# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 3

I. Introduction 4

II. Ancient Historiography 10

III. Western Historiography between the ‘50s and the ‘70s 26

IV. Korean Historiography between the ‘70s and the ‘90s 54

V. The Interview with the Korean Historians 71

VI. Conclusion 78

VII. Bibliography 80
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the West, Greco-Roman studies are commonly called classical studies, but not in the East. Europeans, the heirs to Greco-Roman civilization, affixed the modifier “classical” in admiration for their mother culture, but Asians equally had their own version of classical literature, art, philosophy, and history. Nevertheless, Greco-Roman studies attracted Asians in the Far East who live farthest from Greco-Roman influence and who inherited neither its linguistic nor cultural legacy. It entered Asia in the 19th century. When Europeans and Americans intruded into Asia in the 19th century, they brought not only the Bible and opium but also their pedagogy. Seeing that European/American education begins from Greco-Roman studies, Asian intellectuals who tried to learn from Europeans and adopt their culture developed interests in these studies as well. To avoid confusion with their own classical studies, they preferred the name Greco-Roman studies, which I shall use as well for the same reason. Among Greco-Roman studies in East Asia, this thesis will focus on South Korean studies of Roman history, particularly of Tiberius Gracchus’ agrarian reform. Yet, before we arrive at the moment when Korean scholars took up this topic, let us briefly browse Korean historiography of Roman history.

Compared to the Chinese and Japanese, Koreans were latecomers to Greco-Roman studies. While Great Britain and the Untied States respectively infiltrated China and Japan with a strong commitment to open trade barriers, or to semi-colonize, Korea functioned as a buffer between the two superpowers and remained relatively free of foreign intrusion. Therefore Koreans encountered fewer Westerners and knew less of their culture. Neither Chinese nor Japanese interfered much with Korean affairs, since they were busy confronting foreigners with white skin, blond hair, and blue eyes. Only after Japan occupied Korea by force in 1910, Koreans came into full-scale contact with the Western culture: more Europeans and Americans
missionaries crossed Korean borders through Japan; Japanese entrepreneurs who wore tuxedos and listened to jazz came to Korea and constructed domed buildings and railways; and Korean intellectuals who hoped to surpass the Japanese went to Japan and learned Western technology and culture. Then Koreans first encountered Greco-Roman studies. In Japan, between the late 19th century and the early 20th century, the National Seven Universities, or commonly called Former Imperial Universities, were being recently built on the model of the Western collegiate system to cultivate modernized/Westernized scholarship, and there many Korean literati became acquainted with Western academic studies, including Greco-Roman studies.

Nonetheless, this did not lead Koreans to create an independent academy of Greco-Roman studies. During this time, Japanese exclaimed that “Japan and Korea are one,”1 the slogan of its policy of cultural genocide.2 They hoped to uproot Korean identity and implant Japanese one. With threats of disfranchisement and torture, Japanese compelled Koreans to participate in Shinto rituals3, to change names to Japanese, to speak Japanese in everyday life, and to study Japanese history. Education above all, and language and history above all other academic disciplines, were most severely controlled, because their disciplines were considered the root of Korean identity. Japan reduced all Korean universities to vocational colleges except Keijo Imperial University, a Korean branch of Japanese Imperial Universities,4 and forced them to teach little literature, philosophy, or history and more applied chemistry, commerce, or manufacturing; Korean professors who objected to both Japanese occupation and education policy were replaced with Japanese professors; Japanese colonial government confiscated and burned Korean history books and banned Korean language in schools. Then, remaining Korean

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1 内鮮一体 (naisen-ittai), 내선일체 (naesun-ilche).
2 The term “cultural genocide” is not my invention but is commonly used (perhaps, except in Japan).
3 Japanese indigenous religion. Many Shinto shrines are devoted to war heroes, harvest, etc. Unlike Buddhism, Hinduism, or other religion originated in the East, this did not disseminate outside Japan.
4 After Korean independence, it became Seoul National University.
academics had all they could do to preserve Korean language and history and had little opportunity to pursue foreign Greco-Roman studies. Yet, on the flip side, Greco-Roman history and Western history in general managed to survive under Japanese rule. Western historians were not blacklisted unless they made strong political statements, while Korean historians were one after another laid off, jailed, or banished. Greco-Roman scholars could not undertake independent research or publish their studies but read what they kept in their hands and taught what they had learned before.  

In 1945, Korea gained independence from Japan. Defeated in the World War II, Japan declared unconditional surrender to the Allied force and withdrew from all her colonies. Thereupon, many exiled intellectuals returned to Korea and academic interests seemed to recover. However, tragedies struck Korea. Korea was severed by two Cold-war superpowers, North and South Koreas respectively under the Soviet and American trusteeship. Soon, Korea became a battleground for the proxy war. The Korean War broke out in 1950 and devastated the country until the 1953 ceasefire. Only after then, academic activities resumed. Under American influence, South Korean leaders reconstructed and elevated colleges that had been repressed during the Japanese rule, creating them in their present forms; the major ones are Seoul National University, Yonsei University, and Korea University. It was only then that Korean academia of Greco-Roman studies first came into being. Although the subject was still new to Koreans, it now claimed a certain place in Korean universities; though not substantial, it was not negligible either. Because the new South Korean regime modeled reconstruction after its patron United States, American influence dominated the new academic system, even to the extent of influencing curriculum and perspective. To Koreans, Greco-Roman studies were the study of the origin of

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their model civilization and, thus, became an obligatory coursework for their modernization and Westernization.

A handful of scholars developed serious interests in various fields of Greco-Roman studies: philosophy, literature, art, and history, although history came rather late in comparison to the other humanities. The first to take up Greco-Roman history was Cho, Eui-Sul (1906-1978), one of the intellectuals to study in Japan during Japanese occupation period, there studied Western history in Tohoku University, one of the National Seven Universities, in Japan (1935 – 1938), went back to Korea to teach Western history at Yonsei University (1939 – 1971), and studied as a visiting scholar at University of Minnesota and Harvard University (1953 – 1954). He focused on Greek history but also studied Western history broadly, and in order to encourage the development of untrodden field in 1957, he founded the Korean Society for Western History.6

Roman historians *per se* came a generation after Cho, Eui-Sul. Once he had sired a general overview of Western history and convinced others that the subject was worth studying, succeeding historians laid cornerstones for the study of Roman history. Unlike the preceding scholars, they studied in Korea; the trend of studying in Japan had waned after Independence, and the Korean universities were rebuilt after the Korean War. Chi, Dong-Sik (1928 – 2004) obtained his master’s degree in history from Korean University and his doctoral degree from Dankook University and worked as a history professor first at Dankook University and later at Korea University; Hoe, Seung-II (1940 – present) obtained both his master’s and doctoral degrees from Seoul National University. He worked as a history professor at Konkok University for a while and returned to Seoul National University as history education professor; Kim,  

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6 His publications on general Western history include *Introduction to Western History* (1950), and *Western Cultural History* (1964). Also, he compiled *the Encyclopedia of World History* (1976).
Kyung-Hyun (1957 – present), a student of Chi, Dong-Sik, obtained his master’s degree from Seoul National University and his doctoral degree from Korea University, worked at Dankook University, and is now working at Korea University.

It was these pioneers of Roman history who picked up the Gracchi agrarian reform. Although they took over the job of surveying Roman history and tried to touch upon various topics, they all showed interests in the Gracchi reform. It grabbed the interest of many historians, produced academic communications, and became the first theme of Roman history in Korea from the 1970s to the 1990s. Why did they become interested particularly in the Gracchi reform? How did they study it, and what did they argue about it? These are the question that this thesis will answer, but I will not focus on the entire Gracchi reform. Both Tiberius (elder) and Gaius (younger) Gracchus’, attempted to promote social and economic rights of non-Senate classes. Since Gaius Gracchus’ reform came a decade after his elder brother’s reform and subsequent death, and since specific contents and aims of their reforms differed, ancient and modern Western historians as well as Korea historians have divided the Gracchi reform for both chronological and thematic convenience into two phases: Tiberius Gracchus’ reform in 133 BC and Gaius Gracchus’ reform in 122 BC. Korean scholars studied both, yet in general their attention moved from Tiberius’ reform to Gaius’ reform. It is reasonable that they began with the first reformer and ended with the second. Because I am principally interested in why and how Korean historians took up the Gracchi reform, I will concentrate on Tiberius Gracchus’ reform, because that is where the story had its origin.

In order to investigate the Korean historiography, I will not analyze the Korean studies alone but rather follow the steps that the Korean historians took to study the reform: from ancient

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sources to modern Western studies, finally to the Korean studies. In the following second chapter, I will examine the ancient sources, focusing on Livy, Plutarch, and Appian, and argue that they recorded Tiberius Gracchus’ reform in a partisan tradition. In the third chapter, I will examine how the Western scholars working between the 1950’s and the 1970’s treated Tiberius Gracchus reform; it was their works that Korean scholars used. I will analyze how these Western scholars detached themselves from the partisanship of the ancient sources and reinterpreted the reform through either socioeconomic or prosopographical methodology. The fourth chapter will discuss the Korean studies written between the 1970’s and the 1990’s. There I will introduce the socioeconomic and prosopographical methods that Koreans borrowed from the West and explain how the Korean scholars used these tools in their analyses. In the final chapter, I will offer an explanation of how Korean historians came to study Tiberius Gracchus’ reform: I will draw in their personal histories, obtained through interviews, to propose that to study Tiberius Gracchus’ reform was taken up during 1970’s – 1980’s in part of a broader interest in studying revolutionary moments and social reforms in the past.
II. Ancient Historiography

Modern historians have to rely on the stories given by ancient historians, whether they agree or disagree with them, because few other sources survive. There are, to be sure, some ancient architecture, paintings, inscriptions, and letters, but they give only incomplete narratives of the whole. Instead, the histories written by ancient historians can provide modern historians with principal plots of Roman history. Modern historians are aware of this fundamental limit and tried to bring back ancient Rome more accurately with the aids of modern tools, such as archeological technologies and economic, sociological models. Thus, even though they extracted the basic storyline from ancient historians, modern historians are able to write different histories by applying modern methodologies; they exposed evidences that were probably familiar to ancient audiences but hidden from modern audiences by incorporating archeological remains or census statistics; they shed new lights on Rome by focusing on neglected provinces of the Roman Republic/Empire. The relationship of modern historians to ancient historians is thus not simple: modern historians relied on ancient historians, while at the same time worked against ancient historians, extending or refuting their ideas. My focus here, however, is not to delve into this relationship. Instead, it is enough for my purpose to point out that these two groups of historians worked in different time settings, with different aims, under different influences. Their historical writings were, thus, in different historical traditions and demand separate investigation.

Before we discuss the historiography, it merits reviewing the history of reform itself. First, let us take a look at what Rome was like in the late 2nd century BC. Because Tiberius Gracchus tried to cure what he recognized as social ills, an understanding of the society should precede that of the reform. In the 2nd century BC, Rome arose from one of many powerful states in the Mediterranean world to a superpower: she de facto subjected Southern Gaul in the North, Carthage in the South, Greece in the East, and Spain in the West. Although there remained
occasional campaigns to subdue rebellions and solidify Roman hegemony, there were no more conquests as popular and glorious as in the previous centuries. With external concerns removed, however, internal problems surfaced, especially the social and economic unrest. Senators amassed war booties through foreign conquests, raked in money through proconsulships, and invested their wealth in *latifundia* where numerous military-exempt slaves toiled. Moreover, they now delighted themselves with Greek culture, such as Stoic philosophy and Greek luxurious ornaments. In fact, many Greek intellectuals flowed into Rome and taught philosophy and rhetoric to Roman aristocratic youths, including Tiberius Gracchus. At the other end of the society, however, the common people wandered landless. Many arm-bearing citizens died out from continuous foreign campaigns; families without paterfamilias helplessly lost their land to patricians who appropriated it through coercions; surviving citizens, coming back from foreign campaigns, found that their land had been either extorted by the rich or devastated by Hannibal; once landholding citizens were devastated by warfare. Nor could they lead lives as wage-laborers on big estates, because landlords used slaves who would never be dragged off to wars. Paupers increased, while the small farmers who epitomized the diligent and moderate Roman ideal, at the same time, comprised the Roman citizen army slowly disappeared. As a whole, patricians sank into decadence, while plebians sank into poverty.

Rome was in danger. In fact, the first attempt at reform, though withdrawn shortly in the face of oppositions, came from the most conservative section of the society. In 140 BC, Gaius Laelius, an *optimas*, proposed a land reform and Scipio Aemilianus, the leader of *optimates*,

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8 Proconsuls are governors for Roman provinces, appointed among consular rank senators by the Senate. They enjoyed vast authority with little checks, so they often extorted money from provincial population through various ways. It was almost a customary way of getting rich among senators.
9 Plantation. It was a slavery-intensive farming in a big scale. Senators directed most of their wealth to latifundia, because land and agriculture was the only noble source of income appropriate for their class.
10 During the Second Punic War, or the Hannibalic War (218 – 202 BC), Hannibal succeeded in marching through Italy and devastated the Italian land, which had been secure for centuries despite Romans’ constant warfare.
supported it.\textsuperscript{11} Even though the proposal was taken back, it attests that the situation was so grave as to move big landholders themselves to reform. Furthermore, the Sicilian Slave Revolt in 135 – 132 BC aggravated the situation. \textit{Latifundia} heavily dominated Sicily, and, thus, so did the slave population. Then, these slaves working in \textit{latifundia} rebelled at once and defeated a couple of Roman generals. They terrified Romans. It took Scipio Aemilianus, the best commander of the time, to quell the revolts. This compelled Romans to rethink the \textit{latifundia}; is it right to let treacherous slaves brought from overseas farm the land which had belonged to industrious Italian farmers?\textsuperscript{12} No doubt something was wrong in Rome.

It was Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, a young man in his late 20s, who finally enacted a land reform, \textit{lex Sempronia Agraria}, in 133 BC. Let us save the discussion of his motives for historiographical sections, since historians have debated about it for centuries. Here are dry facts of the event about which historians are agreed. Tiberius Gracchus was a member of traditional Roman aristocracy. By birth, he was connected to the Scipioni, and by marriage, to the Claudii, the two most prestigious gentes of Rome.\textsuperscript{13} As expected for Roman aristocrats, he mastered rhetoric and followed the \textit{cursus honorum}: he was a military tribune during the Third Punic War (149 – 146 BC) and a quaestor in Numantia in 137 BC. And, in 133 BC, the year of Appius Claudius Pulcher’ consulship, he was elected a tribune, the spokesperson of the plebians. As soon as his term began, he presented his land bill directly to the Plebeian Council. His land bill fundamentally renewed a dead law, \textit{lex Licinia Sextia} of 387 BC, with a few modifications: (1) it

\textsuperscript{11} Plutarch. \textit{Tiberius Gracchus}. 8.4; details about Laelius’ reform are lost.
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Latifundia} farming required many slaves, so slave demands were high. Local slaves were not enough to meet the demands, and landholders usually bought slaves brought from overseas.
\textsuperscript{13} His maternal grandfather was Scipio Africanus, the defeater of Hannibal; his cousin and brother-in-law was Scipio Aemilianus, the conqueror of Carthage; his father-in-law was Appius Claudius Pulcher.
\textsuperscript{14} The course of honorable public offices.
caps the occupation of the *ager publicus*\(^{15}\) up to 1,000 *iugera*\(^{16}\) (500 *iugera* for one person and 250 *iugera* for each son), (2) redistributes the confiscated land, 30 *iugera* to each poor family, (3) dictates that newly distributed land is inalienable, (4) commissions three men to oversee procedures.

Tiberius Gracchus’ motion instantly plunged Rome into an unprecedented turmoil. The senators mostly who profited from their land protested fiercely, whereas the poor excitedly gathered from countryside to vote for the land redistribution. Having anticipated the senators’ opposition, Tiberius brought the bill directly to the Plebian Council for a vote. This transgressed the custom, which was to present drafts to the Senate first and to bring approved ones to the council for a vote. Tiberius’ maneuver disempowered the senators and, worse, provoked them. They coaxed Marcus Octavius, Tiberius’ co-tribune, to veto the bill. Obstructed by the veto, Tiberius deposed his co-tribune. Tribuneship, the mouthpiece of the plebians, was not only inviolable by law but also sacred in Roman thought, but Tiberius convinced people that a tribune who did not stand for the interest of the people was not sacred any longer and eventually passed the law. But the worst was yet to come. The senators, being deprived of lawful means to counter Tiberius, resorted to violence. Violence in the city escalated: street fights were daily scenes; backstreet gangs overtly allied with politicians; and poisoned corpses were discovered. Tiberius saw that his life was in danger and sought safety in another year of tribunal sacrosanctity, in vain.

On the election day, a group of senators led by Scipio Nasica\(^{17}\) clubbed Tiberius Gracchus and

\(^{15}\) Literally, public land. Mostly it was the land that Rome confiscated from the conquered Italian communities during the 4\(^{th}\) – 3\(^{rd}\) centuries and leased to Roman colonists in Italy with a rent for a short or long-term tenure. It was a state-owned tool to Romanize Italy. Technically, the state could resume the land at its pleasure.

\(^{16}\) Approximately 250 hectare.

\(^{17}\) Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio (183 – 132 BC). He was a grandson of Scipio Africanus and a cousin of Scipio Aemilianus and Tiberius Gracchus. In 141 BC, he became *Pontifex Maximus*, the highest lifelong priest. After murdering Tiberius Gracchus, he fled to Pergamon, although *Pontifex Maximus* must not leave Rome.
his followers to death. They threw away the corpses into the Tiber River. This was the first bloodshed in Rome that happened in public.

Now, let us take a look at the ancient historiography regarding Tiberius Gracchus’ agrarian reform. Unfortunately not many historical writings on this period survive. Those preserved include Titus Livy’s *History of Rome*, Vellius Paterculus’ *Roman History*, Valerius Maximus’ *Nine books of Memorable Deeds and Sayings*, Plutarch’s *Lives of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus*, Appian’s *Civil Wars*, Dio Cassius’ *Roman History*, listed chronologically. Among these, Livy, Plutarch, and Appian are essential for understanding the Gracchi reform: Livy is the earliest surviving source, and Plutarch and Appian give the most detailed narratives of the Gracchi reform. In fact, to be precise, Plutarch and Appian are the most crucial, because the part of the Gracchi reform in Livy’ work was lost. However, for the reason to be explained later, I will include Livy in our study. As to other historians, they refer Livy’s annals considerably and do not deviate considerably from Livy’s account. Therefore, the study of three ancient writings will suffice our purpose here.

The first among the surviving sources to put down Tiberius Gracchus’ reform is Titus Livy (59 BC – 17 AD). During Augustan reign, he composed his magnum opus, *Ab urbe condita libri* (*History of Rome*), which extensively chronicles Roman history from the mythical foundation of Rome by Aeneas to the death of Drusus in 9 BC. Out of the original 142 books, only 35 books (1-10 and 21-45) survive, and the part of the Gracchi reform is lost. However, we have the *Periochae*, a 4th century summary of the whole work by an unknown author. The *Periocha* of book 58 contains Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. The narrative is accordingly compressed: it is good enough to learn the simplest plot but insufficient to thoroughly appreciate

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18 Son of Tiberius C. Nero and Livia Drusilla, stepson of Augustus, and younger brother of Tiberius (the 2nd Roman emperor) Tib.
its causes, development, and consequences of the reform. Yet, *Periocha* succeeds in transcribing Livy’s position concerning Tiberius Gracchus’ reform and enables us modern readers to glimpse into the way Livy originally depicted the event.

The Periocha of book 58 begins as follows:

“Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, a tribune of the commons, carried a land law against the desire/will of the of the Senate and the equestrian order, to the effect that no one should occupy more than a thousand acres of public land; Gracchus then went so insane as to remove from office by special enactment his colleague Marcus Octavius, who was supporting the other side of the controversy; Gracchus also had himself, his brother Gaius Gracchus, and Appius Claudius father-in-law elected as the board of three in charge of distributing land.”

Livy, or the summarizer, portrays Tiberius as a zealot. According to him, Tiberius pressed the ratification of an agrarian law to redistribute land against the reasonable nobles. Then, out of irrational fury, he crossed the border of sanity, deposing a legally elected tribune while appointing his family members as commissioners. The emphasis is on “*adversus voluntatem senatus et equestris ordinis.*” Livy asserts that the nobles opposed the law even before informing readers of the law’s content and giving them a chance to consider the reform by themselves. All that mattered to him is that: the reform was against the will of the senators and the equestrians, period. Livy does not mention whether there was an economic hardship, whether plebians cried for land redistribution, or how the proposal of agrarian reform was received by plebians. His

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point is that: just from seeing that the nobles opposed the law, it was clearly improper and irrational of Tiberius to keep pushing the reform.

Another striking expression is “in eum furorem exarsit.” Livy conjures up a Tiberius who blazed with madness. Even to the modern readers who do not have knowledge of ancient Rome, Tiberius already seems to have lost his control. In Latin, the image is even stronger. The verb *ardeō*, compounded with an intensifier *ex* in this case, means to be on fire, to burn, to blaze. It was frequently used to describe someone who ‘burns’ with love, hatred, jealousy, or anger and loses reason on account of these emotions. This quality, yielding reason to emotion, was particularly abominable to the Roman elites who always championed *temperantia, aequitas, prudentia* as Roman virtues. To attribute such a character to a political opponent was a useful as well as common rhetorical strategy. For example, Cicero also brings up the same image of fire against his targets, Catiline and his followers: “...*quos maximo furore et scelere esse inflammatos*...” Although these words were descriptive in appearance, they were in essence a political statement. Livy, likewise, through a short description, expresses his sides against Tiberius.

There is a clearer evidence that Livy opposes Tiberius. Livy represents Tiberius nearly as a demagogue: “...*cum minus agri esset quam quod dividit sine offensa etiam plebis...eos ad cupiditatem amplum modum sperandi incitaverat*...” This records the moment when Tiberius insisted that the land which Rome inherited from king Attalus should be included in the redistribution plan. According to Livy, plebians had remained temperate at first not asking more than their appropriate share of land. With this piece of information, he discredits Tiberius’ claim that Tiberius was responding to the needs of the plebians (Tiberius’ claim was not recorded in

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20 Cic. Catil. 3.2: …those who are inflamed with the greatest madness and wickedness…  
21 …when there was less land than could be divided up without incurring the hostility of the commons…Gracchus had stirred them (plebians) up to be greedy enough to hope for a large amount...
Livy’s text, for he did not write Tiberius’ side of story) and concludes that Tiberius roused the moderate people to turn greedy. Tiberius was thus the opposite of an ideal Roman elite who should instruct and discipline people to follow the right direction. In fact, Livy regards him as more than just an irritator. Since he stirred the people into a greedy mob out of his own ambition—not to benefit the people, but to advance his popularity—he showed signs of turning into a demagogue. This representation of Tiberius is significant, because it matches with the claim of his murderers that he, having gained popularity, dared to be a king and, therefore, was a great threat to the Republic. Livy gives only the Senate’s side of the story as if it were an orthodox truth and does not even bother to record Tiberius’ heretical claim. Thus, even though we do not have Livy’s own text, the summaries we do have make it clear that Livy shares the sentiments of the senators.

Plutarch of Chaeronea, the 1st century Greek historian and biographer (46 – 120 AD) chronicles the flip side of the story. His record of Tiberius Gracchus comes from his series of biographies of noble Greeks and Romans, Parallel Lives. He chooses the genre of biography instead of history and naturally inclines to eulogize his objects of study. In fact, he makes it clear that he does not attempt to evaluate their deeds as historians or moralists in this piece but focuses on revealing their superior personalities: “For it is not Histories that I am writing, but Lives; and in the most illustrious deeds there is not always a manifestation of virtue or vice, nay, a slight thing like a phrase or a jest often makes a greater revelation of character than battles where thousands fall, or the greatest armaments, or sieges of cities.”

22 οὕτω γάρ ἱστορίας γράφομεν, ἀλλὰ βίοις, οὕτω ταῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις πράξεις πάντως ἑνεστὶ ὁμολογίας ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας, ἀλλὰ πράξεως βραχύ πολλάκις καὶ ρήμα καὶ παιδιὰ τις ἐμφανίσει ἢθως ἐποίησε μᾶλλον ἡ μάχαι μορίας καὶ παρατάξεις αἰ μέγισται καὶ πολιορκίαι πόλεων; Plutarch, Alexander and Caesar, I. 2. Translation by Bernadotte Perrin.
Plutarch recounts moments of his life that betrayed the personality and then defends his noble character.

It is to Plutarch’s credit that details of Tiberius’ life as well as his agrarian reform are transmitted to us. As it becomes biography, he covers Tiberius’ short life most extensively from a disciplined and courageous youth to his ambitious tribuneship and tragic death. Until he reaches the point of Tiberius’ public life and his agrarian reform, Plutarch recites anecdotes and sayings of Tiberius’ contemporaries that bring back his personality. From his adolescence, according to Plutarch, Tiberius was distinguished: his virtue earned him a favorable reputation among the elites and also his wife from the prominent Claudii. Plutarch builds up Tiberius’ character as noble, gentle, sincere, reasonable, energetic young man. By no means, was Tiberius contentious: he preferred plain language; he chose words carefully; his words were conciliatory and agreeable; he was a forceful but not a provocative orator.

Tiberius’ plan for land redistribution, according to Plutarch, was a product of Tiberius’ such prudent and thoughtful character. Indeed, before giving his own conclusion, Plutarch presents a couple of views on what could have motivated Tiberius Gracchus: 1) encouragements from his Greek teachers and his mother, Cornelia, 2) political rivalry with Spurius Postumius, 3) economic hardship of the people which Tiberius witnessed on his way to Numantia, as written by his brother, Gaius Gracchus. Plutarch ultimately believes in Tiberius’ sincerity: Tiberius took his action because he pitied the people’s grievances. Plutarch reenacts the scene where Tiberius gave a speech for the agrarian reform as follows: “Such words as these,

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23 Diophanes the rhetorician and Blossius the philosopher. Some argue that these Stoicism and Greek idea of freedom that they taught to Tiberius was influential in his proposal of land reform.
24 Cornelia was renowned for her care towards children. After the early death of her husband, she refused a marriage proposal from Ptolemy, the ruler of Egypt, and reared her children alone.
25 According to Plutarch, Spurius Postumius was the same age with Tiberius and a rival as an advocate.
26 In Plutarch, it appears as βιβλίον. It literally means ‘book,’ but Bernadotte Perin translated it as ‘pamphlet’ and added a footnote that it probably was a political pamphlet in a form of letter. But scholars argue about identifying this βιβλίον and translating the word properly.
the product of a lofty spirit and genuine feeling, and falling upon the ears of a people profoundly moved and fully aroused to the speaker’s support, no adversary of Tiberius could successfully withstand.”

Without a slightest doubt, Plutarch upholds that Tiberius wholeheartedly endeavored after ἐπανορθώσεως, rectification of the evil. He supports his claim about Tiberius’ genuineness not only by insisting on his noble personality, manifested in his past, but also by explaining how miserable the small farmers’ lives were at that time. In other words, when one considers Tiberius’ nature and severe poverty at the same time, one cannot doubt his intention. Still, when Plutarch lists the defamatory accusations of Tiberius’ motives, he acknowledges that some regarded Tiberius radical and reckless. He also argues, however, that Tiberius’ course of action was, in fact, well-meditated and cautious, just as Tiberius always was. He supplements the names of the eminent men of the City from whom Tiberius took counsels for the proposal: Crassus the pontifex maximus, Mucius Scaevola the jurist, and Appius Claudius the consul of the year. These prominent elites ensured Tiberius that his reform programme would be acceptable to the senators and would be duly ratified, and this, in turn, assured Plutarch that Tiberius did not proceed rashly. In short, Tiberius sympathized with the poor, decided to take some measures for them, and carefully drafted a reform programme with the most reasonable and respected senior senators.

Plutarch admits that there were elements of passion, provocation, and political rivalry—towards the end of Tiberius’ life. His narrative, nonetheless, carries a forgiving tone. As Tiberius’ heroic term in tribuneship, which guaranteed him inviolability by law, was coming to the end,

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27 Τούτους ἀπὸ φρονήματος μεράλοι καὶ πάθους ἀληθινοὶ τοῖς λόγοις κατιόντας εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἐνθουσιῶντα καὶ συνεξανιστάμενοι οὐδεὶς ἔφιστατο τῶν ἐναντίων; Plutarch, Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, X.1. Translation by Bernadotte Perrin.

28 Literal definition is restoration, rectification, correction. In the context, Plutarch uses the word to say: rectifying the evil, the evil of land scarcity and economic hardship. The word conveys that there was wrong and damage in Rome and calls for reparation. It signals that Plutarch assented Tiberius’ reform programme to cure Rome of its illness.
the vicious opponents threatened to take away his breath. He sought safety in people’s protection and announced popular measures to secure people’s unfailing support: first, he called for the land from king Attalus to be distributed to the people; later, he ran for another year of tribuneship with a series of new reformist laws. Even in the eyes of Plutarch, Tiberius neither conceived these proposals with purely noble motives nor took cautions against exacerbating the tension. Still, Plutarch suggests that Tiberius was helpless. He does not relate how a friend of Tiberius was poisoned to death and how it frightened Tiberius without a reason. He sympathized with Tiberius. While he recognizes the faults on Tiberius’ side, he understands how Tiberius was pressured to become radical. Of driving Tiberius into fury in the first place, he accuses the greedy patricians:

“…the men of wealth and substance, however, were led by their greed to hate the law and by their wrath and contentiousness to hate the law-giver, and tried to dissuade the people by alleging that Tiberius was introducing a re-distribution of land for the confusion of the body politic, and was stirring up a general revolution.”

The way Plutarch treats Tiberius’ anger is contrary to the way Livy does. According to Livy, Tiberius was already consumed by his passion and lost his reason before the opponents reacted. In fact, Livy does not even bother to elaborate their opinions besides “adversus voluntatem senatus et equestris ordinis” and focuses on Tiberius’ irrational revolutionary actions. In contrast, Plutarch argues that the rich landholders’ greed infuriated Tiberius. They tried to hold on to their land by every means, even illegal and violent, so Tiberius had to take his next accordant steps to make the land law passed as well as to save his life.

29. ...οἱ δὲ πλούσιοι καὶ κτηματικοὶ πλούσιοι τῶν νόμων, ὡς δὲ καὶ φιλονεικία τῶν νομοθέτων δι᾽ ἐργίνος ἐροτεσίας, ἐπεχέρισαν ἀποτρέπειν τὸν δῆμον, ὡς γῆς ἀναδασμὸν ἐπὶ συγχώρει τῆς πολιτείας ἐλάχιστος τῷ Τιβερίῳ καὶ πάντα πράγματα κινοῦσιν; Plutarch, Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, IX. 3. Translation by Bernadotte Perrin.
Concerning the death of Tiberius Gracchus, Plutarch also contradicts Livy. Livy sanctions the murderers’ accounts that Tiberius demanded a crown for himself. Plutarch not only denies this allegation but twists the incident to exemplify how faithful ally of the people Tiberius was. On the day of his murder, Plutarch says, there were many portents, such as birds not flying, his toenail broken, a raven throwing stone at his foot. Even when some of Tiberius’ friends cautioned him not to go out to the forum, Tiberius did not hesitate to respond to the people who waited for him and plead for his action on their behalf. Plutarch’s portrait of Tiberius is: Tiberius was such a noble man that he did not risk his own safety for the people’s sake. As for Scipio Nasica and his followers’ assertion that Tiberius gestured to ask for a crown at the forum, he simply ridicules. It was an SOS from Tiberius, but the perpetrators who were waiting for a cue to retaliate against him intentionally misinterpreted the gesture to excuse for their murder. This was how Tiberius fell victim to the first civil bloodshed of Rome. As a whole, Plutarch elevates him from the demagogue described by Livy to a tragic reformist.

Appian of Alexandria (95 – 165 AD), the 2nd century Greek historian, was the next to leave a surviving record of Tiberius Gracchus. Compared to Plutarch, he writes history proper. He reproduces the history of Rome from the time of mythical Aeneas to that of Trajan in 24 books of Roman History, of which only a few books and fragments survive. Among 24 books, 5 books (book 13 – 17), completely preserved, cover the period from the Gracchi to Augustus and is entitled the Civil Wars; this contains the history of Tiberius Gracchus and his reform. Yet, before investigating what Appian writes specifically about Tiberius, it is vital to know what program he has in mind for his entire project, here, the Civil Wars. He writes the events from 133 BC to 35 BC in chronological manner, while he does not comprehend them simply in the same chronological manner. First, he has a particular theme, the civil wars. He does not record every
event that happened during that period, as Livy’s annalistic history does. Rather, he sets his focus on civil strifes and creates a narrative along that focus; because he believes that these moments of civil strife allowed a critical lens for understanding broader Roman history. Instead of examining what really happened and exposing what he found before the readers, with more hindsight as a 2nd century historian he contemplates the deeper significance: what consequences these events eventually brought. In short, he follows the Thucydidian tradition of writing annalitical history\textsuperscript{30}, not the annalistic tradition which was predominant in Rome. Secondly, therefore, to Appian, the civil wars were not meaningful \textit{per se}. He chooses them, since he discovered something profound beneath the brutal reality of the civil wars—through the theological perspective. The civil wars directed Rome to her ultimate destination: the Republic began to fall down, Rome suffered from ceaseless civil wars, and finally these ushered her to present Imperial monarchy. This is the reason why he places the civil wars as the centerpieces of the late Republican era.

After one grasps Appian’s general scheme for the \textit{Civil Wars}, the place Appian assignes Tiberius Gracchus becomes apparent. Succeeding the Thucydidian tradition in which every element contributes to the central argument, he structures his narrative which can effectively build up to his main idea and consciously made a decision that the story of Tiberius should start his narrative of the civil wars. If the civil wars signaled and, at the same time, conduced the fall of the Republic, Tiberius’ reform pointed to its beginning. Plutarch already acknowledged that the murder of Tiberius Gracchus was the first public bloodshed of Rome and mourned that it disrupted the Republican respect and order from then on. Nevertheless, he has more to add on regarding what this murder of a public official fundamentally signified: by triggering the fall of the Republic, it opened the gate for the Roman Empire. He weaves the story of Tiberius

Gracchus in order to present his historical insight, whereas Livy and Plutarch gave their narratives and then made it clear with whom they sided, either the Senate or Tiberius.

Having his own interpretative frame, Appian approaches Tiberius Gracchus’ reform differently. He stresses how it tore down the Republican peace and order. The first passage of the Civil Wars sets the scene of the ancient peaceful and harmonious Republic where feuds between the Senate and the people existed, yet were overcome through moderation and restraint. Right next to it, he juxtaposes a contrasting scene of chaotic Rome where everyone carried a dagger to the forum, powerful men conspired and instigated revolts, seeking to be the sole leaders of Rome, and the armies marched into the city. This transition began during the time of Tiberius Gracchus. However, he does not blame Tiberius alone, nor the senators alone. Unlike Livy and Plutarch, he is impartial to both parties. To be precise, he tries harder not to take any side than to know who was right and wrong. He offers both sides’ versions and finds that both had their internal logics as well as faults: Tiberius had the good intention of propping up small-farmer population by redistributing public land but violated the sacred tribuneship by deposing Octavius during the process; it is understandable that the rich Senate who had tilled and sowed those public land as their own and had regarded as their financial assets for decades resisted the reform, but they still prioritized their wealth before the wellbeing of people and the Republic. He does not judge whether one side was more just than the other as Livy and Plutarch do. Rather, he aggregates each side’ conflicting voices into the City’s mayhem:

“There was a sudden shout from those who knew of it, and violence followed. Some of the partisans of Gracchus took position around him like bodyguards. Others, having girded up their cloaks, seized the fasces and staves in the hands of the lictors and broke them in pieces. They drove the rich out of the assembly with
such disorder and wounds that the tribunes fled from their places in terror, and the
priests closed the doors of the temple…”

Appian’s conclusion on the Tiberius Gracchus, following this passage, is most peculiar. He
wonders why Romans did not appoint a dictator when the entire City fell into anarchy. This final
word captures his major concern: it was not about whether Tiberius was reasonable or the rich
senators were greedy, but that the Republican system, sustained by the cooperation of SPQR,
did not function properly any longer.

The ancient historians whom we have discussed wrote during different time periods, in
different historical traditions, with different purposes. Thus, to cluster them into a single group
is neither possible nor does it do justice to each work’s value. However, limited to the subject of
Tiberius Gracchus and his land reform, I attempt to identify a few common characteristics to
facilitate relating ancient historiography against modern. First, Tiberius’ agrarian reform plunged
Rome into unprecedented violence and wrecked Roman harmony. It fortified the bipartisan
division between optimates and populares and between the rich and the poor. Livy mentions the
former and Plutarch the latter but analyses asides to their narratives, whereas Appian delves
further into this aspect and devlelops it into his overarching theory. Secondly, to depose Octavius
from tribuneship was imprudent of Tiberius. Though there is a difference in tone between the
historians according to how they interpreted his earlier actions, the deposition was a flat violation
of constitution, the tribunal sacrosanctity. By violating it, Tiberius afterwards, regardless of what
he truly intended, came to have a stronger revolutionary shade than a reformist. Thirdly, they

31 καὶ βοὴς ἀφ' Ἱοράννη ἁγιούς τῶν συνειδότων γενομένης στείρες τι ἦσαν ἥδη τό ἀπὸ τοῦδε, καὶ τὸν Γρακχείων οἱ μὲν αὐτὸν ἐφίλαττον οἰα τινες δορυφόροι, οἱ δὲ τὰ ἱμάτια διαξωσάμενοι, ῥάβδους καὶ ξύλα τὰ ἐν χερσὶ τῶν υπηρετῶν ἀρπάσαντες τε καὶ διακάλασσαντες ἐς πόλλα, τοὺς πολιοῦσίος ἐξήλαυνον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, σὸν τοσοῦτον ταράχω καὶ τραύμασιν, σος τοὺς τε δημάχους δέσαντας διαφορέαν ἐκ μέσου, καὶ τὸν νεὼν τοὺς ἱερέας ἐπικλησα...; Appian, Civil Wars, I. 15. Translation by Horace White.
32 Senatus Populusque Romanus; the Senate and the People of Rome.
take sides, except Appian. Appian is aloof to the inside stories of party politics: he is interested in the stream of history which this party politics ultimately lead to. Livy and Plutarch articulate their stance. Livy supports the Senate’s causes and Plutarch Tiberius’; Livy reckons Tiberius as a potential demagogue and Plutarch a considerate reformist. Tiberius was either a destroyer or a savior of the Roman Republic.
III. Western Historiography between the ‘50s and the ‘70s

Tiberius Gracchus’ agrarian reform has been a subject of perennial controversy ever since first proposed in 133 B.C. up to the present day. Just as the ancient historians contested about whether he sought after the ἐπανορθώσεως or the regnum, modern historians debated likewise. However, the discussion became more diversified and complicated. The obvious reason is that the modern historians had the advantage of perspective. The ancient historians had been tangled in the Gracchi reform in one way or another: they allied themselves with a certain factions, which had been handed down from the time of Gracchus up to their own, or they relied on factionist sources. As we have seen above, they turned out to be partisan sources in the eyes of the modern scholars. In contrast, the modern historians who were detached from the ancient power struggle were able to assess Tiberius Gracchus without a, or at least with a less, jaundiced eye. Besides, they had the benefit of more hindsight and a bird’s-eye view to Roman history. They also had the help of modern social science. The ancient historical traditions had annalistic history (ex. Livy, Tacitus), political history (ex. Thucydides), and universal history (ex. Diodorus). Although universal history embraced the subfields of social, economic, cultural, gender history, it inevitably lacked profound analyses for each aspect. From the 20th century, the relatively recent development of social science branches, such as economics, sociology, geography, psychology, encouraged historians to apply the social scientific models to reinterpret history. In ancient history, admittedly there was a fundamental limit to sources or data to apply these new models, but this new fashion of history still opened a new phase to many historical queries. Tiberius Gracchus’ reform, one of the most controversial topics in Roman history, was

33 Rectification of the evil.
34 Kingdom.
35 The historians who followed the Livian tradition of supporting optimates include Vellius Paterculus, Valerius Maximus, and Dio Cassius. The opposite side had Sallust; he did not write about the Gracchi reform but left a few praising words for them.
certainly revisited, and the modern historians succeeded in shedding new lights through the latest approaches.

Modern western literature on Tiberius Gracchus and his reform became richer, and its historiography became no less long and complicated than the reform itself. Though knowledge of the entire modern western historiography would be ideal for comprehending the Korean historiography, it would demand much more space and time than the main subject of this thesis allows. Thus, here I will limit myself to overviewing the most important period that gave critical influence to the Korean historians: from the ‘50s to the ‘70s. It was roughly, then, from the 40’s works on the late Republican period, which begins from the time of the Gracchi, proliferated in the West. E. Badian noted significant progresses on this period and published a historiographical survey in 1962, *From the Gracchi to Sulla* (1940 – 59). Among the late Republican topics, Tiberius Gracchus’ reform was most popular. Not only numerous journal articles but also many monographs on it were published. John M. Riddle’s book, *Tiberius Gracchus: Destroyer or Reformer of the Republic?* in 1970, mirrors the fervent discussion: he compiles 2 ancient and 18 major modern studies on Tiberius Gracchus and ushers readers to the rich modern literature. Nonetheless, a few works from the previous decades also occasionally appear among this literature, including the canonical works of great historians like Theodor Mommsen, Michael I. Rostovtzeff, and Ronald Syme, for they too continued to stimulate later Western historians as well as Korean historians.

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Between the ‘50s and the ‘70s, two popular kinds of methodologies competed against each other among scholars studying Roman history: socioeconomics and prosopography. Earlier historians in fact adopted these two approaches as well: they investigated census statistics, soldiers’ wage, and archeological remains along with genealogy, marital connections, and political career. Not employing one approach predominantly over another, they preferred switching between the two and producing a balanced overview. However, historians from the ‘50s sharpened their arguments by exhaustively pursuing one methodology. The old dispute over Tiberius Gracchus’ intention thus continued, but here the basis of dispute was methodological, not political, as it had been when Livy and the others were writing. To be sure, there were differences among the historians using the same methodology, but in general the binary holds.

Social history—what I am characterizing by socioeconomic methodology—was in fashion from the early 20th century. It swept throughout the academia of history regardless of the field division, and Roman history was no exception. In 1926 Michael I. Rostovtzeff (1870–1952), a Russian-born emigrant scholar to the United States, published a groundbreaking piece, *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*. For the first, he spreads out photographs of ancient plates, mural paintings, and architectural plans in front of the readers. He does not enumerate when emperors passed this and that laws or waged campaigns at obscure frontiers but pictured the real life of Rome where merchants traded at agoras, slaves picked olives in latifundia, and wealthy aristocrats reclined in their suburban villas. Arnaldo Momigliano, a classical historian and historiographer, recalls his first reading of Rostovtzeff’s work: he almost magically “guided [readers] through the streets of Rome, Pompeii, Nîmes, and Trèves and showed how the ancients had lived.”39 Surely Rostovtzeff did not accomplish this all by himself.

Though Russian emphasis on agrarian and labor history could have influenced him to take socioeconomic perspective, a school of social and economic history in classical history was also expanding in Europe around Karl Julius Beloch (1854 – 1929) and Gaetano De Sanctis (1870 – 1957). Decades before Rostovtzeff’s Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire, Beloch already undertook demographic studies of classical antiquity and in 1886 published his achievements into a volume, Die Bevölkerung der Griechisch-Römischen Welt (The Population of Greco-Roman World). In the time of Beloch, unfortunately, his studies had not received as much attention as it did decades later, since a dominant school of Theodor Mommsen scorned it as an ill-founded number game. However, later students of socioeconomic history not only redeemed the value of his works but also promoted socioeconomic approach to Roman history.

Socioeconomic history flowered throughout from the ‘50s to the ‘70s, and so did it in the field of classical history. After historians of the first half of the 20th century first cast socioeconomic outlook on classical history and proposed to reexamine ancient societies through it, those of the second half of the 20th century based on the achievements of their predecessors advanced socioeconomic studies. A tour de force came out in 1973: Moses I. Finley (1912 – 1986, American/British historian)’s The Ancient Economy. He dissects the economic structure of ancient Mediterranean world overarching from 1,000 BC to 500 AD but focusing on classical periods of Greece and Rome (Greece 5th – 4th century BC; Rome 1st – 2nd century AD). He proclaims that he does not make a new discovery about the ancient economy but amplifies predecessors’ work with more details. His methodology was, however, revolutionary: he studies the ancient economy sociologically. He rejects applying modern tools of economics to the ancient society. In 1960s Robert Fogel’s “new economy history,” econometric history, pushed

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historians toward number fetishism, even ancient historians. However, Finley agrees with Max Weber and Karl Polanyi, the sociologists, that a market-centered analysis is inapplicable to the ancient world. It is an anachronism; because the ancients did not run households and states with any modern economic ideas, say, rational choice, opportunity cost, labor force, maximization of profits, or economies of scale. One should view the ancient economy within its particular context, in other words in the mind of the ancients. It does not mean that he claims to see through their mind as if a psychoanalyst. From the ancient writings, he points out that what governed the ancients’ economic behavior were social status, customs, and ethics.

His sociological approach is manifest at a glance. The chapters of his book include: Orders and Status, Masters and Slaves, Landlords and Peasants, Town and Country. He identifies social groups which at the same time constituted economic hierarchies, probes their economic ethics through literary sources, such as Xenophon’s *Oikonomikos* and Varro’s *De Re Rustica*, and examines how the ancients conducted economic affairs according to such ethics and established them as norms (they did not make economic choices, according to Finley, because social status, ethics, and norms prescribed economic activities for them). Looking into the ancients’ both conceptual philosophies and real-life reactions toward wealth, profit, slavery, labor, land, he significantly revises and improves modern understanding of the ancient economy. He did not investigate the Gracchi reform *per se*, mentioning it only a few times as an example or an exception. Still, his reappraisal of the ancient economy carries weight upon our historiographical studies on the Gracchi reform. It impacted the entire field of classical history and influenced the thoughts of many historians, including those who studied the Gracchi reform in both the West and Korea.

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42 Both are about how one should manage his household and estates. A loose but modern counterpart is Protestant ethic, which Finley also mentions.
Finley’s analyses of ancient slavery and peasantry, which are more relevant to the Gracchi reform than other topics, are worth discussing here. In essence, he overturns modern people’s intuition that free peasants were above slaves in socioeconomic hierarchy (as aforesaid, it was not a completely new idea in the scholarship, but Finely reaffirms it with many examples). In fact, slaves were sometimes better off. They had all but legal freedom. They were at least fed (some masters, like Cato, gave slaves more food than average peasants could have\(^{43}\)); were guaranteed protection from dispossession, harsh debt laws, military service; were encouraged to work hard and save private possessions through peculium\(^{44}\); and even shared some of their masters’ prerogatives.\(^{45}\) Eumaeus, a favorite slave of Odysseus, was an example of well-off slaves. Albeit an extreme case, Finley’s point in offering this example was valid: slaves could surpass average citizens to various degrees: “the swineherd Eumaeus a slave, but [he] had a more secure place in the world thanks to his attachment to an oikos, a princely household, an attachment more meaningful, more valuable, than the status of being juridically free, of not being owned by someone.”\(^{46}\) The hopeless weaker were free peasants. They had legal freedom but their freedom that gave them no protection against poor harvests, land exploitations, military levies, and harsh debt laws. “The freer the ancient peasant…the more precarious his position.”\(^{47}\)

Finley supplies additional crucial background about land. Since Tiberius Gracchus’ reform called for redistribution of land, it is important to understand how land was treated in scholarship. It has long been understood that land was the most privileged and dominant type of

\(^{44}\) Literally, pocket-money. Slaves were legally prohibited from holding possessions, but masters gave slaves money with which slaves managed masters’ business for them. Slaves were allowed to save some of profits they made through their work and were encouraged to buy freedom with it. *De jure* it was masters’ money, *de facto* slaves’.
\(^{45}\) Slaves who worked for the nobles and most of all for emperors had higher social statuses than average Romans. Moreover, slaves working in prestigious workshops, such as Arrentine terra sigillata workshops, had more privilege than free nameless craftsmen.
\(^{46}\) Finley, *The Ancient Economy*, 66.
\(^{47}\) Finley, *The Ancient Economy*, 108.
wealth in the ancient world and that land was the foremost determinant of politics. Nonetheless, in the 50’s – 70’s, the emphasis on labor and urban economy, typical of socioeconomic historians of this period, influenced some ancient historians, notably Henry C. Boren, to turn their attention from traditional agrarian issues to urban industrial ones. Finley brought the focus back to land. He asserts that land—in the ancient mind—was the ultimate good in respect to both wealth and morality. It was universal. Senators were essentially big landlords, although they also headed some part-time businesses such as moneylending, trading, or practicing law. Agriculture only behooved their honestas, pietas, and diligentia and, therefore, was a status signifier. In fact, not all the rich could rise up to the Senate, but only those rich by means of land were morally qualified. Moreover, it was a safe investment that made them feel financially secure to concentrate on politics. Hence, they wanted more and more land. The passage where Finley cites an ancient writing clarifies the point.

“With respect to property”, wrote the author of the first book of the pseudo-Aristotelian Oikonomikos (1343a25-b2), “the first care is that it be according to nature. Agriculture ranks first according to nature, second those arts that extract from the ground, such as mining and the like. Agriculture is the best because it is just, for it is not at the expense of others, whether willingly as in trade or wage-earning or unwillingly as in war. It is also one of the activities according to nature in other respects, because by nature all things receive their nourishment from their mother, and so men receive theirs from the earth.” There is more to this painfully naïve restatement of good Aristotelian doctrine but I need not continue. It is also
good Cato, and good Cicero. It is, in short, one of many formulations of the landowning ideology of the ancient upper class.\textsuperscript{48}

The same held among the less fortunate. For the same philosophical reason that agriculture is noble, farmers were higher in class hierarchy than craftsmen, shopkeepers, moneylenders, or doctors. Consequently they also wanted land. All hungered for land.

Now, let us turn to studies directly addressing Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. Historians who made distinguished achievements on the socioeconomic aspects of the reform include Peter A. Brunt (British, 1917 – 2005), Henry C. Boren (American, 1921 – present), Gianfranco Tibiletti (Italian, 1924 – 1976), and Claude Nicolet (French, 1930 – 2010). Their queries begin by asking what moved a man of the upper class to risk a reform. They all conclude that the severe socioeconomic crises were crucial and unanimously concluded that Tiberius Gracchus truly endeavored to remedy the ills. Still, there is a disagreement: whether it was an agrarian or urban crisis that spurred Tiberius Gracchus. The debate is broached by Boren. Introducing urban crisis as a principal cause of the reform, he challenges the traditional views maintained from the time of Theodor Mommsen: he argued that the land crisis was the trigger, as described in the ancient literary sources. Brunt and Nicolet, in reply, uphold the traditional interpretations and oppose Boren’s proposal, although they acknowledge his contribution to enriching the knowledge of socioeconomic crises. Tibiletti is also a supporter of the thesis about agrarian crisis, but his studies, preceding this debate, addresses a slightly different and more specific subject, \textit{ager publicus}. Although he died before the debate took off, he left preeminent works that were revisited by both his contemporary and succeeding historians.

To begin with conventional interpretations will help our understanding. Claude Nicolet and Peter A. Brunt wrote exemplary socioeconomic analyses of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform,

\textsuperscript{48} Finley, \textit{The Ancient Economy}, 122.
respectively in Les Gracques ou crise agraire et révolution à Rome (The Gracchi or Agrarian Crisis and Revolution in Rome) and Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic.49 First, Claude Nicolet’s Les Gracques is a concise and lucid compendium on the Gracchi, in effect a summary of all the discussions in modern scholarship. However he devotes many pages to the agrarian crisis, going all the way back to the 3rd century BC expansionist period when Romans had returned, victoriously and rich with booties, from wars in Hellenistic kingdoms, a time when wars were a business. By setting the scene at the time of Rome’s prosperity, he highlights the abrupt impoverishment after the Hannibalic War (218 – 202 BC). Romans now fought not in foreign land but in their homeland, not for war spoils but for their own lives. The hard-won victory however stood in name only. Many citizen-farmers died in the war; many of those who survived found that the rich had appropriated their land into latifundia during the war; many of who still had their own land found it become sterile after the war and had to sell it to make a living. This war destroyed the Roman agricultural system.

Nicolet connotes the resulting agrarian problem, land dispossession and latifundia, as the tipping-point that sparked a chain of socioeconomic crises and eventually burst into a call for reform. The foremost consequence was that the number of citizen-soldiers conspicuously decreased, because many small landowning citizen-farmers, assidui, lapsed into proletarium, the lowest class which was ineligible for the military service.50 The Roman army was then short of soldiers for its heavy infantry. Nicolet thus presents the orthodox rendition of the agrarian crisis and the ensuing military crisis that had been transmitted by ancient Plutarch, Appian and the modern-day Mommsen. This does not mean, however, that he simply repeats their texts, for none

Peter A. Brunt, Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971).
50 The Roman constitution divided Roman citizens into five classes based on the property. Only citizens who possessed wealth above the minimum qualification were eligible for military service. Those who had below it, proletarii, were ineligible (except in emergent cases).
of them claims that these crises originated from the ruins of the Hannibalic War. Rather, he pulls out the agrarian problem from those sources, traces the seed of socioeconomic crises further back from the 3rd century BC, and underscores their impacts.

Peter A. Brunt also argues that the agrarian crisis drove Tiberius Gracchus. Yet, the route he takes to arrive at this conclusion is different from that of Nicolet. His argument is developed in several studies, especially Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic, and his masterpiece Italian Manpower, 225 B.C. – A.D. 14, both in 1971. In the former he rewrites the Republican history from the socioeconomic perspective and argues that “the fall of the Republic was a social revolution.” In the latter he accumulates the vast amount of demographic studies, confined to the Italian peninsula and the middle-to-late Republican period, into a seven-hundred-page volume and convincingly argues that the war “with its concomitants of conscription, confiscations, devastations, and endemic violence” determined the Italian population. It is also worth noting that Brunt worked closely with Finley; Finley was a professor at the University of Cambridge and Brunt at the University of Oxford. And, they made suggestions and criticisms for each other’s work: Finley was the general editor of Brunt’s Social Conflicts, and Brunt of Finley’s Ancient Economy. No doubt they complemented each other’s socioeconomic studies.

Nevertheless they do not make precisely identical arguments. Whereas Finley distrusts the statistics in ancient history and instead relies on the esprit de corps expressed in literary texts, Brunt accepts the census figures. Though the difficulties of applying modern statistical method to ancient statistics have discouraged many modern historians from trying such methods and help explain why Beloch’s demographic study, a prototype of Brunt’s work, has been

53 Brunt, Italian Manpower, 7.
underappreciated, Brunt deciphers the ancient numbers cautiously, matching them up with literary sources, and draws convincing conclusions. In *Social Conflicts*, he connects demographics with the Gracchi reform, illuminating how grave the socioeconomic crises were in the time of Tiberius Gracchus. According to Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus planned the reform when on his way to Numantia (in present-day Spain) he saw that much land was deserted and that a gang of slaves, not Roman citizen-farmers, farmed the land. Brunt studies the population of southern Etruria (in central Italy) where he supposes Tiberius Gracchus saw the scene, given that he took Via Aurelia, the customary route to Spain. Brunt corroborates that the impoverishment was indeed widespread in the central Italy, since both Strabo, a Greek historian and geographer, and Livy attested to it. Furthermore, he demonstrates that the southern Italy was worse. Rome confiscated a vast amount of land in southern Italy after the War and tuned it into the *ager publicus* that, in turn, resulted in *latifundia* that dominated the southern landscape. Brunt also assures, using the census data and literary sources, that *assidui* declined. Census data recorded an 8 percent decrease in population between 146 and 135 BC, and Brunt figures out that when one subtracts freed-men (manumitted slaves), whose numbers were rising at that time, from the total population, the *assidui* population fell more than 8 percent. Although he concedes that the ancient census methods were inadequate, he argues that even these insecure numbers tell a firm fact: the declining numbers made Romans think that they ran out of manpower. The depopulation anxiety was pervasive, and Romans lowered the property qualification of *assidui*, that is of military service, twice within a century. “This change is an indication that the number of *assidui* on the higher qualification was falling,” or at least considered to be falling. 

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54 Brunt professes in his book that he owes his work to Beloch; Brunt, *Italian Manpower*, 7. 
56 The years are debated, but all guesses fall between the late 3rd century and the late 2nd century. 
57 Brunt, *Italian Manpower*, 75.
Thus Brunt demonstrates the socioeconomic crises behind Tiberius Gracchus’ reform: the small farmers’ loss of land and impoverishment, the growth of *latifundia* and slave labor. And, he does not disagree with Nicolet that this crisis motivated Tiberius. But, they disagree on the deeper origin: Nicolet asserts that the agrarian crisis traces back to the agricultural devastation from the Hannibalic War, while Brunt insists on the moral decay after the War. Contending that the devastation from the War has been exaggerated since Arnold J. Toynbee’s *Hannibal’s Legacy*, he reasons that “the Hannibalic devastations could not in any event have promoted the decline of the Roman yeomanry, with which Tiberius Gracchus was at least primarily concerned, because they hardly touched the lands Roman peasants were tilling at the time.” The matter could not be of an external condition but was of morality. He turns to Sallust, a Roman moralist historian, to make his point. He cites a notorious passage where Sallust laments that, when the external enemy, Carthage, was permanently removed, Romans corrupted themselves chasing after the power and wealth, not of the Republic but of individuals. Although Sallust rigorously moralized every history, Brunt still believes that he captured the fundamental reality of Roman society:

“Sallust’ moralizing is not much to modern taste, and his idealization of old Rome is grossly exaggerated, but his ascription of the fall of the Republic to avarice and ambition is no more than a succinct formulation of what can hardly be gainsaid. The ‘avarice’ of the ruling class was reflected in the misery and discontent of the masses, of which Sallust (unlike Cicero) was keenly aware…”

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60 Gaius Sallustius Crispus (86 BC – 35 BC). He was a *popularis* and was deeply concerned with the moral decline of Rome. His works include *Bellum Catilinae (The War against Catiline)*, and *Bellum Jugurthinum (The War against Jugurtha)*, *Historiae* (Histories).
61 Brunt, *Social Conflicts*, 76.
Alluding to Sallust, Brunt claims that the senators were no longer concerned about the small landholders and avidly expanded their estates. Their greed deprived the small landholders of their land, replaced small farmers with slaves in Italy, and downgraded them, *assidui*, to *proletarii*. He furthermore approves Sallust’s judgment that Tiberius Gracchus exceptionally had a pure heart. His tone becomes political when he incorporates Sallust’ moralization of the upper class’ corruption, yet this should not distract us from noting how much weight he ascribes to the socioeconomic crises. His anger is in fact natural, because the more damaging the rich’s depravity was, the bitterer he becomes toward them.

Whether the agrarian crisis stemmed from the Hannibalic devastations or the rich’s gluttony, that the agrarian crisis was acute was a fact. Then, one question is left unanswered: if the circumstances were so dire, why did the rich still stubbornly and violently oppose Tiberius Gracchus’ reform? Or to be precise, why did his land bill *lex Agraria Sempronia*culminate in a vehement reform? Gianfranco Tibiletti found a key to the answer. 62 His approach, too, is socioeconomic. Studying the agrarian background of the crisis, particularly *ager publicus* and *latifundia*, he realizes what Tiberius Gracchus’ land bill to redistribute *ager publicus* meant to Romans. It was never seen as a renewal of the *lex Licinia Sextia* of 387 BC but as an attack against the *latifundia* and their owners, the senators. Though the contents of the *lex Agraria Sempronia* modeled that of the *lex Licinia Sextia*, Gaius Lucius Stolo, Lucius Sextius, 63 and Tiberius Gracchus proposed their laws in different contexts and with different intentions. Hugh Last made an easily understandable comparison: “…it is surely a very superficial view which would see in the Gracchan measure a mere return to the past. One might almost as well say, since in both cases a restriction was put on the speed of self-propelled road-vehicles, that when Mr.

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62 Badian, “From the Gracchi to Sulla,” 209.
63 The lawgivers of the *lex Licinia Sextia*.

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Oliver Stanley restored the speed-limit to the Statue Book in this country, and Mr. Hore-Belisha applied it, there were archaistically reviving the law of 1836, though their purposes was to protect human life whereas that of the legislators a hundred years before had been to protect the interests of the railway companies.\footnote{\textit{Hugh Last}, review of \textit{A Study of History}, by Arnold J. Toynbee, \textit{The Journal of Roman Studies} Vol. 39 (1949): 116 – 121.} The context, precisely the socioeconomic background, changes the meaning. To interpret the reform accurately and not to conflate Tiberius Gracchus’ agrarian reform with Lucius Stolo and Lucius Sextius’ land law, Tibiletti investigates the socioeconomic background, unquestionably the agrarian one in this case.

Italian scholars in the West produced especially influential agrarian studies. Badian credits Tibiletti with “the best and most important work”\footnote{\textit{Badian}, “From the Gracchi to Sulla,” 209.}: “Il possesso dell’\textit{ager publicus} e le norme \textit{de modo agrorum} sino ai Gracchi (The possession of public land and the rules about land limit up to Gracchi)” in 1948 – 9, “Ricerche di storia agraria romana (Studies on Roman agrarian history)” in 1950, and “Lo sviluppo del latifondo in Italia dall’epoca graccana al principio dell’Impero (The development of \textit{latifundia} in Italy from the time of the Gracchi to the beginning of the Empire)” in 1955.\footnote{\textit{Gianfranco Tibiletti}, “Il possesso dell’\textit{ager publicus} e le norme \textit{de modo agrorum} sino ai Gracchi” \textit{Athenaeum} N. S. 26 (1948): 173 – 236, \textit{Athenaeum} N. S. 27 (1949): 3 – 42; “Ricerche di storia agraria romana” \textit{Athenaeum} N. S. 28 (1950): 183 – 266; “Lo sviluppo del latifondo in Italia dall’epoca graccana al principio dell’Impero” X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche, Relazioni, vol. II, Sansoni, Firenze (1955): 235 – 92.} It is he who makes the \textit{ager publicus} of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century BC the keystone of the Gracchi studies. Scholars have, however, debated whether the \textit{ager publicus} was \textit{de facto} private or public land. It is indubitable that \textit{de jure} it belonged to the state. The question is how Romans dealt with it in real life. Not a few scholars, including Leandro Zancan, propose that the lessees could normally occupy \textit{ager publicus} for a long time without disruption (\textit{usucapion}) so that a holdings of labeled \textit{ager publicus} in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century BC was not precarious.
or temporary occupation but stable and sovereign ownership. Tibiletti refutes this interpretation. The holding of *ager publicus* was still a precarious occupation that the state could resume at any time. He gives as an example the redistribution of Saturnia, a Roman colony, in 183 that happened not long before Tiberius Gracchus. The state had no difficulty at all seizing the land that had been occupied for more than a generation at its will. “Therefore,” he concludes that, “the notion of the occupations’ precariousness must have been very clear and rooted even in recent age and must not have met opposition, at least up to the Gracchi.” By reassuring that Romans regarded the *ager publicus* as an insecure occupation, Tibiletti complicates interpreting Tiberius Gracchus’ reform: it followed that his bill, to redistribute the *ager publicus*, in itself likewise would not have incurred any problem.

To discover what made Tiberius Gracchus’ bill controversial, Tibiletti further delves into another socioeconomic study, the land redistribution history. The history of *ager publicus* up to the time of the Gracchi was, in short, the history of conquest and Romanization. Rome acquired most of her *ager publicus* during the expansionist period by confiscating land from the conquered Italians and leased them to Roman colonists in Italy. Scholars have already established that Romanizing the Italian peninsula drove previous land redistributions, but Tibiletti emphasizes this to make a stark contrast with the land redistribution of Tiberius Gracchus’ bill. By the time of Gracchi, the conquests were over, and Rome had emerged as a rising ruler of the Mediterranean world. There was no longer a colonial intention underway, and neither Tiberius nor the public would have understood the bill in this light. He is left with only one answer, when he takes the swarming *latifundia* and the shrinking *assisdui* into account:

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68 Dunque la nozione della precarietà dell'occupazione doveva essere ben chiara e radicata anche in età recente e non doveva incontrare opposizione, almeno sino ai Gracchi; Tibiletti, “Il possesso dell’*ager publicus*,” 28. My translation.
“Spezzare il latifondio[!] (Crush the latifundia!)”69 Accordingly he proposes that the land Tiberius Gracchus imagined to redistribute was not wild frontier from which farmers fled but fertile farms near Rome exactly where latifundia stood.

“The major difference between the agrarian politics—to be clear—of pre-Glacchan type and of Tiberius Gracchus lay in this: whereas the former was possible to obtain a profitable arrangement in far regions such as Turii, Aquileia, Monferrato, with abundance of land—and the arrangement took place without harming the interests of any one—, according to the plan of Tiberius Gracchus, the aspiring colonists could have been settled in the vicinity of their own cities and their homes: it was an important difference. Tiberius Gracchus thought that he could re-flourish the land and the population of Rome…”70

Tiberius Gracchus’ ambition would have been clearly understood: to re-empower the small farmers in place of the big landholders. Although it must have been clear to the ancient contemporaries, it is not completely reasonable to the modern students. There were precedents of land redistribution, and even Tiberius Gracchus tried, in vain, to disguise his reformatory ambition as a simple evocation of the precedent. Tibiletti makes it comprehensible to the modern audience by spelling out the Roman agrarian background.

The socioeconomic studies between the ‘50s and the ‘70s, despite some conflicts, confirm that the agrarian crisis triggered Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. Nicolet presents the ruins from the Hannibalic War, Brunt the moral dissolution after the fall of Carthage, and Tibiletti the

new agrarian circumstance different from the early colonial era as proofs. Many other scholars such as Emilio Gabba, Plinio Fraccaro, Howard Hayes Scullard, and Jérome Carcopino agree with the agrarian cause as well. However, Henry C. Boren challenges this. Taking the same socioeconomic approach, he starts with a numismatic study of the Graccchan period: “Numismatic Light on the Gracchan Crisis.” Based upon his numismatic hypothesis, he published an unprecedented narrative of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform first into an article, “The Urban Side of the Gracchan Economic Crisis,” and then expanded it in a book, The Gracchi.71 His theory, that the urban crisis overwhelmed Rome and provoked Tiberius Gracchus more critically than the agrarian crisis, impressed scholars. Badian deems it “[t]he most interesting new contribution.”72 Contemporary historians respond to his study one way or another, and the historians whom we have studied above except Tibiletti address it. Before seeing their receptions, let us first learn how Boren arrives at his conclusion.

In “Numismatic Light on the Gracchan Crisis,” Boren claims that Rome suffered from deflation and subsequent recession in the time of the Gracchi. His evidence is coin hoards. He applies the methodology of Bengt Thordeman, a numismatist who inspected the 17th and 18th century Swedish hoards, of estimating the mint coins based on the hoard coins and derives that the considerable monetary change took place: the traditional bronze as was not minted anymore and was devaluated from one tenth of silver denarius to one sixteenth. Then he calculates the effect of this onto the lives of Romans, as modern economists do. Wage-laborers bore the chief burden because they relied on cash wages. The small farmers, on the other hand, provided themselves with the subsistence farming, did not yet participate in the monetary exchange widely,

72 Badian, “From Gracchi to Sulla,” 200.
and thus escaped the economic downturn. Boren’s theory of monetary crisis is innovative. He applies modern economic analyses to the ancient Rome and proposes that Rome underwent a monetary crisis just as the modern states do.

Both Nicolet and Brunt approve his method and conclusion. Since they are aware that the considerable number of small farmers who lost their land flowed into the city and became wage-laborers, they easily accept the monetary crisis theory. Yet, Badian expresses doubts, first because numismatists do not hold Boren’s theory in consensus. He questions whether the historians can still safely stretch his numismatic analysis to historical analyses. Aside from the question of validity, the second bigger problem is an anachronism. Nicolet and Brunt acknowledge that the monetary crisis to some extent afflicted the wage-laborers in the City, but wonder how it could have engulfed the entire Republic: “the currency, in the Antiquity (at least for our period), is less an economic instrument, which would govern the production and the exchange of goods, than a political means: one mints the coin, depending on the availability of metal, for the immediate needs of the State, foremost payment to the soldiers, public works and constructions essentially.”

Scholars are even more skeptical of Boren’s claim that the monetary and urban crisis was the fundamental crisis. Boren argues that the great depression materialized into grain shortage and massive starvation. The falling monetary confidence gradually inflated the grain price, and the recent Slave Rebellion in Sicilia, where Rome obtained a significant portion of her grains, further skyrocketed it. He then takes into account the influx of the country farmers into the City and pictures the entire Rome under the famine. He corroborates it with an ancient source,

Lucilius, “Deficit alma ceres, Nec plebes pane potitur (The grain supply fails; the people cannot get bread),”\textsuperscript{74} but too readily parallelizes the ancient crisis with a modern one:

“It is true that in Rome the urban population grew apace and urban problems and urban mobs then to come to the force during the late Republic—not altogether unlike the Parisian problems and Parisian mobs during the early stages of the French Revolution.”\textsuperscript{75}

Compared to Brunt who is careful not to privilege the census statistics above more reliable evidence, “Boren,” according to Badian, “at times overstates his case and falls into the old error of supposing himself to have found the key to Ti. Gracchus’ programme (an error which, when writing carefully, he avoids).”\textsuperscript{76} Brunt himself flatly disapproves Boren’s idea as “a complete mistake.”\textsuperscript{77} Because most urban population already lost their interests and skills in farming, they neither wished to return to farming nor cared about Tiberius Gracchus’ land redistribution. Both Plutarch and Appian specify that Tiberius’ supporters were impoverished farmers from the rural countries, not starved wage-laborers from the urban streets. Thus, the urban crisis could not have in any way induced Tiberius to propose his agrarian reform. Nicolet, on the other hand, does not neglect Boren’s achievement; in fact he acknowledges it—on the condition that the agrarian crisis was the fatal cause of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform: “[t]he urban crisis should not overshadow the agrarian crisis.”\textsuperscript{78}

Among the socioeconomic historians, the controversy is whether the agrarian or the urban crisis triggered Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. They do not, on the other hand, question whether Tiberius Gracchus wholeheartedly or falseheartedly proposed the reform, a question

\textsuperscript{74} Lucilius, 5. fr. 214; Boren, The Gracchi, 44.
\textsuperscript{75} Boren, The Gracchi, 44.
\textsuperscript{76} Badian, “From Gracchi to Sulla,” 200.
\textsuperscript{77} Brunt, Social Conflicts, 79.
\textsuperscript{78} La crise agraire ne doit pas faire oublier les crises urbaines; Nicolet, Les Gracques, 101 – 102. My translation.
which had troubled the ancient historians. They concentrate on estimating the socioeconomic circumstances and all discover the severe impoverishment, whether of country farmers or of city laborers. Accordingly, they unanimously concur that Tiberius Gracchus could not have had any other motive but to save the Republic from the socioeconomic crises. In this regard, they rely on the ancient sources, primarily Plutarch. Plutarch records Gaius Gracchus’ political pamphlet that proclaimed that the poverty of the small farmers moved Tiberius Gracchus. Because Plutarch’s source was Gaius Gracchus, Tiberius’ brother and heir to the reform programme, there remains a doubt about Tiberius’ motivation. Nevertheless, they believe Plutarch’s, or Gaius’, account and conceive Tiberius as a popularist martyr.

Not all historians agree. When we broaden our scope from the socioeconomic circle to the entire scholarship between the ‘50s and the ‘70s, the major controversy returns to the age-old one: whether Tiberius Gracchus was a savior or a destroyer of the Republic. Whereas the socioeconomic historians tend towards the former conclusion, historians relying on prosopographical evidence tend toward the latter. Prosopography is in a broad sense a methodology of social history since it interprets an individual’s behavior within the context of umbrella group norms and customs. But, for our purpose I will place the prosopographical trend in opposition to the socioeconomic one, because historians who prefer the prosopographical approach toward the Gracchi question do not emphasize socioeconomic crises but propose a radically different reading of their evidence.

It has been that way ever since the prosopographical method was first used in Roman history. In 1939 Sir Ronald Syme first adopted the method for his revolutionary piece *The Roman Revolution*. Immediately upon its publication, it became a cause célèbre. Before Syme, sympathy towards Augustus dictated the British academia. Momigliano recalls that
“authoritative English scholars...[had] pushed this consensus to the point of accepting the ‘noble lies’ of ideological propaganda as both inevitable and useful.”⁷⁹ Syme, on the contrary, portrays Augustus as an ancient Hitler.⁸⁰ He contends that Augustus deliberately professed res publica restituta⁸¹, a political illusion, and premeditatedly established an empire of his own, his clique, and his clientes. For his evidence he aggregates prosopographical data: the diagrams of pedigrees, marital connections, and clientages. These connections, he insists, are a key to Roman politics; the government of Roman Republic was always oligarchic, made up of rival factions, determined the fate of Rome. Therefore, to place an individual in the right faction based on various connections is a safe way to penetrate his political agendas—to empower himself and his party. Syme’s realpolitik interpretation offers an iconoclastic portrait of Augustus and thus aroused heated discussions (fueled by the contemporary ascents of Hitler and Mussolini).

In Tiberius Gracchus: A Study in Politics, ⁸² Donald C. Earl (British, 1931 – 1996) uses a similar method to create an iconoclastic portrait of Tiberius Gracchus and provoke controversy. Yet, in applying prosopography he is more radical than Syme, because he rejects the ancient literary sources. Syme does not discount them completely, even if they were written under Augustus’ surveillance and were generally benign to him. He delves beneath superficial eulogizings of Augustus and pinpoints sly signs of dissatisfactions. Since he couples the traditional literary readings with the novel prosopographical analyses, he succeeds in convincing his readers. ⁸³ Earl, in contrast, excludes the ancient texts, condemning them unreliable; because the Gracchi reform remained a politically charged issue even up to their own time, a couple of

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⁸⁰ He does not openly equate them, but a great part of controversy originates from hints of the connection.
⁸¹ Republic restored. It was Augustus’ slogan after he defeated Mark Antony and returned as an undisputed authority of Rome. Nominally he returned his official powers back to the Republic and humbly became a princeps, the first citizen; practically he became an emperor.
⁸³ Momigliano. “Introduzione a Ronald Syme.”
generations after the Gracchi, they purposely disparaged or lauded Tiberius Gracchus to advance their own political statuses: “all ancient versions, both hostile and favourable, are so corrupted by contemporary and later propaganda as to be, in themselves, very uncertain guides as to what actually happened in 133 B.C.”84 Because the faction-politics governed the Republic, he argues, prosopography will reveal a better truth. Although Earl’s rationale for this method is like Syme’s, their interests are different. Scholars agree that actional politics typified the Augustan age, but they do not agree that this was the case in the Gracchan age. Scholars commonly mark 133 B.C., the year of Tiberius Gracchus’ tribunate, as the transition from the middle to the late Republican period not yet a period when “networks” would reveal political reality. Earl nonetheless assumes that “it was an attitude of mind already well established by the second century B.C.”85 and tries a prosopographical analysis on Tiberius Gracchus’ reform.

Using this method, he denies that the agrarian crisis was the problem. Instead, he argues that the Senate was bothered solely by the decrease of assidui, citizen-soldiers, a decline that threatened the Roman army and thus their Republic, their wealth, their status; starvation and the land dispossession were heard only distantly. In this way Earl asserts that all nobles sympathized with the cause of increasing assidui. The Cornelii Scipiones who headed the opposition against Tiberius Gracchus’ reform also did not oppose his programme itself; under Scipio Aemilianus’ sanction, Laelius, their close friend, had already put forward a similar bill in 140 B.C., though it was withdrawn. Earl deduces that there must have been something else: the power struggle. What they opposed, according to Earl, was Tiberius Gracchus himself and his faction. They forestalled Tiberius Gracchus’ motion, not because he attempted to redistribute their lanfundi to the poor, but because he sought to overrule them through the newly gained popularity. In other

84 Earl, Tiberius Gracchus, 5.
85 Earl, Tiberius Gracchus, 8.
words, the incident of 133 B.C. was not a socioeconomic reform but a factional strife which prosopography elucidates.

No historians, whether clinging to socioeconomic interpretation or using prosopographical method to expose political associations and interests, disagree that Tiberius Gracchus was a member of the ruling oligarchy. He was a grandson of Scipio Africanus, a cousin and brother-in-law of Scipio Aemilianus, and a son-in-law of Appius Claudius Pulcher: he was connected to the most powerful men of Rome by birth and marriage. Tiberius’ high social status leads the socioeconomic historians to wonder why he jeopardized his prerogatives and even his life for the sake of a bill and to identify what social evils he struggled to remedy. However, Earl is skeptic about this ideological politics. He does not believe that Tiberius alone had a noble heart to save the Republic. It is more reasonable to presume that Tiberius was like everyone else, as greedy as other aristocrats and that he proposed the land redistribution not out of the altruism, atypical of the Roman nobles, but out of the pursuit for gloria, prevailing among the nobles. Earl hence suspects that Tiberius Gracchus did not propose the land redistribution that apparently had the potential to provoke a violent clash against all others by himself. Tiberius Gracchus would have been a spokesperson of his party, and his faction would have sponsored him. Earl’s prosopographical research tells that Tiberius was not alone in 133 B.C.’s tribuneship but had his men around him for the “reform”:

“Claudii Pulchri, Sempronii Gracchi and Mucii Scaevolae favourably regarded by Fulvii, Capurnii Pisones and, possibly, Manlii: the grouping is traditional, powerful and instructive. Whatever was contemplated in 133, it was not revolution. At the head of the factio was the princeps senatus and all its members and their present power and future hopes too deeply rooted in the oligarchic
system and its spoils to wish to destroy it. On the other hand, so powerful a

group was not organized for trivialities. Plans were laid well in advance. Care was
taken to have certainly one, possibly two friendly consuls in office. The consuls
could have no direct control over the concilium plebis with which Ti. Gracchus,
as tribune, would have to deal. But the support and advocacy the fact that the
consul presided over the Senate and could largely dictate its conduct of business.
For it was precisely from the Senate that trouble could be expected. The lex
agraria itself was not put forward on a sudden impulse…Powerful political
advantage to the faction or a serious crisis for Rome must lie behind it."

According to Earl, Tiberius Gracchus was not at all a lonely or passionate martyr. He and his
friends systematically planned to raise the problem in anticipation of gaining a wide support
from the people. They envisioned a victory against their opponents, the Scipioni. Not a devotion
to the people’s welfare but his avarice for more power frightened the senators and eventually
devoured him. Earl thus revives the ancient case that Tiberius sought the political dominance of
his faction, regnum.

Between the ‘50s and the ‘70s, Earl solely conducted a thorough prosopographical study
on Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. Expressing the minor viewpoint, he received countless criticisms
from other socioeconomic historians. The historians whom we have studied above, except
Tibiletti, in fact mostly wrote after Earl published his prosopographical study, and they
responded to him straightforwardly, all rejecting his argument. Although they deny that Tiberius
was simply trying to expand his power, their critiques at the bottom are against the methodology:
Earl begins, they conclude, with a false premise. As Brunt points it: “[h]e thinks that there was

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86 Ap. Claudius Pulcher was named princeps senatus in the censorship which he held in 136 with Q. Fulvius
Nobilior. The footnote from Earl.
87 Earl, _Tiberius Gracchus_, 14.
not a crisis «in the agricultural, economic or even social sphere», but only in «recruitment for the legions».\(^{88}\) Earl reduces the deep-rooted socioeconomic crises that ruined many people’s lives to a political hot potato that power-hungry aristocrats would juggle with. Displaying prosopographical data, he distorts Tiberius Gracchus’ reform as if the political side is the entire story and fails to interpret it within the broader socioeconomic context.

There still is a degree of difference among the socioeconomic historians how far they refuse Earl’s methodology. Brunt again gives an absolute no. (Sir Ronald Syme, Brunt’s predecessor in the Camden professorship at the University of Oxford, once said of him “Brunt by name, and brunt by nature.”\(^{89}\)) Initially, he does not credit prosopography as a reliable approach. The faction dynamics, he expounds, was not a well-ordered mechanism which one can safely decode through prosopography and draw out a historical truth but ad hoc relationships which fluctuated at every circumstances: “[i]t is now fashionable to argue from dubious inferences that these factions were often hereditary alliances of families…Friendships, which occasionally rested on genuine feeling, were renewed with bewildering rapidity. Even families were not united, and in civil wars kinsmen took opposed sides.”\(^{90}\) He further affirms that the one cannot take advantage of the prosopography especially for the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) century B.C., since the factions did not even visibly emerge in the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) century B.C. In short, to apply prosopographical method in analyzing Tiberius Gracchus’ reform is to misuse the method.

In contrast, Nicolet and Boren do not go as far as to insist that the faction-politics hardly existed in the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) century B.C. and that prosopography is not a useful tool for studying Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. Rather, they find fault in Earl’s analysis of the prosopographical data. These

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\(^{90}\) Brunt, *Social Conflicts*, 68.
socioeconomic historians agree with Earl that Tiberius Gracchus was a Roman noble, knew how
the Roman politics operated, and conformed to its customary procedures. They also agree that
Tiberius Gracchus was not the purest popularist and acknowledge that “it would be naïve to
think that Tiberius and his friends were indifferent to the popularity.”91 However, Tiberius
Gracchus as a Roman noble was aware that he needed the support of eminent men and
accordingly secured it—in order to realize his reform. It is wrong to equate Tiberius’ adherence
to the convention of Roman politics with his adherence to the prevalent greediness of Roman
senators. Earl’s prosopographical emphasis neglects the socioeconomic crises, eliminates
ideology in politics, and distorts Tiberius’ motive. Boren suggests a way to incorporate the
prosopographical data into a comprehensive study.

“…Tiberius was a Sempronius Gracchus. Moreover, he had the support of the
Claudian faction—which is to say, a large section of the Senate. Plutarch and
Appian, influenced by the Greek experience or perhaps by earlier Greek accounts
of Roman history, simplify the whole struggle into one between the ‘rich’ and the
‘poor,’ ignoring factional politics within the oligarchy, and make it appear that
there was no chance at all that such a bill could have passed the Senate. This is
clearly wrong. The Claudian influence was considerable… But what pressed most
consciously upon him was the need for speedy action. The urgent crisis, Tiberius
felt…”92

Not only Boren but also Brunt and Nicolet urge that one should limit the prosographical method,
using it only to supplement other research. It could be useful to picture the division and
commotion among the nobles and might demonstrate that the factional rivalry was a catalyst to

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91 Brunt, Social Conflicts, 77.
Tiberius’ drive for reform. Nonetheless, prosopography is fundamentally incapable of capturing the principal reason of socioeconomic crises. Nicolet summarizes the opinion of socioeconomic historians:

“The will to reduce the Gracchan revolution to ambitious tactics of a factio greedy only for the personal power, that is to neglect the entire economic, political, and even ideological background of the years 150 – 120 B.C.”

Modern historians thus do not reach a consensus any closer than the ancient historians. The debate whether Tiberius Gracchus aspired the ἐπανορθώσεως or regnum not only continues but further splits the historians. In the ancient times, whether historians sympathized with the optimates or the populares determined how they understood Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. In the modern times, on the other hand, two other reasons do. First, the methodological choice. Nicolet, Brunt, Tibiletti, and Boren approach Tiberius Gracchus’ reform from the socioeconomic angle with the method of that approach and reveal how grave the socioeconomic crises were. Based on the ancient recounts that latifundia extended; slaves increased; and small-farmers, assidui, decreased, they investigate how far the land quality fell, how many assidui decreased, how badly they were fed, and therefore convince that the socioeconomic crises kindled the heart of a 30ish-year-old young noble. Earl instead looks at politics and uses prosopography to reveal how politics worked. Based on the ancients’ genealogy, marriage, and career, he identifies the two rivaling factions and places Tiberius’ motion within the power game. He thus argues that Tiberius Gracchus was a young headlong aristocrat who thought that he could win over Rome into his regnum. Secondly, they disagree about the usefulness of the narratives provided by ancient historians. The socioeconomic historians believe Plutarch and Appian’s claim that

93 …vouloir ramener la révolution gracchienne aux manœuvres ambitieuses d’une factio avide seulement de pouvoir personnel, c’est négliger tout l’arrière-plan économique, politique et même idéologique des années 150 – 120 av. J.-C.; ; Nicolet, Les Gracques, 104. My translation.
Tiberius Gracchus wanted to cure social ills. Earl, on the contrary, denies the ancient interpretations. He believes that the truth lies behind the history revealed by prosopographical analysis and uses it against Tiberius Gracchus.
IV. Korean Historiography between the ‘70s and the ‘90s

In 1959, Chi, Dong-Sik (1928 – 2004) published the first article on Roman history in Korea and thereupon launched his career as the first Roman historian in Korea. The topic he picked for his first study was Tiberius Gracchus’ reform: “The Nature of Tiberius Gracchus’ Agrarian Reform.”94 His choice carried weight, even though he did not delve into it significantly further afterwards.95 Nonetheless, it took awhile for Tiberius Gracchus’ reform to emerge as the leading theme in the Korean academia, frankly because there was no academia yet. There were no other Roman historians besides Chi, Dong-Sik, while there were four Greek historians at that time. Only after Hoe, Seung-Il commenced his academic career in 1968 (M.A. in 1968, Ph. D. in 1984) and Kim, Kyung-Hyun, a student of Chi, Dong-Sik, did his in 1979 (M.A. in 1979, Ph. D. in 1987), Korea had a few Roman historians, and they nourished academic dialogues among them. And Tiberius Gracchus’ reform had a prominent place in their exchanges. Tiberius Gracchus’ reform was not, however, the dominant concern of these Korean historians. They were self-aware that they were the pioneers of Roman history in Korea, and they thought that their foremost job was to introduce Roman history to Korea and publish general narratives in Korean, rather than developing a new theory or contributing to the mainstream Western academia.96 Hence, they touched upon various topics, and their studies scattered throughout the long and wide history of Rome. The significance of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform in the Korean historiography lies in that it for the first time elicited the common interests across the Korean scholars and produced academic discourses among them. It remained as the sole issue on which

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95 Kim, Deog-Su. “From the Ancient Mediterranean World to Orient: The Western Ancient History during the Last 60 Years in Korea,” The Western Historical Review 95 (2007): 177-208.
96 General histories written in Korean include: Chi, Dong-Sik. The Crisis of the Roman Republic (Seoul: Bobmunsa, 1975); Chi, Dong-Sik, and Kim, Kyung-Hyun The Ancient and Medieval Western Society (Seoul: Shinangsa, 1993); Huh, Seung-il. The Roman Republic (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1997), The Studies on the Roman Empire, (Seoul National University Press, 2000).
they debated until historians of the next generation, who showed more interests in Augustus’ revolution, Christianity, and women’s lives, joined the academia in the ‘90s and drove discussions in these directions. Then, the question follows: why Tiberius Gracchus’ reform? Let us defer this question until we review what history Korean scholars wrote of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform.

I have narrowed the scope of our discussion to between the ‘70s and ‘90s, because most discussions concerning Tiberius Gracchus’ reform fall into this period, but Chi, Dong-Sik’s “The Nature of Tiberius Gracchus’ Agrarian Reform” in 1959 rightfully belongs to our discussion as the first work of Korea. Meanwhile, one should keep in mind that this is Chi, Dong-Sik’s first work, not the best (it was his M.A. dissertation). In a thirty-page-long paper, he surely does not exhaust the nature of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. Rather, he concisely addresses the important aspects of the reform that had circulated in the West: socioeconomic, ideological, and political. He explains that the gap between the rich and the poor widened: the rich got richer by latifundia and delighted in Hellenistic booties, while the poor got poorer by land devastation after the Hannibalic War and land extortion by the rich. Ideologically, Blossius of Cumae, a Greek tutor of Tiberius Gracchus, imbued Stoic philosophy, particularly the democratic ideal, to Tiberius Gracchus. Politically, his land bill signified upsetting the socioeconomic strata and inevitably incited an upheaval in Rome. Chi, Dong-Sik lists there points in a bullet-point style and concludes that well-meant Tiberius’ reform happened to exacerbate the factional strife between the optimates and populares and the socioeconomic breach between the rich and the poor. He does not attempt to decide whether Tiberius was a savior or a destroyer of the Republic. He does not dissect every detail to pierce the historical truth but surveys a historical event as a textbook.

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97 Democracy was not an ideal in Roman sense. Romans repudiated the Greek democracy for its danger of developing into an irrational popularism and championed the rationality in their Republicanism.
might do. In fact, the former was not a viable option to him, while the latter was what was expected from him. Almost all of his target readers, Korean academics in the late ‘50s, hardly knew of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform, and he had to introduce it, from the *ager publicus* to the office of tribunate. The Westerners might have regarded it as a cursory overview, but Koreans had an overwhelming amount of new facts to learn from it.

Chi, Dong-Sik introduces the arguments mostly from the canons of Roman history, such as Theodor Mommsen’s *History of Rome* (1881 – 5), William E. Heitland’s *The Roman Republic* (1909), and Michael I. Rostovtzeff’s *History of the Ancient World* (1926 – 8). He does not refer to the contemporary Western studies in the ‘50s that we have reviewed above but the earlier ones from the late 19th century to the early 20th century; he probably could not have acquired the recently published works of the West. Naturally, the focus of Chi, Dong-Sik greatly diverges from that of the contemporary Western historians. In the West, the old theory that Blossius inveigled Tiberius into founding a new Greek-type democratic state was already out of fashion: “Nothing much, at all events, has been said recently. The figure of Blossius of Cumae has been rescued from indiscriminate identification with Greek philosophy…”98 The mainstream view shifted to the opposite side: “whatever the influence of advisers and philosophers, the minds of both Ti. And C. Gracchus largely moved within the traditional Roman aristocratic categories: *fides, pietas, dolor, dignitas.*”99 Recent theories, including this concerning Blossius, came to be available for circulation in Korea more than a decade later, and the following historians, Hoe, Seung-Il and Kim, Kyung-Hyun, actively engaged with them.

99 Badian, “From Gracchi to Sulla,” 201.
Yet, Chi, Dong-Sik’s subsequent dissertation, “the Crisis of the Roman Republic” in 1976\textsuperscript{100}, reflects some of the recent trends of the West. The surveying style nevertheless remains. He broadens his scope further, to the last two centuries of the Roman Republic and deals with the formidable topic, the fall of the Roman Republic. Following the critical moments of civil strife, he illustrates that the violence in politics eroded the respect for law and order, steadily dismantled the Republican system, and eventually caused its collapse. What is noteworthy for our purpose is that he pinpoints the first outbreak of violence in the Roman politics as 151 B.C. when the tribunes kept the consuls in custody, in order to resist military draft for the Spanish War.\textsuperscript{101} This runs contrary to the traditional understanding taken from from Livy, Plutarch, and Appian, which argues that 133 B.C was the turning point from peace and prosperity to hostility and downfall. Chi, Dong-Sik contends that after the previous tribunes had set examples of transgressing the law and resorting to the violence, Tiberius Gracchus without a second thought likewise transgressed the sacrosanctity of his co-tribune Octavius and threatened him with violence.

Chi, Dong-Sik’s argument that 133 B.C. was not the crossroad in Roman history was not conventional, but it was not unprecedented either. There had been a similar attempt to explain Tiberius Gracchus’ behavior by arguing that he had predecessors. In 1962, Lily Ross Taylor in her “Forerunners of the Gracchi,” argued that tribunes in 151 B.C. and 138 B. C. voiced the popular opinion against the military levies even through the violent means and thus created an atmosphere where Tiberius Gracchus could forcefully represent the people’s interests against the ruling oligarchy.\textsuperscript{102} There was not, however, a direct parallel between the two scholars’ interpretations: Chi, Dong-Sik emphasizes the tribune’s use of violence, whereas Taylor stresses

\textsuperscript{100} Chi, Dong-sik. “The Crisis of the Roman Republic.” PhD. Diss., Dankook University, 1976.
\textsuperscript{101} Livy. \textit{Periocha}, XLVIII.
their role as the people’s mouthpiece; Chi, Dong-Sik blames them for demolishing the
Republican order, whereas Taylor defends them for responding to the injustices of the aristocrats.
As Taylor did, Chi, Dong-Sik names the tribunes of 151 B.C. and 138 B.C. as Tiberius’
archetypes on the ground that they were all concerned with the military problem and confronted
the Senate. When it comes to the moment of judgment, whether “the transformation of the
tribunate into an instrument of revolution was a symptom” or “a cause of the decline,” they
disagree. Furthermore, although Chi, Dong-Sik does not refer to her article, he must have read
Taylor’s work: he refers to the publications contemporary to this work, so he had his hands on
the important works of the ‘60s, undoubtedly including this. In addition, he knew of Taylor’s
other works as well. 104

There also is a more visible trace of the influence from the Western scholarship. When
Chi, Dong-Sik correlates the tribunes of 151 B.C. and 138 B.C. with that of Tiberius Gracchus
in 133 B.C., he connects them through the military crisis that underlies both incidents:
population able to serve in the army dwindled. He does not omit the agrarian crisis but stresses
the military crisis; since his interest is to show that the violence precipitated the fall of the
Republic, he gives weight to the military crisis, marking it an immediate cause of violence. He
considers that the military issue directly interested both the senators and the plebs and readily
sparked the violence in the City, while the agrarian one was at the rudimentary and latent level.
Thus, under what he titles “the problem of military conscription,” he clumps the socioeconomic
crises in general. He does not confine the military crisis to the decrease of assidui but
embraces all the socioeconomic discontents that came to be vented in the language of
avoiding military levy:

104 Chi, Dong-Sik refers to: L. R. Taylor, “Appian and Plutarch on Tiberius Gracchus’ Last Assembly,” Athenaeum
“...small independent farmers suffered from a long-term distraction from the agricultural labor [because of the constant drafts for 16 – 20 years] and fell into abjection...the adverse climate continued further dropping the agricultural productivity. Moreover, the ancient tradition of self-supporting army aggravated their impoverishment.

“...soldiers in the late and mid 2nd century B.C. served in wars with little or no payment and were forced long-term services, consisting of brutal and cruel military disciplines and harsh military laws. The ordinary soldiers’ military life in the front contrasted with the nobles’ luxurious life in the rear.”

In this manner, Chi, Dong-Sik brings the socioeconomic crises of the 2nd century B.C. to his study. Socioeconomic discontents collided with the rooted order, spurted violence, and shattered the Republican system. In other words, he places the socioeconomic anxieties at the bottom of the Republic’s fall. His socioeconomic emphasis is indebted to the Western scholarship. His citation tells this; socioeconomic historians, including Rostovtzeff and Brunt, dominate the list.

Hoe, Seung-Il (1940 – present), a historian who came a generation after Chi, Dong-Sik, further probed the socioeconomic facet of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. Since he first undertook Tiberius Gracchus’ reform for his master’s thesis in 1967, he has continued to study it, along

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105 Others include Edmund H. Oliver’s Roman Economic Conditions to the Close of the Republic (1907), Truesdell S. Brown’s “Greek Influence on Tiberius Gracchus” (1947), Tenney Frank’s An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome (1959), E. Badian’s Foreign Clientelae, 264 – 70 B.C. (1958), and Arnold J. Toynbee’s Hannibal’s Legacy (1965).
with Gaius Gracchus’ reform. Boren steers his study throughout. Between Boren’s new theory of urban crisis and the traditional interpretation of agrarian and military crisis, he strives to locate the truth. In search of an answer, he explores many outstanding achievements in the socioeconomic history of Rome: Brunt’s demographic study, Tibiletti’s agrarian study, Boren’s numismatic study, as well as Zvi Yavet’s archeological study on the living conditions in the City of Rome. He aggregates the socioeconomic information of the 2nd century B.C. and reconstructs the 2nd century B.C. landscape of Rome. *Latifundia* and slave labor covered the Italian peninsula; citizens who were evicted from their land drifted into the City; the population of *assidui* decreased, while that of paupers in the city increased; the price of grain skyrocketed; the poor died of starvation; the rich decorated their houses and bodies with Hellenistic luxuries. Hoe, Seung-II recognizes the crises in both agrarian and urban area. His question less concerned whether the crisis of the time was agrarian or urban, but rather whether Tiberius Gracchus’ reform targeted the agrarian or the urban crisis.

In two articles published respectively in 1973 and 1994, Hoe, Seung-II answers this question and yields two contradictory analyses. He reverses his own view after two decades. In the 1973 article “Tiberius Gracchus’ Intention of Agrarian Legislation,” he sides with Brunt and dismisses Boren. Although he appreciates Boren’s new contribution to the understanding of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform, he insists that Boren overemphasized urban crisis as the crux of Tiberius’ land programme:

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“In short, as P. A. Brunt correctly points out, it is a complete mistake to think that Tiberius’ land programme was designed to lead out the urbanized people to the countryside or indeed drove them out. Those who demanded and acquired the land were mostly the rural people. Nevertheless, H. C. Boren alleges that Tiberius implemented the land redistribution to save “the overcrowded city and the urban unemployed.” How unhistorical is it? The modern experience blindly colors the history. I would call it «modernization of history»”.

He takes a full turn in 1994; “Tiberius Gracchus’ Corn Supply Plan of the City of Rome.” This is not because he learned of new evidences or an innovative approach. At the beginning of the article, he affirms that he had learned nothing new about Tiberius Gracchus’ reform thereafter from the Western scholarship, and his sources also remain the same. Thus, he seems to have adjusted his understanding after twenty years of studying and now agrees with Boren while criticizing Brunt’s myopia:

“In a nutshell, it is safe to say that the city of Rome always contained the risk of grain shortage. Therefore, the policy’s aim to reduce the grain demand by transferring some of the grain consuming population in the City to the countryside cannot be underestimated. Tiberius Gracchus’ original intention was to send back the excess and unemployed population, who formerly were farmers, to the countryside; this should be revisited and receive due evaluation. Brunt points out that it is a complete mistake to think that Tiberius’ land reform was designed for

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Why he came to overturn his previous conclusion is another question. For our purpose, let us suffice to acknowledge that Hoe, Seung-II studied from the Western socioeconomic studies of the ‘50s – ‘70s and actively engaged with them.

The influence of the Western socioeconomic historians extends to the way he appraises Tiberius Gracchus. Just as they did, Hoe, Seung-il believes Plutarch’ account that the impoverished poor inspired Tiberius Gracchus to reform and therefore acclaims him as a sincere reformer endeavoring to resolve the socioeconomic crises. In fact, he goes farther than the Western historians in praising Tiberius Gracchus. He asserts what the Western historians dubbed as a “naïve” understanding: “T. Gracchus did not have a political ambition or any other ulterior motives; he was only a young politician who just entered into thirties and had a genuine passion for his political belief.”

Even against the charge that his reform programme was too radical, Hoe, Seung-II argues that Tiberius was entirely committed to reforming society. He adds that Tiberius in fact ascertained that the bill was not radical but acceptable, because he had consulted the preliminary bill with Publius Mucius Scaevola who has a reputation for being moderate and rational. Hoe, Seung-il further contends that the violation of tribunician sacrosanctitas was a necessary evil for the ultimate good. Even though it was unprecedented and against the mos

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the resolute reformer had to take a risk to accomplish his goal. Hoe, Seung-Il more or
less idolizes Tiberius Gracchus as a noble hero of the people.

Kim, Kyung-Hyun (1957 – present), another of the earliest historians, was also drawn to
Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. He stepped into Roman history under the guidance of Chi, Dong-Sik,
and his teacher’s interest in Tiberius Gracchus’ reform to some extent brought him to this
topic. The history of his study on Tiberius Gracchus’ reform is as interesting as that of Hoe,
Seung-Il’s. He also makes a shift, however, not in opinion, but in his approach. His claim has
remained the same since the beginning of his study, but he walks the readers through the two
most prevailing approaches in the West, socioeconomic and prosopographical, to demonstrate
his claim. He published a socioeconomic study in 1986 and a prosopographical study in 1991;
hence, it is reasonable to presume that he planned out his separate publications to head toward
the same end. Initially he undertakes the socioeconomic study: “The Changing Italian
Agricultural Structure during the 2nd Century B.C.: the Socioeconomic Background of Tiberius
Gracchus Agrarian Reform.” Its main topic is the agricultural system, yet it anticipates what this
eventually suggests about Tiberius Gracchus’ intention. His article in 1991, “Tiberius Gracchus
and the Politics of Agrarian Reform” derives a conclusive answer to Tiberius’ intention and
completes his sequence of studies on Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. In short, in order to inquire into
Tiberius’ aim behind the land bill, he first examines what was the situation before the reform in
the former piece and then, in the subsequent work, pins down what Tiberius planned to
renovate. Let us track how he arrives there.

112 Interview.
Background of Tiberius Gracchus’ Agrarian Reform,” Sa-hak-ji 20 (1986): 1 – 63; “Stoicism and Roman Politics in
the Second Century B.C.,” The Western History Review 27 (1986): 1 – 42; “A Study on the Background of Tiberius
Gracchus’ Reform,” (PhD diss., Korea University, 1987); “Tiberius Gracchus and the Politics of Agrarian Reform,”
In “The Changing Italian Agricultural Structure during the 2nd Century B.C.,” Kim, Kyung-Hyun takes a sociological approach to describe the agricultural economy of the ancient Rome. Instead of guesstimating using the unreliable ancient numbers, he assembles small pieces of textual evidences, puts them together like jigsaw puzzles, and refurbishes them into an image of the ancient economy. This was Finley’s methodology. (Finley was Kim, Kyung-Hyun’s favorite scholar, and he translated Finley’s Ancient Economy.114) Adopting Finley’s sociological approach, he establishes that latifundia became essential to the senators politically as a status symbol and economically as a stable and profitable source of income. However, he reaches to a different conclusion from Finley’s about Tiberius Gracchus. The divergence arises from the quintessential problem of reading Tiberius’ character. While Finley defines Tiberius Gracchus as a pure-hearted outlier from the greedy and land-hungry upper class, Kim, Kyung-Hyun groups him along with his friends and families into the same greedy and power-driven upper class. Therefore, while Finley always mentions Tiberius Gracchus’ reform as an exceptional case, a time when an aristocrat sacrificed himself for the poor, Kim, Kyung-Hyun expects that Tiberius Gracchus’ reform was one of those usual power-games.

He does not tarnish Tiberius’ reputation without a good reason. He supports this, in fact, with another socioeconomic study, which commonly champions Tiberius Gracchus as a savior of the Republic. He relies on Tibiletti’s argument that Tiberius Gracchus’ revocation of the land redistribution law had a motive different from the previous land redistributions. Tibiletti demonstrates that Tiberius, behind the façade of succeeding the past land redistributions, purposed to wreck the latifundia and re-populate the impoverished citizens onto that very land; but, he does not offer a psychological account of why Tiberius sought his ends because he does not have such evidence. Thus there still remains a room to debate whether Tiberius did this out

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114 Interview.
of the popularist faith rather than out of the factionist opportunism. His judgment is, however, clear. Tiberius Gracchus sincerely meant to reform: “…only with Tiberius Gracchus the entire perspective of the internal politics of Rome was upset by a new idea, the systematic attack against the *latifundia*, proposed by the tribune in order to resolve the sociopolitical crisis, the plan which because of the vast consequences connected with it suddenly assumed the foremost rank.”115 (Tibiletti’ sociopolitical crisis stands for the agrarian and military crisis, not a factional friction.) Yet, his agricultural study does not necessarily vindicate that Tiberius intended to tear up the *latifundia* in order to subsidize the poor rather than to crush the *optimates*. There remains a room to interpret Tibiletti’s discovery that land redistribution in itself was not the problem, and Kim, Kyung-Hyun twists it to support his assertion: “…the content of the law itself was not at all a ‘res novae (new thing).’ The new thing, that is, the revolution, was when Tiberius Gracchus encountered the opposition from the conservative ruling oligarchy, unlike the preceding generation, he tried to abuse the sociopolitical tensions for his own end.”116 From the point where Tibiletti’s proving ends, Kim, Kyung-Hyun takes over the story to apply his own opinion.

When Kim, Kyung-Hyun investigates the socioeconomic aspect of the Tiberius Gracchus’ reform, he takes advantage of the Western socioeconomic studies to support the alternative prosopographical study. Though he does not debunk any of the socioeconomic studies, even though many socioeconomic historians reach the contrasting conclusion on Tiberius Gracchus’ intention. Instead—based on the different assumption about Tiberius’ personality—he

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115 …soltanto con Ti. Gracco tutta la prospettiva della politica interna romana fu sconvolta da un’idea nuova, l’attacco sistematico al latifondismo, proposto dal tribuno al fine di risolvere la crisi politico-sociale, progetto questo che per le vaste conseguenze ad esso inerenti assunse improvvisamente un posto di primissimo piano; Tibiletti, “Ricerche di storia agraria romana,” 239. My translation.

reinterprets their socioeconomic studies, using them against Tiberius Gracchus. Then, retaining the same “premise that Tiberius Gracchus was a prematurely shrewd politician and had a practical or private motive,”¹¹⁷ he proceeds to the prosopography and reinforces his claim. In fact, he to some extent deliberately attacks Tiberius Gracchus. Although he concedes that the prosopography is not a perfect way to get across an individual’s mind, he chooses it to introduce a flip side of the history: Tiberius Gracchus sought the power through lex Agraria Sempronia.

“The outputs from the predominant academic trend,” he complains, “are not entirely satisfactory. The dichotomy between the ruling oligarchy, which unreasonably sustains the social contradictions out of the unyielding selfishness, and few martyr-like ‘reformer,’ who ‘broke away’ from it, is too simplistic to accept as a historical truth. Moreover, the image of Tiberius Gracchus contrived as a result of this is too idealized and fossilized. In other words, modern scholars are so overwhelmed by the socioeconomic crisis that Tiberius Gracchus tried to solve through his land law that they tend to neglect his personality.”¹¹⁸ Kim, Kyung-Hyun had a historiographical concern as did the preceding Korean historians, but it was slightly different. While they regarded that their job was to provide an overview or a common view of history to Korean academia, he thought that his was to complement it into a balanced view.

Thus Kim, Kyung-Hyun undertakes a prosopographical study on Tiberius Gracchus’ reform, “Tiberius Gracchus and the Politics of Agrarian Reform.” He definitely refers to D. C. Earl who left the most significant achievement in this field. Yet, he seems to have learned more

from the great canons of Roman prosopography, such as Friedrich Münzer’s *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien* (*Roman Aristocratic Parties and Families*), Matthias Gelzer’s *Nobilität der römischen Republik* (*The Roman Nobility*), as well as Ronald Syme’s *Roman Revolution*, than from Earl. After he establishes the prosopographical approach based on these canonical works, he rummages the ancient sources to compile prosopographic data and argues for and against Earl about prosopographic analyses. First, the scheme of his work resembles that of Earl’s in general, but deviates from his work at a different level. First, like Earl, Kim, Kyung-Hyun establishes that the ancient sources are partisan and unreliable; at the same time, unlike Earl, he further investigates the ancient sources and figures out that Greek sources, Plutarch and Appain, are favorable to Tiberius Gracchus while Latin sources, Livy, Velleius Paterculus, and Valerius Maximum, are not. Secondly, like Earl, he justifies prosopographic methodology on the ground that it reveals the growing faction-politics. Yet, compared to Earl, he does not insist that prosopography holds the key to Tiberius Gracchus’ reform but acknowledges that it eliminates the ideological element and therefore urges the readers to take other orthodox socioeconomic studies into account.

Overall, he heeds his own warning not to overstretch the prosopographical discoveries. For example, Earl and Kim, Kyung-Hyun produce different interpretations of the same fact. In 177 B.C. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus the Elder, the father of Tiberius Gracchus, and Gaius Claudius Pulcher, the father of Appius Claudius Pulcher, together served as consuls and in 169 B.C. as censors. In 169 B.C. Gaius Claudius Pulcher was impeached for severe censorship, and Tiberius Gracchus the Elder defended his co-censor. His popularity among the people eventually earned an acquittal for C. Claudius Pulcher. Earl immediately recognizes this as

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119 The censor, one of the highest public offices in Rome, was entitled to control the public morality, to conduct the census, and to make the list of the senators.
evidence of the political alliance between the Sempronii and the Fulvii-Claudii. They apparently made allies of one another on this issue here—they belonged to the same faction, since “their conduct of the censorship was severe and partisan…Gracchus and Claudius degraded seven senators and many equites.”

Tracing the political alliance between Tiberius Gracchus and Appius Claudius Pulcher back to the time of their fathers, Earl consequently emphasizes that rivalry among factions was endemic among Roman nobles, including Tiberius’ father. In contrast, Kim, Kyung-Hyun does not jump to this conclusion. He reminds us that Tiberius Gracchus the Elder was a known rival of Marcus Junius Brutus, a member of the Fulvii-Claudii faction; hence, it is questionable that Tiberius Gracchus the Elder built a firm coalition with the Fulvii-Claudii. Moreover, he reads into Livy that Tiberius Gracchus the Elder defended C. Claudius Pulcher reluctantly out of the fides, dutiful respect, for his colleague, rather than aggressively out of the compassion for his pal. This does not mean that Kim, Kyung-Hyun significantly undermines Earl’s conclusion regarding Tiberius’ intention, but that he, while responding to Earl, tries to reduce the errors arising from a rigid application of prosopographical method and locate the truth that is reasonable from both the socioeconomic and the prosopographical approaches.

Korean scholars thus investigated Tiberius Gracchus’ reform by taking up the two methodologies that dominated in Western academia between the ‘50s and the ‘70s. It is too simplistic to reduce the Korean historiography to a sentence that Chi, Dong-Sik and Hoe, Seung-II followed the socioeconomic trend, and Kim, Kyung-Hyun the prosopographical one. Chi, Dong-Sik who focused on giving a bigger overview of Republican history interpreted Tiberius Gracchus’ reform according to its significance in relation to the entire late Republican history; Hoe, Seung-II who was more committed to this topic than any other scholars kept reviewing it and came to overthrow his earlier work in favor of the urban crisis; Kim, Kyung-Hyun who

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concerned about having a balanced understanding tested both methodologies and to some degree deliberately landed at the prosopographical trend. Although they, as the pioneers in Roman history in Korea, had innumerable difficulties in studying, they not only studiously absorbed the Western achievements but actively interacted with them to produce their own achievements.

In addition to these socioeconomic and prosopographical studies, Korean scholars also undertook studies on the ideological background of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. The ideological study, as I mentioned earlier, had once been a popular subject in the West before the ‘50s but fell out from the Western scholarship long before Koreans began to take interest in the Gracchi reform.\textsuperscript{121} The eyes of Korean scholars were accordingly turned away from the ideological aspect to the socioeconomic and political ones. Yet, a couple of noteworthy works on the ideological side still came out from the Western scholarship: Scullard’s “Scipio Aemilianus and Roman Politics” in 1960, and Boren’s “Tiberius Gracchus: The Opposition View” in 1961.\textsuperscript{122} To a certain extent they encouraged the Korean historians not to leave this, another important area, untouched and led them to introduce the ideological ground of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. Hoe, Seung-Il particularly relies on the above two works. Boren and Scullard contend that the opposition of Scipio Aemilianus’ party rested on constitutional grounds: because they reckoned that Tiberius Gracchus might turn the oligarchy-based Republican constitution upside-down, they had to eradicate him.\textsuperscript{123} Hoe, Seung-Il, in “Polybius’ \textit{µυκτήρ} and the Reforms of Tiberius Gracchus,” expands this influence of Republican ideal onto the side of Scipio Aemilianus to that of Tiberius Gracchus: “…if the opponents of Tiberius Gracchus came even to murder Tiberius...”

\textsuperscript{121} Badian, “From Gracchi to Sulla,”
\textsuperscript{123} Their defense of Scipio Aemilianus and his party does not contradict their previous defense of Tiberius Gracchus’ motive. They believe that Tiberius had a pure reformist purpose, but Scipio Aemilianus and his friends viewed that a series of his actions to implement the reform endangered the Republican order.
Gracchus under the influence of Polybius’ \( \mu \kappa \tau \iota \), Tiberius Gracchus as well, considering the circumstances, would have been under the same influence."\(^{124}\) He concludes that both Tiberius’ reform and Scipio Aemilinaus’ opposition to the reform were the products of Polybius’ \( \mu \kappa \tau \iota \), the Republican ideal; Tiberius Gracchus believed that the debilitated democratic element must be reempowered to realize the balance of ideal \( \mu \kappa \tau \iota \). Kim, Kyung-Hyun also, in “Stoicism and Roman Politics in the Second Century B.C.,” tries an ideological explanation to Tiberius Gracchus’ intention. He deals with the popular theory that Greek stoicism, including Polybius’ \( \mu \kappa \tau \iota \), inculcated the democratic ideal in Tiberius Gracchus. He introduces this argument, however, only to rebut it: Greek stoicism was merely a foreign theorem, not the everyday rule of thumb of Roman politics. Hence he discards the ideological excuses; this is another reason why he turns to the principles of faction-politics to illuminate Tiberius’ mind.

I did not omit the ideological studies in Korea, because the Korean historians did not neglect the ideological facet in Tiberius Gracchus’ reform either. Sparing only two works for the ideological ground, they addressed it to encompass all major aspects of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform rather than to delve into it. Their interests centered on the socioeconomic and the political aspects, as those of the Western historians.

\(^{124}\) 만약 티베리우스 그락쿠스의 정적들이 폴리비우스의 \( \mu \kappa \tau \iota \)의 영향을 받아 그를 살해하기에 이르렀다면 정작 개혁추진의 당사자였던 그락쿠스는 여러 모로 과연 폴리비우스의 정치사상의 영향권 외부에 있었겠느냐 하는 점이었다: Hoe, Seung-II, “Polybius’ \( \mu \kappa \tau \iota \) and the Reforms of Tiberius Gracchus,” 48. My translation.
V. The Interview with the Korean Historians

Kim, Deog-Su and Kim, Kyung-Hyun kindly allowed me to interview them and offer a greater insight into Korean historiography concerning Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. Kim, Deog-Su was a student of Hoe, Seung-II, so he was able to recount much information about his teacher. Kim, Kyung-Hyun was a student of Chi, Dong-Sik, so he recounted the histories not only of himself but also of his teacher. The main questions that I had for them were: why they came to be interested particularly in Tiberius Gracchus’ reform and what their studying environment was like.

Prior to these questions, it is worth noting their educational backgrounds. Chi, Dong-Sik (1928 – 2004) and Kim, Kyung-Hyun (1957 – present), the two greatest historians in Korea, maintained a close rapport of the teacher and the student, and their relationship has a long history. At first, they were high school alumni. Since there was a three-decade gap between them, they did not come across each other as alumni. Yet, it opened up their relationship. Chi, Dong-Sik, after he completed his both bachelor’s and master’s studies at Korea University, was working as a history professor at Dankook University since 1959. As a professor, he came to his high school to recruit prospective students. Kim, Kyung-Hyun was on his target. Smiling, Kim, Kyung-Hyun recalled his own history: “when I was about to graduate from high school, I applied to Seoul National University and was rejected. I didn’t know what to do, because I couldn’t find a way to fund my college education. Then, prof. Chi, Dong-Sik came to scout me… So, when I told him of my situation, he offered me a full scholarship at Dankook University [where he was working]. And I accepted it.” Thus, Kim, Kyung-Hyun came to take up Roman history as his profession under the influence of Chi, Dong-Sik. Their relationship continued even after Chi, Dong-Sik left Dankook University for his alma mater, Korea University. He left when Kim,

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125 Seoul National University is a national university and requires much lower tuition than private universities.
Kyung-Hyun was a junior at college, and Kim, Kyung-Hyun then moved to Seoul National University for his masters’ degree. Chi, Dong-Sik again recruited his former student, now to Korea University. Kim, Kyung-Hyun thus followed the wish of his teacher and completed his doctoral study at Korea University. Thenceforth, he succeeded his teachers’ career: he became a professor at Dankook University while Chi, Dong-Sik worked at Korea University and replaced his teachers’ place at Korea University when Chi, Dong-Sik retired. “That’s a long history, yes,” Kim, Kyung-Hyun nodded.

In contrast, Hoe, Seung-Il studied at a different institution. Except for a few years of teaching at Konkuk University, he spent all his academic life at Seoul National University. There he studied Roman history since when he was an undergraduate student until he retired and became an emeritus professor; his academic home was Seoul National University. The fact that Hoe, Seung-Il studied and worked at a different institution from Chi, Dong-Sik and Kim, Kyung-Hyun makes a difference, although it cannot be articulated in an organized fashion. Seoul National University, Yonsei University, and Korea University are top three universities in Korea, in respect to academic excellence, prestige, history, and resources; they are frequently compared to Harvard, Yale, and Princeton of Korea. The rivalry amongst them is notorious in Korea. As the academic relationships, primarily from the institutions above, have created influential networks throughout Korean society, the academic rivalry has equally stretched into politics and business and developed into one type of factionalism. To claim that the academic factionalism drove Hoe, Seung-Il and Kim, Kyung-Hyun to pursue conflicting interpretations is not only an overstatement but false. However, one cannot completely ignore this subtle and undercurrent influence on the Korean historiography. The academic factionalism in Korea is so notorious that not only Korean scholars themselves are conscious of but also the media and the public daily talk.
about. Kim, Kyung-hyun also warned me, when I was about to undertake this project, that the Korean historiography is a complicated issue that is interconnected with the social circumstances of Korea, including academic factionalism. It is hasty to make any leap from this to Korean historiography, but it is helpful to keep it in mind that Hoe, Seung-Il came from an academic background different from Chi, Dong-Sik and Kim, Kyung-Hyun.

Yet, the awful studying environment applied to all. They were the pioneers; they did not have any teachers to consult, any librarians to fetch the sources, any Korean books to guide them. They hunted for the Western books and articles from which they could learn, and they taught themselves. Kim, Kyung-Hyun had a teacher, but he also mostly taught himself. He rather studied alongside Chi, Dong-Sik than learned from his teacher:

“Teachers, back then, studied during the Japanese occupation. They ushered us to this field and told us that Greek and Roman history is something worth studying. But they didn’t have the ability to teach something about it practically. The way they taught us is [like this]: they did not really care much about primary sources and gave us a few names of important Western historians and their works. That was all that I was taught. After that, I studied by myself.”

Not only history they studied on their own, but also languages, ancient and modern. They started picking up English and an additional foreign language, either German or French, from high school; therefore, they were able to read some Western secondary literature in original languages. They read the English literature relatively fluidly, while they needed dictionaries in hand for the French, German, and Italian literatures. Still, they had to acquire ancient languages as well as the third and the fourth modern languages. Again, they taught themselves. They imported introductory books such as *Latin for Americans* and studied. Kim, Deog-Su assured
that his teacher, Hoe, Seung-II, studied on his own: “He taught himself completely. There was no
one teaching, so he had to teach himself with books.”

To study on their own with books was no less easy. One should not imagine them
studying alone as one might do now with the state-of-art technology. They studied in the ‘70s
and ‘80s before the advent of the Internet. The source condition was extremely poor. The extent
to which they lacked resources would be beyond the expectation of most Western scholars. They
did not have what Western scholars might regard as the fundamental sources, such as the Loeb
Classical Library or Brill’s Pauly. (Seoul National University and Korea University started to
equip the Loeb Classical Library in pieces since the ‘90s.) What they had were scholarly
journals. Kim, Deog-Su described how they studied with Hoe, Seung-II: “there were not many
choices, but we had Journal of Roman Studies or Historia. JRS came into Seoul National
University every year, and what were in it were the most recent studies. That’s how we got to
know of the Western trends. We, to speak realistically, were not coming up with new ideas or
new sources. We learned from what they studied… Generally, while reading journals like JRS or
Historia, [we] picked up [our] topics, those popular or recent.” Kim, Kyung-Hyun assented that
they relied primarily on journals: “[even today,] we still don’t have basic instruments, like CIL
(Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum), SGI (Searchable Greek Inscriptions), or Pauly. We have a
small part of them, but not all of them. We have more of journals. Big universities, like Seoul
National University or Korea University, [subscribed] journals but… didn’t bother with those
huge collections.”

Then, Kim, Deog-Su and Kim, Kyung-Hyun followed up my ultimate question: why the
Korean historians were intrigued by Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. Because the Gracchi reform
ranked one of the highest places in Roman history, historically as well as historiographically, it
was not at all strange even if the Korean historians picked it up purely out of academic interests. Nevertheless, I asked them if they could identify any reasons, and they did.

First, the Western academic trend directed their choice of topic. “[Korean] scholars, generally,” Kim, Deog-Su confessed, “picked up their topics, while reading journals like JRS or Historia. They anchored popular or recent ideas in them as their driving questions.” The popular theme, when the Korean scholars ushered in Roman history, was the Gracchi reform. Kim, Kyung-Hyun was aware of the trend: “Western scholars, either European or American, all were interested in the Gracchi reform from the ‘50s to the ‘70s. Many books and articles on the Gracchi were published… Moreover…a few scholars, including H. C. Boren, talked about urban crisis and many other things, so prof. Chi, Dong-Sik came to be interested in it…” He further explained how much impact the Western scholarship had on the Korean counterpart:

“Scholars of the Soviet and the communist camp…saw the Roman Republic as a slave society and tried to interpret the fall of the Republic as a crisis of slave society and a beginning of social struggle. However, the Western historians didn’t interpret it that way. They saw it as a moment of social progress, of a social reform, and of a positive force. We, Koreans, were also part of the Western or capitalist bloc, so we were limited in our historical perspective. [Later, I came to] read some of books from the communist camp through German translations as well as Eastern German works. There, they had more radical perspectives and did not put much importance on the Gracchi reform. But before the collapse of the Communism, we were proud of our western-infused perspective…and understood history based on the works of Western historians.”
He conceded that the Korean scholars were under the influence of the Western scholars not only in the choice of topic but also in the historical perspective. At the height of the Cold War in the ‘70s, everything Western governed South Korea, including their historical studies.

Secondly, Korean political circumstances pressured Korean scholars to study revolutionary or reformist histories. The ‘70s Korean politics requires our attention, even though neither its own complexity nor its impact on the Korean intellectuals can be by all means properly captured here. The ‘70s was one of the bloodiest and most turbulent periods in Korean history. Park, Chung-Hee, who led a military coup d’état (5.16 coup d’état) in 1961 and ascended to the presidency in 1967, amended the constitution that forbids the reappointment to presidency and monopolized the political and military power. During his 12 years of presidency until assassinated in 1979, he achieved unprecedented economic progress of Korea, while at the same brutally oppressed any opponents. Rosy slogans of prosperity and modernization were hung on the one side of the streets; the bloods of protestors who had cried for democratization covered another side of the streets. Students and professors were at the center of the resistance movement. Universities became the hub; classes were suspended; students and professors were frequently dragged out in the middle of the classes by military forces. Whether the Korean scholars were active or silent, the Korean politics of the time impinged on their lives and therefore one way or another permeated their studies. They were conscious of it. Kim, Kyung-Hyun justified the choice of his and his fellows by the contemporary situation:

“At that time, to think about the situation of the time in Korea, so-called modernization was the fundamental idea of our society under Park, Chung-Hee’s presidency. Since that modernization was modeled after the Western style of progress, we couldn’t imagine something like a class war. That’s, rather, for
North Koreans… A class war, which is for Socialists or Communists, was unimaginable. But, still, we had to come up with something else to push Korea forward for progress and modernization, and also we had some lingering ancient feudalism. Amidst such conditions, what we could have dreamed of was social reforms. This somewhat explains why historians of [our] generation were interested in the Gracchi reform and the Republican period. In Roman history, the Gracchi reform. It failed as a revolution, but still was a reform.”

Kim, Deog-Su also recounted that the Korean politics goaded Hoe, Seung-II to take up the Gracchi reform:

“…one reason why prof. Hoe, Seung-il was preoccupied with the Gracchi was the political and social atmosphere of the time. Actually he himself said in his book why he began to study the Gracchi reform: 5.16 coup d’état and grain crisis. So, he thought that grain problem is important at any time, and that revolutionary movements always stem from land and grain. He felt such pressure of the time, as an intellectual. That’s why he particularly picked the Gracchi reform as his life-long topic… It was also a trend in Korea. When I was an undergraduate student during the ‘80s, people studied all sorts of social revolutions: the French Revolution, labor movements, socialist movements, the Bolshevik Revolution. Ours was the Gracchi reform.”

The Korean historiography of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform intermingles with the Korean history of the time, as Ronald Syme’s *Roman Revolution* does with the Second World War. This is not the place for further excavating whether the Korean politics colored individual interpretations. Here let us suffice to recognize the connection.
VI. Conclusion

The pioneers of Roman history in Korea, Chi, Dong-Sik, Hoe, Seung-Il, and Kim, Kyung-Hyun, embarked on their studies with the study of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. In the ‘70s when the protests for democratization and the counter oppressions plagued Korea, these Korean scholars picked up a reformist history among other possibilities. Whether they actively hoped to ameliorate the current situation through their reformist studies or they were naturally driven to a comparable topic in Roman history, the Korean contemporary politics encouraged Korean scholars to study Tiberius Gracchus’ reform. The academic atmosphere of both Korea and the West promoted it as well: in Korea, reformist histories, such as the French and the Bolshevik Revolution, were in fashion, and in the West, the Republican history centering on the Gracchi reform was. Thus the Korean historians readily started their studies from Tiberius Gracchus’ reform.

They had neither teachers nor books; they had a few scholarly journals. While reading the journals (not perfectly up-to-date), they learned what recent theories Western historians mainly discussed. They caught that Tibiletti’s study on the *ager publicus*, Boren’s theory of urban crisis, Earl’s prosopographical analysis were recently distinguished works and designed their studies to revolve around them. Moreover, they regarded that it was their job: they as the forerunners of Roman history in Korea should introduce the history based on major Western interpretations on behalf of the future Korean historians. They therefore introduced both the socioeconomic and the prosopographical interpretations that governed the discussion of Tiberius Gracchus’ reform in the West. They also modestly conceded that they were students learning from the Western scholarship and just introduced the Western achievements. Though they depreciated their own works, they did not simply recapitulate the Western works but actively investigated them to find the historical truth between the conflicting Western theories, between the agrarian and the urban
crisis and between the social reformer and the shrewd politician. The Korean historians made substantial accomplishments, even more substantial considering their academic condition. Kim Kyung-Hyun said, “We were like flowers in the wilderness.” Yes, they were.
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