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The case for auctioning countermeasures in the WTO

Kyle Bagwell; Petros C. Mavroidis; Robert W. Staiger

Title:
The case for auctioning countermeasures in the WTO
Author(s):
Bagwell, Kyle
Mavroidis, Petros C.
Staiger, Robert W.
Date:
Type:
Working papers
Department:
Economics
Permanent URL:
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Papers
Part Number:
0405-08
Publisher:
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Publisher Location:
New York
Abstract:
A major accomplishment of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in creating the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the introduction of new dispute settlement procedures. These procedures were intended to provide a significant step forward, relative to GATT, in the settling of trade disputes, in large part by ensuring that violations of WTO commitments would be met with swift retaliation ("suspension of concessions") by the affected trading partners. While the dispute settlement procedures of the WTO indeed represent a considerable improvement over those in GATT, nine years of experience under the new procedures suggests that significant problems of enforcement remain in the WTO.
Subject(s):
Economics
Item views:
176
Metadata:
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