Emotion, Identity, & National Memory: The Problem with Japan's Historical Awareness Problem

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ABSTRACT

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As conventionally framed, Japan's World War II historical awareness problem entails excessive victim identity alongside insufficient victimizer identity. Japan readily identifies with its own WWII suffering, but does little to recognize the WWII suffering it inflicted. This thesis sees a problem with the framing of that problem. Casting historical awareness along the dimension of identity—victim identity as opposed to victimizer identity—precludes historical awareness along the dimension of experience—the victimhood Japan experienced together with the victimization Japan perpetrated. The focus on *what Japan is* precludes a full awareness of *what Japan did.* More specifically, this thesis takes up a psychological frame, and investigates the role of emotional language in Japanese historical discourse. In particular, Psychology's Antecedent-Consequence-Behavior Model is applied toward investigating the emotional structures of historical statements at three levels of Japanese society: political elites, civil society, and individuals. That investigation reveals how the language of emotion in Japanese historical discourse diminishes historical awareness along the dimension of experience and brings the dimension of identity to the fore.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING JAPAN'S HISTORICAL AWARENESS PROBLEM

Since the end of World War II, Japan has faced a *rekishi ninshiki mondai.* Translated to English, *rekishi* may be defined as history, *ninshiki* as awareness, and *mondai* as problem. Taken together, *rekishi ninshiki mondai* refers to a historical awareness problem.

More specifically, the *mondai*—or problem part—is conventionally framed as Japan—from political elites, to civil society, to the civilian population—decidedly identifying itself as a victim in World War II, and by extension, ignoring the myriad ways in which it was a victimizer.[1] Ostensibly, the problem is that Japan has adopted a revisionist and nationalist World War II memory: a memory wherein victim identity is elevated or even exalted, and victimizer identity is dismissed and denied.[2]

And indeed, post-war Japan is replete with vivid manifestations of abundant victim identity and scarce victimizer identity. These include whitewashing Japanese aggression in school textbooks and teaching of history, prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine where war criminals are deified, conservative post-war governments consistently evading and equivocating on apology for Japan's war crimes, media and arts and literature just as consistently reinforcing victimization in the hearts and minds of the Japanese people while largely ignoring the suffering Japan inflicted.

The present thesis defines the problem somewhat differently. Extending beyond or underneath an assessment of how much or how little of each identity Japan's historical awareness holds, the present thesis sees a more fundamental issue. Per this thesis, the framing of

[1]Akiko Hashimoto, *The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Japan* (Tōkyō: Misuzu Shobō, 2017), 7.
[2] John W. Dower, "The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory." *Diplomatic History* 19, no. 2 (1995), 294.

history along dimensions of identity—victim or victimizer—presents a problem in-and-of itself. Such a frame has shifted the focus away from experience—from what Japan *did*—which allows for variation and contradiction—and onto the level of what Japan *is*—which demands cohesive structure.

Put another way, it is possible to experience victimization and also experience victimizing; these are by no means mutually exclusive (indeed, most everyone has experienced and inflicted suffering to some degree). Thus, when historical awareness is framed within the terms of experience, the co-existence of both the victimization Japan suffered and the victimizing it inflicted becomes legible. However, when victim and victimizer become identity categories, the cohesiveness and coherence of one identity makes acknowledging the other identity more difficult. Japan taking on a victimizer identity threatens the integrity and legibility of Japan's victim identity, and vice versa.

This thesis thus argues that Japan's experience has been confused with Japan's identity. Identity categories, such as victim and victimizer, are derived principally from experience. Nobody is born a victim or victimizer; one takes on or is assigned such identity by the experience of suffering or perpetrating victimization. Such experiences, moreover, are by no means mutually exclusive: one can have experiences of suffering and inflicting harm (and again, to some degree, most everyone does). Thus, the problem more fundamentally originates in understanding Japan's World War II history along the dimension of identity: doing victimhood and doing victimizing are readily reconcilable, identifying as victim while also identifying as victimizer are decidedly less so.

In marked contrast to the questions and controversies regarding what Japan *is*—whether Japan *is* principally victim or victimizer in World War II—Japan's actions during World War II

are of little dispute. The historical record clearly indicates that Japan *did* both victimizing and being victimized in abundance. Examples of both are cited below.

What Japan did: Japan's victimization

The evidence for Japan as a victim in World War II is voluminous. The loss and destruction extend beyond what numbers alone can capture, but some basic figures include the following.

An estimated 2.7 million servicemen and civilians died as a result of the war—3% to 4% of Japan's population at the time—and over 4.5 million people in Japan were left wounded or ill upon the war's end.[3] One quarter of the country's wealth was destroyed, with living standards falling 65% in rural areas and 35% in nonrural areas.[4]

Moreover, 66 major cities in Japan were bombed, leaving 40% of Japan's urban areas destroyed and 30% of the urban population homeless. In Japan's three largest cities—Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya—well over half of all residences were left destroyed. In the Tokyo fire bombings alone, approximately 100,000 civilians were killed, and over 1,000,000 left homeless.[5]

Perhaps the most quintessential form of victimhood took place at Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Japan remains the only nation that has been victim to an atomic bomb. An estimated 70,000 to 135,000 individuals died in Hiroshima, and 60,000 to 80,000 in Nagasaki, including instant deaths in the explosion, and subsequent long-term diseases tied to radiation.[6]

What Japan did: Japan's victimizing

The evidence for Japan's victimizing during World War II is no less voluminous.

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[3] John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War 2* (London etc.: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), 45.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., 46.
[6] "The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki," Historical Documents, Atomic Archive, https://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/med/med_chp10.html.

In 1931, Japan invaded China and conquered Manchuria. In colonial Manchuria, the first bacterial and chemical warfare units were established, and prisoners of war were treated as experimental subjects in these units. The Imperial Japanese Army also engaged in mass murder of civilians. In the Rape of Nanking in 1937, for example, an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 individuals were murdered.[7] This included 20,000 to 80,000 women and children raped and killed. By the end of the war, an estimated 20 million to 50 million had died in China.[8]

Japanese violence during World War II also extended well beyond China. Japan attacked Guam, Wake Island, Kiribati, Nauru, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, East Timor, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.[9] In almost all of these areas, Imperial Japan instituted brutal colonial rule and police states, exploiting local labor and resources for the empire's gain. In addition, though the number is contested, an estimated 50,000 to 200,000 women were abducted or coerced into institutionalized sexual slavery.[10] This included women from Korea, China, Japan, Netherlands, Malaysia, forced into prostitution, and termed "comfort women" for the soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army.

Sadistic mistreatment of prisoners of war was also prevalent. In April 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army marched 60,000 to 80,000 American and Filipino POWs to a prison camp in what is now termed, the Bataan Death March.[11] Vivisections were also conducted on those

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[7] History.com Editors, "Nanking Massacre," History.com, November 9, 2009, https://www.history.com/topics/japan/nanjing-massacre#:~:text=The%20horrific%20events%20are%20known,80%2C000%20women%20were%20sexually%20assaulted.

[8] "Research Starters: Worldwide Deaths in World War II," The National WWII Museum | New Orleans, https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters-worldwide-deaths-world-war?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F.

[9] "World War II in the Pacific," Holocaust Encyclopedia (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum), https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/world-war-ii-in-the-pacific#:~:text=In%20December%201941%2C%20Guam%2C%20Wake,United%20States%20and%20Great%20Britain.

[10] "Number of Comfort Stations and Comfort Women," Digital Museum: The Comfort Women Issue and the Asia Women's Fund (The Asia Women's Fund), https://www.awf.or.jp/e1/facts-07.html.

[11] Stanley L. Falk, *Bataan: The March of Death* (New York: W.W Norton and Company,1962).

imprisoned in Japanese POW camps, and there are records of Imperial Japanese soldiers cannibalizing American POWs.[12] Death rates for POW's were extremely high, including 40% of American POWs dying in Japanese camps, compared to 1% in Nazi POW camps.[13]

Research Objective

The actions above are historical events that are largely beyond dispute (even if the figures are not entirely certain; the scale of death and destruction defies precise quantification). Thus, any reader who ascribes to the historical record should have little problem grasping that Japan both experienced and perpetrated tremendous victimization. The problem is that somewhere along the way these experiences turned into identities. While what Japan *did* does not present an awareness problem, problems emerge in questions of what Japan *is*. The capacity for understanding the co-existence of experiencing and inflicting harm is eclipsed when identity categories are constructed: one becomes either victim or victimizer, and the infinite variations in both suffering and perpetrating victimization are lost.

The present thesis focuses on the role played by the *language of emotion* within this more fundamental problem: the problem wherein the construction of shared and cohesive identities eclipses particular and not-so-cohesive experiences. The language of emotion refers to the vocabulary assigned to feelings. Words such as sad, happy, angry and the like are names or labels for emotional experiences—such experiences vary, but they converge in the name of the emotion that they generate. For example, many different experiences can generate the feeling of sadness, such as break-ups, losses, failings, and countless more. Even more, break-ups and losses and failings can take countless different shapes and forms—and even more again, different

[12] Kenneth V. Iserson, *Death to Dust: What Happens to Dead Bodies?* (United States: Galen Press, 2001), 454.
[13] Kirk Spitzer, "WWII: American POWS Still Waiting For an Apology," Time, September 12, 2014, https://time.com/3334677/pow-world-war-two-usa-japan/.

individuals experience the same break-ups, losses, and failings in infinitely different ways. In sum, infinite experiences elicit sadness, and all are converged under the umbrella of a singular emotional vocabulary word: sad. That is, infinite experiences generate, and are generated by, feelings we name through one word: sad, angry, happy and so forth. By assigning one word to infinitely varied experiences, the variation in those experiences is collapsed and converged.

Similarly, victim and victimizer are labels applied to people who have experienced suffering and inflicted suffering. By using these one-word identity terms, we miss the variations therein. This variation allows that suffering and inflicting-suffering need not be mutually exclusive. Victim and victimizer labels make this seemingly simple observation—humans are capable of both being harmed and doing harm—less simple. It is a more cognitively difficult position to understand someone as *being* both victim and victimizer than someone as *doing* both victim and victimizing.

Literature Review

The following literature review offers insights into how emotion and victim-victimizer identities have been theorized in relation to Japanese WWII memory. As Hiro Saito notes in his analysis of Japanese national memory, "the role of emotion … has been understudied in the field of collective memory."[14] This review summarizes the few investigations to date. Notably, these investigations operate within a dimension of identity: all provide emotional reasons as to why Japan has extensive victim identity and little victimizer identity. The present thesis extends from the existing literature in order to investigate an underlying discursive process. More than providing emotional justifications or explanations for victim identity, this thesis is interested in

[14] Hiro Saito. "Reiterated Commemoration: Hiroshima as National Trauma." *Sociological Theory* 24, no. 4 (2006), 359.

understanding how the language of emotion contributes to historical awareness in the dimension of identity more than in the dimension of experience.

Japanese peace activist Oda Makoto was among the first figures to coin the phrase Japan's *rekishi ninshiki mondai*. In describing and critiquing Japanese national memory, Makoto explains that "there is a kind of indulgence" that emerges in Japan's relationship to its World War II history: "label this indulgent psychology: victim consciousness."[15] Makoto further explains, "it is an important fact that at some moment we conspicuously lost consciousness that we ourselves have been perpetrators."[16] In other words, from early on in the discussion, experiencing and perpetrating victimization are cast in terms of psychologies or consciousness, not principally in terms of experiences.

John Dower further elaborates on why "victim consciousness" took hold so strongly in post-war Japan: or in Makoto's terms, why "victim consciousness" is so indulged to the exclusion of "victimizer consciousness." In his seminal analysis of Japan in the aftermath of World War II, *Embracing Defeat,* Dower identifies substantive emotional reasons for Japan's historical awareness problems.

First, and most concretely, Dower explains that victimizing took place largely outside of Japan, and victimization largely inside Japan. Though the vast majority of Japanese people directly experienced suffering and victimization, including millions to a traumatic degree, most Japanese only learned of Japan's war crimes after the war.[17] Even then, such crimes remained largely abstractions: events far away and detached from direct experience. And it is direct experience that registers most in mind and memory: what is directly seen, heard, or felt registers

[15] Oda Makoto, "*Heiwa No Rinri to Ronri*," in *Nanshi No Shisō* (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), 59-60.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Dower, *Embracing Defeat,* 506.

with far more impact than what is read about in the newspaper. Even more, what is *suffered* registers most impactfully of all. Indeed, the most fundamental form of learning is emotional learning.[18] The primary function of the human mind is to keep us alive, and towards that end, the mind most remembers events that are life threatening and hurtful and dangerous. As per the neuropsychology of emotions, the experience of direct suffering registered far more centrally in the memories of postwar Japanese individuals than the suffering that Japan inflicted on others far away.

Second, Dower explains how emotional responses to the war's end differed between the victorious Allies and defeated Japanese. While the victors were more concerned with asking "who was responsible for Japanese aggression and the atrocities committed by the imperial forces, the more pressing question on the Japanese side was: who was responsible for defeat?"[19] And while the victors focused on Japan's guilt in perpetrating aggression and atrocities, "the Japanese were overwhelmed by grief and guilt *toward their own countrymen*" (emphasis added).[20] Therein emerges heightened victim consciousness*:* a defeated Japan looked back at the war in terms of victimhood, the emotions of grief and guilt toward their own people. Concerns about victimizing were others' concerns, not Japan's.

The relationship between emotion and war memory in Japan has also been framed in terms of collective trauma. Akiko Hashimoto, in her work *The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Japan* deems the victim narrative in Japan "a trauma narrative."[21] Hashimoto proposes that the victim trauma narrative "promotes empathy and identification with the victims of defeat....This narrative also tends to divert attention, in this case from the suffering

[18] Daniel Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence* (London, UK: Bloomsbury, 1996), 14.
[19] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 486.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Hashimoto, *The Long Defeat*.

of distant others that the Japanese victimized in Asia."[22] Further, Jeffrey Alexander describes a process of cultural trauma wherein "members of a collective feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways."[23] In sum, Hashimoto refers to a binary within the *rekishi ninshiki mondai*, a binary wherein an identification with the victim diverts attention from victimizing. Alexander then extends that binary forward. Once an identification is established, it is carried into the future and sustained as constitutive of a collective identity. In the case of Japan, that collective identity is cast in terms of victimhood.

In sum, there exist disparate explanations for Japan identifying as victim, including historical, neuropsychological, and sociopsychological reasons for such identity. Disparate as such explanations may be, all recognize that victim and victimizer have been cast along the dimension of identity—a dimension wherein victim and victimizer are largely irreconcilable. Indeed, Dower states "dual identity as victim and victimizer—never will be entirely resolved in Japan."[24]

This thesis adds that such irreconcilability is related to understanding history along the dimension of identity rather than experience. One *is* either one *or* the other—victim or victimizer—while one can *do* both—experience victimhood *and* perpetrate victimizing. Extending from the literature above, I argue that an additional problem lies in treating victim and victimizer as identity categories, rather than as descriptions of experience. The following chapters investigate this process: how the underlying discursive structures in specific strains of

[22] Hashimoto, *The Long Defeat*, 7.
[23] Jeffrey Alexander, "Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma." In *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, (Berkeley: U of California P, 2004), 1.
[24] Dower, "The Bombed," 294.

Japanese historical discourse have decentered historical awareness in terms of experience and centered historical awareness in terms of identity.

Chapter Overview

In an attempt to capture the breadth of the historical awareness problem in Japan, this thesis proceeds vertically and addresses historical discourse along three main levels of Japanese society: political elites, civil society groups, and individuals. This thesis also proceeds laterally: addressing controversies particularly central to victim-victimizer tensions in post WWII Japan. Such issues include state apologies and recognition/non-recognition of Japanese victimizing during WWII, the deification of victimizers at Yasukuni shrine, and testimonies of survivor experiences at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

More specifically, Chapter 2 examines issues of wartime accountability and responsibility. As conventionally understood within the historical awareness problem, the repeatedly equivocal apology statements of Japan's political elites constitute a prominent example of Japan's excessive victim identity and insufficient victimizer identity.[25] The present thesis does not dispute this conventional understanding per se. Rather, this chapter examines the speeches and apology statements of political leaders, and demonstrates how the language of emotion therein serves to shift the relevant dimension of historical awareness from experience to identity.

Chapter 3 addresses related issues at the level of Japanese civil society. This chapter specifically contrasts the Japan War Bereaved Families Association—the central lobbying group behind government associations with Yasukuni Shrine—to the Japan Confederation of A- and H-

[25] Jennifer Lind, "An Unhappy Phase in a Certain Period" in S*orry States: Apologies in International Politics*. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008, 26-101.

Bomb Sufferer Organizations—the central activist group advocating for the rights of atomic bomb survivors. The contrast shows that the former group states their organization around the language of shared emotion, reinforcing their victim identity to the point that even war criminals become deified as noble war dead. The latter group states their organization around shared actions, more than shared emotion per se. In so doing, they largely free themselves of identity constraints—*what they are*—and move on to constructive action—*what they do.*

Chapter 4 extends the analysis to the level of individuals, and investigates the emotional structures in testimonies from individual atomic bomb survivors: within the frame of the historical awareness problem, those to whom victim identity is readily conceded or allowed. This chapter argues that despite such concession, atomic bomb survivors do not grab hold of victim identity. An analysis of emotional discourse shows how their emotionality operates in terms of what they experienced—*what they did* and not *who they are.* In contrast to statements analyzed in the prior chapters, survivor statements decidedly do not emphasize the language of emotion: their experiences do the emotional talking.

Finally, Chapter 5 addresses limitations in the present study and concludes by situating the conversation of the present thesis within a broader and existing critique of human rights discourse.

Methodology: The ABC Model

In order to examine the relationship between experience and the language of emotion, this thesis takes up Psychology's Antecedent-Behavior-Consequence model as an analytical frame. This model posits that behaviors (including internal behaviors such as thoughts, memories, images, and external behaviors or actions) are best understood by seeing them in relation to their antecedents and consequences. Antecedents are what elicit behaviors, and

consequences are what behaviors elicit. Applied to emotion, the ABC model maps the experiences that generate and are generated by emotion: the antecedent experiences and the consequent experiences. In essence, this model builds upon the fundamental dimension of time. All events follow a natural chronology of past-present-future: what happened, what state that happening elicits, and what happening that state leads to.

Per this model, emotion begins with an action and/or experience (A). We see/hear/feel/taste/touch/imagine/think/remember something that activates an emotional response. B entails the emotional response and its vocabulary: the feeling state that A elicits, and what we call it. In addition, emotions move us. Indeed, the word emotion is derived from the Latin e*movere*, to move.[26] Emotions motivate acting or doing something, and the C (consequence) represents the experiences and actions they move us to do.

This model elucidates several key points. First, emotions do not exist in a vacuum, they are generated by experiences in the world, and in turn, generate more experiences in the world. There are words for emotions (B) and there are emotional experiences (A and C); these are not one-and-the-same. Moreover, when the language of emotion (B) is attached to and subsumes experiences (A and C), the experiences are collapsed. When experiences are collapsed—when *what you did* is diminished—*what you are* rises to the fore.

As applied to Japan's historical awareness problem, the issue is that experience—what Japan *did*—is of little dispute: Japan suffered victimization and perpetrated victimization. Rather, what generates controversy is the question of what Japan *is*: is Japan a victim or a victimizer, victim identity or victimizer identity? This thesis shows how the language of emotion contributes to Japan's historical awareness problem: how it functions to pare away the dimension

[26] Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence*, 24.

of experience, and thereby elevate the dimension of identity. Similarly, the discursive analysis conducted in the following chapters shows that statements centering the language of emotion (B) contribute to associations with victim identity. In contrast, statements centered on experiences (A) and (C) largely escape these associations.

CHAPTER 2: THE EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE OF JAPAN'S POLITICAL ELITE

Perhaps the most prominent example of Japan's historical awareness problem—or victim identity—has been the persistent inability or refusal of national leaders to acknowledge past aggressions and war crimes, take responsibility for such crimes, and offer unequivocal apology. In this case, the problem is typically framed as Japan's leaders—and the broader population they represent—focusing so intently on their World War II victimhood that they cannot see their own victimizing. As Jennifer Lind states in her analysis of Japanese state apologies: "the world criticizes Japan for failing to come to terms with its past, Tokyo's apologies have been perceived as too little, too late."[27] Even more, Lind argues that genuinely recognizing war crimes and aggressions challenges or discomfits Japan's current self-definition "as a pacifist, cooperative, and generous global citizen, with a strong antiwar and antinuclear identity."[28]

Certainly, this chapter does not disagree with the foregoing: the failure of Japan's political leaders to take responsibility and apologize for World War II aggressions is well documented, and is not challenged here. Similarly, assessing the genuineness or disingenuousness of their statements is not the principal purpose of this chapter. Rather, this chapter focuses on how these statements function discursively and emotionally.

Specifically, this chapter locates a particular emotional logic operating throughout the discourse of the Japanese political elite. Per this logic, the language of emotion collapses myriad experiences under a label of shared emotional pain. That is, contradictory and diverse experiences abound and co-exist in post-war Japan: myriad experiences of victimization, and myriad experiences of victimizing too (A). In the political statements investigated here, these contradictory experiences are coalesced and cohered around a shared label of emotion, the label

[27] Lind, *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*, 7.
[28] Ibid.

of suffering (B). The dimension of experience, and its many forms of both victimization and victimizing therein, is replaced by the dimension of identity: a victim identity built and cohered around a label of shared emotional pain.

These dynamics are examined through an analysis of Japanese political statements across the postwar era: the Emperor's surrender speech in 1945, Prime Minister Murayama's statements in 1995 at the 50th anniversary of war's end, and present day government positions on wartime accountability as published on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.

1945: Emperor Hirohito's Surrender

On August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito went on radio to announce Japan's surrender: the first time a Japanese emperor had communicated directly to the public, and the first time the Japanese public heard an emperor's voice. This section begins by briefly presenting Hirohito's political motives for the speech: how he evaded wartime responsibility, and cast himself—and his followers—as wartime victims. Next, the present intervention looks underneath those overt political motives and examines the emotional logic underpinning his statement: how Hirohito's emotional language functions to collapse varied wartime experiences and converge them under an identity of shared (or ostensibly shared) emotional suffering.

The Emperor's task on August 15, 1945 was perilous and complex. First, he needed to maintain the allegiance of his subjects and followers. Having just guided these subjects and followers into devastation and ruin, he needed to convince them to continue following his lead into the future, even if following his lead so far had proved disastrous. Second, and more immediately, Hirohito needed to protect his job, and his life, neither of which were at all secure

with the conquering American military boots-on-the ground in Tokyo within days. Toward that end, absolving himself of responsibility for Japan's war crimes was vitally important.[29]

As conventionally argued, Hirohito achieves these objectives largely by casting himself as a victim, and thus, as not a victimizer. He begins by emphasizing the profound emotional connections he feels for his subjects: their pain is his pain. He goes on to describe the pain he feels from the suffering of the Japanese people as so great that "my vital organs are torn asunder."[30] As John Dower explains, this framing and turn of phrase enabled the emperor to "offer himself as the embodiment of the nation's suffering, its ultimate victim, transforming the sacrifices of his people into his own agony."[31] Moreover, with the Emperor established as the ultimate victim, his followers—the Japanese people with whom he shares profound connection—become victims too, or at least, penultimate victims.

Examining the Emperor's speech via the lens of the ABC model enables seeing the issues somewhat differently. In particular, this model enables seeing how experiences, what the Japanese people did and were done unto in World War II (A), are converged together into the emotional language of suffering (B), a shared identity of victimhood. With that identity established, moreover, victimhood is carried over into the future (C), an ongoing bond of suffering that unites the people and their Emperor.

The central concern of the present analysis is not that the Emperor takes on victim identity per se, but how that identity is produced discursively and emotionally. In particular, the Emperor's statements frame history, and Japan's relationship to it, much more through the language of emotion than the description of experiences. As discussed prior, the language of

[29] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 34-39.
[30] Michinomiya Hirohito, "The Jewel Voice Broadcast," trans. Tadachi Hirakawa, August 15, 1945.
[31] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 36.

emotion converges divergent experiences into the shared feeling of suffering. This shifts the frame away from the dimension of experience—which allows for divergence and contradiction—and into identity—a dimension wherein experience is rendered coherent and shared.

The following table presents key excerpts of Emperor Hirohito's surrender speech in terms of the ABC model.

Table 1: Hirohito in ABC

A: What happened, what was experienced	B: The feeling state that experience elicits (the language of emotion)	C: What the feeling state motivates
The thought of those officers and men as well as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of duty, or those who met death [otherwise] and all their bereaved families	pains our heart night and day. My vital organs are torn asunder.	
The welfare of the wounded and the war sufferers and of those who lost their homes and livelihood…	is the object of our profound solicitude.	
	We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, our subjects…	… we have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unavoidable and suffering what is unsufferable. Having been able to save and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, we are always with you, our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity.[32]

[32] Hirohito, "The Jewel Voice Broadcast."

In terms of antecedent experiences, the Emperor repeatedly acknowledges the war experiences of his subjects: "the officers," "the men," "the bereaved families," "the wounded and war sufferers." Notably, however, he makes no mention of his own experience during the war, as of course, he had sat out the war in the comfort of the Imperial Palace. Put another way, Hirohito needed to cast himself as victim, but he had not suffered in the way that the millions listening to him on radio had suffered; his war experience and their war experience were about as different as war experiences can feasibly be. Thus, he needed to shift the discussion out of the realm of experience, away from the dimension of what he and his people did during World War II, as what he did and what they did were so dramatically discrepant. In place of experience, he had to center the discussion in terms of stated emotion, which he and they could more readily share.

Though Hirohito had not experienced the suffering his subjects experienced, he could *say* that he felt their suffering, and indeed, repeatedly says that as shown in B above: "pains our heart day and night," "my vital organs are torn asunder," "the object of our profound solicitude." As such, the language of emotion comes to constitute a shared experience by which an identity, and a common identification, can be forged from profoundly different lived experiences. Again, Emperor Hirohito's war experience differed dramatically from his subjects' – *what they did*— was entirely different. But *how they feel* can be discursively cast as similar, and their feeling of suffering becomes constitutive of a shared identity: of *who they are*.

Similarly, alongside differences in experience between Emperor and subjects, there were vast differences in experience amongst the subjects themselves. For example, the experience of firebombed Tokyo residents was dramatically different than that of rural farm dwellers in Hokkaido who lived the war in relative safety. In addition, each individual person firebombed in Tokyo, or relatively safe in rural Hokkaido, had a different war experience than every other

resident of Tokyo and Hokkaido. And of course, there were millions of Japanese who were complicit in inflicting suffering, in varied ways and to varying degrees. In sum, in a nation of 100 million people, there were 100 million different war experiences.

And Hirohito collapses these differences in experience by way of emotional language. "The officers and men" and "those who have fallen in the field" and "bereaved families" and "all those who lost their homes and livelihood," and by extension, all 100 million war experiences, are grouped together under the language of Hirohito's and Japan's collective grief. The feeling state elicited by the experience comes to be more central and meaningful than the experience itself. Similarly, collapsing these myriad war experiences, and creating an identity out of the single and shared feeling these different experiences elicit, serves to erase those experiences that do not fit into that identity. In particular, the experience of Japan victimizing others is rendered incompatible and irreconcilable with an identity built out of the nation's feeling of grief and loss.

Moreover, having moved the focus away from Japan's myriad war experiences— which included both victimizing and victimizing—and onto its shared suffering, Hirohito goes on to project that suffering into the future: "We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unavoidable and suffering what is insufferable." Once the emotional language of victimhood is established, it extends through generations. The myriad and divergent experiences (A) that converge under the emotional language of suffering (B) are extended into perpetuity (C).

1995: The Murayama Statement

Hirohito's projection remains alive and well fifty years later. Speaking at the 50th anniversary of the war's end, Prime Minister Murayama faced a political balancing act. Korea and China, two nations particularly aggrieved by Japan's wartime aggressions, were steadily

emerging as new powers—and their grievances were steadily taking on more clout. At the same time, as a Socialist prime minister with a tenuous grip on power, Murayama was particularly vulnerable to attacks from nationalist conservatives in Japan, and could only go so far in acknowledging Japan's wrongdoings.[33] In that context, Murayama issues what may read as a half-hearted or non-substantive apology.

The present thesis views the matter somewhat differently. Rather than seeking to parse Murayama's intentions, to determine the genuineness of his contrition, this section focuses on how his discourses function: how the language of emotion contributes to the underlying problem of historical awareness along the dimension of identity more so than along the dimension of experience.

Per the present investigation, the problem with Murayama's statement does not rest in the absence of substance per se, but where the substance is centered, and where it is lacking. More specifically, an ABC analysis reveals substantive statements of emotional language, coupled with non-substantive statements of preceding experience. Similar to Hirohito's surrender, the description of experience is not the central dimension by which Murayama's position towards history is framed. Murayama is quick to assign feeling words to experiences (B), without clearly defining what these experiences are (A). The emotional vocabulary becomes detached from and takes on more force than its constituent experiences.

The following table maps key excerpts from Murayama's statement onto the ABC model.

[33] Kazuhiko Togo, "Development of Japan's Historical Memory: The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Murayama Statement in Future Perspective." *Asian Perspective* 35, no. 3 (2011): 337–60.

Table 2: Murayama in ABC

A: What happened, what was experienced	B: The feeling state that experience elicits (the language of emotion)	C: What the feeling state motivates
Now, when I remember the many people both at home and abroad who fell victim to war,	my heart is overwhelmed by a flood of emotions.	
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations.	express here… my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.	
	Building from our deep remorse on this occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war…	…Japan must eliminate self-righteous nationalism, promote international coordination as a responsible member of the international community and, thereby, advance the principles of peace and democracy.[34]

Much as the Emperor did, Murayama collapses differences in experience, and subsumes those under the banner of his own emotional state. Put in terms of the ABC model, he collapses antecedent event under the language of emotion: A under B. Murayama proclaims "when I remember many people who fell victim to war, both at home and abroad, my heart is overwhelmed by a flood of emotions." Of course, the distinction between those who fell victim to war at home and those who fell victim to war abroad is the very crux of the matter: the former

[34] Tomiichi Murayama, "On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War's End" Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 15, 1995, https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html.

represents the victimhood that Japan has been embracing for the prior fifty years, the latter the victimizing for which Japan has evaded responsibility over the same time. Murayama collapses this crucial difference and converges it via a statement of emotion. The horrific events that Japan experienced, and the horrific events that Japan perpetrated, lead to the very same emotional language: "my heart is overwhelmed by a flood of emotions."

Similarly, Murayama's statements place emotional labels above and detached from the eliciting antecedent experience: B is disconnected from A. Though Murayama substantively and directly assigns words to his feeling states, he avoids assigning precise words to the antecedent events that elicit those states:

> During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations.

Evasive qualities are certainly evident here. Murayama sidesteps direct acknowledgement of what Japan actually did in World War II. The 'when' is not clear, it is only "a certain period in the not too distant past." The 'what' is no less elusive, Japan followed "a mistaken national policy," "advanced along the road to war," was "ensnared in a fateful crisis" and "caused tremendous damage." What such damage entails is left unstated, and Japan's active and agentic participation in causing that damage is evaded. The 'who' is further elided, "suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations"—with no mention of which actual nations, and no mention of Korea or China in particular.

Again, the present argument does not dispute this evasiveness, but rather, focuses on where it is and is not centered. More specifically, Murayama's statement largely evades descriptions of experiences—who did what, and when—but decidedly emphasizes emotional

language— “my heart is overwhelmed by a flood of emotions,” “profound remorse,” “heartfelt apology.”

In other words, when the feeling state is defined, or emphatically stated, and the experience is undefined or vague, the feeling state takes on more force. The gap between experience and the language of emotion can be viewed as a sign of Murayama’s disingenuousness: stating an apology without clearly stating what is being apologized for can come across as false apology. Again though, divining the falseness or genuineness of Murayama's contrition is not the central purpose here. Though saying sorry, without clearly saying what one is sorry for, can indeed come across as disingenuous, the present thesis sees more to it than that.

In saying that Japan feels sorry (B), without specifying the actions Japan feels sorry for (A), Murayama avoids *what Japan did*. In terms of Japan’s historical awareness problem, it is in the dimension of experience— *what Japan did*—that we can see Japan as both suffering and inflicting suffering. When that dimension is avoided—as in the case of Murayama’s statement —the dimension of *what Japan is* rises to the fore. It is in this frame of identity—is Japan a victim or victimizer? —that Japan’s historical awareness problem is generated.

The Present: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website

The persistence of Japan’s historical awareness problems into the present—and the government’s position therein—is evident in the “Issues Regarding History Question and Answer” page on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Website. This page spells out common criticisms of the Japanese government’s position on WWII accountability, and offers the official state response. Such questions and answers include:

> **Question:** Is it true that Japan has not formally apologized to the countries of Asia that suffered during the previous war involving Japan?
>
> **Answer:** The feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for the actions during the war have been upheld consistently by the post-war Cabinets.
>
> **Question:** What is the view of the government of Japan on the incident known as the Nanking incident?"
>
> **Answer:** The Government of Japan believes that it cannot be denied that following the entrance of the Japanese Army into Nanking in 1937, the killing of noncombatants, looting and other acts occurred. However, there are numerous theories as to the actual number of victims, and the Government of Japan believes it is difficult to determine which the correct number is.
>
> The feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for the actions during the war have been upheld consistently by the post-war Cabinets. Such feelings of remorse and apology articulated by previous Cabinets will be upheld as unshakable.[35]

Clearly, there are powerful words and expressions of apology here: "deep remorse and heartfelt apology" are repeatedly stated. Moreover, such expressions can be viewed as acknowledgement of Japanese victimizing, or victimizer identity. And certainly, deep remorse and heartfelt apology are not the words or expressions of victims. Nonetheless, this thesis is not focused on assessing Japan's victim or victimizer identity. Rather, it problematizes historical awareness as being cast along the dimension of identity altogether. It is in this frame that the above statements are analyzed.

As with Murayama's statements, The Ministry's position leaves a marked disconnect between the description of what Japan did (A) and how Japan feels (B). With respect to Nanking, for example, The Ministry states "that it cannot be denied that following the entrance of the Japanese Army into Nanking in 1937, the killing of noncombatants, looting, and other acts occurred." Again, events occurred, but who made them occur is left unstated. Similarly, "actions during the war…and other acts" are apologized for, but left undefined. Again, Japan's WWII

[35]"History Issues Q&A," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, February 1, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq16.html.

history is not framed in the dimension of experience: in *what Japan did.* Rather, the emphasis is centered on the language of emotion, "feelings of remorse and apology …upheld as unshakable." In essence, when asked about what happened or what Japan has done, the Ministry answers in terms of how it feels. Into the present, the language of emotion contributes to a historical awareness problem wherein the dimension of *what Japan did* is displaced by how Japan feels.

CHAPTER 3: THE EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE OF JAPANESE CIVIL SOCIETY

The prior chapter investigated the relationship between the emotional language of political leaders' statements and historical awareness along the dimension of identity. This chapter reveals a similar connection—between emotional language and a dimension of identity—at the level of civil society. Specifically, this chapter contrasts the stated language of two associations: the Japan War Bereaved Families Association and the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferer Organizations. This contrast reveals that the former—closely linked to victim identity—centers its associations around emotional language. The latter centers its associations around the language of experience—and does not adhere to a victim identity.

The Japan War Bereaved Families Association *(Nihon Izokukai)* is an organization of the surviving relatives of soldiers who died fighting for Imperial Japan in World War II. In practice, The *Izokukai* advocates for the preservation of Yasukuni Shrine, where veterans and war criminals' souls are enshrined and deified. In addition, the Association maintains close links with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and lobbies for high-ranking official visits to Yasukuni. Indeed, such ties cast doubt on how "civil" this civil society organization really is. The *Izokukai* and LDP are so closely associated that some may consider the former a quasi-state agency. For the purposes of this thesis, which focuses on the functions of emotional language across three main levels of society – political leaders, individual citizens, and intermediary institutions between the leaders and citizens—The *Izokukai* is treated as operating at the intermediary level.

In large part, The *Izokukai* eulogizes those who died fighting the war, and does little or nothing to acknowledge that many of these soldiers may also have perpetrated victimization. In

terms of the existing discussion on Japan's historical awareness problem, *Nihon Izokukai* has excessive victim identity, together with a decided lack of victimizer identity.

Another civil society association that organizes individuals bereaved by WWII is the Japan Confederation of A and H-Bomb Sufferers Organization (*Nihon Hidankyō)*. The *Nihon Hidankyō* defines itself as the only nation-wide organization of A-bomb survivors *(hibakusha*) and represents survivors in all 47 of Japan's prefectures.[36] The group is entirely composed of and led by *hibakusha*. Notably, *Nihon Hidankyō* has largely escaped association with Japan's historical awareness problems: their victim consciousness is deemed not excessive, it is conceded that A-bomb survivors can validly lay claim to identity as victims.

Again, I frame the matter differently. The issue is not just that one association has too much victim identity, and that the other association has the right amount. Rather, the issue is what associates each organization, what coheres each of them into organizations. In the case of The *Izokukai*, associating centers on the language of emotion (B in the ABC model), and their organization remains rooted largely in the emotion of suffering. In the case of The *Hidankyō*, associating centers on actions (C in the ABC model), what suffering impels them to do.

Put another way, it is well established that *The Izokukai* fits into historical awareness controversies and *The Hidankyō* does not: the former displaying excessive victim identity and insufficient victimizer identity, and the latter displaying appropriate amounts. The present analysis is not focused on judging how much or how little either should have. Rather, this chapter focuses on how a discursive emotional logic goes together with a victim identity in the former case, and extends beyond a victim identity in the latter.

[36] "About Us," Nihon Hidankyō, https://www.ne.jp/asahi/hidankyo/nihon/english/about/about1-01.html.

The Japan War Bereaved Families Association (*Nihon Izokukai)*

The feeling state of bereavement is central to the Association's identity: in the Association's very name and title, the centrality of emotional language is immediately evident. The feeling state of bereavement (B) becomes who they are and what they call themselves. Bereavement is what transforms a disparate group of people into an association with a coherent identity.

The A is largely a given in this case: the loss of family members during World War II produced the feeling state of bereavement. The question of C remains: what does the feeling state of bereavement move the association to do? As stated on their website, the answer is threefold:

> (1) consolation: relieve the suffering of the soul
> (2) the promotion of morality
> (3) the cultivation of character: the honoring of the spirits that became the foundation of the country[37]

These answers are vague. The Association appears to be collapsing feeling states with the actions and experiences those feeling states motivate. Whereas the political statements in Chapter 2 collapsed A into B, the Bereaved Families Association collapses C into B. "Consolation," "morality," "character" are all forms of emotional language: words assigned to internal states and internal affects. In describing their activities or actions, the Association stays largely in the language of emotion.

That is not to say that The *Izokukai* does not engage in actions at all. Indeed, they are well known, or notorious, for compelling Prime Ministers to visit Yasukuni, and/or for enabling Prime Ministers to justify their visits on the basis of easing bereavement. Rather, the issue is that

[37] "About the Japan War Bereaved Families Association," Google Translate trans., The Japan War Bereaved Families Association, https://www-nippon--izokukai-jp.translate.goog/aboutus/?_x_tr_sl=ja&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp&_x_tr_sch=http.

when the Association describes who they are, they talk more about how they feel than what they do. Much as in Chapter 2, those actors that are most prominently associated with excessive victim identity are also those actors that pose feeling states as central to and constitutive of identity.

Moreover, these feeling states generate political power. The centrality of bereavement in The *Izokukai's* identity makes them difficult to assail. The Association identifies itself as representing the "the physical and psychological suffering of the war widow who lost the main pillar of the family, had old parents, and raised orphans."[38] This bereaved widow becomes the symbol of the association. And the bereaved widow is largely unassailable: one can disagree with the Association's promotion of visits to Yasukuni, but one would be hard pressed to dispute the grief of the bereaved widow. Feelings are far less readily assailed than actions.

Moreover, the political clout of The *Izokukai* is conventionally understood as yet another manifestation of victim identification in Japan. The *Izokukai's* ties to the ruling party, and the ruling party's support from majorities of the population, testify to the depth and prevalence of victim identification. A seemingly far-right organization invested in the seemingly fringe project of deifying war criminals is not entirely fringe; in fact, it is closely associated with the ruling party and the mainstream population that supports said ruling party.

This analysis extends beyond treating The *Izokukai* as a manifestation of excessive victim identity, and is interested in how that victim identity is supported via emotional logic. In this respect, *The Izokukai's* centrality to Japanese political life is not just a matter of excessive victim identity per se, but of the association's emotional position: a position of bereavement that few in Japan can directly or effectively assail.

[38] The Japan War Bereaved Families Association, "About the Japan War Bereaved Families Association."

The Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations (Nihon Hidankyō)

Unlike The *Izokukai*, The *Hidankyō* does not primarily identify itself via the language of emotion. Though they include the term "Sufferers" in their name or title, they are able to articulate the transformation of their emotional experience into actions. In terms of the ABC model, the suffering impels taking action, B impels C.

On their website, for example, The *Hidankyō* explains the origins of the association as follows:

> The *Hibakusha*, who had continued to suffer in mind and body from physical infirmity and poverty caused by the atomic bombing, and from the discrimination and prejudice due to ignorance of the damage caused by the nuclear weapons, set about a social movement by forming the national organization of atomic bomb victims.[39]

Certainly, this statement bears similarities to statements from the *Izokukai*, the Bereaved Families Association. The *Izokukai* states that "the physical and psychological suffering of the war widow… was terrible." The *Hidankyō* refers to the "physical and psychological suffering of the war" in terms of "the Hibakusha who had continued to suffer in mind and body."[40] Both share expressions of suffering in relation to WWII, and both originate in that experience of suffering.

For The *Hidankyō*, however, that suffering is just the origin. The association's cohesive identity is not formed around the experience of suffering per se, but what that suffering motivates them to do, to "set about a social movement." And that social movement is the essence of the *Hidankyō*. Put another way, The *Hidankyō* are defining themselves in terms of the movement that the emotion of suffering motivates, not the emotion of suffering in and of itself. In terms of

[39] Nihon Hidankyō, "About Us."
[40] Ibid.

the ABC model, The *Hidankyō's* self-identification rests in C—the outcomes of emotion—while the *Izokukai's* rests in B—the language of emotion.

In a related vein, whereas the stated activity of the *Izokukai* remains vague, The *Hidankyō's* mission statement clearly spells out specific actions the association supports. Per their website, The *Hidankyō's* mission statement is as follows:

> 1) Prevention of nuclear war and the elimination of nuclear weapons, including the signing of an international agreement for a total ban and the elimination of nuclear weapons. The convening of an international conference to reach this goal is also part of Hidankyō's basic demand;
>
> 2) State compensation for the A-bomb damages. The state responsibility of having launched the war, which led to the damage by the atomic bombing, should be acknowledged, and the state compensation provided.
>
> 3) Improvement of the current policies and measures on the protection and assistance for the Hibakusha.[41]

All these points represent clear statements of action. In other words, "the psychological suffering of the war" experienced by the *hibakusha* motivates movement: ensuring that others do not suffer the same in the future, and ensuring that those who have suffered receive appropriate remedy.

In addition, point 2 challenges the conventional understanding of Japanese historical memory as entailing excessive victim identity and insufficient victimizer identity. In point 2, victims of the war are articulating Japan's participation in victimizing: "the state responsibility of having launched the war, which led to the atomic bombing, should be acknowledged." Those who have been grotesquely victimized express an awareness of Japan's victimizing actions.

In effect, by focusing on the conditions of their experiences, rather than how they feel about those experiences, *The Hidankyō* is released from the historical awareness problem that

[41] Nihon Hidankyō, "About Us."

posits an exclusivity between victim and victimizer identity. As this thesis argues, an exclusivity between victim and victimizer is generated when victim and victimizer are treated principally outside the realm of experiences. As experience, victim and victimizing can readily co-exist. As identities, they are harder to reconcile. By organizing principally around a shared experience of nuclear war prevention and remedy, more than the shared identity formed through the feeling of suffering, *The Hidankyō* are not invested in the fundamental premise of a historical awareness that defines victim and victimizer at the level of identity.

CHAPTER 4: THE EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES OF INDIVIDUAL SURVIVORS

Prior chapters investigated the statements of political elites, and the statements of civil society organizations that mediate between elites and individuals. This chapter examines the statements of individuals themselves. The individuals of present analysis are atomic bomb survivors, or *hibakusha*. Arguably, the *hibakusha* constitute the ultimate symbols of Japan's WWII victimization, and are chosen here for that very reason: studying their experience can further shed light on victim experience and victim identity in Japan.

As noted in the previous chapter however, the *hibakusha* themselves do not particularly grasp the mantle of victimhood. This chapter goes on to show how: *hibakusha* testimonies make little use of the language of emotion (B) and instead convey emotion through descriptions of imagery (A) and symptomatology (C). A and C are descriptions of experience, B are words that converge such experience. In these testimonies, emotions are conveyed in terms of what *hibakusha* experienced in August 1945 and what experiences they carry forward into the present. *Hibakusha* convey emotion through what happened and what continues to happen; they are preserving their experiences, rather than collapsing them into emotional vocabulary. Per the dimensions of victimhood discussed throughout this thesis—e*xperiencing* victimhood and *being* victim —the hibakusha testimonies operate decidedly in the former.

In effect, the emotional logic here is inverse to that of the prior chapters. Those chapters showed how the language of emotion decentered experiences and centered identity: paring away *what Japan did*, and framing historical awareness around *what Japan is.* The present chapter shows the inverse: how decentering the language of emotion preserves the particularity of experiences and shifts the frame away from a dimension of identity.

These testimonies are sourced from the *Nihon Hidankyō,* the survivor's association

discussed in the prior chapter. More specifically, this section analyzes a publication titled *The Witness of Those Two Days.* Published in 1980, the work is a two volume, translated, compilation of testimonies from one thousand atomic bomb survivors. The statements presented in the text are responses to the following:

> Please describe what happened, what were the circumstances and what you felt, in keeping with the following guidelines:
>
> > A: How people died or were dying. What the victims suffered.
> > B: What you felt in witnessing it.
> > C: If you could not do anything for those crying for help or water, what regret do you feel? [42]

Notably, the A, B, and C above closely track the ABC Model used in this thesis. Guideline A is a statement of antecedent events. Guideline B concerns the language of emotion: assigning names to what was felt. Guideline C is a statement of consequence or outcome. The table below maps a sample of the testimonies onto the present ABC model.

Table 3: Individual Survivor Testimonies in ABC

	A: What happened, what was experienced	B: The feeling state that experience elicits (the language of emotion)	C: What the feeling state motivates
Male, 17 Years Old	Burned faces, arms, and legs, clothes. Of self or others? Figures scattered on the ground, unbelievable as human beings. Corpses lying in the pool some 10 square meters, who seemed to have plunged down for water one after another.	I can not explain the tragedy at 8:15am on August 6, 1945	Still 40 years later, floods my memory with vivid images. Our "No More Hiroshimas" wish must not be betrayed. I have visited Hiroshima Peace Park etc. 13 times since the end of the war, and still weep in prayer in front of the grave of unknown victims, because they repeat this every time.

[42] Nihon Hidankyo, ed., *The Witness of Those Two Days,* Nihon Hidankyo, October 24, 1989.

Male, 17 years old	A [missing word] was staggering with a sword used for a walking stick. A horse was lying with its stomach so swollen that it would easily split. All around me were crowds of people all burnt yellow, with their stomach terribly stiff. The west side became a sea of fire.		Too much to write and all the memories are terrible, I never want to remember again. I want to forget all this.
Male, 18 Years Old	I came back to what had been my house and saw there six dead bodies of my family on August 7, the day after the bombing…		I think I have to leave this valuable experience in some form to our descendants.
Male, 18 years old	I was engaged in the work of pulling corpses out of the Ota River. There was a mother who fell to the ground, giving her burnt breast to her baby.		The terrible sight still stays in my memory Please do not make me remember.
Male, 19 years old	I saw a black human shadow on a wall of a building, who had perhaps been waiting for a tram or a car. No clothes or ashes were left.		I hope such a terrible bomb will never be used again.
Male, 19 years old	I suppose that here are dead bodies of my classmates. They were certainly alive until yesterday, now they turned to corpses…, with their faces burnt and swollen and the skin of their hands looking like water sacks hanging.	Witnessing dying people for the first time then, the “death of people” came deep in my heart with the reality.	Now I am living upon the death of these people, feeling that I must bear this charge through the rest of my life.

Female, 16 years old	By the bombing, my mother, younger brother and I were caught under our fallen house. Fortunately, my brother and I managed to crawl out of the ruins without injuries, but my mother was trapped under a beam.	Perhaps because my senses were paralyzed, I did not feel any emotion about it.	
Female, 16 years old	Swollen corpses were floating in the river and the dead lying on the streets.		In my mind, I can still vividly see that hellish scene.
Female, 17 years old	Friends died by me; a child, after moaning over-night from pain and calling for mother, also died the next morning.	In fact, when I was caught in the bombing, I did not have any special emotion.	I now feel terrified to recall my youth, the days when I was dehumanized, with no emotion or any other human traits in the prevailing nationalist and totalitarian education.

[43]

As the table displays, the columns of antecedent and consequence—the sections that describe events, experiences, and action—are heavily populated, while the language of emotion is left largely unstated.

Again, the *hibakusha* were specifically and directly asked: "what you felt in witnessing it." Yet, very few offered responses to that question. Others stated the matter even more directly: "I cannot explain the tragedy," "I did not have any special emotion," "I did not feel any emotion about it." Indeed, the foreword to *The Witness of Those Two Days* states that "the massacre and destruction caused by the bomb robbed people of all feeling, the mechanism of self defense. It is clear that the human heart cannot endure such disasters."[44] Per the ABC model, "feeling" is the

[43] Nihon Hidankyo, ed., *The Witness of Those Two Days.*
[44] Tadashi Ishida, "Foreword" in *The Witness of Those Two Days.*

language of emotion. As such, *hibakusha* were robbed of the ability to assign language to their feelings.

Of course, these testimonies remain highly emotional and highly evocative. Their emotional load, however, does not rest principally in "I feel" statements, in the language of emotion. The emotions rest heavily in the antecedents: the images of what happened. And in consequences: the external and perpetual manifestations of traumatic experience.

The antecedent events described by the *hibakusha* are largely in the form of images, much more so than the antecedent events described in prior chapters. And these images are highly graphic; they convey experiences and horrors beyond what those that are not *hibakusha* can fully grasp. Anyone who did not experience atomic bombing in Hiroshima or Nagasaki, or comparably horrific events, cannot fully see these images because they were not there to see it, and because there is very little in their own experience that connects to the experiences depicted in these images.

Emotions are similarly evoked in the description of consequence: "still 40 years later, floods my memory with vivid images," "still weep in prayer in front of the graves of unknown victims," "I never want to remember again," "the terrible sight still stays in my memory, please do not make me remember." The horror and traumatic events are seared in memory: what happened in the past permeates psychological experience into the future, past traumatic experiences are re-experienced in the form of post-traumatic symptoms. And symptoms are external manifestations of internal feeling states. The emotional experience is not expressed through the language of emotion, but through the experience of symptoms.

As discussed in prior chapters, emotional language collapses disparate experiences, and converges them into the form of singular words. For example, the emotional language in

Emperor Hirohito's surrender speech collapsed the disparate wartime experiences of 100 million Japanese into the banner of suffering, and by extension, formed a shared identity around such suffering. At Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the experiences were so distinctive, so beyond the pale of normal human experience, that they defy collapsing and converging together as one. That is, when *hibakusha* state "I can not explain the tragedy," they are speaking to experiences so unique that they defy emotional language.

The language of emotion is readily shared, while specific traumatic experiences are not. Put another way, the language of emotion is a shared language, and certainly, has significant value in that respect. When someone says "I feel terrified, or horrified" or feel most anything else, others can understand what they are feeling, and can relate those words to their own experiences of feeling terrified or horrified. In a sense, by creating a shared language, the language of emotion leads to identification: everyone who knows the words can share them. By extension, in not using the language of emotion, the *hibakusha* are not using the words that others can share. As such, they are not providing a basis for identification, and thus identity.

Notably, the dictionary definition of identity involves two parts: "who or what a person is" and "a close similarity or affinity."[45] And these two parts are closely related: who you are is closely related to sharedness with others similar to you. Language, and emotional language, are central forms of sharing. However, as in the case of the *hibakusha*, when emotions are conveyed more through experience (A and C) than emotional language (B), such sharing is diminished. The shared language of emotion is replaced by the particularity of experience. In effect, the *hibakusha's* language of experience avoids both parts of the identity definition. First, their language of experience speaks to what they did and do, rather than who they are. Second, in

[45] *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), s.v. "Identity."

describing what they did and do, they speak to the specificity and particularity of those experiences, rather than to sharedness. As such, the emotional analysis of *hibakusha* discourse reveals an expression of emotion that operates principally within the dimension of experience, rather than through the stated language of emotion or the dimension of identity.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Limitations

Before concluding, limitations of this research warrant addressing. First and foremost, the present analysis is based on what Japan's leaders and institutions and people have said. However, the language analyzed here is not actually what they said: it is an English translation of what they said. As a speaker of Japanese and English, and as someone who has experienced life in both Japan and America, I am reminded daily of the myriad meanings and nuances of the Japanese language that cannot be captured in English. At a certain point, there are meanings in Japanese that can only be explained in Japanese.

Moreover, the language of apology—the focus of analysis in Chapter 2—is particularly loaded in Japan. Apologies preface and conclude daily conversations, and exist on multiple dimensions of formality, sincerity, and gravity. In Japanese, there are myriad ways to state "deep remorse and heartfelt apology," with countless nuances and shades of remorse-apology therein. Those meanings are lost when translated to English, where many of these shades and nuances do not exist.

There also remain questions of cause and effect. The present thesis argues that the language of emotion as employed by controversial historical actors contributes to their association with the *rekishi ninshiki mondai*, to prominent victim identity. Arguably, however, the opposite also applies: victim identity likely contributes to employing the language of emotion in the ways discussed here. Defining oneself as a victim, leads to identification based more on *what you are* than *what you did*. In turn, such identity lends itself to the language of emotion, to the paring away of *what you did*. This direction appears more intuitive, less worthy of critical analysis. As such, this thesis focuses on the opposite direction.

Conclusion

These final pages consider how the issues of the present thesis illuminate or deepen an understanding of the field of human rights. This thesis has been problematizing the conceptualization of post WWII Japanese victimization along the dimension of identity rather than experience. Arguably, that problem—victimization along the dimension of identity—extends to the field of human rights in general.

As Makau Mutua proposes in his now prevalent critique, "Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphors of Human Rights," the victim category is an essential metaphor in human rights discourse. As Mutua explains, "the metaphor of the victim is the giant engine that drives the human rights movement…the basic purpose of the human rights corpus is to contain the state, transform society, and eliminate both the victim and victimhood."[46] Mutua further maintains that human rights discourse constructs victims as "powerless," "sympathetic," and "innocent": "the evil of the perpetrator and the innocence of the victim is an essential distinction...for it is virtually impossible to evoke sympathy for a victim who appears villainous, roguish, or unreceptive to a liberal reconstructionist project."[47] Put another way, Mutua asserts that human rights discourse and its organizing logic of savages-victims-saviors requires constructing the dimension of evil victimizers vs. innocent victims: the very dimension of identity that I have attempted to problematize in this project.

In emotional terms, Mutua adds that "sympathy" is the engine of a savages-victims-saviors human rights discourse.[48] Mapping the organizing logic of human rights onto the ABC model, the antecedent event may be considered injustice in the world. In turn, the elicited

[46] Makau Mutua, "Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights," *Harvard International Law Journal*, Vol. 42, No. 1, (2001), 227.
[47] Ibid., 230.
[48] Mutua, "Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights," 230.

emotion entails feelings of injustice and sympathy for the victims of injustice, and such emotion motivates correcting that injustice.

A: What happened, what was experienced	B: The feeling state that experience elicits (the language of emotion)	C: What the feeling state motivates
Injustice in the world, perpetrated by savages	Sympathy for the sufferers of injustice, for the victims	The project of human rights, carried out by saviors

In order to fulfill the project of human rights, the human rights consensus must first identify the wrongdoers and those that have been wronged. Who are the savages and who are the victims? While Mutua critiques the savages-victims-saviors metaphor as largely racist and Eurocentric, this project applies his critique at a different level: viewing individuals and their experiences in the dimension of identities, such as savage and victim, creates a paradox in the logic of human rights. Human rights operate on the same categories and identities that human rights abusers can use to evade blame and justify human rights abusing. When *what you are* is more central than *what you did*, one can claim *being* a victim, and then perpetrate victimization on those grounds. And history is fraught with such examples: victimizers claiming victimhood to justify their victimizing. As this thesis has argued with specific reference to Japan, the possibility for recognizing a history of victimizing may be elided by the attempt to understand the nation's past in cohesive categories of victim or victimizer. Victims or savages.

Seeing Japan as having experienced victimhood and having perpetrated victimization entails understanding that Japan is an imperfect victim and an imperfect victimizer. The dimension of victim and victimizer as identities insists on perfection, while the dimension of victim and victimizer as experiences does not. Perhaps a more capacious historical awareness and more "human" human rights consensus could allow for that imperfection, for recognizing the coexistence of victimizing and victimhood in their imperfect forms.

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APPENDIX I

Emperor Hirohito, The Jewel Voice Broadcast, Radio Broadcast.

Transmitted by Domei and Recorded by the Federal Communications Commission, 14 August 1945

To our good and loyal subjects: After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in our empire today, we have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.

We have ordered our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that our empire accepts the provisions of their joint declaration.

To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by our imperial ancestors and which we lay close to the heart.

Indeed, we declared war on America and Britain out of our sincere desire to insure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement.

But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone--the gallant fighting of our military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of out servants of the State and the devoted service of our 100,000,000 people--the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Such being the case, how are we to save the millions of our subjects, nor to atone ourselves before the hallowed spirits of our imperial ancestors? This is the reason why we have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers.

We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to our allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently cooperated with the Empire toward the emancipation of East Asia.

The thought of those officers and men as well as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of duty, or those who met death [otherwise] and all their bereaved families, pains our heart night and day. My vital organs are torn asunder.

The welfare of the wounded and the war sufferers and of those who lost their homes and livelihood is the object of our profound solicitude. The hardships and sufferings to which our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great.

We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that we have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the [unavoidable] and suffering what is unsufferable. Having been able to save *** and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, we are always with you, our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity.

Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion that may engender needless complications, of any fraternal contention and strife that may create confusion, lead you astray and cause you to lose the confidence of the world.

Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of the imperishableness of its divine land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and the long road before it. Unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude, nobility of spirit, and work with resolution so that you may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with the progress of the world.

APPENDIX II

Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war's end, 15 August 1995

The world has seen fifty years elapsed since the war came to an end. Now, when I remember the many people both at home and abroad who fell victim to war, my heart is overwhelmed by a flood of emotions.

The peace and prosperity of today were built as Japan overcame great difficulty to arise from a devastated land after defeat in the war. That achievement is something of which we are proud, and let me herein express my heartfelt admiration for the wisdom and untiring effort of each and every one of our citizens. Let me also express once again my profound gratitude for the indispensable support and assistance extended to Japan by the countries of the world, beginning with the United States of America. I am also delighted that we have been able to build the friendly relations which we enjoy today with the neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States and the countries of Europe.

Now that Japan has come to enjoy peace and abundance, we tend to overlook the pricelessness and blessings of peace. Our task is to convey to younger generations the horrors of war, so that we never repeat the errors in our history. I believe that, as we join hands, especially with the peoples of neighboring countries, to ensure true peace in the Asia-Pacific region -indeed, in the entire world- it is necessary, more than anything else, that we foster relations with all countries based on deep understanding and trust. Guided by this conviction, the Government has launched the Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative, which consists of two parts promoting: support for historical research into relations in the modern era between Japan and the neighboring countries of Asia and elsewhere; and rapid expansion of exchanges with those countries. Furthermore, I will continue in all sincerity to do my utmost in efforts being made on the issues arisen from the war, in order to further strengthen the relations of trust between Japan and those countries.

Now, upon this historic occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war's end, we should bear in mind that we must look into the past to learn from the lessons of history, and ensure that we do not stray from the path to the peace and prosperity of human society in the future.

During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.

Building from our deep remorse on this occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan must eliminate self-righteous nationalism, promote international coordination as a responsible member of the international community and, thereby, advance the principles of peace and democracy. At the same time, as the only country to have experienced the devastation of atomic bombing, Japan, with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, must actively strive to further global disarmament in areas such as the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is my conviction that in this way alone can Japan atone for its past and lay to rest the spirits of those who perished.

It is said that one can rely on good faith. And so, at this time of remembrance, I declare to the people of Japan and abroad my intention to make good faith the foundation of our government policy, and this is my vow.