2026 Theses Doctoral

Prospects for an Ethical Foundationalism

Sahu, Amogha B.

In this dissertation, I defend a meta-ethical position-- ‘foundationalism’ about ethics. Foundationalists think that ethical inquiry is like Newtonian physics—ethical questions only get settled when we alight on a unified coherent system of fundamental ethical principles. I believe that ethical thought has foundations, but most ethicists find foundationalism counterintuitive.

First, they worry that any attribution of privileged status to one value over a competing alternative would be objectionably arbitrary. Second, they worry that the possibility of deontic conflict undermines the coherence of foundational obligations (the ‘ought simpliciter’).

Finally, they worry that, since ethics is subjective in being relevant to decision-making, any objective foundation for ethical thought must be objectionably alienating from the first-person practical point of view. I don’t think any of these worries is legitimate. A proper foundationalism is justifiable on widely accepted grounds, compatible with value conflict, and can be explained without excessive alienation. The search for the one true system in ethics is in good standing.