Armies, Navies and Economies in the Greek World
in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.E.

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ABSTRACT

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My study examines a category of data—the logistics of classical Greek warfare—that has not been used before for ancient Greek economic history. This examination provides much new evidence for Greek economies in the fifth and fourth centuries. Close readings of contemporary literary evidence—especially Thucydides—shows that classical Greek amphibious and naval expeditions military forces always acquired their food from markets provided to them by cities and traders. A systematic comparative analysis confirms this conclusion by demonstrating that the economic and politico-social structures of classical Greek states meant that the market was the only institutional mechanism available to them to feed their navies and amphibious forces—in contrast to other European and near Eastern pre-industrial states which could use mechanisms such as requisitioning and taxation-in-kind to acquire provisions to supply their military forces. I then produce estimates of the amounts of food purchased by classical Greek military forces in the markets provided to them by cities and traders by combining data on standard daily rations (from contemporary literary and epigraphical sources) and caloric requirements (established from an analysis of classical Greek skeletal material and WHO/FAO research data) with the relatively precise figures we have in contemporary historians for army and navy sizes and lengths of campaigns. These calculations provide many more figures for trade in grain and other foods in the classical period than we currently possess, and figures that are mostly much greater in scale. The analysis of the
provisioning of Greek overseas warfare provides, then—for the first time—evidence for a regular and large-scale seaborne trade of grain in the classical Greek Mediterranean; it shows a world where the development of marketing structures and networks of merchants was sufficiently strong to permit tens of thousands of men to get their food through markets for years at a time. Demonstrating the existence of a regular and substantial overseas trade in grain in the fifth and fourth centuries is crucially important for a wider understanding of classical Greek economies because the existence of such a trade made possible increased urbanization and specialization of labor, and itself could only have been made possible by sizeable reductions in transactions costs for maritime commerce: it therefore provides evidence for the foundations of economic growth in classical Greece.
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For May O’Connor
Introduction

i. Research questions

In 1962, Moses Finley, in a typically trenchant and brilliant article, exposed the theoretical poverty of (then) current approaches to classical Greek economic history and suggested several “lines of investigation” that could wrench the subject out of the conceptual crisis it was undergoing. The fifth line of investigation suggested by Finley reads as follows:

The army and war deserve a full study in themselves, as feeders into the trade network by seizing mines, by providing slaves and other booty, and as consumers of arms and food.

No one has yet taken up this research project recommended by Finley. If it has often been acknowledged that classical Greek land and sea warfare, like the warfare of any age, cannot be fully understood unless examined within its social, cultural, political, and economic framework, no study has ever situated the activities of classical Greek military

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1 Finley (1965) (publication of a paper given in 1962).

2 (Ibid.) 34. Cf. also Finley’s sixth suggested research topic ((ibid.) 34-35: “[s]trangely enough, there is no complete collection of the evidence on market regulations and procedures. Past experience suggests the necessity for a careful preliminary definition, which would distinguish the kind of market with which the agoranomoi were concerned from the behaviour of pirates on the sea or from wartime blockade measures; or between the agora in its commercial sense, an emporion as a “port of trade” to use a phrase (and a concept) recently placed on the agenda by Karl Polanyi, and the temporary “markets” that Xenophon and others are always mentioning in connection with campaigning armies. Whether these are meaningful distinctions or not remains to be seen; the usual approach to market regulations begins by ignoring them and therefore makes a test impossible.” See now chapter 7 section ii below: there is, in fact, no meaningful distinction between ‘commercial’ polis agarai and those agarai provided to classical Greek military forces.

3 See Perjés (1970) 23: “[t]he warfare of any age is basically determined by economic and social circumstances...”; Braudel (1972) 891: “[e]very age constructs its own war, its own types of war”; Howard (1976) ix-x; and esp. Erdkamp (1998) 1: “[t]he way Roman wars were fought was determined by the geography and climate of the Mediterranean peninsulas, by the ecological restraints on agriculture and transport, and by the economic and social structures of the society of which the armies were a significant part.” For the idea in a specifically classical Greek context, see, e.g., Cartledge (1997) 682; van Wees (2004) 1. Cf. also (J. H.) Finley (1942) 5 on Thucydides’ Archaeology: “he allows the first three sentences to suffice as an introduction, and plunges at once into the argument, demanded alike by these sentences and
forces within the structures and institutions of the economies in which they operated—
or used an analysis of their activities to ask questions about the nature and scale of
economies in the classical Greek world. This dissertation will address itself to the last of
the research topics suggested by Finley above (although I will have often things to say
below, too, on the sale of booty by classical Greek military forces). That is to say, I will
be primarily concerned in this work with addressing the following three questions:

1. To what extent did markets provision Greek armies, navies, and amphibious
forces in the fifth (especially) and fourth centuries B.C.E.?

2. How did the markets provided by poleis and traders to classical Greek military
forces behave? That is, how efficient were these markets in meeting the
demand of classical Greek sailors and soldiers for grain (to meet their daily
energy requirements)?

by the work as a whole, that the magnitude of any war depends on the contemporary state of material
civilization.”

Although there has been much work recently on the financing of military and naval operations by
classical Greek states: see, e.g., Garlan (1989); Kallet-Marx (1993); Millett (1993); Brun (1999); Andreau,
Briant and Descat (edd.) (2000).

For a definition of ‘market,’ see, fundamentally, Samuelson and Nordhaus (1998) 27: “[a] market is a
mechanism by which buyers and sellers interact to determine the price and quantity of a good or service.”
See, too, Erdkamp (2005) 1 on the word ‘market’ meaning three things: “first, the place at which the
commercial exchange of goods takes place; secondly, the forces of supply and demand that govern the
commercial distribution of goods. ‘Market’ in the second sense gives rise to another meaning of the word:
the geographical area in which the commercial exchange of certain goods operates.” I will use ‘market’ in
all three of these senses in this dissertation; in each case, the context will make it clear in which particular
sense I am employing the word. See also chapter 2 section v for definition of what constitutes a market
exchange. I define “provisioning” as “the action of providing or supplying grain and other foods [to
military forces].”

The focus throughout the dissertation will be on the grain supply of classical Greek armies, navies, and
amphibious forces (and not on the supply of any other food). This is so for two important reasons: firstly,
there is not sufficient information to calculate the daily consumption of wine and olive oil by classical
Greek sailors and soldiers: see Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 69-70 (not possible to estimate oil consumption
in antiquity); cf. Morley (2007b) 603 (orthodox figure of twenty liters a year for ancient oil consumption
having no real basis); see also Harris (2005) 22 (the contribution of olive oil and wine to the caloric needs
of ancient Mediterranean populations still unclear). There is, however, sufficient information to calculate
the daily grain requirements of classical Greek sailors and soldiers: see appendix 3 below. Secondly,
iii. Previous work on the provisioning of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces

Answering these questions necessitates a thorough re-examination of how classical Greek armies, navies and amphibious forces acquired their provisions. There has not been much work done previously on the provisioning of classical Greek military forces, and the work that has been done has been marked by basic methodological errors. I will deal in detail in the chapters and appendices which follow with specific problems in earlier treatments of classical Greek military provisioning, and limit myself here to outlining the four main problems marring previous work on this subject.

Firstly, almost all previous work on the food supply of classical Greek armies and navies has taken an antiquarian approach, simply listing the various means of acquisition of provisions.

demand for oil and wine, unlike grain, was elastic: see Erdkamp (2005) 167-170. Classical Greek sailors and soldiers could live without their oil and wine (cf. chapter 3 section iva, chapter 7 section iv below), but not without their grain (only substituting for it in exceptionally desperate circumstances (see chapter 4 section ii)).

See, e.g., Harthen (2001) 1-2 for a brief survey.

Pritchett’s (1971) work on the pay and provisioning of classical Greek military forces is marred by all the methodological errors I am about to describe and by numerous errors of fact, misreadings, and unwarranted assumptions. There will be a lot of correction and criticism of Pritchett throughout this dissertation (see already Wheeler’s criticisms ([1992-93 410-414] of Pritchett’s thesis-less ‘tell all you know’ approach in his review of Pritchett [1991]); this will be done in the belief that productive academic work is generated through (reasoned) controversy and debate, and not out of any wish to be ungenerous. It will be especially necessary to carefully correct and criticize Pritchett’s work on provisioning (and pay) since it is constantly cited as the authoritative treatment of these subjects: see, e.g., Andrewes, HCT v.346; Hornblower, CT i.105, i.249; Kallet-Marx (1993), e.g., 10 n.29, 45 n.20, 75 n.17; Lazenby (1994) 3 n.1, 10 and n.78; Raaflaub (2007) 120 n.9; Hornblower, CT iii.310, 322. See also Hanson (2007) 8: Pritchett “in many ways the pre-eminent ancient Greek military historian of the twentieth century.”
available to Greek military forces in the fifth and fourth centuries without attempting to quantify their relative importance (to each other); but the role of any one method of provisioning in the food supply of military forces can only be understood when its relationship to (available) alternative methods of provisioning is ascertained. Secondly, the mechanisms available to classical Greek states to feed their armies, navies, and amphibious forces depended not just on the economic structures of those states, but also on their institutional, political, and social structures, a fact rarely noted by previous classical historians. Thirdly, previous authors on this topic have taken no or insufficient account of the fact that “[m]ilitary strategy combines tactics and logistics to shape the conduct of operations.” The “dialectical” nature of the relationship between strategy and supply meant that classical Greek generals were sometimes compelled to adopt certain means of acquisition of provisions for their forces in order to achieve their

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9 See, e.g., Lazenby (1994), Harthen (2001), and (the otherwise excellent) Krentz (2007) all making this mistake.

10 See esp. Erdkamp (1998) 17-18: “[s]ince none of the [...] mechanisms [of provisioning] could apply to all circumstances, various alternatives were always used during the same war. The difficulties inherent in feeding armies compelled governments and commanders to use most of the methods available simultaneously. The question that arises is that of their relative importance.” Cf. (ibid.) 11, 26; cf. id. (1995) 171.

11 See the exceptions of Cruickshank (1954) 58-85; van Wees (2004) 105-108, 113. Those scholars citing Engels’ work on the provisioning of Alexander’s army in the east (e.g. Ober [1991] 174, Hanson [1998] 33-34 n.24, Rawlings [2007] 74) miss the point that Alexander was campaigning with resources unavailable to classical Greek poleis (and the fact that Alexander was operating in completely different conditions to those found in ‘old’ Greece). See also p.248 n.134, p.607 n.67, and p.195 n.6 below: several methodological errors in Engels’ groundbreaking work render his conclusions unsafe.

strategic goals.\textsuperscript{13} Fourthly, and related to the previous two points, previous treatments of
the provisioning of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces have failed to
adopt a specific comparative framework in order to establish a model of the “limits of the
possible”\textsuperscript{14} means of acquisition (of supplies) available to classical Greek states and their
military forces, into which one can fit the limited information we possess on Greek
provisioning.\textsuperscript{15} This was an understandable failure for those historians writing on the
food supply of classical Greek military forces before the nineteen eighties, at which point
very little work had been done on the provisioning of other pre-industrial land and sea
forces; but the outpouring of work on pre-industrial (European) military provisioning
since that date makes the failure by Greek historians working on this subject to use
comparative evidence less understandable now.\textsuperscript{16} In this dissertation, I will employ the
models and frameworks developed by Erdkamp\textsuperscript{17} (especially) and Harari\textsuperscript{18} in order to

\textsuperscript{13} See Harari (2000) esp. 297, 329-333. See also Erdkamp (1998) 11-12, and, e.g., chapter 2 section iiic
below for illustration of this point. The failure of previous historians to take account of the role of the
actual conditions of fighting in determining the means of provisioning used by classical Greek military
forces can be seen in, e.g., the (incorrectly) indiscriminate treatment of supply lines to classical Greek land

\textsuperscript{14} See Braudel (1981) 27-29.

\textsuperscript{15} See, e.g., Hopkins (2002) 191-192 on the utility of models: “[f]irst, models allow us to perceive the
structures or repeated patterns which lie behind the superficial flow of individual actors and events, which
fill the pages of traditional Roman narrative histories. Second, models allow us to construct whole
pictures, into which the surviving fragments of ancient source material can be plausibly fitted. The model
is a sort of master picture, as on the front of a jigsaw puzzle box; the fragments of surviving ancient sources
provide only a few of the jigsaw pieces.”

\textsuperscript{16} van Creveld (1977) stimulated interest in logistics in pre-industrial European military history (see
Chambers [1991] 401). For important work on the provisioning of pre-industrial European armies (later
than classical Greece) after van Creveld, see (in addition to the works cited in the next two notes) esp. Lynn

\textsuperscript{17} (1998) esp. 12-18.
ascertain the provisioning possibilities open to classical Greek states, and to get beyond a ‘common sense’ approach to this topic.\(^{19}\)

***Previous and current conceptual approaches to classical Greek economies***

Dominated by the work of Moses Finley, the historiography of the ancient Greek economy in the second half of the twentieth century emphasized what that economy was not: e.g., it was not an economy characterized by large-scale industrial enterprises, economic rationality, integrated self-regulating markets, sophisticated credit instruments, and so on. This approach originated as a necessary and laudable reaction against seventy-five years of theoretically unsophisticated and modernizing scholarship, but it erred in letting a valid ‘substantivist’ critique of the anachronistic assumptions of earlier historians slide into a characterization of economies in the ancient world as static, minimally sized entities;\(^{20}\) and in the last fifteen years, new work, which focuses not on the failure of the classical Greek economy to develop, but rather on its particular structure and performance, has emerged to replace the Finleyian orthodoxy (which “relentlessly emphasized structure over performance”).\(^{21}\) The recent work of Bresson\(^{22}\) and

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\(^{18}\) (2000) esp. 300-301.

\(^{19}\) I do not agree with Hanson ([1999] 413) that the adoption of a common sense approach is the way forward for ancient military history.

\(^{20}\) I am very summary here since the ‘substantivist-formalist’ and ‘primitivist-modernist’ debates have been well summarized and treated so many times: for sane and balanced discussions of those debates, see, e.g., Andreau (2002); Cartledge (2002); Amemiya (2004) 57-58.

\(^{21}\) See Morris, Saller and Scheidel (2007) 3. See also Morris and Manning (2005) 14: for Finley, following Weber, what was most important was the question of why the ancient economy did not undergo a capitalist
(especially) Morris\textsuperscript{23} (and his various collaborators) has been instrumental in this regard,\textsuperscript{24} especially through its emphasis on (respectively) the place of markets and the potential for growth in the ancient Greek economy.

Within the broader debates on the nature and scale of ancient Greek economies, the question of the nature and scale of the trade in grain in the classical Greek world has focused (almost) solely on Athens, and especially on the question of when in the fifth century imports of grain became structurally important to the subsistence of that polis.\textsuperscript{25} There has been almost no work done specifically on the grain trade of poleis other than Athens in the fifth century,\textsuperscript{26} and hardly any for this trade in the fourth century, mostly

\textsuperscript{22} (2000), (2008a), and (2008b).

\textsuperscript{23} See the works cited in n.21, and also Morris (1994a), (2004), and (2006).

\textsuperscript{24} The fact that specialists working on the “advanced organic economies” found throughout the world before the nineteenth century (see Morris and Manning [2005] 14) have recently shown that there was nothing intrinsically special about European economies of the eighteenth century that led to the take-off of those economies into industrial capitalism, but rather that this take-off was dependent on contingent factors such as (especially) the availability of coal and (markets in) colonies to those economies (see especially Pomeranz [2000]). has also motivated scholars to develop a new framework of analysis for ancient Greek and Roman economies, and to consider the possibility of “major gains in performance” in those economies (see esp. Morris, Saller and Scheidel [2007] 6-7, 11).

\textsuperscript{25} For the debate, see Garnsey (1988), Whitby (1998), Moreno (2007).

\textsuperscript{26} Moreno ([2007] 314-315) has recently argued that five to ten per cent of other poleis in the Greek world besides Athens in the fifth century probably imported grain regularly because of their population sizes (around ten thousand male citizens). Moreno relies on Hansen (2006) for these population figures; but this work is full of assumptions with greater or lesser margins of error (Robinson [2007] 1244) that render its conclusions unsafe (on the general problem of methodology here, see p.111 n.243 below).
because the evidential landscape for this question is so bleak outside of Athens: \(^{27}\) “the regular movement of grain [in the Greek world] is not specifically attested in the sources of the fifth century B.C.” \(^{28}\) This dissertation will argue that the provisioning of Greek amphibious forces and navies does give us evidence of regular large-scale trade in grain in the Greek world in the fifth century B.C.E. I will focus mostly on the fifth century since the narrative of Thucydides together with the other literary and epigraphical sources of that century allow for a continuous and integrated analysis of the provisioning of Greek navies and amphibious forces; and also because the idea that there was a regular trade in grain in *poleis* outside Athens in the fourth century is less controversial. \(^{29}\) (I will also focus on the fifth century because there is, in fact, very little work on the nature and scale of economies outside of Athens in the fifth century, full stop.) \(^{30}\)

*iv. Some preliminary remarks on the use of sources in this dissertation*

The evidence to answer the question of how important markets were in satisfying the provisioning requirements of Greek, and especially Athenian, overseas expeditionary forces and navies in the fifth and early fourth centuries comes from many and various sources. I will address the particular challenges of interpretation each of these sources

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\(^{27}\) See Bresson (2000) 278-279, Reed (2003) 16 n.6 for the few references we do have.

\(^{28}\) Horden and Purcell (2000) 120. This is not absolutely right—see *SIG* \(^{3}\) 337-338 and Jameson (1983) 12 for a regular trade in grain attested at Teos in 470/69—but it has been true for regular *large-scale* movements in grain.


\(^{30}\) But see the notable exceptions of Nixon and Price (1990), Descat (1995b).
poses as and when I employ them in the chapters and appendices below. But the importance of one work—Thucydides’ *Histories*—for the reconstruction of the provisioning of overseas expeditions in the Aegean in the period after the Persian Wars and up until 411 is so great that some preliminary points, basic but crucial, need to be made about the use of Thucydides as a source before any analysis of this provisioning can begin.  

Firstly, in constructing his narrative, Thucydides could presume in his contemporary audience “a large contextual competence we fatally lack;” he could therefore take for granted and omit the details of the basic structures of the states and societies he was describing.  

Secondly, Thucydides’ work is not a primary source for the conditions of classical Greek warfare. Thucydides wrote a highly rhetorical narrative containing novel and controversial interpretations of political and military developments: even if we are forced to treat his work as if it were a primary source because of our lack of primary documentation, it must always be remembered that it is not. This means that before we can use any statement in Thucydides’ text concerning

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31 Cf. Davies (1993) 117. Most of the points raised here will be valid for the use of other ancient military narratives, too.


35 I.e., one always has to keep in mind the (obvious but important) point that Thucydides was not writing to become a repository of data on, e.g., the mundane details of the supply and financing of classical Greek wars for later historians.
the provisioning of military forces, we must examine and take into consideration its context in order to grasp its true meaning and significance.\textsuperscript{36}

But how to get from these methodological points to a (as near as one can) comprehensive examination of the provisioning of fifth-century Greek amphibious and naval operations? The answer lies in developing these two points. By actively interpreting Thucydides’ text,\textsuperscript{37} i.e. by studying it closely in order to “rediscover and appreciate more fully the care and categories which Thucydides applied in selecting and presenting events,”\textsuperscript{38} we can reconstruct what Thucydides usually took for granted and therefore omitted. It is a brute fact that the men taking part in the overseas expeditions and naval operations that Thucydides described needed to eat and drink in order to live: but, in general, details of provisioning appear only rarely in his accounts of military campaigns, and then almost always in exceptional circumstances; it is therefore certain that Thucydides thought that the details of military food supply were utterly familiar to

\textsuperscript{36} Cf. Kallet (2001) 7 on the topics of money and finance in Thucydides: “[Thucydides’] aims, and the often highly rhetorical ways in which he embeds the subject of money and financing in the narrative, necessitate an examination of passages concerned with financial information in their narrative context, instead of regarding them as factual nuggets that can be plucked out of context and used as if they came from a list or as if Thucydides were writing a history of Athenian war finance.” Cf. also Kallet-Marx (1993) 98 on Thucy. 2.13.3-5. And see again Luraghi (2000) 228: since Thucydides is not a primary source, we cannot “transform[...] every statement by him into a fact” and we must always remember “the role played by any statement in Thucydides’ rhetorical strategy.” Cf. Flower and Marincola (2002) 22 on using Herodotus as a historical source: “the Histories are a literary creation, and this has important implications for how we understand the text. H. did not haphazardly set down what he knew, but rather constructed his narrative with great care. As a result, it is not legitimate to pick and choose what one wants to believe while ignoring the context of the surrounding narrative.”

\textsuperscript{37} See Hopkins (1978a) 183: “[t]he historian should interpret his sources actively, by trying, for example, to examine what the ancient sources took for granted and so systematically underreported.” See also Cipolla (1991) 54: primary sources are “a screen between the historian and the past. The distorting effect of this screen varies, and the historian’s first task is to check its existence and assess its strength.”

\textsuperscript{38} Stahl (2003) 174; or, as Luraghi puts it ([2000] 228), to overcome the problems noted above, “it is necessary first of all to consider the rhetorical structure and function of [Thucydides’] text.”
his audience, and thus normally did not feel the need to describe them.\textsuperscript{39} In general, Thucydides (in common with other ancient Greek (and Roman) historians) only mentions provisioning when it forms a part of the tactical or strategic considerations of a military force, when he has to in order to clarify his narrative of military operations, or when something extraordinary occurs in connection with it.\textsuperscript{40} Keeping in mind the fact that Thucydides usually systematically underreported military provisioning, one can then use those discrete pieces of evidence on provisioning he does include (with due attention to their context), together with evidence from other (literary and epigraphical) sources external to his text, as well as comparative evidence, in order to begin “to develop an entirely different framework of analysis”\textsuperscript{41} to his. But the basis of any attempt to fully develop a framework of analysis for the provisioning of classical Greek overseas military campaigns has to be a detailed examination of the means of supply of the one expedition whose provisioning Thucydides does describe at length: the Athenian expedition to Sicily from 415-413.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{39} See Gomme, \textit{HCT} i.14 on the question of supplies as part of “What Thucydides took for granted” (there are, however, serious mistakes in Gomme’s treatment in this section of the provisioning of Greek military campaigns (see p.46 n.84 and p.126 n.18 below); cf. Davies (1993) 118. Cf. also Rood (1998) 135: “... food was for [Thucydides] only selectively important;” and (ibid.) 135 n.9 for a summary of those rare occasions when Thucydides does mention food in his narrative. Cf. esp. Kallet (2001) 7 [a continuation of the passage quoted above at p.8 n.36 on the topics of money and financing in Thucydides]: “[i]n order to understand the nature and meaning of such items of [financial] information, we must begin by understanding his purpose in including them. This helps in understanding the reasons for the absence of information in the \textit{History} that we would want to know, as part of the financial history of the arche and the Peloponnesian War.”

\textsuperscript{40} See Erdkamp (1998) 4-5; cf. Luttwak (1993) 3-4.

\textsuperscript{41} Davies (1993) 118; my discussion of the issues surrounding the use of Thucydides as a historical source owes much to his short discussion of this problem (at [1993] 117-118).

\textsuperscript{42} For the question of why Thucydides described the provisioning of the Sicilian expedition at length, see appendix 1 section iii. For the use of Thucydidean speeches as historical evidence, see appendix 1. For use
v. Structure of the dissertation

This dissertation can be understood as comprising three parts. In the first part (chapters 1-3), I demonstrate that both the amphibious forces sent out by Athens to reduce Syracuse by blockade in 415-413, and those sent out before that campaign to besiege coastal and island poleis in the Aegean rebelling from or refusing to join the Athenian empire, depended for their provisions during their siege operations on markets supplied by private traders (bringing their own stocks of grain to sell). In sailing to the poleis they wished to reduce by circumvallation sieges, Athenian amphibious forces relied for their supplies on markets provided by friendly (or neutral) poleis they sailed by. Foraging played no important role in the provisioning of these amphibious forces.

Traders were the most important single source of grain for the provisioning of Athenian periploi around the Peloponnese in the first and second Peloponnesian Wars, too, though, for these operations, foraging did play a greater role in the provisioning of sailors and soldiers (than it did in the provisioning of sailors and soldiers engaged in the blockades of enemy poleis). The huge Athenian and Peloponnesian navies fighting each other in the Ionian War also relied for their food on seaborne supply lines provisioned by traders. In contrast, classical Greek armies relied almost solely on foraging for their provisions in hostile territory; private traders played only a supplementary role in the provisioning of land campaigns. In friendly territory, however, classical Greek armies on the march to war zones depended for their provisions on markets organized by friendly poleis, too.

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of ‘real’ Athenian forensic and bouleutic speeches as historical evidence, see Millett (2000) 25, Nevett (2000) 340: representations of institutions and ‘daily life’ had to be at least plausible in these speeches in order to seem realistic to juries chosen by lot, numbering in the hundreds, and broadly representative of the Athenian citizen body as a whole.
In the second part of the dissertation (chapters 4-6), I discuss previous treatments of the pay and provisioning of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces. I demonstrate, firstly, that the entrenched scholarly consensus that classical Greek sailors and soldiers were regularly the victims of opportunistic behavior by traders in the *agorai* organized for them has no basis in the literary texts usually cited to support that consensus. I then show that the idea held by previous scholars that classical Greek military pay rates reflected prices in the markets prepared for Greek military forces also has no foundation in any ancient evidence. Finally, I show that the old (and firmly held) idea that Athenian (and other) military forces in the fifth and fourth centuries received their pay in two installments (one on campaign, and one when those forces returned from a voyage or campaign) was based on a misreading of passages in Thucydides and the Demosthenic corpus; in reality, classical Greek military forces could expect (till the mid fourth century) always to receive their pay in monthly installments (before each of month of service) while on campaign.

In the third part of the dissertation (chapter 7), I demonstrate that the legal and institutional framework of the markets organized for classical Greek military forces, and the conditions of production and distribution in the Greek world of the fifth and fourth centuries, enabled those markets to satisfy the grain requirements of classical Greek overseas forces. On land campaigns, too, classical Greek soldiers could acquire sufficient amounts of grain from the markets prepared for them by friendly *poleis*.

Finally, after concluding briefly with a consideration of what the provisioning of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces can tell us about the structure and performance of Greek economies in the fifth (especially) and fourth centuries, I discuss,
in seven appendices, the use of Thucydides’ speeches as historical evidence; the numbers of men on the Sicilian expedition; the daily grain requirements of classical Greek sailors and soldiers; the provisioning of the Ten Thousand on their march to Cunaxa; some features of Hellenistic pay and provisioning; the rates of pay of Peloponnesian sailors in the first years of the Ionian War; and figures for proceeds from the sale of plunder in the Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries.

But, before all of that, I will begin the dissertation proper with a discussion of the provisioning of the Sicilian expedition, and what it can tell us about the scale of markets in grain in Italy and Sicily in the late fifth century.
Chapter 1: The Provisioning of the Sicilian Expedition

i. Nicias’ second speech to the assembly concerning the παρασκευή of the expedition (6.20-22)

In the summer of 415, the Athenian assembly voted to send sixty ships to go to war in Sicily, on the pretext of supporting the Egestans and the Leontines (against the Selinuntines and the Syracusans, respectively) (6.8.2); although the Athenians’ real aim in voting for the expedition, according to Thucydides, was to conquer the whole of Sicily (6.6.1; cf. 6.8.4). On the fifth day after the decision to send the sixty ships, a second assembly was held, "καθ’ ὅτι χρὴ τὴν παρασκευὴν ταῖς ναυσὶ τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, εἴ του προσδέοιτο, ψηφισθῆναι ἐς τὸν ἔκπλουν," "to consider how the παρασκευή for the ships might be prepared as quickly as possible, and to vote whatever else might be required by the generals for the expedition" (6.8.3). Nicias, who had been chosen against his will to be one of the three generals to sail to Sicily, thought that the Athenians were being badly advised regarding the decision to send an expedition in the first place; accordingly, he came forward to address the assembly in an attempt to divert it from the undertaking (6.8.4). Instead, then, of speaking about the logistical

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1 All text references in this chapter will be to Thucydides’ Histories, unless otherwise indicated.

2 My translation of this clause, based on Dover (1965a) 14 and Hornblower, CT iii.319.

3 "τὴν παρασκευὴν" in this sentence should be taken to mean “all those things that make up an overseas expedition other than the triremes”; i.e., all the heavy and light infantry, cavalry and provisions (in the broad sense of this word, i.e., meaning supplies of food, drink, and equipment) brought for an expedition. This is not the usual meaning of παρασκευή, nor is this an orthodox translation of the term as it used at 6.8.3; I argue for taking παρασκευή in this way at p.27 n.37.
requirements of a force of sixty ships about to embark for Sicily, he attempted to dissuade the Athenians from the expedition by arguing that their strategic position in the Aegean would be endangered by mounting a campaign in such a distant theater of operations.

Nicias did succeed in persuading some of those present to abandon the idea of the expedition (6.15.1). But, even after his speech, most of the Athenians in the assembly were still in favor of sailing to Sicily (6.15.1); and when Alcibiades, one of the other two generals chosen to command the sixty ships, spoke after Nicias and made a persuasive case against him and for war in Sicily in a brilliant speech full of specious arguments and misrepresentations, the assembly was even more eager for the expedition than before (6.19.1). Nicias, in response, perceiving that it would now be useless to attempt to deter those assembled from the war by the arguments he had used in his first speech, now adopted a new rhetorical strategy: he would attempt to discourage the Athenians from sending the expedition by demanding, as general, a massive amount of παρασκευή for it ("παρασκευῆς δὲ πλῆθει, εἰ πολλὴν ἐπιτάξεις, τάχ’ ἂν μεταστήσειεν αὐτοὺς") (6.19.2).

Although Nicias did acknowledge the official agenda of the assembly in his first words to those gathered ("Ἡ µὲν ἐκκλησία περὶ παρασκευῆς τῆς ἡµετέρας ἥδε ξυνελέγη, καθ’ ὅτι χρὴ ἐς Σικελίαν ἐκπλεῖν...") (6.9.1)).

See appendix 1 section iii for discussion of this speech.

παρασκευή here should be taken to mean “all those things that make up an overseas expedition”; see below p.27 n.37 and p.29 n.42 for this interpretation.

As Connor points out ([1984] 166 and n.21, citing the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1421b 24f.), Nicias was adopting here a rhetorical strategy common in classical Greek oratory: if one could not prevent a course of action by arguing that it was the wrong one to take or that it was infeasible, one could attempt to stop it by arguing that it was too troublesome or expensive to undertake.
In order to justify the dispatch of exceptionally large numbers of land forces and amounts of supplies and equipment to accompany the triremes sailing to Sicily, Nicias had to make a compelling argument to the assembly for why the expedition to Sicily would need an extraordinarily great παρασκευή. He began by describing the character and number of the cities in Sicily; they were many, great, and subject to no one (6.20.2). But it was an emphasis on the impressive military resources available to the Sicilian poleis, and especially those available to the poleis that the Athenians would be sailing against, Selinus and Syracuse, that formed the first truly important part of his argument for a massive παρασκευή for the expedition (6.20.3-4). Ἡ Nicias isolated and emphasized five crucial factors that would make the Sicilian poleis unusually formidable enemies for an expeditionary force sailing from Athens (6.20.4):

1. They had many hoplites and archers and slingers;
2. They had many triremes (an exaggeration at least as far as Selinus was concerned),\(^{10}\) and the populations to man them;
3. Selinus and Syracuse had plentiful supplies of money, both private and public.
But the chief advantages which these cities would have over any potential force sailing from Athens were that:
4. They possessed many horses;
5. They relied on homegrown grain, rather than importing it.\(^{11}\)

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\(^{8}\) Kohl (1977) 145. See appendix 1 for my approach and methodology in using this and other Thucydidean speeches as historical evidence.

\(^{9}\) These factors should be understood as applying to all the Sicilian cities that would be fighting against Athens, but particularly Syracuse: cf. Smith (1913) 47 ad loc. with 7.58.4, 7.55.2.

\(^{10}\) Hornblower, CT iii.355.
Having described the military assets available to Selinus and Syracuse, Nicias then logically and methodically laid out the παρασκευή that would need to be brought with the expedition to Sicily in order to ensure a successful outcome in a war against cities with such (by the standards of ‘mainland’ Greece and the Aegean) extraordinary resources—and especially the παρασκευή that would be needed in order to counteract these cities’ natural advantages in cavalry and grain (over any force sailing against them from a long distance away). Firstly, against such enemies, the force sent from Athens would have to consist not just of triremes and an inadequate force (of infantry is implied), but would have to include a sizeable infantry, too (6.21.1: “Πρὸς οὖν τοιαύτην δύναµιν οὐ ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς µόνον δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πεζῶν πολύν ξυµπλεῖν...”), in order

11 Nicias says “ὦ δὲ µάλιστα ἡµῶν προφυλάσαι, [i.e., cavalry and grain].” Who are the “ἡµῶν” here? It seems that Nicias at 6.20.4 was eliding the Athenians in the assembly and those about to embark on the expedition in order to make his presentation of the potential problems of the expedition more vivid to his audience (“these are the problems you face’). Athens was strong in cavalry (see 1.80.3, 1.80.6), and the Selinuntines and Syracusans could not be said to be especially superior to the Athenians in the numbers of horse available to them: at the start of the war, Athens had 1,200 cavalry (2.13.8), exactly the amount available to their Sicilian enemies in 415 (see 6.67.2). Even allowing for exaggeration on Nicias’ part, he must be alluding here to the cavalry that would be available to an expedition making the long journey from Athens to Sicily, and not to the total numbers of cavalry currently available to the Athenian state. As for Nicias’ statement on the grain resources of Selinus and Syracuse, Dover (HCT iv.257 ad loc.) states that “the contrast with Athens is pointed, but the special relevance of the remark is that states which do not rely on imported corn are less vulnerable to naval blockade.” But a contrast with the resources in grain available to the city of Athens would have no relevance or point here: Nicias is here, in fact, making a contrast with the grain supply of the expedition, since any force sent to Sicily would necessarily have to rely on imported grain in order to survive in Sicily, unlike the cities it would be sent to fight against: see pp.29-33 below on 6.22.

12 Note that Nicias had told his audience that (in implicit contrast to ‘mainland’ Greece and the Aegean) in Sicily the Athenians would be fighting against Greek cities “armed in every way just like our own power” (“παρεσκευασµέναι τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁµοιοτρόπως µάλιστα τῇ ἡµετέρᾳ δυνάµει”); and that this was especially true of Selinus and Syracuse (6.20.3). This would make these cities especially and unusually difficult for the Athenians to war against (the point is endorsed by Thucydides (see again 7.55.2, 7.58.4, and also esp. 8.96.5); cf. Liebeschutz (1968) 294 and n.42.

13 See Kohl (1977) 150: as can be seen from the adverb “οὖν,” 6.21.1 represents the start of the conclusions to be drawn from the analysis at 6.20.3-4. My paraphrase of the Greek is based on Dover (1965a) 32-33; see also Rood (2002) 4 on the translation of the first clause of 6.21.1.
to achieve something worthy of its intentions and not be shut off from the land by the numerous cavalry of the Sicilian cities. A sizeable infantry would be especially necessary “if the cities should take alarm and combine, and we should be left without friends (except the Egestans) to furnish us with cavalry with which to defend ourselves.”

Nicias then once more emphasized the importance of an initial dispatch of a large land force in order to counteract the Sicilian horse: it would be shameful, not having deliberated properly and therefore failing to send out a substantial infantry force to deal with the cavalry of the Sicilian cities, to be forced to depart (due to failure to ward off the Sicilian cavalry) or to have send back to Athens for reinforcements (to deal with the Sicilian cavalry).

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14 6.21.1: “ἐἴπερ βουλόµεθα ἄξιον τῆς διανοίας δηλών καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ἱππέων πολλῶν εἰρήσθαι τῆς γῆς...

15 6.21.1: “ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ ξυστῶσιν αἱ πόλεις φοβηθεῖσαι καὶ μὴ ἀντιπαράσχωσιν ἡµῶν φίλοι τινὲς γενόμενοι ἄλλοι ἢ Ἐγεσταῖοι ᾧ ἀµυνόµεθα ἱππικόν...” As Kohl points out ([1977] 151), the “ἄλλως τε καὶ” here picks up the “εἴπερ” of the previous clause: Nicias is gradually but constantly preparing his audience for the detailed demands for infantry to come.

16 6.21.2: “(αἰσχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν ἢ ὑστερον ἐπιµεταπέµπεσθαι, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευσαµένους...” Kagan ([1981] 187) and Ober ([1998] 113) take “ἐπιµεταπέµπεσθαι” at 6.21.2 as referring to the possibility of the Athenians having to send home for “supplies.” But this section of Nicias’ speech is concerned only with the issue of the size of the infantry force needed by the expedition to counteract the large numbers of cavalry possessed by the Sicilian cities; it is only in the next, separate and discrete, section of the speech that Nicias first mentions and discusses the question of supplies for the expeditionary force. As I will demonstrate below (see pp.24-26, pp.32-33), Nicias never considered the possibility that the Athenians in Sicily might be able to send home for provisions. Crawley’s translation of “ἐπιµεταπέµπεσθαι,” “to send back for reinforcements,” is therefore correct.

The argument that it would be shameful to send back for reinforcements was by far the weakest used by Nicias to support his case that a large land force should form part of the expedition: shame would not prevent the Athenians in the summer of 413 from sending a second expeditionary force to Sicily which would include roughly the same amount of infantry as the first sent to the island (see 7.42.1). But with this argument, Nicias had at least anticipated the potential objection to his plan, that more infantry forces could always be sent out later, if the initial expeditionary force struggled against the Sicilian cavalry; this objection had to be addressed somehow, and in the lack of a compelling strategic argument against it, an appeal to the Athenians’ self-image was the best rhetorical tactic available.
It was, then, essential for the success of the expedition that it set out from Athens with a considerable παρασκευή—but not just to be able to match the Sicilian infantry and cavalry in any fighting, but also in order to be able to counter the advantage in grain resources that Selinus and Syracuse possessed (6.21.2):

αὐτῷ δὲ παρασκευῇ ἀξίοχρεω ἐπιέναι, γνῶντας ὅτι πολὺ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἡµετέρας αὐτῶν µέλλοµεν πλεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὁµοίῳ στρατευσόµενοι καί ὅτε ἐν τοῖς τῆς ὑπηκοόις ἔµµαχοι ἡµεῖς ἐπὶ τινα, ὃς ἁµόιαι ἄλλοι πολλοὶ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας ἂν προσέδει, ἀλλ' ἐς ἀλλοτρίαν πᾶσαν ἀπαρτήσοντες, ἐς ἄλλοις τοῖς τῶν χειµερινῶν ἄγγελοι ἡµῖν ἀδίκοι ἐλθεῖν.

We must therefore start from here (i.e. Athens) with a considerable παρασκευή, seeing that we are going to sail far from our country, with the prospect of a campaign on quite different conditions from those in which you took the field against some other state as an ally of your subjects in this part of the world, where the supply of your additional requirements from friendly territory was easy; but (on this campaign) we are cutting ourselves off, and going to a land entirely hostile, from which it is not easy for a messenger to come (sc. to Athens) even within four months during the winter.

These words mark an important stage in the development of Nicias’ rhetorical strategy. At the start of 6.21.1, the argument that the force sent out from Athens would have to include not just triremes but a sizeable land force in addition had contained an

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17 Two notes on the translation of this first clause. Firstly, as Jordan points out ([2000] 67 n.10 (cf. 72), referencing 6.25.2, 6.26.2, 6.22 and the scholiast (Hude) on 6.21.2), “αὐτῷ δὲ” at 6.21.2 means ‘from Athens itself’ (as opposed to ‘from the allies’ or elsewhere; or, as Kohl [1977] 155 has it, “= griech. Mutterland”). See also Classen/Steup, vi.54 ad loc., and p.32 n.49 below on 6.22. Secondly, Jordan, criticizing Classen/Steup’s translation of “ἀξίοχρεω διάνοιαν” at 6.31.1 as “ein gewaltiges Unternehmen,” states ([2000] 67 n.11) that “ἀξίοχρεω [at 6.31.1] basically means ‘counterbalancing a need’; here it echoes Nicias’ word [at 6.21.2] and has its regular meaning ‘adequate’.” But at 6.21.2, at any rate, there is no real contradiction between translating “ἀξίοχρεω” as “counterbalancing a need” and “considerable” or “large”: the παρασκευή at 6.21.2 is to be sent out to counterbalance the very substantial military resources of Selinus and Syracuse, and therefore is meant to be very substantial itself. Here, then, “adequate,” while a literally correct translation of “ἀξίοχρεος,” does not satisfactorily convey the size of the παρασκευή Nicias is arguing for.

18 For the translation: for “with the prospect of... from friendly territory was easy...” and “from which it is not easy... during the winter,” see Dover, HCT iv.257-258. Otherwise, Crawley’s translation is used, apart from “hostile” for “ἀλλοτρίαν,” for which see Kohl (1977) 153 n.1: “ἀλλοτρίαν” is to be contrasted with “ἐκ τῆς φιλίας.” C.f. 6.23.2 for the thought that the Athenians are going to a strange and hostile land.
implicit contrast between the requirements of the planned expedition to Sicily and those of normal Athenian operations: that is, in pointing out the need for a large infantry force to accompany the expedition to Sicily, Nicias had implied that, in their normal overseas campaigns in the Aegean and ‘mainland’ Greece (against ‘normal’ enemies which did not possess the unusually large infantry and (especially) cavalry resources of Selinus and Syracuse), the Athenians usually sent out only relatively small land forces to accompany the fleets of triremes sent on these campaigns.\(^{19}\) Here, at 6.21.2, Nicias stressed the potentially very great difficulties of provisioning for an expeditionary force from Athens operating in and around Sicily by explicitly contrasting the relative advantages of the methods of supply of normal Athenian overseas campaigns in their usual theater of operations, the Aegean.\(^{20}\) Nicias’ use of the aorist ἤλθετε (“καὶ ὅτε ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ἔχομεν ὑπηκόοις ἐξόμοιχοι ἤλθετε ἐπὶ τινα”), representing “the imagined point of view of the troops who will be in Sicily,”\(^{21}\) emphasized that the Athenians in the assembly had past experience (and knowledge) of these campaigns in the Aegean, the conditions of which he was now inviting them to contrast with the conditions of war they would find in Sicily.\(^{22}\)

\(^{19}\) The infantry forces on Athenian amphibious operations during the Peloponnesian war were sometimes not as small as implied here (see pp.55-56 n.98 below for a list of these operations), but Nicias’ point generally holds.

\(^{20}\) As Kohl points out: “[e]s geht in diesem Satz um den Vergleich zwischen sizilischem und heimatlichen Kriegsschauplatz, genauer: um die Darlegung der Nachteile einer Kriegsführung auf Sizilien im Vergleich zu den Vorteilen eines Kriegsschauplatzes im Mutterland” ([1977] 152). And see also Kohl’s analysis of the whole of this section of Nicias’ speech ([1977] 152-153). See also Classen-Steup’s (vi.54) gloss of 6.21.2, “καὶ όμως ἐν τῷ ἐμφανείᾳ στρατευόμενοι”: “‘in der Erkenntnis, daß wir in Begriff stehen, weit hinaus von der Heimat auszuziehen und nicht mit der Aussicht, in derselben Weise den Krieg zu führen.’”

\(^{21}\) Dover, *HCT* iv.258.

\(^{22}\) On the ‘as all you know’ type of argument Nicias was employing here, see Ober (1989) 149-150, and appendix i section ii. Also, by the change here from the first to second person, Nicias encouraged his listeners (again, see above on 6.20.4) to identify themselves with the Athenians on the expedition and thus
In sailing to Sicily, then, Nicias told the Athenians that they were about to sail far away from home on a campaign which would not be like those that they had undertaken before amongst their subject states ("ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὑπηκόοις"). On these overseas campaigns in the Aegean, and in contrast to any campaign in Sicily, supplies of what the Athenians needed in addition ("προσέδει") could easily be obtained from friendly territory. This begs the question (for us): in addition to what? The answer must be: the supplies that the Athenians had initially taken with them on campaign. Nicias was therefore taking it as understood among his audience in the assembly (whom he presented as experienced in and knowledgeable of the provisioning practices of normal Athenian campaigns) that typical Athenian overseas expeditions in the Aegean departed from Athens with initial stocks of provisions that could be added to, if necessary, by provisions coming from friendly/(subject) states.

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23 See chapter 2 section i: these campaigns normally involved the subjection of rebellious poleis after more or less lengthy sieges. “Taking the field against some other state as an ally of your subjects in this part of the world” should be taken as Nicias’ euphemism for this process.

24 Again: understood to be the type of campaign that all those listening to Nicias had experience (and knowledge) of.

25 See Dover’s gloss at HCT iv.258: “‘where the supply of your additional requirements’ (i.e. requirements in addition to what you took with you)...” For κοµιδαὶ = supplies, Classen/Steup (vi.54) compare 4.27.1.

26 These initial stocks of provisions needed to be brought to the war zone in order to ensure logistical security during the journey to the war zone and, more particularly, to provide a safe margin of supplies until shipments of provisions from nearby subjects/allies and Athens would begin to arrive at the newly established base of operations: see Erdkamp (1998) 56 for the idea, and chapter 2 section ii b.
Why, in contrast to any expedition to Sicily, could the additional requirements of Athenian overseas expeditions in the Aegean be supplied easily by friendly (i.e., subject) states? The answers come out in the contrast that Nicias made between conditions on normal campaigns and those that he described as facing the planned Athenian expedition to Sicily. Firstly, Nicias stressed that, unlike in the Aegean where they operated surrounded by friendly/subject states, the Athenians would be going to a completely strange and hostile land in Sicily. The point was exaggerated, but did contain some substance. With the exception of Egesta, the Athenians would not be able to count on the full co-operation of any Sicilian city or people prior to setting out on the expedition: they did have an alliance with Rhegium in Italy (IG I³ 54) and could expect to appeal to shared Chalcidian kinship to ask for aid from it and Naxos and Catana in their efforts on behalf of the Leontines; but, in contrast to coastal Aegean cities, neither Rhegium nor any of the Sicilian cities were subject to Athens and thus they could refuse to take the Athenians’ side in any fighting. There was also the danger that the Sicilian cities might unite in fear against the invading Athenian force. In contrast to the Aegean, then, where the co-operation of the friendly/subject states of the Athenians’ empire, including the

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27 For Rhegium and Chalcidian kinship to the Leontines, see 6.44.3, 6.46.2, and pp.67-68 below; for Naxos and Catana, see 6.20.3 with p.72 n.139 and p.68 n.129 below.

28 Kohl (1977) 153 n.1. See also Bauslaugh (1991) 165: “[i]n 415... Athens was confronted by a situation in which the West Greek states, because they were too powerful to coerce openly, had to be accepted on their own terms.” Cf. 6.11.1, 6.86.3 for Nicias and Euphemus (an Athenian emissary to Camarina) stating that Sicilian poleis were too powerful and too distant from Athens for the Athenians to be able to rule them as subjects (although it should be noted that these statements were, in the first case, part of a larger argument against Athenian intervention in the west (Nicias) and, in the second, part of a disingenuous speech to the Camarinaeans arguing that the Athenians had no interest in imperial expansion to the far west).

29 6.21.1.
provision of supplies by these states, could be taken for granted by expeditionary forces on their departure from Athens, no such assumption could be made by the force leaving for Sicily: the diplomatic situation in the far west was much more fluid, and both military success and diplomatic efforts would be needed to bring Sicilian (and Italian) states to the side of the Athenians, and to keep them there, so that they (as states friendly to the expedition) would supply the expedition with provisions.\(^{30}\)

Secondly, Nicias emphasized to his audience how far away Sicily was: the Athenians were about to sail far away and cut themselves off from home, by voyaging to a country from which it was not easy even for a messenger to come to Athens during the four winter months. In contrast to overseas expeditions in the Aegean, undertaken against enemies which were near to Athens or its allies/subjects,\(^{31}\) the expedition, in sailing to Sicily, would become detached from Athens and the Aegean, and it would be impossibly difficult to feed the tens of thousands of men campaigning in Sicily through seaborne supply lines carrying provisions over the long distance from Athens and/or its allied poleis in the Aegean: this would be especially true during the winter.\(^{32}\) There

\(^{30}\) See 6.23.2, 6.49.4, 6.68.3, 6.71.2, 6.103.2, 7.14.3 for the necessity of Athenian military success for gaining (and keeping) support from states in Sicily and Italy. For the expedition’s diplomatic efforts to win over states in the far west to the Athenian cause, see 6.44.3, 6.50-52, 6.71.2, 6.88.3, and esp. 6.75.3-4 with 6.81-88.2. Cf. 7.7.2, 7.12.1, 7.25.9, 7.46.1 for the Syracusans sending envoys asking for military aid from the poleis in Sicily after and because they had experienced military success against the Athenians, and see 7.21.1, 7.32.1, 7.50.1 for these envoys’ missions meeting with success; note esp. in this regard Dover, HCT iv.413 on 7.33.1: the news of the Syracusan success in capturing Plemmyrion, which led to Camarina sending military aid to Syracuse, “achieved what persuasive arguments could not.”

\(^{31}\) The nearness of enemies in the Aegean is to be understood from the description of Sicily as far away, since Nicias here was explicitly contrasting conditions in the Aegean with those in the west. Cf. the scholia’s gloss of the first clause of 6.21.2 (Σ\(^{\text{Hude}}\)): “οὐχ ὁµοίως µέλλετε στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ Σικελίαν, ἣτας εν ταύτῃ τῷ ὑπηκόων συµµαχοῦντες στρατεύεσθαι ἐπί τινας οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχοντες, ὥστε ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ τῶν ἀναγκαιῶν παραχωμένη ἐκ τῆς ῥᾳδίας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γῆς.”

\(^{32}\) Cf. Smith’s gloss of “ἐξ Ἑλλάδος οἴκητα πεσάθαι τῶν κειμενῶν ἄγγελον ἀδίκου ἀντίς” ([1913] 49): “from which not even in four winter months could a messenger easily come, i.e. to ask for help or supplies;
were, in the course of the Sicilian campaign, instances of triremes sailing between Sicily and cities in ‘mainland’ Greece during the winter months;\footnote{See Dover, \textit{HCT} iv.258 ad loc.} but the length of the journey to Sicily and the dangers of sailing during the winter meant that Nicias’ argument here was generally valid.\footnote{See ibid. Cf. Pryor (1988) 89: in the medieval Mediterranean, it was common for single galleys (and, one might add, small fleets of galleys) on important diplomatic and military missions to take to the sea during the winter, but very rare for large expeditions to do so. Cf. Roth (1999) 191 (with Erdkamp [1998] 54): shipments by sea of supplies to Roman forces overseas were undertaken in winter only in cases of extreme need or in order to gain advantage over the enemy by surprise (and note that the instances cited by these authors are for shipments over distances much shorter than that from Athens to Sicily). In the sixteenth century (C.E.), Mediterranean galley fleets operating in theaters of war far from home (and/or allied territory) returned home before the winter, because of the difficulties of provisioning by sea during wintertime: see Guilmartin (1974) 104. Cf., too, Erdkamp (2005) 187: Polybius stating that the coast of the Gulf of Tarentum only has harbors suitable for summer sailing.} In the Aegean, Athenian overseas expeditions (prior to embarking) could count on logistical support from Athens and/or from allies/subjects close to the targets of their operations; i.e., once they had established a base of operations for a campaign, they could depend on the easy supply of any additional requirements they might have from Athens or nearby friendly territory (even during winter, as the contrast Nicias draws with the difficulties of sailing to Sicily during this season implies).\footnote{Cf. also, e.g., Erdkamp (1998) 53-55 on the difficulty of keeping open lengthy supply lines by sea during the winter for Republican Roman expeditions operating overseas, and esp. 55: “... overseas shipments were vulnerable to adverse winds and... during wintertime, apart from short coastal trips, they usually had to stop.”} But the expedition to Sicily would face a different set of circumstances: because of the great distance to Sicily, any expedition sent there would not be able to reprovision itself from much less then could these be sent thither in that time.”(Note also that the adjective “ῥᾴδιον” in the last clause of 6.21.2 picks up and is thus to be implicitly compared with “ῥᾴδιαι αἱ κοµιδαί” mentioned as available to expeditions in the Aegean from friendly territory.)
Athens and its allies/subjects in the Aegean; the expedition therefore would require other, extraordinary measures to ensure its supply.\textsuperscript{36}

At 6.21.2, then, Nicias brought out the special problems that the Athenians would have to confront in provisioning an expedition to Sicily by explicitly contrasting the relative ease of supply of their ‘normal’ overseas campaigns in the Aegean. This was a development of his rhetorical strategy of 6.21.1, where he had also invited his audience to note the differences between the unusual requirements of the campaign in Sicily and those of a typical expedition in the Aegean, although at 6.21.1 he had done this implicitly. Thus, building on his presentation at 6.20.3-4 of the exceptional military assets possessed by the Sicilian poleis the Athenians would be campaigning against, Nicias had made the case at 6.21 for the need for an extraordinarily large force of infantry for the expedition in order to counteract the Sicilian strength in infantry and (especially) cavalry, and also for the need for extraordinary arrangements in order both to counteract the Sicilian poleis’ resources in grain and to overcome the logistical difficulties of operating in an unfriendly and distant theater of operations. At 6.21, in other words, Nicias had made his case for an unusually large amount of παρασκευή for the expedition to Sicily. Having done this, Nicias next listed the specifics of the massive παρασκευή necessary to meet the extraordinary operational challenges facing any expedition to the

\textsuperscript{36} Kohl glosses the last clause of 6.21.2 as follows ([1977] 153 n.1): “[u]nd der Nachschub kam dort nicht \textit{\iota\kappa\tau\epsilon\varsigma \phi\iota\lambda\iota\varsigma} aus der Nähe, sondern mußte aus dem fernen Athen herangeschafft werden, wohin ein Bote nicht einmal in vier Monaten, Winter monaten, leicht gelangt!” But there is nothing in Nicias’ description of conditions in the Aegean and Sicily that implies that, because supply from nearby friendly territory could not be depended upon in Sicily, the expedition would have to be supplied from Athens. Indeed, the description of the difficulties of sailing to Sicily during the winter stressed the infeasibility of supplying the expedition in Sicily from Athens. Kohl’s misunderstanding here is based on a misunderstanding of Nicias’ proposals at 6.22 for the provisioning of the expedition once it had reached Sicily: see p.34 n.52 below.
west (6.22).\textsuperscript{37} The motivation behind this next part of Nicias’ speech, i.e. the fact that he was deliberately demanding at 6.22 unusual types and amounts of \textit{παρασκευή} (which he hoped would persuade the Athenians not to embark on the expedition to Sicily), means that a simple but crucial procedural point needs to be kept in mind when discussing this

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{37}Cf. Kohl (1977) 155. And see the first clause of 6.22: “ὅπλίτας τε οὖν πολλοίς μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἰμάς ἀγέναι καὶ ἕμοιν αὐτῶι καὶ τῶι ξυμάχωι, τῶι τοῦ ὕποκαν καὶ ἕν τινα ἐπὶ Πελοποννήσου δυνάμεσα ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ µισθῷ προσαγαγόσαι...”: as can be seen from the adverb “οὖν,” 6.22 represents the conclusions to be drawn from the analysis at 6.21 (cf. p.18 n.13 above on 6.21.1). This brings up an important point on the meaning of \textit{παρασκευή} in the early part of book 6. \textit{παρασκευή} is most frequently used by Thucydides to mean ‘a (military) force (in its entirety)’ (see, e.g., 6.1.1 (with Dover [1965a] 1 ad loc.), 6.6.2. But \textit{παρασκευή} can also shift in meaning in Thucydides to convey other objects, and processes, since it belongs to a class of nouns that exhibit “process-product ambiguity” (see Allison [1989] 7-8, and esp. 30-44; see also Allison [1981] 118 for a definition of process-product ambiguity: “that is some nouns do not mark a distinction between whether they convey an action or the result of an action.”). While Thucydides mostly uses \textit{παρασκευή} to refer to products, i.e. military forces, he sometimes uses it to refer to a process; this is his usage at, e.g., 6.26.2 “καὶ µετὰ ταύτα ἡ παρασκευή ἐγίγνετο.” “[a]fter this the preparation was begun.” Allison ([1989] 81 table 7) states that “παρασκευὴ ἀξιόχρεῳ” at 6.21.2 is ambiguous, i.e. that the term \textit{παρασκευή} here could be taken as referring to a product or a process. But consideration of the phrase “παρασκευὴ ἀξιόχρεῳ” within the context of 6.21-22 as a whole demonstrates that it is not ambiguous, but refers to concrete objects (products). Firstly, a translation of \textit{παρασκευὴ} here as “preparation” would make very little or no sense (note that, in her detailed treatment of 6.21.2, Allison leaves “παρασκευὴ” untranslated ([1989] 84)). Secondly, and much more importantly, when Nicias presents in detail in 6.22 what the “παρασκευὴ ἀξιόχρεῳ” argued for as necessary at 6.21.2 should comprise, it is made up of concrete objects (and persons): “ὅπλίτας... τοῦτον... σφενδονήτας... ναυσί... σιτοποιούς...” (thus Allison [1989] 83 is incorrect to state that “[t]he \textit{ei πολλὴν ἐπιτάξει} clause suggests product while the content of the following speech indicates not merely ‘things-prepared,’ but also ‘manner of preparing,’ both of the things, as well as a ‘preparing’ of the right attitude for the huge expedition.” No indication in Nicia’s speech that supports the latter two meanings suggested here for \textit{παρασκευὴ} by Allison.) See also pp.53-54 n.95 on 6.25.1 on this point. And since the people and objects listed at 6.22 constitute the “παρασκευὴς δὲ πληθύνει” by which Nicias planned to discourage the Athenians from the expedition, then \textit{παρασκευὴ} at 6.19.2 should be taken, too, as referring to concrete objects, and not to any process(es) (contra Allison [1989] 81 table 7, 83; it should be noted here also that the “\textit{ei πολλὴν ἐπιτάξει}” clause at 6.19.2 strongly suggests a product sense for \textit{παρασκευὴ} at 6.19.2, in any case (cf. Allison [1989] 83)). And, again, since Nicias’ second speech outlining what he thought necessary for the \textit{παρασκευὴ} of the expedition was part of the debate before the assembly concerning, as indicated at 6.8.3, the \textit{παρασκευὴ} for the ships of the expedition, then, just as at 6.19.2, \textit{παρασκευὴ} at 6.8.3—and at 6.9.1—should be taken as referring to concrete objects (contra Allison [1989] 81 table 7, 81-83 who states that Thucydides was using the term at 6.8.3 and 6.9.1 in its process sense, i.e. that it should be translated as “preparations”). Thus, to be more precise, at 6.8.3, \textit{παρασκευὴ} should be taken to mean “all those things that make up an overseas expedition apart from the triremes,” i.e. all the heavy and light infantry, cavalry, and provisions brought for an apart from the triremes,” i.e. all the heavy and light infantry, cavalry, and provisions brought for an expedition (Kohl [1977] 4 (“die... Ausrüstung der Flotte”) and Ober [1998] 107 (“the material necessities for [the] expedition”) are, then, better glosses of 6.8.3 than Allison’s, if still not quite precise enough); since at 6.8.3 the \textit{παρασκευὴ} for the triremes of the expedition, it obviously cannot include triremes. One might also add, contra Allison, that at 6.8.3 it is “τὰν \textit{παρασκευὴς}” and not “τὰς \textit{παρασκευὰς},” so that translating the term here as “preparations” is strictly incorrect (cf. 6.34.9, where “τὰς \textit{παρασκευὰς}” is used to mean “preparations”). In addition, the \textit{παρασκευὴ} at 6.8.3 is to be made ready for the ships; this suggests that \textit{παρασκευὴ} here is referring to something concrete. For the exact meaning of \textit{παρασκευὴ} at 6.9.1 and 6.19.2, see p.29 n.42.)}
section of Nicias’ speech: since Nicias meant that all of the forces and materiel he asked for at 6.22 were to be understood by his audience as exceptional demands to meet exceptional circumstances, none of the detailed demands for παρασκευή made in this part of his speech should be taken as representative of usual Athenian practice. But also, conversely, the fact that Nicias meant these plans to be understood by his audience as unusual means that, by examining and establishing what was exceptional about the measures proposed by Nicias at 6.22, one can infer and reconstruct the kinds and amounts of παρασκευή that usually accompanied Athenian overseas expeditions.  

At 6.22, as at 6.20.4 and 6.21, Nicias dealt first with the question of infantry, before moving on to the question of provisions. Thus, his first recommendation for the παρασκευή of the expedition was for many hoplites—Athenian, allied, and mercenary—and for many archers and slingers to withstand the Sicilian cavalry (whose potential threat to the success of the expedition he had outlined at 6.21.1). Very large forces of

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38 It should be remembered here that Nicias was assuming that his audience in the assembly was thoroughly familiar with typical Athenian overseas expeditions in the Aegean (see again p.21 above on the implications of Nicias’ use of ἠλθεῖτε at 6.21.2, and appendix 1 section ii on Nicias’ use there of the ‘as you all know’ type of argument), and thus that it could recognize that the measures which he was proposing at 6.22 were unusual. Cf. Kallet (2001) 44 n.81: “[t]hat Nikias expected his audience to be persuaded by exaggeration says much about their relative knowledge in these areas [i.e., their knowledge of the παρασκευή that usually accompanied overseas expeditions]: they collectively knew enough to be expected to be impressed; that they were impressed to the extent that they reached a conclusion that was the opposite of what Nikias expected does not weaken the point.”

39 6.22: “ὁπλίτας τε οὖν πολλούς µοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡµᾶς ἄγειν καὶ ἡµῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν υπηκόων καὶ ἤν τινα ἐκ Πελοποννήσου δυνώµεθα ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ µισθῷ προσαγαγέσθαι...”

40 6.22: “... καὶ ταξότας πολλοὺς καὶ σφενδονήτας, ὡπως πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνων ἱππικὸν ἀντέχωσι...” One should also remember here the Sicilian strength in archers and javeliners noted by Nicias at 6.20.4. Slingers were not usually part of Athenian expeditions: no slingers are mentioned as part of an Athenian force by Thucydides before the Sicilian expedition. Slinging was not a usual Athenian practice: the seven hundred slingers who left Athens for Sicily were all Rhodian (6.43) (for slinging as a particularly Rhodian practice, see Dover, HCT iv.310 citing Xen., Anab. 3.3.16 (and cf. Xen., Anab. 3.4.15-16)).
hoplites, archers, and slingers were not typical of Athenian expeditionary forces in the eastern Mediterranean; this is an important point because it serves as a confirmation that the measures proposed by Nicias at 6.22 were to be understood as unusual, and not as characteristic of the kinds and amounts of παρασκευή that usually accompanied Athenian overseas expeditions.

After the detailed demands for land forces, Nicias moved from the expedition’s need for infantry to resist the Sicilian cavalry on to the specific measures for provisioning required to meet the special logistical challenges (as he had outlined them at 6.21.2) of campaigning in and around Sicily. Nicias first recommended that the Athenians sail to Sicily with an overwhelming superiority in triremes in order that the expedition might be able to bring in its provisions (the more) easily. The recommendation for great numbers of triremes “ινα και τα ἐπιτήδεια ύφον ἐσκοµιζώμεθα” picked up and addressed,

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41 See pp.55-56 n.98 for the numbers and types of infantry forces accompanying Athenian amphibious operations in the Peloponnesian war before the Sicilian expedition.

42 6.22: “... ναῦσι τε καὶ πολὺ περιεῖναι, ινα και τα ἐπιτήδεια ύφον ἐσκοµιζώμεθα...” It should be noted here that, with the inclusion of triremes among Nicias’ demands for the παρασκευή to be sent to Sicily, Nicias had exploited the ambiguity of this word to suit his rhetorical strategy. At 6.8.3, παρασκευή had meant “all those things that make up an overseas expedition other than the triremes” (see p.27 n.37 above); now, at 6.22, when Nicias was setting out the details of the “παρασκευή ἀξιόχρεῳ” he had earlier presented as necessary for the expedition (6.21.2), he ordered a military force in its entirety—the primary meaning of παρασκευή in Thucydides (that is, at 6.22 Nicias had broadened the meaning of the term so that he could include here as many different things as possible under the heading παρασκευή in order to dissuade the Athenians from making the expedition to Sicily). See pp.53-54 n.95 on 6.25.1 for confirmation of this point. And since, as noted above (p.27 n.37), the people and objects listed at 6.22 constitute the “παρασκευής δὲ πληθοῦσι” by which Nicias intended to deter the Athenians from the expedition, then παρασκευή at 6.19.2 should be taken as meaning ‘a military force in its entirety,’ too. But since Nicias only adopted the plan to discourage the Athenians from making the expedition to Sicily by demanding a massive amount of παρασκευή for it after the reaction to his first speech to the assembly, and at 6.9.1 had acknowledged the assembly’s official agenda in the first words of his first speech to it (“Ἡ µὲν ἐκκλησία περὶ παρασκευῆς τῆς ἡµετέρας ἥδε ξυνελέγη, καθ’ ὅτι χρὴ ἐς Σικελίαν ἐκπλεῖν...”), then παρασκευή at 6.9.1 should be understood as taking the same meaning as it does at 6.8.3, “all those things that make up an overseas expedition other than the triremes,” i.e. all the heavy and light infantry, cavalry, and provisions brought for an expedition.
following logically from the presentation at 6.21.2 of the potential problems confronting the provisioning of the expedition to Sicily, the first concern raised by Nicias at 6.21.2: that, unlike in the Aegean, it could not be presumed prior to the departure of the expedition that “ῥᾴδιαι αἱ κοµιδαὶ” would be available to it in Sicily from friendly states in or near to the theater of operations to add to any provisions brought from Athens. The fact that Nicias stressed the need for a great number of triremes—i.e., the fact that the recommendation that the Athenians should have an overwhelmingly greater number of triremes (than the Sicilian poleis is implied) in order to ensure the safety of the transport of provisions to their forces in Sicily was included as part of a series of exceptional measures—points up, by the implied contrast with usual Athenian practice, another important aspect of the provisioning of normal Athenian operations in the Aegean. As opposed to the Aegean and ‘mainland’ Greece, where, in the period between the Persian Wars and the Sicilian expedition, the Athenian navy had (more or less) complete control of the sea, and operated surrounded by subject poleis, Nicias had argued, at 6.20.4, that an Athenian expeditionary force operating in Sicily would have to confront cities whose naval resources were similar to Athens in terms of ships, crews, and money; it

43 I argue fully for this point in chapter 2 section iic but, for now, see 3.32.3 for a strikingly vivid example of Athenian control of the Aegean in the period before the Sicilian expedition, and 7.57.5 for Athenian control of the seas off western ‘mainland’ Greece.

44 See again 6.21.2: in the Aegean, the Athenians operate “ἐν τοῖς... ὑπηκόοις...”

45 And see again p.18 n.12: Nicias had told his audience (at 6.20.3) that in Sicily (in implicit contrast to ‘mainland’ Greece and the Aegean) the Athenians would be fighting against Greek cities “armed in every way just like our own power.” (Even if Nicias exaggerated the naval strength of Selinus at 6.20.4, this does not weaken the point I am making here because, firstly, I am interested here in the preconceptions about the provisioning of Athenian campaigns in the Aegean that Nicias’ demands revealed as shared by him and his audience; and, secondly, the subsequent narrative demonstrates that Thucydides considered that Nicias’ concerns about the security of the provisioning of the Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily were, in fact, correct (for full discussion of this latter point, see appendix 1 section iii)).
would have to campaign against cities, therefore, that could compete with it for control of the sea. Nicias had also argued at 6.21.2 that a force from Athens could not count on the friendliness of states in or near to the theater of operations in Sicily. Thus, again, contrary to their experiences in the Aegean, where, because of their overwhelming naval superiority, and because of the fact that they were normally surrounded on all sides by friendly/subject states, the Athenians had never had to deal with the problem of enemy triremes challenging the transport of logistical support to their fleets and amphibious forces, and thus could count on the easy supply of their additional requirements from nearby friendly territory, such a superiority could not be taken for granted when operating in and around Sicily, because of the presence of enemy poleis (especially Syracuse) with substantial fleets of triremes. Hence the recommendation that, as part of the παρασκευή of the expedition, an exceptional number of triremes sail with the expedition in order to ensure the safety of its seaborne food supply once it had reached Sicily; the point was that, unlike in the Aegean and the seas around ‘mainland’ Greece, the security of seaborne logistical support coming from nearby friendly states could not be assumed for Athenian forces operating in Sicily.\(^\text{46}\)

\(^{46}\) I will come back to this crucial point of difference with Athenian operations in the Aegean before 412 in chapter 2 section iic. Note here that there is a slight contradiction between the presumed reliance at 6.22 on nearby states (nearby, that is, to any operations in Sicily) for the provisioning of the expedition, and Nicias’ statement at 6.21.2 that the Athenians would be sailing to a land “ἀλλοτρίαν πᾶσαν” (6.21.2). But, as noted above (at pp.23-24), the description of the Sicilian theater of operations at 6.21.2 exaggerated the extent of the hostile, or rather unfriendly, reception which the Athenians might expect to receive in the far west: the crucial difference between operating in and around Sicily and the Aegean was that the Athenians could not depend on the friendship of, and therefore resupply from, states in the west before embarkation, unlike in the Aegean (where they campaigned in the midst of subject states); thus, military success and diplomatic efforts would be required before the Athenians could gain the friendship of, and therefore the capacity to resupply from, states near to or in the Sicilian theatre of operations. In sum, Nicias’ description at 6.21.2 of the ease of resupply of Athenian operations in the Aegean (“ῥᾴδιαι αἱ κομιδαὶ”), which was meant to be contrasted with conditions in the west, implied not that resupply from friendly states in the west would be impossible, but merely that it would be (very) difficult.
Nicias, then, intended for the requested superiority in triremes to provide security for shipments of provisions from states in or near Sicily to the Athenian expeditionary force once it had established itself in the far west (and not, as has been usually thought, to provide security for shipments of supplies from Athens and the Aegean to the force in Sicily). This is confirmed by Nicias’ next specific instruction for the expedition’s provisioning, which consisted of a detailed list of arrangements for the transportation and preparation of grain to be brought with it from Athens:

... τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν σῖτον ἐν ὁλκάσι, πυροὺς καὶ πεφρυγµένας κριθάς, ἄγειν, καὶ σιτοποιοὺς ἐκ τῶν µυλώνων πρὸς µέρος ἄρα καὶ ἄρα αὐτόθεν ἀπολαµβάνωµεν ἀπόλαµα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια (πολλή γὰρ οὖσα οὐ πάσης ἔσται πόλεως ὑποδέξασθαι)...  

... and we must take grain from here (i.e. Athens) in merchant vessels, that is to say, wheat and roasted barley, and bakers from the mills compelled to serve for pay in the proper proportion; so that, if we should be detained by bad weather, the expedition will have provisions, for it is not every city that will be able to receive a force as large as ours.

As Dover commented, καὶ with αὐτόθεν is climactic here, giving the sense of ‘actually from Athens itself’; the emphasis on “αὐτόθεν” was meant, then, to indicate a

47 See pp.33-34 n.52 and p.46 n.84 below.

48 Note again here 6.21.2, with the discussion at pp.24-26: Nicias noting that the extraordinary distance from Athens to Sicily would preclude the sending of provisions from home to the expedition once it had commenced operations in Sicily.

49 Hornblower’s (CT iii.358) translation of “ἡν ποὺ ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας ἀπολαµβανόµεθα...” For the translation of “αὐτόθεν” as “from here (i.e., Athens),” see p.20 n.17 above on 6.21.2 and see main text just below. The rest of the translation is taken, with some slight modifications, from Crawley.

50 HCT iv.259: “although Nikias has emphasized in 21 the importance of taking enough men and equipment from their own resources at the start, the first part of 22 speaks of raising troops also from allies; hence καὶ with αὐτόθεν is climactic, ‘actually from Athens itself.’” This is not quite right: καὶ with αὐτόθεν is climactic, and αὐτόθεν here is meant to contrast the grain from home with an earlier item demanded/recommended by Nicias from abroad (see also Dover [1965a] 33), but this item is not the allied and mercenary hoplites listed earlier. See main text and next note.
very strong contrast with an item or items not from Athens. Since the demand for
“αὐτόθεν σῖτον” formed part of a discrete section of Nicias’ speech dealing specifically
with the question of provisions, the climactic contrast conveyed by the demand for grain
from here should therefore be understood as being with provisions from some place other
than Athens. The contrast, that is, came with the provisions mentioned by Nicias in the
previous clause, “... ἑνασὶ τὲ καὶ πολὺ περιεῖναι, ἦνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ὤφον ἐσκοµιζῶµεθα”: i.e., “τὰ ἐπιτήδεια” from states in or near to Sicily which the
overwhelming number of Athenian triremes would help to ensure reached the Athenian
forces operating in Sicily.

51 In this second part of 6.22, Nicias had moved on from the expedition’s specific needs in infantry to the
question of its provisioning requirements. Just as the first part of 6.22 had dealt with the strategic concerns
raised at 6.21.1 (i.e., the potential problems on land that would confront any Athenian force sailing to
Sicily), the second part of 6.22, following the logical organization of the speech, dealt with the strategic
concern raised at 6.21.2: i.e. the difficulties in provisioning a force sailing to and operating in Sicily would
have to face. This is a decisive objection against Dover’s view that “τὸν... αὐτόθεν σῖτον” was meant to be
 contrasted with the infantry forces demanded in the first part of 6.22. We might also note against Dover
here that the first part of 6.22 speaks of raising hoplites from Athens, and also of raising archers; since the
archers who accompanied Athenian overseas expeditions were usually solely from Athens (when archers
are mentioned as part of Thucydides’ enumerations of Athenian overseas expeditions during the
Peloponnesian War before 415, they are always Athenian: see 2.23.2 [431]; 3.107.1 [winter 426/5];
4.129.2 [423]; 5.84.1 [416]), those listening to Nicias’ speech would have presumed that the archers on the
proposed expedition to Sicily would have been (at least predominantly) Athenian (this is true even if
Nicias, when pressed after his speech for precise arrangements for the expedition, stated that the force
should include archers from Athens and Crete (6.25.2), and the 480 archers who eventually left from
Athens did include 80 Cretans (6.43)). It hardly seems possible that “αὐτόθεν” was meant (or could be
understood by Nicias’ audience) to mark a climactic contrast with demands for a force of heavy and light
infantry, at least half of which were to come from Athens. (This makes sense in general terms, anyway:
why should grain from Athens be contrasted with infantry (from wherever)?)

52 See already Jowett ad loc.: “[t]he supplies taken out from Athens are contrasted by δὲ with the supplies
which would have to be procured by plunder or otherwise in Sicily itself” (note, however, that neither
plunder nor foraging plays any role in Nicias’ plans for the provisioning of the expedition or in its actual
provisioning (see section ivb below). See also appendix 1 section iii: the description of the erga of the
campaign in the narrative subsequent to Nicias’ speech, and esp. the connection made by Thucydides there
between the struggle at sea and the provisioning of the expedition from states in Sicily and Italy (along with
the lack of any mention of provisioning from Athens), confirms the analysis here that Nicias was asking for
a superiority in triremes to protect shipments of provisions to the expedition from states in the far west. As
indicated above, this is not the usual modern interpretation of the clauses “... ναυσὶ τὲ καὶ πολὺ περιεῖναι,
ἠνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ὤφον ἐσκοµιζῶµεθα, τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν σῖτον ἐν ὁλκασι...” Kohl, for instance, in a
Grain was to be brought from home, then, with the expedition (but not to feed the men of the expedition once a base of operations had been established in Sicily; the grain at that point would come from nearby friendly states). It was, however, usual practice for overseas expeditions leaving Athens in this period to bring (at least) some provisions from Athens; thus there was nothing unusual per se in Nicias’ demand that the expedition to Sicily be accompanied by grain from Athens. But the measures that Nicias proposed at 6.22 were meant to deliberately extraordinary; the whole point of his rhetorical strategy in this section of his speech was, as I have shown, to make detailed demands for παρασκευή carefully constructed so as to be radically different from the requirements of normal overseas expeditions in the Aegean. What, then, was extraordinary about Nicias’ demand that the Athenians bring grain from Athens with their expedition to Sicily? The answer is (at least) threefold: the form in which the grain was to be transported; the arrangements for its preparation for consumption; and the reason

53 See the analysis of 6.21.2 above at p.22.
Nicias gave for the transportation of grain from Athens with the expedition and the
special measures to be taken concerning its transportation and preparation.  

When specifying what grain should be brought in the merchant-ships
accompanying the expedition to Sicily, Nicias stated that it should be “πυροὺς καὶ
πεφρυγµένας κριθὰς,” “wheat and roasted barley.” In the fifth and early fourth
centuries, however, although wheat was the preferred and higher-status grain, ἄλφιτα,
barley-flour (or barley-meal), and its products was the most commonly consumed form
of grain in the Greek world. It was also the form of grain most commonly consumed by

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54 The size of the boats in which the grain was to be transported may also have been exceptional: see pp.42-44 below.

55 Hornblower (CT iii.358) cites Pritchett (1971) 43 and n.69, and Dalby (1992) 25 n.66 ad loc. But Pritchett simply notes that “[t]he words for wheat and barley are appositional to sitos [sic], a general word for grain,” while the passage of Dalby cited is a totally incorrect note on the workings of markets provided to classical Greek military forces (see chapter 4 section ii). Other scholars who have previously treated this passage have not dealt with the question of why Nicias should have included precise details on the form of grain that was to be brought with the expedition: so, e.g., Green (1970) 110, Kagan (1981) 187. See, too, in this respect, Kohl ([1977] 156) and Kallet ([2001] 42-44), both of whom see the inclusion of the recommendation for grain from Athens simply as part of Nicias’ strategy to deter the Athenians from going to Sicily by emphasizing the exceptional troublesomeness of the necessary preparations for such an expedition, without asking the question why Nicias made the specific recommendations for the type of grain he did.

56 See Dalby (2003) 46-47 (with ancient and modern references) for a list of the foods that could be made from ἄλφιτα: μᾶζα, a kneaded, uncooked, barley-cake was the form in which ἄλφιτα was most commonly consumed; barley-flour was also eaten in the form of gruel or porridge, or as flat, unleavened bread (but barley-bread was given to slaves only (see von Reden [2007] 390)).

57 See esp. Gallo (1983) 454-456, 458-460 (for Athens), Amouretti (1986) 125-126. For ἄλφιτα meaning in effect ‘daily bread’ at Athens in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, see, e.g., Aristoph., Knights 1000ff., 1359; Clouds 106, 648; Peace 636; Wealth 219. Barley-flour was the grain normally contributed to and eaten in classical Spartan syssitia: see, e.g., Figueira (1984) 88-89; Hodkinson (2000) 191-192; Hdt. 6.57.2-3 with appendix 3 section i; Xen., Lac. Pol. 5.3. Note also that the grain-containers produced by the authorities at Olympia, for a century or so beginning in the third quarter of the fifth century, for regulating consumption of grain (in a way unclear to us) at the Olympic Games were all for the measuring out and consumption of ἄλφιτα (as can be seen from the inscriptions and seal-ring impressions found on them): see Schilbach (1999).
classical Greek military and naval forces on campaign: on the few occasions that Thucydides and other authors of the fifth and fourth centuries specified the form of grain that classical Greek soldiers and sailors were eating, buying, or being given (when engaged in operations in the Greek world), it was always ἄλφιτα. The only instances of a grain-product other than ἄλφιτα being bought by or distributed to classical Greek soldiers occurred in extraordinary circumstances and outside the Greek world: when the grain of the Greek mercenaries in Cyrus’ army gave out as they were marching through the desert between Corsoë and Pylae, their only recourse was to what Xenophon called the Lydian market (i.e., it was a market run by Lydians) in the non-Greek part of the army, where the prices charged for ἄλευρα (wheat-flour) and ἄλφιτα were astronomically high (Xen., Anab. 1.5.6); the wheat-flour and wine which were loaded on 400 wagons assembled by Cyrus before the battle of Cunaxa, and which were to be distributed to the Greeks in the case of famine in the army, were instead pillaged by the Persians in the

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58 3.49.3 [427]: Mytilenian envoys prepare ἄλφιτα for the trireme sailing from Athens to Mytilene to inform Paches that the decision by the Athenian assembly to kill all the Mytilenians had been reversed (the sailors on board the trireme eat the ἄλφιτα kneaded with wine and oil as they row); 4.16.2 [425]: the Spartiates blockaded on Sphacteria were each to receive two choinikes of ἄλφιτα per day, already kneaded; 8.100.2 [411]: Thrasyllus orders stores of ἄλφιτα to be prepared at Methymna for the Athenian fleet (Hornblower incorrectly translates ἄλφιτα in this passage as “barley” (CT iii.1041)). The xenia provided to the Ten Thousand by Trapezus (Xen., Anab. 4.8.23), Sinope (Xen., Anab. 6.1.15), and Heraclea (Xen., Anab. 6.2.3) in 400 all included ἄλφιτα as their grain component. A merchant ship arriving at Calpe from Heraclea carried, amongst other things to sell to the Cyreans, ἄλφιτα, but no other form of grain (Xen., Anab. 6.5.1). Coeratadas’ pathetic attempt at Byzantium to feed the Cyreans included twenty men accompanying him carrying ἄλφιτα (Xen., Anab. 7.1.37). At Aristoph., Peace 368 (performed in 421), Trygaios pretends to take Hermes’ threats about his imminent destruction to mean that he has been called up for military service, at which news he feigns concern that he has not bought barley-meal or cheese in order to meet his death: “ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἠµπόληκά πω, / οὔτε ἄλφιτα οὔτε τυρόν, ὡς ἀπολούµενος.” At Peace 475-477, the Argives are said to be happy with the Peloponnesian War since, by hiring themselves out to the warring parties, they can gain pay to buy ἄλφιτα (see esp. 477: “καὶ ταῦτα διχόθεν µισθοφοροῦντες ἄλφιτα”). The magistrates at Lampsacus, at some unknown point in the fifth or fourth century (see chapter 4 section iii), ordered the price of ἄλφιτα in the city to be raised by fifty per cent when they heard that a fleet of triremes was approaching their city (ps.-Aristotle, Oec. 2.2.7, 1347a3-1347b2).
aftermath of the battle (Xen., *Anab.* 1.10.18); and when the Cyreans bought bread ("ἄρτους") from the city of Caenae on the Tigris (Xen., *Anab.* 2.4.27). 59

This evidence and the fact that the demand for unmilled grain constituted one of Nicias’ extraordinary demands for the παρασκευή of the expedition show that it was clearly unusual for a classical Greek military force to bring with it grain, and especially barley, in unhulled and unground form. What reasoning, then, underlay Nicias’ demand that grain be brought from Athens in the form of “πυροὺς καὶ πεφρυγμένας κριθάς” rather than alphita (and aleura)? His demand can be explained by the fact that wheat and barley in their grain, or “kernel,” form are much more biologically stable than wheat- or barley-flour. The seed coating of dry cereal kernels makes them almost impermeable and therefore naturally biologically stable. 60 The grinding and milling of grain kernels, however, removes the protective layers of the seed coat and thereby endangers the grain’s biological stability; 61 processed cereals are therefore much more susceptible than cereal grains to biological and chemical deterioration, and to insect attack. 62 Because of this

59 At those points on their march when the Ten Thousand subsisted through foraging and plundering indigenous settlements in non-Greek lands, they often subsisted on grain (products) other than barley: see 3.4.25-30, 4.5.5-6, 4.5.25-26, 5.4.27-29, 7.1.13.


61 Also, milled grain is more susceptible to degradation since activities such as milling permit interaction between enzymes in the germ and the bran and fats, as well as microorganisms from the surface of the grain, with other grain constituents: see Campbell, Hauser, and Hill (1991), United Nations World Food Programme, Food Quality Control (2009).

62 See the last note for references for wheat-flour being more susceptible than wheat grains to deterioration; for barley-flour being much less biologically stable and therefore more susceptible to deterioration than barley grain, see Thurmond (2006) 34-35, and the comments of Dr. K. J. Mueller, of the Getreideforschungsanstalt Darzau, ap. Beckmann (2007). (I am grateful to John (Mac) Marston for forwarding my question on the weight and density of barley as compared to barley-flour to the Archaeobotany listserv, and to Seth Pevnick for putting me in touch with John.)
greater susceptibility to deterioration, milled cereals have a shorter ‘shelf life’ than whole grains: although barley-flour, with optimal storage management and special processing, can last for anywhere between six to twenty-four months, in less than optimal conditions (i.e., in a warm but dry environment), it can suffer a clear deterioration already after only two to four weeks,\textsuperscript{63} modern standards for wheat-flour storage set limits of fifteen to sixty days, although rancidity has been detected after only two to fourteen days.\textsuperscript{64} In contrast, properly stored whole grains can last up to four years.\textsuperscript{65}

This greater biological instability of milled grains means that they require more careful handling than whole grain, and a far higher standard of storage management when being transported: as cargo, milled barley and wheat are far more liable than barley and wheat grain to deterioration because of wetting, humidity, changes in temperature, light exposure, and attacks from vermin.\textsuperscript{66} Since transport by water increases the chances of deterioration of milled grains by all of these factors (and, by its very nature, especially wetness and humidity, the greatest threats to the biological stability of grain),\textsuperscript{67} it also increases the likelihood of decrease in their shelf life, much more so than it does for grain being transported in kernel form; thus, for example, in the grain trade of Paris in the early

\textsuperscript{63} See again the comments of Mueller ap. Beckmann (2007).

\textsuperscript{64} Campbell, Hauser, and Hill (1991).

\textsuperscript{65} Thurmond (2006) 25.


\textsuperscript{67} Erdkamp (1998) 57. Cf. also Levinson and Levinson (1998) 140-141 on the paramount importance of dryness in (long-lasting) grain storage.
eighteenth century, “[f]lour formed a large part of the overland trade as water transport increased the likelihood of spoilage, while grain continued to be transported principally by water.”

Although there is only one extant certain piece of evidence for the means by which grain was stored when transported by sea in classical Greece—a man in the debate in the Athenian assembly after the battle of Arginusae told those assembled that he had saved himself after the battle by clinging on to a barrel of alphița (“ἐπὶ τεῦχους ἀλφιτῶν”) (Xen., Hell. 1.7.11)—and it is therefore impossible to state with certainty whether grain in the classical Greek world was normally transported by sea in barrels, sacks, or (loaded straight into) the holds of ships, it is still certain that (without the technological improvements in cargo containing and shipping of the last two centuries) in classical Greece too, barley and wheat in the form of flour would have been much quicker to deteriorate biologically and chemically when being transported by water (i.e., by sea) than barley and wheat in whole grain form. Nicias’ instruction to transport the grain needed for the expedition in the form of whole grain rather than flour, then, was a rational response to the long journey required by an expedition from Athens to Sicily. In other words, just as his request for a superiority in triremes for the expedition addressed

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69 All methods current in the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century (C.E.), for example: Braudel (1972) 306.

70 From the price that three thousand ‘Pheidonian’ medimnoi of barley transported in the form of grain from Apollonia (on the Adriatic) to Delphi raised when sold at Delphi in 361/0 (SIG 239 B (also FD III 5, 3), Col. II, ll.1-22), Bousquet ([1985] 234) calculated that 4.33% of the barley-grain had been lost in transit. This figure has no validity, however, as Bousquet’s calculation relies on a “taux normal” of 2 drachmas per medimnos for the xqițai transported to and sold at Delphi: although 2 drachmas per medimnos was a common price for alphița in the late fifth and fourth centuries (see Heichelheim [1935] 887; cf. Diog. Laertius 6.35, Plut., Mor. 470F), it was not for xqițai (see Heichelheim [ibid.]).
the first point he had made at 6.21.2 regarding the special difficulties the provisioning of a force sent to Sicily (that the Athenians could not assume the safe transport of provisions to their eventual base of operations in Sicily from friendly states), the exceptional request for “πυροὺς καὶ πεφρυγµένας κριθάς”—i.e. for grain instead of the flour transported with normal expeditions embarking on much shorter journeys within the Aegean and the seas around ‘mainland’ Greece—should be understood as a measure designed to address the second special difficulty which Nicias had pointed out at 6.21.2 as facing the supply of a force sent to the far west—the extraordinary length of the journey from Athens to Sicily.

Nicias asked for roasted barley grain (“πεφρυγµένας κριθάς”) rather than just barley grain because the barley grown in classical Greece was hulled.\footnote{See Megaloudi (2006) Table 5.14, 79, 81. See Thurmond (2006) 18-20 for what follows; cf. Amouretti (1986) 123-126 for the practice of roasting barley in order to mill it.} In hulled (or ‘husked’) grains, two modified floret leaves, the lemma and palea, are fused with the outermost covering of the kernel and therefore cannot be removed by normal threshing. In order, then, to make the husks brittle and thereby easily removable from the barley kernels, i.e. in order to prepare barley for milling, barley grains had to be roasted before being pounded and then milled. Thus, by specifying “πεφρυγµένας κριθάς,” Nicias was indicating to his audience that he was asking for barley that had been prepared and was ready for milling.\footnote{It is important to note that Nicias did not demand for the expedition simply “κριθάς.” In contrast to alphita, barley grain in unmilled form (“κριθαί”) had negative connotations in the classical Greek world: “κριθάι” was distributed to slaves and animals, and not to free-born citizens. See Gallo (1983) 455-456, and Starkie (1968) 267 ad Aristoph., Wasps 718, ’κριθῶν’: “the food of the destitute (Pax 449 κηρύζεις ὑπὸ ληστῶν ἐσθίοι κριθὰς µόνον) or of slaves (Hipponax 35 καὶ κρίθινον κόλλικα, δούλιον χόρτον).” Cf. Theophr., Characters 9.7: κριθαί and straw mentioned as food for farm-animals.} And this exceptional measure of bringing unhulled grain with the
expedition entailed another exceptional measure: the expedition would also have to bring “σιτοποιοὺς ἐκ τῶν µυλώνων πρὸς µέρος ἠναγκασµένους ἐµµίσθους,” “bakers from the mills compelled to serve for pay in the proper proportion,” in order to mill the wheat and roasted barley.\textsuperscript{73} The exceptional nature of this demand can be seen by the fact that there is no other reference to a classical Greek state preparing food for consumption by its military forces.\textsuperscript{74} Although the argument from silence is very often an invalid procedure in analysing the practices of classical Greek provisioning, the fact that we nowhere else hear of state-organized preparation of grain (and the requisitioning of labor to do so) in the classical Greek world, together with the fact that Nicias included it in his extraordinary demands for the παρασκευή of the Sicilian expedition, means that we can be certain that the centralized preparation of food for consumption by military forces was not practised by classical Greek states.\textsuperscript{75} The unexampled request for the compulsion of bakers to serve the expedition, therefore, built on the exceptional demand for unhulled grain, and thus again picked up and addressed the the problem raised at 6.21.2 of the difficulty the unusually long distance of the journey to Sicily would cause for the provisioning of the expedition (as well as reinforcing the point that meeting this problem would necessitate an unusual and considerable παρασκευή).

\textsuperscript{73} On the status of these bakers, see p.62 below.

\textsuperscript{74} As Pritchett remarked ([1971] 43 n.68); it should be noted here, however, that this remark is in conflict with Pritchett’s statements elsewhere in the same chapter of GSW I that classical Greek states often supplied provisions directly to their military forces: see (ibid.) 34-35, 48.

\textsuperscript{75} The most important reason for this was that classical Greek states did not exact direct taxation in kind on their citizen’s crops: see below chapter 2 section iic and chapter 3 section ivb for further discussion of the implications of the absence of taxation in kind in classical Greece for the organization of the provisioning of classical Greek overseas and land expeditions.
Nicias also asked that the “πυροὺς καὶ πεφρυγµένας κριθάς” be brought from Athens “ἐν ὁλκάσι.” The recommendation that the grain from Athens be brought in ὁλκάδες, “merchant-ships,” may also have been made on account of the exceptional length of the voyage to Sicily. Any grain carried by the triremes recommended by Nicias for the expedition would have almost certainly been consumed in its first few days’ or week’s sailing; triremes were specialized rowing vessels, built for speed, and thus had very limited stowage space, which meant that they were not able to carry any substantial amounts of provisions. All this would have been known to Nicias’ audience; it would have been clear to them, then, that some form of transporters would be necessary to carry the grain requested by Nicias for the expedition. Since Nicias did not have to mention that the grain he had recommended would have to be carried in vessels other than triremes—since that would have been obvious to his audience—why did he include the detail that it be carried “ἐν ὁλκάσι”? And, more precisely, why did he demand ὁλκάδες

76 For the small amounts of provisions normally taken on-board triremes, see esp. Morrison et al. (2000) 95-96, 64 n.3 and 67; cf. Gomme (1933) 17-19; Casson (1995) 261; van Wees (2004) 218 and n.11. See also Casson (1995) 261: “[t]here was hardly any space... for storage [on triremes], and most of it must have been taken up by spare oars, spare tackle, and similar vital items” (cf. Pryor [1988] 79 (writing of medieval galleys but raising a factor that would have reduced the already very limited storage space for provisions on-board classical Greek triremes, too): “[galleys] also needed to occupy stowage space with war materials and to keep their decks clear for combat”). The fact that triremes going into battle (see 6.34.5 with Morrison et al. [2000] 102) carried minimal amounts of provisions implies that triremes normally carried more than a bare minimum of supplies (contra Gomme [1933] 18). But Gomme was right to emphasize that the limited storage capacity of triremes meant that they had always to operate within a few days’ radius of either their home city, or a friendly city, or supply ships: see (1933) 19. The four or five days’ provisions probably taken by the main fleet of triremes leaving the Piraeus to join up with the rest of the Sicilian expedition at Corcyra (see Morrison et al. [2000] 99) probably represent a near maximal amount of provisions carried on-board a trireme—or at least more than usual, since the triremes could not count on provisioning from a friendly polis before Corcyra, or on reprovisioning from supply ships (since these were already at Corcyra), and could travel quite heavily since they knew they would not have to engage in any fighting on their way to Corcyra. Jordan ([1975] 107-109) argued that triremes could carry large amounts of supplies so as to enable them to operate at sea for long periods at sea without the necessity of resupplying. This is demonstrably incorrect: see p.75 n.143.
rather than simply πλοία. The answer may lie in the fact that a ὅλκας probably denoted a vessel of a larger capacity than a πλοῖον. The specific request for ὅλκαδες, then, may have signalled a demand for bigger supply ships than usually accompanied Athenian overseas expeditions in the Aegean. This would have conveyed the fact that more provisions (than for a conventional operation in the Aegean) would be needed to accompany the expedition to Sicily; that, unlike overseas expeditions in the Aegean,

77 Cf. 6.65.2: the Athenians, after their ruse to draw the Syracusans to Catana succeeds, took all their own army and such of the Sikels or others as had joined them, and embarking on their ships and boats (“καὶ ἐπιβιβάσαντες ἐπὶ τὰς γαίας καὶ τὰ πλοῖα”) sailed under cover of night against Syracuse: Dover (HCT iv.343) comments on ἐπὶ τὰς γαίας καὶ τὰ πλοῖα: “ὁλκάδες, distinguished from πλοῖα in 30.1 and 44.1, must here be subsumed under πλοῖα.” Thus, although ὅλκαδες and πλοῖα are often distinguished in Thucydides (see the next note and, e.g., 7.7.3, 7.23.2), the former could be subsumed under the latter; therefore Nicias (Thucydides) was making an informed choice when he specified the detail that the grain for the expedition ought to be brought in ὅλκαδες.

78 See Dover (1965a) 53 (ad 6.44.1—both here and at 6.30.1 Thucydides differentiates in his description of the support ships of the expedition between “ὁλκάδες σταματοι” and “πλοῖα”): “Thucydides commonly distinguishes between ὅλκας and πλοῖον, but the grounds of the distinction are never clear; probably πλοῖον is the less specific word and ὅλκας is a ship of more than a certain size. Neither word means ‘barge’ or ‘lighter’.” See also Vélissaropoulos (1980) 59: “[I]es navires de gros transport par excellence [in Greece] sont les holkades.”

79 Note that πλοῖα were present as supply ships at the siege of Mytilene in the summer of 428 (3.6.2). Also, (λεπτά) πλοῖα accommodated as supply ships the (mainly Corinthian) Peloponnesian fleet at the first battle of Naupactus in the summer of 429 (2.83.5, 2.84.2, 2.84.3 with the translation of Morrison et al. [2000] 71). In contrast, Thucydides earlier mentions that, at some point in the first two years of the war, the Spartans had killed any Athenian or allied traders whom they had caught sailing around the Peloponnese “ἐν ὅλκασί” (2.67.4: “οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι... τοὺς ἐμπόρους οὓς ἔλαβον Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ἐξωθησάμενων ἐν ὅλκασὶ περί Πελοπόννησον πλέοντας ἀποκτείναντες”). These traders were almost certainly bringing supplies to an Athenian fleet engaged in a ‘periplo’ of the Peloponnes (see chapter 2 section iii). Such an operation was different strategically and logistically from a normal overseas expedition or dispatch of a trireme fleet (through friendly waters and to friendly territory), i.e. from those described at 3.6.2 and 2.83-84. Whereas, in the latter situation, supply boats accompanied amphibious forces or fleets as a supplement both to the initial provisions brought by the crews of the triremes and to the provisions men could buy in markets provided by friendly poleis on their way to theaters of operations, at 2.67.4 the supply boats were sailing to an exceptionally large force operating in hostile territory: thus, the ὅλκαδες mentioned here may have been part of exceptional measures to provision an unusually large amphibious force operating in hostile or uninhabited territory (I argue fully for this view at chapter 2 section iii). But the mention of ὅλκαδες at 2.67.4 does mean that the mentions of πλοῖα at Mytilene and in the first battle of Naupactus can only remain suggestive for our ideas of what types of vessels usually accompanied overseas expeditions in and around ‘mainland’ Greece.
which sailed over (relatively) short distances (among friendly poleis) to their theaters of operations, and therefore did not need many supplies to accompany them (and thus could be accompanied by smaller supply ships; i.e., πλοῖα), the expedition to Sicily would be sailing over a much longer distance to reach its theater of operations, and therefore would need much more provisions than a normal (and normally-sized) expedition would. Thus, Nicias’ recommendation that “τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν σῖτον” be brought “ἐν ὁλκάσι” may have been another extraordinary measure complementing the other arrangements he recommended for the transportation (and preparation) of grain from Athens to meet the problem of the exceptionally great length of the journey to Sicily.

Nicias justified his request that grain be brought with the expedition (and the specific instructions for its transportation and preparation) with the reasoning “ἵνα, ἤν πον ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας ἀπολαµβανόµεθα, ἔχῃ ἡ στρατιὰ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια (πολλὴ γὰρ οὖσα οὐ πάσης ἔσται πόλεως ὑποδέξασθαι),” “that, if we should be detained by bad weather, the expedition will have provisions, for it is not every city that will be able to receive a force as large as ours.” That is, the expedition would need to bring roasted barley and wheat, and bakers to mill this grain, from Athens in order that it would not be lacking for provisions if it were forced to remain, because of bad weather, at a polis which was unable to receive it: in using the term “ὑποδέξασθαι,” Nicias was (primarily) referring to the universally accepted convention in the Greek world of the fifth and fourth centuries that, if traveling to, from or around a theater of operations, military and naval forces, when passing by or through friendly (and, in some cases, neutral) territory, were allowed
to purchase food in the marketplaces of cities or in temporary markets provided by cities outside their walls.\textsuperscript{80}

It is again Nicias’ consideration of the exceptional length of the voyage from Athens to Sicily which we need to keep in mind when trying to explicate his rationale for requesting grain to be brought from Athens. Because of the unusually great length of the voyage from Athens to Sicily, and because of the great size of the expedition, there would be a much greater danger (than for a ‘normal’ expedition in the Aegean making a much shorter journey from Athens to a theater of operations) that the exceptionally large expedition to Sicily would encounter weather enforced sailing delays.\textsuperscript{81} The grain from Athens was to be brought as a precaution against the eventuality of such delays, in order that the (exceptionally large) expedition might not run out of provisions if, during its journey to (and around the) theater of operations in Sicily, it should be forced to remain, because of unfavorable sailing conditions, at a \textit{polis} unable to receive it on account of its unusually huge size.\textsuperscript{82} In other words, Nicias was requesting the grain as a safeguard against any problems with the expedition’s provisioning on its journey to (and around)\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{80} I will have much more to say on this convention, and on the fact that it was universally accepted throughout the Greek world: see section iia below; chapter 3 section iii; and chapter 7 sections iia, iii.

\textsuperscript{81} See section ii below for detailed discussion of this point.

\textsuperscript{82} On the link between \textit{ἀπλοία} and lack of provisions, cf. Fraenkel (1950) 115 ad Aeschy., \textit{Agamemnon} 188 (ad “\textit{ἀπλοίαι κεναγγεῖ}”): “[e]very Athenian of any military experience was familiar with these [hunger-causing (“κεναγγεῖ”)] results of \textit{ἀπλοία}, and with the menace they represent...” (Fraenkel, in the same note ([1950] 115-116), was incorrect, however, to link Nicias’ request for a surplus of ships with the clauses “\textit{ἵνα, ἢν πού ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας ἀπολαμβανόμεθα, ἔχει ἡ στρατιὰ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια}”; as I have shown, the superiority in ships was to ensure the security of the expedition’s seaborne supply lines once it had established itself in Sicily.)

\textsuperscript{83} That is, as the expedition sailed around Sicily to the \textit{polis} or region it was first going to campaign around/in.
Sicily, that is, while it was on the move to the war zone (and around it during the initial stages of the campaign).  

The justification Nicias gave for his request for the grain from Athens and the arrangements concerning it was extraordinary, then, in that his request for grain was motivated by an extraordinary problem confronting the expedition: the exceptional length of the journey to Sicily. The rationale given for this request also allowed him to introduce to his audience another potential problem for an expedition from Athens to Sicily (as his earlier demand for the overwhelming superiority in triremes had done, too), and thus another potential deterrent from the expedition. Nicias’ statement that not every polis could receive a force as exceptionally large as the one which he was proposing for the expedition to Sicily implied a contrast with the functioning of overseas expeditions of usual size on usual campaigns, a contrast from which one can draw several interesting inferences. The statement that not every polis on the way to and around Sicily could receive the exceptionally large force which Nicias was proposing implied that every polis

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84 The crucial point to note here is that Nicias had already made provision for the food supply of the expedition once it had established itself in Sicily (through the requested superiority in triremes): he was not demanding grain from Athens to provision the expedition after it had established a base for operations in Sicily and/or when it was involved in lengthy operations in or around the island—which is the usual interpretation of this clause. See Kohl (1977) 156 (cf. pp.33-34 n.52 above): Nicias at 6.22 “vervollständigen das Bild eines autarkoperierenden athenischen Heeres auf Sizilien” and left no room in his detailing of the expedition’s provisioning requirements for help from allies in Sicily ([1977] 156). Green ([1970] 110) and Kagan ([1981] 187) also interpret Nicias’ request for grain to be brought from Athens with the expedition to mean that he was aiming at a force that depended entirely on provisions from Athens, and that he left no room in his demands for the παρασκευή of the expedition for the possibility of provisioning from allies in the west (or, as they have it, Sicily). See also Gomme ([1933] 18 (cf. HCT i.114)), also incorrect on this point: “even when, as on the Syracusan expedition, special ships with a corn-supply and bakers accompanied the fleet (Thuc. 6.44.1), a landing would be necessary for the baking if the food was to be consumed en route; actually it was intended as an emergency supply once the armament reached Sicily.”

85 A contrast again, that was based, as his whole argument at 6.21-22 was, on the presumption (made explicit at 6.21.2) that his audience was thoroughly familiar with the functioning of normal Athenian overseas operations in the Aegean.
would be able to receive—i.e., provide a market for—‘normal’ expeditions of ‘normal size’ in the Aegean. But it also implied that Nicias assumed as taken for granted by his audience that every polis (on the way to and around Sicily) could receive a normally sized expedition, and that most of those poleis could receive even the unusually large force which he was demanding. That is, Nicias, and by extension, his audience, thought that every Greek city in the eastern Mediterranean and in the west could provide for sale at least one to three days’ worth of provisions (the usual amount of provisions bought by passing forces) to expeditions of anywhere from 10,000 to 20,000 men, and that most cities in the far west could receive forces even larger than these figures.\(^86\)

In this way, then, Nicias’ explanation for the measures to be taken for the grain supply of the expedition on its way to Sicily was a rational response to the extraordinarily long journey required to get there; but his explanation also formed an integral part of his rhetorical strategy at 6.21-22 of using demands for specific types of παρασκευή at 6.22 to bring out and emphasize the extraordinary conditions and challenges he had described at 6.21 as facing the expedition to Sicily.

Nicias’ attempt to discourage the Athenians from sending an expedition to Sicily by demanding, as general, a massive amount of παρασκευή for it resulted in a rhetorically skilled, precisely reasoned, and carefully integrated speech. Having demonstrated the especially great resources of the Sicilian cities, and especially Syracuse and Selinus, he then argued the case for an extraordinary amount of παρασκευή to be brought with the

\(^86\) For the size of previous Athenian amphibious expeditions during the Peloponnesian war, see pp.55-56 n.98.
expedition from Athens to Sicily in order to ensure a successful campaign against cities with such exceptional resources, and especially the παρασκευή that would be needed in order both to counteract these cities’ natural advantages in cavalry and grain, and to overcome the special logistical difficulties of operating in such a strange and distant theater of operations. Having done this, Nicias then specified the extraordinary forces and materiel the massive παρασκευή would have to comprise to meet these extraordinary operational challenges (6.22). The rational organization of Nicias’ speech from 6.20-6.22, and the tight logical connections between its constituent parts, can be seen most clearly when broken down into tabular form:87

87 This table is based on Kohl (1977) 158. Kallet ([2001] 42) has spoken of the “deliberate messiness” of Nicias’ speech (cited approvingly by Hornblower, CT iii.354 (although Hornblower [CT iii.357] also comments on 6.20-21 that “Nikias elaborates on his points in the logical, not the usual natural idiomatic way, cavalry then grain at the end of 20, and again cavalry then grain in 21.”) Kallet also comments ([2001] 43) that “[t]he speech stands out because of the sheer jumble and quantity of items listed by Nikias...” and ([2001] 42) that Nicias’ speech “presents a confusing jumble of information that is as conspicuous for its ultimate vagueness as for its detail.” To rebut these points, in order: firstly, the view that Nicias’ presentation of the need for a massive παρασκευή for the expedition, and his subsequent detailed listing of what that massive παρασκευή should consist of, represents a ‘jumble’ comes from a failure to grasp the logically integrated nature of Nicias’ speech at 6.20-22 (cf. Stahl [1993] 191 on Nicias’ speech being a rational analysis)—although this is not to deny that Nicias’ speech is marked by considerable amounts of circumlocution and complexity: see Tompkins (1972) esp. 187, 191-193. Secondly, as we have seen, there is no vagueness in Nicias’ demands for the παρασκευή of the expedition: each was designed to respond to a specific problem raised by operating in the unusual theater of operations that Sicily would be. See also p.130 n.27: Kallet’s treatment of Nicias’ speech does not sufficiently grasp the agenda to which his speech was replying.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military resources of Sicilian poleis</th>
<th>Παρασκευή recommended for the expedition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 6.20.4: ἵππους πολλοὺς | 6.21.1: Large infantry force, needed especially to counter the cavalry of the Sicilians.  
6.22 (specifics): Many hoplites, and especially many archers and slingers, to counter the Sicilian cavalry |
| 6.20.4: σίτῳ οἰκείῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐπακτῷ | 6.21.1: A considerable παρασκευή from Athens, needed because Sicily is far away and unfriendly, and supplies of additional requirements will not be able to be brought in easily there  
6.22 (specifics): An overwhelming superiority in triremes in order to ensure the bringing in of provisions; grain (and bakers) as a precaution against the eventuality of weather enforced delays on the long voyage to Sicily |
| (See also 6.20.4: πολλοὶ ὁπλῖται) | (6.21.1: Large land force, needed if the Athenians want to do anything worthy of their ambition  
6.22 (specifics): ὁπλῖτας πολλοὺς, Athenian, allied, and mercenary) |
| (See also 6.20.4: πολλοὶ τοξόται καὶ ἀκοντισταί) | (6.21.1: Large land force, needed if the Athenians want to do anything worthy of their ambition  
6.22 (specifics): τοξοτὰς πολλοὺς καὶ σφενδονήτας) |
| (See also 6.20.4: πολλαὶ δὲ τριήρεις καὶ ὄχλος ὁ πληρώσων αὐτὰς) | (6.22: ναυσὶ τε καὶ πολὺ περιεῖναι) |
Several crucial points about the provisioning of normal Athenian overseas expeditions in the Aegean in the fifth century emerge from an analysis of Nicias’ speech:

1. Normal Athenian overseas expeditions in the Aegean departed from Athens with (at least) some provisions;

2. On campaigns in the Aegean, the Athenians operated surrounded by subject/allied states, whose co-operation could be assumed because of their existing relationship with Athens. Because of this, Athenian expeditionary forces could count on logistical support from subjects/allies near or in theaters of operations in the Aegean; thus, on normal campaigns, Athenian forces could depend on the easy supply of provisions from nearby friendly territory to supplement the provisions they had brought from Athens;

3. Because there were no serious competitors to Athenian naval power in the Aegean from 480 to 412, and because the Athenians operated there surrounded by the subject/allied states of their empire, security of seaborne logistical support to Athenian overseas expeditionary forces could be taken for granted in this period;

4. It could be assumed that every polis in the Aegean could receive, i.e. could provide for sale at least one to three days’ worth of provisions to, normally sized Athenian expeditions (this could be assumed for poleis in Italy and Sicily, too; moreover, it could also be taken for granted that most poleis in the west could receive forces larger than normally sized Athenian expeditions);

5. Barley-flour (ἄλφιτα) formed the main, grain-based component of the diets of the soldiers and sailors of Athenian military forces on overseas campaigns;

6. Neither the Athenian nor any other classical Greek state centrally organized the processing of grain so as to prepare it for consumption by state military forces.
The amount of provisions that Athenian expeditionary forces operating in the Aegean usually left Athens with may have been relatively small, and transported in relatively small vessels.

Two other points about Nicias’ recommendations for the Sicilian expedition should be noted before continuing. Firstly, after listing demands for the παρασκευή of the expedition, Nicias also recommended that “we must also provide ourselves with everything else as far as we can, so as not to be dependent upon others; and above all we must take with us from home as much money as possible...”\(^{88}\) (6.22). Although this remark on money was included at least partly as an opportunity to attack the bona fides of the Egestans’ promise to fund the Athenians’ operations in Sicily,\(^{89}\) the recommendation also underlines how crucially important Nicias (and Thucydides) judged (sufficient amounts of) money to be for the success of any expedition to Sicily.\(^{90}\)

Secondly, and crucially, at no point in his (admittedly very brief) description of the provisioning of usual Athenian expeditions in the Aegean at 6.21.2, nor in his detailed

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\(^{88}\) Crawley’s translation of “τά τε άλλα ὡσον δυνατόν έτοιµάσασθαι, και μη ἐπὶ ἑτέροις γίγνεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ χρήµατα αὐτόθεν ὡς πλεῖστα ἔχειν.”

\(^{89}\) As the next sentence in his speech shows: “[t]he sums talked about by the Egestans as ready there are readier, you may be sure, in talk than in any other way” (6.22) (an adapted version of Crawley’s translation of “τὰ [χρήµατα] δὲ παρ’ Ἐγεσταίων, ἢ λέγεται ἢκα ἐτόµαι, νοµίζατε καὶ λόγῳ ἃν μάλιστα ἐτόµα ἔσωτα”). The Egestans had promised money for the expedition on its arrival in Sicily (6.6.2, 6.8.1-2), but Nicias had already voiced his suspicions about their ability to provide this money in his first speech to the assembly (6.12.1). These suspicions are borne out at 6.46 (see section ivb below). The request for much money to be brought with the expedition was also a response to the need to match the abundant monetary reserves held by both Syracuse and Selinus (see 6.20.4 and p.17 above).

\(^{90}\) See section ivb below, appendix 1 section iii for the importance of money in Thucydides’ description of the operations of the Sicilian expedition. As I demonstrate in chapter iv section iv, Nicias’ recommendation that the Athenians bring as much money as possible for the expedition to Sicily is not evidence that he expected that the members of the expedition would find inflated prices in the markets provided to them during the campaign there, contra Pritchett (1971) 23.
plans for the provisioning of the potential expedition to Sicily, did Nicias make any
mention of foraging as a means of acquiring provisions for overseas expeditions. This is
a vital point that will need to be borne in mind when analysing the actual provisioning
practices of the Athenians during the campaign in Sicily.

ii. The requisitioning of grain transports and other ships for the expedition

The expedition that eventually sailed to Sicily in the mid to late summer of 415\textsuperscript{91}
consisted of 134 triremes (beside two Rhodian pentekonters) of which 100 were Athenian
vessels (60 fast triremes (i.e. triremes fitted out for battle) and 40 troop transports
(“στρατιώτιδες”))\textsuperscript{92} and the remainder from Chios and the other allies; 5,100 hoplites, of
which 2,200 were Athenian, and the rest allied troops, some of them Athenian subjects,
and besides these 500 Argives and 250 Mantinean and other mercenaries; 480 archers, 80
of whom were Cretans; 700 slingers from Rhodes; 120 light-armed exiles from Megara;
and one horse-transport carrying 30 horses (6.43). The provisions for this force were
carried by 30 grain-transporters (“ἀλκάδες... σιταγωγοί”) (which also conveyed the
bakers, stonemasons and carpenters for the expedition, and the tools for raising
fortifications)\textsuperscript{93} accompanied by 100 ploia which, like the grain-carrying holkades, had

\textsuperscript{91} Precision as to the date of the embarkation of the expedition is impossible; it appears, however, to have
set sail at some point in July 415. See p.110 n.241 below for discussion and references.

\textsuperscript{92} See appendix 2 for discussion of the carrying capacity of these troop transports.

\textsuperscript{93} The inclusion of these men and objects on the expedition show that the circumvallation of Syracuse was
always the main aim of the Sicilian expedition and had been planned from the beginning (Stahl [2003] 208;
Hornblower, CT iii.419). Nicias, in the generals’ conference at Rhegium, suggested that the expedition
ought to sail against Selinus and then sail home, but “Nikias [was] simply dishonest in pretending that
Selinus [was] the main objective; he could fall back on the actual words of the Athenian decision (8.2), but
Thucydides represents him as recognizing, in the letter which he wrote to the Assembly at the end of 414,
that Syracuse was the objective (vii.11.2)” (Dover [1965a] 55). See also 6.50.5: 60 of the expedition’s
been requisitioned; many other *ploia* and *holkades* also followed the armament voluntarily for purposes of trade.\(^{94}\)

The actual expedition to Sicily therefore followed Nicias’ detailed recommendations at 6.22 very closely.\(^{95}\) This has a crucial implication for the use of the triremes reconnoiter Syracuse and its harbors, and the features of the country [around Syracuse] which they would have to make their base of operations for the war (“κατεσκέψαντο τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τά περί τὴν χώραν εξ ὡς αὐτῶς ὁμοιομένους πολεμητέα ὃν…”). Liebeschutz’s argument ([1968] esp. 290-294) that the reduction of Syracuse by siege was not initially the main goal of the Sicilian expedition is unsuccessful because of his failure to take the implications of 6.44.1, 6.50.5, and 7.11.2 into account (among other reasons).

\(^{94}\) 6.44.1: “τούτως δὲ τά ἐπιτήδεια ἀρχουσαι ὡλκάδες μὲν προίκοιτα σταγονικοί, καὶ τοὺς στις τοιούτους ἀρχουσαι καὶ λυθολόγους καὶ τίπτονας καὶ ἥτα ἐξ τεχνομένων ἐξαλία, πλοία δὲ ἐκατόν, ἀ δὲ ἀνάγκης μετά τῶν ὡλκάδων ξυνάπλει πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πλοία καὶ ὡλκάδες ἐκωνικοὶ ξυνηκολούθουν τή στρατιά ἐμπορίας ἑνεκα…”

\(^{95}\) The surprisingly favorable reaction to Nicias’ second speech in the assembly led to this tight connection between Nicias’ requests for the *παρασκευή* of the expedition at 6.22 and the actual *παρασκευή* of the expedition. In the immediate aftermath of his speech, the Athenians in the assembly, far from being discouraged by “τὸ ὀχλώδη τῆς παρασκευῆς” demanded by Nicias (6.24.2), became more eager for the expedition than ever before (6.24.2-3). One of those present in the assembly came forward and asked Nicias to outline immediately specifically what sort of expeditionary force (“ἂντινα... παρασκευὴν”) the Athenians should vote him (6.25.1). Nicias, presumably surprised that his demands for a massive *παρασκευή* had not resulted in a reversal of the decision to mount the expedition and that he was now being put on the spot by the demand for details, unwillingly gave a provisional listing of the expedition’s requirements in *παρασκευή*: at least 100 triremes; hoplite transports (both from Athens and the allies), and not less than 5,000 hoplites (again both Athenian and allied), and more, if possible; and “τὴν δὲ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ὡς κατὰ λόγον, καὶ τοξοτῶν τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ἐκ Κρήτης καὶ σφενδονητῶν, καὶ ὃ ἄλλο πρέπον δοκῇ εἶναι, ἑτοιµασάµενοι ἄξειν,” “and the rest of the *παρασκευή* in proportion; archers from home and from Crete, and slingers, and whatever else might seem proper, being made ready by the generals and taken with them” (6.25.2).

Nicias, in answering the demand for more precise information on the *παρασκευή* he thought needed for the expedition, was a hostage to the requests for *παρασκευή* he had just made in his second speech to the assembly: to deviate in his answer now from the types and amounts of *παρασκευή* he had just requested in that speech would have been to expose its true motives and duplicitous nature. His reply to the question of exactly what sort of expeditionary force (“ἂντινα... παρασκευὴν”) he wanted therefore had to duplicate the *παρασκευή* he had just outlined in his speech at 6.22 (with the addition now, naturally, of more detail, as the new context demanded). Thus, at 6.25.2 there was the same request as at 6.22 for many triremes and many hoplites. As for the rest of the expeditionary force, at 6.25.2, Nicias also made the same request for many (note “κατὰ λόγον”) archers and slingers as he had done at 6.22. The phrase “τὴν δὲ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν” at 6.25.2 also included, in addition to the archers and slingers, “καὶ ὃ ἄλλο πρέπον δοκῇ εἶναι.” Since Nicias at 6.25.2 was in the position of being forced to repeat and elaborate upon the requests he had made at 6.22, it is possible to construe safely what he meant by “καὶ ὃ ἄλλο πρέπον δοκῇ εἶναι” here—he was referring here to the other kinds of *παρασκευὴ* mentioned at 6.22: grain, boats to transport it, and bakers to mill and prepare it for consumption (and note again “κατὰ λόγον”—there were to be large amounts of all of these). Since Nicias was one of the three generals to whom (having heard his more detailed recommendations on just these matters (6.26.1)) the Athenians voted full powers in the matter of
arrangements made for the expedition as evidence for the provisioning of Athenian overseas expeditions: since the force that sailed to Sicily was a direct result of Nicias’ instructions for the παρασκευή of the expedition at 6.22, this means (remembering the motivation for those instructions)⁹⁶ that we should consider the scale and kinds of forces and materiel recruited and organized for the campaign in Sicily to have been deliberately extraordinary, prepared on the understanding that they were needed to meet the extraordinary military and logistical demands of sailing to and fighting in Sicily. This means, in turn, that none of the individual details of the organization of the Sicilian expedition should be taken as typical of the organization of usual Athenian amphibious expeditions. Taking this further, this then means—focusing on the measures taken for the provisioning of the expedition—that the fact that the grain transports and (smaller) boats (ploia) carrying the provisions for the expedition to Sicily were accompanying it “ἐξ ἀνάγκης,” i.e. that the boats carrying the provisions for the expedition had been

the size of the army and the organization of the expedition generally, it was to be expected that the figures for the ships and men and materiel which actually sailed to Sicily corresponded almost exactly with his detailed recommendations at 6.25.2 (see, e.g., again at 6.43 that the expedition did, in fact, comprise 100 Athenian triremes (cf. 6.31.3); and also that the total number of hoplites on the expedition amounted to 5,100)—which were, again, merely a more detailed version for his recommendations for the παρασκευή of the expedition at 6.22.

Three points on the meaning of παρασκευή here. Firstly, παρασκευή is ambiguous at 6.24.2: it could be referring to the concrete παρασκευή listed by Nicias at 6.22, as well as to the process of preparing that παρασκευή (it should not be understood as just referring to a ‘process,’ contra Allison [1989] 81 table 7). Secondly, when Nicias responded to the request from his anonymous fellow citizens for specific details on the παρασκευή he wanted for the expedition, Nicias responded with a detailed list of objects (products) (cf. Allison [1989] 81). Nicias’ answer—simply a more detailed version of his recommendations of 6.22—shows, then, that the anonymous citizen had been asking for more specific details on Nicias’ demands at 6.22 for military forces and materiel; i.e. that the anonymous citizen had understood the requests for παρασκευή at 6.22 as requests for concrete objects, thus confirming my earlier interpretation of παρασκευή at 6.21.2 (and thus at 6.8.3, 6.9.1, and 6.19.2) (see p.27 n.37 and p.29 n.42 above). Thirdly, the analysis above shows that “τὴν δὲ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν” at 6.25.2 clearly refers to concrete objects (and people), and not to any process, contra Allison (1989) 81 table 7.

⁹⁶ See pp.26-28 above.
requisitioned for this purpose by the Athenian state, should be considered as an extraordinary measure.\textsuperscript{97}

The Athenians took the extraordinary decision to requisition boats to carry provisions for the Sicilian expedition for two reasons: the exceptional size of the expedition and the exceptionally great distance it would have to sail to Sicily. The extraordinarily large size of the expedition would lead to an extraordinarily large demand for provisions during its voyage to Sicily. The expedition sailing to Sicily contained many thousands more men than sailed on normal Athenian expeditions sent overseas for operations within the Aegean (or to western ‘mainland’ Greece).\textsuperscript{98} As Thucydides notes,

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{97} Since the term “requisitioning” has sometimes been used by ancient Greek military historians in a rather loose manner (cf. Erdkamp [1998] 11 on Roman military historians’ confused and indiscriminate use of terminology relating to military food supply), I define it here (or, rather, provide the Concise Oxford Dictionary definition): requisitioning means “the [state] appropriation of goods for military or public use.” More specifically, in a military context, requisitioning “involves obtaining supplies from at least ostensibly friendly authorities or individuals” and “generally involved either an involuntary seizure... or forced purchase...” (Roth [1999] 117, 141).
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{98} 30,000-50,000 men sailed to Sicily (see appendix 2), as compared to the 10,000-20,000 men (the 5,000 or so men who sailed to Amphilochia formed an unusually small force) who sailed on the amphibious expeditions sent out by Athens just before and during the Peloponnesian War to reduce rebellious poleis or on other operations expected to be some length (i.e., not including periploi (on which see chapter 2 section iii)):
1.57.1 (433/2): 30 triremes and 1,000 hoplites sent against Potidaea and other cities in the Chalcidice.
1.61.1 (432): 40 triremes and 2,000 hoplites sent against Potidaea and the other cities in revolt in the Chalcidice (reinforced in the same year by 1,600 hoplites (1.64.2)).
2.58.3 (with 2.56.2) (430): 150 triremes, 4,000 hoplites, and 300 cavalry sent against Potidaea (see also 6.31.2 where Thucydides includes the detail that these forces were accompanied by many other allies besides).
3.3.2 (428): 40 triremes sent against Mytilene (reinforced later in the same summer by 1,000 hoplites (3.18.2)).
3.91.1 (426): 60 triremes and 2,000 hoplites sent against Melos.
3.107.1 (winter 426/5): 20 triremes, 200 hoplites, and 60 archers sent to campaign in Amphilochia.
4.42.1 (425): 80 triremes, 2,000 hoplites, and 200 cavalry, accompanied by Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians from the allies, sent against the territory of Corinth.
4.53.1 (424): 60 triremes, 2,000 hoplites, a few cavalry, and some allied troops from Miletus and other parts sent against Cythera.
4.129.2 (423): 50 triremes, 1,000 hoplites, 600 archers, one hundred Thracian mercenaries and some peltasts drawn from Athenian allies in the neighborhood, sent against Mende and Scione.
5.2.1 (422): 1,200 hoplites, and 300 cavalry from Athens, a larger force of the allies, and 30 triremes sent to the Chalcidide.
\end{quote}
there was just one expeditionary force sent from Athens during the Peloponnesian War that matched the Sicilian expedition in numbers of triremes and men: the expedition sent out against Potidaea in 430, which originally had been prepared for a \textit{periplous} with Epidauros as its main target (6.31.2 with 2.56.2, 2.58.3).

But, as Thucydides also notes, the expeditions to Epidauros and Potidaea had set out on short voyages ("άλλα ἐπὶ τε βραχεῖ πλῷ ὡρµήθησαν") to their respective theaters of operations (6.31.3).\textsuperscript{99} In contrast, as Nicias had pointed out, the expedition to Sicily would be embarking on a much longer voyage than those usually undertaken by overseas expeditions mounted by the Athenian state (6.21.2)—a point explicitly endorsed by Thucydides in an editorial comment on the launch of the expedition: the voyage to Sicily was "μέγιστος ἤδη διάπλους ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας," “the longest passage from home hitherto...

\textsuperscript{99} As did other \textit{periploi} sent out from Athens to and around the Peloponnese, which could sometimes consist of large numbers of ships and men (see, e.g., 2.23.2 (431): 100 triremes, 1,000 hoplites, and 400 archers; 3.16.1 (428): 100 triremes) (see chapter 2 section iii below for discussion of the provisioning of Athenian \textit{periploi}). Thucydides also states at 6.31.3 that, unlike the Sicilian expedition, the expeditions to Epidauros and Potidaea had set out with a "παρασκευῇ φαύλῃ," since they were going on short voyages, and not on a long journey and on a campaign that needed both strong naval and land forces, as the Sicilian expedition did (6.31.3). Dover comments (HCT iv.293) that παρασκευῇ φαύλη "refers to the structure and equipment of the force, not to the force itself..."; cf. Dover (1965a) 41: “here [παρασκευή] must mean ‘equipment’, covering both supplies and supporting arms.” Two points refute Dover’s interpretation of παρασκευῇ φαύλη. Firstly, Thucydides’ explanation (6.31.3-4) of his statement that the Sicilian expedition was not setting out with a παρασκευῇ φαύλη focuses on the unusually expensive preparation of the force and on the unusually careful recruitment of the men for the force, i.e. on the (military and naval) force itself. Secondly, Thucydides at 6.31.2-3 is describing the strictly military and naval part (i.e. the ships and the men) of the Sicilian expedition still present at Athens; the “supplies and supporting arms” had already departed for Corcyra (cf. Morrison et al. [2000] 99). In short, παρασκευή at 6.31.3 refers to the (military and naval) force embarking on the Sicilian expedition, not to its supplies, and therefore does not provide any information on the provisioning of the expedition.
attempted” by a Greek state (6.31.6). Because of the much longer distance of its voyage to its theater of operations in the far west, the Sicilian expedition would be much more likely (than usual Athenian overseas expeditions making much shorter journeys to campaign theaters (relatively) near to Athens, e.g. those to Epidauros and Potidæa) to experience the weather enforced delays that could afflict all voyages in the pre-industrial Mediterranean; in particular, the prevailing northerly winds that marked part of the coasting voyage along the coast of Italy (even in summer) had the potential to slow the expedition’s progress significantly. There was a much greater chance, then, as Nicias

100 Thucydides considered the exceptionally great distance to Sicily a key strategic factor in the planning and eventual outcome of the expedition, as can be seen from this authorial intervention and from the repeated and consistent mentions in speeches of the effect that the great distance to Sicily would have on the likely success both of the expedition and of any continued Athenian intervention in the far west: see 6.33.5 (Hermocrates, commenting on the probable outcome of the Athenian expedition, stating that few great armaments “πολλ’ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀπάγαυτες” (“sent far from their own land”) have succeeded); 6.37.1 (Athenagoras stating that any expedition from Athens to Syracuse would have to make “τοσοῦτον πλοῦν δεῦρο” (“such a great voyage here”)); 6.11.1 (Nicias, in his first speech to the assembly, telling the Athenians that, even if they managed to conquer the Sicilians, they would rule them with difficulty “διὰ πολλ’ ἐπίσκεψης” (“on account of the great distance” to Sicily) (amongst other things)); 6.86.3 (Euphemus making the same point to the Camarinaeans, that the Athenians could not keep the Sicilian cities as subjects “διὰ μῆκος τε πλοῦ” (“on account of the length of the voyage” to Sicily) (amongst other things)). Note that even the first stage of the expedition’s voyage, the crossing of the Ionian Sea, could be described by Hermocrates as one that was particularly long and difficult to make for a large trireme-based expedition: see 6.34.4: “τὸ δὲ πέλαγος αὐτοῖς πολέµου περαιοῦσθαι μετὰ πάσης τῆς παρασκευῆς, χαλέπιν δὲ διὰ πλοῦ μήκος εἰ τάξιν μεῖναι,” “the open sea [of the Ionian] is a wide one to cross with all of their preparations, and it is difficult on account of the length of the trip to keep in formation.” See also Dover (1965a) 40, who notes, comparing 6.13.1, that the Ionian sea “was the natural boundary between the Aegean world and the Western Greeks” (though Dover (ibid.) was wrong to state that the crossing from Corcyra to Iapygia “was the only stage of the journey which would be out of sight of land”—see Horden and Purcell [2000] 127, Map 9: land would have been visible at all stages of the crossing).

101 See Erdkamp (1998) 56 (cf. Pryor [1988] 74-75) for voyages over longer distances being more prone to delays. See also Braudel (1972) 360-363 on ‘average’ travel times in the sixteenth century (C.E.) Mediterranean, and esp. 360: “[t]he essential point to note here is this very variety, the wide range of times taken to travel the same journey: it is a structural feature of the century... In the sixteenth century all timetables were completely dependent on the weather. Irregularity was the rule.” Voyages over very long distances were more prone to these variations in travel times ([1972] 361-362).

102 See 6.104.2: Gylippus’ squadron of four triremes, sailing along on the coast of Italy after leaving Thurii, was driven out to the open sea by northerly winds characteristic of the area and only made it back to land (at Tarentum) with difficulty and having suffered significant damage (which took some time to repair: 6.104.2, 7.1.1). More generally on the dangers of the coasting voyage to Sicily, see Plut., Tim. 7.4: Hicetas
had seen, that the expedition would be delayed for some time, because of unfavorable sailing conditions, in a *polis* that could not provide sufficient food for sale to it on account of its exceptional size.\(^{103}\) This exceptional combination of factors—i.e. the fact that the expedition’s extraordinarily large demand for provisions (because of its exceptional size) on its journey could not be assured of being met because of the greater risk of disruption to the voyage caused by the exceptionally long distance of the journey to (and around) Sicily\(^{104}\)—compelled the dispatch of large reserves of grain with the expedition, in order to ensure its logistical (and therefore military) security during its voyage to the war zone in the far west.\(^{105}\) In addition, the fact that, during parts of its journey, there would be no secure (and predictable) means for the enormous expedition of acquiring sufficient supplies to reprovision itself—because, at several points during the (unusually) long coasting voyage to (and around) Sicily, the expedition would be sailing of Syracuse, having treacherously allied with the Carthaginians, tried to discourage the Corinthians from the “trouble and expense of a voyage to Sicily with all its perils” (“ὡς οὐδὲν δέον πράγµατα καὶ δαπάνας ἔχειν αὐτοὺς πλέοντας εἰς Σικελίαν καὶ κινδυνεύοντας”). Fleets entering the Ionian Sea were “exposed to prevailing northerlies as well as to the changeable and often inclement weather characteristic of it” even during summer: Gertwagen (2006) 104 (contra Simonsen [2003] 263). (The very long delay that some *holkades* carrying hoplites from the Peloponnese to Sicily experienced in the spring and summer of 413 (they were blown off course to Libya: see 7.50.1-2 with 7.19.3-4) is not relevant here, since these vessels had attempted to make the crossing across the open sea from Taenarum to Sicily.)

\(^{103}\) See again 6.22: “(πολλὴ γὰρ οὖσα ὡς πάσης οὐ πάσης ἕτται πάλαις ὑποδέξασθαι).”

\(^{104}\) Note again that, unlike typical major expeditions in the Aegean which were sent out against one specific target (or limited area of operations, such as the Chalcidice), fulfilling the terms of the Sicilian expedition’s mandate would necessitate relatively long voyages from one theater of operations to another (see 6.8.3: the expedition was to help the Egestans against the Selinuntines, to restore the Leontine exiles, and to order all other matters in Sicily as deemed best for the Athenians).

\(^{105}\) See Erdkamp (1998) 61 for the idea here.
through (potentially) hostile or uninhabited territory\textsuperscript{106}—meant that the expedition’s demand for reserves of provisions was increased (exceptionally) still more.\textsuperscript{107}

This extraordinarily high demand for reserves of grain required in turn an extraordinarily high capacity of sea transport; in other words, the expedition required an extraordinarily high number of vessels to transport its provisions.\textsuperscript{108} The expedition also needed the transport of its grain, and therefore the sailing of the grain-transports, to be guaranteed, in order to ensure its logistical security, due to its unusually limited and

\textsuperscript{106} See section iii below.

\textsuperscript{107} Cf. Erdkamp (1998) 61. These conditions would also have faced the two fleets sent from Athens to Sicily during its first intervention in the west from 427 to 424. But these fleets had much fewer men (20 triremes sent at the end of the summer of 427 (3.86.1); 40 triremes sent in the summer of 425 (4.2.1, 4.48.5)) than the Sicilian expedition of 415 and thus would have had a much smaller demand for provisions on their journey; their provisioning during the voyage to Sicily would therefore have been much less precarious. In addition, the duration of the voyage to Sicily for the two fleets sent out in 427 and 425 would have been shorter than that of the expedition in 415. “Fleets, their speed governed by their slowest ships, moved far more slowly and far more predictably [than individual triremes and small squadrons of triremes]” (Guilmartin [1974] 96). The fleets sent out in 427 and 425 consisted solely of fast triremes and would have been to make quicker progress than the expedition in 415 which also included, in addition to its fast triremes, troop transports and other vessels to transport men and materiel for conducting a siege (6.44.1) (note, in this regard, that, although “[t]he distance from Corcyra to the heel of Italy is about 155km or 84 sea miles, not much more than half the distance which could be covered by a trieres comfortably under oar ‘in a long day’” (Morrison et al. [2000] 101), Hermocrates expected the very large expedition from Athens to cross it “slowly and in small groups” (“\textbeta\textrho\alpha\delta\epsilon\sigma\ια \tau\eta \\kappaα\iota \\kappaα\iota\tau\iotaε\iota\gamma\nuον \pi\rho\omicron\omicron\sigma\iota\omicron\pi\iota\omicron\sigma\alpha\nuα”) (6.34.4) (see also p.57 n.100 above: the Ionian sea was thought to be particularly long and difficult crossing for a large expedition)). In addition, the larger the expedition, the more time it took to complete the process of reprovisioning and watering at each stop it made (see again Guilmartin [1974] 96; cf. Simonsen [2003] 260) (this remains true despite the fact that, in the event, the generals of the expedition in 415, before they set sail from Corcyra, split the expedition into three and allotted one to each of their number so as to make the expedition easier to control and to make its provisioning and watering less troublesome; each of these three parts would have taken longer to provision and water than the fleets sent out in 427 and 425). The (probable) shorter duration of the 427 and 425 fleets’ voyages would have meant that they could have been expected to face a lesser risk of unfavorable sailing conditions. Again, it was primarily the combination of the exceptionally large size of the expedition in 415 and the exceptionally long duration of its voyage to Sicily that would have necessitated the dispatch of large amounts of grain with it.

\textsuperscript{108} Contrast the needs of normal Athenian amphibious expeditions operating in the Aegean (or against targets on the eastern coast of the Peloponnese): because of the short (or relatively short) distances to their targets, because of their (relatively) moderate size, and because they sailed within friendly territory, normal Athenian expeditions needed only to be accompanied by small amounts of provisions, and therefore small numbers of supply ships, to ensure their logistical security.
unpredictable access to means of resupply on its voyage to Sicily; i.e., due to the
unusually precarious nature of its provisioning on the voyage to Sicily, the expedition
could not depend on traders accompanying it voluntarily for the purposes of trade (even if
these did provide a welcome supplementary source of provisions for the expedition).\footnote{109}
In these circumstances, since the Athenian state did not possess any \textit{holkades},\footnote{110} the sole
means for Athens to meet the exceptionally high demand for vessels to transport grain for
the Sicilian expedition was to requisition them, i.e. to make (some) owners of \textit{holkades} at
Athens to provide their vessels for the expedition "\textit{ἐξ ἀνάγκης}."\footnote{111}

The requisitioning of 30 \textit{holkades} to transport grain for the Sicilian expedition
(and of 100 \textit{ploia} to transport its other supplies) was, then, an extraordinary measure
designed to meet extraordinary circumstances.\footnote{112} The exceptional nature of the


\footnote{110} See Vélissaropoulos (1980) 59-60 citing Xen., \textit{Poroi} 3.14 (a statement that applies, strictly speaking, to
the middle of the fourth century, but which can be extended safely to cover the entire classical period).

\footnote{111} The requisitioning of merchant ships was a measure commonly taken by other states mounting
unusually large expeditions over unusually long distances in later periods in the pre-industrial
Mediterranean. See especially Erdkamp (1998) 56-62, 82-83 for the requisitioning of ships for major
Roman Republican expeditions: this discussion informs much of the analysis here. See also Madden
(2006) 213-214 on preparations for the Fourth Crusade (of around 65,000 men) in 1201 requiring Venice to
suspend overseas commerce for a year and to press all merchant vessels into service as troop and materiel
transports. See also Guilmartin (1974) 109: the major Mediterranean states of the sixteenth century (C.E.)
basing “their capability to launch a major expedition” in part on their capability to “commandeer[...]”
merchant ships, [in order] to provide logistical support and to serve as troop transports.” (Cf. Braudel
(1972) 307, 309 for further examples of requisitioning of ships for major overseas expeditions in the
sixteenth century (C.E.).) Note that smaller Spanish galley squadrons in the sixteenth century were able to
satisfy their provisioning requirements during their operations from local town markets and royal
magazines, and did not have to depend on requisitioned logistical support: see Guilmartin (1993) 122, 127-
128. (I should note here that the greater number of merchant ships requisitioned in these comparative
cases can be explained by the fact that these vessels were also needed to carry supplies for the
provisioning of expeditions in the theaters of operations (and, in the case of the sixteenth century
expeditions, to transport artillery, too).)

\footnote{112} This means, then, that one cannot use the arrangements made for the provisioning of the voyage of the
Sicilian expedition to its theater(s) of operations as illustrative of the usual means employed to provision
Athenians’ decision to requisition vessels to transport the supplies of the expedition can be seen from the fact that there is no other reference to a classical Greek state requisitioning vessels for the transport of supplies for an expeditionary force operating overseas.\footnote{113} Although the argument from silence is almost always an invalid procedure in analysing the practices of classical Greek provisioning,\footnote{114} the fact that we nowhere else hear of the requisitioning of vessels to transport grain and other provisions in the classical Greek world, together with the fact that the requisitioning of ships was part of a set of atypical measures taken to man and equip the Sicilian expedition, means that we can be sure that the pressing of merchant ships into service to transport supplies for overseas expeditions was not (commonly) practised by classical Greek states.\footnote{115}

\footnote{113} Though see chapter 3 section v: the Corinthians pressing wagons/mules into service to transport provisions overland to Phlius in 367.

\footnote{114} As noted above regarding Nicias’ demand for the requisitioning of labor to mill the grain brought along with the expedition.

\footnote{115} But note that the Athenian expeditions to Egypt and Cyprus in the late 460s and 450s (1.) matched or surpassed the Sicilian expedition in terms of men (see 1.104.2 (first expedition to (Cyprus) and Egypt consisting of 200 triremes (infantry numbers not mentioned by Thucydides); 1.112.2 (second expedition to Cyprus in 451 (?) consisting of 200 triremes (again, infantry numbers not mentioned by Thucydides)); (2.) also had to make unusually long voyages to their theaters of operations; and (3.) could not be assured of friendly reception at all points on those voyages (it is very improbable that the Athenian expeditions to Egypt used the facilities which Phoenician fleets had been using for centuries, contra Davies [2007a] 90 n.80; a mistaken insistence on the (sole) importance of ‘secure naval bases’ for the provisioning of trireme fleets informs Davies’ mistaken belief here). These expeditions were faced therefore with the same potential provisioning problems on their voyages to their theaters of operations as the Sicilian expedition (in addition, it is unlikely that either expedition to Egypt/Cyprus could count on continuous provisioning from nearby friendly territory). It seems likely, then, for all the same considerations raised in the analysis of the Sicilian expedition’s unusual demand for grain, that the expeditions to Egypt and Cyprus were also accompanied by boats requisitioned to transport supplies. Note also in this regard that Thucydides, in his
As for the administrative mechanisms used to requisition the *holkades* and *ploia* for the expedition, as Dover notes, “of the machinery of [the] operation [of the requisitioning] and its legal and constitutional basis we know nothing.” 116 We can say that the *σιτοποιοί* pressed into service for the expedition were probably not slaves, but free men, ‘master-bakers’ accompanied by a number of their own slaves. 117 After that, it is impossible to state with certainty (or probability) whether the grain in the “*ὁλκάδες σιταγωγοί*” was purchased by the state; requisitioned (either by forced purchase or involuntary seizure); or, indeed, whether it was, in fact, always owned by the state (as some form of tax-in-kind). 118 We know nothing, too, of the means of allocation of this grain to the sailors and soldiers on the expedition: if it was to be purchased at market price, at a fixed (and reduced) price, or distributed for free. We do know, however, because the expedition was not provided with any markets on its way to Sicily (6.44.2), that (at least some of) the large reserves of grain brought in the requisitioned _holkades_ as an emergency supply for the expedition’s voyage were consumed.

116 *HCT*_ iv.259.

117 See ibid. (see also Dover [1965a] 33-34): _σιτοποιοί_ normally referring to (female) slaves, but here almost certainly ‘master-bakers.’ Furthermore, regarding Nicias’ demand that the _σιτοποιοί_ be pressed into service “ἐκ τῶν μυλώνων πρὸς μέρος,” it is, as Dover notes (*HCT*_ iv.259), unclear to us “whether Nikias wishes the _σιτοποιοί_ to be assigned proportionately to the various units of the force or to be so conscripted that the burden is to distributed over the mills.”

118 Though this latter mechanism is most unlikely: classical Greek states did not exact direct taxation in kind on their citizens’ crops (see below chapter 2 section iic and chapter 3 section ivb for discussion of the absence of taxation in kind in classical Greece).
iii. The provisioning of the expedition ‘on the move’

a. Markets provided by poleis

Nicias at 6.22 had argued that grain needed to be brought with the expedition from Athens because not every city could receive the force, as large as it was, if it was delayed by bad weather: it can be inferred from his argument, then, that reception by a polis of a military force included some method of provisioning the received force. What the institutional means were by which cities provisioned the military forces they received, and what, generally, the reception of a military force by a polis comprised, can be seen from 6.44.2, where Thucydides describes the treatment that the Athenian expedition received from the Greek cities in southern Italy on its way to Sicily: “τῶν µὲν πόλεων οὐ δέχοµένων αὐτοὺς ἀγορᾷ οὐδὲ ἄστει, ὕδατι δὲ καὶ οἷµωρ, Τάραντος δὲ καὶ Λοκρῶν οὐδὲ τούτως,”119 “the cities not receiving them with a market nor into the town, though furnishing them with water and anchorage, and Tarentum and Locri not even with these” (6.44.2).120 Thucydides only outlined here what a passing expeditionary force expected

119 Although ὑποδέξεσθαι is used in Nicias’ speech at 6.22, δέχοµαι is the verb usually used for ‘to receive,’ ‘to admit as friendly’; but see also 6.34.4, 5 (and 3.111.4) for ὑποδέχοµαι used to denote the reception of military forces by (friendly) states.

120 The translation is taken from the Loeb. Diodorus (13.3.4) narrates that the expedition got every kind of courtesy when it put in at Thurii (a colony of Athens), and that it was provided with a market by the inhabitants of Croton (“καὶ λαβόντες ἀγορὰν παρὰ τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν”). But see Lazenby (2004) 137: “although it is possible that the Thurians remembered that the original colonization of their city had been sponsored by Athens, Thucydides implies that an anti-Athenian faction was now [i.e. in the summer of 415] in power (7.33.5-6).” In addition, although “Kroton’s founder supposedly came from Patraí (Strabo 8.7.5) and might have been friendly because of Alkibiades’ help to its mother-city (5.52.2)” (Lazenby [2004] 137), the Crotoniates refused permission to the Athenians to pass through their territory in the summer of 413 (7.35.2). Although this refusal could have been consistent with a position of neutrality (Bauslaugh [1991] 148), it suggests that Thucydides may have been right to have included the Crotoniates among those states signaling a non-committal attitude to the Athenians in 415. Hornblower states (CT iii.419, 608-609) that we might also have expected Metapontum to have received the expedition in 415, since the force sent from Athens to Sicily two years later, led by Demosthenes and Eurymedon, was received by the Metapontines, who also added three hundred javelin men and two triremes to the Athenian force “κατὰ τὸ ξυµµαχικόν” (7.33.4-5). Hornblower, however, fails to note that the pro-Athenian attitude in Metapontum in 413 may (as at Thurii) have been a recent development (Rutter [1986] 146): see 7.57.11 (unnoted by
to be provided for it when being received by a *polis*—i.e., water, anchorage, reception/admittance into the city proper, and the provision of a market in which members of the force could buy supplies—because he wanted in this passage to distinguish between the different receptions the expedition experienced at the hands of the Italian cities. The facts that at 6.44.2 Thucydides could mention *incidentally* the various arrangements for passing armies and navies denoted by the term δέχοµαι, and that he felt no need earlier in his work to describe what those arrangements were,\(^\text{121}\) demonstrate that there was an assumed and shared understanding between him and his audience of the arrangements constituting the convention of reception by a *polis* of a passing expeditionary force\(^\text{122}\)—and that Thucydides and his audience assumed the provision of a market as an integral part of that convention.

Despite Nicias’ arguments at 6.22 and the fact that, after the entire Sicilian expedition had assembled at Corcyra (6.42.1 with 6.30.1), its three generals divided it into three parts, allotting one to each of their number, because of the possible difficulty that the entire force, sailing together, might have in obtaining provisions (amongst other

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\(^\text{121}\) δέχοµαι is used earlier in the work to indicate reception by a *polis* of a military force: see, e.g., 4.71.2, 4.73.5, 4.84.2, and esp. 6.42.2.

\(^\text{122}\) We may say the same of Nicias’ use of ὑποδέξασθαι without any explanation (at 6.22): i.e., that Nicias’ audience in the assembly assumed (just as Thucydides’ audience did) the provision of a market by a (friendly or neutral) *polis* to a passing expeditionary force as an accepted convention in the Greek world.
things) from the cities on the way to the theater of operations in Sicily, one can state with certainty that the capacity of *poleis* to provide sufficient amounts of food for sale to passing expeditions was not usually the determining factor in their decisions whether or not to receive (provide markets to) expeditions or not. It is, in fact, only at 6.22 and 6.42.1 in the whole of Thucydides that a *polis*’ reception of a passing military or naval force is ever presented as being determined by its (potential) capability to do so, i.e. by the (potential) capability of its inhabitants to provide for sale sufficient food to provision the force received. That considerations of the capacity of *poleis* to provision a passing expeditionary force are mentioned in Thucydides only in Nicias’ speech and in the context of the Athenian generals’ planning for the voyage to Sicily makes sense if we remember that the expedition was purposely designed by Nicias to be extraordinarily large as part of his attempt to discourage the Athenians from sailing to Sicily, and that the actual expedition which traveled to Sicily reflected Nicias’ recommendations very

123 6.42.1: the generals divided the expedition into three parts “ἵνα μὴ ὅταν ἑλλικης ἡγεσίας, ἠποθέσων ὁδοὺς καὶ λυμίδων καὶ τῶν ἑπιτηθεῶν ἐν τοῖς καταγωγαῖς,” “in order that they might not, by sailing together, be at a loss for water and harbors and provisions when they put into shore” (and so that the expedition might be, in general, more orderly and easy to control, having been assigned in divisions to separate commanders). “ταῖς καταγωγαῖς” here is slightly vague: “the places they put into shore”; Crawley translates “at the stations where they might land.” Does Thucydides refer here primarily to stops at *poleis* or merely to any location along the Italian coast suitable for the anchorage and encampment of a large expedition (cf. Gertwagen [2006] 105: “[t]he Gulf of Taranto... provided shelter and numerous small rivers along the east coast of Calabria provided water and moorings at their mouths.”). Two considerations indicate that Thucydides meant the former. The emphasis at 6.42.1 is on the objects and facilities that the stopping points would provide: i.e., the καταγωγαῖ were expected to be the source of (at least some) water, harbors, and provisions for the expedition. Since uninhabited (and therefore uncultivated) areas would be incapable of providing any supplies for the passing expedition, whereas *poleis* would be able to provide (at least some) food, one should take it that “ταῖς καταγωγαῖς” refers to *poleis* which the expedition would be halting at. That this is the right interpretation of “ταῖς καταγωγαῖς” is confirmed by 6.44.2: sailing along the southern shores of Italy, the reception of the expedition is characterized by its access to water, harbors (anchorages), and provisions (market and access to towns), exactly those things expected of the stopping-points mentioned at 6.42.1.
closely. The decision to divide the expedition into three parts so as to ensure that the *poleis* receiving the expedition on its way to the Sicilian theater would be able to provision it was an extraordinary measure, then—as was the proposal at 6.22 to bring wheat and roasted barley in *holkades* in case some cities would not be able to receive the force on account of its great size—intended to deal with the potential problems that might confront a truly extraordinarily sized expeditionary force. In other words, 6.42.1 does not show (as 6.22 does not show) that Athenian generals had commonly to consider, in their planning and organization of campaigns, whether the *poleis* on the way to campaign theaters could provide markets on a sufficient scale for their forces (in other words, 6.42.1 does not show that *poleis*’ capacity to provide markets to passing expeditions was the factor that usually determined whether they received (provided markets to) expeditions or not). Rather, these two passages imply the opposite: that considerations of the capacity of *poleis* to provision forces rarely, if ever, had to enter into the planning of ‘normal’ expeditions on ‘normal’ campaigns—and thus that *poleis*’ reception or refusal of passing expeditions was rarely, if ever, decided by their capability to provide markets to those expeditions.125

And, in fact, we never hear in Thucydides’ subsequent narrative of the Sicilian expedition of a *polis* unable to receive (i.e., unable to provide sufficient amounts of

124 See again section ii.

125 6.42.1, then, taken together with 6.22 (see also pp.46-47 above), also implies that it could be taken for granted that *poleis* in the Athenians’ normal sphere of operations (the Aegean and ‘mainland’ Greece) would be able to provide markets on the necessary scale for normal Athenian amphibious expeditions.
supplies for sale to) the expedition—and this is true even after the entire expedition, having sailed along the southern coast of Italy in divisions, had assembled together ("ἡθροίζοντο") again at Rhegium (6.44.2-3). Instead, Thucydides’ account of the initial operations of the expedition, as it sailed around Sicily to assess the strategic situation and to ascertain the attitudes of the poleis towards it, makes it clear that classical Greek poleis’ decisions whether or not to provide a market to a passing expeditionary force were always based on (what we might call) political considerations and not on their respective capacities to provide markets for any force arriving at their city.

The Italian and Sicilian Greek cities’ decisions to receive (and therefore provide a market for) the Athenian expedition were always determined by and indicated their attitudes towards it (and so the cities’ reception or refusal of the Athenians also indicated the stance they would be taking for the upcoming war). In some cases, the decision to provide a market or not to the expedition indicated neither friendliness nor hostility towards it, but was used by some Italian and Sicilian poleis to signal their neutrality. So when the entire expedition had arrived at Rhegium (6.44.2-3), the Rhegines did not admit the Athenians and their allies within their walls ("ὡς αὐτοὺς ἐσώ οὐκ ἐδέχοντο"), but provided a market for the expedition in the sanctuary of Artemis outside the city ("οὗ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀγορὰν παρεῖχον"), where the expedition had pitched camp (6.44.3). In so doing, the Rhegines were demonstrating to the Athenians that they were remaining neutral for the time being, as becomes clear from 6.44.3: in response to the Athenians’ request for military help on arrival at their city, on the basis of their shared kinship with the Leontines (cf. 6.46.2), the Rhegines had replied that "οἱ δὲ οὐδὲ µεθ’ ἑτέρων ἔφασαν ἐτέρων ἔφασαν εἰς τὸν ἄργους φρονών".

126 Or of any other polis unable to receive an expedition elsewhere in his work.
The Rhegines, then, did not receive the expedition within the walls of the city (and so did not offer the full set of facilities understood throughout the Greek world as making up the conventional reception of a military force) and refused to provide military help to the Athenians in order to demonstrate that they were not friends and allies of the Athenians; but they did provide a market to the expedition to show that they were not hostile to the Athenians, either. But a polis could also demonstrate its neutrality by refusing to receive (and thus refusing to provide a market to) the expedition. Thucydides tells us that the polis of Catana—a polis that, like Rhegium, could have been expected to be friendly to the Athenians on account of its shared kinship with the Leontines (see 6.20.3) and its previous friendly relations with Athens—initially refused to receive the Athenians in 415 because of opposition from a pro-Syracusian party in the city (6.50.3, 6.51.1). The presence of this faction stopped the Catanians from taking the Athenian side in the conflict and therefore being friendly to the expedition (and receiving it); once the pro-Syracusans had fled the city, however, the Catanians made an alliance with the Athenians for “οὐδὲ µεθ’ ἑτέρων” meaning the assumption of a position of neutrality, cf. 2.67.4, and esp. 2.72.1: Archidamus (in the summer of 429) offers the option to the Plataeans that they could remain neutral, “καὶ ἔστε µηδὲ µεθ’ ἑτέρων,” and join neither the Athenians nor the Peloponnesians but receive both as friends and neither as allies for the war (i.e., they were not to provide military help to either side) (“δέχεσθε δὲ ἀµφοτέρους φίλους, ἐπὶ πολέµῳ µηδέτερους”).

For “οὐδὲ µεθ’ ἑτέρων” meaning the assumption of a position of neutrality, cf. 2.67.4, and esp. 2.72.1: Archidamus (in the summer of 429) offers the option to the Plataeans that they could remain neutral, “καὶ ἔστε µηδὲ µεθ’ ἑτέρων,” and join neither the Athenians nor the Peloponnesians but receive both as friends and neither as allies for the war (i.e., they were not to provide military help to either side) (“δέχεσθε δὲ ἀµφοτέρους φίλους, ἐπὶ πολέµῳ µηδέτερους”).

IG I² 291—a list of monetary contributions to an Athenian campaign in the far west from Sicels, Sicilian poleis, and Rhegium—has been associated with the Sicilian expedition of 415 and thereby taken as evidence that monetary contributions to belligerents could be consonant with a position of neutrality in classical Greece (see now Hornblower, CT iii.458-461 for a summary of arguments in support of this position). This is incorrect, however, as the inscription should be dated to 427-424 and the first Athenian intervention in the far west: see Ampolo (1987) and esp. Bauslaugh (1991) 148-150 (whose arguments are not satisfactorily refuted by Hornblower).

Catana was one of the Chalcidian cities that fought alongside the Athenians in the war between Leontini and Syracuse from 427-424 (3.86.2-4); it had also received the Athenian ambassador Phaeax in 422 (5.4.6).
and their city served as a base for the expedition.\textsuperscript{130} A polis could also indicate that it wished to remain neutral by refusing to receive the entire expedition. After the Athenians had gained the Catans as allies and had begun to establish a base there, word reached them from Camarina that, if they went to that city, it would go over to them (6.52.1). When the Athenians with all their ships reached Camarina and sent a herald ashore, however, its inhabitants did not receive them, but said that the terms of their oaths were to receive the Athenians only if they put in with a single ship, unless they themselves sent for more (“οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἐδέχοντο, λέγοντες σφίσι τὰ ὅρκια εἶναι μιᾷ νηὶ καταπλεόντων Αθηναίων δέχεσθαι, ἢν μὴ αὐτοὶ πλείονες μεταπέµπωσιν”) (ibid.).\textsuperscript{131} Informing a belligerent party that it would be received only if it came to a polis in a single ship was, in fact, a measure commonly used in the Greek world by poleis to denote their neutrality.\textsuperscript{132} In this case, then, the Camarinaeans’ decision not to provide a market to the entire expedition indicated their continuing neutral status.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{130} The Catans made the alliance with the Athenians in the summer of 415 when the pro-Syracusan party within the city fled after the men of the expedition had broken into the city and began shopping in the agora while the Athenian generals were making a second attempt to bring the assembled Catans over to their side (6.51.1-2). Catana serving as a base for the expedition: in the summer of 415 (6.51.2-3, 6.52.1, 6.62.3); for most of the winter of 415/414 (6.72.1, 6.74.1, 6.88.5, 6.94.1); and for part of the summer of 414 (6.94). The Catans continued to be friendly to the Athenians throughout the war, providing cavalry for the Athenians in the summer of 414 (6.98.1), being listed by Nicias as allies in the winter of 414/3 (7.14.2), sending supplies to the expedition in the summer of 413 (at least) (7.60.2), and fighting alongside it in the final battle in the harbor of Syracuse in 413 (7.57.11). Catana also served as a refuge for the Athenians and allies who managed to evade capture after the final defeat of the expedition: see 7.85.4 with Dover, \textit{HCT} iv.460 (citing Lys. 20.24, Paus. 7.16.4ff.).

\textsuperscript{131} The oaths mentioned were probably sworn by opposing pro-Athenian and pro-Syracusan factions within Camarina “to maintain neutrality unless after proper deliberation the majority resolved to bring in one side or the other” (see Bauslaugh (1991) 156, and see (1991) 156-158 generally contra Dover, \textit{HCT} 316-317 ad loc.).

\textsuperscript{132} See Gomme, \textit{HCT} ii.7, Fantasia (2003) 241 ad “διερμένους μιᾷ νηὶ” at 2.7.2. See also 3.71.1: during the stasis at Corcyra in 427, the conspirators, having killed most of the pro-Athenian party in the city, called the Corcyrans together and told them that “in future they should remain neutral and receive neither
In all of these cases, therefore, Thucydides indicates explicitly that the decision whether or not to provide a market to the expedition was based on the attitudes of the citizens of these *poleis* to the Athenians (and on the stance they wished to take for the approaching hostilities). But even for those *poleis* whose reasons to receive or to refuse reception to the expedition are not stated explicitly by Thucydides, it can be inferred with certainty from the preceding and surrounding narrative that these decisions were made solely on the basis of political considerations. Thus, when the Messanians, the second *polis* in the Sicilian theater approached by the Athenians in the summer of 415, refused Alcibiades’ offer of alliance, answering that they would not receive him inside the city, but would furnish a market outside (“ἀπεκρίναντο πόλει µὲν ἄν οὐ δέξασθαι, ἀγορὰν δ’ ἐξο παρέξειν”) (6.50.1), they were indicating to the Athenians that they wished to remain neutral. This can be seen to be true from analogy with the earlier actions of the Rhegines, and from the fact that the Messanians remained neutral throughout the rest of the war. The Messanians did not aid either the Athenians or the Syracusans during the war. A pro-Athenian faction within the *polis* did attempt to betray it to the Athenians party if they came with more than one ship, regarding any larger number as hostile,” “τό τε λοιπὸν μηδετέρους δέχεσθαι ἄλλ’ ἢ µιᾷ νηὶ ἡσυχάζοντας, τὸ δὲ πλέον πολέµιον ἡγεῖσθαι.”

133 Cf. 6.88.2: in the winter of 415/4, the Camarinaeans, in response to entreaties from both the Athenians and the Syracusans, still “thought it most consistent with their oaths, at present, to side with neither,” “... ἐκείνην δακτυλία σφίσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι μηδετέρως ἀµίνειν.”

134 See above on 6.44.3; cf. Bauslaugh (1991) 152.

135 The Messanians are not listed at 7.57 as among the allies of Athens or at 7.58 as among the allies of Syracuse before the final battle in 413. Thucydides does generalize at one point that all Sicily except Akragas (which remained neutral) actively joined the Syracusans against the Athenians in 413 (7.33.2). But this “cannot be used as evidence of anything, since Naxos and Catana, both allies of Athens, are also not excepted” (Bauslaugh [1991] 153; cf. Dover, *HCT* iv.413); and Thucydides’ “claim is restricted to those cities which were undecided” until this point in the narrative (Rood [1998] 165 and n.28). (Stahl
in the winter of 415/414, but the friends of Syracuse there, having been informed by Alcibiades that there was a plot to betray the city, succeeded in crushing the conspiracy and, together with other inhabitants of the city opposed to receiving the Athenians, prevented it from receiving them ("ἐπεκράτουν µὴ δέχεσθαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους") and thus kept it in its neutral status (6.74.1).

In other cases where Thucydides does not state the reasons for poleis’ refusal or reception of the expedition, since the decisions of these poleis in this regard always correlate precisely with our knowledge of their relations with the Athenians prior to the expedition, and with their later actions during the war, these decisions can also be considered to have been determined by the friendliness or hostility of the polis in question to the Athenians, or by the wish of a polis to adopt a neutral stance towards the Athenians. Thus, those cities that had been hostile to the Athenians before the war, and especially during the first Athenian intervention in the west in 427-424, and also took part in operations against the Athenians or provided help to anti-Athenian forces during the war in 415-413—i.e., Tarentum and Locri—did not receive the expedition as it sailed to the theater of operations in Sicily. Himera, another polis that could have been

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([2003] 213) takes the fact that Gylippus and his triremes from the Peloponnese touched at Messena (and Rhegium) ("σχόντες Ῥηγίῳ καὶ Μεσσήνῃ") (7.1.2) to indicate that Messana (and Rhegium) were friendly to him. But fleets could ‘touch’ (put into land) at neutral or non-committed cities, too: see 6.62.2 (Athenian fleet touching at Himera ("ἔσχον ἐς Ἱµέραν")); and 7.35.2 (Athenian fleet under Demosthenes and Eurymedon touching at the cities on the Italian coast after Croton except Locri "ἵσχοντες πρὸς τὰς πόλεις πλὴν Λοκρῶν").

136 See Dover, HCT iv.349 ad loc.

137 Tarentum and Locri not receiving the expedition: 6.44.2. Enmity towards Athens before the war: Tarentum was a Spartan colony, and a Syracusan speaker assumed before the beginning of the war that it would receive the Syracusans but not the Athenians in any war between the two (see 6.34.4 and section iiib below). Locri had been particularly hostile to the Athenians during their first operations in the far west in 427-424. After the reconciliation between the Sicilian cities that had ended the war between the
expected to be hostile to the expedition on the basis of its experiences of the Athenians during their first intervention in the west, also did not receive the expedition.\textsuperscript{138} Naxos, on the other hand, which had been consistently friendly to the Athenians before the war and was a strong ally to them during it, was the first polis to receive the expedition in 415 (6.50.3: “Ναξίων δὲ δέξαµένων τῇ πόλει”).\textsuperscript{139} In all of these cases, Thucydides did not

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\textsuperscript{138} Himera’s refusal: 6.62.2. The territory of Himera had been attacked by the Athenians (in concert with the Sicels) in the winter of 426/5 (3.115.1). Bauslaugh ([1991] 154) notes that the Athenian approach shows that they did not consider Himera immediately hostile, and that, the following summer, the Himeraeans had to be persuaded by Gyippus to join the Syracusans; he thus concludes that they were initially neutral in the war. But the Athenians, since they had to pass by Himera in any case on their way to Egesta and Selinus, may simply have chanced their arm with the Himeraeans; and, crucially, note that Gyippus presumed, before his arrival at their city, that the Himeraeans would provide troops for the war against Athens (7.1.1). The Himeraeans did, in fact, at Gyippus’ request, provide troops for the war for the effort against the expedition (7.1.3-5) and later fought alongside the Syracusans in the final battle of the war (7.58.2). It would thus be more accurate to state that Himera, rather than being neutral at the start of the war, was uncommitted; it had not yet joined the fight on the Syracusan side but was (latenty) hostile to the Athenians.

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\textsuperscript{139} The Naxians had taken the side of the Leontines, together with the Athenians, in the fighting in 427-424 (3.86.2, 4.25.7-10). Nicias, in his second speech to the assembly before the expedition, thought that Naxos could be expected to join the Athenians in 415 on account of its Chalcidian kinship with Leontini (6.20.3 with 6.3.1). During the war, Naxos served as a base for the expedition during part of the winter of 415/4 (6.72.1, 6.74.2, 6.88.3); the Naxians provide cavalry for the Athenians in the summer of 414 (6.98.1); they were listed by Nicias as allies of the Athenians in the winter of 414/3 (7.14.2); and they took the Athenian side in the final battle in the harbor of Syracuse in the summer of 413 (7.57.11).
include the reason for these states’ differing treatments of the Athenian expedition, since the fact that their reception or non-admittance of the expedition was motivated by either their friendliness or enmity (or neutrality) towards the Athenians was either immediately apparent from the narrative or could be assumed (and therefore omitted from the narrative).\footnote{Thucydides only includes the reason for \textit{poleis’} refusal of the expedition when it confounds the expedition’s expectations (in the cases of Rhegium and Catana, on account of their kinship with Leontini and their previous friendly relationships with Athens; in the cases of Camarina and Messena (at 6.74.1), because the Athenians had received intelligence that they would be received in these cities) and is therefore surprising (to Thucydides’ audience). Note that, generally, \textit{poleis’} decisions to receive military forces or not are only reported by Thucydides in exceptional circumstances, viz. when a \textit{polis} is, by admitting a force, confirming its (previously uncertain) allegiance or signaling a change in such (4.73.5, 4.84.2; cf. 3.71.1). The reception of Athenian amphibious and naval forces is assumed in his narrative until the defeat of the Sicilian expedition. The (relatively) great frequency with which Thucydides reports the Sicilian (and Italian) \textit{poleis’} decisions to receive the Athenian expedition or not is deliberate; it shows that, unlike in the Aegean, the Athenians could not depend on the friendliness of \textit{poleis} in Sicily and Italy (and thus confirms Nicias’ point at 6.21.2 on the difference between the Aegean and Sicilian theaters of operations).}

A final confirmation that it was political considerations that determined \textit{poleis’} decisions whether to receive passing expeditionary forces or not, and not their capability to provide sufficient provisions for sale to those forces, comes from the second measure taken by the Athenian generals at Corcyra before the expedition’s voyage. Having made the arrangements as to the order in which the expedition would sail, anchor, and encamp, the generals sent ahead three triremes to Italy and Sicily “εἰσοµένας αἵτινες σφᾶς τῶν πόλεων δέξονται,” “to ascertain which of the cities would receive them” (6.42.2). The generals were not asking whether the cities in Italy and Sicily could receive them, but if they \textit{would} receive them. They expected, then, that the \textit{poleis’} decisions whether to receive the Athenians or not would be made on the basis of other criteria than their capacity to do so. Here, as at all points on the subsequent voyage of the Athenians to and
around Sicily, the capability of *poleis* in the far west to provide sufficient supplies for sale to the passing expedition was taken for granted.\textsuperscript{141} Nicias had assumed that every *polis* on the way to and around Sicily could receive a ‘normal’ expedition, and that most of these *poleis* could receive even the unusually large force which he was demanding. The later planning and actual operations of the expedition demonstrated that all of the *poleis* in the Sicilian theater of operations could be assumed to be able to provide markets to the expedition as it passed by their territories\textsuperscript{142}—and that their decisions to provide markets or not to the Athenians were made on the basis of whether they were friendly, hostile, or neutral towards the expedition from the east.

b. Supply ships

Before the expedition’s triremes, troop transports, and one cavalry transport reached Corcyra, Thucydides describes a debate in the Syracusan assembly, called to discuss the many reports reaching the city that an Athenian expedition was coming to attack it (6.32.3), in which Hermocrates proposed a plan to deter the Athenians from crossing over to Sicilian waters, or at least to prevent their doing so until the following spring. He suggested that all existing Sicilian naval resources (or, at least, those available at Syracuse plus all those available to the cities willing to join the Syracusans) be launched and dispatched with two months’ supplies (“\textit{µετὰ δυοῖν µηνοῖν τροφῆς}”) to meet

\textsuperscript{141} Although note that the expedition had been divided into three parts for the voyage to Sicily before the three triremes had been sent ahead to Italy and Sicily (6.42.1).

\textsuperscript{142} It should be noted that it was not the whole expedition but only 60 triremes that were first received at Naxos and Catana (after having been refused at the latter *polis* initially) (although later the whole expedition was received by and encamped at these *poleis*); and that, before the voyage to Selinus and Egesta, during which it stopped at Himera, the generals had divided the expedition in two parts (6.62.1).
the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory (6.34.4). This would cause the Athenians to realize that they would have to fight to cross the Ionian Sea—i.e., that they would have to fight a battle before they would be able to fight (around and) for Sicily (ibid.). This would shock the Athenians and force them to reflect

ὅτι ὁµῷοµέθα µὲν ἐκ φιλίας χώρας φύλακες (ὑποδέχεται γὰρ ἡµᾶς Τάρας), τὸ δὲ πέλαγος αὐτοῖς πολὺ περαιοῦσθαι µετὰ πάσης τῆς παρασκευῆς, χαλεπὸν δὲ διὰ πλοῦ µήκος ἐν τάξει µεῖναι, καὶ ἡµῖν ἂν εὐπόριστος εἶν, βραδεῖα τε καὶ κατ’ ὀλίγους προσπέπτουσα. [5] εἰ δὲ αὐτῷ παρασκευαστὶ ἄδροιος κοινός παρασκέψαις, εἰ µὲν κύκλῳ προσκείµην, ἐπιθυµίας ἂν κεκµνκόσιν, εἰ δὲ µὴ διακοίη, ἐστὶ καὶ ὑποκεῖσαι ἡµῖν ἃς Τάρας· ὅτι δὲ µὲν ὀλίγων ἐφοδιών ὡς ὅπι παρασκέψας ἄποροις ἂν κατα χωρία ἐρήµα, καὶ ἡ µένους πολιορκίαν ἂν ἡ περισσότερος παραπλεῖν τῆς τε ἄλλην παρασκευήν ἁπολείποιεν ἂν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων οὐκ ἂν βέβαια ἄχρυτες, εἰ ὑποδέξοιντο, ἀδυµόοεν.

that we have as our base a friendly territory from which to keep watch—for Tarentum is ready to receive us—whereas for them the open sea is a wide one to cross with all of their παρασκευὴ, and it is difficult on account of the length of the trip to keep in formation; consequently, coming up slowly and in small groups, they would be easy to attack. [5] If, on the other hand, they disembarrassed themselves (of the non-trireme part of the expedition) and attacked with their fast ships concentrated, then, if they used their oars, we could fall upon them when they were tired with rowing. Alternatively, if they took the decision not to cross under oar but under sail, we could withdraw to Tarentum; and they, after making the crossing with a small amount of victuals as men going into a naval battle, would be a loss (for food) in uninhabited regions. Either they would remain and be blockaded, or attempting to sail along the coast

143 The fact that Hermocrates specifies the amount of provisions here implies that it was an unusual (almost certainly an unusually large) amount—Thucydides rarely mentions specific amounts of provisions brought by a military or naval force, and then only to clarify exceptional strategic circumstances (cf. introduction section iv). Since triremes did not have the capacity to carry any substantial amounts of provisions (see p.42 n.76), the τροφή proposed by Hermocrates for the Sicilian fleet was to be carried by supply ships (cf. Morrison et al. [2000] 100). Jordan ([1975] 107-108) believed that Hermocrates’ proposal that the Sicilian fleet bring two months’ τροφή provided evidence that classical Greek triremes could carry substantial amounts of supplies “[s]ince Hermocrates obviously expected the Syracusan ships to stay at sea continually until they met the Athenian fleet, the sailors could not go ashore for food and had to draw their rations from the stores on board the ships.” But Hermocrates’ emphasis at 6.34.4-5 on the advantage that having a base at Tarentum would be for the Sicilians shows that he did not expect the Sicilian triremes to stay at sea continually until the Athenians came. In addition, the fact that Hermocrates thought that the Sicilians would have an advantage in that they could attack, while still fresh, the Athenian triremes tired out from rowing across the Ionian sea (6.34.5) shows that he did not envisage the Sicilian fleet being continually at sea. The rest of the examples Jordan cites (at [1975] 108) to support his point that triremes could carry substantial amounts of supplies in fact undermine it.

144 See Dover (1965a) 46 for translation of this clause: κουφίζειν is intransitive here.
they would leave behind the rest of their παρασκευή, and uncertain as to the
titude of the cities (of the region), whether they would receive them or not,
would be disheartened.145

Hermocrates was convinced that, discouraged by the presence of the Sicilian fleet at
Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, the Athenians would either remain at Corcyra, or
retire to winter-quarters after reconnoitering the Sicilian position, or simply abandon the
expedition altogether (6.34.6). Reports and rumors exaggerating the strength of the
Sicilian fleet would aid in deterring the Athenians from attempting the crossing to Italy
(6.34.7), and the very fact that the Sicilian Greeks were mounting any resistance at all
would shock and possibly discourage the Athenians from the expedition (6.34.8).

Hermocrates’ proposals were grounded on an excellent strategic analysis of the
exceptional problems that would confront an Athenian expedition attempting to sail from
Corcyra to Italy in the face of opposition from a Sicilian fleet;146 in outlining these
problems, however, Hermocrates’ speech, and especially the assumptions underlying it,
also provides us with valuable evidence on the normal workings of the provisioning of
classical Greek overseas expeditions.147 Firstly, the speech shares the assumptions of the

145 6.34.4-5 (with the exception of the clause noted, the translation is based on the Loeb translation and also
on the translation of part of this passage at Morrison et al. [2000] 101).

146 Although previous scholarship had derided the feasibility of Hermocrates’ plan, believing that its
deployment would have resulted in the complete destruction of the Sicilian fleet, Stahl, in a brilliant
analysis ([2003] 194-198), demonstrated that the plan was a “prophylactic enterprise, which, moreover,
[was] designed not to result in military action or even confrontation” ([2003] 196). Hermocrates’ plan
never envisaged a major battle with the Athenian fleet; rather, “[t]he plan’s reliance on rumor and
exaggeration (i.e. on misinformation) renders it clear beyond doubt that Hermocrates never intended his
collection of available ships, assembled at shortest notice, to engage the supreme Athenian fleet in actual
battle. He only wanted at least to buy time for his city until next spring and, if possible, even to scare off
and prevent the enemy from coming at all... The idea ‘to challenge the Athenian fleet’ does not even occur
in Hermocrates’ plan” ([2003] 198). The summary of Hermocrates’ plan in the pages above owes much to
Stahl’s discussion.

147 See the excellent discussion at Morrison et al. (2000) 101-102; this treatment informs much of the
following paragraphs.
surrounding narrative that it will be a *polis*’ attitude towards a passing force that will determine whether the *polis* receives it or not (Hermocrates assumes, in other words, that all *poleis* will have the capability to receive passing trireme fleets): Tarentum will receive the Sicilian ships because it is friendly to them; the Athenian triremes, once they have crossed the Ionian Sea, would be uncertain of the attitude of the *poleis* on the coasting voyage, and therefore uncertain whether they would be received by them or not.\(^{148}\)

Secondly, Hermocrates’ plan also takes for granted the existence of “τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευήν” accompanying an Athenian expedition to Sicily (6.34.5). At 6.34.4, when the whole expedition, including the fast triremes, is envisioned as crossing the Ionian sea, it is referred to as “πάσης τῆς παρασκευῆς” by Hermocrates; at 6.34.5, “τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευήν” will be what remains of the imagined expedition once the triremes have crossed to Italy and left behind (at Corcyra) the rest of the expedition.\(^{149}\) The term “τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευήν” should be taken here as referring to supply ships accompanying the imagined expedition, as can be seen from the rest of Hermocrates’

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\(^{148}\) In an earlier part of his speech, in which he proposed a series of measures for the medium term to prepare the *polis* for the eventuality of an Athenian invading force arriving in Sicilian waters, Hermocrates advised the Syracusans to send envoys to the rest of the Greek cities in Sicily, and Italy, too, in order to make them allies, or else prevent their receiving the Athenians (“ὅπως... μὴ δέχωνται Ἀθηναίους”) (6.34.1). Note here again that it is assumed that a *polis*’ attitude towards the Athenians determines whether it will receive them or not (the (Sicilian and Italian) *poleis*’ capability to do so is taken for granted); and that a position of neutrality—or more precisely, a non-committed position—can be considered to be consistent with the refusal of a passing expeditionary force.

\(^{149}\) Cf. 6.44.2, when the expedition, understood as comprising both the land and naval part of the force *and* its supply and other support ships is referred to as “ἡ πᾶσα παρασκευή.”
plan: the Athenian trireme crews, having crossed over with few provisions in the expectation of a naval battle, would be at a loss for food in deserted regions; and, if they sailed on from these regions, they would leave behind the rest of the expedition ("τὴν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν") and coast along by poleis where they could not be sure that they would be received (and therefore could not be sure whether these cities would provide markets for them), and therefore would be discouraged: i.e., they would be discouraged because they would not be able to obtain provisions from ἡ ἄλλη παρασκευὴ of the expedition if they were not received by the poleis on the coast. Hermocrates’ plan, in other words, assumed that an expedition sailing from ‘mainland Greece’ to a distant theater of operations would bring with it provisions in supply ships.

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150 Cf. Dover, *HCT* iv.299; Morrison et al. (2000) 101. This is the common meaning of “τὴν δὲ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν” in book 6 of Thucydides. See esp. 6.30.1: most of the allies, together with the grain transports and the smaller boats and as much else of ἡ ἄλλη παρασκευὴ as there was (“καὶ ταῖς σιταγωγοῖς ἁλκάσι καὶ τοῖς πλοίοις καὶ ὅση ἄλλη παρασκευὴ...”), had been ordered to assemble at Corcyra, and to cross the Ionian sea from there in a body to the Iapygian promontory (6.30.1): Thucydides includes here the grain transports and smaller boats as the main part of ἡ ἄλλη παρασκευὴ embarking for Sicily. See also pp.53-54 n.95 above on 6.25.2: the phrase “τὴν δὲ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν” there should be taken to include in addition to archers and slingers, grain, boats to transport it, and bakers to mill and prepare it for consumption. See also n.152 below on 6.37.1. (One more point: to repeat, at 6.34.5, once the triremes have left behind the rest of the expedition, the latter is referred to as “τὴν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν.”) At 6.34.4, however, when the whole expedition, including the triremes, is pictured as crossing the Ionian Sea, it is referred to as “πάσης τῆς παρασκευῆς.” This latter phrase, then, comprises both the triremes of the expedition and the expedition’s supply (and other) boats. I reiterate this point to demonstrate that the following inference of Allison’s is incorrect ([1989] 92): “At 34.4, Hermocrates, suggesting a Syracusan defense, says that the Athenians would have to consider that they must cross the sea with “the whole παρασκευὴ”—thus he indicates the difficulty of passage because of the size of the παρασκευὴ.” No: Hermocrates at 6.34.4 is emphasizing that the presence of supply and other boats (accompanying the triremes and constituting with them the whole παρασκευὴ) would cause a slow and difficult crossing; the size of the παρασκευὴ is, at most, a minor consideration here.)

151 Cf. Robinson (1999) 140 on “… καὶ ἡ μένοντες πολιορκοῖντο ἢν” at 6.34.5: “[t]he vulnerability to πολιορκία is thus explicitly connected to the issue of provision, and no other causal factor is mentioned…”

152 See also 6.37.1: Hermocrates’ opponent in the debate in the Syracusan assembly, Athenagoras, employing explicitly rational and probabilistic arguments based on the tactical and logistical difficulties facing an Athenian expedition to Sicily (see Mader [1993] esp. 439-440), argued that one of the difficulties that would face an Athenian force attacking Syracuse, and which would discourage it from doing so (see 6.38.1 with Mader [1993] 436), was that “τὴν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν, ὅσην δὲ ἐπὶ πόλιν τοσάδε
Classical Athenian amphibious forces on the move to theaters of operations acquired their provisions from two sources, then: markets provided by coastal poleis; and the supply ships which accompanied them. These are the only two means of acquisition of provisions considered in Hermocrates’ speech in Syracuse. and they are the only two mentioned in Nicias’ second speech to the assembly at Athens, too. We need to distinguish, however, between the relative importance of polis-provided markets and supply ships in the provisioning of amphibious expeditions (and trireme fleets) on the move. Normal Athenian amphibious expeditions departed from Athens with (at least) some provisions in supply ships; but, because they moved within and along friendly/subject territory at all times during their voyages to their theaters of operations in the Aegean, they could count on reception by poleis on their way to these theaters, and

παριστάται, αὐτῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ,” “the rest of the παρασκευή which must be provided against so large a city as ours is not small.” (This remark comes within the context of a discussion of the military strength of any expedition coming from Athens to attack Sicily as compared to the strength of the polis of Syracuse: Athenagoras refers to “τὴν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν” here because he had already spoken of the main components of a hypothetical Athenian παρασκευή attacking Sicily: horses, hoplites, triremes.) Thus, Athenagoras also assumed, just as Hermocrates had done in his speech to the assembly, that an expedition sailing from Athens against Syracuse would bring with it provisions in supply ships.

Thus, the imagined Athenian triremes pressing on from the deserted regions would be at a loss for food because they would be separated from their supply ships and because they could not be sure whether they would be received by the coastal poleis on their paraplous. Hermocrates’ assumption that markets provided by poleis and supply ships would be the only means of acquisition of supplies available to the envisioned expedition from Athens also explains why, in his plan, having taken on-board a minimal amount of provisions in the expectation of a battle, the Athenian triremes would be at a loss for food in the uninhabited region of Italy at which they would first touch (and thus would have to move on from this region): since there would be no poleis, there would be no markets at which to rep rovision; and since the triremes would also be separated from the supply ships of the expedition, they could not use these to rep rovision, either.

See p.22 above on 6.21.2.
therefore markets and opportunities for resupply.\textsuperscript{155} Normal Athenian amphibious expeditions brought provisions with them therefore only as an emergency supply for their (relatively) short voyages to war zones (in case they did not have access to a market provided by a \textit{polis} because of bad weather or some other unforeseeable circumstance), and to provide a safe margin of supplies until shipments of provisions from nearby subjects/allies and Athens began to arrive at the base of operations.\textsuperscript{156} Even the supply ships requested by Nicias for the extraordinary expedition to Sicily were to function in the first place as an emergency reserve: they were to accompany the expedition to enable it to reprovision in case the enormous force from Athens found itself weather-bound at a \textit{polis} unable to provide sufficient supplies for sale.\textsuperscript{157} Markets provided by friendly (or neutral) \textit{poleis} were, then, the primary means of acquiring supplies for normal Athenian amphibious expeditions on the move to theaters of operations; the supply ships that accompanied these expeditions never played more than a secondary role in their

\textsuperscript{155}Note again that it is assumed in Nicias’ speech that \textit{poleis} in the Athenians’ normal sphere of operations would be able to provide markets on the necessary scale for normal Athenian expeditions. Note also that, traveling at all times through friendly territory, Athenian forces in the Aegean would be unable to acquire provisions through foraging: see pp.179-180 n.192 below. (The same went for the Sicilian expedition traveling through mostly uninhabited or neutral (non-committal) territory.)

\textsuperscript{156}See again Erdkamp (1998) 56, and chapter 2 section iib. And see again section ii above: Athenian amphibious forces (and trireme fleets) sent on operations in the Aegean (or around the Peloponnese) needed only small amounts of provisions and therefore did not need to be accompanied by requisitioned vessels.

\textsuperscript{157}The ensuing narrative of the voyage of the expedition also presents markets provided by cities as the expected (if not, in the end, actual) method of provisioning for the expedition on the move: the Athenian generals’ attempts to ascertain whether the cities in Italy and Sicily would receive (provide a market for) them implied that they were counting on \textit{polis}-provided markets to be the primary source of provisioning for the expedition in its voyage to Sicily. The fact that Thucydides includes the detail at 6.44.2 that the expedition was not provided with any markets also implies that it was expected that the expedition would receive markets from (at least some of) the \textit{poleis} on the way to Sicily. In the end, the grain-transports and other boats carrying provisions for the Sicilian expedition did function as an emergency reserve, but not for the reason envisioned by Nicias: it was because the coastal \textit{poleis} on the way to Sicily did not provide the expedition with markets that it had to rely on its supply ships for the whole of its voyage to Rhegium.
provisioning; to be more precise, they functioned as emergency reserves when, for whatever reason, an amphibious expedition on the move did not have access to a market prepared for it by a friendly or neutral *polis*.\(^\text{158}\)

\*iv. The provisioning of the expedition during the operations in Sicily*

\*a. The importance of seaborne imports for the grain supply of the expedition*

To recap, the expedition received markets from some friendly or neutral Sicilian *poleis* as it moved around from *polis* to *polis* in the opening phase of the campaign, making brief stops at each as its generals attempted to ascertain the attitudes of the *poleis* in Sicily towards it. After this initial phase, however, once the expedition had established a base of operations for the campaign, and especially when it had established itself before Syracuse in order to besiege that city, it (obviously) could not depend on its reception by various cities to reprovision. At least for the roughly eighteen months from the beginning of its siege of Syracuse in the early summer of 414 (6.97ff.) until its eventual destruction in the late fall of 413,\(^\text{159}\) then, it had to acquire its provisions by a different means.

The expedition acquired its provisions during the siege (solely) through seaborne imports (secured by the expedition’s naval superiority) from nearby friendly states. This can be shown to be true from the several references in Thucydides’ narrative to the expedition’s food supply during the operations around Syracuse. In the summer of 414,

\(^{158}\) Thus, Casson ([1995] 262-263, 268-269) was incorrect to state that triremes on the move depended solely on *agorai* (provided by *poleis*) for their supplies; similarly mistaken: Gomme (1933) 18-19; Hanson (2005) 258-260. Pritchett ([1971] 42-45), Jordan ([1975] 109-111), Morrison et al. ([2000] 102), van Wees ([2004] 218-219) and Rawlings ([2007] 118) fail to distinguish between the relative importance of *agorai* provided *by poleis* and supply ships for the provisioning of amphibious and naval expeditions on the move.

\(^{159}\) See p.110 n.241 below for this date.
Nicias decided to fortify Plemmyrion, a headland overlooking the Great Harbor of Syracuse, since “if this were fortified, it seemed to him that the bringing in of supplies would be an easier matter,” “ὁφανῶν αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο ἡ ἐσκομιδὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔσεσθαι,” since basing the Athenian triremes there, instead of the inner bay of in the Great Harbor where they had been previously based, would make it easier to operate against the Syracusan fleet: the expedition’s triremes would now be able to keep closer watch on the harbor of the Syracusans and not have to put out against the Syracusans if they showed any activity with their fleet (7.4.4). Before this decision of Nicias’, provisions had been imported by sea to the Athenians’ naval base in the Great Harbor, and it appears, at the beginning of the siege, to the Athenians’ first naval base at Thapsus.

The absolute necessity of these seaborne imports (and thus of the fortification of Plemmyrion) for the expedition’s provisioning becomes apparent from a letter sent by Nicias to Athens at the end of the summer of 414 (7.8) concerning the strategic situation facing the expedition as winter approached. Nicias wrote that the expedition was now struggling with the Syracusans for control of the sea (7.12.2-7.13.1). The Athenians no longer had a great superiority in the number of their triremes (“πολλῆς... περιουσίας

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160 This follows from the fact that the Athenians’ naval base was in the Great Harbor when Nicias made his decision to make the import of supplies to the expedition easier. See also 6.103.2 with p.84 n.163 for the bringing in of provisions to the Athenian naval base while it was based in the Great Harbor.

161 See 6.99.4: “αἱ δὲ νῆες τῶν Αθηναίων οὔπω ἐκ τῆς Θάψου περιεπεπλεύκεσαν ἐς τὸν µέγαν λιµένα, ἀλλ’ ἐτι οἱ Συρακοσίων ἐκφάτοι τῶν περὶ τὴν ὄλασαν, κατὰ γὰρ δ’ ἐκ τῆς Θάψου οἱ Αθηναίοι τὰ ἐπιτηδεία ἐπήγγειον”; “as the Athenian fleet had not yet sailed round into the Great Harbor, the Syracusans still commanded the sea coast, and the Athenians brought their provisions by land from Thapsus” (Crawley’s translation). See 6.97.1-2 for the establishment of the base for the expedition’s triremes at Thapsus. Although, strictly speaking, 6.99.4 does not provide evidence for seaborne imports to the expedition’s naval base at Thapsus, this would appear to be the most likely source of the supplies brought overland from there to the Athenians’ soldiers engaged in the siege works (given that it was halfway between the deserted site of Megara Hyblaea and Syracuse, and not close to any major (and/or friendly) inland settlement).
νεῶν”), and were forced to use all of them for guarding their food supply: they were compelled to use all of them for this task since, if they were to relax their guard even a little, they would not have provisions, which were even then being brought with difficulty brought past Syracuse and into their camp: “τὰ ἑπτάθεια όντα ἐξομεν, παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων πάλιν χαλέπιως καὶ νῦν ἐσκομιζόμενοι” (7.13.1). There is a crucial implication from this statement: if the expedition could not provide security for its seaborne food supply, it would not have provisions; in other words, the expedition was depending for its provisions solely on imports of grain. This point is reinforced later in the same letter to Athens, when Nicias noted that

If but one advantage more shall be gained by the enemy—that the regions of Italy which supply us with food, seeing in what plight we are and that you are not sending reinforcements, should go over to the enemy—the war will be over for them without a battle, for we shall be besieged into surrender. (7.14.3)

Nicias told the Athenians, in other words, that if those regions of Italy that were currently supplying the Athenians with food were to cease doing so, the Athenians would have to surrender without a battle since, without the food from Italy, they would be, in effect, in the position of a besieged and blockaded city, having to rely solely on whatever stores of grain and other food they might happen to possess at the point when the Italians ceased to supply them; the implication, again, is that seaborne supply (from Italy) was their sole source of provisions.

162 Cf. the translations of “ἐκπολιορκηθέντων ἡμῶν” of Crawley: “famine would compel us to evacuate”; Jowett: “we shall be starved out, and they will have made an end of the war without striking a blow”; Warner: “hunger will force us to submit, and Syracuse will win the war without having to strike a blow.”

Nicias had already written in the same letter that the expedition, which was meant to be besieging Syracuse, was rather itself under siege, at least by land, for the men could not go far into the surrounding countryside
The critical (and continuing) importance of seaborne supply for the provisioning of the expedition can be seen from some events of the early summer of 414/3. As a result of a battle on land and sea with the Syracusans, the Athenian forts at Plemmyrion were taken by the Syracusan army (7.23-7.24.1). This was a serious blow to the Athenians because, with the Syracusan capture of the forts, they had lost many men and a great deal of property (7.24.2). Thucydides considered the capture of Plemmyrion the first and foremost cause of the ultimate ruin of the expedition not for these reasons, however, but because, having lost Plemmyrion,

the work of bringing in provisions through the entrance to the harbor could no longer be carried on with safety (since the Syracusans lying in wait there with triremes hindered this, and from now on the convoys could only make their entrance by fighting), and in general this event brought dismay and discouragement to the army. (7.24.3)

because of the Syracusan cavalry: “ἐφεβίζθησε τε πολιορκεῖν δοκοῦντας ἡμᾶς ἄλλους αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον, ὥσα ἐκατὰ γήν, τούτο πάσχειν ὑδὲ γὰρ τῆς χώρας ἐπὶ πολὺ διὰ τοὺς ἱππέας ἐξερχόμεθα” (7.11.4). The cessation of seaborne food supplies would therefore complete the blockade (cf. Robinson [1999] 143 n.26). See also 7.75.5 (with Connor [1984] 188-189 n.7): the remnants of the expedition, after the destruction of the Athenian fleet in the final battle in the Great Harbor, fleeing the camp and holding very few or no provisions, “looked like nothing else than a city in secret flight after a siege, and that no small city,” “οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεπολιορκηµένῃ ἐῴκεσαν ὑποφευγούσῃ, καὶ ταύτῃ οὐ σµικρῇ...” Hornblower (CT iii.561) compares 4.29.2: the Athenians at Pylos, engaged in the blockade of the Spartans on Sphacteria (a very laborious one on account of the lack of food and drink to be had at Pylos: 4.26.2), “were suffering hardship from the shortages of the place and were being blockaded rather than blockading,” “οἱ γὰρ στρατιῶται κακοπαθοῦντες τοῦ χωρίου τῇ ἀπορίᾳ καὶ μᾶλλον πολιορκούµενοι ἢ πολιορκοῦντες...”

Shipments of provisions from Italy had, in fact, been reaching the expedition at Syracuse since at least the early part of the summer (and siege) in 414: Thucydides mentions, in his description of the consequences of the initial Athenian successes in the effort to besiege Syracuse, that “provisions were coming in for the force from all parts of Italy,” “τὰ δ’ ἐπιτήδεια τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας πανταχώριν” (6.103.2). This notice comes just after Thucydides records the move of the Athenians’ naval base from Thapsus to the Great Harbor (see 6.103.1 with 6.101.3, 6.102.3).

163 See also p.104 n.225 below on the translation of this passage.
Thucydides, then, considered the greatly increased insecurity of the Athenian’s seaborne logistical support as the most important cause of the expedition’s eventual defeat.165

The naval fighting in the Great Harbor before the taking of Plemmyrion signaled the greater confidence and competitiveness of the Syracusans on the sea. These were confirmed just after their taking of the forts on Plemmyrion, when eleven triremes from Syracuse destroyed most of a convoy of boats sailing from Italy with goods for the Athenians ("πλοία τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γέμοντα χρηµάτων"), and also burned in the territory of Caulonia a quantity of timber for trireme-building, which had been readied for the Athenians (7.25.1-2). Eventually, the growing naval ability of the Syracusans and corresponding loss of Athenian confidence brought about a series of Athenian defeats at sea which led to the destruction of the expedition.166 Before the last of these defeats, which decisively marked the end of the attempt to capture Syracuse, in the late summer of 413, the Athenian generals and taxiarchs assembled and discussed the difficulties of their situation; the point which pressed them most was “the fact that they no longer had supplies for their immediate needs—for in the expectation that they would sail away they

165 At Plut., Nic. 20.4, Nicias is reported, after the loss of Plemmyrion (see Plut., Nic. 20.2-3, a summary account of Thucydides’ narrative of the battle on land and sea around Plemmyrion), as not wishing to fight the Syracusans at sea out of an unwillingness to fight with his then inferior forces, which were wretchedly supplied ("καὶ χορηγουµένων φαύλως"), before the arrival of the reinforcements sent from Athens. This notice is not found in Thucydides. The following sentences (Nic. 20.4-5) on Menander’s and Euthydemus’ ambitious desire to fight on sea are also not found in Thucydides and so could derive from a Sicilian source, so that the whole section could be from a source independent of Thucydides; it is safer, however, to see the passage as an invention of Plutarch’s originating in his tendency to attribute to Nicias an unwillingness to fight and an inclination to delay. See Marasco (1977) 160.

166 On the loss of Athenian mastery at sea, see esp. 7.55.2: the Athenians completely bewildered because they had suffered a defeat at sea, where they had never expected defeat. See also, e.g., Macleod (1983) 143-144, Connor (1984) 174-175, 190-191, and Harrison (2000) 88.
had already sent word to Catana and stopped the bringing in of provisions,”—“ότι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὔτε αὐτίκα ἐτὶ ἤχον (προσέπμψαντες γὰρ ἐς Κατάνην ὡς ἐκπλευσόμενοι ἀπεῖπον µὴ ἐπάργειν)”—“and that they would not have any in the future unless they could command the sea,” “οὔτε τὸ λοιπὸν ἐμέλλον οὔσιν, εἰ µὴ ναυκρατήσουσιν...” (7.60.2).

Two points emerge from these considerations: firstly, the expedition is again presented as having been relying solely on seaborne imports for its food (having stopped these, it no longer had provisions for its immediate needs); secondly, and crucially, its ability to reprovision itself in the future is presented as dependent on its naval superiority (without this, it would no longer have provisions, since it would not unable to guard incoming shipments).

The expedition, then, depended on seaborne supply from nearby friendly states for its provisions for the duration of its attempted siege of Syracuse. Athenian naval superiority was seen as essential for the security of this supply; once that superiority was

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167 The Athenian generals had decided to leave Syracuse earlier in the summer, but an eclipse of the moon changed the minds of the men, and Nicias refused even to consider the question of departure until they had waited the twenty-seven days prescribed by the soothsayers (7.50.3-4).

168 Cf. 7.60.5: the men of the expedition were anxious to risk a battle as soon as possible on account of the scarcity of provisions (“διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων σπάνιν”). “ναυκρατήσουσιν” here should be taken to denote tactical superiority in a specific military and geographical context: see Figueira (1985) 64 n.35 (although he incorrectly reports Thucydides as using the term ναυκράτωρ rather than ναυκρατήσουσιν at 7.60.2).

169 In the summer of 413, Demosthenes and Eurymedon sailed from Athens to Syracuse with a second armament consisting of about 5,000 hoplites, “not a few Barbarian and Greek javelin-men, slingers, and bowmen, and a sufficient amount of material and provisions” (“... ἀκοντιστάς τε βαρβάρους καὶ Ἕλληνας οὐκ ὀλίγους καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ τοξότας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ικανήν”) (7.42.1) (for the translation of “τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν” here, see pp.77-78 and n.150 above). The provisions mentioned in this passage seem to have been used solely for the second armament’s voyage, since the implication of 7.60.2 is that the expedition (including the second force under Demosthenes and Eurymedon) had been continually relying on imports for its food supplies.
lost, the bringing in of provisions by sea to the Athenian base of operations could no
longer be guaranteed.

Thucydides, with one exception, never gives an explicit indication from where
the Athenians sourced their provisions from the late fall of 415, when they established a
base of operations at Catana (6.51.3), until the early summer of 414, when they began
the siege of Syracuse. But the facts that: i. naval superiority was considered crucial
for the food supply of the expedition before it had established a base of operations at
Catana; ii. naval superiority was crucial (and considered crucial) for the food supply of
the expedition from the early summer of 414 onwards; iii. the Athenians had

170 See pp.88-89 below.

171 The Athenians also used Naxos as a base for part of the winter of 415/414: see 6.72.1, 6.74.2, 6.88.3.

172 We do hear that the sixty ships which left Rhegium for Naxos in the late summer of 415 provisioned
to themselves ("τὰ ἐπιτήδεια λαβόντες") before leaving Rhegium (6.50.2); presumably, these ships’ crews
bought their provisions from the agora provided by the Rhegians (though, perhaps, there was still some
grain available from the thirty grain-transporters?). Thucydides also mentions that, after the Athenian
success in the battle of the Anapus in the early winter of 415/414, it did not seem possible to the generals
for the moment to carry on the war so near to Syracuse until (amongst other things) "τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ σῖτον
καὶ ὅσων δέοι παρασκευάσωντες ταῖς Συρακούσαις," “they might prepare other
things, both food and whatever else was needed, with a view to attacking Syracuse the next spring”
(6.71.2)—but he does not tell us which source the Athenian generals envisaged this food as coming from.
6.71.2, taken together with 6.48 (see n.174 below) and the evidence gathered above for the sources of the
food supply of the expedition from the early summer of 414 until its destruction in the late fall of 413 (see
p.110 n.241 for this date), does prove, however, that the Athenians never expected to live solely on the
provisions they had brought with them on the supply ships from Athens (again contra Green ([1970] 110,
making attacks on some unfriendly Sicel cities, reprovisioned at Catana (“ἐκείθεν δὲ ἐπιστολεύεσθαι”). In
this case, it is impossible to know whether the men of the expedition obtained their provisions in a market
provided by the Catanians, or from the supplies brought in from nearby states; the latter is more likely,
however (see main text just below).

173 See again Nicias, speaking before the assembly considering the παρασκευή of the expedition (6.22): “... ναυσί τε καὶ πολώ περιεῖναι, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἢςῳ ἑσκομίζωμες...”
unchallenged control of the sea during the period from the late fall of 415 until the early summer of 414—mean that it is (almost) certain that the expedition’s provisions during this time came (primarily) from seaborne imports—safeguarded by the expedition’s superiority at sea.

Thucydides does mention that, at some point in the (it appears) late winter of 415/414, the independent Sicels of the interior brought down grain to the army, and in some cases even money (6.88.4: “καὶ σῖτόν τε κατεκόμιζον τῷ στρατεύματι καὶ εἰσίν οἳ χρήµατα”). This grain must have provisioned the expedition for at least some time, of course, but the Sicels’ delivery of grain is presented by Thucydides as a singular event, and not as a continuing or integral part of the usual means of supply for the expedition (i.e., Thucydides does not present this grain as food upon which the expedition was depending, but rather as an unexpected and welcome addition to its usual means of supply). The next (and only other) time we hear of Sicel grain, it is mentioned as part of Nicias’ as yet unfixed and uncertain plan for the escape of the remnants of the expedition after the destruction of its fleet (“προσέπεμπται δ’ ως αὐτούς, καὶ ἀπαντάν

174 At the Athenian generals’ conference at Rhegium, convened after they had found out that there was not the money promised them at Egesta (6.46), Alcibiades urged amongst other things that “ἐς τε τὰς πόλεις ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι πλὴν Σελινοῦντος καὶ Συρακοσίων τὰς άλλας, καὶ πιηθάδαι καὶ τοὺς Σικελοὺς τοὺς µὲν ἀφιστάναι ἀπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων, τοὺς δὲ φίλους ποιεῖσθαι, ἵνα σῖτον καὶ στρατιὰν ἔχωσι,” “they send heralds to the other cities, except Selinus and Syracuse, and try to detach some of the Sicels from the Syracusans, and to make friends of others, in order that these might furnish grain and troops” (6.48). That the clause “ἵνα σῖτον καὶ στρατιὰν ἔχωσι” refers to military and provisioning aid from the Sicels (and not from the poleis other than Syracuse and Selinus mentioned here, as the scholiast on this passage has it) can be seen from the verbal parallels with 6.62.5 (the Athenians urge their Sicel allies to send them a “στρατιὰν”) and 6.88.4 (the Sicels of the interior brought down “σῖτόν” to the Athenians, and in some cases even money); since these terms are only used to describe aid from the Sicels, and not for military and provisioning help from Sicilian poleis (or regions of Italy), we can state with certainty, relying on the method of elucidating Thucydides’ speeches (even indirect ones as Alcibiades’ here) by the surrounding narrative of events (see Stahl [2003] 174, and appendix 1), that the clause refers to aid from the Sicels.

175 See Hornblower, CT iii.719.
εἰρηµένον καὶ σιτία ἃµα κοµίζειν,” “directions have been sent ahead to the Sicels that they are to meet us and bring provisions with them” (7.77.6)). The grain brought by the Sicels will have played, then, a role in the provisioning of the expedition in the late winter of 415/414 while it was based at Naxos, but at no time before or after this.

The expedition during its operations in Sicily depended, then, for its provisions on seaborne imports from friendly states (with the exception of a brief period in the late winter of 415/414, when it also had access to supplies delivered overland by friendly Sicels). These food supplies were shipped by and belonged to merchants. This follows from Thucydides’ description of the immediate consequences of the Syracusan capture of the forts at Plemmyrion (where the imports of grain to the expedition were arriving): Thucydides comments that in the capture of the forts many men were killed or captured, and much property in all was taken.

176 Bauslaugh ([1991] 148) is incorrect to state that “commerce with the belligerents... [in the form of] shipment to the war zone in Sicily (6.103.2; 7.14.3; 7.25.1)... evidently was not considered inconsistent with neutral status.” But, at 6.103.2, Thucydides is describing the results of Athenian military success after the Athenians had had the best of the engagements at the beginning of their attempt to besiege Syracuse: many of the Sicels came as allies to the Athenians, three 50-oared ships came from Etruria, and provisions came in from all parts of Italy; the sending of provisions is thus included by Thucydides as an example of military aid from (now) friendly states to the Athenians. At 7.14.3, where Nicias writes that he fears that the Athenians’ deteriorating military and naval situation would lead the Italian states that had been supplying the expedition at Syracuse to cease doing so and go over to the enemy: the sending of provisions is thus clearly presented again as an act of positive military help from an ally, and dependent on the military success of the Athenians. In light of these passages, there is no reason to think that the ships full of cargo sailing from Italy at 7.25.1 were from neutral states; it makes much the most sense in fact, in light of 6.103.2 and 7.14.3, to take these ships to be from states friendly to the Athenians. Cf. 6.48 and 6.88.4 for the sending of provisions to the Athenians presented as (part of) the military help given to Athens by an ally (although the provisions are sent to the Athenians by different institutional means in these cases). (Note also that none of the other passages Bauslaugh cites as providing evidence for neutral commerce with belligerents in fact do so ([1991] 148 n.9: the passages he cites are 5.28.2; Ar., Peace 475-77; 2.67.4; Diod. 19.103.4-5; Plat. Demetr. 33.3; also (contra Bauslaugh (ibid.), the Corinthians decided at 7.34.1 to keep guard at Naupactus to protect holkades which were functioning as troop-transports, and not as neutral merchant ships sailing to Sicily: see 7.19.5.)
for since the Athenians used the forts as a warehouse, there were in them much property and grain belonging to merchants, and also much property belonging to the trierarchs—in fact the sails and other tackle of forty triremes were taken there, as well as three triremes that had been drawn up on shore. (7.24.2)177

The seaborne supplies the Athenians obtained from nearby friendly states were not therefore direct contributions in kind from these states—as it seems the food brought to the expedition from the Sicels was178—or food requisitioned from them,179 but food which was bought in these friendly states by merchants who then transported and sold it to the members of the expedition.180

177 This is a slightly altered version of the Loeb translation “... there were in them many wares belonging to merchants as well as food”: I alter the Loeb to emphasize the fact that the grain belongs to the merchants (see, e.g., Jowett, Crawley). Pritchett’s statement ([1971] 44) that “[i]n the Syrakusan [sic] conquest of Plemmyron, many merchants (emporoi), who had provided an agora for the Athenian soldiers, were captured” has no basis in either this passage or the summaries of the Plemmyrion episode in Plutarch and Diodorus.

178 Note that the Sicels themselves bring the money and grain to the Athenians (6.88.4). It appears that Sicel rulers could have centralized control over at least part of their subjects’ agricultural production: cf. Diod. 14.95.7, describing direct state provisioning by some Sicels of the army of Dionysius I in 392: Agyris, a Sicel king “ότεν καὶ τάλλα ὤδα ἡ χεία προδίμως ἐδοκίμασε ἀνακαίνοντο”, “readily provided the entire army of Dionysius with food and whatever else it needed.” In contrast, Greek poleis did not have access to any of their citizens’ agricultural production through taxation-in-kind. It is impossible to state with certainty how these supplies brought down to the expedition were distributed to their recipients (i.e. the members of the Sicilian expedition).

179 See again p.23 n.28: the far western Greek poleis (and other states) were too powerful for the Athenians to be able to coerce contributions of food from them. See also 6.71.2: it did not seem possible to the Athenian generals (at the start of winter 415/414) to continue the war on Syracuse until, amongst other things, “καὶ χρήματα δὲ ἁμα αὐτόθεν τε ξυλλέξωνται καὶ παρ’ Ἀθηναίων έλθει,” “they collected money from the island itself, and to have a supply come from Athens,” and “τὰ τε ἄλλα, καὶ σῖτον καὶ ὅσων δέοι, παρασκευάζωνται,” “and they prepared other things, both food and whatever else was needed.” The Athenians do not collect grain from their allies, but money with which they can purchase grain and other necessary materiel.

180 Note, in this respect, Classen/Steup, vii.55 ad 7.24.2: “τῶν vor τριηράρχων, aus Vat. hinzugefügt, bezeichnet die Trierarchen als zusammengehörigen Stand, nicht als zufälligen zusammengekommen wie die ἐμποροί.” For more on the mechanisms by which merchants acquired, shipped, and sold food to Athenian (and other) naval and amphibious forces below: see chapter 2 section v, chapter 7.
b. The Sicilian expedition: foraging and plundering

Foraging was never an important means of acquisition of provisions for the expedition in Sicily; it was only in the last desperate stages of the campaign, when the remnants of the defeated expedition fled inland from Syracuse, that foraging assumed a major role in its provisioning, and then only briefly and as a desperate recourse in exceptional circumstances. But before I demonstrate the minimal role played by foraging in the food supply of the expedition, I will first specify how I will use the terms foraging and plundering, since these terms have often been used mistakenly and indiscriminately in the literature on classical Greek provisioning, with the result that previous work has frequently been vague, if not simply incorrect, in treating this subject.

As Roth notes, “[i]n a strict sense, the English word “foraging” refers only to the gathering of fodder for animals. It is also used more broadly, however, to refer to the regular collection of specific provisions by groups of soldiers from the immediate area of operations.” 181 Although foraging can mean, then, the gathering of fodder, firewood, water, and/or provisions, 182 I will take ‘foraging’ throughout this dissertation to refer to attempts by sailors and soldiers to collect provisions (i.e. food supplies) from their immediate area of operations. 183 I will take ‘plundering,’ on the other hand, to refer to


183 Cf. the Oxford Concise Dictionary definition: ‘to search widely for food or provisions.’
soldiers and sailors ‘forcibly stealing goods from enemy communities.’ In practice, the boundaries between foraging and plundering would often have been indistinct. In the process of foraging for provisions, soldiers and sailors will have had opportunities to steal goods and property; conversely, on plundering expeditions, men will also have had the opportunity to seize grain and other foodstuffs. But there were still important differences in objective and effect between the two activities. Plundering operations took place especially in captured cities, but, if they took place in the countryside, they ranged over a much wider area (than foraging parties); they aimed primarily at the seizure of objects in order to (re-)sell them to raise money, and they also focused much more on the destruction of enemy property. The gathering of provisions would have been an incidental activity for men on plundering operations, and the opportunity to collect foodstuffs may have been in some cases (and especially in the pillaging of captured cities) spurned by soldiers and sailors intent on stealing other goods that could gain high

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184 Based on the Oxford Concise Dictionary definition of ‘plunder’: ‘forcibly steal goods from, especially in time of war.’ Cf. its definition of ‘pillage’: ‘rob or steal with violence, especially in wartime.’

185 To paraphrase Roth (1999) 117.

186 See Erdkamp (1998) 123: “[f]rom a tactical point of view a clear distinction between the gathering of food and fodder, and between ravaging, plundering and foraging cannot easily be made. All these activities were often executed simultaneously and could be aspects of the same activity.” Cf. (1998) 124 (on Roman Republican foraging expeditions): “[w]e may infer that in many cases when soldiers are sent out according to the source frumentandi causa, they at the same time plundered in search of booty and spoiled what they could not use or take with them.”


188 On the sale of plunder from military operations in order to raise money, see section ivb below, chapter 7 sections iv, v.

prices on their (re-)sale. In contrast, foraging parties were often larger, operated in closer formation in the open countryside, and in more concentrated areas (than plundering operations), and aimed at the collection of specific foodstuffs (in contrast to men engaged in plundering, who would have aimed to steal nothing more specific than valuable items which could be sold to raise money).\(^{190}\)

The men who had survived the defeat in the final naval battle in the Great Harbor and the malarial conditions that had afflicted the Athenian camp in the summer of 413\(^{191}\) were forced to forage for their provisions on the retreat from the Athenian camp before Syracuse because they were not able to pack up sufficient supplies for the march since there was no longer food in the camp ("ἔφερον δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανά· σῖτος γὰρ οὐκέτι ἦν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ") (7.75.5; cf. 7.74.1, 7.77.6). There was no longer food in the camp because the usual source of the expedition’s provisions—seaborne imports secured by naval superiority—had ceased to exist: the Athenian generals, in the expectation that they would be sailing shortly for home, had told the Catanians not to send any more supplies to the camp (see again 7.60.2 and p.86 above).\(^{192}\)

\(^{190}\) See Erdkamp (1998) 124; Roth (1999) 117. Hanson’s ([1998]) failure to distinguish between foraging and plundering (note that there is no entry under ‘foraging’ in his index) is a serious methodological error, one of several that invalidates his larger argument. See also chapter iii section ivb.

\(^{191}\) See 7.75.3 with 7.47.1-2 (and Hornblower, CT iii.632).

\(^{192}\) Although the Athenians still had more triremes than the Syracusans after the final battle, their crews were utterly demoralized and refused to man the ships (7.72.3-4), so that the Syracusans effectively possessed complete naval superiority after the battle: this meant that the bringing in of provisions would from this point be impossible for the Athenians (see again 7.60.2).
But the attempt by the remains of the expedition to subsist on foraging during the attempted retreat by land to friendly territory had no chance of success. Reliance on foraging for food supplies was “only feasible for armies that were certain of their tactical superiority.”\footnote{Erdkamp (1998) 24. Cf. (ibid.) 123: “[o]bviously, a tactically strong army was a precondition for living off the land.”}

Strength in numbers of cavalry and light-armed troops played the most important part in determining whether a force could gain this tactical superiority, since

\[\text{in the attack on foraging, cavalry played an important role, because horsemen covered a large terrain and could make hit-and-run attacks without involving themselves in large-scale fighting. The strength of one’s own cavalry forces compared to those of the opponent determined whether such an attack on foragers could successfully be executed. Light-armed troops were also more suited to this kind of fighting than... heavily armed soldiers...}\]

Because of their great numbers of cavalry and light-armed troops, the Syracusans had, at all points during the retreat, complete tactical superiority over the Athenians and their allies; this superiority allowed the Syracusans to constantly attack the retreat,\footnote{Erdkamp (1998) 126. Cf. 6.52.2 for Syracusan cavalry successfully preventing a plundering raid by some Athenian light-armed troops in 415.} and thus to prevent the Athenians and their allies from foraging, until on the third day of the march

\[\text{kai} \; \tauα \; \epsilonιπτηδεια \; \omegaικετι \; \alphaμοιως \; \epsilonιχ\nu; \; \nu\; \gammaαρ \; \epsilonπι \; \alphaποχωρειν \; \deltaιον \; τι \; \eta \nu \; \ups\nu \; \tau\omicron\omicron\nu \; \iota \omicron \pi\omicron\omicron\nu.\]

they no longer had provisions as before,\footnote{For the attacks of the Syracusan cavalry and light-armed, see 7.78.4, 7.78.6-7, 7.79.2, 7.79.5, 7.81.2, 7.81.5, 7.82.1, 7.83.2, 7.84.1. The retreat was particularly vulnerable to constant harassment since it moved slowly on account of the men’s need to forage for all of their provisions (because of the unavailability to them of any other means of acquiring provisions) (cf. Lazenby [2004] 163).} for by reason of the enemy’s cavalry it was no longer possible to leave the main body (of the army). (7.78.7)

\footnote{Before” because they did have some supplies (though very few) on leaving the camp; and because, on the second day of the retreat, the Athenians and their allies had been able to encamp in a level area with houses, from which they were able to take food (7.78.4). The food in these houses was sufficient to}
Two nights later, the men on the retreat were still “in wretched plight, since by now they were in want of all supplies and many had been wounded in many assaults made by the enemy.”

Two days after this, and still suffering continuous harassment from the Syracusan cavalry and light-armed, the Athenians and their allies “were in a wretched plight through want of food and all necessities.”

The retreat’s doomed attempts to subsist through foraging would only cease with their surrender and slaughter.

In Nicias’ letter home to Athens (sent in the late fall of 414), after he had told the Athenians that the expedition no longer had superiority in the number of its ships over the Syracusans, he elaborated on the reasons for the decline of the expedition’s naval strength. The first reason Nicias gave was that

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\text{τῶν ναυτῶν τῶν}^{200} \text{ μὲν διὰ φρυγανισµὸν καὶ ἁρπαγὴν καὶ ὑδρείαν μακρὰν ύπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἀπολλυµένων...}
\]

of the sailors, some have been killed by the cavalry because of expeditions for firewood and plunder, and the distance from which water has to be fetched... (7.13.2)

provision the men for only one day, however: camping in the same place on the next day and the day after that, the men no longer had provisions (7.78.7, and 7.79.5 with 7.80.1).

197 7.80.1: “ἐπειδὴ κακῶς σφίσι τὸ στράτευµα εἶχε τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων πάντων ἀποφίβα ἤδη καὶ κατατετραυµατισµένοι ψήναν πολλοὶ ἐν πολλαῖς προσβολαῖς τῶν πολεµίων γεγονµέναι...” See again 7.79.2, 7.79.5 for the continuing Syracusan attacks on the retreat.

198 7.83.3: “ẑξὼν δὲ καὶ οὕτως πονηρός σίτου τε καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀποφί...” See again 7.81.2, 7.81.5, 7.82.1, 7.83.2 for the Syracusan attacks.

199 See 7.82-87 for their fate. Cf. already 6.52.2 for Syracusan cavalry having

200 On the second τῶν here, see Hornblower, CT iii.563.
Almost every scholar who has translated or commented on 7.13.2 has taken “ἁρπαγὴ” to mean ‘foraging,’ and thus this passage has been taken as evidence that the Sicilian expedition did depend on foraging for its provisions, and that the sole means for classical Greek fleets of acquiring provisions in hostile territory was through foraging.

The translation of “ἁρπαγὴ” as ‘foraging’ at 7.13.2 can be shown to be incorrect, however, both from examination of Thucydides’ usage of the term ἁρπαγή throughout his work, and from analysis of the narrative surrounding Nicias’ letter.

In almost every other instance of Thucydides’ use of ἁρπαγή, the surrounding narrative offers sufficient context to suggest strongly or require that the term should be taken as indicating the activity of plundering. Thucydides uses ἁρπαγή to denote the

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201 Smith (Loeb): “... for the reason that our sailors, forced to go out to a distance for wood and forage and water, are constantly being killed by the cavalry”; Hobbes: “[f]or our mariners, fetching wood and water and foraging far off, are intercepted by the horsemen...”; Jowett: “that the sailors, having to forage and fetch water and wood from a distance, are cut off by the Syracusan horse...”; Crawley: “[e]xpeditions for fuel and forage, and the distance from which water has to be fetched, cause our sailors to be cut off by the Syracusan cavalry...”; Graham (1992) 259: “[o]f the sailors, some have been killed by the cavalry owing to the distance from which firewood has to be fetched, supplies seized and water brought.” Cf. Marchant (1893) 127 ad διὰ φρυγανισµὸν: “cf. lignatum, pabulatum, aquatum ire.” Kagan ([1981] 279] in his paraphrase of Nicias’ letter to Athens, states the sailors were going for “wood, forage and water.” (Hornblower (CT iii.564) is incorrect to gloss ‘φρυγανισµὸν’ as ‘foraging.’)

202 Hanson ([2005] 370 n.39) cites 7.4.6 for the statement “[c]ommon was the sudden ambush of and attack on sailors who were foraging for food, water, and firewood—especially by horsemen and light-armed troops. Indeed, provisioning was a prime reason for the Athenians’ defeat on Syracuse. Their sailors had to bivouac and search for supplies...” ([2005] 259), but this must be a mistake for 7.13.2. See also van Creveld (1989) 48: incorrectly stating that the Sicilian expedition drew its supplies from the surrounding countryside.

203 van Wees (2004) 63: “[a] fleet needed supplies on a massive scale, and the only way to obtain these in enemy territory was by force. The hoplites would not have been capable of gathering enough for the entire fleet, so the oarsmen would have had to do their own plundering, just as in friendly territory they did their own provisioning. In a letter home, the general Nicias commented on the casualties suffered when his rowers were attacked by the enemy cavalry while out ‘gathering wood, pillaging, and fetching water’ (Thucydides 7.13.2).” (Note the confusion in this passage between plundering and foraging.)
activity of men engaged in the plundering of cities or their surrounding precincts;\(^{204}\) to denote the plunder some Thracians hope to acquire in joining the campaign of Sitalces against Macedonia;\(^{205}\) and to describe plundering raids.\(^{206}\) Thucydides can, in fact,

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\(^{204}\) Strombichides, the Athenian general, having taken Lampsacus at the first assault (in the summer of 411), made booty of the goods and slaves in the city: "καὶ σκεύη µὲν καὶ αὐτοφάπτω σάµµενος" (8.62.2); this passage is the most explicit indication we have that ἁρπαγή should be taken to mean ‘plunder’ in Thucydides. After the Dian Thracians being conducted by Diotrephes from Athens to their home region (see n.206 below) had taken Mycalessus by surprise (7.29.3) (in the summer of 413), some of them were killed there, being caught “while engaged in plundering” “δι’ ἁρπαγὴν ἐγκαταληφθὲν” in the city by a Theban force (7.30.2) : the operational context here (action after the unexpected capture of a city) requires a translation of plundering here. (And cf. 7.29.4 (with p.106 n.229 on the meaning of πορθῶ in Thucydides), describing the same actions: the Thracians, having burst into Mycalessus, were sacking the houses and the temples ("... τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ἐπόρθουν").) In the aftermath of Brasidas’ crossing of the bridge over the Strymon to Amphipolis (in the winter of 424/3), the Amphipolitians were thrown into great confusion (4.104.1), and “it is said that if Brasidas had been willing not to allow the army to plunder, but to go immediately against the city, it was thought that he might have taken it,” and λέγεται ἐπιδιώκει, εἰ ἤθελησεν εἰς ἁρπαγὴν τῷ στρατῷ τραπέσθαι, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς χωρῆσαι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, δοκεῖν ἂν ἐλέν. Gomme (HCT, iii.577) comments on ἁρπαγῆ here: "after so long and so rapid a march, foraging for food—to be obtained by looting the countryside—was probably almost a necessity, and Brasidas consented." But a consideration of the military context and surrounding narrative shows that Gomme is incorrect here. Thucydides had already mentioned that, in getting across the bridge, Brasidas had immediately became master of all the property outside the city, an area that was full of houses of Amphipolitians (4.103.5). Since the crossing of the bridge over the Strymon was a complete surprise to the Amphipolitians, many of those living outside were captured (4.104.1, 4.106.1) and those who escaped inside the walls of the city will have had no time to transport their goods inside with them: there would have been, then, in addition to the Amphipolitians living outside the walls themselves, much property outside the walls to capture and steal, given the circumstances. (Note here that unexpected attacks on settlements or their surrounding territories were associated in Thucydides, Xenophon, and Herodotus with opportunities to take much plunder (cf. pp.104-105 n.226 below on 6.49.3; chapter 2 section iiic).) The translations of 4.104.1 of, e.g., the Loeb above, Crawley (“stopping to pillage”), and Jowett (“allowing his army to plunder”) should be taken as correct, then, contra Gomme. (For "τρεπέσθαι εἰς ἁρπαγὴν" meaning individual members of a military force “turning to plunder” after the capture of a city or a camp, see also Xen., Cyr. 4.2.25, Xen., Anab. 7.1.18, Xen., Ages. 1.32, and Xen., Hell. 6.5.30 (referring to the looting of houses)).

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\(^{205}\) Thucydides narrates that Sitalces, when passing over Mount Cercine on his way to invade Macedonia in the winter of 429/8, lost none of his army on the march except perhaps by sickness, but received some additional troops from many of the independent Thracians volunteering to join him in the hope of plunder, “πολλοὶ γὰρ τῶν αὐτονόµων Θρᾴκων ἀπαράκλητοι ἐφ’ ἁρπαγῆν ἠκολούθουν” (2.98.3). The independent Thracians cannot have joined Sitalces’ campaign in the hope of foraging for provisions.

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\(^{206}\) Thucydides relates that, in the summer of 413, after Diotrephes was instructed by the Athenians to conduct to their home country the Dian Thracians (who had arrived at Athens too late to go to Sicily) and to use them, if he could, to harm enemy territory on the way ("... καὶ τοὺς πολεµίους, ἦν τι σῶσαι, ἀπ’ αὐτῶν διάφησεν") (7.29.1), he first landed them in the territory of Tanagra, “καὶ ἁρπαγῆν τινα ἐτοιµασε ἐπὶ την Τάναρα ληξάνοντος” (7.29.2). The operational context suggests strongly that ἁρπαγή here must mean plunder: firstly, the Thracians will not have lacked for provisions so shortly after embarking from Athens; secondly, the raid had a “destructive intent” (so Hornblower, CT iii.597). See also p.94 n.194 on 6.52.2. See, too,
closely associate ἁρπαγὴ with the activities of λῃσται (“raiders”): at one point, he relates that a (mainly) Athenian force fortified a sort of isthmus opposite Cythera, in order that Helots might desert there “and at the same time raiders might make plundering raids from it, as they had done from Pylos,” “καὶ ἅµα λῃσταὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου, ἁρπαγὴν ποιῶνταί” (7.26.2).²⁰⁷ These excursions from Pylos were not regular military operations, but raids carried out to gain booty and inflict damage on the surrounding countryside.²⁰⁸ In fact, ἁρπαγὴ (almost) always has this further connotation of the taking of plunder by irregular military forces or plunder taken by military forces as part of raids

Ducrey (1968) 45-46 for ἁρπαγὴ and its derivatives referring to plundering raids in sources other than Thucydides.

²⁰⁷ Cf. 1.5.1: in very early times, before the rise of Minos, the Greeks and the barbarians of the coast and the islands turned to piracy (“ἐτράποντο πρὸς λῃστείαν”), and often falling “upon a town unprotected by walls, and consisting of a mere collection of villages, they would plunder it,” “καὶ προσπίπτοντες πόλεις ἁρπάζοντες καὶ κατὰ κωμὰς οἰκομένας ἥρπαζον.”

²⁰⁸ For raids from Pylos taking plunder from the surrounding countryside, see esp. 5.115.2 (416): “καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου Ἀθηναῖοι Λακεδαιμονίων πολλὴν λείαν ἔλαβον,” “and the Athenians from Pylos took so much plunder from the Lacedaemonians...” See also 4.41.2-3, 5.14.3, 5.56.3 for raiding excursions from Pylos. For raids from Pylos inflicting damage on the surrounding countryside, see 4.3.3: Demosthenes thought Pylos would be an especially good place for a fortification since “the Messenians... would be able to inflict very great damage if they made that their base” (“τοὺς Μεσσηνίους... πλείστ' ἀν Βλάπτειν ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἴκυμαν”). Note that Thucydides distinguishes ravaging of territory by regular military forces (in each case, the verb used is δῃώω) from raiding excursions from Pylos on three occasions: see 6.105.2, 7.26.2, and esp. 7.18.3: the Athenians “had ravaged a part of Epidaurus and Prasiae and other places, and at the same time were making predatory excursions from Pylos,” “Ἐπιδαύρου τέ τι καὶ Πρασίων καὶ ἄλλα ἐδῄωσαν καὶ ἐκ Πύλου ἅμα ἠληστεύοντο.” In addition, although in Xenophon λῃσταί can make forays for firewood and provisions (Hell. 2.4.25-26), and some Cyreans are recorded as subsisting by “λῃζόµενοι” the territory of Paphlagonia (Anab. 6.1.1), it is highly unlikely that the raids from Pylos were primarily (or even partly) for foraging: the surrounding countryside was unoccupied (4.3.2-3) and thus produced no food (4.27.1). See chapter 2 section iic below (and esp. 7.28.1 there: Thucydides characterizes garrisoned forts as relying solely on imports for their food). Cf. 7.27.4-5 on the effects of the garrisoning of Deceleia: booty was carried off (“λῃστείας ποιοµένης”), and all the Athenians’ sheep and beasts of burden were lost to the raids from Deceleia (“προσνεστὰ τα πάντα ἀπαλάτεί καὶ ἑπεζέμα”). (Hanson’s statement that “[t]he enemy ravagers, then, were always more interested in collecting food and supplies (Thuc. 7.27.4)...” ([1998] 161) finds no support from the text of 7.27.4.) For raids by λῃσται inflicting damage, see also that raiding activities were especially associated with exiles wishing to harm the territory of their native poleis: see 1.24.5, 3.85.2, 4.2.3, 4.66.1.
or other irregular operations: in addition to the raiding from Pylos, there is the booty taken from the quick Thracian raid in the territory of Tanagra; the plundering of Mycalessus by the bloodthirsty and indisciplined Thracians; and the army of Brasidas turning to individual plundering after the army as a whole had captured the bridge to Amphipolis and the inhabited district outside the city.

Examination of the narrative surrounding Nicias’ letter also shows that we should understand ἁρπαγή at 7.13.2 as referring to plunder taken by military forces as part of raids or other irregular operations. Before presenting Nicias’ letter home to Athens, Thucydides had related that Nicias’ decision to base the triremes at Plemmyrion had been the crucial factor in the deterioration of the condition of the crews

τῷ τε γὰρ ὕδατι σπανίῳ χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἐγγύθεν, καὶ ἐπὶ φρυγανισμὸν ἀμα ὑπό τῶν ἱππέων τῶν Συρακοσίων κρατούσων τῆς γῆς διεφθείροντο. τρίτον γὰρ μέρος τῶν ἱππέων τοῖς Συρακοσίοις διὰ τοὺς ἐν τῷ Πλεµµυρίῳ, ἵνα µὴ κακουργήσοντες ἐξίοιεν, ἐπὶ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυµπιείῳ πολίχνῃ έτετάχατο.

for their water supply was scanty and not near at hand, and at the same time, whenever the sailors went out to fetch firewood they were being killed by the Syracusan cavalry who were in control of the country. For the Syracusans had posted a third part of their cavalry at the small settlement of Olympieion to prevent plundering incursions on the part of the Athenians at Plemmyrion.

Thucydides’ analysis at 7.4.6 of the new strategic situation brought about by the move of the Athenian naval base to Plemmyrion mentioned the collection of water and

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209 See 7.29.2.

210 See the primary definition of ἁρπαγή given in the LSJ: “seizure, robbery, rape.” “Almost” always, because at 8.62.2, “ἁρπαγὴν ποιησάµενος” refers to the sacking of a polis by an amphibious expedition operating as a concerted force. It is also this latter sort of operation that Thucydides indicates when he employs the verb “διαρπάζω”: see 1.49.5, 4.130.5, 8.31.4, 8.36.1.

211 The Loeb translation, with the exception of “were being killed” for “διεφθείροντο,” and the last clause, which is Crawley’s translation.
firewood, because excursions from the Athenian camp for these goods would have been a necessity. The expedition’s trireme crews needed large amounts of water and firewood for their subsistence— and therefore needed to make regular, if not daily, expeditions locally (locally because water and firewood were bulky and awkward to transport).

The collection of water and firewood would have been a constant necessity at the Athenians’ previous naval bases (the bottom of the Great Harbor, Thapsus), too, but the change to Plemmyrion and the stationing of the Syracusan cavalry at Olympieion made the crews now particularly and newly vulnerable to attack when they left their camp to obtain these items. Thucydides makes no mention of ἁρπαγή, however, at 7.4.6. This

212 See Roth (1999) 35-37 on military forces’ need for water, and (ibid.) 59-61 on military forces’ needs for firewood (Roth is specifically discussing Roman armies, but his comments in these sections hold for any pre-industrial military force). See also (ibid.) 118, 326 for the necessity for ancient armies to gather firewood and water frequently. See also Lazenby (1994) 14-15 for passages evidencing the need for firewood for Greek armies for cooking (though he mistakenly states there that classical Greek armies had to cook meat and bake bread) and warmth. See, too, Horden and Purcell (2000) 111: a settlement of 10,000 inhabitants in pre-industrial Europe may have required between 30 and 50 tons of firewood a day. On classical Greek military forces’ need for water, see van Wees (2004) 106 and Harthen’s chapter on ‘The Importance of Adequate Water Supplies’ ([2001] 76-105).

213 See Roth (1999) 118, 326 for the necessity to gather firewood and collect water locally because of the problems of transporting them. See also van Creveld (1989) 47: “[a]nother very important provision for [pre-industrial] armies... was firewood for cooking... firewood was too heavy and bulky by far to be transported by an army. Local supplies had to be found instead, often consisting of the houses and furniture of the inhabitants [of the country].” The costs of transporting these very low or no value per-unit of weight goods would have stopped traders from shipping them to the expedition, since they could not have hoped to make a profit in doing so.

214 The fact that their water supply was not now near at hand would have made the men collecting water vulnerable to attack by the Syracusan cavalry (especially on their return to camp when they would have been laden with waterskins or hydriae); in addition, the fact that the crews’ water supplies were scarce—and thus presumably confined to a few locations—made their movements when out collecting water predictable and therefore made them even more vulnerable to ambush by the enemy cavalry. See Erdkamp (1998) 135 for both of these points; note, too, Roth (1999) 326: “[s]ince water sources are fixed, water parties were particularly vulnerable, and were often ambushed.” See also Dover (HCT iv.383) ad 7.4.6: “soldiers, too, need firewood; but the bulk of the army was on Epipolai, where good warning could be given of the approach of enemy cavalry and intervention was less profitable to the cavalry themselves.” But see below on 7.11.4: the problem of the attacks of the Syracusan cavalry was just less acute for the soldiers on Epipolai.
activity, then, must not have been a continuous requirement for the crews, since it was not one which now made them susceptible to attack by Syracusan cavalry.\textsuperscript{215} (It should be noted in this respect, too, that 7.4.6 shows that at 7.13.2, \textit{μακρὰν} should only be taken with \textit{ὑδρείαν}:\textsuperscript{216} the point is that this means that, at 7.13.2, Nicias states that the trireme crews were not forced to go out at a distance for firewood or \textit{ἁρπαγὴ}, but only for water; that is, Nicias does not present \textit{ἁρπαγὴ} as something that the men were compelled to leave camp for.)\textsuperscript{217} \textit{“ἁρπαγὴν”} at 7.13.2 therefore denotes an activity that was not necessary for the subsistence of the men (as opposed to the collection of water and firewood), but one which they left their base to carry out voluntarily. Given this, and the meaning \textit{ἁρπαγὴ} takes elsewhere in Thucydides, \textit{“ἁρπαγὴν”} should be taken at 7.13.2 to indicate opportunistic raiding for the sake of plunder by the some of the men manning the Athenian (and other) triremes.\textsuperscript{218} (That \textit{“ἁρπαγὴν”} here means something other than foraging should have been expected, in any case, given that, as I have shown, the

\textsuperscript{215} Or by Syracusan light-armed troops, who were also stationed with the cavalry at Olympieion: 7.37.2, 7.37.3, 7.42.6.

\textsuperscript{216} See Smith (1886) 21-22 ad 7.13.2, ‘\textit{μακρὰν}’: “adv. with \textit{ἀπολλυµένων} (“at a distance from their camp”), and rightly placed in Vat. after \textit{ὑδρείαν}, not after \textit{ἁρπαγὴ}. It would seem, however, to have esp. reference to \textit{ὑδρείαν} if we compare c. 4.29, \textit{ὕδατι σπανίῳ χρώµενοι καὶ οὐκ ἐγγύθεν}. The Schol. explains, \textit{ἁρπαγὴν μακρὰν: διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πολλοῦ διαστήµατος ἐξιέναι}; but no doubt wrongly.”

\textsuperscript{217} I stress this point because previous translators who have taken \textit{μακρὰν} as qualifying \textit{φυγανισµὸν} and \textit{ἁρπαγὴ} as well as \textit{ὑδρείαν} (Hobbes, Jowett, Smith (Loeb) (though this conflicts with his commentary ad 7.13.2 cited in the previous note), and Graham) have therefore taken 7.13.2 to mean that the men were compelled to go out at a distance for \textit{ἁρπαγὴ}. This seems to have caused them to translate this word as ‘foraging’ vel sim. (that is, the thinking underlying their translations seems to be: why would men be forced to go out at a distance to plunder)?

\textsuperscript{218} Cf. Lazenby (2004) 152 (paraphrasing 7.13.2): “[t]he crews were deteriorating because of the attentions of the Syracusan cavalry when they went out for firewood, plunder or water…” \textit{ἁρπαγὴν} at 7.13.2 could be referring either to raiding undertaken solely for booty or to raiding carried out as an incidental activity to the collection of food and water or to both (cf. Erdkamp [1998] 124).
expedition is described both in Nicias’ letter and in Thucydides’ narrative preceding and following Nicias’ letter as relying solely in seaborne imports for its provisions.\textsuperscript{219}

Some scholars have taken another passage, 6.49.3, to indicate that one of the expedition’s generals envisaged foraging as the major means of provisioning the expedition during its siege of Syracuse. Lamachus, as part of his proposed strategy for the expedition at the generals’ conference at Rhegium, stated that if the Athenians attacked Syracuse immediately

\begin{center}
εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄγροις πολλοὺς ἀποληφθῆναι εξού διὰ τὸ ἀπιστεῖν σφᾶς μὴ ἥξειν, καὶ ἐσκοµιζοµένων αὐτῶν τὴν στρατίαν οὐκ ἀπορήσειν χρηµάτων, ἢ πρὸς τῇ πόλει κηταυτύσα καθέξεται.
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{219} Thucydides’ use of the term “κακουργήσοντες” to describe the activity the Syracusan cavalry at Olympieion were positioned to prevent lends further support to the interpretation of “ἁρπαγὴ” at 7.13.2 argued for here. While “κακουργῶ” has the general meaning in classical Greek of inflicting damage on property and agriculture (Hanson [1998] 189; this seems to be its primary meaning at 6.7.3), it often takes in Thucydides a more precise meaning: raiding. Thus, at 2.32.1 and 4.53.3, it describes the activities of λῃσταί at sea (cf. 1.8.1-2, where κακοῦργοι and λῃσταί are virtual synonyms). At 2.22.2 and 3.1.2, it is used to describe the activities of light-armed troops leaving the Peloponnesian camp to raid the fields and properties nearest the city-walls of Athens, in contradistinction to the verbs ἰδὼμαι and τέµνω, which are used to describe the devastation of Athenian agriculture by the Peloponnesian army as a whole (see, e.g., 2.21.2, 2.23.1, 2.23.3; 3.1.2). At 7.19.2, Thucydides states that the purpose of the occupation of the Peloponnesian fortification of Deceleia was to dominate the plain and the most fertile parts of the country “ἰς τὸ κακουργεῖν.” Since Thucydides describes the effects of the occupation of Deceleia as the taking of booty, and the loss of all the Athenian’ sheep and beasts of burden (7.27.4-5 and cf. p.98 n.208), and Alcibiades forecast as one of the effects of the occupation of this site as the capture of most of the property in the countryside (“οἷς τε γὰρ ἡ χώρα κατεσκεύσται, τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς ὑµᾶς τὰ µὲν ληφθέντα...”) (6.91.7: see Dover [1965a] 92 ad oíς τε γὰρ ἡ χώρα κατασκεύσται: this includes all the tangible means of human utilization of the land: farms, livestock, equipment, orchards, slave workers [see 6.91.7ff.], and mines” (cf. chapter ii section iic on 2.5.4, 2.14.1), we should take κακουργεῖν at 7.19.2 to be referring to plundering raids (and the coincident infliction of damage of Athenian property and agriculture). (Hanson ([1998] 186) is wrong to think 2.22.2, 3.1.2, and 7.19.2 refer primarily to devastation of agriculture (his statement that “in many of these cases dédoô or temnô appears nearby in apparent elaboration of the damage inflicted” is precisely wrong.) In light of Thucydidean usage elsewhere, then, “κακουργήσοντες” at 7.4.6 should be taken as indicating (primarily) raiding for plunder (this examination of Thucydidean usage and a consideration of the whole of 7.4.6 shows that to interpret “κακουργήσοντες” as “search[ing] for provisions” (Hanson ([1998] 187) is definitely wrong). Cf., e.g., the translation of Crawley: “... a third of the enemy’s cavalry being stationed at the little town of Olympieum, to prevent plundering incursions on the part of the Athenians at Plemmyrion”; and Smith (Loeb): “[f]or the Syracusans had posted a third part of their cavalry at the hamlet near the Olympieum on account of the troops at Plemmyrion, that these might not go out and commit depredations.”
[t]hey might also count upon surprising many in the fields outside, incredulous of their coming; and at the moment that the enemy was carrying in his property the army would not want for booty if it once controlled the land and invested the city. (6.49.3)²²⁰

“χρηµάτων” here has been taken to mean “supplies” or “provisions,” and thus to show that Lamachus planned for the expedition to live from foraging while it invested Syracuse.²²¹ But if we put this passage back into its narrative context, this translation of “χρηµάτων” can be shown to be incorrect.

Lamachus proposed his strategy for the expedition in a conference of the Athenian generals at Rhegium after they had just found out that that the Egestans had lied to the Athenians, and that the former did not have an abundance of money to provide for the support of the expedition (6.8.2), but only thirty talents (6.46.1): having counted on the money of the Egestans to fund the expedition, the expedition was therefore about to soon run out of the money it had brought from Athens. The looming lack of money for the expedition and how to resolve this issue was, then, the main problem facing the Athenian generals as they made their proposals for the immediate and continuing strategy of the expedition.²²² The surprise attack proposed by Lamachus was designed to address

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²²⁰ The translation is Crawley’s, with the exception of the last clause which is Smith’s (Loeb).

²²¹ See Smith (1913) 96: “and while they were attempting to carry in (their property) the army would not lack supplies, if it encamped under the walls victorious”; Jowett: “and while the villagers were trying to convey their property into the city, their own army, which would be encamped close under the walls, would be masters of the field and could have no lack of provisions”; Liebeschutz (1968) 294: “Lamachus’ proposal was intended to save money by bringing matters to a head immediately. At the beginning they would live on the country; the Syracusans would not have time to take their stores into the city”; Jordan (2000) 73: Lamachus aimed to maintain the expedition “and to capture enough Syracusan property with which to feed the army”; Hanson (2005) 209: “Lamachus, as an old veteran of fighting the Spartans in Attica who knew something about raiding and plundering, believed that upon arrival the Athenians should have immediately scoured the Syracusan countryside to find supplies from the unguarded farms and to shut off the city’s access to its vital hinterlands.”

²²² See Jordan (2000) 73: Nicias’, Alcibiades’, and Lamachus’ “proposals leave no doubt that lack of money was the main problem facing the commanders.”
and solve this problem: the unexpected Athenian attack would prevent a Syracusan evacuation of the countryside; the inhabitants of the countryside and their goods would be intercepted;\textsuperscript{223} and these could be sold off, so that the expedition “would not be at a loss for money” (“τὴν στρατίαν οὐκ ἀπορήσειν χρηµάτων”). That is, “χρηµάτων” at 6.49.3 should be taken in its primary and most common meaning in Thucydides—“money”—and not as “supplies” or “provisions,” meanings for “χρήµατα” that are found nowhere else in Thucydides,\textsuperscript{224} nor in the rest of ancient Greek literature.\textsuperscript{225} Lamachus, then, in his plan for the capture of Syracuse, did not see the expedition as subsisting on foraging, but planned that the sale of property plundered from the unexpected attack on the Syracusan countryside would finance the expedition’s siege of the city.\textsuperscript{226}

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\textsuperscript{223} See Dover, \emph{HCT} iv.315 ad loc.: “when the Athenians had landed, the Syracusans would attempt a belated evacuation of the countryside, but their attempt to get themselves and their property (χρήµατα) into the city would be intercepted by the Athenians.” We should understand this to be the intention of Lamachus’ proposal, even if ἐσκοµιζοµένων is used absolutely here (Classen-Steup, vi.109 ad loc., citing 2.18.4 as a parallel).

\textsuperscript{224} See LSJ, ‘χρῆµα.’

\textsuperscript{225} See esp. (contra Smith (1913) 96 ad 6.49.3) 7.24.2, where “χρήµατα” is distinguished from “σίτος” in Thucydides’ description of the merchants’ property lost with the capture of Plemmyrion. If Lamachus/(Thucydides) had really intended to mean that the expedition would not be at a loss for provisions, he simply could have said so: cf. 6.33.5, where Hermocrates speaks of large expeditions potentially having to abandon operations “δι’ ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων.” Note that “χρηµάτων” at 6.49.3 has also been taken by scholars to mean “property” or “goods,” a meaning it does have elsewhere in Thucydides: see esp. Classen/Steup vi.110 ad χρηµάτων at 6.49.3: “nicht bloß Geld, sondern in der allgemeinen Bedeutung von Gut jeder Art, wie Thuk. das Wort auch c. 97.5; 1.49.5; 3.74.2; 7.24.2, 7.25.1 gebräucht hat.” (At 6.97.5, however, “χρήµασιν” should be taken to mean “money” and not “property” (Hornblower, \emph{CT} iii.526)). See also Freeman: “[m]any, not fully believing that the Athenians were coming, would not yet have sought shelter in the city. They would be made prisoners in the open country, and their property would be useful”; Dover, \emph{HCT} iv.315; Hanson (1998) 104 n.1. But this translation is, if its logic is pursued, nonsensical: how could the expedition ever be or have been at a loss for pieces of domestic architecture or farm implements?

\textsuperscript{226} See therefore Crawley’s translation (quoted above in the main text) for the sense in which we should take Lamachus’ proposal. See also Green (1970) 142 on 6.49.3: “[m]oreover—as Lamachus did not fail to
Towards the end of the campaign, another Athenian general also envisaged the funding of the expedition through plunder. After the night attack on Epipolae had ended in disaster, the Athenian generals deliberated about the expedition’s chances of achieving its aim of the capture of Syracuse; these seemed increasingly dim since, in addition to the failed attempt on Epipolae, the men were suffering badly with malaria. Demosthenes’ final contribution to the deliberations was to state that he would not agree at all to continue the siege, but

εἰ δὲ δεῖ µὴ ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιὰν ἄνευ Αθηναίων ψηφίσµατος, ἀλλὰ τρίβειν αὐτοῦ, ἐφ’ ἕξιν κρύψαι ἢ ἐξ τῆς Θάψου ἀναστάτας τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ἐξ τῆς Κατάνης, ὃδε τῷ τε πεζῷ ἐπὶ πολλὰ τῆς χώρας ἐπιόντες δρέψονται παρθενὸν τὰ τῶν πολεµίων καὶ ἐκείνους βλάψουσι...

if they could not lead the army home without a vote of the Athenians, but must stay on in Sicily, he said that they should do this only after removing to Thapsus or Catana. From this new base they could overrun with their army large tracts of the country and support themselves by plundering the enemy’s property, and at the same time do him damage... (7.49.2)²²⁷

point out—if they acted quickly, and established themselves in a dominant position outside Syracuse, they stood to collect some quick, easily negotiable loot: many of the Syracusans, large landowners in particular, would be cut off on their country estates before they could transfer their goods and chattels for safe-keeping within the walls.” Cf. Hobbes: “[a]nd that it was likely that many men might be cut off in the villages without, as not believing they would come; and though they should be already gotten in, yet the army, being master of the field and sitting down before the city, could want no money...” (Note that unexpected attacks on cities and other settlements are also associated with the taking of much plunder in other passages in Thucydides, Herodotus, and Xenophon: see p.139 n.63 below.) It should be noted that Thucydides thought that Lamachus’ plan to take Syracuse had an excellent chance of success: see 6.63.2 and 7.42.3 with Dover (1988) and (e.g.) Morris (2001) 71; Stahl (2003) 183; Hornblower, CT iii.622-623.

²²⁷ The translation is taken from the Loeb, with the exception of “plundering the enemy’s property” for the Loeb’s “by ravaging the enemy’s property.” Demosthenes continued “ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐν πελάγει καὶ οὐκ ἐν στενοχωρίᾳ, ὧν πρὸς τῶν πολεµίων μᾶλλον ἐστὶ, τοὺς ἀγώνας τοιχόνται, ἀλλ’ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ, ἐν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐμπειρίας χρήσιµα σφῶν ἔσται καὶ ἀναχωρήσεις καὶ ἐπίπλους οὐκ ἐκ βραχέος καὶ περιγράπτου ὁµµοιοι τε καὶ καταψήφουσι ἔξωσιν,” “while the fleet would have the open sea to fight in, that is to say, instead of a narrow space which was all in the enemy’s favour, a wide sea room where their skills would be of use, and where they could retreat or advance without being confined or circumscribed either when they put out or put in.”
The verb “πορθοῦντες” is the key term here. “πορθῶ” (and its compounds) has a primary meaning of “to destroy,” from which came its most common meaning in classical Greek historians: “to plunder.” It is most often used by Thucydides in this sense, and especially to refer to the sacking of poleis and other settlements. Thucydides also uses πορθῶ (and διαπορθῶ), however, to refer to the plundering of countryside (which produces booty), and this should be taken to be the meaning of “πορθοῦντες” in this passage.

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228 See LSJ, ‘πορθέω.’ Cf. 6.102.2: In the fighting before Syracuse in the summer of 414, the Syracusans took and thoroughly destroyed (“αἱροῦσι καὶ διεπόρθησαν”) the Athenian outwork of ten plethra.

229 The plundering of poleis: 1.73.4 (Peloponnesian poleis); 2.56.6 (Prasiae); 3.33.2 (Ionian poleis); 3.57.2 (Plataia); 7.29.4 (plundering of houses and temples within the polis of Mycaleissus). The plundering of other settlements: 2.80.8 (Limnaea, a village); 3.7.2 (χωρία on the coast of the Peloponnesse). (πορθῶ does not refer to agricultural devastation at 1.73.4 or 3.7.2, contra Hanson [1998] 187 n.3.) See also 8.28.3: the Peloponnesians, on taking Iasus, plundered it thoroughly and took much property there, “καὶ τὴν ἱλισὺν διεπόρθησαν καὶ χρήµατα πάνω πολλὰ ἡ στρατιὰ ἔλαβεν,”for the place was one of ancient wealth (cf. 8.36.1). Note that Thucydides also uses “ἐκπορθῶ” twice to refer to the sacking of poleis: 4.57.3 (Thyrea), 8.41.2 (Cos Meropis).

230 Where there is sufficient context to tell, this is, with one exception (see next note), the meaning of πορθῶ when Thucydides uses the term to describe military operations in the countryside. See esp. 2.93.4 with 2.94.3: the Peloponnesians, attacking Salamis with a surprise night attack, take the Athenian fort there, towed off the triremes empty, and surprising the inhabitants began to plunder the rest of Salamis, “τὴν τε ἄλλην Σαλαµῖνα ἀπροσδοκήτοις ἐπιπεσόντες ἐπόρθουν”; on becoming aware of approaching relief from Athens, the Peloponnesians, after they had overrun most of Salamis, hastily sailed off with their plunder and captures, “οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι... καταδραµόντες τῆς Σαλαµῖνος τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λείαν λαβόντες...” See also 8.57.1 (with chapter ii section iv): Tissaphernes afraid that the Peloponnesian sailors, in their search for subsistence, might plunder the mainland (“πορθήσωσι τὴν ἥπειρον”). See, too, 8.24.6: some of the Chians tried to bring the city over to the Athenians, since their city was shut in by sea and plundered by land, “εἰργοµένοις οὖν αὐτοῖς τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ κατὰ γῆν πορθουµένοις...” That this refers to plundering (rather than the foraging) of the countryside can be seen from 8.40.1 (the raids on the chora of Chios are being plundered by raids “καὶ κατὰ γῆν λῃστείαις πορθουµένην”) and esp. from 8.24.3: the Athenians, having defeated the Chians a couple of times in the field (with the result that the Chians ceased to meet them in the field), “οἱ δὲ τὴν χώραν καλὸς κατεσκευασµένην καὶ ἀπαθῆ οὖσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν µέχρι τότε διεπορθήσαν...,” “plundered the chora, which was well stocked and had been unharmed from the Persian wars down to that time.” See again p.102 and n.219 above: the term “κατεσκευασµένην” should be taken to indicate all the tangible means of human utilization of the land: farms, livestock, equipment, orchards, slave workers, and mines; the context clearly shows, then, that πορθῶ and διαπορθῶ at 8.24.3, 8.24.6, and 8.40.1 should be taken to refer to Athenian plundering raids targeting the property of the Chians in their chora (contra Hanson [1998] 189). Hanson cites Tuplin (1986) for “the clear sense that portheô and its compounds refer either generally to attack or more particularly to plunder, and rarely to devastation of agriculture” ([1998] 251); although this is the correct way to take
That this is the meaning of “πορθοῦντες” here and 7.49.3 shows that Demosthenes was proposing to fund the expedition during the rest of its operations in Sicily through the profits of plunder can be seen to be true if we examine his first and Nicias’ contributions to the debate on the future course of the expedition after the defeat on Epipolae. Speaking first, Demosthenes had argued for an immediate withdrawal while the expedition still had some naval superiority, because the Athenians had greater need of the forces of the expedition in the war against the Peloponnesians and because Syracuse would be now harder to capture (7.47.3-4); furthermore, he urged that “it was not right that [the Athenians] should continue the siege and spend a great deal of money to no purpose,” “οὐδ’ αὖ ἄλλως χρήµατα πολλὰ δαπανῶντας εἰκὸς εἶναι προσκαθῆσαι” (7.47.4). Nicias, although acknowledging the miserable situation of the expedition, disagreed with Demosthenes. He argued that the Athenians should remain before Syracuse since, among other reasons, he had received information that the Syracusans’ situation would be soon worse than theirs if the siege continued, as the Athenians would

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πορθῶ and its compounds in classical Greek historians, Tuplin ([1986] 332-333) only deals with the term “ἐκπορθῶ,” and only in Diodorus, whose use of πορθῶ is much looser than Thucydides’, Herodotus’, or Xenophon’s, and can mean simply “ravaging” (see, e.g., 12.65, 13.73.5-6 for this meaning (and πορθῶ and δῃώω apparently used for the same activity)). Finally, the actions described by πορθῶ may sometimes have included some stealing of provisions (cf., e.g., Xen., Anab. 7.7.3, 5, 12; Xen., Hell. 6.5.27), but this would always have been incidental to the main activity of plundering.

As noted, πορθῶ does connote destruction as well as plundering. In this sense, Thucydides once uses the verb δῃώω for the same action which he also describes with πορθῶ. See 3.79.3: in the summer of 427, the Peloponnesians refraining from attacking the city of Corcyra, “but they landed upon the promontory of Leukimme and plundered the fields,” “ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν Λευκίµµην τὸ ἀκρωτήριον ἐπόρθουν τοὺς ἀγροὺς...” At 3.80.2, this action is described as “δῃώσαντες τὴν γῆν” (see Jackson [1969] 13 and n.12). πορθῶ and δῃώω, however, normally refer in Thucydides to two distinct activities: plundering (for booty) as opposed to ravaging (see Jackson [1969] 12-13). (Thus Hornblower (CT iii.639) is incorrect to cite 1.96 to support a translation of “πορθοῦντες τὰ τῶν πολεµίων” at 7.49.2 as ‘ravaging the enemy’s territory’; the verb used at 1.96 is δῃώω, not πορθῶ (see Jackson [1969] passim.). Most importantly, at 7.49.2, πορθοῦντες is accompanied by a verb which explicitly describes the ravaging activity of destruction alone (“βλάψουσι”) and so should be taken here to mean strictly “plundering” (cf. Hanson [1998] 188; thus the Loeb translation, “ravaging,” is incorrect).

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then “wear out the Syracusans by lack of money” (“χρήματων γὰρ ἀπορία αὐτῶς ἐκτρυχώσει”) (especially since the arrival of the second expeditionary force from Athens had strengthened their naval superiority) (7.48.2). Nicias elaborated later in his speech upon the desperate financial situation of the Syracusans:

And as bad as their own situation was, that of the Syracusans, he said, was still worse; for in point of money, since they were supporting a mercenary force and at the same time bearing the expense of patrol guard-posts, and had now for a year been maintaining a large fleet besides, and hereafter would be quite without resources; indeed, they had spent 2,000 talents already and were in debt for many talents more, and if they should lose any portion whatsoever of their present force by not being able to pay for its maintenance, their cause would be ruined, since it depended upon mercenary troops and had not, like their own, the backing of necessity. [6] They ought, therefore, he concluded, to stay on and continue the siege, and not go back home beaten by money, in which they had by far the greater resources. (7.48.5-6).

232 Crawley’s translation; Smith’s (Loeb) translation of this clause, “for they would wear the enemy out by cutting off his supplies,” is incorrect.

233 Cf. 6.45: these had been manned in preparation for the invasion of the Athenians.

234 It is a nice question as to who the Syracusans were in debt to.

235 See Dover (1965b) 41: “τροφή, ‘sustenance’, is commonly used of the pay on which a soldier or sailor supports himself. Nikias’ point is that if Syracuse cannot pay the forces of her allies they will go home.”

236 See also 7.49.1: since Nicias had accurate knowledge of affairs in Syracuse, he spoke confidently of the Syracusans’ lack of money (“τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἀπορίαν”).
Financial considerations were thus at the forefront of the generals’ thinking when
they made their cases for how the expedition should proceed.\textsuperscript{237} Demosthenes’ final
proposal at 7.49.2, then, was made not only to address the strategic problems of the
expedition,\textsuperscript{238} but also to stop the outlay of money from Athens on the expedition. If
Demosthenes’ proposal had been followed, that is, the expedition would have been
financed from the profits of the sale of plunder.

Lamachus’ and Demosthenes’ plans to fund the expedition through the capture
and sale of booty were feasible;\textsuperscript{239} events during the expedition demonstrated that it was,
in fact, possible to raise large amounts of money in Sicily from the sale of plunder.
When the expedition was underfunded in the late summer of 415, because of the
deception of the Egestans, the Athenians obtained sufficient money to finance the
expedition through capturing Hyccara and enslaving its inhabitants; the sale of the
Hyccarans at Catana raised 120 talents (6.62.3-4).\textsuperscript{240} The Sicilian expedition, then, not

\textsuperscript{237} Cf. Kallet (2001) 156-157: “[j]ust as Demosthenes had employed financial arguments—and even here it
is not that they lack the resources but that they should not be wasted—as support for an evacuation, Nikias
responds to Demosthenes with financial considerations as well (namely, that the Syracusans would be worn
out by a lack of money should the Athenians persevere in the siege), which he brings up toward the
beginning of his speech given in \textit{oratio obliqua} (48.2). He returns to the same topic at much greater length
at its end (48.5)...”

\textsuperscript{238} By moving to Thapsus or Catana, the expedition would no longer be so susceptible to attacks from
Syracusan cavalry and light-armed troops.

\textsuperscript{239} Note that Eurymedon agreed with Demosthenes’ proposals (7.49.3) and that the expedition stayed only
because Nicias objected and it was suspected that he had positive information to underlie this objection
(7.49.4). Note again, too, that Thucydides thought that Lamachus’ plan had an excellent plan of success
(see above p.105 n.226).

\textsuperscript{240} Cf. Westlake (1968) 179: the decision to use the fleet to transport the Hyccarans to Catana, which
meant that it could not be used against Selinus, “confirms that the financial needs of the Athenians were
urgent.” Some of the Hyccarans were bought by the members of the crews of the expedition’s triremes
only depended on markets for its provisioning, but also depended for some months—and could be envisaged by its generals as depending for some time—on markets to provide its funding through the sale and purchase of plunder.

v. Thucydides’ narrative of the Sicilian expedition and grain markets in Sicily and Italy

The Sicilian expedition operated in a world of markets. On their way to (and around) Sicily, the Athenians and their allies touched at coastal poleis that were all capable of providing markets sufficient to feed the passing expedition. Once established in Sicily, the 30,000 to 50,000 men who constituted the expedition subsisted for roughly two years on grain imported by merchants from nearby friendly states in Sicily and Italy.\footnote{30,000-50,000 men: see appendix 2. Roughly two years: that is, from when the expedition first established a base of operations at Catana in the fall of 415 until the destruction of the expedition in the late fall of 413. Thucydides states that the fleet departed for Sicily “Σέρουσις μεσούτος ἡμερινή” (6.30.1): this expression means ‘after the middle period of the summer had begun’ and “could be used of any date between early May and late July” (Dover, HCT iv.271). Opinions on the date of the expedition’s departure have varied widely (see the summary at Bloedow [1993] 121), but Bloedow has made a convincing case for a date somewhere in July of 415 ([1993] 121-122). Since it is not possible to estimate with any certainty the time required for the voyage from Athens to Rhegium, or the time taken for the operations described at 6.50-52 or at 6.62 (see Dover, HCT iv.272-273), it is impossible to come up with a date any more precise than somewhere between late July and late September 415 for the first establishment of a base at Catana. The Athenian generals had probably just sent to Catana to tell that polis to stop sending grain (7.60.2) when the lunar eclipse of 27 August, 413 took place (see 7.50.4 with Hornblower, CT iii.642 for the date). The expedition was destroyed somewhere between this latter date and the end of October 413 (Thucydides records its destruction towards the end of his summer: see Dover, HCT iv.272: “[t]he end of the Thucydidean Θερός is the end of October.”)) It was taken for granted by the Athenians at all points in the planning and (actual) operations of the campaign that the enormous force sent out from Athens could
and would depend for its food supplies on markets provided by *poleis* and merchants;\(^{242}\) no other means of acquisition of supplies, whether foraging or requisitioning from allies, assumed any importance in the provisioning of the expedition.

We cannot, however, use this information to build a (robust) model of the grain market in Sicily and Italy in the late fifth century. The impossibility of determining precisely the numbers of combatants and non-combatants taking part in the expedition (as well as the length of the operations in Sicily) means that the possible margins in error in calculating the total grain consumption of the participants in the expedition are too great to construct such a model.\(^{243}\) This is quite apart from the fact that we only have the roughest of indications from Thucydides of where the expedition’s grain was imported from during its operations. It appears to have been imported primarily from Italy (“τὰ τρέφοντα ἡµᾶς χωρία τῆς Ἰταλίας” (7.14.3) (cf. 6.103.2)), but Thucydides does not specify from which regions or states there. It seems unlikely, too, that Catana was the only Sicilian *polis* that exported grain to the expedition: surely grain was sent from the other *poleis* friendly to the expedition (Naxos, Egesta, and perhaps the unknown “other

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\(^{242}\) Again, markets provided by *poleis* in the region and by merchants from *poleis* in the region; it bears repeating, in the light of previous work on the provisioning of the Sicilian expedition, that at no point in his account of the campaign does Thucydides mention the export of provisions from Athens to the force in Sicily.

\(^{243}\) On the impossibility of calculating precisely the numbers of men taking part in (the Athenian side on) the Sicilian campaign, see appendix 2. Models for relatively small economic systems such as the Greek far west and the Aegean are difficult to construct: systems such as these are too small to make arguments based on orders of magnitude, since even small errors in estimating consumption can lead to wildly incorrect (final) models. See Morris (1994a) 361 on the problems of modeling the economy of classical Athens: “[b]ut it has proved more difficult to build models for Athens than for Rome. Because we are dealing with a smaller system, disagreements over parameters are more problematic: models of the Athenian economy are simply less robust than those of Rome. Errors of ± 15 percent in estimating population or production would have little impact on the overall shape of Hopkins’ models of the Roman economy, but for Athens they are devastating... Relatively minor changes to the numbers totally transform the models. This does not prevent us from evaluating theories... but it does mean that we depend more on actual evidence...” For the problem, see also Scheidel (1999) 200; Hopkins (2002) 102.
states” which supplied cavalry to the Athenians in the summer of 414 (6.98.1)), too.

There is also the obvious and important problem that Thucydides never provides any indication as to what type of grain was being bought by the Athenians and their allies in the far west.244 Although Sicily is better suited to wheat production than ‘mainland’ Greece, the scholarly orthodoxy that saw classical Greek Sicily solely as a place of wheat monoculture has now been successfully deconstructed, and there is increasing evidence for barley production and consumption in Sicily in the classical period.245 In Italy, barley was the predominant cereal cultivated at Metapontum, and barley (at least) was grown at Cumae, too, in the classical period.246 It is possible, therefore, that, just as in contemporary campaigns in the Aegean, the men on the Sicilian expedition ate (mostly) ἄλφιτα,247 but certainty on this point is impossible.

244 Diodorus states that the Athenian prisoners kept captive in the stone-quarries at Syracuse received two kotylai of “ἄλφιτων” (13.19.4), and Plutarch states that they received the same amount, but of “κριθῶν” (Nic. 29.1). But, since both Diodorus’ and Plutarch’s accounts are merely elaborations of Thucydides’, which states that the prisoners received two kotylai of “σίτου” (7.87.2), they have no independent evidential value (in any case, rations given to prisoners would not be representative of usual consumption habits): see Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 61.


246 On Metapontum, see, e.g., Carter (1980) 10-11, 13 (I am grateful to David Yoon for this reference). Barley is on the classical coins of Metapontum and Cumae (Lacroix [1965] 109). At Umbro, a late fifth to fourth century small rural Greek site a few kilometers from the coast about halfway between Locri and Rhegium, the only identified bits of grain through the 2005 archeological season were one of free-threshing wheat and one of barley (there were seven unidentified cerealia): Yoon (2006).

247 See again pp.35-37 above.
For all of these reasons, then, it is impossible to use the information derived from Thucydides’ narrative of the Sicilian expedition to construct a model of the grain market(s) in Sicily and Italy at this time. While acknowledging this, we can still use the information gleaned from Thucydides’ narrative to make some interesting ‘back of an envelope’ calculations which, however imprecise, still have important and indicative results. Taking a figure of 30,000 men for the expedition—and this figure is definitely too low for the first year, and almost definitely too low for its second—it will have needed to import a minimum of just over 450,000 *medimnoi* of barley-flour per year, (or nearly seven and a half thousand tons of wheat equivalent) per year for the men to have received adequate sustenance. I should emphasize that these figures are (probably far) too low for the amount of grain actually transported by traders to the expedition: again, there were definitely more than 30,000 men on the expedition (at least in its first year); in addition, large amounts of grain meant for the expedition will have been spoiled as a result of inadequate storage (either during transportation to the Athenian base of operations or while stored there). When these figures are put into the context of the

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248 We might add that Thucydides (naturally) (nor any of the later accounts of the Sicilian expedition (again, naturally)) does not provide any information on the organization of production of the grain consumed by the expedition, or on the institutional and physical infrastructure that underlay the markets in which grain was sold to the expedition; all of this could be assumed by Thucydides to have been known to his audience (which is significant in itself).

249 See appendix 2.

250 Taking one *choinix* of wheat or two *choinikes* of barley-flour as the usual daily rates of consumption of these foods in classical Greece: see appendix 3. The figure for wheat equivalent (for definition of this term, see appendix 3 section iii) is actually 7,416,900kg. There is no reason to think that the members of the Sicilian expedition were not receiving adequate sustenance at any point during the operations in Sicily before the decision to send to Catana to tell that *polis* to stop the export of provisions.

few numbers we have for the grain trade and grain production in the Greek world, however, they are striking. Athens in the mid-fourth century imported 800,000 *medimnoi* of grain per annum to meet its population’s subsistence needs; in 329/8, its own *chora*—at about 2,500 km², the second largest in ‘mainland’ Greece behind Sparta’s—produced 339,925 *medimnoi* of barley and 27,062.5 of wheat. At some point in the ten years before 323, Cyrene, which possessed one of the largest *chorai* in the Greek world, donated 1,207,500 *medimnoi* of wheat to forty-one Greek states throughout the Aegean and western Greece, and to the mother (Olympias of Macedonia) and sister

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252 To take Dem. 20.31-32 at face value. Demosthenes states in this passage that as much grain came to Athens from the Pontus as from all other areas of Athenian supply put together (20.31), and then states that 400,000 *medimnoi* of grain came from Pontus (20.32). Demosthenes supports the figure of 400,000 *medimnoi* from the Pontus with a reference to documentary evidence (the records of the *sitophylakes*); we can accept with certainty, then, that Athens imported 400,000 *medimnoi* from the Bosporus per annum (rather than one year: see Moreno [2007] 32 n.185 contra Garnsey [1988] 97, [1999] 194). Demosthenes does not, however, cite any documentary evidence for the claim that half of Athens’ imports came from there; this latter claim is therefore less secure than the first (see again Garnsey [1988] 97, [1999] 194). It seems to me hypercritical, however, to reject this passage as evidence for the amounts of grain imported to Athens from areas other than the Pontus (see, e.g., again Garnsey [ibid.]); the order of magnitude must be roughly right and, if anything, to convince his audience of his case and the importance of the connection with the Bosporus, Demosthenes may have overestimated rather than underestimated the proportion of grain coming from the northern Black Sea (see Bresson [2000] 278 n.66). Demosthenes speaks at 20.31-32 of “*σίτος*,” which has often been taken by scholars to mean wheat. As Gallo points out ([1983] 462 n.15), however, *σίτος* in the classical period denotes both wheat and barley: it is therefore impossible to be certain as to how many of the 800,000 *medimnoi* mentioned by Demosthenes were of wheat, and how many of barley(-meal). Note in this respect that it can be implied that substantial amounts of *ἄλφιτα* were imported to Athens in the late fifth century (at least) from the scholia to Aristoph., *Ach.* 548 (the Great Stoa in the Piraeus was also called the ‘Stoa Alphitopolis’: see Garnsey [1988] 99 n.27 for this point).

253 See Osborne (2000a) 1-2, *IACP* 72, 624.

254 *IG II*² 1672, with Garnsey (1988) 98 for collation of the figures from Attica. It has been argued that the figures reported in *IG II*² 1672 represent ‘a bad year,’ but certainty on this issue is impossible (see Scheidel [1999] 196-197 for discussion and summary of the competing positions on this issue; it should be noted that the arguments for the ‘bad year’ hypothesis are informed by and part of larger arguments wishing to maximize grain production in Attica and thus minimize the importance of grain imports into Athens (see, e.g., esp. Garnsey [1999] 183-195).

255 See *IACP* 72, 1244.
(Cleopatra of Epirus) of Alexander.\textsuperscript{256} Mytilene, one of the largest and most important 
poleis in the Aegean outside of Athens,\textsuperscript{257} appears to have been importing something 
more than 100,000 medimnoi of grain per year around 350.\textsuperscript{258} But a relatively minor 
polis such as Aphytis could subsist in the 420s, it seems, importing a maximum of 10,000 
medimnoi of grain per year.\textsuperscript{259}

The examination of the provisioning of the Sicilian expedition introduces 
therefore an important and striking new figure for grain imports into the bleak evidential 
landscape for the trade in grain in the classical Greek world. It provides evidence for an 
important and substantial trade in grain around Italy and Sicily, a phenomenon otherwise 
(almost) unattested for the fifth century.\textsuperscript{260} It shows, in sum, a world where the 
development of marketing structures and networks of merchants was sufficiently strong
to permit an invading amphibious force which could be likened to a *polis*, and which in fact had a population as large as any *polis*’ outside of Athens and Syracuse, and perhaps as large as these cities, to get its food through markets for years at a time.

The crews of the Syracusan navy also relied on purchasing in a market for their provisions, as Thucydides’ description of a ruse which laid the basis for the Syracusans’ first clear naval success over the Athenians in the summer of 413 makes clear:

... a great part of the day the [Athenians and Syracusans] spent as before, confronting and skirmishing with each other; until at last Ariston son of

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261 For the idea of the Sicilian expedition as a *polis* in Thucydides, see esp. 7.77.4-9 with Mossé (1963) (better than Hornblower [2004]). For the ‘expedition as city’ motif generally in Thucydides (and other classical authors), see Gomme, *HCT* i.456-457 ad 1.142.3; Mossé (1963); Hornblower (2004); Greenwood (2006) 97-98. Cf. Jones (1987) 46 on the logistics of ancient armies: “[a]n army gathered together for a campaign was comparable to a town: it had a dense population and did not produce its own provisions. But, unlike a town, it had neither a preexisting transportation network nor any established pattern of local suppliers for its various needs.”

262 See, e.g., Morris (2001) 26 for Athens and Syracuse being the most populous cities in the Greek world in the fifth century. Referencing Muggia (1997) and de Angelis (2000), Morris also states (ibid.) that fifth century Sicily probably had half a dozen cities with populations of 40,000-50,000 inhabitants. But the works of Muggia and de Angelis fail for the reasons outlined above at p.100-101 n.242: the amount of probabilistic (and sometimes more or less baseless) assumptions each scholar has to make to produce their estimates of population size render those estimates nothing more than guesswork. See also Erdkamp (2005) 216 n.42 for reasons why de Angelis’ method of estimating population sizes “is much too crude.”
Pyrrhikos, a Corinthian, the ablest helmsman in the Syracusan service, persuaded their naval commanders to send to the officials in the city, and tell them to move the market as quickly as they could down to the sea, and oblige everyone to bring whatever edibles he had and sell them there, thus enabling the commanders to land the crews and dine at once close to the ships, and shortly afterwards, the same day, to attack the Athenians again when they were not expecting it. [7.40.1] In compliance with this advice a messenger was sent and the market got ready, upon which the Syracusans suddenly backed water and withdrew to the city, and immediately landed and took their dinner upon the spot; [2] while the Athenians, supposing that they had returned to the city because they felt they were beaten, disembarked at their leisure and set about getting their dinners and about their other occupations, under the impression that they had done with fighting for that day. [3] Suddenly the Syracusans manned their ships and again sailed against them; and the Athenians, in great confusion and most of them hungry, got on board, and with great difficulty put out to meet them. (7.39.2-7.40.3) 

It is apparent from Thucydides’ description of the ruse that the crews of the Syracusan navy normally purchased their food in the “ἡ ἀγορὰ τῶν πωλουµένων,” i.e. in the Syracusan agora, and that it was only in the singular context of Ariston’s suggestion that the stores of all the residents of Syracuse were for sale (as opposed to just the retailers’), and the Syracusan agora moved from its normal location down to the sea. That is, the 16,000 men or so who constituted the Syracusan navy at this time usually obtained their food through purchase in the agora of the city. The fact that so many men could provision themselves in the regular Syracusan agora for a period upwards of a

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263 The translation is Crawley’s.

264 See Dover (1965b) 30 ad 7.39.2, ‘τὴν ἀγορὰν τῶν πωλουµένων’: “lit., ‘the market of things (sc. normally) sold’, clearly distinguished from (lit.) ‘whatever edibles one has’, which would be the private stores of individuals, not normally for sale.” Cf. Dover (1965b) 30 ad 7.39.2, ‘ὑπὸς αὐτοῖς κτλ.’: “αὐτοῖς refers to all the people who would then be selling food,” i.e. retailers and private individuals alike (see Dover, HCT iv.417).

265 Note also that the capacity of the regular agora of the Syracusans to feed the men crewing the Syracusan triremes is not in question here: the point of the ruse was that the supply of greater than usual amounts of food in the market would shorten the time the men would need to buy and prepare their food.

266 The Syracusan fleet comprised 80 triremes at this time: see 7.22.1 and 7.37.3. It remained around this figure throughout the summer of 413 (see 7.52.1: 76 triremes; 7.70.4 with 7.60.3: (just) less than 90).
year\textsuperscript{267} points to the presence of robust commercial grain supply and distribution mechanisms at Syracuse (perhaps to be expected but otherwise not explicitly attested for the fifth century).\textsuperscript{268}

\textsuperscript{267} The fleet had been maintained on a large scale for a year (very roughly): see 7.7.4 with 7.48.5.

\textsuperscript{268} Cf. Morris (2006) 45-46 for the lack of explicit evidence for the grain supply of Syracuse in the fifth century. 16,000 men would needed just over 330 \textit{medimnoi} of wheat a day, or just under 670 \textit{medimnoi} of barley-meal a day to ensure adequate sustenance. It is probable that the men referred to as hired for service on land and receiving pay from the Syracusans at 7.48.5 purchased their supplies in the Syracusan \textit{agora}, too. There were, at a definite minimum, 7,600 of these men: see 7.1.5 (Gylippus in the late summer/fall of 414 taking 700 of his own sailors and marines; 1,000 hoplites and light-armed troops and 100 horse from Himera, some light troops and cavalry from Selinus, a few Geloans, and Sicels numbering 1,000 in all); 7.21.1 (Gylippus coming to Syracuse in the spring of 413 with as many troops as he was able to gather from the \textit{poleis} which he had persuaded to join the Syracusan cause); 7.25.3 (a \textit{holkas} arriving from the Peloponess carrying Thespian hoplites); 7.32.2 (1,500 allied troops coming to Syracuse from allied \textit{poleis}); 7.33.1 (Camarinaeans sending 500 hoplites, 300 javelineers, and 300 archers, the Geloans sending 400 javelineers and 200 horse); 7.50.1 (Gylippus coming back to Syracuse with large numbers of troops raised in Sicily, and the hoplites sent off in the spring by the Peloponnesians in \textit{holkades} (apparently the 1,600 mentioned at 7.19.3-4)). We cannot state with certainty if the citizen Syracusan land forces provisioned themselves in the \textit{agora} at Syracuse.
Chapter 2: The Provisioning of Classical Greek Overseas Campaigns

i. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that Nicias attempted to dissuade the Athenians from undertaking a major amphibious expedition to Syracuse by contrasting the requirements in παρασκευή for such an expedition with those of ‘normal’ major amphibious Athenian operations in the Aegean; I demonstrated there, too, that examination of those aspects of the provisioning of the Sicilian expedition that were unusual helped to bring out crucial features of the food supply of typical Athenian operations in the Aegean. In this chapter, I will build on the insights gained from the analysis of Nicias’ speech and examine further the provisioning of ‘normal’ major Athenian amphibious expeditions, i.e. those military operations most characteristic of the Athenian empire at its height: the reduction by prolonged (circumvallation) sieges of coastal or island poleis in the Aegean that had revolted from the Athenians (or had refused to become subject to them).¹ Before 415, Athenian(-led) amphibious expeditions successfully reduced by siege the poleis of Eion (in 476), Naxos (469), Thasos (465-463), Aegina (458-457), Samos (440-439), Potidaea (432-winter 429), Mytilene (428-427), Scione (423-421), and Melos (416).²

¹ For the suppression of revolts by (more or less) lengthy sieges (supported by naval operations) as the characteristic military activity of the Athenian empire, see, e.g., Davies (1993) 68, Hanson (2005) 176-177, Strauss (2007) 237-238.

² For a list (with references) of Athenian circumvallation sieges post-441, see Krentz (2007) 180 Table 6.3; for circumvallation sieges before this date, see pp.132-133 n.37 below. Note also that, in the aftermath of the Persian War, the Athenians and their allies successfully reduced Sestos by siege in 479/8 (Thucy. 1.89.2, Hdt. 9.114-118); in addition, Athenian forces seem to have formed a substantial part of the force that reduced Byzantium by siege in 478 (Thucy. 1.94, cf. Diod. 11.44). Before the Sicilian expedition, only one attempted full-scale Athenian circumvallation siege—Kition in 451 (Thucy. 1.112.2-4)—was unsuccessful (see section iic below for discussion of this siege). (The dates of the sieges undertaken by the Athenians post-Eion and pre-Samos are all controversial, but the controversy over the precise dating of
In the first and second Peloponnesian Wars, the Athenian state also sent out amphibious forces around the Peloponnese (and the eastern and northern coastlines of ‘mainland’ Greece) on short-term raiding and devastating campaigns, and I will devote the third section of the chapter to the examination of the food supply of the men serving on these *periploi*. I will then analyse the provisioning of the naval operations embarked upon by Athens and the other combatant states engaged in the Ionian War. I will conclude by building on this latter analysis to investigate more closely the methods used by classical Greek states other than Athens to supply amphibious and naval expeditions, and by considering what the provisioning of classical Greek amphibious and naval operations can tell us about the structure and scale of Aegean economies in the fifth and early fourth centuries.

ii. The provisioning of Athenian sieges in the fifth century (prior to the Sicilian expedition)

a. Thucydides and the Trojan War

In the Archaeology, ³ Thucydides justified his belief that the Peloponnesian war was greater than any past war, as well as his expectation at its beginning that it would be so, by setting out the factors that determine the magnitude of wars (and other state enterprises) and using these to demonstrate that the greatest conflicts and military

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³ For sake of convenience, I use the conventional term for Thucy. 1.1.1-1.23 3 while noting Irwin’s point that it brings problematically modernistic connotations to the study of Thucydides’ proem ([2007] 193-194). (From this point on, all text references in this chapter will be to Thucydides’ *Histories*, unless otherwise indicated.)
undertakings in the Greek past were inferior to the Peloponnesian war.⁴ The most important of the (new) criteria Thucydides used to judge the likely magnitude of previous wars and military enterprises were the levels of naval power and financial resources (which made possible the projection of naval power) controlled by states (empires):⁵ in his choice of these factors as criteria, Thucydides was clearly distilling his thoughts on and experiences of the contemporary Athenian archē.⁶ He used these criteria, then, not to write a survey of early Greek history,⁷ but in order to demonstrate that those wars that were commonly considered to be the greatest of the past were, in fact, lesser affairs than the conflict he was writing up.⁸ Finally, Thucydides indicated to his readers that (since (contemporary) evidence was lacking) he was basing his analysis of the organization of

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⁴ See esp. Ellis (1991) 364-365: “[t]he Archaeology was written to demonstrate first that the Peloponnesian War was the greatest and most momentous conflict to that time. That contention, the main thesis, is carried through to its final proof at 21.2-23.3 by reference to the war itself. Then, within its limits and in order to justify the claim that its author had begun to write not at the end of the war... but at the very outset, a logically prior, subordinate thesis is stated. Thucydides explains that he anticipated that this would be the greatest of wars because the formative conditions from which it took its impetus were themselves greater than any before... It follows then that the bulk (Chapters 2-19) of the Archaeology is taken up with two broad subjects: the factors that determine the likely magnitude of wars, and the actual magnitude of the greatest wars of the past. The first is the basis of the subordinate thesis, while the second will provide the standard by which, finally (23.1-3), the greatness of the Peloponnesian War will be judged.” Cf., e.g., Finley (1967) 13; Hunter (1980) 194; Kallet-Marx (1993) 21.


⁸ See esp. Luraghi (2000) 230-231 and esp. 233-234: “[i]f [Thucydides] feels the need to show that also mythical thalassocrats like Minos had been less powerful than fifth-century Athens, the reason is not necessarily that he believes in what we would call their historicity, but rather that he takes for a moment the standpoint of someone who does believe in it, in order to argue that also from that standpoint the sea-powers of the past had been inferior to those of the present times.” See also Kallet-Marx (1993) 27.
past societies and conflicts on probable deduction corroborated by observable indications from the past; in other words, in his reconstruction of past wars and military enterprises, Thucydides was offering a personal thesis founded on arguments from probability and analogy (with the Athenian empire used as the basis for generalization and comparison).

Because the Trojan War was considered by Thucydides’ contemporaries to be one of the greatest undertakings of the Greek past, the argument that it was fought on a smaller scale than the Peloponnesian War holds a central place in the Archaeology.

9 On Thucydides’ use of “τεκµήρια,” “σηµεῖα,” and “µαρτύρια” in the Archaeology, see esp. de Romilly (1967) 242, and Connor (1984) 28: “[these] are not “proofs” of incontrovertible evidence, but “indications”—facts or observations that point in a certain direction. They do not entail generalizations; rather the leading themes of the Archaeology—the importance of sea power and financial reserves—guide him in the selection of corroborating instances from myth, poetry, archaeology, anthropology, and the like.” See also Murphy (1938) 94; Finley (1942) 82; Hornblower (1987) 100-106; de Souza (1999) 28; Nicolai (2001) 275.

10 See again de Romilly (1967) 242: “in his reconstruction of the distant Greek past, Thucydides “n’avait d’autre arme que le raisonnement.” See also Hunter (1982) 112-113: “[a]nalogue reasoning is closely related to argumentation based on probabilities. For analogy like probability is based on the perception of similarities, the belief that individuals acted in the past, or will act in the future, much as they do in the present, and so that behavior in the past can be reconstructed by using the analogy of the present... In the case of Thucydides... [a]nalogue reasoning is at the heart of his evolutionist theory of civilization. For uniform development and uniform stages of growth also imply similarities and parallels. Thus such a theory also affords the means to approach data, to rationalize, and to reconstruct events in the past by using the analogy of the present. In a word, analogy serves as a kind of rational principle in Thucydides’ speculative reconstruction of the past.” And see, too, Canfora (1977) 459: “[l]e jugement [in the Archaeology] est fondé sur le comparaison, mais c’est inévitablement une comparaison avec le présent. L’instrument de ce jugement comparatif est l’analogue: le passé est ramené à des catégories <<modernes>>...” Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 68-69. And see again the works cited at n.6 for the contemporary operations and enterprises of the Athenian empire serving as the model for Thucydides’ arguments from likelihood and analogy in the Archaeology.

11 See Ellis (1991) 356, 360-361, 372-374 for the centrality (literally and figuratively) of the discussion of the Trojan War to the argument of the Archaeology. It should be noted here (again) that Thucydides discusses the Trojan War not because he believes in the literal truth of Homer’s account, but because this war was commonly believed by his contemporaries to be one of the greatest of all wars: see again esp. Luraghi (2001) 230-231, 233-234, 238; cf. Ellis (1991) 373; Kallet-Marx (1993) 27 and n.21. In this regard, note that, while using Homer as his main source for the Trojan War, Thucydides criticizes his reliability and uses his account for different means than it was originally intended: see 1.10.3-5 with de Romilly (1967) 245-247; Crane (1998) 129 n.15; Nicolai (2001) 272.
Using Homer’s figures in the Catalogue of Ships as the basis for his calculations,
Thucydides argued that the force that sailed from Greece against Troy was not great in
size, considering it represented the armed strength of the whole of Greece (1.10.3-5).\footnote{See esp. 1.10.5: “... οὐ πολλοὶ φαίνονται ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἀπὸ πᾶσς τῆς Ἑλλάδος κοινῆ πεµπόµενοι.” This point of Thucydides’ argument has been criticized on the grounds that his calculations lead to a total of 102,000 men on the Trojan expedition—a not inconsiderable total: see esp. Gomme, \textit{HCT} i.114; Hunter (1982) 35; Connor (1984) 21 and n.6. But the fact that, as Thucydides indicates, the Trojan expedition represented all the forces of Hellas means that it was actually (quite) inferior to all the forces potentially available to the Greek world as a whole in his time: see de Romilly (1967) 248; Crane (1998) 83-87. In any case, as Luraghi points out ([2001] 230) regarding Thucydides’ calculations here, “[w]e should not forget that Thucydides’ text would most probably be heard rather than read, and the audience would not be in the condition to stop, do the sum and check the accuracy of Thucydides’ statement.”}
He ascribed the reason for the relatively small size of the Trojan expedition to lack of
money: this lack of money meant that the expedition could not bring sufficient
provisions; the size of the force that sailed out from Greece was therefore limited to the
number of men who could live off the land during the campaign; in addition, the Greeks’
lack of supplies also led to the great duration of their siege of Troy.\footnote{Cf. de Romilly (1967) 269-270.} The full argument runs as follows (1.11.1-2):

\begin{quote}
αἵτιον δὲ ὢν οὐχ ἡ ὀλιγανθρωπία τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἡ ἀχρηµατία. τῆς γὰρ τροφῆς ἀπορία τὸν τε στρατὸν ἐλάσσω ἤγαγον καὶ ὅσον ἠλπίζον αὐτὸν πολεµοῦντα βιοτεύσει, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀρικαµὲνοι μάχῃ ἱκρατήσαν (ὑδαλόν δὲ τὸ γὰρ ἐκεῖµα τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ὡς ἀν ἐτειχίσαντο), φαίνονται δὲ οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα πάση τῇ δυνάµει χρησάµενοι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς γεωργίαν τῆς Χερσονήσου προσπήµασι καὶ ληστείαν τῆς τροφῆς ἀπορία. ἢ καὶ µάλλον οἱ Τρῶες αὐτῶν διεσπαρµένως τὰ δέκα ἔτη ἀντεῖχον βίᾳ, τοῖς αἰεὶ ὑπολειποµένοις αὐτίπαλοι ὄντες. [2] περιουσίαν δὲ ἐκ ἡλίου ἔχοντες τροφῆς καὶ ὄντες ἁθρόοι ἄνευ λῃστείας καὶ γεωργίας ἴνα ἐπάλληλα ὑπὸ τὸν πόλεµον διάφερον, ὥδεις ἕναν τοῖς ἐκατότοντες εἰλον, οἱ γε καὶ οἰκὸς ἁθρόοι, ἀλλα µέρει τῷ αἰεὶ παρόντι ἀντεῖκον, πολιορκία δὲ ἃν προσκαθεζόµενοι ἐν ἑλάσσον τοῖς χρόνοι καὶ ἀποικισµένων τῆς Τροίας εἰλον. ἀλλὰ δὲ ἀρχηγιατίαν τὰ τε πρὸ τοῖς ἀνθρόποι ἤν καὶ αὐτὰ γε ἄν ταύτα, ὀνοµαστότατα τῶν προς γενέµατα, ἀφθονοῖς τοῖς ἐργα ὑποδεέστερα ὄντα τῆς φήµης καὶ τοῦ νῦν περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τοὺς ποιητὰς λόγον κατασχεχκόσ...[13]
\end{quote}

[And the inconsiderable size of the expedition] was due not so much to scarcity of men as of money. Lack of provisions made the invaders reduce the size of the army they brought to a point at which it might live on the country during the
prosecution of the war. Even after the victory they obtained on their arrival—and a victory there must have been, or the fortifications of the naval camp could never have been built—there is no indication of their whole force having been employed; on the contrary, they seem to have turned to cultivation of the Chersonese and to piracy from want of lack of provisions. This was what really enabled the Trojans to keep the field for ten years against them; the dispersion of the enemy making them always a match for the detachment left behind. If they had brought an abundance of provisions with them, and had prosecuted the war en masse without scattering for piracy and agriculture, they would have easily defeated the Trojans in the field; since they could hold their own against them with the part on service. In short, if they had stuck to the siege, they would have captured Troy in less time and with less trouble. But as lack of money proved the weakness of earlier expeditions, so from the same cause even the one in question, more famous than its predecessors, may be pronounced on the evidence of what it accomplished, to have been inferior to its renown and to the current opinion about it formed under the tuition of the poets.  

There are two crucial and related points to bear in mind when analysing this passage. Firstly, Thucydides was explaining here why the forces of the Trojan expedition were smaller than the forces undertaking overseas expeditions in his day; this can be seen from the prefatory remarks he makes before his consideration of the size of the expedition sailing to Troy (1.10.3):

οὔκουν ἀπιστεῖν εἰκός... νοµίζειν δὲ τὴν στρατείαν ἐκείνην µεγίστην µὲν γενέσθαι τῶν πρὸ αὑτῆς, λειτοµένην δὲ τῶν νῦν, τῇ Ὁµήρου αὖ ποιήσαι εἴ τι χρὴ κάνητα ἡ ποιήσαι, ἣν εἰκός ἐπὶ τὸ µεῖζον µὲν ποιητὴν ὄντα κοσµῆσαι, ὅµως δὲ φαίνεται καὶ οὕτως ἐνδεεστέρα.

... but we may safely conclude that this expedition [to Troy] surpassed all before it, just as it fell short (in size) of expeditions today; if we can here also accept the testimony of Homer’s poems in which, without allowing for the exaggeration which a poet would feel himself licensed to employ, we can see that it was far from equaling ours.

14 This is an adapted version of Crawley’s translation. There is no need for Kallet-Marx’s hesitations concerning the meaning of τροφή in this passage ([1993] 29-30) or the meaning of χρήµατα (and its derivatives, such as ἀχρηµατία at 1.11) ([1993] 35-36) throughout the Archaeology: τροφή at 1.11 clearly denotes supplies/provisions and χρήµατα (and its derivatives) clearly refers to money.
Secondly, at 1.11 Thucydides was, as throughout the Archaeology, working from probability and analogy;\textsuperscript{15} that is, his description of the Trojan expedition, and the principles underlying this description, were abstracted from his own personal experience and knowledge of the practices of (amphibious) warfare in his time.\textsuperscript{16} There is therefore throughout Thucydides’ account of the reasons for the (inconsiderable) size of the Trojan expedition and the (considerable) duration of its operations at Troy an implicit comparison (and contrast) with (the greater and more efficient) Athenian amphibious expeditions of his own day.\textsuperscript{17} Thucydides was making the point at 1.11 that the Trojan expedition did not operate with the same scale of naval power as contemporary Athenian expeditions since it did not possess the financial resources available to the contemporary Athenian empire; in addition, he made the related point that, because the Trojan expedition did not have the financial resources available to fifth-century Athens, its siege of Troy had to be prosecuted in a different manner to the (circumvallation) sieges.

\textsuperscript{15} See again p.122 n.9 above and also esp. de Romilly (1967) 242 for a list of words showing that Thucydides’ argument that the Trojan War was inferior to the Peloponnesian War was a personal thesis based on probability and supported by observable indications (note esp. δῆλον ὅτι at 1.11.1, and δηλοῦται at 1.11.2; note also φαίνεται at 1.11.1, showing that Thucydides is not reporting, but reconstructing (from probability)). Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 27-28: “[b]ecause the Trojan expedition was considered one of the greatest events of the Greek past, Thucydides had to demonstrate its weakness to support his own argument. He did so through his own opinion (möi dokei) and deduction, through a cold, dispassionate rationality which derived from, but ultimately rejected, the epic traditions of his day.” Cf. also Connor (1984) 21 n.6: “[t]he Trojan war is dismissed by an argument based on the likelihood that the attacking force had inadequate logistics (ch. 11) and by a calculation derived from the figures in Homer’s Catalogue of the Ships (Iliad II).”

\textsuperscript{16} See again p.122 n.10 above and also esp. Gomme, HCT i.115 for the point that Thucydides’ description of the operations of the Trojan expedition was based on the conditions of contemporary warfare. Cf., e.g., M. I. Finley \textit{ap.} Hornblower, \textit{CT} i.8: Thucydides’ view of the development of early Greece “is a theory derived from prolonged meditation about the world in which Thucydides lived”; Irwin (2007) 194: “Thucydides’ past times are very much the creative projection of his and his audience’s present time.”

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. here Canfora (1977) 459: “[... le point qui sert à chaque fois de référence [i.e. the activities of the Athenian empire in the Peloponnesian war] \textit{contient déjà en soi l’interprétation du fait pris en considération.} Le jugement est déjà contenu dans le choix du terme de comparaison.”
conducted by the Athenians in his time. In the process of comparing and contrasting the size and operations of the Trojan expedition with the amphibious expeditions of his own day, Thucydides thus incidentally (although crucially for his argument) illuminates the usual practices of fifth-century Athenian siege warfare: ¹⁸

1. Unlike the Trojan expedition, Athenian amphibious expeditions launched to reduce rebellious or uncooperative poleis in Thucydides’

¹⁸ Hunter ([1980] 203-204, repeated substantially at Hunter [1982] 40-42) and Kallet ([2001] 97-115 and 119-120 (the idea is derived from Hunter) argue that Thucydides’ presentation of the problems of the Trojan expedition was based on his thinking about the Sicilian expedition. This view is incorrect for several reasons. To deal with only its most serious problems: firstly, Hunter’s and Kallet’s view stems from a misunderstanding of the phrase “living off the land.” Hunter (followed by Kallet [2001] 99) argues that the Sicilian expedition was similar to the Trojan expedition in that both expeditions embarked on campaign with insufficient supplies and therefore had to provision themselves from local resources ([1980] 203-204 and esp. n.48); Hunter cited Gomme (HCT i.114) for the view that both expeditions expected “to live on the country.” But Gomme was misleadingly loose in his terminology here (and inconsistent: see HCT ii.21 n.2 where he states that “an army, save in exceptional cases such as the Sicilian expedition, would expect to live off the land”). The Athenian expedition to Sicily did expect to provision itself from local resources: but it expected (at all times) to acquire these provisions through purchase—whereas the Trojan expedition expected (in Thucydides’ analysis) to provision itself through pillaging (or foraging) or farming. The methods of supply of the two expeditions were therefore completely different (see Lynn [1993a] 15-19 on the importance of defining precisely what one means by “living off the country” and the various provisioning mechanisms this phrase covers; cf. Erdkamp [1998] 11). Secondly, because of their different means of acquiring provisions, the strategic difficulties facing each expedition were completely different: the Achaeans were not able to unite to besiege Troy because of their lack of food; the Athenians, united and massed for the siege of Syracuse, had trouble in securing their food supply because of their gradual loss of control over the sea. Thirdly, Hunter and Kallet miss the point that Thucydides’ judgment of previous military enterprises and wars in the Archaeology was formed by comparison with the normal practices of the Athenian empire (before the Peloponnesian War): the judgment that the Peloponnesian War would be the greatest led him to write up that war; and this judgment was based on criteria abstracted from Thucydides’ knowledge and experience of the Athenian empire before the war. Fourthly, the (implicit) comparison between the Trojan expedition and Athenian expeditions of Thucydides’ day—and the conclusion therefrom that the Trojan expedition was (much) inferior to contemporary expeditions—would have lost all of its value if the comparison was with the failed Sicilian expedition: the point of the Archaeology was to show that the Peloponnesian War and the fifth-century Athenian empire represented the acme of human development, superior to all earlier wars and empires. Fifthly, Kallet pronounces the analysis at 1.11 “unusual” and “strange” and therefore concludes that its motivation must be found outside the Archaeology ([2001] 98-99; cf. [2001] 232 n.14: 1.11 “comes out of the blue” and is only explicable if Thucydides was thinking there about the Sicilian expedition). But the motivation for the analysis at 1.11, as noted above (and by Kallet herself in an earlier work—see the quotation at n.15 above), clearly comes from the fact that Thucydides needed to show for his argument that the Trojan War was inferior to the Peloponnesian War (see 1.9.5 and 1.11.2 for Thucydides explicitly signaling this). Finally, note that, in order to support her argument that Thucydides’ analysis of the Trojan expedition was based on the experience of the Athenians in Sicily, Kallet has to adopt a tendentiously incorrect translation of “περιουσίαν... τροφῆς” at 1.11.2 as “a surplus of money” ([2001] 98, with [2001] 107-108).
day were sufficiently financed.\textsuperscript{19} Because of this, they were able (unlike the Trojan expedition) to embark from Athens with plenty of supplies ("περιουσίαν... τροφῆς").\textsuperscript{20}

2. Because they were sufficiently financed and had plenty of supplies, Athenian amphibious expeditions sent out to besiege island or coastal poleis into subjection could (once they had established their mastery by success in an initial battle) devote all of their forces to the circumvallation and continuous blockades of those poleis:\textsuperscript{21} unlike the Trojan expedition, Athenian besieging forces did not have to scatter to acquire supplies through foraging or pillaging (or farming).\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19} Rawlings ([2007] 75) states that: “Thucydides rationalised the duration of the Trojan War on just these terms: the force of 1,200 Achaean ships was so large that it created supply problems (1.11). The Greeks could only keep part of their force in the field; the rest worked the land to grow food.” This is incorrect: it was the Trojan expedition’s lack of money (and not its size) that led to its supply problems.

\textsuperscript{20} Cf. Hornblower, \textit{CT} i.36 ad 1.11: “[m]uch of what follows is sheer guesswork. Nor do all of Th.’s remarks make very good sense. He argues that the Greeks must have been poor because they did not bring plenty of food supplies with them. Without tinned food there was not much that Greek armies of Th.’s own day (which is what he has in mind) could do after a day or two except what he describes the army before Troy as doing, viz. to forage. Th.’s remarks must, however be taken as evidence that fifth-century Greek armies did bring \textit{some} supplies with them.” Although a moment’s thinking on the food supply of pre-industrial cities or the food storage practices of pre-industrial peasants—never mind the evidence here and elsewhere (see chapter 1 passim, section iii below) for classical Greek military forces bringing and storing provisions (not to mention all the evidence for other pre-industrial European forces engaging in these practices)—shows that Hornblower’s remarks on the impossibility of storing food supplies before the advent of tinned food supplies are incorrect, the content of his last sentence quoted here is a valid and necessary inference from 1.11.

\textsuperscript{21} See Gomme, \textit{HCT} i.115-116 on Thucydides’ description of the experiences of the Trojan expedition: “[i]t would seem then natural to suppose that the picture of the Trojan war which Thucydides has in mind is as follows: the Greeks won the first battle on land... and in the ordinary way [my emphasis], with so large a force, would have proceeded to invest Troy which could not have held out very long; as it was, they had to scatter their forces, with the result that the Trojans... were able to dispute the mastery of the land with them..., so that the city could not be invested...”

\textsuperscript{22} Cf. Krentz (2007) 180: “[Thucydides] argues that insufficient financial resources hampered the Greek siege of Troy, because the Greeks had to turn to farming and piracy to support themselves, making the Trojans a match for the Greeks who remained at Troy (1.11).” Thucydides says the leaders of the Trojan expedition only brought out so many men as could expect to live off the country: “ὡςον ἠπιστεύσαν αὐτῶν πολεµὼν βιοτεύσει” (1.11.1) (cf. Xen., \textit{Cyr.} 3.2.25 where Xenophon says that the Chaldaeans were accustomed to live from pillaging raids: "εἰδικεὶ ἀπὸ πολέµου βιοτεύειν..."); in practice, this meant either farming or “ληστεία.” The noun “ληστεία” normally denotes pillaging rather than foraging (see chapter 1 section ivb nn.205, 206, 218), but it is probably best here not to press the distinction between the
3. From these two points, the conclusion follows that, for their voyages to revolting or recalcitrant poleis, and during their sieges of those poleis, Athenian amphibious forces used money to acquire their provisions: i.e., they acquired their provisions through purchase.

These insights—together with the conclusions from the analysis in chapter 1 of Nicias’ second speech to the assembly before the departure of the Sicilian expedition—will provide the framework for the detailed discussion of the provisioning of Athenian siege warfare that follows.

b. The provisioning of Athenian amphibious forces during their voyages to targets of operations

Although the conditions of warfare for Athenian amphibious expeditions in the Aegean could be taken for granted by Thucydides and his readers, and therefore the preparations for the provisioning of those expeditions could normally be assumed in—and thus omitted from—Thucydides’ narrative, analysis of 1.11 and Nicias’ speech before the departure of the Sicilian expedition shows that normal Athenian amphibious expeditions brought (some) provisions on their voyages to their targets of operations. Both of these points receive further illumination from Thucydides’ description of the terms of the debate for the second assembly discussing the παρασκευή for the Sicilian expedition (6.8.3). Thucydides tells us that a second assembly was held regarding the expedition to Sicily “καὶ ὅτι χρὴ τὴν παρασκευὴν ταῖς ναυσὶ τάχιστα γίνεσθαι, καὶ activities too hard (see again chapter 1 section ivb on the sometimes indistinct boundaries between foraging and pillaging).

23 See introduction section iv.
τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, εἴ του προσδέοιντο, ψηφισθῆναι ἐς τὸν ἔκπλουν” (“to consider how the παρασκευὴ for the ships might be prepared as quickly as possible, and to vote whatever else might be required by the generals for the expedition”); παρασκευὴ here should be taken to mean all the heavy and light infantry, cavalry, and grain supplies brought for an expedition. 24 What is interesting here is that the terms of the debate show that the fact that there would be a παρασκευὴ for the expedition was taken for granted; i.e., the question to be decided in the assembly was not whether there would be a παρασκευὴ for the expedition, but how it might be prepared as quickly as possible. There is no indication from Thucydides that there was anything unusual about the reasons for the calling of this assembly, or that there was anything peculiar to the Sicilian expedition that meant that the organization of provisions (as part of a παρασκευὴ) could be assumed for this expedition, but not for others. 25 The only thing unusual about 6.8.3 is that Thucydides saw fit to include consideration of a debate on the παρασκευὴ of an expedition in the first place: Thucydides did this uniquely here, because it enabled him, by describing the speeches of Alcibiades and Nicias, and especially the latter’s second address to the assembly, to bring out and emphasize those factors that he saw as crucial to the outcome of the Sicilian expedition—i.e., those things that make up the παρασκευὴ of an expedition: infantry, cavalry, triremes, and grain supplies. 26 It was only the fact that

24 See again p.27 n.37 for this definition.

25 Moreover, the fact that Thucydides could casually mention that the assembly was called to consider the quickest means of preparing the παρασκευὴ for the triremes of the expedition, without feeling the need for any explanation of the reason for the assembly or that any indication that it was unusual, demonstrates that this was quite a normal procedure, and not one peculiar to the Sicilian expedition.

26 See appendix 1 section iii. It is because of the close relationship between speech and narrative in Thucydides, and the emphasis placed on the παρασκευὴ of the expedition in the second speech of Nicias,
the Sicilian theater of operations was atypical—i.e., that certain important features of overseas warfare in the Aegean could not be assumed there and therefore that an expedition to Sicily would require certain special forms of παρασκευή—that led to the detailed concentration on παρασκευή in Nicias’ speech, and thus, as at 6.8.3, in the preceding and ensuing narrative. Thus, although the mention of παρασκευή at 6.8.3 is atypical, paradoxically this passage shows us again that the organization of provisions for Athenian overseas expeditions within the Aegean was a normal procedure—but (apart from here) always taken for granted by Thucydides.

But again, because they operated surrounded by allied/subject states, Athenian amphibious expedition sailing out against rebellious or uncooperative poleis in the Aegean did not have to bring substantial amounts of provisions for their (relatively short)

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27 Kallet ([2001] 44 n.81) comments on Nicias’ speech: “[i]t seems reasonable, given the emphasis on the paradoxical nature of the assembly’s reaction to Nikias’ speech, to suggest that the amount of detail and kinds of things mentioned were unusual, not the sorts of things that a general might normally relate in a speech before the assembly. If so, then it follows that the assembly was not accustomed to hearing this degree of detail, nor to learning the extent of the preparations necessary.” This comment misses the implications from 6.8.3 that it was usual for Athenian expeditions to bring παρασκευή from home, and for this παρασκευή to be discussed in the Athenian assembly; though Kallet is right to note that the nature and amount of the παρασκευή Nicias recommended for the expedition were unusual.

28 Thus Krentz ([2007] 154) is incorrect to state that merchant ships only followed expeditions that were sailing to hostile territory; as is Raaflaub ([2007] 100) in stating that transporters only accompanied Athenian naval expeditions once “they moved out of their power sphere.” It should be noted here that, in his description of Hagnon’s reinforcing expedition to the siege of Potidaea in 430, Diodorus notes that Hagnon, in his preparations for the siege, “καθαράς... παρασκεύασε πολιορκητικὰς καὶ ὥπλων καὶ βελῶν πλῆθος, ἓτι δὲ ὄπλων δαψίλειαν ικανήν πάση τῇ δυνάμει; “had made ready every kind of engine used in sieges, a multitude of arms and missiles, and an abundance of grain, sufficient for the entire army” (12.46.2). This passage cannot be taken as independent evidence (from Thucydides) for the provisioning of Athenian amphibious forces in the Aegean in the fifth century, however. Diodorus is here clearly simply extrapolating from the account of Hagnon’s expedition found in Thucydides (2.58.1-2), his main source for this period (see Meiggs [1972] 457, Davies [1993] 2, Samons [2000] 95-96) (for another example of Diodorus extrapolating events from his sources, see p.263 n.22 below).
voyages to war zones. Assured during their voyages of reception at allied/subject 
*poleis*—and therefore markets at which they could reprovision\(^{29}\)—the supplies they 
brought from Athens served a dual function:\(^{30}\) firstly, as an emergency reserve in case of 
sailing delays caused by bad weather; secondly, and more importantly, to provide a 
sufficient amount of food to cover their provisioning requirements during initial 
operations at their target (and until additional shipments of supplies from nearby 
allies/subjects and Athens began to arrive there).\(^{31}\) The proper execution of these 
functions did not require Athenian amphibious expeditions in the Aegean to be 
accompanied by massive amounts of grain supplies.\(^{32}\)

c. The provisioning of Athenian circumvallation sieges

After having arrived at their target, and establishing there in initial operations 
complete superiority on land and sea,\(^{33}\) the (principal) method used by Athenian
amphibious forces to take revolting or recalcitrant poleis by siege was to (completely) surround these poleis’ fortified urban centers with walls and, by means of a continuous and highly constrictive blockade, reduce their inhabitants (who would have fled inside their city walls at the approach of the Athenians) by hunger.\textsuperscript{34} The adoption of this strategy was forced on the Athenians by the primitiveness of Greek siege techniques in the fifth century.\textsuperscript{35} The process of reducing cities by starving out their inhabitants was always a prolonged one:\textsuperscript{36} the siege operations at Thasos lasted three years;\textsuperscript{37} at Aegina

\textsuperscript{34} For the phrase “highly constrictive blockade,” see Robinson (1999) 139.

\textsuperscript{35} The key discussion remains Gomme, \textit{HCT} i.16-18: see esp. \textit{HCT} i.16 for Athenian use of the siege technique of blockade by circumvallation being forced on them by the “immense superiority [in the fifth century] of the defensive weapon, the wall whether of stone or mud-brick, over the offensive—javelins, arrows, or hand-worked battering-rams.” Cf., e.g., Grundy (1948) 283-290; Hanson (2005) 192; Strauss (2007) 239, 243. Although there were some innovations in Greek siege techniques over the course of the fifth century (see, e.g., van Wees [2004] 139-141, Rawlings [2007] 134-135), these were limited, and always insufficient to overcome the superiority of city-wall defenses; circumvallation (followed by continuous and constrictive blockade) therefore remained the primary Athenian siege technique during this period.

\textsuperscript{36} The exceptional case of Nisaea proves the rule: in 424, the Peloponnesian garrison there surrendered immediately after being invested with walls by Athenian forces (4.69); unlike a polis, the garrison had no stores of provisions and could not hope to hold out any length of time (4.69.3).

\textsuperscript{37} See 1.100.2-1.101.3. Krentz ([2007] 179) notes correctly that the first attested Greek circumvallation wall was at Samos in 440. But that the strategy of besieging cities by circumvallation wall and blockade attested in Thucydides for Athenian operations at Samos and later sieges in the Peloponnesian War was also used at the siege of Thasos and other Athenian sieges before Samos can be proved both from general considerations and from descriptions of these sieges in Thucydides and other authors. Firstly, assault techniques were, if anything, more primitive in the pre-Samos period; the walling in of cities followed by continuous and ‘air-tight’ blockade was therefore—as at Samos and later fifth-century sieges—the sole strategic option that had a (high) chance of reducing cities in this period. Secondly, the prolonged duration of siege operations before Samos (when known, see this and next note) suggests very strongly that circumvallation followed by blockade was the technique used by the Athenians pre-Samos to reduce cities by siege. Thirdly, Thucydides uses πολιορκεῖν or πολιορκία to describe the sieges of Eion (“πολιορκία” (1.98.1)), Naxos (“πολιορκία” (1.98.4), “ἐπολιόρκει” (1.137.2)), Thasos (“πολιορκούµενοι” (1.101.1, 1.101.3)), Aegina (“ἐπολιόρκουν” (1.105.2)), and Kition (“ἐπολιόρκουν” (1.112.2)). Although Thucydides’ does not describe any of these sieges in detail, Robinson notes ([1999] 139 (and see his entire discussion at [1999] 139-143)) that “[w]here Thucydides uses πολιορκεῖν or πολιορκία with sufficient narrative context for us to judge precisely, the terms always connote a highly constrictive blockade which cuts off the defender from supplies.” We should take it, then, that Thucydides was thinking in terms of a blockade
nine months;\textsuperscript{38} at Samos some time over a year;\textsuperscript{39} at Potidaea two and a half years;\textsuperscript{40} at Mytilene just less than a year;\textsuperscript{41} at Scione two years;\textsuperscript{42} at Melos somewhere less than a year.\textsuperscript{43}

In some of these cases, however, only part of the initial amphibious force sent out from Athens to establish the circumvallation of cities remained for the entire duration of the ensuing blockade.\textsuperscript{44} Since Athens had complete naval superiority over the Aegean before 413,\textsuperscript{45} blockaded island \textit{poleis} could not hope for outside aid in relieving sieges.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{38} 1.105.2, 1.108.4 with Diod. 11.78.4 (cf. Gomme, \textit{HCT} i.319).

\textsuperscript{39} See 1.115.2-1.117 with \textit{IG} \textit{1}\textsuperscript{3} 363 and the discussion at chapter 5 section iv below.

\textsuperscript{40} 1.64-65, 2.58, 2.70.2.

\textsuperscript{41} 3.6.1-2, 3.18.4-5, 3.27-28.

\textsuperscript{42} 4.131-4.132, 4.133.4, 5.2.2, 5.18.7, 5.32.1.

\textsuperscript{43} The siege started in the summer of 416 before the end of the Panathenaic year (see 5.114.1-2 with \textit{IG} \textit{1}\textsuperscript{3} 370.24-35) and ended some time before the end of winter 416/5 (5.115.4, 5.116.2-4).

\textsuperscript{44} See Gomme, \textit{HCT} i.18.

\textsuperscript{45} See below pp.141-145, pp.164-167.

\textsuperscript{46} Cf. Guilmartin (1974) 102-103.
for this reason, once Athenian forces had successfully walled in rebellious or uncooperative island poleis, their commanders could sometimes dismiss—as at Aegina in 458 and Melos in 416—the majority of the men that had completed the circumvallation of the urban center;⁴⁷ at Scione in 423, too—which, because of its position at the southern tip of the Pallene peninsula, was a virtual island on account of the Athenian occupation of Potidaea—⁴⁸ the Athenians, once they had successfully and completely invested the city, left only a detachment from the original amphibious force sent against the polis to guard the fortifications.⁴⁹ In these instances, only enough men as were sufficient to man the walls of the circumvallation and deal with the few sorties emanating from the invested city could be left behind to maintain the blockade.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Aegina: see again Gomme, HCT i.18; Melos: see 5.114.2. Another factor (in addition to the fact that Athenian naval superiority made access by enemy forces to these islands impossible) permitting the Athenian dismissal of the majority of the initial forces that had sailed against these poleis was that there were no other poleis on either Aegina or Melos: there was thus no possibility of an enemy attack by land on the forces left behind by the Athenians to maintain the blockades of these cities. Because of these factors, it is probable that the blockade of Naxos starting in 469 was also continuously maintained by only part of the force that had been sent to force that polis back into the Athenian fold. Contrast, in this regard, the one thousand hoplites (and forty triremes) sent out against Mytilene in 428 both establishing and remaining for the duration of the siege blockade of that city (see p.136 and n.56 below) because of the threat of attack by land by the forces of the Lesbian poleis friendly to Mytilene (i.e. all the other poleis on Lesbos apart from Methymna)—although cf. 3.18.4: the thousand Athenian hoplites blockaded Mytilene with a single wall, rather than constructing the usual double wall for the circumvallation; as Gomme notes ad loc. (HCT ii.278), this shows that “[t]he Athenians did not fear any big attack from the land side by Mytilene’s allies.”

⁴⁸ For Scione as a virtual island, see 4.120.3, 4.121.2.

⁴⁹ See 4.133.4, 5.2.2.

⁵⁰ It should be noted here that defense against sieges in the Greek world in the fifth century was almost entirely passive (cf. p.132 n.35 above), limited to occasional sorties against siege works or raids for provisions (see, e.g., 5.115.4, 5.116.2). In the fifth century, it was only the exceptional polis of Syracuse—possessed of the biggest urban population in the Greek world outside Athens (see chapter 1 section v)—that could sustain substantial counter-siege operations against an attempted Athenian blockade.
In other cases, however, tactical considerations forced the entirety of the initial force sent out from Athens to reduce a polis to remain for the duration of a blockade. At Samos in 440, the investment and blockade of the city was established by one hundred and twenty-five triremes (1.116.2). After Pericles had taken sixty ships from the blockading squadron to sail to Caunus and Caria against the reported approach of a Phoenician fleet (1.116.3), the Samians sortied out and defeated the remaining Athenian and allied triremes, and “for about fourteen days they were masters of the sea off their coast, bringing in and carrying out whatever they wished” (“καὶ τῆς Σαλάσσης τῆς καὶ τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἐκφατησαν... καὶ ἐσκομίσαντο καὶ ἐξεκομίσαντο καὶ ἔβοϊλοντο”) (1.117.1); but when Pericles returned, after the rumors of the coming of the Phoenician fleet proved unfounded, the Samians were again blockaded by the Athenian and allied triremes (“πάλιν ταῖς ναυσὶ κατεκλῆσαν”) (1.117.2). Because of the real threat of the Samian navy and the rumored threat of the Phoenician fleet, all of the original one hundred and twenty-five triremes (minus however many were lost in the fighting with the Samians (probably only a few)) had to remain for the entire duration of the re-established blockade (which lasted eight months before the Samians capitulated (1.117.3)); as did the sixty Athenian and thirty allied triremes that joined the blockade soon after it was reinstated (1.117.2). Similarly, none of the one hundred and forty triremes of the Athenian expedition that walled and blockaded Kition in 451 left the blockade of that city—until they were forced to because of lack of provisions (see p.145 n.80 below)—since the


52 See 1.112.2 with pp.132-133 n.37 above.
presence nearby of hostile and substantial land and naval forces from Phoenicia, Cyprus, and Cilicia (1.112.4) meant that the presence of all of the Athenian and allied triremes was needed to guard against the possibility of enemy forces breaking their lines from outside and raising the siege.\textsuperscript{53} The initial force of three thousand hoplites (and seventy triremes) sent out against Potidaea in 432 (1.57.6, 1.61.1, 1.61.4) also stayed for the whole two and a half years that it took to reduce that city by starvation;\textsuperscript{54} as Gomme notes, the initial Athenian forces stayed at Potidaea because “the besiegers had to be prepared for attack by land from Olynthus and Spartolos.”\textsuperscript{55} The forty Athenian triremes (3.3.2) and one thousand hoplites (3.18.3-5) who established the blockade of Mytilene in 428 also remained for the duration of the blockade of that city, both because of the (limited) threat of the Mytilenian fleet and because of the possibility of forces from the other Lesbian poleis allied to Mytilene attacking their lines by land.\textsuperscript{56}

The Athenian amphibious forces that did stay to prosecute blockades of revolting or uncooperative poleis did not acquire their provisions through foraging.\textsuperscript{57} There were two main reasons for this. Firstly, the poleis that revolted from the Athenians or refused

\textsuperscript{53} I owe the phrasing of this last clause to Guilmartin (1974) 103.

\textsuperscript{54} I demonstrate this in chapter 4 section iv.

\textsuperscript{55} HCT ii.275. See 1.62.3-4, 1.63.1-2, 1.65.2 for fighting on land between the Athenians and the cities in the vicinity of Potidaea (and allied to that city) before the establishment of the blockade of Potidaea. And note again chapter 4 section iv: the seventy triremes sent out in 432 also appear to have remained for the duration of the siege.

\textsuperscript{56} Thucydides never mentions the dismissal of any part of the Athenian forces besieging Mytilene. The entire Athenian land and naval force remained although neither the naval threat (see 3.4.2) nor the threat of hostile forces from Lesbian poleis relieving the siege by land (see p.134 n.47 above) was very great.

\textsuperscript{57} See again the analysis of 1.11 in section iia above.
to become their subjects broke openly with the Athenians only after a period of sustained planning and preparation.\textsuperscript{58} This meant that rebellious or recalcitrant \textit{poleis} had the opportunity and time to take countermeasures before and against the (inevitable) Athenian reaction and circumvallation of their cities. As part of their preparations for their resistance to the expected Athenian invasion, the inhabitants of \textit{poleis} wishing to break free from or unwilling to submit to Athenian subjection would have removed their property—including crops, stored provisions, and livestock—from the \textit{chora} of their \textit{polis} into its \textit{astu} as part of their preparations for resistance to invasion, just as the inhabitants of every (other) Greek city did when they were threatened by possible invasion or siege.\textsuperscript{59} (Related to this point, it should be presumed, too, that \textit{poleis}

\textsuperscript{58} Although this is only explicitly attested for some of the \textit{poleis} that revolted from or disobeyed Athens, it can be taken as certain that this was the case for all those states who tried to liberate themselves from Athenian subjection. For preparations before revolts from Athens, see 1.115.4-5 (Samian planning and preparations in 440); 1.58.1, 1.60.1 (Potidaean preparations in 432); 3.2.2 (extensive Mytilenian preparations in 428, comprising the construction of triremes, city-walls, and moles for their harbors as well as the importation of archers and grain from the Black Sea); 4.123.4 (preparations at Scione in 423). See, too, Kraay (1984) 4: Mytilene minting a special denomination of electrum coinage on the pattern of the Cyzicene stater (“the normal trade currency of the Black Sea”) to pay for the archers and grain from Pontus. See also Kraay (1984) 5: concluding from a hoard of large and varied late fifth century silver coinage struck by the \textit{polis} of Melos that “[i]t looks as though the Melians, shortly before 416, undertook the conversion into coin of their stock of silver bullion with a view to purchasing supplies and mercenaries to withstand another Athenian attack, which perhaps came sooner than expected.”

\textsuperscript{59} Although the evacuation of property from the countryside is never explicitly attested in Thucydides for a \textit{polis} revolting from or refusing to submit to the Athenians (because it could be assumed by his audience), that such measures were taken is certain from the many references to the practice found in other contexts. For the practice of bringing food and other property from the countryside into the fortified urban center as the usual response by a classical Greek \textit{polis} to a threatened invasion, see Aen. Tact. 7.1, 8.1, 10.3, 15.1-2; cf. Xen., Cyr. 3.1.3. For (late sixth and) fifth century examples of evacuation of food and property from the \textit{chora} surrounding cities, see esp. Hdt. 5.34.1: the inhabitants of Naxos (in 500), having been forewarned of the coming Persian attack on their city by Megabates, Aristagoras, and exiles from their \textit{polis}, “[\textit{αὐτίκα µὲν ἐσηνείκαντο τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος,} “immediately brought everything from the fields within the town walls…” Thucydides describes the Athenians bringing their property into the city from the countryside during the Peloponnesian army’s delay at Oenoe in 431 (2.18.3-4) (cf. 2.13.2, 2.14.1). See also Diod. 13.81.3: the inhabitants of Akragas in 406, presuming that the Carthaginians would attack their city, “[\textit{ἐδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν τε σῖτον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καρπούς, ἐτι δὲ τὰς κτήσεις ἁπάσας, ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας κατακοµίζειν ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν,} “decided to gather not only their grain and other crops but also all their possessions from the countryside within their walls.” At some point in the final years of the fifth century, the Milesians, having heard that Tissaphernes was planning to invade their city, “[\textit{τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν εἰς ἄστυ}}
planning to revolt—since they could choose the timing of their break with Athens—did so only after their harvest had been brought in.)

Even in the cases of Potidaea and Mytilene, when the Athenians found out about these poleis’ revolts before the preparations for the revolts had been fully completed (1.58.2; 3.2.3ff.), the impossibility for the Athenians of keeping secret their preparation of amphibious forces to suppress these rebellions, combined with the weeks or even months it would take for the Athenians to mobilize their forces and for these forces to reach the theater of operations, meant that the arrival of the Athenian expeditions could have been expected and thus prepared for in both cases (i.e., property and provisions could have been taken in from the countryside of Potidaea and Mytilene before the expected Athenian amphibious

ἀνεκοµίσαντο,” “brought their property into the town from the fields” (Polyaenus, Strateg. 7.18.2). For fourth century examples, see Plut., Phoc. 11.1: because of their mistreatment at the hands of Athenian generals in the mid-fourth century, the allies of the Athenians in the Aegean came to regard all Athenian generals except Phocion as enemies, and therefore as men who obstructed their harbors, and forced them to bring their herds, slaves, women, and children into their cities. See also, e.g., Dem. 19.86, 19.125-126 (cf. 18.36) and Aesch. 2.139 (esp.), 3.79-80 for the evacuation of the Athenian countryside in 346 in response to a threatened invasion.

60 For classical Greek poleis that did not have overwhelming naval superiority—i.e., all those cities other than Athens in the fifth century—enemy invasion before harvest could lead to their immediate surrender: see, e.g., 4.84.1-2, 4.88.1 (Acanthians joining Brasidas because of fear for their grapes which were still on the vine); Xen., Hell. 4.7.1 (Acarnanians surrendering immediately after Agesilaos’ invasion because their inland location made replacement of the (threatened) standing crop impossible). It may have been the fact that Aegina and Melos were invaded by the Athenians at times not of their own choosing—and thus possibly before the time of the harvest on those islands—that made the sieges of these poleis (relatively) short in duration (compared to others in the fifth century).

61 See 3.3.5 for a classic illustrative example: the Mytilenians were informed of the Athenian dispatch of an expedition of forty Athenian triremes (to take them by surprise) in 428 by a man who crossed over from Athens to Euboea, went overland to Geraestos, and, coming across there a merchant ship that was putting to sea, embarked and, on the third day after leaving Athens, reached Mytilene (to tell the Mytilenians of the impending approach of the Athenian fleet). Cf. Thorne (2001) 234 on the (great) difficulty for a general land invasion of achieving surprise.

62 See van Wees (2004) 215-218 on the process of launching a fleet from Athens possibly taking several weeks. It should be noted, however, that the Athenian force sent out in 432 on news of the revolt of Potidaea took less than forty days to reach the war zone (see 1.61.1 with 1.60.2).
force disembarked in their territory). Thucydides, other contemporaries historians, and later authors closely linked unexpected attacks on territory with the opportunity to gather much plunder and provisions, on the reasoning that the inhabitants of the invaded territory, not expecting an attack, usually left their property in the countryside in times of (expected) peace; the implication underlying every description of the plunder deriving from unexpected invasions is that attacks that were expected usually failed to find much property to pillage or forage in the countryside surrounding an urban center (in contrast to surprise attacks). For examples of unexpected attacks actually gaining (or expected to gain) much booty in Thucydides, see 2.5.4 (and contrast 2.5.7) (Theban attack on Plataea in 431); 2.93.4 (Peloponnesian attack on Salamis in the winter of 429/8); 4.103.5-104.1, 4.104.3, 4.106.1 (see chapter 1 section ivb above); and Dover, *HCT* iv.315 ad loc.). Thucydides, other contemporaries historians, and later authors closely linked unexpected attacks on territory with the opportunity to gather much plunder and provisions, on the reasoning that the inhabitants of the invaded territory, not expecting an attack, usually left their property in the countryside in times of (expected) peace; the implication underlying every description of the plunder deriving from unexpected invasions is that attacks that were expected usually failed to find much property to pillage or forage in the countryside surrounding an urban center (in contrast to surprise attacks). For examples of unexpected attacks actually gaining (or expected to gain) much booty in Thucydides, see 2.5.4 (and contrast 2.5.7) (Theban attack on Plataea in 431); 2.93.4 (Peloponnesian attack on Salamis in the winter of 429/8); 4.103.5-104.1, 4.104.3, 4.106.1 (see chapter 1 section ivb above); 6.49.3 (see chapter 1 section ivb above and Dover, *HCT* iv.315 ad loc.). For another contemporary classical Greek historian, see, e.g., Xen., *Anab.* 6.2.17 (Arcadian Cyreans’ attack on Bithynian territory in 400); Xen., *Hell.* 3.4.12 (Agesilaos attacking Phrygia in 396); Xen., *Hell.* 4.7.7 (Agesipolis attacking Argive territory in 388). Note that ruses linked to the use of unexpected attacks to gain large amounts of plunder also appear often in Polyaenus’ *Strategica*: see, e.g., 1.40.2, 3.9.36, 3.9.44.

Thus, even if total evacuation of crops, stored provisions and livestock from the countryside of revolting or uncooperative poleis was practically impossible, by the time an Athenian overseas expedition arrived at the territory of a revolting polis, there would have been very little left in the countryside surrounding its fortified center for the Athenians to forage or pillage.

Secondly, tactical considerations—highly constrictive blockades by definition had to be continuously manned in order to achieve their aims—compelled Athenian forces besieging poleis to remain immobile. The forces maintaining blockades of cities could therefore range only over short distances to forage (in any case, their range of foraging was severely limited by the fact that they were normally besieging cities on small

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65 The inhabitants of poleis expecting an Athenian force to besiege their city may also have taken measures to hide food in the countryside or simply to destroy it: cf. Erdkamp (1998) 138-139 for such measures (and also Contamine [1972] 123).

islands). Restricted to foraging over a limited area—and an area from which the inhabitants of the (now) besieged polis would have attempted to remove all food stores (within their city walls)—the blockading Athenian sailors and soldiers would have stripped the land surrounding their circumvallation walls of its remaining food stores in (at most) a matter of weeks. In addition, since a blockade would obviously prevent the inhabitants of the invested polis from sowing or planting any crops, there would be no opportunity for a force maintaining a blockade to acquire provisions through foraging after the first summer and fall of a siege.

It was therefore impossible for Athenian sailors and soldiers engaged in protracted sieges of coastal or island poleis to subsist on foraging. Rather, in order to

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67 And see 3.6.1-2: the forty Athenian triremes that established the naval blockade of Mytilene were almost completely shut off from the rest of the island of Lesbos—and therefore would have had no opportunity to forage for provisions.

68 See esp. Erdkamp (1998) 150; and cf. Diod. 16.13.3: Dionysius II, holed up in the citadel of Syracuse in 357/356, “πάντων δ’ εὐπορῶν πλὴν σίτου καὶ δαλαπτοκρατῶν ἐλήστευε τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰς τροφὰς ἐκ τῶν προομῶν καινὸς προεξόμενος ἡξαπάστειλα ναις φορτίδας καὶ χρήματα πρὸς τὸν τοῦ σίτου καταγορασμὸν”; “[h]aving plenty of everything but grain and being in control of the sea, he began to raid the countryside and, finding it difficult to provide subsistence from his foraging parties, he dispatched merchant ships and money to buy grain.” For stationary pre-industrial European military forces quickly eating out the area surrounding their camps, and therefore having to rely on a method of food supply other than foraging, cf., e.g., Contamine (1972) 123; Mallett (1974) 139; Engels (1978) 45-46; Keegan (1993) 302; Roth (1999) 171, 299; Bachrach (2002) 86-89. Cf. also Harari (2000) 310: “it seems that [northern European medieval] armies relying on local supply [i.e. foraging] alone usually could not camp in enemy country much longer than a week.” We might contrast here the very restricted opportunities for foraging available to Athenian amphibious forces blockading strongly fortified and forewarned Greek urban centers with the experiences of the Cyreans on their parabasis along the southern Black Sea coast. Not restricted to their bases by tactical considerations, and operating in a surrounding territory with many unfortified (or weakly fortified) non-Greek settlements, the relatively small numbers of Cyreans (between seven and nine thousand men on this part of the march (Lee [2007] Table 2)) were able to (partly) subsist by foraging for more than a month during their stays at Trapezus, Cotyora, and Calpe (Lee [2007] 205-206) (“partly” because the mercenaries also acquired provisions through purchase during each of these halts (see chapter 3 section iiia)). Note, however, that during their stay at Heraclea—where there were no surrounding non-Greek settlements to pillage or cultivated territory to forage in—the Cyreans did not consider foraging or pillaging as a viable means of acquiring provisions for their onward journey from that polis (see again chapter 3 section iiiia).

ensure their permanent security of supply, so that they could maintain a continuous blockade,\textsuperscript{70} Athenian besieging forces required a continuous supply of external provisions: in other words, the Athenian forces blockading rebellious or recalcitrant poleis were completely dependent for their provisions on continuous sea-borne supply lines.\textsuperscript{71} Permanent security of supply for Athenian blockades of maritime poleis therefore required naval superiority (in order to guarantee the integrity of their supply lines):\textsuperscript{72} but the complete control Athens enjoyed over the Aegean in the fifth century prior to 412 ensured that the continuous supply of provisions required for Athenian siege

\textsuperscript{70} See Erdkamp (1998) 150 for the phrase “permanent security of supply.”

\textsuperscript{71} But not just Athenian forces. See Isoc. 18.60: an Athenian telling a court of his patriotic acts as a trierarch during the siege of Athens by Peloponnesian forces in 405/4 states: “τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον προειπόντος Λυσάνδρου, εἰ τὶς εἰσάγαγοι σῖτον ὡς ἕμας, ἔναντι τῆς ζηµίας, οὕτω φιλοτίµως εἴχοµεν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὡστε τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲ τὴν σφάτερον αὐτάν εἰσάγαγοι τολµώντων ἡµεῖς τὸν ὡς ἐκείνους εἰσπλέοντα λαµµάνοντες εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατήγοµεν”; “finally, when Lysander proclaimed that if anyone should import grain to you he would be punished with death, we were so zealous for the city’s welfare that although no one else dared to bring in even his own, we intercepted the grain that was being brought into them and discharged it at the Piraeus.” Cf. Diod. 20.82.4-5, 20.84.6: hundreds of ships sailing to the force of Demetrius Poliorcetes during his siege of Rhodes in 305/4 for the sake of trade. For the necessity of sea-borne supply lines in supporting lengthy operations in which continuous pressure on the enemy was the paramount strategic requirement, see Harari (2000) 327-328. See also Engels (1978) 45-46, 61, 120-121 for stationary military forces needing access to the sea (or a navigable river) in order to acquire provisions. Cf. Erdkamp (1998) 150; Roth (1999) 171: “[w]hen the army was forced to remain immobile, local resources were quickly used up and everything had to be brought in by way of supply lines.” Cf. also, e.g., Leyser (1993) 94-95, Bachrach (2002) 89-96 for access to sea-borne supplies crucial to the success of the First Crusades’ siege of Antioch.

\textsuperscript{72} Erdkamp (1998) 55; see also Rawlings (2007) 136. Cf. Dem. 19.123 (delivered in the summer of 343: Demosthenes prosecuting Aeschines for malversation committed by him as a member of the embassy sent to Macedonia in the year 346): if the Athenians had attempted to provide aid to the Phocians, it would have been impossible for Philip to remain at Thermopylae since “οὔτε γὰρ σῖτον ἤν ἐν τῇ χωρὶ, αὐτόρως διὰ τὸν πόλεμον γεγονυῖα, οὔτε η ἀποσιτία διευθυνότων διὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν...”; “[t]here was no grain in the country, as the war had prevented sowing; and the conveyance of grain was impossible so long as your fleet was there and commanded the sea. The Phocian cities were numerous, and not easy of capture, unless by protracted siege.”
operations was never halted (or even threatened) by a hostile fleet.\textsuperscript{73} (The Athenians’ overwhelming superiority over the Aegean and the seas around ‘mainland’ Greece also enabled them to ensure uninterrupted security of grain supplies to the Piraeus and to the ports of their allies connected by “long walls” to their urban centers;\textsuperscript{74} it also enabled the Athenians to maintain unbroken supply lines to their garrisons scattered around the coasts of the Aegean and western Greece.)\textsuperscript{75} Because of their control of the sea, the sea-borne

\textsuperscript{73} For Athenian control of the Aegean in the fifth century, see esp. 1.142.5-1.143.5, 2.62.2, 3.32.3, 5.97.1, 5.109.1; and ps.-Xen., \textit{Ath. Pol.} 2.2-7, 2.11-12, 2.14, 2.16 (with, e.g., the good brief discussion at Rawlings [2007] 111-112). See also next two notes. Note also 7.57.7: the Cephallenians and Zacynthians, though nominally independent allies, having to accompany the Sicilian expedition since, as islanders, they were forced to because of Athenian control of the sea. See also, e.g., \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 174.11-18: the Athenians believing (at some point between 430 and 410) that they were in control of the sea including (apparently) access to the Gulf of Corinth. Complete Athenian control over the Aegean was established with the defeat of the Persian fleet at the Eurymedon (1.100.1) and survived until the beginning of the Ionian War, despite localized attempts to challenge it (which were always unsuccessful): 1.100.2 (Thasos), 1.105.1 (Cecryphalia), 1.105.2 (Aegina), 1.116-1.117 (Samos), 3.4.2 (Mytilene). When control of the sea \textit{was} contested, convoys of supply ships could be attacked: see all in chapter 1 section iva; and Diod. 13.88.3-5 (Carthaginian naval attacks on Syracusan ships transporting grain to Akragas in 406); Diod. 15.3.3 (Evagoras attacking merchant ships supplying Persian forces operating on Cyprus in 386); Diod. 16.13.3 (Syracusan triremes attacking merchant ships carrying grain to Dionysius II in 357/6). In these circumstances, supply ships had to be accompanied by trireme support: see Diod. 14.64.1 (Syracusan triremes escorting a supply of provisions against possible Carthaginian attacks in 396); Polyaeus, \textit{Strateg.} 5.13.1 (with Salmon [1984] 129-130 n.11) (Corinthian triremes escorting supply ships at some point during the Peloponnesian War (?)). Contrast 2.67.4 (with section iii below): ships carrying grain to an Athenian amphibious expedition operating around the Peloponnese in the early years of the Peloponnesian War (apparently) unaccompanied by trireme support.

\textsuperscript{74} The building of long walls at Athens in 459: 1.107.1 (but see Plut., \textit{Cim.} 13.6 for a slightly earlier date). For the building of long walls at other cities allied to Athens, see 1.103.4 (Megara in 459) (cf. Plut., \textit{Phoc.} 15.2 for the rebuilding of long walls between Nisaea and Megara in the later fourth century for the same purpose); 5.52.2 (Patrae in 419); and esp. 5.82.5: the democracy at Argos building long walls down to the sea in 417, in order that, “ἐάν τὸς γῆς εἴργωνται, ἤ κατὰ Ἀθηναίων ἐπιτηδείων ὠφελῇ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ὠφελῇ”; “should they be cut off from the land, they might with the help of the Athenians have the advantage of importing supplies by sea” (these walls were destroyed by the Spartans in the following winter (5.83.2)). (For the building of long walls at Corinth in the middle of the fifth century, see Salmon [2001] 197; cf. Hornblower, \textit{CT} 1.197.) For (brief) discussion of the subject, see esp. Gomme, \textit{HCT} i.18; Osborne (1987) 154; Tchernia and Viviers (2000) 774; cf. Rawlings (2007) 135; Strauss (2007) 237-238. Cf. also \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 61, \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 62.1-5 (with, e.g., Rhodes [2007a] 35): decrees regulating the import of grain from the Black Sea to Methone and Aphytis showing that the Athenians could use their control of the sea to allow their allies import what they needed.

\textsuperscript{75} Garrisons were characterized by Thucydides as (solely) dependent on (sea-borne) imports for their supplies: see 7.28.1, describing Athens after the Peloponnesian occupation of Decelea: “τῶν δὲ πάντων ὁμαίως ἐπικτῶν ἐδείτο ἢ τάλλος, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ τάλλους εἶναι φρούρίου κατέστη”; “everything alike which the
supply of Athenian siege operations during the Peloponnesian War could (usually) be assumed by Thucydides. It was only in the extraordinary conditions of the blockade of Sphacteria that Thucydides described an Athenian blockading force experiencing difficulties in acquiring provisions through sea-borne imports: since the Athenian force at Pylos was operating in an uninhabited area surrounded by enemy states, and because city needed had to be imported, and Athens ceased to be a city and became a garrisoned fortress.” Cf. IG I3 174.11-17: Lycon the Achaean permitted by the Athenians (some time between 430 and 410) to sail and trade from Achaia to all places controlled by the Athenians and their garrisons: “τὴν δὲ ναῦν ἣν ἔδωκε ἐκκοµίσασθαι ἐξ Ἀχαίας ἐκκοµισάσθω καὶ ἐξέδωκεν αὐτῷ πλέον καὶ χρήµατα ἐσάγεν ὅσης Ἀθηναίων κρατεῖσι, καὶ ἐς τὰ Ἀθηναίων φρονία” (see Mackil [2003] 410-411 for brief discussion and references). See also IG I3 175: a separate very fragmentary inscription from the same period as IG I3 174 apparently granting the same allowances to sail and trade with all places controlled by the Athenians and their garrisons (see Walbank [1978] 286 and Lewis (at IG I3 p.176) for this inscription not being a copy of IG I3 174). The raiding characteristic of Athenian garrisons in hostile territory was not (primarily) for provisions: see chapter 1 section ivb. For a listing and (excellent) discussion of Athenian overseas garrisons in the fifth century, see Moreno (2007) 126ff. (numbers of men in garrisons mostly unknown but small (in the low hundreds rather than thousands)). Cf. Horden and Purcell (2000) 135 for the existence of these garrisons made possible by supply from the sea. Note that overseas garrisons were associated with (considerable) expense: 4.3.2-3; 8.4 (the Athenians in 413/412 abandoning the recently built fortress on Cythera as part of their efforts to cut expenditures after the Sicilian disaster (though see Andrews, HCT v.11 ad loc. (Pylos not abandoned at this time)); cf. IG I3 375.10 for a payment of six talents in 410/9 for the garrison at Pylos; and IG I3 377.20 for a payment of one talent for the fortress at Thorikos between 409/8 and 407/6.

76 In Thucydides’ narrative, it is, in fact, only in the recklessly exaggerated Athenian “grand plan” to reduce the whole Peloponnesse by blockade—imagined into existence by Alcibiades to goad the Spartans into supporting Syracuse—that the resources of Athens (and the Aegan) were considered not great enough to fund and provision an Athenian blockading force (for discussion of Alcibiades’ plan, see, e.g., Robinson [1999] 141; Debnar (2001) 207-210; Hornblower, CT iii.511; Fields [2008] 45). Alcibiades told the Spartans that the Athenians wished to capture not just Sicily, but also Italy and Carthage, too (6.90.2); deploying the manpower and resources of these areas, they would blockade the Peloponnesse (“τὴν Πελοπόννησον πέριξ πολιορκοῦτες”) and reduce the cities one-by-one in land operations (6.90.3) (see Dover [1965a] 91 ad “τὴν Πελοπόννησον πέριξ πολιορκοῦτες”: “[t]his is essentially a metaphor; the fleet corresponds to a circumvallation which seals off the enemy from supplies and communications, whereas operations on land correspond to the assaults on a besieged city”). Alcibiades ended his description of the supposed Athenian plan by adding that “χρήµατα δὲ καὶ σῖτον, ὥστε εὔπορωτες τι αὐτῶν, αὐτὰ τὰ προσεγγισµένα ἐκεῖθεν χωρία ἐμβλέπουσα διαρκῆ ἀνευ τῆς ἐνδέξεως προσόδου παρέξει...”; “money and grain for the better execution of these plans were to be supplied in sufficient quantities by the newly acquired places in those countries [i.e., Sicily, Italy, Carthage], independently of our revenues here at home” (6.90.4). It was, then, only for this ‘make-believe’ campaign and the fantastically enormous force Alcibiades conjures up for it that the Athenians would have to obtain resources from outside Athens and the general area of the Aegan.

77 Although Demosthenes could send for a force from the allies nearby to Pylos (4.30.3)—i.e. the Zacynthians and Cephallenians (see 3.94.1 and pp.155-156 n.118 below) (Corcyra was experiencing a civil
it would be impossible to send grain-carrying ships from Athens the relatively long
distance (around the notoriously stormy and dangerous Cape Malea) to Pylos during
winter (it had been difficult to do so even during the summer),\(^{78}\) the Athenians feared the
blockade of Sphacteria might have to be raised.\(^{79}\) In contrast, Athenian forces engaged in

\(^{78}\) For the difficulties of sailing around the western coast of the Peloponnese, see Braudel (1972) 1118,
Pryor (1988) 93. Cf. Diod. 13.64.6: an Athenian fleet of thirty triremes sent to relieve the garrison at Pylos
(from Spartan investment and attack) in 409 was unable to round Cape Malea because of storms.

\(^{79}\) 4.27.1: “ἠπόρουν καὶ ἐδεδοίκεσαν µὴ σφῶν χειµὼν τὴν φυλακὴν ἐπιλάβοι, ὁρῶντες τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων
tῶν τε καὶ τῆν ἑπιστροφὴν κατά τοῖς ἀδύνατον ἐσοµένην, ᾧ ἡ ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήµῳ καὶ ὅντες ἱκανὰ περιπέµπειν, τόν τε ἐφοµον χωρίων ἀλµέαν ὄντων οὐκ ἐσόµενοι”; “[the Athenians] were
perplexed and became apprehensive that the winter would overtake them while still engaged in the
blockade. They saw that conveyance of supplies round the Peloponnese would be impossible—Pylos being
a desolate place at best, to which they were unable even in summer to send round adequate supplies—and
that, since there were no harbors in the neighborhood, the blockade would be a failure.” See also 4.3.3
(with Wilson [1979] 48-50 contra Gomme, HCT iii.439) and 4.9.1 for Pylos and the territory surrounding it
being uninhabited; see section iii below for the western coast of the Peloponnese either being uninhabited
or hostile to the Athenians at this time. Note that because of the very restricted storage space on-board
triremes and their limited seakeeping capability, “naval blockades [mounted by triremes] could not
permanently guard hostile coasts or harbours without a nearby harbour to use as a base and to take shelter
from adverse weather” (Erdkamp [1998] 55; cf. Guilmartin [1974] 16ff.). From Thucydides’ description of
the extraordinary difficulties facing the Athenian forces blockading Sphacteria, some of the facilities
expected for a normal base of operations for a blockade can be reconstructed: a water supply (4.26.1);
space (to eat, amongst other things) (4.26.3, 4.30.2); a harbor (and anchorage) (4.27.1, 4.26.4). To these
could be added (cf. Davies [2007a] 81-82): space for an agora; and facilities for traders to unload
provisions and materiel.
the blockades of *poleis* in the Aegean—operating surrounded by allies and (relatively) near to Athens—could be supplied safely by short coastal trips all year round.\(^{80}\)

The provisions imported to Athenian siege bases in the fifth century were transported and owned by private traders; the sailors and soldiers maintaining the blockades of coastal or island *poleis* acquired their provisions from these traders by purchase. That purchase was the primary means of acquisition of provisions for fifth century Athenian besieging forces engaged was shown by the analysis of 1.11 above; that these provisions were purchased from private traders can be demonstrated both from the two explicit references we possess for the provisioning of Athenian sieges in the fifth century and from consideration of the institutional structures of classical Greek *poleis*.

\(^{80}\) See again 6.21.2 with chapter 1 section i, and Erdkamp (1998) 55ff. Only one Athenian full-scale circumvallation siege of a walled city in the fifth century (before the Sicilian disaster) was unsuccessful: the siege of Kition on Cyprus in 451 (1.112.2-4). (Diodorus has it that the Athenians under Cimon captured Kition (and Marion) by siege (12.3.3) but his whole account of this campaign is confused (see Gomme, *HCT* i.330), and Thucydides’ account should be preferred.) One hundred and forty triremes blockaded (see pp.135-136 above) the city until they were compelled to retire by the death of Cimon and by scarcity of provisions: “καὶ λιµοῦ γενοµένου” (1.112.4) (some earlier scholars preferred to read λοιµοῦ instead of λιµοῦ here (see Gomme, *HCT* i.330 for brief discussion), but this alternate should be dismissed: see Classen/Steup i.292 ad loc.) Thucydides’ summary account is brief and provides no reasons for the dearth of provisions suffered by the Athenian-led besiegers (see Osborne [2000a] 3-4 on the summary nature and goals of Thucydides’ narrative of the Pentekontaetia). But, based on the preceding discussion, we can mark out four crucial differences between the conditions confronting the participants in the siege of Kition and those facing forces taking part in the “normal” sieges of *poleis* in the Aegean that may have led to the shortage of food on Cyprus. Firstly, the Athenian-led force was exceptionally large—twenty-eight thousand men (140 triremes x 200 men per trireme)—and all of these men remained at Kition as long as the siege lasted (see again pp.135-136 above). Secondly, the Athenians were operating surrounded by hostile territory. Thirdly, they were undertaking the blockade at a great distance not just from Athens but from their allies in the Aegean. Both of these latter two factors would have made re-provisioning for the besiegers at Kition extremely difficult. Fourthly, any external supplies which were sent to the force blockading Kition may have been delayed or even intercepted by enemy naval forces from Phoenicia, Cyprus, and Cilicia (1.112.4). Thus, the exceptionally large demand of the Athenian-led force at Kition, together with a combination of exceptional factors that prevented or may have prevented this demand from being met by continuous external supply, probably led to the famine among the besiegers on Cyprus and the raising of the blockade. The force under Cimon besieging Eion in 476 also suffered from lack of provisions—among the challenges that faced it was “fiery famine” (”λιµόν τ’αἴθωνα”) (Plut., *Cim.* 7)—although this did not prevent it from successfully reducing the city by blockade (see pp.132-133 n.37 above). A force under Pericles failed to take Oeniadae by siege (assault and blockade) in 453 (1.111.3; Plut., *Per.* 19.3) but Oeniadae here was not the sole target of a major full-scale Athenian amphibious operation but the aim of an opportunistic *periplous* (see section iii below).
Again, Thucydides normally took for granted the provisioning of Athenian and other Greek overseas expeditions—but he did mention it in some limited circumstances:\(^81\) for example, when it helped to clarify the strategic geography of military operations,\(^82\) or when provisioning facilities became inadvertently involved in fighting.\(^83\) Thus—after narrating that the Athenians had brought their ships to a station south of Mytilene, fortified two camps, one on each side of the city, and instituted a blockade of both of the harbors of the city (3.6.1)—Thucydides stated that, although the Mytilenians were now shut off from the sea, they still commanded the whole of the countryside,

> τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα οὐ πολὺ κατεῖχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ναῦσταζομέν δὲ μᾶλλον ἦν αὐτοῖς πλοίων καὶ ἀγορὰ ἡ Μαλέα.

the Athenians only holding a limited area round their camps, and using Malea more as the station for the boats and the market. (3.6.2)\(^84\)

Likewise, in describing the course of the blockade of Melos in the summer of 416, Thucydides noted that

> εἷλον δὲ καὶ οἱ Μήλιοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ περιτειχίσµατος τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν προσβαλόντες νυκτός, καὶ ἄνδρας τε ἀπέκτειναν καὶ ἐσενεγκάµενοι σίτον τε καὶ ὅσα πλεῖστα ἐδύναντο χρήσιµα ἀναχωρήσαντες ἥσυχαζον: καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀμείνον τὴν φυλακὴν τὸ ἐπείτα παρεσκευάζοντο.

meanwhile the Melians attacked by night and took the part of the Athenian lines near the market, and killed some of the men, and brought in grain and all else that

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\(^81\) See again introduction section iv.

\(^82\) Cf. 1.62.1 (with section v below).

\(^83\) Cf. 8.95.4 (with section iv below).

\(^84\) Cf. Gomme, *HCT* ii.257 on μᾶλλον ἦν: “more than what? Perhaps ‘more than the other one’: i.e. Malea is the site of one of the two camps. But, more probably, a station was maintained at Malea, separate from both camps, and this was used for the import of supplies; i.e. ‘rather as a ναῦσταζομέν πλοίων καὶ ἀγορὰ than as a camp’.”
they could find useful to them, and so returned and kept quiet, while the Athenians took measures to keep better guard in future. (5.115.4)\(^\text{85}\)

When the provisioning of Athenian blockades of maritime poleis does burst to the surface of Thucydides’ narrative, then, it takes place through the institution of the agora. And—crucially—the fact that Thucydides can mention these agora in such a casual and offhand manner (without, that is, feeling the need to explain or elaborate on the reasons for their presence in the Athenian bases at Mytilene and Melos) demonstrates that he (and his audience) assumed agora to be a normal part of Athenian siege bases—and the normal means of provisioning for Athenian sieges of maritime poleis.

Markets supplied by private traders were the only mechanism available to the Athenian state in the fifth century to acquire provisions for its amphibious forces engaged in blockades.\(^\text{86}\) Requisitioning of provisions was used only for the unique requirements of the Sicilian expedition.\(^\text{87}\) Direct supply of provisions for military forces through

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\(^{85}\) The translation is Crawley’s. Andrewes (HCT iv.189) (followed by Hornblower, CT iii.253) rejected the identification of the agora mentioned here with the agora set up for the Athenian force blockading the Melians. He did this on the grounds that the Melians are the subject (and thus one would expect the agora to be theirs) and that “there is some expectation that the landmark is something permanent.” But taking the agora to be the Athenians’ does no great violence to Thucydides’ Greek—he describes the agora with reference to the Athenians’ circumvallation wall—and he gives no indication that the agora should be a permanent one; moreover, the fact that the Melians were able to gather grain and other useful goods during their attack makes most sense if they had attacked an area of the Athenian camp in which such goods were stored—i.e., the agora (Andrewes does not deal satisfactorily with this objection to his position). For previous editors taking the agora mentioned at 5.115.4 as that part of the Athenian camp which they used as their market, see, e.g., Fowler (1888) ad loc.; Graves (1891) 255; Classen/Steup v.235—and see now IACP 759.

\(^{86}\) Erdkamp (1998) 12-18 provides the framework for the discussion in this paragraph.

\(^{87}\) See chapter 1 section ii. Direct contributions from subjects/allies were always exacted in money: see section iv below. Although requisitioning from allies/subjects was not used by the Athenians to acquire provisions for overseas expeditions, it appears that it was sometimes used to provision the Athenian archontes stationed in the poleis of the empire: see IG I\(^1\) 62.5-6: the polis of Therambos required to supply food (in proportion to its population (Meritt [1980] 23)) to the Athenian archontes in Aphytis (“τὸς δὲ ἄρχοντας σηκοδοτών ἔχον ἀγένος παρ’ ἐαυτῷ ἢρμαβιῶν κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος”). Rawlings ([2007] 118) cites ps.-Arist., Oec. 2.2.8, 1347b3-15 as evidence that trireme crews were sometimes provisioned for overseas expeditions by purchasing grain from accompanying state tamiai (treasurers)—grain that had been
contractors possessing access to large amounts of capital, and with networks of agents spread over wide areas, was impossible, since such men did not exist in the classical Greek world: the absence of the legal concept of partnership or corporation, together with the lack of development of the concept of agency, limited trading enterprises to a one- to two-person scale and therefore prevented the development of private contractors who could have provisioned overseas expeditions numbering thousands of men.\(^88\) In addition, the Athenian state in the fifth century did not directly tax the crops of its citizens in kind,\(^89\) and thus could not directly supply its overseas expeditions through forcibly purchased by the state in question (Heraclea Pontica) from merchants. But Rawlings misses the point that the Heracleots’ measure is an atypically clever stratagem to raise funds and provide supplies for a fleet and therefore cannot be used as evidence for the normal provisioning of naval/overseas expeditions (see chapter 4 section iii below on using evidence from ps.-Aristotle’s *Oeconomica*). Gomme (*HCT* i.16) was incorrect to list purchase, requisition, and foraging and raiding as the main methods of acquisition of supplies for classical Greek overseas expeditions.

\(^{88}\) No legal concept of partnership or corporation: see Harris (1989). Lack of development of concept of agency: Reed (2003) 36-37. One- to two-man trading enterprises: Reed (2003) 18, 38 (no “large classical trading “combines””), 79, 85-88. The one trading network throughout the eastern Greek Mediterranean attested for the classical period—that of Cleomenes, deputy of Alexander in Egypt, in the 320s (Reed [2003] 37 and n.17)—was an illegal enterprise and had no legal or institutional basis. The Athenian state did once purchase provisions in bulk from a satrap in the late 360s for a force operating in Asia Minor (see Briant [1994] 71-72 for reference and discussion), but this was an exceptional measure.

\(^{89}\) With the exception of the anomalous cases of Sparta and Crete, no classical Greek directly taxed crops in kind; and direct state taxation on crops or property raised in coin was irregular, levied only for wars (e.g. the Athenian *eisphora* (Thomsen [1977])) or in other times of pressing financial need (see, e.g., Littman [1988]; Möller [2007] 377-378; for discussion of those few examples of direct taxation (in coin) attested for the classical period, see Pleket [1973] 251-252; Migeotte [2003]) (Isager and Skydsgaard ([1993] 137-141), Hodkinson ([2000] 191), and Bresson ([2008a] 109-110) are wrong to imply that direct taxation was regular in the classical Greek world). See esp. ps.-Arist., *Oec.* 2.1.4, 1346a6-8: in contrast to provincial satraps (2.1.4, 1345b29), *poleis* receive no revenues “ἀπὸ γῆς.” See, too, ps.-Arist., *Rhet. Alex.* 38.1446b17-20: taxes on crops not included in the usual revenues of a *polis*. One has to go back to the archaic period for a (doubtful) mention of taxes in kind in Athens: see Bresson (2000) 208. (Note that the grain received by the sanctuary of Eleusis that was not used for sacrifices was sold on the open market: see Stroud [1998] 110). The measures of Agyrrhios’ grain-tax law of 374/3 (Stroud [1998]), decreeing a tax-in-kind of 8⅓% on the crops of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros—the proceeds of which were to be sold at reduced prices in the *agora* at Athens (ll.41-55)—seem to have been implemented for a few years at most (see Rhodes and Osborne [2000] ad loc.). Note finally, in this regard, Curtis (2001) 278-279: classical Greek states did not develop large-scale public grain storage facilities; as for Athens, “[o]n present evidence, it seems that the Athenians did not maintain a large central grain reserve; the state paid close attention to the acquisition of grain from Attica or abroad, through private traders, and sought to control its
state agents from its own resources. Rather, the Athenians provided solely monetary pay (“µισθός” or “τροφή”) to their sailors and soldiers, part of which was to be used to buy provisions in markets. In every blockade the Athenian state ever undertook of a coastal or island polis during the fifth century, then, its forces always acquired their food by buying it from private traders in agorai established in their camps precisely for this purpose.

available, primarily in an unprocessed state, in the markets” (ibid.). Lines 15-16 of the grain-tax law of 374/3 show that Athens had no regular public storage facility for grain at this date.

90 Note that even the grain allowances for Athenian cavalry were distributed in cash, and not in kind: see Bugh (1988) 58-62 for discussion of IG I1 375, the accounts of the treasury of Athena for the year 410/9, and the only accounts of her treasury that record σῖτος payments for cavalry. In contrast to the Hellenistic period (see appendix 6 section iii), the payment in kind of classical Greek military forces is (almost) unattested: Iphicrates’ distribution of grain to his force at Corcyra (ps-Aristot., Oec. 2.2.24, 1350b20-30) seems to have been an opportunistic distributions of spoils of war (see Xen., Hell. 6.2.31, 33, 38).

91 See chapter 5 sections i, iv and chapter 6 section ix for discussion of these terms.

92 Note esp., in this regard, that no portion of the pay of classical Greek sailors or soldiers was ever “stopped” to take account of the state’s expense in providing supplies to them (contrast military payment practices in medieval France (Contamine [1972] 127) and Tudor England (Davies [1964] 235, 238)). The following scholars who refer to Athenian sailors and soldiers receiving both pay and provisions from the state are therefore incorrect: Amit (1965) 51; Jordan (1975) 112-113; Kallet-Marx (1993) 12, 47; de Souza (1999) 33; Samons (2000) 88 nn.24, 26, 104 n.98, 105; Hanson (2005) 251. In addition to the general considerations raised here, see also chapter 6 section ix and appendix 4 for detailed refutation of Griffith’s view ([1935] 264-273) that classical Greek military forces received part of their pay in kind. (See also p.154 n.111 below: Plut., Mor. 349A should not be taken as providing evidence, as has sometimes been thought, that trierarchs in the fifth century normally supplied food to their crews before setting out on expeditions.)

93 Pritchett thought that state pay was not introduced until soon before the (second) Peloponnesian War ([1971] 7-14; followed by Kallet-Marx [1993] 10) and that Athenian sailors must have received rations in kind before then ([1971] 35). But, firstly, as just demonstrated, Athens did not have state reserves of grain in this period from which to distribute rations to its sailors; and, secondly, state naval (monetary) pay (and only monetary pay) is attested for other Greek states from the last quarter of the sixth century and for Athens from 480 onwards—see the discussion and collections of evidence at Wallace (1974) 25-26; van Wees (2004) 237; Burrer (2008) 75-76. We can therefore take it that Athenian amphibious forces engaged in blockades before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War also received pay which they used to buy their provisions. In the light of this discussion, it can be seen that Strauss ([2007] 244) is incorrect to state that “raiding the countryside” and markets were the main methods of provisioning classical sieges without distinguishing between the quantitative importance of these methods for the supply of sieges.
iii. The provisioning of Athenian periploi around the Peloponnesian

During the first and second Peloponnesian Wars, Athens frequently dispatched
amphibious expeditions of (relatively) short duration to devastate the Peloponnesian. The
goal of these expeditions was to exert economic pressure on the Spartans and their allies
through the destruction of their crops and property.\(^{94}\) Athenian periploi did not aim at the
permanent occupation of territory or attempt to undertake full-scale blockades of enemy
poleis (they did sometimes, however, opportunistically capture smaller, isolated
settlements).\(^{95}\) The Athenians mounted (at least) three of these amphibious operations in
the first Peloponnesian War: in 458 or 457 (with an uncertain number of triremes and
infantry),\(^{96}\) in 456 or 455 under Tolmides with (apparently) fifty triremes and one or four
thousand hoplites;\(^{97}\) in 454 or 453 under Pericles with (apparently) one hundred

\(^{94}\) For the exertion of economic pressure as the main strategic aim of Athenian periploi, see esp. 1.143.4 (cf. 1.142.3) and Thorne (2001) 236-238 (cf. Westlake [1945] 83-84). For devastation as the strategy of Athenian periploi, see esp. ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. 2.4-5; Westlake (1945) 80-84 and Thorne (2001) 236-238. In his (fuller) descriptions of the periploi of the second Peloponnesian war, Thucydides (nearly) always uses the language of devastation, i.e. δῄουν (2.25.3, 2.25.5, 4.45.1, 4.54.4, 4.56.1, 4.56.2, 6.105.2, 7.26.2), τέµνειν (1.143.4, 2.56.4, 2.56.5, 2.56.6, 2.57.2), or πακίω (2.25.1) to describe their activities (cf. Thorne [2001] 237 n.36); see also ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. 2.4: Athenian periploi are able to “τέµνειν τὴν γῆν τῶν κρειττόνων.” But see next note.

\(^{95}\) See esp. Westlake (1945) 83; cf. Thorne (2001) 238. See, e.g., 3.7.1, 3.16.2 for an Athenian periplous plundering minor coastal settlements (παχνίν in both cases) in 428; 4.57.3 for the small settlement of Thyrea being plundered (“ἐξεπόρθησαν” by an amphibious expedition under the leadership of Nicias in 424. The same expedition had (exceptionally) the capture of a minor settlement (Cythera) as its primary aim; having achieved which, it then devastated Peloponnesian territory (4.53.1-4.57.3). Cf. p.154 n.112 for the storming of minor settlements by Athenian periploi. See also below p.160 on Pericles’ failed attempt to capture Oeniadae by siege in 453. Note that Athenian periploi did sometimes establish garrisons in Peloponnesian territory: see pp.143-145 above and p.152 n.105 below.

\(^{96}\) See 1.107.3 with Ryder (1978), Davies (2007a) 84.

\(^{97}\) 1.108.5; see Hornblower, CT i.173 for the date. Fifty triremes: Diod. 11.84.6. One thousand hoplites: Aesch. 2.75; four thousand hoplites: Diod. 11.84.3-6.
triremes. Athens sent massive amphibious forces to raid the Peloponnesian War: one hundred triremes with one thousand hoplites and four hundred archers on-board (joined later by at least fifty triremes from their allies in the north-west) in 431;99 one hundred and fifty triremes (of which fifty were from Chios and Lesbos), four thousand hoplites, and three hundred horse in 430.100 But these expeditions necessitated enormous expenditures that were not sustainable (especially when coupled with the costs of the siege of Potidaea).101 Later amphibious expeditions around the Peloponnesian War were accordingly on a (sometimes much) smaller scale: thirty ships in 428 (3.7.1);102 thirty ships in 426 (3.91.1); eighty ships, two

98 1.111.2-3. One hundred triremes: Plut., Per. 19.2-3. The Athenian alliance with Megara (1.103.4) made the possible the embarkation of the force under Pericles from Pegae rather than Athens (see Davies [2007a] 84-85 on the importance of Pegae for the Athenians in these years); the periplous in 458 or 457 may also have been launched from Pegae rather than Athens (Ryder [1978] 123). The loss of Pegae in the settlement with the Spartans and the allies at the end of the first Peloponnesian War (1.115.1) meant that all Athenian periploi in the second Peloponnesian War were launched from Athens.

99 See 2.17.4, 2.23.2, 2.25.1 (the force from Athens reinforced by fifty Corcyran triremes and some other triremes from the allies in those parts). The infantry and archers mentioned at 2.23.2 by Thucydides were probably in addition to the ten hoplites and four archers normally carried by each trireme (Rhodes [1988] 208).

100 2.56.1-2. Westlake, noting the greater numbers of heavy infantry on this expedition and the presence of horses (for which horse-transports were now constructed for the first time (2.56.2)), states that “it is... probable that the raids of 431 disclosed the need for stronger and more mobile landing-parties if the work of devastation was to be sufficiently thorough and cover a sufficiently wide area” ([1945] 82). Note also Rhodes (1988) 234 commenting on the presence of the Chians and the Lesbians on this expedition: “[t]hey had not joined in the expedition of 431, which went to the west side of Greece; Athens’ western allies did not join in this expedition [which only went as far as Prasiae in Laconia].”

101 See Rhodes (1988) 210 for this point. For the massive drain on Athenian state finances in the first years of the war, see chapter 6 section iii.

102 Forty ships had been originally prepared to sail around the Peloponnesian in this year; on the news of the revolt from Mytilene, they were dispatched to that polis instead (3.3.2). In this year, too, in order to deter the Peloponnesians from a massive attack by land and sea on Athens, the Athenians used exceptional measures to rapidly mobilize a fleet of one hundred triremes, manning the ships with Athenian citizens (except those from the classes of the knights and pentekosiomedimnoi) and metics (3.16.1); in other words,
thousand hoplites, two hundred cavalry, and some allied troops in 425 (4.42.1); sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, a few cavalry, and some allied troops from Miletus and other states in 424 (4.53.1),\textsuperscript{103} thirty ships in 414 (6.105.1),\textsuperscript{104} and twenty ships in 413 (7.26.1).\textsuperscript{105}

Athenian sailors (and almost certainly Athenian soldiers, too) purchased supplies in Athens to bring on their *periploi* around the Peloponnese. This comes out clearly from a passage in Aristophanes’ *Acharnians* in which Dicaeopolis pokes fun at the Athenians’ propensity to begin wars and launch major expeditions for the slightest of causes: if the Spartans had seized a puppy-dog of the Seriphians (an insignificant Athenian ally) (541-543),

> καὶ κάρτα μέντὰς εὐθέως καθεῖλκες<br>πτωκοσίας ναῦς, ἧν δ’ ἄν ἡ πόλις πλέα<br>Σωρίδου στρατιωτῶν, περὶ τριηράρχους βοῆς,<br>μισθοῦ διδοµένων, Παλλαδίων χρυσουµένων,<br>στοὰς στεναξούσης, αἰτίων μετρουµένων,<br>ἄσκων, τροπωτῆρων, κάδων ἔνωµυ κόπων,<br>σκορόδων, ἐλαῶν, κροµµύων ἐν δικτύοις,<br>στεφάνων, τριχίδων, ἑπιστρήµάτων·<br>τὸ νεώριον δ’ αὖ κωπέων πλατουµένων,<br>τύλων ψοφοῦντων, ἱµατίων τρυπωµένων,<br>τό νεώριον δ’ αὖ κωπέων πλατούµένων,<br>τύλων ψοφούντων, ἱµατίων τρυπωµένων,<br>τό νεώριον δ’ αὖ κωπέων πλατουµένων,<br>τύλων ψοφούντων, ἱµατίων τρυπωµένων,

the massive force was an exceptional measure forced by the impending threat of a major Peloponnesian attack. (The measure worked (3.16.2, 4.).)

\textsuperscript{103} The figure of two thousand found at 4.54.1 for the number of Milesians on this expedition cannot be right: see Classen/Steup iv.108; Gomme, *HCT* iii.509.

\textsuperscript{104} This expedition ravaged Spartan territory in support of Argos (6.105.2). It also emerges from 6.105.2 that the Athenians had been making amphibious expeditions in the years previous to 414 to devastate non-Spartan territory in the Peloponnesian in support of Argos and Mantinea: a terminus post quem of the summer of 417 (when a pro-Athenian democracy came to power at Argos (5.82.2)) can be established for the first of these expeditions.

\textsuperscript{105} Charicles’ ravaging of Spartan territory and construction of a garrison at Cythera (7.26.2-3) was aided by the huge force under Demosthenes and Euryomedon sent out from Athens to reinforce the Sicilian expedition (see appendix 2 for the size of this expedition).
ἀυλῶν, κελευστῶν, νιγλάρων, συριγµάτων.

Why, on the very instant you’d have been launching three hundred ships, and the city would have been full of the hubbub of sailors, noisy crowds surrounding ships’ captains, pay being handed out, the measuring out of provisions, leathers and oar-loops and people buying jars, garlic and olives and onions in nets, crowns and anchovies and flute-girls and black eyes; and the dockyard full of the planing of oar-spars, the hammering of dowel-pins, the strapping of oar-ports, full of flutes and boatswains, of warbling and piping. (544-554)

Since the expedition is against the Spartans, Dicaeopolis is describing here the preparations for a major periplous. The humor here lies in the incongruity between the flimsiness of the reason for the sending of the expedition and the realities of the preparations necessary for a typical major overseas expedition (against the Peloponnese). Those typical realities included the sailors purchasing barley-meal in the Stoa Alphitopolis (which groans here because of the great number of buyers) and also buying water containers, garlic, olives, and onions before they embarked.

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106 The translation is taken from Sommerstein (1980): with the exception of “the measuring out of provisions” for “rations being handed out” at 548 and “strapping” for “boring” at 553, for which see Casson (2005) 183, 183 and n.4 respectively.


109 The stoa mentioned at 548 is identified in the scholia as the Stoa Alphitopolis: see Sommerstein (1980) 183, Olson (2002) 216. Note that the measuring out at 548 refers to the ordinary process of the measuring out of grain before it was sold: see Aristoph., Knights 1009 (complaints “περὶ τῶν µετρούντων τάλαντ’ ἐν ἄγοτῃ κακώς...”); cf. Aristoph., Clouds 638-639, 641.

110 Which they would use to fill their water-skins: see Casson (2005) 184-185.

111 See also Aristoph., Knights 599-600: the chorus-leader, picturing Athenian horses jumping on-board horse-transports before an expedition, describes them as behaving as if human sailors before a voyage: “πριάµενοι κόψωνας, οἱ δὲ καὶ σκόροδα καὶ κρόµµα” “buying water-bottles (some of them also bought
But, since Athenian periploi around the Peloponnese could last anywhere from forty to one hundred and twenty days in duration, \(^{112}\) whereas sailors and soldiers on these expeditions, because of the limitations of storage space on-board triremes, could only take a few day’s provisions with them on their embarkation from Athens, \(^{113}\) these amphibious expeditions depended on other means of acquisition for their supplies during (the bulk of) their operations. \(^{114}\) Markets provided by friendly (or neutral) poleis constituted one of these means of acquisition of supplies. Opportunities to acquire provisions from markets provided by allied (or neutral) poleis varied according to the

garlic and onions).” The humor lies in the incongruity of the horses behaving like typical humans (cf. Σ vet; Tr: ΨΕΠΟΜΗλ ad 600a (I)): i.e., sailors typically bought provisions before embarking on overseas expeditions (cf. Olson [2002] 216). The weight of the contemporary evidence from the two Aristophanic passages for sailors purchasing provisions should be taken over the statement at Plut., Mor. 349A that Athenian triarchs, before embarking their men, provided barley-meal, onions, and cheese to them (cited for normal Athenian fifth century practice by Jordan [1975] 107; Gabrielsen [1994] 119-120; Rawlings [2007] 118); it should be noted, too, that Plutarch’s statement is part of an axe-grinding exercise in rhetorical criticism of the excesses of Athenian choregoi. Note also 3.49.3: in order to quicken its dispatch, the Mytilenian envoys at Athens prepare barley-meal and wine for the Athenian trireme being sent to Mytilene to inform the Athenian general there of the reversal of the decision to kill all the Mytilenians after their revolt—this would seem to imply that neither the state nor the triarch was normally involved in the provisioning of Athenian triremes. (At Aristoph., Frogs 1073, when the crew of the Paralus are remembered as calling for their maza (“µαζαν καλέσαι”), this means that they were calling for the opportunity to eat or prepare maza (and not that they were issued rations of maza).)

\(^{112}\) See Krentz (2007) 154. Although Thucydides never provides any figures for the duration of periploi, the range and variety of operations he describes for them (sometimes including the installation of garrisons (4.45.2 (425), 4.54.4 (424), 7.26.2 (413)) and the storming of settlements (1.108.5 (456/5?), 1.111.3 (attempted siege of Oinioiade in 454/5?), 2.30.1 (431), 2.56.5 (428), 4.54.1-2 (424), 4.57.3 (424)) in addition to ravaging operations) must have taken several weeks. The amphibious expeditions around the Peloponnese in 428 seem to have been unusually short: on the first, Asopius, having ravaged the seaboard of Laconia, sent eighteen of the thirty triremes home before continuing around the Peloponnese (3.7.2-3); in the second, the one hundred triremes, after making descents on the coast of the Peloponnese before Laconia (see 3.16.2), sailed home after their show of strength quickly scared the Spartans off the invasion by land and sea of Attica (3.16.1-4).

\(^{113}\) See again chapter 1 section i.

\(^{114}\) Therefore Morrison et al. ([2000] 99) are incorrect to think that the sailors on triremes engaged in amphibious operations around the Peloponnese were provisioned primarily through the supplies which they took on-board before their embarkation from Athens.
area of operations of each particular *periplous* and changes over time in Athenian
diplomatic relations with the *poleis* on the coastline of the Peloponnese and its vicinity.
The *periploi* of the 450s could count on reception on the eastern coast of the Peloponnese
at the allied or subject *poleis* of Argos, Halieis, Troezen, and Hermione;\(^\text{115}\) and at the
ends of their expeditions at Naupactus and Pegae, and (for Pericles’ expedition) in
Achaea, too.\(^\text{116}\) Athenian expeditions in the late 430s and 420s could not, however, count
on co-operation (and thus facilities for marketing) at any *poleis* on the eastern seaboard of
the Peloponnese—with the possible exception of neutral Argos;\(^\text{117}\) although, off the
north-west of the Peloponnese, they could rely on reception at Zacynthus, Cephallenia,
Acarnania, and Naupactus, all allies at the beginning of the (second) Peloponnesian
War.\(^\text{118}\) The amphibious forces ravaging the eastern Peloponnese in the mid-410s could

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\(^{115}\) Davies (2007a) 84.

\(^{116}\) For Achaea, see Plut., *Per.* 19.3 (with Stader [1989] 215). Zacynthus and Cephallenia were won over
to the Athenian side by Tolmides in 456/5(?) (Diod. 11.84.7) but marketing facilities on these islands
would not have been used by Pericles’ expedition since it went no further than Oineadae before returning to
Pegae.

\(^{117}\) Gomme (1933) 22-23.

\(^{118}\) The Zacynthians, (most of) the Acarnanians, and the Messenians at Naupactus, allies at the outbreak of
the war: 2.9.4. Cephallenia allied in the first year of the war: 2.30.2 (and 2.7.3). For these peoples
remaining friendly to Athens until the start of the summer of 424 (i.e. the time of the last Athenian
*periplous* in the 420s), see 2.30.1 (Acarnania friendly to Athens in 431); 2.33.2-3 (Peloponnesian attacks on
Acarnania and Cephallenia in the winter of 431/0); 2.66.1-2 (Peloponnesians attacking the Zacynthians in
the summer of 430 but the latter not submitting); 2.69.1 (Phormio using Naupactus as a base in the winter
of 430/29); 2.80.1 (Peloponnesian planned attacks on Acarnania, Zacynthus, Cephallenia, and Naupactus in
the summer of 429); 2.81-82 (Acarnanians repelling Peloponnesian invasion in the summer of 429);
2.83.1ff. (Athenian fleet under Phormio stationed at Naupactus in the summer of 429); 2.102.1-3 (Phormio,
embarking from Naupactus, launching an attack on Oineadae “a place which, unlike the rest of Acarnania,
had always been hostile to [the Athenians]” in the winter of 429/8); 3.7.3 (Asopius sailing on to Naupactus
and launching an expedition from there against Oiniadae in the summer of 428); 3.94.1 (cf. 3.95.2)
(Demosthenes’ expedition against Leucas in 426 reinforced by the whole levy of the Acarnanians (except
Oineadae), and by the Zacynthians and the Cephallenians); 3.102.3 (cf. 3.100.1-2) (Demosthenes’
persuading the Acarnanians to lend aid to the defense of Naupactus against a Peloponnesian attack in 426);
4.30.3 (Demosthenes summoning military aid from allies in the vicinity of Pylos for an attack on
rely on reception at their partner *polis* of Argos and (possibly) Halieis,\(^\text{119}\) while in 413 (the time of Charicles’ *periplous*) Athenian forces could count on the provision of markets at these cities, and also (if necessary) on Zacynthus and Cephallenia, in Acarnania, and at Naupactus.\(^\text{120}\)

Comparing this list of allied (or neutral) *poleis* and *ethnoi* to the recorded scope and targets of Athenian *periploi* in the first and second Peloponnesian Wars, it can be seen that *polis*-provided markets made a limited contribution to the provisioning of some campaigns and none to others. Tolmides’ *periplous* could have benefited from the granting of *agorai* by cities on the eastern seaboard of the Peloponnese, but his men thereafter would not have had the opportunity to provision in an *agora* provided by a *polis* again until (possibly) Zacynthus. Pericles’ expedition in 453 was (almost certainly) granted *agorai* in Achaea or Naupactus, but would not have had access to a *polis*-provided market during its siege of Oineadae (obviously). The *periploi* of the 420s would not have been received by the hostile cities of the eastern Peloponnesian coastline,

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\(^{119}\) For Argos, see p.152 n.104 above. For Halieis, see its treaty with Athens made in 424/3 (*IG* I\(^3\) 75); note the restoration at ll.7-8 (cf. ll.21-22): “*άς Αθεναί[οις ναύσταθµον καὶ προθύµος ὀφελὲν ἈθενβΣἕὗἥb[ΣΘbαίος*.” 4.118.4 should not be taken as evidence of a treaty between Troezen and Athens existing in the spring of 423 (see, e.g., MacDonald [1984] 80): it most probably refers to an arrangement with the Troezenians concerning the Athenian garrison at Methana.

\(^{120}\) See 6.85.2: Euphemus at Camarina stating the islands around the Peloponnese (Zacynthus, Cephallenia) are independent allies “διότι ἐν χωρίοις ἐπικαίροι εἰσὶ περὶ τὴν Πελοποννήσου,” “because they occupy convenient positions around the Peloponnesian.” Cf. 7.57.7: the Zacynthians and Cephallenians sending contingents for the Sicilian expedition, forced as islanders to do so by the fact of Athenian domination of the sea; 7.31.2: Demosthenes taking on-board hoplites for the Sicilian campaign from these islands in 413. See also 7.31.2, 5: Demosthenes recruiting for the Sicilian campaign from Acarnania in 413. See also 7.17.4, 7.19.5, 7.31.4-5: an Athenian squadron of twenty triremes stationed at Naupactus in the winter of 414/3 and the summer of 413 to prevent enemy forces crossing over to Sicily from the Peloponnese.
which means that the expeditions of 430, 428 (both in this year), 425, and 424 did not have a single opportunity to provision in an agora prepared by a polis (with the possible exception of Argos), since they operated solely along the eastern Peloponnese (and also, in some cases, along Spartan territory). The Athenian periploi of the mid-410s, operating on the eastern seaboard of the Peloponnese, will have had access to markets only in Argos and (perhaps) Halieis; the expedition under Charicles in 413 could have used these, too, but thereafter could not be expected to be received at any city (since its operations took it no farther than Pylos before it returned to Athens (7.26.2-3)).

Because, then, Athenian amphibious expeditions to and around the Peloponnese operated mostly or solely along hostile territory—or along the thinly populated or desert coastline of the western Peloponnese— they had to use accompanying (merchant) supply-ships as their primary means of provisioning. The strategy of periploi also prevented them from making much use of markets provided by poleis; rather, it mandated a reliance on supply-ships as their (primary source of) supplies. The key text in this respect is ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. 2.4-5:

121 See already p.143 and n.77 above on the territory around Pylos being uninhabited; and also 4.3.3: plenty of deserted headlands other than Pylos in the (western) Peloponnese. See also esp. Xen., Hell. 6.2.27-30 (with Morrison et al. [2000] 97, 99) for the coastline of the Peloponnese being thinly populated. Cf. Xen., Hell. 4.8.7: Pharnabazus ending an amphibious campaign of devastation of the Peloponnese because of worries about the lack of harbors; the possibility of relief forces arriving; and the shortage of food supplies ("τὴν σπανοσιτίαν").

122 See already 6.34.5 and chapter 1 section iiib: supply-ships necessary to provision trireme-based forces in hostile or uninhabited territory.

123 This text should be dated between 431 and 413: see now Osborne (2004) 4-10 (with Mattingly [1997]).
ποιῶν ἔττυν ἀποφεῖ ἥ πεζῆ παραβοηθῆσαι. [5] ἔπειτα δὲ τοῖς µὲν κατὰ ἥλατταν
ἀρχοῦσιν οἶνον τε ἀποπλαῦσαι ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν ὁπόσον βούλει πλοῦν, τοῖς
δὲ κατὰ γῆν ὀχῶν τε ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν ἀπελθεῖν πολλῶν ἡµερῶν ὁδόν
βραδεῖαί τε γὰρ πορεῖαι καὶ σῖτον οὐχ οἶνον τε ἔχειν πολλοῦ χρόνου πεζῇ ἰόντα;
καὶ τῶν µὲν πεζῆ ἰόντα δεῖ διὰ φιλίας ἢταν ἢ ἀν καταγίζειν... ταύτης τῆς γῆς, ἀλλὰ παραπλεῦσαι, ἦν
ἂν ἐπὶ φιλίας χώραν ἀφίκηται ἤ ἐπὶ ἣττον αὐτοῦ.

Again, a sea power can do what a land power can sometimes do, ravage the lands
of those more powerful than itself. For it can sail along until they reach a place
where there is no enemy, or only a few, and, if the enemy approach, can embark
and sail away. It has fewer difficulties doing this than the power which resists
with a land army. [5] Again, those who rule over the sea can sail as far as they
like from their own country, but those who rule over land cannot travel many
days’ journey from their own land. For journeys are slow, and it is not possible
to carry provisions for a long time if one travels on foot. An army traveling on
foot must either pass through friendly territory or fight and conquer, but a naval
force can land wherever it is superior and, where it is not, it need not put in but
can sail past until it comes to a friendly land or one weaker than itself.124

A crucial difference comes out in the contrast made here between the mobility of land
and (we should understand) Athenian naval/amphibious expeditions: because (unlike
land campaigns) amphibious expeditions could carry provisions for a long period, they
were highly mobile; in other words, because amphibious forces could be supported by
supply-ships, they could disembark and devastate where they want. Pseudo-Xenophon’s
generalizing comments on the conduct of operations of amphibious expeditions are
consistent with the descriptions of *periploi* in Thucydides’ narrative, where they are
characterized by their mobility, unpredictability, and the frequency and short duration of
their raids onshore.125 Relying (solely or mainly) on re-provisioning at friendly ports,
*periploi* would have had a radius of only one to three days and their range of operations
and levels of unpredictability would therefore have been greatly decreased:126 that is, if

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124 The translation is taken from Osborne (2004).


126 See again the classic discussion of Gomme (1933) 18-23.
periploi were restricted to using the agora of friendly poleis for their supplies, they would have been much less effective at achieving their main aim of devastation of enemy territory, and could not have remained stationary anywhere for more than a day or two before having to return to re-provision at an allied polis.

In contrast, the accompaniment of supporting merchant ships enabled Athenian amphibious expeditions “to maneuver freely... unimpeded by supply considerations” for limited periods of operations.\textsuperscript{127} The presence of sea-borne supply-trains on their expeditions gave periploi both freedom of action and a provisioning safety-net in case of weather-enforced disruption or delay to their voyages.\textsuperscript{128} In sum, it allowed them to conduct a moderate raiding strategy.\textsuperscript{129} because they were accompanied by supply-ships, periploi could engage not just in ravaging operations, but they could also, in some cases, remain stationary for limited periods of time in order to install garrisons or to attempt to take settlements by storm. But merchant ships supporting periploi could not offer the permanent security of supply that enabled a longer term, continuous blockade;\textsuperscript{130} it is


\textsuperscript{128} See (ibid.) 321-322. By not taking into account the possibility that Athenian amphibious expeditions could be supported by supply-ships, Davies (in his otherwise very fine and stimulating article) therefore radically over-emphasizes the importance of friendly or subject poleis for the provisioning and operations of periploi around the Peloponnese ([2007a] esp. 90-91). In general, discussions of the limited range of triremes do not do enough to take into account the ability of supply-ships to extend this range (see, in this respect, e.g., Gomme (ibid.); Amit [1965] 54; Gabrielsen [1994] 119).

\textsuperscript{129} See Harari (2000) 301 for the concept.

\textsuperscript{130} See section iic above: this required continuous supply lines. The difference between a supply line and a supply-train is that the former consisted of a continuous connection between a source of supplies and a military force in the field, whereas a supply-train accompanied (from the beginning of a campaign) and remained (constantly) beside a military force in the field: see Roth (1999) 157, Harari (2000) 311 n.43.
almost certainly for this reason that Pericles’ siege of Oineadae failed in 454/3(?) (and that no other *periplous* thereafter attempted to besiege a *polis* by a long-term blockade).

On one occasion, however, for a particularly large and lengthy amphibious expedition around the Peloponnese, more supply-ships did have to be sent out from Athens, in addition to the supply-train of merchant ships that had accompanied the expedition since its embarkation from the Piraeus, in order to ensure that it had a safely sufficient amount of supplies for its operations. This emerges from Thucydides’ description of a diplomatic murder in the late summer of 430: the Athenians killed Aristeus, and other envoys from the Peloponnese captured at the court of Sitalces in Thrace (2.67.1-3), without a trial and threw their bodies in a pit—

\[\text{δικαιοῦντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀμύνεσθαι οἷσπερ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιµόνιοι ὑπῆρξαν, τοὺς ἐµπόρους οὓς ἔλαβον Αθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυµµάχων ἐν ὁλκάσι περὶ Πελοπόννησον πλάονται ἀποκτείναντες καὶ ἐς φάραννας ἐσβαλόντες. πάντας γὰρ ἃρη δὴ κατ’ ἄρχας τοῦ πολέµου Λακεδαιµόνιοι ὅσους λάβοιεν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ὡς πολεµίους διέσθειρον, καὶ τοὺς µετὰ Αθηναίων ξυµπολεµοῦντας καὶ τοὺς µηδὲ µεθ’ ἑτέρων.}\]

in justification they claimed that they were taking the same kind of measures to protect themselves as the Spartans had done previously, when they had killed and thrown into pits the Athenian and allied traders whom they had caught sailing around the Peloponnese in merchant ships. For, at the beginning of the war the Spartans put to death as enemies every single man whom they caught at sea, both those who were allies of Athens and those who did not belong to either side.

(2.67.4)

The Spartan killing of Athenian and allied traders caught sailing around the Peloponnese referred to in this passage was clearly a particular and notable event,\(^{131}\) and one connected to the war (since the Athenians could use it to justify their breaking of the customary norms of war and diplomacy). It must, then, be referring to the killing of Athenian and allied *emporoi* sailing out to an Athenian *periplous*—almost certainly the

\(^{131}\)See Gomme, *HCT* ii.200 (ad τοὺς ἐµπόρους οὓς ἔλαβον): “probably some special occasion here referred to.” Contrast (with Rusten [1989] 216) the aspect of the aorist ἔλαβον with the iterative optative of λάβοιεν in the next sentence: again the first verb is clearly referring to a special, notable event.
massive expedition that embarked from Athens in 431 with 22,400 men (to be later
joined by at least 10,000 men from their allies in the north-west) and that stayed away
from Athens for an exceptionally long time (for a *periplous*). 132

Athenian amphibious expeditions around the Peloponnese will also have obtained
some provisions through foraging and pillaging. 133 The unpredictable and unexpected
forays ashore of *periploi* will have caught food stores and property unguarded in the
countryside;134 in addition, some expeditions will have enjoyed windfalls of provisions
(and plunder) when they took settlements by storm.135 But foraging (and pillaging) can
never have been of structural importance in the provisioning of *periploi* around the
Peloponnese. The usually rapid and short duration of their attacks on the Peloponnesian

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132 See again Krentz (2007) 154: one hundred and twenty days (an estimate but one which must be on the
right order of magnitude since Thucydides’ description implies that this expedition was away from Athens
for most of the summer). For the view that the traders referred to at 2.67.4 were supplying an Athenian
expeditionary force, see Reed (2003) 24 n.61, Krentz (2007) 154. The *periplous* of 430 embarked from
Athens with 38,600 men but stayed away from Athens for a much shorter time (somewhere around forty
days: see 2.56.5, 2.57.2 and again Krentz [2007] 154). The length of the *periplous* of 431 makes it much
more likely that it is the expedition to which the traders at 2.67.4 were sailing to (note that no Athenian
expedition other than these two *periploi* operated around the Peloponnesian in these years). (The figures
found here for the numbers of men on the expeditions of 431 and 430 assume that there were two hundred
men on each trireme departing from Athens, and that each of the hoplites (not serving as *epibatai*) and
cavalry on these expeditions was accompanied by a slave attendant: see appendix 2.)

133 At Aristoph., *Knights* 1078, Demos asks the Sausage-Seller where pay will be found for his fox-cubs.
The reference to fox-cubs is explained at 1075-76; in the supposed oracle given by Apollo to the Sausage-
Seller, he likens Athenian sailors to fox-cubs because they eat grapes in vineyards, i.e. they forage for food
while on campaign. Since *Knights* was first performed at the Lenaea of 424—and other naval and
amphibious campaigns in this period took place in subject/allied territory—the reference here should
probably be taken to refer primarily to sailors foraging while on *periploi*.

134 See p.139 n.63 above for unexpected invasions of territory expected to gain much plunder in the
classical Greek world (and its surrounds); cf. Thorne (2001) 237 specifically on *periploi*. Note, however,
that the expeditions of 431 and 430 may have not left Athens until after the harvest in the Peloponnese:
Westlake (1945) 80 and n.4.

135 See p.154 n.112 for references.
seaboard may have not given all raids the time to locate food stores in the countryside,\textsuperscript{136} and, in any case, the storage limitations of triremes precluded the sailors and soldiers deployed on \textit{periploi} from gathering much food to bring with them for their onward journeys.\textsuperscript{137} In addition, those expeditions that sailed along the desolate western coast of the Peloponnese will not have had any opportunity there to acquire supplies through foraging. Furthermore, and fundamentally, the provisioning of amphibious expeditions of six thousand to thirty-eight thousand six hundred men simply could not be entrusted to foraging (even on these campaigns of relatively short duration): the acquisition of provisions through this method was too dependent on the contingencies of local supply conditions and could not offer security of supply to these (sometimes massive) expeditions.\textsuperscript{138} Embarkation or a weather-enforced delay at a location where an expedition could not (for whatever reason) acquire (many) provisions through foraging would have rapidly lead to a supply crisis for an expedition relying primarily on foraging for its food.\textsuperscript{139} Moreover, the use of foraging as a primary means of provisioning would have constrained the strategic options of \textit{periploi}: it would have precluded them from remaining immobile (to assault a town or install a garrison); and it would have limited their range of operations to those areas of the Peloponnese where they could be sure that they would be able to obtain provisions through raiding the countryside. Foraging, then,


\textsuperscript{137} Cf. Thorne (2001) 238.


\textsuperscript{139} See Harari (2000) 319, 321-322 for these points.
was an occasional (and occasionally important) source of supplies for amphibious expeditions around the Peloponnese: but it was the merchant ships accompanying *periploi* that served as their primary method of provisioning and enabled them to be so mobile and unpredictable (and thus gave them the opportunity to acquire provisions occasionally through foraging).

The provisioning of the amphibious expeditions sent out by the Athenians in the fifth century to devastate the Peloponnese therefore differed markedly from the provisioning of the amphibious expeditions they sent out in this period to suppress by siege those *poleis* that wished to liberate themselves from subjection to their empire. Athenian amphibious expeditions launched from the Piraeus to suppress revolts sailed to their targets surrounded by allied/subject *poleis*, and normally halted on their journeys (of at most a couple of weeks’ length) only to reprovision at allied/subject *poleis*. They acquired their supplies during their voyages to war zones from markets provided by *poleis*; the merchant supply-ships that accompanied them did so solely as an emergency reserve and thus did not normally play any important role in their provisioning. Once established at their target of operations, they provisioned themselves solely through sea-borne supply lines. In contrast, the strategy of Athenian *periploi* sent around the Peloponnese required them to make many halts on their voyages, so that they could inflict as much damage as possible in as many places as possible on their enemies. Sailing along (almost entirely) hostile coastlines and (normally) with no allied *poleis* in their vicinity—and thus not able to count on re-provisioning in markets provided by

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140 Although sometimes they may have been forced to make or lengthen halts because of unfavorable weather conditions.
allies/subjects—periploi depended for their provisioning primarily on supporting merchant supply-ships for the duration of their operations.\footnote{See Krentz (2007) 154, Raaflaub (2007) 100: Athenian expeditions dependent on supply-ships when they sailed into hostile territory (again, van Wees ([2004] 63) is incorrect to state that fleets could only obtain provisions in hostile territory by foraging or pillaging). It should be noted here that the Athenians also sent amphibious expeditions on two occasions to devastate Opuntian Locris and to prevent the inhabitants of that region from launching piratical raids on Euboea: in 431, they sent thirty ships under Cleopompus (2.26.1) (the expedition captured the minor settlement of Thronium and “ἐδῃωσε” Locris; in 426, sixty ships under Nicias ravaged Locris on their way back to Athens (having disembarked two thousand hoplites at Oropus (3.91.3)) (3.91.6: “τέµενιν” the verb used to described the triremes’ activities in Locris). In addition, in 413, one thousand three hundred Thracians who were considered too expensive in light of the Decelean War (see chapter 5 section ii) were sent homewards under the command of Diitrephes, who had the instruction to use them to devastate (“βλάψαι”) enemy territory (such as Boeotia) on their voyage back to Thrace (7.29.1ff.). On account of their location, the provisioning requirements of these expeditions could be met by different means to those sent around the Peloponnese. The expedition under Cleopompus could have been provisioned solely from allied/subject poleis in Euboea, since nowhere in Locris would be outside a one- to three-day sailing range from Euboea; but it was almost certainly accompanied by supply-ships also, in order to give it the tactical leeway to storm Thronium. Similarly, the expeditions under Nicias and Diitrephes will never have been far away from allied/subject states, either; thus, they probably supplied themselves, too, primarily through polis-provided markets (while being supported by some supply-ships to ensure tactical flexibility).} It was the presence of these sea-borne supply-trains that enabled the raiding strategy of Athenian amphibious raiding expeditions around the Peloponnese (and their occasional foraging).

\textit{iv. The Provisioning of the Combatants in the Ionian War}

The strategic situation in the Aegean changed radically after the Athenian disaster in Sicily. In the wake of the catastrophe in the far west, Athens no longer enjoyed an overwhelming financial superiority over its enemies. Encouraged by the news of the Athenians’ total defeat, most of their (important) allies/subjects revolted in the following months and years—and, in so doing, deprived their former oppressors of the bulk of their most important source of current revenue.\footnote{See 8.2 for the reaction in the Aegean to the Athenians’ defeat in Sicily. For revolts from Athens, see, e.g., those explicitly recorded in the last book of Thucydides (covering the first two years of the Ionian War (summer 412 – summer 411): (summer 412) Chios (Athens’ most important ally in terms of trireme numbers) (8.14.1-2); Erythrae (8.14.2); Clazomenae (8.14.3) (recovered by Athens in the same summer (8.23.6)); Teos (8.16.3); Miletus (8.17.1-2); Lebedos (8.19.4); Aerae (8.19.4); Methymna (8.22.2);} Secondly, the Peloponnesians now began to
receive substantial Persian financial support, as the satraps of Asia Minor (and the King himself) attempted to create a power vacuum in the eastern Aegean (in order to fill it themselves eventually).\footnote{143} This support—although not always reliable, especially in the first two years of the Ionian War when it was dispensed (or not, as the case often was) by Tissaphernes—was indispensable to the eventual Peloponnesian victory in the war.\footnote{145}

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\footnote{143}{See Lewis (1989) 231-232 for an excellent summary of the changes in intensity of Persian financial support for the Peloponnesian forces in the Ionian War. See Pritchett (1971) 47 for a list of Persian subsidies to the Peloponnesians in the years from 412 to 404 (though note that his no.8 and no.11 refer to the same payment, as do his no.9 and no.12). Cf. chapter 5 section iii for detailed discussion of Cyrus' financial aid to the Peloponnesians in 408. Note esp. \textit{Hell. Oxy.} 19.2: the Persians had been poor payers until Cyrus arrived in the Aegean theater; and Xen., \textit{Hell.} 2.3.8: at the end of the war, the balance of the war fund given over to Lysander by Cyrus was 470 talents (see also Krentz [1989] 192 ad loc.: “Lysandros had earlier sent Gylippos home with one thousand (Plut. Nik. 28.3) or fifteen hundred talents (Diod. XIII.106.8-10).”) For the importance of Persian subsidies in funding the war, cf. 8.47-8.48.3 (with Blamire [2001] 115): the Athenian oligarchic revolution in 411 being largely motivated by the prospect of gaining financial support from the Persians through the influence of Alcibiades. Cf. also Xen., \textit{Hell.} 1.1.14: Alcibiades telling the Athenian fleet in 410 that they have no money, while the enemy has plenty from the King; and Xen., \textit{Hell.} 1.5.8-9: the Athenians in 407 sending to Cyrus to attempt to gain his (financial) aid. (I should note here that the naval forces opposed to the Athenians in the Ionian War were not just from the Peloponnese, but also from the \textit{poleis} of the Ionian seaboard (most notably Chios), Sicily (see Lévy [1983] 226 and nn.45-48), southern Italy (8.84.2, 8.91.2), and Boeotia, Phocis and Locris (8.3.2). For sake of convenience, however, I will refer to the naval forces engaged against the Athenians in this war as Peloponnesians \textit{tout court}.)

\footnote{144}{For discussion of Tissaphernes' machinations concerning the distribution of pay to Peloponnesian forces in the first two years of the war, see chapter 5 sections iii, iv; chapter 6 section iv; appendix 6; and 8.87.3-5, 8.99.}

\footnote{145}{Without Persian subsidies, the Spartans/Peloponnesians were reduced to ad hoc measures to fund their forces, measures that would have been (completely) insufficient in the longer term to prosecute the war on the scale needed to defeat the Athenians. See 8.3.1: at the beginning of the winter of 413/412—before the arrival of ambassadors from Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes with promises to fund a Peloponnesian fleet (8.5.4ff.)—King Agis, in order to fund the preparation of a fleet to support Athens’ rebellious subjects in}
It enabled the Peloponnesians to fund large fleets of triremes, operating in the waters off Asia Minor, for its entire duration (i.e., from the summer of 412 to the eventual reduction (by blockade) of Athens in 404). It also forced the Athenians (in order to be able to operate in the Aegean against the new Peloponnesian navy) to maintain correspondingly large naval forces in the eastern Aegean—and thus into a series of increasingly desperate measures to raise the money to pay these forces. As a first step, the iron reserve of one thousand talents set aside in 431 in case of a direct attack on Athens (2.24.1) was deployed in the summer of 412 to fund the preparation of a fleet to sail against Chios (8.15.1; Philoc. FGrH 328 F 138). Despite the deployment of the iron reserve, and the reduction of Athenian military/naval pay from one drachma to three obols at some point between the summer of 413 and the winter of 412/11, the Athenians’ financial reserves were virtually exhausted by the summer of 411, and their fleets reduced to funding themselves through the exactions of ad hoc contributions in money from poleis in their area of operations.

Self-financing—through the exaction of ad hoc levies of money

the Aegean, levied money from the allies, plundered and exacted money from the Oetaeans, and also exacted money from the Phthiotic Achaeans and other Thessalian subjects. See also 8.44.4: in the winter of 412/11, having broken with Tissaphernes, the Spartans levied thirty-two talents from the Rhodians; Xen., Hell. 1.6.12: in 406, having broken with Cyrus, Callixartidas levied money from Miletus and Chios; Xen., Hell. 2.1.1: in the summer of 406, in the absence of any financial support from the Persians, the Peloponnesian forces on Chios hired themselves out to earn pay; Xen., Hell. 2.1.5: in the winter of 406/405, Eteonicus levied money from the Chians. Cf. Aristoph., Frogs 365: contributions in money to Athens’ enemies apparently common in 405. See also pp.169-171 below for Peloponnesian plundering (to raise money) during the Ionian War.

146 For a survey of Athenian state finance from 413 to 404, see Blamire (2001) 115-123.

147 See chapter 5 section iii, chapter 6 section iv.

from poleis and the sale of plunder—continued to be the main source of pay for
Athenian and amphibious forces operating in the Ionian and Hellespontine theaters
throughout the war; from 410 onwards, the money raised through forced contributions
and the sale of booty was supplemented by the revenue derived from a dekate imposed on
shipping in and out of the Black Sea. Some money was sent from Athens to the forces
off Asia Minor, raised through the tribute on allied/subject poleis re-established in 410/9
(but now necessarily much reduced because of the revolts of many former subjects),

149 References to Athenian exactions of money during the Ionian War: Xen., *Hell.* 1.1.8, 1.1.12 (winter
411/10); Xen., *Hell.* 1.1.20-21, Diod. 13.47.7 (410); Xen., *Hell.* 1.3.8, Diod. 13.66.3-4, Plut., *Alc.* 30.2-5
(408); Xen., *Hell.* 1.4.9 (407). For the references in Thucydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus to the capture
of plunder (by both Athenian and Peloponnesian forces) in the Ionian War, see Pritchett (1991) 512-514, 530-
531. For references to the sale of plunder during the war, see (ibid.) 420-422. Note esp. there (with [ibid.]
421, Gabrielsen [2007] 252) Diod. 13.47.7 (411): Theramenes, wishing to relieve both the citizens and
allies of their eisphorai, “τήν τε τῶν πολεµίων χώραν ἐπόρθησε καὶ πολλὰς ωφελείας ἤθροισεν,”
“plundered enemy territory and collected great quantities of booty”; Diod. 13.64.4 (409): Alcibiades and
Thrasylus (Diodorus incorrectly has Thrasybulus) plundered Pharnabazus’ territory, sated their soldiers
with booty, “καὶ αὐτοὶ χρήµατα συνήγαγον ἐκ τῶν λαφύρων, βουλόµενοι κουφίσαι τὸν δῆµον τῶν
εἰσφορῶν,” “also themselves realized money from the booty, since they wished to relieve the Athenian
people of the property-taxes imposed for the prosecution of the war.” See also Diod. 13.69.5: Alcibiades
plundering both Cos and Rhodes to raise pay for his soldiers (“καὶ συχνὰς ωφελείας ἤθροισε πρὸς τὰς τῶν
στρατιωτῶν διατροφὰς”) (these operations should probably be dated to 407/6: Krentz [1989] 133). It
should be noted here that, although Athenian amphibious expeditions had raised great sums of money
through the sale of plunder before the Ionian War (see conclusion below), it was (with the partial exception
of the Sicilian expedition (chapter 1 section ivb)) only from 412 onwards that proceeds from the sale of
plunder played a structurally important role in the financing of Athenian overseas forces. Also, note that,
for the preceding discussion and for what follows in this section, the value of Diodorus as a historical
source increases markedly after 411. See esp. Davies (1993) 2-3: “... after 411 [Diodorus] was using
historical sources otherwise lost save for fragments. We can mostly identify them and be confident that he
was using the best standard accounts, but he was not always very good at summarizing them.” Diodorus in
his post-411 narrative is still characterized, however, by the use of unreliable figures (appendix 2 n.31),
extrapolation from sources (see p.130 n.28, p.263 n.23), and stereotypical descriptions of campaign
preparations (see p.182 n.199 below).

150 See, e.g., Andrewes (1953) 5-6: inferring from the accounts of the treasury of Athena for 410/9 that the
Hellespontine fleet under Alcibiades and Theramenes was entirely self-financed.

151 See Xen., *Hell.* 1.1.22 with Blamire (2001) 118.

152 Blamire (2001) 118.
the melting down of sacred dedications, and the striking of emergency coinages; but these sources of funding (by themselves) never provided income anywhere on the scale sufficient to maintain the Athenian naval forces in the eastern Aegean theater.

The new conditions of the Ionian war—opposing fleets of anywhere from fourteen thousand to forty thousand men operating away from home for years at a time—produced, then, a huge and unprecedented demand for money. The need to find the money to fund the payment of sailors’ µισθός and τροφή (and discussions and disagreements about their payment) dominates the narrative of the last book of

153 See p.306 n.46 for bibliography for these latter two measures.


155 Ship numbers in the last book of Thucydides (see Andrewes, HCT v.27-32 for references and full discussion (I note that Erbse [1989] 67-75 disagrees with some of Andrewes’ conclusions; but quibbles over one or two ships here or there does not affect the point I am making here): 93 Athenian and 80 Peloponnesian ships in the Ionian theater at the end of summer 412; roughly 100 triremes (the numbers fluctuate) on each side during the winter 412/11; 114 Athenian and 112 Peloponnesian triremes in the summer of 411 (see 8.79.1 with Andrewes, HCT v.31); 76 Athenian and 86 Peloponnesian triremes at the battle of Cynossema near the end of the summer of 411. For the later years of the war: 86 Athenian and 90 Peloponnesian triremes at the battle of Abydus at the beginning of the winter of 411/410 (see Xen., Hell. 1.1.13 with 1.1.7 and Krentz [1989] 96-97 (10 (Diod. 13.46.4, 13.50.2) or 30 (Xenophon, ibid.) of the Peloponnesian triremes were lost in this battle); 74 Athenian triremes at Sestos in 411 (Diod. 13.45.2); 100 Athenian triremes (and 1,000 hoplites and 150 cavalry) embarking from Athens under Alcibiades in the summer of 407 (Xen., Hell. 1.4.21; cf. Diod. 13.69.1); 70 Peloponnesian triremes in 407 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.1); 90 Peloponnesian triremes in 407 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.10); 115 (or 93) Athenian and 90 (or nearly 70) Peloponnesian triremes at the battle of Notium in 406 (see Krentz [1989] 141 for sources for these figures); 114 or 134 Athenian triremes in spring 406 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.20 with Krentz [1989] 144-145 (but see below); 140 Peloponnesian triremes in 406 (Xen., Hell. 1.6.3, Diod. 13.76.3); 170 Peloponnesian (Xen., Hell. 1.6.26) and roughly 150 Athenian triremes (see Krentz [1989] 151 for sources) engaged in operations before the battle of Arginusae in 406; 180 Athenian triremes before the battle of Aigospotamoi in 405 (Xen., Hell. 2.1.20; Diod. 13.105.1) (but see Diod. 13.104.2; 153 triremes (20 left at Samos)); 200 Peloponnesian triremes sailing against Athens in 405 (Xen., Hell. 2.2.7); 150 Peloponnesian triremes besieging Athens and (roughly) 40 or 50 besieging Samos in 405/4 (see Xen., Hell. 2.2.9 and Krentz [1989] 183). See, however, Xen., Hell. 1.5.20: Conon manning 70 triremes out of the over 100 Athenian triremes that had been campaigning in the Aegean. The implication of Conon’s measure must be that some Athenian triremes were under-manned. It is impossible to know how frequent a phenomenon under-manning of triremes was in the Ionian War, but the frequent difficulties with pay and the duration of service may have meant that desertion was common at some points in the war. (It should be noted here, however, that neither Athenian nor Peloponnesian triremes were under-manned at the moment of their embarkation from their home ports: see appendix 2.)
Thucydides, whereas, before this point, the payment of military and naval forces (especially Athenian forces) was simply assumed by Thucydides, and mentioned only in exceptional circumstances. The details of naval financing—and especially the increasingly desperate expedients adopted by both sides (but particularly the Athenians) to fund their fleets—dominate Xenophon’s and Diodorus’ narratives of the Ionian War, too. But, in contrast, from the winter of 413/412 to the summer of 411, the provisioning of the enormous fleets manned by the Athenians and Peloponnesians continues to be taken for granted in Thucydides, and their provisioning is also taken for granted in Xenophon’s and Diodorus’ accounts of the later phases of the war. Thus, again, in order to reconstruct the means used by the men of these fleets to acquire their provisions, it is necessary to combine the few explicit references we do have for their food supply with consideration both of the strategic demands facing their commanders, and the institutional structures of classical Greek states.

Naval movements to and around the theaters of operations along the Ionian seaboard and the Hellespont in the Ionian War were provisioned primarily through markets provided by poleis. The casual and incidental mentions of the convention of reception and the provision of an agora by a friendly or allied polis to a passing fleet (without any prior mention or explication of this convention) in Thucydides’ and Xenophon’s accounts of the Ionian War (and throughout the historical narratives of those authors) demonstrate that both of these historians (and their readers) took it for granted.

156 Cf., e.g., Kallet (2001) 228-229, 281-282.

157 See chapter 5 sections ii, iii for the funding of military and naval forces being mentioned only in exceptional circumstances before book 8 (with the Sicilian expedition a partial exception (see chapter 1 section ivb)).
that agorai were the usual means of provisioning of naval detachments and fleets on the move during this war. Thus, in Thucydides’ account of the operations of the summer of 411, he reported the provision of an agora by the Eretrians to the crews of thirty-six Athenian triremes (which had sailed to Euboea in order to guard the island from attack by the Peloponnesians (8.95.2)) only because the location of this agora played an integral part in a ruse executed by the Eretrians (8.95.4): having advised an approaching Peloponnesian fleet of their plans, the Eretrians had set up the agora for the Athenian sailors not in the market-place, but in some houses in the part of town furthest from the harbor.\(^{158}\) (so that the Athenian crews would not be able to prepare quickly and properly for battle when the Peloponnesians sailed into the harbor).\(^{159}\) Xenophon mentions the buying of provisions from an allied polis in his narrative of the Ionian War only because it was the fact that the Athenian crews had to walk some distance from their triremes to purchase provisions in Sestos that led directly to their lack of readiness for the battle of Aegospotami (and thus their subsequent (and decisive) defeat in that battle).\(^{160}\) Finally,

\(^{158}\) 8.95.4: “οἱ δὲ ἔτυκαν οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἄριστον ἐπισιτιζόμενοι (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπωλεῖτο ἀπὸ προνοίας τῶν Ἐρετριῶν), ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν ἐπ’ ἔσχατα τοῦ ἄστεως οἰκίων...” (“But [the Athenian crews], instead of being by their ships, as [their commanders] supposed, were gone away to purchase provisions for their dinner in the houses in the outskirts of the city; the Eretrians having so arranged that there would be nothing for sale in the market-place” (Crawley’s translation (slightly adapted)).)

\(^{159}\) Although this episode, strictly speaking, does not form part of the operations of the Ionian War, the fact that Thucydides includes it in the midst of his narrative of that war shows that he was taking the provision of agorai by friendly or allied poleis for granted in his description of the fighting off Asia Minor and in the Hellespont. See chapter 1 sections i, iiia for agorai provided by friendly/allied/subject poleis to passing military forces being taken for granted throughout Thucydides’ narrative.

\(^{160}\) See Xen., Hell. 2.1.27: the Athenian crews having to go a long way to buy their food (“τὰ τε σιτία πάροικοιν ἐν ὑπὸ βρέχουσι”)—at Sestos, as 2.1.25 makes clear. Diodorus makes no mention of a market, but only reports that there was famine in the navy (13.105.2, 13.106.1). The contemporary evidence of Xenophon should be preferred (and, in any case, what is important here is that the contemporary author Xenophon believed that the Athenians could purchase supplies in an agora at Sestos). See chapter 3 section iii for
although Diodorus does not include any mention of polis-provided markets in his summarizing description of the Ionian War, the fact that he could take the convention of reception for granted later in his history shows that he, too, was assuming the reception of fleets by friendly or allied poleis in his description of the operations from 412 to 404.\footnote{161}

The fact that there were so many poleis so close together on the Ionian and Hellespontine coastlines (even if their differing allegiances meant that the Athenians and the Peloponnesians could not expect to be received in every polis they sailed by)\footnote{162} meant that both fleets—and any detachments from both fleets—were never more than a day’s sail away from reception by a friendly polis (and thus the provision of an agora). This nearness and number of poleis on and just off the seaboard of Asia Minor allowed the rapid darting naval movements so characteristic of (especially the first years of) the Ionian War:\footnote{163} assured of provisioning at nearby polis-provided markets, detachments of triremes could operate unencumbered by supply-ships. The fact, too, that any area of the Ionian or Hellespontine theater of operations was easily reachable within a few days for other examples of the convention of the provision of markets by friendly poleis to passing military forces being taken for granted in the Hellenica and other historical works of Xenophon.

\footnote{161} See the discussion of 14.108.1-2 at chapter 3 section iiib. See also 15.46.1-2: in 374/3, the Spartans dispatch a fleet against Corcyra in order to help some oligarchs take that city; the twenty-two triremes dispatched to the city pretended to be sailing to Sicily “ἵνα ως φίλοι προσδεχθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Κορκυραίων κατάσχωσι τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τῶν φυγάδων,” “in order to be received as friends by the Corcyrans and then with the assistance of the exiles to occupy the city.”

\footnote{162} The first naval operations in the Ionian theater demonstrated that the Athenians could no longer assume reception at every polis in the Aegean. See, e.g., 8.17.2: the Milesians not receiving the Athenians in the summer of 412 (“ὡς αὐτοῖς ὡς ἵδη χάριν ὑπὸ τῶν Μιλήσιων κατάσχωσι τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τῶν φυγάδων,” “in order to be received as friends by the Corcyrans and then with the assistance of the exiles to occupy the city.”)

\footnote{163} See, e.g., 8.14-8.108 passim.
triremes already within the general area of operations meant that even whole fleets—having provisioned in *agorai* provided by the *poleis* they were embarking from—could move without supply-ships from one theater (or part of a theater) to another: thus, in the summer of 411, eighty-six Peloponnesian triremes under Mindarus were able to reach Sestos from Chios in two days, having spent two days provisioning in Chios (8.101.1-2). Other movements of whole fleets from one base of operations to another during the war (that had less need for speed than Mindarus had (see just below)) may have been normally accompanied by supply-ships in case of weather- or enemy-enforced sailing delays, but even in these cases, because there would have been almost always a friendly *polis* nearby at any point of a voyage along the coast of Asia Minor, the number of supporting merchant-ships will not have needed to be large.

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164 Cf. Morrison et al. (2000) 97 for Mindarus’ journey. The mode of provisioning in Chios was clearly purchase: the crews of the triremes got their provisions ("ἐπισιτισάµενοι") in Chios and received from the Chians three Chian fortieths (coins of unknown value (see Hornblower, *CT* iii.1043-1044 for bibliography)) for each man (8.101.1).

165 The fact that naval operations in the Ionian War did not stop with the onset of winter meant that sailing disruptions due to weather conditions were more common in this conflict than in earlier wars: see 8.31.4 (the Peloponnesians remaining at an island off Clazomenae for eight days on account of the winds), 8.32, 8.34, 8.42.1-2 (and Andrewes, *HCT v.74*) (see also, e.g., Xen., *Hell.* 1.1.16). But storms could affect the sailing of triremes in the summer during the war, too: see 8.80.3 and esp. 8.99: Mindarus forced "ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας" to remain at Icarus for five or six days. See also, e.g., Xen., *Hell.* 1.6.35, 38 (storm after the battle of Arginusae).

166 Naval detachments would not have presented so much of a burden to a friendly *polis* if forced to halt at one for several days (because of enemy movements or poor sailing conditions); in addition, even if delayed for some days in enemy territory, the (relatively) small numbers of men could expect to survive by living off the proceeds of foraging or pillaging (see, e.g., 8.31.4)—for both of these reasons, naval detachments could sail where they wanted without supply-ships. In contrast, it was only in the exceptional cases of the sacking of a settlement that entire fleets (of up to forty thousand men) could provision themselves from the proceeds of pillaging. Note esp. Xen., *Hell.* 2.1.19: in 405, the provisions gained in the capture and pillaging of Lampasacus—a city full of wine, grain, and other supplies—(almost certainly) gave Lysander the tactical flexibility at Aegospotami that proved crucial to the Peloponnesians’ total victory there.
Other operations during the war, however, required the fleets of both sides (or detachments thereof) to remain immobile for (shorter or longer) periods of time. Attempts to prevent enemy triremes from moving to or around the theater of operations sometimes forced fleets to remain stationary for short periods of time. Thus, for example, at the start of the war, in the early summer of 412, twenty Athenian triremes briefly blockaded in Spiraeum (an uninhabited harbor) twenty-one Peloponnesian triremes which had been attempting to sail from Corinth to Chios (the Peloponnesian triremes eventually escaped by defeating their blockaders in a naval battle) (8.10.3-8.11, 8.20.1); and in the winter of 412/11, twenty Athenian triremes were posted at Syme to remain on the watch for twenty-seven Peloponnese triremes arriving in the Ionian theater from the Peloponnese (8.41.3-8.42). In the summer of 411, Thrasyllus planned to station himself with fifty-five ships at Lesbos in order to attack the fleet of Mindarus if it delayed at Chios for any period of time (it was this movement which forced Mindarus to dash from Chios to Sestos) (8.100.2).

But both the Athenians and Peloponnesians also mounted naval blockades or full-scale sieges (by land and sea) of poleis, which compelled them to remain immobile for longer periods. In the summer of 412, nineteen Athenian triremes (later twenty (8.24.1)), having stationed themselves at the island of Lade, began a naval blockade of Miletus which lasted for a short time (perhaps a month?) (8.17.3, 8.24.1, 8.25) before it was lifted.

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167 Note that of the thirty-seven Athenian triremes that forced the Peloponnesian ships into Spiraeum, a detachment of only twenty were left to prosecute the blockade (8.11.1) and that some of these were later taken for other naval operations (8.15.1). See also 8.11.2: the Peloponnesians in great perplexity because of the difficulty of guarding triremes in a desert place (“ἀφιέρων τὴν φυλακὴν ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ ἠπόρουν ὁρῶντες τὴν φυλακὴν ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήµῳ ἠπόρουν”); the particular difficulty of guarding blockaded triremes in an uninhabited location was almost certainly because of the impossibility of provisioning in such a location (cf. 4.27.1, 6.34.5).

168 Cf. 8.35.2-4: six Peloponnesian triremes on watch at Triopium in the winter of 412/11 to seize merchant shipping coming from Egypt.
on the approach of fifty-five Peloponnesian ships (8.26.1-2, 8.27). The Athenians established a naval blockade of Chios in the summer of 412 with twenty ships (8.24.3, 6) which were called back to the Athenian base at Samos at the beginning of the following winter (8.30.1). Reinstituting the blockade of the city later in the same winter with thirty-two triremes and somewhere under one thousand hoplites, it lasted into the spring of 411 before the Chians were eventually able to break it. In the summer of 409, the Athenians also mounted conventional circumvallation blockades of Chalcedon and Byzantium. Both of these, however, were relatively short in duration, ending in the same summer: negotiations with Pharnabazus led to the sparing of the Calchedonians; while Byzantium was taken by treachery. In the summer of 406, the Peloponnesians under Callicratidas, having defeated the Athenian fleet under Conon in battle in the harbor of Mytilene, blockaded that city (with the crews of the remaining forty Athenian triremes inside it) by land and sea with one hundred and seventy triremes and an unknown number

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169 The twenty Athenian ships had been joined during the blockade by one thousand Athenian and two thousand five hundred allied infantry (8.25.1). After these forces defeated the Milesians (and their Peloponnesian allies) in a land battle before the city (8.25.2-4), the Athenians had prepared to build a circumvallation wall around the city (8.25.5), before the arrival of the Peloponnesian triremes forced them to withdraw. See also 8.30.1-2: an Athenian plan (never executed) in the winter of 412/11 to blockade Miletus with seventy-four triremes.

170 For the blockade, see 8.38.2-5, 8.40.1, 8.56.1, with 8.61 and 8.63.1 (cf. 8.99) for the Chians’ eventual breaking of the Athenian naval domination. See Andrewes, HCT v.29-30 for Athenian trireme numbers during the siege.

171 For the siege of Calchedon, see Xen., Hell. 1.3.4, 8-9 and the slightly different account at Diod. 13.66.1-3. For the siege of Byzantium, see Xen., Hell. 1.3.10, 14, 16-22; Diod. 13.66.3-6. (Note that the Byzantines were starving by the end of the siege but only because Clearchus had requisitioned all of the food in the city for his forces.) Xenophon provides no figures for the amount of Athenian triremes and men involved in these sieges, but Diod. (13.66.1) gives a number of 70 triremes and 5,000 infantry operating at Calchedon, joined by (at least) 30 triremes under Alcibiades and Thrasyllus (13.64.3); and the same forces operating at Byzantium (13.66.3) (although, in both cases, the triremes under Alcibiades sailed off after initial operations). Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus give any indication as to the duration of either siege. Note that an Athenian attempt to blockade Phocaea by land in 407 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.11) was abandoned after the defeat at Notium.
of land troops from Methymna. One hundred and twenty triremes left the siege after two months to sail against an Athenian relieving force of one hundred and ten triremes; the remaining fifty lifted the blockade some days later after the defeat at Arginusae.\footnote{See Xen., \textit{Hell.} 1.6.16-26, 37; Diod. 13.78-79, 13.97.2, 13.100.5. Within two months: on the fifth day of the siege, Conon sent out two triremes from Mytilene to bring word to Athens of the siege; one of these triremes made it to Athens by way of the Hellespont; the Athenians mobilized their relieving fleet within thirty days; when Callicratidas heard that this fleet had reached Samos, he left Mytilene with one hundred and twenty triremes (see Xen., \textit{Hell.} 1.6.16-26).} Finally in 405, two hundred Peloponnesian triremes began the siege of Athens, of which forty or fifty were detached to the siege of Samos.\footnote{Xen., \textit{Hell.} 2.2.10-23: the siege started in the late summer of 405 and ended in the early summer of 404.} The siege of both cities took the form of a complete blockade by land and sea: Athens was reduced by starvation after almost a year;\footnote{Xen., \textit{Hell.} 2.3.6-7.} Samos surrendered soon afterwards.\footnote{Xen., \textit{Hell.} 2.3.6-7.}

Each of these blockades and sieges was provisioned primarily through (merchant) supply-ships. The same considerations apply here as in the discussion of the provisioning of the (circumvallation) sieges undertaken by the Athenians prior to 413.\footnote{See section iic.} Forced by tactical considerations to remain immobile,\footnote{See p.168 n.155 above for sources.} the men engaged in naval blockades and sieges of poleis had a (very) restricted range of foraging, and thus would have consumed

\footnote{This was especially true for those men engaged in naval blockades or watches, since they had to be constantly on the alert for enemy movements.}
any provisions in the areas surrounding their camps within a short period. The siege of Mytilene may have been a (very) limited exception to this, as the blockade of that city started quickly after a surprise naval battle in its harbor (and so the Mytilenians did not have time to prepare to bring much property or food within the walls of the city before the siege). Foraging probably played a limited role in the provisioning of the blockades of Chios and Calchedon, since where we learn from Thucydides and Xenophon, respectively, that the blockading forces in each case managed to obtain substantial amounts of plunder from the territory of the city they were blockading. But, in the main, all of the naval guards and sieges in the Ionian War will have needed to have been provisioned by continuous sea-borne supply lines—or, in the case of naval guards, operations of shorter term and smaller scale, the laying in of sufficient stores of provisions—in order to maintain the continuous pressure they needed to exert on their

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178 We may take it that the plunder taken by Athenian forces from enemy territory mentioned at 8.27.4 ("ἂ δ' ἐκ τῆς πολεµίας") was taken from the countryside surrounding Miletus after the Athenian victory on land over the Milesians (and not by the twenty Athenian ships while they were blockading the city from Lade).

179 Plundering raids on Chian territory by the force blockading it: 8.24.3, 8.24.6 (the first blockade); 8.40.1 (the second blockade). On hearing of the Athenians’ approach, the Calchedonians had entrusted all of their portable property to the Bithynian Thracians (Xen., Hell. 1.3.2). The Bithynians were forced to hand over this property to the Athenians by Alcibiades, who brought it back to the Athenian camp before undertaking the blockade of Calchedon (Xen., Hell. 1.3.3-4). In the case of the raids on Chian territory, the raids were primarily for plunder (Thucydides always the verb πορθεῖν or its derivatives to describe them (chapter 1 section ivb)) and thus provisions will have constituted only a part of their property targeted and (therefore) stolen. In the case of the Calchedonians, we may take it that, expecting the Athenians, they will have transported as many of their food stores as possible within the walls of their city.

180 See 8.100.2: Thrasyllus, having learned of Mindarus’ presence at Chios and having sailed to Methymna, “ἄλφιτα τε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπίτηδεια παρασκευάζειν ἐκέλευεν ὡς, ἢν πλείων χρόνος ἐγγιγνηται, ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου τοὺς ἐπίπλους τῇ Χίῳ ποιησόµενος” (“gave orders to prepare barley-meal and other provisions, in order to attack [Mindarus’ fleet] from Lesbos in the event of its remaining any length of time at Chios”). The laying in of provisions would guarantee the logistical security and operational flexibility of Thrasyllus’ fleet during its watch on Chios. (Thrasyllus’ order to the Methymnaioi (Tucker [1892] 293) to ‘prepare’ barley-meal and other foods tells us nothing about the Methymnaioi means of acquiring that food (although it should be noted that it does not rule out purchase: see 3.49.3 (the Mytilenian...
enemies. With no other means of acquisition of supplies available to the Athenians or the Peloponnesians, these supply lines were manned and provisioned by private traders transporting their privately bought stores of grain (and other foods). This conclusion is supported by our one explicit reference to the provisioning of a circumvallation blockade. When Eteonicus, engaged in the siege of Mytilene, heard of the Peloponnesian defeat at Arginusae, he pretended to his forces that the Peloponnesians had secured a great victory (Xen., Hell. 1.6.36-37); as part of his deception (carried out in order to ensure an orderly withdrawal of his fleet from Mytilene to Chios), he ordered “... τοῖς ἐµπόροις τὰ χρήµατα σιωπῇ ἐνθεµένους εἰς τὰ πλοῖα ἀποπλεῖν εἰς Χίον” (“... the traders to put their goods quietly aboard their ships and then set sail to Chios”) (Xen., Hell. 1.6.37). The traders in the camp of the besieging force at Mytilene are mentioned exceptionally here, then, because they (inadvertently) play a role in a ruse; but the fact that Xenophon could refer to them casually—and with the definite article although he has not previously mentioned them in his narrative—shows that traders were an assumed part of sieges and blockades during the Ionian War.

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181 For the latter, see the conclusion to this chapter. Note that all payments to naval forces in this period remain in cash; see chapter 5 sections iii, iv, chapter 6 section iv for references and discussion.

182 We can assume therefore that the provisions being brought in by sea to the forces besieging Athens in 405/4 (see Isoc. 18.60 at p.141 n.71 above) were being transported by private traders to sell to the besieging forces. This conclusion receives further proof from the facts that the Athenians only undertook the circumvallation sieges of Calchedon and Byzantium after they had established (almost) total control of the sea through successive victories at Cynossema, Abybus, and Cyzicus (Cynossema: 8.103.7; Abydus: Xen., Hell. 1.1.4-7; Cyzicus: Xen., Hell. 1.1.16-18); and that the Peloponnesians only started the blockades by land and sea of Mytilene, Athens, and Samos when there were no Athenian fleets on the sea. In other words, full-scale sieges of poleis were attempted during the Ionian War only when one side or the other had (almost) total naval superiority and so could ensure the security of continuous sea-borne supply lines, and thus the continuous security of supply required for besieging forces. (Shorter term naval guards or
The tens of thousands of men constituting the Athenian and Peloponnesian forces in the Ionian War spent, however, only a part of their time engaged in naval movements, guards, and sieges; the majority of their time in the Ionian theater was spent encamped at operational bases. These bases—camps located at or beside allied or friendly poleis—functioned as secure locations in which forces could be gathered before major operations, provided operational security as a base from which detachments could attack and retire to, and served (most importantly) as winter-quarters. Samos was the most important operational base for the Athenians during the Ionian War: the Athenians based themselves there from the summer of 412 to near the end of the summer of 411, from early 407 till the summer of 405 (and the movement of the fleet to its defeat at Aegospotami); from 411 to 409, the Athenians based first themselves at various poleis in the Hellespont, and in the winter of 410/9 at Lampsacus, before settling down blockades could rely on stores of provisions laid in (see n.180 above)—and, in any case, only needed local tactical superiority on sea for their operations.)

See Roth (1999) 169-177 for the concept and discussion of operational bases.

See (ibid.) esp. 171.

See 8.27.4 for the establishment of the base at Samos in the summer of 412, and 8.100.1 for the Athenian fleet leaving Samos for the Hellespont. For the importance of Samos as a base of operations for the Athenians in these years, see esp. 8.76.4-5.

408 (Xen., Hell. 1.4.8); 407 (Xen., Hell. 1.4.23); 406 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.18, 20; Diod. 13.76.1, 13.100.6); 405 (Xen., Hell. 2.1.12, 2.1.16; Diod. 13.104.1).

Xen., Hell. 1.1.1-1.2.13 passim.

Xen., Hell. 1.2.15-16.
before Calchedon and Byzantium in the summer of 409. The Peloponnesians’ most important operational bases during the war were Chios, Ephesus, Miletus, and Rhodes.\(^{189}\)

Foraging or pillaging did not play any important part of the provisioning of the Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets at their bases. Those operational bases located on islands—Samos, Chios, and Rhodes—necessarily had no nearby enemy territory accessible by land from the sailors’ camps which they could forage from; some petty stealing from the inhabitants of the poleis of these islands or occasional raiding of enemy territory on the mainland opposite did take place,\(^{190}\) but nothing that could feed tens of thousands of men for any significant duration of time. The Athenians did raid the King’s territory in the winter of 410/9 from their base at Lampsacus; but the purpose of these raids was primarily plunder.\(^{191}\) For the Peloponnesian bases at Miletus and Chios, however, foraging or pillaging of the interior was forbidden by the fact that it belonged to their ally, the King.\(^{192}\) It has sometimes been thought by scholars that the Peloponnesian

\(^{189}\) Chios: summer of 406-summer of 405 (Xen., Hell. 2.1.1-10). Ephesus: 406 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.1; Diod. 13.70.4-13.71.1; Plut., Lys. 3); summer 406 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.10-15, 1.6.26; cf. Diod. 13.76.3); summer 406: (Xen., Hell. 1.6.1, 1.6.26). Miletus: summer 412 (8.26-27.1, 8.29.1); winter of 412/11 (8.29.1, 8.33.1, 8.36.1, 8.36.4-5, 8.50.2, 8.60.3); summer of 411 (8.60.3, 8.63.1, 8.78-85, 8.99, 8.100.1); part of summer 406 (Xen., Hell. 1.6.8-12). Note also that the ninety-four triremes of the Peloponnesian fleet spent eighty days at Rhodes in the winter of 412/11 (8.44.2, 8.44.4, 8.60.2) and some time there, too, in 407 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.1). Xenophon and Diodorus are vague on the location of Peloponnesian bases from the winter of 411 to early 408.

\(^{190}\) That is, we should imagine these activities as providing supplies for some sailors for days or a few weeks, rather than months or years. See, e.g., Xen., Hell. 2.1.1: the Peloponnesians on Chios apparently living by stealing food in the summer of 406; and Xen., Hell. 2.1.16: raiding of the King’s territory by the Athenian fleet based on Samos in the summer of 405.

\(^{191}\) Xen., Hell. 1.2.17: “ἐπόρθουν τὴν βασιλέως χώραν...” with chapter 1 section ivb on the meaning of πορθεῖν. Note also Erdkamp (1998) 23 at n.196 below on the difficulty for large stationary forces of provisioning by foraging or pillaging in winter.

\(^{192}\) See Xen., Hell. 3.1.8 for the conventional understanding that classical Greek military forces were not allowed to plunder (or forage from) the territory of their friends; although some private raiding by sailors or
sailors at Miletus in the winter of 412/11 planned to raid the King’s territory in search of provisions, because Tissaphernes was paying them so badly. Thucydides narrates that Tissaphernes decided to start paying the Peloponnesians again near the end of that winter chiefly because, due to the sailors’ lack of pay, “ἐφοβεῖτο µάλιστα µὴ τῆς τροφῆς ζητήσει πορθήσωσι τὴν ἤπειρον” (“he was afraid that, in search of τροφή, they might plunder the mainland”) (8.57.1). But τροφή here, as the surrounding narrative shows, clearly means pay (i.e., money to pay for food): it is found twice with this meaning at 8.57.1 (which describes the reasons for Tissaphernes’ fear of potential Peloponnesian plundering of his territory); τροφή = pay was what Tissaphernes gave to the Peloponnesians in order to prevent them attacking the interior (8.57.2); it was also what he guaranteed to pay them in an immediately subsequent agreement (8.58.5, 8.58.6). In fact, τροφή always means pay, and never supplies, in book 8 of Thucydides. In addition, πορθεῖν always has the primary meaning in Thucydides of the plundering of property (rather than the foraging of food). In sum, then, Tissaphernes was afraid at 8.57.1 that, as a desperate recourse because of their lack of money, the Peloponnesian sailors would plunder the mainland in search of property to sell, so that they could raise

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193 Kagan ([1987] 97), Hanson ([1998] 187), Kallet ([2001] 265, 304), and Hornblower (CT iii.922, 926) (and Smith’s (Loeb) and Crawley’s translations) take this sentence to mean that Tissaphernes was afraid that the Peloponnesians would ravage the mainland in search of provisions.

194 See 8.5.5, 8.29.1, 8.43.4, 8.45.6, 8.46.5, 8.78, 8.80.2, 8.81.3, 8.83.3, 8.86.6, 8.87.1, 8.87.3, 8.99.

195 See again chapter 1 section ivb.
money to buy provisions. (The subsequent agreement with the Peloponnesians made sure that his fears never became a reality.)

Foraging, then, was never of structural importance in the provisioning of the Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets at their operational bases. Rather, just as in the case of the provisioning of forces remaining immobile for sieges, continuous supply lines were needed to provision the tens of thousands of sailors on both sides as they remained stationary for long periods at their bases. Again, in the absence of any other means of state acquisition of supplies, the provisions making possible the functioning of these operational bases were owned and transported by private traders, and sold to the men in agorai in or at the outskirts of their camps. Our one explicit reference to the provisioning of operational bases during the Ionian War is consistent with this conclusion: Andocides, defending himself in an Athenian court, told the assembled dikasts that, in addition to providing oar-spars to the Athenian fleet on Samos in 411, he also imported grain and bronze to it (“ἐἰσήγαγον δὲ σῖτόν τε καὶ χαλκόν”) (2.11). In other words, the existence of markets in grain (and other foods) made the provisioning of operational bases during

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196 For other scholars taking the passage in this way, see Jackson (1969) 13 and n.13; Lewis (1977) 102-103; Lazenby (2004) 186. Note that, given the time of year (late winter), the Peloponnesian sailors could not, in fact, have been thinking of living from foraging: see Erdkamp (1998) 23 on the difficulty of provisioning by foraging or pillaging in winter: “[e]ven the most ruthlessly plundering troops would get into difficulty when trying to operate for a long period in the same area... it would be impossible to operate in such a way during winter or early spring, that is before harvest time, since at that time of year a huge area would be needed to feed an averagely sized army.” Finally, cf. 8.36.1: the Peloponnesians living well at Miletus in the early winter of 412/11 because they were being paid sufficiently by Tissaphernes and because they still had the plunder (not provisions) taken in the capture of Iasus (see 8.28.4).

197 The fleets also needed some reserves of provisions in order to provide strategic and tactical flexibility: see Roth (1999) 170 for this point.

the Ionian War possible, and enabled tens of thousands of men to remain in their bases and at sea for the eight years from the winter of 413/412 to the summer of 404.

v. Conclusions

Peloponnesian—and other Greek—forces on overseas expeditions acquired their food from markets before the Ionian War, too. Despite the nearly total absence of evidence available for the provisioning of fifth century naval and amphibious expeditions mounted by Greek states other than Athens,\textsuperscript{199} this conclusion follows with certainty from consideration of the financial administration of classical Greek states and from the evidence we possess for the funding and preparation of these expeditions. Firstly (and to repeat myself), no classical Greek state had reserves of tax grain which it could use to supply overseas campaigns.\textsuperscript{200} Secondly, there were no private traders—contractors—of sufficient scale in the Greek world which classical Greek states could employ to provision their campaigns.\textsuperscript{201} Thirdly, classical Greek states did not requisition supplies from its citizens for expeditions.\textsuperscript{202} Fourthly, classical Greek states did not exact

\textsuperscript{199} But see chapter 1 section v on the provisioning of Syracusan forces; p.177 on the provisioning of the Peloponnesian forces besieging Mytilene in 406; p.141 n.71 on the provisioning of the forces besieging Athens in 405/4. See also Andoc. 2.14 (with MacDowell [1991] 189): the implication of Andocides being accused of importing grain and oars to the enemy is that a ship-owner could be thought to be supplying provisions to the Peloponnesians during the Ionian War. Diodorus also reports preparation of grain and other supplies for wars by Brasidas at Amphipolis in 424 (12.68.4-5) and Olynthus in 382/1, but as these are simply stereotypically formulaic descriptions Diodorus uses often for his descriptions of military campaigns: see Stylianou (1998) 15.

\textsuperscript{200} It is commonly thought that the supply of Spartan military forces was centrally organized by the Spartan state, but there is no strong evidence for this idea: see chapter 3 section ivb.

\textsuperscript{201} See again pp.147-148 above.

\textsuperscript{202} See again p.147 above.
contributions in kind from their allies or subjects in order to provision campaigns; rather, as in the Ionian War, they always requested or compelled contributions in cash from their allies in order to prepare overseas expeditions or to fund the current expenses of those on campaign. Thus, in 435, before their major expedition against Corcyra, the Corinthians, in addition to asking their maritime allies for triremes (1.27.1, 1.46.1), also asked for money from the Thebans and the Phliasians (1.27.2), and for money and triremes from the Eleans (1.27.2, 1.30.2). At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans asked their allies in Italy and Sicily both to build ships, and to provide fixed sums of money (“καὶ ἀργυρίον ἑτοιµάζειν”) (2.7.2). An inscription from Sparta, IG V 1, 1, probably dating to 427, records a list of irregular voluntary contributions to the Spartan war effort of (in Attic value) of thirteen talents and two hundred and seventy-four drachmas from a collection of individuals, groups of exiles, and states. (This inscription also unusually records contributions in kind of raisins (II.13-16) and two or

203 See again p.165-166 n.45 (Peloponnesians), pp.166-167 (Athenians).

204 See also Plut., Mor. 190A: “Ἀρχίδαµου, ἐν τῷ Πελοποννησιακῷ πολέµῳ τῶν συµµαχῶν ἀξιούντων ὀρίσαι τοὺς φόρους αὐτῶν, εἶπεν, ἢ πόλεµος οὐ τεταγµένα σιτεῖται” (“when the allies said in the Peloponnesian war it was only right that Archidamus set a limit to their contributions, he said, “War does not feed on fixed contributions”). Unfortunately, this saying cannot be safely associated with Archidamus since it wanders from speaker to speaker throughout the works of Plutarch: in addition to the Spartan king Archidamus who died in 427 (Crass. 2.8; Agis and Cleomenes 27.1), Plutarch also reports it of the Spartan king Archidamus who died in 338 (Plut., Mor. 219A) and Crobylus (i.e. Hegesippus the Athenian orator) (Plut., Dem. 17.3).

205 See Loomis (1992) 56-76.

206 (Ibid.) 79. But see (ibid.) 77: the fragmentary state of the inscription means that we do not have the full list of contributors, or the full amounts of all that was given by the contributors we do have.

207 See also IG V 1, 219 for a fragment of another list of contributions to Spartan war efforts during the Peloponnesian War: this fragment is too small, however, to contain any name of a contributor or any amount for a contribution.
three thousand *medimnoi* of an unknown substance (ll.20-24); but the first is from an (unknown) individual and the second contributor in kind is unknown.208 In two treaties of the late 420s, Athens enjoined allies not to provide contributions of money to their allies:209 it can be inferred from this prohibition that it was common practice for classical Greek states to support other states engaged in wars with monetary contributions.210

Money, then, was crucial to the waging of overseas expeditions mounted by states other than Athens. This inference is supported by numismatic evidence. Thus, for example, in the late 430s, Epidamnus may have struck a special coinage to finance Corinthian military aid;211 the Sicyonians minted coinages from the 430/20 onwards that were almost certainly linked to the war effort during those years;212 a coinage of the Euboean League issued in the late fifth century was almost certainly connected also to the Euboean rebellion from Athens and funding of naval squadrons to assist the

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208 Loomis ([1992] 80, 82-83) thinks that the small amounts of cash contributed and the contributions in kind mentioned in this *IG* V 1, 1 shows that the Spartans were less dependent on cash for their military and naval efforts than the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War. No: the inscription shows, rather, that the Spartans simply did not have access to the amounts of money the Athenians possessed from tribute and other sources of current revenue (such as the mines at Laurion, their various harbor taxes, etc.).

209 See *IG* I 75.10-11: among other things, Halieis (in 424/3) not to provide money to Athens’ enemies (“μηδὲ χρήματα παρέχεῖν τοῖς πολέμιοις”; *IG* I 76.19-20: among other things, certain Bottiae cities swear not to provide money to the enemies of the Athenians (“καὶ οὐκ ὠφελήσω τοὺς ἐχθροὺς Ἀθηναίων οὔτε χρήματα παρέχων…”).

210 For later in our period, see Rhodes and Osborne 57 (Tod II.160): a list of contributions to the Boeotians for the prosecution of Sacred War in the late 350s all in cash from the *poleis* of Alyzea, Anactorium, and Byzantium, as well as a Boeotian *proxenos* from Tenedos.

211 Kraay (1976) 84.

212 (Ibid.) 99.
Peloponnesians.\footnote{213} If *poleis* other than Athens either mounted overseas expeditions very infrequently or not at all, it was firstly because the resource requirements of trireme warfare limited this type of warfare to only a few wealthy states;\footnote{214} and, secondly, because no classical Greek states other than Athens (even Syracuse)\footnote{215} possessed the concentrations of capital necessary to easily and quickly fund naval and amphibious expeditions of protracted length.\footnote{216} (These two factors also resulted in the overwhelming Athenian naval superiority that effectively blocked any other Greek state from attempting to launch any major amphibious or naval operations in the Aegean during the Peloponnesian War before 412.\footnote{217}) But those few major overseas expeditions that were mounted by states other than Athens in this period always relied on money to fund their

\footnote{213} See Andrewes, *HCT* v.319 for references and discussion. Note also here p.137 n.58 above for the special coinages struck by the Mytilenians and the Melians to fund their resistance to Athens.

\footnote{214} See Davies (2007a) 77-82 and conclusion.

\footnote{215} See Morris (2001) 74-75: Syracuse able to fund major wars against Athens and Syracuse in the last two decades of the fifth century and the first decade of the fourth century, but only with difficulty and through the use of financial expedients. Cf. chapter 1 conclusion: Syracuse owing two thousand talents by the third summer of the Athenian expedition (in 413).

\footnote{216} See Kallet (1993) *passim*; Morris (2001), e.g., 78-79, 91; and conclusion. Note here that it took Corinth two years to equip and prepare its expedition of one hundred and fifty triremes that sailed in 433 against Corcyra (1.31.1, 1.46.1) (see Kallet-Marx [1993] 77-80 for discussion of the Corinthian preparations and what they reveal about the differences between Corinth’s and Athens’ financial resources for war).

\footnote{217} The Peloponnesians mounted amphibious campaigns in the north-west in the early years of the Peloponnesian War. The Corinthians launched an amphibious expedition (of forty triremes and one thousand five hundred hoplites) against Acarnania and Cephallenia (which would not submit) in the winter of 431/430 (2.33.1-3); the Peloponnesians mounted an (unsuccessful) amphibious expedition against Zacynthus in the summer of 430 (2.66.1-2); and the Peloponnesians also launched amphibious expeditions and fleets to the north-west in the summer of 429, which were all ultimately unsuccessful (2.80-92). Fleets were also sent to Corcyra in the summer of 427 (3.76-80) and in the summer of 425 (4.2, 4.8). The only naval expeditions in areas in the Athenian sphere of influence in the Aegean before 412 were an attempted surprise attack on Athens in the winter of 429/28 (2.93-94); and a fleet of forty ships sent to aid the revolt of Mytilene in the summer of 427 but which failed to execute its mission (3.15.1, 3.29-33).
expeditions and (especially) to pay their men: the men employed on these expeditions used their monetary pay to acquire provisions by purchase in *agorai* from private traders who had accompanied their voyages or sailed to their camps.\textsuperscript{218}

One can only produce orders of magnitude for the amounts of grain purchased by Athenian and Peloponnesian forces engaged in amphibious and naval operations in the Aegean and around ‘mainland’ Greece during the Peloponnesian War, but the figures are again strikingly and impressively large. For the siege of Samos, taking one hundred and ten triremes to have stayed for the whole of the eight months (reckoning that fifteen triremes (probably too high a number) were lost in the naval battles with the Samians), and the reinforcing squadrons of ninety triremes to have stayed for the last six months of the siege (they probably will have arrived before this), the Athenian and allied triremes will have needed to import 365,000 *medimnoi* of barley-meal—over six million kilograms of wheat equivalent of grain.\textsuperscript{219} The seventeen thousand men who remained at Potidaea for the entire duration of the siege from the summer of 432 to the winter of 430/29 will have bought nearly 640,000 *medimnoi* of barley-meal—or over ten and a half

\textsuperscript{218} Cf. 1.62.1: a market was established ("ἀγορὰν ποιεῖσθαι") outside Potidaea for the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus awaiting Athenian attack in 432. Although this was not an amphibious or naval expedition, since the forces under Aristeus made their way to Potidaea by land (see p.216 n.51), the provision of a market to Aristeus’ force shows that this was a normal means of provisioning forces of classical Greek states other than Athens when they were operating far away from their home poleis. Cf. Xen., *Hell.* 6.2.23: many traders in the Peloponnesian camp undertaking the siege of Corcyra in 372.

\textsuperscript{219} Assuming two hundred men per trireme (see appendix 2) and 16.482kg as the wheat equivalent of one *medimnos* of ἄλφιτα (see appendix 3 section iii), the one hundred and ten triremes will have consumed 230,000 *medimnoi* of barley-meal (or 3,790,860kg of w(heat).e(quivalent). of grain), and the ninety triremes 135,000 *medimnoi* of barley-meal (or 2,225,070kg of w.e. of grain).
two thousand men who blockaded Mytilene for roughly nine months from the summer of 428 to the early summer of 427 will have acquired by purchase just over 100,000 medimnoi of barley-meal—or over one million and six hundred and fifty thousand kilograms of wheat equivalent of grain.\textsuperscript{221} The twenty-two thousand and four hundred men who sailed around the Peloponnese—taking foraging to have provided a quarter of their provisions (almost certainly too high a figure)—will have needed from the supply ships accompanying them or sailing out to them from Athens just over 93,000 medimnoi of barley-meal—or over one and a half million kilograms of wheat equivalent of grain.\textsuperscript{222} Finally, each side in the Ionian War will have needed either (taking a conservative figure of fifteen thousand men per fleet) nearly 230,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or just over three million seven hundred and fifty thousand kilograms of wheat equivalent of grain) per year; or (taking a more likely figure of twenty thousand men per fleet) just over 300,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or just over five million kilograms of wheat equivalent of grain) per year.\textsuperscript{223} Placing these figures into the context of the figures we already do have the grain trade in the Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries,\textsuperscript{224} one

\footnotetext{220}Actually 637,500 medimnoi of barley-meal, or 10,507,275kg of w.e. of grain.

\footnotetext{221}Actually 101,250 medimnoi of barley-meal, or 1,668,802.5kg of w.e. of grain.

\footnotetext{222}Actually 93,333 medimnoi of barley-meal, or 1,583,320kg of w.e. of grain.

\footnotetext{223}Actually either 228,125 medimnoi of barley-meal, or 3,759,956.25kg of w.e. of grain; or 304,167 medimnoi of barley-meal, or 5,013,275kg of w.e. of grain.

\footnotetext{224}See chapter 1 section v.
can see that they introduce striking and significant new evidence into the debate on the size of that trade.

Analysis of the provisioning of amphibious and naval operations launched by Greek states in the Aegean and the seas around ‘mainland’ Greece in the fifth century provides for the first time, then, explicit evidence of regular large-scale seaborne trade in grain in the eastern Greek Mediterranean in the fifth century. But in order to prove conclusively that this trade consisted of (thousands of) market (and not reciprocal) exchanges, it is necessary to show that the prices in these exchanges could vary. There is evidence to show that this was the case. Firstly, at Aristoph., *Wasps* 552-557 (produced for the first time in 422), Philokleon, arguing for the power of Athenian dikasts, tells his son how, on his arrival the courts, there are big men there who supplicate him and plea in a piteous tone (556-557),

οἴκτισιν μ’, ὃς πάτερ, αἰτοῦμαι σ’, εἰ καὐτὸς πώποθ’ ὑφείλου ἀρχὴν ἄρξας ἢ ’πι στρατιᾶς τοῖς ἔσσοτοις ἄγοράζων.

Note here, too, that markets provided to military forces are taken for granted in Thucydides’ description of the early years of the Peloponnesian War and in Aristophanes’ comedies of the late 420s (in addition to *Ach.* 544-554, see just below on *Wasps*, 556-557). The fact that ‘military markets’ could be assumed by and represented to Athenian audiences as an expected and customary part of war and war preparations in the 420s only makes sense if this institution was a long-established and conventional feature of Greek warfare by this time.

Previous scholars have mentioned in passing that the monetization of payments to classical Greek military forces presupposes an economy in which the men serving in these forces could spend their money buying goods in market exchanges: see, e.g., Howgego (1995) 18; Morley (2007a) 51-52; von Reden (2007) 402, 405; Burrer (2008) 77 (and cf. 1.81.4 for the explicit linkage between Athenian imperial revenues and the provisioning of Athenian overseas expeditions). But none of these scholars have ever drawn the full implications from this presupposition, or examined whether the exchanges military payments in coin permitted were true market exchanges.

See Temin (2001) 176: “[i]t is not enough, however, to show that prices were widespread. Prices affect the allocation of resources in market economies, and we need to have evidence of this causal relationship as well as indications of the prices themselves.” See (ibid.) 177: “[t]he distinction between market and reciprocal exchange is whether the rate of exchange – the price – can vary.” Temin’s article provides the framework for the following discussion.
Have mercy on me, father, if ever you yourself have nicked anything when you were holding some office or buying food for your mess-mates on campaign.

The man supplicating Philokleon could only have been able to embezzle money if his sussitoi did not know the price of food in the market in which he was buying (in other words, if the price of food could vary, so that it could not be known in advance).

Secondly, Andocides, as part of his defense mentioned earlier, told the dikasts assembled for his trial that not only did he supply oar-spars to the Athenian fleet on Samos, but that he refused to charge more for them than they had cost him, although he could have obtained a price of five drachmas each for them. Although he does not state so explicitly, it seems very likely that the grain he also supplied to the Athenians on Samos could have varied in price, too.

In addition to these instances, there is, to anticipate chapter 7, conclusive evidence that the prices charged for booty in classical Greek military camps were also determined by supply and demand (and were not fixed or customary). Firstly, the Oxyrhynchus Historian narrates that, in the last decades of the fifth century, the Thebans were able to improve their estates and houses greatly since they were able to obtain

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228 Andoc. 2.11: “... καὶ παρόν µοι πέντε δραχµῶν τὴν τιµὴν αὐτῶν δέξασθαι οὐκ ἠθέλησα πράξασθαι πλέον ἢ ὅσου ἐµοὶ κατέστησαν.”

229 The only mention of fixed low prices in the classical period: when Alexander of Pherae offered cattle at a low price to his new Athenian allies, Epamiondas of Thebes commented “[w]e’ll supply them free wood to cook their meat, for we’ll cut down everything in their land if they make trouble’ (Plut., Mor. 193E). This exception proves the rule: as τάγος (and virtual tyrant) of all of Thessaly, Alexander could demand immediate access to the resources of his subjects in ways that the administrations of city-states could not (Xen., Hell. 6.4.29 is particularly instructive in this regard), and he also ruled a region that was much greater in resources (and cities) than a normal city-state (see esp. Xen., Hell. 6.1.5-12, 18-19 on the unusually large resources available to Jason of Pherae (Alexander’s father) as ruler of Thessaly); thus, he could prepare large amounts of cattle, at little or no cost to himself, for sale to the Athenians at low prices. Cf. appendix 6 section iii: the resources available to Hellenistic rulers also explains why prices in markets provided to Hellenistic military forces were often fixed.
slaves and booty, as a result of the Deceleian War, at an unusually small price (13.4). Secondly, in Thrace in the winter of 400/399, Seuthes sent his agent Heraclides with booty to Perinthus in order to sell it there to raise the pay for the Cyreans, whom he had been employing (Xen., Anab. 7.4.2). From the proceeds of the sale of the plunder at Perinthus, Seuthes paid twenty days’ pay only of the month that had just passed to the mercenaries (Xen., Anab. 7.5.4) (although in fact the Greeks were owed two months’ pay (Xen., Anab. 7.6.1)); for Heraclides said that he had not obtained any more money than that from the sale of the booty (“ὁ γὰρ Ἦρακλείδης ἐλεγεν ὅτι οὐ πλέον ἐμπολήσαι”) (Xen., Anab. 7.5.4). Xenophon attacked Heraclides for his lack of success in raising money, telling him that he should have raised more money by borrowing or by selling the clothes off his back (Xen., Anab. 7.5.5): the assumption being that he could have raised more money, and therefore that the prices for the booty he had sold at Perinthus could have varied and were not standardized. Finally, Xenophon praised Agesilaos for making use of the sale of booty to enrich his friends during his campaign in Asia Minor (Ages. 1.17-19). Up country in Phrygia in the summer/autumn campaign of 396, the plunder was so great that things were selling for next to nothing, “ἀντίπροικα.” Agesilaos told his friends that he would be shortly going down to the coast with the army and gave them the word to buy, instructing the laphuropolai to sell to them on credit, so that his friends made huge profits (“πάντες παµπληθή χρήµατα ἔλαβον”) on their arrival at an unnamed city on the coast (Ages. 1.18). It is unlikely to be the case that, in military forces

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230 See chapter 7 section iv for more discussion of this passage. See there also Hell. Oxy. 22.4 for Agesilaos for sending the “more valuable part of the booty” from Lake Dascylitis to Cyzicus to be sold.

231 Unnamed in this text, but Diodorus (14.79.3) tells us that Agesilaos employed Cyme as his base while plundering Phrygian in the summer of 396.
where the allocation of plunder was determined by “‘real prices’ arrived at individually by market bargaining,”232 grain was exchanged at standardized or traditional prices.

Rather, the exchanges of grain and other goods in the *agorai* provided to classical Greek military forces were real market exchanges (in which goods were allocated by price).233 The examination of the provisioning of classical Greek naval and amphibious expeditions in the eastern Mediterranean shows a world, then, where there were large-scale market exchanges in grain and other goods.

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233 Cf. Harris (2001b) 76-77, Möller (2007) 372-373 for prices for goods and services at Athens in the classical period being determined by individual market bargaining (and not being customary). Cf. also Bresson (2008a) 115 citing Xen., *Poroi* 4.6 for the fact that price movements determined levels of agricultural and craft production in the Greek world. Cf., too, Xen., *Anab.* 1.5.6: the prices charged for wheat-flour and barley-meal in the Lydian *agora* accompanying Cyrus’ army on the march to Cunaxa being determined by supply and demand.
Chapter 3: The Provisioning of Classical Greek Overland Campaigns

i. Introduction

In this chapter, I turn from the provisioning of the amphibious and naval campaigns launched by Greek states (and especially Athens) in the fifth and early fourth centuries to the supply of land campaigns undertaken by Greek poleis in this period. I will begin by discussing the (small) amount of provisions that classical Greek armies took with them when they departed for campaigns from their home poleis. I will then examine the provisioning of Greek armies on the move through friendly territory: firstly, I will employ an analysis of Xenophon’s narrative of the parabasis of the Ten Thousand along the southern Black Sea coast to show that the reception of land forces—and the provision of agora to them—by friendly or neutral poleis was taken for granted throughout the Greek world in the classical period; I will continue from this analysis to demonstrate that markets provided by poleis were the primary source of food supplies for classical Greek military forces marching through friendly territory. In contrast, when operating in hostile territory, Greek armies necessarily had to rely on some other means of provisioning than polis-provided markets. Many modern discussions of the traveling markets that always accompanied classical Greek armies on overland campaigns have considered these ‘market mobs’ to have been important sources of food for Greek military expeditions in hostile territory; Xenophon’s paradigmatic account of the preparations necessary for Cyrus’ long march to Thymbrara (Cyr. 6.2.24-41, esp. 38-39) is the passage that has been most often cited in support of this view. I will demonstrate in the fourth section of this chapter, however, that positioning the traveling markets which accompanied Greek armies into a comparative context, and a more careful and
contextualized reading of the passages in Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia* and other ancient works bearing on this question, show that private traders never made a structurally important contribution to the food supply of Greek overland military expeditions. Rather, just as in later European societies, traveling markets were never more than a supplementary source of provisions for classical Greek armies: foraging always remained Greek armies’ primary means of acquiring food in hostile territory. I will conclude by considering what the provisioning of classical Greek land campaigns can tell us about the nature and scale of the overland trade in grain in the Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries.

**ii. The amount of provisions brought along on classical Greek land campaigns**

Classical Greek soldiers took only a few days’ provisions with them when they set out on land campaigns.¹ Athenian soldiers departing for land campaigns in the fifth century were typically ordered to bring along three days’ rations (though five days’ rations are attested for the late fourth century), and this amount is also the quantity of provisions most frequently evidenced for other classical Greek military forces setting out on overland marches.² The number of days’ supplies soldiers were ordered to bring with

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¹ Gomme, *HCT* i.16 (though note the serious mistakes in his treatment of classical Greek military provisioning discussed at chapter 2 section iia, iic); Rawlings (2007) 74. Before continuing, I should add that classical Greek hoplites did not carry their own food; slave attendants performed this task for them (see appendix 2 for discussion).

² For sources for the amounts of provisions brought on campaign by classical Greek armies, see Cruickshank (1954) 66-68; Pritchett (1971) 32-34; Harthen (2001) 106-108. The Aristophanic evidence is completely consistent in representing “the three-day rations... [as] a well-known and hated feature of campaigning...” (Pritchett [1971] 34); for ‘real life’ forming the background to Aristophanic comedy, see p.153 n.108. Cruickshank, Pritchett, and Harthen all miss Eubulus, fr. 19 (*PCG*), describing the preparations for a mock war against an army of ants, which confirms that three days’ provisions were the standard amount of food brought on campaign by fifth century Athenian armies: "ἡµεῖς ποτ’, ἄνδρες, Κακοφίδας ἐπίσαμεν λαβόντας εἰς Ἰμηθέττον ἕξαλθην ὁπλα καὶ στι’ ἐπὶ μύρµηκας ἡµεων τριῶν, ὡς
them at the outset of a campaign would have varied, however, according to the tactical and strategic requirements of the operations they were about to undertake, and the opportunities they would have had during those operations to replenish their supplies.\textsuperscript{3} 

Thus, the Arcadian forces that occupied Oneum in 367—in order to prevent the Thebans from being harassed by enemy forces on their march through the isthmus of Corinth—took seven days’ provisions with them (Xen., \textit{Hell.} 7.1.41), since they knew that they would have to remain immobile in uninhabited and hostile territory for some time in order to achieve their mission.\textsuperscript{4} But the circumstances of this operation were unusual (the operations of classical Greek armies were usually characterized by their mobility, and soldiers normally had the opportunity to replenish supplies during their operations);\textsuperscript{5} the figure found here of seven days’ supplies is, accordingly, the largest attested figure for an amount of provisions carried by a classical Greek land force in ‘mainland’ Greece.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{3} See Erdkamp (1998) 77 for this point.

\textsuperscript{4} Cf. Thucy. 7.43.2: Demosthenes in 413 ordering the taking of five days’ provisions to men who (in case of victory on Epipolae) would have been operating in hostile territory (at a Syracusan cross-wall) and would have had to have remained immobile for some days (in order to build a wall against the Syracusans).

\textsuperscript{5} See sections iiib, ivb, and v below for discussion.

\textsuperscript{6} Cf. Cruickshank (1954) 67-68 for seven days’ rations representing a near maximum for the amount of supplies that could be carried by one man. At Diod. 13.95.3, Dionysios is reported as ordering the Syracusans to bring thirty days’ provisions with them for a campaign against Leontini (in 406). This order represents an exceptional outlier compared to the extant contemporary evidence for the quantities of provisions carried by classical Greek armies for marches overland: and there were no tactical or strategic requirements for this campaign that could have necessitated such an unusually large amount of provisions (Grote (ap. Pritchett [1971] 33 n.14) called Dionysius’ order “preposterous”); thus, it should not be cited as evidence for the typical provisioning practices of classical Greek armies. Anderson ([1970] 48) states that “[t]hirty days seems to have been considered a reasonable amount of time for an army to live off its own supplies, if there was time for preparation.” But the three sources he cites for this statement provide no
That Greek armies in the fifth and fourth centuries usually brought along (very) few days’ provisions on campaign is confirmed by two contemporary generalizing discussions of overland expeditions. Firstly, as already discussed,7 ps.-Xenophon, in
contrasting the mobility and unpredictability of typical amphibious expeditions from the (relative) strategic immobility of typical overland expeditions, \(^8\) states that (Ath. Pol. 2.5) “... τοῖς δὲ κατὰ γῆν οἰχ οἵον τε ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν ἀπελθεῖν πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδὸν· βραδεῖαί τε γὰρ αἱ πορεῖαι καὶ σῖτον οἰχ οἵον τε ἔχειν πολλοῦ χρόνου πεζῇ ιόντα” (“... those who rule over land cannot travel many days’ journey from their own land. For journeys are slow, and it is not possible to carry provisions for a long time if one travels on foot.”). Because they could not bring many days’ provisions on campaign, ps.-Xenophon continues (ibid.), the strategic options of land forces were limited. \(^9\) Secondly, in a lengthy dialogue in the first book of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia between Cambyses and Cyrus, which functions as a précis of the personal qualities necessary for an ideal (Greek) general and of the requirements in military organization and planning for paradigmatically successful (Greek) land campaigns, \(^10\) Cambyses states that

... πάντων δὲ χαλεπώτατον στρατιὰν ἀργὸν τρέφειν. πλεῖστα τε γὰρ τὰ ἐσθίοντα ἐν στρατιᾷ καὶ ἀπ’ ἐλαχίστων ὁρµώµενα καὶ οἷς ἂν λάβῃ δαψιλέστατα χρώµενα, ὡστε οὔποτε ἀργεῖν δεήσει στρατιάν.

... but the worst burden of all is to support an army in idleness. For not only are the mouths in an army very numerous but the supplies they start with are

\(^8\) Cf. Rawlings (2007) 111.

\(^9\) See sections ivb, v for further discussion of this point.

\(^{10}\) See, e.g., Gera (1993) 72, Hirsch (1985) 85. As Stadter points out ([1991] 474-475, 484-485), with his instruction from Cambyses in this dialogue, Cyrus completes his development as an ideal general: the rest of the narrative of the Cyropaedia then serves (amongst other things) as an illustration of the military lessons which Cyrus (now the complete general) has learned in his discussion with his father. See Gera (1993) 72 and n.152 for examples in book 2 of Cyrus putting into practice the lessons learned from his father; cf. also Xen., Cyr. 1.6.43 for Cyrus knowing, at the end of his discussion with his father, all that is required of a successful general. The dialogue at Cyr. 1.6 is then, in sum, a narrative device used by Xenophon to set out the basic requirements for the functioning of an ideal Greek army. On the Cyropaedia functioning, in general, as a narrative in which a fictional Cyrus could be presented to a contemporary Greek audience as a paradigmatically ideal leader and general (and thus also functioning as a narrative forming a sort of handbook of best military practice), see the discussion at section iva.
exceedingly limited, and they use up extravagantly whatever they get, so that an army must never be left idle. (Xen., Cyr. 1.6.17)

Thus, in a summarizing discussion of the needs and characteristics of an idealized classical Greek army, a discussion drawn and distilled from Xenophon’s own wide experience of such campaigns, and one in which the provisioning of armies is considered crucial for their success, it is again assumed that an army will depart on overland campaigns with very few supplies.

Finally, it should be noted here that—in all cases—the few days’ provisions which were brought on campaign were either bought by individual soldiers, or taken from their domestic stores; they were never provided by the state.

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11 See section iva for full discussion of this point.

12 See Xen., Cyr. 1.6.9-11, 14-15, 18, 26.

13 Thucy. 6.7.1 is not evidence for a supply-train (contra Pritchett [1971] 42 (followed by Hornblower, CT iii.310): the Spartans brought the wagons mentioned into Argive territory to carry home plunder (and not to supply themselves. See Xen., Hell. 5.4.42 for the Thebans taking mules into Thespian territory for the same reason (in 377).

14 See the discussion at chapter 6 section ix; see also Pritchett (1971) 33-34; Lee (2006) 494; Rawlings (2007) 74. See, too, Lazenby ([1994] 12) and Lipka ([2002] 190): the soldiers on Cyrus’ march to Thymbrara responsible for their own supplies. It is commonly thought that Spartan overland expeditions were accompanied by a centralized state commissariat, but this was not the case: see section ivb below.
iii. The provisioning of overland campaigns in friendly or neutral territory:

markets provided by poleis

a. Markets provided by poleis to the Cyreans

Xenophon’s narrative of the parabasis of the Cyreans along the southern coast of the Pontus mentions provisioning only in exceptional circumstances, in accordance with the practices of contemporary Greek military narrative. But the Ten Thousand were an extraordinary military force: as a stateless entity, their relations with the poleis whose territory they passed through were often (and unusually) controversial. In addition, as (exceptionally) there was no ruler or state agent providing pay or access to supplies to the Cyreans as they marched (or sometimes sailed) along the Pontic seaboard, provisioning was a crucial determining factor in the army’s strategic deliberations throughout this time. For both of these reasons, the provisioning of the Cyreans, and especially the agorai provided to them by poleis during their parabasis, are mentioned in Xenophon’s narrative of this part of the march unusually often for a Greek historical text; and (almost) exceptionally, details of the convention of the granting of agorai by Greek states to passing armies are also sometimes explicitly discussed in speeches found in this part of the Anabasis (especially when one party or another is accused of not having followed the expected, customary pattern of behavior). Just as, then, Thucydides’ description of the Sicilian expedition provides an unusually large amount of information about the

15 All text references in this section will be to Xenophon’s Anabasis, unless otherwise indicated.

16 See appendix 4 section i for more detailed discussion of this point.

17 (Almost) exceptionally: see just below on Thucydides’ narrative of the Sicilian expedition.
reception by *poleis* of amphibious forces because the reception of the Athenians was unusually controversial (and because Thucydides described the differing receptions of the Athenians in Italy and Sicily in order to implicitly judge the competing proposals of Nicias and Alcibiades before the Athenian assembly)\(^1\) — so Xenophon’s description of the Cyreans’ experiences during this part of the march provides an extraordinarily large amount of information on the provision of *agorai* by *poleis* to Greek land forces because their provision to the Cyreans was extraordinarily controversial (and because of Xenophon’s apologetic agenda in this part of his narrative).\(^2\)

The narrative of the march of the Ten Thousand along the Black Sea and the Propontis can be summarized as a series of halts at or near Greek cities along the coast and the marching through—or sometimes sailing along—non-Greek territory needed to get between those cities.\(^3\) Describing one of these halts, Xenophon narrates that the men stayed outside Cotyora for forty-five days, and that they initially got their provisions there by foraging (partly from Paphlagonian territory and partly from the estates of the Cotyorites), since the Cotyorites did not provide them with a market (“οὐ γὰρ παρεῖχον

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\(^1\) See chapter 1 section iiiia, appendix 1 section iii.

\(^2\) See, e.g., Erbse (1966).

\(^3\) See 5.3.1: the sick, the men older than forty, the women and children sailed from Trapezus to Cerasus; 5.4.1: this group sails on from Cerasus (to Cotyora); 6.1.14: the whole army sails from Cotyora to Sinope/Harmene; 6.2.1: the whole army sails from Sinope/Harmene to Heracleia; 6.2.17: the Arcadians in the army sail from Heracleia to Calpe Harbor. The whole army also made short crossings by sea from Chrysopolis to Byzantium (7.1.7) and from Thrace to Lampsacus (7.8.1).

\(^4\) But see p.213 n.43 on Calpe Harbor.
The foraging from Cotyorite territory brought Sinopean
ambassadors to the city, to complain to the mercenaries on behalf of the Cotyorites, who
were their colonists, that it was not proper for the mercenaries to quarter their ill inside
the city and take whatever they needed from the Cotyorites without the latter’s
permission. If the soldiers continued to do these things, Hecatonymus (who spoke on
behalf of the Sinopeans) threatened, the Sinopeans would make an alliance with Corylas,
ruler of Paphlagonia, against the mercenaries (5.5.7-12). Xenophon responded to the
Sinopeans with a speech generalizing about the obligations and relationships the Cyreans
expected to exist between communities and passing armies: he emphasized especially the
point that communities who wished to be regarded as friendly by the men ought to
provide a market to them; the fact that the Cotyorites had not done so explained and
excused the soldiers’ taking (by force) of provisions from their estates (5.5.13-19). In
contrast, he went on to say, when, on their march, the mercenaries had received a market
from a community, they had regarded this community as friendly. Xenophon used the
example of Trapezus to illustrate his point: since the men had reached Greek cities, they
had gotten their provisions by purchase in Trapezus, for the Trapezuntians had provided a
market (“καὶ νῦν ἐπεὶ εἰς τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἠλθομεν, ἐν Τραπεζοῦντι µέν, παρείχον
γὰρ ἡµῖν ἀγοράν, ὠνοµένοι εἴχοµεν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια...”); in return for this and other signs of
friendship, the army had behaved as friends towards them (5.5.14-15). Xenophon
continued (5.5.16-18):

Nor did the Cotyorites accept the Cyrean ill inside their walls (ibid.).
[o]n the other hand, wherever we come, whether it be to a barbarian or to a Greek land, and have no market at which to buy, we take provisions, not out of arrogance, but from necessity. The Carduchians, for example, and the Taochians and Chaldaeans were not subjects of the King and were exceedingly formidable, yet, even so, we made enemies of them because of this necessity of taking provisions, inasmuch as they would not provide a market. The Macronians, for their part, provided us with as good a market as they could, and we therefore regarded them as friends, barbarians though they were, and took by force not a thing that belonged to them.

In a friendly country, then, the Cyreans will use markets as the primary means of provisioning, whereas the foraging or plundering of a community’s territory for supplies occurs only when that community has shown itself to be unfriendly, thus the taking of provisions from the Cotyorites’ lands: “Κοτυωρίτας δὲ, οὓς ὑµετέρους φατὲ εἶναι, εἴ τι αὐτῶν εἰλήφαµεν, αὐτοὶ αἰτιοὶ εἰσίν; οὐ γὰρ ὡς φίλοι προσεφέροντο ἡµῖν, ἀλλὰ κλείσαντες τὰς πύλας οὔτε εἴσω ἐδέχοντο οὔτε ἐξω ἀγορὰν ἔπεµπον...” (“[a]s for the Cotyorites, whom you claim as yours, if we have taken anything that belonged to them, they are themselves to blame; for they did not behave toward us as friends, but shut their gates and would neither admit us within or send a market without...”) (5.5.19).

Xenophon does not differentiate in this speech between the Cyreans’ expectations of and behavior towards Greeks and non-Greeks: even in (unurbanized) barbarian territory, according to Xenophon here, the Cyreans only seized provisions when they were not offered a market. Xenophon’s description of the army’s relations with non-Greek communities in this speech, however, does not always correspond with his preceding narrative of its relations with those communities. There is, for example, no mention in Xenophon’s account of the march through the land of the Taochians of any attempted negotiations with that people; on the contrary, the Greeks took them to be
hostile without, it appears, any hesitation or reflection, and were immediately intent on
taking food from them by force (4.7.1-2). Moreover, the Greeks did not even march
through the territory of the Chaldaeans, who are mentioned before this just once in the
narrative as forming a contingent of the mercenaries of Orontas, the satrap of Armenian
(4.3.4).23 The Cyreans had, in contrast, tried to establish friendly relations with the
Carduchians: initially they had taken from their deserted villages only whatever
provisions they chanced upon (and those only from necessity), but had refrained from
attempting to make captives of any of the villagers, “εἴ πως ἐθελήσειαν οἱ Καρδοῦχοι
dιεναι αὐτοὺς ὡς διὰ φιλίας τῆς χώρας” (“on the chance that the Carduchians might
perhaps be willing to let them pass through their country in friendship”) (4.1.8) (the
Carduchians rebuffed them, however (4.1.9)). In addition, when, by chance, the
mercenaries had had a means of establishing friendly relations with the Macronians
(4.8.8), the latter had supplied as good as a market as they could (“καὶ ἀγορὰν οἵαν
ἐδύναντο παρεῖχον”).

So the impression that Xenophon attempted to create in this speech—that markets
could be expected on request from even non-Greek friendly communities the army passed
by on their march to the Black Sea—does not completely cohere with what one reads in
his prior account of the Cyreans’ relations with those communities. Rather than attribute
this admixture of misrepresentations and facts to confusion on Xenophon’s part,24 it


24 Ibid.
would be better to explain it in terms of his rhetorical aims in this speech.\(^{25}\) Firstly, by placing the refusal of the Cotyorites to provide an *agora* to the Cyreans as outside the norms not only of Greek practice but even what could be expected of barbarian communities, Xenophon simultaneously characterizes the Cotyorites’ behavior as truly aberrant and justifies the mercenaries’ actions. Secondly, and even more importantly, by mentioning here the Carduchians, Taochians, and Chaldaeans, who were all fierce fighters,\(^{26}\) Xenophon reminds the Sinopeans of the fighting strength and ability of the Cyreans. This sets up nicely Xenophon’s reply to Hecatonymus’ threat to ally with Corylas: “ἀ δὲ ἠπείλησας ὡς ἢν ὑµῖν δοκῇ Κορύλαν καὶ Παφλαγόνας συµµάχους ποιήσοσθε ἐφ’ ὑµᾶς, ἡµεῖς δὲ ἢν μὲν ἀνάγκη ἢ πολεµήσοµεν καὶ ἁµφοτέροις ἡδη γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλαπλασίοις ὑµῶν ἐπολεµήσαµεν” (“[a]s to the threat you uttered, that if you thought best, you would enlist Corylas and the Paphlagonians as allies against us, we on our side are quite ready to make war with you both if it be necessary; for we have made war before now with others who were many times your numbers”) (5.5.22). No matter whether or not the Cyreans had attempted to negotiate with the Taochians and Chaldaeans, adding the names and reputations of these warlike tribes to the list of peoples the mercenaries had bettered in war strongly emphasized to the Sinopeans the dangers of engaging in war. Xenophon’s rhetorical strategy worked: the other Sinopean

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\(^{25}\) See Rood (2004) 314 for “the obvious point that even claims that Xenophon himself makes in his speeches are determined by the needs of the immediate audience and cannot automatically be extrapolated from their context within the *Anabasis*.”

\(^{26}\) Xenophon admired the Carduchians’ fighting ability (4.2.27-28) and the men had suffered more in the fighting with them than in all the conflicts with the King and Tissaphernes (4.3.2); the Chaldaeans were said to be an independent and valiant people (4.3.4) (see also Xen., *Cyr.* 3.2.7: the Chaldaeans very warlike); some of the Taochians had fought fiercely for their stronghold and had chosen suicide rather than surrender to the mercenaries (4.7.2-14).
ambassadors besides Hecatonymus quickly made it clear in response that they did not wish to make war but to be friends with the men, and that they would direct the Cotyorites to behave similarly (5.5.24).

In addition to the misleading mention of the Taochians and Chaldaeans in connection with the provision of markets, Xenophon’s speech also jars with the preceding narrative in another (just as) significant way. Again, at 5.5.16-18, Xenophon did not differentiate between the Cyreans’ expectations of Greeks and non-Greeks concerning the provision of agorai, in order to depict the Cotyorites’ behavior as outside the pale of convention. But Xenophon’s earlier narrative shows that the mercenaries did not always expect that a friendly community in the non-Greek and unurbanized lands Xenophon refers to in this speech (i.e., those in northern Mesopotamia, and eastern and central Anatolia) could always provide them with a market. Thus, in the agreement with Tissaphernes, allowance was made for the fact that the soldiers might pass through lands in which a market could not be provided: in this case, they would be allowed to requisition food.

In the agreement with Tiribazus, made in isolated western Armenia,

27 But see p.213 n.43 below: markets could be expected to be provided by non-Greek poleis in other areas of Asia.

28 2.3.26-27: “Καὶ νῦν ἔξεστιν ὑµῖν πιστὰ λαβεῖν παρ’ ἡµῶν ἦ µὴν φιλίαν παρέξειν υµῖν τὴν χώραν καὶ ἀδόλως ἀπάξειν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀγορὰν παρέχοντας· ὅπ ου δ’ ἂν µὴ παρέχωµεν ἀγοράν, λαµβάνειν υµᾶς ἔκ τῆς χώρας ἐάσοµεν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. ὑµᾶς δὲ αὖ ἡµῖν δεήσει ὁµόσαι ἦ µὴν πορεύεσθαι ὡς διὰ φιλίας ἀσινῶς σῖτα καὶ ποτὰ λαµβάνοντας ὁπόταν µὴ ἀγοράν παρέχοµεν· ἢν δὲ παρέχωµεν ἀγοράν, ὀνοµάσεις ἔξειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια.” (“And now you may receive pledges from us that in very truth the territory you pass through shall be friendly and that we will lead you back to Greece without treachery, providing you with a market; and wherever we do not furnish a market we will allow you to take provisions from the country. And you, on your side, will have to swear to us that in very truth you will proceed as you would through a friendly country, doing no damage and taking food and drink from the country only when we do not provide a market, but that, if we do provide a market, you will obtain provisions by purchase.”)
there was again no provision for a market; instead, the mercenaries were once more to take their provisions by requisitioning.\(^{29}\)

As important, when the mercenaries were provided with a market by a non-Greek community—i.e. the Macronians—in the mountains of Anatolia, Xenophon’s description of this market implies that markets were not a regular institution among that people. Xenophon writes that, after the mercenaries had established friendly relations with the Macronians, the latter “ἀγορὰν οἵαν ἐδύναντο παρεῖχον,” “provided as good a market as they could” (exactly the same phrasing is used at 5.5.18 as in the earlier description in the narrative of the market at 4.8.8). The limiting clause Xenophon attaches to his mention of the agora amongst the Macronians strongly implies that the market must have been provided in response to a request of the Greeks. In not simply saying that the Macronians provided a market, but by attaching the rider that they had provided one as best they could, Xenophon implies that the Macronians had extemporized, employing an unaccustomed means of allocating resources to distribute supplies to the Greeks.\(^{30}\)

In contrast, the description of the mercenaries’ relations with the Cotyorites (and the Trapezuntians) in Xenophon’s speech to the Sinopeans and in his narrative presents a

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\(^{29}\) 4.4.6: Tiribazus “δὲ εἶπεν ὅτι σπείσασθαι βούλοιτο ἑφ’ ὃ μὴ τοῦτο αὐτῶς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀδικεῖν μὴτε ἐκείνους καὶ ταῖς ὸκίασις, λαμβάνειν τε τὰ πάπιθαιδεῖα ὅσων δέοιτο.” (“[Tiribazus] replied that he wished to conclude a treaty with these conditions, that he on his side would not harm the Greeks, and that they should not burn the houses, but might take all the provisions they needed.”)

\(^{30}\) Cf. Plut., Ages. 16.1: after Agesilaos crossed the Hellespont in 394 on his return from campaigning in Asia Minor, he sent envoys to all the non-Greek peoples asking whether he was to pass through their country as friend or enemy: all (but the Trallians) received him as a friend and assisted them on his way, “as they were each able” (“οι μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πάντες φιλικῶς ἐδέχοντο καὶ παρέπεπον, ὡς ἕκαστος δυνάμεως εἶχαν”). Cf. also 5.7.13: during the army’s stay at Cerasus, some indigenous villagers came down from their mountain settlements to sell cattle and other things which they had to the soldiers; some of the soldiers also went to the villages to do some buying. These transactions seem to have been organized informally, i.e. Xenophon does not mention an agora in association with them. Discussion with David Ratzan helped me to clarify my thinking on the Macronians’ provision of a market to the Ten Thousand.
clear difference with the arrangements made with the Macronians, Tiribazus and Tissaphernes: the capacity of the Cotyorites to provide a market is taken for granted, and their failure to provide one is explained by their attitude towards the mercenaries (5.5.19: “for they did not behave towards us as friends, but shut their gates and would neither admit us within or send a market without...”). Similarly, the only consideration Xenophon mentions in his speech to the Sinopean ambassadors as influencing the Trapezuntians’ provision of a market to the Cyreans is their attitude (friendliness) towards the army (see again 5.5.14-15). In contrast to the description of the market provided by the Macronians, the provision of markets by Greek cities is never described with restricting comments in either of these speeches or anywhere else in the *Anabasis*. The point that the capacity of Greek *poleis* to provide *agorai* to the army could be taken for granted by the mercenaries is confirmed in a second speech Xenophon made to the men at Cotyora (the day after his speech to the Sinopeans) on the growing lawlessness in the army as demonstrated by the murder of the Colchian ambassadors and the stoning of the *agoranomoi*.\(^{31}\) In this speech, Xenophon comments on the possible consequences if the men continued to behave outrageously against the representatives of other communities (5.7.33): “πόλις δὲ φιλία τίς ἡµᾶς δέξεται, ἥτις ἂν ὁρᾷ τὸσαύτην ἀνοµίαν ἐν ἡµῖν;” (“[a]nd what friendly city will receive us when it sees so great lawlessness amongst us?”). In a speech to approximately eight and a half thousand men, drawn from all over the Greek world (and beyond),\(^{32}\) then, Xenophon could presume it as a given that

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\(^{31}\) See chapter 7 section iib for full discussion of this speech.

\(^{32}\) See Roy (1967) 302-309; Lee (2007) Table 2.
the assembled soldiers would share his belief that the decision of a Greek city to receive
the army was not based on its capacity to do so, but as one based on whether or not that
city wished to be friendly to the passing military force in question.  

Although Xenophon’s two speeches at Cotyora were made in highly charged
contexts, where Xenophon was defending either his or the army’s actions, the statements
and the preconceptions present in these speeches are completely consistent with what we
find in comments made by Xenophon in less controversial contexts and also with his
description of the army’s relations with Greek communities in the rest of his narrative of
the parabasis; therefore they can and should be used as representative of classical Greek
thought and practice regarding the provision of agorai by friendly Greek poleis to
passing military forces. Markets provided by poleis—once friendly relations are
established with the mercenaries—are taken for granted throughout the account of the
parabasis; they are mentioned solely in this account as an underlying, uncontroversial
background to discussions or decisions concerning the army’s position on the march.
Thus, after Xenophon’s persuasive speech to the Sinopeans, friendly relations between
the army and the Cotyorites were established by the latter giving xenia to the army
(5.5.25). The day after friendship between the mercenaries and the Cotyorites was
established, Timasion the Dardanian and Thorax the Boiotian began a scheme to extort
money from the Heracleots and Sinopeans in order that the Greeks would have provisions
for the voyage from Cotyora (“μισθὸν ὥστε ἔχειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐκπλέοντας”) (5.6.19).
This plan assumed that there must have been a market provided by the Cotyorites in

33 See also 6.6.9, 6.6.12-13, 6.6.36 for the reception of the army by Greek cities as determined by
friendliness or hostility (to the Lacedaemonians who (in Xenophon’s formulation) ruled all the Greeks at
this time).
which the Greeks could buy supplies, but there is no market mentioned in the narrative at this point; the market is mentioned by Xenophon only in a later brief summary of the Cyreans’ stay at Cotyora, when Xenophon narrates that, while the army delayed there, some of the men lived by purchasing from the market, and others by pillaging the territory of the Paphlagonians (“... οἱ µὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἔζων, οἱ δὲ καὶ λῃζόµενοι ἐκ τῆς Παφλαγονίας”) (6.1.1). These details are included at 6.1.1, however, only as a prelude to a description of relations between the army and the Paphlagonians who lived in the hinterland of the city (the plundering, not surprisingly, caused hostilities between the men and the Paphlagonians); Xenophon does not include this mention of the market provided by the Cotyorites for its interest per se, then, but as part of an explanation of the army’s strategic situation.

This pattern of offhand, incidental mentions of markets or their inclusion in the text as part of the army’s tactical or strategic considerations is found throughout Xenophon’s narrative of the parabasis, all the way from Trapezus to Perinthus. So at Trapezus (where the men stayed in some Colchian villages near the city, and used these villages as a base to plunder Colchis (4.8.22-23)), the Trapezuntians provided a market (“ἀγορὰν δὲ παρεῖχον τῷ στρατοπέδῳ Τραπεζούντιοι...”), received the Cyreans, and provided xenia of oxen, barley-meal and wine (4.8.23). The provision of a market by the Trapezuntians is mentioned therefore as part of a series of actions taken by them to establish friendly relations with the mercenaries. Xenophon also mentions the agora given by the Trapezuntians in the context of a mention of the army’s strategic position.34

34 Both mentions also nicely prefigure Xenophon’s speech to the Sinopeans at Cotyora: see pp.200-201 above on 5.5.14.
After staying thirty days in the Colchian villages,\(^{35}\) the army held an assembly to determine its future course of action (5.1.1). Chirisophus volunteered to sail to Anaxibius, the Spartan *nauarchos*, in order to get ships from him to transport the men the rest of the way home, a measure that delighted the men (5.1.1-4). In the meantime, however, there was still the question of supplies to consider: Xenophon suggested in a speech to the army more supervision and organization of the men’s foraging for provisions (5.1.7-8), since the army “τὰ ἐπιτήδεια δεῖ πορίζεσθαι ἐκ τῆς πολεµίας· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγορὰ ἔστιν ἱκανὴ οὔτε ὅτου ὠνησόµεθα εὐπορία εἰ μὴ ὀλίγοις τισίν...” (“had to obtain provisions from hostile territory, for we neither have an adequate market, nor have we, with some few exceptions, the means wherewith to buy...”) (5.1.6).

Later, at Heracleia, there is no mention of the provision of an *agora* by the Heracleots in Xenophon’s description of the army’s arrival at that city, though Xenophon does mention the *xenia* which the Heracleots gave the army to institute a formally friendly relationship with it.\(^{36}\) The presence of a market provided by the Heracleots can be inferred, however, from Lycon the Achaean’s plan, raised in an assembly of the army called to discuss its progress from Heracleia, to demand (in the absence of any other source of supplies for the men) three thousand Cyzicene staters from the Heracleots so that the men might purchase supplies for their onward journey (6.2.4-5). Lycon was astonished that “… τῶν στρατηγῶν ὅτι οὐ πειρῶνται ἡμῖν ἐκπορίζειν σιτηρέσιον· τὰ µὲν

\(^{35}\) Lee (2007) 36 n.122.

\(^{36}\) The Heracleots provided three thousand *medimnoi* of barley-meal, two thousand jars of wine, twenty cattle, and a hundred sheep (6.2.3). On the function of *xenia* as establishing a formal relationship of friendliness, see Herman (1987) (esp. 12 on the giving of *xenia* not limited to individuals, but also practiced by *poleis* and other communities, too).
γὰρ ξένια οὐ μὴ γένηται τῇ στρατιᾷ τριῶν ἴμμερθαι σιτία· ὁπόθεν δὲ ἐπισιτισάμενοι
πορευομένη οὐκ ἐστιν...” (“the generals do not endeavor to supply us with money to buy
provisions; for our gifts of hospitality will not make three days’ rations for the army; and
there is no place from which we can procure provisions before beginning our journey”)
(6.2.4). 37 Lycon’s plan presupposed that the men would be able to buy provisions, and
thus in turn presupposed a market provided by the Heracleots. But the market provided
to the army is included by Xenophon in the narrative only at the point when the
Heracleots decided to move it within their city walls as part of their defensive response to
the demands and threats of the mercenaries (6.2.8): i.e., Xenophon mentions the agora
only in the context of an extraordinary measure taken by the Heracleots in response to the
threatened violence and blackmail of the mercenaries (and not because of its intrinsic
interest to the narrative). 38

When the Cyreans reached Byzantium, the Spartan nauarchos, Anaxibius, refused
to give them the pay he had promised them and demanded that they leave the city—at
which the soldiers became angry because they had no money with which to procure
provisions for the journey (7.1.7). Cleander (the Spartan harmost of the polis) told
Xenophon that he would be blamed for the soldiers’ failure to go home immediately, but
Xenophon replied that it was not his fault, but that the soldiers were not returning home

37 The latter comment refers to the fact there was no indigenous settlements nearby which the Greeks could
plunder: see Lee (2007) 37 and n.135. For further discussion of 6.2.4, see pp.473-474 n.79.

38 The incident has heightened importance for Xenophon because it once again demonstrates the dangerous
consequences for the army of men acting violently towards Greek cities: Xenophon and Chrisophus, who
had been nominated commander of the entire army at Sinope (6.1.32), had refused to go to the Heracleots
to ask for money on the grounds that it was not right to force a friendly polis to give unwillingly what it did
not want to give (6.2.6).
at once because they were despondent because of their inability to get supplies for their journey ("ἐπισιτισμοῦ δεόμενοι") (7.1.9). The soldiers had to have expected to have purchased their provisions from somewhere, and this somewhere must have been the city agora, since the Cyreans were staying inside the city walls of Byzantium;39 the fact that they were quartered inside the city walls shows that they had been received—and thus treated as friendly—by the Byzantines.40 But the market is never mentioned, and the soldiers’ participation in it is taken for granted (to be inferred only from the rancor about the soldiers’ pay), since it is not incidentally involved in any action, nor was it illustrative of the city’s attitude to the army.

Finally, there is also no explicit mention on the mercenaries’ arrival at Perinthus (7.2.11), nor in the subsequent brief narrative of their stay there, of an agora being provided by the Perinthians to the perhaps five thousand or so Cyreans who had made it to that polis41 (nor any mention of the establishment of friendly relations between the Perinthians and the mercenaries). The presence of a market provided to the soldiers at Perinthus can be inferred, however, from Xenophon’s speech there to the assembled

39 Lee ([2007] 41) states that “the soldiers quartered in Thracian villages” near Byzantium (and cf. [2007] 38 where he includes the Byzantines among those poleis who provided markets outside their city walls to the Cyreans). But Anaxibius ordered the men to go forth (“ἐξέβαι”) from the city (7.1.7), and Cleander, after warning Xenophon that it would be better for him if the army left the city, advises him to go forth (“ἐξελθεῖ”) from the city as though he were planning a journey, and to leave the army only when it had gotten outside the city (“ἐξερπεῖ” “ἐξέλθο”) from Byzantium (7.1.8 (“ἐξέφη”) and 7.1.9 (“ἐξάλλει”) referring to the army’s proposed departure from Byzantium). The men eventually march forth (“ἐξῆςα”) from the city, and Eteonicus (a Spartan officer) shuts the gates of the city behind them (7.1.12). It is only then that Anaxibius ordered the soldiers to go to the Thracian villages in order to get provisions (7.1.13). It is clear therefore that the Cyreans were quartered and purchasing their provisions within Byzantium.

40 See 6.6.36: Cleander’s prior promise to receive the Cyreans as splendidly as he could.

41 See Lee (2007) Table 2 for this figure.
soldiers on whether they ought to serve in the Chersonese under the Spartans or in Thrace under Seuthes, where he states that it was his opinion that “ἐπεὶ ἐνθάδε οὔτε ἀργύριον ἔχομεν ὥστε ἀγοράζειν οὔτε ἄνευ ἀργυρίου ἐῶσι λαμβάνειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια” (“seeing that here we neither have money with which to buy provisions nor do they permit us to take them without money”), the army ought to proceed to some villages from which the Aristarchus the Spartan and the Perinthians would allow them to seize provisions and then decide their course of action, with provisions in hand (7.3.5). A market can also be inferred from some of the considerations that eventually led the men to serve for hire under Seuthes (7.3.13): “χειμών γὰρ εἶη καὶ οὔτε οἰκαδε ἀποπλεῖν τῷ τοῦτο βουλομένῳ δύνατὸν εἶη, διαγενέσθαι τε ἐν φιλίᾳ οἷον τ’ εἴη εἰ δέοι ὠνομάσκος ζῆν...” (“for the season was winter, and it was impossible to sail back home, if that was what one wished, and impossible also to get along in a friendly country if they had to maintain themselves by purchasing.”). Again, Xenophon’s speech and the considerations of the army imply that a place to buy provisions must have existed, i.e. a market provided by the Perinthians. But it is only much later, in a speech defending his actions to the army, when Xenophon states explicitly that the Perinthians had provided a market outside their walls to the mercenaries (7.6.24). Again, Xenophon mentions the market only within the context of a description of a (desperate) strategic situation—namely the mercenaries’ lack of any means of provisioning—that confronted the men while they were encamped outside the city (7.6.24): “ἄγορα δὲ ἐκρήγησε σπάνια µὲν ὁµῶντες τὰ ὁµία, σπάνια δ’ ἔχοντες ὄτων ὤνησασθε...” (“... and you got your provisions by purchase at a market,

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42 The idea brought up here and at 7.3.13 of the possibility of the army obtaining provisions from a Greek city without paying for them is unique.
though scanty were the supplies you saw offered for sale and scanty the means you had with which to buy.”)

Xenophon, then, in his narrative of the Cyreans’ *parabasis* describes in detail the dealings that the remnants of the Ten Thousand had with the Greek cities they came to, and especially those actions—by both the men and the *poleis*—that determined the tenor of the relationships between the traveling army and the settlements they passed by. In doing so, he mentions *agorai* provided by these Greek cities very often (relatively speaking), but he does so incidentally and in an offhand manner, demonstrating that he

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43 It should be noted here that the presumption that friendly cities could be expected to grant markets to passing armies was not limited to Greek cities. This can be seen in Xenophon’s description of the site of Calpe Harbor, in which he gives the reasons why it had come to exist as a stopping point: Calpe had a harbor and a plentiful water supply (6.4.4), and it also lay roughly halfway along the Black Sea coast from Heracleia to the nearest Greek city, Byzantium: this gave the site importance, for as Xenophon writes (6.4.2): “καὶ ταχύτερον μὲν ἐστὶν εἰς Ἡράκλειαν ἐκ Βυζαντίου κοσμία μᾶλλον μακρὰς πλοῦς· ἐν δὲ τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλῃ μὲν πόλις οὐδεμία οὐτε φιλία οὐτε Ἑλληνίς, ἀλλὰ Θράκες Βιθυνοί...” (“[i]t is an especially long day’s journey for a trireme to row from Byzantium to Heraclea, and between the two places there is no other city, either friendly or Greek, only [hostile] Bithynian Thracians...”). (Contrast Xenophon’s mention of *poleis* here to his earlier statements to the Sinopean ambassadors on what the army expected from Greek or barbarian communities (i.e. in northern Mesopotamia and in southern and central Anatolia): there, he uses the word τῆς rather than *polis*.) The point Xenophon is making here is that Calpe had to come to exist as a halt for voyages because the fact that there was no city, either friendly or Greek, between Heracleia and Byzantium meant that there was no location where passing travelers (or, in this case, a passing army) could expect the facilities implied by reception: water, a harbor, and the right to use a market provided by a city. Cf. chapter 1 section iiiia on Thucy. 6.42.1: the decision is made by the Athenian generals to divide the Sicilian expedition into three so that the ships might not be at a loss for harbors, water and provisions; and on Thucy. 6.44.2: the expedition was granted water and the right to use harbors (but not markets) by some Greek cities on the coast of southern Italy, and not even that by Tarentum and Locri. (Cf. also Braudel [1972] 107-108: “[s]ometimes on a coast where the hinterland was sparsely populated, like North Africa, a port, with its indispensable source of water, might exist as a meeting point for boats and fishermen, without a town having grown up around it...”) Xenophon’s description of the site of Calpe, with its harbor, water supply, defensible position, large amounts of ship-timber, and fertile soil (6.4.3-6), shows that he thought it an excellent one for the foundation of a *polis*: see, e.g., Brulé (1995) 3-4, Dillery (1995) 89. For the presumption that the army could also expect markets from non-Greek cities, see also see appendix 4 section i: markets were provided to the Cyreans by non-Greek cities in Asia Minor, Syria, and southern Mesopotamia. Also, note that the fact that at Gymnias—a friendly (and large and prosperous and inhabited) city (“πόλιν μεγάλην καὶ εἰδαίμονα καὶ οἰκουμένην”)—there is no mention of provisioning (marking it out as almost exceptional in Xenophon’s description of this part of the march: cf. appendix 4 section i) may also mean that the soldiers got their supplies there through purchase at a market provided by the ruler of the city.

44 Lee (2007) 15: “[i]f, in the course of narrating the campaign, Xenophon makes offhand, repeated remarks about soldiers’ everyday behavior, we can accept these statements as useful evidence, even if they
(and his audience) assumed that these *agorai* were a normal means of provisioning for classical Greek armies moving through friendly territory. In sum, it is taken for granted throughout Xenophon’s account of the mercenaries’ experiences in northern Asia Minor and Thrace that friendly Greek cities (in contrast to the communities in the unurbanized lands the Greeks had marched through on their trek to the Pontus) would provide *agorai* to the army—and that their decision to provide markets to the army was determined by their attitude towards it, and not by their capacity to do so.\(^{45}\)

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\(^{45}\) Although in the cases of Trapezus and Perinthus, the markets proved insufficient to supply the mercenaries. But see chapter 7 section iii: these were both exceptional cases.
b. Markets provided by *poleis* as the primary means of provisioning for classical Greek armies marching to theaters of operations

The provision of *agorai* as a component of the convention of the reception of classical Greek land forces by *poleis* was “an assumed part of the background” in other ancient military narratives besides the *Anabasis*.\(^\text{46}\) Accordingly, markets granted by *poleis* are rarely mentioned in these narratives, too, and then also only in exceptional circumstances, i.e., when they formed part of a ruse, or in order to clarify the tactical or strategic situation of an army.\(^\text{47}\) Thus, Xenophon narrates in the *Hellenica* that Agesilaos, in order to trick Tissaphernes into believing that he would be attacking Caria in 396, sent instructions to all the cities on the route from Ephesus to Caria that they should make a market available for his army.\(^\text{48}\) In the same work, Xenophon writes that Agesilaos used the same trick again in 377 so that his army could make its way safely into Boeotia: planning to advance by the route to Erythrae, he made it look to the Thebans as if he were going to Thespiae by sending messengers ahead to that *polis* to ask that a market be prepared for his men there.\(^\text{49}\) In 391, Dionysius I deceitfully manufactured a diplomatic

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\(^\text{46}\) The quote is taken from Millar’s ([2002] 227-228) comments on the mentions of long-distance trade by sea in the narratives of the conflicts of the Roman revolution.

\(^\text{47}\) Cf. Thucy. 1.62.1: *a market established for the Potidaean and Peloponnesian land forces outside of Potidaea as they awaited the Athenian attack by land.*

\(^\text{48}\) 3.4.11: “... ταῖς δὲ πόλεσιν εἰς ὃς ἀνάγκη ἦν ἀφικνεῖσθαι στρατευομένω ἐπὶ Καρίαν προοίπεν ἄγορὰν παρασκευάζειν.” Agesilaos invaded Phrygia instead (of Caria) (Xen., *Hell.* 3.4.12; cf. Polyænus, *Strateg.* 2.1.9).

\(^\text{49}\) And also that embassies should wait for him there: “... πάλιν προσποιήσατο εἰς τὰς Θεσπιαίας τοῦτον ἵναι, καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἀρχαίαν τὰ ἑκάλευσιν παρασκευάζειν καὶ τὰς Θεσπιαίας ἐκεῖ περιμένειν” (5.4.48). The ruse worked partly because Agesilaos had made Thespiae his base of operations for the invasion of Boeotia in the previous year (Xen., *Hell.* 5.4.38). Cf. Xen., *Hell.* 6.5.12: Agesilaos, taking the *polis* of Eutaia by surprise while its adult males of fighting age were attending the Arcadian assembly, treated the *polis* as friendly and did it no harm: “... ἀλλ' εἴα τε αὐτῶν ὀικεῖν, καὶ ὀφειλομένου ἐλάμβανον ὅσον ἔδοιον· εἰ δὲ τι
controversy over the provision of an agora by either Rhegium (so Diodorus and Frontinus) or Himera (so Polyaenus) in order to declare war on the ‘offending’ polis.\textsuperscript{50}

Also, pseudo-Xenophon must have been referring to the provision of agorai by friendly cities when he stated that, because journeys on land were slow and it was not possible for armies to bring many days’ provisions with them, it was necessary “καὶ τὸν μὲν πεζῇ ἰόντα δεῖ διὰ φιλίας ἰέναι ἢ νικᾶν μαχόμενον,” “for an army traveling on foot to either pass through friendly territory or fight and conquer [in hostile territory]” (Ath. Pol. 2.5):

i.e., it was necessary for armies traveling overland (since they departed for campaigns with so few provisions) to supply themselves by either passing through the territory of friendly poleis and purchasing in the markets provided to them, or to gain tactical superiority—and the ability to forage—in hostile territory by military success.\textsuperscript{51}

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καὶ ἡρπάσθη, ὅτε εἰσῄει εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἐξευρὼν ἀπέδωκε
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(... but allowed the inhabitants to continue to dwell there, and his troops got everything they needed by purchase; and if anything had been taken as booty at the time when he entered the city, he searched it out and gave it back.

\textsuperscript{50} Diod. 14.108.1-2, Frontinus, Strat. 3.4.3; Polyaenus, Strateg. 5.2.10.

\textsuperscript{51} Brasidas’ overland expedition to Thrace in the autumn of 424 (Thucy. 4.78-479.1) has been taken by some modern scholars to disprove ps.-Xenophon’s assertion at Ath. Pol. 2.5 that it was not possible for Greek land forces to travel many days’ journey from their own land: see, e.g., Bowersock (1968) 463-464; Forrest (1970) 108-111; Marr and Rhodes (2008) 5. But see Gomme (1962) 50-51 on this passage (followed by Hornblower, CT ii.279): “[s]o is 2.5 [in general true], the well-known paragraph on expeditions far afield, possible for those who control the seas, impossible for land-powers, which so many have thought could not have been written after Brasidas’ expedition to Thrace in 424... It was true in the fifth century, in the fourth, and it has been true in all subsequent history, that land-powers find it impossible, in ordinary circumstances, to send distant expeditions and that sea-powers can; and the difficulties which Brasidas and succeeding commanders experienced (Thuc. 4.78-79, 132.2, 5.12-13) illustrate and do not contradict the statement in our author. There is some exaggeration... armies occasionally make distant journeys; but in general the statement of the military position is true... The most we can say, in view of Brasidas’ brilliant successes, is that it was perhaps not written immediately after; a layman in particular might have been excused for thinking that the difficulties of land-powers had proved to be non-existent; but it could have been written a few years later, for it was, in essence, true. Besides if the passage must be earlier than Brasidas, it should be earlier than Aristeus’ expedition in 432 as well, and for that matter, than the Peloponnesian to Pholis and Boeotia in 457, when Athens controlled the Megarid and the Corinthian Gulf... ” See also de Ste. Croix (1972) 309: ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. 2.5 “a sensible generalisation, which was and remained broadly true.” Cf. Mattingly (1997) 353.
Pseudo-Xenophon “must have been referring” to the provision of agorai by friendly cities at Ath. Pol. 2.5 because classical Greek armies traversing the territory of friendly poleis normally had no means of acquisition of supplies other than markets provided by those poleis. The preparation by classical Greek states of magazines for their armies on the move to and from campaign theaters was normally impossible since they lacked the means (requisitioning, taxation-in-kind, private contractors operating on a sufficient scale) to acquire supplies to fill magazines for their forces. The establishment of a magazine by Derkylidas at Atarneus in 397 seems to have been a unique occurrence contingent on special circumstances; some exiles from Chios had already assembled large supplies of grain in Atarneus, proceeds from the raiding of Ionia, before Derkylidas had reduced that polis by siege (and set up his supply depot there). The politico-social structures of the classical Greek world ruled out the feeding of armies marching to war

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52 See Erdkamp (1998) 24-25 for the basic framework of this paragraph.

53 See also Anderson (1970) 53 on magazines not normally established for classical Greek armies. See chapter 2 section iic for access to supplies for military forces through requisitioning, taxation-in-kind, or private contractors unavailable to classical Greek states. For the use of magazines by states in pre-industrial European and near Eastern warfare, see, e.g., Erdkamp (1998) 46-52 (Republican and imperial Roman forces); Pryor (2006b) 284 (summarizing evidence for magazines set up for Byzantine, Fatimid, and Mamluk armies); Lynn (1993b) (late seventeenth century French armies); Aksan (1995) 4-6 (Ottoman armies in the 1768-1774 war). For contractors, see also, e.g., Burford (1960) 16-18: no great overland contractors in classical Greece. At Theophr., Characters 8.4, an ἐργολάβος (contractor) is mentioned as coming back from a battle between Polyperchon and Cassander (thus between 317 and 310), but the unspecified services this contractor provides do not seem to have anything to do with the supply of grain (see Diggle [2004] 29-32 for the date; Jebb (1909) ad loc. for the contractor probably having do with the supplying of siege machines).

54 Xen., Hell. 3.2.11: “καὶ κατασκευάσας ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ ἔκπλεω πάντα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, ἵνα εἴη αὐτῷ καταγωγή, ὅπως ἀφικνοῖτο...” (“[Derkylidas] filled the place with great stocks of supplies of all kinds so that he could use it as a centre for rest and re-equipment whenever he came that way”). See also Anderson (1970) 53. The fact that Xenophon explains Derkylidas’ actions at Atarneus in detail demonstrates clearly that the use of supply depots was not a usual feature of classical Greek warfare.
zones through the requisitioning of food from friendly or subject poleis on their route.\textsuperscript{55}
Foraging for provisions in the territory of friendly poleis was not consonant with the conventions of Greek warfare or international relations and is almost never attested.\textsuperscript{56}
Finally, as demonstrated in section ii, classical Greek armies were not accompanied by supply-trains (on any structurally important scale).\textsuperscript{57}

In fact, one reason why classical Greek overland expeditions were able to depart on campaigns with so few food supplies was precisely because they presumed they could depend on being provided with markets by poleis as they marched through friendly or neutral territory on their way to campaign theaters.\textsuperscript{58} In addition to the evidence of the Anabasis collected and analysed above showing that it could be assumed that classical Greek land forces could provision themselves sufficiently at polis-provided markets, the ruses of Agesilaos in Asia Minor and Boeotia, and ps.-Xenophon’s generalizing

\textsuperscript{55} Tänzer ([1912] 22-23, 48-49) and Cruickshank ([1954] 75, 79) refer to the purchase of classical Greek armies in the agorai provided to them by poleis as requisitioning: there is no evidence or indication, however, that classical Greek armies ever engaged in forced purchases of provisions in the agorai provided to them by poleis; the trade in these agorai was clearly voluntary. For other pre-industrial European and near Eastern states relying on requisitioning from friendly or subject territory to provision their armies as they marched to war zones, see, e.g., Rawlinson (1871) 192, Briant (1986) esp. 40 (Persian empire); Mitchell (1983) 139-143, Erdkamp (2002) 57-64 (imperial Rome); Haldon (2006a) 15-16 (Byzantium); Blastenbrei (1987) 265-266 (fourteenth and fifteenth century Italian armies); Kennett (1967) 100-101 (eighteenth century France).

\textsuperscript{56} See again the references at pp.179-180 n.192: Thibron exiled from Sparta for allowing his troops plunder allied territory.

\textsuperscript{57} Pritchett ([1971] 41-44) and Harthen ([2001] 205-228), by treating indiscriminately supply-trains accompanying land forces and supply-trains accompanying or sent out to amphibious forces, mistakenly conclude that supply-trains made a quantitatively important contribution to the provisioning of Greek overland campaigns. Rawlings ([2007] 76-77) implies that classical Greek land forces were sometimes provisioned by accompanying supply ships; but, as the examples he cites show, this practice was limited to Carthaginian and Persian expeditions, and to Alexander’s campaigns.

\textsuperscript{58} See already Gomme, HCT i.16; Cruickshank (1954) 75 (though see n.55 above on Cruickshank wrong on the institutional basis of agorai provided by poleis).
description of fifth-century Greek land warfare, also show that Greek armies could rely on *agorai* provided by friendly cities to supply themselves during their marches to theaters of operations. Agesilaos’ stratagems could only have worked if all the actors involved believed that both Thespiae and the *poleis* on the route from Ephesus to Caria had the capability to feed his armies; whereas ps.-Xenophon simply took it for granted in his discussion of land campaigns that all armies could provision themselves in friendly territory (through markets)—no discussion of the subject was felt necessary. Because the capacity of friendly *poleis* to provide markets sufficient to feed armies on the move to war zones could be taken for granted, classical Greek armies did not have to be accompanied by substantial supply-trains when moving through the territory of friendly *poleis*, since they had the opportunity at these *poleis* to replenish the supplies they had brought from home.59

In conclusion, then, in the absence of any other possible means of provisioning,60 and because classical Greek *poleis* could always be assumed to be able to provide

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59 Cf. Haldon (2006b) 149. Compare here the *étape*—similar in its early usage to markets provided by classical Greek *poleis*—a method employed by early modern European states (in addition to magazines and requisitioning) to feed their armies in national or friendly territory, in order to release these armies from having to rely on supply-trains. See Lynn (1993a) 17-18: “[t]he *étapes* system provided another method of supplying troops with food that they need not drag behind them. Through *étapes*, troops on the march drew their food from local markets or depots at set intervals along the route. The term “*étapes*” originated in the word for market. In the earliest form, troops on the march notified local officials in advance of the day they would arrive and the amounts of food that would be required. These authorities then set up a market at which soldiers or commissaries bought what was needed. Such a system provided for the march of troops in Italy and along the Spanish Road in the sixteenth century. By the mid-seventeenth century... *[a]dministrative decree set stops along along these routes at which local authorities or private contractors supplied the troops directly, without the soldiers having to pay for their food.” See also esp. Parker (2004) 81-90 for definition and discussion of this system of provisioning; cf. Kennett (1967) 109, 120; Perjés (1970) 34-35; van Creveld (1977) 7; Roth (1999) 187 and n.237. (Cf. Contamine [1972] 329: *étapes* also used by fifteenth century French armies.)

60 Note that, although the lengths of the Cyreans’ halts at *poleis* along the Black Sea coast were exceptionally long (over a month in some cases (see chapter 2 section iic, chapter 7 section iiia) as compared to the normal Greek armies few days’ stay at a friendly *polis*), since they used their camps near these *poleis* more as bases than as brief stops during a journey to a theater of operations—and that, again
sufficient amounts of food for sale to passing armies, classical Greek armies provisioned themselves through *polis*-provided markets when they marched through friendly territory on their way to campaign theaters.

**iv. Provisioning in hostile territory**

a. Traveling markets

Private traders were a constant presence on the overland marches of classical Greek armies. Because Greek historians could take it for granted that their audiences would be thoroughly familiar with the basic facts of military life, and because the crowds of sutlers and pedlars that accompanied armies were one of those basic facts, they and the exceptionally, non-Greek territory to forage and plunder was easily reachable from the *poleis* the Cyreans were encamped near—markets provided by Greek cities are assumed throughout Xenophon’s narrative to be the primary means of provisioning for the mercenaries, and foraging for provisions something only turned to when a market fails for some reason (when it proves to be scanty, or the men do not have enough money to buy in it), or when a *polis* fails to provide a market. In other words, throughout their *parabasis*, when the mercenaries were in the territory of a friendly city, a market provided by that city is presented by Xenophon as the men’s default mode of provisioning. See again Xen., *Anab.* 5.1.6 (Trapezus); 5.5.14-19 (Cotyora); 6.2.4 (Heracleia); 7.3.5, 7.3.13, 7.6.24 (Perinthus). Compare the provisioning of the various Crusades on their way to the East: since other means of acquiring provisions were generally unavailable to them as they passed through friendly or neutral territory, the Crusaders also relied primarily on markets provided by friendly cities or rulers to meet their provisioning requirements as they marched to or around the war zone: see, e.g., Leyser (1984) 83 on the forces of the First Crusade purchasing in eastern Macedonia, and Murray (2006) 230-231, 242-243, 244 for the First Crusade purchasing in cities on their way to Anatolia, and also in Byzantine territory, and on their way from Antioch to Jerusalem (markets granted by the amirs there); France (2006) 80-81, 85 on the forces of the Second Crusade asking for and receiving markets from the King of Hungary, King of Sicily, and the Byzantine Emperor; Glasheen (2006) *passim* on the provisioning of Peter the Hermit’s Crusade relying on markets provided by cities; Madden (2006) 215 on the Franks purchasing supplies from markets provided by cities on their way to Venice for the launch of the Fourth Crusade. (The Crusaders were, however, sometimes provisioned in Byzantine territory through magazines set up for them by Byzantine emperors: see, e.g., Pryor (2006b) 287 for examples.) (The foregoing is not meant to imply that other pre-industrial land forces did not use markets provided by cities, or that these markets did not sometimes combine with other means to provision other pre-industrial armies marching overland: see, e.g., Mallett [1974] 139 on fourteenth and fifteenth century Italian armies using markets provided by cities; van Creveld [1977] 7 on early modern European armies doing so.)

61 “Private traders”: i.e. traders operating on their own account and not executing state contracts.
markets they provided on land campaigns were not normally mentioned in conventional historical narratives, but were presumed as part of the background to events, to be mentioned only in exceptional circumstances. Examining two of the explicit references to traders following armies we do have will illustrate the point. Describing the beginning of the battle of Leuktra in 371, Xenophon mentions the traders who were providing a market to the Boeotian army (Hell. 6.4.9): when both sides were getting under arms and it was already clear that there was going to be a battle,

... first of all, there began to withdraw from the Boeotian army those who had been providing the market and also some of the baggage carriers and others who did not want to fight. Now the Spartan mercenaries under Hieron, the peltasts from Phocis, and the Heraclean and Phliasian cavalry wheeled round behind these people, attacked and routed them, and drove them back to the Boeotian camp. The effect was to make the Boeotian army much larger and more closely massed than it was before.

Two important points emerge from this description. Firstly, Xenophon mentions the traders who made up the travelling market accompanying the Boeotian army here only because, unusually, these traders had become involved in fighting and had had an effect on the outcome of the following battle: Xenophon therefore had to include them in his narrative in order to clarify his description of the battle. Secondly, although Xenophon had made no previous reference to this traveling market, and now mentioned it only

See already Pritchett (1991) 413, 432: Xenophon’s description of Agesilaos’ campaigns in the Corinthia in 390 (Hell. 4.5.8) and in Acarnania in 389 (Hell. 4.6.6) showing that Xenophon (and his audience) took it for granted that emporoi would be present on the campaigns of classical Greek land forces to purchase plunder.
incidentally and without any explanation, he still used the definite article when referring
to it ("τὴν ἀγορὰν," “the market”), as if his audience was already aware of its presence.
He could only have referred to the traveling market following the Boeotians in this way if
such a market was a usual and expected feature of military campaigns, something that he
and his audience could take for granted as always accompanying Greek armies on land
campaigns.

The point that private traders were a usual and expected feature of classical Greek
army life comes out even more strongly from a passage of Herodotus (3.139.1):

Καµβύσεω τοῦ Κύρου στρατευοµένου ἐπ' Αἴγυπτον ἄλλοι τε συχνοὶ ἐς τὴν
Αἴγυπτον ἀπίκοντο Ἑλλήνων, οἳ μέν, ὡς οἰκός, κατ' ἐµπορίην στρατευόµενοι, οἳ
دية τινὰς και αὐτῆς τῆς χώρης θεηταὶ...

When Cambyses, son of Cyrus, invaded Egypt, many Greeks came with the
army, some to trade, as was natural, and some to see the country itself.

Herodotus here was setting the context for a chance meeting between a young Darius and
the Samian Syloson, the exiled brother of Polycrates, a meeting which eventually led to
Darius’ conquest of Samos (3.139-149); Syloson had gone to Egypt as one of the Greek
sightseers mentioned. Herodotus, therefore, mentioned traders accompanying an army
incidentally in this passage, and only so that he could provide context for and clarify the
following narrative. But this incidental mention is crucial in that it gives us our only
explicit generalizing statement from a classical (or later) source that private traders
usually accompanied armies on campaign.63

It is now standard to state that these private traders who normally followed
classical Greek armies on land campaigns made an important contribution to the

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63 Because Herodotus was making a general statement (“ὡς οἰκός”) to a Greek audience about military
campaigns and traders, we can use this passage as providing evidence for a phenomenon characteristic of
Greek military campaigns.
provisioning of those armies, and especially when they were marching or operating in hostile territory. The passage most often cited in support of this view is in a speech by the character of Cyrus in Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia* on the preparations necessary for a long march by his army to the city of Thymbrara (*Cyr.* 6.2.38-39). But a detailed analysis of Cyrus’ speech on the requirements of the long overland march to this city shows that he planned for traders to play only a supplementary role in the provisioning of that march.

Cyrus’ army had to journey to Thymbrara in order to confront the forces of the King of Assyria and his allies, which were assembling there under the leadership of Croesus and readying themselves to fight one final, climactic battle (*Cyr.* 6.1.25-26, 6.2.9), in a desperate bid to reverse the series of defeats which they had suffered in the great war with Cyrus. After Cyrus had learned through spies of his enemies’ plans to assemble at Thymbrara, he had proposed to his army an immediate advance there, in order to leave the enemy coalition as little time as possible to prepare for battle (*Cyr.* 6.2.23). When this proposal was accepted, Cyrus spoke in detail to an assembled audience of officers and soldiers on the preparations necessary for the long overland march to Thymbrara.

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65 Cited in support of their conclusion on this topic by Tänzer, Anderson, and van Wees (see last note for detailed references).

66 The description of this war forms the central part of the narrative of the *Cyropaedia*. 
Cyrus’ first instruction for the march concerned the food supply of the army (Cyr. 6.2.25-26):

“...And now for the march we must get together for ourselves and for the animals we use provisions for not less than twenty days; for in reckoning it up, I find that there will be more than fifteen days’ journey in which we shall find no provisions at all; for everything there has been made away with: the enemy took all that they could, and we have taken the rest. [26] Accordingly, we must put up and carry with us sufficient food; for without this we should be unable either to fight or live.”

Since, then, all of the food on this first part of the march had already been carried away, Cyrus’ soldiers would be unable to forage during this part of the march: they therefore had to pack up sufficient grain⁶⁷ to live on before they set out for Thymbrara.⁶⁸ Two important points emerge from this first order of Cyrus’. In addition to “οὖν” at 6.2.26, Cyrus uses “γὰρ” twice at 6.2.25: the amount of explanation he has to give to justify the soldiers’ carrying of many days’ provisions to secure the army’s grain supply in (presumably hostile) territory shows that Cyrus, or rather Xenophon, and his audience presupposed that Cyrus’ army would normally depend for its provisions in enemy territory on a means of acquisition other than the carrying of supplies from base; and therefore that the bringing along of many days’ supplies into hostile territory was an

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⁶⁷ That σῖτον at 6.2.26 definitely means grain can be seen from Cyr. 6.2.31 where Cyrus gives instructions for the ὄψα to carried on the march (i.e., in addition to the σῖτον mentioned here): see just below with n.70.

⁶⁸ Note here the use of the adverb οὖν at the start of 6.2.26: this shows that this first clause of 6.2.26 represents the conclusion to be drawn from the analysis at 6.2.25; i.e., that the reason the army will have to carry sufficient grain is because all of the previously available food on the march has been carried away (i.e. foraged or pillaged) by the enemy or Cyrus’ forces.
unusual, extraordinary measure. The men were to carry a substantial amount of grain with them only because the territory they would be marching through on the first fifteen or so days of the journey had been previously ravaged; if this land had not been ravaged, Cyrus would not have ordered his men to bring so many days’ provisions with them. It was, then, only because Cyrus’ soldiers would not be able to take grain from the previously devastated territory that he ordered them to take not less than twenty days’ supplies. In other words, it was presumed here by all parties (Cyrus and his audience, Xenophon and his audience) that Cyrus’ army, when operating in enemy territory, could normally take its grain from the land (and not from base), i.e., that foraging was the normal means of acquisition of supplies for Cyrus’ army in enemy territory.  

As for the other components of the men’s diet, Cyrus ordered the men to carry from camp only enough wine to last until they became accustomed to drinking water; Cyrus made this provision on the reasoning that the greater part of the march would be through land where there would be no wine, and it would be impossible to carry enough wine to meet the army’s needs for many days (Cyr. 6.2.26 (cf. 6.2.27-29)). The men were also to leave behind their sleeping-mats, so that they could carry an equal weight of provisions; for, as Cyrus explained, an excess of provisions would not be useless (Cyr. 6.2.30). And for the army’s opsα for the first part of the march, i.e. for the foodstuffs to complement and add flavor to the main grain-based component of the diet, the soldiers were to bring along sharp, pungent, and salty foods.

69 On foraging as the normal means of supply for Cyrus’ army in enemy territory, see also section ivb.

70 Cyr. 6.2.31: “ἔξω δὲ κρής συγκεκακάσθαι ὦσα ἵστιν ὀξέα καὶ δριμέα καὶ ἁλµυρά…” (“For opsα, we must pack up and take along in addition only such as are sharp, pungent, and salty.”)
These, then, were the measures ordered by Cyrus for the provisioning of the army during the first stage of the march to Thymbrara, when the soldiers would be traveling through previously ravaged territory. When, however, the army came out into country that had not been devastated (presumably this means after the first “more than fifteen days” of the march had elapsed), Cyrus presumed that it could rely on a different method of provisioning (Cyr. 6.2.31):

“ὅταν δ’ ἐκβαίνωμεν εἰς ἀκέραια, ὅπου ἤδη εἰκὸς ἡµᾶς σῖτον λαµβάνειν, χειρομύλας χρὴ αὐτόθεν παρασκευάσασθαι αἷς σιτοποιησόµεθα· τοῦτο γὰρ κουφότατον τὼν σιτοποιηκῶν ὄργανων.”

“And when we come out again into a country that has not been ravaged, where we are at once likely to find grain again, we must then have hand-mills obtained on the spot with which to prepare bread; for these are the lightest of the implements used in making bread.”

When they entered previously unravaged territory, then, Cyrus told his officers and soldiers, grain would be immediately available there for the taking. The fact that Cyrus here linked the unravaged nature of the territory they would enter to the immediate availability of grain for the army in that territory shows clearly that he meant here for his soldiers to obtain their grain in this territory through foraging. That is, whereas, on the first part of the journey to Thymbrara, they could not relying on foraging because the land they would be marching through had been previously foraged, Cyrus was telling his men that the army could obtain grain in this previously undevastated territory through foraging.  

He did not, therefore, have to issue here a directive for the preparation and

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71 Cf. Garlan (1977) 153 n.5 on Cyr. 6.2.31: “[e]n territoire ennemi, on ne peut donc s’attendre à vivre sur le pays que dans certains endroits – ceux qui sont ἀκέραια, c’est-à-dire <<intacts>>.”
transport of grain supplies, but merely one for the means to process the grain the soldiers would find on their way (hence the reference to hand-mills). \(^{72}\)

In issuing these orders for his soldiers’ provisioning, Cyrus had thereby taken measures to secure the supply of the army’s grain, the main component of its diet, for the whole of the march to Thymbrara. Having focused on the food supply of his soldiers in the first half of his speech, Cyrus devoted its second half almost solely to what we might call the ‘mechanics’ of the march (Cyr. 6.2.32-38). In addition to medical supplies, the soldiers were to prepare straps, rasps to sharpen their spears, lumber and tools to repair the chariots and wagons, tools for road-building. The officers were to make sure that the provisioning arrangements Cyrus set out were adhered to. \(^{73}\) Men deprived of the right to military service were to clear the way for the wagons. Men in the army trained as smiths, carpenters, and leather-workers were to work in those capacities for hire, rather in the ranks.

Having taken care for the army’s transport, Cyrus’ issued one final instruction for the march: that any merchant who wished to follow the army to sell to it, could do so (Cyr. 6.2.38-39):

\[\text{“Ἢν δὲ τις καὶ ἔµπορος βούλεται ἐπεσάθαι πωλεῖν τι βουλόµενος, τῶν µὲν προσιρηµένων ἡµερῶν τάπιτήδεια ἔχειν ἢν τι πωλῶν ἁλίσκηται, πάντων...”} \]

\(^{72}\) Note that Cyrus at 6.2.25 orders twenty days’ rather than fifteen days’ provisions; the army would therefore have some supplies from base even after leaving the previously devastated territory. The extra days’ supplies would function as a provisioning ‘safety net’ if the march took longer than expected for any reason, and would also allow it to operate during their first few days in the undevastated territory unhindered by supply considerations (cf. chapter 2 section iii, appendix 4 section iii).

\(^{73}\) Cyr. 6.2.35: “Τὰ µὲν οὖν εἰς τροφὴν δέοντα οἱ ἡγεµόνες τῶν ὁπλοφόρων ἐξετάζετε τοὺς ὑπ’ ὑµῖν αὐτοῖς· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ παριέναι ὅτου ἀν τις τούτων ἐνδέηται· ἡµεῖς γὰρ τούτων ἐνδεεῖς ἐσόµεθα...” (“As to what is needed for the food supply of the army, you officers of the armed soldiers must make inquiry of the men under you, for we must not overlook anything of this sort that any one may need; for it is we that shall feel the want of it, if it is lacking.”)
“And any merchant who wishes to accompany us, seeking to sell something, may do so; but if he is caught trying to sell anything within the number of days for which the troops are ordered to furnish their own provisions, he shall have all his goods confiscated. But when those days are past, he may sell as he pleases. And the man who seems to offer the largest stock of goods shall receive rewards and preferment both from the allies and from myself. [39] And if any merchant thinks he needs more money for the purchase [of supplies], let him bring me vouchers [people] for his respectability and identity, and sureties as a pledge that he is really going with the army, and he shall receive a certain amount from [the funds] we have.”

It is this particular section of Cyrus’ speech that has been cited as evidence by modern scholars that private traders contributed on a significant scale to the provisioning of classical Greek land campaigns. But if we consider Cyrus’ instruction on merchants within the context of the whole of his speech outlining the requirements for the march to Thymbrara, we can see that he foresaw no major role for these merchants in the feeding of his army. As we have seen, Cyrus earlier in his speech had already made detailed provision for the army’s grain supply for the whole of the march to Thymbrara: his soldiers were to rely on supplies they carried themselves for the first part of the march (Cyr. 6.2.25, 38); and on foraging when they came again into country that had not been ravaged (Cyr. 6.2.31) (that is, even for the period during which Cyrus did allow the merchants to trade with his soldiers, the soldiers had been directed by Cyrus to obtain their grain from another source). Cyrus, then, was not expecting or relying on the traders accompanying his army to make any important contribution to the army’s grain supply; rather, the merchants who were to be encouraged to follow the march were to be present on the campaign only as, at most, a supplementary source of supply to the grain the soldiers brought from home or acquired through foraging. This limited and
supplementary role is reflected even in the location of the directive on traders in Cyrus’ speech. It is included right at the end of the speech, almost as an aside; just as traders did not form an integral part of the army’s food supply, they were not included as an integral part of the first half of the speech discussing the army’s food supply. It should be noted here, too, that, in discussing the traders, Cyrus spoke in indefinites—“if any merchant wishes to sell anything”: there is no specific directive here aimed at securing a specific set of provisions or other goods for the army. Instead, the merchants were to be encouraged to follow the army in order to provide a sort of bonus supply to the arrangements for acquiring supplies Cyrus had already set out.\textsuperscript{74}

So the ancient discussion that has been most often cited to corroborate the view that private traders made a significant contribution to the food supply of Greek armies on campaign shows nothing of the sort; rather, as we have seen, the merchants’ role in the provisioning of the march to Thymbrara was limited and supplementary—probably confined to, at most, the sale of \textit{opsa}. This conclusion is important since it removes the key textual support for the view ingrained in modern scholarship that traveling merchants played a considerable role in the provisioning of classical Greek armies, but it is also crucially important for another reason: because it is drawn from a description that was designed to be paradigmatic. Xenophon’s aim in the \textit{Cyropaedia} was not to recreate the

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\textsuperscript{74} van Wees supports the statement that “… classical sources give the impression that private, unorganized trade made a vital contribution to keeping armies in supplies” ([2004] 105) by citing Cyr. 6.2.38-39 “where private traders are the only source of supply mentioned other than plunder and provisions brought from home, and deemed important enough to be offered incentives by the commander” ([2004] 280 n.15). But see introduction section ii for this statement missing a crucial methodological point for the treatment of the provisioning of pre-industrial armies: what matters is not (just) the various means of acquisition of provisions used by military forces, but their relative importance. Cyrus, as the ideal general he was (see section ii), was concerned to use as many different means of acquisition as possible in the attempt to achieve logistical security for his army; relatively speaking, private traders were (much) the least important of those means of acquisition.
historical reality of the Persian past, but rather to construct a dramatized, didactic narrative, in which a fictional Cyrus could be presented as the model of an ideal leader to a contemporary Greek audience. Therefore, as Stadter points out, in so far as one of the chief characteristics of Xenophon’s ideal leader was his ability in war, the military situations described at length in the narrative of the *Cyropaedia* form a kind of guide to best practice in military organization and planning:

In so far as a principal facet of Xenophon’s ideal leader was the ability to wage war effectively, the military situations of the narrative form a kind of handbook of military training, strategy, and tactics. An unusual economy prevails in Xenophon’s account, quite different from the narrative technique of Herodotus or Thucydides. In these historians, repetitive patterns are employed to allow the reader to understand the underlying similarities of apparently diverse historical events. Xenophon, working not from history but from invention, employs a series of episodes, of which each is independent, and each conveys a particular lesson. The result is a narrative which is simple compared to that of the historians, linear rather than interwoven, and requiring much less of the reader.

A short example will clarify my point: there are several campaigns involving marches to a battle area, but only one such journey is described in detail, the march to Thymbrara... The purpose of the passage is evidently to set forth Xenophon’s ideas of the preparations and formation needed for a long march. The information appears only here; in narrating other campaigns, Xenophon treats other problems, such as the use of deception in concealing the attack against the Armenians as a hunting expedition (2.4.18-32).

Xenophon, then, in a fully elaborated description of what would constitute the organization of an ideal long march by a classical Greek army overland, left no room for a major part for traders in the provisioning of that march.


77 Pritchett, in a discussion of *Cyr*. 6.2.25-41, states that “[i]n this account, there is virtually no mention of reliance on local markets” ([1971] 42)—but, of course there is not, as Cyrus’ army was proceeding through
Moreover, Xenophon’s idealizing description of Cyrus’ military organization, planning, and actual campaigns was derived from Greek norms, and based not just on Xenophon’s knowledge of Spartan practice, but also (and mainly) on his own very broad experience of military life. It would have made no sense for Xenophon to include a recommendation on military organization which had no basis in reality in a work that was founded on classical Greek reality and was self-consciously prescribing norms to be

hostile country for the whole of the march from his base to Thymbrara. Pritchett also notes regarding this passage that “H. Knorringa... has collected the passages relating to sutlers, traders who marched with the army, and drawn the conclusion that their trade was not extensive, and usually even small. Their activity, as assumed in many of our military handbooks, seems exaggerated” ([1971] 42 n.59). Knorringa, in the pages Pritchett incorrectly cites (the citation should have been [1926] 65-66, instead of [1926] 64-67), was making a slightly different point: that all persons engaged in trade in the Greek world operated on a small scale; he does not say anything in these pages on the total contribution made by the traders who accompanied classical Greek armies to the regular provisioning of those armies.

78 See Tuplin (1994) 139: “... the [Cyropaedia’s] bedrock is actually Greek normality, at least in the sense that the principles of leadership which it exemplifies are (Xenophon wishes us to suppose) in no way intrinsically inconsistent with ordinary Greek values.”

79 For parallels between Cyrus’ and Spartan military practices, see esp., e.g., Christesen (2006) 52-53, 55, 59-61.

80 See esp. Delebecque (1957) 385: in the Cyropaedia, “Xénophon crée un idéal nouveau, et tout neuf, en usant de sa réflexion, de ses souvenirs, de ses lectures, et peut-être des débats auxquels il a pu prendre part sur la meilleure forme de gouvernement.” See also Tatum (1989) 53: Xenophon’s ideal “... is clearly a distillation of the practical experiences he had had and the people he had known.” Cf. Tuplin (1994) 163 (although Tuplin’s methodology in this article of comparing the Cyropaedia to Xenophon’s Constitution of the Lacedaemonians in order to demonstrate that Xenophon was not solely using Spartan practices in his construction of Cyrus’ military practice neglects his own (correct) remarks ([1994] 139) that Spartan eccentricities are emphasized in the Lac. Pol., as well as the fact that the Cyropaedia and Lac. Pol. as literary works have different aims and intentions; Xenophon would hardly repeat himself in the Cyropaedia, and using Cyrus as a mask for Spartan institutions would render the Persian setting entirely jejune for his readers. Even if Tuplin is far too sceptical on Xenophon’s use of Spartan practices for his construction of Cyrus’ military practices (and Persian institutions in the Cyropaedia), his article does perform the useful service of showing that previous (much older) work was incorrect in taking the Cyropaedia to be “a book about Sparta in which Persia is used as a mere disguise” ([1994] 162). Anderson (1970) 43-45, followed by Harthen [2001] 112) was therefore incorrect to take Cyr. 6.2.25 as directly reflective of Spartan practice.
followed by a Greek audience. In other words, what was true in Xenophon’s description of Cyrus’ army on the march to Thymbrara—that merchants did not play a major role in feeding it—must have been generally true of classical Greek armies on the march.

Other passages from the Cyropaedia and other ancient narratives confirm that the traveling markets provided by merchants to classical Greek armies never made a structurally important contribution to the provisioning of classical Greek armies on overland campaigns. Thus, after his army had captured the camp of the Assyrians after the first great battle, Cyrus, addressing his friends and allies, instructed them as to what they should do with the money taken from the captured Assyrian treasures (Cyr. 4.5.41-42):

> ὑμεῖς δὲ διάδοτε λαβόντες ἱππεῖ µὲν τὸ διπλοῦν, πεζῷ δὲ τὸ ἁπλοῦν, ἵνα ἔχετε, ἂν τινος προσδέησθε, καὶ ὅτου ὑιόστησθε. [42] τὴν δὲ ἀγορὰν τὴν οὖσαν ἐν τῷ στρατόπεδῳ κηρύξατω µὲν ἤδη, µὴ ἀδικεῖν µηδένα, πωλεῖν δὲ τοὺς καπήλους ὅ τι ἔχει ἕκαστος πράσιµον, καὶ ταῦτα διαθέµένους ἄλλα ἄγειν, ὅπως οἰκῆται ἡµῖν τὸ στρατόπεδον.

Put another way, if it really was the case that traders did normally play a major and regular role in the provisioning of Greek armies, Xenophon could not have had them make such a minor contribution to the supply of Cyrus’ army, since that would have clashed not only with his own experiences, but also with his audience’s knowledge of military life.

But the fact that a paradigmatic account of a long march aimed at a Greek audience includes private traders confirms the point made above that traders were a usual presence on classical Greek land campaigns. (But compare Cyr. 5.3.34-45 here: in Xenophon’s idealizing account of the preparations for a lightly-equipped army proceeding at a forced march pace (see Cyr. 5.3.27 for the reason for the speed of this march), there is no mention of traders; only the most able-bodied men and horses take part in this march (the pack-animals and the wagons are left behind (Cyr. 5.3.34-35)).) Dalby ([1992] 24) comments that “Xenophon’s description of the travelling market [at Anab. 1.5.6] suggests that it was something unusual in his experience.” Xenophon’s description of the travelling market at Anab. 1.5.6, however, does not suggest that it was something unusual in his experience, but that it was once, exceptionally, the main source of grain for the mercenaries (see chapter 4 section ii for full discussion of this point). Xenophon’s offhand mention of the agora accompanying the Boeotian army at the battle of Leuctra and his account of Cyrus’ instructions at Cyr. 6.2.38-39 shows that he was well acquainted with traveling markets accompanying (Greek) armies; see also chapter 7 section iiib for Anab. 5.7.33 showing the same thing. Harthen ([2001] 184 (citing Dalby at [2001] 183)) is incorrect to take Cyr. 6.2.38-39 as evidence for “travelling merchants accompanying an Asiatic army... recorded as standard Persian practice.”
“And do you take the money and pay it out to the cavalry and infantry in the proportion of two to one, in order that you may have all the wherewithal to buy whatever you still may need.” [42] “Further,” he added, “let the herald proclaim that no one shall interfere with the market in the camp, but that the traders may sell what each of them has for sale and, when they have sold that, get in a new stock, that our camp may be supplied.”

The crucial points to realize about this passage is that the captured Assyrian camp had been full of food (in addition to treasure) and that, before this order regarding the traders, Cyrus had already ordered measures to be taken for the collection and preparation of this food for his army, so that his army’s food supply was completely provided for.\(^\text{83}\)

Therefore, although Cyrus was encouraging here the presence of traders in his camp in order to further boost supply in the camp, he was not relying upon them to provide any important amounts of supplies to his army. The supplementary character of the traders’ expected contribution to the army’s provisioning can be seen in the language of Cyrus’ order: money was to be distributed to the men in order that they might buy whatever they might have \textit{still} needed, i.e. in addition to the abundant amounts of food which had already been distributed to them from the Assyrian spoils.\(^\text{84}\)

\(^{83}\) See \textit{Cyr.} 4.2.34ff. for Cyrus organizing the captured provisions to be eaten by his army, and \textit{Cyr.} 4.2.40, 4.2.47, 4.5.1-2, 4.5.4-5, 4.5.8 (the wine and other supplies here explicitly those captured from the Assyrian army) for his army eating these provisions. See esp. \textit{Cyr.} 4.5.39 for Cyrus re-organizing the food supply of the army (still from the captured Assyrian stores) just before his instruction on the distribution of money quoted above. See, too, \textit{Cyr.} 4.6.12: the coin from the Assyrian camp only collected later by the Hyrcanians, as directed by Cyrus, after the Medes “\textit{τοιαῦτα δὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐδέοντο ἑαυτοῖς ἐκπληρώσαντες, ὡς μηδὲνος ἐνδεόµενοι στρατεύωνται· πάντα γὰρ ἦν ἄλλα ἀπὸ πολλά}” (“had also supplied themselves with such other things as they needed, so that they might continue the campaign in want of nothing; for there was an abundance of everything”) (\textit{Cyr.} 4.6.11). (In addition to the stores from the Assyrian camp, note that the Medes had also captured wagons full of supplies from the fleeing Assyrians and their allies and had sent these back to the army (\textit{Cyr.} 4.6.11)).

\(^{84}\) See also \textit{Cyr.} 2.4.32, 6.2.11: armies already in the field put out a call to traders to come to their camp; the fact that the armies were already operating without traders shows that the latter were not meant to be an important means of provisioning.
In addition, for the one actual campaign where we do have (two separate) sources explicitly mentioning traders accompanying an army—Agesilaos’ campaigns in Asia in the years 396 to 394—\textsuperscript{85} the narratives of these campaign found in Xenophon’ \textit{Hellenica} and the Oxyrhynchus Historian demonstrate that Agesilaos’ army depended not on the traders following it for its food, but on supplies bought at the \textit{poleis} he used as bases for his army (Ephesus and Cyme),\textsuperscript{86} markets provided by friendly \textit{poleis}, and, in hostile territory, on foraging.\textsuperscript{87}

Comparative evidence also confirms that traders did not make any significant contribution to the food supply of classical Greek armies. Although traveling merchants marketing food were also a constant presence on the overland campaigns mounted by other pre-industrial European and near Eastern states, they never played more than a minor role in the supply of these campaigns. Thus, while sutlers are attested as accompanying Median,\textsuperscript{88} Persian,\textsuperscript{89} Macedonian,\textsuperscript{90} Republican and imperial Roman,\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{85} Xen., \textit{Ages}. 1.18 (note that the presence of traders can be taken for granted at \textit{Ages}. 1.20-21); Diod. 14.79.2: Agesilaos taking the field in 396 with an army of ten thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry “ἐκολοθην ἀγοραῖος αὐτοῖς ὄχλος καὶ τῆς ἁρπαγῆς χάριν οὐκ ἐλάττων τοῦ προειρημένου” (“was accompanied by a market crowd of no smaller number providing a market and intent upon plunder”).

\textsuperscript{86} See Diod. 14.79.3 for Agesilaos being based at Cyme for part of the summer of 396.

\textsuperscript{87} Xen., \textit{Hell}. 3.4.3, 3.4.7, 3.4.16; 3.4.11-12, 21, 4.1.16-17, \textit{Hell. Oxy}. 21.1, 3, 5 and esp. 22.2. Although there is no mention of members of Agesilaos’ army buying grain in the \textit{poleis} of Ephesus and Cyme, this is because such purchases could be assumed.

\textsuperscript{88} See Lenfant (2004) fr. 6b1 (= Nicolaus of Damascus \textit{FGH} 90 F 4): Ctesias commenting that \textit{kapeloi} normally followed the Median King in great numbers (“ἐπονται δ’ οὕτω πολλοὶ τῷ βασιλέως στρατῷ”) (see Lenfant (2004) fr. 6b2 for another mention of these traders). I thank Andrew Nichols for these references.

\textsuperscript{89} See ps.-Aristot., \textit{Oec.} 2.2.4, 1350b31-33: “τοὺς ταύτας τῶν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ αὐτῶς ἕχοντας καὶ τοὺς κατηγούσας τοὺς μεταβαλλομένους τῇ ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐκ ἤσθην οὐθὲν τούτων ποιεῖν”; “… all the craftsmen in [Datames the satrap’s] army and the \textit{kapeloi} exchanging something, were under his personal control, and
medieval English, French, and Italian land forces, as well as sixteenth century land forces, as well as sixteenth century

[they] enjoyed a complete monopoly.” But we know from many other sources that Persian armies on campaign primarily relied on taxation-in-kind and requisitioning for their provisioning (see Briant [1986] 34, 37, 39-41, and Rawlinson cited at p.218 n.55 above): the traders who followed Persian armies on campaign must, then, have functioned merely as an appendix to these primary means of acquiring provisions. Cf. again Hdt. 3.139.1: the traders who were following Cambyses’ campaign were just a chance aggregation and did not form an integral part of the army. The supply requirements of Cambyses’ army on the march to Egypt and on campaign there were met by requisitioning, as can be inferred from Hdt. 3.25: Cambyses’ campaign to Ethiopia suffering from a supply crisis because he had neglected to take the usual measure of requisitioning supplies (“παρασκευὴν σῖτου”) to take with him. Cf. Hdt. 7.23.3 on the Persian preparations for the provisioning of the workers on the Athos canal in 480: “ἐνθαῦτα λειµών ἐστι, ἵνα σωι ἀγορή τε ἐγίνετο καὶ πρητήριον· σῖτος δὲ σωι πολλὸς ἐφοίτα ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης ἀληλεσµένος” (“in a meadow nearby the workmen had their meeting-place and market, and grain ready ground was brought over in great quantity from Asia”). Purchases in the market at Athos were therefore to supplement the (requisitioned or tax) grain transported from Asia (cf. Stanley [1976] 118, Hammond [1988] 535).

90 See Arrian, Anab. 6.22.4-5 for a mention of Phoenician merchants accompanying Alexander all the way to India and back. Grain for Alexander’s army was acquired by gifts, requisitioning, purchase at markets provided by cities, and, in enemy territory, by foraging (see Engels [1978] 40-41, 72). The Phoenician merchants played no major role in the army’s provisioning and are mentioned only when they take advantage of the chance abundance of myrrh and ginger-grass growing in the Gedrosian desert to load up their pack-mules with these rare, high value per unit of weight substances.

91 For Republican forces, see Erdkamp (1998) 119-120: “... in late Republican wars the presence of... petty traders was common and usually accepted... It is clear that sutlers sold food products to the soldiers. Since the soldiers could not always rely on the presence of petty traders and their trade was sometimes even prohibited, this selling of food products can never have played a structural role in the army’s food supply.” For (late Republican and) imperial Roman armies, see Roth (1999) 101: “... the contribution of sutlers should be considered an appendix to, and not a part of, the regular supply system.”

92 See Bachrach (2006) 429, 431: for the first campaigns of Edward I, merchants were banned from selling in markets in home territory, and encouraged or ordered to sell to his armies (but never while an army was on the march, but always when it was in camp in (royal) territory bordering the theater of operations). Even with these measures, however, and the issuance of letters of protection and safe conducts to merchants trading with the army, “merchants could not be relied upon to provide sufficient supplies in the absence of governmental mobilization of resources through the right of purveyance” ([2006] 440).

93 See Contamine (1972) 324-332: in the last decades of the fifteenth century, the French state instituted a system of acquiring food for its campaigns by levying contributions from communities, which were to be transported to its armies by traders; the monarchy and the military administration changed to this mode of provisioning since “ils étaient incapables, pour des raisons fondamentales [i.e., the cost of land transport] plus encore qu’accentuelles, de transformer la fourniture des armées en une opération commercialement rentable. Il était donc impossible de se fier à la seule <libre entreprise>; un système de contributions obligatoires devait être instauré et maintenu...” ([ibid.] 332).

94 See Mallett (1974) 139-140: markets provided by traders and local farmers always being “complementary” to the main means of provisioning of fourteenth and fifteenth Italian armies.
seventeenth century,\textsuperscript{96} and eighteenth century European\textsuperscript{97} (and Ottoman)\textsuperscript{98} overland campaigns, no European or near Eastern army ever depended on the crowds of private traders (following armies) to make a structurally important contribution to its provisioning while engaged in mobile operations in hostile territory.\textsuperscript{99} Instead, when campaigning in enemy territory, other pre-industrial European (and near Eastern) states sourced their grain supplies from a (variable) mixture of foraging, contributions (from communities in enemy territory), requisitioning, taxation-in-kind, allied contributions, \\textsuperscript{95} See Hale (1985) 160 (on the provisioning of European forces generally in the sixteenth century): “the private sutler, even though his role was restricted by reliance on the great contractors for most of an army’s grain, salt fish, cheese, wine and beer, remained ubiquitous, not only topping up these basic, keeping commodities, but hawking fresh meat and fish, fowls, eggs and butter to whoever could afford to haggle for them.”

\textsuperscript{96} See Parker (2004) 150-151 on the supplementary role of traders in the Spanish army in Flanders in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See esp (ibid.) 151: “[s]ome sutlers did not provide food at all: they followed the Army solely to buy booty and the auctioned goods of the dead.”

\textsuperscript{97} See Kennett (1967) 123 on the “hordes” of men following French armies in the eighteenth century for the sake of trade: “[p]erhaps the generals regarded them a secondary supply system.” The fact these traders were given short shrift if they got in the way of an army (ibid.) shows that they formed no important part of the provisioning of French armies at this time.

\textsuperscript{98} See Aksan (1995) 2, 3 for purchases (from traders) playing a supplementary role in the diet of eighteenth-century Ottoman (and Russian) soldiers.

\textsuperscript{99} Roth ([1999] 100) is incorrect to state that pre-industrial European armies (other than the Romans) relied wholly or primarily on the traders or sutlers who followed them. While pre-industrial European armies never relied on the traveling markets which accompanied them for their provisions, pre-modern European states did sometimes make bulk wholesale purchases from large-scale merchants as an important means of provisioning overland campaigns: see, e.g., Erdkamp (1995) 172-174 (state purchases for Roman Republican forces); Contamine (1972) 124-125 (fourteenth century French armies); Mallet (1974) 139, (1984) 140 (Italian states in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries); Contamine (1978) 411 (early sixteenth century Holy Roman army); Davies (1964) 235 (sixteenth century English armies); Perjés (1970) 46-48 (early modern European forces). It should be noted that private traders (operating on a small scale) did sometimes make an important contribution to the provisioning of classical Greek (and later) inland sieges: see chapter 7 section iv.
and wholesale purchases from large-scale merchants or private contractors with access to large amounts of capital and produce networks spread over large areas.\textsuperscript{100}

The underlying reason for the minor role of (small) private traders in the supply of the main, grain-based component of pre-industrial European and near Eastern armies’ diets was down to one basic fact: the prohibitively expensive cost of transporting overland a low-value per unit weight, bulky good such as grain using pre-industrial technology.\textsuperscript{101} The costs of carrying grain overland in bulk for long distances were so high that only wealthy and powerful states could afford to marshal the transportation necessary to execute the task.\textsuperscript{102} Since they were unable to make a profit from selling grain to soldiers on campaign, the large crowds of sutlers which accompanied overland campaigns in other periods did so to sell high-value per unit of weight foods (such as cheese, eggs, and fresh meat), and to purchase booty at low prices. Unable to break free from the “brute fact” of the high costs of overland transport of grain (before the advent of railways and motorized transport), traders following classical Greek campaigns did the same.\textsuperscript{103} The ‘market mobs’ that accompanied classical Greek armies in hostile (and friendly) territory played no major role in feeding them, then: for their grain, the major

\textsuperscript{100} See Erdkamp (1998) 12-18 for discussion and references (cf. the previous note for state wholesale purchases of grain).

\textsuperscript{101} See here, e.g., Clark and Haswell (1970) 179-199; Braudel (1972) 576-579; Morley (1996) 67-68; Erdkamp (2005) 200-201; and esp. Bresson (2008a) 87-88 for the theoretical basis for calculation of the cost of land transport. See also the conclusion to this chapter, and chapter 7 section iv.

\textsuperscript{102} See here esp. Hopkins (1983) 105; Finley (1999) 126. See also the conclusion to this chapter.

\textsuperscript{103} See chapter 7 section iv for a full discussion of the functioning of the traveling markets that accompanied classical Greek armies. For “brute facts,” see Searle (1995) 27.
component of their diet, classical Greek soldiers on overland campaigns relied on
supplies brought from home, on markets provided by poleis in friendly territory, and, as I
shall demonstrate in the next section, on foraging when they operated in enemy territory.

b. Foraging

Unless there were extraordinary circumstances, classical Greek armies acquired
their provisions in hostile territory through foraging. As discussed above, Cyrus’
orders for the preparations for the (ideal) march to Thymbrara assumed that his army
would (normally) supply themselves through foraging (Xen., Cyr. 6.2.25-26, 6.2.31). In
fact, throughout the narrative of the Cyropaedia, foraging is taken for granted as the
(sole) means of provisioning for operations undertaken in enemy territory by Cyrus’
army. So, as part of an attempt to persuade Cyaxares to allow the Persians to mount an
expedition, Cyrus tells the Median king that “ἔπειτα νῦν μὲν σὺ ἡµᾶς τρέφεις πολλὰ
dαπανών, ὡς νῦν ἐκστρατευσόµεθα ἐκ τῆς πολεµίας” (“you support us now at
great expense; whereas, if we take the field, we shall get our support from the enemy’s
country”) (Cyr. 3.3.16). In a later invasion of Assyria, Cyrus kept an Assyrian rebel
with him as he marched “... ὁδῶν φραστῆρα καὶ ὑδάτων καὶ χιλοῦ καὶ σίτου, ὡς εἴη ἐν ἀφθονωτάτοις στρατοπεδεύσαι” (“to give him information in regard to roads and water,
fodder and provisions, so that they might be able to camp where things were most

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104 See already, e.g., Gomme, HCT i.16; Cruickshank (1954) 75; van Wees (2004) 105-106 (though note
that this conflicts with his view (see p.224 n.64 above) that traveling markets constituted a major source of
supplies for classical Greek armies on campaign).

105 Cf. Cyr. 3.3.23: when Cyrus’ army did invade Assyria, it shifted its camp from time to time, and kept
provisions supplied in abundance and ravaged the country (“καὶ ἐξοντες ἄφθονα τάπιτηδεια καὶ ἄφθονας
τῆς χώρας”), while it awaited the enemy’s approach.
abundant”) (Cyr. 5.4.40). Encamped in Assyrian territory, Cyrus made constant inquiry of those whom he thought likely to know

τὴν χώραν ὁπόθεν ἂν ὡς πλεῖστα ὠφελοῖτο τὸ στρατεύµα, ἐξῆγεν ἀεὶ ἐις προνοµάς, ἅµα µὲν ὅτι πλεῖστα λαµβάνοι τῇ στρατιᾷ τἀπιτήδεια, ἅµα δ’ ὅπως µᾶλλον ὑγιαίνοιεν καὶ ἰσχύοιεν διαπονούµενοι ταῖς πορείαις, ἅµα δ’ ὅπως ἐν ταῖς ἀγωγαῖς τὰς τάξεις ὑποµιµνήσκοιντο.

... about the country from what parts of it the army might profit as much as possible, and kept leading his men out on foraging expeditions; this he did partly that he might get supplies for the army in as great abundance as possible; partly that they might become inured to labour through these expeditions and might thus be in better health and strength, and partly that by such marches they might be enabled to keep their respective positions in mind. (Cyr. 6.1.24)

The point is that in each of these episodes in which Xenophon is self-consciously setting out for a Greek audience paradigmatic presentations of the organization of military campaigns in enemy territory (paradigms drawn from classical Greek norms and practices), foraging is the sole means for Cyrus’ army of acquiring provisions.¹⁰⁷

Xenophon also assumes in generalizing discussions of warfare in other works, too, that armies invading enemy territory would subsist there on the provisions they obtained through foraging. In the Poroi, it is taken for granted that an army invading Attica would bring along no supplies, but would attempt to provision itself through foraging (this would lead to problems for the invading force if it attempted to operate in the mining district) (4.47).¹⁰⁸ Socrates in the Oeconomicus also assumes armies

¹⁰⁶ See the discussion in the previous section.

¹⁰⁷ See also esp. Cyr. 5.4.25 (part of a proposal by Cyrus to the Assyrian king regarding the mutual protection of farmland): “αἰς δὲ τὴν τοῦ καρποῦ κοµιδὴν, ἐὰν µὲν πόλεµος ἢ, ὃ ἐπιφανεῖς ὁµαι καρπώσται...” (“... as to the harvesting of crops, if there is war, the victor, I suppose, will do the reaping”). Cf. Cyr. 5.4.21-23 (foraging for supplies taken for granted in a campaign in enemy territory).

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Poroi 4.45: if a fortress was constructed on the highest point of Besa between Anaphylstos and Thorikos, “εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔλθοιεν πλείοις πολέµοις, δῆλον ὅτι εἰ µὲν σῖτον ἢ οἶνον ἢ πρόβατα ἐξω εὑρεῖν, ἀφέλοις ἀν ταύτα” (“in case enemies came in force, it is clear that they would seize any grain or wine or livestock they found outside”) (but the silver ore they would find would be useless to them, just being lumps of stones).
operating in hostile territory would aim to supply themselves from the crops of their
enemies. These assumptions were not limited to Xenophon. In a discussion of the
military force of his ideal politeia, Socrates in Plato’s Republic tells his interlocutor that
his soldiers would not burn their enemies’ houses or devastate their farmland but only
take their annual harvest (470A-B). It is assumed throughout Aeneas Tacticus, too,
that invading land forces would forage for their provisions.

Xenophon’s, Plato’s, and Aeneas’ discussions all assumed that the armies in
question would have tactical superiority, a prerequisite for military forces aiming to
engage in foraging. This was a valid assumption for most invading classical Greek
armies: even if their invasions were expected, armies operating in hostile territory would
be larger than any forces sent out by the invaded polis against them until that polis
decided (if it eventually did so) to send out a force to engage the invaders in battle; until
that point, the invading army would be tactically stronger and could therefore forage
safely. Two exceptions to the rule prove that Greek invading armies were normally
sufficiently tactically strong to be able to depend on foraging for their provisions. In

109 See Oec. 5.7, and esp. Oec. 5.13: men engaged in farming, if they have been deprived of their harvests
by successive invading armies, “... ἂν µὴ θεὸς ἀποκωλὴν, δύνανται ἰόντες εἰς τὰς τῶν ἀποκωλύοντων
λαµβάνειν ἀφ’ ὧν θρέψονται” (“are able to attack the territory of the men who are keeping them out of their
own, and take what they need to support themselves—unless some god prevents them”).

110 “ἐµοὶ µὲν τοίνυς, ἦν δ’ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τούτων µηδέτερα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐπέτειον καρπὸν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.”
(“Well, I think they’ll avoid both practices, I said, and only take away the annual harvest.”)

111 See 7.1, 8.1, 10.3.

112 See the discussion at Erdkamp (1998) 123-130.

454/3 (?), an Athenian army (accompanied by allied forces from Boeotia and Phocis) marched to Pharsalus in Thessaly in aid of a Thessalian exile. But the Athenians and their allies had to retire from Thessaly because of lack of supplies before they had achieved their objective; although they had controlled the land around their camp, they could not go beyond its immediate vicinity because of the Thessalian cavalry operating against them (Thucy. 1.111.1). A Theban force operating in Thessaly in 368 also suffered from lack of provision because attacks from the Thessalian cavalry prevented it from foraging (Diod. 15.71.4-5). But the Thessalians were unique (on the classical Greek mainland) for their strength and numbers in cavalry; usually, classical Greek armies could invade territory without the fear that enemy action would make foraging impossible.  

The Peloponnesian forces that invaded Attica in 431, 430, 428, 427, and 425 enjoyed (almost) complete tactical superiority as they devastated the Athenian countryside. Despite the Peloponnesians’ overwhelming tactical strength, most scholars discussing these invasions believe that the Peloponnesians did not subsist (mainly) from foraging during their invasions, but used any provisions they acquired

114 “καὶ τῆς µὲν γῆς ἐκράτουν ὅσα µὴ προιόντες πολὺ ἐκ τῶν ὅπλων (οἱ γὰρ ἱππῆς τῶν Θεσσαλῶν εἶργον).” See Gomme, *HCT* i.324 ad loc.: “that is to say, their [i.e., the Athenians’] hoplite force was superior, and had it been in any country but Thessaly (or entirely mountainous country such as Aitolia) could have marched where it would or have settled down to a regular siege; but in Thessaly, the enemy cavalry were able to confine it more or less to camp, and therefore to prevent it getting supplies.”

115 Cf. p.248 n.135, however, for Athenian cavalry being able to limit plundering sorties near the *astu* of Athens during the Archidamian War.

116 I should note here for the following discussion that the forces invading Athenian territory during the Archidamian War probably also included contingents from Megara, Locris, Boeotia, Phocis, and Anactoria (Thucy. 2.9.3); for sake of convenience, however, I will refer to the forces invading Attica simply as Peloponnesian(s).
through foraging as (at most) a supplement to the supplies they had brought with them to Attica from the Peloponnese.  

This view is based, firstly, on the Spartan order to their allies before the first invasion of Attica in 431: “... στρατιὰν παρασκευάζεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι τά τε ἐπιτήδεια αἱ ἐκ ἑπτι ἐξοδον ἑκδημον ἔχειν, ὡς ἐσβαλοῦντες ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν” (“... to the cities in the Peloponnese and the alliance outside it that the cities were to get ready an army and the provisions needed for an expedition away from home, in order to invade Attica”) (Thucy. 2.10.1). The second basis for the view that the invaders subsisted (mainly) on the food they brought along is a number of Thucydidean passages that state that the Peloponnesians remained in Attica during their invasions only so long as provisions were available to them: Thucydides states that the Peloponnesians remained in Attica in 431 “ὅσου εἶχον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια” (“as long as they had provisions available”) (2.23.3); that they retired from Attica in 428 “ἐμείνατες δὲ χρόνον οὗ εἶχον τὰ σιτία” (“after staying the time during which they had food available”) (3.1.3); in 427, the invaders left off ravaging the Athenian chorα as “καὶ ἐπελελοίπει ὁ σῖτος” (“they began to run short of provisions”) (3.26.4).

But that the Peloponnesian invasions of Attica during the Archidamian War did mainly rely on foraging for their food supply can be demonstrated by an analysis of other passages from Thucydides, and from consideration of the institutional organization of

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118 The second invasion of Attica (in 430) was the longest at forty days (Thucy. 2.57.2); the fifth and final invasion in 425 the shortest at fifteen days (4.6.2). The invasions in 431, 428, and 427 lasted between somewhere between fifteen and forty days, then, but probably closer to forty than fifteen (cf. Gomme, HCT ii.79).
classical Greek *poleis*. Thus, in 425, the Peloponnesians under the leadership of Agis invaded Attica before the grain was ripe (Thucy. 4.2.1). Since they had invaded when the corn was still green (and thus inedible), Thucydides reports that most of their troops were short of provisions;\(^{119}\) this was the main reason why this invasion was the shortest of the Peloponnesian attacks on Attica in the Archidamian War, lasting only fifteen days (Thucy. 4.6.2). This passage shows, then, that the Peloponnesians aimed (throughout the Archidamian War) to acquire most of their provisions through foraging: without access to this source of supplies, their invasion of Attica had be to curtailed—in contrast to the previous invasions which, because they had entered Attica at the time when the grain was growing ripe (Thucy. 2.19.1, 3.1.1),\(^{120}\) were able to subsist (primarily) on foraging.\(^{121}\)

In addition, previous discussions taking the view that the Peloponnesians did not subsist primarily on foraging during the Archidamian War have taken the verb “εἶχον” at 2.23.3 and 3.1.3 to mean that the invaders only left Attica when they ran out of the provisions they *had* with them from their home *poleis*.\(^{122}\) But other passages from Thucydides show that it is unnecessary to take εἶχον at 2.23.3 and 3.1.3 in this way. For

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\(^{119}\) 4.6.1: “ἀμα δὲ πηδὶ ἐσβαλόντες καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἐτι χλωροῦ ὄντος ἐσπάνιζον τροφῆς τοῖς πολλοῖς...” See Classen/Steup iv.9: τοῖς πολλοῖς here is to be associated with τροφῆς, and not ἐσπάνιζον.

\(^{120}\) Cf. Thucy. 2.71.1 with 2.79.1: the Peloponnesians invading Plataea in 429 when the grain was ripe (and the Athenians marching overland against the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans at just the same time).

\(^{121}\) Cf. Pritchett (1971) 38-39; Harvey (1986) 207; Rhodes (1998) 211 (contradicting his earlier statements on this subject (see n.117 above)). See esp. Thorne (2001) 235 n.28 on Thucy. 4.6: [t]his does not imply that the Spartans arrived with enough rations for fifteen days. They must have captured some stored supplies in Attica, regardless of the state of the harvest.” But note that 4.6.1 does demonstrate that some few men had brought enough provisions for the campaign.

\(^{122}\) See, e.g., Crawley’s translations of 2.23.3: the Peloponnesians staying “as long as their provisions lasted”; and 3.1.3: “after staying the time for which they had taken provisions...”
instance, at 7.78.7, where Thucydides was describing the desperate retreat of the
Athenian forces from Syracuse, he wrote that “καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκέτι ὁµοίως ἔχον· οὐ
gὰρ ἔτι ἀποκρωσθήκαν οἶον τ’ ἴσον ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων” (“and they no longer had provisions as
before, for by reason of the enemy’s cavalry it was no longer possible to leave the main
body”). The explanatory γὰρ clause here shows that the Athenians and their allies could
not acquire provisions because the actions of the Syracusan cavalry precluded them from
foraging. Thus, ἔχον should not be taken at 7.78.7 to refer to any supplies which the
Athenians and their allies might have brought with them,123 but to refer to the fact that
there were no longer provisions available to them. A passage from Nicias’ letter to
Athens from Syracuse describing the strategic situation facing the Athenian forces in
Sicily at the end of the summer of 414 confirms the point that ἔχον should not
necessarily be taken (at 2.23.3 and 3.1.3) to refer to supplies brought from home: Nicias
wrote to the Athenians that “εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρήσοµέν τι καὶ βραχὺ τῆς τηρήσεως, τὰ
ἐπιτήδεια οὐχ ἕξοµεν, παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων πόλιν χαλεπῶς καὶ νῦν ἐσκοµιζόµενοι” (“... for if
we relax our vigilance ever so little, we shall not have our supplies, which are even now
with difficulty brought past their city and into our camp”) (Thucy. 7.13.1). Again, ἔχον
here refers to the possible availability of provisions (and not (obviously) to the possession
of provisions brought on campaign by a force). These two passages show that ἔχον at
2.23.3 and at 3.1.3 can, and should, be taken to mean something like ‘as long as there
were provisions available to them’ (which may have included the supplies the

123 Note also that although the Athenians and their allies did bring (very) small amounts of supplies from
their camp before the march (7.75.5, 7.77.6), they were relying on foraging for their provisions before the
point mentioned at 7.78.7 (see 7.78.4) (and again: note the explanatory γὰρ clause at 7.78.7.)
Peloponnesians brought with them, but also, and much more importantly, will have included provisions in Attica available through foraging).

Thirdly, in the absence of any opportunity to provision by means of contributions (from communities in enemy territory), requisitioning, taxation-in-kind, allied contributions, or wholesale purchases from large-scale merchants or private contractors, it would have been impossible for Peloponnesian (and Boeotian) poleis to prepare substantial supply-trains. It has often been thought that the Spartans had a centralized supply system in the classical period, but there is no strong evidence for this view. Xen., Hell. 4.5.4 is the passage most frequently cited as supposedly showing that the Spartan state centrally organized the provisioning of its armies: Xenophon narrates here that, in 390, Agesilaos sent some fire-pots to a detachment of his army encamped on a high ridge above Loutraki on an unseasonably cold and rainy summer’s night, “τῶν γὰρ τῇ µόρᾳ φερόντων τὰ σιτία οὐδενὸς πῦρ εἰσενεγκόντος” (“since no one among those who carried provisions for the regiment had brought fire”). But the men carrying provisions for the Spartan mora here were presumably helots simply carrying out the same task that personal slave attendants usually did for hoplites in classical Greek armies. In 396, Agesilaos promised to lead an expedition to Asia if the allies gave him a force of thirty Spartiates, two thousand neodamodeis, and six thousand allied troops (Xen., Hell. 3.4.2);


125 See Hodkinson, Lipka, and Lee cited in last note.

126 Cf. Lazenby (1985) 34. For slave attendants typically accompanying hoplites on campaigns, see appendix 2.
when Agesilaos offered to lead the campaign, “διδόασί τε οἱ Λακεδαιµόνιοι ὅσαπε ητησε και ἕξαµήνου σῖτον” (“the Lakedaimonians give him everything he asked for as well as grain for six months”) (Xen., Hell. 3.4.3). But “σῖτον” could have been referring here, as it sometimes did in the Peloponnesian in this period, to monetary pay for the forces to be led by Agesilaos; and, in any case, a special grant for an overseas campaign to Asia Minor cannot be used as evidence for the normal provisioning of overland campaigns mounted by the Spartans. In addition, Xen., Cyr. 6.2.25ff. has also sometimes been used as evidence for a Spartan centralized commissariat; but, as noted above in section iva, the account of Cyrus’ military organization in the Cyropaedia should not be taken merely as a mirror of Spartan practice. Finally, Xenophon’s Constitution of the Lacedaemonians offers positive evidence that Spartan armies were not usually accompanied by a supply-train. At Lac. Pol. 11.2, Xenophon mentions that the baggage-train usually accompanying Spartan armies had all the tools that an army might need, but he does not mention provisions in connection with it. Moreover, the fact that at Lac. Pol. 13.1

127 Cited by Lipka (see n.124 above).

128 See chapter 5 section iv on Thucy. 5.47.6.

129 See Anderson and Harthen (see p.231 n.80 above).

130 Cf. Tuplin (1994) 147. In this passage, Xenophon states that the ephors proclaim before each expedition which year-groups are to serve as horsemen and hoplites, and then those which are to serve as “καὶ τοῖς χειροτέχναις· ὥστε ἃν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπους, τὰ πάντα τοῦτον καὶ ἕξαµήνου σῖτον οἱ Λακεδαιµόνιοι εὐποροῦσι· καὶ ὅσων δὲ ὀργάνων ἡ στρατιά κοινῇ δεηθείη ἃν, ἅπαντα τὰ µὲν ἁµάξῃ προστέτακται παρέχειν, τὰ δὲ ὑποζυγίῳ” (“as artisans (cheirotechnai). As a result the Lacedaemonians on campaign have an abundance of all the things which people normally use in the city. And so all the equipment the army as a whole might need is ordered to be supplied: some on wagons, some on baggage-animals”). Xenophon states at Lac. Pol. 13.4 that whenever the king (of Sparta) sacrifices on campaign, among those present as the sacrifices are the commanders of the baggage-train (“στρατοῦ σκευοφορικοῦ ἄρχοντες”). Lipka ([2002] 216), in discussing this passage, states that the Spartan baggage-train consisted of equipment and food; but this directly contradicts the evidence of Lac. Pol. 11.2 and the other passages he cites in support of this statement are not pertinent to this question.
Xenophon specifically singles out the king and the *homoioi* who are his messmates as being fed at public expense on campaign implies strongly that they were the only part of the army to have been supplied in this way.\textsuperscript{131}

Finally, in any case, it would have been impossible for a supply-train accompanying the Peloponnesians during their invasions of Attica to provision them for the thirty to forty days they normally spent ravaging the Athenian countryside. Since not all food for the animals constituting any supply-train could have been obtained on the march through foraging, the amount of provisions, and the transport for those provisions, “[i]n a logarithmically rising curse... would rise with the number of days the army would have to carry food.”\textsuperscript{132} Because of this, “[i]n order for the army train to remain within the limits of tactical and logistical manageability, the army could take along provisions only for a limited period – maximally 15 days, but usually less – and then only on the condition that the soldiers [or, more precisely, their slave attendants] would carry a significant portion of their provisions.”\textsuperscript{133} Taking these considerations into mind, and the length of the march from the various points of the Peloponnes (and the home states of other allies) to Attica, it becomes clear that the supplies brought by the forces invading Athenian territory would have been sufficient to feed them for just their first few days’

\textsuperscript{131} For the king and his *homoioi* messmates being fed at public expense (and not all the king’s retainers), see Lipka (2002) 216 ad loc. (contra Hodkinson [2000] 197).


\textsuperscript{133} Erdkamp (1998) 82. See (ibid.) 74-75, 82-83 for further discussion.
operations, and would have functioned mainly to secure their supply while they established themselves in Attica in the first days of the campaign.\(^\text{134}\)

The Peloponnesian (and Boeotian) forces invading the Athenian countryside during the Archidamian War, then, depended primarily on foraging for their provisions, and not on an accompanying supply-train.\(^\text{135}\) (The fact that classical Greek forces could rely on foraging in enemy territory was another reason why they took so few supplies on campaign.)\(^\text{136}\) It was only in exceptional circumstances, in fact—when armies which had been expecting a quick battle had been unexpectedly forced to remain immobile in the

\(^{134}\) Engels (1978) is normally cited by scholars discussing the viability of supply-trains accompanying classical Greek land campaigns: see, e.g., the works cited at pp.194-195 n.6 above; Thorne (2001) 234-235 and n.27; Rawlings (2007) 75. But, although Engels’ work was groundbreaking, it is marred by several methodological errors which render its conclusions unsafe. Firstly, because Engels misunderstood the process of making bread, and because he used the U.S. Army RDA for 19-year-olds as the benchmark for the necessary caloric consumption of Macedonian soldiers, he overestimated the required daily grain requirements of the men on Alexander’s campaigns by a factor of two (see p.607 n.67). Secondly, he overestimated the grain and fodder requirements of the draught animals on Alexander’s marches because he incorrectly used consumption figures for (much larger) modern mules and horses in his reconstruction (see Erdkamp [1998] 73 n.93; Roth [1999] 62-67, 198); he did not realize that ancient mules, horses, and camels could survive on much less than the recommendations of modern military manuals during a campaign if needed (Hammond [1980] 257; Roth [1999] 62)); he did not realize that draught animals could be fed through grazing and/or requisitioned food during marches (Hammond [1980] 257; Erdkamp [1998] 20). Thirdly, Engels greatly underestimated the carrying capacity (Roth [1999] 203, 205-212, 222; Badian [1979] 54-55) and endurance (Badian [1979] 54-55) of mules, horses, and camels (Badian [1979] 54-55). Finally, Engels mistakenly discounted the use of wagons by Alexander’s force to transport grain (Devine [1979] 23-24; Hammond [1980] 256-257).

\(^{135}\) It has been frequently stated in recent scholarship that Peloponnesian attempts to forage in Athenian territory during their invasions were (greatly) hampered by Athenian cavalry attacks issuing from the astu from Athens: see esp. Ober (1985), Spence (1990); cf. Hanson (1998) 122-128; Rawlings (2007) 136-137. But the effectiveness of the Athenian cavalry in preventing the Peloponnesians from foraging has been greatly overstated. In the first invasion, the Athenian cavalry were routed by the (Boeotian, Locrian, and Phocian) cavalry accompanying the Peloponnesian forces at Rheitioi (Thucy. 2.19.1) and at Phrygia (Thucy. 2.22.2). In subsequent campaigns, while Athenian cavalry sorties could hamper the light-armed troops of the Peloponnesian from plundering property near to the astu of Athens (Thucy. 3.1.2), they were powerless to prevent the main body of the Peloponnesian forces from foraging in and ravaging the countryside further away from the city. See also on this question Xen., Mag. Eq. 4.17, 7.8-9: the usefulness of cavalry is in attacking any stragglers or any small forces detached from the main body of an attacking enemy army, but not the main body of the army itself.

\(^{136}\) See already Gomme, HCT i.16; Cruickshank (1954) 75.
field in the presence of nearby enemy forces\footnote{See Anderson (1970) 7-8 and n.18, 53-54.}—that classical Greek states sent out supply-trains to forces operating in the field. Supply-trains were sent to the Greek forces encamped at Plataea in 479 (Hdt. 9.39.2, 9.50), but this was to supply a Greek force at Plataea which was many times larger than usual, and had been forced to remain immobile in a “position on the northern slopes of Kithairon, with the enemy in possession of Boeotia, [which] allowed them no supplies on the spot, and the country immediately behind them, Attica, had been denuded.”\footnote{Gomme, \textit{HCT} i.16; cf. van Wees (2004) 280 n.11. See Hdt. 8.50, 8.142.3 for the two Athenian harvests prior to the battle of Plataea having been lost to Persian foraging and ravaging.} In addition, Plataea was the culminating battle of a Panhellenic war for survival, and the effort against the Persians would have mobilized resources (from a range of states) not normally available for classical Greek wars.\footnote{See Cruickshank (1954) 63-64 for this point.} In 457, the Athenians sent out a supply-train to a force that had been in the field an unusually long time, guarding the passes at Mount Geraneia (to prevent Peloponnesian forces from returning from Phocis to their home \textit{poleis}), before proceeding to Tanagra (where the Peloponnesians had diverted to on learning of the Athenian position at Geraneia), and remaining encamped there (in the presence of the Peloponnesians) after a battle.\footnote{Diod. 11.80.2-4; see esp. 11.80.3: “μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις κομιζομένης ἀγορᾶς πολλῆς ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς, οἱ Θετταλοὶ κρίναντες ἐπιθέσθαι ταύτῃ καὶ αὐτῆς ὥρας δειπνοποιησάμενοι νυκτὸς ἀπήντων τοῖς κομίζουσι τὰς ἀγορὰς” (“[a]fter this, when a large supply-train was on its way from Attica for the Athenians, the Thessalians [who had secretly defected from the Athenian side] decided to attack it, and taking their evening meal at once, they intercepted by night the supply-train”).}
The fact the supply convoys sent to these forces both failed to get through to the armies which they had been equipped to provision points up another reason—in addition to the basic fact that classical Greek states did not usually have the resources or the means to support land forces in the field with substantial supply-trains\textsuperscript{141} (note that supply lines to classical Greek armies are never attested)\textsuperscript{142}—why supply-trains were only exceptionally sent to classical Greek forces in the field: since classical Greek armies moved rapidly on very narrow fronts, fronts proportionately very small to the distance any supply-train (or supply-line) would have to cover to reach the armies they were designed to provision, and the armies could not offer any protection to the supply-trains attempting to reach them (over country that had not been pacified), supply-trains (or supply lines) were extremely vulnerable to enemy attacks.\textsuperscript{143} But this problem—which faced all pre-industrial armies—could be and was solved by other pre-modern European states: in order to secure the possession of recently invaded territory, and the safety of supply-trains and supply lines to the invading force as it advanced, a whole series of fortified magazines could be constructed between the operational base and the

\textsuperscript{141} Cf. Cruickshank (1954) 73, 85.

\textsuperscript{142} It should be noted here that Derkylidas, on setting up his magazine at Atarneus (see section iiib above), made no attempt to establish supply lines from this depot to his forces operating in the field.

\textsuperscript{143} See esp. Harari (2000) 325: “w]hile modern invasion armies usually advance on a broad front, so that the continuous front-line serves as a hard crust shielding the rear of the army and enabling supply lines to function in relative safety, a fourteenth-century invading army often plunged into enemy territory like a stone into a pool of water, and could not offer any protection to vehicles moving in its wake. Under such conditions, even the shortest supply lines could hardly function.” Cf. Perjés (1970) 42; van Creveld (1977) 17-18. See Cruickshank (1954) 58, 71; Hanson (2005) 214 for discussion of the problem in a specifically Greek context.
invading force.\textsuperscript{144} Xenophon, in fact, had seen both the problem and the solution: after invading Assyria for the second time, Cyrus had told his assembled officers and allies that, in order to continue the war in (the hostile territory of) Assyria, they had to get possession of as many as possible of the Assyrians’ forts and build for themselves as many as they could full of provisions (Xen., \textit{Cyr.} 6.1.15), for

``νῦν δ’ οὐδὲν διαφέρομεν τῶν ἐν τῷ πελάγει πλεόντων· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι πλέονται μὲν ἀιώνιοι, τὸ δὲ πεπλευσμένοι οὐδέν οἰκεῖτερον τοῦ ἀπλευστοῦ καταλείποντι. ἐάν δὲ φρούρια ἡµῖν γένηται, ταῦτα δὴ τοῖς µὲν πολεµίοις ἀλλοτριώσει τὴν χώραν, ἡµῖν δ’ ὑπ’ εὐδίαν µᾶλλον πάντ’ ἔσται.’’

“as we are, we are not at all different from those who sail the seas: they keep on sailing continually, but they leave the waters over which they have sailed no more their own than those over which they have not sailed. But if we get fortresses, these will alienate the country from the enemy while everything will be smooth sailing for us.” (Xen., \textit{Cyr.} 6.1.16)

But no classical Greek state had the resources to maintain the provisioning of a chain of land garrisons in enemy territory. Relying (almost) solely on foraging, their armies had to remain constantly on the move in hostile territory, like sailors on the deep and open sea, in their search for food supplies.\textsuperscript{145}

\textit{v. Conclusions}

Classical Greek land campaigns usually were brief affairs that took place in summer and devastated enemy territory.\textsuperscript{146} The strategy of ravaging (to the exclusion of

\textsuperscript{144} See Roth (1999) 284-285, Lynn (1993b), Howard (1976) 71 for examples (from the first, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries A.D., respectively).

\textsuperscript{145} See Erdkamp (1998) 22. The noun “\textit{πελάγει}” used by Xenophon at \textit{Cyr.} 6.1.16 denotes the deep, wide, open sea. See, finally, van Wees (2004) 107: “low levels of state organisation and limited central control of resources meant that most cities, most of the time, were forced to rely on rudimentary, largely private and informal, supply systems which seriously constrained their armies’ striking power.”

\textsuperscript{146} Cf. Osborne (1987) 137.
all other strategies) was so common that “it was institutionalized in the clauses of farm leases and peace treaties” in the classical period.\footnote{Hanson (2005) 39; see already Westlake (1945) 80 for the point. See, e.g., Thucy. 5.23.1-2, 5.47.3-4 for ravaging accepted as an integral part of land warfare in peace treaties; Hanson (2005) 333 n.7 for a farm lease attesting the same phenomenon.} Archidamus, speaking on the prospect of war with the Athenians before a Spartiate assembly in 432/1, assumed the devastation of Athenian territory as the sole strategic option available to a Peloponnesian force invading Attica (Thucy. 1.81.1, 1.81.6, 1.82.3-5). The reason devastation of enemy territory, carried out over the course of a couple of weeks, was normally the sole strategic option available to classical Greek armies was because the adoption of any strategy that required armies to remain immobile or involved them in protracted operations in enemy territory necessitated a means of acquiring provisions other than foraging,\footnote{See Harari (2000) esp. 329-333. Rawlings ([2007[ 224-225) is patently incorrect to state that the monetarization of war in the fifth century allowed classical Greek armies to stay in the field for protracted operations (because of the ability to purchase provisions from markets provided by poleis and traveling markets).} since land forces dependent on foraging for their supplies would quickly have consumed all of the resources in the area surrounding their base of operations and therefore had to be constantly on the move.\footnote{See chapter 2 section iic. Incidentally, a failure to realize this basic fact—that the short-term, raiding nature of hoplite warfare was determined by the economic and institutional structures of archaic and classical Greek poleis—marks a very serious error undermining the many discussions of Greek warfare which would attribute the characteristics of classical Greek land warfare mainly or solely to ‘culture’ (see, e.g., Ober [1991], Hanson [1998]). I plan to return to this subject in detail after the dissertation.} Classical Greek states did sometime undertake sieges of inland poleis, but very rarely, with small forces, and then only of nearby, neighboring
poleis—to which supplies could be easily transported not only from the besieging state but also from nearby poleis friendly to the besieging state.\textsuperscript{150}

The contrast between the brief duration and small scale of classical Greek land campaigns with the lengthy, large-scale maritime sieges undertaken by Athens in the fifth century, and the naval operations of the Ionian War—launched on a massive scale, for years at a time, and taking place hundreds of kilometers from the home poleis of the combatants—is almost complete. The amphibious and naval operations of classical Greek states which projected power on a massive scale far from home were made possible by the presence of marketing structures and commercial supply mechanisms in the eastern (and western) Mediterranean that enabled private traders to provision continuous sea-borne supply lines.\textsuperscript{151} In contrast, the brief, small-scale raiding nature of classical Greek land warfare attests a world in which there was a lack of developed commercial networks for the overland transport of grain. This was because “… [the] long-distance transport over land of low value bulk goods such as grain was far too expensive for it to become a regular phenomenon.”\textsuperscript{152} This is best illustrated from an incident Xenophon reports concerning the Phliasians in 367. Having been cut off from their own land by the Argives and Sicyonians, the Phliasians obtained part of their provisions from Corinth by purchase (\textit{Hell.} 7.2.17). But when Chares cleared the way

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\textsuperscript{150} Cf. Harari (2000) 326-327. For a full discussion of the provisioning of inland sieges, see chapter 7 section iv.
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\textsuperscript{151} As shown in chapter 2.
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\textsuperscript{152} Pleket (2008) 182. Cf., e.g., Temin (2001) 179-180, Erdkamp (2005) 141 (both discussing conditions in the Roman world, but their conclusions are equally valid for conditions in classical Greece).
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from Corinth to Phlius and made it safe for transport (Hell. 7.2.22-23), the Corinthians officially ordered out all their wagons and pack-animals (“κηρύξαντες τὰ ζεύγη καὶ τὰ ὑποζύγια πάντα”), filled them with grain, and sent them to Phlius (Hell. 7.2.23). The point is that, even in Corinth, with its diolkos and which served as an entrepôt for goods from the interior of the Peloponnese (Thucy. 1.120.2), the land transport (along a safe route) of sufficient grain to fulfill the needs of a neighboring polis required the official call-out of all available transport in the city. Land transport had to be requisitioned (even) at Corinth because the private “organization of men and animals to trade and transport staples in bulk overland was simply not available.”\footnote{Hopkins (1983) 104-105; cf. id. (1978b) 46. One should imagine that the transport of grain from Mantinea to Argos in the early fourth century mentioned at Xen., Hell. 5.2.2 was organized by the state, too.} None of this should be taken to imply, however, that there was not a regular overland trade in the classical Greek world of high value per unit of weight goods;\footnote{Cf. Erdkamp (2005) 200-201.} this is, in fact, a well attested phenomenon.\footnote{See Finkelstein (1935) 328 n.37, Reed (2003) 8 n.8 for references to overland trade and traders; see esp. Xen., Poroi 1.7 attesting to much overland trade to Athens in the mid fourth century. See also, e.g., Roy (2000) 335 for a probable trade in herbs from Arcadia in the classical period; and (ibid.) 338 for salt and salt-fish imported from the coast to Arcadia in this period, too; and Howe (2008) 55 for overland trade in cheese at Athens.}
This is not a surprising conclusion,\textsuperscript{156} but it is one that is worth noting, nonetheless. Since the character and practices of classical Greek warfare were determined by the economic and institutional framework of classical Greek states,\textsuperscript{157} if one were to fully think through the consequences of previous views that traveling markets made an important contribution to the provisioning of Greek overland campaigns, it would have to be concluded that there was a regular and substantial overland trade in grain in the classical Greek world. But private traders were not a structurally important part of the provisioning of classical Greek land campaigns; the conclusion stands, then, that in classical Greece, as in the rest of the pre-industrial Mediterranean world, there was no regular or structurally important overland trade in grain.

\textsuperscript{156} See again the works cited at nn.152, 153 above. For full discussion, see chapter 7 sections iii, iv, but see here ps.-Xen., \textit{Ath. Pol.} 2.6: “ἔπειτα νόσους τῶν καρπῶν, αἱ ἐκ Διος εἰσιν, οἱ μὲν κατὰ γῆν κράτιστοι χαλεπῶς φέρουσιν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ θάλατταν ἑρδίως· οὐ γὰρ ἅµα πᾶσα γῆ νοσεῖ, ὥστε ἐκ τῆς εὐθενούσης ἀφικνεῖται τοῖς τῆς θαλάττης ἄρχουσι.” (“Again, diseases sent by Zeus against the crops affect land powers severely, but sea powers hardly at all; the whole earth does not suffer disease at the same time, and supplies come in to sea powers from areas that are flourishing.”)

\textsuperscript{157} See introduction section i.
Chapter 4: Military Markets: Previous Approaches (I)\(^1\)

i. Introduction

The fact that Greek historians took for granted the markets provided by *poleis* and traders to classical Greek military forces means that these markets are mentioned rarely in our literary sources (and then only in exceptional circumstances).\(^2\) This state of affairs means in turn that we have very little evidence both for the institutional framework of the markets in which transactions between traders and soldiers and sailors took place, and for the prices charged to soldiers and sailors in them: only five texts bear (or have been commonly thought to bear) on this latter question. Perhaps because of this scarcity of evidence, there has not been much modern work done on the markets provided by *poleis* and traders to classical Greek armies, navies and amphibious forces. In the limited work that has been done, however, a consensus has been reached: it is now standard to state that classical Greek soldiers and sailors frequently or even usually bought food at inflated prices in the markets prepared for them, that both the *poleis* which provided markets to and the traders who accompanied soldiers and sailors on campaign exploited them.\(^3\) The remarks of Hans van Wees can be quoted as characteristic of this point of view: traders accompanying armies were “happy to sell to the troops what they needed, frequently at

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\(^1\) The term ‘military market’ or ‘military agora’ has no legal or institutional basis, as I will discuss in chapter 7 section ii. I use these terms here simply as convenient shorthand for markets offered by *poleis* or traders to Greek armies and navies.

\(^2\) See introduction.

exorbitant prices since demand was high and supply limited." My goal in this chapter is
to examine if the scholarly consensus that classical Greek soldiers and sailors were
regularly ripped off in the markets provided to them by poleis and traders has any basis in
the literary sources usually cited to support it.

ii. The (supposed) exploitation of classical Greek military forces in markets
provided to them by traders

Two texts, both from Xenophon’s Anabasis, are usually cited by scholars to
support the view that traders accompanying classical Greek military forces regularly
exploited them by charging them high prices for their food. The first is Anab. 1.5.6: the
soldiers in Cyrus’ army were marching through the desert between Corsote and Pylae
when their supply of grain gave out; lacking any other means of acquiring new supplies
of grain, the Greek mercenaries’ only recourse was to what Xenophon calls the Lydian
agora (that is to say, it was a market run by Lydians) in the non-Greek part of the army.
As the prices charged for barley- and wheat-flour there were astronomically high, the


5 "τὸ δὲ στράτευμα οὐκ ἔχει ἱδρύ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρόεισθαι οὐχ ἢ μὴ ἐν τῇ Λυδίᾳ ἀγορᾷ ἐν τῷ Κύρου βαρβαρικῷ,
τὴν καπίθην ἀλέας ἢ ἀλφίτων τεττάρων σίγλων: ὁ σίγλος δύναται ἕπτα ὀβολοὺς καὶ ἡµιωβέλιον Ἀττικοὺς: ἡ δὲ καπίθη
dύο χοίνικας Ἀττικὰς ἐχώρει. ἂον οὖν ἐσθίοντες οἱ στρατιῶται διεγίγνοντο." This
passage has been cited to support the view that traders regularly engaged in profiteering in their
transactions with members of classical Greek military forces by the following: Tänzer (1912) 45; Pritchett

6 At 15 obols per choenix of wheat- or barley-flour, prices were thirty to fifty times those found at Athens
in the late fifth and fourth centuries (see p.277 n.57 below for prices at Athens).
Greek soldiers subsisted instead by eating meat (presumably of the baggage-animals that died of starvation during this part of the march).\footnote{See Anderson (1970) 51: “[at Anab. 1.5.6] Xenophon does not say where the meat came from; probably worn-out and starving pack-animals.” For this statement, see Anab. 1.5.5: on the march through the desert from Corsote to Pylae, many of the baggage-animals died of hunger, for there was no fodder or, in fact, growing thing of any kind to be found. Subsisting solely by eating meat was rare and unusual for classical Greek military forces, a desperate measure only undertaken in the absence of grain or other ‘normal’ foods. See, in this respect, the only two other occasions where the Cyreans lived exclusively off meat: Anab. 2.1.6-7 (the day after the battle of Cunaxa, in the absence of grain or any other food (see Anab. 1.10.18, 2.2.3), the Cyreans provided themselves with food as best as they could by slaughtering animals from the baggage-train); and Anab. 4.7.17 (in the land of the Chalybes, the Cyreans subsisted on the cattle they had taken from the Taochians (Anab. 4.7.14), since their provisions had given out (Anab. 4.7.1: “καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐπέλιπε”) on their arrival in the land of the Taochians (the territory they passed through before entering the land of the Chalybes) and they were unable to steal any grain or any other provisions from Taochian or Chalybian territory, since both of these peoples kept their provisions stored away in strongholds (Anab. 4.7.1, 4.7.17)). Cf. Lee (2007) 222-223 on the Cyreans’ consumption of meat. Krasilnikoff writes that the meat the Greeks subsisted on during the march from Corsote to Pylae was from animals purchased in the Lydian market ([1993] 85), and that, in pushing the grain prices so high, the Lydians were attempting to make meat the only “possible merchandise” in their market ([1993] 85 n.24); he does not offer any evidence or reasoning to support this bizarre notion, and there is no reason to accept it.}

The Lydian agora Xenophon mentions at Anab. 1.5.6 was not usually an important source of provisions for the Greeks in Cyrus’ army on the march to Cunaxa. Although Xenophon rarely explicitly describes the provisioning of the army before Cunaxa,\footnote{There are only eight references to potential sources of provisions or acts of provisioning in the narrative before Cunaxa: Anab. 1.2.17-18, 1.3.11, 1.3.14, 1.4.19 (the first mention of an actual act of provisioning), 1.5.4, 1.5.6, 1.5.9, 1.5.10.} it can be established with certainty that the army on its march before the battle acquired its supplies of grain or grain products in the settlements at which it halted during the course of its march.\footnote{The key text here is Anab. 1.5.9: Xenophon, describing the rhythm of Cyrus’ march, states that “τὸ δὲ σύµπαν δῆλον ἦν Κῦρος ὡς σπεύδων πᾶσαν τὴν ὁδόν καὶ οὐ διατρίβων ὅπου µὴ ἐπισιτισµοῦ ἕνεκα ή τίνος ἄλλου αναγκαίου ἐκατέξετο,” “[i]n general, it was clear that Cyrus was in haste throughout the whole journey and was making no delays, except where he halted to procure provisions or for some other necessary purpose.” (Cf. also Lee [2007] 174, 219 (cf. Tuplin [1999] 346) on the pattern of marching from Sardis to Cunaxa suggesting that the halts on the march were primarily for provisioning.) See appendix 4 for a full discussion of the provisioning of the Ten Thousand during the march to Cunaxa and for what follows in the rest of this paragraph.} The institutional means the army used to acquire its provisions
during its halts differed according to the differing settlement patterns, ecologies and relations with Cyrus of the areas through which it passed.\(^\text{10}\) for most of the march, the soldiers purchased their provisions from markets provided by the cities along its route;\(^\text{11}\) on those parts of the march outside urbanized regions, however, such as between Myriandrus and Thapsacus, and between Thapsacus and Charmande, requisitioning from villages became the primary means of provisioning; in some rare cases—only in Lycaonia, Tarsus and at Belesys’ palace and paradeisos—did the Greeks obtain their food through the pillaging of property in hostile territory.\(^\text{12}\)

The fact that the Lydian agora did not usually function as an important source of supplies for the army is also evidenced by the ways in which Xenophon describes it in the course of his narrative of the march to Cunaxa. Thus, in reporting a speech by an anonymous soldier during the army’s stay at Tarsus, Xenophon makes an authorial intervention to state that the traveling market was in the barbarian part of the army (“ἡ δ’ ἀγορὰ ἦν ἐν τῷ βαρβάρῳ στρατεύματι”), doing so in order to point out that a proposal in this speech to buy provisions (from the Lydian agora) for a possible return to Greece

\(^\text{10}\) See Marinovic (1988) 160: “la situation concrète comptait pour beaucoup, et en particulier les possibilités du pays traversé par l’armée (facteurs conjoncturels qui n’ont pas été pris en compte par ceux qui ont traité du ravitaillement des mercenaires de Cyrus).”

\(^\text{11}\) This is certain at least for the period after the army left Cyrus’ sphere of control in Asia Minor—before this point, there is the slight possibility that the army may have been provisioned from satrapal stores belonging to Cyrus: see appendix 4 for discussion of this point.

\(^\text{12}\) Exceptionally, Cyrus provided four hundred wagons laden with wheat-flour and wine for the march after Pylae, but the Greeks never had the need or opportunity to use these before Cunaxa (Anab. 1.10.18). See again appendix 4 for full discussion.
without Cyrus was absurd (*Anab.* 1.3.14). The anonymous soldier’s proposal was absurd since, if the Greeks had decided to provision themselves through purchase, they would have had to have done so in the Lydian agora; but this market was in Cyrus’ camp, and access to it would therefore depend on good relations with him, which they did not enjoy at the time of the speech. The anonymous soldier’s proposal to buy

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13 The mercenaries had refused at Tarsus to follow Cyrus any further, out of suspicion that he was leading them against the King (*Anab.* 1.3.1-2). Meetings were held to discuss the Greeks’ future course of action, and, at the second of these meetings, a soldier was put up by Clearchus to make apparently sincere—but, in fact, deliberately absurd—proposals for returning to Greece, in order to point up the dependence of the Greeks upon Cyrus for their continued safety and the impossibility of their returning to Greece without him (see *Anab.* 1.3.13-14 with Anthon [1852] 264, Parke [1933] 30-31, Kelly [1977] 28-30, Hirsch [1985] 24-25). As reported by Xenophon, the second proposal made by the anonymous soldier put up by Clearchus was that the mercenaries should buy provisions ("τὰ δ’ ἐπιτήδει' ἀγοράζεσθαι") for their march (at which point Xenophon adds the parenthetical comment that the Lydian agora was in the barbarian part of the army). Note that, in the aftermath of the anonymous soldier’s speech, another (anonymous) soldier stood up to point out the foolishness ("τὴν εὐήθειαν") of the first speaker and the nonsensicality ("φλυαρίας") of his proposals for returning to Greece without Cyrus (with the result that the Greeks were persuaded to remain on good terms with Cyrus (and eventually to join him on his campaign (ostensibly) against Abrocomas, the satrap of Phoenicia (*Anab.* 1.3.20)).

14 All the inhabitants of Tarsus except its tavern-keepers ("οἱ τὰ καπηλεῖα ἔχοντες") had fled the city at the approach of the army (*Anab.* 1.2.24). Tavern-keepers (in the classical Greek world, at least) focused on the sale of goods other than basic subsistence food products and therefore did not hold large amounts of grain or grain products for sale (see references in LSJ s.v., and von Reden [2007] 393-394); the same can almost certainly assumed to have been true of the tavern-keepers at Tarsus. Since (exceptionally) there was no market accessible to the Greeks from or in the city of Tarsus (because its inhabitants had fled), when the anonymous soldier proposed that the army buy its provisions before setting out on its suggested return to Greece, he could be understood immediately by his audience as referring to the Lydian market.

15 See *Anab.* 1.3.9-11 (cf. 1.3.12, 1.3.14-17). This is not to imply that Cyrus provided the Lydian market (as stated at Harthen [2001] 182, Lee [2007] 90, 100-101), but that access to Cyrus’ camp would be impossible for the Greeks if their relations with him were hostile. There is no reason to think that Cyrus provided the traveling market for the army: the cases of Tissaphernes and the Greek poleis on the Black Sea coast cited by Harthen and Lee are not analogous since their institutional relationship to the Cyreans was different from that of Cyrus’; Tissaphernes and the poleis on the Euxine were providing markets as (respectively) a representative of a friendly state and friendly states, and not as the Greeks’ employers. In addition, it is highly improbable that Cyrus would have allowed the gouging attested at *Anab.* 1.5.6 to have happened if he were in control of the traveling market (note also that the one market at a city on the march to Cunaxa described by Xenophon, that at Charmande (*Anab.* 1.5.10), cannot have been provided by Cyrus, since it had opened before he reached the city).
provisions from the Lydian agora was therefore futile,\textsuperscript{16} which implies that the Greeks at this point must have been acquiring their provisions from a source other than the Lydians.\textsuperscript{17} But that the Greeks did not usually use the Lydian market for their provisioning comes out most strongly at Anab. 1.5.6, when Xenophon is describing the shortage that afflicted the Greeks in the desert between Corsote and Pylae once their grain had given out: “... καὶ πρίασθαι οὐκ ἦν εἰ µὴ ἐν τῇ Λυδίᾳ ἀγορᾷ ἐν τῷ Κύρου βαρβαρικῷ...”, “and it was not possible to buy anywhere except in the Lydian market in the barbarian part of Cyrus’ army.” The necessary implication from this statement is that it was usual during (at least this part of) the march to buy provisions elsewhere than in the Lydian agora.\textsuperscript{18}

That the traders in the Lydian market never played any major role in the supply of the Cyreans’ supply of grain or grain-products on the march to Cunaxa is to be expected when we realize that the Lydian agora accompanying the march of Cyrus’ army to Pylae

\textsuperscript{16} Deliberately so, as part of his effort to persuade the Greeks that a return to Greece was not advisable: see again n.13 above and e.g., Anthon (1852) 264; Goodwin and White (1889) 21; Kelly (1977) 154 n.152.

\textsuperscript{17} The fact that the mercenaries could not buy provisions in Tarsus or in the Lydian agora means that they must have been provisioning themselves by another means during their stay in Tarsus. This other means must have been the pillaging of grain and other foods stolen from stores in Tarsus: see Anab. 1.3.14, 1.2.26-27 (though the latter passage only refers to plundering by the men under Menon’s command, and neither passage refers explicitly to the seizure of provisions, in the absence of any other means of acquiring provisions, seizure of supplies was the only alternative open to the Greeks for obtaining supplies).

\textsuperscript{18} Cf. appendix 4 section i. At Anab. 1.3.14 and at 1.5.6, Xenophon notes that the Lydian market was in the barbarian part of Cyrus’ army; see also Anab. 1.2.17-18 (the only other mention of the traveling market on the march to Cunaxa): incidentally mentioning the market, Xenophon includes it among “the barbarians and others,” “τῶν βαρβάρων... τε καὶ ἄλλους” at a review of Cyrus’ assembled forces at Tyriaeum. Note that, although the Greek part of the army often seems to have camped separately from the non-Greek part of the army directly under Cyrus’ control (see Anab. 1.2.26, 1.3.12, 1.5.12, 1.5.15), it is only in the exceptional circumstances of the army’s stay at Tarsus that it is raised by Xenophon as a potential problem for the provisioning of the mercenaries: this again suggests that the Lydian agora took a limited role in the provisioning of the army.
was a traveling market following an army marching overland. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, in classical Greek and ancient near Eastern armies (and in later and better documented pre-industrial European and near Eastern armies, too), traveling merchants marketing food never played more than a minor role in the supply of the main, grain-based part of armies’ diets on overland campaigns, due to one fundamental fact: the prohibitively expensive cost of transporting grain overland using pre-industrial technology left no room to private traders for profit in selling grain to soldiers on campaign.\(^{19}\) The Lydian traders who made up the traveling market following Cyrus’ army on his march to the heart of the Persian Empire\(^ {20}\) evidently did not break free from the brute fact of the high costs of overland transport of grain and therefore did not assume any importance in the provisioning of the army during its march.\(^ {21}\) Instead, they must have functioned for the army mostly as a supplementary source of provisions—i.e., to

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\(^{19}\) See chapter iii section iva for full discussion.

\(^{20}\) Xenophon’s first mention of the traveling market is at Tyriaeum in Phrygia (\textit{Anab.} 1.2.18) (see above n.18): but his casual, offhand mention of the market at Tyriaeum allows us to infer that it was an assumed part of the (barbarian) army at this point in the march upland; this, and the fact that Xenophon specifies at \textit{Anab.} 1.5.6 that the traveling market was Lydian, makes it certain that it had followed the army’s march since its starting point of Sardis.

\(^{21}\) Contra all earlier editors of the \textit{Anabasis}, who took the Lydian \textit{agora} to be the main source of provisions for the Cyreans on the march to Cunaxa: see, e.g., Vollbrecht (1886) 41, Kelsey and Zenos (1895) 214, Mather and Hewitt (1938) 42. Dillery ([1998] 63 n.26) and Anderson ([1974] 89, 90) also take purchase in the Lydian \textit{agora} to have been the Greeks’ primary method of provisioning. Dalby’s ([1992] 23-25) treatment of the provisioning of the Ten Thousand fails to note that the means the mercenaries used to provision themselves differed in relative quantitative importance at different points of their march to and from Cunaxa, and also fails to distinguish between the relative quantitative importance of purchases in the Lydian market and purchases in cities for the provisioning of the Cyreans on the march to Cunaxa, thus implying incorrectly that these were similarly important means of acquiring supplies for the mercenaries ([1992] 24). Lee makes the same mistake: at some points, purchases from local inhabitants at the settlements the Cyreans passed by, the Lydian \textit{agora}, and foraging are mentioned as the main sources of the mercenaries’ provisions before Cunaxa without any indication of their relative importance ([2007] 22-23, 214); at another point, purchases from the Lydian \textit{agora} and plundering ([2007] 217). (Cf. also Lee [2007] 174 stating that the settlements the mercenaries halted at were their main source of provisions, and Lee [2004] 306 for the Lydian \textit{agora} taking this role.)
those purchased, requisitioned, or stolen from the settlements which the army passed—limiting themselves to keeping small (‘topping up’) amounts of grain (products) while primarily trafficking in relatively high value, low bulk foods such as cheese and honey which could be used by the mercenaries to add variety to their grain-based diets.  

22 As traveling markets in other ancient, medieval, and early modern armies did. Descat ([1995a] 101, 107) also sees the Lydian agora as a supplementary source of provisions for the army, occasionally used by the mercenaries to buy “extras” to complement their grain-based diet. But Descat takes the Lydian market as functioning in this way in order to support a claim that, after the army’s stay at Thapsacus (Anab. 1.4.13), Cyrus changed his method of payment to the mercenaries: instead of, as before, simply paying money to the soldiers so that they could buy their food themselves at settlements which they passed by in the course of their march, Descat argues that, from Thapsacus, Cyrus began to pay the mercenaries partly in bullion, and partly in kind by drawing upon imperial resources in grain stored along the route of the march after Thapsacus ([1995] 103-104). If this claim is correct, then the Lydian market can (for Descat) have played no important part in the grain supply of the Cyreans. Descat’s argument is, however, deeply flawed (see already Tuplin [1999] 342-344), for six main reasons. Firstly, its primary basis is two passages from Plutarch which Descat misinterprets. Plutarch has Cyrus once (Artax. 6.3) telling the Spartans before his expedition against the King that, if they join him, he will pay them not by arithmos but by metron, and on another occasion (Mor. 173F) that if they join him, of silver and gold there will be not arithmos but stathmos. Descat associates these passages with Cyrus’ (in his interpretation) assumption of the role of Great King at Thapsacus (Anab. 1.4.11) and takes them as evidence that, from this point of the march on, he was able to provision his soldiers by rations measured out from imperial stores ([1995] 104). But this is obviously not the import of the Plutarchan passages (which refer, incidentally, to promises made before the expedition began and should not be associated with events at Thapsacus (Tuplin [1999] 343)); rather, Cyrus is promising in these passages that he will give the Spartans unimaginable wealth if they join him (see Tuplin [1999] 343-344 and Xen., Hell. 3.2.27 (for a person to have the ability to measure out their wealth rather than merely to count it being proverbial of great riches)). Secondly, Descat mistakenly uses Diodorus’ description of Cyrus’ stay at Thapsacus to provide a suitable context for the promises made by Cyrus in the Plutarchan passages described above. At Diod. 14.21.6, Cyrus pleads with the Greeks at Thapsacus not to abandon him, “promising, besides other great rewards, that when they came to Babylon, he would give every man of them five mnai of silver,” “ἀπαγγελλόµενος ἄλλας τε µεγάλας δωρέας καὶ ὅτι παραγενοµένοις αὐτοῖς εἰς Βαβυλῶνα κατ’ ἄνδρα ἕκαστον δώσει πέντε µνᾶς ἀργυρίου.” Descart took the fabulous rewards of the Plutarchan passages and the “ἄλλας τε µεγάλας δωρέας” of the Diodoran passage to refer to the same promise and thus as evidence for a changed mode of payment to the Greeks from Thapsacus onwards. This cannot be the case, however. Diodorus used Ephorus for his description of the march to Cunaxa, and as Stylianou has cogently demonstrated ([2004] 76, 78, 82-96, esp. 88-91), Ephorus closely followed Xenophon’s account in the Anabasis. Apart from one detail (the double game of Syennesis referred to at Diod. 14.20.3, which seems to have come from Ctesias (Bigwood [1983] 349-350)), Diodorus’ (Ephorus’) account of the march is basically a summary of Xenophon’s, and Diod. 14.21, in particular, is simply a very brief summary of Anab. 1.4.6-1.7.1. Thus, when we read of Cyrus offering at Thapsacus five mnai of silver “besides other great rewards” in Diodorus, but only five mnai in silver and pay in full until the Greeks arrived back in Ionia in Xenophon (Anab. 1.4.13), we should conclude not that Diodorus (Ephorus) was using a source other than Xenophon here, but that he was extrapolating from Xenophon’s account—put another way, simply inventing material—as he did elsewhere in his account of the march upland on at least two other occasions (see Stylianou [2004] 85-86 on Diod. 14.19.7-9, and [2004] 87-88 on 14.20.5). Diod. 14.21.6, then, offers no valid independent evidence for the pay or provisioning of the Cyreans. Thirdly, and crucially, we can state positively that Cyrus assumed the royal prerogatives at Tarsus (see Anab. 1.2.27 with Briant [2002] 301), and not Thapsacus, as Descat has it. Fourthly, Descat misinterprets Xenophon’s use of the word ἐπεσιτίσαντο and its derivatives. He claims the use of “ἐπεσιτίσαντο” at Anab. 1.4.19 to describe the army’s provisioning in the villages at the Araxes river
The fact that the Lydian market normally took a supplementary role in the provisioning of the army explains its behavior as described at *Anab.* 1.5.6. The price rise in the Lydian market took place because there had been a breakdown in the army’s normal means of supply. In the previous course of the campaign, the soldiers had always brought sufficient provisions to cover their relatively short marches from settlement to settlement (i.e. from source of supplies to source of supplies). But the journey from Corsote (the last settlement at which they provisioned before Charmande) to Charmande was the longest single march on the way to Cunaxa, and was through desert terrain which was “absolutely bare” of living things and thus offered no opportunity to provision.

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marks “un changement considérable dans le texte pour le vocabulaire de l’approvisionnement” and this “approvisionnement (episitismos)” is new because it is now in the forms of rations taken from places belonging to the royal administration ([1995a] 104). To state that there is a considerable change at 1.4.19 in the vocabulary Xenophon uses to describe provisioning is misleading, however; this is, in fact, the first explicit mention of provisioning in the *Anabasis*. Moreover, as Marinovic ([1988] 160) and Tuplin ([2004] 171) have pointed out, the term “ἐπεσιτίζοµαι” and its derivatives tell us, by themselves, nothing about the institutional means by which the Cyreans provisioned themselves at the Araxes river; they simply refer to the act of providing food for oneself and tell us nothing without context about the means used to provide that food (thus, “ἐπεσιτίζοµαι” and its derivatives can refer in the *Anabasis* to the stealing or seizing of provisions (3.4.18, 4.7.18, 6.2.4, 7.7.1), as well as to the purchase (7.1.7, 7.1.9) and requisitioning of food (2.4.5, 2.5.37)). Without further information on the means used by the army to provision at the Araxes, of which there is none at 1.4.19, Descat is therefore incorrect to take this verb as referring to the use of food from imperial stores. Fifthly, Descat fails to deal satisfactorily with the fact that the Cyreans are attested as purchasing provisions after their stay at Thapsacus (at Chamande (1.5.10)). Finally, it is very unlikely that there were significant imperial resources in grain stored on the route Cyrus took to Babylonia, since he did not take the Royal Road to Cunaxa, but instead took an unusual route down the left bank of the Euphrates (Joannès (1995) 173, esp. 182-183; Tuplin [1999] 343; Briant [2002] 628; Tuplin [2004] 171). The reasoning behind Descat’s explanation of the purpose of the Lydian *agora* does not hold, then; the Lydian *agora* did function as a supplementary source of provisions for the Cyreans, but not for the reasons Descat puts forward.

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23 See *Anab.* 1.5.5: Xenophon states the march from Corsote to Pylae took thirteen days, covering ninety parasangs. There were not, however, thirteen days of straight marching between Corsote and Pylae, but more probably 11 (or 12), since in the course of the march through the desert the soldiers halted at the city of Charmande (*Anab.* 1.5.10), which was a day’s march away from Pylae (see Lendle [1995] 48; cf. Lee [2007] 24). Even at 11 days, however, the march from Corsote to Charmande was still two days’ longer than the next longest march on the journey to Babylonia (that from Thapsacus to the Araxes (*Anab.* 1.4.19)) and six days’ longer than the next longest after that (see Lee [2007] Table 1, 283-284 for a table conveniently listing the lengths and duration of the marches from Sardis to Cunaxa [though the halt at Charmande is not listed there]).
through foraging. The mercenaries did not bring enough food to cover the extraordinarily long and barren march from Corsote to Charmande, their normal means of provisioning (purchase or requisitioning from settlements) was unavailable to them, and so their grain gave out: they were therefore forced, if they wanted grain, to take desperate recourse to the Lydian market, which they normally used only as a supplementary source of provisions, but was now the only source of grain available to them. Since the soldiers’ demand for their basic subsistence food remained strongly inelastic, there was now a sudden huge surge in demand for grain in the Lydian market; this sudden demand for grain combined with the small (and perfectly inelastic) supply of barley- and wheat-flour in the market (where the traders had only limited, ‘topping up’ amounts of grain) to produce the famine prices attested at Anab. 1.5.6 (and force the men to substitute for grain the unaccustomed but free food of the meat of the dead baggage-animals)).

24 Anab. 1.5.5: “ἐν τούτοις τοῖς σταθµοῖς πολλὰ τῶν ὑποζυγίων ἀπώλετο ὑπὸ λιµοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἦν χόρτος οὐδὲ ἄλλα οὐδὲν δένδρον, ἀλλὰ ψιλὴ ἦν ἅπασα ἡ χώρα...”, “[i]n the course of these stages many of the baggage animals died of hunger, for there was no fodder and, in fact, no growing thing of any kind, but the land was absolutely bare...” The speed of the march from Corsote to Charmande—some thirty-five kilometers a day (a forced march pace for Greek armies (cf. the figures given at Krentz [2007] 161)—would have prevented the army from gathering any substantial amount of food through foraging, even if there had been any: see appendix 4 section iii for foraging as a provisioning method that required significant amounts of time to gather large supplies of food and slowed down marches considerably.

25 The severity of the famine is shown by the fact that wheat and barley products were selling at the same price (wheat and wheat products were usually more expensive than barley and barley products (see Heichelheim [1935] 885-890 for prices for these grains in the Greek world in the classical and Hellenistic periods): see, e.g., Harper and Wallace (1893) 397, Walpole (1963) 69.

26 The price rise in the desert is, in fact, another indication that the Lydian agora was not the Greeks’ usual source of supplies on the march to Cunaxa: if the Lydians were the usual source of the Greeks’ provisions, the mercenaries’ demand for grain from the agora would have remained constant and there would have been no rise in the prices charged in it during the march through the desert.
This phenomenon—extraordinarily high prices for grain and other foods (accompanied by the consumption of unusual foodstuffs) in armies that had been cut off from their normal sources of supplies (and any other source of supply other than purchase) in isolated and infertile inland areas—is paralleled, in fact, in several other ancient campaigns. Thus, for example, when Artaxerxes II invaded the land of the Cadusians with a huge force, probably in 380, expecting to supply his army through the usual Achaemenid methods of requisitioning and foraging, but finding that “the country which he invaded was rough and hard to travel across... and produced no grains,” the army soon found itself in much distress “for no food was to be got in the country or imported from outside, and they could only butcher their beasts of burden, so that an ass’s head was scarcely to be bought for sixty drachmas.”

During Caesar’s campaign in Spain in 49, his army was cut off from its normal sources of supply by flooding and attacks from Spanish infantry, so that his soldiers were forced to rely solely on the merchants who accompanied the army for their grain, the price of which as a result rose

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27 See Manfredini, Orsi and Antelami (1987) 300-301.

28 Plutarch, Artax. 24.1-2: “ἐµβαλὼν δὲ εἰς χώραν τραχύτητι χαλεπήν... καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ σπόρου καρπῶν ἄγονον... οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐδώδιµον ἦν λαµβάνειν οὐδὲ ἐξισογείσθαι, τὰ δὲ ὑποζύγia μόνον κατέκοπτον, ὡστε ὄνον κεφαλήν μόλις δραχµῶν ἕξηκοντα ὄνιον εἶναι.” See Manfredini, Orsi and Antelami (1987) 301 for other ancient sources on the Cadusians’ lack of agriculture and the harshness of their land.

29 Caesar, B. Civ. 1.48.3-5: the flooding of the rivers Sicoris and Cinga prevented friendly states from supplying Caesar’s camp with provisions, the troops he had sent beyond these rivers to forage from returning to the camp, and the supplies of food which he had ordered from Gaul and Italy from reaching it. The parties Caesar did send out to forage within the confined space the army now found itself in because of the flooding (1.48.3) were harassed by the Spanish infantry, who were well acquainted with the country (1.48.7). The scarcity of grain was made worse by the fact that the flooding had occurred just before the harvest, a time when grain was scarce in any case, and because, before Caesar’s arrival, L. Afranius had carried great quantities of the grain that had been in the country to Lerida (1.48.5).
to the exceptionally high price of 50 denarii a modius.\textsuperscript{30} On Marcus Antonius’ retreat from Phraata in 36, when his army had run out of grain in the desert and infertile terrain and was unable to procure any more through foraging because of the attacks of the pursuing Parthian army, famine gripped the army, so that it was said that “one Attic choinix of wheat brought fifty drachmas; and loaves of barley bread were sold for their weight in silver.”\textsuperscript{31}

Thus, at Anab. 1.5.6, Xenophon describes an extraordinary price rise in extraordinary circumstances in a market serving Greek and non-Greek armies,\textsuperscript{32} and not a phenomenon that we can use to generalize about the normal behavior of markets provided by traders to Greek armies.\textsuperscript{33} This leads me on to my last point about this passage: whatever way we read Anab. 1.5.6, with its description of prices charged in a

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{30} Caesar, B. Civ. 1.52.1-2.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{31} Plutarch, Antonius 45.8: “... λέγεται δὲ κριθίναν Αττικὴ πυρῶν πεντήκοντα δραχμῶν ύμισυς γενέσθαι· τοὺς δὲ κριθίνας ἄρτους πρὸς ἀργύριον ἱστάντες ἀπεδίδοντο.” The soldiers of Marcus Antonius were therefore reduced to eating unfamiliar foodstuffs (45.9). Several more examples from later pre-industrial campaigns in Europe and the Near East could be added. Cf., for example, the experiences of the Napoleonic army marching to and from Moscow in 1812: after the army had marched beyond the capabilities of the supply trains organized for it, and was unable to rely on its normal method of seizure of civilian food supplies because of the Russians’ ‘scorched earth’ strategy and the depths of the Russian winter, prices in the army for grain and bread rose to between fifty and one hundred times their normal level (see letters I (pp.140-141), II (p.142), IV (p.145) and V (pp.147-148) collected by Raeff in Walter [1993]).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{32} As noted by Krasilnikoff (1993) 84 and Briant (2002) 628, although neither discusses or explains why these circumstances should be considered exceptional. Descat ([1995a] 104, 107) assumes, on the basis of the prices charged at 1.5.6, that the prices in the Lydian agora were always high; but, as I have shown, this assumption does not take into account the exceptional circumstances the Cyreans encountered on the march between Corsote and Charmande.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{33} The fact that Xenophon mentions the price charged for barley- and wheat-flour in the Lydian agora is in itself unusual—this is the only price for food mentioned in either the Anabasis or the Hellenica—and should alert us to the fact he is describing an unusual set of circumstances here. Note that, in general, food prices are mentioned in ancient sources rarely and almost always in extraordinary circumstances. See Erdkamp (2005) 147: “[m]any of the prices mentioned in our sources are either a product of governmental price regulation or they reflect extreme situations; most are exceptionally high prices in times of dearth.”}
desert, at a point nineteen hundred and thirty-five kilometers and four and a half months away from Sardis, by Lydian traders to an army comprising primarily non-Greeks and led by a pretender to the Persian throne, it can hardly be used to construct a picture of normal relations between Greek armies and Greek merchants. It should be noted again in this regard that Xenophon notes at Anab. 1.5.6 (after doing so already at 1.2.18 and 1.3.14) that the Lydians were in the barbarian part of the army. This passage, in sum, tells us nothing about how markets following classical Greek armies on campaign normally behaved.

The second passage used to support the view that Greek soldiers and sailors were usually charged high prices by the traders accompanying them on campaign is also from the Anabasis (3.2.21):\textsuperscript{35}

\begin{quote}
\textit{τὰ δὲ ἐπιτήδεια πότερον ὑνεῖσθαι κρεῖττον ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἧς οὗτοι παρεῖχον µικρὰ µέτρα πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου, µηδὲ τοῦτο ἔτι ἔχοντας, ἢ αὐτοὺς λαµβάνειν, ἢ µὴν κρατῶµεν, µέτρῳ χρωµένου ὁπόσῳ ἂν ἐκαστὸς βούληται;
}\end{quote}

And as for provisions, is it the better plan to buy from the market which these [Persians] have provided—small measures for large prices, when we have no money left either—or to appropriate for ourselves, in case we are victorious, and to use as large a measure as each one of us pleases?

These words come from a speech given by Xenophon at the river Zapatas to encourage the soldiers of the Ten Thousand the night after the Persian satrap Tissaphernes had had several of their generals and \textit{lochagoi} treacherously killed. Xenophon is referring in this part of his speech to an agreement made after the battle of Cunaxa between Tissaphernes

\textsuperscript{34} Calculated using the figures Xenophon gives us for the numbers of \textit{parasangs} and \textit{stathmoi} traveled. On the probable, but not certain, reliability of these figures, see Tuplin (1997) 404-417.

and Clearchus, whereby the Greeks were permitted to take food and drink from the country when the Persians did not provide a market, but when the Persians did provide a market, they were then to obtain their provisions by purchase (from this market) (Anab. 2.3.26-27).

Before this passage can be interpreted properly, it must be put back into its immediate narrative context. After the murder of the generals, the Greeks were, as Xenophon tells us, despondent about their situation for several reasons (Anab. 3.1.2): they were in the middle of the Persian Empire and surrounded by hostile cities and tribes on all sides; nobody would provide them with a market for provisions any longer; they no longer had any guide to show them the long way home; there were impassable rivers on their homeward route; and they had been abandoned by the barbarians who had accompanied them on the march from Sardis, leaving them without a single horseman. Given this situation, Xenophon decided that the army’s only hope of salvation was to fight its way back to Greece. Xenophon attempted to persuade three different audiences in three different ways of the validity of this decision.\footnote{Rood (2004) 314.} Firstly, he addressed the \textit{lochagoi} of Proxenus (one of the generals who had been killed by Tissaphernes and the man who had invited Xenophon to take part in Cyrus’ expedition against the King). Xenophon used three main arguments to persuade Proxenus’ \textit{lochagoi} of the case for the army fighting its way back to Greece (Anab. 3.1.15-25): the army had no hope of mercy at the hands of the King; the Greeks were tougher than the Persians; and if they were to fight, they would have a much better chance of gaining provisions than they ever had under the agreement with Tissaphernes. For if they fought, they would be able to get
their hands on, among other things, the abundant provisions ("ἀφθόνα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια" (Anab. 3.1.18)) the King and his followers possessed; whereas, previously, under the truce, the soldiers “had no share in these good things, unless we bought them; I knew there were but few of us who still had money wherewith to buy; and I knew that our oaths restrained us from getting provisions in any other way than by purchase.”37 Secondly, Xenophon spoke to the assembled generals and lochagoi of the Greeks (Anab. 3.1.35-45) and persuaded them to elect new generals and lochagoi to show themselves brave and stout-hearted to the soldiers, and also to speak to the soldiers to encourage them and to lift them out of their dejection. (There is no mention of provisions or the market provided by the Persians in this speech.)

Xenophon, having been elected general, then addressed the assembled soldiers (Anab. 3.2.8-32), after two other senior generals, Cheirisophus and Cleanor, had spoken briefly to them: Cheirisophus to emphasize the treachery of the Persians and to encourage the army to die a glorious death rather than submit to them (Anab. 3.2.2-3); and Cleanor to reinforce these points (and especially that they should not trust the Persians again) (Anab. 3.2.4-6).38 Xenophon built on these speeches,39 encouraging the soldiers in a lengthy address, the main part of which was devoted to persuading the

37 Anab. 3.1.20: “...ὁτι τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν τούτων οὐδενὸς ἡμῖν μετείη, εἰ μὴ πριαίµεθα, ὅτου δ眶 ὀνουµένους ᾔδειν ἐτι ὀλίγους ἔχουσας, ἄλλως δὲ πως πορίζεσθαι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἢ ὠνουµένους (τοὺς) ὅρκους ἤδη κατέχουσας ἢμας:”


39 See esp. in this regard Anab. 3.2.8, 3.2.10.
soldiers that their present situation was much better than it seemed.\(^40\) He spoke to all the concerns of the army outlined at \textit{Anab.} 3.1.2 (as well as the fact that Ariaeus had betrayed them, a concern raised (and dismissed) by Cheirisophs at \textit{Anab.} 3.2.2) and addressed each of them in turn, using a series of antitheses to extol the present situation of the Greeks by contrasting it with the situation they were formerly in—i.e., the seemingly better length of time after Cunaxa when they had had the King’s men as guides and allies (at least in name)—all in an attempt to minimize the seriousness of the soldiers’ worries and to persuade them to fight.

The fact was, though, that the soldiers’ concerns were all legitimate and Xenophon was speaking in an extraordinarily difficult situation; in addition, the Persians were continually attempting to “corrupt the soldiers” after the murder of their leaders (\textit{Anab.} 3.3.5), so that some of the soldiers may have been thinking of coming to some sort of an arrangement with the Persians.\(^41\) In his desperate effort to assuage the soldiers’ concerns, to boost their morale and (ultimately) to persuade them not to come to terms with the Persians, Xenophon therefore had to make several assertions that can be shown from the surrounding narrative and other considerations to have been demonstrably false. So, for example, he told the men, using a series of questionable rationalizations, that the Persians’ advantage in cavalry was no advantage at all (\textit{Anab.} 3.2.18-19)—but soon after the speech the Ten Thousand suffered serious losses at the hands of Persian cavalry, so

\(^{40}\) See Hirsch (1985) 30-31: the speeches of Cheirisophus, Cleanor, and Xenophon thus work together to achieve the goal of persuading the soldiers to fight the Persians rather than surrender to them.

\(^{41}\) Hirsch (1985) 31: even after the speech, when the army as a body had decided to follow the generals’ advice, some Greeks deserted (\textit{Anab.} 3.3.5).
that Xenophon decided to cobble together a makeshift cavalry unit (Anab. 3.3.19-20).\textsuperscript{42} Later in the speech, he told the army that the King would do anything to have the Greeks leave Persia (Anab. 3.2.23-24). This statement was based on the reasoning that the King would do the same for the Mysians who, although in no way better men than the Greeks, had shown themselves to be much stronger to the Persians by living in many and large prosperous poleis in the King’s territory. But Mysia was a region lacking in poleis, large and prosperous or otherwise, at the turn of the fifth century.\textsuperscript{43} Simply put, Xenophon was fabricating arguments to persuade the mercenaries to follow their leaders’ advice.\textsuperscript{44}

Even if, then, the one valid argument that Xenophon did make in his speech—that not having Tissaphernes anymore as a guide was, in fact, an advantage, as, from this point on, the army would be able to use captured guides who would know that they would pay with their lives if they did not provide correct directions (Anab. 3.2.20)\textsuperscript{45}— came just before his claim that the Persians were charging high prices for small measures, it has to be remembered that this claim comes in a speech full of hyperbole and fabrication (and that another demonstrably false assertion—that the mercenaries would

\textsuperscript{42} See Rood (2004) 314, Hirsch (1985) 31 and n.54 for this point. See already Anab. 2.4.6: Clearchus pointing out the serious problems a lack of cavalry posed for the Greeks.

\textsuperscript{43} See Tuplin (2004) 179.

\textsuperscript{44} Tuplin (2004) 179: Xenophon in this part of the speech engaging in “rhetorical overstatement.”

\textsuperscript{45} The use of captured prisoners as guides on the march from the King’s country to Trapezus: Anab. 3.5.15-17; 4.1.21; 4.1.22-25 (a captured local who would not give information murdered in front of another local, who then did provide directions); 4.2.5; 4.2.23; 4.5.1; 4.6.1-3. Cf. 4.7.19-20 (and 27): a guide provided by the ruler of the territory around the city of Gymnias stating that the army might kill him if he did not lead them within five days to a place from where they could see the sea.
have no difficulty crossing rivers on their way home—followed directly after it).\textsuperscript{46} We should remember, too, that the claim of cheating in the market also comes after two speeches that had emphasized the treachery of the Persians, and that Xenophon had started his speech by focusing on the perjury and faithlessness of the Persians, so that the assertion that the Persians were cheating the Greeks in the market they provided to them comes in the context of a rhetorically charged and (deliberately) biased portrayal of the prior arrangements between the Ten Thousand and the Persians. If one compares Xenophon’s first speech (\textit{Anab.} 3.1.20), to Proxenus’ \textit{lochagoi}, a more measured and grounded speech given to an audience of men of greater rank and experience than the massed assembly of soldiers, Xenophon states there that there were few men in the army who had money to buy in the market provided to them, and makes no mention of cheating; at \textit{Anab.} 3.2.21, in the greater heat of the later speech to the assembled soldiers, the men have no money left to buy provisions, and they have been cheated in the market. In short, Xenophon’s claim that high prices were charged for small measures in the market provided by the Persians should not be removed from its immediate context of deliberate distortions, dubious rationalizations, and descriptions of Persian treachery: it cannot be taken as a neutral presentation (and therefore as evidence) of conditions in the market provided by the Persians after Cunaxa.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{46} See \textit{Anab.} 3.5.7 for the perplexity of the Greeks on the first occasion after Xenophon’s speech that they faced a deep river on the march out of the King’s country (the generals eventually decided not to attempt to cross the river: \textit{Anab.} 3.5.12-13, 3.5.17). See \textit{Anab.} 4.3.3-7, 4.8.1-3 for the Greeks’ later difficulties in crossing rivers on the march to Trapezus. The consideration that rivers would prove a major difficulty for the Greeks’ attempt to return home is raised before Xenophon’s speech several times in speeches made after Cunaxa: \textit{Anab.} 2.1.11, 2.4.6, 2.5.9, 2.5.18.

\textsuperscript{47} See Rood (2004) 314 on this speech: “... even claims that Xenophon himself makes in his speeches are determined by the needs of the immediate audience and cannot automatically be extrapolated from their context within the \textit{Anabasis}.” See also Hirsch ([1985] 31), who examines this speech for attitudes to non-
One final point. Xenophon at Anab. 3.2.8-32 was describing conditions in a market provided by a Persian, Tissaphernes, who is consistently presented elsewhere in the Anabasis as acting dishonestly and treacherously in his relations with the Greeks, at a point when the mercenaries were “not less than 10,000 stades away from Greece.” Anab. 3.2.21, just as Anab. 1.5.6, then, cannot be used as evidence for normal practices in the markets provided by traders to classical Greek military forces.

iii. The (supposed) exploitation of classical Greek military forces in markets provided to them by poleis

So the two passages from the Anabasis that have been taken by historians to show that traders accompanying classical Greek armies and navies on campaign usually exploited them show, in fact, nothing of the sort. Two more passages have been used

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48 See Hirsch (1985) 22-27: Tissaphernes is presented by Xenophon in the Anabasis as a “monster of treachery.”

49 See Anab. 3.1.2: “ἀπεῖχον δὲ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐ µεῖον ἡ µύρια στάδια.” The Greeks were (using Xenophon’s figures (see p.268 n.34)) five and a half months and four thousand and fifteen kilometers distant from Sardis at this point.

50 Parke ([1933] 232) and Harthen ([2001] 200) also take ps.-Aristot., Oec. 2.2.23d, 1350b5-15 (the same anecdote is found at Polyaeusus, Strateg. 3.10.10) as evidence for high prices being charged by traders in markets in classical Greek military camps. In this anecdote, Timotheus, besieging Samos in 366, found that his camp was becoming short of provisions because of the many foreigners (“πολλοὶ ξένοι”) who were arriving into his camp and buying provisions in the market there (the identity of these foreigners is unclear, but it seems that they were probably mercenaries coming to Samos in the hope of enlistment in Timotheus’ army (see Parke [1933] 108-109)). To counteract this, he gave orders forbidding the sale of milled grain, wine or oil in measures less than a medimnos of grain or a metretes of wine or oil. Accordingly, the taxiarchs and the lochagoi of the army bought supplies in bulk and issued them to the men, while the incomers, without a retail market for daily necessities, brought their own provisions and sold any surplus.
by scholars to support the related point that Greek poleis regularly exploited military forces in the markets that they provided to them. The first of these is also from the *Anabasis*.

In the early summer of 400, when the Ten Thousand were encamped outside the *polis* of Cotyora, Xenophon described to the men two incidents that had recently taken place in their *parabasis* along the southern coast of the Black Sea in order to demonstrate to them their increasing lawlessness and the problems this would cause for the rest of their march.\(^{51}\) The second incident Xenophon described in this speech was a riot in which a crowd of men from the army attacked some *agoranomoi* on account of their (allegedly) outrageous treatment of the soldiers; in the ensuing disorder, some Cerasuntian ambassadors, as well as some of the soldiers, came to fear for their lives and fled from the army (*Anab*. 5.7.21-26). Based on Xenophon’s description of the treatment of the *agoranomoi*, J. K. Anderson stated that:

> [w]hen a market was provided by a friendly city instead of by travelling merchants, regulations were likely to be made by magistrates for the benefit of the sellers rather than by the general to protect the soldiers, as when the Ten Thousand reached Cerasus on the Black Sea. Here the officials [he means of the city of Cerasus, as the preceding sentence shows] narrowly escaped stoning at the hands of the soldiers, who thought themselves cheated, and the generals were unable to intervene.\(^{52}\)

on their departure, so that the original soldiers alone consumed the grain, wine and oil in the market, thus alleviating the shortage. In other words, there is no mention at any point in ps.-Aristotle (or Polyaeus’ account) of a rise in prices or profiteering by merchants in Timotheus’ camp, but only of a lack of provisions (“τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων... σπάνις”) there.

\(^{51}\) *Anab*. 5.7.5-33.

\(^{52}\) (1970) 52. Stanley ([1976] 122) follows Anderson in taking *Anab*. 5.7.21-29 as evidence that the *agoranomoi* of friendly cities generally permitted the traders of their poleis to profiteer in the markets provided by their poleis to passing military forces. Cf. Perlman (1976/1977) 264: in a description of the relations between the Cyreans and Greek poleis of the southern Black Sea coast, citing *Anab*. 5.7.21-29 as evidence for the statement that “when he had to pay extortionate prices for the food provided by the city’s merchants, the mercenary of the Ten Thousand did not hesitate to resort to violence in order to get his supplies.”
Anderson’s statement here was based on the understanding that the *agoranomoi* mentioned at 5.7.21-29 were Cerasuntian and administering a market established for the Cyreans by the city of Cerasus just outside or near that city. But, as I demonstrate in chapter seven, a close reading of Xenophon’s speech at Cotyora shows that the disturbance caused by the alleged wrongdoing of these *agoranomoi* took place just outside Cotyora, not Cerasus; that the *agoranomoi* were not Cerasuntians, but, in fact, Cyreans, members of the Ten Thousand and chosen by the Ten Thousand; and that therefore the inference made by Anderson from *Anab.* 5.7.21-29 regarding the usual workings of markets provided by Greek cities to passing armies is invalid. *Anab.* 5.7.21-29, rather than providing evidence that *poleis* normally ripped off soldiers in markets, presents us, on the contrary, with our only attested instance of *agoranomoi* within a classical (or Hellenistic) Greek army, and, in the men’s reactions to the perceived injustice of the *agoranomoi*, an indication that Greek soldiers expected, naturally enough, that the market officials they appointed would ensure that exchanges in the markets accompanying their campaigns would be transacted fairly.

The second passage cited by scholars as evidence for the claim that *poleis* regularly gouged Greek armies and navies is ps.-Aristotle, *Oeconomica* 2.2.7, 1347a32-

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53 See section iib.

the authorities at Lampsacus, expecting a large number of triremes to arrive at their city, probably at some point in the late fifth or early fourth century, ordered the people working in the agora ("τοῖς ἀγοραίοις") to raise their prices for barley-flour (from four to six drachmas for a medimnos), oil (from 3 drachmas a chous to four drachmas three obols), wine and the other items ("καὶ τῶν ἄλλων") by fifty per cent. When the trireme crews eventually arrived and bought food and wine from the traders in the agora, the latter got the original price for the goods they sold, and the polis took the rest, i.e. the fifty per cent extra profit, and so had plenty of money.

55 “Λαµψακηνοὶ δὲ προσδοκίµων οὐσῶν τριήρων πολλῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ὄντος μεδίµνου τῶν ἀλφίτων τετραδράχµου, προσέταξαν τοῖς ἀγοραίοις πωλεῖν ἑξάδραχµον, καὶ τοῦ ἐλαίου τὸν χοᾶ ὄντα δραχµῶν τριῶν, τεττάρων καὶ τριωβόλου, τοῦ τε οἴνου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. τὴν µὲν οὖν ἀρχαίαν τιµὴν ἐλάµβανεν ὁ ἰδιώτης, τὸ δὲ πλέον ἡ πόλις, καὶ ἐυπόρησε χρηµάτων.”

56 G. C. Armstrong in the Loeb edition (1935) 537 translates “Λαµψακηνοὶ δὲ προσδοκίµων οὐσῶν τριήρων πολλῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς…” as follows: “[o]n one occasion the people of Lampsacus were expecting to be attacked by a large fleet of triremes.” But, as Cracco Ruggini ([1967] 14-15 n.168) points out, πρὸς αὐτοὺς does not necessarily have the sense of “against,” and the anecdote would make no sense if it were an enemy fleet approaching Lampsacus (since if the fleet were hostile, it would not be admitted into the agora of the city or provided with a temporary agora outside the city).

57 This episode has been conventionally dated to 409 (see, e.g., van Groningen ([1933] 83) and Cracco Ruggini ([1967] 15), following earlier commentators) on the basis of a notice at Xen., Hell. 1.2.15 referring to 50 Athenian triremes spending the winter of that year at Lampsacus. None of the reasons usually cited by commentators for this date stand up to scrutiny, however. Firstly, a date of 409 is based on the assumption that the triremes mentioned by pseudo-Aristotle are Athenian but there is no evidence for this: the Greek simply says “τριηρῶν πολλῶν.” Secondly, the price of barley-flour, at 4 drachmas a medimnos, has been thought to be unusually high and a product of military actions around the Hellespont from 411-409. But we simply do not have the evidence to say whether this price for barley-flour was unusually high or not. There are only three other prices for barley-flour in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, and all are from Athens (see Heichelheim [1935] 887-888 (although a price for alphita cannot be reconstructed from Aristoph., Wasps 300ff., contra Heichelheim [ibid.]): two of these are for 2 drachmas a medimnos but come from an unreliablely late ‘wandering anecdote’ about philosophers (Socrates and Diogenes respectively) emphasizing the necessity and ease of a simple life (Plut., Mor. 470F, Diog. Laert. 6.35); the other figure, for 4 drachmas a medimnos, comes from a sacrificial calendar of the Marathonian tetrapolis setting out prices to be paid for deme sacrifices c. 350 (IG II² 1358.45, 50 (see Loomis [1998] 83-84 n.22 for the date)), and therefore may not reflect market prices for barley-flour. In sum, we are in no position to judge whether or not a price of four drachmas for alphita in a polis other than Athens in the late fifth or early fourth century was expensive. Finally, it is only an assumption that the three years of fighting around the Hellespont caused a general rise in prices for grain and other products in the region.
At first sight, this passage seems to support the view that Greek cities regularly took advantage of passing military forces in the markets they provided to them. The very fact that it is included in the second book of the *Oeconomica*, however, argues very strongly against this view. The description of the actions of the Lampsacenes is just one of seventy-seven anecdotes in this section of the *Oeconomica*, all of which describe special financial ‘stratagems’ designed to make money for states (or their agents) at times of financial crisis:58 each of the anecdotes describes attempts by either monarchs, tyrants, mercenary captains, satraps, agents of Alexander or, in nineteen cases, *poleis* to cheat other people out of money or to force people to give up money or, as in this case, both.59 In sum, the actions described in the second book of the *Oeconomica* are all “mesures exceptionelles prises dans des circonstances tout à fait speciales,”60 and tell us nothing of the financial practices of *poleis* in normal circumstances.

Moreover, although the author of the *Oeconomica* makes no explicit judgment on any of the actions included in its second book, it is, as Sitta von Reden has written, “the ethical boundary of the polis which the people of the Aristotelian stories transgress.”61 Thus, *poleis* in the *Oeconomica*, just like generals and tyrants, manipulate coinage and

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60 von Groningen (1933) 57 (sic). See also Gauthier (1991) 63 on the use of the anecdotes from the *Oeconomica* as evidence for institution or common practices in the classical Greek world: “[m]ais, sur le fond, il faut avouer que les deux exemples transmis par l’Économique font figure d’exception. Ce sont des stratagèmes de circonstance, réputés ingénieux, destinés à pallier une pénurie d’argent.”

credit instruments “to manipulate the wealth of their [citizens]”; they also, amongst other things, sell sacred lands (at Byzantium, 2.2.3a, 1346b15-20), or material that has been gathered for a major religious festival (at Antissa, 2.2.6, 1347a25-31); change citizenship laws or validate the standing of loans that had been illegally made to non-citizens (both at Byzantium, 2.2.3b, d, 1346b27-29, 1347a1-3); and exploit the conventions of international relations (the Chalcedonians, 2.2.10, 1347b20-30)—all in order to fill empty city treasuries. Every one of these actions was “morally incompatible” with normal classical Greek approaches to polis finances.

Placed back into their proper generic context, then, the actions of the Lampsacenes can be seen as exceptional. Far from showing that poleis routinely ripped off passing soldiers and sailors, the fact that the money-making ruse of the Lampsacenes was included in the second book of the Oeconomica strongly implies that such acts were regarded as unethical and that it was exceptional practice for Greek poleis to take advantage of friendly military forces in the markets they provided to them. It should be noted, too, in conclusion, that the price fixed by the Lampsacenes apparently did not rise despite the influx of sailors; in other words, the arrival of many triremes at Lampsacus, carrying thousands of men, did not drive up prices in the market there.

62 Ibid.

63 See Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977) 305 n.6, 306 n.9 for explication of the Byzantines’ actions here.

64 The Chalcedonians, owing money to a large number of mercenaries they were employing, exploited the right of reprisal (σύλον).

iv. The (supposed) evidence of Thucydides for profiteering in markets provided by traders and poleis to classical Greek military forces

Finally, W. K. Pritchett also cited Thucydides 6.22 as evidence that soldiers and sailors on campaign were charged higher prices than usual for their food by poleis and traders.\

Pritchett stated that “a special rate [of pay] obtained [at Potidaea, as it did] later for those dispatched to Syracuse,” since “... as we are explicitly told about the expedition to Syracuse, trophe [sic] was going to be difficult to obtain and a higher rate [of pay] was in order [at Potidaea].” He later develops this point by asserting that the supposedly higher rate of pay “given on protracted overseas campaigns at Potidaea and Syracuse must reflect, in part, unusual conditions in procuring food when abroad.” By “unusual conditions,” Pritchett meant inflated prices in markets offered to soldiers and sailors, as can be seen by the references he cited to support his point: Xen., Anab. 1.5.6; 3.2.21; and ps.-Aristotle, Oec. 2.2.7 1347a32-1347b2. Pritchett continued, “[s]uch conditions are implied in the speech of Nikias (Thucydides 6.22) in which he states that it will not be every city which can receive the expedition and continues: τά τε ἄλλα ὅσον δυνάτων

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67 (1971) 16.

68 (1971) 23.

69 (1971) 23-24 (at [1971] 23, Pritchett has Anab. 3.2.2 and [Aristotle] Oec. 2.2.7.1347a; that he is, however, referring to Anab. 3.2.21 and Oec. 2.2.7, 1347a32-1347b2 is clear from his description of the passages).
But Pritchett misread 6.22. In this part of his speech to the assembly on the 
παρασκευή required for the Sicilian expedition, Nicias requested that the expedition bring 
itself grain from Athens in holkades, together with bakers requisitioned from the mills 
there, in order that, if the expedition was detained (on its voyage to and around Sicily) by 
bad weather, it might have provisions, “for it is not every city that will be able to receive 
a force as large as ours,” “(πολλὴ γὰρ οὖσα οὐ πάσης ἕσται πόλεως ὑποδέξασθαι).” That 
is, Nicias did see a potential problem for the provisioning of the expedition because of its 
size (only on its voyage to and around Sicily, however) 71—but he requested the dispatch 
of supply ships with the expedition to solve this problem, not money.

Moreover, consideration of Nicias’ speech to the assembly as an entirety shows 
conclusively that he did not consider inflated prices in markets a possible difficulty for 
the expedition to Sicily. At 6.22, Nicias outlines the special requirements in men and 
materiel necessary to meet the particular strengths of the Sicilian Greeks, which he had 
described at 6.20.3-4. Thus, to counteract the hoplites of the Sicilian poleis, the 
Athenians would need to bring hoplites in large numbers; to neutralize the Sicilians’ 
superiority in cavalry, they would need to bring many archers and slingers. The request 
for supply ships was one of two measures Nicias demanded to meet the Syracusan poleis’
advantage over the expedition from Athens in grain supplies: the other was for a great superiority in triremes, to provide security for the ships carrying grain to the expedition from nearby friendly states once it had established itself in Sicily (a request, incidentally, that demonstrates that Nicias took for granted the availability of provisions for the expedition once it had begun operations in Sicily). Nicias’ final demand is that quoted by Pritchett above: “[w]e must also provide ourselves with everything else as far as we can, so as not to be dependent on others”—and to counter the other major resource of the Sicilian Greeks (especially Selinus and Syracuse) he had mentioned at 6.20.4—“and above all we must take with us from home as much money as possible, as the sums talked of as ready at Egesta are readier, you may be sure, in talk than in any other way.”

Nicias thus explicitly and markedly separated off the problem of the required money for the force from his proposed solutions to the problems of acquiring sufficient grain for the force by including the issue of money under τά τε ἄλλα—all those other things apart from men, ships, and grain that the expedition would need to achieve success in Sicily. At 6.22, in other words, there is no connection made between availability or resources of grain and money (just as there is not in Nicias’ description of the resources of the Sicilian Greeks at 6.20.3-4): they are treated as separate problems, to be dealt with in different ways. There is therefore no evidence in Nicias’ speech that he considered unusually high prices in the markets in which the Athenians would be buying their provisions as a potential difficulty for the expedition to Sicily, and no suggestion in his demands that a

72 See chapter i section i for the rest of this paragraph.

73 Crawley’s translation. The Egestaeans had promised money for the expedition on its arrival in Sicily (6.6.2, 6.8.1-2), but Nicias had already voiced his suspicions about their ability to provide this money in his first speech to the assembly (6.12.1). These suspicions are borne out at 6.46. See also chapter i section ivb.
higher rate of pay would be necessary for the members of the expedition to make allowance for the problem of unusually high prices during the campaign.

As for Potidaea, Pritchett also believed that an especially high rate of pay was given to the Athenian forces on campaign there and that this could be explained (by “reasonable inference”74 from the conditions on the expedition to Syracuse) by the high prices charged to Athenian soldiers and sailors for their food during the siege. As I have just demonstrated, however, there is no evidence that the Athenian forces on the expedition to Sicily had to pay inflated prices for their food. There is also no evidence that the Athenian forces at Potidaea received an especially high rate of pay.

Pritchett’s view on this matter was based on C. F. Smith’s commentary on Thucydides 3.17.3-4, which questioned the authenticity of this passage:75

> καὶ τὰ χρήματα τοῦτο μάλιστα ἑπενήλωσε μετὰ Ποτειδαίας, the absence of any mention of the 4,000 hoplites and 3,000 cavalry of Hagnon and Cleopompus (ii.58), can be explained only on a rather improbable assumption, unless the chapter be ascribed to an interpolator. It must be assumed that the 4,000 hoplites were not δίδαχοι, but received less pay, and that in explanation of the great expenses occasioned by Potidaea especial stress was laid upon the high pay of two of the armies fitted out for the recapture of the city.

Following Smith’s line of reasoning here, Pritchett agreed that one could explain the lack of mention of the force under Hagnon and Cleopompus at Thucydides 3.17.3-4 and thus take this passage as genuine only by assuming that Hagnon’s and Cleopompus’s force was not paid at the same unusually high rate that the forces participating in the blockade of

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74 (1971) 16.

75 Quoted at Pritchett (1971) 15-16 (as Pritchett notes there, Smith’s comments are, for the most part, a translation of Steup’s commentary). Note that the section of 3.17 after the clause in Greek quoted by Smith is, in fact, 3.17.4.
Potidaea were. Pritchett attributed this special rate of pay given to the hoplites participating in the siege of Potidaea to the difficulty of obtaining food there, i.e. to the high food prices being charged in the market in the Athenian camp at Potidaea. There is, however, another, much simpler explanation for the absence of a mention of Hagnon’s and Cleopompus’s force in Thucydides’ accounting of the expenses of the Potidaea campaign at 3.17.4: the fact that it took only a minimal part in the operations at Potidaea and therefore did not contribute in any significant way to the huge expense of the siege of that city. A brief overview of the campaign will establish this.

At 3.17.3-4, Thucydides narrates that:


it was this [i.e. the great number of Athenian triremes on active service mentioned at 3.17.2], with Potidaea, that most exhausted her revenues—[4] Potidaea being blockaded by a force of hoplites (each drawing two drachmas a day, one for himself and another for his slave-attendant), which amounted to three thousand at first, and was kept at this number down to the end of the siege; beside sixteen hundred with Phormio who went away before it was over.

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76 (1971) 16. For a cogent defense of the authenticity of Thucy. 3.17.4 and its placement at 3.17.4, based on an analysis of the passage’s function within the surrounding narrative context, see Kallet-Marx (1993) 130-134, 150-151; cf. Hornblower, C7 i.400-401.

77 Pritchett did not actually state this in so many words, but that this is what he meant is clear from his discussion at (1971) 16, 23-24: see again pp.281-282 above.

78 Crawley’s translation.
The first three thousand hoplites, together with many allies of the Athenians, were sent to Potidæa in the summer of 432 (Thucy. 1.61.4 (cf. Thucy. 1.57.6, 1.61.1)).\textsuperscript{79} They succeeded in building a wall which shut off Potidæa from the rest of the Chalcidide, but were not enough in number both to garrison this first wall and simultaneously build another wall on the Pallene peninsula in order to completely enclose Potidæa with siege-works (Thucy. 1.64.1). Hence, later in the same summer, sixteen hundred hoplites, under the generalship of Phormio, were sent from Athens, who, after arriving at the Pallene peninsula and ravaging some of the country there (Thucy. 1.64.2), completed the wall shutting off Potidæa from the rest of the peninsula (Thucy. 1.64.3). From this point on, Potidæa was fully under a siege “which was prosecuted vigorously on both sides of it as well as by sea, where a fleet blockaded it.”\textsuperscript{80} All of the ships blockading Potidæa drew the same pay, according to Thucydides (Thucy. 3.17.4), as the hoplites manning the siege-works—i.e., one drachma per day.\textsuperscript{81}

When the investment of Potidæa was complete, Phormio took his troops and ravaged Chalcidide and Bottiaea (and captured some cities in these regions) (Thucy. 1.65.3). In the summer of 431, Thucydides narrates that Phormio joined forces with Perdicas against the Chalcidians (Thucy. 2.29.6). At 2.31.2, however, when Thucydides

\textsuperscript{79} Hornblower (\textit{CT} i.402; cf. \textit{CT} i.290)) has some unnecessary doubts, which he ultimately resolves himself, about Thucydides’ statement that the original three thousand men stayed throughout the siege.

\textsuperscript{80} 1.64.3: “καὶ οὕτως ἢδη κατὰ κράτος ἡ Ποτείδαια ἀµφοτέρωθεν ἐπολιορκεῖτο καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ναυσίν ἔφερον ἀλλὰ ἡ αὔριον ἡ βουλή ἱσταλεῖται.”

\textsuperscript{81} 3.17.3: “νησίς τε αἱ πᾶσαι τὸν αὐτὸν μισθὸν ἡφειν.” Commentators are unanimous in taking νησίς as metonymy for the sailors on the ships (see Loomis [1998] 39 n.28). The ships mentioned at 3.17.4 should be taken to include both those that blockaded Potidæa as well as all of those mentioned by Thucydides at 3.17.1-2: see Andrewes, \textit{HCT} v.97.
is enumerating the forces of the Athenians in the field in the autumn of 431, he only lists three thousand hoplites at Potidaea, which must be the original force of three thousand sent in 432 (Thucy. 1.61.4),\textsuperscript{82} while, at 2.58.2, describing the situation at Potidaea in the summer of 430, and particularly the effects of the plague among the Athenian forces stationed there, Thucydides states that Phormio and his sixteen hundred men were no longer in the Chalcidide and thus had escaped the plague. We should therefore most probably assume, then,\textsuperscript{83} that Phormio and his men returned to Athens soon after the campaign in the summer of 431 described at 2.29.6 (and this is why Thucydides states at 3.17.4 that they went away before the siege was over), and that Thucydides mentioned them at 2.58.2 only to distinguish them from the men exposed to the plague at Potidaea.\textsuperscript{84} For in the summer of 430, Hagnon and Cleopompus had been sent from Athens with a force of four thousand hoplites, three hundred cavalry, and one hundred and fifty ships (Thucy. 2.56.2, 2.58.1) to Potidaea to help bring a quick end to the siege there (which, by this stage, had dragged on for two years). But they brought the plague from Athens with them, so that it even broke out amongst the soldiers of the first expedition (Thucy. 2.58.2) (it is at this point that Thucydides mentions that Phormio and his men were no longer in the Chalcidide), so that Hagnon had to take his forces back to Athens, having lost one thousand and fifty out of his four thousand hoplites, after only forty days of campaigning

\textsuperscript{82} Gomme, \textit{HCT} ii.93.

\textsuperscript{83} Following Rhodes (1988) 215; see also Fantasia at (2003) 351 holding the same view.

\textsuperscript{84} Rhodes (1988) 236.
Thucydides twice contrasts their forces with the soldiers of the first expedition whom Thucydides specifies as "τοὺς προτέρους στρατιώτας" (2.58.2) and "οἱ δὲ πρότεροι στρατιῶται" (2.58.3). These latter were the soldiers who had been prosecuting the siege since 432. They eventually spent two and a half years in all at Potidaea. The fleet mentioned at Thucy. 1.64.3 presumably spent the same amount of time blockading Potidaea (see again 3.17.4). Phormio and his men played a key role in completing the siege-works around the city and spent at least one year in the general area of operations.

If we return to 3.17.4, then, we can now see why Hagnon and Cleopompus’ forces are not mentioned there. Contra Smith and Pritchett, the lack of mention of Hagnon and Cleopompus and the forces they commanded at 3.17.4 does not imply “that those who participated in the siege were the only ones who were paid at a rate higher than usual.” They are not mentioned by Thucydides, rather, because they played such a very small role in the operations at Potidaea—they participated in the siege for only forty out of its nine hundred days or so—and therefore the amounts paid to them—in contradistinction to the pay given to the first three thousand hoplites sent to Potidaea in 432, the sixteen

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85 I take this to be the natural reading of this phrase; Gomme, HCT ii.166 takes it only to be implied. Cf. 3.17.4 where the three thousand men sent out from Athens in 432 are referred to as "οἱ πρῶτοι."  

86 See again pp.285-286. Gomme, HCT ii.165 believed it possible that they could have stayed till the early summer of 430.  

87 Pritchett (1971) 16.
hundred hoplites sent out under Phormio in that year, and the triremes which completed the blockade of the city by sea—contributed very little to the exhaustion of Athenian financial resources that is the focus of 3.17, and which the Potidæa campaign played a major role in bringing about.\footnote{See already Gomme, \textit{HCT} ii.275 on 3.17.4: “[e]dd. note that no mention is made of Hagnon’s force of 4,000 hoplites and 300 cavalry (2.56.2, 2.58.1) that made the unsuccessful attempt to take Potidaia by storm. This was a short campaign and hardly counted as part of the siege of Potidaia.” But detailed argumentation for this point has been necessary here since all recent work has followed the later work of Pritchett and his assumption that no mention is made of Hagnon’s force at 3.17.4 because it was paid at a lower rate than the original forces sent out to Potidæa. (In addition, Gomme, in his treatment of 3.17.4, assumed that the rate of pay for the hoplites there was especially high, though not for the same reason at Pritchett: see n.91 just below.)} The fact that the force sent out from Athens in 430 under Hagnon and Cleopompus is not included in Thucydides’ reckoning up of the major expenses of the siege of Potidæa is therefore in no way an indication that the pay for any force employed during the siege was unusually high\footnote{Gallo (1987) 38: “il carattere eccezionale della spesa in questione non è determinato della paga in sé, ma dall’impiego contemporaneo di un gran numero di uomini e di navi e dalla durata insolita delle operazioni militari: il pagamento di 1 dracma a tanti soldati e marinai per un periodo eccessivamente lungo costituisce quindi la causa del dissesto finanziario messo in rilievo da Tucidide.” See also chapter 5 section ii: it can be demonstrated that the one drachma per hoplite rate was the standard rate of pay for Athenian hoplites in the Peloponnesian War before 412 and therefore the mention of this rate at 3.17.4 therefore does not have to be explained away as special or unusual.} on account of unusually high prices in the camp market there\footnote{Note that there is a major problem in the logic of Pritchett’s argument that Hagnon’s and Cleopompus’ force were paid at a lower rate than the original forces sent out to Potidæa: there is no reason (and none given by Pritchett) why the forces under Hagnon and Cleopompus should not have faced the same supposed difficulties in obtaining food at Potidæa, i.e. the same supposedly high prices charged in the market for the besiegers, as the original force sent out; therefore, following Pritchett’s logic, the forces sent out in the summer of 430 should have been paid at the same rate as the original force to take account of the unchanged conditions at Potidæa, and therefore should have been mentioned by Thucydides at 3.17.4 (where they are not, of course).} (and therefore we do not, contra Pritchett and Smith, have to postulate these higher prices and pay to ‘save’ the authenticity of 3.17).\footnote{Cook ([1990] 80) agreed with Pritchett that “there were special hardships and difficulty in obtaining food at Potidaia” (although she thought that the rate of pay given for this campaign was not unusually high but comparable to that given on other Athenian amphibious expeditions). Cf. Gomme, \textit{HCT} ii.275: the two drachmas given to hoplites at Potidæa were “clearly a special rate” paid because of the special hardships}
v. Conclusion

The consensus view, deeply embedded in modern scholarship, that classical Greek soldiers and sailors were often or always the victims of profiteering by traders and \textit{poleis} has, then, no ancient evidence to support it. Previous treatments holding this view of military markets have been marked by several methodological errors: the use of passages from literary sources as evidence without considering their immediate narrative contexts or the generic demands of the works from which they are taken; the failure to remember that both the provisioning of Greek military forces and food prices are normally mentioned in ancient literary texts only in extraordinary circumstances; the failure to place classical Greek military markets within a comparative context; and, finally, the failure to operationalize the view of regular exploitation of Greek military forces in markets (i.e., there has been a failure by adherents to this position to ask the question of why military markets would have been used by classical Greek states to

experienced by the Athenian forces besieging Potidaea. The conditions facing the Athenians undertaking the siege of Potidaea do seem to have been particularly harsh: see Pl., \textit{Symp.} 220a-d and esp. Thucy. 2.70.2 (the only indication of the hardships of the siege in Thucydides’ description of it): “οἱ δὲ προσεδέξαντο, ἀφώντες µὲν τὸς στρατιάς τὴν ταλαιπωρίαν ἐν χωρίῳ χειµερινῷ, ἀνηλωκυίας δὲ ἤδη τῆς πόλεως δισχίλια τάλαντα ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν,” “[the generals] accepted [the proposals of the Potidaeans for surrender], seeing the sufferings of the army in so exposed a position; besides which the state had already spent two thousand talents upon the siege.” (Crawley’s translation.) Note here, however, that the use of “µὲν” and “δὲ” here distinguishes between the two different reasons for the Athenian generals’ acceptance of the Potidaeans’ proposals: that is, the fact of the especially harsh conditions facing the men is not related to the expense of the siege; on the contrary, it is, in fact, differentiated from the expense of the siege as a reason for the Athenians’ acceptance of the Potidaean proposals. Strauss ([2007] 244), discussing the provisioning of classical Greek sieges, states that “[b]esiegers had to feed themselves by raiding the countryside and by establishing markets to attract traders. They weren’t always successful, however, and some besiegers suffered shortages of food or water. Alcibiades... referring to [the siege of] Potidaea, refers to times when supplies were abundant and other times when the soldiers were forced to go without food (Pl. \textit{Symp.} 219e).” But Alcibiades at Pl., \textit{Symp.} 219e-220a does not refer to general shortages of food and difficulties in obtaining food for the Athenians and the campaign around Potidaea. Rather, he states that at some points in the campaign, a part of the army (including his and Socrates’ \textit{sussitia}) was cut off from the main base of operations and therefore did not have access to supplies: “ὦποτ’ ἀγαυκαζείηµεν ἀποληψίητες που, οἰα δὴ ἐπὶ στρατείας, ἀσιτεῖν...,” “whenever we were cut off in some place and were compelled, as often in campaigns, to go without food...” To repeat, there is no reason to think that special hardships or difficulties in obtaining food contributed in any way to higher prices or higher rates of pay at Potidaea.
provision their forces if those markets were characterized by opportunistic gouging and thus allocated provisions extremely inefficiently). None of these criticisms (or the detailed deconstructions of previous views in the body of this chapter) should be taken to imply or suggest, however, that there were never high prices in markets provided for classical Greek armies and navies. Rather, my intention in this chapter has been to clear the ground for a new examination of the behavior and administration of military markets, one that will consider the markets provided for classical Greek military forces within their proper context—the conventions and institutions that governed the exchange of goods in the classical Greek world, and the conditions of production and distribution in that world—taking care to allow for the differing interpretative demands of the available ancient literary, epigraphical and numismatic evidence, and using comparative evidence on military markets in order to gain insights into how the markets that provisioned ten of thousands of Greek soldiers and sailors in the fifth and fourth centuries functioned.
i. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that there was no basis for Pritchett’s argument that inflated prices were charged by traders and cities to the soldiers and sailors on the Athenian campaigns in Sicily and at Potidaea. Pritchett made this argument to support a larger hypothesis about the rate of pay for Athenian hoplites and sailors in the late fifth century, which can be summarized as follows.¹ Pritchett noted (correctly) that Thucydides used the terms μισθός and τροφή synonymously for payments to soldiers and sailors.² He concluded from this that, in the fifth century at least, μισθός and τροφή were meant for the purchase of rations only: “[j]ust as dikastic pay was for maintenance, so the stratiotic pay made to citizens in the fifth century was for purchase of rations.”³ This conclusion—or rather, assumption—provided the grounds for the next step in Pritchett’s hypothesis: since dikasts (from 425) received a μισθός for their service of three obols per day for their maintenance, soldiers should have needed no more for their daily maintenance;⁴ thus—and this was the climax of the argument—the customary daily rate of pay in the late fifth century for Athenian forces, from which men on campaign had to

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¹ See also Loomis (1998) 56 for a summation of Pritchett’s argument.

² (1971) 3-6, esp. 4-5 for argument and examples; and see Loomis (1998) 33 n.6 for additional instances in Thucydides of μισθός and τροφή referring to the same payment. See chapter 6 section ix for the reasons for the synonymity of μισθός and τροφή in the fifth and fourth centuries.

³ (1971) 6 (Cook ([1990] 78) follows Pritchett expressly on this point). See Pritchett (1971) 27 (cf. [1971] 40): “[i]n military economics, the concept of any pay except for sustenance was primarily a development of the period after the Peloponnesian War and of mercenary service.”

⁴ (1971) 23.
buy their food, was three obols.\textsuperscript{5} To defend these claims, Pritchett had to explain away the several mentions in Thucydides of a rate of pay of one drachma a day to Athenian soldiers and sailors during the Peloponnesian War—Thucydides records this rate eight times, as opposed to just one report of a rate of three obols per day\textsuperscript{6}—since this was an amount that was twice what dikasts received in Athens in the same years for their daily maintenance.\textsuperscript{7} Pritchett attempted to do this by asserting that the higher rate of one drachma per day was necessary because of the exceptional circumstances of some overseas expeditions.\textsuperscript{8} To repeat myself, there is no evidence for the exceptional circumstances he cites in support of his assertion, and, therefore, the claims this assertion itself supports, that payments to Athenian military forces in the fifth century were meant solely for rations and that those payments were normally three obols per day have no foundation in the passages from Thucydides cited by Pritchett.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{5} (1971) 16-17.

\textsuperscript{6} Loomis (1998) 56.

\textsuperscript{7} See Loomis (1998) 16-17 for sources for dikast’s pay in Athens in the late fifth century; cf. Rhodes (1981) 338-340. A complicating factor for Pritchett’s argument—and one that he does not mention—is that dikast-pay was meant not just for the dikast, but for his family as well. Cf. Markle (1985) 277, and see esp. Aristoph., \textit{Wasps} 300-301 (cf. 606ff.): out of a pittance a member of the chorus has to get a meal for a family of three: “ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦτο ἕξ οἶνον ἀλφαία δεῖ καὶ ἔλαβα κύψην.”

\textsuperscript{8} (1971) 23: “[o]ur study of the vocabulary has shown that, just as members of the juries were given a maintenance allowance of two obols a day, revised in 425 B.C. to three, both termed misthos, so the misthos introduced, presumably, by Perikles for soldiers must have been primarily for rations and could be called trophe or sitos. The higher stratiotic pay given on protracted overseas campaigns at Poteidaia and Syrakuse must reflect, in part, unusual condition in procuring food when abroad.” Cf. (1971) 24.

\textsuperscript{9} See below p.319, pp.322-323 for further criticism of Pritchett’s arguments for a three obol (as opposed to one drachma) per day per man rate as standard for Athenian sailors and soldiers before 412. In addition, it should be noted that Pritchett seems to contradict himself later in his work, in a section on the amount of \textit{siteresion} given to military forces in “the period after the fifth century,” where he states ([1971] 51) that “[t]he instances where an explicit sum of money is proposed for a soldier’s rations are surprisingly few. The references to sitos in Thucydides 5.47.6 and to trophe in 8.29 have been shown in the preceding
Loomis, in his study of payments to soldiers and sailors in classical Athens, made several effective criticisms of Pritchett’s work on pay. Loomis agreed with Pritchett that µισθός and τροφή were synonymous in Thucydides but came to a different conclusion from this observation: for Loomis, both represented “gross pay,” i.e. ration-money plus pay. Loomis cited three points in support of his conclusion, and against Pritchett. Firstly, he pointed out that there is no affirmative reason why µισθός/τροφή should be ration-money alone. Secondly, Thucydides’ use of the word µισθός for mercenary pay implied that µισθός was for more than just ration-money, since mercenaries were unlikely to serve merely for subsistence. Thirdly, since other payments for daily maintenance in Athens ranged from one from to three obols, then µισθός or τροφή of one drachma must have covered and exceeded the daily cost of rations. Against Pritchett’s argument that food costs may have been higher in Potidæa or Sicily, Loomis argued that: “[t]hat is possible, but the opposite is at least as likely: in the countryside,


11 “Gross pay” quoted from (1998) 34.

12 (1998) 34: “[w]ithout actually saying so, Pritchett seemed to assume that τροφή was the ancestor of σιτοφέσιον, i.e., he seemed intuitively to give weight to its narrower meaning of “food” rather than to its broader meaning of “means of support,” but this is not necessary and indeed, given the fact that τροφή is used synonymously with µισθός, the broader meaning arguably is more likely.”
closer to the source of supply (e.g., in Sicily), food might have been cheaper than in the
city.”

Kallet, in a study of the usage of μισθός and τροφή in book 8 of Thucydides, in which she argued that Thucydides used τροφή in a restricted sense, “as a kind of subcategory of misthos,” in order to characterize the “hand-to-mouth existence” of the Spartans in book 8, countered Loomis’ arguments against Pritchett. She accepted Loomis’ point about μισθός and mercenary pay as valid, “though it is not clear that, while [it is] a reasonable assumption, [it] is a necessary one.” As for the point that pay of one drachma must have exceeded the daily cost of maintenance, Kallet argued that “we

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13 (1998) 35-36. Loomis does not examine the texts (i.e. 3.17.3-4, 6.22) on which Pritchett’s arguments for higher prices are based or the detail of Pritchett’s arguments.


15 (2001) 299; cf. (2001) 300: “[a]lthough the terms do not always conform to precise distinctions, the terminology as used in book 8 (as elsewhere in the History) leans toward a typology in which misthos is a term for fuller pay than is suggested by trophe...” To criticise this point literally, at 8.29.1, τροφή is distributed at the rate of one drachma per man per day, as high a rate as μισθός is ever paid at. And when the issue of “full pay” is brought up later in the book, the terms μισθός, μισθοφορά, and τροφή are used interchangeably by Thucydides to refer to the same payment(s): 8.45.6 (“ἐντελῆ... τὸν µισθὸν” (only to be paid by Tissaphernes on receipt of τροφή from the King (8.45.6)), 8.50.3 (“τῆς µισθοφορᾶς... ἐντελοῦς”), 8.78 (“τροφή... ἐντελῇ”), 8.83.3 (“µισθὸν ἐντελῆ”). There is thus no reason to see τροφή as a form of lesser pay than μισθός (cf. Hornblower (CT iii.771) thinking that the distinction made by Kallet between these two terms seeming “strained”).


17 Kallet states ([2001] 296), as a justification for taking up this subject again, that “[t]he very fact that Pritchett and Loomis, while agreeing on the synonymity of trophe and misthos, arrive at opposite conclusions about their meaning, should alert us to the problematic nature of the evidence of Thucydides, and the difficulty of forcing his terminology into strict synonyms with a consistent meaning, whether ‘ration-money’ or ‘full pay’.” But this is a non sequitur: it simply may be the case that either Pritchett’s or Loomis’s treatment of this subject is incorrect (or that both are); furthermore, as shown above and below, Pritchett’s treatment can be demonstrated to be certainly incorrect, and Loomis’ to be certainly right.

cannot be certain that the procurement of food in the field was not more expensive, requiring a higher monetary allotment”¹⁹ and that Loomis’ response to Pritchett that food should have been in fact cheaper at Potidaea and Syracuse did not seem to her “to carry the necessary weight, since one could easily imagine that the market value may have increased prices given the necessity of the demand.”²⁰

Both Loomis and Kallet’s analyses of the price-setting mechanisms in markets provided to Athenian military forces are unsophisticated, to say the least, but at this point I will set aside detailed discussion of the factors that actually would have determined prices in markets provided to classical Greek military forces (e.g. local conditions of production and distribution, transport costs, demography, social and political institutions) until chapter 7. What I want to do here is to focus on the fact that, although Loomis disagreed with Pritchett’s hypothesis, and Kallet was agnostic, both accepted the logic of the fundamental premise of Pritchett’s argument that the prices expected in the markets provided for classical Greek sailors and soldiers on campaign could determine the amounts paid to soldiers and sailors by their poleis and other employers.²¹ Other scholars

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¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ (2001) 296 n.4: importantly, her objections to Loomis meant that she could not accept one drachma per day as a standard rate of pay for Athenian sailors and soldiers in the Peloponnesian War: see (2001) 53 and below p.332 nn.110-111. Kallet also argued that Thucydides’ usage of trophe in 1.11 provides an obstacle to Loomis’ position that Thucydides consistently used trophe to refer to daily rations plus pay, “for in that passage, the analysis of the Trojan expedition, the idea that more than ‘money’ for rations is at issue strains reason.” Since, however, Thucydides is clearly using trophe to refer to food at 1.11, and it is clear from the context that he is doing so (as it is at 1.2.2, 1.5.1, 4.6.1, 6.34.4), as it is clear that he is using trophe to refer to pay in all the passages that Loomis cites to support his conclusions, there is no confusion at 1.11 and thus this passage presents no potential obstacle to Loomis’ conclusions.

²¹ See also section iv for other instances of this premise underlying Loomis’ treatment of Athenian military pay rates in the late fifth and early fourth centuries.
who have written on the rates of pay given to military forces in the Peloponnesian war have worked on or accepted the same premise. Amit posited that a rise in Athenian pay from three obols before the war to one drachma per day during the war may have been “explained by the general rise in prices caused by the war, and the need of incentive to attract larger number of sailors, including foreigners.” Marinovic accepted Pritchett’s arguments for rises in pay based on inflated prices for foodstuffs in markets provided to soldiers and sailors on campaign, and, recently, Rawlings also explicitly followed Pritchett in stating that “[h]igher than usual costs for supplies might explain the high rates of pay offered on some expeditions.”

If the view that classical Greek rates of military pay were determined by the prices expected to be found on campaign by sailors and soldiers were correct—unlikely

22 This is also presumably what Gomme was referring to when he wrote that the two drachmas per day given at Potidaea was a special rate of pay, and that the one drachma per day given to those embarking on the Sicilian expedition (Thucy. 6.31.3) and to the Thracian peltasts hired to fight in Sicily (but who never left Athens: see section ii below) (Thucy. 7.27.2) were special cases: HCT ii.275-276 (though he refers there to the rate of pay given to the soldiers who manned the siege at Potidaea as “special ‘hardship’ money,” by which he is probably referring to the conditions in which the men had to serve: see Thucy. 2.70.2 and pp.288-289 n.91). Gomme believed that three obols per day per man was the normal rate of pay for Athenian hoplites and sailors in the Peloponnesian war (and before: HCT ii.42) and therefore, like Pritchett, had to explain away any rate attested above this as ‘special.’

23 This is highly unlikely: see the discussion at section iv below.

24 (1965) 51.


26 (2007) 118. Cf. (ibid.) 170: “it is also possible that, at least on some occasions, higher rates [of pay] reflected the expected price of supplies on campaign.” In addition, all those scholars who have cited Pritchett’s work on pay as support for their positions on the normal rates of pay for Athenian military forces during the Peloponnesian war may also be taken as implicitly endorsing his view that rates of pay for those forces were determined by the prices they found in the markets provided to them by poleis and traders: see, e.g., Etienne and Roesch (1978) 372; Kallet-Marx (1993) 10 n.29, 120 n.30, 133 n.64; Samons (2000) 208 and n.170; Raaflaub (2007) 99 and 120 n.9 (citing Pritchett and Loomis).
as this may seem, given that I have demonstrated (contra Pritchett) that there is no
evidence that this did happen on the Potidaean and Sicilian expeditions—then particular
rates of pay could tell us about the conditions in markets provided to sailors and soldiers
campaigning in particular areas of operations. Working on the same premise as Pritchett,
Loomis, and Kallet, we might hope to recover data about the robustness and flexibility of
military markets—and markets in grain (and other foods) generally—in specific regions
of the classical Greek world in specific periods. With these potential insights in mind,
then, I will investigate in this chapter whether there is any basis for the view that classical
Greek poleis (or other employers of Greek military forces) were motivated by expected
prices in military markets when they decided how much they were going to pay their
soldiers and sailors for particular campaigns. I will first confirm that the one drachma per
man per day rate attested several times for Athenian military forces during the
Peloponnesian war (and before) was not a specially high rate of pay set in response to
high food prices. I will then show that those passages from Thucydides, Xenophon,
Demosthenes, and Diodorus Siculus that do provide us with evidence for the factors that
influenced poleis and other employers of classical Greek military forces in setting rates of
pay for these forces do not support the position that they were set with expected
commodity prices in mind. I will follow this by demonstrating that the presence of
standardized and conventional rates of pay for Greek armies and navies in ‘mainland’
Greece and the eastern Mediterranean generally in the fifth and fourth centuries argues
very strongly against the idea that military rates of pay fluctuated as a result of changing
market conditions—demonstrating this will necessitate a thorough investigation of
Athenian rates of pay before 412. Finally, I will conclude by considering what the rates
of pay given to classical Greek soldiers and sailors can, in fact, tell us about the normal behavior of military markets in the Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries.

ii. The one drachma rate paid to Athenian military forces on campaigns abroad and in or around Attica during the Peloponnesian War

Again, as I have demonstrated, there is no foundation for Pritchett’s arguments that the one drachma rate paid to the soldiers and sailors on the Potidaean campaign, and to the trireme crews on the Sicilian expedition, was set by the Athenian state in the expectation that these men would find high prices in the markets they shopped in during these campaigns. We can, in fact, go further than this, and adduce explicit evidence from Thucydides that the one drachma rate was not paid as a result of special conditions (in markets) on campaigns. Firstly, Thucydides at 3.17.4 states that one drachma per day was not only being paid to the hoplites and trireme crews at Potidaea, but to all the triremes he had mentioned at 3.17.2, one hundred of which were sailing around the Peloponnese, and another hundred guarding Attica, Euboea, and Salamis (at the same time as the siege of Potidaea). Since this rate was being paid to ships operating in and around Attica, as well as to forces operating around the Peloponnese and at Potidaea, it cannot have been determined by the expected exigencies of campaigning abroad.28

27 See again Andrewes, HCT v.97.

28 See already Gallo (1987) 38 n.51 (arguing against Gomme’s view that hoplite pay on the Potidaean campaign was paid at a specially high rate as compensation for the “special hardships” of the campaign): “[p]artendo dal suo presupposto di un carattere eccezionale della paga di 1 dracma, legata, a suo parere, alle particolari condizioni determinate dall’assedio di Potidea, il Gomme, di conseguenza, non riusciva a spiegarsi perché tale paga fosse versata, secondo quanto dice Tucidide, ai marinai di tutte le navi ateniesi, e finiva perciò per considerare questo elemento come una delle non poche difficoltà offerte dal passo (276): una difficoltà che, in realtà, non sussiste affatto se si accetta la tesi del carattere standard della dracma giornaliera.”
Analysis of a second passage from Thucydides can help us to make the same point. In the summer of 413, thirteen hundred Thracian peltasts arrived in Athens in order to sail with Demosthenes to Sicily to reinforce the Athenian expedition there (7.27.1). Having reached Athens too late to join with Demosthenes, the Athenians decided to send the Thracians home, as they were receiving a drachma per day, and therefore to continue paying to employ them seemed too expensive (“πολυτελές”) in light of the Decelean War (7.27.2). As Loomis points out, Thucydides’ use of the imperfect (“ἐλάμβανεν”) to describe the Thracians’ receipt of their pay shows that each of them had been actually drawing the one drachma per day during their stay in Athens. Since the peltasts were actually being paid one drachma per day in Athens (and were presumably to keep drawing the same rate in Sicily), this rate cannot have been caused by expected high prices while campaigning abroad.

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29 Thuc. 7.27.2: “οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ὑστερον ἤκον, διενοοῦντο αὐτοὺς πάλιν ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐς Θρᾴκην ἀποπέµπειν. τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς ∆εκελείας πόλεµον αὐτοὺς πολυτελές ἐφαίνετο· δραχµὴν γὰρ τῆς ἡµέρας ἔκαστος ἐλάµβανεν” (“since they had come too late, the Athenians determined to send them back to Thrace, from where they had come; to keep them, in view of the Deceleian war, seemed too expensive, for each of them was being paid a drachma a day.”) See Hornblower, CT iii.589 (with n.31 below) for the translation of the second sentence quoted here.

30 (1998) 44 (contra Marinovic ([1987] 168) who believed they were sent home before receiving any pay in Athens).

31 Again, see already Gallo (1987) 40 (explicitly contra Pritchett [1971] 23)—although Gallo was incorrect to take Thuc. 7.27.2 to mean that the Athenians were thinking of using them for military operations in the Decelean war. Thucydides at 7.27.2 states, rather, that the Thracian peltasts were considered too expensive because of (and not for) the Decelean campaign: see Hornblower’s (CT iii.589, following Classen/Steup ad loc.) translation of Thucy. 7.27.2, “τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς ∆εκελείας πόλεµον πολυτελές ἐφαίνετο”: “it seemed too expensive to retain them, in view of the war from Dekeleia.” As Hornblower remarks (ibid.), “Th. is introducing the Dekeleia theme as the explanation for the financially straitened state in which the Athenians now were; he is not stating a contemplated alternative use to which the Thracians might have been put.”
There is, then, no reason to think that the one drachma rate was paid to Athenian military forces to compensate for higher than usual food costs on campaign. Therefore other factors and motives must have played the determining role in setting rates of pay for Athenian forces in the mid to late fifth century.

iii. Reasons attested in contemporary and later sources for changes in rates of pay of classical Greek military forces

To put it succinctly: it was the funds available to or possessed by Athens and other military employers of classical Greek sailors and soldiers that determined how much they paid them. This can be demonstrated by analysis of several passages from several different (contemporary and later) authors treating the subject of military pay.

In the Ionian war, during which tens of thousands of men fought on the Athenian and Peloponnesian sides in the eastern Aegean for several years continuously, finding pay for those men became a central and determining factor in the outcome of the war. This is reflected in the attention given to military pay in the last book of Thucydides, and especially to the attention he gives to the subsidies provided by the Persians to the Peloponnesians for this purpose: in particular, the fact that negotiations and disputes about rates of pay played a critical role (for Thucydides) in determining the nature of the relationship between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians in the first years of the Ionian war, and thus critically affected the course of the early years of the war, means that

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32 For further discussion and a demonstration that the one drachma per man per day rate was the usual rate of pay for Athenian military forces before 412, see section iv below.
Thucydides’ narrative of these years gives us an unusually large amount of information about the factors that determined rates of pay in the classical Greek world.

Thus, in the winter of 412/11, Tissaphernes came to Miletus to distribute, as he had promised the Peloponnesians previously at Sparta that he would do, a month’s pay at the rate of an Attic drachma per man per day; for the future, however, he proposed to give only three obols until he should ask the King; and if the King so ordered, he would give the full drachma (“ἐντελῆ τὴν δραχµήν”) (Thucy. 8.29.1). Hermocrates the Syracusan objected on behalf of the Peloponnesian sailors to this proposed cut in pay, and in response to this objection, an agreement was made whereby the sailors would receive for the future a little over three obols (rather than three obols) in the future (8.29.2). These negotiations, then, provide explicit evidence for the reasons behind a possible change in a rate of pay to a classical Greek force: the possible change in pay from three obols per day back to one drachma is linked explicitly to the availability of money to fund this change or, to put it more precisely, to whether the King wished that more funds should be released for pay for the Peloponnesian sailors. Thus, we have explicit evidence for a proposed rate of pay that is contingent on availability of funds, and not on commodity prices. Also, it should be noted that the rate of pay for the sailors rose from three obols per day to just over three obols per day not because of any rise in the price of grain or other goods, but because of negotiations between a representative of the sailors and their employer.

33 Thucy. 8.5.5: though no rate of pay is specified there, it is likely that the rate agreed at Sparta was one drachma per day (Lewis [1977] 88 n.29).

34 See Hornblower, CT iii.836-838 for discussion of the exact amount over three obols the Peloponnesian sailors were to receive and how this pay was to be disbursed.
Later, in the same winter of 412/11, the pay for the Peloponnesian triremes was cut down from one Attic drachma to three obols, when Alcibiades, having fled from the Peloponnesians out of fear for his life, found refuge with Tissaphernes and then decided to damage the Peloponnesian cause as much as he could (Thucy. 8.45.1). Alcibiades did this primarily by recommending to Tissaphernes that he lower the rate of pay given to the Peloponnesians: thus,

...καὶ διδάσκαλος πάντων γιγνόµενος τήν τε µισθοφορὰν ξυνέτεµεν, ἀντὶ δραχµῆς Ἀττικῆς ὥστε τριώβολον, καὶ τοῦτο µὴ ἔσωθαν, λέγειν κελεύων καὶ διδάσκαλος πάντων γιγνόµενος τήν τε µισθοφορὰν ξυνέτεµεν, ἀντὶ δραχµῆς Ἀττικῆς ὥστε τριώβολον, καὶ τοῦτο µὴ ἔσωθαν, λέγειν κελεύων καὶ διδάσκαλος πάντων γιγνόµενος τήν τε µισθοφορὰν ξυνέτεµεν, ἀντὶ δραχµῆς Ἀττικῆς ὥστε τριώβολον, καὶ τοῦτο µὴ ἔσωθαν, λέγειν κελεύων καὶ διδάσκαλος πάντων γιγνόµενος τήν τε µισθοφορὰν ξυνέτεµεν, ἀντὶ δραχµῆς Ἀττικῆς ὥστε τριώβολον, καὶ τοῦτο µὴ ἔσωθαν, λέγειν κελεύων καὶ διδάσκαλος πάντων γιγνόµενος τήν τε µισθοφορὰν ξυνέτεµεν, ἀντὶ δραχµῆς Ἀττικῆς ὥστε τριώβολον, καὶ τοῦτο µὴ ἔσωθαν, λέγειν κελεύων... (8.45.2)

This passage again gives us explicit evidence for the reasons behind the pay rates of Greek sailors in the Peloponnesian War. Westlake showed that in clauses of the type introduced by “οὐ τοσοῦτον... ὅσον,” οὐ τοσοῦτον does not entirely negate what follows; rather, the formulation “οὐ τοσοῦτον... ὅσον” emphasizes the second consideration at the expense of the first.36 Thus, the poverty of the Athenians (i.e. the lack of funds available to them to pay their sailors) is given by Alcibiades as a legitimate reason for the pay rate

35 8.45.2: ” I do not take 8.45.2 to be a doublet of 8.29: see chapter 6 section iii. See also chapter 6 section iii for full discussion of the textual problems in this passage, and the evidence it provides for the official distribution of pay in late fifth century Athens.

36 (1958) 102-110.
of three obols per day given to their sailors. If both of the considerations (and especially
the second)\(^3^7\) that Alcibiades told Tissaphernes to raise when telling the Peloponnesians
of his decision to give less pay (and that irregularly) are clearly pretexts, presented in a
“highly tendentious” context,\(^3^8\) that does not mean that we cannot use them as evidence
for Greek thought on pay in the late fifth century, as although “[i]t is not of course
necessary that the information supplied here by Alcibiades should be in all respects
correct... it must [however] be plausible enough for Tissaphernes to be able to base his
argument on it.”\(^3^9\) In other words, at Thuc. 8.45.2, a scarcity of funds emerges as a
reason the Athenians reduced the rate of pay received by their sailors.

Alcibiades continued in his policy of harming the Peloponnesian cause by
dismissing the *poleis* now allied to the Peloponnesians who had come to Tissaphernes to
ask for money for the war (Thucy. 8.45.4). Just as with the Peloponnesian fleet,

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37 See Loomis (1998) 44 n.47: “Alcibiades did not want Tissaphernes to say that the Athenians could not
afford more, since Tissaphernes clearly could—hence the moral motive.” Cf. Gallo (1987) 43 n.63.

38 Hornblower, *CT* iii.887.

39 Andrewes, *HCT* v.99. Kallet ([2001] 261-262) describes the explanation to be given by Tissaphernes as
a “sham,” and that this episode confirms Spartan ignorance about naval financing. But the fact that the
Spartans needed “an explanation for a certain rate of pay over another and why it should be paid
irregularly” does not show ignorance: it is entirely to be expected given that the Peloponnesians and
Tissaphernes had agreed, shortly before Alcibiades’ machinations, pay terms that were more advantageous
(see 8.29.1-2, with 8.36.1) than those now offered by Tissaphernes. And, again contra Kallet, the “sham
nature of the explanation” (and the impression of Spartan ignorance) is not necessarily confirmed by the
fact that Alcibiades told Tissaphernes to bribe the trierarchs and generals of the fleet (8.45.3)—many of
whom had served under the Athenians—so as to get them to accept the reduced rate of pay for their sailors,
since they would see through the moral explanation. This move of Alcibiades can be sufficiently—and
more satisfactorily than Kallet’s attempt—explained by the need to dampen any opposition from the
leaders of the fleet to the move by Tissaphernes to cut the pay of the sailors, opposition that could have
been expected otherwise (see already 8.29.1-2, and see also 8.50.3, 8.57.1-2, 8.78, 8.80.1, 8.83.2-8.84.1 for
dissatisfaction in the Peloponnesian fleet in response to the policy of Tissaphernes as outlined at 8.45.2).
Cf. the scholia [Mvc.] on 8.45.3: “ὡστε δότα χρήματα αὐτῷ πέσαι: ἐπεὶ δὲν ὁ Ἀλκιβίας τῶν
Τισσαφέρνην δόναι χρήματα ταῖς τριηράρχαις τῶν Πελοποννησίων, ἵνα ξυγχωρήσωσιν αὐτῷ ἀντὶ τῆς
dραχμῆς τριῶβολον τῷ στεφανίτῃ διδόναι.”
Alcibiades had to come up with justifications for refusing money to the cities (which had recently revolted from Athens): among other considerations for refusing to give them the money, Alcibiades “also pointed out that Tissaphernes was at present carrying on the war at his own expense, and had good cause for economy, but that as soon as he received remittances from the King he would give them their pay in full, and do what was reasonable for the cities.”

The rate of pay given by Tissaphernes to the Peloponnesians is thus linked to frugality on his part (rather than to any sort of notion of price). This provides us with a third instance (in addition to 8.29.1 and 8.45.2) from the last book of Thucydides where availability of funds—and no other reason—is given as the reason for the establishment of a rate of military pay. If it is here given only as a pretext, like any other reason given as a pretext, it relied on convention, accepted ideas of how the world worked, and probability, and therefore can still serve for us as evidence for what Greeks thought were the causes for the setting of rates of pay.

Explicit evidence for Athenian rates of pay being determined by the state of public finances comes from Thucydides’ description of Athenian political intrigues in the following summer. After the Athenians on Samos had recalled Alcibiades (Thucy. 8.81.1), some envoys from the Four Hundred went to Samos to present the case for the new dispensation at Athens to the Athenian fleet. Alcibiades sent the envoys away with the following answer:

... ὅτι τοὺς μὲν πεντακισχιλίους οὐ κωλύοι ἄρχειν, τοὺς µέντοι τετρακοσίους ἐκέλευεν ἀπαλλάσσειν αὐτοὺς καὶ καθιστάναι τὴν βουλὴν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, τοὺς πεντακόσιους· εἰ δὲ ἐς εὐτέλειαν τι ξυντέτµηται, ὥστε τοὺς στρατευοµένους µᾶλλον ἔξειν τροφήν, πάνυ ἐπαίνειν.

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8.45.6: “τὸν τε Τισσαφέρνη ἀπέφαινε νῦν µέν, τοῖς ἰδίοις χρήµασι πολεµοῦντα, εἰκότως φειδόµενον, ἢν δὲ ποτὲ τροφὴ καταβῇ παρὰ βασιλέως, ἐντελὴ αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν τὸν µισθὸν καὶ τὰς πόλεις τὰ εἰκότα ὑψεῖσαι.”
that he did not object to the government of the Five Thousand, but insisted that the Four Hundred should be deposed and the Council of Five Hundred reinstated in power; and if there had been any curtailment with a view to economy, so the soldiers in the field might have better [pay], he quite approved of that. (8.86.6)

A proposed change in a rate of pay is again explicitly linked to the capability of a public treasury to fund it, and to a measure that might be taken to provide that money.\footnote{41}

Evidence for the factors determining rates of pay at Athens in the classical period is not confined to Thucydides. Probably in 403/2, there was a proposal in a speech of Lysias\footnote{42} to cut the the \textit{μισθός} of the Athenian cavalry from one drachma to four obols. There was also in this speech a proposed change in the pay of the two hundred Athenian \textit{ἱπποτοξόται} [mounted archers], with the new figure to be eight obols. The original editors of the papyrus thought the figure for the mounted archers’ original pay to be two obols, and that they therefore received a pay increase of six obols.\footnote{43} Pritchett, Bugh and others, assuming that the cavalry were representatives of the richer classes at Athens, and the mounted archers members of the poorer classes there, took these two changes in pay rates to be evidence of class warfare in Athens affecting a rate of pay, i.e. that political conditions (the restored democracy’s resentment of the rich after the rule of the Thirty)

\footnote{41}{Cf. Thucy. 8.65.3 (and [Aris.], \textit{Ath. Pol.} 29.5): earlier that summer, those conspiring for the revolution had made a proposal that no one ought to receive pay except those who were serving in the war ("ὡς οὔτε \textit{µισθοφορήτεον εἴη ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς στρατευομένους"). See also Thucy. 8.97.1 (and [Aris.], \textit{Ath. Pol.} 33.1): the newly restored democracy decided that no one was to receive pay for any office ("καὶ \textit{µισθὸν µηδένα φέρειν µηδεµῖας ἀρχῆς"). As Andrewes notes (\textit{HCT} v.329), “[t]he original plan (65.3) abolished all pay but military, and serving troops must have been paid (cf. Alkibiades at 86.6).” The availability of military pay is considered again solely within the context of public finance and expenditure.}

\footnote{42}{Lysias, fr.6 (\textit{Against Theozotides}), ll.70-75.}

\footnote{43}{See Loomis (1995) 231.
determined the changed rates of pay. Loomis has argued convincingly, however, that the original figure for the pay of the ἵπποτοξόται was two drachmas, and that they therefore suffered, just as the cavalry did, a pay cut of a third; he also demonstrated that the mounted archers had at least as much status and prestige as the cavalry. The reduction in pay rates, then, was not a reflection of ideological or class differences, but rather almost certainly one of financial crisis at Athens. The Athenians were in continued financial crisis throughout the Ionian War, engaging in desperate measures to produce pay for their navy, such as melting down practically everything they could of the treasures that were held in the Parthenon to produce silver and gold coinage, and striking the first Athenian token coinage. This financial crisis lasted through the end of the war to the first years of peace and almost certainly provides the proper context in which to interpret the calls for reductions in rates of pay found in the fragment of Lysias.

Just over fifty years later, in 351, Demosthenes attempted to persuade the Athenian assembly to send a force of two thousand infantry, two hundred cavalry, and ten triremes to the northern Aegean against Philip, who had recently won a series of victories against the Athenians. Against any potential objections to the cost of this force, Demosthenes proposed that the Athenians provide it with σιτηρέσιον (i.e. ration-money) only, two obols per day per man for the infantry and the sailors, and one drachma per day for the cavalry (4.28). Anticipating the objection that providing only σιτηρέσιον for the

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44 See Pritchett (1971) 21-32; Bugh (1988) 131-132 n.54 and all bibliography there; Cook (1990) 83.


force would be an insufficient inducement for his proposed force, Demosthenes stated that “...προσποριεῖ τὰ λοίπ' αὐτὸ τὸ στρατεύµ' ἀπὸ τοῦ πολέµου... ὥστε ἔχειν μισθὸν ἐντελῆ,” “the force itself will provide the rest out of the war [i.e. from the sale of booty], so as to make up their full pay...” (4.29).

A number of interesting points arise from this speech. For the first (and only) time, we find price playing a role in a payment to a military force: Demosthenes presents the figure of two obols per day as sufficient for the daily sustenance of the infantry and the naval crews. 47 Although Demosthenes was trying here to play down the expense of the standing force he proposed for the war against Philip, his figures would have had to have seemed plausible, and he would have had to have composed his speech with the expectation that some hundreds or thousands of Athenians, who were broadly representative of the citizen body as a whole, could think his plan conceivable: we should therefore take the figure of two obols as enough for the daily subsistence expenses of a soldier or sailor on campaign as broadly accurate. 48 But it is important to note that


48 Contra Cook (1990) 83: “[i]t seems evident that 2 obols was insufficient even as a ration allowance, and both Demosthenes and his audience knew it.” Cook comes to this mistaken conclusion for four reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, she mistranslates part of 4.29, “εἰ δὲ τις οἴεται µικρὰν ἀφορµὴν εἶναι, σιτηρέσιον τοῖς στρατευοµένοις ὑπάρχειν, οὔκ ὀρθῶς ἔγνωκεν...” as “[a]nd if anyone should think that too little as a σιτηρέσιον... [he is wrong].” But ἀφορµὴ should be translated here as “inducement” (see LSJ, ‘ἀµορφή,’ 2) and therefore the Loeb translation, rather than Cook’s, should be followed: “[i]f anyone imagines that ration-money for the men on active service is only a small provision to start with, he is wrong...” The emphasis is on the σιτηρέσιον as an inducement to serve, as is confirmed by the following clause, where Demosthenes proposes that the σιτηρέσιον will be supplemented, so as to make full pay for the force, by plunder. Secondly, Cook mistakenly takes the pay rates referred to at Thucy. 5.47.6 and Xen., Hell. 5.2.21 as solely for ration-money (see p.335 and n.120): since these were over four obols, her mistake leads her to conclude that two obols must have been too little for ration-money. Thirdly, she misunderstands Thucy. 8.45.2 to mean that Athenian sailors only got three obols on campaign as subsistence money ([1990] 82), and another three obols to make up their full pay when arrived back in Athens; since three obols is more than two, again the mistaken conclusion that two obols must have been insufficient for daily subsistence. But it is anachronistic to distinguish between ration-money and pay in 412/11 (see Loomis [1998] 59 and chapter 6 section viii) and Athenian sailors received all of their pay while on campaign (see chapter 6 for demonstration of this point and for full discussion of Thucy. 8.45.2).
Demosthenes, in proposing an amount for σιτηρέσιον, makes no provision for changes in that figure based on changes in the prices of provisions in the prospective military theater: clearly, then, the figure which Demosthenes gives is based only on a general idea of how much the sailors’ and soldiers’ daily provisioning would cost, and on the assumption that there would not be dramatic changes in the market prices of basic foods on the campaign.

Dem. 4.28-29 also shows that it was generally expected that Athenian soldiers and sailors in the middle of the fourth century would get some amount of μισθός in addition to their σιτηρέσιον, so as to make up their μισθὸς ἐντελής, their full pay.49 Since μισθός proper was normally treated as equivalent to μισθὸς ἐντελής (except when, as here, financial contingencies forced orators or generals to distinguish between the two, in order to focus on providing at least the bare subsistence payment of σιτηρέσιον),50 this means...

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Footnote:

49 See also the discussion of Dem. 4 at chapter 6 section v.

50 See chapter 6 section v, Gabrielsen (1981) 71-72.
that, in the middle of the fourth century, one part of the \(\mu\iota\sigma\delta\iota\zeta\) payment to soldiers and sailors was determined by general ideas about subsistence prices, but the other part of it was determined by factors that had nothing to do with the market prices of commodities. Thus \(\mu\iota\sigma\delta\iota\zeta\), taken as a whole, was only (very) partially determined by thinking on prices.\footnote{Cf. appendix 5 section iii on Hellenistic military pay and ration-allowances.} Here, in Demosthenes’ First \textit{Philippic}, it was the state of Athenian public finances that was the determining factor in the (non-)payment of \(\mu\iota\sigma\delta\iota\zeta\) for his planned standing army: the force to be sent against Philip could not be exceedingly large because the Athenians could afford neither the \(\mu\iota\sigma\delta\iota\zeta\) nor the \(\tau\rho\omicron\varphi\iota\) for such a force;\footnote{4.23: \textquote{\textquotesingle\textquotesingle ο\'υ το\'ι\'ιν \textit{ιπ\'ερ\'ογκον α\'υ\'τ\'η\'ν (ο\'υ \gamma\'α\'ε \iota\'στι \mu\iota\sigma\delta\iota\zeta \omicron\'i\'δ\'ε \tau\rho\omicron\varphi\iota\)\'}...} and the wish not to burden the Athenian treasury is the fundamental motivation for Demosthenes’ proposal that \(\mu\iota\sigma\delta\iota\zeta\) for his moderately sized standing force would be provided from plunder.\footnote{More generally, Demosthenes’ speech is indicative of the financial troubles that hindered Athenian military campaigns throughout the middle of the fourth century, and which are mentioned often in a variety of sources (see Gabrielsen [1994] 117, Cook [1990] 83 for examples). In all of Demosthenes’ complaints about the lack of funding for Athenian overseas expeditions, Isocrates’ praise of Timotheus for his self-financing of campaigns, and the anecdotes found in the pseudo-Aristotelian \textit{Oeconomica} and Polyænus’ \textit{Strategica} on Timotheus’ and other Athenian generals’ stratagems to come up with money to pay their forces, the issue at hand is always the availability of funds to provide pay for military forces. It is the availability of money for pay that keeps forces together, and it is the lack of money for pay that endangers the success of campaigns. Rises or falls in basic food prices, and consequent increases or decreases in pay rates, are never mentioned, however, in the (relatively) abundant ancient discussions of the pay of Athenian forces in the fourth century.} In contrast to Demosthenes’ Athenians, other military employers in the Greek world (and neighboring areas) in the fourth century (occasionally) had abundant financial resources: these resources together with a strong demand for mercenaries sometimes led...
to (substantial) rises in rates of pay for military service.\textsuperscript{54} In 377/6, Acoris, the king of the Egyptians, collected a large mercenary force for his revolt against the King by offering high pay to those who enrolled in his army (“µεγάλους γὰρ µισθοὺς τοῖς ύπακούουσι προτιθέις”) (Diod. 15.29.1). During the Sacred War of 355-347, the Phocians also amassed a large number of mercenaries by offering higher than usual rates of pay. The increased pay rates offered by the Phocians were made possible by their seizure of Delphi and its sacred offerings (see esp. Diod. 16.56.5-6, Isoc. 5.54): the money from Delphi allowed them to raise the current rate of pay for their mercenaries first by one half\textsuperscript{55}—and then, in 353/2, after a crushing defeat at the hands of the forces of Philip and the Thessalians, allowed their new commander, Phayllus to begin again to recruit mercenaries, this time by offering double the usual amount of pay (“διπλασιάσας τοὺς εἰωθότας µισθοὺς”) (Diod. 16.36.1).

Using predatory seizures of property to fund rapid recruitment of large amounts of mercenaries by offering higher than usual rates of pay was a measure more normally

\textsuperscript{54} For demand as a factor affecting rates of pay for classical Greek military forces, see Marinovic (1988) 172, Rawlings (2007) 169, Burrer (2008) 81.

\textsuperscript{55} Diodorus reports two occasions on which the Phocians recruited many mercenaries for campaigns against the Boeotians by raising their pay by a half: 16.25.1 ((355/4) with the Phocian’s own money and a sum of fifteen talents received from Archidamus (16.24.2), Philomelus, the Phocian general, began to assemble a large force of mercenaries by raising the current rate of pay by one half (“ἄναβιβάσας τοὺς µισθοὺς καὶ ποιήσας ἡµιολίους”); 16.30.1 ((354/3) using the sacred dedications at Delphi, Philomelus raised the pay he was offering by one half again (“ὑποστησαµένου δ’ αὐτοῦ τοῖς ξένοις µισθοὺς ἡµιολίους”) and, in this way, gathered many mercenaries who were attracted by the high rates of pay). Diodorus perpetrates several doublets in his account of the Third Sacred War; it appears very likely, given the similarity of his descriptions of the context of the two pay raises, that this is one of them. It should be noted also that Diodorus contradicts himself at 16.30.1, since at 16.28.2 and 16.56.5 he writes that Philomelus kept his hands off the sacred dedications at Delphi: despite this contradiction, it is clear from Diodorus’ account (esp. 16.56.5-6) and Isocrates’ brief description of the Sacred War that the Phocians’ spending on military pay in these years was made possible by their seizure of the sanctuary at Delphi.
associated in the Greek world with tyrants, and especially Dionysius I of Syracuse.\textsuperscript{56}

Dionysius I several times during his rule of Syracuse\textsuperscript{57} raised rates of pay to assemble mercenaries quickly: besieged in the citadel of Syracuse in 404, he promised mercenaries from Campania any price they should ask for the duration of the siege ("ὡµολόγησεν αὐτοῖς δώσειν χρήµατα ὅσα ἂν αἰτήσωσιν εἰς τὴν πολιορκίαν") (Diod. 14.8.6); in 398, he was able to recruit many mercenaries for his war against the Carthaginians by promising high pay ("µισθοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπαγγελλόµενος") (Diod. 14.44.2); in 396, in the midst of the war with the Carthaginians and desperate for military help, he sent men with large amounts of money to recruit mercenaries in the Peloponnese, ordering them to pay whatever rates they had to in order to assemble as many mercenaries as possible ("ἔπεµψε δὲ καὶ ξενολόγους εἰς Πελοπόννησον µετὰ πολλῶν χρηµάτων, ἐντειλάµενος ὡς πλείστους ἀθροίζειν στρατιώτας µὴ φειδοµένους τῶν µισθῶν") (Diod. 14.62.1). Dionysius raised the funds necessary for his wars and the high rates of pay he paid to mercenaries to fight for him in those wars by a series of exceptional financial expedients: plundering temples, imposing extraordinarily high taxes, extorting money, and manipulating coinage.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{56} But cf. Xen., Hell. 7.4.33: in 364, the Arcadian League using the sacred treasures at Olympia to maintain their regular army.

\textsuperscript{57} And even before: see Diod. 13.93.2: in 406, before his tyranny, Dionysius paid what was owing to Dexippus' mercenaries at Gela and double pay to the Syracusans under him by confiscating the possessions of the wealthiest Geloans. In the same year, having been appointed general with supreme power, Dionysius proposed a decree that the pay of the mercenaries hired by the Syracusans be doubled (Diod. 13.95.1).

\textsuperscript{58} See Parke (1933) 72 for discussion and references to the relevant ancient sources; see also Morris (2001) 75 and van Wees (2004) 238 (cf. Marinovic [1988] 172). Cf. Polyaenus, Strateg. 6.1.2-7: various financial stratagems employed by Jason of Pherae to find pay for his mercenaries; and Xen., Hell. 6.4.30: Jason suspected of having designs on the sacred treasures at Delphi. Cf. also Xen., Hiero 4.11: tyrants often forced into robbing temples and their fellow men in order to meet the expenses of maintaining mercenary armies.
The need to win and maintain the allegiance of mercenaries also motivated (some) military employers to raise rates of pay. Hippocrates (in 492) gave his Ergetine mercenaries the largest share of the booty and greater pay (“μισθοὺς μείζονας”) on campaign to win their favor as part of a ruse to eventually capture their city (Polyaenus, Strateg. 5.6). At Tarsus in 401, the Greeks of Cyrus’ army suspected (correctly) that they were being led against the King and asked for more pay because of this (Xen., Anab. 1.3.21): Cyrus, in order to head off the desertion of the men, promised a pay rise of fifty per cent, from one daric to one daric and a half per month (ibid.). Xenophon noted that Jason of Pherae rewarded the best and bravest of his mercenaries by special gifts and by doubling, trebling, and quadrupling their pay (Xen., Hell. 6.1.6). Finally, Xenophon’s paradigmatic military leader, 59 Cyrus, sends to the King of India to ask for funds so that he can pay generous wages (“ὦπως ἔχω καὶ µισθὸν ἀφθόνως διδόναι οἷς ἂν δέῃ”) and reward those of his soldiers who deserve it (Cyr. 3.2.28, cf. 3.2.29-30); after the battle of Sardis, he wins the allegiance of the Egyptians by promising them favors, and especially that, as long as the war continues, he will give them larger pay than they were now receiving (“µισθὸν µὲν ὑµῖν δοίην ἂν πλείονα ἡ νῦν ἐλαµβάνετε ὡςον ἂν χρόνον πόλεµος ἔ”) (Cyr. 7.1.43). 60

Competition for military manpower between warring states also played a crucial role in determining the rates of pay given to classical Greek sailors and soldiers. 61 This

59 See again the discussion at chapter 3 section iva.

60 Cf. Diod. 15.29.1: Acoris recruiting large amounts of mercenaries not only by offering high rates of pay but also by doing favors to many of them.

61 See Gallo (1987) 36, 42-44 for an excellent discussion of the effect competition for (naval) manpower between the Athenians and Peloponnesians had on rates of pay for naval service in the Peloponnesian war.
factor is first attested in two speeches made twenty years’ before Alcibiades’ and Tissaphernes’ machinations. In 432/1, the Corinthians, speaking at a meeting of the Spartans and their allies, attempted to make the case for war against the Athenians. As part of their argument, the Corinthians asserted that the Peloponnesians could raise enough money by contributions and by loans from Delphi and Olympia to both raise a fleet and lure sailors away from the Athenian fleet:

... ναυτικόν τε, ὑ ὅ ἰσχύον, ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης τε ἐκάστοις οἰκείας ἐξηρτυσόμεθα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳ χρημάτων δάνειον γὰρ ποιησάμενοι ὑπολαβεῖν οἴοι τ’ ἐσμὲν μισθῷ μεῖζον τοῖς ξένους αὐτῶν ναυβάτας, ἐνεργῇ γὰρ ἡ Ἁθηναίων δύναμις µᾶλλον ἡ οἰκεία· ἦς δὲ ἡ ἡµετέρα ἄρα ἢσσον ἂν τούτῳ πάθοι, τοῖς σώµατι τὸ πλέον ἰσχύοντα ἢ τοῖς χρήµάσι.

[[the naval strength which they possess shall be raised by us from our respective present resources, and from the moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from these enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. For Athenian power is bought and not native; while ours will not be exposed to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money. (Thucy. 1.121.3)

The Peloponnesians having decided on war, the Spartans went to Athens and offered war, unless certain concessions were made by the Athenians. In the assembly discussing the Peloponnesians’ demands, Pericles stood up and forcefully argued for accepting war as inevitable. In the course of his speech, he made several arguments for why the Athenians could approach any war with the Peloponnesians optimistically, focusing on the Peloponnesians’ want of money, and the Athenians’ greater skill in and knowledge of naval warfare:


63 Cf. p.563 n.8 on the historical use of this speech.
Two crucial points emerge from these two passages. Firstly, the proposed rates of pay are explicitly determined by competition, i.e. by how much the enemy is paying to its sailors. Secondly, this competition can only take place if both sides have similar resources in money: without the treasures of Olympia and Delphi, there is simply no way in which the Peloponnesians can compete in the naval sphere with the Athenians; on the obverse, the huge surpluses of cash the Athenians possess and the yearly revenues they receive mean that they possess an almost insuperable advantage in the new warfare.

The same factors—competition between states in warfare, and the availability of reserves of money to finance increases in rates of pay—surfaced in 408, in the midst of the Ionian War. Lysander, having been sent out as admiral to the eastern Aegean by the Spartans (Xen., Hell. 1.5.1), went up, with ambassadors from his home polis, to Sardis to

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64 Both of which should be read in the light of Thucydides’ reflections in the Archaeology on the necessity of reserves of money for the new trireme-based warfare of the fifth century (and especially 1.19 on the different approaches taken by Athens and Sparta to ruling over others), and Pericles’ description of the limited Peloponnesian capabilities in the new warfare, especially their lack of reserves of money and revenues as compared to the Athenians (Thucy. 1.141-142).

discuss the war with Cyrus, who had arrived recently in Asia Minor to rule over all the peoples on the coast and with orders from the King to support the Spartans in the war (Xen., *Hell.* 1.5.3). Cyrus promised Lysander and the ambassadors that he would do everything in his power to support the Peloponnesians, and especially financially (Xen., *Hell.* 1.5.3). In response to this, the ambassadors thanked him, and “urged him to make the wage of each sailor an Attic drachma a day, explaining that if this were made the rate, the sailors of the Athenian fleet would desert their ships, and hence he would spend less money.”

Cyrus agreed that the plan was a good one, but that he could not deviate from the King’s instructions, and that the original agreement stated that the King should give thirty mnaia per month to each ship (or three obols per day to each sailor) (Xen., *Hell.* 1.5.5). Lysander let the matter drop; but later, after dinner, when Cyrus asked him how he could gratify Lysander the most—expecting Lysander to ask for a private gift—Lysander replied, “[b]y adding an obol to the pay of each sailor.” Cyrus granted the request, and from this point on, the rate of pay on the Peloponnesian side was four obols per day; Cyrus also settled the arrears of pay and gave the sailors a month’s pay in advance, with the result that the Peloponnesian sailors became much more eager for the war (Xen., *Hell.* 1.5.7). The Athenians, in contrast, were despondent when they heard of Cyrus’ actions (Xen., *Hell.* 1.5.8).

Here again, competition and availability of funds—Cyrus told the Spartans that he had brought with him five hundred talents for the war and, if this proved insufficient, he

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66 Xen., *Hell.* 1.5.4: “... καὶ ἐκέλευον αὐτὸν τάξαι τῷ ναύτῃ δραχμὴν Ἀττικῆν, διδάσκοντες ὅτι, ἂν οὗτος ὁ μισθὸς γένηται, οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦται ἀπολείψουσι τὰς ναῦς, καὶ µείω χρήµατα ἀναλώσει.”

67 Xen., *Hell.* 1.5.6: “εἰ πρὸς τὸν µισθὸν ἑκάστῳ ναύτῃ ὀβολὸν προσοδιέτης.”
would use his own funds, that he would even go so far as to break up his throne of silver and gold if he had to (Xen., *Hell.* 1.5.3)—are described by a contemporary author as the sole determinants in setting (higher) pay rates. The Athenians at this time were still paying three obols per day to their sailors (Plut., *Alc.* 35.5) and the extra obol paid from this point on to the sailors on the Peloponnesian side was added with the goal of encouraging desertion from the Athenian navy. In addition to the initial reasoning of the Spartan ambassadors to Cyrus, that such a measure, taken together with the settlement of arrears of pay and the advance of pay, was considered effective can be seen from the contrasting reactions of the Peloponnesian sailors and the Athenians when hearing of Cyrus’ actions.\(^\text{68}\)

Competition for men (made possible by the availability of funds) as a factor in setting rates of pay for sailors was not a factor limited to the Peloponnesian War. In a speech of 359 describing actions that took place in 362, Apollodorus—who was serving as the trierarch of an Athenian ship participating in some actions in the northern Aegean—recounted the factors that caused men from his ship to desert to the navies of other cities. Since the men had received no \(\mu\iota\sigma\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma\) except for two months, and saw that there were no funds to provide \(\mu\iota\sigma\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma\) for the near future ([Dem.] 50.14-15), many of the men deserted Apollodorus’ trireme, some to the mainland to undertake military service there, and others to the ships of the Thasians and Maronites, the latter “won over by the promise of high pay and receiving substantial sums in advance.”\(^\text{69}\) In fact, Apollodorus

\(^{68}\) According to Plut. *Lys.* 4.7, most of the Athenian sailors did, in fact, defect to the Peloponnesians for the extra obol, but Plutarch is exaggerating here: see Krentz (1989) 136.

\(^{69}\) [Dem.] 50.14: “\(\mu\iota\sigma\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma\ \mu\iota\gamma\alpha\lambda\iota\ \pi\iota\sigma\iota\zeta\varsigma\iota\tau\epsilon\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \alpha\rho\gamma\varphi\iota\varsigma\iota\nu\ \pi\omicron\lambda\iota\ \pi\omicron\alpha\lambda\beta\omicron\iota\varsigma\tau\eta\varsigma\varsigma\iota\tau\epsilon\varsigma\)...” Cf. Gabrielsen (1994) 122 and Thucy. 7.13.2: according to the letter of Nicias back to the Athenians, those foreigners who had joined
lamented, since he had gone out of his way to hire especially good rowers, they were especially likely to desert as “trusting in their skill as able rowers, they went off wherever they were likely to again take the most money...”

There were thus two causes for desertions from Apollodorus’ ship and to other cities: firstly, the known lack of money available to pay the men; and secondly, the promise of higher rates of pay elsewhere. Writing four years later on the dire military situation of the Athenians, Isocrates also focused on the effect higher rates of pay offered by other military employers had on the forces employed by the Athenians:

πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον οὖχ ἡµᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀσκοῦµεν, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπους τοὺς µὲν ἀπόλιδας τοὺς δ' αὐτοµόλους τοὺς δ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων κακουργιῶν συνερρυηκόας, οἷς ὁπόταν τις διδῷ πλείω µισθόν, µέτ' ἐκείνων ἐφ' ἡµᾶς ἀκολουθήσωσιν.

we do not train ourselves for war but employ instead vagabonds, deserters, and fugitives who have thronged together here in consequence of other misdemeanors, who, whenever others offer them higher pay, will follow their leaderships against us. (8.44)

Isocrates’ presentation here of the Athenians’ military situation is tendentious and exaggerated; but he was exaggerating the Athenian dependence on mercenaries; the factor he adduced as potentially leading the mercenaries to desert had to seem plausible to his audience, or else his argument would have had no force.

the Sicilian expedition voluntarily in the hope of making money were the most prone of those in the fleet to desertion and the hiring of slaves in their stead. See p.348 n.151 for further discussion of Thucy. 7.13.2.

70 [Dem.] 50.16: “οἱ δ' ἐµοὶ ναῦται πιστεύοντες αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῷ δύνασθαι ἐλαύνειν, ὅπου ἢµελλον ἀγχύριον πάλιν πλείστον ὁλῆσιν, ἐνταῦθ' ἀπῆσαν...”

71 The reference to Athenian mercenary forces taking service with another employer here is almost certainly inspired by the Athenian general Chares’ actions in the same year when he enlisted the forces serving under him in the service of Artabazus in order to save the Athenians expense: see, e.g., Diod. 16.22.1-2, Dem. 4.24, Isoc. 7.8.
Competition between states for military manpower did not always result in rises in rates of military pay for classical Greek soldiers and sailors. As we have seen, in the winter of 412/11, Tissaphernes cut the pay of the Peloponnesian sailors from one drachma to three obols per day (Thucy. 8.45.2). As Gallo points out, Tissaphernes could only cut the pay of the Peloponnesians because the Athenians had recently done the same. Because of the Athenian reduction, Tissaphernes could reduce the rate of pay he gave to the Peloponnesians without the danger of desertion to the Athenians because of their offering a more attractive and competitive rate of pay. Because of the continued financial difficulties of the Athenians in these years and their consequent inability to pay any more than three obols per day to their sailors, the Persians were able to keep paying the same low rate until Lysander’s intervention with Cyrus. And, in general, because, in the fourth century, no Greek state possessed the massive (annual) imperial revenues which the fifth-century Athenian state did before 413/412, there were generally lower rates of military offered and paid in the fourth century: in the absence of competitors that had the financial resources to pay consistently high rates, no Greek state had to pay (on a consistent basis) rates of pay as high of those of the fifth century to recruit men into service and/or to entice them from competing military employers.  

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iv. Standard and conventional rates of pay for classical Greek military forces

As I have indicated, there has been much controversy on whether one drachma per man per day was, in fact, the usual rate of pay for Athenian soldiers and sailors in the fifth century. It is the only rate of pay mentioned by Thucydides for Athenian forces before the winter of 412/11, but Pritchett has argued that “Thucydides’ practice seems to have been to record the rate when it was exceptional.”\(^74\) This is incorrect: it was exceptional for Thucydides to mention rates of pay, but he did not mention them only when they were exceptional. At 3.17, Thucydides includes an unusual amount of financial detail “for a significant purpose: he is using it to explain why there was a special financial drain on Athens.”\(^75\) The rate of pay of the hoplites, their attendants, and the sailors manning the ships is mentioned explicitly at 3.17.4 not because it is unusual, but because it is a detail that helps to explain the vast expenses that the Athenians had to meet in the annual campaigning in the early years of the war—and the later measures needed to meet these expenses.\(^76\) At 6.31.3, in his description of the expedition before it set sail for Sicily, Thucydides tells us, amongst other things, that each sailor received a drachma per day for the expedition; in addition, the *thranitai* (those rowers manning the top bank of each trireme) and the *hyperesia* of each trireme received bonuses from the trierarchs (6.31.3). As with the description of the rates of pay at Potidaea, Thucydides does not mention the rate of pay here because it was unusual (i.e. unusually high), but

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\(^74\) (1971) 24.


\(^76\) See Gallo (1987) 38 (quoted at p.288 n.89 above).
rather as one of a number of details included to emphasize the money spent on this particular campaign, and especially to support his statement regarding the Sicilian expedition that “this armament that first sailed out was by far the most costly and splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a single city up to that time.” Thucydides’ mention of the rate of pay for the Athenian sailors also allowed him to mention the bonuses given to the thranitai and hyperesia of each trireme and thus to bring out the massive private expenditures on the preparation of the expedition. There is also nothing in Thucydides’ narrative to suggest that the one drachma rate given to the Thracian mercenaries in 413 was unusual. Thucydides does tell us that the Thracian peltasts were considered too expensive because of the Decelean war; but the point of his comment is that, in light of the great financial stresses the occupation of Decelea and the heavy expenses of the fighting in Sicily were causing—bringing Athens to a major financial crisis for the first time in the Peloponnesian war—the Athenians could now not afford any unnecessary expense.

Other evidence from Thucydides implies strongly that the one drachma rate was the standard Athenian military rate of pay before 412. At the beginning of the spring of 415, representatives of the polis of Egesta came to Athens, bringing sixty talents of


78 Note that the rate of pay for the infantry and cavalry forces of the expedition is not mentioned by Thucydides: since these were not commanded by private individuals carrying out liturgies, they would have received pay only from the state. See also p.348 n.151 on Thucy. 7.13.2 for discussion of the rate of pay attested for the Sicilian expedition.

79 See the discussion above at section ii.
uncoined silver for sixty ships, which they were to ask the Athenians to send for their war against Selinus and Syracuse (6.8.1): bringing sixty talents for sixty ships meant that, assuming two hundred men per trireme, the Egestaeans assumed that the pay rate for Athenian sailors was one drachma per day, “which rather suggests that it was known as normal...”

In addition, at 8.45.2, as we have seen, Thucydides narrates that Alcibiades cut down the pay of the Peloponnesian sailors from one drachma to three obols a day, telling Tissaphernes to justify this to the Peloponnesians on the grounds that the Athenians were only paying their sailors three obols a day. In the second, what we might call ‘moral,’ consideration that Alcibiades raises at 8.45.2, it is strongly implied that the Athenians had formerly paid more than three obols to their sailors, but had ceased doing so because of the deterioration of conditions in the fleet the higher rate had led to. It is almost certain that this reduction was a recent measure, given the evidence for Athenian pay rates of one drachma per day in 415 and 413 (and before), and, given the many indications of serious financial crisis at Athens in the years 413 and 412, that it was linked to the recent severe financial pressures at Athens in 413/412: “[e]lectrum had occasionally been disbursed during the quadrennium 418/7-415/4 (IG I 370, lines 13-14, 57-58, 64-65), but in 413/12 the Treasurers of Athena paid out the enormous sum of 61,697 [Kyzikene] staters (IG I 372, line 4), the equivalent of 250+T and a sure indication that stocks of silver were now rapidly running out...” See also Samons ([2000] 256) on the allied revolts of 412 also contributing heavily to the financial crisis at Athens. Cf. Thucy. 8.76.6: in the summer of 411, the Athenians at Samos deciding to go their own way from the Athenians at home, since the latter were no longer able to send money to them.

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80 On the legitimacy of this assumption, see appendix 2.

81 Andrewes, HCT v.97. Cf., e.g., Hornblower, CT iii.316.

82 See esp. Gallo (1987) 43 and n.63, with Thucy. 7.27-7.29.1 (and esp. 7.28.4: the decision in the fall of 413 to replace the imperial tribute with a five per cent tax on seaborne trade), 8.1.3 (cuts in public expenditure (see also chapter 6 section v for discussion of 8.1)), 8.15.1 (the decision to use for the war the emergency fund of one thousand talents). See also Blamire (2001) 115 for epigraphical evidence for financial pressures at Athens in 413/412: “[e]lectrum had occasionally been disbursed during the quadrennium 418/7-415/4 (IG I 370, lines 13-14, 57-58, 64-65), but in 413/12 the Treasurers of Athena paid out the enormous sum of 61,697 [Kyzikene] staters (IG I 372, line 4), the equivalent of 250+T and a sure indication that stocks of silver were now rapidly running out...” See also Samons ([2000] 256) on the allied revolts of 412 also contributing heavily to the financial crisis at Athens. Cf. Thucy. 8.76.6: in the summer of 411, the Athenians at Samos deciding to go their own way from the Athenians at home, since the latter were no longer able to send money to them.
deterioration in Athenian state finances. Pritchett, however, as part of his hypothesis that the standard rate of pay for Athenian sailors and soldiers in the Peloponnesian war was three obols per day, took 8.45.2 as providing information for the “customary” practice of the Athenians with regard to pay: the support for this view relied on taking “ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου” from the phrase “ὡς Αθηναῖοι ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου ἐπιστήµονες ὄντες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τηµώδολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν” to refer to “διδόασιν” rather than “ἐπιστήµονες ὄντες.”

Taking this passage in addition to the arguments described (and proven incorrect) above, he concluded that the standard rate of pay for Athenian soldiers and sailors in the Peloponnesian was three obols per day per man. Yet it is clear that the temporal expression is referring to the Athenians’ maritime experience and not the pay rate: the Athenians’ longer knowledge of naval matters meant that they had experience of the deleterious effects of high rates of pay on ships’ crews. Pritchett and those others who have taken “ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου” to go with “διδόασιν” have missed the fact that “πλέονος”

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83 (1971) 17: “[i]n 8.45.2, Alkibiades is reported to have persuaded Tissaphernes to reduce the misthos of the Peloponnesian sailors from one drachme [sic] to three obols a day, excusing the analogy to the Athenian custom.”

84 Cf. (1971) 5, 24. Marinovic (1988) 167-168 and Markle (1985) 276 follow Pritchett expressly on this point: see Markle (1985) 276: “Thucydides (8.45.2) represents Alcibiades as claiming that the Athenians ‘for a considerable time... have paid three obols to their own sailors’ in order to persuade Tissaphernes to reduce the pay of the Peloponnesians, and I think that it is unlikely that Alcibiades would lie about Athenian misthos since the rate would have been generally known: had he done so, he would have been offering the satrap an ineffective argument.” Dover (HCT iv.293) and Andrewes (HCT v.97-98), despite coming to different conclusions than Pritchett on the standard Athenian rate of pay before 412 (see below p.331 n.110), also took “ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου” to be going with “διδόασιν.”

85 (1971) 24. Gomme (HCT ii.275-276) also took 8.45.2 to be evidence for the standard rate of pay of three obols per day.

in this instance)\textsuperscript{87} is a comparative: it does not mean a “considerable” or “long,”\textsuperscript{88} but rather a “longer” amount of time.\textsuperscript{89} Translated correctly, it makes no sense when taken with “διδόασιν:” Alcibiades would be telling Tissaphernes to tell the Peloponnesians that the Athenians were paying three obols per day for a longer time than the Peloponnesians were; this obviously does not fit with the facts that Tissaphernes was paying the Peloponnesians by this stage, that he had just cut their pay from one drachma to three obols, and that he had to bribe the trierarchs and generals to accept the new rate of three obols. Thucy. 8.45.2 does not, then, indicate that the Athenians had been paying three obols per man per day to their sailors for a considerable time before the winter of 412/11; rather, it strongly implies again that the Athenians had been used to paying their men a higher rate than three obols until forced to reduce the rate of pay due to financial exigencies.

Earlier in the same winter, Tissaphernes came to Miletus to distribute, as he had promised the Peloponnesians previously at Sparta that he would do (Thucy. 8.5.5),\textsuperscript{90} a month’s pay at the rate of an Attic drachma per man per day; for the future, though, he proposed to give only three obols until he should ask the King; and if the King so

\textsuperscript{87} At Thucy. 8.88, “ἐκ πλέονος” on its own does mean “long” (Alcibiades had “long” been aware that Tissaphernes had no intention of bringing the Phoenician ships to the Aegean). But see Thucy. 1.118.2 [τὸ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου] and 5.15.2 [περὶ τοῦ πλέονος χρόνου] for similar usage to 8.45.2, i.e. a form of πλέον with χρόνου meaning “longer.”

\textsuperscript{88} Pritchett ([1971] 24) translated “ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου” as “for a long time.”

\textsuperscript{89} See also Tucker (1892) 193, Morrison et al. (2000) 119, Hornblower, CT iii.887-888 for taking πλέονος in this way, and also the last cited for examples of other modern commentators doing so.

\textsuperscript{90} See p.301 and n.33 above: he had almost certainly promised a rate of an Attic drachma per man per day there.
ordered, he would give the full drachma (“ἐντελῆ τὴν δραχµήν”) (Thucy. 8.29.1). The phrasing of Tissaphernes’ offer gives the “strong impression that a ‘full drachma’ was the pay normally expected.”91 But why was this rate expected? As Thucy. 8.45.2 (and Xen., Hell. 1.5.1-8) demonstrate, the rates of pay offered by the Peloponnesians—made possible by Persian financial support—were determined by competition with the pay rates offered by the Athenians. This means that the pay rates offered and promised by Tissaphernes had to match the Athenian rate for naval service of one drachma per man per day, in order to enable the Peloponnesians to compete with the Athenians for manpower for their triremes:92 it should be noted in this respect that Tissaphernes distributed and offered to pay for the future one Attic drachma per day.

Moreover, at Thucy. 8.45.6, Alcibiades promised that the Peloponnesian sailors would get their full pay (“ἐντελῆ... τὸν µισθὸν”) as soon as funds arrived down from the King.93 Three obols per day was, then, not considered as full pay by either it payer or its payees, implying strongly that an (Attic) drachma per day was expected by the Peloponnesian sailors and their officers as a standard rate of pay (as would the fact that Alcibiades felt the need for bribery of the trierarchs and generals of the Peloponnesian fleet in order to get them to accept the dubious reasoning for the reduction in pay to three obols per day per man). The Peloponnesian sailors continued to complain that they were


92 See esp. Andrewes, HCT v.97: “[s]imilarly it is more likely that Tissaphernes first offered the standard Athenian rate (at 29, 45.6), then reduced it when the Athenian rate dropped to 3 ob., than that he began by offering double the standard rate. That the Athenian rate did drop to 3 ob. after 413 is likely in itself, and confirmed by Plu. Alc. 35.5, and the argument of Lysandros at X. HG i.5.4.”

93 For a full discussion of the term ‘µισθὸς ἐντελής’ in book 8 of Thucydides, see chapter six section v.
not receiving their full pay of one drachma per day throughout the winter of 412/11 (Thucy. 8.50.3) and the summer of 411 (Thucy. 8.78, 8.83.2-3).\textsuperscript{94} Even in 407, the Spartans could still propose a rate of pay of one \textit{Attic} drachma per man per day to Cyrus for the sailors of the Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean (Xen., \textit{Hell.} 1.5.4). The strong implication from the continued requests for an Attic drachma per day is that this rate had been established before 412 as a standard rate for Greek sailors in the eastern Mediterranean: it can only have been established as such by the payment practices of the state that had launched many more campaigns and fleets—and had complete control of the seas—in the years before 412—Athens.

Epigraphical evidence suggests that a drachma per man per day was also the rate paid by the Athenian state prior to the Peloponnesian war. On the thirteenth day of the first prytany of 433/2, the treasurers of Athena disbursed at least 26 talents to the generals commanding a first squadron of ten ships setting out for Corcyra (\textit{IG} \textsc{i} \textsuperscript{3} 364.12 with Thucy. 1.45.1); twenty-fours days later,\textsuperscript{95} they disbursed at least another 50 talents for a second squadron of twenty ships sent out to Corcyra to reinforce the first ten ships (\textit{IG} \textsc{i} \textsuperscript{3} 364.23 with Thucy. 1.50.5, 1.51.1). Each of the sums mentioned here are (restored) minima—alternative (and equally plausible) restorations give much larger amounts in each case\textsuperscript{96}—although they are almost certainly the total amount spent on the Corcyran

\textsuperscript{94} See appendix 6.

\textsuperscript{95} This date is restored, but almost certain: see Gomme, \textit{HCT} i.196-197.

\textsuperscript{96} See the remarks of Lewis at \textit{IG} \textsc{i} \textsuperscript{3}, p.334 on, respectively, ll.12 and 23 of \textit{IG} \textsc{i} \textsuperscript{3} 364: “... sed etiam 6]6 T. non omnino excludendum est... 50 T. suppl. Jo., veri simillimum, sed etiam 100 T. non excludendum est.”
expedition. The Athenians, then, at the one drachma per day rate, dispatched (at least) the equivalent of two and a half months’ pay with each squadron—or, at the three obol per day rate, (at least) five months’ pay (assuming two hundred men per trireme in each case). The squadrons sailed from Athens at some point after funds were disbursed for them on July 10 and August 3, respectively; they could be expected by the Athenians to return by the end of October at the latest—both because battle with the Corinthians was imminent and because the end of October marked the end of the normal (safe) sailing season for triremes. The Athenians, then, almost certainly expected the ships to be away for no more than two and half to three months, and not for five months (and into the winter): the one drachma per day per man pay rate therefore makes much better sense than a three obol rate does of IG I 364.12, 23.

97 Although fifth century inscribed records of Athenian expenditures only record payments from “sacral” sources (Samons [2000] 48, 78-80, App.3), it is clear that the treasury of Athena served as the primary, if not exclusive, source of funding for major Athenian overseas expeditions before c. 428/7 ((ibid.) 158 and n.198; cf. (ibid.) 80, 152-153, 162, 193-194, 240 and n.106): further payments for the squadrons sailing to Corcyra can almost certainly be excluded, then (see also Blamire [2001] 102 for this conclusion).

98 See again appendix 2 for the legitimacy of this assumption. It should be noted here that the sums recorded at IG I 364.12, 23 do not represent aggregated expenditures for the expedition, but only individual payments made by the treasurers of Athena on each date. These figures therefore cannot be used to reconstruct the duration of the ships’ absence from Athens (contra, e.g., Pritchett [1971] 9 and n.25, Loomis [1998] 39 and n.27), but only for the Athenians’ estimate of how long the ships might be away from Athens.

99 See again Gomme, HCT i.196-197 for these dates.

100 See Gomme, HCT i.197 citing Thucy. 1.31.1-2.

101 Meiggs (1972) 259. This latter point cannot admit of complete certainty, but it was very rare (at this date) for sizeable fleets of triremes to sail or operate in winter (see chapter 1 section i), and it is therefore most improbable that the Athenians would have foreseen the two squadrons operating into the winter.

102 See Gallo (1987) 45 and n.69: one drachma rates likely before the war on account of the huge financial reserves present at Athens then. Note finally that Pritchett comments ([1971] 9 and n.25) of the
Almost a decade before, the Athenians fought a major war to put down a Samian revolt (Thuc. 1.115.2-117), and the inscription recording the yearly aggregates of the disbursements of the treasurers of Athena for this war is extant (if very fragmentary) (IG I3 363).103 Four figures are recorded: yearly totals of 128+ talents, 368+ talents, and 908+ talents (these yearly totals reflecting the disbursements of three different boards of treasurers of Athena in three different Panathenaic years),104 and a total figure for the expenditures on the operations at Samos of 1,400+ talents (IG I3 363.5, 12, 17, 19 respectively). I will focus solely on the first payment here to show that it supports a rate of one drachma per man per day for men employed by the Athenian state for military service.

Thucydides narrates that, in the sixth year of the truce between the Athenians and the Spartans and their allies after the first Peloponnesian war, i.e. in 441/0, forty Athenian triremes sailed to Samos, in response to Milesian appeals (after these had been defeated in a war with the Samians) and representations from some private individuals from Samos (who wished to change the constitution of their polis) (1.115.2). The forty Athenian triremes on their arrival at Samos set up a democracy there, took hostages from the Samians and lodged them in Lemnos, and then returned home, having left a garrison on the island (1.115.3). The Samians then revolted, having first taken several measures

103 Fornara demonstrated that the payments recorded in IG I3 363 were all for the operations at Samos: (1979) 9-12.

104 Yearly aggregates: Fornara (1979) 9-10 and n.16, 10.
to secure their position for a revolt and for an expedition against Miletus (the Byzantines joined the revolt with them) (1.115.4-5). As soon as the Athenians heard the news, they sailed with sixty ships against Samos (1.116.1). These were subsequently reinforced by another forty triremes from Athens (and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos), after which the Athenians established a blockade of the city (1.116.3) (and Pericles then sailed with sixty ships of the blockading squadron to Caunus and Caria to prevent the suspected approach of a Phoenician fleet to help the Samians (1.116.4)). After some (Athenian) reverses, the blockade was re-established after the return of the triremes under Pericles, after which again another sixty triremes arrived from Athens (and a further thirty from Chios and Lesbos) (1.117.1-2). The Samians eventually capitulated after a siege of eight months (the Byzantines surrendered, too) (1.117.3).

The first yearly sum of disbursements of 128+ talents can be safely associated with the forty ships that sailed to Samos and installed the democracy there. This can be demonstrated by some simple arithmetic. Working from Thucydides’ narrative, we can be sure that the sixty ships sent to Samos on the news of the revolt certainly remained at the island during the establishment and continuation of the first blockade there, or took part in the operations further south under Pericles; that they certainly remained at Samos during the re-establishment of the blockade; and that they certainly remained there for the duration of the successful eight month siege (see again 1.117.2: the sixty triremes from Athens are described by Thucydides as reinforcements and not replacements (the verb used is “προσεβοήθησαν”). If any part of the sum of 128+ talents disbursed for the first year of the operations at Samos were paid out for these sixty ships, then the second yearly
sum of 368+ talents cannot work. For the sixty ships first dispatched to suppress the revolt were present for the duration of the siege—which went on into a third (Panathenaic) year, as the third annual sum of 908+ talents recorded at IG I³ 363.17 shows. Therefore, if any part of the first annual sum of 128+ talents were paid out to these sixty ships, they would have had to have been present for the whole of the second year of the siege. In this case, even at three obols per man per day, disbursements for these ships would have amounted to 360 talents (30 talents per trireme x 12 months). But these sixty ships were joined by a further forty ships from Athens at some point; Thucydides’ narrative of the revolt is compressed, but it is clear that (almost certainly) much less than a year passed before these forty ships were sent out to Samos. Again, even at three obols per man per day, only one months’ disbursement for the forty ships—and there must have spent more than one month at Samos in the year after the first sixty ships were sent out—would have come to 20 talents. In addition, it is probable that the final reinforcements of sixty ships from Athens arrived at Samos less than a year after the sixty ships had sailed out, which would have required again more transfers from the treasury of Athena. In sum, if the sixty ships which sailed out to Samos on the news of the revolt there had received any payments from the first annual sum of disbursements from the treasury of Athena for the expedition, the second annual sum would have had to have been much larger than just under 370 talents. 106

105 It should be noted here that, in the case of the 128+ and 368+ talents yearly totals, it is certain from the inscription that the restored total sum has to be less than 130 and 370 talents respectively.

106 The point made at p.396 n.27 above should be re-emphasized here: the treasury of Athena served as the primary, if not exclusive, source of funding for major Athenian overseas expeditions in this period; any further (major) payments from other sources at Athens for the operations at Samos can almost certainly be ruled out.
The first sum of 128+ talents is, then, the only payment that can be safely associated with a discrete set of operations by Athenian triremes in the Samian war: i.e., the expenses incurred by the squadron of forty triremes which imposed a democracy on Samos. This conclusion is completely consistent with Thucydides’ narrative: there was a definite and large gap in time between the Athenian installation of the democracy on Samos and the second Athenian dispatch of triremes (filled in by the Samian preparations for revolt and the expedition against Samos). And a rate of one talent per man per day makes much better sense of the 128+ talents than a rate of three obols per man per day. It would mean that the forty triremes were away for 3½ months rather than 6½ months, and the shorter period seems a much better fit with their actions (sailing to Samos (no more than a week’s journey in normal conditions), setting up the democracy, preparing the fleet for action, and then sailing back to Athens). Fornara demonstrated that the expenditures for the Samian operations recorded in IG I3 363 extended over three Panathenaic years (see two previous notes), but his dating of these years as 442/1, 441/0, and 440/39 (see [1979] 12-18) clashes with the evidence of Thucydides (1.115.2) and the (Atthidographic) scholium on Aristoph., Wasps 283—which both date the initial operations to 441/0—and therefore should be rejected. In addition, as Meritt pointed out ([1984] 132 n.22), Fornara also failed to take account of the fact that the sums paid out for the war by the treasury of Athena were debited when they were given to the generals, and not when they were spent: thus, the 368+ talents spent in the second year of the war may also have covered expenses in the third year—which presents an insuperable problem for Fornara’s chronology, which uses the expenditures recorded in IG I3 363 to estimate time spent in the field ([1979] 12-14). No scholar subsequent to Fornara has been able, however, to come up with a convincing framework that would bring into agreement the evidence of Thucydides (and the Aristophanic scholiast) that the operations at Samos began in 441/0 and Fornara’s demonstration that the treasurers of Athena paid out sums in three different Panathenaic years: Lewis’ position ([1992b] 502; cf. ML, p.150; IG I3, p.333) that the first payment for Samos was in the conciliar year of 441/0, and the second in 440/39 before the Panathenaia, with the third also in 440/39, but after the Panathenaia, is not plausible. Meritt’s [1984] attempt to re-argue the position that IG I3 363 records separate accounts for Byzantium and Samos over the years 441/0 and 440/39 does not work for the same reasons that his original arguments, demolished by Fornara, do not work; and also because, as Bridges showed ([1980] 187-188), IG I3 48 is not an annual list of Athenian strategoi and therefore cannot aid in dating the conclusion of the war with Samos. It is therefore impossible, as of the present time, to associate the expenditures recorded at IG I3 363.12, 17 with certainty to any particular phase of the operations at Samos.

107 Fornara demonstrated that the expenditures for the Samian operations recorded in IG I3 363 extended over three Panathenaic years (see two previous notes), but his dating of these years as 442/1, 441/0, and 440/39 (see [1979] 12-18) clashes with the evidence of Thucydides (1.115.2) and the (Atthidographic) scholium on Aristoph., Wasps 283—which both date the initial operations to 441/0—and therefore should be rejected. In addition, as Meritt pointed out ([1984] 132 n.22), Fornara also failed to take account of the fact that the sums paid out for the war by the treasury of Athena were debited when they were given to the generals, and not when they were spent: thus, the 368+ talents spent in the second year of the war may also have covered expenses in the third year—which presents an insuperable problem for Fornara’s chronology, which uses the expenditures recorded in IG I3 363 to estimate time spent in the field ([1979] 12-14). No scholar subsequent to Fornara has been able, however, to come up with a convincing framework that would bring into agreement the evidence of Thucydides (and the Aristophanic scholiast) that the operations at Samos began in 441/0 and Fornara’s demonstration that the treasurers of Athena paid out sums in three different Panathenaic years: Lewis’ position ([1992b] 502; cf. ML, p.150; IG I3, p.333) that the first payment for Samos was in the conciliar year of 441/0, and the second in 440/39 before the Panathenaia, with the third also in 440/39, but after the Panathenaia, is not plausible. Meritt’s [1984] attempt to re-argue the position that IG I3 363 records separate accounts for Byzantium and Samos over the years 441/0 and 440/39 does not work for the same reasons that his original arguments, demolished by Fornara, do not work; and also because, as Bridges showed ([1980] 187-188), IG I3 48 is not an annual list of Athenian strategoi and therefore cannot aid in dating the conclusion of the war with Samos. It is therefore impossible, as of the present time, to associate the expenditures recorded at IG I3 363.12, 17 with certainty to any particular phase of the operations at Samos.

108 The special measures taken for the siege against Samos (see chapter 2 section iiia above) (obviously) did not have to be taken for the forty ships sent out to install the democracy: again, then, there is no reason to see the 128+ talents covering anything other than the pay of the forty trireme crews.
taking hostages and placing them on Lemnos, leaving a garrison, and returning home again). We should take it, then, that the Athenians engaged in the operations at Samos in the late 440s were paid at the rate of one drachma per man per day.\(^\text{109}\)

One drachma per man per day was therefore the standard Athenian military rate of pay for at least thirty years before 412.\(^\text{110}\) There is no evidence to suggest (or reason to

\(^{109}\) Fornara ([1979] 12-14) used the expenditures for the expedition against Samos attested at IG I\(^3\) 363 together with the ship figures provided by Thucydides, and a rate of one drachma per man per day (= one talent per trireme per month), to calculate the duration of the Athenian operations at Samos. Since Fornara simply assumed the one drachma per day rate, his linkage between this rate and the duration of the Athenian operations is circular, and thus his argument cannot be used as a means to employ the expenditures on the expedition as evidence that one drachma per day per man was the going rate for Athenian sailors at this time: see Loomis (1998) 38-39 for the argument and references.

\(^{110}\) That the one drachma per man per day rate was the standard rate during the Peloponnesian war has already been argued for, most effectively by Gallo ([1987] 36-45) (especially) and Loomis ([1998] chapter 2 (esp. 55-56), 266-269); the treatment of the Thucydidean mentions of rates of pay here owes much to Gallo’s discussion. Also arguing for the one drachma rate as normal for Athenian forces in the fifth century (before 412): Dover, HCT iv.293 (ad Thucy. 6.31.3) and Andrewes, HCT v.97-98 (ad Thucy. 8.45.2) (but see p.322 n.84 above for an important problem with Dover’s and Andrewes’ treatments, and chapter 6 section v for another major problem for Andrewes’ treatment); Cook (1990) 80-82 (but see chapter 4 section iv, chapter 6 section v, and p.291 n.48 for problems with her discussion of this problem); Hornblower, CT iii.887-888 (ad Thucy. 8.45.2) (with Hornblower, CT i.402 (ad Thucy. 3.17.4) (following Dovers and Andrewes but curiously stating that the “Dover/Andrewes view is accepted by Pritchett, GSW i.14ff.”) and Hornblower, CT iii.386 (ad Thucy. 6.31.3)). See, in addition, Tänzer (1912) 73 (without argumentation for his view); Jones (1952) 16 n.33 and (1957) 32, 142 n.54 (without argumentation); Amit (1965) 51-52 (but stating incorrectly there that one drachma was the rate during most of the Peloponnesian war, but it was three obols before and after the war); see also Rhodes (1981) 306 (ad [Arist.], Ath. Pol. 24.3) contra Pritchett, “more probably a higher rate was normal until after the Sicilian expedition”) and (1994) 192 (contra Pritchett, Rhodes “inclined to think that 1 drachma was normal until after the Sicilian expedition”) (without argumentation in either case); Morrison et al. (2000) 119 (though they state at [2000] 118 that this was a high rate in 415); van Wees (2004) 238 (though he curiously cites Pritchett’s discussion of pay rates in the footnote supporting his statement that one drachma was the standard Athenian rate ([2004] 316 n.30)). See also the discussion of Gauthier (1966) at p.334 n.119 below (See also pp.337-339 below for why the rate attested at Thucy. 5.47.6 (three Aiginetan obols per day per man) cannot be used as evidence for usual Athenian pay rates.) Older views that three obols was the standard rate for Athenian forces during the Peloponnesian war can now be rejected: see, e.g., in addition to Pritchett and Gomme, Böckh (1886) 344 and Schultheß (1932) col. 2085 (without any argumentation); see also Markle (1985) 276 (following Pritchett). See esp. Gallo (1987) 37 n.41 in this regard: “[n]ei casi menzionati da Tucidide, infatti, ricorre, sino al 412, sempre e solo la paga di 1 dracma: il presupposto di un carattere speciale di tale importo costringerà a considerare tutti i casi come eccezioni rispetto a una presunta regola di cui, in realtà, non vi sono attestazioni.” This means that reconstructions of Athenian annual naval budgets (see, e.g., French [1972] 5 and n.12 and Unz [1985] 24 n.13) and calculations of fifth century Athenian fleet costs (see, e.g., Finley [1983] 49, 51; Hökeskamp [1997] 531 (cf. Wallace [1974] 41, expressly following Pritchett for a three obol rate, and using this rate to check the reliability of Herodotus’ account of Themistocles’ bribery of Adeimantos at Artemision (Hdt. 8.4-6)) which used the three obol per man per day rate now have no basis. Finally, the agnosticism avowed by many recent authors (even after Gallo’s and Loomis’ discussions) as to whether three obols or one drachma was the
think) that one drachma was a higher rate of pay offered only to some ranks or members of ships’ crews, with some rowers receiving less (i.e., three obols a day):\(^\text{111}\) higher rates of pay were restricted to officers in infantry forces and cavalry (both in Athenian and other classical Greek military forces);\(^\text{112}\) non-officer members of Athenian infantry forces received the same pay as sailors employed by the Athenians.\(^\text{113}\) The fact that Athenian usual rate of pay for Athenian forces before 412 should now be rejected, too: see Gabrielsen (1994) 111 (neither the 3 obol nor 1 dr. rate view can be rejected); Samons (2000) 89 n.27 (cf. [2000] 93, 207, 208, 306) (hesitation, caused by Pritchett’s arguments (see [2000] 208 n.170 citing Pritchett for uncertainty over rates of naval and hoplite pay at Athens in the fifth century), over whether the normal rate of Athenian pay before 412 was three obols or one drachma (but see [2000] 235 n.87: one drachma rate “probable” at the time of the Sicilian expedition)); Kallet (2001) 53 and n.115 (not coming down on one side or other of the three obol vs. one drachma debate (but stating that “a drachma for ordinary sailors was high”)) (see also next note); Olson (2002) 122 (ad Ar., Ach. 161-162) (hesitation on whether one drachma was the standard rate of pay in Athens in the 420s); Raaflaub (2007) 99 and Gabrielsen (2007) 258 (not choosing definitively between three obols and one drachma).

\(^{111}\) Contra Kallet (2001) 53 (“daily rates of pay likely fluctuated in accordance with the situation and the rank of the crew”) and 53 n.115 (there was in fifth century Athens no “standard wage independent of rank and status”). Cf. Rawlings (2007) 115-116. See also Jordan (1975) 113-115 distinguishing between a normal rate of 1 drachma per day for the nautai and 3 obols a day for the hyperesia of a ship; this view, however, is based on a misreading of Thuc. 6.31.3 (which does not suggest, contra Jordan [1975] 113, that the hyperesia received less than a drachma per day: see Loomis [1998] 56 n.100) and a misunderstanding of the term hyperesia (which did not, contra Jordan [1975] 240-263, consist of slaves and freedmen: see Morrison [1984] passim, and esp. 49, 50, 52; see Gallo (1987) 39 and n.54, 45 and n. 69 for other criticisms of Jordan’s arguments; cf. Gabrielsen [1994] 248 n. 2 for other work contradicting Jordan on this point). Contra Kallet and Rawling, Thucy. 6.31.3 does not represent evidence for different rates of pay for different sections of trireme crews, but simply the common practice of the payment of inducements by trierarchs to attract better quality crews: see Gabrielsen (1994) 121-122 for discussion and examples. Rosivach’s contention ([1985] 52-53) that the one drachma rate was for ‘year-round’ sailors while the three obol rate was for ‘seasonal’ sailors misses the points that the two rates are never simultaneously attested, and that the three obol rate is explicitly described as being caused by financial difficulties; in addition, he can cite no evidence to substantiate his notion. (See also pp.347-348 n.151 for further refutation of Rosivach.) Most importantly for the question of equal pay for trireme crew members, it should be noted that all calculations in the classical period of pay for trireme crews proceed on the basis of equal pay for each of the two hundred crew members: see appendix 2.

\(^{112}\) See last note fin. on the pay of trireme crews; see Burrer’s discussion at (2008) 79-80 for infantry forces.

\(^{113}\) Other rates of pay mentioned at Athens in the fifth century are either exaggerations and/or do not certainly refer to military rates of pay. The rate of pay mentioned at Aristoph., Ach. 159-163 (produced at the Lenaea of 425) of 2 drachmas per day per man to be paid by the Athenians to some Thracian peltasts is clearly a comic exaggeration (Olson [2002] 121). The rates of two obols per man per day (apparently for rowing (MacDowell [1971] 285 ad loc.) mentioned at Aristoph., Wasp 1187-1189 (produced at the Lenaea of 422) refers to theoric and not military service, and may be again comic (under-)exaggeration. The figure of four obols mentioned at IG I² 93.32, an inscription concerned with preparations for the
military pay remained unchanged for at least thirty years (and changed in 412 only because of financial emergency) does not make sense in a world where pay rates responded to changes in commodity prices in local markets.\textsuperscript{114} Although prices for the basic grains of wheat and barley were generally stable year on year over the course of the fifth and fourth centuries in the Greek world,\textsuperscript{115} fluctuations in the prices of these grains normally occurred over the course of a harvest cycle; and there were also frequently localized spikes in grain prices in particular areas caused by disruptions to the production and/or distribution of grain specific to those areas.\textsuperscript{116} If Athenian military rates of pay were determined by food prices, then, they could not have taken on the standardized character they did, in fact, take.\textsuperscript{117}

Customary rates of pay were known in other parts of the late fifth and early fourth century Greek world. They can be demonstrated for the Peloponnese from a treaty between Athens and three Peloponnesian states during the Peloponnesian war, an

\textsuperscript{114} Note also in this regard that the pay rate of three obols attested for the sailors of the Athenian navy in the winter of 412/11 seems still to have been their rate of pay in 407 (see pp.302-304, pp.314-316 above): i.e., it appears that this rate remained unchanged for five years (at least: we have no evidence for Athenian rates of naval pay after 407 again until 351 (Dem. 4.28)).

\textsuperscript{115} The (very) limited evidence for this statement (Heichelheim (1935) 887-889, Markle (1985) 293-294) is restricted to the Aegean.

\textsuperscript{116} See chapter 7 section v.

\textsuperscript{117} This provides the final proof that Pritchett was incorrect to attribute the one drachma rate attested for Athenian operations before 412 to expected high food prices in the markets to be provided to Athenian forces on those operations.
agreement reached by the member states of the Peloponnesian League in 383, and numismatic evidence. In 420, Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis agreed a treaty in which each agreed to provide military assistance to the other states.\textsuperscript{118} The clause on pay for the military force of any of these states that might come to the help of another reads as follows (Thucy. 5.47.6):

\begin{quote}
τοῖς δὲ βοηθοῦσιν ἡ πόλις ἡ πέµπουσα παρεχέτω µέχρι µὲν τριάκοντα ηµερῶν σῖτον ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλξωσιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἐπαγγείλασαν βοηθεῖν, καὶ ἀπίουσι κατὰ ταῦτα ὃν δὲ πλέονα βαύλονται χρόνον τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐπηρεάσαν, ἡ πόλις ἡ μεταπεµβαµένη διδότω σῖτον, τῷ µὲν ὁπλιτῇ καὶ ψιλῷ καὶ τοξότῃ τρεῖς ὀβολοὺς Αἰγιναίους τῆς ἡµέρας ἑκάστης, τῷ δ’ ἱππεῖ δραχµὴν Αἰγιναίαν.
\end{quote}

the relieving troops shall be maintained by the city sending them for thirty days from their arrival in the city that has required them, and upon their return in the same way; if their services be desired for a longer period the city that sent for them shall maintain them, at a rate of three Aiginetan obols per day for a hoplite, archer, or light-armed soldier, and an Aiginetan drachma for a cavalryman.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{118} Thucy. 5.47.1-12. A very fragmentary of the Athenian inscribed copy of the treaty exists (IG I\textsuperscript{3} 83): the few discrepancies between Thucydides’ text and the text of the inscription can be easily explained (see Hornblower, C\textsc{t} iii.109-111, 114, 116).

\textsuperscript{119} The Attic equivalent of three Aiginetan obols was 4.325 obols: Loomis (1998) 41-42 and n.35. This fact causes an insuperable problem for a hypothesis advanced by Gauthier on Athenian pay based on Thucy. 5.47.6. Gauthier ([1966] 75-76), taking three Aiginetan obols to be worth four Athenian obols, believed that the four Athenian obols of this treaty marked a return to an earlier Athenian military pay rate of four obols per day. Gauthier’s evidence and arguments for the earlier pay rate were: firstly, a passage in Plutarch (Per. 27) stating that Pericles sent out 60 triremes each year, on which citizens served for eight months while receiving pay; secondly, evidence from Thucydides that these citizens received a drachma per day; he argued from these data that the pay rate for the sailors on Pericles’ ships was therefore four obols per day per year (=one drachma per day per eight months), and it must have been the same for hoplites. Gauthier argues that the pay rate was then raised to one drachma per day per year but after the Athenians found out, in the siege of Potidaea, that paying one drachma per day for the whole year was draining their resources very quickly, they went back (i.e. in this treaty) to paying four obols per day, but this time in actuality, rather than by paying their forces one drachma per day for eight months. But, in addition to the fact that evaluating three Aiginetan obols as 4.325 Athenian obols means Gauthier’s numbers do not work, the historical accuracy of the Plutarchan passage is very doubtful (see Gabrielsen [1994] 111 and n.13), and there is no support in Thucydides for pay being limited to eight months a year. In addition, the four obol per day thesis cannot support the weight of the evidence for a rate of one drachma per day paid by the Segestans and the Athenians in 415 and by the Athenians in 413 (Gauthier’s attempts to do so ([1966] 76 are feeble). Gauthier is also incorrect to think that the pay rate mentioned in 5.47.6 was determined solely by Athenian thinking: see just below. In general, Gauthier’s hypothesis is simply “troppo sottile e priva di fondamento nell’evidenza a noi disponibile” (Gallo [1987] 39 n.53).
(The σῖτος of this treaty should be taken as simply referring to an ordinary payment for service—i.e. not merely pay for rations—since there is no evidence of military payments solely of rations existed in the late fifth century, despite the arguments of Pritchett and Griffith.) In 383, some ambassadors came from Acanthus and Apollonia to Sparta to address the Spartans and their allies (Xen., Hell. 5.2.11ff.). The ambassadors had come to complain that the Chalcidian federation, led by Olynthus, had been expanding and absorbing many neighboring cities: it was now threatening Acanthus and Apollonia, and the envoys had come to enlist Peloponnesian help against their larger neighbor. The decision was taken by the Spartans and their allies to send out the full force of the Peloponnesian League, nominally ten thousand men, each state furnishing an appropriate contingent (Xen., Hell. 5.2.20). A proposal was added, however, that “any polis which so desired should be allowed to give money instead of men, three Aiginetan obols per day for each man, while if any state normally furnished cavalry, pay equal to that of four hoplites should be given for each horseman...”

The fact that the three Aiginetan obols to be paid to hoplites in this proposal is the same rate paid to hoplites in the treaty agreed between the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans in 420 (though the rate for cavalry given in Xenophon is twice as much) strongly suggests that this rate of pay was standard for Peloponnesian infantry forces in the fifth and early fourth centuries. The conclusion that the fact that the two

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120 See chapter 2 section ii for Pritchett, and chapter 6 section vi for Griffith.

121 Xen., Hell. 5.2.21: “... ἀργύριον τε ἀντ’ ἄνδρῶν ἐξεῖναι διδόναι τῇ βουλοµένῃ τῶν πόλεων, τριώβολον Αἰγιναῖον κατὰ ἄνδρα, ἵππας τε εἴ τις παρέχοι, ἀντὶ τεττάρων ὁπλιτῶν τῷ µισθῷ τῷ ἱππεῖ δίδοσθαι.” See Figueira (1981) 82: since the Aiginetan standard was predominant amongst the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, the financial dealings of the league would be facilitated by the “mutual convertibility” of triobols on the Aiginetan standard.
rates of pay mentioned in these passages are the same is not the result of simple coincidence, but, on the contrary, is an indication of a customary rate of pay for Peloponnesian infantry service at this time gains strength from two considerations. Firstly, the fact that the triobol (on the Aeginetan standard) was the predominant denomination of the Arcadian federal coinage of the fifth century “strongly suggests that this was not a coinage designed for the purposes of retail trade, but rather for large numbers of payments at a standard rate...”¹²² Thuc. 5.47.6 suggests strongly that these large numbers of payments at a standard rate were very probably military payments.¹²³ Secondly, the treaty the Athenians made with the Argives, Eleans and Mantineans in 420 establishing the four poleis as allies—and rates of pay for allied expeditions—was made to last one hundred years.¹²⁴ The fact that a rate of pay could be included in such a treaty (no provision was made in the treaty for adjustment to the rate of pay to reflect changed circumstances) makes most sense if it were a static, customary rate; it does not make sense in a world where military rates of pay responded to fluctuations in the prices of basic subsistence foods.

¹²² Kraay (1976) 98.

¹²³ Kraay (1976) 98: “... it is probably not a coincidence that the treaty made in 420 between the Athenians and a number of Peloponnesian powers (including the Mantineans from Arcadia) the daily pay of an infantry-man is stipulated as three Aiginetan obols (Thuc. 5.47).” See also Carradice and Price (1988) 77. Cf. Lewis (1992a) 105 (though his statement that Thuc. v.47.6 demonstrates that a triobol on the Aeginetan standard was “a normal Peloponnesian soldier’s ration allowance” is imprecise and incorrect); Hornblower, CT iii.115.

¹²⁴ Thucy. 5.47.3: “κατὰ τάδε ξυµµάχους εἶναι Αθηναίους καὶ Αργείους καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Μαντινέας ἑκατόν ἀτην...”
At this point, I want to digress briefly to consider two related arguments W. T.
Loomis made concerning the reasons for the rates of pay found at Thucy. 5.47.6 and
Xen., *Hell.* 5.2.21. Loomis, in his examination of Athenian military pay, concluded that
the σῖτος payment at Thucy. 5.47.6 was for “gross pay”; since, however, a σῖτος payment
of (the equivalent of) 4.325 Attic obols was lower than the one drachma per day rate
attested for earlier Athenian military forces, he thought the rate of three Aiginetan obols
needed explanation. He thus advanced the possibility “that the lower figure than (than 1
dr. p.d.) reflects lower labor and living costs in the more rural Peloponnese, where
locally-produced food was more likely to be available.” He used this rationale again as
an objection against Pritchett’s argument that 3 obols per day was the standard rate for
Athenian forces in the later fifth century: “a rate well in excess of 3 ob. p.d. is supported
by the alliance of 420: it is hard to see how the equivalent of 4.325 ob. p.d. could be the
standard rate in the rural Peloponnese if 3 ob. were the standard in urban Athens.”
Loomis, in other words, was assuming that the rate of pay recorded for Athenian infantry
forces at Thucy. 5.47.6 could have been determined by the prices expected to be charged
for food in markets in areas of military operations.

Yet a careful reading of the rest of the treaty between the Athenians and the
Peloponnesian states demonstrates that such an assumption is not warranted. Firstly, at
5.47.3, it is agreed that, if an enemy should invade the land of the Athenians, the Argives,
Eleans and Mantineans would bring aid to Athens. Thus, the treaty foresees military

125 (1998) 42.

126 (1998) 56.
actions outside the ‘rural’ Peloponnese and in ‘urban’ Athens. Secondly, at 5.47.7, the treaty states:

Ἡ δὲ πόλις ἡ μεταπεµψαµένη τὴν στρατιὰν τὴν ἡγεµονίαν ἐχέτω, ὅταν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἀντὶς ὁ πόλεµος ἦ. ὥν δὲ ποι ὁ δῆµος ἅπασαις ταῖς πόλεσιν κοινὴ στρατεύσαι, τὸ ἵσον τῆς ἡγεµονίας µεταίην ἅπασαις ταῖς πόλεσιν.

The city sending for the troops shall have the command when the war is in its own country; but in case of the cities resolving upon a joint expedition [anywhere] the command shall be equally divided among all the cities.

Thus, the treaty allows for military operations not just in the Peloponnese, but also in Attica, and wherever else the four states might decide jointly to wage war. Therefore, although the treaty was directed against the Spartans (see Thucy. 5.42-46), there is no way in which, in drawing up the articles of the treaty, prices (current or expected) in the Peloponnese could have been the sole determining factor when the Athenians agreed upon the rates of pay for any potential military campaign.

Moreover, Loomis’ position on the pay rates in this treaty assumes that the Athenians were the polis that set these rates. There is no reason to assume this, but there are positive reasons to think such an assumption false. As Andrewes has pointed out, considering the three Aiginetan obols in this treaty to be a reduction in pay for Athenian forces used to a standard rate of one drachma per day per man ignores the fact that “this was a figure agreed between four states by no means equal in wealth and need not follow the Athenian standard rate...”127 In addition, the fact that the rates of pay were expressed in the Aiginetan standard suggests strongly that they were the result of a compromise.

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127 Andrewes, HCT v.97.
between the four states, and that the rates followed Peloponnesian norms: this consideration gains strength from the fact that Elis, Mantinea, and Argos were all coining at this time on the Aiginetan standard. If, therefore, as seems most probable, the rate of pay of three Aiginetan obols per day was the result of an agreement between the four states that signed up to the treaty, and not solely an Athenian decision, then there is no reason to assume from the fact that the rate of pay found in this treaty is lower than the previously attested Athenian rate of one drachma per day per man that expectations regarding prices to be found on any campaign to be waged by these four states formed any part of the decision to set the pay at three Aiginetan obols.

Commenting on Xen., Hell. 5.2.21, Loomis (again taking the three Aiginetan obols (= 4.325 Athenian obols) to be “gross pay”) stated: “[w]e have no direct evidence as to what Athenian military pay rates were at this time, but their gross pay should have been higher than the 4.325 obols that was established in the more rural Peloponnese, where living costs were presumably lower.”

Loomis made the same mistake here as he did in his treatment of Thucy. 5.47.6. Living costs—i.e. food prices—in the Peloponnese cannot have formed any part of the allies’ considerations when they set the rate of pay to be given to the substitute soldiers, since the campaign for which the pay was given was planned (and fought: see Xen., Hell. 5.2.23ff., 5.2.37ff., 5.3.1ff.) against Olynthus, a city in the northern Aegean. This passage therefore does not provide any support for the

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128 See Gallo (1987) 38. The fact that the three Aiginetan per day per man rate was customary in the fifth century Peloponnese gives support to the view that the Athenians were not the sole or primary movers in setting the pay rates found in the treaty of 420.

129 (1998) 50: he also references Thucy. 5.47.6 to support this point.
assumption that food prices (in the Peloponnese or elsewhere) determined military pay rates.

Conventional rates of pay were not confined to particular states or leagues in ‘mainland’ Greece, but could range across large parts of the Greek world, as the rates paid and offered to the mercenaries of the Ten Thousand in the years following the Peloponnesian war demonstrate. The Ten Thousand received pay—or offers of pay—from a number of employers, Greek and non-Greek; the evidence their experiences provide for pay rates for mercenaries in the eastern Mediterranean at the turn of the fourth century has been summarized by Roy: 130

It seems quite clear that a standard rate of pay prevailed in Ionia and the Hellespontine and Thraceward regions, standard in amount and in the formula for various ranks. All employers or prospective employers in the Anabasis offered one daric or cyzicene per month, and Xenophon appears to treat the daric and cyzicene as equivalents.

Cyrus paid the mercenaries one daric a month (approximately five obols per day) in the early part of 401 for a campaign that started in Sardis and was ostensibly directed against the Pisidians (Xen., Anab. 1.3.21); two years later, Thibron the Spartan offered (and eventually paid) a daric a month to the remnants of the Ten Thousand he hired for a campaign against Tissaphernes in western Asia Minor (Xen., Anab. 7.6.1). At Cotyora, in the summer of 400, Timasion the Dardanian promised the men a cyzicene stater a month to serve under him in the Troad (Xen., Anab. 5.6.23); Seuthes promised the same for a campaign in Thrace in the winter of 400/399 (Xen., Anab. 7.2.36). The fact that the same rate of pay was given or offered by four different (actual and potential) employers

130 (1967) 309.
in three different parts of the Mediterranean in different seasons over the course of two years (spring 401-spring 399) shows that it was a conventional rate of pay for mercenary service in the eastern Mediterranean at this time (and that this rate of pay was not determined by the price of commodities).

There is also another consideration arising from the mercenaries’ experiences under Cyrus and Seuthes that demonstrates conclusively that the rates of pay offered to the Cyreans were not determined by food prices. The Cyreans, for the most part, obtained their provisions from markets provided to them along their march to Cunaxa. \(^{131}\) Although the men received pay—or were supposed to receive pay—from Cyrus during the entirety of their service under him, the mercenaries provisioned themselves through non-market means at certain points on their journey to Babylonia, when markets were unavailable, or when circumstances permitted the foraging or pillaging of food: thus, the men requisitioned provisions at the villages of Parysatis, and at the villages on the Araxes and Mascas Rivers, and foraged and pillaged for food in Lycaonia and at Belesys’ estate. \(^{132}\) This is to say the men were still provided with \(\mu\iota\sigma\varsigma\delta\varsigma\), even when they were not (or could not) use that \(\mu\iota\sigma\varsigma\delta\varsigma\) to purchase food: given this fact, expected food prices cannot have been an important factor in the pay rates set for the mercenaries under Cyrus.

This point comes out clearly, too, in the terms of service the remnants of the Ten Thousand agreed with Seuthes. Seuthes proposed the following: pay of a Cyzicene

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\(^{131}\) At no point did they receive rations in kind from Cyrus: see appendix 4 section i.

\(^{132}\) See appendix 4 section i. Note also that Cyrus had prepared four hundred wagons full of wheat-flour and wine, which were to be distributed to the Greeks in the case of serious provisioning difficulties (Xen., *Anab.* 1.10.18 with appendix 4 sections ii, iii): there was very probably no expectation that the Greeks would have to pay for these.
stater a month; food and drink to be obtained by foraging from the country ("ἐκ τῆς χώρας"); and any plunder taken was to be given to Seuthes who would sell it to provide the men’s μισθός (Xen., Anab. 7.3.10). The issue of pay—and the rate of pay—for the mercenaries are completely separated from their provisioning. This is confirmed by the fact that the men were able to subsist during the winter despite the fact that Seuthes was slow in paying them and never actually paid the rate he originally promised. It is clear that commodity market prices had no influence on the pay rates offered by Seuthes.

The Cyreans’ arrangements with Cyrus and Seuthes were, in fact, similar to the pay arrangements of every campaign in which military employers paid classical Greek soldiers to operate in hostile territory. As I have demonstrated, the primary means of provisioning for classical Greek overland campaigns in enemy territory was foraging; purchase (from traveling merchants) played a limited, supplementary role. But although purchase played a minimal role in the classical Greek expeditions into enemy land, the men on those expeditions still continued to receive (and/or expected to receive) pay from their employers. This disconnect between the pay of classical Greek armies and the means they used to acquire their food demonstrates that there was never any important connection between their rates of pay and the prices found for basic subsistence foods in the areas they fought in.

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133 See chapter 3 section iv.

134 See p.672 n.42 for an excellent Hellenistic example of the disconnect between the pay of Greek armies and their means of acquisition of supplies.
v. Conclusion

Rates of pay for Athenian and other Greek sailors and soldiers were fundamentally determined by one main factor: the financial resources possessed by (or available to) the Greek state (or non-Greek king or ruler) that employed them. Military pay is always discussed in contemporary historians and orators (and even comedians) within the context of public finance, the expenses military employers had to incur, or the reductions in expenditure they had to make. Simply put, all other things being equal, and with due regard to convention, military employers in the classical Greek world paid their forces what they could: when the financial situation of military employers changed, the rates of pay they gave or offered to sailors and soldiers changed. A second crucial factor influencing military pay rates was competition. Competition for manpower between warring states sometimes led classical Greek states to set military pay (or to propose setting it) at higher rates in order to recruit more manpower (more quickly) than their enemies and/or to encourage desertions from enemy forces. The third important factor influencing military pay rates (for mercenaries) was demand: higher rates of pay were sometimes offered or given both to rapidly recruit mercenaries and to retain their loyalty.

135 In contrast, the economic prosperity of states did not have, as has been commonly thought, any direct or important effect on the setting of military pay rates (contra Pritchett [1971] 23, Marinovic [1988] 172, Rawlings [2007] 170, Burrer [2008] 81).

136 See below chapter 6 section ii.

137 The machinations of Tissaphernes are the exception that proves the rule.

138 Conversely, in the case of Tissaphernes, the lack of competition meant that he could reduce rates of pay for the Peloponnesian crews he was financing.
once in service. But these second and third factors were functions of the first: there had to be funds available in order to finance the higher rates of pay motivated by competition and demand for military manpower.

Rates of pay for classical Greek sailors and soldiers were not determined by, nor did they change in reaction to, the (expected) prices found on military campaigns for grain or any other basic commodities (such as wine or oil). Prices for basic subsistence foods (or for any other good) are never attested as a factor in the setting of rates of military pay. In addition to the absence of evidence for commodity prices affecting rates of pay, three other phenomena evidenced for the classical Greek world prove that (expected) prices did not affect pay rates. Firstly, the fact that rates of pay were affected by competition between states demonstrates that there could have been no important linkage between these pay rates and food prices. Secondly, the standard and

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139 Loomis ([1998] 258) also considers the supply and demand of manpower to have had an effect on Athenian military pay rates. Specifically, remarking on the fact that pay rates for Athenian military forces and dikasts remained static in the fourth century, while pay rates for certain public officeholders, allowance recipients, and public construction workers increased over the period, sometimes dramatically, Loomis explained the static nature of military (and dikastic) pay rates as having been caused by supply “evidently” exceeding state demand for military and dikastic service. But, as Osborne points out ([2000b] 186-187), Loomis' reasoning does not work because of his failure to consider two important factors: firstly, the fact that competition for manpower with states elsewhere in the Greek world will have affected wage rates at Athens; secondly, the moral and other pressures on Athenian citizens to fight, which did not apply, for example, to slaves working in Eleusis.


141 In fact, prices (either for food or for anything else) are never mentioned in any ancient discussion (contemporary or not) of classical Greek military pay (with the exception of Dem. 4.28-29 (see section iii)).

142 Even if one state/military employer was paying rate determined by food prices, the second competing state, offering a higher rate of pay, could not have been.
customary rates of military pay attested in many parts of the Greek world in the late fifth and early fourth centuries could not have existed in a world where pay rates were changed by employers to respond to changes in food prices: if basic commodity prices did remain remarkably stable over these two centuries, there still would have been price fluctuations (at least for grain) over the course of a normal harvest cycle, sudden significant increases in prices in response to harvest (or distribution) shocks, and, not least, differences in commodity prices by region; we see none of these fluctuations reflected in changes in classical Greek military pay rates.\footnote{Consider the last consideration (regional differences in commodity prices): there is no allowance for this in, e.g., the pay rates offered to the Cyreans as they marched from western Asia Minor to Babylonia and eventually back again to western Asia Minor, or to the crews of the Athenian and Peloponnesian navies who operated all over the eastern Aegean in the last decade of the Peloponnesian War.} Finally, the fact that military pay was not intrinsically linked to provisioning—i.e. the fact that pay was still expected to be distributed to military forces even when means of obtaining provisions other than markets were available and utilized—demonstrates clearly that classical Greek military rates of pay were not determined by prices.\footnote{See also in this regard the fact that, as Dem. 4.28-29 shows, only part of the $\mu\nu\sigma\o\omicron\delta\omicron\varsigma$ $\iota\nu\tau\mu\lambda\varsigma\varsigma$ paid to Athenian forces in the middle of the fourth century was determined by (general) ideas of the money needed for soldiers’ and sailors’ subsistence.}

There is an element of stating the obvious to all of this,\footnote{Note, however, that in other times and places in the pre-industrial military history of Europe, pay rates were changed to reflect the prices at which soldiers had to buy their subsistence: see, e.g., Parker (2004) 133 (“... the reaction of the English parliament to the grave subsistence crisis of 1649: the soldiers of the New Model Army received a wage supplement while grain prices were high”); Mallett (1974) 137 (comparing the military rates of pay offered by competing fourteenth and fifteenth century Italian states) (”[t]here were sometimes local variations depending on the cost of living and forage, but on the whole it seems clear that the more a state had progressed towards creating a standing army the lower the rates of pay it was able to impose”).} but given that the two major works (Pritchett’s, Loomis’) of the last fifty years on the pay of classical Greek...
sailors and soldiers have held to the view that military pay rates were (or could have been) determined by the prices expected to be found in markets provided to military forces on campaign, and that this view continues to be found in discussions of the pay rates of classical (and Hellenistic) military forces, it has been necessary to refute it, since doing so also proves incorrect the assumption underlying it: i.e., if rates of pay were determined by the prices found by classical Greek sailors and soldiers on campaign, then particular rates of pay could tell us about the conditions in markets provided to sailors and soldiers on particular campaigns. Since I have demonstrated that military rates of pay were not motivated by (changes in) food prices, however, it follows that these rates of pay cannot be taken as evidence for conditions in particular markets provided to soldiers and sailors.\textsuperscript{146} This is not to deny that price increases (or decreases) ever occurred in markets provided to military forces by traders or cities,\textsuperscript{147} but it is to deny that pay rates responded to them.

The evidence we possess for classical Greek military pay rates, then, can tell us nothing about the behavior of markets in specific regions during specific military campaigns.\textsuperscript{148} But it can allow us to draw one positive inference about the general

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item This demonstration also means we cannot, as Pritchett did, use assumptions regarding prices on campaigns to aid in reconstructions of specific military rates of pay.
\item See chapter 7 section v, and also appendix 6 section iii on the experiences of the Carthaginian mercenaries in Sicily in the later years of the first Punic war.
\item The evidence for standard and conventional rates of military pay in the Greek world is particularly decisive in proving that military pay rates did not respond to specific market conditions. Cf., in this regard, e.g., Parker (2004) 133: although there were violent fluctuations in the cost of basic subsistence foods and a general rise in the cost of living during Spanish campaigns in the Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (there was a four-fold rise in food prices), the basic wage of the Spanish infantry soldier remained unchanged for one hundred years (from 1534 to 1634) (although there was an eighty per cent increase in their salaries in real terms); Temin (2001) 172: “[n]ominal wages stayed constant for many
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
workings of markets provided to sailors and soldiers in the classical Greek world.

Although military pay rates were never changed in response to food prices, there is no evidence that high food prices led to logistical (and therefore tactical or strategic) difficulties for the members of any classical Greek army, navy, or amphibious expedition because of their inability to fund purchases of food from their pay. For once, the argument from silence has some weight here: if high prices had been responsible for the tactical or strategic problems of a military expedition, we could have expected to hear of it because of the (unusual) effect it would have had on the outcome of a campaign. But, while we do hear about military and logistical difficulties connected to the failure to pay military forces, we only once hear of a connection between such difficulties and an inability to purchase food from military pay because of high market prices: at Xen., Anab. 1.5.6 (see again chapter 4 section ii). This passage is the exception that proves the rule that classical Greek military pay must have been normally (more than) sufficient for subsistence. If military pay was (almost) always sufficient for subsistence, then one

years at a time in the market economy of early modern England, even though the price of grain fluctuated widely..."}

149 See introduction section iv.

150 See, e.g., Thucy. 8.57.1, 8.78, 8.83.3; Hell. Oxy. 19.2; [Dem.] 49.15; [Dem.] 50.23, 53-56; ps.-Arist., Oec. 2.2.23b, 1350a31-1350b4.

151 That classical Greek military pay must have been more than sufficient for subsistence can be shown from other considerations, too. Firstly, as Dem. 4.28-29 and [Dem.] 50 show (see chapter 6 section vii), payments for Athenian military and naval forces in the middle of the fourth century comprised one payment for subsistence, and one payment for pay. Secondly, the one drachma rate paid to Athenian soldiers and sailors in (and before) the Peloponnesian War until 412 and to Peloponnesian sailors at the start of the Ionian war must have included at least three obols more than the daily cost of subsistence, since, when the pay given to the Athenian and Peloponnesian forces was reduced to three obols per day in 412, the sailors on each side were able to survive. This arguments gains support from Alcibiades’ recommendation to Tissaphernes to justify his pay cut with the argument that any pay more than obols would lead to a superfluity of money among the sailors and thus give them opportunity to spend on things
can conclude from our evidence for the lack of response of military pay rates to changes in food prices in the classical period, and from their often unchanging and customary nature, that severe and *sustained* price increases in military markets must have been rare.

that would damage their physical conditions (i.e. on goods other than those necessary for their physical subsistence). Again (see above p.303), this point was clearly and merely a pretext, but it was still one that had to have a ring of plausibility to be offered to the Peloponnesian soldiers and their officers. Interestingly, similar arguments were made almost fifty years later, when one Athenian trierarch (Polycles) accused another (Apollocorus) of corrupting the sailors under his charge by paying them more than subsistence rates: see [Dem.] 50.35-36; and for a full discussion of this passage and the speech as a whole, chapter 6 section vii. See also Thucy. 7.13.2: those men who were not citizens of Athens had signed up for naval service on the Sicilian expedition voluntarily “οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ µεγάλου µισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες καὶ οἰόµενοι χρηµατεῖσθαι µᾶλλον ἢ µαχεῖσθαι,” “were in the first place stirred by the prospects of high pay and thought that they were going to make money rather than fight.” These rowers obviously did not expect that their high pay would be consumed solely by their purchases of provisions, but that the rate of one drachma per day per man would allow them to profit from their service. (It should be noted that Thucy. 7.13.2 does not show that the one drachma per day per man rate paid for the Sicilian expedition was a comparatively (or particularly) high rate of pay, but that it was a high rate of pay in absolute terms.) All this is obvious from the fact that changes in military rates of pay are linked explicitly to the availability (or scarcity) of funds to finance them, but it still bears repeating, in the light of the arguments of Pritchett, Loomis, and others. Finally, it should be noted that the length of military campaigns in the classical Greek world separated trireme crew members and other members of overseas expeditions (especially) from agriculture and other occupations: this had the result that their labor costs were not externalized (by agriculture or any other occupation), and thus their pay had to cover (at least) their full subsistence costs (contra the muddled arguments of Rosivach [1985] (though he does not use the term ‘externalization of labor,’ this is the basic concept underlying his argument)) (see Erdkamp [2005] 84-87 for definition and discussion of the concept of the externalization of labor costs).
Chapter 6: The Disbursement of State Pay to Classical Greek Sailors and Soldiers

i. Introduction

In order to determine how prices for grain (and other foods) were set in the markets provided to classical Greek soldiers and sailors by traders and poleis, it is necessary to quantify the demand in those markets, i.e. the number of soldiers and/or sailors who were purchasing grain and their purchasing power. I have treated the question of the sizes of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces in previous chapters and in appendix 2. In this chapter, I will focus on the question of the disbursement of pay to classical Greek sailors and soldiers since, in order to determine their purchasing power, one has to determine how much money they had to spend in those markets. This necessarily brings up the question of pay: how much soldiers and sailors received, the nature of what they received, and how regularly they received this.

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that Athenian sailors—or, to be more precise, those men who served on-board classical Athenian triremes, who were as likely to be slaves or foreigners as Athenian citizens—received one drachma per man per day for at least thirty years before ca. 412, that from ca. 412 to 407 (at least) they received three obols per day, and that in 351 they could be expected to receive at least two obols a day. It is agreed by (almost) all scholars writing on the subject that classical Athenian

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1 See again p.131 n.32; again, for the sake of brevity, I will sometimes use ‘Athenian sailors’ or ‘Athenian rowers’ as shorthand for the men serving on-board Athenian triremes, in contexts where no ambiguity or uncertainty will result from this usage.

2 See again Dem. 4.29: Demosthenes proposing pay for Athenian sailors of two obols σαπηγίσιον plus “τὰ λοίπ’” of undetermined amount: see also p.397 and n.112 below.
sailors received these fluctuating amounts of pay in two parts: the first half while on campaign, and the second half, the balance of their pay (an amount equaling the amount of the second half of their pay multiplied by as many days as they had spent on campaign), on their return to Athens.\(^3\) (It is also generally agreed by scholars holding the view that Athenian sailors received their pay in two installments that the aim of this supposed method of payment was to prevent desertion during campaigns.)\(^4\) The term \(\mu\sigma\varrho\delta\zeta\varepsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\nu\zeta\)—found throughout fifth- and fourth-century literature in a variety of genres (history, comedy, oratory, rhetorical treatises), and later in Arrian and Plutarch—has been taken by adherents to the consensus view on the disbursement of Athenian naval pay to denote this supposed method of payment in installments to rowers on-board Athenian triremes: i.e., the phrase \(\mu\sigma\varrho\delta\zeta\varepsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\nu\zeta\) has been taken to denote the ‘full pay’ of Athenian sailors, comprising both the first payment distributed to them on campaign and the second given to them on their arrival back in Athens after service abroad; for the

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\(^3\) Morrison and Williams (1968) 258-259 is most often cited by those adhering to the communis opinio on this subject: see Dreizehnter (1981) 275; Sommerstein (1981) 217 (ad Aristoph., Knight 1366-67); Cook (1990) 80, 82; Gabrielsen (1994) 113, 122-123; Morrison et al. (2000) 119-120, 122; Olson (2002) 216 (ad Aristoph., Ach. 547). See also Stahl (1875-1889) vol.4 (2) 85-86; Rogers (1930) 190-191; Berneker (1969) 1351; French (1972) 5 n.12; Casson (1994) 70; Ducrey (1999) 216; Burre (2008) (the most recent summary discussion of classical and Hellenistic military pay) 90 n.68 maintaining this view. This view of the Athenian state’s method of disbursement of naval pay has now been as enshrined as orthodoxy in the recently published Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare: see Gabrielsen (2007) 258. It is also found in popularizing treatments of classical Greek warfare: see Fields (2008) 38. Pritchett ([1971] 17 and n.52, 24-25) and Andrewes (HCT v.98-99) dissent from the scholarly orthodoxy on this topic, but their disagreements with the standard interpretation are based on inaccuracies in interpretation of Thucy. 8.45.2 (see below pp.378-379 n.73, p.428 and n.174, and p.381 n.79, pp.382-383 respectively); cf. also p.354 n.10, p.377 n.72 on Ballin’s (1978) discussion of this topic, and p.369 n.57 on Lapini (2002) 67 n.19. Loomis ([1998] 60) is agnostic on the subject (he incorrectly reports Pritchett, however, as concluding that part of pay for Athenian military forces was normally withheld until the end of a campaign). Griffith ([1935]) also believed that classical Greek soldiers and sailors received their pay in two installments, but at the beginning and the end of each month on campaign, rather than during a campaign and at the end of a campaign, as the prevailing view has it: see section ix below for detailed refutation of Griffith’s position.

currently standard interpretation of this phrase, it was the payment of the second half of the seamen’s pay that meant that, so to speak, Athenian sailors’ µισθός was ἐντελής.

This interpretation of the term µισθός ἐντελής is based primarily on two passages (although, as indicated above, the term appears in several other contexts): Aristoph., Knights 1366-67 and Thucy. 8.45.2. In addition, some scholars have also cited a passage from Polyaenus’ Strategica (3.9.51) in support of the standard view, based on the Knights and Thucydides passages, that Athenian forces received some of their pay up front, and the balance at the end of a campaign. Finally, a passage from the Demosthenic corpus—[Dem.] 50.18, in which Apollodorus, an Athenian trierarch, told an Athenian jury in 359 that he hired, while on campaign in the northern Aegean, some rowers “ἐντελοµίσθους”—has been taken both as confirmation of the scholarly consensus concerning “µισθός ἐντελής,” and as evidence that the ‘two installment’ system of payments to sailors on-board Athenian triremes continued into the fourth century.

In this chapter I will examine each of these passages independently from one another, and all the other passages in which the term µισθός ἐντελής is used to describe military (and naval) pay, considering each within its immediate narrative context and within the genre of the work in which it is located, in order to investigate whether any contemporary or later source provides positive evidence for a standard Athenian administrative procedure of disbursement of naval pay in two installments with the

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5 Gabrielsen (1994) 250 n.17; Cook (1990) 80. See also pp.381-382 below on Classen’s use of this passage in his attempt to restore the text of Thucy. 8.45.2.

second coming at the end of a campaign (or for such a procedure outside Athens). I hope to demonstrate that not only is there no unambiguous, positive evidence to support the standard interpretation of the term μισθὸς ἐντελής, but that a detailed and contextualized analysis of the four passages commonly cited to support the ‘two installment’ thesis, and others that include attestations of the term, as well as some epigraphical evidence for the disbursement of pay to Athenian triremes, shows that the standard interpretation is incorrect. I will show instead that the term μισθὸς ἐντελής should be taken to mean in Aristophanes and Thucydides complete (or full) payment—while on campaign—of a rate of pay previously promised to sailors and soldiers. I will also show that the term μισθὸς ἐντελής continued to take this meaning throughout the early and middle part of the fourth century (i.e., it could still simply refer to the full amount of μισθός that men serving on an expedition expected to be paid during their service), but that, starting in the middle of the fourth century, the term in certain contexts took on a slightly modified meaning to reflect changes in the methods of disbursement of naval pay (and military pay generally) at Athens (and elsewhere). Thus, in some discussions and descriptions of military and naval pay in mid-fourth century Athens (and elsewhere), a sailor’s and soldier’s expected full remuneration (μισθὸς ἐντελής) for service comprised μισθός (‘pay as such’) together with his τροφή (in the limited and new sense of ‘ration-money’ only). (It should be immediately made clear here, however, that

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7 Although no scholar who has written advancing or supporting the communis opinio has advanced any hypothesis of how this method of disbursing pay to Athenian sailors in two installments might have worked operationally (see p.377 n.71 and section viii below for more on this point), the use of words such as, e.g., “system” (Morrison and Williams [1968] 259), “policy” (Cook [1990] 80), and “practice” (Gabrielsen [1994] 113) imply that there is, underlying the consensus view, an assumption that there were permanent administrative procedures put in place by the Athenian state to disburse naval pay in two installments to the crews of the polis’ triremes.
although μισθὸς ἐντελής did therefore come to denote in certain mid-fourth century contexts the sum of two payments for (military or naval) service, it never, at any point, came to mean or imply the disbursement by the Athenian state of naval pay in two equal installments, one on active service abroad, and one on return to the Piraeus.)

Having done this, I will then demonstrate that classical Athenian sailors and members of other classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces expected to receive their pay in advance and each month (in lump sums of monthly pay), and that they never expected to receive this pay in kind (confirming the conclusions of chapter 2 section iic).

**ii. ‘μισθὸν... ’ντελῆ’ at Aristoph., Knights 1366-67**

At *Knights* 1366-67 (produced at the Lenaea of 424), the newly reinvigorated and rehabilitated Demos promises, as one of his policies for the future, that the rowers of Athenian triremes will from now on get their complete pay when they come into port:

“πρῶτον µέν, ὁπόσοι ναῦς ἐλαύνουσιν µακρὰς, / καταγοµένοις τὸν µισθὸν ἀποδώσω ’ντελῆ,” “[f]irst of all, to all who row long ships I will give their full pay when they come into port.” Morrison and Coates stated that the implication from this promise of Demos’ is that “seamen had a balance of pay due to them when they reached port, but did not always get it.”

Andrewes believed that Demos’ promise “shows that in the 420s Athens withheld part of the sailors’ pay till the expedition came home (and the sailor might not get it all then)...” Sommerstein, in his commentary on these lines, stated, explicitly

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8 (1968) 258-259.

9 *HCT* v.98.
following Morrison and Coates, that “this passage, with Thucy. 8.45.2, shows that part of an Athenian naval oarsman’s pay was withheld from him until the end of an expedition... The implication here is that even on return to the Peiraeus men might find it difficult to secure payment of their accumulated arrears.”

Rogers inferred from Thucy. 8.45.2 that Athenian sailors received their pay in two equal installments (half on campaign, half on arrival home), and found this inference confirmed in this passage from *Knights*. Each of these scholars, whether establishing or citing the now conventional interpretation of µισθὸς ἐντελής, then, took these lines in *Knights* to be referring to (the failure of) a regular Athenian policy of withholding part of sailors’ pay till the end of an expedition.

The question I want to answer here is whether there is any positive reason for this inference.

As a first step to answering this question, it should be noted immediately that the adjective ἐντελής (’ντελῆ”) at *Knights* 1366-67 can tell us nothing by itself of the methods of payment employed by the polis of Athens in the 420s. ἐντελής is the regular adjective used in the classical period for (military and naval) pay, tribute, loans paid

10 (1981) 217. See also Ballin (1978) 134 citing Morrison and Coates’ interpretation of this passage in his discussion of the meaning of µισθὸς ἐντελής in [Dem.] 50.

11 See Rogers (1930) 190-191. See below pp.365-368 for detailed refutation of Rogers’ position).

12 As *Knights* 1366-67 refer only to those rowing Athenian triremes, I will be referring to the pay of “Athenian rowers,” and not “sailors,” throughout the next two sections of this chapter.

13 Note that µισθὸς ἐντελής is never attested as referring to public or ‘civilian’ pay.

14 See, e.g., *IG I²* 34.21-22 (ca. 425) (see p.361 and n.37 below for this date), *IG I²* 60.4, 7 (ca. 430) referring to the payment of tribute in full.
or provided in full; or for state military equipment or other state possessions counted as complete. Thus, the use of “ντελῆ at Knights 1366-67 simply informs us that Demos promises to provide pay “in full,” or their “complete pay,” to the rowers on-board Athenian triremes when they arrive back in Athens. What Demos’ promise does allow us to infer is the following only: that on at least one or two recent occasions (i.e. before (roughly) the first month of 424 when the play was performed), Athenian oarsmen who had been on active service abroad had not received the complete pay due to them by the time of their arrival back in Athens. The use of ἐντελής by itself, however, implies nothing about the reason(s) why the rowers had not received their complete pay; i.e., the adjective by itself cannot tell us whether the crews’ failure to receive their complete pay

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15 IG I3 101.30 (a decree concerning the Neapolitans in Thrace, 410/9); [Dem.] 35.11.

16 See LSJ A ad loc.

17 See, e.g., Thucy. 6.45; IG I3 498.20.

18 See, e.g., IG I3 1456.5-6 ([Athenian magistrates’ accounts on the temple of Aphaea on Aegina, ca. 431-404]): ἴκρια περί τὸ ἐ- / δος ἐντελῆ, ἡγόνος :Ι:

19 Note that outside the use of the term μισθὸς ἐντελής to describe naval (and military) pay, the adjective ἐντελῆς is not found again in Aristophanes, Thucydides (with the exception of the passage noted at n.17 above), Xenophon (with the exception of Oec. 20.21 where it is used to refer to the expenses of a household (“δαπάνας... ἐντελεῖς ἐκ τῶν οἴκων”), Lysias, Isocrates or Demosthenes (and that it is not found at all in Herodotus, Antiphon, or Andocides).

20 Cf. MacDowell (1995) 104. Demos’ proposal on pay is one of three policies he is going to adopt for the future. The second (1369-1371) is that no hoplite will be allowed to have his name transferred from the list for military service by improper influence, and the third (1373, 1375-1380) is that pretentious adolescents who are accustomed to chatter in the agora will no longer be allowed to enter it. As MacDowell comments ([1995] 104), “[t]his third policy is no doubt a joke, but the first two look like remedies for genuine grievances.”
was the result of a failure in a standard Athenian administrative procedure (due to, e.g., administrative incompetence or corruption) so that the expected second half of the rowers’ μισθός could not be paid to them on their return to Athens; or simply the result of exceptional circumstances,\(^\text{21}\) such as extraordinary financial pressures, so that there was no money available at Athens to pay the rowers the second installment of their pay on their disembarkation at Athens; or, and this alternative is no less plausible than the first two (if we consider *Knights* 1366-67 by itself), that extraordinary financial pressures at Athens and/or exceptional circumstances experienced while on campaign had meant that the rowers, rather than receiving their μισθός in full and regularly while on campaign, had, contrary to (in this hypothetical alternative) normal practice, received only part of their pay on campaign, so that the μισθός owed to them on their return to Athens was arrears of pay which they had expected to be paid to them during their service abroad.\(^\text{22}\)

The point that the phrase “μισθὸν... ἐντελῆ” at *Knights* 1366-67 can tell us nothing, when considered on its own, about why μισθός had not been paid, or why it was to be paid generally, to Demos’ rowers is (if obvious) an important one. It means that the burden of proof is on those scholars who would see in these lines evidence of a regular

\(^{21}\) Loomis (1998) 60.

\(^{22}\) Griffith ([1935] 272) takes Aristophanes at *Knights* 1366-67 to mean “‘to the sailors, when they come ashore, I will pay their full pay’—i.e. without deductions or delays.” This may sound like the second position described in the text above, but Griffith understands the reference to μισθὸς ἐντελῆ in a different sense to the one offered above: he takes it here to be alluding to the payment of the second of two distinct payments to Athenian sailors, the first payment being called σιταρχία (or σιτηρέσιον). But there is no basis for this view in the lines from *Knights*, and it comes from a schema for the disbursement of payments to soldiers and sailors in the late fifth and early fourth centuries that, as I will demonstrate below, is without foundation (see section ix below).
Athenian policy of withholding half of rowers’ μισθός till their return to the Piraeus at the end of a campaign. If we read these two lines without thinking of any other passage (such as Thucy. 8.45.2 or Polyaeus, Strateg. 3.9.51), there is nothing in these lines, in themselves, that indicates such a system of payment in installments. But before proceeding to an examination of the Thucydides and Polyaeus passages, to see whether they offer support to the consensus interpretation of these lines, I want to consider other evidence—some internal to Knights, but most external to the comedy—that suggests that the arrears in pay implied in Knights 1366-67 could have been the product of exceptional financial pressures in the mid 420s at Athens.

There are three other short passages from Knights that show a concern for pay: at 555, the chorus refers in a prayer to the things that please Poseidon—amongst other things, these include “μισθοφόροι τριήρεις”; at 1065-66, Demos asks the Sausage-Seller and Paphlagon how his rowers are going to get their pay; and at 1078-79, Demos again asks where pay will be found for his rowers, and the Sausage-Seller replies that he’ll provide it, and within three days. All three of these passages, and the last especially,

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23 One could say, of course, that such a system of (dual) payment is taken for granted in these lines, but, again, this does not provide support for the standard view since, as I have just established, the burden of producing positive evidence is on those who hold the consensus view; anyway, in the lack of explicit evidence either way from this passage, one could just as easily argue that, e.g., difficulties in disbursing pay on campaign due to current and extraordinary financial pressures are being taken for granted here.

24 This should be taken as referring to Poseidon’s concern that triremes should be promptly and fully paid, rather than referring to triremes bringing money to Athens to provide (public and military) pay (the two possible interpretations of this phrase raised by Sommerstein at [1981] 174).

25 “... σὺ δ’ ἀναγίγνωσκε, τοῖς ναύταισί µου ὅπως ὁ µισθὸς πρῶτον ἀποδοθῆσεται.”

26 “[∆η.] τοῦτοι ὁ µισθός τοῖς ἀλωπεκίοισι ποῦ; [Αλ.] ἐγὼ πωρίῳ, καὶ τοῦτον ἡμερῶν τριῶν.”
suggest strongly that the problem of unpaid \( \mu\sigma\zeta\zeta \) to Athenian rowers had been a recent, pressing problem at Athens. Again, this does not provide positive proof that the failure to pay \( \mu\sigma\zeta\zeta \) \( \epsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\zeta \) at 1366-67 refers certainly to a failure of the Athenian state to pay a pre-arranged second half of \( \mu\sigma\zeta\zeta \) (supposedly) paid at this time to rowers on Athenian triremes on disembarkation, or to an inability to pay \( \mu\sigma\zeta\zeta \) regularly and completely on campaign. But the fact that unpaid naval \( \mu\sigma\zeta\zeta \) is referred to on at least three occasions in the \textit{Knights} as a problem (i.e., at 1065-66, 1078-79, 1366-67)—in other words, the fact that unpaid \( \mu\sigma\zeta\zeta \) is presented in the \textit{Knights} as an issue that needs to be rectified—implies very strongly that the the \( \mu\sigma\zeta\zeta \) owed to the rowers on their return to the Piraeus at \textit{Knights} 1366-67 is not the result of a standard administrative procedure at Athens, but the result of extraordinary circumstances.\(^27\)

In addition, it should be noted here that \textit{Knights} 1065-66 and 1078-79 refer simply to \( \mu\sigma\zeta\zeta \), without any indication that a second (half) payment is specifically owed. This would seem to favor the interpretation that the \( \mu\sigma\zeta\zeta \) owed in these passages—and at 1366-67—refers simply to accumulated unpaid \( \mu\sigma\zeta\zeta \) that had been expected to be disbursed regularly and punctually on campaign. Let me explain what I mean by this: if the sailors’ expected pay had not been forthcoming on campaign, and thus (some) random amount of pay had built up in arrears, then one would expect any reference to the owed sums (of pay) to be simply to pay; but if a specific, officially fixed

\(^{27}\) Although, again, these extraordinary circumstances could either be factors leading to difficulties in paying rowers on active service abroad, or to difficulties in finding funds in Athens to pay rowers on their return from service abroad.
payment had not been made at its officially fixed time, we might expect a specific reference to such a payment at 1065-66 and 1078-79. The related points I am making here are (again) that the burden of proof is on those scholars who would see $\mu$ισθὸς ἐντελής as referring to two specific payments, and that these two short passages from the *Knights* do not offer any positive support for the conventional interpretation of the term but, if anything, tend to undermine it.

iii. Financial pressures at Athens in the mid 420s and the disbursement of naval pay at Knights 1366-67

Cook, defending the hypothesis that *Knights* 1366-67 implied that Athenian seamen’s $\mu$ισθὸς was normally disbursed in two payments, with one withheld to their return home to Athens, stated that *Knights* “was performed in 424 B.C., before the Sicilian disaster, so that withholding part of the $\mu$ισθὸς was not in fact an austerity measure”—i.e., her point was that *Knights* 1366-67 do not refer simply to a failure to pay $\mu$ισθὸς to sailors on campaign due to financial pressures. But there is, in fact, much evidence that the expenditures made in the first years of the Peloponnesian war had resulted in major strains on the finances of the Athenian state by the mid 420s, i.e. in the years directly before the first staging of *Knights*. In 428, the Athenians raised for the first time an *eisphora* on themselves, which raised two hundred talents, and sent out at

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28 See pp.376-377 and p.389 below for my making similar points regarding, respectively, Thucy. 8.84.1 and Isoc. 15.111.

29 Cook (1990) 80.

the same time “money-collecting ships” to collect a levy, over and above the expected tribute, on the poleis of the empire, explicitly for the purpose of helping to meet the expenses of the siege of Mytilene (Thucydides mentions ‘money- (or silver)-collecting ships,’ ‘νῆες ἀργυρολόγοι’ on four occasions (2.69.1 [winter of 430/29], 3.19.1, 4.50.1 [winter of 425/4], 4.75.1 [summer of 424] (the latter two passages refer to the same expedition)), but 3.19.1 is the only instance where he explicitly tells us the aim of their dispatch (i.e. to raise money for the siege of Mytilene). Kallet-Marx ([1993] 160-164) has shown that the old view—that the dispatch of these ships was to be connected with tribute reassessments—was based on circular argumentation and has little to recommend it. Unfortunately, since it is impossible to tell, in the absence of other evidence, whether these money-collecting expeditions were also sent out before the Peloponnesian war, it is also impossible to tell whether the expeditions of 430/29 and 425/4 were (as the expedition of 428/7 was) responses to financial pressures, or just part of the normal procedures of the Athenian Empire, although it is probable that the first is true (see esp. Kallet-Marx [1993] 201-202, Meiggs [1972] 254).

31 Thucydides has it that earlier that year the Mytilenians had given Athenian financial exhaustion as one of their reasons for revolting (3.13.3). Measures to raise extra money for the Mytilene siege had become necessary since, by the year 428/7, the Athenians had already spent much of the monetary reserve which had lain on the Acropolis before the war (Thuc. 2.13.3-5), as the “Logistai inscription” (IG I3 369) makes clear: this inscription shows that “[w]hile the Athenians had probably spent between 600 and 1,370 talents from Athena’s purse in each year between 432/1 and 429/8, in the following years expenditures from this source ranged only between 100 and 261 talents.”32 This suggests that the Athenians realized that the reserves of the treasury of Athena, the primary source of funding for the first years of war, would not be able to sustain the continuing and necessary military and naval expenditures for the war.33 thus, from 428/7 onwards, the annual tribute, supplemented

32 Samons (2000) 194 (see n.92 there for references).


34 See, e.g., Gomme, HCT iii.688; Rhodes (1994) 193.
by extraordinary measures to increase income, such as the *eisphora* and the extraordinary levy on subject cities, became the primary source of funding for the war.\textsuperscript{35} The now heightened importance of the tribute for the funding of the war is evidenced in three important inscriptions from the 420s.\textsuperscript{36} The so-called “Kleonyms Decree” (*IG I*\textsuperscript{3} 68), passed in the second prytany of 426/5, mandated the appointment, in the *poleis* of the empire, of *eklogeis* who were to be responsible for the collection of tribute in their cities; in an amendment to the decree, supplementary measures to further tighten control of tribute collection were proposed “*[h]όσας δὲ ἄφις καὶ ᾣφαὶ στὰ στὰ ἁστασὶ ἈΘΕΝΑ./ *[ιοὶ τῇ πόλεω[ν...],” “in order that the Athenians may bear the war most easily and effectively” (II.28-29). This decree was followed a couple of years later by the “Kleinias Decree” (*IG I*\textsuperscript{3} 34) of ca. 425/424,\textsuperscript{37} which tightened up the process of dispatch and delivery of the tribute to Athens. Most importantly, the tribute reassessment decree (the “Thoudippos decree,” *IG I*\textsuperscript{3} 71) of late 425 (in Posideon, the month before *Knights* was staged), which proposed a large increase in the tribute assessed on the *poleis* of the empire, and tribute to be assessed on *poleis* that had never paid tribute or had not paid it for a long time, explicitly cited the war as creating a need for extra income (II.44-46):\textsuperscript{38}

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37 The conventional date for this decree is the early 440s but, as Samons ([2000] 189 with n.86) points out, it “should... be placed after Thoudippos’ reassessment of 425/4, since the latter institutes the practice of allies bringing the ‘cow and panoply’ to Athens that Kleinias’ proposal simply assumes (line 42).” I do not agree with Samons ([2000] 189, 192-193] that Kleinias’ proposal superseded that of Kleonymus; instead, I take them to be complementary, agreeing in this with H. B. Mattingly ap. Samons [2000] 192-193 n.88; Rhodes (2007b) p.2 (of handout) (I am grateful to Dr. Errietta Bissa for this last reference).
\end{flushright}
“[the Generals are to see to] the cities bringing in [their tribute as soon as the Council
draws up the tribute] assessment, in order [that the People have sufficient money for the]
war.”

All of these measures show that the state of polis finances—to be more precise,
their ability to meet the expenses of the war—was a matter of serious concern to the
Athenians in the mid 420s: the reserve on the Acropolis was clearly no longer
sufficient by itself to fund the war at the current rate of military and naval expenditures,
therefore action was taken to secure and increase the annual tribute income which was
now the main source of funding for the war, to be supplemented as needed by
extraordinary sources of income. None of this is to suggest that the treasury of Athena

39 “ὕποτας δὲ ἀν τὸν φόρον ἀπά- / γενοῦν χὰς πόλες ἰππελέμβξεν ὧν στρατηγοί εὐθὐ/ς ἐκ ἡμῖν καὶ ἀνταξιοὶ
ὅς βολὲ πᾶν τάχων- / τὸν φόρον ἤπατε ὡτὶ ὑπὸ δῆμοι ἀργύριοι θηλασιῶν ἐς τὸν πόλιςερνο...” The Greek is
obviously heavily restored, but the meaning seems clear. See also II.21-22, 46-48 of this inscription for the
linkage between amounts of tribute and funding for the war; and II.16-17 explicitly stating that the tribute
has become too little.

40 Kallet-Marx ([1993] 164-170, 192-194) concludes from the fact that the tribute reassessment decree is
not mentioned in Thucydides or Aristophanes that its effects were limited, and that it (and the erection
of the stele carrying the inscription) functioned mostly as propaganda. But, as has been pointed out (Engels
[1997] 233-234, Samons [2000] 211 n.184), whatever about the effects of the decree, the very fact of the
reassessment shows that the Athenians were seriously worried about finances just before the staging of
Knights. See also Osborne (2000a) 92: “…Athenians were certainly worried about the cost of the
Peloponnesian War in the middle of the 420s…, the extraordinary re-assessments of the 420s were certainly
a serious exercise and not merely a piece of propaganda either for Athenian or allied consumption… There
was no blanket percentage increase for everyone; individual allies were clearly reassessed independently,
although the criteria on which that re-assessment was based may have changed in the same way for
everyone.” Kallet-Marx’s attempt to minimize the importance of the reassessment decree is part of a larger
argument minimizing the importance of tribute in Athenian funding of the Archidamian War: see n.43
below.

41 In addition to the eisphora and the levy on the allies in 428/7, there is also attested the introduction soon
after 431 of the epidosis, a voluntary payment by Athenian citizens of money to the polis in times of need:
see Plut., Alc. 10.1 with Engels (1997) 234-235. Osborne ([2000a] 92) also cites IG II 161, with its
reference to Hellespontophylakes [the decree was published in 424, but the reference to these officials dates
to 426] and Athenian collection of taxes at the Hellespont, and IG II 1453 (420s?), mandating the use of
Athenian coins, weights and measures in the cities of the arche, as demonstrating that “it is clear that
financially the burdens of empire on the allies increased significantly in the Arkhidamian War;” i.e. that the
Athenians increased the financial burden of the allies as part of their attempts to finance the extraordinary
military efforts of the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war.
(or that of the Other Gods) was empty (or nearly so) in the mid 420s; but it is to say that existing sources of military and naval funding at Athens were experiencing unprecedented stresses at this time. Cook was therefore incorrect: there were serious financial pressures and strains at Athens before and at the same time as the first production of the *Knights* which could have led to difficulties in the full and punctual disbursement of pay to Athenian sailors on campaign. This means that the withholding of the Athenian rowers’ pay referred to at *Knights* 1366-67 could have been, to use Cook’s words, “an austerity measure” (i.e. the result of extraordinary financial pressures leading to a failure to distribute the rowers’ pay fully and punctually on campaign), and not a normal administrative measure. Again, demonstrating this is not a positive proof

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43 Kallet-Marx ([1993] esp. 187-200) argues that there was no financial crisis in Athens in the 420s but, at most, only a perception of one. She argues that the decrees concerning tribute passed in the 420s show that there was a growing difficulty in collecting tribute in the late 430s and 420s, and not that there were any financial strains at Athens. Her main reason for this unorthodox view is the inference from the establishment of cleruchies (rather than the imposition of tribute) at Potidaea and Mytilene, after the reduction of both cities in the early years of the war, that there was a “move away from tribute as a means of extracting revenue” at this time ([1993] 149; cf. 189). But, as Hornblower ([1994] 335) points out, throughout the history of the Athenian empire, “[t]he imposition of a cleruchy... was... regularly viewed at Athens as an alternative to tribute or at least led to massive reductions in tribute;” thus, the settlement of cleruchies at Potidaea and Mytilene was a continuation of established practice and tells us nothing of how the mechanism of tribute collection was working in these years. In fact, as argued above, the increased emphasis on tribute and its collection can, and should, be precisely and fully explained by the depletion of the reserves of the Treasuries of Athena and the Other Gods in the early years of the War. Kallet-Marx ([1993] 194-198) also discounts the “Logistai inscription” as evidence for financial difficulties on the grounds that the borrowing attested there simply represents normal practice. But this view of *IG* I³ 369 fails to take account of, and is disproved by, the huge decreases in borrowing from the gods after 429/8. See Samons (2000) 194, 209-211 for effective criticisms of Kallet-Marx’s positions on these issues; cf. Engels (1997) 233-235. Finally, Kallet-Marx’s ([1993] 198-202) attempts to ‘make up for’ the supposed decline in the amounts of tribute received at Athens in the early years of the War by stressing the amount of other revenues received from the Empire: but these revenues would have remained, at best, constant during the war, or, much more probably, would have decreased (Engels [1997] 234) and therefore do not offer a convincing answer to the question of how Athens’ military expenditures were met in the years after 429/8, if they were not primarily supplied by tribute.
that the standard interpretation of μισθὸς ἐντελής is incorrect,\textsuperscript{44} but it does show again that there is no positive reason to take the measure on pay referred to at *Knights* 1366-67 as referring to an ‘installment system’ of naval pay at Athens. In fact, demonstrating that there were financial problems at Athens in the mid-420s means that the measure on pay referred to in these lines should probably not be taken as reflective of standard late fifth century Athenian naval payment practice. In addition, refutation of Cook’s view that the measure referred to at *Knights* 1366-67 could not have been the product of exceptional circumstances also shows that the alternative explanation of μισθὸς ἐντελής I have alluded to, and hope to prove as correct below, i.e. that the term refers to the promised or expected disbursement of sailors’ (and soldiers’) complete pay while on campaign, is in no way contradicted by *Knights* 1366-67.

\textit{iv. The meaning of μισθὸς ἐντελής in Book 8 of Thucydides}

Thus, Aristophanes’ *Knights* offers no positive support for the ‘two installment’ interpretation of μισθὸς ἐντελής, and tends even to undermine it. The question becomes then: does Thucydides 8.45.2 offer the proof that the standard interpretation fails to gain from Aristophanes? Before answering this question, it will be necessary to examine briefly just why Thucy. 8.45.2 has been introduced into the question of the correct interpretation of μισθὸς ἐντελής, since, although this passage, together with *Knights* 1366-67, has been cited as the primary ancient source in every substantive modern

\textsuperscript{44} Again, though, these lines could also be referring to “an austerity measure” resulting from financial pressures that could have led to a delay in the payment of an expected second installment of μισθὸς at Athens.
discussion of the meaning of µισθὸς ἐντελῆς, Thucydides never actually uses the phrase µισθὸς ἐντελῆς at 8.45.2,\(^{45}\) which reads as follows:

... καὶ διδάσκαλος πάντων γιγνόµενος τὴν τε µισθοφορὰν ξυνέτεµεν, ἀντὶ δραχµῆς Ἀττικῆς ὥστε τριώβολον, καὶ τοῦτο µὴ ἕως ἡµερῶν, δίδοσθαι, λέγειν καλέων τὴν Τισσαφέρνη πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ πλέονες χρόνον ἔπιστατοµένος άντες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τριώβολον τοῖς ἀντίκας διδόσαν, οὗ τοσάντων πενήν ὅσον ἰνα αὐτών µὴ οὐ µὴ µὴ δραχµῆςς ἕως τριώβολον, οὐ µὴ διδοῖσθαι, λέγειν κελεύων τὸν Τισσαϕέρνη πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ πλέον ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν, οὐ τοσούτο τῶν σώµατα κείων ἐκσωστεί δαπανώντας ἕως ταύτα ἄφθιν ἡ αὐτής τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν, οὐτοῖς δὲ ταῖς ναυτικοῖς ἀπολείπωσιν οὐχ ὑπολιπόντες ἐς ὁµηρείαν τὸν προσοφειλόµενο µισθόν.

[Alcibiades] cut down the pay [of the Peloponnesian sailors] from an Attic drachma to three obols a day, and even this not paid too regularly; and told Tissaphernes to say to the Peloponnesians that the Athenians, whose maritime experience was of an older date than their own, only gave their men three obols, not so much from poverty as to prevent their seamen being corrupted by being too well off, and spoiling their fitness by spending money upon enervating indulgences, and also paid their crews irregularly in order to have a security against their deserting in the arrears which they would leave behind them.

The connection between Thucy. 8.45.2 and Ar., Knights 1366-67 was made for the first time in B. B. Rogers’ 1930 edition of the Knights.\(^{47}\) Rogers thought that it was permissible to infer from the Thucydidean passage that sailors on-board Athenian triremes received half of their pay “at the time,” the other half “being retained by the State until the completion of the voyage.”\(^{48}\) But there is nothing in 8.45.2 to support such...

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\(^{45}\) See section v below for detailed discussion of the text of Thucy. 8.45.2.

\(^{46}\) All manuscripts except B omit ἀπολείπωσιν οὐχ, and give ἀπολιπότες for ὑπολιπότες. Morrison and Williams ([1968] 273) reject both ὑπολιπότες and ἀπολιπότες, proposing οὐχ ὑποµένοτες, but they offer no reason for doing so, and there is, in fact, no reason to do so (see Andrewes, HCT v.99). See also Hornblower, C7 iii.888 ad loc.: “[t]he insertion of οὐχ is justified not only by its presence in ‘B’, the Vatican MS, but by Valla’s tr. ‘dum partem stipendii sibi debitam non relinquuerent’.”

\(^{47}\) For the first time as far as I can tell, that is. The Knights passage is not mentioned in any of the major nineteenth-century German commentaries’ (Böhme [1856], Krüger [1858-61], Poppo-Stahl, Classen-Steup) discussions of Thucy. 8.45.2, nor in Goodhart’s (1893) discussion of this passage. Rogers ([1930] 191) notes, in fact, that his interpretation was “not the usual interpretation either of the present passage [i.e. the Knights passage] or of the chapter in Thucydides; but the usual interpretation is by any universal consent unsatisfactory.” (Rogers never specifies what this usual interpretation was.)

\(^{48}\) (1930) 191.
an interpretation, and Rogers, in fact, found support for his position from a later Thucydidean passage, 8.45.6:  

It was by analogy to this Athenian custom that Alcibiades, having persuaded Tissaphernes to reduce the pay of the Peloponnesian sailors from a drachma to three obols a day, excused the reduction to the sailors by declaring that Tissaphernes could not afford to pay more out of his private resources, but that when supplies came down from the Great [sic] King ἐντελῆ αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν τὸν µισθὸν, meaning, I suppose, that they would then receive the other three obols. Thucydidès is using the identical words of Aristophanes in exactly the same sense.  

Rogers’ interpretation of 8.45.6 is absolutely incorrect. Alcibiades in this passage is referring, in fact, to an earlier commitment of Tissaphernes’: earlier that winter, at Miletus, Tissaphernes had distributed a month’s pay, of an Attic drachma per man per day, to each of the Peloponnesian sailors; “in future, however, he was resolved not to give more than three obols, until he had consulted the King when, if the King should so order, he would give, he said, the full drachma [ἐντελῆ τὴν δραχµὴν]” (Thucy. 8.29.1). That Alcibiades at 8.45.6 is definitely referring back to 8.29.1 can be seen

49 (Ibid.) The text of 8.45.6 is as follows: “τὸν τε Τισσαφέρνη ἀπέφαινε νῦν µέν, τοῖς ἰδίοις χρήµασι πολεµοῦντα, εἰκότως φείδοµεν, ἢν δὲ ποτε τροφὴ καταβῆ παρὰ βασιλέως, ἐντελῆ αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν τὸν µισθὸν καὶ τὰς πόλεις τὰ εἰκότα ὤφελήσειν”; “[h]e [i.e. Alcibiades] also pointed out that Tissaphernes was at present carrying on the war at his own expense, and had good cause for economy, but that as soon as he received money from the King he would give them their pay in full, and do what was reasonable for the cities.”

50 See also Marinovic (1988) 166 with n.54 below.

51 “τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐβούλετο τριώβολον διδόναι, ἢς ᾧ βασιλέα ἐπέρηται· ἢν δὲ κελεύῃ, ἔφη δώσειν ἐντελῆ τὴν δραχµὴν.”

52 Some scholars (see esp. Gallo [1987] 42 n.61) have argued that 8.45.2 is a doublet of 8.29.1, but Andrewes (HCT v.96-97), Rood ([1998] 264-265), and Homblover (CT iii.853, 884, 886, 887) have successfully demonstrated that the two reductions in pay are, in fact, not identical (cf. Kallet [2001] 260-261). Thucy. 8.36.1, with its statement that the Peloponnesians were still getting sufficient pay, is the key evidence against the doublet theory (note that Holzapfel ([1893] 46), writing in support of the doublet
from the linkage between Tissaphernes’ frugality, the assent of the King and the adjective ἐντελής.53 What Alcibiades is saying at 8.45.6, therefore, is that, although Tissaphernes was now maintaining the war from his own resources and was thus sparing with his money (i.e. he was now paying the men at the three obol per day rate: see 8.45.2), if money were to come down from the King (“ἢν δέ ποτε τροφὴ καταβῇ παρὰ βασιλέως”), then Tissaphernes would pay the (expected and standard) full pay of an Attic drachma per man per day. Two important conclusions emerge from this passage: firstly, Tissaphernes could now be described as “frugal” or “sparing” (“φειδόμενο”) when paying three obols—this must be referring to the fact that he had reduced the Peloponnesians’ pay at 8.45.2, and not simply changed its means of disbursement; secondly, and more importantly, ἐντελῆ... µισθὸν at 8.45.6 (since it refers back to 8.29.1) refers to the payment of an expected rate of pay (in this case, one drachma per day per man) disbursed in full during a campaign (and not one made in installments).54

That Rogers’ interpretation of 8.45.6 was wrong can also be shown by its lack of internal coherence. Alcibiades’ promise on behalf of Tissaphernes to pay the sailors in

53 See Andrewes, HCT v.100, Rood (1998) 265 n.50; and esp. Goodhart (1893) 66 ad 8.45.6: “he [i.e., Tissaphernes] would pay them the full drachma instead of the three obols.”

54 Gabrielsen’s ([1994] 112) comments on 8.29.1 are relevant for 8.45.6, too: “there is a strong impression that ‘a full drachma’ was the pay normally expected.” (See also chapter 5 section iv on 8.45.6.) Marinovic ([1988] 166) writes that Thucydides at 8.45.6 “oppose la trophè et le misthos entélès que Tissapherne ne promet de payer que s’il reçoit du Roi la trophè...” But there is no opposition here (Marinovic is here influenced by, and supporting, Griffith’s view of the meaning of the term µισθὸς ἐντελής (on the lack of validity of which, see section ix below); the linkage with 8.29.1 shows, rather, that the τροφὴ Tissaphernes might receive from the King is simply money that he could use to pay the soldiers their full drachma a day during the campaign against the Athenians.
full is not linked to the completion of any voyage or campaign (and no such completed
voyage or campaign could have been foreseen until, at the earliest, the following
summer) but to the arrival of money from the King. The failure to pay the soldiers in
full, then, is explained to the cities of Asia Minor and the sailors as a financial expedient,
as a necessary reduction of pay in response to financial pressures, and not as a change in
the way Tissaphernes was to pay the men, from payment in full during a campaign to
payment in installments. There is also no linkage made at 8.45.6 between full pay and
the accumulation of any arrears due to the failure to pay the Peloponnesian sailors an
expected second installment of pay; in fact, no such linkage could have been made since
Tissaphernes’ alteration to the pay arrangements of the Peloponnesians (at 8.45.2) had
just taken place. So again, the words “ἐντελῆ αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν τὸν µισθὸν” at 8.45.6
have nothing to do with payment of µισθός to sailors in installments.

Morrison and Coates, who are most frequently cited as establishing the standard
interpretation of µισθός ἐντελής, by their linking of Thucy. 8.45.2 and Aristoph., Knights
1366-67, also refer, as Rogers, to Thucy. 8.29.1 and 8.45.6 (but only obliquely) to
justify this linkage. Before quoting 8.45.2, and after referencing Knights 1366-67, they
refer to 8.29.1 (“Thucydides tells how Tissaphernes in 412/11 paid the Spartan fleet at the
rate of a drachma a day for one month, but said that in future he could only give 3 obols
(half a drachma) until the Persian king authorized the full drachma”). After quoting
8.45.2, they state that “[Alcibiades] explained that the men could have their pay in full


56 See (1968) 259 for all following quotations from Morrison and Coates.
later on,” and that this passage (i.e. 8.45.2) “shows that the inference from the *Knights* was correct and that Athenian seamen only received three obols on service and were entitled to the balance of their pay when they reached their home port.” Although they provide no reference for Alcibiades’ statement regarding “their pay in full later on,” this can only be a reference to 8.45.6 (since Alcibiades makes no explicit statement regarding the sailors’ pay between 8.45.2 and 8.45.6, and 8.45.6 is the only passage in Thucydides where Alcibiades speaks of pay in full); but, as I have just shown, discussing Rogers’ treatment of this passage, using Thucy. 8.45.6 in this way is to misunderstand the import of that passage; thus, just as with Rogers’ treatment of this question, there is no basis for Morrison and Coates’ view that Athenian sailors received half of their pay on campaign, and half on their return to Athens.\footnote{See n.46 above for Morrison and Coates also incorrectly emending Thucy. 8.45.2 as part of their interpretation of that passage. Lapini ([2002] 67 n.19), disagreeing with Cook’s ([1990] 80) view that 8.45.2 refers to an Athenian policy of dividing sailors’ pay into installments, writes “a me non sembra affatto che <<dimezzare la paga>> possa significare, in questo contesto, darne metà subito e metà dopo; l’espeditore di legare a sè i marinai, credo, non andrà cercato nella rateazione concordata della paga, ma nell’irregolarità stessa dei versamenti: è chiaro che un marinaio in credito di arretrati resterà nell’armata finché non avrà ricevuto il suo.” Having made this—to my mind, correct—statement, however, Lapini then puzzlingly endorses Morrison and Coates’ interpretation of 8.45.2—i.e. the same that Cook (without citing Morrison and Coates) adopts—without any indication as to why he differentiates between these two solutions to the problem of the interpretation of this passage.}

So far in this section, then, I hope to have demonstrated that the linkage between Thucy. 8.45.2 and Aristoph., *Knights* 1366-67 made by previous scholars was based on a misinterpretation of Thucy. 8.45.6; and that Thucy. 8.45.2, taken on its own, cannot help us to explicate the meaning of the term \(µισθὸς \varepsilonντελὴς\), since, as I have noted, Thucydides does not even use the term \(µισθὸς \varepsilonντελὴς\) at 8.45.2. Thucydides does, however, employ the term (or variations thereon) on five occasions in book 8. In the rest of this section, I will show that he used this term in book 8 consistently (and in a way that...
can be easily explicated) to mean a sailor’s complete pay to be (or expected to be) disbursed while on campaign.

To begin: as I have demonstrated in my discussion of Rogers’ (mis)interpretation of *Knights* 1366-67, “ἐντελῆ... µισθὸν” at 8.45.6 means an expected µισθός paid in full during a campaign; the rate of the “ἐντελῆ... µισθὸν” here—as can be seen from the connection of this passage to 8.29.1 and the mention there of “ἐντελῆ τὴν δραχµήν”—is one drachma per man per day; this is contrasted to a reduced rate of pay of three obols (see 8.45.2). “ἐντελῆ... µισθὸν” at 8.45.6 does not refer to the disbursement of a withheld second payment. The same arguments I used to interpret 8.45.6 hold for the mention of “µισθοφορά ἐντελῆς” at 8.50.3. Here, Astyochus, the Peloponnesian nauarchos, in the winter of 412/11, was supposedly attaching himself to Tissaphernes for his own private gain, “δι’ ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τῆς µισθοφορᾶς οὐκ ἐντελοῦς οὔσης µαλακωτέρος ἀνθήπτετο,” “on account of which he did not object more strongly against the pay not being given in full” (8.50.3). Here again, the fact that “τῆς µισθοφορᾶς” is “οὐκ ἐντελοῦς οὔσης” cannot be referring to the lack of a payment of a second and final installment of µισθός, since no voyage or campaign has been completed by the Peloponnesians (nor could any be foreseen to be completed until the following summer) that would necessitate such a payment.

Furthermore, it is evident that the parenthetical remark on the sailors’ pay not being paid in full refers to the cut in pay described at 8.45.2. This can be said to be so for two reasons. Firstly, and more importantly, the remark comes in the analepsis which

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58 There is no significance in the use of µισθοφορά here rather than µισθὸς: Thucydides uses the two words interchangeably, as can be seen, for instance, from 8.45.2.
starts at 8.45.1 and ends at 8.57.1, and thus not very long after the reduction in pay described at 8.45.2-3 and commented on at 8.45.6; this is the only controversy about pay referred to before 8.50.3 in the analepsis and thus must be the controversy referred to at 8.50.3. Secondly, Astyochus comes from Miletus to meet Tissaphernes (8.50.2-3): this means that, at this point of the analepsis, 8.41.1 of the main narrative (when Astyochus sailed from Miletus to Caunus) has not been reached yet; and this, in turn, means that not much time (it is impossible to be any more precise than this) has passed since 8.36.1, when Astyochus arrived to take command of the fleet at Miletus, and when Thucydides tells us that the Peloponnesian camp there was well supplied, since pay was being given sufficiently (“µισθὸς ἐδίδοτο ἀρκούντως”), large amounts of plunder from Iasus were still in the hands of the soldiers, and the Milesians were zealously co-operating with the Peloponnesians. Such a relatively short amount of time (between 8.36.1, when pay was being given sufficiently, and 8.41.1) would leave very little time for arrears to have built up from a failure to pay the troops regularly: this supports the argument that the reference to the failure of Tissaphernes to pay the Peloponnesian sailors in full at 8.50.3 must be to his decision to cease paying the troops at the expected rate of a drachma per man per day, just as it is at 8.46.5.

Note that Astyochus is described as acting “µαλακωτέρος” about the pay. Andrewes (HCT v.119) compares 8.29.2 and the description of Therimenes (Astyochus’ predecessor) there as being “µαλακὸς” about the pay of the sailors; as Andrewes states (ibid.), “‘softness’ about pay has not so far been attributed to Astyochos, but it is easily supplied in the context of 8.45.2-3.”

See Andrewes, HCT v.117.

At 8.46.5, Thucydides tells us that Tissaphernes, in so far as it was possible to conjecture from what he was doing, was inclined to follow Alcibiades’ advice to wear down both the Athenians and the Peloponnesians (8.46.2-4), since, among other things, he was furnishing pay wretchedly to the Peloponnesians (“τὴν τε τροφὴν κακῶς ἐπόριζε τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις...”). As Andrewes notes (HCT v.104), Thucydides must have envisaged this process as starting after Astyochus’ arrival in Miletus, and so there
So far, then, analysis of 8.29.1, 8.45.6, and 8.50.3 has shown a consistency in Thucydides’ use of \(\mu\iota\sigma\theta\omicron\varsigma\ \epsilon\nu\tau\rho\epsilon\lambda\eta\varsigma\) (or variations thereon): the term in each of these passages refers to the disbursement of complete pay (of one drachma per day per man) to (Peloponnesian) sailors while on campaign and not, as the conventional scholarly view holds, to the distribution of pay in two installments. I will continue the analysis to see if the same meaning holds for the final two mentions of \(\mu\iota\sigma\theta\omicron\varsigma\ \epsilon\nu\tau\rho\epsilon\lambda\eta\varsigma\) in Thucydides.

Near the end of the winter of 412/11, Tissaphernes, afraid that his policy of providing pay wretchedly to the Peloponnesian fleet with the purpose of weakening it (see 8.46.2-5) had worked so well that the Peloponnesians, because of their lack of money, would be forced to plunder his territory in order to gain funds to support themselves, conferred with the Peloponnesians, distributed pay (“\(\tau\rho\sigma\phi\acute{\iota}n\)”) to them, and concluded a treaty with them (8.57.1-2) in which he agreed to provide pay for the Peloponnesian triremes then present until the arrival of the King’s ships (8.58.5). But after, and despite, his promise in this treaty, Tissaphernes reverted to his former ways, paying the Peloponnesian sailors badly; and Thucydides reports that, later in the summer of 411, the Peloponnesian sailors, based at Miletos, were angry with the Persian because, among other things, “...\(\tau\rho\sigma\phi\acute{\iota}n \ ο\iota \ \xi\nu\nu\epsilon\chi\omicron\omega\varsigma\ \alpha\omicron\iota\delta\iota\ \iota\nu\tau\rho\epsilon\lambda\eta\ \delta\iota\delta\omicron\omega\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\omicron\ \tau\omicron\ \nu\alpha\omega\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\).” “he was doing harm to the fleet by not giving it pay regularly or in full”

would not have been much time, by this point of the narrative, for the policy to show its effects; but there is no inconsistency in Thucydides’ account, since his analysis here is looking further forward than the date its place in the narrative assigns to it (cf. Andrewes (ibid.); and see Hornblower, CT iii.891 ad 8.46.5: Andrewes is right on the analysis looking further forward, “except that Th. does not ‘assign’ it to a date at all; it floats free.”).

62 See appendix 6 for discussion of this clause (and the treaty as a whole).
After a failed attempt at a decisive battle with the Athenians, when the Peloponnesians did not come out to meet their enemies (8.79.1-8.80.1), the Peloponnesians remained perplexed, because they did not know from what source they could get money (“χρήµατα”) to maintain so many ships, “ἄλλος τε καὶ Τισσαφέρνους κακῶς δидόντος,” “especially since Tissaphernes provided it wretchedly” (8.80.1; cf. 8.46.5). The Peloponnesians’ distrust of Tissaphernes was compounded when they learned that Alcibiades had gone to the satrap in an attempt to gain his support for the Athenians (8.81-82, esp. 82.2). This added to the growing anger in the fleet because of Tissaphernes’ much increased slackness in giving them their pay (“πολλῷ ἐς τὴν µισθοδοσίαν τὸν Τισσαφέρνη ἀρρωστότερον γενόµενον”) after their failure to go out and meet the Athenians in battle (8.83.2). Thus, the Peloponnesian sailors—and not just the common men, but the officers, too—gathered in groups and began to reckon up how “ὡς οὔτε µισθὸν ἐντελῆ πώποτε λάβοιεν τὸ τε διδόµενον βραχὺ καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ξυνεχῶς,” “they

63 See Hornblower, CT iii.891-892, 982: this statement is part of a passage full of “wild exaggeration.” Even if there is exaggeration at 8.78, however, this has no effect on my argument, because the literal truth of 8.78 is not important for the meaning of µισθὸς ἐντελής, but merely Thucydides’ usage of the term here and its evidence for what he employs this term to denote. Also: Cook ([1990] 80 n.41) comments, in the course of a discussion concluding that pay was given to Athenian sailors in two installments with the second coming on their arrival home, as follows on 8.78.1: “Tissaphernes was not even paying the τροφή either regularly nor [sic] in full, and was thus damaging the navy (κακοῖ τὸ ναυτικόν). Presumably the navy would not be so affected were only µισθός withheld.” But, as Cook herself notes ([1990] 78-79), Thucydides uses τροφή and µισθός synonymously throughout his work, and he is doing the same here: see chapter 5 section i n.15. Cook’s statement that Thucydides is using τροφή—only in this instance—to refer solely to ration-money rather than pay as a whole is anachronistic, contradicts her own statements on the vocabulary of pay in the fifth century (see [1990] 78-79, 80), and is based on (as well supports) her incorrect view that Thucy. 8.45.2 refers to the payment of µισθός in two installments. See also chapter v section i and section ix below.

64 They thus decide to send some ships to Pharnabazus, who was inviting them to come to him and “... τροφὴν ἑτοῖµος ἦν παρέχειν,” “who was ready to provide pay” (8.80.2).
had never yet received their pay in full; that what they did receive was short, and even that had been paid irregularly.\(^{65}\) (8.83.3).

This last passage is crucial for the proper interpretation of the term \(\muισθός\) ἐντελής. 8.83.3 shows explicitly that, for Thucydides, a failure to pay \(\muισθός\) ἐντελής is simply a failure to pay men an expected amount of \(\muισθός\) in full (i.e. to leave men short) of the full \(\muισθός\) they were expecting to be paid while on campaign. When \(\muισθός\) is not given ἐντελής, it can be described as \(βραχύ(ς)\). The one explicit Thucydidean description of \(\muισθός\) ἐντελής at 8.83.3 is therefore consistent with and confirms my analysis of the term as it is used at 8.45.6 and 8.50.3 (as well as at 8.29.1). The term is not technical and does not refer to a regular administrative financial procedure. Furthermore, and crucially, both 8.83.2 and 8.78—by presenting Tissaphernes’ failure to pay in full or regularly as two related but separate grievances—make it clear that a failure to pay \(\muισθός\) ἐντελής is

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\(^{65}\) I have translated \(βραχύ\) here as “short” rather than use Crawley’s “small in quantity” to emphasize the fact that the Peloponnesian sailors’ failure to receive full pay means that they were being left short of pay. This does not mean, however, that there is any difference in meaning between the translations; each conveys that the sailors have received an amount less than the full pay they had expected to receive.

\(^{66}\) Andrewes (\textit{HCT} v.278), commenting on 8.78, stated that “the degree of repetition, and even verbal echo, between these chapters [8.78 and 8.83.3] is disquieting…” But, in fact, the level of repetition and verbal echo is limited to two subjects: firstly, the crews’ complaints about their \(\muισθός\), which had, in fact, continued to be a problem between 8.78 and 8.83.3; and secondly, their wish for a decisive naval battle so that the campaign could come to an end (8.78: \(διαναμαχεῖν\); 8.83.2: \(διαναμαχήσει\)) and they would no longer have to endure the conditions they were serving in. Since the crews’ lack of pay and poor conditions of service had both continued to be problems between 8.78 and 8.83, the repetition of these concerns in both passages should not be considered problematic. Also, in addition to the limited number of similarities between 8.78 and 8.83, there are important differences between the two passages: the crews, in addition to the wish for a decisive battle, come up with another option at 8.83.3, not present at 8.78, that would stop their threats to desert: the plan to enter the service of Pharnabazus in order to get pay. Moreover, the complaints against Astyochus in 8.78 and 8.83.3 are not quite the same: in the first passage, there is detailed criticism of his decision not to fight; in the second, there is criticism solely of his putting up with the whims of Tissaphernes. Thus, there is not such a significant amount of repetition between these two chapters so as to cause any worries that Thucydides is simply repeating himself here (and again, even if there were, my arguments above would not be affected since the main goal of this section is to establish Thucydidean usage, i.e. what he means by \(\muισθός\) ἐντελής, and any repetition of his, in fact, adds to the evidence for this usage, rather than undermining it).
distinct from a failure to distribute μισθός regularly, i.e. ξυνεχῶς; that is, the payment of μισθός ἐντελής has nothing to do with the withholding of pay. That this is so is confirmed by the analysis above of the term at 8.45.6 and 8.50.3: again, in both of these instances, the references to Tissaphernes’ failure to pay the sailors in full were made shortly after Tissaphernes’ reduction of pay for the Peloponnesian sailors had come into effect, and thus sufficient time could not have passed for the sailors to realize, if Tissaphernes had also adopted a policy of distributing pay irregularly, that he had done so; thus, the references to problems about pay at 8.45.6 and 8.50.3 refer solely to Tissaphernes’ failure to distribute the sailors’ pay in full; again, in both of these passages, μισθός ἐντελής is separate from, so to speak, μισθός (διδόµενος) οὐ ξυνεχῶς.

It should also be noted that μισθός ἐντελής is discussed or mentioned in Thucydides only in the context of Tissaphernes’ machinations regarding the pay of the Peloponnesian sailors, i.e. in the contexts of a reduction in pay or Tissaphernes paying the sailors ‘badly’ (see 8.46.5, 8.78, 8.80.1), i.e. in the midst of justifications for or reproaches over Tissaphernes’ failure to pay the men properly. When μισθός or τροφή in Thucydides is mentioned or distributed in usual circumstances (i.e. when the payment or availability of μισθός or τροφή is not the focus of arguments or recriminations: see, e.g., 6.31.3, 5; 8.5.5), each noun is used alone and without a qualifier. Thus, μισθός ἐντελής is a term that is used by Thucydides in specific circumstances when he is describing or referring to the complete amount of μισθός that should have been paid or was expected to

67 As he had, in fact, done, as can be seen from 8.78 and 8.83.3, and earlier at 8.57.1-2.

68 See 8.87.3, 8.99 for Tissaphernes’ continuation of the policy of paying the Peloponnesian sailors poorly.
have been paid to the Peloponnesian sailors, but had not been for some reason. It is not a technical term for an administrative procedure: it is no more a technical term for an administrative mechanism than the words ‘complete pay’ would be when used to describe any claim by hired workers for the whole of their pay if they had been left short by an employer.

That µισθὸς ἐντελής is not a technical term, and simply means ‘complete or full pay,’ can be further seen from 8.84.1, where Thucydides describes disputes arising out of the complaints of the sailors on the Peloponnesian side that they had not been paid in full. Thucydides describes the Syracusan and Thurian sailors as being the most bold in demanding their pay—simply “τὸν µισθὸν”—from Astyochus. The reference to µισθός alone here (when we have just learned that the sailors had not received µισθὸς ἐντελής) shows that it is the fact that µισθός is owed to the sailors—i.e. to paraphrase 8.83.2, that they have been left short of µισθός—that means they had not received µισθὸς ἐντελής, and nothing more. 69 Again, there is no special technical or administrative term in question here. Regarding unpaid µισθός, it is only the narrative context that determines whether Thucydides uses µισθός or µισθὸς ἐντελής to describe it, and not the existence of any official state procedure on payments. 70

69 At 8.85.3, Thucydides tells us that Tissaphernes had always been in dispute with Hermocrates the Syracusan regarding the distribution of the men’s pay: “περὶ τοῦ µισθοῦ τῆς ἀποδόσεως.” We hear of disputes between Tissaphernes and Hermocrates earlier in the narrative at 8.29.2 and 8.45.3—in both cases, when Tissaphernes was attempting to reduce the sailors’ pay from one drachma (i.e. their full pay) to three obols. Thus, here, too, although the connection is not as strong as at 8.83.2 and 8.84.1, there is an equivalency made between unpaid µισθός and µισθὸς ἐντελής.

70 See pp.358-359 above for a similar point on the usage of these terms in Aristophanes’ Knights, and p.389 below on Isoc. 15.111.
were left short of pay by an employer—so that they had not received their ‘full pay’—
they could also remonstrate regarding ‘the pay’ owed to them without any confusion as to
what they meant.

To conclude this section, then, examination of Thuc. 8.45.2, and of the passages
in book 8 of Thucydides in which the term \( \mu \iota \sigma \sigma \delta \zeta \varepsilon \tau \tau \eta \varepsilon \) is used, show that these
passages no more prove the standard ‘installment’ interpretation of this term than
Aristoph., Knights 1366-67 do.\(^{71}\) In fact, as I have shown, an analysis of Thucy. 8.29.1,
8.45.6, 8.50.3, 8.78, and 8.83.3, along with 8.45.2, demonstrates that, in Thucydides, and
in contradiction of the conventional interpretation of the term, \( \mu \iota \sigma \sigma \delta \zeta \varepsilon \tau \tau \eta \varepsilon \) means
‘complete or full pay,’ i.e. payment in full of a rate of pay previously promised to men on
campaign.\(^{72}\) Having established this and shown earlier that there is no reason to link

\(^{71}\) Note, in addition, that those scholars who advance or cite the ‘two installment’ view of \( \mu \iota \sigma \sigma \delta \zeta \varepsilon \tau \tau \eta \varepsilon \) have failed to operationalize their position, i.e. they have not thought through how such a system of
payments might have worked, or how such a system coheres with our other evidence on pay from
Thucydides. Note in this regard esp. Thucy. 8.1.1-4: the Athenians were in despair after the destruction of
the Sicilian expedition because the treasury seemed to be empty; but if the rowers (at least) on the Sicilian
expedition had had half of their pay kept back till the end of that campaign, there should have been no view
at Athens that the treasury was empty after the expedition, since most of the rowers did not make it back to
Athens, and their second installment of \( \mu \iota \sigma \sigma \delta \zeta \varepsilon \tau \tau \eta \varepsilon \) would have remained unpaid in the treasury at Athens.
Also, at Thucy. 8.53.2-8.54.2, and at 8.76.3-6, the Athenians consider themselves to have no money in their
treasury. But, again, if there had been a fund of withheld \( \mu \iota \sigma \sigma \delta \zeta \varepsilon \tau \tau \eta \varepsilon \) at Athens waiting for the sailors at Samos
to return from their campaign in the eastern Aegean—a fund that at this stage would have amounted to
ten thousands, if not hundreds, of talents—surely it should have played some part in the discussions and
urgings described in these two passages. The lack of such a fund cannot be explained away, on the
‘installment’ thesis, by a financial crisis at Athens, since the ‘installment’ view of \( \mu \iota \sigma \sigma \delta \zeta \varepsilon \tau \tau \eta \varepsilon \) is based
on 8.45.2; i.e., on the ‘two payments’ interpretation of \( \mu \iota \sigma \sigma \delta \zeta \varepsilon \tau \tau \eta \varepsilon \), the Athenian practice of only
paying their men half their \( \mu \iota \sigma \sigma \delta \zeta \varepsilon \tau \tau \eta \varepsilon \) on campaign was current when the considerations on the finances of
Athens at 8.53.2-8.54.2 and 8.76.3-6 were being raised. Thus, the ‘installment’ interpretation can be found
to be inconsistent with other mentions of pay and money in the narrative of book 8 of Thucydides.

\(^{72}\) Ballin ([1978] 134) states that the passages in book 8 of Thucydides mentioning \( \mu \iota \sigma \sigma \delta \zeta \varepsilon \tau \tau \eta \varepsilon \) “all refer
to pay that had been originally been promised but then not paid in full.” But as his discussion of the term
before this statement shows, Ballin means here a second payment that had been promised to be paid at the
end of a term of service but then was not paid. As I have shown, book 8 of Thucydides shows that the term
\( \mu \iota \sigma \sigma \delta \zeta \varepsilon \tau \tau \eta \varepsilon \) does not refer to a procedure of disbursing military and naval pay in installments; Ballin’s
statement should therefore be taken as incorrect.
Thucy. 8.45.2 and *Knights* 1366-67, and also taking into consideration my earlier discussion of this and other passages discussing \( \mu \sigma \delta \omicron \) in *Knights*, it is now safe to conclude that the passage from *Knights* and its mention of “\( \mu \sigma \delta \omicron \ 'ντελῆ \)” does not describe a regular Athenian state practice of withholding part of rowers’ pay until the end of a campaign, but rather refers to the building up of arrears of naval pay on campaign due to exceptional, contingent circumstances.\(^{73}\)

\(^{73}\) Cf. already Neil (1909) 178 ad *Knights* 1366-67. Pritchett dismissed on two occasions the prevailing ‘two installment’ view of the arrangements used by the Athenian state to disburse naval pay. Firstly, he noted that Morrison and Williams cited Thucydides “as evidence for ‘full pay’ of the Athenians at one drachme (sic), one half of which was withheld, but the Greek does not establish this: ‘\( ως \ Αθηναίοι \ \epsilonκ \ πλέονος \ χρόνου \ \epsilonπιστήµονες \ ότες \ τού \ ναυτικοῦ \ τριώβολον \ τοῖς \ ἑαυτῶν \ διδάσασιν\)’ ([1971] 17 n.52). Secondly, having cited Polyaeus, *Strateg.* 3.9.51 and Aristoph., *Knights* 1366-67, Pritchett continued: “[s]imilarly, in Book 8 of Thucydides, Tissaphernes is twice spoken of as withholding money. In the first case (45.2), the word used was *misithos*, in the second (8.78.1) *trophe*. These three passages have sometimes been cited as supporting a theory that the soldier was given half of his money for maintenance and the other half as *misithos*, the latter being paid when he reached port. What the passages [from Aristophanes and Thucydides] show, rather, is that although the sailor had subsisted in the meantime, not all of the money for his trope or *misithos* had been forthcoming” ([1971] 24-25). Pritchett cited the works of Rogers (1930), Morrison and Williams (1968), and Berneker (1969); cf. Pritchett (1971) 14 and n.41, where he quotes Rogers, and Morrison and Williams, for the standard view in a discussion of rates of military pay paid by the Athenian state in the fifth century (in fact, Pritchett’s summation of the views of these scholars is a slight misrepresentation: none of the works cited here explicitly state that the first three obols paid on campaign were for subsistence, and the second at the end of the expedition for \( \mu \sigma \delta \omicron \)). To start with Pritchett’s second dismissal, his last statement in this passage was the correct inference to take from the Aristophanes and Thucydides passages he cited, as my analysis of these passages has demonstrated (but note that Pritchett was mistaken to cite only two passages from book 8 of Thucydides as speaking of Tissaphernes paying the Peloponnesians irregularly: he should have also noted 8.29.1, 8.45.6, 8.50.3, and 8.83.2-3). But Pritchett was right for the wrong reasons. Pritchett had to reject the ‘two installment’ thesis because this thesis conflicted with his views on Athenian military pay in the late fifth century (or, to be more precise, the Peloponnesian war, since all the figures he discusses for his argument come from Thucydides’ narrative of events therein). Pritchett believed that Athenian military and naval pay during the Peloponnesian war was three obols (rather than a drachma), and was paid for rations only; any attested rates of Athenian military and naval pay higher than three obols could be explained for Pritchett by the Athenians paying more to men serving in military theaters where prices for food were extraordinarily high (see again chapter 4 section iv, chapter 5 section i, ii, and iv for this and what follows). The view, then, that Athenian sailors normally received pay of one drachma, half of this on campaign, and half on their return home, therefore had to be rejected by Pritchett (although he provided no arguments as grounds for its rejection) as part of his general argument that the customary pay for men participating in Athenian military expeditions was three obols a day, and not one drachma. But Pritchett’s arguments for his view that the normal pay for Athenian sailors and soldiers was three obols were, as I have demonstrated at length, baseless and wholly incorrect, and thus his dismissal of the ‘two installment’ thesis part of a general schema of Athenian military pay that must be dismissed itself. This can be seen most clearly in his treatment of Thucy. 8.45.2, a key passage for Pritchett’s argument, since he believed that the phrase “\( ως \ Αθηναίοι \ \epsilonκ \ πλέονος \ χρόνου \ \epsilonπιστήµονες \ ότες \ τού \ ναυτικοῦ \ τριώβολον \ τοῖς \ ἑαυτῶν \ διδάσασιν\)” there provided “information about a practice [i.e. the payment of three obols] which was customary” ([1971] 17). The rejection of Morrison and Coates—i.e., their view that 8.45.2 provided evidence for a rate of pay of
One final point on Thucydides’ use of \( \muισθὸς \, \varepsilonντελής \) in book 8. The fact that Thucydides could use this term to describe disputes over Persian payments made to Peloponnesian sailors demonstrates that there was nothing specifically Athenian or ‘official’ about the term. This is not to say that the uses of the term in book 8 of Thucydides tell us nothing about Athenian usage and practice: it was, after all, an analogy to current Athenian practice that Alcibiades told Tissaphernes to use to justify his reduction of the Peloponnesian crews’ pay from one drachma to three obols.

\[ \text{v. The text of Thucy. 8.45.2} \]

Before continuing in order to discuss fourth century and later usage of \( \muισθὸς \, \varepsilonντελής \), I want to digress here briefly to discuss the text of Thucy. 8.45.2, in order to establish definitively that it offers no support to the position that naval \( \muισθὸς \) was usually paid by the fifth century Athenian state to its trireme crews in two installments. The Greek of Thucy. 8.45.2, as we have it, reads again as follows:

\[
... \text{kai didaskealos panton xynomenvos thn te mioskoforwn xwreteven, auti drakhmes Athinivs wste trimobalon, kai tauto mhe xwrechis, didosidei, ligein kaleinov ton Tissaphernion prois autous ws Athenaioi ek plenous chrano}
\]

\[
\text{epistemones vntes tov nautikon trimobalon tois evntov didosan, ou tosooton penva thn aw autovn mhe oia vaitai ek periwsias vbetaivtes, oie mene ta symptomata}
\]

one drachma a day (even if half of this was withheld till the end of the expedition in question)—noted above was in support of this interpretation of this passage. But Pritchett’s interpretation of this clause of Thuc. 8.45.2 was based on a misreading—again, “\( \text{ek plenous chrano} \)” does not qualify the payment of three obols—and was therefore incorrect, and thus any rejection of Morrison and Coates based on this interpretation, in the lack of other argumentation for that rejection, is incorrect (and simply stating that the Greek of 8.45.2 does not establish Morrison and Coates’ view is correct but: firstly, Pritchett’s statement here was based on his own misinterpretation of the Greek of this passage; and secondly, many scholars have thought that the Greek of 8.45.2 did establish the ‘two installment’ view, so that a thorough analysis of the language of 8.45.2 is necessary to refute it (see next section). (Finally, it should be noted that Pritchett’s work did not disturb the continuing scholarly consensus on the meaning of \( \muισθὸς \, \varepsilonντελής \).)
The problem with the text can be summarized briefly. At the start of 8.45.2, Thucydides states that Alcibiades cut down the pay of the Peloponnesian sailors to three obols, and even this was not to be paid too regularly (καὶ τὸῦτο μὴ ἔννεφος). As the text has it, the justification he tells Tissaphernes to provide to the Peloponnesians for these measures is that the Athenians, longer experienced in naval matters, give three obols to their men (τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν) for reasons explained in the following clause. But some words are clearly missing in the the text of the following clause since in it “the words ἡν μὴ οἱ μὲν τὰ σώµατα κ.τ.λ. clearly refer to the pay being at the lower rate of 3 obols (and to this clause only ἐκ περιουσίας ὑβρίζοντες properly applies), whereas οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς (µὴ) ἀπολείπωσιν as clearly refers only to the irregularity of the pay.” As Andrewes put it, “[t]he notion of withholding part of the sailors’ pay, highly relevant for Alkibiades’ advice to Tissaphernes (καὶ τὸῦτο μὴ ἔννεφος) but not present in the clause ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι, κ.τ.λ., has thus crept into the clause by the time it ends.” There must therefore be a lacuna in the sentence after τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν. The

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74 See already n.46 above on Morrison and Williams’ reading of the text.

75 Again: the temporal expression “ἐκ περιουσίας χράτων” at 8.45.2 is to be taken with “ἐπιστήµονες ὄντες”: see pp.322-323 below.

76 Goodhart (1893) 65.

77 HCT v.98.

78 See Stahl (1875-1889) vol. 4 (2): 85-86. See also, e.g., Homblower, CT iii.887.
question of how this lacuna should be filled is obviously an important one for the proper interpretation of Thucyd. 8.45.2 as a whole.

Stahl proposed that the words “καὶ τοῦτ’ おす ξυνεχῶς vel similia” had fallen out of the sentence; Goodhart suggested that おす ξυνεχῶς had fallen out of the text. Classen, while acknowledging that his own (or any) restoration could not admit of complete certainty, believed it more probable that a second verbal clause should have come after τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόσασιν, rather than just καὶ τοῦτ’ おす ξυνεχῶς; the reason for this view was his belief that the Athenian practice of paying their sailors irregularly would only be described in general terms with the words おす ξυνεχῶς, and that, instead, a more specific second verbal clause was needed here. Offering Polyaeus, Strateg. 3.9.51 as a possible parallel, he suggested “καὶ τούτου ἀεὶ µέρος τι κατέχουσιν” for the lacuna after διδόσασιν. There are two major problems with this suggested reading. Firstly, as I will demonstrate (see pp.390-393 below), this passage from Polyaeus does not offer evidence for usual Athenian practice, since it is clearly describing an exceptional measure.

79 (1875-1889) vol. 4 (2) 85. (But see Hornblower, CT iii.887: “Hude, OCT, and Alberti print the text as it stands, and merely register Stahl’s suggestion.” Merely printing the text as it stands, however, fails to address the problem pointed out by Stahl, Goodhart, and Andrewes, that the Athenians’ reduction of naval pay to three obols would not prevent their sailors deserting, but paying them irregularly would do so; thus, the argument for supplementing the passage stands, Andrewes (HCT v. 98) stated that filling the lacuna at 8.45.2 in this way “would produce a logical sentence, though it would not clear up the contradiction between εκ πλέονος χρόνου and おす τοσοῦτον πενίᾳ.” As I have discussed earlier (see again pp.322-323), however, it is clear that the temporal expression is referring to the Athenians’ maritime experience and not the pay given to their soldiers, and thus there is no contradiction between the two expressions that needs to be cleared up.

80 (1893) 65.

81 (1875-1882) (vol. 3) 182-183 (and for this and what follows).

82 Also referenced by Stahl (1875-1889) vol. 4 (2) 86 and Krüger (1858-61) (vol.2) 124, though neither posit a supplement based on the Polyaeus passage.
(which may not even have concerned an Athenian force), and therefore should not be
brought forward as a parallel to explicate Thucy. 8.45.2. Secondly, there is no reason to
posit a second, more specific clause after διδόσασιν. Alcibiades, having introduced the
decline in pay and the plan to disburse the reduced pay irregularly at the start of the
sentence, is now urging Tissaphernes to give the explanation for those measures. The
emphasis in this latter half of the sentence is therefore not on the measures themselves,
but on the explanations to be given for them; and since they have been mentioned before
and are being merely recapitulated here, the earlier description of the measures did not
need to be fully reproduced again at this point by Thucydides. 83 Thus, τριώβολον τοῖς
ἐαυτῶν διδόσασιν is not more specific than the earlier ὥστε τριώβολον... δίδοσθαι, and
there is no reason why the lacuna after διδόσασιν should have included anything more
specific than the earlier καὶ τοῦτο μὴ ἔνεκχως, and, in fact, good reason why it may have
included something less specific: thus, οὐ ἔνεκχως is both a possible and, on the parallel
with ὥστε τριώβολον... δίδοσθαι, a very likely restoration here.

Andrewes, as noted above, referenced Knights 1366-67 in his discussion of the
textual problems of Thucy. 8.45.2, inferring from that passage that the Athenian state in
the 420s normally withheld pay from expeditions until they returned to Athens. He also
believed that the temporal expression ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου at 8.45.2 referred to the Athenian
method of paying their sailors, and not to their experience of naval affairs. On these two
grounds, Andrewes posited that the supplement to 8.45.2 should read as follows: 84 “the

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83 I owe the phrasing of the latter half of this sentence to Marshall (1975) 30.

84 HCT v.98.
Athenians from their long experience of naval matters <withhold part of the pay, and now> give their men three obols, not so much because of their (present) poverty as...”

But, as I have shown above, the Aristophanic passage, by itself, offers no positive evidence for such a practice; and ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου at 8.45.2 does not refer to their payment of sailors, i.e. 8.45.2 does not state that the Athenians had paid their sailors three obols per day for a long time. Thus, there are no grounds for Andrewes’ proposed supplement, and there is no reason to take 8.45.2 as referring to a regular Athenian procedure of withholding pay from their sailors.

Neither Classen’s nor Andrewes’ alternative suggestions to οὐ ξυνεχῶς for the lacuna after τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν works, then; and if one solely limits oneself to a consideration of the internal architecture of Thucydides. 8.45.2, οὐ ξυνεχῶς suggests itself as both a possible and the most probable supplement. That οὐ ξυνεχῶς should be restored at 8.45.2 is made certain by Thucydides’ description of the continuing controversy over pay between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians. As I have shown above, the policy of Alcibiades, followed by Tissaphernes, of paying the Peloponnesian sailors three obols, instead of a drachma, was recognized by all parties as a failure to give the Peloponnesian fleet its μισθὸς ἐντελής. In addition, Tissaphernes continued to follow Alcibiades’ advice in full, by not only failing to pay the rowers their complete μισθὸς, but also by paying it irregularly, too (8.78: οὐ ξυνεχῶς; 8.83.3: καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ξυνεχῶς). This was the point of the latter part of the analogy to Athenian practice that Alcibiades told Tissaphernes to give to the Peloponnesians as a pretext for paying their rowers less and irregularly:85

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85 Cook’s ([1990] 79-80) failure to take account of the inclusion of irregularity of pay in Alcibiades’ and Tissaphernes’ plan forms part of the reason for her misinterpretation of 8.45.2.
sailors paid irregularly would not desert, since they would lose the pay owed to them, i.e. owed money that ought to have been paid to them earlier. Tissaphernes’ later actions—in not paying the Peloponnesians in full and paying them irregularly—thus confirm the results of my examination of the text of 8.45.2: οὐ ξυνεχῶς needs to be added after τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδάσκατι in the latter part of 8.45.2, both for the passage to make sense on its own terms, and for it to be consistent with the later narrative of book 8. 86

Thus, when Alcibiades told Tissaphernes at 8.45.2 to cut down the Peloponnesian sailors’ pay, and also told him to disburse the reduced pay irregularly, advising him to justify this to the Peloponnesians by analogy with Athenian practice, what he meant by this was not that the Athenians regularly withheld part of their sailors’ pay till their disembarkation on their return to Athens, but that the Athenians did not always pay the complete amount of their rowers’ pay on time, in order that some pay would be owed to the sailors, and thus left behind as a pledge, thus discouraging them from deserting. Again, Thucy. 8.45.2 does not provide any support for the view that the Athenian state paid its sailors in the late fifth century in two installments. 87

86 As noted above, Classen stated that no supplement to 8.45.2 could admit of complete certainty (see also Steup [1966] viii.259 making the same point). Notwithstanding this, I hope to have shown in my analysis of the text of 8.45.2 above, and by placement of 8.45.2 in the wider context of Thucydides’ treatment of pay in book 8, that the supplement οὐ ξυνεχῶς is the safest, and an almost definitively certain, supplement to 8.45.2. (In any case, the arguments I have made in the preceding section regarding the proper interpretation of the term μισθὸς ἐντελής in book 8 of Thucydides remain valid, regardless of whether my argument concerning the insertion of οὐ ξυνεχῶς at 8.45.2 stands or not.)

87 In the final analysis, it is, in fact, remarkable that Thucy. 8.45.2 has ever been used to support the hypothesis that pay was distributed to Athenian sailors in installments. The strangeness of the ‘installment’ interpretation can be seen most clearly in treatments of this chapter by scholars who have taken no part in the ‘μισθὸς ἐντελής’ controversy. To take the most significant recent discussions of 8.45.2, Hornblower (CT iii.877-888), Kallet ([2001] 261, 302), and Rood ([1998] 264-265) have all taken it to be uncontroversial that the chapter tells us that Alcibiades cut down the pay of the sailors to three obols, and paid that amount irregularly; i.e. these scholars have not even raised the ‘installment’ thesis as an alternative interpretation of the text. See also in this regard Andrewes, HCT v.98: “[s]ome, including Morrison and Williams (258-9), have concluded that the regular Athenian practice was to pay 3 ob. a day in


vi. The meaning of μισθὸς ἐντελῆς in the (first half of the) fourth century

That the term μισθὸς ἐντελῆς did not refer to an official Athenian policy, practice or custom of paying its sailors in installments, but simply referred to the full amount of pay that (all) classical Greek sailors (and soldiers) were promised and thus expected to be paid on campaign is confirmed by fourth century usage and later ancient descriptions of fourth century contexts.

After the Greeks in Cyrus’ army on the march upland found out at Thapsacus the real aim of their march (i.e., the King), they demanded extra money from Cyrus in return for their efforts (Xen., Anab. 1.4.11-12). Cyrus promised every man five mnai in silver when they reached Babylon and “... τὸν μισθὸν ἐντελῆ μέχρι ἂν καταστήσῃ τοὺς Ἕλληνας εἰς Ἰωνίαν πάλιν,” “full pay until he brought the Greeks back to Ionia again” (Xen., Anab. 1.4.13). Since the Greeks were not demanding a raise in pay, but rather a special donative as a reward for marching against the King,88 we are dealing here with a special measure; Cyrus’ offer of pay in full implies that Greek mercenaries were customarily paid less89 or not at all90 for the return march after a campaign (unfortunately, there is no other evidence to clarify this point). Importantly for our

the field and other 3 ob. on return home; but that will not help here, for Alkibiades is urging Tissaphernes both to keep the total down to 3 ob. a day and to pay that irregularly”; and cf. of earlier treatments, e.g., Steup (1966) viii.105, 286-287.

88 After having learned that they were marching against the King, “καὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν ἰέναι, ἐὰν µή τις αὐτοῖς χρήματα διδῷ...,” “[the Greeks] refused to go on unless they were given money,” as the men had been who had made the journey upland with Cyrus to see his dying father (and not fight in battle) (Xen., Anab. 1.4.12; cf. 1.1.2).


90 Dillery’s note ([1998] 87 n.47) ad Anab. 1.4.13.
understanding of the term \( \mu\sigma\delta\omicron\hat{o} \varepsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\hat{h}\iota \), Cyrus’ promise was to pay his Greek soldiers in full “until” (“\( \mu\acute{e}\chi\varsigma \)”) they reached Ionia again—that is, the mercenaries were to receive “\( \tau\omicron\nu \mu\sigma\delta\omicron\nu \varepsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\hat{h}\iota \)” while they were still on campaign; thus, “\( \tau\omicron\nu \mu\sigma\delta\omicron\nu \varepsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\hat{h}\iota \)” in this case cannot refer to an arrangement to pay the Greeks part of their pay on campaign, and part on their return home. Why did Cyrus promise ‘pay in full’ here, then, and not simply ‘pay’ for the duration of the return march? Firstly, the promise of full pay must have been made as a special (and specially munificent) incentive to encourage the Greek mercenaries to remain with him on the march. Secondly, the promise of ‘\( \mu\sigma\delta\omicron\nu \varepsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\hat{h}\iota \)’ was made because the Greeks did not receive \( \mu\sigma\delta\omicron\nu \) from Cyrus for more than three months from the start of the march from Sardis (Xen., Anab. 1.2.11); because of this history, Cyrus had to specify that he would pay in full in order to bolster his offer encouraging the Greeks to march on with him against the King.

“\( \tau\omicron\nu \mu\sigma\delta\omicron\nu \varepsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\hat{h}\iota \),” then, at Xen. Anab. 1.4.13 refers to \( \mu\sigma\delta\omicron\nu \) paid in full, on campaign, on time (and not delayed in any way). This is consistent with the meaning of the term found already in Thucydides and Aristophanes, and this consistency is significant in itself. Let me elaborate. Marinovic, in her discussion of the meaning of \( \mu\sigma\delta\omicron\nu \varepsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\hat{h}\iota \), states that the passage from the Anabasis “n’apporte rien de nouveau sur ce point.”\(^9\) But Xenophon’s description of a promise of pay in full made as a special incentive by a Persian satrap to a group of Greek mercenaries drawn from all over the Greek world does tell us something, by telling us ‘nothing new’ about the usage of \( \mu\sigma\delta\omicron\nu \varepsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\hat{h}\iota \) in the classical period: the fact that this term could be used in such a context—

\(^9\) (1988) 166. She is incorrect in stating that the soldiers, in their demand for money, “exigent une augmentation de paye” (ibid.): as noted above, they were demanding a special donative for marching against the King.
without any effort on Xenophon’s part to explain its meaning—implies very strongly that the term did not refer to a special administrative procedure governing naval pay at Athens, but could refer to any promise or expectation of \( \mu \iota \sigma \zeta \ \) being paid in full and without delay to classical Greek military forces, whether by Athenians or Persians or to sailors or soldiers.

This inference is confirmed by Isocrates’ use of the term in his portrayal of the campaign of the Cyreans and its aftermath. Employing their experiences to encourage Philip II to mount an invasion of Asia, Isocrates narrates that the King, despite his victory at Cunaxa, was still so afraid of the Greeks and felt such lack of confidence in his own forces

\[ \text{ὡς \ προκαλεσάμενος Κλέαρχον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἡγεμόνας εἰς λόγον \ ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τούτους \ μὲν \ ύπισχνούμενος \ μεγάλας \ δωρεὰς \ δώσειν, τοῖς \ δὲ \ ἄλλοις \ στρατιώταις \ ἐντελῆ \ τὸν \ µισθὸν \ ἀποδοὺς \ ἀποπέµψειν...} \]

that he invited Clearchus and the other captains to a parley, promising to give them great gifts and to pay their soldiers their wages in full and to give them safe convoy home... (5.91)

Isocrates’ description here obviously conflates Cyrus’ offer (made at Thapsacus on the Euphrates) with Tissaphernes’ betrayal of Clearchus and other Greek generals and captains after the battle of Cunaxa (see Xen., \textit{Anab.} 2.5.24-31) in order to present a tendentiously misleading picture of the King’s attitude after the battle. But the literal truth of Isocrates’ presentation is irrelevant here: what is relevant and important is that he also, writing in 346, could use “\( \text{ἐντελῆ τὸν \ µισθὸν} \)” of an offer made by the King to Greek forces without having to specify or expand on its meaning: again, the phrase is referring simply to a promise made to pay soldiers in full and punctually while they were still on campaign (as can be seen by the fact that the King’s promise to pay the Greeks in
full was made together with a promise to escort them back to Greece).  

In other words, there was nothing specific to the disbursement of Athenian state naval pay about μισθὸς ἐντελής.

But μισθὸς ἐντελής also continued to be used to describe the disbursement of their complete pay during service to Athenian forces in the fourth century. In a eulogy of his pupil Timotheus’ career, Isocrates made the argument that none of Timotheus’ enemies could find a better general at finding resources in the field for his soldiers:

συνίσασι γὰρ αὐτῷ κατὰ μὲν ἀρχὰς τῶν πολέμων διὰ τὸ μηδὲν παρὰ τῆς πόλεως λαμβάνειν εἰς τὰς ἐσχάτας ἐνδείας καθιστάμενον, ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τοῦτο τὰ πράγματα περιστάναι δυνάμενον, ὡστε καὶ τῶν πολέμιων περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐντελεῖς ἀποδιδόναι τοὺς µισθοὺς.

For they know that at the beginning of his campaigns, owing to the fact that he received nothing from Athens, he found himself in great extremities, but that, even with this handicap, he was able to bring his fortunes round to the point where he not only prevailed over our enemies but paid his soldiers in full. (15.120)

As Marinovic noted, “ἐντελεῖς... τοὺς µισθοὺς” means “simplement un traitement entièrement payé”; one should add, to be precise, paid fully while on campaign. Griffith noted that the phrase ‘µισθὸς ἐντελής’ is found in this passage “with no special meaning apparently.” These statements are exactly right, and confirm the point I made above, but this time in a specifically Athenian context: μισθὸς ἐντελής had no special ‘official’

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92 Ballin ([1978] 134) states of this passage that “the Persian king offered to pay off Klearchos’ troops and send them home; i.e. pay the arrears Klearchos owed them”; and took the passage to mean that the Cyreans had part of their pay kept back by Clearchus. This is incorrect. Clearchus was never the paymaster of the mercenaries and so could not have owed them arrears of pay. The King’s supposed offer was a special bonus designed to encourage the Greeks to acquiesce to the plan of the King (cf. above on Cyrus’ offer of full pay to the mercenaries at Thapsacus).


94 (1935) 272 n.1.
meaning at Athens (or elsewhere), and could be used to describe the pay of any force, Athenian or otherwise, that was promised or expected to be paid in full on campaign.

This fact is confirmed by another passage from this speech, when Isocrates describes the achievements of Timotheus at Samos: without receiving any money from the Athenians or any of the allies, Timotheus captured Samos after a siege of ten months with a force of eight thousand peltasts and thirty triremes, “καὶ τούτων ἅπασιν ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας τὸν μισθὸν ἀπέδωκε,” “and he distributed μισθὸς to all these forces from the spoils of war” (15.111). Once more here, one sees that it is only the context that determines whether μισθός or μισθὸς ἐντελής is used by Isocrates to describe the pay given by Timotheus to his troops: in the passage describing in detail the campaign at Samos, μισθός is used alone; in the more elaborate passage summarizing Timotheus’ campaigns as a whole (of which the Samian campaign was, of course, part) μισθὸς ἐντελής is used to point up Timotheus’ achievements in providing pay in full to his soldiers in the absence of help from his polis. Again, there is no special meaning given to μισθὸς ἐντελής at Athens; the term had the same general meaning there as elsewhere.

One later passage, unnoted in previous discussions of the meaning of μισθὸς ἐντελής, confirms this ‘general’ usage of the term. In 356/5, during the warring between the Syracusan tyrants, Dionysius II proposed terms of surrender to Dion, on the acceptance of which he hoped to retire without fighting into Italy: he sent to Dion

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95 As at Aristoph., Knights 1065-66, 1078-1079 (see pp.358-359 above) and Thucy. 8.84.1 (see pp.376-377).

96 A fragment of Lysias contains another (probably) fourth-century mention of complete pay (fr. 346, l.14): “τηµ µισθ<οφορίαν ... ασαν εἵπωῃ.” But the lack of context caused by the extremely lacunose nature of the fragment means that it is impossible to ascertain what this phrase is referring to.
offering to surrender to him the acropolis (of Syracuse), his weapons, and his mercenaries, “καὶ πέντε μηνῶν ἐντελῆ τούτως μισθόν,” “with five months’ full pay for these...” Here again, just as in Xenophon and Isocrates, and the earlier sources I have examined, this passage with its mention of complete pay for soldiers simply means that the mercenaries would be paid for five months at the full rate they had previously been promised by Dionysius, i.e. that they would be not left short of pay they had been expecting from Dionysius, so that they would not be potentially mutinous or desperate for money when Dion took the city completely from Dionysius’ power. There is no thought here of a part of the mercenaries’ pay being distributed to them at the end of their service; rather, their pay was to be distributed before their service under Dion began.

Finally, as noted above, one other description of a fourth-century context from a Second Sophistic author has been used to support the idea that Athenian naval forces received their pay in two installments. The passage in question is Polyaeusus, Strateg. 3.9.51:

Ἰφικράτης ἦρξε τοῦ πλείστου στρατεύματος πεζοῦ καὶ ναυτικοῦ ἐν τῇ δόσει τοῦ μισθοῦ καὶ ἐκάστου ἑκάστου ἑκάστου μῆνα ὑφαιρῶν τὸ τέταρτον µέρος, ὥσπερ ἐνέχυρον ἑκάστου κατέχων, ἵνα µὴ λίποιεν τὸ στρατόπεδον. οὕτως ἄρα καὶ πολλοὺς εἶχεν ἀεὶ τοὺς στρατευοµένους καὶ εὐπόρους, τὸ τέταρτον τοῦ µισθοῦ φυλαττόµενον ἔχοντας.

Iphicrates commanded a large army including land and naval forces. He held back a quarter of their pay each month, as a pledge for each, so they would not desert the army. In this way he always had many wealthy soldiers, who had a quarter of their pay held back.

The stratagem is undated, and there is no indication of the location of the campaign during which Iphicrates held back a quarter of the pay of his men.

97 Plut., Dion 37.1 (Dion did not accept the terms of Dionysus’ offer (Plut., Dion 37.2)).
Consequently, there is no certainty that this anecdote refers to Athenian forces under Iphicrates’ command: during his long and varied career, Iphikrates did command land and naval forces for the Athenian state in the Chersonese (389-387), at Corcyra (373-372), at Amphipolis and in Thrace generally (367-364); but he also commanded mercenary land and naval forces in Egypt (374) and Thrace (364), too (even commanding land and naval forces against the Athenian state on one occasion in 364). The ruse described by Polyaenus in this passage—and cited as providing evidence for the payment practices of the Athenian state—may therefore not be referring to an Athenian campaign at all.

But the crucial point about this passage, with its description of Iphicrates’ retention of a part of his forces’ pay, is that it is a description of a stratagem located in a collection of stratagems: the measure undertaken by Iphicrates which is described at Strateg. 3.9.51, then, has something exceptional about it, something that marked it out as unusually clever and to be taken note of by future generals. Iphicrates’ ruse concerning his men’s pay—even if it was an action taken while he was in command of Athenian forces (which, again, is not certain)—therefore cannot be taken as reflective of common or standard practice at Athens. A look at some other ruses concerning money in Polyaenus’ collection of Iphicratean stratagems illustrates this point. At 3.9.30,

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98 For ancient sources for and summaries of these commands, see Parke (1933) 55, 81-82, 126-127, respectively.

99 See again Parke (1933) 105-106 (with Diod. 15.42-43, Polyaenus, Strateg. 3.9.38), 127, respectively. In addition, Iphicrates may have commanded land and naval forces together during his time as a mercenary leader in Thrace in 386-379, but the sources for his activities during this time are very scanty: see Parke (1933) 55.

100 See Dem. 23.130-132 with Parke (1933) 127.
Iphicrates persuades the Athenians—who are short of money—to demolish or sell the parts of buildings overhanging public roads, so that the owners of the buildings contributed a great deal of money to prevent their structures from being mutilated and becoming unsound. At 3.9.35, Polyaenus writes that if Iphicrates could not pay his soldiers, he led them to uninhabited places and coasts, so that they would spend as little as possible; on the other hand, if he had plenty of money, he led them to wealthy cities and places, where they spend their money quickly and be eager for action. Finally, at 3.9.59, when Iphicrates was once short of money for pay, and his angry soldiers demanded an assembly, he found men who could speak Persian, dressed them in Persian clothing, and commanded them to appear before the assembly of soldiers and to tell it, in Persian, that they had been ordered to tell the assembly that the men bringing money were near. (Iphicrates’ soldiers, deceived, dissolved the assembly.)

Placed in its proper context, then, the point that ought to be drawn from the location of Iphicrates’ retention of pay—which, again, may not even have been an action taken during an Athenian campaign—among the stratagems collected by Polyaenus is that his retention of a quarter of his men’s pay was not typical of Athenian practice (even in the case that the pay was withheld from men serving on a campaign waged by the Athenian state); on the contrary, it should be considered as an exceptional and unusual measure, just as all the other ruses of Iphicrates described by Polyaenus were.\(^\text{101}\)

Polyaenus’ description of Iphicrates’ measure cannot be taken as a recounting of a usual, regular feature of Athenian military/naval financial administration, then; rather,

\(^{101}\) Cf. Tucker (1892) 194, after having cited Iphicrates’ stratagem, stating: “[b]ut this would rather show that such a course was unusual, as indeed it would be likely to be among a people like the Athenians.” Cf. again Loomis (1998) 60.
Polyaenus includes it in his work because it shows a particular resourcefulness and astuteness on the part of Iphicrates, and because it reinforces the picture emerging from the rest of his collection of Iphicrates’ stratagems of a general who was especially attentive to his men and to discipline in the forces he led (and thus of a general who could provide a good *exemplum* for military leadership).  

So, far from supporting the commonly held view that, in the fifth and fourth centuries, half of the pay of Athenian naval forces was usually retained by the commander or the state till the end of a campaign, to be paid then, Polyaenus, *Strateg.* 3.9.51 demonstrates the opposite: that retaining part of military forces’ pay was an exceptional and extraordinary measure, and one contrary to normal practice (at least in the first half of the fourth century).

To conclude this section, then, I made two related points in its first part: I confirmed that, for the first half of the fourth century as well for the fifth, the conventional view that *µισθὸς ἐντελής* refers to an Athenian policy or custom of paying their sailors in two installments, with the second withheld till their return to Athens, is incorrect—rather the phrase simply refers to the complete amount of *µισθός* that men were expecting to be paid while on campaign; and secondly, that *µισθὸς ἐντελής* could be used to refer to the complete pay expected by all sailors and soldiers from all military employers in the Greek world in the early and mid fourth century.  

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103 Just as it could be during the Ionian war, too.
established that it was expected, or at least aspired to, that classical Greek sailors and
soldiers on campaign in the late fifth and first half of the fourth century would receive the
full μισθός they had been promised before their term of service, one can see now why
Iphicrates’ idea to hold back a part of his men’s pay until the end of a campaign was
included by Polyaenus in his collection of stratagems: it was an exceptional measure, an
unusual financial ruse worth recording.

vii. The modification of the meaning of μισθός ἐντελής in the middle of the fourth
century

In response to straitened public finances, however, the methods of disbursement
of military and naval pay at Athens (and elsewhere) in the mid-fourth century did
sometimes differ from those of the fifth: in this period, μισθός ἐντελής did sometimes
come to mean, in certain contexts, the sum of two payments—although it should be
immediately noted that payment of μισθός ἐντελής to Athenian sailors (and soldiers) (and
Peloponnesian sailors) never came to denote the payment of half their μισθός on active
service and half on their return home. The evidence for these modified pay practices in
the mid-fourth century come from two speeches from the Demosthenic corpus, the First
Philippic and Against Polycles, and a passage from Arrian’s Anabasis. Although the
First Philippic has played almost no role in the controversy over the meaning of μισθός
ἐντελής,¹⁰⁴ and the Against Polycles only a minor one,¹⁰⁵ since each speech offers a

¹⁰⁴ But see section ix below on Griffith’s treatment of this speech.

¹⁰⁵ See pp.399-400, pp.413-414 and nn.138-139 below.
considerable amount of evidence for Athenian methods and terminology of naval payment in the mid-fourth century, I will analyze both speeches in detail to demonstrate once more that the scholarly consensus reached regarding the meaning of μισθὸς ἐντελής has no foundation, and to establish the proper interpretation of what this term meant at Athens in the mid-fourth century. I will also devote some time to an analysis of the passage of Arrian’s *Anabasis* noted above, to show that μισθὸς ἐντελής was used in exactly the same way in the Peloponnese of the late 330s as it was in the Athens of the late 360s and 350s. Investigating each of the attestations of μισθὸς ἐντελής and its derivatives in these works will thus contribute to the wider goal of this chapter: to establish the amounts of money classical Greek sailors and soldiers had to spend in the markets provided to them.

In the *First Philippic* (Dem. 4), given in 351, Demosthenes proposed two measures to guard against sudden attacks by Philip on poleis and regions in the northern Aegean friendly to Athens (4.16-17): firstly, the preparation of fifty triremes (4.16-17); and secondly, the dispatch of an Athenian force to the north-east Aegean to carry on a campaign of continuous harassment against Philip there (4.19). Demosthenes also outlined the scale and composition of the force he considered appropriate for this second task, and, in addition, how the members of the proposed force were to be paid (4.19-22). He proposed for the planned campaign of harassment an infantry force of two

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106 See esp. 4.19-20: “καὶ τροφὴν ταύτη πορίσαι κελεύω. ἔσται δ’ αὕτη τίς ἡ δύναμις καὶ πόση, καὶ πόθεν τὴν τροφήν ἔξει, καὶ πῶς ταύτ’ ἐξαλλήσῃ ποιεῖν; ἐγὼ φράσω, καθ’ ἕκαστον τούτων διεξιὼν χωρίς”; “I also urge you to provide for its maintenance. And what will this force be, and how large? How will it be maintained, and how far will it consent to effect its purpose? I will tell you, describing each detail separately.”
thousand men (of which five hundred had to be Athenians, the rest being mercenaries), a
cavalry force of two hundred horse (with cavalry transports besides), and a fleet of ten
triremes (4.21-22). Demosthenes told his audience he proposed a force of this size for
two reasons: firstly, because the Athenians could not provide a force that could match
Philip in pitched battle, so that it was necessary to engage in raiding of his territory to
begin with (4.23); thus, the force to be sent out could not be excessively large (nor
altogether too small), and this also because (this being the second reason for its proposed
size) there was neither the pay or the maintenance available for an excessively large force
at Athens: “οὐ γὰρ ἔστι µισθὸς οὐδὲ τροφὴ” (4.23). There is in this passage, then, a
distinction, which is never found in fifth century texts, made between µισθός and
τροφή.  

This distinction between µισθός and τροφή is found again at 4.28-29, in a passage
that helps to confirm and clarify the distinction made between the two terms at 4.23. At
4.28-29, as part of his goal of emphasizing the feasibility of his plan to attack Philip on
his home ground, Demosthenes describes the cost of the proposed force—I will quote
the passage in full because of its importance:

χρήματα τοίνυν· ἔστι µὲν ἡ τροφή, σιτηρέσιον µόνον, τῇ δυνάµει ταύτῃ τάλαντ’
ἐνενήκοντα καὶ µικρόν τι πρός, δέκα µὲν ναυσὶ ταχείαις τεττεράκοντα τάλαντα.

107 After listing the components of the planned force, Demosthenes told his audience that he would shortly
explain how the army was to be maintained: “πόθεν δὴ τούτοις ἡ τροφή γενήσεται;” (4.22). On the
meaning of τροφή here and at 4.19-20, see n.111 below.

108 For the (changes in) meaning of µισθός and τροφή over the course of the fifth and fourth century, see
section ix below.

109 And the planned source of the money to meet the cost of the expedition; we do not know this source
since it was described in a separate document (“Πόρου Ἀπόδειξις”) which was read out to the assembly and
thus did not form part of the body of the text of the speech.
εἴκοσι εἰς τὴν ναῦν μναί τοῦ μηνὸς ἑκάστου, στρατιώταις δὲ δισχιλίοις τοσαῦτ’ ἔτερα, ἵνα δέκα τοῦ μηνὸς ὁ στρατιώτης δραχµὰς σιτηρέσιον λαµβάνῃ τοῦ µηνός, ὡδεκα τάλαντα. ἐν δὲ τις σέιται µικρὰν ἀφοµὴν εἶναι, σιτηρέσιον τοῖς στρατευοµένοις ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ἀδυνάτος ἐνοµήν. ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶδα σαφῶς ὅτι, τοῦτ’ ἂν γένηται, προσποριεῖ τὰ λοίπ’ αὐτὸ τὸ στράτευµ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ πολέµου, οὐδένα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀδικοῦν οὐδὲ τῶν συµµάχων, ὥστ’ ἔχειν µισθὸν ἐντελῆ.

As to the cost then: the _trophe_, the _siteresion_ only, of this force, comes to rather more than ninety talents; for the ten fast ships forty talents, or twenty _mnai_ a ship every month; for two thousand men the same amount, that each may receive ten drachmas a month _sitereson_; for the two hundred cavalry twelve talents, if each is to receive thirty drachmas a month. If anyone imagines that _siteresion_ for the men on campaign is only a small provision to begin with, he is wrong; for I feel quite sure that if no more than that is forthcoming, the force itself will provide the rest out of the war, so as to make up their full pay without injury to any Greek or allied community.

“µισθὸν ἐντελῆ” here, then, is the sum of two payments: _σιτηρέσιον_ (= _τροφὴ_ here) of two obols per day and _τὰ λοίπ’_ (“the rest”), an unspecified amount of money (per day), to be acquired by the force through plundering. If it is not possible to establish the amount of money the phrase “_τὰ λοίπ’_” refers to, it is possible to specify what type of payment “_τὰ λοίπ’_” signifies, by comparing 4.28-29 to 4.23. Demosthenes, throughout the early part of this speech, emphasized that his plans were feasible, that, unlike previously proposed Athenian forces of great size that never actually campaigned

110 See chapter 5 section iii for the translation of this clause.

111 See Marinovic (1988) 165-166, Trundle (2004) 88-89. Gabrielsen ([1981] 71, 153) is incorrect in thinking that _τροφὴ_ and _µισθὸς ἐντελῆς_ are synonymous at 4.28-29: _τροφὴ_ in this passage means money to purchase rations only, as can be seen by the epexegetic apposition of _σιτηρέσιον_ µόνον. And the fact that Demosthenes had to specify that he meant by _τροφὴ_ here _σιτηρέσιον_ only implies that he was using _τροφὴ_ in the broader sense of (total) pay earlier in the speech, at 4.19-20, and 22 (see p.395 and n.106, p.396 above); the context of these earlier passages also imply that he was using _τροφὴ_ to mean total pay, since Demosthenes is speaking generally in each of the maintenance of his proposed force, and gives no indication that he is considering only a restricted part of the force’s remuneration. Note, too, in this respect that the use of _τροφὴ_ in this wider sense at 4.19-20, 22 comes before Demosthenes’ first use of _τροφὴ_ in the restricted sense of ration-money only at 4.23 (in contrast to his use of _µισθὸς_ at 4.24-25, see p.406 n.128 below).

112 See Marinovic (1988) 158 and n.70: the sums of _σιτηρέσιον_ and the amount of “_τὰ λοίπ’_” at 4.28-29 were not necessarily identical.
because Athens did not have the resources in men or money to field them, the force he proposed was capable of action and affordable. At 4.28-29, in outlining the expense of maintaining the force to harass Philip, he limits the state’s expenditures to paying the τροφή (= σιτηρέσιον) of the force. Referring back to 4.23, it will be remembered that one of the disadvantages of an exceedingly large force for the campaign Demosthenes proposed to mount was that the Athenians would not be in a position to provide either μισθός or τροφή for it; the implication being that the Athenians would be able to find either or both of these for the smaller force Demosthenes put forward for consideration. To return to 4.28-29, then, where Demosthenes specifies how the costs for the payment of his planned force of harassment will be met, he proposes that the Athenians provide the τροφή (= σιτηρέσιον) for his force; this leaves, from the two components of pay mentioned at 4.23, the μισθός of the force that Demosthenes implied at 4.23 would be met for his force. The phrase “τὰ λοίπ’” is, then, a rather loose way of referring to the μισθός of the force Demosthenes proposed (the vague (to us) reference possible because his audience would obviously be familiar with the methods and vocabulary of Athenian naval payments at this time). Thus, at 4.28-29, τροφή (= σιτηρέσιον) + μισθός = μισθὸς ἐντελής.113

Thus, μισθὸς ἐντελής at Dem. 4.28-29 does not refer to a system of paying Athenian forces half of their pay on campaign, and half on their return to the Piraeus, but again, simply, to the payment of the full amount of pay promised to and expected by military forces on campaign. This last point follows from the fact that Demosthenes

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113 Griffith ([1935] 271-272) disputed this interpretation of μισθὸς ἐντελής at Dem. 4.29, but only did so because it contradicted his wider thesis on the payment of classical Greek mercenaries. See section ix below: neither his interpretation of μισθὸς ἐντελής at Dem. 4.29 nor his wider thesis have any foundation.
proposed that the force would provide its own \( \mu\iota\sigma\delta\omicron \varepsilon\iota\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\lambda\iota\varsigma \), by topping up the \( \tau\rho\omega\zeta \) provided by the state with \( \mu\iota\sigma\delta\omicron \varepsilon\iota\tau\eta\zeta \), therefore, could be proposed as achievable on active service in 351, as in the fifth century and other fourth century authors I have already discussed, and not on return to Athens after the completion of a campaign. And although Demosthenes’ speech makes clear that it frequently happened at this time that military and naval forces sent out on campaign by the Athenian state were paid only \( \sigma\iota\tau\iota\mu\eta\zeta\omicron\varepsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma\nu\nu \), his proposed project shows that the provision of \( \mu\iota\sigma\delta\omicron \varepsilon\iota\tau\eta\zeta \) was expected to be provided on campaign for members of Athenian military expeditions in the middle of the fourth century, or, at the very least, was considered a desideratum.

In the Against Polycles ([Dem.] 50), probably given in 359 and describing events that took place from 362-360, Apollodorus sued Polycles for the expenses he had incurred in serving beyond his time as trierarch due to Polycles’ failure to present himself to take over Apollodorus’ trireme on the expiration of the latter’s term of service. With the focus on the expenditures Apollodorus had had to make during his (appointed) time of service and the time thereafter, there is considerable discussion in this speech of the pay and other inducements given to the men serving on-board his trireme. At one point (50.18), Apollodorus states that he hired some rowers at Sestus “\( \varepsilon\iota\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\mu\iota\sigma\omicron\varsigma\omicron\varsigma \).” Scholars who have advanced the thesis that half of Athenian naval pay was normally withheld till the end of a campaign have cited this passage in support of their position. Thus, Morrison and Williams, commenting on the use of the term “\( \varepsilon\iota\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\mu\iota\sigma\omicron\varsigma\varsigma \)” at [Dem.] 50.18, stated that Apollodorus was “obliged to hire local men ‘at full pay’” since
“[n]aturally it would be no good to them to have half their pay waiting for them at Athens.”\footnote{114} Gabrielsen, having noted that as a countermeasure against desertion, “part of the pay supplied by the state was frequently withheld until disembarkation,” stated that “[i]n such cases the trierarch was compelled to meet his crew’s demand for full pay out of his own means.”\footnote{115} A detailed analysis of this speech gives considerable opportunity to show that these interpretations of [Dem.] 50.18 are not valid, and that \(\text{µισθὸς ἐντελής} \) (and its related terms) in the Against Polycles has the same meaning that it has in Dem.4: i.e. that in this speech also, \(\text{µισθὸς ἐντελής} = \text{µισθὸς} + \text{σιτηρέσιον}\), and that both payments could be expected to be paid while on campaign.

When Apollodorus was appointed trierarch, the sailors listed for service by their demes either did not show up or (in Apollodorus’ presentation of the matter) were incompetent; so, having dismissed the conscripted sailors who had shown up on account of their incompetence, he then hired the best rowers\footnote{116} possible by giving to each of the men he hired large bonuses and advance payments ("δωρεῖα καὶ προδόσεις... µεγάλας") (50.7). He also hired the best hyperesia he could (ibid.).\footnote{117} Having described these and

\footnote{114} (1968) 259. See also Morrison et al. (2000) 119-120, 122 and Cook (1990) 80 holding that [Dem.] 50 provides evidence for a ‘two installment’ system of naval pay at Athens in the middle of the fourth century.

\footnote{115} (1994) 122: he gives no explicit reference for the latter statement, but given that it comes in a discussion of pay arrangements for Athenian sailors based mostly on [Dem.] 50, and that there is no explicit evidence for a trierarch distributing full pay out of his personal funds in any source other than [Dem.] 50, it can be taken that Gabrielsen is referring to [Dem.] 50, and, in particular, 50.18.

\footnote{116} "\(\nuαύται\)”: throughout this speech, \(\nuαύται\) has the restricted meaning of “rowers”: see Morrison (1984) 52-53 (Ballin [1978] 80 is incorrect to take \(\nuαύται\) in [Dem.] 50 to mean simply “members of a ship’s crew”).

\footnote{117} This term can refer either to the thirty assistants to the trierarch over and above the oar-crew (i.e. the six specialist ‘petty-officers’ (the helmsman, \textit{keleustes}, \textit{pentekontarchos}, bow officer, ship’s carpenter, \textit{ualetes}), ten deckhands, ten marines (\textit{epibatai}), and four archers) or, in a more limited sense, to the six
other expenses he had incurred as trierarch (and citizen—he had paid proeisphorai before the campaign) prior to the trip (50.8-9), Apollodorus then asked the clerk to read out a summary of his expenditures while on campaign. These, among other things, included “τοὺς µισθούς” that he had disbursed every month to the hyperesia and epibatai serving under him, since he had received from the generals siteresion alone (“σιτηρέσιον µόνον”) for the payment of the crew of his trireme, except for a period of two months (only) in a term of service of a year and five months, when he had also received “µισθὸν” from the generals. Three things should be noticed immediately here: firstly, the rowers only received µισθός for two months—this can be deduced from the fact that Apollodorus specifies only the hyperesia and epibatai on his trireme as receiving µισθός on his account every month on campaign, in contrast to the rest of the crew who only received µισθός from the money provided by the generals (in addition to the σιτηρέσιον they received every month from the money provided by the generals); secondly, Apollodorus had had to meet the expense of the µισθοί of the hyperesia and epibatai himself, but the generals had provided σιτηρέσιον for them (and the oarsmen)—thus the petty-officers and ten deckhands: see Morrison (1983) 49-56. Here, at 50.7, the hyperesia may include the epibatai; in the rest of the speech, however, the hyperesia and the epibatai on-board Apollodorus’ trireme are distinguished as two separate groups, the first comprising the trireme’s petty officers and deckhands: see Morrison (1983) 52-53.

118 50.10: “καὶ τοὺς µισθούς οὓς ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις καὶ τοῖς ἐπιβάταις κατὰ µῆνα ἐδίδουν, παρὰ τῶν στρατηγῶν σιτηρέσιον µόνον λαμβάνον, πλὴν δύοι µησιῶν µόνου µισθόν ἐν πέντε µησί καὶ ἐνιαυτῷ...” Note also, in the list of expenses, sums of money that “each oarsman received” (“καὶ ὅσον ἕκαστος ἔλαβε ἀργύριον”) these sums are not included the rubric of µισθός or σιτηρέσιον, and must refer, on the one hand, to the large bonuses and advance payments that Apollodorus paid to recruit to his rowers, and on the other, to the irregular sums of money he distribute to them for their subsistence needs: see below pp.405-406, pp.408-409.

119 See pp.405-406 below on 50.14 for an explicit statement of Apollodorus’ confirming this point.
hyperesia and epibatai had, every month on campaign, received both µισθός and σιτηρέσιον; thirdly, µισθός here is something that can be paid and received on campaign (and can be expected to be received on campaign), as Apollodorus’ payments of µισθός every month to the hyperesia and epibatai, as well as his complaint that the generals had only distributed µισθός for two months of the trireme’s seventeen on service, make clear.

After describing the preliminaries to the campaign, and summarizing the expenses he had incurred during it, Apollodorus then launched into a description of his time on service to demonstrate to the jurors the (alleged) misfortunes and injustices he had suffered as trierarch, and the (alleged) misbehavior of Polycles, and also of the generals in command of this particular campaign in the northern Aegean. He started as follows (50.11-13):

It is admitted that the usefulness of a trireme is done away with, first, if no one gives pay (“µισθός”), and secondly, if she puts into the Piraeus before her expedition is finished; for in that case there is a great deal of desertion, and those of the rowers who remain are unwilling to embark again, unless someone gives them additional money for their household expenses. Both of these things

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120 See again pp.405-406 below for 50.14 confirming the latter point. And see also Ballin (1978) 112 50.10: “[w]e may also conclude that the generals were expected to pay the misthos as well by the fact that they did pay two months of it, as A. here admits.”
happened to me, men of the jury, so that my trierarchy became the more costly. (12) For I received no pay (“µισθὸν”) from the general for the space of eight months, and I sailed home to Piraeus with the ambassadors because my ship was the fastest sailor, and again, when I was ordered by the people to take Menon the general to the Hellespont to replace Autocles, who had been removed from his command, I set sail on short notice from Athens. In the place of the rowers who had deserted I hired others, giving them large bonuses and advance payments, and I gave to those of the original rowers who stayed with me something to leave behind for the maintenance of their households in addition to what they had before; (13) for I was well aware of the need they felt, and how it pressed upon each one...

Again in this passage, both at 50.11 and at 50.12, µισθός is described as something that is expected to be paid while a trireme is on campaign. At 50.11, Apollodorus is generalizing: a trireme’s crew can be destroyed by two things: if its oarsmen (Apollodorus speaks only of “ναῦται” throughout this passage) do not receive µισθός, or if the ship puts into the Piraeus before the end of an expedition. That Apollodorus means here that a ship’s crew is ruined if it does not receive µισθός while on campaign is clarified and confirmed by the start of 50.12, where he states that both of the things that are generally known to ruin a trireme’s crew actually happened to him (through no fault of his own): he received no µισθός from the general for eight months, and he had to return to the Piraeus before the end of the campaign (thus he had received no µισθός for the rowers for eight months while the trireme had been away from the Piraeus and Athens—i.e., while the rowers had been on campaign). Thus, at 50.12, Apollodorus speaks as if he should have received µισθός from the general to distribute to his rowers while on campaign and, at 50.11, more importantly, speaks as if it could be expected by his audience that µισθός would generally be paid on campaign to the oarsmen of a trireme (in order to prevent the sort of desertions Apollodorus suffered).

There is no mention in this passage of pay being distributed, or any implication that it was expected to be distributed, to the rowers of the trireme on their return to the
Piraeus\textsuperscript{121} (or any mention of an actual or expected second installment of \(\mu\iota\sigma\delta\omicron\varepsilon\ \iota\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\lambda\omicron\varepsilon\) to be distributed on their return). Apollodorus does speak of—expected and real—desertion on a trireme’s return to the Piraeus; but not because the men had received the second installment of their full pay and thus could desert with a substantial amount of money. Rather, desertion could be expected to occur and did occur because the oarsmen would not have or had not received \(\mu\iota\sigma\delta\omicron\varepsilon\) on campaign, but only ration-money (\(\sigma\iota\tau\iota\rho\iota\varepsilon\sigma\iota\omicron\nu\): see above on 50.10), and would not or did not want to re-embark under conditions of service which could be expected to be similarly poor. Moreover, in his generalizing description of a trireme’s complement of oarsmen undermined by a lack of \(\mu\iota\sigma\delta\omicron\varepsilon\) and a return to the Piraeus, Apollodorus does not say that they would re-embark if they received their owed \(\mu\iota\sigma\delta\omicron\varepsilon\), but only if they were to receive additional money to manage their household expenses (“\(\varepsilon\acute{a}v\ \mu\acute{h}\ \tau\iota\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \varepsilon\tau\tau\omicron\nu\ \alpha\rho\gamma\gamma\omicron\upsilon\omicron\\nu\ \delta\iota\delta\omicron\), \(\omicron\upsilon\sigma\tau\epsilon\tau\omicron\) \tau\alpha\ \omega\iota\kappa\epsilon\iota\alpha\ \delta\iota\omicron\omega\sigma\omega\xi\iota\alpha\)”) (50.11).\textsuperscript{122} In reality (as to be expected, on Apollodorus’ presentation of things, from common knowledge of naval affairs), having paid out large bonuses and advance payments (again: see 50.7 above) to hire more rowers to replace those who had deserted, Apollodorus had to give some money to the original rowers\textsuperscript{123} for them to leave behind for the maintenance of their households in addition to what they

\textsuperscript{121} Contra Ballin (1978) 118.

\textsuperscript{122} van Wees ([2004] 220) is therefore incorrect to take [Dem.] 50.11 as showing that Apollodorus thought it to be a universal truth that rowers would demand higher wages to stay on-board a trireme if it had put into the Piraeus halfway through a campaign: the demand was for additional money (“\(\varepsilon\tau\tau\omicron\nu\ \alpha\rho\gamma\gamma\omicron\upsilon\omicron\\nu\)”) for their household expenses (and not \(\mu\iota\sigma\delta\omicron\varepsilon\)).

\textsuperscript{123} I.e., those men who had spent the first eight months of Apollodorus’ term of service on-board his trireme and had now returned to Athens with him.
had had before ("ἐδωκά τι εἰς διοίκησιν τῶν οἰκείων καταλιπεῖν πρὸς ὧν πρότερον ἐίχον") (50.12), since he knew that they were pressed for money (50.13). Apollodorus was hard-pressed for money, too, and had to mortgage off his farm in order to borrow three thousand drachmas which he distributed among the oarsmen ("διαδοὺς τοῖς ναύταις") (50.13)—both the original and the newly hired rowers—before setting back out from Athens, in order to convey the general Menon to the Hellespont (50.12). This disbursed money is again not referred to as μισθός, or as a payment of arrears: it must be, partly, the already mentioned advance payments and bonuses paid to the newly hired rowers; and, partly, the special, already mentioned once-off payments to the original oarsmen given for the maintenance of their households.\footnote{Contra Ballin (1978) 120-121.}

Confirmation that this distribution of money to his rowers was not to cover any payment of μισθός can be found at 50.14. After describing the return to Athens, Apollodorus takes up the story of the campaign in the north again: after the trireme had come to the Hellespont, and the time of his trierarchy had expired, and no pay had been given to the rowers except for two months ("καὶ μισθὸς οὐκ ἀπεδόθη τοῖς στρατιώταις ἀλλ’ ἢ δυοῖν μηνοῖν"), and a new general had come without any new trierarchs to take up service, many of Apollodorus’ rowers began to desert.\footnote{Two lexical points should be noted here: first, "τοῖς στρατιώταις" refers to the oarsmen of Apollodorus’ trireme (see Morrison [1983] 53) (Ballin [1978] 123 is wrong to take this noun to refer to “the entire squadron of fighting men as contrasted with his own specific pleroma’’); second, Apollodorus says that “πολλοὶ τοῦ πληρώµατος” began to desert—as Morrison ([1983] 53) points out, the noun “πλήρωµα” in this speech refers to the ship’s complement of oarsmen, and not to the whole crew of the trireme (Ballin [1978] 85-86 is wrong to take this term as denoting in [Dem.] 50 “the entire body of men stationed on board a Greek warship”).} Thus, at the end of the term of Apollodorus’ service as trierarch, the rowers had only received two months’ μισθός. This
must be the two months’ μισθός given by the generals to Apollodorus to distribute
referred to at 50.10; therefore, the rowers had only received μισθός from the money
provided by the generals, and not from Apollodorus’ personal funds, and so the sums of
money referred to at 50.12 and 50.13 distributed by Apollodorus to the oarsmen were not
μισθός. (In addition, and confirming the analysis of 50.10 above, note that
Apollodorus’ lament that the rowers had only received two months’ μισθός during the
term of his trierarchy, only a brief part of which had been spent at the Piraeus (see 50.12),
demonstrates that it was expected by him, his rowers, and the assembled dikasts
addressed at the trial that the rowers ought to have received μισθός while on active
service.)

As I have already alluded to, many of Apollodorus’ oarsmen became discouraged
with their lack of μισθός, and left the ship: some to military service on the mainland,
some to the ships of the Thasians and the Maronites, being persuaded by high pay and
receiving large sums of money in advance ("μισθῷ µεγάλῳ πεισθέντες καὶ ἀργύριον πολὺ
 µισθὸν πορίσαντα..."

126 Or, more precisely, given by the general Menon: see Ballin (1978) 122: “[s]ince no misthos had been
paid at the time Menon took over the command (cf. Sec. 12), it follows that Menon had paid the two
months’ wages.”

127 Again, contra Ballin (1978) 120-121.

128 Cf. here Dem. 4.24-25: the foreign mercenaries of Athens desert the campaigns for which Athens has
hired them, and go off to service under Persian satraps, and their general has to follow, “οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν
µὴ διδόντα µισθόν,” “for it is impossible for him to command if he does not provide µισθός” (4.24). (Cf.
here 4.46 for Demosthenes’ attack on the uselessness of sending generals out on campaign with
"ἀποµίσθων ξένων," “mercenaries without pay.”) Demosthenes’ proposed remedy for this was to deprive
both general and soldiers of excuses to desert by providing them µισθός (“... τὰς προφάσεις ἀφελεῖν καὶ τοῦ
στρατηγοῦ καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν, µισθὸν πορίσαντας...”) (4.25) and to provide citizen overseers over forces.
(That Demosthenes is referring here to µισθός as one part of µισθὸς ἐντελής follows from the fact that the
passages referred to here come just after 4.23-24 and its insistence that the Athenians cannot come up with
either µισθός or τροφή for large (non-citizen) forces, i.e. after µισθός had been distinguished as one of two
parts of µισθὸς ἐντελής.)
προλαβόντες (50.14). They deserted also because they saw that Apollodorus’ resources were spent, the city was heedless, the allies were in need, and the generals not to be trusted. In fact, as Apollodorus has it, since he had been more ambitious than the other trierarchs to man his ship with good rowers, the more desertion there had been from his trireme (50.15); for the other trierarchs who had come on campaign had the advantage that their oarsmen were conscripted Athenians who had stayed with their triremes in order to make sure of their return home to Athens; whereas Apollodorus’ ναύται,

“trusting in their skill as able rowers, went off to wherever they might again receive the most money, thinking more of their gain for the immediate present than of the danger impending over them, if they should ever be caught by me.”129 There are three important points to be drawn from Apollodorus’ presentation of these events. Firstly, the only tie binding rowers to Athenian triremes on this campaign is residence at Athens. Second, the main factor encouraging desertion from Apollodorus’ trireme is a lack of µισθός—implying the hired rowers expected to receive µισθός while on campaign. These two observations lead to the third point: there is no mention here, or any hint of, a second installment of µισθός being retained in Athens (to be paid on the triremes’ return there at the end of the campaign) in order to discourage the oarsmen from deserting their ships on campaign; and this absence of any mention of µισθὸς ἐντελῆς, in the light of Apollodorus’ explicit statements on the rowers’ motivations for remaining with or

129 50.16: “οἱ δ’ ἐμοὶ ναύται πιστεύοντες αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῷ δύνασθαι ἐλαύνειν, ὅπου ἡμελλόν ἀφείσαν τάλιν πλάισισον λήψασθαι, ἔντειν ἀπῆραν, ἄνθρωποι τῆν ἐν τῷ παρόντι εὐπορίαν κρείττω εἶναι αὐτοῖς τοῦ μέλλοντας φόβου, εἰ ποτὲ ληφθεῖναι ὑπ’ ἐμοΐ.”
deserting their ships, implies very strongly that no such second installment was present and waiting in Athens.\(^{130}\)

Despite the desertion from Apollodorus’ trireme, and the fact that he had no money left, the general Timomachus ordered him to sail to Hieron (on the eastern shore of the Bosporus) to convoy grain ships, although the general did not provide pay (“καὶ µισθὸν οὐ διδόντος”) for the men on-board Apollodorus’ trireme (50.17). Apollodorus was thus forced to borrow money (50.17), and send Euctemon, his pentekontarch, to Lampsacus, giving him money, and letters for friends of Apollodorus’ father (Pasion the banker), and ordering him to hire the best rowers he could there (“ναύτας µισθώσασθαι ὡς ἂν δύνηται ἀρίστου”) (50.18). Apollodorus, meanwhile, stayed in Sestus, and himself hired more oarsmen, in order to replace those who had deserted, hiring the new rowers “ἐντελοµίσθους” (50.18) (I will come back, presently, to the question of how this term should be properly understood and translated). He also gave some money, all he had (“ἐδώκα τι, ὅσον εἶχεν”), to the original rowers (“τῶν ἀρχαίων ναυτῶν”) who had stayed with him throughout his term of service, and who had residences in Athens (see 50.11-13) (note again that Apollodorus does not say that he gave them µισθός, but (‘irregular’) sums of money to help them get by). That Apollodorus was not distributing µισθός here is confirmed from a later passage in his speech. After service in particularly harsh conditions off the coast of Thrace (50.21-22), there was again desertion from Apollodorus’ ship. For, as Apollodorus said, “the original sailors had borne many hardships and profited little—merely what I was able to borrow and give to each man in

\(^{130}\) Cf. 50.65 in this regard: among Apollodorus’ expenses for his trierarchy are the sums which the several deserters took with them when they ran away from the ship (i.e. during the campaign).
addition to what they had had from me before, since the general did not supply enough even for their daily subsistence.\textsuperscript{131} The money referred to here as borrowed and distributed to “τῶν ἀρχαίων ναυτῶν” must be that given at Sestus to them, an extraordinary payment to help these rowers subsist on campaign.\textsuperscript{132}

In addition to all of these considerations, there is no reason to doubt Apollodorus’ statement at the start of his speech that he did not give \( \muισ\varrho\\theta\varsigma \) to the rowers, but only to the \textit{hyperesia} and \textit{epibatai}, since it was in the interests of the case he was making to emphasize any expense he incurred as trierarch, including any \( \muισ\varrho\\theta\varsigma \) for his rowers. And the argument from silence (i.e. the fact that Apollodorus does not state that he distributed \( \muισ\varrho\\theta\varsigma \) to his oarsmen) is valid here since he does mention in his description of his trireme’s service when he did distribute \( \muισ\varrho\\theta\varsigma \). In addition to 50.10, and its summary of the campaign’s expenses mentioning the distribution of \( \muισ\varrho\\theta\varsigma \) to the \textit{hyperesia} and \textit{epibatai} on-board his trireme, Apollodorus mentions two other instances when he paid \( \muισ\varrho\\theta\varsigma \) to men serving on his trireme. When Euctemon, the \textit{pentekontarch} of the trireme, returned from Lampsacus, bringing with him the rowers he had hired there, it happened that he fell sick, just as the general gave the word to sail to Hieron (50.19). Since he was seriously ill, Apollodorus gave him his \( \muισ\varrho\\theta\varsigma \), adding money for

\textsuperscript{131} 50.23: “... τῶν ἀρχαίων ναυτῶν ταλαιπωρούμενων μὲν πολλά, ὄφελος μὲν ἐπαρκέσαι πρὸς ᾧ πρότερον εἶχον παρ᾽ ἐµοῦ, ἐπεὶ ὅ γε στρατηγὸς οὐδὲ τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡµέραν αὐτοῖς τροφὴν διαρκῆ ἐδίδου.” “τροφὴν” is used here in its most basic sense of “subsistence,” and not as a term denoting a payment.

\textsuperscript{132} I argue this point at length in order to contradict Ballin ([1978] 134-135), who thought that \( ἕδωκα \) \( π\iota \) at 50.18 may be referring to the payment of a month’s \( μισ\varrho\\theta\varsigma \) by Apollodorus to his crew. Ballin ([1978] 135 n.1) added in a note: “[w]e should not overlook the possibility that \( ἕδωκα \) \( π\iota \) may merely refer to a small bonus given to the remaining \textit{nautai} as a reward for sticking with A.” This note is nearer to the truth, but still not precise enough: see the analysis in the main text here and following, and above at p.408.
the journey, and sent him home: “τούτῳ µὲν οὖν ἀποδοὺς τὸν µισθὸν καὶ ἐφόδια προσθεὶς ἀπέστηµα αὐτὰδε” (50.19). Euctemon received µισθός from Apollodorus’ personal funds, in addition to the σιτηρέσιον from the generals, because, as pentekontarch, he was part of the hyperesia of Apollodorus’ trireme. Similarly, later on the campaign, Poseidippus, Apollodorus’ kybernetes, refused to follow the general’s orders to sail to Macedonia, but obeyed Apollodorus’ order to sail to Thasos instead, since, as Poseidippus said, “ὅτι τριήραρχός τε ἐγὼ τῆς νεὼς εἴην καὶ ὑπεύθυνος, καὶ τὸν µισθὸν παρ’ ἐµοῦ λαµβάνει,” “[Apollodorus] was the trierarch of the ship, and the one responsible, and that he got his µισθός from [him]” (50.50). Again, Poseidippus, as kybernetes and therefore part of the hyperesia, was receiving µισθός from Apollodorus’ personal funds, in addition to the σιτηρέσιον he was receiving from the funds provided by the generals. Both of these incidents confirm Apollodorus’ earlier statement at 50.10 that he paid µισθός to the hyperesia throughout the term of his service, and that he did not to the rowers on his ship.

Let me summarize here what I have demonstrated so far in this analysis of [Dem.]

50. I have shown that an examination of Apollodorus’ speech till 50.19 demonstrates that the hyperesia and epibatai on-board Apollodorus’ trireme were the only members of his crew to receive both µισθός (from Apollodorus) and σιτηρέσιον (from public funds) for each month while on service: the original oarsmen, apart from two months, received only σιτηρέσιον (from public funds) and no µισθός (although Apollodorus did also give them

133 At 50.15, Apollodorus’ funds are exhausted; at 50.17, he is ordered to embark for Hieron by Timomachus the general although the latter did not give him µισθός for his crew; further, at 50.17, he borrows money, to spend on his ship. In the absence of any receipt of money for µισθός from Timomachus, the µισθός given to Euctemon must have come from the funds Apollodorus had borrowed (either at Lampsacus or Sestus).
money to get by on two occasions); and that, although the original rowers only received σιτηρέσιον, it could be expected by them, and by Apollodorus’ audience of assembled dikasts, that they ought to receive both µισθός and σιτηρέσιον. I have also shown that there is no indication at any point in the first part of Apollodorus’ speech that there was a (second) installment of µισθός withheld at Athens to prevent the men of his trireme (and other Athenian triremes on campaign in the northern Aegean) from deserting. With this done, I want to continue now to examine the rest of Apollodorus’ speech, in order to establish the meaning of µισθὸς ἐντελής and “ἐντελοµίσθους” in it.

After Euctemon had reached the Piraeus, and heard that Polycles had been appointed as the trierarch appointed to succeed Apollodorus, whose term of service had now expired, he took with him Apollodorus’ father-in-law and approached Polycles at the deigma (50.24). Euctemon told Polycles “to join the ship as quickly as possible, since large sums were being paid each day [by Apollodorus] in addition to what the general gave the ship for σιτηρέσιον.” Euctemon then detailed for Polycles what Apollodorus’ daily expenditures on the campaign consisted of (50.25):

... τοὺς τε µισθοὺς τοὺς τῇ ὑπηρεσίᾳ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβάταις κατὰ µῆνα διδοµένους, τοὺς τε ναύτας ὡς αὐτὸς ἐκ τῆς Λαµψάκου ἐµισθώσατο, καὶ τοῖς ὕστεροι ἐπεµβᾶσιν ἀντὶ τῶν ἀπολιπόντων, ἐτί δὲ ἡ τῶν αρχαίων ναυτῶν ἑκάστων προσθήκη δεχόντητι, ἐπειδὴ µοι ὁ χρόνος ἐξῆκε τῆς τριηραρχίας, καὶ τἄλλα ὅσα ἦν τὰ καὶ ἐκάστην ἀναλισκόµενα εἰς τὴν ναῦν...

... the pay (“τοὺς τε µισθοὺς”) given each month to the hyperesia and the epibatai, both to the rowers [Euctemon] had hired at Lampsacus and to those who came on board subsequently to replace those who had deserted, and also of the additional sums which I had given to each of the original rowers at their request after the term of my trierarchy had expired, and all the rest of the money expended upon the ship from day to day.135

134 50.24: “... ἐκέλευεν αὐτὸν ὡς τάχιστα ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν ἀποπλεῖν, ὡς τῶν ἀναλομάτων πολλῶν ὦτων, καὶ ἐκάστην ἐπιβάτην ἐπειδὴ µοι ὁ χρόνος ἐξῆκε τῆς τριηραρχίας, καὶ τἄλλα ὅσα ἦν τὰ καὶ ἐκάστην ἀναλισκόµενα εἰς τὴν ναῦν...

135 Euctemon would have thoroughly acquainted with these matters as the trireme’s pentekontarch, through whom all purchases and expenditures for the ship would have been made (50.25).
Thus, three groups were described by Euctemon as receiving both μισθός and σιτηρέσιον while on campaign: the hyperesia and epibatai on-board Apollodorus’ trireme (again: see 50.10 again); the rowers hired by Euctemon at Lampsacus (see 50.18-19); and the rowers hired by Apollodorus at Sestus. (And note that these three groups are all distinguished from “τῶν ἀρχαίων ναυτῶν” who did not receive μισθός from Apollodorus but ‘irregular’ sums of money in order to help them subsist while on campaign.)

That this last group of men—the rowers hired by Apollodorus at Sestus—received μισθός from Apollodorus, in addition to σιτηρέσιον from the generals, is significant for our understanding of μισθὸς ἐντελής and related terms in the mid-fourth century.

Apollodorus, as I have mentioned above, in describing his activities at Sestus, mentioned that he had given as much money as he had to the “original rowers” (i.e. those who had stayed with him from the start of the expedition and who had never received μισθός from him), and that he had also hired other rowers “ἐντελομίσθους” (50.18); these new rowers are therefore distinguished from and contrasted with “τῶν ἀρχαίων ναυτῶν” by

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136 That the oarsmen hired at Sestus are those mentioned here by Euctemon, and not those hired earlier at the Piraeus to replace those who had deserted on the trireme’s return to Athens (50.12), can be proved from three considerations: firstly, and most importantly, those rowers hired on the return to the Piraeus must be included among those described at the Hellespont as getting only two months’ μισθός—the money for which came from the generals, and not from Apollodorus—thus they cannot be among those groups of men listed as receiving μισθός from Apollodorus. Secondly, the hiring of the oarsmen at 50.25 is listed by Euctemon after his hiring of sailors at Lampsacus (this was after Apollodorus’ term had expired: see 50.14), and before the distribution of sums of money to the “original sailors” on the expiration of Apollodorus’ term of service; that is, we should take it that the oarsmen referred to as “subsequently hired” must be the third and last group of men (i.e. after the rowers hired at Lampsacus by Euctemon, and the rowers already on the trireme) we hear about in Apollodorus’ description, at 50.18-19, of his experiences on the expiry of his term of service as trierarch—the men Apollodorus himself hired at Sestus. Finally—and this is almost redundant in light of the foregoing, but anyway—the rowers hired at the Piraeus are never described by Apollodorus (or Euctemon) as receiving μισθός from Apollodorus.

137 It should be noted here that this is a hapax legomenon.
the fact that they were hired “ἐντελομίσθους,” “at full pay” (as the Loeb translates). But what was the distinguishing characteristic that made the rowers hired at Sestus “ἐντελομίσθους” and not the men originally hired by Apollodorus? It was the fact that the rowers hired at Sestus, in contrast to the “original rowers,” were paid both σιτηρέσιον and μισθός, as 50.25 shows: i.e., that their receiving both σιτηρέσιον and μισθός meant that they could be described as “ἐντελομίσθους,” as being hired “at full pay.”

This explanation of the term is consistent with the terminology of payments throughout the speech, and with Apollodorus’ (and Euctemon’s) description of their disbursements, unlike the explanation offered by those scholars who have advanced the ‘two installment’ thesis of μισθὸς ἐντελής. As I have shown repeatedly, there is no evidence in this speech that there was a second installment of μισθὸς waiting in Athens for Apollodorus’ “original rowers,” and much evidence to suggest otherwise, so that Morrison and Williams’, and Gabrielsen’s, explanations of “ἐντελομίσθους” have absolutely no basis. Morrison and Williams’ explanation also begs the question of why the rowers hired at Sestus could be distinguished from the rowers hired at Athens as “ἐντελομίσθους”? On their understanding of pay arrangements at Athens at this time, the “original rowers” would also have received μισθὸς ἐντελής, albeit on their return to Athens; thus, they could be termed, as much as the rowers hired at Sestus, as “ἐντελομίσθους.”138

There is obviously another arrangement at work here that allows the

138 This objection can also be made against Morrison et al.’s explanation of 50.18 ([2000] 119-120), based on the argument that there was a ‘two installment’ system of naval pay at Athens at this time: “Athenian trierarchs, who had to recruit oarsmen abroad to replace deserters had, of course, to offer full pay.” Again, this statement fails to explain why those men hired at Sestus could be distinguished, from the “original rowers,” as being paid “at full pay.” Gabrielsen’s explanation of 50.18 ([1994] 122: “the expression ‘fully paid oarsmen... probably refers to professional experts who demanded to be recompensed fully and promptly for their services’) fails for the same reasons.
rowers hired at Sestus to be termed “ἐντελοµίσθους,” in contrast to the rowers hired earlier—namely, the fact that the former received both σιτηρέσιον and μισθός.\footnote{Ballin ([1978] 133; cited by Bers [2003] 26 n.41) suggests that at 50.18 and at 50.35, Apollodorus means by ‘full pay’ “payment of the wages contracted for at the end of each month,” i.e. not cheating them of the balance of pay they had been promised at the end of the month. But there is no basis for positing a system of two payments per month to Apollodorus’ crew. Ballin is basing this view Griffith’s work on pay in the fifth and fourth centuries (cf. Ballin [1978] 114, 115, 203), according to which σιτηρέσιον was paid at the start of the month, and μισθός at the end of the month: I show below, however, that Griffith’s position has no foundation (see section ix). Also, Ballin states ([1978] 134) that “[w]hether [Apollodorus] kept his promise or not [to provide full pay] is a moot question.” This is not the case: 50.25 shows that he paid μισθός ἐντελῶς to the men hired at Sestus.}

That “ἐντελοµίσθους” at 50.18 refers to men who have received both σιτηρέσιον and μισθός is confirmed by an exchange between Apollodorus and Polycles at Thasos. Polycles had dismissed Euctemon’s plea to him to sail to the north to take over as trierarch from Apollodorus (50.25-26), but eventually arrived at Thasos four months after Apollodorus’ term as trierarch had expired (50.29). After repeated demands by Apollodorus that Polycles repay him for the expenses he had incurred after his term of service had expired (50.29-34), Polycles finally deigned to reply, first mocking Apollodorus’ needlessly expensive equipment, and then continuing on to say (50.35):

\[
\text{τίς ἂν οὖν δύναιτ’... τὴν σὴν μανίαν καὶ πολυτέλειαν ὑποµεῖναι, διεφθαρµένον µὲν πλήρωµα καὶ εἰωθὸς ἀργύριον πολὺ προλαµβάνειν καὶ ἀτελείας ἄγειν τῶν νοµιζοµένων ἐν τῇ νηὶ λῃτουργίᾳ καὶ λούσθαι ἐν βαλανείῳ, τρυφῶντας δ’ ἐπιβάτας καὶ ὑπηρεσίαν ὑπὸ µισθοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ ἐντελοῦς;}
\]

Who could endure your madness and extravagance, a crew of oarsmen corrupted and accustomed to receive in advance large sums of money and to enjoy exemption of services normally required on board a ship, and able also to make use of the baths, and epibatai and a hyperesia rendered luxurious by high wages paid in full?

Polycles, then, divides Apollodorus’ supposed irresponsible extravagance regarding the crew of the trireme and its remuneration into two parts: first, the rowers on-board the
tireme who could be characterized as receiving large advances before serving;\footnote{Polycles’ response to Apollodorus was brief and direct, and simplified the pay arrangements on-board Apollodorus’ trireme. Omitting from his attack the rowers whom Euctemon and Apollodorus had hired and paid \textit{µισθός} to did not weaken it: his attack on Apollodorus’ extravagance was served well enough by his focus on the advance payments paid to the original rowers (who, most probably, still made up the majority of the rowers and thus could be taken to characterize the whole complement of rowers) and the full pay paid to the \textit{hyperesia} and \textit{epibatai}. In addition, the \textit{µισθός} paid to the rowers hired later would have only accounted for a minor part of the trireme’s expenses, so that it could be omitted from Polycles’ attack without weakening it. In addition, the expenses Polycles did attack came about before Apollodorus’ term of service had expired, and thus any attack on them would not produce awkward (for Polycles) counter-accusations regarding the expenses incurred by Apollodorus after the completion of his term of service. In sum, there is no reason to think that Polycles’ failure to mention the \textit{µισθός} paid by Euctemon and Apollodorus to the rowers hired at Lampsacus and Sestus respectively implies that \textit{µισθός} was not paid to these men. Rather, the rhetorical demands of Polycles’ brief dismissal of Apollodorus’ queries did not demand their mention.} and second, the \textit{hyperesia} and \textit{epibatai} who could be characterized (and distinguished from the rowers) as receiving high pay and that “in full.” But why could the \textit{hyperesia} and \textit{epibatai} be distinguished from the rowers as receiving “\textit{µισθὸς πολλοῦ καὶ ἐντελοῦς}”? Again, it must be because—that unlike the vast majority of the rowers who did not receive \textit{µισθός} but only large advance payments and bonuses (see 50.7, 12)—the \textit{hyperesia} and \textit{epibatai} received, for each month while they were on campaign with Apollodorus, \textit{σιτηρέσιον} and \textit{µισθός}, in contrast to the (“original”) rowers, who only received \textit{σιτηρέσιον}. Therefore, at 50.35, just as at 50.18 (and Dem. 4.28-29), \textit{µισθὸς} + \textit{σιτηρέσιον} = \textit{µισθὸς ἐντελής}. Interestingly, 50.35 plays no part in the work of those who would see naval \textit{µισθός} being paid in two installments by the Athenian state: this must be at least partly because any analysis of 50.35, placed in the larger context of a discussion of the other passages in this speech detailing the pay arrangements of the \textit{hyperesia} and \textit{epibatai}, and the other members of Apollodorus’ trireme, shows that \textit{µισθὸς ἐντελής} refers here to payments made in full while on campaign. In sum, neither here nor at 50.18 is there any basis for the claim that [Dem.] 50 provides evidence for a system at
Athens whereby part of rowers’ μισθός was not paid to them until the end of an expedition and the consequent return to Athens. Μισθός ἐντελής here, as in Dem. 4, simply refers to the disbursement of an expected payment during a campaign.

If the considerations raised by Demosthenes and Apollodorus in Dem. 4 and [Dem.] 50, respectively, show that it was still thought at Athens in the middle of the fourth century that soldiers and sailors ought to get their μισθός ἐντελής on campaign from polis funds, the plans proposed by Demosthenes and the events on the campaign described by Apollodorus demonstrate that the Athenian state sometimes struggled in this period to pay μισθός ἐντελής to its forces, and that soldiers and sailors regularly had to settle for the payment from polis funds of σιτηρέσιον only, with the balance of their pay to be made up out of the sale of booty or the personal funds of their leaders on campaign.\footnote{See, e.g., Dem. 23.209: μισθός for the full duration of campaigns regularly not available to the mid-fourth-century Athenian state.} Thus, by the time of Apollodorus’ trierarchy, simply paying μισθός ἐντελής could sometimes be enough to attract a skilled hyperesia or rowers to service, whereas, in the late fifth century, higher pay or bonus payments had been needed.\footnote{See Morrison and Williams (1968) 258, Gabrielsen (1994) 123 for sources for this statement. But see Dem. 51.6 for Demosthenes, at some time between 361 and 357, as trierarch hiring the strongest hyperesia he could by offering the highest pay. Obviously, within the general trend of weakened (as compared to the fifth century) state finances at Athens in the early to mid-fourth century, there could have been certain occasions when polis finances may have been stronger than the norm.}

It is in this context that we should place the final passage referring to μισθός ἐντελής found in our sources, and one again that has played almost no part in the
scholarly discussion of this term.\textsuperscript{143} According to Arrian (\textit{Anab.} 2.13.4), in 333, as part of the opposition to Alexander, Agis, king of Sparta, had gone to the satraps Autophradates (and Pharnabazus) to ask for money for the war, and for as many ships and men as possible. In response to his request,

\[ Ἀγις δὲ παρ’ Αὐτοφραδάτου τάλαντα ἀργυρίου λαβὼν τριάκοντα καὶ τριήρεις δέκα, ταύτας μὲν Ἱππίαν ἄξοντα ἀποστέλλει παρὰ τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ Ἀγησιλαὸν ἐπὶ Ταίναρον· καὶ παραγγέλλειν ἐκέλευσεν Ἀγησιλάῳ, διδόντα τοῖς ναύταις ἑντελῆ τὸν µισθὸν πλεῖν τὴν τάχιστην ἐπὶ Κρήτης, ὡς τὰ ἐκεῖ καταστησόμενον. \]

Agis got thirty talents of silver from Autophradates and ten triremes and despatched Hippias to take them to his brother Agesilaos at Taenarum. He ordered him to tell Agesilaus to give full pay to the sailors and to sail as quickly as possible to Crete, to settle things there. (Arr., \textit{Anab.} 2.13.6)

If we put the actions of Agis back into their fourth-century and immediate context, his order to his brother to pay the crews in full can begin to make sense. The fact that Agis needed to specify to Agesilaos to pay the ναύται “ἐντελῆ τὸν µισθὸν” implies strongly that it was not expected, or, to put it more precisely, that it could not be taken for granted in the late 330s, that sailors would receive µισθὸς ἑντελῆς from their employers—or at least not from the Spartans, whose financial weakness at this time can be gauged from the fact that Agis had had to go abroad to ask for funds for the naval campaign against Alexander. Also, the immediate context—and the need to hire men quickly to fill the triremes for the expedition to Crete—demanded that the Spartans had to pay well to recruit rapidly for the campaign.\textsuperscript{144} Therefore the most probable interpretation of the Spartans’ decision to pay “ἐντελῆ τὸν µισθὸν” is that, just as at

\textsuperscript{143} For its only (very brief) mention in the debate on the meaning of this term, see n.145 below.

\textsuperscript{144} Cf. chapter 5 section iii on sudden surges in demand for military and naval manpower leading to rises in military and naval pay in the classical Greek world.
Athens in the mid-fourth century, it had become the norm in the Peloponnese in the 330s to pay sailors their σιτηρέσιον only, so that any promise to pay μισθὸς ἐντελής, that is to say μισθὸς and σιτηρέσιον, was sufficient incentive to attract men (quickly) to service.  

viii. The time and periodicity of payment of μισθὸς

Literary and epigraphical evidence shows that the fifth century Athenian state disbursed sailors’ μισθὸς in full in advance of service. At Acharnians 544-554 (produced at the Lenaea of 425), Aristophanes, poking fun at the belligerent nature of the Athenians, has Dicaeopolis describe the scene in the Piraeus just before the imagined departure of a typical overseas expedition launched by the Athenians in response to a laughably flimsy grievance (the Spartan seizure of a pup from the tiny and inconsequential island of Seriphos). Part of this description concerns rowers’ pay (544-547): “why on the very instant you’d have been launching 300 ships, and the city would have been full of the hubbub of soldiers, noisy crowds surrounding ships’ captains, (547) μισθὸς being handed out…” The crucial point here is that Dicaeopolis is describing the actions taken before a typical Athenian campaign: Aristophanes and his audience therefore saw μισθὸς being paid before the start of a campaign as usual practice.  

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145 Griffith ([1935] 272 n.1) commented that the phrase μισθὸς ἐντελής is found at Arr., Anab. 2.13.6, “with no special meaning apparently.” In so far as it means here an expected amount of pay that has been promised to be disbursed in full and on campaign, this is correct.

146 “καὶ κάστα μένταν εἰδέως καδείλετε / περὶ τριηράρχον βοῆς, / µισθὸς διδοµενόυ...” The context demands that “στρατιωτῶν” be taken to mean “sailors” here: this usage can be paralleled in several other Athenian authors from the fifth and fourth centuries, namely Thucydides, Isocrates, and the author of [Dem.] 50: see esp. Morrison (1984) 53, and also Andrewes, HCT v.318 (ad Thucy. 8.95.4).

147 See p.153 n.108 above on the realistic background of Aristophanic humor.
Describing the departure of the Sicilian expedition, Thucydides narrates at 6.31.3 that the fleet had been equipped at great cost both to the trierarchs and to the (Athenian) state, and lists some of the expenditures made by both prior to the embarkation of the fleet; among other things, “τοῦ µὲν δηµοσίου δραχµὴν τῆς ἡµέρας τῷ ναῦτῃ διδόντος,” the state gave “a drachma per day for each rower...” Pay given to the rowers, then, at a rate of a drachma a day, is counted as money already expended by the state before the expedition set out. At 6.31.5, it is confirmed that the state had distributed pay to the rowers before they set out on the campaign. The passage is worth quoting in full:

εἰ γάρ τις ἐλογίσατο τὴν τε τῆς πόλεως ἀνάλωσιν δηµοσίαν καὶ τῶν στρατευοµένων τῆν ἰδιὰν, τῆς µὲν πόλεως ὅσα τε ἤδη προτετελέκει καὶ ὅ τε ἐχοντας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἀπέστειλε, τῶν δὲ ιδιωτῶν ἅ τε περὶ τὸ σῶµα τις καὶ τριήραρχος εἰς τὴν ναῦν αὐτὰς ἀνηλίκηκε καὶ ὅσα ἔµελλεν ἀναλώσειν, χωρὶς δ' ἂ εἰκὸς ἦν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐκ δηµοσίου µισθοῦ πάντα τινὰ παρασκευάσασθαι ἐφόδιον ἢ ἐπὶ χρόνιον στρατεύσειν, καὶ ὅσα ἐπὶ μεταβολῇ τις ἢ στρατιώτης ἢ ἄµιθος ἢ ἐχον δῆλον ἐπλεί, πολλὰ ἂν τάλαντα ηὑρέθη ἐκ τῆς πόλεως τὰ πάντα ἐξαγόµενα.

For if anyone had counted up the public expenditure of the state, and the private outlay of individuals—that is to say, the sums which the state had already spent upon the expedition and was sending in the hands of the generals, and those sums which individuals had expended upon their personal outfit, or as trierarchs had laid out and were still to lay out upon their vessels; and if he had added to this the journey money which each was likely to have provided himself with, independently of the pay from the treasury [my emphasis], for a voyage of such length, and what the soldiers or traders took with them for the purpose of exchange—it would have been found that many talents in all were being taken out of the city.

Here, Thucydides opposes the public expenditure of the state on the expedition to the private expenses of individuals setting out on the campaign, and, in the description of the

148 Note that the humor in these lines lies in the incongruity between the flimsiness of the imagined motivation for going to war and the large scale of preparations undertaken at Athens before the embarkation of a typical expedition from the city. Aristophanes thus does not need to exaggerate here in his description of the arrangements made before a typical expedition overseas.

149 Thucydides here is referring strictly to the rowers of the fleet, rather than the crews of the triremes as a whole: see Morrison (1984) 50.
latter, the pay provided by the state ("τοῦ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθοῦ") is set aside from private expenses, as it naturally forms part of the public expenditure. I make this obvious point because it raises another crucial one that I am trying to make, that is that both forms of expense—including pay provided by the state to those setting out on the campaign—are counted among the many talents being taken out of the city, i.e. the money already expended by the state before the launch of the expedition. The μισθός given out, i.e. paid to all the members of the expedition before its embarkation, at 6.31.5 must surely include the drachma per day mentioned as paid to each rower at 6.31.3. Thus, the Athenian state paid its rowers μισθός in advance before the Sicilian expedition (and in full).\(^{150}\) The arrangements made for the payment of the members of the Sicilian expedition are especially significant in that they represent the payment methods of the Athenian state when polis finances were healthy\(^{151}\) and when there were no other military theaters or campaigns competing for state expenditure. The payment of μισθός in advance and in full therefore represented normal practice at Athens in the late fifth century.\(^{152}\)

One more Thucydidean passage provides explicit information on Athenian methods of disbursing pay in the late fifth century: 7.27.2.\(^{153}\) In the summer of 413,

\(^{150}\) There is no hint at 6.31.3 or 6.31.5 of any pay being withheld at Athens, or of installment of pay of any kind. Furthermore, if the one drachma per day rate attested here was only the first installment of a μισθὸς ἐντελής, the rate of pay given to the sailors on the Sicilian expedition would be substantially, and implausibly, higher than any other attested rate of pay at Athens in the fifth (or fourth) centuries.

\(^{151}\) See esp. Thucy. 6.26.2 for this point.

\(^{152}\) Cf. van Wees (2004) 308 and n.40 for the Sicilian expedition representing “normal practice” in the recruiting of \(\text{thêtes}\) as marines for the expedition’s triremes.

\(^{153}\) “οἱ δὲ Αθηναῖοι, ὡς ὑστερον ἦκαν, διενοοῦντο αὐτοὺς πάλιν ὤθεν ἠλθον ἐς Θρᾴκην ἀποτέμπειν. τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας πόλημον αὐτοὺς πολυτέλεις ἀφαίνετο· ἀλλὰ τῆς ἡμέρας ἔκαστος ἠλάμβανεν”; “[s]ince they [i.e., the Thracian peltasts] had come too late, the Athenians determined to send
thirteen hundred Thracian peltasts arrived in Athens in order to sail with Demosthenes to Sicily to reinforce the Athenian expedition there (7.27.1). Having reached Athens too late to join with Demosthenes, the Athenians decided to send the Thracians home, as they were receiving a drachma per day, and therefore to keep them seemed too expensive ("πολυτελὲς") in light of the Decelean War (7.27.2). As noted above, Thucydides’ use of the imperfect ("ἐλάμβανεν") to describe the Thracians’ receipt of their pay shows that each of them had been actually drawing their full pay of one drachma per day in Athens, before their dispatch abroad.\(^{154}\) Thus, again, we have evidence of late fifth century Athenian practice of disbursing military pay in advance of service (and in full).\(^{155}\)

Epigraphical evidence also shows that \(\mu\ισθός\) was also disbursed to Athenian sailors in the fifth century in advance of service. \textit{IG I\textsuperscript{3} 364.12, 23} show that the full amount of money disbursed by the treasury of Athena (and thus the \textit{polis} of Athens) for the pay of the thirty triremes sent out to Corcyra by the Athenians in the summer of 433/2 was disbursed before those triremes set out for Corcyra.\(^{156}\) Although the fact that the money for the pay of the triremes was disbursed to the generals of the expedition before the triremes left Athens does not necessarily mean that the generals disbursed this money back to Thrace, from where they had come; to keep them, in view of the Dekeleian war, seemed too expensive, for each of them was being paid a drachma a day.” See again Hornblower, \textit{CT} iii.589 for the translation of “\(πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς ∆εκελείας πόλεµον\)” here.

\(^{154}\) See again chapter 5 section ii with Loomis (1998) 44.

\(^{155}\) See p.420 n.150 above for the great improbability of a rate of pay of an Attic drachma per man per day comprising only the first installment of a supposed \(\mu\ισθός ἐντελῆς\).

\(^{156}\) See the full discussion of this inscription at chapter v section iv: note esp. again that the transfers from the treasury of Athena almost certainly reflect the full expenditures made by the Athenian \textit{polis} for the Corcyra campaign.
as pay to the trireme crews before they set out for Corecyra, this would seem to be the natural inference from the inscription. It should be noted here, too, that there are no disbursements listed from the treasury of Athena for the thirty triremes after they had returned from Corecyra: there was therefore no pay being withheld at Athens for these triremes; in other words, they were being paid in full during their term of service.

Peloponnesian fleets in the late fifth and early fourth centuries were also (meant to be) paid in advance. This can be seen from three passages in Xenophon’s *Hellenica*. At 1.5.7, Xenophon tells us that in 406 Cyrus (who had brought five hundred talents with him to Ionia (*Hell. 1.5.3*)) settled all the arrears owed by the Persians to the Peloponnesian sailors and in addition gave them a month’s *μισθός* in advance; in the winter of 406/405, Eteonicus the Spartan, having extorted money from the Chians (*Hell. 2.1.5*), paid his sailors a month’s *μισθός* before setting out from Chios; in 389, Teleutias, in command of the Peloponnesian fleet, took much booty from Athens and sold it at Aegina, and paid his sailors a month’s *μισθός* in advance (*Hell. 5.1.24*). If Xenophon mentions each of these payments of *μισθός* in advance as notable occurrences, this was not because *μισθός* was not meant to be paid in advance, but because, due to the poor financial situation of the Spartans (Peloponnesians) throughout these years, *μισθός* was rarely paid in advance, and sometimes not at all to their trireme crews.\(^{157}\) But when the paymasters of Peloponnesian triremes did have sufficient money, their rowers received their *μισθός* in advance.

\(^{157}\) Each of the payments in advance noted here came after (lengthy) periods during which Peloponnesian crews were paid badly or not at all: see Xen., *Hell. 1.5.1-6* (and on the poor payment record of the King generally, *Hell. Oxy. 19.2*); Xen., *Hell. 2.1.1-5*; and Xen., *Hell. 5.1.14-17*. 
The Ten Thousand were also paid their μισθός, or were promised to be paid their μισθός, in advance of any service. Thus, at Xen., Anab. 1.2.11-12, at Caîstru-pedion, the army was owed more than three month’s pay by Cyrus (“καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις ὠφείλετο μισθός πλέον ἡ τριῶν μηνῶν”). On his receipt there of a large amount of money from the wife of the king of the Cilicians (at least this is how the Greeks supposed he got the money), Cyrus paid the troops at that time four month’s wages. If μισθός was usually paid at the end of a month, Cyrus would only have had to pay three months’ wages. In the summer of 400, when the mercenaries on their katabasis had reached Cotyora, Timasion the Dardanian “promised to provide the men pay from the first of the month,” “ὑπισχνοῦμαι δὲ ὑµῖν... ἀπὸ νουµηνίας µισθοφορὰν παρέξειν” and to take them to Troas, from which he was an exile (Xen., Anab. 5.6.23). Thorax the Boiotian also promised the troops pay “καθάπερ Τιµασίων” “like Timasion” (Xen., Anab. 5.6.26), and Xenophon, referring to the fact that Timasion and Thorax were promising the men μισθός from the first of the month (ἀπὸ νουµηνίας) (Xen., Anab. 5.6.31), said to the troops that “it seems to me it is a fine thing to be carried safely where we want to go and at the same time receive pay for our preservation.” Furthermore, Timasion and Thorax initially requested this μισθός from the Heracleots and Sinopeans (through the mediation of some merchants from those cities) so that the soldiers would have provisions for the voyage.


159 Xen., Anab. 5.6.31: “καλόν µοι δοκεῖ εἶναι συγκοµιδῆς ἐξ ὑµῶν βουλόµεθα µισθὸν τῆς σωτηρίας λαµβάνειν...” Griffith translated “ἀπὸ νουµηνίας” as “reckoning from the first of the month” but this is not a natural translation, and the only reason Griffith takes the phrase in this way is to provide support for his idea that μισθός was paid at the end of the month: see next note and section ix below.
from Cotyora (“Μισθὸν ὥστε ἔχειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐκπλέοντας”) (Xen., Anab. 5.6.19).  
Μισθός in the proposed (but never executed) agreement between the Heracleots and 
Sinopeans and the remnants of the Ten Thousand was to be provided, then, at the start of 
the month (for the purpose of purchasing provisions for the Cyreans’ onward voyage).

At Xen., Anab. 7.1.7, Anaxibius, the Spartan admiral, having promised the 
Cyreans that there would be pay (“Μισθοφορὰν”) if they crossed over to Byzantium (Xen., 
Anab. 7.1.3; cf. 6.1.16), did not give μισθός to the mercenaries after they had crossed 
over to the city, something which angered the Greeks, since they had no money with 
which to procure provisions for their journey from Byzantium (“ὅτι οὐκ εἶχον ἀργύριον 
ἐπισιτίζεσθαι εἰς τὴν πορείαν”).  Μισθός here again was expected before any action (and 
was meant for the purchase of provisions).  Two final instances from the Anabasis 
confirm that it was customary for Greek mercenaries in the eastern Mediterranean at the 
turn of the fifth century be paid in advance of service.  Heracleides, the agent of Seuthes, 
promised the generals of the Cyreans, as part of his machinations against Xenophon, that 
the soldiers would receive pay in full for two months (“τὸν τε Μισθὸν... ἐκπλέον... δύοῖν 
μηνοῖν”) (Xen., Anab. 7.5.9), although only a month of service had passed (Xen., Anab. 
7.5.4).  Finally, when the remnants of the Ten Thousand agreed to service under Thibron, 
two Spartan officers arrived at Ophrynium with money to give to the army before any 
campaign under Thibron had begun (Xen., Anab. 7.8.6).

160 Griffith ([1935] 266) realized that Xen., Anab. 5.6.19 provided insuperable problems for his thesis that 
the μισθός of mercenaries was (a second part of) pay given at the end of a month’s service and resorted to 
translating μισθὸν here as “bribe,” for which there are no grounds and no parallels in the Anabasis.

161 See Marinovic (1988) 162 on Xen., Anab. 5.6.23 and 7.1.7 (contra Griffith): “dans le deux cas, le mot 
misthos est utilisé quand il est question des vivres: ce qui fait penser qu’il s’agit plutôt de l’ensemble de la 
Two passages from the ps.-Aristotelian *Oeconomica* show that it continued to be usual practice in the fourth century for μισθός to be paid in advance of military (or naval) service. The *polis* of Heraclea Pontica advanced two months’ μισθός to a fleet of triremes sailing against the tyrants of Bosporus at some unknown point in the fourth century (2.2.8, 1347b9-10);¹⁶² and it emerges from 2.2.29d, 1351b16-19 that Memnon normally paid his mercenaries at the beginning of the month (at some point in the 340s or 330s), and from 2.2.39, 1353b1-7 that Cleomenes also normally distributed μισθός at the beginning of the month (at some point between 331 and 323).¹⁶³

Payment of μισθός was (meant to be) paid in (full) monthly installments in advance of each month’s military and naval service throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. This finds confirmation in all our sources dealing with the disbursement of pay to classical Greek sailors and soldiers. Thucydides at 8.29.1-2 takes it for granted that pay would not only be reckoned on a monthly basis but would also be paid in monthly installments.¹⁶⁴ Xenophon mentions only the month as the period for which pay was given (or offered) or by which it was calculated.¹⁶⁵ Apollodorus, during his service as

¹⁶² This is not the unusual or clever feature of the Heracleots’ financial stratagem: see chapter 2 section iii.

¹⁶³ At 2.2.39, the author of the *Oeconomica* equates μισθός with σιταρχία; thus, while σιταρχία is spoken of at 2.2.29d, it is accurate to translate this as ‘pay,’ rather than ration-allowance. In both of these anecdotes, it is the deviation from payment at the beginning of the month that marks out the respective payment measures as exceptional.

¹⁶⁴ See Andrewes, *HCT* v.70 ad 8.29.1: “… Thucydides writes here as in sect. 2 (later passages on pay are not specific) as if the money were not only calculated on a monthly basis but given as a lump sum for the month.” See also Lapini, (2002) 25 n.4 ad Thucy. 8.29.1: “[i]l mese funzionava come unità fiscale; in 5.47.6, sede del testo del trattato a quattro, si legge che la città che ne chiamerà un’altra alleata sul suo territorio dovrà fornire il σῖτος per 30 giorni dopo l’intervento, e la stessa cosa dovrà accadere per il viaggio di ritorno.” See also Thucy. 6.8.1 for triremes’ pay being calculated on a monthly basis.

¹⁶⁵ Burrer (2008) 78.
trierarch, paid his men a lump sum of (monthly) pay each month ([Dem.] 50.10, 25). At Dem. 4.28-29, pay (σιτηρέσιον) is calculated on a monthly basis and proposed as being paid in monthly installments. At Polyaeus, Strateg. 3.9.51, Iphicrates pays his men every month in monthly installments. Finally, in all of the financial stratagems concerning the pay of military and naval forces in the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica, pay is always calculated and paid (as a lump sum for the month) on a monthly basis.

ix. The relationship between μισθός and τροφή in the fifth and fourth centuries

As noted above, μισθός and τροφή were used synonymously for the pay of Greek military and naval forces in the fifth century. These terms could be used interchangeably since both described rewards for services and both were used to support or maintain payees. As Gabrielsen notes of the usage of μισθός, τροφή, and the related term σῖτος,

[t]he general tendency to make free usage of these terms when referring to the same payment... may be in agreement with the indisputable fact that misthós’ (sic) functional significance was first and foremost to ensure one’s living, as did the payments termed trofē (sic) and sitos, and that, regardless of their specific name, all three were generally received or given in return for a service.

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166 Ballin ([1978] 188) and Burrel ([2008] 78) take [Dem.] 50.53 to show that σιτηρέσιον could sometimes, and even usually, be paid daily. But σιτηρέσιον was disbursed daily in this instance (exceptionally) because the rowers were being paid during a voyage home which, under normal circumstances, took less than a month.

167 See chapter 5 section i; note also, e.g., Aristoph., Birds 1367 (first produced at the City Dionysia in 414): Peisetairos tells a young man looking for wings: “φρούρει, στρατεύου, µισθοφορῶν σαυτὸν τρέφε.”

168 (1981) 73-74. Gabrielsen is here, in fact, describing the usage of these terms in the fourth century, but the considerations expressed here are equally valid for the fifth century.

169 Cf. again Loomis (1998) 34: τροφή having “the narrower meaning of ‘food’” as well as “the broader meaning of ‘means of support.’”
In the fourth century, Greek terminology for military and naval pay changed as the conditions of military and naval service changed.\textsuperscript{170} Some scholars, relying on passages such as Dem. 4.28-29, have argued that in the fourth century a permanent distinction came to be made between \( \muισθός \), pay as such, and \( \tauροφή \), ration-money, in contrast to fifth and early fourth century usage.\textsuperscript{171} This is incorrect; a distinction was sometimes made in the fourth century between \( \muισθός \) and \( \tauροφή \) (and \( σῖτος \)), but such usage was limited to specific contexts. I will quote Gabrielsen again on this subject:

Although the examples in which the terms [\( \muισθός \) and \( \tauροφή \)] are used synonymously are by far the most numerous, we can occasionally point at single instances where there seems to be a distinction. But a thorough analysis of the instances has shown that the distinction between \( \text{misthós} \) (sic) on the one hand and \( \text{trophē} \) (sic) and \( \text{sitos} \) (sic) on the other can be drawn (1) whenever two payments are to be differentiated as being either monetary payments or payments in kind – which are most properly expressed respectively by \( \text{misthós} \) and \( \text{trophē/sitos} \) – or (2) whenever \( \text{trophē/sitos} \) refer to sums that constitute merely a portion of a larger sum, \( \text{misthós} \).\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{170} Xen., \textit{Anab.} 6.2.4 has been taken as the first attestation of \( σιτηρέσιον \) as a subsistence payment for military forces distinct from \( \muισθός \) (Griffith [1935] 268, Pritchett [1971] 6, Burrer [2008] 75 and n.18). But \( σιτηρέσιον \) in this passage simply means the money (which according to Lycon to Achaean) the Cyreans should demand (in the absence of any other source of funds) to purchase provisions from the Heracleots in the absence of any other means of acquiring provisions: see Marinovic (1988) 162. Also, Cook [1990] 79 took Xen., \textit{Hell.} 5.1.13-24 as evidence that a distinction between \( \muισθός \) and payments for subsistence had developed by 389: but Xen., \textit{Hell.} 5.1.17 clearly shows that provisions were still at this date to be bought from the (sole) payment of \( \muισθός \) (and not any specific payment for subsistence).

\textsuperscript{171} Pritchett (1971) 3-6, Cook (1990) 78 (although see pp.428-429 nn.174-175 below). Compare Loomis (1998) 52-53: “[Dem. 4.28] shows that \( τροφή \) now was (at least in this instance) the equivalent of \( σιτηρέσιον \) rather than \( \muισθός \).”

\textsuperscript{172} (1981) 71-72; see (1981) 70-76, 151-155 for full documentation of and supporting argumentation for the conclusions quoted here. See again Gabrielsen’s comments above on the reasons for the (frequent) synonymity of \( \muισθός \) and \( \tauροφή \) (and \( σῖτος \)) in the fifth and fourth centuries. Cf. Marinovic (1988) 167, Anderson (1970) 54 on the ‘lack of precision’ in the usage of these terms in the fourth century.
The usage we find in the *First Philippic* at 4.23 and 4.28-29 is, then, an example of the second type of distinction described by Gabrielsen.\(^{173}\) This distinction in the fourth century between \(\mu\iota\sigma\xi\omicron\sigma\zeta\) and \(\tau\rho\omicron\varphi\iota\) arose as a response to financial difficulties on the part of Greek *poleis*:\(^{174}\) as in Dem. 4 and [Dem.] 50, fourth-century Greek city-states paid (or proposed to pay) \(\tau\rho\omicron\varphi\iota\) (\(=\ \sigma\iota\tau\rho\varphi\epsilon\sigma\iota\omicron\nu\)) since it was “absolutely essential” to the “immediate situation,” (i.e. for the immediate subsistence needs of men on military service,) whereas \(\mu\iota\sigma\xi\omicron\sigma\zeta\), although expected to paid together with \(\sigma\iota\tau\rho\varphi\epsilon\sigma\iota\omicron\nu\) before service, “might be promised for [or delayed to] the future.”\(^{175}\)

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\(^{173}\) Cf. Trundle (2004) 88-89 on 4.28 (and [Dem.] 50.10): “[a]ll this would suggest that *sitêresion* could be considered as part, but not all, of a full wage paid to sailors and mercenaries in the mid-fourth century BC.”

\(^{174}\) See section vii above and Cook (1990) 79. The idea that a permanent distinction between \(\mu\iota\sigma\xi\omicron\sigma\zeta\) and \(\tau\rho\omicron\varphi\iota\) developed in the fourth century was formulated by Pritchett: “[i]n military economics, the concept of any pay except for sustenance was primarily a development of the period after the Peloponnesian war and of mercenary service” ([1971] 27; cf. [1971] 40-41). In Pritchett’s view, the citizen-soldiers of the fifth century and the Peloponnesian War could be satisfied with ration-money only, while the rise of “professional soldiering” in the fourth century meant that pay had to be added to ration-money in order to attract mercenaries to military service, in the absence of any other motivation for them to serve ([1971] 27-29). Pritchett’s views, however, were based on incorrect assumption and argumentation, as well as a misunderstanding of the role played by mercenaries in the wars the fifth and fourth century Greek world. To deal with the first of these: as I have shown, there is no foundation for Pritchett’s argument that \(\mu\iota\sigma\xi\omicron\sigma\zeta\) and \(\tau\rho\omicron\varphi\iota\) were paid in the fifth century solely to cover the purchase of rations and therefore no reason to think that any military or naval payment above subsistence represented an innovation of the fourth century (see chapter 4 section iv and chapter 5 sections i, ii, iv). Secondly, the employment of large numbers of mercenaries by Greek *poleis* was not a phenomenon that originated in the fourth century: large numbers of troops were hired and employed by Greek city-states in fifth century; in fact, there is no reason to think that there were any more mercenaries employed in the fourth century than there were in the fifth (see van Wees [2004] 41-42, 73-74). Thus, there is no reason to think that remuneration for military or naval service in the fourth century changed, either in its nature or amount, to reflect new sources of military manpower: Pritchett was simply incorrect on this point.

\(^{175}\) Cook (1990) 79; see also Cook (1990) 79 n.40 making this point against Pritchett. Cook is correct on this point despite the fact that she is contradicting herself, since earlier in her article ([1990] 78), she followed Pritchett on seeing pay in the fifth century as being distributed “primarily for rations,” and later in the same article ([1990] 80), summarizing her argument, stated that “in the fifth and early fourth century, \(\mu\iota\sigma\xi\omicron\sigma\zeta\) might mean pay, ration money, or a combination of both.”
Finally, the fact that the terms \( \muισθός \), \( \tauροφή \), and \( σίτος \) could be used interchangeably in the fifth century means that Griffith’s thesis on the nature of pay given to mercenaries (as well as citizens) in the fifth century fails. Almost certainly influenced by the clear distinction that existed in the Hellenistic period between ration-money and money for pay proper,\(^{176}\) he posited: 1) that both \( σίτος \)—rations of food provided by the state, and called by various Greek terms (e.g., \( σιτηρέσιον \), \( σιτία \), \( σιταρχία \), \( ἐπιτήδεια \)—and \( \muισθός \)—payment in money, pay proper—existed in fifth and fourth century armies at the same time; and 2) that this was because rations in food, or, at least, money for rations, were given at the start of a campaign, since they “are something without which a soldier cannot begin to fight,” whereas pay proper (\( \muισθός \)) was given at the end of the campaign, in return for work done, “like any other wages or salary.”\(^{177}\) But, as we have seen, fifth century mercenary and citizen soldiers only received one payment for their service: payments of \( \muισθός \) were (meant to be) always paid in advance of military and naval expeditions; and, in addition, there is simply no evidence of a system of dual payments for military and naval service in the fifth century.\(^{178}\)

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\(^{176}\) See Cook (1990) 78 n.39.


\(^{178}\) See already Cook (1978) 78 n.39 (with the criticisms noted at n.175 above), and esp. on the difficulties that Thucy. 5.47.6 (where a sole payment of \( σίτος \) is mentioned) posed for Griffith’s thesis, difficulties which Griffith acknowledged he was unable to resolve. Griffith’s evidence for his first proposition on the nature of pay for classical Greek military forces consisted primarily of three Aristophanic passages: *Acharnians* 197, *Wasps* 243, and *Peace* 311 ([1935] 264 n.2, 265). Each of these passages refers to the Athenian practice of ordering citizen hoplites mustering for an expedition to bring three days’ provisions—\( σιτία \) (and not \( σίτος \) as Griffith ([1935] 264 n.2) has it) \( τριῶν ἡµερῶν \)—with them (see chapter 3 section ii for discussion of this practice). Other Aristophanic passages, however, show that these provisions were not given to the hoplites by the state as rations in kind, or in the form of ration-money, but were expected either to be bought by the hoplite from his own money (*Peace*, 368, 1182) or to be provided out of the resources
The general synonymity between the terms μισθός, τροφή, and σῖτος in the fourth century, too, also caused insuperable problems for Griffith’s treatment of pay in that century. Furthermore, the fourth-century usage of μισθὸς ἐντελής (i.e. a payment of both σιτηρέσιον and μισθός, σιτηρέσιον being therefore a part of μισθὸς ἐντελής) also caused intractable difficulties for Griffith’s schema, which he could only escape by circular and incorrect argumentation. Thus, having raised the correct interpretation of μισθὸς ἐντελής at Dem. 4.28-29 only to dismiss it, he continues:

the foregoing pages have been based on evidence showing σιταρχία (= σιτηρέσιον) and μισθός as two perfectly distinct payments to soldiers on campaign: is the issue to be obscured now by these words of Demosthenes? To speak impartially, there is at least no need for the obscurity, if it is to exist. The passage can equally well be translated “the army will make make the rest for itself from the war... so as to have full pay” (i.e. it will make not merely part of its μισθός but all of it, assuming μισθός to be perfectly distinct from σιτηρέσιον). And fortunately one can quote a parallel use of this very phrase from Aristophanes (Eq. 1367): [cites passage]... Here surely the poet cannot have in mind a previously paid σιτηρέσιον as part of the μισθός: he merely means “to the sailors, when they come ashore, I will pay their full pay”—i.e. without deductions and delays.

But, as I have shown, there is no evidence showing “σιταρχία (= σιτήρεσιον) and µισθός as two perfectly distinct payments to soldiers on campaign” and the passage from *Knights* can offer no guidance on this question, as separate payments of σιτήρεσιον and µισθός did not exist yet in the fifth century.

Griffith also attempted to use the ps.-Aristotelian *Oeconomica* to provide evidence for the fourth century of his dual payment schema, but, as the careful criticisms of Marinovic demonstrated, Griffith was forced to misinterpret or invent new readings for several passages in order to get them to fit into his schema. I will only note here three separate criticisms of Griffith to underline the point that the *Oeconomica* provides no support for his thesis: the fact that Datames’ men foraged for their provisions while still receiving (or expecting to receive) µισθός does not provide evidence for the distribution of rations by Datames to his force (2.2.24a, 1350b15-30); the point of 2.2.23c, 1350b5-15 is that Timotheus’ soldiers only received rations in kind exceptionally, and that they normally bought their provisions retail; finally, the synonymity between σιταρχία and µισθός found at 2.2.39, 1353b1-7 destroys the thesis that these payments were different in kind and made at different times.

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180 (1935) 268-271.

181 (1988) 162-165. In light of these criticisms, it is puzzling to find that she concludes that Griffith’s treatment of the *Oeconomica* was “juste dans l’ensemble,” a statement that is contradicted by her own examination of Griffith’s treatment of this work.

182 See p.425 and n.163 above.

183 Timotheus provided σιταρχία in kind in addition to µισθός during operations at Corcyra (in 375) (2.2.23b, 1350a30-1350b5) but the point of the anecdote is that this was an exceptional measure: see again chapter 4 section iii on the interpretation of the evidence of the *Oeconomica*. 
no ancient support for the existence in the fifth and fourth centuries of a system of payment of rations (in kind or in money) before the beginning of a term of service, to be followed by a payment of μισθός at its end.

x. Conclusions

Classical Greek sailors and soldiers expected to receive the rates of pay promised to them (whatever they were) in full, in advance of (each month of) service (during that service), and in monthly installments. They never expected that half (or any part) of their pay would be withheld by their employer until the completion of a voyage, campaign, or term of service. In the fourth century, as a result of the weakness of its public finances (compared to its military ambitions), the Athenian state often could provide to their sailors (and soldiers) only enough money to cover their immediate subsistence needs—i.e., the Athenian state was often in a position to provide only a subsistence payment of σιτηρέσιον (sometimes referred to as τροφή) to the men serving on its campaigns. Thus, in some discussions and descriptions of military pay in mid-fourth-century Athens, the term μισθός (in order to reflect the changed conditions of military and naval pay) came to take on the more limited meaning of ´pay as such,’ i.e. the amount of money that the Athenian state now had great difficulty in paying, but that together with his τροφή (=σιτηρέσιον) made up a sailor’s (and soldier’s) expected full remuneration for service. In these contexts, the term μισθός ἐντελής was now used to denote this expected full remuneration for military service; i.e., μισθός ἐντελής now came to denote the payment of both τροφή (=σιτηρέσιον) and μισθός. And although the payment of μισθός ἐντελής in the mid- and late fourth century seemed to have been more often something to be aspired
to rather than common practice (both at Athens and elsewhere, as the passage from Arrian’s *Anabasis* demonstrates), the details of Demosthenes’ plan in the *First Philippic* and Apollodorus’ description of the travails of his rowers in the *Against Polycles* show that it was still considered ‘best practice’ at Athens at this time to give sailors their µισθὸς ἐντελῆς on campaign; i.e., µισθὸς ἐντελῆς was still presented in public discourse as a sailor’s (or soldier’s) full pay, that was expected to be paid punctually and up front to him while he was serving on campaign;¹⁸⁴ thus, µισθὸς ἐντελῆς had essentially the same meaning as it had in earlier and more general contexts. But although the term now came to denote in the contexts just discussed the sum of two payments, it never, at any point, came to mean or imply the disbursement of naval pay in two equal installments, one on active service abroad, and one on return to the Piraeus.

Demonstrating these points has necessitated a full refutation of the scholarly consensus on the meaning of µισθὸς ἐντελῆς and a full argumentation for the interpretation of µισθὸς ἐντελῆς found here (since it is radically different from the conventional one). This refutation and argumentation has been necessary in an investigation of the behavior of military markets in the classical Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries since establishing the fact that a failure to pay µισθὸς ἐντελῆς at Athens and elsewhere in the fifth and fourth centuries meant simply to leave men short while on campaign of the full µισθὸς they were expecting to be paid punctually and on

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Loomis (1998) 60 taking Dem. 4.28-29 to show that µισθὸς ἐντελῆς was normally paid to men participating in military expeditions by the Athenian state at this time. It could be objected here that Polycles’ attack on Apollodorus for giving his hyperesia and epibatai “µισθοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ ἐντελοῦς” ([Dem. 50.35] might imply that the payment of µισθὸς ἐντελῆς by triarchs to any members of their crews at this time was unusual, but Polycles’ words in this passage are part of a transparently tendentious attack, and even if they had a ring of plausibility, they do not imply that µισθὸς ἐντελῆς was rarely paid to hyperesiai and epibatai, but only the obvious point that µισθὸς ἐντελῆς was pay above subsistence rates.
campaign allows us to ascertain how much and when men were paid on campaign, and thus to estimate the amount of cash that was available to be spent in military markets, and therefore the levels of effective demand in these markets. In other words, the rates of pay we find mentioned in our literary sources provide us (unless those sources indicate otherwise) with evidence for the full amount of pay that classical Greek sailors and soldiers had to spend in the markets provided to them.

One final point. The amount of pay classical Greek sailors and soldiers were paid by their employers did not necessarily represent all the cash that all those sailors and soldiers had available to spend during their campaigns and services. Firstly, rowers and members of hyperesiai often received bonuses and advance payments as part of their recruitment. The Anabasis shows that a bonus paid on recruitment seems to have been part of the standard terms of recruitment of mercenaries in the eastern Mediterranean at the turn of the fifth century: Xenophon remarked specifically on the fact that Seuthes did not pay such a bonus (Xen., Anab. 7.7.25), and the Spartans paid one later to the troops (Xen., Anab. 7.8.6). Demand for mercenaries could also mean the payment of special donatives in addition of pay. Secondly, it seems to have been common practice

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185 See Gabrielsen (1994) 121-122 and, e.g., p.400, pp.403-405 above on [Dem.] 50.7, 12. This practice was not confined to Athens: see, e.g., pp.406-407 above on [Dem.] 50.14.

186 Roy (1967) 312 and n.98.

187 Though we do not hear of any such bonus given by Cyrus to the mercenaries he recruited, this may simply be a consequence of the fact that their contract with Cyrus started before the march, and therefore before Xenophon’s detailed narrative, and also because it could be taken for granted as standard practice. See Roy (1967) 316: “... mercenary service of this nature had been practised long enough to have developed certain institutional features;” and (1967) 323: “by 401 B.C. ... the term of service had been standardized...”

188 See again chapter 5 section iii.
in Athens (at least) during this period for sailors and soldiers to bring money to spend, in addition to \( \mu\iota\sigma\theta\o\varsigma \), for campaigns, both long and short. This practice must have grown out of long experience of the inability of the Athenian state to deliver pay regularly and in full. Thus, as already noted, Thucydides, reckoning the amount of money that left Athens as part of the Sicilian expedition, includes (6.31.5): “the money we may suppose that everyone, even apart from the pay he received from the state, provided for himself as traveling expenses, counting upon an expedition of long duration...” But even for an expedition just across the border for a campaign that could be expected to be relatively short, it was usual to bring along money for traveling expenses. So a wealthy Athenian citizen named Mantitheus thought that well-off men in Athens should give money to those “\( \epsilon\varphi\omega\delta\iota\iota\nu\; \delta\varepsilon\; \alpha\pi\omicron\rho\omicron\omicron\upsilon\nu\tau\alpha\varsigma \),” “lacking means for expenses of service” for the campaign in relief of Haliartus in 395, and himself gave thirty drachmae each to two men (Lys. 16.14). Demosthenes claimed that the Athenian overland expedition to Thermopylae in 352 cost more than two hundred talents, “\( \alpha\nu\; \lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\iota\sigma\nu\sigma\theta\varepsilon\; \tau\acute{a}\; \iota\delta\iota\iota\varsigma\; \delta\alpha\pi\alpha\nu\varsigma\alpha\varsigma\; \tau\acute{a}\; \tau\omicron\eta\nu\; \sigma\tau\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\nu\sigma\sigma\alpha\mu\acute{e}\nu\nu \),” “if you include the private expenses of those campaigning” (Dem. 19.84). Xenophon may have been referring to similar undertakings at Xen., Anab. 6.4.8 when he writes that some of the members of the Ten Thousand had brought other men with them, and some of them had even spent money of their own on the enterprise.

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189 See Cook (1990) 75-76.

190 “... \( \dot{\alpha} \; \epsilon\iota\kappa\o\varsigma\; \acute{\eta} \; k\acute{a}i \; \acute{\alpha}n\acute{e}n\; \tau\omicron\eta\; \acute{\epsilon}k\; \delta\eta\mu\omicron\omicron\omicron\upsilon\nu\; \mu\iota\sigma\theta\o\varsigma\; \pi\acute{a}\tau\acute{a}\; \tau\iota\nu\; \pi\alpha\rho\alpha\sigma\kappa\epsilon\nu\sigma\sigma\alpha\sigma\theta\omicron\varsigma\; \epsilon\varphi\delta\iota\iota\nu\; \acute{\omicron}\; \epsilon\pi\iota\; \chi\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\upsilon\nu\; \sigma\tau\eta\tau\epsilon\tau\iota\alpha \) ...”

addition to their basic pay, then, classical Greek sailors and soldiers may sometimes or often have had other sources of funds to spend in the markets provided to them—but most probably not too often or too much, given the evidence of the frequent military crises brought about the failure of classical Greek military employers to pay their forces properly.\textsuperscript{192}

\textsuperscript{192} See again the concluding remarks to chapter 5.
Chapter 7: The Administration and Functioning of Markets used by Classical Greek Military Forces

i. Introduction

In this chapter, I aim to situate the markets used by classical Greek forces in what we already know of the institutions and practices of Greek economies in order to show that these markets functioned effectively. I will begin by discussing the legal and institutional framework in which classical Greek sailors and soldiers made their purchases (and sold their plunder). I will demonstrate that the agorai provided by poleis to Greek military forces and those supplied by traders accompanying or traveling to armies, navies, and amphibious forces were overseen by the same officials and worked under the same legal mechanisms as other agorai organized by Greek poleis (showing this to be true for the agorai located in the camps and bases of classical Greek military forces will necessitate a lengthy analysis of a speech given by Xenophon to the assembled Cyreans at Cotyora in the summer of 400). After analyzing the institutions and legal mechanisms underlying market exchanges between traders and classical Greek sailors and soldiers, I will reconstruct the behavior of markets provided by classical Greek poleis to passing military forces, the markets supplied by traders accompanying Greek overland expeditions, and those supplied by traders sailing to the camps of amphibious forces besieging cities and the operational bases of trireme fleets. I will show that while the high costs of overland transport restricted the traders following classical Greek armies to selling high value per unit of weight goods to soldiers (and purchasing booty from them) (and also restricted the frequency of sieges of inland poleis in the Greek world), the same high costs together with the institutional and political structures of Greek poleis had the effect that the markets provided by inland poleis to
passing armies were normally capable of feeding those armies; on the other hand, the constant demand and high purchasing power in the camps of amphibious forces besieging poleis and the bases of trireme fleets encouraged traders to sail to them and ensured that the agorai in those camps and bases would usually be sufficiently supplied. I will conclude by considering briefly what the markets used by classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces can tell us about the structure of classical Greek economies.

ii. The legal and institutional framework of markets provided by poleis and traders to classical Greek military forces

a. Markets provided by friendly or neutral poleis to passing armies, navies, and amphibious expeditions

This subject has already been well treated by Descat. He demonstrated that, while it has sometimes been thought that the agorai established by poleis for passing armies, navies, and amphibious forces were in some way ‘special’ because of their location and temporary nature, the granting of temporary markets by cities to groups of foreigners was a common practice in the Greek world. Classical (and Hellenistic) poleis, in general, strictly controlled the rights of foreigners to purchase and sell in their territories; the authorization and organization by poleis of markets for passing military forces were simply another expression of the desire of Greek states to control trade (with

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3 Cf. p.478 below for the granting of export licenses by Greek cities.
foreigners) within their jurisdictions. The granting of temporary agorai by Greek states was not restricted to passing armies and navies, then, but could be extended to any transient group of non-citizens. Temporary agorai were, for example, also commonly authorized and established by poleis for the crowds of foreigners who traveled to attend festivals within their territories. It is true that markets for military forces were often set up by Greek cities outside their city walls, but this is easily explained by the desire of polis authorities not to have thousands of armed foreigners milling around within their towns, and does not imply that the institutional basis of these markets was in any way unusual. In sum, “Il faut reconnaître que l’armée est intégrée dans les formes normales de rapport avec les étrangers mais qu’elle en constitue souvent la forme limite pour des raisons évidentes de masse d’hommes et de sécurité dans la ville.”

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4 Descat (1995a) 106: “[I]l fait donc d’accorder le droit d’agora n’est pas spécifique à ce qui serait une agora militaire dont le concept n’existe pas.”

5 See Descat (1993) 153 for two examples of the granting of agorai by Greek states to groups of foreigners.


7 See Xen., Anab. 7.1.7ff., Diod. 15.46.2 for the potential of disorder and danger consequent on the reception by poleis of armed forces. Cf. McKechnie (1989) 182 commenting on Plato, Laws 952D-953A: “[a] practical formula for avoiding the influence of traders without isolating the city from the benefits of trade is given in Book XI [of Plato’s Laws]: traders are to be received in markets, harbours and a public building outside the city.”

8 Descat (1995a) 106.
Although there is no explicit evidence for the administrative framework of the temporary agorai provided by poleis to passing military forces, the fact that these agorai were set up and operated by the polis in whose jurisdiction they were located, together with the facts that poleis organizing temporary markets for the duration of festivals designated agoranomoi to supervise those markets, and that these agoranomoi had the same duties and powers as agoranomoi overseeing polis markets, means that it is almost certain that classical Greek poleis appointed market magistrates to oversee the agorai they organized for passing military forces.

Finally, armies, navies, and amphibious forces passing by friendly (or neutral) poleis were often received within the walls of those poleis and permitted to purchase supplies in their civic agorai. Thus, in the fall of 400, the Cyreans were received within the city walls of Byzantium and bought their provisions in the ‘normal’ polis market there. The fact that, in Italy and Sicily in the late summer of 415, the provision of a

9 Descat (ibid.) was incorrect to state that the agoranomoi mentioned at Xen., Anab. 5.7.23 were Cerasuntians overseeing a market provided by the polis of Cerasus: see section iib.

10 Cf. Xen., Anab. 6.2.8; Stanley (1976) 117. Tänzer ([1912] 27-28) incorrectly treated temporary agorai set up by poleis outside their city walls as opened and operated by the passing military force.

11 Chandezon (2000a) 79. Although the first attested polis-appointed agoranomos overseeing a festival agora dates to the third century (Jyllion 3) (see de Ligt [1993] 42), this is a function of the fact that the epigraphical record for the Greek world (outside Athens), and Asia Minor in particular, is much richer in the third century than in the classical period. In addition, continuity between classical and Hellenistic polis institutions can normally be assumed: see Migeotte (1995) 8-9, 23 on classical and Hellenistic poleis sharing “les mêmes cadres institutionnels”; and id. (2002) 8 on the “longues continuités dans les conditions, les pratiques et les attitudes économiques” between classical and later Greek economies.

12 Chandezon (2000a) 80-85, and esp. 80: “[l]es fonctions des agoranes de panégyries étaient semblables à celles de leurs collègues qui exerçaient sur l’agora civique.”

13 See chapter 3 section iiiia.
market to a passing military force by a *polis* outside its city walls, together with a simultaneous refusal by that *polis* to receive the force within its *astu*, could be used by *poleis* in order to indicate their neutrality toward military forces, demonstrates that military forces could normally expect to be received within city walls and use *polis* markets.\(^\text{14}\) The Spartan attempt to enter Corcyra by trickery in 373 attempted to exploit the fact that passing naval forces could normally expected to be received by *poleis* (and thus be in a position to purchase in their civic *agorai*) (Diod. 15.46.2). Obviously, in all of those cases where passing military forces were permitted to purchase provisions in the civic *agorai* of *poleis*, they were purchasing within the same legal and institutional frameworks that governed all market exchanges (at a retail level) in the Greek world

b. Traveling markets and *agoranomoi*\(^\text{15}\)

The exchanges between traders and soldiers in the markets in the camps and operational bases of classical Greek military forces were also supervised by *agoranomoi*. Demonstrating this will require a lengthy analysis of a speech given by Xenophon to the Ten Thousand at one of the halts during their *parabasis* along the southern Black Sea coast.

When the Cyreans were encamped outside the city of Cotyora in the early summer of 400, Xenophon addressed the soldiers gathered in assembly, in order to

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\(^\text{14}\) See Thucy. 6.44.2, 6.50.1 and chapter 1 section iiiia. Cf. Xen., *Anab.* 5.5.19 for the reception of a military force indicating friendliness to it, and for the provision of a market outside a city’s walls to a military force (without receiving it) indicating a non-hostile stance towards it.

\(^\text{15}\) All text references in this section will be to Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, unless otherwise indicated.
defend himself against accusations (see 5.6.27, 5.7.1) that he was planning to lead the men on a colonizing expedition to the land of the Phasians. Having demonstrated that he was not misleading the soldiers (i.e. that his true intentions were not to lead them to Phasis), by proving to the men that he could not hope to deceive them into traveling East, Xenophon then moved on to what he presented as a more serious matter for the assembled mercenaries: the problem of growing indiscipline in the army, and its potential (and actual) consequences. Xenophon illustrated the extent of the problem by describing to the soldiers two incidents in detail.

The first of these, described at 5.7.13-19, began with an unauthorized plundering raid by some of the Cyreans on a Colchian village near Cerasus that was friendly to the Cerasuntians and to the army. The raid had ended in disaster: the villagers repelled the attack and killed several of the mercenaries. To make matters worse, when the Colchians had sent some elders as ambassadors to Cerasus to ask the army why it had attacked their village (not knowing that the bulk of the soldiers had already left the city), some of the

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16 See 5.7.5-9 with Rood (2004) 323.

17 See 5.7.12 for the change in direction of the speech. Focusing on the violent wrongdoings of others in the army enabled Xenophon to deflect the charges against him: see Rood (2004) 323 for this point. Xenophon’s inclusion of this speech in his narrative also has a broader purpose, however, when seen in the wider context of the Anabasis and Xenophon’s oeuvre as a whole: the speech gives Xenophon the opportunity to expound at length on the importance of discipline in a community, and the related subject of the proper relations between commander and commanded, subjects that are crucial to the Anabasis and other works of Xenophon: see Nussbaum (1967) 19-22, 172-175; Dillery (1995) 81-83, 156; and esp. Rood (2004) 323-325. See also, e.g., Anab. 3.1.39, Oec. 8, Mem. 3.1.7, Cyr. 2.1.27.

18 That the village was friendly to the Cyreans can be inferred from the fact that it had engaged in trading with some of the mercenaries: see 5.7.13-14. Earlier in the march, at Trapezus, the army had resolved that any man of the army going out on a plundering raid had to inform the army that he was doing so (5.1.8). The leader of the attack on the village, Clearetus, a lochagos in the army, had not informed the army of his planned plundering raid (almost certainly because he knew that it would not be approved and because he was planning to sail away from the army with whatever booty he managed to obtain in the raid (see 5.7.15 for the latter point)) and thus the raid can be described as unauthorized.
Cyreans who had survived the raid, and who had stayed back at Cerasus after the rest of
the men had left the city, stoned to death the Colchian ambassadors to prevent news of
the raid on the village reaching the other soldiers.

The second incident Xenophon narrated in order to demonstrate to the men the
increasing lawlessness amongst them was a riot in which a crowd of men from the army
attacked some agoranomoi on account of their (allegedly) outrageous treatment of the
soldiers; in the ensuing disorder, some Cerasuntian ambassadors, as well as some of the
soldiers, came to fear for their lives and fled from the army. Based on Xenophon’s
description of their treatment, J. K. Anderson made the following statement:

[w]hen a market was provided by a friendly city instead of by travelling
merchants, regulations were likely to be made by magistrates for the benefit of
the sellers rather than by the general to protect the soldiers, as when the Ten
Thousand reached Cerasus on the Black Sea. Here the officials [he means of the
city of Cerasus, as the preceding sentence shows] narrowly escaped stoning at the
hands of the soldiers, who thought themselves cheated, and the generals were
unable to intervene.\(^1\)

Anderson’s statement was based on the understanding that the agoranomoi mentioned at
5.7.21-29 were Cerasuntian and administering a market established by the city of Cerasus
just outside or near that city. Almost every modern discussion of this incident has
similarly understood the agoranomoi in question to have been Cerasuntian and the
disorder involving them to have taken place just outside Cerasus.\(^2\) A close reading of

\(^{19}(1970)\) 52 (n.60 there cites 5.7.21-29 and Tänzer [1912] 47 for the passage just quoted: but Tänzer
simply states there without argument that 5.7.21-29 provides evidence that the agoranomoi who supervised
markets provided to classical Greek armies were appointed by the cities whose inhabitants provided the

\(^{20}\) Grote (1869) 7: 440-441, Tänzer (1912) 46-47, Nussbaum (1967) 172-173 (cf. 42-43, 104), Perlman
n.141, all take the agoranomoi to have been appointed by the Cerasuntians to supervise a market
established and administered by the city. But see p.458 n.39, p.459 n.40 below.
Xenophon’s speech shows, however, that the disturbance caused by the alleged wrongdoing of these *agoranomoi* took place just outside Cotyora, not Cerasus; that the *agoranomoi* were not Cerasuntians, but, in fact, Cyreans, members of the Ten Thousand and appointed by the Ten Thousand; and therefore that the inference made by Anderson from 5.7.21-29 regarding the usual workings of markets provided by Greek cities to passing armies is invalid. I will begin by showing that the riot took place beside Cotyora, and not just outside Cerasus.

At the start of Xenophon’s description of the attack on the *agoranomoi*, he tells the assembled mercenaries that, just before the riot, some Cerasuntians had come to the generals of the Ten Thousand to tell them of the whole Colchian ‘affair’: “ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ τοῦτο ἐγένετο, ἔρχονται πρὸς ἡµᾶς Κερασούντιοι καὶ λέγουσι τὸ πρᾶγµα...”21 After the generals had heard what had happened, and while they and the Cerasuntians were deliberating on how the bodies of the Greek dead from the attack on the Colchian village might be buried, the generals and the Cerasuntians saw a crowd of men rushing towards them, shouting “Παῖε, παῖε, βάλλε, βάλλε,” some carrying stones in their hands, and others picking stones up (5.7.20-21). The shouts of “Παῖε, παῖε, βάλλε, βάλλε” and the rush of men in the direction of the generals and the Cerasuntians marked the start of the *agoranomoi* riot, as Xenophon found out a little later from questioning some of the men

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21 5.7.20: “When this [the attack on the village and the murder of the envoys sent by the Colchians to Cerasus] had taken place, the Cerasuntians came to us and told us of the affair...” That the “ἡµᾶς” here refers to the generals of the Ten Thousand can be seen from the following clause (5.7.20): “καὶ ἡµεῖς οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀκούσαντες ἠχθόµεθά τε τοῖς γεγονόσις καὶ ἐβουλευόµεθα σὺν τοῖς Κερασούντιοις ὅπως ἄν ταφείησαν οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νεκροί” (“and we generals, upon hearing the story, were distressed at what had happened, and we proceeded to take counsel with the Cerasuntians as to how the bodies of the Greek dead might be buried”).
involved in the disturbance (5.7.23). Seeing this rush of men, the Cerasuntians, as Xenophon reports, “καὶ οἱ µὲν Κερασούντιοι, ὡς ᾧ καὶ ἑορακότες τὸ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς πρᾶγµα, δείσαντες ἀποχωροῦσι πρὸς τὰ πλοῖα” (“were naturally terrified, as they too would have witnessed the affair in their own city, and hurried back toward their ships”) (5.7.22). 22  Xenophon thus differentiates here between the location of the Cerasuntians at the start of the agoranomoi riot and their location at the time of the murder of the Colchian heralds, when they were “παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς”—in “their own place,” “their own city.” The inference resulting from this statement must be, then, that, at the time of the riot, the Cerasuntians were no longer in their own city, that they were, in fact, somewhere else other than Cerasus. This inference is confirmed by the fact that the Cerasuntians had had to sail to meet with the generals of the Ten Thousand, evidenced by the fact that the Cerasuntians had rushed back to their ships on seeing the soldiers rushing towards them with stones. If the Ten Thousand had been encamped just outside Cerasus at the time of the riot, there would have been no need for the Cerasuntians to sail to the generals of the army to inform them of the Colchian “affair”: but the Cerasuntians did have to sail to the generals, and thus the Ten Thousand could not have been encamped near the city of Cerasus when the riot broke out.

As to where the Cerasuntians had had to sail to, and where, consequently, the riot did take place, the answer to these questions lie in Xenophon’s description of the events leading up to the stoning to death of the Colchian ambassadors at Cerasus and the narrative surrounding his speech as a whole. At 5.7.17, Xenophon tells the men that the failed plundering raid on the Colchian village took place “ἐν τῇ ἡµέρᾳ ᾗ ἡµεῖς δεῦρο

22 The “affair in their own city” was the murder of the Colchian ambassadors by the rogue Cyreans.
ἐξωρµῶµεν πεζῇ· τῶν δὲ παραπλεόντων ἔτι τινὲς ἦσαν ἐν Κερασοῦντι, οὔπω ἀνηγµένοι”

(“on the day when we setting forth to come here by land; and some of those who were going by sea along the coast were still at Cerasus, not having as yet set sail”). “Here,” “δεῦρο,” is the place where Xenophon and the assembled army were when he was addressing them: the narrative preceding, and succeeding, the speech demonstrates clearly and unambiguously that this was just outside the city of Cotyora.23

Directly following this passage, at 5.7.17-18, Xenophon informs the men that the Cerasuntians had told the generals that, after the failed plundering raid on the Colchian village,

... ἀφικνοῦνται τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου τρεῖς ἄνδρες τῶν γεραιτέρων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ ἴµέτερον χρήµατας ἔλθεῖν. (18) ἐπεὶ δ' ἡµᾶς οὐ κατέλαβον, πρὸς τοὺς Κερασουντίους ἔλθειν ὃτι θαµµάζοιες τὴν ἡµῖν δόξαν ἑλθείν ἐπ' ἀυτούς. ἐπεὶ μέντοι σφεῖς λέγειν, ἔφασαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ γένοιτο τὸ πρᾶγµα, ἥδεσθαί τε αὐτοὺς καὶ µέλλειν ἐνθάδε πλεῖν, ὡς ἡµῖν λέξειν τὰ γένοµενα, καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς κελεύειν αὐτοὺς θάπτειν λαβόντας τοὺς τούτου δεοµένους.

... there arrived at Cerasus three of the inhabitants of the stronghold, all elderly men, desiring to come before our general assembly. (18) But since they did not find us, they addressed themselves to the Cerasuntians, saying that they wondered why we had seen fit to make an attack on them. When, however, the Cerasuntians replied, so their statement ran, that it was not by public authority that the affair took place, the envoys were pleased, and were intending to sail

23 At 5.5.4 (i.e. before the speech to the assembled army), Xenophon reports the arrival of the army at Cotyora (where they stayed for forty-five days: 5.5.5); at 6.1.1 (i.e. after the speech), the army was still encamped outside Cotyora. There is no indication from Xenophon’s narrative that the army as a body had moved from the city at any point in the interim; in fact, his narrative of the time between the arrival of Ten Thousand at Cotyora and his speech to the men regarding the Colchian affair and the agoranomoi riot make it clear that the army as a body did not leave Cotyora during that time (although individuals and groups of men from the army had gone into the hinterland of the city to forage (5.5.6)). After an initial undeterminable period of time (5.5.7: “ἐν τούτων”) after the army’s arrival at Cotyora, ambassadors from Sinope came to the army, encamped outside Cotyora, to discuss the fate of the Cotyorites (their colonists) and the mercenaries’ future plans. From the arrival of the Sinopean ambassadors to the point of Xenophon’s speech, Xenophon’s account of events is taken up, firstly, with speeches from Hecotonymus (a Sinopean envoy) and Xenophon that explicitly discuss and take place at Cotyora (see esp. 5.5.25; cf. 5.5.9-10, 19); secondly, with speeches and plans that have as their explicit concern the acquisition of resources to allow the mercenaries to set sail from Cotyora (see 5.6.1-10 (esp.10), 5.6.11, and esp. 5.6.19 (cf. 5.6.31); and thirdly, with an abandoned plan of Xenophon’s and then rumors concerning the establishment at Cotyora of a colony comprising the mercenaries (5.6.15-20; 5.6.36-5.7.2). Xenophon’s speech, then, was definitely given at Cotyora.
here in order to tell us what happened, and to bid those concerned to retrieve and bury the corpses.

The crucial point in this passage is when Xenophon reports that the Colchian ambassadors were planning to sail “here,” “ἐνθάδε.” Again, “here,” “ἐνθάδε,” just as “δεῦρο” at 5.7.17 above, refers to the place where Xenophon gave his speech to the men, that is, as I have just shown, somewhere just outside the city of Cotyora. Therefore, by the time of the murder of the Colchian envoys, which took place just after those envoys’ decision to sail to the army to tell it of the attack on their village (5.7.19), the Ten Thousand were already at Cotyora. Thus, when the Cerasuntians came to speak to the generals of the mercenaries about the murder of the envoys, the mercenaries were still at Cotyora. And since it was just after the Cerasuntians had come to Cotyora to speak with the generals that the disorder involving the agoranomoi occurred (see again 5.7.20-24), the agoranomoi riot therefore took place outside the city of Cotyora, and not Cerasus, as Anderson and other scholars have assumed. Since, then, the agoranomoi riot occurred just outside Cotyora, it therefore took place outside of Cerasuntian territory.

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24 Note, too, that the fact that the Colchian ambassadors were planning to sail from Cerasus to the same place where Xenophon addressed the men shows that Xenophon did not make this speech anywhere near Cerasus. In addition, the fact that, at 5.7.17, the army had set forth from Cerasus to come “here,” i.e. to the location of Xenophon’s speech, again shows that Xenophon was not addressing the men near Cerasus.

25 Since they had not moved anywhere in the time between their arrival at that city and Xenophon’s speech: see again n.23 above.

26 See Tuplin (1998) 288 correcting Lendle on this point: “[Lendle] wrongly locates the agoranomoi riot just west of Cerasus rather than at Cotyora.” Tuplin notes this in a list of miscellaneous corrections and queries in his review of Lendle, and does not make the argument that the riot took place outside Cotyora in any detail, hence the discussion here. Note, however, that since Tuplin does not specify in his list of corrections that he disagrees with Lendle on the identity of the agoranomoi, he, too, presumably believes that they were polis-appointed magistrates (from Cerasus).
and Cerasuntian jurisdiction; given these facts, there is no reason to think that the
agoranomoi involved in the disturbances with the army were from the city of Cerasus.

In fact, a close reading of Xenophon’s entire description of the riot and its
aftermath, brief as it is, demonstrates conclusively that the agoranomoi in question were
not Cerasuntian. As already mentioned, while the generals of the Ten Thousand were in
deliberations with the Cerasuntians, they had heard a great uproar, and shouts of “Παῖε,
paîe, βάλλε, βάλλε,” and seen a large number of men running towards them with stones,
and others picking up stones (5.7.21). The Cerasuntians were terrified, and even some of
the generals were terrified (5.7.22). But when Xenophon went up to the men and asked
what the trouble was about, he found out eventually that the shouts and stones were not
directed against the generals and the Cerasuntians, but against the agoranomoi, who were
supposedly treating the army outrageously (5.7.23). Then Xenophon tells us (5.7.24-25):

ἐν τούτῳ τις ὁρᾷ τὸν ἀγορανόµον Ζήλαρχον πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν ἀποχωροῦντα,
καὶ ἀνέκραγεν· οἱ δὲ ώς ἤκουσαν, ὥσπερ ἢ συὸς ἀγρίου ἢ ἐλάφου φανέντως ἔγουν ἐπὶ αὐτὸν. (25) οἱ δ’ αὖ Κερασούντιοι ώς εἶδον ὁµοίωτας καὶ αὐτοῖς, σαιρὸς
νοµίζοντες ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἰσχύει, φεύγουσι δρόμῳ καὶ ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τὴν θάλατταν.

At this moment someone saw the agoranomos, Zelarchus, retreating toward the
sea, and set up a shout; and when the rest heard it, they rushed upon him as
though a wild boar or a stag had been sighted. (25) And the Cerasuntians, in turn,
seeing this rush in their neighborhood and believing it was certainly directed
against themselves, took to running in their flight and threw themselves into the
sea.

I want to focus here on Xenophon’s use of the adverb “αὖ” at the start of 5.7.25.

At 5.7.23 and 24, after describing the reactions of the Cerasuntians to the start of the riot
at 5.7.22, Xenophon tells how he found out that the tumult had arisen in response to some
allegedly unjust action on behalf of the agoranomoi, and describes the attack on one
particular agoranomos, Zelarchus. Then, at the start of 5.7.25, by his use of αὖ—an
adverb that marks a return to a previously mentioned subject (it should be translated here as “again, once more,” or “in turn”\(^\text{27}\))—Xenophon indicates that he is changing subject, turning away from the just described experiences of Zelarchus and the other *agoranomoi*, and back to the flight of the Cerasuntians, which he had left off describing at 5.7.22: there the Cerasuntians were described as hurrying back to their ships because of the start of the riot, now at 5.7.25 they have taken to running to the sea in their terror at the developing disorder. By his use of the adverb *αὖ* at 5.7.25, then, Xenophon distinguishes between the experiences of the Zelarchus and the other *agoranomoi*, on the one hand, and those of the Cerasuntians, on the other; he therefore clearly believed the two to be separate matters.

In fact, at no point in Xenophon’s description are the Cerasuntians ever presented as playing an integral role in the riot. Their actions are always reactions to and consequences of the disorder in the army, rather than a part of it. Thus, at 5.7.20-22, the Cerasuntians were in discussions with the generals outside the camp of the mercenaries when the riot started somewhere else, and when the Cerasuntians hurried back to their ships on seeing the angry rush of soldiers armed with stones, it was for no other reason than they had seen in their own city the stoning of the Colchian envoys by some of the Cyreans; as 5.7.23 makes clear, the anger of the crowd of men with stones was not directed against the Cerasuntians (or the generals), but against the *agoranomoi*, and so the Cerasuntians’ rushed return to their ships was unnecessary. Similarly, at 5.7.25, having seen the crowd of men, in the chase of Zelarchus, move in their direction, the Cerasuntians threw themselves into the sea. But, as just pointed out by Xenophon, it was

\(^{27}\) See LSJ ii.2 s.v., Smyth 2802.
the *agoranomoi* and not the Cerasuntians who were the target of the soldiers’ anger, and there was thus no reason for the Cerasuntians to flee: accordingly, since they had no reason to fear for their safety, Xenophon has to include, in his description of the Cerasuntians’ actions, the reason for their flight to the sea, since its motivation was unexplained on his account of events; they fled “σαφῶς νομίσαντες ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἱέσθαι,” “believing [that the rush of men] was certainly directed against themselves.” The Cerasuntians, then, although they were not involved in any way in the disturbances, fled from the army under the mistaken impression that the ensuing disorder was somehow directed against them. Their unfortunate experiences were a result of their misunderstanding of the true cause of the tumult in the army (i.e. the alleged mistreatment of the soldiers by the *agoranomoi*) and not a result of anything they had done to the soldiers. Xenophon included the Cerasuntians’ sufferings as an appendage to his description of the riot and its aftermath because the Cerasuntians’ reaction to the riot, their panicked escape to the sea, helped him to bring out for the soldiers just how violent and uncontrolled their actions in the dispute with the *agoranomoi* had been; the very fact that the Cerasuntians had had no part in the dispute, but had still feared for their lives, allowed Xenophon, in his final remarks on the riot, to emphasize the soldiers’ indiscipline to them: “καὶ τούτους τί δοκεῖτε; ἡδίκουν μὲν οὐδὲν, ἔδεισαν δὲ μὴ λύττα τις ὥσπερ κυσὶν ἡμῖν” (“now what think you about these Cerasuntians? They had done no wrong, but they were afraid that as a kind of madness, such as attacks dogs, had seized upon us”) (5.7.26). That is, Xenophon included the experiences of the Cerasuntians in his description of the *agoranomoi* riot and its aftermath precisely because they had had no part in the riot.
Xenophon, then, in his full description of the riot and its aftermath, not only clearly distinguishes the experiences of the Cerasuntians present at Cotyora from those of the attacked market-officials, but also presents the Cerasuntians visiting the army as in no way involved in the dispute leading to the riot, or in the riot itself. One other feature of Xenophon’s description of the riot and the associated experiences of the Cerasuntians helps to build on these observations to make an important point regarding the identity of the *agoranomoi* involved in the riot. At no point in his description of the riot does Xenophon specify the Cerasuntians who had come to deliberate with the generals of the army as a specific group of Cerasuntians: i.e. he never designates the deputation of Cerasuntians as just that, a deputation; rather, on each occasion Xenophon refers to these men (5.7.20, 22, 25), he refers to them simply as “the Cerasuntians.” At 5.7.20, it is clear from the context that, by “the Cerasuntians,” he means only those Cerasuntians who had come from to Cotyora to deliberate with the generals. But at 5.7.25, when Xenophon is distinguishing the experiences of the delegation of Cerasuntians from those of the *agoranomoi* (just mentioned at 5.7.24), the fact that, in distinguishing between these two groups, Xenophon still felt himself able to refer to the men making up the delegation as “the Cerasuntians” *tout court*, without any indication that describing these men in this way could cause any confusion to his audience of assembled Cyreans—i.e. the fact that Xenophon did not feel the need to include at this point of his description of the riot an aside clarifying that by his use of “the Cerasuntians” here he meant those Cerasuntians who had come to deliberate with the generals—shows that the *agoranomoi* were not Cerasuntian. That is, if the *agoranomoi* involved in the riot had been Cerasuntian (or even if some of them had been Cerasuntian), it would not have been clear to the
assembled soldiers, in the lack of any clarification from Xenophon at 5.7.25 that he was referring specifically to the Cerasuntian envoys, which group of Cerasuntians he was speaking of in particular at 5.7.25. But if Xenophon was speaking, and the soldiers were listening to him, on the understanding that the *agoranomoi* were not Cerasuntian, then no confusion would have arisen from the simple reference to “the Cerasuntians” at 5.7.25, and his account of the riot would have been easily and clearly comprehensible. This is clearly the understanding we should have too, then: the *agoranomoi* involved in the riot at Cotyora were therefore not from the city of Cerasus.

After Xenophon had finished his detailed account of the failed raid on the Colchian village and the subsequent murder of the ambassadors the villagers sent to Cerasus, and then the *agoranomoi* riot just outside Cotyora, he changed mode from description to analysis, using the just described episodes to outline for the soldiers, firstly, the potential negative consequences for the army if the kind of indiscipline evidenced by these incidents was allowed to run unchecked within it; and, secondly, the actual harm already caused to the mercenaries by the soldiers’ uncontrolled violence at Cerasus and Cotyora. In the next part of this section, I will show that a close reading of this part of Xenophon’s speech proves conclusively that the *agoranomoi* at Cotyora were not Cerasuntian, that they were, instead, officers elected by and part of the Ten Thousand.

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28 The same is true of 5.7.22: if speaker and audience shared the understanding that the *agoranomoi* were not Cerasuntian, then no confusion would have ensued from Xenophon’s reference to “the Cerasuntians” here (he would clearly be referring to the Cerasuntians who had come to talk to the generals). But if the *agoranomoi* were Cerasuntian, it would be unclear, without any explanatory aside on Xenophon’s part, which Cerasuntians were fleeing towards their ships, those who were part of the deputation sent to the army or those supervising the market in which the soldiers were taking part.
Having demonstrated the extent of lawlessness in the army to the soldiers, Xenophon signaled explicitly to the soldiers that he was changing tack, that he was now going to draw out for the soldiers the dangers for the army arising from the sorts of actions he had just narrated: “εἰ οὖν ταῦτα τοιαῦτα ἔσται, ἔσται οἵα ἡ κατάστασις ἡµῖν τῆς στρατιᾶς” (“now if these things are to go on in this way, observe what the situation of your army will be”) (5.7.26). Xenophon first outlined the potential consequences of the lawlessness he had just described (5.7.27-28):

You, the general body, will not have it in your power either to undertake war upon whom you please or to bring war to an end, but any individual who wishes will be leading an army to gain any end he may desire. And if people come to you as ambassadors, either desiring peace or anything else, any who choose will kill them and prevent you from hearing the words of those who come to confer with you. (28) Furthermore, the men whom you as a body may choose for <commanders> will be of no account, but whoever may choose himself general and will raise the cry ‘Pelt, pelt!’ that man will have the power to slay either <commander> or private, any one of you he pleases, without a trial, provided—as indeed it came about in the present case—there are people who will obey him.29

The potential consequences are of two different kinds, then. 5.7.27, with its references to the dangers of individual war-making, and especially the dangers of individuals undertaking military actions without the approval of the army as a whole, and also to the murder of ambassadors with the aim of preventing them addressing the army, clearly refers to the Colchian incidents: the potential consequences are for what one

29 See p.456 and n.34 for my reasons for putting “commanders” and “commander” in brackets here.
might call the army’s external relations; the army as a whole will not be able to choose whom it makes wars upon, or to deal with ambassadors appropriately.

At 5.7.28, when Xenophon scolds the soldiers that the men whom they as a body have chosen as ἄρχοντας of the army will be of no account if any man may elect himself general and raise the shout “Βάλλε, βάλλε” against them, his use of the words “Βάλλε, βάλλε” is clearly meant to recall the reported earlier shouts (at 5.7.21) of “Παῖε, παῖε, βάλλε, βάλλε” that marked the beginning of the riot involving the market-officials; Xenophon is thus presenting (as he indicated he would do at 5.7.26) to the soldiers the potential consequences for the mercenaries if the sort of behavior that had characterized the agoranomoi riot was allowed to continue within the army. In contrast to the analysis of the potential consequences of the continuance of the sort of behavior that had characterized the Colchian incidents, Xenophon sees the type of conduct that had marked the incident with the agoranomoi riot as potentially leading to internal disorder within the army: if this sort of thing is allowed to continue in the army, whoever in the future elects himself general and raises an uproar against the ἄρχοντας of the army “will have the power to kill any one of you, ὑμῶν, he pleases, ἄρχοντα καὶ ἰδιώτην, ἄκριτον.” The potential consequences of the agoranomoi riot do not involve its relations with other communities, then, but only relations within the army itself.

30 Note ἔπειτα at the start of 5.7.28 marking the sequence of thought, i.e. indicating that Xenophon is here moving on to a new subject.

31 Provided, Xenophon says, there are men who will obey a man starting such a riot “as indeed it came about in the present case,” “ὡς καὶ νῦν ἐγένετο.” These last words confirm Xenophon’s earlier statement (5.7.26) that his analysis in this section of the speech will be drawn from the events he has described to the mercenaries earlier in the speech (in this case, the agoranomoi riot). And see the text above immediately following on 5.7.29 and Xenophon’s presentation of the actual consequences for the army of the Colchian and agoranomoi incidents.
In the next section of his speech (5.7.29), Xenophon explicitly indicates that he is moving on from drawing out the potential consequences of the men’s lawlessness to describing the actual consequences of their indiscipline to them: “οἷα δὲ ὑµῖν καὶ διαπεπράχασιν οἱ αὐθαίρετοι οὕτωι στρατηγοὶ σκέψασθε” (“consider the sort of things these self-chosen generals have actually accomplished for you”). Xenophon first raises the issue of the attack on Zelarchus the agoranomos: “Ζήλαρχος µὲν ὁ ἀγορανόµος εἰ µὲν ἀδικεῖ ὑµᾶς, οἴχεται ἀποπλέων οὐ δοὺς ὑµῖν δίκην· εἰ δὲ µὴ ἀδικεῖ, φεύγει ἐκ τοῦ στρατεύµατος δείσας µὴ ἀδίκως ἄκριτος ἀποθάνῃ” (“take Zelarchus, the agoranomos: supposing he has done you wrong, he has sailed off without paying you the penalty; supposing he is not guilty, he has fled from the army out of fear that he might be slain unjustly and without a trial”). Again, the subject of Zelarchus, and thus the agoranomoi riot (of which the Zelarchus’ escape was a part: see 5.7.24), is discussed as a matter internal to the army and not involving another community: Xenophon tells the assembled men that Zelarchus may have wronged “you,” “ὑµᾶς,” and that Zelarchus may have sailed off without paying “you” the penalty, “οὐ δοὺς ὑµῖν δίκην.” All of this strongly suggests that Zelarchus the agoranomos was a member of the army, and this hypothesis is confirmed by returning to 5.7.28 and by an analysis of the rest of 5.7.29, and especially Xenophon’s supposition that Zelarchus fled from the army out of fear he might be slain unjustly and “without a trial,” “ἄχριτας.” To return to 5.7.28, Xenophon had raised there the possibility, if the army’s lawlessness were to continue, that the ἄρχοντας, whom the

32 And note, in contrast to Zelarchus who is presented by Xenophon as possibly having wronged the army, that earlier in the speech (5.7.26), Xenophon can take it for granted that the assembled mercenaries will agree with him that the Cerasuntians who fled to their ships in the belief that they were being attacked by the soldiers had wronged the army in no way: see p.450 above.
army had chosen, would have no authority, if any man could elect himself general and raise the shout “βάλλε, βάλλε” against them, and slay either ἄρχοντα or ἰδιώτην, without a trial, “ἀκριτον.” These ἄρχοντας at 5.7.28 must be the agoranomoi for two reasons. Firstly, because in the reference to the shout “βάλλε, βάλλε” against the ἄρχοντας, Xenophon was clearly recalling the shout “Παῖε, παῖε, βάλλε, βάλλε” that was directed against the agoranomoi (see 5.7.21, 23); in his analysis of the potential consequences for the army based on the type of behavior evidenced in the agoranomoi riot, then, Xenophon makes an equivalency between the ἄρχοντες of the army and the agoranomoi involved in the riot. Secondly, and crucially, the use of the word “ἀκριτον” at 5.7.28, and Zelarchus’ supposed fear that he would be slain “ἀκριτος” at 5.7.29, show that at 5.7.28 Xenophon is drawing the particular detail of the potential killing of an ἄρχων in the army without a trial from Zelarchus’ actual fear that he might have been killed without a trial.33 Thus, Xenophon is equating the potential killing of an ἄρχων in the army with the feared killing of the agoranomos. The agoranomoi in the riot, therefore, were ἄρχοντες in the army.34 In other words, they were Cyreans.

33 5.7.28 does refer to the killing of “ἀρχοντα... καὶ ἰδιώτην,” but Zelarchus is referred on both occasions in the speech as “Zelarchus the agoranomos,” i.e. as a magistrate/official, and thus we should understand the use of “ἀχριτος” to describe Zelarchus at 5.7.29 as referring back to “ἀρχοντα” at 5.7.29. Xenophon might have drawn the potential consequence that private members of the army might be slain by self-elected generals from two considerations: firstly, the fact that some ordinary soldiers drowned as a result of the disorder surrounding the agoranomoi riot (5.7.25); and secondly, from the general consideration that any man willing to kill an officer obviously would not shrink from doing the same to a private soldier.

34 Thus, in my quotation of the Loeb translation of 5.7.28 above, I put brackets around its translation of “ἀρχοντας” and “ἀχριτος” as “commanders” and “commander.” “ἄρχοντας” in this passage should be translated as “magistrates” or “officers.” That the “ἀρχοντας” of 5.7.28 were part of another another class of officers separate from the generals is also shown by the opposition Xenophon posits in 5.7.28 between the man who may choose himself general (“στρατηγος”), i.e. a man taking upon himself to act like a general, and the “ἀχριτος.”
5.7.30 confirms that the *agoranomoi* were part of the army, and not Cerasuntians. Here, Xenophon describes the actual consequences of the Cyrean stoning of the Colchian envoys: alone of all the Greeks, the remnants of the Ten Thousand cannot enter Cerasus without a strong force; and it is not possible for the mercenaries themselves to bury the bodies of those Cyreans who fell while attacking the Colchian village. The actual consequences of the murder of the Colchian heralds, then, consist of the breach in relations with the Cerasuntians (and with the Colchian villagers): the consequences of the Colchian affair are thus, again, in contrast to the *agoranomoi* riot, external; and crucially, it is the murder of the Colchian ambassadors that Xenophon sees as destroying relations with the Cerasuntians, and not the Zelarchus episode. If Zelarchus and the other *agoranomoi* were magistrates of Cerasus, their mistreatment by the army would surely have been included by Xenophon in his analysis of the factors leading to the breakdown in relations with the Cerasuntians. That it is not shows that the *agoranomoi* involved in the riot cannot have been Cerasuntian.

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35 “οἱ δὲ καταλεύσαντες τοὺς πρέσβεις διεπράξαντο ὑµῖν µόνοις µὲν τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς Κερασοῦντα µὴ ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι ἂν µὴ σὺν ἰσχύι ἀφικνεῖσθαι· τοὺς δὲ νεκροὺς οὓς πρόσθεν αὐτοὶ οἱ κατακανόντες ἐκέλευον θάπτειν, τούτους διεπράξαντο µηδὲ σὺν κηρυκείῳ ἐτί θάπτεσθαι, τίς γὰρ ἐδελήσει κηρυξ ἀνελέσθαι. τίς γὰρ ἐθελήσει κήρυξ ἀπεκτονώς; ἀλλ' ηµεῖς Κερασουντίων θάψαι αὐτοὺς ἐδεήθηµεν.” (“Take those who stoned to death the ambassadors: they have accomplished this result, that for you alone of all the Greeks it is not safe to enter Cerasus unless with a strong force; and as for the dead whom previously the very men who killed them proposed burying, the result accomplished is that now it is not safe to pick up their bodies even for one who carries a herald’s staff. For who will care to go as herald when he has the blood of heralds upon his hands? So we requested the Cerasuntians to bury them.”)

36 Note that, in the words “οἱ δὲ καταλεύσαντες” at the start of 5.7.30, the “δὲ” answers the “µὲν” in the words “Ζήλαρχος µὲν ὁ ἀγορανόµος” beginning 5.7.29, and shows that Xenophon is moving on to a different, but related, subject.

37 That the ambassadors referred to as stoned to death at the beginning of 5.7.30 are the Colchian elders stoned to death at Cerasus by those Cyreans who had survived the failed raid on the Colchian village (see 5.7.19) is clear from reading the rest of 5.7.30. Xenophon never describes the Cerasuntians who came to the generals outside Cotyora as “πρεσβεῖς” or “κήρυκες.”
So, the *agoranomoi* at Xen., *Anab.* 5.7.21-29 were Cyreans, and not Cerasuntians; there is no reason to assume or think that they were Cerasuntian.\(^{38}\) remarkably enough, although it is currently the consensus view in all scholarly traditions that the *agoranomoi* mentioned at 5.7.21-29 (and 5.7.2) were Cerasuntian, the view that they were, in fact, part of the army was unremarkable and uncontroversial to commentators on these passages in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, who simply stated the fact without feeling any need to argue the point.\(^{39}\) 5.7.21-29 does not, then, provide evidence

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\(^{38}\) A passage from the speech, and a remark in the narrative just before the speech, lend support to this conclusion. At 5.7.24, when describing the attack on the market-officials, Xenophon refers by name to the *agoranomos* Zelarchus without an ethnic: “τὸν ἀγορανόµον Ζήλαρχον.” This naming of an individual without an ethnic contrasts with Xenophon’s description of the Cerasuntians: not just in his account of the riot, but throughout his speech, he refers to these as a group, “the Cerasuntians” (in addition to 5.7.20, 22, 25, cf. 5.7.13, 17, 18, 30), and nowhere in this speech (or anywhere else in the *Anabasis*) are individual Cerasuntians ever distinguished by name (or even mentioned) by Xenophon. This difference in treatment implies two things: that Zelarchus was known to the men and that he was not Cerasuntian. 5.7.2, a passage in which Xenophon is describing the mood amongst the soldiers before his speech, can be usefully compared in this regard. Here Xenophon states that it was greatly to be feared that the army would do the sorts of things they had done to the heralds of the Colchians and the *agoranomoi*: “καὶ µάλα φοβεροὶ ἦσαν µὴ ποιήσησαι οἷα καὶ τοὺς τῶν Κόλχων κήρυκας ἐποίησαν καὶ τοὺς ἀγορανόµους.” In contrast to the Colchian heralds, the ethnic origin of the *agoranomoi* does not have to be specified: cf. 5.7.23, where the *agoranomoi* are again mentioned without any other term to distinguish them. (The reference to “τῶν τῶν Κόλχων κήρυκας” here is to the Colchian elders killed at Cerasus by the rogue Cyreans. Xenophon uses the terms “heralds” (“κήρυκες”) and “envoys” (“πρέσβεις”) interchangeably to describe these men: cf. esp. 5.7.30 for clarification on this point.) The fact that, both in his reported speech and in his narrative, Xenophon could refer to the *agoranomoi*, in contrast to groups of men from other communities he mentions, without any other identifier, assuming that, in so doing, there would no confusion for his audiences (of readers and mercenaries), suggests very strongly that the *agoranomoi* were part of the army.

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\(^{39}\) So Masqueray, in the Budé edition (2000: a reprint of the first edition of 1930/31) 81, on οἱ ἀγορανόµοι at 5.7.23: “[l’]agoranome, chargé de la police des marchés, portait un fouet pour se faire obéir. (Cf. Acharn. 723 sq.) Dans les armées il frappait aussi les soldats et se faisait ainsi détester.” (Masqueray [2000: 82 and n.1], however, was mistaken in taking the ἄρχοντας mentioned at 5.7.27 as referring to the generals of the army: see again p.456 above.) In the Anglophone world, one has to go back to the nineteenth century to find scholars who saw that the *agoronomi* were appointed by the army, and not by the Cerasuntians (even if these scholars did import anachronistic ideas about a commissariat accompanying the army into their notes: no such thing existed in any classical Greek army (see chapter 3 section ivb)): see Pretor (1895) 108 ad 5.7.2—τοὺς ἀγορανόµους: “[t]hese officers were appointed to regulate the sale of provisions in the soldiers’ market, and in this capacity would correspond to the commissariat of modern times...”; and Anthon (1852) 537 ad 5.7.1—ἀγορανόµους: “[t]hese ἀγορανόµοι belonged to what we would call, in modern parlance, the commissariat. They regulated the buying and selling in the market that was furnished to the soldiery.”
for Cerasuntian magistrates colluding with merchants to exploit the Ten Thousand, but, on the contrary, our only mention of army-appointed agoranomoi supervising a market in the classical (or Hellenistic) Greek world.\footnote{Garlan (1975) 141—a verbatim translation of Garlan (1972) 166-167—may refer to the appointment of agoranomoi by the Ten Thousand. Garlan mentions the appointment of market overseers in a discussion of the food supply of classical and Hellenistic Greek armies but without any reference (either in the French original or the English translation) to an ancient source: “[h]owever, the armies were not wholly at the mercy of the merchants, wholesale or retail, who were always inclined to take advantage of circumstances. These special markets were strictly supervised by the military authorities who would subsequently be responsible for apportioning the booty. Sometimes they appointed market overseers [named at Garlan [1972] 167 as “agoranomes”], or intervened, for instance, to increase the supply of ready cash by artificial means, most often to impose price controls in order to protect the soldiers’ purse and prevent discontent.” (Increasing the supply of ready cash by artificial means presumably refers to Timotheus’ coining of token money at Olynthus in 364 in order to provide cash to his troops so that they could purchase provisions from the merchants who were accompanying them (ps.-Aristot., Oec. 2.2.23a, 1350a23-30 (a version of the same anecdote is found Polyaeus, Strateg. 3.10.1) (on this coinage, see Robinson and Price [1967] (although see also Price [1979] 358 n.19)). There is no evidence, however, for military authorities imposing price controls in the classical period (as there is for the Hellenistic period, see appendix 5 section iii; see there also for Garlan ascribing another practice—in this case, the right of soldiers to buy provisions at set prices—that was only current in Hellenistic armies to both classical and Hellenistic armies).) Since there is no evidence for agoranomoi being present in any Hellenistic army, or in any classical Greek army other than the Ten Thousand, Garlan may be referring here to Xen., Anab. 5.7.21-29 (and/or 5.7.2). In any case, whatever Garlan meant, his work has had no influence on subsequent readings of or the general thinking on Xen., Anab. 5.7.21-29, so that a close reading of this passage and extended argument for the view that the agoranomoi mentioned there were elected by the Ten Thousand is still necessary here.}

The agoranomoi elected by the remnants of the Ten Thousand were supervising a traveling market which had accompanied the army on its march to Cotyora (from Cerasus and, possibly, Trapezus). After Xenophon had presented to the army the potential and actual consequences of their conduct in the Colchian and agoranomoi incidents, he closed his speech with a series of questions asking the soldiers how would they be able to maintain order in their internal and external relations if they were continue to behave in the ways he had described earlier (5.7.32-33). The series of questions included the following (5.7.33): “ἀγορὰν δὲ τίς ἄξει θαρρῶν, ἢν περὶ τὰ µέγιστα τοιαύτα ἐξαµαρτάνοντες φαινώµεθα;” The Loeb translates this as follows: “who will dare to
supply us a market if in matters of the greatest import we show ourselves guilty of such
offences?” But this is to translate the verb “ἀξεῖ” incorrectly: “ἀξεῖ” here is being used
with its literal, standard meaning of ‘to lead or carry, bring.’ The verb is describing a
physical action: Xenophon is warning the mercenaries that, literally, nobody will bring
along or carry goods for sale in a market to them if they continue committing great
crimes. (If Xenophon had wanted to say that nobody would want “to supply” a market to
the mercenaries, he would have used, as elsewhere (see, e.g., 4.8.23, 5.5.6), the verb
παρέχειν.) Xenophon, then, is referring in this question to a traveling market made up of
traders who accompanied the soldiers on their march. That he is not referring here to a
*polis* supplying a market to the army is confirmed by the preceding question in the series:
“πόλις δὲ φιλία τίς ἡµᾶς δέξεται, ἥτις ἂν ἀνάφασεν ἄνοµίαν ἐν ἡµῖν;” Since the
reception by a friendly city in the Greek world of a passing military force could always
be assumed to include the provision of a market, the warning that the army would not
receive a market from friendly cities if it continued on its present path of lawless
behavior had already been made by Xenophon to the mercenaries prior to the question
warning that no one “ἀξεῖ” a market to them.

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41 See LSJ s.v. ἀγω, I.

42 Masqueray’s translation ([2000] 83) of the question conveys “ἀξεῖ” accurately, but mistranslates
“ἀγορᾶς”: “[q]ui nous apportera des vivres avec confiance, si l’on nous voit commettre ainsi les plus
grandes crimes?” “ἀγορᾶς” should be translated at 5.7.33 as “market”: it does not simply mean “food” or
“supplies.”

43 5.7.33: “[a]nd what friendly city will receive us when it sees so great lawlessness amongst us?”

44 See Thucy. 6.44.2 with chapter 1 section iiia; see also chapter 3 section iii.
The question warning that nobody would carry goods for sale in a market to the mercenaries if they continued committing crimes of the greatest seriousness forms a distinct series with three other questions that describe practices that had been and were important to the army’s survival, but that would not continue if the mercenaries did not change their undisciplined ways (the other practices being sacrificing to the gods, fighting with enemies, and reception by friendly cities).\(^4\) We should therefore understand that traveling markets had been a feature of the army’s existence in its *parabasis* along the southern Black Sea coast to Cotyora and that Xenophon hoped that they would continue to be so.\(^5\) That a traveling market had accompanied the army along the initial part of its journey along the Black Sea coast can also be inferred from a later passage describing the soldiers’ experiences at Calpe Harbor. The soldiers had no provisions (6.4.11) and the sacrifices undertaken with a view to departure from the camp for a foraging expedition were proving unfavourable, despite repeated attempts (6.4.11-16). As Xenophon narrates (6.4.16), “... χαλεπῶς εἶχον οἱ στρατιῶται· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐπέλιπεν ἃ ἔχοντες ἦλθον, καὶ ἀγορὰ οὐδὲµία πω παρῆν” (“the soldiers were angry for the provisions they brought with them had given out and there was not yet any market at hand”). The latter consideration implies that there was, during earlier stages of

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\(^4\) All four of these questions take the form of future more vivid conditional clauses: the practices in question will continue if the soldiers cease behaving lawlessly. Contrast Xenophon’s final question to the army, which is syntactically different from the rest of the series, taking the form of a potential optative to express an assumption about the future considered as less certain to come true: “οὗ δὲ δὴ πάντων ὄντας ἐπαινέσειεν;” (“And in that land where we were fancying that we would obtain praise from everyone, who would praise us if we are men of this sort?”)

\(^5\) The previous question, with its reference to reception by friendly cities, shows that Xenophon is thinking here of the soldiers’ experiences on the Black Sea coast. Xenophon is not referring here to the Lydian *agora*: the Lydian market accompanied the non-Greek part of Cyrus’ army (see chapter 4 section ii) that separated from and finally left the Greeks in the second month after the battle of Cunaxa (2.4.9, 2.4.35ff.).
the march along the coast, a market accompanying the army which the soldiers were able to resort to when their primary source of supplies had given out.

It can be demonstrated, then, that there was (almost certainly) a traveling market accompanying the Ten Thousand at this point on their *parabasis*. In addition, it can be shown, too, that the Cyrean *agoranomoi* were not overseeing a market provided by the Cotyorites outside their city walls. On the mercenaries’ arrival at Cotyora, they were treated as a hostile force by the Cotyorites and, as such, were not provided with a market by the Cotyorites (5.5.6). The Cotyorites were still refusing to provide a market to the mercenaries (5.5.19) when, after the army had spent a substantial but undefined amount of time at Cotyora (5.5.7), some Sinopean ambassadors came to Cotyora to discuss the army’s relations with the Cotyorites, who were their colonists. It was only after discussions between the Sinopean ambassadors and the mercenaries that friendly relations were established between the army and the Cotyorites (5.6.24-25); it was also presumably from this point on that the Cotyorites provided a market for the army, although their doing so is reported by Xenophon only after his speech to the assembled mercenaries (6.1.1).

The *agoranomoi* riot took place, however, in the time after the mercenaries’ arrival at Cotyora and before the discussions with the Sinopeans. Xenophon’s narrative of the army’s stay at Cotyora after the arrival of the Sinopean ambassadors is quite detailed and it is incredible that the arrival of emissaries from Cerasus would not have found a mention in his description of the various intrigues that were being undertaken at that time at Cotyora. The converse is also true: it is incredible that, if the various

47 See p.200 above.
schemes being plotted at Cotyora after the arrival of the Sinopeans were being devised at the time of the attack on the *agoranomoi*, they would have found no mention in Xenophon’s description of the riot and its consequences. Xenophon’s account of the attacks on the Colchian villages and the subsequent dispatch of ambassadors to Cotyora also suggests strongly that the riot took place shortly after the army’s arrival at Cotyora. Since, then, the *agoranomoi* riot occurred at a time when the Cotyorites were not providing a market to the mercenaries and were unfriendly to them, the *agoranomoi* elected by the Ten Thousand were therefore not overseeing a market provided by the inhabitants of the *polis* of Cotyora; they must have been supervising, instead, the traveling market accompanying the army on its march along the southern Pontic seaboard.

In conclusion, then, Xen., *Anab.* 5.7.21-29 presents us with our only attested instance of *agoranomoi* supervising the exchanges between traders and soldiers in the temporary *agorai* in the camps of classical Greek armies on campaign.

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48 The army took at least ten days to march from Cerasus to Cotyora: see 5.4.1 (undetermined amount of time marching from Cerasus to the borders of the territory with the Mossynoeceans); 5.5.1 (eight days’ marching through the territory of the Mossynoeceans); and 5.5.4 (two days’ marching through the territory of the Tibarenians to Cotyora). The failed attack on the Colchian villages took place the night before the army’s departure from Cerasus (5.7.17). It was some (unspecified, but apparently not lengthy period of) time after this that the Colchian ambassadors came to Cerasus to complain of the attack (5.7.17), and again some unspecified, but apparently not lengthy period of time after their murder that the Cerasuntians sailed to Cotyora to tell the generals of the affair (5.7.20). Although it is impossible to be precise on this question, it appears likely, then, that the Cerasuntians came to Cotyora not long after the mercenaries arrived there. Cf. 5.7.12 in this regard: the mercenaries at a loss when Xenophon alludes to serious misbehavior manifesting itself in the army—if the murder of the heralds and the *agoranomoi* riot had taken place in the days between the arrival of the Sinopeans and Xenophon’s speech, the mercenaries would hardly have been unable to grasp what Xenophon was referring to here.
c. The legal and administrative framework within which classical Greek sailors and soldiers bought their provisions (and sold their booty)

There is no reason to think that that the appointment of *agoranomoi* by the Ten Thousand to oversee their market exchanges with traders was an unusual measure.⁴⁹

Other sources indicate an intense interest by classical Greek military forces and their leaders in controlling and encouraging exchanges in the markets established in their camps and bases.⁵⁰ Classical Greek generals controlled the use of weights and measures in the markets their forces used;⁵¹ they could also control the means of exchange used in those markets.⁵² Xenophon’s paradigmatic military leader, Cyrus, took measures to

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⁴⁹ Cf. in this respect Xen., *Anab.* 5.8.34: after Xenophon’s speech to the mercenaries at Cotyora on the growing lawlessness within the army, the men decide, in order to prevent disorder breaking out in the army again, that in future the *lochagoi* would serve as dikasts overseeing trials of men accused of lawlessness. The establishment of courts within the Ten Thousand was extraordinary—there is no other attestation of courts in any other Greek army—but it took place only because, exceptionally, there could be no recourse to *polis* courts at the end of the army’s campaign (see Lys. 14.5, 15.1-4 for Athenian soldiers accused of crimes on campaign being tried in *polis* courts on their return to Athens; see also the discussion at Parke [1933] 78). In contrast, *polis* military forces were accompanied on campaign by traders just as the Ten Thousand were, and had to face the issue of how to control and manage exchanges with traders on campaign, just as the Ten Thousand had to.

⁵⁰ Cf. Garlan (1972), (1975) at p.459 n.40 above. Classical Greek military leaders naturally also took an interest in the functioning of the markets provided to their forces by cities on the routes of their marches. See Xen., *Anab.* 1.5.12: Clearchus crossing the river to Charmande to inspect the agora ("κατασκεψάµενος τὴν ἀγορὰν") provided by that city for the Cyreans.

⁵¹ See ps.-Aristot., *Oec.* 2.2.23c, 1350b5-15 (the same anecdote is found at Polyaeus, *Strateg.* 3.10.10) (see already pp.274-275 n.50 for discussion of this passage): Timotheus, besieging Samos in 366, found that his camp was becoming short of provisions because of the many foreigners who were arriving into his camp and buying provisions in the market there; to counter this, he gave orders forbidding the sale of milled grain, wine or oil in measures less than a *medimnos* of grain or a *metretes* of wine or oil.

⁵² See p.459 n.40 above on ps.-Aristot., *Oec.* 2.2.23a, 1350a23-30 (and Polyaeus, *Strateg.* 3.10.1) on Timotheus striking a token coinage at Olynthus in 364 for use in the agora of his camp.
ensure that the kapeloi accompanying his army could trade in its agora without harm.\(^{53}\)

Cyrus also, in order to boost supply to his army on the march to Thymbrara, allowed the emporoi following his army, once the twenty days for which the soldiers had to bring their own provisions had elapsed, to sell “ὅπως ἄν βούληται,” “in whatever way they wish” (Cyr. 6.2.38). This passage would seem to imply that merchants might not usually sell however they wanted; rather, that their activities in military agora were usually (closely) controlled. Classical Greek states also exercised strict control over sales of the plunder taken by their military forces to the traders accompanying those forces. Spartan armies had a permanent λαφυροπώλης (‘booty-seller’) to whom all plunder had to be reported and who organized and oversaw auctions of that plunder,\(^{54}\) other classical Greek military forces appointed λαφυροπῶλαι and other officials on an ad hoc basis to supervise and control sales of booty to traders.\(^{55}\) The Ten Thousand also appointed λαφυροπῶλαι to

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\(^{54}\) See Polyaeus, Strateg. 6.1.7: Jason of Pherai appointing, as part of a ruse to extort money from him, his brother Polydorus as λαφυροπώλης to deal with the booty resulting from the capture of some unnamed city (this reference was missed by Pritchett [1991]). Cf. IG V, 2, 6.9-12: in the mid-fourth century, a decree from Tegea providing for repairs on the city walls and other public buildings damaged in war being paid for out of the sale of plunder; the generals of the polis are instructed to hold a λαφυροπωλίον (cf. Brun and Descat [2000] 222). See Pritchett (1991) 402-403 for references to other officials involved in the state sale of plunder (cf. Rawlings [2007] 153-154 for discussion). In addition to these few references, the fact that the collection and sale of plunder was centralized by classical Greek states in the early fifth century and state control of plunder in the field remained normal practice throughout the classical period (see esp. van Wees [2004] 236-237; cf. Rawlings [2007] 153-154) implies the regular appointment of officials in classical Greek military forces to supervise the collection and sale of plunder. Classical Greek states were not always successful in their efforts to gain control of the all of the booty seized by their military forces: see, e.g., Krentz (2007) 183; Rawlings (2007) 154.
sell plunder,\textsuperscript{56} confirming that they participated in the same conventions and institutions that usually governed the exchange of goods between military forces and traders in the Greek world.

The market exchanges between sailors and soldiers and traders in the \textit{agorai} located in the camps and bases of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces did not take place, therefore, in a legal and institutional vacuum.\textsuperscript{57} Although the evidence is scanty and it is often necessary to use indirect reasoning to reconstruct the institutional framework of the markets organized for Greek military forces, it seems fair to conclude that these markets—just as the markets provided by \textit{poleis} to passing military forces in the classical Greek world—were organized and administered similarly to normal civic \textit{polis agorai}. If the office of \textit{agoranomos} is only attested for the Ten Thousand, this is almost certainly because of the exceptional nature of that text,\textsuperscript{58} and not because \textit{agoranomoi} did not exist in other classical Greek military forces; like other mundane details connected to provisioning, they could simply be taken for granted by authors (and

\textsuperscript{56} See Xen., \textit{Anab.} 7.7.56: Charminus and Polycinicus, two Spartiates sent by Thibron to take the Cyreans into his service, took over the captured livestock from Xenophon (to whom the livestock had been given by Seuthes in order to raise pay for the mercenaries), appointed booty-sellers and proceeded to sell it (“\textit{kai λαφυροπώλας καταστήσαντες ἐπώλου}”). Although this sale of plunder for the Cyreans was organized by Spartiates, the mercenaries had probably appointed booty-sellers on their own initiative to sell the army’s plunder earlier in the march, too. See Xen., \textit{Anab.} 6.6.38: the mercenaries remained at Chrysopolis for seven days “\textit{λαφυροπωλοῦντες}” (having pillaged the Bithynian countryside with the aim of raising money). Note that Xenophon uses this term only after the principle of common ownership of plunder acquired by the army as a whole was adopted by the army (at Calpe, see Xen., \textit{Anab.} 6.6.2-3 with Dalby [1992] 25-26). Cf. Xen., \textit{Anab.} 5.3.4 for another sale of plunder by the army as a whole.

\textsuperscript{57} This phrase is adapted from E. M. Harris’ discussion of the institutions of the Athenian \textit{agora} in the classical period ([2002] 5).

\textsuperscript{58} See chapter 3 section iiiia, appendix 4 section i.
their audiences) for other military forces and therefore not mentioned in ancient military narratives.

As in normal civic _agorai_, the institutional framework of both the markets provided by _poleis_ to passing armies and navies, and of the markets located in the camps and bases of Greek military forces, would have provided a (relatively) efficient and stable structure for exchanges between sailors and soldiers and traders.\(^{59}\) Exclusive property rights would have been established by public weights and measures and protected by _agoranomoi_,\(^{60}\) whose jurisdiction not only extended over weights and measures, but also to the supervision of contracts.\(^{61}\) _Agoranomoi_ were also charged with maintaining law and order in the _agora_; presumably this entailed guarding against the illegal and violent expropriation of property during transactions there.\(^{62}\) The tasks of market supervisors


\(^{60}\) See again p.464 and n.51 above for state control of the weights and measures used in the market exchanges in the camps of military forces.

\(^{61}\) See Aristot., _Pol._ 1321b12-18: one of the indispensable magistracies for a _polis_ is an _agoranomos_ for the supervision of contracts and the maintenance of good order. Cf. Theophr. fr. 651 (FHS): _agoranomoi_ must ensure orderly conduct in the marketplace and truthfulness on the part not only of the sellers but also of those buying. See Cohen (2005) 292-293 and esp. n.17; Moreno (2007) 334 for the Athenian evidence; at Athens, however, some of the duties normally exercised by _agoranomoi_ were discharged by other specialized magistrates such as _metronomoi_ (in charge of weights and measures) and _sitophylakes_ (in charge of supervising the grain market) (see, e.g., Moreno (ibid.)). On the necessity for efficient markets of having legal mechanisms to establish and enforce property rights, see esp. North (1981) 42: “[p]rice-making markets require well-defined and enforced property rights. It must be possible to measure the dimensions of a good or service; moreover, the consequent rights must be exclusive and there must be an enforcement mechanism to police the exchange of goods.” Cf. McMillan (2002) ix, 11, 101-102 for the importance of the defining and protection (enforcement) of property rights for properly functioning markets. Since “[m]easurement constitutes the formalized description of a good or service, and therefore without some form of measurement, property rights cannot be established nor exchange take place” (North [1981] 18-19), the presence of public weights and measures in classical Greek _agorai_ played a key role in establishing property rights (cf. Morley [2007a] 60-61), as did the use of coinage issued and guaranteed by classical Greek states: see McMillan (2002) 11; Morley (2007a) 61-64.

\(^{62}\) See ancient references in last note, and also Aristot., _Pol._ 1299b14-18: keeping “σύνοψιμας... ἐν ἀγορῇ” a crucial duty of the _agoranomos_. Cf. Migeotte (2002) 120.
also included the enforcement of the (promised) quality of goods and contracts, and the prevention of misrepresentation in the dealings taking place in agorai; thus, there were mechanisms in place in classical Greek agorai to prevent possible opportunism through the exploitation of asymmetry of information between buyer and seller. A set of strongly embedded ethical norms condemning cheating in the agora also constituted an important informal constraint reducing opportunistic behavior and enforcement costs in classical Greek markets.64

It might be argued here that conditions peculiar to the markets in which classical Greek sailors and soldiers took part could have rendered these markets less stable and more inefficient than regular polis markets. The first part of this argument might go something along the lines of the following: because classical Greek military forces (naval and amphibious forces especially) operating in foreign territory were dealing with traders with whom they had not had repeated dealings (whether in agorai provided by poleis or in the agora in their camps/bases) or prior personal contacts, and in areas with which they were unfamiliar—and in which, therefore, they did not have as much information on local conditions as the traders they were transacting with—they may have been particularly vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by traders. But several factors will have reduced the risk of opportunism (and exploitation of sailors and soldiers) in the markets organized for classical Greek military forces in foreign territory. Firstly, the

63 See Bresson (2008b) 34-39 on the threat posed by asymmetry of information to the efficient working of agorai and the steps taken by poleis to reduce this threat. Cf. McMillan (2002) ix-x.

level of overcharging will have been limited by military forces’ potential resort to violent appropriation of offending traders’ goods: fear of disorder will have motivated the authorities of friendly poleis to monitor trade especially closely.\textsuperscript{65} Secondly, to anticipate briefly the next three sections of the chapter, there were usually many traders selling and purchasing from classical Greek military forces in markets: no one trader ever had enough market power to force up prices; rather, competition between the many traders exchanging with sailors and soldiers will have limited opportunistic behavior.\textsuperscript{66} Thirdly, with respect to grain, the general sense throughout the Greek world of the ‘right’ price of barley-meal and wheat in the months after harvest will have constrained traders’ ability to overcharge for this good.\textsuperscript{67} Fourthly, the traveling markets accompanying classical Greek armies will have been made up mostly of traders from those armies’ home poleis: in this case, soldiers may have had previous repeated exchanges and personal contacts with (at least) some of the traders accompanying them, thus limiting the chances of sharp practice by those traders.\textsuperscript{68} In addition, the fact that the traders in traveling markets accompanying armies in hostile territory had to remain with those armies for the duration of their campaigns because of security considerations may have led to a greater personalization of exchanges in those traveling markets over time (thus again

\textsuperscript{65} I am grateful to Josh Ober for this and the next point.

\textsuperscript{66} See also North (1981) 36, 204.

\textsuperscript{67} See Reger (2007) 469 (discussing Hellenistic Greece and western Asia Minor but the point should be valid for the classical Greek world, too).

\textsuperscript{68} See North (1981) 35, 204.
constraining opportunism in them).\textsuperscript{69} Fifthly, the fear of reputational sanctions will also have constrained traders’ opportunistic behavior,\textsuperscript{70} especially for those traders accompanying armies from the poleis in which they lived, but also for those traders who dealt with classical Greek amphibious and naval forces consisting of men from all over the Greek world, who could spread news of traders’ cheating across the eastern (and western) Mediterranean. Finally, as discussed above, the normal legal and administrative mechanisms of the agora would also have worked to limit opportunities for cheating in market transactions between members of classical Greek military forces and the sutlers and merchants following or sailing to them.

It might also be argued—citing, e.g., Xen., \textit{Anab.} 5.7.21-29 as evidence—that traders or poleis might be discouraged from trading with classical Greek sailors and soldiers because of fear of the violent expropriation of their goods by those sailors and soldiers.\textsuperscript{71} But, again, one of the main tasks of the market magistrates present in the agorai in which classical Greek military forces bought their food was to maintain law and order: these magistrates would have restricted any attempts to rob or endanger traders.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{69} The fact that traders knew that they would have to continue transacting with the armed men they were dealing with would also have deterred them from overcharging (for fear of being discovered and having their goods violently expropriated). For traders accompanying amphibious forces (i.e., not just sailing to and from their camps/bases), see again Xen., \textit{Hell.} 1.6.37; cf. Xen., \textit{Hell.} 6.2.23.

\textsuperscript{70} See McMillan (2002) 56-58 for the idea.

\textsuperscript{71} See McMillan (2002) 90: “[a]ssurance against expropriation is needed if markets are to operate successfully. People will invest if they have some assurance that they will reap the returns on their investment.” Cf. Morley (2007a) 56-58 on the importance of creating a risk-free, welcoming environment in order to attract traders. On poleis ceasing to trade with a military force because of the threat of disorder (and possible violent expropriation), see Xen., \textit{Anab.} 6.2.8. Cf. France (2006) 83, 85 for forces of the First Crusade receiving markets from cities only grudgingly or not at all because of their violent behavior.

\textsuperscript{72} Note that, in the case of the agoranomoi riot at Cotyora, the soldiers in the disturbance knew that they would face no polis sanctions nor any sanctions from the leadership of the Cyreans: it was only after (and
Secondly, classical Greek military leaders were also well aware of this potential problem, and had great incentives to prevent disorder and violent treatment in the agora their forces used (violence in these agora could lead to shortages of provisions and low prices for plunder through discouraging the presence of traders); accordingly, they put in place measures to ensure that traders would not be mistreated in the agora they controlled (see again Xen., Cyr. 4.5.42).

The legal and institutional structures of the markets provided by poleis to passing armies and navies and the markets located in the camps and bases of Greek military forces therefore did not prevent those markets from functioning efficiently to supply the provisioning needs of those forces. In the following three sections of this chapter, I will investigate if the conditions of production and distribution, and the social structures and political institutions, of the classical Greek world also enabled Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces to meet their food supply requirements on campaign.

iii. The behavior of markets provided by poleis to classical Greek military forces

The demand of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces (on the move to war zones) for grain (and other foods) in the markets provided by the poleis on their marches or voyages to campaign theaters was not normally great. Firstly, sailors and soldiers needed to purchase provisions to subsist during their halts at friendly (or neutral) poleis. The duration of these halts is not (usually) indicated by ancient authors,

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73 See again Xen., Anab. 5.7.33 at p.460 above.
although Xenophon’s *Anabasis* again proves an exception: there is a pattern throughout the Cyreans’ march from Sardis to Cunaxa of a series of multi-day marches followed by a three-day halt;⁷⁴ in fact, this pattern recurs after Cunaxa and throughout the march to Trapezus, too.⁷⁵ But the distance, and the number of days’ march, between halts on the Cyreans’ march to Cunaxa was much greater than for marches by armies operating in the classical Greek world of micro-states closely packed together; the normal five to eight kilometers’ distance between inland (and coastal) *poleis* could have been easily covered by Greek armies in a days’ march.⁷⁶ Amphibious and naval forces would normally have taken no more than one or two days to sail between the island and coastal *poleis* on the way to their theaters of operations.⁷⁷ One should therefore be thinking of a duration of no more than one or two days for the halts of classical Greek military forces at the *poleis* they passed by on their way to campaign theaters.⁷⁸ Secondly, sailors and soldiers

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⁷⁴ Tuplin (1999) 346, Lee (2007) 174, 219. See also Lee (2007) 219: “Xenophon gives reasons for all the longer halts and most of the three-day pauses: waits for new contingents or emissaries to arrive, the celebration of the Lycaean festival at Peltae, unrest among the troops at Tarsus, confusion caused by the desertion of Xenias and Pasion at Myriandrus.”

⁷⁵ Lee (2007) 219. See p.481 below for discussion of the duration of the mercenaries’ stays at *poleis* at Trapezus and the other *poleis* they halted at before being taken into service by Thibron.

⁷⁶ For classical Greek micro-states and the short distances between them, see *IACP* 71-72, and esp. Bintliff (2008) 19: “60 per cent of all Greek *poleis* [had] a territory of 5-6km radius, and 80 per cent [were] within an 8km radius.” See Krentz (2007) 161 for the marching rates of Greek armies; cf. Xen., *Hell.* 5.4.49: Agesilaus in 377 completing what would be a normal two days’ march for an army in one day when he marched from Plataea past Erythrae and Scolus into Theban territory, a distance of ten to fifteen kilometers.

⁷⁷ The uninhabited eastern coast of the Peloponnese and western coasts of the Italian peninsula were exceptions: see chapter 1 section ii; chapter 2 section iic; chapter 2 section iii.

⁷⁸ Note that Dionysius’ ruse at Rhegium (or Himera) (see the discussion at chapter 3 section iiib, and p.482 n.111 below) exploited the fact that *poleis* could typically expect military forces to halt in their territories for a brief period of time.
needed to purchase provisions for their onward marches or voyages. Although, as just discussed, the opportunity to purchase at other friendly poleis (or to forage in enemy territory, or to purchase from accompanying traders on overseas campaigns) would normally be available within a day or two of leaving a friendly city, three days’ provisions seems to have been the usual amount purchased by the members of classical Greek military forces in the agoraí of friendly cities before they departed for the next part of their march or voyage.

79 See again the references at chapter 3 section ii. See also again Xen., Anab. 6.2.4: Lycon was astonished at Heraclea that “… τῶν στρατηγῶν ὅτι οὐ πειρῶνται ἡµῖν ἐκπορίζειν σιτηρέσιον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ξένα οὐ µὴ γένηται τῇ στρατιᾷ τετράων ήµερῶν στίςτια· ὅποθεν δ’ ἐπισιτισάµενοι πορεύµεθα οἶκ ἔστιν…” (“the generals do not endeavor to supply us with money to buy provisions; for our gifts of hospitality will not make three days’ rations for the army; and there is no place from which we can procure provisions before beginning our journey.”) The two modern scholars who have commented at length on this passage have found Lycon’s arguments either puzzling or dishonest. Anderson ([1970] 51 (cf. id. [1974] 132) writes on Lycon’s proposal: “[o]ne malcontent stated emphatically that this would not feed the army for three days, but as they were now reduced to about 8500 combatants, besides women and children, the barley (144,-000 choinikes) ought to have lasted them for more than a week even on the generous scale of two choinikes a day. Presumably therefore the shortage of meat was the cause of complaint; but at Sinope the “entertainment” had included only meat, three thousand medimni of barley and fifteen hundred jars of wine.” Lendle ([1995] 373 ad Anab. 6.2.4/5) accuses Lycon of producing specious arguments to press the case for extorting some money from the Heracleots: “…stellte das Gastgeschenk der Herakleotern die Ernährung für 1-2 Wochen sicher: Lykon betreibt hier mit seinem Redebeitrag regelrechte Panikmache, um zusätzlich zu den Naturalien noch Bargeld zu erpressen.” Both Anderson’s and Lendle’s treatments of this passage are based on the thinking that Lycon was proposing a source of provisions for the length of the men’s stay at Heraclea (thus the negative judgment of Lycon’s plan based on the rationale that 3,000 medimnoi would have lasted the men more than three days (and especially in the case of Lendle, since he takes one choinix of alphita to be the standard daily ration for soldiers [1995] 366). Lycon was proposing, however, that the men obtain money in order to be able to provision themselves for the upcoming journey from Heraclea, as examination of two parts of his proposal indicates. Firstly, “τριῶν ἡµερῶν στίςτια” was the usual standing order for an army about to embark on a march (see Nall [1922] 45, and the references again at chapter 3 section ii). Secondly, as the clause “δ’ ἐπισιτισάµενοι πορεύµεθα οἶκ ἔστιν…” makes clear, Lycon was thinking of provisions for an impending march, and nothing else. The use of “ἐπισιτισάµενοι” shows definitively that this is the case. At Xen., Anab. 7.1.7, when Anaxibius would not give the soldiers the µισθός he had promised them, the soldiers were unhappy since they had no money with which to procure provisions for the journey home (“ὅτι οἶκ εἰς ἀργύριον ἐπισιτισάσεται εἰς τὴν πορείαν”); and when Cleander, the Spartan harmost at Byzantium, told Xenophon he would be held responsible for the soldiers’ refusal to leave the city, Xenophon replied that he was not responsible for that, and the soldiers were refusing to leave since lacked a means of supplying themselves (“ἐπισιτισάµοι διόµενοι”) for the journey (Xen., Anab. 7.1.9). When the army later fell out with Seuthes over his failure to pay them what he owed, the Greeks took up quarters in villages “ὅτι ἐκεῖ ἐκεῖνοι πλεῖστα ἐπισιτισάµοι εἰς τὴν πορείαν εἶναι” (“from which they could secure provisions in greatest abundance before their journey to the coast”) (Xen., Anab. 7.7.1). In each of these cases, we see episitismos used to describe something more than just the furnishing or collection of provisions, but rather the procurement of provisions with the particular purpose of supplying oneself for a journey or a military campaign. Lycon, then, was addressing the army after it had spent three or four days at Heraclea (Chirisophus had been elected sole leader of the army at Sinope (Xen.,
The amounts of grain passing classical Greek military forces had to acquire in the 
agorai of friendly poleis to meet their daily energy requirements were therefore not 
enormous. Some calculations will indicate the scale one should be thinking on here. The 
three to fifty thousand men on the Sicilian expedition will have needed to purchase 
somewhere between 6,000 and 11,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or between 100,000 and 
170,000kg. of wheat equivalent of grain) during their halts at poleis which received 
them. But the eight thousand men who began the siege of Mytilene in 428 will only 
have required somewhere in the range of 1,500 and 2,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or 
between 25,000 and 30,000kg. of w.e. of grain) from the agorai of the friendly/subject 
states they halted at on their voyage across the Aegean. The Athenian periploi sent 
around the Peloponnese in the fifth century will have bought somewhere between 800 
and 5,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or between 10,000 and 80,000kg. of w.e. of grain) in

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Anab. 6.1.32); on the next day the army sailed to Heraclea, and took two days to make it there (Xen., Anab. 
6.2.1); Chirisophus’ supreme leadership was ended on the sixth or seventh day after it had begun (Xen., 
Anab. 6.2.12), the same day, it seems, as Lycon’s proposal (though certainty on this last point is 
impossible). Lycon’s proposals, therefore, were based on the premise that 3,000 medimnoi would be 
insufficient to feed the army (8,500 men, with some women and children, but very few slaves (after the sale 
of captives at Cerasus (Xen., Anab. 5.3.4), the men had marched through mostly friendly territory to 
Cotyora, and there had difficulty in pillaging the Paphlagonians; from Cotyora they had gotten to Sinope 
and Heraclea by ship)) for six to seven days (the three or four days they had already spent at Heraclea, and 
the three on the upcoming journey). This is plausible (seven days of 8,500 men eating two choinikes of 
alphita a day adds up to 119,000 choinikes) but it should be noted that there was no dissension at Sinope, 
where the men also received xenia including 3,000 medimnoi of alphita (6.1.15), and where they stayed for 
five days (6.1.17) before embarking on the three day journey to Heraclea. (But perhaps they had sufficient 
money at Sinope to supplement the xenia?)

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80 30,000-50,000 men: see appendix 2. 30,000 x 2 choinikes of barley-meal (see appendix 3, sections i, ii) 
x 5 days (2 halt, 3 for onward voyage) = 6,250 medimnoi of barley-meal. 50,000 x 2 choinikes of barley-
meal x 5 days = 10,416.67 medimnoi of barley-meal. One medimnos of barley-meal = 16.482kg. of wheat 
equivalent: see again appendix 3 section iii. Note, however, that only 12,000 men (=the crews of 60 
triremes) would have been purchasing in the first agora provided to the expedition (by the Naxians (Thucy. 
6.50.3, with 6.50.2)).

81 40 triremes x 200 men (see appendix 2) = 8,000 men. 8,000 x 2 choinikes of barley-meal x 5 days = 
1666.67 medimnoi of barley-meal (=27,470kg. of w.e. of grain).
the *polis* markets they bought in.\(^\text{82}\) Finally, while Agesilaos’ land force in Asia Minor in 396, consisting of somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 men,\(^\text{83}\) will have acquired by purchase somewhere in the range of 2,000 to 3,000 *medimnoi* of barley-meal (or between 30,000 and 50,000kg. of w.e. of grain) from the cities they halted at during the march, Aristeus’ and Brasidas’ forces on their overland marches from the Peloponnese to Thrace in 432 and 425, respectively, will have needed to buy less than 800 *medimnoi* of barley-meal (or somewhere over 10,000kg. of w.e. of grain) in the markets of friendly *poleis* on their journeys to the north.\(^\text{84}\) These figures can only be indicative, in the lack of complete certainty regarding some of the variables in the calculations, but they do serve to illustrate the orders of magnitude one should have in mind. The amounts of grain bought

\(^{82}\) The smallest Athenian *periplous* of the fifth century (in 413) consisted of twenty triremes (see Thucy. 7.26.1 and chapter 2 section iii). 20 triremes x 200 men = 4,000 men: 8,000 x 2 *choinikes* of barley-meal x 5 days = 833.33 *medimnoi* of barley-meal (=13,735kg. of w.e. of grain). The largest Athenian *periplous* of the fifth century (in 431) consisted of 22,400 men (see Thucy. 2.17.4, 2.23.2, 2.25.1 with chapter 2 sections iii, v): 22,400 x 2 *choinikes* of barley-meal x 5 days = 4,666.67 *medimnoi* of barley-meal (=76,916kg. of w.e. of grain).

\(^{83}\) Agesilaos left for Asia Minor with 30 Spartiates, 2,000 *neodamodeis*, and 6,000 allied soldiers (Xen., *Hell.* 3.4.2-3). The *neodamodeis* will not have been accompanied by slave attendants; it is unclear how many of the allied soldiers were hoplites (accompanied by slave attendants). Agesilaos also had contingents from allied *poleis* in Asia Minor serving under him (Xen., *Hell.* 3.4.11, 3.4.12) too, but Xenophon does not specify how many men these contingents comprised. Diodorus has Agesilaos enlisting 4,000 troops at Ephesus to make a total of 10,000 infantry and 400 cavalry (14.79.2); the figures of Xenophon, who accompanied Agesilaos on this campaign, should be preferred. In the light of the vagueness of Xenophon’s figures, however, I will adopt an estimate of 10,000 to 15,000 men. Thus, 10,000 x 2 *choinikes* of barley-meal x 5 days = 2,083.33 *medimnoi* of barley-meal (=34,337.5kg. of w.e. of grain); 15,000 x 2 *choinikes* of barley-meal x 5 days = 3,125 *medimnoi* of barley-meal (=51,506.25kg. of w.e. of grain).

\(^{84}\) Aristeus’ force consisted of 1,600 hoplites (an unknown number of whom were mercenaries) and 400 light troops (Thucy. 1.60.1): although it is doubtful that each of the mercenary hoplites was accompanied by a slave attendant, I will proceed on the basis that they were (the light troops will not have been accompanied by slave attendants) (see appendix 2 for both of these points). Thus, 4,000 x 2 *choinikes* of barley-meal x 5 days = 750 *medimnoi* of barley-meal (=12,631.5kg. of w.e. of grain). Brasidas’ force in 425 consisted of 1,700 hoplites (Thucy. 4.78.1): 3,400 men (assuming each hoplite to have followed by a slave attendant) x 2 *choinikes* of barley-meal x 5 days = 708.33 *medimnoi* of barley-meal (=11,674.75kg. of w.e. of grain).
in *agorai* provided by friendly Greek *poleis* to passing military forces represent the yield of barley or wheat harvests of tens or (low) hundreds of hectares,\(^{85}\) or the cargoes of one to four or five trading ships.\(^{86}\)

In addition, classical Greek armies “did not commonly pass back and forth across the same areas often,”\(^{87}\) nor did classical Greek navies and amphibious forces regularly sail back and forth through the same areas of the Aegean or the western Mediterranean. Classical Greek military forces were (almost) always invasion forces, too: that is, it was rare for two Greek military forces to be operating against each other in areas outside their respective *polis* territories; thus, the inhabitants of *poleis* receiving a classical Greek military force, having provided an *agora* to that passing military force, did not normally have to be concerned by the prospect of having to provide an *agora* to another force within a short period of time thereafter (or of having their territory foraged or pillaged by enemy troops).\(^{88}\) The fighting of the Ionian War is an exception in both of these respects, however: the demand for markets by the two warring sides sailing the seas off Asia Minor (and Thrace) and operating hundreds of kilometers from their home states may

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\(^{85}\) See Cahill (2002) 331 n.20 for a summary of the debate on the yields of barley and wheat per hectare in classical Greece: the figures are essentially unrecoverable but modern estimates range between 400kg. and 900kg. per hectare (wheat yields being at the lower end of this range, barley yields at the higher end).

\(^{86}\) See section v below on (trading) ship sizes.

\(^{87}\) Tuplin (1997) 373. The presence of regular marching routes in later pre-industrial European wars “could impose a serious burden on areas neighbouring” them (see Erdkamp [1998] 24); this was never an issue in the classical Greek world. Cf. France (2006) 81, Pryor (2006b) 287 for Crusading forces experiencing supply problems when marching on routes along which other Crusading forces had passed and had received markets from the cities on those routes a few weeks previously (again, never an issue in classical Greek warfare).

have represented a considerable burden on the resources of poleis on the Ionian and Hellespontine (and Thracian) seaboards.\footnote{These problems would also have been present (on a much smaller scale) in the amphibious and naval fighting of the Corinthian and Social Wars in the fourth century, too.} Usually, however, the demand of passing Greek land, naval, and amphibious forces for grain and other foods in the agorai provided to them was not only not very onerous, but also (very) infrequent.

The capacity to supply markets to satisfy the provisioning requirements of passing military forces will obviously have varied from polis to polis. Some general remarks can be made here, however. Firstly, grain markets in inland areas in the classical Greek world were not closely integrated across space.\footnote{Cf. Erdkamp (2005) 175-205.} “As far the distribution of grain was concerned, inland regions in antiquity were truly isolated.”\footnote{See Erdkamp (2005) 199 citing Xen., Hell. 4.7.1.} This was primarily because of the high costs of the overland transport of grain common to all pre-industrial societies,\footnote{See again Pleket (2008) 182 quoted at p.253 above. See here also Langton (1998) 387: “... but it is incontrovertible that bulky commodities could not be hauled long distances overland before railways applied mineral energy to the task. In early modern times, agricultural surpluses were of very little value except near to navigable water, and large towns could only exist on waterways because of the inordinate difficulty and cost of getting energy, in the forms of food and fuel, to them.” See, too, Temin (2001) 179-180: “[s]urviving prices also tend to be for places that were accessible by water. Ships could carry bulk goods across the Mediterranean and up rivers, but it was hard and expensive to carry them over land. Roman roads were not primarily for the transport of goods, and they did not go everywhere. Wagons off the roads moved with far greater effort and diminished speed. The result is that inland locations were less firmly connected to the general market. To a first approximation, the Roman market for bulk commodities extended only slightly beyond where ships could go, although high-value goods could travel to land-locked destinations.”} but it was also because of the political fragmentation and intense political particularism in the classical Greek world, which presented institutional obstacles to
regional market integration and urban specialization among poleis. The astu of each classical Greek micro-state was the center of consumption and (administrative control of) distribution of grain and other goods produced in its territory; in addition, each polis strictly controlled the export of grain from its territory (export was only possible once a license had been granted by the state authorities). Each (especially inland) polis attempted to act “as a local monopolist” of grain as an ethic of self-sufficiency pervaded polis decision-making regarding the proper distribution of this product. In addition, the frequent (and long-lasting) bad feelings between neighboring poleis also hindered regional trade in grain and other goods. This political fragmentation and particularism was also characteristic of maritime poleis, too. But the (relatively) cheap costs of sea transport permitted the commercialization and export of grain surpluses from maritime cities once polis authorities had ascertained that their city had enough grain for its needs. This could happen often enough so that regional markets in seaborne grain in the classical Aegean (at least) could become (weakly) integrated over time.

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93 I owe this idea to Epstein (2001) 18 (describing a similar phenomenon in early modern Europe). Cf. Bintliff (2002) for the arguments in the rest of this paragraph.

94 See Gauthier (1979); Bresson (2008b) 72-83, 189-192.

95 See again Epstein (2001) 18. For poleis aiming for self-sufficiency in grain, see, e.g., Osborne (1987) 103-104. Note, however, that the classical Greek understanding of autarkeia (“having enough for one’s own needs” (Harris [2001a] 5)) did not necessarily mean that a polis attempted to rely solely on its own resources: see Bresson (2000) 109-130 with Harris (2001a) 5, and main text just below.


97 Cf. Epstein (1992) 282 on sea transport permitting domestic trade in grain in medieval Sicily. See also Descat (1993) 151: “l’interdiction générale portant sur un produit est une forme de contrôle du commerce compatible avec des autorisations d’exporter accordées à des individus...” See also in this regard Aristot., Rhet. 1.4.11, 1360a12-17: the men wishing to be active in political affairs should know regarding the food supply of his polis what his polis produces and what it lacks, and with whom it is necessary to make
All of this is to say that the inhabitants of classical Greek poleis, and especially inland poleis,99 would normally have had more than sufficient surpluses of grain to sell in agorai to meet the demand of passing military forces.100 But the distribution and production of grain in inland poleis may normally have been only partially commercialized since producers did not have usually have access to outside markets, and therefore had limited opportunity or incentive to produce grain and other goods for sale; this, rather than the need for polis authorities to acquire more grain, probably explains why the leaders of classical Greek generals alerted inland poleis along their lines of importation and exportation agreements (“ἔτι δὲ περὶ τροφῆς, πόση δαπάνη ἰκανή τῇ πόλει, καὶ ποιά, ἢ αὐτοῦ τε γιγαντεύον καὶ εἰσαγωγήμας, καὶ τίνων τ’ ἐξαγωγῆς δέονται καὶ τίνων εἰσαγωγῆς, ἣν περὶ τούτων καὶ συνδῆμαι καὶ συμβολαί γίνωμαι”). For full discussion of the implications of this passage, see Bresson (2000) 119-130.

98 See, e.g., Rhodes and Osborne no.18.17-20 demonstrating that neighboring poleis could function as regular sources of imports for coastal poleis in the Aegean: in 387/6, the Athenians allow the Clazomenians to visit the ports of the poleis from which they import their grain; “τῶν πόλεων ἀγοραίουσαι Κλαζομένιοι, Φωκάας καὶ Χίω καὶ Σμύρνης, ἐναντίον αὑτοῖς ἐς τὸν λιμένα” (“whether Clazomenae’s sources of corn are Phocaea, Chios, and Smyrna (Wilhelm) or Chios, Miletus and Smyrna (Ziebarth), it is striking that they are nearby cities, not the distant sources of which Athens has accustomed us to think.” Cf. Reger (2007) 469-470 on grain markets in the Hellenistic Aegean. But regional grain markets in the classical Greek world (even among island or coastal poleis) were never so integrated or robust as to allow “the rise and consolidation of more complex and integrated urban hierarchies and networks which reflected the growth of market integration and functional specialization” (Epstein [2001] 18). Cf. Bintliff (2002) 224, 234-235.

99 But see, importantly, Xen., Anab. 6.6.3, describing conditions during the later part of the Cyreans’ halt at Calpe Harbor: “ἣδε δὲ ἦν πολλὴ πάντων ἰδρυματική· καὶ γὰρ ἠγοραὶ πάντων ἢερων ἐκ τῶν Ἐλληνίδων πόλεων...” (“And by this time there was a great abundance of everything, for market products came in from the Greek cities on all sides...”) The fact that traders came from the Greek cities on all sides, (i.e. including those poleis that had already provided xenia and agorai to the mercenaries), and provided an abundance of products for sale, acts a forceful indicator of the ability of the traders of these poleis to mobilize large surpluses of grain and other goods for trade.

100 See again Tuplin (1991) 373: “[o]ur historical sources are, for the most part, sovereignly disdainful about such mundane matters as how easy it was to keep bodies of soldiers sufficiently well fed and watered for them to be effective (and how often their effectiveness was hampered by failings in this regard). To some extent this must be because the ordinary processes of the agricultural economy produced substantial stored surpluses of food in many regions and that armies did not commonly pass back and forth across the same areas often enough to exhaust the possibility of such surpluses for pillage or purchase – so major problems were rare.”
march in advance of their coming. The certainty of the arrival of an approaching army and thus a greatly increased (temporary) demand for grain and other goods at a polis will have provided a great incentive for producers to make available their surpluses for sale; it will also have encouraged itinerant traders from the region to come to the polis to sell other food products to soldiers. The practice of alerting poleis expected to provide markets by amphibious and naval forces is not specifically attested, but it may have occurred, too, in any case, news of the preparation and coming of large fleets of triremes will normally have reached cities before those triremes.

These considerations explain why it could be assumed by all actors in wars in the classical Greek world that poleis could receive passing armies, navies, and amphibious forces, even ones as large as the Sicilian expedition. They also explain why the problems of supply we do sometimes find mentioned in our ancient literary sources in

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101 See again Xen., Hell. 3.4.11; Xen., Hell. 5.4.48. See also Polyb. 28.12.4: the Achaean League in 170 sending envoys to the poleis on the way to Thessaly (where it planned to fight against Perseus) “ἵνα τὸ στράτευµα πὰν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀγορὰς ἔχῃ.” Cf. Anderson (1970) 53: “[e]ven willing allies... could not be expected to provide an adequate and convenient market for a large body of men without notice in advance, and a prudent commander would warn friends along his proposed line of march to have food ready.”

102 Cf. de Ligt and de Neeve (1988) 399 on temporary large aggregations of people at festivals encouraging the presence of itinerant traders at those festivals.

103 The generals of the Sicilian expedition sent three triremes ahead of the main body of the expedition to find out which of the cities along the coasts of Italy and Sicily would receive them (Thucy. 6.42.3), but this is not quite the same thing as alerting poleis on the expected route of a voyage of the need to prepare a market.

104 See chapter 2 section iie. See also ps.-Aristot., Oec. 2.2.7, 1347a32-1347b2: the authorities at Lampsaicus apparently hearing by chance about the fleet of triremes sailing to their polis rather than having been instructed of their coming.

105 See chapter 1 section iiiia for the Sicilian expedition; chapter 1 section i, iiiia for poleis in the Aegean; chapter 3 section iiia, iiib for inland poleis and poleis on the coast of the southern Black Sea.
connection with markets provided by *poleis* were all products of extraordinary circumstances. Xenophon mentions scarcity of supply in markets supplied by the *poleis* of Trapezus and Perinthus to the Cyreans,\(^{106}\) but this scarcity can be explained in both cases by the fact that the mercenaries were staying outside these cities in winter,\(^{107}\) months after the old harvest and months before the new harvest, when supplies of grain for sale in markets would have been at their lowest level (throughout the Greek world);\(^{108}\) and by the fact that the difficulties the markets at Trapezus and Perinthus had in supplying the mercenaries in winter would have been exacerbated by the extraordinary length of their stays near these cities.\(^{109}\) The Cyreans, because of their stateless and leaderless status, were in an extraordinary position both at Trapezus and Perinthus; rather than halting briefly at these *poleis* on their way to a campaign theater, they had to stay for extended periods of time at both cities as they figured out (literally and figuratively) where they would go next. The same problems (protracted winter stays at *poleis*) probably explain Xenophon’s comment that Derkylidas, having taken nine cities in eight days in Asia Minor in 398, set out about planning how he might avoid being a burden to

\(^{106}\) See *Anab.* 5.1.6, 7.6.24 with chapter 3 section iiia.

\(^{107}\) The Cyreans were staying at Trapezus in January and February of 400: Lee (2007) 19, 29-30 and n.72, and Table 1. Their halt at Perinthus took place in the early winter of 400/399: see Xen., *Anab.* 7.6.24 with Lee (2007) 41, Table 1.

\(^{108}\) See the discussion at Erdkamp (2005) 147-155; cf. Pleket (2008) 182. For attempts by Greek *poleis* to provide grain for sale in winter months to smooth the intra-annual price volatility caused by decreasing amounts of grain in the market, together with the inelastic nature of demand (for grain), see Gauthier (1987), Stroud (1998).

\(^{109}\) Xenophon mentions that supplies were scanty in the *agora* provided by the Trapezuntians in an assembly held after the mercenaries had already spent thirty days encamped in some Colchian villages near Trapezus: see Lee (2007) 36 n.122.
his allies, as Thibron had been the previous winter, by wintering in a friendly country; the pressures exerted by the continued and prolonged demand of Thibron’s forces for grain when the market supply in the poleis they stayed in was at its lowest annual level would have placed a great burden on the resources of these poleis. Again, though, since passing armies, navies, and amphibious forces usually requested agorai from poleis in the summer (after the grain harvest) and for (very) short periods of time, they could normally expect that poleis would (always) be in a position to offer them sufficient market supply of grain and other goods for their brief halts and onward marches and voyages.

iv. The behavior of markets provisioned by traders accompanying classical Greek land campaigns

In chapter 3, I noted that private traders played only a supplementary role in the provisioning of classical Greek land campaigns because of the high costs of transporting grain overland. But this is not the full story, since it does not take into consideration the

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110 Hell. 3.2.1: Derkylidas “ἐβουλεύετο ὅπως ἂν μὴ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ χειµάζων βαρὺς εἴη τοῖς συµµάχοις...” Derkylidas avoided being a burden on friendly cities by making a truce with Pharnabazus that allowed him to spend the winter plundering the villages of Bithynian Thrace in order to supply his army (Xen., Hell. 3.2.1-2).

111 Cf. here Diod. 14.108.1-2 (with Frontinus, Strat. 3.4.3; Polyuenus, Strateg. 5.2.10; and chapter 3 section iiib): Dionysius asking Rhegium (or Himera) in 391 to provide him with an agora, with the intention that if the Rhegians (or Himerans) did not provide one, he would have a pretext to attack their city; and that, if Rhegium (or Himera) did provide an agora, he could easily reduce the city by starvation after their supplies had been exhausted in provisioning his force (Diod. 14.108.1: “... δόντων δ' ἐνόµιζεν ἐξαναλώσειν αὐτῶν τὸν σῖτον καὶ προσκαθίσας τῇ τόλιν διὰ τήν σπάνιν ταχύ νυχτείσαιν αὐτῆς”). In the event, the Rhegians (or Himerans) provided the market for several days but ceased doing so when they became suspicious of the fact that Dionysius’ army continued to remain outside their city for an extended period; Dionysius used the refusal to continue providing an agora as a pretext to lay siege to the city. Again, the reasoning behind Dionysius’ ruse was that a city could normally expect to provide an agora to a passing military force for only a limited period (of a few days); it was only an extended stay by a military force that could lead to grain supply problems within a polis providing an agora to a military force.
question of demand: that is, despite the expense of transporting grain overland, private traders would have done so if the demand of soldiers on land campaigns for grain was sufficiently inelastic to tolerate the increase in prices caused by its transport.\footnote{112} Since, however, soldiers could normally acquire provisions while on campaign from markets provided by poleis in friendly territory, and from foraging in hostile territory, their demand for grain from the private traders accompanying them would have been very weak. Even in cases of real scarcity of grain, traders’ windfall profits from selling grain would be limited by soldiers’ substitution of unusual foods for grain,\footnote{113} soldiers’ expectations that they would/might be able to purchase grain at a (substantially) cheaper price in the near future at a friendly polis, and by the fact that trust between traders and soldiers would deteriorate in such situations (thus increasing the chances of soldiers’ violent expropriation of the property of traders who engaged in (high) price-taking). Traders accompanying classical Greek armies would have limited themselves, then, to carrying ‘topping up’ amounts of grain,\footnote{114} or would have carried no grain at all.

Private traders following Greek armies, however, may have been able to make a profit in some cases by carrying for sale low bulk, high value per unit of weight foods such as cheese or honey.\footnote{115} Especially for the better paid land forces of the fifth and early fourth centuries, and for any land forces throughout the classical period who had


\footnote{113} See chapter 4 section ii for discussion and illustration of this point.

\footnote{114} See Hale (1985) 160 for this phrase.

\footnote{115} See already chapter 3 section v.
gained substantial amounts of plunder, the (relatively) high amounts of money in those armies may have led to a greater demand for such foods, and for other goods with (relatively) high income elasticities of demand such as better-quality, more expensive wines and olive oils. But the fact that most *opsa* were so cheap (and bulky), together with the fact that they could be bought more cheaply in friendly territory in *polis*-provided markets (because they were not bearing the same transport costs as the goods carried by traders following armies) and foraged in hostile territory (or substituted for out of locally gathered greens and herbs in friendly territory), meant they could not bear the costs of transport. Higher-value foods were probably often available to armies, too, by purchase in the *agorai* provided by the cities along their lines of march or by foraging or plundering from enemy territory; these opportunities to acquire higher-value goods elsewhere and more cheaply (or for free) would obviously have limited soldiers’ demand for these goods from the private traders who followed them. In addition, in armies in which soldiers were struggling to receive their pay (i.e., most fourth century armies) and/or had limited opportunities to raise money through plunder, the

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117 See Böckh (1886) 127-132; Markle (1985) 280-281 with Cook (1990) 85 n.60.

118 Clark and Haswell (1970) 182-183: “vegetables less valuable per unit of weight than grain.”

119 See Thucy. 3.111.1: in the winter of 426/5, the Mantineans and soldiers from other Peloponnesian states deserted from their Ambraciot allies by leaving camp “ἐπὶ λαχανισμὸν καὶ φρυγάνων ξυλογήσα εξελθόντες,” “under the pretense of gathering herbs and firewood.” The fact that the Peloponnesian soldiers could desert under the cover of gathering herbs shows that this was a common practice in classical Greek armies.

120 See the soldiers of Mnasippus getting a taste for fine wine from the plundered wine-cellar of Corcyran country estates in 373 (Xen., *Hell.* 6.2.6).
greater price and income elasticities of demand of higher value foods and wines may have (greatly) restricted soldiers’ consumption of these foods and therefore their purchase from traders. Demand, then, for all foods carried by private traders accompanying classical Greek armies was frequently, if not mostly, (very) restricted.

Why, then, were traders a constant presence on classical Greek land campaigns, and sometimes in great numbers? The answer can be given in one word: booty. Classical Greek armies normally sold their booty on the spot; as Pritchett points out, “this is not surprising, since... the progress of an army would be greatly impeded by the transportation of booty, particularly livestock. Moreover, pay was often in arrears, and money was required to satisfy this need.” Thus, the λαφυροπῶλαι and other officials in Greek armies charged with the sale of plunder usually sold it in hostile (and often remote) territory; this meant that the private traders accompanying armies represented the only source of demand for these goods. This, in turn, meant that the traders on classical Greek land campaigns were able to purchase plunder (very) cheaply in the field. Two examples illustrate the point: firstly, on Agesilaos’ campaign in Phrygia in 396, the

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121 For the elasticity of demand for wine, note that Cyrus, in his instructions for the march to Thymbrara, believed that his army could eventually adapt to living without wine (Xen., Cyr. 6.2.26-29).

122 See, e.g., Diod. 14.79.2: Agesilaos’ army setting out from Ephesus in the summer of 396 accompanying by an “ἀγοραῖος... ὄχλος” no less in number. The description of the preliminaries to the battle of Leuctra at Xen., Hell. 6.4.9 also implies the presence of a large number of traders within the Boeotian army (see chapter 3 section iva for full discussion of this passage).


plunder was so great that traders could buy it for “almost nothing,” “ἀντίπροικα”;

secondly, as a result of the Peloponnesians epiteichismos at Decelea in the latter years of the Peloponnesian War, the Thebans enjoyed great riches because “τὰ τε γὰρ ἀνθρώποδα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἁλισκόμενα μικροῦ τινος ἀργυρίον παρελάµβανον” (“because they took possession of the slaves and all the other plunder very cheaply”) (Hell. Oxy. 13.4).

The opportunity to make large profits from the resale of this booty in nearby cities or their home cities provided a great incentive to traders to follow land campaigns. Some idea of the profits that could be made by traders following campaigns can be provided by an examination of Agesilaos’ campaign in Asia Minor in 396-394. As the result of one battle with Persian forces in the early spring of 395, in which he captured the enemy camp, Agesilaos raised more than seventy talents from the sale of plunder. In total, he raised more than one thousand talents from the sale of plunder during his time in Asia Minor (this is the largest securely attested sum for proceeds from the sale of booty in the classical Greek world). Although some of this money was raised from

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125 See Xen., Ages. 1.18 (with chapter 2 section v for full context).

126 As it did in later pre-industrial European land warfare: see chapter 3 section iva for references.

127 See Xen., Hell. 3.4.24 for the figure. See Xen., Ages. 1.28-33, Hell. 3.4.21-24 and Hell. Oxy. 11 for (different) accounts of this battle.

128 Recalled to Greece in 394 and having defeated an anti-Spartan coalition at Coronea, Agesilaos deposited the obligatory dekate to Apollo at Delphi, a tenth of the proceeds of the plunder he had sold during his campaigns in Asia (see Plut., Ages. 19.4). Xenophon states that the dekate came to no less than one hundred talents (Hell. 4.3.21, Ages. 1.34); thus Agesilaos managed to amass at least one thousand talents from the proceeds of sales of booty in Asia Minor.

129 See appendix 7 for figures for the proceeds of the sale of plunder by classical Greek military forces.
selling booty in cities in Asia Minor,\textsuperscript{130} the great bulk of it would have been raised by sales to traders at low prices: that is, the total profit of traders following Agesilaos’ campaign could have extended into thousands of talents. Agesilaos’ campaign was exceptional in being able to plunder wide areas of rich and previously unplundered territory, but large sums (just not as large) could also be raised from plunder in ‘mainland’ Greece, too: thus, Thucydides states that, in 414, the Argives invaded the border territory of Thyrea and plundered much Spartan property that sold “for no less than 25 talents.”\textsuperscript{131}

There were, then, potentially large amounts of money for traders to be made from the purchase of plunder from classical Greek armies. In the final analysis, it may have been this fact that provided the rationale for much of the food carried by sutlers to sell to soldiers on their marches to war zones. Since traders on overland campaigns had to bring baggage-animals to carry back their purchased plunder from campaign theaters anyway, it made sense for them to attempt to make a profit, or at least cover their costs of transport,\textsuperscript{132} by using the transport capacity of these animals to carry food to sell to

\textsuperscript{130} See Xen., \textit{Hell.} 3.4.19, \textit{Ages.} 1.29: Agesilaos instructing the heralds at Ephesus in the winter of 396 to sell naked the captives seized by his army’s raiding parties from the territory surrounding the city. More importantly, while Agesilaos was wintering at Lake Dascylitis in the winter of 395, he ordered his admiral Pancalus “ἐνθέµενον ὅσα τῶν διηρπασµένων ἦν πλείον ἄξια διαγαγεῖν εἰς Κύζην, ὅπως ἄπταν τοὺς µεθὲς τῷ [παντῷς] γένοιτο” (“to put on board all the more valuable part of the plunder and transport it to Cyzicus, that it might produce pay for the army”) (\textit{Hell. Oxy.} 22.4).

\textsuperscript{131} 6.95.2: “λείαν τῶν Λακεδαιµονίων πολλήν ἔλαβον, ἣ ἐπράθη ταλάντων οὐκ ἔλασσον πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι.” See Hornblower, \textit{CT} iii.523 ad loc.: “[i]t is most unusual for Th. to give this sort of financial detail about what was in fact normal military practice... The amount is huge and this may be partly why Th. mentions it.”

\textsuperscript{132} I.e. the food requirements (and, in some cases, hire) of their baggage-animals.
soldiers on the outward march to war zones. Those land campaigns that could be expected to acquire large amounts of booty might have been accompanied by exceptionally large amounts of traders (and food carried by traders) for two reasons, then: firstly, because as noted above, traders could expect soldiers to have more income than usual and thus demand for their goods to be higher than usual; but also, secondly, because more traders would follow along in the hope of making profits from plunder (and bring food with them to sell on the march to the war zone).

I end this section by briefly discussing the provisioning of sieges of inland poleis undertaken by classical Greek armies. Sieges of inland poleis were very rare in the classical period; in addition, classical Greek states only attempted to blockade neighboring poleis (which were surrounded on all sides by states friendly to the besieging state). Since, as has been discussed, classical Greek states did not have access to large stores of grain through requisitioning, taxation-in-kind, or private contractors, they relied on private trade to provision the continuous supply lines required to ensure the continuous security of supply necessary for forces blockading (both inland and maritime) poleis. Private trade could be relied on to provision the few men who would be left

133 I thank Peter Myler for making this point to me.

134 Cf. Erdkamp (1998) 119-120 for wealthy Roman armies fighting in rich areas being accompanied by more sutlers and camp-followers than usual.

135 See Krentz (2007) 180 for a list of land (circumvallation) sieges undertaken by classical Greek poleis; add also Mycenae (468) (see Diod. 11.65.2-5 with Krentz [2007] 176).

136 See chapter 2 section iic.
behind to man the circumvallation wall around a besieged inland city once the blockade had been completely established.\textsuperscript{137} Because the men manning the blockade would have quickly eaten out the area surrounding the besieged city,\textsuperscript{138} they would have soon needed new supplies of grain (and other foods). In other words, private traders could transport grain overland to besiegers in the knowledge that those men could not acquire grain from any other source and therefore had a constant demand for grain. For the same reason, agricultural producers from nearby poleis would have carried grain and other foods overland to inland sieges in the hope of making a profit—especially in the slack periods of the agricultural year, when the costs of their transport would have been externalized.\textsuperscript{139} Such small trade would also have been encouraged by the complete tactical superiority enjoyed by the besiegers, rendering null the chance of attacks on traders or farmers carrying goods to the blockade. But, because of the absence of the necessary infrastructure to transport large amounts of grain long distances overland in the classical Greek world,\textsuperscript{140} private trade was never capable of provisioning continuous overland supply lines to (large-scale) sieges of distant land poleis or those not surrounded on all

\textsuperscript{137} See, e.g., Thucy. 2.78.2. Cf. again chapter 2 section iic.

\textsuperscript{138} See again chapter 2 section iic.

\textsuperscript{139} Cf. the Colchian villagers bringing down cattle and other goods to the Cyreans during their stay at Cerasus (Xen., Anab. 5.7.13). For a similar phenomenon (peasants flocking to stationary armies establishing markets) in later pre-industrial European history, see Braudel (1981) 210-211 (the siege of Pavia in 1524-1525), Keegan (1993) 302 (Wellington’s army in the Iberian peninsula in 1807-1808).

\textsuperscript{140} See again chapter 3 section v.
sides by friendly states (to the besiegers);\textsuperscript{141} the contrast with the possibilities afforded by private trade to provision huge overseas forces engaged in blockades of distant coastal or island poleis is total.

\textit{v. The behavior of markets supplied by traders in the operational bases of classical Greek naval and amphibious forces}

In Xenophon’s \textit{Oeconomicus}, Socrates tells Ischomachus that his father loved agriculture as much as

\begin{quote}
oἱ ἔµποροι φιλόσιτοι εἰσί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἔµποροι διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν τὸν σῖτον, ὅπου ἂν ἀκούσωσι πλεῖστον εἶναι, ἐκεῖσε πλέουσιν ἐπ’ αὐτὸν καὶ Ἀιγαῖον καὶ Ἐὔξεινον καὶ Σικελικὸν πόντον περῶντες: (28) ἔπειτα δὲ λαθόντες ὅποσον δύνανται πλεῖστον ἀγοῦσιν αὐτὸν διὰ τῆς θαλάττης, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὸ πλοῖον ἐνθέµενοι ἐπ’ αὐτὸν πλέουσιν. καὶ ὅταν δεηθῶσιν ἀργυρίου, οὐκ εἰκῃ αὐτὸν ὅπου ἂν τύχωσιν ἀπέβαλον, ἀλλ’ ὅπου ἂν ἀκούσωσι τιµᾶσθαι τε µάλιστα τὸν σῖτον καὶ περὶ πλείστου αὐτὸν ποιῶνται οἱ ἄνθρωποι, τούτοις αὐτὸν ἄγοντες παραδιδόασι.  
\end{quote}

merchants love grain. So deep is their love of grain that on receiving reports that it is abundant anywhere, merchants will voyage in quest of it: they will cross the Aegean, the Euxine, the Sicilian sea; (28) and when they have got as much as possible, they carry it over the sea, and they actually stow it in the very ship in which they sail themselves. And when they want money, they don’t throw the grain anywhere at haphazard, but they carry it to the place where they hear that grain is most expensive and the people prize it most highly, and deliver it to them there. (20.27-28)\textsuperscript{142}

The \textit{emporoi} Socrates/Xenophon describes here would have been especially attracted to the markets located in the camps of classical Greek amphibious forces

\textsuperscript{141} Classical Greek states would not have been able to effectively protect overland supply lines, in any case: see chapter 3 section ivb.

\textsuperscript{142} Cf. Plato, \textit{Laws} 952D-953A: traders mentioned as the first of four kinds of unavoidable foreign visitors to cities: coming continually in summer (just like migratory birds) (952D), “οἱ πολλοὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἄτεχνοι οὖν πετόμενοι χρηµατισµοῦ χάριν ἐµπορευόµενοι ἔτους ὥρᾳ πέτονται πρὸς τὰς άλλας πόλεις,” “trading for the sake of money-making, they fly from city to city for the length of the summer” (952E) (cf. 949E).
engaged in blockades of coastal and island *poleis*, and also to those in the operational bases of classical Greek navies engaged in protracted operations abroad. This would have been so for a number of reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, the (relatively) massive demand of amphibious forces (blockading cities) and stationary fleets provided a huge incentive to traders to sail with grain (and other goods) to them. The size of the markets provided by the fleets fighting the Ionian War, and by the forces besieging (e.g.) Samos, Potidaea, or Mytilene, was larger than that provided by any urban population in the classical Greek world, with the exception of Athens and Syracuse—and the Athenian forces that attempted to reduce Syracuse, and those that did reduce Samos, may have been greater in number than even the populations of these two imperial *poleis*.\(^{143}\) In addition, the fact that amphibious forces and navies remaining immobile for operational reasons could not access grain or other foods from any source other than sea-borne supplies transported by traders (in contrast to the populations of the urban centers of *poleis*, many of whom would have been engaged in agriculture of some sort) magnified their demand for imported grain.\(^{144}\) Hence, the markets in the camps of stationary classical Greek amphibious forces and navies would have offered far more price stability to grain traders than the markets of normal *poleis* (or almost any other *polis* apart from Athens or Syracuse).\(^{145}\) Traders could sail to the bases of immobile amphibious forces

\(^{143}\) See chapter 1 section v.

\(^{144}\) See again chapter 2 section ii, iv: classical Greek sailors and soldiers engaged in blockades would have quickly consumed all of the provisions in the area surrounding the besieged city; fleets in operational bases would have been surrounded by friendly territory and therefore had no opportunity to forage for provisions.

\(^{145}\) See Erdkamp (2005) 190-191 for the idea here.
and navies with the certainty that the constant high demand for grain in the markets in these bases would ensure a constant price level for this good.\textsuperscript{146} In contrast, price levels for grain (and other goods) in the much smaller markets of maritime ‘Normalpoleis’ could collapse with the arrival of just one ship;\textsuperscript{147} traders sailing to the agorai of these ‘Normalpoleis’ could never be sure that they would not be anticipated by competitors before they arrived with their grain. This brings up a related point: traders from all over the eastern Mediterranean would have known of the efforts of Athenian forces to reduce rebellious poleis by blockade in the fifth century,\textsuperscript{148} and of the locations of the bases of fleets operating in the seas off Asia Minor in the last years of the Peloponnesian War. The amount of time required to prepare these massive amphibious and naval undertakings would have given sufficient time for news of their preparation to spread throughout the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean generally;\textsuperscript{149} and the fact that sailors and soldiers were recruited for these operations from all over the Greek world would have furthered the spread of news of their preparation. In contrast, information on (sudden surges in) demand for grain in normal (i.e., small) maritime poleis (especially those in peripheral areas of the Greek world) may sometimes have been much slower in reaching grain traders, or may not have reached them at all.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{146} Cf. Morley (2007a) 56.


\textsuperscript{148} The same is valid for the Athenian siege of Syracuse and the western Mediterranean.

\textsuperscript{149} See again chapter 2 section iic for the classic illustrative example of Thucy. 3.3.5.

\textsuperscript{150} Cf. Pleket (2008) 183: ‘[c]onnectivity’ was definitely promoted by mare nostrum; its potential, however, should not be overestimated. Harvest shocks were unpredictable; good, fast, adequate
The constant, massive demand of immobile amphibious and naval forces for grain, together with the fact that traders throughout the Greek world would have known of the nature and scale of this demand, ensured, then, that traders of grain surpluses would have found the markets in the camps of these forces especially attractive destinations for their grain. The fact that sailors and soldiers in these *agorai* would normally have had the purchasing power to make their demand for grain effective would also have drawn traders to the *agorai* of stationary amphibious and naval forces. The members of Athenian forces receiving a drachma per man per day (paid in full) during campaigns before 413\textsuperscript{152} would have had (much) greater daily incomes than (most of) the inhabitants of smaller island and coastal *poleis* in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{153} Even when pay rates for both the Athenian and Peloponnesian forces dropped to three obols in the early years of the Ionian War,\textsuperscript{154} or when, in the fourth century, τροφή was, increasingly, the only payment guaranteed to Greek sailors and soldiers (as opposed to μισθὸς ἐντελής),\textsuperscript{155} the total available income to spend on grain (and therefore the effective demand for it) in the

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\textsuperscript{151} See Erdkamp (2005) 203, 325 for this point.

\textsuperscript{152} See chapter 5 sections ii, iv; chapter 6 sections i-v, viii.

\textsuperscript{153} Cf. Erdkamp (2005) 195.

\textsuperscript{154} See chapter 5 section iii.

\textsuperscript{155} See chapter 6 sections vii, ix.
bases of amphibious and naval forces on protracted operations abroad would have been (much) greater than in normal *poleis*.

In addition, especially for the very well-paid Athenian forces before 413, traders would also have been enticed to overseas amphibious and naval bases by the opportunity to sell goods with greater income elasticities of demand. The fact that the one drachma per man per day dispensed to overseas Athenian forces before the outbreak of the Ionian War (as well as the lower rates of pay dispensed after this date) only had to provide for the subsistence requirements of the man receiving it (and not for a whole family) increased further the disposable income available to sailors and soldiers on operations abroad. Thus, well-paid classical Greek sailors ashore in the fifth and fourth centuries could be characterized in elite representations of their behavior as spending like drunken sailors ashore, so to speak;\(^{156}\) even if these representations were claims made in highly tendentious speeches, they still had to proceed from some basis in reality in order to have any rhetorical effectiveness.\(^{157}\) Two anecdotes preserved from later sources confirm the point that the greater incomes of sailors and soldiers led to greater demand for goods and services other than grain and other essential provisions:\(^{158}\) thus, Polyaeon mentions in his collection of stratagems that

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\text{Ἰφικράτης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ἔχοι διδόναι μισθοφορὰν, ἦγε τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς ἀοίκητα χωρία καὶ ἀκτὰς, ἵνα ὡς ἐλάχιστα ἀναλίσκοίεν· εἰ δὲ εὐποροίη χρηµάτων, ἦγεν}
\]

\(^{156}\) See Thucy. 8.45.2 (with chapter 5 section iii), [Dem.] 50.35-36 (with chapter 6 section viii).

\(^{157}\) Cf. Aristoph., *Ach.* 544-554: sailors’ preparations for a typical major amphibious expedition including not only the purchase of essential provisions for their voyages, but also spending on parties.

\(^{158}\) The fact that classical Greek sailors and soldiers were paid in monthly lump sums may have added to any tendency of theirs to engage in periodic bouts of high spending (see chapter 6 section viii for the periodicity of payments for classical Greek military forces).
if Iphicrates could not pay his soldiers, he led them to uninhabited places and coasts, so they would spend as little as possible. If he had plenty of money, he led them to cities and wealthy places, where they could spend their pay quickly and be eager for action due to their lack of money. (Strateg. 3.9.35)

Similarly, Athenaeus reports Alexis of Samos as writing that the prostitutes accompanying the Athenian expedition to Samos in 441-439 made so much money from the sailors on this expedition that they were able to dedicate a temple to Aphrodite from the dekate on the proceeds of their trade during the siege (13.245F). Since classical Greek traders were mostly engaged in ‘cabotage,’ amphibious and naval forces’ demand for goods other than grain will have also resulted in greater seaborne supplies of grain to these forces; Greek traders engaged in tramping will have brought, in addition to the small amounts of heterogeneous and more expensive goods they carried on-board the boats they were sailing in, small supplies of grain, too, to sell to sailors and soldiers.\footnote{See Braudel (1972) 102-108 for the classic discussion of ‘cabotage’; see also Horden and Purcell (2000) 140-142; Erdkamp (2005) 177-181; Pleket (2008) 183.}

Fourthly, the fact that traders could count on return cargoes when sailing to the bases of classical Greek amphibious and naval forces provided another incentive for them to sail to these forces.\footnote{Cf. Erdkamp (2005) 193, 195, 203, 325 for this point.} This was especially true for Athenian forces employed on overseas operations. In the mid fourth century, Xenophon could comment that one of the reasons why Athens was a most profitable port for traders (Xen., Poroi 3.1) was that whereas

\begin{quote}
... τοῖς ἐμπόροις ἐν μὲν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἀντιφορτίζεσθαι τι ἀνάγκη: νομίσµατι γὰρ οὐ χρησίµοι ἐξω χρῶνται· ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀθηναῖς πλείστα µὲν ἐστιν ἄνταξάγειν ὧν ἄν δέονται ἄνυψωσει, ὡς ὃς μὴ βούλωσται ἀντιφορτίζεσθαι, καὶ
\end{quote}
ἀργύριον ἐξάγοντες καλὴν ἐµπορίαν ἐξάγουσιν, ὅπου γὰρ ἂν πωλῶσιν αὐτό, πανταχοῦ πλέον τοῦ ἀρχαίου λαµβάνουσιν.

... at most ports merchants are compelled to ship a return cargo, because the local coinage has no circulation in other states; but at Athens they have the opportunity of exchanging their cargo and exporting very many classes of goods that are in demand, or, if they do not want to ship a return cargo of goods, it is sound business to export silver; for, wherever they sell it, they are sure to make a profit on the capital invested. (Poroi 3.2)

The demand for Athenian coinage—caused by its reputation for purity—can also be seen by the number of hoards found throughout the eastern Mediterranean in the archaic and classical periods with large numbers of Athenian coins—and by the frequent striking of counterfeit Athenian coinage in the east.161 Traders sailing to Athenian overseas forces in the classical period could be assured, then, of a valuable return cargo (since these forces were (obviously) paid in Athenian coinage).162

Fifthly, private traders could often also expect to acquire a valuable return cargo in the bases of Athenian and other overseas forces abroad in the form of purchased plunder. The fact that both the Athenian and Peloponnesian forces had to live off plunder in the Ionian War—that is, the fact that they had to acquire and sell large amounts of plunder in order to raise their pay163—meant that traders could often purchase large amounts of plunder cheaply from them; cheaply because, again, traders would have formed the only source of demand for the booty collected by the sailors of the Athenian


162 Occasionally, traders could be assured of the same valuable return cargo, too, when sailing to the operational bases of Peloponnesian overseas forces during the Ionian War: see Briant (2002) 615-616 for Cyrus overstriking Athenian tetradrachms in order to use them to pay the Peloponnesian forces he was supporting.

163 See chapter 2 section iv for discussion and references.
and Peloponnesian fleets. Even before the Ionian War, Athenian amphibious forces had collected and sold massive amounts of plunder while on campaign: the sale of plunder from Cimon’s victory at Eurymedon had allowed the Athenians to meet the costs of various items of state expenditure and to finance the construction of the southern wall of the Acropolis,\textsuperscript{164} proceeds from the sale of plunder also made a limited contribution to meeting the expenses of the Athenian building program which started in the 440s.\textsuperscript{165} Although Athenian amphibious forces did not have to sell booty to raise pay before the Ionian War,\textsuperscript{166} men engaged in blockades would have had plenty of time to scour the countryside surrounding besieged cities for property to sell off to merchants sailing to their \textit{agorai} to trade with them.\textsuperscript{167} The hope (or expectation) of cheap plunder (to re-sell elsewhere) would have continued to draw traders to the operating bases of Greek amphibious and naval forces throughout the fourth century, too.\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{164} See esp. Plut., \textit{Cim.} 13.6; see Blamire (1989) 151 for other references and brief discussion.


\textsuperscript{166} With the limited exception of the Sicilian expedition: see chapter 1 section ivb. But the funding of the Sicilian expedition through the sale of plunder, and plans to do so, occurred only when expected sources of income failed (the money from the Egestans) or were wanted for other operations (i.e., the war ‘at home’ against the Peloponnesians): one should not therefore use the evidence for the (actual and planned) sale of booty in Sicily as evidence for the usual Athenian methods of financing amphibious expedition at (or prior) to this time.

\textsuperscript{167} Cf. the next note for the activities of the amphibious forces under Timotheus at Olynthus and Samos in the 360s.

\textsuperscript{168} See again appendix 7 for a list of figures for the proceeds of the sale of plunder in the classical Greek world. For Athenian and Peloponnesian forces raising pay through the sale of plunder during the Corinthian War, see, respectively, Sommerstein (2001) 2-3, Loomis (1992) 68 and n.100. See also (again), e.g., ps.-Aristot., \textit{Oec.} 2.2.23a, 1350a23-30 (a version of the same anecdote is found Polyaenus, \textit{Strateg.} 3.10.1): Timotheus’ men at Olynthus in 364 selling booty stolen from the surrounding countryside to traders. See ps.-Aristot., \textit{Oec.}, 2.2.23, 1350b5-7 (and Polyaeus, \textit{Strateg.} 3.10.5, 9): Timotheus raising
Traders would also have been attracted to destinations that offered them security of supply. As discussed, because there were no serious competitors to Athenian naval power in the Aegean between 480 and 412, traders could supply Athenian amphibious operation employed in protracted operations in the Aegean in complete security. But this complete naval superiority and security of supply disappeared in 412 with the outbreak of the Ionian War. After that date in the Peloponnesian War, since traders sailing to enemy forces were (always) fair game for combatants, and both the origins and destinations of the goods carried by traders could be checked by written declarations of money at Samos in 366-365 by selling the Samians’ own crops and country property (“τοὺς κάρπους καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄγρων”) back to them. See also Isocrates in his Antidosis: praising Timotheus for taking twenty-four cities in the course of his career (113), cities which included Corcyra, Samos, Sestos and Crithote in the Hellespont, and Potidaea and Torone in Thrace (107-109) (Sestos and Crithote in 365, Potidaea before 361), all the most strategically important cities in their respective regions, and all with no great outlay of money, and without forcing the Athenians to pay eisphorai. Isocrates pours most praise on Timotheus’ Samian campaign (111), a city which took Pericles two hundred ships and two thousand talents to capture [in 440], but which Timotheus captured after a siege of ten months with a force of eight thousand peltasts and thirty triremes, “and he paid all these forces from the spoils of war (καὶ τούτως ἀπαίνει ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας τὸν μισθὸν ἀπέδωκε).” That is to say, Timotheus had to pay fourteen thousand men (eight thousand plus thirty x two hundred men) for ten months: at three obols per man per day, this would have cost three hundred and fifty talents; at two obols per day, just over two and hundred talents. Note also that Cornelius Nepos (13.1) states that Timotheus gained booty to the value of twelve hundred talents in the war with Cotys, King of Thrace, in the late 360s. The sum is very large and from a doubtful source but, as Pritchett ([1991] 501) notes, Isocrates wrote of this same campaign in Thrace (7.9) that Athens had “πλαύω δ’ ἡ χώρα τάλαντα μάτην εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρωπούς...” (“had squandered to no purpose more than a thousand talents on mercenary troops.”) See also chapter 6 section viii for Athenian amphibious forces expected to be able to raise their own pay through the sale of plunder. See also Gabrielsen (1994) 117 and 251 n.26 for more examples of fourth century Athenian fleets and amphibious expeditions raiding for plunder to fund their campaigns.

169 See chapter 1 section i; cf. chapter 2 section iiic. The naval power of the Athenian empire also allowed it to block imports to its enemies: see, e.g., Osborne (2000a) 59, Rhodes (2007a) 35 and n.69 for references and discussion.

170 See, e.g., van Wees (2004) 223. Cf. Andoc. 1.138: in response to allegations of impiety in his taking up ship-owning after his exile from Athens, Andocides responds by stating: “ἔτι δὲ πολέμου γεγομένου καὶ τριήρων ἄλλα κατὰ σάλιον ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ ληστῶν, ως ἀν τολμᾶς ληπτέοντες, ἀπολέσαντες τὰ ὄντα, δουλεύοντες τὸν βίον διετέλεσαν...” (“Furthermore, it was war-time; the sea was infested with triremes and pirates, who took many a traveller prisoner, and after robbing him of his all, sent him to send his days in slavery.”) The Athenian murder of the Peloponnesian ambassadors in the late 430 was in reprisal not so much against the attacks on their traders sailing around the Peloponnesse but to some particularly heinous treatment of these traders by the Spartans: see Thucy. 2.67.4 with chapter 2 section iii.
which they received when they bought those goods, their trading with both sets of combatants became less secure. In the fourth century, when the Athenian navy was just one of many navies operating in the Aegean (if most of the time the strongest), i.e. when the Athenian navy was much less powerful and operating itself sometimes as a predatory agent, there were more dangers for traders sailing over the seas to stationary Athenian amphibious forces and navies, and thus possibly less grain supplied to those forces (and to the overseas forces of other states for the same reasons). But this (greater) insecurity of supply in the Ionian War and the fourth century was probably as serious a problem for traders supplying grain and other goods to poleis, and therefore may not have greatly affected the supply of immobile overseas forces (relatively speaking). In addition, while there is no explicit certain mention of classical Greek amphibious and naval forces providing convoys for the grain ships providing their food supply, we may assume that this was current practice in amphibious and naval warfare from 412 onwards.\footnote{See Polyaenus, \textit{Strateg.} 5.13.1, 5.22.1 for possible mentions of convoys escorting grain supplies to amphibious and naval forces. Cf. Xen., \textit{Hell.} 1.6.37: the traders provisioning the Peloponnesian force engaged in the siege of Mytilene sailing as that part of that force when it lifted the siege after the Peloponnesian defeat at Arginusae.}

Finally, the loss of complete control over the Aegean by the Athenian state would also have compromised the complete security of the food supply of their overseas forces in another way, too. In the fifth century (before 412), Athens could count on provisioning support from (more or less) every state in the Aegean.\footnote{See Bresson (2000) 131-151 for demonstration and discussion.} But after 412, and the rebellion of many poleis from their empire, Athenian overseas forces had many fewer

\footnote{See Thucy. 6.21.2 with chapter 1 section i.}
states to draw supplies from, since enemy *poleis* would not supply grain or other goods to them (and, in any case, importation of goods from enemy states to Athenian forces during the Peloponnesian War was illegal). ¹⁷⁴ No other amphibious or naval force after 412 would ever have the ability to import supplies from all over the Aegean (and the eastern Mediterranean) which the Athenians enjoyed before that date.

The performance of the markets supplied to stationary amphibious and naval forces in the Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries did not, then, remain unchanged over time. The *agorai* in the bases of Athenian amphibious forces engaged in blockades of revolting *poleis* before 412 were probably particularly well supplied with grain (and other goods), since before this date Athenian forces were (mostly) very well paid,¹⁷⁵ enjoyed complete security of supply, and had access to imports of grain from all over the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean. After 412, Athenian and other amphibious and naval forces were never as well paid, or enjoyed the naval superiority or access to supplies which the Athenians had prior to that date. In some cases, the pay of amphibious or naval forces was either not dispensed on time, or never dispensed at all.¹⁷⁶ News of delay in payment or lack of payment to immobile amphibious forces or fleets would have discouraged traders from sailing to those forces or fleets; the disorder caused by lack of pay, and the consequent (greater or lesser) loss of control of officers over


¹⁷⁵ See, however, chapter 6 sections ii, iii for the Athenians experiencing problems and delays in paying their overseas forces in the mid 420s.

¹⁷⁶ See, e.g., the discussion at chapter 6 section iv for irregularity of payment and non-payment of *μισθός* to Peloponnesian forces during the Ionian War; see also, e.g., *Hell. Oxy.* 19.2: Conon’s forces in 395 owed many months’ pay.
sailors and soldiers, may have also deterred traders from sailing to these forces and fleets, since the chances of violent expropriation of their goods would have increased proportionately with the level of disorder within operating bases due to a lack of or delay in pay. All that said, throughout the classical period, the (relatively) enormous demand of stationary amphibious forces and navies for grain, and for goods with high income elasticities of demand, the secure information available to traders about that demand (and the price stability it ensured), the opportunities for (highly) profitable return cargoes those forces and navies offered, all had the result that traders from all over the eastern (and western) Mediterranean had massive incentives to sail to the agorai of immobile (for operational reasons) Greek amphibious forces and navies.\(^{177}\)

The number of ships needed to provision the continuous supply lines necessary in order to ensure the constant logistical security of stationary amphibious forces and navies was not enormous.\(^{178}\) The forty thousand men (the crews of two hundred triremes) present at Samos during the last six months of the blockade of that city in 440-439 (?) will have required 50,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or just over 800 (metric) tons of

\(^{177}\) Two other factors may have encouraged traders to sail with grain supplies to overseas forces. Firstly, two passages from Aristophanes (Eccl. 1027 (with Ussher [1973] ad loc.), Wealth 904) apparently indicate that emporoi were exempt from military service at Athens at the turn of the fifth century—perhaps in return for supplying Athenian forces? Secondly, traders sailing to maritime poleis to exchange in their markets were liable to a range of indirect taxes: import/export taxes, taxes on goods in transit, and harbor dues (see Vélassaropoulos [1980] 205-231). Were all of these taxes and dues levied on traders sailing to the agorai of classical Greek amphibious forces and trireme fleets? There is no way of achieving certainty on this question, but it may be held on general considerations that it is probably unlikely that these taxes and dues were levied in the camps and bases of amphibious and naval forces; this may have provided another (large) incentive to traders to sail to stationary amphibious and naval forces.

\(^{178}\) Cf. Erdkamp (1998) 56, 61-62, 83 on the shipping required to supply the needs of overseas Roman Republican forces; cf. also Bachrach (2002) 92 on the needs of the sixty thousand men of the first Crusade besieging Antioch: “[t]he naval assets that were required to supply the Crusader camp, in addition to whatever protection had to be provided by war ships, were not of a great order of magnitude.”
wheat equivalent of grain\textsuperscript{179} per month: the Athenian forces at Syracuse somewhere between 37,500 and 62,500 \textit{medimnoi} of barley-meal (or between 600 and 1,100 tons of w.e. of grain)\textsuperscript{180} per month; the Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets in the Ionian War (assuming twenty thousand men on each side) 25,000 \textit{medimnoi} of barley-meal (or just over 400 tons of w.e. of grain)\textsuperscript{181} each per month; the Athenians sailors and soldiers blockading Potidaea from the summer of 432 to the winter of 430/429 just over 21,500 \textit{medimnoi} of barley-meal (or just over 350 tons of w.e. of grain)\textsuperscript{182} each per month; the Athenian force besieging Mytilene in 428/427 11,250 \textit{medimnoi} of barley-meal (or just 180 tons of w.e. of grain)\textsuperscript{183} per month. Unfortunately, one is reduced to guessing—at best, ‘guesstimating’—the number of ships that would have needed to sail to the camps and bases of classical Greek amphibious forces and navies to meet their subsistence requirements, since there is very little information available on the carrying capacities of classical Greek trading vessels: underwater archaeology has produced three shipwrecks intact enough to produce figures for carrying capacity; 25, 30, and 126 tons.\textsuperscript{184} The

\textsuperscript{179} Really 824,100kg per month.

\textsuperscript{180} Really between 618,075kg and 1,103,125kg. Between these figures because the forces of the Sicilian expedition amounted to somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 men.

\textsuperscript{181} Really 412,050kg.

\textsuperscript{182} Really 21,520 \textit{medimnoi} and 355,107kg.

\textsuperscript{183} Really 185,422kg.

\textsuperscript{184} See Reed (2003) 18-19 and n.23 for references. See Gibbins (2001) 283-288 for summary and discussion of our knowledge of classical Greek shipwrecks. An average of 3,000 \textit{medimnoi}/amphorae for the size of classical Greek trading vessels is often cited by scholars, citing Casson (1971) 171 n.23 who based this figure on \textit{IG} XII, Suppl. 348 (a fourth century decree of Thasos regulating use of its harbor). But
problem is complicated by the fact that none of these three wrecks was carrying grain, and also by the fact that it is unclear how much of the carrying capacity of trading vessels (which were not dedicated grain transports) was normally taken up with grain.\(^{185}\)

I will conclude this section, however, with some general considerations that suggest that the numbers of ships required to supply the *agorai* of classical Greek amphibious and naval forces need not have been great. Firstly, if one adopts a figure of 30 to 100 tons as a relatively safe range for the carrying capacity of dedicated grain-carrying vessels in the classical Greek world, the number of ships needed to satisfy the energy requirements of immobile blockading forces and navies will have between somewhere between two and thirty. Secondly, the fact that overseas forces were often—perhaps, mostly—provisioned from areas relatively near to or in their theater of operations meant that traders may have been able to make several return trips a month to and from camps, thus reducing the number of ships needed to provision these forces.\(^{186}\) Thirdly, ‘tramping’ traders coming to engage in exchanges with sailors and soldiers will have brought small amounts of grain, too, also lessening the number of dedicated grain-carriers needed to sail to camps and operational bases. Fourthly, and finally, Athenian overseas forces in the Aegean, at least, assumed that they could be provisioned

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186 See Thucy. 6.21.2 with chapter 1 section i: Nicias’ speech implying that Athenian overseas forces on campaign in the Aegean could obtain their supplies from friendly territory within the Aegean. See also chapter 1 section iva: the Sicilian expedition being provisioned from nearby areas in Italy and Sicily. Cf. again Rhodes and Osborne no.18 (cited at p.479 n.98 above): neighboring *poleis* functioning as regular sources of imports within the Aegean.
adequately by sea during the winter, as well as the summer: there will have been no peaks of supply needed during the summer months, then. In sum, the number of specialized grain-carrying vessels will have been in single figures, or in low double figures.

vi. Concluding remarks

In Thucydides’ narrative of the Sicilian expedition, although the inability of the Athenians and Syracusans to pay their fighting forces is sometimes raised as a factor in the conduct of the war, the capacity of the Syracusans to provide supplies for their forces is always taken for granted in his narrative, and Thucydides mentions lack of provisions as a factor determining the Athenian conduct of operations only in exceptional circumstances: once when the expedition’s triremes spent an unexpectedly long amount of time away from their base (waiting for Messana to be betrayed to them in the early winter of 415/414 (6.74.1-2)); and again in the last days of the final retreat. But the problem of lack of provisions disappears from the narrative when the fleet returns to its winter base at Naxos, and even the lack of provisions on the expedition’s overland retreat from Syracuse was artificial: the men had very little or no food only because the generals had sent to Catana to tell that polis to cease exporting food to the expedition. Thucydides does raise on several occasions the problems that the Athenians had in safeguarding seaborne imports to the expedition, but, just as the capacity of coastal poleis to provision

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187 See again Thuc. 6.21.2 with chapter 1 section i; see also chapter 2 section iic.

188 See chapter 1 section ivb on 6.46-49 and 7.48.5.
the passing expedition is taken for granted in his narrative of the Sicilian campaign, the
capacity of nearby friendly states to supply (through seaborne trade) the tens of thousands
of men who made up the Sicilian expedition is also always taken for granted by
Thucydides.

Thucydides also simply assumed the capacity of the sometimes massive Athenian
amphibious forces blockading rebellious poleis in the Aegean in the fifth century to
provision themselves through seaborne grain supplies transported (and owned) by private
traders. Even for the Ionian War, when Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets were paid
less (and sometimes not paid at all), could not draw from the entire Aegean (and eastern
Mediterranean) for their supplies, and could no longer guarantee complete security to the
traders providing their grain, the provisioning of those fleets through seaborne (private)
trade is still assumed by Thucydides, and also by Xenophon and Diodorus. As this
chapter has shown, the basis for these assumptions was sound: the legal and
administrative framework of classical Greek ‘military markets,’ as well as the conditions
of distribution of grain in the classical Greek world, enabled classical Greek overseas
forces (and classical Greek armies on the march to war zone) to provision themselves
easily and sufficiently through markets. This was the reason why, as the conclusion of
chapter 5 demonstrated, that severe and sustained price increases in the agorai organized
for classical Greek military forces were rare; the normal functioning of classical Greek
economies made possible the normal functioning of the agorai organized for classical
Greek military forces.

189 See chapter 2 sections iia, iic.
It may be objected here that some of the conclusions of this chapter are not so surprising: as I have demonstrated, the demands on the resources of poleis at which classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces halted on their way to campaign theaters were not that great; and the subsistence requirements of even the greatest classical Greek overseas forces could be met by perhaps ten or twenty trading vessels a month. But the conclusions of this chapter are important for two reasons. Firstly, they confirm that the scholarly orthodoxy that prices for grain and other goods in the agorai provided to classical Greek military forces were regularly very high is without foundation. Secondly, and more importantly, they show that markets in grain (and all of the institutional, legal, and built infrastructure these imply) could be assumed all over the Greek world in the fifth century (and the fourth, too).
Conclusion: Classical Greek Armies and Navies and the Structure and Performance of Greek Economies in the Fifth Century B.C.E.

The scale and duration of classical Greek military campaigns were determined by the economic, institutional, and social structures of the classical Greek world. The fact that, in the fifth century (especially), tens of thousands of Greek sailors and soldiers taking part in amphibious and naval operations could (and could be assumed to) depend (for months or years at a time) on markets (in which they bought food in true market exchanges) to acquire their provisions demonstrates that classical Greek economies were market economies (based on agriculture). This is not to say that all economic transactions took place through the market, but that “[m]arket exchange was ubiquitous, and market prices moved together in ways typical of markets, albeit imperfectly co-ordinated ones.” Markets in grain and other goods provided the economic framework in which classical Greek military forces operated. Classical Greek states did not have to construct complex apparatuses to feed the thousands of men who constituted their amphibious, land, and naval forces (forces that (excepting Republican and imperial

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1 See Temin (2001) 172-173: in other advanced agricultural market economies, substantial proportions of output were allocated by other means than market transactions. Cf. esp. McMillan (2002) 6-7: “[a] lot of transactions are excluded by this definition of a market. Markets are never ubiquitous. Even in the most market-orientated economy, a majority of transactions do not actually go through markets. The reach of markets is delimited... Why then is it called a “market economy”, given that a majority of transactions, those inside households, firms, and government, are actually outside the market? It is a market economy because even these nonmarket transactions take place within the context of markets. The market transactions mold the economy overall.”


3 Cf. van Wees (2007) 273: “[f]or all the accounts and images of war in art and literature, for all the temples littered with dedications of booty and victory monuments, the impact of war on Greek society was rather limited. The demands of war usually did not dictate the daily routine of citizens, or shape social and political structures, or dominate economic activity. On the contrary, in archaic and classical Greece it was the demands of social, political and economic life which shaped warfare.”
Rome) were not surpassed in size in Europe until the late fifteenth century and the rise of the large territorial state). The organizational system of classical Greek overseas military provisioning remained at all times the institution of the market (supplied by private traders transporting their own stocks of grain (and not engaging in ‘directed trade’)). In addition, the practice of funding armies and navies on campaign by the sale of plunder, and the presuppositions underlying this practice, demonstrate that there were robust markets for goods other than grain in the classical Greek world (and very large volumes of monetary exchange in that world). The picture of the fifth (and fourth) century Greek world that emerges from an analysis of the provisioning of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces, then, is one with robust commercial supply mechanisms for grain (and other foods), and high levels of liquidity and aggregate demand.

For two reasons, however, an analysis of the provisioning of classical Greek military forces cannot provide any direct information on the performance of classical Greek economies. This is so for two reasons. Firstly, the sources of the grain sold by traders to Greek military forces are indicated in ancient accounts of military conflicts very rarely, and then only in the vaguest of terms. Thus, Thucydides mentions in passing that the Athenians in Sicily in 415-413 were being supplied with grain from Catana and Italy; Nicias’ second speech to the assembly before the departure of the Sicilian

\[4\] Cf., e.g., Dotson (1995) 223 for a survey of Italian fleet sizes in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (paralleling classical Greek fleet sizes); and note esp. (ibid.) 222: in 1295 “the Genoese put to sea the largest fleet ever launched by any Italian city: 165 galleys with 35,000 men.”

\[5\] See chapter 1 sections iva, v.
expedition implies that Athenian overseas forces operating in the Aegean in the fifth century could assume supplies of grain from nearby friendly poleis; and Dionysius I, in his war against the Carthaginians in 396, apparently relied, too, on provisions from nearby friendly poleis while he was based at Egesta (Diod. 14.55.5). We (almost) never certainly know, then, where classical Greek overseas forces (remaining immobile at operational bases) were supplied from.

Secondly, there are no indications in contemporary or later sources of the impact of classical Greek land and overseas forces’ demand for provisions on the ‘normal’ grain supply of Greek states. In other times and places in pre-industrial European history, the demand of military forces for grain (and other foods) sometimes led to massive dislocations in the normal grain trade and supply of communities, and thus to serious food shortages in those communities. In other times and place in pre-modern Europe, too, the presence of military forces sometimes led to substantial price rises in the areas in which they were operating. There is no mention of dislocations in the classical Greek

6 See chapter 1 section i.

7 See only Thuc. 3.82.2: in the Greek world of Thucydides’ time, “ό δὲ πόλεµος ύψαλών τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ κατὰ σάλτ’ ἡµέραν” (“war takes away the easy supply of daily wants...”). Cf. the discussion at chapter 7 section iii.

8 See, e.g., Housley (1999) 128-129: “[s]o effective was the redirection of Sicilian grain towards the supply needs of Louis IX’s crusading army in Tunisia in the summer of 1270 that there were shortages not just in the north Italian cities but at Syracuse itself...” See also Hale (1985) 181 on the same phenomenon in fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe.

9 See Garnsey (1988) 247-248 for price rises in cities associated with the presence of Roman (Republican and imperial) armies; Kaegi (1993) 46 for price rises associated with Roman armies in fourth century Antioch and in Anatolia in the late sixth century. See also Hale (1985) 181-182 on this phenomenon in fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe. Note here, too, that Greek cities in the Hellenistic and Roman periods sometimes intervened to fix prices for food at festivals, and on other occasions when temporary large aggregations of people could be expected (see Migeotte [1997] 39-43 for discussion (of the seven epigraphical texts spread over five centuries attesting this practice)): the presence of temporary large
grain trade or rises in the price of grain related to the demand of classical Greek military forces. But, given that we rely for our accounts of classical Greek land and naval warfare on literary representations of that warfare, this is not surprising: we hear almost nothing of the effects of war on agriculture in the classical period, either, but difficulties in agricultural production caused by warfare are constantly mentioned in the much richer (extra-Athenian) epigraphical record of the Hellenistic period. Although we might expect to have mentioned in our literary sources disruptions to the grain supply of major states due to the demand of military forces for grain (and the fact that we do not does mean something), we should not expect to this be the case for the hundreds of smaller poleis dotted around the shores of the Aegean and western Mediterranean; that is to say, there is no way of knowing whether the more attractive markets provided by the camps and operational bases of classical Greek amphibious and naval forces drew grain away from—and thus led to subsistence difficulties in—small, insignificant ‘Normalpoleis’ in the fifth century. The provisioning of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious crowds of visitors, then, could be sometimes be expected in the Hellenistic and Roman Greek worlds to cause (temporary) price increases for food (cf. de Ligt [1993] 231-232; Chandezon [2000a] 91).

10 See Holleaux (1938) 99-101, Chandezon (2000b) for references and discussion. But note Chandezon (2000b) 240 nn.60-61: price rises (due to war) rarely (if ever) mentioned in inscriptions from the Hellenistic period (Moretti ([1977] 358) states that there are numerous inscriptions from (Aegean) islands describing situations in which imports became difficult because of the insecurity of the seas (because of war) or because of the necessity of provisioning armies directed merchants elsewhere—but none of the references Moretti cites supports (either of) these points).

11 See chapter 7 section v.
forces, then, cannot help us to say anything meaningful about the total (marketed) output of grain in the Greek world in the fifth (and fourth) century.\textsuperscript{12}

Demonstrating, through an analysis of the provisioning of classical Greek military forces, the existence of a regular and substantial overseas trade in grain in the fifth century can, however, help us to say some things about the performance of classical Greek economies. The existence of such a trade made possible increased specialization of labor and urbanization, and therefore the expansion of markets for other goods, and itself could only have been made possible by sizeable reductions in transactions costs for maritime commerce.\textsuperscript{13} it therefore provided the foundation for the kinds of economic productivity growth seen in other times and places in pre-industrial Europe.\textsuperscript{14}

I end by outlining one “line of investigation” that could provide important information on the performance of Greek economies in the fifth century. Recent work has demonstrated how the huge increase in the scale of Greek amphibious and naval warfare seen in the fifth century was made possible by increasing state centralization and

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. the evidence of sales of plunder for classical Greek economies: this cannot provide a foundation for further studies of regional Greek economies; the figures we have for proceeds from sales of plunder only represent a base, and can tell us nothing about the total amount of demand and liquidity within a particular city or region (although they do provide evidence for high levels of liquidity and demand for goods in many areas of the Greek world, and especially in Asia Minor).

\textsuperscript{13} Cf. Morris, Saller and Scheidel (2007) 10 on decreasing transactions costs.

the consequent concentrations of capital it permitted.\textsuperscript{15} Money became essential to overseas Greek war-making in the fifth century.\textsuperscript{16} But previous scholarship has missed the point that money only became essential for classical Greek amphibious and naval warfare because the growth of exchange economies in the Greek world enabled it to be so. Firstly, increased trade (as the most important source of tax income for Greek states) produced increased revenues for Greek states, which they—or, more precisely, hegemonic powers such as the Athenians—could then concentrate to pay their forces.\textsuperscript{17} Secondly, and more importantly, the introduction of military pay in the late sixth and fifth centuries did not encourage the creation of markets from nowhere (although it will have further encouraged commercialization of the Greek economy), but was itself dependent on the presence of markets in which it could be used. Tracing—or attempting to trace—the interrelationship between the development of market economies and the growth in the scale and duration of Greek warfare in the late sixth and fifth centuries seems to me to offer a promising way forward into the study of the performance of classical Greek economies.

\textsuperscript{15} See Morris (2001) esp. 78-79, 91; and the groundbreaking work of van Wees (2004) 232-239. It was the (much) smaller size of concentrations of capital available to Greek states in the fourth century that explains the lesser scale of overseas warfare in that century (and not any contraction in the size of markets): see, e.g., van Wees (2004) 239.


\textsuperscript{17} Thucydides makes the point clearly in his Archaeology: see, e.g., Gomme, HCT i.89, 108, 120; de Romilly (1967) 261-262, 267.
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Appendix 1: Thucydides’ Speeches as Historical Evidence

I first outline in this appendix my position on the general problem of the authenticity of Thucydides’ speeches. I then show that the basis for the shared understandings in Nicias’ second speech to the assembly before the Sicilian expedition concerning the workings of normal Athenian amphibious expeditions (in the Aegean and the ‘near west’) was secure since most (if not all or nearly all) of the Athenian citizens listening to him had considerable experience and/or knowledge of such expeditions. I end by discussing Thucydides’ method of bringing out judgments of speakers by (implicitly) comparing their arguments with the following narrative of events, and demonstrating that an analysis of the narrative subsequent to Nicias’ second speech to the assembly confirms my conclusion in chapter 1 section i that Nicias in that speech was asking for a superiority in triremes to protect shipments of provisions to the expedition in Sicily from states in the far west (and not from Athens).

i. The problems of the authenticity of Thucydides’ speeches

To get to the point, I find myself in complete agreement with Kallet-Marx (1993) on this question.1 With Kallet-Marx’s treatment of this question in mind, I want to emphasize here six considerations that I think are of particular importance in using Thucydides’ speeches as historical sources.

Firstly, the speeches are not free inventions: the arguments for this position were based on anachronistic assumptions about the plausibility of the historical and rhetorical

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1 (1993) 75-76 n.18 (or almost complete agreement: see Pelling [2000] 275 n.10 on γνώµης at 1.22.1 meaning ‘sense’ (or ‘gist’) rather than Badian’s ‘intention’). (All text references in this appendix will be to Thucydides’ Histories.)
arguments of the speeches; and on the incorrect view that Thucydides inserted the speeches into his work so that he could have occasions to comment on the objective narrative surrounding them.

Secondly, Thucydides’ strikingly novel concern about the problems of accurately representing speeches, and his desire to keep as closely as possible to the gist of what was actually said (“... it is of basic importance that Thucydides should bring the speeches actually delivered into the question at all and suggest that they might be of concern to his readers”), show that he rendered the speeches as accurately as he could.

Thirdly, that said, Thucydides does stress that, in contrast to his account of the ἔργα of the war, the speeches are his product and do not aim for the same level of accuracy as his account of the ἔργα.

Fourthly, if the responsions between speeches and events, and between speeches made at different times and places, sometimes seem very close in his work, we should remember that Thucydides chose to represent only those speeches that seemed to him the most important and useful in bringing out the themes and subjects he was interested in

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analysing; similarly, Thucydides’ understanding of what were the crucial factors in any
given situation guided him in his condensation, selection and arrangement of the
arguments in his speeches.\(^8\)

Fifthly, Thucydides describes his method in composing the speeches at 1.22.1, but
never indicates for any speech how much is “τὰ δέοντα,”\(^9\) and how much “τῆς ξυµπάσης
γνώµης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων.” “The vagueness of 1.22.1 is deliberate,” and suggests
the “strong possibility... that he is providing an umbrella description which could cover a
range of different procedures, and that he composed more freely at some times than at
others.”\(^10\) In analysing the speeches of the debate on the Sicilian expedition, it is of basic
importance that Thucydides would have had “a large number of reliable informants for an
exchange all knew would be critical”;\(^11\) we should thus expect much of the total argument
of the words truly spoken in the speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades under consideration
here.

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\(^7\) Kagan (1975) 78; Pelling (2000) 118-119; Marincola (2001) 80-81. See, e.g., 1.139.4, 6.15.1, 6.19.1 for
explicit acknowledgements by Thucydides that he is not reporting all the speeches delivered in a debate
before an (Athenian) assembly.

Kagan (1975) 89; Greenwood (2006) 64; and see 2.13.9 for an unusually explicit statement of Thucydides’
criteria in deciding what to include in a speech (omitting from a representation of a speech of Pericles the
conventional arguments he used to urge support for the war). On the close correspondences between
the speech of the Corinthians at the second meeting of the Peloponnesian League at Sparta in 432 (1.120-124)
and Pericles’ speech before the Athenian assembly later in the same year urging the Athenians against any
concession to the Peloponnesians (1.140-144) not necessarily meaning (at all) that these speeches were
‘inventions’ of Thucydides, see Dover (1973) 25; Connor (1984) 49 n.58; and Hornblower, *CT* i.195-200.

\(^9\) On which see Macleod (1983) 68-69.


\(^11\) (Ibid.).
Sixthly, and finally, those speeches for which we might expect Thucydides to have had fewer informants for,\textsuperscript{12} and thus to consist more of “τὰ δέοντα,” will be still useful, “for to be persuasive an orator [and an author representing an orator] had to move within the attitudes, values and prejudices of his audience.”\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{ii. Nicias’ use of the ‘as you all know’ argument at 6.21-22}

To summarize and restate: Nicias based his justification for the unusual amounts and types of παρασκευή he would go on to ask the assembly for at 6.22 on the understanding—made explicit at 6.21.2—that his audience in the assembly was thoroughly familiar with the nature of Athenian amphibious operations in the Aegean. Nicias was, in other words, employing a common rhetorical strategy in classical Greek oratory, the ‘as you all know’ type of argument.\textsuperscript{14} The syntax of his speech (naturally) supported and reinforced this strategy. As Tompkins has pointed out,\textsuperscript{15} at 6.21 (and, in fact, throughout the speech), Nicias employed impersonal verbs (“... δεῖ... ξυµπλεῖν... ἐπιέναι”) and impersonal expressions employing abstract neuter adjectives and infinitives (“ἀισχρὸν δὲ βιαστὴν ἄπελθεν ἢ ὑστερον ἐπιµεταµπεσθείη,” “ἐφάσιον ἐλθεῖν”) that all “betray[ed] adherence to a\textit{ priori} concepts” and rested on “antecedent commitments”\textsuperscript{16}—

\begin{footnotes}
\item[12] See, e.g., Hornblower, \textit{CT} iii.395-396, 404 on the speeches of Hermocrates and Athenagoras (6.33-40.1).
\item[14] For a discussion of this type of argument, see Ober (1989) 149-150.
\item[16] Tompkins (1972) 193.
\end{footnotes}
on the nature of Athenian campaigns in the Aegean—that Nicias represented as shared by (himself and) his audience. This brings up an important question concerning the use of Nicias’ speech as evidence for the provisioning of Athenian campaigns in the Aegean (and Sicily): was there any basis for these shared commitments, for the ‘you all know how overseas expeditions in the Aegean are usually manned and provisioned’ argument, that formed the foundation of Nicias’ case for an exceptionally large παρασκευή for the Sicilian expedition? Were the Athenians addressed by Nicias thoroughly familiar with conditions on Athenian campaigns in the Aegean?

Ober writes of this ‘you all know’ rhetorical strategy,17

The statement that everyone knew something could be used in an attempt to manipulate the audience. Aristotle (Rhet. 1408a32-36) says that speechwriters used the tactic of saying everyone knows something to secure the agreement of even those who did not know it, because the latter would be ashamed at their ignorance of what was common knowledge.

So, for this type of argument to work, at least some of the speaker’s audience had to possess the knowledge assumed by the speaker to be ‘common knowledge.’ But in the case of Nicias’ audience, one can go further than that: many, if not most, of those present—some thousands of citizens of all ages and socio-economic statuses (see esp. 6.24.3)18—would have served on amphibious or naval operations in the Aegean or, at the

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17 (1989) 149.

18 Thousands of citizens: at 8.72.1, an oligarch envoy to the Athenians assembled at Samos is reported as stating that “what with their expeditions and employments abroad, the Athenians had never yet assembled to discuss a question important enough to bring five thousand of them together;” but this statement is not explicitly supported by Thucydides, and it is made by a speaker in a rhetorical context that requires the use of as low a figure as possible for past attendance figures at assemblies in order to support an argument (see Hornblower, CT iii.967 ad loc., and bibliography cited there). Also, although the figure of five thousand cannot have been a gross distortion of the facts, for then it would have had no real persuasive force (see Andrews, HCT v.183 ad loc.), it cannot be correct, either, since a quorum of six thousand was needed for an assembly dealing with questions involving individuals, and there must have been at least some of these
very least, would have learned of conditions on Athenian overseas campaigns from close family members, other relatives, and/or friends who would have taken part in such campaigns.\textsuperscript{19} Moreover, as Kallet has pointed out, the fact that Nicias employed this rhetorical strategy in the first place demonstrated that he thought that the assembled Athenians “collectively knew enough [about the conditions of overseas campaigns] to be expected to be impressed.”\textsuperscript{20} These considerations, taken together with the fact that Thucydides would have had many informants for this important speech and thus we should expect of much of the total argument of the words spoken by Nicias in this assembly,\textsuperscript{21} are important in that they add up to demonstrate that the foundation for the implicit and explicit understandings concerning the nature of overseas campaigns in the period referred to (see again Hornblower, \textit{CT} iii.967, Andrewes \textit{HCT} v.183). For the range of ages and statuses of the citizens present at the ‘Sicilian’ assemblies: see 6.24.3 with Dover, \textit{HCT} iv.262-263, Hornblower, \textit{CT} iii.361-363.

\textsuperscript{19} See Raaflaub (2007) 108: “[i]ndeed, many of those who voted [at Athens] upon a specific proposal for military action were going to be among the soldiers fighting to realize it in the field. Most of them had served in several campaigns on land or sea and thus were thoroughly familiar not only with the technical, logistic, and tactical issues, but also with the empire and thus with much of the “territory” in which such actions were going to take place. Despite frequent criticism of the assembly’s incompetence, the Athenians must have brought to most decisions on military matters a level of personal experience matched by few modern societies.” It should be noted here that, even in the quieter period (see 6.26) after the truce between the Athenians and Spartans in the summer of 423 (4.116-119) (leading eventually to the treaty of alliance between the two states in the winter of 422/1 (5.21-24)), the Athenians continued to dispatch amphibious and naval expeditions throughout the Aegean: there were operations in the Chalcidice and Thrace from 423 to 421 (see 4.129.2ff., 5.2ff., 5.32.1); in 418/7, there were operations in Thrace and the Argolid (see \textit{IG I\textsuperscript{3} 370.1-23 with ML} p.235) (note that no records for the expenditures of the treasurers of Athena have survived for the quadrennium 422/1-419/18 (Blamire [2001] 113)); in 417/16, there were again operations in Thrace (see \textit{IG I\textsuperscript{3} 370.24-26}), and Melos was reduced in an operation lasting from the summer of 416 to the winter of 416/5 (5.84-116). See also chapter 2 section iii on the \textit{periploi} sent around the Peloponnese in the years just before 415. Thus, there would have occasions even for the younger members of Nicias’ audience to have gained experience of conditions of campaigning in the Aegean, or at least to become familiar with these through report.

\textsuperscript{20} (2001) 44 n.81.

\textsuperscript{21} See p.563 and n.11 above.
Aegean (and the ‘near west’) that Nicias represented as shared with his audience was secure, since it lay upon a bedrock of experience and knowledge of amphibious and naval operations undertaken by the Athenian state in that part of the world. Nicias’ speech, then, once properly analysed, represents valid and important evidence for how Athenian overseas campaigns in the Aegean were usually provisioned.

iii. The relationship between logoi and erga in Thucydides and the importance of naval superiority for the provisioning of the Sicilian expedition

Stahl, in a discussion published originally in 1973, demonstrated that the old view of the relationship between speech and narrative in Thucydides, i.e., that Thucydides inserted speeches into his text to serve as opportunities to comment on the objective narrative around them, was wrong. Rather, the belated realization of the necessarily subjective character of narrative (i.e., the fact that any narrative implies interpretation) allowed us to reevaluate the relationship between speeches and course of events in Thucydides, and to realize that we could grasp Thucydides’ judgments of speakers and their proposals by examining the surrounding narrative: “not elucidation of events by speeches, but, to put it pointedly, elucidation of speeches by the ensuing (or preceding) narrative of events now seems the appropriate method of reading Thucydides.”


23 Stahl (2003) 174. Macleod, independently of Stahl, reached the same conclusion in an analysis ([1983] 69-70) that I quote here in full: “Thucydides is seeking not merely to record [the attempt by speakers to persuade an audience], but to show us how and why [the speakers in his narrative] succeeded or failed, to help us understand, and so also to judge, the speaker and his public. This purpose we can achieve in two main ways: by sifting the arguments and by examining their relation to the narrative. The speeches are so constructed that a careful reader can see into—or see through—the speaker’s reasoning; and the debate form, which confronts opposing arguments, is one of the chief means to this end. There may also be a revealing relation between speeches which do not belong together in time; a particularly valuable point of
Stahl applied this method of analysis to the speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades during the debate in the second assembly before the departure of the Sicilian expedition in 415. He demonstrated that it was exactly those factors that Nicias had emphasized in his second speech attempting to dissuade the Athenians from embarking on the expedition—cavalry, ships, money and grain supplies—that were to prove decisive in deciding the fate of the force sent to Sicily. Reading the narrative of the campaign that follows the speeches, and the emphasis Thucydides placed within it on the importance of cavalry, ships, money, and, vitally for the analysis here, provisions for the eventual outcome of the expedition, “... the reader quickly realizes that Thucydides himself favors the views of Nicias, whom the Athenians did not follow;” rather than heed the warnings of Nicias on the difficulties that a campaign in Sicily would inevitably encounter, however, the Athenians allowed themselves (in Thucydides’ presentation of events) to be seduced into the expedition by the specious arguments and distortions of Alcibiades.

reference are those of Pericles, for Thucydides Athens’ best leader. So too a complex pattern of verbal and conceptual echoes between speech and narrative helps him trace the path from proposal to event. This relation of words to deeds is at the heart of Thucydides’ thinking; for the whole work is a passionate, though often gloomy, enquiry into the possibility of rational behaviour in politics and war.” Thucydides had, in his introduction (1.21.2-1.22), alerted his audience to the fact that the speeches in his work would play a vital role—in combination with his description of the events that took place—in his account and interpretation of the war: see Macleod (1983) 70, Pelling (2000) 114-115, 118.


25 Stahl (2003) 177. In fact, Thucydides already presents Nicias in the introduction to his first speech to the assembly before the expedition as being correctly concerned that the Athenians were embarking on a great and dangerous undertaking on the specious pretext of aiding their allies, and that they were ignorant of the demands and dangers that their real goal, the conquest of the whole of Sicily, involved: see 6.8.4 echoing the narrative at 6.6.1 (and Connor [1984] 162 n.12, Rood [1998] 162, Stahl [2003] 182). The reader is thus “preconditioned” (see Kallet [2001] 36) by Thucydides’ introduction to this speech to be in sympathy with Nicias’ aim of warning the Athenians off the expedition.

26 On Alcibiades’ superficially attractive but fallacious and contradictory arguments advocating the expedition to Sicily, see Macleod (1980) 68-87; Connor (1984) 165-166; Jordan (2000) 72-73; Kallet
their own ignorance,\(^{27}\) and their irrational hopes and desires for the possible gains ensuing from conquest.\(^{28}\)

Thucydides, then, used his narrative of the expedition to pass judgment on the arguments of Alcibiades and Nicias before the assembly (and the decision-making ability of their audience)—and more specifically, to endorse Nicias’ analysis (as against Alcibiades’) of the conditions facing the potential expedition to Sicily as correct: “[t]he hard facts of money, horse, archers and grain supplies [and ships], as well as the stable

\(^{27}\) See Stahl (2003) 177, 181-183; Liebeschutz (1968) 306 on 6.2-5: Thucydides characterizes and underlines Athenian ignorance about Sicily by means of the ‘Sicilian Archaeology,’ and the deception at Egesta (see 6.6.2 and 6.8.2 with 6.46). (Nicias’ suspicions at 6.22 that the Egestaens are misleading the Athenians about the quantity of money they have available to support the Athenians in Sicily is borne out at 6.46.2; again, his analysis of Sicilian affairs is proven correct by the later narrative. See Stahl [2003] 178-179: “[a]nd by thus honoring Nicias, Thucydides implicitly exposes Alcibiades (and those who voted for his plan).”) It is probable, though, that Thucydides exaggerated the extent of the Athenians’ ignorance of Sicily before the Sicilian expedition: Buck (1988) 74; Greenwood (2006) 54; Missiou (2007) passim.

\(^{28}\) See esp. Stahl (2003) 183-184, 190-191; cf. also Liebeschutz (1968) 306 and n.134; Connor (1984) 159, 168. See also, e.g., Rood (1998) 152, Finley (1942) 217 n.25 on 6.1.1 echoing 4.65.4 where criticism of Athenian ‘grasping after more’ in Sicily is criticized. See also Nicias in his first speech, 6.10.5, warning the Athenians not to give into the tendency to ‘grasp for more’ (6.10.5). See also 6.31.6 for the Athenians letting irrational hopes and greed guide their decisions.
constitution of major Sicilian cities, in the long run prove Nicias correct and his risk-taking, war-mongering colleague-in-office wrong." This endorsement of Nicias’ analysis can be traced clearly and precisely by comparing Thucydides’ presentation of the differing positions of Alcibiades and Nicias concerning the importance of ensuring naval superiority for the expedition with his description of the Athenians’ experiences once they had arrived in the theater of operations in the far west. Alcibiades, addressing the assembly, had simply assumed that the Athenians would remain in control of the sea

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29 Stahl (2003) 191. See also Marincola (2001) 90 summarizing Stahl’s analysis of the relationship between the speeches of Alcibiades and Nicias and the ensuing narrative: “Stahl’s analysis of the speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades in Book VI in the light of the later Sicilian expedition argues that it was Nicias who correctly foresaw events, and the narrative plays up exactly those variables – Sicilian unity, money, cavalry [and ships and grain supplies] – that Nicias had foreseen as crucial. In this way the narrative retrospectively gives judgement on the two participants, and, by extension, the Athenians who voted for the expedition.”

For Hunter (1973) the—in her view, exact—anticipation of erga by logoi in Thucydides’ history showed an artist who was not so much concerned with writing a historical account of events, but with constructing a work with “a veritable complexity of repetitive patterns—patterns not merely of human behaviour but type-characters, events, and even sequences of events” ([ibid.] 179); since these patterns constituted the cycles of history, Thucydides’ readers could learn to recognize these in the future. Taking this view meant that Hunter had to argue that Thucydides had suppressed, exaggerated, and distorted historical data in order to maintain the exact relationship he (supposedly) sought between logoi and erga (cf. Ellis [1979], following the approach of Hunter, attempting to show how Thucydides in his Sicilian narrative consistently manipulated facts to maintain the relationship between the speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades and the ensuing narrative). If Hunter were correct in taking this approach, it would have serious consequences for our view of the historical reliability of Thucydides’ work. Hunter’s (and Ellis’) thesis, however, does not work for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was based on a naïve and outdated view of historical ‘objectivity’: see Marincola (2001) 100-101. Secondly, it ignored the fact that Thucydides did worry about sources of information: see Connor (1976-1977) 292 (and see [ibid.] 292-293 for an effective general refutation of Hunter’s work). Finally, the relationship between logoi and erga is not as neatly exact as Hunter’s analysis requires. To take the example of the Sicilian expedition, Thucydides’ narrative shows that “historical developments are anything but predictable, that is, steerable” (Stahl [2003] 200): there were very many points during the campaign in Sicily when things might have gone differently and the ultimate result of the campaign might have changed: see Stahl (2003) 216-219, Morris (2001) 71, Marincola (2001) 10. Also, to repeat from above (p.563 nn.7, 8), if the responsions between speeches and events, and between speeches made at different times and places, sometimes seem very close, we should remember that Thucydides chose to represent only those speeches that seemed to him the most important and useful in bringing out the themes and subjects he was interested in analysing; similarly, Thucydides’ understanding of what were the crucial factors in any given situation guided him in his condensation, selection and arrangement of the arguments in his speeches. For the Sicilian expedition, see Rood (1998) 160 for how “Thucydides gives prominence to Nikias by his selective use of speeches”; and note that, of the speeches after Nicias’ first speech, Thucydides only chooses to include Alcibiades’ (see 6.15.1-2, and Kallet [2001] 35). Cf. Connor (1984) 162 n.11 on the possible reasons for Thucydides’ presentation of the debate reconsidering the expedition, rather than the speeches before the initial decision was taken.
during any fighting in Sicily, even against all the Siceliots combined ("ναυκράτορες γὰρ ἐσώμεθα καὶ ξυμπάντων Σικελιώτων"), and therefore that, even if the campaign did not go well, the expedition could return home safely (6.18.5). Nicias, in contrast, had warned of the strength of Sicilian naval resources (6.20.4) and the need for the expedition to have an overwhelming superiority in triremes to counteract this and specifically “ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ῥᾳν ἐσκομιζόμεθα” (6.22). The subsequent narrative proves Nicias’ counsel to the assembled Athenians right.

In the second summer of the campaign in 414, Nicias decided to fortify Plemmyrium, a headland overlooking the Great Harbour of Syracuse, since “if this were fortified, it seemed to him that the bringing in of supplies would be an easier matter,” “ὁμών αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο ἡ ἐσκομιδὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔσεσθαι,” as basing the Athenian triremes there would make it easier to operate against the Syracusan fleet (7.4.4). Soon, however, after some (avoidable) tactical errors in the same summer, Nicias wrote to Athens that the expedition had lost its superiority in numbers of triremes and that it was now struggling with the Syracusans for control of the sea (7.12.2-7.13.1). Since the Athenians no longer had a “πολλῆς... περιουσίας νεῶν” (cf. 6.22: Nicias had advised that the expedition “ναυσί τε καὶ πολὺ περιεῖναι”), if they were to relax their guard even a little, they would not have their supplies, which were even then being brought with difficulty brought past Syracuse and into their camp: “τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐχ ἔξομεν, παρὰ τὴν ἑκεῖνων πόλιν χαλεπῶς καὶ νῦν ἐσκομιζόμενοι” (7.13.1). Nicias’ letter home and other parts of Thucydides’ narrative of the expedition show that it was the necessity to protect supplies coming by sea from Italy (6.103.2, 7.14.3, cf. 7.25.1-2) and Sicily (Catana:

30 See the discussion of Nicias’ speech in chapter 1 section i.
7.60.2) that meant that Athens had to have control of the sea. In the following winter, however, the Athenian forts at Plemmyrium were taken by the Syracusan army (7.23-7.24.2). This was a serious blow to the Athenians since, having lost Plemmyrium, the work of bringing in provisions through the entrance to the harbor could no longer be carried on with safety (since the Syracusans lying in wait there with triremes hindered this, and from now on the convoys could only make their entrance by fighting)... (7.24.3)

The greater competitiveness of the Syracusans on the sea was confirmed just after the loss of Plemmyrium, when eleven ships from Syracuse destroyed most of a convoy of boats sailing from Italy with goods for the Athenians (“πλοῖα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γέµοντα χρηµάτων”) (7.25.1-2). Eventually, the loss of Athenian superiority in trireme numbers and the growing naval ability of the Syracusans brought about a series of defeats at sea which led to the destruction of the expedition.31

The narrative of the expedition and especially the very close, almost exact, verbal echoes of Nicias’ advice to the Athenians at 6.22 found in Thucydides’ account of operations during the Sicilian campaign at (especially) 7.4.4, 7.13.1, and also 7.24.3—note especially there the use of ἐσκοµίσθη, a very rare word,32 recalling “ἐσκοµίζωµεν” at 6.22—bear out, then, Nicias’ analysis of the difficulties of provisioning the expedition in Sicily prior to its setting out and especially his emphasis on the importance of naval

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31 See chapter 1 section iva.

32 See Classen-Steup, vii.12 ad 7.4.4.
superiority for its successful provisioning.\textsuperscript{33} Crucially, in Thucydides’ narrative of the expedition, this (Athenian) naval superiority is linked with the security of logistical support from states near to or in the theater of operations (once that superiority was lost, the bringing in of supplies from areas near to the Athenian base of operations could no longer be guaranteed). Thus, given the close relationship between the \textit{erga} of the campaign and the \textit{logos} of Nicias, the close connection in Thucydides’ narrative of the Sicilian expedition between the struggle at sea and the provisioning of the expedition from nearby states (along with the lack of any mention of provisioning from Athens in the narrative of the expedition) confirms the analysis in chapter 1 section i that, at 6.22, Nicias was asking for a superiority in triremes to guarantee the safety of the transport of provisions from states near to the Athenian base of operations, i.e. from states in Italy and Sicily, and not, as previous treatments of Nicias’ speech have thought, from Athens.

\textsuperscript{33} Thucydides’ wish to demonstrate this means incidentally that he includes in his description of the Sicilian expedition the type of detail on provisioning that was usually omitted in the rest of his work as taken for granted by his audience in order to justify Nicias’ initial pessimism about the expedition and to demonstrate that the Athenians should have followed Nicias’ advice and not sailed to Sicily. Cf. here the many more mentions of the convention of reception by \textit{poleis} in Thucydides’ account of the Sicilian expedition: Thucydides includes these not only because the political/diplomatic situation in the far west was far more fluid than in the Aegean and the power of the Sicilian \textit{poleis} and their distance from Athens meant that their reception of the expedition could not be taken for granted, but also to bear out Nicias’ contention in his second speech to the assembly that the Athenians, if they embarked upon the expedition, would be sailing to a land that was potentially (entirely) hostile (see 6.21.2, 6.23.1-3).
Appendix 2: The Number of Men on the Athenian Campaign in Sicily in 415-413

Although Thucydides presents singularly detailed information on the size of the first armament that sailed from Athens to Sicily (6.43-6.44.1), and also provides (less detailed) information on its reinforcements, it is impossible to calculate with any precision the number of men who took part in the Athenian campaign in Sicily from 415-413. There are five main problems:

1. Perhaps the most serious source of uncertainty in calculating the numbers of men who took part in the campaign is that we do not know how many men rowed the troop-transports\(^1\) which are mentioned by Thucydides as constituting part of the first armament in 415, and which must have been the majority of the ships sailing under Demosthenes and Eurymedon in 413.\(^2\) Classical Athenian troop-transports were triremes that had been structurally modified in some way but could be reconverted into warships.\(^3\) But we are reduced to guessing as to what the structural modifications troop-transports underwent so as to be converted from triremes, and when it comes to estimating the number of sailors who were needed to row troop-transports.\(^4\) To accommodate the roughly 100 hoplites

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1. “στρατιώτιδες” at 6.43, but also referred to as ὀπλιταγωγοὶ by Thucydides (see, e.g., 8.25.1).

2. See now the recent summary of the problem at Hornblower, *CT* iii.1063-1065.

3. See Dover, *HCT* iv.309. (This is Dover’s possibility (iii) for the meaning of στρατιώτις. Recently, Wallinga ([1993] 174-177) has argued that triremes were regularly undermanned, and thus that Dover’s possibility (ii)—that a troop-carrier “was a normal trireme [i.e. with no structural modification] with a skeleton crew of sailors and a full complement of soldiers”—should be preferred (see Hornblower, *CT* iii.1063, 1064). But Wallinga’s arguments that triremes were regularly undermanned do not stand up to scrutiny (see n.40 below), and thus Dover’s possibility (ii) should still be rejected for the reasons outlined by Dover.)

4. Troop-transports were not rowed by the hoplites they were designed to carry: see Hornblower, *CT* iii.1064-5.
that each transport must have carried, each troop-transport must have had (many?) fewer rowers than a ‘fast’ trireme (i.e. (many) fewer than 170). But how many fewer, we do not know.  

2. Thucydides provides many fewer numbers and details for the second major armament that sailed out under Demosthenes and Eurymedon in the summer of 413 as a reinforcement than he does for the first expedition in the summer of 415. He mentions that the force under Demosthenes and Eurymedon consisted of 73 triremes, about 5,000 hoplites (of which 1,200 were Athenians “ἐκ καταλόγου” (7.20.2)), “not a few Barbarian and Greek javelin-men, slingers, and bowmen, and a sufficient amount of materiel and provisions” (7.42.1). There are several problems in attempting to calculate precisely the

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5 A figure of roughly 100 hoplites per troop-transport makes the most sense of the figures Thucydides gives for the number of ships and hoplites sailing to Sicily in 415 and 413. See van Wees (2004) 311-312 n.20; Hornblower, CT iii.1063-1065, and esp. the summary at 1065: “[l]et us assume that fast triremes carried 10 hoplite marines and were rowed by 170 sailors, and that troop-carriers carried 10 hoplite marines and were rowed by 60 sailors; and that some rowers were hoplites [N.B. this last step does not follow from the preceding discussion]... If we adopt Casson’s more conservative 85 as the no. of hoplites carried on troop-carriers, there is not room for 5,000 (40 x 85 = 3,400 on 40 troop-carriers + 100 epibatai on 10 fast triremes = 3,500) without yet more hoplite rowers. It is not possible to be more precise than this.” In practice, the number of hoplites carried by troop-transports must have varied according to the requirements and circumstances of an expedition: see Krentz (2007) 149 Table 6.1.

6 In addition, it is not absolutely certain that the troop-transports were oared by dedicated rowers: H. van Wees’ attractive suggestion (ap. Hornblower, CT iii.1064) “that the hoplites’ slave attendants acted as rowers on the transports” cannot be ruled out. Also, note that Thucydides does not indicate if any of the allied triremes in 415 were troop-transports, although it appears that none were: see Hornblower, CT iii.1063.

7 Cf. Hornblower, CT iii.619.

8 See Dover, HCT iv.419, Hornblower, CT iii.1062 for this number.

9 “... ἀκοντιστάς τε βαρβάρους καὶ Ἐλλήνας οὐκ ἄλλους καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ τοξότας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἱκανῆς.” For the translation of “τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν” in the text above, see chapter 1 section ii.
number of men who constituted this second force. Although Thucydides does not tell us that any of the 73 triremes were troop-carriers, most must have been, otherwise we cannot explain how the 5,000 hoplites were conveyed to Sicily;\(^\text{10}\) since Demosthenes and Eurymedon “brought as many troops as the original expedition, their 73 ships must have included troop-carrying space equivalent at least to 40 troop-carriers.”\(^\text{11}\) More precision than this is impossible, leading to the double problem that we have only a rough idea both of how many ships served as troop-transports in 413, as well as no real idea of how many men rowed these.

Secondly, since Thucydides does not provide a precise figure for the numbers of light-armed troops on the second expedition, it is also impossible to calculate exactly the numbers of men who made up the light infantry component of the second force.

Thucydides does mention that the second armament was joined (on its way to Sicily) by 150 Iapygian (7.33.4), 300 Metapontine (7.33.5), and 300 Thurian javelin-men (7.35.1), but he provides no figures for the slingers and javelin-men Demosthenes collected in Acarnania (7.31.5),\(^\text{12}\) from Aetolia,\(^\text{13}\) or for the light-armed troops recruited in the Aegean before the force had embarked from Athens.\(^\text{14}\)

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\(^\text{10}\) See Hornblower, *CT* iii.1063.

\(^\text{11}\) Dover, *HCT* iv.309.

\(^\text{12}\) Although these seem to have matched the number of light-armed troops recruited by the Athenians from elsewhere: this is the implication that follows from 7.60.4.

\(^\text{13}\) See 7.57.9 with Hornblower, *CT* iii.667 ad loc.

\(^\text{14}\) See 7.20.2: in addition to preparing triremes and recruiting hoplites from the islands for the expedition, the Athenians collected light-armed troops from their other allied subjects (“... καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμῶν ἑμμάχων τῶν ὑπεράνων, εἰ ποθὲν τι εἶχον ἐπίτηδειον ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, ἐμπαρίσαντες”). See Dover (1965b)
The expedition under Demosthenes and Eurymedon will also have been accompanied by vessels carrying supplies and materiel.\(^\text{15}\) Since the 413 expedition was smaller than the 415 expedition, there would have been fewer vessels of this type sailing in 413. But Thucydides provides no indication as to their number; thus, to arrive at any estimate for them, we would be reduced to falling back on probabilistic assumptions based on the numbers he does provide for the ships carrying supplies and materiel for the expedition in 415.

3. This leads to the third problem, that of estimating the numbers of slaves and non-combatants following the expedition(s).\(^\text{16}\) In 415, the purely military/naval part of the force was followed by 30 grain-transporters (which also conveyed the bakers, stonemasons and carpenters for the expedition)\(^\text{17}\) and by one hundred \textit{ploia} also requisitioned for the expedition. In addition, Thucydides tells us that many other \textit{holkades} and \textit{ploia} followed the expedition voluntarily for the purposes of trade. If it is difficult to calculate accurately the numbers of men on the officially requisitioned

\(^{15}\) See above on “\textit{τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν}” at 7.42.1, contra Hornblower, \textit{CT} iii.619 ad 7.42.1 (“[p]resumably we should not now factor in large numbers of merchant ships (\textit{ὁλκάδες}) and small boats, as at 6.44?””).

\(^{16}\) Cf. Hornblower, \textit{CT} iii.1062.

\(^{17}\) The masons and carpenters were still in Sicily in the summer of 413: 7.43.2.
vessels, it is impossible to do for the numbers of men on the private vessels sailing voluntarily.  

Another source of uncertainty for the calculation of the numbers of men on the expedition is the numbers of slave attendants. It was usual practice for citizen hoplites to be accompanied on campaign by slave attendants, and the 1,500 Athenian hoplites on the 415 expedition and the 1,200 on the 413 expedition who qualified for military service as a member of the top three property classes will certainly have had slave attendants.

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18 Green has attempted to estimate the number of men aboard these ships ([1970] 131 n.2): “supplies, grain, tools, bakers, masons, and carpenters were carried aboard thirty merchant-vessels; the total complement of these ships, at the most conservative estimate, is unlikely to have been less than 1,500-2,000 men. There were also 100 smaller vessels (size not specified) requisitioned by the fleet, which may have accounted for a further 3,000 ±. This is quite apart from the private traders and camp-followers.” Green, in fact, thinks that for non-combatants “a total figure of up to 20,000 is by no means impossible” ([1970] 131). But these figures, though based on reasonable assumptions, are all conjecture: see Hornblower, next note and at n.16 above.

19 See Hornblower, CT iii.1061: “Th.’s partial or total silences on [the] topics [of slaves] reduce us to conjecture.”

20 See Pritchett (1971) 49-51; van Wees (2004) 68-69; and 7.75.5 for the Sicilian expedition especially: on account of the desertion of some slaves, and distrust of others, the hoplites and cavalrymen carried their own property “παρὰ τὸ εἰωθός,” “contrary to their usual custom” (Jowett). Other literary evidence, in addition to that collected by Pritchett and van Wees, for the presence of slave attendants assumed in classical Greek armies: Xen., Oec. 8.4; Polyaeon, Strateg. 2.3.10, 3.9.52. See also van Wees (2004) 271-272 n.23 for iconographical evidence for slave attendants accompanying Athenian hoplites on campaign; and Hornblower, CT iii.564 for inscriptive evidence for same. The presence of slave attendants on military campaigns was a simple extension of the fact that well-off classical Greek citizens (see next note), when traveling, were always accompanied by a slave attending to their needs: see Whitehead (1982) 120 for this point (and, in addition to the evidence collected by Whitehead there, see also, e.g., Thucy. 4.118.6; Xen., Mem. 3.13.6; Theophr., Characters 21.5, 30.7. (Gomme (HCT ii.275 ad 3.17.4), citing Thucydides’ description of the battle of Delium and Athenian operations at Pylos, disagreed with the position that every hoplite had a slave-attendant: but, firstly, see already Pritchett [1971] 50 for Gomme’s mistake in not realizing that Thucydides does mention slave-attendants at Delium; secondly, Thucydides does tell us, contra Gomme, why the Athenian hoplites at Pylos did take up the “banausic work” of building a wall there (they were bored: 4.4.1); thirdly, Gomme did not take into account the rest of the vast amount of evidence for slave-attendants accompanying citizens of hoplite status during military campaigns and peacetime travels.)
with them; the 2,150 allied and 500 Argive hoplites on the first expedition and the 3,800 hoplites from the islands (7.20.2) on the second, who also served as hoplites by reason of their property qualification, will almost certainly have had slaves with them, too. It is much less certain, and likely improbable, however, that the seven hundred Athenian *thetes* on the first expedition (and the unknown number on the second) who served as hoplite marines had slaves to accompany them; and the 250 mercenary hoplites in 415 will probably not have been followed by personal servants, either. It is unlikely that any of the light-armed troops who took part in the operations in Sicily will have been accompanied by slave attendants, but, again, certainty is impossible on this point. But the 650 cavalry on the expedition will certainly have had slave attendants with them.

4. The “many” Sicels who came to Syracuse to join the operations against Syracuse in the summer of 414 (6.103.2) present a fourth problem: Thucydides never gives a figure for the Sicels who joined the Athenians (perhaps because he had no way of ascertaining one), and we have no way of knowing how many Sicels “many Sicels” might have been. Estimates have ranged from 1,000 to 10,000; there is no way of

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21 See van Wees (2004) 56, citing Aristot., *Pol.* 1274a16-22, 1303a8-10: the top three property classes in Athens included only the “rich” and the “notables.”

22 If the evidence of Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, describing conditions in a Greek mercenary army some fifteen years later, is any guide: it appears that, amongst the Cyreans, only officers were followed by slave attendants (Tuplin [1998] 287-288; Lee [2007] 255-256).

23 See again 7.75.5. Note, too, that an unknown number of the captured Hyccarans had been bought by members of the expedition (7.13.2): this may explain the reference to the presence of slaves under the age of military service with the expedition before the final battle in the Great Harbor of 413 (see 7.60.3 with Dover, *HCT* iv.441).

24 1,000: Hornblower, *CT* iii.1062; 10,000: H. van Wees ap. Hornblower, *CT* iii.1066.
adjudicating between these figures, though it does seem unlikely that Thucydides would have used the adjective “many” (”πολλοῖ”) if the Sicel allies had amounted to only 1,000 troops.25

5. A final and serious problem confronting any attempt to determine precisely the numbers of men on the Athenian campaign in Sicily from 415-413 is the issue of casualties and desertions.26 The problem in calculating casualty figures stems from the facts that Thucydides only gives casualty figures selectively, and not after every engagement;27 that he rarely reports casualties among light-armed troops;28 and that his figures appear to be rough estimates, rather than any sort of official counts.29 In other words, Thucydides’ narrative of the expedition does not present a consciously full accounting of the numbers of casualties suffered by the Athenians and their allies in Sicily. It is clear, however, from his description of the operations in Sicily that the losses

25 There must also have been hoplite reinforcements from Naxos, Catana, and Etruria with the expedition, too (see Hornblower, CT iii.1065 for this point), but again, we are reduced to conjecture in estimating their number.

26 Cf. Hornblower, CT iii.1065.

27 Rubincam (1991) 181, 190-191, and esp. 186-187: there are “considerable fluctuations in the casualty information reported by Thucydides for different kinds of troops; and there are signs that these may well be due as much to the historian’s own judgment of the relative significance of different details for the understanding of a battle or of the whole war, as to the chance of his access to different sorts of information. For in a considerable number of cases his statement of casualties contributes significantly to the particular picture his narrative paints of the engagement in question.”


29 Rubincam (1991) 182-184 and Graph 1: many of Thucydides’ casualty figures are rounded (but not conventional).
suffered by the Athenians in the first year of the campaign were minimal, but that, especially after the stationing of the fleet at Plemmyrion in the summer of 414, casualties must have been numerous and continuous in the second year of the campaign.

Thucydides does mention that the crews stationed at Plemmyrion suffered serious losses at the hands of the Syracusan cavalry stationed at Olympieion (7.4.6; cf. 7.13.2), but provides no numbers. Similarly, Thucydides tells us that the expedition lost a great many men (killed and taken prisoner) when the Syracusans captured the forts at Plemmyrion (7.24.2), and that a great many of the Athenians and allies were killed in the night battle on Epipolae (7.45.2) (both in the summer of 413), but provides no casualty figures for either engagement. Thucydides does give fuller and more precise information on the losses suffered by the Athenians at sea in the summer of 413: three triremes were lost defending against the Syracusan attack on Plemmyrion (7.23.4); one or two of the Athenian triremes were sunk in the first battle after the reconstruction of the Syracusan

30 Before the change of the Athenians’ naval base to Plemmyrion in the summer of 414, the mentioned casualties are: “some light-armed” (“τῶν ψιλῶν τινὰς”) scattered in search of plunder who were killed by Syracusan cavalry (the first ominous mention of this crucial Syracusan strategic advantage in operation) (summer 415) (6.52.2); 50 (Athenian and allied) dead in the battle of the Anapus (beginning of winter 415/414) (6.71.1); some few Athenians and Argives killed in the capture of the first Syracusan counterwall (summer 414) (6.100.2); Lamachus and 5 or 6 men (summer of 414) (6.101.6). Some few Athenians and allies must have been killed in the other limited operations undertaken by the forces of the expedition during its first year in Sicily (see esp. 6.101.5-6: other casualties certain, but only those of Lamachus and the 5 or 6 men accompanying him mentioned), but losses will have been small since these engagements were minor.

31 Diodorus gives a figure of 2,500 men lost in the attack on Epipolae (13.11.5), but figures in Diodorus for the sizes of military forces and casualties are schematic and unreliable, and should not be trusted: see Meiggs (1972) 447-452, 457-458; Hornblower (1987) 203; cf. esp. Bigwood (1983) 351 and n.50 on Diodorus’ “[s]chematic figures [in his account of the battle of Cunaxa]... insinuating little confidence.” The only casualty figure Thucydides provides (for operations on land in the second year of the expedition) is 70 horse and a few hoplites, lost in a defensive operation against a Syracusan attack on the Athenian lines (7.51.2) (confirming the Syracusan superiority on land noted at 7.51.1). Again, there must have been other infantry engagements after the relocation of the Athenian naval base to Plemmyrion—the Athenians suffered at least one other relatively serious defeat (7.6.3)—but no other casualty figures are mentioned.
triremes (7.38.1); seven triremes were sunk and most of the men on-board them taken prisoner and others killed in the battle after Ariston’s ruse (7.41.4); 18 triremes were taken by the Syracusans and all their men killed in a battle soon after the lunar eclipse (7.53.3). (This last notice alerts us to another source of uncertainty: it is usually unclear in Thucydides how many, if any, men escape after the sinking of a trireme.) In sum, we can state that the Athenians suffered major casualties in the final year of the war, but we will be reduced to the roughest of estimates in calculating these.

The expedition also lost many men to desertion, especially again in the final year of the war, when the Athenians had lost their clear superiority on land and sea, and an unsuccessful outcome for the expedition became increasingly certain: already by the late summer of 414, Nicias was describing desertion as a serious problem for the expedition (see esp. 7.13.2). We may imagine that the process accelerated as the situation of the expedition deteriorated, and especially when malaria began to be a serious problem in the camp as the summer of 413 progressed (7.47.2; cf. 7.50.3, 7.75.3). But we have no way of arriving even at a rough estimate of how many men may have deserted the Athenian camp.32

It is, then, impossible to derive from Thucydides’ narrative of the Sicilian expedition (or any other narrative thereof) a precise (or even closely approximate) figure for the number of combatants and non-combatants on the Sicilian campaign at any point during its operations. This is not meant in any way as an attack on Thucydides’ integrity as a historian. Thucydides was generally careful and conservative in his use of numbers:

32 For desertion in other contexts, see p.585 n.39 below.
he clearly took pains to establish their accuracy;\textsuperscript{33} indicated to his audience the level of confidence they should have in the exactness of particular figures;\textsuperscript{34} and, generally, “did not... indulge in the kind of wild and absurd inflation of numbers that so besmirched the reputation of some other ancient historians...”\textsuperscript{35} But there were major limits, given the state of communications technology and the limited aims of public archives in the fifth century Greek world, to the amounts of accurate numerical information Thucydides could gather.\textsuperscript{36} In addition, Thucydides could presume in his audience knowledge of the basic conditions of war: thus he did not have to specify, for example, how many sailors usually rowed classical Athenian troop-transport, or if light-armed troops were usually accompanied by slave attendants or not. Moreover, Thucydides’ narrative of the events in Sicily was not written to serve as a primary source for the Sicilian expedition: it was constructed, rather, as an interpretation of a recent and controversial series of events of

\textsuperscript{33} See, e.g., Rubincam (1979) 80, 82.

\textsuperscript{34} See Rubincam (1979) 78-82, 84 for Thucydides using qualifiers to indicate doubts about the precision or certainty of particular figures. See Rubincam (1991) 184-185 for an interesting illustration of this: “only 17% of troop numbers are qualified [in Thucydides], as against 57% of the casualty figures, even though the troop numbers are larger on average, and larger figures are as a rule more highly qualified. I would take this to mean that Thucydides and/or his informants (we cannot usually be sure who introduced the qualification felt less certainty regarding casualty figures),” Precise numbers of troops going out to fight will have been easier to discover than casualty figures (Rubincam [1991] 184). See also Rubincam (2001) 85: Thucydides does not qualify all his measures of distance; those he does not qualify are between fixed points within Attica, or immediately adjacent areas, or in the Amphipolis area—i.e., in areas with which Thucydides was thoroughly familiar.

\textsuperscript{35} Rubincam (1991) 190. See also Hornblower (1987) 203: “Thucydides’ sobriety in giving troop and fleet totals does not establish his accuracy. But he must be given his rightful place at the head of an honourable tradition which avoided inflated figures.”

\textsuperscript{36} Rubincam (1991) 181, 190.
enormous importance.\textsuperscript{37} Those numbers that were included in Thucydides’ account of the Sicilian expedition all served the rhetorical purpose of furthering his interpretation of the events of the expedition. This is not to say that Thucydides misrepresented or invented numerical information, but that his presentation of numbers should not be judged by anachronistic norms taken from modern research or discursive practices.\textsuperscript{38}

If, then, Thucydides could not gather precise information on the numbers of all of the various contingents of the expedition, and may sometimes not have included numerical information which he did have access to, we can still accept the figures that Thucydides does give us for troops, cavalry, triremes, and transports. And we can use these figures to come up with the order of magnitude we should be thinking of for the numbers of men on the expedition. The numbers are enormously and impressively large. The first force that sailed to the far west in 415 had 5,100 hoplites, of which 2,200 were Athenian, 1,500 from the hoplite register, and 700 \textit{thetes} who were with the force as marines for the ships; 2,150 were from Athenian subject \textit{poleis}, 500 from Argos and there were 250 Mantinean and other mercenaries. Completing the infantry forces of the expedition, there were 480 archers (80 of whom were from Crete), 700 slingers from Rhodes, and 120 light-armed exiles from Megara. There was also one horse-transport carrying 30 horses: these would have been accompanied by their cavalrymen. All together, then, the land force that sailed to Sicily in 415 comprised 6,430 effectives.

\textsuperscript{37} See introduction section iv for these points.

\textsuperscript{38} For the rhetoric of numbers in Thucydides, see Rubincam (1979) 86, Rubincam (1991) 190-191.
The naval component of the expedition was made up of 134 triremes, of which 100 were Athenian vessels—60 fast triremes and 40 troop-transports—and the remainder from Chios and the other allies, and 2 pentekonters. The 94 triremes that were not troop-transports would have been manned by, in addition to 10 hoplites and 4 archers (already counted), 170 rowers, 10 deck hands, and 6 officers.\(^{39}\) some 17,500 men in total (17,484 exactly). The two pentekonters would have rowed by 50 men. The one horse-transport would have been oared by 60 rowers.\(^{40}\) Leaving aside the men who crewed the troop-transports, the purely naval component of the force would therefore have amounted to somewhere around 17,650 men. The expedition leaving Athens in the summer of 415 comprised, then, at a minimum, approximately 24,100 effectives. These were joined, by the early summer of 414, by 650 cavalry in all (i.e. both Athenian and allied) (6.98.1; cf. 6.94.4). Three pentekonters arrived from Etruria in the summer of 414 (6.103.2), adding

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\(^{39}\) See Hornblower, *CT* iii.1063 for the 34 allied triremes being warships, and not troop transports. See Morrison (1984) 55 for two hundred men (as broken down in the text above) being the usual crew of a trireme in the classical period. Wallinga ([1993] 169-185) argued that Athenian triremes were regularly undermanned “at the moment of mobilization” ([ibid.] 178), but this view has been thoroughly refuted by Gabrielsen (1994) 249 n.11. In addition to Gabrielsen’s objections to Wallinga, note also, firstly, that Wallinga ([1993] 170-171) has no convincing arguments against the evidence of the many calculations of trireme crews’ pay for future or proposed campaigns found in classical sources that all proceed on the basis that trireme crews numbered 200 men; secondly, that his treatment of the crew numbers at the battle of Sybota ([1993] 173) suffers from the misconception that Corcyra and Corinth were ordinary poleis (see esp. 1.33.2 on Corcyra being the second greatest naval power in Greece after Athens), and misses the point that it took the Corinthians two years to prepare a fleet for the campaign which culminated in the battle of Sybota (1.31.1); and, thirdly, that 6.50.2 and Xen., *Hell.* 1.5.20 do not show that “even in the Athenian navy undermanning was habitual” ([1993] 174), but that desertion from fleets on campaign occurred in certain circumstances (cf. Xen., *Hell.* 5.1.24, [Dem.] 50.32, 38 for evidence for desertion apparently being common in the fourth century). See also [Dem.] 50.7 (unnoted by Wallinga): Apollodorus boasts that he was the first trierarch to man his ship before embarkation for some operations in the north Aegean—implying that all trierarchs could be expected to do so eventually; and [Dem.] 51.5-6: another trierarch in the mid fourth century assuming that all triremes setting on a campaign will eventually be manned.

another roughly 240 men.41 Thus, at some time before the end of summer 414 (i.e., before the start of the serious losses in manpower suffered by the expedition due to fighting and desertion), the expedition numbered at least 25,000 men.

There will have been roughly 4,000 slave attendants (at a conservative estimate) accompanying the expedition’s hoplites, and certainly 650 slaves accompanying the cavalrymen. The number of rowers oaring the troop-transportes can only be guessed at, but one could adopt 60 as a minimum estimate. Each transport and the two pentekonters will have had officers and deck hands, too. In addition to the men crewing the fast triremes and rowing the pentekonters, we could therefore add 3,000 men (almost certainly a minimum figure) oaring the transports and making up the crews of the pentekonters for the expedition. The men in the vessels requisitioned for the transport of the supplies and materiel of the expedition and in the vessels sailing voluntarily for the sake of trade may have amounted to at least 5,000 men.42 Moreover, one plausible guess estimates the number of Sicels who joined the operations against Syracuse in the summer of 414 (6.88.4, 6.103.2) at 10,000;43 again, being (very) conservative, we could add, say, 5,000 for our estimates. Adopting a series of purposefully low and cautious estimates, then, the expedition will have numbered between 25,000 and 42,500 men before Nicias took the decision to transfer the expedition’s naval station to Plemmyrion; more likely,

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41 See Morrison et al. (2000) 56 (citing Hdt. 7.184.3).

42 Cf. again n.18 for Green’s guess of “up to 20,000” for these men and the other non-combatants on the first expedition.

43 See again p.579 n.24 for this estimate of van Wees.
we should be thinking of somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 men.\textsuperscript{44} After the transfer of the fleet to Plemmyrion, even the roughest of estimates become difficult, since the rates of the expedition’s casualties and desertion amongst its crews become much heavier, and there are the problems indicated above with calculating the numbers of men who came to Sicily as part of Demosthenes’ and Eurymedon’s expedition in 413;\textsuperscript{45} it seems very unlikely, however, that losses were such that the numbers of combatants and non-combatants in the Athenian and allied forces ever dipped below 30,000 men.

One final point. Thucydides does state, in his highly emotional description of the retreat of the remnants of the expedition after the final defeat of the fleet in the Great Harbor of Syracuse, that “in the entire throng no fewer than 40,000 men were on the march together,” “\textit{μυριάδες γὰρ τοῦ ἕξιμπαντος ὄχλου οὐκ ἐλάσσους τεσσάρων ἄμα ἐπορεύοντο}” (7.75.5). This figure, however, should not be taken as indicative of the numbers of men who constituted the expedition at this point. As discussed, Thucydides was generally very careful and cautious in his numbers. On rare occasions, however, he did ‘tragically’ use exaggeratedly large numbers to evoke strong emotion; but this use of huge, ‘conventional’ figures is limited to three highly rhetorical contexts in which precision was impossible.\textsuperscript{46} At 7.75.5, there is no way that Thucydides could have

\textsuperscript{44} Though see p.579 n.23: some of the slaves who were with the expedition in 413 were not of military age.

\textsuperscript{45} But note that, in addition to these reinforcements, Eurymedon sailed out from Athens during the winter of 414/413 with 10 triremes (7.16.2), and left 9 behind (7.31.3)—that is, 1,800 men. Given the problems indicated above, however, even these precise data do not help us to formulate an estimate for the numbers of Athenian and allied forces in the winter of 414/413 or summer of 413.

\textsuperscript{46} See Rubincam (1979) 85-86 with n.36: in addition to 7.75.5, the other two occasions are 2.98.3 (a figure given in the context of the huge resources possessed by the barbarian kingdom of Sitalces): the huge army that invaded Macedonia under Sitalces is said to have amounted to no less than 150,000 men (“\textit{λέγεται οὐκ ἔλασσον πεντεκαίδεκα µισθάδων γενόσθαι}”: note “\textit{λέγεται}”—the number of men under Sitalces’ is not endorsed by Thucydides); and 7.27.5: the “more than 20,000 slaves” that fled from Athens to Deceleia.
known how many men were fleeing the Athenian camp; this, together with the strongly emotional context in which the figure is given, requires that the figure of 40,000 should not be taken as representing a ‘true minimum.’\textsuperscript{47} That is, the figure of ‘more than 40,000’ should be taken as indicating a general idea that great numbers of men were fleeing the Athenian camp, and the precise idea that the final demise of the Sicilian expedition constituted a tragedy for the Athenian state, and not as an estimate or the basis for an estimate of the number of combatants and non-combatants on the Sicilian expedition who had survived the fighting until this point.\textsuperscript{48}

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\textsuperscript{47} See Rubincam (1979) 85-86: “[t]here are other passages where a considerable element of uncertainty probably existed for Thucydides or his informants, but the strongly hyperbolic context in which the figures are cited... makes it likely that the primary reason for the qualification was emphasis... [W]hen [Th.] asserts that the crowd that streamed out of the Athenian camp near Syracuse for the final hopeless retreat by land numbered “not less than 40,000” (VII.75.5), I cannot believe that this is anything more than the roughest of estimates. If, as seems probable, the group enumerated included not only fighting troops, but hangers-on and slaves, it would be surprising if even Nikias knew how many they were. Why, then, a comparative rather than an approximating qualifier? The context here is highly rhetorical, the whole chapter devoted to the description of the retreat being written so as to evoke strong emotion, in the style of ‘tragic history’. And the figure is cited to justify the statement that the retreat resembled a procession of refugees fleeing from a captured city, “... and a large [city] at that”. This hyperbolic tone in the passage suggests that Thucydides wrote “more than 40,000” instead of “about 40,000” chiefly from a desire to emphasize the magnitude of the figure. That it is no true minimum is confirmed by its largeness, both by Thucydides’ standards and by those of modern scholars: it is the second largest number applied by Thucydides to a group of people, and one of only four numbers from 20,000 up; and many modern scholars have felt that even if 40,000 were taken as an absolute figure, or an outside maximum, it is probably still too high.”

\textsuperscript{48} As, e.g., Dover (\textit{HCT} iv.452) does. See also Hornblower, who devotes an appendix “to establish whether that figure [of more than 40,000] can be true” (\textit{CT} iii.1061-1066) (though Hornblower concludes that Thucydides “did exaggerate a bit,” citing H. van Wees (who thinks the figure of 40,000 “just possibly right” if the expedition had been joined by 10,000 Sicels) (\textit{CT} iii.1066)).
Appendix 3: The Daily Grain Requirements of Classical Greek Sailors and Soldiers

i. Classical and Hellenistic ideas of the daily grain requirements of adult males

It appears to have been a commonly accepted notion in the classical and Hellenistic Greek worlds that one Attic choinix (= 1.094 liters) of wheat was a proper and sufficient allowance for the daily grain consumption of sailors and soldiers.

Herodotus used this amount to calculate the total grain requirements of the men in Xerxes’ army and navy: “εὑρίσκω γὰρ συµβαλλόµενος, εἰ χοίνικα πυρῶν ἕκαστος τῆς ἡµέρης ἐλαµβάνε, καὶ µηδὲν πλέον,” “for I find reckoning that each man received a choinix of wheat, and nothing more...” (7.187.2); the fact that Herodotus used this figure to make his calculation of Persian military requirements in grain in 481 strongly implies that such an amount was considered usual (and sufficient) for the daily subsistence of sailors and soldiers in the classical period. The same implication can be drawn for the Hellenistic period from two inscriptions from Crete and Amorgos. In a treaty between Attalus I and Malla made ca. 200, it was stipulated that, on the arrival at Malla of auxiliary soldiers sent by Attalus, the Mallians would provide for the maintenance of the men, giving one Aiginetan drachma to each man (and two to their officers) and one Attic choinix (of wheat) (Face A, ll.20-24): “Ὅταν δὲ παραγένωνται πρὸς Μαλλαίους,MORENO (2007) 325.

1 Moreno (2007) 325.

2 Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 52, 55. Or, to put it another way, this amount of wheat was considered a sufficient contribution to a diet meeting the energy requirements of an adult male in the classical period: on energy requirements, see section ii below.

3 See Ducrey and van Effenterre (1969) 281-282 for the inscribed text of the treaty and (ibid.) 288 for its date.
Although the type of grain is not specified in the treaty, since wheat was by far the most commonly consumed grain in the Greek world ca. 200, we should take it that wheat is the grain referred to here.)

An inscription recording the arrangements for a public meal at Aegiale in the second century states that, in addition to pork (for the ephebes) and wine, one choinix of wheat was to be distributed to all male residents of the polis (and one half choinix to boys): “... σιτομετρείτωσαν δ[ὲ οἱ] ἐπιµεληταὶ ὠνησαµένοι σῖτον πύρινον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀργυρίου διδόντες τῇ προτεραιότητι τοῖς τε πολίταισι τοῖς ἐπιθηµεύονσι καὶ παροίκοισι καὶ ἐξύοις τοῖς παρεπιθηµεύονσι τῶν μὲν ἀνδρῶν ἑκάστῳ χοίνικα τῶν δε παίδων ἥµισυ χοίνικος” (IG XII.7.515.70-4). Although Foxhall and Forbes thought that this inscription could not offer evidence for the usual daily consumption of wheat by Greek adult males because the wheat was dispensed “under such special, ceremonial circumstances,” “the fact remains that the ration given to each man under the regulations governing the festival is the precise equivalent of the daily military ration attested by... other sources; thus, the regulations recorded by this inscription strongly imply that a choinix of wheat for each man was an appropriate ration for one day.”

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4 The treaty also stipulated that the Mallians were to continue to distribute the ration of one Attic choinix a day during operations in enemy territory if there were no opportunity to forage there: see ll.24-26 with p.672 n.42.


7 Markle (1985) 294. For one choinix of grain as an appropriate allowance for the daily grain consumption of an adult Greek male, cf. also Herakleides Lembos, FHG 3.169 fr. 5 (ap. Atheneaus 3.98E): reporting
It also appears to have been commonly accepted in classical and Hellenistic Greece that two choinikes of ἀλφίτα were the (nutritional) equivalent of one choinix of wheat.\(^8\) The strongest evidence for this equivalency comes from the accounts of the temple of Apollo on Delos for 282 (IG XI.2.158A.37-50). For the first seven months of their service in this year, two τεχνῖται employed by the temple received 1.5 choinikes of wheat per day, in addition to two obols per day “εἰς ὀψώνιον.”\(^9\) In the last three months of the year, when wheat prices on Delos had risen significantly,\(^{10}\) cheaper ἀλφίτα was substituted for the wheat at the rate of 3 choinikes per day.\(^{11}\) Although these rations do not provide evidence for Greek thinking on the standard daily grain consumption of adult males—since they were meant to provide for the two craftsmen’s households, too\(^{12}\)—

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that Alexarchus, brother of Cassander, called the choinix “the daily-feeder,” “τὴν χοίνικα ἡµεροτροφίδα.” Although no interpretation of this phrase can admit of complete certainty, it is likely, given the date (see n.5 above), that Alexarchus was referring to a choinix of wheat (see Figueira [1984] 91). The Pythagorean precept “µηδ’ ἐπὶ χοίνικα καθίσει,” reported in later sources, may not be referring to a daily ration of grain (Foxhall and Forbes [1982] 51-52 n.34) and it is unclear in any case whether it is referring to a choinix of wheat, barley, or barley-meal ((ibid.), Roebuck [1945] 161 n.88).

\(^8\) See Jardé (1925) 128-135 for the original argument for this position (though see Roebuck [1945] 159 for Jardé establishing daily grain consumption at too high a level on the basis of IG XI.2.158A.37-50 (and see further n.12 below)).

\(^9\) Actually 45 choinikes of wheat and 10 drachmas “εἰς ὀψώνιον” per month.

\(^{10}\) I do not enter here into the controversy on the reason for this price rise: see Oliver (2007) 241-247 for a recent summary and reasonable treatment of the controversy.

\(^{11}\) Actually 90 choinikes of ἀλφίτα. Reger’s discussion ([1993] 304-317) of the relative prices of wheat and barley-flour on Hellenistic Delos is not helpful in ascertaining the relative cheapness of ἀλφίτα on the island in 282 since it is based on an incorrect conversion of (whole) barley (“κηδαι”) prices into barley-flour (“ἀλφίτα”) prices: see Sosin (2002) 138.

\(^{12}\) This can be stated for two reasons: firstly, both 1.5 choinikes of wheat and 3 choinikes of barley-meal are 50% greater than the standard amounts for daily grain consumptions for adult males recorded elsewhere in literary and epigraphical sources; secondly, “the 2 obols per day εἰς ὀψώνιον is too much for other food, such as oil, wine, fruit and vegetables, for one person” (Markle [1985] 295).
they do demonstrate that it was thought on Delos in 282 that two volumetric units of ἄλφιτα were the equivalent of one volumetric unit of wheat. That two (Attic) choinikes of ἄλφιτα per day were considered sufficient (over a continuous period of time) to cover the daily grain requirements of adult male soldiers (and were thus the equivalent of one choinix of wheat) can be seen from the terms of the armistice between the Athenians and the Spartans in 425 after the Spartiate force on Sphacteria had been cut off from the mainland: the Athenians permitted the Spartans on the mainland to send the Spartiates blockaded on Sphacteria (a fixed amount of) two Attic choinikes of ἄλφιτα (already kneaded) per day, as well as two kotylai (= 0.547 liters) of wine and a piece of meat per day.13 Around 200, an inscription from Mykonos records that a cook, in return for his work butchering and cooking two pigs for a public sacrifice, was paid by the archons in charge of the sacrifice "ὠσφών καὶ κωλῆν τῆς ὑὸς τῆς ἑτέρας, ἀλφίτω[ν] δύο χοίνικας,

13 Thucy. 4.16.1: the Spartiates were to receive "δύο χοίνικας ἑκάστῳ Αττικὰς ἀλφίτω[ν] καὶ δύο κοτύλας οἴνου καὶ κρέας..." Roebuck ([1945] 160) suggests that the rations of two choinikes of ἄλφιτα and two kotylai of wine received by the Spartiates on Sphacteria could have been a ration deliberately designed to humiliate them (and thus might not offer evidence for usual daily food consumption rates). This view is based, however, on inferences about daily consumption rates drawn from evidence for Spartan contributions to their syssitia; but these contributions can tell us nothing about daily Spartan consumption rates (see n.20 below). The Helots accompanying the Spartiates on Sphacteria were to receive half their rations (Thucy. 4.16.1): i.e., they were to receive a grain ration of one choinix of barley-meal a day (not barley, as Moreno [2007] 32 n.184 has it). This does not mean that one choinix of ἄλφιτα was considered sufficient to cover the daily energy requirements of an adult male Helot, but reflects Helots’ lower status as compared to Spartiates (contra Foxhall and Forbes [1982] 55)—and therefore does not tell us how much grain Helots normally consumed per day in civilian life on their farms. Thucy. 4.16.1 has been cited along with Athenaeus 6.272B by Figueira ([1984] 91) and Moreno ([2007] 31 n.184) as evidence that slaves normally received one choinix (of barley-meal) per day. But the statement at Athenaeus 6.272B that the Corinthians had so many slaves that the Pythian priestess called them "pint-measurers" “χοινικοµέτρας” “merely informs us that the choenix was the unit normally used for measuring out grain for slaves; it is not specifically stated how many choenikes or with what product slaves were fed” (Foxhall and Forbes [1982] 51); for the measuring out of grain for distribution as particularly associated with slaves, see Theophr., Characters 9.4. (Note finally here that Hornblower (CT ii.169-170) states ad 4.16.1 that “a single choinix—here, the helot ration—is the... daily ration of corn assumed by Hdt. at vii.187.2.” But it is not the same ration assumed by Herodotus at 7.187.2, since the helots were receiving ἄλφιτα, and not wheat.)
οἶνου τρεῖς κοτύλ[α]ς,” “the loins and ham of one pig, two choinikes of barley-meal, three kotylai of wine” (SIG³ 1024.14-16). While the loins and ham were clearly special rewards, the payments of ἄλφιτα and wine can be taken, in the absence of any disbursement of money to the cook, as the payment of a day’s food requirements, and thus back up the evidence of Thucy. 4.16.1 that two choinikes of barley-meal were considered sufficient allowance for the daily grain consumption of an adult male in classical and Hellenistic Greece.

This figure also receives support from a passage in Herodotus discussing Spartan customs and institutions. Herodotus states that if the Spartan kings do not come to the messes, two choinikes of barley-meal and a kotyle of wine are sent to each of them at their houses, but when they come they shall receive a double share of everything; and the same honor shall be theirs when they are bidden by private citizens to dinner... (6.57.3)

The kings, then, received two choinikes of barley-meal and a kotyle of wine when they dined at home, and twice these rations—and twice more than the other Spartiates present—when they dined at the public mess (i.e., the Spartiates at the messes received a daily ration of two choinikes of barley-meal and a kotyle of wine). Hodkinson thought

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15 This is an adaptation of the Loeb translation.

16 The second portion was to allow the King to honor whomsoever he might choose: see Xen., Lac. Pol. 15.4. Hodkinson ([2000] 194), following Macan, notes that “the word διπλήσια [at 6.57.3] describes the relationship between the kings’ rations and those of other citizens, not that between the kings’ rations at the mess and at home.” But Hodkinson is forced to note (ibid.) that “Herodotus’ text, however, clearly intends some contrast between home and mess”; it is hard to see what that contrast could be if it were not between the portion of two choinikes of barley-meal and a kotyle of wine received at home, and the double portion of these foods received at the mess. Hodkinson ([2000] 194-195) attempts to argue, leaning on Herodotus’
that Herodotus was using Lakonian rather than Attic measures here,\textsuperscript{17} but there is good reason to think that Herodotus is, in fact, using Attic measures in this passage. Firstly, Attic(-Euboic) measures are assumed as the ‘default’ measures throughout the rest of Herodotus’ work: when he converts the Persian artaba into Greek measures for his audience, he uses the Attic medimnos and choinix (1.192.1); similarly, when he converts Babylonian talents into Greek talents, he uses the (Attic)-Euboic standard (3.95.1).\textsuperscript{18} Secondly, slightly earlier in his description of the perquisites of the Spartan kings, Herodotus notes that they receive at each new moon and each seventh day of the first part of the month, a full-grown victim for Apollo’s temple, a medimnos of barley-meal and a ‘Laconian quart’ of wine (“καὶ οἴνου τετάρτην Λακωνικήν”) (6.57.2): the fact that Herodotus specifies that the Laconian measure only here in his account of the kings’ perquisites implies strongly that he is using other (i.e. Attic) measures in the rest of his description (why would he specify a Laconian measure for the wine and not for the barley-meal here otherwise?).\textsuperscript{19} Thirdly, Herodotus cannot be referring to two Laconian choinikes of ἄλφιτα as the normal daily ration of grain distributed at the Spartan syssitia, use of the word “πάντα” at 6.57.3, that the contrast is between the limited range of foodstuffs the king would receive at home (barley-meal and wine only) and the full range of foodstuffs they would receive in the mess. But this interpretation provides no satisfactory explanation for the contrast between home and mess rations denoted by “διπλήσια,” and forces Hodkinson into unconvincing and incorrect argumentation for the amounts of food normally consumed by Spartiates in their syssitia (see p.599 n.35 below), and therefore should be rejected.

\textsuperscript{17} (2000) 194.

\textsuperscript{18} And see again 7.187.2: there is no reason to think that Herodotus is using any other measure here than the Attic. Therefore Hodkinson’s statement that the view that Herodotus was using Attic measures “does violence to Herodotus’ text in implying that he translated Lakonian measures into Attic, but neglected to inform his readers” ([2000] 194) is incorrect.

\textsuperscript{19} Contra Hodkinson (2000) 207 n.18.
because that would add up to a total of 60 Laconian *choinikes* a month, more than (we know from other evidence) each Spartiate actually contributed to the *syssitia* (and we never hear of any public contribution to the Spartan messes).\(^{20}\) At 6.57.3, then, Herodotus narrates that the Spartan kings received two *choinikes* of ἄλφιτα when they stayed at home, and that all Spartiates (except the kings) received the same measure of ἄλφιτα at the public messes.\(^{21}\)

Finally, a passage from Xenophon’s *Anabasis* may also offer evidence that two *choinikes* of ἄλφιτα were a usual and sufficient allowance for the daily grain needs of soldiers (and so could be considered the nutritional equivalent of one *choinix* of wheat). At *Anab.* 1.5.6, Xenophon, describing the desperate situation of the Greeks when their grain ran out during the march between Corsote and Charmande, states that it was not possible to buy grain anywhere else than in the Lydian *agora*.

\(^{20}\) Each Spartiate contributed one Laconian *medimnos* (=48 *choinikes*) a month to their *syssition*: see Plut., *Lyc.* 12.2 and Dicaearchus, *FHG* 2.242, fr. 23 (ap. Athenaeus 4.141C) with Figueira (1984) 88-89, Hodkinson (2000) 191-192. It should be noted here that Spartiate contributions to their *syssitia* cannot be used to reconstruct their daily or monthly food consumption since there is no indication in any ancient source that the Spartiates’ consumption in the messes matched their contributions and it is probable that some of the food contributed went to feed non-Spartiates: see Garnsey (1989b) 91 n.8 for this point. (It should be noted here, in addition, that Foxhall and Forbes’ discussion of the caloric values of the Spartiate contributions to the *syssitia* ([1982] 58-59) is invalid because of their failure to realize that Plutarch’s account of the common mess dues used Laconian (and not Attic) measures (see Figueira [1984] 92 n.11, Hodkinson [2000] 206 n.9, 206-207 n.12.).

\(^{21}\) See also p.599 n.35 below for refutation of Hodkinson’s arguments that Herodotus was using Laconian measures at 6.57.3. Hodkinson also argues that Herodotus cannot be using two Attic *choinikes* at 6.57.3 because they do not convert into Laconian measures neatly; but there is no reason why this would present a problem for Herodotus’ audience. Hodkinson also argues that the circumstances on Sphacteria do not present corroboration for the view that Hdt. 6.57.3 offers evidence for a daily mess ration of two Attic *choinikes*, since the rations for the Spartiates on Sphacteria were to cover their daily consumption and the rations for the Spartiates were only to cover their evening meals: but we do not know how much a Spartiate ate outside the *syssitia* (Foxhall and Forbes [1982] 58) and the communal meal is presented in all ancient sources to be (by far) the most important meal of the day. Finally, it should be noted here that Moreno cites Hdt. 7.187 with Hdt. 6.57 and Thucy. 4.16 for the statement that “[t]wo *choinikes* of barley were perceived as the nutritional equivalent of one *choinix* of wheat” ([2007] 32 n.184). But both Hdt. 6.57.3 and Thucy. 4.16.1 refer to barley-meal, not barley (see already p.592 n.13 above).
τὴν καπίθην ἀλεύρων ἢ ἀλφίτων τεττάρων σίγλων. ὁ σίγλος δύναται ἑπτὰ ὀβολοὺς καὶ ἡµιωβέλιον Ἀττικοὺς· ἡ δὲ καπίθη δύο χοίνικας Ἀττικὰς ἐχώρει.

at the price of four sigloi for a kapithē of wheat-flour or barley-meal. The siglos is worth seven and one-half Attic obols, and the kapithē had the capacity of two Attic choinikes.

The interesting thing about Xenophon’s description of the prices found in the Lydian agora for this discussion is that the kapithē is converted in other Greek texts into Greek measures at the rate of either half a choinix or one (Attic) choinix, and appears to have been in reality a dry measure of just less than a liter in capacity (or just under an Attic choinix). Why did Xenophon write, then, that the kapithē contained two Attic choinikes? It seems to me that there are two possible answers to this question. Firstly, the kapithē in the Lydian agora may have contained, as usual, just less than an Attic choinix but Xenophon, influenced by the fact that he and the rest of the Greeks normally bought and consumed two Attic choinikes of barley-meal (and wheat-flour) per day, may have recalled incorrectly that the kapithē contained two Attic choinikes. Secondly, the kapithē in the Lydian agora may really have contained two Attic choinikes of barley-

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23 Bivar (1985) 632-634.

24 It should be noted that the equivalence found at Anab. 1.5.6 between wheat-flour and barley-meal tells us nothing about the normal relationship between wheat and barley-meal in the Greek world because wheat was always sold/distributed in the form of grain and not flour in the Greek world. It is not surprising, however, that two choinikes of wheat-flour could be considered a daily grain allowance similar to two choinikes of barley-meal, given the close relationship between wheat and barley in weight per volume and the fact that wheat-flour weighs less by volume than wheat: see Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 78.

25 For the idea, cf. already Tuplin (2004) 172 n.58: “[p]erhaps Xenophon absorbed the drachmae-per-choinix and translated back into sigloi-per-kapithe, getting relatively familiar sigloi roughly right but misremembering the size of a kapithe – a confusion possibly assisted by disagreement about how many choinikes constituted a day’s ration.”
meal (or wheat-flour) because the traders in the *agora* may have adjusted its capacity to meet the usual purchasing (and consumption) practices of the Greeks. Under either hypothesis (and no other seems possible to me), two Attic *choinikes* of ἄλφιτα per day again seems to be considered a normal consumption rate of grain for classical Greek soldiers.

There is, then, relatively speaking, quite a lot of contemporary ancient evidence to support the idea that classical and Hellenistic Greeks thought that one *choinix* of wheat or two *choinikes* of ἄλφιτα were sufficient to cover the daily grain requirements of adult males, and especially sailors and soldiers. Almost all discussions of the daily grain consumption of adult Greek males now reject this equivalency, however, on the basis of the results of some grinding and milling experiments carried out by Lin Foxhall.  

In order to attempt to define the contribution made by grain to ancient Greek and Roman diets, and in the absence of any data from antiquity for the weight per volume of ἄλφιτα, Foxhall produced her own figure for the weight per liter of ἄλφιτα by some milling experiments with a small sample of English two-rowed, hulled barley.  

Although Foxhall noted many reasons why any result from these experiments should be treated with caution, the figure she produced—0.643kg of barley-meal per liter—was still used

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26 Jasny ([1942] 752 n.11) and Roebuck ([1945] 159-160) had already rejected the 1:2 wheat : barley-meal equivalency on the grounds that wheat has a nutritive value of roughly 35 percent more than barley by volume, and thus the ratio of 1:2 could not be valid as it did not accurately reflect the difference in nutritive value between wheat and barley: but, again, the question is one of barley-meal, and not barley, and therefore the 1:2 equivalency cannot be rejected on these grounds.

27 Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 75-78.

28 (Ibid.) 77-78: “[t]here are, however, some severe difficulties involved [in these experiments], and I am not fully convinced of the validity of the figure produced [by them]. First, my sample of barley meal was made from English, not Greek, barley. Second, we do not know precisely which methods were used to remove the lemma and palea [from hulled barley grains] in antiquity. Third, we do not know the extraction
throughout her and Forbes’ treatment of ancient grain consumption. On the basis of this figure, a figure for weight per volume of wheat (from modern Messenia) of 0.772 kg per liter, and the fact that the caloric value of wheat and barley is roughly the same, Foxhall and Forbes calculated that one liter of wheat would only have provided 440 more calories than one liter of ἀλφίτα. They concluded from this that “[i]t is likely, then, that one choenix of wheat per man per day was the more or less standard Greek allowance, especially for army rations, though whether this is true of its possible corollary, two choenikes of alphita is more doubtful.”

After Foxhall and Forbes’ article—or, more precisely, after Foxhall’s calculation of the weight per volume of barley-meal—it has become standard to deny any rate of ancient alphita, i.e. what percentage of the original weight of grain is left after grinding and winnowing or sifting... It is likely that the extraction rate of ancient alphita fell within the 60-70% range, but it is by no means certain, and again much further experimentation is needed.”

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29 (Ibid.) 44: “[u]nfortunately, we have carried out only one set of experiments with small samples, and the results are thus statistically dubious; but since these are the only weight/volume figures available for barley ground on a simple mill, they will have to suffice for the present.” Before continuing, I should say here that Foxhall and Forbes’ article was ground-breaking both in its collection and treatment of the literary and epigraphical evidence for ancient Greek and Roman grain consumption, and in its attempts to compare this evidence with skeletal data (but see pp.610-611 n.79 below) and FAO/WHO information on human caloric requirements, and, although new data have emerged since they published their article (see section ii below), still remains the starting point for any research on this topic.

30 See (ibid.) 45 for Foxhall and Forbes’ reasons for using this figure, and n.40 below for the source of this figure.

31 (Ibid.) 53-54.

32 (Ibid.) 55; cf. (ibid.) 56 n.49. Although they attempted to cast doubt on the literary and epigraphical evidence for a standard daily grain allowance of two choenikes of ἀλφίτα per man per day ((ibid.) 54-55), it was Foxhall’s milling experiments that bore the weight of this conclusion.
equivalency between one choinix of wheat and two choinikes of āλφιτα, and to use one choinix of wheat or barley-meal in calculating the daily grain requirements of classical Greek populations. It has also become standard for scholars to use the figure Foxhall produced for the weight per volume of āλφιτα of 0.643kg per liter to calculate the grain requirements of adult Greek males (even for those few scholars still using two choinikes of āλφιτα as their figure for the daily grain consumption of classical Greek populations). But, in addition to the problems cited by Foxhall and Forbes in using the

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33 Although Foxhall and Forbes nowhere in their article actually ever explicitly rejected the 1 : 2 equivalency between wheat and barley-meal. See, e.g., Gallo (1983) 453 (explicitly following Foxhall and Forbes, and consequently rejecting the 1 : 2 equivalency between wheat and barley (sic)); Garnsey (1989b) 38: “[u]ntil 1982, when Foxhall and Forbes published their article... it was generally accepted that the ‘standard ration’, at least in the Greek world, was 1 choinix of unmilled wheat per day, or double this volume of barley meal.” See also Markle (1985) 278-279 using Foxhall and Forbes’ calculations to reject the 1 : 2 equivalency between wheat and barley-meal, and to compute a figure of 1.2 choinikes of barley-meal as a sufficient daily ration for an adult male.

34 See, e.g., van Wees (2001) 48 (and n.20) citing Foxhall and Forbes in using one choinix of “grain” (the context shows van Wees is thinking of barley-meal) to calculate the caloric requirements of the inhabitants of zeugite farms in classical Attica (and cf. [2001] 47 and n.11 for using Foxhall and Forbes’ figures to calculate the grain-producing requirements for membership of Athenian property classes); Lee (2007) 8 and n.33, 214 and nn.46, 48 explicitly citing Foxhall and Forbes for the statement that a choinix of wheat or barley-meal was the standard daily ration for the Cyreans, and esp. (2007) 38 and n.142 citing Foxhall and Forbes in using a figure of one choinix of barley-meal to calculate how many days’ rations the xenia given to the Cyreans by Sinope and Heraclea would have made for 8,000 men. See also Krentz (2007) 154 taking one choinix of barley-meal (“or (less often) wheat”) to be a standard ration for classical Greek soldiers; Lendle (1995) 373 taking one choinix of barley-meal to be the standard daily ration. See also Lazenby (1994) 16 and n.143 citing Foxhall and Forbes on figures for rations for classical Greek military forces and their calorific equivalents.

35 Arguing incorrectly from Hdt. 6.57.3 (see n.16 above), and using Foxhall and Forbes’ estimates of the weight per volume of āλφιτα, Hodkinson ([2000] 195-196) postulates daily mess rations for Spartiates of 1 Laconian choinix (1.55 liters) of āλφιτα (it should be noted that his postulated daily mess ration of 1 kotyle of wine has serious problems: see Lipka [2002] 151 n.27). Hodkinson ([2000] 194) similarly uses Foxhall and Forbes’ calculations to argue that Hdt. 6.57.3 does not offer evidence for a daily ration in the Spartan syssitia of two Attic choinikes of āλφιτα on the grounds that this would provide an unrealistically high number of calories. See also Figueira (1985) 93 n.15 using Foxhall and Forbes’ figures to calculate the wheat equivalent of āλφιτα (and see also p.601 n.42, p.617 n.100 below); and Reger (1993) 325 n.80 using Foxhall and Forbes’ figure for weight per volume of āλφιτα to calculate the monthly demand for grain of the population of Hellenistic Delos (and [1993] 307 n.25 in a discussion of the relative prices of wheat and āλφιτα).

figure for ἄλφιτα produced by Foxhall’s milling experiments, there is a problem in their calculations that renders invalid their figure for the weight per volume of barley-meal. For her experiments, Foxhall states that she started with a sample of one liter of “very clean” English autumn-sown wheat (*triticum vulgare*) with a net weight of 782.2g per liter, and with a sample of English two rowed, hulled barley, “fodder quality, reaped by combine harvester, not cleaned, numerous hull and rachis fragments included,” with a net weight of 587.0g per liter. But in her presentation of her milling results, Foxhall lists a figure for her (“whole, hulled grain”) barley sample (“before grinding”) of 750g per liter: it was the grinding, winnowing, and sifting of this sample that produced the weight per volume of barley-meal of 0.643kg/liter. (Foxhall gives no indication as to why she uses this different figure; my best guess is that it refers to the weight per volume of her original sample of barley after it had been cleaned and the “numerous hull and rachis fragments” removed.) This figure—750g per liter—for weight per volume of hulled barley grains is not possible, however. The normal weight per volume ratio between wheat and barley (made ready for sale or distribution, i.e. “cleaned”), as found in all other times and places, is roughly 6 : 5 or 5 : 4. But the barley sample used by Foxhall

37 See Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 76.

38 (Ibid.)

39 This ratio between wheat and barley is attested for classical Attica (Stroud [1998] 54), Roman Egypt (Rathbone [1983] 270 (and see (ibid.) for this ratio found in other times and places in pre-modern and modern Europe)), and the modern United States of America (see again Stroud [1998] 54).

40 The latter ratio is attested for modern Messenia (see van Wersch [1972] 185: a figure of 772g/liter for wheat compared to a figure of 618g/liter for barley) and the modern United States (Pritchett [1956] 193).
weighing 750g per liter does not fit this ratio either with her own sample of wheat—which only weighed 32.2g more per liter—or with the weight per volume of any sample of wheat known from antiquity (or modernity).\textsuperscript{41} Secondly, as Figueira has pointed out, a weight of 750g/liter for barley is heavier than USDA #1 barley (c. 606g/liter) and heavier than the upper range for weight per volume of barley allowed in modern grain storage handbooks.\textsuperscript{42} At some point in her experiment or calculations, then, Foxhall made an error that led her to use a figure for the weight per volume for her barley sample that was invalid—and since her figure for the weight per volume of ἄλφιτα was derived from this invalid figure, her figure for the weight per volume of barley-meal must be considered invalid, too.

Foxhall’s calculations, then, offer no grounds to reject the weight of the classical and Hellenistic literary and epigraphical evidence attesting that both one choinix of wheat and two choinikes of ἄλφιτα could be considered proper and sufficient for an adult Greek male’s daily consumption of grain; and all the calculations of Foxhall and Forbes—and subsequent scholars—of the grain requirements of classical Greek adult male populations made on the basis of Foxhall’s figure of 0.643kg/liter for the weight per volume of ἄλφιτα must be rejected.

\textsuperscript{41} Since for a sample of wheat to cohere with Foxhall’s figures for barley, it would have to have a weight per volume of 900g/liter or 937.5g/liter. These weights per volume would be above any known for antiquity (see, e.g., Foxhall and Forbes [1982] 43 on the figures from Pliny, \textit{HN} 18.66; Rathbone [1983] 270 on weights per volume for wheat from Roman Egypt) or known to me from modern agriculture: the National Association of British and Irish Millers (the U.K. trade association for flour millers), for example, quotes a figure for weight per volume of wheat of 750g/liter (I am grateful to Dr. Sam Millar, Head of Cereals & Milling Department, Campden & Chorleywood Food Research Association, for sending me this information (in an e-mail of 3/15/2007)).

\textsuperscript{42} (1985) 93 n.15. Curiously, however, having pointed this out, Figueira then proceeds to use Foxhall’s figures in his own calculations of a wheat equivalent for ἄλφιτα: see p.617 n.100 below.
ii. Was one choinix of wheat per day sufficient to cover the energy requirements of classical Greek sailors and soldiers?

Since the publication of Foxhall and Forbes’ article in 1982, new data on the weight per volume of wheat and barley in classical Greece have emerged from a recently discovered inscription recording an Athenian law of 374/3 B.C. establishing a tax on grain from the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros. The law prescribed that the contractors of the tax, once they had transported the tax grain to the Aiakeion (in the Athenian agora), weigh out the wheat at the weight of a talent for 5/6 of a medimnos and the barley at the weight of talent per medimnos. An initial objective of this appendix was to use this equivalency to come up with a figure of weight per volume for barley-flour, but there are no data (from any geographical region or historical period) presently available on the weight ratio between a given volume of barley-flour and the given volume of barley it was produced from. In this section of the appendix, therefore, I will attempt to use the (normative) figure for the weight per volume of wheat the Athenian grain-tax law gives us in order to calculate whether one choinix of wheat—

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45 Rhodes and Osborne 26.21-25.

46 I have searched through ancient literary and epigraphical texts, secondary literature on ancient grain production and consumption, secondary literature on the metrology of pre-modern Europe, work and research on modern production and milling of barley, and have asked archaeobotanists about this question, but all to no avail.

47 Stroud (1998) 55) evinces caution in taking the weight/volume ratios recorded in the grain-tax law as standard figures either for Athens or for Greece in general; the point is well taken, but the point I would emphasize here is that this a weight per volume ratio for wheat prescribed by the polis of Athens for an
given that, as I have demonstrated in the previous section, this was considered in the Greek world the nutritional equivalent of two choinikes of barley-meal—would have provided a sufficient amount of calories to provide for the energy requirements of an average classical Greek sailor or soldier. Before proceeding, I should state that I am aware of the limitations of the results proceeding from the calculations I undertake in the rest of this section. All of the key variables underlying the following calculations (the weight/volume conversion for wheat, the caloric value of ancient wheat, the height, weight, age, and physical activity levels of the average Greek sailor or soldier) allow of greater or lesser amounts of imprecision. But the range of uncertainty will not be so large that “the parameters of the possible” on this question will not be able to be established, that is, despite the imprecision of the calculations, I hope to demonstrate that they will still show that it is possible to establish whether one choinix of wheat provided a

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48 Note that von Reden ([2007] 403 and n.96) has already made use of Rhodes and Osborne 26 to calculate the daily and annual grain consumption of average classical Greek soldiers, and that Rosivach ([2000] 32 and n.6) and Moreno ([2007] 32) have already made use of the inscription to calculate the annual grain consumption of Athenian adult males. None of these scholars, however, have attempted to calculate whether the amount of wheat contained in a choinix as implied by Rhodes and Osborne 26.21-25 would have provided a sufficient amount of calories for a classical Greek adult male, and, furthermore, there is an error in Rosivach’s and von Reden’s calculations (see n.54 just below).

49 Cf. the gloomy remarks of Devroey on attempting to ascertain the caloric value of rations in the Carolingian period ([1987] 88): “[q]uantitative research creates problems for the study of history of the early middle ages. By calculating cereal yields and calorific values of rations on the basis of uncertain metric data there is a danger of substituting tenuous knowledge for ignorance. The resulting illusion of reality may be no more than the reflection of our own hopes, anxieties and prejudices.”

50 See Starr (1977) 152 for this phrase.
(roughly) sufficient amount of calories to meet the energy requirements of classical Greek sailors and soldiers.

The first source of uncertainty concerns the weight of an Attic talent. In general, classical Greek measures cannot be expected to have been as precise or consistent as modern measures are. With this consideration in mind, although there is some doubt on the precise weight of an Attic talent, I will use here, following Moreno, the Attic market weight of 27.47kg for a talent. Proceeding on the basis of the weight/volume ratios provided by the grain-tax law, this gives us a figure of 0.687kg. (actually 0.68675kg) per Attic choinix of wheat.

Estimating the caloric content of this weight of wheat is fraught with difficulties. Firstly, it is not possible to ascertain the cultivar of wheat grown on the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, or Skyros. Secondly, “[f]ood composition depends on a large number of factors: climate, soil, variety, transport, storage, and preparation.” Because of these


52 See the discussion at Stroud (1998) 55.


54 Rosivach and von Reden (see n.48 above) mistakenly Attic coin weights in converting the weight/volume ratio found in Rhodes and Osborne 26 into metric weight equivalents of Attic volumetric units of wheat.

55 See Dalby (2003) 348-349 for a brief summary of the different cultivars of wheat grown in the Greek world. Sallares ([1991] 324, 326) states that bread wheat was unknown in classical Greece, but it has been found in archeological excavations of Protogeometric and Geometric Greek sites, and the scant archeobotanical data from archaic and classical Greek sites suggests that it was cultivated in these periods, too: Megaloudi (2006) 77-79, 81 with Tables 5.12, 13, 14.

factors, modern food composition databases will only have a limited predictive accuracy for any single sample of wheat (although it should be noted that uncooked grains have a low water content and therefore are less variable in composition than other foods).

Thirdly, we do not know the typical extraction rates for wheat in classical Greece, i.e. how much of the original grain was left after milling, winnowing, and sifting. We may assume, however, for classical Greek sailors and soldiers using simple hand-held mills, that the usual extraction rate was (very) high. With all of these problems in mind, I will use the figures of 343 kcal. per 100g. dry measure edible portion of whole grain or meal soft wheat (*triticum aestivum*), and 364 kcal. per 100g. dry measure edible portion of soft wheat flour of an extraction rate of 80-89 per cent (both drawn from FAO/USDA food composition data for the Near East) to calculate the (possible) caloric value of the

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57 Southgate (1993) 268-269. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the producers of food composition databases have not always indicated precisely the sources of their data and variations therein, or included descriptions of their samples: see Sevenhuysen (1994), Greenfield and Southgate (2003) 19-20.

58 (Ibid.) 269.


60 FAO/USDA (1982) (this study would have been unavailable to Foxhall and Forbes): I chose the figure for *triticum aestivum* on the basis of the works cited at n.55; see also Megaloudi (2006) 35. FAO/USDA (1982) also lists a figure of 367 kcal per 100g. dry measure edible portion of soft wheat flour of an extraction rate of 72 per cent. Foxhall and Forbes used the figure of 334 kcal. per 100g for “medium” wheat of 100 per cent extraction (noted, however, as applicable to extraction rates of 94 to 100 per cent) from FAO/Chatfield (1949) Table 2, Item 1. But, firstly, see next note on extraction rates for wheat and other grains; secondly, Chatfield’s study is now out of date, because of changes and improvements in analytical methodologies and documentation procedures (see FAO, [n.d.]); thirdly, and related to the second point, the values found in her study for the caloric value of wheat are consistently lower than those found in more recent publications (cf., e.g., Sika et al. [1995] 67 Table 5; USDA, Agricultural Research Service [2005]). Of more recent FAO food composition data, I chose the data from the Near East since it clearly indicated caloric values for different extraction rates of indigenous wheat (from a region more
normal daily allowance of wheat for classical Greek sailors and soldiers. Assuming an extraction rate of 90 per cent for the one Attic *choinix* of wheat, it would have been milled down to 0.618kg and had a caloric content of 2120 kcal; assuming an extraction rate of 80 per cent, it would have been milled down to 0.545kg and contained 2000 kcal.

Comparative evidence suggests that cereals will have made up between 60 and 75 per cent of an average classical Greek adult male’s caloric needs: this is a guess, but an informed guess. It has sometimes been suggested that the diet of classical Greek soldiers may have included more cereals than the normal ‘civilian’ diet, but there is no reason to think this: in friendly or neutral territory, military forces acquired their provisions from markets similar in scale and structure to those used by civilian closely comparable to the Mediterranean and Black Sea region than other sources of FAO research data (Africa, Asia, Latin America) on food composition more recent than FAO/Chatfield [1949]).

61 See Clark and Haswell (1970) 53-54: consumption of grain at extraction rates above 90 per cent unknown in contemporary third-world countries; they therefore assume a roughly 10 per cent loss in weight in milling “in the hands of a cultivator who has to exercise strict economy” ([1970] 54). Foxhall and Forbes ([1982] 46 n.14) reject Clark and Haswell’s assumption, but without providing a reason.

62 Actually 0.618075kg. From this point on, I will round figures for convenience.

63 Actually 0.5494kg.

64 Note that wheat flour does not lose any calories in the process of being made into bread (Foxhall and Forbes [1982] 80; Garnsey [1989a] 90 n.18).


66 Garnsey (1989b) 39, von Reden (2007) 403. Garnsey was generalizing here about ancient military forces and fails to note that classical Greek military forces acquired their provisions through different means than later armies in antiquity (i.e. through purchase rather than rationing).
populations and therefore had access to a ‘normal’ range of foodstuffs; in enemy territory, foraging may, in fact, have provided opportunities for a more variable diet than usually consumed. Extrapolating from the 60 to 75 per cent estimates, then, one *choinix* of wheat at an extraction rate of 90 per cent would have been part of a diet providing between 2826 and 3533 kcal, and one *choinix* of wheat at an extraction rate of 80 per cent part of a diet providing between 2668 and 3335 kcal.

How do these figures compare to the energy requirements of classical Greek sailors and soldiers? Energy requirement is defined as “the amount of food energy needed to balance energy expenditure in order to maintain body size, body composition and a level of necessary and desirable physical activity consistent with long-term good

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67 Military historians of other periods in pre-industrial European history have attempted to calculate both the energy requirements of sailors and soldiers and the caloric content of known figures for military diets. Engels ([1978] 123-126) used a figure of 3600 kcal per man per day for the caloric requirements of Alexander the Great’s army and a daily ration of 3.9 lbs. of grain (to make 3.5 lbs. of bread). But Engels’ figure of 3600 kcal. per day was the U.S. Army RDA for a 19-year-old soldier of 175.2cm height—Alexander’s (and classical Greek) soldiers will have been both shorter and older, and therefore would have needed fewer calories (Roth [1999] 7, 12). Secondly, Engels overestimated the amount of grain required per man per day because he misunderstood the bread-making process (Foxhall and Forbes [1982] 80) and because he mistakenly counted only grain consumption in his calculations of the food needed to meet daily energy requirements (Roth [1999] 47-48). All estimates which have been made by scholars for the caloric requirements of Roman, medieval, and early modern European sailors and soldiers and the energy values of their diets are all more or less (sometimes methodologically) loose estimates, based on uncertain calculations, and offer no useful concrete comparative evidence (see the survey in Bachrach [2002] 97-100; Bachrach [2002] 86 uses a figure for grain consumption for the forces of the First Crusade besieging Antioch of “approximately one kilogram of milled wheat for each person per day” but this would produce a contribution for wheat alone of upwards of 3600 calories to the diets of the besieging forces and thus an implausibly high total caloric content for their diet of somewhere between 4800 and 6000 calories). There are, at first sight, promising data in four medieval figures for the daily diets of galley crews and crusading forces (see Pryor [2006a] 10-12); but since the grain component of each of these diets consisted of ship’s biscuit, and we do not know the volume or weight of grain needed to make a given weight of biscuit (ibid.) 14-15), we cannot estimate the caloric content of these diets (Lane, in a ground-breaking article, used modern unshortened water crackers to estimate the caloric content of biscuit ([1966] 264 n.2), but this amounts to no more than a guess). On the whole subject, see already Garnsey (1989b) 36, and esp. 38: “[n] short, it is difficult to be enthusiastic about medieval and early modern sources on food consumption.” But comparative evidence does offer two insights. Firstly, a survey of the scholarly literature on the rations of pre-modern European military forces demonstrates “the dominance of grain as the staple of the soldier’s diet in the pre-modern West” (Bachrach [2002] 100). Secondly, the wheat ration of the Roman Republican army was approximately the same as one *choinix* of wheat: see Polyb. 6.39.13 with Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 62.
Human energy requirements are determined by a number of variables: gender, weight, age, and level of physical activity. We can state with certainty that Classical Greek sailors and soldiers were male (!). What of the other variables?

An adult male’s BMR, and therefore the bulk of his energy requirements, is determined by his body weight. We have no data for the weights of classical Greek adult males, but there are skeletal data providing an indication of the average stature of classical Greek adult males, which I summarize here:

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69 FAO/WHO/UNU (2004) 7: adult males need energy for basal metabolism (representing 45 to 70 percent of daily total energy expenditure (and which “is determined mainly by the individual’s age... body size, and body composition”)); metabolic response to food (which “increases total energy expenditure by about 10 percent of the BMR [basal metabolic rate] over a 24-hour period in individuals eating a mixed diet”); and physical activity (this “is the most variable and, after BMR, the second largest component of daily energy expenditure”).

70 (Ibid.) 8, 35-36. BMR [basal metabolic rate]: “[t]he minimal rate of energy expenditure compatible with life. It is measured in the supine position under standard conditions of rest, fasting, immobility, thermoneutrality and mental relaxation” (FAO/WHO/UNU [2004] 9).

71 A number of notes regarding these figures. The numbers in this table represent averages calculated in each case by the reporting authors; only Bisel (1990) and Ma (2008) report individual heights. Also, none of these figures, with the exception of those in Breitinger (1937), would have been available to Foxhall and Forbes. Finally, von Reden ([2007] 388 Table 14.1) has also summarized average heights for classical Greek skeletons, but there are several problems with her table. Firstly, she missed Bisel and Angel (1985), a publication that supersedes the Angel articles from 1971 and 1972 which she cites (see next note). Secondly, she reports a figure for classical Acanthos of an average of 169.2cm for male skeletons without providing a reference for this figure. Thirdly, she states that “sample size is given in cases in which n < 50” but does not note sample size for the figures from Metapontum and for the skeletons from the grave of the Messenians where the sample sizes are < 50. Fourthly, she does not include a figure for the Spartiates buried in the Kerameikos. See also n.75 just below.
‘Classical Greece’\textsuperscript{72} 170.5cm (n=52)

Metapontum\textsuperscript{73} 166.6cm (n=20) (std. 6.1)

Spartiates\textsuperscript{74} 170.0cm (n=13)

Messenians\textsuperscript{75} 171.3cm (n=4)

Thebans (?)\textsuperscript{76} 179cm (n=2)

The mean of these figures is 169.79cm; the standard deviation of 2.13cm implies that 170cm should serve as a reasonable approximation of average heights.\textsuperscript{77} A total of

\textsuperscript{72} Bisel and Angel (1985) 203 Table 4: the classical period is periodized there as 650-300 B.C., and the skeletons are listed as coming from “various sites in Greece.” This study can be taken from Angel’s comment at (1985) 197 on the Mycenaean skeletons he reports in this article as superseding his previous publications of skeletal data from the classical period. Kron ([2005] 72 n.22) notes regarding this article that Angel employed the (commonly used) Trotter and Gleser method (for extrapolating stature from long bones) which “arguably gives very slightly exaggerated results compared to the more conservation Olivier method.” But note also that Kron himself uses results gained by using the Trotter and Gleser method since it is generally “considered accurate” ([2005] 79-80).

\textsuperscript{73} Henneberg and Henneberg (1998) 520. Note that the average height of males in the table above is uncorrected for age; the average corrected for age by Henneberg and Henneberg is given as 165.6cm (std. 6.0). Henneberg and Henneberg used the Trotter and Gleser method to reconstruct stature from the skeletal remains they examined (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{74} Breitinger (1937) 203. These skeletons are the remains of the Spartiate dead from King Pausanias’ Athenian expedition of 403: see Xen., \textit{Hell.} 2.4.33. Three notes on this figure: firstly, Breitinger reports an average of 170cm, with the three tallest individuals being 178, 181, 185cm, respectively, and the smallest being 160cm; secondly, Breitinger does not indicate the methods he used to reconstruct the statures of the Spartiates; thirdly, these results may have been skewed upwards by attempts to accommodate them to the National Socialist ideological position that classical Spartiates were part of the same ‘Northern race’ as Germans (see [1937] 203).

\textsuperscript{75} Bisel (1990) 159 Table 7. The skeletons in question were Messenian, not Athenian (contra von Reden [2007] 388 Table 14.1).

\textsuperscript{76} Ma (2008) 76: these two skeletons were among the dead buried in the tomb underneath the Lion of Chaironeia commemorating the battle of Chaironeia in 338.

\textsuperscript{77} It should be noted here that Henneberg and Henneberg’s sample of twenty skeletons had a standard deviation of 6.1, showing quite a variation between samples. In contrast, the variation found between the
ninety-one heights for classical Greek males is clearly a very small sample set to be working from; that said, the sample is not skewed by any subjective bias (representing simply the classical Greek skeletal heights that have been published) and is drawn from all over the classical Greek world. From the figure established here for an average height for classical Greek adult males, one can reconstruct an average body weight for classical Greek males by using an exponential equation developed by Henneberg, Hugg, and Townsend precisely for this purpose: \( W(eight) = 2.05 \cdot \exp[0.0208 \cdot h(eight)] \). Using the figure established for the mean height of classical Greek males (169.79cm), this equation produces a figure of 72.4 kg. (actually 72.398456kg.) for the average body weight of classical Greek males.

Different sets of data calculated here is much lower: this may be because the combining of the four sets of already averaged figures has hidden “skews” in the data.

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78 Henneberg et al. (1989). See Henneberg and Henneberg (1998) 520 for a useful summary of the method: “[b]ody weight can be reconstructed from numerous bone dimensions combined into multiple regression equations. Such an approach seems to be impractical in the case of our poorly preserved and often fragmentary material. Moreover, robustness of the skeleton only partially reflects body weight since the degree of fatness may fluctuate over short periods of time, as may the level of hydration of the body. Since the relationship between human body height and weight seems to be uniform over the wide range of individual ages and across populations, we have decided to reconstruct weight from body height. This approach obviously cannot provide for fluctuating levels of fatness or hydration. It can only indicate an average “normal” body weight. The relationship between body height and weight is exponential: weight=2.05 \cdot \exp[0.0208 \cdot height].”

79 I am grateful to Maura Halpenny for her help with the calculations of average classical Greek male body heights and weights in this appendix. Foxhall and Forbes ([1982] 47-48) adopted an estimate of 62kg. for the average body weight of the “ancient Greek (or Roman) male.” Remarking correctly that it was extremely difficult to determine even approximately average body weights for ancient Greek or Roman males (in 1982: see p.608 n.71 above), because of the lack of attention paid to skeletal remains in classical archaeology, they arrived at this figure in two steps. Firstly, they cited Angel (1945) 284-285 for a mean height for the ancient Attic male of 162.2cm (while noting that the results were not statistically significant because of the small sample size (61 males)). Secondly, in order “to add flesh to these very bare bones” ([1982] 47), they supplemented Angel’s figure with data for the average heights and weights of Cretan males in the 1940s and on Greek soldiers and university students in the 1960s ([1982] 47-48 n.22). But there is a serious methodological error underlying these calculations. Human height is determined by health and nutrition and, as such, is a highly sensitive indicator of the biological well-being of a population (see Kron [2005] 69-71 for a survey of recent research in anthropometry): average heights will therefore vary by region and time period to reflect changes in, e.g., the economic, demographic, and epidemiological environments; average statures have been known to increase in some historical populations by as much as
Thirdly, age. Classical Greek adult males of the requisite property were liable to conscription for hoplite (and cavalry) service between the ages of 18 and 60, although call-ups for active service on campaign for citizens at the upper end of this age range may have been limited in most poleis to extraordinary circumstances. Citizens were conscripted for hoplite service by tribal unit and age-group so that the burden of military service could be distributed equitably among those liable to conscription. Although it was something of a topos that mercenary forces were fitter and more able for military service than citizen armies made up of hoplites of a range of ages, there are numerous references in Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, by far the fullest and detailed account we possess of the ‘lived experience’ of a classical Greek mercenary force on campaign, to younger

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5cm over a single generation (Niskanen [2006]). Average heights (and weights) from modern Greece therefore cannot be used to reconstruct average heights and weights from classical (or ancient) Greece. Angel’s figure of 162.2cm cannot be used for the same reason, since it is an average calculated from skeletal material scattered chronologically over a time span of roughly 4500 years (from the Neolithic to the medieval periods) ([1945] 330, 362-363 Table 8).


81 See van Wees (2004) 242: older age limit (in normal circumstances) for active service in Athens (which may have been caused exceptionally by the need for a substantial ‘home guard’ to defend the extraordinarily long fortification walls (and borders) of Athens). But see also Thucyd. 1.105.3-6, 4.44.4 for the “older men” at Corinth not taking part in land campaigns in normal circumstances. See, however, Hanson (2000) 89-95 for examples of older (in their forties and fifties) hoplites at Athens and elsewhere.

82 The system is best attested, as usual, at Athens: see Hamel (1998) 24-28, Christ (2001) (at some point before 352, the method of conscription was changed from call-up by tribe to call-up by age-group). For evidence of organization (and presumably conscription) of other polis armies by tribal affiliation, see Hanson (2000) 122-123, Krentz (2007) 148.


and older mercenaries marching and fighting in the army recruited by Cyrus.\textsuperscript{85} There is no precise information on the recruitment to \textit{polis} armies of light-armed troops in the classical Greek world, both because the presence of these forces in classical Greek armies was generally ignored by contemporary historians and because there does not seem to have been any organized conscription of these forces: that said, Thucydides’ descriptions of general levies shows that light-armed troops turned out in large numbers for campaigns and thus were probably representative of the (property) classes from which they came.\textsuperscript{86} Classical Greek navies were recruited through a mixture of citizen levies and the hiring of mercenaries (and the slaves of both of these groups):\textsuperscript{87} there is no reason to think that the ages of the men rowing classical Greek triremes were skewed in any one direction. In sum, although the age profile of classical Greek armies and navies cannot be determined precisely, it can be said with some certainty that their composition was broadly representative of the adult male populations of their organizing \textit{poleis} and the classical Greek world as a whole.

Finally, levels of physical activity. These would have varied according to type and stage of campaign. The total energy expenditure (TEE)\textsuperscript{88} of, e.g., naval forces anchored at operating bases or on days during voyages spent in port or at anchorage, of

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\textsuperscript{85} See Lee (2007) 74-76 for references and discussion.
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\textsuperscript{87} See (ibid.) 209, 211-212, 218.
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\textsuperscript{88} Defined at FAO/WHO/UNU (2004) 9 as “[t]he energy spent, on average, in a 24-hour period by an individual or a group of individuals. By definition, it reflects the average amount of energy spent in a typical day, but it is not the exact amount of energy spent each and every day.”
\end{flushright}
amphibious and land forces engaged in the blockades of enemy poleis, or of land forces on rest days during marches, would obviously have been much lower than that of naval forces sailing from one base to another (or engaged in battle), or of infantry forces on marching days. For the physical activity level (PAL)\(^{89}\) of the first group of activities indicated here, I will adopt a PAL value consistent with a moderately active daily lifestyle: 1.75 x BMR;\(^{90}\) for the second group of activities, I will adopt a PAL value consistent with a vigorously active daily lifestyle: 2.05 x BMR.\(^{91}\) The typical rhythms of classical Greek land, naval, and amphibious campaigns will have meant that the number of days spent by military forces engaged in the first type of activities described here would have been greater, normally considerably so, than the days spent engaged in ‘vigorous’ activities.\(^{92}\)

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\(^{89}\) Defined at (ibid.) 9 as “TEE for 24 hours expressed as a multiple of BMR, and calculated as TEE/BMR for 24 hours. In adult men... BMR times PAL is equal to TEE or the total energy requirement.”

\(^{90}\) (Ibid.) 37-39 for a discussion and classification of physical activity levels.

\(^{91}\) It should be noted here that these categories of physical activity levels “indicate the physical activity most often performed by most individuals in the population, over a period of time” and that “[e]nergy requirements of such populations will change with the energy demands of their cyclical lifestyles” ((ibid.) 38). Obviously, on days of land and naval combat, the PAL and therefore TEE of armies and trireme crews would have been much higher, but such days were obviously rare.

\(^{92}\) See chapters 1, 2, and 3 for the normal rhythm of campaigns: typical (Athenian) amphibious campaigns in the fifth (and fourth) centuries were marked by some days or weeks of sail, followed by (at most) a few days’ fighting, and then months or years of blockade (during which any fighting was (at most) intermittent); for classical navies, days spent at operating bases, or at ports and anchorages during voyages, far outweighed days rowing and fighting; finally, most land campaigns were marked by (at most) a few days’ marching followed by the establishment of camps at frequent intervals so as to enables armies to ravage and forage their enemies’ territory.
Combining these data, the daily average energy requirements of classical Greek sailors and soldiers can be estimated, using FAO research data,\(^{93}\) to have been between 3050 and 3200 kcal for men aged 18 to 29.9 years with a moderately active lifestyle, and between 3600 and 3750 kcal for men aged 18 to 29.9 years with a vigorously active lifestyle; between 2950 and 3050 kcal for men aged 30 to 59.9 years with a moderately active lifestyle, and between 3450 and 3550 kcal for men aged 30 to 59.9 years with a vigorously active lifestyle. Comparing these figures to the estimates of average daily energy requirements to the energy values calculated above for daily classical Greek military diets in which one *choinix* of wheat provided the bulk of carbohydrates,\(^{94}\) it can be seen that a diet (of 3533 kcal) in which one *choinix* of wheat milled at an extraction rate of 90 per cent provided 60 per cent of the calories—both assumptions with a high degree of probability—would have covered the TEE of both moderately and vigorously active classical Greek men aged 30 to 59.9 years, and the TEE of moderately active Greek men aged 18 to 29.9 years. Such a diet would result in a deficiency of somewhere

\(^{93}\) FAO/WHO/UNU (2004) 41 Table 5.4, 42 Table 5.5. This research was obviously unavailable to Foxhall and Forbes: note that the 2004 FAO estimates of energy requirements are lower than the 1973 FAO estimates available to them; cf. Garnsey (1989b) 38 for the point that expert estimates of caloric requirements have gradually decreased over time. I should note here also that my reasons for presenting these data are the same as Foxhall and Forbes ([1982] 50): “[i]t must be stressed, however, that it is not possible to use calorific or other nutritional requirements to reconstruct ancient diets. Calorific requirements merely provide a set of independent parameters, useful for determining the limits of human food consumption, and thus useful as ‘yardsticks’ against which modern hypotheses about ancient food consumption can be measured. That is to say, they can show whether our estimates of, e.g., ancient grain consumption are within the bounds of physiological possibility (or even likelihood), but they cannot by themselves provide an answer to the question ‘how much?’.”

\(^{94}\) It should be emphasized again that these calculations led to estimates of average consumption. When military forces received their monthly pay installments or bonuses and were operating in areas with markets where food was available in abundance, they may have consumed more food than required (cf. chapter 7 section iv above). In other cases, when sailors or soldiers were paid irregularly or not at all, or found themselves cut off from any means of acquiring provisions as a result of the movements of enemy forces, they may have consumed less food than required to meet their energy needs. But, in general, the consumption of classical Greek military forces would have been within the bands calculated here.
between 67 and 217 kcal for a vigorously active classical Greek male aged 18 to 29.9 years, and therefore not so much as to result in serious physiological or behavioral penalties over time—especially considering that, for classical Greek sailors and soldiers, periods of vigorous activity would be interspersed among periods of moderate activity. In sum, one *choinix* of wheat could have formed—and probably did form—part of a diet providing a sufficient amount of calories to provide for the energy requirements of an average classical Greek sailor or soldier.

Finally, there is the question of the energy requirements of the slave attendants of hoplites and those slaves who rowed Athenian and classical Greek triremes. There is no reliable ancient evidence for the normal daily grain consumption of slaves in the classical Greek world.\(^95\) There is also no evidence for the heights (and therefore) weights of slaves. Any remarks on the typical ages of slave-attendants will be no more than guesses. We can make the following probabilistic assumptions, however. The lives of slave attendants on campaign will necessarily have been more onerous than those of their hoplite owners. Slave rowers will have had the same caloric requirements as the free rowers of classical Greek triremes. Slaves were valuable property and owners would have been usually concerned to make sure that they were not undernourished.\(^96\) Slaves would not usually have been free to select their own diets. Owners would generally wish to meet the energy requirements of their slave in the cheapest way possible—i.e., by feeding them with grain. In light of these considerations, it is highly probable that the

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\(^{95}\) See again p.592 n.13.

\(^{96}\) See Garnsey (1989b) 39 for this assumption and the two following.
energy requirements of slave attendants and slave rowers were (in the first case) higher and (in the second) equal to their owners’, that these requirements were met by their owners, and that they were met predominantly by grain.\textsuperscript{97} It seems best, then, to think that the daily grain consumption of slaves on land and naval campaigns was at least equal to that of their owners.

\textit{iii. The measurement of classical Greek sailors and soldiers’ consumption of \textit{ἄλφιτα} in wheat equivalent}

So far, then, I have established that in classical and Hellenistic Greece one \textit{choinix} of wheat was considered the nutritional equivalent of two \textit{choinikes} of \textit{ἄλφιτα}; and that one \textit{choinix} of wheat could have constituted part of a diet sufficient to meet the daily energy requirements of an average classical Greek sailor or soldier. We may conclude, following on from these two premises, that two \textit{choinikes} of \textit{ἄλφιτα} could also have constituted part of a daily diet sufficient to provide for the energy needs of an average classical Greek adult male (sailor or soldier). But, although there is now available a normative classical Greek figure (keeping in mind Stroud’s reservations) for the weight of one \textit{choinix} of wheat (0.687kg.), we do not possess any (reliable) figures for the weight of a similar volume of \textit{ἄλφιτα}. This presents a problem: since classical Greek sailors and soldiers most often consumed barley-meal rather than wheat,\textsuperscript{98} any calculation of the grain consumption and purchases of classical Greek military forces will necessarily

\textsuperscript{97} On the type of grain normally distributed to slaves, and the form in which it was distributed, see p.35 n.56 above.

\textsuperscript{98} See pp.35-37 above.
have to be in volumetric units of unknown weight (of barley-meal). While such a procedure will still allow for comparison with figures for the grain consumption and purchases recorded for other classical Greek populations, it will not allow for any cross-cultural comparisons across time. Therefore, this dissertation will express figures for the consumption of ἄλφιτα of Greek military forces both in Greek volumetric units, and in kilograms of wheat equivalent (reflecting the fact that, in the classical Greek world just as in other pre-industrial European societies, grain was the single greatest component of both output and consumption). Since two choinikes of ἄλφιτα were considered the nutritional equivalent of one choinix of wheat, the wheat equivalent of two choinikes of ἄλφιτα can be easily calculated: it will be 0.687kg. (=the weight of one choinix of wheat) of wheat equivalent; and one medimnos of ἄλφιτα will equal 16.482 kg. of wheat equivalent.

99 For the use of wheat equivalent to generate cross-cultural and cross-temporal comparisons, see Clark and Haswell (1970) 55ff.; Figueira (1984) 91-92; Hopkins (2002) 198. See Figueira’s definition of a kilogram of wheat equivalent ([1984] 92): this “is equivalent to either the amount of nutrition derived from a kilogram of wheat or to the value of other foodstuffs expressed in terms of wheat by price.”

100 Figueira calculated an equivalency for ἄλφιτα and wheat of 1 medimnos of ἄλφιτα = 0.72 medimnos of wheat ([1984] 92-93 and nn.14-15). To arrive at this figure, Figueira first noted that barley was valued in the modern Mediterranean at 65 per cent of the value of wheat, and that this figure was approximated in the few surviving ancient data available to us. To get from this figure to the relationship between the value of barley-meal and wheat, he used Foxhall’s figure for weight per volume of barley-meal, even after noting that the figure for the barley from which she produced her barley-meal was implausibly high (see p.601 above). Figueira then substituted (arbitrarily) for Foxhall’s figure of c. 750g/liter a weight per volume for barley of 583g/liter and then, using the relationship between this figure and Foxhall’s figure for barley-meal of 643g/liter (the latter is 1.103 times greater than the former), multiplied 65 (the value of barley as compared to wheat in percentage terms he had already noted) by 1.103 to reach a figure of 72 per cent for the price relationship between barley-meal and wheat. Since Foxhall’s figure for weight per volume of barley-meal is invalid, the second and third steps of Figueira’s calculations are also invalid, and therefore his figure for the wheat equivalent of ἄλφιτα is, too.
iv. Concluding remarks; suggestions for further research

In presenting the results of sections ii and iii of this appendix, I am aware of the limitations of the data underlying these results and the consequent possible objections to them. As already noted, all of the key variables underlying the calculations in this appendix are uncertain: accordingly, the figures found here are not meant to project a false sense of precision or certainty, but only to represent the bands of probability within which we should be moving on the spectrum of possible grain consumption rates and energy requirements for classical Greek military forces. But, again, these bands can be (very roughly) established. In addition, this appendix represents an improvement on the pioneering article of Foxhall and Forbes, the study now conventionally cited by scholars both on the caloric values of grains and grain-products and the energy requirements of populations in the classical Greek world, in that it has indicated errors in their calculations of the weight per volume of barley-meal and in their use of skeletal data, and has also incorporated data unavailable to them on the weight per volume of wheat in classical Greece, the heights of classical Greek males, and human energy requirements.

In sum, the goal here has been to push as hard as possible against the limits of our knowledge, while indicating precisely the nature of those limits, and to establish a framework for further study.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{101} Cf. the remarks of Foxhall and Forbes ([1982] 75), which serve as a useful methodological guide in this respect: “[p]erhaps this study will best serve as a cautionary tale for researchers using grain consumption as one of the bases for constructing models of population size and/or structure, agricultural production, grain trade and other fundamental issues in classical social and economic history. In order to estimate ancient grain consumption from the available ration figures and to use these data without merely repeating or enlarging upon past mistakes, one must continually re-evaluate and make explicit our underlying assumptions and understand the full range of variables involved. Only then can one incorporate estimates of grain consumption into wider-reaching hypotheses about life in antiquity.”
I end with some suggestions as to how the results of this appendix could be improved upon and how they could (should) become obsolete in the (near) future. While some of the variables in the calculations undertaken here will never be known precisely, such as, e.g., the age profile of classical Greek military forces, there are some areas of research where further precision is and will be possible:

1. The question of how much a given volume of barley-flour weighed in comparison to the weight of the given volume of barley it was made from in the classical Greek world could be determined within a range of probability by enlisting the services of a specialist miller stone milling barley with traditional techniques.102 There are still in Greece bakers using roughly milled, hulled barley to bake the traditional biscuit called ‘dako’ on Crete and ‘paximadi’ in Greece. The practical expertise of the millers producing the barley-meal for this biscuit could be used to ascertain the relationship between the volume/weight ratios of barley and barley-meal. The process would be fraught with difficulties (how to decide what cultivars of barley, type of grinding stone, or extraction rates to use? How does the processing of barley before and for milling differ today from antiquity? How much should the barley-flour be tamped down before measuring its volume?)103 but it would still “get us further” in establishing possible parameters for this question (which are currently unavailable).104

102 See already Foxhall, reporting the results of her milling experiments ([1982] 77): “[m]ore experimentation with various methods of processing hulled barley is clearly very necessary.” To my knowledge, no study focusing on classical antiquity has carried out any further experiments on the processing of hulled barley.

103 See Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 78 for the last question.

104 My thinking on this subject was greatly helped by the contributors to a thread of discussion on the subject of ‘barley and barley-flour weights/densities’ on the Archaeobotany listserv
2. The greater attention now paid (finally) to botanical remains during the 
excavation of classical sites in the Greek world will aid in ascertaining the cultivars of 
barley grown in the classical period. This, in turn, could aid in the attainment of 
greater precision in the choice of cultivars for the types of experiments just described and 
thus in greater precision in the results of such experiments.

3. There are many skeletal remains from the classical period which remain 
unpublished—for example: the remains of the Spartiate dead from King Pausanias’ 
invasion of Attica in 403 still await final publication; the skeletal remains from the mass 
grave found near Thespiae in the nineteenth century A.D., which may be the Thespian 
dead from the Battle of Delium in 424, have never been published, and not only have 
the two hundred and fifty-four skeletons found during the excavations of the Lion of 
Chaironeia in 1879 never been fully published, but their current exact location is 
uncertain. In addition, new skeletal remains from the classical Greek world are being 
discovered constantly: most exciting in this regard are the (possibly) hundreds of 
skeletons of soldiers from the classical period recently found in Himera that have been

(archaeobotany@jiscmail.co.uk) in March and April 2007 (I am again grateful to John (Mac) Marston for 
forwarding my question on the weight and density of barley as compared to barley-flour to the 
Archaeobotany listserv, and to Seth Pevnick for putting me in touch with John). In particular, I learned a 
lot from the comments in this thread of Sabine Beckmann, Nic Dolby, Delwen Samuel, and Anaya Sarpaki.


106 For description of and bibliography on this burial, see, e.g., Pritchett (1985) 132-133.

107 Ma (2008) 76.

108 See, e.g., Baziotopoulou-Valavani (2002) 190: 89 adult male and female skeletons discovered in a mass 
burial in the Kerameikos; (ibid.) 199: report of a discovery of one hundred and twenty skeletons of adult 
males, females and children in a mass grave at Pydna dated to the fourth century.
reported to have an average height of 175cm. The publication of some or all of these remains will obviously bring greater precision and more statistical significance to our calculations of the average heights (and weights) of classical Greek sailors and soldiers.

4. Finally, stable isotope analysis has, as of now, hardly been applied to skeletal remains from the classical period: it can be expected that a much more precise idea of the role of cereals in the diet of classical Greek adult males will become possible in the coming years and decades as more stable isotope analysis of human remains from the classical period is performed.  

109 Valsecchi (2008) (I thank Graham Claytor for alerting me to this article).

Appendix 4: The Provisioning of the Ten Thousand on the March to Cunaxa

i. The usual means of provisioning of the Ten Thousand on the march to Cunaxa

As noted in chapter 4 section ii, the Ten Thousand on the march to Cunaxa did not usually acquire their provisions from the Lydian agora located in the non-Greek part of Cyrus’ army. Rather, the army on the move to Cunaxa provisioned itself in the settlements which it passed during its march.¹ For most of the march, this meant purchasing from markets provided by cities along its route.² This can be shown to be true

¹ Again, the key text here is Anab. 1.5.9: Xenophon, describing the character of Cyrus’ march, states that “τὸ δὲ σύµπαν δῆλος ἦν Κῦρος ὡς σπεύδων πᾶσαν τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ οὐ διατρίβων ὅπου μὴ ἐπισιτισµοῦ ἕνεκα ἢ τινος ἄλλου ἀναγκαίου εκαθέζετο,” “[i]n general, it was clear that Cyrus was in haste throughout the whole journey and was making no delays, except where he halted to procure provisions or for some other necessary purpose.” (All text references in this appendix will be to Xenophon’s Anabasis, unless otherwise indicated.)

² Krasilnikoff (1993), now sometimes cited as the standard work on the pay of the Ten Thousand (Descat [1995a] 101, Roy [2004] 265 n.2, 269), argues that the Cyreans usually obtained their food by purchase from cities and villages throughout the course of the march to Cunaxa. He cites ([1993] 84) 1.2.18, 1.2.24, 1.5.6, 1.5.10 in support of this view (without further argumentation for why we should or can extrapolate from the few mentions of provisioning on the march to Cunaxa to the army’s normal provisioning practices) but only the last passage refers to the purchase of supplies at a city (at 1.2.24, Xenophon notes that the tavern-keepers ("οἱ τὰ καπηλεῖα ἔχοντες") remained at Tarsus after the rest of its inhabitants had fled: while it is possible that the Greeks may have bought some provisions from these tavern keepers, it cannot have been significant; at least Menon’s soldiers could have lived off the plunder they took in the city (1.2.20); and, at 1.3.14, when the troops were still at Tarsus, the assumed place of purchase of provisions is the Lydian market in the non-Greek part of the army (although this is meant as a deliberately absurd proposal (see p.260 n.13 above)). Krasilnikoff ([1993] 84-86) also cites 1.3.9 and 1.3.11 together with 5.6.19-23 and 7.1.7 in support of the view that the Cyreans provisioned themselves from purchases in cities before the battle of Cunaxa, but the first two passages do not refer to the purchase of provisions, and, while the latter two do, the arrangements made with (prospective) employers at Cotyora and Byzantium cannot tell us anything by themselves (i.e. without further argument) about the arrangements for pay and provisioning under Cyrus. Also, Krasilnikoff rejects Griffith’s arguments that Cyrus supplied his soldiers with rations in kind ([1993] 83-84) without addressing or refuting the latter’s arguments properly. In sum, Krasilnikoff’s arguments for his position that the Greeks on their march to Cunaxa usually obtained their food by purchase from the settlements on their way provide no firm basis at all for that position. In addition, Krasilnikoff’s analysis of the pay and provisioning of the Ten Thousand is marred by several errors of fact. 1.3.21 offers no information on the “normal” amounts of pay for the Cyreans (contra [1993] 82). The agreement Cyrus struck with the mercenaries at Thapsacus (1.4.13) was significantly different from the agreements struck with Seuthes and the Spartans (for neither of which is 7.3.12 the correct citation) (contra [1993] 86 n.27) (see also p.258 n.7 for another serious problem with Krasilnikoff’s account).
from three considerations. Firstly, the provisioning of the mercenaries under Cyrus is taken for granted in Xenophon’s narrative, mentioned only when it took place under exceptional circumstances or by methods that might be considered unusual (this is unsurprising, given that the *Anabasis* can be characterized primarily as a classical military historical narrative written by a classical Greek military man):\(^3\) there are (including the three references to the Lydian *agora*) only eight explicit references to provisioning (or potential sources of provisions) in his description of the six months from the beginning of the march in Sardis to the battle of Cunaxa (1.2.18, 1.3.11, 1.3.14, 1.4.19, 1.5.4, 1.5.6, 1.5.9, 1.5.10) and all refer to exceptional circumstances. In the rest of the *Anabasis*, the provisioning of the mercenaries is assumed in the narrative in two circumstances only: firstly, when the mercenaries were explicitly guaranteed availability of supplies in an agreement with a state agent or employer and this source of supplies was explicitly described before a part of a march (or a campaign) (as in the cases of Tissaphernes (2.3.26-27) and Seuthes (7.3.10)), provisioning is not mentioned at all or only in unusual circumstances (or when it serves to clarify the narrative) in the subsequent narrative of the march or campaign. Secondly, the provisioning of the march is assumed (and thus only mentioned exceptionally) in those months when the Cyreans were moving within a world of friendly Greek *poleis* and were purchasing their

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\(^3\) Formally, the *Anabasis* is an unusual text, not easily categorized in one genre or another, combining, as it does, elements of travel literature, biography, and ethnography (see, e.g., Dillery [1998] 9-15). That said, it is “obviously not a systematic ‘travel’ account; large distances are covered which attract no description of places or events at all, and the primary purposes of the account are not topographical or concerned with conveying a sense of place about the eastern world” (Tuplin [1991] 44-45). In sum, although autobiographical justification does play a role in the formation of the narrative (especially in the descriptions of the army’s dealings with the Greek cities it passes by and halts at during its *katabasis*) (see, e.g., Erbse [1966], Tuplin [1991] 45), the *Anabasis* can be characterized primarily as an account of a military campaign written by a military man who had a particular interest in the themes of military leadership and practice (see, e.g., Anderson [1974] 129-130, Hirsch [1985] 15, Dillery [1998] 13).
provisions at markets provided by friendly (Greek) poleis or foraging for them from hostile non-Greek territory. Otherwise, when the mercenaries were moving through strange, hostile and non-Greek territory without a state agent or employer who could guarantee access to provisions, the provisioning of the Cyreans was always precarious and since they could not take it for granted, it was not taken for granted in Xenophon’s narrative, either.

The march from Sardis to Cunaxa took place mainly within a world of friendly cities: the rhythm of the march in Asia Minor was from city to city and, after Asia Minor, the march stopped and was received at the cities of Issus, Myriandrus, Thapsacus, Charmande, and Pylae. In addition, if under Cyrus, provisioning arrangements are taken for granted in the narrative, as they are under Tissaphernes and Seuthes, there is one significant difference between Xenophon’s account of provisioning under Cyrus, on the one hand, and of Tissaphernes and Seuthes, on the other. The methods by which the mercenaries were to get their provisions under the latter leaders were proposed explicitly in (Xenophon’s text of the) speeches made by those leaders, and were explicitly accepted by the Cyreans. It is only once these speeches are made, and the proposals in them regarding supplies are accepted by the men, that there is no need to mention the sources.

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4 See chapter 3 section iiiia.

5 Thus, in the three days from the battle of Cunaxa to the mercenaries’ temporary truce with the King (2.1.1-2.3.26-27), there are fifteen explicit mentions of provisions and the act of provisioning, compared to eight for the previous six months. On the narrative of the march from the Zapatas (after the murder of the generals and the break with Tissaphernes) to Trapezus (3.1.1-4.8.21), see Nussbaum (1967) 148: the narrative of this part of the march is “completely dominated by the external physical emergency in which the Army finds itself – the immediate need to procure subsistence and to ward off an active enemy and in general overcome every physical danger and obstacle...” Cf. Woronoff ([1987] 13) on Xenophon’s descriptions of the villages the army comes across during this part of the march: “si Xénophon s’attarde aussi longuement sur la prospérité de ces villages, c’est que les questions d’intendance sont primordiales.”
of the men’s supplies in the subsequent narrative. In contrast, the methods of the men’s provisioning under Cyrus are never described explicitly by Xenophon, who, in regard to the logistics of the army under the pretender, concentrates only on the problems and discussions surrounding the receipt of \( \mu\iota\sigma\varsigma\ddot{o}\varsigma \) from Cyrus.\(^6\) It appears certain, then, that purchase at markets in cities was the assumed means of acquiring provisions for the mercenaries on their march to Cunaxa; i.e., when the march stopped at cities before Cunaxa, it provisioned itself in markets in those cities or provided by those cities.\(^7\) This conclusion gains support from the one (offhand) mention of purchasing in a market provided by a city during the march to Cunaxa, at Charmande (1.5.10, cf. 1.5.11-12). Here, the purchasing of food is described by Xenophon because of the unusual means of transport necessary to get to the market in the city (the soldiers used skins filled with hay and then sewn up to cross the Euphrates); the unusual (for classical Greeks) food purchased there (wine made from dates and bread from millet); and because Clearchus was nearly killed on his way back from inspecting the agora (1.5.11-12). That is to say, the purchase of food in the market at Charmande is mentioned by Xenophon because of the unusual circumstances under which the purchasing took place and because of the unusual products bought in the market; but the means of acquisition—purchasing in a market—is not presented as unusual.

Secondly, as noted in chapter 4 section ii, in Xenophon’s description of the famine that afflicted the Greeks in the desert between Corsote and Pylae once their grain

\(^6\) See pp.627-628 and n.11 below.

\(^7\) This is certain, at least, for that part of the march after the army had left Cyrus’ sphere of control; for the march from Sardis until the border of Lycaonia, there is the (slight) possibility that provisioning from satrapal sources could have been assumed by Xenophon and his audience: see pp.629-630 below.
had given out (1.5.6), he states that: “... καὶ πρίασθαι οὐκ ἦν εἰ µὴ ἐν τῇ Λυδίᾳ ἀγορᾷ ἐν τῷ Κύρου βαρβαρικῷ...”, “and it was not possible to buy anywhere except in the Lydian market in the barbarian part of Cyrus’ army.” The necessary implication from this statement is that it was normal during (at least this part of) the march for the Cyreans to buy provisions elsewhere than in the Lydian agora: i.e., that the Cyreans normally bought their provisions in the cities they passed.

Thirdly, the argument that the mercenaries on the march to Cunaxa were obtaining their food supplies primarily through purchases from markets provided by cities also gains confirmation from a point raised by Marinovic. All the real or potential employers (but one) of the Ten Thousand, Greek and non-Greek, paid or proposed a sum of money for their hire, to be paid per month; this sum is termed µισθός.

(Tissaphernes was (ostensibly) leading the Greeks home, not employing them.) When Xenophon speaks of Cyrus, Timasion (5.6.23), Thorax (5.6.26), Anaxibius (7.1.7), and

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8 Note that Xenophon states that “there was nowhere else to buy...,” not “there was nowhere else to get food.” Contrast 6.2.4: Lycon the Achaean demanding σιτηρέσιον from the Heracleots to buy provisions for the mercenaries’ journey from Heraclea since the xenia provided by the Heracleots were not sufficient and there was no other place (no indigenous settlement to plunder) from which the mercenaries could provision themselves (see chapter 3 section iii for full discussion of this passage).


10 The exception is Coeratadas (7.1.33ff.). Unable to provide µισθός to the soldiers, he had to promise them food and drink till they reached the Delta of Thrace, at which point they could live off plunder. The striking and important part, for the argument here, of Coeratadas’ proposal, is that, in the absence of pay, he had to propose to the soldiers alternative arrangements to obtain food and drink; such alternative arrangements are proposed only here and in the agreement with Seuthes.

11 E.g., 1.2.11-12: at Caýstru-pedion, Cyrus owed the mercenaries more than three month’s µισθός and paid them four; 1.3.9: Cyrus had been the mercenaries’ µισθοδότης; 1.3.21: Cyrus promising a fifty per cent rise in µισθός; 1.4.13: at Thapsacus, Cyrus promised the Greeks µισθὸν ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν µισθοφοράν. (Xenophon uses µισθός and µισθοφορά interchangeably: see here, 5.6.19 (µισθὼν) and 5.6.23
Thibron (7.6.1), Xenophon mentions no other form of payment other than \( \mu i\sigma\delta\omega\zeta \) as being disbursed or promised.

In contrast, as Marinovic points out, Seuthes came to a different agreement with the men: having promised \( \mu i\sigma\delta\omega\zeta \) to them, he added that they were to take their food and drink from the country (and that any booty taken was to be given to him to sell, in order to provide the soldiers’ \( \mu i\sigma\delta\omega\zeta \) (7.3.10)). Seuthes had to make this arrangement for the food and drink of the men, since they would be operating in hostile territory (see, e.g., 7.3.13, 7.6.25-31), away from any friendly cities or communities, and thus would not able to use their pay to purchase provisions. The fact that Seuthes had to specify arrangements for provisioning, in addition to his promise of \( \mu i\sigma\delta\omega\zeta \), marks his agreement with the mercenaries out as exceptional, according to Marinovic.\(^\text{12}\) This is not quite true. When the men were deciding at Perinthus which leader they should serve under, Seuthes or Aristarchus, Xenophon presented the latter’s offer as follows (7.3.3): “... Aristarchus directs us to force our way to the Chersonese... and if we... get to the Chersonese, he says that... you will not be cheated any more but will receive pay, and that he will not shut his eyes any more, as he does now, to your being in want of provisions.”\(^\text{13}\) But the reason for specifying the provisions in this case was different: it was not because there would be no

\(^{12}\) (1988) 161. Cf. 7.7.33-34, where any forces hired by Seuthes for a potential campaign in Thrace (against the remnants of the Ten Thousand if they refused to leave Thrace) would have to receive both provisions and \( \mu i\sigma\delta\omega\zeta \) from Seuthes.

\(^{13}\) “... οὗτος δὲ αὐτὸς κελεύει εἰς Χερσόνησον... πορεύεσθαι ὃπ... ἐκεῖσοι ἐλέημεν... οὔτε ἐξαπατήσεσθαι ἔτι ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ λύψεσθαι μισθόν, οὔτε παρόψεσθαι ἔτι ὑπάρχει ὑποικισμένοις τῶν ἔπιτηρησίων.”
opportunity to purchase provisions in the Chersonese but because Aristarchus, prior to his offer, had been staying in Perinthus while the mercenaries were struggling to obtain provisions outside the city and had not done anything to alleviate their supply situation. He had to address this failure to help the mercenaries in any offer he might make to them, in order to make it more acceptable to them. His offer might also have reflected the fact that any service for the mercenaries in the Chersonese would have been in the middle of winter, and therefore he may have to make special arrangements to ensure that there would be no shortage of provisions for the soldiers there.14

In contrast to the agreement with Seuthes, in the agreements with Timasion, Thorax, and Anaxibius (5.6.23, 5.6.26, 7.1.7), μισθός was demanded or promised with the explicit expectation that it would be used for the purchase of provisions in a market provided by or in a city (although the market is not mentioned in the text, or is only mentioned later (in the case of Timasion and Thorax)), in accordance with normal classical Greek historiographical practice. At 7.6.1, where, if we remember that the army Thibron was recruiting would have been expected to provision itself according to Greek norms (there is nothing in Xenophon’s account in the Hellenica of the campaigns of Thibron to suggest otherwise), we can assume that the μισθός promised there was (partly)
for the purchase of provisions. Therefore, when Xenophon mentions, repeatedly,
agreements between Cyrus and the mercenaries that specify amounts of \( \mu \iota \sigma \chi \omega \varsigma \) and the
lengths of time during which \( \mu \iota \sigma \chi \omega \varsigma \) was to be paid, but no further arrangements for
provisioning, as Seuthes had to do, and in the light of the previous arguments in this
section, it seems certain that the soldiers, during their service under Cyrus, were expected
to use the \( \mu \iota \sigma \chi \omega \varsigma \) they received from him to buy provisions, as they were in their
agreements with their later Greek employers.\(^{15}\)

All that said, there is the slight possibility that, as long as the army marched
through Cyrus’ sphere of control in Asia Minor, it may have been provisioned from
satrapal stores. There is evidence for the presence of sizeable reserves of tax grain
available to satrap in Asia Minor in the fourth century;\(^{16}\) and there is a chance that
Xenophon may have felt his readers sufficiently familiar with Persian institutions to take
for granted in his narrative the distribution of provisions by Cyrus to the army during the
march in Asia Minor until the border of Lycaonia.\(^{17}\) There almost certainly would have
been satrapal reserves of grain at Cyrus’ capital of Sardis and at Celaenae, where the

\(^{15}\) Griffith ([1935] 266-267) gives no evidence or reasoning for his statement that the mercenaries’ contract
with Seuthes was the same as the one they had with Cyrus (other than that shown at chapter 6 section ix
and n.23 below to be false); neither does Loomis for his statement ([1998] 48 n.68) that Seuthes’ agreement
with the Greeks promised “less regular provision” of rations in kind than the agreement with Cyrus did. I
hope to have provided in these pages the analysis, argumentation and background needed (lacking in
Krasilnikoff’s account (see above n.2)) in order to utilize 5.6.19-23 and 7.1.7 to reconstruct details of the
pay and provisioning arrangements of the Greeks on their way to Cunaxa.


\(^{17}\) See Briant (1987) 4-5 for classical Greek literary audiences being relatively familiar with Persian
customs and institutions.
march paused for thirty days and which was a center of satrapal administration,\textsuperscript{18} and probably there would have been also at Ceramon Agora (1.2.10), where, because of its situation on the Royal Road, there would have been imperial stores of provisions stockpiled.\textsuperscript{19} (Ceramon Agora was, however, the only point at which Cyrus joined the Royal Road, before leaving it again to march to Iconium\textsuperscript{20} (though Cyrus could have ordered communities on the route of the march to prepare provisions for the (ostensible) purpose of the march against Phrygia)). There is therefore a possibility that the men may have been provisioned from satrapal reserves of grain during this part of the march.\textsuperscript{21} That said, the fact that Xenophon was operating within the mental framework of the polis and saw the world through the template provided by that framework\textsuperscript{22} means that it is most likely that, when he took for granted the provisioning of the men on the march through Asia Minor, he assumed that his audience would take it that the men provisioned themselves in Asia Minor (primarily) from markets provided by the cities they passed. In addition, the fact that Xenophon can indicate explicitly when Cyrus had provided for the

\textsuperscript{18} See Briant (2002) 625, 705 and 1.2.8-9: the city contained both a satrapal palace and a paradeisos belonging to Cyrus.

\textsuperscript{19} Though whether the staging-posts along Royal Roads could provision large armies is a matter of some doubt (Tuplin [2004] 173), set up, as they were, mainly for individual travelers and messengers (Briant [2002] 364-368; Debord [1995] 90; Kuhrt [1995] 244); see, however, ps.-Arist., \textit{Oec.} 2.2.38a, 1353a25-28 with Briant (2002) 364-365, 452-453 for the possibility of storehouses on the Royal Road being able to feed passing armies in Alexander’s time.

\textsuperscript{20} Debord (1995) 95.

\textsuperscript{21} For other possible evidence of Persian use of satrapal/imperial stores in Asia Minor in the fourth century: see Dem. 23.155, Diod. 15.3.3, Polyaeus, \textit{Strateg.} 7.33.2.

\textsuperscript{22} See Brulé (1995) esp. 3-6, and 13 (Xenophon’s “gabarit mental” is the Greek city); see also Tuplin (1999) 333.
food supply of the Greeks (see below on 1.10.18) and that he does not so during his
description of the march in Asia Minor also implies that the primary means of
provisioning for the Greeks until Lycaonia was purchase from cities. 23

On those parts of the march outside urbanized regions, such as between
Myriandrus and Thapsacus, and between Thapsacus and Charmande, requisitioning from
villages became the primary means of provisioning. The army had to provision in the
villages they encamped in at the Chalus river because it was the last settlement before
five days of marching through unpopulated (and infertile country); 24 and in the villages

23 Griffith believed that the Ten Thousand received both rations in kind (at the start of each month of their
service) and µισθός (at the end of each month of service) from Cyrus: (1935) 265-267, 295-296. Roy, in an
important article on the mercenaries of Cyrus, agreed with Griffith’s conclusions on the rates of pay the
Ten Thousand received ([1967] 309) and their provisioning arrangements ([1967] 311) (although he
subsequently changed his position ([2004] 269) to agree with Krasilnikoff [1993]); Griffith is also followed
linked problems of the pay and the provisioning of the Cyreans was both an illustration of and based on his
general thesis on the nature of pay given to mercenaries in the fifth and fourth centuries, which I have
shown above to be incorrect (see chapter 6 section ix). In addition, Griffith took 1.4.19, 1.5.9, and 1.10.18
as evidence that Cyrus provided rations in kind to the mercenaries in addition to µισθός. But the
provisioning in the villages mentioned at 1.4.19 offers no evidence for the usual provisioning of the
Cyreans throughout the course of the march, since they requisitioned food in these villages solely because
they were the only settlements in this part of the march (see next note); 1.5.9 says nothing of Cyrus
providing rations in kind (and see also pp.263-264 n.22 on the use of ἐπισιτίζοµαι and its derivatives at
1.4.19 and 1.5.9); and although at 1.10.18 Xenophon tells us that Cyrus provided 400 wagons laden with
stores of wheat-flour and wine, these were never used and were an exceptional measure taken solely for the
provisioning of the mercenaries in the days before the final battle with the King: see sections ii, iii below.
One should also note here that the Greeks had been paid µισθός at Tarsus and that there is explicit evidence
that the Greeks were purchasing food from markets on (at least) the latter part of the march (1.5.6, 1.5.10),
the money for which must have come from the µισθός paid out by Cyrus earlier; this is a major problem for
his presentation that Griffith does not address (see Marinovic [1988] 160 for this point). In addition, it is
very unlikely that the mercenaries had access to imperial stores of grain at any point after they had crossed
into Lycaonia (since they did not travel on the Royal Road): see pp.263-264 n.22. Finally, it should be
noted that Griffith’s incorrect dual payment schema also means that all of his arguments and conclusions
on the rates of pay given to mercenaries in this period, including that of the Cyreans, are invalid ([1935]
294-297), since, following the logic of his argument, he had to add a payment of σῖτος—for which there is
no evidence—to those rates we find for µισθός in Thucydides and Xenophon: the rates of pay he posits are
thus too high (by the amount of the imaginary σῖτος payment he posits). Loomis (1998) 48 and n.68,
following Griffith’s logic, adds a payment for σῖτος of two obols to the four the mercenaries received as
µισθός from Cyrus; Griffith’s figures are unclear, but it appears he saw a µισθός payment of five obols,
with the σῖτος bringing up a total of seven or eight obols (see Loomis [1998] 48 n.67).

24 At 1.4.9, Xenophon tells us that the army encamped (“ἐσκήνουν”) in some villages at the Chalus river
belonging to Parysatis, the mother of Cyrus. It seems certain, on the basis that the stop here resembled
they found at the Araxes\textsuperscript{25} and Mascas\textsuperscript{26} rivers because, during their march along this part of the middle Euphrates, these were the only settlements in this non-urbanized and desert region, and thus the only places that offered it opportunities to provision.\textsuperscript{27}

The Greeks obtained food through foraging or pillaging only infrequently. The fact that the mercenaries only passed through hostile territory on a couple of occasions

\textsuperscript{25} See 1.4.19: at the end of a nine-day march from Thapsacus, the army halted for three days at the Araxes river, where the soldiers found many villages full of grain and wine and provisioned themselves ("ἐπεσιτίσαντο").

\textsuperscript{26} From the Araxes, the army marched five days to the deserted city of Corsote, on the Mascas river, where again the soldiers stayed for three days and provisioned themselves (again Xenophon uses the verb "ἐπεσιτίσαντο") (1.5.4). Xenophon describes Corsote as a "πόλις ἐρήµη, µεγάλη." This phrase was taken by earlier editors and translators to mean a large city in the desert (see, e.g., Brownson’s translation in the Loeb (“in the desert... a large city”), Walpole [1963] 69, Mather and Hewitt [1938] 269). But, on the basis of the parallels at 3.4.7 (the once inhabited Larisa described as a deserted (ἐρήµη) city) and 3.4.10 (a deserted (ἐρήµη) stronghold by the formerly inhabited city of Mespila), Corsote should be taken to be a deserted city: see, e.g., Masqueray (2000) 66, Manfredi (1986) 27, Joannès (1995) 176, Lendle (1995) 46, Tuplin (1999) 353. It is unclear in what type of settlement(s) the soldiers obtained their food at Corsote; in the absence of a city, and given the similarity in details to the halt at the Araxes, and other rivers and groups of villages later (see 2.5.1, and cf. 2.3.14-17, 3.4.31, 4.7.18), it would seem that the Cyreans provisioned in villages here; certainty is impossible, however.

\textsuperscript{27} See Joannès (1995) 174-176, Tuplin (1999) 353. The use of the verb "ἐπεσιτίσαντο" at 1.4.19 and 1.5.4 tells us nothing by itself about the institutional means used by the soldiers to provision themselves in these villages (see again pp.263-264 n.22). Krasilnikoff ([1993] 85) and Trundle ([2004] 88) assume that the Greeks bought their provisions in the villages at the Araxes river. The fact, however, that the act of provisioning is mentioned at all at the Araxes and Mascas rivers—1.4.19 is the first explicit mention of an act of provisioning in the Anabasis—marks the acts of provisioning in the villages there as exceptional on the march to Cunaxa, and makes it very unlikely that the mode of provisioning in these villages was purchase. On the other hand, there is nothing to indicate that the army took these villages to be hostile: it is therefore almost certain that the army acquired food from these villages (as from those at the Chalus) by requisitioning.
greatly limited the role played by these methods in the provisioning of the march to Cunaxa. Passing into Lycaonia, Cyrus, in accordance with convention, gave the country over to the Greeks to plunder on the grounds that it was hostile territory (“ὡς πολεμίαν ὀφσαν”) (1.2.19). Xenophon’s description of the provisioning arrangements of the army at Tarsus implies strongly that at least some of the mercenaries stole provisions in that city or its surrounds.\(^\text{28}\) It is almost certain that the Greeks were able to collect food for themselves when Cyrus cut down the paradeisos of Belesys (which contained “all the products of the seasons” (“ἔχων πάντα ὅσα ὧραι φύουσι”)) and burned down his palace, both of which were located at the sources of the Dardas River (1.4.10).\(^\text{29}\) Xenophon does not state in any of these three cases that food had been stolen as part of pillaging operations: but gathering food through foraging or pillaging is only mentioned in the Anabasis when the mercenaries were without a leader and/or outside urbanized regions, and so it can be assumed in each of these instances.

The army also foraged as it marched down the Euphrates.\(^\text{30}\) On the march from the Araxes to the Mascas, the army hunted the wild animals and birds found in the country (1.5.1-3).\(^\text{31}\) The bustards that were caught were eaten as a “delicious”

\(^\text{28}\) See p.261 n.17 above.

\(^\text{29}\) Lee (2007) 23.


\(^\text{31}\) They had also probably made an attempt earlier (at the Chalus river) to supplement their diet with fish and doves but were prevented from doing so by the Syrian inhabitants on religious grounds: see 1.4.19 and Lee (2007) 223.
supplement to the soldiers’ grain-based diet (1.5.3). The day after the battle of Cunaxa, when the Greeks discussed with Ariaeus, the commander of Cyrus’ barbarian troops, how they should return to Ionia (2.2.10-12), he was of the opinion that they should return by a route different from that which they had taken to get to Cunaxa: “[f]or even on our way hither we were not able to get anything from the country during the last seventeen stages; and where there was anything, we consumed it entirely on our way through” (2.2.11).

Ariaeus’ statement is supported by Xenophon’s narrative: the army can be calculated to have been, seventeen σταθµοί before the meeting of the Persian with the Greek commanders, in the midst of the march to Corsote to Charmande/(Pylae); in the course of this march, Xenophon tells us, there was no fodder or any growing thing of any kind (1.5.5); and from Pylae, the Persians had adopted a “scorched earth” strategy, burning up “καὶ χιλὸν καὶ ἕτερον χρήσιμον ἄλλο,” “fodder and everything else that was of any use” (1.6.1). One can infer from the implicit contrast in Ariaeus’ statement with the rest of the march before the ordeal from Corsote to Charmande/(Pylae) that the army, including the Greeks, had been able to forage for provisions ἐκ τῆς χώρας it passed through previously. This foraging, however, was limited in scope for two main reasons. Firstly, it took place in infertile and unpopulated territory. Secondly, the speed of the march from the Levant

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32 Cf. 1.5.6 with p.258 n.7 above: on the most barren part of the entire march—from Corsote to Pylae—the Greeks subsisted on meat obtained by butchering the baggage-animals who had died on this stage of the march.

33 “ἐπεκαύειν γὰρ σταθµῶν τῶν ἐγγυτάτω οὐδὲ δεύκῃ δέχοντες ἐκ τῆς χώρας οὐδὲν ἐκρήμαν λαμβάνων· ἔνσα δὲ τι ἤν, ἡμεῖς διατηροῦμεν κατεδαπάνησαμεν.” (Diod. 14.25.8 is a summary of 2.2.11 and thus offers no information additional to that passage.)

34 See Lee (2007) Table 1 (at 284).
to the battle at Cunaxa—some twenty-five to thirty-five kilometers a day, a rate of march near (or at) the performance maximum of Greek (or other pre-industrial) armies—would have prevented the army from gathering any very large amount of food through foraging, even if there had been any, since gathering large supplies of food through foraging was a process that took significant amounts of time and would have slowed down the march considerably. In sum, then, on the march to Cunaxa, foraging was an occasional source of food to enliven otherwise monotonous grain-based meals, i.e., it functioned, as the Lydian agora did, merely as a supplementary source of provisions to those acquired in cities or villages.

35 See the table at Gabrielli (1995) 118-119 summarizing the distances traveled in the march to Cunaxa and the time taken to cover those distances.


38 Thus Lee ([2007] 23) is incorrect to list purchase from towns, the Lydian agora, and foraging as the major sources of provisions for the Greeks without indicating the relative insignificance of the latter two compared to the first. Foraging would have been a major source of fodder, however: see 1.6.1 quoted in the text above; 1.5.5: many of the baggage-animals died on the brutal march between Corsote and Charmande because of the lack of fodder in the desert; 1.5.7: Cyrus making the stages through the desert very long, when he wanted to reach fresh fodder; 1.9.27: fodder gathered by Cyrus’ servants, and shared out when scarce (implying that its collection was usually a matter of individual responsibility). Cf. 2.4.11: going out to collect fodder is included among the activities usually associated with the life of an army on the march.

39 We have almost no evidence for the means by which the non-Greek part of Cyrus’ army was provisioned throughout the march to Cunaxa. The Lydian agora was in the barbarian part of the army (see again 1.2.17-18, 1.3.14, 1.5.6) but this traveling market will not have played any major role in the provisioning of the non-Greek part of the army for the reasons outlined at chapter 4 section ii. Ariaeus, in speaking of the strategic situation that faced the non-Greeks in the army that survived the battle of Cunaxa and the Greek mercenaries, uses the first-person plural in addressing the Greeks and speaking of the army’s provisioning in the seventeen days before the battle and of his plan for the joint forces’ sources of provisions in the upcoming march home (2.2.11-12, and see above p.634). This suggests that Greeks and non-Greeks in Cyrus’ army provisioned themselves on the march before Cunaxa by the same means though, frustratingly, in the negotiations and descriptions concerning provisioning that follow Ariaeus’ speech, Xenophon only tells us of the Greeks’ negotiations with the Persians and of how the Greeks provisioned themselves (2.3.4, 2.3.13, 2.3.21ff.); this is despite the fact the Greeks and the force under Ariaeus continued to encamp near
ii. The 400 wagons provided by Cyrus for the Greeks: Previous Views

When the Greeks returned to their camp after the battle of Cunaxa,

καταλαµβάνουσι δὲ τῶν τε ἄλλων χρηµάτων τὰ πλεῖστα διηρπασµένα καὶ εἰ τι στίτου ἢ ποτὸν ἢν, καὶ τὰς ἁµάξας µεστὰς ἀλεύρων καὶ οἴνου, ὡς παρεσκευάστο Κῦρος, ἵνα εἰ ποτὲ σφόδρα τὸ στράτευµα λάβοι ἔνδεια, διαδιδοίη τοῖς Ἕλλησι οὔτε ἠταί τετρακόσιοι, ὡς ἐλέγοντο, οἷς ἠταί οἰ σύν βασιλεῖς διήρπασαν.

[they found most of their property pillaged, in particular whatever there was to eat or drink, and as for the wagons loaded with wheat-flour and wine which Cyrus had provided in order that, if ever serious need should overtake the army, he might have supplies to distribute among the Greeks (and there were four hundred of these wagons, it was said), these also the King and his men had now pillaged. (1.10.18)]

The role of these wagons in the provisioning of the Greek mercenaries hired by Cyrus has been the source of much controversy. Some scholars have denied that these wagons existed at all, basing this view primarily on the fact that Xenophon used the phrase “ὡς ἐλέγοντο” in reporting the number of the wagons provided by Cyrus. But Xenophon states in his own voice that Cyrus provided the wagons—therefore they must have existed—and the citation “ὡς ἐλέγοντο,” far from expressing doubt as to the existence of the wagons (as has been thought by previous scholars), is, in fact, used by Xenophon to authorize the extremely large figure given for their number.

Griffith took each other for twenty days after the agreement with Tissaphernes (2.4.1) before Ariaeus’ force started to encamp with Tissaphernes (2.4.9). Thus, although there are some indications that non-Greek forces of Cyrus provisioned themselves using the same methods as his Greek mercenaries, certainty (or even probability) on this question is impossible.

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41 See Gray (2003) 116 (with n.29 citing 1.10.18 as an example): “[t]he major function of citations [in Xenophon] is to validate content that the reader might find too great to be believed. The writer engages with the reader to authorize... excessively large or small numbers...” Cf. Gray (2003) 123. See also Gray (2003) 117: “The citations [in Xenophon’s Anabasis and Hellenica]... authorize... details in a larger story that the narrator tells in his own voice... [Xenophon] does not use citations where his knowledge falls short,
the presence of the four hundred wagons in the camp of the Greeks after the battle of Cunaxa as evidence supporting the view that the mercenaries were provisioned through their march to Babylonia primarily through rations in kind provided by Cyrus, and Descat took the wagons as evidence that the mercenaries were provisioned from imperial stores of grain after Thapsacus.\(^{42}\) But, as I have demonstrated, the wheat-flour and wine on the wagons were cited by Griffith and Descat in support of hypothetical schemas of payments to the Cyreans that are baseless and the presence of the wagons in Cyrus’ camp after Cunaxa offers no evidence in itself for the usual provisioning of the march.\(^{43}\)

Gabrielli has also recently argued that the wagons did exist and that they provisioned the mercenaries on the march (starting from Myriandros or Issos); and his position has been cited in a recent major review of work on the Anabasis as one of the standard works on the provisioning of the mercenaries till Cunaxa.\(^{44}\) But Gabrielli’s paper on the wagons is full of methodological errors, false assumptions, and contradictions, and his conclusions should not be accepted:

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\(^{42}\) See Griffith (1935) 266 (followed by Dillery [1995] 67, Loomis [1998] 47-48, esp. 48 n.65); Descat (1995a) 104 (stating the wagons accompanied the army from Thapsacus onwards).

\(^{43}\) See chapter 6 section ix and p.629 n.15, p.631 n.24 above on the problems with Griffith’s account; and pp.263-264 n.22 for refutation of Descat’s account of the pay and provisioning of the Cyreans.

\(^{44}\) See Lane Fox (2004) 18 n.58 and see n.40 above for Roy now following Gabrielli, too.
1. The first part of Gabrielli’s paper is an attempt to produce “une estimation relativement précise des forces dont disposait Cyrus.”\(^{45}\) His argument runs as follows: there were less than four hours between the time Cyrus’ army learned of the approach of the King’s army and the time it was lined up ready for battle; Cyrus’ army was marching in single column when it learned of the approach of the King’s army; Clausewitz stated that a division of 8,000 men (“y compris son artillerie et autre véhicules”) takes up the space of one hour’s march; since the tail of the column of Cyrus’ army caught up with its head within four hours, the army cannot have been more than 30,000 men in total (i.e., it must have been less than 4 (hours) x 8,000 men = 32,000 men). On the basis of these calculations, Gabrielli accepts Tarn’s figure of 28,000 men for the size of Cyrus’ army.

There are serious problems with every step of this calculation.\(^{46}\) That less than four hours elapsed between the approach of the King’s army and the formation of Cyrus’ army for battle is Gabrielli’s guess, and nothing more. Xenophon provides only the roughest of time indicators for the events of the day of the battle of Cunaxa. It was about “full market time” (“ἀμφὶ ἀγορὰν πλήθουσαν”) when Pategyas came with the news that the King was approaching with a large army in formation for battle (1.8.1); it was already the afternoon (“ἡνίκα δὲ δείλη ἐγίγνετο”) when a cloud of rising dust—which the Greeks realized was caused by the King’s army—appeared in the plain. Gabrielli arbitrarily assigns the times of 9 a.m. and 1 p.m. (he does not explicitly state the latter time but it follows from the four hour figure he gives) to each of the time indicators given by


\(^{46}\) See already Tuplin (1999) 344-345 for effective criticisms of the first part of Gabrielli’s paper.
Xenophon, but these times are arbitrarily assigned and admit of no certainty.\textsuperscript{47} In addition, as Tuplin points out,\textsuperscript{48} Gabrielli fails to realize that “some parts of the army were still forming when battle had almost started [1.8.14]; [and] \textit{deilē} marks the point when the dust cloud appeared, still a long way from the fighting.” Thus, a precise figure for the time that elapsed between the news of the coming of the King’s army and the time of the battle is impossible to obtain, but Gabrielli’s figure of less than four hours is certainly too low because of the points raised by Tuplin. One of the two figures underlying Gabrielli’s calculation of the size of Cyrus’ army has no basis, then.

Secondly, Gabrielli uses some passages from the \textit{Cyropaedia} to argue that Cyrus’ army must have been marching in single file on the day of the battle. But the part of the \textit{Cyropaedia} from which Gabrielli cites his evidence for this conclusion is presenting a fully elaborated description of what would constitute the organization of an ideal short march by a classical Greek army, and cannot be used to reconstruct the practices of a mainly non-Greek army.\textsuperscript{49} Furthermore, the passages Gabrielli cites from the \textit{Cyropaedia} do not offer evidence for an army marching in single file.\textsuperscript{50} In any case, it is clear from Xenophon’s account that Cyrus’ army was not marching in single file before

\textsuperscript{47} The times he gives are arbitrary despite the ancient references he gives and discusses for the time of “\textit{ἀµφὶ ἀγορὰν πλήθουσαν}.” None of these references provide any precise guidance as to what time “full market time” represents on the 24 hour clock (or provide any guidance as to Xenophon’s use of the term) so that the 9 a.m. time is still simply Gabrielli’s guess.

\textsuperscript{48} (1999) 344-345.

\textsuperscript{49} See the discussion of the use of the \textit{Cyropaedia} as a source for classical Greek military organization at chapter 3 section iva.

\textsuperscript{50} See Tuplin (1999) 345.
the news of the King reached it: on the day of the battle, Cyrus proceeded more carelessly (than previous days) with only a small body of troops in front of him (“καὶ ὀλίγους ἐν τάξει ἔχων πρὸ αὐτοῦ”), and most of the army was marching in disorder (“τὸ δὲ πολὺ αὐτῷ ἀνατεταραγµένον ἐπορεύετο”) (1.7.20). Since Cyrus’ army was not marching in single file, there are therefore no grounds for Gabrielli’s calculation.

Finally, even if there were (and there are not) grounds for Gabrielli’s calculation, one cannot use Clausewitz’s figures for the marching rates of an early nineteenth-century C.E. Prussian army to reconstruct those of a mixed Greek and non-Greek army at the turn of the fifth century B.C.E.: the presence of an artillery train in Clausewitz’s division would have added greatly to the total size of the train of the division of the army and increased correspondingly the space it occupied (making it longer and more unwieldy than a column of 8,000 men of an ancient army marching in single column). In sum, neither of the figures in Gabrielli’s calculation of the numbers of combatants in Cyrus’ army stand up, nor does the rationale underlying his calculation, and therefore the number of 28,000 men he estimates for the size of Cyrus’ army must be rejected out of hand.

2. Establishing that there is no basis for the estimate of 28,000 (for the number of combatants in Cyrus’ army) arrived at in the first half of Gabrielli’s paper is crucial for the analysis of Gabrielli’s discussion of the four hundred wagons provided by Cyrus, since the goal of his discussion of the wagons is to provide indirect confirmation of the

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51 See Gabrielli (1995) 113 n.10: this problem with using Clausewitz’s figure had already been seen by Delbrück. Gabrielli attempts to get around this problems by stating the presence in the column of Cyrus’ army of chariots and draft animals would have occupied a space equivalent to that of the artillery train accompanying Clausewitz’s division, but i. there is no way of ascertaining this; and ii. Clausewitz’s division would have been accompanied by its own draught animals, too.
28,000 figure.\textsuperscript{52} To confirm his (baseless) estimate for the size of Cyrus’ army, Gabrielli simply assumes without argumentation that the wagons accompanied Cyrus’ march for the duration of his march through the desert\textsuperscript{53} (and that Cyrus distributed rations in kind to the Greeks throughout this part of the march),\textsuperscript{54} and then plays a series of games with numbers to support the figure of 28,000—a figure, I emphasize again, that has no foundation. In order to defend his estimate,\textsuperscript{55} Gabrielli has to commit a series of serious methodological errors and engage in a number of misinterpretations of Xenophon’s account of Cyrus’ march.

3. Firstly, Gabrielli use the evidence of \textit{Cyr}. 6.1.54 (where Xenophon states that the normal load of one yoke was twenty-five talents) to infer that each of the four hundred wagons could carry 900 kilograms of grain.\textsuperscript{56} The equivalency 25 talents = 900 kg. means that Gabrielli is using the Aeginetan rather than the Attic(-Euboeic) standard in calculating the capacity of the wagons. There is no reason to suppose that Xenophon—

\textsuperscript{52} See Gabrielli (1994) 114: the estimate of 28,000 “a l’avantage de nour fournir la base de raisonnement nécessaire à une réflexion sur la logistique de l’expédition.” See also Tuplin (1999) 344: “[Gabrielli] starts with a direct argument for a modest estimate of the number of combatants. He then offers an indirect confirmation that [this] relatively modest estimate[,] [is correct]. (Gabrielli does not quite state what he is doing in the second part of his paper in these terms. But frankly the calculations he performs there are not of much real significance unless this is at least part of their purpose.)”

\textsuperscript{53} (1995) 116 (though see p.647 n.77, 648 n.78 below: Gabrielli arguing (incorrectly) that they must have accompanied the march since Myriandros or Issos).

\textsuperscript{54} Or rather he cites a passage that offers no evidence for the statement that Cyrus distributed rations in kind ([1995] 117: Gabrielli cites 1.6.21 here, but this reference does not exist; I presume from the translated passage he cites that he is referring here to 1.9.27-28, which, again, offers no support for his statement.)

\textsuperscript{55} And to counter the arguments of Roy (1967) 311 n.93, on which see pp.646-647 below.

\textsuperscript{56} (1995) 117.
an Athenian—had the Aeginetan standard in mind in the passage cited from the
*Cyropaedia* rather than the Attic standard\(^{57}\) (which would have given a figure of 660-690 kg,\(^{58}\) much less suitable for Gabrielli’s (ultimate) arguments) (cf. *Anab.* 1.5.6). Also, the four hundred wagons will have been requisitioned from civilian owners and therefore will have been of different sizes and capacities; thus, in calculating the total capacity of the wagons, one cannot proceed as if each wagon was of a standard(ized) size and capacity.\(^{59}\) Finally, since some of the four hundred wagons were carrying wine, we have no idea how many carried grain, and therefore any inferences drawn from calculations based on the grain-carrying capacity of all the wagons must lose all validity. Gabrielli’s figure of 900 kg per wagon will not stand, then.

4. Gabrielli uses barley-flour (\(\alpha\lambda\varphi\iota\tau\alpha\)) rather than wheat-flour (\(\alpha\lambda\nu\gamma\alpha\))—the grain product explicitly mentioned in 1.10.18—to calculate how many daily rations the supposed 900 kg. would have produced. He offers no sensible reason for doing this,\(^{60}\) and there is none, since wheat-flour and barley-flour are not substances of uniform density.\(^{61}\) Using the figure of 2 *choinikes* of *alphita* per day given to the Spartiates held

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58 See appendix 3 section i.

59 Cf. Mitchell (1976) 122-123 n.100 for this point.

60 His reasoning for using barley-meal rather than wheat-flour goes as follows ([1995] 119): “[b]ien sûr la même valeur calorique peut être apportée, et pour une poids plus faible, par une quantité moindre de farine de blé, mais en choississant la ration la plus pondéreuse nous conservons une marge qui nous permet d’évaluer au plus juste les capacités de ces chariots.” This makes no sense.

61 See appendix 3 section i. Tuplin ([1999] 345) states that it might be better to use a figure of nearer 1 kg per day as a daily ration in calculating the grain-carrying capacity of the wagons. He cites, from the Persian side, the evidence of the Persepolis fortification tablets, but these refer to rations of barley; from the Greek side, he cites Hdt. 7.187, where Herodotus uses 1 *choinix* of wheat per day to calculate the grain
prisoner on Sphacteria (Thucy. 4.16.1), and the incorrect calculations of Foxhall and Forbes (2 choinikes of barley-flour = 1.4 kg.),\textsuperscript{62} the figure for daily rations per wagon he produces (640)\textsuperscript{63} is far too low for the supposed 900 kg. on the wagons. All this ends up meaning that the figure he produces for the number of daily rations provided by each of the four hundred wagons is absolutely meaningless.

5. On the basis of the (meaningless) figure of 640 rations of grain per day per wagon, Gabrielli calculates that the Greeks by themselves would have needed only twenty wagons per day; therefore he concludes that it is doubtful that the wagons were provided for the Greeks only, rather that “il est plus vraisemblable de considérer qu’ils sont destinés à l’armée tout entière.”\textsuperscript{64} But Xenophon states explicitly at 1.10.18 that the wine and wheat-flour on the wagons were meant (solely) for the Greeks. There is no reason not to accept Xenophon’s report on their intended function.

6. Assuming that the wagons were already accompanying the march by the time of the army’s halt at the Araxes, Gabrielli states that the wagons carried less than thirteen days’ provisions, since the army suffered a shortage of grain on the march from Corsote to Pylae, but must have carried more than five, since the army suffered no shortage of needs of Xerxes’ army. But it is wheat-flour, and not barley or wheat, which is being carried on the wagons, and therefore the evidence of the fortification tablets and Herodotus’ figure of one choinix a day are not pertinent here.

\textsuperscript{62} See again appendix 3. Note, however, that Foxhall and Forbes’ figure for weight per volume of ἄλφιτα is 0.643kg/liter ([1982] 44, 76) and so Gabrielli should have been using a figure of 1.286kg in his calculations, yet another error invalidating his conclusions.

\textsuperscript{63} His calculations should produce a figure of 642: Tuplin (1999) 345.

\textsuperscript{64} (1995) 119.
food on the five day march from the Araxes to Corsote. Assuming that the wagons
carried no wine on the march from Corsote to Pylae, Gabrielli calculates (on the basis of
the incorrect figures for the carrying capacity of the wagons and the daily rations of the
soldiers discussed above) that the four hundred wagons could have carried at least ten
days of grain for an army of 28,000 combatants. Since this figure of ten days is
consistent (on Gabrielli’s reckoning) with the evidence of the availability of grain on the
march through the desert, it serves as confirmation that the calculation of the number of
combatants in Cyrus’ army in the first half of the paper is correct.

But, again, there are major problems with each step of this final part of Gabrielli’s
argument for the estimate of the size of Cyrus’ army. Firstly, there were not thirteen
straight days of marching between Corsote and Pylae, but more probably eleven or
twelve, since the soldiers halted at the city of Charmande, a day’s march before Pylae.
Secondly, the inference Gabrielli makes from the differing conditions on the two desert
marches relies on the assumption that the wagons were the only source of supplies on
these marches, and that the men did not carry any supplies requisitioned in the villages on
the Araxes and Mascas Rivers. But it is certain from usual classical Greek military
practice and the vocabulary used at 1.4.19 and 1.5.4 that the soldiers took some (probably
three) days’ provisions with them from these villages for the march, so that the wagons

65 In fact, on the basis of Gabrielli’s prior calculations, the figure should be just over nine days: see Tuplin

66 See p.264 n.23.

67 Three days’ worth of provisions a standard amount for a Greek army setting out on a march: see chapter
3 section i. ἐπισιτίζοµαι at 1.4.19 and 1.5.4 meaning (primarily) to provision for the upcoming march: see
again chapter 3 section ii. See also 1.10.18: it was not only the four hundred wagons that were pillaged,
but the Greeks also found all of their property plundered, and “in particular whatever there was to eat and
(hypothetically) would not have had to carry provisions for every day of the march either between the Araxes and the Mascas rivers, or between Corsote and Charmande. If the Greeks (at least) each took three days’ of provisions for the march—the standard amount—and the march from Corsote to Charmande was only twelve days, then the wagons (again, hypothetically) should have needed to cover only nine days, which, following Gabrielli’s calculations, they should have been able to do; thus, following the logic of Gabrielli’s arguments, there should have been no scarcity of grain in the desert between Corsote and Charmande/Pylae.

Thirdly, in order to support his argument here, Gabrielli has to advance the supposition that the wine Xenophon speaks of at 1.10.18 was only loaded on to the wagons after Pylae “lorsque les problèmes de ravitaillement furent moins aigus.”68 But the only reason to suppose this is to support the faulty calculations already made: there is no reason to think the wine and grain were loaded on to the wagons at different times; and nothing in Xenophon’s statement about the wagons suggests that we should do so.

7. Also, Gabrielli’s (incorrect) calculation that the four hundred wagons could have covered the grain needs of the Greek and non-Greek forces of Cyrus does not drink.” The Greeks, then, each had individual supplies of food and drink for the march after Pylae. Roy expresses the reservation concerning Gabrielli’s argument that the four hundred wagons really existed that “Gabrielli does not explain why a large stock of supplies had not been distributed while the army crossed terrain where food was scarce and then faced a decisive battle” ([2004] 277). It is true that Gabrielli does not explain why the wheat-flour and wine was not distributed by Cyrus, but the fact that the Greeks still had food and drink explains why Cyrus had not had to distribute the wheat-flour and wine from the four hundred wagons by the time of the battle (and thus there is no reason to doubt the existence of the wagons).

68 (1995) 120: Gabrielli states that the wine must only have loaded after Corsote, but he must mean Pylae here, since he states earlier on the same page that his calculations are proceeding on the assumption that the wagons carried only wheat-flour from Corsote to Pylae.
answer the problem of how the non-combatants on the march were provisioned.  

Gabrielli estimates the number of non-combatants in Cyrus’ army as “certainement au moins aussi nombreux que les combattants.” This is certainly incorrect for the Greek part of the army: Lee has shown that relatively few of the Greeks had slave attendants (before Cunaxa, at least); and the evidence Gabrielli cites for slaves accompanying Cyrus on the march is based on evidence for slave attendants in Greek armies. Nevertheless, there will have been some slave-attendants in both parts of the army, and the failure to include their provisioning needs undermines the internal logic of Gabrielli’s argument. Following his figures for the slave attendants in Cyrus’ army and the rations carried on the wagons, the grain needs of the Greeks and the slaves would have represented almost exactly ten days’ provisions, i.e. the total amount he claims were carried on the wagons, and thus there would not have been enough grain on the wagons for the army (of Greeks and non-Greeks) as a whole. This is yet one more error that render Gabrielli’s whole analysis of the function of the four hundred wagons provided by Cyrus absolutely nugatory.

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69 Gabrielli ([1995] 120) states that the four hundred wagons would have provided at least ten days’ rations for the 28,000 combatants of the army, “sans compter la foule des non-combatants et les chevaux.” Having acknowledged the problem of the non-combatants, he then provides no answer as to how they might have been provisioned.


72 (1995) 115. In addition, Gabrielli cites the Cyropaedia as evidence for the usual organization of Persian armies in his discussion of the number of non-combatants and draught animals in Cyrus’ army: but, again, the Cyropaedia should be understood as Xenophon’s paradigmatic account of the military organization and tactics appropriate for a Greek army (see chapter 3 section iva).
8. Finally, Gabrielli never satisfactorily answers Roy’s objection to the presence of the wagons on the desert marches on the ground that the pace of these marches was too high for wagons heavily laden with wheat-flour and wine.\footnote{Gabrielli ([1995] 117) states, without argumentation, that a load of 900 kg. for a wagon “est peu” but this is simply incorrect: see, e.g., Burford (1960) 4-5, 9; and, for comparative evidence, see also, e.g., Erdkamp (1998) 73 n.93.} Gabrielli himself cites statistics that heavily laden wagons traveled roughly 2.5 \text{km./hr.} and up to 3.7 \text{km./hr.} when carrying a light load. Even the quicker time he cites—which would be infeasible for a wagon carrying (supposedly) 900\text{kg.} of grain (or wine)\footnote{See Maurice (1930) 229; Pryor (2006a) 6-7, 9.}—would be barely sufficient to cover the 35 \text{km.} per day covered between the Araxes and Pylae, taking into account the fact that the army would have needed time before each day’s march to eat, decamp, and tend to the animals and after each day’s march to bivouac, tend to the animals, and eat—and that the vanguard of the army would have had to stop marching for the day some hours ahead of the rest of the army in order to allow the army to camp together each night.\footnote{The oxen pulling these wagons were almost certainly operating above normal performance maxima: early modern data suggest a maximum marching rate of 25 \text{km.} per day for oxen (Erdkamp [1998] 73).} Some wagons did make the march between Corsote and Charmande/Pylae,\footnote{(1967) 311 n.93.} but it appears that they were few in number and were not heavily laden, since all of them could be lifted “high and dry” out of mud by the Persian nobles accompanying the march (1.5.7-8) (these wagons probably formed Cyrus’ personal ...
retinue). Four hundred wagons heavily laden with wheat-flour and wine could have not accompanied the march at the pace it traveled between the Araxes and Pylae.\footnote{Note also that part of the reason that Gabrielli thinks that the wagons joined the march at Myriandros or Issos is that, before these cities, the wagons “auraient ralenti l’armée inutilement” ([1995] 120). But, even apart from the fact that the average speeds of the march were higher after Myriandros and Issos (and the rest-periods shorter), the same reasoning should have applied to exclude the wagons from the march after these cities (since the provisioning opportunities offered by the settlements on the march to Babylonia would mean that the presence of the wagons on the march would have been similarly useless).}

Gabrielli’s hypothesis that the four hundred wagons mentioned at 1.10.18 accompanied Cyrus’ march through the desert and that they functioned to provision the entire army through that march has absolutely no foundation, then—\footnote{Gabrielli posits that the wagons probably only accompanied the march from Myriandros or Issos, and were “probablement la réponse au problème logistique que posait la traversée du désert à Cyrus” ([1995] 120). He gives two explanations for this view. Firstly, he cites Marinovic’s point that there is no mention of provisions during the march from over the territory controlled by Cyrus; but there is no mention of provisions at any point until the Araxes, and provisioning is mentioned on the march even after this point only in exceptional circumstances. (Also, Gabrielli adds that “[s]ur cette première partie du trajet [i.e. in Asia Minor] la question du transport des vivres ne se pose donc pas.” But, since Cyrus was received by every city he passed, and had the opportunity to requisition at every group of villages he halted at, after leaving Asia Minor, he had effectively the same control over the lands he passed through from Cilicia to Cunaxa as he had in the lands he officially controlled, in terms of provisioning, at least. Following Gabrielli’s logic, therefore, there was no reason why the question of the transport of provisions should have been posed on the march from Cilicia to Cunaxa.) Secondly, Gabrielli states that the presence of wagons would have slowed the march “inutilement” before Myriandros or Issos: but see previous note. And two external factors make it most improbable that Cyrus added the four hundred wagons loaded with wheat-flour and wine at Myriandros or Issos. Firstly, to get from Myriandros to the Euphrates, the army had to cross Mount Amanus, most likely by means of the Beilan pass (Manfredi [1986] 96-97). Even if this pass is not especially rugged (see Lee [2007] 22 contra Farrell [1961] 154), its ascent still entailed a rise of 740 meters over only eight or nine kilometers of marching (Manfredi [1986] 99-100), a difficult task for wagons weighed down with hundreds of kilograms of grain and wine, but one easily foreseen and thus avoidable. Secondly, the march from Myriandros to the Chalus river was not through desert: the Amiq plain west of the Chalus is fertile (see p.648 n.78 above). Thus, there was no desert crossing (causing logistical problems) facing the army until after the villages of Parysatis on the Chalus.} and it is surprising that an article so full of basic errors, baseless assumptions, and faulty methodology could ever have been cited as the standard article on the wagons. Other scholars accepting the existence of the wagons have also assumed that the wagons were present with the army as it marched through the desert along the left bank of the Euphrates. To explain the...
dearth of grain described by Xenophon at 1.5.6, some of these scholars have resorted to thinking that Cyrus miscalculated the amount of supplies needed for the march from Corsote to Charmande. But this assumes that Cyrus was distributing rations in kind throughout the march—an assumption I have shown earlier to be false—and is inconsistent with Xenophon’s description of the famine, which makes no mention of a failure of Cyrus to distribute rations, but implies, rather, that the men were suffering famine because they had had no opportunity to buy grain. Other scholars accepting the existence of the wagons confess that they have no idea why the grain was not distributed on the march between Corsote and Charmande.

But it is mere assumption that the wagons laden with wheat-flour and grain accompanied the march before Pylae—and the fact that there is no mention of distribution of wheat-flour when there was a dearth of grain in the army on the march between Corsote and Charmande is a definite proof that they were not present on this part of the march: it would have made no sense for Cyrus to hold back grain from the soldiers when they had no other means of acquiring it (and were reduced to eating meat).

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79 See, e.g., Kelsey and Zenos (1895) 18, 228; Mather and Hewitt (1938) 269.


81 See Roy (1967) 311 n.93. Roy (ibid.) also argued against the existence of the wagons on the grounds that 2.2.11 shows that there were no opportunities for the army to reprovision after Charmande and thus no opportunity to acquire four hundred cartloads of food after Charmande. Ariaeus at 2.2.11 states during his meeting with the Greek generals and ὀχαγοὶ that there had been no provisions—or hardly any (whatever there was had been taken by the army)—in the last seventeen march-days to take “ἐν τῇ Χώρᾳ” (see p.634 above for discussion of this passage). The start of the seventeen march-days can be calculated to have been in the middle of the march between Corsote and Charmande (see above p.264 n.23). But the mercenaries bought provisions at Charmande, i.e. after the start of the seventeen march days referred to by Ariaeus. Thus, when Ariaeus stated that there were no opportunities to provision “ἐν τῇ Χώρᾳ” in the seventeen march days previous to his meeting with the Greeks, he meant that there were no opportunities for the army to provision from foraging, and not there were absolutely no opportunities for the army to provision itself. 2.2.11 therefore does not rule out provisioning by the army after Charmande (i.e., at Pylae) by means other than foraging.
Moreover, Xenophon’s description at 1.10.18 of the wagons’ function—that they had been provided by Cyrus in case serious need (of grain) should ever overtake the army—does not make sense if these wagons had been used previously to provision the mercenaries. In sum, we can state with certainty that the wagons were not used to provision the Greeks at any point before they are mentioned by Xenophon at 1.10.18.

iii. The 400 wagons provided by Cyrus: a measure taken to provide logistical security and tactical flexibility for the army before Cunaxa

In the preceding section, then, the following was established: there is no evidence that the four hundred wagons mentioned by Xenophon at 1.10.18 accompanied any part of the march other than that from Pylae to the day of the battle; moreover, because of the dearth of grain in the army between Corsote and Charmande narrated at 1.5.6, and the implication of 1.10.18 that wagons had not been used previously to feed the Greeks, one can state with certainty that the wagons were not present at any point before Pylae. (This coheres with the discussion in section i, which demonstrated that the Greeks

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82 Cf. Tuplin (1999) 345: Xenophon’s description of the wagons “is rather peculiar if they were actually the ones which had fed them for at least half of the hard stages after Corsote.”

83 This conclusion also gains support from an analysis of the relative marching rates of the army from Sardis to Cunaxa. On the march through Babylonia from Pylae, the average number of parasangs covered a day dropped to four (roughly twenty kilometers a day) (1.7.1), the slowest rate on the march, and the fourth day of marching from Pylae only covered three parasangs (though this is probably to be explained by the difficulty of marching through the narrow passage between the Euphrates and a huge ditch dug by the King (see 1.7.14 with Anderson [1974] 100)). This is in direct contrast to the march between the Araxes and Pylae, when the march covered an average of seven parasangs a day; even earlier in the march, the average speed was somewhere between five and six parasangs a day, with occasional bursts of seven (1.4.1), eight (1.2.6), and ten parasangs a day (1.2.11) (cf. the table of marching speeds compiled by Gabrielli ([1995] 118)). The decrease in marching rates after Pylae would be consistent with the addition of four hundred wagons heavily laden with wheat-flour and wine to the train of the army.
acquired their supplies from the settlements which they passed during the march to Cunaxa: because they could provision in the settlements they passed, there was no need for the army to be accompanied by a supply train on the march to Babylonia.)\textsuperscript{84}

Secondly, the wheat-flour and wine on the wagons did not have to be distributed before the battle because there was still food and drink in the army, the property of individual soldiers. Finally, there is no reason to doubt Xenophon’s statement that the wagons had been provided by Cyrus as a source of supplies in case of an emergency (only).\textsuperscript{85}

Why did Cyrus prepare wagons loaded with wheat-flour and wine at Pylae (and not previously), then? The answer to this question lies in a consideration of the strategic situation faced by Cyrus at Pylae. Cyrus was expecting battle with the King soon after he left Pylae. At 1.7.18, Xenophon tells us that, four days’ march out of the city, the pretender gave Silanus three thousand darics for correctly forecasting, eleven days earlier, that there would not be a battle within ten days: Cyrus had expected that the King would fight within ten days or not at all.\textsuperscript{86} As Lendle has pointed out,\textsuperscript{87} although there is no mention in the text of the number of days taken up by the army’s halts at Charmande and Pylae, Silanus’ prophecy—and thus Cyrus’ expectation that battle with his brother

\textsuperscript{84} Cf. chapter 3 sections ii, iii above: substantial supply-trains unnecessary for classical Greek armies when marching through friendly territory since they acquired supplies on these marches from markets provided by friendly poleis.

\textsuperscript{85} I should add here, too, the point that, since it is impossible to ascertain the total carrying capacity of the wagons, it is impossible to ascertain how many days’ provisions the wheat-flour and wine carried on the wagons represented.

\textsuperscript{86} Note that Cyrus thought that the King would fight within ten ἡµέραι and not ten σταδίων.

\textsuperscript{87} (1995) 61.
was imminent—should be dated to the stay at Pylae, directly before the invasion of
Babylonia (or, at the very earliest, to the stay at Charmande, a day or two’s march before
Pylae).\textsuperscript{88}

But, after the army had departed from Pylae, there were no (or few) opportunities
to forage for provisions\textsuperscript{89} and (seemingly) no settlements to acquire new sources of
supplies from\textsuperscript{90}—and, in any case, tactical considerations (the expected approach of
Artaxerxes’ army) meant that the soldiers could not be allowed to spread out in order to
forage, or to leave the march in order to purchase or requisition food from any
settlements they passed. Therefore, in the time between the departure of the army from
Pylae and the battle, Cyrus could not rely on any new means of acquiring provisions for
the mercenaries to supplement the supplies they had each taken from Pylae for the
upcoming march.\textsuperscript{91} Given this strategic situation, the wagons full of provisions will have

\textsuperscript{88} (Ibid.): it is very unlikely that, following the indications of time given in the narrative, that the prophecy
was given on the sixth day of the march between Corsote and Pylae, somewhere in the middle of the desert.
It is much more likely, instead, that the army spent around six or seven days at Pylae, and that Xenophon
did not describe the army’s halt at the city because little unusual or of consequence happened there. Note
that a halt of six or seven days at Pylae would give more than sufficient time to prepare the four hundred
wagons.

\textsuperscript{89} See p.634 above on the implication of Ariaeus’ statement at 2.2.11. Cyrus probably expected, too, that
the King’s force would employ a “ scorched earth” strategy as, in fact, they did (1.6.1). In addition, the
expected presence of the King’s (vast) forces nearby meant that Cyrus would have been expecting to
compete for whatever supplies there were in the area of operations with another (vast) army.

\textsuperscript{90} There is no mention of any settlements in Xenophon’s account of the five days of marching from Pylae.
See also 2.2.12-13: the first villages in Babylonia were a long day’s march away from the halt the army
departed from on the day of the battle.

\textsuperscript{91} I should add here that there is no reason to doubt that Pylae had the resources both to provision the army
for the coming marches and to fill four hundred wagons with wheat-flour and wine. The area around Pylae
was fertile (see Joannès [1995] 175; cf. Lee [2007] 25, Lendle [2005] 50) and one of the few places in
almost certainly commandeered at Pylae the provisions loaded on the four hundred wagons. But the
requisitioning of these provisions does not tell us about the usual provisioning of the march up to this point
had two linked functions. Firstly, they would have acted as a “safety net” for the Greeks, which the mercenaries could have relied upon if a greater amount of time than Cyrus expected elapsed between the departure from Pylae and the battle (because of a later (than expected) arrival of the King’s forces or if the armies’ maneuvering for position before battle took up a large amount of time) and the mercenaries’ supplies ran out (as a result). Secondly, the four hundred wagons “increased the tactical flexibility” of Cyrus’ army. The grain and wine carried on the wagons gave Cyrus considerable maneuvering room before the imminent battle: any decisions he might make on whither and when to march could be made now for tactical rather than supply considerations. Whereas the necessity for speed earlier on the march had discouraged the preparation of a substantial supply-train to accompany the army—and the facts that the army was able to acquire provisions from the settlements it passed during the march, and, in the absence of

since the preparation of the wagons was an exceptional measure targeted to meet a specific and new strategic situation.

92 See Harari (2000) 319 for this point.

93 See chapter 3 section ivb for two examples of classical Greek armies having to send home for supply-trains when the time between their arrival in the area of operations and eventual battle was greater than expected.

94 Cf. 1.10.18 (Cyrus provided the wagons in case “serious need should overtake the army”) to Harari (2000) 319 (the “safety net” of a supply-train “enabled armies to live off the land without fear that a sudden supply crisis would bring immediate starvation”).


96 See again Harari (2000) 319: “[t]rains were also of great importance during military crises, for instance when a battle was imminent, because they enabled armies to maneuver freely at least for a few days, unimpeded by supply considerations.” The straits to which the army had been reduced on the march from Corsote to Charmande doubtlessly reinforced, in any consideration, the advantages of having a supply-train accompany the army on the last days before the battle.
enemy forces earlier in the march, was not constrained by any tactical considerations in its provisioning, had meant that such a supply-train was previously unnecessary\(^7\)—the strategic situation confronting Cyrus at Pylae, and especially the freedom of action which the presence of the wagons in the army would give in that situation, now compelled the preparation of a sizeable supply-train at that city.

In conclusion, this explanation of the function of the four hundred wagons provided by Cyrus for the Greeks (but never used by them)—that the wagons were added at Pylae to give the army both logistical security and tactical flexibility—has the following advantages. Firstly, it is consistent with Xenophon’s statement at 1.10.18 that Cyrus’ intention in providing the wagons was to have supplies distributed to the Greeks in case of serious need in the army. Secondly, it coheres with his treatment of provisioning throughout the *anabasis* to Cunaxa. Thirdly, it matches with the ecological and topographical ‘facts on the ground.’ Finally, and crucially, it gives us a convincing strategic rationale for the addition of the wagons to the army, something lacking from all previous treatments of the four hundred wagons provided by Cyrus.

\(^7\) Cf. Haldon (2006b) 149: “[i]n friendly territory, and whenever provisions could be garnered readily, [armies] would have replenished supplies much more frequently in order to avoid having to take along large numbers of pack-animals until that became absolutely essential...”
Appendix 5: Some Notes on Hellenistic Military Pay and Provisioning

i. Introduction

I briefly examine here some arrangements made for the pay and provisioning of military forces in the Hellenistic period. I do this for two reasons: firstly, I wish to examine a claim that conditions on campaign affected the rates of pay given to Boeotian cavalry in the early third century; if this claim is correct, it would mark an important difference between classical and early Hellenistic practice, and could throw some doubt on the conclusions reached above in chapter 5. Secondly, I want to draw attention to some differences between the ways in which classical and Hellenistic military employers paid their soldiers; I aim, in highlighting these, to both support and confirm some of the conclusions reached above in chapter 7 concerning the workings of military markets in the classical period.

ii. SEG 28.461 and the sharing of military expenses between allies in the classical and Hellenistic periods

I will begin by looking at an inscribed agreement between the Boeotian poleis of Orchomenus and Chaeronea,\(^1\) datable to the mid 280s,\(^2\) regarding cavalry service in the Boeotian koinon army. At some unknown time prior to the erection of the inscription

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\(^1\) SEG 28.461. See Étienne and Roesch (1978) for the text of the inscription with a translation and commentary.

\(^2\) See Mackil (2003) 493 for the date.
(which is the Orchomenian copy of the agreement between the two cities), the one cavalry squadron (ϝίλα) of the Chaeroneans had been integrated into the cavalry force of the Orchomenians, where it had joined with the three Orchomenian squadrons to form a single contingent available for the requirements of the federal Boeotian army. The object of the agreement was to ensure that the burden of koinon cavalry service would be shared equitably between the two cities. Thus, an order of departure for military service, both within and outside Boeotia, for the four squadrons was established; and in the event of a call for service by the koinon army when each squadron had already served for the year and each had spent equal time on campaign, provision was made for the drawing of lots by the Orchomenian hipparch, who was to be in charge of the contingent as a whole, to see which squadron would serve (ll.23-26). To monitor and enforce the fair distribution of service, an account was to be established by the two cities in which campaigns within Boeotia and outside Boeotia were to be recorded separately, for as much time as the cavalry received ἐφόδια (ll.26-29). A second document, inscribed later by a different hand, below the agreement on the same stone, is that account: the first half recording the lengths of service within Boeotia survives, but unfortunately the account of service outside Boeotia is missing, apart from its heading and a part of a name of an Orchomenian squadron leader (ilarch).

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3 Étienne and Roesch (1978) 359.

4 (Ibid.) 366.

5 (Ibid.) 360, Roesch (1979) 245.
It is to the provision for the setting up of this account of the lengths of service undertaken by the cavalry squadrons that I want to turn to now. The Greek is as follows:

τιθέσθη δὲ τὰς στροτει/ίας τάς τε ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίη κη τὰς ἐ- / χθόνδε τὰς Βοιωτίας
χωρίς ἑκατέ/ρας κα τὰ ἐφόδια λάβωθι.

Étienne and Roesch translate as follows: “que l’on compte séparément les campagnes en Béotie et les campagnes hors de Béotie, pour tout le temps où les cavaliers auront touché leurs indemités de route.”

In a recent brief discussion of the evidence of the agreement between Orchomenus and Chaeronea for the military organization of the Boeotian League, part of an interesting paper on the coinages and economies of Greek federal states in the classical and Hellenistic periods, Mackil and van Alfen took this clause to

make... it clear that the cavalrymen who served in the koinon army were required to keep track of the time they served, because they were to receive pay from the district itself (that is, from the combined treasuries of the member poleis), at different rates for service within Boiotia than for service outside the region.

The assumption underlying this interpretation of the provision establishing the account is that conditions on campaign will determine the rates of pay given to the cavalry forces of both cities. The question is whether there is anything in the clause ordering the setting up of the account that justifies such an assumption.

This part of Mackil and van Alfen’s paper is based on work in Mackil’s 2003 dissertation on the agreement between the Orchomenians and the Chaeroneans. There she translated lines 26-29 of the inscription as follows: “Let them keep track of the time they serve inside Boiotia and outside it separately, for which they have accepted traveling

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6 (1978) 362.

expenses.” This led to the following conclusion (more or less the same as above, except that this earlier version includes a “presumably”) regarding the setting up of the account:

[The cavalry] are to keep track for themselves of the time they served, because they are evidently to be paid for it, by the district itself, and presumably at different rates depending on whether they served inside Boiotia or outside the region.

The problem with this conclusion is that it relies on an error in Mackil’s original translation. Mackil takes the subject of the infinitive τιθέσθη to be the men serving in the cavalry squadrons. The subject of τιθέσθη is, however, more ‘generalized,’ as the ‘on’ of Étienne and Roesch’s translation conveys successfully: there is no particular person or persons in mind as the subject; the idea is that an account is to be set up by public order—that it is to be taken care of by the poleis in question. That the account is to made by the poleis of the agreement, and not the members of the cavalry squadrons, is proved by the presence of the account below and on the same stone as the public inscription ordering its establishment. The account was a matter of concern for the Orchomenians and Chaeroneans as a whole, then, rather than the members of the cavalry squadrons who were to undertake the military service: the agreement was for the poleis


10 Compare the translation at Mackil and van Alfen (2006) 223 n.69: “[I]et an account be recorded separately for campaigns in Boiotia and outside of Boiotia, for which they have taken their travel allowances.” Although this translation is correct, the incorrect inference from Mackil’s original translation (that the cavalrymen themselves were to keep track of the time they had served) remains in the later paper.
to keep account of the lengths of the campaigns served by their respective cavalry
squadrons.\textsuperscript{11}

But if there is no basis for Mackil and van Alfen’s assertion that the cavalrymen
were to keep track themselves of the time they served on campaign because they were to
be paid at different rates for service in and outside Boeotia,\textsuperscript{12} the question still remains
why the cities of Orchomenus and Chaeronea should have been concerned to record the
lengths of service undertaken by their cavalry for the Boeotian \textit{koinon} inside and outside
Boeotia separately, “for as much time as the cavalry received ἐφόδια [ἐκατέ- / [θ]ατς ἄς
κα. τὰ ἐφόδια λάβων ἃι],” i.e. why the cities were concerned to differentiate between the
pay arrangements for military service in and outside Boeotia. The answer to this
question lies in placing this account within the context of the conventions governing
military aid to allies in the Greek world in the classical and (much better attested in this
respect) Hellenistic periods, and, particularly, of some of the provisions of a treaty made
by the Boeotians with the Aetolians and Phocians some five or fifteen years before the
agreement between the Orchomenians and Chaeroneans.

Especially in the Hellenistic period, it was common in military alliances between
Greek states to specify how, if one of the parties to the alliance was called to the help of
another, how any expeditionary force sent by that party to the call for help was to be
maintained while fulfilling its reciprocal military obligations to the party requesting its

\textsuperscript{11} In fact, a moment’s reflection will make it clear that this must have been so. Letting the individual
members of the cavalry squadrons report the lengths of service for which they were due pay would have led
to an unacceptably high number of opportunities for those individuals to defraud their respective \textit{poleis}.

\textsuperscript{12} There is also no reason to think that the cavalrymen were to receive pay from “the combined treasuries of
the member \textit{poleis} [i.e. Orchomenus and Chaeronea]” (Mackil and van Alfen [2006] 223: see p.657
above), rather than that each cavalry squadron was to receive pay from the city where they were from.
aid: i.e., provision was made for how the expenses of any potential campaign(s) were to be shared between the state/s requesting help and the state/s summoned to help.\textsuperscript{13} There were three basic arrangements.\textsuperscript{14} In some agreements, the expenses of the expeditionary force were borne exclusively by the state or ruler summoning military aid. In others, the expense of paying and maintaining any summoned force were shared: they were to be incurred by the state/ruler that was dispatching the force for the duration of the journey to the requesting ally, after which the requesting state/ruler paid for the summoned force for as long as it employed that force; or, more often, the summoned force received its pay for the first thirty days following its arrival at its ally state/ruler from the state/ruler that had sent it, after which, again, the requesting state/ruler paid for the force as long as it employed the force.\textsuperscript{15} These basic arrangements could receive slight modifications in specific agreements between states: for instance, in a treaty between the Aetolians and Acarnanians in 263-262, it was agreed that the pay for the first thirty days of service would be given by the state from which the soldiers were coming, without any specification as to at which time this thirty day period would begin;\textsuperscript{16} after the thirty days, the expense of maintaining the force was to be met by the people that requested it, as usual (\textit{IG IX} 1\textsuperscript{2}, 3 (Schmitt [1969], no.483), ll.20-28).

\textsuperscript{13} See Garlan (1977) 150-158.

\textsuperscript{14} See (ibid.) 155-157 for examples.

\textsuperscript{15} For a treaty of this type, see chapter 5 section iv on Thucy. 5.47.6.

\textsuperscript{16} The date of departure to the neighboring state was probably understood as the start date of this period: see Ducrey (1970) 652.
Another slightly different take on the basic customary arrangements is found in an agreement of either 301 or 292/1 made by the Boeotians with the Aetolians and the Phocians (Schmitt [1969], no.462).\(^\text{17}\) In the event of one of these states being attacked by a third party, the Boeotians and the Aetolians agreed to help the attacked ally (frag. a, ll.14-15). The details governing the pay arrangements for the forces providing the reciprocal military aid are found on fragment b of the inscription, at ll.3-13: “]\(\text{ο}ν \text{ἐφόδια}\) [--- παφ’ (?)] Αἰτωλων Βοιωτοὺς [--- ὃσον δ’ ἄν χρόνον δέονται, χρῆσθαι ταῖς συμμάχαις (?)] Αἰτωλῶν παρὰ Βοιωτῶν ἢ Βοιωτῶν παρ’ Αἰτωλῶν ---[τε ἀφῶσιν Αἰτωλῶν Βοιω[το]ς--- ὃ (?)] Βοιωτῶν] Αἰτωλῶν· διδόναι δὲ ὅτι --- ἐπ[ιείδαν προα[ν]αλώσωσιν Βοιωτοῖ --- ἀπὸ[δοῦναι τοὺς] Βουλάρχους ἐντ--- εἰν καὶ ἐν τῶι ἐπιστήσοντι σὺ[νεδρίωι (?)] ---οῦ. κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄν Αἰτωλῶν --- προαναλώσωσιν, [ἀ]πὸ]τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ---” Although the state of the stone makes it impossible to restore with certainty those parts of the inscription that are missing, the general meaning of the agreement and some of the clauses on pay can be grasped quite easily.\(^\text{18}\) There is a clause mentioning \(\text{ἐφόδια}\)—most probably regarding its payment—followed (at ll.5ff.) by a clause agreeing that each of the states, the Boeotians and the Aetolians, if they had requested military aid, could keep the force sent to them by their ally for as long as they had need of it (ll.5-6: [--- ὃσον δ’ ἄν χρόνον δέονται, χρῆσθαι ταῖς συμμάχαις (?)] Αἰτωλων Βοιωτῶν ἢ Βοιωτῶν παφ’ Αἰτωλῶν ---

\(^{17}\) The Phocians, however, are not mentioned in the clauses detailing the requirements of reciprocal military aid and the provisions made for its execution.

19 The service in aid of the requesting state was to cease only when that state
dismissed the summoned military force to its home state (ll.7-8: ἀφῶσιν Αἰτωλοὶ
Βοιωτοὺςἰἰἰ ἢ (?) Βοιωτοὶ Ἀιτωλούς). Finally, at ll.9ff., there is a mention of
advances—which are almost certainly of the ἐφόδια mentioned above—that were to be
made by the summoned state and that were to reimbursed by the magistrates of the
summoning state within a certain period of time. As to why and in what circumstances
these advances were to be paid, Flacelière, having placed this treaty within the context of
the other types of agreements described above on the distribution of military expenses
between allies, was able to provide a convincing explanation:

Ici les frais d’entretien des troupes de secours devaient être entièrement à la
charge du pays secouru,—car, s’ils avaient incombé pendant les trente premiers
jours au pays qui envoyait le secours, aucun avance n’aurait été nécessaire.
Comme il y avait une impossibilité matérielle à ce que le pays secouru pût payer
ces frais dès le début, c’est-à-dire dès le moment où les troupes de secours se
metaient en marche, les dépenses faites par ces troupes de secours se devaient
être provisoirement couvertes par leur pays d’origine, à charge pour le pays
secouru de les rembourser ensuite.20

It is in the context of the clauses on advances in the Boeotian treaty with the
Aetolians that we ought to place the provision in the agreement between the
Orchomenians and the Chaeroneans for the setting up of the account of the lengths of
military service in and outside Boeotia. The treaty with the Aetolians was made either in
301 or 292/1—complete certainty is impossible on this point21—and was still in force in
279, during the invasion of central Greece by the Gauls: thus it was in force at the time

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19 The restoration is, of course, not certain, but is highly probable: Flacelière ([1930] 78) compares Thucy.
5.47.6: “ἢν δὲ πλέονα βούλωνται χρόνον τῇ στρατιᾷ χρῆσθαι...”


21 See Schmitt (1969) 99 for the arguments for each date.
of the agreement between the Orchomenians and Chaeroneans. As I have argued above, the account of the duration of campaigns for which the cavalry of these two poleis received ἐφόδια was the concern of the poleis: it was the poleis that wished to record the lengths of service undertaken by their cavalry squadrons. Placing their agreement within the context of the Boeotian League’s treaty with the Aetolian League, one can see that the account of the duration of the campaigns would have served two requirements for Orchomenus and Chaeronea: it would not only allow for the equitable distribution of cavalry service between the four squadrons of the combined cavalry force of the two cities, but it would also allow for calculation and equitable distribution of the military expenses for which the cities were liable—the ἐφόδια for service within Boeotia, for internal Boeotian League policing duties—and calculation of the expenses for which the cities were initially liable, but for which they would later be reimbursed—the ἐφόδια for service outside Boeotia, in aid of an allied state, most probably the Aetolian League, for which they were to advance sums of money that would later be repaid to them.

I realize that this interpretation of the clause cannot admit of complete certainty but I believe that it is cogent for three reasons. Firstly, it places the actions of the Orchomenians and Chaeroneans within the framework of long recognized conventions governing foreign military expeditions in the Greek world: it is an explanation, therefore, that fits within known polis financial and military practices in this period. Even if the campaigns outside Boeotia were not in aid of the Aetolians, there may have been other

22 Roesch (1979) 250-251. Roesch (ibid.) notes that the fact that the treaty between the Boeotians and Aetolians was in force at the time of the agreement between Orchomenus and Chaeronea “pourrait donner une indication sur les opérations effectuées hors de Béotie peu après 287,” i.e. on the operations outside Boeotia listed in the account below the agreement. (Roesch does not use this point, however, to clarify the meaning of clause on the setting up of the account in the treaty between Orchomenus and Chaeronea.)
unattested treaties made by the Boeotians with similar provisions on pay. But, and this is the second point in favor of my interpretation, my linking of this clause with the treaty of the Aetolians gives an appropriate historical context for the *poleis’* actions: the unsettled conditions in central Greece during this period. Thirdly, this interpretation places the military pay given by the Orchomenians and Chaeroneans back into a context of public finance and expenditure. Given that there is no evidence prior to this date for states in the Greek world linking military pay to conditions on campaign—that, in contrast, all the evidence points to pay being determined by the current financial resources of military employers and/or by competition among military employers for soldiers and sailors—and that there is nothing in this inscription or in contemporary evidence from Boeotia to suggest that the Boeotian League or the *poleis* of Orchomenus and Chaeronea were anomalous in this respect, it is almost certain that the clause in the agreement between these two cities providing for the establishment of an account listing the duration of the cities’ cavalry squadrons’ service within and outside Boeotia should be interpreted as a measure to monitor and control public spending, and more particularly to ascertain what the two *poleis* were owed for their cavalry squadrons’ service outside Boeotia.23

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23 In fact, the clause “ἐκατέρας ἄς καὶ τὰ ἐφόδια λάβωνθι” is redundant if interpreted as part of an attempt by the two *poleis* to keep track of their spending on cavalry pay because of their payment of different rates of “ἐφόδια” for military service in and outside Boeotia. On this interpretation, the account to be set up would have included the lengths of the different cavalry squadrons’ service, and thus monitored and enforced the part of the agreement between the two cities attempting to ensure equal lengths of service for the four cavalry squadrons, but the clause on “τὰ ἐφόδια” would have served no purpose. If the two cities were paying different rates to their cavalry depending on whether they served within or outside Boeotia, this would have been generally known and thus presumed in any agreement between the two cities, and there would have been no reason to mention it as part of the establishment of an account in any agreement, especially since its mention would not have made any material difference to the Orchomenians or Chaeroneans: this pay would have been distributed before and during the squadrons’ service, and the two *poleis*, on this hypothetical explanation, would not have expected any recompense for the sums they had distributed. Interpreting the clause in question differently, it could be argued the inclusion in the agreement of a clause ordering the setting up of an account of the campaigns for which the cavalry received pay implies that there were campaigns for which the cavalry squadrons did not receive “ἐφόδια,” and that the clause on pay was meant to keep track of the campaigns for which the cities had to distribute pay, in
iii. Some notes on the payment of Hellenistic military forces and the markets provided to them by their employers

In the Hellenistic period, the distinction between pay (μισθός) and subsistence rations (σιτηρέσιον), which had been inchoate in the middle of the fourth century, hardened into established practice. From the third century on, Hellenistic soldiers generally received two payments in return for service: pay (proper) in coin—the term ὀψώνιον for the most part replacing the classical μισθός to denote this payment, although the latter was still used frequently in literary authors; and a payment of rations in kind—variously called σῖτος, σιτομετρία, σιταρχία, σιτηρέσιον, μέτρηµα—the value of part or all of which could be converted into and paid in coin (which type of payment the term σιτώνιον always referred to). Again, these were the terms generally utilized to denote the two types of payments, but there could be differences in usage by region and period: the treaty made between the Aetolians and Acarnanians referred to above (IG IX 1², 3 (Schmitt [1969], no.483, ll.35-37), for example, used σιταρχία, it seems, to refer to both payments combined; and, in Ptolemaic Egypt, σιταρχία meant pay (proper), as opposed to σιτομετρία, rations in kind. The term ἐφόδια, however, is only attested in the agreement between the Orchomenians and the Chaeroneans, and in the treaty between the

order that the financial burden of cavalry service might be distributed equally between the two cities. This might have been so, but this interpretation would still not explain why a distinction was made for campaigns within and outside Boeotia.


25 Launey (1949-50) 758-759, 765; cf. (ibid.) 733, Burrer (2008) 86 n.16 for other examples of σιταρχία meaning pay proper.
Boeotians, Aetolians and Phocians, to refer to a payment to military forces. Thus, there is uncertainty as to what it means in the agreement between the Orchomenians and the Chaeroneans: pay (=οψώνια), or the rations granted to the cavalry squadrons, or a payment including both of their allowances. In the absence of any mention of another type of payment here, or in the agreement with the Aetolians—though, given the fragmentary state of this inscription, the argument from silence is not so strong here—it would be seem to be the last: a single payment combining both pay proper and a subsistence allowance.

If ἐφόδια does mean in these two inscriptions a single payment combining both pay proper and a subsistence allowance, it is still true that Hellenistic soldiers, in contrast to those serving in classical military forces, usually received two types of payments: namely, one for pay proper, and one to cover basic food expenses (the latter sometimes distributed in kind, sometimes in coin). In another contrast with usual practices in the classical period, Hellenistic soldiers were sometimes offered markets by their employers in which basic foods, e.g. grain, oil, and wine, were sold to them at fixed prices that were lower than those prevailing on markets in the areas in question. The evidence for this practice comes from Pergamum, Egypt (especially), Athens, and Carthage. In an


27 The fact that the term ἐφόδια is used for payments to military forces only in the agreement between the Orchomenians and Chaeroneans and in the Boeotian treaty with the Aetolians tends to favor the interpretation that the payments for service outside Boeotia mentioned in the cavalry agreement were made for military service in conjunction with the Aetolians.
agreement between Eumenes I and the previously revolted mercenaries of his garrisons in Philetaeria and Attaleia, the conditions of future service for the mercenaries were regulated; included in the agreement was a clause on the sale of provisions by the King to the mercenaries (ll.3-4): “σίτου τιµὴν ἀποτίνειν τοῦ µεδίµνου δραχµὰς τέσσ[αρ]ας, οἴνου τοῦ µετρητοῦ δραχµὰς τόσσαρας.” In the absence of any price data for grain (or wine) in Pergamum in the third century, one cannot state certainly that the price of four drachmas for a medimnos of grain was lower than prevailing market prices at Pergamum but, given that these clauses represent the demands of the mercenaries, it would seem very likely that this was the case. A decree of 210 in praise of the Athenian general for the countryside at Eleusis seems to refer to the acquisition by the general of a stock of grain that he resold to the soldiers of the garrison at Eleusis at low prices. The fact that the general received special praise for this action and the grain was not provided by the state implies that soldiers in Athenian garrisons did not usually have the right or opportunity to buy provisions at lower than market prices (the phrasing of the inscription

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28 OGIS 266, Schmitt (1969) no.481. The inscription is undated but Eumenes I reigned from 263 to 241.

29 This clause has sometimes been interpreted—taking Eumenes as the subject of ἀποτίνειν—as fixing the rate of conversion of the mercenaries’ rations in kind into payments in coin (see Launey [1949-50] 738, Bagnall and Derow [2004], no.23). As Chaniotis ([2005] 87) points out, however, “[t]he clauses represent the demands of the mercenaries and, therefore, reflect their main concerns...” and thus the mercenaries should be taken as the subject of the infinitive: see also Launey (1949-50) 739-741.

30 Launey ([1949-50] 738-741) think that the prices for wheat and wine in this inscription represent fixed low prices (cf. Chaniotis [2005] 87), since the prices are substantially lower than the only other prices for grain and wine we possess for the third century, i.e. those from Delos: but the data from Delos can tell us nothing about prevailing market conditions at Pergamum and are therefore irrelevant to this question. Demands of the mercenaries: see Chaniotis in the last note.

31 See IG II² 1304, ll.31-33 (“ἐπεµελήθη δὲ καὶ τῆς τῶν ὀψωνίων διαδόσεως, σῖτόν τε παρατιθέµενος ἐξ ἐτοίµου ὅσιον ἔχοντος ἐξχωσιν ὡς λυσιτελέστατα[λ]”) with Launey (1949-50) 741 n.3.
also implies that the soldiers of the garrison were to buy their provisions from their ὀψωνίον. The right of soldiers to buy grain and other basic foods from the state authorities at lower than market prices was, however, common in Ptolemaic Egypt, where it carried the general name of ἀγορά in documents.\textsuperscript{32} The contrast with the classical period is instructive. There is only one instance attested in the literary and epigraphic sources for the classical period of a military employer providing food to a force at fixed low prices.\textsuperscript{33} The argument from (almost) silence is not quite conclusive, since there is so much more documentary evidence for the conditions of service for soldiers in the Hellenistic period than there is for the fifth and fourth centuries, but the contrast is striking, nonetheless. The establishment and continued duration\textsuperscript{34} of this practice in the Hellenistic period at Pergamum and Egypt was made possible by the reserves of tax grain (and other foods) available to the monarchs of these kingdoms and the generally greater resources of these kingdoms compared to classical city-states (as well their rulers’ greater power to mobilize those resources): the virtual absence of fixed (low) prices in military markets in the classical period, conversely, must be a result of the fact that almost no classical Greek state, due to the absence of direct taxation in kind in the classical period, had similar reserves of grain or other foods to draw upon for distribution to soldiers.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{32} See Launey (1949-50) 766-767, 770-771, 779.

\textsuperscript{33} Plut., Mor. 193E: see chapter seven section iv for discussion.

\textsuperscript{34} As opposed to its one mention for a specific campaign in the classical period (see last note).

\textsuperscript{35} Taxation: see chapter 2 section iic and chapter 3 section ivb. See also p.189 n.229 for discussion of the one military employer in the classical period (Alexander of Pherae) who did offer food at low prices to soldiers he employed having exceptional access to exceptional resources (by fifth and fourth century polis standards).
It should also be noted that the practice of providing grain and other foods at fixed low prices is attested in the Hellenistic period within the controlled environment of garrisons, i.e. in circumstances in which it was possible to plan and organize the transport and distribution of grain and other foods to a fixed (and limited) amount of men at a fixed location. The fact that we do not have evidence of this practice for military expeditions abroad can be ascribed to the rarity of major military expeditions (by Egyptian forces, at any rate), and the extraordinary logistical requirements of these expeditions, that went far beyond the routine duties and recording practices of the Ptolemaic military administration, and thus our surviving evidence. We do not know, then, if the system of fixed prices for grain and other basic foods was maintained for the soldiers of Hellenistic kings on their campaigns abroad (and, if so, how well such a system might have worked).

We also hear of basic foods being offered to mercenaries at low prices by the Carthaginians in the middle of the third century, but in a much different context. In the aftermath of the First Punic War (in 240), on the return to Africa of the mercenaries who had fought for the Carthaginians against the Romans in Sicily, a mutiny was stirring among these mercenaries because of the Carthaginians’ failure to hand over arrears of pay owed to them (Polyb. 1.66-67, esp. 1.66.3, 11, 1.67.2): the Carthaginians could not pay these arrears because of the exhaustion of their resources brought about by the war with the Romans (Polyb. 1.66.5, 1.67.1). Furious with the Carthaginians’ failure to pay them, and by the Carthaginians’ attempts to beg off part of the pay owed, the mercenaries marched to Tunis, only twenty or so kilometers, a day’s march, away from Carthage (Polyb. 1.67.13). Terrified by the mass of mercenaries encamped so near their city, “[the Carthaginians] went to every length in their eagerness to pacify [the mercenaries’] anger;
they sent them supplies of provisions in rich abundance, to be purchased exactly on their own terms, and at their own price [i.e. at the price the mercenaries fixed],”\textsuperscript{36} and also sent them representatives from their gerousia promising to do, in so far as they could, whatever the mercenaries asked for (Polyb. 1.68.5). Encouraged by the evident fear of the Carthaginians, and by the Carthaginians’ eventual concession on the issue of the owed όψώνιον, and to their demands that the Carthaginians pay them the value of their horses that had been killed by the Romans (Polyb. 1.68.8), the mercenaries pressed for more: “that they ought to receive the value of the rations of grain due to them from a long time previous, reckoned at the highest price reached during the war.”\textsuperscript{37} The crux of the mercenaries’ claim was that they were owed σιτοµετρία by the Carthaginians; they were now demanding, rather than the payment in kind of the rations owed in kind, the cash value of their ration allowance—but at the highest price reached by grain during the war.\textsuperscript{38} In short, as Polybius comments (1.68.10), they were inventing all sorts of outrageous claims. The Carthaginians promised to do all they could and the matter went to arbitration (Polyb. 1.68.11).

We can infer two very interesting implications from the mercenaries’ demands and the Carthaginians’ fearful actions in reply. Firstly, the fixing of food prices by

\textsuperscript{36} Polyb. 1.68.4-5: “σπουδάζοντες ἐξιλάσασθαι τὴν ὀργὴν αὐτῶν· καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀγορὰς ἐκπέµποντες δαψιλεῖς ἐπώλουν, καθὼς ἐκεῖνοι βούλοιτο καὶ τάττοιεν τὰς τιµὰς...”

\textsuperscript{37} Polyb. 1.68.9: “τὰς σιτοµετρίας τὰς προτεταγµένας ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου τὴν μεγίστην γεγονυῖαν ἐν τῷ πολέµῳ τιµὴν ἑρασκόν αὐτοῖς δεῖ κοµίζεσθαι.” Interestingly, it seems that, in contrast to Greek practice, the Carthaginians could have been distributing rations in kind as part of total pay already in the late fifth century: see Diod. 13.88.2 (when the Carthaginian army encamped before Agrigentum in 406 was suffering from lack of food, the Campanian and other mercenaries in the army demanded from Himilcar, the Carthaginian commander, “τὰς σιτοµετρίας τὰς προτεταγµένας”).

\textsuperscript{38} See Walbank (1957) 134-135.
soldiers in the market offered to them, and the conversion of the payments of owed 
σιτοµετρία into coin, were obviously exceptional occurrences, considered outrageous by Polybius, and permitted here only because of the terror of the Carthaginians. Secondly, and more importantly, the claim of the mercenaries regarding σιτοµετρία gives us our only explicit evidence for price changes in the camp of a military force on campaign in the Mediterranean in the classical and Hellenistic periods, in what we may consider normal circumstances.39 There is no evidence, however, for the cause of these price increases, and we should not assign, without reflection, the reason for the price rises to disruptions in the production and distribution of grain caused by the First Punic War: prices for grain ordinarily fluctuated over the course of the year, and the mercenaries may simply be referring to the (relatively) high prices reached by grain in the months before the harvest.40

Finally, in the cases of the mercenaries employed by Eumenes I and the Carthaginians, and the soldiers serving under the Ptolemies, we have only been dealing with the rations or ration-allowances of soldiers, and not their total pay: in addition to their rations—either in coin (implied by the granting of ἄγοραι) or in kind—the mercenaries, as I have noted above, also received ὀψώνιον. That is to say, the level of these soldiers’ total remuneration was only partially determined by the fixed prices they found in the markets provided to them.41 Moreover, by paying rations in kind or by

39 I.e., outside those instances discussed in chapter 4.

40 See chapter 7 section iii, and cf. Griffith (1935) 289: “... the fluctuations in commodity prices, due perhaps to the state of war as well as to the ordinary causes.”

41 In the case of the Athenian evidence cited above, where the inscription implies that the soldiers bought their provisions from their ὀψώνιον, we have no reason to think, albeit in the absence of any evidence either
setting fixed prices at which soldiers could buy their provisions, Hellenistic military
employers divorced the levels of payments of ration-allowances to their soldiers from
prevailing market prices.\textsuperscript{42} Payments to soldiers for ration-allowances to be spent in the
markets specially organized for them must have borne over time only a very limited
relation to the prices of basic foods in ‘normal’ markets in surrounding areas, and
therefore the amounts of these payments can tell us nothing specific about the prices
found simultaneously in ‘normal’ markets in Pergamum, Egypt or Carthage—except for
the obvious point that prices must have been generally higher in these ‘normal’ markets
(since the soldiers were getting fixed low prices). The decision to provide soldiers the
benefit of ἀγοραί with fixed prices for their basic subsistence foods does tell us one very
important thing about the functioning of ‘normal’ markets in Pergamum, Egypt, and
Carthage, however: there were flexible prices for basic foods in these ‘normal’ markets
way, to think that market prices for grain or other foods determined the amount of pay distributed by the
state to Athenians serving in garrisons, although it can be concluded that the praise for the general of the
countryside at Eleusis’ actions implies very strongly that the men serving in the garrisons usually bought
their food at current market prices.

\textsuperscript{42} The disconnect between ration-allowances and market prices is illustrated brilliantly in a treaty between
Attalus I and Malla made ca. 200 (see Ducrey and van Effenterre [1969] 281-282 for the inscribed text of
the treaty and (ibid.) 288 for its date). The treaty stipulates that Attalus is to send men to the Mallians if
they have need of military aid (ll.9-17); and that Attalus will provide for these men their means of
transport, their pay (“τὰ ὀψώνια”), and what is necessary for their voyage to Malla (ll.17-19). On their
arrival at Malla, the Mallians will provide for the maintenance of the men, giving one Aiginetan drachma to
each man (and two to their officers) and one Attic choinix (of grain) (ll.20-24), “ἐὰν μὴ ἐν πολεµίαι ὦσιν,
οὐ ἔσται σῖτον λανβάνειν,” “unless they are in an enemy territory where it will be possible to take grain”
(ll.24-26). Thus, the ration of one Attic choinix of grain per man per day will be still due to each man in an
enemy territory where they will be no grain available to forage; but, if there is grain to be taken in the
enemy territory, the Mallians will be released from their obligation to provision the men (see Garlan [1977]
152-153 n.5 for the correct interpretation of this clause, contra Ducrey and van Effenterre [1969] 298,
Ducrey [1970] 658-659). Ration-allowances of grain acquired through foraging were obviously not
determined by market prices (!).
(since the measure of setting fixed prices in markets for these foods must have been motivated (primarily) by the desire to protect soldiers from fluctuations in prices). 43

43 In the case of the Carthaginian mercenaries, the Carthaginians’ concession of letting the mercenaries set their own fixed prices not only protected the latter from fluctuations in price, but also functioned primarily as a Carthaginian gift (since the mercenaries would have had the opportunity (and the incentive) to set prices as low as possible, and therefore save money). The provision of food at fixed low prices also protected military employers from potential discontent in their armies and disruption of military activity arising from high food prices and consequent subsistence crises (the provision of rations in kind would have functioned similarly).
Appendix 6: Thucydides 8.58.5-6 and Rates of Pay for Peloponnesian Sailors in the First Years of the Ionian War

i. Introduction

I demonstrated in chapter 6 that the “full drachma” (per man per day) was the rate of pay expected by the men of the Peloponnesian fleet during the summer of 412 and the winter of 412/11 (see 8.29.1, 8.45.6, 8.50.3), the first year of the Ionian War.\(^1\) Having done this, I want here to discuss how much money the men of the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus in the summer of 411 (i.e. those men who were angry that they were not receiving their pay in full or regularly from Tissaphernes (8.78, 8.83.2-3)) expected to receive as their ‘full pay.’ If one were to follow the current scholarly consensus, the answer to the question of what the rate of pay of the Peloponnesian fleet in the summer of 411 was would lie in the proper interpretation of a clause in the treaty made by the Spartans and Persians towards the end of the winter of 412/11 (8.58.5):

\[
\text{τροφὴν δὲ ταῖς ναυσὶ ταῖς νῦν παρούσαις Τισσαφέρνη παρέχειν κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείµενα µέχρι ἂν αἱ νῆες αἱ βασιλέως ἔλθωσιν.}
\]

Tissaphernes shall provide pay for the ships now present, according to the agreement, until the arrival of the King’s ships.

Almost every scholar who has written on this treaty has taken the phrase “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείµενα” at 8.58.5 to be referring to an agreement on a rate of pay made between Tissaphernes and the Spartans prior to the treaty—an agreement that this clause reaffirms as valid.\(^2\) Although the scholars who have interpreted “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείµενα” as referring

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\(^1\) 8.29.1, in fact, strongly implies that such a rate had been established in the years before 412 as usual for naval service: see again chapter 5 section iv. All textual references in this appendix will be to Thucydides unless otherwise indicated.

to an agreed rate of pay have done so within the framework of a debate on the aims and the proper interpretation of this treaty (and its relationship to the two earlier agreements between Tissaphernes and the Spartans in the summer of 412 and earlier in the winter of 412/411), and not within the context of a discussion of the rate of pay for the Peloponnesian fleet in the summer of 411, the conventional interpretation that “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” refers to an earlier established rate of pay has had the necessary consequence that these scholars have had to point to an earlier agreement specifying a rate of pay, a rate of pay that, on the customary view of 8.58.5, is reaffirmed as valid by this clause. And since we hear of no later agreement on pay between the Spartans and the Persians between this treaty (made toward the end of the winter of 412/11) and the expression of discontent over their pay by the Peloponnesian sailors at 8.78, the rates of pay proposed by scholars as solutions to the proper significance of “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” at 8.58.5 should be taken as representing what they have believed to be the rates of pay expected by the Peloponnesian sailors at Miletus in the summer of 411.

Several different prior agreements have been advanced as providing the rate of pay supposedly implied by “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα.” Lewis believed that the reference to “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” left “us with no choice but to believe that the reference is to 29.2 [since there was no other reference between this passage and 8.58.5 to an agreed rate of pay in Thucydides’ narrative], but this may not be right.” This solution to the problem...

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Andrewes, HCT v.142 (cf. HCT v.70, 80, 102, 143) (followed by Kallet [2001] 266) and Hornblower, CT iii.929 for the view that 8.58.5 refers to a rate of pay agreed by the Spartans and Tissaphernes, and approved by the King at some unknown point prior to the treaty. But see below p.690 n.50 for Krüger (1858-61).

3 (1977) 104 n.84; cf. 124 n.105. Lewis, as part of his discussion of this problem, demonstrated [(1977) 124] that the three obol per day rate we find agreed between the Persians and the Spartans in 407 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.5) was a product of negotiations between these two parties in the winter of 408/7 (Xen., Hell.
of 8.58.5 and “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” was the common one in earlier literature on the
subject.⁴ on this view, the rate agreed at 8.29.2 between Tissaphernes and the
Peloponnesians in the early winter of 412/11—thirty talents per month for fifty-five
ships, or a sum slightly over three obols per day per man⁵—was the rate at issue at 8.58.5.

Meyer had 8.58.5 referring back to 8.45 and Tissaphernes’ unilateral reduction
there, on Alcibiades’ urging, of the Peloponnesians’ pay from one drachma to three
obols, though he acknowledged that this suggestion was not capable of proof.⁶
Cawkwell, on the other hand, criticizing Thucydides for the incompleteness of the
information he provided in Book 8 on the subject of pay for the Peloponnesian sailors,
took “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” to be referring to Tissaphernes’ promise, in the winter of
413/2, to provide τροφή for any Peloponnesian triremes that came to Asia to campaign
against the Athenians (8.5.5), i.e. to a rate of pay that was agreed then (but not reported in
Thucydides’ narrative) for the crews of these triremes.⁷ (Although Cawkwell did not

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⁴ Classen ([1885] VIII.93 ad 8.29.2) believed that the phrase referred “ohne Zweifel” to 8.29.2; cf. (1885)
VIII.140 ad 8.58.5. See also Tucker and Kirchhoff (see n.2 for exact citations) for “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα”
taken to be referring back to 8.29.2. See also pp.677-678 for Hornblower (CT iii.929) taking 8.58.5 as
referring to the rate of pay agreed at 8.29.

⁵ See Hornblower, CT iii.836-838 for the various solutions proposed for the question of what the rate of pay
agreed on at 8.29.2 actually was.

⁶ See n.2 for citation.

⁷ See n.2 for citation. Cawkwell (ibid.) states that “and in the formal treaty there is no more than a clause to
the effect that Tissaphernes ‘should provide pay for the ships currently present in accordance with what
had been agreed’ [emphasis in the original] (8.58.4) (sic). The reference must be to the original agreement
at Sparta.” But Cawkwell never demonstrates why the reference must be to the original agreement at
Sparta (rather than, to follow the logic of the rate of pay argument, the agreement reached at 8.29.2
between Tissaphernes and the Spartans). Cawkwell’s interpretation of 8.58.5 as referring back to 8.5.5 is
specify, the rate of pay promised by Tissaphernes at 8.5.5 was almost certainly one drachma per man per day.)

Andrewes interpreted “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” to imply that a rate of pay for the Peloponnesians—that, according to Andrewes, had been left to be decided by the King at 8.29.1 (and still not had been at 8.45.6)—had been settled by him in the meantime, but Thucydides had omitted, for some reason or another, this information from his narrative. In the absence of any mention of a rate of pay in the treaty, and the supposed ruling from the King on the rate of pay for the Peloponnesian sailors, Andrewes, offering the rate agreed between the King and the Spartans in 408/7 tentatively as a parallel, suggested that the rate referred to at 8.58.5 may have been three obols a day.

Hornblower took the agreement to be most likely referring to 8.29, “which specifically

also odd, since he states (ibid.) that neither at 8.5.5 nor at 8.29.1 were Tissaphernes’ promises to provide the pay of the Peloponnesians “put into any sort of formal agreement.”


9 8.29.1: “τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνοµένου χειµῶνος, ἐπειδὴ τὴν Ἴασον κατεστήσατο ὁ Τισσαφέρνης ἐς φυλακήν, παρεῆλθεν εἰς τὴν Μίλητον, καὶ μηνὸς μὲν τροφήν, ὡσπερ ὑπέστη ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίµονι, ἐς δραχµὴν Ἀττικὴν ἕκαστῳ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ διέδωκε, τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐδούλευσε νυνὶ διδόναι, ἕως ἂν βασιλέα ἐπέρθηται ὃν ἰελείµην, ἐφ' ἄδεστον ἐνελθὴ τὴν δραχµὴν”; “[d]uring the following winter [412/11], after he had placed Iasus in charge of a garrison, Tissaphernes came to Miletus, where he distributed to all the ships a month’s pay, as he had promised at Lacedaemon to do, to the amount of an Attic drachma a day for each man; for the future, however, he proposed to give only three obols until he should ask the King; if the King should so order, he would give the full drachma.”

10 HCT v.142: “at 29.1, 45.6, the king had not yet ruled on the rate of pay; by now he has done so, but the fact is not yet noted in its place by Thucydides.” Cf. HCT v.70, 102. Citing Andrewes, Kallet comments on 8.58.5-6 ([2001] 266): “[w]hich agreement is mentioned in the treaty is unclear, but it implies that the King had fixed a rate of pay, and that he would provide the pay to be disbursed by Tissaphernes.” Rood (see n.2 above for citation) also does not specify what “fixed rate of pay” he thinks Thucyl. 8.58.5 refers to.

11 Offered only tentatively since Andrewes was aware (see pp.675-676 n.3 above) that the rate of pay attested in 407 was a product of the negotiations between the Spartans and the King in the winter of 408/7.
mentioned the need for the King’s approval.” He continued: “[i]f, as seems likely, the King had indeed given approval at some point, Th. has not told us this (so Andrewes)...

The reference [to “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα”] will be twofold: (1) to the level of pay envisaged at 29.1 (a drachma a day), as (2) approved by the King at some unknown subsequent moment.” Thus, Hornblower, in assuming that 8.58.5 was referring to a prior agreement on a rate of pay later approved by the King, and offering an interpretation of 8.58.5 based on this assumption, had to adopt Andrewes’ rather desperate solution of assuming Thucydides’ failure to note an important point in the agreements on and machinations concerning the pay given by the Persians to the Peloponnesians in the course of the historian’s description of the early years of the Ionian war, in a narrative that is otherwise very careful and full in its presentation concerning the financing of the Peloponnesian fleet.

There are, then, problems for each of these previously proposed solutions to the proper interpretation of 8.58.5, problems that are, in fairness, acknowledged by most of the scholars advancing them: admitted uncertainty regarding the validity of the proposed interpretations, or the resort to unsatisfactory assumptions, or both. In the rest of this appendix, I will argue that the uncertainty as to what “τὰ ξυγκειµένα” at 8.58.5 refer to,

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12 See p.676 n.4 for the citation for this and the following quote.

13 Cf. Lévy’s treatment of this clause [(1983) 236]: he supposed that “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” must be referring to “modalités de financement” such as a rate of pay, or the number of men to be paid by Tissaphernes; on that basis, since these modalities had already ignited various conflicts prior to the treaty (though most of the conflicts he cites (at [1983] 236 n.122) are, in fact, subsequent to the treaty), “on ne sait à quelles conventions précises fait allusion le texte” ([1983] 236). See also section iv below on Lévy’s treatment of 8.58.5.

and the despairing assumptions regarding Thucydidean vagueness or incompleteness this uncertainty has given rise to, have come about not because of the lack of clarity or fullness of Thucydides’ narrative, but because the scholars working on this passage have been looking for the wrong sort of earlier agreement. All of the works discussed so far have assumed without discussion or argument that “τὰ ξυγκειµένα” of 8.58.5 refer to an earlier agreement between Tissaphernes (approved by the King or not) and the Spartans on a rate of pay for the sailors of the Peloponnesian triremes. But, as I hope to demonstrate below, there are no grounds for this assumption (or for the linked assumption that 8.58.5 is referring to an agreed rate of pay now approved by the King). And after considering 8.58.5 and the phrase “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” first within the context of the three agreements made between the Spartans and the Persians in 412 and 411, and then within the context of the whole of the section treating pay in the third treaty between the Spartans and the Persians, and the events leading up to that treaty, I will posit another explanation of 8.58.5, one that does not require uncertain reference to some earlier mentioned rate of pay, or the assumption of Thucydidean failure of any kind. Having done this, I will then be in a position to state what the rate of pay expected by the Peloponnesian sailors at Miletus in the summer of 411 was.
The consistency of content of the three treaties between the Spartans and the Persians

There is a striking consistency in the content of the three treaties agreed between the Spartans and Persians in the years between 412 and 411. They consist of largely similar clauses, although these clauses tend to become more precise, and more formal, over the course of the three treaties. The first treaty, concluded between Tissaphernes and Chalcideus (8.17.4), recognizes the right of the King to both the territory and cities he holds and those his ancestors held, and contains an undertaking by the Spartans to act in concert with the Persians to stop the Athenians collecting tribute (or anything else) from the cities now recognized as belonging to the King (8.18.1); agrees on joint prosecution of the war and against making a separate peace with the Athenians (8.18.2); and engages each of the parties to consider any who revolt from the other party as enemies (8.18.3). As commentators on this first treaty have pointed out, the advantage of this last clause lay wholly with the Persians: one of the two motives lying behind Tissaphernes’ initial request for ships from the Spartans was a desire to gain their help in

15 Although the first two agreements between Tissaphernes and Spartans were not treaties formally ratified by the authorities at Sparta and the King, the third being the only agreement holding this status (see Andrewes, HCT v.40, 143, and esp. 90 ad 8.43.4; Lévy [1983] 226-227; Cawkwell [2005] 149-150; Hornblower, CT iii.928), Thucydides described and referred to them as treaties (see Lévy [1983] 228), and since it is also the modern scholarly convention to refer to them as such, I will do so, too.

16 See Lévy (1983) 222.

17 See Andrewes, HCT v.143, Lévy (1983) 224 and n.36.

18 8.5.5: see there also for the other, and primary, motive lying behind Tissaphernes’ approach to the Spartans: the King’s demand for tribute from the Greek cities in the area under Tissaphernes’ control, tribute which the Persians had not been able to collect because of the Athenian control of these cities. The issue of the collection of tribute in the cities under the King’s control is one of the first issues to be addressed in each of the three treaties: see 8.18.1, 8.37.2, 8.58.2 (the last passage with pp.683-684 below).
the capturing of Amorges, a Persian in Caria who had rebelled from the King, and whom
the King had ordered Tissaphernes to capture dead or alive (8.5.5);\(^{19}\) in contrast, the
Spartans at this time were not in danger of any immediate defections from their alliance,
and thus had nothing to gain from this clause.\(^{20}\) Accordingly, after the capture of
Amorges (8.28.1-3), the clause does not reappear in the two later treaties.\(^{21}\)

The second treaty makes some slight alterations to the first two clauses of the first

\(^{19}\) Lewis (1977) 91; Andrewes, HCT v.41-42; Lévy (1983) 232.

\(^{20}\) See Lewis (1977) 91 on the Persian undertaking to assist the Spartans in the event of a revolt of one of
their allies: “... it is hard to see who is in mind, and no doubt this is simply a courteous balancing-clause.”
Cf. Lévy (1983) 232: this clause is founded on “une fausse réciprocité” since “le camp lacédémonien n’est
alors menacé d’aucune défection.”

\(^{21}\) See Andrewes, HCT v.42, Lévy (1983) 233. Although the language of this clause specifying a promise
not to support revolts from the other party does disappear from the second and the third treaties, the thrust
of the clause still remains in the reciprocal non-aggression clauses of the later treaties: see Lewis (1977)
94.

\(^{22}\) Lewis (1977) 93: “[m]uch of the difference between the [first and second] treaties is a matter of nuance.”

\(^{23}\) The first treaty recognizes the King’s possession of “Ὅποσην χώραν καὶ πόλεις βασιλέως ἔχει καὶ οἱ
πατέρες οἱ βασιλέως εἶχον” (8.18.1), the second his possession of “Ὅποση χώρα καὶ πόλεις βασιλέως εἰσὶ
Δαρείου ἢ τοῦ πατρὸς ἢσαν ἢ τῶν προγόνων” (8.37.2).
their allies or subjects attacking the other party (8.37.5).\textsuperscript{24} The clause in the first treaty engaging the Spartans’ assistance in preventing the Athenians collecting tribute from cities belonging to the King is replaced by a clause barring the Spartans or any of their allies exacting tribute from cities belonging to the King (8.37.2). 8.37.4, a clause enjoining the Spartans and the Persians to wage war together, and to make peace with the Athenians together is “more succinct than 18.2, but not in substance different.”\textsuperscript{25}

There are two clauses in the second treaty that do not appear in the first. 8.37.3 recognizes any later agreements necessitating changes to the second treaty as valid.\textsuperscript{26} That this provision did not appear in the first treaty is readily explicable given that that agreement was “concerned entirely with Tissaphernes’ immediate needs” and should be regarded as “no more than a preliminary working arrangement between the forces on the spot.”\textsuperscript{27} Also, importantly, the second treaty includes a clause on pay for the first time: the King will meet the expenses of any forces summoned by him and operating in his territory (8.37.4). That a clause on pay had not appeared in the first treaty is also readily explicable. The first treaty had not included a clause providing for Persian maintenance of Peloponnesian sailors because there were not, at that point in time, any Peloponnesian

\textsuperscript{24} For this interpretation of 8.37.5, see Lévy (1983) 233 and n.102, Hornblower, CT iii.856-857 (contra Andrewes, HCT v.80-81).

\textsuperscript{25} Andrewes, HCT v.80; cf. Lévy (1983) 235.

\textsuperscript{26} A common clause in Greek treaties allowing for unforeseen circumstances or later negotiations (see Andrewes, HCT v.80 ad loc.): there is no reason (despite Andrewes’ (ibid.) mention of rates of pay in his note on this clause: see below pp.693-694) to think that this clause “pourrait s’appliquer aussi au financement de l’expédition,” contra Lévy (1983) 235.

\textsuperscript{27} See Andrewes, HCT v.80. This provision does not appear in the third treaty, either: see below p.685 n.37 for suggested reasons why not.
ships present off the coast of Asia Minor for the Persians to provide pay to.\(^{28}\) By the time of the second treaty, however, Peloponnesian and allied ships were operating in force off the coast of Asia Minor, and cooperating with Tissaphernes (see 8.25.2, 8.28-29, 8.35.1-2), and thus a provision for the financing of their fleet was now inserted into the agreement between the Spartans and the Persians.\(^{29}\)

The third treaty begins again with a clause recognizing the extent of the King’s empire, now again, as in the first treaty, in the form of an explicit statement: his territorial possessions are now expressly limited to Asia (8.58.2): this limitation was most probably in response to Lichas’ objections that the second treaty, which recognized the King’s territory as that which he or his forefathers had held, allowed the King to claim authority over Greek lands as far as Boeotia (8.43.3).\(^{30}\) The grandiloquent second clause of the treaty that “concerning his own country the King shall determine as he pleases [καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βούλεται]” (8.58.2) probably expresses

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\(^{28}\) See Andrewes, *HCT* v.40; see also Hornblower, *CT* iii.801, 855: as Hornblower points out, Kallet ([2001] 256 (cf. 251)) is therefore incorrect in seeing the omission in the first treaty of a provision for Persian payments to the Peloponnesian fleet as evidence of Spartan financial “amateurishness.”

\(^{29}\) Lévy describes 8.37.4 as a “formule habile qui lie les deux volets de l’accord: reconnaissance des droits du Roi et financement de l’expédition” ([1983] 235). In other words, Lévy assumes that a clause assigning responsibility for the payment of the Peloponnesian ships was not, on its own, significant enough to warrant inclusion in the second treaty: its inclusion has to be explained by its “formule habile” linking the Peloponnesian receipt of pay to Spartan acknowledgement of the rights of the King. But, as I have just noted, the changes in the military situation between the time of the first and the second treaties provide more than sufficient explanation for the inclusion of a clause assigning responsibility for pay in the second treaty (cf. Hornblower, *CT* iii.856). See also p.694 n.64 below for further discussion of this point.

\(^{30}\) See Lewis (1977) 104-105. As Andrewes points out (*HCT* v.140), however, the phrasing of this clause (“χώραν τὴν βασιλέως, ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστι, βασιλέως εἶναι”) “allows that there is still territory in Europe which he may regard as his.” Cf. Hornblower, *CT* iii.928; Lévy (1983) 230. See also Cawkwell (2005) 149: this clause of the third treaty could also be seen as an improvement for the Persians in that “whatever territory and cities the King holds or the King’s fathers held’ might be questioned on the ground that Darius’ father, Artaxerxes I, had ceded control of the Greek cities of Asia, and his grandfather, Xerxes, had lost control of a large part of the Asian coast after 479.”
the King’s uncontested claim to tribute from the territory he claims as his. The third and fourth clauses, 8.58.3-4, a mutual non-aggression pact and positive undertakings on each side to prevent any of their allies or subjects attacking the other side, are slightly modified versions of 8.37.2 and 5. the slight changes were almost certainly in response to the fears of Tissaphernes (attested at 8.57.1) that the Peloponnesian trireme crews might be thinking of plundering Persian territory to obtain money. There are then two clauses on pay, 8.58.5-6, again, as in the second treaty, apportioning responsibility for the payment of the Peloponnesian ships: the responsibility for this will shift to the Spartans and their allies when the King’s ships (i.e. a Phoenician fleet of one hundred and forty-seven ships which was being equipped by Tissaphernes for use in the Aegean) arrive. The treaty ends with clauses in which the Spartans and Persians agree to wage war together and to make peace together, altered to reflect the imminent arrival of the Phoenician fleet (8.58.7).

The basic issues agreed between the Spartans and the Persians remain the same over the course of the three treaties, then—the extent of the King’s territory, his right to

31 See Lévy (1983) 234, Hornblower, CT iii.928. See also Andrewes, HCT v.140-141 for discussion of this clause, and esp. HCT v.140: “it should be self-evident that the king may do as he will with his own, and some reason has to be found why this should be secured explicitly in the treaty; a likely answer is that in the course of the negotiations some possible limitation on his powers had been discussed.”


33 Note in this respect that 8.58.4, unlike 8.37.2 and 8.37.5, enjoins the Spartans and their allies, and the King, to prevent individuals from their respective forces from harming the other’s territories.

34 See 8.46.1, 5, 8.59 and Hornblower, CT iii.1004-1005 (ad 8.87).

35 Cf. Lewis (1977) 106.
tribute, the mutual non-aggression pact and the promise to act against any party
contravening the non-aggression pact, the joint prosecution of the war and the agreement
to end it together, (and once the Peloponnesians have arrived in the theater of operations)
the clauses assigning responsibility for the pay of the Peloponnesian ships — although as
the agreements develop from the “working arrangement” that is the first treaty to the fully
‘worked up’ third treaty (a document that appears to represent a striving for finality in the
arrangements between the Spartans and Persians), the introductions to the agreements
are increasingly more official, the language of the agreements become more precise, the
individual provisions of the treaties become more formal and appropriate for a
conventional Greek treaty, and the clauses on military action and pay more “concrete”
to reflect changes in the circumstances of the war (the arrival of a substantial
Peloponnesian naval presence in the eastern Aegean; the imminent arrival of the King’s
ships). These are all intelligible developments. Thus, the content of each clause of

36 As noted above (pp.680-681 and n.21), although the language of 8.18.3 disappears from the later treaties,
the basic import of that clause is still present in the mutual non-aggression clauses of the text of the second
and third treaties.

37 See Andrewes, HCT v.143. This effort for finality, together with the fact that the final treaty appears to
view the end of the war with the Athenians as near (or at least foreseeable) and the more “concrete”
(Andrewes, (ibid.)) nature of its clauses on military action, probably explains the omission of any clause in
the final treaty recognizing any later agreements necessitating changes to it as valid (cf. 8.37.3).

38 See Andrewes (ibid.) on the prescript to the third treaty: “[t]he inclusion of other Persians besides
Tissaphernes, the elaboration of the preamble, the date given in both Persian and Spartan terms, all suggest
a more resolute attempt to draft a document for formal ratification.”

39 Cf. Andrewes, HCT v.80 (ad 8.37.2, 3), and 82 (on the second treaty generally): “[t]his is, at least in its
language, much more like a regular treaty between independent partners. 18.1 and 3, with their
concentration on the interests of Persia, are replaced by provisions which are formally reciprocal, except on
the financial side.” Cf. Lewis (1977) 94.

40 Ibid.
each treaty makes sense on its own terms, but the slightly altered and new clauses of the second and third treaties also make sense as easily discernible modified versions of clauses in the first and second treaties, respectively. To conclude this section, then, the point I wish to make is that, given the nature and content of the three treaties between the Spartans and Persians, there is no need to go outside the text of these agreements in order to locate the earlier clauses of which the provisions of the second and third treaties are slightly modified versions.

iii. 8.58.5 within its immediate context

8.58.5 forms part of a discrete section of the third treaty treating the pay of the Peloponnesian fleet:

τροφὴν δὲ ταῖς ναυσὶ ταῖς νῦν παρούσαις Τισσαφέρνη παρέχειν κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείµενα µέχρι ἂν αἱ νῆες αἱ βασιλέως ἔλθωσιν· (6) Λακεδαιµονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυµµάχους, ἐπὶν αἱ βασιλέως νῆες ἀφίκωνται, τὰς ἑαυτῶν ναύς, ἢν βούλωνται, τρέφειν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι. ἢν δὲ παρὰ Τισσαφέρνους λαµβάνειν ἐπέλοσι τὴν τροφὴν, Τισσαφέρνη παρέχειν, Λακεδαιµονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυµµάχους τελευτῶντος τοῦ πολέµου τὰ χρήµατα Τισσαφέρνει ἀποδοῦναι ὁπόσα ἂν λάβωσιν.

Tissaphernes shall provide pay for the ships now present, according to the agreement, until the arrival of the King’s ships; (6) but after the arrival of the King’s vessels the Lacedaemonians and their allies may pay their own ships if they wish it. If, however, they choose to receive pay from Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall furnish it; and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall repay him at the end of the war such moneys as they shall have received.\(^{42}\)

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\(^{42}\) I take “τὰς ἑαυτῶν ναύς, ἢν βούλωνται, τρέφειν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι” as allowing the Spartans the choice of whether they want to maintain their fleet or not, with Hornblower, \(CT\) iii.930 ad loc. contra, e.g., Andrewes, \(HCT\) v.142 ad loc. (the latter interpreted this clause as assigning responsibility to the Spartans and their allies to pay their men on the arrival of the King’s ships). In either case, the clause will be still be concerned with the question of which party will be maintaining the Spartan fleet and thus the controversy does not affect my argument here.
8.58.5-6 is a section of the treaty that has a consistent thrust and an internal coherence: these clauses are wholly concerned with responsibility for payment, and not with rates of pay; to be more precise, the clauses on pay here detail whose responsibility it will be in the future (i.e. from the time of the treaty onwards) to provide pay for the Peloponnesian ships, and in which circumstances. Thus, at 8.58.5, the payment of the Peloponnesian ships in the immediate future is the subject under consideration: τροφή for the ships present off the coast of Asia Minor, according to the previous agreement (“κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα”), is to be provided by Tissaphernes until the King’s ships come. 8.58.6 then follows without any change in topic from 8.58.5: in the first clause of 8.58.6 following 8.58.5, it is agreed that, in the event of the King’s ships arriving—i.e., when the strategic circumstances of the war in the eastern Aegean will have changed on account of the King’s ships’ arrival there—the responsibility for funding the pay of the Peloponnesian triremes will fall upon the Spartans and their allies, 43 the obligation to provide pay to the Peloponnesian sailors will longer be Tissaphernes’, who has the responsibility to provide pay only until the moment of the King’s ships arrival in the Aegean.

Thus if one considers 8.58.5 in its immediate context, one sees that its reference to an earlier agreement (“τὰ ξυγκειµένα”) forms an integral part of a section of the third treaty detailing who was to pay, from the time of that treaty onwards, the Peloponnesian ships which were then operating off the coast of Asia Minor. There is therefore no

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43 In the event of the King’s ships arriving, the Spartans and their allies can, if they wish (see previous note), as the treaty states, receive the money for pay for their ships from Tissaphernes, but it is agreed that they will have to pay back this money at the end of the war; it is, therefore, wholly accurate to say that the responsibility for paying the Peloponnesian ships will shift from Tissaphernes to the Spartans and their allies on the arrival of the King’s ships.
reason to take “τὰ ξυγκειµένα” at 8.58 as referring to an earlier agreement setting a rate of pay, and every reason to take it as referring to an earlier agreement that stated that Tissaphernes was to provide pay for the Peloponnesian ships. And, in fact, an earlier agreement can be found in Thucydides’ narrative with just such a provision. As noted in section ii above, there is a clause in the second treaty between Tissaphernes and the Spartans detailing which party was to be responsible for the pay of any military force of the Peloponnesians operating in the King’s country (in which Asia Minor is included):44 “the expense of all forces in the King’s country, sent for by the King, shall be borne by the King.”45 The obligation of the King to maintain the Peloponnesian ships in Asia Minor is thereby explicitly established by this clause. 8.58.5, then, with its reference to Persian payments to the ships “now present” refers to those Peloponnesian ships summoned by the Persians and operating in Persian territory (in which Asia Minor is included by the agreements), and the prior agreement referred to at 8.58.5 (“τὰ ξυγκειµένα”) is the clause on pay agreed on by the two parties in the second treaty at 8.37.4, detailing the responsibility of the Persians for the pay of Peloponnesian crews operating in the King’s territory (i.e. Asia Minor and its surrounding waters). That the King is specified as the provider of pay at 8.37.4, whereas Tissaphernes is at 8.58.5, does not present a problem for this view: despite the language of 8.37.4, it was Tissaphernes who provided pay for the Peloponnesian force in the period between the second and third

44 See 8.37.2 and Andrewes, HCT v.80.

45 8.37.4: “Ὁπόση δ’ ἂν στρατιὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ τῆς βασιλείας ἢ μεταπεμψαµένου βασιλείας, τὴν δαπάνην βασιλεία παρέχειν.”
treaty;\textsuperscript{46} the reference to the King as provider of pay at 8.37.4 should therefore be understood loosely, and taken as denoting a general Persian responsibility to maintain the Peloponnesian ships that had come to fight on the Persian side.\textsuperscript{47} The section on pay in the third treaty (8.58.5-6) was included, then, in order to modify the clause on pay in the second treaty (8.37.4), to allow for a change in the provider of pay to the Peloponnesian ships, on the arrival of the Phoenician ships.\textsuperscript{48} Put simply, to place 8.58.5 back into the wider context of the three treaties as a whole, the clauses of 8.58.5-6 are, just as the rest of the clauses in the third treaty between the Spartans and the Persians, a slightly modified version of a similar clause in the second treaty between those two parties:\textsuperscript{49} “τὰ ξυγκειµένα” of 8.58.5 do not refer, then, to an earlier agreement between Tissaphernes and the Spartans establishing a rate of pay for the men of the Peloponnesian fleet, but to

\textsuperscript{46} See 8.45.2, 8.45.6 (with Andrewes, \textit{HCT} v.142, Kallet [2001] 266 n.119), 8.50.3, 8.57.1-2. In addition, note that Tissaphernes was paying the Peloponnesians before the second treaty (see 8.29.1-2) and after the third (see 8.78, 8.80.1, 8.83-84, 8.87, 8.99).

\textsuperscript{47} At the risk of circularity, that 8.37.4 should be understood in this way is confirmed by 8.58.5-6, and the explicit statement there that the Peloponnesian ships were to be paid by Tissaphernes “according to the agreement” until the King’s ships should arrive, and the implication therefrom that he had been doing so since the prior agreement on pay, i.e., 8.37.4.

\textsuperscript{48} It also, as pointed out by Lewis ([1977] 106 n.95; cf. Andrewes, \textit{HCT} v.80 ad 8.37.4, μεταπεµψαµένου βασιλέως), modified the earlier clause on pay, in that the final treaty withdrew the theoretical possibility left by the second treaty (37.4) that the King may send for more Peloponnesian ships.

\textsuperscript{49} It should be noted that it is only in the case of 8.58.5 that Andrewes thinks one of the treaties is “referring outside itself” (“to ξυγκείµαινα which must have been negotiated earlier and separately”) (\textit{HCT} v.143); and that Lévy, in an examination of the use of the terms ξυονθηκαι and ξυγκείµαινα to describe the three treaties, goes outside the context of the three treaties to explain the meaning of these terms only to explain the use of ξυγκείµαινα at 8.58.5: see (1983) 228 n.68. It should also be noted in respect of this question that Thucydides uses the terms ξυονθηκαι and ξυγκείµαινα in book 8 to denote only the three treaties between the Spartans and the Persians (Lévy [1983] 228), and no other agreement between them (such as those reached on rates of pay at 8.5.5 and 8.29.1-2).
an earlier agreement at 8.37.4 assigning responsibility for the pay of the Peloponnesian fleet to the Persian.\textsuperscript{50}

\begin{quote}
\textit{iv. The inclusion of clauses apportioning responsibility for pay in the second and third treaties; and the reason why rates of pay were not included in these treaties}
\end{quote}

The clauses of 8.58.5-6, then, represent a series of linked provisions outlining how the expenses of the joint Peloponnesian-Persian campaign against the Athenians were to be shared between the requesting (Persian) and summoned (Peloponnesian) states from the time of the third treaty onwards. They are a comprehensible development on a similar clause in the second treaty between the Spartans and the Persians. Thus, there is no need for the assumption that there is an allusion to an agreement on a rate of pay in the words “κατὰ τὰ ἡγεσίμενα” at 8.58.5. So why have so many scholars assumed that these words must be referring to a previously agreed rate of pay? The beginning of an answer to this question emerges from an examination of Edmond Lévy’s treatment of the clauses on pay in the second and third treaties.

Lévy, writing on 8.58.4-7, rejected the view that 8.58.5-6 could be referring to the second treaty.\textsuperscript{51}

\begin{flushright}
Jusque-là [the arrival of the royal fleet] Tissapherne entretiendra la flotte actuellement présente selon les dispositions convenues (κατὰ τὰ ἡγεσίμενα). II
\end{flushright}

\textsuperscript{50} Krüger ([1858-61] II.2.137) in his comments on 8.58.5 and, in particular, on “κατὰ τὰ ἡγεσίμενα,” already noted that this phrase referred back to the second treaty: “[n]ach dem mit Theramenes geschlossenen Vertrage. (Ds.) Wohl nur allgemein mit Bezug auf 8.37.3 [sic]: τὴν δαπάνην βασιλέα παρέχειν.” But, as I have shown (see n.2 above), Krüger is in a minority of one on this question and his interpretation of 8.58.5-6 has had no influence on subsequent readings of this clause and the formation of the scholarly consensus on the proper interpretation of 8.58.5, so that a full argumentation for the view that 8.58.5 is referring back to 8.37.4 is still called for here.

\textsuperscript{51} He is the only scholar in the debate on the content and goals of the three treaties to explicitly do so.
paraît difficile de voir dans cette dernière expression une simple allusion au fait que la chose avait déjà été décidée, ne serait-ce que dans le deuxième accord. Il faut plutôt supposer qu’on s’était mis d’accord sur les modalités de financement (solde journalière, nombre d’hommes à payer, etc.), modalités qui avaient déjà suscité de nombreux conflits. S’il en est bien ainsi, on ne sait à quelles conventions précises fait allusion le texte.  

Lévy, then, rejected the view that “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” could refer to 8.37.4 on the grounds that such a reference would be too obvious (“une simple allusion”); the implication must be—and I think it is safe to say this without misrepresenting Lévy’s intentions here—that Lévy thought that if the phrase “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” referred simply to a clause delimiting responsibility for payment of the Peloponnesian ships, it would be otiose—the phrase needed (“il faut plutôt supposer”) to refer to something else to be of enough importance to warrant inclusion in the third treaty.

But certain developments in the relationship between Tissaphernes and the Spartans in the time between the second and third treaties had the consequence that a clause in the third treaty apportioning responsibility for the pay of the Peloponnesian fleet was in no way redundant. In the period between the making of the second and third treaties, the issue of who was to pay for the Peloponnesian fleet was a live one. The eleven Spartan ξύµβουλοι who had been sent out to act as advisers to Astyochus (the Spartan commander of the Peloponnesian fleet) had, on meeting with Tissaphernes at Cnidos to discuss the terms of the first two treaties with the Persian (8.43.2), rejected the terms of those treaties, and renounced any claim to receive pay from Tissaphernes

52 (1983) 236.

53 I take this clause to be what Lévy is referring to in his allusion to “le deuxième accord” in the passage just quoted.

54 See 8.39.2.
Having refused to observe the terms of the first two treaties, and thus broken with Tissaphernes—who had left the conference with the Spartans in a rage without having settled anything (8.43.4)—the Spartans had then attempted to provide pay for the Peloponnesian fleet from the resources of their allies (and without asking Tissaphernes for money). Although the Peloponnesians were able to levy thirty-two talents from the Rhodians (8.44.4), and still presumably had some money remaining from the sack of Iasus (8.36.1), their attempt to self-finance the fleet’s pay was a failure; within a couple of months, there was no longer any money for the pay of the men of the fleet (8.57.1). It was, in fact, precisely this lack of pay that caused Tissaphernes to approach the Spartans again towards the end of the winter of 412/411. Afraid that their lack of money might force the Peloponnesians to fight a possibly unsuccessful naval battle against the Athenians, or to desert their ships—in either case destroying the balance between the two warring sides that he was striving for (see esp. 8.46.5)—or that it might force them to plunder his territory in search of money (8.57.1), Tissaphernes supplied the Peloponnesians with pay and concluded a third treaty with them (8.57.2).

With these events in mind, one can see why the clause on pay in the second treaty assigning responsibility for payment for the Peloponnesian ships to Tissaphernes was

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55 Lichas, one of the Spartan ἄξυμβουλοι, rejecting the territorial provisions of the first two treaties “urged that another and better treaty be concluded; at any rate, the Spartans would not abide by this, nor did they need [Tissaphernes’] pay at all upon such terms” (“ἐτίθησας ὑπὸ ἱκάλευ ἑλτίους σπένδεσθαι, ἡταύταις γε οὐ χρήσεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῆς τροφῆς ἐπὶ τούτοις δεῖσθαι οὐδὲν”) (8.43.4).

56 See 8.44.1: the Spartans “thought that they would be able by themselves to maintain their fleet, on the basis of the existing alliance, without asking Tissaphernes for money (“... ἰὴρομενοι αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἐμμακριας δυναιτο θεοθα, Τισσαφερνη μὴ αἰτιοῦτες χρήματα, τεθεὶν τάς γαλις”).

57 Andrewes, HCT v.137 ad 8.57.1, τροφήν τε παρέχειν.
reaffirmed in the third treaty, and why it was necessary that it be reaffirmed. The break in relations with Tissaphernes between the second and third treaties, the refusal to observe the terms of the first two treaties, and the Peloponnesian attempt at self-financing in the months before the conclusion of the third treaty, taken together, had the result that Persian responsibility for paying the Peloponnesian fleet could not be taken for granted in any new treaty between the Spartans and the Persians and that any prior undertaking by Tissaphernes to pay the Peloponnesians had to be reconfirmed. The phrase “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” does make sense, therefore, on its own terms, as “une simple allusion” back to 8.37.4.58

Lévy, as noted above,59 also thought that 8.37.4 did not “do enough” in itself to merit inclusion in the second treaty. This sense, that the clause on pay at 8.37.4 is in some way lacking, is present, too, in other treatments by scholars who believe that “τὰ ξυγκειµένα” at 8.58.5 refer to a rate of pay. Thus, Kallet states of the clause on pay in the second treaty that “a rate of pay is conspicuously absent” from it.60 Although there is no mention of a rate of pay at 8.37.4, Andrewes found a reference to a rate of pay at 8.37.3, and that clause’s allowance for later negotiations and unforeseen circumstances,61 although there was no explicit reason or positive evidence for this interpretation of 8.37.3

58 Lévy was also incorrect in citing Xen., Hell. 1.5.5 in relation to the question of the meaning of “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” at 8.58.5 ([1983] 236 n.122) (see above pp.675-676 n.3).

59 See p.683 n.29.

60 (2001) 257.

61 See Andrewes, HCT v.80 ad locc. See also HCT v.82: “[t]he king’s obligations to maintain the Peloponnesian fleet is now recognized, even if the terms remain unclear.”
(based, as it was, on the assumption that 8.58.5 is a back reference to an agreement settling a rate of pay). Lewis commented of 8.37.4 that “hard figures are avoided” in it—the implication being that the omission of a rate of pay here was worthy of note. The assumption underlying all of these criticisms of 8.37.4 is, then, that any clause in a treaty assigning responsibility for the payment of military forces ought to include a rate of pay: as 8.37.4 does not, this has to be commented on or explained away. Although, as I have demonstrated, the clause on pay at 8.37.4 makes sense on its own terms and does not have to be explained away, I raise this point again because it is precisely the same assumption that also underlies these scholars’ and the consensus interpretation of the phrase “κατὰ τὰ ἔνγκειµένα” at 8.58.5: that a clause on pay in any treaty should refer to

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62 (1977) 94: see also n.93 there suggesting an explanation for the lack of “hard figures”: “[i]f the Peloponnesians or Hermocrates wanted to put them in, they were doubtless put off with the reminder that the King’s will was still not known on this point.”

63 Cf. Cawkwell (2005) 150: the omission of any reference to a rate of pay at 8.37.4 one of the reasons why “Thucydides must be found deficient in omitting” the matter of pay.

64 See pp.682-683 above: the military context in which the second treaty was concluded—i.e. the presence of the Peloponnesian triremes off the coast of Asia Minor and the joint operations of Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians—differed from the first. In addition, there was also, in the period just before the conclusion of the second treaty, the feeling among the Peloponnesians—despite the fact that their μισθός was being paid sufficiently at this time and that the war was well-provided for in general (8.36.1)—that the first treaty was “lacking” (“ἐνδεεῖς”), and not so much to their own interest as Tissaphernes’ (8.36.2), and so a new treaty was needed with the Persian. Thus, in order to reflect the changed military context and Spartan dissatisfaction with the first treaty, the provisions of this second treaty were framed to make them, in contrast to the first treaty, “formally reciprocal” (Andrewes, HCT v.82), and 8.37.4 and its provision for Persian payment of the Peloponnesian ships was included in the second treaty. (Kallet ([2001] 256) writes that the Spartans saw the first treaty as wanting because it did not include any provision for pay—in opposition to Andrewes who thought “ἐνδεεῖς” to be “a question of... politics” (HCT v.79). But the second treaty improved the Spartan position both financially and politically: one should not see this in ‘either... or’ terms. That said, 8.37.4 is, as Hornblower states ad loc. (CT iii.856), “the main respect in which, from the Peloponnesian point of view, treaty (2) is an improvement on treaty (1)...”)
a rate of pay, and therefore that the clause in the third treaty assigning responsibility for the pay of the Peloponnesian ships should specify a rate of pay.\textsuperscript{65}

But the assumption that either of the clauses in the second and third treaties between the Spartans and the Persians ought to have specified the rates of pay to be distributed to the Peloponnesian ships ignores the fact that rates of pay for the Peloponnesian ships had already been agreed or set before these treaties, and thus did not need to be mentioned in them.\textsuperscript{66} At the beginning of the winter of 412/11, an agreement was reached between Tissaphernes and the Spartans whereby the Tissaphernes distributed a month’s pay at an Attic drachma a day per man and promised for the future to pay at a rate of a little over three obols per day per man (and that he would give a drachma again if the King so ordered) (8.29.1-2);\textsuperscript{67} this agreement was still in force when the second treaty between the Persians and the Spartans was concluded in the same winter (at some point before the solstice of 412 recorded at 8.39.1); the rate of pay for the Peloponnesian ships was not a matter of controversy and therefore there was no reason to include it in that treaty. At some undeterminable point in the same winter, after the second treaty but

\textsuperscript{65} Although evidence for this belief does not emerge explicitly in treatments of 8.58.5—though it lurks there silently in the unspoken assumptions underlying those treatments—it can be seen in the comments on 8.37.4 noted just above, and from the fact that 8.58.5 has not attracted the same criticism or comments as 8.37.4—because of the assumption that it includes a reference to a rate of pay.

\textsuperscript{66} Note also that while provisions in classical and Hellenistic treaties detailing how the expenses of any potential campaign(s) were to be shared among summoning and summoned states very often did specify rates of pay for the military force summoned to provide military aid to its treaty partner (see examples in Garlan (1977) 150-158, esp., e.g., 5.47.6 (cf. chapter 5 section iv)), they sometimes did not (cf., e.g., ML 42 (although fragmentary, it appears that no rate of pay is mentioned here); SEG 28.461 (with discussion at appendix 5 section ii); Garlan [1977] 154 n.1).

\textsuperscript{67} See again p.676 n.5.
before the third treaty, Tissaphernes (on Alcibiades’s advice) unilaterally cut the pay of
the Peloponnesian sailors to three obols per man per day (8.45.2); this rate was agreed
with the trierarchs and generals of the Peloponnesian fleet (except the Syracusans)
(8.45.3), although, in the aftermath of the reduction, Alcibiades promised that the
Peloponnesians would get their full drachma (rather than three obols) per day again when
money arrived from the King (8.45.6). That a drachma per day was thought of as their
proper and full pay by the Peloponnesians can be seen by the Peloponnesians’ claims for
it later in the same winter (8.50.2). Again, then, the rate of pay for the Peloponnesian
triremes had been the subject of updated agreements and detailed announcements before
the third treaty: the rate of one drachma per day was acknowledged by both sides; it was
Tissaphernes’ failure to pay this rate that was the cause of dispute and controversy
between the two sides and not the rate itself; again, therefore, there was no need to
include a rate of pay in the third treaty. Again, there is no need to search for a rate of
pay at 8.37.4 or 8.58.5: therefore the assumption underlying the scholarly consensus on
the phrase “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” at 8.58.5 has no basis and should be rejected.

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68 See chapter 6 section iv for discussion of this point, and for the rest of the paragraph.

69 The Spartan advisors’ renunciation of financial aid from Tissaphernes took place at some point after
8.50.2 and the Peloponnesian claims for their full drachma: see 8.50.2 with 8.41.1 together with 8.52 and
8.43.2. But the question of the Peloponnesian trireme crews’ rate of pay did not feature in the Spartan
advisors’ disputes with Tissaphernes, or as a reason for their brief break with him: regarding pay, the sole
issue at hand in their dispute with the satrap was the question of who would provide it for the
Peloponnesian triremes. There was, then, no change in or controversy regarding the Peloponnesians’
expected rate of pay between 8.50.2 and the time of the third treaty.

70 And with this assumption gone, nor is there a basis any longer for the linked assumption that 8.58.5
refers to a previously agreed rate of pay that had been approved by the King prior to the treaty. To
demonstrate this fully will require extensive quotation of the main adherents to this view. Andrewes, in his
commentary (HCT v.142) ad Τισσαφέρνη παρέχειν, stated: “[Tissaphernes] is naturally the agent, but the
text does not make it clear whether or not the money was the king’s. The money brought to Sparta or
promised there at 5.5-6.2 was presumably the satraps’ own, and at 45.6 Tissaphernes was still paying out of
his own resources, but hoped for money from the king. Now there appears to be an agreement about this...,
v. Conclusion

If one no longer looks through the distorting lenses of the assumption that 8.58.5-6 is referring to a prior agreement between Tissaphernes and the Spartans on a rate of pay, but instead considers 8.58.5 within its proper context, then Thucydides’ presentation of all issues regarding the pay of the Peloponnesian trireme crews in book 8 become clear, complete and comprehensible. Since 8.58.5 does not refer to any agreement on a rate of pay, but simply apportions responsibility for payment of the Peloponnesian ships present in the theater of operations to Tissaphernes, and there is no other indication of a change in the rate of pay offered to the Peloponnesians after the machinations described at 8.45.2 and 8.45.6, we can take it therefore that there was no change in the rate of pay, or rather the expected rate of pay, between the events described at 8.29.1, 8.45.6, and 8.50.3, when Thucydides used the term \( \mu\sigma\delta\omicron\acute{o} \ \varepsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota} \zeta \) (or variations thereof) to refer to a rate of pay of one drachma per man per day that the Peloponnesian sailors expected to be disbursed to them, and those described at 8.78 and 8.83.2-3, when the Peloponnesians were complaining that they were not receiving their \( \mu\sigma\delta\omicron\acute{o} \ \varepsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota} \zeta \) from Tissaphernes:

and it is likely enough that the king had now taken over the expense.” Following on from this, in his comments ([1981] 142) ad \( \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha} \ \xi\gamma\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota} \mu\acute{e} \zeta \), Andrewes continued (as noted above: see p.677): “at 29.1, 45.6, the king had not yet ruled on the rate of pay; by now he has done so, but the fact is not yet noted in its place by Thucydides.” Lewis ([1977] 104) thought along the same lines as Andrewes: “[t]he question of the rate of pay had been referred to the King (29.1); it has now evidently been settled (58.5), though we are not told on what terms.” Hornblower’s interpretation of 8.58.5 and “\( \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha} \ \xi\gamma\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota} \mu\acute{e} \zeta \)” is also dependent on the idea of the King’s subsequent approval of a rate pay agreed previously by Tissaphernes with the Spartans (see pp.677-678 above). But, as I have shown, there is also no reason to assume that 8.58.5-6 is evidence for the King’s approval of a previous agreement on a rate of pay for the Peloponnesian sailors; this assumption is based on the baseless assumption that 8.58.5 refers to a prior agreement between Tissaphernes and the Spartans on a rate of pay; there is also no reason to assume, nor any evidence, that the King gave his approval to a rate of pay agreed by Tissaphernes with the Peloponnesian fleet prior to the third treaty. In addition, contra Andrewes, it is nowhere explicitly stated at 8.58.5-6 that the money to be disbursed by Tissaphernes will come from the King (see Kallet [2001] 266); this is simply assumption. These arguments hold even if one does accept Lewis’ arguments ([1977] 104) that there is external evidence indicating that the King participated in the drafting of the treaty.
i.e. the “full pay” referred to as not being paid at 8.78 and 8.83.2-3 still meant the “full drachma” of 8.29.1 and 8.45.6. The Peloponnesian sailors were still, then, in the summer of 411, expecting a rate of pay of one drachma per day per man, but were receiving less: they were almost certainly receiving only three obols per day at this time (see 8.45.2, 6) (and that irregularly). Despite their complaints and their unwillingness to serve for less than the expected rate of a drachma a day, it seems that the men serving in the Peloponnesian fleet had, in the absence of the Athenians’ capability to pay any more than three obols, soon to become accustomed to such a rate from the Persians in the early years of the Ionian War; this at least is what is implied by the agreement reached in the winter of 408/7 by the Spartans and the King that the latter should pay only three obols per day per man to the Peloponnesians (see Xen., Hell. 1.5.5 with pp.675-676 n.3 above). But one should note that, even in 407, the Spartans could still propose a rate of pay of one drachma per man per day to Cyrus, who had recently come down to the coast to take charge of Persian affairs in Asia Minor, for the sailors of the Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean (Xen., Hell. 1.5.4). The expectation of one drachma per man per day, no matter how hopeless it had now become in reality, was slow to die.

71 Consider also the fact that the desertion from the Athenian fleet on the eventual rise in pay of the Peloponnesian fleet to four from three obols is presented as a (potential) new development in the war: see chapter 5 section iii.
Appendix 7: Figures for Proceeds from the Sale of Plunder in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.E.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Victor</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From Description</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simonides 170</td>
<td>Victor</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>Carthage (Himera)</td>
<td>6,400 T²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plut., Arist. 20.3</td>
<td>Greeks/Plataeans</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>Persians (Plataea)</td>
<td>(At least) 80 T³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thucy. 6.62.4, Diod. 13.3.1</td>
<td>Athenians (Nicias)</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>Hyccara</td>
<td>120 T (Th), 100 T (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thucy. 6.95</td>
<td>Argos</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>Thyreatis</td>
<td>25 T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Lys.] 20.24</td>
<td>Son of Polystratus</td>
<td>Probably 412 (definitely before 410)⁴</td>
<td>Catane</td>
<td>300 minae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xen., H.G. 3.4.24</td>
<td>Agesilaos</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>Tissaphernes</td>
<td>More than 70 T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xen., H.G. 4.3.21</td>
<td>Agesilaos</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>Asia Minor</td>
<td>1,000 T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diod. 15.14.4</td>
<td>Dionysios</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>Agylle</td>
<td>500 T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. 20.77</td>
<td>Chabrias</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>Spartans</td>
<td>110 T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diod. 15.47.7</td>
<td>Iphicrates⁵</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>Syracusans</td>
<td>More than 60 T⁶</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Pritchett’s table of specific figures for booty ([1971] 75-76) contains several inaccuracies and some sums of money that were raised from exactions and raids on temples rather than from the proceeds of sales of plunder. T=talents.

2 This poem is an inscription on a tripod stating that Gelo, Hiero, Polyzalus, and Thrasybulus dedicated four tripods at Delphi out of fifty talents and a hundred litres of gold, being a tithe of the tithe of their victory over the Carthaginians. Multiplying by one hundred to get the total amount of the booty, one arrives at the sum of six thousand and four hundred talents.

3 On the proposal of Cleocritus the Corinthian, the Plataeans were awarded for the prize for valour, and eighty talents of the spoils were accordingly set aside for them, with which money they, as Plutarch tells us, “rebuilt the sanctuary of Athena, set up the shrine and decorated the temple with frescoes which have remained in perfect condition to this day.”

4 See pp.109-110 n.240 for the date.

5 Timotheus is wrongly included by Diodorus.

6 Diodorus writes that Timotheus (see previous note) and Iphicrates captured nine Syracusan triremes attempting to provide aid to the Spartans at Corcyra and sold their crews for more than sixty talents. Xenophon (Hell. 6.2.35-36), however, writes that the captured Syracusan crews were ransomed (and does...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nepos, <em>Tim.</em> 1</th>
<th>Timotheus</th>
<th>365</th>
<th>Cotys (Thrace)</th>
<th>1,200 T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philochorus</td>
<td>Philip</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>Merchant ships to Athens under the protection of Chares</td>
<td>700 T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Diod. 17.14.4 | Alexander | 335/4 | Thebans | 440 T |

not provide a figure for the proceeds of their ransom). The brief account of the episode at Polyænus, *Strateg.* 3.9.55 mentions neither sale nor ransom of captives.

7 See pp.497-498 n.168 for discussion of this figure.

8 Diodoros states that the 440 talents were the proceeds of the sale of the thirty thousand captives taken in the capture of the city. Cleitarchus mentions the same figure, but applies it to the total wealth found in the city (Athenæus, 4.148D-F; *FGrH 137 F* 1).