Working papers:
Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
Effrosyni Diamantoudi; Eiichi Miyagawa; Licun Xue
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- Title:
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Author(s):
-
Diamantoudi, Effrosyni
Miyagawa, Eiichi
Xue, Licun - Date:
- 2002
- Type:
- Working papers
- Department:
- Economics
- Permanent URL:
- http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:353
- Series:
- Department of Economics Discussion Papers
- Part Number:
- 0102-65
- Publisher:
- Department of Economics, Columbia University
- Publisher Location:
- New York
- Abstract:
- This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable matching. This implies that, starting from any unstable matching, the process of allowing a randomly chosen blocking pair to form converges to a stable matching with probability one. This result generalizes those of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) and Chung (2000) under strict preferences.
- Subject(s):
- Economic theory
- Item views:
- 271