 4.3% identified as Jewish, 3.6% identified as Buddhist, 17.6% identified as Atheist, 24.4% identified as Agnostic, and 15.4% identified as having another religious affiliation (e.g.
Muslim, Hindu). Of these, 45.9% identified as somewhat religious/spiritual, 37.7% as not at all religious/spiritual, and 16.1% identified as very religious/spiritual.

**Measures**

In addition to the DRB, all 579 participants completed a demographic questionnaire with the following measures to evaluate convergent and discriminant validity of the DRB scores.

**Demographic Questionnaire.** Participants were asked to identify their race, age, gender, sexual orientation, social class status, income, level of education, religious affiliation, level of religiosity, geographical region, the number of years they had lived in the United States, and who they voted for in the 2016 presidential election.

**CoBRAS Color-blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS).** The CoBRAS (Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee & Brown, 2000) was used to assess color-blind racial attitudes among participants. As discussed previously, racial color-blindness is the distortion, denial, or minimization of the importance of race. The measure consists of 20 items, which are divided into three subscales. Participants rated their level of agreement on a 6-point Likert scale (1=strongly agree, 6 = strongly disagree) to statements about racial privilege, institutional discrimination, and blatant racial issues. For example, participants were asked to respond to statements such as, “White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin,” and “Social policies such as affirmative action, discriminate unfairly against white people.”

The psychometric properties of the CoBRAS measure were established over the course of five studies, with the largest sample consisting of 594 participants. Previous research suggests the CoBRAS (2000) has solid psychometric properties with White samples. The Cronbach’s alpha for the total CoBRAS scale was .84 to .91. The Cronbach’s alpha for three subscales were as follows: $\alpha = .71$ to $.83$ for Racial Privilege; $\alpha = .73$ to $.81$ for Institutional Discrimination; $\alpha$
=.70 to .76 for Blatant Racial Issues. The test-retest reliability coefficients for the total and subscales were \( r = .80, .80, .35 \) respectively. The Guttman split-half reliability for the total CoBRAS was \( r = .72 \).

For the current study, certain items were reverse scored. Total scale and subscale scores were generated for all participants. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the Phase 1 sample was .87. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the Phase 2 sample was .82.

**Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (SR2KS).** Sears & Henry’s (2002) SR2KS was used to measure Whites’ beliefs about Blacks by assessing endorsements of certain societal views. The themes addressed in the development of this measure include: (1) “work ethic and responsibility for outcomes,” the sense that Blacks’ failure to progress results from an unwillingness to work hard; (2) “excessive demands,” the sense that Blacks are demanding too much; (3) “denial of continuing racial discrimination,” the belief that Blacks no longer face much prejudice in society today; and (4) “underserved advantage,” the sense that Blacks have gotten more than they deserve (Henry & Sears, 2002). The instrument is an 8-item Likert-type self-report inventory composed of two subscales: (1) Traditional Racial Attitudes and (2) Political Predisposition. Example statements include: “Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up, Blacks should do the same,” “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower classes,” and “Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.” Data from five studies was used to establish and test the psychometric properties of this measure. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the total score ranged from .59 to .79 across the samples. In sum, the SR2KS has demonstrated questionable reliability as well as
acceptable construct validity and may offer a way to measure Whites’ conscious attributions of Blacks’ disadvantages.

For the current study, certain items were reverse scored and total scores were generated for all participants. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the Phase 1 sample was .76. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the Phase 2 sample was .76.

**Internal/External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (IMS/ EMS).**

Plant and Devine’s (1998) IMS and EMS scales were designed to assess an individual’s internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. Internal motivation is understood to reflect the internalization of nonprejudiced values. External motivation is understood to reflect a desire to comply with social pressures. The 10-item measure is rated on a Likert-type self-report inventory. Each point is rated on a 9-point Likert-type scale. The measure is composed of two distinct scales: (1) Internal Motivation Scale (IMS) and (2) External Motivation Scale (EMS). Based on a review of the literature on prejudice, the authors developed an initial 19-point instrument to measure two discrete motivational phenomena. Principal components analysis with oblique rotation resulted in a 15-item, 2-factor measure. Using LISREL 7, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) indicated that a 2-factor solution provided the best fit for their data. The CFA also resulted in the removal of 5 items, leaving a 10-item, 2-factor measure. Validation of the measure was established with three samples, with N = 135, 247, and 1,363. The Cronbach’s alpha for the two subscales were as follows: $\alpha = .81$ to $.85$ for the Internal Motivation Scale; $\alpha = .76$ to $.80$ for the External Motivation Scale. The nine-week test-retest reliability coefficients were $r = .77$ and $.60$ respectively.

For the current study, certain items were reverse scored and two subscale scores were generated for all participants. For Phase 1, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the Internal
Motivation Scale was .78 and the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the External Motivation Scale was .65. For Phase 2, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the Internal Motivation Scale was .76 and the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the External Motivation Scale was .69. For both samples, participants reported high levels of internal motivation to respond without prejudice. Of note, scores were skewed negatively (-3.00). More than 95% of participants reported high levels of internal motivation and nearly 50% of participants had a maximum score of 45. Participants’ External Motivation scores were lower and more evenly distributed (M = 17.79, SD = 9.14, Mdn = 16).

The Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites Scale (PCRW). Spanierman & Heppner’s (2004) PCRW was designed to measure the affective, cognitive, and behavior consequences Whites experience as the result of their position within a racially oppressive society. The PCRW scale consists of 16 self-report items. Each item is rated on a 6-point Likert-type scale and consists of three subscales: (1) White Empathic Reactions Toward Racism; (2) White Guilt; and (3) White Fear of Others. The scale was constructed over the course of several steps. First, an initial pool of 39 items was generated according to relevant literature on Whiteness. A tripartite model was used to assess the feelings, thoughts, and behaviors associated with Whites’ racial experiences. Second, five doctoral students in counseling psychology provided feedback in relation to the content and clarity of the items. Next, a panel of experts was consulted, resulting in the editing of several items, the deletion of four items, and the addition of one item. Principle components analysis was conducted to inform the exploratory factor analysis (EFA), with a 3-factor solution emerging as the best fit for the data. An EFA was subsequently conducted using maximum likelihood extraction with oblique rotation. Items were deleted if they correlated to multiple factors or had structure coefficients less than .35. Confirmatory factor analysis was used
to confirm the 3-factor structure in the final 16-item measure. Cronbach’s alpha for the subscale scores ranged from .63 to .78. For the current study, certain items were reverse scored. Three subscale scores were generated for all participants. For Phase 1, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the PCRW was .64. For Phase 2, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the PCRW was .62.

**Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR).** Paulhus’ (1988) BIDR was designed to measure patterns in response bias related to self-deception and impression management. Self-deception refers to the tendency to give positively biased self-reports. Impression management refers to deliberate changes in self-presentation in order to appear a certain way to other people. The BIDR scale consists of 40 self-report items, each of which is rated on a 6-point Likert-type scale. There are two subscales: (1) Self-Deceptive Enhancement (SDE) and (2) Impression Management (IM). Typical alphas for the SDE subscale are .67–.77 while typical alphas for the IM subscale are .77–.85.

For the current study, certain items were reverse scored and two subscale scores were generated for all participants. For Phase 1, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the Self-Deceptive Enhancement items was .70 and the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the Impression Management items was .78. For Phase 2, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the Self-Deceptive Enhancement items was .74 and the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the Impression Management items was .82. For both samples, participants reported higher levels of impression management than self-deception, which is consistent with previous studies (IM: $M = 6.75, SD = 3.61, Mdn = 6.00$; SDE: $M = 5.02, SD = 3.32, Mdn = 4.00$).
There are different strategies used to construct psychological measures (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). Theoretical, rational and logical approaches, which rely on the developer’s judgment as well as the psychological literature, have become less popular methods for scale development (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). An empirical approach, which uses statistical analyses of item responses as the basis for item selection, has been deemed preferable (Stevens, 2002; Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). This study employs an empirical approach, relying on factor analysis to form homogenous item groupings.

**Phase 1: Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)**

In Phase 1, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted using SPSS 24 with data from the first sample of 579 participants. The aim of the EFA was to determine the factor structure underlying the 38 DRB scale items. Specifically, the EFA helped identify how many factors were present and to what extent they were correlated.

**Preliminary Analysis.** Before conducting the EFA, the sample size and the performance of the initial 38 DRB items were examined.

**Sample size.** Sufficient sample size is determined by both the absolute and relative number of subjects (DeVellis, 2017). According to a number of guidelines, a sample of 300 is considered adequate and above 500 is considered very good (DeVellis, 2017; Comrey, 1988; Tinsley & Tinsley, 1987). However, the number of items and number of anticipated factors can also be important. Although the ratio of subjects to items becomes less important with large samples, Tinsley & Tinsley (1987) have suggested a ratio of 5 to 10 subjects per item. As
follows, the subsample size of 579 participants for Phase 1 was deemed large enough to yield reliable estimates of correlations among the variables and to replicate the same factor structure in Phase 2.

**Preliminary analysis of 38 initial DRB items.** The possible total score range for the 38 item DRB was from 38 to 228, with lower scores suggesting higher levels of disavowal. In Sample 1, total scores ranged from a minimum of 38 to a maximum of 187. The mean total score was 90.68 (SD = 23.75). The Shapiro-Wilk statistic indicated that scores were non-normally distributed, W(579) = .992, p = .003. The distribution had a skewness of .268 (SE = .102) and kurtosis of .068 (SEI = .203).

DRB items had a possible range from 1 to 6. In Sample 1, item means ranged from 1.57 to 4.24 with an overall item mean of 2.38. This mean was lower than the center of the scale (3.50). The scores on a number of items were highly positively skewed. Fifteen items had skewness greater than 1.0, indicating that the scores on these items were non-normally distributed.

**Factorability Evaluation.** For the Phase 1 Sample, a correlation matrix was created for the 38 DRB items. Of the inter-item correlations displayed, there were a number of correlations of $r = .3$ or greater. No correlations exceeded $r = .9$, suggesting the absence of multicollinearity. Next, Bartlett’s (1950) Test of Sphericity was used to estimate the probability that the correlations in the matrix were 0. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant, $X^2(703, N = 579) = 8925.28, p < .001$. However, Bartlett’s Test is likely to be significant for large samples. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy, which accounts for the relationship of partial correlations to the sum of squared correlations, indicates the extent to
which a correlation matrix actually contains factors or simply chance correlations between a small subset of variables. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) suggested that a value of .60 and higher is required for good factor analysis. For the Phase 1 sample, the KMO was significant and, at .923, was above the suggested cut-off. The scale was deemed to be appropriate for factor analysis.

**Factor Extraction.** There are a number of factor-extraction methods available to researchers. Principal-components analysis (PCA) and common factors analysis (FA) are two common empirical approaches (DeVellis, 2017, Stevens, 2002). While there is support for both PCA and FA in the counseling psychology literature, FA is better suited for exploratory procedures (DeVellis, 2017, Stevens, 2002, Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). The aim of FA is to understand the latent factors that account for the shared variance among items, which makes it a preferred procedure in the development of new scales (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). FA was selected as the factor-extraction method for the current study.

There are several techniques of FA, including principal-axis factoring, maximum likelihood, image factoring, alpha factoring, and unweighted and generalized least squares. Gerbing and Hamilton (1996) have shown that principal-axis factoring and maximum likelihood approaches are relatively equal in their capacities to extract the best model. However, Gorsuch (1997) points out that maximum-likelihood extractions result in occasional problems that do not occur with principal-axis factoring. As a result, principle-axis factoring (PAF) was selected as the form of FA for the current study.

FA rotation methods include two basic types: orthogonal and oblique. Researchers use orthogonal rotations when the set of factors underlying a given item set are assumed or known to be uncorrelated (DeVellis, 2017, Stevens, 2002, Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). Selection of
an orthogonal or oblique rotation during the initial FA can be based on either theory or data. However, many argue that factors can be assumed to be correlated in most cases and that oblique rotations constitute “good practice” (Stevens, 2002; Worthington and Whittaker 2006). If an orthogonal rotation were to be used with correlated factors, loadings can be overestimated and the factor structure becomes difficult to replicate in CFA. In the current study, both the theory and data suggested that the factors underlying the DRB items would be correlated. Promax, an oblique rotation, was selected for the current study.

**Factor Retention.** Three methods were used in deciding how many factors to retain: the eigenvalue rule (Kaiser, 1960), the scree test (Cattell, 1966), and parallel analysis (Hayton, Allen, & Scarpello, 2004). Kaiser’s criterion was used to extract components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. According to the eigenvalues, 7 factors explained 45.47% of the variance. However, the 1.0 eigenvalue cutoff tends to be generous and can lead to excessive factor retention (DeVellis, 2017). Next, the scree plot was examined to see how the eigenvalues dropped across successive factors (DeVellis, 2017). The scree plot of the factor loadings was consulted to determine the “cut off” where eigenvalues account for significantly less variance. The location of an “elbow” on the scree plot suggested a 5-factor solution (See Figure 1). However, the scree test relies heavily on factor interpretability (DeVellis, 2017). A parallel analysis method (Hayton, Allen, & Scarpello, 2004) was also used. A parallel analysis method posits that the eigenvalue of any retained factor should be greater than the corresponding eigenvalue associated with a randomly generated data set comprised of the same number of variables and participants (DeVellis, 2017). The parallel analysis suggested a 4-factor solution.

Further exploration involved reanalyzing the data specifying 2-factor, 3-factor, 4-factor, and 5-factor solutions. This process allowed comparisons between solutions to determine the
best model. Factor loadings, cross-loadings and the interpretability of factors were considered. Particular attention was paid to items with a factor loading of less than .4 or a relative discrepancy between the factor loading and cross loading of less than .15. Factors with less than 3 items were also noted.

The 2-factor, 3-factor, 4-factor, and 5-factor solutions were all examined. In all solutions, the negative emotion items and discriminatory/avoidance behavior items clustered together, comprising a single factor. As hypothesized, these items did not overlap with items describing the idea of racial bias, which consistently emerged as a separate factor. The 2-factor solution revealed a first factor with emotion/behaviors items and second factor with racial bias factors. In
the 3-factor solution, the third factor contained a number of prejudicial thought items. The 4-factor solution divided the prejudicial thought items into two separate factors, each with a small number of mostly reverse-coded items. In this model, the fourth factor had 3 items, all of which had low loadings in the 2-factor and 3-factor solutions. The 4-factor solution failed to separate the emotion and behavior items into two factors, as initially hypothesized. The 5-factor model similarly failed to separate these two categories of items. In addition to a factor with many emotion/behavior items, racial bias items and prejudicial thought items were each divided into two additional factors. Two of these factors had only two items and both were difficult to interpret.

**Testing the 3-Factor Model.** Initially, the 3-factor model was selected due to interpretability based on the literature. The EFA item loadings were first identified using SPSS 24, which considered both the correlations among factor items as well as their correlations with all scale items. Next, Mplus (Muthen & Muthen, 2015) was used on the same data set to estimate the fit of the 3-factor model. Mplus does not account for the correlations among all items and is thus more conservative. Model fit was assessed via several indices including chi-square (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004), root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) (Byrne, 1998; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Steiger, 1990), standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) (Kline, 2015), and the comparative fit index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990).

The results of the MPlus analysis were as follows: \( \chi^2 (374) = 2542.56, p < .001 \); RMSEA = .100, 90% CI [.096 -.104]; SRMR = .095; CFI = .677. The \( \chi^2 \) was statistically significant. However, Schumacker and Lomax (2004) have noted that the chi-square statistic is affected by sample size with samples above 200 producing a significant probability level. Factor loadings or parameter estimates, which can be interpreted as validity coefficients, suggested that some items
were not good measures of the latent construct (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). While all critical values appeared statistically significant (p < .001), they ranged from .154 to .774. The standardized residual variance values fell between .478 and .976. The R-square values, which provided information on how much variance is explained by the variables, should have been > .50 for each item. However, a number of the scale items fell below this threshold, with a range from .074 to .600. Overall, these values suggested a poor model fit. Standardized parameter estimates (or factor loadings) and modification indices (MI) were used to identify changes that would improve model fit. Using these values, additional items were deleted. However, the model fit remained poor: $X^2 (321) = 2056.85$, p < .001; RMSEA = .097, 90% CI [.093 - .101]; SRMR = .097; CFI = .717.

The MPlus analysis revealed an additional issue with the 3-Factor model. The correlation between Factor 2 and Factor 3 was shown to be .969, suggesting that items loading on both factors were in fact measuring the same thing. Upon closer examination, nearly all items that loaded on Factor 3 were reverse-coded. Thus, Factor 3 appeared to be a method factor. In consultation with dissertation committee members, Factor 2 and Factor 3 were combined. Thus, the 2-factor solution was determined to provide the best model.

**Item Retention and Deletion.** In an effort to increase the specificity and stability of the two identified factors, item retention was determined by the magnitude of factor loadings and cross loadings. Items were removed based on the recommendations of Stevens (2002), who suggests that only items with factor loadings greater than .40 be used for interpretation. Items with a relative discrepancy between the factor loading and cross-loading of less than .15 were
Table 1

*Factor Loadings for EFA with Promax Rotation of 26 Retained DRB Items*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items by Factor Loading</th>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If a stranger starts up a conversation with me, I am more uneasy if they are of a different race (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.814</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am less concerned about a person talking to themselves on the street if they are the same race as me (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.767</td>
<td>-0.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When someone of a different race joins me in the elevator, I feel nervous (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am more likely to offer assistance to someone of my own race (32)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.725</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel more comfortable asking for the time from a stranger who shares my racial identity (8)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.725</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At night, I am more likely to cross the street if the person walking towards me is of a different race (33)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.692</td>
<td>-0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In choosing a seat on public transportation, I am more likely to sit next to a person of my own race, if I have the option (28)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am more suspicious of someone walking behind me if they are of a different race than me (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When someone asks me for directions, their race may affect my instinct to respond (30)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If someone knocked on my door for help, their race would impact my response (34)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel more relaxed around members of my own racial group (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am more distressed by a murder if the victim is the same race as me (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.577</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a stranger is being friendly to me, I am more likely to think that they want something if they are of a different race than me (18)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.567</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel more safe in neighborhoods where I am in the racial majority (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The idea of going to a party where I am the only member of my racial group makes me anxious (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.509</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When someone is arrested for a crime, their race may influence my initial belief in their guilt or innocence (16)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am more likely to remember someone’s face if they are the same race as me (27)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without meaning to, I have acted in ways that are racially biased (36)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>0.807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes have racially biased thoughts (21)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes have thoughts about race that are not consistent with my values (22)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without meaning to, I occasionally say things that could be construed as racist (37)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>0.747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have sometimes doubted my ability to act in a non-racist way (38)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes I make snap judgments based on race (20)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't jump to conclusions based on race (19)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When meeting someone for the first time, I do not make any assumptions based on race (13)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have never thought of a racial insult (14)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>0.472</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Factor loadings > .40 are in boldface. Number in parentheses identify original item number.
also removed. Using these cut-offs, 12 items from the original 38 items were deleted. Specifically, items 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31, and 35 were deleted. The result was a 26-item measure that accounted for 42.14% of the total variance. The factor loadings and cross-loadings for the 26 retained items are listed in Table 1.

The initial EFA item loadings were identified using SPSS 24, which considered both the correlations among factor items as well as their correlations with all scale items. Mplus 7.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 2015) was used on the same data set to estimate the fit of the 26-item 2-factor model and to identify additional items for deletion. Mplus does not account for the correlations among all items and is thus more conservative. Model fit was assessed via several indices including chi-square (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004), root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) (Byrne, 1998; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Steiger, 1990), standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) (Kline, 2015), and the comparative fit index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990).

The results of the MPlus analysis on the 26 retained DRB items were as follows: $\chi^2 (298) = 2234.04$, $p < .001$; RMSEA = .106, 90% CI [.102 - .110]; SRMR = .092; CFI = .696. The $\chi^2$ was statistically significant. However, Schumacker and Lomax (2004) have noted that the chi-square statistic is affected by sample size with samples above 200 producing a significant probability level. Standardized parameter estimates, which can be interpreted as validity coefficients, suggested that some items were not good measures of the latent construct (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). While all critical values appeared statistically significant ($p < .001$), they ranged from .234 to .745. The standardized residual variance values fell between .445 and .945. The R-square values, which provide information on how much variance is explained by the variables, should be > .50 for each item. However, a number of the scale
Figure 2
Diagram of DRB-26 model with standardized loadings, residuals, and standard error

Note. Circles represent factors. Squares represent scale items. Straight arrows indicate loadings. Curved lines indicate covariance between factors. Numbers in parentheses are standard error.
items fell below this threshold, with a range from .055 to .516. Overall, these values suggested a poor model fit. A diagram depicting the 2-factor 26-item model with standardized regression loadings, residuals, and standard error is represented in Figure 2.

Standardized parameter estimates (or factor loadings) and modification indices (MI) were used to identify changes that would improve model fit. Using these values, two additional items were deleted resulting in a 24-item measure. Specifically, items 3 and 27 were deleted. However, the model fit remained poor: $X^2 (251) = 1679.46$, $p < .001$; RMSEA = .099, 90% CI [.095 - .104]; SRMR = .077; CFI = .747.

**Scale Characteristics.** After a total of 14 items were deleted, 24 items remained. The 2-factor 24-item model accounted for 43.44% of the total variance. For the 24-item DRB, possible total scale scores ranged from 24 to 144, with lower scores suggesting higher levels of disavowal. For Sample 1, total scores ranged from a minimum of 24 to a maximum of 130. The mean total score was 59.17 (SD = 16.50). Total scores were approximately normally distributed, with skewness of .247 ($SE = .102$) and kurtosis of .068 ($SEI = .203$).

**Factor Characteristics.** For Factor 1, possible subscale scores ranged from 15 to 90, with lower scores suggesting lower levels of awareness of anxiety and avoidance responses to racial stimuli. For Sample 1, Factor 1 subscale scores ranged from a minimum of 15 to a maximum of 78. The mean total score was 29.43 (SD = 10.01). Total scores were non-normally distributed, with skewness of .680 ($SE = .102$) and kurtosis of .394 ($SEI = .203$). Overall, scores on Factor 1 items were consistently negatively skewed. Eleven of the fifteen items had a skewness greater than 1.0. Three items had a skewness greater than 2.0. Item means ranged from 1.52 to 2.99 with an overall item mean of 1.96. This mean was lower than the center of the scale (3.50).
For Factor 2, possible subscale scores ranged from 9 to 54, with lower scores suggesting lower levels of awareness of implicit racial bias. For Sample 1, Factor 2 subscale scores ranged from a minimum of 9 to a maximum of 52. The mean total score was 29.74 (SD = 10.01). Total scores were more normally distributed, with skewness of $-0.109$ ($SE = 0.102$) and kurtosis of $-0.575$ ($SEI = 0.203$). Unlike Factor 1 subscale scores, scores on Factor 2 items were not significantly skewed. No items had a skewness that exceeded $±1.0$. Item means ranged from 2.62 to 4.24 with an overall item mean of 3.30. The Factor 2 item mean of 3.3 was closer to the center of the scale (3.50).

**Factor Descriptions.** Factor 1 included 15 items and accounted for 33% of the total variance. Factor 1 was renamed *Bias Examples*. *Bias Examples* included items drawn from the categories of negative emotional responses, prejudicial thoughts, and discriminatory behaviors. Although the affective, cognitive, and behavioral expressions of implicit bias were hypothesized to fall on three separate factors, the fact that all items referred to specific examples of implicit racial bias increased its interpretability. For example, *Bias Examples* items described hypothetical scenarios in which subjects spoke to strangers, encountered people on elevators, and selected seats on public transportation.

Factor 2 included 7 items and accounted for 10.44% of the total variance. Factor 2 was renamed *Bias Existence*. *Bias Existence* included statements describing a more general awareness of implicit racial bias (rather than examples of bias). Put another way, *Bias Existence* items captured an awareness of the presence of implicit racial bias rather than specific manifestations of this bias. For example, *Bias Existence* items described the experience of having thoughts that contradict one’s values, making snap judgements about race, and doubting one’s ability to act in a non-racist way.
Phase 2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)

In Phase 2, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted using Mplus with data from the second sample of 579 participants. The aim of the CFA was to confirm a pattern of relationships among DRB factors on the basis of the Phase 1 analysis. The 2-factor model of the DRB was thus established a priori. The second subsample was used to assess the fit of the 2-factor 24-item model.

Mplus (Muthen & Muthen, 2015) was again used to estimate the fit of the 2-factor 24-item model. Model fit was assessed via several indices including chi-square (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004), root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) (Byrne, 1998; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Steiger, 1990), standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) (Kline, 2015), and the comparative fit index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990). The results of the MPlus analysis were as follows: $\chi^2 (321) = 1650.076$, $p < .001$; RMSEA = .085, 90% CI [.081 - .089]; SRMR = .079; CFI = .758. The $\chi^2$ was statistically significant. However, Schumacker and Lomax (2004) have noted that the chi-square statistic is affected by sample size with samples above 200 producing a significant probability level. Factor loadings or parameter estimates, which can be interpreted as validity coefficients, suggested that some items were not good measures of the latent construct (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). While all critical values appeared statistically significant ($p < .001$), they ranged from .152 to .787. The standardized residual variance values fell between .380 and .927. The R-square values, which provide information on how much variance is explained by the variables, should be > .50 for each item. However, a number of the scale items fell below this threshold, with a range from .073 to .620. A diagram depicting the 2-factor model with standardized regression loadings, residuals, and standard error is represented in Figure 3. Overall, fit indices suggested an inconsistency between the 2-factor 24-item model.
Figure 3

Diagram of DRB-24 model with standardized loadings, residuals, and standard error

Note. Circles represent factors. Squares represent scale items. Straight arrows indicate loadings. Curved lines indicate covariance between factors. Numbers in parentheses are standard error.
Table 3

*Standardized Regression Loadings for Confirmatory Factor Analysis on the DRB-24*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item by Factor</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factor 1: Bias Examples</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a stranger starts up a conversation with me, I am more uneasy if they are of a different race (7)</td>
<td>.551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am less concerned about a person talking to themselves on the street if they are the same race as me (6)</td>
<td>.677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When someone of a different race joins me in the elevator, I feel nervous (5)</td>
<td>.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am more likely to offer assistance to someone of my own race (32)</td>
<td>.767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel more comfortable asking for the time from a stranger who shares my racial identity (8)</td>
<td>.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At night, I am more likely to cross the street if the person walking towards me is of a different race (33)</td>
<td>.688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In choosing a seat on public transportation, I am more likely to sit next to a person of my own race, if I have the option (28)</td>
<td>.717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am more suspicious of someone walking behind me if they are of a different race than me (2)</td>
<td>.687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When someone asks me for directions, their race may affect my instinct to respond (30)</td>
<td>.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If someone knocked on my door for help, their race would impact my response (34)</td>
<td>.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel more relaxed around members of my own racial group (9)</td>
<td>.712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am more distressed by a murder if the victim is the same race as me (1)</td>
<td>.544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a stranger is being friendly to me, I am more likely to think that they want something if they are of a different race than me (18)</td>
<td>.553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel more safe in neighborhoods where I am in the racial majority (4)</td>
<td>.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When someone is arrested for a crime, their race may influence my initial belief in their guilt or innocence (16)</td>
<td>.419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factor 2: Bias Existence</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without meaning to, I have acted in ways that are racially biased (36)</td>
<td>.535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes have racially biased thoughts (21)</td>
<td>.506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sometimes have thoughts about race that are not consistent with my values (22)</td>
<td>.516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without meaning to, I occasionally say things that could be construed as racist (37)</td>
<td>.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have sometimes doubted my ability to act in a non-racist way (38)</td>
<td>.669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes I make snap judgments based on race (20)</td>
<td>.439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't jump to conclusions based on race (19)</td>
<td>.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When meeting someone for the first time, I do not make any assumptions based on race (13)</td>
<td>.621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have never thought of a racial insult (14)</td>
<td>.716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and the data. An examination of the standardized residual covariance matrix did not reveal any additional unexplained relationships in the model and the modification indices did not offer any conceptually sound paths to improve the poor model fit. As a result, no additional items were deleted. Standardized factor loadings for the final 24 items are listed in Table 3.

**Reliability**

Internal consistency reliability for the 24-item DRB and the 2 DRB subscales was calculated using Cronbach’s alpha. For the Phase 1 subsample, the Cronbach’s alpha for the Full Scale DRB was .902 suggesting good internal consistency. The Cronbach’s alpha for the “Examples of Bias” subscale was .909 and the Cronbach’s alpha for the “Presence of Bias” subscale was .874. For the Phase 2 subsample, the Full Scale DRB also had good internal consistency (.899). The Cronbach’s alpha for the “Examples of Bias” subscale was .905 and the Cronbach’s alpha for the “Presence of Bias” subscale was .892. Overall, the analysis provided good evidence of the DRB’s reliability, suggesting that the 24 items measure a single construct.

**Validity**

Further evidence of construct validity was sought by examining the relationships between the 24-item DRB and other measures. Correlations between the DRB and measures designed to assess similar constructs were used to determine convergent validity. DRB scores were expected to have strong significant relationships with measures of desirable responding (particularly self-deceptive enhancement), color-blind racial attitudes, psychosocial costs of racism, and the external motivation to respond without prejudice. Correlations between the DRB and dissimilar measures were used to determine discriminant validity. DRB scores were expected to have weak
correlations with measures of symbolic racism and the internal motivation to respond without prejudice. Overall, the DRB was predicted to be related to but distinct from other measures of contemporary racism.

**Preliminary Analysis of Validity Scales.** A preliminary analysis of all validity scales was conducted before assessing convergent and discriminant validity. Descriptive statistics and internal consistency reliability estimates were calculated for all of the scales in this study. All measures showed acceptable internal consistency reliabilities, ranging from .67 to .93.

For the 20-item CoBRAS, possible total scale scores ranged from 20 to 120, with higher scores suggesting higher levels of racial colorblindness. For Sample 1, total scores ranged from a minimum of 20 to a maximum of 88. Total scores were non-normally distributed, W(456) = .868, p < .001, with a positive skewness of 1.45 (SE = .108). Overall, participants reported low levels of color-blind racial attitudes ($M = 34.55$, $SD = 12.03$, $Mdn = 30$). Less than 5% of participants reported moderate or high levels of color-blind racial attitudes.

For the 8-item SR2K, possible total scale scores ranged from 0 to 8, with higher scores suggesting higher levels of modern racism. For Sample 1, total scores ranged from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 6.49. Total scores were non-normally distributed, W(456) = .813, p < .001, with a positive skewness of 1.76 (SE = .107). Overall, participants reported low levels of symbolic racism ($M = .86$, $SD = .93$, $Mdn = .66$). Less than 5% of participants reported moderate or high levels of symbolic racism.

The 16-item PCRW generated 3 subscale scores. For the 6-item Empathic Reactions Towards Racism subscale, possible subscale scores ranged from 6 to 36, with higher scores indicating stronger empathic emotional reactions towards the consequences of racism. For Sample 1, Empathic Reactions Towards Racism subscale scores ranged from a minimum of 13
to a maximum of 36. Empathic Reactions Towards Racism subscale scores were non-normally distributed, $W(456) = .625, p < .001$, with skewness of $-1.45$ ($SE = .106$). Participants reported high levels of empathy for racism ($M = 32.84, SD = 3.02, Mdn = 34$). Less than 10% of participants reported low levels of empathy. For the 5-item White Guilt subscale, possible subscale scores ranged from 5 to 30, with higher scores indicating a greater sense of guilt about the unearned privileges that structural racism affords Whites. For Sample 1, Guilt subscale scores ranged from a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 30. White Guilt subscale scores were non-normally distributed, $W(456) = .981, p < .001$, with skewness of $-1.17$ ($SE = .106$). Participants reported moderate levels of guilt ($M = 17.27, SD = 6.17, Mdn = 18$). For the 5-item White Fear of Others subscale, possible subscale scores ranged from 5 to 30, with higher scores indicating a fear and distrust of people of color. For Sample 1, White Fear of Others subscale scores ranged from a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 23. Total scores were non-normally distributed, $W(456) = .967, p < .001$, with with skewness of $-66$ ($SE = .106$). Participants reported low levels of fear and distrust ($M = 9.84, SD = 3.27, Mdn = 10$). Roughly 6% of participants reported high levels of fear.

The 10-item IMS/EMS generated 2 subscale scores. Both 5-item subscales had a possible score range from 5 to 45, with higher scores suggesting higher levels of either internal or external motivation to respond without prejudice. For Sample 1, scores on the Internal subscale ranged from a minimum of 11 to a maximum of 45. Internal subscale scores were non-normally distributed, $W(456) = .625, p < .001$, with skewness of $-3.01$ ($SE = .107$). Participants reported high levels of internal motivation to respond without prejudice ($M = 42.62, SD = 4.17, Mdn = 45$). More than 95% of participants reported high levels of internal motivation and nearly 50% of participants had a maximum score of 45. Scores on the External subscale ranged from a
minimum of 5 to a maximum of 45. They were also non-normally distributed, \( W(456) = .952, p < .001 \), with a skewness of .705 (\( SE = .107 \)). Participants’ External Motivation scores were significantly lower than Internal Motivation scores (\( M = 17.79, SD = 9.14, Mdn = 16 \)).

The 40-item BIDR generated 2 subscale scores. Using dichotomous scoring, both 20-item subscales had a possible score range from 0 to 20, with higher scores suggesting higher levels of either self-deceptive enhancement or impression management. For Sample 1, scores on the Self-Deceptive Enhancement (SDE) subscale ranged from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 17. SDE subscale scores were non-normally distributed, \( W(456) = .925, p < .001 \), with a positive skew of .964 (\( SE = .108 \)). The mean total score was 5.02 (\( SD = 3.32 \)). Scores on the Impression Management (IM) subscale ranged from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 17. Impression Management subscale scores were normally distributed, \( W(456) = .996, p = .285 \), with skewness of .363 (\( SE = .108 \)). The mean total score was 6.75 (\( SD = 3.61 \)).

**Convergent and Discriminant Validity.** Due to the non-normal distribution of variables and the nonlinear relationships between variables, nonparametric correlations were run using the 2-Factor 24-item DRB and existing scales. The magnitudes of correlations are described using benchmarks for small/weak (\( r = .10 \)), medium/moderate (\( r = .30 \)), and large/strong (\( r = .50 \)) (Cohen, 1992; Sink & Stroh, 2006). Correlations are displayed in Table 3.

Racial color-blindness (as measured by the CoBRAS) was hypothesized to be significantly negatively correlated with DRB factors. Specifically, high scores on the CoBRAS (indicating an unawareness of covert and institutional racism) were thought to be associated with low scores on the DRB (indicating a disavowal of racial bias). If a respondent minimizes the existence of societal racism, it is likely that she will minimize examples of racial bias. In this
case, denying the prevalence of racism and denying personal prejudice are thought to be related. Defying the original hypothesis, there did not appear to be an association between the CoBRAS and the DRB. The only significant association was between the CoBRAS and the DRB Bias Existence subscale, which was weak. Of note, the CoBRAS had a strong association with the SR2K and PCRW White Guilt subscale, suggesting that lower levels of racial colorblindness were associated with both lower levels of modern racism and higher levels of guilt about the injustice of structural racism. This finding is consistent with prior research.

Overall, the correlation between the CoBRAS and the DRB did not provide evidence of convergent validity. This finding contradicted the initial hypothesis and warranted further investigation. Using MPlus, a CFA with the two DRB subscales and the CoBRAS scale helped illustrate the complexity of variable relationships. In the 3-factor model that emerged, nearly half

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<th>Measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. DRB—Full</td>
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<td>2. DRB–Examples</td>
<td>.854**</td>
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<td>3. DRB–Existence</td>
<td>.841**</td>
<td>.456**</td>
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<td>4. CoBRAS</td>
<td>-.080</td>
<td>.095*</td>
<td>-.248**</td>
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<td>5. SR2K</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>.099*</td>
<td>-.165**</td>
<td>.643**</td>
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<td>6. PCRW–Empathy</td>
<td>-.086*</td>
<td>-.153**</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>-.190**</td>
<td>-.147**</td>
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<td>7. PCRW–Guilt</td>
<td>.283**</td>
<td>.130**</td>
<td>.370**</td>
<td>-.553**</td>
<td>-.425**</td>
<td>.108**</td>
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<td>8. PCRW–Fear</td>
<td>.533**</td>
<td>.563**</td>
<td>.331**</td>
<td>.157**</td>
<td>.126**</td>
<td>-.163**</td>
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<td>9. EMS</td>
<td>.438**</td>
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<td>.355**</td>
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<td>0.064</td>
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<td>10. IMS</td>
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<td>-.079</td>
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<td>-.376**</td>
<td>-.275**</td>
<td>.191**</td>
<td>.178**</td>
<td>.131**</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. BIDR_SDE</td>
<td>-.447**</td>
<td>-.290**</td>
<td>-.483**</td>
<td>-.249**</td>
<td>.154**</td>
<td>-.104</td>
<td>-.349**</td>
<td>-.218**</td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td>-.244**</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. BIDR_IM</td>
<td>-.329**</td>
<td>-.185**</td>
<td>-.392**</td>
<td>.107*</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>-.131</td>
<td>-.159</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>-.142**</td>
<td>.388**</td>
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M       | 59.17| 29.43| 29.74| 34.55| 0.86| 0.86| 32.84| 17.27| 9.84| 17.79| 42.62| 5.02| 6.75|
(SD)    | 16.50| 10.01| 9.27| 12.03| 0.93| 0.93| 3.03| 6.18| 3.27| 9.15| 4.17| 3.32| 3.61|

Note. N=579. **p < .01; *p < .05
of the standardized estimates for the CoBRAS were nonsignificant. However, this model provided evidence that there is a stronger correlation between both DRB subscales and the CoBRAS than was suggested by an analysis of the correlation matrix.

Psychosocial costs of racism (as measured by the PCRW) were hypothesized to be associated with the DRB. Specifically, high levels of empathy and guilt were thought to be significantly positively correlated with awareness of implicit racial bias. According to the literature, empathy for racial issues suggests an awareness of both systemic racism and personal prejudice. An individual demonstrating high levels of awareness in these areas is likely to be aware of her own implicit racial biases. Contrary to initial predictions, the PCRW Empathic Reactions Towards Racism subscale had no meaningful association with the DRB full scale or subscales. Of note, the PCRW Empathic Reactions Towards Racism subscale had weak associations with nearly all other validation scales and subscales, including the CoBRAS and SR2K. The only exception was a moderate association between the Empathic Reactions Toward Racism subscale and the BIDR Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale. The PCRW White Guilt subscale had a weak positive association with the full scale DRB and a moderate positive association with the DRB Bias Existence subscale. The PCRW White Guilt subscale had a strong negative association with the CoBRAS scale and a moderate negative association with the SR2K.

As mentioned previously, higher levels of guilt about the injustice of structural racism may be related to both lower levels of racial colorblindness and lower levels of modern racism. The PCRW White Fear of Others subscale was theorized to be significantly positively correlated with the DRB. In order to endorse high levels of anxiety on the PCRW, the respondent must identify and acknowledge her own fear. If the respondent acknowledges this fear on the PCRW, she is likely to acknowledge experiencing anxiety, avoidance, and discomfort in the hypothetical
scenarios described by DRB items. As hypothesized, there were strong positive correlations between the White Fear of Others subscale and the DRB. The positive correlation was particularly strong between the White Fear of Others subscale and the DRB Bias Examples subscale. Of note, the White Fear of Others subscale had only weak associations with the other validity subscales. Overall, only the White Fear of Others subscale provided evidence of convergent validity.

The BIDR was predicted to have a significant negative correlation with DRB factors. Although this trend was expected with both the Self-Deceptive Enhancement (SDE) and Impression Management (IM) subscales, the correlation was expected to be stronger with the SDE subscale. As hypothesized, there were significant negative correlations between both BIDR subscales and the DRB. Specifically, the correlation between the DRB and the SDE subscale was strong and the correlation between the DRB and the IM subscale was moderate. The correlation was particularly strong between the SDE subscale and the DRB Bias Existence subscale. Of note, the BIDR subscales had weak associations with the other validity scales. The only exception was a moderate association between the SDE and the PCRW White Empathic Reactions to Racism subscale. The BIDR provided evidence of convergent validity.

Symbolic racism (as measured by the SR2K) was predicted to have a weak association with the DRB. The DRB was not predicted to be a measure of racial prejudice. Instead, it was developed to measure varying levels of awareness of racial bias (rather than the presence of bias itself). While the racist sentiments captured by high scores on the SR2K may be indicative of an unawareness about racism, a respondent endorsing prejudicial views may be particularly cognizant of her antipathy towards Blacks. As a result, prejudiced respondents may have scores that suggest high level of awareness of racial bias on the DRB. As hypothesized, there was little
association between the SR2K and the DRB. As mentioned previously, the SR2K had a strong positive correlation with the CoBRAS. The SR2K also had a moderate negative correlation with the PCRW White Guilt subscale. The SR2K provided evidence of discriminant validity.

Internal motivation to respond without prejudice was predicted to have a weak association with the DRB. While individuals who are motivated to be non-prejudiced for personal reasons may be more eager to develop self-awareness, they may also be more susceptible to self-deception. As a result, the factors of the DRB were hypothesized to relate weakly to the Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (IMS). As hypothesized, there were no significant correlations between the IMS and the DRB. Of note, the IMS did have moderate negative correlations with the CoBRAS and the SR2K, which may suggest that higher levels of internal motivation to be non-prejudiced are associated with more awareness of covert and institutional racism. Overall, the IMS provided evidence of discriminant validity.
While research suggests that blatant expressions of racism are on the decline, more subtle forms of bias persist (Dovidio & Gartner, 2004; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). These biases can be automatic and unintentional, often occurring outside conscious awareness. Studies suggest that developing awareness is the first step to moderating discriminatory thoughts and behaviors (Divine & Monteith, 1993; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Durrheim, Hook, & Riggs, 2009; Monteith & Voils, 1998). When White Americans are aware of their biases, they have new opportunities to adjust their attitudes and alter their behaviors. Crucially, when biases go unacknowledged, unintentional racism persists. As a result, the tendency to disavow racial biases demands scholarly attention.

In order to further research in this area, the present study developed and initially validated the Disavowal of Racial Bias Scale (DRB). Specifically, the DRB was designed to measure the extent to which one disavows both the phenomenon and examples of racial bias. This was an exploratory study intended to increase empirical research in the area of racial bias awareness. Although the DRB demonstrated many promising aspects, more work is needed to make it a valid measure for future use. The following chapter provides a summary of findings and a discussion of the results. Various limitations of the study are explored and recommendations for future research are made.

Summary of Findings

This study relied on an empirical approach to analyze and select DRB items. In Phase 1, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was run on a subsample of 579 participants to determine the
underlying factor structure of the DRB. In addition to identifying specific factors, the EFA was used to compute alphas, delete items, and determine an optimal version of the scale. In Phase 2, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was run on a second subsample of 579 participants to confirm the factor structure identified in Phase 1. The aim of Phase 2 was to cross-check and replicate Phase 1 findings.

Initially, DRB items were developed from the literature. Prior research suggested that implicit racial biases can be communicated through certain thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. These three components mapped onto an affective/cognitive/behavioral “tripartite model,” which is often used to discuss psychological phenomenon. In the field of counseling psychology, the tripartite model has frequently provided a foundation for scale development (e.g. Heppner et al., 1995). Although cognitive, affective, and behavioral categories were considered mutually exclusive, it was hypothesized that they could together capture diverse aspects of implicit racial bias. Using this perspective, three categories of items emerged: (a) disavowals of negative emotions, (b) disavowals of biased behaviors, and (c) disavowals of prejudiced thoughts. Items pertaining to these three categories all referenced different kinds of interactions and scenarios. In short, they assessed the extent to which participants denied experiencing common examples of bias. A fourth category comprised of more general statements was included in the initial item pool. Unlike the items assessing examples of bias, these items assessed awareness of the phenomenon of implicit racial bias itself. Items were worded to be applicable across multiple contexts and did not overtly reference interracial encounters.

Models with two, three, four, and five factors were all explored. While it was hypothesized that the four categories of items would comprise four separate factors, response patterns associated with affective, cognitive, and behavioral expressions of implicit racial bias
did not differ from each other in significant ways. In the end, the exploratory factor analysis provided support for a 2-factor model. A combination of items from the categories of negative emotions, biased behaviors, and prejudicial thoughts loaded onto the first factor. The first factor was named *Bias Examples* because it included statements referring to specific examples of implicit racial bias. Statements describing a more general awareness of the phenomenon of implicit racial bias (rather than examples of bias) loaded onto the second factor. The second factor was named *Bias Existence* because it included statements referring to the existence of implicit racial bias. Twelve items were deleted at this time. Descriptive statistics revealed that scores on both subscales were non-normally distributed. Of note, scores on the *Bias Examples* subscale were significantly negatively skewed. Both subscales demonstrated high internal consistency, providing evidence of the DRB’s reliability.

Although the 2-factor model was deemed optimal, it was not reasonably consistent with the data. In Phase 1, the same subsample of 579 participants that informed the 2-factor model development in SPSS was used to evaluate model fit in MPlus. Standardized parameter estimates and modification indices were used to identify problematic items. After deleting an additional two items, the model fit remained poor. The final 2-factor 24-item model that emerged from the EFA was then used to perform a CFA with the second subsample of 579 participants. Unsurprisingly, the analysis produced similar results. While the chi-square statistic and critical values were again significant, fit indices provided evidence that there remained an inconsistency between the 2-factor 24-item model and the data. The standardized residual covariance matrix did not reveal any additional unexplained relationships in the model and the modification indices did not offer any conceptually sound paths to improve fit. As discussed in the following section, the poor model fit may reflect methodological and theoretical issues.
In an effort to establish construct validity, the relationships between the two DRB subscales and other measures were examined. Both bivariate correlations and confirmatory factor analyses were used to determine convergent and discriminant validity. The DRB was predicted to be related to, but distinct from, other measures of contemporary racism and prejudice. As hypothesized, the DRB had significant and positive associations with the Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites (PCRW) White Fear of Others subscale, the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale (strong), the BIDR Impression Management subscale (moderate), and the External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice (EMS) subscale. These positive associations provided support for conceptual and empirical links between awareness of racial bias and other related constructs. Contrary to initial hypothesis, the DRB had weak or no associations with the Color-Blind Racial Attitudes (CoBRAS) scale, the PCRW White Empathic Reactions Toward Racism subscale, and the PCRW White Guilt subscale. As hypothesized, the DRB also had weak or no associations with a measure of Symbolic Racism (SR2K) and the Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (IMS). Overall, an investigation of the DRB’s relationships with similar and dissimilar measures provided evidence of both convergent and discriminant validity.

This dissertation was done with the assumption that DRB development will continue. While the results of the initial validation are promising, more work is needed to make the DRB a robust measure. With this in mind, the discussion of findings will elaborate on perceived strengths and shortcomings of the DRB. The study’s limitations will be explored and recommendations for future research will be made.
Discussion of Findings

A review of the Factor 1 Bias Examples items helped make sense of its emergence as a single factor. Although cognitive, affective, and behavioral categories were never intended to be mutually exclusive, there was considerable overlap among them in the Bias Examples items. This was particularly true for the negative emotions items (many of which described anxiety responses) and biased behaviors items (many of which described avoidance or distancing behaviors). For example, item 7 states that, “If a stranger starts up a conversation with me, I am more uneasy if they are of a different race.” Although item 7 refers to the feeling of “uneasiness” and belonged to the “negative emotions” category, uneasiness in this situation could just as easily be identified by a behavioral response as by a particular felt experience. Item 32 states that, “I am more likely to offer assistance to someone of my own race.” Unlike item 7, Item 32 refers to a distancing behavior and was predicted to cluster with items tapping biased behaviors. However, the reason that someone may hesitate to offer assistance likely stems from some negative emotional response. Alternately, claiming that race does not impact one’s impulse to offer assistance implies the denial of a negative emotional response. In sum, there are both empirical and theoretical reasons why expressions of racial bias cannot be organized into the discrete categories of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. While the tripartite model was helpful for generating a diverse pool of items, the data did not support a separation of affective, cognitive, and behavioral expressions of subtle bias.

Although Bias Examples items referenced different negative emotions, biased behaviors, and prejudicial thoughts, all of them referred to specific examples of racial bias. The statements in this subscale described a wide array of scenarios, many of which involved interracial interactions. Descriptive statistics revealed that many participants disagreed with Bias Examples
statements. Item scores were consistently positively skewed. In fact, eleven of the fifteen *Bias Examples* items had skewness greater than 1.0 and three of these items had skewness greater than 2.0. The non-normal distribution of scores reflected the fact that a significant minority (and in many cases majority) of participants answered “strongly disagree” on *Bias Examples* items. The overall item mean of 1.96 was well below the scale’s center of 3.50. The psychometric challenges created by the non-normal distribution of scores and the overall lack of variation in responses will be discussed in the section on limitations below. However, the positive skew suggests that, for whatever reason, participants had difficulty acknowledging that race influenced the everyday interactions and scenarios described by *Bias Examples* items.

While this response pattern may be indicative of issues related to sampling bias, it may also reflect a trend towards disavowal. For example, 45% of participants strongly disagreed with the statement, “I am more distressed by a murder if the victim is the same race as me.” 57% of participants strongly disagreed with the statement, “If a stranger starts up a conversation with me, I am more uneasy if they are of a different race.” Nearly 43% strongly disagreed with the statement, “When someone is arrested for a crime, their race may influence my initial belief in their guilt or innocence.” This statistic is particularly striking in light of the extensive research on White Americans’ tendency to associate criminality with blackness (XX).

The high frequency of extreme responses on *Bias Examples* items is of particular interest. In social desirability research, extreme response styles are indicative of response bias. For example, when scoring the BIDR scale, Paulhus suggests using a dichotomous technique, wherein only extreme responses are summed (2006). The thought is that extreme responders are answer items inaccurately in an effort to deceive themselves or others. Instead of answering truthfully, their endorsements are distorted by a desire to see themselves in an unrealistically
favorable light. If we extend this logic to the *Bias Examples* subscale, a pattern of extreme responses may suggest the presence of response bias. Specifically, extreme responses may indicate a tendency to disavow examples of racial bias that in reality exist.

While there is reason to believe that extreme responses on *Bias Examples* could be indicative of disavowals of racial bias, they may instead be accurate reports. It is important to acknowledge the possibility that those who disagreed with some statements did so regardless of their level of awareness. In other words, some extreme responders may be telling the truth. For example, nearly 61% of participants strongly disagreed with the statement, “When someone of a different race joins me in the elevator, I feel nervous.” Strikingly, only 3% of participants agreed with the same statement. Although the elevator is a place where people find themselves within close proximity to strangers, it may be an unlikely context to trigger responses to racial difference. In order to improve future versions of the DRB, more research about specific examples of racial bias are needed.

Alternatively, items may have been worded in ways that were too vague to trigger a hypothetical response. Research suggests that implicit biases are greatly influenced by specific contexts or states of mind. As follows, participants may require more elaborate scenario descriptions in order to imagine a specific kind of response. For example, scores for the aforementioned elevator item may have been different if replaced by a more detailed situation: “If I am in an elevator at night in an unfamiliar building and a stranger joins me, I may be more nervous if the stranger is of a different race.” Although *Bias Examples* items referenced specific examples of racial bias, it is possible that they were not detailed enough to elicit realistic responses.
In contrast to *Bias Examples* items, Factor 2 items were more general. Crucially, Factor 2 *Bias Existence* items tapped participants’ awareness of the existence of implicit racial bias (rather than examples of bias). Items such as “I have sometimes doubted my ability to act in a non-racist way” and “Without meaning to, I occasionally say things that could be construed as racist” were intended to capture participants’ appraisals of themselves across multiple contexts. Instead of assessing awareness of automatic reactions to specific situations (e.g. talking to a stranger on the street, selecting a seat on public transportation), *Bias Existence* assessed an awareness of the capacity to display subtle biases. In other words, endorsements of *Bias Existence* items acknowledged the presence of bias but did not demonstrate an awareness of specific manifestations of bias.

It is reasonable to assume that recognizing one’s capacity to experience bias is easier than recognizing the specific ways one enacts these biases. Endorsing the existence (rather than examples) of bias does not require a knowledge of the content or consequences of unintentional racism. From this perspective, an understanding that one is biased likely precedes an understanding of how one is biased.

While *Bias Existence* items may be tapping an earlier stage of racial bias awareness, they may be better at capturing the construct of racial bias awareness entirely. As discussed, implicit biases are seen to be highly fluid, with considerable variance across contexts. In addition, it is unclear which (and to what degree) biases are accessible to the conscious mind. The comparatively more specific *Bias Examples* items may be asking responders to endorse specific thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that are truly outside their awareness. *Bias Existence* items, on the other hand, merely ask responders to acknowledge that there are thoughts, feelings, and behaviors occurring outside their awareness.
Performance on *Bias Existence* items provides evidence that they may better capture varying levels of awareness. Descriptive statistics revealed that participants were more likely to agree to *Bias Existence* statements than they were to agree with *Bias Example* statements. Subscale scores were normally distributed and item scores were not significantly skewed. The mean of *Bias Existence* items was 3.30, which was close to the scale’s center of 3.50. For example, nearly 60% of participants expressed some level of agreement with the statement, “I sometimes have thoughts about race that are not consistent with my values.” Similarly, more than 50% of participants agreed with the statement, “I have sometimes doubted my ability to act in a non-racist way.” Given that the specificity of items was a defining difference between the two DRB factors, future versions of the scale may be improved by reconsidering item breadth. As DeVillis has pointed out, there are “tradeoffs” when using either general or specific domains, and the specificity of individual items should be considered carefully (2017, p. 112). When a variable is broad, it becomes more likely that item statements will not apply in all situations. Inevitably, determining an appropriate level of item specificity involves an examination of the variable that the DRB is intended to measure. The question of how broadly or narrowly to view the domain of bias awareness is addressed further in the limitations section.

Overall, the study provided evidence of both convergent and discriminant validity. While the data supported some initial hypotheses, the DRB had few strong correlations with the other validity scales. It is worth acknowledging that the non-normality of scores on both the DRB and other validation measures is a serious limitation, which will be discussed below. However, the DRB’s relationships (or lack thereof) to a few of these existing measures was surprising. For example, a measure of color-blind racial attitudes was hypothesized to have a stronger association with disavowals of racial bias. High scores on the CoBRAS (indicating an
unawareness of institutional and systemic racism) were thought to be correlated with low scores on the DRB (indicating an unawareness of implicit racial biases). If a respondent minimizes the existence of societal racism, it is unlikely that she will acknowledge ways she perpetuates racism. In this case, denying the prevalence of racism and denying personal privilege were predicted to go hand-in-hand. Although a significant strong correlation between the CoBRAS and the DRB was expected, there was no correlation between the measures. Even the CFA using the CoBRAS as a third factor revealed a weak association between the two scales. This may suggest that colorblind racial attitudes and awareness of implicit racial bias may be less related than initially thought. An individual may acknowledge societal racism (i.e. endorse low levels of color-blind racial attitudes) while still disavowing biased thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.

**Limitations**

The DRB was developed specifically for White Americans. While there is considerable diversity within this demographic, such variation was not represented in this study’s sample. A significant majority of participants were women. Many were highly educated, with 75% completing at least some graduate studies and 33% attaining a college degree. The sample was skewed towards a higher socio-economic status with nearly half participants identifying as middle class and more than a quarter identifying as upper middle class. In the 2016 presidential election, 89% of participants voted for Hillary Clinton and a mere 2% of participants voted for Donald Trump. Given that more than 58% of White Americans voted for Trump in 2016, we can conclude that the results are not generalizable to the entire White population. Of note, the sample was diverse in terms of age, with participants ranging from 18 to 80 years old.

The reliance on the internet for advertising and administering this study was in part responsible for the sample characteristic limitations. On social media platforms such as
Facebook and Instagram, a flyer advertising the study was posted and re-posted by a number of people. Decisions to help publicize this study were likely motivated by a larger interest in understanding and combating racism. One of the people who posted about the study was Van Jones, a CNN political contributor with a large liberal following. As a result, there are reasons to assume that knowledge about the study was circulated more widely among liberal-leaning people. At the respondent level, motivation to participate was likely influenced by some interest in the topic. Flyers circulated on the Internet asked potential participants, “Does race matter?” and “What are your views on race?” It is thus likely that the data collected in this study may only be representative of people willing to take the time and energy to think about the topic of race.

While there is strong evidence that the study sample was not representative of White Americans in the United States, the related but more serious issue of limited response variation posed a significant psychometric issue. As DeVellis points out, scale development can occur with a homogenous sample so long as there is a sufficient degree of response variability (2017). Unfortunately, the non-normality of scores on the DRB made it difficult to fit a model to the data. Similarly, the non-normality of scores across nearly all validity scales jeopardized analyses of construct validity. Future work on the DRB will require a more diverse data set, the chances of which will increase if the DRB is administered to a more diverse sample. Recruiting a heterogeneous and truly random sample of White Americans will provide stronger evidence of valid exploratory and theoretical models, as well as construct validity.

The lack of CFA was a major limitation of the current study. Due to a lack of model fit, the researcher was unable to show that the proposed theoretical structure fit the structure of the data. The unexpected statistical results from the CFA were likely exacerbated by use of a split sample. The current study used data from 1,158 participants, which was then split into two
subsamples. Splitting the sample enabled two distinct phases of analysis. However, because all data was collected at the same time, results from the EFA could not be used to edit, add, or delete scale items. As a result, there were limited opportunities to alter the scale. Administering a revised DRB to a new sample will likely improve the scale’s psychometric properties.

The current study also lacked a demonstration of robust construct validity. Due to the few strong correlations between the DRB and the other validity scales, future studies using the DRB will need to provide additional evidence of convergent validity. In order to demonstrate the DRB’s convergent validity in the future, it will be important to find additional scales that measure constructs that may be related to the awareness of implicit bias. Scales to consider for this purpose include the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974) and the Should-Would Discrepancies Scale (Monteith & Voils, 1998). The Self-Monitoring Scale is used to assess the extent to which people generally monitor and manage themselves in social situations (Snyder, 1974). The Should-Would Discrepancies Scale is used to assess the extent to which people report discrepancies between their non-prejudiced attitudes and prejudiced behaviors (Monteith & Voils, 1998).

Issues that arose during methodological and psychometric analyses of the DRB should not obscure issues related to theoretical analysis. Perhaps the most important limitations to consider are those involving the DRB’s content validity. The DRB was developed to measure awareness of racial bias. In its current version, the DRB attempts to capture both an awareness of the general phenomenon of bias as well as more specific manifestations of bias. However, much remains unknown about the individual’s capacity to become aware of racial biases. While there is ample data to support the fact that people are racially biased, the exact mental processes responsible for these biases remain in question. Far from being static, it appears that biases are
fluid and changing, specific to certain situations and inconsistent over time. In short, awareness of specific manifestations of bias as well as awareness of one’s capacity to be biased may not be sufficiently understood. As a result, the construct that the DRB is attempting to measure (i.e. awareness of racial biases) may need further clarification.

**Future Directions**

The development and initial validation of the DRB is an important first step in increasing understanding of racial bias awareness. Although validity and reliability have not been fully established, the results of this dissertation provide reasons to continue to develop the DRB. Future work on the DRB will involve refining scale items, re-evaluating the proposed factor structure, further exploring its relationships with other scales and variables, and testing the scale’s usefulness with a more diverse sample of White Americans. In addition to further empirical analyses, it will be important to qualitatively explore the construct of racial bias awareness. Specifically, more research is needed to understand both individual differences in racial bias awareness as well as fluctuations in racial bias awareness across multiple contexts. In future stages of DRB development, interviews could be conducted with individuals who score both high and low on the revised measure. This may offer important insights into the content and meaning of discrepancies in bias awareness. Once improved, the DRB could be relevant to both research and applied work. Hopefully, future studies will produce a tool that further sheds light on the tendency to deny racial biases.
REFERENCES


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APPENDIX A
Reduced Item Pool

Negative Emotions/Emotional Responses
- If a stranger starts up a conversation with me, I am more uneasy if they are of a different race
- I am less concerned about a person talking to themselves on the street if they are the same race as me
- When someone of a different race joins me in the elevator, I feel nervous
- I am more suspicious of a person walking behind me if they are a different race than me
- I feel more relaxed around members of my own racial group
- I am more distressed by a murder if the victim is the same race as me
- I feel safer in neighborhoods where I am in the racial majority
- The idea of going to a party where I am the only member of my racial group makes me anxious
- I am equally attracted to people of all races

Discriminatory Behaviors/Behavioral Responses
- I am more likely to offer assistance to someone of my own race
- I feel more comfortable asking for the time from a stranger who shares my racial identity
- At night, I am more likely to cross the street if the person walking towards me is of a different race
- In choosing a seat on public transportation, I am more likely to sit next to a person of my own race, if I have the option
- When someone asks me for directions, their race may affect my instinct to respond
- If someone knocked on my door for help, their race would impact my response
- I am more likely to remember someone’s face if they are the same race as me
- My ability to remember people’s names is not affected by their race
- Race does not play any role in my search for a romantic partner
- When selecting a neighborhood in which to live, I do not consider its racial composition
- The race of a new neighbor would not impact the way I welcome them

Prejudicial Thoughts
- If a stranger is being friendly to me, I am more likely to think that they want something if they are a different race than me
- When someone is arrested for a crime, their race may influence my initial belief in their guilt or innocence
- When asking for financial advice at a bank, the race of the financial advisor does not impact how much I trust the information
- On the road, race does not factor in the way I judge other drivers
- Race would not be a factor when choosing a caretaker for a child
- The race of a teacher does not impact my first impression of them
- Race would not be a factor when choosing a doctor
• Race would not be a factor for me when looking for a housemate/tenant

**Presence of Implicit Racial Bias**
• Without meaning to, I have acted in ways that are racially biased
• I sometimes have racially biased thoughts
• I sometimes have thoughts about race that are not consistent with my values
• Without meaning to, I occasionally say things that could be construed as racist
• I have sometimes doubted my ability to act in a non-racist way
• Sometimes I make snap judgments based on race
• I don’t jump to conclusions based on race
• When meeting someone for the first time, I do not make any assumptions based on race
• I have never thought of a racial insult
• Racial slurs occasionally enter my mind
APPENDIX B
The Disavowal of Racial Bias (DRB-38)

The Disavowal of Racial Bias Scale (DRB-38)

Using the 6-point scale below, please give your honest rating about the degree to which you personally agree or disagree with each statement.

1. If a stranger starts up a conversation with me, I am more uneasy if they are of a different race (7)
2. I am less concerned about a person talking to themselves on the street if they are the same race as me (6)
3. When someone of a different race joins me in the elevator, I feel nervous (5)
4. I am more likely to offer assistance to someone of my own race (32)
5. I feel more comfortable asking for the time from a stranger who shares my racial identity (8)
6. At night, I am more likely to cross the street if the person walking towards me is of a different race (33)
7. In choosing a seat on public transportation, I am more likely to sit next to a person of my own race, if I have the option (28)
8. I am more suspicious of a person walking behind me if they are a different race than me (2)
9. When someone asks me for directions, their race may affect my instinct to respond (30)
10. If someone knocked on my door for help, their race would impact my response (34)
11. I feel more relaxed around members of my own racial group (9)
12. I am more distressed by a murder if the victim is the same race as me (1)

13. If a stranger is being friendly to me, I am more likely to think that they want something if they are a different race than me (18)

14. I feel safer in neighborhoods where I am in the racial majority (4)

15. The idea of going to a party where I am the only member of my racial group makes me anxious (3)

16. When someone is arrested for a crime, their race may influence my initial belief in their guilt or innocence (16)

17. Without meaning to, I have acted in ways that are racially biased (36)

18. I sometimes have racially biased thoughts (21)

19. I sometimes have thoughts about race that are not consistent with my values (22)

20. Without meaning to, I occasionally say things that could be construed as racist (37)

21. I have sometimes doubted my ability to act in a non-racist way (38)

22. Sometimes I make snap judgments based on race (20)

23. I don’t jump to conclusions based on race (19) (REVERSED)

24. When meeting someone for the first time, I do not make any assumptions based on race (13) (REVERSED)

25. I have never thought of a racial insult (14) (REVERSED)

26. Racial slurs occasionally enter my mind (12)

27. When asking for financial advice at a bank, the race of the financial advisor does not impact how much I trust the information (10) (REVERSED)

28. On the road, race does not factor in the way I judge other drivers (11) (REVERSED)

29. Race would not be a factor when choosing a caretaker for a child (15) (REVERSED)

30. The race of a teacher does not impact my first impression of them (17) (REVERSED)

31. Race would not be a factor when choosing a doctor (29) (REVERSED)
32. I am more likely to remember someone’s face if they are the same race as me (27)

33. My ability to remember people’s names is not affected by their race (26) (REVERSED)

34. I am equally attracted to people of all races (24) (REVERSED)

35. Race does not play any role in my search for a romantic partner (23) (REVERSED)

36. Race would not be a factor for me when looking for a housemate/tenant (31) (REVERSED)

37. When selecting a neighborhood in which to live, I do not consider its racial composition (25) (REVERSED)

38. The race of a new neighbor would not impact the way I welcome them (35) (REVERSED)
The Disavowal of Racial Bias Scale (DRB-24)

Using the 6-point scale below, please give your honest rating about the degree to which you personally agree or disagree with each statement.

![6-point scale]

1. If a stranger starts up a conversation with me, I am more uneasy if they are of a different race (7)
2. I am less concerned about a person talking to themselves on the street if they are the same race as me (6)
3. When someone of a different race joins me in the elevator, I feel nervous (5)
4. I am more likely to offer assistance to someone of my own race (32)
5. I feel more comfortable asking for the time from a stranger who shares my racial identity (8)
6. At night, I am more likely to cross the street if the person walking towards me is of a different race (33)
7. In choosing a seat on public transportation, I am more likely to sit next to a person of my own race, if I have the option (28)
8. I am more suspicious of a person walking behind me if they are a different race than me (2)
9. When someone asks me for directions, their race may affect my instinct to respond (30)
10. If someone knocked on my door for help, their race would impact my response (34)
11. I feel more relaxed around members of my own racial group (9)
12. I am more distressed by a murder if the victim is the same race as me (1)

13. If a stranger is being friendly to me, I am more likely to think that they want something if they are a different race than me (18)

14. I feel safer in neighborhoods where I am in the racial majority (4)

15. When someone is arrested for a crime, their race may influence my initial belief in their guilt or innocence (16)

16. Without meaning to, I have acted in ways that are racially biased (36)

17. I sometimes have racially biased thoughts (21)

18. I sometimes have thoughts about race that are not consistent with my values (22)

19. Without meaning to, I occasionally say things that could be construed as racist (37)

20. I have sometimes doubted my ability to act in a non-racist way (38)

21. Sometimes I make snap judgments based on race (20)

22. I don’t jump to conclusions based on race (19) (REVERSED)

23. When meeting someone for the first time, I do not make any assumptions based on race (13) (REVERSED)

24. I have never thought of a racial insult (14) (REVERSED)
APPENDIX D
DRB-24 Factors

Factor 1: Bias Examples (i.e. Examples of Racial Bias)

- If a stranger starts up a conversation with me, I am more uneasy if they are of a different race (7)
- I am less concerned about a person talking to themselves on the street if they are the same race as me (6)
- When someone of a different race joins me in the elevator, I feel nervous (5)
- I am more likely to offer assistance to someone of my own race (32)
- I feel more comfortable asking for the time from a stranger who shares my racial identity (8)
- At night, I am more likely to cross the street if the person walking towards me is of a different race (33)
- In choosing a seat on public transportation, I am more likely to sit next to a person of my own race, if I have the option (28)
- I am more suspicious of a person walking behind me if they are a different race than me (2)
- When someone asks me for directions, their race may affect my instinct to respond (30)
- If someone knocked on my door for help, their race would impact my response (34)
- I feel more relaxed around members of my own racial group (9)
- I am more distressed by a murder if the victim is the same race as me (1)
- If a stranger is being friendly to me, I am more likely to think that they want something if they are a different race than me (18)
- I feel safer in neighborhoods where I am in the racial majority (4)
- When someone is arrested for a crime, their race may influence my initial belief in their guilt or innocence (16)

Factor 2: Bias Existence (i.e. Existence of Racial Bias)

- Without meaning to, I have acted in ways that are racially biased (36)
- I sometimes have racially biased thoughts (21)
- I sometimes have thoughts about race that are not consistent with my values (22)
- Without meaning to, I occasionally say things that could be construed as racist (37)
- I have sometimes doubted my ability to act in a non-racist way (38)
- Sometimes I make snap judgments based on race (20)
- I don’t jump to conclusions based on race (19) (REVERSED)
- When meeting someone for the first time, I do not make any assumptions based on race (13) (REVERSED)
- I have never thought of a racial insult (14) (REVERSED)
APPENDIX E
Color-blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS)

Below is a set of questions that deal with social issues in the United States. Using the 6-point scale, please give your honest rating about the degree to which you personally agree or disagree with each statement. Please be as open and honest as you can; there are no right or wrong answers. Please indicate your response below each item.

1 = Strongly Disagree, 6 = Strongly Agree

1. White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.

2. Race is very important in determining who is successful and who is not.

3. Race plays an important role in who gets sent to prison.

4. Race plays a major role in the type of social services (such as type of health care or day care) that people receive in the U.S.

5. Racial and ethnic minorities do not have the same opportunities as white people in the U.S.

6. Everyone who works hard, no matter what race they are, has an equal chance to become rich.

7. White people are more to blame for racial discrimination than racial and ethnic minorities.

8. Social policies, such as affirmative action, discriminate unfairly against white people.

9. White people in the U.S. are discriminated against because of the color of their skin.

10. English should be the only official language in the U.S.

11. Due to racial discrimination, programs such as affirmative action are necessary to help create equality.

12. Racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.

13. It is important that people begin to think of themselves as American and not African American, Mexican American or Italian American.

14. Immigrants should try to fit into the culture and values of the U.S.

15. Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.
16. Talking about racial issues causes unnecessary tension.

17. Racism is a major problem in the U.S.

18. It is important for public schools to teach about the history and contributions of racial and ethnic minorities.

19. It is important for political leaders to talk about racism to help work through or solve society's problems.

20. Racism may have been a problem in the past, it is not an important problem today.
APPENDIX F
The Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (SR2K)

1. It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites.
   <1> Strongly agree
   <2> Somewhat agree
   <3> Somewhat disagree
   <4> Strongly disagree

2. Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same.
   <1> Strongly agree
   <2> Somewhat agree
   <3> Somewhat disagree
   <4> Strongly disagree

3. Some say that Black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they haven’t pushed fast enough. What do you think?
   <1> Trying to push very much too fast
   <2> Going too slowly
   <3> Moving at about the right speed

4. How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think Blacks are responsible for creating?
   <1> All of it
   <2> Most
   <3> Some
   <4> Not much at all

5. How much discrimination against Blacks do you feel there is in the United States today, limiting their chances to get ahead?
   <1> A lot
   <2> Some
   <3> Just a little
   <4> None at all

6. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
   <1> Strongly agree
   <2> Somewhat agree
   <3> Somewhat disagree
   <4> Strongly disagree

7. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
8. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.
   <1> Strongly agree
   <2> Somewhat agree
   <3> Somewhat disagree
   <4> Strongly disagree
APPENDIX G
Psychosocial Costs of Racism to Whites Scale (PCRW)
Please respond to the following statements by inserting only one number next to the item from the chart below. Your possible choices range from 1 to 6. Please answer honestly, as there are no right answers or wrong answers. Avoid answering as you think you “should” feel or as how you would expect others to answer. All responses are completely anonymous. Response categories: 1 = Strongly disagree; 2 = Moderately disagree; 3 = Slightly disagree; 4 = Slightly agree; 5 = Moderately agree; 6 = Strongly agree

1. When I hear about acts of racial violence, I become angry or depressed.

2. I feel safe in most neighborhoods, regardless of the racial composition (R).

3. I feel helpless about not being able to eliminate racism.

4. Sometimes I feel guilty about being White. Inter-racial Measures 125

5. I have very few friends of other races.

6. I become sad when I think about racial injustice.

7. Being White makes me feel personally responsible for racism.

8. I never feel ashamed about being White (R).

9. I am fearful that racial minority populations are rapidly increasing in the United States, and my group will no longer be the numerical majority.

10. I am angry that racism exists.

11. I am distrustful of people of other races.

12. I feel good about being White (R).

13. I often find myself fearful of people of other races.

14. Racism is dehumanizing to people of all races, including Whites.

15. I am afraid that I abuse my power and privilege as a White person.

16. It disturbs me when people express racist views.

*White Empathic Reactions Toward Racism reflecting affective costs of racism: 1, 3, 6, 20, 14, 16
*White guilt measuring feelings of shame (4, 7, 8, 12, 15)
*White fear of others (2, 5, 9, 11, 13)
APPENDIX H
Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice

Please read instructions carefully

The following questions concern various reasons or motivations people might have for trying to respond in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people. Some of the reasons reflect internal/personal motivations whereas other reflect more external/social motivations. Of course, people may be motivated for both internal and external reasons; we want to emphasize that neither type of motivation is by definition better than the other. In addition, we want to be clear that we are not evaluating you or your individual responses. All your responses will be completely confidential. We are simply trying to get an idea of the types of motivations that students in general have for responding in nonprejudiced ways. If we are to learn anything useful, it is important that you respond to each of the questions openly and honestly. Please give your response according to the scale below

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strongly agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Because of today's PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people. (EM)

2. I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to me. (IM)

3. I try to hide any negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid negative reactions from others. (EM)

4. If I acted prejudiced toward Black people, I would be concerned that others would be angry with me. (EM)

5. According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is OK. (IM)

6. I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward Black people. (IM)

7. I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people in order to avoid disapproval from others. (EM)

8. Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about Black people is wrong. (IM)

9. I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from others. (EM)

10. Being nonprejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept. (IM)
APPENDIX I
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR)

BIDR Version 6 - Form 40A

Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how true it is.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>not true</td>
<td>somewhat</td>
<td>very true</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

____ 1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
____ 2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.
____ 3. I don't care to know what other people really think of me.
____ 4. I have not always been honest with myself.
____ 5. I always know why I like things.
____ 6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.
____ 7. Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
____ 8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.
____ 9. I am fully in control of my own fate.
____ 10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
____ 11. I never regret my decisions.
____ 12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.
____ 13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.
____ 14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me.
____ 15. I am a completely rational person.
____ 16. I rarely appreciate criticism.
____ 17. I am very confident of my judgments
18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
19. It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.
20. I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do.
21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
22. I never cover up my mistakes.
23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
24. I never swear.
25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.
27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back.
28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
30. I always declare everything at customs.
31. When I was young I sometimes stole things.
32. I have never dropped litter on the street.
33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
34. I never read sexy books or magazines.
35. I have done things that I don't tell other people about.
36. I never take things that don't belong to me.
37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick.
38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
39. I have some pretty awful habits.
40. I don't gossip about other people's business.
APPENDIX J
Demographic Questionnaire

1. What is your age? ______________

2. Have you lived outside the United States?
   o Yes
   o No

3. For how many years did you live outside the United States? ______________

4. ______________

5. What is your race/ethnicity?
   o African American/Black
   o Asian American/Pacific Islander
   o Native American/Indigenous American/American Indian
   o Hispanic/Latino/a
   o Bi/Multicultural
   o White/Caucasian
   o Other: ______________

6. What is your preferred gender identity?
   o Woman
   o Man
   o Gender nonconforming
   o Other: ______________

7. What is your sexual orientation?
   o Straight/heterosexual
   o Bisexual
   o Gay/homosexual
   o Lesbian
   o Queer
   o Asexual
   o Pansexual
   o Other: ______________

8. Please select your yearly household income:
   o Below $10,000
   o $10,000–$20,000
   o $20,000–$30,000
   o $30,000–$40,000
   o $40,000–$50,000
   o $50,000–$60,000
   o $60,000–$70,000
   o $70,000–$80,000
   o $80,000–$90,000
   o $90,000–$100,000
   o Above $110,000
9. Please select your current social class:
   o Low income/poor
   o Working class
   o Middle class
   o Upper middle class
   o Upper class
10. What is your highest level of education?
    o Middle school
    o High school
    o Some college
    o Associate Degree/Community College
    o Bachelors Degree/4 Year College
    o Graduate Degree
11. In the 2016 presidential election, I voted for the candidate from the following party:
    o Democratic
    o Republican
    o Independent
    o Other
    o Didn’t vote
12. Please select your religious affiliation selecting the best descriptor:
    o Christianity
    o Judaism
    o Islam
    o Buddhism
    o Hinduism
    o Atheism
    o Agnosticism
    o Other: ____________
13. Please indicate your level of religiosity/spirituality:
    o Very religious/spiritual
    o Somewhat religious/spiritual
    o Not at all religious/spiritual
14. We would like to obtain information regarding the geographic location of our sample.
    This information will remain confidential. What is your zip code? _____________