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Editor’s Note

Greetings!

In this issue of Perspectives we bring you two sets of stimulating contributions. The first set contains essays drawn from the three plenary sessions at the 17th Europeanists conference in April 2010, held in Montreal. The first two essays, by CES Chair Cathie Jo Martin and Axel van den Berg, are based on their commentaries in the plenary, The Past and Future of Social Solidarity. Martin’s essay poses the question of why some societies are more equitable and solidaristic than others. Her answer lies in the structure of associations and how they shape employers’ preferences for social policies, as well as the state’s role in supporting these associations. She believes the current crisis will likely strengthen the divergence between solidaristic/coordinated economies and liberal market economies. Axel van den Berg starts from the observation that western welfare states have proved remarkably robust and resilient in the face of numerous challenges and repeated predictions of its demise over several decades. He explores the literature behind some of the key factors that might explain this resilience, including continued public support for the welfare state and its economic benefits. The next two essays, by Peter Hall and Michèle Lamont, are based on the plenary, Successful Societies, which was inspired by the eponymous book Successful Societies: How Institutions and Culture Affect Health (Cambridge University Press, 2009). The two essays together present fascinating insights into this project which explored the social conditions for societal success, understood not simply by measures of economic growth but broader indicators of human health and life satisfaction. The overarching argument of the project roots satisfaction – and thus success – in a broad distribution “across the population of capabilities for coping with the life challenges that all people face” (Hall, this volume). The final essay, by Sophie Meunier, summarizes the discussion from the plenary, Do Transatlantic Relations Still Matter? True to the academic spirit, two panelists – Peter Baldwin and Jeffrey Kopstein – answered largely in the negative, while the two others – François Delattre and Andrew Moravcsik – answered in the affirmative.

The second set of contributions in this volume consists of research reports from CES pre-dissertation fellowship recipients. These reports provide intriguing early results on a range of fascinating projects by rising young scholars. Elizabeth Hanauer, from New York University, reports on her project, “Collective Identity Formation in the French Classroom: The Discourse and Incorporation of Immigration History.” Katie Jarvis, from University of Wisconsin-Madison, reports on her project on the Dames des Halles during the French Revolution. Alexandra Lohse, from American University, tells us about her research on the reactions of “ordinary Germans” to the experience of total war between 1943 and 1945. Ceren Ozgul, from CUNY Graduate Center informs us of her project on the history and meaning of individual conversion from Islam to Christianity in Turkey. Chloe Thurston, from University of California, Berkeley, writes about her research on how European states have managed the growth of non-standard forms of employment since the 1970s. Finally, Tara Tubb informs us of her project, “Mastering the Stasi Past: State and Societal Approaches to Working through the East German Past in Unified Germany.”

Altogether these contributions convey a picture of many key questions about Europe which today occupy scholars across disciplines. We hope you enjoy them as much as we did.

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The Revenge of Coordinated Capitalism?
Reflections from the Presidential Plenary in Montreal

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Introduction

The global financial crisis of 2008 initially seemed to mark the bankruptcy of neoliberal deregulation and a transition to a new era of renewed faith in government, yet the rising fortunes of parties on the right seem to belie this easy lesson. This essay considers the persistence of managed and relatively egalitarian capitalism after the crisis of finance capitalism. I reflect on why some societies are more equitable and solidaristic than others, question whether our beliefs about cross-national variation continue to hold true, and ponder how the financial crisis might affect nations’ capacities to construct coalitions for social solidarity.

The Social Determinants of an Egalitarian, Coordinated Society

Market inequality and dualism have increased substantially in the past few decades and one wonders why some countries are better able than others to sustain relative equality, redistribution and investment in the skills for low-skilled workers against postindustrial treats. In a series of articles and a book manuscript, Duane Swank and I reflect on the possible role for employers in coalitions to sustain welfare state spending and skills investments. We differ from much of the engaging work on class coalitions for equality by our peers, as we believe that employers are potentially important coalitions for programs for low-skilled workers and investigate the conditions under which employers take positions that further social solidarity.1

We argue that the structure of associations shape employers’ preferences for social policies and that the state plays a major role in the creation and sustenance of these associations and in coalition building (see also work by Suzanne Berger, Wolfgang Streeck, and Peter Katzenstein). Corporatist associations have political-economic effects (in producing wage compression), collective action effects (in helping employers work jointly for collective social goods), and cognitive effects (in channeling information, creating identities, and shaping preferences.) These effects are especially important to investments in policies for marginal workers; for example, at a cross-national level, countries with high levels of macro-corporatism had the highest levels of spending on active labor market programs, and, at a micro-level, firm membership in corporatist groups is a significant determinant of firm participation in active labor market programs. These associations also matter to redistribution and relative equality (Martin and Swank, APSR, 2004; Swank and Martin 2009).

Much of our book concerns the emergence and maintenance of diverse types of associations: macro-corporatist groups found in Scandinavia, pluralist ones found in liberal countries, and ones with an intermediate level of sectoral coordination found in Germany and other continental
countries. At the dawn of the 20th century, employers’ peak associations were created to further industrialization and to control worker activism and rising democratization. Party leaders and bureaucrats, in fact, organized these peak employers’ associations to serve their own policy and electoral agendas and to fight politicians representing agricultural interests. Consequently, the rules of political competition and structures of the state mattered greatly to the ultimate form of the groups. In countries with centralized, multiparty systems (as opposed to two-party systems), business-oriented politicians faced potential coalitions of farmers and workers and had incentives to cultivate the organization of their business allies to bolster electoral support against these political competitors. Because these politicians on the right viewed success in parliamentary channels as unlikely, they sought to delegate policy-making authority to peak organizations of employers and labor, thinking that business had a better chance of retaining control when negotiating with workers than when fighting legislative battles against workers and farmers. Thus, corporatism was born, somewhat paradoxically, out of a desire to evade democratic controls, but the countries that were most successful in this evasion ended up becoming the most egalitarian by the end of the 20th century (Martin and Swank, *APSR*, 2008).

In the past quarter-century, deindustrialization pressured the coordinating capacities of business and labor throughout the world. Yet convergence failed to occur, as some countries have been better able than others to resist neoliberal attacks on the welfare state and deregulation. Somewhat surprisingly, those countries with the highest level of coordination – where one might most expect the greatest departure from the old arrangements – have had the most success in sustaining social pacts among business, labor and the state. We suggest that the same features of government that shaped the emergence of corporatist systems – party system features and the centralization of government – have sustained high levels of coordination and attention to the skills needs of even marginal workers against challenges posed by deindustrialization. In part, this is because political leaders in these multi-party coalition governments still need their private-sector constituency groups to bolster their party’s political power against other political parties.

Proportional representation and centralization have also been associated with the growth of the public sector, and countries with large public sectors have greater incentive to enhance the skills of low skilled workers, many of whom end up working within government. Faced with fiscal austerity, public bureaucrats turn to the social partners to help share in the pain of managing economic transition. The associations loathe losing their policymaking authority and tend to participate in these state campaigns to stay in charge. Thus a representative of a Danish peak association told me that “business and labor are like Siamese twins” in seeking to preserve their jurisdictional authority against the state.

**The New Logic of Post-Finance Capitalism**

The essential question is whether this logic will hold in the wake of the financial crisis. Coordination sustained social solidarity (and certain features of government shored up coordination) during the recent period of globalization and deindustrialization, but what happens when the neoliberal attacks end and when the end of these attacks is accompanied by de-globalization and the collapse of major service sectors (in particular finance and retail)? Will the havens of security gain the upper hand, or will the coordinating capacities of egalitarian countries be scaled back? Will the financial crisis threaten our expectations about the impact of coordination on public policy and will it have implications for social science theory?

First, the financial crisis seems to have had an impact on conceptions of appropriate coordination, regulation and big government. Many celebrated the death knoll to deregulation and neoliberalism in the wake of the downturn, and this might ease states’ capacity to embrace coordination and big government. Thus in the Warwick Commission, Len Seabrook, Mark Blythe and others observed a greater need for systemic regulation, because monitoring individual financial instruments was insufficient. The Obama victory gave a sense of excitement on the left that progressive ideas would gain salience in political circles. *Newsweek* – hardly a radical rag – declared that “Big Government Is Back – Big Time” (2/16/09). Yet, the ideological legacy of finance capitalism has been rather mixed. Fred Block points out that recent trends in the US have been toward “reregulation” rather than “deregulation,” because altering regulations allowed firms to renego on worker commitments and create new risky derivatives markets. Moreover, the public has short-term memory, while parties in charge at the crisis point – think New Labour – have lost their bearing.

Second, the financial crisis has had mixed economic implications for egalitarian capitalism and the fiscal slack that enables collective action toward shared social ends. On the one hand, there has been a huge rise in use of expansionary fiscal policies and government stimulus programs in wake of the crisis and a seeming break with the monetarist policies of Thatcher and Reagan. In a moment reminiscent of Nixon’s famous declaration “We are all Keynesians now,” Sarkozy remarked, “Am I a socialist? Perhaps.”

Yet, deregulation was not the only legacy of finance capitalism. Despite lip service to supply-side economics, economic growth in the past decades has been stimulated by consumer-debt-driven demand. If failure is blamed on debt-driven consumption rather than on deregulation, the resurgence of big government is in trouble. As Johannes Lindvall points out, there has been
a decoupling of economic policy from other policymaking realms and macroeconomic stabilization policies with strong commitments to enhancing employment are unlikely to emerge with this crisis as they did during the Great Depression.

Moreover, while the failures of finance capitalism may undercut neoliberal ideology, they also undercut social investments. Bubble economies created fiscal slack for social solidarity and high rates of employment created a labor market need for the low skilled workers, but the financial woes have both reduced economic slack and increased unemployment. Thus a year after the crisis, the Economist (9/26/2009, 29-32) announced that “a leaner and fitter state should emerge” from the crisis, and recommended various forms of “lipo-suction” to cut away the fat.

In addition, the economic crisis may threaten international economic relations, with the rise of economic nationalism and trade protectionism (Financial Times 9/14/2009). Coordinated winners may sustain coordinated capitalism at home, but handle the crisis by “begging their debtors” in less developed countries. Before the crisis, coordinated countries were like college undergraduates on spring break in Eastern Europe, encouraging risky financial ventures with low-interest loans. After the crisis, the major Latvian bank had to be nationalized, the housing bubble burst, and the country’s credit rating was downgraded to junk status (Economist 2/28/09, 27). Thus, even if coordinated countries survive, there may be a dangerous drying up of credit across borders and resurgence of economic nationalism.

Third, the financial crisis seems to confirm our beliefs about the institutional benefits of coordinated capitalism and a large, vibrant state: coordinated countries with high levels of macrocorporatism, infrastructure-bolstering social investments, and large states are best surviving the storm. The Danish bailout plan won high praise from the EU (Outlook 3/12/09), and the Lausanne’s Institute for Management Development ranked Denmark number one in responding to the financial crisis (Financial Times 2/25/09). Firms in coordinated countries also seem to recognize the benefits of coordination during these troubled times; thus, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared the crisis good for Danish energy companies because cooperation improved firms’ competitive positions (“Financial Crisis is Good for the Danish Energy Companies, 10/28/08”). Liberal countries are learning rather different lessons from the crisis, moving to cut spending to the bone. Thus our theories about continuing divergence are likely to withstand this new critical juncture.

Yet, at this moment of transition, a big question about the persistence of social solidarity concerns solidarity for whom? Are we only concerned about the insular countries of Western Europe, or should we worry about a broader cross-section of humanity? Perhaps the financial crisis reinforces our beliefs about the benefits of coordination and a strong state, but one wonders what will be the impact of the end of finance capitalism on the truly disadvantaged.

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Some Notes on the Future of Social Solidarity
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Introduction

Ever since the end of what the French call *les trentes glorieuses*, wave after wave of commentators has assured us that the future of social solidarity, in particular as expressed in the welfare state that was largely constructed during that period, is bleak. First the ‘fiscal crisis’ resulting from the era of ‘stagflation’ was forecast to lead to an inevitable dismantling of the welfare state (see, e.g., O’Connor 1973), then globalization was to force competing nations into a ‘race to the bottom’ (Mishra 1999), then the introduction of the Euro was seen as a more or less deliberate strategy to undermine Europe’s welfare states (Hay 2000; Martin and Ross 1999), and now we are told that the Greek debt crisis is just the beginning of an inevitable wave of cutbacks to get our collective fiscal houses in order again. It is ‘payback time’ at last, according to a recent article in the *New York Times*, as “The deficit crisis that threatens the euro has also undermined the sustainability of the European standard of social welfare, built by left-leaning governments since the end of World War II” (Erlanger 2010).

Yet these successive waves of dire predictions have been consistently found to be greatly exaggerated. While there certainly has been a considerable amount of deregulation and privatization during the period of supposed neoliberal hegemony that followed *les trentes glorieuses*, there has been significant re-regulation as well (Sarfati and Bonoli 2002) and overall government social expenditures as a proportion of GDP has barely budged in most OECD countries (Adema and Ladaigue 2009; Castles 2005; Navarro, Schmitt and Astudillo 2004). There is room for debate about whether or not this means that there has been a significant retreat from an erstwhile social contract (see Clasen and Siegel 2007; Korpi 2003). As well, there is no question that many of the programs implemented during the postwar period have undergone significant reforms in many countries over the past couple of decades, mostly in an ‘activating’ direction (see, e.g., Palier 2010). But overall, the welfare state appears to be considerably more robust than the pessimists have feared and than its detractors had hoped. What accounts for this remarkable robustness?

In these short reflections I want to consider two main sets of reasons for this surprising durability. Together, I think, they provide grounds for a rather more optimistic perspective on the future fate of the welfare state, although, of course, at this point no one can predict with any degree of confidence what the outcome of the present debt crisis is going to be. I will mainly consider the classical social protection policies, such as unemployment benefits, pensions, sickness benefits and social assistance. I will leave other major programs that are sometimes viewed as part of the state’s social expenditures, in particular publicly provided or insured healthcare and education, largely aside. My main reason for this is that these latter programs are much less controversial than the former ones, at least with respect to the issues I wish to discuss in this paper.
Social Protection and Public Opinion: A Surprisingly Enduring Consensus

Since WWII we have allegedly witnessed two massive swings of the political pendulum: the rise of the welfare state/‘Keynesian’/Fordist state-market accommodation from the 1950s until the late 1970s, followed by the neoliberal reaction against its supposed excesses. Much of that neoliberal reaction - such as it was - consisted of the claim that the welfare state as it had been constructed in most Western countries in the postwar period had become economically unsustainable and needed, therefore, to be drastically cut back. Yet for all the rhetorical bluster by the various representatives of this supposedly newly ‘hegemonic’ neoliberal creed (see, e.g., Peck 2001), the remarkable thing is that it appears to have had little or no effect on public opinion. In spite of 30-odd years of supposed neoliberal retrenchment, an almost ‘social-democratic’ consensus about the desirability of the range of social protection programs as a way to guarantee a minimum standard of living for all appears to have endured across the advanced democracies. The remarkable resilience of this cross-national consensus has been documented time and again in the growing body of literature on public opinion with respect to various forms of publicly provided social protection since the 1970s. While there are some important and systematic differences between countries as well as programs, virtually everywhere where such survey research has been conducted most standard social protection policies meet with majority or even overwhelming majority support among the general public.

Slightly oversimplified, the general patterns are as follows. Across the board, overwhelming majorities favor governmental responsibility for health care for the sick and a decent standard of living for the old. In most countries the proportions of the population supporting these notions run between 80 to over 90%. But even in the United States, for all its welfare state exceptionalism, around three quarters of the population support statements along these lines. State provision of ‘a decent standard of living for the unemployed’ and income redistribution and social assistance (‘welfare’ in the US) receive more variable support across countries, with solid majorities in favor of both on the European continent but roughly between 30 and 50% support in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Bean and Papadakis 1998; Svalfors 2003; Svalfors 1997; Svalfors 2004).

Even more striking, however, is the stability over time of these generally favorable attitudes towards welfare state programs across the industrialized world, or at least the ‘older’ industrialized countries of Europe, North America and the Antipodes. While the occasional dip and peak is recorded in the literature, generally in connection with changes in government and public discourse, overall and over the entire period from the earliest surveys in the 1980s until the latest available figures, majority public support for the range of policies associated with the welfare state has remained stable and solid (Bean and Papadakis 1998; Brooks and Manza 2007; Edlund and Svalfors 2009; Svalfors 2003). This robustness of public support for welfare programs is all the more remarkable since it largely holds even for the US, the supposed anti-welfare outlier, and it appears to have withstood the aforementioned swing of the pendulum towards a new neoliberal ‘hegemony’ quite unscathed.

To be sure, there has been plenty of debate at the margins about the means (private vs. public provision) and the levels and conditions of various forms of social protection in each of the countries concerned. Moreover, there is room for debate about whether public opinion follows or determines policy in these matters (Brooks and Manza 2006; Brooks and Manza 2007). Yet the sheer solidity of public opinion in this regard suggests to me that it would be quite difficult indeed for any government to advocate anything other than marginal tinkering with the classic welfare state programs, even in the face of dire financial circumstances. Or could the current debt crisis be so severe that, public support or no, we simply can’t afford the luxury of the current welfare state?

Social Protection and the Economy: It’s Not All Deadweight

Note that all pessimistic forecasts about the future fate of the welfare state have one thing in common: they all assume that social welfare programs are inherently a net burden on the economy, i.e., that higher levels of social protection and growth and employment have a negative relationship. This is by now a vast literature trying to link social expenditures and economic growth is far from clear. There is a strong prediction of a negative relationship between higher levels of social protection and growth and employment have not been borne out in the data. While some studies find support for these propositions, empirical results are very fragile and not robust in regard to changes in sample size or statistical specification” (Mares 2007: 67)
In view of such findings a number of authors have come to the conclusion that the welfare state is essentially neutral with respect to economic performance, that is, it does not necessarily hurt economic growth (e.g., Bassanini and Venn 2008; Honeck 2006; Kenworthy 2004; Korpi 1985; Lindert 2004; Mares 2007; Scruggs and Allan 2006). But what if the welfare state, or at least some variants or aspects of it, are actually supportive of economic efficiency, productivity and growth? There are a number of suggestions, scattered over more or less unconnected literatures, as to how, why and when this might in fact be the case. Here I can only briefly refer to a few which seem to me to be worthy of much more systematic attention than they have received so far.

Roughly speaking, one can distinguish between four types of arguments in favor of economically beneficial effects of social protection policies: economic, political, social-psychological and macro-sociological arguments. The economic arguments range from those about the benefits of ’Keynesian stabilizers,’ which have been revived forcefully in the wake of the present financial crisis (see, for instance, the lively debates about Clarke 2009 ; Skidelsky 2009), to the argument that generous income support for the unemployed may actually improve the eventual ’matching’ of job seekers and jobs (Bassanini and Venn 2008; Marimon and Zilibotti 1999). While both of these arguments have some prima facie plausibility—though the Keynesian argument deals with stabilization rather than growth—the highly technical literature on the latter and the highly politically charged debate on the former remain, for now, rather inconclusive.

By political arguments I mean a variety of neocorporatist claims to the effect that under certain institutional conditions—including, at a minimum, strong unions and employers’ organizations and centralized bargaining—a well-developed welfare state can serve to underwrite relatively cooperative industrial relations, which, in turn, can produce the prudent, well-balanced wage and employment bargains that support competitiveness and growth in the economy as a whole. It is an idea that has been around for some time (Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982; Schmitter 1974; Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979) and that has spawned a vast and contentious literature. While the general argument continues to attract attention (Mares 2007: 76), attempts to test it empirically have been fraught with specification, overdetermination, and comparability problems (Smith 1992: Ch. 6).

Then there is a variety of ’social-psychological’ arguments based on the notion that workers who feel less insecure will act in ways that promote rather than undermine productivity and growth. Probably the best-known version of this argument originates from the literature on internal labor markets, but it has also been presented in favor of job protection legislation. The argument is that if workers feel safe and secure in their current jobs or with their current employers, then they will be more willing to invest in their own human capital, in particular so-called ’specific’ human capital (i.e., not transferable between employers and/or occupations), as well as more willing to share their skills and knowledge with fellow workers than would otherwise be the case (Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn 2009; Osterman 1988).

But while internal labor markets appear to be on the wane, and job protection legislation of the kind practiced in the Mediterranean countries is definitely out of favor, there is a slightly different variant of this argument with a particular Scandinavian flavor. Here the argument is that security of earnings and employability provided by generous unemployment insurance benefits and training and job-searching support will render workers more willing to invest in their own specific and general human capital, to share their knowledge with fellow workers, and to accept technological change and to take on jobs that are relatively risky in terms of their long-term employment prospects. This argument has been made in particular on behalf of the Danish and Swedish versions of what is now called ’flexicure’: the combination of generous unemployment insurance benefits and a strong emphasis on activation through skill upgrading increases the willingness of workers to take risks and move between jobs and employers (Acémoglu and Shimer 2000; Bassanini and Venn 2008; Mares 2007; van den Berg 2009). It has been applied to independent entrepreneurs as well: social security, including the assurance of an adequate pension, encourages greater risk-taking on the part of (presumably relatively small) entrepreneurs as well (Sinn 1996). Plausible as these ideas may appear at first sight, they have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to test empirically (as my colleagues and I found out the hard way: van den Berg, Füräker and Johansson 1997; van den Berg et al. 2000).

But the original framers of the so-called ’Swedish Model’ were under no illusion that the security provided by generous ’passive’ benefits would automatically turn Swedish workers into enthusiastic risk-takers and job-hoppers. In addition, they recommended a stringent regime of ’active labor market policies,’ the aim of which was not only to counteract any possible negative incentive effects of those benefits, but also to enhance the smooth functioning of the labor market in the face of accelerated structural change and help reconcile the unions to that accelerated change (van den Berg, Furäker and Johansson 1997: 86-90). Today, ’activation’ is all the rage across the range of different welfare state regimes (Bonoli 2010; van den Berg 2008), although there are enormous differences in its mode of implementation (Pascual and Magnusson 2007). Current policy makers are no doubt in part motivated by a desire to get the (long-term) unemployed off the benefit rolls. The evidence that these policies actually succeed in doing this, particularly in times of high unemployment, is decidedly mixed (for a quite critical review of the evaluation literature on Sweden’s long-standing policies, see Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström 2002; see also Martin and Grubb 2001). Even so, the many current experiments with a wide range of programs encouraging, coaxing or even forcing benefit recipients to find employment, acquire skills that enhance their employability, etc. (OECD 2003: p. 174) may well have long-term beneficial effects for the economy as a whole, even if they do not necessarily succeed in putting the unemployed back to work in the short term. This was, in effect, what Gösta Rehn, one of the architects of the original Swedish approach, thought would be one of the main payoffs of active labor policies: even if during periods of relative job scarcity some of the unemployed are effectively simply ’parked’ in some ’active’ program or other, this may still have the considerable economic benefit of preventing human capital atrophy and enlarging the pool of labor well-
prepared to go back to work at the end of the downturn. This, too, strikes me as at least *prima facie* a plausible claim, but not one that has, to my knowledge, been seriously tested empirically. Finally, under the rubric of macro-sociological beneficial effects, I would consider a whole range of desiderata, from lower crime rates to better popular health, that may well result from generous social protection programs. There is now a burgeoning literature on such more diffuse social benefits (see, e.g., Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). There is no doubt that the potential economic benefits from such effects are quite considerable, but we are still very far from being able to make any reasonable estimates as to the net size of such benefits.

In short, there are a number of ways in which at least some welfare state programs may well generate quite sizeable benefits for the economy. But we still know painfully little about whether and when this is in fact the case and how large the net benefits are likely to be. There is a vast potential research agenda here for social scientists who are willing and able to conduct research that may or may not end up confirming their political biases and preferences. Meanwhile, policy makers would be well-advised to tread carefully when contemplating drastic changes in welfare state programs in their attempts to deal with the current budget crisis, lest they throw out the economic baby with the social bath water.

**Conclusion**

It is, of course, seriously misleading to talk about the welfare state as though it was a single set of institutions to be found in all countries concerned. In fact, as a growing literature has made clear, even talking about any limited number—whether three, four, or five—of distinct ‘welfare regimes’ constitutes a gross oversimplification. Each country has its own complicated web of inter-articulated institutions and programs which may look quite similar but produce radically different effects, or look quite different and produce surprisingly similar ones. When it comes to the economic effects of the welfare state, or the implications of the current debt crisis for the welfare state, such simplification borders on the disingenuous. Any such complex set of policies, programs and institutions is bound to have all kinds of possibly contradictory economic effects and, as a result, the debt crisis has no general implications for the welfare state.

In fact, the euro crisis does not appear to have undermined the welfare state as such, but rather certain quite specific welfare states, namely the more or less clientelistic ones around the Mediterranean rim. The Nordic countries, with their far more elaborate and expensive welfare states, seem to have weathered the current crisis much better—with the exception of Iceland, that is. These Nordic countries are also the ones that have most consciously and explicitly designed their welfare programs to be compatible with, and supportive of, a successful, heavily export-dependent private sector. In the process they may have learned to put some of the beneficent potential of certain (combinations of) welfare state programs to their advantage. It is high time that we researchers start catching up.

**References**


What creates a successful society? There is no simple answer to this question because decisions about the criteria by which success should be measured inevitably depend on normative judgments that are contestable, and real-world conditions often entail concessions on some dimensions of success to secure improvements in others. For these reasons, even the most sophisticated efforts to address this problem, such as Amartya Sen's impressive theory of development as freedom, can be frustratingly indeterminate. As Michèle Lamont and I argue in Successful Societies: How Institutions and Culture Affect Health (Cambridge University Press 2009), however, this question is too important to ignore. Even when the answers are necessarily incomplete, social scientists should be asking such questions. Although there is a natural preference for more tractable subjects, the watchword of social science should not be 'convenience'. We need to advance our understanding not only of how societies work but of how they can work better.

The approach to this problem adopted by the Successful Societies volume is to take the health of the population as a relatively uncontroversial indicator of well-being, without suggesting it is the only important element of social success, and then ask: how can our understandings of the conditions that advance population health be expanded? For our initial intuitions, we rely on an important literature in social epidemiology and then bring to the issues a wide range of observations about the social roles of institutions and cultural frameworks. Our objective is to show that population health offers fruitful terrain for the inquiries of social science.

The analysis generates a 'capabilities' approach to population health. One of the implications is that the success of a society depends on the distribution across the population of capabilities for coping with the life challenges that all people face, such as those associated with finding a partner, securing housing, raising children and the like. This concept of 'capabilities' is more limited than that of Sen's but more concrete. Where there is better balance between those challenges and a person's capabilities, that person will experience less of the 'wear and tear of daily life' that is now widely believed to have pervasive effects on health through the experiences of stress, anxiety and frustration it engenders.

Social science can then ask: how do the structures of the economy, polity and society condition the distribution of capabilities across the population? We argue that they do so by giving rise to a specific distribution of economic and social resources on which people draw for their capabilities. Thus, the organization of the national or regional political economy is associated with particular distributions of income and autonomy in the workplace. The structure of a society, associated with the shape of the social hierarchy and the factors that condition social connectedness, also distributes social prestige, recognition, and connections to social networks that are constitutive of capabilities. Here, we argue that cultural frameworks matter as much as social institutions. The collective imaginary of a society, composed of narratives that link its past to its future, accord recognition to
particular groups that can affect the level of cooperation they receive from others and generate feelings of belonging that are also important to the capabilities and social resilience of individuals. This analysis provides terms in which societies can be compared that speak to the success of those societies.

In this analysis, there are also important implications for public policy-making. We live in a neo-liberal era in which governments are invariably attentive to the effects of their policies on the structure of the market economy. When policies are formulated, officials typically ask: what effects will this policy have on the structure of market incentives? But they are much less likely to ask: what effects will this policy have on the structure of society? As a result, policies with well-intended objectives often have perverse ancillary effects on the distribution of social resources. While stimulating economic development, they may erode the longstanding social networks intrinsic to the social connectedness of communities or shift the terms in which social belonging is defined. Therefore, we argue that governments should see public policy-making, not only as efforts to improve the allocation of economic resources, but also as a process of social-resource creation. If governments fail to do so, policies designed to allocate economic resources can inadvertently erode social resources.

The contributors to this symposium offer important suggestions about how inquiries of this sort into successful societies can be extended. In terms reminiscent of E.P. Thompson’s account of the ‘moral economy’, Natalie Davis reminds us that the collective imaginaries support particular kinds of collective mobilization, moral engagement and senses of worth that can be crucial to individual, as well as collective, well-being, for what they tell people about what they owe to and can expect from others. Her suggestions that the family is an important site for social success and that gender roles are intrinsic to social well-being point to important lines of inquiry. She is quite right that those inquiries should be attentive to the voices of the actors. The sinews of society are built on the mobilization of meaning.

The innovative analysis of Claus Offe is complementary in many ways and also appropriately political. He associates the success of a society with the ways in which it assigns responsibility, arguing that politics is at least partly about the management of responsibility and one metric of social success might turn on whether the assignment of responsibility in a society is ultimately fair. This is an especially important point in an era when market ideologies that assign the individual responsibility for much of what happens to him are now being called into question and, as Jane Jenson argues, when states are reconsidering how responsibility for such fundamental tasks as the rearing of children and the care of aging parents should be assigned among the public, private and community sectors.

Bo Rothstein notes that there is more to social success than life expectancy and urges scholars to be more attentive to indices of life satisfaction. We should care about whether life is ‘nasty’ and ‘brutish’ as well as whether it is ‘short’. This is an important point. Scholars such as John Helliwell are doing interesting cross-national work on life satisfaction, which seems to be a more stable indicator than alternative measures of happiness. We are conscious, however, that responses to questions about life satisfaction are conditioned by the expectations of the respondents, which may vary cross-nationally in ways that must also be taken into account if such questions are to be good indicators of societal success. The quality of governance is also a crucial determinant of these outcomes. Efforts to measure the broader dimensions of social success reflect important steps beyond conventional measures couched largely in terms of national income.

The overarching point here, however, is that we need not only better indicators of successful societies, but renewed ways of understanding how success is generated. For those of us interested in comparison across Europe and beyond it, that entails finding new terms in which to compare societies. In recent years, social science has vastly improved its understanding of how to compare polities and economies. There is real value in extending such comparisons to the structures of society. At present, many scholars think of that primarily as a matter involving the distribution of income. We should be thinking more broadly, however, about the distribution of life chances and about the ways in which institutional and cultural frameworks structure the interactions that are not only central to social life but constitutive of the social resources that contribute to individual and collective well-being.

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What makes a Society Successful?
Michele Lamont, Harvard University

Following the fall of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe, many people expected life spans in these countries to increase as new freedoms and opportunities became available. Subsequently, male life expectancy in the Czech Republic increased to 72 years by 2001, but dropped to barely 59 years in Russia. That is a difference of thirteen years of life, on average, per man. You would not see that kind of discrepancy between two societies, even if one had a cure for cancer and the other did not. What do these findings mean? Do they reflect the difference between a successful and a less successful society? Does it even make sense to compare societies in terms of their relative success? Below I discuss the work of social scientists who came to be convinced that we should take this question seriously.

In 2003, the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) invited a multidisciplinary group of researchers to work together on the question of what might constitute a successful society and how to study it. The results of our work together were published in the fall of 2009 in a collective volume titled, Successful Societies: How Institutions and Culture Affect Health, which was the object of a plenary session at the last meeting of the Council for European Studies held in Montréal in last April. The group and our advisory committee includes several Europeanists (Marcos Ancelovici, Natalie Zemon Davis, Jane Jenson, Peter Hall, William Sewell, myself) as well as a number of comparativists and macro social scientists (Peter Evans, Peter Gourevitch, Will Kimlicka, and Biju Rao among others). Our collective insights could be of use to experts on Europe who often ponder the relative merits of the “Scandinavian model,” the “European welfare state,” “the American neoliberal regime,” etc.

To consider societal success, think of the famous Indian parable of the six blind men and the elephant. Each man touches a different part of the pachyderm and makes prediction about what the animal as a whole looks like. One touches the tail and says it is like a rope. Another finds its front leg and thinks an elephant is like a tree. Only by putting all of their experiences together do they get at a complete description of an elephant. So it goes for our group.

Obviously, average lifespan is a suitable measure of societal success. But you can also measure success by how equitable a society is; or by how well it deals with an epidemic such as AIDS; or by how minority groups are treated by the majority. There are other equally valid measures. But our group started with health-related measures, as these appeared to be less culturally biased than other measures – almost everyone agrees that it is a good thing to have low infant mortality and high life expectancy.

Whereas epidemiologists write about how the wear and tear of everyday life, i.e., stress, gets under the skin to produce poor health outcomes for lower income populations, our group wanted to know how institutions and collective myths and ideals intervene to mediate this relationship. What do societies do to alleviate the wear and tear? How does shared hope generate collective
resilience? How can institutions buffer individuals from the vagaries of the market? These are the types of questions that drove our collective inquiry. Each of us focused on one aspect of successful societies and how they may buffer individuals and help them face various challenges. Some considered the conditions producing more effective institutions, while others focused on less inter-group violence, more equal distribution of resources, and so forth.

Our multidimensional view draws on the work of the economist Nobel Laureate Amyrtia Sen to emphasize capabilities, as opposed to purely economic indexes. However, we defined capabilities more broadly to consider capability as much as recognition and cultural membership, social inclusion as much as democratic participation, cultural tolerance as much as economic growth. Social networks, social identity, social hierarchies, collective action, boundaries, and social capital are the analytical tools that our research group mobilized to analyze these various dimensions of successful societies.

We proposed that as the life challenges facing a person loom larger relative to his or her capabilities for coping with them, we expect the wear and tear of daily life to take a greater toll on that person’s health, because s/he is likely to have more intense feelings of anger, anxiety, depression or stress. We explore how specific types of institutional and cultural structures condition people’s capabilities. The perspective suggests not only that meaning-making and social resources can be as important as material resources to the balance between capabilities and life challenges, but also that social resources are not always as tightly coupled with economic inequality as some analyses imply.

In sub-Saharan Africa, governments are struggling to cope with an AIDS epidemic that is devastating the continent. But the governments usually seen as most effective are not necessarily the ones coping best with that epidemic. In Botswana, for instance, arguably the best governed of African states, the rate of HIV infection has climbed, despite intensive public health campaigns. By contrast, Uganda has had more corruption and less democratic governance, but is coping with the epidemic more successfully. How can these differences in the success of AIDS prevention strategies be explained? One of our group members, Ann Swidler at the University of California, Berkeley, has found the answer by examining how governments have been able to mobilize the population by evoking elements of their collective identity – of their collective sense of who they are together to solve the crisis. This led us to think that dignity, recognition, and group membership have a lot to do with what may define a successful society.

Along similar lines, health experts in British Columbia have shown that variations in suicide rates across First Nation tribes can be explained in large part by the extent to which tribes are able to pass on to their youth a sense of pride in their shared past and common future and to teach them to respect, honor, and take responsibility for their cultural heritage; their collective identity. This case exemplifies the importance of promoting recognition of a wide range of people as a dimension of societal success. Similarly, we have evidence that the election of Barack Obama mattered for the well-being of some African-Americans, as it signaled change in their cultural membership within the American polity.

Within the context of our program, I considered the bridging of group boundaries as a dimension of successful societies. I analyzed how members of low-status groups respond to their stigmatization. Whether or not societies make available cultural repertoires that empower them to not be “losers” is important from the perspective of societal success. Whether societies sustain multiple matrixes for defining a worthy life is crucial, and this is the question which we consider in our next book “Social Resilience in the Age of Neo-Liberalism,” which we hope to complete next year. Stay tuned.

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References


The first plenary session started off the 2010 CES conference with a provocative question: Do transatlantic relations still matter? This is a timely query as Europeans are questioning President Obama’s commitment to the transatlantic relationship and Americans are questioning the relevance of Europe in the 21st century.

On the European side, the election of Barack Obama did wonders to the image of the US, which had been tarnished after the end of the Cold War and especially under the presidency of George W. Bush. Quicker and cheaper than any public diplomacy program, the election of an internationally-minded, highly educated African-American Democrat with a penchant for subtlety and compromise improved the favorable opinions of the U.S. abroad almost overnight, often by more than thirty percentage points in Western Europe. More than a year into his presidency, Obama still benefits from a prolonged honeymoon period in most of Europe, much more so than he does at home. Yet the same time, Western and Eastern European leaders feel they have been “neglected” by Obama. They deplore that Europe is no longer on the American radar screen. It is as if Europe was no longer the solution to the world’s problems, nor the source of the world’s problems, so why care? A series of public snubs and disappointments, such as Obama’s absence at the Berlin Wall celebration in November 2009, his skipping the US-EU summit in May 2010, and the failure of the Copenhagen climate conference in December 2009, are reinforcing many European policy-makers in their assessment and worry that Obama is indeed, sadly, a “post-European”.

On the American side, the importance of the transatlantic economic relationship is obvious, and so is the feeling that Americans and Europeans are part of the same political and economic family. However, the nagging European fear that Europe is no longer the source or the solution to the world’s problems seems confirmed by American actions. In trade, the US has all but given up on a meaningful multilateral agreement and is instead focusing its efforts on a multitude of bilateral deals in which Europe is not a party. In foreign policy, the US is concerned about appeasing its relations with Pakistan, Iran, Russia and China, and the transatlantic relationship seems increasingly irrelevant to deal with these issues, especially as long as the Europeans cannot get their own house in order and speak with a single voice.

So, do transatlantic relations still matter? Two of the panelists argued that they have lost relevance and don’t matter as much as they used to, while two argued that Europe is a major power to be reckoned with, making the transatlantic relationship more vital and vibrant than ever.

Peter Baldwin, Professor of History at UCLA and author of The Narcissism of Minor Differences: How America and Europe Are Alike (Oxford University Press, 2009) asked whether transatlantic relations still matter to anyone else besides the transatlantic partners. Not really, he argued, and for other countries, the differences between Europe and the United States appear invisible and inconsequential, even though the processes by which they have achieved these similarities have
been different. In four areas, however, Europe and America exhibit sharp contrasts and their powers of attraction over the rest of the world differ accordingly. In the military arena, the EU is not much of a model to be emulated, since security is a global public good that has to be provided by someone ultimately. Similarly, with respect to knowledge development, whether it be genetically modified organisms or Google for instance, the rest of the world is not following in European footsteps. When it comes to religion, Europe appears pretty unique in its post-religious, though not post-Christian, secularity. By contrast, in the area of demography and immigration, the American model seems pretty unique and unlikely to be emulated. Nevertheless, these differences are small overall, and the rest of the world increasingly looks elsewhere to come up with their own model of economic development and social organization.

For Jeffrey Kopstein, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the University of Toronto, transatlantic relations still matter but not as much as they used to, in large part because of the inability and unwillingness of the EU and key European players to act or think strategically vis-à-vis the outside world. The world has changed, but the transatlantic partners have not fully adapted. The evolution of NATO is a case in point: nobody would invent it today if it did not already exist. It is not clear what purpose it fulfills, what security dilemma it responds to, or how it surpasses other, competing international security fora. Whereas the Americans pushed hard for EU and NATO expansion, a policy that ran through both Bill Clinton’s and George W. Bush’s presidencies, this now appears to have been taken off the table. Instead we now have the realist “reset” with Russia. The reset, undertaken in the hopes of eliciting cooperation on Iran, entailed the end of missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, the abandonment of the push to expand NATO to Ukraine and Georgia, some sort of deal not to make waves regarding Russian meddling in Kyrgyzstan, and an acquiescence in Europe’s tacit decision to suspend or slow down on EU enlargement to Turkey and other destinations on the new European periphery. This new American policy departure, it must be said, is having profound effects on the continent, some of them perhaps unintended. For one thing, the West Europeans have made their peace with Russia’s new assertiveness and have quietly suggested to the new EU members that they do the same. At the same time, elites of the new accession states and especially the elites of the new European and Eurasian periphery are paying an extraordinarily high price for the reset and, in the case of those outside of the EU, for their diminishing prospects of being admitted in the medium term. And so, while transatlantic security relations may not matter as much as to the traditional transatlantic allies, it remains true that their impact on those traditionally outside of the European alliance remains profound.

Taking a contrarian view to these assessments about the withering significance of the transatlantic relationship, François Delattre, Ambassador of France to Canada, argued by contrast that transatlantic relations have never been as important as today for meeting the challenges of globalization and a new strategic environment. When it comes to globalization, both pillars of the transatlantic relationship display a remarkable convergence of interests and objectives, mostly because their economies are so interdependent, being each other’s main economic partner. Whereas the media often focuses sensationaly on the growing importance taken on by the Chinese economy, the fact is that today the European market is five times larger for the US than the Chinese market, and 56% of total American investments are currently in Europe. North America and Europe also share the same objectives when it comes to the downsides of globalization, such as preventing social dumping. This interdependence and the commonality of their social and economic interests lead Europe and the US to be crucial anchors of global economic governance, whether in the WTO or in the G20. The transatlantic relationship is also crucial for dealing with a changing strategic environment. In an “era of relative power”, in the words of French president Nicolas Sarkozy, where no single country is able to impose its vision by itself, Europe has become not only a major player but also a model and reference. Europeans have learned to cooperate and seek everyday solutions that take into account the interest of others. Therefore it is a natural pillar of the multipolar world, with North America as another crucial pillar sharing the same goals and aspirations.

For Andrew Moravcsik, Professor of Politics and International Affairs and Director of the European Union Program at Princeton University, and Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, transatlantic relations matter immensely because it is Europe, not China or India, which will be the second global superpower, both in military and civilian terms, for most of the 21st century. This is already true today, though few people, including Europeans, realize it. Excessive pessimism about Europe’s decline stems in part from a tendency to focus on headline-grabbing problems, such as those that often dominate the US-China relationship, rather than stable and incremental cooperation, such as dominates the US-European relationship. But, more fundamentally, it stems from a basic theoretical misunderstanding by realists, who continue to hold 19th century views about the primacy of “hard” power population, aggregate national income, and military force in great power relations. Many scholars and statesmen would concede that most 21st century global problems can be managed only using “civilian” power, which rests on high per capita income, high technology, international institutions, a robust civil society, close alliances with influential actors, and attractive of social and political values. By this measure, Europe is the world’s second superpower. Yet when these same people assess the relative geopolitical standing of nations, they revert to 19th century categories: only big countries with big populations, large aggregate income, a single sovereign state, and massively manned military are
treated as superpowers. They fail to understand that active global power projection is increasingly a luxury good available only to those states with high per capita incomes—which is why China and India do so little of it. Even in the military area, Europe, with 21% of the world’s military spending, has 100,000 troops active in global combat situations, compared to China or India, with 4% and 3% of global military spending respectively, and a couple of thousand troops abroad each. Hence, the endless debates about institutionalizing, centralizing and strengthening of European foreign policy as preconditions for the exercise of Euro-power are beside the point: power does not need to be centralized to be usable in the networked world of the 21st century. The transatlantic relationship is more crucial than ever. One pillar, the US, provides the hard power (and is the “second superpower” on the civilian side) while the other pillar, Europe, specializes in the use of economic influence, international law, and power of attraction (while remaining the “second superpower” on the military side). None of this is likely to change for two or three generations. Whether Europe has been weakened by its successive difficulties, from the constitutional debate to the Greek crisis, or whether Europe does not get enough credit for being an actual superpower, what is indubitable is that it is in need of a new narrative in order to be taken seriously. Until then, transatlantic relations may not seem as attractive to the US as they used to be. Yet with the rise of new global and regional powers, it increasingly seems that Europe and the US are in the same boat when it comes to globalization. Maybe transatlantic relations do not seem to matter as much as they used to the rest of the world, as our panelists argued, but to Europeans and Americans, they seem to matter more than ever.

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Andrew W. Mellon Foundation
Pre-Dissertation Award Fellowship Reports

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Thanks to the Council for European Studies Fellowship, I just returned from an invaluable month of pre-dissertation research in Paris. Setting out, my main objectives were: 1) to study the education initiatives and work of the National Center of Immigration History (CNHI); 2) to conduct interviews with high school history teachers to test interview protocol and see what issues teachers are raising as most salient in regards to teaching about immigration; 3) to make contacts at high schools in the region to identify potential sites for my study next fall; 4) to meet with scholars in my field. All of this I set out to accomplish with an eye to guiding and focusing my research questions and methodology for my dissertation.

I started my research at the CNHI where during my first two weeks in Paris I observed three teacher training sessions. These sessions, which generally included a lecture and a guided visit of the immigration history museum followed by a group discussion, were extremely interesting in terms of understanding how the CNHI Education Department is working with and approaching teachers, as well as how their advocacy for the teaching of immigration history is understood and received by teachers. These sessions also proved to be extremely fruitful for me in terms of making contacts with teachers and schools. One of the teacher trainers I met at the first session I attended sent an email out on my behalf to teachers in the Versailles school district, and it was through this email that I recruited most of the teachers I interviewed. In addition to these training sessions, I spent some time in the newly opened library and media center at the CNHI where I was able to consult books and film that I cannot access in the United States. I also interviewed the head of the Education Department and a history teacher who works closely with the CNHI on designing their education materials.

I conducted a total of five interviews in January. These interviews were extremely beneficial to my research as they allowed me to test out my questions, become a more experienced interviewer, and even with this small sample, see some common themes emerge from the data. Additionally through each teacher I interviewed I was able to learn more about their school and with some spoke about the possibility of conducting research at their institution next year. Finally, the process of recruiting interviewees was extremely rewarding, as there was clearly high interest among teachers to be interviewed on my topic. However, because of my time constraints, I was unable to meet with and interview all of the teachers who contacted me. I therefore have a reserve of contacts for my future research trips.

Through teachers, the CNHI staff, professors and other contacts, I visited high schools in the Paris region (both in the city proper and in the suburbs) to identify and gain access to schools for my research starting next fall. This was the most challenging task, as I knew that cold calling
schools would not get me far, and therefore I was reliant on the contacts I made. I identified one suburban school that could be a good fit for my study, and where I was able to spend an entire day during which I sat in on classes, spoke with teachers and students, and met with the principal who said I was welcome to conduct research at the school next year. However, I was unable to spend this much time at other schools where I made varying degrees of contacts. Furthermore, I am looking for three schools that fit my methodological criteria, as I am planning a comparative case study where I will compare schools based on differing student demographics. Therefore, my main objective for when I return to Paris in May will be to visit more schools and meet with more teachers and principals in order to finalize the site selection for my study.

Between observations, interviews, and school visits, I met with several key scholars in my field to get their input on my research. In particular I met with historians Nancy Green and Philippe Joutard who have both worked extensively with the CNHI (Joutard is currently President of the CNHI Pedagogy Committee) and were helpful in talking through my research plans. I also spent a day with sociologist Nacira Guenif-Souilamas at the University of Paris Nord. In addition to discussing my research, I sat in on one of her education classes where I was able to talk through my project with her students. Finally, I met with researchers (and history teachers) working for the National Institute of Pedagogical Research (INRP), Benoit Falaize and Laurence De Cock, who have published studies on the teaching of controversial topics such as immigration and colonization which sit at the crossroads of research and practice in history education. They were extremely helpful in pointing me towards resources for textbook and curricula analysis and have also invited me to speak at a conference next fall.

My research is situated within the context of public debate in France over immigration and national identity. It was therefore excellent timing for me to be in Paris this January, as I was able to attend two of the public town hall forums/debates on national identity that were organized (amid much controversy) by the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development between November 2009 and January 2010. I also attended a press conference for the launch of a book/call to action, “Call for a Multicultural and Postracial Republic,” put together by five prominent scholar activists. These public events provided me with rich data, as well as a more nuanced understanding of how issues of national identity, immigration, and multiculturalism are viewed today in France and how the education system relates to and reflects these debates.

While I am still in the process of transcribing and analyzing the data I collected, it is clear to me that this month of research will shape my dissertation. My interviews, observations, readings, and conversations with scholars and practitioners have shed light on those questions that are most salient. For example, one of the issues that caught my attention was the omnipresent debate over whether teachers should have students work on projects related to their own family history while studying immigration. This seemingly trivial question has been raised in the French education literature and came up in the teacher training sessions I observed, as well as in my interviews. I also began to see how it relates to issues surrounding the use of different pedagogical approaches based on the immigrant or ethnic origin of the student population in question. The debate, I believe, goes straight to the heart of the tensions in France today surrounding the traditional assimilation model and how schools and society construct and define what it means to be French.

After years of reading about, discussing, and studying these questions from afar, it was a thrill to be at the debate, in the classroom, and speaking face to face with French scholars, teachers, and students about my research. Thank you again for this generous support of my work.

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From May 24, 2009 to July 27, 2009, the Council for European Studies/Mellon Foundation Pre-Dissertation Fellowship funded my research trip to Paris. During this time, I worked at seven archives and consulted three leading experts in my subject area to mine sources and discuss the theoretical and methodological grounding of my project. As a result of my time in Paris, I was able to develop a strong dissertation proposal which I have submitted for several grant competitions to fund my dissertation research next year.

My project concerns the Dames des Halles during the French Revolution. My research focuses on the political activism and cultural representation of these Parisian merchants. During the Revolution, the Dames struggled to maintain their Old Regime position as ritual representatives of the people by appropriating revolutionary practices and discourse. Although the Dames des Halles proved to be critical political actors in several journées, historians have yet to undertake a comprehensive study of their revolutionary activism. In order to throw into relief the complexity of female political practice during the Revolution, I analyze, on the one hand, the economic, religious, ritual, and gendered elements of their political activism. On the other hand, I study how other revolutionary actors visually and textually deployed the Dames’ image for their own political ends. The Dames’ case is particularly complicated due to the literary genre poissard, which sought to capture the daily lives of the Parisian popular classes, particularly the Dames des Halles, in a boisterous and often hyperbolic form. This poissard image became deeply politicized as pamphleteers of contradictory political positions appropriated it to gain popular legitimacy. My dissertation investigates how the intricate relationship between the literary counterfeit and true Dames des Halles informed their collective public image. Working at the intersection of popular politics, popular culture, and economics, I intend to study the Dames des Halles’ political activism and the simultaneous renegotiation of their public identity throughout the course of the Revolution.

During my summer research trip, I consulted several municipal, departmental, and national archives. I began at the Bibliothèque nationale de France-Mitterand (BnF) where I surveyed the largest collection of poissard political pamphlets (most in the vast cote Lb39). In addition, I found several newspapers and plays written in the poissard dialect. The BnF will be a crucial site for my dissertation research. At the Archives de la Préfecture de Police, I recorded potential leads in the police commissioners’ records as the registers and cartons are broadly categorized. I spent much time drawing up inventories in the Archives nationales. The extensive holdings of governmental petitions Series F7 and C proved the most challenging since they were the least organized. Recent register work in Series W allowed me to pinpoint the location of spy accounts of the marketplace. Since the subsistence records of Series F11 are organized chronologically rather than thematically, I will need to find the exact dates of economic legislation before I return to Paris. I should be able to collect these dates through the National Assembly records which are published in Archives parlementaires. Also in the Archives nationales, I discovered
that territoires de roi in series Q2 continue into the early years of the Revolution. I intend to use these records to analyze ownership patterns and the reorganization of places in the market on the eve of the Revolution. Much to my surprise, the Archives de Paris's collection of the justice of the peace records remains remarkably intact in D.4 U. Using these documents, I will study the interactions between the Dames des Halles and their neighbors to discern their economic reputation on a local level. The remaining pamphlet records of Les Halles at the Bibliothèque Historique de la Ville de Paris will help to elucidate the market women's relationship with communal groups. I located multiple visual representations of the Dames des Halles in the holdings of the Bibliothèque nationale-Richelieu series QB and also hope to explore those of the Musée de Carnavalet's Cabinet des Arts Graphiques. These images will help me determine how artists portrayed the Dames des Halles for political ends. During my visit to the Institut d'Histoire de la Révolution française, I had the opportunity to study several French dissertations on Parisian popular politics. These dissertations helped me think about alternative sources and methodologies for tapping into the Dames' activism. The Institut also possessed an impressive array of rare source collections and guides that I hope to take advantage of when I return.

While in Paris, I met with three leading historians of the French Revolution to discuss my project. I first consulted Professor Jean-Clément Martin. Martin was able to discuss the state of the archives for the Parisian sectional sources, whose registers remain vague and outdated. He informed me that the holdings at the Archives de la Police were rather scattered due to the records lost to the 1871 Commune fire, and indeed, I had only found a few surviving cartons for the neighborhood where the Dames des Halles worked and resided (Marché). He wisely suggested that I also pursue traces of the women's political activity in police the records of sections which housed governmental assemblies, such as Tuileries. In addition, he advised me to go to the Archives de Paris (the departmental archives), where I found useful information in the records of the justice of the peace. Martin directed me to a French dissertation on another Parisian section to consider alternate neighborhood sources. We also discussed the theoretical strands of my project, especially those concerning gender and cultural construction. Our conversation helped me position my work alongside the current work on gender and the Revolution in French academic circles. Martin recommended that I consider all Parisian market women, along with those of the central market, in order to broaden my source base. Such considerations would allow me to clarify the socio-economic position of market women as a whole, while allowing me to point up the exceptional political influence of the Dames des Halles. Martin also gave me contact information for his colleagues who have worked with confraternity sources during the revolutionary era. Finally, Martin put me in touch with his ex-student Virginie Besakian, who had written a thesis on the Dames des Halles but decided to stop after her master's degree.

While I had also employed many of the more easily accessible sources Besakian used in her master's thesis, she was kindly able to direct me to a few more obscure archival documents which I had not yet come across. My conversations with Professors Dominique Godineau and Lynn Hunt proved fruitful for further conceptualizing my project. Godineau, whose own work on women in revolutionary Paris has been crucial to the field, explained to me the finer points of judicial and criminal administration levels. She also gave me new leads for work on Parisian processions and lay religious organizations during the Revolution. We also explored different ideas of female citizenship and discussed what work remains to be done on such legal and cultural constructs. On the other hand, Lynn Hunt encouraged me to consider the different power structures which underpin extrastitutional political activism. For example, she asked me to consider what role violence played in alternate forms of political practice and how cultural judgments were tied to the gender, class, and occupation of the participants. She also expressed concern that my topic might be too narrow to garner a large source base and that I should consider the wider ramifications of the Dames' actions. Finally, Hunt directed me to the vast image collections of the Musée Carnavalet's Cabinet des Arts Graphiques. Such alternative sources will expand my methodology to include non-literary sources as I study the cultural construction and representations of the Dames des Halles.

My experiences in Paris have allowed me to further refine the methodological and conceptual foundations of my dissertation. Since the majority of my sources will concern how others represented the Dames des Halles, I will need to draw heavily on their image as the source of their political legitimacy. I will draw from the genre poissard, as well as journals, newspaper accounts, pamphlets, and visual representations. The Dames' multifaceted image will permit me to jointly engage the often separate historiographies of cultural representation and popular activism. The poissard literary works, poissard political pamphlets, and the actions of the living Dames des Halles existed within the same political and communal space, and they coalesced into a shared image. I will use the marchandes' position at this nexus to probe the exchange between female political practice and its cultural construction by different political groups. I will study how their political image developed as a complex result of both self-presentation and external appropriation, with each angle repeatedly informing the other. The Dames relied on their reputation as popular representatives to legitimize their activism. Yet, the power of their image partially depended upon the public reception and depiction of their actions. My socio-cultural reading of the living Dames des Halles and their poissard counterparts will investigate how the Dames des Halles carved out political spaces by relying on this collective image. In turn, I will analyze how authors' portrayal of poissard characters developed in dialogue with evolving public perception of the...
living Dames des Halles and their political position over the course of the Revolution. By examining the relationship between the Dames’ actions and their literary image, my thesis will create new pathways in the historiography of gender and in the socio-cultural methodology of history. These various constructions will also shed light on the ways in which authors, playwrights, and pamphleteers deployed gender and women for political ends.

Since my time in Paris, I have continued to use my new understanding of the archival source base and the connections I made to plan my dissertation research trip to Paris in 2010-2011. Professor Jean-Clément Martin introduced me to Professor Pierre Serna, who is the current director of L’Institute d’Histoire de la Révolution française (IHRF) at the Université de Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne. Professor Serna read my dissertation proposal and has granted me affiliation with the IHRF during the year in which I return for my dissertation research. By auditing the seminars of the IHRF, I will be in dialogue with French scholars of the Revolution, whose gender theory and research methodology sometimes differs from their Anglo-Saxon counterparts’ approach. While French historians currently engage gender history as “the study of relations between men and women,” many Anglo-Saxon scholars stress the instability of these two “conceptual categories” and ask “how the meanings of sexed bodies are produced, deployed, and changed.” I believe that both approaches offer historians productive windows into how the revolutionaries reimagined society and, in turn, how men and women interacted within shifting gendered spaces. French doctoral students also use different methods in crafting their dissertation research. Most focus on mastering the content of a specific set of documents; and the organization of the archives often informs their topics. Through my discussions at the IHRF, I will be exposed to additional methods for mining the archives with precision.

I have also used my resulting dissertation proposal to seek further funding for my research. During the past semester, I applied to the Fulbright IIE (France), the Social Science Research Council International Dissertation Research Fellowship, the Bourse Jeanne Marandon (Société des Professeurs français et francophones d’Amérique), Bourse Chateaubriand (French Embassy), an Institute for Humane Studies Fellowship, the Theta Wolf Travel Fellowship and Majorie M. Farrar Memorial Award (Society for French Historical Studies), the Gilbert Chinard Research Fellowship (Institut Français d’Amérique), and the Ouisconsin Field Research Scholarship (UW-Madison Alumni, France Chapter). This semester, I will also submit applications for the Bernadotte E. Schmitt Research Grant (American Historical Association), the Millstone Fellowship (Western Society for French History), UW-Madison History Department Travel Fellowship, and the MAASS Research Grant (The Manuscript Society). I am certain that the detailed proposal which I developed as a result of my CES trip greatly strengthened my candidacy in these competitions. I will not receive any notifications until March, but I hope to obtain enough funding from a combination of these sources to conduct my dissertation research in Paris during the academic year of 2010-2011.

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Notes

1. Jean-Claude Martin, La Révolte Brisée: Femmes dans la Révolution française et l’Empire (Paris: Armand Colin, 2008), 6. Martin’s recent work encourages his French colleagues to use this type of “gender history” to examine wider cultural questions which “women’s history” cannot fully explore.

Pre-Dissertation Fellowship Research Report

ALEXANDRA LOHSE

I. Dissertation Abstract

My dissertation examines the reactions of “ordinary Germans” to the experience of total war between 1943 and 1945. Specifically, I address questions about the nature and endurance of popular support for the Nazi regime under conditions of military, economic, social, and political dissolution. I explore how traditional values and Nazi ideology framed popular perceptions of the war and reactions to impending defeat. Did violence and deprivation change people’s relationship to the Nazi regime and facilitate political and ethical re-evaluation? Did new assessments influence popular behavior and responses in day-to-day life?

I approach these questions from a holistic perspective that treats German civilians as special combatants and soldiers as integral members of civilian society. I contend that between 1943 and 1945 most Germans actively participated in total war and that their actions and experiences spanned the entire spectrum between victimhood and culpability. Also, I argue that the interactions between German military and civilian populations shaped the overall German response to the war; this dynamic receives particular attention.

My examination is based on a qualitative analysis of archival sources, including German newspapers, Nazi morale and censorship reports, and citizens’ private letters. Additionally, I analyze previously underutilized Allied intelligence reports to reconstruct the values and attitudes of ordinary Germans during the dissolution of the Third Reich.

II. Central Themes of Preliminary Research

In February of 2010, I submitted my dissertation proposal to my dissertation committee consisting of Professor Richard Breitman, Professor Eric Lohr, and Professor Max Paul Friedman of American University, Washington, DC. I successfully defended the proposal later that same month and began planning my summer research trip to Europe.

I aspired to an examination of how “ordinary Germans” experienced the final and for them most lethal period of World War II. Specifically, I wanted to investigate how the violence and deprivation of those years impacted people’s relationship to the Nazi regime. What meaning did Nazism—both as a system of governance and as a secular faith—have for “ordinary Germans” under these difficult conditions? Did they justify or delegitimize the regime and its policies? Did the war re-enforce or alter the political and ethical universe people inhabited? Ultimately, I hoped to draw general conclusions about the nature of popular support for the Nazi regime and about Germans’ ideological transition in the postwar period.

It struck me that in many ways, the final war years were the logical culmination of the Nazis’ totalitarian project. Believing itself encircled by enemies outside and infiltrated by enemies within, the regime...
orchestrated the all-or-nothing existential struggle that lay at the heart of Nazi ideology. United, the German nation would triumph or perish forever. To this end, ever younger and ever older generations of men were called to the front, while the militarization of civilian society proceeded with the drafting of women, children, and the elderly into labor and auxiliary military services. Moreover, in their attempt to mobilize all national resources, Nazi authorities issued an avalanche of laws and regulations that aimed to control virtually all areas of life, including food, travel, schooling, entertainment, and housing. Noncompliance with the Nazi war effort carried heavy sentences as authorities escalated their persecution of alleged saboteurs, deserters, and defectors in the ranks of the army and the general population.

Paradoxically, this attempt at totalitarian control occurred against the context of social, political, economic, and military dissolution. With Germany’s military situation ever more desperate and its economy collapsing, the Nazi regime increasingly lacked the means to enforce its policies at the fronts and at home. In other words, between 1943 and 1945, German society faced extreme regulation as well as new opportunities for free action and expression. I wanted to know how people reacted to these developments. By what ideological or other value systems did they interpret their world? How did they make sense of this increasingly invasive yet crumbling system? How did they understand the battle they were fighting? What was Nazism to ordinary Germans as they faced its simultaneous culmination and dissolution?

III. Sources

For my preliminary research trip in June and July 2010 I chose to focus particularly on three record groups in German and English archives that I expected to become the main documentary source for my project. My aim was to familiarize myself with the quality and quantity of these records to the point where I would be able to adjust the scope and foci of my project accordingly. Happily, my preliminary examination showed that these sources largely met my expectations and resulted in only minor revisions of the project outline.

I spent the first five weeks of my stay in Freiburg, Germany, where I explored the holdings of the federal military archive (Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv). Because of the nature of my project, I focused on all those records revealing a relationship between war experiences and soldiers’ conduct or attitudes during the Second World War. These included surveillance records detailing the moods and attitudes of German troops at different points in the war. Also, I pursued all available mail censorship reports to gain insight into the topics of concern and conversation between German soldiers and their families at the home front. Finally, I paid attention to any records issued as disciplinary orders or detailing disciplinary proceedings in an attempt to understand the overall patterns of conduct by German soldiers.

My most important find were the few dozen surviving mail censorship reports of mid-1944 record group RH 13/48 and RH 13/49. The German army commands issued monthly morale reports (so-called Feldpostprüfberichte) about the mood of the troops based on intercepted letters. To be sure, these reports have been widely used by historians concerned with the political allegiances and motivations of German soldiers, such as Marlis S. Steinert, Wolfram Wette, and Sven Oliver Müller. But while these reports are no new source, they certainly are a very rich and suggestive one, especially when used in conjunction with alternative material.

One element that makes these reports unique is the fact that they offer some rare statistical or quantitative sense about how often certain topics were discussed, who discussed them, and how the regime reacted to these conversations. The statistical part entails the number of letters screened, their origin and destination, and how many transgressions against military secrecy or political uniformity were committed within the sample. The main body of the reports is then taken up by a narrative summary of the censor’s impression. These summaries detail the overall consensus on subjects including the course of war, front experiences, political allegiances, relationships between troops, between soldiers and superiors, and reflections on food supplies and war materiel.

In some cases, the censor also provides a mirror description of the sentiments of the home front, based on letters sent from Germany to soldiers in the field. These insights are especially valuable for my project, as it pursues the argument that the attitudes and preoccupations of the home front “combatants” were very similar to those serving at the actual front. Moreover, information gleaned from letters from the home front is rare because the nature of the warfare made it harder for soldiers to actually preserve the correspondence they received. Thus, while the majority of the so-called Feldpost actually traveled from Germany outward, most of the surviving records are letters written by soldiers to their families and friends. The Feldpostprüfberichte therefore allow for a more balanced examination of both fronts and of the perhaps reciprocal relationship between prevailing attitudes, if only for a very brief period of the war.

In order to support their summaries and arguments, many German army censors included a series of relevant excerpts from intercepted letters in their reports. These make it possible today to analyze the quality and methods of the regime’s morale assessment against the actual primary sources. My preliminary analysis of these records suggests that there are often significant quality differences between different censors. The best of them, however, provide what appears a very nuanced and sophisticated analysis of the material at hand that allows for important insights into the moods and attitudes of the troops and their families at home. The material appears to support some of my working hypotheses regarding the similarity between reactions to war on the home front and at the front. It also seems to support my initial assertion that the war had not a depoliticizing but rather a radicalizing effect on the German population.

I arrived at a similar conclusion from my preliminary analysis of English intelligence material generated during the war. I was able to spend three weeks working at the British National Archives in Kew, where I surveyed the roughly 17,000 transcripts of surreptitiously taped conversations between German prisoners of war. This enormous—and possibly illegal—intelligence operation was organized by the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation
Centre or CSDIC, a British intelligence organization created for the purposes of interrogating German prisoners. However, it was in their secret tapings of soldiers in their cells that the CSDIC captured significant insights into the morale, interests, attitudes, and capabilities of the German enemy. My initial survey of the material in Kew resulted in the selection of some 2,800 transcripts for the period of November 1942 and April 1945, which will be the most important documentary base for my dissertation.

My preliminary analysis of the material has resulted in a number of fascinating insights that I believe will become a valuable contribution to the field. For example, I have examined soldiers’ conversations about domestic and international situations, politics, religion, and personal matters to gain a better understanding of what “Nazism” or “National Socialism” actually meant to these men. I have found that most of them had a very limited understanding of these concepts, which they tended to use to describe a political system marked by corruption and incompetence. Complaints about unfair, small-minded, and corrupt superiors in civilian and military life were ubiquitous, as was the regret over the Nazis’ broken promise of an egalitarian and just national community.

Interestingly, while these soldiers are very vocal about their rejection of “Nazism,” they use the very language that we today associate with Nazi ideology. They talk in terms of German racial superiority and English and American inferiority on account of Jewish control. They regret the annihilation of Europe’s Jews but less because of humanitarian or moral concerns and more because of fears for retaliation and concerns over the dilution of German military power at a critical point in the war. In sum, these soldiers appear to have internalized many of the most important aspects of Nazi ideology and Nazi propaganda and their main regret lies with the shortcomings of the Nazi regime, not with its essence.

I find these initial conclusions are also supported by some of the reports of the Foreign Office that were generated by German refugees and friendly POWs in an effort to give the British a better understanding of their enemies. Such reports on civilian morale often highlight the extent of the investment of regular Germans in the Nazi cause even as much grumbling and complaints about food shortages and corruption seem to suggest an alienated population. Since I spent most of my time at the British National Archives working through the CSDIC transcripts, I was only able to superficially survey the Foreign Office records and will have to return for at least four more weeks of research at a later point. At the moment, however, I will make due with similar material available at the American National Archives in College Park, which is easier for me to access for sustained research.

Finally, I was able to spend a week at the Imperial War Museum (IMW) in London, where I found a number of relevant sources. These included two separate reports of former CSDIC officers detailing the workings of their organization and their own role in it. More importantly, the IMW also held several German morale surveillance reports detailing the moods and attitudes of the civilian population between 1943 and 1944. Again, their quality depends on the author’s dedication to detail and nuance but several of them are of very high quality and will be an important substitute to the Nazi surveillance reports available in published format.

The two months of preliminary research afforded by the CES Fellowship put me in the ideal position of surveying most of the European records I intend to use in my dissertation and, in the case of the CSDIC transcripts and German military censorship records, I finished examining the whole collection. Consequently, I was able to spend the fall semester analyzing my notes and copies while continuing research of American intelligence records at the National Archives in College Park. In February 2010 I began writing my dissertation based on the European and American records I have already gathered. I have decided that the quality and quantity of my material will allow for sound conclusions that I can fine-tune with additional short research trips to the National Archives in Kew and the German Federal Archives in Berlin and Freiburg, to which I hope to return in August or September 2010.

I am thrilled that my material appears to support my working hypotheses that distinguish my work from existing scholarship. First, I suggest that throughout the war, “ordinary Germans” were less “ordinary” and more ideologically committed than the current scholarly consensus allows. It is my working hypothesis that the war had not a depoliticizing but a radicalizing effect on the general population and that many Germans increasingly abandoned “ordinary” moral and ethical codes.

Second, I think that people’s positive motivational factors and convictions need to receive more attention. Much scholarship in the field has focused on what Germans were afraid of and were fighting against. I want to understand what they were defending, what they were fighting for, whether in material, ideological, or any other terms.

Third, I believe that rigid scholarly distinctions between military and civilian populations are misleading for a period when all Germans lived and fought total war. The Nazi regime treated all Germans as combatants. So, too, did the Allies, whose military strategies aimed at both German soldiers and civilians. My research suggests that many Germans - with or without uniform - assumed the role of active participant in the existential struggle of their nation. In fact, ordinary people’s attitudes and reactions to total war grew out of a paradoxical identity as both victims and perpetrators. Therefore, this project treats German civilians as particular types of combatants and considers German soldiers as integral members of civilian society.

Fourth, I argue that the interactions between civilian and military combatants are crucial for our understanding of the overall German perception of and response to the war. This dynamic receives particular attention in my analysis. I want to highlight identity boundaries as well instances of fluidity as German soldiers and civilians shared the experience of total war.

I am sincerely grateful for the generous support of the CES Pre-Dissertation Fellowship which enabled me to examine my dissertation’s most important documentary bases in one highly effective research trip, and which has allowed me to stay on schedule with my project. I expect to finish the first draft by the spring semester of 2011 and defend my dissertation by summer 2011. I thank you once again for your support.

ALEXANDRA LOHSE is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History at American University.
My preliminary fieldwork examined recent cases of individual conversion from Islam to Christianity in Turkey. Hundreds of Muslim citizens, claiming Armenian descent, have sought the arbitration of secular legal authorities of the Turkish Republic to convert back to Christianity, the religion of their ancestors, and to instate their baptismal Christian Armenian names. Their conversion reverses an earlier practice. The applicants for conversion to Christianity are predominantly descendants of Armenians of the Ottoman Empire who had adopted Islam to avoid annihilation during the massacres that culminated in the genocide of 1915. The focus on Armenian converts is significant, as two realms of their struggle to convert back to their ancestors’ religion, namely freedom of religion and minority rights, have been at the center of debates about Turkish secularism and the EU accession process.

In my preliminary research, I conducted fieldwork in five mid-level civil courts of Istanbul where registration of conversion and subsequent name change cases of the converted Armenians are administered. Here my research was guided by the ways in which law was enacted and experienced by social actors who participate in the legal process related to conversion. Non-participant observation in the courts provided important information about the strategies that converts use to establish their Armenian/Christian past and family genealogy, as well as motives for converting to Christianity. I have detailed the courts’ activities, combining observations with careful analysis of selected cases, and analyzed the records around the questions of how arbitrations are argued and rationalized in the court and which legal concepts are referred to and how. My fieldwork in the courts also included interviews with judges, prosecutors, court-clerks, civil servants and lawyers. The purpose of these interviews was to reveal a broader context to the study of conversion within the Turkish legal context, such as perceptions of EU initiated legal reform, Nufus Kanunu (Population Law), and the different ways of addressing the “issue” of conversion.

Also, I have conducted a systematic survey of periodicals from 1979 to the present in Beyazit State Library in Istanbul, covering the lead up to and aftermath of the 1980 coup that marked many publicized conversions of Armenians to Islam. This part of my preliminary research provided me with the required knowledge of the historical and social background of religious conversion. I have explored commentaries and news items on conversion and minorities during the Republican era in both Turkish and Armenian. Although there is extensive historical research on the circumstances of Armenian conversion to Islam during the genocide of 1915, less well known is the fact that conversion to Islam continued throughout the Republican era, especially after the military coup d’état of 1980 that marked the mass conversion to Islam of a few remaining Armenian villages to avoid discrimination. The archival part of my preliminary research filled this gap. I covered the widely circulating Turkish dailies and Armenian papers published in Istanbul. I also reviewed legal regulations regarding religious conversion, population law (Nufus Kanunu) and civil law (Medeni
Kanun) of the Turkish Republic, and EU reports and regulations on Turkey that presently form the legal basis of conversion procedures. This initial period of archival and documentary work allowed me to refine interview questions regarding the history of conversion in Turkey that later elicited relevant responses in the next step of my research. Through my archival research, I realized that conversion to Islam emerged as a common strategy for survival and avoiding discrimination among the Christian minorities of Turkey.

My preliminary research helped me to develop the main issues I will focus in my dissertation research which will center on the contradictory nature of the success of multicultural religious tolerance in the legal context of Turkey. I argue that the ambiguities of tolerance for minority religions in Turkey are particularly evident in the name change cases following conversion in which the legitimacy of the state is challenged by its own citizens and the international public on the issue of granting religious freedom and minority rights to ethnic/religious minorities in the EU accession process. By studying the social, political and legal ramifications of conversion to a minority religion in Turkey, dealing with everyday experiences of inclusion and exclusion of converted Armenians into ‘purported’ national unity, as well as the claims of tolerance, justice, recognition, and multiculturalism on the side of the secular Turkish state as part of my preliminary research, I reconceptualized the main questions of my dissertation research. The main research focuses on the complex ways in which “converted Armenians” have imagined and related to the state that they are citizens of, their Muslim neighbors, and the ways these representations have reflected upon Armenian converts’ struggle for claiming minority rights. I therefore ask two related questions in the research as a whole: First, how have images of “hidden Armenians” intervened in changing Turkish/majority notions of religious minority, security, loyalty, and the nation? Secondly, how have converted Armenians contributed to the re-imagination of the Turkish nation in the process of the EU accession through their court cases and everyday experiences? In this sense, my dissertation contributes to the larger field of studies on secularism, as well as a study on the status of religious minorities in secular nation-states. Thus, as a result of my preliminary research, I conceptualized my dissertation research as a case study of the nature of secular multiculturalism, as well as the notions through which it is discussed in Turkey’s EU accession process - namely, tolerance, justice, legal reform, and genocide recognition. At the same time it is an ethnographic study of a crypto-religious group and their now-obscured experience of violence and injustice.

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Mellon Fellowship 2009 Report

Chloe Thurston, University of California, Berkeley

In the United States and Western Europe, much of the postwar legal and regulatory framework governing labor relations, employment regulation and social policy has been based on a model that assumed full-time, on-site and indefinite-contract work. Non-standard forms of work (part-time, temporary and self-employment) have increased in prevalence since the 1970s, posing a challenge to pre-existing laws, regulations and social policies that assumed the existence of a standard employment relationship. Governments have responded to these changing conditions of employment by redefining the legal employment relationship, changing the qualifying conditions for employment-based social benefits, and increasing enforcement of circumvention, to name a few strategies, yet there remains wide variation in state responses to this challenge.

How have states managed the growth of non-standard forms of employment since the 1970s? What factors account for the variation in state responses to this trend? These were the questions motivating my summer research stay in Europe, generously funded by a Mellon Pre-Dissertation Grant from the Council for European Studies. Visits to sites in Germany, France and Switzerland in the summer of 2009 helped me to clarify this research question, identify the most compelling outcomes of interest, improve the case selection justification, and make contact with European experts in political economy, employment law and social policy.

I was based in Germany for most of the summer at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, where I was affiliated with Jens Albers’ research unit on inequality and social integration. The stay at the WZB provided me with ample opportunity to meet with other relevant researchers based at my unit and researchers from the units on Skill Formation and Labor Markets; Knowledge, Production Systems and Work; as well as researchers who had worked on the completed unit on Labor Market Policy and Employment, headed by Günther Schmid. A meeting in late June with Jutta Allmendinger was helpful in providing me with contacts at other German research institutes, especially at the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung (IAB) in Nürnberg. While in Berlin I was also able to meet with scholars at the Hertie School of Business, as well as Katrin Vitols from the Institute for Ecological Economy Research, who had previously written a dissertation on the regulation of temporary employment in Germany.

I also had the chance to visit the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung in Nürnberg, where I was able to learn more about getting access to the IAB Establishment panel, a survey of employment practices at about 10,000 firms that may be of future use. While there I also inquired about the possibility of affiliation with the IAB during future research stays. A visit to the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung in Düsseldorf gave me a better sense of the data which they been collecting on relevant issues, confirmed some of my hunches about the implications of the growth of non-standard employment for social policy provision and coverage, and raised new questions about differential social insurance costs that merit further research.
In France I met with researchers from CEPREMAP and Bruegel (based in Belgium) to learn more about the growth of non-standard employment as a firm-level strategy, as well as the French government’s strategy to regulate its growth. These discussions alerted me to different data sets and archives, though my case selection has shifted as a result of the overall summer research experience in favor of treating Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as the central cases of interest. While in Paris I was also able to attend the conference of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics. This provided me the opportunity to meet scholars working on issues of non-standard employment in countries that I have not yet been able to study and from perspectives that are different from my own, especially from the legal perspective. Finally, a trip to the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Switzerland in August provided me with a chance to discover ILO employees’ perceptions of which challenges non-standard employment presents to preexisting social policies and regulatory structures. While there I visited with employees of several of the groups within the Social Dialogues unit to learn about the Institute’s role in regulating non-standard employment, labor law and social policy, as well as the developments and discussions that have occurred at the supra-national level.

My research trip in summer 2009 helped me to determine how to narrow the scope of the research in a way that allows for sufficient leverage on my outcome of interest - policy updating. In addition, my initial conceptualization of the problem at hand was a bit too fuzzy to be tractable. The summer research trip helped me to narrow the scope of the research in a deliberate way that developed out of discussions with people closer to these policy developments. For example, while I began my research project with the intention of focusing on three types of non-standard employment – temporary, part-time and independent contracting – data collected and information gathered from interviews suggested instead that self-employment is an understudied yet promising area that is worth more attention.

The other thing that this research stay helped to shape was my case selection. I went into my fieldwork having undertaken some preliminary research on the United States, Germany, Netherlands, Denmark and Japan, but without a clear idea of what case selection would provide the most causal leverage, or whether I should expand the universe of cases beyond those five initial ones. Interviews in Germany, France and Switzerland (in particular with academics who already had some expertise on the subject) helped me to justify a case selection comparing the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands as the project progresses. Finally, many of the researchers I met with were happy to share their contacts in academia, politics and journalism who may be of help in the future.

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Mastering the Stasi Past: State and Societal Approaches to Working through the East German Past in Unified Germany

TARA TUBB, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA

With the generous grant from the Council for European Studies, I was able to complete two successful months of research in Berlin and Leipzig, Germany between October and December 2009. In this time, I conducted research at the Bundesarchiv in Berlin, the Archiv der DDR-Opposition also in Berlin, and at the Archiv der Bürgerbewegung in Leipzig. During my stay in Berlin, I split my time between the Bundesarchiv and the Archiv der DDR-Opposition, working between five and seven hours a day. I spent four days in Leipzig, working in the archive and visiting the Museum in der “Runden Ecke”, the Leipzig Stasi museum. In Berlin, I also visited the Stasi Museum, attended talks and events celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Wall, and conducted an interview with an eyewitness from the storming of the Normannenstraße Stasi headquarters. This research trip generated a wide collection of materials that I will use to write my dissertation.

The collections I utilized ranged from parliamentary documents to those spanning the development of the citizens’ movements, especially Neues Forum. At the Bundesarchiv, I primarily focused on the papers of the East German Volkskammer and the Zentraler Runder Tisch. I was especially interested in how the different citizens’ groups viewed their role in the transitional government, with a specific emphasis on the role of the “people” in the dissolution of the Stasi. For this reason, I made use of the documents of the parliamentary committee assigned the task of dissolving the Stasi.

At the Archiv der DDR-Opposition located in the Robert Havemann-Gesellschaft, I was able to access a wealth of document collections of the citizens’ group Neues Forum. I was especially interested in locating documents related to the storming of the Berlin Stasi headquarters in the Normannenstraße as well as different sources discussing the dissolution of the Stasi. Here, I researched not only the Neues Forum collection, but also the personal archives of opposition members. At the Archiv der Bürgerbewegung Leipzig, I accessed document collections detailing the citizens’ movements in Saxony as well as those that detailed the dissolution of the Stasi in Leipzig and Saxony.

The research I conducted last fall has significantly shaped the way I conceive of my dissertation. Originally I planned to focus on the creation of the BStU (the agency that manages the Stasi’s files) and to explore the implications of its work for political, judicial and historical reckoning with the past. After conducting my research, the focus of my dissertation has changed considerably. My dissertation will examine the conception and passage of the law that opened the Stasi files, as well as its impact on the task of working through the past. I intend to explore what motivated East German activists to storm the Stasi headquarters and stop the shredding of the files. More importantly, I seek to understand why these activists believed they had the authority to dissolve
the Stasi themselves and why they thought this authority should carry over into united Germany. I argue that though East German activists originally proposed the law that opened the Stasi’s files, some are not entirely satisfied with the way that they are now being used. Rather than promoting an ongoing public confrontation with the past, the files are primarily used for individual reckoning and political vetting. This perceived failure of the Stasi File Law to promote public working through the past has resulted in the attempts by former activists to seek alternate forms of working through the past, specifically in the form of museums in two of the Stasi’s former headquarters in Leipzig and Berlin. Without the research made possible by the pre-dissertation grant from CES, I would not have been able to refocus my dissertation in this way.

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