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School choice: A mechanism design approach

Atila Abdulkadiroglu; Tayfun Sönmez

Title:
School choice: A mechanism design approach
Author(s):
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila
Sönmez, Tayfun
Date:
Type:
Working papers
Department:
Economics
Permanent URL:
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Papers
Part Number:
0203-18
Publisher:
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Publisher Location:
New York
Abstract:
A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appeals by unsatisfied parents. We formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle. We show that these existing plans have serious shortcomings, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.
Subject(s):
Education policy
Public policy
Item views:
249
Metadata:
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