GAD and Gender Mainstreaming: A Pathway to Sustainable Development?

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Brief biography: Alletta, who recently completed a two-year tenure in Great Britain as a Marshall Scholar, holds Masters degrees in Human Rights from the London School of Economics, and International and European Politics from the University of Edinburgh. In addition, she has a B.A. in History and Women’s Studies at the University of Oregon. Her areas of interest include: international political discourse, normative change, and women’s and human rights. This paper, which was originally written for a class on Gender and Development at the University of Edinburgh, arose from the early stages of research for her masters thesis on the pseudo-feminist language deployed by the U.S. Bush Administration in its description and justification of the ‘War on Terror,’ especially with regard to the invasion of Afghanistan, and the question of whether this discourse represented actual changes to U.S. development strategy. A shortened version of this thesis, “Speaking Transformation: US Foreign Policy Discourse and the Language of Feminism,” is forthcoming in the Journal of International Women’s Studies.
Scholarly Abstract

In recent years there has been increased attention to the importance of gender in securing long-term development goals. Consensus has now been reached that increasing the social status and economic capacity of women is an effective way of improving outcomes. The subject of this paper is the viability of the ‘Gender and Development’ (GAD) paradigm as a means of establishing socially and politically sustainable gains for women in developing countries. The author examines the GAD paradigm using the case study of ‘Gender Mainstreaming’ in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan since 2001. Through an analysis of some of the problems encountered so far, the author questions whether such an approach is likely to actually result in long-term, sustainable improvement in that country. Three key issues include: marginalization of ‘Gender Mainstreaming’; lack of state capacity; and failures to fully integrate programs into social and cultural contexts. Though reconstruction efforts have clearly resulted in some improvement, it is argued that it is unclear whether such an approach will lead to long-term progress. Rather, there is strong evidence that GAD can actually contribute to the further politicization of gender and result in a backlash against reforms. Ultimately, the goals that the GAD paradigm attempts to achieve are extremely difficult to translate into effective practice, especially in highly volatile and politicized situations. In conclusion, the author finds that sustainable and transformative change may be elusive if one simply applies new aims to old models of aid provision.
Author’s Note

A great deal of feminist scholarship focuses either on how the world we live in is rife with inequality and injustice. What is often missing in between however is a road map for how it may be possible to overcome these problems to envision and create a better future. The field of development, on the other hand, tends to be concerned primarily with pragmatic questions of how we can improve the lives of people around the world. In this context, the ‘end point’ of such efforts is often uncritically assumed. A feminist approach to development attempts in many ways to bring together these two disparate tendencies, combining a critical standpoint with a pragmatic approach. However appealing such an approach may seem, however, it is perhaps unsurprising that feminist models of development have often proved incredibly problematic, both in theory and practice. A feminist approach to development reveals particular challenges for the goals of sustainable development. For, while it is argued that gender equality is a necessary step in creating sustainable development, how to create such change in socially and politically sustainable ways remains unresolved. The holistic and transformative aims that gender-sensitive approaches to development aspire to are incredibly difficult to realize. In the end, to achieve these, it may be necessary to conceive of a wholly different model of aid provision.

Keywords: Gender, Development, Mainstreaming, Afghanistan, Post-conflict Reconstruction
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Until recently, the issue of gender\(^1\) has tended to be ignored and undervalued by the development community. Providers of aid have paid little attention to the particular needs and problems of women and likewise have failed to recognize the importance of their well being for the overall success of the societies in which they live. Since the 1970s however, a shift in thinking has been under way. Ester Boserup’s landmark study on agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa, published in 1970, pointed to the crucial role of women’s labor in sustaining local and international economies.\(^2\) Since then, feminist scholars across a range of disciplines have sought to show how women act as essential players in the economic, social and cultural development of their societies and how gender-sensitivity is a crucial part of sustainable development.\(^3\) As a result of this work there has been a monumental shift in attitudes among development practitioners. Increasingly, aid donors, providers and scholars alike have come to recognize the links between the status and welfare of women and a whole range of development goals, from political stability and economic growth to environmental sustainability. As the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action proclaimed: “The advancement of women and the achievement of equality between women and men are a matter of human rights and a condition for social justice… they are the only way to build a sustainable, just and developed society.”\(^4\) Promoting ‘gender equality’ would be identified as a key component of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals.\(^5\) More recently, the passage of UN Resolution 1325, which declared that the empowerment of women was critical to the processes of both peacemaking and democratization, has affirmed this view.\(^6\) Across the board, investment in a country’s women has proven to be one of the most effective and cost-efficient means of generating substantial and sustainable development gains.\(^7\)

A significant manifestation of the growing recognition of the special role women play in development has been the creation of new gender-sensitive paradigms for aid provision. One of the most important of these is the ‘Gender and Development’ (GAD) approach, which evolved in the late 1980s in response to the limitations of earlier attempts at feminist development practice, such as a continued marginalization of women and a limited capacity for transformational change.\(^8\) Defined and promoted by the theoretical work of both ‘Third World’ and socialist
feminists in the ‘West,’ the GAD approach argues that development programs cannot be successful if they only take on economic problems in isolation of the social and political structures that underlie all transactions. Individual capacity to command and allocate resources is just as important as access to them in the first place.9 Thus, drawing on the theoretical foundations of radical feminism,10 and in contrast with other paradigms for women and development, which have tended to focus on women in isolation from larger development programs, GAD draws attention to how sexual difference is constructed and inscribed via gender on social, political and economic relations within the communities where development programs function and to the ways in which these relations play a role in the need for assistance in the first place.11 As a result, it seeks not just to meet basic, material needs but to make women (and men) aid recipients aware of the structural inequalities that lead to poverty and to engage them as agents in their own improvement and thereby create more lasting and sustainable change.12 In other words, the GAD approach goes beyond simply trying to integrate women into development, but argues that the whole mode by which development operates must be transformed in order to take on social and political transformation in addition to economic reallocation.13 In this way, GAD aims to change the social, economic and political structures that contribute to the need for external assistance in the first place—empowering women in all aspects of their lives as a means of strengthening the foundations of their societies.14

The GAD framework offers a new and appealing way of thinking about the goals and means of development because it presents the recipients of aid in a more holistic light and doesn’t shy away from culture and politics.15 One key strategy for the implementation of a GAD approach that has emerged is ‘Gender Mainstreaming,’ which seeks to end the oppositional dualism between ‘women’s issues’ and the rest of politics, economics and culture by bringing women ‘in from the periphery.’16 On one level, this involves making the structures of government and civil society sensitive to women’s needs. However, at the same time, mainstreaming also means bringing women into the public sphere by increasing their participation. Nonetheless, putting a Gender Mainstreaming program into practice poses a number of difficult problems. How should international development programs go about implementing this kind of approach? Should change come from the bottom up through the grassroots work of non-governmental organizations? Or, can it only come from the top down via aggressive intervention from the state? The possibility of this kind of transformation implies a
process of re-structuring social and economic relations on a broad scale. How does one actually set in motion this sort of process and even then, how can we measure its ‘progress’? Finally, does the whole idea of directing this kind of cultural and political change from the outside (as the whole development framework implies) render such a program problematically imperialistic?

Despite a perceptible shift in thinking within the international community towards a gender-sensitive approach, GAD has largely remained on the sidelines of large-scale development programs. However, one exception has been the application of a GAD approach to the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan since 2001, primarily through the strategy of Gender Mainstreaming. In this case, the goal of improving the status and welfare of Afghan women was defined both as a central goal of development in of itself and as a means of achieving greater efficiency for resources spent. In accordance, a flurry of Gender Mainstreaming programs and initiatives would emerge in the years immediately following the overthrow of the Taliban. However, realities on the ground in the country have proven that the broader transformative agenda that GAD embodies is extremely difficult to translate into effective practice. While programs may have helped improve the welfare of Afghan women in some contexts up to the present, it is unclear whether a GAD approach articulated through Gender Mainstreaming is capable of ensuring the social and political sustainability of such changes.

After decades of relative isolation, Afghanistan reappeared on the geopolitical stage in late 2001, when in the wake of the September 11th bombings in the USA it became the first of a series of targets in the international ‘War on Terror.’ Ironically, though the terrorism that the United States was reacting against had little to do with gender specifically, issues of culture, religion and political rights became the sites where the U.S. clash with Al Queda could be measured, and the issue of ‘women’s rights’ in Afghanistan became a focus of attention. Thus, Afghan women were suddenly thrown into the international limelight as the embodiment of the kind of oppression Muslim terrorist groups like Al Queda allegedly intended to impose on the entire world. As First Lady Laura Bush proclaimed: “The brutal oppression of women is a central goal of the terrorists...[The regime in Afghanistan] is the world the terrorists would like to impose on the rest of us.” In this vein, the Bush Administration quickly adopted a kind of pseudo-feminist rhetoric in its framing of the Afghanistan invasion. Using the emancipation of Afghan women as a means of justifying the war, the Bush Administration began to insist “the
fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women.” Accordingly, in the aftermath of the fall of the Taliban, many saw the ‘liberation’ of Afghanistan’s women as a litmus test for the success of the re-building and ‘modernization’ of this former ‘failed state.’ It is upon this backdrop that the GAD approach was adopted as a guiding principle in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and that Afghanistan itself became a sort of testing ground for the application of GAD on a broad scale.

With the establishment of a new government in Afghanistan pursuant to the Bonn Agreement, which was signed in December 2001, advancing women’s status and welfare by a variety of mechanisms became a central tenet of state-building and development strategy in Afghanistan, with the express goal of reversing Taliban era restrictions on women’s lives and furthering their advancement in Afghan society overall. As the new government’s National Development Strategy proclaimed: “The government’s goal is to eliminate discrimination against women, develop their human capital and promote their leadership in order to guarantee their full and equal participation in all aspects of life in Afghanistan.” Likewise, many of the key donors in the reconstruction also took up an aggressive GAD standpoint, with USAID for example proclaiming that "that gender be integrated into all of the work of USAID in order to contribute to effective programs, social equity, and sustainable change." The development program in Afghanistan has thus sought to apply a GAD framework in several ways, each attempting to engage women’s strategic as well as immediate needs.

Building from the framework established by the Bonn Agreement, Gender Mainstreaming in Afghanistan since 2001 has taken a number of forms. One of the most prominent of these has been in the political sphere: from the writing of specific rights and protections for women into the state’s new Constitution and other laws, to mandating minimum levels of female participation in the country’s new governing structures via a gender quota system for the election of parliamentary representatives, which reserves a quarter of seats for female candidates. Due in large part to such policies and laws, the percentage of women representatives and civil servants in the new Afghan government is relatively high, even compared to more-developed countries in the West. Likewise, a number of specific institutional organizations and mechanisms have been created with the aim of furthering Gender Mainstreaming and women’s advancement, namely: the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, charged with developing and implementing mainstreaming projects into other government ministries; the Office of the State
Minister for Women, responsible for advising the president; the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, which both ensures that Afghan laws are in agreement with international standards and monitors conditions within the country; and a Gender Advisory Group to help with mainstreaming and work with donors. At the same time, development projects, particularly in the urban area of Kabul, have spent considerable energy raising the level of participation among Afghani women and getting them involved as much as possible in community politics. Finally, a significant component of Mainstreaming efforts have been ‘gender training’ projects—often in tandem with other programs directed at ‘capacity building’—which attempt to educate and inform both ordinary Afghans as well as community leaders about ‘gender issues’ and thereby gain their appreciation and support for the goal of female empowerment in that country.

On the surface of things, Gender Mainstreaming has had a significant impact on the development of the new Afghan state. For example, the new government has proclaimed establishment of a “broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government” one of its central goals. Across the country, women are entering the public sphere—from thousands of girls returning to newly constructed schools to the large-scale participation of women in the nation’s first presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2005. The new Constitution proclaims formal equality and non-discrimination between women and men, and in the new National Assembly over a quarter of seats are held by women, a vast improvement over the three percent who held seats in 1990. Similarly, ten percent of government employees at the ministerial level today are women. Likewise, the building of hospitals and schools, often with a focus on providing specially for women’s basic needs, have played a real and important role in healing wounds left by decades of war.

However despite these apparent successes, serious problems hamper the advancement of the GAD agenda, resulting in significant gaps between women’s formal and substantive rights. One reason for this may be the structural nature of the gender inequalities Gender Mainstreaming seeks to overcome. For, even though the need for Mainstreaming has been well recognized in Afghanistan, efforts to put the approach into practice have inevitably been subject to the same forces that make it necessary in the first place. Despite a large amount of fanfare on the progress of women’s rights in the country, Mainstreaming has tended to be sidelined—made a feature of ‘special initiatives’ aimed at certain women, rather than integrated into the whole country’s development and democratization. For example, while the new government promptly
established the new Ministry of Women’s Affairs as stipulated by the Bonn Agreement, it gave the new ministry neither the legal jurisdiction nor the powers needed to implement its policies. Similarly, though the new Constitution proclaims equal rights, many have criticized its overall weak language and many loopholes, which ultimately undermine and weaken the legal protections it affords. At the same time those programs aimed at creating this transformation have tended to be marginalized in the funding they have received from international donors, as the vast majority of funds have been diverted instead to the nation’s security needs. These days, it appears that Gender Mainstreaming (and with it the whole GAD agenda in Afghanistan) has been progressively left behind in favor of other concerns. As one NGO worker has noted: “In 2001, after the fall of the Taliban, improving the rights of Afghan women was at the top of the international agenda; [Now], despite many well-intentioned programs for women, women’s human rights appears to be more of an afterthought.” Indeed, even the United States, which was integrally involved with the advancement of women in Afghanistan in the past, seems to have lost interest. In USAID's 2008 "Afghanistan Strategy" no mention was made whatsoever of the particular role of Gender Mainstreaming or of women's empowerment at all as a key goal or benchmark for progress in that country. Indeed, the last time USAID published any report specific to gender issues in Afghanistan was in 2006. While the War in Iraq has largely taken over the focus of US foreign policy and development assistance, the United States apparent special concern for Afghan women also seems to have diminished significantly.

Moreover, even those Mainstreaming efforts that have been fully implemented have had debatable success. For example, despite aggressive efforts to bring women into the formal structures of governance, it is reported by observers that even when they do take part, women continue to be excluded from the actual decision-making processes where policy is made, raising questions about the actual impact of such measures. For example, despite a significant female presence at the nation’s first constitutional assembly (“Loya Jirga”), it was extremely difficult for these women to either work together or push ‘women’s issues’ to the front of the agenda. In fact, some argue, rather than create community support for the empowerment of Afghan women, there is some evidence that Mainstreaming has had the opposite effect, especially among those ordinary Afghans for whom the Western vision of the oppressed Afghan woman has never held much resonance. Instead, many seem to find this focus disingenuous and troubling. As one woman lamented: “Right now our women are all over the place, being used for politics, used like
dolls… Every event they are in front of the TV, the camera. They are being used just to show that women were there. Despite large scale attempts to normalize the involvement of women in public decision-making, the attitudes of most Afghans appear unchanged; they feel that only ‘educated’ women (who make up a very tiny portion of the overall population) ought to participate and then only in certain ways, with men remaining ultimately dominant. Likewise, even as women have been increasingly encouraged to take public roles, using these to actually challenge gender inequality has proven to be extremely difficult. More often than not, these women have tended to find it necessary to accede to more traditional norms in order to be accepted as legitimate. Finally, despite all the programs targeting them, women in Afghanistan remain for the most part politically disengaged—far less likely than men to be aware of important political developments or to vote.

These realities highlight the very real tensions inherent any time development projects become intertwined with the complex politics of state building. For even as gender has become a dominant rhetorical theme, translating this rhetoric into effective practice in an environment that lacks both political strength and stability has proven exceedingly difficult. Decades of conflict and turmoil have left Afghanistan a largely fragmented nation, split along regional, ethnic and even family lines, with many parts of the country largely outside of the national government’s influence and control. Enforcing a national policy on women’s rights in the nation’s periphery has thus posed a monumental task that the new Afghan government has not always been able to carry out. Likewise, while Mainstreaming may have helped make some more sensitive to women’s issues, the goals of Gender Mainstreaming have overall remained a peripheral concern in Afghan politics. In the end, even as the new government has made genuine attempts to promote gender equality, these ideals have had to compete with the necessity of political maneuvering and coalition building. Ultimately, in a context where the national government itself is incredibly weak and the judiciary very limited in capacity, the appropriateness of the kind of top-down approach that Gender Mainstreaming requires has in many ways proven questionable.

The effectiveness of Gender Mainstreaming as a means to social and cultural transformation in Afghanistan has also been limited by the nature of Mainstreaming itself. For, while it has clearly been effective at increasing the participation of at least some women in the public sphere, Mainstreaming is less adept at addressing gender inequalities in the private sphere.
Thus, even with the participation of women in government at an all time high and many new laws and policies aimed at combating them, problems like forced marriage and domestic violence have continued unabated.\textsuperscript{50} One reason for this may be the way that Mainstreaming tends to focus on certain groups of women in isolation from the social ties that are so central to the way gender is defined and expressed in Afghan culture.\textsuperscript{51} For Afghans, ‘woman’ is an interconnected and contested source of Afghan identity and political orientation that is seen as important and deserving of protection: “Women have always been, and remain, wards of their families and communities...The domestic domain and the control of women are among the most jealously guarded areas in the reproduction of sub-national identities.”\textsuperscript{52} Conflicts over gender in Afghanistan have always been related to larger socio-political tensions, such as that between those Western-educated elite Afghans in urban areas who today act as the representative voice of the whole of Afghanistan in the development process,\textsuperscript{53} and the conservative majority of the country which live in rural areas.\textsuperscript{54} Likewise, Afghans understand the identity ‘woman’ in far more complex, relational terms than acknowledged by the dominant stereotype of ‘oppressed victim.’\textsuperscript{55} As one ethnographer has argued:

Contemporary scholarly and humanitarian discourses evolve around the victimisation of Afghan women, employ culture as a deterministic explanatory device and use Islamic fundamentalism as represented by the Taliban as a scapegoat to summarily account for all forms of distress in Afghanistan…[These tropes fail] to account for how gender has been inflected by violence, war and occupation and subsequently what work war and its accompanying forces have performed on social institutions, family structure and individual subjectivities.\textsuperscript{56}

Development projects that attempt to target women, especially certain classes of women such as widows, in isolation from these relational fields results in a situation where development projects neither acknowledge the experiences of Afghans--men and women alike--nor respond to the true dimensions of their needs.\textsuperscript{57}

Indeed, despite its emphasis on ‘gender’ (instead of simply on ‘women’) men have been almost entirely left out the transformative agenda. As one 2004 survey found, no development workers interviewed could come up with a single Mainstreaming program that meaningfully incorporated men as well as women. If the Mainstreaming project in Afghanistan ultimately fails to include the whole of Afghan society in its transformative project, it risks inciting resentment and frustration and setting off a reactionary response that is all-too-familiar. As one Afghan man reported, to most men Gender Mainstreaming means: “increasing the power of women while
decreasing the power of men. Women over men. Such attitudes are further deepened by the mistrust and hostility that many Afghans feel toward foreign aid and development in general, as unhelpful and self-serving, or as the popular Afghan phrase puts it: “like cows who drink their own milk.” While it may be too early to gauge the full political consequences of such perceptions, there is increasing evidence that a backlash is already occurring, often in the form of increased violence against women, both in the home and in public spaces.

In the end, the big problem may not be the mainstreaming of Afghan women into the public sphere, but the incorporation of the country’s men and women into a more holistic and gender-aware development program that not only seeks to increase their participation, but that aims to empower women along with their whole families and communities so that they can live better and more secure lives. Sadly, Gender Mainstreaming as it has been realized in Afghanistan today has tended to fall short of this goal. As one scholar has criticized: Gender Mainstreaming programs in Afghanistan today seem like they “may have more to do with international politics and the agendas of external agencies than with meeting the felt and expressed needs of the majority of Afghan women.” This is extremely problematic, because not only do such perceptions lead to a sense that the goals of GAD are illegitimate, they risk inciting a sense among Afghans that the prospect of changes to gender relations at all poses a threat to the very fabric of Afghan society. The project of creating greater gender equality in Afghanistan is not a new one, and in the past such attempts have often been seen in just such a light and been faced with stiff resistance. The danger of inciting a backlash is very real and should be taken very seriously by proponents of Gender Mainstreaming today in Afghanistan. More than anything, Afghans must view Mainstreaming with a sense of ‘ownership’ as something legitimately rooted in their own culture and traditions, not as a pet project of outside aid groups, no matter how well meaning they are.

In conclusion, Gender Mainstreaming has not lived up to its promise as the means of transforming gender in post-war Afghanistan. One reason for this is the way Mainstreaming has been executed as a policy. For, in the overall reconstruction effort Mainstreaming has tended to be marginalized and this lack of commitment has only worsened over time. Rather than becoming established as a new way of doing things, there has instead been a gradual decline in attention and resources paid to the advancement of women and a return instead to traditional, technocratic development programs that ignore gender completely. While an ongoing lack of
security in Afghanistan due to continued fighting has no doubt played some part in this trend, one cannot wonder if this may also be due to the fact that the novelty of GAD has worn a bit thin for the countries and organizations that have so far been the lead drivers of development policy in the country. Indeed, as the attention of the United States and many of its allies has progressively turned toward Iraq, resources directed toward women in that conflict and for that matter any discussion of GAD at all have been almost entirely absent. Such a lack of sustained interest may be one of the biggest barriers of all for the success of GAD and Gender Mainstreaming in Afghanistan; after all, if there is one thing more than all others that large-scale societal transformations require, it is a sustained and long-term commitment. As it stands today, the lack of such commitment in Afghanistan is creating a real danger that GAD and with it Gender Mainstreaming will become seen as little more than a fashionable set of ‘buzz words’ devoid of actual meaning.

However, not all of the problems I have highlighted in this paper can be attributed to lack of commitment and effective implementation. Some are related to the inherent limitations of Mainstreaming as a strategy. GAD cannot be effective in transforming gender relations if it only means placing women in the political arena and ‘gender’ on the agenda, or as some have said ‘adding women and stirring.’ Other structural dimensions of gender inequality such as family organization and economic independence must also be addressed, and Mainstreaming is in many ways not well suited to addressing these. As a result of such limitations, some have raised the question of whether Mainstreaming, or in fact any strategy of GAD will ever manage to accomplish the goal of long-term sustainable change. For, a fundamental transformation of ‘gender’ may not be unattainable via the kinds of externally driven, technocratic-focused projects that make up the bulk of development practice today. As one scholar has noted:

A more creative engagement with the complexities of the politics of gender, which is laden [there] as elsewhere with its own historical baggage, would mandate a contextual, non-technocratic approach which requires temporal horizons, levels of commitment and types of coalition building and collaborating which far exceed the time frames and resources of ‘project’ cycles.

More often than not, there has been a tendency in recent years for organizations to take up the language of GAD while continuing to apply the same old kinds of strategies to their work. In many ways, one can argue that Mainstreaming is exactly this sort of old strategy. For though the concept of Gender Mainstreaming may fit well into the theoretical aims of GAD, its tendency to
take this kind of top-down form may mean it is not an ideal strategy for achieving these goals. For, by focusing almost exclusively on formal equality, it fails to take into account the vast complexity that a successful transformation of gender relations would actually require. Gender Mainstreaming is an inherently ‘blunt’ instrument, where something much more flexible, creative and grassroots-oriented is needed.

In the end, however, one should not take the limitations of Gender Mainstreaming to mean that GAD simply cannot work. Gender Mainstreaming remains only one tactic for achieving gender transformation, and as it stands today, there have been so few attempts at implementing a large-scale GAD development program it is impossible to say what outcomes are actually possible. Moreover, those few attempts that have been made, such as in Afghanistan, have not had nearly enough time to truly reveal all their impacts. Before we can close the book on GAD, far more creative and committed attempts to implement this approach will be needed. For, ultimately, if GAD can ever hope to be successful, one thing is clear: it will require a whole range of localized tactics rather than one single strategy, and many years of stanch work, not just a few. However, in spite of the many challenges its application in Afghanistan has revealed, GAD remains a crucial link for achieving more sustainable development everywhere in the world. For, in order to create truly sustainable outcomes, development must encompass and uplift whole communities, women as well as men, and to this end GAD presents the most thoughtful and nuanced approach yet.
Works Cited:


1 In general usage, the term ‘gender’ tends to be interchangeable with ‘sex.’ However, ‘gender’ is actually distinct from biological sex in that it describes the social aspects of being a man or woman. As Beckwith describes it: Gender is made up of “socially constructed, fluid, politically relevant identities, values, conventions and practices conceived as masculine and/or feminine” which are mapped in multidimensional ways onto political structures, rules and norms (131).

2 See Boserup.

3 Visvanathan et al, 1-29; and Parpart et al, 31-36.

4 Quoted in Richey, 247.


6 United Nations Secretary General; and Cohn, 1430-40.

7 See Roy, Tisdell and Blomqvist, 4-24.

8 Parpart et al, 62.

9 Jaquette and Summerfield, 5-6.

10 Parpart et al., 62. In general, Radical Feminism is the school of feminist thought that challenges the construction of sex and gender in society and aims for the transformation of these relations. For a discussion on radical feminism and some examples of radical feminist theory, see Kemp and Squires.

11 Ravazi and Miller, 12, 27-40.

12 Parpart et al., 63; and Visvanathan et al, 51-54.

13 Ravazi and Miller, 27-30.

14 Jaquette and Summerfield, 87-106. This argument is also made in Chant and Gutmann.

15 Marchand and Parpart, 180, 204-207.

16 See Walby, 321-325.
Ravazi and Miller, 31-40.

For more discussion about the use of a GAD approach by non-governmental organizations in the development sector, see the journal Gender and Development, published three times annually by Oxfam and Routledge.

In Afghanistan, the line between reconstruction and development is very blurred. Much of what is currently being ‘rebuilt’ was actually destroyed not in the most recent conflict but over the course of the many different wars that have devastated the country repeatedly in the last fifty years. Moreover, in many cases it can be argued that much of what is being ‘rebuilt’ was never there in the first place to start. This issue is not limited to Afghanistan. For more on this critique of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ see Englebert and Tull.


First Lady Laura Bush, on CNN 17 November 2001, quoted in Khattak, 221.

Kandiyoti “Politics”, 1; Ferguson, 9-24; and Khattak, 221-223.

Ferguson, 22.

See USAID, 3; and Kandiyoti “Politics”, 15-32.


Rojos and Aziz, 5. Similarly, in USAID’s Strategic Plan for 2005-210, the empowerment of women as a means of creating an environment of ‘social inclusion’ was identified as a crucial aspect of sustainable development and the goal of achieving ‘gender equity’ proclaimed to be built into ‘every-aspect’ of USAID’s program; see “Afghanistan Strategic Plan,” 5-11, 15.

Wardak et al. 84; also See Oates and Helal.

According to the most recent numbers available, 25.9 percent of seats in the Afghan Parliament and held by women. See Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007/8.

Kandiyoti “Politics”, 16.

Abirafeh, 7-13.

Kandiyoti “Politics”, 17. Also see United Nations Development Programme.

Amnesty “No One Listens”, 2.

Greenblatt-Harrison, 9; and National Development Strategy, 21.


This marginalization also continues to be reflected in the approaches and priorities of major aid providers. For example, Hirschmann argues that even though it often employs a rhetoric of gender
sensitivity, USAID continues to exclude “women’s specific constraints and contributions” from broader policy analyses (in Jaquette and Summerfield 71-86).

36 This language comes from the Preamble to the Bonn Agreement. Quoted in Khattak, 225.

37 Khattak, 224.

38 According to the latest figures available the per capita aid received was $110.7 (in US dollars). Though this has gone up from $76.6 in 2004, it still compares unfavorably with aid received in other countries.


Ironically, the percentage of aid from the USA has earmarked for women has been even lower, just $189 million out of $4.2 billion! See Greenblatt-Harrison et al., 18; and Rehn and Sirleaf, 24.

39 Human Rights Watch, 4 (Quoted in Abirafeh, 8).


41 Wardak et. al., 10, 97-98.

42 See Khattak, 225-226 and Oates and Helal, 24-35.

43 Quoted in Abirafeh, 8.

44 Kamal, 406-409.

45 Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium, 27. Women’s lack of ‘knowledge’ is a common justification for their exclusion in public decision-making. See Wakefield.


47 Barakat, 98, 100-105; Suhrke, 4-5.

48 Khattak, 225-228. In the period of the civil war rural warlords galvanized support precisely on the issue of resisting imposed reforms on gender relations and today many these same leaders remain in power.

49 Kandiyoti “Political Fiction”, 135.

50 Kandiyoti “Politics”, 24-27; and Amnesty “Women Still Under Attack.”

51 Barakat, 125.

52 Kandiyoti “Politics”, 12.

53 Suhrke, 7-10.

54 Khattak, 218-219; and Barakat, 117-118. According to the most recent numbers, more than seventy percent of Afghans live in rural areas. See United Nations Human Development Report: Afghanistan (2007/8), Section 5: “Demographic Trends.”


56 Dualatzai, 299.

57 Dualatzai, 293, 304-305.
58 Abirafeh, 13. Also see Kandiyoti “Politics”, 30.
59 Suhrke, 5.
60 See Human Rights Watch; and Amnesty “No One Listens.”
61 Barakat, 109.
62 Moghadam, 35-53.
63 Margesson and Kronenfeld, 5-8.
64 Parpart et al, 64.
65 Kandiyoti “Political Fiction”, 136.