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Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions

Eiichi Miyagawa

Title:
Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions
Author(s):
Miyagawa, Eiichi
Date:
Type:
Working papers
Department:
Economics
Permanent URL:
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Papers
Part Number:
0102-16
Publisher:
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Publisher Location:
New York
Abstract:
This paper provides simple four-stage game forms that fully implement a large class of two-person bargaining solutions in subgame-perfect equilibrium. The solutions that can be implemented by our game forms are those that maximize a monotonic and quasi-concave function of utilities after normalizing each agent's utility function so that the maximum utility is 1 and the utility of the disagreement outcome is 0. This class of solutions includes the Nash, Kalai, Smorodinsky, and Relative Utilitarian solutions. The game forms have a structure of alternating offers and contain no integer device.
Subject(s):
Economic theory
Item views:
247
Metadata:
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