Home

Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty

Richard Holden; Navin Kartik; Olivier Tercieux

Title:
Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty
Author(s):
Holden, Richard
Kartik, Navin
Tercieux, Olivier
Date:
Type:
Working papers
Department:
Economics
Permanent URL:
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Papers
Part Number:
1213-06
Publisher:
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Publisher Location:
New York
Abstract:
We consider full implementation in abstract complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. We also extend our result to settings of incomplete information so long as there is non-exclusive information.
Subject(s):
Economics
Item views:
156
Metadata:
text | xml

In Partnership with the Center for Digital Research and Scholarship at Columbia University Libraries/Information Services | Terms of Use