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Vertical integration, exclusive dealing, and ex post cartelization

Yongmin Chen; Michael H. Riordan

Title:
Vertical integration, exclusive dealing, and ex post cartelization
Author(s):
Chen, Yongmin
Riordan, Michael H.
Date:
Type:
Working papers
Department:
Economics
Permanent URL:
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Papers
Part Number:
0203-13
Abstract:
A vertically integrated firm has the incentive and ability to use exclusive contracts to foreclose an equally efficient upstream competitor and to effect a cartelization of the downstream industry. Its ability to do so may be limited when downstream firms are heterogeneous and supply contracts are not contingent on uncertain market conditions. The extent of cartelization depends on the degree of downstream market concentration and on the degree to which downstream competition is localized.
Subject(s):
Economics
Business
Item views:
339
Metadata:
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