Working papers:
Cores of non-atomic market games
Massimiliano Amarante; Fabio Maccheroni; M. Marinacci; L. Montrucchio
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- Title:
- Cores of non-atomic market games
- Author(s):
-
Amarante, Massimiliano
Maccheroni, Fabio
Marinacci, M.
Montrucchio, L. - Date:
- 2005
- Type:
- Working papers
- Department:
- Economics
- Permanent URL:
- http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:458
- Series:
- Department of Economics Discussion Papers
- Part Number:
- 0506-10
- Publisher:
- Department of Economics, Columbia University
- Publisher Location:
- New York
- Abstract:
- We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2], and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [12]. We show that the core of such games is norm compact and we provide some representation results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our results.We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative.
- Subject(s):
- Economic theory
- Item views:
- 253