

Africas on one's mind: Studying Appropriation in World Politics from the
Africanization of Security in Senegal

Ayrton Aubry

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Abstract

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“African Solutions to African Problems” are put forward today by African actors as well as actors exogenous to Africa, parallel to their own interventions. The theory of extraversion as well as the theory of regime survival would a priori easily explain such contradiction. But it would be part of a broader narrative of invention of Africa, as it has been existing in International Relations literature since the 1960s. To read works produced in Africa, which is not spontaneous for scholars in Western universities, contributes to nuance these theories. As for Senegal for instance, the President has not systematically been an “omnipotent African executive” since independence. Furthermore, ideas (especially those related to Pan-Africanism) and interests are complementary to readings in terms of constraints and voluntary dependency. “African solutions” are as a matter of fact a “moment” in a longer intellectual history that grasps with Africa’s dismemberment since the slave trade and colonization. Appropriation constitutes in that regard a way to constitute a political subjectivity as well as a re-membering. The study of how the Senegalese state came into world politics through appropriation shed light on the forming of the state generally speaking, until today. The wolof expression “moom sa bopp”, that could be translated both by appropriation and independence, and that was a political rallying cry during the 1960s, is a symptom of such porosity between appropriation and independence when they are observed “from Senegal”.

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Introduction

Let's imagine that an African philosopher publishes a philosophical work in which she assumes her complete ignorance of Western philosophy but proposes to explore it. [...] This work would attempt to identify the main Western philosophical texts and to situate them. It would probably startle Western readers, who doubt that we can think without being aware of Western philosophy. [...] If such hypothesis seems unrealistic, its reverse is on the contrary possible.¹

Let us introduce this dissertation with a small prospective fiction. The year is 2060, and the journal Africa Report writes on its front page with capital characters: “Security is Africanized!” The watchword that prevailed during the early 21st century within and outside Africa is eventually reached.

But what will the lucky readers of the 2060 issue of Africa Report discover when they will open the pages of their journal? What image could illustrate this major news? What would a world with an Africanized security look like? Who would be the actors involved? Let's imagine a few scenarios.

First scenario: the illustration on the front page displays an African military that looks straight at the camera. He wears an Army jacket with the African Standby Forces emblem. In the back, we see blue helmets getting in a transport aircraft with the logo of the African Union. In this scenario, an Africanized security is managed by African institutions. It is a form of collective security not far from the projects that were formulated in the early 21st century: African states cooperate and provide troops as well as material to the AU.

¹ Séverine Kodjo-Grandvaux, *Philosophies Africaines*, Paris, Présence Africaine, 2013, p13, we translate

How Africanized this security is would then depend on what drives external supports to the operations, and whether African states can dictate their conditions to external actors. The first scenario considers security as Africanized if military operations are under African command. It sheds a light on the continental characteristic of “Africanization”, that can be understood as referring to the scale of action when it comes to security issues.

Second scenario: the image on the front page shows a classroom, the photo is taken from the back row. We can thus see the blackboard as well as numerous chairs and tables occupied by African militaries. On the blackboard, we can distinguish the map of a famous historic battle, that could be Kirina in 1235 (considered as the founding event of the Mali Empire), Adwa in 1896 (when the Ethiopian forces pushed back an Italian invasion), or Tondibi in 1591 (when the Songhay empire fell against the Moroccan armies).

In that scenario, Africanization is not only a practical issue. African militaries are now trained with African military history and theory. In that case, Africanization goes hand in hand with the idea that local solutions are more efficient and legitimate than universal toolboxes that could apply to any context (to quickly organize elections for instance). As a result, it is no more question for foreign powers to deploy military according to a short-term view (for instance to stop jihadists on pick-ups driving to Bamako) with no long-term perspective other than military.

Third scenario: the illustration is surprising. A young Senegalese man wears the t-shirt of the company that employs him, he sits in front of a computer and looks at the screen, he is working. What would be the link between this image and the title “Security is Africanized!” at the bottom of the page? The answer lays in what is defined as security. According to traditional approaches, security is related to the state with its protection against domestic threats or external invasion. But statistically speaking, even in the Sahel region, death by heavy weapons is not the highest cause

of death, which means that it is not the main threat against the life of the citizens of a given state. For instance, more people may die in car accidents or by attempting to reach Europe.

This is what the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) developed during the 1990s with the concept of Human Security, that shifts the attention of security studies from the state to its population. In that case, insecurity can arise from lack of nutrition, car accidents, a pandemic and not just armed people. The illustration of the third scenario thus suggests that in 2060 Senegal, the security priority is the job market: the Senegalese government decided to act on the drain of its population in the Atlantic (with people attempting to reach the Spanish islands) or in the Sahara desert because of unemployment and a lack of economic perspectives. In this third scenario, the very definition of security is Africanized, which adds an epistemological and an ontological dimension to the practical and theoretical ones that appeared in the first two scenarios.

The point of these scenarios is to highlight how plural definitions of Africanization co-exist, that are complementary as well as contradictory. These scenarios of course don't cover every possibility of Africanization.

To open this work with a projection into the future is also a way to proceed to a first decentering. It refers to Gaston Berger, a philosopher who is important to Senegal's intellectual history and whose name is now associated with one of the biggest universities of the country, in Saint-Louis (Gaston Berger was born in Saint-Louis, his grandmother was Fatou Diagne a Wolof woman from the region). Gaston Berger is well known for his theory about prospective. To him, time representations are key to the forming of societies' collective political subjectivity²: to project into one's future is to take major decisions today.

² Souleymane Bachir Diagne, « On Prospective: Development and a Political Culture of Time », *Africa Development / Afrique et Développement* 29, n° 1 (2004): 55-69

Gaston Berger is not far from one of African National Congress' (ANC) founding member Pixley Seme who called on the “becoming” of Africa, which refers not to a hypothetical future on which one can't do nothing but to the power to act in accordance with one's aspirations³.

A projection into the future is also a nod to Afrofuturism, which has been experiencing a popular but also an intellectual attention lately, especially in terms of the implications of reclaiming the production of narratives about one's future.

The starting point of this short fiction was the title page of a journal published in Africa. The geographical location of an intellectual production matters here. As it is illustrated by the opening quote from Séverine Kodjo-Grandvaux, African academic productions are sometimes downplayed in a context of asymmetrical structures of knowledge production and consumption. African and non-Western academic works are numerous in general, but they don't appear in mainstream journals. To pay attention to these works requires an effort which is not neutral nor natural.

These elements are part of what constitutes an “epistemic injustice”, whose cause is structural as well as the result of individual behaviors of scholars. This is why we embrace a reflexive position all along this dissertation, not only regarding our empirical observations, but also our institutional environment. The point is not to annihilate any subjective positioning from ourselves, but to acknowledge it. This forms what we call an “ostentatious attention”.

The difficulty of studying African cases

What is an African theory of international relations? How to deal with the issue of Africa's place in world politics? To scholars in the 1960s and 1970s international diplomacy is for African

³ Sarah Fila-Bakabadio, « Des greffes aux lignages : une histoire des pan-africanismes », Chapitre 6 in François-Xavier Fauvelle-Aymar et Anne Lafont, éd., *L'Afrique et le monde, histoires renouvelées: de la Préhistoire au XXI^e siècle*, Histoire-monde (Paris: La Découverte, 2022), pp179-198, p191.

states their main means of recognition as a state⁴. Until today, just a quick glance at events related to international relations in Africa easily convinces observers that foreign policy and diplomacy are tools to strengthen domestic positions for African actors.

But international relations in Africa are also much more heterogeneous and composite than that. How can we do justice to this complexity in our analysis? How to navigate between the confirmation bias of diplomacy as a mere tool of domestic policy for African states and the critics against IR literature as misrepresenting Africa?

To bring “African solutions to African problems” is at the core of these questions, although this expression is ambiguous and vague. “African solutions to African problems” pledges to answer some of the questions raised since the beginning of this work: it would constitute an empirical example of how “Africa” reappropriates ways to assume its own security. To Africanize security in that sense would be a new step (perhaps the ultimate one) towards the completion of African decolonization. African solutions are not only about military strategies, they are also part of a pan-African rhetoric that has a long theoretical history.

However, it carries too the illusion of a miraculous cure not only to problems of insecurity but also of dissatisfactions towards postcolonial states, considered as not decolonized yet and of dignity for African peoples. On the institutional side, the African Peace and Security Architecture, that is supposed to implement African solutions to African problems is still relatively new and in construction.

⁴ Christopher S. Clapham, *Africa and the international system: the politics of state survival*, Cambridge studies in international relations 50 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p20

Definitions

In the end, the very outlines of Africanization are the blind spot of the literature. What exactly is Africanization referring to? The term carries several acceptations. The most common one is Africanization as a transfer: the starting point would be a security administered by powers outside of Africa (through international interventions like the one in the Sahel region), and Africanization would strike one as a strengthening of African capacities to manage security issues on the continent. But this definition is ambiguous, as a transfer is limited to the circulation of a norm or a public policy from one geographical place to another. It is easily measurable, through remittances for instance, or through the number of training courses provided.

IR literature already seized the issue with the concepts of norm localization and norm subsidiarity as coined by Amitav Acharya. Acharya proposes for instance to compare norm circulation to a banyan tree: strong and well spread roots represent the “localization” side of circulation and the wide expansion of branches on the surface represents subsidiarity⁵.

A second definition of Africanization is geographical. It refers to the continentalization of security in Africa. In that sense, what happens in Chad or Mozambique has consequences on Mali or Niger. This reading builds on Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s theory of regional security complexes⁶. Africanization as continentalization refers to the scale of management of security issues, for instance through a more important role for the AU: Africanization here is a process of institutionalization of a continental management of security, that could be studied through an institutional analysis of African collective security, with the APSA or regional organizations.

⁵ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing global order: agency and change in world politics* (Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018) p193 and following

⁶ See their chapter 8 in Barry Buzan et Ole Wæver, *Regions and powers: the structure of international security*, Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp219-253

Academic works then insist both on Africanization as a reinforcement of African capacities and as an institutionalization process through continental settings.

It must be added that Africanization is systematically considered as an explaining factor by itself. The term is sufficient to understand Ghana's involvement into the MINUSMA for instance ("it is because of Africanization processes that Ghana participates to the intervention in Mali", one could say). Subsequently, everything that lays within range of the term is left aside of the analysis, the explaining factor is never the factor to be explained.

The symptom of that situation is the absence of agreement on any definition of what Africanization means (or the lack of any discussion thereof) in academic literature. What we do here is to question a terminology that otherwise seems self-evident, and we take seriously African agency. As it appears, the Africanization of security is much more than just a recent and trending phenomenon. It goes back way before the birth of the OAU in 1963.

Strictly speaking, appropriation comes up only little in constructivist works about norms. Acharya prefers using the term of localization (as opposed to replication) and Finnemore and Sikkink use the terms of *imitation* and *norm cascade*⁷.

Marx mobilizes the concept of appropriation to oppose it to alienation⁸ (which is a form of appropriation as a confiscation, with a strategic usage, what Habermas will refer to as the colonization of the world as it is experienced) in a materialist and utilitarian approach. Achille Mbembe considers appropriation according to Marx as having reifying effects on the subject (the colonized people in Mbembe analysis)⁹. The Beninese philosopher Paulin Hountondji also

⁷ Martha Finnemore et Kathryn Sikkink, « International Norm Dynamics and Political Change », *International Organization* 52, n° 4 (1998): 887-917, p895

⁸ Karl Marx, *Le capital: critique de l'économie politique*, Les essentielles, Paris, Les Editions sociales, 2016, p207

⁹ Achille Mbembe, *La communauté terrestre*, Paris, La Découverte, 2023, p182

mobilizes the concept of appropriation from the angle of its usages. He insists on considering the end of appropriation as at the service of the welcoming context.

In this work, we propose to define appropriation as a contradictory and heterogenous process of (re)building of an institution whose end is thought in relation to the welcoming context rather than to the enunciating context. The end being thought means that the objective is to be distinguished from the actual effect of the process. The term of institution is to be understood in the sense of the English school of IR, as a set of norms, rules, organizations, broader than institutions in the formal sense.

This definition implies to distinguish several steps in a process of appropriation, from its genesis, its goal (being thought) to its actual effects. Furthermore, it is worth noting that because it is in constant construction, there is no final ending to appropriation. An original aspect of this definition is that the welcoming context and the context of enunciation don't necessarily differ: the latter can be embedded in the former. This is why we pay attention to the "proper" part of what appropriation is (the word appropriation refers in French to what is one's own), which evacuates the "circulation" part of constructivist works on appropriation.

Case study

The empirical attention of this work is on how Senegalese authorities position themselves regarding Africanization of security. This choice is not self-evident, as Senegal is a relatively small country both demographically and militarily speaking. But Senegal has also been one of the main suppliers of blue helmets in the world since the 1990s. On top of that, Senegalese top-ranking

diplomats are involved in multilateral organizations, such as Khassim Diagne¹⁰, Mankeur Ndiaye¹¹, Amadu Mahtar Mbow¹².

In addition, Senegal's first president left a huge political and cultural legacy. Leopold Sedar Senghor is such an important figure in Senegal that it is indispensable for his successors to position themselves regarding his heritage. This is an important point because it makes it easier for us to identify contradictions in the construction of Senegalese foreign policy, and thus to nuance the unanimous terms of traditional analyses of African foreign policies.

Senegal in Comparative Politics is considered as a country that went through a sustainable process of democratization during the 1980s and 1990s, while its neighbors oscillate between coups and illiberal forms of democracy. However, Senegal is not an ideal type of a liberal democracy, although it has consolidating institutions and professionalizing administration.

What do we learn from looking at Senegal's positioning in matters of Africanizing security? Foreign policies mobilize several actors from the early days of independence: although the Constitution commits the President with a huge responsibility, the ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a decisive role as well. Doudou Thiam is the first individual to occupy this position, from 1960 to 1968, and he is an important figure of the Senegalese political life before independence. This is also true during the 1990s, when Moustapha Niasse is minister of Foreign Affairs (1978-1984 and 1993-1998). Even today Moustapha Niasse is a major political figure in Senegal, he has been Prime minister before being President of the National Assembly. He was recently the head

¹⁰ Khassim Diagne, portrait: <https://www.un.org/sg/fr/content/profiles/khassim-diagne> Visited on October 8th, 2021

¹¹ Mankeur Ndiaye, portrait: <https://www.un.org/sg/fr/content/profiles/mankeur-ndiaye-2> Visited on October 19th, 2021

¹² Amadou Mahtar Mbow, portrait: <http://whc.unesco.org/fr/archivesorales/amadou-mahtar-mbow/> Visited on October 28th, 2021

of the national mediation to soothe the tension that rose due to uncertainties about the coming elections in February 2024.

Because in the early 1960s Senegal was involved in the Brazzaville and Monrovia groups as opposed to the Casablanca group, that dealt with security issues in Africa, we argue that security was Africanized before the Africanization of security: in other words, what is framed by the AU as the Africanization of security today is at best an enhancement of a process that has already been going on for decades, at worst it is a rhetorical coating that presents as a new wine what is just a new bottle.

Epistemology and methodology

On what empirical material rests this dissertation? We led a series of interviews with a set of actors in Senegalese diplomacy. These interviews are however not numerous as we focused our attention on historical manifestations of appropriation in Senegalese diplomacy. Following the lead of the dialogue between historians and political scientists, we visited the national archives of Senegal with a lot of scrutiny on the changing foreign policy of Senegal since independence. We examined 23 folders in the National Archives of Senegal over the course of several weeks.

This work also claims to be contributing to decentering the academic discussion in IR, and by doing so we propose new methodologies and avenues for research. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson's views on reflexivity and its contradictions with positivism are key in this perspective¹³. Jackson presents different categories to situate scholars in terms of scientific production: in a monist worldview, scholars see themselves as not independent from what they study. Following Jackson, we undertake a reflexive effort that is not limited to explaining our situation. While other works

¹³ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The conduct of inquiry in international relations: philosophy of science and its implications for the study of world politics*, Second edition, New international relations (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), p160

overinvest the extraction and compilation of empirical data to circumvent bias, we consider that theoretical observations play a more important role in renewing the discussion¹⁴. This implies for instance an extensive and historically informed review of internationalist approaches to Africa in IR to identify in what “moment” of the discipline we now are.

This goes beyond a mere state-of-the-art. As Acharya and Buzan recently demonstrated beyond African studies, it is not only our implication as a scholar that situates ourselves in knowledge production, but a given historical moment: our immediate environment (for instance today’s French intervention in Sahel and its contestation) and research published before our own¹⁵. The point is not to show how we overcame difficulties and circumscribed biases but to “neutralize” these biases by recognizing their effect on our work. Just like Jackson argues, it is less about being detached and non-partisan than being conscious of one’s social position in our cultural environment and through our day-to-day activities¹⁶. Knowledge of society doesn’t start with the world but with oneself¹⁷.

Our own research environment has been for a large part made of the libraries at Sciences Po and Columbia University and their department of Political Science, International Relations and African studies. Sciences Po and Columbia are both demanding institutions when it comes to research. They also provide extensive support to their members, our work has been deeply informed by our stays in both institutions.

Although Sciences Po is not considered a leading place for African studies research in France (compared to other centers in France such as the Les Afriques dans le Monde in Bordeaux,

¹⁴ See for instance the preface “Decolonizing area studies” to Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002

¹⁵ Amitav Acharya et Barry Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at Its Centenary*, 2019.

¹⁶ Jackson, *The conduct of inquiry in international relations*, p178

¹⁷ Jackson, p159

and the Institut des Mondes Africains at the EHESS, Paris). In the early phase of my research however, I could implement with two other PhD candidates a new seminar questioning the postcolonial approaches in social sciences. All along my research, this seminar guided me through a better understanding of postcolonial approaches.

Columbia University has stronger disciplinary boundaries than what exists at Sciences Po. Political science is very cohesive at Columbia, which made me discern the role of structures in knowledge production, because of the infra-discipline discussion that it makes easier. Within the same university, a few meters away, the African studies department is the place where very different ideas are voiced, much more interpretative than explicative. By their very nature, African studies at Columbia are much less limited by disciplinary boundaries. During my stay at Columbia I navigated between both departments and experienced with some difficulties these differences: “one continent but two different worlds” once characterized this situation a full-professor at the Political science department.

“Research stay” rather than fieldwork

In French Comparative Politics an empirical turn took place decades ago with approaches from the bottom-up as promoted by the journal *Politique Africaine*. In francophone International Relations, this turn manifested itself with anthropological methods applied to the study of international politics (especially international organizations) in the journal *Critique Internationale*.

Here we try to reconcile a strong theoretical reflection with an approach of traditional “field study” not only as a source of empirical data but also as a determining factor for research epistemologies. Stays in the “field” were thus not just parentheses between sessions in the libraries at Columbia and Sciences Po. What is usually heard by “fieldwork” was in that case a phase of

research not detached from theoretical and pedagogical reflections. For instance, we continued to teach during our stays at the University Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD).

The length of the stay

The length of stays varies a lot in social science depending on the needs of the research. In our case, because we had an empirico-inductive approach, we needed extra time to adapt our questions along our own learning. This is a way to limit the risk of projecting one's own conceptions on the context we study¹⁸. This implies to be able to change one's research questions because of empirical observations, and it was made possible by two seven month-research stays in Dakar.

In our work, our perspective changed several times due to empirical observations. For instance, after having visited the national archives of Senegal, it quickly became plain that we should dig deeper into the role of Senegal's first minister of Foreign affairs, Doudou Thiam. It took us several weeks to have access to his son (him being now deceased) and to set up a series of interviews.

Last but not least, longer stays also imply having writing activities in the field. In that case, this text was partially written in Dakar. Although it is difficult to objectivize, the context of writing undoubtedly shaped the content of the text.

¹⁸ Like Pinar Bilgin remarks about the concept of security in Arlene B. Tickner et Karen Smith, éd., *International relations from the global South: worlds of difference*, Wording beyond the West (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020), 181-196, p183

Accessing the archives

African history is yet to be grasped through diplomatic and IR lenses. Academic works have been published since the 1960s wave of independences¹⁹ and some classical works in African studies deal with precolonial diplomacy²⁰. But the history of IR in certain areas such as West Africa is not systematically narrated, nor it is the topic of strong theoretical works.

Africanism in France has (rightly) for a long time been associated with the colonial project and the reification of Africa, which explains how reluctant French scholars are until today to be categorized as “Africanist” scholars. To Alain Ricard, Africanism is the place where “passions” about African can be formulated²¹, and this can be verified until today²². While the African specificity in empirical manifestations such as diplomacy or scientific production can be contested, there is a specificity in the scientific outlook that is projected on Africa.

African studies in French political science have been varying a lot for three decades. “Bottom up” analyses now dominate the field, especially in Comparative Politics. This is also true in International Relations with the sociological and anthropological approaches as well as ethnographic methods that takes distance with theoretical mainstream approaches in IR. But when it comes to the study of African international relations, epistemological reflections have not yet contributed to renew the discussion, especially about globalizing the discipline.

¹⁹ Willard Scott Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966*. (Place of publication not identified: Princeton University Press, 2016)

²⁰ Joseph K. Adjaye, « Indigenous African Diplomacy: An Asante Case Study », *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 18, n° 3 (1985): 487-503; Graham W. Irwin, « Precolonial African Diplomacy: The Example of Asante », *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 8, n° 1 (1975): 81-96

²¹ Ricard, Alain. « De l'africanisme aux études africaines. Textes et « humanités » », *Afrique & histoire*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2004, pp. 171-192, p173

²² See for instance https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/03/24/il-ne-sert-a-rien-d-accroitre-l-esperance-de-vie-si-c-est-pour-offrir-une-vie-sans-esperance-le-carnet-de-voyage-d-erik-orsenna-au-niger_5440612_3212.html and Hervé Bourges et Alain Bouldouyre, *Dictionnaire amoureux de l'Afrique*, 2017.

Appropriation as a constellation

The multiple definitions of appropriation that we identified as well as the different disciplinary paths to study them may look like a theoretical patchwork. We prefer looking at it like what Walter Benjamin called a constellation. In *Origins of German Tragic Drama*, Benjamin uses the concept of constellation as a set of “individual insights” that form philosophical knowledge (which is never absolute). Constellation implies mutual lightings of an object that are connected, following a heuristic perspective.

The concept of constellation is thus useful for how it leaves space for pluralism, as the opposite of negative mirror analyses that prevailed in internationalist inventions of Africa. This brings us closer to what Séverine Kodjo-Grandvaux calls a kaleidoscopic approach, that connects dots by reflecting an object from different angles.

Two uses of constellation and kaleidoscope are mobilized in our thesis in relation to the study of appropriation. First, we project a kaleidoscopic image of appropriations in their historical manifestations. In these cases, we will study the precise continuities between historical episodes and how they reflect each other. Then, we study the much looser links between the different uses of appropriation concerning African issues, forming a constellation of the Africanization of security. The contribution of these reflections is to explore links little studied until now in the literature and to allow us to better understand the resonance of contemporary rhetoric around the Africanization of security.

Part I. African Rememberings and International Relations: epistemological appropriation

Are African international relations a field of research like any other? From its expression, this question is ambiguous: to answer “yes” would attract attention on the singularity of these IR. This would raise the issue of even more marginalization of Africa in the narrative. Similarly, to answer “no” would risk normalizing the examination of the African continent without paying justice to its specificities and would end up in its marginalization too.

The ambiguity between the specificities of the context and processes of generalization exists in all social sciences but it is all the more salient when it comes to African issues. This was demonstrated by Valentin Yves Mudimbe in his seminal work *The Invention of Africa*, published in 1988. Narratives about Africa are spread between “*an extreme generalization and a radical fragmentation*”²³. The act of defining Africa carries a symbolic weight as well, ranging from systematic catastrophism to immoderate optimism concerning its future²⁴.

“Africa” indeed became much more than a geographic word. It now carries heavy symbolic meanings. This is not specific to Africa: the US for instance may be associated with characteristics of liberty, France with Human Rights. These adjectives are not even always positive ones. What is striking however when it comes to Africa is how systematically exogenous and oversized these qualifications are.

The exogenous nature of these narratives is the result of a process of epistemic confiscation, that takes form during the 18th and 19th centuries. These constructions shape our understanding of

²³ Souleymane Bachir Diagne, *L'encre des savants*, Paris, Politique Africaine, 2013, p14, translated in English: Souleymane Bachir Diagne, *The Ink of the Scholars: Reflections on Philosophy in Africa*, Codesria Book Series (Dakar: CODESRIA, Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2016)

²⁴ Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2015).

social problems in West Africa. We argue that the epistemological inventions of Africa are symptomatic of an “appropriation-confiscation” a term that we coin referring to a form of appropriation that prevents any formation of a political subjectivity.

The signifying charge of Africa as a concept operates like a strainer that organizes scientific productions about Africa. The point here is not to have an objective analysis of politics in West African settings, but to acknowledge the positionality of the scholar, who inherits a discursive register that has been gradually elaborated for hundreds of years. Universities are stakeholders in this process.

In the first chapter of this thesis, we reflect on the “internationalist inventions” of Africa. The term “invention” directly refers to Mudimbe’s work, from which we study the construction of Africa as a signifier in International Relations. What is at stake here is to situate the literature of IR about Africa in the colonial library: producing academic knowledge about Africa is not neutral, because of how power and knowledge are interlocked and directly contributed to the colonial exploitation of the continent.

As a result, although detachment methods exist and are effectively used in political science, they don’t always apply to the study of how African states interact on the international scale. This is especially true concerning security issues, regularly framed in terms of “extraversion” and “negative sovereignty”²⁵. As it turns out, the attentive reading of the archives during this research and the observation of foreign policies in Senegal shed light on discrepancies between narratives in terms of extraversion and negative sovereignty and what we found. If we stopped ourselves to

²⁵ Both concepts durably shaped academic approaches of how African states position themselves on the international scale. Extraversion theory suggests that African actors deliberately put themselves in situations of depending on external supports in order to draw resources from it. The negative sovereignty theory opposes European positive sovereignties (based on a Weberian model) and African negative sovereignties (in that case the state only has a judicial existence, based on its international recognition by other states, hence the absence of any form of accountability towards its own people).

arguments in terms of extraversion and negative sovereignty, we would have missed a part of the picture, especially concerning the role of ideas.

We attempt to “trivialize” our study of the politics in Africa, as a direct reference to Jean-François Bayart’s claim of “de-exoticize” it²⁶. Until now, most academic discussions about states and international relations have marginalized African scientific productions, while such productions were abundant during the 1970s and have been since then. This is true in social science in general but also in IR²⁷. Mudimbe himself understood that works produced in Africa are also part of the colonial library and contribute to its formation, even while criticizing it. This is why it is so important to interrogate how knowledge about Africa is produced before producing new ones.

Postcolonial approaches that we mobilize in the second chapter urge us to consider how hybridity is produced by contacts between social groups²⁸. The last pages of the chapter evaluates the possibility of a discussion between African studies and IR in that regard.

Last but not least, the third chapter raises the question of the political effects of constructing Africa as a signifier. This chapter is at the crossroad of two literatures: the one about reflexivity²⁹ and the global turn in IR³⁰, and the one about political subjectivity as it appears in African studies. In other words, we build the frame for a scientific production about African concerns while taking seriously political subjectivity in Africa.

²⁶ Richard Banégas, « Etudes africaines : l’exotisme est-il devenu banal ? Décentrement du regard, comparatisme et doxa disciplinaire », Les Etudes du CERI, 2015 ; Jean-François Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly* (London ; New York: Longman, 1993).

²⁷ As Robert Vitalis notices in Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics*

²⁸ Edward W. Said, *Culture and imperialism*, 1st Vintage Books ed (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

²⁹ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The conduct of inquiry in international relations: philosophy of science and its implications for the study of world politics*, The new international relations (London ; New York: Routledge, 2011)

³⁰ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing global order: agency and change in world politics* (Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018)

Chapter 1: Internationalist inventions of Africa

On top of a geographical definition, scholars mobilize a conceptual definition of Africa in their work, related to failure and marginalization. We explore this definition in the first part of the chapter. We then push the discussion forward by shedding light on the IR literature, to build a stronger critic of contemporary works in IR about African positionings in the world.

The point is neither to forsake our own positioning, nor to objectivize it. It is to be more conscious about it, to be more receptive to critics related to it and more open to literatures with different canons. This is inspired by a double displacement: a displacement of the focus (be it on its intensity or where it stands regarding its object of attention); and a displacement as “dis-centering”, i.e., the critic of the organization around a center.

1.1 Global and postcolonial controversies that participate to the writing of a colonial library

What is the genealogy of internationalist academic texts on Africa? “Internationalist inventions” of the continent are part of a discursive register. We take a look at this literature in this part in order to identify its contemporary signs in IR, bearing in mind that to produce academic knowledge about Africa is neither neutral nor spontaneous in Western universities.

According to Mudimbe, the “paradigm of difference” dominates the construction of Africa as a concept to the point that we can talk about a “refused continent”³¹. Correspondingly in this construction of a paradigmatic otherness, Africa is the place of extreme negations following the logic of mirroring Europe. This appears clearly for instance with the expression of “negative sovereignty” as it is coined by Robert Jackson in the 1960s.

³¹ Mudimbé, *The idea of Africa*, p9

These normative aspects exist in different theories of IR especially when it comes to defining states and the usage of such a definition as a norm of comparison. As a result, the characterization of forms of statehood is strongly normative which is detrimental to non-Western forms of statehood. This explains why so little attention is given in IR to non-Western forms of sovereignty. When such an attention exists, it takes roots in a strong form of presentism and doesn't go back to different historical steps of state formation. In political science, the work of Bayart on the historicity of societies is essential and original on these issues. Unfortunately, this aspect of his work is too little mobilized elsewhere.

Indeed, to the “episodic school of history”, processes of colonization are considered to operate a break in African history, lowering how interesting it is for political scientists to go beyond the 19th century for mechanisms of state formation³². What would be the point of paying attention to long history if colonization during the 19th century erased the political experience that existed before?

This is what Chakrabarty reproaches to “European historicisms” which consider other contexts as incomplete until they are touched by European capitalism³³. Building on Chakrabarty's work, other authors from the subaltern studies in India recall that colonized people are not necessarily anachronic, on the contrary they are fully contemporary of the capitalist system, they are part of it, they are not only in the “waiting room” of History.

Adom Getachew, Barry Buzan and Amitav Acharya recently highlighted the relationship between building otherness in the discipline of IR and the reality of international relations. Getachew insists on the unequal status of Black states during the interwar period: Haiti, Liberia

³² The terms of epic school and episodic school of history were coined by Ali Mazrui, as reported by Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Epistemic Freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and Decolonization* (Routledge, 2018).

³³ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and historical difference*, Princeton studies in culture/power/history (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000).

and Ethiopia³⁴. All three of them were victim of predation during the period, with the US invasion of Haiti in 1915, colonialism in Liberia and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. These events were part of a narrative about humanitarian intervention to put an end to slavery (in Ethiopia and Liberia), building on existing representations of a barbarian environment surrounding the Western world.

According to narratives about the origins and development of the discipline of IR, the discipline has been built gradually along these events³⁵. As a matter of fact, non-Western theories are not negative mirrors of what happened in Europe. They can sometimes take similar forms than what exists in the Western world, to the point that Homi Bhabha describes cultural circulations and circulations of knowledge as having a form of “*almost the same but not quite*”³⁶.

Africa is also marginalized in narratives about world history. Howard French recently illustrated that aspect concerning the circumvention made by Portuguese merchants during the 15th century. To French, the point of the expeditions was not to dodge Africa to join India by sea. It was actually a result of these expeditions more than the intended objective. Howard French argues that it was clear for the Portuguese at the time that the objective was to trade with Sudanese empires (Ghana, Mali, Songhay), after they heard of Mansa Musa’s wealth and Mali’s gold in stories about the pilgrimage of the emperor to Cairo in 1324³⁷. Notwithstanding, the dominant narrative today

³⁴ Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after empire: the rise and fall of self-determination* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2019), pp52-53

³⁵ Amitav Acharya et Barry Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at Its Centenary*, 2019; Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, et John M. Hobson, « The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919 », *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 39, n° 3 (mai 2011): 735-58

³⁶ Quoted in Pinar Bilgin, « Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR? », *Third World Quarterly* 29, n° 1 (février 2008): 5-23, p5

³⁷ French, *Born in Blackness*, Chapter 5: “Islands in the offing”

is that Portuguese sail men sought to skirt Africa to reach India, thus making Africa an empty obstacle to be bypassed. This is not without consequences on narratives in IR today.

This narrative goes hand in hand with the construction of non-Western actors as politically insignificant, as it is infamously illustrated by Kenneth Waltz's words considering that it would be "*ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica [...], a general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers*"³⁸. As a result, contemporary postcolonial literature pays more and more attention to Black Atlantic and to the Haitian revolution to spell out this epistemic injustice. On top of Haiti, another example of overlooked event is the 1955 Bandung conference³⁹. Both events catch more and more attention from IR scholars today⁴⁰.

This is partly the result of what Aimé Césaire laments : "*the great historical tragedy of Africa has been not so much that it was too late in making contact with the rest of the world, as the manner in which that contact was brought about; that Europe began to 'propagate' at a time when it had fallen into the hands of the most unscrupulous financiers and captains of industry; that it was our misfortune to encounter Europe on our path, and that Europe is responsible before the human community for the highest heap of corpses in history*"⁴¹.

³⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Addison-Wesley series in political science (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979), p72

³⁹ Amitav Acharya, *Rethinking power, institutions and ideas in world politics: whose IR?* (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), Chapter 9 "Norm subsidiarity and regional orders: sovereignty, regionalism and rule-making in the Third World", pp217-249

⁴⁰ Getachew, « Universalism After the Post-Colonial Turn »; Amitav Acharya, éd., *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order* (Nus Press Pte Ltd, 2008); Amitav Acharya, « Studying the Bandung Conference from a Global IR Perspective », *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 70, n° 4 (3 juillet 2016): 342-57.

⁴¹ Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on colonialism*, p45

The processes of marginalization that we identified so far are relatively familiar among critical works about African studies and they are more and more mobilized in the mainstream literature today. The critic is thus louder and louder, and it generates changes. In this perspective some approaches are close to the other extreme by looking for African materials for an “extra touch of soul”. This attitude was identified very soon after the publication of Placide Tempels’ seminal work *The Bantu Philosophy*⁴². Although it was praised by major intellectual figures of the period, it received a scathing critic by Aimé Césaire, who reproaches Tempels to leave Africans aside and to talk directly to the colonizer. Even though he acknowledges the capacity for Africans to do philosophy, Tempels aims at regenerating the colonial project and accelerating the missionary enterprise by bringing to it an extra touch of soul based on a new understanding of how colonized people think.

Another critic that Césaire formulates is that not only Tempels don’t talk to Africans, but he also talks in their name: he discloses a philosophy that he considers was waiting for him to be clearly formulated (until then it was the natural and collective practice of the Bantu). Paulin Hountondji adds his critic about ethnophilosophy, which is key to understand before studying how ideas are produced in Africa⁴³. Hountondji criticizes how unaware of itself African philosophy is in Tempels’ work. Hountondji also rejects the inherently collective definition of Bantu philosophy.

Contrary to what is sometimes heard, the point is not to single out Western works that would be responsible for all contemporary evils. It is first and foremost about the characterization of crises in the postcolonial state. Because postcolonial studies put forwards processes of

⁴² The French translation was the first monography published by Présence Africaine publishing house. The Bantu Philosophy was attentively read by major political and intellectual figures at the time such as Senghor and Césaire who navigate around Présence Africaine in the 1940s and 1950s France.

⁴³ Paulin J. Hountondji, *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality*, 2nd ed, African Systems of Thought (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 1996).

hybridization, research on causes of postcolonial states crises goes beyond their geographical framework, and ends up spreading to Western states and their responsibility too.

1.2 An orthodox literature that marginalizes appropriation or ascertains its failure

We import in IR Kwasi Wiredu's thinking on universality of European concepts as the first step of a "conceptual decolonization" understood as "*an African's divesting his thought of all modes of conceptualization emanating from the colonial past that cannot stand the test of due reflection*"⁴⁴. We aim to discuss three concepts here: negative sovereignty as it was developed in IR literature during the 1970s and that contributed to radically changing the study of Africa in world politics at the time. We then turn to the concept of extraversion and the concept of omnipotent African executive.

While academic works in the early 20th century were about maintaining non-conflictual relations of domination between colonizers and colonized people, the content of academic works in IR during the 1960s is not the same⁴⁵. After WW2 the time is of the erosion of racism as a legitimating tool, which fragilizes colonial structures and lowers the scientific interest for racial relations.

These questions are gradually replaced by those about the construction of the nation, that is at the center of the attention of political science works about new African states in the 1960s. This question is first framed through the opposition between tradition and modernity, with the framework of a national structure that inherits colonization and is in competition with village

⁴⁴ Kwasi Wiredu et al., éd., *A companion to African philosophy*, Blackwell companions to philosophy 28 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2004), p15

⁴⁵ Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations*, Cornell University Press (New York, NY, 2017), p45

structures. The discussion still exists today, although while during the 1960s the arguments were about structures of domination following a Weberian frame⁴⁶, today they are about modes of production⁴⁷. Weber is almost systematically mobilized in political studies of Africa during the 1960s, as he dominates general discussions about transition from traditional to modern societies.

During the 1960s, the nation is questioned as a process of construction of postcolonial authorities. Such a construction of the nation through new institutions is considered the main challenge of the new states of the 1960s, before that other issues show up. Rupert Emerson suggests such an analysis in his 1960 *From Empire to Nation: the Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*, published at Harvard University Press⁴⁸. Emerson explores the specificity of nationalism in non-Western contexts. He continues his analysis during the 1970s with the theme of Human Rights, interrogating the relation between self-determination, minorities and respect of Human Rights in postcolonial settings.

Robert Rotberg identifies in the case of Kenya the formation of nationalism in a series of organizations that were created by the population to alleviate negative actions by colonial authorities⁴⁹. The problem of nation building in new states with artificial borders and plural societies as well as plural identities has been often studied since the 1960s in political science literature about Africa, although its vocabulary regularly shifts: “nation” has been replaced by “ethnicity”, the question of the effect of borders on identity is less salient⁵⁰. To some authors, the

⁴⁶ David E. Apter, « The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda », *World Politics* 13, n° 1 (octobre 1960): 45-68

⁴⁷ With for instance Catherine Boone, *Property and political order in Africa: land rights and the structure of politics*, Cambridge studies in comparative politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

⁴⁸ Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*, 2014

⁴⁹ Robert I. Rotberg, « The Rise of African Nationalism: The Case of East and Central Africa », *World Politics* 15, n° 1 (octobre 1962): 75-90, p77

⁵⁰ Walker Connor for instance deals with it in a similar way between Canada, Uganda and other multinational contexts. Walker Connor, « Self-Determination: The New Phase », *World Politics* 20, n° 1 (octobre 1967): 30-53, p35

systematic use of ethnicity as explaining variable is a new form of imposing a racial grid on African events, that extends the bias that we identified earlier in this chapter⁵¹.

During the 1960s the understanding of political trajectories is mostly linear, following modernization theories. For instance, to David Apter “Ghana achieved the level of political development in 1950 which Uganda now hopes to achieve”⁵². This reasoning comes from previous works in political science on changing societies by Gabriel Almond⁵³ and Samuel Huntington⁵⁴.

These texts set the basis for an academic discussion on postcolonial African politics. It is organized around an “orthodox” literature, based on Weberian principles and that follows modernization theories, and a dependentist literature (not yet labeled as such) that criticizes modernization theories. Among the 1960s internationalist authors, Ali Mazrui is among the first to propose a well formulated critic of modernization theory. He identifies its Darwinist origins and criticizes the systematic dialectic between tradition and modernity⁵⁵.

As a general rule however, the original works during the 1960s about postcolonial African politics can be startling because they don’t fit with the image that postcolonial critics usually make of them. During a short period after 1960, authors try to grasp the essence of politics in Africa with the tools they have at their disposal, and not only in terms of negative mirror between Africa and Europe. As a matter of fact, comparative ambitions and universalist claims are first relatively low, in relation to empirical descriptions.

⁵¹ Jemima Pierre, *The predicament of blackness: postcolonial Ghana and the politics of race* (Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013)

⁵² David E. Apter, « The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda », *World Politics* 13, n° 1 (octobre 1960): 45-68, p54

⁵³ Gabriel Abraham Almond et James Smoot Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton University Press, 1960).; Gabriel A. Almond, « A Developmental Approach to Political Systems », *World Politics* 17, n° 2 (janvier 1965): 183-214.

⁵⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, « Political Development and Political Decay », *World Politics* 17, n° 3 (avril 1965): 386-430

⁵⁵ Ali A. Mazrui, « From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization: A Tradition of Analysis », *World Politics* 21, n° 1 (octobre 1968): 69-83

Besides, some critics that are audible today such as the weak attention to ideas of African policy makers is already present at the time (Kenneth Grundy writes “*this dearth of systematic analytical writing about the political thought of the leaders of underdeveloped states is particularly acute with respect to Africa*” in a 1963 *World Politics* article)⁵⁶. Considering this, several authors now prefer talking about a misrepresentation of Africa in IR rather than an under-representation⁵⁷. We show here that this critic is true for texts published from the late 1960s, not for most of those published in the early years of independence.

Academics have been soon interested in how new African states behave on the international scale. Early on in 1962 the journal *International Organization* publishes a special issue on African states in international organizations. The issue is completed the year after with an article dealing specifically with the OAU, that was not yet born at the time of the 1962 issue⁵⁸. The published articles have more empirical ambitions than of general theorization, the point is not yet to systematically formalize how African states behave. *International Organization* pays some attention to multilateralism in Africa and provides the space to discuss the OAU and the UN. Works are published about the massive entrance of African states in the UN between 1955 and 1968⁵⁹, others on electoral behaviors of African states in the UN⁶⁰.

Most importantly these works published in the early 1960s rarely frame African states through their weaknesses, on the contrary the agency that is considered in the analysis appears

⁵⁶ Kenneth W. Grundy, « Nkrumah’s Theory of Underdevelopment: An Analysis of Recurrent Themes* », *World Politics* 15, n° 3 (avril 1963): 438-54, p438

⁵⁷ Wai, *Recentering Africa in international relations*

⁵⁸ Norman J. Padelford, « The Organization of African Unity », *International Organization* 18, n° 3 (1964): 521-42

⁵⁹ David A. Kay, « The Impact of African States on the United Nations », *International Organization* 23, n° 1 (ed 1969): 20-47

⁶⁰ Kathleen Maas Weigert et Robert E. Riggs, « Africa and United Nations Elections: An Aggregate Data Analysis », *International Organization* 23, n° 1 (ed 1969): 1-19

remarkable. Because agency is banal at the time, no discussion takes place about the necessity to pay attention to agency, contrary to today's debates.

However, the same works also lay the foundation for negative truisms in the study of African politics. First, African societies are perceived as mostly sluggish before colonization: Robert Rotberg writes in a 1962 article for *World Politics*: “[Whites] found a small number of strong chiefdoms and many small ethnic groupings. The indigenous inhabitants enjoyed economies that were pastoral or agricultural or that were dependent upon raiding and hunting”⁶¹. The same goes for Edward Tiryakian who considers that “in the early phase [...] political development showed no central tendencies: diffuse and scattered local tribal political systems in East and Central Africa, waxing and waning kingdoms in West Africa – all were superimposed upon extension inter-African population movements and political conquests of various sorts”⁶². Periods that precede the colonization era are considered as uninteresting for political science scholars during the 1960s. With a few exceptions, the “historicity of societies” will be considered only with Bayart's work during the 1980s and 1990s in political science as it is produced in Europe and in the US.

Apart from Ali Mazrui, no one at the time seriously deals with the role of ideas in the transformations of African societies. Ali Mazrui pays attention to the context in which ideas are produced and their role on the behavior of African states at the UN. Kenneth Grundy as well looks at Kwame Nkrumah's ideas, but these works are numerically limited during the 1960s. Grundy's article is still quite well discussed because it has been quoted 39 times between its publication and today.

⁶¹ Robert I. Rotberg, « The Rise of African Nationalism: The Case of East and Central Africa », *World Politics* 15, n° 1 (octobre 1962): 75-90, p76

⁶² Edward A. Tiryakian, « African Political Development », *World Politics* 14, n° 4 (juillet 1962): 700-712., p700

Strong internationalist inventions of Africa happen later in the decade. These new inventions of the continent are part of attempts to generalize studies of African states in the international system. The influence of William Zartman is here essential. Zartman applies the theory of sub-systems to Africa in order to identify its domestic dynamics and to lay the ground for a theoretical work about African international relations⁶³. To Zartman new African states are characterized by their weakness and they can't mutually influence each other.

While Zartman's work can be considered as the starting point of internationalist inventions of Africa, it seems that crises in the Congo since the early 1960s were their empirical starting point. Aristide Zolberg for instance considers in a 1966 paper that Congo is the paradigmatic example of the African state concerned by the question of the "*sheer possibility of minimal political order*"⁶⁴. Zolberg then generalizes this case to the rest of the continent. He becomes later a major author in the study of African politics and African institutions and contributes to steer academic discussion in journals such as *World Politics* and *International Organization*⁶⁵. Studies about African conflicts emerge as well at the time, once again with Zartman as a key reference. Robert Matthews proposes a state of the art in a 1970 issue of *International Organization* and extensively quotes him⁶⁶. This is also when the question of refugees becomes important in scientific literature. It is not yet portrayed as an exclusive characteristic of the Global South because the Greek and Balkan experiences are still present in mind⁶⁷.

⁶³ I. William Zartman, « Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations », *International Organization* 21, n° 3 (1967): 545-64. See as well Larry W. Bowman, « The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa », *International Studies Quarterly* 12, n° 3 (septembre 1968): 231-261.

⁶⁴ Aristide R. Zolberg, « A View from the Congo », *World Politics* 19, n° 1 (octobre 1966): 137-49, p137

⁶⁵ Ibid. One of his works is also reviewed by Bienen in Henry Bienen, « What Does Political Development Mean in Africa? », *World Politics* 20, n° 1 (octobre 1967): 128-41

⁶⁶ Robert O. Matthews, « Interstate Conflicts in Africa: A Review », *International Organization* 24, n° 2 (1970): 335-60

⁶⁷ Robert O. Matthews, « Refugees and Stability in Africa », *International Organization* 26, n° 1 (ed 1972): 62-83

Geographical smallness of African states and their weakness gradually become paradigmatic in the 1970s IR. Susan Aurelia Gitelson wonders in a 1974 issue of *International Organization* “can small states in the periphery of the international system help to resolve major conflicts in which the Great Powers have palpable interests?”⁶⁸.

The dialectic with European institutions was born during the late 1960s and the 1970s. This is particularly striking when it comes to works about the OAU. These works are mostly realists, they take seriously the interests of African states as well as their international moves. Right before 1975, analyses of the OAU insist on its limited authority and constrained resources (this is how David Meyers entitles the first part of one of his papers in 1974)⁶⁹. In that case, what is interesting is that even the previous texts are now interpreted through the weakness of African state, while as we saw earlier these texts didn’t particularly insist on that aspect. Not only politics in Africa is from now on more and more defined as a negative mirror of the European experience, but great powers too are redefined based on these definitions. This is why we talk here of internationalist inventions of Africa.

Early after independences, the anglophone academic literature in IR pays attention to the new African states on the international scene. Two trends dominate: the first is based on the study of the international economic system based on Marxist reflections and theories of modes of production, following an interdisciplinary approach. The second one is more orthodox in its relation to major figures of the discipline of political science, and is interested in the new political

⁶⁸ Susan Aurelia Gitelson, « The OAU Mission and the Middle East Conflict », *International Organization* 27, n° 3 (ed 1973): 413-19., p414

⁶⁹ B. David Meyers, « Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organization of African Unity », *International Organization* 28, n° 3 (ed 1974): 345-73, p348

systems that emerged after decolonization. The economic trend dominates during the 1970s and fades away during the 1990s.

Academic works of the 1960s directly follow the steps of political science studies about legitimacy and authoritarianism⁷⁰ and other discussions in the discipline. New states quickly penetrate the international scene and become the object of interest of political science. As it is always the case, scientific analyses of these new states don't come from nowhere and are inspired by previous works.

This is why the study of African politics after independence is in the range of modernization theories and is part of the institutionalist turn. The orthodox branch of the literature is close to these paradigms until today: from Jeffrey Herbst's work in 2000 to Eisenstadt in 1963, the genealogy is easily traceable with Weberian historical sociology⁷¹.

Whereas the paradigms of dependence and structuralism dominate the 1970s with a focus on the Third World in general and not only Africa, the 1980s and 1990s show another turn in the literature. New works of the period pay attention first and foremost to the legal framework that organizes the newly independent states, before turning to how they put their sovereignty into practice with the theories of extraversion and state survival during the 1990s. The literature at the time is characterized by reflections on state models in Africa and their comparison with European models. In such settings the use of heavily normative concepts such as failed-states, quasi-states is persistent.

⁷⁰ Guenther Roth, « Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States », *World Politics* 20, n° 2 (janvier 1968): 194-206

⁷¹ Herbst relies a lot on Charles Tilly in Jeffrey Ira Herbst, *States and power in Africa: comparative lessons in authority and control*, Princeton studies in international history and politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000), p13

It is instructive to take some time looking at the opening sentences of texts from the orthodox trend in political science about Africa. On top of *Personal Rule in Black Africa*, Rosberg opens his 1982 article “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical Statehood” published in *World Politics* as follows: “*Black Africa’s forty-odd states are among the weakest in the world. State institutions and organizations are less developed in the sub-Saharan region than almost anywhere else; political instability [...] has been prevalent in the two-and-a-half decades during which the region gained independence from colonial rule*”⁷²; Jackson and Rosberg again open their article “Democracy in Tropical Africa, Democracy Versus Autocracy in Africa Politics” with “*the most important fact about political democracy in Tropical Africa is that it is unusual: in many countries it is almost unknown*”⁷³, and they continue in “Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis”: “*In Tropical Africa, many so-called states are seriously lacking the essentials of statehood. They are ramshackle regimes of highly personal rule that are severely deficient in institutional authority and organizational capability*”⁷⁴. Such openings can be traced until today, they are characteristic of internationalist inventions of Africa. To insist so systematically on how dysfunctional Africa is in institutional terms become characteristic of a literary genre in itself.

With his concepts of quasi-state and of personal rule, Robert Jackson is a major figure in the IR literature on African issues during the 1980s and 1990s. Christopher Clapham says that he sparked a first turn in the study of Africa in IR: “*only with Jackson’s work on quasi-statehood did scholars of Africa’s international relations explicitly detach the welfare of individual Africans*

⁷² Robert H. Jackson et Carl G. Rosberg, « Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood », *World Politics* 35, n° 1 (octobre 1982): 1-24, p1

⁷³ Robert H. Jackson et Carl G. Rosberg, « Democracy in Tropical Africa: Democracy Versus Autocracy in African Politics », *Journal of International Affairs* 38, n° 2 (1985): 293-305, p293

⁷⁴ Robert H. Jackson et Carl G. Rosberg, « Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis », *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 24, n° 1 (1986): 1-31, p1.

*from that of the states and even the liberation movements which claimed to act on their behalf*⁷⁵.

While in the Weberian system, institutions work according to “*rules and offices*”, the African administration according to Jackson works with “*roles and relations*”⁷⁶.

These internationalist inventions are geographically situated, which contradicts their universalist claims. To quote John Hobson, they are “provincial analyses”⁷⁷ that are part of a specific and situated frame that we extensively described so far. This forms what Hobson calls a “Eurocentric metanarrative”⁷⁸, that still affects contemporary academic productions.

Robert Jackson is one of the first authors to insist on the “negative sovereignty” of states borne out of colonial empires. He distinguishes these cases from the “positive sovereignty” of Western powers. He opposes a legalist approach of sovereignty to dependency theories that existed before, as well as to modernization theories⁷⁹. In Jackson’s formulation, “negative sovereignty” in IR comes from the concept of “positive liberty” coined by Isaiah Berlin. To Isaiah Berlin positive liberty refers to “*the freedom which consists in being one’s own master*”⁸⁰. Jackson applies Berlin’s thought to IR. In a postcolonial context, he identifies conditions of Berlin’s liberty for new African states when applied to their sovereignty and coins the concept of negative sovereignty from what he observes.

⁷⁵ Christopher S. Clapham, *Africa and the international system: the politics of state survival*, Cambridge studies in international relations 50 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996)., p246

⁷⁶ Robert H. Jackson et Carl Gustav Rosberg, *Personal rule in Black Africa: prince, autocrat, prophet, tyrant* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982)., p10

⁷⁷ John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric conception of world politics: western international theory, 1760-2010* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 18

⁷⁸ John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric conception of world politics: western international theory, 1760-2010* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p13

⁷⁹ Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations, and the Third World*, Cambridge studies in international relations 12 (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p1

⁸⁰ See in particular notes 41 and 58 in Robert H. Jackson, « Negative Sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa », *Review of International Studies* 12, n° 4 (octobre 1986): 247-64

To Jackson, negative sovereignty is not defined positively as the capacity to be one's own master (Berlin's positive liberty) but as "*the freedom of 'not being interfered with by others'*"⁸¹. African states are not defined by their ability to be their own master, but by their liberty of *not* receiving foreign intervention. It is thus well a negative definition of sovereignty, now a negative mirror of positive sovereignty to Jackson. Positive sovereignty rests on self-determination defined as "*the right of black Africans to have a government of their own race within the inherited framework of the ex-colonial state*"⁸². Where the sovereignty of African states expresses itself is thus an exogenous place, while in Europe sovereignty is the result of an endogenous history.

Where does Senegal fit into all these considerations? Senegal exists in the works of Jackson and Rosberg, first described as an oligarchic system dominated by Senghor's personality: "*where regimes are primarily oligarchic – such as Leopold Sédar Senghor's Senegal*"⁸³; "*Senghor's sagacious rule in Senegal*"⁸⁴. Senegal is forthwith presented as a democratic exception in Africa: "*in Senegal, the only French-speaking African country with any tradition of democracy, a more unusual liberalization occurred*"⁸⁵; "*In contrast, Senegal is perhaps the most authentic plural democracy in tropical Africa*"⁸⁶; "*Senegal is the unique case of an African country that has been liberalized and democratized, by two exceptional rulers, without violence or external intervention*"⁸⁷; "*Senegal is a fascinating experiment in moving from a party monopoly to a multi-party state*"⁸⁸. According to both authors, Senegal situates itself at one extremity of the spectrum

⁸¹ Jackson, p257

⁸² Jackson, p254

⁸³ Jackson et Rosberg, « Why Africa's Weak States Persist », p7

⁸⁴ Robert H. Jackson et Carl G. Rosberg, « Personal Rule: Theory and Practice in Africa », *Comparative Politics* 16, n° 4 (juillet 1984): 421, p433

⁸⁵ Jackson et Rosberg, « Democracy in Tropical Africa », p299

⁸⁶ Jackson et Rosberg, p302

⁸⁷ Jackson et Rosberg, p302

⁸⁸ Jackson et Rosberg, « Personal Rule », p439

of state complexity in Africa: “*from sophisticated Senegal to remote and vacuous Chad*”⁸⁹. Senegal is very little mentioned in other political science works during the 1960s, with the notable exception of political economy studies during the late 1970s. In that case, political scientists are interested in Senegal because of the relations between the marabouts and the groundnut production⁹⁰.

Although it is not a major case study in political science, Senegal has the attention of some articles that are specifically dedicated to the country, which stands out in the usually totalizing readings of the continent that also exist at the time. When it comes to the invention of Africa however, Senegal is still integrated into an academic discussion sometimes far from any empirical reality. The approached subjects depend on their disciplinary importance rather than their empirical importance: for instance, the military is studied a lot during the 1970s even in Senegal, mostly because it is also studied in other contexts such as Ghana and Nigeria, which makes comparison easier.

The public of the academic works in mainstream journals about Senegal during the 1960s are obviously scholars in US-universities, no dialogue is even considered with research produced directly in Senegal. As a consequence, there is a distance with the subject of study (for instance the military) and topics are made more abstract in order to ease the intradisciplinary dialogue (in that case political science and comparative politics more specifically) rather than to better empirically understand what happens in Senegal. The abstraction of African states in the academic literature is the result of the circulation of academic works. Political science writings about Senegal thus contribute too to the invention of Africa during the 1960s.

⁸⁹ Jackson, « Negative Sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa », p256

⁹⁰ Robert H. Bates, « People in Villages: Micro-Level Studies in Political Economy », *World Politics* 31, n° 1 (octobre 1978): 129-49, p132

1.3 Theoretical models limited in the study of foreign policies in Africa

In the wake of national independences in Africa, academic works drew a lot from Weberian analyses on the nature of the state in new post-colonial settings. In IR this led to the normative comparison of these new states with the Weberian ideal type. As a result, these works focused more on the weaknesses of the states than they considered them for what they were.

Theoretical models that dominate contemporary political science to explain how states behave are the continuation of these works⁹¹. In this part we discuss three of them: extraversion, regime survival and the model of the omnipotent African executive.

In *Africa and the International System: the Politics of State Survival*, Christopher Clapham picked up Robert Jackson's analysis and integrated it into a deeper reflection on the forms and expressions of national sovereignty in Africa. He also takes a step back from the reading of Africa as a negative mirror of the West in IR. Clapham directly reacts to previous texts that consider African actors as being passive and marginal in the international system. He pays a lot of attention to the structure of African states defined by their international recognition rather than by their own capacities (on this point his analysis is similar to Jackson's work). To Clapham, the sovereignty of African states doesn't rest on a popular support, but it is externally driven, as a result of their recognition by other states as their peer (through their admission in international forums such as

⁹¹ For generalist readings of postcolonial African states see for instance E. Harsh, "African States in Social and Historical Context", *Sociological Forum*, Vol.12, Num. 4, 1997; C. Clapham, "Rethinking African States", *African Security Studies*, Vol. 10, Num. 3, 2001, or P. Englebort, "Feature Review: The Contemporary African state: Neither African nor state", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 18, Num. 4, 1997, et pour des recensions spécifiques du travail de J. F. Bayart *The State in Africa, Politics of the Belly*, see C. Clapham, "Review: The "Longue Durée" of the African State", *African Affairs*, Vol. 93, Num. 372, 1994, et T. Young, "Review Article: The State and Politics in Africa", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 25, Num. 1, 1999

the UNGA). To Clapham, being a state can thus be summed up in controlling the most important building of the capital city in order to physically receive the invitation to the UN (what Clapham calls the mailbox sovereignty). This politics of survival based on exogenous recognition is made easier in a Cold War context, where the two great powers seek supporters on the continent.

In that regard, Clapham is clearly part of the orthodox trend in the literature that we identified earlier: before him one of pillars of Jackson and Rosberg theory of personal rule is to consider that empirical sovereignty weights little in independent African states, sovereignty being mostly juridical and perfunctory. Yet Clapham is more nuanced in how he opens his work (compared to the openings we studied earlier) as he doesn't spontaneously associate Africa to state malfunction. To him, African states are indeed weak, but not exceptional compared to the rest of the international system. Besides, Clapham doesn't consider that African states are at the margin of IR, because weakness characterizes most states in the world. Although Jackson, Rosberg and Clapham all have the same starting points (Clapham even mobilizes Jackson's concept of negative sovereignty), Clapham is part of a new generation of scientific approaches to Africa in IR.

Besides, while Jackson's discussion was about Comparative Politics, Clapham situates himself in the field of IR. He tries to grasp the forming of an African international system, building on what William Zartman⁹² and Larry Bowman⁹³ undertook during the 1960s. Just like Jackson before him, Clapham deals with the question of the nature of African states, but he prefers mobilizing Buzan's theory of the state as a construct based on ideas and legitimacy⁹⁴ (he uses too Buzan's concept of security complex). Yet Clapham's conclusions are not too far from what Jackson argues about the role of leaders in the conduct of foreign policies in Africa. In the light of

⁹² Zartman, « Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations ».

⁹³ Bowman, « The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa »

⁹⁴ The idea of the state is part of the definition of what a state is, it is not only material according to Barry Buzan, *People, states, and fear: the national security problem in international relations* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983)

Robert Bates' work⁹⁵, he writes that postcolonial regimes choose to maintain the orientation of their economic towards the exportation of a non-food crop agriculture (such as cacao for Ghana, groundnut for Senegal). As a consequence, to Clapham, this reinforces the dependency of African states towards their external environment (which rests now on exportations and international recognition as a state).

Clapham's work is both a break with Jackson's theories and a move towards the theories elaborated right after independence, that we mentioned earlier. Clapham takes the time to consider the relationships between new African states, and thus takes distance with the analysis of Africa as a negative mirror of Western states. The final point of his seminal work is to better understand African states, not European states.

Clapham's core argument in *The Politics of state survival*, which differentiates him from previous works is to consider that these strategies are not merely imposed by external constraints on African regimes. Regimes implement strategies to circumvent international constraints and to stay in power, be it at the expense of their artificial diversification (for instance after the La Baule summit in 1990).

By extending Jackson's reflections, Christopher Clapham put himself too in a process of internationalist invention of Africa and in the forming of a library exogenous to the continent. The concept of regime survival tries to seize African regimes' interactions with the rest of the world. Analytically speaking, Clapham is part of a Jacksonian heritage, that he pushes further by insisting on the non-passive characteristic of Africa regimes. He also makes the effort of including the study of African behaviors in a global context, and not only in a geopolitical analysis of the Cold War

⁹⁵ Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*, Updated and expanded, with a new preface, California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy (Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of California Press, 2014), p85

(which is not simply the opposition of two great powers). He adds to the analysis new actors such as international financial institutions with the IMF and the World Bank.

Since the end of the 1960s, political science literature on African issues thus pays attention to African agency, contrary to what is sometimes argued in recent works. From Jackson to Clapham through Zartman, African regimes themselves organize the nature of their integration with the rest of the world. But by mostly dialoguing with each other, these texts end up also inventing an Africa in IR. Although he breaks in some regards with previous works, Clapham is not free from this process of invention. This works not only for the works with which he discusses (very little African works are mentioned) but also because of the content of his theory of regime survival.

Clapham's theory is part of a larger context of deep renewing of studies about the African state during the 1990s. Jean-François Bayart proposes a similar model in his *The State in Africa* with the extraversion theory. Both scholars aim at banalizing the study of Africa, considered until now as exceptional and marginal compared to the rest of the world. Most of all, Bayart and Clapham as well as many other authors reject the reading of African actors as passive in IR. They strongly oppose the Marxist inspired dependency theory as it dominated the field during the 1970s. According to Bayart, the point is to “*analyze dependency policies without being dependentist*”⁹⁶.

The State in Africa was first published in French under the title *L'Etat en Afrique* in 1989 at Karthala publishing house. In this book Bayart pushes forwards the arguments he developed into *The State in Cameroon (L'Etat au Cameroun)*. He will synthesize the argument in a famous 1999 article for the French journal he contributed to create, *Critique Internationale*, “L’historicité

⁹⁶ Jean-François Bayart, « L’Afrique dans le monde : une histoire d’extraversion », *Critique internationale* 5, n° 1 (1999): 97-120, p119

de l'Etat importé" (The historicity of the imported state). When *The State in Africa* was published, Bayart was already a recognized scholar in French African studies, as he was a founding member of *Politique Africaine*⁹⁷, an academic journal that sought at the time to take distance with traditional analyses of politics in Africa.

The concept of extraversion as it is used in these works dominates today's francophone studies of the behavior of African states. Paradoxically, while extraversion and attention to the everyday of international politics in Africa are well relayed, other parts of Bayart's work such as historicity of societies is a lot less mentioned, in particular when it comes to IR. As a result, the theory of extraversion is massively used in contemporary political science without a critical perspective or contextualization: whereas Bayart's works were largely informed by history and mobilized history not only as a tank of examples but also as a tool of demonstration, more recent studies only pay a little attention to history. As a consequence, no major change has been brought to the theory of extraversion since 1989 while African states don't behave on the international scale the same way they did then.

The extraversion theory is quite easily understood and we can identify it very easily in most readings of the news about the international system, not only about Africa. This mostly explains why the theory is so popular today. Today's generation of Africanists was trained with reading the theory of extraversion, which also explains its quasi-systematic use and its capacity to thrive.

A survey of recent uses of the theory of extraversion in the study of politics in Africa shows that out of eight articles published between 2017 and 2019 in anglophone peer-reviewed journals

⁹⁷ In 2021 a special issue commemorates the 40 years anniversary of the journal and is the occasion of presenting its history. See for instance Jean Copans, « Politique africaine : la naissance heureuse d'une sociabilité scientifique inédite: », *Politique africaine* n° 161-162, n° 1 (7 juin 2021): 33-55

specialized on African issues, only one takes the time to define and to criticize Bayart's theory⁹⁸. The others just settle for directly quoting Bayart's 1989 article in *Critique Internationale*. Besides, the theory of extraversion is mobilized in contexts as different as security, social mobilization about prostitution, football, Mali, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mauritania.

Senegal is often presented as a prototypical case of extraversion strategies by African states, including when it comes to IR (Foucher and Dahou write from instance: "*the Senegalese state is born, like other African states, out of extraversion*"⁹⁹, and they quote Bayart's article in *Critique Internationale*). Extraversion is probably a factor of creation of the state in Senegal and perhaps in other African settings as well, but focusing on it leaves aside other mechanism of state-building that could for instance explain the behavior of the state in the international system.

When it comes to security studies, the theory of extraversion is largely mobilized too, especially concerning the Sahel. Regimes such as the ones of Idriss Déby in Chad, Mahamadou Issoufou in Niger, Ibrahim Boubakar Keïta in Mali (all three are not in charge anymore) were described like doing the minimum of efforts in the struggle against jihadist groups in order to maintain an international support through structures such as the G5 Sahel. With the recent announcement of Mali's withdrawal of the G5 Sahel, observers noticed that the country would keep the military bases financed by international funders. These numerous analyses are however not the only existing lenses on the topic, other authors mobilize a historical analysis of the Sahel and a critical reading of mainstream theories. What are the limits of the explanation in terms of extraversion when it comes to Senegalese diplomacy?

⁹⁸ Maxime Ricard, « Historicity of Extraversion in Côte d'Ivoire and the 'Post-Conflict' », *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 35, n° 4 (2 octobre 2017): 506-24, p507

⁹⁹ Tarik Dahou et Vincent Foucher, « Le Sénégal, entre changement politique et révolution passive: « Sopi » or not « sopi »? », *Politique africaine* 96, n° 4 (2004): 5-21, p11

In international institutions, Senegal is considered as an important actor that mobilizes a normative diplomacy (rather than a coercive one). Senegal acts on setting on the agenda themes such as peace, development or a better representation of Africa in international forums (security council, G20) to grow its influence. Senegalese authorities insist on their mediation capacities and their own institutional characteristics related to Senegal's civil government since independence (without any successful military coup) and on Senegal's political alternance as it exists since 2000¹⁰⁰. Senegalese presidency of the OAU between February 2022 and February 2023 fits with these characteristics.

Since 1964 Senegalese foreign policy has taken multiple forms and hasn't been decided solely in the presidential palace. These characteristics are too little considered by approaches in terms of extraversion or of regime survival, which tend to homogenize decision-making mechanisms. Besides, following the realist theory of IR, they grasp foreign policies as seeking superior interests of states (no longer defined in terms of power maximization but in terms of capture of an exogenous rent). These approaches don't mobilize in their demonstration how African diplomats are trained nor their individual trajectory more generally.

In other cases, the theory of extraversion is limited in the explications it brings, for instance with the creation of African extraordinary chambers to judge Hissène Habré, Chad former ruler. Similarly, the theory of extraversion works only little to understand the Senegalese intervention supporting Adama Barrow against the Gambian ruler Yahya Jammeh in December 2016¹⁰¹.

¹⁰⁰ M. Bodian, C. Lena Kelly, "Senegalese Foreign Policy: Leadership Through Soft Power from Senghor to Sall", in Warner, Shaw (ed.), *African foreign policies in international institutions* (New York, NY: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2017), p327

¹⁰¹ Barka Bâ et Vincent Foucher, « Une Agencéité Forte: L'État Sénégalais Face à La Crise Gambienne de 2016-2017 », *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines*, 5 avril 2021, 141-160, p148

Interestingly, Senegalese foreign policy is often framed in terms of concentric circles (this is not a Senegalese specificity, but it was formulated as such by Senghor), which contradicts approaches formulated in terms of extraversion. As a matter of fact, the most important circle in Senegalese foreign policy according to the theory is not about the foreign powers who provide Senegal with a rent. This contradicts the idea of a stance by Senegal in terms of foreign policy which would consist in putting itself in situation of dependency towards foreign funders.

Similarly, Senegalese involvement in peacekeeping operations is regularly highlighted and qualified as an extraversion practice. Senegal is said to use Blue Helmets as a tool to get fundings from the UN. Once again, this observation is not empirically wrong, but it only partially answers the question of Senegalese involvement in peacekeeping. A culturalist reading could argue that “teranga” and “gan” in wolof mean “well-being” and “welcome” or “guest” shape Senegal’s inspirations in maintaining a regional stability. Interviews with diplomats support this argument.

The last model that we explore in this chapter is the omnipotent African executive, coined in a recent work about African IR¹⁰². In this work, the authors claim too that they contribute to the banalization of the study of African foreign policies by considering them “along broadly similar logics as do other non-African states”¹⁰³.

The omnipotent African executive model comes from Jackson and Rosberg’s theories of personal rule. Jackson and Rosberg elaborated the concept along the 1970s and 1980s, not only to describe African case studies, as they consider that the theory is a lot inspired by Machiavel’s *The Prince*. To Jason Warner, the model of personal rule has been massively applied to describe postcolonial politics in Africa. It refers to the centralization of power around individuals such as

¹⁰² Warner, Shaw (ed.), *African foreign policies in international institutions*, p2

¹⁰³ Warner, Shaw (ed.), foreword

Mobutu, Bokassa, Sami Abacha, Téodoro Obiang, Mugabe, Bongo, Isaias Afiwerki or Yahya Jammeh¹⁰⁴. But since the time of these rulers, African foreign policies have become more complex, with specialized administrations less and less depending on the presidential palace.

Until now, African foreign policies have been mostly studied as tools serving domestic politics with regard to maintaining the regime and to lower its unpopularity. Space of production of international politics such as international organizations are thus framed as mechanisms of regime protection, hence the labeling of OAU-like organizations of “dictators club” that only protect principles of non-interference and non-intervention. Jackson and Rosberg for instance write: “*the OAU is less an ‘organization’ with its own agents, agencies, and resources than it is an ‘association’ with its own rules: a club of statesmen who are obligated to subscribe to a small number of rules and practices of regional conduct, and to which every state [...] belongs*”¹⁰⁵.

New approaches in the study of African foreign policies put forwards the “decentered inputs”, i.e. the plurality of sources of decision making. To Tim Shaw and Jason Warner, “*African foreign policies in the twenty first century are more rightly characterized by a proliferation of inputs [...] which, when combined with the still unconsolidated nature of some states, render the logics and expectations of African policymakers to be underwritten by diverse objectives and varied inputs, and thus to be non-monolithic in character*”¹⁰⁶. With the complexification of modes of decision making when it comes to foreign policies, we need to pay attention to ministerial bureaucracies, universities, medias, the military and other institutions beyond the presidential office.

¹⁰⁴ J. Warner, Chapter 1 “Introduction: African Foreign Policies and International Organizations: The Views from the Twenty-First Century”, in Warner, Shaw (ed.), *African foreign policies in international institutions*, p3

¹⁰⁵ Jackson et Rosberg, « Why Africa’s Weak States Persist », p19.

¹⁰⁶ J. Warner, Chapter 1 “Introduction: African Foreign Policies and International Organizations: The Views from the Twenty-First Century”, in Warner, Shaw (ed.), pp6-7.

By insisting on the invention of Africa as an irreducible other and on the epistemic erasing that it implies, we set the bases for a new reading of internationalist works on Africa as they have been produced since the 1960s. The point here is not to seek an “Africaness” that would be pure of any foreign influence. African scientific productions, like elsewhere in the world, are in any case as hybrid as are their authors. Normative changes are not necessarily importations or the result of externally driven migrations.

This first chapter aimed at stretching our epistemological criteria, through the focus on an academic and intellectual legacy that precedes us. To acknowledge it and its provincial or situated characteristic may seem anecdotal, but we insist on this step here as it contributes to making us more sensitive and open to amend the epistemological structure of our work.

Chapter 2: “Invisible to whom?”: to banalize Black and African approaches in International Relations

“Why should I be forced to play chess with people who do not seem to know the rules of the game?”¹⁰⁷

From the questions raised in the first chapter, we can now bring the discussion further in terms of critical reflexivity, based on a clearer understanding of where scholars stand in their work. These questions also work for our own research. “Invisible to whom?” asked Toni Morrison about Ralph Ellison’s *Invisible man*, assuming that the title of the book – a major piece of the Harlem Renaissance – still took the dominant point of view : Ellison’s invisible man is more invisible to White people than to Black people.

¹⁰⁷ V. Y. Mudimbé, *The Idea of Africa*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994, Preface, pXIV

The question raised by Morrison is relevant to our work: to acknowledge the marginalization of Africa and of Black experiences as we did so far amounts to again situate ourselves in the North and thus to limit the decentering of our perspective. The content changes, but there is no decentering in the literal sense because the content is still expressed from the center. How to go beyond this situation?

Academic works exist at the university Cheikh Anta Diop in Dakar about IR, others are published in the Council for Development of Research in Social Science in Africa (CODESRIA) a few blocks further. They form a substantive Senegalese scientific corpus on the themes that interest us here. They are not invisible if we situate ourselves in Dakar and we take a look at them from the UCAD documentation room or from the CODESRIA.

It must be underlined that works that mention African productions also exist in mainstream journals, which encourages us to nuance the aforementioned process of invisibilization. However, these works tend to consider African productions as primary sources and they are driven by a mission of mapping them, without substantially engaging with them. To build on Hountondji's words, "*that makes a huge difference. Ethnoscience does not ask any question about the truth of local knowledge systems. It just describes them and leaves them as they are*"¹⁰⁸. This blind spot encourages us here to contribute to consider African approaches as secondary sources with which to engage into a scientific debate.

¹⁰⁸ Paulin Hountondji, "Knowledge as a Development issue", Chapter 44 dans Kwasi Wiredu et al., éd., *A companion to African philosophy*, Blackwell companions to philosophy 28 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2004), p535

2.1 Multiple libraries: to banalize African scientific productions in IR

Different phases in the history of research activities in Africa have been documented in the last decades with works by the CODESRIA¹⁰⁹, and contemporary scientific works in IR are studied as well in francophone literature.

Producing knowledge “from Africa” can be nonsensical, as authors and ideas navigate freely and are hybrid objects. They are never purely and exclusively from one geographical place. Academic conditions are of course not the same in Dakar and in New York, but professors in Dakar yesterday are now in New York and vice-versa. All of them write in American and African journals, which makes it impossible to define clear-cut categories. In IR generally speaking, similar questions arise when it comes to national theoretical schools: for instance the English school of IR is led by Hedley Bull, an Australian scholar¹¹⁰. Another problem stands out: when we use “Africa” as a concept larger than a geographical term, this gives a new sense to what we mean by “African scientific production”. We shouldn’t exclusively pay attention to where knowledge is produced to determine how African a scientific production is.

On top of that, to sum up any knowledge to its “African” quality can lead to deny the uniqueness of the works that are produced and to fall again into the trap of ethnophilosophy that considers African knowledge systems as collective ones¹¹¹. Paulin Hountondji regularly points out the low visibility of African discourses on Africa from Africa¹¹². He and others regret that it is not

¹⁰⁹ Mahmood Mamdani et Mamadou Diouf, éd., *Academic freedom in Africa*, Codesria book series (Dakar, Senegal : Oxford: Codesria ; Distributors, ABC, 1994)

¹¹⁰ See among many others Barry Buzan, « The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR », *Review of International Studies* 27, n° 3 (2001): 471-88

¹¹¹ Mudimbé, *The idea of Africa*, p198

¹¹² Paulin J. Hountondji, « Knowledge of Africa, Knowledge by Africans: Two Perspectives on African Studies* », *RCCS Annual Review*, n° 1, 2009

what ideas that matter, but *whose* ideas¹¹³. Numerous solutions exist to limit this asymmetrical situation. Exhuming little known African works is not justified exclusively by their Africanness, but by what they tell about their modes of production¹¹⁴.

An African knowledge is sometimes defined as answering an African problem¹¹⁵. Other scholars consider African knowledge as part of a process of African invention of Africa without essentializing the continent¹¹⁶. The first definition refers to an obstacle to decentering the discipline of IR that we referred to earlier, with the difficulty for Western scholars to seriously consider concepts anchored in other contexts. Power relations actually continue to determine how certain themes are unilaterally imposed in the scientific discussion, even when it comes to scientific works about decentering IR¹¹⁷.

To define African scientific productions implies to pay attention to the conditions under which they are produced. To Hountondji, African conditions of production are not European conditions of production, although scholars are just as competent in both cases. To Hountondji, it is anachronistic to talk of Africa as being theoretically empty, as institutions specialized on knowledge production now flourish on the continent. But he adds that this variation in numbers doesn't change power relations between North and South in terms of knowledge production¹¹⁸. To Hountondji, an answer to that is to scientifically recenter Africa, i.e. not simply build categories of African knowledge but also scientifically discuss them.

¹¹³ Building on Acharya, *Rethinking power, institutions and ideas in world politics*, p12

¹¹⁴ Catherine A. Odora Hoppers, éd., *Indigenous knowledge and the integration of knowledge systems: towards a philosophy of articulation* (Claremont, South Africa: New Africa Books, 2002), pvii

¹¹⁵ Maria Grosz-Ngaté, « Knowledge and Power: Perspectives on the Production and Decolonization of African/Ist Knowledges », *African Studies Review* 63, n° 4 (décembre 2020): 689-718, p697

¹¹⁶ Felwine Sarr, *Afrotopia* (Paris: Philippe Rey, 2016)

¹¹⁷ This is what Bilgin argues in Bilgin, « The 'Western-Centrism' of Security Studies », p618

¹¹⁸ Odora Hoppers, *Indigenous knowledge and the integration of knowledge systems*, p24

Mahmood Mamdani and Mamadou Diouf wrote in 1994 for the CODESRIA an overview of the situation of academic liberties. They observe how higher education systems changed in Africa since independence, which is quantifiable by the number of universities created (an argument that Hountondji opposes, considering that research produced in universities can be extraverted: there are many universities in African, but only little African universities). In a context of Africanization of managers and executive positions, universities in Africa are according to Mamdani and Diouf oriented towards development studies with the support of the state¹¹⁹. This state intervention profoundly shaped the identity of professors in Africa and it was reinforced by the contraction of resources allocated to universities during the 1980s. At the time, authors such as Ali Mazrui, Claude Ake and Joseph Ki-Zerbo think about scientific production in Africa. To Mazrui, “*Western liberalism [...] champions pluralism ideologically but destroys diversity in practice, for capital creates cultural uniformity*”¹²⁰.

Mamadou Diouf also pays attention to the situation of intellectuals in Senegal. To him, after independence, intellectuals in Senegal take a messianic role of a “*modern consciousness in traditional societies*”¹²¹. He argues that the status of intellectual is not as much given by society as it is the result of individual statement by people with a university degree and capable of expressing themselves in French.

Diouf identifies regularities in the figure of the intellectual in Senegal: it is a social position that is the result of the region’s social history (for instance to Bathily, griots and blacksmiths as well as clerics had key positions in the Sudanese empires)¹²². Another long-term characteristic that

¹¹⁹ Mamdani et Diouf, *Academic freedom in Africa*

¹²⁰ Mamdani et Diouf, p8

¹²¹ Mamadou Diouf, “Intellectuals and the State in Senegal: the Search for a Paradigm”, Chapter 12 in Mahmood Mamdani et Mamadou Diouf, éd., *Academic freedom in Africa*, Codesria book series (Dakar, Senegal : Oxford: Codesria ; Distributors, ABC, 1994).

¹²² See as well Lamin O. Sanneh, *Beyond jihad: the pacifist tradition in West African Islam* (New York, N.Y: Oxford University Press, 2016)

Diouf identifies is how close these figures are to the central state, be it in terms of social position but also in terms of expertise production (in the political, economic and juridical fields). Proximity with central power doesn't radically change with colonization as colonial administrations still rest on intellectuals in West Africa to discipline populations.

The content of the category, however, changes during the 20th century with a new elite trained in the colonial system (with institutions such as William Ponty). While Mbembe sees here the forming of two elite groups (a religious and a European), Diouf considers them as one group with some internal nuances. Diouf goes on opposing the theory of an African elite alienated from its society because of colonial authorities and he shows that counterstrategies were implemented by the elite of the Four Communes to force the colonial administration to adapt. The result of the colonization era has rather been to neutralize organic intellectuals as they existed before by integrating them depending on their own needs¹²³. These figures became intermediaries between colonial administration and colonized populations.

The experience of colonization produced according to Diouf three models that dominate the postcolonial intellectual environment in Senegal. All three are part of processes of legitimacy building during the colonial era: Senghor's negritude, Pathé Diagne's neopharaonism, and the Marxist model. To Senghor and Pathé Diagne, African intellectuals have a role in revealing African realities. But to Diouf, after independence the state in Senegal dominates rather than is at the service of its people, and as a result popular culture is excluded from politics¹²⁴.

A last generation of scholars grows during the 1980s, Abdou Diouf being its most prominent figure. Mamadou Diouf considers that this "corporatist" generation is directed towards

¹²³ See in particular Jean Copans, *Les Marabouts de l'arachide: la confrérie mouride et les paysans du Sénégal* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1989)

¹²⁴ Mamadou Diouf, "Intellectuals and the State in Senegal: the Search for a Paradigm", Chapter 12 in Mamdani et Diouf, *Academic freedom in Africa*.

technical and managerial responsibilities. More important, it fully accepts the heritage of Islam and is well spread among Senegalese society by being fluid in French, Arab and Wolof.

It is thus possible to identify a category of intellectuals in the history of Senegal well before colonization. The history of this social category is not only made of ruptures, contrary to what is often argued. Intellectual elites from the Senegambian area profit from their environment and shape it when they can. They also form a heterogenous category with its own power relations and gradual changes.

In their work on the gradual coming of age of IR as a discipline, Acharya and Buzan find in Islamic works and pan-African discussions the origins of an African thinking about IR, before that the discipline was institutionalized on the continent. Such institutionalization didn't take place before independence according to Acharya and Buzan¹²⁵.

In Africa, Ali Mazrui is a major figure in the formation of IR as a discipline¹²⁶. During the 1960s, the Kenyan author is one of the prominent figures to write in journals like *World Politics* and *International Organization*. His academic career starts at Makerere University in Uganda, where he publishes numerous books. He then gets a position at the University of Michigan where he stays while teaching at the University of Jos, Nigeria.

During the 1970s in Central Africa new institutions that produce knowledge in IR are created, with the Institut des Relations Internationales du Cameroun (IRIC) in 1971 for instance and the Institut Africain des Etudes Stratégiques (IAES) in Gabon created in 1982¹²⁷.

¹²⁵ Acharya et Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations*, pp175-177

¹²⁶ Ibid, p107

¹²⁷ Léon Koungou, « L'Afrique Centrale, Congo, Gabon, République Centrafricaine et Tchad », Chapitre 3 dans Thierry Balzacq et Frédéric Ramel, *Traité de relations internationales* (Paris: Sciences po, les presses, 2013), p74

After the Cold War, Acharya and Buzan consider that IR in Africa is still a weak discipline with no resources nor legibility when it comes to forming an “African school” of IR. Acharya and Buzan show that at this time African works of IR are above all meant to assert African stance. As a consequence, African literature of IR is mostly organized around the agency of the continent and around African solutions to African problems.

In South Africa, IR becomes more and more institutionalized after apartheid and decades of diplomatic isolation¹²⁸. Failing to do research, pedagogy is at least institutionalized in Central Africa with trainings in IR created during the 1990s¹²⁹. In research centers, according to Jean-Emmanuel Pondi, the head of the international politics department of the IRIC, African perspectives on IR represent 8.5% of students’ research between 1972 and 1992, which makes it the third most studied theme¹³⁰.

To Léon Koungou the discipline of IR in Africa is perceived as elitist (related to diplomacy, higher education and research and international officers) and takes place in a context of empowerment of political science in universities in Africa¹³¹. This last point is all the more true in Senegal that a political science department was created in March 2021. The first context seems more contestable however, especially when it comes to international officers, because international organizations (especially related to the UN) have a very strong presence in African countries. In that regard, positions of international officers are more banal than in European contexts where international interventions are less frequent.

¹²⁸ Smith, « International Relations in South Africa »

¹²⁹ Léon Koungou, « L'Afrique Centrale, Congo, Gabon, République Centrafricaine et Tchad », Chapitre 3 dans Balzacq et Ramel, *Traité de relations internationales*, p75

¹³⁰ Ibid

¹³¹ Ibid, p72

A recurring argument about the limits of African works is the proximity of African authors with African political authorities. This supposedly would nullify the scholar's neutrality by transforming him into the Prince's adviser with biased conclusions. This argument is problematic first because it applies to criteria elaborated for Western systems of higher education throughout hundreds of years of complex relations between universities and central power¹³². In Senegal, as we have explained, the intellectual history is not the same. Besides, research conditions differ: universities have lower resources and are thus less able to maintain the autonomy of scholars.

Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni is one such figure, he wrote in 1977 about the African diplomatic international system¹³³. He proposes an original and quantitative theory of the diplomacy of African states from 1960 to 1970. Kontchou Kouomegni insists on the role of ideas in African diplomacies, and the portrait he gives of them is much less like a negative mirror of Western diplomacies (according to him, the Casablanca group is much more diplomatically active than is the Monrovia group, and both are hermetically closed to each other). Kontchou Kouomegni's analysis seriously considers how African states behave on the international scale and he compares them with each other. He thus gets a precise and individualized view of several African states rather than a general analysis of the continent.

He also questions the time dimension of IO in Africa, mentioning disappearing IOs during the 1960s (there are numerous of them, as they were removed after the birth of the OAU). In 1977 already he opened his book by inscribing Africa into the 20th century, considering that a major event of the century that is often silenced is the coming of the Third World. This reminds us of Achille Mbembe's own opening of *Critic of Black Reason* published well later: "*I envision this*

¹³² In France for instance, the Sorbonne university was created in 1253

¹³³ Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, *Le système diplomatique africain: bilan et tendances de la première décennie* (Paris: A. Pédone, 1977)

*book as a river with many tributaries, since history and all things flow towards us now. Europe is no longer the center of gravity of the world. This is the significant event, the fundamental experience, of our era*¹³⁴.

To our knowledge, Kontchou Kouomegni's book doesn't appear in any work about African IR at the time. Even worse, although the book is edited by a French publisher, it was necessary for us to go to the IFAN in Dakar to encounter it and then consult it. Most of all, the author insists on how "extraverted" African diplomacies are between 1960 and 1970, because of the asymmetrical relation between African diplomatic representations outside of Africa and non-African diplomatic representations in the continent (in particular with regard to European countries, much less represented in Africa than African states are represented in Europe). Here Kontchou Kouomegni has a literal use of the concept of extraversion, the concept is not yet about a voluntary dependency. But to our knowledge the book is never mentioned by works mobilizing the theory of extraversion after Bayart, nor by Bayart himself.

Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni has indeed been the Prince's advisor, but only from the 1980s. Before that, he got a PhD in political science at Sorbonne University as well the French aggregation in political science in 1981. His book that we discussed earlier was published in 1977, which makes him a very normal academic figure in the French and Cameroonian setting at the time. His invisibility is preoccupying because Kontchou Kouomegni was part of a discussion and tried to engage a dialogue with American as well as French works, to introduce new concepts such as "diplomatic pole" or "diplomatic orientation".

¹³⁴ Achille Mbembe et Laurent Dubois, *Critique of Black Reason*, A John Hope Franklin Center Book (Durham London: Duke University Press, 2017). p1

Are African scientific productions specific in IR? If diplomatic practices are the result of historical trajectories, how universal are theories? What are the bases of African productions in IR? Academic journals aim at relaying African knowledge in IR and social science. This is what the journal *African Identities* does for instance. It was born in 2003 to promote Africa-based knowledge and postcolonial analytical frames¹³⁵. More than half of the contributions of the journal comes from African universities. Rather than focusing on the marginalization of Africa in IR, we focus here on what actually exists¹³⁶.

On top of the few African works that stand out and that we identified earlier, other works are produced in Africa and in particular in Senegal about IR, in the form of master's thesis and doctoral dissertations, which are no accessible without a physical stay at the university's library. Other works also exist and are more difficult to find, and it sometimes take chance to have a look at them¹³⁷.

These works nourish an academic reflection on IR in Senegal and form an African literature on the theme. In Senegal, IR analyses take several shapes. One of the most canonical texts is probably Doudou Thiam's *La politique étrangère des États africains* (The foreign policy of African states) published in 1963¹³⁸ by the French University Press. At the time of the publication, Doudou Thiam is the Senegalese minister of foreign affairs.

In this work Thiam reflects on general trends in African foreign policies after independences. Although he observes the strong meddling of non-African powers in Africa, he

¹³⁵ Guillaume Beaud, « Rendre compte des tensions et hégémonies épistémiques qui sous-tendent la production de savoirs sur l'Afrique: Une étude empirique de la revue African Identities (2003-2018) », *Revue d'anthropologie des connaissances* 15, n° 1 (1 mars 2021), pp4-5

¹³⁶ Acharya, *Rethinking power, institutions and ideas in world politics*, p45

¹³⁷ For instance the proceedings of the first meeting of Africanists in Africa published in 1964, that we were lucky to discover by browsing the IFAN archives without looking for it in particular.

¹³⁸ Doudou Thiam, *La politique étrangère des États africains, ses fondements idéologiques, sa réalité présente, ses perspectives d'avenir* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1963)

doesn't conclude to a voluntary dependency nor a passivity of African diplomacies, on the contrary arguing that it shows how integrated Africa is to the rest of the world and to contemporary history. This is a first major difference that can be observed compared to works of the aforementioned orthodox trend. Thiam continues with the familiarity between African and Asian states due to the shared experience of decolonization, which to him explains the forming of a common UN group.

Thiam also insists upon the role of ideas in decisions of foreign policy of new African states, and especially ideas related to Pan-Africanism. To him pan-African ideas are a form of "macro-nationalism" that gains weight during the 1960s. Thiam merges the history of Pan-Africanism with the quest for an African personality. By doing so, he takes distance both with communism and with imperialism. This theoretically supports Senegal's position in the non-aligned movement (which is different from neutrality) that continues until today.

Thiam considers that ideas trump interests and opportunism in African foreign policies. Although he is a major decisionmaker in foreign policies, his analysis is not heard in other political science works at the time. Not only these works ignore the role of non-presidential figures in African foreign policies, but they also wait decades before paying attention to their analyses. In a 1983 issue of the *African Studies Review*, Coleman and Halisi propose a quantitative analysis of the different works produced in American political science about Africa: ideas represent 5,6% of the corpus, way behind nationalism, party politics, ethnicity and military interventions.

African approaches in general and Senegalese approaches in particular are extremely diverse when it comes to analyze IR. These are indeed "plural libraries", with works whose genealogy rests on their own context of production. Just like the colonial library, African libraries

have objects that “*are not themes that are spontaneously and passively open research curiosity*”¹³⁹. Building on Foucault, the aspiration of this work is not merely to make scientific progress but rather to accompany a transition towards another “order of knowledge” (“*ordre de connaissances*”). We note (rather than we reveal) the existence of a flourishing and yet invisible literature for Western works: “*it is not a thousand year old inattentiveness that has suddenly been dissipated, but a new field of visibility that has been constituted*”¹⁴⁰.

2.2 A necessary dialogue between IR and African studies

African studies are quite an important discipline in the US academia and provide the place for a fertile cross-disciplinary discussion in social sciences. This is for instance the case of the MESAAS department at the university of Columbia (Middle Eastern, South Asian and African Studies), that gathers among the most prominent scholars of African studies in the world (Mahmood Mamdani for political science, Mamadou Diouf for history, Souleymane Bachir Diagne for philosophy) and has a language department.

This thesis tries to occupy a space that reformulates internationalist stances with a large theoretical integration not only of African works but of African studies as well. With that regard, Amy Niang shows for instance how important it is that Africans write conventional IR to demonstrate that they are not passive in tackling international events¹⁴¹.

Let’s mobilize our practical knowledge based on our stay at Columbia’s departments of political science and African studies to elaborate a fictional dialogue (inspired from discussions during the stay) between students of each department. This would make it easier to identify

¹³⁹ Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses: une archéologie des sciences humaines*, Collection tel 166 (Paris: Gallimard, 2014), p81

¹⁴⁰ Foucault., p139

¹⁴¹ Niang, « The Imperative of African Perspectives on International Relations (IR) », p458

differences between the two departments and potential bridges. The starting point of the conversation is the potential generalization of questions related to where and how Africa stands in the world. This question is justified as a starting point as it is a stumbling block between the two disciplines, particularly at Columbia university.

African studies student: Africa has for a long time been well integrated into processes of globalization, and is more often than not an engine of these processes. Black bodies provided the energy for industrialization during the 17th century with plantations in the Black Atlantic. Before that, West-African gold favored the extraordinary growth of European and then Atlantic imperial powers like Spain and Portugal. Africa has never been a passive actor in this, people on the continent and in the diaspora always determined how foreign actors would interact with them. But these interactions never happened twice the same way. By paying attention to emic manifestations of what they study, scholars must acknowledge this diversity.

IR student: it is fair enough to say that some interactions have structural outcomes, in norm circulations as well as institutions. As a result, it triggers a graft of institutions like the state, that “take local colors” varying on local historicities. This raises two questions: can the graft not succeed? And what are the common denominators of the grafts that could be generalized and help to formulate mechanisms? As for the first question, some authors consider that “imported” states function according to logics that are still different from the rest of society which leads to mismatch, especially in non-Western settings. On the contrary, to talk about a dysfunctional state is nonsensical according to the theory of the graft, the point being to understand how politics actually takes place, not to compare it normatively with an ideal-type. As to the second question, the extraversion theory is central to the study of non-Western states and in particular African states.

AS student: the theory of extraversion indeed brought research forward as it was one of the first attempts to generalize while taking African agency seriously in processes of globalization. But in some cases such as slavery or colonization, creativity never ceased to exist, yet was this the equivalent of defining one's own destiny? Talal Asad once clearly raised the question: "*even the inmates of the concentration camp are able, in this sense, to live by their own cultural logic [...]. But one may be forgiven for doubting that they are therefore 'making their own history'*"¹⁴². Besides, how Africa participates in processes of globalization varies depending on places and time. When Mali's Mansa Mula goes to Egypt, he aims at confirming the global range of the empire in 1324. In the 16th century, when Portuguese relations with the kingdom of Kongo became difficult, Kongolesse rulers directly reached the Holy See to help. Do these practices still shape contemporary African politics? Political scientists tend to evacuate too quickly the questions of continuity and breaks with the colonial era. Concentrating on everyday practices such as corruption as they take place today runs the risk of decontextualizing them and to end up considering them as imperfect or uncomplete.

IR student: we circle back to the question of the balance between generalization and how exceptional Africa is in IR. Obviously the extraversion theory works in some cases but less in others, slavery and colonization included.

AS student: at the end of the day, can't we say that the debate is less about what empirically exists and more about putting events into some sort of narrative? I think for instance about Jeffrey Herbst's work published in 2000, *States and Power in Africa*, where he coined a spatial theory of

¹⁴² Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1993, quoted in Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and subject: contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism*, New paperback edition, Princeton studies in culture/power/history (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2018), p9.

power¹⁴³. When I read his work, I wonder whether it is more about theories of power in general as they are discussed in political science than it is about actual power competition in Africa. For instance I am dazzled by how close to a negative mirror of Tilly is Herbst's work: while Tilly insists on the control of land Herbst says that what matters in Africa is the control of people¹⁴⁴. My question is: would Herbst work have been different if Tilly hadn't produced before him his work about the forming of state power in Western Europe? Scientific knowledge is of course cumulative, but in that case, it is more about forms of power competition than about the historicity of these forms of competition, isn't it?

IR student: to some extent you are right, but it can also be argued that such a setting makes the discussion between scientists easier. There is indeed a process of invention that leads to an abstraction that can be both heuristic and empirically strong. This is also why political science is not only a discipline based exclusively on area studies. While an Africanist scholar is interested in everything a philosopher, a historian or a musicologist can say about Africa, a political scientist is more interested in, say, democracy, be it about Brazil, Mozambique or Germany. Besides, from my perspective, African studies are not free from these abstracting narratives neither. For instance, it is remarkable how mechanisms of demonstration vary only little from one work to the other. At the end of the day, can we situate the distinction between an analytical political science and hermeneutical African studies? Both IR and African studies mobilize intertextuality in any case: works answer each other, they never exclusively rest on empirical findings.

AS student: some of the questions we raise are very close to each other. For instance, many Africanist scholars interrogate the labeling of Sudanese regimes during the Middle-age in West

¹⁴³ Herbst, *States and power in Africa*, p6

¹⁴⁴ Charles Tilly et Denis A Canal, *Contrainte et capital dans la formation de l'Europe: 990-1990* (Paris: Aubier, 1992), pp14-16

Africa. The point is not to question their status as a state, but their nature: were they kingdoms? Empires? By saying that, I become more aware of a critic that is often formulated against African studies by political scientists: political scientists seek to categorize what they study and end up reifying and fixing situations. Scholars in African studies on the contrary prefer arguing that social phenomena are always moving, in construction and never ending. African studies indeed pay attention to relationships, which are relegated to the backscene in political science. This can be a starting point to explain the gap between the two disciplines.

IR student: that's right, but let's not forget that interpretative and qualitative approaches exist too in IR and that they are more and more numerous when it comes to study African contexts. Moreover, these works refine quantitative demonstrations. This is true to migration studies¹⁴⁵ as well as conflict studies¹⁴⁶, two major themes in the study of IR. It is always a good surprise to read texts in political science that engage with African studies, although political studies based on qualitative approaches also have a restrictive understanding of the African studies literature and mostly refer to works directly related to their theme strictly speaking. But African studies have a much longer range than their original theme, they interact with a much larger set of texts with musicologists, historians and other human science specialists. We reach here a limit of crossdisciplinarity: how to participate to several discussions at the same time?

AS student: I would even go further saying that authors in African studies tend to selectively quote texts in political science when they fit with the image they want to give of the discipline. We should take note of it as it shouldn't stop scholars who want to navigate from a discipline to the other. Authors who mention their peers in other disciplines get closer to each other

¹⁴⁵ Liisa H. Malkki, *Purity and exile: violence, memory, and national cosmology among Hutu refugees in Tanzania* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995)

¹⁴⁶ Scott Straus, *The order of genocide: race, power, and war in Rwanda* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, Repr. (New York: Columbia Univ. Pr, 1997)

but also take an academic risk. This should be recalled before criticizing their lack of integration in larger academic discussions. Scientific research is a process that can't be summed up to publishing an article or a book: when we take a look at the acknowledgement part of these works, it quickly becomes clear that authors make the effort of discussing with members of other disciplines, although it isn't explicitly stated in footnotes or in the core of the argument. Crossdisciplinary discussion already exists, but it is the result of individual initiatives.

The dialogue we materialized contributes to highlight ways for each discipline to stick with each other and to imagine topics where discussion would be possible. Even though it risks circling on itself or reaching dead-ends, this dialogue concretely displays what is put into question when it comes to making IR and African studies discuss.

This is how we close the second chapter of the thesis that started with the banalization of African texts in IR. This goes through a better grip by IR of African issues. African studies contribute to make scholars of other social sciences aware of African based scientific works. By doing so it limits the risks that these works are minimized in other scientific disciplines. African works on international issues are not recent, but their accessibility in Western universities is not self-evident, it implies a conscious and constant effort by authors interested in decentering IR.

Questioning what happens in African contexts can't go without consulting African-based works on these issues. If a topic is pertinent, then it has been studied by concerned societies. In the context of IR, these works teach us about the role of ideas that prevail over materialist interests and constraints. Furthermore, Africa is much less presented as a failure for international society or as a negative mirror of Western societies. Epistemic reappropriation through scientific production is a mode of self-writing that participates in the forming of a political subjectivity.

Chapter 3: Political subjectivity as what is at stake in epistemic appropriation

How much of an epistemic break did triangular trade and colonization provoke? To Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, colonization did bring a series of "dismembering" on Africa: the first one is the brutal taking of millions of Africans during the Atlantic trade. The second one is the territorial fragmenting as it is symbolized by the Berlin conference. Such trends went along a process of expropriation, of "de-africanization" . Colonial conquest went beyond the territorial conquest in some instances as it attacked collective memories as well, for instance by changing the name of certain places (now related to European figures): colonial expansion was not only territorial, it was also semantic . Concomitantly, decolonization can't only be territorial.

3.1 Appropriation as essential to Pan-Africanism

Appropriation is often presented as a reaction to a prior expropriation. In that case, we argue that appropriation is part of a process of forming a political subjectivity, that implies in some occasion invitations to "return to tradition". Because this expression is ambiguous (traditions are invented¹⁴⁷, and ethnicity has for a long time been instrumental in governing societies¹⁴⁸) some anticolonial authors prefer taking distance with it¹⁴⁹. Contemporary African authors are cautious as well, especially after episodes of manipulation of authenticity as a source of political legitimacy, for instance with Mobutu. Appropriation is not simply about having an instrumental use of identity, it is part of a long and sometimes contradictory process of forming a political subjectivity, i.e. the coming to being of political subjects. By referring to centuries old and global experiences,

¹⁴⁷ E. J Hobsbawm et T. O Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*, 2012

¹⁴⁸ Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Centre national de la recherche scientifique (France), et Centre de recherches africaines, éd., *Les ethnies ont une histoire* (Paris: Karthala, 2003), see as well Claude Hélène Perrot et François-Xavier Fauvelle-Aymar, éd., *Le retour des rois: les autorités traditionnelles et l'Etat en Afrique contemporaine*, Collection Hommes et sociétés (Colloque international Rois et chefs dans les Etats africains, Paris: Karthala, 2003).

¹⁴⁹ See in particular Fanon et al., *Les damnés de la terre*, p213

appropriation is much more a process than it is a mechanism. This is one of the key differences between appropriation and transfer, as appropriation is neither triggered nor clearly delimited.

With this we can go further in our definition of appropriation. We defined it in our introduction as “a contradictory and multifaceted process of (re)construction whose goal is thought of in relation to the receiving context rather than from where it is enunciated, in the case both would differ”. This “(re)construction” doesn’t necessarily imply a geographic displacement, which is a major difference between our work and other works about norm circulation¹⁵⁰: appropriation can be a reaction to an expropriation, in that case there is no geographic displacement. From another point of view, appropriation is also a form of expropriation. For instance, appropriation of knowledge during processes of colonization can be categorized as such. In other words, it is not far from what Hartmut Rosa calls “*a relation without a relation*”¹⁵¹, meaning that it doesn’t involve a transformation of its actors. On the contrary, it reifies her.

The appropriation of knowledge as proposed by Ngugi Wa Thiong’o and Paulin Hountondji (which of course is different from appropriation of knowledge during the processes of colonization) is closer to what we call an appropriation as restitution. In that case it is part of forming a political subjectivity and it has a reactionary aspect (this is why it is more often referred to as “reappropriation”). Last but not least, to insist on expropriation or restitution is a way not to oppose the two concepts, contrary to their qualification as positive or negative (which would reproduce the tradition of inventing Africa and Europe as their mutual negative mirrors).

¹⁵⁰ In particular Olivier de Sardan, *La revanche des contextes* et Amitav Acharya, *Constructing global order: agency and change in world politics* (Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

¹⁵¹ Rosa, *Rendre le monde indisponible*, p47

Political subjectivity is at the core of discussions about processes of appropriation-restitution, especially when it comes to African contexts. To articulate appropriation with restitution or with expropriation represents an explanatory move more than an analytical stance. Yet the two concepts allow to “*investigate aspects of reality that otherwise would have stayed ‘invisible’*” as Olivier de Sardan would say¹⁵². The difference between the two forms of appropriation makes comparisons easier and contributes to refine the distinction between appropriation and transfer.

Self-determination was partly appropriated in 1960 with the UNGA Resolution 1514, but the discussion is also older than that. Cultural productions of the 1930s after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia show well how appropriation is perceived as a first step towards political empowerment for colonized people, as it happens for instance in George Schuyler’s *Black Empire* published as a series in 1936.

More generally among the numerous definitions of Pan-Africanism, most do mention the role of emancipation (be it through continental unity, cohesiveness of Black people all around the world) and the need to right how belittle African populations have been throughout history. The restitutive characteristic of appropriation also appears in the expression “Africa to Africans” that punctuates the history of panafrikanism. The expression was made famous by Marcus Garvey but to Hakim Adi it was first used by Martin Robinson Delany (1812-1885), who was inspired by the expression “Ireland for the Irish” that existed during the 1850s¹⁵³. Similarly during the August 1893 summit in Chicago where Frederick Douglass and Alexander Crummel were present among others, the question of African subjectivity was raised.

¹⁵² Olivier de Sardan, *La revanche des contextes*, p162

¹⁵³ Adi, *Pan-Africanism*, p98

Appropriation has been taking place in Africa for a long time, as ideas and practices have known a constant circulation. Religious movements are interesting to look at in that regard, especially the circulation of Islam in West Africa. Colonial administrations distinguished Black Islam and Arab Islam and did their best to keep them separated, in order to make colonial domination easier. These approaches have since then been nuanced by scholars such as Cedric Robinson. More recently, Abdoulaye Sounaye recalled that “*in Islam, there is only what Man says and does*” (“il n’y a d’islam que ce qu’en disent les hommes et ce qu’ils en font”)¹⁵⁴. Sounaye agrees in that regard with Souleymane Bachir Diagne’s view that appropriation happens through discussion: to do philosophy in Islam is to discuss, as Islam exists through philosophical disputes between Muslims¹⁵⁵.

3.2 Appropriation as what is at stake in the formation of the postcolonial state

When it is articulated to the formation of postcolonial states, appropriation implies to pay more attention to ideas. Contemporary African political theory is filled with reflections about appropriation, and we build on them to refine our own definition of the concept.

Is there a specific formulation of political subjectivity in Africa compared to the rest of the world? To afropessimist authors, the quest for liberty is futile in a context of destruction of Black social life through slavery and colonization and the setting of a form of social death¹⁵⁶, of ontological death¹⁵⁷. The hopeless quest for liberty implies that liberty can’t be reached

¹⁵⁴ Sounaye, Diagne, et Pénel, *Islam et modernité*, p16

¹⁵⁵ Souleymane Bachir Diagne, *Comment philosophe en islam ?*, Cyclo (Paris: Panama, 2008); Sounaye, Diagne, et Pénel, *Islam et modernité*

¹⁵⁶ Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and social death: a comparative study: with a new preface*, First Harvard University Press paperback edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018)

¹⁵⁷ Frank B. Wilderson, *Red, white & black: cinema and the structure of U.S. antagonisms* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), p220

without a global revolution and a “destruction of the world”¹⁵⁸. How to think the construction of a postcolonial state from here?

Appropriation is useful here to push the discussion forward, especially from Fanon’s work and others that he inspired such as Ato Sekyi-Otu. Appropriation is mobilized in multiple ways within Fanon’s writings, but it usually refers to the need for anticolonial struggle to go along endogenous dynamics which are necessary to the formation of new subjectivities¹⁵⁹. Anticolonial writers such as Steve Biko consider appropriation as the very condition of liberation as it is a way to avoid reproducing new forms of domination afterward¹⁶⁰. We find here the roots of afropessimism on the continuity in considering Black bodies as disposable bodies.

To Fanon, appropriation refers to earning liberty rather than receiving it, as it needs to provide its own justification. Alternatively it would lead to the confiscation of the struggle and a “crisis of national consciousness”¹⁶¹. Ato Sekyi-Otu distinguishes “lived experience” through anticolonial struggle and “immediate knowledge”. This leads him to contrast the Africanization of the cadres as it empirically happens after African independences, and appropriation in a Fanonian sense¹⁶². To him, the revolutionary experience goes further than just immediate knowledge in the forming of a political subjectivity.

We explored so far how Africa has been constructed as a concept with a geographical but also a symbolic meaning, that carries representations. We demonstrated as well the influence of this construction on contemporary representations of Africa. This step is a necessary one to

¹⁵⁸ F. Wilderson III, “We’re Trying to Destroy the World’: Anti-Blackness & Police Violence after Ferguson”, Ill Will Editions, 2014

¹⁵⁹ Nigel C. Gibson, *Fanonian practices in South Africa: from Steve Biko to Abahlali baseMjondolo*, 1st ed (New York : Scotsville, South Africa: Palgrave Macmillan ; University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2011), p2

¹⁶⁰ Steve Biko, *I Write What I like: A Selection of His Writings*, 15. print. (Oxford: Heinemann, 1987).

¹⁶¹ Gibson, *Fanonian practices in South Africa*, p5

¹⁶² Ato Sekyi-Otu, *Fanon’s dialectic of experience* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), p47

encourage us to pay attention to non-orthodox corpuses in African international relations. Similarly, reflexivity helped us taking distance with mainstream IR approaches about Africa. More specifically, we twined the strand of the theory of negative sovereignty from the moment it was coined to today and we have taken notes of the limits of the omnipotent African executive model, of extraversion as well as of the model of state survival in understanding African IR.

When it comes to the definitional part of the thesis, in this first part we enhanced our definition of appropriation by showing how secondary the question of geographic displacement is (which allows us to look at appropriation in other situations than in norm transfers). On the other hand, we showed how important it is to look at history to understand appropriation as a process rather than as a mechanism. On top of that, we offered to distinguish appropriation-confiscation from appropriation-restitution, which helps us to understand the effects of appropriation-restitution in terms of forming a political subjectivity.

Part II. Africa is the horizon: political appropriation of African solutions

Be it applied to religion, economy, administration or security, the rhetoric of Africanization is part of “political usages of Africa”. This is an expression filled with contradictions due to the plurality of actors who mobilize it. The fourth chapter takes a look at the different uses of expressions related to the Africanization of security since the late 19th century. Although policies of Africanization seem to be instrumental and part of neo-patrimonial strategies, they have empirical effects that can be observed in terms of state formation and construction of political subjectivities. This is what we study in chapter 5 from a Senegalese perspective. How Senegalese authorities interact with their environment is also driven by material and non-material factors that sometimes bring in imaginaries about negritude, African socialism, but also pharaonism and Islam. This is what chapter 6 aims to highlight.

Chapter 4: An ambiguous appropriation: to bring “African solutions to African problems”

“Perhaps the most basic dialectic in Africa’s history since the Second World War has been that between the quest for continental autonomy and the pull of a continuing relationship with Europe”¹⁶³

4.1 Flexible discourses on African solutions

References to African solutions are numerous in academic writings but also in grey literature and political speeches, which shows the fluidity of the formula. African solutions to

¹⁶³ Ali Mazrui, *Africa’s International Relations: the Diplomacy of Dependency and Change*, London, Heinemann, 1977, p41

African problems can for instance become African solutions **for** African problems, but also African solution strategy. During the mid-20th century, the expression Try Africa First dominated in a larger context of Africanization of national militaries and public administrations in Africa. Because the issue of Africanizing the cadres of the military and administration is not easy to solve, numerous works and report were produced during the 1960s on this topic. Kenya, Ghana, and Uganda implement Africanization commissions for instance¹⁶⁴. On each case, the point is to claim self-determination for every layer of the public administration: Africanization is framed in terms of dignity, but it is also described as a never ending task¹⁶⁵.

Try Africa First is an efficient slogan as it is straightforward, just like Nkrumah's Africa must unite. Both expressions exist around the same period and Try Africa First is used a lot during the creation of the OAU. Try Africa First is also mobilized during the 1990 to support the ECOMOG intervention in West Africa, which shows the malleability of the expression¹⁶⁶.

While Try Africa First is tied to the creation of the OAU, the expression Africa for Africans is rather associated with the fifth pan-African conference, also known as the Manchester conference, that took place in 1945¹⁶⁷. At this time, W. E. B. Du Bois symbolically transferred the patronage of Pan-Africanism to Kwame Nkrumah. Marcus Garvey also mobilized the expression

¹⁶⁴ *Report of the select committee of the legislative council on the Africanization of the public service*, Gold Coast. Legislative Council. Select Committee on the Africanization of the Public Service; *Report of the Commissioners for Africanisation*, Entebbe, Uganda : Printed by the Govt. Printer, 1962 ; Africanization Commission, *Report of the Africanization of the public services of the East African Common Services Organization /* under the chairmanship of J. O. Udoji. [Nairobi?] : [East African Common Services Organization], [cover 1963]

¹⁶⁵ Fred G. Burke and Peter L. French, *Politics and processes of Africanization*, Bloomington : Comparative Administrative Group, American Society for Public Administration, 1966

¹⁶⁶ Amadu Sesay, "ECOWAS and the limits of peacemaking in West Africa", Chapter 6 in Victor Adetula, Cyril Obil, et Redie Bereketeab, *Regional Economic Communities and Peacebuilding in Africa: Lessons from ECOWAS and IGAD* (S.I.: Routledge, 2022), p83.

¹⁶⁷ Rita Abrahamsen, « Internationalists, Sovereignists, Nativists: Contending Visions of World Order in Pan-Africanism », *Review of International Studies* 46, no 1 (janvier 2020): 56-74, p63

in the early 20th century in his project of a Black Star Company, that aimed to bring back former slaves to African shores.

Africanization is the oldest expression of our corpus and the one whose malleability is the most important. Early in the 20th century it was mobilized in the US on racial issues, just like W. E. B. Du Bois did in a famous quote about the double consciousness of African-Americans in *The Souls of Black Folk*: “*The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife, -this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not **Africanize** America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face*”¹⁶⁸.

There is in Du Bois’ work a thread between Africanization and Pan-Africanism: Du Bois’ Pan-Africanization is about human dignity more than about the political liberation of Africa (which corresponds too to the Pan-Africanism of the first congresses in the early 20th century).

Africanization as a concept is then mobilized to define historical modes of appropriation by African societies of religious and cultural models especially coming from North Africa and Middle East. This is the case of David Robinson’s study of Africanization of Islam¹⁶⁹. During the 1950s and the 1960s, Africanization then refers to the composition of African administrations, in a context where colonial authorities try to maintain control of who can access higher administration, especially through universities.

¹⁶⁸ Du, Bois, W. E. B.. *The Souls of Black Folk* : The Oxford W. E. B. du Bois, edited by Henry Louis, Jr. Gates, Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2007, p3

¹⁶⁹ David Robinson, *Muslim societies in African history, New approaches to African history* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), see his chapter 4 “The Africanization of Islam”, pp42-59

More recently, African ownership has been used in universal international organizations towards funders. Franke and Gänzle distinguish African ownership and Africanization, the first referring to “*de facto political control over an issue*” and Africanization defined as “*the process of increasing the extent and quality of African participation in a particular activity or field*”¹⁷⁰. They argue that this vague definition illustrates the different ways to conceptualize security issues in Africa. Franke and Gänzle say that “ownership” was used for the first time in 2001 during the 37th OAU summit in Lusaka, Zambia¹⁷¹. In African institutions, the expression that prevails is “African agenda”. It is more assertive than African ownership, which carries with it the paternalist idea of a transfer of responsibility towards a newly matured actor.

The malleability of the references to Africanization is a resource for African regimes to mobilize external resources, but it is also the result of the concept’s long history, related to the filiation of Marcus Garvey and Kwame Nkrumah, as well as the dialectic analysis of the Black folk by W. E. B. Du Bois. With that in mind, Africanization can’t be thought of independently from Pan-Africanism.

4.2 A long-term perspective on Africanization of security

The narrative is well known as it has been repeatedly told: when the OAU was created in May 1963, a couple of days after Togolese president Sylvanus Olympio’s assassination, the perspective that prevailed during the talks on the shape of the pan-African institution was the restrictive view from the Monrovia group. From this time, the OAU is shaped like an “office of heads of states” whose goal is to maintain their own protection rather than their people’s one.

¹⁷⁰ Benedikt Franke et Stefan Gänzle, « How “African” Is the African Peace and Security Architecture? Conceptual and Practical Constraints of Regional Security Cooperation in Africa », *African Security* 5, no 2 (avril 2012): 88-104, p90

¹⁷¹ Franke et Gänzle, note 6, p91

Principles of sovereignty and of border inviolability are held sacred. The OAU is quickly blocked when it comes to conflict resolution. Be that as it may, its first mission is not to solve conflict but to accompany the struggle of Africa against white minority rules and for independence. Once this task is achieved, other deficiencies become more visible. In the early 2000s, the AU replaces the OAU and insists on non-indifference rather than non-intervention based on a new set of norms such as human security and responsibility to protect. But the new pan-African organization is quickly overwhelmed due to a lack of resources (most of AU's fundings come from sources exogenous to Africa) and to a weak political will of its members.

Although it is not empirically false, this story addresses only one part of the whole picture, especially because it considers that African solutions start in 1963. African solutions were not born with the OAU only, and in some sense we can paradoxically talk about an African security that precedes the Africanization of security.

We begin the historical study of Africanization of security in the early 20th century for two reasons. First, this is a period of strong and visible anticolonial resistance, not only in military terms but also in political issues (through unions and political parties for instance). We can talk of "Africanization" as many of these actors identify themselves as "Africans", for instance with the African National Congress, founded in 1912. The second reason is that the early 20th century is a period of intense circulation of demands based on group belonging (by doing so it continues dynamics that existed during the 19th century)¹⁷². This works well for the US and Caribbean-based

¹⁷² Jean-François Bayart, *Le gouvernement du monde: une critique politique de la globalisation* (Paris: Fayard, 2004), p30

pan-African movements, where we can trace the origins of projects of Africanization of security, and thus go beyond the traditional separation between colonial and post-colonial settings¹⁷³.

The first generation of Pan-Africanism was borne out of struggles for the emancipation of Black people across the Atlantic as well as of projects to repatriate them in Africa. Marcus Garvey created the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League, in Jamaica and then in the US that gathered thousands of people (up to 2 million). Garvey mobilized a lot the expression Africa for Africans, which is still massively used today in relation to contemporary forms of Africanization of security.

In New York, the early years of Pan-Africanism are accompanied by the Harlem Renaissance and the John Locke's New Negro Movement. W. E. B. Du Bois sits on both intellectual movements. At every congress, although individuals sometimes have harsh intellectual discussions, all agree on the necessity to speak on global issues. The genealogy of African solutions to African problems can be traced here. Marcus Garvey is probably the closest to contemporary forms of African solutions norm with his "Africa for Africans" motto. After WW1 he suggests for instance for former German colonies to be administered by Africans.

A cornerstone event is the 1935 Italian invasion of Ethiopia, that triggers large demonstrations in Europe and the US, the creation of numerous Pan-African organizations and the boycott of Italian goods. The International African Service Bureau is created at that time with George Padmore, C. L. R. James, Amy Ashwood Garvey, Ras Makonnen, Jomo Kenyatta among others¹⁷⁴. At this time, non-African powers take some sanctions against Italy but non-intervention is the general rule. In 1936, when Haile Selassie comes to the League of Nation to plea for the

¹⁷³ Naomi H. Chazan, « The Africanization of Political Change: Some Aspects of the Dynamics of Political Cultures in Ghana and Nigeria », *African Studies Review* 21, n° 2 (septembre 1978): 15-38, p22

¹⁷⁴ Matteo Grilli et Frank Gerits, *Visions of African Unity: New Perspectives on the History of Pan-Africanism and African Unification Projects*, 2021, p2

condemnation of the invasion, the Italian delegation whistles and disrupts his speech, and ironically the sanctions against Italy are lifted that day.

The 1945 Manchester pan-African conference is considered a turning point in the history of Pan-Africanism, as it gathers many more African delegates than it ever did before that. This is also from this time that African elites trained in Europe come back to Africa. Kwame Nkrumah replaces W. E. B. Du Bois as the flagbearer of Pan-African ideals. When he became prime minister of Gold Coast, Nkrumah supported the movement with institutional means. The 1958 All African People Conference is a key event in that regard, as well as the 1953 West African National Conference in Kumasi that preceded it¹⁷⁵.

The continentalization of Pan-Africanism, that could be labeled the Africanization of Pan-Africanism shapes power relations and reinforces the tensions between Nkrumah and Tubman until 1963. The May 1963 Addis Abeba meeting is another cornerstone in the history of Pan-Africanism in Africa. Pan-Africanism is what motivates Nkrumah to propose an African High Command, although it is not accepted during the Addis Abeba meeting. The continental army is at the heart of the disagreements between the Monrovia and the Casablanca groups. The Casablanca Charter (Ghana is part of the Casablanca group) includes an African High Command. The tensions around propositions of an African High Command arise during every security crisis in Africa, with the war in Congo in 1961 and the 1958 Guinean independence. For the ideals of Pan-Africanism to be credible as guiding principles for decolonization, both crises need to be

¹⁷⁵ Thomas Kwasi Tiekou, *Governing Africa: 3D Analysis of the African Union's Performance*, Lanham : Rowman&Littlefield, 2017, p64

successfully solved, this is why Kwame Nkrumah mobilizes a lot of Ghanaian resources to support both countries¹⁷⁶.

What lies at the core of Pan-Africanism is the ascertainment of a hierarchical world order and the need to start a political contestation with self-determination. Both ideas justify African solutions, although they don't prevent differences on the ways to achieve it.

The 1963 Addis Ababa meeting is often framed as a synthesis between the Monrovia and the Casablanca groups¹⁷⁷, although ideas from the Monrovia group dominate in the OAU Charter as it was written at the time, for instance with the principle of border intangibility.

Propositions for an African High Command are put aside and replaced by a Defense Commission, where each member keeps its national prerogatives: the point is not anymore to manage a continental army but to coordinate national militaries, following a sovereigntist perspective. The first meeting of the Defense Commission took place in Accra 1964. At the time, Nkrumah's proposal of multiple military bases across Africa was rejected. Yet the discussion was not over, and the theme of a continental army continued to come up every time a security crisis happens, such as with Tanzania in 1964 (that ends up with a British military intervention, perceived in Africa as a humiliation), the siege of Kisangani in 1967 or the Portuguese-led invasion of Guinea Bissau in 1970. All these episodes illustrate how the question of the Africanization of security preceded contemporary debates.

¹⁷⁶ Mazrui, *Africa's international relations*, p50

¹⁷⁷ -Ntalaja Georges Nzongola, « Pan-Africanism since decolonization : from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) », *African Journal of Democracy and Governance* 1, n° 4 (janvier 2014): 31-47, p40

The 1990s multilateral interventions in Africa (under a UN or a OAU mandate) contribute to bring the discussion forward with concepts such as the Responsibility to Protect and non-indifference. In resolutions taken by the UNSC about Somalia (resolution 794 in 1992) and Rwanda (resolution 929 in 1994) references to Africanization exist. Resolution 794 states for instance that “*the people of Somalia bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and the reconstruction of their own country*”¹⁷⁸. That being said, the 30 000 men UNITAF multilateral force is mainly composed by US military (21 000), African soldiers are only 1350, mostly from Morocco¹⁷⁹.

Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni considers the 1990s as a “decade of awakening”¹⁸⁰, because of the great powers new hesitations to military intervene in Africa after the US fiasco in Somalia in 1993. One diagnosis of what made the genocide in Rwanda possible is the indifference of multilateral organizations, which makes it necessary for African institutions to have the capacities to handle such situations themselves.

The APSA is thus the result of a long normative trajectory with failures and heterogenous actors since the early 20th century. Appropriation, and in some sense, Africanization, is never far from the discussions. Today’s aspirations to African solutions are not just a normative transfer from universal international organizations to Africa, or strategies that would be taught to African actors by foreign partners. Similarly, today’s Africanization is not exactly the replication of previous forms of Africanization, it mostly extends them.

¹⁷⁸ <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/794>, August 2, 2023, p2

¹⁷⁹ Frédéric Ramel, « 794(1992) : Somalie », Chapitre 18 dans Mélanie Albaret, Emmanuel Decaux, et Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, *Les grandes résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies*, Grandes résolutions (Paris: Dalloz, 2012), pp170-180, p176.

¹⁸⁰ Franke, « Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture and the Concept of Multilayered Security Communities », p318

What are the key takeaways of this historical outlook? First, appropriation as discussed in Pan-African movements is not simply about extraversion, it continuously contributes to the production of a political subjectivity. In that regard, it could be argued that Africanization has an existential dimension, that only a long-term approach can disclose: the point is not simply to make norms circulate from an organization to another, but to make sure of one's autonomy within the world system. Second, the history of Africanization spread on one century-long displays the plurality and the competition, the contradictions of Pan-African ideas. There is no consensus nor unanimity about the means for Africa to be organized, not only after national independences but also during the anticolonial struggle. This strife goes beyond the well-known opposition between major figures such as Tubman and Nkrumah, as there is an intense competition in national political scenes too, for instance in Senegal.

Chapter 5: Africanization of diplomacy as a source of post-colonial state-building in Senegal

In this chapter we argue that the formation of Senegalese foreign policy is a form of appropriation-restitution, that participates to the forming of the post-colonial state in Senegal. This appropriation leaves traces among the multiple actors involved in the process. Senegalese decisions in terms of foreign policy are not just the result of extraversion strategies.

We carry on with our attempt to pluralize the readings of Senegalese foreign policy in this chapter, especially by demonstrating how historically diverse it is. Data are sometimes difficult to gather in the Senegalese context, for instance concerning the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly. But this shouldn't stop us from looking beyond the presidential palace as a source of foreign policy decision making. Kate Skinner faced the same issue about Togo, and she

argues that historians should pay attention to the fragments at their disposal . These fragments form a constellation, a new image of what we study, that we can have a look at due to the epistemological precautions we have been deploying since the beginning of this work.

Based on the Senegalese national archives we argue here that the Africanization of Senegalese foreign policy is a driver of the formation of the Senegalese state. The originality of the argument is the emphasis we put on the Senegalese ministry of Foreign Affairs in constructing the state in Senegal, that completes the role of the Presidential palace.

5.1 The construction of the Senegalese state and its foreign policy

Senegal became independent in April 1960 and quickly set the bases of new foreign policy institutions. From now on, three institutions became central in foreign policy decision making: the Presidential palace, the Council Presidency, the ministry of Foreign Affairs. While the Council Presidency doesn't last long after independence, the ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential palace gain more weight. Their respective weight varies afterward depending on the period and the personality that leads them.

Political life has been existing in the territory of Senegal well before independence. Diplomatic practices and political elites didn't wait for colonization to exist. In Senegambia, the diplomatic system was already formed with “*an elaborate system of curtesy calls, envoys accompanied by gift-giving*”¹⁸¹. As Lucie Colvin demonstrates, until 1847 the mayor of Saint-Louis was charged with diplomatic missions, even under colonial rule.

¹⁸¹ Lucie Gallistel Colvin, « Theoretical Issues in Historical International Politics: The Case of the Senegambia », *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 8, n° 1 (1977): 23, p34

When it comes to foreign policy decisions in the late 1950s, the forming of the French Community is a turning point. Metropolitan authorities wanted to avoid at all costs to divide French influence in international institutions. But the National Archives in Senegal show that two openings exist: the possibility for colonized territories to have diplomatic relations with direct neighbors on specific questions, and the training of a diplomatic service with “*young Africans, who could be deployed in embassies and consulates in Africa where, while training, they could be useful by dealing with inter-African states relations. It would be understandable to entrust African missions to Africans. In Liberia, Guinea, Ghana, Nigeria, the diplomatic envoy of the Community could be African*”¹⁸². Colonial administration was thus not contradictory with diplomatic experience, even limited.

Colonial authorities are careful to integrate autonomous political units in international institutions, as it is demonstrated by the Châtaigner report (chief administrator of overseas France and technical counselor for foreign affairs). The report written in 1959 deals with the relations of the Community with international organizations¹⁸³. Colonial authorities want to avoid at all costs the dilution of French voices in new ones. The “strict unicity” of French voice in the UN is reaffirmed, with the integration “into a unique delegation” of envoys from the French community in Africa¹⁸⁴. The cohesion of the French delegation is a huge preoccupation for colonial authorities, who go on and on to expound it. The first two articles of a decision integrated on February 15, 1959 to the French Community’s official journal consider that both foreign policy and foreign representation of France and the Community are unique¹⁸⁵.

¹⁸² National Archives in Senegal, Folder VP00131, File “Organisation de la Communauté”

¹⁸³ National Archives in Senegal, Folder VP00131, File “Extrait du compte-rendu de la session du comité des rapports de la communauté avec les organisations internationales, Paris du 6 au 8 octobre 1959”

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, p1

¹⁸⁵ National Archives in Senegal, Folder VP00131, File “Journal officiel de la Communauté du 15 février 1959 ”

Relations between the French Community and international organizations are not unilaterally defined by French authorities. Some documents of the archives show that before the independence of Senegal, Mamadou Dia proposed to present Mali's candidature¹⁸⁶. Although it has no official and institutional reality, Senegalese elites contribute to the making of French foreign policy in the late 1950s, and it has consequences on their individual trajectories.

After independence, the ministry of Foreign Affairs is created in Senegal. Before that, because Senegal was part of the Mali Federation, its foreign policy was decided in an Office of Foreign Relations (Bureau des Relations Extérieures), that was not headed by a minister but part of the office of the President of the government (Mamadou Dia at the time)¹⁸⁷. At the time of Senegal's independence, because there is a bicephalous regime, the president of the Council Mamadou Dia considers he has a prominent role outside of Senegal: *“in meetings with heads of states and of government, I had the final say as President of the Council [...]. Then, when it came to foreign relations, when the Senegalese government was invited abroad, it concerned first the President of the Council and then the Head of State because to discuss agreements, the best partner is the one who holds powers”*¹⁸⁸.

Senegal's ministry of foreign affairs was organized first with the decree of October 13th, 1960. On May 8th, 1961, Mamadou Dia precises the repartition of certain missions between ministers when it comes to questions of foreign policy¹⁸⁹. The ministry of Foreign Affairs *“is*

¹⁸⁶ National Archives in Senegal, Folder VP00131, File “Lettre de Mamadou Dia au Président du Conseil de la Fédération du Mali, 14 octobre 1959”

¹⁸⁷ Yaya Diallo, « Contribution à l'étude de la politique étrangère du Sénégal : 1960-1983 » (Thèse de 3e cycle, Paris ; 1970-2021, France, Université Panthéon-Assas, 1984)

¹⁸⁸ Mamadou Dia, *Mémoires d'un militant du Tiers-Monde*, Collection « Les Témoins de l'histoire » (Paris: Publisud, 1985), p111

¹⁸⁹ National Archives of Senegal Folder VP00171, File « Le Président du Conseil à Messieurs des Ministres : Répartition des compétences et tâches entre le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, le Ministère chargé de la Coopération Technique et les autres Départements Ministériels »

*concerned, generally speaking, with what refers to external relations of the Republic of Senegal*¹⁹⁰.

A protocol is quickly set up, with Sidy Alpha Ba nominated on June 5, 1962, as chief of protocol. At the time, the nickname of the Ministry is “the forge” because of Doudou Thiam’s position in the caste system (he is a “tëg”)¹⁹¹. Already in 1963, the size of Senegalese diplomacy is out of proportion with the economic might of Senegal: as Bruno Sonko demonstrates, while Cote d’Ivoire had a dozen of diplomatic representations all over the world at the time, Senegal has 28 of them¹⁹². Before the presidential turn of the regime in 1963, it can be said that in terms of foreign relations, a phase has existed during which it is not Senghor but Dia who plays a crucial role.

Senegalese diplomacy is during the 1970s influenced a lot by the personality of Senghor, who insists on dialogue as being a marker of the country’s foreign policy. Senghor argues in the internal documentation of the administration: “*our country, because of its renowned philosophy of dialogue and its affinity with consultation practices*”¹⁹³. At the time, Babacar Ba is chief of staff then secretary general of the presidency. To Mamadou Diouf and Momar-Coumba Diop in their seminal study of Senegalese politics, Babacar Ba is one of the individuals in competition with Abdou Diouf under Senghor’s presidency. Babacar Ba is ministry of Foreign Affairs in Senegal in 1978, which is another example of a prominent political figure being nominated at the post, that contradicts the narrative of the omnipotent African executive.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, p2

¹⁹¹ Gerti Hesselting, *Histoire politique du Sénégal: institutions, droit et société*, Hommes et sociétés (Paris, France : Leiden, Pays-Bas: Editions Karthala ; Afrika-Studiecentrum, 1985) p82.

¹⁹² Sonko, « Essai sur la politique africaine du Sénégal, de 1981 à 2000 », p246

¹⁹³ National Archives in Senegal, Folder Affaires Etrangères I, File « Note sur quelques aspects de la politique extérieure du Sénégal (Avril 1972-Mars 1973), Ministère des affaires étrangères, direction des relations extérieures », IMG 0049

A 1976 decree precises the mission of the ministry of Foreign Affairs: “*the ministry is tasked with elaborating, applying and coordinating the state’s foreign policy. It is mandated, under the authority of the Prime minister, to define the attitude of Senegalese envoys in international negotiations in accordance with the guidelines formulated by the head of state*”¹⁹⁴. This extract shows well the interdependence of the three poles that participate the most in defining Senegal’s foreign policy: the ministry, the Prime minister office and the Presidential palace.

When Abdou Diouf became president, the division of the labor of defining Senegal’s foreign policy changed. Although progression African integration is still the leitmotiv¹⁹⁵, the centralized regime that existed with Senghor didn’t survive him. With Abdou Diouf as president, Prime minister Habib Thiam had his own diplomatic office that doesn’t depend on the Presidential palace nor on the National Assembly. Abdou Diouf’s presidency is marked by the contraction of Senegalese diplomacy, also known as a “recentrage”.

Every year in Senegal, as it is the case in most other countries, the dean of the diplomatic community presents its vows to the president, which is the occasion to discuss general orientations of foreign policy, but also to recall Senegal’s diplomatic orientations. For instance Diouf reminded in 1985 the weight of Dakar as an “*African diplomatic capital city*”¹⁹⁶.

In 1993, the ministry of Foreign Affairs grew and got the portfolio of the Senegalese diaspora¹⁹⁷. It became with decree 2000.296 the ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese living abroad. At the same time, the decree reinforced the authority of the Prime minister and the President on the ministry: “*under the authority of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign*

¹⁹⁴ Quotied pp246-247 in Bruno Sonko, « Essai sur la politique africaine du Sénégal, de 1981 à 2000 »

¹⁹⁵ National Archives in Senegal, Folder Sénégal Affaires Etrangères I, File « La politique étrangère du Sénégal : principaux discours d’Abdou Diouf. Préface de Ibrahima Fall, Ministre des Affaires étrangères »

¹⁹⁶ National Archives in Senegal, Folder Sénégal Affaires Etrangères I, File « La politique étrangère du Sénégal : principaux discours d’Abdou Diouf. Réponse aux vœux du corps diplomatique »

¹⁹⁷ Mamadou Bodian, Catherine Lena Kelly, “Senegalese Foreign Policy: Leadership Through Soft Power from Senghor to Sall”, Chapter 21 in Warner, Shaw (ed.), *African foreign policies in international institutions*, p330

Affairs and Senegalese Living Abroad is to prepare and apply the policy decided by the Head of State concerning relations with foreign states and international organizations"¹⁹⁸.

During the mandates of Abdoulaye Wade, the foreign policy of Senegal also changed. Wade is the first president since independence that is not from the ruling majority that preceded him. He contributed a lot to the personification of Senegal's foreign policy, for instance by insisting on his personal relationship with other major African figures. To certain authors, this overarching positioning led to a new contraction of the ministry of Foreign Affairs¹⁹⁹. Besides, quickly after the 2000 election of Abdoulaye Wade, new decrees redesign certain tasks, for instance with the coming of the ministry of African Integration.

Changes in Senegalese foreign policy with Wade go beyond his own decisions. Abdoulaye Wade is even more proactive that he intervenes in a context of banalization of summit diplomacy, which mechanically gives more weight to national executives at the expense of Ministries of Foreign Affairs. To Alioune Sall, the direct result of this new orientation is to deprive judiciary and legislative organs with knowledge and competency related to diplomacy²⁰⁰.

This strong resurgence of the President in Senegalese foreign policy is associated with a new centralization of power in Senegal itself, which is even reinforced during Macky Sall's mandates. With Abdoulaye Wade, the centralization of power comes along a marginalization of the National Assembly²⁰¹. Such a centralization is also the result of the quest of a new source of legitimacy for Abdoulaye Wade: while Senghor could claim to have carried Senegal to

¹⁹⁸ Quoted p247 dans Sonko, "Essai sur la politique africaine du Sénégal, de 1981 à 2000".

¹⁹⁹ Alioune Sall, « The Foreign Policy of Senegal Since 2000 », Africa Portal (South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), 1 avril 2013), <https://www.africaportal.org/publications/the-foreign-policy-of-senegal-since-2000/>

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Momar-Coumba Diop, « Introduction : Etat, pouvoirs et société : essai sur les trajectoires du Sénégal contemporain » dans Momar Coumba Diop, éd., *Le Sénégal sous Abdoulaye Wade: le Sopi à l'épreuve du pouvoir*, Hommes et sociétés (Dakar Médina : Paris: CRES Karthala, 2013), pp41-96

independence, Wade can't rely on this rhetoric, hence his new legitimacy in mimicking and performing power²⁰².

Domestic and foreign policies are even more tied under the regime of Macky Sall, and the latter is sometimes determined by the issues pressing the former. The question of the third mandate for Macky Sall is a manifest example that occurred lately. While Senegalese authorities are usually vocal when it comes to condemn coups and changes of Constitutions, they were relatively silent about this issue during the Senegalese presidency of the AU from February 2022 to February 2023. At the same time, Macky Sall kept silent for a very long time about his own intentions regarding a third mandate (legally contested) in Senegal. It is only after the condemnation of one of his main political opponents Ousmane Sonko that he declared not being candidate to his own succession. Since then, Senegalese authorities have been much more vocal in condemning coups, especially the one that took place in Niger in August 2023. Senegal declared that it would stand by to send troops in the scenario of a military operation under the command of the ECOWAS.

Senegal's foreign policy is gradually constructed with the first Pan-African meetings on the continent, especially those organized in Ghana (such as the 1957 *All African's People Conference*, to which Doudou Thiam attends), and then the discussions within the groups of Casablanca and Monrovia. These groups are among the first instances of post-independence leaders formally meeting as heads of states to deal with issues at the continental scale (not limited to Pan-Africanism with the famous confrontation between Kwame Nkrumah and William Tubman). Senegal participates to the Monrovia group through the diplomatic representation of Senghor but also with the minister Doudou Thiam.

²⁰² Momar Coumba Diop et Mamadou Diouf, *Le Sénégal sous Abdou Diouf: Etat et société*, Les Afriques (Paris: Karthala, 1990), pp18-19

To some authors, the ministry of Foreign Affairs was central to decision making until Doudou Thiam left the office in 1968²⁰³. After the 1962 crisis, the Constitutional review of March 7, 1963 confirms the minister of Foreign Affairs as second figure of the state in terms of protocol (there is no more president of the Council). After 1968 foreign policy becomes the almost exclusive domain of the president, the minister becoming a mere enforcement agent²⁰⁴.

In Senegal, being minister of foreign affairs is politically rewarding. The office is a strong accolade for a long career, and it facilitates the coming steps. Senegalese ministry of Foreign Affairs are not mere puppets that can be manipulated by the President. Before running the office, Doudou Thiam occupied important administrative positions, and after 1968 he became president of the Social and Economic Council, before being appointed to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The same works for Moustapha Niasse, several times appointed minister of Foreign Affairs (1978-1984 and 1993-1998), before becoming Prime minister and then president of the Senegalese National Assembly. Moustapha Niasse recently played a crucial role in mediating the discussions between the ruling majority and opposition parties about Macky Sall's potential race for a third mandate.

African states are even more marginalized in IR when the role of international organizations is minimized, because they tend to invest a lot in multilateral spaces. What national diplomats do in international organizations is actually part of plural dynamics. The career of diplomats is part of individual strategies but also of collective choices. Offices of high-ranking in international institutions demonstrate (among other things) the implication of a given state in a

²⁰³ Sonko, « Essai sur la politique africaine du Sénégal, de 1981 à 2000 »

²⁰⁴ Ibid

specific international regime. This makes necessary to have a close look at the trajectory of diplomats in these institutions.

Since the early days of independence, Senegalese authorities are a lot invested in their representation at the UN. During the first UNGA to which they participated, on September 28, 1960, Senghor declared: “*Senegal [...] will make a point of being an element of progress, a symbol of vitality. Senegal will spare no effort for the triumph of UN’s ideals*”²⁰⁵.

Multiple membership to regional or continental organizations complicates even more this setting. International organizations are much more than a resonance chamber of power politics between member states. The very rules of IO influence international politics, they are non-neutral arenas for diplomatic actors²⁰⁶. The balance of nominations to international high-ranking civil servants is illustrated in Abdou Diouf’s memoires:

“When I went to my first OAU summit, it was in Nairobi, I brought him [Kéba Mbaye] with me because I wanted him to be the African candidate to the International Court in La Haye, where Forster just completed two nine years-mandates. This was a very hard time, because Malagasy president Ratsiraka already had a candidate. When I asked his support he declined: ‘Mister President, he said, I regret but I can’t, because you, Senegalese people, take all for granted. You have Mbow to UNESCO, Forster to the ICJ, and you want a new Senegalese? No! No! I have another candidate’”²⁰⁷.

Senegalese authorities asked for being integrated to the UN the day of the crumble of the Mali Federation. The point is of course to acknowledge Senegal’s place at the international scale,

²⁰⁵ National Archives in Senegal, folder VP 194, file « Télégramme à l’intention de Son Excellence Monsieur Dag Hammarskjöld, Secrétaire Général de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, New York »

²⁰⁶ Hopewell demonstrates very clearly how the diplomats of Brazil, India and China used the WTO as a lever in their international projection. Kristen Hopewell, « Different Paths to Power: The Rise of Brazil, India and China at the World Trade Organization », *Review of International Political Economy* 22, n° 2 (4 mars 2015): 311-38

²⁰⁷ Abdou Diouf, *Mémoires* (Paris: Seuil, 2014), p190

but Yaya Diallo suggests as well that some themes can be identified in Senegal's first speeches to the UN, such as "*the issue of peace, East-West relations and the affirmation of neutralism*"²⁰⁸.

Other actions suggest too that Senegal's positions in the UN are not only about existing as a state, contrary to what the theory of negative sovereignty affirms. Senegal votes for instance in favor of the admission of China and Mauritania while it was contested by other powers. 1968 is the year Senegal is a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the first time. It replaces Mali in that role. This task mobilizes the energy of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, that puts forward a "*wise and careful diplomatic preparation*"²⁰⁹.

In 1987, Senegal and Algeria present their candidate to a new non-permanent seat to the UNSC, after a prior selection to the OAU²¹⁰. This practice is a way for African actors to not scatter their vote at the UN. The Senegalese diplomat Gabriel d'Arboussier already benefited from this practice in 1967 when the OAU coordinated its support to his appointment as head of the FAO (although he eventually wasn't elected)²¹¹.

To nominate a single candidate for the whole continent of Africa is difficult because it implies to organize the competition between African actors. Discussions prior to a single candidate are common practice today, and have been existing for decades. Even before the creation of the OAU in 1963, the African and Malagasy Union (AMU) is for Senegal the place to discuss and build consensus on common candidates to IOs. It is demonstrated by a letter sent by Doudou Thiam to Senghor in October 1962 where it is said: "*the issue having its importance, it is necessary to examine it with other members of the AMU because, as a matter of fact, it is an application to a*

²⁰⁸ Diallo, « Contribution à l'étude de la politique étrangère du Sénégal : 1960-1983 », p254.

²⁰⁹ National Archives in Senegal, folder Sénégal Affaires Etrangères I , file « Communication sur les travaux de la XXème session de l'assemblée générale des Nations Unies »

²¹⁰ National Archives in Senegal, folder Unité Africaine IX Bis Généralités 1975-1999, file Le Soleil, « Dakar et Alger en orbite », 28 juillet 1987

²¹¹ National Archives in Senegal, folder Unité Africaine IX Généralités 1966-1974, file « Dakar Matin 4 mars 1967 »

UN specialized agency”²¹². The AMU had decided upstream to promote Mauritania’s application to the Security Council and Senegal to the Commission on Human Rights (OHCHR) as well as to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)²¹³.

Before the OAU was established, AMU was one of the places to coordinate African votes at the UN. Senegal considers this task seriously. On March 25, 1962, in Lagos, the final report of a meeting says for instance that “*the Conference insists on the indispensable coordination and vote discipline. To that end, the SG of the AMU is to go to New York to reach out to the chiefs of diplomatic missions and to analyze the possibility for the forming of a permanent secretariat to the AMU group to the UN*”²¹⁴.

Dakar has been since the late 1980s a central location for a multilateralism that goes beyond the UN system. Many international summits have been organized in Senegal, which even originates the saying “Dakar-summit”²¹⁵. On May 24th, 1989, Senegal welcomed the third summit of francophone countries, and then in 1991 the sixth summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (for the first time the summit takes place in the South of the Sahara). These summits durably set Senegal as heavy multilateral power in Africa and at the UN. More recently Folashadé Soulé-Kohndou identified a “Dakar consensus” elaborated in Senegal to reassure fundraisers and investors about the security of African debts and to lower interest rates²¹⁶. We could go as far as saying that just like Algier is the “Mecca of revolutionaries” and Accra was the place of Pan-Africanism in the early independence era, Dakar occupies a specific place in African

²¹² National Archives in Senegal, folder VP 157, file « Lettre de Doudou Thiam à Léopold Sédar Senghor du 16 octobre 1962 »

²¹³ National Archives in Senegal, folder VP 168, file « UAM : Conférence de Bangui 25-27 mars 1962, Synthèse des délibérations des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement », p13

²¹⁴ National Archives in Senegal, folder VP 168, file « UAM : Conférence de Bangui 25-27 mars 1962, Synthèse des délibérations des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement », p10

²¹⁵ Sonko, « Essai sur la politique africaine du Sénégal, de 1981 à 2000 », p286

²¹⁶ Soulé, « ‘Africa+1’ Summit Diplomacy and the ‘New Scramble’ Narrative », p643

imaginaries during the 1980s. Dakar sustainably occupies this imaginary, partly due to the relative political stability of the country since independence.

During Macky Sall's mandates, Senegalese authorities commit a lot of resources to existing international institutions, which is made easier with Senegalese presidency of the African Union from February 2022 to February 2023. Macky Sall was in the front rows of early negotiations about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also about the integration of the AU as a member of the G20 and a permanent seat for an African member to the UNSC.

Such a series of positionings by the Senegalese President are important because both the G20 and the UNSC deal with security issues, which demonstrates African aspirations to have a more institutionalized weight on these matters. This would also imply a continental alignment on these issues.

Once integrated, multilateral organizations become places of deliberations for internal reforms by African states (and Senegal among them). A recurring question is about the representativeness of African states (be it through the number of seats to the UNSC, or quotas in the IMF). These questions of internal reforms to international institutions are taken very seriously by African states that are ready to act collectively on them, and upstream of multilateral summits in order to weight heavier in negotiations.

5.2 The articulation of a Senegalese identity on the international scale

Senghor is famous for his promotion of convergence between civilizations²¹⁷ (“dialogue entre les civilisations”). He explained in 1975: “*it is in that context that Senegal goes on with its mission, to work with nations and men of good will, to the edification of the civilization of the universal. This is why we act on two levels: on the political level by promoting dialogue, not only*

²¹⁷ Constantin et Coulon, « La Diplomatie Du Dialogue », p59

between North and South, developing countries and developed countries, but also between West and East, between Third world countries”²¹⁸. The rhetoric of civilization is useful as it doesn’t constrain Senghor in a North-South or a West-East confrontation. He mobilizes very often the expression all along the first twenty years of Senegal’s independence.

In 1966 Senegal hosts the world festival of Black arts, which is a key event for the country’s foreign policy. It has been in gestation for years, and as it is demonstrated by Yann Ripert, it is a prototypical moment of art being mobilized as a tool of foreign policy, especially to contest colonialist ideologies²¹⁹ (understood mostly as maintaining exclusive ties of dependence between the former colony and metropolis). To Ripert, Senghor precisely tried during the festival to diversify Senegal’s diplomatic partners, especially with regards to the US.

Mamadou Dia builds on this diversification too:

*Another political orientation on the international scale was problematic: I did my best to diversify our international partnerships. While keeping good relations with France, I considered that it was time to open our cooperation with other countries without exclusive, hence my trip to Eastern countries. I wanted to diversify, not only with Western countries, by also with Eastern countries. This is when I decided to organize this trip... responding to a preoccupation from Eastern countries, who paid attention to my policy in Senegal that was sympathetic to them. I think that the success of this Eastern orientation is an explanation to the 1962 crisis [in Senegal]*²²⁰.

The study of the letters exchanged between Senghor and Kennedy gives us new information to have a better understanding of Senegalese foreign policy, that can’t be summed up to its final decisions. As Korany writes, foreign policy is “*a continuous, wider, phenomenon, embracing*

²¹⁸ National Archives in Senegal, folder Sénégal Affaires Etrangères I, file « Présentation des vœux du corps diplomatique, 3 janvier 1975, Réponse de M. le Président de la République », p3

²¹⁹ Yohann C. Ripert, « Decolonizing Diplomacy: Senghor, Kennedy, and the Practice of Ideological Resistance », *African Studies Review* 64, n° 2 (juin 2021): 292-314, p294

²²⁰ Dia, *Mémoires d’un militant du Tiers-Monde*, p110.

general objectives, stated strategy, and a series of routine actions: trade exchanges, cultural encounters, exchange of diplomatic notes”²²¹.

Jean-Gérard Bosio was Senghor’s cultural and diplomatic advisor during the 1966 festival. He uses the expression “cultural diplomacy” to qualify the event and the following policies proposed by Senghor. To Senghor, cultural diplomacy is about acknowledging African art at a world scale, through the circulation of works of art between Europe and Africa, with for instance Dakar’s Dynamic Museum²²². Music plays also a major role in this process of recognition, by helping to go beyond differences through harmonization on a similar rhythm. Just like Jean Pasler says, “*in their programming at major venues, organizers prioritized balance and equity, prerequisites in the pursuit of African unity*”²²³.

Négritude is of course another key point of Senghor’s views on Senegal’s foreign policy. Through this term, he is quickly identified by foreign leaders, and he can easily mobilize it²²⁴. The definition of negritude is a bit elusive because it has many creators, who changed their own views over time: Senghor, Césaire and Gontran-Damas are most of the time associated with it, without forgetting the Nardal sisters. To Senghor, it refers most of all to the “*civilization of the black world*” and the “*African collective personality*”. When it comes to negritude, Senghor pays much more attention to African continental cultural characteristics. Senghor refers too to the concept of “*force vitale*” and “*rhythm*”, that he finds in the work of Placide Tempels and Bergson.

Senghor’s heritage is essential in Senegal’s foreign policy, until today. To Moda Dieng, “*during the two decades of his power, Pan-Africanism and negritude were at the center of*

²²¹ Bahgat Korany, *How foreign policy decisions are made in the Third World: a comparative analysis* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p39

²²² Musée du quai Branly-Jacques Chirac, éd., *Senghor et les arts: réinventer l’universel [Exposition au Musée du Quai Branly du 7 février au 19 novembre 2023]* (Paris: Musée du Quai Branly-Jacques Chirac, 2023)

²²³ Jann Pasler, “Music and African Diplomacy at the Festival Mondial des Arts Nègres, Dakar, 1966”, *Diplomatica*, Vol 3 Num 2, 2021, p320

²²⁴ W. A. E. Skurnik, *The foreign policy of Senegal* (Evanston [Ill.]: Northwestern University Press, 1972)

Senegal's foreign policy. Today, Senegal is considered as a 'diplomatic power' largely because of Senghor's open mind and his ideological orientation"²²⁵.

During the 1970s, Senegalese authorities also organized their rhetoric around peace activities, especially through culture and mediation. Senghor personally participated to mediations during the 1970s via the OAU in the Middle-East region (especially to restart the Jarring mission)²²⁶. In 1979, Senegalese authorities support Egypt after the agreement of Camp David, while the country is criticized a lot among the non-aligned movement for doing so²²⁷.

In 1975, when he addresses his vows to the diplomatic community, Senghor insists on culture, civilization and negritude in solving conflicting situations:

*As we know, behind political conflicts such as those of decolonization or economic conflicts due to the deterioration of the trade terms there are, sometimes, cultural conflicts that is concealed behind ideology. The best way to avoid these conflicts is to develop culture itself. This is why we pay a lot of attention, in our education system, to the teaching of different languages and civilizations. Our aim is to transform our students into men of integral culture who, beyond African languages, will be rooted in negritude and bilingual, even trilingual*²²⁸.

Initiatives favoring conflict resolution are part at the time of a rhetoric with strong theoretical bases. This vocabulary is used less by Senghor's successors, although in that regard their practices are still a lot influenced by him. Senghor has a functionalist understanding of IR, with the idea that day-to-day contacts on technical issues could limit the possibilities of conflict. Senghor adds to it a cultural dimension (sometimes labeled as "civilizational"). After he willingly left power to Abdou Diouf, Senghor didn't take part in any mediation.

²²⁵ Moda Dieng, *Médiations africaines dans les conflits: le dynamisme diplomatique de l'Afrique du Sud et du Sénégal* (Saarbrücken: Éditions universitaires européennes, 2011), p76

²²⁶ Constantin et Coulon, « La Diplomatie Du Dialogue », p61

²²⁷ Jovan Čavoški, *Non-Aligned Movement Summits: A History*, New Approaches to International History (London New York Oxford New Delhi Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022), pp219-220

²²⁸ National Archives in Senegal, file Sénégal Affaires Etrangères I, folder « Présentation des vœux du corps diplomatique, 3 janvier 1975, Réponse de M. le Président de la République », p4

Abdou Diouf sent troops in Chad quickly after his coming to the presidency. He said in a speech to the diplomatic community: *“this is the very reason of Senegal’s presence in Lebanon and Chad, and it justifies as well Senegal’s views to the UN, the OAU and other international forums. There is a duty of justice and human solidarity with thousands of innocent victims, but peace preservation and security for every nation are at stake too”*²²⁹. In that speech, the Senghorian vocabulary leaves space to more explicit Senegalese ambitions about peacekeeping and African unity.

Chapter 6: To capture unity and security in Africa from Senegal

All along the 20th century, Senegalese political figures have played an important role in the forming of continental institutions and the promotion of African unity. For instance Senghor and Kéba Mbaye were central to the elaboration of the African Charter for Human and Peoples Rights²³⁰. Senghor even introduces the discussion with a saying from Senegal, “nit nitaay garabam” in Wolof (“man is man’s cure”). As Bachir Diagne shows, this was first pronounced during a 1978 conference: from the Senegalese case, Senghor proposes an African participation to the realization of humanity as a whole²³¹.

There is indeed a Senegalese intellectual contribution to African reflections on universal issues. This contribution is very clear with Senghor, but other forms exist too. Another expression

²²⁹ National Archives in Senegal, folder Sénégal Affaires Etrangères I, file « Présentation des vœux du corps diplomatique, Réponse de M. le Président de la République, Dakar le 8 janvier 1982 »

²³⁰ Kéba Mbaye was president of the group of expert that worked from November 28 to December 5, 1979 on the resolution 115 proposed by Senghor to the Monrovia conference of Heads of State and Government on the elaboration of an African charter for Human Rights. National Archives in Senegal, folder Sénégal Affaires Etrangères I, file « Il n’y a pas de développement sans respect des droits de l’homme »

²³¹ <https://palaisdetokyo.com/ressource/ubuntu-nite-et-humanisme/> consulté le 17/06/2023

in wolof, “moom sa bopp”, was used by the political opponents to Senghor and Diouf. It refers too to universal issues, in particular issues related to appropriation.

6.1 Changing Senegalese views on Pan-Africanism

As we demonstrated in chapter 4, Pan-Africanism is much older than the successive waves of independence that took place during the 1960s. Several African intellectual figures participate to the movement as early as the dawn of the 20th century. Who participates from Senegambia? The birth of modern Senegalese political life is often associated with Blaise Diagne’s election as a deputy to the French National Assembly. To Nakao, this election is crucial not only for the Senegalese territory but also for the continent, as Blaise Diagne “*represents Senegal as well as ‘Africa’*”²³².

In the late 1940s, a major Senegalese figure is Alioune Diop, the founding father of *Présence Africaine* in 1947. He aggregates to the journal important reflections on negritude and African emancipation in general, with articles written by Senghor, Cheikh Anta Diop, Abdoulaye Wade and many others, be they artists or political leaders. The rhetoric at the time among Black and Senegalese students and intellectuals is about the possibility of an African modernity that would not be a mere transfer of Western characteristics but a modernity “*adapted to the profound changes that African cities went through*”²³³.

After Senegal’s independence, Pan-Africanism and African unity are at the core of intellectual discussions in the country. Bruno Sonko distinguishes an “official doctrine” (as

²³² Sakiko Nakao, *Nationaliser le panafricanisme? ladécolonisation au Sénégal, en Haute-Volta et au Ghana (1945-1962)*, Hommes et sociétés (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 2023)., p126

²³³ Nakao, p56

formulated by Senghor and Diouf when they were president) from a “peripheral doctrine” (in his work, Bruno Sonko focuses on Cheikh Anta Diop, we expand it here to other figures)²³⁴.

After independence, the official doctrine through Senghor is of a gradual African integration, as the opposite of an immediate federation. As a symptom of this positioning, Senegalese authorities don't participate to the Casablanca meeting from January 3 to 7, 1961, but to the Brazzaville and Monrovia meetings, initiated at first by Nigeria. This is the sign that after independences, Pan-Africanism became a dividing rather than a uniting theme in Africa.

Senghor opens the African and Malagasy Union session in March 1962 in Bangui²³⁵. Gabriel d'Arboussier participates to the summit too, as part of the ad hoc commission that deals with the opportunity of the autonomous existence of the AMU²³⁶. This is an important period before the creation of the OAU on May 25th, 1963.

The AMU is an important experience not only in terms of diplomatic harmonization, but also when it comes to security cooperation. A Superior Council of Defense is created and regularly meets. Its headquarters are at Ouagadougou. Senghor proposes to entrench this new structure more permanently²³⁷. The Council eventually seems to have most of all an advisory role, and can't take military decisions (joint military operation or even the forming of a unified military command), and member states are considered to have full autonomy in terms of defense related issues²³⁸. This makes the AMU much closer to sovereigntist views in international organizations. Such characteristics can also be found in the Addis Ababa charter signed in 1963. This is a very light

²³⁴ Bruno Sonko, « Essai sur la politique africaine du Sénégal, de 1981 à 2000 », p92

²³⁵ National Archives in Senegal, folder VP00168, file « Union Africaine et Malgache, Conférence de Bangui, 25-27 Mars 1962, Synthèse des délibérations des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement, rapport établi par le secrétaire général de l'UAM », p1

²³⁶ Ibid, p2

²³⁷ National Archives in Senegal, folder VP00208, file « Rapport de présentation des travaux effectués par le conseil supérieur de défense du pace de défense de l'Union Africaine et Malgache à Ouagadougou », p2

²³⁸ Ibid, p19

cooperation, centered on solving technical problems without further integration. It fits with Senghor's functionalist views on international cooperation, that animate Senegal's African policy between 1968 and 1980.

The peripheral doctrine of Senegal's African policy could be completed with the figure of Alioune Diop, the founder of *Présence Africaine*. This Senegalese intellectual is less marginalized during Senghor's rule than Cheikh Anta Diop was, but he still has strong divergences with Senghor. To Alioune Diop too, this is through culture that political emancipation will come. This is what motivates him to organize the 1956 Black writers and artists congress in Paris. At this occasion, Diop proposes to catalogue Black cultures on the eve of African independences.

6.2 African solutions as symptomatic of a moment in the history of appropriation of security

Pan-African solidarity is a recurring rhetoric in African justifications to military operations. Solidarity interventions refer to African characteristics and provide additional legitimacy²³⁹. Not only are African solutions a specific moment in the history of appropriation of security in Africa, but Senegal is a distinct place in that appropriation generally speaking. This makes the expression "African solutions to African problems" part of a broader constellation of expressions referring to African appropriation, that varied depending on the individuals mobilizing it, the historical and geographical context.

The wolof expression *moom sa bopp* is an original way to approach appropriation in the study of foreign policy. *Moom sa bopp* is not particularly referred to as such in today's Senegal, but it refers both to appropriation and independence. *Moom* is the wolof word for "to own". Jean-

²³⁹ Gino Vlavonou, « The APSA and (Complex) International Security Regime Theory: A Critique », *African Security*, 5 mars 2019, 87-110, p97

Léopold Diouf's dictionary of Wolof-French illustrates the word with the expression "moom sa reew", that explicitly refers to national independence from colonization.

Literally, moom sa reew means "own your country". The expression is thus originally a summon that appeared in a specific moment in the history of Senegal. Both the moment and the expression are today inseparable. Abdoulaye Bathily recalls in his *Mémoires* that at the time of the Mali federation, "*schoolboys from Saint-Louis, youth from the PAI their fists clenched and their arms upraised shouting 'MOM SA REW'!*"²⁴⁰.

Although the expression is not used in everyday conversations, it is known enough to be understood when it is mobilized in Senegal. It doesn't reflect a collective intelligence that would be specifically wolof or spread among Senegalese people, it rather empirically illustrates conceptual ties that link appropriation and political subjectivity in a constellation.

We also show the link between the literal sense of a word ("moom" refers to "possess", that is close to "appropriate"), its usage as a designation of Senegal's political independence, and our own argument in this work that appropriation generates political subjectivity. It is not only because it is a Wolof expression that moom sa bopp is interesting, but also because it is used in a particular way.

Moom sa bopp was used by Majhemout Diop and his political party the African Party for Independence (PAI). The general idea also appears in the Fédération des Etudiants d'Afrique Noire (FEANF) motto, whose members were also members of the PAI. Françoise Blum quotes Amady Aly Dieng, FEANF's president in the late 1950s: "*due to the nature of French colonialism, independence is to be conquered not through successive and misleading reforms but through an*

²⁴⁰ Abdoulaye Bathily. Abdoulaye Bathily, *Passion de liberté: mémoires*, Histoire, politique, société (Paris: Présence africaine, 2022), p146

African revolutionary mass struggle”²⁴¹. This is a very Fanonian expression, that doesn’t aim to a mere transfer but promotes a move of appropriation-restitution, that forms a political subjectivity.

On top of coining the expression Moom sa bopp, supporters of the PAI also coined the expression bokk sa reew, to refer to Pan-Africanism (bokk in Wolof can be translated as “to group”), literally meaning “group your country”, as opposed to the dynamics of Balkanisation that happened after independence.

Moom sa bopp makes it clear that since the 1950s independence is not only thought of superficially as a transfer of authority or of competencies or as a norm replacing another. It is not the expression of an oblivious collective intelligence in Senegal that our perspective as a scholar would have “revealed”. It is an expression that took on a political as well as a philosophical meaning and became a concept once it was mobilized to solve locally formulated issues.

²⁴¹ Françoise Blum, « D’une révolte africaine à l’autre : passeurs et transferts », *Monde(s)* 11, n° 1 (2017): 37-60, p47

Conclusion

I decided to subtitle this thesis “Studying Appropriation in World Politics from the Africanization of Security in Senegal” and not just “Africanization of Security in Senegal”. The point was to insist on the reflexive stance adopted throughout this work during the last five years. This dissertation studies an empirical object and it is a reflection on researching African issues.

This is how “Africa on one’s mind” is important: regarding scientific practices as studied in the first part, and political practices in the second part. Constellations of Africanization shed light on Africa as being a political and scientific horizon well beyond its geographical definition. In that regard, the “horizon” of Part II is to be heard as the expected point of arrival, but also the line that is never to be reached. Whether we situate ourselves in 2060 or later, there is little chance for newspapers to one day claim “Security is Africanized!”. This is not because of a lack of political capability in Africa, but because it refers to the formation of political subjectivity: it is a never-ending process.

Theoretical and empirical findings

First, this work confirms Alioune Badara Diop’s view that the state in Africa can’t be looked at without considering senior officials²⁴². This is also true for foreign policy making, while it has for a long time been considered a presidential prerogative. It was time to put at the center of the analysis, for a state with a “disproportionate” diplomacy like Senegal, other institutions of foreign affairs. This thesis also paid attention to the diplomatic activity of major Senegalese figures such as Mamadou Dia and Doudou Thiam.

²⁴² Alioune Badara Diop, « L’État en Afrique : contribution à une sociologie du pouvoir politique institutionnalisé », dans Diallo Ibou et al., *Comprendre le Sénégal et l’Afrique d’aujourd’hui*.

I first stated the importance of situating oneself in the scientific production (in International Relations as well as in African studies). This reflexive work was articulated with scientific inventions of Africa during the late 1960s in a literature that I called orthodox. The next step was to build a clearer picture of Senegalese scientific productions in International Relations, and by doing so, to make them banal.

The epistemic choices of the first part infuse the second part of this thesis, although it is more about empirical issues. The second part integrated African solutions to African problems into the equation in a larger context, both geographically and historically speaking. Geographically because I attempted to “de-Africanize” the Africanization of security (by looking at it with Caribbean thinkers for instance). Historically because I went beyond the 2000s and 1960s to understand this new set of continental policies.

After this conceptual enlargement I proceeded on the contrary to a narrowing of the scale, with the study of Senegal. I argued that in Senegal, Africanization of security contributes to the forming of a national elite already before independence and then in postcolonial institutions (especially in the ministry of Foreign affairs).

Senegalese African policy is closely tied to its political and religious elite since independence. The consultation of the National Archives of Senegal helped me manufacturing a refined periodization of Senegal’s foreign policy in the early years of independence: between 1960 and 1963, the foreign policy is decided by Mamadou Dia as vice-president. Doudou Thiam is the main decision maker in that regard for the period 1963-1968, before a centering of the activities on Senghor’s hands between 1968 and 1980.

This new approach calls for a pluralist reading of Senegal’s foreign policy, that works until today: Abdoulaye Wade was an opponent with an international reputation from 1981 to 2000,

Moustapha Niasse was a Prime minister and a minister of Foreign affairs with a strong personality after that. It appears that the Senegalese foreign policy is closely tied with the country's domestic situation: at the international scale, Senegal plays on its reputation as a stable liberal democracy, as well as on its relatively strong economy, to compensate its low military and demographic weight.

To bring appropriation to the center of the analysis implies to distinguish it with work from other publications about the Africanization of security. Appropriation is the thread that organizes this dissertation. In so doing, it also has a discussion with African philosophers such as Paulin Hountondji and Achille Mbembe. While Hountondji is preoccupied with issues that directly and concretely affect African societies, Mbembe prefers having a global conversation about thinking Living entities from an African perspective²⁴³.

Scaling and back and forth: Senegal, Africa, the Atlantic

Writing this thesis has several times consisted of an equilibrist job because of how narrow the path was between different theoretical fields. Theoretical questions don't get the same attention in every discipline, this is true for the scaling between Senegal, West Africa, Africa, or the Atlantic. All four are pertinent to a certain extent, but to build a strong work concerning contexts that are so fluid? How to pay attention to the specificities of a given context while maintaining a potential generalization, concerning issues that have a long history of epistemic invention?

It is crucial to shed light on the plurality of situations, and this is what I undertook while studying Senegalese diplomacy at the time of its birth. Because the inventions of Africa refer to the continent as a whole, the approach I mobilized to nuance this can be also applied elsewhere in Africa, generalization is possible. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the forms of

²⁴³ Mbembe, *La communauté terrestre*, pp10-12

appropriation that I presented in this thesis are not the unique nor exclusive way for African actors to interact with the rest of the world.

This non-definitive approach is closely tied with the ever-changing characteristics of the writings of Africa. Early in my research the key references in terms of African modes of self-writing were Mudimbe and Mbembe. These references didn't stop renewing themselves until the last weeks of writing, with authors such as Elgas²⁴⁴, Olufemi Taiwo²⁴⁵ or Dipo Faloyin²⁴⁶. African intellectuals never stop thinking reflexively about how they communicate African realities.

A thread that ties this work together is the definition of Africanization as a form of continentalization of security. It can be empirically verified until today with the most recent events that took place in Sahel: on August 16, 2023, the AU PSC dealt with the coup that happened a few days before in Niger, and rejected the idea of a military intervention. Before that, the ECOWAS was on the contrary much more determined to militarily intervene in Niger to restore the President Mohamed Bazoum²⁴⁷. PSC's decision, that contradicts ECOWAS's position, is the sign of a continentalization of how security issues are dealt with in Africa.

Besides, it is to be reminded that the association of Africa with solutions rather than with problems is a more and more powerful rhetoric today, which confirms too the necessity of my approach here. Solutions associated with Africa now go beyond security issues: when the Senegalese president Macky Sall was president of the AU, he claimed to embody "*Africa as a provider of solutions*". The Togolese economist Kako Nubukpo also recently published *A Solution*

²⁴⁴ Elgas et Sophie Bessis, *Les bons ressentiments: essai sur le malaise post-colonial*, Collection Pépites (Paris: Riveneuve, 2023).

²⁴⁵ Olufemi Taiwo, *Against Decolonisation: Taking African Agency Seriously*, African Arguments (London: Hurst & Company, 2022), especially chapter 4 "Decolonise this!"

²⁴⁶ Dipo Faloyin, *Africa Is Not a Country: Breaking Stereotypes of Modern Africa* (New York: Vintage, 2023) et la partie 8: "What's next?"

²⁴⁷ https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/08/16/l-union-africaine-rejette-une-intervention-militaire-au-niger_6185522_3212.html Visited on August 16, 2023

for Africa, where he mobilizes Elinor Ostrom's theory of governing the commons to understand Africa's role in bringing global solutions today.

These examples illustrate a reactive move, what Salim Abdelmajid calls a "negation of Africa's negation", which contributes to the constitution of political subjectivity in Africa. To Nubukpo, "*the search for a solution for Africa is first and foremost about Africa's positioning at a particularly dark time for the planet*"²⁴⁸.

The role of the broker

This work made me realize the importance of brokers in transmitting knowledge. I understood that first through learning wolof. Professor Soda Marième Sy played a central role during my stay at Columbia University, teaching me grammatical aspects of the wolof language as well as practical aspects of life in Senegal. Brokers in transmitting knowledge are key figures in any process of transmission or appropriation. It is all the more accurate when it comes to learning a new language, as Alain Ricard noticed. To Ricard, learning a new language makes students "*more fitted to understand other societies*"²⁴⁹. I fully identified myself in Ricard's words about learning a language as sharing "*learning moments*".

Last but not least, in a context of scientific asymmetry the broker in transmitting knowledge is capital. I heard many scholars explaining how late they encountered iconic authors in African studies, such as Frantz Fanon, and this is all the more veridical for the study of African issues as these texts do not circulate well, including in syllabi. This can also be traced in the late translation of major works from English to French, such as Mudimbe's *The Invention of Africa (The Idea of Africa is yet to be translated)* and Charles Mills' *The Racial Contract*.

²⁴⁸ Kako Nubukpo, *Une solution pour l'Afrique: du néoprotectionnisme aux biens communs* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2022), p21

²⁴⁹ Alain Ricard, « De l'africanisme aux études africaines. Textes et « humanités » », *Afrique & histoire* 2, n° 1 (2004): 171-92, p176

Mobilized frameworks

The epistemological reflections conducted in this work led me to wonder about the materiality of my own scientific production. In the last pages of this thesis, I can observe that the shape of the document that I produced fits with traditional works in the discipline (successive pages following an organized argument with an introduction, two parts and a conclusion). To this can be added an additional frustration: throughout the thesis there is a glimpse of what could be a “Senegalese school” of IR, but at the end of my work I can’t identify such a school, be it African or Senegalese. This position fits with the shape of academic discussions today in that regard, that affirms the impossibility of purely non-Western IR theory²⁵⁰.

There is indeed no IR theory that would be the radical opposite of mainstream theories (which are also not homogenous), and whose reading would make us see world politics in a completely different way. Thoughts on IR are intrinsically the result of hybridization and travels, they vary depending on the concrete problems they face and other factors, but these differences are rather “*almost the same but not quite*” than they are part of a radical otherness. This is why there is no systematic and definitive answer to the question of what is a Senegalese theory of International Relations.

There is indeed a material component in every intellectual production, be it during the phase of writing or during the phase of sources selection, although its effects are difficult to objectivize. In my case, the writing of some parts of my thesis from Ndjamen and Dakar makes it different than if it had been written in Paris exclusively.

²⁵⁰ Ali Bakir, « Islam and International Relations (IR): Why Is There No Islamic IR Theory? », *Third World Quarterly* 44, n° 1 (2 janvier 2023): 22-38

The specificity of African issues seen from Western universities

African studies have a particularity among other disciplines in Western universities, because of the colonial and slave history: people of African descent now constitute part of societies in the Americas and Europe, they participate to their political and cultural definitions. In Europe just like in the US, the experience of Black people is until today related to contemporary representations of Africa.

Malcolm X argued that racism in the US would not stop until there would be no consideration for Africa in the country. This thesis was written between 2018 and 2023, which means that at the same time the Black question was made more visible with the mobilization of Assa Traoré in memory of her brother Adama Traoré, killed in 2016 by the police, and with the manifestations in French suburbs during the summer 2023 following Nahel death in the hand of the police.

Any research on African issues from a French university can't be dissociated from this context. Sociological questions related to people of African descent in France are tied to issues of International Relations. In a collective book written in France in 2017 after the violent interpellation of another Black young boy (Théodore Luhaka), the Togolese artist Elom20ce called for rethinking relations between African countries and France in general. He wondered why, fifty years after most African countries reached independence, so many French officials intervened in African policies, and why African militaries were still trained in French schools (the same that trained the militaries that fought against African revolutionaries before independences)²⁵¹. The author entitles the chapter "Dokuishinono", and he specifies that in Ewe the expression can be translated as "to be in possession of oneself". The parallel with our own argument is obvious,

²⁵¹ Elom20ce, « Dokuishinono : reprendre possession de nous-mêmes », dans Léonora Miano, *Marianne et le garçon noir* (Paris: Pauvert, 2017), 143-44.

which supports the link between appropriation and the constitution of a political subjectivity beyond the Senegalese example.

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Appendix A: Introduction to the Châtaigner report (1959)

National Archives in Senegal, Folder VP00131, File « Extrait du compte-rendu de la session du comité des rapports de la communauté avec les organisations internationales, Paris du 6 au 8 octobre 1959 » ; Text only (extracts), we translate and highlight.

I have the honor to send you the Châtaigner report on the last meeting of the community's relations committee with international organizations which was held in Paris from October 6 to 8, 1959.

The cases of most important international organizations are examined there. The arguments which militate in favor of the participation of our nation - under the flag of Mali - are presented there; emergencies are highlighted.

Will you kindly, after examining these various subjects, share with me the reflections that they could suggest to you, so that I can take the advantage of submitting to the Mali federation, as soon as possible, the point of view of Senegal .

Extract from the report on the session of the community's relations committee with international organizations

Paris, October 6 to 8, 1959

A report from the president, Ambassador OFFROY, opens the committee meeting. This report is intended to take note of the achievements recommended at the June session. It highlights an "advance" in many areas and particularly underlines:

1) The appointment of state nationals to diplomatic and consular functions. These nominations are pending and have only been delayed by some states in providing the files. (Those from Mali are full). Final applications will be received without further delay and appointments will be made within 15 days.

2) The creation of consular posts. It is decided that:

- Koumassi will be open on January 1, 1960
- Bathurst will become, on January 1, 1960, a full-service consulate
- Bissao will become a consulate during the year 1960

3) The association of states in economic and commercial negotiations has come into practice, despite the financial and technical obstacles which often limit it. Very good results were

obtained, notably at the coffee conference where the negotiators from the African and Malagasy states showed a competence and cohesion which greatly impressed foreign delegations. In Lisbon, Portugal, in August a national of Senegal took part in a negotiation on the delimitation of the marine border. Finally, Senegal must soon cooperate in a Franco-Spanish negotiation which will open in Madrid.

Some may have been surprised that the Franco-Tunisian customs union could have been ended without consulting the States. This, says Mr. Offroy, is because this union was specific to the French Republic and Tunisia, and that it did not affect overseas territories.

4) Association with the European economic community has not yet manifested itself, for all the states, in a new form. This is because the preparatory studies have not been completed. However, let us ensure that the states are widely heard in the next debate on the price structure of tropical products, debates which are of primary interest to them. (coffee, cocoa, cotton, wood came in first discussion).

5) At the European Development Fund the association is already better organized: the August 5 instructions provide that the states must be represented in the working group which studies the files. So was Mauritania to that for the (illegible).

6) At the UN, **where the strict uniqueness of the diplomacy of the French Republic and the community must triumph**, the association of states was achieved by the inclusion or the unique delegation of 4 African and Malagasy minister advisors.

7) The joint subcommittee on international economic affairs, which must bring together elements of this committee and that of economic and financial affairs and whose creation was requested at the June session, has not yet been able to meet. The only meeting is material: Mr. Calvot's economic committee must not meet before the second half of October.

8) For states to participate to international conferences, for which the committee had proposed the guidelines in June, the Executive Council of Antananarivo therefore decided:

- That in a political conference, the delegation would be unique for the French Republic and the states of the community (common delegation).

- That in technical conferences, states could have their own delegation.

9) Same principle for membership in international organizations. The eligibility of states in the various institutions was studied by Foreign Affairs which will present the results of their studies during the session. On several occasions, state delegations have already been formed with excellent results. Thus, at the WHO meeting in Nairobi, the cohesion of the African and Malagasy delegations with that of the French Republic had technically very successful effects. It is understood that she particularly impressed the delegates from Ghana and Guinea.

Mr. Offroy then asked if any state wished to add an issue to the agenda. Mali proposes to examine the name of the Council and to make a communication on its relations with the Gambia.

Gabon proposes to discuss the negotiations they wish with Spanish Guinea and its participation in diplomatic or consular staff in this country and soon in Cameroon. These points are included at the end of the agenda.

There was no point in recalling that the envoys from Senegal and Sudan sat for Mali (the only one competent in matters of external relations): this mention appeared on the lists given to the delegates by the secretariat.

The representative of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dorget, proposes to examine both the case of each international organization and that of the conferences which will soon be held under their auspices.

Let's first talk in general about the eligibility of states for these organizations, he wants to emphasize two points:

1) The desire of the French Republic to favor the admission of states as associate members whenever possible.

2) The caution required, whenever the statutes do not provide for an associate member, before seeking to force the doors either by alteration or by solicitation of the statutes.

Indeed, it is then important, before undertaking any action that would be of a political nature, to first safeguard the uniqueness of French diplomacy and the community, then to examine whether it is appropriate to trigger international reactions in chain.

We could perhaps try to have a state admitted as a full member of this or that institution. But immediately there is a risk of around ten requests from Soviet autonomous states and perhaps around forty requests from the United States of North America. It would be extremely imprudent to start such fights. It is, moreover, very unlikely that in the current situation the international community will lend itself to this.

Finally, Mr. Dorget underlines the primordial interest in harmonizing the international action of the community, not only when it will be represented by a single delegation, but also when the associated States will have distinct delegations. Conferences are planned for this purpose before and during the sessions.

After these general remarks, the case of each organization is presented by an expert specially invited for this purpose and whose available time sets the agenda.

Appendix B: Telegram from Senghor to Hammarskjöld

ANS VP 194, « Télégramme à l'intention de Son Excellence Monsieur Dag Hammarskjöld, Secrétaire Général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, New York » ; Text only, we translate

Particularly sensitive to the telegrams by which you announce to me the unanimous decision of the Security Council to propose today the admission of Senegal as a member of the United Nations, I ask you to accept the gratitude of the Senegalese people. Be our interpreter to the members of the Security Council to convey to them our thanks. The unanimity around the candidacy of Senegal which you were pleased to highlight is a crowning achievement of your tireless efforts for the maintenance of peace. The strength of this unanimity, Senegal, a member of the great family of nations, will make it its duty to be an element of progress, a symbol of vitality. Senegal will spare no efforts so that the ideal contained in the United Nations charter triumphs.

LEOPOLD SEDAR SENGHOR

President of the Republic of Senegal