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The Incumbency Effects of Signalling

Francesco Caselli; Tom Cunningham; Massimo Morelli; Ines Moreno de Barreda

Title:
The Incumbency Effects of Signalling
Author(s):
Caselli, Francesco
Cunningham, Tom
Morelli, Massimo
Moreno de Barreda, Ines
Date:
Type:
Working papers
Department:
Economics
Permanent URL:
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Papers
Part Number:
1213-05
Publisher:
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Publisher Location:
New York
Abstract:
Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a reelection hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for reelection. This generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election. We also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit.
Subject(s):
Political science
Item views:
190
Metadata:
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