In Defense of Close Reading and Close Listening

By Stephen Blum

Alan Lessem in memoriam

Whatever we write about music is informed (in more ways than we can recognize) by our responses to works, genres, theories, performances, performers, and to many other factors, some of which we treat as "extra-musical." As musicians and as writers, we enact our interpretations of prior interpretive acts. As scholars, we also reflect on the history of our modes of interpretation and compare them with other ways of responding.

These points offer one approach to a question posed by the organizers of this symposium: "With a life that extends well beyond the historical era in which it had its genesis, does the musical work (or any artistic work) require a special kind of historiography?" At the very least, the production and reproduction of music require a historiography that enables us to discover some of the prior interpretive moves that have eluded our consciousness. A number of these moves, but by no means all, will have involved responses to works. We have no good reason to isolate histories of our interactions with works from histories of our interactions with (for example) musical instruments, musicians, spirits, patrons, melody types, stories, and aesthetic theories. A Persian musician who continues to discover new aspects of Segāh and Chahārgāh has established a relationship to these dastgāhs (systems of melodic models) that may well resemble the relationship of a German or a Korean pianist to the Beethoven sonatas and Das wohltemperierte Klavier. In both cases, the relationship between the musician and the models or works is the product of a very long series of social interactions, and the most exhaustive histories can represent only a small proportion of these interactions.

Music histories are histories of performances and of modes or styles of performance. Every act of composition is an act of performance, whether or not the composer draws up a detailed plan for use in future performances. Because there are so many variables in all aspects of performance (the resources and instruments, purposes and consequences, etc.), we should not take a small selection of these as the "primary concerns" or the "central problems" of music historians. One of our special tasks as music historians is to trace the changing relationships between the knowledge and actions of musicians in various times and places, and the theories and practices of people who followed other vocations and avocations. As products of these changing relationships, musicological disciplines help us to register and interpret the changes.

It has often happened, of course, that a fund of terms, metaphors, and
stories elaborated with respect to music has been adopted and transformed by critics and practitioners of literary, visual, or kinetic arts. For example, the language of Chinese texts dealing with the criticism of poetry and painting is deeply indebted to earlier Chinese musicology. Similarly, when Jacques Derrida speaks of texts in which “the labor of writing is no longer a transparent ether” but “catches our attention and forces us . . . to work with it,” his words may remind us, once again, of the indebtedness of modern European poetry and painting to modern European music and ideas about music.

A Musical View of the Universe, the title of Ellen Basso’s excellent monograph on Kalapalo myth and ritual performances, would serve equally well for books on many other subjects, as would An Unmusical View of the Universe (not yet used as a title, so far as I know). In the late twentieth century few of us expect to find “a musical view of the universe” at the centers of political and economic power. It is difficult even to imagine what such a view might entail for those who hold power, other than “a radical aestheticizing of the political consciousness or subconscious” and a fascist “transfiguration of brute force through intoxication born of the spirit of music.” In many familiar myths, the powerless are represented as “more musical” than the powerful. It is no secret that people who seek to live a musical life may find it virtually impossible to reconcile the demands of music with those of political or economic interests. We now have ample evidence of the consequences for professional and amateur musicians when music is relegated to an area of “power-protected inwardness.” We also have more than enough experience to compare many histories of musical practices that have been politicized or commercialized in different ways. We do not have, and do not need, general criteria that would enable us to distinguish between “musical” and “non-musical” actions in all known societies and civilizations.

Arguments about what is or is not “extra-musical” are necessarily specific to particular sets of circumstances, as interpreted by various interested parties. Whatever may be true of some of us as individuals, the full “population” of musicologists does not constitute a sect, living mainly within what Max Weber called the “aesthetic sphere of value.” Our incentives for musicological research arise from conflicts between several value-spheres or “life orders,” and musicological writing is heavily dependent on terms, metaphors, and stories that also occur in accounts of religious and political conflicts. We can easily ignite sectarian disputes that develop into bad imitations of religious and political quarrels.

Unless we decide to cancel our lectures and stop producing books and papers, we will continue to retell some of the stories that have already been told: each critique of one myth will reproduce another myth, by the process that Peirce described as “translation of a sign into another system
of signs." For musicians, "another system" is whatever configuration of
signs they deem pertinent on a subsequent occasion: for example, a later
moment in the same performance (or process of composition), a different
performance, or a discussion of what happened in a given performance.
In each case, "the meaning of a word [or of a musical cue, a gesture, a
touch, etc.] really lies in the way in which it might, in a proper position in
a proposition believed, tend to mould the conduct of a person into con-
formity to that to which it is itself moulded." Since so many types of
translation are possible, it is not surprising that musicologists continue to
argue about which translations produce the "real" or "true" meanings.
Such arguments could be settled only by imposing a religious or political
orthodoxy (one with more powerful tools for suppressing dissent than the
world has yet seen).

In the "Afterword" to his Musikgeschichte im Überblick, Jacques Handschin
underlined the difference between music historians who live in specific
times and places and the utterly imaginary creatures who do not:

Our possibilities are unlimited only in the final instance, not in the
first; for were we capable of apprehending aesthetically every type of
music—music from all epochs and music of all peoples—we would
not be human beings in a specific (temporal, national) location, but
we would be "humankind in itself."10

If "humankind in itself" remains unknowable, we can hardly claim that
"aesthetic apprehension" (however defined) is the normal human response
to music. Neither musicians nor musicologists can avoid making claims
about how one should respond in particular situations. Yet everyone real-
izes, to some extent, that others make different claims: "A concurring yes
... is not only a dissenting no to a different set of yeses but may also be a
modification or adaptation that rephrases an implicit, perhaps unrecog-
nized, question."11 Historical and ethnographic studies of musical prac-
tices can direct our attention toward some of these implicit questions,
even if we could only recognize all of them by becoming "humankind in
itself."

For obvious reasons, it is not uncommon for musicologists working in
the late twentieth century to adopt "an aesthetic which is essentially con-
sumer-orientated in that music is treated as a kind of commodity whose
value is realized in the gratification of the listener."12 The aesthetic that
Nicholas Cook describes in these terms is not equally available (or, at
least, not available in the same way) to rich and poor alike: the earth has
not yet become a giant shopping mall where everybody enjoys unlimited
reserves of cash and credit. We can observe that a considerable number of
affluent consumers attend performances of music that would not have
been described by the performers and composers as commodities designed for the gratification of listeners. Is it our task, as musicologists, to lecture consumers relentlessly until some of them attempt to hear the music in what we claim is an appropriate manner? For what proportion of listeners does some kind of musicological knowledge (however diluted or otherwise transformed) serve as “cultural capital” in Pierre Bourdieu’s sense, increasing their sense of participation in the music by enabling them to feel that they know how to appreciate it?13

Cook approaches this problem by distinguishing between “musical” and “musicological” listening: “If by ‘musical listening’ we mean listening to music for purposes of direct aesthetic gratification, then we can use the term ‘musicological listening’ to refer to any type of listening to music whose purpose is the establishment of facts or the formulation of theories” (p. 152). Why should the “musical” listener be concerned with facts or theories? Bourdieu’s answer is that members of the dominant class use them in the process of “aesthetic distancing” through which they lay claim to “distinction.” Cook argues that, for “normal” listeners, “the experience of music is not problematical at all; it is, in a sense, the one thing we can be sure of” (p. 230). Since his own discussion of “normal listening” is highly problematical, it is quite useful in a number of respects. Of particular relevance to this symposium on Approaches to the Discipline is the question of what will happen to musicology should the experience of more and more listeners become “unproblematical” in Cook’s sense. How would we reinterpret the classic texts of our discipline and the large ethnographic literature to which we now have access?

The answer, I fear, is that these texts would be ignored even more than they are at present. Cook has little use for the many writers who have treated “the work of music as a moral rather than a perceptual entity” (p. 227). The normality of his normal listeners could be more easily sustained if no one agreed with Richard Kuhns that “interpretation, when exercised upon human products, discovers an unconscious domain which is a necessary condition for, and an inevitable accompaniment of, a conscious domain.”14 No sociologist investigating the production and sale of certain commodities would be so naive as to deny the potential significance of the consumers’ desires, as understood and manipulated by the producers and distributors. A musicology that adopted Cook’s view of normal, “unproblematic” listening would abolish itself as a scholarly discipline.

Kuhns’s impressive Psychoanalytic Theory of Art is an important book for musicologists, in part because his interpretation of Freud’s theory in relation to Hegel and others offers an excellent point of departure for rereading musicological texts—those of August Halm, for example, which are briefly discussed below. Musical performances (including, as already men-
tioned, acts of composition), are “enactments” that “organize and focus objects in highly cathected ways”—as are (in some instances) the writings and lectures of musicologists: any act of performance or writing may produce representations that can be enacted on a subsequent occasion. The performances of musicians and listeners, writers and readers “possess a latent content whose translation to manifest content will be at once sought and resisted” (p. 28). However relentlessly we may attempt to disclose our motives (or, more often, the motives we attribute to others), we can also expect to find conjunctions of seeking and resistance in scholarly work, inasmuch as “the risk of being exposed to forced disclosure itself becomes part of the ground for the creation of enactments, since they subtly represent delicate matters requiring hiddenness, and are able to disclose the otherwise inexpressible” (p. 74).

An important consequence of Kuhns’s argument about latent and manifest content is the need for a “multiplicity of interpretations and responses” (p. 32); fortunately, many interpretations of the latent or manifest content of music and dance rely more on sounds and gestures than on verbal argument. Kuhns has good things to say about the “interpretative reorganization” of enactments in artistic manifestoes (p. 72), recognizing that “each interpretation draws a boundary around the variables that can be considered in making an interpretation” (p. 80). All of us have good (and not-so-good) reasons to dispute and transgress some of the boundaries that various authorities seek to enforce. (Kuhns’s short book does not examine the uses of manifestoes as tools of intimidation.)

In the past few decades, musicologists have begun to investigate the literary genres and conventions employed by writers of artistic and scholarly manifestoes, and more generally by theorists, historians, and educators. I have not seen any history of musical thought or musical pedagogy described as “a parable of the history of all sciences, a novel of European thought through the millennia”—Thomas Mann’s apt phrase for Goethe’s Materialien zur Geschichte der Farbenlehre. Carl Dahlhaus, among others, insisted that the music historian’s choice of appropriate distancing devices needs to be informed by considerable experience with literature. He often drew attention to novelistic aspects of music histories, expanding upon Handschin’s critique of “the general ego” (quoted above):

We need to question the naiveté that recognizes “humanity pure and simple” in every historical agent (seen, like the protagonist of a novel, as an appropriate object of empathy); but no less disabling is the skepticism that can satisfy its [overly] sensitive historical scruples only when every semblance of understanding has been destroyed and the past lies before us in inaccessible otherness.
Dahlhaus, who worked for several years as a Dramaturg, used a number of dramatic techniques (particularly in his writings on the history of music theory) as he sought to avoid the extremes of naive empathy and unbridled skepticism. In the first chapter of Untersuchungen über die Entstehung der harmonischen Tonalität, for example, we see Hugo Riemann (like the characters in the opening scenes of many plays) making a number of mistakes, with consequences that are worked out later. Dahlhaus first dramatizes the differences between the theories of Fétis and Riemann (pp. 9–18), noting that one should not rule out the possibility of reconciling them. Before the chapter concludes with a confrontation between certain ideas of Riemann and Helmholtz (pp. 51–54), several other theorists are drawn into the action: Riemann misinterprets Rameau (pp. 28–29), Sechter makes an adaptation of Rameau’s theory (pp. 29–33), several writers develop theories of the cadence (pp. 33–40), and Riemann misinterprets Hauptmann (p. 41).

Although his own practice may seem somewhat more dramatistic than novelistic, Dahlhaus endorsed the suggestion of Hans Robert Jauss that historians have much to learn from the narrative techniques of Joyce and Proust; in my opinion, those of Musil are even more relevant to music historians. Our choices as writers on music are not so much among literary genres as among different approaches to the genres. Despite the claims advanced in numerous manifestos, musicology as a whole has never followed the model of a pseudo-historical pageant in which the confusion and errors of the past are dissipated by the “blessèd assurance” of a brighter future.

As musicologists, we can participate in dramas that continue to enjoy long runs, and we can stage revivals of older and allegedly outmoded types of drama and storytelling. Some of us may prefer not to renew the ritual denunciations of “formalism” that have loomed so large in many parts of the world for most of this century. Sooner or later, “formalism” (like any other -ism) will lose its effectiveness as a term of abuse, and the dramas in which evil formalists conspire against “the people” will be deleted from the repertoire or rewritten. Historians can ask (even now) how the so-called formalists were able to create “a dissenting no to a different set of yeses.” Such creative acts are possible only when one manages to resist demands to keep step with the “progress” of history. No series of attacks on “formalism” could possibly serve everyone’s interests.

Lawrence Kramer’s manifesto on “The Musicology of the Future” includes an account of his experience at a recent performance of Mozart’s Divertimento K. 563: he perceived “the performer’s (and by proxy the composer’s) body shuttling, with ambiguity and constraint, between labor and pleasure.” Compare Hermann Abert’s account of this work, in which
he heard a "healthy, youthful feeling of vitality, which knows how to laugh with good humor as well as to be full of enthusiasm"; "all three players are equals, and even where one individual takes over the lead, several ideas, agreeing or contradictory, spring up in the others, so that we always have the impression of the most animated life." The differences between the two interpretations are considerable, yet Abert's reference to players who "rouse" one another's "own thoughts" in agreement and in contradiction, presenting the listener with "the impression of the most animated life," is to some extent compatible with Kramer's image of bodies "shuttling between labor and pleasure." Kramer objects to Charles Rosen's perception of a "transference of divertimento form ... into the realm of serious chamber music, making purely intimate what had been public." For Abert, the tone of the divertimento was "weit intimer und zarter" in comparison, not with "serious chamber music," but with the last three symphonies, which are the main subject of his chapter. Abert (though not, of course, Cook's normalized listeners) might well have agreed with Kramer that "Mozart raises [questions] by making his music behave as it does, and trusting the listener to hear the music within a broader field of rhetorical, expressive, and discursive behaviors" (p. 17).

I have no quarrel with Kramer's thesis that "listening is not an immediacy alienated from a later reflection, but a mode of dialogue" (p. 17). Recalling Kuhns's discussion of manifestoes as instruments for the "interpretative reorganization" of enactments, I can readily imagine that manifestoes announcing a "postmodernist perspective" are helpful to Kramer and others as they "continue the dialogue of listening." As a historian and ethnographer, I must acknowledge that earlier manifestoes on the "relative autonomy" of works have been no less helpful to many musicians and listeners as they engaged in dialogue with one another as well as with whatever additional presences the performance awakened in their imaginations. There are many names for such presences and for aspects of the complex relationships people entertain with them: the composer's persona, the performer's magnetism, the spirit of an age or a people or a locale, blind faith in genius, idolatry, and fetishism, to name but a few. The terms are not identical with the relationships that people enact.

We have much to learn about the ways in which people talk about the dialogues in which musicians and listeners are engaged. All of the talk relies on tropes, as Goethe recognized: "We think we are speaking in pure prose and we are already speaking in tropes; one person employs the tropes differently than another, takes them farther in a related sense, and thus the debate becomes interminable and the riddle insoluble." Human beings lack the ability to "fully articulate, in words, either the objects [of our attention] or ourselves." I have not yet understood the difference
between the "postmodernist perspective" that Kramer advocates and the various "modern" (or modernizing) critiques of "purity," of which Goethe's is one. Whatever the differences, we can perhaps recognize more of what happens in our own dialogues as listeners by comparing what we say about the dialogues with what others have said about their experiences. The tropes used in Kramer's account of listening to K. 563 are well represented in the extensive written records of responses to Mozart and his music.

Those who share Kramer's interest in "strategies that are radically anti-foundationalist, anti-essentialist, and anti-totalizing" (p. 5) can only smile (as may well be his intent) at the definite articles in his title, "The Musicology of the Future." The narrative strategies that consign earlier writing and discourse to a repertoire of -isms, while urging us forward to a necessary future (usually named with a new -ism), are as totalizing as narrative strategies can become. One can't have much of a dialogue with an -ism or a paradigm, unless the dialogue questions the ways in which the -ism was named or those in which the paradigm was constructed. Many of the other ghosts who still bend our ears (the ghost of Mozart, for example) talk back to us more forcefully than paradigms are wont to do (although we can make them talk back by challenging their right to exist).

In his remarks on Kramer's discussion of K. 563, Gary Tomlinson conjures up the specters of "internalism," "formalism," "aestheticism," and "transcendentalism" (p. 20, above)—a formidable quartet of ghosts, which makes another appearance as he objects to the "western presumptions" of many ethnomusicologists (p. 24). Evidently, these demons will continue to wreak havoc for as long as Kramer, or anyone else, imagines a "bond with Mozart" (p. 21). One may share Tomlinson's desire "to problematize the knowledge of others we come to through their musics" (p. 24) without wishing to join a campaign against "cultural constructions" that are "darkly tinted for us with modernist ideology" (p. 23). The uses that Tomlinson finds for such constructs as "nineteenth- and twentieth-century westernism" (p. 23) can produce a "ventriloquist's monologue" (p. 21) just as easily as any listener's "conceptions of subjectivity that grant it unrivaled culture-making powers" (p. 22).

No doubt all of us are capable of self-deception, whether we are interpreting the decisions of a composer-performer or the demands of the situation we imagine to be our own (or that of our family, tribe, guild, profession, region, nation, epoch, or "culture"). Kramer's (or anyone's) close listening to Mozart's music may or may not endow an imaginary "Mozart" with "sweeping subjective powers... to speak to the critic (analyst, listener in general) through the music" (p. 20): listeners who sense that the processes initiated in performances of this music elude our efforts
to participate fully in them do not always seek refuge in myths of "subjective powers." In any case, we should not place a permanent (or even a temporary) ban on all illusions of understanding "Mozart." Musicologists can learn to tolerate many varieties of love—including some that may strike guardians of our morals as fetishism, idolatry, or some other "perversion."

August Halm was critical of what he called an ausgeprägte Geniegläubigkeit in the writings of Heinrich Schenker. He nonetheless conceded that this "in no way blind, but downright clairvoyant belief in genius" revealed itself in Schenker’s work as "a valuable heuristic principle, an incentive to make discoveries that do not stand or fall with his faith." This is a good criterion with which to assess our reactions to beliefs and loves we do not share: do our prejudices against the belief or the love prevent us from recognizing it as an incentive to acts that are "valuable" from one or more perspectives? Halm’s remark also points to an enduring dilemma faced by musicologists: we may have little choice but to understand many beliefs and loves as "heuristic principles," but this is not how they are experienced by the believers and lovers. Nietzsche’s "philosophizing with a sledgehammer," recalled in Kramer’s paper, is not always the right response to this dilemma.

In a helpful and provocative paragraph, Tomlinson expands on his recommendation that we “interrogate our love for the music we study” (p. 24). His language immediately brings to mind Foucault’s discussion of Bentham’s Panopticon, in which humans are “object[s] of an investigation [information], never subject[s] in a communication." Tomlinson does not suggest that we should interrogate our love for music and for musicians in this manner. It is entirely possible to “dredge up our usual impassioned musical involvements from the hidden realm of untouchable premise they tend to inhabit” (p. 24) without enacting a drama of interrogation in which the style of questioning prevents the answers from altering the questioner’s initial stance.

Without knowing what writings Tomlinson regards as “bound to models of culture that see it as made exclusively through the conscious and subconscious intents of historical actors” (p. 22), I fully agree with him that these are by no means the only factors to be considered in writing history and ethnography. Many ethnomusicological monographs of the past decade pay close attention to questions of political economy—which, of course, require some “western presumptions” that Tomlinson might find no less “disconcerting” (p. 18) than Kramer’s “confidence in his bond with Mozart.” His insistence that “the act of close reading . . . carries with it the ideological charge of modernism” (p. 22) places a strong restriction on Tomlinson’s earlier statement that “art works inscribe in one fashion
or another cultural concepts, assumptions, aspirations, etc., that govern their reception." How can we hope to know in what fashion the concepts, assumptions, aspirations have been "inscribed" if we must sacrifice "close reading" in order to exorcise the ghost of modernism and all its cousins?

Polemicizing elsewhere against what he heard as a call for "greater engagement in decontextualized musical sound" in studies of African music, Tomlinson maintains that "musicology has trodden this path for a hundred years now, with an ever-increasing arrogance of the same as the most pervasive result." One can read musicological writings of the past century without arriving at this impression. What we can gain from acts of close reading and close listening is, above all, the possibility of rereading and rehearing, increasing our recognition of the limitations of paradigms, "ideal types," and other constructs. Conversation without close listening is pointless. Ethnomusicologists may have acquired more experience than Tomlinson is prepared to acknowledge in learning how not to impose our conceptions and fantasies about what is or is not "western" on the musicians with whom we interact, and in learning to listen, read, and write dialogically.

Toward the end of his life, Halm published a remarkable account of his responses to the music of Beethoven, whom he had once regarded as an "enemy" without allowing himself to confess this in so many words. He was concerned with the consequences of a situation in which "we involuntarily take [Beethoven's] music as the symbol of a definite way of being human": specifically, the satisfaction that "the mass" of listeners derives from Beethoven's music is based on an attitude of self-importance. The syndrome of "involuntary" attachment to a symbol must be broken if one is to respond to the "real" (wirklichen) Beethoven, or to any other musician. Inasmuch as a composer's musical technique is symptomatic of his "underlying desire" (untergründliche Trieb), the technique (when properly understood) indicates the desired response: "a genuine artist's way of working offers direct testimony about his convictions, about his attitude toward art, and, hence, about the kind of response that he wants!" Discussion of technical issues enables us to recognize and alter our habitual responses; Halm did not suggest that an appropriate response must conform to one's interpretation of the composer's desires. Whatever causes us to mistrust our perceptions and habitual responses is to be welcomed as the necessary first step in replacing a culture that is "narrow" and "exclusive" with a culture worthy of human beings. To the extent that we experience music as symptomatic or representative of "an existing culture," the music does not "itself become culture or lead to a culture."

Halm's approach to dramatizing "the history of music" (in his book Von zwei Kulturen der Musik and elsewhere) was based on the model of the
Bildungsroman: the protagonist (humanity in its engagement with "the spirit of music") grows older and wiser, learning how to retain and renew some of the energy of youth (the Kraftgefühl that Abert heard in K. 563). The culture of fugue, fully acknowledging and developing youthful energies, had been followed by the culture of sonata, allowing for coordination and control of formal processes but imposing excessive limitations on the "autonomy" of themes, composers, performers, and listeners. With the advantages of hindsight, we can read Halm's text in relation to texts by his contemporaries, overhearing but also dramatizing his conversations with himself and with his colleagues.

The language of Halm's writings is that of a "secularized theology"—due in part to his training in theology but also, more significantly, to the conditions of music, musicology, writing, and scholarship in his time and place. These are not as different from our own local conditions as we might like to imagine. When we are willing to recognize points at which our own techniques of storytelling and dramatizing overlap significantly with those employed by "others," we can no longer relegate the so-called others to a "backward culture" or an "outmoded paradigm." Those who learn to read well learn to listen well, and good listeners can also become good readers.

NOTES


9 Ibid., vol. 1 (1931), par. 343.


11 Albert Murray, The Omni-Americans: Some Alternatives to the Folklore of White Supremacy (New York: Outerbridge and Dienstfrey, 1970; reprint, Da Capo Press, 1990), 1. The subtitle (which was different in the first edition of 1970) indicates exactly why this point is so important for citizens of the United States.


15 Ibid., 57. Since the viewer of a painting (or the reader of a musicological work) must “go through a specific set of responses, judgments, interpretations,” it is appropriate to speak of the viewer’s [reader’s, listener’s] “performance.” Hence, “representation and performance are closely related though not coincident.”


17 Dahlhaus, Grundlagen, 122: “So fragwürdig aber eine Naivität ist, die in jedem geschichtlich Handelnden ‘den Menschen schlechthin’ wiedererkennt—als Gegenstand romanhafter Einfühlung—, so lähmend wirkt eine Skepsis, deren empfindliches historischen Gewissen sich erst beruhigt fühlt, wenn jeder Schein von Verständnis zerstört ist und das Vergangene sich in unzugänglicher Fremdheit präsentiert.”

18 Dahlhaus, Untersuchungen über die Entstehung der harmonischen Tonalität (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1967), Ch. 1, 9-56.


Marcel Proust spoke of a "fetishism" that carries few dangers so long as one can "pass from one symbol to another, without being immobilized by the differences that lie on the surface" (*Contre Sainte-Beuve*, Pléiade ed. [Paris: Gallimard, 1971], 117). "Fetishism" in this sense avoided the faults of the "idolatry" that Proust criticized in Ruskin; its consequences resemble those of the "admiration" that continually recreates beauty "because at every instant it evokes the desire" of beauty (pp. 139–40).


Ethnomusicology cannot be adequately described (or undertaken) as a flight from "western presumptions"; one of the many recent discussions of this point is that of Francesco Giannattasio, *Il concetto di musica: contributi e prospettive della ricerca etnomusicologica* (Rome: La nuova Italia scientifica, 1992), 22–23.

Halm, *Beethoven* (Berlin: Max Hesse, 1927), 9: "Mein Gefühl sah ihn als Feind; nur verbot mir besonnene Überlegung ihn so zu nennen." In a discussion of Halm’s *Von zwei Kulturen der Musik*, Dahlhaus comments on his "covert challenge to the veneration of Beethoven, which was paramount and inviolable at the time"; see Dahlhaus, *Die Idee der absoluten Musik* (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1978), 125. In a letter of 3 April 1924, Schenker urged Halm not to forget that in his youth he, too, must surely have held Beethoven close to his heart; the letter is quoted by Hellmut Federhofer, "Anton Bruckner im Briefwechsel von August Halm (1869–1929)—Heinrich Schenker (1868–1935)," in *Anton Bruckner: Studien zu Werk und Wirkung* (Tutzing: H. Schneider, 1988), 39.

Halm, *Beethoven*, 199: “die Arbeitsweise eines echten Künstlers sagt ganz direkt etwas aus über seine Gesinnung, über seine Stellung zur Kunst—und also auch über die Art des Wirkens, die er will!”

Halm, *Beethoven*, 20. In "Musikalische Jugendkultur," *Neue Musik-Zeitung* 41 (1919): 150. Halm distinguished between "bourgeois music" and "human music." He is one of the first music theorists whose work was significantly affected by Freudian theory.

Halm, *Beethoven*, 72: "Wie kann Musik, ohne an einer vorhandenen Kultur teilzunehmen, ohne Symptom und Exponent einer solchen zu sein, selbst Kultur werden oder zu einer Kultur führen?"

dienen die Hauptthemen und die Art, wie sie verarbeitet werden; . . . kurz alles Geschehen ist hier viel mehr als in der Fuge, ja es ist in erster Linie eine Funktion im Ganzen . . . . Die Fuge hat mehr Struktur als Aufbau, sie gleicht eher einer gesonderten Existenz, einem Lebewesen, etwa einem Baum, wenn man konkrete Vorstellungen wagen will; sie ist die Formel einer Individualität. Die Sonate dagegen ist die Formel des Zusammenwirkens vieler Individuen, ist ein Organismus im grossen: sie gleicht dem Staat." Halm’s use of these metaphors is discussed at greater length in my “Conclusion: Music in an Age of Cultural Confrontation,” in Music-Cultures in Contact: Collisions and Convergences, ed. M. J. Kartomi and S. Blum (Sydney: Currency Press, 1993), 256–84.

37 Halm’s metaphors express an opposition between “individuality” and “authority” that turns up again and again in writings on the subject of culture. Ivan Nagel’s juxtaposition of texts written by Franz Kafka and Carl Schmitt in the years 1912 to 1922 is highly pertinent to a reading of Halm’s Von zwei Kulturen der Musik; see Nagel, Autonomy and Mercy: Reflections on Mozart’s Operas, trans. Marion Faber and Ivan Nagel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 147–48.

38 The dependence of modern European musical thought on “secularized theological concepts” is briefly mentioned by Dahlhaus in “Schönbergs ästhetische Theologie,” Bericht über den 2. Kongress der Internationalen Schönberg-Gesellschaft 1984 (Vienna: Internationale Schönberg Gesellschaft, 1986), 14. His claim that this state of affairs “has never been underestimated” seems to me an exaggeration, especially when one considers North American as well as European musicology.