

Columbia University  
Graduate School of Arts & Sciences  
Human Rights Studies Master of Arts Program

**Decolonizing Human Rights and the United Nation's Declaration of Human Rights:  
The Darfur perspective**

Yassmin Mohamed Fashir

Thesis adviser: Rhiannon Stephens

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts

Fall 2022

## **Abstract**

Human Rights in Africa, particularly in Sudan, needs to be based on traditional ideologies of belonging, peace, and justice. This paper aims to show why a new framework is important. By analyzing how the Human Rights regime tried to sustain and promote peace in Darfur since its intervention in the late 1970s, I argue that the human rights framework thwarts peace and justice in three ways. The first is that the conflict was misdiagnosed as genocide and thus mishandled. The second is that famine aid was inappropriately administered based on theories of Western famine relief. Lastly, the international community relied on the government of Sudan to enforce individual rights through treaties where Darfuris called on reconciliation and compensation.

The Human Rights framework and supporting institutions were not designed to address conflicts outside of liberal democracy. It was designed as a series of international treaties and conventions that grant rights through the court of law. In this way, human rights are colonized in that their application and implementation are based solely on historically Western institutions, theories, and philosophies that maintain universality. To truly understand how to decolonize Human Rights, we need subjectivity, the perspective of those most left out of its framework. Discourse is central to my understanding of human rights because rights are expressed through discourse. This paper reveals that Darfuris have rationalized a different conception of Human Rights based on traditional ideas of justice.

## **List of Abbreviations**

FCC	Forces for Freedom and Change
ICC	International Criminal Court
UN	United Nations
UNDHR	United Nations Declaration of Human Rights
JPA	Juba Peace Agreement
AU	African Union
FEWS	The Famine Early Warning Systems and Network
ICESCR	The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
NIF	National Islamic Front
SLA/M	Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
OAU	Organization of African Unity
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace



**<sup>1</sup> Map of modern-day Sudan**

---

<sup>1</sup> Oxfam International, "Map of Sudan," July 7, 2021.

## Acknowledgments

I have watched my father, Mohamed Adam Fashir, write about Darfur and the issues that have raged since childhood. I have written countless papers about Sudan, and each time I find myself correcting what I previously thought to be true. The issues in Darfur are beyond complex, but I found the best way to understand my nation is by listening to my Darfuri family about what is and has been important. I want to thank Professor Rhiannon Stephens, first and foremost, for sharing resources and giving me the tools to conceptualize and understand African history. Professor Stephens truly centers the voices and ideas of African people in her work, particularly in Uganda, and I aspire to do the same. I would also like to thank Nick Greven for changing my thoughts on social justice, decolonization, and liberalism. Leading the Indiana Department of Correction Watch (IDOC Watch) to protect incarcerated people and participating in movements such as “Students against state violence,” Nick has always been a great mentor and intellectual inspiration. Lastly, I would like to thank Fatinia Abdullah Karbis, my mother, and Abdulmunim Adam Sharif, my first cousin, for helping me understand Darfuri concepts consistently throughout my visit to Sudan in 2022. They did more than translate; they conceptualized Darfuri's ideas and practices by sharing their experiences.

*“Farmers who had once hosted his [Arab] tribe and his camels were now blocking their migration; the land could no longer support both herder and farmer. Many tribesmen had lost their stock and scratched at millet farming on marginal plots. The God-given order was broken... The way the world was set up since time immemorial was being disturbed. And it was bewildering, depressing. And the consequences were terrible.”<sup>2</sup>*

- **Sheik Hilal Abdalla**

---

<sup>2</sup> Stephan Faris, “The real roots of Darfur,” *The Atlantic*, 1 April, 2007, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/04/the-real-roots-of-darfur/305701/>.

## Table of Content

Abstract	2
List of Abbreviations	3
Map of Sudan	4
Acknowledgments	5
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>8</b>
Methodology	10
Conceptual Framework	12
<b>Section 1</b>	
Understanding Genocide	15
Beyond Genocide	21
Darfur in Context: Northern River	22
Darfur in Context: Dar Fur	23
Conclusion	26
The Regional African and Arab Belt	27
Conclusion	31
<b>Section 2</b>	
The Drought: Humanitarian Framework	33
Conclusion	39
<b>The Conjecture: Darfur 2003-2004</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Section 3</b>	
The First Comprehensive Peace 2006	42
The Civilian Voice	45
The Second Peace Agreement	47
The Civilian Voice	49
The Third Darfur Peace Agreement	51
The Civilian Voice	52
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>54</b>
Bibliography	58

## Introduction

In 2004, rebel groups attacked government facilities in Khartoum as a response to decades of regional marginalization. The government of Sudan responded by inflaming conflicts and arming the rivals of the rebel groups in Darfur; this insurgency led to the deaths and displacement of thousands of Darfuri residents. Most victims were part of the Fur, Masalit, or Zaghawa tribe, while the perpetrators were several nomadic Arab tribes. As a result, the United Nations and International Criminal Court deployed a peacekeeping force. They later indicted the President, Omar Al-Bashir, on five counts of crimes against humanity, two counts of war crimes, and three counts of Genocide in 2008. Between 2006 and 2011, Omar al-Bashir and several Darfur rebel factions signed two peace agreements, but the region was still unstable economically, and violence persisted. Then, in 2019, protesters ended the 30-year reign of Omar al-Bashir and established a new state of order in Sudan.<sup>3</sup> After the toppling of al-Bashir's regime, the military council and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FCC), a civil society group that claimed to represent the will of the masses, signed a power-sharing agreement to mediate issues in Darfur. The Juba Peace Agreement was signed, but since the revolution in 2019, over 330,000 people have been displaced in Darfur.<sup>4</sup> Sporadic violence and political changes have led to large-scale displacement and environmental desertification.<sup>5</sup> Due to the deadly drought of 1985, land has become scarce, and the traditional mechanism used to deal with land problems has been eroded. The International intervention in food aid has had no major impact in keeping

---

<sup>3</sup> African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, *Delays and Dilemmas: New Violence in Darfur and Uncertain Justice Efforts within Sudan's Fragile Transition* (Tunis: International Federation for Human Rights, July 2020), 5, [https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh\\_report\\_sudan2021.pdf](https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_report_sudan2021.pdf).

<sup>4</sup> African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, *Delays and Dilemmas*, 5.

<sup>5</sup> African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, *Delays and Dilemmas*, 5.



people alive through the famine.<sup>6</sup> The mortality rates in Darfur are almost as high as during the height of the conflict in 2004-2005.<sup>7</sup> Thus, to what extent has the Human Rights regime sustained and promoted peace in Darfur since its intervention in the late 1970s?

In response to the Juba Peace Agreements in 2021, most UN/multilateral interventions have pulled out of Darfur, claiming that they have succeeded in bringing justice to Darfur.<sup>8</sup> Because of the arrest of Omar Al Bashir, the joint UN-African Union mission announced that it is the responsibility of the transitional government to “assume the primary role in supporting the peace process, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and supporting the mediation of intercommunal conflicts.”<sup>9</sup> While the International Criminal Court claims that the Genocide in Darfur was the fault of Omar Al Bashir for pitting tribes against each other, the conflicts in Darfur predated his rule and continued after his fall. The reality is that the conflict in Darfur has no single cause. Rather, it is the result of colonial history, regional conflicts, and failed international interventions. A carceral solution to a regional, environmental, and political issue is careless. The litigation process has been largely unsuccessful in protecting domestic citizens in Darfur. The violence has continued, and Darfuris have called on the UN to return.<sup>10</sup> In 2020, a massive sit-in was organized in Nierteti, Darfur, where the populous demanded practical rights to resettle in Darfur.<sup>11</sup> Most people at the sit-in were internally displaced people

---

<sup>6</sup> Susanne Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan: A History of Power, Politics and Profit* (London: Zed, 2019), 140.

<sup>7</sup> Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan*, 5.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations. “UN confirms closure of Darfur peacekeeping mission,” *UN News*, December 30, 2020, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1081122>.

<sup>9</sup> United Nations. “UN confirms closure.”

<sup>10</sup> Radio Dabanga, “Protests against insecurity growing in Darfur,” February 1, 2020, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/darfur-protests-against-insecurity-growing>.

<sup>11</sup> Radio Dabanga, “Protests against insecurity growing in Darfur.”

who needed protection and compensation to rebuild their homes and lives. Bashir left, but the protestors still asked for the dismissal of almost all military persons in Darfur, the return of their livestock, and retribution for all victims.<sup>12</sup> Darfurians did not use Human Rights discourse or call for the individual liberties written in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.

The human rights frameworks the UN and other multilateral organizations have used to promote and sustain peace in Darfur thwart peace and justice by utilizing a colonial framework in three ways. First, the Human Rights regime's label of genocide, where a perpetrator and a victim exist, does not provide an appropriate framework to analyze the conflicts in Darfur in a historical context. Second, the international development community misinterpreted the social capacity of people in Darfur to sustain themselves through traditional drought management systems. Finally, where the human rights framework relies on the state to enforce rights through treaties, Darfuris enforce their rights through reconciliation and compensation. Human rights discourse is not applicable in Sudan, where the socio-economic and political conditions have led to a different conceptualization of peace and justice.

## **Methodology**

This article draws on secondary sources from prominent historians in Sudanese history. Rex Seán O'Fahey wrote about the sultanates in Darfur beginning in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Along with many field visits, he was also engaged in peacekeeping missions supported by the UN. Jay Spaulding was a historian specializing in Sudan whose work provides historical context for the contemporary situation in Darfur. Alex De Waal's research in Darfur extended before and after

---

<sup>12</sup> Radio Dabanga, "Protests against insecurity growing in Darfur."

the conflict in 2004, providing a long-term perspective of the social and political structures as they changed under new regimes. Mahmood Mamdani, Julie Flint, and Erik Solevad are researchers who also rely on historical data. However, they each reach similar conclusions about the causes of war in Darfur: colonization, drought, and regional civil war. Data about mortality rates, violence, and famine come from multilateral research organizations such as USAID. The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS) is an international system of data management used in Darfur to predict famine and collect data about nutrition, livelihoods, and climate. This data has been used to analyze famine and drought in the 1980s.

Darfuri voices presented here come from interviews and surveys conducted by research groups in refugee camps primarily located in southern Darfur. They also come from two Darfuri sources; Radio Dabanga and the film *Darfur Skeletons*. Radio Dabanga is a radio and news station started after the genocide to keep people in Darfur informed. Kamal Yousif Elsadig, editor-in-Chief of Radio Dabanga, was exiled in 2008 when he first wrote about abuses in rural Darfur. Soon after his exile, he founded Radio Dabanga in the Netherlands, where freedom of speech exists. Elsadig is one of many journalists and political opposition leaders who were exiled but continue to stay engaged in the politics of Darfur from abroad.<sup>13</sup> *Dakar Skeletons* is a film produced by a Darfuri filmmaker Hisham Haj Omar in the southern region of Darfur. He begins the film by writing, “You are about to witness a story lived and narrated by Darfurians.” Omar focused his film on issues that impact everyday Darfuri people without concerning himself with the distinction of “African” and “Arab.” The film is narrated by people living in

---

<sup>13</sup> Kamal Elsadig, “Makers of Dabanga: The story of Kamal Elsadig,” Radio Dabanga, June 8, 2018, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/makers-of-dabanga-the-story-of-kamal-elsadig>.

camps, nearby villages, and tribal leaders. As a Darfuri refugee, I could locate and access these resources by talking to political leaders in Indiana; Indiana houses the largest population of Darfur refugees in the United States.<sup>14</sup> Because of the bias internationally towards the victimization of “African” tribes, the voice of nomadic tribes in Darfur is elusive and missing from this article. Instead, an analysis of the structure of their military operations (Janjaweed) and how those structures changed over time is presented.

### **Conceptual Framework: The Colonial Construction of Human Rights**

Human rights are laws, treaties, and covenants proclaiming fundamental freedoms. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was established after the atrocities of WWII. Many European nations promised never to let international conflict devastate societies so catastrophically again. The UDHR was inspired by the French and American revolutions of the 18th century, where protestors called for basic rights against the state as taxpayers. Along with the UDHR, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) are the three main human rights documents.<sup>15</sup> They are designed to be translated into domestic law for every nation that signed the treaties. The grand idea behind human rights is that states are the main violators of human rights, and without international oversight, states are “unlikely to punish or correct their

---

<sup>14</sup> Susan Saulny, “After Darfur, starting anew in the Midwest,” *The New York Times*, April 2, 2007, <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/02/us/02indiana.html>.

<sup>15</sup> Amnesty International, “Universal declaration of human rights,” March 31, 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/universal-declaration-of-human-rights/>.

behavior.”<sup>16</sup> If the domestic court process fails to bring justice, victims may use a regional court or request a review from the committee of that specific treaty. The review is brought back to the domestic courts in hopes the domestic courts change their mind. If justice is not found in a regional court, cases are tried in the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the direction of the Special Prosecutor. However, individuals are not allowed to bring cases to the ICC; they must send their request to the special prosecutor and wait for a decision. Based on findings from periodic reviews and monitoring bodies, the Special Prosecutor can also bring cases with enough evidence to the ICC themselves. Beyond treaties, litigation, and monitoring, the Human Rights regime also consists of humanitarian aid. International law allows and promotes the intervention of humanitarian aid organizations such as the International Red Cross, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization.

The problem is that the utilization of the law to address human rights issues and the conceptualization that rights as an obligation of the State, centered around judicial litigation, comes from a Western tradition of addressing human rights violations. The Human Rights regime is a mechanism of Western colonial power in that while claiming universality, its application and implementation are based solely on historically Western institutions.

Rights are called in times of violation, and how rights are rationalized is based on social-political context. Human rights are a relatively new concept; the idea did not exist before 1948. Human rights discourse is essentially the language of the UDHR and the constitutions of sovereign states. It calls for individual rights based on the rule of law and citizenship. People

---

<sup>16</sup> International Justice Resource Center, “Overview of the human rights framework,” February 3, 2022, <https://ijrcenter.org/ihr-reading-room/overview-of-the-human-rights-framework/>.

have long fought for their rights to self-determination, freedom from oppression, and migration, among other basic rights, but before 1948, the term “human rights” was not used. Louis Henkin, credited with creating the field of human rights, wrote his essay “Judaism and Human Rights” to provide a philosophical basis for human rights.<sup>17</sup> He argues that the ideas of right and wrong, good and bad, and moral and immoral are all judged by God in Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions.<sup>18</sup> He further says that the socio-historical position of Jews as perpetual victims in exile influenced the “civilized world” to concede to minority rights.<sup>19</sup> Henkin is correct that Human Rights emerged almost entirely in response to the Holocaust. However, his latter point seems to speak to the nature of rights themselves: they do not exist until a violation occurs. In other words, articulating a right directly indicates that it has been violated.

Rights are deeply contextual. Ram Chandra Pandeya is an Indian philosopher who thinks through the idea of rights claiming in the Western sense. She explains in detail,

“If to be human confers certain rights on an individual then, it may be contended, to be an animal would also confer some set of rights. But can we talk of animal rights in the sense in which we talk of human rights? Obviously, animal rights, if there be any, have to be different from human rights in at least one fundamental sense. A man can voluntarily invoke or renounce these rights but animals cannot. This means that these rights are intimately connected with human volition. So rights have to be linked not with

---

<sup>17</sup> HLS News Staff, “Louis Henkin '40, a founder of modern human rights law [1917-2010],” Harvard Law School, October 20, 2010, <https://hls.harvard.edu/today/louis-henkin-40-a-founder-of-modern-human-rights-law-1917-2010/>.

<sup>18</sup> Louis Henkin, “Judaism and Human Rights,” *Judaism* 25, no. 4 (Fall 1976), 435.

<sup>19</sup> Henkin, “Judaism and Human Rights,” 435.

status as a human being but with volition, which is an important manifestation of rationality.”<sup>20</sup>

Pandeya explains that rights are, by nature, linked with reason. The rights drafted in the context of 20<sup>th</sup>-century Europe, when most of Africa was still colonized, are recognized by the Human Rights regime as universal human rights. However, they respond to a particular socio-economic condition: a liberal democracy under capitalism. Article 17, the right to join a trade union can only exist in a society where an employer can take advantage of many workers; capitalism. There would be no reason to conceptualize this idea in a region dominated by subsistence agriculture. Continuing with Henkin,

“There have also been recurrent confrontations between rights which Jews cherished and claims asserted by other groups – notably Jewish insistence on equal opportunity and individual merit as the basis for reward, and the demands by Black Americans and others for equal treatment regardless of merit, indeed, for the beneficial discrimination to equalize or compensate for inequalities.”<sup>21</sup>

Black Americans do not insist on beneficial discrimination to equalize; black Americans realize the United States does not offer equal opportunity to them. Jewish people's emphasis on merit for reward suggests a belief in equal opportunity. This comes from the fact that Jewish people were treated as one unit even before the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Their rights lie in their need to be judged as individuals in the same way that Muslim people fought to be judged as individuals in the era of the patriot act. During the civil rights era in the US, many black nationalists and radicals used

---

<sup>20</sup> R. C. Pandeya, "Human Rights: An Indian Perspective," in *Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights* (Paris: UNESCO, 1986), 270.

<sup>21</sup> Henkin, "Judaism and Human Rights," 444.

the language of communism that emphasized the idea that black people were facing economic discrimination in a capitalist system. The language of economics was tied to their rationalization of rights. The conceptualization of rights against a state relates to how a particular group experiences oppression; they are not universal. So this work is not a critique of human rights to minimally expand its ability to claim universality. This paper emphatically argues that rights are not universal and should not be.

### **Understanding Genocide: Perpetrator and victim framework**

The main issue related to intervention in Darfur was the question of genocide. The human rights rhetoric surrounding the conversation about genocide in Darfur was often polarizing; there was a clear good and a clear bad. In 2004, Nicholas Kristof published “Dare we call it Genocide?” where he explained, “Sudanese government resolved to crush a rebellion in Darfur, a region the size of France in western Sudan. Sudan armed and paid a militia of Arab raiders, the Janjaweed, and authorized them to slaughter and drive out members of the Zaghawa, Masalit, and Fur tribes.”<sup>22</sup> Kristof quoted the Arabs in Darfur: “We will not allow blacks here. We will not let Zaghawa here. This land is only for Arabs.”<sup>23</sup>

Along with Kristof, John Prendergast, founding director of the Enough Project to End Genocide and Mass Atrocities, led a strong media campaign to call the conflict in Darfur a genocide.<sup>24</sup> At John Hopkins, during a conference concerning genocide, Prendergast explained

---

<sup>22</sup> Nicholas Kristof, “Dare we call it genocide?,” *The New York Times*, June 16, 2004, <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/16/opinion/dare-we-call-it-genocide.html>.

<sup>23</sup> Kristof, “Dare we call it genocide?”

<sup>24</sup> International House, *A Conversation with John Prendergast of the Enough Project*, The University of Chicago, April 30, 2019.



that the Janjaweed were “loosely organized bandits who believe their race superior;” He compared the Janjaweed to the Ku Klux Klan.<sup>25</sup> He also starred in “A Journey to the Dark Heart of Nameless Unspeakable Evil, a film that promoted the idea of the conflict in Darfur being a genocide”.<sup>26</sup> Soon after, groups like Jewish World Watch, committed to ending the genocide in memory of the Holocaust, the Holocaust Museum, and MoveOn.org pressured political leaders to use the term genocide. The most notable support, however, came from the Save Darfur Movement.<sup>27</sup> David Lanz describes the Save Darfur Movement as “Arguably the largest international social movement since anti-apartheid.”<sup>28</sup> Save Darfur was a lobbying group composed mostly of students, significantly impacting the US political stance on Darfur. They pressed Secretary of State Colin Powell and President George Bush to eventually term the conflict genocide, which was considered a compelling act. Calling a conflict genocide invokes a legal obligation from all member states of the Convention to act to end the genocide.<sup>29</sup> These activist groups pushed the label genocide to force action through obligation and did so using the stories and experiences of the Darfuri people, who were victims of state violence.

Each of the above-mentioned organizations explained the conflict in Darfur uncomplicatedly, using ethnic status to position the victims and perpetrators. In these explanations, Arab people in Darfur are the perpetrators of “nameless unspeakable evil”. The

---

<sup>25</sup> Christine Grillo, “Sands shifting in Darfur genocide,” Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, January 2008, <https://publichealth.jhu.edu/2008/prendergast-darfur-2>.

<sup>26</sup> International House, *A Conversation with John Prendergast*.

<sup>27</sup> Scott Straus, “Darfur and the Genocide Debate,” *Foreign Affairs*, 84, no. 1 (January 2005): 123, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20034212>.

<sup>28</sup> David Lanz, “Save Darfur: A Movement and Its Discontents,” *African Affairs*, 108, no. 433 (October 2009): 669, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40388427>.

<sup>29</sup> Lanz, “Save Darfur,” 670.

African tribes are victims in need of humanitarian aid and civil rights. Comparing the Janjaweed and Arab tribes in Darfur to the Ku Klux Klan, or Nazis in the case of the Jewish World Watch, structures the conflict in Darfur into a conversation about ethics and morality. The most common phrase among most of these advocates was “never again” in reference to the case of the Holocaust in Germany and the Genocide in Rwanda; it is the belief that these situations are the same – or at least somehow equivalent.<sup>30</sup> But many who refused to see events in Darfur as a genocide argued that the explanations of the conflict were extremely oversimplified; there was no clear victim and perpetrator.

Mahmood Mamdani has analyzed the publicity about Darfur and is one of the biggest critics of the media’s representation of the conflict. In *Saviors and Survivors*, Mamdani argues that the Save Darfur student activist group pushed a narrative that falsely characterized the conflicts in Sudan. Mamdani argues against the idea that light-skinned Arab militias, supported by the government, are committing genocide against dark-skinned African people for their land and resources. Instead, he argues that the conflict has many factors, including environmental degradation and a regional civil war. In a debate with John Prendergast at Columbia University in 2009, Mamdani angered a crowd, mainly Darfuri audience members, for refusing to acknowledge that a genocide happened in Darfur.<sup>31</sup> Crowd members detailed the horrific deaths and rape of loved ones, but Mamdani called it a government insurgency instead. He argued that regardless of the title genocide, the crime was just as bad as genocide.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> Anne Penketh, “Darfur: Never again?,” *The Independent*, January 26, 2005, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/darfur-never-again-488268.html>.

<sup>31</sup> Columbia University, “Prof. Mahmood Mamdani and John Prendergast, ‘The Darfur Debate’,” YouTube Video, 1:41:00, April 30, 2009, [https://youtu.be/yGOpfH\\_5\\_pY](https://youtu.be/yGOpfH_5_pY).

<sup>32</sup> Columbia University, “The Darfur Debate,” 1:41:00.

The term genocide is powerful. It calls on a shared sense of humanity to save a group of people and invokes an international obligation. Although what happened in Darfur may not politically parallel Rwanda or Germany, Mamdani agrees that those in Darfur are marginalized in Sudan. He also notes that Arabs are marginalized in Darfur proper. Mamdani calls the humanitarian intervention in Sudan an extension of the U.S. war on terror, targeting Arab tribes. Less concerned with the actual title of genocide, Mamdani focuses on the international implications of intervention, and for many Darfuris and activists, he is an obstacle.<sup>33</sup> Nicholas Kristof wrote a review of Mamdani's book *Saviors and Savivors*, stating,

“he published a book, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim*, which was more sympathetic to Osama bin Laden than most other books on the subject. He has been accused of serving as an apologist for the extremist Hutus behind the Rwandan genocide, and he is also more understanding with respect to Robert Mugabe's brutal rule in Zimbabwe than most writers. His writing is infused with a tendency to indict European colonialism for inflaming tribal tensions and producing other disasters.”<sup>34</sup>

The anger towards Mamdani from Darfuris and leftist activists stems from his lack of support for US intervention. For victims and humanitarians, he went too far in suggesting the United States not intervene. While he is correct that global politics and geopolitics dictate the intervention strategies of the human rights regime, it is still true that Darfur needed help from the international community.

---

<sup>33</sup> Rita Kiki Edozie, “Global Citizens and Sudanese Subjects: Reading Mamdani's *Saviours and Survivors*,” *African Affairs* 108, no. 433 (2009): 661, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40388426>.

<sup>34</sup> Nicholas D. Kristof, *What to Do about Darfur* (New York: The New York Review of Books, 2020).

In 2004, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed a resolution calling for Sudan to respect its human rights obligations or suffer the consequences of economic sanctions. It also called for the Secretary-General to create a commission of inquiry to determine if acts of genocide had been committed. In 2004 the Commission of Inquiry stated, "The Commission concluded that the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide."<sup>35</sup> They further reported, "The Commission does recognize that in some instances individuals, including Government officials, may commit acts with genocidal intent. Whether this was the case in Darfur, however, is a determination that only a competent court can make on a case-by-case basis."<sup>36</sup> After years of political debate and an appeal from the UN prosecutor, the International Criminal Court charged the former president, Omar al-Bashir, with five counts of crimes against humanity, two counts of war crimes, and three counts of genocide in 2008.

It is important to understand why the term genocide is difficult to prove in the case of Darfur and why it was initially labeled a crime against humanity. The international Human Rights framework is centered around litigation and state obligation to treaties through official review; defining the crime correctly offers the best form of justice. The term "genocide" was first coined by Raphael Lemkin. Irvin-Erickson points out that the original definition of genocide found in the context of German imperialism has been changed. As Lemkin himself claims, genocide was defined as "the destruction of nations, which entailed the destruction of the national patterns of the oppressed group and the imposition of the national patterns of the

---

<sup>35</sup> UN Security Council, *Resolution 1564 (2004)* (United Nations Digital Library System, 2004), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/530567?ln=en>.

<sup>36</sup> ReliefWeb, "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General – Sudan," February 25, 2005. <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/report-international-commission-inquiry-darfur-united-nations-secretary-general>.

oppressor."<sup>37</sup> This idea was largely ignored as states did not want to criminalize their "imposition of national patterns."<sup>38</sup> In the 1948 genocide convention, genocide is redefined as an "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group."<sup>39</sup> The factors related to how we understand genocide legally have been changed, particularly in response to the Holocaust, in a way that the term genocide has ridged definitional boundaries. The term genocide or Holocaust has not been reconceptualized in a way that fits the paradigms and dynamics of Darfur. We should take up intellectual work to understand how to define the conflict in Darfur without simply naming it after a European crisis. That is the Black Radical Tradition, which is to reconceptualize the history of the Black African and Black African diaspora in its context without using theory.<sup>40</sup> By looking at Sudan's ecological, political, social, and economic context in the decades before the 2003 counter-insurgency, we can place the Darfur conflict in context and understand the articulation of justice and accountability in today's context of revolution.

## **Beyond Genocide**

In a sovereign nation, the rule of law is established to protect the human rights of citizens. During the French Revolution, the populace chanted and sang against the state in the name of citizens. The song "Alarm of the People" begins with the verses, "French people,

---

<sup>37</sup> Douglas Irvin-Erickson, "Raphaël Lemkin, Genocide, Colonialism, Famine, and Ukraine," *East/West* 8, no. 1 (May 2021): 199, <https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus645>.

<sup>38</sup> Irvin-Erickson, "Raphaël Lemkin, Genocide, Colonialism, Famine, and Ukraine," 202.

<sup>39</sup> Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," 1948. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crimeofgenocide.aspx>.

<sup>40</sup> David Scott, "On the Very Idea of a Black Radical Tradition," *Small Axe: A Caribbean Journal of Criticism* 17, no. 1 (March 2013): 1–6, <https://doi.org/10.1215/07990537-1665398>.

people of brothers, can you watch, without shuddering in horror, as crime unfurls its banners, of carnage and terror?"<sup>41</sup> Another popular song, *Marseille*, begins, "Forward children of the homeland! The day of glory has arrived; Against us, tyranny's bloody standard has been raised."<sup>42</sup> The populace collectively recognized themselves as French people of the "homeland" in their protests; they identified as a nation and called for their rights as French *citizens*. In *Provincializing Europe*, Dipesh Chakrabarty notes that "concepts such as citizenship, the state, civil society, public sphere, human rights, equality before the law, the individual, distinctions between private and public, the idea of the subject, democracy, popular sovereignty, social justice, scientific rationality and so on all bear the burden of European thought and history".<sup>43</sup> Chakrabarty argues that these concepts have no social-historical conditions in places outside of Europe; these concepts are referential to European models and institutions. Sudan lacks the historical conditions for a liberal democracy, first and foremost in the idea of a citizen. In 18<sup>th</sup> century Darfur, the idea of a nation was not understood as the dominant form of belonging to which you could call for rights. The nation-state, as we understand it today, belongs to a European tradition of governance. The rest of this section will be a historical review and understanding of how people understood belonging beyond national citizenship in Darfur.

---

<sup>41</sup> Historyplex, "Famous songs of the French revolution with English translations," April 13, 2005, <https://historyplex.com/songs-of-french-revolution>.

<sup>42</sup> Historyplex, "Famous songs of the French revolution."

<sup>43</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 200.

## Darfur in Context: Northern River Valley (Khartoum)

In the 1700s, the Funj sultanate conquered and ruled what is known as modern-day north Sudan, “bounded by Egypt on the north, Abyssinia on the east, Upper Nile on the south, and the edges of Kordofan on the west.”<sup>44</sup> However, in 1762, internal warlords took over the Funj sultanate and expanded the empire through commercial capitalism by introducing the coin.<sup>45</sup> Historian Sean O’Fahey writes, “...the acquisition of commercial interests by the provincial lords made any return to the centralized government on the old pattern very difficult.”<sup>46</sup> The Funj sultanate was very large, and maintaining control became difficult as merchants began working in their interests, not the interest of the king (who lost his monopoly on trade). The capital city, Sinnar, was metropolitan with merchants from all over the world, and in the later 1700s, it was controlled by a new middle class of merchants exposed to Arab trade. They were primarily nomadic petty traders trying to “expand their commerce to items previously monopolized by the king.”<sup>47</sup> The ideology of the middle class was that of orthodox Islam, and soon, Islam became more public in Sudan with new buildings such as mosques.<sup>48</sup> Arabic also became the language of literacy, politics, and the common language amongst middle-class men.<sup>49</sup> This spread of Islam led many Sudanese people to claim Arab ancestry and political power. “In support of these claims, there arose first a trickle, then a flood of putative genealogies, tracing family descent from son to father carefully back to various distinguished

---

<sup>44</sup> Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 200.

<sup>45</sup> R. S. O’Fahey and Jay Spaulding, *Kingdoms of the Sudan* (London: Methuen, 1974), 79.

<sup>46</sup> O’Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms of the Sudan*, 80.

<sup>47</sup> O’Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms of the Sudan*, 79.

<sup>48</sup> O’Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms of the Sudan*, 81.

<sup>49</sup> O’Fahey and Spaulding, *Kingdoms of the Sudan*, 81.

Arabs of the early days of Islam.”<sup>50</sup> Some Arab migrants came to Sudan in small waves beginning in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. However, many who claim to be Arab today are native Sudanese people who gradually began practicing strict Islam due to their class.<sup>51</sup> They are known as *Jellaba*. They not only held political, social, and economic rights in Sudan but also held political, social, and economic hegemony.

### **Darfur in Context: Dar Fur**

To the west, in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, Dar Fur (land of the Fur) was united in El-Fashir under the Kiera dynasty. The Kiera is historically known for bringing Islam into Dar Fur, told through the story of the “wise stranger”, the story of a man who “comes to a remote and barbarous land, introduces new customs, often associated with eating, and marries the chief's daughter. Their descendants then rule but in a different style.”<sup>52</sup> The wise stranger is identified as a series of Arab men who brought changes to Darfur. One includes Ahmad al-Macqulr, who married a Fur woman and fathered Sulieman, the leader of the Kiera dynasty.<sup>53</sup> Although this story is yet to be historically proven, it indicates a major political, social, and economic change in Darfur through marriages between different ethnic groups. The rise of Sulieman, son of the wise stranger, parallels the first accounts of economic change with establishing an extensive long-distance trade of slaves from Darfur.<sup>54</sup> The institution of slavery was the source of power

---

<sup>50</sup> O’Fahey, and Spaulding, *Kingdoms of the Sudan*, 81.

<sup>51</sup> Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, *A New History of a Long War* (London: Zed Books, 2008), 112.

<sup>52</sup> R. S. O’Fahey, “Slavery and the Slave Trade in Dār Fūr,” *The Journal of African History*, 14, no. 1 (1973), 31, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/180775>.

<sup>53</sup> O’Fahey, “Slavery and the Slave Trade in Dār Fūr,” 31.

<sup>54</sup> O’Fahey, “Slavery and the Slave Trade in Dār Fūr,” 31.



for the Kiera dynasty, and as they expanded, they took on many partners, including many Arab nomadic tribes. The Baggara are cattle herders in the north, and the Abbala are camel herders in the south that claim Arab ancestry. They were tributaries to the Kiera sultans that were used as paid militia to fight in wars and capture slaves for the Sultan.<sup>55</sup> Until the British colonization of Sudan in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, they were the main military force contracted by the sultan in Sudan. Although their ancestry is not proven, the claim to Arab ancestry is the defining characteristic of an Arab tribe in Sudan. Ancestral genealogies are Darfur's traditional social organization unit for identifying tribes and clans.<sup>56</sup>

Historians disagree about the Baggara and Abbala Arab tribes' migration patterns, but what is known is that they have lived in Darfur since before the 14th century, in periods of conflict and harmony with African tribes.<sup>57</sup> The Arab tribes were nomadic, while the Fur, the largest tribe in Darfur, were farmers. However, “more prosperous Fur farmers invested their wealth in cattle, to the extent that some even joined migratory Arabs groups, ‘becoming Arab’ in culture and lifestyle.”<sup>58</sup> Ethnic associations and tribes could change based on marriage, occupation, and wealth. Because the main pillar of the economy was slavery, the societal divisions reflected those who could be enslaved and those who were not. Mamdani writes, “the history of Darfur ... cannot be tagged as either “Arab” or “non-Arab,” for no such distinction divided slaves from their captors. The real division was between subjects of the sultan, who

---

<sup>55</sup> O’Fahey, “Slavery and the Slave Trade in Dār Fūr,” 31.

<sup>56</sup> Alex De Waal, *The Conflict in Darfur, Sudan: Background and Overview* (Boston: Tufts University, 2022), <https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2022/04/AdW-expert-witness-statement-DF-for-ICC.pdf>.

<sup>57</sup> Ḥasan, Yūsuf Faḍl. “Main Aspects of the Arab Migration to the Sudan.” *Arabica* 14, no. 1 (February 1967): 15

<sup>58</sup> Alex De Waal, *The Conflict in Darfur, Sudan*, 15.

could not be enslaved, and those who lived in tributaries to the south, who could be.”<sup>59</sup> The *Fartit* is a name used for people who could be enslaved in Darfur. They were usually pagan African people from the tribes of southern Sudan and Darfur. Citizenship in Sudan was marked by kinship. Ethnic groups, through imagined or real ancestral ties, were granted communal rights such as land. Land was the property of groups, not individuals.

The flexibility of Arab and Africans began to change drastically after European colonization. When Darfur was colonized but not yet annexed and made part of Sudan, the British established a system of indirect rule where native leaders were allowed to manage Darfur according to rules set by the British. In the early 1920s, the British established the Native Administration in Sudan to categorize and delegate administrative responsibilities.<sup>60</sup> They divided Darfur and categorized each person based on their ethnic association. This began with a census used to categorize tribes for administrative efforts. They further divided tribes into two different races, Zurga - “Negro” and Arab.<sup>61</sup> Tribes considered native to Darfur were given land and power over administrative aspects, whereas those considered settlers did not receive land. Although a few Arab nomads received land, the majority did not.<sup>62</sup> Tribes had been relatively open social units that carried social organization and political power based on kinship. However, under British rule, a tribe became understood as a signifier for certain rights within the native administration. Even so, “the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Government tried, with

---

<sup>59</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2009), 157.

<sup>60</sup> Sharif Harir, Terje Tvedt, and Raphael K. Badal, eds. *Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan* (Villavägen: Nordic Africa Institute, 1994), 143.

<sup>61</sup> Harir, Tvedt, and Badal, eds. *Short-Cut to Decay*, 199.

<sup>62</sup> Harir, Tvedt, and Badal, eds. *Short-Cut to Decay*, 143.

limited success, to prevent the processes of ethnic change in areas dominated by the Fur. For instance, they became worried about the 'detrribalization' of small groups, such as the cattle-herding Beni Hussein, and gave them their sheikhs and homelands. Nevertheless, a contingent of the Beni Hussein assimilated to Fur and formed a new clan known as Madinga.”<sup>63</sup> The British made ethnic associations rigid, legal, and formalized. After this change, tribes who migrated to areas in Darfur, such as Nankose, remained on the periphery and maintained their own ethnic associations.<sup>64</sup> This change reflects a major shift in managing migration and resettlement in Darfur.

## **Conclusion**

British colonial policies changed the discourse of rights in Darfur in that rights and privileges were granted based on “Arab” or “African.” However, throughout the history of the Funj and Keira Sultanate (until the 19<sup>th</sup> century), Arab and African were not salient identifying categories for the majority of the population. Arab and African cannot be conceptualized regarding race, indigenous populations, or phenotype as done by human rights activists and lobbyist groups. In Sudan, these are historical categories of lineage. Both Africans and Arabs are natives of Darfur in that they migrated to that region centuries ago. The narrative of the Arab settlers in Darfur downplays the role of nomads in Sudanese history but also ignores the reality that these ethnic associations were not one-dimensional. Kunjara, the largest fur clan in Darfur, comprises many ethnic groups. Kunjara loosely translates to “gathered together,” reflecting

---

<sup>63</sup> Alex De Waal, *Famine That Kills: Darfur, Sudan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 49.

<sup>64</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 49.

that the clan includes many ethnic groups.<sup>65</sup> Citizenship came from kinship associations and was directly related to safety from enslavement. The discourse of land rights is conflated with ethnicity because that is how the colonial powers divided the land. Any assessment of Genocide in Darfur needs to consider how the persistent colonial legacies of the formalization of “Arab” and “African” changed the language of rights. To date, the Arab tribes who received land, regardless of their “settler” status, are absent from the conflict. This indicates that it is not a fight between Arabs and Africans but between land owners and nomads.

### **The Regional African and Arab belt**

The second event structure that solidified the African/Arab divide was the regional war between Chad and Libya in the 1980s. At this point, Sudan had been independent for roughly 24 years, but no single Sudanese nation existed. There were many different ethnic groups and languages, but colonial privilege led orthodox Islamic merchants, the Jellaba, to political power. Harir writes, “What was called Sudanese nationalism expressed the riverain Sudanese point of view rather than the point of view of a whole called Sudan for it did not exist at the time. The term “Sudanese” became equivalent to “riverain”, reinforced in the popular political culture by dichotomies such as Aw/ad Al Ba/ad (sons of the land) versus Janubi (Southerner) and Gharbawi (Westerner) and Awlad Arab versus Abd (slave) or Nubawi (Nuba).”<sup>66</sup> Arab became synonymous with Sudanese, and Libya especially supported this. Gaddafi was in office in Libya and working towards expanding an “Arab belt.” He enlisted mercenaries, called the Islamic

---

<sup>65</sup> Erik Solevad Nielson, “Ethnic Boundaries and Conflict in Darfur: An Event Structure Hypothesis,” *Ethnicities* 8, no. 4 (December 2008): 448, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23890177>.

<sup>66</sup> Harir, Tvedt, and Badal, eds. *Short-Cut to Decay*, 36.

Legion, from nomadic groups in Chad and other parts of the Sahel belt. These were particularly destitute tribes in an environment undergoing desertification. Janjaweed, meaning devils on horses, came to represent these militant nomadic groups who took up arms for Gaddafi. Throughout the war between Libya and Chad, “the frontiers of Darfur have served as the base of every overthrow of the Chadian regime since independence.”<sup>67</sup> Chadians were migrating to Sudan in their thousands. By 1990, 10% of Chad’s population lived in Darfur, and the population of Darfur increased from 1.3 million in 1985 to 6.4 million in 2004.<sup>68</sup> Because the border was pre-colonially non-existent, many migrants joined kin groups in Darfur with relative ease, such as the Abballa and the Zaghawa. But many Chadian Arab groups and political rebels also began to occupy space around the very fertile lands of Jabel Marra. Frequently, the Chadian government followed, often killing Fur tribe members in the battle. The Fur tribes felt unsafe in their land, retaliating by burning fields, stealing animals, and limiting access to natural resources. The Chadian Arabs were displaced in Sudan but exiled from Chad. To reestablish themselves, they began to fight against the lesser enemies in their exile and “slaughtered anyone whose tribal identity was Fur or looked like a Fur in complexion or facial appearance, whether on a highway or in a village... The Arabs sought the support of other nomadic Arab groups in Sudan, especially from the neighboring Kordofan province, and in the end, formed an organization called the Arab Congregation.”<sup>69</sup> There had been issues in Darfur between Arabs and Africans, but this was the first time it had taken on a racialized ideology. Neither of these

---

<sup>67</sup> Nielson, “Ethnic Boundaries and Conflict in Darfur,” 466.

<sup>68</sup> J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2006), 192.

<sup>69</sup> Harir, Tvedt, and Badal, eds. *Short-Cut to Decay*, 166.

groups used the discourse of nationality - calling on Chadian or Sudanese allies based on the nation. They used the language of Arab vs. African and refashioned an old alliance between slave raiders.

In 1989, the Fur and Arab tribes were brought together in a conference to mediate the Fur/Arab war. Dimingawi Fadl Sese, a leader in the Fur delegation, began his opening statement with:

We are witnessing yet another and yet more sinister phase of this dirty war: the aim is a total holocaust and no less than the complete annihilation of the Fur people and all things Fur. How are we to understand the brutal mutilation of Fur victims and the burning alive of residents of Fur villages? The message is quite clear: empty the land and do not allow any Fur survivors to come back and re-establish their villages. All this, of course, is a step in the chain of effects that aims at the complete displacement of the Fur and their replacement by the invading [Arab] elements that are party to this conflict. How are we supposed to understand the mobilization of 27 Arab tribes, including some from across regional boundaries and others from across international boundaries, against only one tribe?<sup>70</sup>

The Fur believed that the Arab tribes and opposition groups from Chad and even Darfur were trying to commit genocide. The Beni Helba Arabs then gave a statement claiming,

“Our Arab tribe [note the singular form] and the Fur coexisted peacefully throughout the known history of Darfur. However, the situation was destabilized towards the end of

---

<sup>70</sup> Harir, Tvedt, and Badal, eds. *Short-Cut to Decay*, 146.

the seventies when the Fur raised a slogan that claimed that Darfur is for the Fur, "Darfur for Fur." This coincided with the fact that the first regional government of Dar was led by a Fur individual who did not lift a finger to quell this dangerous trend. To further exacerbate the situation, some Fur intellectuals in the Darfur Development Front and the Independent Alliance have embraced the "Dar Fur for Fur" slogan. The Arabs were depicted as foreigners who should be evicted from this area of Dar Fur... Ours is a legitimate self-defense, and we shall continue defending our right of access to water and pasture. However, let us not be in doubt about who began this war: it is the Fur who, in their quest to extend the so-called "African belt" (al hizam al Zunji, Arabic), wanted to remove all the Arabs from this soil."<sup>71</sup>

The Arab tribes believed that the Fur wanted to expel them from Darfur in the same way the Fur believed the Arabs wanted to expel them. Historically, the situation of refugees and displaced people from Chad led to a land and population problem during a drought. The Fur/Arab civil war is not as the discourse suggests. It was not the Arabs and the Africans. It was between the Fur and the Chadian nomads who made claims to land in Darfur. Their claims were based on their shared kinship relationships with nomads already living in Darfur and ruling Sudan. They were never seen as refugees. It began in Jabal Marra and expanded throughout Darfur as Arab and Africans became widely deployed. Dr. Tigani Sese, the leader in Darfur and Fur himself, stated,

As a result of our peaceful ways, Dar Fur has become a standard quotation for many parts of our world regarding stability and peaceful coexistence. The people of Dar Fur's

---

<sup>71</sup> Harir, Tvedt, and Badal, eds. *Short-Cut to Decay*, 147.

ability to solve tribal conflicts is exemplary. I need not labor much for examples of tribal conflicts which were solved in the "Dar Fur way" of amicability: Rezaiqat vs. Maalia, Gimir vs. Fellata, Northern Rezaiqat vs. Beni Helba, etc . ... But despite our rich experience in containing tribal problems, we witness today a conflict that has been conducted in ways completely out of character with our spirit...The conflict we are trying to resolve today began as an ordinary conflict between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers over natural resources. The extraordinary aspect of the Fur/Arabs conflict is not in how it began but in the speed with which it spread out from the Jebel Marra areas to engulf communities in Wadi Salih, Zalingei, Kas, Kabkabiya, and Nyala rural council areas.<sup>72</sup>

A regional conflict and the gradual destitution of nomads in the Sahel inflamed the issues in Darfur. Prior to the influx of the opposition groups from Chad, the majority of the tribal issues that occurred in Darfur between 1950 and 1990 occurred between Arab groups.<sup>73</sup> Africans and Arabs were never primordial enemies in Darfur; tribal conflicts occurred between all tribes. Only after 1989 did the ideologies of the "African and Arab belt" really permeate the entire region.

## **Conclusion**

The idea of genocide permeating Darfur in the 1980s came from the mobilization of Arab and African ideologies during the Chad/Libyan war. The key issue was land ownership.

---

<sup>72</sup> Harir, Tvedt, and Badal, eds. *Short-Cut to Decay*, 147.

<sup>73</sup> Harir, Tvedt, and Badal, eds. *Short-Cut to Decay*, 146.



Traditionally, the Fur would give access to land to patrons for the price of one-tenth of the produce. Harir argues that this was primarily symbolic; sometimes, a bowl of porridge would suffice. When the drought began, and more migrants from Chad arrived, sedentary tribes began to build enclosures and fences around their communal lands. Nomads began to demand land from the government, but land in Darfur was already scarce. The idea that Arab nomads from Chad had a claim to the land or a claim to rights in Sudan is derived from the fact that the national government represented their kinship groups.

“The majority of the nomadic Arab groups which, under the leadership of the Beni Helba, waged that war against the Fur were groups originating from Chad or were formally Chadian nationals but de facto Sudanese since they have kin in Sudan and hence did not ask for refugee status.”<sup>74</sup> Chadian refugees could call on kinship groups to support them in Sudan not based on citizenship but through a shared Arab genealogy. The term genocide cannot be practically applied to fit the situation in Darfur in that, initially, the Sudanese government was not involved. The Sudanese government supported the Chadian refugees who shared kinship relationships with Darfuri citizens, but they did not initiate the war. In addition, there is no one unit of Arab or African in Darfur. The sheer power of the government led to the deaths of many “Africans,” but the context is not genocide; it is desertification and a war for land. Omar al Bashir was arrested, but it can be argued that Gaddafi was also responsible for assembling and deploying his mercenaries across the Sahel. The fighting that began in the 1989 civil war between the Fur and the Arabs never stopped and is the origin of the contemporary conflict in the historical context.

---

<sup>74</sup> Harir, Tvedt, and Badal, eds. *Short-Cut to Decay*, 181.

### **The Drought: Humanitarian Framework**

Question: Was there a famine after Dan Muubi [about 1953]?

Answer: Yes. No one died, but the price of millet rose. When the sack of millet costs 6000 francs, isn't that a famine?

**- Sahelian herder quoted 1975**

Famine is a particularly virulent form of [starvation] causing widespread death.

**- Amartya Sen, Poverty, and Famines<sup>75</sup>**

Instead of trying to maintain their original way of life, people in Darfur dealt with famine by adapting to the new drought conditions. Famine in Darfur was traditionally recognized not by death but by changes in social structures and grain prices. Alex De Waal begins his

---

<sup>75</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 15.

investigation on famine with this quote. Famine in Darfur does not have the same conceptual meaning as famine in the Western humanitarian sense. Famine comes from the Latin word “fames,” meaning hunger. It was first used in the 14<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>76</sup> Throughout the famines in Europe during that period, regardless of changes in population size, famine meant that there was an agrarian issue.

De Waal argues that it was in 1775 when the term “starvation” was used to describe the condition in British colonies, that the word famine began to change.<sup>77</sup> Thomas Malthus theorized that food shortages and epidemics would occur in populations with too many people. He argued that it was a natural phenomenon that famine would check large populations. There was a “vision of apocalyptic famine, gigantic and inevitable, waiting to level the population with a single blow....it [famine] came to be defined simultaneously as a food shortage, and as mass death through starvation.”<sup>78</sup> This new understanding of famine was based on writers, missionaries, and settlers who lived in the colonized world. Tropes of starving African and Indian children tugged at the ethical heartstrings of colonizers. The colonial world began to diagnose famine scientifically to help. Demographers, doctors, and experts are now brought in to assess birth rates, death rates, and caloric food consumption. For example, In 1985, USAID reported that over 8.4 million people were impacted by a famine in Darfur. Of that, 8.4 million, 1.6 were calculated to have suffered from starvation.<sup>79</sup> The main solution was to send food, but

---

<sup>76</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 16.

<sup>77</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 16.

<sup>78</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 17.

<sup>79</sup> U.S. Agency for International Development, *SUDAN -Drought/Famine*, (Washington: USAID, 1983), [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/pbaab327.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pbaab327.pdf).

according to a rural study in Darfur amid the famine, less than half of the people interviewed thought food aid was important to their survival.<sup>80</sup> The idea that African people are dying from hunger (famine theory) is the direct assumption leading humanitarian aid agencies to prioritize food delivery. In Darfur, people recognized famine beyond the idea of mass death; in fact, “mass starvation is only one possible outcome of the famine process; others include fertility decline, economic destitution, community distress migration and exposure to new disease vectors.”<sup>81</sup> The overreliance on famine theories among aid and media organizations makes it difficult to notice the strategies those affected in Darfur already take.

Historically, Darfuris remember famines through naming. De Waal organized the names of famines in Darfur into three distinct categories.<sup>82</sup> One category of names refers to grain, the units of measurement used to give out the grain in the form of Zakat.<sup>83</sup> During periods of food shortage, community leaders distributed grain. The poor are the *fakir* and the *miskeen*. The *Fakir* do not have enough food for one day, and the *miskeen* do not have enough for one year.”<sup>84</sup> This can also be understood in the framework of structural and conjunctural poverty. Those who are *fakir* are conjecturally poor due to misfortunes and the drought. The *miskeen* are structurally poor, such as older women unable to work. “Most of the charity given during the famine consisted of gifts within extended families. The help took the form of money, food,

---

<sup>80</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, X.

<sup>81</sup> Stephen Devereux, “Famine in the Twentieth Century,” IDS working papers, No. 105, (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 1970), 4, <https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/3435>.

<sup>82</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 59.

<sup>83</sup> Zakat is the practice of Alms giving in Islam.

<sup>84</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 199.

or labor. The recipients were mostly old people, disabled people, widows, or orphans.”<sup>85</sup>

Historically, kinship determined aid allocation during times of need in Darfur. Ethnic groups relied on their own networks to manage different forms of charity. Such kinship networks of assistance would not include outsiders, such as refugees from Chad. In the recent period, aid organizations primarily catered to migrants or people who did not have family networks because of this traditional aid structure. Organizations remain in urban areas in camps.

Another category refers to foods that were salvaged and eaten during certain droughts. These were serious famines, but people in Darfur did not respond to these famines with panic. History shows a calculated response. Mukheit, a plant similar to a green pea, was a food that reached the price of grain before the famine. It became a staple food; grain became a luxury.<sup>86</sup> Historically, only people outside the community ate wild food because it could not be shared.<sup>87</sup> Adapting to eating wild foods during famines implies a form of societal degradation, but even then, the statistics prove that they did not have to eat wild foods exclusively. According to the data compiled by De Waal on the consumption of grain in the 1980s, while “rural population could have afforded to buy between 7 percent and 51 percent of their grain needs (and more if they had liquidated more assets or worked for longer) they bought only 5 percent or less.”<sup>88</sup> The traditional response to famine in Darfur shows people switched to different dietary supplements. There was an influx of food aid, but instead of eating it and maintaining an original diet, people sold their grain and adapted to a new staple crop.

---

<sup>85</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 199.

<sup>86</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 136.

<sup>87</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 136.

<sup>88</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 123.

The third category of famine is usually in reference to body parts and being lost, a famine that kills. This is the most severe category. The famine of 1888 is known as Jildai, “father of the skins,” and the famine of 1913 is called julu “wandering.” This is taken to mean wandering alone in search of food. It is also called Nitlaaga, “We’ll meet again.” The last category signifies a breakdown of community in that social relations collapse – where community and normal social functions are suspended.<sup>89</sup> An example of this breakdown is in the practice of eating animals not slaughtered in the Islamic way or not sharing food (the 1900 famine Alabas means “the one who doesn’t share”). The most severe famines are those in which social relations break down; it has little to do with statistical death rates.<sup>90</sup> The drought that began in the late 1970s initiated the famine of 1985 - sometimes called Ifza-una. It is the Arabic name of an unfamiliar sorghum distributed by the government during this time. It is also referred to as “save us.”<sup>91</sup> Drought led to less than 20% production of major crops. For pastoralists, herd size decreased by 86%.<sup>92</sup> In famines that kill, tribes such as the Zaghawa learned to adapt socially and economically. They moved from cattle to camels because camels were better suited to drier environments. They then began to use cash instead of livestock (such as cattle) for the bride price. Their biggest tactic was migration; in 1970, there were 250,000 people in Dar Zaghawa, and in 1983, only 82,000 were left.<sup>93</sup> Many retained connections through kinship relationships throughout Darfur, allowing them to secure land and

---

<sup>89</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 59.

<sup>90</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 59.

<sup>91</sup> Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan*, 116.

<sup>92</sup> Nielson, “Ethnic Boundaries and Conflict in Darfur,” 466.

<sup>93</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 91.

settle.<sup>94</sup> The drought caused Zaghawa to become a diasporic community in that they began settling all over Darfur outside of their native homeland.

The international response to Darfur's drought often hurt the community they were trying to help. When the World Food Program sent 12,000 metric tons of food aid to Darfur in 1984, government employees and merchants sold the majority of it on the market.<sup>95</sup> Fuel prices, commercial transportation and other intermediaries often thwarted the logistics of targeting food aid to the most needy. In effect, "towns received more than villages, richer more than poor and displaced populations and nomads were often excluded."<sup>96</sup> The local government in Darfur was responsible for village-level distribution and often prioritized urban areas. In addition, over 40% of those receiving food aid were selling it to pay for commodities or transportation costs.<sup>97</sup> This caused the rural agricultural market to collapse, and local producers suffered heavy losses.<sup>98</sup> Food aid did not do what humanitarian agencies intended, even if people were hungry. Food aid became a trade means, but not everyone received aid. Because of the international bias against "violent" nomads, many Arab tribes reached the highest malnutrition levels in Sudan. They were not prioritized for food aid, and this further inflamed conflicts.<sup>99</sup> In response to marginalization, aid agencies were often raided and taxed before reaching IDP and refugee camps.<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>94</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 91.

<sup>95</sup> Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan*, 116.

<sup>96</sup> Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan*, 117.

<sup>97</sup> Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan*, 203.

<sup>98</sup> Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan*, 131.

<sup>99</sup> Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan*, 127.

<sup>100</sup> Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan*, 127.

When International aid is deployed at a time lives are statistically at risk, it is deployed too late. Mass starvation can be one extreme effect of famine, but international aid can respond much more effectively by understanding famine is a process, not an event. Drought was not the only factor that led to the famine - agricultural practices, government policies, population growth, and many others contributed. The international community, particularly USAID and Save the Children, did help Darfur throughout the famine, but they failed to recognize most people died because of sickness, not hunger. In fact, “most if not all of the excess deaths in Darfur during the famine could have been prevented if the health crises that caused them could have been prevented.”<sup>101</sup> The Darfur cities, Sabola, Nankose and Saiyah, showed the highest mortality rates in the 1980s because of epidemics, malaria and typhoid. Saiyah received a high amount of USAID grain, and because of large numbers of migrants arriving for aid – those who traveled died in the epidemics.

## **Conclusion**

Where international agencies aimed at curbing “distress migration,” they failed to understand that migration was an appropriate strategy for famine relief.<sup>102</sup> We can see this practice with Dar Zaghawa, a diasporic ethnic group who coped with an enormous environmental crisis. Save the Children thought that providing food aid to rural villagers would prompt their migration back and sustain them until they could continue farming, but they failed

---

<sup>101</sup> Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan*, 77.

<sup>102</sup> Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan*, 120.



to keep people stagnated.<sup>103</sup> Still, the international community maintained this idea because many projects were specifically designed to keep people where they were in Darfur. The idea that migration needs to be curbed and people should stay in their native lands comes from a Western idea of legal residency and belonging in a nation-state.<sup>104</sup> The idea of a physical homeland was rejected, particularly by Zaghawa, who developed networks of kinship relationships outside of Dar Zaghawa.

What's true is that people in Darfur have their conceptions of famine. The ability to adapt food aid to match the models of famine relief already established in Darfur is resistance to a new conception of famine. Most people sold their food aid to pay for commodities or transportation costs.<sup>105</sup> In one conversation with a Darfur farmer, he was asked: "why he was repaying his debts when he could renege on them, safe in the knowledge of food aid, and replied that he trusted the merchant to be around to lend to him in the next famine, but not the aid agencies."<sup>106</sup> The attitude towards food aid in Darfur is one of inconsistency. The most impactful way to aid Darfur people through the famine would have been to facilitate travel and make employment opportunities coincide with the dry and the rainy seasons: "to make employment available during the dry season, and close the projects during the rains."<sup>107</sup> In that way, the international community can support the traditional labor migration systems. Famine

---

<sup>103</sup> Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan*, 78.

<sup>104</sup> Irene Bloemraad, Anna Korteweg, and Gökçe Yurdakul, "Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State," *Annual Review of Sociology* 34, no. 1 (June 2008): 154, 10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134608.

<sup>105</sup> Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan*, 203.

<sup>106</sup> Gérard Prunier, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide* (United States: Cornell University Press, 2011), 70.

<sup>107</sup> Waal, *Famine That Kills*, 80.

cannot be understood simply as a lack of food because there is little to no evidence that international aid had any significant impact on the lives of those in Darfur from 1980 to 1990.<sup>108</sup> Relying on the Malthusian principles of mortality rates in Darfur Sudan is to rely on a colonial framework that has been proven ineffective in Darfur.

### **The Conjunction: Darfur 2003-2004**

In 1989, shortly after the drought and migration wave from Chad, Omar al Bashir took control of Sudan. The National Islamic Front (NIF) was the primary political party, and Sudan underwent massive changes. The NIF purged all government institutions of Darfur and South Sudanese workers to be replaced by NIF and Arab civil services workers. NIF Islamic principles also governed all institutions, including education, foreign service and judicial services.<sup>109</sup> The Arabization of Sudan was not national but part of a regional Islamic revival movement across North Africa. The NIF's ideological movement hit western Sudan by redesigning administrative units in Darfur.<sup>110</sup> In 1994, they [NIF] divided Darfur into three regions, but the reconstruction led the Fur, Darfur's largest ethnic group, to be a minority in each region.<sup>111</sup> Then, in 1995, west Darfur governor Mohamed Ahmed Fadl filled the tribal administration with kin, particularly from the Arab riverine tribe Jallul. He ruled an area belonging to the Masalit. In 1999 when they [Masalit] protested the change of power, over 2,000 were killed, and over 40,000 Masalit

---

<sup>108</sup> Jaspars, *Food Aid in Sudan*, 140.

<sup>109</sup> Burr and Collins, *Darfur*, 287.

<sup>110</sup> Burr and Collins, *Darfur*, 287.

<sup>111</sup> Burr and Collins, *Darfur*, 287.

moved to Chad.<sup>112</sup> Just a year later, in 2000, Abdallal al-Nur, the leader in the Arab gathering, became governor of north Darfur and called on 20,000 armed Arab Chadians to settle in Darfur.<sup>113</sup> Shortly after that, an anonymous group wrote “The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan,” stating:

“This publication unveils the level of injustice practiced by successive governments, secular and theocratic, democratic or autocratic, since the independence of the country in 1956 to this date... This book is an exposé of the injustice that was visited on Sudan by successive governments which ruled it since independence (1956). The pattern of injustice remained almost the same throughout, irrespective of the political orientation of the incumbent government: secular, theocratic, dictatorial or –presumed- democratic. They all displayed blatant favoritism of one particular circle in Sudan to detriment of all others.”<sup>114</sup>

The Black Book detailed the marginalization of those in the periphery of Sudan. It argued that nearly 80% of all government jobs were held by three Arab tribes. It statistically proves how the Sudanese government utilized certain tribes in military conquests in the south and Darfur to create tribal warfare. The Black Book provides concrete evidence of how Darfur suffered from national neglect. Although the authors are unknown, they are speculated to have come from the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). In 2001, both groups took up arms and consolidated economic support primarily from kin in

---

<sup>112</sup> Burr and Collins, *Darfur*, 288,

<sup>113</sup> Burr and Collins, *Darfur*, 288,

<sup>114</sup> Seekers of Truth and Justice, *The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan*, 2000.

political positions in Chad.<sup>115</sup> While the SLA are predominantly Fur, the JEM are Zaghawa tribe members who had worked in Khartoum. They [JEM] were marginalized, so they formed a group and returned to Darfur. The two groups have different ideologies. The SLA wants a secular state, while JEM agrees with implementing Shari'a. They merged out of convenience and took over the town of Gulu, Darfur, in 2003 with demands for development in Darfur.<sup>116</sup> Later, they attacked Fashir, and the government responded by purging their military of everyone with ties to Darfur. The government contracted the Janjaweed and began a project of aerial bombing. The armed conflict between JEM, SLA, Janjaweed and the Sudanese government beginning in 2003 is the event that is understood as the absolute height of the conflict in Darfur.

### **The First Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2006: Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)**

The international community, including the Organization of African Unity and UN, brought together the government of Sudan, SLA and JEM to settle the conflict in May of 2006. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was eventually only signed by the government of Sudan and one small faction of the Sudanese liberation army led by Minni Minawi.<sup>117</sup> The fact that only one group signed and was promised concessions resulted in many factions being created among the rebel groups. Each group in Darfur wanted to prioritize different rights within the peace agreement. According to the International Crisis Group analysis,

---

<sup>115</sup> Burr and Collins, *Darfur*, 290.

<sup>116</sup> Burr and Collins, *Darfur*, 290.

<sup>117</sup> International Crisis Group, "Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement," August 26, 2016, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/darfurs-fragile-peace-agreement>.

“Abdel Wahid [leader of SLA] demands more direct SLA participation in implementation of security arrangements and is also dissatisfied with the Darfur Peace Agreements provisions for political representation and a victim’s compensation fund. JEM maintains that the protocols on power and wealth sharing do not adequately address the conflict’s root causes: the structural inequities between Sudan’s center and its periphery that led to the rebellion in 2003.”<sup>118</sup>

In any case, neither of these groups and their demands represents Darfur. Further issues include the fact that Arab tribes were not invited to take part in the peace treaties. The national government tried to distance itself from the Janjaweed entirely. The Arabs are not a cohesive force, but the international community recognized them as such. Having been marginalized since the Kiera Dynasty, many Arabs in Darfur were impoverished and marginalized in Darfur with the least access to schools and medical facilities. Through the drought, many lost their cattle and began farming, trying to assimilate. As a result, land-owning tribes, “The Beni Hussein of North Darfur, and the Baggara of South Darfur: the Southern Rizeigat, Habbaniya, Beni Halba, and Ta’aisha—all attempted to remain neutral, and most of their tribal leaders refused to participate in the counter-insurgency.”<sup>119</sup> The Janjaweed consisted of people from Arab tribes who did not receive lands and from Arab tribes that fled Chad and settled in Darfur in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. The biggest issue with keeping the Janjaweed out of the peace discussions was that they, too, felt aggrieved and saw themselves as victims.

---

<sup>118</sup> International Crisis Group, “Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement.”

<sup>119</sup> Julie Flint, *Beyond ‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the militias of Darfur* (Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, 2009), 24. <http://www.gppplatform.ch/sites/default/files/Understanding%20the%20militias%20in%20Darfur.pdf>.

Historically, the Janjaweed has been paid for violence. In “On Postcoloniality,” Achille Mbembe explains the political nature of many violent African conflicts. Through a process Mbembe calls the “privatization of sovereignty,” global financial institutions control African states. He argues that African people have controlled mechanisms of coercion (weapons, drugs, etc.) to gain power in their nations. The reason is that there are not many political avenues to change or be included in a national regime for the rebels in Darfur and other African nations. Historically, this [privatization of sovereignty] has been the history of politics in Darfur. Nomadic tribes in the Funj and Kiera dynasties (Arab and African) were contracted by the government as tributaries to capture slaves and then again to fight the British. The use of the Janjaweed in Darfur today is not a new phenomenon but an old phenomenon playing out in the context of a nation-state.

Shortly after the 2006 peace agreement was signed, factions of the Janjaweed broke off. They called themselves “the promised truth soldiers” and “the wronged soldiers.” One member of the Masar Arab tribes notes, “When there is peace, the government ignores the Janjaweed.”<sup>120</sup> In 2007, Mohamed Hamdan Dogolo “Hemeti” led a rebellion in Nyala. He was angry with the lack of support from the government and the certain concessions made to rebel groups. “Arabs who had fought with the government, by contrast, had not received their salaries, had not received compensation for their war dead and wounded, and had not been given health and veterinary services, schools, or water. Their livestock migration routes were still blocked by the rebels.”<sup>121</sup> By then, Darfur had broken into multiple groups who demanded

---

<sup>120</sup> Flint, *Beyond ‘Janjaweed’*, 24.

<sup>121</sup> Flint, *Beyond ‘Janjaweed’*, 36.

different rights from the national government, and violence persisted. This is the nature of rights, the violation of rights is evident in their call for rights, but each group has rationalized their entitlements differently. The SLA wants direct protection from the Janjaweed. The JEM, who have enough arms to challenge the Janjaweed, instead call for political rights—lastly, the Janjaweed call for a livelihood and equal access to resources in Darfur.

### **The Civilian Voice**

Throughout the negotiations and signing of the first Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), the voices of traditional leaders, civilians and Arab tribes were left out of the conversation. Deadlines set in place by funders caused the DPA to be signed before all the rebel groups could contribute.<sup>122</sup> In 2009, a joint mission between the Darfur People’s Association of New York, the Darfur Rehabilitation Project, the Genocide Intervention Network, the Lowenstein Human Rights Project and Yale Law School presented finding based on interviews with Darfur refugees in Chad.<sup>123</sup> Darfur Voices documented the voices of over 2,000 refugees in interviews from May 2008 to July 2009. Those interviewed consist of tribal leaders, civil society members, rebels and civilians from over 13 ethnic groups displaced since 2003.<sup>124</sup>

In one survey, Darfuris were asked what peace meant to them. The majority responded that the cessation of violence was the number one characteristic of peace.<sup>125</sup> The second was

---

<sup>122</sup> Flint, *Beyond ‘Janjaweed’*, 32.

<sup>123</sup> 24 Hours for Darfur. *Darfurian Voices: Documenting Darfurian Refugees’ Views on Issues of Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation* (New York: 24 Hours for Darfur, 2010), 24, <https://sites.tufts.edu/bennaimarkrowse/files/2021/02/DARFURIAN-VOICES-Full-Color-English-Final-Report.pdf>.

<sup>124</sup> 24 Hours for Darfur. *Darfurian Voices*, 24.

<sup>125</sup> 24 Hours for Darfur. *Darfurian Voices*, 26.

adequate compensation for the victims. The need for compensation is an extension of Darfur's traditional peacekeeping means. Judiya is the word for the traditional justice system in Darfur. It comes from the root word Jud which means generosity. The framework is "a consensual mediation that brings together a commonly acceptable outcome for the parties. Problems are not solved by punishment but by a common acceptance of social ties."<sup>126</sup> Historically, problems were settled through the material compensation of wealth and marriage. It is not a system predicated on the idea of punishment and criminality or the law. However, through colonization and Sudanese independence, the native administration and the Judiya system have evolved to encompass criminality. The expansion of Judiya is partly due to new forms of crime beyond the scope of traditional reconciliation. The "traditional" system is, in fact, a system that has been subject to a lot of change. However, it still holds onto one key premise: compensation, particularly concerning livestock. 86% of those surveyed wanted to be directly compensated because of livestock losses during the war.<sup>127</sup> The Human Rights framework does not use the discourse of compensation; it calls on liberties. From this case, it is clear that without direct compensation for the victims in Darfur, it would be impossible to realize certain liberties enshrined in the UDHR. The right to life (Article 1) can be achieved when their livelihoods are returned. In the case of Darfur, the language of compensation precedes the language of liberty.

### **The Second Peace Agreement: The Doha Document for Peace 2011**

---

<sup>126</sup> Jérôme Tubiana, Victor Tanner, and Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil, *Traditional authorities' Peacemaking Role in Darfur* (Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 2010), 39, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/155469/PW83.pdf>.

<sup>127</sup> Tubiana, Tanner, and Abdul-Jalil, *Traditional authorities' Peacemaking Role in Darfur*, 39.



In Doha, Qatar, in May of 2011, the Sudanese government and certain members of the SLA and the JEM signed the Doha Document for Peace (DDPD) 8 years after the violence began in Darfur. The Doha peace agreement listed a set of 12 rights meant to be achieved due to the agreement.<sup>128</sup> These rights are:

1. Freedom from hunger;
2. Sustainable means of living;
3. Access to potable water;
4. Access to quality education;
5. Access to health and other social services;
6. Adequate access to public utilities and infrastructures;
7. Access to development and job opportunities;
8. Free access to markets;
9. Protection of property;
10. Promotion and protection of cultural heritage;
11. Restitution and/or compensation for property lost to those affected by the conflict;
12. Review of administrative measures which affect livelihood.

The Sudan government agreed to hear the Darfur rebels' grievances because the rebels' power and organization posed a threat. Nevertheless, the Doha peace agreement often thwarted the rebels' efforts to expand the range of the document. While the government focused on regional issues, the rebels wanted to speak about Darfur in the context of the nation (Sudan

---

<sup>128</sup> United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur, *Doha Document for Peace in Darfur* (UNAMID, 2015), 26 [https://unamid.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ddpd\\_arabic.pdf](https://unamid.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ddpd_arabic.pdf).

proper).<sup>129</sup> Although promised more seats in government, wealth sharing, affirmative action and a new land-sharing agreement, the government has done nothing. The government is bankrupt, but from the outset, the “UN and AU threaten[ed] Darfur rebels with sanctions for not joining the DDPD, even as they ostensibly agree a comprehensive approach is needed.” There was no implementation guarantee, and the rebels reacted by re-arming themselves.<sup>130</sup>

The first two peace treaties looked at the issues in Darfur as regional issues. Although many of the rights listed are subsistence rights, the treaties ignore that many of the development issues in Darfur result from a lack of sharing from the center, Khartoum. The International Crisis Group continues, “While trying to limit negotiations to local issues, the DDPD included provisions that only made sense if discussed and implemented nationally, such as governance reform, more equitable sharing of power and resources and affirmative action to reduce the socio-economic gap between the center and peripheries.”<sup>131</sup> Again, the Sudanese government did not work to structurally and institutionally change national power dynamics to include the regions in the periphery and continued to neglect the needs of the civilians, including compensation.

## **The Civilian Voice**

In 2012, Hisham Haj Omar produced *Darfur Skeletons* to talk about the impact of the crisis in Darfur. He uses the voices of people in Darfur to narrate the film and discuss the issues

---

<sup>129</sup> International Crisis Group, “Sudan’s spreading conflict (III): The limits of Darfur’s peace process,” December 28, 2016, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudan-s-spreading-conflict-iii-limits-darfur-s-peace-process>.

<sup>130</sup> International Crisis Group, “Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (III).”

<sup>131</sup> International Crisis Group, “Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (III).”

of deforestation, camp life and the politics of tribal leaders after the peace agreement. At the beginning of the film, forest trooper Haroon Omer Abubekr argues with a local man about the timber in his cart. Abubekr explained that before building the Kalma refugee camp, the Kondowa forest in southern Darfur was lush.<sup>132</sup> Until 2004 there was a lot of vegetation and diversity. Nevertheless, over 150,000 refugees and Internally Displaced People gradually cut down trees for firewood to cook and sell (for commodities, transportation, etc.). Abubekr explains how he tried to explain the problem to humanitarian organizations.

Despite his suggestion to collect fallen trees to distribute alongside the food aid and organize the displaced people, the forest gradually began to die. “We had predicted that the forest would die if this continued, and surely that is happening despite all our efforts.”<sup>133</sup> An older man said that although they knew cutting down the trees would hurt the environment, there was no choice. One reason was the need for cash. At the Otash refugee camp, religious leader Ayoub Adam Ahmed explains, “In the autumn, there wasn’t transportation to enable us to get to Nyala. People worked in the fields, the fields of others, just to be able to pay for car rides. How do we work to pay for transportation.”<sup>134</sup> The absence of a workforce displaced people to use the natural forests surrounding the camp. Selling firewood and food aid helped many displaced people find transportation to safer areas in Darfur. On the other hand, they were directly contributing to the desertification of Darfur and the gradual destitution of their land. On the other, they were making enough money to flee violence.

---

<sup>132</sup> Hajooj Kuka, “Darfur's skeleton - Full documentary,” YouTube Video, 03:15, March 13, 2012. <https://youtu.be/l16iN7jfVoE>.

<sup>133</sup> Hajooj Kuka, “Darfur's skeleton,” 5:08.

<sup>134</sup> Hajooj Kuka, “Darfur's skeleton,” 10:38.

Filmmaker Omar then turns to tribal leaders who explain a leadership crisis. Local leaders discuss the role of the tribal administration, and many come to the same conclusion as leader Abdel Rahman Dodo. He argues, “If we are respected and given our place, then the solution will be strictly through the tribal administration. Not through government talks. We don’t want government intervention.”<sup>135</sup> The tribal leaders are all in a consensus that if peace is found in Darfur, tribal generals (the leaders of military groups) and the Hakama must be brought to the table. The Hakama, which means “a horse’s mouth bit” in Arabic, are essential leaders in Darfur. They are poetic women who often sing and chant about tribal honor. In Darfur, they are known to incite violence and mobilize men to fight. Both tribal generals and the Hakama have become more powerful in recent years, overshadowing others in the administration.

Moreover, the national government only supports the most prominent and important tribal leaders, but mid-level and others are often ignored. The tribal administration has posts and positions that are “the true glue to society.”<sup>136</sup> These positions and people are integral to the stability of Darfur; they represent Darfur. The film ends with a common proverb in Darfur, “If the skeleton is intact, then the flesh will reattach.”<sup>137</sup> Thus, if the structures and agreements made in Darfur for the people of Darfur are reestablished, Darfur can surely find peace and stability. The civilian in Darfur is not asking for government intervention to mediate the issues

---

<sup>135</sup> Hajooj Kuka, “Darfur's skeleton,” 32:02.

<sup>136</sup> Hajooj Kuka, “Darfur's skeleton,” 36:42.

<sup>137</sup> Hajooj Kuka, “Darfur's skeleton,” 48:47.

between nomad and farmer. They are asking the government to re-fund their traditional institutions of peace and justice.

### **The Third Darfur Peace Agreement: The Juba Peace Agreement**

In October 2020, the transitional government signed a peace agreement with rebels in Darfur and other protesters in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Essentially, “The Juba Peace Agreement is a collection of accords setting out principles covering power and wealth sharing, land reform, transitional justice, security arrangements and the return of displaced persons.”<sup>138</sup> Many of these accords reflect the promises of the previous two peace agreements but also include a new idea of a federal system where Darfur can exist as a region with greater autonomy. While many did sign the agreement, two huge factions in Darfur held out: the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement led by Abdel Asis al-Hilu and the Sudanese Liberation Movement led by Abdelwahid al-Nur. Both are extremely suspicious that former Janjaweed and government military forces that had previously attacked Darfur will now be in the security forces to protect the region. In an interview with local radio station Radio Dabanda, al-Nur states, “We do not recognize the new government or its Sovereign Council, which represents the Al Bashir security infrastructure that committed genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in Darfur.”<sup>139</sup> What made this peace agreement slightly different from the others was

---

<sup>138</sup> International Crisis Group, “The rebels come to Khartoum: How to implement Sudan's New Peace Agreement,” February 23, 2021, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/b168-rebels-come-khartoum-how-implement-sudans-new-peace-agreement>

<sup>139</sup> Radio Dabanga, “Interview with Sudan liberation movement leader El Nur: Paris meeting with Hamdok 'Friendly and Frank',” October 3, 2019, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/interview-with-sudan-liberation-movement-leader-el-nur-paris-meeting-with-hamdok-friendly-and-frank>.

that the international community believed peace would be sustainable with Bashir out of power. These international organizations did not consider that the systems Bashir used were still in place. The treaty unrealistically attempted to integrate the Janjaweed into the protection force in Darfur in a way that undermined the trust of Darfur citizens. Just a year after the signing, on June 22<sup>nd</sup> 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Watch urged the joint UN-AU peacekeeping units to return to Darfur, stating, “The large-scale violence has been carried out, particularly against civilians in Kerenik and Kulbus. It underscores the Sudanese government’s failure to fulfill its duty to protect civilians and the urgent need for ramped up United Nations monitoring, protection through its presence, and public reporting on events in Darfur.”<sup>140</sup>

Human rights are built upon the notion that states will and have the capacity to hold themselves accountable. However, in the case of Sudan, no peace treaty has been successfully implemented or designed to address systemic issues.

### **The Civilian Voice**

While international organizations pulled out, they left behind the idea that the fight to ensure respect for human rights in Darfur could be held in court. Many of these peace treaties enable citizens to go to court and actively fight for their rights as internally displaced people. The problem is that many people in Darfur do not know how to manage the international or domestic court systems. Refugees told the Institute for War and Peace Reporting that many ICC lawyers stopped coming in 2011. A refugee at the Farchana camp stated, “They said we can

---

<sup>140</sup> Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: New Deadly Attacks in West Darfur,” June 22, 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/22/sudan-new-deadly-attacks-west-darfur>.

delegate a lawyer on our behalf, and we will be safe, but we need more details about ...this technical and legal thing. We don't know a lot about it, and we still need more information."<sup>141</sup>

A state-centric approach based on litigation does not accomplish or even provide the rights language to assess Darfur's needs. It is a foreign imposition, evident in the fact that refugees have no idea how to use the court system against the state.

The fall of Omar Al Bashir was known throughout the country, but it was not felt in Darfur. In 2020 after a gunman shot down two displaced people near the Khor Ramla Refugee camp, people in the town of Nierteti, Darfur, began a massive sit-in.<sup>142</sup> They called for an extension of UN peacekeeping units, arguing that the Sudanese forces would not protect them. They also listed a set of 8 rights to be enacted in Darfur, as follows:

1. Dismissal of the director of the locality, the chief of police, and the commanders of the army, security service, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces
2. Disarmament of those not authorized to carry weapons
3. Security and protection in the area
4. Protection of farmers and farms to prevent the failure of the agricultural season
5. Return of the livestock robbed by militiamen during the past two months
6. Opening of pasture tracks to avoid friction between herders and farmers
7. The arrest of those against whom complaints have been filed and retribution for the victims
8. Banning of motorcycles in all parts of the locality.

---

<sup>141</sup> Zakia Yousif, Janet Anderson, and Tajeldin Adam, "Has ICC lost touch with Darfur refugees?" Institute for War & Peace Reporting, May 29, 2012, <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/has-icc-lost-touch-darfur-refugees>.

<sup>142</sup> Radio Dabanga, "Protests against insecurity growing in Darfur."

These rights do not follow a theory or framework. They are a mixture of calls for compensation, dismissals, restoration of traditional systems and criminalization of those inflicting violence. They are also not directly addressed to the national government but to the regional government. The protest was held directly in front of the locality office. These rights are in response to the particular conflicts as they are happening. For example, the dismissal of local protection forces indicates that they are the same forces used by Omar al Bashir. Although the Rapid Support Forces are a new element, they are known in Darfur as Janjaweed rebranded. The opening of pasture tracks is a concession to nomads in the area. Banning motorcycles in certain areas comes from the rise in crime when motorcycles sideswipe and steal from pedestrians.<sup>143</sup> Human rights tend to be 'idealistic' in that they are reduced to ideas abstracted from social history. They are seen as the outcome of concepts, not conflict, insight, instigation, philosophy, or politics. They are legalistic in that their provenances are primarily located in the courts, not culture, a procedure not practice, rhetoric not reality, codes not contingency."<sup>144</sup> In contrast with contemporary human rights discourse, the rights called for in Nierteti are not individual rights. They are not claims made against the government for freedoms. They are practical demands that will help local people in Darfur resettle, and they are socio-economically appropriate.

---

<sup>143</sup> Radio Dabanga, "Protests against insecurity growing in Darfur."

<sup>144</sup> Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, "The Struggle for Human Rights in Africa," *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 41, no. 3 (2007): 486, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40380100>.



## Conclusion

Violence in Darfur persists because of the Western theoretical framework of the Human Rights regime through which foreign actors analyze and respond to local problems. By looking at the issue through the lens of “genocide,” we also look for the groups of victims and perpetrators. In the case of Darfur, there are many victims and many perpetrators, neither falling neatly into the category of Arab or African. The Janjaweed exist beyond the borders of Darfur; they are often nomads or unemployed young men who took up arms across the Sahel. At certain points, nomadic tribes were excluded and marginalized in Darfur. They were starved with no political representation. Pastoral tribes (Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit) have been in deeply precarious situations with massive mortality rates. For all, their livelihoods are risked by desertification and drought. When the international community stepped in to speed up development and deliver food aid, they were met with resistance. People periodically changed social structures and sold their food aid. Camps are directly correlated to deforestation and epidemics, both collateral consequences of international aid.

Similarly, drought is not a new experience in Darfur; it is an environmental experience that people have traditionally adapted to. Although the drought of 1985 was particularly deadly, the idea in Darfur is not to fight the environment and remain the same. The idea is to change with the environment, migrate and find new means of making a livelihood while retaining societal relationships. Lastly, in trying to find a way to promote justice and peace in Darfur, the international community became involved in peace talks between rebel groups and the Sudanese national government. The president, Omar al Bashir, was internationally blamed as the one who incited the violence when he escalated his response to an insurgency. The

conflict began before he was in office and continued after he was out. It was not Omar al Bashir; it was Sudan's social, political and economic structures that exploited Darfur. Even when the laws were written to compensate the victims, the government had no money to pay Darfur. The UN could not mediate and bring all parties to the table as local conditions required; instead, the UN tried to arrest Bashir, applying the Human Rights regime's inappropriate carceral solution. The Human Rights regime did not effectively promote or sustain peace in Darfur.

The case of Darfur shows that a state-centric approach to human rights does not work everywhere because the Sudanese government was unable to hold itself accountable to the court of law. The Sudanese government did not respect the land rights of Darfur citizens; they sided with their ethnic groups. What the Sudanese government did was wrong, but to argue that they are wrong based on not recognizing the rights of a citizen is colonial. Darfuris have a claim to the land, but that claim does not come from British colonial rule making them citizens of Sudan. Their claim to the land comes from the fact that since the time of their ancestors, they have worked that land – the land should not be in the government's jurisdiction. Darfuris have built social structures and kinship relationships on that land. When they call on their rights, they use that language of compensation in the Judiya framework because they want what they are owed, not what is politically entitled. Judiya is a traditional system of mediation and reconciliation; elders in the community, respected for their knowledge of Darfur history and customary law, have always been involved. Judiya is not carceral, and the point is not to punish. Abraham Maslow's law of instruments conceptualizes my understanding of human

rights. "If all you have is a hammer, every problem starts to resemble a nail."<sup>145</sup> The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights is a hammer, and contemporary human rights issues are dealt with as nails through the building of a Western democracy with a capitalist free market- a model which the Sudanese people have rejected. The idea of justice in Darfur is tied to reconciliation, not court-sanctioned punishment. Sudanese political analyst Muzan Alneel argues that the sentiment of most Sudanese people is that "the best support that the Sudanese revolution can get from international revolutionary allies is for them to reject and fight their own government's efforts to force a government of killers on Sudan for the second time."<sup>146</sup> What is at stake is the Darfur perspective of Human rights and the reproduction of an inequitable system.

---

<sup>145</sup> Abraham Harold Maslow, *The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance* (New York: HarperCollins, 1974)

<sup>146</sup> Muzan Alneel, "Sudan's revolution and counterrevolution," *Africa Is a Country*, June 12, 2021, <https://africasacountry.com/2021/12/sudans-revolution-and-counterrevolution>.

## Bibliography

- 24 Hours for Darfur. *Darfurian Voices: Documenting Darfurian Refugees' Views on Issues of Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation*. New York: 24 Hours for Darfur, 2010.  
<https://sites.tufts.edu/bennaimarkrowse/files/2021/02/DARFURIAN-VOICES-Full-Color-English-Final-Report.pdf>.
- African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies. *Delays and Dilemmas: New Violence in Darfur and Uncertain Justice Efforts within Sudan's Fragile Transition*. Tunis: International Federation for Human Rights, July 2020.  
[https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh\\_report\\_sudan2021.pdf\\_.pdf](https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_report_sudan2021.pdf_.pdf).
- Alneel, Muzan. "Sudan's revolution and counterrevolution." *Africa Is a Country*, June 12, 2021.  
<https://africasacountry.com/2021/12/sudans-revolution-and-counterrevolution>.
- Alneel, Muzan. "The people of Sudan don't want to share power with their military oppressors." *Jacobin*, 2021. <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/11/sudan-revolution-coup-strikes-power-sharing-protests>.
- Alneel, Muzan. "The West is waging war on the Sudanese revolution." *Novara Media*, January 24, 2022. <https://novaramedia.com/2022/01/24/the-west-is-waging-war-on-the-sudanese-revolution/>.
- Alneel, Muzan. "Why 'it hasn't fallen yet'? Lessons from the Sudanese revolution." *Transnational Institute*, October 27, 2021. <https://longreads.tni.org/why-it-hasnt-fallen-yet-lessons-from-the-sudanese-revolution>.
- Amnesty International. "Universal declaration of human rights." March 31, 2022.  
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/universal-declaration-of-human-rights/>.
- Anderson, Janet, Zakia Yousif, and Tajeldin Adam. "Has ICC lost touch with Darfur refugees?" *Institute for War & Peace Reporting*, May 29, 2012. <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/has-icc-lost-touch-darfur-refugees>.
- An-Na'im, Abdullahi A. "Human rights in the Arab world: A regional perspective." *Human Rights Quarterly* 23 (August, 2001): 701–32. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4489353>.
- An-Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmed. *Decolonizing Human Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.
- Bloemraad, Irene, Anna Korteweg, and Gökçe Yurdakul. "Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State." *Annual Review of Sociology* 34, no. 1 (June 2008): 153–79. 10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134608.
- Brown, Richard. "The rationale and effects of the IMF stabilisation programme in Sudan." In *Political Dimensions of the International Debt Crisis*, 51–91. New York: Springer, 1989.

- Burr, J. Millard, and Robert O. Collins. *Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster*. Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2006.
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Columbia University. "Prof. Mahmood Mamdani and John Prendergast, 'The Darfur Debate'." YouTube Video, 2:28:06, April 30, 2009. [https://youtu.be/yGOpfH\\_5\\_pY](https://youtu.be/yGOpfH_5_pY).
- Cross, Harry. "Sudan at the IMF: Behind appearances of financial orthodoxy." *African Arguments*, July 13, 2021. <https://africanarguments.org/2021/07/sudan-at-the-imf-behind-appearances-of-financial-orthodoxy/>.
- De Waal, Alex. "Recalling the 'Unmanageable' Crisis of the 1980s." *African Arguments*, November 26, 2008. <https://africanarguments.org/2008/11/recalling-the-unmanageable-crisis-of-the-1980s/>.
- De Waal, Alex. *Famine That Kills: Darfur, Sudan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- De Waal, Alex. *The Conflict in Darfur, Sudan: Background and Overview*. Boston: Tufts University, 2022. <https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2022/04/AdW-expert-witness-statement-DF-for-ICC.pdf>.
- Devereux, Stephen. "Famine in the Twentieth Century." IDS working papers, No. 105. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 1970. <https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/3435>.
- Edozie, Rita Kiki. "Global Citizens and Sudanese Subjects: Reading Mamdani's Saviours and Survivors." *African Affairs* 108, no. 433 (2009): 661–67. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40388426>.
- Elsadig, Kamal. "Makers of Dabanga: The story of Kamal Elsadig." *Radio Dabanga*, June 8, 2018. <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/makers-of-dabanga-the-story-of-kamal-elsadig>.
- Enough Project. "Founding director." 2017. <https://enoughproject.org/about/john-prendergast>.
- Faris, Stephan. "The real roots of Darfur." *The Atlantic*, 1 April, 2007. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/04/the-real-roots-of-darfur/305701/>.
- Flint, Julie, and Alex De Waal. *A New History of a Long War*. London: Zed Books, 2008.
- Flint, Julie. *Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the militias of Darfur*. Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, 2009.

- <http://www.gpplatform.ch/sites/default/files/Understanding%20the%20militias%20in%20Darfur.pdf>.
- Grillo, Christine. "Sands shifting in Darfur genocide." Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, January 2008. <https://publichealth.jhu.edu/2008/prendergast-darfur-2>.
- Hajooj Kuka. "Darfur's skeleton - Full documentary." YouTube Video, 51:06, March 13, 2012. <https://youtu.be/l16iN7jfVoE>.
- Hamid, Ahmed. "The politics of famine in Sudan: The case of Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar." PhD diss., University of Leeds, 1995. White Rose eTheses Online. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/5225571.pdf>.
- Harir, Sharif, Terje Tvedt, and Raphael K. Badal, eds. *Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan*. Villavägen: Nordic Africa Institute, 1994.
- Hasan, Yūsuf Faḍl. "Main aspects of the Arab migration to the Sudan." *Arabica*, 14, no. 1 (February 1967): 15–7. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4055902>.
- Havnevik, Kjell. "The IMF and the World Bank in Africa: Conditionality, impact and alternatives." Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1987. <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:277664/FULLTEXT01.pdf>.
- Henkin, Louis. "Judaism and Human Rights." *Judaism* 25, no. 4 (Fall 1976), 435–36.
- Historyplex. "Famous songs of the French revolution with English translations." April 13, 2005. <https://historyplex.com/songs-of-french-revolution>.
- HLS News Staff. "Louis Henkin '40, a founder of modern human rights law [1917-2010]." Harvard Law School, October 20, 2010. <https://hls.harvard.edu/today/louis-henkin-40-a-founder-of-modern-human-rights-law-1917-2010/>.
- Human Rights Watch. "Sudan: New Deadly Attacks in West Darfur." June 22, 2022. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/22/sudan-new-deadly-attacks-west-darfur>.
- International Crisis Group. "Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement." August 26, 2016. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/darfurs-fragile-peace-agreement>.
- International Crisis Group. "Sudan's spreading conflict (III): The limits of Darfur's peace process." December 28, 2016. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudan-s-spreading-conflict-iii-limits-darfur-s-peace-process>
- International Crisis Group. "The Rebels come to Khartoum: How to implement Sudan's New Peace Agreement." February 23, 2021. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/b168-rebels-come-khartoum-how-implement-sudans-new-peace-agreement>

- International House. *A Conversation with John Prendergast of the Enough Project*. The University of Chicago, April 30, 2019.
- International Justice Resource Center. "Overview of the human rights framework." February 3, 2022. <https://ijrcenter.org/ihr-reading-room/overview-of-the-human-rights-framework/>
- Irvin-Erickson, Douglas. "Raphaël Lemkin, Genocide, Colonialism, Famine, and Ukraine." *East/West* 8, no. 1 (May 2021): 193–215. <https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus645>.
- Jaspars, Susanne. *Food Aid in Sudan: A History of Power, Politics and Profit*. London: Zed, 2019.
- Kleinfeld, Philip. "Darfur diary: From global cause to forgotten crisis." *The New Humanitarian*, June 15, 2021. <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2021/6/15/darfur-diary-from-global-cause-to-forgotten-crisis>.
- Kristof, Nicholas D. *What to Do about Darfur*. New York: The New York Review of Books, 2020.
- Kristof, Nicholas. "Dare we call it genocide?." *The New York Times*. June 16, 2004. <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/16/opinion/dare-we-call-it-genocide.html>.
- Lanz, David. "Save Darfur: A Movement and Its Discontents." *African Affairs*, 108, no. 433 (October 2009): 669–77. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40388427>.
- Lozada, Carlos Lozada. "Does international food aid harm the poor?." National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2005. <https://www.nber.org/digest/mar05/does-international-food-aid-harm-poor>.
- Mach, Achol, Althea Middleton-Detzner, Will Lead, Azaz Elshami, Will Ferroggiaro, Caleb Gichuhi, Marrian Haileselassie, Jok, A., Sara, M., et al. "Social media and conflict in Sudan: A lexicon of hate speech terms." PeaceLab Tech, 2020. <https://res.cloudinary.com/andariya/image/upload/v1604300549/tpdeilstfaksf5o0alnu.pdf>.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2009.
- Maslow, Abraham Harold. *The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance*. New York: HarperCollins, 1974.
- Mendes, Errol. "The important role of the IMF and external creditors in case of arrest warrants from the ICC-the Case of Sudan," International Criminal Court, 2009. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/NR/rdonlyres/6B747BF5-1F1E-4139-B81B-E1DE6B02FEC6/280592/PresentationErrolMendes.pdf>.

- Nielson, Erik Solevad. "Ethnic Boundaries and Conflict in Darfur: An Event Structure Hypothesis." *Ethnicities* 8, no. 4 (December 2008): 427–62. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23890177>.
- O'Fahey, R. S. "Religion and Trade in the Kayra Sultanate of Dar Fur." In *Sudan in Africa*, ed. Yusuf Fadl Hassan. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 1971.
- O'Fahey, R. S. "Slavery and the Slave Trade in Dār Fūr." *The Journal of African History* 14, no. 1 (1973): 29–43. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/180775>.
- O'Fahey, R. S., and Jay Spaulding. *Kingdoms of the Sudan*. London: Methuen, 1974.
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. "Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide." 1948. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crimeofgenocide.aspx>.
- Oxfam International. "Map of Sudan." July 7, 2021.
- Pandeya, R. C. "Human Rights: An Indian Perspective." In *Philo-sophical Foundations of Human Rights*. Paris: UNESCO, 1986.
- Penketh, Anne. "Darfur: Never again?." *The Independent*, January 26, 2005. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/darfur-never-again-488268.html>.
- Prunier, Gérard. *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*. United States: Cornell University Press, 2011.
- Radio Dabanga. "Interview with Sudan liberation movement leader El Nur: Paris meeting with Hamdok 'Friendly and Frank'." October 3, 2019. <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/interview-with-sudan-liberation-movement-leader-el-nur-paris-meeting-with-hamdok-friendly-and-frank>.
- Radio Dabanga. "Protests against insecurity growing in Darfur." February 1, 2020. <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/darfur-protests-against-insecurity-growing>.
- ReliefWeb. "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General - Sudan." February 25, 2005. <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/report-international-commission-inquiry-darfur-united-nations-secretary-general>.
- Saulny, Susan. "After Darfur, starting anew in the Midwest." *The New York Times*, April 2, 2007. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/02/us/02indiana.html>.
- Scott, David. "On the Very Idea of a Black Radical Tradition." *Small Axe: A Caribbean Journal of Criticism* 17, no. 1 (March 2013): 1–6. <https://doi.org/10.1215/07990537-1665398>.



- Seekers of Truth and Justice. *The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan*. 2000.
- Senait Woldu Tesfamichael. "Negotiating peace for Darfur: An overview of failed processes." *Beyond Intractability*, February 22, 2017. <https://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/tesfamichael-negotiating>.
- Straus, Scott. "Darfur and the Genocide Debate." *Foreign Affairs*, 84, no. 1 (January 2005): 123–33. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20034212>.
- Tubiana, Jérôme, Victor Tanner, and Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil. *Traditional authorities' Peacemaking Role in Darfur*. Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 2010. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/155469/PW83.pdf>.
- Tubiana, Jérôme. "In Darfur." *London Review of Books*, June 3, 2021. <https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v43/n11/jerome-tubiana/diary>.
- Tubiana, Jérôme. "The revolution was hijacked': Inside the conflict in Darfur." *Al Jazeera*, July 6, 2021. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/7/6/the-revolution-was-hijacked-inside-the-conflict-in-darfur>.
- U.S. Agency for International Development. *SUDAN -Drought/Famine*. Washington: USAID, 1983. [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/pbaab327.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pbaab327.pdf).
- UN Security Council. *Resolution 1564 (2004)*. United Nations Digital Library System, 2004. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/530567?ln=en>.
- United Nations Development Programme. "Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultations." March 2009. <https://www.undp.org/sudan/publications/darfur-internal-dialogue-and-consultations>.
- United Nations. "UN confirms closure of Darfur peacekeeping mission," *UN News*, December 30, 2020, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1081122>.
- United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur. *Doha Document for Peace in Darfur*. UNAMID, 2015. [https://unamid.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ddpd\\_arabic.pdf](https://unamid.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ddpd_arabic.pdf).
- United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. "Darfur." <https://www.ushmm.org/collections/bibliography/darfur>.
- Waal, Alex de. "Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap." *Review of African Political Economy*, 31, no. 102 (December 2004), 723–25. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4007044>.
- Women in Peace & Transition Processes. "Case study series women in peace and transition processes," 2018. <https://www.inclusivepeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/case-study-women-sudan-2009-2017-en.pdf>.

- World Without Genocide. "Darfur Genocide." January, 2021.  
<https://worldwithoutgenocide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/darfur-genocide>.
- Young, John. "Sudan uprising: Popular struggles, elite compromises, and revolution betrayed," 2020. [https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/HSBA-Report-Sudan-Uprising\\_0.pdf](https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/HSBA-Report-Sudan-Uprising_0.pdf).
- Yousif, Zakia, Janet Anderson, and Tajeldin Adam. "Has ICC lost touch with Darfur refugees?" Institute for War & Peace Reporting, May 29, 2012. <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/has-icc-lost-touch-darfur-refugees>.
- Zezeza, Paul Tiyaambe. "The Struggle for Human Rights in Africa." *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 41, no. 3 (2007): 474–506.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40380100>.